

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR JAVITS TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, on tomorrow, immediately following the remarks of the able Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD), the distinguished Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10:30 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 10:30 a.m. tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I now announce the final quorum call for the day.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RULE OF GERMANENESS WAIVED TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, in view of the fact that there is a time limit on amendment No. 143, on which the Senate will vote by yeas and nays on tomorrow at not later than 5 p.m., I ask unanimous consent that the

Pastore rule of germaneness be waived for the entire day tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of the remarks of the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) on tomorrow, there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, not to exceed 15 minutes, and that the conclusion of the period for the transaction of routine business on tomorrow, the unfinished business, H.R. 6531, be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator wish the statements made to be limited to 3 minutes?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that statements made during the period for the transaction of routine morning business on tomorrow be limited to 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, the program for tomorrow is as follows:

The Senate will convene at 10:30 a.m. May the RECORD show that the change in the convening time has been authorized by the distinguished majority leader after a discussion with the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) and the manager of the bill, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS).

Immediately following the recognition of the two leaders under the standing order, the distinguished senior Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD) will be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes. He will be followed by the distinguished senior Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), who will be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

At the conclusion of those orders, there will be a period for the transaction of

routine morning business with statements therein limited to 3 minutes, the period not to exceed 15 minutes, following which the unfinished business, H.R. 6531, will be laid before the Senate.

The pending business will be amendment No. 143, offered by the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), and others.

A time agreement has been entered into and the time will be under the control of the mover of the amendment and the manager of the bill. A yeas-and-nays vote is to occur thereon not later than 5 p.m. on tomorrow.

Amendments to the amendment may be offered in the meantime, and the time will be limited thereon to 1 hour on perfecting amendments or substitute amendments. The Senators in control of the time on amendment No. 143 may yield time under their control to any Senator who wishes to have additional time on any amendment to the amendment.

The Pastore germaneness rule has been waived for the entire day tomorrow.

Under the previous order, when the Senate completes its business on tomorrow, it will stand in adjournment until 10 a.m. on Thursday next. That order, of course, is subject to change.

Does the distinguished minority whip have anything further? If not, I will make the motion that the Senate adjourn.

ADJOURNMENT TO 10:30 A.M.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I move in accordance with the previous order that the Senate stand in adjournment until 10:30 a.m. tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 13 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, June 16, 1971, at 10:30 a.m.

NOMINATION

Executive nomination received by the Senate June 15, 1971:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Robert F. Froehke, of Wisconsin, to be Secretary of the Army.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Tuesday, June 15, 1971

The House met at 12 o'clock noon. The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward G. Latch, D.D., offered the following prayer:

God is our refuge and strength, a very present help in trouble.—Psalm 46: 1.

Almighty and eternal God, source of life, fountain of love, and the giver of all goodness, we pause this moment to open our hearts unto Thee ere we continue the work of this day. We pray not for light burdens, but for strength to carry all our burdens; not for superficial answers to the questions life raises, but for clear insight to see the right and for courage to make the right come to life in our day.

Bless our Nation as she struggles to find the way to justice by all, to good will among all, and to freedom for all. Leave us not to walk our way alone, but now

and always be to us a refuge and strength, a very present help.

In the spirit of Christ we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Without objection, the Journal stands approved.

There was no objection.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate, by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate insists upon its amendments to the bill (H.R. 4724) entitled "An act

to authorize appropriations for certain maritime programs of the Department of Commerce," disagreed to by the House; agrees to the conference requested by the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and appoints Mr. LONG, Mr. PASTORE, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. GRIFIN, and Mr. PROUTY to be the conferees on the part of the Senate.

CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR WINNER VISITS

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, it was my rare privilege and honor to welcome to my office today CWO Michael J. Novosel,

of Fort Walton Beach, who is in Washington for ceremonies at the White House during which he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor by the President.

Chief Warrant Officer Novosel's son, Michael J. Novosel, Jr., is also a chief warrant officer and both father and son have served in combat in Vietnam together as medical evacuation pilots. They are probably the only father-son flying team in the Army. Between the two of them, they have evacuated over 8,000 individuals wounded in combat during the course of their duties in Vietnam.

I was very pleased and proud to visit with this outstanding representative of the Army and to extend to him my warmest congratulations on his being awarded the highest honor this country can bestow to a member of our Armed Forces.

WELCOME WILLY?

(Mr. DERWINSKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt is now in Washington to confer with the President and other administration officials on the status of Berlin, the future of NATO, and various ramifications of his "ostpolitik."

As an interested Member of Congress and especially as an American, I can only wish Mr. Brandt well in these discussions. I sincerely hope and trust that his negotiations here will be more successful than those he has conducted with Moscow and Warsaw.

Americans should understand that what Mr. Brandt is discussing with President Nixon concerns them directly. The President has made it clear that the United States does not intend to make vital concessions on Berlin. Mr. Brandt has been told as much for some time now, yet he persists in weakening the position of the West German Government, therefore, putting the allies, including the United States in a difficult position. Perhaps Mr. Nixon will succeed in making clear to Mr. Brandt what ought to be crystal clear to him as West Germany's head of state; namely, that by refusing to insist on the political integration of West Berlin with West Germany and by abandoning the link between an acceptable Berlin settlement and the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, Mr. Brandt is giving up all of our cards before the game has really begun.

More than anyone else, Mr. Brandt is aware of the growing strength of the political opposition to his policies in Germany. Thus, the President, and even the State Department will not be fooled when Mr. Brandt tries to tell them that the ratification of the Warsaw and Moscow treaties is "inevitable."

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Brandt has adopted a most unrealistic course with his "ostpolitik" which has gained nothing for the West and has already, even without ratification of the treaties, amounted to a significant gain for the East. All we can hope is that his meetings here in Washington will bring him and his Govern-

ment back to reality. Reality is that the Soviet threat in Eastern Europe is greater than ever.

DISPENSING WITH CALL OF PRIVATE CALENDAR

The SPEAKER. This is the day for the call of the Private Calendar.

Mr. JAMES V. STANTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the call of the Private Calendar be dispensed with.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio? There was no objection.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. BOLLING. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

A call of the House was ordered.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 132]		
Abbitt	Donohue	Melcher
Abernethy	Downing	Murphy, N.Y.
Abouzeck	Dulski	Nix
Alexander	Dwyer	Pelly
Andrews,	Edwards, La.	Rallsback
N. Dak.	Fish	Rangel
Badillo	Flynt	Reid, N.Y.
Bevill	Foley	Robinson, Va.
Brown, Ohio	Fulton, Tenn.	Rogers
Camp	Gallagher	Rooney, Pa.
Casey, Tex.	Gettys	Rostenkowski
Celler	Grasso	Runnels
Chamberlain	Gray	Satterfield
Chisholm	Halpern	Scherle
Clark	Hays	Scheuer
Clay	Helstoski	Stratton
Conte	Hogan	Talbot
Corman	Jarman	Veysey
Davis, S.C.	Lent	Wampler
Dellums	Long, La.	Whitehurst
Denholm	McClory	Wyatt
Dennis	McCulloch	Wyman
Dent	Mathias, Calif.	Zablocki

The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 365 Members have answered to their names, a quorum.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 575, PUBLIC WORKS ACCELERATION ACT, PUBLIC WORKS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACT, AND APPALACHIAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACT EXTENSIONS

Mr. BLATNIK. Mr. Speaker, I call up the conference report on the bill (S. 575) to authorize funds to carry out the purposes of the Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965, as amended, and ask unanimous consent that the statement of the managers be read in lieu of the report.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Minnesota?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the statement.

(For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of June 2, 1971.)

Mr. BLATNIK (during the reading).

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the statement of the managers be dispensed with.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Minnesota?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Minnesota is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. BLATNIK. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, at the outset may I express my appreciation to all my colleagues who served as House conferees on S. 575 for their fine participation in the discussion we have had with the other body on the conference report which is before us today.

I would in particular single out each and every member of the conference, the distinguished member from Alabama (Mr. JONES), the leading expert on the Appalachian program; the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. EDMONDSON), who is so familiar with the economic development program; the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. GRAY), who was a bulwark of support throughout the conference for our position; and, despite their differences with us—and, they were honest differences, may I add—the ranking minority member from Ohio (Mr. HARSHA) and his colleagues, the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. CLEVELAND) and the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. SCHWEN- GEL).

The conference report we have before us today is in essence the bill that passed this body back on April 22.

We are in a period of increasing economic difficulty. Inflation moves ever upward.

The average unemployment level across the country today is 6.2 percent. Let me emphasize the word "average"—in many areas of this Nation that figure is much higher. Since January 1970, unemployment in this country has risen every month.

We are now in the 18th month of high unemployment. The record is clear. A major effort must be made to cut back on these drastic unemployment figures and to curtail this inflationary spiral.

To my right as I stand here and speak is a chart of headlines prepared by the Library of Congress which spells out most vividly the basic problem we face today. Look at these headlines and the dates. I will cite a few:

First, "Burns Warns of More Joblessness: Gloomy Economic Data Are Released," from the Wall Street Journal of May 15, 1970.

Mr. Burns was quite correct. The news was gloomy then and it is even more gloomy now. Look at the next headlines that follow in sequence. They speak for themselves.

Second, "Youth Jobless Rate Hits 16 Percent—Highest Since 1964," from the Washington Post, August 17, 1970.

Third, "31 Large Cities Have Substantial Unemployment," from the Washington Post, August 28, 1970.

Fourth, "Hardest Hit Cities Facing Problem of Jobless," from the New York Times, September 5, 1970.

Fifth, "Full Employment Not Seen Until 1972," from the Washington Post, October 16, 1970.

Sixth. "Unemployment Rate Hits 5.6 Percent," from the Evening Star, November 6, 1970.

Seventh. "Jobless Rate Rises to Nine Year High," from the Washington Post, January 9, 1971.

Eighth. "Jobless Rate Rises to 7.9 Percent Among Vietnam Veterans," from the Washington Post, January 1971.

Ninth. "Jobless Rate Rises to 6.1 Percent," from the Evening Star, May 7, 1971.

Tenth. "Unemployment Wholesale Prices Rose Last Month," from the Wall Street Journal, May 1971.

Here it is, step by step, in chronological order; a problem of unemployment that is mounting day by day, week by week, month by month, and year by year.

What has the President of the United States been doing during this period to concern himself with the fact that many, many millions of our fellow Americans are without work? He has put forth various proposals to decrease inflation and to reduce unemployment. There has been no real tangible results in this area. If there were, and if an effort had been made by the executive branch, I am certain we would not be in this economic crisis we now face.

I do not question the sincerity of the President's proposals. I do question the effort that has been made by him and by those around him to face up to these problems.

I note with interest that in matters affecting the Penn Central, the Lockheed Corp., and the SST, this administration has moved promptly and swiftly to attempt to assist these various programs, and has pushed as hard as it could the legislative proposals that would accomplish these goals.

All this may be fine. But, yet, it ignores the major problem that faces us day in and day out.

The fact is that our American citizens, those who wish to work and who need to work to preserve their dignity as human beings, are not being helped to achieve that goal.

The Congress, let me point out, has acted—and acted in an affirmative fashion. The Committee on Public Works reported promptly legislation that would provide immediate relief to many areas of our Nation where unemployment is high, and also reported out legislation in the same bill that would continue two very effective programs that provide continuing help and assistance to many regions and areas of our Nation where there has been chronic unemployment.

That bill passed this House by a resounding margin; it passed the other body; it went to conference. The conference report has been passed by the other body and it is before us today.

That legislation is embodied in the conference report on S. 575 which we are now considering. There is no need for me to point out the effectiveness of the programs embodied in the conference report. They are all proven programs.

The Accelerated Public Works Act of 1962, which we are amending to face up to the realities of 1971, has a record during another period of high unemployment of providing immediate assistance where needed.

That record can be equaled again at this particular time. Here is a program that is ready and set to go. There is a fantastic backlog of public works projects that will be eligible for immediate help under the accelerated public works program, and at this point I place this backlog of projects in the RECORD:

	[In millions of dollars]		
	Applica- tions	Federal funds	Total proj- ect cost
Waste treatment plants, EPA.....	3,000	2,100	5,900
Water and sewer (HUD).....	900	485	970
Hospitals, public health centers (HEW).....	1,919	2,000	4,900
Farmers Home Ad- ministration.....	1,076	82	164.6
Loans.....	1,809	235.2	235.2
Total.....	8,704	4,902,000	12,170,000

Here, if someone wants to do something about this problem is one of the answers. I repeat: a program that has worked, that is ready to go—for which there is a backlog. It is obvious that if this is used, there will be immediate and wide-spread effects on our unemployment figures on a downward scale.

Mr. Speaker, under further leave to extend my remarks, I place in the RECORD at this time a brief summary of the conference report and the authorizations contained thereunder:

SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE REPORT

Title I: Public Works Acceleration Act. Same as the House Amendment. Authorizes \$2 billion.

Title II: The Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965. Substantially the same as the House Amendment except one of the new "Special Impact" criterion that would have made areas affected by a natural disaster eligible was deleted because there is other legislation that deals with the problems resulting from natural disaster. Authorizes \$1,945,500,000.

Title III: Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965. Substantially the same as the Senate bill but there is only an increase of \$2.2 million over the authorizations in the House Amendment as a result of a compromise in the authorization of administrative expenses of the Appalachian Commission.

Senate provisions not in House Amendment accepted in Conference are:

New program for airport safety improvements
Expands authority:

Health demonstration program—to allow combining funds for child development services under Social Security Act without requirement of statewide program. Also permits combining appalachian funds with other Federal funds for planning grants for health projects.

Mining area restoration—permits grants for controlling or abating mine drainage pollution.

Housing fund—permits mortgage assistance payments as provided under Sec. 235 of National Housing Act and grants up to 10% of cost for site development and off site improvements. It also allows the Commission to provide or contract for technical assistance.

Vocational education—permits planning, construction and operating grants for Vocational education demonstration projects to public non-profit institutions.

Supplementary grants—permits "first money" grants when funds are unavailable under the basic grant-in-aid program.

Research and demonstrations—permits construction projects necessary to carry out research and demonstrations.

Authorizes \$1,547,000,000.
New Total Authorization of Bill—\$5,492,500,000.

AUTHORIZATION—CONFERENCE REPORT: SECTION OF S.575 AS REPORTED OUT OF CONFERENCE

TITLE I—PUBLIC WORKS ACCELERATION ACT

[In thousands of dollars; fiscal year]

Purpose	Amount
102(5) For grants and supplementary grants beginning with fiscal year 1971, a total not to exceed.....	2,000,000

TITLE II—THE PUBLIC WORKS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1965

202 Grants and supplementary grants: 1972.....	550,000
1973.....	550,000
Subtotal.....	1,100,000
203 Public works and business loans, maximum for: 1972.....	170,000
1973.....	170,000
Subtotal.....	340,000
204 Technical assistance and research: 1972.....	50,000
1973.....	50,000
Subtotal.....	100,000
207 Assistance for economic development centers and 10 percent bonus for districts: 1972.....	50,000
1973.....	50,000
Subtotal.....	100,000
208 Assistance for title V regions: 1972-73.....	305,000
209 Planning, Alaska Federal Field Commission: 1972-73.....	500
Total of title II.....	1,945,500

TITLE III—APPALACHIA REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1965

302 Commission expenses: Fiscal year 1972-73.....	2,700
Fiscal year 1974-75.....	3,300
Subtotal.....	6,000
304 Development highways, access roads: Fiscal year 1973.....	110,000
Fiscal year 1974.....	180,000
Fiscal year 1975.....	185,000
Fiscal year 1976.....	185,000
Fiscal year 1977.....	185,000
Fiscal year 1978.....	180,000
Subtotal.....	925,000
305 Appalachian airport safety improvements: 1972-75.....	40,000
Purpose	Amount
307 Nonhighway programs: Fiscal year 1972-73.....	282,000
Fiscal year 1974-75.....	294,000
Subtotal.....	576,000
Total of Title III.....	1,547,000
Title I.....	2,000,000
Title II.....	1,945,500
Title III.....	1,547,000
Total authorizations in conference report.	5,492,500

¹ Increase.

The second section of the conference report, amendments to the Economic Development Act of 1965, continues another effective program that is nationwide in its scope.

The third section, the Appalachian re-

gional program, has received the unanimous support of every Governor in the Appalachian region, regardless of party. It has received the support of all other State and local officials. It is a program we can be proud of because it is doing the job it was supposed to do—which was to open up this vast region of our Nation so that some 15 million of our citizens could return to the mainstream of American life.

Let me say that if the President does not recognize the merits of these proven and tested programs, this Congress surely has and does.

If he does not realize the dreadful impact unemployment has on the Nation's economy and on the lives of our citizens, this Congress surely does.

I trust the rumors and reports I have heard that the President will veto this bill are not factual. I believe a veto would be a tragedy.

This is good legislation. It is needed. All of us, regardless of party, recognize this fact.

This legislation will allow a man to be able to satisfy, out of his honest toil, the needs of his family for food and shelter.

It will restore dignity to millions of our American citizens.

There is a vital need for this legislation. I am proud to support it. I would sincerely hope that the executive branch will recognize its importance so that all of us together—the legislative and the executive—can work toward reaching the common goal all of us desire which is full employment, a job for every American, so that he can live with dignity and decency in this great Nation of ours, and contribute his share, along with all of us, to maintaining the strength and vitality of our Nation.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BLATNIK. I shall be happy to yield to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, Chairman BLATNIK and the members of the House Public Works Committee must be commended for the time and work their committee devoted by successfully submitting and having enacted by the House and Senate one of the most outstanding pieces of legislation for the benefit of the American economy since the devastating depression of the early 1930's. For over a year we have been receiving reports from the administration outlining optimistic reports concerning the upturn of employment and business conditions but we find that these reports are merely for public consumption and are not supported by the facts. Unemployment is spreading, inflation increasing and business conditions are continuing in a slowdown trend.

Approximately 6.2 percent are unemployed throughout the country, as of the most recent report from the Labor Department. Considering our increased population of 206 million compared to 135 million in the early 1930's this depression is gradually moving into a condition comparable to the early 1930's depression.

This 92d Congress, through this pending public works legislation, and several

other economic programs now pending, will succeed in making great strides toward restoring reasonable employment, business conditions and prosperity throughout the Nation. It is highly incumbent that both political parties work together to put the jobless back to work. It is indeed unfortunate that the vote in the Senate on this measure seemed to be divided almost strictly along partisan lines which indicates that the administration is not completely in agreement with all provisions set out in this outstanding public works legislation.

Although some of the opposition has signified a possible Presidential veto of this legislation, I firmly believe that when the White House hears from the public throughout the Nation they will go along and cooperate in this great step to aid our economy.

Programs of this type were highly successful in the early 1960's when the Democratic administration was confronted with persistent unemployment. This bill is designed to provide jobs in all segments of our economy and initiate make-work programs. It is a program that will instill enthusiasm and vitality, especially in urban communities throughout the Nation where public service and construction projects have lagged far behind because of the financial conditions of the municipal governments in urban areas.

Mr. Speaker, the economic depression and our unemployment rate is now gradually approaching a 35-year high and the Members of Congress must work together in unison to put the jobless back to work. This conference report we are now considering was adopted in the Senate last week by a vote of 45 to 33 and the vote was, unfortunately, strictly along party lines with only one Democrat and two Republicans lined up against the bill. It is indeed fortunate that we had excellent bipartisan cooperation when the bill passed the House to enact this accelerated public works legislation. I do hope the House adopts this conference report by almost unanimous majority and when the President looks at the vote in the House and Senate he will sign this measure so that we can have a uniform front in the fight to restore our economy and full employment.

Mr. BLATNIK. I thank the gentleman from Indiana and I want to show how appreciative and indebted we are to the gentleman from Indiana for the leadership he has played in getting this bill through the Committee on Rules.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BLATNIK. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. EDMONDSON) who has played a leading role in the development of this program.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, I wish to join my friend, the distinguished gentleman from Indiana (Mr. MADDEN), in commending the chairman of the Committee on Public Works, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. BLATNIK), for the leadership which he has given to the Congress in the effort to deal with the growing unemployment problem in this country.

Mr. Speaker, one of the headlines

which the distinguished chairman has exhibited reads that our jobless rate has risen to a 9-year high. This is a critical and severe problem calling for emergency measures by the Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I earnestly hope that the conference report will be overwhelmingly approved by the House of Representatives and that the President will sign it and make it possible for us to get on, without delay, with the urgent problem of dealing with massive unemployment in our country.

Mr. Speaker, would the chairman yield further for a brief discussion of title II?

Mr. BLATNIK. I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the conference on the House side which is submitting this conference report for House approval today, I strongly urge its adoption.

At the outset, I believe the conferees on the House side have successfully upheld the House position on most points. The House amendment of title II was substantially adopted as passed by the House. The title provides for a 2-year extension and authorization of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965. In addition, it modifies and adds new criteria to identify areas of distress that will become eligible for assistance as redevelopment areas.

This act provides Federal assistance in cooperation with the States to communities, areas, and regions in the United States which are suffering from excessive unemployment or underemployment. It provides financial and technical assistance needed for the creation of new jobs and emphasizes long-range planning for the development of long-term employment and economic growth. The success of the EDA programs has been established by indepth studies of our subcommittee as well as by a thorough evaluation made by the administration itself at the request of the President.

PUBLIC WORKS

Grants and supplementary grants are authorized by this legislation for needed public works, public service, or development facilities, including related machinery and equipment. It authorizes supplementary grants to enable the States and other entities to take advantage of other Federal grant-in-aid programs which, because of their condition of high unemployment, they cannot supply the required matching share.

Last year, a total of 274 public works projects that had been completed for at least 1 year were evaluated by consultants for the Economic Development Administration. These projects generated the equivalent of 33,486 industrial, commercial, and supporting jobs at an average annual salary of \$6,500. The total EDA public works investment in these projects was \$76.5 million. The EDA cost per job averaged \$2,290. EDA's share of the total cost of these projects was about 61 percent.

This extension will authorize a continuation of the grant program for public works and development facilities needed for economic growth. The annual authorization of \$500 million is extended

and increased by \$50 million to provide both basic and supplementary grants for existing airports to enhance airport safety.

BUSINESS LOANS

The business loan program authorizes loans up to 100 percent of project cost to assist in financing public works and development facilities and authorizes business development loans up to 65 percent for the purchase or development of land and facilities. Working capital guarantees are authorized up to 90 percent of private working capital loans made in connection with direct loan projects.

Fifty-two business loan projects approved prior to the fiscal year 1970 were analyzed by consultants for the Economic Development Administration. It is estimated that 25,000 direct and indirect jobs have been located by EDA business loans, with an annual payroll of over \$130 million and an average wage per job of \$5,300. The findings indicate that the agency's cost per job averaged \$1,248.

Under this bill the public facility loans and industrial and commercial loan programs are extended at the existing annual authorization of \$170 million.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

The technical assistance provisions of the act provide for a broad range of assistance that is useful in alleviating or preventing conditions of excessive unemployment or underemployment where the Secretary of Commerce finds there is substantial need for such assistance. The program includes a wide variety of projects designed to meet two basic needs: First, to enable a community to find solutions to problems that retard industrial growth and a generation of new jobs; and, second, to help pay for the expertise needed to plan, implement, and coordinate local development programs.

The findings of the evaluations on the technical assistance program indicate that it has helped initiate a broad range of business activity in distressed areas and has provided coordination between communities in need of aid and organizations that can furnish various forms of support and training.

This bill extends the technical assistance program at its existing annual authorization of \$50 million.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS

The economic development district program has provided a new approach in creating job opportunities and providing alternatives to the relocation of the unemployed or underemployed to large urban areas. The evaluations conducted by the Economic Development Administration found that the strategy was most effective when growth centers were located within commuting distance of redevelopment areas.

This bill extends the \$50-million annual authorization for grant and loan assistance to economic development centers and the 10-percent bonus for projects in redevelopment areas within designated economic development districts. There is widespread belief that growth center strategy should be viewed as a critical component of any future national growth policy.

REGIONAL ACTION PLANNING COMMISSIONS

Title V of the act authorizes the desig-

nations of appropriate economic development regions within the United States and procedures for establishment of appropriate multistate regional commissions. The form and responsibility of these commissions were patterned after those of the Appalachian Regional Commission. To date, five regional commissions have been established.

This bill would extend the authorization for the regional commission for an additional 2 years in the amount of \$305 million for this period. Fifty million dollars of this authorization is intended for projects relating to airport safety.

ALASKA FIELD COMMITTEE

The conference report also authorizes \$500,000 for the 2-fiscal-year period ending June 30, 1973, for the Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in Alaska for the purpose of planning economic development programs and projects in Alaska in cooperation with the government of the State of Alaska.

CRITERIA

The modifications and additions to the redevelopment area criteria in the House amendment have been substantially retained. The only change made in title II by the conferees was a deletion of one source of eligibility for the special impact area definition which was broadened in the House amendment. The conference substitute eliminates from the redefined "special impact" areas those with severe economic distress due to occurrence of a national disaster, since other legislation is more appropriate to deal with the problems resulting from natural disasters.

The total amount of the authorization for the extension of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 is the same as in the House amendment which provides a total of \$1,945,500,000 over the next 2 fiscal years.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly support all of the provisions of this conference report and urge its prompt passage.

Mr. JONES of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield.

Mr. BLATNIK. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama such time as he may consume.

Mr. JONES of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, I shall address myself briefly to title III of the bill, the Appalachian section of the bill. It will not be necessary for me to repeat the history of this legislation, since it has been carefully considered by the House over the recent years.

Mr. Speaker, the conferees devoted a great deal of time in resolving the differences between the House and the Senate before reaching agreement. The conference report which has emerged has produced what I believe the best features of the legislation produced by both Houses. The provisions of title III, as passed by the House, have essentially been preserved. This title of the bill basically extends the Appalachian development highway and access road program for an additional period of 5 years through fiscal year 1978. The other Appalachian programs have been broadened and extended for a period of 4 years through fiscal year 1975.

The Appalachian program has enjoyed remarkable support during the past 6

years. The reason for this support and success can be attributed to a great extent to the partnership that has been established between the Federal and State Governments. The enthusiasm demonstrated by the Governors and local authorities and the people themselves has brought about this success. The remarkable efforts which have started to improve the development of the region must be carried forward.

This bill provides the necessary tools and authorizations to carry forward these efforts to boost the development of the region so that it will be on par with the rest of the country in the future.

I would like to highlight and comment briefly on the substance of this legislation and discuss the significant changes recommended in the conference report before us.

ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES

The Senate bill provided an open-ended authorization for administrative expenses of the Commission. The House amendment extended the current 2-year fiscal authorization of \$1,900,000 for 2 additional fiscal bienniums, fiscal years 1971-73 and fiscal years 1974-75. Of each such 2-year authorization, \$475,000 was provided for the expenses of the Federal cochairman, his alternate, and his staff.

The conference substitute authorizes administrative expenses of \$2,700,000 for the fiscal years 1972 and 1973, not to exceed \$525,000 for the expenses of the Federal cochairman, his alternate, and his staff. In addition, it authorizes \$3,300,000 for the fiscal years 1974 and 1975, not to exceed \$575,000 for the expenses of the Federal cochairman, his alternate, and his staff.

HIGHWAY PROGRAM

The total new authorization of \$925,000,000 is provided for the extension of the highway program which is extended for 5 more years through fiscal 1978. This provision was the same in both the House amendment and the Senate bill.

AIRPORT SAFETY IMPROVEMENT

A new section was adopted in conference which provides grants for the removal of hazards, safety equipment, navigation aids, land and air space acquisition for safety at existing airports, and \$40 million is authorized over a 4-fiscal year period through June 1975 for this purpose. The House amendment had provided this same kind of assistance through the use of the supplemental grant provisions of the act.

HEALTH DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS

The health demonstration program is broadened by the conference report to give authority for health and child development services as provided in the Social Security Act without the requirement that these services be offered on a "statewide basis." Planning grants are also authorized to be combined with other Federal grant funds to raise the Federal share to 75 percent. There was no such provision in the House amendment.

MINING AREA RESTORATION

The authority in this section was broadened to include grants for the pur-

pose of controlling or abating mine drainage pollution. There was no such provision in the House amendment. A provision in the House amendment was retained which makes the reasonable value, including donations of planning, engineering, and land eligible as project costs in mining restoration projects.

HOUSING

A Senate amendment is contained in the conference report which permits mortgage assistance payments as provided under section 235 of the National Housing Act. Also accepted was a provision which permits grants up to 10 percent of costs for site development and offsite improvements, such as water and sewer extensions, when they are essential to the feasibility of housing projects designed for low- and moderate-income families.

VOCATIONAL EDUCATION

A compromise was reached on a Senate amendment which will now permit planning, construction, and operating grants for vocational education demonstration projects to public, nonprofit institutions. The Appalachian States need to improve the quality of technical education provided in their facilities. This authority will permit assistance in operating these programs and should greatly facilitate the alleviation of this deficiency.

THE SUPPLEMENTARY GRANTS

Greater flexibility has been given under the supplementary grant program to permit the use of funds to make basic grants when the basic grant funds available under the authorizing act are insufficient. First money grants will now be available under this section. The supplemental grant program, by its nature, depends on sufficient funds being available in those basic Federal grant programs. When the trust funds under the basic grant-in-aid programs are inadequate to meet the region's identified needs, "first dollar money" will insure that the flexibility now provided by the Appalachian program could be maintained and strengthened.

RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS

The use of technical assistance, research and demonstration funds are now permitted for construction when necessary to carry out such programs. Occasionally some physical construction is involved in a particularly useful demonstration.

OTHER PROGRAM MONEYS

Authorizations for the Appalachian programs other than the highway program and airport safety program are \$282 million for the fiscal years 1972 and 1973 and \$294 million for the fiscal years 1974 and 1975.

The total new authorizations provided in the conference report for title III is \$1,547,000,000.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. DANIEL of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

A call of the House was ordered.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 133]

Abbott	Eckhardt	Purcell
Abernethy	Edwards, La.	Quillen
Abourezk	Evins, Tenn.	Reld, N.Y.
Alexander	Fascell	Robinson,
Anderson,	Fish	Va.
Ill.	Flynt	Rogers
Anderson,	Foley	Rooney, N.Y.
Tenn.	Fulton, Tenn.	Rooney, Pa.
Andrews,	Gallagher	Rostenkowski
N. Dak.	Gettys	Runnels
Badillo	Grasso	Ryan
Blanton	Gude	St Germain
Brown, Ohio	Hanna	Satterfield
Byrnes, Wis.	Hays	Scherle
Camp	Hébert	Schmitz
Carey, N.Y.	Helstoski	Sisk
Casey, Tex.	Howard	Stratton
Celler	Jonas	Stuckey
Chappell	Jones, Tenn.	Talcott
Clark	Karth	Teague, Tex.
Clay	Kyros	Thompson,
Conte	Lent	Ga.
Conyers	Long, La.	Thompson,
Corman	McClary	N.J.
Danielson	McCulloch	Tiernan
Dellums	Mathias, Calif.	Udall
Denholm	Melcher	Vander Jagt
Dent	Metcalfe	Veysey
Diggs	Mills, Ark.	Wampler
Dingell	Mizell	Whitehurst
Donohue	Monaghan	Wilson, Bob
Downing	Murphy, N.Y.	Winn
Dulski	Pelly	Wyman
Dwyer	Podell	Zablocki

The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 337 Members have answered to their names, a quorum.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 575, PUBLIC WORKS ACCELERATION ACT, PUBLIC WORKS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACT, AND APPALACHIAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACT EXTENSIONS

Mr. BLATNIK. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. JOHNSON).

Mr. JOHNSON of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the conference report on S. 575.

This bill passed the House by a resounding vote in the early part of April and is before us today for final congressional approval before it is submitted to the President for signature.

As one of the ranking members of the Committee on Public Works, I have sat through the hearings on this legislation and am fully familiar with the operation of all titles of the bill and, in particular, title I dealing with renewal of the accelerated public works program, and title II which is a 2-year extension of the basic titles of the Economic Development Act of 1965.

These two titles are good legislation. They have a previous record of accomplishment. In 1962, when we passed the original accelerated public works program, the problem of hard-core unemployment existed in many sections of our Nation. The percentage of unemployment in many areas of the country were far beyond even the normal unemployment

figures. People were out of work with no place to turn. In 1962, the accelerated public works program presented an effort to put onto the payrolls as quickly as possible many of our citizens who needed help desperately. After its passage it was implemented almost immediately with proper funding, and it worked. The record is clear that it worked.

The same situation exists today in 1971. The same problem of hard-core unemployment is with us. Something must be done immediately to break through this logjam. Accelerated public works is not a panacea, but it is an answer. It will help. It will put people to work. It will restore the dignity to a man who is capable of work and who wants to work. It will not only provide that intangible value whereby every American who needs to preserve his right to be meaningfully employed can do this, it will also bring about the construction of needed and necessary public works such as sewage treatment plants, Federal buildings, highway improvements, and so forth. I supported it in 1962; I support it now.

Today, 14 of the 20 counties that encompass my congressional district are eligible for assistance under the Economic Development Act. I know what this program can do. It is another performance program. It combines public works, grants, loans, and technical assistance to allow areas to move forward singly or jointly to develop the economy of the area so that it will once again be put into the mainstream of the American economy. Under the Accelerated Public Works Act Amendments of 1971, these counties will be eligible not only for economic development but for relief under the Accelerated Public Works Act.

Let me repeat. Here are two worthwhile programs that will help alleviate and cut down the pressing problem of unemployment we now face in many areas of the country. Here are two programs that are on the books and can be made to work immediately. The answer is obvious. There should be strong support for these programs. This Congress should pass them today; send them to the President; he should sign this into law so we can go ahead with the job that all of us want and that is to give every able-bodied American who wants to work the opportunity to so do.

Mr. BLATNIK. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. MCFALL).

Before I yield, may I point out that the gentleman from California (Mr. MCFALL) has been one of the leaders in the field of providing relief to our American citizens who are now without employment. He was the chief sponsor on the House side of that section of S. 575 which is now title I, the Public Works Acceleration Act Amendments of 1971.

Throughout the years he has shown deep concern for the problems of those who are jobless. He has not only supported accelerated public works, he has also been a strong supporter of economic development and the Appalachian program. I take this opportunity to commend him for his efforts and to thank

him for the invaluable assistance he has given to us on this legislation.

Mr. McFALL. Mr. Speaker, I extend my congratulations to the Public Works Committee and its Chairman, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. BLATNIK).

It is gratifying to me, and I know the 150 cosponsors of the accelerated public works bill in the House join me. We are glad to have the provisions of that bill included as title I of S. 575 which has been approved in its amended form by this body. Title I, together with titles II and III, to extend the Economic Development and Appalachia Acts, make up most meritorious and important legislation.

All three elements of this bill are aimed at shoring up our sagging economy which, in spite of glowing reports and optimistic forecasts from administration spokesmen, has not taken a significant upturn. The most serious threat to our economy is persistent unemployment, and no administration program has offered any substantial relief for the 5 million unemployed. The Accelerated Public Works Act would bring direct and immediate relief to the areas of highest unemployment by providing \$2 billion in Federal funds for public works projects that have been planned by local governments but delayed for lack of funding.

This is a sensible approach and a proven program. It worked effectively in the 1960's when a Democratic administration was confronted with persistent unemployment. It is designed to provide meaningful jobs, not make-work jobs. It is a program that can create new vitality in communities where public service and construction projects have lagged far behind need because of the financial condition of local governments in this period of recession brought on by misguided economic policies at the national level.

Mr. Speaker, the unemployment rate is now at a 9-year high, at 6.2 percent, and it is incumbent on both parties to work together to put the jobless back to work. But in spite of this need to work together, the word appears to have gone out that the administration opposes this bill.

There seems to be a buildup to prepare us for the veto message. Are we to hear the President again denounce spending Federal funds in the interest of the people as "inflationary"?

Mr. Speaker, I hope that is not the case. I hope the President looks at the vote in the House and the Senate, and looks at the need of his countrymen, and signs this measure promptly so that its benefits can begin reaching our people as quickly as possible.

But if he does exercise the veto, as press reports have hinted, I sincerely hope the Congress acts promptly and decisively to override that veto.

As the original sponsor of the revised accelerated public works legislation in the Congress, I am cognizant of the inflation problems this administration must face in dealing with job-creating spending programs. I recognize the need for balance and economic discipline and joined with my colleague, Congressman JOHN MONAGAN, of Connecticut, in in-

roducing legislation to establish a temporary emergency guidance board to set us voluntary wage-price guidelines which have been advocated by Arthur Burns, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. This legislation is now pending before the House Banking and Currency Committee and I hope it will receive early consideration.

It is important to call the attention to the wide range of bipartisan support the APW proposal received during the course of hearings in the House Committee on Public Works. Few congressional proposals in recent times have received more broad-based support than this bill when it was identified as H.R. 5376. Many Governors—Democrats and Republicans—appeared in person or filed statements supporting this bill. Organized labor produced their No. 1 spokesman, Mr. George Meany, who testified at length in favor of title I. He was followed by many Members of the House of Representatives—Democrats and Republicans—who presented favorable bipartisan testimony. The committee also heard from mayors, businessmen, noted economists, county governments' representatives, farmers and environmentalist spokesmen, League of Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors representatives, city managers, and others. The list is long. My cursory review of the record of these hearings revealed that only administration spokesmen opposed this bill.

Mr. Speaker, for the record I wish to list the witnesses who appeared personally as well as those who submitted statements for the record when committee hearings were held by the Special Subcommittee on Economic Development Programs of the Committee on Public Works in the House of Representatives.

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McFALL. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak in favor of the conference report on S. 575. As an original sponsor of the accelerated public works bill in the 91st Congress I again joined with Congressman McFALL in this Congress in cosponsoring this much needed legislation which I am pleased has been included as title I of the legislation we are considering today.

The national rate of unemployment has reached a 9-year high according to figures recently released by the Department of Labor. The unemployment rate now stands at 6.2 percent which means nearly 6 million persons are out of work. The most serious threat to our economy is this persistent unemployment.

With nearly 6 million Americans out of work across the country, Congress must take concrete action to stimulate our stagnant economy and get people back to work. It is my firm belief that this bill provide a major impetus in this direction. It is not a panacea. It will focus only on the hardest hit areas where unemployment is the highest. Acceleration of public works is a proven method of providing jobs where the need is greatest.

As you know, Seattle-King County, Wash., where my district is located is one of those hit hardest by the downturn.

King County has been designated an economic development area by the Department of Commerce. The whole metropolitan area has been designated a distressed labor market by the Department of Labor.

Unemployment in the Seattle area is over 13 percent and climbing. The major factor behind the excessively high unemployment has been the tightening of Federal spending and the contraction in employment in the aerospace and lumber products industries, which represent over one-half of the total basic employment in King County. We need jobs for our people, and this bill will help.

Seattle is not alone; there are over 150 areas in the United States suffering high unemployment. This legislation is essential if we are to provide both the means and the funds to create the jobs where they are needed.

At the same time this bill will emphasize the type of project which will provide the basis for further industrial development and stimulation of the local economy.

I believe this legislation with the additions approved by the conference and the Senate last week provide a vehicle to accomplish these purposes. I urge its passage.

Mr. HICKS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McFALL. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. HICKS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I want to concur in the remarks made by the gentleman from California (Mr. McFALL) and to commend the gentleman for his interest and work on this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I wish to express my support for the conference report to S. 575 and H.R. 5376, which extends the Public Works Acceleration, Economic Development, and Appalachian Regional Development Acts. As you know, the conference report has been approved in the Senate by a vote of 45 to 33.

At the present time the most serious threat to our economy is persistent unemployment. As we are all painfully aware, during the past 2½ years unemployment in the country has nearly doubled. In January of 1969, the national unemployment rate stood at 3.3 percent. Since that time it has climbed steadily to where it has now reached 6.2 percent—the highest figure in 9 years. And despite continuing optimistic reports and predictions by the administration, many economists are saying that the situation may get worse before it gets better.

Unfortunately, these figures tell only half the story. The tragedy of 5½ million American workers without jobs is compounded by the fact that some areas have been especially hard hit with loss of jobs. They have virtually become pockets of economic depression.

For example, in the Sixth Congressional District of Washington, which I represent, there is no question that the most pressing problem is jobs. Over 12 percent of the workforce in Pierce County and 10 percent in Kitsap County are without jobs, and in my view, it is essential that we do everything possible to help get these men and women back to work.

Mr. Speaker, all three titles of the legislation before us today are aimed at shoring up our economy. Title I, the Public Works Acceleration Act, which I joined as a cosponsor with our colleague from California (Mr. McFALL), would bring direct and immediate relief to these areas of high unemployment by providing \$2 billion in Federal funds for public works projects that have been planned by local governmental units but delayed for lack of funding.

I know of several projects in my district that remain on the drawing board, victims of the financial condition of local government in this period of recession. All are essential to the district, not only because they will provide immediate employment, but because they are projects of high priority in the growth and development of these communities.

As you know, Mr. Speaker, the Public Works Acceleration Act of 1962 proved to be a highly successful economic tool for the Kennedy administration. I would today join the cosponsors of this measure in urging that the House overwhelmingly adopt this conference report to better help Congress to deal with some of the economic problems of 1971.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McFALL. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I wish to congratulate the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. BLATNIK), the chairman of the committee, and the gentleman from California (Mr. McFALL), as well as my colleagues, the gentlemen from Washington (Mr. ADAMS and Mr. HICKS), for their remarks.

Mr. Speaker, continued stagnation of the economy, which has forced a small but growing minority of our population to bear the full burden of administration attempts to curb inflation, must be ended.

Forgetting, if we could, the reduced national production and revenue caused by unemployment levels which are running at 6.2 percent nationally and double that in my own State of Washington, we cannot forget the hardships imposed on our jobless citizens and their families. We cannot forget the adverse effect this must be having on the morale of the hard-hit communities.

Congress has chosen to do something about it. I am proud to have been cosponsor of some of the legislation we have processed to shore up our sagging economy—to provide Federal help for public works projects which will speed up construction of needed facilities and put thousands of unemployed persons to work at the same time.

It is inconceivable to me that there would be any doubt about the future of this legislation. Both the House and Senate have passed it. We are now about to give the final congressional touches to it. But there are persistent rumors that the President plans to veto the bill.

Before the House passed the bill originally, I had the opportunity of conducting a 1-day conference in Yakima in the Fourth Congressional District of Washington on the need for new public facilities

and the need for employment opportunities in counties or communities hardest hit by unemployment. City and county officials from throughout the district appeared and reaffirmed the fact that many projects are ready to be undertaken if there is financing available, and that only through this route is there the opportunity for immediate action.

I urge the President to sign this bill without delay and release these Federal funds to begin relieving the miseries of unemployment which are afflicting our Nation.

Mr. MEEDS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McFALL. I yield to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. MEEDS).

Mr. MEEDS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to urge approval of the conference report on the accelerated public works bill. Holding down prices and getting people back to work is our most urgent domestic priority. The accelerated works program in this bill, of which I am a cosponsor, is a needed response to the deterioration of the national economy.

The most depressing mail I receive from the Pacific Northwest comes in the form of unemployment statistics. Behind bland numbers and escalating percentages lie thousands of individual human tragedies. By mid-May, unemployment in the State of Washington was at 11.7 percent. The rate of unemployment in parts of the Second Congressional District is nearly double that.

But those percentages include only the persons fortunate enough to be drawing unemployment compensation. Thousands more are on welfare or not seeking work because of this depression. I use the word "depression" on purpose, because it is the economic term best suited to the situation. The unemployment rate in the worst areas of my district equals the rate of unemployment there during the depression of the 1930's.

In 1930, President Herbert Hoover said:

We have passed the worst and shall rapidly recover.

In 1970, President Richard Nixon said:

Our policies have been planned to avoid a recession. I do expect that the present rate of inflation will continue to decline and that we will be able to control inflation without a recession.

Well, it is now mid-1971 and we have an incipient depression. You cannot pay off the mortgage with optimism. You cannot expect the kids to stop eating when dad loses his job. You cannot keep a payroll going on hope. But you can pay more for groceries when you're out of a job, and that is where the Nixon administration has taken us.

All of us, particularly those of us who remember from personal experience, know what happened after Mr. Hoover's misplaced optimism in 1930. In the depths of the depression, shantytowns of despair shamed our cities and were called "Hoovervilles."

In 1971, both the cities and the countryside know the despair of unemployment rivaling that of 40 years ago.

For that reason, I think we should call our cities and high unemployment areas, "Nixonvilles."

The White House has been strangely quiet lately about the constant rise in joblessness in those "Nixonvilles." Perhaps the administration is fearful that espousal of programs to increase employment will focus attention on the ineffectiveness of present programs.

But while the White House dawdles, Congress has acted. With the approval of this bill and earlier, of the emergency employment bill now before the other body, Congress has again demonstrated compassion and responsiveness in dealing with the jobless in "Nixonvilles."

This bill will provide \$2 billion immediately for projects in areas of 6-percent unemployment or worse. The Federal share in these projects would be 80 percent.

In Washington's Second Congressional District there are more than 200 public works projects already planned and lacking only funds. Among them are water and sewer efforts, flood control, docks, bridges, erosion prevention, street construction improvement, and harbor projects.

These projects would solve a dual purpose of cutting unemployment and providing communities with basic and long-neglected facilities. Obviously, these are not leaf-raking or make-work projects.

Accelerating public works projects is not a cure-all. It does not pretend to be a permanent solution. But it does offer a way of handling the problem until we get our economy going again and develop other measures necessary to solve our unemployment problem.

I think the causes and severity of this depression obligate the Government—at least the responsible branches of it—to take necessary steps to promote recovery. Administration policies have transformed parts of our Nation into "Nixonvilles." Now, it is time to try something else.

Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McFALL. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the conference report on S. 575, the Accelerated Public Works Act.

This measure, which I was pleased to coauthor in the House version with my colleague, JOHN McFALL, is aimed at putting people to work on projects which have been planned by local governments, but delayed for lack of funding.

My area, Mr. Speaker, has been particularly hard hit by unemployment, and the jobless rate has risen to 7.7 percent. These people sincerely seek work, but cannot find it. They want to provide for their families; they want to keep their self-respect; they do not want welfare—they want jobs.

The Public Works Acceleration Act, first employed in 1962, provided useful work for the unemployed, and opened areas for industrial and commercial development by providing public facilities. In its 2-year history, this act accounted for the construction of 7,769

needed projects, such as sewage treatment plants, hospitals, nursing homes, community buildings, as well as urgently needed work in our national parks and recreation areas.

The Public Works Acceleration Act, title I of S. 575, would authorize the appropriation of \$2 billion immediately to be made available to the President for accelerated public works employment through both Federal and local government projects.

Projects for assistance in the construction of basic public works for which there is an urgent and vital public need are given priority, and only Federal projects which have been specifically authorized by the Congress, or other projects which are eligible for Federal aid, are qualified for this program.

Grants can be used for three purposes: First, a grant can be used to start a project; second, to supplement an original grant made by a Federal agency; or, third, to contribute to the local share of a project to be built by a Federal agency. In the case of grant-in-aid for local public works involving local cost sharing, a grant can be made to cover up to 80 percent of the cost of such projects with a further proviso that a 100-percent grant can be made if the State or local government has exhausted its effective taxing and borrowing capacity for such purposes and, as a result, does not have the financial capability to assume all of the additional financial obligations required.

Projects are authorized for areas designated by the Secretary of Commerce as a redevelopment area or as economic development centers. In addition, an area would be eligible if the Secretary of Labor found that the rate of unemployment is 6 percent or more, and that the unemployment rate will remain at, or exceed, 6 percent during the next 2 months.

Title II of S. 575 amends the Public Works and Economic Development Act to provide Federal help in conjunction with the States—to assist communities, areas, and regions which are suffering from unemployment, by providing financial and technical assistance needed for the creation of new jobs. Its long-range objective is to enhance domestic prosperity by establishing stable and diversified local economies.

Mr. Speaker, there is a need for jobs in this country, but there is also a need for public works projects. In the President's manpower report, released in April 1971, the Department of Labor states that—

Less than one-third of the Nation's population is served by sewage systems as well as adequate waste treatment plants . . . solid waste facilities are inadequate and antiquated. It is estimated that 94 percent of existing land disposal operations and 75 percent of incinerator facilities are substandard.

This legislation is designed to meet the needs of our Nation by stimulating the construction of Federal and local public works for the dual purpose of increasing employment in areas of greatest need and helping communities to provide the basic facilities, such as water and sewer works, hospitals, road improvements, public buildings, and waste disposal facilities. This legislation would meet the

current needs of our citizens and, at the same time, pave the way for the further expansion of employment.

Mr. VAN DEERLIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McFALL. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. VAN DEERLIN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I am proud to have been a cosponsor of the accelerated public works legislation incorporated as title I of the conference report we have just adopted.

I would like to take this occasion to also salute the outstanding leadership of our colleague, Congressman McFALL, in first introducing and then rallying the forces that brought about enactment of this measure.

I know what APW did for my own San Diego area, during my first years in this body. The program literally helped put my city back on its feet, after it was clobbered by massive layoffs in the local aerospace industry.

This money was carefully placed to do the most good, while avoiding the mistake of overemphasis on airframe and related industries which led directly to the San Diego area recession of the early 1960's.

Some \$4 million in APW funds was applied to the construction of a modern new marine terminal in National City, adjacent to San Diego and also within my district. This terminal promises to become the genesis for a major industrial complex based on a flourishing world trade—economic diversification of the purest sort.

Considering our current economic difficulties, the logic of the gentleman from California (Mr. McFALL) and his more active cosponsors in promoting a revival of the accelerated public works program is impeccable.

By the same token, the reports that the President may veto this bill are, to me at least, inexplicable.

I hope these reports prove inaccurate, but on this point I am not very optimistic. Something has to be behind the increasing partisanship which has been demonstrated here and in the other body as our consideration of this legislation has proceeded.

A veto of this bill would be the most blatant kind of false economizing.

And while I am not very sanguine about what Mr. Nixon might do, I remain confident that if the worst should happen the House and Senate will do the right thing and override the veto.

Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McFALL. I yield to the gentleman from West Virginia.

Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman from California (Mr. McFALL) and also the Chairman of the Committee on Public Works, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. BLATNIK) their persistent and effective work in including the Public Works Acceleration program in this conference report. I hope this conference report will receive strong support from all over our Nation, because it contains legislation that will benefit not only the Appalachian area, but it will provide jobs

throughout the entire Nation and furnish the necessary stimulus to the economy which will help all our people.

Mr. Speaker, I hope that this report receives overwhelming support.

Last March I had the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on Economic Development of the House Public Works Committee on behalf of the Accelerated Public Works Act. This program will not only provide useful and constructive work for those who need it, but also furnish water and waste disposal systems and other public works improvements to the areas that so badly need them.

I think that most of my colleagues are aware of the highly successful Accelerated Public Works program of the 1960's that this bill would reinstitute. The program is clearly an alternative to revenue sharing, in that it will enable States and municipalities, as well as public service districts in unincorporated rural areas, to build badly needed facilities which they do not have the financial capacity to afford.

The Senate has passed the conference report on this measure, and suddenly the news is filled with rumors of a Presidential veto on this important legislation. This recalls to me similar threats that were made not too long ago when the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act was overwhelmingly approved by Congress and then sat on the President's desk while reports circulated on an impending Presidential veto. The happy ending to that story is now history, but it took a great deal of effort on the part of many people to persuade the President to sign that bill. I am ready to exert the same effort today on behalf of the Accelerated Public Works provision of this bill which will greatly benefit the unemployed in my home State of West Virginia and other areas of high unemployment.

I include at this point the text of my statement before the Public Works Subcommittee on the accelerated public works program:

STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE KEN HECHLER

Recently, I introduced a bill to ban the strip mining of coal, which has ruined the top-soil, polluted our streams, ripped out the guts of our hills and spilled them down ugly gullies. Next week will be the first week of spring and thousands of people who ordinarily welcome rain are waiting in apprehension and fear of what the spring rains will do in further damage to their land and homes.

Of course, there are thousands of people employed in the strip mining industry, and their employers have mounted a well-financed advertising campaign which contends that with the stroke of a pen I propose to wipe out an entire industry and take bread from the mouths of those who work in it. At the end of World War II, when we had over 10 million men in the armed forces, we didn't say: "Let's continue the war in order to keep these men on the Federal payroll." Instead, we decided to put them to constructive work in the peacetime economy. Likewise, strip mining is war on the environment and we must seek more constructive work for those engaged in that war.

This is one of the reasons why I so strongly support the legislation before this committee to re-institute the highly successful Accelerated Public Works program which op-

erated nearly a decade ago. This program not only will provide useful and constructive work for those who need it, but also benefits the nation and the communities thereof by furnishing badly-needed water systems, waste disposal, and other public works improvements.

This program is clearly an alternative to revenue-sharing, in that it will enable states and municipalities, as well as public service districts in unincorporated rural areas, to build badly-needed facilities which they do not have the financial capacity to afford. In our fight against water pollution, for example, the people should not be forced to drink contaminated water downstream of a community which does not have the financial capacity to build a modern waste treatment plant. At the time the accelerated public works program of the 1960's was terminated, there were still 79 West Virginia municipalities dumping raw and untreated sewage into the Ohio River and its tributaries.

It is for this reason that I hope this committee writes into the bill a priority for the award of accelerated public works grants which relate to water and sewer systems, and any project which has the effect of reducing air and water pollution or improving the environment.

Mr. KEE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McFALL. I yield to the gentleman from West Virginia (Mr. KEE).

Mr. KEE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from California for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Committee on Public Works I have had the privilege and the honor and the responsibility to serve on the two subcommittees under the unsurpassed leadership of our distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. BLATNIK), and I cannot too strongly urge the passage of this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, this legislation does one thing: it is simply an investment in the future of the America we love.

(Mr. KEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. Speaker, I would like to again commend our distinguished chairman, the Honorable JOHN BLATNIK, and the conferees for their tremendous efforts in bringing to the floor today this conference report. With minor changes, this report contains the provisions of the bill we debated here on April 21 and 22, and passed by an overwhelming majority. It is my deepest desire that we not only repeat the voting pattern of last April, but persuade by justification and logic, the active support of all Members of the House.

During the debate on April 21, many of our colleagues advocated passage and cited the grim economic statistics which made this proposal mandatory if we were to begin to attack our problems. Since that time, official statistics of the U.S. Government reveal that unemployment has reached a 9-year high, with a 6.2 percent of the labor force seeking work. This is double the unemployment figure of only 2 years ago. The way things are going, there are many in West Virginia who would feel such a figure to be an improvement—however, we must eliminate this tragic situation. Coupled with the use in unemployment is the continued and alarming rise of the Consumer Price Index. The administration suggests that

inflation is being slowed down. But, if the mortgage rate figure is deleted from the items on which the CPI is based—there is, in fact, no slowing down of this economic cancer. Experts contend that these rates will creep back up in the immediate future, offsetting any anti-inflationary trends.

As has been pointed out previously, the legislation before us contains three essential elements. Each of these has been tested by time or previous experience. Title I—the Accelerated Public Works Act—is an urgent extension of a program which proved its value after passage of the legislation in 1962. The proven results of that act are a matter of record—a matter of accomplishments.

Title II, in extending the Public Works and Economic Development Act for 2 years, the sponsors demonstrated their wisdom in supporting a program that is making headway in assisting economically depressed areas to develop productive job opportunities across the United States. Here, too, the evidence is overwhelming in favor of continuation of a program that is putting human beings back to work, while at the same time bringing into being critically needed public works.

Then there is title III. If those of you who would oppose continuation of the Appalachian Regional Development Act for another 4 years would visit the 13-State area covered by this title and see the great strides we have made already—looking backward to what our economic conditions were at the time of passage of the original act and what these conditions are today—I am sure your opposition would evaporate. But, as good as it has been, it is just a positive beginning. Much more is to be done—and must be done if the distressed people of this great area are to be relieved of their chronic problems. It has been accurately noted before that the entire State of West Virginia is under the provisions of the Appalachian Act, the only one of the 13 participating States. I know what has been done in my State. I know what must be done. Without this humanitarian bill, I am deeply concerned that our beloved Nation will slip backward, and eventually be in a more critical condition than we were in when it was first enacted.

I plead with you from the very bottom of my heart to support this forward-looking and greatly needed economic helping hand. To those of you who have successfully fought the battle—I am in your debt.

Mr. Speaker, the enactment of this conference report—properly administered—is sound investment in the future of our younger generation and those yet to come. Recorded history in the years ahead will determine the degree of our success—history will determine the degree of our failure. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, let history clearly demonstrate the fact that we are worthy of our responsibilities—and that our successors will have responsible freedom—not the bondage of anarchy. Hand in hand—we can do the job we have been elected to do.

Mr. McFALL. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. SKUBITZ).

(Mr. CONTE, at the request of (Mr.

SKUBITZ), was granted permission to extend his remarks in the RECORD at this point.)

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 5376. As a cosponsor, along with 150 of my colleagues, of legislation to amend the Public Works Acceleration Act, I am most gratified that the House and the Senate have taken swift action to continue the lifeline assistance embodied in this Act.

The job situation in the United States grows increasingly critical. Throughout every section of the country, more and more people are experiencing the frustration and humiliation of being without a means of earning a livelihood.

The original 1962 legislation was a great boon to communities throughout the Nation that were plagued by high unemployment rates. It eased their financial burdens by providing needed public facilities that made these communities better places in which to live and work. Title I of the bill we are considering today, with the \$2 billion in grants it authorizes, would stimulate a flaccid economy, put jobless people back to work, and enable local communities to proceed with long-delayed public works programs.

No one is asserting that this legislation is a long-range answer to the long-range problems that affect our economy. But the millions of persons that have been thrown out of work and are struggling to survive and maintain their human dignity cannot afford to wait for long-range solutions. Congress must meet its responsibility now by implementing immediate relief while it searches for more complex solutions that will provide the long-range economic stability that this Nation so desperately needs.

For communities that are ready with a firm plan for a badly needed permanent public facility and that are willing to begin almost immediate construction, this bill would provide the necessary impetus of Federal assistance. The construction of such facilities as municipal buildings and sewer facilities would make local areas more attractive to industry without overburdening their local tax rates.

I wholeheartedly support this vital legislation and urge my colleagues to approve the conference report on this bill.

Mr. McFALL. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. GRAY).

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Speaker, nearly 2 months ago this body debated a House-sponsored bill, a bill which listed 150 cosponsors including myself. Most of us, indeed a vast majority of us, felt at that time that this was necessary legislation and voted accordingly. Now in so short a time the compelling need for passage has been evidenced by recently released data which shows that unemployment has passed well above the 5 million mark, while inflation continues to gallop at a fast pace. Soon, if matters harming the economy are not halted and reversed, we will see more than 6 million human beings seeking and not finding work. The welfare and unemployment compensation costs of all this economic chaos will hover around \$5.5 billion, hardly any of these funds contributing to the well-being of the Nation.

Today, I again urge my colleagues to vote for this legislation, by agreeing with the conference report submitted to us for consideration. We can repeat our show of confidence in the programs contained therein. Time has proved that Accelerated Public Works Acts have been both job and project productive. The Public Works and Economic Development Act has been reviewed by the administration and they agree that it is an effective act. As to the needs of Appalachia, that region of 13 States has already shown an improvement in its economy in many areas. Some communities in Appalachia have been in a chronic state of depression for nearly a century. Imagine that, in the greatest Nation in the world, where just 2 short years ago we were enjoying an economic boom which startled the world. Where did it all go? What can we do to reverse the trend? Someone has to do something—and I suggest that the "someone" has to be in the plural in the form of the U.S. Congress. By passing this one bill we will have taken a crucial and necessary step in correcting our economic ills. There are others which will come before us for consideration in the coming months. These will be progressive and humane suggestions which should receive our deepest consideration, and if they will serve our people during their current stress, we should pass them, too.

As one of the conferees on the bill I want to commend our distinguished chairman the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. BLATNIK), and the other members of the Committee on Public Works for their hard work on this important measure. We labored to keep the key provisions of the House resolution en toto. We have succeeded. I believe the best way for us to show our appreciation would be to accept this report by a far greater margin than we did H.R. 5376. Southern Illinois and the Nation will be the beneficiaries.

The SPEAKER. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HARSHA).

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the minority Members of the House conferees urge the rejection of the conference report on S. 575. We do so in the hope that the bill will be returned to a conference between the House and the Senate in order that an amended version may be agreed upon—one which eliminates title I, the Accelerated Public Works Act Amendments of 1971.

First, let me say that the conference report insofar as title I is concerned is exactly as title I appeared in the House bill, and there are no changes therein. Title II again is predominantly the same version that passed the House with no significant change except in the criteria established for determining redevelopment areas. The conference report eliminates from the redefined special impact areas those with severe economic distress due to an occurrence of a national disaster which was one of the criteria making an area eligible because other legislation more appropriately dealt with the problems resulting from natural dis-

asters. Otherwise title II is the same as the original House version.

Title III, the so-called Appalachian Regional Development Act Amendments of 1971, has several changes in it from the form in which this phase of S. 575 passed the House. While as I have indicated there are several changes in title III which the chairman has explained, I think, by and large, they are improvements over the House version. Therefore, I will not dwell further on them except to answer any questions my colleagues might have concerning them.

In voicing opposition to the accelerated public works title, let me make it perfectly clear that I am not misunderstood in my support of the balance of the bill. I am a strong supporter of titles II and III, the extensions of the Appalachian and economic development programs. Both are ongoing, successful efforts to stem rural outmigration, to curb unemployment, and to provide much-needed capital facilities by promoting long-range development of economically lagging areas.

If this conference report is voted down, we can then return to a conference and report out an amended version of S. 575 without title I but retaining titles II and III so that we can continue both of these effective programs.

I do not want to overburden you with a repetition of the reasons why I was opposed to title I when we debated the issue originally in the House. But let me just make a few additional points to amplify my previous reasons and the reasons set forth in the report on the bill as it came out of the House Public Works Committee.

Prior to reporting the accelerated public works bill out of the House Public Works Committee, the minority had several meetings with White House officials going over the matter set out in title I, and we were told in no uncertain terms that title I was totally and wholly unacceptable to the administration. As a result, we offered several counterproposals and suggestions to modify title I in an effort to find an area to deal with this problem that would be acceptable to the administration. On each occasion we were advised that none of these suggestions or proposals was acceptable and that if the bill included an accelerated public works program, a recommendation would be made to the President to veto the bill. Reasonable minds could come to no other conclusion that if S. 575 included title I, it would be vetoed by this administration.

Acting on this assumption, the minority party proceeded accordingly. Every effort that could possibly be made was made to strike title I from the bill both during committee consideration and during floor debate and during the conference. That is one of the reasons the minority did not sign the conference report. We were of the firm opinion that if this conference report passes with title I in it, the bill will be vetoed by the administration, and we will be sacrificing two successful, ongoing programs—the Appalachian and the economic development programs.

Let me suggest to the administration that after this effort to try to find some area of compromise with the administration, after our efforts to offer the administration alternatives, after the administration's representatives indicated in unequivocal terms that the bill would be vetoed, if by some strange sequence of events the administration does not veto the bill, then insofar as I personally am concerned, there will be a great and tremendous credibility gap between the administration, its representatives, and myself.

Now let me point out to my colleagues some additional reasons why title I is not good legislation. In the first place, it is basically a resuscitation of the 1962 Accelerated Public Works Act which failed to accomplish its ultimate objectives. A total of \$1.7 billion was expended as a result of the 1962 act which created, at its peak, some 46,000 onsite jobs 2 years after the enactment of the bill. So, obviously, there is no immediate effect on unemployment if the history of the Accelerated Public Works Act is any criteria. In addition to that, we have now environmental considerations which we did not have to consider before which will further delay implementation. But as in 1962 the locus of the jobs to be created will be extended throughout the entire Nation without regard to any need for the particular types of jobs that will be created and irrespective of existing full employment in the construction industry within areas eligible for assistance which obviously will have an inflationary impact. The bill makes no effort to concentrate assistance on areas of sudden rise of unemployment on critical types of unemployment.

Let me point out to you that back in 1964 when the accelerated public works program employed at its peak some 46,000 people, it cost conservatively \$20,000 per onsite job for 1 year. Now since that time, construction costs have increased by at least 60 percent, and, therefore, we are talking about an onsite job involving the expenditure of somewhere between \$30,000 and \$35,000 per year. Thus the \$2 billion authorized in title I will produce approximately the same number of jobs that resulted from the \$900 million authorized by the 1962 act.

So what we are talking about is a program that may 2 years hence from now create 46,000 onsite jobs with the expenditure of between \$1.7 and \$2 billion. This in relation to the over 5 million people that are unemployed will not even bring about an appreciable percentage reduction to the unemployment figures of this Nation. But it will have a tremendous impact on the inflationary problems of this Nation and conceivably could result in further unemployment. But most certainly it will mean a lower level of living for those who are hit by an increasing inflationary spiral and this will hurt many times the number of people conceivably aided by this program.

Certainly, there are more economical methods, more effective methods, and more successful methods of finding work for the unemployed than this particular program.

I have stated repeatedly that resuscitation of a program that was designed originally to combat the type of unemployment prevalent in the country 9 years ago is a questionable approach for combating the kind of unemployment we have today. Furthermore, this is one of the few areas where professional economists are in agreement on the point that Federal public works expenditures are totally ineffective as a means of increasing employment quickly.

Now let me give you some other reasons why this program is not going to be a meaningful one and why it is a cruel hoax on the unemployed to paint a glowing picture of vast expenditures of Federal money giving the impression that this will alleviate the unemployment immediately and give the unemployed cause to have increased hopes. All of this will have the ultimate effect of greater disappointment than ever before when they finally realize that this is not the answer to their problem and when they fail to get a job from this program.

Assuming for argument's sake that it will be as effective as the 1962 program, then we are talking about at one period of time 46,000 jobs—which will be some time from now. But inasmuch as this bill does not endeavor to localize or focus its effect on areas of critical, professional, and technical unemployment which is the principal problem today but is scattered throughout the Nation, we are talking about an average of less than 900 jobs per State. Now what kind of impression is that going to have on unemployment in the State of Washington where you have many thousands of men and women in the aerospace industry out of work? The answer is obvious. It will have very little, if any, and it is a cruel hoax on the unemployed to offer this bill as having a significant resolution to their problems.

Let us not further complicate the problem. Let us not further add to unemployment by having titles II and III also vetoed because of the inclusion of this unacceptable and unneeded, unworkable and ineffective title I in this bill.

I urge my colleagues to reject the conference report and let us get on with the business of continuing the Appalachian and economic development programs. Do not sacrifice these two ongoing, successful measures.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. CLEVELAND).

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, the conference report before us really brings three issues before the House.

Title I is the Accelerated Public Works Act.

Title II is the Public Works and Economic Development Act.

Title III is for Appalachia.

As one who has supported the Public Works and Economic Development Act, I find myself in a difficult position of voting against the conference report which will include that program.

My feelings about Appalachia have been made clear on several occasions, and I shall not go into that aspect of the problem at this time. As Members know, I have frequently pointed out that al-

though the Appalachia program has enjoyed some success, it is objectionable to me, at least, because it is somewhat unfair. It discriminates against those regions of the country that are not included in its purview, yet need the same type of help.

I have frequently pointed out that perhaps northern New England needs this type of support. It is true that has been partially taken care of by the regional concept. However, the New England regions get very little when compared to Appalachia. As recently as 2 months ago, when we adopted this legislation, the House refused to include northern New York in the Appalachia region. This highlights the fact that the Appalachia legislation is discriminatory. Northern New York is not even in one of the poorly financed regions.

The first section of the legislation which is most objectionable is the Accelerated Public Works Act. The ranking Republican member of the Public Works Committee, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HARSHA), has ably set forth the reasons why this legislation is unwise, why it is unwarranted, why it is hopelessly expensive, and why it will not accomplish what its stated purpose is.

There is a good deal of discussion now about the credibility gap, and a good deal of discussion about the fact that people are losing respect for our institutions, such as the Congress, the White House, large businesses and other of our institutions.

I always feel sad when the Congress aids and abets this credibility gap by passing legislation that does not do what we say it is going to do.

Mr. Speaker, we have an important debate coming up later in the afternoon. In the interest of time I ask unanimous consent to include in the RECORD at this point the minority views on H.R. 5376, as they set forth in some further detail some of the objections to the Accelerated Public Works Act.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Hampshire?

There was no objection.

The minority views are as follows:

MINORITY VIEWS ON H.R. 5376

We favor the basic objective of title I of H.R. 5376, which is to alleviate the unemployment in depressed areas of the Nation, but we are opposed to enactment of this title as it is now written. We endorse the extension of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 and the Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965 under titles II and III of the bill. The programs under these two acts have proven to be effective for their purpose of offering long-range economic planning and development to the lagging areas of the country. Both programs are under sound management, and the original acts have been refined to deal with the complex problems they are designed to relieve.

Title I attempts to relieve today's unemployment problems by use of a 9-year-old law. The present funding of this emergency type legislation, which was enacted in response to specific problems existing in 1962, cannot possibly meet today's needs which are substantially different. Bare unemployment statistics are approximately the same today as they were in 1962, but the types of unemployment are different. Title I of H.R. 5376

is an attempt to find a simplistic solution to a complex question. Simplistic solutions just don't solve complex problems. In our opinion, the objectives of title I, however commendable and worthwhile, cannot be obtained by this legislation. Good intentions are not an acceptable substitute for good legislation.

We are opposed to the enactment of title I, which would resurrect and amend the 1962 Public Works Acceleration Act, for the following reasons:

1. It will provide little help for those who have lost their jobs in aerospace, defense, and other technical industries, as a result of the transition from a war-time to a peace-time economy.

2. Implementing and statutory time delays will prevent any real acceleration of public works construction.

3. It will thwart efforts to curb inflation.

4. The President's budget for fiscal year 1972 already provides for a \$1.4 billion public works outlay increase over the previous fiscal year, which will produce accelerated public works spending for fiscal year 1972. The President has additionally requested \$2 billion waste treatment plant construction grant authorizations for each of the fiscal years 1972, 1973, and 1974, which annual authorizations are double the amount appropriated for fiscal year 1971.

5. It is feared that high hopes of the unemployed will later be dashed to disillusionment when the highly advertised job expectancy is not realized.

LITTLE HELP FOR UNEMPLOYED IN AEROSPACE, DEFENSE, AND TECHNICAL INDUSTRIES

Title I addresses itself to the national unemployment problems of today. This title takes an aggregate view of the problems, and the remedies it offers imply that the types of unemployment are the same throughout the country. But unemployment problems in rural areas are not the same as the unemployment problems in the urban areas; nor are the problems the same throughout the country. Indiscriminate Federal spending would be applied to the construction of public works projects in areas statistically lagging in employment, in the unsupported hope that such spending will solve short-range unemployment. We do not think this is sound reasoning. We cannot conceive of such a simple program employing at the same time unemployed unskilled laborers and unemployed aerospace engineers and other persons highly skilled in specific limited functions.

For example, at recent hearings on H.R. 5376, witnesses from the States of Kansas and Washington described the economic plights of people in these two States. These two witnesses insisted that accelerated public works was the answer to their respective problems. But what was omitted from their testimony was emphasis on unemployment in their areas' basic industry—aerospace. Wichita is the site of many aircraft companies, which employ 56 percent of the total work force in the area, and 25 percent of the total work force are employed on Government projects alone. With such a large portion of the work force employed by a single industry, it is little wonder that this town in Kansas would clamor for aid when fluctuations occur in this particular industry. Public works construction projects are no substitute for aerospace programs.

Washington, particularly Seattle, is plagued by the same problem. The city's economy is closely tied to the aerospace industry. And when that industry sneezes, Seattle gets pneumonia.

There are other areas in this country suffering from high unemployment which do need public works projects. Such projects, referred to by economists as social overhead capital, aid an area tremendously in maintaining and expanding their long-range economy. Street improvement, sewage lines,

water systems, and the like are basic criteria for multilevel economic growth. Unemployment, however, follows a pattern independent of the need for social overhead capital. Title I does not take into account these complexities. It assumes, erroneously, that existing short-range unemployment will be substantially alleviated by public works construction projects, and this assumption, as pointed out earlier, is largely based on the premise that substantial numbers of the unemployed are construction workers.

At best, it appears that only 1 percent to 2 percent of those unemployed would be employed by the proposed accelerated public works projects, because the skills of the unemployed labor force in many areas cannot be easily adapted to the construction trades. Additionally, since the construction industry is extremely mobile, construction laborers may be imported to take the jobs created by such accelerated public works construction projects.

If the efforts of this committee in favorably reporting this legislation are aimed at reaching the hard block of unemployed people, it will not succeed, because of the large group of new unemployed from the aerospace, defense-oriented, and other technical industries.

Many of these people are highly skilled; they are trained for more advanced work than unskilled and semiskilled employees on public works construction projects.

We believe that the great bulk of the new unemployed identified by most of the witnesses who testified before the subcommittee will not be helped by this particular legislation.

TIME DELAYS

A second, and equally important, point is that construction projects by title I will not, to any appreciable extent, provide new jobs immediately. Significant employment gains under the Public Works Acceleration Act, enacted in 1962, did not occur until 9 months after the Act was signed into law. The time lag resulted from administrative and planning delays that apparently could not be avoided in implementing the program. This obviously would not meet the objective of the committee or the sponsors of the legislation—to provide immediate short-range employment. Certainly, with a time lag of 9 months, or more, the Accelerated Public Works Act would not meet that objective.

We foresee, in fact, even greater delays in the commencement of construction of projects as a result of environmental legislation. For example, Section 102(1)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 requires that the applications for all major projects significantly affecting the quality of the human environment must be accompanied by an environmental impact statement, which includes:

- (1) the environmental impact of the proposed action;
- (2) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented;
- (3) alternatives to the proposed action;
- (4) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and
- (5) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.

These highly technical and detailed statements require careful preparation and often require voluminous supporting data, which may take months to develop by engineers, environmentalists, psychologists, and other specialists. The act further provides that prior to making a detailed statement, the responsible officials shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental

impact involved. Copies of the statement and comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, are required to be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality, and to the public, and all of these documents must accompany the project application through the agency review process. These statutory requirements, alone, can add many months to the time required for the processing and approval of project applications.

The immediate creation of public works construction jobs, to relieve short-range unemployment, appears impossible to achieve under title I of this bill.

INFLATIONARY PRESSURES

Title I would primarily stimulate activity in the construction industry. Average hourly earnings in the construction industry increased 8.4 percent from 1968 to 1969, and 9.2 percent from 1969 to 1970; whereas the average hourly earnings increases in the manufacturing industry for the same periods were 6.0 percent and 5.3 percent respectively. Thus, the construction industry not only experienced a much larger increase in average hourly earnings for the same period, but a growing increase as well. There are many inflationary pressures in the construction industry, and to add a \$2 billion 2-year construction program, as proposed by this title, would dampen efforts being taken by the administration to combat inflation.

Since public works construction projects to be financed by title I would take up to 3 years, after initiation of applications, to complete, substantial portions of the \$2 billion authorized to be appropriated for the 2-fiscal-year period 1972 and 1973 would enter the economy during fiscal years 1973 and 1974. This can overheat the economy at a time when there may be far less unemployment. In addition, the wages that will ultimately flow from these construction projects may go into areas that are depressed today, but which will have achieved greater economic strength at the time of actual construction. The President's full employment budget for fiscal year 1972, which includes an increase of \$3.2 billion over fiscal year 1970 for public works construction, and the President's efforts to stimulate the economy through fiscal and monetary policy, also will have their most significant impact on the economy during this period. The President's program is calculated to achieve full employment with price stability. The addition of the \$2 billion public works program authorized by title I of H.R. 5376 will add substantial fuel to the fires of inflation and thus counteract many of the beneficial long-range effects of the President's program.

PRESIDENT'S ACCELERATION OF PUBLIC WORKS CONSTRUCTION

We would further emphasize that the President's budget for fiscal year 1972, which has been submitted to the Congress and which will be implemented beginning July 1 of this year, provides its own acceleration of public works construction.

It contains a \$1.4 billion increase in outlays for public works projects in fiscal year 1972 over corresponding outlays for fiscal year 1971. This increased expenditure in 1972 will be reflective of action already taken by the President to combat unemployment.

Also, the President has submitted to Congress a request for authorizations for appropriation of \$2 billion for construction of waste treatment works for each of the fiscal years 1972, 1973, and 1974. Recognizing the importance of the environmental protection and enhancement that will result from the construction of these projects, he has further requested that the entire \$2 billion to be authorized for fiscal year 1972 be appropriated.

This is twice the amount ever appropriated

for this program for any year heretofore, and, when coupled with the \$1.4 billion increased public works spending previously referred to, presents a far more adequate method of funding an accelerated public works program than that contained in title I of this bill.

HIGH HOPES TO DISILLUSIONMENT

The Comptroller General of the United States reviewed 497 projects constructed under the Public Works Acceleration Act, which was passed in 1962. The review disclosed that drastic overstatements of expected employment had been made for these projects. Whereas 50,853 man-months of on-site employment had been estimated to be created by these projects, only 27,345 man-months were actually realized.

A report of this review, which was submitted to the Congress, shows, first, that the administration of the Public Works Acceleration Act did not produce the results hoped for and, second, that Congress cannot rely upon the validity of estimates of expected successes and accomplishments to be realized from this program.

Much propaganda accompanied the introduction of this legislation in an effort to convince the public that it will expeditiously meet the current unemployment problem. We are gravely concerned that many people will be disillusioned when their needs are not met by this legislation.

It would be most unfortunate, even cruel, if the hopes of the unemployed were raised by heralded announcements of bounteous jobs under title I only to be struck down later by the reality of unemployable specialized skills, statutory delays, and inflated expectations.

WILLIAM H. HARSHA.
JAMES C. CLEVELAND.
FRED SCHWENGL.
WILMER (VINEGAR BEND) MIZELL.
JOHN H. TERRY.
CHARLES THONE.
LAMAR BAKER.

SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS ON H.R. 5376

We respectfully disagree with the frequently tenuous and, at times, partisan rationales set forth in the majority report to justify enactment of title I of H.R. 5376. In our view, the fundamental causes of the employment difficulties, which the accelerated public works title seeks to alleviate, antedate this administration. As we see it, they are three in number:

1. A failure, extending over many decades, to formulate and implement effective programs to overcome the social and economic handicaps faced by literally millions of undereducated, undertrained, undervalued and underemployed Americans;
2. Fiscal irresponsibilities over the better part of the last decade which had the effect of unleashing almost unbearable inflationary pressures and strains which the present administration has struggled valiantly, and with some success, to overcome; and
3. The welcome scaling down of our involvement in Vietnam and the consequent agonies of shifting from a war to a peacetime economy.

