EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

THE MONEY GAP WIDENS

HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, the money manipulation continues to resemble the huckster's shell game.

Last week the Federal Reserve Banking System announced its intention to slow the economy by raising interest rates. This manipulation is to be accomplished through the calculated dumping of Treasury securities on the market, thus creating an artificial drain to sop up the available reserve from the banking system and curtailing the capacity of the banks to make loans. These sales will raise interest rates as the money availability is lessened.

FEDERAL RESERVE BANKING SYSTEM

But as the Fed acts to slow the economy, the Export-Import Bank seeks to increase loan guarantees from $3.5 billion to $10 billion and the lending ceiling from $13 billion to $20 billion. And to make sure the Federal financing of foreign economy is not hamstrung, the new Export-Import Bank bill exempts foreign economy from Federal Reserve control programs.

As the administration moves to trade with Red China, the proposed Export-Import Bank bill would authorize loans and guarantees for exports to Communist countries with which the United States is not at war.

And if this does not constitute a double standard of use of the American people's money, we learn from New York that the administration is drafting legislation for a Federal financing bank to purchase securities from Government agencies—seemingly, another banking system to be used to create money and credit.

All of these activities were reported in different accounts in the same newspaper on the same day, but their significance remains uninterpreted to the American people.

Quite obviously, these myriad exercises in finance will usher in a more dangerous fiscal policy—to the further detriment of the American people.

We can expect loans to foreign nations and to U.S. enterprises in foreign countries at normal interest rates, but continued exorbitant interest rates in domestic loans.

This new financial diversification must be a subterfuge the part of the Federal Reserve to shift the growing criticism and lack of public confidence in its existing policies to an ad hoc Government agency.

I include several related news stories at this point:

[From the Washington Evening Star, June 11, 1971]

FEDERAL RESERVE REPORTEDLY TIGHTENING MONETARY POLICY

(By Lee M. Cohn)

The Federal Reserve is tightening monetary policy despite its concern that the shift may slow the economy by raising interest rates, according to financial analysts.

They have concluded that the latest decision to tighten was made at a meeting of the Federal Reserve's open market committee Tuesday, following up milder moves in that direction previously.

Decisions by the policy-making open market committee are disclosed officially only after a three-month lag.

If the central bank's actions retard the economic recovery, President Nixon may try to compensate by proposing tax cuts. He is expected to decide next month whether the economy needs that kind of stimulation.

The Federal Reserve tightens availability of money and credit by selling Treasury securities in the market, which drains reserves out of the banking system and thus curtails the capacity of banks to make loans. The sales also tend to raise interest rates.

Policy is tightening because the Federal Reserve fears that excessively fast growth of the nation's money supply—checking accounts plus currency—is sowing the seeds of a new inflationary surge next year.

The apparent target is monetary growth at about 5 to 6 percent a year, but the pace has been erratic.

Although the money supply expanded at annual rates of 14 percent in February and 11.6 percent in March, this was considered acceptable temporarily as an offset to abnormally slow expansion in previous months.

The money managers expected the growth rate to subside during the spring through the workings of natural forces in the economy and in financial markets. Instead, the money supply continued to expand at rates far above the target—9.3 percent in April and 16.3 percent in May.

This presented a dilemma. Persistence of such fast monetary growth would be inflationary. But any attemp by the central bank to slow the expansion through market operations probably would raise interest rates.

Rising interest rates could dampen the economic recovery by discouraging expenditures for housing, state and local construction, business inventories and new plants and equipment.

Since the economy is more sluggish than expected, the Nixon administration and the legally independent Federal Reserve agree that lower interest rates are desirable, especially for mortgage, municipal bonds and other forms of long-term credit.

The central bank's experts do not understand why the money supply has expanded so rapidly, and they considered the possibility of standing aside to see whether the growth rate would subside on its own.

But analysts believe they finally concluded it would not be safe to trust to luck, and decided to tighten policy to make sure the money supply's growth rate will slow.

SHORT-TERM PRESSURE

The decision apparently was a compromise of conflicting objectives. Analysts expect the Federal Reserve to try to cushion the impact on interest rates by tightening market conditions only moderately and by avoiding pressure on long-term rates as much as possible.

There is no intention of cutting the monetary growth rate to 2 percent or less, as some economists advise, to fully offset the recent very rapid expansion. Rather, the Federal Reserve is expected to aim for a gradual reduction to the 6 percent range.

Interest rate increases may be mild if the economy remains relatively weak, because in those circumstances demand for credit would not be overwhelming, even with the Federal Reserve limiting the supply.

Nevertheless, rates almost inevitably will rise at least initially because lenders and borrowers cannot be sure how far the Federal Reserve will go in tightening policy.

Anticipation of Federal Reserve action has boosted rates in the last two weeks.

TREASURY'S SALE NOTED

Beyond market expectations, there is evidence that the money managers were tightening even before Tuesday's meeting of the open market committee. The market was particularly impressed by the Federal Reserve's sales of Treasury bills Monday and by the lack of intervention to prevent key short-term rates from rising.

As reported at the time, the committee apparently started tightening policy slightly at its meeting April 6. One purpose then was to stop the decline of short-term interest rates, which was weakening the dollar internationally by encouraging a flow of money to Europe.

Analysts believe the committee at its May meeting left policy essentially unchanged, but gave its market technicians discretion to tighten if the money supply continued to grow rapidly.

This discretion was used. The committee at this week's meeting apparently moved a step further by deciding to act more forcefully to slow monetary growth.

The committee, which meets at four-week intervals, consists of the seven members of the Federal Reserve Board plus presidents of five of the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks.

[From the Washington Evening Star, June 11, 1971]

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK BILL OKAYED BY HOUSE PANEL

The House Banking Committee yesterday approved legislation to extend the life of the Export-Import Bank and step up its efforts to finance U.S. exports.

Similar to a bill passed by the Senate, the measure would increase the loan-guarantee authority of the government bank from $3.5 billion to $10 billion and the lending ceiling from $13.5 billion to $20 billion.

It would also provide that the program of voluntary restraints on credits administered by the Federal Reserve would not apply to loans in support of exports

Like the Senate bill, the measure would authorize loans and guarantees for exports to communist countries with which the United States is not at war, subject to restraint by the president.

[From the Washington Evening Star, June 11, 1971]

FEDERAL FINANCING BANK IS PLANNED BY ADMINISTRATION

NEW YORK (DJ)—The administration is drafting legislation for a federal financing bank to purchase securities from government

AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

agencies, Paul A. Volcker, undersecretary of the Treasury, said.

The legislation will be submitted to the Congress before the end of the year, Volcker said.

The bank would finance its purchases by issuing its own taxable securities. It will allow closer presidential control and congressional review of federal credit programs and centralize federal financing, Volcker said.

Federally assisted borrowing for 1972 is expected to reach $30 billion, or one-third of the total funds raised in credit markets. This compares with 12 percent for fiscal 1969, the spokesman said.

Volcker's remarks were made at the Municipal Bond Women's Club of New York.

[From the Washington Evening Star, June 11, 1971]

TRADE LISTS SIMILAR FOR CHINA, RUSSIA

President Nixon's move to drop the 21-year embargo against Peking brings into line American trade policy toward both the Soviet Union and Communist China.

The White House announcement yesterday put all non-strategic goods for Communist China into the same two categories long used for Moscow—"general licensing" and "specific licensing."

The long list of items in the general category, including everything from wheat to shoes and automobiles, can be sent to China without special permission from Washington.

SECOND MORE SENSITIVE

But the other category is more complicated and sensitive.

These items, including jet commercial aircraft, diesel locomotives, heavy dump trucks, must have a "specific license" on a transaction-by-transaction basis. These licenses are granted, the announcement said, as "consistent with the requirements of U.S. national security."

This more difficult specific licensing category for Communist China is larger than for the Soviet Union. For instance, diesel locomotives, petroleum, navigational and telecommunications equipment, and welding equipment, are all sold under general license to the Soviet Union.

The Nixon administration is soft-peddling the difference.

What counts, officials say, is that the system now is generally the same for both Peking and Moscow. The proportions between the two categories may differ, but no nonstrategic items are flatly prohibited from going to Communist China.

AIRCRAFT SALES POSSIBLE

For instance, Winthrop Brown, deputy assistant secretary of State in charge of the China task force, said yesterday that any Chinese request for commercial civilian aircraft would be considered "objectively, without any bias whatsoever."

Other officials added that, given the depressed state of the American aircraft industry and the huge Chinese market, there is little doubt that the Chinese could buy medium-range aircraft here.

"These specific licensing items are the ones we would like to look at more closely in each case," said one official, "but they are not items which any country buys great quantities of on the world market."

But officials conceded that the Pentagon is extremely reluctant to let items like locomotives and heavy trucks—with military potential—go under general licensing.

Administration strategists say the next move is up to Peking.

The United States, they say, will wait for the Chinese to draw their own conclusions on the list.

There is no intention to present that list personally to Chinese representatives at the stalled talks in Warsaw—since everything will be published in a bulletin of the Commerce Department for worldwide circulation.

In practical terms, neither American officials nor businessmen expect any great upsurge in trade.

Benjamin Weiner, President of Probe International, a China-trade consulting firm in Stamford, Conn., says "It's going to be a very slow process. American sales to China will be constrained primarily by the Chinese ability to pay."

North Carolina Gov. Bob Scott moved quickly to probe the Chinese tobacco market, opened yesterday to American sales. He has sent a state official to the Chinese embassy in Ottawa, Canada, to apply for visas for a tobacco trade mission to Peking.

WHEAT POTENTIAL CITED

But officials here believe the greatest trade potential initially lies with wheat—for the Soviet Union, as well as Communist China.

The surprise in the announcement yesterday was Nixon's decision to drop all special licensing for wheat, the flour, and the requirement that at least half of these shipments go in American ships.

That shipping requirement dates to a condition the late President John F. Kennedy attached in 1963 to the sale of $130 million in wheat to Russia. Since then, the Russians have categorically refused to buy American wheat, claiming that the extra cost of paying for American shipping makes the grain too expensive.

Officials here have been told by American wheat merchants that the U.S. is certain to get a part of the Soviet imported wheat market if American wheat can be made competitive.

The big question mark is whether the maritime unions and longshoremen will allow this change to take place.

Yesterday George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, attacked the Nixon decision as unfair to American labor. Also, the longshoremen have sporadically refused to load or unload ships heading for Communist ports.

[From the Evening Star, June 14 1971]

PHILADELPHIA BANK RAISES PRIME RATE

(By Lee M. Cohn)

The minimum interest rate on loans to corporations was raised from 5½ to 5¾ percent by a big Philadelphia bank today, but it was not clear whether the new "prime" rate would spread quickly through the banking industry.

First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co., the 20th largest bank in the nation, announced the rate increase. Changes in the prime rate usually are initiated by one of the bigger banks in New York or Chicago.

The prime rate is the interest charged on loans to corporations with the best credit ratings, and rates on loans to less favored borrowers are scaled up from the prime.

Bankers have been talking for weeks about raising the prime rate, but they have held back because demand for business loans has been relatively weak. They also are worried about adverse reaction to an increase by the Nixon administration and Congress.

The White House was "disappointed" by the Philadelphia bank's action because interest rate increases may raise costs and prices, Deputy Press Secretary Gerald L. Warren said today. Warren also said the prime rate increase was "something of a surprise," since the banks have "ample" funds to lend.

When the prime rate was increased from 5¼ to 5½ percent in April, Treasury Secretary John B. Connally criticized the banks publicly and privately. The administration fears that rising interest rates would dampen the economic recovery.

First Pennsylvania said it acted because loan volume is increasing and because interest rates in the money markets have been rising.

COST OF MONEY

Market rates affect the cost to banks of obtaining money for relending. When these costs rise, the banks try to maintain profit margins by increasing the rates they charge.

Rising market rates also minimize the competitive risks to banks of boosting their rates. Rates have been rising on commercial paper, for example. Commercial paper—unsecured promissory notes—is an alternative to bank loans as a source of funds for corporations.

This is an appropriate time, seasonally, for banks to raise the prime rate, because corporations usually borrow heavily to make quarterly payments of federal taxes on June 15.

Market interest rates have been raising because of concern that progress against inflation is falling short of expectations, and because of strong indications that the Federal Reserve is tightening money and credit.

DISCOUNT RATE EYED

Although the Federal Reserve fears that rising interest rates will hurt the economy, the money managers feel they must tighten policy moderately to slow the excessive rate of expansion of the money supply in recent months.

There is conjecture that the Federal Reserve may follow through by raising its 4¾ percent discount rate, although this is not at all certain.

A rise in the discount rate—the interest charged by the Federal Reserve on loans to commercial banks—would bring it into closer alignment with money market rates. However, the Federal Reserve may be reluctant to take this action, for fear of triggering sharp increases in interest rates generally.

April's increase in the prime rate was the first after a series of reductions from the 8½ percent peak, which prevailed from June 1969 until March 1970.

[From the Evening Star, June 14, 1971]

PATMAN PROPOSES "UMBRELLA" AGENCY TO REGULATE BANKS

Declaring U.S. consumers are the victims of a mishmash of confusion, waste and apathy among bank regulatory agencies, Rep. Wright Patman, D–Tex., today urged creation of a new federal banking authority.

Patman, chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee, said the current supervisory agencies "sit downtown twiddling their thumbs" while banking industry lobbyists effectively stymie new legislation.

Congress, he charged, sees little more than "the constant parade of the same old witnesses from the executive branch and affected industry groups."

"WATER BOYS"

"It's an old cliche," Patman said, "that the regulators always end up carrying water for the industries they are supposed to be regulating."

In a speech prepared for a financial services seminar in New York but released here in advance, Patman called for consolidation of the regulatory functions of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Federal Reserve Board and the comptroller of the currency.

"There has been a tremendous conflict among the banking agencies and some of the worst regulation that the nation has ever seen," Patman said. "The public gets virtually no protection from the system and the banks are faced with conflicting opinions and overlapping jurisdictions: in short-total confusion, little regulation."

Singling out William B. Camp, comptroller of the currency in his attack, Patman said Camp "has attempted in everyway possible to emulate the performance of" his predecessor James Saxon.

Under Saxon's jurisdiction, Patman said, "the comptroller's office became a runaway

'let - the - banks - do-anything-they-please' agency."

The Texas congressman did credit the Federal Reserve and the FDIC for "trying to carry out regulator functions in an impossible structure."

[From the Evening Star, June 14, 1971]

PRIME RATE RISE SINKS STOCK PRICES

NEW YORK.—Expectations that other major banks would follow First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co. and raise their prime rate of interest sent stock market prices sharply and broadly lower today.

Trading was slow.

Declines outnumbered advances by about 8-to-3 among issues traded on the New York Stock Exchange.

Brokers attributed the market's decline to the prime-rate increase and predictions that higher rates would prevail by the end of the week. But they said the trading pace indicated relatively light selling pressure.

American Stock Exchange prices were lower in slow trading.

MARYLAND LIEUTENANT KILLED IN VIETNAM

HON. CLARENCE D. LONG

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, a fine young man from Maryland, Lt. James R. Saxon, was recently killed in action in Vietnam. I would like to commend his courage and to honor his memory by including the following article in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

A requiem mass for Army Lt. James R. Saxon, of Glen Burnie, who was killed in combat in Vietnam June 1, will be offered at 10 A.M. today at Holy Trinity Church, in Glen Burnie.

Lieutenant Saxon excelled in sports, gaining Little All-American honors in lacrosse at Towson State College where he graduated in 1968.

ENTERED ARMY IN 1969

He graduated from Glen Burnie High School in 1964 where he was active in soccer. Prior to that he had been active in Little League baseball.

In March, 1969, he was doing graduate work at Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pa., when facing the draft, he enlisted in Officer's Training at Fort Benning, Ga.

Lieutenant Saxon, 24, died in combat when his company was ambushed by the enemy in Thua Thien province.

He was sent to Vietnam in January, where he was attached to Company B, 8d Battalion, 501st Infantry, 101st Airborne Division.

An Army spokesman said that the lieutenant was born in Braddock, Pa., but moved to Maryland several years ago.

Lieutenant Saxon had planned to go into college administration and personnel work, said his wife, the former Nancy Walker.

In college, he was the president of the Kiwanis Service Club, Circle K.

SURVIVORS LISTED

Several summers during his college years he worked at Westinghouse, and was a life guard and counselor one summer at Fort Meade.

In addition to his wife, the lieutenant is survived by his parents, Mr. and Mrs. George W. Saxon, and a brother, Craig, of the 400 block Baylor road, Glen Burnie; grandparents, Mr. and Mrs. Alfred Sanderson, of Redwood, Miss., and Mr. and Mrs. John Saxon, of Wall, Pa.

ARTHUR M. WIRTZ ELECTED TO HOCKEY HALL OF FAME

HON. FRANK ANNUNZIO

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to the attention of my colleagues the honor that has been bestowed on Arthur M. Wirtz who is owner of the Chicago Stadium located in the Seventh Congressional District of Illinois which I have the honor to represent.

A few days ago Mr. Wirtz was elected into the Hockey Hall of Fame. Formal induction ceremonies will take place on August 26 at Toronto, Canada, the site of the Hall of Fame.

Mr. Wirtz, who is chairman of the board for the Black Hawks, first entered hockey in 1931, when he formed a company to acquire the Detroit Red Wings. The Red Wings were sold more than 20 years later. In 1954, Wirtz acquired the Black Hawks hockey team, and subsequently, the Black Hawks have become one of the National League's most successful teams.

Arthur Wirtz, whom I have known for over 25 years, has vast real estate holdings in the Seventh Congressional District. He is founder, chairman, and chief executive officer of the Wirtz Corp.; founder, chairman, and chief executive officer of Consolidated Enterprises, Inc.; chairman of American Furniture Mart Corp.; Bismarck Hotel; Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad; First National Bank of South Miami; Consolidated Broadcasting Co., and is actively involved in numerous other business enterprises.

Not only is Arthur Wirtz a successful businessman, but he is also a highly respected civic leader and philanthropist. As one who has always been deeply concerned with the betterment of his community, he has made over the years a substantial contribution both to his community and to his fellow man. It is distinguished entrepreneurs of Arthur Wirtz's high caliber, vision, and courage who have made American the great country she is today.

On this occasion, I am pleased to extend my warmest congratulations to one of the outstanding citizens of Chicago, Arthur Wirtz, to his devoted wife, Virginia, and to his children, and also my best wishes for his continued good health and good fortune in the years ahead.

Mr. Speaker, at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, I would like to include an article that appeared in the June 10, edition of the Chicago Tribune about Mr. Wirtz's election into the Hockey Hall of Fame. The article follows:

[From the Chicago Tribune, June 10, 1971]

WIRTZ CHOSEN FOR HOCKEY'S HALL OF FAME

(By Bob Verdi)

MONTREAL, June 9.—Chicago's Arthur M. Wirtz, one of the sport's premier builders and still chairman of the board for the Black Hawks, today was elected into the hockey Hall of Fame.

Wirtz, who first entered hockey in 1931 when he purchased and formed a company with the late James Norris Sr. to acquire the Detroit Red Wings, will be formally inducted Aug. 26 at Toronto, site of the hall.

Other inductees announced today were four former players: Cooney Weiland, of Boston; Harvey (Busher) Jackson, Toronto; Gordon Roberts, Ottawa Senators; and Terry Sawchuk, Detroit and New York. The latter three are dead.

Wirtz was here yesterday, but returned to his native Chicago where he received the news today.

His son, William, president of the Black Hawks, said here: "I'm tickled for him. Hockey has been my father's life, and this honor is richly deserved."

In 1933, Arthur Wirtz, James Norris and James D. Norris acquired control of the Chicago Stadium Corporation and took it out of receivership. The building's tenant at the time was the Black Hawks hockey team, owned then by the late Major McLaughin.

During the depression, hockey in the United States was just starting. The season consisted of only 25 games, and structures such as the Stadium could not be supported solely by hockey.

BRINGS SONJA TO THE UNITED STATES

In 1935, the senior Wirtz brought Sonja Henie to America just after she had won world skating championships in three consecutive Olympic competitions.

She joined an ice show, which turned into a splendid success, and helped provide immense revenue to help support arenas thruout the league.

Later, Wirtz and the Norrisses acquired control of Madison Square Garden, the St. Louis Arena, developed farm systems for the Red Wings and added outlets for the popular ice shows.

James Norris Sr. died in 1952, and two years thereafter Wirtz and James D. Norris purchased the Black Hawks from the McLaughlin estate. They sold the Red Wings to Bruce Norris.

THE 1950S LEAN FOR HAWKS

The mid 1950's were lean years for the Black Hawks, artistically and financially. Attendance was poor, and the franchise lost almost three million dollars.

But since the late 50s, the Black Hawks have been one of the National Hockey League's most successful teams, altho Wirtz has bowed out of the limelight and turned the reins over to his sons, William and Michael.

Weiland played 11 years for the Bruins, retiring in 1939. A center, he scored 173 goals. He just resigned as coach of the Harvard University hockey team, a post he held for 20 years.

Jackson starred for the Maple Leafs in the 1930s as left wing and wound up with 241 goals. He died in 1966.

Roberts played from 1910 until 1920 with the old Ottawa Senators. He also obtained a medical degree.

Sawchuck, thought by many to be the greatest goaltender in history, starred with Detroit, Toronto, and completed his career in 1969–70 with the Rangers. He died in New York last year.

TELLS HOW HUMANE PROGRAMS CAN BE DIVERTED TO WARMAKING PURPOSES

HON. BELLA S. ABZUG

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mrs. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, Mrs. Claire Culhane is a courageous Canadian woman who helped run the Canadian tuberculosis hospital in Luang Ngai,

South Vietnam, in 1967 and had been protesting the conditions she found there ever since. Since her return, Mrs. Culhane has written a disturbing account of the operation of the hospital and its relation to political rather than humanitarian pursuits. The implication which one draws from her disclosures is that not even a medical unit functions in Vietnam without having American political interest as their foremost consideration. As a result, Mrs. Culhane contends that:

There exists no role for Canadians even involved in nonmilitary activities, in Vietnam and demands that the Canadian government . . . immediately withdraw (its) medical personnel on the grounds that (they) can no longer work in context of the known corruption and complicity of the Saigon government.

The reports made by Mrs. Culhane demonstrate clearly how the most humanitarian of programs can become distorted and diverted to warmaking purposes. I respect Mrs. Culhane for her undeterred efforts to make these facts public, and I am inserting in the RECORD a copy of her most recent statement plus some news articles about her activities. These items follow:

MONTREAL, QUEBEC,
May 31, 1971.

Mr. PAUL GÉRIN-LAJOIE,
President, Canadian International Developmental Agency, Ottawa, Canada.

DEAR MR. GÉRIN-LAJOIE: Would you please attach this addendum to my original report filed with the Department of External Aid on April 16, 1968, following my return from South Vietnam where I was sent by the Government of Canada in the capacity of an Adviser:

In the intervening years since this report was prepared and filed, additional features have presented themselves which require further concrete suggestions. Offering recommendations to improve the administration of the Canadian Anti-Tuberculosis Hospital in Quang Ngai must now be changed to demand that the administration be turned over to local Vietnamese personnel, and the withdrawal of all Canadian personnel, as well as a halt to similar construction elsewhere in South Vietnam.

The main intent of this recommendation is to improve and guarantee meaningful medical aid to the Vietnamese population, not to eliminate or to decrease same. Since the intrusion of foreign forces has led to the most devastating state of Biocide known to modern man, to simultaneously offer paramedical aid loses all sense of credibility at this time.

On the political side of the ledger, we are informed by Dr. John Hannah, Chief of US-AID in Laos, that his organization was indeed a cover for C.I.A. activities (Washington Post, June 7/70), and since Canadian aid must function, within the infrasture of US-AID, it therefore becomes impossible to claim any purity of purpose in such a participation.

On the medical side of the ledger, for those who consider that our facilities and personnel are indispensable and of tremendous worth, note should be taken of the following indications to the contrary:

a) From South Vietnam come urgent requests for larger supplies of anti-malaria medication to cope with epidemics in this area. From North Vietnam come reports that malaria has been eliminated as a result of the teaching and training programs successfully instituted by the late Dr. Thach, Minister of Health, D.R.V.N., whereby mosquito-breeding areas have been cleared and levels of personal hygiene have been raised.

b) In South Vietnam, our Canadian teams which use BCG vaccine composed of live antibodies requiring refrigeration, travel into refugee camps and outlying hamlets to carry out Mantoux tests, returning three days later to read and record these tests, frequently find movement or absence of the tested population, thus negating our efforts and reducing the entire procedure to still another futile farce.

In North Vietnam, a method of heating antibodies to 43°C permits the vaccine to be kept for three months without refrigeration and used without need for allergy testing, has resulted in vaccinating about five million adults and 350,000 new-born babies every year since 1962.

c) After the writer was prohibited from completing the pharmacy inventory in the Canadian Anti-Tuberculosis Hospital in Quang Ngai in January 1968, it was reported by the former medical director that the three year supply of antibiotic medication on hand at that time was no longer present three months later. This in turn would obviously mitigate against treatment of those buying the pills on the black market, who would have ingested same in indeterminate quantities, thus rendering themselves immune to future treatment.

Note should also be taken that in 85% of the country (liberated zones) there are underground hospitals, and mobile teams travelling into jungles and other inaccessible areas which result in more adequate attention to more people than that which can be provided by foreign teams to the small fraction who eventually reach the provincial hospitals. The knowledge of this degree of difference in the quality and quantity of care accounts for the numbers who travel from the controlled to the liberated areas seeking such attention.

It is far too simple to becloud the issue by the use of semantics. Are we really "meeting the needs of the Vietnamese people" when we allocate $570,000 to the Saigon administration (1967) to construct housing units for the refugees? We have built two modern apartment buildings in a Saigon suburb (Ming Manh) where rents can only be afforded by high ranking military and government officials, while 2,000 real refugees continue to live on the grounds of the Canadian Anti-Tuberculosis Hospital in Quang Ngai, sharing a common mud hole for their water needs.

That the Canadian government—which is a declared neutral in this conflict, which is a member of the ICC, which shares $4 billion in exchange of military materiel with the United States for use against the Vietnamese people—is now establishing new medical centres on the Vietnam-Cambodia border (An Giang, Long Xuyen Province) in the face of the above critical observations, must only raise serious doubts about our stated intention to help the Vietnamese people.

I would therefore, in the most concise and passionate terms, urge that all medical teams and other civilian personnel be immediately withdrawn from Vietnam (and anywhere else they may be installed in Indo-China), and that in their place, massive supplies of medical and surgical equipment be relayed through channels already established for many years (far too many years!), as listed below.

This would guarantee the maximum medical assistance with the minimum foreign political interference, both now and in the future.

Sincerely yours,

CLAIRE CULHANE,
Former Advisor, Canadian Anti-Tuberculosis Hospital, Quang Ngai, South Vietnam.

CANADIAN ROLE IN VIET NAM QUESTIONED

(By John Gray)

As the war in Viet Nam grinds endlessly along its inevitable course of diplomatic and military and social disaster, there is, very occasionally, a bright gleam of hope.

A Canadian medical team is to travel to Viet Nam to establish a physical rehabilitation centre. This, at least, would seem to offer some limited measure of hope for that sad and battered country.

So it would seem. And especially pleasing for Canadians—a welcome other side to the debate about selling Canadian arms to American military forces, a welcome alternative to the relative diplomatic silence we have so studiously maintained.

The idea of the medical team fits perfectly into the diplomatic ideal which we have built up in the past two decades. This is the ideal of Canada as the keeper of peace between men who are mad, the dispassionate humanitarian middle man.

MOTIVES SUSPECT

However, the chorus of happy approval is not unanimous. At least one voice has been raised to warn that the medical team is a fruitless venture, that the motives which led to its formation are suspect.

The dissident voice is that of Claire Culhane, a woman who is not without qualification to speak about the expectations of the rehabilitation hospital which will be established at Qui Nhon. Mrs. Culhane herself spent six months in Viet Nam.

When Mrs. Culhane volunteered to serve in the Canadian tuberculosis hospital in Quang Ngai, South Viet Nam, officials of the External Aid Office in Ottawa assured her that her task would be "100 per cent humanitarian."

While she was in Viet Nam, battling against strange circumstances for which there was no apparent logic, she got a rather different assessment. A senior Canadian official told her that her mission was "50 per cent humanitarian, 50 per cent political."

Today, after returning from Viet Nam in despair, Mrs. Culhane is convinced that the true percentage is closer to 100 per cent political. And fruitless besides.

Mrs. Culhane, now 49, has advised the External Aid Office, the minister of external affairs, and even Prime Minister Trudeau of her fears about the nature of Canadian "humanitarianism" in Viet Nam.

She also warned that the $2,500,000 rehabilitation centre is doomed to a fate as uncertain as that of the tuberculosis hospital. For her trouble, she got a number of letters thanking her for her trouble and beyond that nothing.

This is not the first time that questions have been raised about the nature of the Canadian involvement in Viet Nam. Still unanswered, for example, are questions about the Canadian team on the International Control Commission.

Is the ICC a direct expression of Canadian diplomatic initiative or is it an indirect arm of the American war effort? (It was the legal adviser to the Canadian ICC team, Gordon Longmuir, who defined Mrs. Culhane's medical mission as 50 per cent humanitarian, 50 per cent political.)

DISTURBING STORY

The story told by Mrs. Culhane about the tuberculosis hospital is disturbing, for it raises question about both the nature and the quality of our involvement in Viet Nam.

Like our role in the ICC, the external aid program looks great on paper; like the ICC, there is something less than the glory of the brave new world underneath.

It is a spongey story, in that it contains few spectacular revelations. Rather than

hard facts, it is an accumulation of incidents and question marks.

Mrs. Culhane, a medical records librarian, volunteered to go to Viet Nam after reading of the work in the tuberculosis hospital and its director, Dr. Alje Vennema of Burlington, Ont. Dr. Vennema won the Order of Canada service medal last year.

The young doctor left the hospital three months after Mrs. Culhane arrived in Quang Ngai last October, to continue his studies. The $500,000 hospital was going well. Fifty patients were confined permanently, and the clinic treated up to 200 patients a day.

Dr. Vennema was a popular figure with the Vietnamese. He and his medical team served their patients well. But Dr. Vennema was less popular with local American officials, and with Canadian officials in Saigon, because he was an outspoken critic of the war.

Under Dr. Vennema's successor, a new policy grew up quickly. It was a policy not to make waves. Relations became very close with the local American adviser and with the local office of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Running the hospital had never been very easy, because medical supplies were always hard to secure. When they arrived, it was only after running the gauntlet of theft and corruption which are now a way of life in Viet Nam. After Dr. Vennema's departure, Mrs. Culhane was prevented from pursuing "missing" supplies.

That was really only administrative trouble. Real trouble came during the Tet offensive by the Viet Cong last February. Fighting broke out all across Viet Nam, including the region not far from the Canadian hospital in Quang Ngai.

The fighting did not ever threaten the hospital, but several days after the offensive began, South Vietnamese troops moved into the hospital. Although patients filled the hospital, the troops set up a firing base on an upper balcony.

Protests to Vietnamese and American officials did no good. The balcony was militarily convenient. When the Canadians warned of the danger to the patients, the Province Chief sent his reply through the American adviser: "Go and tell it to the VC."

Eventually the patients were evacuated from the hospital and the Canadian medical team left for Saigon to wait until the fighting had ended. The Tet fighting did end, but the hospital remained closed until June when it resumed partial operation.

VENNEMA RETURNS

It was in Saigon that Mrs. Culhane learned of the depth of distrust felt by both American and Canadian officials for the previous hospital director, Dr. Vennema.

When fighting broke out during Tet, Dr. Vennema interrupted a year's studies in Amsterdam to return to Viet Nam. The Canadian government asked him to determine how Canada could provide medical assistance to relieve the distress.

Mr. Longmuir of the ICC was disturbed by Dr. Vennema's return, and suggested that the doctor was really trying to take over his old position as medical director of the hospital. Subsequently, at Canadian instigation, Dr. Vennema was denied access to the only functional airline in Viet Nam.

The airline is called Air America, and it happens that Air America is operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. Passengers such as those working on medical teams have a high priority. They may fly anywhere in the country free of charge.

When Mrs. Culhane learned of the ban against Dr. Vennema, Mr. Longmuir explained to her: "Dr. Vennema's tour might turn up some unsavory features so why should Air America be expected to co-operate in transporting him on such a survey?"

ACTION LIMITED

For Mrs. Culhane, this symbolized all of the problems of the Canadian group at Quang Ngai. All action is circumscribed by the political and military exigencies of the American war effort; humanitarianism as such does not exist.

"We are there for only one reason—as a source of support for the Americans. The more countries that join, the more the Americans can say 'we are not alone.'

"As things are now, we cannot conceive of doing anything independent of the Americans in Viet Nam."

Aside from the political problems, the efficiency of Canada's aid is questioned by Mrs. Culhane. Ottawa is a long way away, and regulations seem designed more to hinder than help.

What does this mean for the new rehabilitation hospital in Qui Nhon? For a start, it means a thousand bureaucratic and political headaches—if the hospital ever opens.

Mrs. Culhane fears that it may not open. The tuberculosis hospital has only partially reopened since Tet, and numerous other humanitarian ventures in Viet Nam have ceased to function because the fighting has made it impossible.

Right now, she feels there is no role for Canadians in Viet Nam, for they have been too closely allied with the Americans. There may be no role for any white man—"it's fit only for journalists and spies."

[From the (Ottawa) Globe and Mail, Feb. 10, 1971]

WOMAN ASKS TRUDEAU TO SEEK CONFERENCE ON WAR IN INDOCHINA

(By Malcolm Reid)

OTTAWA.—Claire Culhane, who helped run a Canadian hospital in the My Lai area of Vietnam and calls herself a "professional protester" since her return in 1969, confronted Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau at the door of the constitutional conference centre yesterday.

She carried copies of a cable to her Montreal address from Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front in Paris, asking her to stir up protest in Canada over "tens of thousands of U.S. Saigon, Thai troops" in Laos. She wanted Canada to call for a new Geneva conference on the country supposedly neutralized by a 1962 agreement.

The Prime Minister paused to talk with her, telling her Canada's position that the International Control Commission should inspect the case. Canada, a member of this commission, was willing—she should address the same request to India and Poland, the other members.

Mrs. Cuhane was accompanied by an old acquaintance of Mr. Trudeau's from Cite Libre days, Belgian-born writer Michel van Schendel. Mr. van Schendel said Mr. Trudeau "made as if he did not see me." They haven't communicated often since the former magazine editor became Prime Minister.

He said he was representing the magazine Socialisme Quebecois, colleagues at the University of Quebec (where he teaches Quebec literature), and the Quebec Committee for Democratic Freedoms.

They believe the Control Commission is powerless. Mrs. Culhane said one of the Canadian officers on it had admitted giving information to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

She was sent to Vietnam by Canadian External Aid and was there at the time of the alleged My Lai massacre which is the subject of current trials of U.S. soldiers. She wrote a report of conditions in the zone which the Canadian Government has refused to table on grounds it is "libellous." But she is also mentioned by U.S. journalist Seymour Hersh as one of his sources for his reports of the My Lai massacre.

The brief chat with the Prime Minister ended with Mr. Trudeau shrugging and going into the conference room and Mrs. Culhane calling to him: "They're going to use the atomic bomb . . ."

Mrs. Culhane and Mr. van Schendel said this was a hard assertion to prove beforehand, but there were indications from reports in publications as varied as The New Yorker and the left-wing National Guardian which spoke of massive evacuations in the northern part of South Vietnam which could be preparations for nuclear attacks on North Vietnam. The justification for the Laos invasion given by the South Vietnamese invaders and their U.S. backers is that the country serves as a North Vietnamese base for attacking South Vietnam.

Mrs. Culhane and Mr. van Schendel said that during the Korean war there were similar hints that atomic weapons might be used and it took a trip to Washington by British Prime Minister Clement Attlee (backed by Canada's then External Affairs Minister, Lester Pearson) to persuade the United States to drop the idea.

In this case, Mrs. Culhane admitted, the political climate may be bad for such an escalation: "It may be a sawoff, and finally they won't use it. But we must protest to make sure they don't."

Mrs. Binh's cable was intended for "peace forces in your country." Mr. van Schendel said they didn't know of Mrs. Binh having sent other cables to North Americans, and she did not often send such appeals.

A NATIONAL HISTORIC SHRINE TO THADDEUS KOSCIUSZKO

HON. JOSEPH G. MINISH

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. MINISH. Mr. Speaker, on June 9, 1971 I introduced in the House of Representatives H.R. 9021, which would establish the home of Thaddeus Kosciuszko at 301 Pine Street, Philadelphia, as a national historic shrine.

Mr. Speaker, this legislation would authorize the first U.S. national memorial to a son of Poland, and it is most fitting that the choice devolve on Thaddeus Kosciuszko. This great Polish patriot came to the United States to help in our war of independence. After his arrival here, he was appointed as the colonel of engineers, and distinguished himself for his advanced fortifications constructed as West Point and Yorktown. At West Point Academy today, there is a commemorative statue in Kosciuszko's honor, inscribed to a "hero of two worlds."

In view of Kosciuszko's contribution to our national independence, it would be most appropriate if H.R. 9021 was enacted in time for America's bicentennial anniversary celebration. I am hopeful, therefore, that this legislation will receive swift consideration by the Congress, and would welcome any colleagues who would join me in sponsoring this legislation.

AMENDMENT TO DELETE TITLE IV FROM DEFENSE BUDGET

HON. MICHAEL HARRINGTON

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, the military procurement bill—H.R. 8687—will be on the floor of the House tomorrow, June 15, and for the rest of the week. On Wednesday or Thursday, I will offer an amendment to delete title IV of the bill, which provides an authorization of $2.5 billion for military assistance to South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. This section also provides for financial payments to South Korea for their troops fighting in Vietnam.

Title IV received only 2 hours of consideration by the House Armed Services Committee. Jurisdiction over this military aid should be returned to the AID budget and the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, which have responsibility for nearly all other military aid programs. Such a restoration to the normal aid channels is fully consistent with the administration's Vietnamization plans and with U.S. withdrawal. In fact, continued inclusion in the defense budget of these funds would cast doubt on the seriousness of claims that U.S. troops are ceasing to have a combat role and that this is no longer an American war.

Our military aid to Southeast Asia must be carefully evaluated on its own terms in relation to our other foreign commitments and military assistance programs. It must no longer be submerged and ignored in the massive defense budget.

The secret Pentagon study of U.S. participation in the Vietnam war that is now being made public in the New York Times demonstrates once again the need for Congress to assert itself on foreign policy issues. The Pentagon papers contain revelations of clandestine warfare and planning before the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964. Only by painstaking and tough examination of our military programs in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, will we be able to prevent being dragged into future Vietnams and stop the accumulation of secret "commitments."

Congress, and the House Armed Services Committee, know very little about how these title IV funds are being expended. We need information to act wisely and my amendment would be a step toward restoring a procedure that at least offers some potential for safeguarding the interests of Congress and the American people.

I have asked the Congressional Research Service to prepare a commentary on the advisability of continued inclusion of military assistance to South Vietnam within the Department of Defense budget. This analysis describes the history and justification for how this aid was shifted from the AID budget to DOD in 1966 and 1967. The following arguments are presented for removing this program from the DOD budget and restoring it to the normal military assistance budget—and thus to the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees:

Vietnamization of the war and U.S. withdrawal from it represents a major policy shift, and the mechanism for financing U.S. support would be readjusted accordingly to the pre-Americanization period.

Since the South Vietnamese Army is no longer an arm of DOD, it makes no sense for DOD to retain operational, financial, and logistical control over that army.

Free world non-Vietnamese forces are being reduced, as are their assistance requirements, and support for them should be removed from the mammoth DOD budget to the military assistance program where it can be closely scrutinized.

Even if assistance to the South Vietnamese Army cannot be restored to the military assistance program, there is no reason for not restoring support for Laos and Thailand to the same program through which Cambodia is assisted.

It is time to reevaluate the nature and degree of our assistance to the South Vietnamese Army in relation to our other military assistance programs. To place our assistance in proper perspective, it must not be dwarfed and should be considered on its own merits and in relation to our other military assistance commitments.

I hope my colleagues will join me in voting for this amendment.

I include the Congressional Research Service memorandum at this point in the RECORD:

BACKGROUND OF THE HARRINGTON AMENDMENT TO DELETE VIETNAM MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM THE DEFENSE BUDGET

Costs of the support of the South Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam, at first provided for in the Military Assistance Program, were transferred from the MAP program to the Department of Defense budget under provisions in the Supplemental Defense Appropriation Act of 1966. The rationale for this transfer as explained by Secretary McNamara and supported by AID Administrator David Bell was twofold:

1. "The MAP was not designed to underwrite any sustained military hostilities, but rather to provide a deterrent to aggression and initial ability to resist it. Continued MAP financing of the rapidly rising requirements of the South Vietnamese and other free world forces would have seriously distorted the basic purposes of the program. The allocation of such a disproportionate percentage of available funds to a single country would have seriously jeopardized U.S. security interests in other countries and areas of the free world." [1]

2. "Now that large U.S. and other free world military assistance forces (e.g., Korean) have joined in the defense of South Vietnam, the maintenance of separate financial and logistic systems for U.S. and military assistance forces is proving to be entirely too cumbersome, time consuming, and inefficient . . ." [2]

An examination of various Committee hearings indicates that these two contentions were consistently made in formal statements and in testimony supporting Administration requests for both foreign assistance and military appropriations during the latter part of FY 1966 and FY 1967. The practice of integrating military assistance costs of the Vietnam war with the general DOD budget, and of legislating non-Vietnam-related military assistance programs separately, has continued ever since.

Since the Administration request for inclusion of Vietnam military assistance costs in the DOD budget was based upon a conclusion that the circumstances under which assistance was originally granted had radically changed, it would appear that a suggestion to restore the *status quo ante* should be similarly based—i.e., the winding down of the war is about to eliminate the special conditions which necessitated the change in the original procedures.

It should be noted parenthetically that the quotation from the President's Annual Report to Congress on the Foreign Assistance Program for FY 1966 was quite candid in suggesting that if the costs of the military assistance program for the South Vietnamese were not lumped together with the (then) politically attractive Defense budget, the Congress might well have not appropriated sufficient funds. Additionally, the shift in funding from the military assistance to the DOD budget symbolized the translation of the Vietnam war from a Vietnamese into an American enterprise.

Logically, therefore, a recommendation that the military assistance aspects of the Vietnamese war be removed from the Defense budget and restored to the military assistance budget could be defended on the following grounds:

1. The Administration program of "Vietnamization" and programmed withdrawal from the war is represented as a major shift in policy from one of treating the war as a U.S. enterprise to one of recognition that the war is a Vietnamese problem and that the period of U.S. involvement is to come to an end. If such a major policy shift is to be made credible, the mechanism for assisting the Vietnamese must be readjusted accordingly. Specifically, military aid for the Vietnamese should no longer be provided for in the budget of the U.S. Defense Department. Such aid as may be deemed advisable should be provided for in the foreign aid program—a program which is scrutinized by those Congressional commitees charged with oversight responsibility for that program, namely, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

2. Having established the point that the South Vietnamese Army is, in terms of the changed nature of the war, no longer in effect an arm of the U.S. Department of Defense, it is contended that the practical operational, logistical, and accounting circumstances raised by Secretary McNamara have become outmoded. Removal of U.S. troops from a combat role in the very near future, as promised by the Administration, negates the original DOD objection to the maintenance of separate financial and logistic systems for U.S. and "military assistance" forces.

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[1] 90th Congress, 2d Session. House Document N. 228. The President's Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1966, *The Foreign Assistance Program*, p. 29.

[2] Statement of Secretary of Defense McNamara before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 89th Congress, January 26, 1966.

3. It should be noted that not only are U.S. troop commitments and military activities being reduced: so are those of other non-Vietnamese military forces originally covered under the military assistance program but for which funding was incorporated at Secretary McNamara's request into the DOD budget. This further reduces the magnitude of our assistance requirements, and is additional justification for removing these requirements from the DOD budget, where they are dwarfed by comparison to the total budget, and returning them to the military assistance program where they can be carefully evaluated.

4. H.R. 8687 would provide that U.S. military assistance to the South Vietnamese, to Laos, and to Thailand be incorporated in the DOD budget. Similar assistance to Cambodia, however, has been and is now channeled through the military assistance program. Even if it can be substantiated that U.S. participation in the Vietnam war has not yet been reduced to the point where logistical fiscal considerations permit "normalization" of assistance to the South Vietnamese, surely assistance to Laos and to Thailand should be recognized as conceptually analogous to assistance to Cambodia, and should be provided for within the military assistance program.

5. Finally, and this could be the most important point of all, it is time to evaluate the nature and degree of U.S. assistance to the South Vietnamese Army in proportion to the rest of our overall military assistance program. The Administration's candid assertion in FY 1966 that if the South Vietnamese military assistance program were not removed from the jurisdiction of the respective House and Senate committees overseeing the foreign assistance program the South Vietnamese program might not be enacted is a point well worthy of reconsideration at the present time. This program must be evaluated on its own merits—not as a comparatively small proportion of the huge Defense budget. If evaluation of the South Vietnamese military assistance program within the context of our entire military assistance spectrum reveals that the South Vietnamese are getting more than the circumstances truly merit, this revelation deserves careful study.

THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MASS DEPORTATIONS OF BALTIC PEOPLES TO SLAVE LABOR CAMPS BY THE RUSSIANS

HON. GERALD R. FORD

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, representatives of more than a million Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians living in the United States joined Sunday in commemorating the 30th anniversary of the mass deportations of Baltic peoples to slave labor camps by the Russians in 1941. With the unanimous consent of the House, I would like to place in the RECORD at this point a description of the church service at the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception which marked this tragic event in world history. The account follows:

A church service commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the mass deportations of the Baltic peoples to slave-labor camps in Siberia was held on Sunday, June 13, at the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception in the Nation's Capital.

The celebrant of the special service was Rev. Father Kazimieras Pugevicius of Baltimore.

Spokesmen for the Joint Baltic Committee, representing the central organizations of Americans of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian descent, explained that the brutal Soviet action, commencing on the night of June 13, 1941, left deep scars and bitter memories among the Baltic peoples on both sides of the iron curtain. Concentration camp victims were drawn from all social and age groups, the Joint Baltic Committee pointed out, and were packed into cattle cars going to Northern Russia and Siberia, where most perished under the inhuman conditions.

The vast scale of these and later deportations after the Second World War was emphasized by Gunars Meierovics, Dr. John B. Genys and Gerhard Buschmann, representing over a million Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians in the United States.

The Committee placed conservative estimates of human losses by Baltic people in Soviet concentration camps to be in excess of fifteen percent of the population.

"The Baltic people expressed their alarm at current Soviet policies, which are totalitarian cultural genocide tactics, implemented in the name of russification. They hope that world opinion will be reminded by Sunday's ceremonies of the brutal attempts to stamp out the Baltic peoples' national identity and desire for self-determination. The resultant protests to the Soviet government might stem these policies."

The consensus was unanimous that the plight of the Baltic peoples today was very critical, in the context of colonialism vs. self-government. The Committee declares that "the annexation of the Baltic nations into the Soviet Union is not recognized by our government and many other nations. This occupation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union is a flagrant breach of all international treaties and agreements between the Soviet Union and the Independent Baltic States governments!"

CPL. ARTHUR W. MACHEN III

HON. CLARENCE D. LONG

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, Cpl. Arthur W. Machen III, 21, of Ruxton, has been awarded posthumously the Navy Commendation Medal for heroism in Vietnam. "Pete" Machen died in early December after a 5-month struggle to survive abdominal wounds he received in June 1970. He was a courageous and dedicated young man. I have known the Machen family for years and have shared their grief over Corporal Machen's death. I also share their pride in his service to his country, and am honored to pay tribute to Corporal Machen by including the text of the citation in the RECORD:

CITATION

The Secretary of the Navy takes pride in presenting the Navy Commendation Medal posthumously to Corporal Arthur W. Machen III, United States Marine Corps, for service as set forth in the following citation:

"For meritorious service while serving as a Squad Leader with Company I, Third Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division in connection with combat operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam for 20 August 1969 to 19 June 1970. Throughout this period, Corporal Machen performed his duties in an exemplary and highly professional manner. Exceptionally skilled in small-unit tactics, he molded his men into a spirited fighting force and provided consistently outstanding combat support to his command. Participating in four major combat operations, including Operations Upshur Stream and Charlie Ridge, he repeatedly disregarded his own safety to gain vantage points from which to direct accurate fire at the enemy. In addition, Corporal Machen led his squad on more than one hundred combat patrols and ambushes and displayed exceptional initiative in locating and exploiting hostile targets. Under his inspiring leadership, his men accounted for numerous enemy casualties and were instrumental in thwarting persistent attempts by hostile forces to penetrate friendly areas. Seriously wounded while participating in a combat patrol in Elephant Valley on 19 June 1970, Corporal Machen remained calm and continued to encourage his men until he was medically evacuated. His resolute determination and seemingly unlimited resourcefulness earned the respect and admiration of all who served with him and contributed significantly to the accomplishment of his unit's mission. By his initiative, superb professionalism, and loyal devotion to duty throughout his tour in the Republic of Vietnam, Corporal Machen upheld the finest tradition of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service."

The Combat Distinguished Device is authorized.

For the Secretary of the Navy,

WILLIAM K. JONES,

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

BUY AMERICA

HON. PETER W. RODINO, JR.

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Speaker, one of my constituents, a small businessman in New Jersey, has been practicing what he preaches. He is in his own way significantly helping to maintain a sound American economy and to show pride in his country for all the many riches it has bestowed upon its citizens. Mr. Jerome Schapiro, of Montclair, N.J., recently informed me of his buy American program and I think it is particularly noteworthy to share his efforts with my colleagues on this Flag Day:

DIXO CO., INC.,

Rochelle Park, N.J., May 26, 1971.

Congressman PETER RODINO,
Rayburn Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN RODINO: I am enclosing with this letter a copy of a new promotional sign that we use when selling perchlorethylene (the drycleaning fluid used by most drycleaners). As you will note in the lower left

hand corner we strongly emphasize the fact that the drycleaning fluid that we sell is made in America. At present, despite up to a 33% discount at times if you purchase foreign origin material, we are still the only distributor in the Metropolitan New York-New Jersey area who has continued to handle only material of domestic origin. We are proud of this record which has lasted over 26 years. Our customers, the drycleaners in this area, are proud to put up a sign at this time of year (Memorial Day, Flag Day, Independence Day) to show that they also support the country that affords them the opportunity to enjoy the life they do.

Possibly, if more distributors of drycleaning fluid acted as we do it would serve to bolster the American economy. So much is lost when people are proud to live in a land such as ours but unwilling to buy its products because import material is so much cheaper. You cannot enjoy the benefits of one country and do your shopping to benefit another.

Might it exert a position influence on others to buy and sell American if our efforts were brought to the attention of the people in government whose job is to keep the American economy sound. My efforts in this behalf are not without a selfish motive: For without a sound American economy my business cannot prosper.

Regards,

JEROME SCHAPIRO,
President.

"DEBRIEFING FORM" FOR PEACE LOBBYISTS

HON. DAVID E. SATTERFIELD III

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Mr. Speaker, last week many Congressmen received a request through a local committee to make a specific appointment to meet with certain constituents who were to be in Washington to lobby on behalf of proposals to fix a deadline for withdrawal from South Vietnam.

I am sure my colleagues would want to know that an organization called the Lobby of Americans which claims to be sponsored jointly by the Committee for Peace and New Priorities and the National Council for an Indochina Deadline provided each lobbyist with a lobbying kit which contained among other things written suggestions for conducting an effective lobby with Congressmen, a brief outline of current legislation which would provide an Indochina deadline, a list of members of committees related to this issue, an analysis of certain votes cast by selected Senators and Representatives; a series of questions and answers about Indochina to aid assist lobbyists in their discussions with Congressmen and a final document, titled "Debriefing Form."

A copy of that debriefing form, which I am sure my colleagues will find interesting and revealing, follows:

DEBRIEFING FORM

(Please Print)

Senator/Representative ____State _____
Lobbyist's name_____
Address _____
Phone _____

Did you speak to:

Congressman.

His/her aide.

Position on deadline legislation (Nedzi-Whalen or Hatfield-McGovern):

Will vote for.

Leaning for.

Uncommitted.

Leaning against.

Will vote against.

What reasons does your Congressman give for opposing deadline legislation, if any? (Please check)

There will be a bloodbath when we pull out.

The enemy will bide his time, then take over.

We would be abandoning our POW's.

We would be giving in to the enemy.

It eliminates the possibility of a negotiated settlement.

The President will get us out by 1972.

Other.

Which of the arguments in favor of the deadline did your Congressman seem to respond to? (Please check)

We should get out in time for the elections.

Setting a date is the only way to negotiate release of the POW's.

The war is illegal because it is undeclared.

The Vietnamese should settle their own affairs.

The President's intentions are not clear.

The South Vietnamese Army is as well prepared now as it will ever be.

It is the responsibility of Congress to end the war.

Domestic programs are suffering because of war costs.

Our economy is in bad shape because of the war.

Other.

Will your Congressman be home this July 4?

What kinds of people would be most effective to lobby this man?

Is there any special pressure that could be exerted because of conditions in his particular district?

VETERAN TEACHER TO DO HER HOMEWORK

HON. J. J. PICKLE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend Mrs. Elnora Mays Ake of my district for 45 years of invaluable service which she has rendered to the community. Mrs. Ake has been preparing many young minds for a constructive role in our society, particularly at the first grade level, where students form lasting and crucial habits and opinions which will be influential in the outcomes of their lives. She has been twice honored as teacher of the year and worked in Head-start and regional educational service center programs. Mrs. Ake is now enjoying a well-deserved rest from her duties which gives us a particularly appropriate time to note her far-reaching accomplishments and invaluable services. At this time I submit in the RECORD a May 21 article from the Austin American which tells more of this remarkable woman:

VETERAN TEACHER TO DO HER HOMEWORK

(By Mary M. Moody)

When Mrs. Elnora Mays Ake ends her 45th year of teaching this month, she intends to stay home and do something she's wanted to do since she got married—housekeeping.

Mrs. Ake began teaching when she was only 17 years old. She had planned to stop teaching and start housekeeping five years afterward.

The death of her husband at the end of their fifth year of marriage postponed those plans until this year.

But Mrs. Ake hasn't lamented all those years of teaching. They are filled with warm and rewarding memories of the hundreds of students she has taught.

"Every day now, the little children ask me, 'Why are you leaving? Why are you leaving? Why are you quitting?'," she says. "And I tell them, 'I'm just tired. I want to stop.' "

Mrs. Ake retires this year after 16 years at Sims Elementary School. She was one of the original teachers at this school, opened when Rosewood Elementary became so large the students had to be divided into a new school.

The other years of her 45-year career have been spent in the area, including Swenson Gove Elementary School in Williamson County (where she took her first job) and in the Pflugerville Independent School district and the Sprinkle School in Travics County.

During her first years of teaching, she taught grades one through six—all in one classroom. Eventually, as she moved from the rural schools into Austin, she began specializing in first grade classes.

Smaller classes are among the big changes she has witnessed during her career. Another equally important change has been the acquisition of more teaching aides.

Twice during her career, Mrs. Ake has been named "Teacher of the Year," and she is proud that many of her students remembered her and attended festivities in her honor Tuesday at the school.

When she recalls the highlights of her career, the Round Rock native is reminded of two relatively recent experiences of her 45-year career.

In the summer of 1965, she worked as one of Austin's first Head Start teachers. Since that time, she had been selected to participate in the summer reading programs at Sims and Allison Elementary Schools.

The second experience was during the summer of 1970 when Mrs. Ake participated in an Education Service Center, Region XIII in San Marcos.

The institute worked with the "Shift of Emphasis" project—a program to bring the children now in special education classes back into the classroom.

She says this year she has made practical application of her training by working with handicapped and exceptional children.

As a first-grade teacher, Mrs. Ake has been responsible for getting hundreds of students off to a good start. Now she is ready for a new start herself.

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL

HON. LES ASPIN

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, during the past week, I have submitted to the REC-

ORD a series of articles and testimony on aspects of the defense authorization bill. Each supports the conclusion that the administration's request is too high and should be cut.

My amendment to hold the fiscal year 1972 authorization to the amount authorized for fiscal year 1971 does not cut any particular service, appropriation title, or specific program. However, a ceiling will provide the needed incentive to force the Department of Defense to face the problem of maintaining a balance between modernization and realistic force levels, and the problems of increasing cost of weapon sophistication and cost overruns.

For convenience of the Members, the entire series is reprinted below:

[From the Congressional Record, June 7, 1971]

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL—PART I

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, soon the House will debate and vote on the defense authorization bill. At that time I intend to offer an amendment which will propose holding the fiscal year 1972 authorization to the level approved last year.

During the hearings on the bill, the Armed Services Committee heard testimony from nongovernment witnesses. The following testimony of Charles P. Shirkey supports the conclusion that the funds requested by the administration for defense in 1972 are more than we need. Mr. Shirkey concludes that:

As many as four Army divisions, seven Air Force tactical air wings and three Navy carrier task forces could be cut from the force levels proposed by the administration in 1972 without jeopardizing the administration's one and one-half war strategy for general purpose forces.

Such a reduction in forces should include proportionate reductions in procurement and R. & D. as well as the associated direct and indirect support.

Implementation of these force reductions could have $7 to $15 billion in 1972.

Mr. Shirkey is well qualified to comment on the 1972 defense budget and the adequacy of general purpose forces, having worked on the defense budget and national security issues in the Bureau of the Budget and Office of Secretary of Defense.

(Mr. Shirkey's testimony follows:)

STATEMENT OF CHARLES P. SHIRKEY

Mr. Chairman and members of the House Armed Services Committee, my name is Charles Shirkey. For several years I have been concerned with defense policy—academically, in professional service and now in private research. At the Bureau of the Budget, I worked as an analyst on national security programs.

Subsequently, I served as a defense analyst in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis).

I wish to thank the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom for granting me this time to appear before you. However, the testimony I present today represents my own views.

I shall limit my testimony to the general purpose forces, excluding the incremental costs and forces engaged in Indochina. In other words, I wish to concentrate on what we otherwise might call the "baseline" general purpose forces. As you know, these forces account for the largest portion of the defense budget.

It was observed last year that general purpose forces accounted for about 60% of the total FY 71 defense budget for 70% of the pre-Vietnam baseline budget, excluding the incremental cost of the Vietnam war. The FY 72 budget does not appear to represent a dramatic change in that allocation.

I would like to suggest today a way to conceptualize those general purpose forces and the associated budgetary resources. In particular, I wish to focus on force levels: why we maintain any given level, what are some of the rather consistent interrelationships peculiar to general purpose forces, what are some of the constants or "eternal verities", and what are some of the questions that one might raise in reviewing the 72 budget. For purposes of the record, my prepared text includes numerous tables which I will refer to during my testimony. Finally, I would like to suggest some broader questions that perhaps cannot be answered during this budget review but should be asked nonetheless.

The ultimate question confronting the Administration, you and your Senate colleagues is "how much is enough?" In a recent book by Alain Enthoven and Wayne Smith bearing that title, the authors begin with a quote from former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. I quote: "You cannot make decisions simply by asking yourself whether something might be nice to have. You have to make a judgment on how much is enough." This statement was made in 1963: it is equally true today. In the final analysis, the judgment that Secretary McNamara referred to is a judgment of how much confidence we feel is necessary to assure U.S. and allied security will not be placed in jeopardy.

That judgment process is exceedingly complex. The difficulty in making that judgment is perhaps equalled by the responsibility that you on this Committee share in reviewing the budget before you and ultimately shaping our general purpose force capacity. You are well aware that the recommendations and decisions that you will make will have an effect for many years to come.

We are speaking today of budgets, but of course, the final product are the very forces themselves. It is perhaps useful to put that relationship into perspective and look at the forces in being in 1969 and 1970. Those forces were largely the product of research and development of the fifties and early sixties, of procurement actions taken in the early and mid sixties, and of budgetary and management decisions on the operation and maintenance of forces in more recent years. Given this long chain of decisions, it is relevant to ask whether those forces were "enough" when they became operational. No one had a crystal ball when those decisions and commitments were made. Yet the evidence suggests there was sufficient if not an abundance of confidence in 1969 and 70 in our ability to implement a flexible and graduated response vis-a-vis the Soviets, primarily in Europe, or the Chinese Peoples' Republic in East Asia. Furthermore, I submit that we could have so responded without drawing-down our forces committed in Southeast Asia and Korea; and 1969 was the peak of our force commitment to that theater.

A publication on world military expenditures put out by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency observes that the entire world spent about $200 billion on military expenditures in 1969. During that same period, the U.S. spent about $80 billion or 40% of the world's total. Excluding the incremental cost of the Vietnam war, the U.S. still accounted for as much as 30%. The entire NATO Alliance spent about $90 billion, excluding the incremental Vietnam war costs, compared to about $65 billion spent by the entire Warsaw Pact, the bulk of which was spent by the Soviet Union. Of course, these figures include outlays for strategic nuclear forces by those countries so involved in addition to conventional or general purpose forces.

At first glance, the 72 budget suggests dramatic cuts in general purpose forces and equally dramatic changes in the underlying assumptions. However, I would suggest that these cuts and apparent changes are not as dramatic as they might first appear.

The key to general purpose force planning is land warfare and the number of division forces to be fielded. As shown in Table 1, in 1970 the U.S. had the capability to mobilize and deploy a total of 12 active Army divisions and two active Marine divisions, augmented by eight National Guard divisions and one reserve Marine division—a total of 23 division forces, excluding forces committed in Southeast Asia. As shown in Table 4, as many as 13⅔ active and reserve divisions were available to reinforce the 4⅓ divisions based in Europe, for a total of 18 division forces. Moreover, we had this capability simultaneous to the deployment of 6⅓ division forces to Southeast Asia, in addition to other contingencies as shown in Table 4. I do not wish to suggest that we had the proper degree of readiness; sufficient strategic lift capability; or the optimal mix of reconnaissance, mobility, and firepower. Yet the undeniable fact remains that we had an abundance of forces and were allocating sufficient sums of resources, over and above Vietnam, to buy and maintain a very impressive array of land force capability.

Taking into account the possiblity of a minor contingency and a holding action in Asia, it appears that 11⅓ active divisions (excluding the possibility of one division in Vietnam) and a total of 20⅓ division forces should be enough in 1972 to assure a reasonable, if not high confidence capability for the U.S. to respond flexibly and with discretion to any NATO contingency—which after all is the most demanding case which we can conceive in the near-term. However, the 72 budget provides for 13⅓ active Army divisions or four more active divisions than what might be regarded as "enough". Thus an alternative which provides for 9⅓ active Army divisions (four less than the 72 budget) and 3 active Marine divisions or a total of 21⅓ active and reserve division forces compared to the 25⅓ proposed in the 72 budget does not appear unreasonable.

Given a particular number of active and reserve divisions, the number of tactical air wings is readily derived. Taking account of the size of the Marine air wing—about twice the size of Air Force and Navy tactical air wings—there has historically been about two wings per division. One of these has commonly been associated with the mission of close air support; the remainder are designed and assigned to such missions as deep interdiction, air superiority, and air defense. The 72 budget includes 21 active Air Force tactical air wings and 11 active Navy wings, in a total active and reserve force of 50⅓ Air Force (or Navy) tactical air wing equivalents. For an alternative force of 21⅓ division forces, it appears that 40⅓ active and reserve Air Force (or Navy) tactical air wing equivalents would be sufficient.

Another major determinant of general purpose force levels is the mix of land-based and sea-based tactical air given a particular number of tactical air wings. It can be assumed for the indefinite future that the number of Marine wings is given; this leaves only the number of Air Force and Navy air wings to be determined. Since Navy (or sea-based) tactical air wings are not designed for use in NATO's Center Region, where most if not all of U.S. land forces would be committed, it appears that a force mix of 14

active Air Force wings and 8 active Navy tactical air wings, augmented by the current 8⅓ Air Force and 2 Navy reserve wings, would be consistent with (a) the land force of 21⅓ divisions and (b) the concept of "realistic deterrence" (or flexible response), particularly as applied to the NATO theater..