Foreign policy involvements, specifically as they relate to defense, influence the economic activity and condition of the country. A recent history shows, our economy experiences expansion during war and a slowdown immediately following deescalation of a war. The economic slumps of 1946 and 1953, for example, were the result of the slowdown in military spending on war-related goods. Foreign policy also affects fiscal policy. Both influence the economy, although they do not control it. Defense production played a major role in stimulating the Nation's economy in the sixties, largely because of the escalation of the war in Indochina. Although the economy prospered and the Nation enjoyed a low level of unemployment, the Federal budget

soared as increased expenditures were financed by deficit spending.

In addition, during this feverish period, certain sectors of the economy grew too rapidly. The rate of investment grew much faster than the rate of consumption. Artificial support was given to many war-related materials and facilities. When these stimuli and supports were removed as a result of deescalation of the war, and when we began returning to a peacetime production, the entire economy had to shift gears. As the demand for guns shifted to a demand for butter, investment tapered off and plants began producing at less than capacity. Our present economic difficulties are, in large measure, the result of this changeover of the Nation's priorities.

Unfortunately, the shift of the economy from wartime to peacetime production could not take place overnight. Investment in new plant construction and visible demand for peacetime goods takes time to emerge, both in the private and the public sector. We applaud the administration for its courageous stand in winding down the war, although we deeply regret the hardships caused by the interruption of production of war-related goods and the loss of jobs in defense industries it has necessarily occasioned. Regrettably, the report on title I of H.R. 5376 does not give adequate recognition to these factors.

The promotion of economic growth requires good judgment. All things considered, we believe that outlook for the economy is bright. Further, we believe the President's prediction of an improving and expanding economy is realistic. The administration has formulated sound goals for stimulating greater private consumption and lessening emphasis on war-related public consumption. It has recognized the need to combat the present rate of inflation.

Moreover, just as we recognize the loss of jobs through cutbacks in defense-related production, so too must we recognize the high level of skills that such jobs require. Thus it is not prudent to predict success of this program to alleviate unemployment without taking into account the types of skills the unemployed we seek to help possess. We must bear in mind that skilled technicians, as well as the young, the untrained and the uneducated, are the ones for whom this program is designed.

At the same time, we must bear in mind the admitted shortcomings of the Accelerated Public Works Act of 1962. Skepticism of the effectiveness of that measure to provide jobs for the jobless and to stimulate consumer income and expenditures has already been noted in the majority report. It was also highlighted in a report of the Comptroller General of the United States which stated that, as of November 1, 1963, a review of projects showed an overstatement of actual onsite man-months of employment realized from the program of from 33 to 128 percent, depending on the size of the project. Such discrepancies between promise and performance must be borne in mind if the \$2 billion of the taxpayers' money this committee has authorized is to be wisely spent.

Our caution in this regard is prompted by the fact that no compilation of actual accomplishments was ever made of the Accelerated Public Works Act of 1962. Nor is it known how many direct and indirect jobs were actually created by the program. In-depth studies were never undertaken. We believe they should have been.

We therefore urge that if this measure is enacted into law it be considered a test of the viability of the accelerated public works concept and that continuous and careful legislative oversight should mark its implementation at all levels.

A final observation is in order. No accelerated public works program can possibly succeed unless we deal forthrightly with the

question of environmental impacts. Administrative delays in complying with environmental standards which the Congress has established would undoubtedly slow the initiation of countless projects. Required approval procedures are cumbersome and time-consuming. While the President may be able to streamline them somewhat, they cannot be dispensed with. Thus, if we are serious about alleviating unemployment through accelerated public works, we must come to grips with the environmental impacts problem.

An amendment was offered in the executive session of the committee to do just that. Under its provisions, the five criteria of section 102(1)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 would be considered to have been met if the Governor of the State in which the proposed project is located certified that priority construction was in the best public interest. We believe that such an exception is mandatory. As a practical matter, it is inconceivable that this program can succeed without such a provision.

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Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, for the benefit of those Members who will not have an opportunity to read in detail the views I have just inserted in the RECORD, I should like to point out there would be little help in the Accelerated Public Works Act for the type of unemployment that plagues many parts of the country the worst. The defense-related industries are the most noticeable example.

In my own district I might point out that the highest rate of unemployment is coming not only in the defense-related industries but also in those areas where foreign imports, built with very low wages under labor conditions which are shocking, are gradually putting people out of work, and far faster than any other single cause. I refer to the electronics industry, the ball bearing industry, the textile industry, and the shoe industry as notable examples.

I would suggest to my colleagues in the Democratic Party that if they are really interested in unemployment, they should get to work and pass trade legislation which would cope with this very difficult problem. The delays in time which were so explicitly touched on by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HARSHA) are detailed in the minority report, and I will not discuss them.

There is one additional point I would like to make as I conclude my remarks. The President has already asked for a far greater expenditure in public works than has been the case in recent years. He has also asked for an additional \$1 billion for the construction of water pollution abatement plants. The President, in other words, has already asked for about the same sum as in the Accelerated Public Works Act, but for proven, ongoing programs. That is the point I want to make in concluding my remarks. The battle against water pollution alone could absorb the skills and men who are out of work due to the transition toward a peacetime economy.

We have here a great irony. The Public

Works Committee, both the full committee, under the chairmanship of the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. BLATNIK), and the oversight committee, under the chairmanship of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT), at the present time are investigating the delays in the construction of public works because of redtape, because of Government agency duplication, and because of requirements which are imposed by the Congress or by the agencies.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.

Mr. CLEVELAND. The Public Works Committee is exercising at long last this very important oversight function. As a result of the hearings, as the record stands at the present time, it is an indisputable and undeniable fact that most of the Federal programs that would be accelerated under the Accelerated Public Works Act are already so bogged down in Federal requirements, congressional requirements, and redtape that the purpose of this act could not be conceivably implemented within the next 12 months, if then.

I suggest to Members of Congress, if they really want to help the unemployed, they should devote themselves, as the Committee on Public Works is doing now, to the fact that our Government is becoming so complicated, so top heavy, with a piling up of power on the banks of the Potomac, and so unresponsive to the needs of the people that we cannot implement the programs which we now have, let alone start up a new one. It is a sad commentary that Congress after all our years of experience stoops now to the sorry expedient of just passing another program. Instead, we should get to work on the hard task of making some of the programs we already have work as they are meant to.

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Iowa (Mr. SCHWENGEL).

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the report.

I cannot present any better arguments than already have been presented by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HARSHA), who has been our leader in this fight, nor the others who have already spoken on this subject today and previously.

The principal argument by those on the other side in promoting this report is that we are going to deal with unemployment. I yield to no one in my desire to deal with the unemployment problem in America. Neither does any other person on this side or, for that matter, any Member of Congress. However, I think there are factors that have to be noted here to be sure we are doing the right thing the right way.

One thing that bothers me about the approach in this legislation is what it will do to our fiscal matters in this country. I sincerely believe and many competent people believe that the inflation which this bill will cause will penalize more people and diminish the income of more people than it will help.

Mr. Speaker, any penalty which we impose in this manner upon the 22 million people on social security is a tragedy.

At best—and the testimony has been presented to us already very well—somewhere between 1 and 2 percent of those unemployed would get jobs as a result of the adoption of this conference report at some later date, probably a much later date.

So, Mr. Speaker, this program that we call the accelerated public works program is not accelerating very much.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to have the Members of Congress give real serious thought to this and to what it will do and probably you then will agree that it is, as our leader has said, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HARSHA), a cruel hoax, holding out hope for the unemployed that will never be realized. There are better answers to this problem. The gentleman from New Hampshire just put his finger on the monetary situation when he pointed out that we are discovering in our oversight hearings the complications and the irresponsibilities, the cumbersome-ness which prevails in Government which makes it impossible for us to use funds now available that could be used to deal more effectively with unemployment while we are making a public contribution to the welfare of this country.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge the Members of this House to vote against this conference report and let us get on with the two most important sections of this legislation which have proven themselves.

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. Speaker, let me explain the parliamentary situation which exists on the floor at the present time. The other body has already adopted the conference report. We have only two votes; that is, either a "yea" or "nay" vote here. A "nay" vote does not mean we are voting to kill the programs contained in titles II and III. If the "no" vote is sustained, under the parliamentary procedure as I understand it, the chairman of the full committee would ask for the appointment of new conferees and they would then return to meet with the conferees of the other body and report out another version of this bill.

I just wanted to point out that a "no" vote does not mean a vote to kill titles II and III.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. BOGGS).

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, first, let me congratulate the chairman of the Committee on Public Works and the members of that committee for this very excellent conference report.

The report incorporates much of what was in the original bill introduced by the gentleman from California (Mr. McFALL) and cosponsored by 150 Members of this body on both sides of the aisle.

Mr. Speaker, the main attack here is made on title I. Let us for a moment see what title I seeks to do and ascertain whether or not it is as bad as the opposition makes it out to be.

Mr. Speaker, I have heard over and over again for many years the expressions "wasteful spending," "pork barrel

projects," ill-considered programs," and others.

Mr. Speaker, these terms do not apply to this bill. These projects have passed the test of economic value, and have been soundly planned and engineered on the local level, both for the large cities and the small rural towns all over the United States.

This bill seeks to make it possible for these communities to go forward with their projects for sewerage, drainage, public buildings, necessary transportation facilities, and so forth.

Mr. Speaker, local communities are not able to meet these obligations today. We have experienced exorbitant interest rates in the United States in the past 2 years. These rates are so high that one of two things has been happening in most cities of this country: Either a community cannot sell its bonds to finance its projects because the cost of money exceeds its constitutional limitation, or it has become so impoverished because of unemployment, economic stagnation, and all the related problems that confront us today in this country that it is unable to raise the necessary funds.

I heard the distinguished gentleman from Ohio and some of his colleagues say that this bill would not really do anything. He used several figures on the number of jobs that it would produce. I am not in a position to affirm or deny the gentleman's figures, but I would say this: even if it were very few, never mind the figures the gentleman from Ohio mentioned, it would still be meritorious legislation.

The tragedy of unemployment in this country, Mr. Speaker, is that it should occur at a time when so much needs to be done. We can approach this problem from one of two points of view. We can continue to allow what we have now; namely, unemployment increasing and interest rates continuing to go up. Incidentally, I made a statement here about a month ago about interest rate increases and some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle stood up and denied it. Well, the interest rates have continued to go up. They went up yesterday and the stock market went down, and so did the bond market.

So I say, Mr. Speaker, we can either stand by or we can take constructive steps such as in this bill, and in the Public Service Employment Act we passed last week, and in other bills that will soon come before us here like welfare reform. We can do it this way, constructively, bringing back into the labor force the people who are now unemployed—because each job here generates four of five additional jobs—we can do that, which is a tradition in our free enterprise system, or we can go ahead and increase the rolls of the unemployed, extend unemployment insurance from 4 or 5 weeks to 7 or 8 weeks, and bring no help or hope to the unemployed.

So, Mr. Speaker, I say that we should do it the way this bill proposes to do it. I hope this conference report is overwhelmingly agreed to.

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, my good friend, the distinguished majority leader, has said that these are good projects that would be constructed all over the country. Certainly there has been no effort on our part to criticize the type of projects that are to be constructed, or the type of facilities that are to be constructed. They are worthwhile facilities. Our criticism is directed at the ineffective way of getting at the unemployment problem.

The distinguished majority leader says that these would be constructed all over the United States—well, if this program is as effective as the last program we will have an average of 900 jobs in each State. That conceivably could not make any imprint or cause a decline in the total unemployment in this Nation.

It is not the question that 46,000 jobs are unimportant, because they are important. The point is that there are more effective and efficient ways to spend \$2 billion to try to generate jobs. Certainly, when we spend from \$30,000 to \$35,000 per year to generate one job, that is a very inefficient and ineffective method of doing it. It can only compound the inflationary problems of this Nation. It will mean that those least able to pay for this extravaganza are forced into a lower standard of living. It will further erode the meager income of those on fixed incomes, those existing on social security and other retirement programs. It will harm far more people than it will help and probably compound our present economic problems.

Let me point out again to my colleagues on the other side that the contractors and the construction people who do this sort of work are what you might call mobile employers and employees. They do a job here and then they take another job over here and they do not necessarily have any impact on unemployment in fixed local areas because they are from other areas and they move from job to job. So you are not getting at the local unemployment through this.

Then let me make one further point, Mr. Speaker, and that is this—the distinguished majority leader mentioned, if I understood him correctly, that school construction could be provided by this program.

In the legislation itself it says that no part of any allocation made by the President under this act shall be available for any planning of or construction directly or indirectly of any school or other educational facility. So, it will not bring any relief to the need for additional school facilities, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HARSHA) has consumed 3 minutes.

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the distinguished gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. CLEVELAND) 1 minute.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, I would like to comment on the remarks of the distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. BOGGS). He spoke of not only this approach which I do not feel is the right approach to the unemployment problem, but he spoke of other legislative proposals, some of which we have already dealt with and some of

which we will deal with in the future. Although he did not mention it today, I hope he will include in his roster of legislative approaches some sound trade legislation. In my district, and I am sure in many other parts of the country, much of the unemployment besides that caused by shifting from a wartime to a peacetime economy, is caused by cheap foreign imports. These imports are putting out of business many of our industries. They are putting out of work many people, even in highly skilled and technological fields. Until we face up to this problem there will be no long-term solution to unemployment.

Mr. KLUCZYNSKI. Mr. Speaker, as we debate this conference report today, let us remember that while the national rate of unemployment has reached 6.2 percent of the total labor force, many communities have much higher rates than this national average. In some areas this percentage has reached the horrendous figure of one-third of the available work force. Now no community, or economic area, can afford such a state of affairs. Should this rate of joblessness continue for any length of time entire tax bases will evaporate. Public services will suffer. Communities will not even be able to raise money through bonding authority—a condition which already exists in many places.

I support all three titles contained in S. 575, as shown in the conference report. However, I would like to discuss the merits of title I of that proposal. It is to those communities which I mentioned and which we can justifiably describe as economic disaster areas that title I is addressed.

When, in 1962, the Public Works Acceleration Act was enacted, the criteria for Federal financial participation varied from 50 to 75 percent for those areas considered to be special hardship cases. At that time we realized the need for an economic shot-in-the-arm to turn around what was becoming a years-on-end drop in the construction of vital and necessary public works and a growing unemployment rate in these places. With the act in being we saw that an economic turnaround was accomplished in many of these communities, and that these benefits continued right on until 2 years ago. But experience revealed that even as generous as we considered the 1962 act, many communities still were not brought along, since they could not even match a 75 to 25 percent participation rate. Realizing this the sponsors of this legislation have written provisions into the new extension of the act to provide for a 100 percent Federal financing where communities have exhausted their taxing and bonding limits, while raising the 50 percent minimum to 80 percent. Authorizing the expenditure of \$2 billion over 2 years, this money will create thousands upon thousands of jobs, take people off the relief rolls, enable human beings to regain their dignity, and result in the construction of thousands of badly needed public works.

Remember that no one group is immune today from the blight of unemployment. Not only laborers, skilled and otherwise, but skilled construction workers,

engineers, physicists, planners, managers and executives are searching for employment, many so desperate they are willing to do anything to earn sufficient money to care for their families. These are bleak times for more than 9 million unemployed in this country, not to mention the millions of others who constitute their families. When the time comes to vote on this conference report, remember that for many of them you are offering a way back to productivity and self-respect.

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Speaker, today the House must act on a measure which is important to hundreds of thousands of unemployed Americans. I refer to the conference report on the Accelerated Public Works Act cosponsored by Senator JENNINGS RANDOLPH and Congressman JOHN MCFALL. I was proud to have sponsored this far-reaching bill in the House. It was gratifying to see the House move swiftly and efficiently in preparing this legislation for consideration by the Members. Now, there is but one last hurdle to overcome in making this drastically needed measure a working reality, and that is the vote in the House today and the President's signature.

Mr. Speaker, this is a proposal which received overwhelming bipartisan support in the House, and it is clear to me that if such a resounding majority of the elected Representatives of the people of this Nation are in favor of this measure, it should be implemented as soon as humanly possible. We have heard how this bill is inflationary, how it creates make-work jobs, and how it does not fulfill the promises which served as its impetus. Yet, the simple truth is that public works has always played an integral part in the economic development of this country since the early days of the Republic. Through 1960, Federal appropriation to the Corps of Engineers for construction and maintenance of navigation, flood control, and multipurpose projects totaled about \$13 billion. The point is simple. Public works programs have always been part and parcel of the American way of life. The measure before the House today continues that tradition. The Randolph-McFall accelerated public works bill allocates money to high unemployment areas, where municipalities have already definite plans for badly needed permanent public facilities, where communities are able to finance the local share of construction, and where communities can guarantee that a high percentage of the construction cost will be labor. This bill is no substitute for sound fiscal and monetary policies which must provide the long-range cure for curbing unemployment and inflation. But it can serve to generate economic activity and relieve the anguish and misery of unemployment now plaguing millions of our people.

I ask my colleagues to direct their attention to the unemployed people of our Nation, who seem to have been forgotten. People who are skilled and eager to use these skills in the construction of projects beneficial to the entire community. People who are tired of listening to

hollow excuses about the inflationary risk of public works legislation. And people who must be reassured that the Congress of the United States is committed to a program of assistance and encouragement which will provide them with some sort of security for the future.

There have been reports from supposed high administration sources that if this measure passes the House, the President will use the veto power to thwart the Congress. I ask that my distinguished colleagues from both sides of the aisle ignore this Executive sword of Damocles and act in good conscience. I ask that the House of Representatives take action which will preserve its integrity and instill in the American people confidence in their elected Representatives.

This body has a mandate from the people. As a coequal branch of government, it can and must act in a way which will justify the implicit faith conveyed with that mandate. The Randolph-McFall accelerated public works bill should be recorded as one of the plus marks of the 92d Congress. If we are to be recorded as a Congress that cares, we must meet the task before us and give our unequivocal support to this desperately needed legislation.

Mr. STAGGERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise to urge speedy action on the conference report presented by our conferees on the Public Works Acceleration Act. I have full confidence in the good judgment and discretion of our conferees, and I believe they have produced the best bill that can be enacted at this time.

In a written statement to the House subcommittee working on this bill back in March, I emphasized the necessity of sustaining the forward drive of industrial development in my home State of West Virginia. Numerous small enterprises were being started, and there was good hope for general improvement all over the State. Rising unemployment tended to place a damper on business confidence, however, and it was my contention that a speedup in public works projects was the best—and only—way of taking up the slack in demand for workmen.

Since March we have been shocked by additional business reverses and consequent layoffs. Railroad passenger service cancellations and Lockheed suspensions are examples. The situation is critical. We need job openings. It would be wrong to permit our State and all the other States to slide back into a really serious depression again.

Public works projects are ready for funding immediately. At least 46 of our 55 counties have already developed rural water and sewer programs. They have been approved for action. If funded immediately, the transfusion of Federal money would put new life into a weakening economy. In addition, several major projects involving internal waterways, if accelerated, would put paydays where they are needed.

I support the conference report.

Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, it was almost 6 months ago when I joined 150 of my colleagues in cosponsoring a bill to amend the Public Works Acceleration Act. Although provisions of that bill,

which this House approved 320 to 67, have since been included in title I of S. 575, as amended, the situation which originally prompted us to initiate that legislation has, it appears, changed very little. If anything, in fact, it has worsened.

At that time unemployment stood at 6 percent. Now, 6 months later, it is more than 6 percent. We are all of us inured to statistics, and to many 6 percent is merely another statistic. But I would like to remind you that statistics have a way of translating themselves into people—in this case, millions of people who desperately need and want jobs. This statistic has also translated itself into an increase of nearly another million persons who have had to turn to public welfare in the last year to sustain themselves. Finally, it has translated itself into a vast and growing sum of money which must be paid in unemployment compensation.

I would also like to remind you of what the President said in his state of the Union message back at the time this legislation was first proposed. He said, and I quote:

By spending as if we were at full employment, we will help bring about full employment.

Now, I am led to believe, there are indications the President may veto this legislation—legislation specifically aimed at increasing employment opportunities while spurring the construction of long-overdue public projects. Frankly, I find this difficult to understand.

First of all, legislation of this type has proven extremely effective in the recent past. This is not a new or pioneering effort the administration might be reluctant, for some reason, to undertake. Second, it is likely to allow the construction of public works and systems which are now 2 and 3 years behind schedule. In the case of sewer systems, I might add, the damage caused by 2 years of neglect often requires 10 years and much more money to overcome. Finally, the proposed legislation is geared to accelerate public works—and employment—in the very areas of this country where the physical and moral damage caused by high unemployment is most prevalent.

I know there are some who have referred to the results this legislation will accomplish as mere "cosmetic treatment." They claim it will not serve the needs of many of the highly skilled who are currently unemployed. But the work this bill is designed to create is not make-work. It will require skills in all professions and the trades. Furthermore, I know in my State, Oregon, where there are some areas with unemployment substantially above 6.2 percent, that these people need an opportunity to earn a living, and they need it now.

Consequently, Mr. Speaker, I hope it is the will of this body to indicate a commitment to the proposed legislation strong enough to preclude any Presidential inclination to veto it. I hope also that if and when he considers it, the President has the insight to look not only at the expressed will of Congress but beyond the statistics to the people themselves.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, I take enormous pleasure in the House of Representatives' approval today of the conference report on S. 575. This bill, which extends the vitally needed programs authorized under the Economic Development Act and the Appalachian Regional Commission, has another equally—and to my State, possibly more—important aspect.

I refer to title I, the provisions of the Accelerated Public Works Act, of which I am a cosponsor with the Honorable JOHN J. McFALL, of California, and more than a third of the other Members of the House of Representatives.

Efforts to have the Accelerated Public Works Act amended to provide urgently needed relief to economically depressed areas have been underway for nearly 6 months. The support in the House for the measure was gratifyingly bipartisan, as was the bill's sponsorship.

There has been growing support in many segments of our national life for enactment and operation of the accelerated public works title of this bill, as well as the other titles.

For that reason, recent developments relating to the portion of this legislation which would directly increase the stimulation of a flabby economy are especially alarming. I refer, of course, to the character of the Senate vote favoring the conference report on this legislation. First, the count was 45 to 33 in favor of the report. This seems a poor showing of support for the thousands of deserving persons who would directly benefit from the expenditure of the \$2 billion authorized under title I of the bill alone.

More importantly, the Senate conference report vote was almost entirely along partisan lines, with the Republicans opposing it. This, combined with some of the unjustified reservations about the bill voiced by its Senate opponents and persistent reports in the mass media that President Nixon may veto the bill is alarming.

In the past, under Democratic administrations, the accelerated public works program has worked to strengthen a sagging economy while providing urgently needed public facilities. I find it difficult indeed to understand why a knowledgeable public official would oppose reasoned, logical and proven programs which deal only in public good.

This bill has been 6 months in reaching this stage. The aid it would provide is needed now—not at the end of some undetermined time which would be required for passage of a substitute proposal which might be the favorite of the administration.

The Congress, I feel, is to be congratulated for taking this situation in hand and passing this legislation. I would urge even speedier and more positive action should President Nixon choose to veto this bill.

Mrs. GRASSO. Mr. Speaker, the conference committee report on the Accelerated Public Works Act of 1971 deserves our approval.

While we consider other measures to strengthen the economy, the critical need at the moment is to ease the burden of unemployment. The Sixth District in

Connecticut, which I represent, is experiencing severe economic depression and joblessness which accounts for three of the largest cities having an unemployment rate in excess of 12 percent.

The Accelerated Public Works Act of 1971 is designed to aid those unemployment impacted communities as designated by the Secretary of Labor. The bill includes Federal assistance to many cities and towns not previously eligible. It also provides that core areas within cities can get Federal help even if the city as a whole is not eligible.

These provisions make this bill a particularly significant one. However, the prospect of a Presidential veto looms heavily over this vital legislation which would bring direct and immediate relief to the areas of highest unemployment in the Nation.

In recent days "high, unnamed administration sources" have been quoted as predicting that the President will veto the bill. Does this mean we are being prepared for another Presidential veto? Are hundreds of thousands of unemployed workers, including many in the Sixth District of Connecticut, going to be denied this opportunity to secure good jobs during a time of urgent need?

I hope this is not the case. Public works legislation has provided needed employment in the past. The current economic distress nationwide demands a revitalization of the Accelerated Public Works Act to push forward public works projects that are needed and have been denied in many communities.

If the President vetoes this important legislation, I will work hard to have the Congress help our unemployed by overriding that veto.

Mr. DULSKI. Mr. Speaker, I support fully and enthusiastically the conference report on S. 575, the accelerated public works bill.

This is a vitally important measure to deal with the heavy unemployment conditions which have developed in many of our communities across the Nation in recent months.

There has been a steady increase in the number of areas in our country—including my own area of Buffalo and the Niagara Frontier—where unemployment has risen to the crisis level.

Indeed, unemployment has reached a 9-year high of 6.2 percent and it is incumbent upon all of us to work together to put the jobless back to work. The bill as it emerged from the House had bipartisan support which is an indication of the realization on the part of Members from all parts of the country of the need for Federal action to deal with the acute unemployment problem.

Data from the Labor Department shows unemployment continuing to increase in labor markets across the country and there are now 55 major areas included in the some 700 labor markets which have an excess of 6 percent unemployment. Included among the major areas is my own metropolitan area of Buffalo, N.Y.

Mr. Speaker, the House and the Senate supported this measure in differing versions and the conference committee

has come up with a very reasonable and acceptable compromise which I believe merits the support of every Member of the House.

I urge the adoption of the conference report.

Mr. BEGICH. Mr. Speaker, it is with pleasure that I rise to join a great number of my distinguished colleagues in support of the conference report on S. 575. This legislation, which includes the Public Works Acceleration Act, the Economic Development Act extension, and the Appalachia Development Act extension, represents a major effort by Congress to do for the economy what the administration has promised but failed to do.

The programs proposed in this legislation are in direct response to a national economic crisis. Specifically, this bill is aimed at reducing the highest unemployment the United States has experienced in a decade. The programs are straightforward and proven by prior practice. I think the House recognized these virtues when it passed parts of this bill by large majorities earlier in this session.

It is strange, then, that we meet today to consider this important bill with the knowledge that our actions very possibly will be vetoed by the President. While I fervently hope this does not happen, and believe it would be a great tragedy if it did, I urge all Members of the House to pass the bill by such a wide margin that the administration can only undertake a veto in the knowledge that it is destroying something of very great value to our country.

Because so many able men have spoken on all aspects of this bill, I do not intend to dwell on those aspects which have been discussed so ably already. I would, however, call attention to section 209 of the bill which deals with the extension of the Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in Alaska. This lesser-known feature of the bill is both important for Alaska and representative of a sound approach to development planning in any area.

The Field Committee was created in 1964 to study development factors in Alaska with special regard to the way in which different levels of government and different agencies could function together to best contribute to a sound pattern of development. In the years since that time, the Field Committee has become an important contributor to the life of Alaska, and it would be with the greatest regret that I would see its role terminated.

From the beginning, the Field Committee had the advantage of being only a planning agency without programs or grant funds to administer. The value of this status was demonstrated repeatedly, and could serve as a lesson for the establishment of future regional development planning agencies.

The Field Committee has also benefited from a cooperative membership of nearly every Federal department having major responsibilities in Alaska. This includes HEW, HUD, Transportation, Labor, the sponsoring Commerce Department, and several others. The benefits of this interagency approach cannot be overstated.

Finally, the Field Committee operates cooperatively with all levels of the State and local government, and with the academic and private sectors. The final result is a web of cooperating arrangements which permit an extremely well informed and comprehensive approach.

At the conclusion of all this, the question is: What is the Field Committee? Clearly, it is a successful experiment in the effort to provide Federal assistance in regional development planning. It has made contributions in nearly every phase of Alaskan life by providing high quality information and thought on a wide range of subjects.

The material produced by the committee has been the basis for State and Federal legislation, and in the past few weeks, the committee has published a major work on the economic outlook for Alaska and a strategy for future economic development.

That the Field Committee is included for your consideration in S. 575 is a tribute to the House Public Works Committee, and its able chairman, Mr. JOHN BLATNIK, who recognized the merits of continuing the operation of this valuable agency. Were it not for this special effort, the administration would have buried the Field Committee long ago. The fact is that the Bureau of the Budget is committed to the idea that there is no further function for the Field Committee to serve in Alaska, and continues to oppose the appropriation of any funds to continue its operation.

In view of the record of service of the Field Committee and the job that remains to be done in Alaska, I am at a loss to understand opposition to what is an extremely modestly funded program. If investments are to be judged by future returns, then the Federal Field Committee is a bargain of the first rank.

I would make it very clear that this innovative organization for development planning will not remain unchanged. It is certainly my intent, as well as that of others from Alaska, that the Field Committee eventually be integrated into two important areas of concern for Alaska. The first is the implementation of the recommendations of the Public Land Law Review Commission, which will have a strong impact on the vast public land area of Alaska. The second is the settlement of the Alaska Native land claims, and the integration of the settlement into the pattern of life in Alaska.

In my view, the most desirable course would be for the Field Committee to offer the vehicle of transition into whatever organization is formed to deal with these two important areas of concern. Passage of this bill today brings this desire very close to reality.

In summary, both the major parts of this act—S. 575—and section 209, which is so important to Alaska, offer similar virtues and are extremely timely in view of serious needs. Both are threatened by administration disapproval.

When the vote on this question is over, I feel certain that the conference report on S. 575 will have been approved by an overwhelming margin. The result will be that Congress will have done its job in providing responsible solutions to severe

economic problems. Should the administration still seek to veto these measures, then the responsibility for that action will be clear. I strongly urge approval of this legislation, and commend the gentleman from both Houses who labored in the conference room.

Mr. TIERNAN. Mr. Speaker, I am extremely pleased to rise in support of the conference report on S. 575, which includes title I of the House-passed Accelerated Public Works Act.

While I have no doubt that this body will adopt the conference report, I am concerned over the partisan nature of the Senate vote and the possibility of a similar vote here. Unemployment is not a partisan issue. It exists in every corner of every State in this Nation. The unemployment rate is presently 6.2 percent, a 9-year high, and it is imperative that we work together to provide additional jobs.

Two days ago President Nixon directed Secretary of Labor James Hodgson to "launch a new intensive effort to find jobs or provide training for returning Vietnam veterans." In a letter to the Secretary, Mr. Nixon stated:

This is an effort which I consider to be of the highest priority in federal manpower and training programs, and of such importance that every available program should be used to the maximum toward achieving its goals.

I would remind my colleagues that this conference report before us is wholly consonant with the President's directive. It was my amendment to title I which included those areas with unemployment of Vietnam veterans 25 percent above the national average rate of all unemployment for 3 consecutive months or more, as one of the eligible areas for assistance under this bill. The rate for veterans 20 to 29 years old, including 85 percent of our Vietnam veterans, for the first quarter of 1971 was 10.8 percent. This certainly meets the criteria in the bill.

I urge my Republican colleagues to support the conference report on S. 575 and to urge the President to sign it into law.

Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Speaker, there are 150 Members of the House who have co-sponsored the accelerated public works bill in the House. This would have the provisions of that bill included as title I of S. 575.

Certainly, titles II and III which extend the Economic Development and Appalachia Acts are important.

These provisions are designed to help our sagging economy which has not taken a significant upturn in my opinion.

Persistent unemployment, as has been pointed out time and again, is the most serious threat to our economy. We believe that no program which has been offered offers substantial relief for the 5 million Americans who are unemployed.

Most of the measures which we are asked to consider are simply applying a band-aid to a major illness.

The Accelerated Public Works Act is a proven program which would bring direct and immediate relief to the areas of highest unemployment.

It would provide meaningful jobs and allow construction of needed public

works projects which will be of lasting benefit.

Our unemployment rate is at a 9-year high.

It is my hope that this bill will pass, and it is my further hope that it will not be vetoed, as has been rumored.

This measure is an important one, and its passage is important to the economy of this Nation.

Mr. MIZELL. Mr. Speaker, I rise at this time to express my support for the motion to recommit the accelerated public works bill to the conference committee for the purpose of striking title I from that bill.

There are two excellent reasons for deleting that provision from the bill. First, title I is an irresponsible, costly, and ill-conceived effort to reduce unemployment by creating dead-end jobs at an estimated average cost of \$35,000 to \$40,000 per job.

Despite the great amount of money that would be expended in this project, it would have no real impact on the unemployment problem. Until we begin to revamp our entire manpower approach, rather than attacking unemployment with expensive, ineffective stopgap measures like this one, we can hold little hope for success.

The second reason that title I should be eliminated from the bill is the fact that by its inclusion the entire bill, which provides for continuation of some of the Government's finest programs, will be placed in jeopardy.

The Appalachian Regional Commission, the title V regional commissions, and the Economic Development Administration must all be extended by the Congress within 15 days, or their authorizations will expire.

I would hate to see the 92d Congress become the executioner for a group of programs, born in such great hope and now maturing with such great success.

But this could be the case. There are indications that President Nixon will veto this bill if title I is not taken out. He believes, as I do, that title I is not the remedy for unemployment its sponsors say it is.

I see no reason why this controversy should have to involve the development programs that have proven themselves effective to Members on both sides of this aisle.

I sponsored legislation to extend the Appalachian Commission for another 4 years, because I believe it is the best all-around agency of the Federal Government and deserves the right to complete its mission—the social and economic redevelopment of the vast Appalachian region.

To let this program and its worthy companions go by the wayside because of the title I controversy would be a disservice to the people these agencies serve so well and to the agencies themselves.

I urge my colleagues to join with me in supporting this motion to recommit the bill, strike out title I, and then bring out a clean measure for regional development that all of us can enthusiastically support.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I

urge the approval of the conference report of S. 575, extending the Appalachia and Economic Development Acts. Title I of this act includes the provisions of the Accelerated Public Works Act which I cosponsored. It is of particular significance because it attacks our serious unemployment problem.

In spite of frequently expounded official statements concerning an upturn in the American economy, the gross national product declined in 1970 for the first time in 12 years. Unemployment now stands at a 9-year high of 6.2 percent. As compared with the unemployment figure from the first quarter of 1969, the first quarter of 1971 shows a 73.5 percent increase. There are presently over 5 million unemployed nationwide, while in January 1969 this number was 2.6 million. The 24th Congressional District has not escaped the administration's mis-handling of the economy. As of mid-February, unemployment was 9.1 percent of the civilian work force which is a 2.1 percent increase over the figure of 1 year ago.

Title I of S. 575 is a weapon which can be utilized to combat difficulties in two areas of the domestic sphere. This bill is designed to assist economic development areas, major labor market areas, and "poverty pockets" that have a history of persistent unemployment reaching the level of 8.75 percent and above. As a pump-priming proposal, it would filter over \$1 billion into local areas for the building of facilities such as sewer plants and municipal buildings which would act as added incentives to industrial development in the areas to be served by this legislation. Thus, this proposal would act to improve the national employment situation by creating more jobs at the local level. In addition, it would help alleviate the financial burden which many communities are facing in attempting to satisfy the needs of their citizens for improved facilities.

Although reports and rumors have conveyed the President's proposed intention of vetoing this bill, I cannot believe that in good conscience he can ignore the plight of our unemployed, the unmet needs of our communities, and the faltering performance of our economy. The economic situation of this country is too dire to allow the enactment of remedial legislation to be stymied by political considerations.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, the public works bill now before us contains several sections aimed directly at helping boost our sagging economy and helping local people help themselves.

Title I is known as the accelerated public works program which will touch directly those local government projects now awaiting funding. What this means in terms of local impact is best demonstrated in terms of thousands of meaningful jobs which will be generated.

With unemployment now at a 9-year high, it is significant that a similar approach to nagging unemployment was employed in the early 1960's and it worked.

Also contained in this bill are provisions to extend the Economic Development and Appalachia Acts. Both of these programs have proven their worth and

are effective in the kind of self-help efforts which mean so much to people.

Despite these worthy provisions, there are reports this fine legislation faces the veto.

I hope this is not the case. This measure is not inflationary. To the contrary, it is anti-inflationary in that it will provide jobs, give a boost to local economies, and will make available badly needed local facilities.

To make these things available is not inflationary. It is an example of a concerned government acting in the interests of all the people.

It should be passed by this body and it should become law with the President's signature.

Mr. BRADEMÁS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the conference report on S. 575, legislation extending the Appalachia and Economic Development Acts and including a major provision which would revive the accelerated public works program.

This latter proposal is especially significant during the present period of high nationwide unemployment because it is designed to put unemployed men and women back to work on constructive projects in the public interest.

The accelerated public works concept—which makes additional Federal funds available for construction and improvement of public facilities—was successful in combating high unemployment a decade ago. Other achievements of the program—the public buildings and facilities constructed under accelerated public works projects—still stand today as a symbol of its success.

I am pleased to say, Mr. Speaker, that I served as a cosponsor of the new Accelerated Public Works Act when it was introduced in the House earlier this year. I wholeheartedly endorse it now.

So it is distressing to me, Mr. Speaker, to hear warnings that President Nixon may veto this badly needed legislation.

Unemployment in America should not be a partisan political issue. With nationwide unemployment now at a 9-year high of 6.2 percent of the work force, and with a seasonally adjusted unemployment rate of 7.3 percent in my hometown of South Bend, Ind., I say to you, Mr. Speaker, that it is time Congress acted to arrest spiraling unemployment.

I would hope, Mr. Speaker, that the administration would agree that it is time to act and give its full support to desperately needed legislation to create employment in America, such as the Accelerated Public Works Act and another important measure, the Emergency Employment Act.

The President, in vetoing the employment and manpower bill last December, cast a Christmas chill over the millions of jobless men and women in America.

As you know, Mr. Speaker, the unemployment situation has worsened since then.

I call on the President, and both Democrats and Republicans in Congress to give serious thought to the plight of the jobless in America as they consider the measure before us today.

Indeed, Mr. Speaker, I urge that we all give our strong support to this conference bill so that we can begin to get these

men and women off of unemployment rolls and into a productive role building a greater America.

Mr. McKAY. Mr. Speaker, the House today passed the conference report on a vital piece of legislation designed to relieve communities in economic distress, thereby doing all that can be done by this body in this vital area—the Randolph-McFall accelerated public works measure.

I hope the administration heeds the views of the House on this bill. It deserves the support of all persons concerned with our present economic problems. Unemployment is immeasurably destructive to those affected by it, and that is why I have supported public works acceleration from the beginning of this Congress. When the Senate passes on the conference report the Congress will have taken all the steps it can. It will then be up to the President. In my opinion it would be unthinkable for the President to veto this bill if he is genuinely concerned about unemployment. The bill has the broadest support from labor, industry, and local government officials and will provide Federal grants to go for approved public works projects. This will be of great value to the people of my district where unemployment problems are on the increase.

This is not a giveaway program. Rather, it provides needed public works projects, thereby giving emergency relief long-term benefits. The capacity of communities to accommodate future economic growth is thus increased and the long-term tax base broadened.

Areas designated as redevelopment areas or economic development centers as well as those areas that have suffered substantial unemployment will receive needed funds with the money going to the areas that are most in need.

In my State of Utah—this program will be of great benefit to the majority of the counties in my district. Weber and Carbon Counties are examples of areas now having significant unemployment problems.

This bill should also create jobs for young people in our rural areas and reduce the concentration of jobseekers in congested urban areas where competition is keen and opportunities are limited.

I would urge the President to take prompt action on the accelerated public works bill as a step in getting at the causes of our present economic woes.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support the conference report on S. 575, the Appalachian Regional Development Program Extension.

As is well known, the bill before us now contains a great deal more than an extension of the Appalachian Regional program, important as that program is. Titles I and II of the pending bill would extend the Economic Development Act and the Public Works Acceleration Act. In most important respects, the conference report is identical to the House version, H.R. 5376, which the House passed on May 22 by an overwhelming vote of 319-67.

Most of the discussion about S. 575 has centered around title I, the Public Works Acceleration Act activation. What we

are addressing in these provisions, Mr. Speaker, are two of the most urgent domestic problems: unemployment which has reached a 9-year high, and pressing need for public facilities in communities throughout the Nation.

This title authorizes the appropriation of \$2 billion immediately for accelerated public works projects of various kinds. It has been estimated that this part of the measure alone would generate about 420,000 jobs. Moreover, the public facilities to be constructed are themselves badly needed, but the communities involved cannot afford them.

There have been indications, Mr. Speaker, that administration opposition to title I of this bill might bring about a Presidential veto of the entire package. This threat, if real, is unfortunate, especially in view of the strongly bipartisan nature of the group of House Members who supported the bill originally. Expressed in the most favorable way possible, the administration seems to be saying, "Yes, we are concerned about unemployment, but this is not exactly the way we want to deal with it." The only proper response to that is to note the disagreement but to insist that action be taken. The Congress cannot, must not, sit idly by, waiting for Presidential initiatives, while 5 million Americans who want to work cannot find jobs.

Mr. Speaker, this bill will create substantial numbers of jobs. It will create needed public facilities of many kinds. Perhaps most importantly, it will create a sense of hope among those millions of presently unsuccessful job-seekers, because the Congress is addressing and responding to their problems.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I urge the immediate and overwhelming approval of the conference report on S. 575.

Mr. MINISH. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the conference report to H.R. 5376, the Public Works Acceleration Act. The Congress, by moving this vital legislation toward enactment in such an expeditious manner, has demonstrated its firm commitment to the reduction of our tragically high level of unemployment.

Unemployment now stands at a 9-year high of 6.2 percent. Despite glowing reports and optimistic forecasts from administration spokesmen, the economy continues to stagnate. The executive branch has yet to offer any constructive program to assist the Nation's 5 million unemployed.

The Accelerated Public Works Act will bring direct and immediate relief to the areas of highest unemployment by providing Federal funds for vital public works projects.

Mr. Speaker, I sincerely hope reports which indicate that this measure will fall victim to a veto are incorrect. The plight of our jobless millions should not be the subject of partisan controversy.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. Mr. Speaker, the persistent unemployment which many parts of our Nation have been experiencing for several years now has festered beyond a hardship confined solely to the unemployed and their families. It has become a cancer which is eroding away

the economic vitality of our Nation and undermining the revenues available for public projects and services.

The impact of this persistent unemployment has been that many of our States and local governments have fallen behind in their services to the public. Communities across the Nation need such vital projects as sewage and water treatment plants to meet the increased pressures for cleaner water, and those needing these projects the most are those communities whose spending efforts are crippled by unemployment. Furthermore, many of these communities also have immediate needs for more public service workers, and they cannot afford to pay them.

Only the daily administration of sound economic principles to encourage business investment and hence more jobs can attack unemployment head on. All of the best advice of the Congress and the public cannot assure that this will be done.

But, it seems to me, that we, here in the Congress, can break this cycle of unemployment by treating its effects. We can stimulate more construction of public facilities and we cannot help local and State governments hire more public service workers.

By treating these symptoms of unemployment, we can—and I stress, with a massive program beyond mere first aid—revitalize our economy and create more jobs.

Governmental investment in the public sector is a recognized means for stimulating economic growth. With national unemployment soaring to 6.2 percent, there should be no doubt that now is the time for the Federal Government to give the economy a transfusion, and that is why I urge that we pass the Accelerated Public Works Act.

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Speaker, this conference report is brought to us by the majority party as legislation to help cure the unemployment problem, and we all know that there is no more sensitive political issue than the matter of jobs. It would be a simple and cheap political trick to equate opposition to this conference report with lack of concern for the creation of job opportunity, and it would, therefore, be very tempting to vote for this conference report for political gain.

However, I have enough confidence in the people to believe they will see the difference between fundamentally sound legislation and that which is not.

I am of course in favor of the extension of the economic development program, which is title 3 of the bill. It is title I to which I object. Title I is basically a recap job on the 1962 Accelerated Public Works Act which failed to accomplish its objective. It is reliably reported that a total of \$1.7 billion was spent under that 1962 act, which at its peak resulted in the creation of only 46,000 onsite jobs. This was a tax cost of \$20,000 per onsite job for 1 year.

Construction costs have increased by 60 percent since that time. Therefore, the creation of one onsite job today would mean the expenditure of over \$30,000 per year. Thus, we are now called

upon to authorize the expenditure of \$2 billion, which, on the basis of past experience, would create these 46,000 on-site jobs in 2 years. These 46,000 jobs should be contrasted against the 5 million unemployed people, and thus contrasted, it is obvious that there would not be sufficient employment created to even affect the percentage of unemployed.

Utah has one-half of 1 percent of the Nation's population. One-half of 1 percent of 46,000 is a mere 230 jobs which just might be created. The effect upon unemployment obviously does not justify the expenditure of \$2 billion, which would agitate inflationary pressures, thereby endangering present jobs and further adding onerous tax burdens upon those people now employed.

It is politically tempting to vote for this bill, and then shout that it is a vote in favor of jobs and against unemployment. However, to cast a vote for political gain would obviously be a political fraud.

Mr. ROYBAL. Mr. Speaker, thank you for the opportunity to express my support of the amendment to the Public Works Acceleration Act which would make the full benefits of this act available to workers in areas of very high unemployment. As a cosponsor of the bill, I believe the House should take immediate action in assuring that those laborers in severe economically depressed trades will be assured of productive employment in the public sector when the private economy fails to employ their talents. With over 40 major labor market areas now experiencing substantial unemployment, compared to only six a year ago, passage of this bill is essential in order that local communities be permitted to employ these workers in projects of benefit to the local area which have not been undertaken due to lack of funds.

By providing 80 percent grants-in-aid to assist these communities to initiate such badly needed public improvements as sewer plants, municipal buildings, and recreation areas, the Federal Government will also be relieving the increasing burden on the local tax rate. It is important to note, however, that this program will be of limited duration and is not intended as a long-range cure for the alarmingly high unemployment rate. Rather, the legislation is intended to stimulate local communities to make permanent improvements in their public facilities and to foment the development of local industries by making these areas more attractive places for people to live and work.

I urge my fellow Members to support this innovative approach to ameliorating the effects of our current economic crisis, and recognize that the time has come to seek new remedies for the chronic illness of high unemployment plaguing our economy.

Mr. COTTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the conference report on the Accelerated Public Works Act, the EDA extension and the Appalachian regional development programs.

I know that there are threats that the President will veto this necessary legislation, but I support this conference report and I will work to override any veto.

Quite truthfully, Mr. Speaker, I do not know how there could be a veto of this necessary legislation. We have all heard that the current national level of unemployment is 6.2 percent and, unfortunately, my district exceeds this national average.

It is heartless to throw men and women out of work to support an "economic game plan" that has proven so inadequate in combating inflation. The administration's game plan has created a recession and an employment crisis. The administration has striven for relief of special big business groups through preferential tax breaks and now proposes to bail out Lockheed.

The President has not utilized the power voted to him by Congress to control inflation by across-the-board wage-price and profit controls, but has relied instead on tight money and unemployment to cool off inflation. The result is that there continues to be tragically high unemployment, continuing inflation and a foreign money crisis.

In light of our economic situation, I believe that the President would be ill-advised to veto legislation that attempts to provide some tangible relief from the ravages of pressing economic problems.

This conference report forwards the effort to relieve the economic distress assailing our Nation. First, it provides State and local governments with the ability to continue the construction of vital public works projects. At a time when State and local governments are concerned that they will have to cut off necessary projects because of other demands, this legislation offers the means to fund such projects. By gearing these projects to areas of high unemployment, the bill assists in lessening the unemployment crisis that afflicts many of our States, cities, and towns.

Mr. Speaker, I was privileged to join with other Members in introducing this legislation and it has my strong support.

The other programs, EDA and Appalachian regional development, continue to demonstrate that they are effective means to combat economic stagnation. They should be approved.

I urge the strongest support for this conference report and I am confident that the President will sign these bills given our economic problems.

These bills are not partisan attempts to make political capital, but they reflect the best in the American tradition of nonpartisan effort to face our current economic crisis. These bills are soundly conceived and can be supported. For this reason, I believe that this conference report should be passed by an overwhelming vote today.

Mr. DIGGS. Mr. Speaker, updating the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 would serve as a boon to the economically hard-pressed areas of the Nation. The economic slowdown, which is taking heavy tolls across the country, strikes an alarming high in the poverty pockets of America.

With the present unemployment at 6.2 percent, the black and the poor are the hardest hit. Historically, blacks have comprised 20 percent of the Nation's unemployed, although they comprise only 11 percent of the labor force. In re-

cent years, the rise in unemployment has been phenomenal. In 1969, unemployment among blacks totaled 517,000 and, by 1970, had reached 750,000.

As of May 1971, in Detroit alone, figures show that 139,000 of the total working force are unemployed. This statistic represents 8 percent of the total Detroit working force. Blacks account for one-third of this number—an estimated 45,000 unemployed.

Support of S. 575, which provides for \$2 billion in Federal funds for local public works projects is one way of combating the startling unemployment situation. If the bill were updated and amended, it could be an effective tool in easing the strain of rising unemployment by providing much-needed jobs in the area of the construction trades.

It is not sufficient to hope that the economy will take an upswing and automatically eradicate the woes of unemployment. It is imperative that we set into motion legislative measures designed to bring about needed changes.

It is my contention that S. 575, which proposes to provide jobs in the area of public works, will bring about a measure of relief for those who have felt the ravages of recession the most.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks in connection with the conference report on S. 575.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

Mr. BLATNIK. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the conference report.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the conference report.

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 275, nays 104, not voting 54, as follows:

[Roll No. 134]

YEAS—275

Abourezk	Broomfield	Dorn
Abzug	Broyhill, N.C.	Downing
Adams	Burke, Mass.	Drinan
Addabbo	Burlison, Mo.	Dulski
Anderson,	Burton	Duncan
Calif.	Byrne, Pa.	du Pont
Anderson,	Byron	Eckhardt
Tenn.	Cabell	Edmondson
Andrews, Ala.	Caffery	Edwards, Calif.
Annunzio	Carney, N.Y.	Ellberg
Ashley	Carney	Evans, Colo.
Aspin	Carter	Evins, Tenn.
Aspinall	Celler	Fascell
Badillo	Chamberlain	Flood
Baring	Chappell	Flowers
Barrett	Chisholm	Ford,
Begich	Clancy	William D.
Bell	Clark	Forsythe
Bennett	Clausen,	Fountain
Bergland	Don H.	Fraser
Bevill	Clawson, Del	Frenzel
Biaggi	Conyers	Frey
Biester	Cotter	Fulton, Pa.
Bingham	Cuiver	Fuqua
Blanton	Daniels, N.J.	Galifianakis
Blatnik	Danielson	Garmatz
Boggs	Davis, Ga.	Gaydos
Boland	Davis, S.C.	Gialmo
Bolling	de la Garza	Gibbons
Brademas	Delaney	Gonzalez
Brasco	Dellenback	Gray
Brinkley	Diggs	Green, Oreg.
Brooks	Dingell	Green, Pa.

Griffin	McKinney	Roe
Griffiths	McMillan	Roncalio
Gubser	Macdonald,	Rooney, N.Y.
Gude	Mass.	Rosenthal
Hagan	Madden	Roush
Halpern	Mahon	Roy
Hamilton	Mann	Roybal
Hammer-	Mathis, Ga.	Ryan
schmidt	Matsunaga	St Germain
Hanley	Mazzoli	Sandman
Hanna	Meeds	Sarbanes
Hansen, Idaho	Metcalfe	Saylor
Hansen, Wash.	Mikva	Scheuer
Harrington	Miller, Calif.	Seiberling
Harvey	Miller, Ohio	Shipley
Hastings	Mills, Ark.	Shriver
Hathaway	Mills, Md.	Sikes
Hawkins	Minish	Sisk
Hébert	Mink	Skubitz
Hechler, W. Va.	Mollohan	Slack
Heckler, Mass.	Monagan	Smith, Iowa
Henderson	Moorhead	Spence
Hicks, Mass.	Morgan	Stafford
Hicks, Wash.	Morse	Staggers
Hillis	Mosher	Stanton,
Hogan	Moss	James V.
Hollifield	Murphy, Ill.	Steed
Horton	Murphy, N.Y.	Steele
Howard	Natcher	Stephens
Hull	Nedzi	Stubblefield
Hungate	Nichols	Stuckey
Hunt	Nix	Sullivan
Ichord	Obey	Symington
Jacobs	O'Hara	Taylor
Johnson, Calif.	O'Konski	Teague, Tex.
Jones, Ala.	O'Neill	Thompson, Ga.
Jones, N.C.	Passman	Thompson, N.J.
Jones, Tenn.	Patman	Thomson, Wis.
Karth	Patten	Tiernan
Kastenmeier	Pepper	Udall
Kazen	Perkins	Ullman
Keating	Pettis	Van Deerlin
Kee	Peyser	Vander Jagt
Keith	Pickle	Vanik
Kemp	Pike	Vigorito
King	Pirnie	Waggonner
Kluczynski	Poage	Waldie
Koch	Podell	Watts
Kyros	Preyer, N.C.	Whalen
Landrum	Price, Ill.	White
Leggett	Pryor, Ark.	Whitten
Link	Pucinski	Widnall
Long, Md.	Quillen	Wilson,
Lujan	Railsback	Charles H.
McCloskey	Randall	Wolf
McCormack	Rees	Wright
McDade	Reid, N.Y.	Wyatt
McDonald,	Reuss	Yates
Mich.	Riegle	Yatron
McEwen	Roberts	Young, Tex.
McFall	Robison, N.Y.	Zwach
McKay	Rodino	

Clay	Gettys	Rogers
Collier	Grasso	Rooney, Pa.
Collins, Ill.	Hays	Rostenkowski
Conte	Helstoski	Runnels
Corman	Kuykendall	Ruppe
Dellums	Lennon	Satterfield
Denholm	Long, La.	Scherle
Dent	McClary	Stokes
Donohue	McCulloch	Stratton
Dow	Mathias, Calif.	Talcott
Dwyer	Melcher	Veysey
Edwards, La.	Mitchell	Wampler
Flynt	Pelly	Wyman
Foley	Purcell	Zablocki
Fulton, Tenn.	Rangel	
Gallagher	Robinson, Va.	

MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND RESERVE STRENGTH AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972

Mr. YOUNG of Texas. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules and on behalf of my distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. COLMER), I call up House Resolution 470 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. RES. 470

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 8687) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed four hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. YOUNG of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. SMITH), pending which I yield myself such time as I may require.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 470 provides an open rule with 4 hours of general debate for consideration of H.R. 8687, the military procurement authorization bill for fiscal year 1972.

The purpose of H.R. 8687 is to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1972 for military procurement, research and development, reserve strength, and other purposes.

A total of \$13,911,900,000 is authorized for procurement. Of this amount, \$6,532,500,000 is authorized for aircraft for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force; \$3,645,300,000 is authorized for missiles for the several branches of service; \$3,328,900,000 is authorized for naval vessels, of which \$14.6 million is for advanced procurement for the nuclear-powered guided-missile frigate; \$176,400,000 is for tracked combat vehicles; \$193,500,000 is for torpedoes; and \$35,300,000 is for other weapons.

The legislative committee reduced procurement funds for the main battle tank program \$59.1 million; increased procurement funds for the F-111 aircraft \$112 million; reduced the request for the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile \$92.5 million; reduced the Navy's authorization for aircraft \$24.4 million; reduced the Navy's request for torpedoes and related support equipment by \$12 million; and made several other de-

So the conference report was agreed to. The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Andrews of North Dakota for, with Mr. Robinson of Virginia against.
Mrs. Dwyer for, with Mr. Collier against.
Mr. Hays for, with Mr. Camp against.
Mr. Dent for, with Mr. Abbutt against.

Until further notice:

Mr. Abernethy with Mr. Brown of Ohio.
Mr. Corman with Mr. Pelly.
Mr. Zablocki with Mr. Cederberg.
Mr. Casey of Texas with Mr. Kuykendall.
Mr. Donohue with Mr. McClary.
Mr. Rogers with Mr. Talcott.
Mr. Rooney of Pennsylvania with Mr. Wyman.
Mrs. Grasso with Mr. Conte.
Mr. Gettys with Mr. Wampler.
Mr. Flynt with Mr. Mathias of California.
Mr. Foley with Mr. Ruppe.
Mr. Helstoski with Mr. Scherle.
Mr. Alexander with Mr. Veysey.
Mr. Dow with Mr. Collins of Illinois.
Mr. Gallagher with Mr. Stokes.
Mr. Stratton with Mr. Clay.
Mr. Fulton of Tennessee with Mr. Satterfield.

Mr. Purcell with Mr. Lennon.
Mr. Melcher with Mr. Rangel.
Mr. Rostenkowski with Mr. Dellums.
Mr. Denholm with Mr. Edwards of Louisiana.
Mr. Runnels with Mr. Long of Louisiana.

Mr. BURLESON of Texas changed his vote from "yea" to "nay."

Mr. RARICK changed his vote from "yea" to "nay."

Mr. O'KONSKI changed his vote from "nay" to "yea."

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

PERSONAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Mr. DULSKI. Mr. Speaker, I have missed several rollcall votes. Had I been present and voting I would have voted "yea" on rollcall No. 106.

I would have voted "nay" on recorded teller vote No. 113 and on rollcall vote No. 114; I would have voted "yea" on rollcalls Nos. 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, and 131.

PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON RULES TO FILE CERTAIN PRIVILEGED REPORTS

Mr. YOUNG of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Rules have until midnight tonight to file certain privileged reports.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

NAYS—104

Anderson, Ill.	Fish	Price, Tex.
Archer	Fisher	Quile
Arends	Ford, Gerald R.	Rarick
Ashbrook	Frelinghuysen	Reid, Ill.
Baker	Goldwater	Rhodes
Belcher	Goodling	Rousselot
Betts	Gross	Ruth
Blackburn	Grover	Schmitz
Bow	Haley	Schneebeli
Bray	Hall	Schwengel
Brotzman	Harsha	Scott
Brown, Mich.	Hosmer	Sebelius
Broyhill, Va.	Hutchinson	Shoup
Buchanan	Jarman	Smith, Calif.
Burke, Fla.	Johnson, Pa.	Smith, N.Y.
Burleson, Tex.	Jonas	Snyder
Byrnes, Wis.	Kyl	Springer
Cleveland	Landgrebe	Stanton,
Collins, Tex.	Latta	J. William
Colmer	Lent	Steiger, Ariz.
Conable	Lloyd	Steiger, Wis.
Coughlin	McClure	Teague, Calif.
Crane	McCollister	Terry
Daniel, Va.	McKevitt	Thone
Davis, Wis.	Malliard	Ware
Dennis	Martin	Whalley
Derwinski	Mayne	Whitehurst
Devine	Michel	Wiggins
Dickinson	Minshall	Williams
Dowdy	Mizell	Wilson, Bob
Edwards, Ala.	Montgomery	Winn
Erlenborn	Myers	Wydler
Esch	Nelsen	Wylie
Eshleman	Poff	Young, Fla.
Findley	Powell	Zion

NOT VOTING—54

Abbutt	Andrews,	Camp
Abernethy	N. Dak.	Casey, Tex.
Alexander	Brown, Ohio	Cederberg

letions and revisions in proposed spending authority.

A total of \$7,963,312,000 is authorized for research, development, test, and evaluation, as follows: for the Army, \$1,933,256,000; for the Navy—including the Marine Corps—\$2,460,469,000; for the Air Force, \$3,030,144,000; for the Defense agencies, \$489,443,000. Also included is \$50 million for the Department of Defense for use as an emergency fund for research, and so forth.

The legislation sets the strength of the Reserve forces and provides that the average strength of any Reserve component shall be proportionately reduced under certain conditions, dependent on the strength of units on active duty.

Not to exceed \$2.5 billion of the funds appropriated are authorized to support South Vietnam, other free-world forces in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of House Resolution 470 in order that H.R. 8687 may be considered.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 470 provides an open rule with 4 hours of debate on H.R. 8687, the military procurement, research, and development authorization bill for 1972.

The purposes of the bill are, first, to include the authorization of appropriations for fiscal year 1972 in the areas of military hardware procurement and also for military research, development and testing projects for new weapons systems; second, to authorize personnel levels for the Selected Reserves of our Armed Forces for fiscal 1972; and, third, to continue existing authority for emergency military assistance to South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.

The total authorization contained in the bill is \$21,875,212,000, a total which is \$18,555,000 below figures requested by the Department of Defense.

In authorizing \$3,328,900,000, the full amount requested by the administration, for ship construction, the report sets forth the continuing rapid growth, both in quality and quantity of the Russian Navy. To meet this ever growing threat, destroyers, attack submarines, and missile firing nuclear frigates which will protect our carriers are necessary, and they are authorized by this bill.

The bill authorizes \$1,084,000,000 for the Safeguard ABM system.

There are some other major decisions which this distinguished committee has included: First, a denial of all procurement funds for the new Army tank;

Second, an authorization of \$277,400,000 to purchase F-111 aircraft, \$112,000,000 more than was requested by the Department of Defense, to insure that the production line remains open.

Third, an authorization of \$193,500,000 for the new MK-48 torpedo, which is claimed to be the most effective anti-submarine weapon available;

Fourth, a denial of procurement funds for the Cheyenne helicopter pending completion of a departmental study of the matter;

Fifth, an authorization of \$357,200,000 to insure continued production of the already ordered 81 C-5A aircraft;

Sixth, an authorization of \$808,100,000

for continued development of the Navy's new F-14 aircraft;

Seventh, an authorization of \$370,300,000 for continued development of the B-1 manned bomber prototypes.

Mr. Speaker, the bill was reported by the committee by a vote of 31 to 4.

There have been a number of additional views filed.

I assume there will be a number of amendments offered when we get into the 5-minute rule. The one amendment which we have all heard about is the so-called Nedzi-Whalen amendment to cut off funds for Southeast Asia as of January 1, 1972.

Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of the rule.

Mr. YOUNG of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. TEAGUE).

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, the bill we have before us today, brought to us from the Armed Services Committee, is an annual bill. But the regularity with which we see this legislation in no way lessens its importance, nor diminishes its significance to our security. If it represents only one in a series of steps toward the defense and protection of our country, it is still a step that must be taken.

I have gone through the report that accompanies the bill, and its depth and completeness is witness to the care with which our defense is being studied in the Armed Services Committee. But I do not rise to speak about this bill, as important as it is; I will leave that to others who have sat through the long hearings that have produced the legislation. Rather, Mr. Speaker, I rise to say a few words about the new chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

First, he is my friend, and I therefore confess to a certain amount of partiality when I speak of him.

Through some circumstance of fate or destiny the Armed Services Committee has had, since its beginning, the great good fortune to be headed by a succession of men who, because of towering personality, unbounded leadership, strong character, and an absolute dedication to our country, have made and kept America strong.

From Carl Vinson to Dewey Short to Mendel Rivers to EDDIE HÉBERT the pattern is unbroken.

Each has been his own man. Each has been vastly different from the others, but a pattern of excellence, a consistent theme of dedicated patriotism matched with wisdom, has been the constant hallmark of this great committee.

And now the committee is again headed by a man of unique personality. Important as this particular bill is, it represents only a detail in the rich mosaic of the life of the man who brings it to the floor today. Student, newspaperman, editor, Congressman, and—most of all—American. That is EDDIE HÉBERT.

The world is changing and the Congress is changing. Keeping full pace with the increased complexity of our weapon systems is a new complexity in the leadership of a committee. Greater than ever before is the demand that a chairman be a leader. Every committee has its "Young Turks," and EDDIE's committee is no ex-

ception. But when you see the loyal opposition, when you see the "Young Turks" vying with each other in praising the fairness and objectivity of their chairman, you know—you have to know—that, however it is put, you are hearing about character and leadership in capital letters.

Probably there has never been a more colorful man serve in the Congress of the United States than EDDIE HÉBERT. He is already the subject of a biography that is little short of inspiring to read because it is a biography of a man who understands the basic traditions of our country.

Mr. YOUNG of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 8687) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Louisiana.

The motion was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The Chair designates the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI) to preside over the Committee of the Whole, and the Chair requests the gentleman from Texas (Mr. YOUNG), to take the Chair temporarily.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill H.R. 8687, with Mr. YOUNG of Texas (Chairman pro tempore) in the Chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT) will be recognized for 2 hours, and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ARENDS) will be recognized for 2 hours.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Today, on behalf of the Committee on Armed Services, I submit the annual authorization to procure weapons and to provide research and development for our Armed Forces and to provide the strength of the Reserve forces for the coming year.

I would appreciate it very much if I be allowed to continue with the full text of this prepared statement. It is in detail and I shall not yield while I am presenting it. However, at the conclusion

of its presentation I shall be very happy to yield to any member of the committee who desires to ask any question. In the interest of an orderly procedure and a continuity of thought I ask that I not be interrupted.

The bill authorizes appropriations totaling \$21,875,212,000. Of this total, \$7,963,312,000 is for R.D.T. & E.; and \$13,911,900,000 is for procurement of aircraft, missiles, ships, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons.

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

The bill comes to the House from your Committee on Armed Services after the most intensive scrutiny. We had 18 days of full committee hearings on the bill and 3 additional days for markup. In addition, the Research and Development Subcommittee held 22 hearing sessions and the Reserve Subcommittee held seven sessions.

The hearings, which have been available to all Members of the House, cover 2,460 pages. I hope many Members of the House have taken time to read substantial portions of the hearings. There is an enormous amount of information in them on our national defense.

As I am managing this bill for the first time as chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I wish to particularly express my appreciation to all of the members of the committee for the conscientious and thorough manner in which they have attended to their duties.

The subcommittee under the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE) which considered research and development and the subcommittee under the gentleman from Texas (Mr. FISHER) which considered Reserve strength went into their portions of the bill at great length and at the same time allowed the members of the full committee to devote more attention to the procurement portion of the legislation. The members of the committee were diligent in their attendance, probing in their questions and independent in their judgments.

They have produced a bill of which all members of the committee can be proud and which would not have been possible without all members contributing.

When we brought the draft bill to the House earlier in the year, I told the Members of the House that I would make no move to cut off debate because I believe that all Members of the House should have an opportunity to express their views on such vital legislation. I make the same pledge today. And I shall be here for as long as Members of the House desire to discuss this legislation.

THE PURPOSE OF THE BILL

Mr. Chairman, a study of history shows that all wars are followed by a turning away from military solutions to international problems and by a tendency, of a greater or lesser degree, to antimilitarism. That tendency is accentuated today as we come to the end of perhaps the most uncertain war of our history, a terrible experience that has left a scar upon the spirit of America.

It is perhaps understandable in such a time that people get the needs of basic defense confused with the policies that led to involvement in a particular war and a particularly unpopular war.

Such a confusion, however, is not acceptable on the part of those of us who are called upon to be legislators and lawmakers.

I ask you, above all, to keep in mind that the fundamental purpose of this bill is to provide for the future strategic security of the United States.

It is not for financing the involvement in Vietnam. It is not to authorize the financing of some future Vietnam.

The major portion of the procurements that this bill would authorize and the major portion of the R.D.T. & E. it would authorize are for systems to deter aggression against the United States itself and to assure that in the future we will continue to be able to deter such potential aggression beyond any peradventure of doubt.

FUTURE PREPAREDNESS

Let me ask the Members of this House to also keep in mind that America's ability to defend itself is often based on decisions made as much as a decade earlier. It is no exaggeration to say that the decisions we make on this bill will start us on the path to determine the kind and the adequacy of the national defense we have in the 1980's.

I ask you to remember that many of the new systems that we are recommending are not for the defensive needs of today but are to allow us to be in a position to meet the threat that could develop in the years ahead.

Many of these major expensive systems will not be available until the late 1970's. The Safeguard system, the B-1, the SAM-D air defense system, the undersea long-range missile system—ULMS—the airborne warning and control system—AWACS—the F-15, and other key systems will not actually be in the inventory in any numbers until the late 1970's—even, in some cases, the 1980's. It may be that when we reach the time for a decision on their actual procurement and deployment, some of these systems may turn out not to be needed and that we may be able to discontinue them. But if they are needed at the end of this decade, the development work has to be done now.

Candor compels me to tell you that in some instances the development has been delayed beyond the advisable point so that in some cases, if current trends continue, the desirable defensive systems may not be ready by the time the threat becomes a reality.

So I ask you to keep in mind this factor of long leadtime requirements which is always present in these very complicated modern weapons systems. You can stop the development of a weapons system at any time. But if you find you need it and you do not have it, there is no way that you can buy the time that is lost.

As we debate this bill, let us remember one other thing. We also know the legislative situation in the House of Congress. What we do on this bill represents the upper limit of the defense we can provide.

Now let me turn to some details in the bill itself.

COMMITTEE REDUCTIONS

The committee made a number of significant reductions:

We cut \$59.1 million from the Army's

main battle tank—MBT-70—which deletes all procurement funds. Our committee is not willing to let this tank go into production until the Army can present better justification.

We did allow \$27.5 million to continue R.D.T. & E.

Frankly, there was a great deal of sentiment in the committee for killing the program entirely in view of the high cost and what appeared to be a marginal increase in effectiveness over a combination of presently available tanks. However, the majority voted to continue R. & D. rather than to cut off the development program at this late date.

The committee eliminated \$24.4 million the Navy had requested for transport aircraft for fleet logistic support. This would have been the beginning of a substantial program to replace propeller-driven aircraft. The committee believes more economical means of providing new transport planes should first be explored by the Navy.

The committee also reduced the Navy's torpedo authorization by \$12 million to eliminate the procurement of the MK-113 fire control system modification. We did not think it was required.

The committee deleted \$13.2 million for advanced procurement funds for the Cheyenne helicopter. The procurement decision for this system is still pending.

I would stress that this is not an expression of committee opposition to the Cheyenne. The system represents important technical advancements and the development is very near completion. There are R.D.T. & E. and procurement funds from prior years to complete development work. But we decided to delay further funding until present Department of Defense studies are finished and a decision is made by the Department.

F-14

The bill as reported by the committee contains \$806.1 million for the procurement of the F-14 aircraft for the Navy.

However, at the appropriate time, I shall, with the committee support, offer an amendment to delete this \$806.1 million.

Now let me explain this very significant action.

The printed committee hearings will reveal that the committee went into great depth in questioning this new aircraft program. It was ascertained by the committee's review that the F-14 was experiencing technical difficulties and cost-increase problems.

Because it was clear that the program needed more intensive review, I directed our investigative subcommittee to inquire into the program with particular emphasis on the recent crash of one F-14 aircraft.

At this juncture, the committee chose to approve the authorization request of the Department of Defense, recognizing that a new airplane is badly needed by our carrier fleet.

Subsequent to the committee's action, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Packard, directed a restudy of the Navy's planned program for the F-14. In view of this new study, coupled with the problems uncovered by our committee, I advised the Deputy Secretary of Defense that I wanted the results of this restudy

and his recommendations prior to the time this bill was brought to the floor of the House. The Deputy Secretary has had to advise me, in turn, that the extensive review of the F-14 program that he has directed could not be completed before the scheduled House consideration of the bill. I, therefore, recommend to the Committee on Armed Services the deletion of the entire procurement authorization for this aircraft for fiscal 1972 and the committee, after reviewing the facts, authorized me to offer such an amendment on the floor of the House on behalf of the committee.

I shall, therefore, when the bill is open for amendments, offer an amendment to delete \$806.1 million from the authorization for procurement of aircraft for the Navy.

Let me emphasize that this action is taken without prejudice to the ultimate decision on this aircraft. In a letter to me dated June 10, 1971, the Secretary of Defense expressed his belief that there is an urgent requirement for a new Navy fighter. He pointed out that the review of the F-14 program which Deputy Secretary Packard has asked the Secretary of the Navy to conduct, will be carried out on a priority basis. As soon as this review is completed a detailed explanation of the decisions of the Secretary concerning the program will be made available to the Congress.

If the decision is to go ahead with the procurement program of the F-14 and strong justification for that decision can be provided, prior to the time that congressional action on this bill is completed, funds may be restored for the F-14. That is to say, if the Senate, after reviewing the results of the Department's study, determines that the money should be restored and if the explanation of the Secretary of Defense is equally convincing to us, we will be prepared to consider a restoration of the funds in conference, at which time we shall be in a position to report back to the House.

Therefore, I say that the deletion of the \$806.1 million is without prejudice at the present time. However, our committee believes it would be derelict in its responsibilities to the House if we recommended approval of an authorization of this magnitude, until the problems and questions raised by the Department's study are resolved.

COMMITTEE ADDITION

In only one instance did the committee add funds above the amount requested by the Department of Defense. We added \$112 million to continue production of the F-111 aircraft.

This was done to provide an additional 12 aircraft and to keep open, on a minimum basis, a production line that is a valuable national defense resource.

I will not take extensive time to go into this matter because I know other members of the committee wish to discuss the subject. But the essential point that should be stressed is that you are considering the need and the authorization for an airplane—not for a contract. Try to keep separate in your thinking the F-111 contract difficulties from the airplane itself.

The F-111 is unique. It is the best all-weather interdiction aircraft in the world, and we need more in our inventory. Even with the additional 12 authorized here, we are still far below the initial buy planned for the program. In addition to being an outstanding all-weather interdiction aircraft, the F-111 provides us with valuable interim bomber capability until such time as we get the B-1 in our inventory.

The committee vote on this addition of \$112 million was 27 to 8.

R.D.T. & E.

There are two areas in the bill where the committee approved authorization requests which are substantially above what was provided last year.

One is R.D.T. & E. We authorized \$7,963,200,000. This is \$974,967,000 more than the appropriation for this fiscal year. R. & D. is the cutting edge of our national defense. We believe it is time to reverse the downward trend in R. & D. and to provide a level of effort commensurate with long term needs. We are still trailing the Soviets in this area.

I am not going to say anything more about the subject now because, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE), the chairman of our Research and Development Subcommittee, will address the subject in the course of this debate.

SHIP CONSTRUCTION

The other area showing a major increase is ship construction. We authorized \$3,328,900,000 for 19 new ships and nine conversions. The program is \$863,500,000 above last year's appropriation.

This includes \$14.6 million of shipbuilding funds which, however, can be used only for the nuclear-powered guided-missile frigate DLGN-41. For some reason the Department of Defense keeps trying to reduce the number of frigates even though we do not have enough for escorts for our present nuclear carriers. Our committee is convinced these frigates should be built.

Look at the discussion of the Soviet naval threat in the committee's report and you will understand why this ship authorization is the minimum we can provide.

There is no carrier in this bill. The Department of Defense has a habit of favoring carriers but not favoring spending the money for them. If the Defense Department has requested the CVAN-70, I believe our committee would have supported it. I hope the ship can be authorized next year.

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

Our committee has told the House many things about national defense. We have never told you that it is inexpensive.

The major strategic systems for which funding is provided are costly programs, but they are the principal deterrents to global warfare. A study of the developing threat convinces our committee anew that our three-pronged deterrent of land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles and manned strategic aircraft is the best insurance against being strategically outflanked.

The authorizations in the bill includes \$489.4 million for the Minuteman ICBM

missiles, plus \$270.5 million for modernization of the Minuteman force; \$54.7 million for the submarine-launched Poseidon missile, the follow-on to the Polaris; and \$370.3 million for research and development for the B-1 bomber. There is also included in the bill \$1,084 million for the Safeguard antiballistic missile system.

The funds for the B-1 in this bill are for research and development only and are not a commitment to production. The procurement decision is still 4 years away. When the fiscal year for which we are authorizing this research and development money is included, it will mark the end of a decade since the last B-52 came off the production line. These B-52's are our present manned strategic system, but they cannot last forever and we are far behind schedule in developing a true intercontinental manned bomber.

I know there will be amendments attacking the Safeguard ABM system. This system, which has had tremendous success in its tests during the past year, is one of the principal chips the President has in his hand at the SALT and provides for needed strategic protection if SALT fails.

NEW SOVIET ICBM CONSTRUCTION

Since there has been much public discussion and many press reports concerning developments in the Soviet missile threat to the United States, it is time to set the record straight.

First, there is no disagreement between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Both agencies agree fully that there is not one but two, different ICBM programs involved in the activity presently underway in the Soviet Union. I can also assure you that the CIA and the DIA have been and are still in agreement since the first information on this construction activity became available.

Late last year, the Soviet Union began a program of expansion of its intercontinental missile system. The limited information initially available indicated new construction at SS-9 complexes and the SS-9 R. & D. test facility. This suggested the deployment of one large missile system. More recent data confirms an expanded ICBM program, with new construction also occurring at SS-11 complexes and the SS-11 R. & D. test facility. It now appears that two different ICBM systems may be under development.

The Soviets have under construction more than the 58 new missile silos reported by the news media. Approximately two-thirds of these are located at SS-11 complexes, and one-third at SS-9 complexes. The pace of construction is comparable with earlier ICBM deployment programs.

Evidence now available does not permit a conclusion on the kind of missiles that will be deployed in the new silos. There are many possibilities and combinations: Additional SS-9's and SS-11's could be deployed; or a modified version of the SS-9 and SS-11 could be installed at the new sites. It is also possible that two completely new ICBM's could be deployed.

Regardless of the kind of ICBM's to be installed, the evidence indicates that both types of silos will be harder and more survivable than existing Soviet ICBM silos.

The dimensions and magnitude of the new Soviet ICBM program cannot be determined at this time. One conclusion is inescapable. The new Soviet program represents an increased threat to the United States.

SOUTHEAST ASIA SUPPORT

Members of the House will note that this is not a "Christmas tree" bill. There is only one general provision: Section 401, an authorization of several years' standing, which allows Defense Department funds to be made available to Vietnamese and other friendly forces in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand, subject to various limitations.

This authorization of funds for Asian forces is in harmony with the program of withdrawing American forces from Southeast Asia and is strongly supported by our committee.

The provision authorizes "not to exceed \$2.5 billion" to be made available for the support of Southeast Asia forces. This is an upper limit and does not mean that that amount will necessarily be spent. The present estimate is that the cost in fiscal year 1972 will be about \$2.3 billion.

RESERVE STRENGTH

The bill sets the authorized average annual strength of the Reserve Forces, including the National Guard, for the coming fiscal year. The strengths authorized are identical to the administration's request in all cases except two. The committee added 182 slots to the Air Force Reserve and 10,000 to the Coast Guard Reserve.

The administration, in a singularly in-supportable move, attempted to gut the Coast Guard Reserve. Our committee is not willing to permit this.

These matters will be discussed in detail during the debate by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. FISHER), chairman of the subcommittee which considered the Reserve authorizations.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I could take several hours discussing the bill and still not tell you all that you should know about our national defense. It is necessary for the Members to read our very comprehensive committee report and hearings to appreciate all of the facts and all of the details that are involved in these very complex programs that are authorized by H.R. 8687. When antidefense protagonists suggest cutting the defense budget—I recommend they read the table on page 10 of the report.

When someone refers to newspaper articles that seek to placate the American people concerning our declining seapower, I refer them to pages 13 to 19 of the report. I hope every Member has a chance to read these pages.

There are many Members who wish to be heard, and I want to provide time to as many as possible.

Let me conclude with this thought: it does not take a lot of courage to vote against defense programs. It has unfortunately become the easy and popular

thing to do. In a time when public opinion is running high against things military, it is possible to score points with some constituents by voting against major military programs. But providing for national security is the first function of a lawmaker and requires that he be not just a mirror to changing opinion. It requires making the hard judgments and having the courage of leadership to make the necessity for these judgments known to the people.

The great Edmund Burke said:

Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion.

Are the programs authorized in this legislation necessary for the present and the future security of the United States? That question, and that question only, should be the basis on which you make your judgment on this bill. When you do that, I know that you will support the actions of your Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER).

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, this is a bill which authorizes procurement of almost \$22 billion in arms. It is a bill which has become the object of some of the most intensive nationwide lobbying that I have witnessed in my 19 years' experience as a Member of this body. It is a bill which has been advertised as a vehicle which might be used to bring the war in Southeast Asia to an end.

In looking around the Chamber I have only seen 42 Members present, and included in that number I see very few of those who have gotten most of the publicity for their opposition to the war.

I, therefore, suggest that a quorum is not present, Mr. Chairman, and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. ROBERTS). The Chair will count.

Forty-five Members are present, not a quorum. The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 185]

Abernethy	Edwards, Calif.	Podell
Abourezk	Edwards, La.	Pryor, Ark.
Addabbo	Ellberg	Purcell
Alexander	Evins, Tenn.	Rangel
Andrews,	Flynt	Rarick
N. Dak.	Foley	Reid, N.Y.
Ashley	Fraser	Rogers
Blatnik	Fulton, Tenn.	Rooney, Pa.
Brown, Mich.	Gallagher	Rosenthal
Brown, Ohio	Garmatz	Rostenkowski
Buchanan	Gettys	Roybal
Byron	Grasso	Runnels
Camp	Gray	Sarbanes
Casey, Tex.	Halpern	Scherle
Cederberg	Hansen, Wash.	Scheuer
Celler	Hays	Schmitz
Chappell	Helstoski	Selbinger
Clark	Horton	Springer
Clausen,	Kastenmeier	Stanton,
Don H.	Kyros	James V.
Clay	Long, La.	Steiger, Ariz.
Conte	Long, Md.	Stokes
Conyers	McClory	Stratton
Corman	McCulloch	Symington
Dellums	McKay	Talcoff
Denholm	McMillan	Thompson,
Dent	Mathias, Calif.	N.J.
Diggs	Melcher	Veysel
Donohue	Mikva	Wilson, Bob
Dorn	Mitchell	Wright
Dowdy	Morse	Wyman
Dwyer	Pelly	Zablocki

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. ROBERTS, Chairman pro tempore of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill H.R. 8687, and finding itself without a quorum, he had directed the roll to be called, when 341 Members responded to their names, a quorum, and he submitted herewith the names of the absentees to be spread upon the Journal.

The Committee resumed its sitting.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, the chairman of our committee, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT), has summarized very cogently the important changes that our committee made in the procurement and R.D.T. & E authorizations requested by the administration. I will not plow the same ground, but I do want to pinpoint some of the considerations which influenced our committee in its actions on the bill and which you should be aware of in voting on it.

The bill as reported by the committee, providing an authorization of \$21,875,-212,000, was \$18,555,000 below the Department of Defense request. The committee was able to make these reductions even though the bill as submitted by the administration was one of the most austere authorization requests that I have seen in my many years in the House. Quite simply, the leadership of the Defense Department, in struggling to hold down the fiscal year 1972 budget, has been more stringent with the Armed Forces than has been true of similar leadership in the past.

In addition, as the chairman has explained to you, we will offer at the appropriate time a committee amendment to delete \$806,100,000 of procurement funds for the F-14 aircraft. With this reduction, our bill will be \$824,655,000 below the administration's request.

I think it should be emphasized, however, that the deletion of the procurement funds for the F-14 at this time is, as the chairman said, without prejudice. A review of the F-14 procurement rate is now being conducted by Deputy Defense Secretary Packard and other officials of the Department. We know the Navy needs a new-generation carrier aircraft, and we believe the F-14 is going to prove to be an outstanding plane. However, we do not believe that we can give a blank check to the Department until the pace of their procurement is firmly established. Our committee, therefore, will offer this amendment to delete the procurement funds at this time.

I would emphasize for the Members of the House that we are taking the only course we can prudently take while the matter is still under study.

The authorization still must be approved by the Senate; and the pace of work in that body being what it is, it may be some time before the legislation is cleared for the President. If, in that time, the Department of Defense completes its review and comes to a firm recommendation on the level of procurement it believes desirable in fiscal year 1972, and if it can convince the Senate

committee of the wisdom of putting those funds back into the bill, we will be ready to give it every consideration in conference.

The fate of the F-14, therefore, depends in large part on the conclusions of Mr. Packard's study and the speed with which those conclusions can be made available to the Congress.

TORPEDOES AUTHORIZED FOR THE FIRST TIME

When contemplating the cost totals in the bill, it should be kept in mind that this is the first year in which the committee has been required to authorize appropriations for procurement of torpedoes for the Navy.

The bill provides \$193,500,000 for procurement of torpedoes.

Therefore, in considering the total authorization in the bill, remember that it includes \$193,500,000 for items that did not require authorization in the past.

SOUTHEAST ASIA SUPPORT

The legislation contains a general provision which continues the practice of several years' standing of authorizing support to friendly forces in Southeast Asia through the Defense Authorization Act.

I hope the Members of the House will heed the point made by the chairman that the purpose of this bill is to provide for the long-range strategic security of the United States and will not attempt to use the bill to make instant foreign policy.

I hope the Members of the House will forget political considerations in approaching this aspect of the bill.

Mr. Chairman, all of us are frustrated and weary with this long and costly war. Some people, in their impatience to seek and end, fail to give credit to the President for the remarkable progress he has made in bringing American involvement to a close—and doing it in such a way that our sacrifices will not have been in vain.

The manner in which we became involved in this conflict was a serious mistake. Ironically, some of the same officials who participated in the decisions involving the war, as part of earlier administrations, are now urging upon us the grave mistake of legislating a fixed withdrawal date.

I cannot think of a worse step for this House to take than to tie the President's hands in negotiations by setting a fixed date of withdrawal of troops from Vietnam.

An amendment to do that was offered in our committee and was rejected by a vote of 33 to 6.

Since I know the subject will come up on the floor again, I ask the Members to consider that such an amendment, contrary to what many people are led to believe, will not force a withdrawal by December 31 of this year, or whatever date is fixed. Such an amendment applies only to funds authorized to be appropriated by the present bill.

The appropriations authorized by the present bill will not be voted on for months at the very earliest, and it will be months after that before contracts can be let for the procurements which the bill authorizes.

Operations of U.S. military forces in Vietnam are financed in large part by operation and maintenance appropriations which are not subject to authorization in this bill. And the weapons procurement authorized by this bill will not be completed until well after the supposed termination date.

As a practical matter, therefore, the amendment is meaningless as far as forcing withdrawal from the Vietnam war is concerned. But if it is adopted, it would adversely affect the President's efforts to negotiate a settlement.

I hope, therefore, that Members of the House will not fall prey to the political temptations of a Vietnam withdrawal amendment.

One other point which I believe all of us will want to keep particularly in mind is the question of our prisoners of war in North Vietnam and those who are prisoners of Vietcong somewhere in South Vietnam. Certainly none of us here in the House are willing to abandon those POW's. And it is going to take the most skillful negotiations on the part of the President to obtain their release.

To say that we are going to set a fixed date for withdrawal without any quid pro quo from the other side seems to me almost tantamount to abandoning the POW's. Considering the record of intractability and duplicity on the part of the North Vietnamese, it is impossible for me to understand how anybody could feel any sense of assurance that they would release our prisoners of war once U.S. forces are withdrawn.

SHIPBUILDING

Last year, when we brought the authorization bill to the floor, I devoted an extensive part of my time to discussing the Soviet missile threat. The chairman of our committee, the gentleman from Louisiana, has brought you up to date on the new Soviet ICBM construction and the results of some of the latest intelligence concerning new types of Soviet silos.

While I will not go into great detail at this time, I would like to particularly urge the Members of the House to read the portion of the committee's report dealing with the Soviet naval threat. The report goes to considerable length to spell out the tremendous advances the Soviets have made in developing a worldwide surface fleet, in creating an unmatched shipbuilding capability, and in developing the largest submarine fleet in the history of the world.

The Soviets have one shipyard which can construct as many submarines in a year as all of our U.S. shipyards put together.

The Soviets have more than twice as many submarines as the United States. Included in their total are 37 nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines and 28 non-nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines. The United States does not have any cruise missile submarines.

It may interest Members of the House to know that the Soviets have given away or scrapped submarines of more recent vintage than some U.S. submarines which are still operating.

Not only are the Soviets ahead of us in the total number of submarines, but

they have now passed us in the number of nuclear submarines.

There are areas where our naval force, of course, is still superior. And the Soviets do not yet have a submarine missile capability equal to our Poseidon. But they are gaining on us at an alarming rate. And when one considers the extraordinary age of the U.S. surface fleet, it becomes quite clear that we have to start a long-range program of revitalizing our Navy if we are not to be outflanked on the oceans of the world.

It is with these thoughts in mind that the Committee has approved a ship-construction authorization \$863,500,000 above what was appropriated last year. The authorization in the bill, of \$3,328,900,000, will provide for 19 new ships and 9 conversions.

Quite frankly, I think we should be constructing ships at a faster rate. Certainly this minimum ship-construction program should receive the support of all Members of the House.

NATO

In our report the committee expressed concern for the financial impact on the U.S. taxpayer of our commitment to NATO. And it also expressed the belief that the Western European members of NATO must begin gradually taking on a greater share of the burden of providing funds and personnel for NATO forces.

However, I hope we will not fall prey to proposals to precipitously reduce our forces in Europe in such a way as to threaten the very existence of this great alliance.

Let us not forget that for all its faults the NATO alliance has secured peace in Western Europe for the last quarter century.

I have been part of the U.S. delegation to the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference on nine occasions. On each of those occasions I have joined in calling attention to the failure of some member countries to meet their military pledges and in emphasizing that there is a limit to what the United States should do and can do. So I am not impressed by the "Johnny-come-latelys" in calling for a greater Western European contribution to NATO.

Actually, the European members of NATO have begun to recognize their shortcomings. Last year the European members established a new defense improvement program and made commitments for the improvement of their armed forces which will mean an additional billion dollars for NATO over the next 5 years.

I believe that we should look for an even greater European contribution in the years ahead and for all feasible reductions in the U.S. commitment. But the way to bring about a reduction of our forces is not by legislative fiat. It should be done through consultation with our NATO allies, keeping in mind the impact on negotiations which might be undertaken with the Russians and the Warsaw Pact countries. To force a specific withdrawal now would weaken our negotiating position at the very time the Russians are indicating a willingness to begin negotiations.

SAFEGUARD

Mr. Chairman, I have urged Members not to weaken the President's hands in negotiations relating to Vietnam or negotiations relating to Western Europe. I urge you with equal vigor not to weaken the President's hands in negotiations for strategic arms limitations. Any move to reduce or eliminate the Safeguard ABM system would be holding back the best chip the President has to play at the strategic arms limitation talks—SALT.

Our committee has provided an authorization of \$1,084 million for the Safeguard ABM system for the coming fiscal year. The first ABM site will not be operational until late 1974 and the full four-site protection for our Minute-man force will not be operational until late 1977. If SALT fails, the system will be needed by that time to assure protection against the Soviet threat.

Our committee has provided the authorization for the system which we believe provides the President maximum flexibility in regards to SALT while at the same time providing the standby defensive capability required.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, I think the committee has brought to the floor a good bill. All of the reductions we have made have been specifically justified; we have not taken a meatax approach to the legislation. What is left is a minimum program to guarantee our national security, not just in the coming fiscal year but in the decade ahead.

The bill has been subject to months of scrutiny, and I am proud of the great deal of plain hard work that members of our committee on both sides of the aisle have contributed.

I urge all Members of the House to support the bill. It is as important as any legislation you will vote on in this Congress.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE).

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, the fiscal year 1972 defense research, development, test, and evaluation budget recommended by the Armed Services Committee totals \$7,963,312,000. This is \$12,545,000 more than the Department request; however, it includes transfer from the missile procurement accounts of the Navy and Air Force totaling \$34.4 million. So, without that transfer from procurement to R. & D., the amount recommended would be approximately \$22 million below the request of the Department of Defense.

The R.D.T. & E. budget recommended by the committee is approximately \$987 million more than the Congress appropriated last year. At first look this appears to be a substantial increase; however, when compared with previous years levels of efforts, it is actually less than that of fiscal year 1964, commonly referred to as the last peacetime year before the Vietnam buildup. According to testimony received by the committee, the level of effort supported by the fiscal year 1964 R. & D. budget in terms of fiscal year 1972 dollars would be \$9.3 billion, or approximately \$1.4 billion more than the effort that can be supported by the amounts included in this bill.

Approximately 40 percent of the dollar increase over last year's appropriation is required for new R. & D. Initiatives in the coming fiscal year. Another 40 percent of the increased amount will be consumed by inflation. The remaining 20 percent of the increase is needed to support a number of major programs which have reached a more advanced stage of development and require greater levels of effort in terms of technical man-hours and material fabrication.

According to information received by the subcommittee reviewing the R. & D. authorization request, the cost index for a research and development technical man-year increased over 7 percent during the last calendar year and has increased over 30 percent in the past 5 years. So again, I point out that even though there is a dollar increase in the Defense R. & D. budget proposed for the coming fiscal year, the amount recommended will support less R. & D. effort than that of fiscal year 1964—and is only slightly above the more recent years.

Congressional appropriations for Defense R. & D. over the past 7 years reflect net reductions totaling more than \$2.2 billion from the amounts requested by the President in his yearly budgets.

Testimony received from Defense witnesses indicate that during this same period, Soviet research and development efforts were increasing at a steady rate and have now surpassed us in yearly expenditures for military R. & D.

This increased rate of expenditure by the Soviets is projected to eliminate or drastically reduce U.S. technological superiority during the decade of the 1970's unless greater effort is exerted by the United States and adequate funds are provided by the Congress.

We need a strong R. & D. program to maintain technological superiority over all of our competitors, especially in view of the secrecy surrounding military R. & D. efforts behind the Iron Curtain. We need superiority—not parity—to cope with technological surprises sprung on us in the form of prototype hardware exhibited from time to time by the Soviets, such as the display of six new fighter aircraft at an air show in July 1967. Decisions to initiate such prototype developments are said to precede the actual appearance of the hardware at an air show or in conspicuous testing by 2 to 3 years. According to Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering:

Given the uncertainties in measuring technological lead, a 2-3 year U.S. technological lead at the prototype stage of development appears necessary to offset Soviet RDT&E secrecy. From the Soviet point of view, given the relative openness of the U.S. R&D and our decision process, being a year behind (with little uncertainty in position) might be acceptable and being equal would be to their advantage.

The R. & D. funds in the fiscal year 1972 Defense authorization bill will not provide weapons systems, either defensive or offensive, in fiscal year 1972 and very few if any during fiscal year 1973. As our former great chairman, the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Vinson, used to say:

R&D efforts are the seed corn for our future Defense Posture.

Out of R. & D. for today comes the weapons systems for the next decade or two. Our aircraft of today such as the F-4 were born during the decade of the fifties. The aircraft in this year's authorization bill are for the latter part of this decade and on into the nineties.

In my opinion, the amount contained in this bill for research and development will allow us to maintain our technological superiority and develop the weapons systems necessary for a defense posture that continues to provide a valid deterrent.

B-1 STRATEGIC BOMBER

During the committee's markup of this bill, several amendments were offered which would have a significant long-term impact upon the ability of this Nation to underwrite its strategy of deterrence. The authors of these amendments have indicated that they would offer the same amendments on the House floor.

One of the amendments offered would eliminate the entire amount included in the bill for the development of the B-1 bomber, \$370.3 million. The other amendment proposed a limit of \$200 million for the B-1 during fiscal year 1972. Both amendments were overwhelmingly defeated in the committee markup—7 to 28 and 13 to 23.

Mr. Chairman, the merit of the proposed amendments can be evaluated by answering three fundamental questions:

First. Do we need manned bombers in our strategic offensive forces in the post-1980 time period?

Second. Given the need for manned bombers, will the B-1 possess the requisite characteristics?

Third. Does the proposed B-1 development program justify the request for \$370.3 million in R.D.T. & E. funds for fiscal year 1972?

Mr. Chairman, these questions are not rhetoric in nature but the true gut issues which underlie the proposed amendments. I submit that each of these questions is deserving of an affirmative response and I will discuss briefly the reasoning which the committee used in arriving at that decision.

In respect to the need for manned bombers as an essential element of our strategic forces after 1980, we must consider the long lead times involved in the development and production of major new weapon systems. In essence, we must project our thinking at least 10 to 15 years into the future. By that time, new and totally unanticipated vulnerabilities may appear in one element or another of our strategic forces, just as they have in the past. The only way in which we can insure that these unanticipated vulnerabilities—both prelaunch and post-launch—will not fatally weaken our deterrent before we can act to offset them is to maintain at all times well diversified forces in which each element has distinctly different survival and penetration characteristics.

We currently have such forces. They consist of three primary elements—bombers of which a large proportion are maintained on continuous ground alert, land-based missiles deployed in hardened

underground silos that are dispersed in the central part of the United States, and sea-based missiles deployed in submarines, a large proportion of which are maintained on station within range of their targets at any particular time.

By having a diversified force, one can tolerate a temporary vulnerability in any one element. We can counter the vulnerability with deliberate, well thought-out actions because we have confidence that the other elements of our forces will still work. On the other hand, if we put all of our deterrent in a single force element then we would have to be absolutely certain that there would never be any gap in the survivability of that force, however temporary. Without diversification, we would be compelled to react strongly to every Soviet R. & D. program—actual or potential—that could conceivably be a more dangerous or different threat to our single force.

In addition to these benefits of diversified strategic forces and the role which manned bombers have as an element of those forces, there are other ways in which bombers make a unique and important contribution to our national security.

First, bombers provide the essential insurance against presently unanticipated, but possible, failures in our missile systems. Extensive operational testing has given us considerable confidence in the reliability and dependability of our strategic missile systems—but neither the United States nor any other nation has ever used them in combat or in a nuclear environment.

A second unique contribution of bombers to our national security is the degree of flexibility which they lend to our strategic forces. Missiles, once launched, are essentially committed and they impose on the opponent a very compressed reaction time—both of which serve to invite uncontrolled escalation. Bombers, in contrast, can be launched, redirected, or recalled over a period of hours, always remaining fairly unambiguous with respect to the area they are threatening. Thus, they provide the opponent with much more time to consider his response, or to react in a deliberate, carefully controlled manner.

A third contribution of bombers is that they are particularly useful in third area conflicts, both in a nuclear and conventional bombing role. In contrast to missiles, bombers can be recycled repeatedly, and because air defenses in those areas are far less formidable than in the Soviet Union, bombers could be employed in sustained campaigns—at least in selected areas—with the expectation that losses can be kept to acceptable levels.

Fourth, in contrast to missiles, bombers can also be used in nonnuclear wars. In this respect, they are unique among our strategic weapon systems. They, alone, have the flexibility and capability to support our national objectives across a wide range of possible conflicts—from a quick show of force, to small-scale conventional wars, to global nuclear wars.

Finally, a mixed force of bombers and missiles provides the United States with a greater degree of flexibility in any disarmament negotiations. SALT is still in

an early stage—except for ABM's, no specific weapon system proposals have as yet been presented by the Soviet delegation. Until agreement is reached on the limitation of specific weapon systems, which may take some time to negotiate, it would be highly imprudent for us to prejudge the outcome. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to speculate that, because bombers are not very good "first strike" weapons, their retention by both sides, at the expense of missiles, would be a logical provision to include in any agreement designed to enhance stability.

From these comments on the advisability of retaining manned bombers in our strategic forces in the post-1980 time frame, it is only reasonable to conclude that manned bombers will continue to be an indispensable element of our strategic deterrent for as far into the future as we can discern the threat. In combination with land- and sea-based missiles, they provide a hedge against future technological developments which might severely degrade the capabilities of any one of the major elements of our strategic offensive forces. They provide insurance against an unlikely, but possible, gross failure in our strategic missile system. They are more appropriate and useful than strategic missiles for less than all-out nuclear wars, and they comprise the only major element of our strategic offensive forces which can be used in conventional wars. Finally, their presence in the force provides the United States with a greater degree of flexibility in arms negotiations.

These points, I believe, substantiate the need for the manned bomber in our strategic forces of the future. I can now address the second question: Will the B-1 possess the characteristics necessary to counter the threats postulated for the 1980's and 1990's?

Obviously, to serve the purpose of underwriting our strategy of deterrence, the bomber force must be able to survive a surprise attack, and then go on to penetrate the attacker's air defenses. In respect to the first imperative, the pre-launch survivability of our bomber force could be threatened if the Soviets deploy submarines very close to our shores with missiles that can be fired on greatly depressed trajectories. Although we have no evidence that the Soviets are developing depressed trajectory submarine launched ballistic missiles—SLBM's, or that they would risk stationing their ballistic missile submarines close to our shores, we must take these possibilities into account in our forward planning.

This means that, in addition to a quick engine start and other prompt reaction characteristics, a new bomber should have a faster takeoff, acceleration, and fly-out speed, as well as a greater degree of hardness to overpressure and other nuclear effects than the B-52. The B-1, through a combination of appropriate airframe, engine and sub-system design, will have these essential characteristics.

Also, the shorter takeoff distance required by the B-1 will permit that aircraft to be operated from about 150 more existing runways than are now available to the B-52. Consequently, the bomber/tanker force could be dispersed over a

greater number of bases, with fewer aircraft per runway, thus further improving the reaction time of the alert force as a whole.

Given the greater number of existing bases available to the B-1 and its significantly shorter safe escape time, it would be possible to deploy safely a sizable force of these bombers on bases outside the deep interior of the United States. The most interior bases could then be utilized for the KC-135 tankers—or for B-52's—which have a longer safe escape time.

In short, a force of B-1's would have a considerably higher degree of pre-launch survivability than the B-52's against even the most severe Soviet SLBM threats postulated for the future.

With regard to penetration, a new bomber should be able to cope with much more advanced Soviet air defenses than exist at the present time. It should have sufficient operational flexibility to preclude the Soviets from concentrating their air defense resources against just one mode of bomber attack, for example, standoff only. And, it should be relatively insensitive to unanticipated changes in Soviet air defenses.

The U.S. counter to the numerous medium and high altitude capable Soviet surface-to-air missiles is to penetrate with the bombers at low altitude. The B-1, due to its greater low altitude speed, smaller radar cross-section, and its advanced avionics, could do even better than the B-52 against both the SA-3 or a new low altitude SAM. The greater speed and smaller radar cross-section would shorten the reaction time available to the SAM defenses. The advanced avionics would permit the B-1 to deliver a short range attack missile—SRAM—with even greater accuracy than the B-52.

The penetration aids planned for the B-1 are similar to those currently planned for the B-52. However, because of its far more advanced design, the B-1 will be less dependent on electronic countermeasures, decoys—SCAD's—and other aids for penetration than the B-52. For example, it is predicted that the B-1 without penetration aids could successfully penetrate at low altitude against current Soviet fighters—which do not have a "look-down, shoot-down" capability—even when the capabilities of these fighters are improved by the deployment of large numbers of Soviet AWACS. The B-52, against the same threat, would still need penetration aids.

Against a more advanced threat, both the B-1 and B-52 will need SCAD's, but the B-1 will require a lesser number to achieve the same probability of success. Or, alternatively, using the same number of SCAD's, the probability of success for the B-1 would be about 1½ times as great as the B-52. This means that even ignoring the other advantages—greater internal payload, and so forth—a B-1 force could deliver to the same targets up to 50 percent more SRAM's than a B-52 force of equal size, where both forces start from a common penetration point with the same number of SRAM's and fly at low altitude over the same routes.

In this connection, it should be borne in mind that refitting the B-52 G's and H's with new and more efficient engines would increase their low-altitude range, but would not otherwise improve their penetration capabilities. And, even so, we would still be left with a very old aircraft which might well require very extensive structural modifications in the 1980's and thereafter to keep it in a safe operable condition.

So, in respect to the first two questions which must be answered to evaluate the proposed amendments, we see that—

First, Diversified strategic forces will continue to be essential to the maintenance of our deterrent as far as we can see into the future—with or without a SALT agreement.

Second, Bombers will continue to be an indispensable element of these deterrent forces.

Third, Given the age of the B-52 G and H force and the Soviet air defenses postulated for the late 1970's, it is not too early now to proceed with the development of a new bomber on an orderly and deliberately paced schedule.

The third issue pertinent to a decision on these proposed amendments focuses on the nature of the B-1 development program. Phrased as a question, have the excesses been trimmed from the proposed development program to justify the funding of \$370 million during fiscal year 1972? Or conversely, can we safely reduce the proposed funding by \$170 million without impacting unfavorably upon the efficient and orderly progression of the development program?

The Air Force wants to build the B-1 in an orderly and deliberate manner. An integral part of such a development schedule is a minimum number of disruptions to the scheduled pace and tempo of development activities, thereby minimizing the time required to reach a sustaining rate of obligation and increasing the likelihood of an efficient application of funds during the life of the program.

In an effort to keep the B-1 production on a more realistic schedule, the Air Force made several changes in the program. These changes are a part of an innovative approach to management that minimizes the total funding commitment by the Air Force prior to a production decision. All effort not directly contributing to reaching a logical production decision will be deleted or deferred until after the decision is made. This permits a reduction in total development costs and a reduction in total Government commitment prior to the production decision.

To be more specific, the number of flight test aircraft has been reduced from five to three. The static test airframe, as usually conceived, has been eliminated, and in its place major airframe components have been included in the preproduction verification testing, which will be essentially completed prior to the first flight. Also, the number of engines for R.D.T. & E. have been reduced from 40 to 27. A flight test program which combines elements of contractor and Air Force testing will allow objectives to be accomplished with a significant reduc-

tion in the number of test hours. A full year will be provided between first flight of the aircraft and the production decision, instead of the 6 months previously established. This will insure that all the necessary and pertinent data are in hand at the time a production decision is made.

So far, \$324 million have been appropriated for the AMSA/B-1 project. For the 13-month period from the start of the full-scale development in June 1970 through June 1971 some \$180.2 million will be expended. Of this, \$75 million is from the fiscal year 1971 appropriation and the remainder is from prior year funds. During the last quarter of fiscal year 1971, funds are being expended and committed at an annual rate of about \$270 million. The 1972 request is \$370.3 million. The principal activities in fiscal year 1972 will include the design, fabrication, and testing of component parts for test aircraft and engines; the design, development, and testing of static test subassemblies; the fatigue test of aircraft components; the sled testing and aerial drop of the crew module; 400 hours of engine testing; and wind tunnel tests for the airframe and the engine.

The criticality of these development efforts to the total program should be apparent. It is desirable from the standpoint of total program cost to reach a sustaining rate of Government obligation in the least time consistent with an orderly and efficient buildup of contractor effort. The arbitrary restriction of funds in the hope of cutting costs would cause unpredictable disruptions in the scheduled sequence of development activities; create unanticipated delays and contractual difficulties; cause an increase in total program cost as a result of the program stretchout and the associated turmoil within the development program.

In short, the proposed reduction of funding for the B-1 during fiscal year 1972 might create the illusion of being an effective economy measure. However, the ultimate effect of such an action would be an increase in total program costs.

So, in summary, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that each Member of this body evaluate the proposed amendments in the context of the three questions which I have posed. I submit that the result of such an evaluation will be the resounding defeat of these proposed amendments and the reaffirmation by the Congress that manned bombers in general and the B-1 in particular will be an essential part of our strategic deterrent posture for as far into the future as we can currently perceive the threat.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the Members of the House to support the E.D.T. & E. portion of this bill as reported by the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. CLANCY).

Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 8687. This resolution authorizes appropriations to continue the military defense of the United States and for the research and development of better and more efficient weapons to

insure the safety of our Nation in the future.

This bill authorizes the allocation of 21 billion, 875 million dollars for military procurements in fiscal year 1972. While that figure staggers the imagination, let me point out that it is urgently necessary. There are logical, strong arguments for appropriating even more money than this.

And, while the sum still seems like a monumental expenditure, it is nevertheless a smaller amount than the Congress appropriated to our defenses a year ago. The Armed Services Committee actually has cut \$18,555,000 from the requests of the Department of Defense.

Today's authorizations indicate that we really are winding down the war in Southeast Asia. For fiscal year 1971 now ending, military spending accounted for 22.4 percent of the expenditures of all of America's governments. The authorizations before us represent 21.3 percent of America's net public spending. The authorizations for fiscal year 1972 are 7.9-percent less than were spent in 1968 which was the most costly year of our involvement in Vietnam.

Look at it still another way. This year, defense spending will be 32.1 percent of the Federal budget compared to 42.5 percent in 1968. This year's authorizations are 6.8 percent of the gross national product, but back in 1968, defense spending amounted to 9.5 percent of the gross national product.

These figures show clearly that we are indeed making reductions in military spending and that the recommendations make it possible for other urgent matters to receive the attention that they need. It is important that we thus demonstrate that we are very much interested in other matters at this time.

But it is imperative that we remain aware of the actions, interests and threats of other nations. The motivations of some are obviously less humane and honorable than those of the United States. America in this generation has proven to be the most powerful in world history. That power makes us a target for nations which would succeed us and, I suspect, which would dominate us and enslave our people.

Witnesses before the Armed Services Committee testified that other nations devote more of their budgets to military spending than we do. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird told us that the Soviets are spending, in terms of percentages, about twice as much as we are on strategic offensive weapons. Note—that is "offensive" weapons; not defensive.

We were also told in committee that only 10 years ago, the United States held undisputed nuclear and strategic superiority in the world. We did not strive to maintain or improve that superiority gap. And now, Secretary Laird tells us that we are on a strategic nuclear parity with the Soviets. If we continue to maintain or decelerate our defense spending, while the Soviets continue to increase at their present rate, they will have undisputed nuclear and strategic superiority in the world by 1981.

Allow me to discuss two items in these authorizations with you for a moment.

First, the Safeguard antiballistics missile system. This year, we would authorize \$68 million more than a year ago. The total needed to continue the work already begun on the system through the next fiscal year is \$1,084,000,000.

This is a defensive mechanism. It is not designed to strike first. Its missiles would be on constant guard to blast off and knock approaching enemies from the sky. The Safeguard would be deployed to protect what we call our land-based strategic deterrent.

Deployment is already underway at Grand Forks, N. Dak., and Malmstrom, Mont. This authorization would continue deployment at Whiteman Air Force Base at Knob Noster, Mo., which we initiated in last year's authorization. It would provide advanced preparations at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base near Cheyenne, Wyo. The first Safeguard site would be ready by October 1974. The last would be operational sometime in 1977.

The sum asked for Safeguard is purposefully not generous. It allows work to go on for those sites. But it also permits us to halt deployment or revise our defense posture quickly. The value of these options, it is hoped, will give America greater flexibility in the strategic arms limitation talks.

Today, you are being asked to authorize \$370.3 million to develop three prototype B-1 bombers. The B-1 is a member of our "Triad" or triple deterrent. We already have, as deterrents against attacks from enemies, the land-based Minuteman missiles and sea-based Polaris/Poseidon missiles. It is conceivable that an enemy attack might avoid or disarm two of the Triad. The B-1 is needed to insure us against a surprise attack. B-1 bombers would replace and be a great improvement over the B-52's which have been such an effective deterrent.

If the B-1 is developed as expected, it will be able to fly lower, higher, faster, and farther while carrying a bigger load than the old, reliable B-52. It would be designed and constructed to permit extremely swift takeoffs in event the scramble order was ever given. With these refinements, it could quickly strike and decimate the strategic bases and forces of any enemy who decided numerical arms superiority could conquer America.

The authorization sought here today is the first substantial step toward development of the B-1. Even if we authorize that step, it will be April of 1975 before we will have to decide if a fleet of B-1's should be constructed to defend America.

These authorizations, it seems to me, are logical and reasonable. To ask for less would be to neglect the safety of our people and to lower the defenses of our Nation. These sums will allow us to maintain our vigil against attack while sharpening new weapons to match the buildup of offensive weapons which we know is going on in other countries. And, because it is a lessening amount of our national economy, it illustrates to the world and our countrymen that America is still a peace-loving Nation.

I urge passage of this measure.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. FISHER).

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 8687. As chairman of the subcommittee which looked into the status of our Reserve Forces, I would particularly like to direct my remarks to title III of the bill which pertains to the Reserve Forces. I am going to direct my remarks primarily to the Reserve Forces. My distinguished colleague, the Honorable ALEXANDER PIRNIE of New York, will discuss with you the Selected Reserve of the Coast Guard.

We used these hearings as an opportunity to make a comprehensive review of the posture of the Reserve Forces, as well as scrutinize the strength authorization request for the Selected Reserve for fiscal year 1972. Several general observations appear appropriate at this time.

First, the intent of Congress as expressed in the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization of Act of December 1, 1967 is finally being implemented as exemplified by the total force concept instituted this fiscal year by the Secretary of Defense.

In any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the Active Forces, Guard and Reserve Forces, rather than draftees, will be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the Active Forces. This means that the Guard and Reserve have been assigned a vital national security mission. It also means that the Selected Reserve must be manned, trained and equipped for mobilization should the need arise. It means that men should join the units because they want to be a part of this military mission, and not to avoid real military service.

Second, the Department of Defense and the military services have embraced the total force concept and have moved forward in plans, programs, and logistics affecting the Guard and Reserve during this fiscal year. This is in sharp contrast to the years 1965 through 1969 when virtually all the equipment purchased by the Army for Guard and Reserve Forces was diverted to support the war in Southeast Asia. In addition to these diversions, other equipment was withdrawn from the Army Guard and Reserve to meet Vietnam requirements. The result was a net change in the equipment inventory of the Army Guard and Reserve in the period 1965-69 of minus \$72 million. But the picture has changed sharply. In 1970, equipment with a value of \$300 million was issued to the Army Guard and Reserve and in the first 9 months of fiscal 1971, additional equipment with a value of just under \$500 million has been issued or allocated to the Army Guard and Reserve. Much more will be added through the depot rebuilding programs.

Thus, by the beginning of fiscal year 1972, nine National Guard and Reserve brigades are expected to be capable, both by equipment on hand and personnel readiness, to meet mobilization requirements.

In the Navy, World War II destroyers assigned to the Naval Reserve have been replaced with combat-serviceable ships.

The Navy and Marine Corps Air Reserves programs have been reoriented to make such units possess a much greater degree of readiness with combat deployable aircraft.

Modernization of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve is proceeding with C-130's, F-101's and R.F. 101's replace older model aircraft. Further modernization is programed as equipment becomes available through Active Air Force reductions.

It is significant that the administration budget for fiscal year 1972 includes \$3.1 billion for the Guard and Reserve. This is 50 percent greater than the fiscal year 1969 budget. This means funds to assure the maintenance of Selected Reserve strengths, funds to reduce backlogs of enlistees awaiting training, funds to increase technician support for units receiving more sophisticated equipment, and funds to bring repairable equipment in Army stocks to combat-serviceable standards for issue to Guard and Reserve units.

Third, while substantial progress is being made to equip and modernize the Guard and Reserve Forces, an almost staggering amount remains to be done. In order to fully equip the Guard and Reserves with equipment comparable to the Active Forces by fiscal year 1974, \$5-072,600,000 in appropriations or that amount of equipment assigned from existing resources will be required. Yet, if the total force concept is to be a realistic one, such will be necessary.

Fourth, even with the full equipping of the Guard and Reserves, the total force concept approach requires manpower to accomplish its goals. With an estimate of 70 percent of the new entries into the Guard and Reserve Force draft-motivated, serious attention must be focused on the recruitment and retention problems as the way is pointed to zero-draft calls. This may require legislation providing additional incentives in order to maintain the strength essential to assigned missions.

There are three particular areas to which we would call the attention of the House; First, little has been accomplished during this past year in increasing participation by minority groups in the Guard and Reserve program. The committee pursued the efforts made by the Guard and Reserve to increase that participation but agree with the witnesses that as desirable as the goal of proportional participation by minority groups may be, it is an unrealistic goal unless it also becomes the goal of the minority communities. Second, we pursued the subject of training and utilization of National Guardsmen since the unfortunate incident at Kent State last year. We believe the overall record of the Guard in the area of riot control is an outstanding one, and are pleased with the increased emphasis on riot control training. Third, we are extremely concerned over the attempts of some within the Government to seek lands from the Department of Defense so that such lands may be converted into other uses. Naturally, the Committee does not want the Department of Defense to have excess land but would call attention that if we are to have a viable and effective Reserve

Force, there must be adequate land on which to train for the assigned mission. In other words, there is no sense in assigning Reservists tanks unless they have terrain on which to train. To require a Reservist to go 300 to 400 miles to a training site on a weekend would be to waste essential time that should be spent in training.

During the hearings, the Air Force requested that their original request be adjusted upward by 182, thus making their request now 49,634. Since the original request was formulated, two changes have taken place which require these additional authorizations. The C-124 unit at Homestead, Fla., will now convert to the EC-121 instead of converting to C-130's, and an additional C-130 unit will be activated at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., in fiscal year 1972. The Committee agreed that the increase was essential if these units were to function as described.

We added a section which incorporates a change in existing law recommended by the Committee on Armed Services. The committee was concerned with the practice of the Department of Defense and the individual services which results in requiring reservists to perform annual active duty training periods of approximately 14 days despite the fact that the individual reservist or National Guard member will within 120 days or less, no longer, have an obligation to remain in a Ready Reserve status. The involuntary ordering of such personnel to annual active duty training is designed to maintain the individual reservist's military proficiency with a view toward his possible utilization in a mobilized status. However, it is less than realistic to justify this expenditure if the member will shortly, after completing his annual active duty training period, be transferred from a Ready Reserve status and no longer be available for mobilization. The language does not preclude the voluntary ordering of such individuals to active duty for training. Moreover, the general prohibition applies only in the instance of those reservists and Guard personnel who have spent a year or more on active duty. Thus, the so-called 6-month trainee who have never been on extended active duty would not be included in this proviso.

The bill provides that for the year beginning July 1, 1971, and ending June 30, 1972, the Selected Reserve will be programmed to obtain an average strength of not less than the following:

Army National Guard of the United States	400,000
Army Reserve	260,000
Naval Reserve	129,000
Marine Corps Reserve	45,849
Air National Guard	88,191
Air Force Reserve	49,634
Coast Guard Reserve	15,000

Mr. Chairman, I now yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIRNIE) who, through both the meetings of the subcommittee and the full committee, led the in-depth inquiry into the action of the Secretary of Transportation in attempting to phase out the Selected Reserve of the Coast Guard during this coming fiscal year. Mr. PIRNIE will explain the unanimous position of the

members of the Armed Services Committee in this area.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, it is with particular pleasure that I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT).

Mr. LEGGETT. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the chairman very much for yielding me this time to generally apprise the effect of the pending legislation.

First, I would like to say a word again in praise of the excellent management of the committee and the work of the chairman as well as the work of the dedicated staff of the House Armed Services Committee. I particularly am pleased with the work which we have done over the past 5 months on the pending bill.

Mr. Chairman, this is an expensive bill. Any particular item contained therein could be talked about for hours. We have escalations, we have expensive programs, we have the C-5 aircraft that we saw in Paris just a week ago, which was the hit of the International Air Show. It took off, I believe, in less than 1,000 feet unloaded. But, certainly, there was considerable appreciation of the American air might around the world.

These vehicles, though, are not cheap. I believe the development cost now stands at about \$56 million each.

Mr. Chairman, there is money contained in this bill for the B-1 bomber, which is built in my home State, costing about \$46 million each, with \$24 million of contained missilery amounting to \$70 million in development program cost. The estimate unit cost itself is \$245 million. I intend to offer an amendment at the appropriate time to reduce and hold back this total purchase which I believe is extremely expensive, considering the current economic condition of the United States.

I fully support the chairman in his efforts to hold back on the funding of the F-14 aircraft. I think we need a new Navy F-14 fighter aircraft and I would certainly hope that whatever we do in the House and the Senate does not abrogate the contract which we currently have with Grumman Aircraft which is currently causing Grumman considerable discomfiture because they apparently are losing on the order of \$100 million net on the first 65 aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, I hope whatever we do we can maintain the benefit of bargaining and make some adjustments to keep this program going, perhaps with modifications, at the cheapest possible cost.

The subcommittee chairman, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE), on research and development has done some very excellent work in touring the country and seeing some of this hardware being constructed all over the country. We have not found escalation in every single program. As an example, the F-15, the fighter aircraft, developed almost simultaneously with the Navy fighter aircraft, is not going into the \$50 million unit cost, but the unit cost they are talking about is more like \$5.6 million or \$5.8 million.

So, though it is possible I believe at this time to develop aircraft within some

kind of a reasonable limitation without breaking the bank.

We have not talked much to date about the effect of the strategic arms limitation talks that are going on in Helsinki, Warsaw, and Vienna. I would certainly hope that whatever we do in this legislation does not waste funds that are going to be summarily rejected by international agreements that are made at these international symposiums.

At the proper time I intend to offer an additional amendment to call for a small step in the reduction of the total NATO posture. As you know at the present time we have some 300,000 troops in both the Army and the 6th Fleet in Germany, and in perhaps 1,000 bases in western Europe. I believe that it is this expenditure of funds, perhaps only a few hundred million dollars, which are contributing to our deficit balance of payments which has caused the United States considerable embarrassment with regard to the stability of the American dollar. We have devalued the American dollar by revaluation of the mark only a few weeks ago, and this 5-percent revaluation has lost the American traders on the order of \$5 billion already to date.

So the amendment that I have in mind with respect to that item would call for a unilateral 10-percent reduction in this total force which would not be front-line forces, but would be primarily support forces. I believe that this would have a reciprocal and salutary effect, particularly in view of the speeches made by Mr. Kosygin, Mr. Brezhnev, and Mr. Gromyko, which I intend to refer to at the proper time when I offer the amendment.

I would like to commend the chairman on the additions we have included in the budget for the U.S. Navy. We have got at least a one-third increase in the items which were programmed from last year. Unfortunately, we do not buy 30 percent more because naval ships are more expensive than they were last year. I tend to think that with carriers costing nearly \$1 billion per unit we have almost priced ourselves out of the capacity to build these very large, multi-purpose billion-dollar monsters. I tend to think we need to proliferate our capability more than we have in the past, even though I have been a great disciple of our nuclear force.

Unfortunately, it's simply not possible for each of us to represent the daily demands of the thousands of people that we each represent, attend the social functions, visit our districts, see people, attend to other committee functions and also do what could be described as a thorough credible professional review of a \$21 billion authorization bill which indirectly affects total defense expenditures now being made at the \$76 billion annual monthly rate.

We work hard. We do as best we can. We did a darn good job on MEL PRICE'S R. & D. subcommittee. We rely on our professionals, the newspapers, the writers, yes even CBS, NBC and the thousands of periodicals with which we are daily familiar. We work with rumors, local bar information, secret and top secret information and in the end try to synthe-

size some kind of a rational result that we can sell to the American people—which we call national defense policy.

If you consider the administrative budget of \$169 billion only, defense expenditures comprise \$80 billion directly, \$11 billion for veterans, \$19 billion for the debt interest of past wars and \$3 billion for military aid, atomic warheads and space camouflaged items—over 70 percent of administrative budget.

When we win wars and friends and save freedom, we are the world's saviors.

When we dump \$200 billion down the drain with 45,000 American kids in Southeast Asia to upgrade a \$3 billion economy, and our main bargain in getting out is to get our POW's returned and not have our troops fired on as they leave, when we obligate ourselves for another \$200 billion veteran benefits to the year 2050, then we are not the saviors—we are perhaps the world's clowns.

We have retired a President and several Secretaries of Defense that developed this policy with our congressional connivance. Though I have generally opposed our escalation—I did vote for the Tonkin Gulf resolution and today I am frankly embarrassed and sick.

Nixon should be praised for getting us out. He is doing it though hardly victorious and with a bare amount of honor.

I intend to talk later on the Nedzi-Whalen amendment how we can further either adopt the Leggett-Riegle program of proportional repatriation setting a date 6-8 months away to totally wind up the American Southeast Asian misplaced effort.

Some years ago in August of 1967 I sent words to the President as follows:

Unfortunately I see little real blue sky on the horizon during 1968. The problem simply is not credibility gap but the fact that the Bureau of the Budget simply is not geared to provide oversight of the Department of Defense. What is needed is some agency actually able to exercise heavy restraint on Defense spending such that the size and nature of our foreign military operations could be controlled. . . .

I firmly believe we have escalated to no place. In the face of continuous recommendations from General Westmoreland that the war will go on indefinitely, I have failed to understand the theory of escalation. When we in the States have assumed that our force level at 150,000 or 250,000 was at the outer limit considering that a \$750 billion economy was fighting a \$1 billion economy without modern transportation, a Navy or airpower, we have always assumed that the large buildup had some kind of foreseeable victory in mind. . . .

I would say then that the better part of valor at the present time would be for the administration to be deadly serious with itself as to where we have been and where we are going. It will profit us little as a nation if we exhaust ourselves economically on North Vietnam only to find that our curtailment and lack of attention to the rest of the world, including the Americas, has allowed a Communist foundation to be dug on our hemispheric mainland. While our policy in Vietnam at one time was a matter of choice, at the present time it is monumentally compulsive.

How should the United States resolve our current international dilemma? First we should recognize that we are escalating to nowhere. We should resist escalation at all costs unless we know the escalated result.

We have played too much blind man's bluff on a major scale too long. We should unilaterally scale down our cost and size of operations in South Vietnam and keep the burden of the conflict on the Vietnamese themselves. We should recognize, I believe, that the alternative to being pushed into the Tonkin Gulf in 1965 is not wholesale, all-out war in 1967 especially when our commander in the battlefield has no predictions for victory whatsoever in the foreseeable future.

In some encounters in the past perhaps we had not the option to reason why, only to do and suffer the consequences. Today we are involved in a new kind of undeclared war which is concerned not so much with a mad dictator's lust for power, but with a surge of people to better their plight. While we can destroy a dictator, you cannot destroy a whole people.

It is inevitable, therefore, that the present conflict be concluded with some kind of an accommodation by the people on both sides of the encounter looking toward their mutual development. The United States has been, perhaps, too ready with the olive branch in the past and now grows weary of offering to negotiate. In time, I believe tensions will relax to the point when Ho Chi Minh will talk. It is to American interests that the balance of world, free and Communist, not become too exercised or alarmed in the meantime.

Indirectly our effort in Southeast Asia is related to domestic strife and both matters are related to your tax message.

We are concerned in recent months about lawlessness in our urban streets. The Congress has responded with the Riot Control Bill and the Justice Department's Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Assistance Act. The fact is that better trained police and National Guardsmen can give us a better level of peace control, but there is little they can do to resolve the widespread underlying domestic discontent.

Our poor and minorities are certainly better employed, welfareed and anti-povertized than ever before. Unfortunately, however, they just can't evolve a plan of co-existence with their rats and ghettos. The blighted cities of America are crying out for a plan of redevelopment while white America has evacuated to suburbia. We must recognize that our currently operative Poverty Programs simply do not offer the requisite record of success and hope for the future that America needs. . . .

To make our American cities over again on their obsolete historical site locations would require a program of multi-billion dollar magnitude. Such a program is obviously not feasible current overseas military drain.

I can envision an Administration postulating a five-year Federal program that would cut across state restrictive legislation; that would be operative with the consent of the Governors only; that could be enriched by state and private funds; that would envision fee ownership and rental homes ratably constructed all over the Great Society. This is the multi-billion dollar plan spoken of by Senator Abraham Ribicoff—a program we obviously can't afford with our enormous, uncontrolled overseas expenditures, a program which properly outlined and bipartisanly supported would offer real hope for urban masses even though it might not be accomplished for five-to-ten years.

To restate my position: It will gain us little to drain our economy over the next decade, wearing Ho Chi Minh into submission, only to find that we have stimulated the creation of a class-against-class struggle in our own nation and particularly in our neighboring Americas because we have paid too little attention to developing truly effective domestic programs.

For the foregoing reasons and for fear of future consequences, I want to be recorded

against the high overseas military dollar drain and the resultant 10 percent tax surcharge.

Record me for a revitalized domestic program of home ownership and effective reorganization of our cities.

While the military situation in the field is open to question, I do believe that in spite of the fact that the Paris negotiations appear to be stalemated, we are making progress.

I spoke on the floor June 18, 1969, as follows:

Mr. Speaker, I do wish to discuss one or two more items. We, of course, must wait for the next move. Hopefully, President Nixon's "open door to mutual deescalation" will be seen by the enemy. I know the reaction by the enemy. I know the reaction by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong in Paris was one of cynicism. This might be because Asiatics do not fight or negotiate according to Marquis of Queensbury rules. We have long experienced a series of tirades from the enemy after each piece move on our part. I believe we should ignore the spoken word and rely on actions of our adversary to determine their true response. The North Vietnamese reductions I have already cited are an example of response we might anticipate. If the reductions continue on both sides—ours publicly and theirs privately—I think we are on the road to peace. If American reductions matched the North Vietnamese reductions over the past year, already we should have withdrawn 140,000 men—a 25-percent reduction.

However, I doubt that American presence in South Vietnam will totally evaporate until there is a thread of political settlement in the south.

It is possible that President Nixon has finally found a way out of the deadlock. The President's televised message on May 14, 1969, prior to the Midway Conference, contained a number of suggestions which could, if seriously implemented, start the final settlement. The suggestions, I feel, that have merit are as follows—as taken from the transcript of the President's speech:

"In this spirit, let me be explicit about several points:

"We seek no bases in Vietnam.

"We insist on no military ties.

"We are willing to agree to neutrality if that is what South Vietnamese people freely choose.

"We believe there should be an opportunity for full participation in the political life of South Vietnam by all political elements that are prepared to do so without the use of force or intimidation."

He means here that the SVN Constitution must be revised.

"We are prepared to accept any government in South Vietnam that results from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves."

He means here that we must have a new Constitution, and new election.

"We have no intention of imposing any form of government upon the people of South Vietnam, nor will we be a party to such coercion."

He means we do not support the existing SVN Constitution.

While it is true that there were only 10,000 North Vietnamese in the South in 1965 when the United States began its apparently preconceived plan of bombing, those enemy figures did escalate to 190,000 south of the 19th parallel in June of 1968 prior to the bombing halt. In 1969, the level reduced to 150,000. Last year the President announced that the level had further reduced to 100,000—a 50-percent reduction.

American forces today are now down also almost 50 percent from the 1968 high level of the Johnson years.

Unfortunately, in the self-determination area mentioned by President Nixon at Guam, there is little progress being made.

The Thieu-Ky ticket representing 35 percent of the voters in the last election is now fragmenting with efforts being made by Thieu to disqualify Vice President Ky. Tran Vin Dinh, who received nearly one-third of the votes in the 1968 elections, unfortunately still basks in jail for fostering in public the self-determination principles mentioned by Nixon in 1969.

A vast segment of the Vietnam population is still disqualified from participating in the election franchise. Unfortunately with the political bravado now in vogue in this small country, there will be no progress toward a self-determination political settlement until the United States finally decides to sever the maternal cord.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIRNIE).

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Chairman, on April 29 of last year, I stood in the well of the House and warned you of the budget proposal to phase out the Selected Reserve of the Coast Guard, and the reasons why the Armed Services Committee had unanimously rejected that recommendation. Fortunately, for the defense of this Nation, the committee position was sustained, and the Coast Guard Selected Reserve is in existence today.

But, despite congressional rejection of the budget approach of last year, the same proposal, in essence, came before the Armed Services Committee again this year. In other words, the President this year asked for a strength of only 5,000 to enable him to phase out the Selected Reserve of the Coast Guard by the end of fiscal year 1972.

I am reluctant to criticize my President and his administration but I am compelled to speak out again this year on a policy which is wrong. In essence, this is a move initiated within the Office of Management and Budget so as to reduce the Department of Transportation's budget. It was undertaken without any regard to our Nation's security and in contradiction of conclusions reached by independent studies.

Initially, some budgetary planners assumed that if the functions, roles, and missions now assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Coast Guard Selected Reserve were transferred to the Department of the Navy, the Navy could absorb this cost within the current Navy Reserve budget. This assumption was made prior to consultation with any responsible official in the Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, or in the Coast Guard.

Our hearings brought out the fact that if the Navy were required to assume these functions without a substantial increase in budget, the Navy would have to degrade its Naval Reserve programs to an unacceptable level. Thereafter, these budgetary planners adopted a new theory

as justification for the elimination. The new theory is that since the Selected Reserve of the Coast Guard would become part of the Navy under a wartime situation, the needed manpower would be provided within the Naval Reserve appropriation.

I understand that legislation is now being formulated within the Department of Transportation to transfer the function of port security from the Selected Reserve to the Department of the Navy. In my opinion, this is recognition of the validity of the decision of the entire Congress last year and of our committee this year that the mission of port security remains vital to America.

When we questioned the Secretary of Transportation as to the Navy plans for assuming the functions now assigned to the Coast Guard Reserve, he admitted that the Navy had not made plans or established procedures for inclusion of the Selected Reserve function as part of the Navy Reserve, but that he would turn over to the Navy the documentation on how the Coast Guard operates its programs. He also acknowledged that it is "virtually impossible to detail the size, structure and operations of these portions of the Selected Reserve functions which the Navy will perform."

This answer by the Secretary of Transportation supports the committee premise that as of now, there are really no plans by which the important dual missions of port security and fleet augmentation could be undertaken in the early days of full mobilization—a risk found to be unacceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commandant of the Coast Guard—those military men who are responsible for this phase of our national security.

It is shocking that on matters affecting national security, budgetary planners within the Office of Management and Budget attempt to ride roughshod over those who are responsible for these missions.

Last year, I detailed for you the roles of the Coast Guard Selected Reserve, and I will not take up your time by doing it again. However, I do point out that two independent studies since 1960 have examined into those roles and missions, and found them to be valid and that no study to the contrary has been completed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any other branch of the Government.

There is no doubt that if the Navy were required to undertake the functions currently assigned to the Selected Reserve of the Coast Guard, they could sometime in the future develop a program which could accomplish the mission, but the Chief of Naval Personnel told the committee that the Navy was not now expert in the matter of port security and it would take several years to develop that expertise and, even then, it would probably cost more for the Navy to perform that mission than if it were to remain in the Selected Reserve of the Coast Guard.

To destroy that which has been created and is now functioning effectively, in the hope of establishing something

that might do as well in the future, is to waste current assets. Since there will be no cost savings to the Government, it would appear the proposed elimination of the Selected Reserve of the Coast Guard is based only on a desire to shift from the Department of Transportation the cost of this program. But there is no saving to the Government—merely by transferring obligations from the Department of Transportation to the Department of the Navy.

Even the administration agrees that the functions now performed by the Selected Reserve of the Coast Guard are essential. It is clear that it is wise to retain the Selected Reserve at the strength authorized last year; that is, at 15,000.

I am not going to take further time, because if you will refer to page 68 and thereafter in the committee report, you will find well documented some of the questions and answers which were considered by this committee in reaching the conclusion which is embodied in this bill and which is supported by my remarks.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT).

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 8687.

The report of the Armed Services Committee starting on page 13 shows the Soviet naval threat and comparison of the U.S. Navy. This comparison is frightening. However, I want to bring to your attention today a comparison that was published by the Seapower Subcommittee on the Status of Shipyards. This comparison shows the total strengths of the United States, the United Kingdom and U.S.S.R. both now and in 1950 just before the start of the Korean war.

In 1950 the United States had a total of 663 combat ships with an average age of 5.4 years. There were 163 submarines in the fleet. There was a reserve fleet of 1,958 ships with an average age of 6.5 years. There was a total fleet of 2,621. In 1950 the United Kingdom had a total combat fleet of 421 ships. A reserve fleet of 673. There was a total fleet of 1,094.

Therefore, in 1950 the combined fleets of the United States and the United Kingdom were 3,715 effective combatant ships. In 1950 the U.S.S.R. had 1,785 combat ships of which 350 were submarines.

Now let us look at 1971. In 1971 the United States has a total combat ship fleet of 642 with an average ship age of 15 years. There are 142 submarines in the fleet. There are 431 ships in the reserve fleet with an average age of over 25 years for a total of 1,081.

The United Kingdom now has 143 ships in its active fleet. Thirty-eight in its reserve for a total of 181. Between the United States and United Kingdom the grant total is 1,261.

Now, however, the U.S.S.R. has a total combat fleet of 1,604 with an average age of 8.8 years and a submarine fleet of over 356. What has happened then is very clear. The United States and the United Kingdom fleets have been greatly

reduced. What is left is made up in large part of old ships. The U.S.S.R. on the other hand, has a fleet with an average age of 8.8 years. This is a new fleet with new capabilities in weapons, propulsion and command and control.

In our report on the status of shipyards we very clearly pointed out that this momentum of the Soviets in the construction of a new fleet started with the construction and modernization of the Soviet shipyards in World War II and shortly thereafter. Without those new yards the Soviets would not now be able to have a fleet of 1,604 ships with an average age of 8.8 years. To this fleet there should be added 500 amphibious, mine warfare and auxiliary ships, to get a complete picture of the Soviet fleet.

Mr. Chairman, the momentum with which the Soviets have carried on their shipbuilding gives me great concern. They have the new ships, they are building more. They are building more surface ships and they are building more submarines. In the meantime our ships have been allowed to deteriorate. Our naval shipyards are now manned at less than minimum efficient level and our private shipyards have been reduced to the point where many of the famous old names in shipbuilding are not even constructing naval ships any more.

Mr. Chairman, the Armed Services Committee reported without change the shipbuilding program of \$3,328,900,000 in ship construction that was requested by the President. This is the largest shipbuilding request that has come up from the executive department in recent years. However, let me remind you that even as large as this bill is the Chief of Naval Operations has said in testimony to this committee that we really should have a shipbuilding program of \$4 billion and that there are still risks associated with a shipbuilding program of this size.

This shipbuilding program includes five nuclear attack submarines, one nuclear-powered guided-missile frigate, seven destroyers of the *Spruance* class, one replenishment oiler, two attack submarine tenders, three salvage and rescue ships and service craft. It also provides for the conversion of six Polaris submarines to Poseidons, for the conversion of two guided-missile frigates to have more effective surface to air missile systems and for one deep ocean survey ship to provide for support of the new submarine fleet.

Mr. Chairman, I want to point out one item in particular in connection with this program. In the Presidential request there was included the sum of \$14.6 million for the long-lead time items for nuclear guided-missile frigate DLGN 41. At the time that we had the construction program under consideration we got word that maybe the Department of Defense did not want to proceed with the DLGN program any further.

If you will remember, Mr. Chairman, the *Truxtun*, one of the two nuclear-powered guided-missile frigates that is now in existence as escorts for the *Enterprise*, was made nuclear powered by the Congress in the fiscal year 1962 pro-

gram, when this frigate was originally requested as a conventionally powered frigate. It took a mandate in the law, that nuclear-powered frigates shall be built unless the President finds their construction is in the national interest, to have the *California*, and the *South Carolina* built.

Following that mandate the Department of Defense announced plans for a five-ship DLGN program. Moneys in the present bill would provide for the completion of the construction of DLGN 40. This would be three of the five. With the *Truxtun*, the *Bainbridge*, the *California*, and the *South Carolina*, the Navy would have at least four frigates which would be able to escort the *Enterprise*. The *Nimitz* is coming along. The DLGN 38, 39, and 40 would provide three of the four escorts for the *Nimitz*. The DLGN would complete the group for the *Nimitz*. This still leaves the Eisenhower as a nuclear-powered attack carrier for which at the moment there would appear to be no plans for nuclear powered escorts.

Since it has been the history of the Congress that it has insisted on nuclear-powered frigates, the Committee on Armed Services again inserted in the bill that mandatory language which was used before and which reads:

For naval vessels: for the Navy, \$3,328,000,000, of which \$14,600,000 is authorized only for advance procurement for the nuclear powered guided-missile frigate DLGN 41. The contract(s) for advance procurement for the DLGN 41 shall be entered into as soon as practicable unless the President fully advises the Congress that its construction is not in the national interest.

In other words, people say in these days that Congress does not take the initiative in the things that it should, particularly in the national defense. This is an illustration of where this Congress has taken the initiative through the years to force on the department what it knows is lacking but hesitates to ask for because of the dollars initially involved in construction. Nuclear-powered vessels on the sea, ships, submarines, and so forth, are an economy in the long run when everything is taken into consideration over the period of the life of a ship, to say nothing of the defense value which would be added by this.

So in this particular part of the bill, at least, Congress is taking the initiative in asking the country to go vigorously forward in this particular part of the program.

Mr. ARENDS, Mr. Chairman. I yield the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN) as much time as he desires.

Mr. WHALEN, Mr. Chairman, at the appropriate time, Mr. Nedzi of Michigan will introduce an amendment which has now become well known as the Nedzi-Whalen amendment. I am not going to use this time this afternoon to advance argument in behalf of this amendment. This will be done at the appropriate time during the course of debate on that amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned by the fact that there appears to me to be some misunderstanding regarding the effect of this amendment both on the

part of some Members of this body as well as on the part of those who have been writing and calling the Members in support of the Nedzi-Whalen amendment. Therefore, I would like to take these few minutes this afternoon to explain to the Members of this body the scope of this amendment.

In doing so, I shall cover three points. First, I think it is necessary, if we are to understand this amendment, to understand the jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services and the scope of the bill that is presently before us. Secondly, with this background I shall briefly explain what the Nedzi-Whalen amendment proposes to do. Third, I shall explain by using illustrations what the amendment will not do.

First, what is the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee? What is the scope of this bill that this body is presently considering? Among other things, the Committee on Armed Services has the responsibility for authorizing the procurement of various defense weapons systems.

Mr. Chairman, the committee is exercising its prerogative in bringing this bill to the floor of the House of Representatives.

The bill before us provides for research and development. In fact, about one-third of the funds authorized in this measure are for that purpose. The other two-thirds of the funds go for military equipment, including aircraft, missiles, armored and tracked vehicles as well as naval vessels.

Mr. Chairman, this is an authorization bill. It is not an appropriation bill.

I would point out further that the committee's jurisdiction does not extend to the payment of military personnel. This is the responsibility of the House Committee on Appropriations. Nor does the committee jurisdiction extend to the appropriations for ammunition. This, too, comes within the purview of the House Appropriations Committee.

Second, with this background, what does the Nedzi-Whalen amendment propose to do? Simply this: It prohibits the use after December 31, 1971, of equipment authorized by this bill in and above South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. I repeat, it prohibits use of the equipment authorized by this bill in or above the four countries of what was formerly known as Indochina.

Third, what does it not do? Let me just state some specific examples of things that the Nedzi-Whalen amendment will not accomplish.

First, it will not require that troops be withdrawn from South Vietnam after December 31 of this year.

Second, the Nedzi-Whalen amendment will not cut off the pay from any American troops remaining in South Vietnam after the effective date of December 31.

Also, it will not deny American troops the use of equipment and weapons systems that are already in South Vietnam. Nor, will it deny the use of weapons systems authorized in previous procurement programs. Nor does it deny to the administration the right to provide military assistance to our three allies in Indochina.

Nor, as I examine my and Mr. NEDZI's amendment would it prohibit the use of the equipment authorized by this bill by South Vietnamese, or Laotian, or Cambodian troops.

I wanted to make these points clear because, as I stated earlier, I think there has been a misunderstanding to the effect that the passage of this amendment will remove troops from South Vietnam after December 31 of this year. This it will not do.

This being the last, some may question whether this amendment is very meaningful. I think it is. I say that because passage of the Nedzi-Whalen amendment, to me would represent a very clear message from the people of the United States through their elected Representatives that we want our troops out of Indochina.

Despite the fact that this amendment does have its limitations, I agreed with the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEDZI) to cosponsor it. I did so for two reasons.

First, Mr. Chairman, I firmly believe that the legislative branch is coequal with the executive branch of Government. I feel that we in the Congress have a responsibility for considering and for providing solutions to the problems confronting our country. In my opinion, the biggest problem facing us today, and the major problem which has confronted us for the past 5 or 6 years, is our involvement in Vietnam.

Second, in keeping with this philosophy I agreed to cosponsor this amendment, because I felt that I should do everything possible within my limited jurisdiction as a member of the House Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WHALEN. I shall be glad to yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. DENNIS. Am I correct, that your amendment contains a section which says that the amendment shall not be construed to affect the constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief?

Mr. WHALEN. That is correct.

Mr. DENNIS. Then I put this proposition to the gentleman from Ohio: Since the whole problem in this field is, really, one as to the extent of the broad constitutional powers the President has as Commander in Chief, and as to where those powers end, and those of the Congress begin, or vice versa, then I make the suggestion that, since that is the case, that when you present an amendment, the design and effect of which is to limit support for the deployment of troops by the Commander in Chief, and at the same time say, "However, my amendment in no way affects his powers as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces," That you are coming rather close, actually, to saying that your amendment does not mean anything at all. Is that not so?

Mr. WHALEN. Not at all. Certainly Congress cannot preempt that responsibility or that power of the President in any way. But I would point out the fact that we are certainly operating within our jurisdiction, within our congressional responsibilities, when we submit this

amendment and when we act upon this amendment.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WHALEN. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's frankness and candor in explaining all of the things that his amendment will not do. I must say that I am somewhat troubled, as was the previous gentleman, that if this amendment is not going to do all these things, whether all the phone calls, letters, and telegrams and petitions that I have been receiving, as well as many other Members of the House, that these people have been under the wrong impression.

The gentleman says the only meaning that this amendment has is that it is going to give a signal of the American people's intentions. A signal to whom? A signal of what? Who is the signal going to be received by? If Hanoi reads the transcript of today's proceedings here and reads our colleague's frank, honest, and discerning statement on what the Nedzi-Whalen amendment is not going to do, I do not believe Hanoi is going to be very troubled with this amendment, regardless of what happens to it on the floor of the House. So who are we signaling, and with what?

Mr. WHALEN. To answer the question specifically, I think certainly we are signaling to the executive branch of the government our desire and our concern. Let me reiterate what I stated during my previous remarks. That is, I believe that there is a misunderstanding regarding the effect of this amendment. There is, therefore, a responsibility upon the part of the authors of this amendment to make perfectly clear the effect of it. Now, I do not make this statement as an apology, nor do I make the statement in an effort to solicit votes on the part of those who say, "Well, since it does have these limitations, I feel I can go along with it."

I just want to set the record straight. And, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to do that very thing.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WHALEN. I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, I am confused, and that is really the reason I am asking this question concerning the meaning of the Nedzi-Whalen amendment. I might say that I read in the committee report, where the gentleman from Ohio and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEDZI) have submitted additional views, and I will read the first paragraph that you gentlemen submitted to the report:

During Committee consideration of H.R. 8687, the Defense Procurement Bill for Fiscal 1972, we introduced an amendment to prohibit the expenditure of new funds, after January 1, 1972, to support U.S. military deployment or military operations in or over South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos. We intend to re-introduce the amendment during the forthcoming House debate on this bill.

You state very clearly new funds to be cut off after January 1, 1972.

Mr. WHALEN. If the items that are authorized in this bill are not funded, obviously, they would not find their way to South Vietnam anyway. So this amendment certainly conforms to that language in the committee report and vice versa.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL).

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, I have listened attentively to the remarks of the gentleman from Ohio, who has stated that tomorrow he will be one of the co-authors of the celebrated and much-publicized amendment to end the Vietnam war on December 31, 1971.

It has been my privilege to sit as a member of the House Armed Services Committee with the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEDZI), who will be the first to offer the so-called end-the-war amendment. I regard him as a friend, and certainly as a very able member of the House Armed Services Committee. While his coauthor was in the well, I sat at the committee table and had the privilege to listen out of one ear to the gentleman from Ohio and out of the other ear to the gentleman from Michigan.

From my conversation at the committee table and from the remarks of the gentleman in the well, I think I learned quite a lot about what the Nedzi-Whalen amendment will do, what it will not do, and what is the real issue expressed by this amendment.

First of all, unlike the McGovern-Hatfield proposal, this amendment does not provide for the withdrawal of troops. It does simply provide that no funds authorized by this act may be expended after December 31, 1971, to support the deployment of U.S. military personnel or the conduct of military operations in or over South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos. With this wording in mind, and with the knowledge that of the nearly \$28 billion in the bill only about \$2.5 billion will be spent for procurement in fiscal year 1972, the amendment is thus brought into a better perspective. I suppose that in its strictly legal effort the amendment would have less application in fiscal 1972 than in future years, because the funds which we authorize in H.R. 8687 will actually be spent by the Pentagon as far away as July 1, 1978.

The mail which I have received and the calls which have been made to my office indicate that people believe, or I should say assume, that the Nedzi-Whalen amendment means withdrawal. That is not true, as I find from my conversation with the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEDZI), and as I gather from the remarks of the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN). I think that an interested observer would be entitled to inquire, what then is the significance of the Nedzi-Whalen amendment? One of the authors answered my question to indicate, "We are saying we want this thing over with." Surely neither of the authors of this amendment are any more inter-

ested in having the Vietnam conflict over with than the great majority of the Members of the House of Representatives. It will be my intention to offer my own amendment, or support an amendment of another Member which will have the same effect and the same result except perhaps for fixing a date. Interested in the importance of a date to the authors of this amendment, I inquired, "Why is the date of December 31, 1971, so important?" Their answer was that it is a matter of symbolism and if you take out the date there is nothing left.

Mr. Chairman, I think we should look carefully at this amendment. There are some good things in it which I can support without reservation, but there are some things in it which I cannot accept. First, I am not sure of the effectiveness of this amendment, because it would not impair the right or power of the President to take equipment or military hardware from anywhere else in the world and send it to be used in Vietnam. The President can draw on inventories of military hardware anywhere, either here in the United States or from our NATO commitments or elsewhere, and send it to Vietnam. Certainly the amendment could not affect the equipment in Vietnam now, nor could it in any way affect authorizations of military equipment made in previous bills, nor could it deny military assistance to our allies.

As I read the amendment, there would be nothing to prevent the President from taking a ship or a plane that might be stationed somewhere else in the world and sending it to Vietnam, and replacing that military hardware with funds procured from this authorization. Certainly the amendment itself states that it is not meant to be construed to affect the constitutional power of the President as Commander in Chief. We all know that the House Armed Services Committee has no authority to affect military pay, because that is purely a matter of law and action by the Appropriations Committee. We also know that the Armed Services Committee has no direct authority over ammunition, as that is again a matter of an amount to be approved by the Appropriations Committee.

There are so many things that the amendment does not do. I am not sure to whom it is meaningful, or just what the clear meaning may be. It is a limited amendment. I would not be one to say that it has no meaning at all. If it has a symbolism, as one of its authors has said, it is to express the clear message that we want our troops out of Indochina at the earliest possible date, and we want this war over with just as soon as possible. Once again, Mr. Chairman, I repeat that the authors of this amendment have no monopoly on this objective or this desire. I, too, along with the great majority have this same objective. It is my intention to participate before this debate is over in the support of an amendment which will express this intention and desire and this symbolism, just as well and perhaps better than the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan and the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield

such time as he may desire to the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON).

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I, too, rise in support of H.R. 8687.

There are two areas in the committee's recommendations to which I would like to address my attention. One area is the submarine program and one is the Army's main battle tank.

Within the shipbuilding program brought before you today for your approval there is included \$767.5 million to complete the construction of five nuclear attack submarines. There is also included \$113.5 million for the long-lead-time items for the construction of the five more nuclear attack submarines to be funded next year. In addition, there are \$265.4 million for the conversion of six Polaris submarines to Poseidon, and there are \$136.3 million for the long-lead-time items for six more conversions next year. That means that there are nearly \$1.3 billion in this program for nuclear submarine work of one kind or another. That sounds like a lot of money and it is.

However, I want to remind you that the Soviets have a submarine fleet of over 356 submarines, compared to our fleet of 142. While they have, at the moment, only 25 nuclear attack submarines compared to our 51, nevertheless, they have 211 nonnuclear attack submarines compared to our 50. Over 25 nuclear ballistic submarines, compared to our 41. Twenty-five nonnuclear ballistic submarines, compared to our zero. Thirty-seven nuclear cruise-missile submarines, compared to our zero, and 28 nonnuclear-missile submarines, compared to our zero. When you count them all up, Mr. Chairman, we have 92 nuclear submarines and the Soviets now have over 92. By 1975 the Soviets will probably add at least 70 nuclear submarines, for a total of 145 to 153, giving them an advantage of over 50 percent in nuclear submarines. On the other hand, the U.S. program through 1975 is essentially fixed by budget and procurement decisions already made. Here we have been thinking that we would have the edge because of our nuclear submarines, and we no longer even have numerical superiority. When I last saw the figures, the Soviets, with a smaller submarine fleet and no surface fleet, had 50 percent more nuclear shaft horsepower than we had with all our submarines and our surface fleet. I shudder to think what it is now.

Mr. Chairman, Soviet submarines are not only more numerous but they are improving in all aspects of their capability. It is now known that Soviet submarines are much faster than our planners originally believed. The Soviets have also made significant improvements in other areas such as quietness of operation, reliability, crew performance, and operating efficiency.

We are still trying to push forward with our submarine technology. The *Glenard P. Lipscomb*, SSN 685, a submarine named in honor of our late colleague who did so much to foster the nuclear naval fleet, will have new advances in quietness. The submarine of the SSN 668 class will have new advantages in speed. There is also presently undergoing extensive evaluation of the undersea launch

missile system—ULMS—for which there is an additional \$110 million provided in the research and development portion of the bill.

Even with all of this we are still not doing enough. The Soviets can build 20 nuclear submarines a year on one shift. The United States can, with its present yards in an all-out effort, build only 10 or perhaps 12. The Soviets have one yard that alone can build more than that number. Our present rate of five nuclear attack submarines a year is still too low—and to think that the systems analysis people would have cut off the nuclear submarine lines completely a couple of years ago if they had their way.

Let me remind you that the Soviets have 65 submarines capable of firing cruise missiles—of which 37 are nuclear and 28 are nonnuclear. Both Admiral Rickover and Secretary Laird are now saying that we too must have the cruise missile firing submarine.

Mr. Chairman, what we have brought forward in the bill for submarine work is everything that has been requested by the President in his budget submission but it still is a long way from seeing that our country will be adequately defended against the superior Soviet submarine threat.

The other matter is the so-called MBT-70. As you know, the Army, for the last 10 years, has been trying to develop a new main battle tank. Beginning in 1963 this tank was known as the MBT-70. It started out as a joint program with the Federal Republic of Germany. However, after many delays and greatly increasing costs, the United States made a decision in January of 1970 to develop the tank unilaterally. At this point it became known as the XM803, but the basic tank remained the same.

To date Congress has appropriated \$293.3 million for the development of the MBT-70/XM803. And although the Army, under the prodding of the Department of Defense, has, for the past year, been trying for an austere version of the MBT-70, they have barely made a dent in the cost of the system. As a matter of fact, the Army estimates the program unit cost of an XM803 at almost \$1 million—and there are indications that that price will go even higher. In addition, the program is 6 years behind schedule and further possible slippages are visible on the horizon.

This year the Army is requesting \$59.1 million in procurement funds for advanced production engineering and continuation of the fabrication of six pilot tanks. It is also requesting \$27.5 million for further research and development. The committee recommends the denial of the \$59.1 million for procurement funds. This recommendation stems from the committee's considered judgment that the Army has a more than adequate alternative means of meeting the Warsaw Pact threat—the threat for which the MBT-70 was originally designed. That alternative is the Army's M60A1E2 tank, which can be produced at less than one-half the cost of the XM803—\$447,000 versus \$1 million.

You may recall that 8 or 9 years ago

the Army sought to give its proven M60A1 tank a missile firing capability. To do this required the design and installation of a new turret and 152-millimeter gun tube. The tank was to be known as the M60A1E2. Unfortunately, the Army began production before all engineering and service testing was completed and ran into a very serious stabilization problem. According to reports which we have been given by the Army, this problem now appears to have been licked.

Comparing the M60A1E2 with the XM803, we find that they can both fire on the move and that they can both fire the Shillelagh missile with identical accuracy and effectiveness. Both also fire the 152 millimeter caseless cartridge. With respect to cruising range and speed, the XM803 has a slight edge on the E2, but not significantly so. It is true that the XM803 fires a kinetic energy round and the E2 does not. However, for those who may consider this important, I would like to point out that the M60A1, which is the Army's present main battle tank, also fires the kinetic energy round; and in this respect the XM803 would not be adding anything new to our inventory. So, on balance, it is clear that the Army can get virtually the same performance out of the M60A1E2 that it can out of the XM803, and at a much lower cost.

However, there is another very important point which was considered by the committee before making its decision in this matter—it has to do with the future of tank warfare. There are many military experts who believe that the tank is nearing the end of its era of usefulness. This obsolescence has been brought about by new antitank weapons, including missiles, and there is reason to believe that the Soviets could have such weapons ready to offset the XM803 when put in the field. This possibility is certainly enough to give one pause, particularly in view of the Army's estimated cost of that tank program. That cost is estimated to be \$2.4 billion.

I think it should also be pointed out that both Russia and Germany are placing increasing emphasis on light, hard hitting antitank vehicles and weapons. In this connection, it should be noted that Russia's heavy tank is no longer in production and is being gradually phased out of inventory. These developments suggest that other countries also recognize the diminishing usefulness of heavy tanks.

In any event, the Army's M60A1 and M60A1E2 are more than a match for any Russian tank now in the field, or anticipated in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the denial of the XM803 procurement funds should have little effect on our country's military posture. And, as the committee report points out:

In view of these circumstances, the Army may consider it advisable to utilize the FY 72 research and development funds to develop a weapons system designed to counter the growing antitank capability which threatens to outmode the MBT-70/XM803 even before it is in inventory.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. STRATTON. I am glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. PUCINSKI. What happened to the excellent suggestion the gentleman made here the other day for releasing the RB-70 from the aeromuseum and using it to test the effect of the SST on the ecology—and whether or not there is anything in this bill or that should be in this bill to make such a move possible—I do not know but I am really asking the question because I thought the gentleman made an excellent suggestion here the other day.