A major factor in determining the size of naval forces is the number of carriers, including attack carriers (CVAs) and anti-submarine warfare or ASW carriers (CVSs); I will confine my discussion to CVAs only. Given 8 active Navy tactical air wings and maintaining the current 2 reserve wings, it further appears that 10 attack carriers would be reasonable. The 72 budget includes 12 CVAs and one CV, an experimental dual-capable attack and ASW carrier concept. As noted in Table 7, to maintain a 10 CVA/CV force in the out-years would require either (a) cancellation of the Eisenhower, CVAN-69 currently under construction, or (b) deactivation of one Forrestal-class CVA, the oldest of which will be 20 years old in 1975.

Just focusing on these major general purpose forces components, a case can be made that the 72 budget has more than enough for a flexible response for NATO. Given the Administration's "1½ war" strategy, the NATO contingency is simply the most demanding case; but this does not necessarily imply that we would use these forces in response to a NATO contingency only. It is still prudent, perhaps, to plan for the use of some U.S. forces in response to a major contingency in East Asia. However, assuming this is a valid basis for planning general purpose forces, the major alternative force levels proposed here would provide as much or more general purpose forces for deployment to East Asia than we committed in Korea or at the height of the buildup in Vietnam, as shown in Tables 4, 6 and 8.

If this alternative approach is valid, the excess would include the following:

4 active Army division forces;

7 active Air Force tactical air wings;

3 active Navy tactical air wings; and

3 attack carriers (CVAs).

Such a dramatic change in force levels would greatly impact on numerous systems in procurement and even in R. & D. Of course, savings would also include direct and indirect support associated with these forces. The total savings to the 72 budget would exceed $7 billion. Cutting other general purposes forces to achieve a balance given these proposed reductions could perhaps double the savings in FY 72 for a total of about $14–15 billion.

I do not wish to suggest that the capability for flexible response to a NATO contingency, particularly in Central Europe, is the only criterion for determining sufficiency in the 72 budget or is the only method for determining how much is enough. Nor do I wish to imply that I have addressed all the general purpose force level issues to be resolved in this 72 budget. It is merely my hope that this approach and the questions it raises may be of some assistance to the Committee and its members in reviewing the 72 budget and future Administration testimony.

* * * * *

In addition to the question "how much is enough?", I suggest that it is perhaps useful to this Committee to raise certain other questions with the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the individual military departments and services. Given the time constraint, I will simply enumerate what I consider to be major questions unanswered by the 72 budget:

(1) What is the appropriate ratio of manpower to the number of Army divisions? Examination will show that it is increasing in FY 72.

(2) Is it advisable to maintain 3 active amphibious divisions out of a total of 16⅓ active Army and Marine divisions (or even 4 out of a total of 25⅓ active and reserve divisions)? The Marine Corps continues to be organized into Marine Expeditionary Forces, primarily designed, equipped and trained for the amphibious assault mission.

(3) In implementing the Nixon Doctrine, what is the military significance, feasibility and advisability of Security Assistance for many recipient countries? In short, can we and should we try to accomplish through expanded Security Assistance to most recipients what we have been somewhat less than successful in doing with U.S. forces, particularly ground forces?

(4) Is the ratio of total active and reserve tactical air wings to divisions immutable? The ratio of about 2 to 1 appears to be an "eternal verity." Most interpretations of the Nixon Doctrine suggest that the cutback in U.S. ground forces for Asian contingencies, offset by greater self defense capability largely through increased Security Assistance, would result in an increased ratio of tactical air to division forces. As shown in Table 2, this is not the case in the 1972 budget.

(5) Does the 1972 budget adequately provide for the deployability and, in the final analysis the usability of the active and reserve forces based in the U.S.? Specifically, is there sufficient airlift, sealift and prepositioning; what is the appropriate mix of active and reserve forces; and what is the feasibility of attaining the necessary readiness levels, particularly given the ever-increasing complexity and sophistication of equipment?

(6) Are the dual-capable forces—namely, those designed to employ conventional as well as nuclear munitions—available for conventional employment at the outset of a contingency? It is relevant to recall the non-availability of such forces in and around Korea during the Pueblo crisis.

(7) Finally, given the level of modernization requested by all services in the 1972 budget, can equivalent units be maintained at equal or lower cost in future years? I would include such systems as the F-14, F-15, S-3, DD-963, MBT-70, SAM-D, A-X, Cheyenne, and miscellaneous electronic and communications hardware designed for reconnaissance and surveillance—commonly referred to as the "automated battlefield."

* * * * *

Beyond these specific questions, I submit that the Administration, this Committee and its counterpart in the Senate should give serious consideration to questions which go beyond the horizon of the 1972 budget and get to the very heart of the issue of national and global security in this and the remaining decades of this century.

First, in spite of the Administration's appellation of "realistic deterrence," it is relevant to question whether the concept of flexible response, particularly vis-a-vis the Soviets, continues to be relevant in the seventies. If so, should it be defined the same way it was in the 1960's? This particularly affects the NATO posture and the conventional arms race with the Soviets. If the concept should be changed, how should it be defined, what are the cost implications, and how do we get there from here?

Second, it is essential that we question whether militarily Asia is critical to U.S. security. It might be useful to note that in constant 1970 dollars, the U.S. spent about $275 billion in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives in East Asia in the sixties. Of that total, roughly $180 billion was for so-called "baseline" general purpose forces and military assistance designed to deter and, if need be, counter a conventional threat emanating from Communist China. About $90 billion represents the incremental costs of the war in Indochina through 1970. The remaining $5 billion is probably an overstatement of all unilateral and multilateral economic assistance and preferential trade to the area during the past 10 years. If our interests are derived from our principal interest in Japan, I submit they would be considerably limited. It would probably exclude Southeast Asia, perhaps Taiwan, and even a lower profile in Korea. One might even question one of the basic assumptions underlying the U.S. interest in Japan; namely, is the fear of a rearmed and independent Japan justified or not. Japan after all is exceedingly vulnerable were she to rearm conventionally or with nuclear arms.

Finally, I suggest there are some broader questions that force us even to redefine the meaning of national security and the means to ensure it. What are the *real* challenges to our national and global security in the 1970's and beyond? Admittedly, the problems of aggression and the tyranny of war are not likely to disappear. These problems, for which our military forces are relevant, have a very legitimate claim on our national resources. But there are other problems which military expenditures at best defer and often aggravate such as: population growth, which has only been deferred a decade or two thanks to the "green revolution"; economic and social deterioration, not only in the underdeveloped world but also in the developed world; the adequacy of technology to cope with pollution given the degree to which all nations are flagrantly abusing the world environment; the potentially explosive issue of U.S. (and other developed countries) consumption of the world's resources, now 40% and predicted to be somewhere around 60% by the turn of the century; and last, the need to make our industrial, technical and automated societies fit for satisfying and meaningful human existence. These are not simply matters of national concern and priorities; they are also matters of national *security*, now and in the years ahead. In this sense, this Administration is correct when it states that we will solve the problems at home and abroad or we will solve neither.

In closing, I would reemphasize the following points:

I believe force levels in the 72 budget are excessive for acceptable confidence in the U.S. capability to respond flexibly to the various contingencies which might jeopardize U.S. and global security. I believe that we can save at least $7 billion and perhaps as much as $14–15 billion by cutting major and associated excess forces alone.

I think the mix and efficiency of general purpose forces resources, including Security Assistance, are questionable.

The capability to operate and maintain new systems sought in the 72 budget must be weighed against the availability of resources in future years.

Finally, I submit this 72 budget—which the Administration has made clear is no longer a transition budget—raises more questions than it resolves. This Committee can make a great contribution to the enhancement of our national security by pursuing these and other necessary questions.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today and will be glad to answer any questions which the Committee may have to the best of my ability.

TABLE 1.—DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR ACTIVE GENERAL PURPOSES FORCES END—FISCAL YEAR 1970

	Army divisions	Marines: Divisions	Marines: Wings	Air Force, tactical air wings	Navy carrier task forces [1]
NATO:					
Europe	4⅓			7	
Mediterranean (6th Fleet)		⅙	⅙		2
Continental United States (CONUS) [2 3]	[4] 5⅔	1⅚	1⅚	9	[5] 10
Northeast Asia:					
Korea/Japan/Okinawa	2	⅙	⅙	2	
Western Pacific (7th Fleet)		⅙			1
Southeast Asia	5⅓	1	⅚	5	3
Total, major units	17⅓	3	3	23	6

[1] Includes the Shangri-La, a CVS functioning as a CVA for the duration of the Vietnam war.
[2] Includes ⅔ Army division assigned to 7th Army in Germany, and 2 Army divisions and 1⅓ Air Force wings specifically "earmarked" for NATO augmentation. The remainder are generally regarded as Strategic Reserve Forces (STRAF).
[3] These active forces in CONUS were complemented by the following reserve forces: 8 Army divisions, 1 Marine division, 1 Marine air wing, 8⅓ Air Force tactical air wings and 2 Navy carrier air wings.
[4] Includes 1 division (5th Mech. Div.) functioning as a training division for troops assigned to Vietnam.
[5] Includes 3 to 4 in some stage of overhaul and 6 to 7 in some stage of training.

Source: Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1971. Statement before a Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, 91 Cong., 2 sess., 1970, part I, pp. 13, 20; Gen. Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Ibid., p. 740; Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier, Testimony before the Joint Subcommittee of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees on CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier, 91 Cong., 2 sess., Washington, D.C., p. 135; The Military Balance 1970-71, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1970, p. 3-5.

TABLE 2.—MAJOR GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES AND COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE FORCE LEVELS—AS OF FISCAL YEAR END

	Fiscal year— 1965 [1] pre-Vietnam "baseline" (actual)	1970 [2] (actual)	1972 [3] (estimate)	Alternative
Land forces (division):				
Army:				
Active	16⅓	17⅓	13⅓	9⅓
Reserve	8	8	8	8
Marines:				
Active	3	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1	1
Total	28⅓	29⅓	25⅓	21⅓
Tactical air forces (wings):				
Air Force:				
Active	21	23	21	14
Reserve	7⅔	8⅓	8⅓	8⅓
Navy:				
Active	15	14	11	8
Reserve	2	2	2	2
Marines:				
Active	3 } ×2	3 } ×2	3 } ×2	3
Reserve	[4] 1 }	[4] 1 }	[4] 1 }	[4] 1
Total (Air Force wing equivalents)	53⅔	55⅓	50⅓	40⅓
Naval forces (active forces):				
Attack carrier task forces (CVA's/CV's)	15	15	13	10
ASW carrier task forces (CV's)	9	4	3	0
Amphibious task forces (MEF lift)	2	1⅓	1⅓	1⅓
Cost of general purpose forces (1971 dollars in billions) [5]	$44	$46	$40	$32

[1] The Budget of the U.S. Government, fiscal year 1967, p. 76; Charles L. Schultze, Setting National Priorities; the 1971 budget, the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1970, p. 19; the Military Balance, 1965-66, the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1965, p. 26; Robert S. McNamara, Department of Defense Appropriations, 1966, statement before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, 80 Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D.C., 1965, pt. 1, pp. 97, 113-115; Jane's Fighting Ships 1969-70, Jane's Yearbooks, London, 1970, pp. 395-404; Robert S. McNamara, Department of Defense Appropriations, 1969, statement submitted to the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, 90 Cong., 2d sess., Washington, D.C., 1968, pt. 5, p. 2739.
[2] Melvin R. Laird, fiscal year 1971 defense program and budget statement before a joint session of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, GPO, Washington, D.C., 1970, pp. 127, 134-140, 142-143, 148-149, 153.
[3] The budget of the U.S. Government, fiscal year 1972, p. 88.
[4] Marine air wings equivalent to about 2 Air Force (or Navy) tactical air wings; see footnote (1), table 5.
[5] Author's estimates; reflects the estimated peacetime costs of all general purpose forces varying these major force elements. The cost of general purpose forces is the fiscal year 1971 budget costs ($55,000,000,000) less the incremental costs of the Vietnam war (−$11,000,000,000) plus the peacetime costs of maintaining 1 Army division force (+$800,000,000), 1 more than the pre-Vietnam "baseline" (17⅓ vs. 16⅓). Of course, in 1972 dollars (with allowance for inflation and pay incentives) all costs would increase.

TABLE 3.—COMPOSITION OF ALTERNATIVE DIVISION FORCES—AS OF FISCAL YEAR END

	Fiscal year— 1965 [1] pre-Vietnam "baseline" (actual)	1970 [2] (actual)	1972 [3] (estimate)	Alternative
Active Forces:				
Army	16⅓	[4] 13⅓	13⅓	9⅓
Marines	3	3	3	3
Subtotal, active	19⅓	20⅓	16⅓	12⅓
Reserve Forces:				
Army	8	8	8	8
Marines	1	1	1	1
Subtotal, reserve	9	9	9	9
Total	28⅓	29⅓	25⅓	21⅓

[1] Fiscal year 1967 budget, p. 76; Schultze, Setting National Priorities: 1971 budget, p. 19. (The difference of ⅓ active Army division is due to the subsequent distinction between division forces and special mission forces.
[2] Laird, fiscal year 1971 Defense program and budget, p. 127.
[3] Fiscal year 1972 budget, p. 88.
[4] Includes 1 division activated during the Vietnam buildup for deployment to Vietnam.

TABLE 4.—ALLOCATION OF ALTERNATIVE ACTIVE AND RESERVE LAND FORCES BY CONTINGENCY [1]

[In divisions; active divisions in parentheses]

	Army		Marine		Total [2]	
NATO Europe	17	(9)	1		[3] 18	(9)
Or Asia (Korea or Southeast Asia)	12	(4)	3	(2)	[4] 15	(6)
And minor contingency	⅓	(⅓)	1	(1)	[5] 1⅓	(1⅓)

[1] Total alternative forces consists of 21⅓ divisions; see table 6 for allocation of alternative tactical air forces.
[2] Each could be complemented by 7 special forces groups, and various Navy special warfare forces.
[3] Excludes 2 active Marine divisions for a temporary holding action in Korea or Southeast Asia.
[4] Excludes 4⅓ Active Army divisions based in Germany and ⅔ division based in Conus and and assigned to 7th Army.
[5] Could be an Atlantic or Pacific-based division component of a Marine expeditionary force (MEF) with amphibious assault capability and a Conus-based airborne brigade.

TABLE 5.—COMPOSITION OF ALTERNATIVE TACTICAL (FIGHTER/ATTACK) AIR FORCES

[In Air Force tactical air wing equivalents) [1]

	Fiscal year— 1965 [2] pre-Vietnam "baseline" (actual)	1970 [3] (actual)	1972 [4] (estimate)	Alternative
Active Forces:				
Air Force	[5] 21	23	21	14
Navy	15	14	11	8
Marines [1]	6	6	6	6
Subtotal, active	42	43	38	28
Reserve forces:				
Air Force	7⅔	8⅓	8⅓	8⅓
Navy	2	2	2	2
Marines [1]	2	2	2	2
Subtotal, reserve	11⅔	12⅓	12⅓	12⅓
Total	53⅔	55⅓	50⅓	40⅓

[1] An Air Force fighter/attack wing has 72 U.E. aircraft. An attack carrier air wing includes about 75 U.E. fighter/attack aircraft, and thus, is equivalent to about 1 Air Force wing. However, a Marine air wing has about 140-145 U.E. fighter/attack aircraft and, therefore, is equivalent to about 2 Air Force wings.
[2] Schultze, Setting National Priorities; 1971 budget, p. 19; Military balance 1965-66, p. 26; McNamara defense appropriations, 1966, pp. 113-115.
[3] Laird, fiscal year 1971 defense program and budget, p. 134-140.
[4] Fiscal year 1972 budget, p. 88.
[5] Programed at the time to become 24 wings for a total of 56⅔ wings—exactly twice the "baseline" division force of 28⅓ divisions (see McNamara, defense appropriations, 1966, p. 113.)

TABLE 6.—ALLOCATION OF ALTERNATIVE ACTIVE AND RESERVE TACTICAL AIR FORCES BY CONTINGENCY[1]

[In Air Force wing equivalents; active wings in parentheses][2]

	Air Force/Navy		Marine		Total[2]	
NATO Europe or	29⅓	(19)	2	(—)[4]	31⅓	(19)
Asia (Korea or Southeast Asia)	21⅓	(11)	6	(4)[5]	27⅓	(15)
And minor contingency	1	(1)	2	(2)[6]	3	(3)

[1] Total alternative force consists of 40⅓ tactical air wings; see table 4 for allocation of alternative and forces.
[2] See footnote (1) to table 5.
[3] Each could be complemented by Special Air Warfare Forces (SAWF), currently in Vietnam.
[4] Excludes 2 active Marine air wings (or 4 AF equivalents) and 2 active AF/Navy air wings for a holding action in Korea/SEA.
[5] Excludes 10 active AF/Navy air wings for NATO, including 7 Air Force wings based in Central Europe.
[6] Could be an Atlantic- or Pacific-based air wing component of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), with amphibious assault capability, and a CONUS-based AF/Navy air wing.

TABLE 7.—COMPOSITION OF ALTERNATIVE ATTACK CARRIER (CVA/CV) FORCE LEVELS (CVA/CV'S AS OF END FISCAL YEAR)

	Fiscal year—			
	1965[1] pre-Vietnam "baseline" (actual)	1970[2] (actual)	1972[3] (estimate)	Alternative
CVAN's:				
Nimitz class				
Enterprise class	1	1	1	1
Post-World War II CVA's: Forrestal-class	7	8	7	8
World War II CVA's:				
Midway-class	2	[5]2	[6]3	1
Hancock-class	4	[5]4	1	
Essex-class	1			
Subtotal	15	[4]15	12	10
CV functioning as a CVA: Essex class (Shangri-La)		[7]1		
CV (CVA functioning as dual-purpose CVA/CVS): Forrestal-class (Saratoga)			1	(8)
Total	15	16	13	10

[1] McNamara, Department of Defense appropriations, 1966, p. 97; Jane's 1969–70, pp. 395–404.
[2] Laird, 1971 Defense program and budget, p. 142.
[3] Fiscal year 1972 budget, p. 88.
[4] To maintain this force level through the 1970's would imply either cancellation of the Eisenhower (CVAN–69) or deactivation of 1 Forrestal-class CVA, the oldest of which (the Forrestal) would be 20 years old in fiscal year 1975.
[5] In August 1970, deactivation of the Bon Homme Richard (Hancock class) was announced, which reduces the force level to 14 CVA's. In September 1970, the Midway completed a 4-year, $207,000,000 modernization and replaced the Ticonderoga (Hancock class).
[6] The Midway or the Oriskany (Hancock class) would be replaced in 1977 by CVAN–70 ("Navy duty on Attack Carriers," p. 93).
[7] Laird, 1971 Defense Program and Budget, p. 1421.
[8] Alternative does not preclude the use of some carriers as CV's.

TABLE 8.—DEPLOYMENT OF ALTERNATIVE ATTACK CARRIER (CVA) FORCE LEVELS

	Western Pacific	In training/overhaul: Pacific coast	Atlantic coast	Mediterranean	Other	Total
End fiscal year 1970 (actual) including Vietnam	4(6)	6	4	2		16
Alternative:						
1[1]	3	6	4	2		15
2[1]	2	4	4	2		12
3A	2	4	2	1	[2]1	10
3B	1	2	4	2	[2]1	10

[1] Admiral Moorer, CVAN–70 Aircraft Carriers, p. 306.
[2] Could be deployed in either the Atlantic or Pacific to augment existing forces, or to support the amphibious and airborne forces as a hedge against a minor contingency during a major European or Asian contingency.

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL—PART II

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, soon the House will debate and vote on the defense authorization bill. At that time, I will submit an amendment to limit the authorization for fiscal year 1972 to the level authorized for fiscal year 1971.

As reported out by the Armed Services Committee, the authorization bill requests a significant increase over the amount authorized for the current fiscal year. This is partly because the bill contains a substantial increase in naval vessel procurement, the same amount requested by the administration.

The increase of about $615 million over the amount authorized for fiscal year 1971 represents a real increase of about $485 million over the amount authorized for the current fiscal year and about $730 million over the amount actually appropriated for fiscal year 1971. However, a critical examination of the administration's request and the committee report will show that this increase is not warranted. In fact, a reduction in ship construction would be compatible with the administration's own recommended force levels for fiscal year 1972 and naval force requirements.

Modernization cannot be considered in the absence of force levels. As naval force levels have been reduced over the past several years, the older, World War II vessels have been retired. With fewer ships to replace, there should be less need for new ships. Yet, what we are observing in the fiscal year 1972 budget is a sharp increase in requests for naval vessel procurement at a time when the recommended naval force levels are still declining.

The prevailing assumption that we must keep abreast of the Soviets and increase naval vessel procurement because they do is simplistic and misleading. The Soviet Union and the United States have different objectives and missions for their naval forces, and each is confronted with a different set of problems. For example, the United States needs naval forces in deploying and supporting land and tactical air forces overseas; the Soviets do not need naval forces for this purpose. On the other hand, the Soviets have a limited number of year-round ocean ports whereas we have ready access to two oceans.

As shown below, about $1.5 billion in fiscal year 1972 or almost half of the naval vessel procurement included in the authorization bill is for two programs—the high-speed nuclear submarine SSN–688 and the new class of antisubmarine warfare—ASW—destroyers DD–963. Both programs could be greatly reduced or even terminated after the fiscal year 1971 buy. The number of SSN's and ASW destroyers funded through fiscal year 1971 is enough to counter even the most pessimistic assumptions concerning the future quantity and quality of Soviet submarines. A tabulation follows:

[In millions of dollars]

SSN–688:	
Construction (5)	877.5
Less advanced procurement	−110.0
Plus long-lead construction	+113.5
Total	881.0
DD–963: Construction (7)	599.2
Total	1,480.2
Total, naval vessel procurement	3,328.9

The request for the authorization of five SSN's in fiscal year 1972 is consistent with the Navy's publicly stated force objective of 105 SSN's. To reach this goal we must replace conventional submarines with nuclear submarines on a 1-for-1 basis at the rate of 5 per year until the late seventies. But this force objective of 105 SSN's is based neither on an evaluation of the Soviet submarine threat nor an analysis of submarine barrier operations and requirements. It is largely derived from force levels inherited from the late 1940's.

The number of attack submarine we need to counter the Soviet submarine threat is or should be dictated by geography. There is an optimum number of submarines which can be stationed as barriers in particular areas in the world. More submarines do not improve the effectiveness of given barriers and, in fact, may impair their capability to intercept submarines. This is true regardless of the number of Soviet submarines which may attempt to penetrate the barrier.

Likewise, increases in Soviet submarine capability, particularly increased speed and lower noise levels, does not alter the attack submarine requirement. A Soviet submarine attempting to penetrate a submarine barrier will go slow to make as little noise as possible. And the best way to counter the new, quieter Soviet submarines is to improve our detection capability rather than buy more ASW platforms. Even if the Soviets predeployed most of their submarines prior to the outbreak of hostilities, we would not need more submarines. Land- and sea-based ASW aircraft and escort ships would first engage the Soviet submarines. But eventually the Soviet submarines must return to port, and to do so, they must transit the submarine barriers.

Based on such a geographic analysis of submarine barrier requirements, former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara concluded that a total of 60—not 105—"first-class" SSN's was needed. More than 60 have already been authorized. The buy through fiscal year 1971 provides for 69 SSN's for ASW operations. Since the first SSN was commissioned in 1954 and submarines have a useful life of about 28 years, no replacement would be needed until the late seventies. Moreover, most of the conventional attack submarines could be retired now. And most important the five new SSN's requested in this year's authorization bill could be cut from the budget.

The authorization bill also includes about $600 million for construction of seven more DD–963 ASW destroyers. This new class destroyer is designed for offensive and defen-

sive task group operations including the hunting and killing of enemy submarines. How many ASW escorts we need, including the DD-963, is determined or should be determined by the number of forces they are assigned to protect—specifically, carrier task forces.

The original DD-963 program approved in fiscal year 1969 was for 30 ships. At that time there were 15 attack carriers—CVA's—and four ASW carriers—CVS's—for a total of 19 carriers.

But before 1980 the carrier force level will drop to at most 12 even assuming another nuclear attack carrier—CVAN—is approved. Currently, there are eight Forrestal-class conventional carriers, the nuclear-powered *Enterprise* and two CVAN's under construction which will be under 30 years old—the useful life of a naval surface ship—by 1980. The CVS's are approaching 30 years old and no replacements are planned. In fact, the Navy is already testing a new CV concept whereby both attack and ASW aircraft would operate from the existing CVA's. Thus, the number of carrier task forces to be protected by escort ships has dropped from 19 to 11 or 12.

Terminating the DD-963 at the end of the fiscal year 1971 buy, brings to nine the number of ships authorized. However, for a 12-carrier force, no more than nine DD-963's are needed because of the capability of other escorts currently in the force and authorized to date. Terminating the DD-963's would create a shortage of escorts having the single ASW capability. However, since there is an excess in the more expensive dual-capable antiair/antisubmarine warfare—AAW/ASW—escorts, the shortfall can be rectified by assigning a greater percentage of AAW/ASW escorts to these roles.

Although we probably would not buy such additional AAW/ASW escorts for this purpose, having an excess capability in this area is not altogether undesirable, given the nature and extent of our requirements. And the seven new DD-963's requested in the authorization bill can be eliminated from the budget.

Mr. Speaker, these two programs together cost $1.5 billion. My amendment would cut $1.9 billion from this year's budget. But my amendment would not cut specific programs. Rather it would impose a ceiling on the overall authorization. Certainly a significant portion of that reduction could come from cutting the SSN-688 and DD-963 programs without jeopardizing our capability to counter the Soviet naval threat.

DEFENSE AUTHORIZED BILL—PART III

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, I submit today the third in a series of articles and testimony concerning the Defense Authorization bill. The testimony was given by Mr. Joseph S. Clark in open hearings before the Armed Services Committee.

As a former Senator, serving as a member as chairman of subcommittees on manpower employment and poverty, education, housing, and foreign relations, and a former colonel in the Army Air Force in World War II, and currently the president of the World Federalists, U.S.A., and chairman of the Task Force of the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy, Mr. Clark is well qualified to comment on defense spending. Looking at defense spending in the light of competing domestic needs and military capability in the context of foreign policy objectives and security needs, Mr. Clark poses some penetrating questions which challenge some of the assumptions underlying the Authorization bill and the budget request for fiscal year 1972. But these are the kinds of questions to which constituents throughout the country are increasingly seeking answers.

Such a perspective as Mr. Clark outlines is of utmost importance to the debate on the Authorization bill and the consideration of my amendment to hold the fiscal year 1972 authorization to the amount authorized for the current year.

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF JOSEPH S. CLARK, CHAIRMAN OF TASK FORCE ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT OF THE COALITION ON NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND MILITARY POLICY

INTRODUCTION

Gentlemen, I appreciate your willingness to hear me for no more than five minutes this morning. I shall be guided by your restriction on time, but am filing with you a somewhat longer statement than I will have time to present orally.

I appear before you in connection with H.R. 3818 wearing several different hats. First I am Chairman of the Task Force of the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy. I am filing with my statement several copies of the brochures of the Coalition indicating our purposes and activities. We now have 37 nation-wide civic and religious groups who are members of our Coalition.

Second, I am President of World Federalists, USA, a national civic organization dedicated to the cause of World Peace Through World War. I am filing with the committee several copies of our brochure entitled "Our Work Is Peace . . . It Should Be Yours."

Third, I am a former U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania who served for some years as a member or as Chairman of sub-committees on manpower employment and poverty, education, housing and foreign relations. In the latter capacity it was my privilege to travel on behalf of the committee to Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Israel, Egypt, Indonesia, New Zealand and Vietnam in the interest of studying the foreign policy of our country, and reporting in writing to the Foreign Relations Committee and the public, the result of my studies in those countries.

Fourth, I appear before you as a former member of the Army Air Force who served for two years in the China-Burma theater in World War II as a Colonel, and saw, firsthand, the impact of our foreign policy in Asia.

OBLIGATION OF THE COMMITTEE

We suggest that you gentlemen, in considering this Military Procurement Bill, have a far greater obligation to your constituents and to the country than merely to pass on the specific requests of the Department of Defense for particular military expenditure authorizations.

We suggest that in the interest of our country you must ask yourselves and answer a number of specific questions involving where our country is headed, what should our foreign policy be, how large a military establishment do we need, and can we afford to sustain it?

We must keep America safe and free for all of our citizens in the years immediately ahead. This involves considering Federal expenditure to meet domestic needs, as well as funding requests from the Department of Defense for military expenditures. It is accordingly not enough for you to conclude that we do not need this additional aircraft carrier, or that the Defense Department has not asked for enough money for research and development, or whether the average manpower strength of our armed forces is fixed at an acceptable figure.

You must ask yourselves, and answer, not only to the House of Representatives, but to your own constituents, and to the country, much larger, far more searching questions. Among them are:

1. Is U.S. Military policy obsolete in the light of the international and domestic situation which confronts us? To this we give an unqualified yes.

2. What are the real requirements of our national security? We suggest they do not call for the enormous expenditures set forth in this Bill and in the requested military appropriations for which this Bill is a preliminary requirement. We suggest this is not a Bill for the defense of the U.S. but rather a Bill to enable us to carry on offensive military operations all over the world.

3. Who is the "real enemy" of the U.S.? Is it the Russians? Is it the Chinese? Is it the North Vietnamese? Or is it the Pentagon and its industrial allies who are tearing this country apart for no sensible reason affecting our national security. I suggest we have all been brainwashed by skillful propaganda paid for at taxpayers' expense for year after year, and that the foreign threat to our national security has been grossly exaggerated.

4. Is there justification for sacrificing our needs at home to feed the hungry, to educate the young, to clear our streams and air of pollution, to re-build our cities, to the demands for even greater national military offensive expenditures? We say no.

5. Are we content to have the U.S. case by the military and their contractor allies in the role of policemen of the "free" world? Are we engaged in a holy war against godless communism? We say no. There is room in this world for all people to live together in cooperation and harmony without the need for this constantly escalating arms race.

6. What are these excessive military expenditures doing to our country? We say they are tearing it apart, both our economy and our relationships with each other.

7. Where does the major thrust of inflation come from? We say it comes from our military budget which requires Federal deficit after Federal deficit, and makes the stabilization of wages, profits and the cost of living impossible.

8. And finally, how can we stop this nonsense? We say the first step is to cut our overall military budget from the 76 billion dollars requested by the President for fiscal 1972, to no more than the 60 billion which competent civilian students of the problem believe is adequate for our national security.

So far as H.R. 8687 is concerned, the following reductions in the authorizations requested by the Department of Defense should be made. Our recommendations are based in large part on the 400 page "Counter Budget—a blueprint for changing national priorities," recently published by the National Urban Coalition after a year of study by competent experts.

It is also based on a report of the panel of inquiry issued after "Citizen's Hearing on an Alternate Defense Budget for the U.S.," sponsored by the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy conducted on March 25th, 1970. Members of the panel were Dean of the Georgetown Law Center and former deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adrian S. Fisher, W. Willard Wirtz, former Secretary of Labor and myself. These two studies were conducted independently of each other. They reached almost the same conclusions. To be more specific:

1. We should stop further expenditures for MIRV—we don't need it. We have presently enormous overskill which rules out a first strike by the Russians. They have no defense against our present nuclear capability.

2. We should stop further expenditure for the B1 bomber. It is obsolete for effective nuclear airfare. The B.52 gives completely adequate bombing power for conventional war.

3. We should stop further expenditures on the ABM. It won't work anymore than the Soviet ABM will work. It merely stimulates the USSR to further efforts through the SS.9 to assure a swamping of the ABM defense.

4. With regard to nuclear or strategic weapons, it is obviously necessary pending the results of the SALT talks, to maintain an adequate nuclear deterrent. But a first strike on our part should be ruled out. And there is no need to produce or stockpile nuclear

war-heads in excess of our present inventory. While invulnerability of the deterrent is important, there is no need to build competing offensive systems to gratify the vanity of one or more of the Armed Services.

5. We should cut back average military manpower for the coming fiscal year from 2.6 million dollars to no more than 2 million at the most. Actually, 1.5 million would be enough to provide for our national security if we are to have no more Vietnams. This committee should frame its budget in the light of a withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam by the end of fiscal 1972 at the latest.

6. Conventional military forces and hardware should be cut back to a level adequate to defend territory of the U.S. against attack, and to participate on an appropriate basis with other countries with peacekeeping or peacemaking efforts in the Middle East Europe and elsewhere.

7. There are a number of obsolete or at least obsolescent or ineffective offensive and defensive systems which could be phased out without prejudice to national security. Among these are:

(a) The SAFE early warning system.

(b) The proposed 15th nuclear carrier. Actually, we do not need the 14 attack carrier task forces we now have.

(c) Further purchase of the very expensive C-5A troop carrier airplane of which we have presently enough for foreseeable emergencies.

(d) Further large expenditures for anti-submarine warfare which has proven it is ineffective.

(e) We should stop all expenditures for chemical, biological and radiological methods of warfare

(f) We could cut back on expenditures for anti-aircraft artillery since there is no reasonable prospect of a sophisticated air attack against U.S. forces engaged in defending our country.

(g) Nor do we need more attack tactical aircraft. Our present 22 wings are far more than we need.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion the committee should rid itself of the "worst case" psychology which the Pentagon uses to brainwash members of Congress and the general public. The Russian threat to our country's legitimate foreign policy objectives, is vastly over-estimated by the Pentagon. The Chinese threat is non existent. Our appraisal of the dangers to our national security should be based not on the most malevolent of intentions nor on an excessive appraisal of the capabilities of our alleged enemies. In the light of our critical domestic priorities it should be based on a reasonable appraisal of threats to the national security of the U.S. assuming we are determined to have no more Vietnams, to stay home and mind our own business, and to contribute in any reasonable way to peace-making or peace-keeping forces under the auspices of the U.N.

I do not consider myself an expert in the field of weaponry capable of passing final judgment on the necessity for either building or maintaining these sophisticated weapons, or on maintaining so large an armed force in uniform. I merely raise questions propounded by experts far more competent than I as to the necessity for these enormous expenditures, in the light of our domestic requirements and any rational security needs.

However, substantial cuts totalling many billions of dollars must be made promptly in our military budget in order to assure a proper re-ordering of our national priorities. The Federal government must play a larger role in meeting our domestic crises. The military budget is the only feasible place to find the money, and this committee has a heavy responsibility for meeting the challenge thus propounded.

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL—PART IV

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, this is another in a series of articles and testimony concerning the defense authorization bill. The testimony was given by Mr. Sanford Gottlieb in open hearings before the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. Gottlieb is currently an executive director of SANE and expresses the concern that many Americans have today. He addresses the question of American interests and commitments. Since 1947, we have assumed no less than 47 military commitments—and that number does not include Israel or Ethiopia. He further points out that these military commitments are supported primarily by general purpose forces. As much as $60 billion of the administration budget request for fiscal year 1972 is for general purpose and related forces, including Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, my amendment to hold the fiscal year 1972 authorization to the current year's level does not identify where particular cuts should be made. But, Mr. Gottlieb has clearly pointed out that the foreign policy assumptions which underly the lion's share of the administration's budget request are subject to serious question.

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF SANFORD GOTTLEIB, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF SANE

We very much appreciate the willingness of the Committee to hear public witnesses for the first time in open session during consideration of a military authorization bill. This is a most welcome step since the military budget in recent years has consumed about half of the controllable funds upon which Congress is asked to vote. This large slice of the federal pie exercises a major influence not only upon the foreign policy of the United States, but also upon the conditions of life for its citizens.

Since 1946 the United States has spent more than $1 trillion for military programs. We have invested in the most powerful military establishment in history. We have done so in the name of national security. As we understand it, the concept of national security can be divided into a primary function of preserving the safety of the American people (usually called deterrence in the nuclear age) and a secondary function of defending American interests elsewhere in the world.

We believe the Congress in general and the Armed Services Committees in particular have a near-impossible task of making judgments about military program requested by the Executive Branch. This is manifest where deterrence is concerned; it is much more obvious where American interests abroad are concerned. It is to these interests that we would like to address most of this testimony.

In his first State of the World Message President Nixon said, and he repeated again this year: "Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around."

Yet these interests are rarely defined at any level of government, and there has been no effort to separate *vital* interests from secondary interests. The United States has publicly assumed military commitments to 47 countries since 1947, often without defining our vital interests, the nature of the threat to these interests, or the possible consequences of American military involvement in these countries.

The 47 nations which have received public military commitments from the United States are:

Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty 1947): 1. Argentina. 2. Bolivia, 3. Brazil, 4. Chile, 5. Colombia, 6. Costa Rica, 7. Dominican Republic, 8. Ecuador, 9. El Salvador, 10. Guatemala, 11. Haiti, 12. Honduras, 13. Mexico, 14. Nicaragua, 15. Panama, 16. Paraguay, 17. Peru, 18. Trinidad and Tobago, 19. Uruguay, and 20. Venezuela.

North Atlantic Treaty (NATO, 1949): 21. Belgium, 22. Canada, 23. Denmark, 24. Federal Republic of Germany, 25. France, 26. Greece, 27. Iceland, 28. Italy, 29. Luxembourg, 30. the Netherlands, 31. Norway, 32. Portugal, 33. Turkey, 34. United Kingdom.

Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines (1951)—35.

Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS, 1951)—36 and 37.

Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO), 1954)—(38) Pakistan and (39) Thailand were added to the prior commitments made under other treaties with Australia, France, New Zealand, the Philippines and the United Kingdom. In addition, by a protocol signed on the same date as the SEATO Treaty, the states of (40) Cambodia, (41) Laos and (42) South Vietnam were designed for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty.

Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China (1954)—43.

Declaration Respecting the Baghdad Pact Between the United States of America and Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom (1958)—(44) Iran was added to the prior commitments made under other treaties with Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Liberia (1959)—45.

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan (1960)—46.

Joint Declaration by Spain and the United States of America Concerning the Renewal of the Defense Agreement of September 26, 1953 (1963) and Joint Communique of March 26, 1969—47.

This information comes from the study, "Collective Defense Treaties," prepared by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and published April 21, 1969. The fact that the Committee on Foreign Affairs no longer has any copies available is perhaps evidence that there has been intense interest in the question of national commitments. We hope so. May I suggest that the Armed Services Committee secure copies of this study from the Government Printing Office and make them available to the members. It is a most illuminating document.

The agreements listed in this document do not include the more informal commitments such as the one to Israel, or the secret commitments such as the one to train and assist a 40,000-man Ethiopian army, as revealed by the Senate Subcommittee on Security Agreements Abroad.

These military commitments by the United States are supported primarily by general pupose forces. The Administration's request for Fiscal Year 1972 for general purpose and related forces, including Vietnam, is $59.5 billion out of a total of $76 billion. The sum requested represents not only the lion's share of the military budget, but also an increase of $1.3 billion over the Fiscal 1971 level.

Why this increase? What is the nature of the threat to our national security which warrants this enormous sum?

In his 1971 State of the World Message President Nixon said: "In the last 20 years, the nature of the Communist challenges has been transformed. The Stalinist bloc has fragmented into competing centers of doctrine and power. One of the deepest conflicts in the world today is between Communist China and the Soviet Union. The most prevalent Communist threats now are not massive military invasions, but a more subtle mix of military, psychological and political pressures."

If the most prevalent Communist threats now are a more subtle mix of military, psy-

chological and political pressures, how and where do these pressures affect the vital interests and national security of the United States? And how are such pressures resisted by an increase in American conventional forces? Before the taxpayers are asked to spend more money for general purpose forces, it would seem to us that these questions must be addressed.

We are unaware that there is any generally-accepted theory of how the conventional military forces of a superpower can be used successfully to resist a subtle mix of military, psychological and political pressures, especially when that superpower has at least 48 allies on all continents. The war in Indochina has shown, at terrible cost, the limitations of American military power when used in a guerrilla war against a highly motivated foe. What is the effectiveness of this military power when its use is merely threatened to counter a subtle mix of pressures?

Let us be specific. Pakistan received an American military commitment as a party to the SEATO Treaty in 1954. Did that commitment prevent the Pakistanis from engaging in a war against India during this period, with both sides using American-made tanks? If the current tensions between East and West Pakistan lead to the political as well as geographic division of that unhappy country, will the American commitment enhance the security of either new state? Will the United States find itself being asked to make a 48th public commitment—to both Pakistans? If the Chinese apply a subtle mix of military, psychological and political pressure to West Pakistan, how will we carry out our commitment?

A careful reading of the Administration's statements indicates that American military forces may be used to deal with political agitation, insurgency and guerrilla warfare throughout the world. If this is so, we have learned nothing from Indo-China and the Nixon Doctrine is simply a cover for continued American military intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Quite apart from the rights and wrongs of such intervention, we should have learned by now that it often spells disaster for all parties concerned, including those whose homeland is far away.

Mr. Chairman, we know that the questions we have raised are bothersome. Our purpose in raising them is to encourage a discussion of the premises on which this country supports its military programs. As we have said before to this Committee, we do not have the answers but we intend to continue asking the questions until there is a meaningful dialogue on national security.

To move a step forward toward such a dialogue permit me to suggest a few basic criteria to help define a nation's vital interests:

1. Geographic proximity. Clearly, all nations are concerned about potentially hostile military activities near their borders. Where the United States is concerned this criterion would apply to Canada, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, and the waters surrounding Alaska and Hawaii.

2. Major trading partners. Nations are concerned with the security of other nations with which they conduct a substantial share of their trade or upon which they are primarily dependent for basic raw materials. Where the United States is concerned, this criterion applies mainly to Western Europe and Japan and the sea lanes to these regions. By the same criterion, Latin America and the Middle East are secondary interests.

Once we have cited these two basic and clear-cut criteria, we enter an area of fuzziness. Take, for example, the criterion of national affinity. Nations are likely to consider that they have a special interest in other areas populated by the same ethnic group or sharing the same culture or historical experience. However, this criterion raises more questions than it answers. Does the presence of millions of overseas Chinese throughout Southeast Asia give China a vital interest in that area? If Americans think that the United States has a vital interest in Western Europe because a majority of its population is descended from the peoples of that region, what is our interest in Southern and Eastern Europe from whose peoples about 40 million Americans are descended? And what of Western Africa from whose peoples about 11% of our population is descended?

Then, there may be special cases which amount to moral rather than vital interests. Israel could be considered in this category, as a country created under unique circumstances by the United Nations to provide a homeland for the survivors of genocide, in a region surrounded by hostile neighbors. It might help the discussion of the conflict in the Middle East if there were general acceptance within the United States of such a moral commitment, rather than the implication by some that we have a vital interest and by others that we have no interest in that area.

Mr. Chairman, it is clearly difficult to define a nation's vital interests. But surely this task must be undertaken if the United States is to measure whether its security is really endangered in a given region of the world. Unless vital interests are clearly at stake, there should be no military commitments except in very special circumstances.

If such rigorous standards were applied we might be able drastically to reduce our military commitments, our military expenditures, and our tendency to make other people's squabble our own.

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 10, 1971]

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL—PART V

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, the Defense Authorization Bill for fiscal year 1972 includes a significant increase for naval vessel procurement over the amount provided last year. In constant dollars, it is about $590 million more than the amount authorized last year and about $830 million more than was actually appropriated for fiscal year 1971. The major reason given for this increase is the need to replace the aging ships in the fleet. In particular it is noted that on the average, our major ships are 6 years older than those of the Soviets. Ships commissioned during World War II and the immediate postwar years still account for a major portion of the current active force. These ships will have to be retired in the next decade or so. However, the administration has not made clear how many of these ships must be replaced.

The problem has been called "block obsolescence" and has been a source of concern to the Navy and Armed Services Committee for many years. In an excellent analysis by Arnold M. Kuzmack of "Naval Force Levels and Modernization: An Analysis of Shipbuilding Requirements," recently published by the Brookings Institution, this problem is addressed. Mr. Kuzmack argues convincingly that modernization requirements cannot be separated from questions of force levels. However, a critical examination of the administration's budget request for fiscal year 1972 suggests that there is considerable confusion on this point. For example, maintenance of the fiscal year 1972 force levels would require as much as a 25 percent increase in shipbuilding over the amount requested for fiscal year 1972. On the other hand, lower force levels such as those implicit in the administration's budget as likely to prevail in the late seventies would result in the virtual disappearance of the "block obsolescence" problem.

With concise facts and clear reason, Mr. Kuzmack shows that alternative force levels for 1980 have a direct impact on the amount of ship construction needed during the next 5 years. To arrive at alternative force level requirements, he has focused on four major elements of naval forces: attack carrier—CVA—force levels; antisubmarine warfare—ASW—carrier—CVS—force levels; the nuclear attack submarine—SSN—annual building rate; and amphibious assault lift capability. Other naval forces are in direct support of these major force elements and can be derived using commonly accepted factors. To determine the number of ships that are available, it is necessary to determine the ships which must be retired. To do so, Mr. Kuzmack has accepted the Navy's rule of thumb. Although no specific age is associated with the maximum useful life of Navy ships, it has been the Navy's experience that an age of about 30 years for surface ships, perhaps slightly less for submarines, is a reasonable maximum life expectancy for the hull, propulsion machinery, and basic installations. Using Mr. Kuzmack's methodology, it is possible to determine the shipbuilding requirements to support alternative force levels for 1980.

Two alternatives are of particular interest in reviewing the fiscal year 1972 naval vessel procurement authorization: the force levels in the President's 1972 budget; and the force levels most likely to obtain in the late seventies.

The fiscal year 1972 force levels are interesting as a measure of the adequacy of recent and proposed ship construction. However, the administration has given little indication that these force levels can be maintained through the seventies. The CVS's are nearing 30 years old but there has been no mention of their replacement—although the budget provides procurement funds for a new generation sea-based ASW aircraft, the S-3A. Rather, the Navy is trying out a new CV concept whereby both attack and ASW aircraft would operate from the current CVA's. Nor has the administration implied that there will be more than 12 CVA's. Only 11 will be less than 30 years old in 1980 and none is requested in fiscal year 1972. Even a force of 12 requires approval of an additional CVA—such as CVAN—70. In the posture statement on the fiscal year 1972 budget Secretary Laird stated we will "keep the option open to authorize the next carrier (CVAN-70) in fiscal year 1973 or fiscal year 1974." In his analysis Mr. Kuzmack shows that no additional escorts need be built for a 12-carrier force given the escort ships approved to date. However, should a second all-nuclear task force be desired, we would need to build the nuclear guided missile frigate—DLGN—requested in fiscal year 1972. The SSN building rate could be maintained at five—to replace all conventional attack submarines on a 1-for-1 basis for a total SSN force of 105 in the early eighties, or terminated in fiscal year 1972 for a total of 69 SSN's, or phased down and terminated somewhere between 69 and 105. Hence, a range is still of interest. As for amphibious assault ships, the termination of the general purpose amphibious assault ship (LHA) has virtually guaranteed that lift capability will not exceed 1⅓ Marine division wing teams—MEF's—in the seventies.

Table I summarizes the major force components of these two alternatives:

TABLE I

	President's 1972 budget	Probable alternative
CVA force level	13	12
Antisubmarine warfare forces:		
CVS force level	3	0
SSN annual building rate	5	0–5
Amphibious assault capability (MEF)	1⅓	1⅓

These levels in turn determine the detailed force structure, including the various types of escort ships, amphibious assault ships, underway replenishment ships and fleet supports ship. In general, the planning factors used take into account the fact that, in most cases, new ships are more capable than the ships they replace. Thus, ships are generally replaced on less than a 1-for-1 basis. The results are summarized in table 2 which shows the alternatives broken down by broad ship categories:

TABLE 2.—ALTERNATIVE FORCE STRUCTURES, AS OF 1980

Ship category	President's 1972 budget	Probable alternative [1]
Attack aircraft carriers	13	12
ASW aircraft carriers	3	0
Attack submarines	94	69–94
Cruiser-destroyer forces	202	163
Amphibious assault ships	76	76
Mine countermeasures ships	61	61
Underway replenishment ships	47	43
Fleet support ships	61	51–56
Subtotal	557	475–505
Strategic forces	52	52
Other general-purpose forces	19	19
Total, Active Navy	628	546–576

[1] Corresponds to alternative 1 in "Naval Force Levels and Modernization," Arnold M. Kuzmack, the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1971, as updated to reflect the fiscal year 1972 budget.

There are 71 ships that are not included in the analysis. Of these, 52 are strategic nuclear forces: the 41 Polaris submarines and their support ships. The other 19 are patrol boats and a few miscellaneous auxiliaries. The force levels of these ships are determined by considerations that are quite separate from the sort of arguments associated with the major general purpose forces. Hence, they are held constant in both alternatives.

Given these force levels, the number of ships needed can be derived. Table 3 shows the shipbuilding required to maintain the force levels in the President's 1972 budget. The table assumes that modernization will be completed by 1980 by which time there will be no ships 30 years old or older. For each type of ship for which new construction is required, the table shows the required force level shown above, the number of ships funded through fiscal year 1971 that will be less than 30 years old in 1980, and the number of additional ships needed and their cost. The types of ships for which new construction is not required do not appear in the table. Since it takes about 4 years to build most naval ships—including administrative as well as production leadtimes—ships shown in this table would have to be funded during the 5 fiscal years, 1972–76:

TABLE 3.—SHIPBUILDING TO MAINTAIN FISCAL YEAR 1972 FORCE LEVEL, MODERNIZATION TO BE COMPLETED BY 1980

Type of ship	Force level	Available	Needed	Fiscal 1972–76 cost (millions of dollars)
Carriers:				
CVA, CVAN	13	11	2	1,900
CVS	3	0	3	935
Attack submarines: SSN	94	69	25	4,400
Cruiser-destroyer forces:				
DLGN	8	6	2	480
DDG	33	29	4	460
DD	33	23	10	860
DE	94	71	23	1,195
Amphibious assault ships:				
LSD	15	13	2	145
LST (20 knot)	22	20	2	75
LFS	2	0	2	145
Underway replenishment ships:				
AE	14	13	1	45
AFS	9	7	2	85
AOR	12	6	6	340
Fleet support ships:				
AS	6	2	4	430
ASR	10	2	8	295
AD	12	3	9	965
ATS	33	3	30	840
Total (fiscal year 1972 prices)			136	13,595
Average annual budget			27	2,719

The administration's request for ship construction for fiscal year 1972 supports this alternative in several respects: construction of SSN's beginning at a rate of five per year; construction of one of the last two DLGN's needed to have two all-nuclear carrier task forces; and continuation of the DD–963 program as part of the 30-ship contract. However, it falls short of the average annual budget needed to maintain these force levels. About $500 million would have to be made up in future years in addition to such major ships as two CVA's—or CVAN's, three CVS's and one more DLGN.

If the force levels are dropped to the levels implicit in the administration's budget as very likely for the late seventies, modernization requirements would drop considerably. Table 4 shows that a total of 55 to 85 ships would be needed at a cost of $3,490 to $8,215 million compared to the 137 ships needed to maintain the fiscal year 1972 force levels at a cost of $13,595 million. Likewise the average annual rate drops about $1 to $2 billion.

The table follows:

TABLE 4.—SHIPBUILDING REQUIRED FOR PROBABLE ALTERNATIVE FORCE LEVELS, MODERNIZATION TO BE COMPLETED BY 1980

Type of ships	Force level	Available	Needed	Fiscal 1972–76 cost (millions of dollars)
Carriers:				
CVA, CVAN	12	11	1	950
Attach submarines:				
SSN	69–94	69	0–25	0–4,400
Amphibious assault, ships:				
LSD	15	13	2	145
LST (20-knot)	22	20	2	75
LFS	2	0	2	145
Underway replenishment ships:				
AFS	8	7	1	40
AOR	10	6	4	230
Fleet support ships:				
AS	4–6	2	2–4	215–430
ASR	7–10	2	5–8	185–295
AD	10	3	7	750
ATS	30	3	27	755
Total (fiscal year 1972 prices)			55–85	3,490–8,215
Average annual budget			11–17	698–1,643

This alternative is noteworthy. The mixture of ships is quite different from that for previous years. Most of the spending is for auxiliary ships—underway replenishment and fleet support ships; in fiscal year 1969–71 there were essentially none. Conversely, there are few of the large frequently nuclear-powered warships that form the bulk of the program in recent years. In effect, we have completed most of the replacement for the warships—at this alternative force level—and now have to catch up on auxiliaries. The shipbuilding program for this alternative would thus require cancellation of a number of on-going procurement programs. Most striking, the 30-ship contract for the new DD–963 class destroyer would be cut back to about four ships.

Finally, the average annual budget for this alternative is highly sensitive to the SSN building rate—in this case, force levels of submarine support ships, AS and ASR, must also be varied.

Even looking beyond fiscal year 1976, only 17 major ships would have to be built to retain these alternative forces through 1985 and the average annual budget would be somewhat less than even that projected for fiscal years 1972–76. Looking further into the future and considering those ships that will be 20 to 24 years old in 1980 and thus due for replacement in fiscal years 1982–86, the average annual budget for new ship construction for the 10 fiscal years 1977–86 would be only about $900 million, still well below recent levels. Hence, if force levels like those in this alternative are adopted for the long term the outlook is for large reductions in the shipbuilding budget lasting well toward 1990.

For purposes of comparison, table 5 shows in millions of current dollars the program for fiscal years 1969–71 and the authorization request for 1972.

TABLE 5.—SHIPBUILDING BUDGET IN CURRENT DOLLARS

[In millions of dollars]

	1969	1970	1971	President's 1972 budget
New construction	589.6	1,907.4	1,690.5	2,082.4
Conversion	438.9	406.4	509.1	497.2
Other	41.6	150.3	390.6	756.2
Total	1,070.1	2,464.1	2,590.2	3,335.8

The figures for new construction cover the cost of building 5, 10, 14, and 19 ships, respectively.

These figures can be compared with the average annual budget for new construction of the two alternatives discussed above: to maintain fiscal year 1972 force levels would require construction of 27 ships per year for about $2,719 million and the probable alternative would require construction of 11 to 17 ships per year for about $698 to $1,643 million.

Mr. Speaker, my amendment to hold the authorization for fiscal year 1972 to the level authorized for fiscal year 1971 does not cut specific programs or particular services. However, it appears that a very significant amount could come from new ship construction to achieve a better balanced program than that proposed by the administration

and one compatible with the size and mix of forces we are most likely and able to operate in the late seventies.

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 14, 1971]

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL—PART VI

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, this is the last of a series of articles which I have submitted to the RECORD on the defense authorization bill. In presenting the 1972 defense budget, the administration placed heavy emphasis on the need for modernization "to offset prior year deferrals because of Southeast Asia requirements." If this were so, there might be a case for increasing procurement—and probably R. & D. However, the facts do not support the administration's argument.

If there was a backlog in modernization requirements during the Vietnam war, there should be a decrease in procurement for non-Vietnam general-purpose forces during the war from the prewar level after allowing for price and pay increases. Strategic forces should be treated separately since they were subject to factors independent of the war.

The following table shows obligations for procurement for fiscal year 1964–1972. Rather than a decrease as the administration's position would suggest, procurement for non-Vietnam general-purpose forces as a whole actually increased on the average over the 6-year period 1965–71.

Procurement use	In billions of constant 1972 dollars		
	1964	1965–71	1972
Total	19.3	23.7	19.7
Strategic nuclear forces	6.1	3.3	3.3
Vietnam		5.6	2.3
Non-Vietnam general-purpose forces	13.2	14.8	14.1

Source: Data for fiscal years 1964–71 from Charles L. Schultze, et alia., Setting National Priorities: The 1972 Budget, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1971, p. 105. The fiscal year 1972 budget request has been broken out on a similar basis for comparison.

It should be noted, however, that not all of these funds have been expended. A similar breakout of outlays during the fiscal year 1965–71 period shows that about $10 billion has yet to be obligated and expended for non-Vietnam—or "baseline—general-purpose forces. These funds should be expended in the near future. This leadtime delay in spending the funds authorized to date could largely explain the delays in modernization observed in many of the forces.

Aside from the funds specifically earmarked for non-Vietnam forces, the war itself will leave the general-purpose forces with new weapon systems and equipment. As older equipment attrited during the war, it was replaced. This has permitted the services to replace billions of dollars worth of older equipment in their inventories.

In other cases, the services have obtained new weapons and equipment to cope with the conditions which prevail in Vietnam. For example, the Army has obtained the M–16 rifle and become heavily dependent on helicopters.

In addition to being newer than what they replaced, these weapons and equipment are more effective. Aircraft replacements, for example, have incorporated qualitative improvements in firepower, navigation and avionics. The intratheater mobility of land forces has been significantly increased with the greater reliance of helicopters in lieu of ground systems. Current communications systems are more reliable. And the overall firepower available to combat units has increased greatly.

Even if modernization of general-purpose forces during the war had not kept pace with the pre-Vietnam level of spending, we would expect some drop in total procurement in fiscal year 1972 in constant dollars. Force levels for all general purpose forces have declined from the pre-Vietnam level. The fiscal year 1972 budget calls for three less Army divisions, five less Air Force and Navy tactical air wings, eight less attack and antisubmarine carriers, and 74 fewer major warships. Hence, modernization at the pre-Vietnam rate would result in a reduction in total annual procurement after allowing for price and pay increases. But, the administration's fiscal year 1972 budget includes about $1 billion more in procurement for non-Vietnam general purpose forces than the fiscal year 1964 budget, adjusted to reflect equivalent purchasing power.

Mr. Speaker, my amendment to hold the fiscal year 1972 authorization to the amount authorized last year does not cut particular programs or even single out procurement or R. & D. Rather, my amendment would permit the Defense Department to make the determination where the cuts should be made. But, the facts clearly show that a significant portion of that reduction could come from procurement for modernization of the post-Vietnam general-purpose forces.

DAIRY MONTH IN ALASKA

HON. NICK BEGICH

OF ALASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. BEGICH. Mr. Speaker, Alaska's agricultural industry is still in the developmental stage, but the prospects for the future are attractive. Approximately 2 million acres of Alaskan soil are considered agricultural. More than 800,000 acres are considered tillable. However, currently only about 16,000 acres are being used for crops and the grazing lands have been used very little.

The two important farming areas are in the Matanuska and Tanana Valleys, near Anchorage and Fairbanks.

The Alaskan farmer in these areas enjoys a desirable agricultural climate with almost continuous sunlight throughout the summer.

During June, which has been designated as dairy month, Alaskan farmers have reason to be proud of their record of milk production. In 1969, total cash receipts from the sale of all agricultural products in the State totaled nearly $3.8 million. The sale of dairy products accounted for about $1.9, or approximately 49 percent of the total. This past year farmers in Alaska produced 2.35 million gallons of milk with a farm value of $2.1 million. These data clearly demonstrate the importance of dairy production in the State.

It has been generally accepted for some time now that of all foods none is more important to the health of the individual than milk. It is the principal food of infants and children, and of the ill and aged, for which there is no satisfactory substitute. The inclusion of adequate amounts of milk in our diets is necessary to the proper development of the bodies and minds of our children, and for the maintenance of good health in all age groups. Milk or some form of milk product is consumed daily by practically every person in Alaska and throughout the entire Nation.

Alaskan farmers are doing an excellent job of providing the people of Alaska with an adequate supply of this almost perfect food.

CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

HON. NORMAN F. LENT

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. LENT. Mr. Speaker, recently, a speech dealing with corporate responsibility was presented to the Conference on Corporate Responsibility by Thomas W. McMahon, Jr., executive vice-president of the Chase Manhattan Bank.

The speech came to my attention and I commend it here to my colleagues for their own information:

REMARKS BY THOMAS W. MCMAHON, JR.

I will try to outline briefly some of the questions raised by the very concept of a "corporate responsibility officer," then I will point a few ways we at Chase are striving to answer these questions and meet future challenges.

To begin with, I am not *the* corporate responsibility officer for our bank. Rather, I am one of a number of line and staff officers who have corporate responsibility as a major part of their function. This distinction is, I believe, important for several reasons.

First, I doubt that anyone, despite all the studies made, can in any definitive way describe just what corporate responsibility is. Though some "don't's" seem fairly clear, the solid "do's" are few and far between. Not only is that art of measuring social responsibility in its infancy, but there are also vast differences between companies and even between various parts of a single company.

Second, I do not feel you can separate out corporate responsibility as the role of one man or one division within an organization. You must strive to involve the whole fabric of the company in terms of everyday operations as well as special social programs. The "house do-gooder" who does not know his house and have control over it will not be able to do much good.

Finally, following this line of argument, the only true corporate responsibility officer must be the chief executive who has total responsibility, for social awareness must also be total. Yet here again, it is not enough just to have a responsible chief executive who expounds a progressive philosophy. The chief must in turn involve people throughout his company, all the way up and down the line, if he is to be successful. Corporate responsibility must be treated as an integral corporate goal just like profitability or efficiency.

Without such thorough involvement and returning of the corporation to a "social bottom line," I am afraid that we will only achieve rhetorical satisfaction. H. L. Mencken once described the impotent reformer as a man who, "perceiving that a rose smells better than a cabbage, concludes that it will also make better soup."

At our bank, we have endeavored to get the cabbage and the rose together through our organizational concept that we call "coordinated decentralization"—a term that, among other benefits, totally confounds both critics and management consultants.

What this means is that we have set up a specific corporate responsibility function in each appropriate line area.

Within our real estate department, we have a special full-time urban lending staff responsible for low and moderate income housing and related community facilities

such as Day Care. This year's goal for these purposes is $100 million in short and long term loans, as well as necessary technical assistance.

In my own department, we have a Community Economic Development Division responsible for loans that do not meet ordinary credit standards to minority businessmen. Over the past 18 months, we have placed some $8 million in loans of this type in nearly 200 businesses, again putting great stress on managerial help to fill the gaps.

In our Human Resources Department, we have close to 70 training and upgrading programs, many aimed at minority employees from disadvantaged neighborhoods. Thirty per cent of our staff now come from minority groups.

In other areas, we have two urban economists and an Environment Technical Director who give guidance to senior management and lending officers on overall conditions, strategy, and loan policy. We have, for instance, recently instituted an environmental policy for our lending areas, and are now planning a series of programs to assure its effectiveness. In fact, pollution in the long run doesn't make economic sense. A facility that must be closed down is a loss to both its owner, its banker and to the total community.

These, then, are an indication of the decentralized side of coordinated decentralization. The coordination comes through two mechanisms—a senior level urban affairs committee that meets monthly to review progress and make policy recommendations. A staff urban affairs division is responsible for coordination, program development, strategy planning, and liaison with corresponding community and governmental groups.

The main thrust of this effort has been to get as many people as possible involved. We now have some 50 people working full-time in urban and environmental functions, and over 300 more on a part-time or voluntary basis. Our management officer trainees, for instance, as part of their job, give technical help to less advantaged businessmen and community groups. The bank's gross social expense budget is now $3–4 million and we have some $150 million committed in soft loans and relatively low yield loans for subsidized housing and community facilities. Through the various programs involved, we work with nearly 200 community groups and governmental agencies.

In social responsibility, as I have indicated, we feel involvement is the key—of our whole organization, of customers, of the general public, of government, of everybody. We also feel that we've made some progress toward this goal, though it always takes longer to involve people than to issue policy statements or simply give to a worthy cause. Still, however, those of you from New York know it is far from "Fun City," and all of us know that the idea of "Fun City" is getting more and more like the lost city of Atlantis.

So, in closing, let me outline quickly four challenges I see to making corporate responsibility more meaningful and effetcive.

First, we must have much better planning internally and externally.

How does what we are doing really relate to our corporate goals and functions, to our employees, to the environments on which we depend, to the uses of our tax dollars, to our long-range objectives? How does what we are doing or should be doing relate to plans and needs of others such as community groups and government at all levels? How can we better mesh these needs and goals, and spur sounder regional planning by all concerned parties? How can we help community and government organizations and how can they help us? How can we take advantage of our developing expertise in social problem solving to break new ground?