Mr. STRATTON. I am grateful for the gentleman's comments. I have received an acknowledgment from the White House to whom I sent the suggestion, but there is no money in this bill that deals with that matter.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 8687) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

THE EXTINCTION OF THE BLUE WHALE

(Mr. BROOMFIELD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, in 1930, ocean whalers caught and killed some 30,000 blue whales, by all accounts the largest creature the world has ever known. Today, a mere 40 years later, we are fortunate if 1,000 specimens of the blue whale continue to survive the onslaught of modern technology's terrible new weapons; the radar and helicopters which track them, the 20-knot whale catchers which overtake them, and the massive factory ships which carve them up in half an hour. As this magnificent species approaches extinction, the words of Herman Melville over a century ago must take on an entirely new cast for us. Then he said:

The moot point is, whether Leviathan can long endure so wide a chase and so remorseless a havoc; whether he must not at last be exterminated from the waters.

The tragedy, Mr. Speaker, is that these questions are no longer moot; the whale, all species of whale, will not survive unless we take steps to safeguard his existence.

The worldwide agency charged with guaranteeing his survival, the International Whaling Commission, apparently has little taste for its job. In 1967-68, after the Commission had decided that all hunting of the blue whale must cease, there were still 66 of them killed. And just this year the Commission voted

behind closed doors to increase by 20 percent the kill quotas for all species recommended by its own scientific committee.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, the United States alone among the nations of the world has taken the initiative in this area of conservation. In December of last year the Department of the Interior placed several groups of whales on the Endangered Species List, thereby ending the importation of their products into this country. And just this March the Department of Commerce effectively ended whaling by U.S.-based concerns.

These are useful and important steps, Mr. Speaker, but they are not enough. While the United States does import between 25 and 30 percent of the world's market for whale products, we do not have much of a role in whaling itself. Most of that activity, 85 percent, is undertaken by Japan and the Soviet Union, and there is no assurance that the unilateral actions taken by the Departments of Interior and Commerce will deter them one bit from their relentless attack on the whale.

For that assurance we must work through international channels, even the aforementioned IWC. The joint resolution I am introducing today would require just that, instructing the Secretary of State to call for an international moratorium of 10 years on the killing of all species of whale. Under the present circumstances, no less will save him.

Not only the blue whale, but the humpback, bowhead and wight whale species are rapidly nearing extinction. While the latter two, like the blue, are supposed to be totally protected by the IWC, they continue to be killed "accidentally." Considering the wholesale slaughter that went on before their "protection," we can only wonder whether there are enough of them left for males to find females across the great oceans, whether their numbers are so low that the death rate from natural causes may, in fact, be greater than the birth rate.

Meanwhile, the chase after the 80-foot finback is intensifying. The Antarctic now yields 2,500 of these whales a year compared to the 1961 harvest of 30,000. As the finbacks diminish, the whalers are going after the smaller sperm and sei whales. The figures are as illuminating as they are saddening: In 1930-31, some 43,000 whales yielded 3.5 million barrels of oil; in 1966-67, 52,000 whales yielded little more than 1.5 million.

A few years ago an annual harvest of 10,000 finback whales, for example, could have gone on indefinitely. But with the mindless slaughter of the last decade I should doubt whether that many even continue to exist.

The only possible solution is a moratorium on the killing of whales for minimum of 10 years, so that all their species could build themselves up to breeding levels that would eventually permit a stable annual harvest. What we have lost for the next decade can be regained as long as we abstain from whaling for those 10 years and supervise it carefully after that period. It is not too much to ask that the United States take the lead in this area.

The International Whaling Commission is conducting its annual meeting in

Washington later this month. Let the Secretary of State urge the Commission to fulfill its 1946 charter and begin the massive effort to conserve a dying race. And if there is no response here, the call should be made through our diplomatic offices around the world. The matter is too important to let drop.

Since 1900, Mr. Speaker, an average of one species of animal per year has become extinct. It is one thing to kill an individual member of a species, for nature can recover that loss in time. But to exterminate an entire race of animals is to lose them forever; it means that nature has lost one of its essential components, one which played a role in the interrelationship of life on earth. Here the cycle of birth and death ends, here there is no chance to begin again.

I urge the Members of this House to recognize the urgency of the whales' special situation, and to pass this resolution immediately. The whale has no lobby in Congress or around the world. It is up to us to see that he is protected from the "remorseless havoc" man has brought upon his existence.

A CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION TO EXPLAIN ITS PRESS RELEASES

(Mr. PATMAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, for some time, I have contended that the American Bankers Association—the giant lobby which operates in Washington, D.C.—has little or no contact with its members across the Nation.

Last week, the ABA's new president, Mr. Clifford C. Sommer, proved my point by disclaiming any knowledge of lending practices obviously followed by thousands of his organization's members.

Mr. Sommer issued a news release—which was carried by a number of newspapers—denying that commercial banks have used a bobtailed, 360-day calendar to calculate extra interest charges on 1-year and 5-year loans. Mr. Sommer stated:

The implication of the charge is that one-year and five-year loans are subject to the 360-day computation practice. This is untrue.

These are the words of Mr. Sommer as distributed to the Nation's press.

At the time that Mr. Sommer made this statement, I was in possession of a survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Board plainly establishing that the practice is indeed widespread on all types of loans including the 1-year and 5-year loans referred to by Mr. Sommer.

The Federal Reserve's figures, of course, are based on questionnaires filled out by the banks themselves—banks which are members of Mr. Sommer's organization—the American Bankers Association.

Yet, Mr. Sommer tells the Nation's press under the letterhead of the American Bankers Association that, "This is untrue."

It is easy to understand why the American Bankers Association would

want to hide the facts about the use of the 360-day calendar, but it is regrettable that a national organization would attempt to palm off such a statement on the Nation's press. Mr. Sommer's denial had no factual basis—it was completely contrary to the facts furnished by the banks themselves.

The Federal Reserve, at my request, sent questionnaires to 370 banks across the Nation. The questionnaire asked specifically about the maturities of the loans on which the 360-day calculation is used. The survey determined conclusively that the 360-day year is used extensively on 1-year, 5-year, and even longer term loans.

To be specific, 105 banks responding to the survey—or 45 percent—stated that they used the 360-day calculation on personal loans of from 1 to 5 years. Another 122 banks—or approximately 53 percent—stated that they used the 360-day calculation on business loans of from 1 to 5 years. And 107—or 46 percent of the respondents—indicated that they used the calculation for commercial and industrial loans of more than 5 years.

Overall, of course, 82 percent of the respondents stated that they used the calculation on some types of loans.

As I have stated previously, the use of the 360-day calendar is allowing the commercial banking system to overcharge the American consumer by more than \$150 million annually. Mr. Sommer, however, describes the overcharges "insignificant." Only a banker could display such arrogance.

The denial of the president of the American Bankers Association is amazing in light of the facts. Mr. Sommer has either deliberately attempted to mislead the press or he is woefully ignorant of the practices followed by the banks which are members of his association.

Since the publication of the Federal Reserve survey, I have received dozens of letters from all parts of the Nation—from consumers and businessmen who have been victimized by the practice. Many of these writers have documented their cases and I have in my possession copies of a number of loan contracts which were based on the bobtailed 360-day year.

In addition, Mr. Speaker, suits have been filed against banks in Illinois, Oregon, and California over the 360-day calculations.

Mr. Speaker, I have written Mr. Sommer asking he explain publicly the denial which he issued to the press on June 7. I sent my letter to Mr. Sommer on Wednesday, June 9. As yet, Mr. Sommer has not replied to my letter nor has he made any public explanation about the ABA statement.

Once again, I challenge Mr. Sommer and the American Bankers Association to back up the denial which they issued to the Nation's press on June 7.

PRESIDENT NIXON AIDING THE FAMILIES OF POLICEMEN

(Mr. BIAGGI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Speaker, President

Nixon is the first President in the history of the United States that has taken an honest and forthright step toward aiding the families of policemen killed in the line of duty. His proposal to provide the widows with \$50,000 is highly commendable.

These men are on the front lines of our domestic war—a war whose casualty rate has increased astronomically during the last few years. Without a doubt, the criminal element has declared an open season on policemen.

While steps must be taken to protect these men from loss of life—and I have proposed them—we must also be sure that the families of those who have died in the line of duty are taken care of in the same way they would have been had their husbands and fathers still been alive.

I strongly praise the President for his action and hope that with his support legislation will be passed to aid these widows and children. As a former 23-year veteran of the New York Police Force who has been wounded 11 times in the line of duty, I know what it is to live in constant fear of being killed. The fear is not so much for yourself, but of what will happen to your wife and children after you are gone.

For this reason I am serving as chairman of the New York's Bravest and Finest Foundation which is dedicated to helping the widows and children of policemen and firemen killed in the line of duty. I have also joined with my colleague from Indiana (Mr. JACOBS) in introducing legislation that would provide death and disability benefits for the families of policemen and firemen.

Moreover, I will soon introduce legislation that will pay the tuition costs for the child of any deceased or disabled policeman who would otherwise be unable to go to college.

We have long provided benefits for the widows of veterans who have fought wars on foreign soil. We can do no less for the families of men who have laid down their lives protecting the institutions of freedom and liberty here at home. The peril on the domestic front is far greater today than ever before. Let us give courage to the men and families that are on the front lines of that war.

Mr. Speaker, I would also ask my colleagues to give their support to my legislation aimed at preventing the gunning down of policemen in the first place. I have introduced a bill to make killing a police officer a Federal crime and a bill to provide a mandatory death sentence for those convicted of killing a police officer.

These bills, too, merit support if we are to stop this continued carnage of the defenders of our rights and privileges against a foe who seeks anarchy as an alternative. None of us would ask for less if we were the ones fighting the war in our streets.

A LETTER FROM AN EX-FARMER'S WIFE

(Mr. SKUBITZ asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Speaker, those of us in the Congress who represent rural constituencies are well aware that we are in the minority; that we have been fighting a losing battle in trying to explain to the American people—the big-city people—that their life, their welfare, the future of the economy of the Nation—are all tied up with what is happening down on the farm.

Last week I received a letter from a farmer's wife, or perhaps more accurately, an ex-farmer's wife, for this farm family has left the farm. Her letter is in response to a question dealing with the farm problem contained in a 20-part questionnaire I have recently sent my constituents. To date I have received almost a thousand separately written letters on these farm questions alone.

Because it is eloquent and touching, because it explains the farm problem in simple but powerful words and imagery that all can understand, because it makes very clear what is ahead in America, I think it should appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. It is my earnest hope that my colleagues from the cities will read this letter from Mrs. R. C. Doornbos of El Dorado, Kans. Perhaps they will realize, as Mrs. Doornbos phrases it, that a farmer "is not someone who stands around with a straw in his mouth and not much more in his head."

EL DORADO, KANS.

CONGRESSMAN JOE SKUBITZ: In answer to question 19 on your recent questionnaire: Please permit me a few comments of a Kansas homemaker and "ex-farmer's" wife. These thoughts came to me a day after our complete dispersal sale, March 24, 1970. We have lived on this farm for seventeen years, and today, it's very lonely and everything seems unreal. There's a sadness everywhere. This was a going farm business just 12 hours ago, but now, emptiness and nothing!

I look towards the barn and notice there is no gate across from the corral. As I start off the porch, thinking, "someone left the gate open, and the cows will get out," I suddenly remember, that where we had a herd of fat glossy Angus cows with frolicking calves by their side only yesterday, now there is nothing but empty pens, and empty pastures. Our only livestock today is Molly, a tangle-haired Springer-Spaniel, and a white mother cat with one blue and one green eye. This is all—there is no need for a gate at the barn.

In a grassy patch across from the House, where our modern efficient line of machinery was lined up, awaiting the auction, there is only one piece of equipment left waiting for its buyer to return and tow it off. On the only beautiful, warm day in March we had our sale—gone out of business!

More than any other profession, and farming is a profession, a farming business is a family business. Our three children always felt they would surely dry up and wither away if they had to live in town; even a small town such as Ed Dorado would be too restraining, just nothing to do! With their 4-H projects of baby lambs and garden produce, they learned to love the growing crops and livestock and respect the modern machinery of a busy farm.

There was no "generation gap" here; everyone helped! Often, in the early summer, their daddy would rise at 4:00 A.M. to cultivate the row crops until the dew dried off the wheat by 9:30 or 10:00, so he could combine the grain. He never complained about the long hours, for he really was happiest in this work.

Why, then, should he decide to sell everything, turn in his dungarees and quit?—1941 prices for our crops and 1970 costs for machinery, repairs, fuel, tires, taxes and everything we buy—that's why!

It will just never balance out, and we decided, we had better get out while there was something for ourselves, because a "dreaded drought," even just one dry season, could put us in a position where selling out would barely pay our creditors, and our 29 years of labor would be for nothing.

It is reported that farmers are borrowing more money than ever, and their mortgages are the largest ever. This isn't a sign of prosperity; it's a sign that their backs are to the wall and they are borrowing money on their real estate and its inflated value, for operating expenses. There's got to be a time of repayment, or they lose their property.

There's a wail about cattle and beef prices being outrageously high. This even brings out boycotts and marching housewives. We sold fat steers in 1952 for \$31.50 per hundred and in 1958 fat steers sold for \$33.50 per hundred and—that's 1970 prices now! Back then bread was, very likely, 15c a loaf, hair-cuts, 75c, private hospital rooms \$8.00—\$9.00 per day. So what are cattle prices high in relation to?

What laboring man is working today for 1958 wages? Hospital administrators speak of \$100.00 to \$150.00 a day rooms and the only reason they need is to say, "It costs more to operate; for more labor, more for maintenance, more for more sophisticated machines."

The modern farmer, too, has all these increases, but the market prices of his produce keep going down! I mentioned to a professional man's wife of our inflated costs and her comment was, "everyone has to live with inflation these days." But if her husband's expenses go up, he increases his charges to cover them. Even in our small town, people don't know and don't care about the farmer's predicament. I hear no complaints of the price of new cars, whiskey, entertainment—but food!

A good portion of consumer's grocery bills is for "instant" products and frozen foods and they are actually buying maid-service, and they blame the high cost of living on food prices. Most foreign countries' citizens pay as much as 50% of their dollar for food. In the U.S., 17-18%! Isn't that a bargain? Isn't it a production miracle that 6% of the population feeds the other 94%, and could possibly feed the world? The Federal Land Banks have labeled the American farmer "Providers of Plenty," they might well add, "Receivers of Nothing."

As a combined group, the farming industry buys more tires, gasoline, oil, manufactured goods, steel products, chemicals (fertilizers, etc.) than any other industry in America today. But the way labor forces up the prices of machinery on every hand you'd never know their living depends to a great extent on the prosperity of the farmer. What a pity labor can't see that they are eliminating their own jobs; i.e., not one sewing machine is made in this country now. It is cheaper to build factories overseas and ship the product back here to sell than pay the outrageous prices than labor demands!

To replace a diesel tractor that cost \$3300.00 in 1950, a similar tractor, now, costs \$12,000.00, and what can you do with a tractor alone? Nothing! You need another \$12,000 or \$15,000 of other tools to pull behind it, and a \$14,000 combine to harvest the crops you have grown. These machines can never pay for themselves, let alone make you a profit.

Compare our crop prices of today to this—wheat prices in 1952, \$2.18 per bu.—1969, \$1.32 per bu. and the government subsidy

doesn't make it a paying crop as urban dwellers believe, so that we are not being "kept." No wonder wheat land isn't even leasable any more. It won't pay expenses to grow the crop. Other crops' prices have done similarly. A family whose sole income is from the land cannot possibly buy real estate now, with the return you get from it, you'd never live long enough to pay for it.

Every college ag. expert and every fertilizer specialist at every meeting ever attended, keeps saying, "If farmers just hang on three or four more years, they've got it made!" With the population explosion people have got to have food, and it would certainly seem that "they've got it made!"

You know, you can run so fast, and operate just so much land and you can't possibly hang on forever. Since our dispersal sale, we have traveled considerably, and farmers generally congregate together at campgrounds. From Brownsville, Texas, to Dawson Creek, British Columbia, they are saying, "Every year we borrow more money and pay back less. We're going to try to hang on just this one more year." Obviously, when you borrow more each year and pay back less, eventually, what comes to the surface is a big fat zero! Is it any wonder farmers are selling out as fast as they can tack up the sale bills? The local auctioneers are the ones who really have it made. We've had enough of paying 8½% interest for the privilege of working ourselves to death and going bankrupt.

Farmers aren't dummies. This idea that a farmer is someone who stands around with a straw in his mouth, and not much in his head, just isn't true! Farmers are the best of several professions, or they wouldn't be operating as long as they have been. They are bankers, managers, veterinarians, weather prophets, mechanics, big equipment operators, carpenters, cowboys, chemists, soil experts, seed experts . . . and more.

I think, big companies will be doing the farming in the future, and their stand will be—You can have our crop for our cost, plus a fair profit—and isn't this as it should be? For us, the idea of a corporation was studied. Then a \$700,000 appropriation for land acquisition in fiscal 1970 for El Dorado Reservoir was allowed, so that would take the very best land we operate and give a corporation no time to prove itself.

Right now, I wouldn't care if the grocery shelves stand empty, the dairy bars dry up, the bakery goes without flour. We'll be on the buying end, if prices are ever forced up by scarcity, but, so be it. The American farmer has to have a fair return on his investment, just as every business. The only answer, I believe, is organize and power. But, for individual farmers, this is already too late. They just won't do it! They believe they are too independent, but, really, they can't look up long enough from chasing their dwindling dollar to see the actual good it would do them. The speaker at a Texas Christian University graduation program, at Fort Worth, recently said, "We are just 24 meals away from savagery." Something to think about. So how could there be a more vital industry than producing food for our country?

You'll never know the anguish that went into our decision to sell out. On that day I helped the cashier with records, and I did all right, keeping my mind busy, as strangers came through paying for equipment we had been 29 years accumulating. All of a sudden, I heard the old combine motor start. It had a certain bellow none of the other motors had, and I could really see my husband swinging in through the driveway, perhaps, ahead of a rain storm, or just at the end of a beautiful Indian summer day, and open up the throttle as he came rolling in home. It hit me this was the last time I'd ever hear that sound, and I burst out in tears, for 1969 was my life, too, and I loved our farm.

CONGRESSMAN FLETCHER
THOMPSON SPEAKS OUT

(Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, today you are witnessing the dilemma of a Congressman who sincerely desires to support his President and the Republican Party, but feels a much stronger obligation to speak out on behalf of the people whom he serves.

Only yesterday, I received a statement of President Nixon relative to equal housing opportunities. In this statement, the President made it amply clear that he would not have his administration force upon people publicly subsidized low-income housing which they did not want in their area.

To quote the President:

In terms of site selection for a housing development, the Federal role is one of agreeing or not agreeing to provide Federal subsidies for projects proposed by local authorities or other developers.

He also said:

A municipality that does not want federal-assisted housing should not have it imposed from Washington by bureaucratic fiat; this is not a proper Federal role.

In his opening statement, President Nixon said:

Through the ages, men have fought to defend their homes.

After making these comments, the President makes it amply clear that he would not "countenance the use of economic measures as a subterfuge for racial discrimination."

The Supreme Court in a decision only 1-month old involving a California law to allow local referendums on the issue of whether or not tax payer-subsidized low-income housing would be placed in a neighborhood, ruled that such a law was constitutional, and further held that although most residents of low-income publicly subsidized housing are black, this does not constitute racial discrimination, since the decision is not whether to allow blacks in the community, but whether to allow low-income publicly subsidized housing.

After reading these statements of President Nixon, I was astounded to hear on television last night, statements made by Governor Romney and Attorney General Mitchell, who were speaking on behalf of the administration. Attorney General Mitchell announced the filing of a lawsuit against a newly incorporated community in Missouri, because that community had adopted a zoning ordinance which precluded the inclusion of taxpayer subsidized low-income housing in the incorporated area. Governor Romney, in one of the most masterful portrayals of doubletalk I have seen, stated that HUD would not withhold funds to communities that did not have low-income housing as part of their plans, but would set up criteria whereby, if a community did not include plans for low income public housing, they could not get any Federal money for sewers and other projects.

Gentleman, the time has come for the Nixon administration to stop trying to curry favor on both sides with regard to the housing and school issues. I, for one, am fed up with doubletalk and double-dealing, which permeates the entire Nixon administration so far as social issues are concerned. To use the President's own terms: Let me make myself amply clear—I do not favor discrimination against any person because of race, creed, or color, and my record supports this stand. However, I refuse to remain silent even though, by speaking out, I may be called a destructive force in my own party, because the American people have a right to more than glittering generalities and shining platitudes. They have a right to a consistent statement and policy from the administration on school and housing issues. In my personal opinion, the actions of the Nixon administration on school and housing matters is best described as "schizophrenic."

To give an example, although Congress precluded the closing of schools to force racial balance, the Nixon administration has forced the closing and abandonment of a quarter of a billion dollars worth of school facilities in the South, paid for with taxpayers' dollars earned by the sweat of taxpayers' brows. Then they state that this has not been done to achieve racial balance, but rather to desegregate. I do not care how you slice the cake, it comes out the same not withstanding the doubletalk. The school-child's education and the taxpayer are the victims. Then, although President Nixon says that he is opposed to busing children out of their neighborhoods, against their will, to achieve racial balance, in the recent case of Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools, the Solicitor General of the United States appeared to make only halfway arguments before the Supreme Court in defense of the administration's publicly stated policy. The Court went on to rule, in effect, that in order to achieve equal protection under the law for black children, white children may be forced to attend schools outside their neighborhoods.

In his recent statement, President Nixon said:

Freedom has two essential elements: the right to choose and the ability to choose.

He also said:

We cannot be free, and at the same time be required to fit our lives into prescribed places on a racial grid—whether segregated or integrated, and whether by some mathematical formula or by automatic assignment. Neither can we be free, and at the same time be denied—because of race—the right to associate with our fellow-citizens on a basis of human equality.

Obviously, this is just more administration doubletalk, because public statements such as these simply do not jive with actions of the administration. The President allows HEW to apply the same standards as set in the recent Supreme Court decision allowing busing to areas not even involved in litigation. In short, it appears to me that his public statements notwithstanding, President Nixon's actions have been to support those elements that favor busing.

Yes, the American public is confused as to where the Nixon administration stands, and I am dismayed by this political doubletalk. It is unconscionable to me that a President would make a statement that he would not force people to accept taxpayer subsidized low-income housing, and then have an agency of his administration, such as George Romney's HUD, use blackjack tactics and stating that if a community does not adopt standards which include plans for low-income housing payed for by the taxpayers, then that community will not receive any of its tax dollars back, for sewers and other grants. And to top it all, Governor Romney has the audacity and gall to say that Federal funds will not be withheld from communities that do not want low-income publicly subsidized housing.

In conclusion, as I have stated, I want to support my President and the head of my party, but I cannot remain silent when I witness the hypocritical statements that are being made. I, for one, do not believe that anyone in the American public will be fooled. The administration will not gain the support of advocates of integration or advocates of a nondiscriminatory policy, such as myself, by the use of schizophrenic, double-dealing methods.

H.R. 9102—BRAILLE DENOMINATIONS ON PAPER MONEY TO HELP THE BLIND

(Mr. RARICK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I introduced H.R. 9102, a bill to benefit the blind by providing for printing in braille the denominations on the paper money of the United States.

I feel that this action would be a great asset to the blind in handling money and in making change by permitting them to "see" by feeling the amount of the paper bills without having to accept the word of someone else.

Each of us knows individuals who are physically and mentally sound and, except for their blindness or impaired vision, would enjoy normal activity. Likewise, we are all aware that Congress and most of the States are appropriating sizable sums of money to train and rehabilitate our blind and visually impaired citizens so that they might be self-employed and know the freedom of financial independence. In federal buildings and most other public buildings the concession counters are usually manned by the blind.

According to the 1968 National Health Service figures 5.6 out of every 1,000 persons are blind—or over 1 million.

The idea of using braille on money is not new. The Netherlands uses this braille system of denomination identification on their currency.

I fully realize that problems may be created because of the stockpile of printed currency at the Federal Reserve and that it might be years before all currency in circulation would carry the braille figures. But H.R. 9102 provides for a progressive and constructive step for-

ward. The sooner we get started, the sooner we give this help to our blind citizens.

I urge our colleagues who are understanding of the problem and want to help the blind to introduce like legislation.

I insert the text of H.R. 9102 at this point in the RECORD.

H.R. 9102

A bill to provide for paper money of the United States to carry a designation in braille indicating the denomination

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) there shall appear on the face of all paper money of the United States which is printed after January 1, 1972, a designation in braille indicating the denomination thereof.

(b) The Secretary of the Treasury shall carry out the provisions of this Act, and for such purpose he may establish such rules and regulations as he determines appropriate.

BENEFITS FOR SURVIVORS OF POLICE OFFICERS KILLED IN ACTION

(Mr. HOGAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOGAN, Mr. Speaker, I have today cosponsored legislation with my esteemed colleague on the Judiciary Committee, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. POFF) to amend the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to provide benefits to survivors of police officers killed in the line of duty.

In today's rebellious atmosphere, policemen must not only cope with an alarming and increasing crime problem, they are also forced to defend their very lives. The slayings of police officers in New York City and in Washington, D.C., in recent weeks show the degree of violent danger faced daily by our police.

Mr. Speaker, the bill which I am cosponsoring today would give to the spouse and dependents of a police officer killed in the line of duty a payment of \$50,000, payable from funds appropriated to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration for that purpose.

As a member of the District of Columbia Committee during the last Congress, I supported a measure which instituted a similar benefit for the dependents of District of Columbia police officers killed in the line of duty. This proposal for the District of Columbia is now a provision of Public Law 91-509, signed by President Nixon last year.

Because of the disparity in survivors' benefits throughout our 50 States, I think it fitting that the Federal Government provide this payment to the families of these police officers who have made the supreme sacrifice for their fellow men. This stipend would serve as a Federal floor for survivors' benefits and would be in addition to any other benefits due the family. Because the security of the United States is involved in attacks on police officers, I think there is ample justification for Federal legislation in this area.

The law enforcement officer today bears a heavier burden, faces more frustrations, and is second-guessed more than ever before. The public asks more

and expects more of the present-day policeman because the public need for protection is greater. When a policeman is assaulted or slain, the criminal significance of the incident extends far beyond the victim officer. It extends to the door of every law-abiding citizen and to the very security of the United States.

Mr. Speaker, I think this is the significance of legislation such as we are introducing today. Police slayings, attacks on J. Edgar Hoover, criticism of the Attorney General—all of these, Mr. Speaker, are more than mere acts against a single individual. These are examples of blatant, outright attacks on the entire law enforcement community in this country. And this we cannot tolerate.

Man cannot live in this complex, bewildering society of ours without a system of laws, and this system is doomed to destruction unless these laws are enforced. The enforcement officer is rendered totally ineffective unless his efforts to maintain the peace and protect life and property are supported by the government and the people.

The price of enforcing the law is costly. Perhaps, no one knows just how costly except the slain policeman's family and fellow officers.

I am hopeful, Mr. Speaker, that this legislation will indicate to these families and officers that most Americans do care and that, as a society, we are grateful that there are men and women who will take the ultimate risk, who do recognize the high glory that is attached to service in the law enforcement community.

Mr. Speaker, I am hopeful that this legislation will be favorably received and that committee action will be rapidly forthcoming.

TRANSFER OF SPECIAL ORDER

Mr. GONZALEZ, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the special order that I had scheduled for today be transferred to Monday next after the termination of all legislative business.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

OPERATION HELPING HAND

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. HOSMER) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. HOSMER, Mr. Speaker, on several previous occasions, I spoke of a joint civilian-U.S. Navy program called Operation Helping Hand, a program designed to upgrade the standard of living of the Vietnamese Navymen and their dependents.

Today, I would like briefly to discuss the food supplement aspect which is intended to provide the Vietnamese Navy family with a well-balanced diet as well as a means of obtaining additional income. Like the dependent shelter program, the food supplement projects are progressing well and are visibly successful.

The need for this dual purpose program arose when it became readily ap-

parent that pay raises were not solving the economic problems plaguing the Vietnamese sailors. As a matter of fact, pay raises were promptly and drastically outstripped by the fast pace of inflation in an already deteriorating economic situation. During the past 6 years Vietnamese Navy personnel received pay increases amounting to almost 50 percent. That sounds pretty good until you compare it to the cost of living index which rose 800 percent at the same time. So you can see that pay raises have not only failed to remedy the navyman's problem, but the adverse effects of cost of living escalations have deepened the economic distress of these sailors and their families.

With this in mind, the U.S. Navy sought to establish a program which would benefit the members of the Vietnamese Navy community without effecting the overall economy in South Vietnam. The program developed involves raising pigs, chickens, ducks, goats, and rabbits as well as a variety of vegetables.

The overall program is affectionately referred to by our sailors in Vietnam as the "pigs and chickens program," since this was the pilot project. The animals were imported from the Philippines, then bred, raised, and distributed among Navy families. Concurrently, U.S. Navy advisers, all having a background in animal husbandry, were teaching their counterparts to care for and breed the animals. Aside from the initial outlay of funds, the program is designed to be self-sufficient and self-sustaining. Once in the hands of the individual families, they continue to breed and raise the animals for later consumption and sale to a Navy commissary. A similar procedure is followed in the agronomy portion of the program.

In addition to the animal husbandry and agriculture projects, a fishing program has been initiated at the An Thoi and Vung Tau Naval bases. At these two sea locations, Vietnamese Navymen fish in quantity using the deep line fishing method. The catches are then shipped to the various Navy commissaries throughout the country for sale at a greatly reduced price. For the most part, food purchased at commissaries can be obtained for about one-fifth of the open market price.

I believe that it is quite apparent that these programs will have a beneficial and lasting effect on the economic situation of the Vietnamese Navy personnel. They will help create within these forces, a strong, loyal, career-oriented cadre of personnel which is so vital to the preservation of a fighting force.

However, as I have stated in the past, these programs are limited because of the shortfall of appropriated funds and the Operation Helping Hand Foundation is seeking privately donated money and material to advance the effort of these two Navies. Material contributions are constantly being received by Navy bases throughout the United States and sent to the Navy's West Coast Project Hand-clasp Director in San Diego for transshipment to Vietnam. To date, over \$25,000 has been contributed in money and material by private organizations and

citizens who, as members of the silent majority, finally received an opportunity to lend a helping hand in support of our strife for peace in Southeast Asia.

The Navy League of the United States has helped greatly to forward the work of Operation Helping Hand and operates to channel contributions in cash and kind to the end beneficiaries.

TAX INCENTIVE FOR CONTROLLING URBAN BLIGHT

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CHAMBERLAIN) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, as we in the Congress continue to concern ourselves with the serious problems of the inner cities and urban blight, perhaps the time has come to look at our tax laws and to ask if we are in fact compounding problems rather than solving them.

Presently we are committed to a program of urban renewal whereby public tax dollars are channeled into an area to tear down slums and encourage new building. But as we encourage this effort we should make certain that we are making the proper use of existing private capital which might readily be channeled toward urban renewal objectives.

For example, I know of one business in Michigan's sixth district that has indicated its willingness to invest in new construction in the downtown sections of several communities, except that present tax policies virtually preclude such a possibility. Under present tax law neither the cost of an old building nor the cost of demolition in preparation for construction of a new facility can be deducted as a business expense or added to the cost of the new building and depreciated. Rather, these costs are included in the value of the land with only the prospect of regaining such costs upon the sale of the land at a future date. I am sure that as many businesses find that it is not economically sound to invest in new construction in downtown areas under the present ground rules and this encourages businesses to flee to the suburbs with their open spaces and more attractive land prices.

I believe the time has come to recruit and encourage rather than penalize the forces of private enterprise in the rebuilding of our cities, and it is for that reason I am today introducing legislation to amend the Internal Revenue Code to provide a tax incentive for the razing of old buildings which scar the business areas of so many of our communities. At a time when so many problems are being brought to the doorstep of the Federal Treasury, I suggest that we consider action to reinvigorate local and private initiative in combating the problem of urban blight.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REFUSES TO RELEASE PHOTOGRAPHS OF LAOTIAN VILLAGES

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Cali-

fornia (Mr. McCLOSKEY) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I addressed the House alleging certain items of deception pursued by the administration with respect to Air Force bombing of villages in Laos. Commencing 3 months ago, I had directed a number of letters to the Defense Department requesting photographs of representative villages in the area occupied or contested by the Pathet Lao during the past 9 years. After receipt of several letters from the Defense Department, I received today what appears to be the final response, from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Dennis J. Doolin, concluding:

I cannot see that the cause of the civilians in Laos will be advanced by our further exchange of photographs.

So that my colleagues might have the complete record of at least one congressional attempt to obtain full disclosure as to conditions existing in a country with which we are not at war, I am pleased to insert in the Record at this point the Department of Defense letter of June 11, 1971, together with the correspondence which preceded it. I am also appending, for the edification of the House, some information published in today's New York Times, with reference to the Defense Department's 1968 Vietnam Task Force Study which was referred to in pages 19563 to 19603 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of June 14, 1971.

The material follows:

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., June 14, 1971.

HON. PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, Jr.,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR Mr. McCLOSKEY: Mr. Johnson has asked me to reply to your letter of 19 May 1971.

I have reflected on your various requests for photographs of villages in Laos. Your understandably humane interest in the effect of the war on the civilian population in Laos is shared by the many in the Defense Department who over the years have wrestled with this problem. I hope our basic agreement on motives is not obscured by the differences we may have over issues of management.

With regard to management, we have explained repeatedly that we have established restrictions up to the limits of the safety of our pilots in order to minimize the effects of the war on civilian populations. Ambassador Sullivan, along with knowledgeable and competent witnesses from State, AID, and Defense, has discussed the refugee situation thoroughly with cognizant bodies in the Congress. As you know, we are convinced that the overwhelming cause of refugees in Laos is the offensive military activity of the North Vietnamese Army. Finally, when civilians have been caught up unavoidably in the web of warfare, we have given strong support through AID to ameliorative programs.

It is neither feasible nor useful to go beyond these steps to furnish extended photography of Laos. Much of Laos is inhabited by itinerant groups who establish their villages temporarily and then move on. The abandoned villages, in various stages of decrepitude, dot the countryside. Those which have suffered military damage may be indistinguishable from those ravaged by the weather; those which have suffered identifiable military damage may have been struck by the enemy rather than by US bombs; finally, even if it appears from current pho-

tography that US bombs might have damaged a village, we come back to our assertion that only valid military targets come under attack as an unavoidable consequence of enemy activity, an assertion which you implicitly are challenging.

In sum, I cannot see that the cause of the civilians in Laos will be advanced by our further exchange of photographs. The public record is as complete regarding our efforts to minimize the effect of the war on Laotian civilians as we can make it without disclosing information which the enemy would certainly use further to endanger the lives of our pilots. Let me assure you that we are resisting a ruthless and aggressive enemy as humanely as the circumstances permit.

Sincerely,

DENNIS J. DOOLIN,
Deputy Assistant Secretary.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., May 19, 1971.

MR. RADY JOHNSON,
Assistant to the Secretary,
Department of Defense,
The Pentagon,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR Mr. JOHNSON: In your letter of May 13, responding to my letter of April 29 to your predecessor, Mr. Richard G. Capen, no mention is made of the photographs requested from the Air Force in my earlier letters to Mr. Capen and to Major General Giraudo.

Specifically, in as much as the Air Force has referred all priority inquiries to your office for response, I would like to reiterate the following request for photographs:

1. The most recent photographs taken of the 196 villages on the attached list. All of such villages are located in the Plain of Jars area and testimony has been received from a number of refugees from that area that their homes were damaged or destroyed by the United States bombing in 1969. This information was previously requested of the Air Force in my letter of April 20, 1971, addressed to Major General John C. Giraudo, a copy of which was enclosed in the letter of April 29 to which you partially responded in your letter of May 13.

2. The two photographs of Laotian villages handed to me for examination on April 1, by Major General Evans, Commander 13th Air Force, Udorn, Thailand. These are the photographs which General Evans discussed with General Clay on April 16 in Saigon and which Major General Hardin on the same day advised me that General Clay had decided to refuse release, suggesting that I should request the pictures from the Air Force Liaison Office in Washington. I made such request to Major General Giraudo in my letter of April 19, a copy of which was enclosed in the letter to your predecessor, Mr. Capen.

3. A copy of the photograph of an F-105 bombing four huts with a direct hit with white phosphorus, such photograph being the one formerly hanging in the office of the Vice Commander, 7th Air Force, and from which the present oil painting behind General Hardin's desk was copied. This photograph was also referred to in my letter of April 19 to General Giraudo, aforesaid.

From a personal inspection of your photographic records in Udorn I am satisfied that it is a simple matter for the Air Force to collect the photographs in question from those records and forward them forthwith.

The Air Force had no difficulty whatsoever in furnishing us with 12 recent pictures of Laotian villages, these being the following:

1. Ban Toumlan, photograph dated 14 November 1970.
2. Ban Le, photograph dated 27 February 1971.
3. Ban Khe Louong, photograph dated 21 February 1971.
4. Ban Donbouag, photograph dated 14 November 1970.

5. Ban Khammouan, photograph dated 15 February 1971.
6. Ban Nambak, photograph dated 1 April 1971.
7. Ban Toumlan, photograph date 14 November 1970.
8. Ban Nanhang, photograph dated 1 April 1971.
9. Pak Beng, photograph dated 1 April 1971.
10. Mahaxai, photograph dated 15 February 1971.
11. Saravan, photograph dated 14 November 1970.
12. Attopeu, photograph date 14 November 1970.

None of these villages were named in the list previously requested, however, at least to the best of our knowledge.

Needless to say, this request is made with the understanding that no photographic missions should be flown nor lives placed in jeopardy for photographs not already in your files. It was my understanding that you already have a complete and comprehensive file of photographs for each village located along lines of communication (LOC's) in Laos.

If photographs of any of these villages are unavailable in your files I would appreciate being immediately so advised.

Respectfully,

PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, Jr.

APRIL 29, 1971.

Mr. RICHARD G. CAPEN, JR.,
Assistant to the Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of Defense, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CAPEN: Requests to the Department of the Air Force for information on activities in Southeast Asia have resulted in a letter to me from Major General John C. Geraudo suggesting that further inquiries on this matter be addressed directly to your office.

Accordingly, I would like to request the following information:

1. The identification of the villages and populated which have been hit by American air strikes since 1963.
2. The types of ordnance and the tonnage thereof which have been used against such targets.
3. A description of the ground combat operations directed or supported by American personnel in northern Laos during the period 1965-1967.
4. The number of current or former American military officers presently engaged in current combat operations in northern Laos, and the agency or contractor of the federal government which employs such individuals.

I am enclosing copies of letters sent by this office to the Air Force on March 3, 17, 22, April 19 and 20, 1971.

Thank you for your courtesy.

Respectfully,

PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, Jr.

APRIL 20, 1971.

Maj. Gen. JOHN C. GIRAUDO,
Office of Legislative Liaison, U.S. Air Force,
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

DEAR GENERAL GIRAUDO: Supplemental to my letter to you of yesterday, April 19, I would like to request the most recent aerial photographs taken of the villages listed in the attached list. All of such villages are located in the Plain of Jars area. Testimony has been received from residents of a majority of these villages that they were partially or totally destroyed by aerial bombing in 1969.

If there are target folders for one or more of these villages I would appreciate the opportunity to review such target folders at your convenience.

Thank you for your courtesy.

Respectfully,

PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, Jr.

CXVII—1255—Part 15

[Exhibit A]

MARCH 17, 1971.

Maj. Gen. JOHN C. GIRAUDO,
Director of Legislative Liaison,
Department of the Air Force,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR GENERAL GIRAUDO: In recent weeks, my office staff has repeatedly requested the following information from either the Department of Defense and/or the Department of State, thus far without response:

1. The identification of the villages and populated areas in northern Laos which have been hit by American air strikes since 1965.
2. The types of ordnance and the tonnage thereof which have been used against such targets.

3. A description of the ground combat operations directed or supported by American personnel in northern Laos during the period 1965-1971.

4. The number of current or former American military officers presently engaged in current combat operations in northern Laos, and the agency or contractor of the federal government which employs such individuals.

As we have previously stated to your Congressional Liaison personnel, I will be glad to have my own staff go over any records which are so voluminous as to make it difficult for the immediate collection of this material. To the extent that the information is classified, I will of course respect the classification restrictions imposed.

Paul LaFond, Colonel, United States Marine Corps (Ret.), of my staff holds a Top Secret security clearance, and as a Colonel in the Ready Reserves of the United States Marine Corps, I hold a Secret clearance.

I would appreciate your early response.

Respectfully,

PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, Jr.

[Exhibit B]

MARCH 22, 1971.

Maj. Gen. JOHN C. GIRAUDO,
Director of Legislative Liaison,
Department of the Air Force,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR GENERAL GIRAUDO: In response to my letter of March 17, I received on March 18 a letter labelled "Secret" which gave me the descriptions and characteristics of the ordnance used in Southeast Asia by the United States Air Force since 1957. I was also furnished with a map of Laos showing a dividing line between "North Laos and South Laos" and the unclassified statement: "North Laos. In 1957, sorties were very light. In 1968 the sortie rate nearly doubled. 1969 was the peak year. In 1970, the sortie rate decreased 27%."

This information does not answer the questions in my letter to you of March 17, to wit:

1. The identification of the villages and populated areas in northern Laos which have been hit by American air strikes since 1965.
2. The types of ordnance and the tonnage thereof which have been used against such targets.

3. A description of the ground combat operations directed or supported by American personnel in northern Laos during the period 1965-1971.

4. The number of current or former American military officers presently engaged in current combat operations in northern Laos, and the agency or contractor of the federal government which employs such individuals.

May I kindly have a detailed response to these questions, preferably with a map large enough to identify the villages and populated areas and a description of the weapons and tonnage thereof used in each area. I would particularly like to have, as to North Laos, South Laos, Cambodia, South Viet Nam and North Viet Nam, the number of sorties flown each month, the percentages of antipersonnel bombs, fire bombs and other ordnance,

making up the monthly bomb loads and the total damage, enemy KIA, tracks, trucks, bridges, etc., destroyed, and civilian casualties estimated to have been caused each month since 1965.

In the past, it has been my privilege to sit in on individual debriefings where individual pilots reported these statistics. Frankly, it is difficult for us to understand why the Air Force has thus far been unable to furnish me with this detailed information. As I mentioned in my earlier letter, I will be glad to have my own staff go over any records which are so voluminous as to make it difficult for the immediate collection of this material.

Thank you for your courtesy.

Respectfully,

PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, Jr.

[EXHIBIT C]

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., April 19, 1971.

Maj. Gen. JOHN C. GIRAUDO,
Office of Legislative Liaison
U.S. Air Force,
The Pentagon,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR GENERAL GIRAUDO: On April 13 and 15, I was privileged to meet with Major General Evans, Commander 13th Air Force, and on April 16 with Major General Hardin, Vice Commander, 7th Air Force. General Evans confirmed to me that current rules in Northern Laos require that no bombing take place within 500 meters of an "active village," an active village being defined as one hut.

At the April 13 meeting, I circled eight villages in Northern Laos at random and asked for aerial photographs of such villages. General Evans said he would be glad to have such photographs located and enlarged. On April 15, General Evans advised me that his staff had located only two of the villages in question, and showed me two photographs blown up to approximately 24' square. It was clear from the photographs, and General Evans confirmed, that these two villages were no longer in existence in the circled areas indicated.

I asked General Evans for the photographs and he replied that he would first like to get permission for their release from his superior, General Clay, Commander, 7th Air Force, in Saigon. He stated he was going to Saigon the following morning and request permission from General Clay for their release to me prior to my scheduled departure from Saigon at 1700 the following day, April 16.

In the early afternoon of April 16, I called at 7th Air Force Headquarters at Saigon and was referred to General Hardin, who advised me that General Clay had decided to refuse release of the pictures to me, and that I should request the pictures and any other Air Force data and information from your office in Washington.

This I now do.

I would also like to request further information as follows:

1. A list of the villages bombed in Northern Laos in "Barre Roll" operations since 1965, reflecting the date or dates of bombing such villages.

2. A copy of the photograph of an F-105 bombing four huts with a direct hit with white phosphorous, such photograph being the one formerly hanging in the office of the Vice Commander, 7th Air Force, and from which the present oil painting behind General Hardin's desk was copied.

These requests are made because of the widespread and uniform statements by Laotian refugees that their villages were destroyed by Air Force bombing in 1969. Such destruction is described in the U.S.I.S. memo of July 10, 1970, a copy of which is attached, and it is apparent that such bombing was in direct violation of the rules of target des-

Ignation described by Ambassador William Sullivan in his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on May 7, 1970. A copy of the Ambassador's partial testimony in this regard is attached hereto for your reference.

General Evans confirmed expressly to me on April 13, 1971, that during his seven months tenure as Commander, 13th Air Force, he has followed the targeting procedures directed by Ambassador Godley, and that to his knowledge, no Laotian villages have been destroyed by U.S. Air Force.

In the personal interviews with refugees from seven different villages in Xieng Khouang Province on April 15, 1971, by Congressman Waldie and myself, it was conclusively established that all seven villages were completely destroyed by T-28 and jet aircraft during 1969. The villagers described both SBU cluster bombers and white phosphorous as the ordnance which was used, and we personally observed several persons whose scars were consistent with such ordnance.

From the foregoing, it seems reasonable to believe that sometime between March 1969, when Ambassador Sullivan was replaced by Ambassador Godley, and the fall of 1970 when General Evans took command of 13th Air Force, at least seven, and presumably more, villages were destroyed by 13th Air Force aircraft and/or Royal Laotian Government T-28's.

It is likewise clear that if any such villages were destroyed, they were destroyed under the control and direction of the United States Ambassador to Laos who personally confirmed to me on April 13 and 15 that any villages destroyed in Northern Laos were destroyed either at his direction or with his consent, excepting only the relatively few occasions where a mistake may have been made.

I would much appreciate your comprehensive evaluation and comments on the matters set forth above, together with your early forwarding of the photographs and information requested.

Respectfully,

PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, Jr.

KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S
VIETNAM STUDY

Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering the opening of the sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam in the first half of 1965. Except where excerpting is indicated, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

LETTER FROM ROSTOW FAVORING COMMITMENT OF TROOPS BY UNITED STATES

(Personal letter from Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, to Secretary McNamara, Nov. 16, 1964, "Military Dispositions and Political Signals.")

Following on our conversation of last night I am concerned that too much thought is being given to the actual damage we do in the North, not enough thought to the signal we wish to send.

The signal consists of three parts:

a) damage to the North is now to be inflicted because they are violating the 1954 and 1962 accords;

b) we are ready and able to go much further than our initial act of damage;

c) we are ready and able to meet any level of escalation they might mount in response, if they are so minded.

Four points follow.

1. I am convinced that we should not go forward into the next stage without a US ground force commitment of some kind:

a. The withdrawal of those ground forces could be a critically important part of our diplomatic bargaining position. Ground

forces can sit during a conference more easily than we can maintain a series of mounting air and naval pressures.

b. We must make clear that counter escalation by the Communists will run directly into US strength on the ground; and, therefore the possibility of radically extending their position on the ground at the cost of air and naval damage alone, is ruled out.

c. There is a marginal possibility that in attacking the airfield they were thinking two moves ahead; namely, they might be planning a pre-emptive ground force response to an expected US retaliation for the Bien Hoa attack.

2. The first critical military action against North Vietnam should be designed merely to install the principle that they will, from the present forward, be vulnerable to retaliatory attack in the north for continued violations for the 1954 and 1962 Accords. In other words, we would signal a shift from the principle involved in the Tonkin Gulf response. This means that the initial use of force in the north should be as limited and as unsanguinary as possible. It is the installation of the principle that we are initially interested in, not tit for tat.

3. But our force dispositions to accompany an initial retaliatory move against the north should send three further signals lucidly:

a. that we are putting in place a capacity subsequently to step up direct and naval pressure on the north, if that should be required;

b. that we are prepared to face down any form of escalation North Vietnam might mount on the ground; and

c. that we are putting forces into place to exact retaliation directly against Communist China, if Peiping should join in an escalatory response from Hanoi. The latter could take the form of increased aircraft on Formosa plus, perhaps, a carrier force sitting off China distinguished from the force in the South China Sea.

4. The launching of this track, almost certainly, will require the President to explain to our own people and to the world our intentions and objectives. This will also be perhaps the most persuasive form of communication with Ho and Mao. In addition, I am inclined to think the most direct communication we can mount (perhaps via Vientiane and Warsaw) is desirable, as opposed to the use of cut-outs. They should feel they now confront an LBJ who has made up his mind. Contrary to an anxiety expressed at an earlier stage, I believe it quite possible to communicate the limits as well as the seriousness of our intentions without raising seriously the fear in Hanoi that we intend at our initiative to land immediately in the Red River Delta, in China, or seek any other objective than the re-installation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords.

MEMO FROM ROSTOW ADVOCATING GROUND TROOPS AND AIR ATTACKS

(Memorandum from Mr Rostow to Secretary Rusk, Nov. 23, 1964, "Some Observations as We Come to the Crunch in Southeast Asia")

I leave for Lima this Saturday for the CIAP and CIES meetings. I presume that in early December some major decisions on Southeast Asia will be made. I should, therefore, like to leave with you some observations on the situation. I have already communicated them to Bill Bundy.

1. We must begin by fastening our minds as sharply as we can around our appreciation of the view in Hanoi and Peiping of the Southeast Asia problem. I agree almost completely with SNIE 10-3-64 of October 9. Here are the critical passages:

"While they will seek to exploit and encourage the deteriorating situation in Saigon, they probably will avoid actions that would in their view unduly increase the chances of a major US response against

North Vietnam (DRV) or Communist China. We are almost certain that both Hanoi and Peiping are anxious not to become involved in the kind of war in which the great weight of superior US weaponry could be brought against them. Even if Hanoi and Peiping estimated that the US would not use nuclear weapons against them, they could not be sure of this. . . .

"In the face of new US pressures against the DRV, further actions by Hanoi and Peiping would be based to a considerable extent on their estimate of US intentions, i.e., whether the US was actually determined to increase its pressures as necessary. Their estimates on this point are probably uncertain, but we believe that fear of provoking severe measures by the US would lead them to temper their responses with a good deal of caution. . . .

"If despite Communist efforts, the US attacks continued, Hanoi's leaders would have to ask themselves whether it was not better to suspend their support of Viet Cong military action rather than suffer the destruction of their major military facilities and the industrial sector of their economy. In the belief that the tide has set almost irreversibly in their favor in South Vietnam, they might calculate that the Viet Cong could stop its military attacks for the time being and renew the insurrection successfully at a later date. Their judgment in this matter might be reinforced by the Chinese Communist concern over becoming involved in a conflict with US air and naval power."

Our most basic problem is, therefore, how to persuade them that a continuation of their present policy will risk major destruction in North Vietnam; that a preemptive move on the ground as a prelude to negotiation will be met by US strength on the ground; and that Communist China will not be a sanctuary, if it assists North Viet Nam in counter-escalation.

2. In terms of force dispositions, the critical moves are, I believe, these.

a. The introduction of some ground forces in South Viet Nam and, possibly, in the Laos corridor.

b. A minimal installation of the principle that from the present forward North Viet Nam will be vulnerable to retaliatory attacks for continued violation of the 1954-1962 Accords.

c. Perhaps most important of all, the introduction into the Pacific Theater of massive forces to deal with any escalatory response, including forces evidently aimed at China as well as North Viet Nam, should the Chinese Communists enter the game. I am increasingly confident that we can do this in ways which would be understood—and not dangerously misinterpreted—in Hanoi and Peiping.

3. But the movement of forces, and even bombing operations in the north, will not, in themselves, constitute a decisive signal. They will be searching, with enormous sensitivity, for the answer to the following question: Is the President of the United States deeply committed to reinstalling the 1954-1962 Accords; or is he putting on a demonstration of force that would save face for, essentially, a U.S. political defeat at a diplomatic conference? Here their judgment will depend not merely on our use of force and force dispositions but also on the posture of the President, including commitments he makes to our own people and before the world, and on our follow-through. The SNIE accurately catches the extent of their commitments and their hopes in South Viet Nam and Laos. They will not actually accept a setback until they are absolutely sure that we really mean it. They will be as searching in this matter as Khrushchev was before he abandoned the effort to break our hold on Berlin and as Khrushchev was in searching us out on the Turkish missiles before he

finally dismantled and removed his missiles from Cuba. Initial rhetoric and military moves will not be enough to convince them.

4. Given the fundamental assessment in this SNIE, I have no doubt we have the capacity to achieve a reinstatement of the 1954-1962 Accords if we enter the exercise with the same determination and staying power that we entered the long test on Berlin and the short test on the Cuba missiles. But it will take that kind of Presidential commitment and staying power.

5. In this connection, the SNIE is quite sound in emphasizing that they will seek, if they are permitted, either to pretend to call off the war in South Viet Nam, without actually doing so; or to revive it again when the pressure is off. (We can see Castro doing this now in Venezuela.) The nature of guerrilla war, infiltration, etc., lends itself to this kind of ambiguous letdown and reacceleration. This places a high premium on our defining precisely what they have to do to remove the pressure from the north. It is because we may wish to maintain pressure for some time to insure their compliance that we should think hard about the installation of troops not merely in South Viet Nam south of the seventeenth parallel, but also in the infiltration corridor of Laos. The same consideration argues for a non-sanguinary but important pressure in the form of naval blockade which will be easier to maintain during a negotiation or quasi-negotiation phase than bombing operations.

6. The touchstones for compliance should include the following: the removal of Viet Minh troops from Laos; the cessation of infiltration of South Viet Nam from the north; the turning off of the tactical radio network; and the overt statement on Hanoi radio that the Viet Cong should cease their operations and pursue their objectives in South Viet Nam by political means. On the latter point, even if contrary covert instructions are given, an overt statement would have important political and psychological impact.

7. As I said in my memorandum to the President of June 6, no one can be or should be dogmatic about how much of a war we still would have—and for how long—if the external element were thus radically reduced or eliminated. The odds are pretty good, in my view, that, if we do these things in this way, the war will either promptly stop or we will see the same kind of fragmentation of the Communist movement in South Viet Nam that we saw in Greece after the Yugoslav frontier was closed by the Tito-Stalin split. But we can't proceed on that assumption. We must try to gear this whole operation with the best counter-insurgency effort we can mount with our Vietnamese friends outside the country; and not withdraw US forces from Viet Nam until the war is truly under control. (In this connection, I hope everyone concerned considers carefully RAND proposal of November 17, 1964, entitled "SIAT: Single Integrated Attack Team, A Concept for Offensive Military Operations in South Viet Nam.")

8. I do not see how, if we adopt this line, we can avoid heightened pressures from our allies for either Chinese Communist entrance into the UN or for a UN offer to the Chinese Communists on some form of two-China basis. This will be livable for the President and the Administration if—but only if—we get a clean resolution of the Laos and South Viet Nam problems. The publication of a good Jordan Report will help pin our allies to the wall on a prior reinstatement of the 1954 and 1962 Accords.

9. Considering these observations as a whole, I suspect what I am really saying is that our assets, as I see them, are sufficient to see this thing through if we enter the exercise with adequate determination to succeed. I know well the anxieties and complications on our side of the line. But there may be a tendency to underestimate both the anxieties

and complications on the other side and also to underestimate that limited but real margin of influence on the outcome which flows from the simple fact that at this stage of history we are the greatest power in the world—if we behave like it.

10. In the President's public exposition of his policy, I would now add something to the draft I did to accompany the June 6 memorandum to the President. I believe he should hold up a vision of an Asian community that goes beyond the Mekong passage in that draft. The vision, essentially, should hold out the hope that if the 1954 and 1962 Accords are reinstated, these things are possible:

- a. peace;
- b. accelerated economic development;
- c. Asians taking a larger hand in their own destiny;
- d. as much peaceful coexistence between Asian Communists and non-Communists as the Communists wish.

11. A scenario to launch this track might begin as follows:

A. A Presidential decision, communicated to but held by the Congressional leaders. Some leakage would not be unhelpful.

B. Immediate movement of relevant forces to the Pacific.

C. Immediate direct communication to Hanoi to give them a chance to back down before faced with our actions, including a clear statement of the limits of our objectives but our absolute commitment to them.

D. Should this first communication fail (as is likely) installation of our ground forces and naval blockade, plus first attack in North, to be accompanied by publication of up-dated Jordan Report and Presidential speech.

McGEORGE BUNDY MEMO TO JOHNSON ON
"SUSTAINED REPRISAL" POLICY
(Annex A, "A Policy of Sustained Reprisal,"
to Memorandum to President Lyndon B.
Johnson From McGeorge Bundy, Presi-
dential Assistant for National Security,
Feb. 7, 1965.)

I. INTRODUCTION

We believe that the best available way of increasing our chance of success in Vietnam is the development and execution of a policy of *sustained reprisal* against North Vietnam—a policy in which air and naval action against the North is justified by and related to the whole Viet Cong campaign of violence and terror in the South.

While we believe that the risks of such a policy are acceptable, we emphasize that its costs are real. It implies significant U.S. air losses even if no full air war is joined, and it seems likely that it would eventually require an extensive and costly effort against the whole air defense system of North Vietnam. U.S. casualties would be higher—and more visible to American feelings—than those sustained in the struggle in South Vietnam.

Yet measured against the costs of defeat in Vietnam, this program seems cheap. And even if it fails to turn the tide—as it may—the value of the effort seems to us to exceed its cost.

II. OUTLINE OF THE POLICY

1. In partnership with the Government of Vietnam, we should develop and exercise the option to retaliate against any VC act of violence to persons or property.

2. In practice, we may wish at the outset to relate our reprisals to those acts of relatively high visibility such as the Pleiku incident. Later, we might retaliate against the assassination of a province chief, but not necessarily the murder of a hamlet official; we might retaliate against a grenade thrown into a crowded cafe in Saigon, but not necessarily to a shot fired into a small shop in the countryside.

3. Once a program of reprisals is clearly underway, it should not be necessary to connect each specific act against North Vietnam to a particular outrage in the South. It

should be possible, for example, to publish weekly lists of outrages in the South and to have it clearly understood that these outrages are the cause of such action against the North as may be occurring in the current period. Such a more generalized pattern of reprisal would remove much of the difficulty involved in finding precisely matching targets in response to specific atrocities. Even in such a more general pattern, however, it would be important to insure that the general level of reprisal action remained in close correspondence with the level of outrages in the South. We must keep it clear at every stage both to Hanoi and to the world, that our reprisals will be reduced or stopped when outrages in the South are reduced or stopped—and that we are not attempting to destroy or conquer North Vietnam.

4. In the early stages of such a course, we should take the appropriate occasion to make clear our firm intent to undertake reprisals on any further acts, major or minor, that appear to us and the GVN as indicating Hanoi's support. We would announce that our two governments have been patient and forbearing in the hope that Hanoi would come to its senses without the necessity of our having to take further action; but the outrages continue and now we must react against those who are responsible; we will not provoke; we will not use our force indiscriminately; but we can no longer sit by in the face of repeated acts of terror and violence for which the DRV is responsible.

5. Having once made this announcement, we should execute our reprisal policy with as low a level of public noise as possible. It is to our interest that our acts should be seen—but we do not wish to boast about them in ways that make it hard for Hanoi to shift its ground. We should instead direct maximum attention to the continuing acts of violence which are the cause of our continuing reprisals.

6. This reprisal policy should begin at a low level. Its level of force and pressure should be increased only gradually—and as indicated above should be decreased if VC terror visibly decreases. The object would not be to "win" an air war against Hanoi, but rather to influence the course of the struggle in the South.

7. At the same time it should be recognized that in order to maintain the power of reprisal without risk of excessive loss, an "air war" may in fact be necessary. We should therefore be ready to develop a separate justification for energetic flak suppression and if necessary for the destruction of Communist air power. The essence of such an explanation should be that these actions are intended solely to insure the effectiveness of a policy of reprisal, and in no sense represent any intent to wage offensive war against the North. These distinctions should not be difficult to develop.

8. It remains quite possible, however, that this reprisal policy would get us quickly into the level of military activity contemplated in the so-called Phase II of our December planning. It may even get us beyond this level with both Hanoi and Peiping, if there is Communist counter-action. We and the GVN should also be prepared for a spurt of VC terrorism, especially in urban areas, that would dwarf anything yet experienced. These are the risks of any action. They should be carefully reviewed—but we believe them to be acceptable.

9. We are convinced that the political values of reprisal require a continuous operation. Episodic responses geared on a one-for-one basis to "spectacular" outrages would lack the persuasive force of sustained pressure. More important still, they would leave it open to the Communists to avoid reprisals entirely by giving up only a small element of their own program. The Gulf of Tonkin affair produced a sharp upturn in morale in South Vietnam. When it remained

an isolated episode, however, there was a severe relapse. It is the great merit of the proposed scheme that to stop if the Communists would have to stop enough of their activity in the South to permit the probable success of a determined pacification effort.

III. EXPECTED EFFECT OF SUSTAINED REPRISAL POLICY

1. We emphasize that our primary target in advocating a reprisal policy is the improvement of the situation in South Vietnam. Action against the North is usually urged as a means of affecting the will of Hanoi to direct and support the VC. We consider this an important but longer-range purpose. The immediate and critical targets are in the South—in the minds of the South Vietnamese and in the minds of the Viet Cong cadres.

2. Predictions of the effect of any given course of action upon the states of mind of people are difficult. It seems very clear that if the United States and the Government of Vietnam join in a policy of reprisal, there will be a sharp immediate increase in optimism in the South, among nearly all articulate groups. The Mission believes—and our own conversations confirm—that in all sectors of Vietnamese opinion there is a strong belief that the United States could do much more if it would, and that they are suspicious of our failure to use more of our obviously enormous power. At least in the short run, the reaction to reprisal policy would be very favorable.

3. This favorable reaction should offer opportunity for increased American influence in pressing for a more effective government—at least in the short run. Joint reprisals would imply military planning in which the American role would necessarily be controlling, and this new relation should add to our bargaining power in other military efforts—and conceivably on a wider plane as well if a more stable government is formed. We have the whip hand in reprisals as we do not in other fields.

4. The Vietnamese increase in hope could well increase the readiness of Vietnamese factions themselves to join together in forming a more effective government.

5. We think it plausible that effective and sustained reprisals, even in a low key, would have a substantial depressing effect upon the morale of Viet Cong cadres in South Vietnam. This is the strong opinion of CIA Saigon. It is based upon reliable reports of the initial Viet Cong reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin episode, and also upon the solid general assessment that the determination of Hanoi and the apparent timidity of the mighty United States are both major items in Viet Cong confidence.

6. The long-run effect of reprisals in the South is far less clear. It may be that like other stimulants, the value of this one would decline over time. Indeed the risk of this result is large enough so that we ourselves believe that a very major effort all along the line should be made in South Vietnam to take full advantage of the immediate stimulus of reprisal policy in its early stages. Our object should be to use this new policy to effect a visible upward turn in pacification, in governmental effectiveness, in operations against the Viet Cong, and in the whole U.S./GVN relationship. It is changes in these areas that can have enduring long-term effects.

7. While emphasizing the importance of reprisals in the South, we do not exclude the impact on Hanoi. We believe, indeed, that it is of great importance that the level of reprisal be adjusted rapidly and visibly to both upward and downward shifts in the level of Viet Cong offenses. We want to keep before Hanoi the carrot of our desisting as well as the stick of continued pressure. We also need to conduct the application of force so that there is always a prospect of worse to come.

8. We cannot assert that a policy of sustained reprisal will succeed in changing the course of the contest in Vietnam. It may fail, and we cannot estimate the odds of success with any accuracy—they may be somewhere between 25% and 75%. What we can say is that even if it fails, the policy will be worth it. At a minimum it will damp down the charge that we did not do all that we could have done, and this charge will be important in many countries, including our own. Beyond that, a reprisal policy—to the extent that it demonstrates U.S. willingness to employ this new norm in counter-insurgency—will set a higher price for the future upon all adventures of guerrilla warfare, and it should therefore somewhat increase our ability to deter such adventures. We must recognize, however, that that ability will be gravely weakened if there is failure for any reason in Vietnam.

IV. PRESENT ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS

1. This general recommendation was developed in intensive discussions in the days just before the attacks on Pleiku. These attacks and our reaction to them have created an ideal opportunity for the prompt development and execution of sustained reprisals. Conversely, if no such policy is now developed, we face the grave danger that Pleiku, like the Gulf of Tonkin, may be a short-run stimulant and a long-term depressant. We therefore recommend that the necessary preparations be made for continuing reprisals. The major necessary steps to be taken appear to use to be the following:

(1) We should complete the evacuation of dependents.

(2) We should quietly start the necessary westward deployments of [word illegible] contingency forces.

(3) We should develop and refine a running catalogue of Viet Cong offenses which can be published regularly and related clearly to our own reprisals. Such a catalogue should perhaps build on the foundation of an initial White Paper.

(4) We should initiate joint planning with the GVN on both the civil and military level. Specifically, we should give a clear and strong signal to those now forming a government that we will be ready for this policy when they are.

(5) We should develop the necessary public and diplomatic statements to accompany the initiation and continuation of this program.

(6) We should insure that reprisal program is matched by renewed public commitment to our family of programs in the South, so that the central importance of the southern struggle may never be neglected.

(7) We should plan quiet diplomatic communication of the precise meaning of what we are and are not doing, to Hanoi, to Peking and to Moscow.

(8) We should be prepared to defend and to justify this new policy by concentrating attention in every forum upon its cause—the aggression in South.

(9) We should accept discussion on these terms in any forum, but we should not now accept the idea of negotiations of any sort except on the basis of a stand down of Viet Cong violence. A program of sustained reprisal, with its direct link to Hanoi's continuing aggressive actions in the South, will not involve us in nearly the level of international recrimination which would be precipitated by a go-North program which is not so connected. For this reason the international pressures for negotiation should be quite manageable.

DRAFT BY WILLIAM BUNDY ON RESULTS OF POLICY IN 1965

Draft paper by William Bundy, "Where Are We Heading?" Feb. 18, 1965. An attached note, dated June 25, says, "Later than November paper, and unfinished."

This memorandum examines possible de-

velopments and problems if the US pursues the following policy with respect to South Viet-Nam:

a. Intensified pacification within South Viet-Nam. To meet the security problem, this might include a significant increase in present US force strength.

b. A program of measured, limited, and spaced air attacks, jointly with the GVN, against the infiltration complex in the DRV. Such attacks would take place at the rate of about one a week, unless spectacular Viet Cong action dictated an immediate response out of sequence. The normal pattern of such attacks would comprise one GVN and one US strike on each occasion, confined to targets south of the 19th parallel, with variations in severity depending on the tempo of VC action, but with a slow upward trend in severity as the weeks went by.

c. That the US itself would take no initiative for talks, but would agree to cooperate in consultations—not a conference—undertaken by the UK and USSR as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference. As an opening move, the British would request an expression of our views, and we would use this occasion to spell out our position fully, including our purposes and what we regard as essential to the restoration of peace. We would further present our case against the DRV in the form of a long written document to be sent to the President of the United Nations Security Council and to be circulated to members of the UN.

1. COMMUNIST RESPONSES

a. Hanoi would almost certainly not feel itself under pressure at any early point to enter into fruitful negotiations or to call off its activity in any way. They would denounce the continued air attacks and seek to whip up maximum world opposition to them. Within South Viet-Nam, they might avoid spectacular actions, but would certainly continue a substantial pattern of activity along past lines, probably with emphasis on the kind of incidents we have seen this week, in which Communist agents stirred up a village "protest" against government air attacks, and against the U.S. Basically, they would see the situation in South Viet-Nam as likely to deteriorate further ("crumble", as they have put it), and would be expecting that at some point someone in the GVN will start secret talks with them behind our backs.

b. Communist China might supply additional air defense equipment to the DRV, but we do not believe they would engage in air operations from Communist China, at least up to the point where the MIGs in the DRV were engaged and we had found it necessary to attack Fukien or possibly—if the MIGs had been moved there—Vinh.

c. The Soviets would supply air defense equipment to the DRV and would continue to protest our air attacks in strong terms. However, we do not believe they would make any new commitment at this stage, and they would probably not do so even if the Chicom became even more deeply involved—provided that we were not ourselves attacking Communist China. At that point, the heat might get awfully great on them, and they would be in a very difficult position to continue actively working as Co-Chairman. However, their approach to the British on the Co-Chairmanship certainly suggests that they would find some relief in starting to act in that role, and might use it as a hedge against further involvement, perhaps pointing out to Hanoi that the Co-Chairman exercise serves to prevent us from taking extreme action and that Hanoi will get the same result in the end if a political track is operating and if, in fact, South Viet-Nam keeps crumbling. They might also argue to Hanoi that the existence of the political track tends to reduce the chances of the Chicom having to become deeply involved—which we believe Hanoi does not want unless it is compelled to accept it.

2. Within South Viet-Nam the new government is a somewhat better one, but the cohesive effects of the strikes to date have at most helped things a bit. The latest MACV report indicates a deteriorating situation except in the extreme south, and it is unlikely that this can be arrested in any short period of time even if the government does hold together well and the military go about their business. We shall be very lucky to see a leveling off, much less any significant improvement, in the next two months. In short, we may have to hang on quite a long time before we can hope to see an improving situation in South Viet-Nam—and this in turn is really the key to any negotiating position we could have at any time.

3. On the political track we believe the British will undertake their role with vigor, and that the Soviets will be more reserved. The Soviets can hardly hope to influence Hanoi much at this point, and they certainly have no leverage with Communist China. In the opening rounds, the Soviets will probably fire off some fairly sharp statements that the real key to the situation is for us to get out and to stop our attacks, and the opposing positions are so far apart that it is hard to see any useful movement for some time to come. We might well find the Soviets—or even the Canadians—sounding us out on whether we would stop our attacks in return for some moderation in VC activity. This is clearly unacceptable, and the very least we should hold out on is a verified cessation of infiltration (and radio silence) before we stop our attacks. Our stress on the cessation of infiltration may conceivably lead to the Indians coming forward to offer policing forces—a suggestion they have made before—and this would be a constructive move we could pick up. But, as noted above, Hanoi is most unlikely to trade on this basis for a long time to come.

4. In sum—the most likely prospect is for a prolonged period without major risks of escalation but equally without any give by Hanoi. If, contrary to our present judgment, the GVN should start to do better.

WHITE HOUSE CABLE TO TAYLOR ON THE ROLLING THUNDER DECISION

Excerpts from cablegram from the State Department to Ambassador Taylor, Feb. 13, 1965, as provided in the body of the Pentagon study. The words in brackets are those of the study. The narrative says this message was drafted at the White House.

The President today approved the following program for immediate future actions in follow-up decisions he reported to you in Deptel 1653. [The first FLAMING DART reprisal decision.]

1. We will intensify by all available means the program of pacification within SVN.
2. We will execute a program of measured and limited air action jointly with GVN against selected military targets in DRV, remaining south of 19th parallel until further notice.

FYI. Our current expectation is that these attacks might come about once or twice a week and involve two or three targets on each day of operation. END FYI.

3. We will announce this policy of measured action in general terms and at the same time, we will go to UN Security Council to make clear case that aggressor is Hanoi. We will also make it plain that we are ready and eager for 'talks' to bring aggression to an end.

4. We believe that this 3-part program must be concerted with SVN, and we currently expect to announce it by Presidential statement directly after next authorized air action. We believe this action should take place as early as possible next week.

5. You are accordingly instructed to seek immediate GVN agreement on this program. You are authorized to emphasize our conviction

that announcement of readiness to talk is stronger diplomatic position than awaiting inevitable summons to Security Council by third parties. We would hope to have appropriate GVN concurrence by Monday [Feb. 14th] if possible here.

In presenting above to GVN, you should draw fully, as you see fit, on following arguments:

a. We are determined to continue with military actions regardless of Security Council deliberations and any 'talks' or negotiations when [words illegible]. [Beginning of sentence illegible] that they cease [words illegible] and also the activity they are directing in the south.

b. We consider the UN Security Council initiative, following another strike, essential if we are to avoid being faced with really damaging initiatives by the USSR or perhaps by such powers as India, France, or even the UN.

c. At an early point in the UN Security Council initiative, we would expect to see calls for the DRV to appear in the UN. If they failed to appear, as in August, this will make doubly clear that it is they who are refusing to desist, and our position in pursuing military actions against the DRV would be strengthened. For some reason we would now hope GVN itself would appear at UN and work closely with US.

d. With or without Hanoi, we have every expectation that any 'talks' that may result from our Security Council initiative would in fact go on for many weeks or perhaps months and would above all focus constantly on the cessation of Hanoi's aggression as the precondition to any cessation of military action against the DRV. We further anticipate that any detailed discussions about any possible eventual form of agreement returning to the essentials of the 1954 Accords would be postponed and would be subordinated to the central issue. . . .

CABLE TO U.S. ENVOYS IN ASIA ANNOUNCING SUSTAINED BOMBING

Cablegram from State Department to heads of nine United States diplomatic missions in the Far East, Feb. 18, 1965, as provided in the body of the Pentagon study.

Policy on Viet-Nam adopted today calls for the following:

1. Joint program with GVN of continuing air and naval action against North Viet-Nam whenever and wherever necessary. Such action to be against selected military targets and to be limited and fitting and adequate as response to continuous aggression in South Viet-Nam directed in Hanoi. Air strikes will be jointly planned and agreed with GVN and carried out on joint basis.

2. Intensification by all available means of pacification program within South Viet-Nam, including every possible step to find and attack VC concentrations and headquarters within SVN by all conventional means available to GVN and US.

3. Early detailed presentation to nations of world and to public of documented case against DRV as aggressor. Forum and form this presentation not yet decided, but we do not repeat not expect to touch upon readiness for talks or negotiations at this time. We are considering reaffirmation our objectives in some form in the near future.

4. Careful public statements of USG, combined with facts of continuing air action, are expected to make it clear that military action will continue while aggression continues. But focus of public attention will be kept as far as possible on DRV aggression; not on joint GVN-US military operations. There will be no comment of any sort on future actions except that all such actions will be adequate and measured and fitting to aggression. (You will have noted President's statement of yesterday, which we will probably allow to stand.)

Addressees should inform head of government or State (as appropriate) of above in strictest confidence and report reactions. In the case of Canberra and Wellington [several words illegible] subject to security considerations of each operation as it occurs, as we did with respect to operations of February 7, and 11.

MCNAUGHTON DRAFT FOR McNAMARA ON "PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION"

(First draft of "Annex—Plan for Action for South Vietnam," appended to memorandum from John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, for Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, March 24, 1965.)

1. US aims: 70%—To avoid a humiliating US defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor). 20%—To keep SVN (and the adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.

10%—To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life.

ALSO—To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used.

NOT—To "help a friend," although it would be hard to stay in if asked out.

2. The situation: The situation in general is bad and deteriorating. The VC have the initiative. Defeatism is gaining among the rural population, somewhat in the cities, and even among the soldiers—especially those with relatives in rural areas. The Hop Tac area around Saigon is making little progress; the Delta stays bad; the country have been severed in the north. GVN control is shrinking to the enclaves, some burdened with refugees. In Saigon we have a remission: Quat is giving hope on the civilian side, the Buddhists have calmed, and the split generals are in uneasy equilibrium.

3. The preliminary question: Can the situation inside SVN be bottomed out (a) without extreme measures against the DRV and/or (b) without deployment of large numbers of US (and other) combat troops inside SVN? The answer is perhaps, but probably no.

4. Ways GVN might collapse: (a) VC successes reduce GVN control to enclaves, causing:

- (1) insurrection in the enclaved population,
- (2) massive defections of ARVN soldiers and even units,
- (3) aggravated dissension and impotence in Saigon,
- (4) defeatism and reorientation by key GVN officials.

(5) entrance of left-wing elements into the government,

- (6) emergence of a popular-front regime,
- (7) request that US leave,
- (8) concessions to the VC, and
- (9) accommodations to the DRV.

(b) VC and DRV volunteers concentrate on I and II Corps,

(1) conquering principal GVN-held enclaves there.

- (2) declaring Liberation Government * * *
- (3) joining the I & II Corps areas to the DRV, and
- (4) pressing the course in (a) above for rest of SVN.

(c) While in a temporary funk, GVN might throw in sponge:

- (1) dealing under the table with VC,
- (2) asking the US to cease at least military aid,
- (3) bringing left-wing elements into the government,
- (4) leading to a popular-front regime, and
- (5) ending in accommodations to the VC and DRV.

(d) In a surge of anti-Americanism, GVN could ask the US out and pursue course otherwise similar to (c) above.

5. The "trilemma": US policy appears to be drifting. This is because, while there is consensus that efforts inside SVN (para 6) will

probably fall to prevent collapse, all three of the possible remedial courses of action have so far been rejected:

a. Will-breaking strikes on the North (para 7) are balked (1) by flash-point limits, (2) by doubts that the DRV will cave and (3) by doubts that the VC will obey a caving DRV. (Leaving strikes only a political and anti-infiltration nuisance.)

b. Large US troops deployments. (para 9) are blocked by "French-defeat" and "Korea" syndromes, and Quat is queasy. (Troops could be net negatives, and be besieged.)

c. Exit by negotiations (para 9) is tainted by the humiliation likely to follow.

Effort inside South Vietnam: Progress inside SVN is our main aim. Great, imaginative efforts on the civilian political as well as military side must be made, bearing in mind that progress depends as much on GVN efforts and luck as on added US efforts. While only a few of such efforts can pay off quickly enough to affect the present ominous deterioration, some may, and we are dealing here in small critical margins. Furthermore, such investment is essential to provide a foundation for the longer run.

a. Improve spirit and effectiveness. (fill out further, drawing from State memo to the President)

(1) Achieve governmental stability.
(2) Augment the psy-war program.
(3) Build a stronger pro-government infrastructure.

b. Improve physical security. (fill out)

c. Reduce infiltration. (fill out)

STRIKES ON THE NORTH

(Program of Progressive Military Pressure)

a. Purposes:

(1) to reduce DRV/VC activities by affecting DRV will.
(2) To improve the GVN/VC relative "balance of morale."
(3) To provide the US/GVN with a bargaining counter.
(4) To reduce DRV infiltration of men and materiel.
(5) To show the world the lengths to which US will go for a friend.

b. Program: Each week, 1 or 2 "mission days" with 100-plane high-damage US-VNAF strikes each "day" against important targets, plus 3 armed recon missions—all moving upward in weight of effort, value of target or proximity to Hanoi and China.

ALTERNATIVE ONE: 12-week DRV-wide program shunning only "population" targets.

ALTERNATIVE TWO: 12-week program short of taking out Phuc Yen (Hanoi) airfield.

c. Other actions:

(1) Blockade of DRV ports by VNAF/US-dropped mines or by ships.
(2) South Vietnamese-implemented 34A MAROPS.
(3) Reconnaissance flights over Laos and the DRV.
(4) Daily BARREL ROLL armed recon strikes in Laos (plus T-28s),
(5) Four-a-week BARREL ROLL choke-point strikes in Laos.
(6) US/VNAF air & naval strikes against VC ops and bases in SVN.
(7) Westward deployment of US forces.
(8) No de Soto patrols or naval bombardment of DRV at this time.

d. Red "flash points." There are events which we can expect to imply substantial risk of escalation.