Second, we must do more to cooperate within the private sector and to involve many other businesses.

Much of my own time recently has been spent as chairman of the American Bankers Association Urban Affairs Committee. From this experience, I have been learning just how challenging and rewarding it is to forge joint efforts. For instance, we early set a $1 billion goal for loans that would not ordinarily be made to minority businesses. Realizing that a goal alone was not enough, we once again employed the concept of coordinated decentralization to urge cooperation and spread experience at the local bank level in some 50 key urban centers. The results have been most rewarding. Nationally, we're now underway with an industry-sponsored program to provide badly needed capital to minority banks. In my own city, we recently set a $1 million joint-bank MESBIC to complement our lending efforts.

Third, we must work increasingly closely with the public sector at all levels—both in program implementation and policy development.

If government can't solve our social problems alone, neither can business. We are constantly running into roadblocks such as building and zoning codes, vague environmental standards, uneven performance demands, and unnecessary red tape. It is no longer sufficient to sit back and gripe about big government or, ironically, say it is all government's responsibility. We must take the initiative in working out better schemes, whether they relate to minority enterprise, housing, new towns or a host of other questions. Moreover, we must be prepared to take stands on broader policy questions such as revenue sharing or welfare reform.

In trying to divide up responsibility between the public and private sectors, we too often get into a "chicken or egg" controversy. The fact is we can't have one without the other.

Fourth, we need sharper mechanisms to measure social progress and social needs—to more clearly determine the effects of what we are doing, what we should be doing, and to choose between alterative investments.

Just what is the social impact of the corporation—in terms of taxes, salaries, benefits, location, customers, purchases, holding of government and other securities, products, direct social programs, and so on? What do we really mean when we explain our social expenditures as long-term investments for a healthy and profitable environment? How can these intangibles be reflected in a profit and loss statement?

These are tough questions but they are no longer academic. Any breakthrough in social problem-solving, by either the public or private sector, will demand answers to them.

Summing up, I have tried to outline a few of the limits and challenges of corporate responsibility as I see them. I obvously do not have answers to all of these questions, and they are not necessarily new. Hopefully, however, we can at least define them better at meetings such as this.

NIXON'S NEW TRADE REGULATIONS APPLAUDED

HON. BILL FRENZEL

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, this week President Nixon announced the new trade regulations affecting commerce with Communist nations including Mainland China. In my judgment, the most significant item was the President's cancellation of the existing U.S. policy requiring that 50 percent of American exports to these countries move in "American bottoms."

The policy of requiring the use of American carriers was established by President Kennedy and has succeeded in stopping the sale of American agricultural products to Communist nations. I am informed that the last sale of grain was made to Russia in 1964, and since that time the Russians have refused to buy from us, because of the added cost of shipping by American carriers.

This "ship American" policy was founded on good intentions, but like many well-intentioned ideas, it simply did not work. It has not resulted in one new American job nor has it resulted in the continuation of existing American jobs.

The President showed keen insight into the long-term problem of expanding our export markets and ultimately reducing our negative balance of trade by eliminating the "American bottoms" provision.

The President's action was especially significant to the agricultural areas of the Midwest, including the State of Minnesota. At a time when many critics are only too happy to criticize Presidential directives, it should be emphasized strongly that this particular action was a mighty Presidential blow in favor of increased American exports and in favor of American agriculture. I join the people of my area in commending the President for this action.

HOUSE RESOLUTION 319

HON. ANDREW JACOBS, JR.

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, the following is the language of House Resolution 319, which I introduced on March 17, 1971. I was hoping it might catch the attention of the administration:

H. RES. 319

Whereas the President of the United States on March 4, 1971, stated that his policy is that: "as long as there are American POW's in North Vietnam we will have to maintain a residual force in South Vietnam. That is the least we can negotiate for."

Whereas Madam Nguyen Thi Binh, chief delegate of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam stated on September 17, 1970, that the policy of her government is "In case the United States Government decalres it will withdraw from South Vietnam all its troops and those of the other foreign countries in the United States camp, and the parties will engage at once in discussion on:

"The question of ensuring safety for the total withdrawal from South Vietnam of United States troops and those of the other foreign countries in the United Stames camp.

"The question of releasing captured military men."

Resolved, That the United States shall forthwith propose at the Paris peace talks that in return for the return of all American prisoners held in Indochina, the United States shall withdraw all its Armed Forces from Vietnam within sixty days following the signing of the agreement: Provided, That the

agreement shall contain guarantee by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of safe conduct out of Vietnam for all American prisoners and all American Armed Forces simultaneously.

KEEP "JOBS FOR VETERANS" IN HIGH GEAR

HON. CARL D. PERKINS

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. PERKINS. Mr. Speaker, I insert in the RECORD an excerpt from the American Legion Advance entitled "Keep 'Jobs for Veterans' in High Gear."

This summer, the American Legion begins its fourth year of an intensified program to contact and assist the newly discharged veterans in their return to civilian life. Many American Legion Posts (and their Auxiliary Units) are implementing this program with a wide variety of activities, but they all contain the following factors:

1. An expression of the Legion's appreciation of the young veteran's service.

2. An offer of help the young veteran may need in readjustment to civilian status—aid in getting medical attention, assistance in obtaining further educational benefits, and guidance in getting a job.

NATIONAL "JOBS FOR VETERANS" PROGRAM

And that last item has become a problem which has reached such proportions that a national American Legion "Jobs for Veterans" program has been established.

Many American Legionnaires are of an age to have experienced or at least observed at close hand the disastrous effect of joblessness in the 1930's. Some victims of that period never recovered their self-respect or their independence. But consider how much more shattering is the effect of prolonged joblessness today when the vast majority of Americans are enjoying a degree of affluence never before known. At the same time, inflation stretches even thinner the dwindling resources of the young, jobless veteran.

The newly discharged veteran of today has performed a very difficult task that his country asked of him. Yet, when he returns to civilian life he is apt to become rapidly disillusioned about the value of the service he has honorably performed for his country. Strident voices of protest raised by some elements of dissent may cause him to have some doubts concerning where he stands in this topsy-turvey society of the 1970's.

YOUNG VETERAN'S CONCERN

Moreover, he is concerned about his future. He knows that jobs are scarce. He has heard that GI Bill allowances will not meet the cost of further education or training. And he may be included in that 20 per cent of the returning veterans who have either limited or no vocational skills.

Shortly after The American Legion launched its "Jobs for Veterans" program in 17 pilot states, President Richard M. Nixon called for all-out support of appropriate federal agencies to aid the program. This permits the coordination of job assistance with the Veterans Administration, the Department of Labor, and the various state employment service agencies.

When he announced his support of the program, President Nixon said, "'Jobs for Veterans' is a nationwide effort to highlight the quality of the American veteran whose blend of skills and self-discipline make him an ideal candidate for employment. He has proved himself in the military—all he needs is the opportunity to demonstrate that he can contribute as much in civilian employment."

President Nixon appointed a National Advisory Committee for the "Jobs for Veterans" program under the chairmanship of James F. Oates. National Commander Alfred P. Chamie of The American Legion is a member of this distinguished panel of leaders representing government, business, labor, and welfare.

PROMOTIONAL AIDS AVAILABLE

The National Organization of The American Legion has prepared a variety of promotional aids—television spot announcement, radio spot announcements, newspaper cooperative advertising materials, press releases, etc.—to help promote the program. In addition, there have been other promotional aids prepared and distributed by governmental agencies.

But good intentions, hopeful promises, and press releases are not enough. This decade has been labeled by some as the "socially sensitive seventies." Any institution—governmental, commercial, or non-profit—which fails to respond to legitimate social needs is asking for trouble. For the young veteran of today an adequate job is a legitimate social need.

CHECK LOCAL PARTICIPATION

Has the mayor of your city appointed a veterans' employment task force to tie in with the national program? If so, is there a Legionnaire from your post on it? If there isn't such a group already functioning, your post should take the initiative in calling upon the mayor to request that such action be taken. This task force will provide the action on the front line where veterans and jobs are brought together.

Of course, the task force is just the first step in the program. This local committee is not to be created just to talk. It needs to be an action group, working with vigor and imagination in the community to see that veterans receive the preference and priority in employment to which they are entitled—legally, as well as morally.

Another major contribution your post can make in this campaign is to appeal strongly to those employers who are members of your post to lead the way in the employment of veterans.

The United States now is in the midst of the largest and most welcome demobilization since the end of World War II. Military separations are running in excess of 80,000 per month. And those young men are returning to a job market that's tighter than at any point in the last 10 years.

MORE THAN 300,000 VIET-TIME VETS UNEMPLOYED

This is the type of challenge which has been the crucible of The American Legion throughout its history. It is estimated that more than 300,000 of our Viet-Time Veterans are currently out of work. It is imperative that each community expand its jobs and training opportunities for veterans.

Guidelines for successful post programs have resulted from some of the original pilot programs in 17 states. Naturally, these should be modified and adapted to fit the situation in your own community:

1. Appoint an employment chairman. If possible, use influential businessmen on employment committees.

2. Contact nearest Veterans Employment Representative of your state's employment commission. Invite him to a post meeting to outline steps now being taken to secure jobs for returning and other older veterans.

3. Discuss with the Veterans Employment Representative ways that personal contacts with new veterans will reach all returning veterans and will be more effective.

4. Determine the type of information that would be most helpful in outlining skills, training, and job preferences of new veterans.

5. Contact other civic, fraternal and veterans organizations, asking that one or more returning veterans (including their families, if possible) be honored at an appropriate function.

6. Work out a procedure with the Veterans Employment Representative to circularize other participating organizations in the program with individual resume for each veteran.

7. Contact all news media—newspapers, radio, and tv stations—concerning the program at every opportunity.

8. Establish a recognition awards program.

9. Provide a system for making direct, personal contact with jobless veterans to give them reliable information on training facilities, job openings, education, etc. Recognize that in many cases they will not come to you. You have to go to them.

Above all, keep in mind that The American Legion's primary purpose is to get that young man into a job situation where a job can result. Leave it up to the Veterans Employment Service, to the state employment security offices, to the directors of personnel in business, to Civil Service personnel directors, and others the actual placement of the veteran.

The "Jobs for Veterans" project is a part of The American Legion's continuing service contact program for the newest generation of war veterans. The Legion's goal is that each veteran requiring job assistance will be placed in contact with a potential employer, particularly in the private sector, on a first-person basis, with continued contacts until a job opportunity is found; if he is not equipped to fill a job, to steer him into the necessary training.

INTRODUCTION OF BILL TO TREAT GI'S DISHONORABLY DISCHARGED BECAUSE OF DRUG ADDICTION

HON. LOUISE DAY HICKS

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mrs. HICKS of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce a bill which would extend Veterans' Administration medical benefits to those dishonorably discharged from the military, because of drug addiction.

There has been a sudden explosion of the drug epidemic in our armed services, not unlike that in our civilian society. A recent estimate from the provost marshal's office in Saigon indicates that between 10 and 15 percent of the American troops in Vietnam are on hard drugs. This estimate would mean 30,000 to 40,000 addicts in Vietnam, and this is thought to be a conservative estimate.

The initial response of the military leadership was stern. They felt that drug addiction is a crime for which the answer is strict enforcement and harsh punishment. In their view, addicts are a disgrace to their uniforms and should be drummed out of the armed services with dishonorable discharge.

However, in November 1970, the Pentagon issued a new policy of treating drug users, rather than prosecuting them. Instead of punishment usually leading to a dishonorable discharge, drug abusers who seek it now receive treatment under a new program of amnesty. Soldiers who are addicted beyond rehabilitation are now receiving honorable discharges—not dishonorable ones that preclude treat-

ment in Veterans' Administration hospitals.

The VA has made plans to provide 30 special units to care for narcotics victims by July 1972, with five units already in operation capable of treating 200 addicts each. Yet those dishonorably discharged prior to the enlightened Pentagon policy still cannot receive VA treatment.

Therefore, I am introdcing today a bill which would authorize the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to provide care and treatment for ceraain former members of the Armed Forces addicted to narcotic drugs. The "certain" members are those who were discharged dishonorably, because of drug addiction.

I believe it is important for the Armed Forces to assert national leadership in identifying drug abusers, and once recognized, insure that treatment and rehabilitation are available to all who have served their country. This is no less important for those addicts now serving on active duty who are now receiving treatment as it is for those who were treated punitively in being released dishonorably from the Army. Military leadership in handling the drug problem would be a distinct contribution toward the abatement of this national tragedy.

The bill which I am introducing today provides the possibility of treatment for thousands who have been sent home with an addiction which is all too often supported by regular criminal activity. It is madness to allow the military to return addicts to civilian life and not provide for their treatment.

OPIUM TRAFFIC IN INDOCHINA

HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to include in the RECORD a news article on the recent testimony of John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, before the House Select Committee on Crime during hearings on the importation of opium into the United States. The article was written by Tom Foley and appeared in the Los Angeles Times on June 3.

Mr. Foley's coverage of the proceedings of that day are excellent and describe some of the startling findings we learned on the involvement of the governments and some high officials in many Southeast Asia countries in illegal drug traffic.

I commend this article to the attention of all who have an interest in this subject.

[From the Los Angeles Times, June 3, 1971]

ASIAN OFFICIALS PROTECT HEROIN SALE, PANEL TOLD—THEY MAY PROFIT FROM SUPPLYING DRUGS TO U.S. SOLDIERS, NARCOTICS CHIEF SAYS

(By Thomas J. Foley)

WASHINGTON.—The government's chief narcotics enforcement officer said Wednesday that officials of friendly Southeast Asia governments are protecting and may even have an interest in heroin traffic to American servicemen in Vietnam.

In testimony before the House Crime Committee, John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, also said heroin had been unwittingly smuggled into South Vietnam on airplanes of the CIA-operated Air America.

Committee Chairman Claude Pepper (D-Fla.) and other members urged the Administration to take a stronger stand with foreign friendly governments to force a halt to illicit drug traffic.

These included Turkey and France, which respectively grow and process the overwhelming amount of the opium smuggled into the United States as heroin.

RIGHT TO ASK AID

"We're committed to risk our own cities in a nuclear war if any French city is attacked by the Communists," Pepper said, "and we have the right not only to ask but to demand that the French take emergency action to help us."

Ingersoll, who recently returned from discussions with Southeast Asia leaders on the heroin problem, said he doubted that any policy-making officials of the countries—Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam—are involved in the illicit drug traffic.

Burma, Thailand and Laos account for about 80 percent of the world's opium production, he said.

But he told newsmen after the hearing that many lower-lever officials, including members of the South Vietnamese Legislature, deal in opium. He said some legislators have friends in President Nguyen Van Thieu's cabinet.

Ingersoll told the committee that heroin refineries were under control of insurgents in Burma and Thailand but that those in Laos are protected by elements of the royal Laotian armed forces.

RAMPARTS DISCLOSURES

He said that while management and ownership of the Laotian refineries appear to be primarily in the hands of ethanic Chinese citizens of that nation, "some reports suggest" that a senior Laotian air force officer may have an ownership interest in some of the plants.

When Rep. Jerome R. Waldie (D-Calif.) noted that Ramparts magazine had identified the official as Gen. Ouane Rathiqoune, Ingersoll replied that "general speculation" conceded this.

Ingersoll denied one contention of the Ramparts article. It maintained that remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang army left in the area are involved in heroin production and are in the employ of the CIA for operations on the China mainland.

But Ingersoll conceded that Air America planes had been used in the past for smuggling heroin—just as regular commercial airliners have been used to smuggle it into the United States.

He told newsmen later that 80 kilograms were seized on an Air America plane at the huge Tan Son Hut Air Base outside Saigon only three or four weeks ago.

During the hearing, Waldie also asked Ingersoll about a Ramparts report that the secret CIA base of Long Cheng, used to support the U.S.-paid Meo tribesmen, was a distribution point for heroin to be shipped into South Vietnam.

Ingersoll said he had not heard of that. However, he later said he had discussed the general illicit drug problem with CIA Director Richard Helms. He said Helms denied the CIA was involved in any way, and that he believed him.

"The Meo tribesmen are something else," Ingersoll said, "but I don't blame the CIA for what the tribesmen do."

POOR CIA SECURITY

Waldie said CIA security was apparently "abysmally poor, since those in the CIA employ used the base and facilities for the illicit traffic."

The narcotics chief sought to allay criticism by congressmen of U.S. efforts to get the cooperation of the Asian governments to crack down on the drug traffic.

He said the United States had virtually no leverage over the Burma government, since the last existing aid program is being phased out. The opium-growing area in Thailand is in the hands of insurgents, Ingersoll said, but the Bangkok government is taking steps to try to control it.

He said Laotian officials were "most responsive" even though some high-ranking officials were involved.

VIETNAM SMUGGLING

Ingersoll said the Saigon government had taken several steps to crack down on the smuggling, including a shakeup of its customs officials, an increase in the size of its central police force dealing with the problem and the appointment of a special task force by President Thieu.

He also said he was assigning three additional agents to the Far East and that the Defense Department had placed off limits areas of open heroin dealing.

A SYMBOLIC FLAG CEREMONY

HON. FRANK HORTON

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, during these times, when, on one hand, the patriotism of some of our Nation's finest leaders is questioned; and when, on the other, it is often scorned to be patriotic, we must stop to consider what the flag and patriotism actually mean.

Sunday, in Rochester, N.Y., in my congressional district, I attended a flag ceremony at the Rochester Polish People's Home. It was the first flag raising at the home. I would like to share the ceremony with my colleagues for it vividly made the significance of the flag clear to all who attended.

Mr. Ray Gatz, president of the home, introduced the guests, who represented local, county, State, and Federal legislative bodies, as well as the Polish-American and American Legion Posts.

Officials included Rochester Mayor Stephen May, State Assemblyman Raymond Lill, City Councilman Urban Kress, Monroe County Legislators Nicholas Santaro and Sam Poppick.

County Judge Arthur Curran also attended. Judge Curran was especially aware of the value of the flag. He recently received the flag from the coffin of his son, a marine, who was killed in Japan.

Also present were James O'Grady, commander of the Michalski Post; Joseph Zabuchek, commander of the Pulaski Post; Joseph DeMeis, commander of the Monroe County American Legion Post; and Edmund R. Przysinda, president of Hudson Avenue Area Association.

During the ceremony, I presented a flag which had flown over the Capitol to Mr. Gatz. It was blessed by Father Pietrzykowski and raised by Mr. Gatz. County Commander DeMeis led the Pledge of Allegiance.

Commander Joseph Wituszyski presented the Polish flag, which was blessed by Father Pietrzykowski, and raised. The Polish hymn was sung.

In a touching gesture, a Polish American war veteran sprinkled soil from Poland on the American soil around the flag pole.

It was as if these acts were symbolic of the brotherhood and friendship between countries and among Americans of different backgrounds and persuasions.

Watching the ceremony, I wished that the differences which now divide our country could be erased and the warm bonds of friendship and concern for the United States displayed at this ceremony could join all Americans.

Wanda V. Pietrzak of the Polish People's Home deserves special mention and credit for the ceremony was her idea. She planned and directed the event.

Before the ceremony was concluded, the winning essay in a contest sponsored by the Rochester Polish Arts Group, on the topic "What the Flag Means to Me" was read. It was written by 12-year-old Mary Reidl, of 478 Peart Avenue, Irondequoit, N.Y. I would like to share her thoughts with my colleagues in the House. Her essay follows:

WHAT THE AMERICAN FLAG MEANS TO ME

To me the American Flag means freedom. It means the love and the glory of our own country. It is the American heritage. The way our ancestors fought to gain freedom almost 200 years ago. It is the growth of our country. It symbolizes the blood that is or was shed on the battle fields. It is the honor in which the American people serve their country.

Yes, to me the flag truly means the love and the glory and the honored of this beautiful country of ours. That is what the American Flag means to me.

LITHUANIA UNDER COMMUNIST OPPRESSION FOR 30 YEARS

HON. H. ALLEN SMITH

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, We, in America, pause in our daily routine to reflect on the fate of the peoples of the ancient country of Lithuania who have lived under Communist Russian domination since 1940.

As we continue efforts to preserve the rights of self-determination for the peoples of South Vietnam, let us be ever more mindful of the brutal occupation of the countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

We recognize their courageous struggles over the past 30 years to restore national identity and gain independence from oppression.

House Concurrent Resolution 416 of the 89th Congress in support of the individual rights of these oppressed people, sought to focus attention throughout the world by means of the United Nations and other international forums. Let us renew our efforts and strengthen our resolve to bring them their freedom and to bring peace in our time to all nations of the earth.

GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S VIEWS AND PHILOSOPHY ON OUR NATION AND OUR MILITARY SERVICE

HON. GEORGE A. GOODLING

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, just recently I was privileged to attend a ceremony that was part of the 17th annual national strategy seminar of the U.S. Army War College, held at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., my congressional district.

Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, was the principal speaker for the closing session. Because of the nature of the event, his remarks were considered to be classified; hence, these comments cannot be made public.

General Westmoreland did, however, on June 11, 1971, present an address to the Cleveland Chapter of Sigma Delta Chi in Cleveland, Ohio. Because this presentation reflects General Westmoreland's views and philosophy on various important matters relating to our Nation and our military service, I insert this address into the RECORD and commend it to the attention of my colleagues:

ADDRESS BY GEN. W. C. WESTMORELAND

I am pleased at this opportunity to meet, and speak to the members of the Cleveland Chapter of Sigma Delta Chi . . . men and women dedicated to the highest professional ideals of journalism. I might add that it is a rare occasion when a public servant can manage to have as a captive audience newspapermen and women, broadcasters, public relations people, and managing editors.

Your profession and mine have more things in common than might meet the eye. Neither the journalist nor the soldier lacks lay advice on how to run his business. . . . And we are both frequently blamed for the ills of our society. On the more positive side, we also have much in common. You are concerned with the open pursuit of truth, freedom of speech, and freedom of information. As a soldier, I am concerned with protecting the Nation so that these and other freedoms may continue to flourish in our country. I think we have both succeeded in the pursuit of these goals. Indeed, our success may be measured in part by the very criticism we receive.

Tonight I want to address the role of the Army and the military within our country in these uncertain times. I shall keep in mind Joseph Pulitzer's advice to the newspaperman when he said:

"Put it before them briefly so they will read it, clearly so they will appreciate it, picturesquely so they will remember it, and above all, accurately so they will be guided by its light."

I will not make any promises about my speech tonight being appreciated, picturesque, or providing any guiding lights, but I will promise that it will be brief and accurate.

To begin with, I want to give you my impressions of what is happening within our society—indeed, in most of Western Society—today. Prior to this century, there were conflicts in Western Society between new and old values, but these were usually of minor proportions in terms of changing concepts of life. The mass of the population generally continued to lead their lives according to unchanged norms. Today, the new generation finds itself in an environment much different from that in which their parents grew up. The relevance of traditional wisdom is no longer evident . . . not only to many young people but to some adults as well. But, problems with younger generations are not a new phenomenon:

Four thousand years ago, for example, an Egyptian priest wrote in despair: "Vandalism is rife and crime of all kinds is rampant among our young people."

Socrates complained that young Athenians "contradict their parents, gobble up the best at the table, and tyrannize over their teachers."

Nine hundred years before Christ, a Greek poet and social critic had this to say: "I see no hope for the future of our people if they are to be dependent upon the frivolous youth of today, for certainly all youths are reckless beyond words and opinionated much beyond their years."

Although some problems remain constant, it appears that the present change in attitudes is one of major proportions resulting from an individual freedom of considerable dimension and from a decreasing influence of traditional authority.

Our society today is not an easy one to grow up in. Considering this, I think the youth of this country do very well. They are more sensitive to human values. Most of them are willing and eager to dedicate themselves to worthwhile works. They want to contribute to activities which afford them an opportunity for both group and individual growth. They have courage, conviction and commitment. In the long run, when they add the perspective which experience brings to this array of youthful virtues, I have faith that they will serve themselves, the people and the Nation well.

Domestic transformation is not the only thing which troubles us now. On the world scene we are still very much troubled with man's imperfect state of human relations . . . aggression, conflict, and power politics are very much in the forefront of world affairs . . . and there is little consolation from Dr. Henry Writson's words that ". . . there never was a golden age when men lived happily, securely, without tension." Nevertheless, there has always been the chance to make each age better than the one which came before. Winston Churchill once said: "I am an optimist. It does not seem to be much use being anything else." I share his attitude, and I commend it to you.

What concerns many people is that Americans, discouraged by some world events of recent years, will turn inward and away from our international obligations. In this connection, I have little doubt about our Nation. America will continue to face her responsibilities squarely . . . perhaps without the idealistic fervor of the '40s, '50s, and 60s . . . but with a pragmatic knowledge that as a leading nation in what has become a very small world, it is in her interest to remain an active power on the international scene.

The economic, political, social, and military strengths of our Nation have been bound together and guided by moral considerations. Our Nation has applied its great power with discretion and restraint in carrying out its role as a world power. As President Nixon said in an address this year to the Corps of Cadets at the United States Military Academy:

"You can be proud of our country's power, because that power is wholly committed to the service of peace."

We live in a troubled world. From the standpoint of our national security, we do not know what lies around the corner next week, next month, or next year. America must always be able to deal from a position of strength. Only from such a position can she face squarely her responsibilities as a free nation. And—most important—only from such a position of strength can America, herself, remain free!

Now we come to the circumstances in which the American military finds itself today. In both the national and international environments that I mentioned, the military . . . and particularly the Army . . .

finds the situation most difficult. Within our country there is an atmosphere in which the military bears the brunt of national frustrations. There appears to be an anti-military movement of apparently considerable proportions, which stems from a combination of factors. A disenchantment with the Vietnam situation seems to be the primary reason although, as this audience knows, the military has done . . . and is basically doing what it has been asked to do. Other reasons include a concern that insufficient attention is being paid to difficult domestic problems, a vague dissatisfaction with the "establishment" as a whole . . . including the military, suspicion or dislike of the military or the so-called military-industrial complex, and the unfortunate motivations of a few who seem intent on actually destroying the military and our country. The American people must be aware of the pitfalls of letting antiwar feelings become antimilitary in nature. Short-run frustrations should not blind us to longer range imperatives of national security. If the military is continually demeaned within our country, this can only have an undesirable effect over the long run.

There is some turmoil within the military today. The Army is experiencing, as you know, one of the most critical and turbulent periods in its history . . . and, like the Nation, is in a period of transition. I would be less than candid if I did not admit that the Army has problems of our making. However, many of our problems are due to circumstances beyond our control. Sir John Hackett, distinguished British soldier and scholar has said:

"What a society gets in its armed services is exactly what it asks for, no more and no less. What it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a country looks at its fighting forces it is looking in a mirror; if the mirror is a true one the face that it sees there will be its own."

Or put in a different way, "The qualities of its courts of law and its armies," said Goethe, "give the most minute insight into the essence of an empire." These statements are particularly true of our Nation . . . with its tradition of citizen-soldier service.

The current drug problem within the United States illustrates the point well. The entire issue of drug abuse is difficult and complex . . . and presents special problems in the military. The basic military mission requires an individual alertness and responsibility which far exceed that required in the job of the average civilian. In Vietnam the situation is even more difficult. There the individual serviceman is under a great deal of stress in an environment where drugs are inexpensive and easily available.

The drug problem is not unique to the military. In fact, it is a significant national problem . . . and it should be understood in a national context. Drug abuse is a social condition within the United States, and I view with alarm the impression given by certain people that the drug problem in the military overseas . . . particularly in Vietnam . . . is one of the major causes of the national drug problem. Such a line of reasoning is about as accurate as saying that the military is the major cause of dissent, racial and environmental problems within the United States.

Some young men come into the military with a drug habit or the psychological tendency toward one . . . particularly when we consider the pressures of the peer group in an increasingly drug-oriented society. The Army has always been an institution which has prided itself on teaching our young people responsibility and good citizenship. We have been very successful in this area, although we have not enjoyed complete success with all of those who pass through our ranks. The Army has always taken its social responsibilities seriously, and we will continue to do so as we fully support President Nixon's drug abuse program. We recognize our obligation to control drug abuse within the military as well as cooperate fully with the civilian community in solving our common problem.

The Army is also adjusting to other changes within our country. The realities of the Nixon Doctrine are fundamental in this regard.

The Army is winding down a war and moving into a peacetime posture.

The Army is reducing its deployments overseas and placing greater reliance on its strategic reserve and National Guard and Reserve forces.

The Army is substantially reducing its size in order to come within reduced budgets.

And the Army is changing internally to build a smaller, leaner, tougher, more professional force.

Despite the imperatives of decreasing budgets, the Army . . . together with the other Services . . . is faced with maintaining national security and furthering national interests against threats that have not diminished. Related to this is the view of some people that the military is "crying wolf" concerning threats to our national security. This reaction by some may be a result of the frustrations I mentioned earlier. It certainly provides a dilemma for the military. As Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in a magazine article:

"The threat is there and we get paid to tell Americans it is there. If we get caught with insufficient forces, we're accused of dereliction of duty. But today we're also blamed for saying a threat exists."

In assuming the responsibility for the defense of this country, our civilian and military leaders are not blind to other needs in our society. Neither are they unaware of the basic economic tenet that needs usually exceed means—even in a country as rich in material resources and manpower as ours. Those responsible for our defense do not seek growth of the military at the expense of other needs of our Nation. Indeed, as citizens themselves, they too are concerned with the domestic health and tranquility of America. However, the military chiefs of the Armed Services must and do recommend to their civilian leaders what, in their best professional judgment is required for the Nation's defense. Then it is the civilian leadership under our constitutionally-elected Commander in Chief, and the Congress, that makes the ultimate determination of national priorities.

When priorities are set, and both national and foreign policy objectives determined, the military then is charged with carrying out its role. In a time such as this, that role is difficult, often challenged, and often misunderstood. Yet it is a role of transcendent importance for, in a dangerous and imperfect world, it is the security provided by the military which makes it possible for our people and this Nation to grow and prosper in freedom.

Some groups and individuals do not understand the historic role of the Army in our society. Your Army has never been a threat to our country . . . it has never compromised its sacred oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. We have never deviated from the time-honored tradition of subordination to constitutionally-elected and legally-appointed civilian leadership. No other major nation in the world can boast of a military establishment with as long a period of continued, undivided loyalty.

Today more than ever, it is essential that the American people understand and support the military in this role. Not to do so is to handicap not just the military but, more importantly, the Nation itself at a critical time. It is apparent today that there are many misconceptions in America about the military as an institution, the dedicated people who fill its ranks, and the missions with which they are charged.

I do not believe that we can long allow these misunderstandings to persist if we would maintain the national security and domestic tranquility we all desire and need. It is in this area—the creation of better understanding and public support of the uniformed citizens of America—that I believe you ladies and gentlemen can be of particular service.

I do not suggest that you abdicate your "fourth-estate" role of keeping main issues before the public, and telling the truth as you see it. I have too much respect for the importance of your profession to do that . . . or to imply that you are not patriotic when you criticize the military. What I do ask of you is to report the Army . . . the military . . . completely—to tell the full story and not just one aspect of it. With that in mind, I should like to turn to the Army for a moment, the Army of today and tomorrow, . . . the Army as we would hope you and the American public would understand it.

If a smaller American Army is to perform its mission for the future, it must be a better Army . . . an Army equipped with the most modern and effective weapons and equipment . . . an Army that capitalizes on the wealth of experience it has gained from Vietnam . . . and an Army manned by motivated, well-trained soldiers.

As you know, the President has made a volunteer force a national objective. The Army is committed to achieving that objective by moving steadily toward a zero draft. In so doing, our goal is a modern volunteer Army, not a "mod" Army. We believe we can best move toward that end by improving the professionalism of the Army, improving the total environment within which soldiers live and work, and, hopefully, by obtaining public understanding and support of our efforts.

A modern and professional Army, above all, must be a disciplined Army. . . . I cannot stress that point too strongly. An undisciplined Army is a threat to the society that it is sworn to defend. George Washington's statement that "Discipline is the soul of an Army" certainly is as true today as any time in the past. We shall not sacrifice discipline in any sense—it is essential to success in combat, and it is essential that the armed forces of a democracy, in particular, possesses the pride and responsibility which are the hallmarks of true discipline. We believe that the best form of discipline is self-discipline, stemming from soldiers who are treated as mature individuals, and based on professional competence, confidence and mutual respect. It is this we are seeking; this will be the foundation of the Army we are building today.

With this as a base, we are engaged in an across-the-board effort to improve the service, the life and the leadership of the Army. As a part of this, we are taking many steps, and seeking much help, in improving the conditions under which our men live and work. Further, we are looking in the mirror at all our practices and procedures. Those which are still militarily relevant and necessary will be kept. Those which no longer serve useful ends will be terminated. Above all, we are looking at the nature and quality of our leadership.

We realize that the responsibility for enhancing the professional climate of the Army rests squarely on our leadership. We are placing increased emphasis on training our leaders . . . particularly the young ones. We are placing greater confidence in our young leaders and potential leaders, and giving them more responsibility. We are also assisting them to understand and deal effec-

tively with the common problems of modern society as reflected by the soldier of today. I believe the young people of our country are looking for responsibility, challenge, fulfillment, job satisfaction and adventure. I believe they are searching for purpose and direction as well. The Army can satisfy these aspirations.

We are acutely aware that a few of our people have not lived up to the high standards of military leadership. The military is a hard, tough, and demanding profession. So are our standards. We cannot afford . . . nor will we tolerate . . . anything less than the highest personal and professional standards. In this respect, the American people must not be hasty to judge. There are too many capable . . . dedicated . . . and honorable men in the military to allow the acts of a few to degrade their standards and diminish their pride.

Despite the occasional departures from our norms, the Army's performance need not be defended. The Army has done what it was ordered to do . . . and it has done it well . . . in Vietnam and elsewhere. The record is a proud one.

Nowhere has this been better demonstrated than in Vietnam, where the Army has fought a difficult, complex war—taking fire at home as well as on the battlefield. We have done essentially what we were asked to do—prevent a communist takeover in the South. I am proud of the job that the Army has done.

The record of the Army goes beyond Vietnam. Although Vietnam has grabbed the lion's share of headlines, the Army has also performed well in other areas of the world.

Along the DMZ in Korea and on the Czechoslovakian border where one incident could ignite another war.

The Dominican Republic where a communist takeover in a smoldering civil war was thwarted.

The buildup in Florida during the Cuban missile crisis where land power and the capability to project it on a hostile shore aided in cooling the first nuclear confrontation.

And the reinforcement of Berlin with a battle group from West Germany demonstrating to the Soviets that we were serious in our commitment to keep land lines of communication open to that city.

This is the record of an excellent organization of dedicated men who have performed admirably in a difficult role—a role that has been widely misunderstood, frequently misinterpreted, and occasionally misrepresented.

Despite this proud record, the Army by itself cannot rally public support. Yet its vitality is dependent on support, understanding, and encouragement from the American people from whom it springs and who it serves. If the military continues to receive indiscriminate abuse . . . if it is not provided adequate resources . . . and if it is not supported as an essential and respectable profession, we can hardly expect to attract young Americans to serve in the numbers and quality required. And, the consequences for our Nation's security will be ominous indeed.

I urge you, then, to look at us critically but with understanding. The Army regards constructive criticism as a positive contribution to its forward progress. At the same time, its success is contingent in large part on public understanding which is balanced, informed and sympathetic.

At the beginning, I mentioned that the members of your profession and mine were joined in many common purposes and aspirations, essentially pointed toward the well-being and progress of the Nation we love. We in the Army will continue to dedicate ourselves to that end. I would hope, in your role, that you would assist us in obtaining the public understanding and fundamental support which are essential if we are to succeed.

HAVE A HAPPY DAY

HON. DON H. CLAUSEN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN. Mr. Speaker, recently it was my personal privilege to participate in a graduation ceremony at Ukiah High School in my First Congressional District of California.

One of the principal speakers of the evening was a lovely and talented young lady, Janet Broaddus, daughter of one of our highly respected judges of the superior court of Mendocino County—Judge Broaddus.

As I listened to the message being delivered to her classmates, the graduates' parents and friends, I kept saying to myself, "This girl is really on target." The speech had real substance and meaning, in addition to its timeliness.

Two very significant points left a lasting impression on me and prompted me to respond following her speech, by suggesting "We have too many people that are against everything—what we need are more people who are for something."

Janet said:

I believe that intelligence and righteousness cannot solve problems without love and happiness and as I look around me I see millions of problems—large and small—with millions of solutions—all intricately worked out. But all the intelligence, power, and money in the world are never going to solve anything, if we are all struggling against each other.

Janet's eloquent works and articulate delivery made a profound impression on all who were in attendance. I want to share these words with my colleagues in the Congress and also record them permanently in our official document, the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, so that others throughout the United States might gain the same inspiration from her remarks as we, who were present, did. Janet Broaddus is an outstanding example of this great generation of young people who are about to assume expanding leadership roles as, together, we meet the challenges of change.

The speech follows:

HAVE A HAPPY DAY

(By Janet Broaddus)

Dr. Coryell, Congressman Clausen, Parents, Ladies and Gentleman, Fellow Graduates, and members of the band: This is a happy time of year. Everyone is out of school, the beautiful weather has finally arrived, and the class of '71 is on its way to new adventures. Since everyone should be happy, I wanted to speak on a topic that is different, refreshing, and happy. I just couldn't sit myself down at my desk in a stuffy room and write a speech about the depressing problems of society, social technology in the seventies, the generation gap, or how the class of '71 plans to save the world. These are all typical topics for a graduation speech, but I wanted to go outside, sit in the warm sun under the bright, blue sky and write about something happy—something that is not depressing. I thought about it and asked myself, "What is happier than happiness?", so I decided to speak tonight about happiness. It is not a typical subject to a speech at graduation, but it seems appropriate.

First of all, what is happiness? Webster describes it as "good luck, prosperity, a state of well-being" Charles Schultz says that "happiness is a security blanket", "happiness is having a friend", "happiness is a warm puppy", and on and on. A dictionary can describe the word, but there is more to it than that. Charlie Brown and his friends can describe the feeling, because happiness is in everything, everywhere, and it is whatever you want it to be, or whatever you make it to be. To me happiness is a way of showing a freedom and of expressing a love for the world and its people. It is a feeling that can keep me from worrying needlessly. Happiness is a feeling that everyone should be able to experience all the time, and not just when they have a stroke of good luck.

That's what happiness is—so what about it? Well I said I didn't want to speak on problems of society, and I still don't, but they *do* exist like a brick wall across the path of our future which cannot be ignored. It is depressing to know that there are millions of starving people in our world, to see the poverty and the slums only a couple miles from the White House in Washington, D.C., to see all the prejudice and racial riots, to watch our magnificient wilderness become covered with concrete or polluted with deadly chemicals. It doesn't make anyone happy to know that there is still a war in Viet Nam or to open the morning paper to a headline reading, "The 24th Body Found."

Why am I talking about happiness when all these problems still exist in the world? Because I believe that intelligence and righteousness cannot solve probelms without love and happiness. These problems have all existed since man was created and we are still struggling to solve them. The brick wall is not being knocked down. It is slowly being chipped at, but new bricks are being laid faster than they can be destroyed. How much longer will they exist? How much longer can we exist *with* them? As I look around me I see millions of problems—large and small—with millions of solutions—all intricately worked out. But all the intelligence, power, and money in the world are never going to solve anything, if we are all struggling against each other. There is too much bitterness in our world—politicians and voters, parents and children, educators and students are all slowly pulling at each other as if each were a section of a rubber band in the hands of a very nervous person.

Everyone fights for what he believes is right, and everyone wants more rights than he already has. But who really knows what is right? There could be many solutions to one problem and then the purpose usually changes to that of who is able to have his solution accepted—and the battle goes on while the problem remains. The emphasis today, not just in our country but all over the world, is too much on nationalism instead of individualism. If it were possible for governments to consider the happiness of the individuals involved before the pride of the country, the face of a political party, or what is considered to be "right" for the nation, the world, or the people, I think there would be a lot of quick changes. But the way society and government are structured this is not very easy. For example, in order for everyone at the Paris Peace Talks to have all those pressures lifted from their shoulders there would have to be a revolution in the minds of every single person on this earth at exactly the same moment. I'd say that's just a little bit impossible, but then again nothing worthwhile is easy to accomplish.

If we can't start at the top and work down, we can start at the bottom and work up—start with the individual and work up through the larger organizations of humanity. So far I've been talking about big problems and big governments, but the same is true down the line through state governments, local governments, community organizations, families, all the way to the relationship of two people meeting on the street.

Our world is made up of individuals, and I think that in the individual is where any kind of a change or solution must start. It can't stop there, though, because it must eventually reach the top. For example, if a person is happy he won't mind separating his garbage for recycling, giving away some of his food or money, thinking of the other party before he demands more rights or throws a bomb. If he is happy he will have a concern for other people. If everyone did his individual part in helping to solve such major problems, and took down just one brick that wall would be gone in no time.

That is a lot of if's. How can a person be happy so he will want to do his part? As I've already said, happiness means different things to different people, but a full stomach, a roof over one's head, and a feeling of acceptance and security among one's peers usually helps. For those of us who are lucky enough to have these things already, happiness should be helping others to find them, also. Happiness is contagious, and even if you can't give a person what he needs most, a smile or a hello can sometimes mean just as much. Then maybe he will pass that smile on to another person.

Sometimes I have to stop to think, and assure myself that we, the people of this planet, are not going backwards—or becoming more violent, egotistical, and antagonistic. I always manage to convince myself that we aren't although sometimes it appears that way because it's always the negative and not the positive things that we hear about. The number of people who truly care about other people is growing, and man is beginning to spread his concern over a wider circle of humanity. We usually care about our family and friends and we want them to be happy, but as the years go by there are *more and more* of us who care about the people in our city, state, county, and world *as individuals*. By caring, I mean wanting each person to be happy and secure and, wanting this bad enough to do something about it. If each inhabitant of this earth cared about the rest of mankind as individuals our brick wall would disappear, and I hope that we can destroy it before it crushes us.

I'd just like to see everyone here *really happy* and able to show it. Sometime—try saying HI to someone you don't know—take off the mask for awhile—really feel the smile you are giving everyone—forget your problems—make someone else happy—and if you can't do that at least *you* can be happy.

Well, I know what I can do to make everyone happy *now*—that is to end this speech so that we can all get out of this wind. Have a happy day tomorrow! and make it happy for someone else too. The world is only what we make it—so let's make it happy!

ANNIVERSARY CONGRATULATIONS TO FATHER WALSH

HON. PETER W. RODINO, JR.

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Speaker, congratulations are in order for Father Gerald W. Walsh who celebrated the 25th anniversary of his ordination to the Holy Priesthood on June 1, 1971. Father Walsh returned to St. Mary's Church in Nutley, N.J. where he had spent his early priesthood to perform a special mass with St. Mary's pastor, Msgr. John J. Feeley.

Father Walsh is an ardent contributor to both his parish and his community. His humane spirit pervades all who know him. Let me offer my warmest thanks for his devoted service and wish him continued personal fulfillment in the future.

THAIS "VOLUNTEERS" IN LAOS

HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to include in the RECORD a second article by Tammy Arbuckle on his recent findings in Southeast Asia which appeared June 7th in the Washington Evening Star.

I believe it sheds further light on the military interests and activities of the Thai Army in Laos and the corresponding role of the United States.

The article follows:

THAIS IN LAOS IDENTIFIED AS REGULARS

(By Tammy Arbuckle)

VIENTIANE, LAOS.—Despite official statements that the Thai forces serving in Laos are volunteers wtihout official sanction from the Bangkok government, informed sources here say they are regular Thai army troops.

The sources said the troops sent here keep their Thai army rank and salary as well as the salary paid by the Americans.

Some Thai units come here in a group, said the sources, adding that Thailand's 940th Battalion presently is garrisoned on Hill 1663 west of Ban Na on the southwest rim of the Plain of Jars in northern Laos.

The Thais are sent to Laos on temporary detachment for six months or a year, the sources said. There are cases where units are formed from Thais of different units who have volunteered for certain duties in Laos, the sources said. However, these units remain part of the Thai army on loan to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the sources said.

The only voluntary aspect of their duty is that Thai soldiers are anxious for assignment to Laos because of the financial benefits.

Officials of the United States and Thailand governments insist the Thai troops in Laos, numbering at least 3,200, are volunteers. Thai officials, in particular, claim the troops have no official sanction from Bangkok.

(Even the number of troops is in dispute. As a result of U.S. Senate inquiries into the operation, the figure of 4,800 troops presently is given in Washington as the number of Thai troops on duty in Laos.)

The Lao military attributes the official Thai position to corruption. They say only certain members of the Thai government are pocketing payments from the United States, so the entire Thai cabinet may not be informed of the entire U.S. arrangements for Thais to fight in Laos.

Thai troops have been fighting in Laos since late 1964. The first Thai unit in Laos was a battery of 155mm howitzers based near Ban Khay village in the Plain of Jars.

Thai officers and men then were sent separately to guerilla units run by the CIA.

On Feb. 1, 1967, a reporter met one of these Thais at NAM Bac, Lao fortress 40 miles southwest at Dien Bien Phu. The Thai said he was a captain in the Thai army and came from Bangkok.

An American in civilian clothes was commanding his unit and was responsible for payment, he said.

There were at least 20 Thais with the captain at Nam Bac and Site 217.

On June 25, 1969, the Thai Artillery unit (which remained in the same place for five years while men were rotated) was overrun when North Vietnamese tanks broke through the neutralist Lao troops.

Following this attack, in which at least 30 Thais were killed, Bangkok insisted on having Thai troops protect the Thai gunners. Thai gunners also were sent to Long Cheng, further south, but this time several hundred—some sources say 800—Thai infantrymen were sent to protect the artillery.

Part of these units now are at Fire Base Zebra northeast of Long Cheng.

Recently Thai troops have served on the Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos and on operations against Route Seven, the main Hanoi resupply route to its troops in northern Laos.

All troops under American control who need medical help are sent to Thailand directly, American officials say, so Thais have no worries if they are sick or wounded.

The Communist Lao radio claims over 300 Thais have been killed in action in Laos, but American officials say it's less than 200.

The Thai role, according to U.S. officials is to make up for heavy losses among the Meo tribesmen of Gen. Vang Pao, who have been fighting since 1960 against the North Vietnamese, suffering in the last three years over 8,000 killed in action.

The Lao army claims it's under strength and unable to substantially help Vang Pao because it's spread the length of Laos, facing the enemy. This claim, however, is suspect. Hundreds of unemployed young men roam around Vientiane in motorbikes. When Gen. Kouprasith Abhay, the Vientiane military boss, tried to conscript them, he found they are the sons of influential Laotians who protested conscription and forced Kouprasith to cease his activities.

Also, several thousand Lao troops are not gainfully employed but act as bodyguards, chauffeurs, office personnel or are building new villas for Lao officers.

Despite all this, it may be said that Laos still is woefully short of manpower as well as good field officers and some military discipline. Therefore, Lao needs help from its ethnic neighbors, the Thais.

The Lao however, don't want their neighbors in the western provinces of Champassac and Sayaboury, which the Thais covet nor in Mekong River towns where the Thai propensity for the spoils of war may match that of Saigon troops in Cambodia. Therefore, they are in the mountains of northern Laos where the Thais can do the most fighting and the least mischief.

HORTON PRAISES MRS. DONALD LOETZER FOR HER AFFIRMATION OF AMERICA

HON. FRANK HORTON

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, during these times of protest by our Nation's youth, the very philosophies upon which this country was established are being questioned. At times, anti-American sentiments and acts seem to overshadow positive feelings for this country and our leader's goals.

There is little doubt that we must do what we can to foster respect for and understanding of this country among people of all ages, especially among our youth.

Concerned about the destiny of this country and about the young people who

will be its future leaders, Mrs. Donald Loetzer of Pittsford, N.Y., in my congressional district, has taken a noteworthy step toward fostering patriotism among our youth.

She has written, and directed the recording of, a song entitled, "Up, Up With America." Recorded by a group of teenage singers, the record is popular with listeners of all ages.

Mrs. Loetzer, who has two school age children, was moved to write the song because of two events: The burning of an American flag in her home community, and hearing Vice President AGNEW ask why today's songs all seemed to deal with drugs, instead of something positive.

I know my colleagues will agree that Mrs. Loetzer deserves special recognition for her concern about our country and its young people, and for the personal action she has taken to promote feelings of patriotism. I share with my colleagues the words of Mrs. Loetzer's song and two newspaper articles which give additional information on Mrs. Loetzer's significant contribution:

UP! UP! WITH AMERICA

Up! Up! With America!
Let's hear it kids for America!
Motherhood, brotherhood, apple pie!
Respect law and order is the cry!
Who says we kids just don't belong
Who says we don't know right from wrong,
Just step aside while we do our thing,
We'll shout it out—you will hear us sing!
Up! Up! With America!
Let's hear it kids for America!
Who cares if our hair is short or long,
Our love for our country is very strong!
Though at times we may seem way out,
We know what our nation's all about,
Just step aside while we do our thing
We'll shout it out—you will hear us sing!
Up! Up! With America!
Let's hear it kids for America!
We will stand beside her night and day—
All the way—America!

A recent newspaper article by Bill Beeney, writer for the Rochester Democrat & Chronicle discussed Mrs. Loetzer's song:

It all came about because Mrs. Donald (Liz) Loetzer became upset when she heard about an American flag-burning incident in Pittsford a few weeks ago.

Now she is a published song writer. Words and music both, matter of fact.

Liz Loetzer decided that the silent majority should have something to say about the American flag. Not directly critical of the specific incident, but something which she hoped could serve as a rallying point for young people.

That's an esoteric ambition.

"I wrote two histories of the flag in verse, for children. But this didn't seem to accomplish what I wanted to do, so I put them aside and decided to try my hand at writing a song about America that youngsters could endorse."

Result: A song, "Up, Up With America," done with a semirock beat, arranged by Mat Mathews and Freddy Costello. It has been pressed into records (45 rpm stereo) under the "Lizdon" label, and has been released within the last few days and aired by local radio stations.

The Loetzers live at 51 Round Trail Drive, Pittsford. Mr. Loetzer is with Massachusetts Mutual Insurance Co. They have two children in school, Diane, 9, and Gregg, 5. Mrs. Loetzer is "a fashion copy writer by trade," having worked here and in New York City, but had never ventured into the song-writing field before.

"I was able to get together about a dozen members of the United Builders Association singers from Our Lady of Lourdes Church. We called them 'The Kids Next Door,' and rehearsed for three weeks after Mat Mathews and Fred Costello had made the arrangement for the song.

"Then we made the record at their studio here, on Culver Road, and it was pressed in California, and now we have it, with an ASCAP number and everything."

The Brighton-Pittsford Post also wrote a feature story on Mrs. Loetzer and her song. It brings out additional background material about her enthusiasm and patriotism. Under the headline "Her Record Sings 'Up with America'" the article said:

"I think it's the timing. People are sick of the mood of the young people's music today. Bennie this and bennie that."

Mrs. Donald D. Loetzer of 51 Round Trail Dr., Pittsford, was explaining why she thought her new recording, "Up, Up With America," was catching on.

Actually, the fashion copy writer for B. Forman, the National and McFarlin's doesn't have to peg it on a mood—the lyrics are catchy and the music ditto. Moreover it has the stamp of approval of parents and young alike, a rare combination in today's world.

She wrote the song because of two happenings!

"I remember Spiro Agnew saying why did today's songs all have to deal with dope instead of something in another vein, and on top of that came that flag-burning incident in Pittsford.

So the mother of two Barker Road School children, Diane 9, and Gregg 5, came up with these lyrics:

"Who cares if our hair is short or long, Our love for our country is very strong!"

She first got the go-ahead from her own brood and 5-year-old Gregg, "the only musical member of the family," started rendering it around the house.

Encouraged, the Loetzers started looking for somebody to arrange it and settled on local entertainers Matt Mathews and Fred Costello, who just started in the arranging business.

"We made the master tape and reproduced it under our own name (Lizdon—for the Loetzers two first names) and from here on the success depends on what they call the local "break-out."

The group singing in the record are members of the United Builders Association Singers from Brighton's Our Lady of Lourdes Church, whom Mrs. Loetzer called into action and dubbed "The Kids Next Door."

They rehearsed for three weeks, she said, before the arrangement was taped.

The "local break-out" she talks about is the response on the part of area disc jockeys which, she said, has been very good. The next step would be the sponsoring of a national recording company, which would stamp it with its own label—and up, up and away to success.

"I've had people stop me in the market or the drug store," Mrs. Loetzer said, "especially mothers. They're so glad to hear a song that they can associate with, as well as their children. The young seem to like it. It isn't "God Bless America"—it has a beat they seem to like."

Although her husband hails from New York City where Mrs. Loetzer spent several years writing copy for Bloomingdale's and J. C. Penney Co., she is a local girl, the former Elizabeth Langie who lived in the family home at the corner of Culver Rd. and East Ave. Her parents, the Eugene H. Langies, still live there, as does her brother, Eugene.

She has another brother, Michael Langie, who lives with his family at 35 Kurt Rd. Perinton; a sister Mrs. Philip Fitzsimmons of 64 Branford Rd., Brighton and a younger sister, a nun, Sister Mary Jo, who is currently assigned to Holy Name Church, Greece, with the Rev. Thomas Reddington.

Loetzer is with Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.

After the record was taped, it was sent to California to be pressed and now has it's own ASCAP number.

THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR LITHUANIA, LATVIA, AND ESTONIA

HON. ROMAN C. PUCINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, this week, we observe the anniversary of the Soviet "annexation" of the Baltic States.

This illegal action has never been adjudicated by an international body.

Six years ago, in the 89th Congress, the House and Senate adopted House Concurrent Resolution 416 urging the President "to direct the attention of world opinion at the United Nations—to the denial of the rights of self-determination for the peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania."

Mr. Speaker, this issue deserves to be heard before the United Nations. The peoples of the Baltic States have endured 30 years of Soviet oppression and domination. Between 1940 and 1952 alone, 30,000 Lithuanian freedom fighters lost their lives attempting to resist the illegal invaders. Resistance continues to the present time, a tradition that is being handed on from father to son to grandson.

I wholeheartedly endorse the language and intent of the resolution we passed here in this body 6 years ago and am including that language in the RECORD today to remind us of our special obligations to the peoples of the world who are not free to speak out on their own behalf.

Mr. Speaker, the text of House Concurrent Resolution 416 follows:

H. CON. RES. 416

Whereas the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation; and

Whereas all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, cultural, and religious development; and

Whereas the Baltic peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been forcibly deprived of these rights by the Government of the Soviet Union; and

Whereas the Government of the Soviet Union, through a program of deportations and resettlement of peoples, continues in its effort to change the ethnic character of the populations of the Baltic States; and

Whereas it has been the firm and consistent policy of the Government of the United States to support the aspirations of Baltic peoples for self-determination and national independence; and

Whereas there exist many historical, cultural, and family ties between the peoples of the Baltic States and the American people: Be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the House of Representatives of the United States urge the President of the United States—

(a) to direct the attention of world opinion at the United Nations and at other appropriate international forums and by such means as he deems appropriate, to the denial of the rights of self-determination for the peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and

(b) to bring the force of world opinion to bear on behalf of the restoration of these rights to the Baltic peoples.

A LONGER LOOK AT MAY DAY

HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include an article which appeared in a recent issue of the Austin American, Austin, Tex. I certainly think that Police Chief Jerry Wilson of the District of Columbia deserves the thanks of all who believe in law and order for the manner in which he and his men handled this situation.

The article follows:

A LONGER LOOK AT MAY DAY

Civil libertarians, including a U.S. senator, a former attorney general and a mixed bag of columnists and commentators, continue to talk and write as if the May Day clash between police and protestors in Washington was a replay of the charge of the cossacks against the people in front of the czar's palace.

Amid all the alarm expressed about constitutional rights ridden roughshod over by the police, one truth is ignored:

Any government which cannot or will not defend itself, which permits itself to be impeded or intimidated by a mob take-over of the streets of its capital and the offices of its buildings, will soon be no government at all. And when government goes, there goes everybody's constitutional rights.

To disagree with the handwringers is not necessary to go to the other extreme, however.

One need not subscribe to the charge made by Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst that it was a "vicious and wanton mob attack on Washington" whose leaders were in cahoots with the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese.

Indeed, much more disturbing is the thought that these may have been sincere, patriotic Americans who really believed that this was the way national policy should be decided.

Nor is there any need to deny that when some 12,000 people are rounded up off the streets and herded into detention camps, there will undoubtedly be a lot of entirely innocent people among them and undoubtedly any number of instances of police misjudgment or unnecessary roughness—in short, a great deal of bruising of individual constitutional rights.

But then, one does not stop in the middle of the road to argue constitutional rights when a police car or ambulance with flashing lights and screaming siren demands the right of way.

The May Day assault on Washington was just such an emergency. Here were thousands of people—"kids," they called themselves—descending on the nation's capital with the openly avowed intention of "shutting the government down."

Their appearance, opinions or age had nothing to do with it. Had the American Legion, the Jaycees or the Women's Christian Temperance Union flocked to Washington with the same purpose, they could have expected, and deserved, exactly the same treatment.

It is claimed that the government had no intention of prosecuting all 12,000 demonstrators and that their release the next day was proof that constitutional rights had been abrogated.

It would make as much sense to decry a mandatory mass inoculation by health authorities when they know that only a handful of people may be infected with a particular disease.

The roundup of demonstrators—and hapless nondemonstrators—was a form of inoculation, a form of preventive medicine against something that could have become seriously virulent if it had been allowed to run its own course.

It saved the government—not from collapse or revolution but from a blow to its legitimacy it might never have quite recovered from. And by government is meant not just the Nixon administration but all succeeding administrations.

The roundup was lamentable, distasteful, thoroughly un-American. It is to be hoped it never happens again. By acting firmly and decisively, the Washington, D.C. police may have ensured that it does not happen again.

NEW YORK TIMES VIETNAM DOCUMENT—PART 3

HON. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, I am today placing in the RECORD the third installment in the series of selections from the Pentagon's massive Vietman study that the New York Times has been making public this week.

I believe the Times, by publishing these documents, has performed a service to the Nation. I hope we have learned from this. I hope we, who are Members of Congress, learn it is wrong to accept at face value all that we hear from the executive branch. Congress, as one of the three arms of Government, is a check on the executive branch. For too long we have abrogated this authority, and the time to reassert that role has long since passed.

Defense Secretary Laird says publishing the documents jeopardizes national security, but I wonder if it does not jeopardize more our respect for those who created this disaster. In the Armed Services Committee hearings national security rests on everything from new long-range bombers to trash disposal on military installations. Just saying something is vital to national security does not make it so.

The major issues, or what should be the major issues, rest on the larger philosophical question of how we got into the war and how Congress can prevent the country from becoming involved in future wars. When a U.S. Senator is denied this material until he reads it in the Times, something is wrong. I have yet to see anyone addressing themselves to those questions.

The New York Times has provided the source material, now we must analyze it so another 50,000 will not have to die.

The material follows:

VIETNAM ARCHIVE: STUDY TELLS HOW JOHNSON SECRETLY OPENED WAY TO GROUND COMBAT

(By Neil Sheehan)

President Johnson decided on April 1, 1965, to use American ground troops for offensive action in South Vietnam because the Administration had discovered that its long-planned bombing of North Vietnam—which had just begun—was not going to stave off collapse in the South, the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war discloses. He ordered that the decision be kept secret.

"The fact that this departure from a long-held policy had momentous implications was well recognized by the Administration leadership," the Pentagon analyst writes, alluding to the policy axiom since the Korean conflict that another land war in Asia should be avoided.

Although the President's decision was a "pivotal" change, the study declares, "Mr. Johnson was greatly concerned that the step be given as little prominence as possible."

The decision was embodied in National Security Action Memorandum 328, on April 6, which included the following paragraphs:

"5. The President approved an 18-20,000 man increase in U.S. military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.

"6. The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron and associated headquarters and support elements.

"7. The President approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State."

The paragraph stating the President's concern about publicity gave stringent orders in writing to members of the National Security Council:

"11. The President desires that with respect to the actions in paragraphs 5 through 7, premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practicable, but in ways that should minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy, and official statements on these troop movements will be made only with the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State. The President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy." [See text, action memorandum on change of mission, April 6, 1965, Page 21.]

The period of increasing ground-combat involvement is shown in the Pentagon papers to be the third major phase of President Johnson's commitment to South Vietnam. This period forms another section of the presentation of those papers by The New York Times.

The papers, prepared by a large team of authors in 1967–68 as an official study of how the United States went to war in Indochina, consist of 3,000 pages of analysis and 4,000 pages of supporting documents. The study covers nearly three decades of American policy toward Southeast Asia. Thus far The Times' reports on the study, with presentation of key documents, have covered the period of clandestine warfare before the Tonkin Gulf incidents in 1964 and the planning for sustained bombing of North Vietnam to begin early the next year.

In the spring of 1965, the study discloses, the Johnson Administration pinned its hopes on air assaults against the North to break the enemy's will and persuade Hanoi to stop the Vietcong insurgency in the South. The air assaults began on a sustained basis on March 2.

"Once set in motion, however, the bombing effort seemed to stiffen rather than soften Hanoi's backbone, as well as the willingness of Hanoi's allies, particularly the Soviet Union, to work toward compromise," the study continues.

"Official hopes were high that the Rolling Thunder program . . . would rapidly convince Hanoi that it should agree to negotiate a settlement to the war in the South. After a month of bombing with no response from the North Vietnamese, optimism began to wane," the study remarks.

"The U.S. was presented essentially with two options: (1) to withdraw unilaterally from Vietnam leaving the South Vietnamese to fend for themselves, or (2) to commit ground forces in pursuit of its objectives. A third option, that of drastically increasing the scope and scale of the bombing, was rejected because of the concomitant high risk of inviting Chinese intervention."

And so within a month, the account continues, with the Administration recognizing that the bombing would not work quickly enough, the crucial decision was made to put the two Marine battalions already in South Vietnam on the offensive. The 3,500 marines landed at Danang on March 8—bringing the total United States force in South Vietnam to 27,000. The restricted mission of the marines had been the static defense of the Danang airfield.

ORDERS PUT IN WRITING

As a result of the President's wish to keep the shift of mission from defense to offense imperceptible to the public, the April 1 decision received no publicity "until it crept out almost by accident in a State Department release on 8 June," in the words of the Pentagon study.

The day before, the hastily improvised static security and enclave strategies of the spring were overtaken by a request from Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the American commander in Saigon, for nearly 200,000 troops. He wanted these forces, the Pentagon study relates, to hold off defeat long enough to make possible a further build-up of American troops.

"Swiftly and in an atmosphere of crisis," the study says, President Johnson gave his approval to General Westmoreland's request a little more than a month later, in mid-July. And once again, the study adds, Mr. Johnson concealed his decision.

But the President, the narrative continues, was now heeding the counsel of General Westmoreland to embark on a full-scale ground war. The study for this period concludes that Mr. Johnson and most of his Administration were in no mood for compromise on Vietnam.

As an indication of the Administration's mood during this period, the study cites "a marathon public-information campaign" conducted by Secretary of State Dean Rusk late in February and early in March as sustained bombing was getting under way.

Mr. Rusk, the study says, sought "to signal a seemingly reasonable but in fact quite tough U.S. position on negotiations, demanding that Hanoi 'stop doing what it is doing against its neighbors' before any negotiations could prove fruitful.

"Rusk's disinterest in negotiations at this time was in concert with the view of virtually all of the President's key advisers, that the path to peace was not then open," the Pentagon account continues. "Hanoi held sway over more than half of South Vietnam and could see the Saigon Government crumbling before her very eyes. The balance of power at this time simply did not furnish the U.S. with a basis for bargaining and Hanoi had no reason to accede to the hard terms that the U.S. had in mind. Until military pressures of North Vietnam could tilt the balance of forces the other way, talk of negotiation could be little more than a hollow exercise."

A POSITION OF COMPROMISE

The study also says that two of the President's major moves involving the bombing campaign in the spring of 1965 were designed, among other aims, to quiet critics and obtain public support for the air war by striking a position of compromise. But in fact, the account goes on, the moves masked publicly unstated conditions for peace that "were not 'compromise' terms, but more akin to a 'cease and desist' order that, from the D.R.V./VC point of view, was tantamount to a demand for their surrender." "D.R.V." denotes the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; "VC" the Vietcong.

In Mr. Johnson's first action, his speech at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore on April 7, he offered to negotiate "without posing any preconditions" and also held out what the study calls a "billion-dollar carrot" in the form of a regional economic-development program for the Mekong Delta, financed by the United States, in which North Vietnam might participate.

The second action was the unannounced five-day pause in bombing in May, during which the President called upon Hanoi to accept a "political solution" in the South. This "seemed to be aimed more at clearing the decks for a subsequent intensified resumption than it was at evoking a reciprocal act of deescalation by Hanoi,' the study says. Admiral Raborn, in his May 6 memorandum, had suggested a pause for this purpose and as an opportunity for Hanoi "to make concessions with some grace."

The air attacks had begun Feb. 8 and Feb. 11 with reprisal raids, code-named Operations Flaming Dart I and II, announced as retaliation for Vietcong attacks on American installations at Pleiku and Quinhon.

In public Administration statements on the air assaults, the study goes on, President Johnson broadened "the reprisal concept as gradually and imperceptibly as possible" into sustained air raids against the North, in the same fashion that the analyst describes him blurring the shift from defensive to offensive action on the ground during the spring and summer of 1965.

The study declares that the two February strikes—unlike the Tonkin Gulf reprisals in August, 1964, which were tied directly to a North Vietnamese attack on American ships—were publicly associated with a "larger pattern of aggression" by North Vietnam. Flaming Dart II, for example, was characterized as "a generalized response to 'continued acts of aggression,'" the account notes.

"Although discussed publicly in very muted tones," it goes on, "the second Flaming Dart operation constituted a sharp break with past U.S. policy and set the stage for the continuing bombing program that was now to be launched in earnest."

In another section of the study, a Pentagon analyst remarks that "the change in ground rules . . . posed serious public-information and stage-managing problems for the President."

It was on Feb. 13, two days after this second reprisal, that Mr. Johnson ordered Operation Rolling Thunder. An important influence on his unpublicized decision was a memorandum from his special assistant for national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy, who was heading a fact-finding mission in Vietnam when the Vietcong attack at Pleiku occurred on Feb. 7. With Mr. Bundy were Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Leonard Unger.

"A policy of sustained reprisal against North Vietnam" was the strategy advocated by Mr. Bundy in his memorandum, drafted on the President's personal Boeing 707, Air Force One, while returning from Saigon the same day. [See text, Bundy memorandum, Feb. 7, 1965.]"

The memorandum explained that the justification for the air attacks against the North, and their intensity, would be keyed to the level of Vietcong activity in the South.

SUSTAINED PRESSURE SOUGHT

"We are convinced that the political values of reprisal require a continuous operation," Mr. Bundy wrote. "Episodic responses geared on a one-for-one basis to 'spectacular' outrages would lack the persuasive force of sustained pressure. More important still, they would leave it open to the Communists to avoid reprisals entirely by giving up only a small element of their own program. . . . It is the great merit of the proposed scheme that to stop it the Communists would have to stop enough of their activity in the South to permit the probable success of a determined pacification effort."

The analyst notes, however, that Mr. Bundy's memorandum was a "unique articulation of a rationale for the Rolling Thunder policy" because Mr. Bundy held out as the immediate benefit an opportunity to rally the anti-Communist elements in the South and achieve some political stability and progress in pacification. "Once such a policy is put in force," Mr. Bundy wrote, in summary conclusions to his memorandum," we shall be able to speak in Vietnam on many topics and in many ways, with growing force and effectiveness."

It was also plausible, he said, that bombing in the North, "even in a low key, would have a substantial depressing effect upon the morale of Vietcong cadres in South Vietnam."

Mr. Bundy, the study remarks, thus differed from most other proponents of bombing. These included Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor, who despaired of improving the Saigon Government's effectiveness and who wanted bombing primarily as a will-breaking device "to inflict such pain or threat of pain upon the D.R.V. that it would be compelled to order a stand-down of Viet Cong violence," in the study's words.

As several chapters of the Pentagon study show, a number of Administration strategists—particularly Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council—had assumed for years that "calculated doses" of American air power would accomplish this end.

Mr. Bundy, while not underrating the bombing's "impact on Hanoi" and its use "as a means of affecting the will of Hanoi," saw this as a "longer-range purpose."

"THIS PROGRAM SEEMS CHEAP"

The bombing might not work. Mr. Bundy acknowledged. "Yet measured against the costs of defeat in Vietnam," he wrote, "this program seems cheap. And even if it fails to turn the tide—as it may—the value of the effort seems to us to exceed its cost."

President Johnson informed Ambassador Taylor of his Rolling Thunder decision in a cablegram drafted in the White House and transmitted to Saigon late in the afternoon of Sunday, Feb. 13.

The cable told the Ambassador that "we will execute a program of measured and limited air action jointly with the GVN [the Government of Vietnam] against selected military targets in D.R.V. remaining south of the 19th Parallel until further notice."

"Our current expectation," the message added, "is that these attacks might come about once or twice a week and involve two or three targets on each day of operation." [See text of White House cable, Feb. 13.]

Mr. Johnson said he hoped "to have appropriate GVN concurrence by Monday if possible. . . ."

The study recounts that "Ambassador Taylor received the news of the President's new program with enthusiasm. In his response, however, he explained the difficulties he faced in obtaining authentic GVN concurrence 'in the condition of virtual nongovernment' which existed in Saigon at that moment."

Gen. Nguyen Khanh, the nominal commander of the South Vietnamese armed forces, had ousted the civilian cabinet of Premier Tran Van Huong on Jan. 27. Led by Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, a group of young generals—the so-called Young Turks—were in turn intriguing against General Khanh.

(A footnote in the account of the first reprisal strikes, on Feb. 8, says that Marshal Ky, who led the South Vietnamese planes participating in the raid, caused "consternation" among American target controllers by dropping his bombs on the wrong targets. "In a last minute switch," the footnote says, Marshal Ky "dumped his flight's bomb loads on an unassigned target in the Vinhlinh area, in order, as he later explained, to avoid colliding with U.S.A.F. aircraft which, he claimed, were striking his originally assigned target when his flight arrived over the target area." Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp, Commander of United States forces in the Pacific, reported the incident to the Joint Chiefs.)

CABLES TO THE EMBASSIES

Referring to the political situation in Saigon, the account says: "This Alice-in-Wonderland atmosphere notwithstanding, Taylor was undaunted."

"It will be interesting to observe the effect of our proposal on the internal political situation here," the Ambassador cabled back to Mr. Johnson in Washington about the bombing. "I will use the occasion to emphasize that a dramatic change is occurring in U.S. policy, one highly favorable to GVN interests but demanding a parallel dramatic change of attitude on the part of the GVN. Now is the time to install the best possible Government as we are clearly approaching a climax in the next few months."

Ambassador Taylor apparently obtained what concurrence was possible and on Feb. 8 another cable went out from the State Department to London and eight United States Embassies in the Far East besides the one in Saigon. The message told the ambassadors of the forthcoming bombing campaign and instructed them to "inform head of government or State (as appropriate) of above in strictest confidence and report reactions." (See text, cable to U.S. envoys, Feb. 18.)

Both McGeorge Bundy and Ambassador Taylor had recommended playing down publicity on the details of the raids. "Careful public statements of U.S.G. (United States Government), combined with fact of continuing air actions, are expected to make it clear that military action will continue while aggression continues," the cable said. "But focus of public attention will be kept as far as possible on DRV aggression; not on joint GVN/US military operations.

The President had scheduled the first of the sustained raids Rolling Thunder I, for Feb. 20. Five hours after the State Department transmitted that cable, a perennial Saigon plotter, Col. Pham Ngoc Thao, staged an unsuccessful "semi-coup" against General Khanh and "pandemonium reigned in Saigon," the study recounts. "Ambassador Taylor promptly recommended cancellation of the Feb. 20 air strikes and his recommendation was equally promptly accepted" by Washington, the Pentagon study says.

The State Department sent a cablegram to the various embassies rescinding the instructions to notify heads of government or state of the planned air war until further notice "in view of the disturbed situation in Saigon."

The situation there, the study says, remained "disturbed" for nearly a week while the Young Turks also sought to get rid of General Khanh.

"The latter made frantic but unsuccessful efforts to rally his supporters," the study says, and finally took off in his plane to avoid having to resign as commander in chief. "Literally running out of gas in Nhatrang shortly before dawn on Feb. 21, he submitted his resignation, claiming that a 'foreign hand' was behind the coup. No one, however, could be quite certain that Khanh might not 're-coup' once again, unless he were physically removed from the scene."

This took three more days to accomplish, and on Feb. 25 General Khanh finally went into permanent exile as an ambassador at large, with Ambassador Taylor seeing him off at the airport, "glassily polite," in the study's words. "It was only then that Taylor was able to issue, and Washington could accept, clearance for the long-postponed and frequently rescheduled first Rolling Thunder strike."

Less than three weeks earlier, in his memorandum to the President predicting that "a policy of sustained reprisal" might bring a better government in Saigon. McGeorge Bundy had said he did not agree with Ambassador Taylor that General Khanh "must somehow be removed from the . . . scene."

"We see no one else in sight with anything like his ability to combine military authority with some sense of politics," the accounts quotes Mr. Bundy as having written.

In the meantime two more Rolling Thunder strikes—II and III—had also been scheduled and then canceled because, the study says, the South Vietnamese Air Force was on "coup alert," in Saigon.

During part of this period, air strikes against North Vietnam were also inhibited by a diplomatic initiative from the Soviet Union and Britain. They moved to reactivate their co-chairmanship of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina to consider the current Vietnam crisis. Secretary Rusk cabled Ambassador Taylor that the diplomatic initiative would not affect Washington's decision to begin the air war, merely its timing.

According to the Pentagon study the Administration regarded the possibility of reviving the Geneva conference of 1954, which had ended the French Indochina War, "not as a potential negotiating opportunity, but as a convenient vehicle for public expression of a tough U.S. position."

But, the account adds, this "diplomatic gambit" had "languished" by the time General Khanh left Saigon, and the day of his departure Mr. Johnson scheduled a strike, Rolling Thunder IV, for Feb. 26.

The pilots had been standing by, for nearly a week, with the orders to execute a strike being canceled every 24 hours.

But the order to begin the raid was again canceled, a last time, by monsoon weather for four more days.

Rolling Thunder finally rolled on March 2, 1965, when F-100 Super Sabre and F-105 Thunderchief jets of the United States Air Force bombed an ammunition depot at Xombang while 19 propeller-driven A-1H fighter-bombers of South Vietnam struck the Quangkhe naval base.

The various arguments in the Administration over how the raids ought to be conducted, which had developed during the planning stages, were now revived in sharper forms by the opening blow in the actual air war.

Secretary McNamara, whose attention to management of resources and cost-effectiveness is cited repeatedly by the study, was concerned about improving the military efficiency of the bombing even before the sustained air war got under way.

He had received bomb damage assessments on the two reprisal strikes in February, reporting that of 491 buildings attacked, only 47 had been destroyed and 22 damaged. The information "caused McNamara to fire off a rather blunt memorandum" to General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Feb. 17, the account says.

I AM QUITE SATISFIED

"Although the four missions [flown during the two raids] left the operations at the targets relatively unimpaired, I am quite satisfied with the results," Mr. McNamara began. "Our primary objective, of course, was to communicate our political resolve. This I believe we did. Future communications or resolve, however, will carry a hollow ring unless we accomplish more military damage than we have to date. . . . Surely we cannot continue for months accomplishing no more with 267 sorties than we did on these four missions." A sortie is a flight by a single plane.

General Wheeler replied that measures were being taken to heighten the destructiveness of the strikes and said that one way to accomplish this was to give the operational commander on the scene "adequate latitude" to attack the target as he saw fit, rather than seeking to control the details from Washington.

One measure approved by the President on March 9 was the use of napalm in North Vietnam.

And the day before, the day that 3,500 marines came ashore at Danang to protect the airfield there, Ambassador Taylor had already expressed, in two cables to Washington, what the historian describes as "sharp annoyance" with the "unnecessary timid and ambivalent" way in which the air war was being conducted.

No air strikes had been authorized by the President beyond the initial Rolling Thunder raids that began on March 2, and, according to the study, the Ambassador was irritated at "the long delays between strikes, the marginal weight of the attacks and the great ado about behind-the-scenes diplomatic feelers."

GENERAL WESTMORELAND CONCURS

With the concurrence of General Westmoreland, Ambassador Taylor proposed "a more dynamic schedule of strikes, a several week program relentlessly marching north" beyond the 19th Parallel, which President Johnson had so far set as a limit, "to break the will of the D.R.V."

Ambassador Taylor cabled: "Current feverish diplomatic activity particularly by French and British" was interfering with the ability of the United States to "progressively turn the screws on D.R.V."

"It appears to me evident that to date D.R.V. leaders believe air strikes at present levels on their territory are meaningless and that we are more susceptible to international pressure for negotiations than they are," the Ambassador said. He cited as evidence a report from J. Blair Seaborn, the Canadian member of the International Control Commission, who, in Hanoi earlier that month, had performed one of a series of secret diplomatic missions for the United States.

Mr. Seaborn had been sent back to convey directly to the Hanoi leaders an American policy statement on Vietnam that had been delivered to China on Feb. 24 through its embassy in Warsaw.

NO DESIGNS ON THE D.R.V.

In essence, the Pentagon study reports, the policy statement said that while the United States was determined to take whatever measures were necessary to maintain South Vietnam, it "had no designs on the territory of North Vietnam, nor any desire to destroy the D.R.V."

The delivery of the message to the Chinese was apparently aimed at helping to stave off any Chinese intervention as a result of the forthcoming bombing campaign.

But the purpose in sending Mr. Seaborn back, the study makes clear, was to convey the obvious threat than Hanoi now faced

"extensive future destruction of . . . military and economic investments" if it did not call off the Vietcong guerrillas and accept a separate, non-Communist South.

Premier Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam, who had seen Mr. Seaborn on two earlier visits, declined this time, and the Canadian had to settle for the chief North Vietnamese liaison officer for the commission, to whom he read Washington's statement.

The North Vietnamese officer, the account says, commented that the message "contained nothing new and that the North Vietnamese had already received a briefing on the Warsaw meeting" from the Chinese Communists.

This treatment led the Canadian to sense "a mood of confidence" among the Hanoi leaders, Ambassador Taylor told Washington in a cablegram, and Mr. Seaborn felt "that Hanoi has the impression that our air strikes are a limited attempt to improve our bargaining position and hence are no great cause for immediate concern."

"Our objective should be to induce in D.R.V. leadership an attitude favorable to U.S. objectives in as short a time as possible in order to avoid a build-up of international pressure to negotiate," the Ambassador said.

Therefore, he went on, it was necessary to "begin at once a progression of U.S. strikes north of 19th Parallel in a slow but steadily ascending movement to dispel any illusions in Hanoi.

"If we tarry too long in the south [below the 19th Parallel], we will give Hanoi a weak and misleading signal which will work against our ultimate purpose," he said.

The next Rolling Thunder strikes, on March 14 and 15, were the heaviest of the air war so far, involving 100 American and 24 South Vietnamese planes against barracks and depots on Tiger Island off the North Vietnamese coast and the ammunition dump near Phuqui, 100 miles southwest of Hanoi.

For the first time, the planes used napalm against the North, a measure approved by Mr. Johnson on May 9 to achieve the more efficient destruction of the targets that Mr. McNamara was seeking and to give the pilots protection from antiaircraft batteries.

MOUNTING CRESCENDO URGED

But the Ambassador regarded these, too, as an "isolated, stage-managed joint U.S./GVN operation," the Pentagon study says. He sent Washington another cable, saying that "through repeated delays we are failing to give the mounting crescendo to Rolling Thunder which is necessary to get the desired results."

Meanwhile, Admiral Sharp in Honolulu and the Joint Chiefs in Washington were quickly devising a number of other programs to broaden and intensify the air war now that it had begun.

On March 21, Admiral Sharp proposed a "radar busting day" to knock out the North Vietnamese early-warning system, and a program "to attrite harass and interdict the D.R.V. south" of the 20th Parallel by cutting lines of communication, "LOC" in official terminology.

The "LOC cut program" would choke off traffic along all roads and rail lines through southern North Vietnam by bombing strikes and would thus squeeze the flow of supplies into the South.

"All targets selected are extremely difficult or impossible to bypass," the admiral said in a cable to the Joint Chiefs. "LOC network cutting in this depth will degrade tonnage arrivals at the main 'funnels' and will develop a broad series of new targets such as backed-up convoys, offloaded materiel dumps and personnel staging areas at one or both sides of cuts."

These probable effects might in turn "force major D.R.V. log flow to sea-carry and into surveillance and attack by our SVN [South Vietnamese] coastal sanitization forces," the admiral added.

In Washington at this time, the narrative goes on, the Joint Chiefs were engaged in an "interservice division" over potential ground-troop deployments to Vietnam and over the air war itself.

Gen. John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff of the Air Force adopted a "maverick position" and was arguing for a short and violent 28-day bombing campaign. All of the targets on the original 94-target list drawn up in May, 1964, from bridges to industries, would be progressively destroyed.

"He proposed beginning the air strikes in the southern part of North Vietnam and continuing at two- to six-day intervals until Hanoi was attacked," the study continues.

The raids would be along the lines of the mighty strikes, including the use of B-52 bombers, that the Joint Chiefs had proposed in retaliation for the Vietnam mortar attack in Beinhoa airfield on Nov. 1, 1964, the narrative says. General McConnell contended that his plan was consistent with previous bombing proposals by the Joint Chiefs.

The general abandoned his proposal, however, when the other members of the Joint Chiefs decided to incorporate Admiral Sharp's "LOC cut program" and some of General McConnell's individual target concepts into a bombing program of several weeks. They proposed this to Mr. McNamara on March 27.

This plan proposed an intense bombing campaign that would start on road and rail lines south of the 20th Parallel and then "march north" week by week to isolate North Vietnam from China gradually by cutting road and rail lines above Hanoi. In later phases upon which the Joint Chiefs had not yet fully decided, the port facilities were to be destroyed to isolate North Vietnam from the sea. Then industries outside populated areas would be attacked "leading up to a situation where the enemy will realize that the Hanoi and Haiphong areas will be the next logical targets in our continued air campaign."

But the President and Mr. McNamara declined to approve any multiweek program, the study relates. "They clearly preferred to retain continual personal control over attack concepts and individual target selection."

ALTERNATE TARGETS APPROVED

In mid-March, after a Presidential fact-finding trip to Vietnam by Gen. Harold K. Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, the President did regularize the bombing campaign and relaxed some of the restrictions. Among the innovations was the selection of the targets in weekly packages with the precise timing of the individual attacks left to the commanders on the scene. Also, "the strikes were no longer to be specifically related to VC atrocities" and "publicity on the strikes was to be progressively reduced," the study says.

The President did not accept two recommendations from General Johnson relating to a possible ground war. They were to dispatch a division of American troops to South Vietnam to hold coastal enclaves or defend the Central Highlands in order to free Saigon Government forces for offensive action against the Vietcong. The second proposal was to create a four-division force of American and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization troops, who, to interdict infiltration, would patrol both the demilitarized zone along the border separating North and South Vietnam and the Laotian border region.

Better organization for the air war meant that concepts such as Admiral Sharp's "LOC cut program" and his "radar busting" were now incorporated into the weekly target packages. But President Johnson and Secretary McNamara continued to select the targets and to communicate them to the Joint Chiefs—and thus, eventually, to the operating strike forces—in weekly Rolling Thunder planning messages issued by the Secretary of Defense.

HOPES WERE WANING

Operation Rolling Thunder was thus being shifted from an exercise in air power "dominated by political and psychological considerations" to a "militarily more significant, sustained bombing program" aimed at destroying the capabilities of North Vietnam to support a war in the south.

But the shift also meant that "early hopes that Rolling Thunder could succeed by itself" in persuading Hanoi to call off the Vietcong were also waning.

"The underlying question that was being posed for the Administration at this time was well formulated," the study says, by John McNaughton in a memorandum drafted on March 24 for Secretary McNamara in preparation for the April 1-2 National Security Council meetings.

"Can the situation inside SVN be bottomed out (a) without extreme measures against the DRV and/or (b) without deployment of large number of U.S. (and other) combat troops inside SVN?"

Mr. McNaughton's answer was "perhaps, but probably no." [See Text, McNaughton action plan, March 24.]

General Wetsmoreland stated his conclusions in a half-inch-thick report labeled "Commander's Estimate of the situation in SVN." The document, "a classic Leavenworth-style analysis," the analyst remarks, referring to the Command and General Staff College, was completed in Saigon on March 26 and delivered to Washington in time for the April 1-2 strategy meeting.

The Saigon military commander and his staff had begun working on this voluminous report on March 13, the day after General Johnson left Vietnam with his ground war proposals of an American division to hold enclaves and a four-division American and SEATO force along the borders, the study notes.

General Westmoreland predicted that the bombing campaign against the North would not show tangible results until June at the earliest, and that in the meantime the South Vietnamese Army needed American reinforcements to hold the line against growing Vietcong strength and to carry out an "orderly" expansion of its own ranks.

And, paraphrasing the report, the study says that the general warned that the Saigon troops, "although at the moment performing fairly well, would not be able in the face of a VC summer offensive to hold in the South long enough for the bombing to become effective."

General Westmoreland asked for reinforcements equivalent to two American divisions, a total of about 70,000 troops, counting those already in Vietnam.

They included 17 maneuver battalions. The general proposed adding two more Marine battalion landing teams to the two battalions already at Danang in order to establish another base at the airfield at Phubai to the north; putting an Army brigade into the Bienhoa-Vungtau area near Saigon, and using two more Army battalions to garrison the central coastal ports of Quinhon and Nhatrang as logistics bases. These bases would sustain an army division that General Westmoreland proposed to send into active combat in the strategic central highlands inland to "defeat" the Vietcong who were seizing control there.

General Westmoreland said that he wanted the 17 battalions and their initial supporting elements in South Vietnam by June and indicated that more troops might be required thereafter if the bombing failed to achieve results.

The Saigon military commander and General Johnson were not alone in pressing for American ground combat troops to forestall a Vietcong victory, the study points out.

On March 20, the Joint Chiefs as a body

had proposed sending two American divisions and one South Korean division to South Vietnam for offensive combat operations against the guerrillas.

Secretary McNamara, the Joint Chiefs and Ambassador Taylor all discussed the three-division proposal on March 29, the study relates, while the Ambassador was in Washington for the forthcoming White House strategy conference.

The Ambassador opposed the plan, the study says, because he felt the South Vietnamese might resent the presence of so many foreign troops—upwards of 100,000 men—and also because he believed there was still no military necessity for them.

The Joint Chiefs "had the qualified support of McNamara," however, the study continues, and was one of the topics discussed at the national security council meeting.

CONCERN WITH DEPLOYMENT

Thus, the study says, at the White House strategy session of April 1–2, "the principal concern of Administration policy makers at this time was with the prospect of major deployment of U.S. and third-country combat forces to SVN."

A memorandum written by McGeorge Bundy before the meeting, which set forth the key issues for discussion and decision by the President, "gave only the most superficial treatment to the complex matter of future air pressure policy," the Pentagon analyst remarks.

The morning that Ambassador Taylor left Saigon to attend the meeting, March 29, the Vietcong guerrillas blew up the American Embassy in Saigon in what the study calls "the boldest and most direct Communist action against the U.S. since the attacks at Pleiku and Quinhon which had precipitated the Flaming Dart reprisal airstrikes."

Admiral Sharp requested permission to launch a "spectacular" air raid on North Vietnam in retaliation, the narrative continues, but the "plea . . . did not fall on responsive ears" at the White House.

"At this point, the President preferred to maneuver, quietly to help the nation get used to living with the Vietnam crisis. He played down any drama intrinsic in Taylor's arrival" and refused to permit a retaliation raid for the embassy bombing.

"After his first meeting with Taylor and other officials on March 31, the President responded to press inquiries concerning dramatic new developments by saying: "I know of no far-reaching strategy that is being suggested or promulgated."

"But the President was being less than candid," the study observes. "The proposals that were at that moment being promulgated, and on which he reached significant decision the following day, did involve a far-reaching strategy change: acceptance of the concept of U.S. troops engaged in offensive ground operations against Asian insurgents. This issue greatly overshadowed all other Vietnam questions then being reconsidered."

The analyst is referring to the President's decision at the White House strategy conference on April 1–2 to change the mission of the marine battalions at Danang from defense to offense.

McGeorge Bundy embodied the decision in National Security Action Memorandum 328, which he drafted and signed on behalf of the President on April 6. The analyst says that this "pivotal document" followed almost "verbatim" the text of another memorandum that Mr. Bundy had written before the N.S.C. meeting to outline the proposals for discussion and decision by the President.

The Pentagon study notes that the actual landing of 3,500 marines at Danang the previous month had "caused surprisingly little outcry."

Secretary of State Dean Rusk had explained on a television program the day before the marines came ashore that their mission was solely to provide security for the air base and "not to kill the Vietcong," in the words of the study. This initial mission for the marines was later to be referred to as the short-lived strategy of security that would apply only to this American troop movement into South Vietnam.

A DEAD LETTER QUICKLY

The President's decision to change their mission to offense now made the strategy of base security "a dead letter," the study says, when it was less than a month old.

At the April 1–2 meeting, Mr. Johnson had also decided to send ashore two more marine battalions, which General Westmoreland had asked for in a separate request on March 17. Mr. Johnson further decided to increase support forces in South Vietnam by 18,000 to 20,000 men.

The President was "doubtless aware" of the general's additional request for the equivalent of two divisions, and of the Joint Chiefs' for three divisions, the Pentagon account says, but Mr. Johnson took no action on these requests.

"The initial steps in ground build-up appear to have been grudgingly taken," the study says, "indicating that the President . . . and his advisers recognized the tremendous inertial complications of ground troop deployment. Halting ground involvement was seen to be a manifestly greater problem than halting air or naval activity.

"It is pretty clear, then, that the President intended, after the early April N.S.C. meetings, to cautiously and carefully experiment with the U.S. forces in offensive roles," the analyst concludes.

National Security Action Memorandum 328 did not precisely define or limit the offensive role it authorized, and Ambassador Taylor, who had attended the National Security Council meeting during his visit to Washington, was not satisfied with the guidance he received from the State Department. Therefore, on his way back to Saigon on April 4, the Ambassador, formerly resident John F. Kennedy's military adviser and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, sent a cable from the Honolulu headquarters of the commander of Pacific forces to the State Department, saying:

"I propose to describe the new mission to [Premier Pham Huy] Quat as the use of Marines in a mobile counter-insurgency role in the vicinity of Danang for the improved protection of that base and also in a strike role as a reserve in support of ARVN operations anywhere within 50 miles of the base. This latter employment would follow acquisition of experience on local counter-insurgency missions."

Ambassador Taylor's 50-mile limit apparently became an accepted rule-of-thumb boundary for counterinsurgency strikes.

And so, the analyst sums up, with the promulgation of National Security Action Memorandum 328, "the strategy of security effectively becomes a dead letter on the first of April," and the strategy of enclave begins.

LETTER FROM ROSTOW FAVORING COMMITMENT OF TROOPS BY U.S.

(Personal letter from Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, to Secretary McNamara, Nov. 16, 1964, "Military Dispositions and Political Signals.")

Following on our conversations of last night I am concerned that too much thought is being given to the actual damage we do in the North, not enough thought to the signal we wish to send.

The signal consists of three parts:

a) damage to the North is now to be inflicted because they are violating the 1954 and 1962 accords;

b) we are ready and able to go much further than our initial act of damage;

c) we are ready and able to meet any level of escalation they might mount in response, if they are so minded.

Four points follow.

1. I am convinced that we should not go forward into the next stage without a US ground force commitment of some kind:

a. The withdrawal of those ground forces could be a critically important part of our diplomatic bargaining position. Ground forces can sit during a conference more easily than we can maintain a series of mounting air and naval pressures.

b. We must make clear that counter escalation by the Communists will run directly into US strength on the ground; and, therefore the possibility of radically extending their position on the ground at the cost of air and naval damage alone, is ruled out.

c. There is a marginal possibility that in attacking the airfield they were thinking two moves ahead; namely, they might be planning a pre-emptive ground force response to an expected US retaliation for the Bien Hoa attack.

2. The first critical military action against North Vietnam should be designed merely to install the principle that they will, from the present forward, be vulnerable to retaliatory attacks in the north for continued violations for the 1954 and 1962 Accords. In other words, we would signal a shift from the principle involved in the Tonkin Gulf response. This means that the initial use of force in the north should be as limited and as unsanguinary as possible. It is the installation of the principle that we are initially interested in, not tit for tat.

3. But our force dispositions to accompany an initial retaliatory move against the north should send three further signals lucidly:

a. that we are putting in place a capacity subsequently to step up direct and naval pressure on the north, if that should be required;

b. that we are prepared to face down any form of escalation North Vietnam might mount on the ground; and

c. that we are putting forces into place to exact retaliation directly against Communist China, if Peiping should join in an escalatory response from Hanoi. The latter could take the form of increased aircraft on Formosa plus, perhaps, a carrier force sitting off China distinguished from the force in the South China Sea.

4. The launching of this track, almost certainly, will require the President to explain to our own people and to the world our intentions and objectives. This will also be perhaps the most persuasive form of communication with Ho and Mao. In addition, I am inclined to think the most direct communication we can mount (perhaps via Vientiane and Warsaw) is desirable, as opposed to the use of cut-outs. They should feel they now confront an LBJ who has made up his mind. Contrary to an anxiety expressed at an earlier stage, I believe it quite possible to communicate the limits as well as the seriousness of our intentions without raising seriously the fear in Hanoi that we intend at our initiative to land immediately in the Red River Delta, in China, or seek any other objective than the re-installation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords.

MEMO FROM ROSTOW ADVOCATING GROUND TROOPS AND AIR ATTACKS

(Memorandum from Mr. Rostow to Secretary Rusk, Nov. 23, 1964, "Some Observations as We Come to the Crunch in Southeast Asia.")

I leave for Lima this Saturday for the CIAP and CIES meetings. I presume that in early December some major decisions on Southeast Asia will be made. I should, therefore, like to leave with you some observations on the situation. I have already communicated them to Bill Bundy.

1. We must begin by fastening our minds as sharply as we can around our apprecia-

tion of the view in Hanoi and Peiping of the Southeast Asia problem. I agree almost completely with SNIE 10-3-64 of October 9. Here are the critical passages:

"While they will seek to exploit and encourage the deteriorating situation in Saigon, they probably will avoid actions that would in their view unduly increase the chances of a major US response against North Vietnam (DRV) or Communist China. We are almost certain that both Hanoi and Peiping are anxious not to become involved in the kind of war in which the great weight of superior US weaponry could be brought against them. Even if Hanoi and Peiping estimated that the US would not use nuclear weapons against them, they could not be sure of this. . . .

"In the face of new US pressures against the DRV, further actions by Hanoi and Peiping would be based to a considerable extent on their estimate of US intentions, i.e., whether the US was actually determined to increase its pressures as necessary. Their estimates on this point are probably uncertain, but we believe that fear of provoking severe measures by the US would lead them to temper their responses with a good deal of caution. . . .

"If despite Communist efforts, the US attacks continued, Hanoi's leaders would have to ask themselves whether it was not better to suspend their support of Viet Cong military action rather than suffer the destruction of their major military facilities and the industrial sector of their economy. In the belief that the tide has set almost irreversibly in their favor in South Vietnam, they might calculate that the Viet Cong could stop its military attacks for the time being and renew the insurrection successfully at a later date. Their judgment in this matter might be reinforced by the Chinese Communist concern over becoming involved in a conflict with US air and naval power."

Our most basic problem is, therefore, how to persuade them that a continuation of their present policy will risk major destruction in North Viet Nam; that a preemptive move on the ground as a prelude to negotiation will be met by US strength on the ground; and that Communist China will not be a sanctuary if it assists North Viet Nam in counter-escalation.

2. In terms of force dispositions, the critical moves are, I believe, these.

a. The introduction of some ground forces in South Vietnam and, possibly, in the Laos corridor.

b. A minimal installation of the principle that from the present forward North Viet Nam will be vulnerable to retaliatory attacks for continued violation of the 1954-1962 Accords.

c. Perhaps most important of all, the introduction into the Pacific Theater of massive forces to deal with any escalatory response, including forces evidently aimed at China as well as North Viet Nam, should the Chinese Communists enter the game. I am increasingly confident that we can do this in ways which would be understood—and not dangerously misinterpreted—in Hanoi and Peiping.

3. But the movement of forces, and even bombing operations in the north, will not, in themselves, constitute a decisive signal. They will be searching, with enormous sensitivity, for the answer to the following question: Is the President of the United States deeply committed to reinstalling the 1954-1962 Accords; or is he putting on a demonstration of force that would save face for, essentially, a U.S. political defeat at a diplomatic conference? Here their judgment will depend not merely on our use of force and force dispositions but also on the posture of the President, including commitments he makes to our own people and before the world, and on our follow-through. The SNIE accurately catches the extent of their commitments and their hopes in South Viet Nam and Laos. They will not actually accept a setback until they are absolutely sure that we really mean it. They will be as searching in this matter as Khrushchev was before he abandoned the effort to break our hold on Berlin and as Khrushchev was in searching us out on the Turkish missiles before he finally dismantled and removed his missiles from Cuba. Initial rhetoric and military moves will not be enough to convince them.

4. Given the fundamental assessment in this SNIE, I have no doubt we have the capacity to achieve a reinstallation of the 1954-1962 Accords if we enter the exercise with the same determination and staying power that we entered the long test on Berlin and the short test on the Cuba missiles. But it will take that kind of Presidential commitment and staying power.

5. In this connection, the SNIE is quite sound in emphasizing that they will seek, if they are permitted, either to pretend to call off the war in South Viet Nam, without actually doing so; or to revive it again when the pressure is off. (We can see Castro doing this now in Venezuela.) The nature of guerrilla war, infiltration, etc., lends itself to this kind of ambiguous letdown and reacceleration. This places a high premium on our defining precisely what they have to do to remove the pressure from the north. It is because we may wish to maintain pressure for some time to insure their compliance that we should think hard about the installation of troops not merely in South Viet Nam south of the seventeenth parallel, but also in the infiltration corridor of Laos. The same consideration argues for a non-sanguinary but important pressure in the form of naval blockade which will be easier to maintain during a negotiation or quasi-negotiation phase than bombing operations.

6. The touchstones for compliance should include the following: the removal of Viet Minh troops from Laos; the cessation of infiltration of South Viet Nam from the north; the turning off of the tactical radio network; and the overt statement on Hanoi radio that the Viet Cong should cease their operations and pursue their objectives in South Viet Nam by political means. On the latter point, even if contrary covert instructions are given, an overt statement would have important political and psychological impact.

7. As I said in my memorandum to the President of June 6, no one can be or should be dogmatic about how much of a war we still would have—and for how long—if the external element were thus radically reduced or eliminated. The odds are pretty good, in my view, that, if we do these things in this way, the war will either promptly stop or we will see the same kind of fragmentation of the Communist movement in South Viet Nam that we saw in Greece after the Yugoslav frontier was closed by the Tito-Stalin split. But we can't proceed on that assumption. We must try to gear this whole operation with the best counter-insurgency effort we can mount with our Vietnamese friends outside the country; and not withdraw US forces from Viet Nam until the war is truly under control. (In his connection, I hope everyone concerned considers carefully RAND proposal of November 17, 1964, entitled "SIAT: Single Integrated Attack Team, A Concept for Offensive Military Operations in South Viet-Nam.")

8. I do not see how, if we adopt this line, we can avoid heightened pressures from our allies for either Chinese Communist entrance into the UN or for a UN offer to the Chinese Communists on some form of two-China basis. This will be livable for the President and the Administration if—but only if—we get a clean resolution of the Laos and South Viet Nam problems. The publication of a good Jordan Report will help pin our allies to the wall on a prior reinstallation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords.

9. Considering these observations as a whole, I suspect what I am really saying is that our assets, as I see them, are sufficient to see this thing through if we enter the exercise with adequate determination to succeed. I know well the anxieties and complications on our side of the line. But there may be a tendency to underestimate both the anxieties and complications on the other side and also to underestimate that limited but real margin of influence on the outcome which flows from the simple fact that at this stage of history we are the greatest power in the world—if we behave like it.

10. In the President's public exposition of his policy, I would now add something to the draft I did to accompany the June 6 memorandum to the President. I believe he should hold up a vision of an Asian community that goes beyond the Mekong passage in that draft. The vision, essentially, should hold out the hope that if the 1954 and 1962 Accords are reinstalled, these things are possible:

a. peace;

b. accelerated economic development;

c. Asians taking a larger hand in their own destiny;

d. as much peaceful coexistence between Asian Communists and non-Communists as the Communists wish.

11. A scenario to launch this track might begin as follows:

A. A Presidential decision, communicated to but held by the Congressional leaders. Some leakage would not be unhelpful.

B. Immediate movement of relevant forces to the Pacific.

C. Immediate direct communication to Hanoi to give them a chance to back down before faced with our actions, including a clear statement of the limits of our objectives but our absolute commitment to them.

D. Should this first communication fail (as is likely) installation of our ground forces and naval blockade, plus first attack in North, to be accompanied by publication up-dated Jordan Report and Presidential speech.

McGEORGE BUNDY MEMO TO JOHNSON ON "SUSTAINED REPRISAL" POLICY

(Annex A, "A Policy of Sustained Reprisal," to memorandum to President Lyndon B. Johnson from McGeorge Bundy, Presidential assistant for national security, Feb. 7, 1965.)

I. INTRODUCTORY

We believe that the best available way of increasing our chance of success in Vietnam is the development and execution of a policy of *sustained reprisal* against North Vietnam—a policy in which air and naval action against the North is justified by and related to the whole Viet Cong campaign of violence and terror in the South.

While we believe that the risks of such a policy are acceptable, we emphasize that its costs are real. It implies significant U.S. air losses even if no full air war is joined, and it seems likely that it would eventually require an extensive and costly effort against the whole air defense system of North Vietnam. U.S. casualties would be higher—and more visible to American feelings—than those sustained in the struggle in South Vietnam.

Yet measured against the costs of defeat in Vietnam, this program seems cheap. And even if it fails to turn the tide—as it may—the value of the effort seems to us to exceed its cost.

II. OUTLINE OF THE POLICY

1. In partnership with the Government of Vietnam, we should develop and exercise the option to retaliate against any VC act of violence to persons or property.

2. In practice, we may wish at the outset to relate our reprisals to those acts of relatively high visibility such as the Pleiku incident. Later, we might retaliate against the

assassination of a province chief, but not necessarily the murder of a hamlet official; we might retaliate against a grenade thrown into a crowded cafe in Saigon, but not necessarily to a shot fired into a small shop in the countryside.

3. Once a program of reprisals is clearly underway, it should not be necessary to conduct each specific act against North Vietnam to a particular outrage in the South. It should be possible, for example, to publish weekly lists of outrages in the South and to have it clearly understood that these outrages are the cause of such action against the North as may be occurring in the current period. Such a more generalized pattern of reprisal would remove much of the difficulty involved in finding precisely matching targets in response to specific atrocities. Even in such a more general pattern, however, it would be important to insure that the general level of reprisal action remained in close correspondence with the level of outrages in the South. We must keep it clear at every stage both to Hanoi and to the world, that our reprisals will be reduced or stopped when outrages in the South are reduced or stopped—and that we are not attempting to destroy or conquer North Vietnam.

4. In the early stages of such a course, we should take the appropriate occasion to make clear our firm intent to undertake reprisals on any further acts, major or minor, that appear to us and the GVN as indicating Hanoi's support. We would announce that our two governments have been patient and forebearing in the hope that Hanoi would come to its senses without the necessity of our having to take further action; but the outrages continue and now we must react against those who are responsible; we will not provoke; we will not use our force indiscriminately, but we can no longer sit by in the face of repeated acts of terror and violence for which the DRV is responsible.

5. Having once made this announcement, we should execute our reprisal policy with as low a level of public noise as possible. It is to our interest that our acts should be seen—but we do not wish to boast about them in ways that make it hard for Hanoi to shift its ground. We should instead direct maximum attention to the continuing acts of violence which are the cause of our continuing reprisals.

6. This reprisal policy should begin at a low level. Its level of force and pressure should be increased only gradually—and as indicated above should be decreased if VC terror visibly decreases. The object would not be to "win" an air war against Hanoi, but rather to influence the course of the struggle in the South.

7. At the same time it should be recognized that in order to maintain the power of reprisal without risk of excessive loss, an "air war" may in fact be necessary. We should therefore be ready to develop a separate justification for energetic flak suppression and if necessary for the destruction of Communist air power. The essence of such an explanation should be that these actions are intended solely to insure the effectiveness of a policy of reprisal, and in no sense represent any intent to wage offensive war against the North. These distinctions should not be difficult to develop.

8. It remains quite possible, however, that this reprisal policy would get us quickly into the level of military activity contemplated in the so-called Phase II of our December planning. It may even get in, beyond this level with both Hanoi and Peiking, if there is Communist counter-action. We and the GVN should also be prepared for a spurt of VC terrorism, especially in urban areas, that would dwarf anything yet experienced. These are the risks of any action. They should be carefully reviewed—but we believe them to be acceptable.

9. We are convinced that the political values of reprisal require a *continuous* operation. Episodic responses geared on a one-for-one basis to "spectacular" outrages would lack the persuasive force of sustained pressure. More important still, they would leave it open to the Communists to avoid reprisals entirely by giving up only a small element of their own program. The Gulf of Tonkin affair produced a sharp upturn in morale in South Vietnam. When it remained an isolated episode, however, there was a severe relapse. It is the great merit of the proposed scheme that to stop it the Communists would have to stop enough of their activity in the South to permit the probable success of a determined pacification effort.

III. EXPECTED EFFECT OF SUSTAINED REPRISAL POLICY

1. We emphasize that our primary target in advocating a reprisal policy is the improvement of the situation in South Vietnam. Action against the North is usually urged as a means of affecting the will of Hanoi to direct and support the VC. We consider this an important but longer-range purpose. The immediate and critical targets are in the South—in the minds of the South Vietnamese and in the minds of the Viet Cong cadres.

2. Predictions of the effect of any given course of action upon the states of mind of people are difficult. It seems very clear that if the United States and the Government of Vietnam join in a policy of reprisal, there will be a sharp immediate increase in optimism in the South, among nearly all articulate groups. The Mission believes—and our own conversations confirm—that in all sectors of Vietnamese opinion there is a strong belief that the United States could do much more if it would, and that they are suspicious of our failure to use more of our obviously enormous power. At least in the short run, the reaction to reprisal policy would be very favorable.

3. This favorable reaction should offer opportunity for increased American influence in pressing for a more effective government—at least in the short run. Joint reprisals would imply military planning in which the American role would necessarily be controlling, and this new relation should add to our bargaining power in other military efforts—and conceivably on a wider plane as well if a more stable government is formed. We have the whip hand in reprisals as we do not in other fields.

4. The Vietnamese increase in hope could well increase the readiness of Vietnamese factions themselves to join together in forming a more effective government.

5. We think it plausible that effective and sustained reprisals, even in a low key, would have a substantial depressing effect upon the morale of Viet Cong cadres in South Vietnam. This is the strong opinion of CIA Saigon. It is based upon reliable reports of the initial Viet Cong reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin episode, and also upon the solid general assessment that the determination of Hanoi and the apparent timidity of the mighty United States are both major items in Viet Cong confidence.

6. The long-run effect of reprisals in the South is far less clear. It may be that like other stimulants, the value of this one would decline over time. Indeed the risk of this result is large enough so that we ourselves believe that a very major effort all along the line should be made in South Vietnam to take full advantage of the immediate stimulus of reprisal policy in its early stages. Our object should be to use this new policy to effect a visible upward turn in pacification, in governmental effectiveness, in operations against the Viet Cong, and in the whole U.S./GVN relationship. It is changes in these areas that can have enduring long-term effects.

7. While emphasizing the importance of reprisals in the South, we do not exclude the impact on Hanoi. We believe, indeed, that it is of great importance that the level of reprisal be adjusted rapidly and visibly to both upward and downward shifts in the level of Viet Cong offenses. We want to keep before Hanoi the carrot of our desisting as well as the stick of continued pressure. We also need to conduct the application of force so that there is always a prospect of worse to come.

8. We cannot assert that a policy of sustained reprisal will succeed in changing the course of the contest in Vietnam. It may fail, and we cannot estimate the odds of success with any accuracy—they may be somewhere between 25% and 75%. What we can say is that even if it fails, the policy will be worth it. At a minimum it will damp down the charge that we did not do all that we could have done, and this charge will be important in many countries, including our own. Beyond that, a reprisal policy—to the extent that it demonstrates U.S. willingness to employ this new norm in counter-insurgency—will set a higher price for the future upon all adventures of guerrilla warfare, and it should therefore somewhat increase our ability to deter such adventures. We must recognize, however, that that ability will be gravely weakened if there is failure for any reason in Vietnam.

IV. PRESENT ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS

1. This general recommendation was developed in intensive discussions in the days just before the attacks on Pleiku. These attacks and our reaction to them have created an ideal opportunity for the prompt development and execution of sustained reprisals. Conversely, if no such policy is now developed, we face the grave danger that Pleiku, like the Gulf of Tonkin, may be a short-run stimulant and a long-term depressant. We therefore recommend that the necessary preparations be made for continuing reprisals. The major necessary steps to be taken appear to us to be the following:

(1) We should complete the evacuation of dependents.

(2) We should quietly start the necessary westward deployments of [word illegible] contingency forces.

(3) We should develop and refine a running catalogue of Viet Cong offenses which can be published regularly and related clearly to our own reprisals. Such a catalogue should perhaps build on the foundation of an initial White Paper.

(4) We should initiate joint planning with the GVN on both the civil and military levels. Specifically, we should give a clear and strong signal to those now forming a government that we will be ready for this policy when they are.

(5) We should develop the necessary public and diplomatic statements to accompany the initiation and continuation of this program.

(6) We should insure that a reprisal program is matched by renewed public commitment to our family of programs in the South, so that the central importance of the southern struggle may never be neglected.

(7) We should plan quiet diplomatic communication of the precise meaning of what we are and are not doing, to Hanoi, to Peking and to Moscow.

(8) We should be prepared to defend and to justify this new policy by concentrating attention in every forum upon its cause—the aggression in the South.

(9) We should accept discussion on these terms in any forum, but we should not now accept the idea of negotiations of any sort except on the basis of a stand down of Viet Cong violence. A program of sustained reprisal, with its direct link to Hanoi's continuing aggressive actions in the South, will not involve us in nearly the level of international recrimination which would be precipitated by a go-North program which was not so connected. For this reason the international pressures for negotiation should be quite manageable.

DRAFT BY WILLIAM BUNDY ON RESULTS OF POLICY IN 1965

(Draft paper by William Bundy, "Where Are We Heading?," Feb. 18, 1965. An attached note, dated June 25, says, "Later than November paper, and unfinished.")

This memorandum examines possible developments and problems if the U.S. pursues the following policy with respect to South Viet-Nam:

a. Intensified pacification within South Viet-Nam. To meet the security problem, this might include a significant increase in present US force strength.

b. A program of measured, limited, and spaced air attacks, jointly with the GVN, against the infiltration complex in the DRV. Such attacks would take place at the rate of about one a week, unless spectacular Viet Cong action dictated an immediate response out of sequence. The normal pattern of such attacks would comprise one GVN and one U.S. strike on each occasion, confined to targets south of the 19th parallel, with variations in severity depending on the tempo of VC action, but with a slow upward trend in severity as the weeks went by.

c. That the US itself would take no initiative for talks, but would agree to cooperate in consultations—not a conference—undertaken by the UK and USSR as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference. As an opening move, the British would request an expression of our views, and we would use this occasion to spell out our position fully, including our purposes and what we regard as essential to the restoration of peace. We would further present our case against the DRV in the form of a long written document to be sent to the President of the United Nations Security Council and to be circulated to members of the UN.

1. COMMUNIST RESPONSES

a. Hanoi would almost certainly not feel itself under pressure at any early point to enter into fruitful negotiations or to call off its activity in any way. They would denounce the continued air attacks and seek to whip up maximum world opposition to them. Within South Viet-Nam, they might avoid spectacular actions, but would certainly continue a substantial pattern of activity along past lines, probably with emphasis on the kind of incidents we have seen this week, in which Communist agents stirred up a village "protest" against government air attacks, and against the U.S. Basically, they would see the situation in South Viet-Nam as likely to deteriorate further ("crumble", as they have put it), and would be expecting that at some point someone in the GVN will start secret talks with them behind our backs.

b. Communist China might supply additional air defense equipment to the DRV, but we do not believe they would engage in air operations from Communist China, at least up to the point where the MIGs in the DRV were engaged and we had found it necessary to attack Fukien or possibly—if the MIGs had been moved there—Vinh.

c. The Soviets would supply air defense equipment to the DRV and would continue to protest our air attacks in strong terms. However, we do not believe they would make any new commitment at this stage, and they would probably not do so even if the Chicoms became even more deeply involved—provided that we were not ourselves attacking Communist China. At that point, the heat might get awfully great on them, and they would be in a very difficult position to continue actively working as Co-Chairman. However, their approach to the British on the Co-Chairmanship certainly suggests that they would find some relief in starting to act in that role, and might use it as a hedge against further involvement, perhaps pointing out to Hanoi that the Co-Chairman exercise serves to prevent us from taking extreme action and that Hanoi will get the same result in the end if a political track is operating and if, in fact, South Viet-Nam keeps crumbling. They might also argue to Hanoi that the existence of the political track tends to reduce the chances of the Chicoms having to become deeply involved—which we believe Hanoi does not want unless it is compelled to accept it.

2. Within South Viet-Nam the new government is a somewhat better one, but the cohesive effects of the strikes to date have at most helped things a bit. The latest MACV report indicates a deteriorating situation except in the extreme south, and it is unlikely that this can be arrested in any short period of time even if the government does hold together well and the military go about their business. We shall be very lucky to see a leveling off, much less any significant improvement, in the next two months. In short, we may have to hang on quite a long time before we can hope to see an improving situation in South Viet-Nam—and this in turn is really the key to any negotiating position we could have at any time.

3. On the political track we believe the British will undertake their role with vigor, and that the Soviets will be more reserved. The Soviet can hardly hope to influence Hanoi much at this point, and they certainly have no leverage with Communist China. In the opening rounds, the Soviets will probably fire off some fairly sharp statements that the real key to the situation is for us to get out and to stop our attacks, and the opposing positions are so far apart that it is hard to see any useful movement for some time to come. We might well find the Soviets—or even the Canadians—sounding us out on whether we would stop our attacks in return for some moderation in VC activity. This is clearly unacceptable, and the very least we should hold out on is a verified cessation of infiltration (and radio silence) before we stop our attacks. Our stress on the cessation of infiltration may conceivably lead to the Indians coming forward to offer policing forces—a suggestion they have made before—and this would be a constructive move we could pick up. But, as noted above, Hanoi is most unlikely to trade on this basis for a long time to come.

4. In sum—the most likely prospect is for a prolonged period without major risks of escalation but equally without any give by Hanoi. If, contrary to our present judgment, the GVN should start to do better.

WHITE HOUSE CABLE TO TAYLOR ON THE ROLLING THUNDER DECISION

(Excerpts from cablegram from the State Department to Ambassador Taylor, Feb. 13, 1965, as provided in the body of the Pentagon study. The words in brackets are those of the study. The narative says this message was drafted at the White House.)

The President today approved the following program for immediate future actions in follow-up decisions he reported to you in Deptel 1653. [The first FLAMING DART reprisal decision.]

1. We will intensify by all available means the program of pacification within SVN.

2. We will execute a program of measured and limited air action jointly with GVN against selected military targets in DRV, remaining south of 19th parallel until further notice.

FYI. Our current expectation is that these attacks might come about once or twice a week and involve two or three targets on each day of operation. END FYI.

3. We will announce this policy of measured action in general terms and at the same time, we will go to UN Security Council to make clear case that aggressor is Hanoi. We will also make it plain that we are ready and eager for 'talks' to bring aggression to an end.

4. We believe that this 3-part program must be concerted with SVN, and we currently expect to announce it by Presidential statement diretcly after next authorized air action. We believe this action should take place as early as possible next week.

5. You are accordingly instructed to seek immediate GVN agreement on this program. You are authorized to emphasize our conviction that announcement of readiness to talk is stronger diplomatic position than awaiting inevitable summons to Security Council by third parties. We would hope to have appropriate GVN concurrence by Monday [Feb. 14th] if possible here.

In presenting above to GVN, you should draw fully, as you see fit, on following arguments:

a. We are determined to continue with military actions regardless of Security Council deliberations and any 'talks' or negotiations when [words illegible]. [Beginning of sentence illegible] that they cease [words illegible] and also the activity they are directing in the south.

b. We consider the UN Security Council initiative, following another strike, essential if we are to avoid being faced with really damaging initiatives by the USSR or perhaps by such powers as India, France, or even the UN.

c. At an early point in the Security Council initiative, we would expect to see calls fot the DRV to appear in the UN. If they failed to appear, as in August, this will make doubly clear that it is they who are refusing to desist, and our position in pursuing military actions against the DRV would be strengthened. For some reason we would now hope GVN itself would appear at UN and work closely with US.

d. With or without Hanoi, we have every expectation that any 'talks' that may result from our Security Council initiative would in fact go on for many weeks or perhaps months and would above all focus constantly on the cessation of Hanoi's aggression as the precondition to any cessation of military action against the DRV. We further anticipate that any detailed discussions about any possible eventual form of agreement returning to the essentials of the 1954 Accords would be postponed and would be subordinated to the central issue. . . .

CABLE TO U.S. ENVOYS IN ASIA ANNOUNCING SUSTAINED BOMBING

(Cablegram from State Department to heads of nine United States diplomatic missions in the Far East, Feb. 18, 1965, as provided in the body of the Pentagon study.)

Policy on Viet-Nam adopted today calls for the following:

1. Joint program with GVN of continuing air and naval action against North Viet-Nam whenever and wherever necessary. Such action to be against selected military targets and to be limited and fitting and adequate as response to continuous aggression in South Viet-Nam directed in Hanoi. Air strikes will be jointly planned and agreed with GVN and carried out on joint basis.

2. Intensification by all available means of pacification program within South Viet-Nam, including every possible step to find and attack VC concentrations and headquarters within SVN by all conventional means available to GVN and US.

3. Early detailed presentation to nations of world and to public of documented case against DRV as aggressor. Forum and form this presentation not yet decided, but we do not repeat not expect to touch upon readiness for talks or negotiations at this time. We are considering reaffirmation our objectives in some form in the near future.

4. Careful public statements of USG, combined with fact of continuing air action, are expected to make it clear that military action will continue while aggression continues. But focus of public attention will be kept as far as possible on DRV aggression; not on joint GVN-US military operations. There will be no comment of any sort on future actions except that all such actions will be adequate

and measured and fitting to aggression. (You will have noted President's statement of yesterday, which we will probably allow to stand.)

Addressees should inform head of government or State (as appropriate) of above in strictest confidence and report reactions. In the case of Canberra and Wellington [several words illegible] subject to security considerations of each operation as it occurs, as we did with respect to operations of February 7 and 11.

McNaughton Draft for McNamara on 'Proposed Course of Action'

(First draft of "Annex—Plan for Action for South Vietnam," appended to memorandum from John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, for Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, March 24, 1965.)

1. US aims: 70%—To avoid a humiliating US defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor).

20%—To keep SVN (and the adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.

10%—To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life.

ALSO—To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used.

NOT—To "help a friend," although it would be hard to stay in if asked out.

2. The situation: The situation in general is bad and deteriorating. The VC have the initiative. Defeatism is gaining among the rural population, somewhat in the cities, and even among the soldiers—especially those with relatives in rural areas. The Hop Tac area around Saigon is making little progress; the Delta stays bad; the country has been severed in the north. GVN control is shrinking to the enclaves, some burdened with refugees. In Saigon we have a remission: Quat is giving hope on the civilian side, the Buddhists have calmed, and the split generals are in uneasy equilibrium.

3. The preliminary question: Can the situation inside SVN be bottomed out (a) without extreme measures against the DRV and/or (b) without deployment of large numbers of US (and other) combat troops inside SVN? The answer is perhaps, but probably no.

4. Ways GVN might collapse: (a) VC successes reduce GVN control to enclaves, causing:

(1) insurrection in the enclaved population,

(2) massive defections of ARVN soldiers and even units,

(3) aggravated dissension and impotence in Saigon,

(4) defeatism and reorientation by key GVN officials,

(5) entrance of left-wing elements into the government,

(6) emergence of a popular-front regime,

(7) request that US leave,

(8) concessions to the VC, and

(9) accommodations to the DRV.

(b) VC with DRV volunteers concentrate on I and II Corps.

(1) conquering principal GVN-held enclaves there,

(2) declaring Liberation Government.

(3) joining the I & II Corps areas to the DRV, and

(4) pressing the course in (a) above for rest of SVN.

(c) While in a temporary funk, GVN might throw in sponge:

(1) dealing under the table with VC,

(2) asking the US to cease at least military aid,

(3) bringing left-wing elements into the government,

(4) leading to a popular-front regime, and

(5) ending in accommodations to the VC and DRV.

(d) In a surge of anti-Americanism, GVN could ask the US out and pursue course otherwise similar to (c) above.

5. The "trilemma": US policy appears to be drifting. This is because, while there is consensus that efforts inside SVN (para 6) will probably fail to prevent collapse, all three of the possible remedial courses of action have so far been rejected:

a. Will-breaking strikes on the North (para 7) are balked (1) by flash-point limits, (2) by doubts that the DRV will cave and (3) by doubts that the VC will obey a caving DRV. (Leaving strikes only a political and anti-infiltration nuisance.)

b. Large US troop deployments (para 9) are blocked by "French-defeat" and "Korea" syndromes, and Quat is queasy. (Troops could be net negatives, and be besieged.)

c. Exit by negotiations (para 9) is tainted by the humilitation likely to follow.

Effort inside South Vietnam: Progress inside SVN is our main aim. Great, imaginative efforts on the civilian political as well as military side must be made, bearing in mind that progress depends as much on GVN efforts and luck as on added US efforts. While only a few of such efforts can pay off quickly enough to affect the present ominous deterioration, some may, and we are dealing here in small critical margins. Furthermore, such investment is essential to provide a foundation for the longer run.

a. Improve spirit and effectiveness (fill out further, drawing from State memo to the President):

(1) Achieve governmental stability.

(2) Augment the psy-war program.

(3) Build a stronger pro-government infrastructure.

b. Improve physical security (fill out).

c. Reduce infiltration (fill out).

STRIKES ON THE NORTH (PROGRAM OF PROGRESSIVE MILITARY PRESSURE)

a. Purposes:

(1) To reduce DRV/VC activities by affecting DRV will.

(2) To improve the GVN/VC relative "balance of morale."

(3) To provide the US/GVN with a bargaining counter.

(4) To reduce DRV infiltration of men and materiel.

(5) To show the world the lengths to which US will go for a friend.

b. Program: Each week, 1 or 2 "mission days" with 100-plane high-damage US–VNAF strikes each "day" against important targets, plus 3 armed recce missions—all moving upward in weight of effort, value of target or proximity to Hanoi and China.

Alternative One: 12-week DRV-wide program shunning only "population" targets.

Alternative Two: 12-week program short of taking out Phuc Yen (Hanoi) airfield.

c. Other actions:

(1) Blockade of DRV ports by VNAF/US-dropped mines or by ships.

(2) South Vietnamese-implemented 34A MAROPS.

(3) Reconnaissance flights over Laos and the DRV.

(4) Daily Barrel Roll armed recce strikes in Laos (plus T–28s).

(5) Four-a-week Barrel Roll choke-point strikes in Laos.

(6) US/VNAF air and naval strikes against VC ops and bases in SVN.

(7) Westward deployment of US forces.

(8) No de Soto patrols or naval bombardment of DRV at this time.

d. Red "flash points." There are events which we can expect to imply substantial risk of escalation.

(1) Air strikes north of 17°. (This one already passed.)

(2) First US/VNAF confrontation with DRV MIGs.

(3) Strike on Phuc Yen MIG base near Hanoi.

(4) First strikes on Tonkin industrial/population targets.

(5) First strikes on Chinese railroad near China.

(6) First US/VNAF confrontation with Chicom MIGs.

(7) First hot pursuit of Chicom MIGs into China.

(8) First flak-suppression of Chicom or Soviet-manned SAM.

(9) Massive introduction of US ground troops into SVN.

(10 US/ARVN occupation of DRV territory (e.g., Ile de Tigre).

(11) First Chi/Sov-US confrontation or sinking in blockade.

e. Blue "flash points." China/DRV surely are sensitive to events which might cause *us* to escalate.

(1) All of the above "red" flash points.

(2) VC ground attack on Danang.

(3) Sinking of a US naval vessel.

(4) Open deployment of DRV troops into South Vietnam.

(5) Deployment of Chinese troops into North Vietnam.

(6) Deployment of FROGs or SAMs in North Vietnam.

(7) DRV air attack on South Vietnam.

(8) Announcement of Liberation Government in I/II Corps area.

f. Major risks:

(1) Losses to DRV MIGs, and later possibly to SAMs.

(2) Increased VC activities, and possibly Liberation Government.

(3) Panic or other collapse of GVN from under us.

(4) World-wide revulsion against us (against strikes, blockades, etc.).

(5) Sympathetic fires over Berlin, Cyprus, Kashmir, Jordan waters.

(6) Escalation to conventional war with DRV, China (and USSR?)

(7) Escalation to the use of nuclear weapons.

g. Other Red moves:

(1) More jets to NVN with DRV or Chicom pilots.

(2) More AA (SAMs?) and radar gear (Soviet-manned?) to MVN.

(3) Increased air and ground forces in South China.

(4) Other "defensive" DRV retaliation (e.g., shoot-down of a U–2).

(5) PL land grabs in Laos.

(6) PL declaration of new government in Laos.

(7) Political drive for "neutralization" of Indo-China.

h. Escalation control. We can do three things to avoid escalation too-much or too-fast:

(1) Stretch out. Retard the program (e.g., 1 not 2 fixed strikes a week).

(2) Circuit breaker. Abandon at least temporarily the theory that our strikes are intended to break DRV will, and "plateau" them below the "Phuc Yen Airfield" flash point on one or the other of these tenable theories:

(a) That we strike as necessary to interdict infiltration.

(b) That our level of strikes is generally responsive to the level of VC/DRV activities in South Vietnam.

(3) Shunt. Plateau the air strikes per para (2) and divert the energy into:

(a) A mine—and/or ship-blockade of DRV ports.

(b) Massive deployment of US (and other?) troops into SVN (and Laos?):

(1) To man the "enclaves", releasing ARVN forces.

(2) To take over Pleiku, Kontum, Darlac provinces.

(3) To create a [word illegible] sea-Thailand infiltration wall.

i. Important miscellany:

(1) Program should appear to be relentless (i.e., possibility of employing "circuit-breakers" should be secret).

(2) Enemy should be kept aware of our limited objectives.

(3) Allies should be kept on board.

(4) USSR should be kept in passive role.

(5) Information program should preserve US public support.

PROGRAM OF LARGE US GROUND EFFORT IN SVN AND SEA

a. Purposes:

(1) To defeat the VC on the ground.

(2) To improve GVN/VC relative "morale balance."

(3) To improve US/GVN bargaining position.