(1) Air strikes north of 17°. (This one already passed.)

(2) First US/VNAF confrontation with DRV MIGs.

(3) Strike on Phuc Yen MIG base near Hanoi.

(4) First strikes on Tonkin industrial/population targets.

(5) First strikes on Chinese railroad near China.

(6) First US/VNAF confrontation with Chicom MIGs.

(7) First hot pursuit of Chicom MIGs into China.

(8) First flak-suppression of Chicom or Soviet-manned SAM.

(9) Massive introduction of US ground troops into SVN.

(10) US/ARVN occupation of DRV territory (e.g., Ile de Tigre).

(11) First Chi/Sov-US confrontation or sinking in blockade.

e. Blue "flash points." China/DRV surely are sensitive to events which might cause us to escalate.

(1) All of the above "red" flash points.

(2) VC ground attack on Danang.

(3) Sinking of a US naval vessel.

(4) Open deployment of DRV troops into South Vietnam.

(5) Deployment of Chinese troops into North Vietnam.

(6) Deployment of FROGs or SAMs in North Vietnam.

(7) DRV air attack on South Vietnam.

(8) Announcement of Liberation Government in I/II Corps area.

f. Major risks:

(1) Losses to DRV MIGs, and later possibly to SAMs.

(2) Increased VC activities, and possibly Liberation Government.

(3) Panic or other collapse of GVN from under us.

(4) World-wide revulsion against us (against strikes, blockades, etc.).

(5) Sympathetic fires over Berlin, Cyprus, Kashmir, Jordan waters.

(6) Escalation to conventional war with DRV, China (and USSR?).

(7) Escalation to the use of nuclear weapons.

g. Other Red moves:

(1) More jets to NVN with DRV or Chicom pilots.

(2) More AA (SAMs?) and radar gear (Soviet-manned?) to MVN.

(3) Increased air and ground forces in South China.

(4) Other "defensive" DRV retaliation (e.g., shoot-down of a U-2).

(5) PL land grabs in Laos.

(6) PL declaration of new government in Laos.

(7) Political drive for "neutralization" of Indo-China.

h. Escalation control. We can do three things to avoid escalation too-much or too-fast:

(1) Stretch out. Retard the program (e.g., 1 not 2 fixed strikes a week).

(2) Circuit breaker. Abandon at least temporarily the theory that our strikes are intended to break DRV will, and "plateau" them below the "Phuc Yen Airfield" flash point on one or the other of these tenable theories:

(a) That we strike as necessary to interdict infiltration.

(b) That our level of strikes is generally responsive to the level of VC/DRV activities in South Vietnam.

(3) Shunt. Plateau the air strikes per para (2) and divert the energy into:

(a) A mine—and/or ship-blockade of DRV ports.

(b) Massive deployment of US (and other?) troops into SVN (and Laos?);

(1) To man the "enclaves", releasing ARVN forces.

(2) To take over Pleiku, Kontum, Darlac provinces.

(3) To create a [word illegible] sea-Thailand infiltration wall.

i. Important miscellany:

(1) Program should appear to be relentless (i.e., possibility of employing "circuit-breakers" should be secret).

(2) Enemy should be kept aware of our limited objectives.

(3) Allies should be kept on board.

(4) USSR should be kept in passive role.

(5) Information program should preserve US public support.

PROGRAM OF LARGE U.S. GROUND EFFORT IN SVN AND SEA

a. Purposes:

(1) To defeat the VC on the ground.

(2) To improve GVN/VC relative "morale balance."

(3) To improve US/GVN bargaining position.

(4) To show world lengths to which US will go to fulfill commitments.

b. Program:

(1) Continue strike-North "crescendo" or "plateau" (para 7 above.)

(2) Add any "combat support" personnel needed by MACV; and (3) Deploy remainder of the III Marine Expeditionary Force to Danang; and (4) Deploy one US (plus one Korean?) division to defeat VC in Pleiku-Kontum-Darlac area, and/or (5) Deploy one US (plus one Korean?) division to hold enclaves (Bien Hoa/Ton Son Nhut, Nha Trang, Qui Non, Pleiku); and/or (6) Deploy 3-5 US divisions (with "international" elements) across Laos-SVN infiltration routes and at key SVN population centers.

c. Advantages:

(1) Improve (at least initially) manpower ratio vs. the VC.

(2) Boost GVN morale and depress DRV/VC morale.

(3) Firm up US commitment in eyes of all Reds, allies and neutrals.

(4) Deter (or even prevent) coups in the South.

d. Risks:

(1) Deployment will suck Chicom troops into DRV.

(2) Deployment will suck counterbalancing DRV/Chinese troops into SVN.

(3) Announcement of deployment will cause massive DRV/Chicom effort preemptively to occupy new SVN territory.

(4) US losses will increase.

(5) Friction with GVN (and Koreans?) over command will arise.

(6) GVN will tend increasingly to "let the US do it."

(7) Anti-US "colonialist" mood may increase in and outside SVN.

(8) US forces may be surrounded and trapped.

e. Important miscellany:

(1) There are no obvious circuit-breakers. Once US troops are in, it will be difficult to withdraw them or to move them, say, to Thailand without admitting defeat.

(2) It will take massive deployments (many divisions) to improve the GVN/US: VC ratio to the optimum 10+ : 1.

(3) In any event, our Project 22 planning with the Thais for defense of the Mekong towns must proceed apace.

EXIT BY NEGOTIATIONS

a. Bargaining counters.

(1) What DRV could give:

(a) Stop training and sending personnel to SVN/Laos.

(b) Stop sending arms and supplies into SVN/Laos.

(c) Stop directing military actions into SVN/Laos.

(d) Order the VC/PL to stop their insurgencies.

(e) Stop propaganda broadcasts to South Vietnam.

(f) Remove VM forces and cadres from SVN and Laos.

(g) See that VC/PL stop incidents in SVN and Laos.

(h) See that VC/PL cease resistance.

(i) See that VC/PL turn in weapons and bases.

(j) See that VC/PL surrender for amnesty/expatriation.

- (2) What GVN/US could give:
 (a) Stop (or not increase) air strikes on DRV.
 (b) Remove (or not increase) US troops in SVN.
 (c) Rice supply to DRV.
 (d) Assurance that US/GVN have no designs on NVN.
 (e) Assurance that US/GVN will not demand public renunciation by the DRV of Communist goals.
 (f) Assurance that "peaceful coexistence" (e.g., continuation of Red propaganda in SVN) is acceptable.
 (g) Capitulation: Leftists in GVN, coalition government, and eventual incorporation of SVN into DRV.

- b. Possible outcomes.
 (1) Pacified non-Communist South Vietnam.
 (2) "Laotian" solution, with areas of de facto VC dominion, a "government of national unity," and a Liberation Front ostensibly weened from DRV control.
 (3) Explicit partition of SVN, with each area under a separate government.
 (4) A "semi-equilibrium"—a slow-motion war—with slowly shifting GVN-VC lines.
 (5) Loss of SVN to the DRV.

c. Techniques to minimize impact of bad outcomes. If/when it is estimated that even the best US/GVN efforts mean failure ("flash" or defeat), it will be important to act to minimize the after-damage to US effectiveness and image by steps such as these:

- (1) Publicize uniqueness of congenial impossibility of SVN case (e.g., Viet Minh held much of SVN in 1954, long sieve-like borders, unfavorable terrain, no national tradition, few administrators, mess left by French, competing factions, Red LOC advantage, late US start, etc.)

(2) Take opportunity offered by next coup or GVN anti-US tantrum to "ship out" (coupled with advanced threat to do so if they fall to "shape up"?)

(3) Create diversionary "offensives" elsewhere in the world (e.g., to shore up Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, India, Australia; to launch an 'anti-poverty' program for underdeveloped areas).

(4) Enter multi-nation negotiations calculated to shift opinions and values.

d. Risks. With the physical situation and the trends as they are the fear is overwhelming that an exit negotiated now would result in humiliation for the US.

Evaluation: It is essential—however badly SEA may go over the next 1-3 years—that U.S. emerge as a "good doctor." We must have kept promises, been tough, taken risks, gotten bloodied, and hurt the enemy very badly. We must avoid harmful appearances which will affect judgments by, and provide pretexts to, other nations regarding how the U.S. will behave in future cases of particular interest to those nations—regarding U.S. policy, power, resolve and competence to deal with their problems. In this connection, the relevant audiences are the Communists (who must feel strong pressures), the South Vietnamese (whose morale must be buoyed), our allies (who must trust us as "underwriters") and the U.S. public (which must support our risk-taking with U.S. lives and prestige).

Urgency: If the strike-North program (para 7) is not altered: we will reach the MIG/Phuc Yen flash point in approximately one month. If the program is altered only to stretch out the crescendo: up to 3 months may be had before that flash point, at the expense of a less persuasive squeeze. If the program is altered to "plateau" or dampen the strikes: much of their negotiating value will be lost. (Furthermore, there is now a hint of flexibility on the Red side; the Soviets are struggling to find a Gordian knot-cutter; the Chicoms may be wavering (Paris 5326).)

POSSIBLE COURSE

(1) Redouble efforts inside SVN (get better organized for it).

(2) Prepare to deploy U.S. combat troops in Phases, starting with one Army division at Pleiku and a Marine MEF at Danang.

(3) Stretch out strike-North program, postponing Phuc Yen until June (exceed flash points only in specific retaliations).

(4) Initiate talks along the following lines, bearing in mind that formal partition, or even a "Laos" partition, is out in SVN; we must break the VC back or work out an accommodation.

Phase One talks:

(A) When: Now, before an avoidable flash point.

(B) Who: U.S.—U.S.S.R., perhaps also U.S.—India. (Not with China or Liberation Front; not through UK or France or U Thant; keep alert to possibility that GVN officials are talking under the table.)

(C) How: With GVN consent, private, quiet (refuse formal talks).

(D) What:

(1) Offer to stop strikes on DRV and withhold deployment of large U.S. forces in trade for DRV stoppage of infiltration, communications to VC, and VC attacks, sabotage and terrorism, and for withdrawal of named units in SVN.

2. Compliance would be placed unilaterally. If as is likely, complete compliance by the DRV is not forthcoming, we would carry out occasional strikes.

(3) We make clear that we are not demanding cessation of Red propaganda nor a public renunciation by Hanoi of its doctrines.

(4) Regarding "defensive" VC attacks—i.e., VC defending VC-held areas from encroaching ARVN forces—we take the public position that ARVN forces must be free to operate throughout SVN, especially in areas where amnesty is offered (but in fact, discretion will be exercised).

(5) Terrorism and sabotage, however, must be dampened markedly throughout the country, and civilian administrators must be free to move and operate freely, certainly in so-called contested areas (and perhaps even in VC base areas).

Phase two talks:

(A) When: At the end of Phase One.

(B) Who: All interested nations.

(C) How: Publicly in large conference.

(D) What:

(1) Offer to remove US combat forces from South Vietnam in exchange for repatriation (or regroupment?) of DRV infiltrators and for erection of international machinery to verify the end of infiltration and communication.

(2) Offer to seek to determine the will of the people under international supervision, with an appropriate reflection of those who favor the VC.

(3) Any recognition of the Liberation Front would have to be accompanied by disarming the VC and at least avowed VC independence from DRV control.

Phase Three talks: Avoid any talks regarding the future of all of Southeast Asia, Thailand's future should not be up for discussions; and we have the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords covering the rest of the area.

c. Special Points:

(1) Play on DRV's fear of China.

(2) To show good will, suspend strikes on North for a few days if requested by Soviets during efforts to mediate.

(3) Have a contingency plan prepared to evacuate US personnel in case a para-9-type situation arises.

(4) If the DRV will not "play" the above game, we must be prepared (a) to risk passing some flash points, in the Strike-North program, (b) to put more US troops into SVN, and/or (c) to reconsider our minimum acceptable outcome.

McCONE MEMO TO TOP OFFICIALS ON FORCEFULNESS OF AIR WAR

(Memorandum from John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, to Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Ambassador Taylor, April 2, 1965, as provided in the body of the Pentagon's study. Paragraphs in italics are the study's paraphrase or explanation.)

McCone did not inherently disagree with the change in the U.S. ground-force role, but felt that it was inconsistent with the decision to continue the air strike program at the feeble level at which it was then being conducted. McCone developed his argument as follows:

I have been giving thought to the paper that we discussed in yesterday's meeting, which unfortunately I had little time to study, and also to the decision made to change the mission of our ground forces in South Vietnam from one of advice and static defense to one of active combat operations against the Viet Cong guerrillas.

I feel that the latter decision is correct only if our air strikes against the North are sufficiently heavy and damaging really to hurt the North Vietnamese. The paper we examined yesterday does not anticipate the type of air operation against the North necessary to force the NVN to reappraise their policy. On the contrary, it states, "We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of ROLLING THUNDER operations —," and later, in outlining the types of targets, states, "The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of MIG's," and these conditions indicate restraints which will not be persuasive to the NVN and would probably be read as evidence of a U.S. desire to temporize.

I have reported that the strikes to date have not caused a change in the North Vietnamese policy of directing Viet Cong insurgency, infiltrating cadres and supplying material. If anything, the strikes to date have hardened their attitude.

I have now had a chance to examine the 12-week program referred to by General Wheeler and it is my personal opinion that this program is not sufficiently severe and [words illegible] the North Vietnamese to [words illegible] policy.

On the other hand, we must look with care to our position under a program of slowly ascending tempo of air strikes. With the passage of each day and each week, we can expect increasing pressure to stop the bombing. This will come from various elements of the American public, from the press, the United Nations and world opinion. Therefore time will run against us in this operation and I think the North Vietnamese are counting on this.

Therefore I think what we are doing is starting on a track which involves ground force operations, which in all probability, will have limited effectiveness against guerrillas, although admittedly will restrain some VC advances. However, we can expect requirements for an ever-increasing commitment of U.S. personnel without materially improving the chances of victory. I support and agree with this decision but I must point out that in my judgment, forcing submission of the VC can only be brought about by a decision in Hanoi. Since the contemplated actions against the North are modest in scale, they will not impose unacceptable damages on it, nor will they threaten the DRV's vital interests. Hence, they will not present them with a situation with which they cannot live though such actions will cause the DRV pain and inconvenience.

I believe our proposed track offers great danger of simply encouraging Chinese Communists and Soviet support of the DRV and VC cause, if for no other reason than the risk

for both will be minimum. I envision that the reaction of the NVN and Chinese Communists will be to deliberately, carefully, and probably gradually, build up the Viet Cong capabilities by covert infiltration of North Vietnamese and, possibly, Chinese cadres and thus bring and ever-increasing pressure on our forces. In effect, we will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win, and from which we will have extreme difficulty in extracting ourselves.

Therefore it is my judgment that if we are to change the mission of the ground forces, we must also change the ground rules of the strikes against North Vietnam. We must hit them harder, more frequently, and inflict greater damage. Instead of avoiding the MIG's, we must go in and take them out. A bridge here and there will not do the job. We must strike their airfields, their petroleum resources, power stations and their military compounds. This, in my opinion, must be done promptly and with minimum restraint.

If we are unwilling to take this kind of a decision now, we must not take the actions concerning the mission of our ground forces for the reasons I have mentioned [words illegible].

TERMS IN TEXTS

ARVN—Army of Republic of (South) Vietnam.

A.S.A.P.—As soon as possible.

B.L.T.—Battalion landing team.

CINCPAC—Commander in Chief, Pacific.

DEPTEL—Department telegram.

D.O.D.—Department of Defense.

DRV—Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam.

EMBTTEL—Embassy telegram.

ISA—International Security Agency.

JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff.

L.O.C.—Lines of communication.

MACV—Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

NLF—National Liberation Front.

NLF SVN—National Liberation Front for South Vietnam.

PAVN—People's Army of (North) Vietnam.

P.I.—Philippine Islands.

P.L.—Pathet Lao.

P.O.L.—Petroleum, oil, lubricants.

R.O.K.—Republic of (South) Korea.

RVNAF—Republic of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces.

SAM—Surface-to-air missile.

SEA—Southeast Asia.

SVN—South Vietnam.

U.S.G.—U.S. Government.

VM—Vietminh.

APRIL 1965, ORDER INCREASING GROUND FORCE AND SHIFTING MISSION

(National Security Action Memorandum 328, April 6, 1965, signed by McGeorge Bundy and addressed to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.)

On Thursday, April 1, The President made the following decisions with respect to Vietnam:

1. Subject to modifications in light of experience, to coordination and direction both in Saigon and in Washington, the President approved the 41-point program of non-military actions submitted by Ambassador Taylor in a memorandum dated March 31, 1965.

2. The President gave general approval to the recommendations submitted by Mr. Rowan in his report dated March 16, with the exception that the President withheld approval of any request for supplemental funds at this time—it is his decision that this program is to be energetically supported by all agencies and departments and by the reprogramming of available funds as necessary within USIA.

3. The President approved the urgent exploration of the 12 suggestions for covert and other actions submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence under date of March 31.

4. The President repeated his earlier approval of the 21-point program of military actions submitted by General Harold K. Johnson under date of March 14 and re-emphasized his desire that aircraft and helicopter reinforcements under this program be accelerated.

5. The President approved an 18-20,000 man increase in U.S. military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.

6. The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron and associated headquarters and support elements.

7. The President approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.

8. The President approved the urgent exploration, with the Korean, Australian, and New Zealand Governments, of the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements from their armed forces in parallel with the additional Marine deployment approved in paragraph 6.

9. Subject to continuing review, the President approved the following general framework of continuing action against North Vietnam and Laos:

We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of Rolling Thunder operations being prepared to add strikes in response to a higher rate of VC operations, or conceivably to slow the pace in the unlikely event VC slacked off sharply for what appeared to be more than a temporary operational lull.

The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GGI range of MIGs. We should continue to vary the types of targets, stepping up attacks on lines of communication in the near future, and possibly moving in a few weeks to attacks on the rail lines north and northeast of Hanoi.

Leaflet operations should be expanded to obtain maximum practicable psychological effect on North Vietnamese population.

Blockade or aerial mining of North Vietnamese ports need further study and should be considered for future operations. It would have major political complications, especially in relation to the Soviets and other third countries, but also offers many advantages.

Air operation in Laos, particularly route blocking operations in the Panhandle area, should be stepped up to the maximum remunerative rate.

10. Ambassador Taylor will promptly seek the reactions of the South Vietnamese Government to appropriate sections of this program and their approval as necessary, and in the event of disapproval or difficulty at that end, these decisions will be appropriately reconsidered. In any event, no action into Vietnam under paragraphs 6 and 7 above should take place without GVN approval or further Presidential authorization.

11. The President desires that with respect to the actions in paragraphs 5 through 7, premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practicable, but in ways that should minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy, and official statements on these troop movements will be made only with the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State. The President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy.

TAYLOR CABLE TO WASHINGTON ON STEP-UP IN GROUND FORCES

Cablegram April 17, 1965, from Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor in Saigon to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, with a copy of the White House for the attention of McGeorge Bundy.

This message undertakes to summarize instructions which I have received over the last ten days with regard to the introduction of third-country combat forces and to discuss the preferred way of presenting the subject to the GVN.

As the result of the meeting of the President and his advisors on April 1 and the NSC meeting on the following day, I left Washington and returned to Saigon with the understanding that the reinforcement of the Marines already ashore by two additional BLT's and a F-4 squadron and the progressive introduction of IIAWPNPPP support forces were approved but that decision on the several proposals for bringing in more US combat forces and their possible modes of employment was withheld in an offensive counterinsurgency role. State was to explore with the Korean, Australian and New Zealand govts the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements in parallel with the Marine reinforcement.

Since arriving home, I have received the following instructions and have taken the indicated actions with respect to third-country combat forces.

April 6 and 8. Received GVN concurrence to introduction of the Marine reinforcements and to an expanded mission for all Marines in Danang-Phu Bai area.

April 8. Received Deptel 2229 directing approach to GVN, suggesting request to Australian govt for an infantry battalion for use in SVN. While awaiting a propitious moment to raise the matter, I received Deptel 2237 directing approach be delayed until further orders. Nothing further has been received since.

April 14. I learned by JCS 009012 to Cincpac of apparent decision to deploy 173rd airborne brigade immediately to Bien Hoa-Vung Tau. By Embtel 3373, delay in this deployment was urgently recommended but no reply has been received. However, Para 2 of Doc 152339 apparently makes reference to this project in terms which suggest that is something less than an approved immediate action. In view of the uncertainty of its status, I have not broached the matter with Quat.

April 15. Received Deptel 2314 directing that embassy Saigon discuss with GVN introduction of Rok regimental combat team and suggest GVN request such a force asap. Because of Quat's absence from Saigon, I have not been able to raise matter. As matter of fact, it should not be raised until we have a clear concept of employment.

April 16. I have just seen state-defense message Dod 152339 cited above which indicates a favorable attitude toward several possible uses of US combat forces beyond the NSC decisions of April 2. I am told to discuss these and certain other non-military matters urgently with Quat. The substance of this cable will be addressed in a separate message. I can not raise these matters with Quat without further guidance.

Faced with this rapidly changing picture of Washington desires and intentions with regard to the introduction of third-country (as well as US) combat forces, I badly needed a clarification of our purposes and objectives. Before I can present our case to GVN, I have to know what that case is and why. It is not going to be easy to get ready concurrence for the large-scale introduction of foreign troops unless the need is clear and explicit.

Let me suggest the kind of instruction to the AMB which it would be most helpful to receive for use in presenting to GVN what I take to be a new policy of third-country participation in ground combat.

The USG has completed a thorough review of the situation in SVN both in its national and international aspects and has reached certain important conclusions. It feels that in recent weeks there has been a somewhat favorable change in the overall situation as the result of the air attacks on DRV, the relatively small but numerous successes in the field against the VC and the encouraging progress of the Quat govt. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that, in all probability, the primary objective of the GVN and the USG of changing the will of the DRV to support the VC insurgency can not be attained in an acceptable time-frame by the methods presently employed. The air campaign in the North must be supplemented by signal successes against the VC on the South before we can hope to create that frame of mind in Hanoi which will lead to the decisions we seek.

"The JCS have reviewed the military resources which will be available in SVN by the end of 1965 and have concluded that even with an attainment of the highest feasible mobilization goals, ARVN will have insufficient forces to carry out the kind of successful campaign against the VC which is considered essential for the purposes discussed above. If the ground war is not to drag into 1966 and even beyond, they consider it necessary to reinforce GVN ground forces with about 23 battalion equivalents in addition to the forces now being recruited in SVN. Since these reinforcements cannot be raised by the GVN, they must inevitably come from third-country sources.

"The USG accepts the validity of this reasoning of the JCS and offers its assistance to the GVN to raise these additional forces for the purpose of bringing the VC insurgency to an end in the shortest possible time. We are prepared to bring in additional US ground forces provided we can get a reasonable degree of participation from other third countries. If the GVN will make urgent representations to them, we believe it entirely possible to obtain the following contributions; Korea, one regimental combat team; Australia, one infantry battalion; New Zealand, one battery and one company of tanks; PI, one battalion. If forces of the foregoing magnitude are forthcoming, the USG is prepared to provide the remainder of the combat reinforcements as well as the necessary logistic personnel to support the third-country contingents. Also it will use its good offices as desired in assisting the GVN approach to these govts.

"You (the Ambassador) will seek the concurrence of the GVN to the foregoing program, recognizing that a large number of questions such as command relationships, concepts of employment and disposition of forces must be worked out subsequently." Armed with an instruction such as the foregoing, I would feel adequately equipped to initiate what may be a sharp debate with the GVN. I need something like this before taking up the pending troop matters with Quat.

JOHNSON'S MESSAGE TO TAYLOR ON THE MAY 10 HALT IN BOMBING

(Message from President Johnson to Ambassador Taylor, May 10, 1965, as provided in the body of the Pentagon study.)

I have learned from Bob McNamara that nearly all ROLLING THUNDER operations for this week can be completed by Wednesday noon, Washington time. This fact and the days of Buddha's birthday seem to me to provide an excellent opportunity for a pause in air attacks which might go into next week and which I could use to good effect with world opinion.

My plan is not to announce this brief pause but simply to call it privately to the attention of Moscow and Hanoi as soon as possible and tell them that we shall be watch-

ing closely to see whether they respond in any way. My current plan is to report publicly after the pause ends on what we have done.

Could you see Quat right away on Tuesday and see if you can persuade him to concur in this plan. I would like to associate him with me in this decision if possible, but I would accept a simple concurrence or even willingness not to oppose my decision. In general, I think it important that he and I should get together in such matters, but I have no desire to embarrass him if it is a politically difficult for him to join actively in a pause over Buddha's birthday.

[Words illegible] noted your [words illegible] but do not yet have your appreciation of the political effect in Saigon of acting around Buddha's birthday. From my point of view it is a great advantage to use Buddha's birthday to mask the first days of the pause here, if it is at all possible in political terms for Quat. I assume we could undertake to enlist the Archbishop and the Nuncio in calming the Catholics.

You should understand that my purpose in this plan is to begin to clear a path either toward restoration of peace or toward increased military action, depending upon the reaction of the Communists. We have amply demonstrated our determination and our commitment in the last two months, and I now wish to gain some flexibility.

I know that this is a hard assignment on short notice, but there is no one who can bring it off better.

I have kept this plan in the tightest possible circle here and wish you to inform no one but Alexis Johnson. After I have your report of Quat's reaction I will make a final decision and it will be communicated promptly to senior officers concerned.

ROSTOW MEMORANDUM ON "VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN GUERRILLA WARS"

(Memorandum from Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, for Secretary of State Rusk, "Victory and Defeat in Guerrilla Wars: The Case of South Vietnam," May 20, 1965, as provided in the body of the Pentagon's study)

In the press, at least, there is a certain fuzziness about the possibility of clear-cut victory in South Viet-nam; and the President's statement that a military victory is impossible is open to misinterpretation.

1. Historically, guerrilla wars have generally been lost or won clearly: Greece, China mainland, North Viet-Nam, Malaya, Philippines. Laos in 1954 was an exception, with two provinces granted the Communists and a de facto split imposed on the country.

2. In all the cases won by Free World forces, there was a phase when the guerrillas commanded a good part of the countryside and, indeed, placed Athens, Kuala Lumpur, and Manila under something close to siege. They failed to win because all the possible routes to guerrilla victory were closed and, in failing to win, they lost. They finally gave up in discouragement. The routes to victory are:

a) Mao Stage Three: going to all-out conventional war and winning as in China in 1947-49;

b) Political collapse and takeover: North Viet-Nam;

c) Political collapse and a coalition government in which the Communists get control over the security machinery; army and/or police. This has been an evident Viet Cong objective in this (rest illegible).

d) Converting the bargaining pressure generated by the guerrilla forces into a partial victory by splitting the country: Laos. Also, in a sense, North Viet-Nam in 1954 and the Irish Rebellion after the First World War.

3. If we succeed in blocking these four routes to victory, discouraging the Communist force in the South, and making the

continuance of the war sufficiently costly to the North there is no reason we cannot win as clear a victory in South Viet-Nam as in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines. Unless political morale in Saigon collapses and the ARVN tends to break up, case c), the most realistic hope of the VC, should be avoidable. This danger argues for more rather than less pressure on the North, while continuing the battle in the South in such a way as to make VC hopes of military and political progress wane.

4. The objective of the exercise is to convince Hanoi that its bargaining position is being reduced with the passage of time; for, even in the worst case for Hanoi, it wants some bargaining position (rather than simply dropping the war) to get U.S. forces radically reduced in South Viet-Nam and to get some minimum face-saving formula for the VC.

5. I believe Hanoi understands its dilemma well. As of early February it saw a good chance of a quiet clean victory via route c). It now is staring at quite clear-cut defeat, with the rising U.S. strength and GVN morale in the South and rising costs in the North. That readjustment in prospects is painful; and they won't in my view, accept its consequences unless they are convinced time has ceased to be their friend, despite the full use of their assets on the ground in South Viet-nam, in political warfare around the world, and in diplomacy.

6. Their last and best hope will be, of course, that if they end the war and get us out, the political, social, and economic situation in South Viet Nam will deteriorate in such a way as to permit Communist political takeover, with or without a revival of guerrilla warfare. It is in this phase that we will have to consolidate, with the South Vietnamese, a victory that is nearer our grasp than we (but not Hanoi) may think.

GEORGE BALL MEMO FOR JOHNSON ON "A COMPROMISE SOLUTION"

(Memorandum, "A Compromise Solution in South Vietnam," from Under Secretary of State George W. Ball for President Johnson, July 1, 1965.)

(1) A Losing War: The South Vietnamese are losing the war to the Viet Cong. No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms, no matter how many hundred thousand white, foreign (U.S.) troops we deploy.

No one has demonstrated that a white ground force of whatever size can win a guerrilla war—which is at the same time a civil war between Asians—in jungle terrain in the midst of a population that refuses cooperation to the white forces (and the South Vietnamese) and thus provides a great intelligence advantage to the other side. Three recent incidents vividly illustrate this point: (a) the sneak attack on the Da Nang Air Base which involved penetration of a defense perimeter guarded by 9,000 Marines. This raid was possible only because of the cooperation of the local inhabitants; (b) the B52 raid that failed to hit the Viet Cong who had obviously been tipped off; (c) the search and destroy mission of the 173rd Air Borne Brigade which spent three days looking for the Viet Cong, suffered 23 casualties, and never made contact with the enemy who had obviously gotten advance word of their assignment.

(2) The Question to Decide: Should we limit our liabilities in South Vietnam and try to find a way out with minimal long-term costs?

The alternative—no matter what we may wish it to be—is almost certainly a protracted war involving an open-ended commitment of U.S. forces, mounting U.S. casualties, no assurance of a satisfactory solution, and a serious danger of escalation at the end of the road.

(3) Need for a Decision Now: So long as our forces are restricted to advising and assisting the South Vietnamese, the struggle will remain a civil war between Asian people. Once we deploy substantial numbers of troops in combat it will become a war between the U.S. and a large part of the population of South Vietnam, organized and directed from North Vietnam and backed by the resources of both Moscow and Peking.

The decision you face now, therefore, is crucial. Once large numbers of U.S. troops are committed to direct combat, they will begin to take heavy casualties in a war they are ill-equipped to fight in a non-cooperative if not downright hostile countryside.

Once we suffer large casualties, we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot—without national humiliation—stop short of achieving our complete objectives. *Of the two possibilities I think humiliation would be more likely than the achievement of our objectives—even after we have paid terrible costs.*

(4) Compromise Solution: Should we commit U.S. manpower and prestige to a terrain so unfavorable as to give a very large advantage to the enemy—or should we seek a compromise settlement which achieves less than our stated objectives and thus cut our losses while we still have the freedom of maneuver to do so.

(5) Costs of a Compromise Solution: The answer involves a judgment as to the cost to the U.S. of such a compromise settlement in terms of our relations with the countries in the area of South Vietnam, the credibility of our commitments, and our prestige around the world. In my judgment, if we act before we commit substantial U.S. troops to combat in South Vietnam we can, by accepting some short-term costs, avoid what may well be a long-term catastrophe. I believe we tended grossly to exaggerate the costs involved in a compromise settlement. An appreciation of probable costs is contained in the attached memorandum.

(6) With these considerations in mind, I strongly urge the following program:

(a) Military Program

(1) Complete all deployments already announced—15 battalions—but decide not to go beyond a figure of 72,000 men represented by this figure.

(2) Restrict the combat role of the American forces to the June 19 announcement, making it clear to General Westmoreland that this announcement is to be strictly construed.

(3) Continue bombing in the North but avoid the Hanoi-Haiphong area and any targets nearer to the Chinese border than those already struck.

(b) Political Program

(1) In any political approaches so far, we have been the prisoners of whatever South Vietnamese government that was momentarily in power. If we are ever to move toward a settlement, it will probably be because the South Vietnamese government pulls the rug out from under us and makes its own deal or because we go forward quietly without advance prearrangement with Saigon.

(2) So far we have not given the other side a reason to believe there is *any* flexibility in our negotiating approach. And the other side has been unwilling to accept what *in their terms* is complete capitulation.

(3) Now is the time to start some serious diplomatic feelers looking towards a solution based on some application of a self-determination principle.

(4) I would recommend approaching Hanoi rather than any of the other probable parties, the NLF—or Peking. Hanoi is the only one that has given any signs of interest in discussion. Peking has been rigidly opposed. Moscow has recommended that we negotiate with Hanoi. The NLF has been silent.

(5) There are several channels to the North Vietnamese but I think the best one is through their representative in Paris, Mai Van Bo. Initial feelers of Bo should be directed toward a discussion both of the four points we have put forward and the four points put forward by Hanoi as a basis for negotiation. We can accept all but one of Hanoi's four points, and hopefully we should be able to agree on some ground rules for serious negotiation—including no preconditions.

(6) If the initial feelers lead to further secret, exploratory talks, we can inject the concept of self-determination that would permit the Viet Cong some hope of achieving some of their political objectives through local elections or some other device.

(7) The contact on our side should be handled through a non-government cutout (possibly a reliable newspaper man who can be repudiated).

(8) If progress can be made at this level a basis can be laid for a multinational conference. At some point, obviously, the government of South Vietnam will have to be brought on board, but I would postpone this step until after a substantial feeling out of Hanoi.

(7) Before moving to any formal conference we should be prepared to agree once the conference is started:

(a) The U.S. will stand down its bombing of the North.

(b) The South Vietnamese will initiate no offensive operations in the South, and

(c) the DRV will stop terrorism and other aggressive action against the South.

(8) The negotiations at the conference should aim at incorporating our understanding with Hanoi in the form of a multinational agreement guaranteed by the U.S., the Soviet Union and possibly other parties, and providing for an international mechanism to supervise its execution.

PROBABLE REACTIONS TO THE CUTTING OF OUR LOSSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

We have tended to exaggerate the losses involved in a complete settlement in South Vietnam. There are three aspects to the problem that should be considered. First, the local effect of our action on nations in or near Southeast Asia. Second, the effect on our action on the credibility of our commitments around the world. Third, the effect on our position of world leadership.

A. Free Asian Reactions to a Compromise Settlement in South Vietnam Would Be Highly Parochial.

With each country interpreting the event primarily in terms of (a) its own immediate interest, (b) its sense of vulnerability to Communist invasion or insurgency, and (c) its confidence in the integrity of our commitment to its own security based on evidence other than that provided by our actions in South Vietnam.

Within this framework the following groupings emerge:

(1) The Republic of China and Thailand: staunch allies whose preference for extreme U.S. actions including a risk of war with Communist China sets them apart from all other Asian nations;

(2) The Republic of Korea and the Philippines: equally staunch allies whose support for strong U.S. action short of a war with Communist China would make post-settlement reassurance a pressing U.S. need;

(3) Japan: it would prefer wisdom to valor in an area remote from its own interests where escalation could involve its Chinese or Eurasian neighbors or both;

(4) Laos: a friendly neutral dependent on a strong Thai-U.S. guarantee of support in the face of increased Vietnamese and Laos pressures.

(5) Burma and Cambodia; suspicious neutrals whose fear of antagonizing Communist China would increase their leaning toward Peking in a conviction that the U.S. presence is not long for Southeast Asia; and

(6) Indonesia: whose opportunistic marriage of convenience of both Hanoi and Peking would carry it further in its overt aggression against Malaysia, convinced that foreign imperialism is a fast fading entity in the region.

JAPAN

Government cooperation [words illegible] essential in making the following points to the Japanese people:

(1) U.S. support was given in full measure as shown by our casualties, our expenditures and our risk taking;

(2) The U.S. record in Korea shows the credibility of our commitment so far as Japan is concerned.

The government as such supports our strong posture in Vietnam but stops short of the idea of a war between the U.S. and China.

THAILAND

Thai commitments to the struggle within Laos and South Vietnam are based upon a careful evaluation of the regional threat to Thailand's security. The Thais are confident they can contain any threats from Indochina alone. They know, however, they cannot withstand the massive power of Communist China without foreign assistance. Unfortunately, the Thai view of the war has seriously erred in fundamental respects. They believe American power can do anything, both militarily and in terms of shoring up the Saigon region. They now assume that we really could take over in Saigon and win the war if we felt we had to. If we should fail to do so, the Thais would initially see it as a failure of U.S. will. Yet time is on our side, providing we employ it effectively. Thailand is an independent nation with a long national history, and unlike South Vietnam, an acute national consciousness. It has few domestic Communists and none of the instability that plague its neighbors, Burma and Malaysia. Its one danger area in the northeast is well in hand so far as preventive measures against insurgency are concerned. Securing the Mekong Valley will be critical in any long-run solution, whether by the partition of Laos with Thai-U.S. forces occupying the western half or by some [word illegible] arrangement. Providing we are willing to make the effort, Thailand can be a foundation of rock and not a bed of sand in which to base our political/military commitment to Southeast Asia.

With the exception of the nations in Southeast Asia, a compromise settlement in South Vietnam should not have a major impact on the credibility of our commitments around the world. . . . Chancellor Erhard has told us privately that the people of Berlin would be concerned by a compromise settlement of South Vietnam. But this was hardly an original thought, and I suspect he was telling us what he believed we would like to hear. After all, the confidence of the West Berliners will depend more on what they see on the spot than on [word illegible] news or event halfway around the world. In my observation, the principal anxiety of our NATO Allies is that we have become too preoccupied with an area which seems to them an irrelevance and may be tempted to neglect to our NATO responsibilities. Moreover, they have a vested interest in an easier relationship between Washington and Moscow. By and large, therefore, they will be inclined to regard a compromise solution in South Vietnam more as new evidence of American maturity and judgment than of American loss of face. . . . On balance, I believe we would more seriously undermine the effectiveness of our world leadership by continuing the war and deepening our involvement than by pursuing a carefully plotted course toward a compromise solution. In spite of the number of powers that have—in response to our pleading—given verbal support from feeling of loyalty and dependence, we cannot ignore the fact that the war is vastly unpopular and that our role in it

is perceptively eroding the respect and confidence with which other nations regard us. We have not persuaded either our friends or allies that our further involvement is essential to the defense of freedom in the cold war. Moreover, the men we deploy in the jungles of South Vietnam, the more we contribute to a growing world anxiety and mistrust.

[Words illegible] the short run, of course, we could expect some catcalls from the sidelines and some vindictive pleasure on the part of Europeans jealous of American power. But that would, in my view, be a transient phenomenon with which we could live without sustained anguish. Elsewhere around the world I would see few unhappy implications for the credibility of our commitments. No doubt the Communists will gain propaganda value in Africa, but I cannot seriously believe that the Africans care too much about what happens in Southeast Asia. Australia and New Zealand are, of course, special cases since they feel lonely in the far reaches of the Pacific. Yet even their concern is far greater with Malaysia than with South Vietnam, and the degree of their anxiety would be conditioned largely by expressions of our support for Malaysia.

[Words illegible] Quite possibly President de Gaulle will make propaganda about perfidious Washington, yet even he will be inhibited by his much-heralded disapproval of our activities in South Vietnam.

South Korea—As for the rest of the Far East the only serious point of concern might be South Korea. But if we stop pressing the Koreans for more troops to Vietnam (the Vietnamese show no desire for additional Asian forces since it affronts their sense of pride) we may be able to cushion Korean reactions to a compromise in South Vietnam by the provision of greater military and economic assistance. In this regard, Japan can play a pivotal role now that it has achieved normal relations with South Korea.

MCNAUGHTON MEMO TO GOODPASTER ON "FORCES REQUIRED TO WIN"

(Excerpts from memorandum from Assistant Secretary McNaughton to Lieut. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 2, 1965, "Forces Required to Win in South Vietnam," as provided in the body of the Pentagon's study.)

Secretary McNamara this morning suggested that General Wheeler form a small group to address the question, "If we do everything we can, can we have assurance of winning in South Vietnam?" General Wheeler suggested that he would have you head up the group and that the group would be fairly small. Secretary McNamara indicated that he wanted your group to work with me and that I should send down a memorandum suggesting some of the questions that occurred to us. Here are our suggestions:

1. I do not think the question is whether the 44-battalion program (including 3d-country forces) is sufficient to do the job although the answer to that question should fall out of the study. Rather, I think we should think in terms of the 44-battalion build-up by the end of 1965, with added forces—as required and as our capabilities permit—in 1966. Furthermore, the study surely should look into the need for forces other than ground forces, such as air to be used one way or another in-country. I would hope that the study could produce a clear articulation of what our strategy is for winning the war in South Vietnam, tough as that articulation will be in view of the nature of the problem.

2. I would assume that the questions of calling up reserves and extending tours of duty are outside the scope of this study.

3. We must make some assumptions with respect to the number of VC. Also, we must

make some assumptions with respect to what the infiltration of men and material will be especially if there is a build-up of U.S. forces in South Vietnam. I am quite concerned about the increasing probability that there are regular PAVN forces either in the II Corps area or in Laos directly across the border from II Corps. Furthermore, I am fearful that especially with the kind of build-up here envisioned, infiltration of even greater numbers of regular forces may occur. As a part of this general problem of enemy build-up, we must of course ask how much assistance the USSR and China can be expected to give to the VC. I suspect that the increased strength levels of the VC and the more "conventional" nature of the operations implied by larger force levels may imply that the often-repeated ratio of "10 to 1" may no longer apply. I sense that this may be the case in the future, but I have no reason to be sure. For example, if the VC, even with larger forces engaged in more "conventional" type actions, are able to overrun towns and disappear into the jungles before we can bring the action troops to bear, we may still be faced with the old "ratio" problem.

4. I think we might avoid some spinning of wheels if we simply assumed that the GNV will not be able to increase its forces in the relevant time period. Indeed, from what Westy has reported about the battalions being chewed up and about their showing some signs of reluctance to engage in offensive operations, we might even have to ask the question whether we can expect them to maintain present levels of men—or more accurately, present levels of effectiveness.

5. With respect to 3d-country forces, Westy has equated the 9 ROK battalions with 9 US battalions, saying that, if he did not get the former, he must have the latter. I do not know enough about ROK forces to know whether they are in all respects "equal to" US forces (they may be better in some respects, and not as good in others). For purposes of the study, it might save us time if we assumed that we would get no meaningful forces from anyone other than the ROKs during the relative time frame. (If the Australians decide to send another battalion or two, this should not alter the conclusions of the study significantly.) . . .

9. At the moment, I do not see how the study can avoid addressing the question as to how long our forces will have to remain in order to achieve a "win" and the extent to which the presence of those forces over a long period of time might, by itself, nullify the "win." If it turns out that the study cannot go into this matter without first getting heavily into the political side of the question, I think the study at least should note the problem in some meaningful way.

10. I believe that the study should go into specifics—e.g., the numbers and effectiveness and uses of the South Vietnamese forces, exactly where we would deploy ours and exactly what we would expect their mission to be, how we would go about opening in the roads and providing security for the towns as well as protecting our own assets there, the time frames in which things would be done, command relationships, etc. Also, I think we should find a way to indicate how badly the conclusions might be thrown off if we are wrong with respect to key assumptions or judgments. . . .

PRIME MINISTER WILSON'S WARNING TO JOHNSON ON PETROLEUM RAIDS

(Excerpts from cablegram to President Johnson from Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Britain, June 3, 1965, as provided in the body of the Pentagon's study.)

I was most grateful to you for asking Bob McNamara to arrange the very full briefing about the two oil targets near Hanoi and Haiphong that Col. Rogers gave me yesterday. . . .

I know you will not feel that I am either unsympathetic or uncomprehending of the dilemma that this problem presents for you. In particular, I wholly understand the deep concern you must feel at the need to do anything possible to reduce the losses of young Americans in and over Vietnam; and Col. Rogers made it clear to us what care has been taken to plan this operation so as to keep civilian casualties to the minimum.

However, . . . I am bound to say that, as seen from here, the possible military benefits that may result from this bombing do not appear to outweigh the political disadvantages that would seem the inevitable consequence. If you and the South Vietnamese Government were conducting a declared war on the conventional pattern . . . this operation would clearly be necessary and right. But since you have made it abundantly clear—and you know how much we have welcomed and supported this—that your purpose is to achieve a negotiated settlement, and that you are not striving for total military victory in the field, I remain convinced that the bombing of these targets, without producing decisive military advantage, may only increase the difficulty of reaching an eventual settlement. . . .

The last thing I wish is to add to your difficulties, but, as I warned you in my previous message, if this action is taken we shall have to dissociate ourselves from it, and in doing so I should have to say that you had given me advance warning and that I had made my position clear to you. . . .

Nevertheless I want to repeat . . . that our reservations about this operation will not affect our continuing support for your policy over Vietnam, as you and your people have made it clear from your Baltimore speech onwards. But, while this will remain the Government's position, I know that the effect on public opinion in this country—and I believe throughout Western Europe—is likely to be such as to reinforce the existing disquiet and criticism that we have to deal with.

MCNAMARA'S MEMORANDUM ON JULY 20, 1965, ON INCREASING ALLIED GROUND FORCE

(Excerpts from memorandum from Secretary McNamara for President Johnson, drafted on July 1, 1965, and revised on July 20, as provided in the body of the Pentagon's study. Paragraphs in italics are the study's paraphrase or explanation.)

In a memorandum to the President drafted on 1 July and then revised on 20 July, immediately following his return from a week-long visit to Vietnam, he recommended an immediate decision to increase the U.S.-Third Country presence from the current 16 maneuver battalions (15 U.S., one Australian) and a change in the mission of these forces from one of providing support and reinforcement for the ARVN to one which soon became known as "search and destroy"—as McNamara put it, they were "by aggressive exploitation of superior military forces . . . to gain and hold the initiative . . . pressing the fight against VC-DRV main force units in South Vietnam to run them to ground and destroy them." . . .

His specific recommendations, he noted, were concurred in by General Wheeler and Ambassador-designate Lodge, who accompanied him on his trip to Vietnam, and by Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Johnson, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland, with whom he conferred there. The rationale for his decisions was supplied by the CIA, whose assessment he quoted with approval in concluding that 1 July version of his memorandum. It stated:

Over the longer term we doubt if the Communists are likely to change their basic strategy in Vietnam (i.e., aggressive and steadily mounting insurgency) unless and until two conditions prevail: (1) they are

forced to accept a situation in the war in the South which offers them no prospect of an early victory and no grounds for hope that they can simply outlast the US and (2) North Vietnam itself is under continuing and increasingly damaging punitive attack. So attack. So long as the Communists think they see the possibility of an early victory (which is probably now the case), we believe that they will persevere and accept extremely severe damage to the North. Conversely, if North Vietnam itself is not hurting, Hanoi's doctrinaire leaders will probably be ready to carry on the Southern struggle almost indefinitely. If, however, both of the conditions outlined above should be brought to pass, we believe Hanoi probably would, at least for a period of time, alter its basic strategy and course of action in South Vietnam.

McNamara's memorandum of 20 July did not include this quotation, although many of these points were made elsewhere in the paper. Instead, it concluded with an optimistic forecast:

The overall evaluation is that the course of action recommended in this memorandum—if the military and political moves are properly integrated and executed with continuing vigor and visible determination—stands a good chance of achieving an acceptable outcome within a reasonable time in Vietnam.

Never again while he was Secretary of Defense would McNamara make so optimistic a statement about Vietnam—except in public.

This concluding paragraph of McNamara's memorandum spoke of political, as well as military, "vigor" and "determination." Earlier in the paper, under the heading "Expanded political moves," he had elaborated on this point, writing:

Together with the above military moves, we should take political initiatives in order to lay a groundwork for a favorable political settlement by clarifying our objectives and establishing channels of communications. At the same time as we are taking steps to turn the tide in South Vietnam, we would make quiet moves through diplomatic channels (a) to open a dialogue with Moscow and Hanoi, and perhaps the VC, looking first toward disabusing them of any misconceptions as to our goals and second toward laying the groundwork for a settlement when the time is ripe; (b) to keep the Soviet Union from deepening its military [sic] in the world until the time when settlement can be achieved; and (c) to cement support for US policy by the US public, allies and friends, and to keep international opposition at a manageable level. Our efforts may be unproductive until the tide begins to turn, but nevertheless they should be made.

Here was scarcely a program for drastic political action. McNamara's essentially procedural (as opposed to substantive) recommendations amounted to little more than saying that the United States should provide channels for the enemy's discreet and relatively facesaving surrender when he decided that the game had grown too costly. This was in fact, what official Washington (again with the exception of Ball) meant in mid-1965 when it spoke of a "political settlement." (As McNamara noted in a footnote, even this went too far for Ambassador-designate Lodge, whose view was that "any further initiative by us now [before we are strong] would simply harden the Communist resolve not to stop fighting." In this view Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson concurred, except that they would maintain "discreet contacts with the Soviets.")

McNamara's concluding paragraph spoke of "an acceptable outcome." Previously in his paper he had listed "nine fundamental elements" of a favorable outcome. These were:

(a) VC stop attacks and drastically reduce incidents of terror and sabotage.

(b) DRV reduces infiltration to a trickle, with some reasonably reliable method of our obtaining confirmation of this fact.

(c) US/GVN stop bombing of North Vietnam.

(d) GVN stays independent (hopefully pro-US, but possibly genuinely neutral).

(e) GVN exercises governmental functions over substantially all of South Vietnam.

(f) Communists remain quiescent in Laos and Thailand.

(g) DRV withdraws PAVN forces and other North Vietnamese infiltrators (not regroupes) from South Vietnam.

(h) VC/NLF transform from a military to a purely political organization.

(i) US combat forces (not advisors or AID) withdraw.

Vietnam Archive: Study Tells How Johnson Secretly Opened Way to Ground Combat

(By Neil Sheehan)

President Johnson decided on April 1, 1965, to use American ground troops for offensive action in South Vietnam because the Administration had discovered that its long-planned bombing of North Vietnam—which had just begun—was not going to stave off collapse in the South, the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war discloses. He ordered that the decision be kept secret.

"The fact that this departure from a long-held policy had momentous implications was well recognized by the Administration leadership," the Pentagon analyst writes, alluding to the policy axiom since the Korean conflict that another land war in Asia should be avoided.

Although the President's decision was a "pivotal" change, the study declares, "Mr. Johnson was greatly concerned that the step be given as little prominence as possible."

The decision was embodied in National Security Action Memorandum 328, on April 6, which included the following paragraphs:

"5. The President approved an 18-20,000 man increase in U.S. military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel.

"6. The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron and associated headquarters and support elements.

"7. The President approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State."

The paragraph stating the President's concern about publicity gave stringent orders in writing to members of the National Security Council:

"11. The President desires that with respect to the actions in paragraphs 5 through 7, premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practicable, but in ways that should minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy, and official statements on these troop movements will be made only with the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State. The President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy." [See text, action memorandum on change of mission, April 6, 1965, Page 21.]

The period of increasing ground combat involvement is shown in the Pentagon papers to be the third major phase of President Johnson's commitment to South Vietnam. This period forms another section of the presentation of those papers by The New York Times.

The papers, prepared by a large team of authors in 1967-68 as an official study of how the United States went to war in Indochina, consist of 3,000 pages of analysis and 4,000 pages of supporting documents. The study covers nearly three decades of American policy toward Southeast Asia. Thus far The Times' reports on the study, with presenta-

tion of key documents, have covered the period of clandestine warfare before the Tonkin Gulf incidents in 1964 and the planning for sustained bombing of North Vietnam to begin early the next year.

In the spring of 1965, the study discloses, the Johnson Administration pinned its hopes on air assaults against the North to break the enemy's will and persuade Hanoi to stop the Vietcong insurgency in the South. The air assaults began on a sustained basis on March 2.

"Once set in motion, however, the bombing effort seemed to stiffen rather than soften Hanoi's backbone, as well as the willingness of Hanoi's allies, particularly the Soviet Union, to work toward compromise," the study continues.

"Official hopes were high that the Rolling Thunder program . . . would rapidly convince Hanoi that it should agree to negotiate a settlement to the war in the South. After a month of bombing with no response from the North Vietnamese, optimism began to wane," the study remarks.

"The U.S. was presented essentially with two options: (1) to withdraw unilaterally from Vietnam leaving the South Vietnamese to fend for themselves, or (2) to commit ground forces in pursuit of its objectives. A third option, that of drastically increasing the scope and scale of the bombing, was rejected because of the concomitant high risk of inviting Chinese intervention."

And so within a month, the account continues, with the Administration recognizing that the bombing would not work quickly enough, the crucial decision was made to put the two Marine battalions already in South Vietnam on the offensive. The 3,500 marines landed at Danang on March 8—bringing the total United States force in South Vietnam to 27,000. The restricted mission of the marines had been the static defense of the Danang airfield.

ORDERS PUT IN WRITING

As a result of the President's wish to keep the shift of mission from defense to offense imperceptible to the public, the April 1 decision received no publicity "until it crept out almost by accident in a State Department release on 8 June," in the words of the Pentagon study.

The day before, the hastily improvised static security and enclave strategies of the spring were overtaken by a requirement from Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the American commander in Saigon, for nearly 200,000 troops. He wanted these forces, the Pentagon study relates, to hold off defeat long enough to make possible a further build-up of American troops.

"Swiftly and in an atmosphere of crisis," the study says, President Johnson gave his approval to General Westmoreland's request a little more than a month later, in mid-July. And once again, the study adds, Mr. Johnson concealed his decision.

But the President, the narrative continues, was now heeding the counsel of General Westmoreland to embark on a full-scale ground war. The study for this period concludes that Mr. Johnson and most of his Administration were in no mood for compromise on Vietnam.

As an indication of the Administration's mood during this period, the study cites "a marathon public-information campaign" conducted by Secretary of State Dean Rusk late in February and early in March as sustained bombing was getting under way.

Mr. Rusk, the study says, sought "to signal a seemingly reasonable but in fact quite tough U.S. position on negotiations, demanding that Hanoi 'stop doing what it is doing against its neighbors' before any negotiations could prove fruitful.

"Rusk's disinterest in negotiations at this time was in concert with the view of virtually all of the President's key advisers, that the path to peace was not then open," the Pen-

tagon account continues. "Hanoi held sway over more than half of South Vietnam and could see the Saigon Government crumbling before her very eyes. The balance of power at this time simply did not furnish the U.S. with a basis for bargaining and Hanoi had no reason to accede to the hard terms that the U.S. had in mind. Until military pressures on North Vietnam could tilt the balance of forces the other way, talk of negotiation could be little more than a hollow exercise."

A POSITION OF COMPROMISE

The study also says that two of the President's major moves involving the bombing campaign in the spring of 1965 were designed, among other aims, to quiet critics and obtain public support for the air war by striking a position of compromise. But in fact, the account goes on, the moves masked publicly unstated conditions for peace that "were not 'compromise' terms, but more akin to a 'cease and desist' order that, from the D.R.V./VC point of view, was tantamount to a demand for their surrender." "D.R.V." denotes the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; "VC" the Vietcong.

In Mr. Johnson's first action, his speech at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore on April 7, he offered to negotiate "without posing any preconditions" and also held out what the study calls a "billion-dollar carrot" in the form of a regional economic-development program for the Mekong Delta, financed by the United States, in which North Vietnam might participate.

The second action was the unannounced five-day pause in bombing in May, during which the President called upon Hanoi to accept a "political solution" in the South. This "seemed to be aimed more at clearing the decks for a subsequent intensified resumption than it was at evoking a reciprocal act of deescalation by Hanoi," the study says. Admiral Raborn, in his May 6 memorandum, had suggested a pause for this purpose and as an opportunity for Hanoi "to make concessions with some grace."

The air attacks had begun Feb. 8 and Feb. 11 with reprisal raids, code-named Operations Flaming Dart I and II, announced as retaliation for Vietcong attacks on American installations at Pleiku and Quinhon.

In public Administration statements on the air assaults, the study goes on, President Johnson broadened "the reprisal concept as gradually and imperceptibly as possible" into sustained air raids against the North, in the same fashion that the analyst describes him blurring the shift from defensive to offensive action on the ground during the spring and summer of 1965.

The study declares that the two February strikes—unlike the Tonkin Gulf reprisals in August, 1964, which were tied directly to a North Vietnamese attack on American ships—were publicly associated with a "larger pattern of aggression" by North Vietnam. Flaming Dart II, for example, was characterized as "a generalized response to 'continued acts of aggression,'" the account notes.

"Although discussed publicly in very muted tones," it goes on, "the second Flaming Dart operation constituted a sharp break with past U.S. policy and set the stage for the continuing bombing program that was now to be launched in earnest."

In another section of the study, a Pentagon analyst remarks that "the change in ground rules . . . posed serious public-information and stage-managing problems for the President."

It was on Feb. 13, two days after this second reprisal, that Mr. Johnson ordered Operation Rolling Thunder. An important influence on his unpublicized decision was a memorandum from his special assistant for national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy, who was heading a fact-finding mission in Vietnam when the Vietcong attack at Pleiku

occurred on Feb. 7. With Mr. Bundy were Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Leonard Unger.

"A policy of sustained reprisal against North Vietnam" was the strategy advocated by Mr. Bundy in his memorandum, drafted on the President's personal Boeing 707, Air Force One, while returning from Saigon the same day. [See text, Bundy memorandum, Feb. 7, 1965.]

The memorandum explained that the justification for the air attacks against the North, and their intensity, would be keyed to the level of Vietcong activity in the South.

SUSTAINED PRESSURE SOUGHT

"We are convinced that the political values of reprisal require a continuous operation," Mr. Bundy wrote. "Eposodic responses geared on a one-for-one basis to 'spectacular' outrages would lack the persuasive force of sustained pressure. More important still, they would leave it open to the Communists to avoid reprisals entirely by giving up only a small element of their own program. . . . It is the great merit of the proposed scheme that to stop it the Communists would have to stop enough of their activity in the South to permit the probable success of a determined pacification effort."

The analyst notes, however, that Mr. Bundy's memorandum was a "unique articulation of a rationale for the Rolling Thunder policy" because Mr. Bundy held out as the immediate benefit an opportunity to rally the anti-Communist elements in the South and achieve some political stability and progress in pacification. "Once such a policy is put in force," Mr. Bundy wrote, in summary conclusions to his memorandum, "we shall be able to speak in Vietnam on many topics and in many ways, with growing force and effectiveness."

It was also plausible, he said, that bombing in the North, "even in a low key, would have a substantial depressing effect upon the morale of Vietcong cadres in South Vietnam."

Mr. Bundy, the study remarks, thus differed from most other proponents of bombing. These included Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor, who despaired of improving the Saigon Government's effectiveness and who wanted bombing primarily as a will-breaking device "to inflict such pain or threat of pain upon the D.R.V. that it would be compelled to order a stand-down of Viet Cong violence," in the study's words.

As several chapters of the Pentagon study show, a number of Administration strategists—particularly Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council—had assumed for years that "calculated doses" of American air power would accomplish this end.

Mr. Bundy, while not underrating the bombing's "impact on Hanoi" and its use "as a means of affecting the will of Hanoi," saw this as a "longer-range purpose."

THIS PROGRAM SEEMS CHEAP

The bombing might not work. Mr. Bundy acknowledged. "Yet measured against the costs of defeat in Vietnam," he wrote, "this program seems cheap. And even if it fails to turn the tide—as it may—the value of the effort seems to us to exceed its cost."

President Johnson informed Ambassador Taylor of his Rolling Thunder decision in a cablegram drafted in the White House and transmitted to Saigon late in the afternoon of Sunday, Feb. 13.

The cable told the Ambassador that "we will execute a program of measured and limited air action jointly with the GVN [the Government of Vietnam] against selected military targets in D.R.V. remaining south of the 19th Parallel until further notice."

"Our current expectation," the message added, "is that these attacks might come

about once or twice a week and involve two or three targets on each day of operation." [See text of White House cable, Feb. 13.]

Mr. Johnson said he hoped "to have appropriate GVN concurrence by Monday if possible. . . ."

The study recounts that "Ambassador Taylor received the news of the President's new program with enthusiasm. In his response, however, he explained the difficulties he faced in obtaining authentic GVN concurrence 'in the condition of virtual nongovernment' which existed in Saigon at that moment."

Gen. Nguyen Khanh, the nominal commander of the South Vietnamese armed forces, had ousted the civilian cabinet of Premier Tran Van Huong on Jan. 27. Led by Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, a group of young generals—the so-called Young Turks—were in turn intriguing against General Khanh.

(A footnote in the account of the first reprisal strikes, on Feb. 8, says that Marshal Ky, who led the South Vietnamese planes participating in the raid, caused "consternation" among American target controllers by dropping his bombs on the wrong targets. "In a last minute switch," the footnote says, Marshal Ky "dumped his flight's bomb loads on an unassigned target in the Vinhlinh area, in order, as he later explained, to avoid colliding with U.S.A.F. aircraft which, he claimed, were striking his originally assigned target when his flight arrived over the target area." Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp, Commander of United States forces in the Pacific, reported the incident to the Joint Chiefs.)

CABLES TO THE EMBASSIES

Referring to the political situation in Saigon, the account says: "This Alice-in-Wonderland atmosphere notwithstanding, Taylor was undaunted."

"It will be interesting to observe the effect of our proposal on the internal political situation here," the Ambassador cabled back to Mr. Johnson in Washington about the bombing: "I will use the occasion to emphasize that a dramatic change is occurring in U.S. policy, one highly favorable to GVN interests but demanding a parallel dramatic change of attitude on the part of the GVN. Now is the time to install the best possible Government as we are clearly approaching a climax in the next few months."

Ambassador Taylor apparently obtained what concurrence was possible and on Feb. 8 another cable went out from the State Department to London and eight United States Embassies in the Far East besides the one in Saigon. The message told the ambassadors of the forthcoming bombing campaign and instructed them to "inform head of government or State (as appropriate) of above in strictest confidence and report reactions." [See text, cable to U.S. envoys, Feb. 13.]

Both McGeorge Bundy and Ambassador Taylor had recommended playing down publicity on the details of the raids. "Careful public statements of U.S.G. [United States Government], combined with fact of continuing air actions, are expected to make it clear that military action will continue while aggression continues," the cable said. "But focus of public attention will be kept as far as possible on DRV aggression; not on joint GVN/US military operations."

The President had scheduled the first of the sustained raids, Rolling Thunder I, for Feb. 20. Five hours after the State Department transmitted that cable, a perennial Saigon plotter, Col. Pham Ngoc Thao, staged an unsuccessful "semicoup" against General Khanh and "pandemonium reigned in Saigon," the study recounts. "Ambassador Taylor promptly recommended cancellation of the Feb. 20 air strikes and his recommendation was equally promptly accepted" by Washington, the Pentagon study says.

The State Department sent a cablegram to the various embassies rescinding the in-

structions to notify heads of government or state of the planned air war until further notice "in view of the disturbed situation in Saigon."

The situation there, the study says, remained "disturbed" for nearly a week while the Young Turks also sought to get rid of General Khanh.

"The latter made frantic but unsuccessful efforts to rally his supporters," the study says, and finally took off in his plane to avoid having to resign as commander in chief. "Literally running out of gas in Nhatrang shortly before dawn on Feb. 21, he submitted his resignation, claiming that a 'foreign hand' was behind the coup. No one, however, could be quite certain that Khanh might not 're-coup' once again, unless he were physically removed from the scene."

This took three more days to accomplish, and on Feb. 25 General Khanh finally went into permanent exile as an ambassador at large, with Ambassador Taylor seeing him off at the airport, "glassily polite," in the study's words. "It was only then that Taylor was able to issue, and Washington could accept, clearance for the long-postponed and frequently rescheduled first Rolling Thunder strike."

Less than three weeks earlier, in his memorandum to the President, predicting that "a policy of sustained reprisal" might bring a better government in Saigon. McGeorge Bundy had said he did not agree with Ambassador Taylor that General Khanh "must somehow be removed from the . . . scene."

"We see no one else in sight with anything like his ability to combine military authority with some sense of politics," the account quotes Mr. Bundy as having written.

In the meantime two more Rolling Thunder strikes—II and III—had also been scheduled and then canceled because, the study says, the South Vietnamese Air Force was on "coup alert," in Saigon.

During part of this period, air strikes against North Vietnam were also inhibited by a diplomatic initiative from the Soviet Union and Britain. They moved to reactivate their co-chairmanship of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina to consider the current Vietnam crisis. Secretary Rusk cabled Ambassador Taylor that the diplomatic initiative would not affect Washington's decision to begin the air war, merely its timing.

According to the Pentagon study, the Administration regarded the possibility of reviving the Geneva conference of 1954, which had ended the French Indochina War, "not as a potential negotiating opportunity, but as a convenient vehicle for public expression of a tough U.S. position."

But, the account adds, this "diplomatic gambit" had "languished" by the time General Khanh left Saigon, and the day of his departure Mr. Johnson scheduled a strike, Rolling Thunder IV, for Feb. 26.

The pilots had been standing by, for nearly a week, with the orders to execute a strike being canceled every 24 hours.

But the order to begin the raid was again canceled, a last time, by monsoon weather for four more days.

Rolling Thunder finally rolled on March 2, 1965, when F-100 Super Sabre and F-105 Thunderchief jets of the United States Air Force bombed an ammunition depot at Xombang while 19 propeller-driven A-1H fighter-bombers of South Vietnam struck the Quangke naval base.

The various arguments in the Administration over how the raids ought to be conducted, which had developed during the planning stages, were now revived in sharper form by the opening blow in the actual air war.

Secretary McNamara, whose attention to management of resources and cost-effectiveness is cited repeatedly by the study, was concerned about improving the military ef-

ficacy of the bombing even before the sustained air war got under way.

He had received bomb damage assessments on the two reprisal strikes in February, reporting that of 491 buildings attacked, only 47 had been destroyed and 22 damaged. The information "caused McNamara to fire off a rather blunt memorandum" to General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Feb. 17 the account says.

"I AM QUITE SATISFIED"

"Although the four missions [flown during the two raids] left the operations at the targets relatively unimpaired, I am quite satisfied with the results," Mr. McNamara began. "Our primary objective, of course, was to communicate our political resolve. This I believe we did. Future communications to resolve, however, will carry a hollow ring unless we accomplish more military damage than we have to date. . . . Surely we cannot continue for months accomplishing no more with 267 sorties than we did on these four missions." A sortie is a flight by a single plane.

General Wheeler replied that measures were being taken to heighten the destructiveness of the strikes and said that one way to accomplish this was to give the operational commander on the scene "adequate latitude" to attack the target as he saw fit, rather than seeking to control the details from Washington.

One measure approved by the President on March 9 was the use of napalm in North Vietnam.

And the day before the day that 3,500 marines came ashore at Danang to protect the airfield there, Ambassador Taylor had already expressed, in two cables to Washington, what the historian describes as "sharp annoyance" with the "unnecessarily timid and ambivalent" way in which the air war was being conducted.

No air strikes had been authorized by the President beyond the initial Rolling Thunder raids that began on March 2, and, according to the study, the Ambassador was irritated at "the long delays between strikes, the marginal weight of the attacks and the great ado about behind-the-scenes diplomatic feelers."

GENERAL WESTMORELAND CONCURS

With the concurrence of General Westmoreland, Ambassador Taylor proposed "a more dynamic schedule of strikes, a several week program relentlessly marching north" beyond the 19th Parallel, which President Johnson had so far set as a limit, "to break the will of the D.R.V."

Ambassador Taylor cabled: "Current feverish diplomatic activity particularly by French and British" was interfering with the ability of the United States to "progressively turn the screws on D.R.V."

"It appears to me evident that to date D.R.V. leaders believe air strikes at present levels on their territory are meaningless and that we are more susceptible to international pressure for negotiations than they are," the Ambassador said. He cited as evidence a report from J. Blair Seaborn, the Canadian member of the International Control Commission, who, in Hanoi earlier that month, had performed one of a series of secret diplomatic missions for the United States.

Mr. Seaborn had been sent back to convey directly to the Hanoi leaders an American policy statement on Vietnam that had been delivered to China on Feb. 24 through its embassy in Warsaw.

"NO DESIGNS" ON THE D.R.V.

In essence, the Pentagon study reports, the policy statement said that while the United States was determined to take whatever measures were necessary to maintain South Vietnam, it "had no designs on the territory of North Vietnam, nor any desire to destroy the D.R.V."

The delivery of the message to the Chinese was apparently aimed at helping to stave off any Chinese intervention as a result of the forthcoming bombing campaign.

But the purpose in sending Mr. Seaborn back, the study makes clear, was to convey the obvious threat that Hanoi now faced "extensive future destruction of . . . military and economic investments" if it did not call off the Vietcong guerrillas and accept a separate, non-Communist South.

Premier Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam, who had seen Mr. Seaborn on two earlier visits, declined this time, and the Canadian had to settle for the chief North Vietnamese liaison officer for the commission, to whom he read Washington's statement.

The North Vietnamese officer, the account says, commented that the message "contained nothing new and that the North Vietnamese had already received a briefing on the Warsaw meeting" from the Chinese Communists.

The treatment led the Canadian to sense "a mood of confidence" among the Hanoi leaders, Ambassador Taylor told Washington in a cablegram, and Mr. Seaborn felt "that Hanoi has the impression that our air strikes are a limited attempt to improve our bargaining position and hence are no great cause for immediate concern."

"Our objective should be to induce in D.R.V. leadership an attitude favorable to U.S. objectives in as short a time as possible in order to avoid a build-up of international pressure to negotiate," the Ambassador said.

Therefore, he went on, it was necessary to "begin at once a progression of U.S. strikes north of 19th Parallel in a slow but steadily ascending movement" to dispel any illusions in Hanoi.

"If we tarry too long in the south (below the 19th Parallel), we will give Hanoi a weak and misleading signal which will work against our ultimate purpose," he said.

The next Rolling Thunder strikes, on March 14 and 15, were the heaviest of the air war so far, involving 100 American and 24 South Vietnamese planes against barracks and depots on Tiger Island off the North Vietnamese coast and the ammunition dump near Phuqui, 100 miles southwest of Hanoi.

For the first time, the planes used napalm against the North, a measure approved by Mr. Johnson on May 9 to achieve the more efficient destruction of the targets that Mr. McNamara was seeking and to give the pilots protection from antiaircraft batteries.

"MOUNTING CRESCENDO" URGED

But the Ambassador regarded these, too, as an "isolated, stage-managed joint U.S./GVN operation," the Pentagon study says. He sent Washington another cable, saying that "through repeated delays we are failing to give the mounting crescendo to Rolling Thunder which is necessary to get the desired results."

Meanwhile, Admiral Sharp in Honolulu and the Joint Chiefs in Washington were quickly devising a number of other programs to broaden and intensify the air war now that it had begun.

On March 21, Admiral Sharp proposed a "radar busting day" to knock out the North Vietnamese early-warning system, and a program "to attrite harass and interdict the D.R.V. south" of the 20th Parallel by cutting lines of communication, "LOC" in official terminology.

The "LOC cut program" would choke off traffic along all roads and rail lines through southern North Vietnam by bombing strikes and would thus squeeze the flow of supplies into the South.

"All targets selected are extremely difficult or impossible to bypass," the admiral said in a cable to the Joint Chiefs. "LOC network cutting in this depth will degrade tonnage arrivals at the main 'funnels' and will develop a broad series of new targets such as backed-up convoys, offloaded materiel dumps

and personnel staging areas at one or both sides of cuts."

These probable effects might in turn "force major D.R.V. log flow to sea-carry and into surveillance and attack by our SVN [South Vietnamese] coastal sanitization forces," the admiral added.

In Washington at this time, the narrative goes on, the Joint Chiefs were engaged in an "interservice division" over potential ground-troop deployments to Vietnam and over the air war itself.

Gen. John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff of the Air Force adopted a "maverick position" and was arguing for a short and violent 28-day bombing campaign. All of the targets on the original 94-target list drawn up in May, 1964, from bridges to industries, would be progressively destroyed.

"He proposed beginning the air strikes in the southern part of North Vietnam and continuing at two- to six-day intervals until Hanoi was attacked," the study continues.

The raids would be along the lines of the mighty strikes, including the use of B-52 bombers, that the Joint Chiefs had proposed in retaliation for the Vietcong mortar attack in Binhhoa airfield on Nov. 1, 1964, the narrative says. General McConnell contended that his plan was consistent with previous bombing proposals by the Joint Chiefs.

The general abandoned his proposal however, when the other members of the Joint Chiefs decided to incorporate Admiral Sharp's "LOC cut program" and some of General McConnell's individual target concepts into a bombing program of several weeks. They proposed this to Mr. McNamara on March 27.

This plan proposed an intense bombing campaign that would start on road and rail lines south of the 20th Parallel and then "march north" week by week to isolate North Vietnam from China gradually by cutting road and rail lines above Hanoi. In later phases upon which the Joint Chiefs had not yet fully decided, the port facilities were to be destroyed to isolate North Vietnam from the sea. Then industries outside populated areas would be attacked "leading up to a situation where the enemy will realize that the Hanoi and Haiphong areas will be the next logical targets in our continued air campaign."

But the President and Mr. McNamara declined to approve any multiweek program, the study relates. "They clearly preferred to retain continual personal control over attack concepts and individual target selection."

ALTERNATE TARGETS APPROVED

In mid-March, after a Presidential fact-finding trip to Vietnam by Gen. Harold K. Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, the President did regularize the bombing campaign and relaxed some of the restrictions. Among the innovations was the selection of the targets in weekly packages with the precise timing of the individual attacks left to the commanders on the scene. Also, "the strikes were no longer to be specifically related to VC atrocities" and "publicity on the strikes was to be progressively reduced," the study says.

The President did not accept two recommendations from General Johnson relating to a possible ground war. They were to dispatch a division of American troops to South Vietnam to hold coastal enclaves or defend the Central Highlands in order to free Saigon Government forces for offensive action against the Vietcong. The second proposal was to create a four-division force of American and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization troops, who, to interdict infiltration, would patrol both the demilitarized zone along the border separating North and South Vietnam and the Laotian border region.

Better organization for the air war meant that concepts such as Admiral Sharp's "LOC cut program" and his "radar busting" were

now incorporated into the weekly target packages. But President Johnson and Secretary McNamara continued to select the targets and to communicate them to the Joint Chiefs—and thus, eventually, to the operating strike forces—in weekly Rolling Thunder planning messages issued by the Secretary of Defense.

HOPES WERE WANING

Operation Rolling Thunder was thus being shifted from an exercise in air power "dominated by political and psychological considerations" to a "militarily more significant, sustained bombing program" aimed at destroying the capabilities of North Vietnam to support a war in the south.

But the shift also meant that "early hopes that Rolling Thunder could succeed by itself" in persuading Hanoi to call off the Vietcong were also waning.

"The underlying question that was being posed for the Administration at this time was well formulated," the study says, by John McNaughton in a memorandum drafted on March 24 for Secretary McNamara in preparation for the April 1-2 National Security Council meetings.

"Can the situation inside SVN be bottomed out (a) without extreme measures against the DRV and/or (b) without deployment of large numbers of U.S. (and other) combat troops inside SVN?"

Mr. McNaughton's answer was "perhaps, but probably no." [See Text, McNaughton action plan, March 24.]

General Westmoreland stated his conclusions in a half-inch-thick report labeled "Commander's Estimate of the situation in SVN." The document, "a classic Leavenworth-style analysis," the analyst remarks, referring to the Command and General Staff College, was completed in Saigon on March 26 and delivered to Washington in time for the April 1-2 strategy meeting.

The Saigon military commander and his staff had begun working on this voluminous report on March 13, the day after General Johnson left Vietnam with his ground war proposals of an American division to hold enclaves and a four-division American and SEATO force along the borders, the study notes.

General Westmoreland predicted that the bombing campaign against the North would not show tangible results until June at the earliest, and that in the meantime the South Vietnamese Army needed American reinforcements to hold the line against growing Vietcong strength and to carry out "orderly" expansion of its own ranks.

And, paraphrasing the report, the study says that the general warned that the Saigon troops, "although at the moment performing fairly well, would not be able in the face of a VC summer offensive to hold in the South long enough for the bombing to become effective."

General Westmoreland asked for reinforcements equivalent to two American divisions, a total of about 70,000 troops, counting those already in Vietnam.

They included 17 maneuver battalions. The general proposed adding two more Marine battalion landing teams to the two battalions already at Danang in order to establish another base at the airfield at Phubal to the north; putting an Army brigade into the Bienhoa-Vungtau area near Saigon, and using two more Army battalions to garrison the central coastal ports of Quinhon and Nhatrang as logistics bases. These bases would sustain an army division that General Westmoreland proposed to send into active combat in the strategic central highlands inland to "defeat" the Vietcong who were seizing control there.

General Westmoreland said that he wanted the 17 battalions and their initial supporting elements in South Vietnam by June and indicated that more troops might be required

thereafter if the bombing failed to achieve results.

The Saigon military commander and General Johnson were not alone in pressing for American ground combat troops to forestall a Vietcong victory, the study points out.

On March 20, the Joint Chiefs as a body had proposed sending two American divisions and one South Korean division to South Vietnam for offensive combat operations against the guerrillas.

Secretary McNamara, the Joint Chiefs and Ambassador Taylor all discussed the three-division proposal on March 29, the study relates, while the Ambassador was in Washington for the forthcoming White House strategy conference.

The Ambassador opposed the plan, the study says, because he felt the South Vietnamese might resent the presence of so many foreign troops—upwards of 100,000 men—and also because he believed there was still no military necessity for them.

The Joint Chiefs "had the qualified support of McNamara," however, the study continues, and was one of the topics discussed at the national security council meeting.

CONCERN WITH DEPLOYMENT

Thus, the study says, at the White House strategy session of April 1-2, "the principal concern of Administration policy makers at this time was with the prospect of major deployment of U.S. and third-country combat forces to SVN."

A memorandum written by McGeorge Bundy before the meeting, which set forth the key issues for discussion and decision by the President, "gave only the most superficial treatment to the complex matter of future air pressure policy," the Pentagon analyst remarks.

The morning that Ambassador Taylor left Saigon to attend the meeting, March 29, the Vietcong guerrillas blew up the American Embassy in Saigon in what the study calls "the boldest and most direct Communist action against the U.S. since the attacks at Pleiku and Quinhon which had precipitated the Flaming Dart reprisal airstrikes."

Admiral Sharp requested permission to launch a "spectacular" air raid on North Vietnam in retaliation, the narrative continues, but the "plea . . . did not fall on responsive ears" at the White House.

"At this point, the President preferred to maneuver quietly to help the nation get used to living with the Vietnam crisis. He played down any drama intrinsic in Taylor's arrival" and refused to permit a retaliation raid for the embassy bombing.

"After his first meeting with Taylor and other officials on March 31, the President responded to press inquiries concerning dramatic new developments by saying: 'I know of no far-reaching strategy that is being suggested or promulgated.'"