(4) To show world lengths to which US will go to fulfill commitments.

b. Program:

(1) Continue strike-North "crescendo" or "plateau" (para 7 above.)

(2) Add any "combat support" personnel needed by MACV; and (3) Deploy remainder of the III Marine Expeditionary Force to Danang; and (4) Deploy one US (plus one Korean?) division to defeat VC in Pleiku-Kontum-Darlac area, and/or (5) Deploy one US (plus one Korean?) division to hold enclaves Bien Hoa/Ton Son Nhut, Nha Trang, Qui Non, Pleiku; and/or (6) Deploy 3–5 US divisions (with "international" elements) across Laos-SVN infiltration routes and at key SVN population centers.

c. Advantages:

(1) Improve (at least initially) manpower ratio vs. the VC.

(2) Boost GVN morale and depress DRV/VC morale.

(3) Firm up US commitment in eyes of all Reds, allies and neutrals.

(4) Deter (or even prevent) coups in the South.

d. Risks:

(1) Deployment will suck Chicom troops into DRV.

(2) Deployment will suck counter-balancing DRV/Chinese troops into SVN.

(3) Announcement of deployment will cause massive DRV/Chicom effort preemptively to occupy new SVN territory.

(4) US losses will increase.

(5) Friction with GVN (and Koreans?) over command will arise.

(6) GVN will tend increasingly to "let the US do it."

(7) Anti-US "colonialist" mood may increase in and outside SVN.

(8) US forces may be surrounded and trapped.

e. Important miscellany:

(1) There are no obvious circuit-breakers. Once US troops are in, it will be difficult to withdraw them or to move them, say, to Thailand without admitting defeat.

(2) It will take massive deployments (many divisions) to improve the GVN/US: VC ratio to the optimum 10+:1.

(3) In any event, our Project 22 planning with the Thais for defense of the Mekong towns must proceed apace.

EXIT BY NEGOTIATIONS

a. Bargaining counters.

(1) What DRV could give:

(a) Stop training and sending personnel to SVN/Laos.

(b) Stop sending arms and supplies into SVN/Laos.

(c) Stop directing military actions into SVN/Laos.

(d) Order the VC/PL to stop their insurgencies.

(e) Stop propaganda broadcasts to South Vietnam.

(f) Remove VM forces and cadres from SVN and Laos.

(g) See that VC/PL stop incidents in SVN and Laos.

(h) See that VC/PL cease resistance.

(i) See that VC/PL turn in weapons and bases.

(j) See that VC/PL surrender for amnesty/expatriation.

(2) What GVN/US could give:

(a) Stop (or not increase) air strikes on DRV.

(b) Remove (or not increase) US troops in SVN.

(c) Rice supply to DRV.

(d) Assurance that US/GVN have no designs on NVN.

(e) Assurance that US/GVN will not demand public renunciation by the DRV of Communist goals.

(f) Assurance that "peaceful coexistance" (e.g., continuation of Red propaganda in SVN) is acceptable.

(g) Capitulation: Leftists in GVN, coalition government, and eventual incorporation of SVN into DRV.

b. Possible outcomes.

(1) Pacified non-Communist South Vietnam.

(2) "Laotian" solution, with areas of de facto VC dominion, a "government of national unity," and a Liberation Front ostensibly weened from DRV control.

(3) Explicit partition of SVN, with each area under a separate government.

(4) A "semi-equilibrium"—a slow-motion war—with slowly shifting GVN-VC lines.

(5) Loss of SVN to the DRV.

c. Techniques to minimize impact of bad outcomes. If/when it is estimated that even the best US/GVN efforts means failure ("flash" or defeat), it will be important to act to minimize the after-damage to US effectiveness and image by steps such as these:

(1) Publicize uniqueness of congenital impossibility of SVN case (e.g., Viet Minh held much of SVN in 1954, long sieve-like borders, unfavorable terrain, no national tradition, few administrators, mess left by French, competing factions, Red LOC advantage, late US start, etc.).

(2) Take opportunity offered by next coup or GVN anti-US tantrum to 'ship out' (coupled with advance threat to do so if they fail to "shape up"?)

(3) Create diversionary "offensives" elsewhere in the world (e.g., to shore up Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, India, Australia; to launch an "anti-poverty" program for underdeveloped areas.)

(4) Enter multi-nation negotiations calculated to shift opinions and values.

d. Risks. With the physical situation and the trends as they are the fear is overwhelming that an exit negotiated now would result in humiliation for the US.

Evaluation: It is essential—however badly SEA may go over the next 1–3 years—that US emerge as a "good doctor." We must have kept promises, been tough, taken risks, gotten bloodied, and hurt the enemy very badly. We must avoid harmful appearances which will affect judgments by, and provide pretexts to, other nations regarding how the US will behave in future cases of particular interest to those nations—regarding US policy, power, resolve and competence to deal with their problems. In this connection, the relevant audiences are the Communists (who must feel strong pressures), the South Vietnamese (whose morale must be buoyed), our allies (who must trust us as "underwriters") and the US public (which must support our risk-taking with US lives and prestige).

Urgency: If the strike-North program (para 7) is not altered: we will reach the MIG/Phuc Yen flash point in approximately one month. If the program is altered only to stretch out the crescendo: up to 3 months may be had before that flash point, at the expense of a less persuasive squeeze. If the program is altered to "plateau" or dampen the strikes: much of their negotiating value will be lost. (Furthermore, there is now a hint of flexibility on the Red side: the Soviets are struggling to find a Gordian knot-cutter; the Chicoms may be wavering (Paris 5326).)

POSSIBLE COURSE

(1) Redouble efforts inside SVN (get better organized for it).

(2) Prepare to deploy US combat troops in phases, starting with one Army division at Pleiku and a Marine MEF at Danang.

(3) Stretch out strike-North program, postponing Phuc Yen until June (exceed flash points only in specific retaliations).

(4) Initiate talks along the following lines, bearing in mind that formal partition, or even a "Laos" partition, is out in SVN; we must break the VC back or work out an accommodation.

PHASE ONE TALKS:

(A) When: Now, before an avoidable flash point.

(B) Who: US–USSR, perhaps also US-India. (Not with China or Liberation Front; not through UK or France or U Thant; keep alert to possibility that GVN officials are talking under the table.)

(C) How: With GVN consent, private, quiet (refuse formal talks).

(D) What:

(1) Offer to stop strikes on DRV and withhold deployment of large US forces in trade for DRV stoppage of infiltration, communications to VC, and VC attacks, sabotage and terrorism, and for withdrawal of named units in SVN.

(2) Compliance would be policed unilaterally. If as is likely, complete compliance by the DRV is not forthcoming, we would carry out occasional strikes.

(3) We make clear that we are not demanding cessation of Fed propaganda nor a public renunciation by Hanoi of its doctrines.

(4) Regarding "defensive" VC attacks—i.e., VC defending VC-held areas from encroaching ARVN forces—we take the public position that ARVN forces must be free to operate throughout SVN, especially in areas where amnesty is offered (but in fact, discretion will be exercised).

(5) Terrorism and sabotage, however, must be dampened markedly throughout the country, and civilian administrators must be free to move and operate freely, certainly in so-called contested areas (and perhaps even in VC base areas).

PHASE TWO TALKS:

(A) When: At the end of Phase One.

(B) Who: All interested nations.

(C) How: Publicly in large conference.

(4): What:

(1) Offer to remove US combat forces from South Vietnam in exchange for repatriation (or regroupment?) of DRV infiltrators and for erection of international machinery to verify the end of infiltration and communication.

(2) Offer to seek to determine the will of the people under international supervision, with an appropriate reflection of those who favor the VC.

(3) Any recognition of the Liberation Front would have to be accompanied by disarming the VC and at least avowed VC independence from DRV control.

PHASE THREE TALKS: Avoid any talks regarding the future of all of Southeast Asia. Thailand's future should not be up for discussion; and we have the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords covering the rest of the area.

c. Special Points:

(1) Play on DRV's fear of China.

(2) To show good will, suspend strikes on North for a few days if requested by Soviets during efforts to mediate.

(3) Have a contingency plan prepared to evacuate US personnel in case a para-9-type situation arises.

(4) If the DRV will not "play" the above game, we must be prepared (a) to risk passing some flash points, in the Strike-North program, (b) to put more US troops into SVN, and/or (c) reconsider our minimum acceptable outcome.

TERMS IN TEXTS

ARVN—Army of Republic of (South) Vietnam.

A.S.A.P.—As soon as possible.

B.L.T.—Battalion landing team.

CINCPAC—Commander in Chief, Pacific.
DEPTEL—Department telegram.
D.O.D.—Department of Defense.
DRV—Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam.
EMBTEL—Embassy telegram.
ISA—International Security Agency.
JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff.
L.O.C.—Lines of communication.
MACV—Military Assistance Command. Vietnam.
NLF—National Liberation Front.
NLFSVN—National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam.
PAVN—People's Army of (North) Vietnam.
P.I.—Philippine Islands.
P.L.—Pathet Lao.
P.O.L.—Petroleum, oil, lubricants.
R.O.K.—Republic of (South) Korea.
RVNAF—Republic of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces.
SAM—Surface-to-air missile.
SEA—Southeast Asia.
SVN—South Vietnam.
U.S.G.—U.S. Government.
VM—Vietminh.

McCONE MEMO TO TOP OFFICIALS ON FORCEFULNESS OF AIR WAR

(Memorandum from John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, to Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Ambassador Taylor, April 2, 1965, as provided in the body of the Pentagon's study. Paragraphs in italics are the study's paraphrase or explanation.)

McCone did not inherently disagree with the change in the U.S. ground-force role, but felt that it was inconsistent with the decision to continue the air strike program at the feeble level at which it was then being conducted. McCone developed his argument as follows:

I have been giving thought to the paper that we discussed in yesterday's meeting, which unfortunately I had little time to study, and also to the decision made to change the mission of our ground forces in South Vietnam from one of advice and static defense to one of active combat operations against the Viet Cong guerrillas.

I feel that the latter decision is correct only if our air strikes against the North are sufficiently heavy and damaging really to hurt the North Vietnamese. The paper we examined yesterday does not anticipate the type of air operation against the North necessary to force the NVN to reappraise their policy. On the contrary, it states, "We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of ROLLING THUNDER operations ——," and later, in outlining the types of targets, states, "The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of MIG's," and these conditions indicate restraints which will not be persuasive to the NVM and would probably be read as evidence of a U.S. desire to temporize.

I have reported that the strikes to date have not caused a change in the North Vietnamese policy of directing Viet Cong insurgency, infiltrating cadres and supplying material. If anything, the strikes to date have hardened their attitude.

I have now had a chance to examine the 12-week program referred to by General Wheeler and it is my personal opinion that this program is not sufficiently severe and [words illegible] the North Vietnamese to [words illegible] policy.

On the other hand, we must look with care to our position under a program of slowly ascending tempo of air strikes. With the passage of each day and each week, we can expect increasing pressure to stop the bombing. This will come from various elements of the American public, from the press, the United Nations and world opinion. Therefore time will run against us in this operation and I think the North Vietnamese are counting on this.

Therefore I think what we are doing is starting on a track which involves ground force operations, which, in all probability, will have limited effectiveness against guerrillas, although admittedly will restrain some VC advances. However, we can expect requirements for an ever-increasing commitment of U.S. personnel without materially improving the chances of victory. I support and agree with this decision but I must point out that in my judgment, forcing submission of the VC can only be brought about by a decision in Hanoi. Since the contemplated actions against the North are modest in scale, they will not impose unacceptable damage on it, nor will they threaten the DRV's vital interests. Hence, they will not present them with a situation with which they cannot live, though such actions will cause the DRV pain and inconvenience.

I believe our proposed track offers great danger of simply encouraging Chinese Communists and Soviet support of the DRV and VC cause, if for no other reason than the risk for both will be minimum. I envision that the reaction of the NVN and Chinese Communists will be to deliberately, carefully, and probably gradually, build up the Viet Cong capabilities by covert infiltration on North Vietnamese and, possibly, Chinese cadres and thus bring an ever-increasing pressure on our forces. In effect, we will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win, and from which we will have extreme difficulty in extracting ourselves.

Therefore it is my judgment that if we are to change the mission of the ground forces, we must also change the ground rules of the strikes against North Vietnam. We must hit them harder, more frequently, and inflict greater damage. Instead of avoiding the MIG's, we must go in and take them out. A bridge here and there will not do the job. We must strike their airfields, their petroleum resources, power stations and their military compounds. This, in my opinion, must be done promptly and with minimum restraint.

If we are unwilling to take it this kind of a decision now, we must not take the actions concerning the mission of our ground forces for the reasons I have mentioned [words illegible].

APRIL '65, ORDER INCREASING GROUND FORCE AND SHIFTING MISSION

(National Security Action Memorandum 328, April 6, 1965, signed by McGeorge Bundy and addressed to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.)

On Thursday, April 1, The President made the following decisions with respect to Vietnam:

1. Subject to modifications in light of experience, to coordination and direction both in Saigon and in Washington, the President approved the 41-point program of non-military actions submitted by Ambassador Taylor in a memorandum dated March 31, 1965.

2. The President gave general approval to the recommendations submitted by Mr. Rowan in his report dated March 16, with the exception that the President withheld approval of any request for supplemental funds at this time—it is his decision that this program is to be energetically supported by all agencies and departments and by reprogramming of available funds as necessary within USIA.

3. The President approved the urgent exploration of the 12 suggestions for covert and other actions submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence under date of March 31.

4. The President repeated his earlier approval of the 21-point program of military actions submitted by General Harold K. Johnson under date of March 14 and re-emphasized his desire that aircraft and helicopter reinforcements under this program be accelerated.

5. The President approved an 18–20,000 man increase in U.S. military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.

6. The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron and associated headquarters and support elements.

7. The President approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.

8. The President approved the urgent exploration, with the Korean, Australian, and New Zealand Governments, of the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements from their armed forces in parallel with the additional Marine deployment approved in paragraph 6.

9. Subject to continuing review, the President approved the following general framework of continuing action against North Vietnam and Laos:

We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of ROLLING THUNDER operations being prepared to add strikes in response to a higher rate of VC operations, or conceivably to slow the pace in the unlikely event VC slacked off sharply for what appeared to be more than a temporary operational lull.

The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GGI range of MIGs. We should continue to vary the types of targets, stepping up attacks on lines of communication in the near future, and possibly moving in a few weeks to attack on the rail lines north and northeast of Hanoi.

Leaflet operations should be expanded to obtain maximum practicable psychological effect on North Vietnamese population.

Blockade or aerial mining of North Vietnamese ports need further study and should be considered for future operations. It would have major political complications, especially in relation to the Soviets and other third countries, but also offers many advantages.

Air operation in Laos, particularly route blocking operations in the Panhandle area, should be stepped up to the maximum remunerative rate.

10. Ambassador Taylor will promptly seek the reactions of the South Vietnamese Government to appropriate sections of this program and their approval as necessary, and in the event of disapproval or difficulty at that end, these decisions will be appropriately reconsidered. In any event, no action into Vietnam under paragraphs 6 and 7 above should take place without GVN approval or further Presidential authorization.

11. The President desires that with respect to the actions in paragraphs 5 through 7, premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practicable, but in ways that should minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy, and official statements on these troop movements will be made only with the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State. The President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy.

TAYLOR CABLE TO WASHINGTON ON STEP-UP IN GROUND FORCES

(Cablegram April 17, 1965, from Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor in Saigon to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, with a copy to the White House for the attention of McGeorge Bundy.)

This message undertakes to summarize instructions which I have received over the last ten days with regard to the introduction of

third-country combat forces and to discuss the preferred way of presenting the subject to the GVN.

As the result of the meeting of the President and his advisors on April 1 and the NSC meeting on the following day, I left Washington and returned to Saigon with the understanding that the reinforcement of the Marines already ashore by two additional BLT's and a F-4 squadron and the progressive introduction of HAWPNPPP support forces were approved but that decision on the several proposals for bringing in more U.S. combat forces and their possible modes of employment was withheld in an offensive counterinsurgency role. State was to explore with the Korean, Australian and New Zealand govts the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements in parallel with the Marine reinforcement.

Since arriving home, I have received the following instructions and have taken the indicated actions with respect to third-country combat forces.

April 6 and 8. Received GVN concurrence to introduction of the Marine reinforcements and to an expanded mission for all Marines in Danang-Phu Bai area.

April 8. Received Deptel 2229 directing approach to GVN, suggesting request to Australian govt for an infantry battalion for use in SVN. While awaiting a propitious moment to raise the matter, I received Deptel 2237 directing approach be delayed until further orders. Nothing further has been received since.

April 14. I learned by JCS 009012 to Cincpac of apparent decision to deploy 173rd airborne brigade immediately to Bien Hoa-Vung Tau. By Embtel 3373, delay in this deployment was urgently recommended but no reply has been received. However, Para 2 of Doc 152339 apparently makes reference to this project in terms which suggest that is something less than as an approved immediate action. In view of the uncertainty of its status, I have not broached the matter with Quat.

April 15. Received Deptel 2314 directing that embassy Saigon discuss with GVN introduction of Rok regimental combat team and suggest GVN request such a force Asap. Because of Quat's absence from Saigon, I have not been able to raise matter. As matter of fact, it should not be raised until we have a clear concept of employment.

April 16. I have just seen state-defense message Dod 152339 cited above which indicates a favorable attitude toward several possible uses of US combat forces beyond the NSC decisions of April 2. I am told to discuss these and certain other non-military matters urgently with Quat. The substance of this cable will be addressed in a separate message. I can not raise these matters with Quat without further guidance.

Faced with this rapidly changing picture of Washington desires and intentions with regard to the introduction of third-country (as well as US) combat forces, I badly need a clarification of our purposes and objectives. Before I can present our case to GVN, I have to know what that case is and why. It is not going to be easy to get ready concurrence for the large-scale introduction of foreign troops unless the need is clear and explicit.

Let me suggest the kind of instruction to the AMB which it would be most helpful to receive for use in presenting to GVN what I take to be a new policy of third-country participation in ground combat.

"The USG has completed a thorough review of the situation in SVN both in its national and international aspects and has reached certain important conclusions. It feels that in recent weeks there has been a somewhat favorable change in the overall situation as the result of the air attacks on DRV, the relatively small but numerous successes in the field against the VC and the encouraging progress of the Quat govt. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that, in all probability, the primary objective of the GVN and the USG of changing the will of the DRV to support the VC insurgency can not be attained in an acceptable time-frame by the methods presently employed. The air campaign in the North must be supplemented by signal successes against the VC on the South before we can hope to create that frame of mind in Hanoi which will lead to the decisions we seek.

"The JCS have reviewed the military resources which will be available in SVN by the end of 1965 and have concluded that even with an attainment of the highest feasible mobilization goals, ARVN will have insufficient forces to carry out the kind of successful campaign against the VC which is considered essential for the purposes discussed above. If the ground war is not to drag into 1966 and even beyond, they consider it necessary to reinforce GNV ground forces with about 23 battalion equivalents in addition to the force now being recruited in SVN. Since these reinforcements can not be raised by the GVN, they must inevitably come from third-country sources.

"The USG accepts the validity of this reasoning of the JCS and offers its assistance to the GVN to raise these additional forces for the purpose of bringing the VC insurgency to an end in the shortest possible time. We are prepared to bring in additional US ground forces provided we can get a reasonable degree of participation from other third countries. If the GVN will make urgent representations to them, we believe it entirely possible to obtain the following contributions: Korea, one regimental combat team; Australia, one infantry battalion; New Zealand, one battery and one company of tanks; PI, one battalion. If the forces of the foregoing magnitude are forthcoming the USG is prepared to provide the remainder of the combat reinforcements as well as the necessary logistic personnel to support the third-country contingents. Also it will use its good offices as desired in assisting the GVN approach to these govts.

"You (the Ambassador) will seek the concurrence of the GVN to the foregoing program, recognizing that a large number of questions such as command relationships, concepts of employment and disposition of forces must be worked out subsequently." Armed with an instruction such as the foregoing, I would feel adequately equipped to initiate what may be a sharp debate with the GVN. I need something like this before taking up the pending troop matters with Quat.

JOHNSON'S MESSAGE TO TAYLOR ON THE MAY 10 HALT IN BOMBING

(Message from President Johnson to Ambassador Taylor, May 10, 1965, as provided in the body of the Pentagon study.)

I have learned from Bob McNamara that nearly all Rolling Thunder operations for this week can be completed by Wednesday noon, Washington time. This fact and the days of Buddha's birthday seem to me to provide an excellent opportunity for a pause in air attacks which might go into next week and which I could use to good effect with world opinion.

My plan is not to announce this brief pause but simply to call it privately to the attention of Moscow and Hanoi as soon as possible and tell them that we shall be watching closely to see whether they respond in any way. My current plan is to report publicly after the pause ends on what we have done.

Could you see Quat right away on Tuesday and see if you can persuade him to concur in this plan. I would like to associate him with me in this decision if possible, but I would accept a simple concurrence or even willingness not to oppose my decision. In general, I think it important that he and I should get together in such matters, but I have no desire to embarrass him if it is politically difficult for him to join activity in a pause over Buddha's birthday.

[Words illegible] noted your [words illegible] but do not yet have your appreciation of the political effect in Saigon of acting around Buddha's birthday. From my point of view it is a great advantage to use Buddha's birthday to mask the first days of the pause here, if it is at all possible in political terms for Quat. I assume we could undertake to enlist the Archbishop and the Nuncio in calming the Catholics.

You should understand that my purpose in this plan is to begin to clear a path either toward restoration of peace or toward increased military action, depending upon the reaction of the Communists. We have amply demonstrated our determination and our commitment in the last two months, and I now wish to gain some flexibility.

I know that this is a hard assignment on short notice, but there is no one who can bring it off better.

I have kept this plan in the tightest possible circle here and wish you to inform no one but Alexis Johnson. After I have your report of Quat's reaction I will make a final decision and it will be communicated promptly to senior officers concerned.

ROSTOW MEMORANDUM ON "VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN GUERRILLA WARS"

(Memorandum from Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, for Secretary of State Rusk, "Victory and Defeat in Guerrilla Wars: The Case of South Vietnam," May 20, 1965, as provided in the body of the Pentagon's study.)

In the press, at least, there is a certain fuzziness about the possibility of clear-cut victory in South Vietnam; and the President's statement that a military victory is impossible is open to misinterpretation.

1. Historically, guerrilla wars have generally been lost or won cleanly: Greece, China mainland, North Viet-Nam, Malaya, Philippines, Laos in 1954 was an exception, with two provinces granted the Communists and a de facto split imposed on the country.

2. In all the cases won by Free World forces, there was a phase when the guerrillas commanded a good part of the countryside and, indeed, placed Athens, Kuala Lumpur, and Manila under something close to siege. They failed to win because all the possible routes to guerrilla victory were closed and, in failing to win, they lost. They finally gave up in discouragement. The routes to victory are:

a) Mao Stage Three: going to all-out conventional war and winning as in China in 1947–49;

b) Political collapse and takeover: North Viet-Nam;

c) Political collapse and a coalition government in which the Communists get control over security machinery; army and/or police. This has been an evident Viet Cong objective in this [rest illegible].

d) Converting the bargaining pressure generated by the guerrilla forces into a partial victory by splitting the country: Laos. Also, in a sense, North Viet-Nam in 1954 and the Irish Rebellion after the First World War.

3. If we succeed in blocking these four routes to victory, discouraging the Communist force in the South, and making the continuance of the war sufficiently costly to the North there is no reason we cannot win as clear a victory in South Viet-Nam as in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines. Unless political morale in Saigon collapses and the ARVN tends to break up, case c), the most realistic hope of the VC, should be avoidable. This danger argues for more

rather less presure on the North, while continuing the battle in the South in such a way as to make VC hopes of military and political progress wane.

4. The objective of the exercise is to convince Hanoi that its bargaining position is being reduced with the passage of time; for, even in the worst case for Hanoi, it wants some bargaining position (rather than simply dropping the war) to get U.S. forces radically reduced in South Viet-Nam and to get some minimum face-saving formula for the VC.

5. I believe Hanoi understands its dilemma well. As of early February it saw a good chance of a quiet clean victory via route c). It now is staring at a quite clear-cut defeat, with the rising U.S. strength and GVN morale in the South and rising costs in the North. That readjustment in prospects is painful; and they won't in my view, accept its consequences unless they are convinced time has ceased to be their friend, despite the full use of their assets on the ground in South Viet-Nam, in political warfare around the world, and in diplomacy.

6. Their last and best hope will be, of course, that if they end the war and get us out, the political, social, and economic situation in South Viet-Nam will deteriorate in such a way as to permit Communist political takeover, with or without a revival of guerrilla warfare, it is in this phase that we will have to consolidate, with the South Vietnamese, a victory that is nearer our grasp than we (but not Hanoi) may think.

GEORGE BALL MEMO FOR JOHNSON ON "A COMPROMISE SOLUTION"

(Memorandum, "A Compromise Solution in South Vietnam," from Under Secretary of State George W. Ball for President Johnson, July 1, 1965.)

(1) A Losing War: The South Vietnamese are losing the war to the Viet Cong. No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms, no matter how many hundred thousand *white foreign* (U.S.) troops we deploy.

No one has demonstrated that a white ground force of whatever size can win a guerrilla war—which is at the same time a civil war between Asians—in jungle terrain in the midst of a population that refuses cooperation to the white forces (and the South Vietnamese) and thus provides a great intelligence advantage to the other side. Three recent incidents vividly illustrate this point: (a) the sneak attack on the Da Nang Air Base which involved penetration of a defense perimeter guarded by 9,000 Marines. This raid was possible only because of the cooperation of the local inhabitants; (b) the B52 raid that failed to hit the Viet Cong who had obviously been tipped off; (c) the search and destroy mission of the 173rd Air Borne Brigade which spent three days looking for the Viet Cong, suffered 23 casualties, and never made contact with the enemy who had obviously gotten advance word of their assignment.

(2) The Question to Decide: Should we limit our liabilities in South Vietnam and try to find a way out with minimal long-term costs?

The alternative—no matter what we may wish it to be—is almost certainly a protracted war involving an openended commitment of U.S. forces, mounting U.S. casualities, no assurance of a satisfactory solution, and a serious danger of escalation at the end of the road.

(3) Need for a Decision Now: So long as our forces are restricted to advising and assisting the South Vietnamese, the struggle will remain a civil war between Asian peoples. Once we deploy substantial numbers of troops in combat it will become a war between the U.S. and a large part of the population of South Vietnam, organized and directed from North Vietnam and backed by the resources of both Moscow and Peiping.

The decision you face now, therefore, is crucial. Once large numbers of U.S. troops are committed to direct combat, they will begin to take heavy casualties in a war they are ill-equipped to fight in a non-cooperative if not downright hostile countryside.

Once we suffer large casualties, we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot—without national humiliation—stop short of achieving our complete objectives. *Of the two possibilities I think humiliation would be more likely than the achievement of our objectives—even after we have paid terrible costs.*

(4) Compromise Solution: Should we commit U.S. manpower and prestige to a terrain so unfavorable as to give a very large advantage to the enemy—or should we seek a compromise settlement which achieves less than our stated objectives and thus cut our losses while we still have the freedom of maneuver to do so.

(5) Costs of a Compromise Solution: The answer involves a judgment as to the cost of the U.S. such a compromise settlement in terms of our relations with the countries in the area of South Vietnam, the credibility of our commitments, and our prestige around the world. In my judgment, if we act before we commit substantial U.S. troops to combat in South Vietnam we can, by accepting some short-term costs, avoid what may well be a long-term catastrophe. I believe we tended grossly to exaggerate the costs involved in a compromise settlement. An appreciation of probable costs is contained in the attached memorandum.

(6) With these considerations in mind, I strongly urge the following program:

(a) Military Program

(1) Complete all deployments already announced—15 battalions—but decide not to go beyond a total of 72,000 men represented by this figure.

(2) Restrict the combat role of the American forces to the June 19 announcement, making it clear to General Westmoreland that this announcement is to be strictly construed.

(3) Continue bombing in the North but avoid the Hanoi-Haiphong area and any targets nearer the Chinese border than those already struck.

(b) Political Program

(1) In any political approaches so far, we have been the prisoners of whatever South Vietnamese government that was momentarily in power. If we are ever to move toward a settlement, it will probably be because the South Vietnamese government pulls the rug out from under us and makes its own deal *or* because we go forward quietly without advance prearrangement with Saigon.

(2) So far we have not given the other side a reason to believe there is *any* flexibility in our negotiating approach. And the other side has been unwilling to accept what *in their terms* is complete capitulation.

(3) Now is the time to start some serious diplomatic feelers looking toward a solution based on some application of a self-determination principle.

(4) I would recommend approaching Hanoi rather than any of the other probable parties, the NLF—or Peiping. Hanoi is the only one that has given any signs of interest in discussion. Peiping has been rigidly opposed. Moscow has recommended that we negotiate with Hanoi. The NLF has been silent.

(5) There are several channels to the North Vietnamese but I think the best one is through their representative in Paris, Mai Van Bo. Initial feelers of Bo should be directed toward a discussion both of the four points we have put forward and the four points put forward by Hanoi as a basis for negotiation. We can accept all but one of Hanoi's four points, and hopefully we should be able to agree on some ground rules for serious negotiation—including no preconditions.

(6) If the initial feelers lead to further secret, exploratory talks, we can inject the concept of self-determination that would permit the Viet Cong some hope of achieving some of their political objectives through local elections or some other device.

(7) The contact on our side should be handled through a non-governmental cutout (possibly a reliable newspaper man who can be repudiated).

(8) If progress can be made at this level a basis can be laid for a multinational conference. At some point, obviously, the government of South Vietnam will have to be brought on board, but I would postpone this step until after a substantial feeling out of Hanoi.

(7) Before moving to any formal conference we should be prepared to agree once the conference is started:

(a) The U.S. will stand down its bombing of the North

(b) The South Vietnamese will initiate no offensive operations in the South, and

(c) the DRV will stop terrorism and other aggressive action against the South.

(8) The negotiations at the conference should aim at incorporating our understanding with Hanoi in the form of a multinational agreement guaranteed by the U.S., the Soviet Union and possibly other parties, and providing for an international mechanism to supervise its execution.

PROBABLE REACTIONS TO THE CUTTING OF OUR LOSSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

We have tended to exaggerate the losses involved in a complete settlement in South Vietnam. There are three aspects to the problem that should be considered. First, the local effect of our action on nations in or near Southeast Asia. Second, the effect of our action on the credibility of our commitments around the world. Third, the effect on our position of world leadership.

A. Free Asian Reactions to a Compromise Settlement in South Vietnam Would Be Highly Parochial.

With each country interpreting the event primarily in terms of (a) its own immediate interest, (b) its sense of vulnerability to Communist invasion or insurgency, and (c) its confidence in the integrity of our commitment to its own security based on evidence other than that provided by our actions in South Vietnam.

Within this framework the following groupings emerge:

(1) The Republic of China and Thailand: staunch allies whose preference for extreme U.S. actions including a risk of war with Communist China sets them apart from all other Asian nations

(2) The Republic of Korea and the Philippines; equally staunch allies whose support for strong U.S. action short of a war with Communist China would make post-settlement reassurance of pressing U.S. need;

(3) Japan: it would prefer wisdom to valor in an area remote from its own interests where escalation could involve its Chinese or Eurasian neighbors or both;

(4) Laos; a friendly neutral dependent on a strong Thai-U.S. guarantee of support in the face of increased Vietnamese and Laos pressures.

(5) Burma and Cambodia: suspicious neutrals whose fear of antagonizing Communist China would increase their leaning toward Peiping in a conviction that the U.S. presence is not long for Southeast Asia; and

(6) Indonesia: whose opportunistic marriage of convenience of both Hanoi and Peiping would carry it further in its overt aggression against Malaysia, convinced that foreign imperialism is a fast fading entity in the region.

Government cooperation (words illegible) essential in making the following points to the Japanese people.

(1) U.S. support was given in full measure as shown by our casualties, our expenditures and our risk taking;

(2) The U.S. record in Korea shows the credibility of our commitment so far as Japan is concerned.

The government as such supports our strong posture in Vietnam but stops short of the idea of a war between the U.S. and China.

THAILAND

Thai commitments to the struggle within Laos and South Vietnam are based upon a careful evaluation of the regional threat to Thailand's security. The Thais are confident they can contain any threats from Indochina alone. They know, however, they cannot withstand the massive power of Communist China without foreign assistance. Unfortunately, the Thai view of the war has seriously erred in fundamental respects. They believe American power can do anything, both militarily and in terms of shoring up the Saigon regime. They now assume that we really could take over in Saigon and win the war if we felt we had to. If we should fail to do so, the Thais would initially see it as a failure of U.S. will. Yet time is on our side, providing we employ it effectively. Thailand is an independent nation with a long national history, and unlike South Vietnam, an acute national consciousness. It has few domestic Communists and none of the instability that plagues its neighbors, Burma and Malaysia. Its one danger area in the northeast is well in hand so far as preventive measures against insurgency are concerned. Securing the Mekong Valley will be critical in any long-run solution, whether by the partition of Laos with Thai-U.S. forces occupying the western half or by some [word illegible] arrangement. Providing we are willing to make the effort, Thailand can be a foundation of rock and not a bed of sand in which to base our political/military commitment to Southeast Asia.

With the exception of the nations in Southeast Asia, a compromise settlement in South Vietnam should not have a major impact on the credibility of our commitments around the world . . . Chancellor Erhard has told us privately that the people of Berlin would be concerned by a compromise settlement of South Vietnam. But this was hardly an original thought, and I suspect he was telling us what he believed we would like to hear. After all, the confidence of the West Berliners will depend more on what they see on the spot than on [word illegible] news or events halfway around the world. In my observation, the principal anxiety of our NATO Allies is that we have become too preoccupied with an area which seems to them an irrelevance and may be tempted in neglect to our NATO responsibilities. Moreover, they have a vested interest in an easier relationship between Washington and Moscow. By and large, therefore, they will be inclined to regard a compromise solution in South Vietnam more as new evidence of American maturity and judgment than of American loss of face . . . On balance, I believe we would more seriously undermine the effectiveness of our world leadership by continuing the war and deepening our involvement than by pursuing a carefully plotted course toward a compromise solution. In spite of the number of powers that have—in response to our pleading—given verbal support from feeling of loyalty and dependence, we cannot ignore the fact that the war is vastly unpopular and that our role in it is perceptively eroding the respect and confidence with which other nations regard us. We have not persuaded either our friends or allies that our further involvement is essential to the defense of freedom in the cold war. Moreover, the men we deploy in the jungles of South Vietnam, the more we contribute to a growing world anxiety and mistrust.

[Words illegible] the short run, of course, we could expect some catcalls from the sidelines and some vindictive pleasure on the part of Europeans jealous of American power. But that would, in my view, be a transient phenomenon with which we could live without sustained anguish. Elsewhere around the world I would see few unhappy implications for the credibility of our commitments. No doubt the Communists will to gain propaganda value in Africa, but I cannot seriously believe that the Africans care too much about what happens in Southeast Asia. Australia and New Zealand are, of course, special cases since they feel lonely in the far reaches of the Pacific. Yet even their concern is far greater with Malaysia than with South Vietnam, and the degree of their anxiety would be conditioned largely by expressions of our support for Malaysia.

[Words illegible] Quite possibly President de Gaulle will make propaganda about perfidious Washington, yet even he will be inhibited by his much-heralded disapproval of our activities in South Vietnam.

South Korea—As for the rest of the Far East the only serious point of concern might be South Korea. But if we stop pressing the Koreans for more troops to Vietnam (the Vietnamese show no desire for additional Asian forces since it affronts their sense of pride) we may be able to cushion Korean reactions to a compromise in South Vietnam by the provision of greater military and economic assistance. In this regard, Japan can play a pivotal role now that it has achieved normal relations with South Korea.

NEW WARNINGS OF FAILURE

Before the opening of the air war in the spring warnings were sounded high in the Administration that it would not succeed. Now there were warnings that a ground war in the South might prove fruitless. The warnings came not only from Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, long known as a dissenter on Vietnam, but also from John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, who felt the actions planned were not strong enough.

On April 2 Mr. McCone circulated a memorandum within the National Security Council asserting that unless the United States was willing to bomb the North "with minimum restraint" to break Hanoi's will, it was unwise to commit ground troops to battle.

"In effect," he said, "we will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win and from which we will have extreme difficulty extracting ourselves." [See text, McCone memorandum, April 2, 1965.]

It is not clear from the documentary record whether President Johnson read this particular memorandum, but the Pentagon study says Mr. McCone expressed these same views in a personal memorandum to the President on April 28.

In a separate intelligence estimate for the President on May 6, Vice Adm. William F. Raborn Jr., Mr. McCone's successor, indicated agreement with Mr. McCone.

Mr. Ball's dissent came from the opposite side. He believed that neither bombing the North nor fighting the guerrillas in the South nor any combination of the two offered a solution and said so in a memorandum circulated June 28, the study reports.

"Convinced that the U.S. was pouring its resources down the drain in the wrong place," the account goes on, Mr. Ball proposed that the United States "cut its losses" and withdraw from South Vietnam.

"Ball was cold-blooded in his analysis," the study continues, describing the memorandum. "He recognized that the U.S. would not be able to avoid losing face before its Asian allies if it staged some form of conference leading to withdrawal of U.S. forces. The losses would be of short-term duration, however, and the U.S. could emerge from this period of travail as a 'wiser and more mature nation.' "

BALL OFFERS A COMPROMISE

On July 1, the analyst says, Mr. Ball reiterated his proposal for withdrawal in a memorandum to the President entitled "A Compromise Solution for South Vietnam." [See text, Ball memorandum July 1, 1965.]

PRIME MINISTER WILSON'S WARNING TO JOHNSON ON PETROLEUM RAIDS

(Excerpts from cablegram to President Johnson from Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Britain, June 3, 1965, as provided in the body of the Pentagon's study.)

I was most grateful to you for asking Bob McNamara to arrange the very full briefing about the two oil targets near Hanoi and Haiphong that Col. Rogers gave me yesterday. . . .

I know you will not feel that I am either unsympathetic or uncomprehending of the dilemma that this problem presents for you. In particular, I wholly understand the deep concern you must feel at the need to do anything possible to reduce the losses of young Americans in and over Vietnam; and Col. Rogers made it clear to us what care has been taken to plan this operation so as to keep civilian casualties to the minimum.

However, . . . I am bound to say that, as seen from here, the possible military benefits that may result from this bombing do not appear to outweigh the political disadvantages that would seem the inevitable consequence. If you and the South Vietnamese Government were conducting a declared war on the conventional pattern . . . this operation would clearly be necessary and right. But since you have made it abundantly clear—and you know how much we have welcomed and supported this—that your purpose is to achieve a negotiated settlement, and that you are not striving for total military victory in the field, I remain convinced that the bombing of these targets, without producing decisive military advantage, may only increase the difficulty of reaching an eventual settlement. . . .

The last thing I wish is to add to your difficulties, but, as I warned you in my previous message, if this action is taken we shall have to dissociate ourselves from it, and in doing so I should have to say that you had given me advance warning and that I had made my position clear to you. . . .

Nevertheless I want to repeat . . . that our reservations about this operation will not affect our continuing support for your policy over Vietnam, as you and your people have made it clear from your Baltimore speech onwards. But, while this will remain the Government's position, I know that the effect on public opinion in this country—and I believe throughout Western Europe—is likely to be such as to reinforce the existing disquiet and criticism that we have to deal with.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PERIOD

Within a month of the start of Operation Rolling Thunder, the Pentagon study says, the Johnson Administration had made the first of the decisions that were to lead, in the next months, to American assumption of the major burden of the ground war in South Vietnam.

Here, in chronological order, are the highlights of this period of debate and decision:

MARCH, 1965

First "Rolling Tunder" air strike at ammunition depot and naval base. The two Marine battalions deployed in Vietnam.

APRIL, 1965

President approves 18,000-20,000-man increase in "military support forces" and "a change of mission for marines "to permit their more active use. . . ." Memo notes his desire for "all possible precautions" against "premature publicity" and to "minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy."

John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, urges deployment of 173d Airborne Brigade also.

Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor, calls this "hasty and ill-conceived."

Honolulu strategy meeting. Conferees agree to urge increase to 82,000 U.S. troops.

George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, proposes United States "cut its losses" and withdraw instead, history says.

MAY, 1965

Vietcong "summer offensive" begins, history says. About 200 Marine casualties during April, May.

JUNE, 1965

Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commander in Vietnam, says United States must "reinforce our efforts . . . as rapidly as practical." Asks total of 44 battalions.

State Department announces that United States troops are "available for combat support."

First major ground action by United States forces northwest of Saigon.

Gen. Westmoreland, in reply to Joint Chiefs, makes "big pitch . . . for a free hand to maneuver the troops around . . . ," analyst says.

Ambassador Taylor "confirms the seriousness of the military situation" and "very tenuous hold" of new Government, study goes on.

General Westmoreland given authority to use U.S. forces in battle when necessary "to strengthen" South Vietnam forces.

Mr. Ball, analyst writes, opposes ground-troop increase. Says it gives "absolutely no assurance" of success, risks "costly and indeterminate struggle". Urges "base defense and reserve" strategy "while the stage was being set for withdrawal."

William Bundy, history says, urges President avoid "ultimatum aspects" of either Ball or Westmoreland proposal. Says United States troops should be held to supporting "reserve reaction" role.

JULY, 1965

President at first approves deployment of 34 battalions, about 100,000 men; 44 battalions finally agreed on; total 193,887 troops.

History says this decision "perceived as a threshold—entrance into Asian land war. . . ."

By year's end, history notes, United States forces in South Vietnam total 184,314.

McNAUGHTON MEMO TO GOODPASTER ON "FORCES REQUIRED TO WIN"

(Excerpts from memorandum from Assistant Secretary McNaughton to Lieut. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 2, 1965, "Forces Required to Win in South Vietnam," as provided in the body of the Pentagon's study.)

Secretary McNamara this morning suggested that General Wheeler form a small group to address the question, "If we do everything we can, can we have assurance of winning in South Vietnam?" General Wheeler suggested that he would have you head up the group and that the group would be fairly small. Secretary McNamara indicated that he wanted your group to work with me and that I should send down a memorandum suggesting some of the questions that occurred to us. Here are our suggestions:

1. I do not think the question is whether the 44-battalion program (including 3d-country forces) is sufficient to do the job although the answer to that question should fall out of the study. Rather, I think we should think in terms of the 44-battalion build-up by the end of 1965, with added forces—as required and as our capabilities permit—in 1966. Furthermore, the study surely should look into the need for forces other than ground forces, such as air to be used one way or another in-country. I would hope that the study could produce a clear articulation of what our strategy is for winning the war in South Vietnam, tough as that articulation will be in view of the nature of the problem.

2. I would assume that the questions of calling up reserves and extending tours of duty are outside the scope of this study.

3. We must make some assumptions with respect to the number of VC. Also, we must make some assumptions with respect to what the infiltration of men and material will be especially if there is a build-up of U.S. forces in South Vietnam. I am quite concerned about the increasing probability that there are regular PAVN forces either in the II Corps area or in Laos directly across the border from II Corps. Furthermore, I am fearful that especially with the kind of build-up here envisioned, infiltration of even greater numbers of regular forces may occur. As a part of this general problem of enemy build-up, we must of course ask how much assistance the USSR and China can be expected to give to the VC. I suspect that the increased strength levels of the VC and the more "conventional" nature of the operations implied by larger force levels may imply that the often-repeated ratio of "10 to 1" may no longer apply. I sense that this may be the case in the future, but I have no reason to be sure. For example, if the VC, even with larger forces engaged in more "conventional" type actions, are able to overrun towns and disappear into the jungles before we can bring the action troops to bear, we may still be faced with the old "ratio" problem.

4. I think we might avoid some spinning of wheels if we simply assumed that the GVN will not be able to increase its forces in the relevant time period. Indeed, from what Westy has reported about the battalions being chewed up and about their showing some signs of reluctance to engage in offensive operations, we might even have to ask the question whether we can expect them to maintain present levels of men—or more accurately, present levels of effectiveness.

5. With respect to 3d-country forces, Westy has equated the 9 ROK battalions with 9 U.S. battalions, saying that, if he did not get the former, he must have the latter. I do not know enough about ROK forces to know whether they are in all respects "equal to" U.S. forces (they may be better in some respects and not as good in others. For purposes of the study, it might save us time if we assumed that we would get no meaningful forces from anyone other than the ROKs during the relative time frame. (If the Australians decide to send another battalion or two, this should not alter the conclusions of the study significantly.). . . .

9. At the moment, I do not see how the study can avoid addressing the question as to how long our forces will have to remain in order to achieve a "win" and the extent to which the presence of those forces over a long period of time might, by itself, nullify the "win." If it turns out that the study cannot go into this matter without first getting heavily into the political side of the question, I think the study at least should note the problem in some meaningful way.

10. I believe that the study should go into specifics—e.g., the numbers and effectiveness and uses of the South Vietnamese forces, exactly where we would deploy ours and exactly what we would expect their mission to be, how we would go about opening up the roads and providing security for the towns as well as protecting our own assets there, the time frames in which things would be done, command relationships, etc. Also, I think we should find a way to indicate how badly the conclusions might be thrown off if we are wrong with respect to key assumptions or judgments. . . .

THE SERIES SO FAR

Events before Tonkin Gulf: Passage of the Tonkin resolution, the Pentagon account says, "set U.S. public support for virtually any action," but its passage was the culmination of months of covert U.S. military involvement and detailed preparation for escalation. This covert war, the narrative relates, included Plan 34A—a program of clandestine military operations against North Vietnam—and the development of precise scenarios for escallation leading up to the full-scale bombing of the North.

Planning the bombing: The months between the Tonkin Gulf incident and the March, 1965, start of Operation Rolling Thunder were months of planning how to carry out the "general consensus" on the necessity of an air war against the North, which the study says was reached in September, 1964. "Tactical considerations"—including the Presidential campaign, the study says—required delay, and low-risk interim measures, including coastal raids and U.S. air strikes at infiltration routes in Laos, were ordered "to assist morale . . ."

McNAMARA'S MEMO ON JULY 20, 1965, ON INCREASING ALLIED GROUND FORCE

(Excerpts from memorandum from Secretary McNamara for President Johnson, drafted on July 1, 1965, and revised on July 20, as provided in the body of the Pentagon's study. Paragraphs in italics are the study's paraphrase or explanation.)

In a memorandum to the President drafted on 1 July and then revised on 20 July, immediately following his return from a week-long visit to Vietnam, he recommended an immediate decision to increase the U.S.-Third Country presence from the current 16 maneuver battalions (15 U.S., one Australian,) and a change in the mission of these forces from one of providing support and reinforcement for the ARVN to one which soon became known as "search and destroy"—as McNamara put it, they were "by aggressive exploitation of superior military forces . . . to gain and hold the initiative . . . pressing the fight against VC–DRV main force units in South Vietnam to run them to ground and destroy them." . . .

His specific recommendations, he noted, were concurred in by General Wheeler and Ambassador-designate Lodge, who accompanied him on his trip to Vietnam, and by Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Johnson, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland, with whom he conferred there. The rationale for his decisions was supplied by the CIA, whose assessment he quoted with approval in concluding that 1 July version of his memorandum. It stated:

Over the longer term we doubt if the Communists are likely to change their basic strategy in Vietnam (i.e., aggressive and steadily mounting insurgency) unless and until two conditions prevail: (1) they are forced to accept a situation in the war in the South which offers them no prospect of an early victory and no grounds for hope that they can simply outlast the US and (2) North Vietnam itself is under continuing and increasingly damaging punitive attack. So long as the Communists think they scent the possibility of an early victory (which is probably now the case), we believe that they will preserve and accept extremely severe damage to the North. Conversely, if North Vietnam itself is not hurting, Hanoi's doctrinaire leaders will probably be ready to carry on the Southern struggle almost indefinitely. If, however, both of the conditions outlined above should be brought to

pass, we believe Hanoi probably would, at least for a period of time, alter its basic strategy and course of action in South Vietnam.

McNamara's memorandum of 20 July did not include this quotation, although many of these points were made elsewhere in the paper. Instead, it concluded with an optimistic forecast:

The overall evaluation is that the course of action recommended in this memorandum—if the military and political moves are properly integrated and executed with continuing vigor and visible determination—stands a good chance of achieving an acceptable outcome within a reasonable time in Vietnam.

Never again while he was Secretary of Defense would McNamara make so optimistic a statement about Vietnam—except in public.

This concluding paragraph of McNamara's memorandum spoke of political, as well as military "vigor" and "determination." Earlier in the paper, under the heading "Expanded political moves," he had elaborated on this point, writing:

Together with the above military moves, we should take political initiatives in order to lay a groundwork for a favorable political settlement by clarifying our objectives and establishing channels of communications. At the same time as we are taking steps to turn the tide in South Vietnam, we would make quiet moves through diplomatic channels (a) to open a dialogue with Moscow and Hanoi, and perhaps the VC, looking first toward disabusing them of any misconceptions as to our goals and second toward laying the groundwork for a settlement when the time is ripe; (b) to keep the Soviet Union from deepening its military [sic] in the world until the time when settlement can be achieved; and (c) to cement support for U.S. policy by the U.S. public, allies and friends, and to keep international opposition at a manageable level. Our efforts may be unproductive until the tide begins to turn, but nevertheless they should be made.

Here was scarcely a program for drastic political action. McNamara's essentially procedural (as opposed to substantive) recommendations amounted to little more than saying that the United States should provide channels for the enemy's discreet and relatively facesaving surrender when he decided that the game had grown too costly. This was, in fact, what official Washington (again with the exception of Ball) meant in mid-1965 when it spoke of a "political settlement." (As McNamara noted in a footnote, even this went too far for Ambassador-designate Lodge, whose view was that "any further initiative by us now (before we are strong) would simply harden the Communist resolve not to stop fighting." In this view Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson concurred, except that they would maintain "discreet contacts with the Soviets.")

McNamara's concluding paragraph spoke of "an acceptable outcome." Previously in his paper he had listed "nine fundamental elements" of a favorable outcome. These were:

(a) VC stop attacks and drastically reduce incidents of terror and sabotage.

(b) DRV reduces infiltration to a trickle, with some reasonably reliable method of our obtaining confirmation of this fact.

(c) US/GVN stop bombing of North Vietnam.

(d) GVN stays independent (hopefully pro-US, but possibly genuinely neutral).

(e) GVN exercises governmental functions over substantially all of South Vietnam.

(f) Communists remain quiescent in Laos and Thailand.

(g) DRV withdraws PAVN forces and other North Vietnamese infiltrators (not regroupees) from South Vietnam.

(h) VC/NLF transform from a military to a purely political organization.

(i) US combat forces (not advisors or AID) withdraw.

CONFUSION AND SUSPICION

There was some confusion, suspicion and controversy about the President's approval of an 18,000–20,000 increase in support troops, which, he explained, was meant "to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel."

On April 21, Secretary McNamara told the President that 11,000 of these new men would augment various existing forces, while 7,000 were logistic troops to support "previously approved forces."

"It isn't entirely clear from the documents exactly what the President did have in mind for the support troop add-ons," the study comments. "What is clear, however, . . . was that the J.C.S. were continuing to plan for the earliest possible introduction of two to three divisions into RVN." The analyst cites a memorandum from Mr. McNamara to General Wheeler on April 6 as evidence of this planning.

Later, on May 5, the study continues, Assistant Secretary of Defense, McNaughton would send a memorandum to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, saying that "the J.C.S. misconstrued the [support] add-ons to mean logistic build-up for coastal enclaves and the possible later introduction of two to three divisions." (These were the divisions the Joint Chiefs had requested on March 20.)

"RELATIVELY LOW RISK"

The enclave strategy had as its object the involvement of United States combat units at "relatively low risk." It proposed "that U.S. troops occupy coastal enclaves, accept full responsibility for enclave security, and be prepared to go to the rescue of the RVNF as far as 50 miles outside the enclave. . . . The intent was not to take the war to the enemy but rather to deny him certain critical areas," the study says.

To prove the viability of its "reserve reaction," the analyst goes on, the enclave strategy required testing, but the rules for committing United States troops under it had not been worked out by the time it was overtaken by events—a series of major military victories by the Vietcong in May and June that led to the adoption of the search-and-destroy strategy.

Search and destroy, the analyst says, was "articulated by Westmoreland and the J.C.S. in keeping with sound military principles garnered by men accustomed to winning. The basic idea . . . was the desire to take the war to the enemy, denying him freedom of movement anywhere in the country . . . and deal him the heaviest possible blows." In the meantime, the South Vietnamese Army "would be free to concentrate their efforts in populated areas."

From April 11 through April 14, the additional two marine battalions were deployed at Hue-Phubai and at Danang, bringing the total maneuver battalions to four.

"The marines set about consolidating and developing their two coastal base areas, and, although they pushed their patrol perimeters out beyond their tactical wire and thereby conducted active rather than passive defense, they did not engage in any offensive operations in support of ARVN for the next few months," the study says.

At this point, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs and General Westmoreland collaborated—as it turned out, successfully—in what the study calls "a little cart-before-horsemanship." It involved the deployment to South Vietnam of the 173d Airborne Brigade, two battalions that were then situated on Okinawa in a reserve role.

General Westmoreland had had his eye on the 173d for some time. On March 26, in his "Commander's Estimate of the Situation," in which he requested the equivalent of two divisions, he also recommended that the 173d Airborne Brigade be deployed to the Bienhoa-Vungtau areas "to secure vital U.S. installations." This recommendation, like that for two divisions, was not acted upon by the National Security Council in the April 1–2 meeting.

On April 11, General Westmoreland cabled Admiral Sharp, the Pacific commander, that he understood from the National Security Council's meetings and Ambassador Taylor's discussions in Washington at the beginning of the month that his requested divisions were not in prospect. But, he said, he still wanted the 173d Airborne Brigade.

AHEAD IN TWO AREAS

This message, the study says, set in motion "a series of cables, proposals and false start which indicated that Washington was well ahead of Saigon in its planning and in its anxiety."

The upshot of all this communication was that at a meeting in Honolulu of representatives of the Joint Chiefs and the Pacific command from April 10 to April 12, the deployment of the 173d Airborne Brigade was recommended. On April 14, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the deployment to Bienhoa-Vungtau, and the replacement of the brigade by one from the United States.

"This decision to deploy the 173d apparently caught the Ambassador flatfooted," the study says, "for he had quite obviously not been privy to it."

On the day of the Joint Chiefs' decision, Ambassador Taylor cabled the State Department that "this [decision on the deploying the brigade] comes as a complete surprise in view of the understanding reached in Washington [during his visit] that he would experiment with the marines in a counterinsurgency role before bringing in other U.S. contingents." He asked that deployment of the brigade be held up until matters were sorted out.

However, the study notes, Ambassador Taylor "held the trump card" because the proposed action had to be cleared with Premier Quat, and General Taylor told his superiors on April 17 that he did not intend to tell the Premier "without clearer guidance explaining Washington's intentions." [See text, Taylor cable, April 17, 1965.]

"That Washington was determined, with the President's sanction, to go beyond what had been agreed to and formalized in NSAM 328 was manifested unmistakably in a cable under joint Defense/State auspices by Mr. McNaughton to the Ambassador on 15 April," the Pentagon study says.

In the cablegram, Mr. McNaughton said: "Highest authority [the President] believes the situation in South Vietnam has been deteriorating and that, in addition to actions against the North, something new must be added in the South to achieve victory." He then listed seven recommended actions, including the introduction of military-civil affairs personnel into the air effort and the deployment of the 173d Airborne Brigade to Bienhoa-Vungtau "as a security force for our installations and also to participate in counterinsurgency combat operations" according to General Westmoreland's plans.

Reacting to that cable on April 17, Ambassador Taylor protested to McGeorge Bundy in the White House against the introduction of military-civilian affairs personnel into the air effort. The Ambassador's cablegram continued by saying that the McNaughton message "shows a far greater willingness to get into the ground war than I had discerned in Washington during my recent trip."

"Mac, can't we be better protected from our friends?" the Ambassador asked. "I know that everyone wants to help, but there's such a thing as killing with kindness." [See text, Taylor cable April 17.]

EXACT DATE IS UNCERTAIN

Discussing the contretemps between the Pentagon and General Taylor the study says:

"The documents do not reveal just exactly when Presidential sanction was obtained for the expanded scope of the above [McNaughton] proposals. It is possible that [on the approval for deploying the brigade] the Ambassador may have caught the Defense Department and the J.C.S in a little cart-before-horsemanship."

In any event on April 15 the day after it had ordered the deployment of the brigade, the J.C.S. sent a memorandum to Secretary McNamara dealing with the Ambassador's objections and still insisting that the brigade was needed.

"Whether or not the J.C.S. wrote that memorandum with red faces," the study remarks, "the Secretary of Defense dates approval for final deployment of the 173d as of the 30th of April."

PRESSURE FROM MILITARY

The strategy of base security having been ended by National Security Action Memorandum 328, a high-level meeting began in Honolulu on April 20 to "sanctify" and "structure", as the Pentagon analyst puts it, "an expanded enclave strategy."

Present at the meeting were Secretary of Defense McNamara; William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton; Ambassador Taylor; Admiral Sharp; Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and General Westmoreland.

"Some of these men had helped produce the current optimism in situation reports and cables," the Pentagon study says, "and yet the consensus of their meeting was that the then-present level of Vietcong activity was nothing but the lull before the storm.

"The situation which presented itself to the Honolulu conferees was in many ways the whole Vietnam problem in microcosm. What was needed to galvanize everyone to action was some sort of dramatic event within South Vietnam itself. Unfortunately, the very nature of the war precluded the abrupt collapse of a front or the loss of large chunks of territory in lightning strokes by the enemy. The enemy in this war was spreading his control and influence slowly and inexorably but without drama. The political infrastructure from which he derived his strength took years to create, and in most areas the expansion of control was hardly felt until it was a fait accompli."

IN A REAR-GUARD ACTION

Of the conferees, the study says, "by far the most dogged protagonist of the enclave strategy was Ambassador Taylor." It had already become apparent, however, and was to become manifestly clear at Honolulu, that the Ambassador was fighting a rear-guard action against both civilian and military officials in the Pentagon who were bent on expansion of U.S. forces in South Vietnam and an enlargement of their combat mission.

On March 18, in a message to Washington, Ambassador Taylor had suggested that if a division were sent to South Vietnam as had been proposed by the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Harold K. Johnson, then consideration should be given to deploying it in either a highland or coastal enclave.

When he got no response, Ambassador Taylor sent another message on March 27, stating that if United States forces were to come, his preference was, as the study says, that they be used in a combination of defensive or offensive enclave plus reserve for an emergency, rather than in "territorial clear and hold" operations.

The Ambassador, the study notes, interpreted the pivotal National Security Action Memorandum as supporting his position, because in it the President seemed to make plain that he "wanted to experiment very carefully with a small amount of force before deciding whether or not to accept any kind of ground war commitment."

FOR GUERRILLAS, TANKS

Therefore, the study says, "the Ambassador was surprised to discover that the marines [the two additional battalions that landed April 11–14] had come ashore with tanks, self-propelled artillery, and various other items of weighty equipment not 'appropriate for counterinsurgency operations.'"

In his April 17 cable to McGeorge Bundy, Ambassador Taylor had also protested the "hasty and ill-conceived" proposals for the deployment of more forces with which he was being flooded.

"Thus was the Ambassador propelled into the conference of 20 April 1965, only one step ahead of the Washington juggernaut, which was itself fueled by encouragement from Westmoreland in Saigon," the study comments. "Taylor was not opposed to the U.S. build-up *per se*, but rather was concerned to move slowly with combat troop deployments . . . He was overtaken in Honolulu."

According to Mr. McNaughton's minutes, the conference in preliminary discussions on April 20 agreed that:

"(1) The D.R.V. was not likely to quit within the next six months; and in any case, they were more likely to give up because of VC failure in the South than because of bomb-induced 'pain' in the North. It could take up to two years to demonstrate VC failure.

"(2) The level of air activity through Rolling Thunder was about right. The U.S. did not, in Ambassador Taylor's words, want 'to kill the hostage.' Therefore, Hanoi and environs remained on the restricted list. It was recognized that air activity would not do the job alone.

"(3) Progress in the South would be slow, and great care should be taken to avoid dramatic defeat. The current lull in Vietcong activity was merely the quiet before a storm.

"(4) The victory strategy was to 'break the will of the D.R.V./VC by denying them victory.' Impotence would lead eventually to a political solution."

6,700 MEN BELOW STRENGTH

At the time of the Honolulu conference, the study notes, "the level of approved U.S. forces for Vietnam was 40,200," but 33,500 were actually in the country at that time.

"To accomplish the 'victory strategy' described above," the study continues, the conferees agreed that U.S. ground forces should be increased from 4 to 13 maneuver battalions and to 82,000 men. The United States, they agreed, should also seek to get additional troops from Australia and South Korea that would bring the so-called third-country strength to four maneuver battalions and 7,250 men.

Thus, the Honolulu conferees proposed raising the recommended United States-third country strength to 17 battalions.

The conferees also mentioned but did not recommend a possible later deployment of 11 U.S. and 6 South Korean battalions, which when added to the approved totals, would bring the United States-third country combat capability to 34 batallions. In this later possible deployment was included an Army airmobile division.

Secretary McNamara forwarded the Honolulu recommendations to the President on April 21, together with a notation on possible later deployment of the airmobile division and the Third Marine Expeditionary Force.

DETAILED DEPLOYMENT PLAN

On April 30 the Joint Chiefs presented a detailed program for deployment of some 48,000 American and 5,250 third-country soldiers. "Included were all the units mentioned in the Honolulu recommendations plus a healthy support package," the study says.

The Joint Chiefs said that these additional forces were "to bolster GVN forces during their continued build-up, secure bases and installations, conduct counterinsurgency combat operations in coordination with the RVNAF, and prepare for the later introduction of an airmobile division to the central plateau, the remainder of the third M.E.F. [the marine force] to the Danang area, and the remainder of a ROK [Republic of Korea] division to Quangngai."

From the thrust of this memorandum by the Joint Chiefs, the analyst comments, "it is apparent that the enclave strategy was no stopping place as far as the Chiefs were concerned. They continued to push hard for the earliest possible input of three full divisions of troops. They were still well ahead of the pack in that regard."

THE ENEMY RESPONDS

The question of final Presidential approval of the 17-battalion recommendations now became academic as the enemy started attacks that provided the Pentagon and General Westmoreland with a battlefield rationale for their campaign to have American troops take over the major share of the ground war.

As the manpower debates continued in March and April, the study portrays the military situation: "The Vietcong were unusually inactive throughout March and April. There had been no major defeat of the enemy's forces and no signs of any major shift in strategy on his part. Hence it was assumed that he was merely pausing to regroup and to assess the effect of the changed American participation in the war embodied in air strikes and in the marines," the first two battalions deployed at Danang on March 8.

"There were, however, plenty of indications in the early spring of 1965 of what was to come," the study continues. . . . "From throughout the country came reports that Vietcong troops and cadres were moving into central Vietnam and into areas adjacent to the ring of provinces . . . around Saigon."

'A SOBERING HARBINGER'

"Finally and most ominous of all," the study says, a memorandum by the Central Intelligences Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency on April 21, 1965, "reflected the acceptance into the enemy order of battle of one regiment of the 325th PAVN [People's Army of Vietnam] division said to be located in Kontum province The presence of this regular North Vietnamese unit, which had been first reported as early as February, was a sobering harbinger. . . ."

On May 11, when the Vietcong attacked Songbe, the capital of Phuoclong Province, using more than a regiment of troops, "the storm broke in earnest," the study says. The enemy overran the town and the American advisers' compound, causing heavy casualties. After holding the town for a day, the Vietcong withdrew, the study relates.

Later in May, in Quangngai Province in the northern part of South Vietnam, a battalion of Government troops—the Army of the Republic of Vietnam—was ambushed and overrun near Bagia, west of Quangngai. Reinforcements were also ambushed.