"But the President was being less than candid," the study observes. "The proposals that were at that moment being promulgated, and on which he reached significant decision the following day, did involve a far-reaching strategy change: acceptance of the concept of U.S. troops engaged in offensive ground operations against Asian insurgents. This issue greatly overshadowed all other Vietnam questions then being reconsidered."

The analyst is referring to the President's decision at the White House strategy conference on April 1-2 to change the mission of the marine battalions at Danang from defense to offense.

McGeorge Bundy embodied the decision in National Security Action Memorandum 328, which he drafted and signed on behalf of the President on April 6. The analyst says that this "pivotal document" followed almost "verbatim" the text of another memorandum that Br. Bundy had written before

the N.S.C. meeting to outline the proposals for discussion and decision by the President.

The Pentagon study notes that the actual landing of 3,500 marines at Danang the previous month had "caused surprisingly little outcry."

Secretary of State Dean Rusk had explained on a television program the day before the marines came ashore that their mission was solely to provide security for the air base and "not to kill the Vietcong," in the words of the study. This initial mission for the marines was later to be referred to as the short-lived strategy of security that would apply only to this American troop movement into South Vietnam.

"A DEAD LETTER" QUICKLY

The President's decision to change their mission to offense now made the strategy of base security "a dead letter," the study says, when it was less than a month old.

At the April 1-2 meeting, Mr. Johnson had also decided to send ashore two more marine battalions, which General Westmoreland had asked for in a separate request on March 17. Mr. Johnson further decided to increase support forces in South Vietnam by 18,000 to 20,000 men.

The President was "doubtless aware" of the general's additional request for the equivalent of two divisions, and of the Joint Chiefs for three divisions, the Pentagon account says, but Mr. Johnson took no action on these requests.

"The initial steps in ground build-up appear to have been grudgingly taken," the study says, "indicating that the President . . . and his advisers recognized the tremendous inertial complications of ground troop deployments. Halting ground involvement was seen to be a manifestly greater problem than halting air or naval activity.

"It is pretty clear, then, that the President intended, after the early April N.S.C. meetings, to cautiously and carefully experiment with the U.S. forces in offensive roles," the analyst concludes.

National Security Action Memorandum 328 did not precisely define or limit the offensive role it authorized, and Ambassador Taylor, who had attended the National Security Council meeting during his visit to Washington, was not satisfied with the guidance he received from the State Department. Therefore, on his way back to Saigon on April 4, the Ambassador, formerly President John F. Kennedy's military adviser and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, sent a cable from the Honolulu headquarters of the commander of Pacific forces to the State Department, saying:

"I propose to describe the new mission to [Premier Pham Huy] Quat as the use of marines in a mobile counterinsurgency role in the vicinity of Danang for the improved protection of that base and also in a strike role as a reserve in support of ARVN operations anywhere within 50 miles of the base. This latter employment would follow acquisition of experience on local counter-insurgency missions."

Ambassador Taylor's 50-mile limit apparently became an accepted rule-of-thumb boundary for counterinsurgency strikes.

And so, the analyst sums up, with the promulgation of National Security Action Memorandum 328, "the strategy of security effectively becomes a dead letter on the first of April," and the strategy of enclave begins.

The strategy of base security having been ended by National Security Action Memorandum 328, a high-level meeting began in Honolulu on April 20 to "sanctify" and "structure", as the Pentagon analyst puts it, "an expanded enclave strategy."

Present at the meeting were Secretary of Defense McNamara; William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton; Ambassador Taylor; Admiral Sharp; Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and General Westmoreland.

"Some of these men had helped produce the current optimism in situation reports and cables," the Pentagon study says, "and yet the consensus of their meeting was that the then-present level of Vietcong activity was nothing but the lull before the storm."

"The situation which presented itself to the Honolulu conferees was in many ways the whole Vietnam problem in microcosm. What was needed to galvanize everyone to action was some sort of dramatic event within South Vietnam itself. Unfortunately, the very nature of the war precluded the abrupt collapse of a front or the loss of large chunks of territory in lightning strokes by the enemy. The enemy in this war was spreading his control and influence slowly and inexorably but without drama. The political infrastructure from which he derived his strength took years to create, and in most areas the expansion of control was hardly felt until it was a fait accompli."

IN A REAR-GUARD ACTION

Of the conferees, the study says, "by far the most dogged protagonist of the enclave strategy was Ambassador Taylor." It had already become apparent, however, and was to become manifestly clear at Honolulu, that the Ambassador was fighting a rear-guard action against both civilian and military officials in the Pentagon who were bent on expansion of U.S. forces in South Vietnam and an enlargement of their combat mission.

On March 18, in a message to Washington, Ambassador Taylor had suggested that if a division were sent to South Vietnam as had been proposed by the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Harold K. Johnson, then consideration should be given to deploying it in either a highland or coastal enclave.

When he got no response, Ambassador Taylor sent another message on March 27, stating that if United States forces were to come, his preference was, as the study says, that they be used in a combination of defensive or offensive enclave plus reserve for an emergency, rather than in "territorial clear and hold" operations.

The Ambassador, the study notes, interpreted the pivotal National Security Action Memorandum as supporting his position, because in it the President seemed to make plain that he "wanted to experiment very carefully with a small amount of force before deciding whether or not to accept any kind of ground war commitment."

FOR GUERRILLAS, TANKS

Therefore, the study says, "the Ambassador was surprised to discover that the marines [the two additional battalions that landed April 11-14] had come ashore with tanks, self-propelled artillery, and various other items of weighty equipment not 'appropriate for counterinsurgency operations.'"

In his April 17, cable to McGeorge Bundy, Ambassador Taylor had also protested the "hasty and ill-conceived" proposals for the deployment of more forces with which he was being flooded.

"Thus was the Ambassador propelled into the conference of 20 April 1965, only one step ahead of the Washington juggernaut, which was itself fueled by encouragement from Westmoreland in Saigon," the study comments. "Taylor was not opposed to the U.S. build-up *per se*, but rather was concerned to move slowly with combat troop deployments . . . He was overtaken in Honolulu."

According to Mr. McNaughton's minutes, the conference in preliminary discussions on April 20 agreed that:

"(1) The D.R.V. was not likely to quit within the next six months; and in any case, they were more likely to give up because of VC failure in the South than because of bomb-induced 'pain' in the North. It could take up to two years to demonstrate VC failure.

"(2) The level of air activity through

Rolling Thunder was about right. The U.S. did not, in Ambassador Taylor's words, want 'to kill the hostage.' Therefore, Hanoi and environs remained on the restricted list. It was recognized that air activity would not do the job alone.

"(3) Progress in the South would be slow, and great care should be taken to avoid dramatic defeat. The current lull in Vietcong activity was merely the quiet before a storm."

"(4) The victory strategy was to 'break the will of the D.R.V./VC by denying them victory.' Impotence would lead eventually to a political solution."

6,700 MEN BELOW STRENGTH

At the time of the Honolulu conference, the study notes, "the level of approved U.S. forces for Vietnam was 40,200," but 33,500 were actually in the country at that time.

"To accomplish the 'victory strategy' described above," the study continues, the conferees agreed that U.S. ground forces should be increased from 4 to 13 maneuver battalions and to 82,000 men. The United States, they agreed, should also seek to get additional troops from Australia and South Korea that would bring the so-called third-country strength to four maneuver battalions and 7,250 men.

Thus, the Honolulu conferees proposed raising the recommended United States-third country strength to 17 battalions.

The conferees also mentioned but did not recommend a possible later deployment of 11 U.S. and 6 South Korean battalions, which, when added to the approved totals, would bring the United States-third country combat capability to 34 battalions. In this later possible deployment was included an Army airmobile division.

Secretary McNamara forwarded the Honolulu recommendations to the President on April 21, together with a notation on possible later deployment of the airmobile division and the Third Marine Expeditionary Force.

DETAILED DEPLOYMENT PLAN

On April 30 the Joint Chiefs presented a detailed program for deployment of some 48,000 American and 5,250 third-country soldiers. "Included were all the units mentioned in the Honolulu recommendations plus a healthy support package," the study says.

The Joint Chiefs said that these additional forces were "to bolster GVN forces during their continued build-up, secure bases and installations, conduct counterinsurgency combat operations in coordination with the RVNAF, and prepare for the later introduction of an airmobile division to the central plateau, the remainder of the third M.E.F. [the marine force] to the Danang area, and the remainder of a ROK [Republic of Korea] division to Quangngai."

From the thrust of this memorandum by the Joint Chiefs, the analyst comments, "it is apparent that the enclave strategy was no stopping place as far as the Chiefs were concerned. They continued to push hard for the earliest possible input of three full divisions of troops. They were still well ahead of the pack in that regard."

NEW WARNINGS OF FAILURE

Before the opening of the air war in the spring warnings were sounded high in the Administration that it would not succeed. Now there were warnings that a ground war in the South might prove fruitless. The warnings came not only from Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, long known as a dissenter on Vietnam, but also from John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, who felt the actions planned were not strong enough.

On April 2 Mr. McCone circulated a memorandum within the National Security Council asserting that unless the United States was willing to bomb the North "with minimum restraint" to break Hanoi's will, it was unwise to commit ground troops to battle.

"In effect," he said, "we will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win and from which we will have extreme difficulty extracting ourselves." [See text, McCone memorandum, April 2, 1965.]

It is not clear from the documentary record whether President Johnson read this particular memorandum, but the Pentagon study says Mr. McCone expressed these same views in a personal memorandum to the President on April 28.

In a separate intelligence estimate for the President on May 6, Vice Adm. William F. Rarborn Jr., Mr. McCone's successor, indicated agreement with Mr. McCone.

Mr. Ball's dissent came from the opposite side. He believed that neither bombing the North nor fighting the guerrillas in the South nor any combination of the two offered a solution and said so in a memorandum circulated on June 28, the study reports.

"Convinced that the U.S. was pouring its resources down the drain in the wrong place," the account goes on, Mr. Ball proposed that the United States "cut its losses" and withdraw from South Vietnam.

"Ball was cold-blooded in his analysis," the study continues, describing the memorandum. "He recognized that the U.S. would not be able to avoid losing face before its Asian allies if it staged some form of conference leading to withdrawal of U.S. forces. The losses would be of short-term duration, however, and the U.S. could emerge from this period of travail as a 'wiser and more mature nation.'"

BALL OFFERS 'A COMPROMISE'

On July 1, the analyst says, Mr. Ball reiterated his proposal for withdrawal in a memorandum to the President entitled "A Compromise Solution for South Vietnam." [See text, Ball memorandum, July 1, 1965.]

THE SERIES SO FAR

Events before Tonkin Gulf: Passage of the Tonkin resolution, the Pentagon account says, "set U.S. public support for virtually any action," but its passage was the culmination of months of covert U.S. military involvement and detailed preparation for escalation. This covert war, the narrative relates, included Plan 34A—a program of clandestine military operations against North Vietnam—and the development of precise scenarios for escalation leading up to the full-scale bombing of the North.

Planning the bombing: The months between the Tonkin Gulf incident and the March 1965, start of Operation Rolling Thunder were months of planning how to carry out the "general consensus" on the necessity of an air war against the North, which the study says was reached in September, 1964. "Tactical considerations"—including the Presidential campaign, the study says—required delay, and low-risk interim measures, including coastal raids and U.S. air strikes at infiltration routes in Laos, were ordered "to assist morale . . ."

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PERIOD

Within a month of the start of Operation Rolling Thunder, the Pentagon study says, the Johnson Administration had made the first of the decisions that were to lead, in the next months, to American assumption of the major burden of the ground war in South Vietnam.

Here, in chronological order, are the highlights of this period of debate and decision:

MARCH 1965

First "Rolling Thunder" air strike at ammunition depot and naval base. The two Marine battalions deployed in Vietnam.

APRIL 1965

President approves 18,000-20,000-man increase in "military support forces" and "a

change of mission" for marines "to permit their more active use. . ." Memo notes his desire for "all possible precautions" against "premature publicity" and to "minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy."

John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, urges deployment of 173d Airborne Brigade also.

Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor, calls this "hasty and ill-conceived."

Honolulu strategy meeting. Conferees agree to urge increase to 82,000 U.S. troops.

George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, proposes United States "cut its losses" and withdraw instead, history says.

MAY 1965

Vietcong "summer offensive" begins history says. About 200 Marine casualties during April, May.

JUNE 1965

Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commander in Vietnam, says United States must "reinforce our efforts . . . as rapidly as practical." Asks total of 44 battalions.

State Department announces that United States troops are "available for combat support."

First major ground action by United States forces northwest of Saigon.

Gen. Westmoreland, in reply to Joint Chiefs, makes "big pitch . . . for a free hand to maneuver the troops around . . ." analyst says.

Ambassador Taylor "confirms the seriousness of the military situation" and "very tenuous hold" of new Government, study goes on.

General Westmoreland given authority to use U.S. forces in battle when necessary "to strengthen" South Vietnam forces.

Mr. Ball, analyst writes, opposes ground-troop increase. Says it gives "absolutely no assurance" of success, risks "costly and indeterminate struggle". Urges "base defense and reserve" strategy "while the stage was being set for withdrawal."

William Bundy, history says, urges President avoid "ultimatum aspects" of either Ball or Westmoreland proposal. Says United States troops should be held to supporting "reserve reaction" role.

JULY 1965

President at first approves deployment of 34 battalions, about 100,000 men; 44 battalions finally agreed on; total 193,887 troops.

History says this decision "perceived as a threshold—entrance into Asian land war . . ."

By year's end, history notes, United States forces in South Vietnam total 184,314.

CONFUSION AND SUSPICION

There was some confusion, suspicion and controversy about the President's approval of an 18,000-20,000 increase in support troops, which, he explained, was meant "to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel."

On April 21, Secretary McNamara told the President that 11,000 of these new men would augment various existing forces, while 7,000 were logistic troops to support "previously approved forces."

"It isn't entirely clear from the documents exactly what the President did have in mind for the support troop add-ons," the study comments. "What is clear, however, . . . was that the J.C.S. were continuing to plan for the earliest possible introduction of two to three divisions into RVN." The analyst cites a memorandum from Mr. McNamara to General Wheeler on April 6 as evidence of this planning.

Later, on May 5, the study continues, Assistant Secretary of Defense, McNaughton would send a memorandum to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, saying that

"the J.C.S. misconstrued the [support] add-ons to mean logistic build-up for coastal enclaves and the possible later introduction of two to three divisions." (These were the divisions the Joint Chiefs had requested on March 20.)

"RELATIVELY LOW RISK"

The enclave strategy had as its object the involvement of United States combat units at "relatively low risk." It proposed "that U.S. troops occupy coastal enclaves, accept full responsibility for enclave security, and be prepared to go to the rescue of the RVN as far as 50 miles outside the enclave. . . . The intent was not to take the war to the enemy but rather to deny him certain critical areas," the study says.

To prove the viability of its "reserve reaction," the analyst goes on, the enclave strategy required testing, but the rules for committing United States troops under it had not been worked out by the time it was overtaken by events—a series of major military victories by the Vietcong in May and June that led to the adoption of the search-and-destroy strategy.

Search and destroy, the analyst says, was "articulated by Westmoreland and the J.C.S. in keeping with sound military principles garnered by men accustomed to winning. The basic idea . . . was the desire to take the war to the enemy, denying him freedom of movement anywhere in the country . . . and deal him the heaviest possible blows." In the meantime, the South Vietnamese Army "would be free to concentrate their efforts in populated areas."

From April 11 through April 14, the additional two marine battalions were deployed at Hue-Phuhal and at Danang, bringing the total maneuver battalions to four.

"The marines set about consolidating and developing their two coastal base areas, and, although they pushed their patrol perimeters out beyond their tactical wire and thereby conducted active rather than passive defense, they did not engage in any offensive operation, in support of ARVN for the next few months," the study says.

At this point, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs and General Westmoreland collaborated—as it turned out, successfully—in what the study calls "a little cart-before-horsemanship." It involves the deployment to South Vietnam of the 173d Airborne Brigade, two battalions that were then situated on Okinawa in a reserve role.

General Westmoreland had had his eye on the 173d for some time. On March 26, in his "Commander's Estimate of the Situation," in which he requested the equivalent of two divisions, he also recommended that the 173d Airborne Brigade be deployed to the Bienhoa-Vungtau areas "to secure vital U.S. installations." This recommendation, like that for two divisions, was not acted upon by the National Security Council in the April 1-2 meeting.

On April 11, General Westmoreland cabled Admiral Sharp, the Pacific commander, that he understood from the National Security Council's meetings and Ambassador Taylor's discussions in Washington at the beginning of the month that his requested divisions were not in prospect. But, he said, he still wanted the 173d Airborne Brigade.

AHEAD IN TWO AREAS

This message, the study says, set in motion "a series of cables, proposals and false starts which indicated that Washington was well ahead of Saigon in its planning and in its anxiety."

The upshot of all this communication was that at a meeting in Honolulu of representatives of the Joint Chiefs and the Pacific command from April 10 to April 12, the deployment of the 173d Airborne Brigade was recommended. On April 14, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the deployment to Bienhoa-

Vungtau, and the replacement of the brigade by one from the United States.

"This decision to deploy the 173d apparently caught the Ambassador flatfooted," the study says, "for he had quite obviously not been privy to it."

On the day of the Joint Chiefs' decision, Ambassador Taylor cabled the State Department that "this [decision on the deploying the brigade] comes as a complete surprise in view of the understanding reached in Washington [during his visit] that we would experiment with the marines in a counter-insurgency role before bringing in other U.S. contingents." He asked that deployment of the brigade be held up until matters were sorted out.

However, the study notes, Ambassador Taylor "held the trump card" because the proposed action had to be cleared with Premier Quat, and General Taylor told his superiors on April 17 that he did not intend to tell the Premier "without clearer guidance explaining Washington's intentions." [See text, Taylor cable, April 17, 1965.]

"That Washington was determined, with the President's sanction, to go beyond what had been agreed to and formalized in NSAM 328 was manifested unmistakably in a cable under joint Defense/State auspices by Mr. McNaughton to the Ambassador on 15 April," the Pentagon study says.

In the cablegram, Mr. McNaughton said: "Highest authority [the President] believes the situation in South Vietnam has been deteriorating and that, in addition to actions against the North, something new must be added in the South to achieve victory." He then listed seven recommended actions, including the introduction of military-civil affairs personnel into the air effort and the deployment of the 173d Airborne Brigade to Bienhoa-Vungtau "as a security force for our installations and also to participate in counter-insurgency combat operations" according to General Westmoreland's plans.

Reacting to that cable on April 17, Ambassador Taylor protested to McGeorge Bundy in the White House against the introduction of military-civilian affairs personnel into the aid effort. The Ambassador's cablegram continued by saying that the McNaughton message "shows a far greater willingness to get into the ground war than I had discerned in Washington during my recent trip."

"Mac, can't we be better protected from our friends?" the Ambassador asked. "I know that everyone wants to help, but there's such a thing as killing with kindness." [See text, Taylor cable, April 17.]

EXACT DATE IS UNCERTAIN

Discussing the contretemps between the Pentagon and General Taylor, the study says: "The documents do not reveal just exactly when Presidential sanction was obtained for the expanded scope of the above [McNaughton] proposals. It is possible that [on the approval for deploying the brigade] the Ambassador may have caught the Defense Department and the J.C.S. in a little cart-before-horsemanship."

In any event, on April 15, the day after it had ordered the deployment of the brigade, the J.C.S. sent a memorandum to Secretary McNamara dealing with the Ambassador's objections and still insisting that the brigade was needed.

"Whether or not the J.C.S. wrote that memorandum with red faces," the study remarks, "the Secretary of Defense dates approval for final deployment of the 173d as of the 30th of April."

THE ENEMY RESPONDS

The question of final Presidential approval of the 17-battalion recommendations now became academic as the enemy started attacks that provided the Pentagon and General Westmoreland with a battlefield rationale for their campaign to have American

troops take over the major share of the ground war.

As the manpower debates continued in March and April, the study portrays the military situation: "The Vietcong were unusually inactive throughout March and April. There had been no major defeat of the enemy's forces and no signs of any major shift in strategy on his part. Hence it was assumed that he was merely pausing to regroup and to assess the effect of the changed American participation in the war embodied in air strikes and in the marines," the first two battalions deployed at Danang on March 8.

"There were, however, plenty of indications in the early spring of 1965 of what was to come," the study continues. . . . "From throughout the country came reports that Vietcong troops and cadres were moving into central Vietnam and into areas adjacent to the ring of provinces . . . around Saigon."

"A SOBERING HARBINGER"

"Finally and most ominous of all," the study says, a memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency on April 21, 1965, "reflected the acceptance into the enemy order of battle of one regiment of the 325th PAVN [People's Army of Vietnam] division to be located in Kontum province. The presence of this regular North Vietnamese unit, which had been first reported as early as February, was a sobering harbinger. . . ."

On May 11, when the Vietcong attacked Songbe, the capital of Phuoclong Province, using more than a regiment of troops, "the storm broke in earnest," the study says. The enemy overran the town and the American advisers' compound, causing heavy casualties. After holding the town for a day, the Vietcong withdrew, the study relates.

Later in May, in Quangngai Province in the northern part of South Vietnam, a battalion of Government-troops—the Army of the Republic of Vietnam—was ambushed and overrun near Bagia, west of Quangngai. Reinforcements were also ambushed.

"The battle," the study says, dragged on for several days and ended in total defeat for the ARVN. Two battalions were completely decimated. . . . From Bagia came a sense of urgency, at least among some of the senior U.S. officers who had been witnesses to the battle."

TWO REGIMENTS ATTACK

Then in June, two Vietcong regiments attacked an outpost at Dongxoal and when Government reinforcements were committed "piecemeal" they were "devoured by the enemy" the Pentagon study says.

"By mid-June, 1965," it asserts, "the Vietcong summer offensive was in full stride." By mid-July, the Vietcong were "systematically forcing the GVN to yield what little control it still exercised in rural areas outside the Mekong Delta."

On June 7, after the attack on Bagia, General Westmoreland sent a long message on the military situation and his needs to the Pacific Commander for relay to the Joint Chiefs.

"In pressing their campaign," the general said, "the Vietcong are capable of mounting regimental-size operations in all four ARVN corps areas, and at least battalion-sized attack in virtually all provinces. . . ."

"ARVN forces on the other hand are already experiencing difficulty in coping with this increased VC capability. Desertion rates are inordinately high. Battle losses have been higher than expected; in fact, four ARVN battalions have been rendered ineffective by VC action in the I and II Corps zones. . . ."

"Thus, the GVN/VC force ratios upon which we based our estimate of the situation in March have taken an adverse trend. You will recall that I recommended the deployment of a U.S. division in II Corps to cover the period of the RVNAF build-up and to weight the force ratios in that important

area. We assumed at that time that the ARVN battalions would be brought to full strength by now and that the force build-up would proceed on schedule. Neither of these assumptions has materialized. . . ."

"In order to cope with the situation outlined above, I see no course of action open to us except to reinforce our efforts in SVN with additional U.S. or third country forces as rapidly as is practical during the critical weeks ahead."

THE "44-BATTALION REQUEST"

What General Westmoreland asked for added up to a total force of 44 battalions and the June 7 message became known as the "44-battalion request."

Just as intense internal debate was beginning on the request, there was a "credibility" flare-up deriving from President Johnson's injunction of secrecy on the change of missions for the marines authorized on April 1 in National Security Action Memorandum 328.

"The long official silence between the sanction for U.S. offensive operations contained in NSAM 328 and the final approval [in negotiations with Saigon] of the conditions under which U.S. troops could be committed was not without cost," the study asserts. "The President had admonished each of the N.S.C. members not to allow release of provisions of the NSAM, but the unduly long interregnum inevitably led to leaks." In addition, the marines had 200 casualties, including 18 killed, as they went about "tidying up," as the study puts it, their newly assigned area in April and May.

"The Commandant of the Marine Corps," the study continues, "raised the tempo of speculation by saying to the press during an inspection trip to Vietnam in April that the marines were not in Vietnam to 'sit on their dityboxes'—and they were there to 'kill Vietcong.'"

"An honest and superficially innocuous statement by Department of State Press Officer Robert McCloskey on 8 June to the effect that 'American forces would be available for combat support together with Vietnamese forces when and if necessary' produced an immediate response [in the press]."

"BY ITS OWN PETARD"

"The White House was hoisted by its own petard. In an attempt to quell the outcry a statement was issued on the 9th of June which, because of its ambiguity, only served to exacerbate the situation and to widen what was being described as 'the credibility gap.'"

The White House statement said: "There has been no change in the mission of United States ground combat units in Vietnam in recent days or weeks. The President has issued no order of any kind in this regard to General Westmoreland recently or at any other time. The primary mission of these troops is to secure and safeguard important military installations like the air base at Danang. They have the associated mission of . . . patrolling and securing actions in and near the areas thus safeguarded."

"If help is requested by the appropriate Vietnamese commander, General Westmoreland also has authority within the assigned mission to employ those troops in support of Vietnamese forces faced with aggressive attack when other effective reserves are not available and when, in his judgment, the general military situation urgently requires it."

Discussing this statement, the Pentagon analyst says: "The documents do not reveal whether or not the ground rules for engagement of U.S. forces had actually been worked out to everyone's satisfaction at the time of the White House statement. There is good indication that they had not." The analyst also notes that during the battles of Bagia and Dongxoal, the Government forces "were desperately in need of assistance," but that United States forces were not committed al-

though the marines were available for Bagia and the 173d Airborne Brigade for Dongxoi.

THE FIRST MAJOR ACTION

The study reports that the first major ground action by United States forces took place northwest of Saigon from June 27 to June 30, and involved the 173d Airborne Brigade, an Australian battalion and South Vietnamese forces.

"The operation could by no stretch of definition have been described as a reserve reaction," the study says. "It was a search and destroy operation into Vietcong base areas. . . . The excursion was a direct result of the sanction given to General Westmoreland . . . [as a result of National Security Action Memorandum 328 and the enemy offensive] to 'commit U.S. troops to combat, independent of or in conjunction with GVN forces in any situation in which the use of such troops is requested by an appropriate GVN commander and when in [General Westmoreland's] judgment, their use is necessary to strengthen the relative position of GVN forces'."

However, as the study notes, "At that juncture the 44-battalion debate was in full swing and the enclave strategy, as a means to limit the amount and use of U.S. combat force in Vietnam, was certainly overcome by events," and by "a much more ambitious strategy sanctioned by the President."

Recapitulating the situation just before the debate, the study gives this picture of deployment. At the beginning of June, the enclave strategy was in its first stages with Marine Corps forces at Phubal, Danang and Chulai, and Army forces in Vungtau. Other enclaves were under consideration. Approved for deployment—but not all arrived in South Vietnam yet—were approximately 70,000 troops in 13 maneuver battalions; with third-country forces the total came to 77,250 men and 17 maneuver battalions.

This was the situation when, on June 7, General Westmoreland asked for reinforcements "as rapidly as possible."

General Westmoreland's message, the Pentagon study says, "stirred up a veritable hornet's nest in Washington," because his request for large reinforcements and his proposed strategy to go on the offensive "did not contain any of the comfortable restrictions and safeguards which had been part of every strategy debated to date."

"In such a move," the study continues "the specter of U.S. involvement in a major Asian ground war was there for all to see."

Just as Ambassador Taylor had consistently resisted involvement of United States forces, the study says, so General Westmoreland had been equally determined to get the troops into the war and have "a free hand" in using them.

At the time of his message, the general had available in Vietnam seven Marine and 2 Army maneuver battalions, plus an Australian battalion. Now, he was asking for a total of 33 battalions, and if the 173d Airborne Brigade's two battalions—which were on temporary assignment—were added, the total came to 35. But in a subparagraph, General Westmoreland also identified nine other United States battalions that he might request at a later date. Thus the total of 44 battalions, and hence the name given the request. In the total was included an airborne division of nine battalions to be formed later.

Admiral Sharp favored the request in a message to the Joint Chiefs on June 7, saying, "We will lose by staying in enclaves defending coastal areas."

THE CHIEFS IN FAVOR

The Joint Chiefs, the Pentagon analyst says, favored bolstering the United States troop commitment. As far back as March 20, the Joint Chiefs had advocated sending three divisions—two American and one Korean—

with the objective of "destroying the Vietcong."

Now, the study states, General Westmoreland's request "altered drastically the role of the J.C.S. in the buildup debate.

"Up to that time," the study continues, "the J.C.S. had, if anything, been ahead of General Westmoreland in advocating allied forces for Vietnam. The 27 battalions of their three-division plan were in themselves more than Westmoreland ever requested until 7 June. After that date, the big push came from Westmoreland in Saigon, and the J.C.S. were caught in the middle between the latter and the powerful and strident opposition his latest request for forces had surfaced in Washington."

On June 11, the Joint Chiefs cabled Admiral Sharp that something less than General Westmoreland's request was close to approval, but they wanted to know, the study says, "where Westmoreland intended to put this force in Vietnam."

He replied on June 13 in detail and the study comments: "This message was extremely important, for in it (he) spelled out the concept of keeping U.S. forces away from the people. The search and destroy strategy for U.S. and third country forces which continues to this day and the primary focus of RVNAF on pacification both stem from that concept. In addition, Westmoreland made a big pitch in this cable for a free hand to maneuver the troops around inside the country. . . ."

CONFIRMATION BY TAYLOR

Ambassador Taylor, in a report on June 17, "confirmed the seriousness of the military situation as reported by General Westmoreland and also pointed up the very tenuous hold the new government had on the country." This was the Government of President Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky.

"This report apparently helped to remove the last obstacles to consideration of all the forces mentioned in Westmoreland's request of 7 June," the analyst says.

On June 22, General Wheeler cabled General Westmoreland and asked if the 44 battalions were enough to convince the enemy forces that they could not win. General Westmoreland replied, the study says, "that there was no evidence the VC/DRV would alter their plans regardless of what the U.S. did in the next six months."

"The 44-battalion force should, however, establish a favorable balance of power by the end of the year," the study quotes the general as having said. "If the U.S. was to seize the initiative from the enemy, then further forces would be required into 1966 and beyond. . . ."

On June 26, the general was given authority to commit U.S. forces to battle when he decided they were necessary "to strengthen the relative position of GVN forces."

"This was about as close to a free hand in managing the forces as General Westmoreland was likely to get," the analyst says. "The strategy was finished, and the debate from then on centered on how much force and to what end."

DIVERGENT VIEWS AT HOME

The opposition to General Westmoreland had "its day in court," late in June and early in July, the study says. The embassy in Saigon, "while recognizing the seriousness of the situation in South Vietnam, was less than sanguine about the prospects for success if large numbers of foreign troops were brought in."

Another critic of General Westmoreland's recommendations, the account reports, was Under Secretary of State Ball who was "convinced that the U.S. was pouring its resources down the drain in the wrong place."

"In Ball's view, the account continues," there was absolutely no assurance that the U.S. could with the provision of more ground

forces achieve its political objectives in Vietnam. Instead, the U.S. risked involving itself in a costly and indeterminate struggle. To further complicate matters, it would be equally impossible to achieve political objectives by expanding the bombing of the North. . . ."

WILLIAM BUNDY IN THE MIDDLE

Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy, the study says, "like so many others found himself in between Westmoreland and Ball."

In a memorandum to the President on July 1, Mr. Bundy gave his position, as summarized in the Pentagon study:

"The U.S. needed to avoid the ultimatum aspects of the 44 battalions and also the Ball withdrawal proposal. . . . The U.S. should adopt a policy which would allow it to hold on without risking disasters of scale if the war were lost despite deployment of the full 44 battalions. For the moment, according to Bundy, the U.S. should complete planned deployments to bring in-country forces to 18 maneuver battalions and 85,000 men. . . . The forces in Vietnam, which Bundy assumed would be enough to prevent collapse, would be restricted to reserve reaction in support of RVNAF. This would allow for some experimentation without taking over the war effort—a familiar theme." [See text, George Ball memo, July 1.]

As for Secretary McNamara's views, the study comments: "It is difficult to be precise about the position of the Secretary of Defense during the buildup debate because there is so little of him in the files."

"There are plenty of other indications in the files that the Secretary was very carefully and personally insuring that the Defense Establishment was ready to provide efficient and sufficient support to the fighting elements in Vietnam," the study continues. "From the records, the Secretary comes out much more clearly for good management than he does for any particular strategy."

The Secretary went to South Vietnam for a four-day inspection starting July 16. The study says that while he was in Saigon on July 17, he received a cable from Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance informing him that the President had decided to go ahead with the plan to deploy 34 battalions.

"The debate was over," the analyst says. "McNamara left Saigon bearing Westmoreland recommendations for an even greater increase in forces. . . ."

The study says 34 battalions. This is not entirely clear, because in his request General Westmoreland had asked for a total of 33, and if the battalions of the 173rd Airborne Brigade were added, the total would be 35. The explanation apparently is that when the Airborne Division was finally organized, it had eight rather than nine battalions. The 34 battalions were, of course, to be supplied immediately. The nine others were to be requested later if needed.

The Pentagon analyst apparently did not have access to White House memoranda, so he is able to give only a sketchy account of Mr. Johnson's role. But he says: "There is no question that the key figure in the early 1965 buildup was the President."

On May 4, the President asked Congress for a \$700-million supplemental appropriation "to meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam."

"Nor can I guarantee this will be the last request," he said in a message. "If our need expands I will turn again to the Congress. For we will do whatever must be done to insure the safety of South Vietnam from aggression. This is the firm and irrevocable commitment of our people and nation."

On July 28, the President held a press conference in which he said, "The lesson of history dictated that the U.S. commit its strength to resist aggression in South Vietnam."

As for the troop increases, the President said:

"I have asked the commanding general,

General Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs.

"I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air-mobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested . . .

"I have concluded that it is not essential to order Reserve units into service now."

IT DOES NOT IMPLY CHANGE

During the questioning after the announcement, this exchange took place:

"Q. Mr. President, does the fact that you are sending additional forces to Vietnam imply any change in the existing policy of relying mainly on the South Vietnamese to carry out offensive operations and using American forces to guard installations and to act as emergency back-up?

"A. It does not imply any change in policy whatever. It does not imply change of objective."

On July 30, the Joint Chiefs approved 44 maneuver battalions for deployment, involving a total of 193,887 United States troops. By the end of the year, United States forces in South Vietnam numbered 184,314.

"The major participants in the decision knew the choices and understood the consequences," the study says in summation. The decision taken in mid-July to commit 44 battalions of troops to battle in South Vietnam "was perceived as a threshold—entrance into an Asian land war. The conflict was seen to be long, with further U.S. deployments to follow. The choice at that time was not whether or not to negotiate, it was not whether to hold on for a while or let go—the choice was viewed as winning or losing South Vietnam."

Accompanying this decision to give General Westmoreland enough troops to embark on the first phase of his search-and-destroy strategy "was a subtle change of emphasis," the study says.

"Instead of simply denying the enemy victory and convincing him that he could not win, the thrust became defeating the enemy in the South. This was sanctioned implicitly as the only way to achieve the U.S. objective of a non-Communist South Vietnam.

"The acceptance of the search-and-destroy strategy . . . left the U.S. commitment to Vietnam open-ended. The implications in terms of manpower and money are inescapable.

"Final acceptance of the desirability of inflicting defeat on the enemy rather than merely denying him victory opened the door to an indeterminate amount of additional force."

Precisely what President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara expected their decisions of July to bring within the near term "is not clear," the study says, "but there are manifold indications that they were prepared for a long war."

MITCHELL SEEKS TO HALT SERIES ON VIETNAM BUT TIMES REFUSES—COURT STEP LIKELY—RETURN OF DOCUMENTS ASKED IN TELEGRAM TO PUBLISHER

(By Max Frankel)

WASHINGTON, June 14.—The Justice Department asked The New York Times this evening to refrain from further publication of documents drawn from a Pentagon study of the Vietnam war on the ground that it will cause "irreparable injury to the defense interests of the United States."

If the paper refuses, the department said, it will try to forbid further publication by court action tomorrow.

The Times refused to halt publication voluntarily.

The department's request and intention to seek a court enjoiner were conveyed by Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the internal security division, to Harding F. Bancroft, executive vice president of The Times.

They spoke by telephone at about 7:30 P.M., which was some two hours before the first edition of today's issue of the paper was scheduled to go to press, with the third installment of the articles about the Pentagon study.

The Times issued the following statement: "We have received the telegram from the Attorney General asking The Times to cease further publication of the Pentagon's Vietnam study.

"The Times must respectfully decline the request of the Attorney General, believing that it is in the interest of the people of this country to be informed of the material contained in this series of articles.

"We have also been informed of the Attorney General's intention to seek an injunction against further publication. We believe that it is properly a matter for the courts to decide. The Times will oppose any request for an injunction for the same reason that led us to publish the articles in the first place. We will of course abide by the final decision of the court."

TELEGRAM FROM MITCHELL

The following telegram from Attorney General John N. Mitchell was received at The New York Times, addressed to The Times' publisher, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger:

PRESIDENT AND PUBLISHER,
The New York Times,
New York, New York:

I have been advised by the Secretary of Defense that the material published in The New York Times on June 13, 14, 1971 captioned "Key Texts From Pentagon's Vietnam Study" contains information relating to the national defense of the United States and bears a top secret classification.

As such, publication of this information is directly prohibited by the provisions of the Espionage Law, Title 18, United States Code, Section 793.

Moreover, further publication of information of this character will cause irreparable injury to the defense interests of the United States.

Accordingly, I respectfully request that you publish no further information of this character and advise me that you have made arrangements for the return of these documents to the Department of Defense.

JOHN N. MITCHELL,
Attorney General.

The Justice Department's request was the first direct contact between the Government and The Times about the publication of the Pentagon papers. It was also the most direct Government response to the first two installments of articles and documents.

The first group of materials, published Sunday, covered the clandestine warfare against North Vietnam before the Tonkin Gulf incident in August, 1964. The second installment, in this morning's issue, covered the decision to begin open bombing of North Vietnam in February, 1965.

Before Mr. Mardian's call, the Administration had said only that the Justice Department was investigating the disclosures, at the request of the Defense Department.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird said the disclosure violated the security regulations of the United States.

The Secretary implied a difference between the violation of security regulations—by officials subject to these regulations—and violation of a law. He said he had asked the Justice Department to determine the legal implications.

This morning, a formal Pentagon statement expressed concern about "this violation

of security" but left determination of legal action to the Justice Department.

At the Justice Department this afternoon, a spokesman said the subject was still under consideration by Attorney General Mitchell. "We have yet to determine whether or not there is something to investigate," the spokesman added, explaining that Mr. Mitchell was dealing today with a statement on housing discrimination and had not yet considered the matter fully.

As of that time, there was said to have been no order for any Justice investigation, but other agencies of government reported intensive inquiries into the affair.

Mr. Mitchell, Secretary Laird and White House officials began to confer on the disclosures to The Times on Sunday.

No official here challenged the authenticity of the Pentagon study and the documents printed in The Times. Only a few members of Congress commented on their content. One of them, Senator Barry M. Goldwater, the Republican candidate for the Presidency against Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964, said he knew at the time of secret plans to widen the war and accused Mr. Johnson of having lied to the country.

The White House referred to the Pentagon all questions on the circumstances of the disclosure. Under vigorous questioning about the documents, it chose to emphasize that President Nixon had developed a "new Vietnam policy" and decided when he took office in 1969 "not to engage ourselves in a continuation or justification" of the policies of earlier administrations, which are the subject of the Pentagon papers.

Ronald L. Ziegler, the President's press secretary, said that a copy of the 1967-68 Pentagon study was brought to the White House this morning from the Defense Department.

Although Mr. Nixon and his aides were said to be unfamiliar with this "internal" archive, Mr. Ziegler stressed that the basic documents and information contained therein had been available to the new Administration and were fully considered in its own policy review in early 1969.

Asked whether The Times had informed the White House of its publishing plans, Mr. Ziegler said the newspaper "did not at any time check with us." Asked whether the President was concerned about the publication of secret documents, he replied:

"I'm not going to build up, by White House comment, the exposure of classified information."

The only formal statement was that by the Pentagon referring the matter to the Justice Department. But this came after Secretary Laird was drawn into a discussion of the affair by Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on foreign aid.

Senator Symington announced his intention to propose a "full examination of the origins of the war" for the benefit of future generations. Mr. Laird opposed the idea, arguing that a debate of the past "would not serve the interests of the country and would not help us disengage from Vietnam."

Stating a theme that he apparently hoped would dominate the reaction to the Times' disclosures, Mr. Laird said that "the divisions caused by debate of the past actions would not serve a useful purpose today." He has been trying to shift focus away from "why Vietnam," he said, to the means of disengaging in an honorable way.

DISCLOSURE UNAUTHORIZED

Mr. Laird said the disclosure of the Pentagon papers was "unauthorized" and "violates the security regulations of our Government." Although the study covers information only to 1968, he added, the information "remains sensitive" and its publication does not serve

"a useful purpose." The Secretary said the documents would remain classified and would not be made available to the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator Symington observed that the committee had tried several times to obtain the material on a confidential basis. He said it was "shocking" that Congress had been kept ignorant of the materials and that even now he had to read about them in the newspapers.

Asked whether he knew who might have passed the materials to the Times, Mr. Laird said, "No, I don't yet know." But since there were so few copies, he added, "it won't be hard to track down whoever was responsible."

"This is highly sensitive information and should not have been made public," he declared.

Shortly afterward, Jerry W. Friedheim, the Pentagon briefing officer, read a statement that had been worked out after 24 hours of consultation among Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Laird, some White House officials and lawyers of the Defense and Justice Departments. Inferentially, the statement made a distinction between violation of Government security regulations and possible violations of law. It said:

"The Department of Defense must be and is concerned about the disclosure of publication of highly classified information affecting national security.

"The material remains classified and sensitive despite the fact that it covers a period that ended in 1968.

"It is our responsibility to call this violation of security to the attention of the Justice Department. We have done so.

"The Government has the responsibility to determine what individual or individuals, if any, violated the laws relating to national security information by unauthorized disclosure of classified material."

Mr. Friedheim said officials of the Justice and Defense Departments had had various discussions of the matter, face to face and also by telephone, since Sunday, when The Times began publication of its series of articles.

He said the relevant law was Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 793, noting that it contained "certain ambiguities" as to whether it applies to publications or only to their sources of secret information.

"Some lawyers are of the opinion that the publication is liable to prosecution as well as the official [source]," the spokesman said, "but there appears no precedent to establish that point. Justice is studying the whole matter to decide who, if anyone, to charge with law violation."

DEFINITION OF CLASSIFIED DATA

The cited legal section states: "Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States any classified information . . . shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both."

The section contains a list and definition of classified information as bearing on codes, weapons and materials, intelligence activities and material obtained from the communications of foreign governments. Government attorneys are said to have found no case in which the law had been applied to a publication.

Mr. Friedheim said the Pentagon had determined that there were "a dozen or so copies of the papers and that half of these at the Defense Department, have remained under extremely tight control." He said he did not believe the Pentagon's copies had either been duplicated or shown to unau-

thorized persons. He refused to say where the other copies had been kept.

There is a possibility, the spokesman remarked, that unauthorized copies were made at some point, "or even that a set of the study was stolen at some point." The materials run to about 7,000 pages of analysis and documentation.

As a practical matter, Mr. Friedheim said, the Pentagon regards individuals with authorized clearance to classified information as primarily responsible for the protection of such information.

He said Secretary Laird had been aware of the secret Pentagon study since he came into office in 1969 and had even once referred to its existence in public testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The spokesman then emphasized again Mr. Laird's "philosophical" conviction that it was more important to consider ways of disengaging from Vietnam than to "rake over the coals" of past policies.

At the State Department, a spokesman said he could not comment "on the accuracy of—or make any useful comment on the substance of—these papers until we have had an opportunity to check the original."

Checking is difficult, the spokesman, Charles W. Bray 3d, added, because the department has not had time to locate its copy of the report, or even to determine whether it has one.

"Anyone familiar with the volume and dimension of our files could understand that," Mr. Bray said.

"Can you rule the possibility that State 'lost' its copy to The Times?" he was asked.

"Yes, I am on fairly safe ground ruling that out," he replied.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers had no comment but is likely to be asked about the materials at a news conference tomorrow.

In Congress, there were only a few other comments on the matter and no indication that disclosure of the Vietnam materials would significantly influence the Senate vote Wednesday on legislation that would require withdrawal of American forces from the war zone by the end of this year.

Senator George S. McGovern of South Dakota, a cosponsor of that measure and candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination, said the documents, told a story of "almost incredible deception" of Congress and the American people by the highest officials in Government, including the President.

He said that he did not see how any Senator could ever again believe it was safe to permit the executive branch to make foreign policy alone, and added:

"We would make a serious mistake to assume the kind of deception revealed in these documents began and ended with the Johnson Administration."

Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, the Republican leader, said that the "release" of the documents was "a bad thing, it's a federal crime." But he described their content as "very instructive and somewhat shocking."

"I think the American people have never been told as much as they could digest about the war until President Nixon assumed office," he added. "He has been more than candid. This President has taken the people into his confidence more than anyone else."

Asked whether The Times should continue publication of its articles, Senator Scott said the paper would have to decide "on its good judgment."

Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr. of California, who has talked of challenging Mr. Nixon for the Presidency in the Republican primaries next year, discussed The Times articles and underlying Pentagon papers on the floor of the House.

He said "the issue of truthfulness in Government is a problem as serious as that of ending the war itself." He also complained

of "deceptive," "incomplete and misleading" briefings given to him on a recent visit to Southeast Asia, often, he said, with officers who knew the statements to be incorrect standing mute in his presence.

"This deception is not a matter of protecting secret information from the enemy," Mr. McCloskey said. "The intention is to conceal information from the people of the United States as if we were the enemy."

Robert S. McNamara, the former Secretary of Defense, who commissioned the Pentagon study in 1967, was reported to have sent the copy later delivered to him to the National Archives.

Mr. McNamara turned down several invitations to make a public comment today on the ground that this was inappropriate to his present duties as President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—the World Bank.

DEATH BENEFITS FOR POLICE OFFICERS

The SPEAKER, Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. POFF) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. POFF. Mr. Speaker, in the general discussion about the problem of crime in our society, we are required to think in impersonal terms—in terms of crime statistics, in terms of complex legislative responses, in terms of governmental budgets. Consequently, we often overlook the tragic impact of crime on the individual and his family.

Law enforcement officers throughout the Nation risk their lives daily in combatting crime. Recent slayings in New York City and in Washington, D.C., underscore the severity of that risk. Clearly, society cannot ignore the plight of the families of peace officers that are left husbandless and fatherless when the law officers are killed performing the duties society has asked them to perform. We cannot ask these officers to risk their lives and the welfare of their families and then ignore the consequences of their deaths.

Mr. Speaker, today in company with colleagues on the Committee on the Judiciary, I am introducing a bill that would require society to pay part of the social costs of these deaths. The bill would authorize the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to grant \$50,000 to the spouse and dependent children of a law enforcement officer killed in the line of duty.

Mr. Speaker, I include the letter of transmittal from the Attorney General and the sectional analysis prepared by the Department of Justice be included in the RECORD at this point together with the bill:

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Washington, D.C., June 11, 1971.

The Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Enclosed for your consideration and appropriate reference is a legislative proposal "To amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, to provide benefits to survivors of police officers killed in the line of duty."

The slaying of police officers in New York City and in Washington, D. C. in recent weeks has shown to America the risk of lethal violence faced daily by peace officers in city after city across the country. The nature of the dangers police officers confront and

the disparity in survivors benefits from State to State have led us to conclude that the Federal Government should provide a gratuity to the families of each municipal or State police officer killed while in the performance of duty, to serve as a federal floor for survivors benefits, and to be in addition to any other benefits due the family. The 91st Congress authorized a payment of \$50,000 to survivors of police and other public safety officers slain in the line of duty here in the District of Columbia.

On behalf of the President of the United States, I am transmitting the enclosed legislative proposal to give to the spouse and dependents of a police officer killed in the line of duty a gratuity of \$50,000, payable from funds appropriated to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration for that purpose.

I urge early consideration and prompt enactment of this proposed legislation.

The Office of Management and Budget has advised that enactment of this legislation is in accord with the Program of the President.

Sincerely,

JOHN N. MITCHELL,
Attorney General.

H.R. —

An act to amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, as amended, to provide benefits to survivors of police officers killed in the line of duty.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled that this Act may be cited as the "Police Officers Benefits Act of 1971."

SEC. 2. Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new Part:

"Part J—POLICE OFFICERS DEATH BENEFITS

"Sec. 701. (a) Under regulations issued by the administration under Part F of this title, upon certification to the administration by the Governor of any State that a police officer employed on a full-time basis by that State or a unit of general local government within the State to enforce the criminal laws has been killed in the line of duty, leaving a spouse or one or more eligible dependents, the Administration shall pay a gratuity of \$50,000, in the following order of precedence:

"(1) If there is no dependent child, to the spouse.

"(2) If there is no spouse, to the dependent child or children, in equal shares.

"(3) If there are both a spouse and one or more dependent children, one-half to the spouse and one-half to the child or children, in equal shares.

"(4) If there is no survivor in the above classes, to the parent or parents dependent for support on the decedent, in equal shares.

"(b) As used in this section, a dependent child is one who is unmarried and who was either living with or was receiving regular support contributions from the police officer at the time of his death, including a stepchild, an adopted child, or a posthumous child, and who is—

"(1) under 18 years of age; or

"(2) over 18 years of age and incapable of self-support because of physical or mental disability; or

"(3) over 18 years of age and a student as defined by section 8101 of title 5, United States Code.

"(c) As used in this section, spouse includes one living with or dependent for support on the decedent at the time of his death, or living apart for reasonable cause or because of desertion by the decedent.

"Sec. 702. The gratuity payable to any person under this Part is in addition to any

benefits to which he may be entitled under any other law.

SEC. 3. Section 520 of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, as amended, is amended by adding at the end of the section the following sentence:

"In addition there are authorized to be appropriated in each fiscal year such sums as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of Part J."

SEC. 4. Section 601 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, is amended by changing the period at the end of subsection (c) of that section to a comma and adding: "except that for the purposes of Part J the term does not include the District of Columbia".

SECTIONAL ANALYSIS

SECTION 1 is the short title.

SEC. 2 would add a new Part J to Title I (Law Enforcement Assistance) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The new part would consist of two new sections, 701 and 702.

Proposed section 701 would authorize the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to pay a lump sum gratuity of \$50,000 to the spouse, dependent children or parents of police officers who are killed in the line of duty. It is intended that the latter term be construed to provide payment to the survivors of a police officer who dies as the proximate result of injuries sustained in or on account of the performance of his official duties. Payments would be made under regulations promulgated by the Administration upon certification of the applicable facts to LEAA by the Governor of the State concerned. Where the police officer leaves both a surviving spouse and one or more dependent children, the spouse would receive \$25,000 and the children \$25,000, divided equally. Otherwise, the spouse or children would receive the entire \$50,000. If there are neither children nor a spouse surviving the officer, the money would go to the dependent parents of the officer. The term "dependent for support" in the section is intended to mean more than one-half of the support of the dependent concerned.

Proposed section 702 would make clear that the new benefits are in addition to any other benefits.

SEC. 3 of the bill would amend section 520 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, to authorize appropriation of such sums as are necessary to carry out the program.

SEC. 4 of the bill would amend the definition of "State" in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 so as to exclude the District of Columbia from the coverage of the bill. Survivors of police and other public safety officers of the District of Columbia killed in the line of duty are entitled to a \$50,000 death benefit by virtue of Public Law 91-509, approved October 26, 1970.

A NEW LOOK AT THAILAND AND SOUTH VIETNAM

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. RUPPE) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. RUPPE. Mr. Speaker, I have recently returned from Southeast Asia where I was able to visit both Thailand and South Vietnam. My experiences there, as well as the specific responses I received to the questions I asked, have led me to conclude that there are two basic directions American policy must now follow.

First, I am firmly convinced that, with the exception of air support units, and

for a short period of time, some artillery support units, we should remove all combat units from South Vietnam, accelerating our present withdrawal rate. I do not believe that American ground combat troops are vital or essential to the security of South Vietnam.

Second, we must make the South Vietnamese leadership understand that there are definite, definable limits to our economic and military assistance programs. We must determine what is essential to maintain a national government in South Vietnam, and what they could not reasonably be expected to supply for themselves. Only when the South Vietnamese have exhausted their best efforts, should we determine what assistance should be forthcoming from the American people.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that American combat forces now assigned to I Corps and II Corps in the Northern half of South Vietnam could well be replaced by South Vietnamese units. It was evident that such units were available in other Corps areas, and that South Vietnam must initiate the necessary redeployment—regardless of the resistance offered by the Generals involved. In my mind, this redeployment will only come about if American forces are withdrawn.

South Vietnam has over 1 million men under arms. We have now spent in excess of \$130 billion in that country and I must presume that the South Vietnamese are well trained and equipped.

If there is any lack of motivation on the part of the South Vietnamese military, then I feel the Saigon government must undertake the necessary reforms of its armed forces. These reforms must include the elimination of the corruption which is so much a part of the South Vietnamese military system. We simply cannot support a military organization that tolerates the sale of provisions, rations, promotions, and personnel transfers. The glaring corruption of some South Vietnamese province and district chiefs is a national scandal that no longer can be supported or protected by American military might.

America has already suffered 54,833 deaths, 299,924 wounded, and some 1,492 prisoners of war and missing in action. Now the specter of widespread drug addiction has been added to the list. Conservative estimates indicate that 10 percent of the American men in Vietnam are addicted to heroin. That means that some 25,000 to 30,000 confirmed heroin addicts will be returning home in the next year. The cost in terms of human suffering, and in terms of care and, hopefully, rehabilitation, will be staggering. Too long have we responded to requests for military assistance with a blanket commitment of men and materiel. From this date on, let us supply only what is absolutely essential—only what cannot be supplied by an honest, dedicated, and motivated South Vietnamese Government.

I will support the retention of American air and artillery support units, but only if and when their need can be documented and proven to my satisfaction.

Mr. Speaker, I am vitally interested in the maintenance of an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. It is deadly

important for the millions of South Vietnamese who have fought for freedom and have sacrificed so much in the struggle for independence. These people have merited our assistance and I am proud, as an American, that we have fought and sacrificed in their behalf. However, I strongly believe that the time has come when the likelihood of South Vietnam's survival as an independent nation can only be achieved if the South Vietnam Government is forced to live up to its military, political, and economic responsibilities.

Only when the Saigon government uses its resources effectively, only when it initiates land and tax reform and curbs its obvious abuses and corruption can it secure the kind of broad-based, popular support necessary for an independent democratic state. If they carry out these reforms and if they mobilize their resources, then I believe the goal of a stable secure South Vietnamese Government can be achieved. Millions of Vietnamese now support the Thieu government, but millions more antigovernment nationalists could only be impressed with a government that was free of corruption and reconciliation.

It has been suggested that some \$2.5 billion annually would provide the essential military and economic assistance to South Vietnam. I am prepared to support such a commitment, but only when I have been assured that South Vietnam has taken the necessary steps to eliminate internal corruption and utilize its own resources to the maximum extent. I will support only those efforts which are truly beyond the best efforts of the South Vietnamese themselves—and only when those efforts produce the kind of progress that can be clearly measured by this Congress. We must constantly monitor our assistance effort and be prepared to terminate those parts of the program which are touched with corruption or inefficiency.

The ability of this Congress to effectively monitor our policies and assistance efforts is crucial. At this point, we are sadly lacking in this ability. Perhaps the most shocking aspect of my trip was the complete lack of candor on the part of our Government's representatives in Southeast Asia. My questions about the extent of American involvement in Laos, about our military strengths there and elsewhere, inquiries about the goals and costs of our assistance programs, all went unanswered. I had the distinct impression that I was considered an intruder in someone's private domain of interest, an interloper who could not be trusted with knowledge of American policy in Southeast Asia. If that is the considered treatment of the U.S. Congress, then Mr. Speaker, it is no wonder that the American people feel misled, frustrated, and angry. The people who elected me have not sent their representative to be a tourist in Vietnam, blithely following a crucial war policy with only a tourist's knowledge of what is going on.

JOBS FOR VETERANS

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from

Missouri (Mr. RANDALL), is recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Speaker, the subject of my remarks, "Jobs for Veterans," in my judgment will be repeated again and again in this House in the weeks and months ahead. I say this because not nearly enough has been said on this important matter, and, up to this time, almost nothing has been done.

When those important three key words are used, although not always expressed, the clear reference is to jobs for returning Vietnam veterans. I asked for this time today to make these remarks, because of the announcement of the President that he has assigned to Secretary of Labor Hodgson the responsibility for the six-point program to be developed in the weeks and months ahead. Along with just about every Member of this House, I applaud the President for his statement that this new job drive for our former GI's should be of the highest priority and that every available program now on the books as well as any new programs that may be needed should be used to the very maximum to achieve the goal to find either jobs for or to provide training for these returning veterans. I noted with interest the words of our President, "intensive effort," and that is exactly the way it should be.

As I understand it, the President directed the Secretary of Labor to concentrate his efforts on six separate fronts either to find the needed jobs or to provide training which would later lead to jobs. These six directions were as follows:

1. Work with the National Alliance of Businessmen to increase the participation of business in providing new job opportunities for veterans.
2. Work with the Defense Department to "expand substantially" the job training and counseling program offered to veterans in the final weeks of their service.
3. Increase veteran participation in special manpower assistance programs and on-the-job training.
4. Require listing of all job openings with the U.S. Employment Security by all agencies and contractors under Federal contract. Hodgson said this would be one of the most valuable parts of the new program by helping to match veterans with jobs.
5. Increase the effectiveness of U.S. training and employment service in placing veterans in jobs. "Each returning veteran must be reached and served by this effort," the President said.
6. Provide special Labor Department-Veterans' Administration services for veterans who have been unemployed for three months or longer.

It has been said that statistics can prove a good thing to be bad or a bad thing to be much worse. I suppose the latest statistics for unemployment among veterans would be those for the first quarter of 1971. At the end of April the Department of Labor statistics indicated there were almost 400,000 Vietnam veterans unemployed. Unfortunately, this was nearly twice the number recorded during the corresponding period of the previous year.

It would seem that the older veterans are somewhat better off than the younger veterans, because the unemployment rate among the veterans between the

ages of 20 and 29 was 10.8 percent while the unemployment rate for the young men in the under-20 age bracket stands at 14.6 percent. While it is difficult to assemble statistics for minority veterans of the Vietnam war, the jobless rate has been frequently estimated to be twice that of their white counterparts. No amount of statistics, however, can ever convey the frustration, the disappointment, disillusionment, despair, the headaches, and the heartaches that these young Americans experience when they return from combat in Southeast Asia and then find it is impossible to obtain employment. Think how depressed a young man must feel when he has risked his life in an unpopular war and returns to his home, only to find not only that employment is not available, but that the door of employment opportunity may be closed to him.

Within the next few days or weeks I shall devote a lot of my time to the preparation of legislation and extensive consideration of what the Congress can do about the Vietnam veterans unemployment problem.

There are, of course, several approaches, and I announce at this time that I will be determined to try to find out which will give the quickest and best relief for our deserving Vietnam veterans. Of course, one approach is to provide unemployment compensation such as the special legislation enacted by the Congress after World War II and the Korean war. Then, as we so well remember, it was called the "52-20 Club," which provided relief of \$20 per week for 52 weeks for the unemployed veterans. Within the framework of the present inflationary trend, "52-75" would be somewhat comparable today.

Another approach is to try to encourage the private sector to do its very best to find jobs for our returnees. This kind of action could, of course, be encouraged and promoted by providing a tax credit to employers who hire unemployed Vietnam veterans. No one will suggest that this approach is a panacea, but it seems to me it would represent a step toward the objective of full employment of what could now be said to be our erstwhile Vietnam heroes who at present seem to be our forgotten former GI's.

Yet another approach will be in the area of manpower and training programs for those who may not possess the skills required for certain job openings and who may not be possessed of all the qualifications to hold some jobs which may be available. Certainly expansion of training programs is one kind of thrust that cannot be neglected, but it must be a gigantic, coordinated, concerted drive sufficient enough to provide jobs for our Southeast Asia veterans.

Mr. Speaker, as I tried to make clear at the beginning of these remarks, in the days and weeks ahead I may seem to be repetitive and somewhat tiresome to my colleagues, but so far as I am concerned, there is no higher priority project that any of us in the Congress can work on than to do something for these men.

In a day or two, we are going to debate an amendment to the defense procurement bill which will cause a cutoff date

of December 31, 1971, as to all funds for Vietnam. Regardless of our views on that kind of an amendment, all of us who support such a cutoff date and those who oppose it should join together and close ranks in an effort to do something for those veterans who have served their time and who have been honorably discharged and are now coming home to discover it is impossible to find a job.

TRUTH IN FOOD LABELING

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. ROSENTHAL), is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Speaker, 29 colleagues are joining me today in reintroducing the Truth in Food Labeling Act to require that all ingredients in a food product be listed on the label in order of their predominance.

Cosponsors of this bill are Mr. ASPIN, Mr. BADILLO, Mr. BURTON, Mrs. CHISOLM, Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. EILBERG, Mr. GRAY, Mrs. GREEN of Oregon, Mr. HALPERN, Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. KOCH, Mr. MADDEN, Mr. MELCHER, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. MOORHEAD, Mr. PATTEN, Mr. PIKE, Mr. POBELL, Mr. REES, Mr. RODINO, Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania, Mr. ROYBAL, Mr. RYAN, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. SEIBERLING, Mr. STOKES and Mr. VANIK.

The purpose of this bill is to protect the consumer's right to know what he is eating.

This is especially important in this day of widespread usage of chemical additives, some of which might prove injurious to certain individuals. Knowing the ingredients is particularly essential for persons with allergies, high cholesterol levels, and other dietary problems.

Hundreds of food items are permitted to be sold with only a partial statement of ingredients or even none at all.

This bill would amend the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. When Congress enacted that law in 1938, it stated that the purpose was to "promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of the consumer." My bill would seek to insure that the original intention of Congress is followed.

I originally introduced this bill on May 24, 1971, as H.R. 8670.

THE BORDEN REPORT ON THE TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN), is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, today I am inserting into the RECORD a report which casts further doubts on the advisability of the proposed trans-Alaska pipeline. The report, written by Ted Borden, deputy director of Alaska Industrial Development Division, has apparently been suppressed. It appears to have been written in the fall of 1970.

In brief, the report contends that a Canadian pipeline could be \$1.85 billion more profitable for the State of Alaska than the trans-Alaska pipeline. Mr. Bor-

den bases this contention on the fact that the west coast could consume only 0.5 million of the 2.5-million-barrel-per-day capacity of the trans-Alaska line, thus necessitating construction of an additional pipeline to transport the 2-million-barrel-per-day excess to the midwest where both demand and price for oil are higher.

The Borden report maintains that construction of a railroad to transport the 500,000 barrels a day that is needed for the west coast would be as profitable a way of shipping oil as the trans-Alaska pipeline would be.

Among the major advantages of a railroad, as opposed to a pipeline, for transporting Alaska's North Slope oil, Mr. Borden lists the fact that construction of a railroad would provide more employment for Alaskans than construction of a pipeline, as well as providing more permanent jobs. A railroad would also encourage further development of Alaska's northern areas more than a pipeline would.

In addition, by sending only 500,000 barrels a day to the west coast rather than 2 to 2.5 million barrels a day, you would avoid depressing the price for oil on the West Coast. In other words, if you dump 1.5 to 2 million unneeded barrels of oil per day on the west coast, the price for oil is obviously going to go down and thus Alaska's profits on the royalties would be considerably less.

By taking only 500,000 barrels out a day you would avoid that, as well as provide a steady income to the State of Alaska for a much longer period of time. Also, Alaska would have the enormous benefits a railroad would bring.

Mr. Borden is also critical of the manner in which Alyeska is organized. Alyeska, the pipeline consortium of seven oil companies who have interests in the North Slope oil, is not organized as a single corporate entity but, rather, is organized as a pipeline system or joint venture. It has thus been very difficult for the State of Alaska to obtain the necessary information concerning transportation costs on which the State's own profits are partially based.

The report states:

We should be suspicious of every effort on the part of the oil or pipeline companies to hide behind any plea that certain information is proprietary.

Although most previous arguments against construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline have been based on environmental concerns, this report is yet additional proof that the trans-Alaska pipeline is not the most practical, economical, or generally desirable way of transporting the North Slope oil to the Lower 48.

Because I believe that Mr. Borden's report is critical to understanding the pipeline issue in its totality, I am inserting it along with appendixes, in the RECORD today, and invite my colleagues to examine it:

A PROPOSAL TO PROMOTE EXTENSION OF THE ALASKA RAILROAD

(By Ted Borden, Deputy Director, Industrial Development Division)

It is my understanding that when Congress authorized construction of the Alaska Railroad the avowed purpose was to open up

mineral development in Alaska. It is also my understanding that the mileage of track authorized was nearly double the miles constructed. This, I believe, gives Alaska a strong position to have legislation enacted to appropriate Federal funds to extend the Alaska Railroad to the North Slope oil fields and into the Seward Peninsula.

Alaska possesses petroleum, gas, and minerals which during the next twenty years will be in critical supply. The entire nation may depend upon Alaska's resources to maintain the present standard of living.

The fact that the Federal Government will own 90% of Alaska, even after the Native Land Claim is settled, poses an obligation on the United States to assist in the development of these resources.

According to some published reports, the proposed 48 inch pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez would have a maximum transmission capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day. Other reports indicate that the present West Coast market for North Slope is roughly .5 million barrels per day, so that maximum utilization of TAPS capacity would depend upon construction of a 48 inch pipeline from the Seattle area to the Chicago area.

Attempting to obtain factual information relative to almost any phase of the pipeline is difficult. However, revenue which will accrue to Alaska from oil production will be directly related to the expense of transporting North Slope oil to market, and before any plans for moving the oil are finalized, Alaska has every right to know, with reasonable limits of error, exactly how much of the market value of the oil will be charged to transportation. Alaska's royalty and severance tax will be based upon the wellhead value of the oil. The wellhead value will be the market value less the cost of transportation. The State has the option of taking its revenue in cash or in oil, and before a determination of which option to take it must have complete information. We should be suspicious of every effort on the part of the oil or pipeline companies to hide behind any plea that certain information is proprietary.

The original cost estimate for the construction of the Trans Alaska Pipeline was approximately a billion dollars. Some reports presently indicate the cost may be nearer two billion dollars.

Estimates on the cost of transporting oil by tanker from Valdez to Seattle vary from 21 cents per barrel as reported in the July issue, 1970, of Alaska Construction and Oil Report to about 37 cents as indicated in a letter from George Hughes, junior, project manager for TAPS, on August 27, 1970 (exhibit No. 1). In a letter dated September 25, 1970, Tom Brennan, of Atlantic Richfield, stated "The actual cost of operating a RCO-owned and chartered vessel is proprietary information and not for publication." (exhibit No. 2). The only published information I have seen relative to the cost of transporting oil by pipeline from Seattle to mid-continent markets was in Alaska Construction and Oil Report for July, 1970. The cost figure given here is subject to serious question because the length of this proposed pipeline was listed as 1700 miles, but railroad companies operating between Seattle and Chicago have been contacted for use of right of way for this pipeline and the shortest rail route is 2300 miles (exhibit No. 3).

Another fact, the importance of which I am not prepared to presently determine, is the "common ownership undivided interest" structure (exhibit No. 4), referred to me by John Manley, Manager of Alaska Railroad, author not identified, raises some questions relating to the State's ability to actually determine pipeline transportation costs.

Construction of TAPS, with only a West Coast market for .5 million barrels of oil per day, and without construction of the pipeline from Seattle to Chicago would result in utilizing only one-fifth the maxi-

mum transmission capacity of the Alaska section. We certainly need to know transmission costs by pipeline operating at one-fifth capacity.

Although the previous administration was totally committed to construction of a highway and pipeline to the North Slope, the NORTH Commission which was appointed by that administration recognized the feasibility of a railroad as an alternate or parallel means of transporting oil, as well as opening up the Interior to mineral exploration and development.

John Manley, Manager of the Alaska Railroad, submitted a study to the NORTH Commission which indicated that a railroad, amortized over a 30 year period, could transport petroleum from Prudhoe Bay to an Alaskan Southern seaport for less than sixty cents per barrel on a 500,000 barrel per day capacity. Based upon this volume, employment would be provided for 1,050 employees in operation and maintenance, in addition to the present labor force. Manley stated that well over the 500,000 barrel figure could be handled at a decreasing cost per barrel.

Assuming that the market value less transportation cost would be only \$2.00 per barrel and that only 500,000 barrels would be transported daily, the annual revenue to the State would be nearly \$70 million on the basis of 12½% royalty and 6% severance.

Since a major transportation system would be beneficial to Native villages along the route and would open up scenic and recreational areas, it is my belief that securing right-of-way would not be a problem and that conservation organizations would be less opposed to the railroad than to the pipeline.

I see several advantages of a railroad over a pipeline which would accrue to the people of Alaska:

1. Construction of the railroad would provide more employment for Alaskans than a pipeline.
2. After the completion of construction the railroad would employ many more people than the pipeline.
3. The railroad would provide low cost transportation of supplies and equipment for the development of existing and future oil fields.
4. A means would be available for transporting minerals to tidewater at ¼th the cost of a highway.
5. Settlements will follow the railroad.
6. Preliminary work on the railroad could be started immediately to relieve our critical unemployment problem.
7. A railroad could be operated year-round, where a highway could not.
8. It is entirely possible that a railroad could be in operation several years before the pipeline could be completed and the oil revenues would begin to accrue to the State.
9. The present undivided ownership concept for companies proposing the pipeline construction will create problems in determining transportation costs through the pipeline.

The Canadians and some United States' companies have proposed an alternate pipeline route from Prudhoe Bay to the Chicago area. This line would be 3,250 miles in length and would relieve the necessity of constructing 2,300 miles of pipeline east from Seattle. See map (exhibit #3). This proposed Canadian route would be only fifty miles longer than the TAPS Alaskan section plus the Seattle to Chicago section, but would eliminate the cost of tanker transportation between Valdez and Seattle for the portion of North Slope oil destined for the mid-continent market.

Assuming that transportation of Prudhoe Bay oil by the more direct route would reduce transmission costs by only 25 cents per barrel, and assuming the Alaskan Arctic

Slope has a total reserve of 40 billion barrels, the actual financial advantage to Alaska over the life of the field would be 25 cents per barrel (less cost of transmission) X 40 billion barrels X 18½% (royalty plus severance tax) or a total of \$1,850,000,000, based only upon the saving in transmission cost via Canada as compared to a route from Alaska-to-Seattle-to-Chicago.

The next Congress will be controlled by the Democrats, and with Alaska having a Democrat in each of the Congressional Houses, the chances of getting legislative action for Federal construction of the railroad are the best in history. I would strongly recommend that the Governor and Alaska's Congressional Delegation make every immediate effort in this direction.

On November 6, 1970, I visited the Anchorage offices of Mitsubishi International, C. Itoh and Company, and Nissho-Iwai. The manager of each of those Japanese corporations indicated his interest in developing Alaska's mineral resources and pledged financial participation if necessary in the development of a transportation system which would provide a means of opening our mineralized regions. In the event the Federal Government will not provide funds for the construction of the railroad, I believe the State should start negotiations immediately with these companies, as well as with domestic oil and mining companies to begin construction of a railroad. If a major railroad company could be interested in constructing the railroad either with or without the financial participation by other industries, this might be preferable to having the State become involved, but as a last resort, the State should, I believe, take any steps necessary to develop a railroad system which would permit and expedite development of our mineral resources.

Exhibits Nos. 5, 6, 7 are editorials relative to the need for a railroad copies from Daily News Miner.

Exhibit No. 8—excerpt from article by David Brower, President of Friends of the Earth indicating that conservation groups would favor railroad over pipeline.

Exhibit No. 9—Proposed extension of Alaska Railroad in report to North Commission by EBS Management Consultants Incorporated.

Exhibit No. 10—Excerpt from Laird report to North Commission.

APPENDIX A

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO.,

Anchorage, Alaska, September 25, 1970.

MR. THERON F. BORDEN,
Deputy Director, Department of Economic Development, Juneau, Alaska.

DEAR MR. BORDEN: I must apologize for the delay in replying to your letter of August 14, 1970, requesting information on the cost of transporting a barrel of oil by tanker from Valdez to a Washington port. In Joe Fitzgerald's absence I asked our operations people to give us a figure on such costs.

I have now received a memorandum explaining that it is not feasible to quote a rate that would reflect an average cost, because rates vary greatly, depending upon the size of the vessel, seasonal demands, whether the tanker is owned or chartered, and other factors. Unfortunately, the company's ruling is that, "The actual cost of operating ARCO-owned and chartered vessels is proprietary information and not for publication."

Our best advice to you is therefore to contact Commissioner of Natural Resources Tom Kelly, who may be able to give you an approximate figure that would serve your purposes.

Again, I regret the delay and our inability to give you a useful reply.

Sincerely yours,

TOM BRENNAN.

APPENDIX B

TRANS ALASKA PIPELINE SYSTEM,
Houston, Tex., August 27, 1970.

MR. THERON F. BORDEN,
Deputy Director, State of Alaska, Department of Economic Development, Juneau, Alaska

DEAR MR. BORDEN: Your August 14 letter to David Henderson requesting information on the estimated cost of transporting crude oil by tanker from Valdez to Seattle has been referred to me for handling.

Since no costs are available from Valdez to Seattle, I will give you the American Tanker Rate Schedule from Nikishka (Cook Inlet) to west coast ports. This is the flat schedule and today's tanker market is 10 to 15% above this schedule. Tanker rates fluctuate widely and are obviously affected by the supply demand situation in world-wide tanker operations; you may apply your best estimate to what the rate will be at any future time.

From Cook Inlet to:

	Per ton
Los Angeles-----	\$3.45
San Francisco-----	2.95
Seattle-----	2.40

A conversion factor of 7.2 barrels per ton may be used to convert this price to cents per barrel.

It is hoped that this information will be sufficient for your use.

Yours very truly,

GEORGE G. HUGHES, Jr.,
Project Manager.

APPENDIX C

BP ALASKA INC.,

Anchorage, Alaska, September 28, 1970.

MR. THERON F. BORDEN,
Deputy Director, Industrial Development Division, Department of Economic Development, Juneau, Alaska.

DEAR MR. BORDEN: My apologies for not having replied to your letter of September 14, 1970 earlier.

I am authorized to advise you that neither the Standard Oil Company (Ohio), for whom we are operators of their North Slope leases nor our parent company, The British Petroleum Company Ltd., have any plans for moving crude oil produced from the Prudhoe Bay leases other than via the Trans Alaska Pipeline System, the responsibility for the construction and operation of which has been vested in the Alyeska Pipeline Service Corporation by the various participating parties.

With regard your request for information relating to the economics of moving oil from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez, Seattle and Chicago, we are unable to assist you as we have not been involved in any such economic studies.

Yours sincerely,

J. G. COOPER,
General Manager.

APPENDIX D

THE SYSTEM APPROACH

As we understand it, the Trans-Alaskan pipeline will not be organized as a single corporate entity. It will rather exist as what is variously known as a "pipeline system", a "joint venture", or in legal parlance, a "common ownership undivided interest" line. This means that rather than existing as a single corporate entity in Alaska, the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline will instead be owned by eight separate and independent corporate entities, consisting of each of the various pipeline subsidiaries of the oil companies associated in TAPS. Each pipeline subsidiary will essentially own a proportionate share of TAPS's physical properties, the assets, costs, and revenues associated with the latter being consolidated into the accounts of each subsidiary. For all intents and purposes, one may

visualize eight different pipelines which together will form the unit known as TAPS. Each of these pipelines will independently post a tariff for the transportation of crude oil from the North Slope to Valdez and each will separately be responsible for insuring that its portion of the TAPS transportation capacity is effectively utilized. The question, then, is what are the implications of this organizational framework on the effectiveness of ICC pipeline regulation.

IMPLICATIONS OF A "SYSTEM" APPROACH

7% dividend limitation arising from "consent decree" will not be directly applicable to TAPS.

Financial accounts filed with ICC will not reflect the isolated operations of TAPS.

Although the ICC could conceivably audit the cost figures of the agent in charge of TAPS, it will not be in possession of fully disclosed cost and revenue figures to judge the appropriateness of proposed tariff changes.

A summary answer to this question is shown in the above exhibit. If TAPS does organize itself on a system basis, this implies that the 7% dividend limitation arising from the 1941 consent decree will not be applicable directly to TAPS, since the latter will not exist as a revenue collecting and dividend distributing entity. Each of the various pipeline companies owning a part of the TAPS system will, of course, continue to be subject to the 7% consent decree. This dividend constraint, however, will apply not to their isolated operations in Alaska, but rather to their consolidated pipeline ownership throughout the United States.

A further implication is that since TAPS does not exist as a separate corporate entity it will not itself be required to file financial accounts with the ICC. Rather, the assets, costs and revenues associated with the Trans-Alaskan operation will be consolidated on a proportionate basis into the financial accounts of the various pipeline companies associated in TAPS, and it is these consolidated accounts which will be filed with the ICC. The financial records of TAPS will thus tend to be lost within the consolidated figures of the eight companies interested in the Trans-Alaskan line. To this extent the job of the State, and for that matter of the ICC itself, in monitoring the financial activities of TAPS will be far more difficult than would have been the case if the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline were established on a corporate basis.

Although a corporate identity for TAPS would simplify the regulatory problem, we do not by any means want to imply that the reason behind the choice of a system approach for TAPS was either to obscure the latter's financial returns or to dilute the regulatory constraints imposed either by the ICC or associated with the 1941 consent decree. In all probability the choice of a system approach was motivated by the desire to minimize the pipeline companies' federal income tax liabilities. Because of the possibility of taking accelerated depreciation allowances for federal income tax purposes. It can be advantageous under certain conditions for a company to be able to supply the depreciation allowance associated with a new investment, such as TAPS, against its earnings from other existing pipeline properties in the United States. It is likely that such a fiscal incentive was the dominant one behind the choice of a systems approach for TAPS, rather than a desire to evade regulatory disclosure requirements.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that as a result of the system approach, and given the present nature of ICC disclosure requirements, the State of Alaska will not have access to the financial information necessary to judge the appropriateness of any tariff proposed for the TAPS line. To the extent that transportation charges are reflected

in oil wellhead values, this implies that the State will not be in possession of sufficient information to judge whether the basis of assessment for its severance tax and royalty revenues is reasonable. It would consequently appear to be in the State's interest to determine what measures it can take to ensure that it will have access to all information which could have a material impact on its royalty and tax revenues.

APPENDIX E

A study (Alaskan Transportation Opportunities, *no author indicated*, no date) made for the NORTH Commission presents some interesting comparisons of the cost of transporting a barrel of oil through a pipeline built without a railroad, as compared to similar costs with a railroad already in existence. These comparisons are presented below and are a compilation of the data from the above mentioned report.