"The battle," the study says, "dragged on for several days and ended in total defeat for the ARVN. Two battalions were completely decimated. . . . From Bagia came a sense of urgency, at least among some of the senior US officers who had been witness to the battle."

TWO REGIMENTS ATTACK

Then in June, two Vietcong regiments attacked an outpost at Dongxoai and when Government reinforcements were committed "piecemeal" they were "devoured by the enemy" the Pentagon study says.

"By mid-June, 1965," it asserts, "the Vietcong summer offensive was in full stride." By mid-July, the Vietcong were "systematically forcing the GVN to yield what little control it still exercised in rural areas outside the Mekong Delta."

On June 7, after the attack on Bagia, General Westmoreland sent a long message on the military situation and his needs to the Pacific Commander for relay to the Joint Chiefs.

"In pressing their campaign," the general said, "the Vietcong are capable of mounting regimental-size operations in all four ARVN corps areas, and at least battalion-sized attack in virtually all provinces. . . .

"ARVN forces on the other hand are already experiencing difficulty in coping with this increased VC capability. Desertion rates are inordinately high. Battle losses have been higher than expected; in fact, four ARVN battalions have been rendered ineffective by VC action in the I and II Corps zones. . . .

"Thus, the GVN/VC force ratios upon which we based our estimate of the situation in March have taken an adverse trend. You will recall that I recommended the deployment of a U.S. division in II Corps to cover the period of the RVNAF build-up and to weight the force ratios in that important area. We assumed at that time that the ARVN battalions would be brought to full strength by now and that the force build-up would proceed on schedule. Neither of these assumptions has materialized. . . .

"In order to cope with the situation outlined above, I see no course of action open to us except to reinforce our efforts in SVN with additional U.S. or third country forces as rapidly as is practical during the critical weeks ahead."

THE "44-BATTALION REQUEST"

What General Westmoreland asked for added up to a total force of 44 battalions and the June 7 message became known as the "44-battalion request."

Just as intense internal debate was beginning on the request, there was a "credibility" flare-up deriving from President Johnson's injunction of secrecy on the change of missions for the marines authorized on April 1 in National Security Action Memorandum 328.

"The long official silence between the sanction for U.S. offensive operations contained in NSAM 328 and the final approval [in negotiations with Saigon] of the conditions under which U.S. troops could be committed was not without cost," the study asserts. "The President had admonished each of the N.S.C. members not to allow release of provisions of the NSAM, but the unduly long interregnum inevitably led to leaks." In addition, the marines had 200 casualties, including 18 killed, as they went about "tidying up," as the study puts it, their newly assigned area in April and May.

"The Commandant of the Marine Corps," the study continues, "raised the tempo of speculation by saying to the press during an inspection trip to Vietnam in April that the marines were not in Vietnam to 'sit on their dittyboxes'—and they were there to 'kill Vietcong.' "

"An honest and superficially innocuous statement by Department of State Press Officer Robert McCloskey on 8 June to the effect that 'American forces would be available for combat support together with Vietnamese forces when and if necessary' produced an immediate response [in the press].

'BY ITS OWN PETARD'

"The White House was hoisted by its own petard. In an attempt to quell the outcry, a statement was issued on the 9th of June which, because of its ambiguity, only served to exacerbate the situation and to widen what was being described as 'the credibility gap'."

The White House statement said: "There has been no change in the mission of United States ground combat units in Vietnam in recent days or weeks. The President has issued no order of any kind in this regard to General Westmoreland recently or at any other time. The primary mission of these troops is to secure and safeguard important military installations like the air base at Danang. They have the associated mission of . . . patrolling and securing actions in and near the areas thus safeguarded.

"If help is requested by the appropriate Vietnamese commander, General Westmoreland also has authority within the assigned mission to employ those troops in support of Vietnamese forces faced with aggressive attack when other effective reserves are not available and when, in his judgment, the general military situation urgently requires it."

Discussing this statement, the Pentagon analyst says: "The documents do not reveal whether or not the ground rules for engagement of U.S. forces had actually been worked out to everyone's satisfaction at the time of the White House statement. There is good indication that they had not." The analyst also notes that during the battles of Bagia and Dongxoai, the Government forces "were desperately in need of assistance," but that United States forces were not committed although the marines were available for Bagia and the 173d Airborne Brigade for Dongxoai.

THE FIRST MAJOR ACTION

The study reports that the first major ground action by United States forces took place northwest of Saigon from June 27 to June 30, and involved the 173d Airborne Brigade, an Australian battalion and South Vietnamese forces.

"The operation could by no stretch of definition have been described as a reserve reaction," the study says. "It was a search and destroy operation into Vietcong base areas. . . . The excursion was a direct result of the sanction given to General Westmoreland . . . [as a result of National Security Action Memorandum 328 and the enemy offensive] to 'commit U.S. troops to combat, independent of or in conjunction with GVN forces in any situation in which the use of such troops is requested by an appropriate GVN commander and when in [General Westmoreland's] judgment, their use is necessary to strengthen the relative position of GVN forces'."

However, as the study notes, "At that juncture the 44-battalion debate was in full swing and the enclave strategy, as a means to limit the amount and use of U.S. combat force in Vietnam, was certainly overcome by events," and by "a much more ambitious strategy sanctioned by the President."

Recapitulating the situation just before the debate, the study gives this picture of deployment: At the beginning of June, the enclave strategy was in its first stages with Marine Corps forces at Phubai, Danang and Chulai, and Army forces in Vungtau. Other enclaves were under consideration. Approved for deployment—but not all arrived in South Vietnam yet—were approximately 70,000 troops in 13 maneuver battalions; with third-country forces the total came to 77,250 men and 17 maneuver battalions.

This was the situation when, on June 7, General Westmoreland asked for reinforcements "as rapidly as possible."

General Westmoreland's message, the Pentagon study says, "stirred up a veritable hornet's nest in Washington," because his request for large reinforcements and his proposed strategy to go on the offensive "did not contain any of the comfortable restrictions and safeguards which had been part of every strategy debated to date."

"In such a move," the study continues "the specter of U.S. involvement in a major Asian ground war was there for all to see."

Just as Ambassador Taylor had consistently resisted involvement of United States forces, the study says, so General Westmoreland had been equally determined to get the troops into the war and have "a free hand" in using them.

At the time of his message, the general had available in Vietnam seven Marine and 2 Army maneuver battalions, plus an Australian battalion. Now, he was asking for a total of 33 battalions, and if the 173d Airborne Brigade's two battalions—which were on temporary assignment—were added, the total came to 35. But in a subparagraph, General Westmoreland also identified nine other United States battalions that he might request at a later date. Thus the total of 44 battalions, and hence the name given the request. In the total was included an airmobile division of nine battalions to be formed later.

Admiral Sharp favored the request in a message to the Joint Chiefs on June 7, saying, "We will lose by staying in enclaves defending coastal areas."

THE CHIEFS IN FAVOR

The Joint Chiefs, the Pentagon analyst says, favored bolstering the United States troop commitment. As far back as March 20, the Joint Chiefs had advocated sending three divisions—two American and one Korean—with the objective of "destroying the Vietcong."

Now, the study states, General Westmoreland's request "altered drastically the role of the J.C.S. in the buildup debate.

"Up to that time," the study continues, "the J.C.S. had, if anything, been ahead of General Westmoreland in advocating allied forces for Vietnam. The 27 battalions of their three-division plan were in themselves more than Westmoreland ever requested until 7 June. After that date, the big push came from Westmoreland in Saigon, and the J.C.S. were caught in the middle between the latter and the powerful and strident opposition his latest request for forces had surfaced in Washington."

On June 11, the Joint Chiefs cabled Admiral Sharp that something less than General Westmoreland's request was close to approval, but they wanted to know, the study says, "where Westmoreland intended to put this force in Vietnam."

He replied on June 13 in detail and the study comments: "This message was extremely important, for in it [he] spelled out the concept of keeping U.S. forces away from the people. The search and destroy strategy for U.S. and third country forces which continues to this day and the primary focus of RVNAF on pacification both stem from that concept. In addition, Westmoreland made a big pitch in this cable for a free hand to maneuver the troops around inside the country. . . ."

CONFIRMATION BY TAYLOR

Ambassador Taylor, in a report on June 17, "confirmed the seriousness of the military situation as reported by General Westmoreland and also pointed up the very tenuous hold the new government had on the country." This was the Government of President Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky.

"This report apparently helped to remove the last obstacles to consideration of all of the forces mentioned in Westmoreland's request of 7 June," the analyst says.

On June 22, General Wheeler cabled General Westmoreland and asked if the 44 battalions were enough to convince the enemy forces that they could not win. General Westmoreland replied, the study says, "that there was no evidence the VC/DRV would alter their plans regardless of what the U.S. did in the next six months."

"The 44-battalion force should, however, establish a favorable balance of power by the end of the year," the study quotes the general as having said. "If the U.S. was to seize the initiative from the enemy, then further forces would be required into 1966 and beyond. . . ."

On June 26, the general was given authority to commit U.S. forces to battle when he decided they were necessary "to strengthen the relative position of GVN forces."

"This was about as close to a free hand in managing the forces as General Westmoreland was likely to get," the analyst says. "The strategy was finished, and the debate from then on centered on how much force and to what end."

DIVERGENT VIEWS AT HOME

The opposition to General Westmoreland had "its day in court," late in June and early in July, the study says. The embassy in Saigon, "while recognizing the seriousness of the situation in South Vietnam, was less than sanguine about the prospects for success if large numbers of foreign troops were brought in."

Another critic of General Westmoreland's recommendations, the account reports, was Under Secretary of State Ball who was "convinced that the U.S. was pouring its resources down the drain in the wrong place."

"In Ball's view, the account continues," there was absolutely no assurance that the U.S. could with the provision of more ground forces achieve its political objectives in Vietnam. Instead, the U.S. risked involving itself in a costly and indeterminate struggle. To further complicate matters, it would be equally impossible to achieve political objectives by expanding the bombing of the North. . . ."

WILLIAM BUNDY IN THE MIDDLE

Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy, the study says, "like so many others found himself in between Westmoreland and Ball."

In a memorandum to the President on July 1, Mr. Bundy gave his position, as summarized in the Pentagon study:

The U.S. needed to avoid the ultimatum aspects of the 44 battalions and also the Ball withdrawal proposal. . . . The U.S. should adopt a policy which would allow it to hold on without risking disasters of scale if the war were lost despite deployment of the full 44 battalions. For the moment, according to Bundy, the U.S. should complete planned deployments to bring in-country forces to 18 maneuver battalions and 85,000 men. . . . The forces in Vietnam, which Bundy assumed would be enough to prevent collapse, would be restricted to reserve reaction in support of RVNAF. This would allow for some experimentation without taking over the war effort—a familiar theme." [See text, George Ball memo, July 1.]

As for Secretary McNamara's views, the study comments: "It is difficult to be precise about the position of the Secretary of Defense during the buildup debate because there is so little of him in the files."

"There are plenty of other indications in the files that the Secretary was very carefully and personally insuring that the Defense Establishment was ready to provide efficient and sufficient support to the fighting elements in Vietnam," the study continues. "From the records, the Secretary comes out much more clearly for good management than he does for any particular strategy."

The Secretary went to South Vietnam for a four-day inspection starting July 16. The study says that while he was in Saigon on July 17, he received a cable from Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance informing him that the President had decided to go ahead with the plan to deploy 34 battalions.

"The debate was over," the analyst says. "McNamara left Saigon bearing Westmoreland recommendations for an even greater increase in forces. . . ."

The study says 34 battalions. This is not entirely clear, because in his request General Westmoreland had asked for a total of 33, and if the battalions of the 173rd Airborne Brigade were added, the total would be 35. The explanation apparently is that when the Airmobile Division was finally organized, it had eight rather than nine battalions. The 34 battalions were, of course, to be supplied immediately. The nine others were to be requested later if needed.

The Pentagon analyst apparently did not have access to White House memoranda, so he is able to give only a sketchy account of Mr. Johnson's role. But he says: "There is no question that the key figure in the early 1965 buildup was the President."

On May 4, the President asked Congress for a $700-million supplemental appropriation "to meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam."

"Nor can I guarantee this will be the last request," he said in a message. "If our need expands I will turn again to the Congress. For we will do whatever must be done to insure the safety of South Vietnam from aggression. This is the firm and irrevocable commitment of our people and nation."

On July 28, the President held a press conference in which he said, "The lesson of history dictated that the U.S. commit its strength to resist aggression in South Vietnam."

As for the troop increases, the President said:

"I have asked the commanding general, General Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs.

"I have today ordered to Vietnam the Airmobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested . . .

"I have concluded that it is not essential to order Reserve units into service now."

"IT DOES NOT IMPLY CHANGE"

During the questioning after the announcement, this exchange took place:

"Q. Mr. President, does the fact that you are sending additional forces to Vietnam imply any change in the existing policy of relying mainly on the South Vietnamese to carry out offensive operations and using American forces to guard installations and to act as emergency back-up?

"A. It does not imply any change in policy whatever. It does not imply change of objective."

On July 30, the Joint Chiefs approved 44 maneuver battalions for deployment, involving a total of 193,887 United States troops. By the end of the year, United States forces in South Vietnam numbered 184,314.

"The major participants in the decision knew the choices and understood the consequences," the study says in summation. The decision taken in mid-July to commit 44 battalions of troops to battle in South Vietnam "was perceived as a threshold—entrance into an Asian land war. The conflict was seen to be long, with further U.S. deployments to follow. The choice at that time was not whether or not to negotiate, it was not whether to hold on for a while or let go—the choice was viewed as winning or losing South Vietnam."

Accompanying this decision to give General Westmoreland enough troops to embark on the first phase of his search-and-destroy strategy "was a subtle change of emphasis," the study says.

"Instead of simply denying the enemy victory and convincing him that he could not win, the thrust became defeating the enemy in the South. This was sanctioned implicitly as the only way to achieve the U.S. objective of a non-Communist South Vietnam.

"The acceptance of the search-and-destroy strategy . . . left the U.S. commitment to Vietnam open-ended. The implications in terms of manpower and money are inescapable.

"Final acceptance of the desirability of inflicting defeat on the enemy rather than merely denying him victory opened the door to an indeterminate amount of additional force."

Precisely what President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara expected their decisions of July to bring within the near term "is not clear," the study says, "but there are manifold indications that they were prepared for a long war."

DATA ON OUR SICK ECONOMY

HON. BELLA S. ABZUG

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mrs. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, on the occasion of the adoption of the conference report on the Public Works Acceleration Act, the meeting of the conferees on the Public Service Employment Acts, and the beginning of consideration of the Defense Procurement Act of 1971, I would like to take the occasion to present an economic framework in which we in Congress, who so frequently become isolated from the real problems besetting this country, can view these attempts of ours to deal with the problems confronting our economy and its participants—our constituents.

The framework is an excellent statistical analysis presented by an economist, Robert Philipoff, at the National Hearing for Action on Jobs and Unemployment held in Washington on May 22, 1971. It speaks to the desperate economic situation that many Americans have to deal with—a 50-percent increase in the number of people unemployed in 1970 alone—at the same time pointing to the 211-percent increase in the number of American millionaires who paid no taxes in the period 1966–69, to the vast expenditures on cost overruns alone in our defense budget.

The contrasts are stark and sobering. May we in the 92d Congress heed them, both in the act of congratulating ourselves and in stirring ourselves to further action in the hard work of reordering our expenditures that they begin to reflect the very real needs of the people in this country.

The analysis follows:

UNEMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY

(Testimony before the National Hearing for Action on Jobs and Unemployment, May 22, 1971, Washington, D.C., by Robert Philipoff, economist and associate research director, Labor Research Association)

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

EXTENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY

Last month the Labor Department reported that the unemployment rate was 6.1% for the nation as a whole and the number of unemployed was 5,085,000.

Actually, the average man on the street knows that the government figures vastly understate the number of people unemployed. This is done by resorting to such devices as simply not counting accurately the number of black Americans, and not counting the number of people white, black, and brown, who have given up looking for a job because they know they cannot find one. In reality the number of people unemployed is about double the official government figures.

You know the old saying that figures don't lie but only liars figure.

Well, what has happened is that the grim reality has become so obvious that even some

of the figures used by the liars illustrate the reality.

I mentioned earlier that the officially reported rate for April was 6.1%, which, by the way has been at about that level for the past five months. This is no freak occurrence.

The Labor Department has divided the country into 150 major labor areas. As of early May the number of these major areas with substantial unemployment was 52, over one-third the total, the highest level in nine years. Only 11 were so classified one year ago, and only 6 had such high rates of unemployment when President Nixon took office in January of 1969.

And what are substantial rates of unemployment according to the government? These are rates of unemployment above 6%.[1]

So actually the whole country, all the 150 major labor areas, not only 6, 11, or 52, on the average ranks as an area of substantial unemployment.

In reality, the economy as a whole is in a depression, and when you take into consideration the inflationary impact of the huge amount of government military spending, especially for the barbaric war in Indochina, the enormous tax load that has been shifted to the workers from the big corporations, the erosion, and decay of the cities, and city services such as mass transit, the housing crisis, the enormous air, noise, and water pollution crises, the constant threat of nuclear obliteration, as well as such scandalous situations as the vast number of people unemployed and on public assistance, then the situation worsens.

But let's just stick for a moment to bread and butter (and by the way, the very bread and butter we eat today contains more chemicals and harmful additives than they ever did in the Great 1929 Depression).

A 1965 U.S. Department of Agriculture survey, published in 1968, covering all sections of the country and all income groups, found that 20% of the population suffers from malnutrition, about 40 million people.[2]

Think of that! One out of every five people in this country suffering from malnutrition based on the government survey. And that was in 1965 when there were far fewer major areas of substantial unemployment, when the official unemployment rate was less than 5 percent, when fewer than four million people were officially counted as unemployed, and when the rate of inflation was not nearly so severe as it is today.

In 1970 real spendable earnings (adjusted for price and tax increases in 1957–59 dollars) for a worker with three dependents in the total private economy was $77.72 or *less than* for any year since 1965, year of the illegal and immoral U.S. bombing raids over North Vietnam began.[3]

But the number of millionaires who paid no federal taxes in 1969 increased 211% over 1966 and 81% over 1968 according to Internal Revenue Service reports.[4]

In 1970 the number of the poor in the nation increased sharply, reversing a 10-year trend according to government figures.[5]

There were 25.5 million poor persons in 1970, a rise of 1.2 million over 1969, an increase of 5%.

The proportion of black Americans in poverty to the total in poverty has sharply risen to 32% in 1970.

To increase the income of all poor families to the poverty minimum of $3,968 the Census Bureau estimated would cost $11.4 billion. This is less than the $15 billion in cost overruns, especially extra profiteering embodied in 27 of the Pentagon's major weapons programs. (See Business Week, June 6, 1970, p. 31).[6]

While the decade since 1960 has been accompanied by growth of the military-industrial complex, active U.S. military involvement in Indochina, and of the monopolization of the nation's wealth,[7] the number of people on relief under a system which severely demeans the poor has almost doubled from over seven million in 1960 to over 13 million in October, 1970. And since 1964, with the passage by Congress of the "Gulf of Tonkin" resolution which paved the way for the U.S. invasion of North Vietnam, the number of people on public assistance has jumped by 70%, and the miserably inadequate relief provisions continued unabated. In contrast between 1950 and 1960 the increase in the number of people on relief was only 17%.[8]

In 1970 the middle U.S. Department of Labor budget for a moderate but adequate standard of living for a family of four in the urban United States was $205 a week. In that year the average wage in the total private economy was $120 a week, less than 60% of the Department of Labor standard.

WHAT ABOUT UNEMPLOYMENT IN 1970? [9]

1970 witnessed an almost 50% increase in the number of people unemployed.

The total number of unemployed in 1970—4,088,000—was the third highest since 1941.

This came amidst the drive by the Nixon administration to expand the war in Indochina to Laos and Cambodia and curtail the living standards of the American people, and a severe domestic economic crisis aggravated by the Nixon war policies.

At the point of production, workers in the nation's manufacturing industries comprised almost 30% of the unemployed according to official figures, highest annual rate in 12 years. For women workers in manufacturing their unemployed rate in 1970 according to government estimates stood at 8.1%, almost double that for their male counterparts.

And for black workers and other racial U.S. minorities (let us not forget that white people are only a minority of the world's population)—the chronically last-to-be-hired, first-to-be-fired—the unemployment rate in 1970 as officially reported also was about double that for whites increasing by 28% over 1969. For black single women 16 years and over the unemployment rate in 1970 was over twice that for their white counterparts. But I repeat that government statistics especially conceal the true nature of black unemployment principally by the method of labor force undercounting.[10]

Even so, the number of officially counted unemployed Afro-American women in 1970—373,000—was the highest ever since official statistics were compiled in 1954, and the 34.4% unemployment rate for black women 16–19 was the second highest recorded compared with 13.4% for their white counterparts—a ratio of 2.6 to 1.

Fully 48% of the unemployed were youth 16–24 years old compared with 33.6% in 1960!

The number of unemployed youth officially recorded in 1970—1,970,000—was the highest since the beginning of the Cold War immediately after the end of World War II.

Officially reported unemployment rates of 30–46%, for Black, Mexican American and Puerto-Rican American youth have not been uncommon in the nation's ghettos!

And while there has been a great growth of the number of unemployed professional and technical workers they comprised less than 6% of the unemployed in 1970 compared with 26% for factory operators.

While over 45% of the unemployed were women in 1970 they constituted only about 30% of the full-time employed; and the number of unemployed women workers—1,853,000—also was without Cold War precedent.

The number of workers unemployed five weeks or less topped the two million mark for the first time since the Cold War began and the number of long-term unemployed in 1970, 15 weeks and over was the highest in the previous four years.

And, as we know, the unemployment situation is worsening in 1971. Areas of previously strong employment such as government jobs, and the electronics industry are drying up under the stimulation of the Nixon Administration.

THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION

The Nixon Administration actually promotes poverty and unemployment while hiding behind "full employment" rhetoric.

I am not going to bore you with a rundown of the broken promises that come from the White House.

Suffice it to say that the Nixon Administration on December 16, 1970 vetoed the $9.5 billion manpower development and training program citing the public works portion of it "a reversion to the remedies [such as 'WPA-type jobs'] that were tried 35 years ago."[11]

In January of 1970 the Nixon Administration vetoed the $19.7 billion appropriation for the Departments of Labor, Health, Education and Welfare, and the Office of Economic Opportunity.

On June 22, 1970 he vetoed a $2.79 billion hospital construction program.

On August 11, 1970 he vetoed the $18 billion appropriation for the Department of Housing and Urban Development and other agencies.

The Nixon Administration has openly stated as in his veto of the Departments of Labor, and Health, Education and Welfare bill that such a measure is "excessive in a period of serious inflationary pressures,"[12] (inflationary pressures which the administration has fostered and created in the interests of big business).

The latest Nixon budget calls for a dismantling of a number of programs enacted over the last decade in such areas as education, housing and poverty to make way for his revenue-sharing program which provides open-season for further cutbacks.[13]

The Nixon Administration has frozen over $12 billion of funds appropriated by Congress for such needed public facilities as roads, airports, public housing, water and sewer facilities and the Appalachian Regional Development program.

This administration likes to talk a lot about "law and order," but aside from the flagrant violation of the law as with the unusual Congressionally undeclared war in Indochina, the Nixon Administration has flaunted the National Full Employment Act of 1946. Although a weak measure, it said, and I quote:[14]

"The Congress hereby declares that it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal government to use all practicable means consistent with its needs and obligations and other essential considerations of national policy . . . to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources . . . in a manner calculated to foster and promote competitive enterprise *and the* general welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded *useful employment opportunities*, including self-employment, for those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote *maximum employment*, production, and purchasing power." (Emphasis added.)

In addition the Nixon Administration fosters poverty and unemployment:

Through the reckless heating up of the cold war in general and in Indochina in particular thus fanning the flames of inflation which erode the living standards of workers, the poor and unemployed who have no tax loopholes to hide in as do the corporate rich. In 1941 corporations paid 55 percent of federal taxes and workers 45 percent. Today the situation has been more than reversed. In 1970 workers paid 70 percent of the federal taxes, the corporations 30 percent.

By permitting the big corporations to raise prices to record levels thus diminishing mass purchasing power while hitting hard at union efforts to keep up with the inflation-

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See footnotes at end of table.

ary spiral and make organizational gains. A recent example was in the construction industry with the suspension of the Davis-Bacon Act requiring that prevailing wage rates be paid on federally financed construction work.

By abandoning civil rights enforcement as noted by the report of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission in November of 1970.[15] This abandonment includes the denial of enforcement powers to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission thus permitting the big corporations to perpetuate Jim Crow hiring practices, a main engine of economic racial oppression which serves to divide the workers along with anti-communist hysteria.

By fanning the flames of the ultra-right, historically the enemy of labor to divert attention abroad while hiding the true face of the enemy at home—the big military industrial complex and the system it represents.

By providing financial aid as in the foreign aid program and tax incentives, among other methods, to the big multinational corporations that have caused the loss of hundreds of thousands if not millions of jobs to American workers thru runaway production abroad to take advantage of extra low wages.

By failing to come to the financial aid of the cities and states that are laying off hundreds of thousands of state and local government workers. A case in point is New York.

In New York where mass layoffs, budget cuts, and tax hikes abound, there is in fact the financial wherewithal to turn the situation around.

In early March Mayor Lindsay issued his $881 million tax plan which falls most heavily on workers and small businessmen.

But a five percent tax on the revenues of the financial corporations located in New York City, the insurance companies, banks and assorted investments dealers would have yielded $1.6 billion or twice the Lindsay package.

More than an additional $1.5 billion could have been raised by hiking taxes of the big real estate interests in the city through doubling their tax assessments, and plugging tax loopholes of tax exempt properties.

Thus over three times the Lindsay package could have been raised by taxing big finance and real estate. And in addition more than $5 billion in revenues could have come to New York City in one year thru its share of a federal military budget used instead for peaceful needs.

WHAT ABOUT THE AFL–CIO AND THE WAR ON POVERTY?

The AFL–CIO has issued many critical examinations of the Administration's economic policies.

Among other things it wants Congress to:

Raise the minimum wage to at least $2.00 an hour.

Extend the unemployment compensation program.

Provide more funds for housing.

Lower interest rates.

Provide collective bargaining rights for all federal workers.

Pass a national health security bill.

Expand child care centers.

Provide a $2 billion public works program creating 420,000 jobs.[16]

The main point about all these programs is not that they are inadequate, since their enactment and enforcement would result in at least some improvement of the existing situation. In the words of Brother Ernest DeMaio (President, United Electrical Workers District 11) they would be a "down-payment" on what is rightfully deserved.

And in addition, in the area of equal employment opportunity and civil rights some of the top labor unions such as in the construction trades have been most active followers of basic company Jim Crow policies, thus fomenting the worsening of conditions for all of labor.

WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN AFFORD

In reality the United States is a rich enough country to provide for a decent living for all Americans.

If all the income in the $15,000 and over family bracket were redistributed to the lower brackets, and if the amount the U.S. government provides for military spending in 1 year were spent instead on raising the lower income brackets, then all American families could enjoy almost immediately a moderate but adequate standard of living as defined by government standards.[17]

This is what we as Americans deserve . . . and more!

Anything short of this are "downpayments," vital downpayments but not the complete package:

We deserve:

Guaranteed annual wage at union wages.

Extension of unemployment insurance to include all workers at regular wages with no cuts until a new job is found.

End to the dehumanizing welfare dole program. Income maintenance at the $6,500 level demanded by the National Welfare Rights Organization.

30 hour week with 40 hours pay.

Vastly expanded public works job program along the lines of the Murray full-employment bill, scuttled by Congress in 1945 which provided that the government provide useful employment at good wages for all workers not employed by private industry.

Vastly expanded Civil Rights enforcement.

Cradle-to-the grave government sponsored health security.

Vastly expanded federal low-income housing program double current housing starts with no racial discrimination.

Extended social security benefits with no hike in social security taxes.

Vastly improved job training and hiring programs with emphasis on training of Afro-Americans, Mexican Americans, the American Indians, and other racial U.S. minorities.

Improved federal aid to the cities program for more city services especially mass transit.

Extended child-care centers for working mothers and all mothers.

More and better old age homes for the retired and elderly.

Higher education for all who are financially unable to continue schooling; quality education for all.

All of these measures in reality could be financed by taxing the rich, and using the military budget for peaceful needs, while at the same time lowering the tax load of the working people.

The specific bills which are good enough for our support we will hear more about later on in this most important conference.

CONCLUSION

Hundreds of thousands of Mr. and Mrs. Grossups of every age, trade, creed, national origin, and political belief were coming together to fight the depression in 1932. As they changed, *they changed the country.* They transformed America from a place of despair to a country of struggle.

They astonished themselves, not only by their courage and their militance but by the swiftness with which they learned, throwing aside old beliefs and habits which had brought them nothing but despair. There were times that a man learned more in an hour about what makes the world go than he had learned previously in a lifetime. [Emphasis added] [18]

This great passage from *Labor's Untold Story* by Boyer and Morais is a portent of things to come today.

Ours is the first national demonstration action for full employment since the 1930's which includes both the unemployed as well as the employed.

United in action we will indeed change the face of this country.

FOOTNOTES

[1] See U.S. Department of Labor, "Area Trends," March, 1971, p. 7.

[2] U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, *Dietary Levels of Households in the United States*, Spring, 1965; cited in *AFL–CIO News*, February 13, 1971, p. 8

[3] U.S. Department of Labor: *Monthly Labor Review*, May 23, converted to 1957–59 base: *Handbook of Labor Statistics*, 1970, table 103.

[4] Based on data in *The Wall Street Journal*, March 17, 1971.

[5] See U.S. Department of Commerce, "Poverty Increases by 1.2 million in 1970," *Current Population Reports*, Series P–60, No. 77, May 7, 1971.

[6] See *Business Week*, June 6, 1970, p. 31.

[7] For example, the amount of merged corporate assets grew about as much in the period 1960–69 as in the previous 40 years. Based on data in U.S. Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstracts of the United States*, 1970, Table 735, "Mergers and Acquisitions—Manufacturing and Mining Concerns Acquired: 1920 to 1969," p. 483.

[8] See U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, *Social Security Bulletin*, February, 1971, Table M–24; phone conservation with Department staff member.

[9] See U.S. Department of Labor, *Employment and Earnings*, February, 1971, "Revised Seasonally Adjusted Labor Force Series."

[10] See for example, "Warped Statistics, 'Discouraged' Blacks Leave the Labor Force, Distorting Jobless Rate" *The Wall Street Journal*, January 8, 1971.

[11] *Facts on File*, December 23, 1970, p. 934.

[12] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, January 30, 1970, p. 257.

[13] See *AFL-CIO* News, February 7, 1971, p. 1.

[14] *Employment Act of 1946, As Amended with Related Laws*, December 1969, p. 1.

[15] *The New York Times*, May 11, 1971.

[16] *AFL-CIO News*, February 27, 1971, p. 3; April 24, 1971, p. 1.

[17] Based on: U.S. Department of Commerce, *Current Population Reports*, Series P–60, No. 75, December 14, 1970, Table 1, "Summary Measures of Family Characteristics, by Total Money Income, 1969;" and U.S. Department of Labor data.

[18] Richard O. Boyer and Herbert M. Morais, *Labor's Untold Story* (Cameron Associates, New York, 1955), pp. 258–9.

BIG BUS BILL

HON. FRED SCHWENGEL

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Speaker, the Des Moines Register for May 25 contains an excellent editorial concerning the big bus bill. The same editorial is reprinted in the "Mirror of Opinion" section of the Christian Science Monitor for June 15. The editorial follows:

NOW THEY WANT WIDER BUSES

The continuing fight over bigger vehicles on the highways has turned in this session of Congress from trucks to buses. The House Committee on Public Works recently approved a bill permitting the width of buses on Interstate highways to increase from 96 inches to 102 inches.

The measure is opposed by the two federal agencies most concerned about highway safety—the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in the Department of Transpor-

tation and the National Transportation Safety Board.

Representative Fred Schwengel (Rep., Iowa), a leader in the successful battle against bigger trucks in 1969, is gearing up for a new fight against bigger buses.

Although research into the causes of accidents is appallingly incomplete, Schwengel says bigger buses might increase traffic accidents by taking up more of the road, by creating a more powerful air "blast" when meeting or passing a light car, and by creating a larger "blind spot"—the area directly behind a bus which its driver can't see.

Proponents of the bill argue that wide buses would permit more comfortable seats, so buses would attract more passengers and the national goal of increased mass transit would be achieved. However, Schwengel points out that the width of present bus seats is the same as in most United Air Lines planes.

"If bus companies are sincerely interested in attracting more passengers they could do better by cleaning up their dirty bus depots," Schwengel said.

The 12-foot widths of the lanes of Interstate highways were designed to be safe based upon research using 96-inch wide vehicles. If the Interstate system were rebuilt to provide the same margin of safety for vehicles 102 inches wide, the expense would be phenomenal.

The big bus bill would be permissive. States could continue their 96-inch wide limits. However, if the bill became law, there would be great pressure on states to allow the wider buses on state highways, many of which are narrower and less safe than the Interstates.

The wide-bus bill is the latest target in domino strategy of the truck and bus industries. If 102-inch wide buses are allowed, why not 102-inch wide trucks? And if wider trucks are permitted, why not let them carry larger weights? And so on.

Before Congress pushes over the wide-bus domino, it should obtain a reliable and comprehensive analysis of the impact of the wide vehicles on highway safety.

THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF LITHUANIA'S REVOLT AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

HON. WILLIAM R. COTTER

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. COTTER. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to commemorate the 30th anniversary of Lithuania's successful, but all too brief revolt against the Soviet Union. The Lithuanians and other Baltic peoples, in their zealous and unending quest for freedom, independence, and identity, have shown great courage in the face of Communist oppression. Their fight has been long and bitter, for they were twice overrun by Soviet and once by German armies. In spite of the great hardships and tragedies that they have repeatedly experienced, the Lithuanian people have continued their heroic struggle for recognition not only in their homeland, but also here in the United States. We must help the Lithuanian Americans, our fellow citizens, to preserve and continue their culture and tradition within the framework of American life. As a country traditionally dedicated to the pursuit of liberty, let us not forget our responsibility to all of those peoples of Baltic origin and descent, who cherish freedom and who are ready and willing to work for it.

I ask that this distinguished body recognize this important anniversary in the hope that it will bring renewed faith and courage to the citizens of this oppressed land.

MAO'S RED SHADOWS IN AMERICA

HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, the following article by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover appeared in the June 1971 edition of VFW magazine. It contains information of great importance in acquiring an understanding of the efforts being made by the Communist Party of China to foster subversion in the United States.

This article confirms beyond the shadow of a doubt the wisdom of the stand taken by the House Committee on Armed Services as to the need for maintaining the Selected Reserves of the Coast Guard whose expertise in security measures is a matter of record. Responding to the contention of Secretary of Transportation Volpe that large-scale sabotage in ports in the United States is unlikely under present conditions, the committee stated:

> The committee also rejects the contention that there is no probability that there would be large-scale efforts to sabotage ports within the United States. It is rather inconceivable that this position could be advocated at a time when contingents carrying the enemy flag are parading in port cities both on the East and West Coasts of our country, and acts of political sabotage have occurred more frequently recently than ever before in our history. Who can predict with any degree of certainty where the loyalty of some of these people would lie in the event of a wartime situation.

We can predict the loyalty of the people mentioned in this article by the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Their loyalty lies to Red China just as the loyalty of members of the Communist Party of the United States lies with the Soviet Union.

Another excellent point made by Mr. Hoover is the essential distinction he draws between the "old" and the "new left." There is a growing tendency to characterize everyone involved in various extreme leftist activities as a member of the "new left." This is an incorrect understanding of the situation. The difference between the "new left" and the "old left" is basically that of discipline, organization and control, and clarity of objectives.

Members of the Communist Party of the United States, the Socialist Workers Party, the Progressive Labor Party, et cetera, are all "old left" whether their age be 18 or 80. To quote Mr. Hoover,

> First of all, we must realize that the PLP is what we call an Old Left group, that is, it draws its ideological roots from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 (as do the pro-Moscow Communist Party, USA, and the Socialist Workers Party or Trotskyists). Actually, PLP was formed in 1962 by dissidents expelled by the Communist Party after bitter internal dissension caused by the Sino-Soviet dispute.
>
> Moreover, not only is PLP Old Leftist (which means strict discipline), but it represents the most orthodox, traditional and dictatorial interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, namely, that delineated by Mao.

The crucial distinction between "old left" and "new left" is not that of age but that of discipline. A Bolshevik party is one whose disciplined cadre allow it to conduct organized and directed warfare operations across the entire spectrum of conflict, from the military to the psycho-political. These groups are supposed to be capable of moving toward their objective of seizing absolute and total power using either bullets or ballots as weapons, depending on the orders of the day.

The "new left" lacks this capability and is primarily a manipulatable mass whose hostility to our system of government leaves them quite open to certain forms of tactical exploitation by the professional Communist rear warfare experts. This shared hostility toward our way of life which exists between both "old" and "new" left types opens up great new recruiting possibilities for the Bolshevik groups who have the advantage of organizational continuity and disciplined command structure.

The "new left" is largely a product of organized disenchantment campaigns which have tended to use the war in Vietnam as the focal point for agitational efforts. Someone recently pointed out that the failure of the United States to successfully conclude the war in Southeast Asia at a rate consonant with our capabilities, 3 to 6 weeks, has resulted in Communist Party recruiting conditions which have not existed since the depression era in the 1930's.

Mr. Hoover also takes note of the major handicap faced by the Red Chinese in the field of espionage:

> Red Chinese intelligence in the United States, as compared with Soivet Russia's, has a major handicap in that Peking is not recognized diplomatically by this country nor is it a member of the United Nations. This deprives the Red Chinese of a legal base from which to operate spies. A high percentage of Soviet espionage, for example, is carried out by Soviet diplomats assigned to either the Soviet embassy in Washington or the USSR's Mission to the United Nations in New York.

There would seem to me to be little need to remove this obstacle to improved Chinese Communist espionage work in the United States unless, of course, one wishes to establish some type of continuity in the current administration's approach to the question of Red China by coordinating foreign policy debacles abroad with internal shambles at home.

The article by Mr. Hoover follows:

[From the V.F.W. Magazine, June, 1971]

MAO'S RED SHADOWS IN AMERICA

(By John Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation)

Mao Tse-tung, the Red Chinese dictator, is some 6,000 miles from the United States. But the shadows of pro-Peking subversion are daily becoming a more serious problem in this country.

EXAMPLE 1

It was a warm evening in May. In a city not far from San Francisco several cars drove

through a suburban area and then parked. Their occupants hurried into an attractive small home. A friendly gathering of people.

But, not quite. This was a meeting of a "collective" (or cell) of the Revolutionary Union (RU), a group dedicated to Mao Tse-tung and his doctrine of the Marxist-Leninist revolution.

Inside, the meeting came to order. The chief speaker, one of RU's West Coast leaders was talking.

"The RU," he said, smacking his fist into his hand, "is placing far too much emphasis on theoretical work. Reading, studying and theory have their place—but not now. The times demand direct action."

He paused for a moment, almost caught up in a rage. He turned and slowly looked into the eyes of every member present, as if he were talking to each individually. This was a group small in numbers, but hysterically dedicated to the teachings of Chairman Mao.

The leader leaned forward, almost hissing between his teeth. "We must start arming. Only in this way will we awaken the revolutionary masses."

EXAMPLE 2

The man had entered the United States from a foreign country. He was a "tourist"—there was no doubt about that. He wouldn't stay permanently. But he had assignments other than just sightseeing. As a pro-Peking intelligence agent, he was gathering information of many types.

In the eyes of this spy, and his masters in Red China, the U.S. was the "citadel of imperialism," "Enemy Number One"—a nation with a vast array of scientific, technological, military and other types of information which, as much as possible, must be stolen or otherwise obtained for use by Mao's government.

EXAMPLES

The woman was medium in stature. Her brown eyes reflected a cold, steel fanaticism. She stood behind the podium with a sheaf of papers scattered in front of her.

"I have lived in the Peoples' Republic of China under Chairman Mao. His thoughts and teachings have brought success to the 'people's revolution.' He represents the wave of the future. You must learn more about him—who he is, what he stands for and what you can do to help him.

"You are in an excellent position to tell the story of Mao to Americans. Many of you here today are students. You are working with students on college campuses and young people in industry. Carry to them Chairman Mao's message of revolution."

The group?

A New England cadre training session of the Progressive Labor Party (PLP), a pro-Maoist activist organization with headquarters in New York.

The woman speaker?

A person very closely connected with the Peking regime.

What do these three incidents tell us?

First, there is a variety of pro-Maoist groups in the United States, such as the Revolutionary Union and the Progressive Labor Party, which, although often in dispute over the tactics of bringing about the revolution, are working zealously for the Red Chinese cause.

Second, this nation today is the target of a growing Red Chinese espionage campaign designed, among other things, to gather confidential data for Peking.

Third, Red China desperately wants to make contact with and influence our rising generation, both college and high school students as well as youthful workers employed in industry.

Let's examine in more detail these Maoist thrusts.

The two main pro-Maoist groups, highly competitive with each other, are the Progressive Labor Party and the Revolutionary Union. Each has its own program, origins and, on occasion, feuds with the other. But both are fanatically loyal to Mao doctrines.

PLP's chief contribution to the Red Chinese cause has been the "pulling off" of an almost unbelievable revolutionary feat—that of not only influencing, but ideologically capturing a sizable number of America's most militant and radical youth!

Here is what happened—and this technique looms as a threat as to what can happen in the subversive indoctrination of youth.

First of all, we must realize that the PLP is what we call an Old Left group, that is, it draws its ideological roots from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 (as do the pro-Moscow Communist Party, USA, and the Socialist Workers Party or Trotskyists). Actually, PLP was formed in 1962 by dissidents expelled by the Communist Party after bitter internal dissension caused by the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Moreover, not only is PLP Old Leftist (which means strict discipline), but it represents the most orthodox, traditional and dictatorial interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, namely, that delineated by Mao.

Yet, despite this Old Left background, PLP was able, through hard work, masterly maneuvering and a keen sense of strategic timing, to so project a "face" of activism, revolutionary zeal and youthful appeal as to strike deep roots on college campuses.

The Worker-Student Alliance (WSA), a PLP-sponsored college group, grew steadily. (The name comes from PLP's emphasis that students and workers form an alliance to bring about the Communist revolution.) In June, 1969, WSA even attempted to gain control of the New Leftist Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).

This attempt tore SDS apart, leading to the rise of factions, such as the extremist-anarchist Weatherman, which were to become separate entities. The WSA faction claims to be the legitimate SDS and today, with headquarters in Chicago, it calls itself by this name and issues a newspaper, *New Left Notes*, the name of SDS's former official paper.

In other words, an Old Left group, believing in Maoist Communism, with its strict discipline, organizational control, and concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, was able to influence and control students who, caught up in the mood of New Left extremism, were denouncing the "tyrannical Establishment" and demanding more "freedom!"

Surely, PLP's exploit must rank as one of the most remarkable and paradoxical in Marxist history in this country.

In late December last year, WSA–SDS held a national convention in Chicago, with an estimated 900 to 1,000 registered.

PLP's newspaper, *Challenge*, headlined the proceedings: "Best SDS Convention: 'Worker-Student Unity is Key to Victory;'" and wrote:

"Over a thousand students came from dozens and dozens of schools from every corner of the country . . . This convention showed that SDS is a strong and growing organization composed of students who want to ally with workers, and not a group of crazy terrorists."

As part of the convention proceedings, delegates conducted on-the-street agitation, handed out PLP literature, made personal contact with workers:

"Nearly 400,000 flyers were handed out. Many students on the brigades (organized by the convention) passed out PLP leaflets. All 100,000 PLP flyers were given out in the first two days, 6,000 *Challenges* were sold, and over 600 workers from the communities and factories gave us their names and phone numbers so that we would work together in the future."

Here is a pro-Maoist group, active on campuses, which says, among other things:

"We see that millions are awakening to the need to seize power and set up a dictatorship of the working class. . . ." Resist the military; fight ROTC and veterans organizations. Agitate inside the armed forces if drafted: "There are many ways of resistance within the Army, literature, discussions, organized rebellions, sabotage." Disrupting the courts: "Carry the struggle to courts—turn the court into a political forum. . . ." Hate the law of the land and the law enforcement officer. Indoctrinate the workers in industry with Maoist Communism. Make the university an agency for propagandizing the revolution.

Membership of the parent PLP group is not large, running over 300. However, through the WSA–SDS, this pro-Maoist organization is able to reach thousands of young people, especially on campuses. It is known, for example, that PLP maintains close contact with pro-Red Chinese organizations abroad. The Chinese Communists subsidize the PLP through the purchase of its publications. PLP leaders have been in periodic contact with Chinese agencies and these leaders on occasion have visited the Chinese mainland.

No wonder PLP proudly sent greetings to Mao Tse-tung last fall on the occasion of the 21st anniversary of his regime's seizure of power.

What about PLP and WSA–SDS opinion regarding the use of violence?

Being Old Leftists, they are not opposed in principle to violence, but they do not feel the time is yet ripe for its use to bring about a revolution. Hence, they oppose the anarchist style of Weatherman violence:

"SDS is NOT against violence," says an article in *New Left Notes*, "but we oppose the mindless violence of small terrorist groups isolated from the people, lashing out in frustration at friend and enemy alike. This includes aimless property destruction and attacking other students and workers on campus."

A growing minority inside PLP and WSA–SDS, however, is chafing at this policy of nonviolence. This group feels that violence is needed to bring about the destruction of the hated Establishment. Much will depend on the outcome of this internal argument.

The second major Maoist group's emphasis, is on violence. The Revolutionary Union believes guerrilla warfare is essential to revolutionary action:

"We recognize the need for organized armed struggle against the power of the state. . . ." "The people must be armed. . . ." "The organized repressive violence of the state (police) must be met with the organized revolutionary violence of the people."

As one observer commented, RU's policy is "g before p"—guns before politics!

FBI investigation reflects that RU members have accumulated weapons and have engaged in firearms and guerrilla warfare training.

Originally based in the San Francisco area, RU has now spread to other cities, in the South, Midwest and East.

Membership is not large, perhaps several hundred. Adherents have come from former members of the Communist Party, USA. At the same time, RU has been successful in attracting both high school and college activists. One youthful member of RU claims to have lived in China and participated in Mao's infamous Red Guards. Key leadership has been given to RU by self-styled intellectuals.

The RU has been rent recently by a violent dispute on the question, "When the revolution?"

In late 1970, a splinter group, calling itself Venceremos, split from the parent RU. This

group feels that RU is hesitating on its commitment to armed struggle now, preferring to build a mass base before an actual insurrection. In Venceremos' eyes, the time for an armed struggle is now:

"We believe that armed struggle is an actuality now, not an eventuality."

These militants gave strong support to the Black Panther Party: "We support the Black Panther Party and recognize it as the vanguard of the American revolution. We want to unite with the Black Panther Party in every way possible."

What is Mao's fascination for these individuals? Here is a man in a distant foreign country, whom these radicals have never seen. They know little, if anything, about Red China. Why are they so infectiously enamored with him and Peking's program?

For some of the old-line Marxists in the PLP and the RU, Mao is the personification of the "original purity" of Marxism-Leninism, a Communist leader who bitterly resisted the Khrushchev brand of "revisionism." To these comrades, the Soviet Union and its mouthpiece in this country, the Community Party, USA, have betrayed the "revolution." They feel that Mao, as one of international Communism's pioneers, alone held firm to the original revolutionary principles of Lenin and his successor, Stalin.

To these adherents, Mao is a man of the "old school," believing in discipline, strict organizational control and Communist orthodoxy. They view Mao's "Great Cultural Revolution" as a purge necessary to oust the decadent and revisionist elements which are gradually creeping into Communism.

For the younger members, Mao (like Fidel Castro and Che Guevara) is a charismatic guerrilla leader who fought the "Establishment of his day" and won. They think in terms of the young, tempestuous, romantic guerrilla leader. They feel Mao's call to arms is what is needed in the United States.

All the time, the red wind of espionage from the Far East continues to blow. The FBI's investigation reflects stepped-up intelligence activity by Peking.

Red Chinese intelligence in the United States, as compared with Soviet Russia's, has a major handicap in that Peking is not recognized diplomatically by this country nor is it a member of the United Nations. This deprives the Red Chinese of a legal base from which to operate spies. A high percentage of Soviet espionage, for example, is carried out by Soviet diplomats assigned to either the Soviet embassy in Washington or the USSR's Mission to the United Nations in New York.

Peking is attempting espionage in a variety of ways, one is to endeavor to introduce deep cover intelligence agents into the United States, trained Peking agents who clandestinely enter this country using false identities and identifications and attempt under the cover of being an American to conduct spy operations.

Third countries are used as bases of attack against the United States. The New China News Agency, an agency of Communist China, has an office in Canada. Though claiming to be a legitimate newsgathering organization, it is obvious that the New China News Agency serves as Red China's chief propaganda outlet abroad and has the potential of supplying Peking with intelligence of all types.

Penetration of Chinese ethnic groups in the United States is also tried. The overwhelming majority of Chinese Americans are loyal to this country, and only a very small percentage are sympathetic to Peking. Yet, Mao leaders constantly seek to identify those Chinese Americans who might help them, especially among the younger elements who might have a sentimental pride in the so-called "accomplishments" of Mao in the ancestral homeland.

Recruiting of agents among indigenous pro-Maoist American groups, such as the Progressive Labor Party, Worker-Student Alliance and the Revolutionary Union, is yet another method. The indoctrination of members of these groups in Mao ideology makes them prime candidates for the carrying out of Red Chinese espionage assignments.

Spy couriers are developed. They are individuals who travel between the United States and other countries and can engage in spy activities. This also includes the development of mail drops in third countries whereby spy data can be transmitted.

We must be alert constantly to the possibility that, following an established espionage pattern, we may find the Red Chinese attempting to introduce "sleeper agents" into the United States among the thousands of Chinese refugees who immigrate annually. The same observation applies to hundreds of Hong Kong-based merchant seamen who desert in American ports, some of whom vanish into the American mainstream.

The shadow of Mao Tse-tung can be seen and felt in the United States today. We can expect the subversive danger to grow as time passes. The only way to meet it is to be prepared. This the FBI is doing through its investigations and the training of its personnel. For example, we are giving instruction to FBI agents in the various Chinese dialects. In this way, our agents are capable of conversing in the native tongue, and the FBI will be able to handle present and likely future contingencies.

Above all, the FBI needs the constant and concerned cooperation of patriotic Americans such as the men and women of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. You, as veterans, know the perils of subversion.

My associates and I are deeply grateful for the splendid cooperation which you have given the FBI. To all the readers of the *V.F.W. Magazine,* we say, "thank you."

LEST WE FORGET

HON. CLARENCE E. MILLER

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. MILLER of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, in a land of progress and prosperity, it is often easy to assume an "out of sight, out of mind" attitude about matters which are not consistently brought to our attention. The fact exists that today more than 1,550 American servicemen are listed as prisoners or missing in Southeast Asia. The wives, children, and parents of these men have not forgotten, and I would hope that my colleagues in Congress and our countrymen across America will not neglect the fact that all men are not free for as long as one of our number is enslaved. I insert the name of one of the captured:

Maj. David Henry Duart, U.S. Air Force, FV3057321, Canton, Pa. Married and the father of three children. The son of Mr. and Mrs. Dean Duart, Canton, Pa. Officially listed as captured February 18, 1967. As of today, Major Duart has been held captive in Southeast Asia 1,577 days.

A BILL TO PROVIDE PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYMENT FOR VIETNAM ERA VETERANS

HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I joined in sponsoring legislation to deal with the problem of growing unemployment among Vietnam veterans. The bill would make financial assistance available to public and private nonprofit agencies and institutions during times of high unemployment to provide transitional employment for unemployed veterans.

The incidence of unemployment among these veterans is currently 7.9 percent, the highest among any labor category in the country except minority groups. An estimated 40,000 new claims for unemployment compensation are filed each month by veterans.

Only one-fourth of the Vietnam veterans return to school. The other 75 percent seek work immediately. Unfortunately, jobs are not always available and are becoming increasingly difficult to find. The veteran is bearing the brunt of this job shortage.

The Congress must take steps to correct this situation. We cannot allow the young men we have sent to fight another nation's war, return home to find their own country is unable to offer them even the means of a livelihood.

I am including a copy of the bill in the RECORD:

H.R. —

A bill to amend title 38 of the United States Code to provide public service employment for Vietnam era veterans

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) part III of title 38, United States Code, is amended by adding immediately after chapter 31 the following new chapter:

"Chapter 32.—PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYMENT FOR VETERANS OF THE VIETNAM ERA

"Sec.
"1550. Financial assistance.
"1551. Authorization.
"1552. Eligible applications.
"1553. Applications.
"1554. Approval of funds.
"1555. Distribution of applications.
"1556. Training and manpower services.
"1557. Special responsibilities of the Secretary.
"1558. Special provisions.
"1559. Special report.
"1560. Definitions.

"§ 1550. Financial assistance

"The Administrator shall enter into arrangements with eligible applicants in accordance with the provisions of this chapter in order to make financial assistance available to public and private nonprofit agencies and institutions during times of high unemployment for the purposes of providing transitional employment for unemployed veterans of the Vietnam era in jobs providing needed public services and training and manpower services related to such employment which are otherwise unavailable, and

enabling such persons to move into employment or training not supported under this chapter.

"§ 1551. Authorization

"(a) There are authorized to be appropriated for the purpose of carrying out this chapter $100,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1972, and $500,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973.

"(b) For the purpose of providing financial assistance under this chapter to enable eligible applicants to carry out public service employment programs, the Administrator is authorized, out of funds appropriated to carry out this chapter, to obligate expenditures equal to the sum of the amounts determined in accordance with the following clauses:

"(1) $75,000,000 when the Secretary determines that the rate of unemployment among Vietnam veterans (seasonally adjusted) equals or exceeds 3 per centum for three consecutive months prior to any such determination, but the Secretary may, under this clause, make only one determination prior to July 1, 1972, and one determination in the twelve-month period thereafter; and

"(2) $10,000,000 for each increment of one-half of 1 per centum by which the Secretary determines that the average rate of unemployment among Vietnam veterans (seasonally adjusted) for three consecutive months prior to any such determination exceeds the rate specified in clause (1), but the Secretary may, with respect to each such increment, make only one determination prior to July 1, 1972, and one determination in the twelve-month period thereafter.

"(c) No further obligation of funds may be made under subsection (b) subsequent to a determination by the Secretary that the rate of unemployment among Vietnam veterans (seasonally adjusted) has receded below 3 per centum for three consecutive months.

"(d) Whenever the Secretary makes any determination required by subsection (b) or (c), he shall promptly notify the Administrator and the Congress and shall publish such determination in the Federal Register.

"§ 1552. Eligible applicants

"For the purpose of entering into arrangements with the Administrator to carry out public service employment programs under this chapter, eligible applicants shall be—

"(1) States;

"(2) cities, counties, and other units of general local government;

"(3) Indian tribes; and

"(4) public and private nonprofit agencies and institutions (including local service companies, and public service agencies and institutions of the Federal Government).

"§ 1553. Applications

"(a) Financial assistance under this chapter may be provided by the Administrator for any fiscal year only pursuant to an application which is submitted by an eligible applicant and which is approved by the Administrator in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Any such application shall set forth a public service employment program designed, in times of high employment, to provide transitional employment for unemployed veterans of the Vietnam era in jobs providing needed public services and, where appropriate, training and manpower services related to such employment which are otherwise unavailable, and to enable such persons to move into employment or training not supported under this chapter.

"(b) Programs assisted under this chapter shall be designed with a view toward—

"(1) developing new careers,

"(2) providing opportunities for career advancement,

"(3) providing opportunities for continued training, including on-the-job training, and

"(4) providing transitional public service employment which will enable the individuals so employed to move into public or private employment or training not supported under this chapter.

"(c) An application for financial assistance for a public service employment program under this chapter shall include provisions setting forth—

"(1) assurances that the activities and services for which assistance is sought under this chapter will be administered by or under the supervision of the applicant, identifying any agency or institution designated to carry out such activities or services under such supervision;

"(2) a description of the area to be served by such programs, and data indicating the number of potential eligible participants and their income and employment status;

"(3) assurances that special consideration will be given to the filling of jobs which provide sufficient prospects for advancement or suitable continued employment by providing complementary training and manpower services designed to (A) promote the advancement of participants to employment or training opportunities suitable to the individuals involved, whether in the public or private sector of the economy, (B) provide participants with skills for which there is an anticipated high demand, or (C) provide participants with self-development skills, but nothing contained in this paragraph shall be construed to preclude persons or programs for whom the foregoing goals are not feasible or appropriate;

"(4) assurances that, to the extent feasible, public service jobs shall be provided in occupational fields which are most likely to expand within the public or private sector as the unemployment rate recedes;

"(5) assurances that due consideration be given to persons who have participated in manpower training programs for whom employment opportunities would not be otherwise immediately available;

"(6) a description of the methods to be used to recruit, select, and orient participants, for their job responsibilities;

"(7) a description of unmet public service needs and a statement of priorities among such needs;

"(8) a description of jobs to be filled, a listing of the major kinds of work to be performed and skills to be acquired, and the approximate duration for which participants would be assigned to such jobs;

"(9) the wages or salaries to be paid persons employed in public service jobs under this chapter and a comparison with the wages paid for similar public occupations by the same employer;

"(10) where appropriate, the education, training, and supportive services (including counseling and health care services) which complement the work performed;

"(11) the planning for and training of supervisory personnel in working with participants;

"(12) a description of career opportunities and job advancement potentialities for participants;

"(13) assurances that procedures established pursuant to section (a) will be complied with;

"(14) assurances that agencies and institutions to whom financial assistance will be made available under this chapter will undertake analysis of job descriptions and a reevaluation of skill requirements at all levels of employment, including civil service requirements and practices relating thereto, in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Administrator;

"(15) assurances that the applicant will, where appropriate, maintain or provide linkages with upgrading and other manpower programs for the purpose of (A) providing those persons employed in public service jobs under this chapter who want to pursue work with the employer, in the same or similar work, with opportunities to do so and to find permanent, upwardly mobile careers in that field, and (B) providing those persons so employed, who do not wish to pursue permanent careers in such field, with opportunities to seek, prepare for, and obtain work in other fields;

"(16) assurances that all persons employed thereunder, other than necessary technical, supervisory, and administrative personnel, will be selected from among unemployed veterans of the Vietnam era;

"(17) assurances that the program will, to the maximum extent feasible, contribute to the elimination of artificial barriers to employment and occupational advancement, including civil service requirements which restrict employment opportunities for the disadvantaged; and

"(18) such other assurances, arrangements, and conditions, consistent with the provisions of this chapter, as the Administrator deems necessary, in accordance with such regulations as he shall prescribe.

"§ 1554. Approval of applications

"An application, or modification or amendment thereof, for financial assistance under this chapter may be approved only if the Administrator determines that—

"(1) the application meets the requirements set forth in this chapter.

"(2) the approvable request for funds does not exceed 90 per centum of the cost of carrying out the program proposed in such application, unless the Administrator determines that special circumstances or other provisions of law warrant the waiver of this requirement;

"(3) an opportunity has been provided to the community action agency in the area to be served to submit comments with respect to the application to the applicant and to the Administrator;

"(4) an opportunity has been provided to officials of the appropriate units of general local government to submit comments with respect to the application to the applicant and to the Administrator; and

"(5) an opportunity has been provided to the Governor of the State to submit comments with respect to the application to the applicant and to the Administrator.

"§ 1555. Distribution of funds

"(a) Funds made available for carrying out this chapter shall be apportioned by the Administrator on an equitable basis among States and within each State among local areas, including Indian reservations, and among rural and urban areas. To the extent practicable, such funds shall be apportioned in proportion to the unemployment in each such area.

"§ 1556. Training and manpower services

"For the purpose of providing training and manpower services for persons employed in public service employment programs assisted under this chapter, the Administrator is authorized to utilize, in addition to any funds otherwise available under federally supported manpower programs, not to exceed 20 per centum of the amounts made available for carrying out this chapter.

"§ 1557. Special responsibilities of the Secretary

"(a) The Administrator shall establish procedures for periodic reviews by an appropriate agency of the status of each person employed in a public service job under this chapter to assure that—

"(1) in the event that any veteran of the Vietnam era employed in a public service job under this chapter and the reviewing agency find that such job will not provide sufficient prospects for advancement or suitable continued employment, maximum efforts shall be made to locate employment or training opportunities providing such prospects, and such veteran shall be offered appropriate assistance in securing placement in the opportunity which he chooses after appropriate counseling; and

"(2) as the rate of unemployment approaches the objective of section 1551(c) or financial assistance will otherwise no longer be available under this chapter, maximum efforts shall be made to locate employment or training opportunities not supported under this chapter for each person employed in a public service job under this chapter, and such person shall be offered appropriate assistance in securing placement in the opportunity which he chooses after appropriate counseling.

"(b) The Administrator shall review the implementation of the procedures established under subsection (a) of this section six months after funds are first obligated under thereafter.

"(c) From funds appropriated pursuant to section 1551, the Administrator may reserve such amount, not to exceed 1 per centum, as he deems necessary to provide for a continuing evaluation of programs assisted under this chapter and their impact on related programs.

"§ 1558. Special provisions

"(a) The Administrator shall not provide financial assistance for any program or activity under this chapter unless he determines, in accordance with such regulations as he shall prescribe, that

"(1) the program (A) will result in an increase in employment opportunities over those which would otherwise be available, (B) will not result in the displacement of currently employed workers (including partial displacement such as a reduction in the hours of nonovertime work or wages or employment benefits), (C) will not impair existing contracts for services or result in the substitution of Federal for other funds in connection with work that would otherwise be performed, and (D) will not substitute public service jobs for existing federally assisted jobs;

"(2) persons employed in public service jobs under this chapter shall be paid wages which shall not be lower than whichever is the highest of (A) the minimum wage which would be applicable to the employment under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, if section 6(a)(1) of such Act applied to the participant and if he were not exempt under section 13 thereof, (B) the State or local minimum wage for the most nearly comparable covered employment, or (C) the prevailing rates of pay for persons employed in similar public occupations by the same employer to the extent that such rates are determined by the Administrator to be consistent with the purposes of this chapter;

"(3) all persons employed in public service jobs under this chapter will be assured of workmen's compensation, health insurance, unemployment insurance, and other benefits at the same levels and to the same extent as other employees of the employer and to working conditions and promotional opportunities neither more nor less favorable than such other employees enjoy;

"(4) the provisions of section 2(a)(3) of Public Law 89-286 (relating to health and safety conditions) shall apply to such program or activity;

"(5) the program will, to the maximum extent feasible contribute to the occupational development or upward mobility of individual participants; and

"(6) every participant shall be advised, prior to entering upon employment, of his rights and benefits in connection with such employment.

"(b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall exempt any project otherwise subject to the provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act, as amended (sections 276a—276a-5 of title 40), from the provisions of that Act. The Secretary shall have, with respect to labor standards on any such project, the authority and functions set forth in Reorganization Plan Numbered 14 of 1950 (15 F.R. 3176; 64 Stat. 1267) and section 2 of the Act of June 1, 1934, as amended (48 Stat. 948, as amended; 40 U.S.C. 276(c)).

"(c) Where a labor organization represents employees who are engaged in similar work in the same labor market area to that proposed to be performed under any program for which an application is being developed for submission under this chapter, such organization shall be notified and afforded a reasonable period of time in which to make comments to the applicant and to the Administrator.

"(d) The Administrator shall prescribe regulations to assure that programs under this chapter have adequate internal administrative controls, accounting requirements, personnel standards, evaluation procedures, and other policies as may be necessary to promote the effect use of funds.

"(e) The Administrator may make such grants, contracts, or agreements, establish such procedures, policies, rules, and regulations, and make such payments, in installments and in advance or by way of reimbursement, or otherwise allocate or expend funds made available under this chapter, as he may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter, including (without regard to the provisions of section 4774(d) of title 10) expenditures for construction, repairs, and capital improvements, and including necessary adjustments in payments on account of overpayments or underpayments. The Administrator may also withhold funds otherwise payable under this chapter in order to recover any amounts expended in the current or immediately prior fiscal year in violation of any provision of this chapter or any term or condition of assistance under this chapter.

"(f) Acceptance of family planning services provided on behalf of veterans of the Vietnam era shall be voluntary on the part of the individual to whom such services are offered and shall not be prerequisite to eligibility for or receipt of any benefit under the program.

"(g) The Administrator shall not provide financial assistance for any program under this chapter unless he determines, in accordance with regulations which he shall prescribe, that periodic reports will be submitted to him containing data designed to enable the Administrator and the Congress to measure the relative and, where programs can be compared appropriately, comparative effectiveness of the programs authorized under this chapter and other federally supported manpower programs. Such data shall include information on—

"(1) characteristics of participants including age, sex, race, health, education level, and previous wage and employment experience;

"(2) duration in employment situations, including information on the duration of employment of program participants for at least a year following the termination of participation in federally assisted programs and comparable information on other employees or trainees of participating employers; and

"(3) total dollar cost per participant, including breakdown between wages, training, and supportive service, all fringe benefits, and administrative costs.

The Administrator shall compile such information on a State, regional, and national basis, and shall include such information in the report required by section 1559 of this title.

"(h) The Administrator shall not provide financial assistance for any program under this chapter unless the grant, contract, or agreement with respect thereto specifically provides that no person with responsibilities in the operation of such program will discriminate with respect to any program participation or any applicant for participation in such program because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, political affiliation, or beliefs.

"(i) The Administrator shall not provide financial assistance for any program under this chapter which involves political activities; and neither the program, the funds provided therefor, nor personnel employed in the administration thereof, shall be, in any way or to any extent, engaged in the conduct of political activities in contravention of chapter 15 of title 5.

"(j) The Administrator shall not provide financial assistance for any program under this chapter unless he determines that participants in the program will not be employed on the construction, operation, or maintenance of so much of any facility as is used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship.

"§ 1559. Special report

"The Secretary shall transmit to the Congress at least annually a detailed report setting forth the activities conducted under this chapter, including information derived from evaluations required by section 1557(c) and 1558(g) of this title and information on the extent to which (1) participants in such activities subsequently secure and retain public or private employment or participate in training or employability development programs, (2) segments of the population of unemployed persons are provided public service opportunities in accordance with the purposes of this chapter.

"§ 1560. Definitions

"As used in this title—

"(1) The term 'Secretary' means the Secretary of Labor.

"(2) The term 'State' includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

"(3) The term 'city' means an incorporated municipality having general governmental powers.

"(4) The term 'public service' includes, but is not limited to, work in such fields as environmental quality, health care, public safety, education, transportation, recreation, maintenance of parks, streets, and other public facilities, solid waste removal, pollution control, housing and neighborhood improvements, rural development, conservation, beautification, and other fields of human betterment and community improvement.

"(5) The term 'health care' means other than hospital and medical available under chapter 17 of this title and includes, but is not limited to, preventive and clinical medical treatment, family planning services, nutrition services, and appropriate psychiatric, psychological, and prosthetic services.

"(6) The term 'local service company' means a community development corporation or other corporation, partnership, or other business entity organized to operate a public service employment program or component thereof and owned or operated in substantial part by unemployed or low-income residents of the area to be served."

(b) The analyses of title 38, United States Code, and of part III of such title are each amended by inserting immediately after

"31. Vocational Rehabilitation.....1501."

the following:

"32. Public Service Employment for Veterans of the Vietnam Era.....1550."

SEC. 2. This Act shall be effective upon enactment and the determinations to be made under section 1551(b) of title 38, United States Code (as added by the first section of this Act) shall take into account the rate of unemployment for a period of three consecutive months even though all or part of such period may have occurred prior to the date of the enactment of this Act.

CONGRESS MUST ACT TO PROVIDE JOBS FOR UNEMPLOYED AMERICANS

HON. WILLIAM D. FORD

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. Mr. Speaker, today, we in the House of Representatives have the opportunity to pass the conference report of S. 575, which includes as title I, the provisions of the Accelerated Public Works Act which I cosponsored along with a bipartisan coalition of 150 of my colleagues in the House.

Passage of the Accelerated Public Works Act at this time of rising unemployment is extremely crucial. The primary purpose of this legislation is to provide jobs—to provide immediate relief for at least some of the 5.5 million Americans who are now unable to find work.

In addition to creating an estimated 170,000 jobs almost immediately, this bill would simultaneously provide localities throughout the country with badly needed local facilities such as road improvements, water and sewer works, hospitals, and other public buildings. It will bring direct and immediate relief to the areas of highest unemployment by providing $2 billion in Federal funds for public works projects which have been planned by local governments, but delayed for lack of funding.

The jobs which will result from the enactment of this legislation are of extremely critical importance to the families of hundreds of thousands of unemployed Americans. The rate of unemployment now, at 6.2 percent has reached its highest point in over 9 years, and according to a member of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, could continue to climb still higher.

The rate of unemployment for minority groups has recently reached 10.5 percent, its highest level since 1963, and the rate for construction workers, to whom this bill would be especially helpful, has now reached an alarming 11.2 percent.

The number of Americans out of work for 27 weeks or longer has advanced to 580,000—the highest level since May 1963, and the average duration of unemployment has once again increased, from 10.9 weeks to 11.5.

This is indeed a shocking and dismaying comment on Mr. Nixon's total failure to deal with the problem of unemployment and the economy in general and the message is clear. Congress must fill the void created by the Nixon administration's total lack of leadership. Congress must develop programs to create jobs and to reverse the ever-increasing rate of unemployment, and Congress can do this today—by sending the Accelerated Public Works Act to the President for his signature.

Now I am sure we are all well aware of the so-called leaks from the White House that the President may veto this bill as well as the Emergency Unemployment Act of 1971, another measure which Congress has developed as part of its two-pronged attack on unemployment. I find this extremely difficult to believe, in light of the President's own comments on the issue now before us.

In an address to the Nation less than 2 years ago the President stated that—

> We intend to do everything we can to resist increases in unemployment, to help train and place workers in new jobs, to cushion the effect of readjustment.

That was in 1969, a year when the national rate of unemployment averaged 3.5 percent. Now, in 1971, the national rate has climbed to 6.2 percent.

In that same address the President stated that—

> The Nation must dedicate itself to the ideal of helping every man who is looking for a job to find a job.

This is precisely what this legislation is designed to do—"help every man who is looking for a job to find a job." I hope my colleagues will send this bill to the President today with the strong bipartisan support which it deserves, and I hope the President will live up to his pledge to the American people by signing it into law.

LATVIA, AND LITHUANIA

HON. SAM STEIGER

OF ARIZONA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. STEIGER of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, for more than a quarter of a century Americans of Baltic origin and their friends have deplored Soviet occupation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. How much longer must these proud people be subjected to tyranny?

The U.S. Congress has spoken out on their behalf by urging the President to bring their plight to the attention of the world opinion at the United Nations. The following resolution was adopted by the 89th Congress:

H. CON. RES. 416

Whereas the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation; and

Whereas all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, cultural, and religious development; and

Whereas the Baltic peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been forcibly deprived of these rights by the Government of the Soviet Union; and

Whereas the Government of the Soviet Union, through a program of deportations and resettlement of peoples, continues in its effort to change the ethnic character of the populations of the Baltic States; and

Whereas it has been the firm and consistent policy of the Government of the United States to support the aspirations of Baltic peoples for self-determination and national independence; and

Whereas there exist many historical, cultural, and family ties between the peoples of the Baltic States and the American people: Be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the House of Representatives of the United States urge the President of the United States—

(a) to direct the attention of world opinion at the United Nations and at other appropriate international forums and by such means as he deems appropriate, to the denial of the rights of self-determination for the peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and

(b) to bring the force of world opinion to bear on behalf of the restoration of these rights to the Baltic peoples.

THE BALTIC PEOPLES AND THEIR UNENDING QUEST FOR FREEDOM

HON. JOSEPH P. ADDABBO

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, it was on June 15, 1940, that the Soviet Union invaded the Baltic States and by force instituted the period of oppression over Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. That period of slavery for the Baltics has not dampened the desire for freedom or the hope in the hearts of these peoples.

Despite the tragic fact that these three nations have lost more than one-fourth of their population since the invasion of June 15, 1940, and despite the continued practices of spiritual, cultural, and physical genocide by the Soviet Union, there is still widespread resistance to the Communist tyranny which was imposed. History has recorded the unsuccessful but commendable efforts of freedom fighters in the Baltic States. History will one day record the victory of peoples determined to overthrow their dictators and to be free once more to determine their own destiny.

The U.S. Congress adopted House Concurrent Resolution 416 during the 89th Congress urging the President to direct the attention of world opinion at the United Nations and other appropriate international forums to the denial of the rights of self-determination for the Baltic peoples. That resolution remains the hope for future liberty for those now held captive and I ask permission to place the text of that resolution in the RECORD at this point:

H. CON. RES. 416

Whereas the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation; and

Whereas all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, cultural, and religious development; and

Whereas the Baltic peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been forcibly deprived of these rights by the Government of the Soviet Union; and

Whereas the Government of the Soviet Union, through a program of deportations and resettlement of peoples, continues in its effort to change the ethnic character of the populations of the Baltic States; and

Whereas it has been the firm and consistent policy of the Government of the United States to support the aspirations of Baltic peoples for self-determinations and national independence; and

Whereas there exist many historical, cultural, and family ties between the peoples of the Baltic States and the American people: Be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the House of Representatives of the United States urge the President of the United States—

(a) to direct the attention of world opinion at the United Nations and at other appropriate international forums and by such means as he deems appropriate, to the denial of the rights of self-determination for the peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and

(b) to bring the force of world opinion to bear on behalf of the restoration of these rights to the Baltic peoples.

TWO BOOKS IN MONTH FOR AUTHOR IN CHINO

HON. JERRY L. PETTIS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. PETTIS. Mr. Speaker, a constituent of mine, Mr. William L. Roper, has recently authored two books on figures who have contributed much to our society. One of these individuals, the renowned Western actor and singer, Roy Rogers, is also a constituent and personal friend of mine. We all know of the immense talents of Roy Rogers, and I commend the two books mentioned in the following article as most worthy reading for my colleagues:

TWO BOOKS IN MONTH FOR AUTHOR IN CHINO

CHINO.—William L. Roper, reporter on The Telegram in the 1920s, is author of two hardcover books published recently—one a biography of Roy Rogers, the star of Western films who lives in Apple Valley.

The Rogers book, which was approved by the actor, is published by the T. S. Denison Company of Minneapolis.

The other book, "William Spry—Man of Firmness," tells the dramatic life story of the governor of Utah from 1909 to 1917, who courageously defied the Industrial Workers of the World, and became the target for IWW vengeance. It is published jointly by the United States Historical Society and University of Utah Press, and has been selected as Vol. 6 of the University of Utah publications on the American West. Dr. Leonard J. Arrington, professor at Logan and an authority on Western history, collaborated with Roper in checking historical facts and is listed as co-author.

The Spry book contains information regarding the "IWW war" on the Western States, including the bombing of the Los Angeles Times and other acts of sabotage that characterized this period. An exchange of correspondence between Gov. Spry of Utah and Gov. Hiram Johnson of California during those times makes the book of particular interest to students of history, since it throws new light on the IWW.

Some of these letters, marked "confidential," were preserved in the personal files of the Spry family. Spry's eldest daughter, Mrs. Roland Rich Woolley of North Hollywood, gave Roper access to these letters. (Mr. Woolley, Los Angeles attorney, who formerly represented Leo Carrillo and Olivia de Havilland, is the grandson of Gen. Charles Coulson Rich, who led the Mormon migration to San Bernardino in 1850.)

Since this is the first book ever written about Spry and his times, Roper and Arrington had to do a large amount of independent research in the archives of California and Utah.

Spry sought in vain to obtain assistance of the Wilson administration in curbing the IWW conspiracy.

A considerable part of the Spry book has to do with the furor that the IWW and sympathizers succeeded in generating over the Joe Hill case, Joel Hagglund, alias Joseph Hillstrom, alias Joe Hill, native of Sweden and the writer of revolutionary songs, was convicted of murdering a Salt Lake City grocer Jan. 10, 1914. In an effort to save him from execution by a Utah firing squad, the IWW began a worldwide letter-writing campaign to portray Hill as a poor, innocent "labor martyr," framed on a murder charge simply because he was their songbird. During 1915 and 1916, the case became a cause celebre.

Because Spry stood firm against the pressure, even when President Wilson attempted to intervene and refused to grant Hill clemency, he received death threats. An unsuccessful attempt was made to bomb Spry's home Christmas Eve. After several legal delays and accompanying terroristic activities directed against the governor and Utah courts, Hill was executed Nov. 19, 1915.

Both the Spry story and that of Rogers are in a sense Horatio Alger themes. Spry rose from stable-boy to governor; Rogers, from Ohio pig-raiser and shoe factory worker to motion picture stardom.

"In my Rogers Book," Roper explains, "I have tried to set the record straight. A lot of erroneous things have been published about him. For instance, Roy was not born in Wyoming or Illinois, as some have written, but in a red brick tenement in Cincinnati, Nov. 5, 1911. And his real name at birth was Leonard Franklin Slye."

How this shy Ohio farm boy found his aladdin-lamp magic in a guitar, a heart-touching voice and a trained horse makes his story an inspiring one for today, Roper believes. He also sees Rogers as a philosopher with some advice for solving today's political and social problems. The book is expected to be included in "The Men of Achievement" series used in many high schools.

After working as a reporter in San Bernardino, Roper worked for several years on the editorial staffs of Los Angeles Examiner and Los Angeles Times. He and his wife, Zenith Armstrong Roper, reside at 11843 Monte Vista Ave., Chino.

WHITE HOUSE POLICE CONFERENCE: NO VISIBLE RESULTS

HON. LUCIEN N. NEDZI

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Speaker, the recent White House meeting on police killings produced no visible results. In addition, it was unfortunate that the organizers of the conference succumbed to pettiness when they failed to invite New York Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy and Detroit Police Commissioner John Nichols and others who are in the front lines of the crime crisis.

Under leave to extend my remarks, I submit for the RECORD the June 7, 1971, editorials of the Detroit Free Press and the Detroit News on this matter:

[From the Detroit Free Press, June 7, 1971]

POLICE KILLINGS CONFERENCE JUST AN EMPTY GESTURE

Attorney General John Mitchell says the recent White House meeting on police killings was meant to give further indication of the administration's support for American policemen. And that was plain enough. Less plain is whether it was meant to produce any more tangible results.

Of course, the administration did change its mind about placing a federal floor under compensation paid the survivors of slain policemen, an idea at least three years old and opposed by the administration until now. But worthy as this notion may be, it has nothing to do with the problem of preventing police deaths in the first place.

Nor does anything else visibly produced by the conference, beyond a pledge of FBI help in cases involving police killings, a pledge that hopefully is no more than an affirmation of standing policy. The principal fallout of the meeting seems to have been bitter gossip over omissions in the invitation list.

The details of the bickering need not detain us here. Obviously no love is lost among several parties on both sides of the dispute. But it is fair to say that Mr. Nixon invited this backlash when he placed conference arrangements in the hands of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, whose relations with other American law enforcement officers are notoriously spotty.

And it is fair to wonder what purpose is served by a conference that omits some of the men most cruelly pressed by the issue under discussion. Several big-city police officials did attend. But several more were not invited, not even New York Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy, whose own tragic difficulties in recent days helped inspire the meeting.

In sum, the White House discussions fell far short of the serious attention the issue deserves. The problem of police killings is central to the lingering problem of crime, violence and urban upheaval. The price policemen are paying is powerful evidence that the country at large has not yet paid price enough to find a solution.

Reports say that additional meetings are planned in Washington this week, and that they are expected to produce more in the way of substantial proposals. One devoutly hopes so. If the administration does not wish to deal forthrightly with this matter, it ought to keep hands off.

[From the Detroit News, June 7, 1971]

WHITE HOUSE STAFF FUMBLES

Someone should blow the policeman's whistle on the White House staffers who failed to check out the guest list for the conference called to discuss recent slayings of policemen and to demonstrate the President's concern and his determination to uphold law and order.

The problem is essentially that of the big cities. There was an acknowledgment of that in the presence at the White House of the police chiefs of Boston, Kansas City, Mo., Chicago, Washington and Los Angeles, with whom Mr. Nixon, flanked by Atty.-Gen. John Mitchell and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, conferred.

But the police chief of New York, the nation's biggest city, was not invited and neither was Detroit's chief, John Nichols. Absent also were the law enforcement heads of Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Omaha, Baltimore, Atlanta, Houston, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, St. Louis and San Francisco, to mention only some of the metropolitan forces which have had to contend with riot, demonstration and slaying.

What helpful words of wisdom, we wonder, came from such invited guests as the police chiefs or sheriffs of Brighton, Colo., Miami

Beach, Oneida, N.Y., and Kettering, O.? We are sure another guest, the police chief of Toms River, N.J., is an estimable character, but would not the chief of riot-torn Newark have had something more pertinent to report?

According to Press Secretary Ziegler, the list had been put together by Hoover at Mr. Nixon's request. It was termed "representative." What baffles us is that no one on Mr. Nixon's staff questioned Hoover's judgment that Oneida is more representative than New York, or Detroit than Brighton (Zip code 80601, 20 miles from Denver).

Quinn Tamm, executive director of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, who was omitted from the list, left the FBI 10 years ago and reports he has clashed with Hoover several times. Tamm, however, praised the President's concern with police safety, saying of Hoover's list only: "I hate to see people play politics with people's lives."

The White House staff should patrol its beat on such guest lists more thoroughly.

CAMPOLINDA HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS EXAMINE CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN

HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I have recently been privileged to receive and read a paper prepared for an American Government course at Campolinda High School in Moraga, Calif., on the projected impact of the California water plan and the peripheral canal.

This paper, which I am including in the RECORD, is as fair a treatment of the subject as I have seen and I commend it to all who have an interest in the project:

CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN, STATE WATER PROJECT, PERIPHERAL CANAL—VARYING OPINIONS

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Water is a basic element of man's environment; his life depends on it. Man must have water wherever he lives. If he does not live near water, he must move to the water or bring it home. Man's need for water has greatly broadened since Adam knelt down to a stream and cupped his hands for Eve to drink from. Today our needs are much larger. We not only need water to drink, but we need it for our modern homes, for industry and agriculture and also to generate electricity—all of which are for man's immediate environment. Water is also needed in streams for the fish, the wildlife, and for the beauty it brings, for everyone to enjoy.

California has worked out a way to do both. Both means to (1) meet today's needs for water development, and (2) otherwise brighten our environment. An unprecedented plan approved by the State Legislature 20 years ago has been brought to reality in the State Water project—to create a better environment for each and every Californian. The California State Water Project provides water to sustain life, helps produce food to feed our families, and fibers to clothe them. The State Water Project generates power to light our homes and schools and run the television. It gives us new lakes where the youngsters can swim, the fathers can fish and the moms can sit and relax under a shady tree. It also protects life and property from winter floods, stores excess water for use in the dry summer, keeps beauty and fish in mountain streams, swells the flows of rivers, and serves all of man's needs at home, on the farm and in the factory.

Many people wonder about the California State Water Project. They ask such questions as, "How did the California State Water Project come into being?" and "Who is paying for the Project?" These and other questions are answered in the following:

1. How did the California State Water Project originate? In order to answer this question, we must go back and realize that the problem of water being a vital factor in the lives of people has been in existence ever since California's Constitutional Convention in 1849. The prolonged drought which began in 1928, spurred the legislature to pass the State Central Valley Project Act in 1933. A major part of the water development authorized by the act has been accomplished by the federal Central Valley Project, beginning with that Project's water service to Contra Costa County in 1940. In 1951, the State Legislature authorized construction of what is now the State Water Project.

The plan the State Legislature approved and refined in the years that followed was broad and far-reaching. It had to follow the pattern established by new Californians who consistently located their homes and businesses in defiance of the natural distribution of water within California's boundaries.

The people have located themselves and their industries in such a way that 80 percent of the water needs of California occur in the southern two-thirds of the State, while 75 percent of the water supply is in the northern one-third of the State. California's water supply is adequate, but some of it needs to be redistributed. This was clearly a statewide problem, the legislators agreed, so they added other environmental benefits for the people of the basic purpose of water conservation and distribution.

This was the first statewide water project ever planned with recreation and fish and wildlife enhancement as basic purposes.

Planning construction, and operation of the California State Water Project are responsibilities of the State Department of Water Resources. Working in the Department are engineers, administrators, and professionals in many scientific disciplines, along with technicians and inspectors, clerks and typists, plant operators and maintenance men. The Department pioneered in putting special skills to work on the special problems of adding diverse benefits to a water conservation project. It brought in fish biologists and recreation planners years ago, back when ecology and environment were just words in the dictionary to just about every Californian.

2. What does the California State Water Project consist of? The initial facilities of the California State Water Project, now just about 91 percent completed or at least under way, include 18 reservoirs, 18 pumping plants, 5 powerplants and 580 miles of aqueducts. Parts of the Project have been serving Californians ever since 1962.

The State Water Projects two big reservoirs, built for conservation of water and the other benefits, are Lake Oroville in Butte County and San Luis Reservoir in Merced County. Two smog-free powerplants at Oroville and one at San Luis provide electrical energy.

In the Sierra, in Plumas County, there are three pretty lakes devoted almost entirely to recreation. The lakes include: Frenchman Lake, Antelope Lakes, and Lake Davis. Lake Del Valle in Alameda County is for storage, flood control, and recreation.

The California Aqueduct provides State Water Project benefits in the San Joaquin Valley and this year will be taken over the Tehachapi Mountains into Los Angeles County. It will reach the southernmost reservoir to be built, Lake Perris in Riverside County, in 1973. Other aqueducts serve the counties north and south of San Francisco Bay. A branch aqueduct will be built from the San Joaquin Valley across the coastal mountains to serve Santa Barbara and San Luis Obispo Counties when they need a new supply, about 1980.

3. Who is paying for the California State Water Project? In general, the "water users" are paying for the State Water Project, except for a few minor costs. That was the decision made by Legislature in 1959 when it passed the Burns-Porter Act, which provided the major financing for the project.

The 1959 enactment authorized the issuance of $1.75 billion in general obligation bonds to assist in financing construction of the dams and reservoirs and aqueducts of the State Water Project. The voters of the State gave their approval to the bond issue in 1960, adding their mandate for the project and all its facilities to be built. The Department of Water Resources completed the arrangements to have the bonds and the interest on those bonds paid off by the water users and other beneficiaries.

Thirty-two public agencies in many parts of California contracted with the Department to buy the water supplies they need for the people in their local areas. They began their payments in advance of receiving water, and many of them still have another year or two of advanced payments to make before the project aqueduct will reach their territory. The local water agencies already have paid the State a total of $155 million, of which more than $122 million has come from agencies yet to receive water. The Federal government pays the State for costs of reservoir construction allocated to flood control. The total paid to date by the Federal government is $75 million.

Recreation costs are shared by the people of the State, since recreation is planned for all, and available to all.

The State Water Project can be summarized simply as a project making a better life for Californians. As its services are extended, its benefits will spread to even more of the men, women and children in our State.

The peripheral canal

A water transfer facility across the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta was authorized by the Burns-Porter Act in 1959 as a primary facility of the California State Water Project. Since there were so many water transfer facilities proposed and because there was so much controversy over these proposals, a Federal-State Interagency Delta Committee was organized in 1961 to study all of the proposals, and then to recommend a facility which would protect the Delta from salinity intrusion, serve the needs of fish and wildlife habitats, provide a firm supply of quality water for Delta use, and, still provide the needed water across the Delta which would take surplus water to the Federal and State export pumps at the southern end. In January of 1965, after extensive study and coordination with concerned local, state, and federal interests, the Committee recommended the adoption of the "Peripheral Canal Plan." It is called Peripheral Canal because it would be placed at the eastern and southern periphery of the Delta.

At public hearings before the California Water Commission and later adopted under administrative action, the recommended plan was approved.

The proposed canal will be more than merely a ditch taking water from one point to another. It will be, instead, a complex engineering works including a canal, pumps, siphons and released gates and recreational facilities extending from Hood to near Tracey. The Peripheral Canal will be located in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, approximately 75 miles east of San Francisco. It will be 3 miles long, 25 to 30 feet deep, and about 400 feet wide. The cost of this canal will exceed two hundred million dollars, to be shared equally by the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project. It will start from the Sacramento River at Hood about 20 miles south of Sacramento and will terminate at the State and Federal pumping plants which serve the Delta-Men-

dota Canal, the San Luis Project, and California Aqueduct, and South Bay Aqueduct, the authorized San Felipe Project, and the future Kellogg Project.

A pumping plant, 3½ miles below the intake, will lift the water 11 feet to provide the required flow. Water release structures will be located at slough and river crossings along its route to supply water and improve its quality for Delta uses and environmental needs. The Canal will be siphoned under three major stream crossings: the Mokelumne, San Joaquin, and Old Rivers; so there will be no interference with fish migration, navigation, or the passage of floodwaters. Fish screening facilities will be installed at the headworks and provisions will be made to prevent downstream migrant adult fish from being trapped in front of the trashracks. A fish-screen by pass will return salvaged fish to the Sacramento River.

This supply of water from Northern California would flow directly into pumps operated by the Federal government's Central Valley Project and the State Department of Resources. A lot of this water would go to the joint Federal-State San Luis Reservoir which already has begun to make what was almost a desert area bloom. These deliveries of water would open new areas to settlement.

Many years ago the Delta was not much more than an uninhabitable marshland. Early settlers, recognizing the tremendously rich quality of the soil, built dikes to create farms. As time went on, the dikes became a major levee system built by the United States Army Corps of Engineers and state and local interests. Later it was noted that salt water from the ocean often was contaminating delta water and land. So, as a part of the Federal government's Central Valley Project, releases of fresh water from behind Shasta Dam were sent down the Sacramento River to repel this salt water intrusion. Before Shasta, salt water intruded as far north as just below Sacramento. After Shasta, the salt water line generally remained below Rio Vista. Under operation of the canal, this would continue. Without Shasta, the Delta would be damaged in many dry years. It is possible that without the canal the Delta would also suffer because of the need to increase pumping of water out of the Delta to meet the needs of the Federal and State water projects. With this in mind, the canal would therefore serve two main purposes: 1. provide fresh water for the pumps, and 2. retard salt water from the ocean.

OPINIONS

The California Water Plan, the State Water Project, and the Peripheral Canal should be of concern to all citizens of California, and especially those in Contra Costa County and those in the Southern California counties that are to receive the water. These projects will definitely have farther-reaching results than just supplying water to areas in the southern part of the state. The San Francisco Bay, the Delta, and economy, population, and pollution of California will all be affected.

However, a recent telephone survey conducted by the Contra Costa Times showed few people to be concerned or even educated in this subject. Those people, selected at random, who participated were asked if they know about the Peripheral Canal and its relationship to the State Water Project and its prospective effects on Contra Costa County. For the most part, the general public questioned knew little and could have cared less. This seems hard to believe since recently the prime interest of radio, television, newspapers, and legislators from Contra Costa County and other parts of the state had been the threat of the Peripheral Canal on not only our immediate area, but also the southern part of the state.

It is sad that the majority of the general public is not concerned about this subject as it takes large support from the public for legislators to be able to change plans for such things as the proposed Peripheral Canal. Fortunately, there are a few concerned citizens seriously opposing the Peripheral Canal and the other water projects. There are as well, though, those who are strongly backing these water projects. We intend to present the opinions and arguments of specific persons and groups, both pro and con on the subject, as we received them through letters, newspaper articles, and other printed literature. We would have liked to include a greater number of opinions, but the majority of the groups we wrote to either did not have time available or were not concerned enough to answer our letter.

Citizen groups

Save the Delta Association

In working to protect the future of the Delta and bay environment, the Save the Delta Association has found it advisable to question the necessity of the entire State Water Project, including the Peripheral Canal.

The construction of the entire water plan would allow, in theory, disposal of scarce water resources to areas of need in Southern California (in terms of population, growth potential, etc. within the state). However, there is obviously a question as to whether or not continual population expansion in the Los Angeles basin would be wise, if it is at all possible. Peter Pumphrey, Director of the Save the Delta Asociation, stated, "There are doubts in my mind that transport is an appropriate method of providing water for future Southern California water needs. As alternatives he suggests treatment of tertiary standards such as presently being imposed upon the city of Stockton, the potential of vast underground water resources in the Imperial Valley, and the desalination of salt water.

There is a strong possibility that the proposed plan to develop agricultural land in the south valley is not that good an idea. There is a great deal of information which would indicate that the heavy irrigation of thus far unproductive lands causes a rapid build-up of salts within the soil, as has occurred in the Imperial Valley. Also, the impact of new productive areas upon the stability of the existing agricultural community is expected to be significant in its effects.

When asked of the benefits of the peripheral Canal when first completed and in the future, Peter Pumphrey answered:

"There is no question, at present, that the Peripheral Canal would prove to be of benefit to water interests outside of the bay-delta pool. However, there is a great deal of uncertainty as to whether it would ever be of any benefit to the delta at all."

"The most often repeated argument on behalf of the Peripheral Canal is that it will improve the quality of water within the Delta. That this quality level must be enhanced is not disputed. Pumping activities in the south delta have produced severe reverse flow conditions which have already caused damage to the region's fish populations. There is also the ever-present danger due to salt water intrusion from the San Francisco Bay. This intrusion will not only damage delta fish and game populations, but it will make the surrounding lands unfit for agricultural productivity and threaten the continued economic growth of the communities in the west delta.

Supporters of the canal argue that the operation of the unit will allow the release of fresh water into the south delta system at strategic locations along its route and thus, alleviate reverse flow problems. In reality, though, it is not clear that the proported releases will be sufficient to accomplish this goal. It is clear that the proposed volume of water to be withdrawn from the Sacramento River at the canal's intake will be enough to invite a disastrous intrusion of high saline water into the delta system. There is no guarantee that any minimum outflow level through the delta will be maintained. The figures being proposed by the state (with no guarantee that they would be maintained) are not sufficient to prevent the destruction of delta farmlands due to salt build-up and saline intrusion.

The construction of the Peripheral Canal would have other effects on the Delta. A decreased outflow would have serious consequences to the Suisun Marshlands. The operating facility at Hood (point of intake for Peripheral) stands in the way of migratory fish runs upstream in the Sacramento River. Unique wildlife reserves and archaeological sites in the east delta are threatened by the proposed route of the canal itself.

Also threatened by any decrease in the available fresh water outflow through the delta system is the San Francisco Bay, according to the recent United States Geologic Study of the south bay. This outflow is what provides the circulation of bay waters. Without circulation, the water in the south bay would stagnate, resulting in the rapid deterioration of the environment in this area.

The economics of the situation are rather unclear. The economics of the entire water project are not particularly well founded according to evidence developed by the Rand Corporation. The impact of decreased outflow is going to be of great cost if land in the Delta is forced out of production by saline intrusion. The cost of water treatment by west delta communities is also expected to be increased as water quality deteriorates. Although the cost to the Bay area involved in project operations has not been determined, it is expected to be significant. Not subject to estimate is the overall cost of destruction of natural resources within the delta pool.

The position of the Save the Delta Association is that the policy of water export should, in itself, be re-examined in light of decreased population growth projects for Southern California, and that new technological and source alternatives be put to use for future water supply needs. In addition, the association feels that the proposed plans for the Peripheral Canal unit should be halted until a re-evaluation of the need for the canal and the standards for its operation can be completed.

The Sierra Club

It was on September 17, 1969, that the Sierra Club testified that the Peripheral Canal should be built "as soon as practical" provided there would be a guaranteed outflow of 4,600 cubic feet per second (CFS) to the Delta. On Monday, December 7, 1970, however, the Sierra Club's Northern California Regional Conservation Committee announced its total opposition to the canal stating they are "categorically opposed."

In January of 1970, Peter Zars and Dwight Steels, representing the Sierra Club, again testified what they considered a necessary outflow (4,600 CFS) in order to protect the Delta. This testimony took place during the water rights hearings before the State Water Resources Control Board. The latest report from these hearings states that the supporters of the Peripheral Canal seem to have the attitude, "Let's build it, and then we can experiment." It also states that there have been no significant changes in project designs, contract schedules, delivery quantities, or Delta outflow minimum, which state and federal officials have maintained 1,500 to 1,800 CFS to be sufficent for protection of the Delta.

The Sierra Club's opposition to the canal has come about through their studies, on the realization that the Delta will be affected gravely through the proposed minimum standards of outflow. In December of 1969, the Sierra Club's National Board of Directors had adopted a resolution calling on Governor Reagan to withhold approval of

the Peripheral Canal Feasibility Report until necessary ecological studies as to the effect of the Project on the Bay and Delta are completed.

Save San Francisco Bay Association

In December of 1969 more than 500 Bay Area residents attended a conference on the subject, "Is the Bay Saved?" Speakers at this conference, which took place in the auditorium of Boalt Hall, placed emphasis on the importance of early public awareness and action on all matters affecting the Bay and its shorelines.

In the morning, members of this conference divided into county workshops to discuss local problems and opportunities with officials from city and county planning departments, water quality control, public health, highway, and officials from other agencies. The Peripheral Canal was a subject of concern in several of the county workshops, as they recommended that strong action be taken to oppose the canal. The people in the workshops called it the part of the State Water Plan which is a serious threat to the Bay. The redirection to Southern California of the fresh water normally flowing into the Bay from the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers, as the State Water Plan calls for, will result in some changes for the Bay. The ecology of the Bay will be upset by the change of fresh water to salt water. The Bay currents will be reduced. Also, since the Bay serves as the drainage area for nearly 40% of the state, it will receive old and new pollutants from increasing rural and urban developments elsewhere in the state. With decreased amounts of water, these pollutants will be more concentrated and the water even more polluted than at present.

Although the Save San Francisco Bay Association has not studied the Peripheral Canal at length, they wrote of the detrimental effects and opposition to the canal. The results of the Canal will directly violate some of the set purposes of the Association; all of which are (in relation to the Bay):

1. To protect open water
2. To promote regional planning
3. To plan for conservation of wildlife
4. To create boating and recreational facilities
5. To beautify the shoreline

In December of 1969, the Association adopted a resolution similar to the one adopted by the Sierra Club, urging the Governor to halt consideration of the Peripheral Canal until necessary studies are completed.

Industry

Johns-Manville Products Corporation

Johns-Manville Products Corporation has owned and operated a Building Materials factory located in Pittsburg, California since 1924. The Corporation has rights to the Sacramento/San Joaquin Delta which flows past the property. The river is the corporation's source of water for operating the production facilities at the plant. The historical water requirements of the plant are 2,100 feet per year.

Diverting fresh water from the Delta through the Peripheral Canal will change the salinity content of the Delta waters flowing past the Johns-Manville plant in Pittsburg. This will cause Johns-Manville to be deprived of its water rights. Fresh water will have to be obtained from some other source in order to operate the plant. To obtain a new source of fresh water, by transporting it into the area through canals, will be more costly than pumping from the Delta flowing past the plant. The recognition of this fact by the California State Department of Water Resources has resulted in several proposals being prepared to provide supplemental water to Contra Costa County. Johns-Manville Products Corporation states, as expressed by H. L. Olson, Area Marketing Manager, "It is also recognized in principle and in law that some compensation is due those who hold water rights on the Delta and who will be deprived of those rights."

The policy of Johns-Manville is to conserve the quality of the air and water used in manufacturing operations and shared with the community in which it operates. Johns-Manville feels the people of the State of California have stated they want the California Water Plan, thus Johns-Manville wishes to cooperate with the wishes of the people of California in this way. The Johns-Manville Products Corporation also believes that the California Water Plan will greatly contribute to the economic growth of the State and that the Corporation will profit by this growth, as will everyone in the State of California.

Therefore, it is the position of the Johns-Manville Products Corporation, in respect to the California Water Plan, to support the desires of the people of the State, but to also request that the State recognize the needs and rights of the Corporation to operate its factory and offer just compensation for the loss that will be sustained by Johns-Manville from being deprived of its water rights.

Fibreboard Products Corporation

Walter Simon, an executive of Fibreboard Products Corporation, was one of a long line of speakers who recently voiced fears about the proposed Peripheral Canal resulting in salt water intrusion problems for industry, cities, and counties.

Fibreboard Products Corporation operates two mills in Antioch which uses 20,000 acre feet of river water annually. Walter Simon testified to the effect that if it is the State Water Resources Control Board's decision to allow increased sea water intrusion into the western part of the delta, his firm will expect the State to provide substitute water plus reimbursement of other costs.

The feelings of reimbursement and probable damages as a result of the Peripheral Canal on the Fibreboard Products Corporation are the same as that of Johns-Manville Products Corporation except that Fibreboard has questioned the canal by voicing its fears where Johns-Manville has decided to accept the canal without trying to oppose it.

The Dow Chemical Company

The Dow Chemical Company considers the Peripheral Canal and the California Water Plan political questions which many individuals, politicians, and organizations seem to be exploiting to attract attention to themselves.

Both those people in support of the California Water Plan, including the Peripheral Canal, and those people opposed to it are extremely careless with the facts, according to the Dow Chemical Company. The newspapers frequently print their statements as fact when the statements are nothing more than opinions. This is unfortunate as it makes an intelligent or informed opinion about the matter very difficult to reach. For this reason, the Dow Chemical Company has declined to take sides.

The Dow Chemical Company has been required to report to the State of California the effect of the Peripheral Canal on its plant operations at Pittsburg, as were Johns-Manville Products Corporation, U.S. Steel Corporation, Fiberboard Products Corporation, and Crown Zellerbach Corporation. One of the purposes of such a report was to determine the extent to which those being deprived of water rights were injured. In the report by the Dow Chemical Company, the company described how a reduction in the quality of water, if it occurs, would require them to spend about $8,000,000 to change their water handling system at the Pittsburg plant.

In spite of seeming to know somewhat about the probable effects of the Peripheral Canal on the Delta and its water quality, etc., when asked what they thought the far-reaching results of the Peripheral Canal and California Water plan would be, Jack Jones, Western Manager Public Relations for the Dow Chemical Company, answered, "We do not know what the 'far-reaching results' of these projects will be on the Delta area. But we are not impressed by the claims of those who think they do know."

Governmental officials

Norman B. Livermore, Secretary of The Resources Agency of California

Norman Livermore supports the views of the State of California; that is, those in the best interest of the State as studied and reviewed by the Departments of Water Resources, Fish and Game, Parks and Recreation, Conservation, Agriculture, Navigation and Ocean Development, Public Health, Public Works, and Finance; the State Water Resources Control Board; and the Reclamation Board.

In a letter written by Norman Livermore on April 28, 1970 to ex-Secretary of the Interior, Walter J. Hickel, Normal Livermore urged Federal authorization of the Peripheral Canal Project. He stated it is critically needed for both the conservation of the Delta's fishery resources and environment, and to firm up authorized export water supplies of the Federal Central Valley Project and the California State Water Project.

The Project is economically justified because of the benefits from improved water quality, fish and wildlife enhancement, and recreation. Even without these benefits the Peripheral Canal is essential for reliable operation of the Federal and State projects. This is because the hydraulics of the Delta Channels cause the amount of water for salinity control to increase as the already authorized exports increase. Without the Peripheral Canal, an additional two million acre feet of water would have to be developed to maintain the same protection against salinity intrusion into the interior Delta channels.

As far as environmental guarantees, it is the State's unequivocal position that in water-deficient years the Delta interests must continue to receive a full supply of available water for protection of the Delta's environment and water rights. If there is not sufficient water in the Delta to meet any water quality criteria, which will be established by the Water Resources Control Board, and to meet any requirements under an agreement which would be reached with Delta interests and the Department of Water Resources and the Bureau of Reclamation, then it would be the Federal and State export projects which would be required to assume any such shortage of supply. The Delta area would have a prior right. Special attention is given to environmental guarantees in Section 13050f of the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act of California. Under this law, the State Water Resources Control Board is required to give full and adequate consideration to the beneficial uses (listed as recreation, esthetic enjoyment, preservation, and enhancement of fish, wildlife, and other aquatic resources and preserves) in establishing water quality standard for the Delta.

The Peripheral Canal is needed now for protection and enhancement of the Delta fishery and environment. Because of the present method of transferring water through the Delta channels and the increased future exports, greater proportions of the Delta fishery will be directly influenced by the Federal and State pumps, detrimental flow reversals in fish migration channels will be increased, and fish food production will be decreased. Without a Peripheral Canal, the increased velocity in the channels leading to the export pumps will draw many more eggs and small fish into the pumps. The canal would correct these conditions by removing the point of diversion from the channels of the southern Delta. The canal will also en-

hance the fishery in many areas of the Delta by releasing high quality water in certain Delta channels to improve conditions for striped bass spawning, fish migration, and the warmwater fishery.

The need of the Peripheral Canal to protect and serve other uses in the Delta, in addition to fishery, is present. In the Southern Delta channels serious problems already exist because of the high velocities causing levee erosion due to the export pumping. In some areas there may be drawndown problems, which will increase without the Peripheral Canal as the export amounts are increased to meet authorized water supply commitments. The canal will enhance the water quality of the interior Delta by making releases of fresh water into the dead-end sloughs. It will make releases into the channels of the southern Delta to improve water quality for irrigation and other purposes. Furthermore, the floodwaters of Morrison Creek in the northern Delta can be taken into the canal, reducing the flood threat in that area.

The Peripheral Canal will provide additional opportunities for a large recreational resource. It is the States intention to introduce legislation to authorize state participation under Public Law 89–72, in the recreation features along the canal, in accordance with Federal law.

Archaeological and historical surveys will be made to properly identify archeological sites along the canal. Measures will be undertaken during the construction of the canal to remove and preserve those artifacts which have any significant historic value.

The agricultural area in the Delta should be assured that its production capacity will not be impaired as a result of operation of the Peripheral Canal.

In his letter of April 28, 1970 to Walter Hickel, Norman Livermore stated:

"The State strongly recommends authorization and funding of the Peripheral Canal by the Congress as soon as possible to protect and enhance the environment and ecology of the Delta and to firm up authorized export water supplies of the federal Central Valley Project and the California State Water Project.

On December 11, 1970, Norman Livermore further displayed his support when he said that "the Peripheral Canal must and will be built. He told a lunch meeting of the Association of Water Contractors and Developers in San Jose that the environmental impact of the canal had been studied to death" and is ecologically sound.

Congressman JEROME R. WALDIE, Fourteenth Congressional District, California

Congressman Waldie questions the motives for transporting water from Northern California to Southern California for its further development. In September, 1969, Waldie testified before the joint Senate-Assembly Water Resources Committee, urging the State to re-examine its water export policy so that only areas whose other resources are sufficient to support increased development should receive new waters.

The justification of the California Water Plan is to meet the critical need of the Los Angeles basin for water. Congressman Waldie believes water is not the most critical need of this area, but that air is needed far more. The present air supply is so polluted it cannot support the present population in the basin. For this reason, Waldie questions increasing the pressures on the limited air supply by a governmental policy that will enable present barren acres to develop more subdivisions, more automobiles, more factories, and more people in that basin.

Since 1955, when air pollution levels were set, there have been seventy "smog alerts" which require inhabitants of the Los Angeles basin to curtail their activity and use of automobiles and the industry of the area to reduce operations that might contribute to the critical pollution levels of the air. Waldie told the joint Senate-Assembly Water Resources committee, "Surely sending water to an area that should be decreasing population, not increasing, is shortsighted" and that the "desperately essential need for the Los Angeles basin is to improve their supply of air, not their supply of water."

The California Water Plan is perhaps more detrimental to the existing population in the Los Angeles basin than it is to the North, although it is also a large threat to the North. The Peripheral Canal would divert the fresh water of the Sacramento River to Southern California causing the salt concentration in the Bay to rise tremendously, as 80% of all the fresh water entering the Bay comes from the Sacramento River. Also, there is a direct correlation between the amount of fresh water entering the Bay from the Sacramento River and the salinity and phosphate (or sewage affluent) level of Bay waters, according to the June, 1970 report of the United States Geological Survey on the impact of Sacramento inflows on San Francisco Bay water quality. The report indicates inflows are more important than tidal action in flushing the Bay, contrary to the statement of Director William Gianelli of the State Department of Water Resources, "Tidal action is the principal mechanism by which pollutants are alternately removed from the Bay. The effects of tidal movements on dispersion of wastes far overwhelm the effects of river outflows from the Delta." Using the U.S. Geological Survey Report as a basis, Waldie states, "No reasonable amount of sewage treatment or industrial pollution controls will save the quality of the Bay if the Sacramento River is plugged up."

The higher salt concentration resulting from the diversion of the fresh water southward would destroy the delicate ecologist balance of the Delta and Sacramento River as well as the Bay. It will destroy much of the agriculture and wildlife of the area. The Suisun Marsh, located in Solano County on the northern shore of Suisun Bay, is covered by vegetation which provides the principal feeding place of some 750,000 wild fowl each season. Yet this marsh "is in grave danger of being irreparably damaged by increased salinity due to proposed diversions of fresh water inflows," as was written to Walter Hickel by Congressmen Jerome Waldie and Robert Leggett. It is also Waldie's belief that human health problems would also be raised.

Waldie also questions whether the supposed improvement of agricultural interests will benefit the people. It is more likely that developing more than 250,000 acres of apparently unneeded agricultural land will have a harmful effect on California's farm economy. Congressman Waldie called for a congressional investigation on this question after the disclosure of a University of California study which shows the State Water Project will develop excess agricultural land in the San Joaquin Valley, and that the developer will cause a drop in farm prices with little chance that the reduction of market prices will be reflected in consumer prices. This study by the University of California shows that the development of some 253,000 acres will cause prices that farmers receive for cotton, almond and other specialty crops to fall from three to four percent, causing many small and moderate-sized farmers to be hurt. Congressman Waldie states:

"I find it difficult to understand why one arm of the Federal Government, the Bureau of Reclamation, is assisting in the development of unneeded and substandard lands to grow crops, while, at the same time, another arm of the Federal Government, the Department of Agriculture, is paying farmers not to grow crops on virtually the same land."

It is the opinion of Congressman Jerome R. Waldie that the construction of the Peripheral Canal would prove to have a most disastrous effect, as it relates to the San Francisco Bay, the Delta area, the pollution of Southern California, and the farm economy of the State.

Governor Ronald Reagan

On April 29, 1970, Governor Ronald Reagan threw the full support of the state administration behind the proposed federal-state Peripheral Canal. The Governor's strong statement supporting federal authorization of this vital part of the State Water Project and the federal Central Valley Project was, "No one has come up with an acceptable alternative."

The original State Water Project authorized by the Legislature and the people ten years ago included a trans-Delta water facility. According to the Governor, the principal support for the Peripheral Canal originally came from fishery, sportsmen, and recreational interests who expressed fear that any other alternative to the canal could result in loss of the fishery resources of that area as well as impairment of the present and future great recreational potentials of the Delta.

In giving the full support of the State of California officially to the canal, Governor Reagan indicated that now the task of securing the federal authorization for participation in this joint facility will be up to the federal agencies and the Congress. Governor Reagan stated that he will personally request that the California Congressional Delegation support this vitally needed facility.

Governor Reagan is in full support of the Peripheral Canal and has also given it the full support of the state administration. He has noted, "In all our actions to date, we have stressed that not only will the facility meet the needs of water users, but it will also insure the enhancement and protection of the environment in the Delta."

Mayor Louise Giersch of Antioch

Antioch Mayor Louise Giersch has voiced her fears about the results of the proposed $200 million Peripheral Canal on the city of Antioch.

The Peripheral Canal would divert fresh water from the Sacramento River around the Delta for shipment to the San Joaquin Valley and on to Southern California. Mayor Giersch told a State Senate Committee on Salinity Intrusion that Antioch already has problems with salt water intrusion and that when Antioch's major source of water, the San Joaquin River, becomes too salty, water is purchased from the Contra Costa Water District at the price of $41 per million gallons.

Mayor Giersch has estimated that if her city has to go elsewhere because the river becomes too saline, the cost to Antioch would be $70,000 annually. The fears that Mayor Giersch has voiced show one way that the Peripheral Canal would present problems to the areas that would be losing the water.

Senator John A. Nejedly, Seventh Senatorial District, California

Senator Nejedly endorses the recognition of environmental conditions. The conditions of the environment must be maintained. He disagrees with the Senate Committee on the Peripheral Canal project. He cannot support it and has instead written the minority Senate report on the subject of the Peripheral Canal.

Nejedly has pointed out the faults of the Senate Committee's report. There has already been serious damage to fish and plant life in the Delta area. The salt water can confuse the fish at spawning time. They go to the spawning grounds by instinct, but they need the water to lead them there. The density of the water, the amount of salt; these are factors. Salt water barriers are needed to hold the salt water and keep it from entering and killing the ecological life.

Senater Nejedly feels that if the Peripheral Canal is built that it would cause even more

problems for the Delta area than would occur if it is not built.

Water agencies and departments

Orange County Water District

According to Mr. Langdon Owen, Secretary Manager of the Orange County Water District, the California Water Plan, including the Peripheral Canal is necessary to support the growth of our population by providing water to all our citizens, both the newest arrivals and the long-standing residents.

The State of California is going to continue to be one of the most attractive places in the United States; consequently, our population will continue to increase. Talk about the possibility of limiting water development projects in an effort to restrict future population growth, which would theoretically minimize the inevitable impact on the State's environment, is not logical. Populations expand regardless of water supply, with net effect of an environmental disaster, if an adequate supply of low cost water is not available, as in Tijuana. The Orange County Water District maintains that the water transferred from the north to the central and southern portions of the state will not limit future development of the north, because the water involved in the state project is surplus water—water in excess of present and ultimate future local northern water requirements.

The California Water Plan provides much needed flood control facilities and some splendid recreational areas, in addition to the water it provides. Speaking for itself is the flood control afforded by the Sacramento Valley as recently as two years ago, the Oroville facilities. A flood will seldom enhance the environment. The principal considerations in the design and construction of the State Water Project have been environmental requirements to provide for recreation and fish and wildlife. Some of the reservoirs on the Upper Feather River were built primarily for recreation.

The Peripheral Canal, in addition to being a very vital part of the California Water Plan, is essential to save the Delta from further deterioration, and a project of the same type would be necessary even if the California Water Plan was not a reality, according to Mr. Owen. The Peripheral Canal will protect the integrity of water quality in the state system. The system would be pumping the sewage wastes of local dischargers to the south without the canal. Upon completion the Peripheral Canal will immediately provide high quality water in the eastern sloughs of the Delta which will protect and enhance the striped bass and salmon fisheries by rejuvenating normal currents in the Delta channels and by diluting the pollution of the San Joaquin River. The high quality water will be provided to ranchers on the east side and interior of the Delta for their use.

A long-term effect of the Peripheral Canal on the Bay-Delta system will be that for the first time since man began reclamation in the swamps of this area, we will have a tool to positively control salinity intrusion and the waste-water quality degradation that has been the result of the imperfect plans of local waste dischargers. Mr. Owen further said that the ecology of the Delta and the San Francisco Bay will not be seriously damaged by the canal, but will be damaged severely if the canal is not built. The canal could not significantly affect the quality of water in the Bay. Mr. Owen states:

"The solution to the Bay water quality problems rests totally upon local waste dischargers who would prefer to waste high quality water to assimilate their raw waste discharges rather than apply reasonable (expensive, certainly, but reasonable) waste-water treatment provisions that everyone else in the state currently employs."

When asked about the effects of the Peripheral Canal on population and economics, Mr. Owen answered:

"Economics and over-population are really not our field, but for what it is worth regarding over-population in California—with the more and more emphasis on the so-called new morality, the "pill," the deterioration of family institutions, ZPG groups, etc., it is conceivable that the population will not increase at the rate past experience would indicate, and if this is true, perhaps our population will stabilize in the near future."

California Water Resources Association

The position of the California Water Resources Association, as presented by Mr. Jack Keating, Acting Manager, on the California Water Plan is that it is vitally necessary. Nearly three-fourths of the water in the state is located in the north, yet the larger part of the population is in the south, an area with a very limited water supply which makes it almost totally dependent on imported water. The people are there, and there is no way for these people to be moved elsewhere to locations where the water is readily available.

"The Project is essential to the survival of the ecology and the fish and the wildlife of the Delta," wrote Mr. Keating. The fishery of the Delta is being destroyed and, unless the canal is completed in a very few years, it will disappear. The reverse flows occurring from pumping operations in the Delta are damaging the ecology of the levees, channels, etc.

As far as the effect of the canal on the Bay, Mr. Keating believes:

"There has never been anyone, expert or otherwise, who has said that the Peripheral Canal as such would damage the San Francisco Bay. There have been some charges that reduced flows from the Sacramento-San Joaquin regions into the Bay might tend to increase pollution into the Bay—but all agree that if sewage effluent and other types of pollution pouring into the Bay were to be discontinued there would be no need for large outflows of water to keep the Bay clean, since the major flushing factor for the Bay is the tidal exchange which occurs each day."

As for any relation between the California Water Plan and population, the California Water Resources Association feels it is illogical to say that the utilities of people living in a particular metropolitan area should be cut off in order to keep that area from growing. Anyway, this could not be done because it is telling people where they may or may not live, which is both unconstitutional and contrary to our way of life.

The California Water Resources Association is trying to show that water projects are invaluable because they open up to migration thinly populated areas while they enhance the ecology by producing green belts, recreation, fish, and wildlife enhancement. This has a dispersing effect—drawing people away from the congested metropolitan communities; thus water projects result in a decrease, rather than an increase in population.

Delta Water Agency

The Delta Water Agency was formed in 1968 by the state legislature to protect and study the water resources of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. The Agency has made the following resolution: Be it resolved by the directors of the Delta Water Agency that this agency is unequivocally opposed to the proposed Peripheral Canal.

Congressman Waldie commented on this resolution:

"This is a striking victory for those who have been fighting for the preservation of the Bay-Delta's environment. Of all the numerous agencies and entities that are concerned with Delta water resources, none is more directly representative of the Delta itself than the Delta Water Agency."

The Agency consists of eleven members who are elected to represent the several county areas covered by the Delta which include portions of San Joaquin, Contra Costa, Sacramento, Yolo, Solani, and Alameda Counties. All totaled, the agency encompasses some 700,000 acres of fertile land including about 400 acres of picturesque channels and water ways.

In the words of Congressman Waldie:

"It is no secret that the Delta Water Agency was originally conceived with the blessing of the State Department of Water Resources. The Department expected that the agency would meet whatever demand the department considered necessary in order to facilitate delivery of Delta water to the 'south.' "

However, after the results and findings from water studies on the damaging impact upon the Delta came in, the Board of Directors of the Delta Water Agency showed it was not a puppet to Mr. Gianelli, director of the Department of Water Resources, by recognizing the many threats to the Bay-Delta system posed by the California Water Plan and then by formulating their resolution.

Water Resources Engineers

Sewage water from the Bay Area could be recycled and used to compensate for the water drained from the Sacramento River by the proposed Peripheral Canal of the California Water Plan. This was suggested in December of 1970 by Dr. Gerald T. Orlob, president of Water Resources Engineers. The proposed idea was that Bay Area waste water should be piped to a giant plant in the Antioch area where it would be treated to a "tertiary" degree and then piped back into the Delta.

Dr. Orlob conducted a state-financed survey into possible sources of new water. He is in support of the canal and is now seeking solutions to any problems of the system. He said that after the waste water is treated it would be clean enough for irrigation and swimming. The cost would be $25 per acre-foot compared with $45 if dams were built to divert water from the Eel and Klamath Rivers to the Delta.

This concept of recycling the sewage water was endorsed by both the Department of Water Resources and the Department of Public Health's Bureau of Sanitary Engineering.

Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District

Mr. Joseph V. Reynolds, District Engineer of the Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District, stated that the idea of the Peripheral Canal is a beneficial one, ". . . both initially and in the future . . ." He believes that the canal will not destroy the Delta, in fact it will provide a more effective water circulation, reduce erosion on the banks, and enhance the fishery resources.

It will benefit the economy not only through supplying water but recreational facilities can be developed. It will reduce flood damage and related activities. Mr. Reynolds feels that the building of the canal will not be an economic burden to the tax payers; it will be payed for by the users of the water.

All effects of the Peripheral Canal may not be beneficial to the Delta, but any such detrimental effects will be adequately compensated for, while the beneficial effects will accrue to the overall enhancement of the Delta.

Los Angeles City Department of Water and Power

Mr. Robert V. Phillips, Chief Engineer of Water Works and Assistant Manager of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, believes that the overall objectives of the California Water Plan are sound and that the operation of the plan is necessary, if there is to be a continued orderly growth of Cali-

fornia. The proposed Peripheral Canal, as a part of the plan, is also necessary. The Peripheral Canal will be beneficial if it is constructed and operated in accordance with the plans of the State Department of Water Resources.

When asked what he thought the far-reaching results would be, as far as destruction of the Delta and the San Francisco Bay, economics, over-population, etc., Mr. Phillips answered:

"Because the region involved in this question is many miles from the area served by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, we have not participated in studies, or reviews of studies, relative to the broad fields included in this question. Therefore, I am not able to present an opinion for you on such matters as 'economics' or 'over-population' or the region as they relate to the California Water Plan, including the Peripheral Canal."

Mr. Phillips further explains that he is unable to give really complete answers about the possible effects of the California Water Plan because the City of Los Angeles will only be involved in the plan to the extent that at times they will purchase from the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California water that will have been delivered to the area by certain facilities included in the Plan.

CONCLUSION

The State Water Project became a reality in the 1960's. Much of the project has been completed but not all, the controversial Peripheral Canal, for example. There is, as has been shown, much disagreement as to the advantages and disadvantages of the entire State Water Project and the Peripheral Canal. Just reading or hearing the arguments at surface value, they all sound reasonable and valid. But when you challenge these arguments thoughtfully, you find many holes and still unanswered questions. The public has to learn to question what it is told, not to just accept something it is fed. This is the only way meaningful decisions and conclusions about any subject can come about.

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RETIREES ENJOYED KOSHER FLORIDA VACATIONS LAST FALL

HON. JAMES H. SCHEUER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Speaker, the problems and hardships faced by senior citizens in this country have been widely publicized in recent months. The public does not often hear, however, of a number of innovative solutions being offered by private groups around the country.

I insert in the RECORD an article appearing in both the Jewish Week and the American Examiner which describes one highly successful project initiated by the Associated Y's which brought a great deal of joy and pleasure into the lives of almost 500 senior citizens of New York.

The project is just one imaginative example of what can be done to make the lives of the elderly more pleasant. It enabled these people, all perfect strangers, to spend 2 weeks together vacationing in Miami. Most had never before been to Florida, and many went on scholarship funds. The new experiences gained and the new friendships that were made helped enrich the lives of all who participated.

The article follows:

FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-THREE RETIREES ENJOYED KOSHER FLORIDA VACATIONS LAST FALL

(By Bernard Postal)

"Who would believe it?" It's a machiah!" "It's like living again!"

That's how 493 retired older adults felt about their participation in what began as an experiment late last fall and has now become a continuing project called "Florida vacations for the aged", sponsored by the Associated Camps of the Associated YM & YWHAs of Greater New York. By mid-May, over 200 reservations with cash deposits were on hand for the 1971 Florida vacation trips.

Last March, William Wolfston, vice-president of the board of Associated Camps, which supervises the camping programs of the Associated Ys, asked why vacations for senior citizens should be confined to summer camping. Why not explore the possibility of providing the aged with winter vacations in Florida?

The Associated Ys, whose branch Ys throughout the city and the Long Island and Westchester suburbs serve some 6,000 senior citizens, is known for its innovative programming policy, so Wolfston's proposal caught the staff's imagination.

Last April, Barnett Lambert, director of Associated Camps, went to Florida and interviewed the owners of ten kosher hotels in Miami Beach, discussing lodgings, Sabbath requirements, kosher meals, snacks, linens, entertainment, baggage handling, tips, trip dates and price. Contact was also made with airlines, bus companies and sightseeing tour operators and directors of the municipal recreation facilities in Miami Beach. Promises of cooperation were obtained from the Greater Miami Beach YM-YWHA.

By mid-June, Associated Camps had publicized the first trip among the senior membership of its cooperating Ys. The package of 14 days and 13 nights that was offered included round trip transportation from the local Center or Y, baggage handling, hotel, program and sightseeing costs, professional staff supervision, a full-time nurse in residence at the hotel and all gratuities. The cost ranged from $250 to $300, depending on the location of the room in the Hotel Martinique.

EARLY RESPONSES WERE SLOW

At first responses were slow. Some days more people called to cancel than to enroll, often for fear of hijacking or concern over flying. The first scheduled trip had to be called off because there were not enough people registered. The second trip was only half-booked but the third was over-subscribed. All told, 493 older adults—381 women (321 unattached), 112 men (43 unattached)—went to Florida in two separate trips.

Nearly half of them had never flown before and 42 per cent had never been to Florida. More than half of the participants had incomes under $3,000 a year and 70 per cent lived on less than $5,000 annually. Yet 80 per cent of them paid their own way, although this included many whose children put up all or most of the cost. The rest went on "scholarships."

The senior travellers were largely a Yiddish-speaking group. At the hotel they were assigned two to a room. Many requested specific room-mates and these requests were honored wherever possible. Where no request was made, or when the plea was simply for "a nice person, please", room-mates were assigned on the basis of agency, age, borough or accommodations requested. People who became friendly with seat-mates on the plane were delighted to find they were room-mates too. This was no coincidence.

A special temporary staff was engaged to handle administrative and programming assignments and sightseeing. One staff member conducted daily calisthenics for the oldsters.

TO EXPAND CONTACTS

The entire program in Miami was designed to expand the social contacts of senior citizens who often live lonely lives in retirement. The staff carefully planned activities to encourage the older adults to make new friends, to explore new surroundings and to get around Miami Beach with an eye to potential settlement there. Frequent opportunities to get dressed up for evening social functions stimulated a new interest in personal appearance.

Many went to museums, shopped on Lincoln Road, visited the Everglades, surprised old friends living in Miami Beach, invited relatives to dinner at the hotel, worshipped in local synagogues or in the hotel's chapel. Some people who met on these trips became fast friends.

Mrs. Rita Bloom, who was the professional director of the first year's Florida vacations for the aged, summed up the experience like this: "It was someone to talk to, someone to act with, someone to walk with, some-

one to share with. Two hundred and fifty strangers on Tuesday began to feel like part of an 'in group' three days later, after sharing common facilities, interests, activities and staff."

At the end of each trip the travellers received a questionnaire to check their individual reactions. Eighty per cent or more rated everything as "good" or "excellent." One lady ignored the choices of excellent, good, fair, and poor, and replied to the question, "how is your health?" "better, thank you."

At least 15 of the travellers answered "going home," when they were asked what they liked least about the trip. One who noted, "I paid for this trip myself," added, "it wasn't easy," while another credited: "All Mighty God" for making the trip possible.

When the 493 travellers, ranging in age from 67 to the late 80s, were asked "should we offer this trip again next year?" The response was an overwhelming 96 per cent yes. And when they were asked, "would you like to come with us next year?", the yes vote was a landslide 98.3 per cent.

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION'S NATURAL GAS RATE REGULATION

HON. ROBERT O. TIERNAN

OF RHODE ISLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. TIERNAN. Mr. Speaker, on May 25, I spoke on the floor of the House attacking the Federal Power Commission's decision in the Texas Gulf area rate case, which granted natural gas producers in Texas a 33⅓-percent rate increase as an incentive "to promote dedication of gas reserves to the interstate market." It did so because the producers said the existing rates were insufficient to justify exploration and development of potential gas supplies and that consequently the American consumer would be faced with a severe shortage of natural gas. The shortage claim was based on statistics provided by the American Gas Association, which represents the producers interests.