TABLE I.—TRANSPORTATION COSTS PER BARREL

Throughput in thousands of barrels	Pipeline only; no railroad	Railroad only	Pipeline after railroad; railroad costs not included	Pipeline after railroad; railroad costs included
50		\$2.03		
100	\$4.64	1.18	\$1.54	\$2.15
150		.89		
200	2.47	.75	.82	1.12
300	1.73		.57	.78
400	1.32		.44	.59
500	1.09	.59	.36	.48
1,000	.72		.25	.31
1,500			.22	

Due to the fact I do not know who wrote this or what data source was used in making these evaluations, it is impossible for me to know the correctness of these assumptions. However, in absence of any data, I will have to accept the conclusions as valid.

It is obvious that the cheapest transportation as far as costs per barrel are concerned in the 500,000 barrels per day range would be the pipeline built after the railroad in which the cost of construction of the railroad is not included. The 500,000 barrel per day figure is chosen as that is reported to be the initial plans for the operation of the proposed Trans Alaska Pipeline undoubtedly as the development of the field warrants it, this capacity could be more than doubled by the addition of more pumping stations.

MEDAL OF HONOR

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. RARICK, is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, I have just returned from the White House where I was honored to be present during a ceremony in which the President in the name of Congress presented the Congressional Medal of Honor—the Nation's highest combat decoration—to Pfc. Raymond M. Clausen, Jr., USMC, for service as set forth in the following citation which I am proud to read:

CITATION

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to Private First Class Raymond M. Clausen, Jr., United States Marine Corps.

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving with Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263, Marine Aircraft Group 16, First Marine Aircraft Wing, during operations against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam on 31 January 1970.

Participating in a helicopter rescue mission to extract elements of a platoon which had inadvertently entered a minefield while attacking enemy positions, Private First Class Clausen skillfully guided the helicopter pilot to a landing in an area cleared by one of several mine explosions. With eleven Marines wounded, one dead, and the remaining eight Marines holding their positions for fear of detonating other mines, Private First Class Clausen quickly leaped from the helicopter and, in the face of enemy fire, moved across the extremely hazardous, mine-laden area to assist in carrying casualties to the waiting helicopter and in placing them aboard. Despite the ever-present threat of further mine explosions, he continued his valiant efforts, leaving the comparatively safe area of the helicopter on six separate occasions to carry out his rescue efforts. On one occasion while he was carrying one of the wounded, another mine detonated, killing a corpsman and wounding three other men. Only when he was certain that all Marines were safely aboard did he signal the pilot to lift the helicopter. By his courageous, determined and inspiring efforts in the face of the utmost danger, Private First Class Clausen upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service.

Raymond M. Clausen, Jr., was born October 14, 1947, in New Orleans, La. He graduated from high school in 1965 and then attended college for 6 months. He enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve in New Orleans on March 30, 1966. After 2 months in the Marine Corps Reserve, he was discharged to enlist in the Regular Marine Corps.

Upon completion of recruit training at San Diego and individual combat training at Camp Pendleton, he prepared himself further for combat by completing a course in the aviation mechanical fundamental school and a basic helicopter course.

Upon completion of his training in April 1967, he spent 7 months on active duty in the United States.

In December 1967, Private Clausen was ordered overseas where he was to serve as a jet helicopter mechanic throughout almost all of his active duty service.

Private Clausen was returned to state-side duty in August 1969, where he remained for 3 months.

In November 1969 he began his second tour of duty in Vietnam. He was released from active duty upon his return to the United States on August 19, 1970.

A complete list of his medals and decorations include: the Air Crewman Insignia and the Air Medal, both with three Gold Stars, the Combat Action Ribbon, the Purple Heart, the Presidential Unit Citation, the Good Conduct Medal, the National Defense Service Medal, the Vietnam Service Medal with one Silver Star and one Bronze Star, the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, the Vietnam Campaign Medal with device, and the Rifle Sharpshooter Badge.

Raymond's parents are Mr. and Mrs. Raymond M. Clausen, Sr., of Route No. 2, Box 117, Hammond, La.

Raymond Clausen, his mother, and his five brothers and sisters attended the ceremony. His father, at sea with the merchant marine, was unable to attend. Two of Raymond's brothers, Erdwin and Carl, have also served their country.

Erdwin remains disabled from his combat wounds received in Vietnam. We Americans can be justly proud of Raymond Clausen as well as of his wonderful family.

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. FRASER, is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to section 119 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, notice is hereby given that I intend to introduce the following amendment to H.R. 8687 to amend the Defense Procurement Authorization Act:

AMENDMENT

Title IV, General Provisions, of H.R. 8687 (FY 1972 Defense Procurement Authorization Bill) is amended by adding the following new section:

"Sect. 402. The Secretary of the Treasury shall place in a special account established by him—

(1) the amount of the funds which may be appropriated under the authority of this Act for the production or deployment, or both, of multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's), and

(2) the amount of all appropriations made before the date of the enactment of this Act for such production or deployment, or both, which remain unexpended or unobligated on the date of the enactment of this Act to the extent that the sum of the amounts in clauses (1) and (2) exceed the sum of—

(3) the cost required to complete the conversion of 16 nuclear-powered submarines to the POSEIDON missile system, and

(4) the cost of the number of MIRV systems required to equip the launchers for the 16 nuclear-powered submarines referred to in clause (3), and

(5) the cost of the number of MIRV systems for which appropriations were obligated on the date of the enactment of this Act for equipping MINUTEMAN III missiles.

The funds and prior appropriations required to be placed in the special account under the preceding sentence shall be held in such account and not further obligated or expended until and unless the President reports to Congress that the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) have not, and in his best judgment will not, provide an agreement which would enable the United States to cease further deployment of MIRV's and that continued testing and deployment by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of additional defensive or offensive strategic nuclear weapons systems require that such funds and prior appropriations be expended by the United States for the purposes for which they were appropriated."

AMERICAN POW'S

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. FOUNTAIN) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Speaker, on March 26, 1964, Capt. Floyd Thompson became the first American prisoner of war in South Vietnam. This was 7 years and 81 days ago.

During this entire period of time the North Vietnamese, the Vietcong, and the Pathet Lao have paid no attention to the provisions of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war. We have not even been permitted the right to inspect their

prison camps nor to get an onsite confirmation as to which prisoners are still alive. Because of the impact of public opinion in this country, the enemy finally permitted some mail to get through.

Obviously the enemy are using our men as political pawns in the hope that public opinion in this country will force us to unilaterally withdraw all of our forces and completely cease participation in the Vietnam war. This attitude on the part of the enemy is actually prolonging the war because they would still have our men, and more and more demands by them would be in the making.

Of course, all the world knows by now that our men being held prisoner are subjected to unbelievably harsh treatment. Some are imprisoned in North Vietnam in ancient French prisons, seldom if ever catching sight of another American. One of the wives called it "concrete captivity."

Some are imprisoned in bamboo cages in South Vietnam's jungles, constantly suffering from tropical weather and heat, disease and filth.

Some are imprisoned in Laos and Cambodia under the same conditions. Some are, reportedly, even confined in 20-foot-deep pits in the ground; 1971 will certainly be a critical year for these American POW's, some of whom have been held since the early 1960's. I firmly believe that every possible avenue for solving this problem should be explored. Like the war itself in Vietnam, the time has long since come for a permanent and lasting solution, one which will soon bring our American fighting men home again and put an end to the killing and suffering.

New approaches are needed in our effort to solve the POW/MIA problem—and even they may fail. But one idea being suggested is contained in a resolution which calls for us to release unconditionally 1,600 of the North Vietnamese prisoners now being held in South Vietnam. I thought this was an idea worth exploring, and so I joined in cosponsoring this resolution. This idea was recently tried on a more limited basis by South Vietnam. Apparently, most of the prisoners refused the opportunity—but the passage of such a resolution publicized all over the world, followed by appropriate action, may be worth a try.

The resolution calls for the North Vietnamese soldiers to be released simultaneously at one point near the demilitarized zone. Each one would be given a supply of rations and allowed to head north on foot. At the same time, allied officials would make appropriate public appeals to Hanoi, the National Liberation Front, and the Pathet Lao for similar treatment of American POW's. All of this would be under the supervision of the International Red Cross.

Unquestionably, if this ever takes place, it would be front-page news all over the world and the Communists would be under additional world pressure to treat our men humanely, and to comprehend the depth of American feeling and concern for our men.

The release of prisoners on such an unprecedented scale would dramatize the

contrast between the way POW's are being treated north and south and just might be the trigger needed to push Hanoi in a more responsible direction. Then again, it might not be, but at any rate it seems worth trying. Col. Frank Borman, the President's Special Representative for Prisoners of War, testified in favor of the measure and urged "that it be accomplished with maximum haste."

Of course, such a novel move would bring some risks with it, but conceivably, as remote as the possibility may be, it could cause Hanoi to respond in kind. At the very least, it would put Hanoi on trial in the court of world opinion.

Releasing so many prisoners of war would be one of the most compassionate acts ever committed by any nation. It would reaffirm in a most effective and dramatic way our Nation's willingness to promote the safety and freedom of our men.

In any event, I hope and pray that this war can and will soon be over, and that America will soon be able to stop spending its blood and treasure on foreign shores and start spending them here at home in an effort to reunite a dangerously divided America.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GUN CONTROL ACT—"SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL" LOOPHOLE

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. MURPHY) is recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. MURPHY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I rise to report on two developments in the area of firearms control. The first concerns a report I received from the Treasury Department on the effectiveness of the Gun Control Act of 1968 which I sponsored in the House; the second development concerns a group of gun manufacturers in America who are blatantly and intentionally violating the spirit and intent of the Gun Act.

I asked for the Treasury study because die-hard opponents of the law have insisted that if the traffic in firearms is controlled, only criminals will have guns. Guided by that simple slogan, efforts are being made by the gun lobby to convince the U.S. Congress that the legislation is ineffective and should be repealed.

Contrary to what the gunrunners say, in the 26 months since the effective date of the act, December 16, 1968, the Treasury Department agents have made 6,188 cases resulting in 4,447 arrests. This is compared to 1,851 cases and 878 arrests made during the 27 months prior to the act under the old Federal firearms laws. This means there has been a remarkable 409-percent increase in arrests and a 234-percent increase in cases made.

I think this is an exceptional record. And this is especially so in view of the fact that in the bulk of these cases an actual crime of violence had not yet been committed. That means crimes against persons or property might have been carried out if it had not been for the gun law we passed in Congress in 1968.

The record of the law is all the more

remarkable when it is realized that many organized criminals who have violated every other law on the books for years and who successfully avoided prosecution, have now been put behind bars for violating the Gun Control Act. Significant arrests of every type of criminal known—holdup artists, rapists, extortionists, murderers—have been made under this law, but perhaps one of the most important was the arrest on February 10, 1970, of an individual who is regarded as a presidential security risk by the U.S. Secret Service.

These facts are incontrovertible—gun legislation does reduce crime and contribute to its prevention.

Despite this excellent record, the intent and integrity of the law is being threatened by a few shady gunrunners who tooled up to mass produce a cheap handgun right here in America, the domestic "Saturday night special" which was banned from overseas importation by the law we passed in 1968. I have sent a letter to Congressman Emanuel Celler, calling on him to convene immediate hearings of the House Judiciary Committee on my bill, H.R. 8394, to plug this leak in the law that threatens to flood the country with 2½ million cheap, killer guns within the next year.

I told Congressman Celler that we are now faced with a serious threat to the effectiveness of the Federal gun laws by a group of shady business entrepreneurs in the United States who are producing these cheap guns in makeshift factories such as converted garages, basements, and even a church.

These fast-buck merchants of death are accomplishing this in three ways:

The first group is producing these cheap "manstoppers" from prefabricated parts manufactured entirely in the United States. There are seven of these "quickie" gun operations and they are rapidly approaching the 1 million mark in terms of annual production.

The second group is comprised of five former importers of the "Saturday night specials" who are now importing only handgun parts minus the frame or receiver which they produce themselves. To date they have been authorized to import enough parts to assemble 1½ million guns of the kind that we outlawed 2 years ago.

The third and perhaps most dangerous method of violating the intent of the act involves five importers of sporting revolvers that actually are importable under the law, but which are then altered by sawing off the barrel to a "snub-nosed" length to make them easily concealable for hoodlums and bank robbers. Not only does this defy the intent of the law, but the nefarious practice of barrel shortening has hindered enforcement agencies because the identification markings of the importer are removed or obliterated during the alteration process. Homicides involving these modified killer guns have been recorded in New York City and in Missouri.

Production of these domestic "manstoppers" is now approaching a staggering 2½ million in the 1971-72 period. If this trend continues, we can expect sub-

stantial numbers of these guns to be involved in crimes of violence.

In fact, information I have from 73 of the Nation's police chiefs shows that there was an 87-percent increase in crimes involving just four domestically produced "Saturday night specials" from 1969 to 1970. These crimes ran the gamut of criminal activity up to and including murder.

That is why I have asked the House Judiciary Committee to act to assure our citizens an additional measure of safety from armed delinquents and hoodlums. The enactment of my bill, which will prohibit the sale of the domestic "Saturday night special" will, I am certain, guarantee that measure of safety.

No one knows more than I of the political sensitivity of the gun control issue. The gun lobby and the "gunrunner" magazines are all applauding each other in taking credit for having defeated Senators and Congressmen who were advocates of the Gun Act that I helped pass.

And the day after I introduced my recent amendment, my office began to receive hate mail from "gun nuts" and was flooded with threatening telephone calls from the gunrunners and the publishers of gun magazines who depend on advertising revenues from these merchants of death.

The firearms lobby in the United States made me one of their primary targets on Capitol Hill because I tried to keep firearms out of the hands of hoodlums, delinquents, lunatics, and presidential assassins.

But I will not be intimidated by them because I am convinced that this loophole in the law is a tragic one, one that will cause in the next year alone, the deaths of between 3,000 and 4,000 people.

I am not willing to wait for a rash of assassinations, murders, assaults, and armed robberies before I attempt to get the Congress to act.

The Congress must act decisively and it must act now before we lose more loved ones or another Congressman or even another President.

Chairman Celler has written me an encouraging letter that the Judiciary Committee will shortly consider the amendment, H.R. 8394, which will close a serious gap in the Gun Control Act of 1968. I ask Members to join me in this fight to keep these cheap "killer guns" from the hands of criminals and assassins.

I include two reports to me including a letter dated May 12, 1971, from Ralph H. Alkire of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division and a report entitled "Deviations From the Intent of the Gun Control Act of 1968," at this point in the RECORD:

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
Washington, D.C., May 12, 1971.

HON. JOHN M. MURPHY,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. MURPHY: Secretary Connally has asked us to reply to your letter of April 29, 1971, requesting certain information to assist you in evaluating the effectiveness of the Gun Control Act of 1968, legislation which you sponsored in the House of Representatives.

The following table provides a statistical breakdown, by titles, of the cases and arrests

made for 27 month periods prior and subsequent to the effective date of the Act and includes similar data for Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, as amended by Title III of the Gun Control Act. It is not possible to provide such data for the 28 month periods you requested since the statistics for April 1971, have not yet been compiled.

Prior to Gun Control Act (October 1966 to December 1968)		Subsequent to Gun Control Act (January 1969 to March 1971)	
Statute	Cases made	Statute	Cases made
FFA.....	496	Title—	
NFA.....	1,290	I.....	1,627
FFA-NFA.....	65	II.....	2,393
		VII.....	871
		I-II.....	193
		I-VII.....	771
		II-VII.....	273
		I-II-VII.....	60
Total.....	1,851		6,188

Note: Increase of 234.3 percent.

HON. JOHN M. MURPHY

Statute	Arrests	Statute	Arrests
FFA.....	258	Title—	
NFA.....	573	I.....	967
FFA-NFA.....	47	II.....	1,728
		VII.....	476
		I-II.....	209
		I-VII.....	484
		II-VII.....	524
		I-II-VII.....	83
Total.....	878		4,477

Note: Increase of 409.9 percent.

As a matter of information, the letters FFA and NFA, as shown in the above table, stand for the Federal Firearms Act and the National Firearms Act. The "Cases Made" category includes cases pending judicial action, such as indictment, as well as cases in which arrests have already been accomplished. Therefore, the number of arrests always lag behind the number of cases made during a particular period.

In view of our development of over 6,000 cases since passage of the Gun Control Act, you can appreciate that it would be impossible to list all of the firearms cases which might be considered as major or significant. However, to answer your request for summaries, we have selected the following cases to best demonstrate the scope and flavor of the Act's contribution to law enforcement. Please note that we have included several cases pointing up the value of the new firearms laws, especially Title VII, as tools in the Organized Crime Drive.

In Montana, police responded to a call—a shooting in a bar. They found a body, a foreign handgun on the floor, and customers who avowed no knowledge of the shooting. Ordinarily, this might have been the beginning and the end of the investigation. In this instance, Montana authorities decided to take advantage of the "State Assistance" features of the Gun Control Act of 1968, and a request for assistance was made to the Billings, Montana, office of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division. The ATF Firearms Control Section traced the foreign handgun from Germany through Mississippi and finally to Montana. A special investigator continued the investigation and identified the last known owner—a customer who had carried the firearm into the bar the night of the shooting and was present when police arrived. The killer was subsequently convicted of homicide in State Court. (Barcroft-Billings, Montana P.D.)

In a joint operation conducted by the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, five firearms were purchased from Carl McFarland in a parking lot in Indianapolis, Indiana. Three of the five weapons had been previously reported as stolen. A search of McFarland's car revealed an additional 36 firearms, 14 of which turned out to be stolen. McFarland pled guilty to violations of the Gun Control Act and was sentenced to a total of 10 years in prison. (Indiana S-3215—McFarland)

Harry Weiler, a convicted felon, was arrested by ATF investigators on February 10, 1970, for allegedly purchasing and possessing a firearm. Mr. Weiler is regarded as a Presidential Security Risk by the United States Secret Service and is the local president of the National Association for the Advancement of White People. The arrest and seizure resulted from the cooperation of a licensed New Jersey firearms dealer. Mr. Weiler has sought an injunction from the courts to halt harassment and is suing the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the District Director, Philadelphia, and two ATF Special Investigators, for civil damages. (Pa.—E-6726, T-I-VII)

Police investigation of a bizarre, brutal, sex-murder case revealed that a suspect might have recently purchased a firearm. An ATF Special Investigator was notified and through extensive records search found a record of a firearm sale to the suspect, who was prohibited from purchasing a firearm by virtue of his record as a felon. It was determined that the suspect had concealed this fact in purchasing the firearm by falsely executing Form 4473 Firearm Transaction Record. He was arrested and jailed. The Special Investigator, working alone, developed conclusive and final evidence as to the subject's guilt for the murder. After initial contact with the subject, police officers had written him off as a "harmless nut." (Texas—N-4508 (T-I))

A significant court decision was recently rendered in Federal Court, Springfield, Illinois, when Ronald E. Shafer was convicted for ten violations of the Gun Control Act. This case is significant since it involved the sale of firearm components sufficient to make destructive devices. Shafer was alleged to be a principal supplier of grenades and firearms to East St. Louis militant groups. In addition, he was responsible for the sale of 300 cheap import pistols in the St. Louis metropolitan area. Thirty-five of these firearms have subsequently been recovered in connection with crimes of violence. Shafer received a ten year prison sentence. (Ill. S-1311—Shafer)

A major stolen property fence in the Macon, Georgia Area, William Price Campbell, Jr. and his mother, Betty Douglas Ludlow, were charged with violation of the firearms statutes on June 13, 1969. Campbell had a notorious record in the Macon, Georgia area for dealing in all types of stolen property. He allegedly took orders for property which would then be stolen by thieves and burglars working in conjunction with him. The operation was broken by undercover purchases of unregistered automatic weapons from Campbell and Ludlow. Campbell was convicted in the U.S. District Court on October 31, 1969, and sentenced to a term of five years imprisonment in spite of the fact that Campbell is a virtual invalid. (Ga.—M-12, 849 (T-II))

An unusual seizure both in terms of size and diversity of articles was made on November 30, 1970, in the Birmingham, Alabama area when a trailer portion of a tractor trailer rig used as a storage and manufacturing plant for firearms, explosive devices and incendiary devices was raided. The seizure included 140 rifles, 1 60mm Mortar, 2 cases of partially prepared Molotov cocktails, 2 cases of re-worked surplus military hand grenades, a quantity of explosives, including dynamite, nitra-mon and Flex X, 200 dynamite caps, 3

rolls of detonator cord, a dozen cans of black powder, more than 100 hand grenades, a large number of bayonet and combat knives, thousands of empty shotgun shells and a quantity of lead used for molding slugs.

More firearms were seized the following day in a search of the residence of the defendant, a prominent professional man in Birmingham, Alabama. Additional articles, including a quantity of unarmed military grenades, were seized from another house owned by the defendant. The evidence in these cases indicates that the defendant has been engaged in supplying firearms, destructive devices, incendiary devices, bombs and similar articles to extremist groups of both the left and right, including the KKK, Black Panthers, Black Muslims, SDS (Weatherman faction), and others. The defendant has been a suspect in weight reducing rackets for a long time. The quantity of material seized from him was enough to start a small war. This case is currently pending prosecution. (Ala. N-15,578 (T-II), 15,579 (IL, T-XI) and 15,580 (T-II))

ATFD National Office Laboratory technology recently came to the aid of Virginia law enforcement officials when, on January 11, 1970, a bomb exploded under an unoccupied vehicle owned by the Dean of Men, Emory and Henry College, Emory, Virginia. An adjacent occupied dormitory was damaged. On January 22, two individuals, both students at Emory and Henry College, were arrested on State warrants charging felonious use of explosives. The bomb contained gunpowder identified in the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division National Office Laboratory as "Hercules 2400". The Laboratory examination was conducted on the material recovered at the bomb scene, a piece of burnt safety fuse, a hubcap, a hubcap rime, and a piece of asphalt. The State prosecution of the defendant will rest solely on evidence developed by ATFD.

Russell Payne, a felon on appeal for a manslaughter conviction, was convicted in Wyoming District Court for transporting a registered firearm in interstate commerce without the authorization of the Assistant Regional Commissioner, ATF, in violation of Section 922(a)(4), Chapter 44, Title 18, U.S.C. Payne was sentenced to five years imprisonment. This is believed to be the first conviction in the Nation under this particular section of law which was a new provision enacted under the Gun Control Act of 1968. (Wyo. 450 (T-II)—Payne).

On August 19, 1969, when ATF served a search warrant at the home of Joseph Aiuppa, an organized crime figure, Chicago, Illinois, they discovered twenty-nine (29) firearms secreted behind a wooden panel in the basement. He was indicted on August 26, 1969, and the case is now pending in Federal Court.

A Senate Congressional Record dated August 12, 1969, reflects one Felix (Milwaukee Phil) Alderisio as the "Consigliere" of the Chicago La Cosa Nostra structure. On January 23, 1970, Alderisio was sentenced to two years in prison for violation of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. (Ill. N-7343—T-VII)

During August 1970, ATF undercover special investigators infiltrated an organized gang of hijackers and burglars who utilized fences associated with organized crime figures. The undercover special investigators learned a \$50,000 load of cigarettes moving in interstate commerce on September 4, 1970, was hijacked at gunpoint. The gun was stuck in the nose of the driver of the truck owned by Lasham Revere Motors, Inc. Following the arrest of three men by the Illinois Bureau of Investigation for the hijacking, interrogation by ATF special investigators disclosed that Leo Rugendorf participated in the arrangements for the hijacking. On October 16, 1970, he was arrested by ATF on a charge of conspiracy to violate the Gun Control Act of

1968. This infamous Leo Rugendorf of Chicago, Illinois, is an alleged juiceman, "Scam" operator and close associate of Sam Battaglia, Felix Alderisio, Marshall Caifano, Jackie Cerone, Albert Frabotta and many other Chicago crime figures. Rugendorf allegedly is the vehicle through which money acquired illegally by the crime syndicate is moved into quasi-legitimate businesses, a function most vital to the continued success of the organization.

Santo Perrone was one of six subjects arrested in Detroit in June 1969 on Title VII firearms charges. He has been known to enforcement officers as an alleged strike breaker, extortionist, bootlegger, financier of illegal enterprises and many times a suspect in murders, bombings, and the smuggling of aliens. He lost his right leg in a mysterious bombing of his car in January 1964 and was a suspect in the 1948 attempted assassination of Walter P. Reuther, UAW President. In 1963 Perrone was named as one of the "big men" in the crime syndicate in testimony before the United States Senate Crime Investigating Committee. At the time of Perrone's arrest in his home in Grosse Pointe Woods, Michigan, special investigators found a total of eight firearms, one firearm in each room having an outside window. On November 14, 1969, APT arrested Santo Perrone for the second time for possession of a firearm.

The fate of one Joseph Vincent Bisogno, a member of the New York Gambino Family, points up the syndicate's total disregard for human life. Mr. Bisogno was indicted on May 28, 1969, in Miami, Florida, the charge being the possession of a firearm by a felon. The court allowed Bisogno's return to New York where on August 12, 1969, he was found murdered.

We trust that you will find the foregoing responsive to your request and that it will assist you in evaluating the impact of the Gun Control Act. If we can be of further service, please let us know.

Sincerely yours,

RALPH H. ALKIRE,
Acting Director, Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms Division.

DEVIATIONS FROM THE INTENT OF THE GUN CONTROL ACT OF 1968

The Gun Control Act of 1968, now in its third year, has exhibited certain inadequacies which were not envisioned by the Congress of the United States at the time of enactment. These inadequacies fall into the category of intentional deviations on the part of United States importers and manufacturers, enhanced to a degree by certain foreign manufacturers.

The placing of stringent importation controls on firearms, namely sub-quality handguns, caused a rising demand in the United States for this type of commodity. The dwindling supply, coupled with the rising demand, created three options for the enterprising United States firearms entrepreneur. All three options are presently being widely exercised.

United States manufacturers of firearms, consisting of both the long-established quality corporations as well as the opportune non-reputable makers, commenced the manufacture of cheap handguns of the type which were precluded from importation. Although some fall marginally into the quality category, they nevertheless would not be classified as "sporting purpose" firearms. At the present time, a total of not less than 22 variations of sub-quality or non-sporting type handguns are being manufactured in this country, all having had their inception since the advent of the Gun Control Act of 1968. These are prefabricated from parts manufactured entirely in the United States and, although current production figures are not available, the 1,000,000 mark should be rapidly approaching.

United States importers, in consort with European manufacturers, approached the problem in a different vein. Those with a potential manufacturing capability initiated contracts with their previous suppliers to import only handgun parts, less the frame or the receiver, and would subsequently assemble the firearms in the United States, using domestically manufactured "frames or receivers." This endeavor is presently being carried out by 5 large volume United States manufacturers and/or importers. To date, sufficient parts have been authorized for importation which will allow for the assembling of 1,433,800 handguns of the precluded type. This method of manufacture has seen 19 additional variations of otherwise non-importable handguns appear on the scene, again since the start of Public Law 90-618.

The final method of deviation involves the importation of sanctioned sporting type revolvers with the importer, special jobber or eventual dealer accomplishing alterations to the weapon by cutting off the barrel to a desirable "snub-nose" length. This practice is commonplace to a minimum of 5 leading importers. In addition to defying the intent of the law, the barrel shortening process has hindered enforcement agencies in that the identification markings of the importer are sometimes removed or obliterated during the alteration process. The investigation surrounding recent homicides in both New York City and St. Claire County, Missouri, encountered firearms of the above-described modified variety.

Starter guns, which were a source of readily convertible firearms prior to the implementation of the Gun Control Act of 1968, have vastly diminished as a potential threat. New methods of manufacture which require the incorporation of design changes to defy conversion of these devices has been one of the notable achievements of the cited Act.

Submitted herewith are samples of some of the categories of firearms referenced above.

A TRADE REFORM ACT IS ESSENTIAL

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. BURKE) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, last week this House passed the Sugar Act of 1971. This week, it is my understanding that we are to consider the extension of the U.S. participation in the International Coffee Agreement. What do both of these acts have in common? They both will mean that for the next few years both sugar and coffee will be governed by the strictest system of import quotas.

In listening to the debate on the Sugar Act, I was struck by the fact that very few of those Members who announced their intention to vote against the act listed as their principal reason a philosophical objection to a system of quotas. Most of the controversy centered around the allocation of the quotas to one foreign country or another.

Very few words were said, and then only in passing, about the fact that the American consumer may well be paying more for sugar as a result of the sugar quota system. Considerable importance was attached by the supporters of the act on the need for protecting the jobs of American workers against the threat of a flood of cheap foreign imports in the absence of a quota system.

I am sure that most of the Members of this House are aware that one of the reasons for the delay in the forthcoming legislation extending this country's participation in the International Coffee Agreement is the fact that considerable pressure was brought to bear on the Brazilians to agree to abandon or restrict their policies favoring the export of instant coffee at prices considerably lower than that charged by the American manufacturers of the same product. The manufacturers of instant coffee, in other words, were able to influence our Government to the extent that negotiations have been going on for the last 4 years with the Brazilians and other coffee consumers to protect their interests—that is, the interests of the American instant coffee manufacturers.

At times, the negotiations were bitter and with one side or the other threatening to break-off negotiations. In all of this, the diplomatic relationship and, indeed, the friendship between this country and Brazil was put squarely on the line. The United States was accused in the Brazilian press of over-reaction to a rather insignificant threat posed by a few million dollars worth of foreign imports.

The irony in all of this, of course, was that for years the Government's message to the developing countries of Latin America was to encourage industrial development. I think if the truth were known in this case, it could be established that the instant coffee manufacturing plants were specifically encouraged and supported with U.S. financial assistance to encourage the Brazilians to take advantage of their principal agricultural commodity and diversify into manufacture.

My point in delving into all this is simply to show how at last one American interest was able to bring sufficient pressure to bear in high places that Brazilian-American relations notwithstanding, our Government successfully negotiated a restriction on the import of such products into this country.

My next point, in all of this, is to add that the threat from the import of Brazilian instant coffee is not nearly as ominous or serious as the continued unbridled import of textiles and shoes into this country; and yet, in sharp contrast to this Government's determined effort to do something for General Foods, there has been a noticeable lack of purposeful action in the area of textiles or shoes—whether at the international conference table or in the halls of this Congress.

Despite the fact that the President promised in his election campaign to strongly support a modest piece of quota legislation for textiles, the commitment to this promise can only be considered somewhat lukewarm and considerably less than 100 percent. What are the statistics? Secretary Stans, on May 31 in his speech before the International Wool Textile Organization, confessed:

Over 100,000 jobs in the textile and apparel industry were lost in the last year and 549 plants closed in the past two years. Imports now account for 28% of the total U.S. market for wool products . . . and this is now truly a depressed industry.

By the President's own admission, the situation with shoes is even more serious. If nothing is done by way of legislation this year, and that will be an uphill battle, there is a very real prospect that further imports will account for close to 50 percent of the domestic market for nonrubber footwear.

In other words, my purpose for rising today in between consideration by this House of the Sugar Act and the International Coffee Agreement Act is to remind the Members of this body that the Trade Reform Act of 1969 if examined closely would be found to be a much more modest piece of legislation than either of these two acts.

Furthermore, that there is nothing novel in quota legislation. The books are full of legislative quotas. The oil industry is a well-protected industry indeed in this country, in more ways than one. Domestic airlines are protected against foreign competition with reciprocity demanded for the landing and takeoff of every foreign flight into or out of this country.

The point is, gentlemen, that the unemployment figures in this country show that with each passing day this country is exporting jobs. The balance-of-trade figures tell the same story. Japan's balance of trade with this country soars to new heights while ours sinks to new lows. We are not asking the Japanese to give up their full employment or their favorable balance of trade with us—simply trying to control its future expansion.

This country can no longer afford to ignore the serious plight of its own domestic economy in the name of free trade. Whatever happened to the idea of reciprocity in all of this?

The restrictions on imports into Japan are too well known to need repetition here. I think it is time that this country serve notice to the Japanese, who can afford to be told this much more than the Brazilians, that this country's days of unrestricted foreign aid to the third ranking economy in the world are over. Our days of watching the yen go up and up in value and the dollar down and down are over. The New York Times reported on May 24 that consideration is being given in administration circles to imposing a special tariff on goods from Japan.

While such action may seem drastic, the fact that it is being discussed indicates what I have been saying all along, that if we do not act soon, the medicine is going to have to be much stronger than the doctor was recommending a short time ago. And I have only discussed textiles and shoes. There are other industries which are being hurt increasingly each day, steel and electronics, to mention two of the most important. It is estimated now that by 1975 the Japanese will succeed the United States as the world's leading steel producer.

With the announcement this weekend that Chrysler is to invest in Mitsubishi and that Ford and GM are in the midst of similar negotiations with other companies, another threat is on the horizon. The major multi-national American corporations with this kind of foothold in Japan are going to make it that much more difficult for any strong action by

this country to redress the imbalance of trade with the Japanese.

Once again, it is becoming apparent that behind this country's dismal trading performance is the story of the export of billions of dollars of capital overseas by the multi-national corporations to take advantage of foreign investment opportunities and lower foreign labor costs. With those dollars, jobs are being exported. With those joint venture announcements and licensing arrangements, American technology and know-how is being exported at the expense of our balance-of-trade figures.

I seriously question whether this Nation can any longer afford to maintain its traditional *laissez faire* attitude toward the export of American capital overseas. Reluctantly, I am coming to the conclusion that we owe it to the American worker to protect domestic protection. It is no wonder then that as *Time Magazine* reports, the "new protectionism" is increasingly in vogue. It is always the case that traditional policies and attitudes are re-examined in trying times and, believe me, these are trying times.

In 1970 alone, while American unemployment was going from 2,628,000 to 4,636,000 the outflow of U.S. capital for overseas investment increased \$900 million, or almost 25 percent. This year, the Commerce Department estimates that spending abroad will increase another 16 percent to \$15.3 billion. While this may rebound in the form of profits for the shareholders of these major corporations, domestic plants are faced with reduced working hours or shut down altogether.

The next weeks should bear out a suspicion I have long held. What irritated the American corporations the most about Japan in the past has been its restrictions on U.S. investment in Japan, not trade with that country. Now that the Japanese have opened up to Chrysler and later on will do the same for Ford and GM, I am convinced that we will hear a lot more about the threat of Japanese retaliation from the free trade lobby. What they will be concerned about, however, will not be retaliation on U.S. exports which are little enough in the manufactured sector as it is, but threats against these sizable U.S. investments.

At the present moment, the book value of American corporate enterprises abroad stands at close to \$75 million. I understand the concern of the major corporations about possible retaliation in view of these figures, but as a Congressman I must be more concerned about the threat to the security of the American worker in his job and the future, life, and prosperity of communities across this country. I am tired of hearing about the value of unrestricted exports of capital for the interest rate structure of this country and about the value of unchecked imports into this country as a possible depressant on inflation.

Faced with a bias toward rising interest rates and inflation, I think we are paying a high price for a policy that does not work. Other factors have to be taken into consideration which have been neglected far too long. Again, I see the time to act is now before something much

more drastic than a Trade Reform Act along the lines of that of 1969 is the only solution.

SOVIET UNION VISITED

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. PODELL) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. PODELL. Mr. Speaker, on June 10 of last week I documented to my colleagues the problems encountered in just obtaining a visa to visit the Soviet Union. Today, I would like to continue my story of the Russian harassment and intimidation.

I finally arrived in Moscow late in the afternoon of May 22. I was met by a representative of the U.S. Embassy, who was extremely capable and who escorted me to the Nationale Hotel in Moscow. I noted during our drive to the hotel that he constantly was peering into the back window as if to see what was behind our vehicle. I asked him almost in jest whether or not someone was following us. I was surprised when he answered, "Yes" and pointed to an automobile some distance behind, which had followed us from the airport. From this moment on, no less than two cars of secret police followed my every move. Night or day, wherever I went; and this was the beginning of a period of intimidation and harassment such as I have never witnessed before.

Upon checking into the Nationale Hotel, I was given a special suite, which I was told had more bugs in it than any meeting of the Soviet presidium. In other words, "big brother" was watching me and listening to me even in my own hotel room.

During dinner, I was watched. When I went for a walk, I was followed. My every action was made note of. It is difficult for an individual who is brought up in a free democracy to truly understand the intimidation that one feels when his every action and word are being observed and recorded. To the last day as I left on a plane to Paris, I saw the lineup of Russian goons watching me as I boarded the plane. Perhaps the one pleasure I received was immediately before entering the airplane; I signaled to them and accorded them the "Brooklyn salute." During my second day in Moscow, I asked my escort to confirm my tickets to Leningrad and was then advised that my reservations had to be cancelled because there was no longer any hotel accommodations. I displayed my confirming reservation at the Astoria Hotel in Leningrad where they treated me with utter disdain and were further apologetic when I indicated that I would be happy to fly to Leningrad in the morning and return that evening without the need for hotel accommodations; and they advised me that they were sorry, but there were no seats available on the plane. When I protested firmly that I had confirming reservations and tickets paid for in advance, they merely indicated there was nothing further that they could do.

This example of Russian "hospitality" turned to open hostility when I asked

permission to visit other national cities, and they advised me in no uncertain terms to enjoy the sights of Moscow, go to the theater, and then go home.

On the Monday after my arrival in Moscow, I visited with Ambassador Beam and asked him what Soviet officials had he made appointments with me to visit during my stay. Ambassador Beam apologized and told me that he could not make any appointments with any Soviet officials as none would see me. I found this incredible and demanded a complete list of the individuals that he or his office had contacted. The list is set forth here-in in detail as well as the results.

As a further indication of Russian "hospitality," on May 28 immediately after my departure, Mr. Martin A. Wenick of our Embassy in Moscow had all four tires punctured, rendering his automobile inoperative.

In Mr. Wenick's letter to me he stated:

While dining in the restaurant of the hotel the evening of May 28 with some friends, some "unidentified" individuals punctured all four tires rendering the vehicle inoperative.

I wonder just how much outcry our State Department has made in connection with this obvious act of vandalism against one of its employees. I wonder what would be said if Ambassador Dobrynin's tires or those of one of his assistants were to be slashed in the same way.

The arrogance of the Russian attitude would be a delight of any hardened boor. I am positive that if any of the treatment I received were given to a Soviet official visiting the United States, not only would terse diplomatic notes be exchanged, but United States-Soviet relations would surely be affected in an adverse manner.

On the plane returning from Moscow I reflected on the trip, the treatment and the trepidation I experienced. It can be said without reservation that Russia is definitely a world power in such necessary areas as: arrogance, unnecessary bureaucracy, bugging of conversations, shadowing of people's movements, puncturing of tires, and general harassment.

If this kind of treatment is representative of Russian civilization, then their national symbol should no longer be a bear but a boar.

The following is a documentation of the appointments requested for me and the results of this request:

APPOINTMENTS REQUESTED FOR REPRESENTATIVE BERTRAM PODELL

DATE, INDIVIDUAL, AND RESULT

May 18: Professor S. Zivs (Vice President of Association of Soviet Jurists). Call back 5/20.

May 18: Moscow City Hall (Meeting with Mayor or one of Deputy Mayors followed by meetings with city transportation officials). Will call back. Embassy should inform Ministry of Foreign Affairs about request. (Never called back.)

May 19: A Deputy Chairman of the House of Nationalities of Supreme Soviet or any member of the House of Nationalities who present in Moscow. Call back 5/20.

May 19: Judge Anashkin, USSR Supreme Court. Call back 5/24. Judge out of town.

May 19: President of Inyurkollegiya. Call back 5/21.

May 19: Political Counselor called USA

Division of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) requesting assistance in arranging program. Letter confirming call sent same day. Note taken of request.

May 20: Professor Zivs. In principle could receive Congressman but request should be made through MFA.

May 21: House of Nationalities of Supreme Soviet. (Second call.) Arrangements must be requested through MFA.

May 21: President of Inyurkollegiya. President out of town. Appointment with his Deputy set for 5/24.

May 22: Political Counsellor told Mr. Fedoseyev of Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Embassy would renew its request for assistance in arranging for appointments on May 24. No comment.

May 24: Acting Political Counsellor called Mr. Fedoseyev and renewed request for appointments. Additionally asked for meetings with member of Premier Kosygin's staff and with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Indicated appointments unlikely to be forthcoming.

May 24: Judge Anashkin. Still out of town.

May 24: Mr. Fedoseyev or other member of USA Section of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Appointment with Mr. Isakov set for 10:00 a.m. 5/25.

May 24: Mr. Rudenko, USSR Prosecutor-General. Arrangements must be made through MFA.

May 25: Congressman met with Mr. Isakov of MFA and personally requested assistance in arranging meetings. Congressman told that Soviet officials would not be interested in meeting with him.

May 25: USA Institute. No one available to meet with Congressman.

Next week I would like to describe in detail some of my conversations with the Jewish families in Moscow, which I am sure you will find of interest.

THE UPSTREAM WATERSHED ACT

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from West Virginia (Mr. KEE), is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. KEE. Mr. Speaker, I had the pleasure of attending the 18th National Watershed Congress in Tampa, Fla., June 7, 8, and 9, 1971. It was an illuminating experience, one which I shall long remember. The highlight, as far as I am concerned, came on Tuesday, June 8, when our colleague, the Honorable W. R. (BOB) POAGE of Texas, was the principal speaker. I feel that every Member should read his thought-provoking address, so I am placing his speech in the RECORD at this point:

THE UPSTREAM WATERSHED ACT

(Remarks of Hon. W. R. Poage)

Mr. Chairman, my good friend and former colleague, Cliff McIntire, and distinguished delegates and guests of the 18th National Watershed Congress. I want each of you to know how honored I am to be with you today.

It has been quite a while since I have visited in the great State of Florida and especially in the District so ably represented by your Congressman—Honorable Sam Gibbons. I first met Sam in connection with the approval of the Upper Tampa Bay Watershed Project. This makes me ever more happy to be here. I have followed with much regret the terrible drought which has ravaged the southern part of this State. Of course, coming from Texas, I can claim to be somewhat of an expert on dry weather. We have a lot of it, and this year has been one of the driest in our history—just as it is in Florida.

Drought, my friends, is a major cause of pollution. When the ground is powder dry,

the wind carries away our valuable soil—creating a form of air pollution. When our brush, grass or timber is dangerously dry from lack of rain, we have the setting for disastrous fires, which may blacken huge areas, destroying valuable wildlife, grass and timber. Nothing then remains to hold the soil intact, and when the rains finally do come, the soil races into the creeks and rivers, becoming the silt which clogs and chokes our rivers and lakes, destroying water life just as surely as would the most potent poison. This is surely an example of water pollution at its worst.

When we speak of pollution control, we must recognize the great work which has been done by the splendid cooperation between you folks and the Soil Conservation Service of the United States Department of Agriculture, but intriguing as the subject is, I am not going to give you another talk on either pollution or on ecology, I am going to talk about the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act.

But since I have mentioned the Department of Agriculture I had just as well state for the record here and now, that I am flatly opposed to any consolidation, reorganization, or bureaucratic manipulation which would deny American Agriculture a representative in the President's Cabinet and a Federal agency whose primary mission is to work for and with the American farmer and Rural America.

You know, many years ago, I was attending a meeting in a school house in my own District in Texas. We were talking about ways we could combat flooding on the tributaries of our smaller streams, which has always caused so much grief for farmers. I remember I used the term "flood control", and an old boy stood up in the back of the room and said: "Congressman Poage, we're not interested in flood 'control', we want flood 'prevention'." And, of course, he was right, and we have that kind of program today in the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act.

I have had the unpleasant experience of rowing a boat across a pasture during a flood to see whether I had any cattle left, and I know many of you have done the same thing. That was before we had a Flood Prevention Program in my area. This program has saved human lives, saved farm stock, and has prevented the destruction of millions of dollars in crops and real estate. I think this is a great program for all of America and, barring none, it is one of the most outstanding pollution prevention programs we have on the books.

This program not only helps rural America, but it helps urban America as well. Whenever we can keep water and silt from going downstream, we help the great cities below our mighty rivers. When we can make water sink into the ground it becomes an unmixed blessing. When we let water run over the surface it becomes a curse.

I was honored to be an original sponsor of the Flood Prevention Act and I have been privileged to see it become a reality throughout America. It worked well in the mudslide areas of California, in the gully regions of Wisconsin, in the suburban areas of the Northeast, in the bayou areas of the Southeast, and in many areas of Texas and the Southwest where the creeks flow only a few days after a rain. It also serves in this area where drainage is normally your basic problem.

While we have a flexible and versatile program, we have not been without our problems. Naturally we need more money. Hundreds of projects need to be constructed, while many others are still in the planning stages. Actually, there are 223 fully authorized projects now awaiting funding. Certainly there are far more which are still only the dreams of folks who need help badly. The watershed program, just as many others, has

been hurt by inflation and higher priorities on Federal spending, but it is alive and kicking. I think the Soil Conservation Service has utilized watershed money well. I wish we had more to spend, and I am confident that we will, one of these days. As I see it, we should be spending at least \$100 million per year on this program.

Now, if I may, I would like to review the experiences of the Small Watershed Program over the past few years. It seems to me that the last five years or so has been a critical period in the life of the program. We have encountered many obstacles and we have overcome most of them. You know, both the House Agriculture Committee, and our Conservation and Credit Subcommittee, of which I have retained the chairmanship, have been criticized a great deal for taking a very hard and close look at each watershed project which comes before us. We are constantly reminded that our counterpart in the other Body routinely passes each project. I do not mean to criticize anyone, but we have often been cast as the villain who refuses to automatically approve each and every project sent to us. However, I believe that our policy of setting high standards for each project has served to strengthen the program a great deal, and has spread the benefits to the most deserving projects. We have tried to keep the program on the right track, and I believe we have been quite successful.

You may recall that a few years back we were confronted with a number of projects sent to us from the Department of Agriculture which were primarily irrigation projects. We felt this was an extremely dangerous trend, and we so stated in a Watershed Policy Statement issued by our Committee on July 31, 1967, and forwarded to the Secretary of Agriculture. This statement served notice that, while we would do our best to be fair to those irrigation projects caught as they were in the middle, we would not approve projects in the future whose primary purpose was not flood prevention. The Department of Agriculture has cooperated with us on this. There are other Federal programs for irrigation and certainly our Committee is not against irrigation. It is one of Agriculture's useful tools, but we do not intend to see the Small Watershed Program become ineffective by spreading it too thin in too many areas.

This has happened to too many of our Federal programs already. When you have but a limited amount of money, it seems to us that it should be spent where it will do the most good. We have, therefore, used some very rough guidelines. For instance, we have generally refused to approve projects where the cost per benefited acre was more than \$200 per acre—unless it was shown that some very unusual circumstances justified a different course. We have approved an expenditure in excess of this in locations like Hawaii where land values were in the thousands of dollars. If we had more money we would doubtless raise our limits.

Another thing which has brought us criticism is that our Committee has tried to hold the approval of the more expensive projects to a reasonable rate, recognizing that we must take into consideration the amount of funds on hand and how they can best be utilized. We feel it would be unfair to use all available money for a handful of very large projects. On some occasions we have approved only one of two closely related projects, allowing work to start only on the most important one. Then at a later date we have approved the second project. Thus we are able to keep more projects going over the country.

For many years, a problem of great concern was how we could be assured that proper land treatment measures would be implemented on Forest Service or Bureau of Land Management lands. With the help of

the Soil Conservation Service, we arrived at a standard procedure to assure that the same cooperation would be expected from these agencies as that which is expected from private individuals who own land in a watershed. And this is only fair. We have achieved equal success so far where other Federal, State, and public lands are concerned. We are proud of this achievement.

Probably the most difficult trial the Small Watershed Program has ever undergone was the crisis which arose as a result of the position taken by the Executive Branch that Public Law 566 was unconstitutional. That's right—"unconstitutional". While I felt that this contention was totally unfounded, the deadlock between the Executive Branch and the Congress brought the program to a total standstill. We were told that we had to amend Public Law 566, so that the committees of the Congress could not disapprove specific projects, if we were to ever see the program resumed; but we held firm, because we were right. This fight involved three Attorneys General, before it was finally resolved in our favor, and I want to commend the present Attorney General for recognizing that the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act is not an infringement on the President's power, but is a sound and honest program with no evil intent whatsoever.

We have gone through a critical period, but new challenges lie ahead. As I said before, our program is flexible and can serve in many ways to develop rural America. We have amended it through the years to provide for drainage, recreation, and other features. I think these changes have been good, but more amendments will be necessary to enable the Program to keep pace with the times.

Our program simply cannot continue unless we can have urban support. Most of the people of America live in our cities. If we are to have their votes we must show them some tangible benefits. Of course, we know that the Small Watershed Program benefits the whole ecology. This should be enough to city people—but I fear it is not. As I see it, we must greatly expand our program so as to provide a more direct and tangible connection with the needs of our cities. This means a tremendous increase in our costs. To give Los Angeles alone the Flood Prevention Program it seeks would possibly cost a quarter of a billion dollars.

And the implications go much further. Not only will the cost multiply many fold, but as we spend a larger part of the money on non-farm projects, the demand that the planning and control of these programs be turned over to some agency other than the Soil Conservation Service will become more and more insistent. I fear that we may be approaching the destruction of a most helpful program simply because it has been so successful—and yet I recognize that we must work out some practical solutions to the problems. In doing this, we need your help.

Before I invite questions, I do want to briefly discuss a key role to be played by Public Law 566. "Rural Development" is a term we hear a great deal about these days. Our Committee now has before it many important issues, but in my judgment none is as vital as the need to develop Rural America. I need not go into the great problems of our cities which have been created to a great extent by the mass exodus from the countryside to the ghetto. We all know about that. The problem has been "discussed to death". What we need is action.

In the near future, I plan to introduce some form of Rural Development legislation designed to help preserve our small towns and communities and to encourage the farmer to stay where he belongs—on the land into which he has put so much of his life. While I have not completed the drafting of this legislation, I can assure you of one thing—I plan to make the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act an integral part of any proposal I introduce.

Rural Development can become a reality only if we can create industrial development in the countryside. Industry needs water, doesn't it? We must expand our recreational opportunities in Rural America and, of course, this involves water. We all know that we must combat water pollution and the Small Watershed Program is an outstanding tool which can and must be used in this area. Rural Development must come, and it will—just as sure as we are here today—and Public Law 566 is destined to be in the forefront of the revitalization of our countryside.

We have seen, throughout the years, a great deal of honest disagreement between many of the 33 organizations represented here today. It's also no secret that many of you have fought me on some issues, and in many cases, whipped me soundly. Maybe you were right. But we have all survived our battles and I think it is significant that we have pretty well all agreed on the basics of the Small Watershed Program. I look forward to working with you in the days ahead, because we have a rough road in front of us. I almost am tempted to say that I have enjoyed our battles together in the past, but I am reminded of the fact that while watching his troops win a great victory at Fredericksburg, a jubilant General Lee said, "It is well that war is so terrible, else we would grow too fond of it." And, goodness knows, we can certainly make better use of our time by working toward the betterment of not only Rural America, but of all America, than by fighting among ourselves.

Thank you each and all for letting me be here today.

Now if there are any specific questions I can answer I will be glad to try.

SUPPORTS HELP FOR DEPRESSED AREAS

(Mr. ANNUNZIO asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, the subject before this Chamber today is approval or disapproval of the conference report on S. 575, which would amend and extend the Public Works Acceleration Act of 1962, the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, and the Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965. As one of the cosponsors of the Accelerated Public Works bill, which was included as title I of S. 575, I feel it is essential that we pass this conference report.

All three titles of S. 575 help depressed areas. Each title attempts to help depressed areas in a different way in order to treat the varied causes which have retarded their economies.

Temporary help to depressed areas is found in title I of S. 575 which amends the 1962 Accelerated Public Works Act. The Accelerated Public Works program will help relieve the economic distress and unemployment caused by the current recession by employment on public works. It is aimed nationwide. It will help areas which have high unemployment even in the best of times, but which because of the current economic difficulties have acute unemployment problems. It will also help areas which are normally prosperous, but which because of cutbacks in consumer spending and industry layoffs are experiencing high unemployment rates.

The current 6.2-percent rate of unemployment, and the fact that the national

unemployment rate has been around 6 percent since November 1970 has caused hardship for many Americans. Something short term and immediate needs to be done to help these people. In the Chicago area alone, which I represent along with several other distinguished Members, there were 140,000 unemployed in March. In Illinois in the same month, there were 246,000 unemployed. In some cities such as Wichita, Grand Rapids, and Seattle the March unemployment rate was over 9 percent. For this reason I feel that title I is important. It will provide \$2 billion in Federal funds, which along with State and local matching funds will be used to build hospitals, roads, schools, and other needed public works in areas burdened by substantial unemployment and other employment.

This public works construction will provide direct employment to, among others, engineers, lawyers, and construction workers engaged on these projects. It will provide indirect employment to those who make the cement, bricks, steel, and other materials used on these projects, as well as create jobs for salesmen, clerks, and repairmen who will provide the goods and services for those working on the public works projects.

Title II of S. 575 provides additional authorizations and amends certain programs of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965. This 1965 bill created the Economic Development Administration whose prime purpose is to promote the long-term growth of rural depressed areas throughout the country. It provides grants and loans for the construction of public works, loans, and loan guarantees to private industry in redevelopment areas, and technical assistance. Long-term growth is a slow process. It takes years of work and much Federal and local effort to bring prosperity to depressed areas. I feel that the work of the Economic Development Administration is extremely important and that for this reason alone it is essential to pass S. 575.

Title III of S. 575 deals with authorizations and amendments to the Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965. The Appalachian Regional Commission provides assistance to parts of 12 States and all of West Virginia. The Appalachian region extends from New York to Alabama and Mississippi. The goal of the Appalachian Regional Commission is to promote the economic growth of the area.

The Appalachian programs include highway construction in order to make Appalachia more accessible, as well as programs dealing with education, health, housing, and conservation. I feel that the Appalachian program has been extremely effective in helping an area which for decades has been economically depressed. It is bringing Appalachia into the mainstream of the economy. It is a test to see if the Federal Government can help a severely depressed area. I, therefore, urge the passage of S. 575.

My concern with the economic health of the Nation and depressed areas is the interest of every American. Unemployment and underemployment bring untold misery and hardships to millions of people. S. 575 will help solve these prob-

lems. As a former union official and former director of labor in the State of Illinois under Governor Stevenson, I have always been concerned and acutely aware of the problems faced by working Americans, and the need to help relieve unemployment through public works construction and long-range economic development programs.

The threat of President Nixon to veto S. 575 is unfair in view of the current 6.2 percent rate of unemployment, which is a 9-year high. No administration bill will help relieve unemployment in the way the accelerated public works amendment will. The long-term programs of EDA and the ARC are needed to make many depressed areas more economically viable. Thus, S. 575 should have the full support of the House.

KEENE, N.H., STATE COLLEGE PRESIDENT LEO F. REDFERN POINT-EDLY QUESTIONS THE VALUE AND EXPENSE OF FEDERAL REQUESTS FOR REPORTS, SURVEYS, AND OTHER PAPERWORK

(Mr. CLEVELAND asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, in my mail the other day I received an eloquent commentary on the burdens piled on State and local governments, private industry, and private citizens by Federal requests for information.

In an ever increasing stream, requests for information, data, statistics, and so forth, have been flooding out of Washington, without regard to the burden on the recipients. Though there is undoubtedly a need for much of this material, it is also clear that the requesting agencies are often insensitive to the burden they are creating. One reason is that the Federal agencies do not have to pay for the cost of compiling the information. All their cost-accounting shows is the cost to the agency itself.

Leo F. Redfern, president of Keene, N.H., State College in my district, recently received such a request for information from a Federal agency. His eloquent answer speaks well for itself. It is my pleasure to be able to share it with my colleagues.

The letter follows:

KEENE STATE COLLEGE,
Keene, N.H., June 2, 1971.

MR. JOHN R. PASTA,
Head, Office of Computing Activities,
National Science Foundation,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PASTE: I have before me a letter from you, undated, together with a number of forms to be filled out in connection with an NSF survey on Inventory of Computers. In glancing over these forms and accompanying instructions, I estimate it would cost Keene State College \$125.00 to complete and return this Inventory. Therefore, upon receipt of this amount we will complete and return these forms to you.

Otherwise, this is not worth our time to complete, particularly in view of the fact that the latest published report in this series is the *Inventory of Computers, 1966-67*, which can hardly be considered current in view of the rapidly changing field of computer usage in higher education. I question the effectiveness, considering the expense in-

involved, of this entire Inventory of Computers, but nevertheless will find staff to complete and return the forms to you upon payment of the above mentioned \$125.00.

Sincerely yours,

LEO F. REDFERN,
President.

THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE BALTIC STATES

(Mr. ANNUNZIO asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, we pause today to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the mass deportations from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia which occurred in June of 1941.

Although the people of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia had regained their freedom at the end of the First World War, and for 20 years thereafter enjoyed the fruits of that hard-earned independence, the Second World War unfortunately brought disaster and tragedy to these three Baltic Republics.

Most unfortunately for the hopes of the Baltic Nations, they had a powerful neighbor with intentions of controlling the territory of each—not only could Soviet Russia not allow a nation knowing political freedom to border its country, but Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia controlled a major portion of the Baltic Sea, a vital trade and shipping route the Russians felt they must have. How to gain control of these countries, each of which had a treaty of friendship and guarantee of sovereignty with Russia, was an easily solved problem for the Kremlin.

Quickly overpowering each weakened government, the Russians established their militia in each country and began a brutal campaign of mass deportations. On June 14, 1941, the wave of deportations reached its peak, continuing in Lithuania for five more nights. Fifteen thousand Latvian men, women, and children were rounded up by Soviet secret police during a single night and transported in cattle cars to the slave labor camps of Siberia. Thousands of Lithuanians and Estonians were similarly rounded up and deported under equally inhuman conditions.

Today very little is known of the fate of these innocent and helpless souls whose only crime was their opposition to Communism. Many have undoubtedly died, while others still suffer under cruel Communist control clinging to the hope for eventual freedom.

National independence was no more in the Baltic countries—it died through Russian domination. However, the primary goal of the mass deportations—the physical and spiritual destruction of these three small nations—was never realized. In this respect Soviet Russia failed, for the people of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have never lost their identity and their love of liberty which live on in the hearts and minds of the Baltic peoples.

The Captive Nations Friends Committee, with headquarters in Chicago, represents a large number of Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians, many of whom

reside in the Seventh Congressional District of Illinois which I have the honor to represent. At this point in my remarks, I would like to include a press release which I received from that organization's able and dedicated executive chairman, Mr. Viktors Viksnins:

MASS EXECUTIONS AND DEPORTATIONS OF THE BALTIC STATES—ESTONIA, LATVIA, AND LITHUANIA

The Baltic States Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania proclaimed their independence in 1918. The Soviet Union signed a peace treaty solemnly pledging to forever respect the Sovereignty of independence of the Baltic States.

On June 16, 1940, the Soviet Union presented to the Baltic States an ultimatum demanding the establishment of a new government . . . friendly to the Soviet Union. On June 17, 1940, the following ultimatum . . . the Soviet army marched into and occupied Estonia and Latvia. Lithuania was occupied one day earlier.

The rape of the Baltic republics by the Kremlin was recognized by the Axis powers and a few neutrals. Most of the free western democracies, however, followed the lead of the United States, which, issued a declaration by Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, declining recognition.

After arbitrary incorporation into the Soviet Union, a Constitution shaped on the Red pattern was imposed upon the nations.

The incorporation of the Baltic States by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is not recognized by the government of the United States of America.

The Soviet government had begun planning for mass extermination of the Baltic people soon after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact that was signed on August 23, 1939. The clear evidence is found in NKVD Order No. 001223, regarding the "deportation of anti-Soviet elements Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians".

According to this order, lists of those to be deported and supervise the arrest of these people and their transportation to the "loading stations" at railroad facilities.

Next the order stated that at the time of arrest the deportees were under no circumstances to be told that family heads would later on be separated from the rest of the families. When the order was actually executed, all adult men—married or unmarried—were placed in separate railroad cars destined for special slave labor camps. In practical terms, this meant not only separation, but the destruction of the family unit as children were torn not only from fathers and mothers, but also, from their nation, to be brought up as Russians.

The first large-scale mass deportations from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia took place simultaneously the night of June 13, 1941. During that single night thousands of families were dragged from their beds, forced into trucks and sent in railway cattle cars to forced labor camps in the most adverse parts of the Soviet Union. The families thus separated lost track of each other's whereabouts. Wherever the Soviet regime enters as invader or unwelcome guest, it inevitably introduces an "agrarian reform" as a stepping stone to ultimate collectivization.

Estonia: Arrested, deported, June 13, 1941 10,205.

Lithuania: Arrested, deported, June 13, 1941 34,260.

Latvia: Arrested, deported, June 13, 1941 14,693.

Baltic Conference Representatives,
VIKTORS VIKSNINS,
President, Chicago Latvian Association.
AUGUST PARTS,
President, Estonian Society.
DR. KAZYS BOBELIS,
President, Lithuanian American Council.

Today, 30 years after the mass deportations from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, the situation remains unchanged. It is therefore our just and rightful duty to give recognition to the peoples of the Baltic Nations in their struggle to overcome opposition and to regain freedom in their homelands. On January 22, 1971, I introduced House Concurrent Resolution 7 which expresses the sense of the Congress with respect to the incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic. At this time I would like to include in my remarks the text of that bill:

H. CON. RES. 7

Whereas the Government and the people of the United States of America have maintained and enjoyed excellent and friendly relations with the Governments and peoples of the Baltic States Republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, during the years of independence of these Republics; and

Whereas the concept of liberty and freedom of choice of government is still alive in this country, as it has been constantly since the Declaration of Independence; and

Whereas the evidence produced at the hearings of the select committee of the House of Representatives to investigate the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics overwhelmingly tends to prove that the actions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in relation to these free and independent Baltic Republics were contrary to the principles of international law and the principles of freedom; and

Whereas the people of this Nation have consistently shown great sympathy for the peoples of these three Republics, especially as a result of their enslavement and as a result of the inhuman exile and deportation of great numbers of law-abiding persons from their native lands to imprisonment in slave labor camps in the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the President of the United States of America should continue the American policy of nonrecognition of the unlawful absorption of the Baltic States Republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and continue the recognition of the diplomatic and consular officers of these Republics, as the lawful representatives of these three nations in the United States of America; and

(2) the President should take such steps as may be appropriate, through the United States delegation to the United Nations, to raise in the United Nations the question of the forced incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and request the United Nations to conduct an investigation of conditions in the said Baltic Republics to the intent and purpose that Soviet armed forces, agents, and colonists be withdrawn therefrom, and that the exiled peoples of these Republics be returned thereto in freedom, and that free plebiscites and elections be held therein, under the supervision of the United Nations to let the people, in freedom, make their own election and choice as to government.

We speak today in memory of this sad occasion and call attention to the heroism of the peoples and nations involved. The mass deportations of 1941, however painful, have strengthened their determination to resist continuing efforts to extinguish all traces of their national character and spirit. It is therefore with

great pride that I commend the peoples of the Baltic nations, and express the fervent hope that one day they will resume their rightful place in the community of free nations.

VIETNAM VETS INTERESTED IN
DRUG BILL

(Mr. MONAGAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, on May 10, I introduced H.R. 8216, "The Armed Forces Drug Abuse Control Act of 1971." Since this bill was filed, interest has been demonstrated in many quarters.

The distinguished gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT) as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has assured me that the committee will consider scheduling hearings on my bill and the general subject of drug abuse in the military after the position of the Department of Defense on this subject is determined.

Today, I would like to direct the attention of the Members to a letter received by me from the Danbury-Waterbury chapter of Vietnam Veterans Against the War.

The letter suggests two specific areas where implementation of any drug rehabilitation program is likely to encounter difficulty. The first is the likelihood that command influence may block the orderly and just administration of such a program. The suggested solution is the inclusion of civilian medical personnel in the program. The second problem concerns the communication gap between officer program administrators and the enlisted participants which is likely to exist and to impede rehabilitation. Here the Vietnam Veterans Against the War suggest that enlisted personnel administer and control the rehabilitation program.

Mr. Speaker, these veterans have served their country in Vietnam and have intimate knowledge of the drug situation there. Their observations and suggestions should be carefully weighed by individual Members and during hearings examining this problem. I include the letter with my remarks.

VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE
WAR, DANBURY-WATERBURY AREA
CHAPTER

Bethel, Conn., May 17, 1971.

HON. JOHN S. MONAGAN,

House of Representatives, Congress of the
United States, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: We read with interest your proposed rehabilitation bill and we wish to commend you on your interest and initiative in this grave issue. The problem of drug abuse is more widespread than anyone realizes, and the consequences will manifest themselves in the next few years.

However, we wish to take issue on a few points. One in particular is the composition of the Drug Abuse Controls in the armed services. All governing members are officers of company grade or higher. The strongest drug they have ever encountered is alcohol, and while this is a problem, it is of a completely different nature. "Junkies" cannot relate to "lifters" just as officers cannot relate to "junkies". The program will turn into an escape from the brig, and it will not serve any rehabilitation purpose. Put the problem in

the hands of enlisted men, preferably ex-addicts who can relate to the "junkie head".

Another problem is going to be too much military influence, which tends to scare off people from seeking out help. The gap between the modern soldier and the antiquated Army is indeed a wide one. Allow civilian medical personnel to have the deciding say in the final disposition of the patient, and you will find addicts free from fear of command influence.

Thank you for your concern, and we applaud your proposed amendment to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. We will be following the progress of the bill closely.

Sincerely yours,

PHILIP A. LOWE,
STEPHEN WILSON,
WILLIAM D. LEO, JR.

REDTAPE HEARINGS

(Mr. CLEVELAND asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, during the debate earlier today on the Accelerated Public Works bill I pointed out that the Public Works Committee is now holding oversight hearings on the problem of redtape in Federal programs. This afternoon I myself appeared as a witness. I think my opening remarks and my testimony are relevant today and are also of general interest.

It does not make much sense to me to start a new program like Accelerated Public Works when we have not even made existing programs work efficiently. To pile a new program on ones that our investigations have found bogged down in redtape is not being responsible or responsive to the needs of our Nation.

Although my testimony deals with one incident involving a highway, it is typical of other examples of redtape delays involving other federally assisted programs which have been placed in the record of our hearings.

The statements follow:

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES C.
CLEVELAND, RANKING REPUBLICAN MEMBER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman—I would like to make a few comments at this time.

I am very glad these hearings are getting underway. Red Tape in Government—with all its attendant problems—has been a major concern for some time. In New Hampshire, we have too often been confronted with its burdens. Time and again I have tried to help my constituents—State and local officials, as well as private citizens—cut through the ever-present web of red tape facing them in their dealings with the Federal Government. Quite frankly, I find it one of the most frustrating aspects of Government. So much so, in fact, that I plan during the course of these hearings to assume the role of witness myself and outline for the record some of the specific red tape aggravations we in New Hampshire have struggled with in connection with projects and programs within the jurisdiction of the Public Works Committee.

It is certain that potential recipients of Federal assistance—those very ones for whom we have designed the programs—become frustrated and confused by the proliferation of paperwork requirements, the changes in regulations which often negate many hours of work they have performed in fulfilling Federal requirements, and the procrastinated decisions which often occur in the Federal establishment. Is it any wonder that some question whether it is worth-

while to even request assistance from their Government?

I have also noted with growing concern that simple paragraphs in the law, which require some agreement from a potential recipient of Federal aid, too often, in bureaucratic splendor of interpretation, catapult from this small paragraph size to an impressive and frightening super document of many thousands of words. If our aim is to offer assistance on a catch-me-if-you-can basis, we seem to be heading in the right direction.

Regrettably, red tape has been a Government-wide problem for a long time. Over the years there have been many efforts to eliminate—or at least curb—its burdensome effects. Many studies and surveys have been conducted, some on a one-shot basis, others on a continuing or oversight basis. One of the more famous studies of the significance of the problem was conducted by the second Hoover Commission, back in 1955. In its report on paperwork and red tape, there was a particularly interesting observation concerning paperwork costs. An analysis prepared by management consultants revealed that, in government and in industry, the minimum cost of processing each 5 character word or 5 digit number by each person preparing a report was 1¢ per word. Apply that to the trillions of words put on paper and it's a pretty staggering thought. Remember, that was in 1955! Today, I estimate that the 1¢ figure has increased over 100%, and the cost would be something over 2¢ per word. In estimating this figure, I kept all other factors constant and up-dated only the average clerical salary. When you consider the growth in the size of government generally, the increased number of grant-in-aid programs, and the amount of paperwork involved, the dimensions of the problem reach awesome proportions!

To carry this thought even further, would it be impossible to assume that recipients of Federal aid, in complying with Federal regulations, might reach the point where the cost of their required paperwork exceeds the amount of assistance being requested? Think about it, it's not as ridiculous a question as it may seem at first.

Yet, from such studies have come recommendations which, in turn, have led to legislative and administrative changes dealing with the Federal management process and intergovernmental cooperation. But, in spite of the steps which have been taken to combat the size and complexity of Government, to meet the needs of the Nation, to solve some of its problems in as reasonable, timely, and efficient a manner as possible, the red tape complaints continue.

I think the real value of this Subcommittee's investigations may be measured in two ways. Not only are we zeroing in on the general programs and projects within our own Committee's purview, but we are also zeroing in on those specific problems which have delayed these projects and added so greatly to the cost in terms of money, time, paperwork, and headaches. I hope we can reassess our old answers, ask ourselves some new questions, and find some really significant solutions. If we don't find some means of eliminating the red tape and paperwork involved in our own programs, we may yet reach that point where the cost exceeds the amount of assistance. Certainly, we will fall far short of achieving the Committee's goals, and more importantly, the goal of meeting the Nation's needs.

Hopefully, the time will also come when hard-working and capable State officials will be treated with the respect and consideration they deserve. One reason that so many of our programs work so poorly is that the advice and experience of State officials is not sought and/or listened to as much as it should be. These people with a wealth of experience and knowledge are just not consulted before decisions are made; rather, all-

knowing Washington officials hand down unworkable rules and make ill-considered decisions. Despite their well-meant intentions, the results are all too often waste, delay, and failure of programs to solve problems.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES C. CLEVELAND, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, REDTAPE HEARINGS, RE FRANCONIA NOTCH

Mr. Chairman, I take the witness stand to present to this Subcommittee a documented picture of one State's frustration resulting from delay initiated by the Federal establishment. Most particularly I refer to a 10-mile section of I-93 in my own State of New Hampshire which, after twelve years of careful development with the environment in mind and with Federal approval at each step of the way, was placed in pre-construction limbo over a year ago with no hope for assured completion.

This section is a needed link in New Hampshire's and the Nation's Interstate system. Its absence would create a serious safety hazard. It is also of vital importance to an important industry in New Hampshire—tourism—and to the economic development of the economically-disadvantaged North Country of New Hampshire. The expenditure of several hundred thousand dollars in studies and plans and several thousand man hours had resulted in bringing this section to approval by the Federal Government and by all conservation groups involved. The location was specifically authorized by the statutes of the State.

I have attached to this statement a brief chronology of the development of this highway and a copy of a letter I have received from R. H. Whitaker, Commissioner of the Department of Public Works and Highways in New Hampshire, which outlines the development of the highway in more detail. These documents reveal how an environmentally-minded State took every conceivable precaution in planning and designing a section of highway, complying with Federal requirements and the wishes of its citizenry. After years of compliance it has found the ground cut out from under it by an all-powerful Federal bureaucracy, which is unwilling to trust or respect the judgment of conscientious State officials.

FRANCONIA NOTCH I-93

1944—Interstate & Defense Highway System created.

1947—General location of Interstate System located (40,000 Miles).

1956—Interstate Highway Act—13 year period.

December 1958—Route study completed by Clarkeson Engineering Company. Proved conclusively the feasibility of a location thru Notch. It put forth a scheme which would accomplish this without damage to the Notch's natural and points of interest while at the same time it provided a means of access to the area's important features.

May 1959—Following many information meetings, the State Legislature by Laws of 1959 authorized the Commissioner to construct I-93 thru the Notch.

March 30, 1966—Formal Public Hearing in Lincoln for complete 30 mile layout held (Campton to Franconia).

March 30, 1966—Ad Hoc Committee formed to advise the Department.

April 29, 1966—Governor King and Executive Council approved Special Committee report from Campton northerly to the Lincoln-Woodstock Town Line. Governor King also directed Commissioner John Morton to engage a competent consultant geologist to study Notch and submit a Geological Report by December 1, 1966.

June 1966—Drs. Casagrande and Deere engaged for geological study.

June 21, 1966—Bureau of Public Roads approved layout (Campton to Woodstock).

July 27, 1966—Clarkeson engaged to design section—Campton to Thornton.

November 30, 1966—Governor King and Executive Council approved the remainder of the Special Committee report for layout thru Notch.

November 30, 1966—Governor King and Executive Council appointed a Citizens Advisory Committee (Governor Adams, Mrs. Jean Hennessey, Paul Bofinger, Mr. Carter, and Dr. McDade).

Adams, Hennessey and Bofinger were former members of "Ad Hoc" Committee formed at Lincoln Public Hearing. Committee was charged to act in an advisory capacity toward preserving the scene beauty and recreational values of the Notch during the planning phase.

December 1, 1966—Drs. Casagrande and Deere submitted their report. Gave assurance that there were no geological reasons which would preclude construction thru Notch.

Recommended Cut and Cover protection at Profile Lake.

March 31, 1967—Governor and Council authorized State Parks Director Russell Tobey to hire Wirth Associates of Billings, Montana to prepare a master plan for Franconia State Park. Wirth Associates presented their preliminary report to the Advisory Committee in Lincoln on September 8, 1967. Recommendations were negative to Clarkeson's proposal and recommended a westerly route, bypassing the Notch. On October 17, 1967 the Department presented a rebuttal to Wirth's suggestion. Would create serious in-direction, steep grades exceeding 5% in Bog Pond area.

August 1, 1967—Fay, Spofford and Thorn-dike engaged to design the Woodstock section.

September 8, 1967—Wirth submitted their report (see above). Westerly route or Tunnel under Eagle Cliff.

October 25, 1967—Clarkeson engaged to design Lincoln section.

January 17, 1968—Conference with Parks Division. Proposed plan from Flume to Profile Lake approved. Negotiations initiated with Edwards and Kelcey for design of this section.

March 1968—U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey engaged to monitor Profile (\$90,000).

June 6, 1968—Edwards and Kelcey engaged for study and design (\$385,000). Sub-contracts by Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade and Douglas for Tunnel feasibility study—Bolt, Beranek and Newman for noise environment study and Dr. Deere for geological studies.

October 2, 1968—Edwards and Kelcey instructed to add tunnel study (\$62,000).

December 5, 1968—Edwards and Kelcey presented studies to Department and D.R.E.D. 3 Studies presented:

Eagle Cliff Route \$88.2 million—9000' Tunnel.

Single Interchange Route 3 \$28.3 million. Slide Protection Structure 2200'—500' open—1400'.

Double interchange Route 3 \$26.1 million.

December 16, 1968—Edwards and Kelcey presented report of studies to Governor King and Council. Governor and Council approved the following Resolution:

Resolved that: Governor and Council in furtherance of their action at their meeting of November 30, 1966 accept the recommendations made by Edwards and Kelcey, i.e., the surface route with double interchange, on this date for the treatment of I-93 through the Franconia Notch area. Such acceptance subject to receipt and considerations of the Franconia Notch Advisory Committee provided same is placed before the Governor and Council on or before December 20, 1968.

December 23, 1968—The Governor and Council accepted the report submitted by the Franconia Notch Advisory Committee

and noted its contents and were in agreement without qualification.

January 17, 1969—B.P.R. approval of design concept (Profile Lake at Echo Lake).

January 1969—Department initiated negotiations with Edwards and Kelcey for design of the section from Profile Lake north.

June 16, 1969—Governor and Council approved Edwards and Kelcey's agreement for design.

Estimated Construction Cost, \$26,000,000. Consultant Fee, \$1,230,000 Part A Design; 200,000 Part B Soils.

Completion Date—March 1, 1972.

June 30, 1969—Bureau of Public Roads approval of Edwards and Kelcey's agreement.

August 6, 1969—Edwards and Kelcey gave formal presentation of Notch Study, to representatives of White Mountain Region Association, Forestry and Recreation, A.M.C. Chapter, Councilor Smith, North Alternate Route Committee, N.H. Good Roads Association, N.H. Federation of Garden Club, Audubon Society of New Hampshire, Appalachian Mountain Club, National Park Service, Sierra Club, White Mountain "93" Association, U.N.H. Outing Club.

September 2, 1969—Edwards and Kelcey started soil borings.

October 1969—Preliminary negotiations with Edwards and Kelcey for single interchange at Echo Lake and road west of Echo Lake (\$15,000).

November 19, 1969—E. & K. submitted soils study re: feasibility slide protection structure.

December 12, 1969—Meeting arranged by Councilor Smith to review I-93 from Flume to Echo Lake including Park Service Road. Those attending—Councilor Smith, Richard Hamilton of Ski 93, Paul Bofinger of Society for Protection of N.H. Forests, John Colby of Littleton Courier and Terrance Briggs of Plymouth Record. This group very much in favor of a continuous Park Service Road from the Flume to Lafayette Campground.

December 22, 1969—E. & K. submitted Echo Lake Study.

December 31, 1969—Park Service Road plan reviewed with D.R.E.D.

January 8, 1970—Commissioner Whitaker, Councilor Smith to Washington, D.C. to discuss I-93—Franconia Notch with Volpe and Turner.

January 8, 1970—Webb and Brunel reviewed Park Service Road with Paul Bofinger, Comstock, Tobey and Thomas.

January 9, 1970—At Loon Mt.—General Meeting to discuss Park Service Road and Echo Lake interchange and road to the west of the Lake. Those attending:

Advisory Committee—Governor Adams, Bofinger, Hennessey, Carter.

D.R.E.D.—Tobey, Sullivan, Thomas and Carpenter.

Department—Webb, Langley, Brunel and Roberts.

Councilor Smith, Mr. Paul McGoldrick.

January 8, 1970—Briefing memo from F. C. Turner thru J. D. Braman to John A. Volpe.

February 2, 1970—Resolution to Asst. Sec. Braman from Appalachian Mt. Club and Society for the Protection of N.H. Forests.

February 4, 1970—Letter from Crowley to Commissioner confirming alignment at Whitehouse Bridge and the Basin.

March 2, 1970—Received telephone call from Editor of Engineering-News Record that their Washington Office had advised them that I-93 Franconia Notch was indefinitely postponed.

March 2, 1970—4:25 P.M. Telephone call from Volpe's Office (Joe Boscoe) advising that I-93 be discontinued.