I challenged the FPC in my earlier statement to document the existence of a gas shortage because it is this claim of a shortage which will result in a $4 billion increase annually to consumers of natural gas. Numerous groups had challenged this shortage. Among them was the American Public Gas Association which alleged in a well-documented statement that the shortage resulted from artificial control of supply by the gas producers. At that time I thought that the FPC's naive acceptance of the industry's figures was an innocent result of the dependence which often develops among regulatory agencies with the regulated industries.

Since that time, however, substantial evidence has become available to indicate that this rate increase was approved by Chairman Nassikas and the other Commissioners with full knowledge that there was very serious question as to whether or not a gas shortage in fact existed.

According to FPC documents obtained by Mr. Jack Anderson, which he apparently intends to make available to Congress, Chairman Nassikas was made aware on many occasions by various ranking staff members at the Commission that there was substantial doubt about the accuracy of the producer's figures.

In the Louisiana rate case, a similar case in which the Commission will reportedly grant even larger increases to Louisiana producers, the staff's analysis of the gas reserves was almost half again as high as the industry's claim, according to the FPC documents which Mr. Anderson obtained. In addition, the staff reported that figures supplied by the pipeline owners and the AGA figures were surprisingly wide apart.

Chairman Nassikas suppressed this evidence and refused to allow the staff to conduct an independent analysis of the industry's figures. In addition, according to Mr. Anderson, he has engaged in deliberate deception of public officials. In response to a request from Senator PHILIP HART, Chairman Nassikas reported that the producer's figures and the aforementioned pipeline owner's statistics "closely parallel" one another. He also made it appear that the staff supported the industry figures when in fact they had challenged them repeatedly.

Mr. Speaker, the time has come for Chairman Nassikas to explain how his actions as FPC Chairman are not directly opposed to the public interest which he has sworn to uphold. If he is unwilling or unable to do so, then it is only proper that he resign.

I include for the RECORD two of Mr. Anderson's recent columns from the Washington Post and an additional article from the Wall Street Journal dealing with the FPC's natural gas rate regulation:

[From the Washington Post, June 14, 1971]

FPC CHIEF AND NATURAL-GAS RATE RISE

(By Jack Anderson)

Federal Power Commission Chairman John Nassikas, who is supposed to protect the housewives from excessive gas charges, is pushing instead to add a whopping $4 billion to their bills based on industry-supplied information that conflicts with a study by the commission staff.

He has gone so far as to fail to reveal certain evidence and to mislead senators about the basis of the $4 billion rate increase.

The evidence—in the form of studies, letters and memos—has been kept under lock by Nassikas. Nevertheless, we have obtained copies of these documents.

Squeezing $4 billion out of the housewives, of course, is a complex operation. But here are the facts as simply as we can present them:

The Federal Power Commission fixes the basic rates that millions of consumers pay for natural gas. The gas producers always want to raise the rates, naturally, to increase their profits. But the FPC was established to keep the public from being gouged.

The producers are now seeking a rate increase on the gas they will draw from a vast Louisiana reservoir. The higher rate, which would be tacked on to the monthly bill of every householder who uses the gas, is supposed to be an incentive to encourage the producers to sink more wells.

FIGURES DISPUTED

The producers, according to the FPC staff, have greatly understated the amount of natural gas available under the Louisiana bed. Their figures make the risk and expense of sinking new wells appear to be far higher than is true.

The American Gas Association, which speaks for the producers, estimated one part of the Louisiana reserves to be 24 trillion cubic feet. But the FPC's own experts, after careful calculation, came up with a 34 trillion figure. The difference of 10 trillion cubic feet would seriously weaken the producers' case for a rate increase.

Nassikas not only accepted the producers' figures but failed to reveal estimates that were damaging to the producers.

We know from copies of documents in our possession that the Federal Power Chairman was fully informed as early as February 1970, by both his Economics and Producers divisions that the industry's figures were suspect. Yet he failed to reveal the discrepancy and sided with the gas producers in public statements, Senate hearings and congressional correspondence.

The FPC's experts based their estimates, in part, upon figures furnished by the pipeline companies. These figures were far higher than those submitted by the gas producers. But Nassikas told Sen. Philip Hart (D-Mich.), the Senate antitrust chairman, that the gas reserve figures from the producers and pipeline operators "closely parallel" each other. Nassikas knew from his own economic study, dated Feb. 12, that the figures were "surprisingly wide apart."

One of the FPC documents shows how the economic division had tried to persuade the FPC to uphold the consumers. Failing this, an appeal was made to Nassikas's general counsel, Gordon Gooch, to amend the legal brief to show that the economics division had objected.

The economics office wrote a strong, detailed dissent. It not only was excluded from the legal brief but was put away in locked files. Thus, the economics experts were denied even the dignity of dissent.

Then, over the protests of consumer advocates, Nassikas took the $4 billion rate case away from a tough hearing examiner, Martin Rendelman. The American Public Gas Association, which fights for the consumers, tells us this move was unprecedented.

A formal ruling from the FPC is still pending. Only an outpouring of mail from the housewives can save them from $4 billion in extra gas payments.

In coming days, we will quote more fully from the FPC documents. We will also turn the documents over to appropriate congressional authorities for action.

Footnote: Nassikas refused to talk with us. Gordon Gooch, his chief counsel, explained Nassikas cannot comment because the case is still pending. Gooch himself spoke emphatically with us for an hour, denying any suppression or wrongdoing by Nassikas or other FPC officials.

[From the Washington Post, June 15, 1971]

FPC STAFF DISPUTED INDUSTRY DATA

(By Jack Anderson)

We have detailed how Federal Power Commission Chairman John Nassikas failed to reveal evidence and misled Congress on a proposed $4 billion rate increase for the natural gas producers.

This is a stupendous sum, which would be squeezed out of the customers in the form of higher monthly gas payments.

We have pieced together the story from a sheaf of memos and studies kept under lock at the FPC. Through a maze of intermediaries, however, we have obtained the papers.

It would take dozens of columns to publish them all, with their legal profundities and complexities. But here is the outline of our case against Nassikas:

The papers reveal that Nassikas ignored the studies of his own economists and relied

upon the gas industry's information. The FPC, of course, is supposed to protect the public against the depredations of the gas barons. Yet Nassikas, speaking for the FPC, quoted industry figures to senators—figures that had been contradicted by the FPC's economists.

These figures had to do with the Louisiana gas reserves, which eventually will supply half the nation. The FPC's chief economist, Haskell Wald, found the industry's figures to be dubious.

On Feb. 12, 1970, Wald wrote a personal memo to Nassikas, warning that two crucial sets of industry data on gas reserves "can hardly be said to match each other."

He could see "no way of corroborating" some of the industry data. The FPC's own auditing, he said, "tells us nothing about the reliability" of the questionable information.

The industry's estimates, which should be consistent, show "surprisingly large differences" with many specific figures "surprisingly wide apart," he wrote.

The following day, Nassikas received another personal memo from Edward McManus, chief of the FPC's producer division, who warned that "the reliability of gas reserve estimates (by the industry) for any specific reservoir or field initially is suspect."

On Feb. 19, Wald sent an even blunter memo to Gordon Gooch, whom Nassikas had picked to be the FPC's chief counsel.

"We are concerned over the apparent lack of adequate checks on the statistical reporting operations," wrote Wald. He called attention to an industry error of 1.3 trillion cubic feet.

At this point, Nassikas and Gooch should have ordered an immediate, massive FPC staff investigation. Instead, they accepted the gas producers' figures.

Senate Antitrust Chairman Philip Hart (D-Mich.) got wind of the matter. In a Sept. 1 letter, Hart asked Nassikas explicitly about the information furnished by the natural gas industry.

In Nassikas' reply, dated Sept. 13, he said the two crucial sets of data "closely parallel" each other. To buttress this statement, he added: "The staff has also made specialized reports and conducted investigations."

This made it appear that the staff backed up the gas industry's figures when, in fact, the staff memos said exactly the opposite.

On Nov. 12, Nassikas again cited the industry figures at a Senate hearing before the Senate Fuels Subcommittee.

Chairman Frank Moss (D-Utah) asked: "You do have to rely . . . on industry figures?"

"Yes, but not entirely," said Nassikas. Later, he added that "there is substantial reliance, but . . . it is not non-analytical reliance." In its context, the statement gave the impression that the FPC's "analytical" studies supported the industry's figures. The opposite, of course, was true.

The next day, Wald jolted Nassikas with another memo disclosing that the FPC's studies and the industry's figures were out of kilter by a startling 42 per cent.

Wald followed this up with a strong memo to Gooch's office on Dec. 1 reiterating that the evidence indicated errors up to 40 percent in some of the industry data.

Eight days later, both Nassikas and Gooch again used the industry's figures at a Senate hearing chaired by Sen. Lee Metcalf (D-Mont.), an expert on the subject. Gooch testified that the industry's figures were "reasonably reliable."

Footnote: As we previously reported, Nassikas refused to discuss the $4 billion increase with us on the grounds that the case is still before him. Gooch has denied any wrongdoing by Nassikas or himself.

Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.) is introducing a bill this week to force outboard motor firms to install anti-pollution devices. The motors dump millions of gallons of gas and oil into U.S. lakes and rivers each year. The bill would give the Environmental Protection Agency power to set standards for both old and new motors.

FPC PLANS TO END DECADE-OLD REVAMPING BY YEAR-END OF RATES GAS PRODUCERS GET

(By Kenneth H. Bacon)

WASHINGTON.—By year-end, the Federal Power Commission plans to complete its decade-long revision of prices producers get for natural gas sold to interstate pipeline companies.

The pipelines, distributors and consumers will be paying higher prices as a result of the rate revamping, and many of them already are. But the FPC hopes the price boosts will encourage producers to find more gas for interstate markets, helping to end shortages that have forced some pipelines to limit supplies.

Once it has restructured gas rates throughout the nation, the FPC's chairman, John N. Nassikas, says the agency will be able to adjust prices quickly to balance supply and demand—something it hasn't been able to do before—and thus regulate more effectively.

In 1960, the FPC launched a policy of basing natural-gas prices on the cost of producing the fuel in various areas of the country. Although it was designed to erase an enormous backlog of rate cases, it quickly became clear that the new policy was itself very time consuming. Long hearings on accounting matters dragged on for years, and when prices were finally set in the first proceedings, producers claimed they were too low to make additional gas exploration worthwhile.

But, currently, the FPC is approving big price boosts. Last month, the five-man commission granted sharply higher rates for gas produced along the Texas Gulf Coast, the nation's second-ranking production area, and soon it's expected to approve even higher prices for gas from southern Louisiana, the richest production area.

The higher Louisiana prices are contained in a settlement agreement between producers and their pipeline customers and distributors, which is currently awaiting FPC approval and is almost certain to get it.

STRESS ON SETTLEMENTS

Such settlement agreements are one of the methods Mr. Nassikas, a 1969 Nixon appointee, has emphasized to skirt the long proceedings and court fights that have snarled area rate cases. In an effort to clear up the first round of area cases, the FPC also has set some rates by rulemaking, a process that takes less time than the standard area proceeding. Mr. Nassikas, who has set out to streamline proceedings and provide greater incentive for producers, predicts that both of these speedier methods will be used more frequently in the future, although some consumer groups charge that they are just excuses for giving the industry more money faster.

When the FPC started its area rate policy "we assumed that we'd have all the areas done in several years and then start the second round" to review prices, according to Commissioner Lawrence J. O'Connor Jr. But the first round hasn't even been finished yet. "The length of the proceedings surprised everyone," Mr. O'Connor observes.

The Permian Basin rate case, the first proceeding, began in 1960, and in 1968 the Supreme Court upheld the new approach and the rates for the Permian area of Texas and New Mexico.

The FPC issued the southern Louisiana decision, its second area case in 1968, and a federal appeals court affirmed it in 1970 but chastised the FPC for basing gas prices almost exclusively on the cost of producing the fuel. It instructed the FPC to study noncost factors such as supply and demand and later gave it authority to change the rates set forth in the 1968 decision.

The industry had denounced as disastrously low the 1968 prices, ranging from 17 cents to 20 cents per 1,000 cubic feet. Those prices, stayed by the FPC haven't taken effect and won't if the higher settlement rates are approved.

REFUNDS COULD BE CANCELED

The settlement calls for prices ranging from 21.375 cents to 26 cents with provisions to increase certain rates in 1973 and 1974. It also provides that by pledging new gas to interstate sale, producers could cancel refunds they owe to pipelines.

If paid, the refunds, which accumulated during the case while producers sold gas at rates higher than interim rates approved by the FPC, would ultimately reach consumers, and a consumer group has filed a court suit charging that these refunds should be paid. The refunds obligation would top $375 million if the 1968 prices took effect, but will be considerably less if the higher settlement prices are accepted.

If as expected, the FPC accepts the settlement, it will mark the second area proceeding to be concluded this way. Last year, the FPC accepted an accord in the Hugoton-Anadarko area covering the Texas Panhandle, Kansas and the western half of Oklahoma. Those prices range from 12.5 cents to 20.5 cents.

Last month, the commission approved prices ranging from 18 cents to 24 cents in the Texas Gulf Coast area, with price escalation provisions and a plan to allow producers to work off refunds, similar to the provision proposed in the southern Louisiana settlement. The prices were sharply higher than the 13.3 cents to 17.4 cents recommended for the area in a 1968 examiner's decision.

It is expected that the FPC will approve similar increases for gas produced in what's known as the "other Southwest area" which includes territory in Mississippi, Arkansas, northwest Alabama, northern Louisiana and parts of Texas and Oklahoma.

Together, the Permian basin, southern Louisiana, Texas Gulf Coast, Hugoton-Anadarko, and other Southwest areas account for about 93 percent of the gas sold in interstate commerce.

Last year, the FPC set prices in the Appalachian and Illinois Basin areas by rulemaking skipping long proceedings. It's expected that the commission will use the same novel approach, which involves proposing rates and then considering written comment on them, in the Rocky Mountain area of Colorado and Wyoming to finish up the area rate cases this year.

In a separate but related action last year, the FPC opened a proceeding to set gas prices nationwide by rulemaking. While the agency hasn't worked on that proposal recently, Mr. Nassikas says the FPC may return to it later in order to adjust prices, presumably upward, throughout the nation all at once if necessary.

Despite the streamlined approaches, the basic principles of area price regulation remain the same, agency staffers note. Gas prices are still set by geographic area, and the prices vary according to the date of the contract under which the gas is sold. To encourage exploration, gas sold under recent contracts brings the highest price.

Many pipelines and distributors will be able to pass the higher producer prices on to their customers, although a gas industry spokesman asserts final consumer prices will rise only slightly at first because the price a producer receives for gas accounts for less than 20 percent of the total cost of gas to residential consumer.

CANADIAN AID AND THE WAR

HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, in October 1967, Mrs. Claire Culhane went to South Vietnam as a member of a hospital team furnished by the Canadian Government as part of its foreign aid to Southeast Asia. She went with the understanding that her role was humanitarian; once in Vietnam, officials changed tune, and her job was supposed to be half humanitarian, half political.

The story of her 6 months in Vietnam is both oppressive and enlightening. Mrs. Culhane was able to see the ramifications of U.S. policy upon the efforts of other nations such as Canada; she saw the utter corruption and deceit of the South Vietnamese Government; she felt the real needs of the people, not the rulers.

From her encounters, she prepared a comprehensive report for the Canadian Government. In it, she asked a number of key questions about the nature and aims of Canadian involvement in Indochina.

She was ignored.

Recently, Mr. Culhane sent me a copy of that report along with some news clippings and an addendum. I found it fascinating reading, and I now insert a somewhat abridged version into the RECORD.

VIETNAM LEAFLETS TOSSED IN HOUSE

(By John Gray)

OTTAWA—Since she left her job at the Canadian tuberculosis hospital in South Vietnam three years ago, Claire Culhane has been trying to get someone to pay attention to her complaints.

She wrote letters and gave lectures. She talked to members of Parliament and tracked down ministers of the government wherever and whenever she could find them.

She fasted on Parliament Hill, and she camped out in a tent in downtown Ottawa in the dead of winter in the hope that somebody would take notice.

As a campaigner she was tireless, and her energy was intimidating. With her white hair, she was a familiar and easily identified figure at most demonstrations on Parliament Hill.

Finally, in the House of Commons yesterday afternoon, Claire Culhane ended her gentle approach with the government of Canada.

NOTHING WORKED

She had, as she explained when they released her two hours later, tried every other way. And nothing had worked.

So Claire Culhane stood up in the select visitors' gallery of the Commons, hurled a handful of angry leaflets onto the desks of startled MPs below, and began to shout.

To those who knew Claire Culhane, her cries were familiar. She was shouting questions about why and how deeply the Canadian government is involved in the war in Viet Nam.

Why is Canada building hospitals and also supplying bombs in Vietnam?

Why was there no investigation of the Canadian member of the International Control Commission who admitted he had given information to the CIA?

Why is the government refusing to release reports made by herself and a former director of the TB hospital about the conditions there?

When was Ottawa going to make representations to Washington about the mass evacuation of Vietnamese from their homes?

Does the government care as little about the Vietnamese as they do about Quebecers, Indians, Metis, Eskimos and the unemployed?

BARELY AUDIBLE

The questions were barely audible. But Mrs. Culhane, a seasoned campaigner, had left copies in the parliamentary press gallery.

When the guard moved in quickly a pair of heavy duty wire cutters was produced almost immediately to snip the chain which she had tied around her leg and the seat.

A Liberal MP said loudly "Leave her alone", and NDP leader T. C. Douglas was clearly dazed by the commotion in the visitors' gallery over his head.

Mr. Douglas was trying to ask a question amid the strange shouts and he explained casually to the Commons that "I am used to being interrupted. I have been married a long time."

Question period had been under way for only about 10 minutes when Mrs. Culhane had thrown her leaflets and started shouting. It took only a short while before everything settled down again.

But it took more than two hours before the Commons security staff, Speaker Lucien Lamoureux, and the Ottawa police could decide what to do with Mrs. Culhane.

The gallery in which she was sitting is reserved for special guests of Liberal Members of Parliament.

A friend of her's, Mimi Taylor, a curator at the National Gallery, had asked for two passes from Ottawa East MP Jean Richard.

The security staff knows Mrs. Culhane well from her constant appearances around Parliament Hill. But the passes were all in order. They did not see her chain her leg to the seat.

Mrs. Taylor was outraged later that she had been held for two hours just because she had been sitting beside Mrs. Culhane.

She was aware of nothing, Mrs. Taylor said, until Mrs. Culhane stood up and began throwing leaflets—"a harmless enough activity."

Mrs. Culhane said later that Ottawa police had said she would be sent a summons to charge her with disturbing the peace.

But the white-haired grandmother was clearly not phased by her experience at the hands of the security guards.

She had tried every method and exhausted every channel, and nobody paid attention—"and if I can think of another way, I'll do that."

She denied the suggestion that she was trying to force everyone simply to adopt her ideas—"the MPs have not been provided with the opportunity to decide for themselves whether there should be an investigation into the Canadian role in Vietnam."

Part of the evidence of deciding that would be the publication of her own highly-critical report of the tuberculosis hospital where she worked for six months in 1967 and 1968.

After returning from Vietnam in the spring of 1968, Mrs. Culhane worked as a medical records librarian in Montreal. She was recently president of the Quebec Voice of Women.

Mrs. Culhane's own report maintains that the Canadian operation in the TB hospital in Quang Ngai is primarily a political project to give a respectable cover for Canadian involvement in the war.

She documents what she alleges are shoddy medical practices in the hospital, as well as evidence of corruption and clear alignment of "neutral Canadians" with American forces.

In her statement distributed yesterday she cites the report of the former director of the hospital, who claims the present director "is completely incompetent and has ruined an excellent project."

The statement also quoted the admission of the director of the U.S. aid program that aid projects in Laos are a cover for the activities of the CIA.

The same, she said, is true of Canadian activities in Vietnam—"I went as an independent humanitarian worker, but when I got there I found that it was just not so."

WOMAN ASKS TRUDEAU TO SEEK CONFERENCE ON WAR IN INDOCHINA

(By Malcolm Reid)

OTTAWA.—Claire Culhane, who helped run a Canadian hospital in the My Lai area of Vietnam and calls herself a "professional protester" since her return in 1969, confronted Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau at the door of the constitutional conference centre yesterday.

She carried copies of a cable to her Montreal address from Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front in Paris, asking her to stir up protest in Canada over "tens of thousands of U.S., Saigon, Thai troops" in Laos. She wanted Canada to call for a new Geneva conference on the country supposedly neutralized by a 1962 agreement.

The Prime Minister paused to talk with her, telling her Canada's position that the International Control Commission should inspect the case. Canada, a member of this commission, was willing—she should address the same request to India and Poland, the other members.

Mrs. Culhane was accompanied by an old acquaintance of Mr. Trudeau's from Cite Libre days, Belgian-born writer Michel van Schendel. Mr. van Schendel said Mr. Trudeau "made as if he did not see me." They haven't communicated often since the former magazine editor became Prime Minister.

He said he was representing the magazine Socialisme Quebecois, colleagues at the University of Quebec (where he teaches Quebec literature), and the Quebec Committee for Democratic Freedoms.

They believe the Control Commission is powerless. Mrs. Culhane said one of the Canadian officers on it has admitted giving information to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

She was sent to Vietnam by Canadian External Aid and was there at the time of the alleged My Lai massacre which is the subject of current trials of U.S. soldiers. She wrote a report of conditions in the zone which the Canadian Government has refused to table on grounds it is "libelous." But she is also mentioned by U.S. journalist Seymour Hersh as one of his sources for his reports of the My Lai massacre.

The brief chat with the Prime Minister ended with Mr. Trudeau shrugging and going into the conference room and Mrs. Culhane calling to him: "They're going to use the atomic bomb . . ."

Mrs. Culhane and Mr. van Schendel said this was a hard assertion to prove beforehand, but there were indications from reports in publications as varied as The New Yorker and the left-wing National Guardian which spoke of massive evacuations in the northern part of South Vietnam which could be preparations for nuclear attacks on North Vietnam. The justification for the Laos invasion given by the South Vietnamese invaders and their U.S. backers is that the country serves as a North Vietnamese base for attacking South Vietnam.

Mrs. Culhane and Mr. van Schendel said that during the Korean war there were similar hints that atomic weapons might be used and it took a trip to Washington by British Prime Minister Clement Attlee (backed by Canada's then External Affairs Minister, Lester Pearson) to persuade the United States to drop the idea.

In this case, Mrs. Culhane admitted, the political climate may be bad for such an escalation: "It may be a sawoff, and finally

they won't use it. But we must protest to make sure they don't."

Mrs. Binh's cable was intended for "peace forces in your country." Mr. van Schendel said they didn't know of Mrs. Binh having sent other cables to North Americans, and she did not often send such appeals.

CANADIAN ROLE IN VIET NAM QUESTIONED

MEDICAL WORKER CITES POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

(By John Gray)

As the war in Viet Nam grinds endlessly along its inevitable course of diplomatic and military and social disaster, there is, very occasionally, a bright gleam of hope.

A Canadian medical team is to travel to Viet Nam to establish a physical rehabilitation centre. This, at least, would seem to offer some limited measure of hope for that sad and battered country.

So it would seem. And especially pleasing for Canadians—a welcome other side to the debate about selling Canadian arms to American military forces, a welcome alternative to the relative diplomatic silence we have so studiously maintained.

The idea of the medical team fits perfectly into the diplomatic ideal which we have built up in the past two decades. This is the ideal of Canada as the keeper of peace between men who are mad, the dispassionate humanitarian middle man.

MOTIVES SUSPECT

However, the chorus of happy approval is not unanimous. At least one voice has been raised to warn that the medical team is a fruitless venture, that the motives which led to its formation are suspect.

The dissident voice is that of Claire Culhane, a woman who is not without qualification to speak about the expectations of the rehabilitation hospital which will be established at Qui Nhon. Mrs. Culhane herself spent six months in Viet Nam.

When Mrs. Culhane volunteered to serve in the Canadian tuberculosis hospital in Quang Ngai, South Viet Nam, officials of the External Aid Office in Ottawa assured her that her task would be "100 per cent humanitarian."

While she was in Viet Nam, battling against strange circumstances for which there was no apparent logic, she got a rather different assessment. A senior Canadian official told her that her mission was "50 per cent humanitarian, 50 per cent political."

Today, after returning from Viet Nam in despair, Mrs. Culhane is convinced that the true percentage is closer to 100 per cent political. And fruitless besides.

Mrs. Culhane, now 49, has advised the External Aid Office, the minister of external affairs, and even Prime Minister Trudeau of her fears about the nature of Canadian "humanitarianism" in Viet Nam.

She also warned that the $2,500,000 rehabilitation centre is doomed to a fate as uncertain as that of the tuberculosis hospital. For her trouble, she got a number of letters thanking her for her trouble and beyond that nothing.

This is not the first time that questions have been raised about the nature of the Canadian involvement in Viet Nam. Still unanswered, for example, are questions about the Canadian team on the International Control Commission.

Is the ICC a direct expression of Canadian diplomatic initiative, or is it an indirect arm of the American war effort? (It was the legal adviser to the Canadian ICC team, Gordon Longmuir, who defined Mrs. Culhane's medical mission as 50 per cent humanitarian, 50 per cent political.)

DISTURBING STORY

The story told by Mrs. Culhane about the tuberculosis hospital is disturbing, for it raises questions about both the nature and the quality of our involvement in Viet Nam.

Like our role in the ICC, the external aid program looks great on paper; like the ICC, there is something less than the glory of the brave new world underneath.

It is a spongey story, in that it contains few spectacular revelations. Rather than hard facts, it is an accumulation of incidents and question marks.

Mrs. Culhane, a medical records librarian, volunteered to go to Viet Nam after reading of the work in the tuberculosis hospital and its director, Dr. Alje Vennema of Burlington, Ont. Dr. Vennema won the Order of Canada service medal last year.

The young doctor left the hospital three months atfer Mrs. Culhane arrived in Quang Ngai last October, to continue his studies. The $500,000 hospital was going well. Fifty patients were confined permanently, and the clinic treated up to 200 patients a day.

Dr. Vennema was a popular figure with the Vietnamese. He and his medical team served their patients well. But Dr. Vennema was less popular with local American officials, and with Canadian officials in Saigon, because he was an outspoken critic of the war.

Under Dr. Vennema's successor, a new policy grew up quickly. It was a policy not to make waves. Relations became very close with the local American adviser and with the local office of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Running the hospital had never been very easy, because medical supplies were always hard to secure. When they arrived, it was only after running the gauntlet of theft and corruption which are now a way of life in Viet Nam. After Dr. Vennema's departure, Mrs. Culhane was prevented from pursuing "missing" supplies.

That was really only administrative trouble. Real trouble came during the Tet offensive by the Viet Cong last February. Fighting broke out all across Viet Nam, including the region not far from the Canadian hospital in Quang Ngai.

The fighting did not ever threaten the hospital, but several days after the offensive began, South Vietnamese troops moved into the hospital. Although patients filled the hospital, the troops set up a firing base on an upper balcony.

Protests to Vietnamese and American officials did no good. The balcony was militarily convenient. When the Canadians warned of the danger to the patients, the Province Chief sent his reply through the American adviser: "Go and tell it to the VC."

Eventually the patients were evacuated from the hospital and the Canadian medical team left for Saigon to wait until the fighting had ended. The Tet fighting did end, but the hospital remained closed until June when it resumed partial operation.

VENNEMA RETURNS

It was in Saigon that Mrs. Culhane learned of the depth of distrust felt by both American and Canadian officials for the previous hospital director, Dr. Vennema.

When fighting broke out during Tet, Dr. Vennema interrupted a year's studies in Amsterdam to return to Viet Nam. The Canadian government asked him to determine how Canada could provide medical assistance to relieve the distress.

Mr. Longmuir of the ICC was disturbed by Dr. Vennema's return, and suggested that the doctor was really trying to take over his old position as medical director of the hospital. Subsequently, at Canadian instigation, Dr. Vennema was denied access to the only functional airline in Viet Nam.

The airline is called Air America, and it happens that Air America is operated by the Central Intelligence Agency Passengers such as those working on medical teams have a high priority. They may fly anywhere in the country free of charge.

When Mrs. Culhane learned of the ban against Dr. Vennema, Mr. Longmuir explained to her: "Dr. Vennema's tour might turn up some unsavory features so why should Air America be expected to co-operate in transporting him on such a survey?"

ACTION LIMITED

For Mrs. Culhane, this symbolized all of the problems of the Canadian group at Quang Ngai. All action is circumscribed by the political and military exigencies of the American war effort; humanitarianism as such does not exist.

"We are there for only one reason—as a source of support for the Americans. The more countries that join, the more the Americans say 'we are not alone'.

"As things are now, we cannot conceive of doing anything independent of the Americans in Viet Nam."

Aside from the political problem, the efficiency of Canada's aid is questioned by Mrs. Culhane. Ottawa is a long way away, and regulations seem designed more to hinder than help.

What does this mean for the new rehabilitation hospital in Qui Nhon? For a start, it means a thousand bureaucratic and political headaches—if the hospital ever opens.

Mrs. Culhane fears that it may not open. The tuberculosis hospital has only partially reopened since Tet, and numerous other humanitarian ventures in Viet Nam have ceased to function because the fighting has made it impossible.

Right now, she feels there is no role for Canadians in Viet Nam, for they have been too closely allied with the Americans. There may be no role for any white man—"it's fit only for journalists and spies."

REPORT ON PROJECT OF ANTI-TUBERCULOSIS HOSPITAL QUANG NGAI, VIETNAM

CANADIAN COLOMBO PLAN

PREPARED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AID GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

Further to a recent interview at Ottawa with Mr. Maurice Strong, and Mr. J. A. Arsenault, I have been asked by the Department of External Aid to present a written report covering my observations and recommendations regarding the Canadian Government's project in Quang Ngai, Vietnam, namely the Anti-Tuberculosis Hospital, where I was employed as Administrative Assistant from early October 1967 to March 1968. Consistent with my offer to be of any possible help to the Department at any time by sharing my experiences there, I shall attempt to describe the project as I found it on arrival; its progress up to March 1968; general recommendations for improving our work in Vietnam, and my reasons for decision to withdraw.

On arrival in Saigon, I found the members of the Canadian Delegation appeared to be comfortably located and their conditions of work very pleasant. It was explained that while the members in Saigon very occasionally went to Quang Ngai, Dr. Vennema or other members of the team came to Saigon more frequently in order to collect supplies and finances, since nothing could really be safely placed on planes for delivery unless escorted.

In preparing for the operation of the hospital, I listed all the necessary supplies for clinic and hospital wards, e.g. forms and reports as required by W.H.O. standards as used in the Hong Bang Hospital in Saigon, according to Dr. LeHir, as well as similar charts pages and lab forms already in use at the Provincial Hospital.

It was understood that our Hospital was to operate under the direction of the Ministry of Health in Saigon, and was to receive its supplies through the Provincial Hospital channels. The difficulties encountered in this area were many, since either the Provincial Hospital would insist that they did not have any supplies, or the Hong Bang Hospital in Saigon would insist they could not provide us from their supplies since they only receive their own allotment.

Similar problems existed in areas of pay-

ment of electricity and fuel accounts by the Provincial Hospital and we were constantly harassed. In other words it appeared that whatever decisions and allotments made by the Finance Division in Saigon were rarely followed through, and the ultimate result was that adequate and conscientious care for patients was constantly hampered. It must be added at this point that the food allowance of *30 piastres per patient per day* was a grim indication of the lack of human concern shown for their fellow Vietnamese by the government officials.

A concentrated teaching program was being carried out for most of our Vietnamese personnel, with Dr. Vennema teaching medical subjects two hours per day and myself teaching English one hour per day.

The clinic was opened the first week of December 1967, and despite problems encountered (but not insurmountable . . .) to obtain necessary equipment and maintain smooth operation, we were actually able to register, examine and treat approximately 150–200 patients each morning, including Mantoux Tests, Acid-fast tests, Minifilms and large X-rays, medical examinations by the doctors for advanced cases, and referrals to hospital care.

The first week of January 1968 saw the transfer of patients from the Tuberculosis Ward of the Provincial Hospital to our Hospital, involving operation of kitchen facilities, sterilization room, and further organization of our 32 member staff of Vietnamese personnel.

I come now to the final period of operation of the hospital, namely the week of the Tet Offensive commencing the night of January 30th, 1968. At the expense of lengthening this report, I do believe a detailed description should be included of this vitally important and decisive week.

At 4 a.m. when the attack began, our interpreter (le Chau) Louise Piche and I came out of our rooms to view the action which appeared to be all about us and very close—to put it mildly!! As Pauline Trudel had taken night duty at the hospital when the Vietnamese nurse had failed to report, and as Dr. Jutras did not leave his room, I decided to go to the hospital to make sure everyone was all right there, which I did at 4:30 a.m., despite the barrage. I knew the patrol that night at the crossroads and he agreed to raise the barbed wire barrier so I could proceed. Everything was under control at the hospital.

The following few days witnessed a most tragic parade of wounded being brought into the town from all sides. The Provincial Hospital already with two and three patients to each bed, and floor space fully occupied by stretchers, was obliged to leave wounded on the grounds between the buildings.

Two bullet wound cases which came to our house and to our hospital pleading for help, were turned away by Dr. Jutras and instructed to go to the Provincial Hospital as "we were just a Tuberculosis Hospital."

When our electrician's apprentice brought in his uncle, severely burned, and having been extricated from a cave where his wife and ten children had all been killed, Pauline Trudel bandaged him and put him into one of the empty beds in a section of the ward separate from the others (only 44 beds of the total 80 beds were occupied at that time). Dr. Jutras would only agree that he be permitted to remain on condition that he be removed after TET . . . which he did in fact do three days later, while I was at lunch . . . I was certainly protesting most vigorously against this policy, since during such a desperate time of emergency, I felt we should be offering more help and certainly treating the wounded, even on a temporary basis, if only to relieve the terrible pressures at the Provincial Hospital, in spite of the fact that we "were just a Tuberculosis hospital." However, my protests were over-ruled by Dr. Jutras.

The second night (Jan. 31st) Dr. Jutras offered to take night duty, but by the time he arrived and it was time for P. Trudel, our interpreter and myself to return to the house, it was already dark and much action taking place, in the area, especially from behind and the sides of the hospital. Against my better judgment, but by this time weary of constant arguments with Dr. Jutras, we left, only to be turned back by a most hysterical patrol who could not identify us in the dark and moon-less night. He seemed to be ready to start firing but our interpreter managed to make himself heard, and to tell us to turn our bikes around quickly and return to the hospital, which we did. Dr. Jutras' comment on our explanation for our return is worthy of quoting: "I sure felt a little guilty when I saw you going down the road in the dark. I guess you should not have gone when it was so late."

Later that night, when everyone was asleep, I endeavoured to have a serious talk with Dr. Jutras pointing out that although our relations were not the most cordial, we owed it to the project and the patients which were more important than either one of us, to make a better attempt to work in harmony, since by this time I had reached the stage where I constantly hesitated to make any proposals knowing they would be immediately rejected by him, mainly because they originated from me—up to the moment where it could have cost us our lives that evening, for obviously Pauline and I were fortunate that our interpreter was with us, otherwise the hysteria of the patrol could easily have led to shooting first and identifying later . . . and all because I had hesitated to raise any objections to our leaving at such a late hour. His reply was prompt and to the effect that he knew he was questioning every one of my proposals, since he was "playing Devil's advocate" with me, and though he would continue to do so I need not feel I did not have the right to make suggestions . . . but I must expect his reactions to continue along those lines.

The clinic was no longer operating as strict curfew prevented any traveling by the local Vietnamese. I shared duties with Pauline Trudel in the hospital ward during the days as she had no nurses to work with, and in the evenings, Pauline Trudel, Arthur Ludwick, Dr. Jutras and myself divided night duties, some times all four of us, sometimes three of us and sometimes two of us. I elected to go each night, as a matter of personal choice. Part of each day I worked at the Provincial Hospital in the Emergency ward, the Burns ward and with the Quakers.

The following observation should be noted that never once in the entire week that we spent with our patients in particularly close contact, especially through the many wakeful nights—never once did I ever see Dr. Jutras examine, speak to, contact, touch or in any way try to communicate by personal gesture with a single one of our patients. Such a cool and unconcerned attitude on the part of our physician in the atmosphere of a war, could hardly pass unnoticed, especially by the Vietnamese themselves.

The afternoon of February 3rd we were visited by two local South Vietnamese army members, advising that they would come that night to "protect" us. Dr. Jutras and I immediately called on the Province Chief to request that the troops remain in the fields surrounding the hospital, but not to enter the hospital thus making a target of it and endangering the patients. He agreed, though at the same time adding if the VC attacked and occupied the hospital he would immediately order rockets fired against it.

That night, around midnight, a platoon of 24 soldiers came up the stairs to the balcony of the hospital intending to set up their firing equipment, but with the help of our interpreter and an hour's persuasion, they finally agreed to withdraw to the lower grounds and remain there.

The next day Dr. Jutras insisted he would go by himself this time to call upon the Province Chief to request again that the troops remain in the fields. However, as he failed to return home for supper or to come to the hospital by nightfall, and as we discovered a portion of our fencing ripped up with a white streamer to identify the spot in the dark, I decided to spend the night at the foot of the stairs leading up to the balcony to try and intercept them should they come again. Our interpreter and his family were also in the hospital that night, as well as Pauline Trudel and Arthur Ludwick. The troops did not come that night.

On returning home at breakfast time I found Dr. Jutras there and was only then advised that the Province Chief had promised the troops would not come up into the hospital. I had to inform him that it would have been nice to know about it the night before . . . and would have revealed more sense of responsibility on his part to have returned to tell us so.

That night (February 5th) I was the only team member taking duty along with one Vietnamese nurse, the same platoon came running up the stairs around 2 a.m., and this time commenced shooting immediately, so there was no time to argue with them about it. The only thing to do was to have all the patients wrap themselves in their blanket under their beds, in case any return fire came through the windows or walls. Although the shooting continued until 6 a.m. there was no return fire from any direction, and no one was hurt.

On my return home around 7:30 a.m (leaving our interpreter in charge) I suggested to the team that since we obviously were going to have no guarantee that the last night's performance would not now become the pattern, the hospital was being used as a firing base, endangering our patients, and therefore we should try and return them to the old ward at the Provincial Hospital, caring for them there, at the same time continuing our fight with the Province Chief not to occupy our hospital.

As the Province Chief could not be located that morning, Dr. Jutras and I left our message with the American Advisor, namely were the troops going to continue to repeat their nightly performance, in which case would the Province Chief advise us to evacuate the patients. The reply brought back to us from the Province Chief, via the American Advisor was "Go and tell it to the VC", and so we had to make our own decision. Dr. Connolly, the head of the American Military Medical Resist Team, refused to allow us to bring back the patients, saying he might want to use the still empty ward to cope with overflow from other buildings, and since Dr. Jutras would not support my request to transfer the patients, we had to return to our hospital and prepare the patients for evacuation to their own homes. This meant giving them about 10 days supplies of medication and sending them on their way . . . transporting the weakest three to the Provincial Hospital.

The extent of the danger to our patients of this totally unnecessary step, should not be forgotten when we later consider the validity of our continued presence in Vietnam to help ameliorate their suffering.

Although the patients had all displayed the greatest courage and spirit throughout the past week of heavy action, when the time came for their departure, they showed great emotion and grief, in many cases, absolute despair, pointing to their chests and shaking their heads . . . it was very sad and agonizingly frustrating to have to be responsible for such a futile exodus . . . how many would be able to reach their homes in safety . . . what were they likely to find there if and when they did arrive . . .

Since the local American military had that day offered us a plane to evacuate to Da Nang, and as a portion of the civilian popula-

tion of Quang Ngai was also evacuating, Dr. Jerema recommended that we accept it as perhaps it was a veiled way of indicating that further action was expected. We all left, except for Dr. Jutras who remained behind, to keep an eye on things, and who was able to stay at the house of Mr. May, which was heavily guarded.

Before leaving that afternoon, (February 6th) a cable was delivered to us by the American military from the British Embassy in Saigon requesting information as to the whereabouts and safety of Tara Dier (daughter of Mr. O. W. Dier) who had been with us for the past month. No similar communication was received from the Canadian Delegation in Saigon with regards to the whereabouts or safety of our team.

After two days in Da Nang, we learned that the city was expecting to be over-run by 30,000 troops already on the outskirts of the city, and we were given emergency postings and directions for helicopter evacuation in such an event. During this week both Louise Piche and Tara Dier personally decided to return to Quang Nagi and had made contact with their CIA friends in Quang Ngai to arrange plane connections for them. Since Dr. Jutras has officially delegated Dr. Jerema as the head of the team in Da Nang, and since Dr. Jerema refused to intercede with the girls' decisions, and since I felt we would be held responsible if any danger should befall Tara Dier, especially. I phoned Saigon and spoke with Mr. Longmuir, suggesting that since our safety was equally if not more endangered in Da Nang than in Quang Ngai, and since it appeared that Saigon was the quietest spot at the moment, should we not proceed there . . . after several days of calling him and finally locating Dr. Jutras in Quang Ngai, it was agreed that we all proceed to Saigon, which we did.

On reaching Saigon, we met various other medical teams, Swiss and German, and in each case were told of similar incidents, of the need to evacuate hospitals because of being caught in the crossfire, though not because of being attacked by VC, and that they were awaiting arrangements to evacuate them home.

By this time it was February 14th, and Dr. Vennema arrived from Amsterdam. Dr. Jerema, Dr. Vennema, Pauline Trudel and myself went to the restaurant where Mr. Longmuir and Miss Peschl were having lunch. We were soon joined by Dr. Jutras accompanied by his lady friend, the secretary for the CIA in Quang Ngai, which turned out to be an unfortunate coincidence since it made her witness to a most disgraceful inner group discussion. (However, since Louise Piche entertained several members of the DMA at Quang Ngai, they were regular guests there).

When Mr. Longmuir questioned Dr. Vennema's right to return, assuring him that he would not be allowed to usurp Dr. Jutras' directorship, the sparks began to fly . . . and I must admit my own contribution was not the calmest . . . for I was shocked by such a naked "jockeying for position" where the main concern of Dr. Jutras was whether he was going to be able to hold on to his job in the face of Dr. Vennema's return, despite the latter's assurance that he had returned in the capacity of a Doctor and not as a competitor. I tried to steer the discussion into the real problems of our decisions regarding the evacuation of the hospital . . . had it been necessary . . . could we have taken another course . . . where were the patients . . . what should we do now . . . what should we plan to do next time . . . but the tone of the discussion had sunk to an abysmal level.

As is known by now, Dr. Vennema was to be permitted to proceed to make a tour of S. Vietnam to see where the Canadian Government could offer further assistance—keeping in mind that this was during the climax of the Battle of Hue, in which direction he was to go first.

But, is it known by the members of the Department of External Aid that AIR AMERICA had cabled all their stations instructing them to refuse aircraft privileges to Dr. Vennema, and these instructions were over the signature of Mr. James May of QUANG NGAI (Chief American Advisor), with whom Dr. Jutras was still staying? I was only to learn about this part on my return to Quang Ngai several weeks later.

However when Dr. Jerema and I were arranging bookings to return to Quang Ngai and were advised about the above mentioned cable, I questioned Mr. Longmuir about it but he felt it was entirely reasonable since "Dr. Vennema's tour might turn up some unsavory features so why should the AIR AMERICA be expected to cooperate in transporting him on such a survey" and further that he had in fact 'told Al not to try and fly Air America but to stay with Air Vietnam and hope he would have sense enough to do as he was told."

It would appear imperative that a full investigation into this matter should be made at the earliest moment feasible, for its implications—as they appear on the surface—are most disturbing!!

During the period when the team was evacuated to Saigon, along with other medical teams in the city, we vainly offered our help to the Ministry of Health, since the refugees were pouring into the city by the thousands. But we were told that there was no need for our help as there was enough medical aid, and that further services had not been organized. . . which seemed very strange to me considering the enormous influx of wounded and sick . . . why could we not be of some help? I could only conclude that there existed a serious lack of concern for the suffering population, which could not organize some form of help, especially with all the funds pouring in from various Red Cross and volunteer organizations . . .

After a week's excursion out of the country, on return to Saigon, we requested permission to return to Quang Ngai to collect our belongings during the lull. Mr. Longmuir refused, but Mr. Dier agreed on condition that we promise to return the following day. On arrival in Quang Ngai, Dr. Jutras suggested that we all remain as things were relatively quiet, even though the hospital was still being occupied each night and curfew was still in force. I failed to see how we could operate the hospital under the same conditions that forced us to close it. I insisted as well that we were bound by our promise to Mr. Dier to return immediately.

Dr. Jutras phoned Mr. Longmuir to Saigon and returned with the assurance that Mr. Longmuir agreed we should all remain in Quang Ngai but would confirm it with Mr. Dier the following morning. At that time Dr. Jutras said he was unable to get through to Saigon, which I found difficult to believe since it was not the first time that when the occasion suited him "connections could not be made" while others were making successful connections with Saigon at the same time . . .

On making a tour of the Provincial Hospital I found that the old Tuberculosis ward was still not occupied, nor damaged as had been feared when I suggested we transfer our own patients back there for continued care. Also that the Quakers group had left their prosthesis ward and gone to Hong Kong. I later read in the March 8th issue of TIME that the reason they gave for their evacuation was "the intensified military operations throughout the country have made it impossible for us to continue."

Also the Christian Missionary Services had all evacuated from the country to Bangkok the week before.

I later read in THE TIMES (London) March 22nd, that "the International Volunteer Service Group, supported by the USA, was withdrawing almost half of its volunteers from their posts in Vietnam because of the increased dangers of the war."

I therefore recommended to the team that we should also return to Saigon for further consultation and advice from Ottawa, which Mr. Longmuir continued to be very vague about. Though he assured us he had cabled Ottawa about our circumstances and requested advice for our further movements, there was still no reply. At the same time he assured us we were free to leave for home at any time we wished, on an individual basis.

When Dr. Jutras repeatedly "granted me permission to leave if I felt my personal safety was at stake" I was obliged to make it abundantly clear to the team as a whole that since my record showed that at no time during my stay in Vietnam, and most especially during the recent Tet offensive, had I placed my personal safety before my duties (including the first night when I went down the road alone to the hospital at 4:30 a.m.) and therefore I did not feel obliged to apologize for my decision to leave at this time. My reasons were clearly aligned to what I felt was the correct policy for all. I spent the afternoon with our Vietnamese personnel explaining my position to them in more detail, and though we shared in the sorrow of the moment, they assured me they understood and supported my decision and hoped I would come back . . . which I promised I would, and sincerely hope to do some day.

On return to Saigon I had further discussions with Mr. Longmuir going into all the details as described above. In addition to the clear demonstration that I could no longer discharge my duties as Administrative Assistant—when the situation had reached the absurd lengths as Dr. Jutras assigning four major duties (kitchen, pharmacy, inventories and central supply room) to volunteer worker (Tara Dier) rejecting my offer to absorb some of the responsibilities since I had the clinic sufficiently well organized to allow me the extra time—I refused to be a party to fraudulently accepting a wage intended for Administrative Assistant when I was now being relegated to the position of an office clerk.

At that time I asked about the possibilities of transfer to our Rehabilitation Centre in Qui Nhon, but was told (in the presence of Col. Veitch) that an all Vietnamese team was ready, and that no Canadian team would be required for there—a statement which I later found on arrival in Ottawa, did not appear to bear any substance, since a team of twelve Canadians is presently being recruited for the Rehabilitation Centre there . . .

Before proceeding any further, I would like to make several concrete recommendations that might improve the calibre of work of our medical team for the future.

(a) It should be obligatory to learn the language of the people.

This could be arranged either by a concentrated 4–6 week course of the rudimentary fundamentals before arrival, or by imitating the Quakers who assign a tutor to the newcomer for three hours daily study, for a period of 2–3 months. Daily contact and use of the language from either of these two methods, should be an adequate working start to allow for adequate communication, without which more than half the effectiveness of our work is lost. The Quakers showed great success with their method.

(b) Brief weekly reports should be prepared and submitted by each member of the team, to Ottawa, relating to their own responsibility in the project. This would encourage closer contact and more thorough understanding of the problems involved. These reports should also include copies of minutes of meetings held, delegating specific tasks to specific members.

If this appears to be an extreme measure, I would submit that the alternative of no

contact at all (as when the Department today has no idea if the hospital in Quang Ngai is even functioning) is a far more extreme disaster. Sporadic contact should also be eliminated as it inevitably leads to confusion and repetition and delays. If ordinary salesmen can file daily reports in ordinary little businesses, how much more necessary for regular reports by persons using public funds and carrying responsibilities as representatives of the government.

(c) Removal of inducements of increased income and shorter working days combined with unchecked holiday periods to interest a better motivated type of applicant.

(d) Frequent and regular strict examination of expenditure of funds, including examination of costs of delays in transportation, customs, warehouses, and rectification of such errors, e.g. recent cost of shipping a generator which exceeded the actual value of the item, including additional unnecessary costs of storage on arrival. The number of hours that Dr. Vennema, Florent Lavoie or myself have spent searching warehouses and custom houses to locate items as well as the money wasted for substantial storage charges is truly wasteful and could be avoided.

(e) There should not be any discrepancy of facilities and privileges between members working in the same areas. Canadian Delegation members in Saigon possess ID cards which provide them with PX shopping privileges almost immediately upon their arrival. Whereas members of the medical team of Quanfi Ngai, even after a year and a half of services, are still without such advantages (not counting the four years of service in the country by the former team leader).

(f) Numerous requests have been made for Canadian identification cards, which should so clearly be a routine matter for any Canadian services abroad, and especially in such countries in Asia, in order to always have identification on one's person, since it is neither safe nor feasible to carry around one's passport.

(g) By raising the initial requirements to a more demanding level, I feel a more responsible and motivated applicant would respond, since the emphasis would be placed on personal contact in the assisted country, and help eliminate those who seek only adventure and change.

(h) In the event that any advance knowledge is held of the danger of a second attack, then an RCAF plane should be immediately despatched at least to Hong Kong to arrange for evacuation of Canadians, so that all members of the team have an equal opportunity to be evacuated.

Returning to my final discussions with Mr. Longmuir in Saigon prior to my return to Canada, I had then to refer to the other reasons for my decision to withdraw from Vietnam. At the time of signing my contract I was advised that our project was strictly an independent Canadian humanitarian effort, intended solely to ameliorate the desperate conditions of the Vietnamese people and that we would be required to utilize American services only in the areas of transportation and communication, in the course of our work.

As the months went by and the political situation became more acute and as the role of the American military in this area became more fully exposed in all its senseless, merciless, inhuman destruction—it also became abundantly clear that we, even as a small medical group, could not possibly operate without the goodwill and cooperation of this same American establishment. Mr. Longmuir at this point admitted that our project in Vietnam was 50% humanitarian and 50% political.

Without wishing to enter into an analysis of the role of the USA in Vietnam today—a subject that is being tortuously debated in journals and public forums in every country, since the very conscience of the world is at stake—I must only state that the mere fact of my being in South Vietnam on these terms deprived me of my right to stand aside from some measure of responsibility for all the brutality and horror being inflicted upon innocent human beings.

I had always felt that the Vietnamese people must be accorded their inalienable right to the same self-determination that other countries maintain for themselves. I accepted the assignment to work with these people in a volunteer medical capacity, under the direction of Dr. Vennema whose views on this subject coincided with my own, even while this battle was being fought.

However, when I found myself being required to associate with those elements which were not only impeding the solution but employing the most cruel and savage methods to do so, I was left with no other choice but to detach myself from them.

Even recognizing the more complicated aspects of Canada's official role as part of the "Free World's Assistance to South Vietnam" I had to weigh for myself the extent to which the expediency of maintaining a medical team in Quang Ngai was consistent with our nonmilitary support and non-participation in the American war effort—at the same time that Canadian aircraft were flying overhead bearing USA military insignia. It very soon became impossible for me to reconcile these two positions.

The premise has been stated that even to be able to care for one victim would justify the entire effort. As a person so deeply affected by the sights I have seen and the victims I have bathed and bandaged and the babies I have lifted out of pools of their own blood, I humbly repeat that whatever meagre help—which is so infinitesmal in the total area of destruction which is Vietnam today—whatever meager help we can give to these ravaged people can no longer be justified or compensated for when placed in juxtaposition to our participation at other levels—providing the means to destroy them with such apalling savagery. To bind their wounds and send them home and to know they just might be strafed and bombed by a Canadian plane on their way home, is too much to accept!!

The Vietnamese have an expression for this which translates with startling clarity—"Behead and cure."

At this moment in history I do not feel it is sufficient to fervently hope and pray for an end to this terrible war. I submit that the time has come for a strong stand on the part of every nation in the world to say "We demand that the slaughter of innocent human beings be stopped immediately, and we will withhold and withdraw any and every item originating in our country, which can in any possible way be used for continuing this murder."

To return to our own projects in Vietnam, I submit that whatever has been built and invested be maintained at its present level, with a caretaker left in charge, but no further investment be continued.

That we immediately withdraw our medical personnel on the grounds that we can no longer work in the context of the known corruption and complicity of the Saigon government.

That instead we will devote our entire energies towards helping to bring an immediate cessation to hostilities by disassociating from those forces which are presently involved in creating the debacle of torn and twisted bodies.

To anyone who may feel that this is a strange way to help the sick and wounded, may I assure them that every day used to bring total peace will be a day that will see the absence of new hundreds of victims.

I further submit that the Vietnamese people themselves would be the keenest supporters of such an action on our part. This would be proof indeed that we really care enough for them, to take such a strong measure in order to speed the day when they will no longer be victims of war, and on that day we can rush back and truly help to care for them in a meangful way—instead of in the utter futility and hopelessness of the present situation.

Very simply—let us withdraw our support of the forces which are creating this abundance of pain and suffering, in order to herald the day when we can return to multiply our facilities to heal and cure in the secure atmosphere of peace.

In conclusion may I set out a few quotations from a Signet Special Broadside pamphlet written by John Kenneth Galbraith, former United States Ambassador to India, entitled: "How to get out of Vietnam."

"the war we cannot win,
should not wish to win,
are not winning."

"It now seems reasonably clear that our involvement in Vietnam was the result of a massive miscalculation—perhaps the worse miscalculation in our history." (page 8)

"It (the Saigon government) is supported by the traders, landlords, and profiteers who flourished also under the French. Numerous of its officials are not patriotic, simply corrupt." (page 21)

"It is interesting also that the modern American standpatter, like his Tory antecedent, complains that those who face reality are unpatriotic. They encourage the enemy. The complaint should not deter anyone. It is the price, a small one, of rescuing those who made this miscalculation from their error." (page 24)

"The first step toward a solution of the Vietnam problem is to change our objectives in that country so that they are in accord with the character of the conflict as we are now able to see it." (page 33)

"People are far more likely to accept a solution that moves in the right direction than one that continues in the wrong path." (page 40)

"Of all the reasons for not changing course, the fact that the individuals involved are overcommitted by their past error—that they are defending their personal reputation—is the worst. It is probably now the most important." (page 41)

"Finally let everyone realize how we get on to a wiser path in Vietnam. It is by everyone possible being persuaded that there is a wiser path. Here every individual has a personal opportunity, even a personal obligation. That is to aid in this task of persuasion . . . when a majority of our people realize that there is a better course in Vietnam, we can be dead certain that the politicians will not be far behind." (page 47)

MONTREAL 130, QUEBEC,
May 31, 1971.

Mr. PAUL GÉRIN-LAJOIE,
President, Canadian International Developmental Agency, Ottawa, Canada.

DEAR MR. GÉRIN-LAJOIE, would you please attach this addendum to my original report filed with the Department of External Aid on April 16, 1968, following my return from South Vietnam where I was sent by the Government of Canada in the capacity of an Adviser:

In the intervening years since this report was prepared and filed, additional features have presented themselves which require further concrete suggestions. Offering recommendations to improve the administration of the Canadian Anti-Tuberculosis Hospital in Quang Ngai must now be changed to demand that the administration be turned over to local Vietnamese personnel, and the withdrawal of all Canadian personnel, as well as a halt to similar construction elsewhere in South Vietnam.

The main intent of this recommendation is to improve and guarantee meaningful med-

ical aid to the Vietnamese population, not to eliminate or to decrease same. Since the intrusion of foreign forces has led to the most devastating state of Biocide known to modern man, to simultaneously offer paramedical aid loses all sense of credibility at this time.

On the political side of the ledger, we are informed by Dr. John Hannah, Chief of US-AID in Laos, that his organization was indeed a cover for C.I.A. activities (Washington Post, June 7/70), and since Canadian aid must function, within the infrastructure of US-AID, it therefore becomes impossible to claim any purity of purpose in such a participation.

On the medical side of the ledger, for those who consider that our facilities and personnel are indispensable and of tremendous worth, note should be taken of the following indications to the contrary:

(a) From South Vietnam come urgent requests for larger supplies of anti-malaria medication to cope with epidemics in this area. From North Vietnam come reports that malaria has been eliminated as a result of the teaching and training programs successfully instituted by the late Dr. Thach, Minister of Health, D.R.V.N., whereby mosquito-breeding areas have been cleared and levels of personal hygiene have been raised.

(b) In South Vietnam, our Canadian teams which use BCG vacine composed of live antibodies requiring refrigeration, travel into refugee camps and outlying hamlets to carry out Mantoux tests, returning three days later to read and record these tests, frequently find movement or absence of the tested population, thus negating our efforts and reducing the entire procedure to still another futile farce.

In North Vietnam, a method of heating antibodies to 43° C permits the vacine to be kept for three months without refrigeration and used without need for allergy testing, has resulted in vacinating about five million adults and 350,000 new-born babies every year since 1962.

(c) After the writer was prohibited from completing the pharmacy inventory in the Canadian Anti-Tuberculosis Hospital in Quang Ngai in January 1968, it was reported by the former medical director that the three year supply of antibiotic medications on hand at that time was no longer present three months later. This in turn would obviously mitigate against treatment of those buying the pills on the black market, who would have ingested same in indeterminate quantities, thus rendering themselves immune to future treatment.

Note should also be taken that in 85% of the country (liberated zones) there are underground hospitals, and mobile teams travelling into jungles and other inaccessible areas which result in more adequate attention to more people than that which can be provided by foreign teams to the small fraction who eventually reach the provincial hospitals. The knowledge of this degree of difference in the quality and quantity of medical care accounts for the numbers who travel from the controlled to the liberated areas seeking such attention.

It is far too simple to becloud the issue by the use of semantics. Are we really "meeting the needs of the Vietnamese people" when we allocate $570,000 to the Saigon administration (1967) to construct housing units for the refugees? We have built two modern apartment buildings in a Saigon suburb (Ming Manh) where rents can only be afforded by high ranking military and government officials, while 2,000 real refugees continue to live on the grounds of the Canadian Anti-Tuberculosis Hospital in Quang Ngai, sharing a common mud hole for their water needs.

That the Canadian government—which is a declared neutral in this conflict, which is a member of the ICC; which shares $4 billion in exchange of military materiel with the United States for use against the Vietnamese people—is now establishing new medical centres on the Vietnam-Cambodia border (An Giang, Long Xuyen Province) in the face of the above critical observations, must only raise serious doubts about our stated intention to help the Vietnamese people.

I would therefore, in the most concise and passionate terms, urge that all medical teams and other civilian personnel be immediately withdrawn from Vietnam (and anywhere else they may be installed in Indo-China), and that in their place, massive supplies of medical and surgical equipment be relayed through channels already established for many years (far too many years!), as listed below.

This would guarantee the maximum medical assistance with the minimum foreign political interference, both now and in the future.

Sincerely yours,

CLAIRE CULHANE,
Former Advisor, Canadian Anti-Tuberculosis Hospital, Quang Ngai, South Vietnam.

MONTREAL 29, QUEBEC,
April 18, 1968.

Mr. EARL DRAKE,
Director of Planning Division, Department of External Aid, Ottawa, Ont.

DEAR MR. DRAKE: I was indeed sorry not to have had the opportunity to see you last week when I was in Ottawa. However, I enclose herewith a copy of my report prepared for the Department of External Aid in accordance with recent request made by Mr. J. A. Arsenault.

I should like to re-emphasize the following recommendations which I feel are required to implement our repeated pledges of help to the long suffering peoples of Vietnam.

(1) The immediate recall of the Canadian Medical Team from Vietnam

(2) A subsequent conference to be arranged to include Dr. Vennema, Dr. Jutras and myself, amongst others, as speedily as possible, for clarification of issues which should not be left unresolved.

(3) Cessation of all assistance and supplies to the USA which are presently being used, or intended to be used in the prosecution of the war against the peoples of Vietnam, including production which provides substantial financial returns to Canadians.

No apologies are deemed necessary for either the length of the accompanying document, nor for the forthright presentation of the facts as I understand them to be accurate and true.

It is my sincere belief that the alacrity with which we contribute to the finalizing of the war in Vietnam, will assist us in the fulfillment of our role as dedicated Canadians, in its truest meaning.

Respectfully yours,

(Mrs.) CLAIRE CULHANE.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LAW STUDENTS PROPOSE ACTIVE ROLE IN PROTECTING CONSUMERS AND ENVIRONMENT

HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to request the attention of my colleagues to a recent newsclipping which describes a proposal passed in a referendum by the student body of the University of California at Berkeley to finance a nonprofit public interest law firm.

I am extremely impressed with this proposal which is the idea of Boalt Hall law student Ray Bourhis. It represents a growing sense of purpose and concern among students which was sadly lacking in previous years. It also shows what can and is being done to work constructively—and, I hope, effectively—within our system.

I enthusiastically commend this article to my colleagues.

UC BERKELEY STUDENTS OK LAW FIRM PROPOSAL

BERKELEY.—Students on the UC Berkeley campus have voted overwhelmingly to spend an extra $1.50 a quarter to finance a nonprofit public interest law firm.

Results of student elections May 26–28 were announced Sunday and the public interest law firm referendum was supported by 70.82% of those voting and opposed by 29.18%.

The final hurdle to launching the firm, which would be called Citizens-Action Law Advocates or CAL Advocates, is approval by the university regents.

CAL Advocates plans to hire five to seven full-time lawyers, who would be paid $10,500 to $12,500, to take cases to protect consumers and the environment.

HOPES FOR REGENT APPROVAL

"We have every reason to think the regents will be very happy with what we've done. We've shown that students are willing to work within the system," said Ray Bourhis, 28, a law student who conceived of the idea.

"It's a nontax-supported, nonprofit organization set up by the students for the public," he said, adding that he hopes a voluntary fee plan will bring in $100,000.

Only 6,145 of the university's 27,500-member student body voted in the election—4,352 approving the referendum and 1,793 opposing it. "It was one of the largest turnouts that they've ever had in a Berkeley student election," Bourhis said.

He said the firm plans to bring suit against small and large industrial polluters and to investigate problems of respiratory ailments that may result from enzyme detergents.

He said many county departments of weights and measures "have uncovered gross and excessive and continuing violations" in packaging.

"They almost never cite the offenders and they don't disclose to the public who's doing this and what's going on," Bourhis said. This is another area the firm hopes to get into.

The firm also plans to look into automobile insurance practices and the California Public Utilities Commission.

In the field of advertising, he said, investigators would study the question of whether bulk rate advertising is being subsidized by the American public "whenever they buy a first-class or air mail stamp."

He said they would also investigate advertising involving political or social issues on radio and television and sex discrimination in TV advertising.

Bourhis said UCLA and San Jose State College and the University of Santa Clara will be holding referendums in the fall on establishment of similar public interest law firms. He said he was also in touch with student groups at New York University, the University of Michigan and Yale.

"What we're talking about is a huge network of public interest law firms to provide representation for a group of people never given representation in court before in seeking injunctive relief, the general public. What we'd like is enough representation to match the hundreds of thousands of huge corporate law firms," he said.