March 3, 1970—4:55 P.M. Telephone call from Love advising I-93 discontinued.

March 6, 1970—Letter dated March 2, 1970 from Volpe confirming I-93 discontinuance.

March 13, 1970—Letter to Volpe from Commissioner Whitaker to reconsider his decision

of March 2, 1970 re: discontinuance of I-93 Franconia Notch.

March 17, 1970—Letter dated 3-17-70 from Comstock, B.P.R. together w/ltr. dated 3-13-70 from R. T. Messer, Washington requesting data on Interstate Corridor Comparisons.

April 28, 1970—Copy of letter from John Volpe to F. C. Turner re: action taken on I-93 Franconia Notch. Also attached letter from E. H. Bartelink dated 3-13-70 to J. D. Braman together with letter dated 3-20-70 from J. D. Braman to Administrator, Federal Highway Administration.

May 7, 1970—Letter was signed by the Secretary 5-5-70 and addressed to Hon. George H. Fallon, Washington relative to sections in question on the 1970 Interstate System Cost Estimate. Franconia Notch-New Hampshire included.

June 13, 1970—New Release from the Office of the Secretary re-affirming the Department of Transportation's decision not to build and Interstate Highway through New Hampshire's Franconia Notch.

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,
Concord, N.H., May 12, 1971.

HON. JAMES C. CLEVELAND,
Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, 1112 Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN CLEVELAND: This letter will supplement information which Governor Peterson has forwarded to Congressman Jim Wright, Chairman of your Subcommittee. It is designed basically to provide you with a chronology of events which led up to the fiasco of Interstate 93 in Franconia Notch.

In 1958, the Department, with Federal concurrence, engaged the Clarkson Engineering Company of Boston to make a study designed to determine the optimum location for Interstate Route 93 between Plymouth, N.H. and Franconia, N.H. The report of this study was delivered to the Department late in that year. It established the Pemigewasset Valley-Franconia Notch location for the highway after careful evaluation of all alternatives. It justified an imaginative utilitarian and environment-oriented plan for handling the route through the Notch itself.

The Clarkson firm's report was widely circulated and presented to interested groups on a Statewide basis through a long series of informal meetings. It was accepted by the Federal government and the Department. In May of 1959 New Hampshire's General Court placed in the statutes Chapter 90 of the Laws of 1959 which is quoted for convenience as follows: "90:1 Highway Authorized. The commissioner of public works and highways is hereby authorized to lay out, construct and maintain as a part of the interstate and defense highway system a parkway type of public highway through Franconia Notch from the towns of Lincoln and Woodstock to Franconia Village in accordance with the recommendations in respect thereto contained in the report of the Clarkson Engineering Company, Inc. of Boston, Massachusetts dated December 8, 1958, as funds may be appropriated and programmed for this purpose 90:2 Takes Effect. This act shall take effect sixty days after its passage."

Following this action of the Legislature the prosecution of surveys and designs leading to construction in this area remained dormant. In the interim, New Hampshire's Interstate funds were applied to a logical development of Interstate 93 northward from Salem, N.H. and to other sections of Interstate highway which could replace the most deficient sections of the then existing highway system. During the latter months of 1965, preliminary plans were formulated for the location and design of a thirty mile section of Interstate 93 from Compton northward to Franconia.

In October of 1965 a full scale informal

public informational meeting was held in the auditorium of the Lin-Wood High School in Lincoln, N.H. This meeting was attended by several hundred interested citizens. In January of 1966 a similar meeting was held in the Thornton vestry in the Town of Thornton. It, too, was heavily attended by interested citizens. A petition bearing upwards of 500 names of New Hampshire citizens was offered in support. On March 30, 1966, the formal public hearing was held in the Lin-Wood High School at Lincoln. This hearing was attended by from 700 to 800 interested citizens, some 67 or 68 of whom testified for the record. Of this latter number, at least sixty people spoke in favor of the proposal which I have neglected to state was based on the Clarkeson plan as concerns the Franconia Notch area. The hearing itself lasted some six or seven hours and was preceded by a two-hour period during which engineers of the Department gave individual explanations to all interested citizens. The hearing was presided over by a special committee made up of three members of the Governor's Executive Council. It was chairmanned by the Councilor from that District, the late William Stiles of Groveton, assisted by Councilor James H. Hayes of District No. 5 and Councilor Austin Quinney of District No. 2.

On April 29, 1966, following a detailed route inspection by Governor King and the five Executive Councilors, the special committee's report in favor of the proposed location, was reviewed by the Governor and the Executive Council. The Executive body approved the report of the special committee for the road from its southerly terminus in Campton northerly as far as the Lincoln-Woodstock town line. As a precedent to further approval, the Department was directed to engage a competent consulting geologist to study the Notch area and report the results of this study back to the Executive body.

As a result, in June of 1966, the Department engaged two internationally famous engineering geologists: Dr. Arthur Casagrande of Harvard University, and Dr. Don U. Deere of the University of Illinois.

On June 21, 1966, the Department received the approval of the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads of the layout from Campton to the Lincoln-Woodstock town line, and surveys and designs were initiated. In the interim, studies were made of the area by the geologists referred to above.

On November 30, 1966, the findings of the geologists were presented to the regular meeting of Governor King and the Executive Council. The report of Doctors Casagrande and Deere gave assurance that there were no geological reasons which would preclude construction of the highway through the Notch. The report also gave assurance that such minor blasting (the valley floor is composed largely of earth and boulders) as might be involved could be conducted without endangering the integrity of the "Old Man."

Upon receipt of this information, at the same meeting, Governor King and the Council approved the remainder of the special committee's recommendations for a layout of the highway through Franconia Notch. Coincidentally, Governor King and the Council appoint a Citizens' Advisory Committee composed of leading New Hampshire conservationists. This committee was chairmanned by Governor Sherman Adams of Lincoln, and supported by Mrs. Jean Hennessey, Chairman of the Governor's Committee on Natural Beauty, Mr. Paul Bofinger of the Society for the Protection of N.H. Forests, Mr. John Carter of the architectural firm of Carter and Woodruff, and Dr. Harry McDade of Littleton. It should be noted at this point that Governor Adams, Mrs. Hennessey, and Mr. Bofinger were also members of a so-called ad hoc committee which had constituted it-

self immediately following the public hearing at Lincoln and which had worked with the Department from that time on. The new committee which was appointed on November 30 was charged with the responsibility for acting in an advisory capacity to the Department during the planning phase for the purpose of preserving the scenic beauty and recreational values of the Notch.

During the early months of 1968 a series of conferences was held between the members of the Advisory Committee and the State's Park Division. Among other things, the recommendations of the Parks Division's planning consultant for an extensive tunnel under the entire area was considered. During the month of March the services of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey were called upon through the Bureau of Public Roads to provide a continuous seismographic monitoring of the "Old Man's" profile, at an estimated cost of \$90,000. When removed two years later the system had provided substantial proof that natural forces acting on the Profile are far greater than those created by man.

On June 6, 1968, the firm of Edwards and Kelcey of Boston was engaged to provide designs and contract plans in the State park area up to a point just below the Notch proper. This same agreement provided for an extremely detailed study of the Notch itself. In the process of executing this latter study, Edwards and Kelcey called upon the services of the internationally known tunnel firm, Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade and Douglas, for a tunnel feasibility study and on the firm of Bolt, Beranek and Newman in connection with the environmental effect of highway noise. Edwards and Kelcey also engaged the services of the same Dr. Deere previously referred to, for a geological review of their designs. From June until December, Edwards and Kelcey proceeded with the study of the Notch area in conjunction with representatives of this Department and representatives of the Department of Resources and Economic Development. Each important step in the study was presented to and reviewed by the Advisory Committee. The Committee placed its veto on several of the initial schemes under consideration and provided very substantial input on the development of the consultant's final recommendations. All accepted steps were approved by the Bureau of Public Roads.

On December 5 of 1968, Edwards and Kelcey presented the results of their studies to the Department and to the Department of Resources and Economic Development. Three studies were presented: The Eagle Cliff tunnel route (9000' in length) and favored by DRED, was estimated to cost 88.2 million dollars. The single interchange proposal (north of Echo Lake) and favored by the Advisory Committee, was estimated to cost 28.3 million dollars. This proposal embodied a slide protection structure or so-called cut and cover tunnel, a form of which was originally proposed by the geologists. The third study provided for two interchanges in the Notch and was estimated to cost 26.1 million dollars. This proposal was not favored by the Advisory Committee.

On December 16, 1968, the Edwards and Kelcey people presented their report and recommendations to the Governor and Council in regular session. Following the presentation, the Executive group adopted the following resolution: "Resolved that: Governor and Council in furtherance of their action at their meeting of November 30, 1966, accept the recommendations made by Edwards and Kelcey, i.e., the surface route with double interchange, on this date for the treatment of Interstate 93 through the Franconia Notch area. Such acceptance subject to receipt and consideration of the report of the Franconia Notch Advisory Committee provided same is placed before Governor and Council on or before December 20, 1968."

On December 23, 1968, the Governor and Council accepted the report submitted by the

Franconia Notch Advisory Committee, noted its contents, and were in agreement with the qualifications. On January 17, 1969, the Bureau of Public Roads gave its approval to the design concept recommended by Edwards and Kelcey as approved by the Governor and Council and the Franconia Notch Advisory Committee.

The Department at once initiated negotiations with Edwards and Kelcey for the design of the highway through the Notch proper. On June 30 of 1969 the Bureau of Public Roads gave its approval to the agreement developed by this Department and Edwards and Kelcey for the design and provision of contract plans through the Notch area. On August 6, 1969, representatives of Edwards and Kelcey made a formal presentation in the John O. Morton building of its study to representatives of the following groups: White Mountain Region Association, Forestry and Recreation, A.M.C. Chapter, Councilor Smith, North Alternate Route Committee, N.H. Goods Roads Association, N.H. Federation of Garden Clubs, Audubon Society of New Hampshire, Appalachian Mountain Club, National Park Service, Sierra Club, White Mountain "93" Association, U.N.H. Outing Club. Following this presentation, field work and the preparation of plans proceeded forthwith.

On November 7, 1969, the Department received telephone notice from the Bureau of Public Roads of a visit to Franconia by the Department of Transportation's Assistant Secretary for Environmental and Urban Systems, Mr. J. D. Braman. It (the Department) was asked to send a representative to meet with Mr. Braman in Franconia on November 10, 1969. The writer, in company with Governor Sherman Adams, Executive Councilor Stephen Smith, and Planning Engineer Robert Kenevel, participated in an impromptu meeting of conservationists conducted by Mr. Braman in the basement of the Tramway Base Station on that date.

Following this meeting, the Department received indications from the Bureau of Public Roads that further approvals were being withheld in compliance with informal instructions from Mr. Braman. As a result of this situation, Councilor Stephen Smith and the writer obtained an appointment with Secretary Volpe on January 8, 1970. While this meeting was an entirely cordial one, no really conclusive information or action resulted from it. The first indication of formal action by the Secretary to tie up the ten mile section of Interstate 93 under Section (4f) came on March 2, 1970—not through official channels—but through a telephone call to the writer from the editor of the Engineering News Record who indicated he had just received information to the effect that the Secretary had "demapped" a section of Interstate 93 at the end of construction near the Jack O'Lantern in Woodstock to Franconia. Later, on the same day, this information was confirmed by a telephone call from Secretary Volpe's office. On March 6, the writer received a letter confirming this under date of March 2.

Following this action by the Secretary, Governor Peterson, Executive Councilor Smith, Governor Peterson's aide, Alexander Taft, and the writer traveled to Washington where they were joined by Senators Cotton, McIntyre, Congressmen Cleveland and Wyman, in a meeting with Secretary Volpe and members of his staff. The Secretary's action in connection with Franconia Notch was very strongly protested.

Following this meeting in the Secretary's office, Secretary Volpe paid a visit to New Hampshire on June 13, 1970, and was flown over the Franconia Notch area in company with Governor Walter Peterson and the writer. After this flight he held a prearranged press conference at the Concord Airport and announced his decision to permit continuance of Interstate 93 to an inter-

change with Route 3A between Woodstock and Lincoln, with a two-lane transition route to be constructed back to a connection with existing Route 3 about a half mile north of "Clark's Bear Ranch," with any further work on either designs or construction to be indefinitely postponed for the ten mile section of 93 leading through Franconia Notch. The Secretary's decision of that date still stands.

Thus, twelve years of study, planning, and logical step by step procedure, each of which had received the unqualified approval and funding participation of the Federal government, have gone down the drain. Several hundred thousand dollars in studies and plans have been placed on the shelf to gather dust, together with several thousand man-hours of study, planning, coordination and informational effort. All these things added up to a fully approved effort. Fully approved means just that—by the Federal government, by all conservation agencies involved, including those of the Federal government and those conservationists active on the New Hampshire scene, and perhaps most important, by the Advisory Committee which worked with the Department and its consultants and had given its blessing to the whole matter. Should time permit, you may wish to review a copy of Secretary Volpe's letter stopping all work, together with copies of letters from various conservation agencies and other pertinent documents which are attached.

I am most grateful for the opportunity to make this lengthy presentation of this important subject for the consideration of your Committee.

Sincerely,

R. H. WHITAKER, P.E.

NAUM GABO WINS NEW HONOR

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, I was permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, I was honored last week to attend a conferring upon Naum Gabo of Middlebury, Conn., of the Order of the British Empire at ceremonies at the British Embassy here in Washington. Gabo is a friend and former constituent and we in Connecticut are proud of his artistic achievements and happy that this well-deserved honor has come to him.

A summary of his career and achievements by Charles Dixon appeared in the Waterbury American and I include that article herewith for those who are acquainted with Gabo's outstanding position in the world of modern art.

I also include a complimentary editorial which appeared in the Waterbury American of June 10, 1971:

[From the Waterbury American, June 9, 1971]

FAMED SCULPTOR WINS HIGH BRITISH HONOR (By Charles Dixon)

MIDDLEBURY.—Eighty-year-old Sculptor Naum Gabo, of Middlebury, who helped to revolutionize the art 50 years ago, today will receive one of the highest honors Great Britain can bestow.

On orders of Queen Elizabeth, Gabo will become an honorary Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire in ceremonies at the British Embassy in Washington.

The knighting ritual will be conducted on the Queen's behalf by the Earl of Cromer, British ambassador to the United States. The ceremonies are scheduled for 5 p.m.

Gabo, a native of Russia has lived in this area since 1946, first in Woodbury, and since 1953 on Breakneck Hill in Middlebury.

He said Monday he was informed last month that his name would appear on the list of the Queen's Birthday Honors, but that the honor must remain confidential until today.

Gabo and his brother, Antoine Deuser of Paris, ushered in the constructivist school of sculpture with publication of their "Realistic Manifesto" in Russia in 1920.

With the constructivist method, forms are constructed with plastic and metals instead of by the traditional carving and modeling in wood, stone and clay.

A world-renowned artist for many years, Gabo was made an honorary doctor by the Royal College of Art in 1967. He won the grand prize in sculpture in Dusseldorf, Germany, the following year. Several years ago the British Broadcasting Co. came to Middlebury to film a Gabo television documentary.

Gabo said he has been told the honorary knighthood he will receive today is of the highest type England can bestow on a foreigner. Actual knighthood is granted only to British subjects.

Gabo, who displays an unusual vigor and energy for his years, continues to work in his field, "What can I do else?" he asked.

A traveling exhibition containing 54 pieces of his work is currently in Hanover, West Germany, having already appeared in Copenhagen, Oslo and West Berlin. Also on its itinerary is the Museum of Modern Art in Paris.

His works also are displayed in a number of leading museums in the United States, including the Museum of Modern Art and the Whitney Museum in New York City.

His largest work is an 81-foot-tall steel and bronze construction in Rotterdam, which commemorates the city's resurrection following World War II.

Gabo, who became an American citizen in 1953, left the Soviet Union shortly after publication of his manifesto. He later lectured in Germany and first exhibited in the United States in 1926. He then went to London where he met and married New York artist Marian Israels.

The Gabos spent World War II in England, coming to Woodbury when the war ended.

[From the Waterbury American, June 10, 1971]

DESERVED HONOR FOR GABO

Connecticut and Middlebury were signally honored with the conferring on the talented Naum Gabo of the highest rank that Great Britain awards a person not of British ancestry. Gabo, who is certainly at the top of his profession as a sculptor, was made an Honorary Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire. The ceremony was held in Washington with the British ambassador to the United States, presiding.

The Waterbury area has been singularly blessed by the presence of Gabo in our midst since 1946. His work has been lauded in the local press as it has in all manner of publication and by his fellow artists and admirers of the school of art that he and a brother introduced to the world a great many years ago.

It is a pleasure to join with friends and others in congratulating Naum Gabo on his well-deserved honor.

MAYOR EDWARD D. BERGIN

(Mr. MONAGAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, in the passing of Mayor Edward Bergin of Wa-

terbury on May 30, I lost a friend since boyhood and a political associate of many years. In addition, our party lost a faithful adherent and our city lost a chief executive whose devotion to its welfare could never be questioned.

An appreciation of Mayor Bergin's career appeared in the Waterbury Republican on May 31. Since this newspaper was not always the strongest supporter of Mayor Bergin during his career this appraisal is particularly dispassionate.

I include the editorial with my remarks as a fair statement of the outstanding career of Mayor Edward D. Bergin:

MAYOR EDWARD D. BERGIN

The sudden and completely unexpected death of Mayor Edward D. Bergin is a shock to the city. Both friend and foe must be moved by his passing at the age of 59.

To recount the activities in which Mayor Bergin was involved would only result in a statistical listing which would include such obvious loves as his church, the Knights of Columbus, and many other organizations of all kinds, but it would hardly tell the story of his life.

Mayor Bergin was a politician. It was, aside from his family, probably his first love. Politics to him was far more than a hobby; it was a way of life.

He never backed off from a political fight. He enjoyed them. Naturally, he enjoyed winning, but he was never one to sulk at a loss. There was always another day, and Bergin made many a comeback in his career. He was declared politically dead on a number of occasions, but confounded his enemies and astonished his friends by reappearing, almost from nowhere, and winning.

Mr. Bergin was a state-wide figure even though he only sought state office once in his life. He ran for state comptroller in 1954. It was the wrong year politically because of all the Democratic candidates on the state ticket that year, only Abraham A. Ribicoff was elected. That defeat never bothered Mr. Bergin. Some wondered if he really had his heart in election to any state post.

Mr. Bergin made his presence felt on the state level. He sought to reward his political friends by having them appointed judges or to state jobs. He was never reluctant to fight the state party leaders in order to insure proper representation for the city on the state ticket.

To describe him as strong willed is an understatement. He never objected to taking on any and all comers—even the entire city—if he felt he was right and others were wrong.

His severest critics always had respect for his ability and proficiency in convincing the voters to view things as he did. Mayor Bergin was always at his best when he was extemporaneous in his speaking. On the occasions when he was forced to use a text, he was rarely as forceful and recognized it himself.

He had the unique capacity of being able to keep up with virtually every phase of city government, particularly in earlier years when it was not as complex as today. Because of that familiarity, he was able to withstand the attacks of critics, often blasting their arguments to smithereens.

Mr. Bergin always had a soft spot in his heart for the city's educational system. It stemmed from the 12 years he served on the Board of Education. After becoming mayor he often attended School Board meetings and presided over them because of his interest.

There was never any question about Mr. Bergin being a Democrat. It was almost a way of life with him. That did not mean he always agreed with the philosophies of the party locally, in the state or even nationally. If he lived elsewhere in the country, he

might have been a Republican. His views were generally most conservative.

Some politicians tend to bend with the prevailing winds. Mr. Bergin stood for principles as he saw them and fought to bend others to his ways. He was successful more often than not, particularly in his early political years.

Except in recent weeks when he was apparently recovering successfully from an illness, Bergin maintained a personal schedule which would exhaust most men. He attended as many city board meetings as possible. He was in City Hall early and stayed late. And he went to all kinds of municipal functions.

The sudden death of Mayor Bergin will leave a void in the city's political scene which no person can fill. It will cause a political upheaval which will involve the careers of many people. It will result in the kind of political battling which he always enjoyed, although this may exceed the biggest he ever witnessed in his life.

Mayor Bergin devoted his adult life to the city government of Waterbury. His family deserves the sincerest sympathies of all.

HORTON LEGISLATION BANS SALE OF MAILING LISTS BY FEDERAL AGENCIES FOR SOLICITATIONS, PROTECTS FREEDOM ON INFORMATION

(Mr. HORTON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, on June 3, I introduced H.R. 8903, to limit the sale or distribution of mailing lists by Federal agencies. The bill is very similar to the one I introduced last year which was cosponsored by over 75 of my colleagues.

H.R. 8930 is the result of an in-depth study I conducted of mailing list sales by the Federal Government. The study unearthed a serious gap in our Federal laws that encourages the invasion of an individual's right to privacy and, in some cases, his safety.

A survey of 50 departments and agencies revealed that there is no established Government policy on the sale of mailing lists. Some agencies provide such lists routinely; others do not. Curiously, all cite the Freedom of Information Act as the basis for their decisions.

The Freedom of Information Act was enacted in 1967 to provide the public with as complete access as possible to public records. Its purpose is to prevent Government agencies from unjustifiably withholding information that should be reasonably available to the public. Certain information can be withheld if it involves national security, proprietary business information, investigatory files, or personnel or medical files. Other statutes protect the confidentiality of income tax and census data.

However, the act overlooks completely the mailing lists compiled by Federal agencies in carrying out their proper roles. I do not believe that the Freedom of Information Act was passed as a license for commercial organizations to invade an individual's privacy or to aid those with illegal intent.

The mailing list problem was brought to my attention by Dr. Wendell Ames, director of the Monroe County Health

Department. Dr. Ames, a gun collector, was required to register with the Internal Revenue Service under the 1968 Gun Control Act. Shortly after registering, he began receiving solicitations from a sports supply shop in Ohio. These solicitations used the identical address label used by the IRS for its own mailings to licensees.

When I first looked into this, the IRS claimed it was forced to sell the list, containing the names and addresses of 143,000 gun collectors and dealers, under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. IRS said it had to sell the list to anyone who wanted it and who paid the \$140 charge set by the agency. This amounts to less than a tenth of a cent per name and address.

Dr. Ames' complaint was that his home had been placed in jeopardy, without his knowledge, by the sale of the list. The list would have made it easy for anyone to locate and steal supplies of weapons kept unprotected in private homes across the country.

As a result of my inquiry, IRS Commissioner Randolph W. Throver reviewed this practice and stopped the distribution of names of gun collectors. However, IRS continues to sell the list of gun dealers.

There are other examples of how Federal agencies aid the invasion of privacy of our citizens. The Federal Communications Commission sells at cost the names of all licensed ham radio operators, numbering about 265,000. The Federal Aviation Administration sells the lists of licensed pilots with approximately 680,000 names. The Coast Guard sells the names of registered boat owners.

H.R. 8930 will correct this serious breach of privacy by amending the Freedom of Information Act to prohibit the Government from selling mailing lists for commercial purposes or other solicitations or for any illegal purpose. It will prohibit the sale or distribution of any list of names of Federal employees, past or present members of the Armed Forces, or persons who are licensed or required to register with any Federal agency unless there is a certification that such a list will not be used for commercial or other solicitation or for any unlawful purpose.

Let me emphasize, Mr. Speaker, that H.R. 8930 will not prevent legitimate access to agency information. Nor will it undermine in any way the carefully forged statutes of the Freedom of Information Act. It will, however, clearly establish the intent of Congress that mailing lists will not be used for purposes of affecting individual safety or privacy.

A critic of my original bill claimed that it would "prohibit a reporter from writing stories about hundreds of Federal licensees—ranging from whisky distillers to airline pilots—unless he wrote for a nonprofit publication." I feel there would be no such prohibition since the language of the bill bars only the release of mailing lists to be used for commercial or other solicitations. To make this absolutely clear, however, I have amended the language of my original bill by adding that "commercial or other solicitation shall not include publication of lists, or

parts thereof where such publication does not have as its purpose the solicitation, by mail or otherwise, of persons whose names and addresses are contained in the published list."

The need for a Government-wide policy on the question of mailing lists is clear. H.R. 8930 will provide the missing policy while maintaining a positive balance between the public's right to know and the individual's right to privacy.

Mr. Speaker, at this point I insert the language of my bill:

H.R. 8930

A bill to limit the sale or distribution of mailing lists by Federal agencies

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 552 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(c) (1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), no agency may distribute, sell, or otherwise make available to any person any list of names and addresses of—

"(A) employees, or former employees, of any agency,

"(B) persons licensed by any agency,

"(C) persons registered or required to file information with any agency, or

"(D) members, or former members, of the Armed Forces,

except in accordance with paragraph (2) or (3).

"(2) An agency may make available a list of names and addresses of persons referred to in paragraph (1)—

"(A) if the person to whom such list is made available certifies (in such manner as the agency shall by regulation prescribe) that—

"(i) such list will not be used for purposes of commercial or other solicitation, and

"(ii) such list will not be used for any purpose which is unlawful under any State or Federal law, or

"(B) if the list is made available by the agency as a necessary part of its statutory functions or requirements (other than requirements imposed by this section).

"(3) Any agency may make available a list of names and addresses if specifically authorized to do so by statute (other than this section).

"(4) For purposes of this subsection, 'commercial or other solicitation' shall not include publication of lists, or parts thereof where such publication does not have as its purpose the solicitation, by mail or otherwise, of persons whose names and addresses are contained in the published list.

"(5) Any person whose name and address is on any list made available under paragraph (2) (A) and who is solicited in a communication mailed to him the address of which is obtained from such list may request the person who addressed such communication to remove his name from such list. Upon receipt of such request, the person addressing the communication shall remove such name from such list.

"(6) Any person—

"(A) who uses a list for a purpose for which he has certified under paragraph (2) (A) that it will not be used,

"(B) who uses a list, obtained by another person under paragraph (2) (A), for purposes of commercial or other solicitation, or

"(C) who fails to remove a name from a list in accordance with paragraph (5), shall be imprisoned for not more than one year, or fined not more than \$10,000, or both."

SEC. 2. The amendment made by the first section of this Act shall apply only to lists made available by an agency after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3. Subsection (c) of section 552 is redesignated as subsection (d).

COL. WILLIAM J. KING—HIS CONCERN IS FOR PEOPLE

(Mr. HORTON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, becoming a U.S. citizen can be the happiest experience of one's life. Often, it is the culmination of years of saving hard-earned money and the reuniting of loved ones after long separations. Seeking citizenship may also be a terrifying time, as the prospective citizen, confronted with seemingly endless forms and applications, tries to make his needs known with only scant familiarity with English.

Fortunately, for thousands seeking citizenship to the United States each year, there is a man who understands both the joy and trepidation which fill this event. He has tried to insure that this is a happy culmination to their dreams.

For the past 14 years, Col. William J. King has been director of Immigration and Naturalization for District 7, which includes all of New York State north of Ulster, Dutchess, and Sullivan Counties. It is believed that during the summer months more foreigners enter the United States through the Niagara frontier than anywhere else in this country.

At the end of May, Colonel King retired after 43 years of service with the U.S. Immigration Service. I would like to share with my colleagues some of his accomplishments for I know the fate of immigrants and visitors to this country is the concern of us all.

As seventh district director, Colonel King has responsibility not only for the citizenship and naturalization process, but also for U.S. citizens crossing the Canadian-United States border as travelers. He oversees inspection checks at bridges, airports, and ports at points of entry.

Colonel King has been more than a district director with oversight responsibility for the immigration and naturalization process in the Seventh District; he has taken the time to personally attend the problems of many immigrants and travelers. He has not only instructed his staff to give every consideration to those who seek aid from his office, but, moreover, he has instilled in them the compassion, understanding, and human concern that have characterized his own dealings with immigrants and travelers to this country over the years.

Colonel King has taken innovative steps to insure that the citizenship process is made as simple and carefree as possible. Colonel King and his staff cooperated with the New York State Department of Adult Education to facilitate preparation for citizenship. His office played a part in preparing textbooks and films on citizenship for prospective citizens and for teachers of foreign born.

He continues to take an active interest in many of our new citizens after they have arrived in this country to make sure they are happy and have found jobs compatible with their interests and skills.

He has tried to make border crossings comfortable and easy for thousands traveling between the United States and Canada. Behind the scenes, he suggested

policy that would expedite procedures at the checkpoints.

As a Representative of the 36th Congressional District in upstate New York, thousands of my constituents cross the Canadian-United States border every year. Many have relatives who have come to the United States from other countries.

As a result, many have written or spoken to me about the kind treatment they have received from U.S. immigration officials.

My office handles many cases which requires contacting Colonel King and his staff. I have always received their fullest cooperation.

I know my colleagues join me in praising Colonel King for his years of dedication and service to the United States and for the deep concern for people he has shown.

I share with my colleagues two articles about Colonel King, which give some additional insights into the way he has approached his job:

IMMIGRATION DIRECTOR SAYS NEW QUOTAS TO BENEFIT UNITED STATES

(By Anne McIlhenney Matthews)

The bill to provide new immigration quotas, now being heatedly debated in Congress, will mean increased work and business for Col. William King, district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and his staff, no matter what form it finally takes.

But, in many ways, he welcomes this. Because this former Army executive is outstanding in the way he enforces quota problems. He has utilized understanding, sympathy and humanity to solve involved situations and there are many brides, bridegrooms and reunited families in Buffalo who add his name to their prayers of thanksgiving.

ASSISTANCE OFFERED

King took the President's directive to facilitate travel to the United States to his heart and in his Seventh District, which has a total of 14 points of entry, immigration inspectors are charged with definite responsibility to extend a welcome to travelers and to offer all possible assistance over and above the regular inspection.

Under the new quotas, King is particularly hoping for an influx of tailors from Italy, Greece or Spain. He says there is no such thing as a great American-trained tailor.

"For every first class tailor admitted, this country will put 25 people to work," said King. "One tailor means that number in seamstresses, pressers, salesmen and others. All industries want the specialists, the well-trained, the European designers, particularly hand-crafters. The old timers are dying off and there are no skilled American replacements. Last year, we couldn't fill 20 per cent of the requests for notification when people of such accomplishments crossed the border."

SHORTAGE OF CHEFS

There is a crying need for experts to make prescription shoes. There is a shortage of chefs . . . of physicists (and Italy has many eager to come here), he states. The popularity of foreign cars has created a demand for mechanics able to service them. But most of all King is concerned with enlarged quotas in order to reunite families. He said that normally England, Ireland, France and sometimes Germany do not use up their quotas and these can be spread now to others.

Col. King's domain extends to Rouses Point on the north end of Lake Champlain. He points out that Rainbow Bridge in Niagara Falls has more foot travelers than any other bridge in the world. In the fiscal year end-

ing in July, the total number of persons examined in this district was 3,950,262. Vessels boarded totaled 1,226 and aircraft, 883.

IMMIGRATION OFFICIAL SEES SUMMER INCREASE

(By H. Katherine Smith)

FOREIGN VISITORS

During June, July, and August, a larger number of foreigners enter the United States through Niagara Frontier ports than anywhere else in the country.

This statement was made by William J. King, director of Immigration and Naturalization for District No. 7 which includes all of this State north of Ulster, Dutchess and Sullivan counties.

FROM CANADA

The majority of the millions of foreigners who come here through local ports of entry are visitors, predominantly from Canada. White foreign born residents of the Buffalo area registered at Immigration and Naturalization Headquarters in the U.S. Court Building number nearly three quarters of a million, Buffalo has received no influx of refugees from Communist China, Mr. King reports.

Most of the Hungarian immigrants who settled here after the 1956 revolt have become U.S. citizens. Foreign born children automatically become citizens through the naturalization of their parents. Only older immigrants do not apply for citizenship. Mr. King believes they are deterred by the difficulty of learning English and the literacy test that must be passed.

TEXT BOOK

Mr. King and his subordinates co-operate with the New York State Department of Adult Education to facilitate preparation for citizenship. The naturalization staff produced a textbook covering the subjects new citizens are required to know and a film on preparation for citizenship. Frank Pompei, an officer of Mr. King's district, plays a part in the motion picture.

"It is designed to aid teachers of the foreign born and to alleviate the latter's fear of that test that results in citizenship or disappointment," said Mr. King.

JOB PROMISE

The film is shown throughout this country. Half our quota of immigrants are persons proficient in skills of which the U.S. has a shortage. Several tailors from Italy have settled in Western New York lately. Foreign physicists also find ready employment here.

Before entering the U.S. these men must show a promise of employment from an American corporation or institution. Spouses of American citizens can come here to live without regard to quota.

ILLEGAL ENTRY

Thirty-four years ago, Mr. King joined the staff of the U.S. Immigration Service. Illegal entry into this country was attempted so frequently that border officers had to train their ears to detect the slightest foreign accent.

Today, Mr. King says Canada and other countries offer so many opportunities for employment to immigrants that this country has become merely one of several where the European can make a new start. Therefore, illegal entry attempts have been reduced greatly.

CHECK CREWS

In addition to the routine border inspection at bridges familiar to most Western New Yorkers, local immigration officers check passengers and crew of ships and planes arriving from foreign posts. An office is maintained at the Toronto Air Port for examination of persons flying from Canada to the United States. In June, 228 ships and 514 planes came under the watchful eye of our immigration officers.

Mr. King has lived in 26 American cities from Honolulu to New York, and also in London and several cities of West Germany. Shortly after moving to our Queen City, five years ago, he said:

"Buffalo is by far the friendliest place I have called home."

He and his wife still hold that opinion.

LAST OUTPOST

"The only place comparable to Buffalo in friendliness is Ireland," Mr. King says, adding, "Ireland is the last outpost of leisurely living and love of culture. The slightest good fortune is a reason for a party, and if no reason can be found, the party is given anyway."

The southern coast of Ireland, where palm trees and other semi-tropical verdure flourish, is the place to which Mr. King dreams of retiring. His progenitors came from Ireland to New England in 1812. If Mr. King fulfills his dream, he will reverse their procedure and, after decades of ministering to immigrants, become an immigrant himself. The lure of the British Isles is due in large measure to the residence in London of Mr. King's only daughter, Mrs. Peter Thwaites, and her three children.

JOINED ARMY

Born in Springfield, Mass., Mr. King married his high school sweetheart, who has moved with him to cities circling half the world. A graduate of the Foreign Service School of Georgetown University, Washington, he speaks German fluently. During World War II he enlisted in the U.S. Army in which he served 14 years, attaining the rank of colonel.

He organized and commanded the Criminal Investigation Division of the U.S. Army in Europe. During several years in England, he was attached to Scotland Yard. His division investigated crimes of GIs all the way from petit larceny to homicide.

DICKENS FAN

In 1954, he returned to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Every day Mr. King swims at the Buffalo Athletic Club, of which he became a member shortly after arriving in Buffalo. He reads widely in the field of history and biography. While stationed in England, he joined the devotees of Dickens for the annual Christmas Eve walk from Scrooge's office to the vicinity of the home of Bob Cratchit of the immortal "Christmas Carol."

WIDE CIRCLE

Our District Director of Immigration and Naturalization has made several trips to England to renew friendships there. He plans to visit his daughter and friends in October.

He likes people and finds it a privilege to know a wide variety of them through his work. As District Director of Immigration, he has met the President of Finland and Queen Elizabeth of England. A longtime member of the International Assn. of Police Chiefs, he regularly attends that organization's conventions.

IS THE NEW YORK TIMES ABOVE THE LAW?

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, is the New York Times above the law?

The hierarchy of the Times has taken it upon itself to publish a secret Pentagon report, sensationalizing it, and leaving the impression that preplanning by the military is an evil which must be stopped.

We are all familiar with the track record of the New York Times. It is

among the far left of the major publications. It was the New York Times, you will recall, which assured the world that Fidel Castro is a Cuban patriot, and it scoffed at suggestions that he had Communist leanings.

The New York Times has engaged in violent attacks upon public figures, reserving its most vicious language for those who urge a strong, free, and sound America. Many of its utterances would have been held libelous had not the U.S. Supreme Court bailed out all such publications by ruling that they are free to lie about public figures.

Now comes the ultimate. The Times has somehow gained access to a secret document. With utter disregard for the security of the United States, with disdain for the lives of American servicemen, and with open scorn for the espionage laws of this Nation, the Times people have published the contents of the document.

In the past, those of us who have opposed the far-left rantings of the Times writers were willing, at least, to allow them their right to espouse whatever "down with America" philosophy struck them at the moment.

But now, Mr. Speaker, the Times has gone too far.

There are specific laws covering the handling of classified documents. Despite the fact someone obviously fed a copy of this document to the newspaper, the Times should have declined to publish it.

No such action was taken. The contents of the document are being spread across the front pages of the Times.

If this is the Times' concept of news that is fit to print, then no secret in this Nation is secure from scrutiny by any enemy willing to spend a few cents for a copy of the Times.

But, again, Mr. Speaker, there are laws which govern these matters and I repeat my question: Is the New York Times above the law?

Whatever the Times may seek to make of its "expose," the simple fact is that the Department of Defense must make contingency plans in order to have some degree of preparation for any emergency which may develop. This includes plans for small or large wars in most parts of the world—Vietnam included. It includes possible actions which conceivably could become necessary in meeting whatever defense requirements are thrust upon us. We would find ourselves in a sad state indeed if staff planning for each defense action was not initiated until after there was an actual requirement.

There is no reason that anyone should be shocked at the fact that plans are made in advance to protect our Nation in time of trouble. Those who engage in this type of planning are doing their jobs. They deserve high credit. It is a job which must be carried on under every administration, for contingency plans must constantly be updated. Obviously a World War II plan would be of little value in most parts of the world under the circumstances which would govern combat operations in 1971 or 1980. This does not mean we are about to embark on military adventures all over the globe. It means that we want to have basic staff

work available whenever emergencies develop.

No, Mr. Speaker, there is nothing shocking about plans which are made for America's security.

What should be shocking is that someone, apparently with access to the highest of this Nation's secrets, disclosed those secrets in direct violation of the law and at the peril of the security of the United States. This is ample cause for congressional investigation and for direct action by the Department of Justice.

THE PARKERS—A FINE OLD WEST FLORIDA FAMILY

(Mr. SIKES asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, west Florida history is replete with records of the contributions of individual families. One of these, the Parker family, has been identified with and has contributed to the development of west Florida for as long as Florida has been a State. Members of the Parker family are identified with all counties and most communities in west Florida. As is the case in such families, most of the Parkers are related, although very distantly so in some cases. The annual Parker family reunion is to be held on June 20 at Chipley.

The name Parker comes from England, where in medieval times most of the lords had portions of their estates set aside as parkland, hunting preserves, or deer parks. One member of their official household was in charge of this preserve and was known by the title "gamekeeper" or "parker." The present day surname Parker owes its origin to this occupation or position.

The word itself comes from the Old French, "Parquier, Parchair," meaning a gamekeeper. Its French roots indicate that the surname evolved after the Norman conquest of England in 1066. Notable American Parkers have included Dorothy Parker, the writer; Isaac Parker, the American jurist who was instrumental in the creation of the Harvard Law School, and Theodore Parker, Massachusetts Unitarian clergyman, who was a leading 19th century abolitionist.

In west Florida today there is one municipality named Parker. There is also a community named Parker in neighboring Escambia County, Ala., just north of the Florida-Alabama line. Nearby across the Conecuh River is Parker Bridge and nearby also is Parker Springs. The name has been identified with good citizenship and positions of responsibility, from McDavid to Blountstown and from Mexico Beach to Pensacola.

Of particular interest is the branch of the family descended from W. W. Parker, pioneer settler in the Jackson County area. Some members of this family also were long identified with the Holmes-Geneva County border area, near Black, Ala.

W. W. "William Wiley" Parker was born in 1851 and helped organize the Damascus Baptist Church near Graceville in 1865, when he was only 14 years of age. He married Elizabeth White in 1872. To them were born 13 children, some of whom died in infancy.

Brothers and sisters of William Wiley included Mary Jane, James Jasper, Thomas Jefferson, Lucinda, Queen Victoria, Edward Robert, and John Jr.

Descendants of W. W. Parker held their first reunion at Damascus Baptist Church, 1 mile south of Graceville, in 1951. Henry Parker and Cleatus Golden were among the leaders of that gathering. On the motion of D. C. Whiddon, with a second by Isaac Crutchfield, the 67 relatives in attendance voted to make the reunion an annual event. D. C. Suggs was named chairman of the reunion committee, and Irma Suggs was named secretary.

Only four of the W. W. Parker children were still living at the time of the first reunion. They were Henry, a retired army man, then living in Pensacola; Walter of Chipley, a retired International Paper Co. employee, and Nettie Halaway also of Pensacola, and John Hiram, of the Holmes-Jackson County area.

The second reunion was held September 21, 1952 at Damascus, with 50 children and grandchildren of W. W. Parker in attendance, not to mention more distant relatives, in-law and friends. J. Ed Stokes, State representative from Bay County, was the speaker. He told of his fellowship with members of the W. W. Parker family throughout the years.

Still in possession of the family is W. W. Parker's old ledger, in which he kept the accounts of Damascus Baptist Church. He was church treasurer for several years.

Included also are some of the old gentlemen's personal accounts, showing that in 1898 corn was selling for less than 50 cents per bushel, peas for 50 cents per bushel, pork at 4 cents per pound and fish for 5 cents per pound. A barrel of flour, however, cost \$5.50. Sheetting cost 6 cents per yard and calico 5 cents per yard.

W. W. Parker was a justice of the peace in the Graceville area for many years, including the period before the railroad came to the community. His ledger contains the record of many of his court cases. Surely this document should be preserved for its historical interest. Future scholars will find in it some of the flavor of frontier west Florida. It also tells something of the character of the patriarch of one of west Florida's pioneer families. The Parker family has contributed many leaders during this long and illustrious history. The family reunion is certain to be a fine gathering which will contribute to family knowledge and family pride.

MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNITED STATES

(Mr. LEGGETT asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Speaker, legislation affecting health delivery services in the United States is a prime concern of Congress this year. This current and proposed legislation has stimulated a great deal of interest in current medical practices in the United States.

In connection with this problem I am including for the benefit of my colleagues the report of the Exchange Mission to the U.S.S.R. on Health Planning and Medical Education. This mission, led by Dr. John A. D. Cooper, president of the Association of American Medical Colleges, surveyed the medical teaching facilities in the Soviet Union from May 15 to June 3, 1970.

They report that Soviet medical education starts immediately after secondary school, and continues for 7 years. Six years are devoted to lecture and clinical studies and 1 year to internship. Specialization follows this program. At present, 45,000 students are in Soviet medical schools, and the current ratio of doctors to population is 1 to 370. In 5 years they expect this ratio to improve to 1 to 300. Contrasted to the situation in the United States, we see that the Soviet citizen has far greater access to a doctor, as the doctor-patient ratio in the United States runs from 1 to 600 at the top of the scale, 1 to 1,100 at the bottom.

The report also noted however, that the quality of medical care in the United States is still far superior to the quality in the Soviet Union.

At a time when the major superpowers are facing up to the demands for a restructuring of priorities we should closely follow the actions taken by other countries.

I include the full text of the report: REPORT ON EXCHANGE MISSION TO U.S.S.R. ON HEALTH PLANNING AND MEDICAL EDUCATION, MAY 15 TO JUNE 3, 1970

(By John A. D. Cooper, M.D., president, Association of American Medical Colleges)

INTRODUCTION

In 1958, the U.S.S.R. and the United States entered into a formal agreement for cultural, educational and scientific cooperation. One aspect of this program involved the exchange of information and promotion of better understanding between the two countries through cultural missions. These exchange missions have included the areas of health care, biomedical research and the education of health professionals and research scientists.

Even before the inception of official missions, however, there had been unofficial visits after the withdrawal of the U.S.S.R. from WHO in 1950. Both the unofficial and official visits have been described in some detail by Joseph R. Quinn in "Anatomy of East-West Cooperation: U.S.-U.S.S.R. Public Health Exchange Program 1958-1967."¹ In 1956 and 1957, there were four missions to the U.S.S.R. and three missions from the U.S.S.R. With the Lacy-Zorubin agreement on January 27, 1958 and its subsequent extensions, there have been 23 U.S.A. missions to the U.S.S.R. and 22 from the U.S.S.R. to the U.S.

In 1969, a Soviet delegation visited the United States to become better acquainted with our health planning methods. The present mission was organized to make a similar study of health planning in the U.S.S.R. as a part of the exchange agreement. It was decided that individuals with knowledge and interest in the planning process, in medical education and research, and the delivery of health care would be included as members.

Originally, Dr. Roger O. Egeberg, Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs, DHEW, was to head the delegation, but pressing affairs in the Department made necessary a change in plans and Dr. Jesse L. Steinfeld, Deputy Assistant Secretary and Surgeon

General, traveled from the meeting of the World Health Organization Governing Board in Geneva to serve as chairman. Mr. Frederick Malek, Deputy Under Secretary, was also unable to participate in the mission. The final membership of the delegation was as follows:

Dr. Jesse L. Steinfeld, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs and Surgeon General, Chairman.

Dr. John A. D. Cooper, President, Association of American Medical Colleges.

Dr. Robert Q. Marston, Director, National Institutes of Health.

Dr. Russell B. Roth, Speaker of the House of Delegates, American Medical Association.

Dr. Patrick B. Storey, Professor of Community Medicine, Hahnemann Medical College.

Mrs. Jean Roth accompanied Dr. Roth on the trip and participated in most of the social activities during the visit. Dr. Storey had previous experience in the U.S.S.R. and speaks the Russian language. The other members of the delegation were visiting the country for the first time.

Prior to departure, two briefing sessions were held at DHEW. At the first session, Dr. Mark G. Field shared his knowledge and insights on the health care, education and research of the U.S.S.R. In addition, Dr. Field's book, "Soviet Socialized Medicine,"² was provided to the participants along with reports of previous visits by U.S. missions in the areas of health.

Since the mission was to extend over a period of only three weeks (May 15 to June 5, 1970), it was considered advisable to limit the number of cities visited to reduce as far as possible travel time in the U.S.S.R. The original itinerary included an initial visit to Moscow, followed by trips to see a spectrum of institutions in a variety of settings: Moscow, the capitol city; Georgia, an industrial state in a formerly agrarian economy and, Uzbekistan, a more remote and less developed Republic.

Dr. Steinfeld discussed the visit in Geneva with Dr. Venedictov, Deputy Minister of Health, who recommended that Kiev and Leningrad be included in the itinerary and Tashkent eliminated. These recommendations were accepted in establishing the final plan for the mission's visit.

Soviet representatives

The Ministry of Health clearly regarded the mission as important. The delegates had opportunity for discussions with the Minister of Health, Boris B. Petrovsky, Deputy Minister, Boris P. Danilov, and other high officials in the Ministry. Alexei Georgevich Safonov, Chief of the Board of Preventive and Curative Medicine, accompanied the group on their entire itinerary. Dr. Saslov is obviously a man of considerable stature in the Ministry and has a vast system of health care under his direction.

The Ministry also made great efforts to provide the best possible interpreter for the mission. They obtained Mr. Vladimir (Walter) Nikolaevitch Bobrov from the Ministry of Information. Mr. Bobrov's usual position was an English language commentator for Radio Moscow. He has much experience as a simultaneous translator for conferences related to health and science and apparently is involved only with the most important groups visiting Russia. Mr. Bobrov had an interesting history. He was born to Russian parents in Japan and attended American schools in that country. During the U.S. occupation of Japan, he worked for the U.S. Army as an interpreter. He had at one time planned to emigrate to the United States but some delay in processing his application caused him to return to Russia in 1958. He is not only fluent with the American language, including its idioms and slang, but has many American attitudes and manners.

Dr. Valerie Alexandrovich Limarev, who

also accompanied the group, has the important staff position of Chief of the Protocol Section of the External Relations Board of the Ministry of Health. Dr. Boris Fedorovich Kirillov, of the External Relations Board, worked closely with us during our periods in Moscow.

General impressions

The delegation was treated with warmth, friendship and respect. It is obvious that a decision had been made at the highest level in the Ministry of Health and possibly other Government Ministries to cooperate fully in allowing the group to visit the cities, institutions, and individuals of their choice and to provide any reasonable information and data requested, including budgets, number of personnel, etc. We did not meet the "top man" in every institution, but it is obvious that those with whom we met were people of stature and were able to share wide knowledge and substantial information about the matters under discussion. When they did not have exact information, e.g., about budgets, they called the appropriate individual to obtain the correct data.

Social relationships were relaxed and friendly. It is clear that most of those we met from medicine had a real desire to develop good personal relationships. We were never confronted with differences in political philosophy. The Cambodian and Middle East situation were only dealt with indirectly by an expression of a desire for peace and understanding. There was much evidence of a general feeling that our two Nations must come to understand each other better and find ways to live and work together.

I was impressed with the depth of feeling that still exists about the toll which World War II exacted from the U.S.S.R. In contrast to this country, where this War is fast fading into the dimly perceived past, they still remember and talk of the great destruction and loss of life which it brought to their people. I realized, really for the first time, that World War II left a much deeper and more persistent wound in the U.S.S.R. than in the United States. This makes many of them more opposed to war than I had thought. On the other hand, they have pride in what they consider as their accomplishments since the revolution and can be expected to react violently against those who do not recognize and accept their new status as a world power. This is complicated by the fact that they are still in many senses a developing country with all of the unpredictable attitudes and actions that status entails and have a long tradition of isolation and lack of any profound interest in understanding the rest of the world.

I have often criticized those who make a flying one-month trip to South America and become "instant experts" about situations in countries which differ widely from our own in culture, mores, habits and values. In a sense, I am doing what I criticize with regard to the U.S.S.R. in writing a report on their health care and medical education. My only excuse is that I had read a great deal about the Soviet Union before I visited their country and have continued my efforts to understand the nation since I returned. A course in Russian in 1943 and substantial discussions with Soviets in World War II helped me to develop a better insight into our similarities and differences. However, I do not fool myself into believing I really have come to know a people whose history is so complex and different from Western culture to which our whole education is so narrowly limited.

National planning for health

The U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health has the overall responsibility for developing plans for health care and the education of health professionals and the organization and facilities to deliver this care. However, there is a divi-

¹Footnotes at end of article.

sion of responsibilities between the all Soviet ministry and the ministries of the fifteen union republics. There is considerable decentralization of planning and the implementation of these plans to the republics that have been given some autonomy to deal with their local problems.

Each republic draws up a five-year plan of its requirements. The health plan is developed by the republican ministry of health. The overall plan of the republic is submitted to the GOSPLAN of the republic that functions much like our Office of Management and Budget. After review and revision of the plan, the republic GOSPLAN submits it to the Republic Council of Ministers. After approval by this body, it is submitted to the All Soviet GOSPLAN. These specialists prepare an overall health plan in collaboration with the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health. Attention is given to whether the republican plans meet national goals and norms. In many cases, additions are made to the original plans to help assure that these goals and norms can be met. Some aspects of republic planning combined into a single national plan; i.e., the number of hospital beds to be constructed, the number of physicians to be trained. The health plan also takes into account the planning of other agencies and their effect on the needs and requirements.

After consideration of the plan by the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., it is submitted to the Supreme Soviet. Approval of this body makes the plan the law of the land. The Minister of Finance then allocates funds according to the plan.

Each republic prepares annual plans based on the approved five-year plan. These plans are not ordinarily considered by the U.S.S.R. GOSPLAN. The Republic has latitude in planning facilities and services to accomplish the purposes of the five-year plan. It can, and often does, add to the funds received in the national budget for health from allocations made by trade unions, collective farms or industry to further strengthen health services.

The last five-year plan covered the period 1966 through 1970. The new five-year plan has just been approved for the period through 1975.³ The plan calls for an increase in the training of specialists in medicine, an increase in the number of health professionals, and an increase in the number of hospital beds. The U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health is trying to obtain approval from GOSPLAN to increase the number of physicians from the present level of 26.6/10,000 to 32 or 34/10,000, and the number of hospital beds from 10.7/1,000 to 13.5/1,000 over the next ten years. They also hope to substantially increase the ratio of other health professionals to physicians during this period. This will require a substantial increase in the present annual budget of 10.3 billion rubles for health.

Planning for research

Planning for research takes a somewhat different form and is more national in scope. The research plans are prepared by the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health with the aid of the Academy of Medical Sciences which has twenty problematic commissions operating under the direction of the head institutes of the Academy. These problematic commissions determine the broad directions of research in their respective areas and advise the Academy on support needed. The Academy prepares a plan which is submitted to the Ministry of Health. It then goes to the Soviet Council on Science and Technology which makes final recommendations to the Presidium.

Research in the biomedical sciences is carried out in several levels of institutes. The most prestigious are those under the Academy of Sciences which devote themselves to fundamental problems in biology. The next

level are the thirty head institutes of the Academy of Medical Sciences that also address themselves to theoretical problems and the most important aspects of biomedical science. These institutes work directly under the Academy and are supported from its budget.

The U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health also directs and supports research institutes whose work is more related to planning or to more practical problems of national scope. For example, the Scientific Research Institute of Social Hygiene and Public Health Organization, named after Semashko, is such an Institute.

At the next level are the research institutes supported by the Ministries of Health of the Republics. These institutes often deal with problems of local health interest and coordinate research programs in institutions supported by the republic.

The Academy of Medical Sciences can also make research grants to scientists working outside of their Institutes. Usually these grants are made to full or corresponding members of the Academy working in medical schools. These grants are made on the basis of proposals reviewed and recommended by the problematic commissions of the Academy.

It is also interesting to note that the Academy of Medical Sciences has annual meetings in Moscow for department chairmen of the medical school. These meetings which last from fifteen to twenty days are devoted to a discussion of research in the various disciplines and the most fruitful approaches for investigators.

It seems clear that the Academy of Medical Sciences has great influence on biomedical research in the U.S.S.R. Its institutes give direction to institutes of other agencies through problematic commissions and the financial support they provide leading investigators. It is obviously of immense value to a scientist to be a full or corresponding member of the Academy. This gives him a special status and membership in a select and powerful organization.

The Academy of Medical Sciences

The Academy of Medical Sciences is made up of one hundred academicians and one hundred fifty corresponding members. Most of the academicians are over sixty years of age. The corresponding members are younger and the full members are selected from this group. However, it is clear that the control of research in the Soviet Union is to a very great extent in the hands of the "senior citizens" of science.

The Academy was established in 1944 under the Ministry of Health to coordinate and plan both basic and more practical research. Although it has gained substantial autonomy from the Ministry, probably because of the high status in society of its members, we were told that since the Ministry pays the piper it calls the tune. The observation was made "that the Ministry would like to have its road paved with scientific achievements."

There seems to be less organization and bureaucracy in biomedical sciences than in health services because of the fundamental attitudes of scientists and their lack of interest in spending a great deal of time and effort in planning and management. Apparently, it is somewhat difficult to get scientists to serve in administrative posts in the Academy, even for four-year terms, and the officers are glad to relinquish their posts after one term in office.

The views expressed at the Academy were substantiated in our visits to the institutes. It was clear that much freedom and autonomy is given to individual investigators and that central planning consisted primarily of elaborating broad guidelines through the problematic commissions under which almost any study could be carried out.

The Academy has as officers a president, two vice presidents, three secretaries, with

two other elected members. They form the Executive Committee. The terms are for four years. The staff is organized into three departments: microbiology, hygiene, and clinical sciences. Each of these is headed by a secretary. The various problematic commissions are assigned to one of these.

The Scientific Research Institute of Social Hygiene and Public Health Organization Named for N.A. Semashko, Moscow

This Institute, headed by Professor I. D. Bogatyrev, operates directly under the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health. It is the scientific and methodological center for broad planning in the area of health and is responsible for recommending norms and goals for health services at a national level. The Institute works very closely with the Board of Planning and Finance of the Ministry headed by Dr. V. V. Galoteev.

The Ministry can request the Institute to work on problems of importance to it in establishing plans. The staff can also work on problems of interest to them. Theoretically, about 70 percent of the effort should be devoted to Ministry problems and 30 percent to institute problems but, in fact, about equal effort is spent on the two.

In contrast to the Academies that direct their attention more to theoretical and fundamental areas in biomedicine, the Institute concerns itself with more practical and health service oriented matters. They help to identify areas in health that should be given serious consideration over the next few years and they provide advice on approaches to be taken. The Institute receives reports from medical and research institutes on their scientific, educational and health service activities. After analyzing this information, it makes recommendations on future courses of action. The Institute has no operating function and can only exert its influence through participation in meetings in the Ministry, speeches, papers, study reports, and by the advice it provides to the Ministry, on allocation of resources. Professor Bogatyrev can have an important impact through his editorship of *Soviet Health* and his chairmanship of a problematic commission. The Institute advises the Ministry of names and needs and the latter makes the decision on how to implement the suggestions. There are similar institutes at the Republic level that provide similar service at that level of organization. The Semashko Institute does provide some of their funds to other institutes to carry out studies of interest to the overall planning function.

One of the principal current interests of the Institute is in the study of the use of computers in health care management. It is exploring the establishment of a network by which information from individual health centers can be channeled through higher echelons of the health service organization to improve management and planning. It is also exploring how the computer can be used to make the operation of large hospitals more efficient and effective.

Organization and structure of health services

The organization of health services in the U.S.S.R. has not changed to any great extent from that presented by Dr. M. G. Field in 1967.

[Chart 5-1—The Administration of Health Services in the USSR] ⁴

The Ministry of Health of the U.S.S.R. is organized with the following departments: ⁵

1. *Department of Curative and Preventive Medicine*. Responsible for all medical treatment and all prophylactic measures for adults, and for all adult hospitals, adult polyclinics, and clinical research institutes of the Ministry of Health.

2. *Department of Medical Care and Prophylaxis for Mothers and Children*. Responsible for maternity homes, children's hospitals, women's consultation services, nurseries (creches), and orphanages. This was former-

Footnotes at end of article.

ly a division of the Department of Curative and Preventive Medicine, but in 1962 was established as a separate department.

3. *Central Sanitary-Epidemiologic Department.* Responsible for environmental health practices and services.

4. *Department of Planning and Finance.* Responsible for hospital planning, standards, and finances.

5. *Department of Medical Personnel and Higher Education.* Responsible for medical and paramedical schools and for graduate and postgraduate education of physicians.

6. *Department of Capital Construction.* Responsible for design, construction, and renovation of facilities.

7. *Department of Foreign Affairs.* Responsible for international aspects of health and participation in international health programs.

8. *Department of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries.* Responsible for production and approval of all drugs, including antibiotics. (The pharmaceutical industry is under the control of the Ministry, and its chief inspector has authority to close a pharmaceutical plant if its products do not meet quality standards.)

9. *Department of Medical Equipment and Technical Apparatus.* Responsible for design and production of medical equipment, devices, etc.

10. *Department of Supplies.* Responsible for supplying all medical and hospital facilities in the Soviet Union with medical equipment, medications, mobile equipment, etc.

11. *Department of Biological Products.* Responsible for production of vaccines, sera, and other biological and immunological products.

Many of these departments have their own research institutes. For example, the Department of Capital Construction has an Institute for Design of Medical Establishments. However, most research functions are carried on by institutes under the Academy of Medical Sciences, which study broad theoretical problems; by institutes of the Ministry itself, which study specific diseases; and by the research institutes of the Republic Ministries of Health, which emphasize special local health problems.

In addition, the Academy of Medical Sciences has an advisory function on biomedical research to the Ministry.

The central administrative structure of the republican ministries of health is similar to that of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health. However, because of the decentralization of responsibility and function, they are relatively larger in size.

The organization of health services in the Ukrainian Republic can be taken as an example. The Republic has a population of 47 million people and an area about that of France. The largest health care unit in the republic system is the oblast or city health departments. There are 25 oblasts in the Ukraine. The oblast, which ordinarily serves a population of 1.5 to 2.0 million, has a hospital of 900-1,500 beds and a polyclinic headed by the chief physician of the oblast. The hospital and its associated polyclinic has a wide range of specialists available including neurosurgery, endocrinology, hematology, nephrology, etc., which are not available in lower eschelons.

The oblasts are divided into 20 to 30 rayons. Each rayon, or district, serves 40,000 to 75,000 people. The rayon has a hospital of about 350 beds with an associated polyclinic. Some rayon hospitals are smaller, but there is a policy to increase their beds to this size when possible. General specialists are available at the rayon level, but the super-specialists are assigned to the larger oblast hospitals. Each rayon is divided into uchastoks which serve a population of 2,000 adults and 1,000 children. The uchastok polyclinic has one therapist, a pediatrician, and two or

three nurses. The uchastok physicians make home visits. In the less populous rural areas, communities of 400-500 have feldsher midwife posts. For somewhat larger population groups, the posts may have a physician and even 35 to 50 hospital beds.

Physicians work a six and one-half hour day, six days a week. Polyclinic physicians spend three hours seeing patients in the clinic and three hours in home visits. The other half hour is accumulated to spend two days a month for a 24-hour turn as officer of the day for the clinic. The clinic physicians rotate on a regular basis into hospital service to provide them with an opportunity to learn about advances in medicine and new developments in hospital care. The rotation pattern varies with the republic, the specialty and the level of the clinic. For example, in the rayon polyclinics in the Ukraine, the internist spends nine months in the clinic and three months in the hospital. A surgeon, on the other hand, divides his time equally between the two assignments. In other settings, the polyclinic physician may spend six months in each three years in hospital service.

The general medical care system is supplemented by health services in industrial establishments supported by funds available to the industries. The Soviets give high priorities to the health of workers, especially those in hazardous occupations. The staffing and facilities depend on the size of the establishment and the degree of hazard for the workers. In some cases, it is a simple feldsher post. There are also combined inpatient-outpatient facilities with physicians and other health professionals for some industries. Prophylactoria are provided through industrial health services for workers who are recovering from disease. They serve as "half way" houses where workers can spend the night and weekends for 30-40 days following a severe disease to receive the rehabilitation and follow-up therapy appropriate to their condition.

There will be an attempt to unify the ordinary and industrial medical service systems in the 1971-76 five-year plan. The industrial medical service systems are supported by funds from the industry, but are under the professional supervision of the appropriate regular medical institution. There are 39,000 regular polyclinics and 1,200 industrial clinics in the U.S.S.R. which gives some idea of the relative extent of their contributions to health services.

The Soviet system also includes dispensarization which furnishes a method to give priority to categorical disease entities such as tuberculosis, venereal disease, diabetes, cervical cancer, etc., selected on their importance to the health of the nation. One might infer that the necessity for this special attention to a particular disease indicates that the general health care system is considered inadequate to provide really comprehensive health care. However, dispensarization came into being during the early years of Soviet power when it became necessary to create from scratch a national health system. It was felt, at that time, to be the most effective and rapid method of improving the health and environment of the population through the diagnosis, treatment and prevention of specific diseases. In the future, dispensarization will probably be merged with the health care system.

An important dispensarization activity relates to children's health and development from birth to age eight. The program includes not only preventive and curative medicine but health education.

There are also special medical services for pregnant women. These women are seen in a special outpatient clinic which carries out prenatal care. The woman is given the choice of proceeding with her pregnancy or having it terminated by abortion. The availability of abortion is apparently not related so much

to an interest of the U.S.S.R. to control population growth as an expression of a woman's freedom to make a decision about childbirth. The generous provisions for maternity leave, the maintenance of seniority for those in unions, and the availability of creches, etc., for child care provide the necessary assistance for women desiring to raise a family.

Nearly all childbirth occurs in maternity hospitals or the maternity sections of regular hospitals in the urban areas. The usual maternity stay is nine days and the Soviet obstetricians believe that this is the reason for the low infant and maternal mortality rates.

Emergency services

The emergency services (Skoraya Pomoscha) are organized into a separate system in the health care services of the U.S.S.R. It is not to be confused with "first aid" because much more extensive and definitive services are provided. The Emergency Services can be summoned from any telephone in the Soviet Union by dialing 03. In public telephones, a button may be pushed which permits dialing for police, fire, or medical help without depositing a coin. Calls go into a central dispatch office which attempts to determine the nature of the emergency by dialogue with the caller. This is to determine whether a vehicle to deal with general problems is to be dispatched or a team specialized in cardiac, stroke, obstetrics, trauma, or poisoning is to be sent. If the health professional at the dispatch center is not sure of the cause for the summons, a general purpose team is sent. They can summon by radio telephone a specialized team after they arrive on the scene and make an assessment of the situation. The well-equipped vehicles manned by a physician, and at least one other health professional, are dispersed around the city. There is great pride in the fact that a team is dispatched within one to two minutes after receiving a call and arrives on the scene within seven to eight minutes. The patient may be given definitive treatment after diagnosis and evaluation by the use of the specialized equipment available in the vehicle and told to report to his polyclinic service the next day. Where indicated, he may be taken to a hospital where admission is assured because of the special priority assigned to the service for beds. About 30 percent of the patients seen are sent to the hospital. In cases of public emergency, i.e., a fire in an apartment building where there are many people requiring care, several teams may be dispatched. They are trained to set up emergency medical services in nearby buildings to provide triage to the victims.

There are plans to extend the number of inpatient facilities under the control and direction of the Emergency Service. This is already the case in Moscow and it is hoped that the system can be established in all cities over the next five to ten years. It is felt that these specialized hospital facilities can provide more expert care for emergency illness and can serve as a resource for expanded research in emergency care.

The Emergency Service also provides transport for patients admitted to hospitals after home visits by health personnel from the polyclinics.

Questions may be raised about the relative benefits gained by such a heavy investment in emergency services. However, it is clear that in the U.S.S.R., this is a service that has a fairly high priority in the eyes of the people and the health care system. The lack of personal transport to get patients to centralized facilities probably plays an important role in giving this aspect of health care the importance it holds.

The Emergency Service also has a preventive aspect. It carries out studies and makes recommendations on methods to prevent accidents on the basis of the information gathered during its activities.

In most cities other than Tbilisi, where

home visits by the polyclinic staff (Neotlozhnaya) have been merged with the Emergency Service System, there is some confusion on the scope of responsibility. The physicians in the polyclinics spend two days a month as an officer of the day for his polyclinic. In this role, he provides 24-hour service to the population covered, including house calls during hours when the clinic is not open.

*Sanitary and epidemiological services—
SANIPED*

The SANIPED system is parallel to the medical service system with a head sanitary physician and found at the republic level in the Ministry of Health. From the republic level, there is a relationship to the chief sanitary physician in the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health.

In the republic, the SANIPED system is divided into oblast or city departments and rayon departments. Each rayon and city department have SANIPED stations, whose functions are: assure purity of water, control air and soil pollution, control communicable disease, including immunizations, control of noise and vibration in industrial establishments, health promotion in factories and schools.

There are three categories of SANIPED stations: the first category serves a population of 30,000 to 100,000 in the rural areas; the second category serves 30,000 to 60,000, and the third category less than 30,000.

Each station has three departments: laboratory service, with a chemical and bacteriological laboratory; a sanitary and epidemiological service; and a disinfection service.

The SANIPED has apparently great authority in controlling the environment. For example, in controlling air and water pollution, it reviews all plans for new factories and must give approval before construction can begin. One of the SANIPED physicians would be responsible for reviewing plans and seeing that they were followed in the construction and equipping of facilities. If they found mass compliance, they could stop construction by writing a letter to the bank stopping credit. The bank is obliged to follow the order of the SANIPED. SANIPED can also require established factories to install pollution control devices and procedures. If the factory does not comply, it can be closed down.

Disagreements between the SANIPED and other government agencies are discussed at higher and higher echelons in the republic until they are settled. If they cannot be settled at the republic level, they are referred to the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health and the Ministry concerned with the plant or activity in question. If agreement cannot be reached through discussions, the Chief Sanitary Officer of the U.S.S.R. makes a final and binding decision which cannot be changed by the Minister of Health or appealed. It is obvious that real emphasis is being placed on controlling pollution and a mechanism has been established with authority to implement these plans.

Water purity in the city is the responsibility of the city water supply plant. The plant is required to take samples every two hours for laboratory examination. The Saniped takes samples daily from sites in the city where contamination is most likely to exist to assure that adequate treatment is being effected. This same procedure is followed for industrial water supplies. For public wells serving a community, samples are taken every ten days. For private wells, there are only occasional spot checks.

Fluoridation is just being introduced. At present, only 10 percent of the water supply has fluoride added, but some supplies already have an adequate natural fluoride content. It is hoped that it will be possible to implement the central government decision to fluoridize all water supplies within three to five years.

The immunization schedules for children

carried out in Georgia provide an insight into the national plan. Children are immunized for diphtheria, tetanus, smallpox, pertussis, measles, and poliomyelitis. Polio immunizations are given two times a year to children. It is in the form of a candy jaw-breaker which we chewed as we discussed the Saniped system in Georgia. Children are also immunized with BCG and in some areas for brucellosis and typhoid.

EDUCATION OF PHYSICIANS IN THE U.S.S.R.

The education of physicians is carried out in 92 medical institutes which are under the jurisdiction of the 15 autonomous republics. There is at least one medical school in each republic and all of its financial support for educational and some research programs comes from the Republic Ministry of Health.

Although there is not a federal system of medical education, the curriculum and number of students to be enrolled in the various programs is established centrally. In 1965, there were 8,800 entering students in the 85 medical schools. In 1970, there were 45,000 students in the 92 medical schools. It is hoped to increase the entering class size over the next five to ten years to enable the physician population ratio to rise from 26.6/10,000 to 32-34/10,000. This would be approximately twice as many physicians/population as are presently in practice in the U.S.

Organization of medical schools

Medical education is given in Medical Institutes which are free-standing institutions unrelated to universities. In the past, the medical faculties were part of universities, but it was considered desirable to have them under the jurisdiction of the Ministries of Health rather than the Ministries of Education.

The chief administrative officer is a Rector, appointed by the Ministry of Health of the Republic for an indefinite period. The Rector has four deputy rectors for teaching, research, clinical services and administration. He is advised by a Council which includes the deputy rectors, deans of the various faculties in the institute, department chairmen, sometimes the associate professors, party organization members, students and trade union representatives. The Council at the First Medical Institute in Moscow totals 80. The Council meets monthly and decides on all major policy matters. There is an Executive Committee of the Council which includes the Rector, his deputies and deans that can act in the period between meetings of the Council.

The Chairmen of the Departments are elected for a period of five years by a Scientific Council made up of Department Chairmen. They are ordinarily reelected three to four times. A Special Commission of the Council studies possible candidates and makes recommendations to the Council. The Council votes by secret ballot and rarely disagrees with the recommendations of the Commission. Although there is no formal retirement age, the Council tries not to elect Chairmen after they have reached the age of 70.

Although medical institutes vary somewhat in size and complexity, the First Medical Institute in Moscow named for T. M. Sechenov can be taken as a model. The Institute has two medical faculties, each with 300-400 entering students, a faculty of sanitary hygiene with 200 entering students, a faculty of pharmacy with 300 entering students and a faculty of evening pharmacy with 150 entering students. This Institute has abolished evening courses for medical students.

The Institute has about 1,200-1,500 entering students each year and a total of 6,000-8,000 students. It has doubled in size since World War II. Three to four hundred entering students is considered an upper limit for one medical faculty and if there is any increase in size, another faculty would probably be formed.

The Institute is one of the largest in the

country and has over 1,000 faculty members. There is the equivalent of 300 members in each of the two medical faculties, about one for every eight to ten members. Each faculty has its own main clinical departments, but some of the faculties in the specialty clinical areas are shared between the various schools and have multiple teaching responsibilities. Single basic science departments are common to all faculties. They are administratively a part of one of the faculties. The First Medical Institute is unique because it does not have a faculty of Stomatology.

The faculties of the Institute are divided among 70 departments. There are 27 departments in the first medical faculty. A department will ordinarily have one or two professors, one or two associate professors (docents) and five to fifteen assistant professors.

Three of the departments at the Institute have associate Academy of Medical Sciences research institutes; therapeutics, obstetrics and gynecology, and surgery. In these departments, there is a co-mingling of faculty for teaching and research supported from the two sources and the individual who is director of the research institute may also be chairman of the department. Dr. Boris P. Petrovsky, U.S.S.R. Minister of Health, heads the Surgical Institute.

The total budget for the First Medical Institute is 50 million rubles per year. The cost for educating a medical student, including instruction, equipment, administration, stipends and student health costs, exclusive of patient care costs and research, have been estimated at 1,200 rubles/year/student. This same figure was quoted in other institutes and would appear to be a national norm.

The Institute has its own outpatient clinics with 14 separate clinics and 2,315 beds. Other teaching hospitals in Moscow provide another 12,000 beds. Fifteen percent of these beds are under the direct control of the clinical faculty of the Institute. There are a total of 300,000 hospital beds for a population of about 8 million in Greater Moscow.

The medical school curriculum in the Soviet Union has undergone a recent reform and the amount of specialization has been increased for all students. The changes were introduced in some schools in 1967 and all schools will have instituted the new program by 1973. Students enter medical school after ten years of elementary and secondary education. In the first two years, the students complete courses in chemistry, biochemistry, anatomy, physiology, philosophy, and English and take an examination in these subjects. In the third year, the student has courses in pharmacology, microbiology, pathology, physical examination and surgery, and is examined on these. In the fourth year, the student has clinical training in the major clinical departments. The rotation is for one month on each service. They have one lecture a day on clinical subjects and work in the wards for three to four hours in groups of six or seven. Each student has one bed assigned for the month, but he also studies to a lesser extent the patients of other members of his group. Twice a week they have rounds with the professor and once a week they attend a lecture in the clinical specialty area to which they are assigned.

The student has essentially the same curriculum in the fifth year but is given more clinical responsibility.

In the sixth year, the student works in one of four departments and begins his specialization in surgery, therapeutics, obstetrics and gynecology, or pediatrics. The pediatric training will ultimately be given by a separate faculty but all schools have not yet established it. At the end of the sixth year, which is called the "subordinatura," the student is given a certificate. In the sixth year, the student's record becomes official when countersigned by a member of the faculty.

In the seventh year, the student begins his "internatura" in a large oblast or city hospi-

tal. Those who were in surgery can further specialize in general surgery, ENT, ophthalmology, urology, orthopedics or pediatric surgery. Those who are following the therapeutic path can choose general therapeutics, psychiatry, neurology, dermatology or tuberculosis.

Those in obstetrics and gynecology and pediatrics continue broad training in their fields.

At the end of the sixth year, the student is assigned for a period of three to five years in a medical service institution.

Each medical school has "Student Societies" with branches in each department. The Societies are autonomous but operate under the guidance and with the help of the faculty and administration in each department. The students elect their own officers and executive committee. About one-third of the students join these societies. One of the main functions of the societies is to provide an opportunity for the student to work in a research laboratory or in a clinic under the preceptorship of a faculty member. This work is in addition to the regular medical school program and must be done in the later afternoons, on weekends or in the evening. There is an interest in increasing and expanding this type of opportunity. Both at the Ministry level and in the medical schools, there is the feeling that research experience is important in the educational program of medical students because of the increasing scientific content of medicine, even if the student intends to have a career entirely in clinical service.

Advanced and continuing medical education

After the three to five years' service, the physician may take advanced training for clinical practice by four routes:

(a) *Ordinatura*: Here the physician spends two years in specialty training in a large hospital. He works in various departments and has some formal instruction. He spends most of his time in the field of his specialty but does rotate on related services. During the *Ordinatura*, he has considerable responsibility for patient care.

(b) *Training in one of the 13 Institutes of Advanced Training for a Period of 3 to 5 Months*: The training is largely didactic and he does not have patient care responsibilities.

(c) *Training in one of the 17 Faculties of Advanced Training in the regular Medical Institutes*: This training is similar to that under (b) above.

(d) *Preceptorship Under a Specialist in a Large Hospital*: Very few choose this method.

Physicians in practice have advanced training every three years if they practice in a rural area and every five years if assigned to an urban area. Fifty six thousand physicians took advanced training in 1969. It is not obligatory by law for them to return for this training but the advantages of increased salary and a more attractive position after training attracts them to the courses. During their absence from their medical institution, to which they usually return, their families remain behind. However, they are given extra compensation to cover the costs of living. Because of the difficulties for female physicians leaving their families for three to five months for advanced training, correspondence courses have been provided. This permits the physician to attend the institute only for two months. Shorter refresher courses are also given for physicians in the large oblast hospitals, and by the Institutes and Faculties for Advanced Training.

Research training

Students who wish to engage in a career in research and teaching enter the "aspirantura." Usually the student returns after his three to five year period of service in a medical care faculty, but unusually bright and promising students may begin their aspirantura immediately after the internatura.

Those interested in careers in the basic medical sciences may begin their aspirantura after the sixth year Certificate.

The number of aspirants is regulated by the All Soviet Union Council on Science and Technology on recommendations made by the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health on the basis of plans submitted by the Republics. However, from discussions with faculty members in various institutes, it is apparent that it is a flexible program and requests for a larger number of students than originally programmed are routinely approved by the Republic Ministry. About 200 aspirants are supported by the Academy of Medical Sciences in their institutes. It was not possible to find out the number of aspirants in training this year. However, it is reported that there were 7,058 in training in 1965 and this number has probably risen considerably since then.

A student is admitted to the "Aspirantura" on the basis of an entrance examination which covers his special area of interest, one foreign language and political philosophy. The examinations are oral and are conducted by a Committee of the Scientific Council of the Institute. The Council also selects the preceptor for the student, usually the Chairman of a Department or the Director of a laboratory, and approves the plan of study prepared by the preceptor and student during the first three months of his course. For areas which bridge two disciplines, the student may have two preceptors and one may even be from another institution. The student must take advanced courses, sometimes in a University. He is given a special foreign language tutor for one year who ordinarily meets with him twice a week for two hours a session. He also has a course of lectures, seminars in selected subjects and assigned reading in political philosophy.

At the end of the first year of study, the student must pass a candidate exam, which covers the same topics as the entrance examination except that more advanced knowledge is required. The foreign language and philosophy examinations are written.

The student must do research and prepare and defend a thesis. The entire course usually requires three years. At the end of this period he is given a Certificate as a Candidate in Medical Sciences. The student may then obtain a teaching post or continue research and research training for a period of five to seven years for the degree of Doctor of Medical Science with the same or another preceptor. He must prepare and defend another thesis.

The students receive a stipend during their graduate education and engage in teaching during their training period.

Evening studies

In the past, most Institutes have had faculties for evening studies that admitted students who had finished secondary health professions schools which train feldshers, nurses, technicians, etc. These students study at night for three years and finish the first two years of the medical curriculum. They then transfer to the regular day program to complete their work.

Apparently this program is being phased out and some institutes have already abolished evening classes. It is interesting that there is no credit given for previous work as a health professional and the students were required to take the same courses as secondary school graduates.

Medical students

Students enter medical school at about age 17. They have completed four years of primary school which they enter at age seven, and six or seven years of secondary school.

There are always more applicant to medical schools than places available for them. At the Semashko Institute, we were told there were seven applicants per place available. In Moscow, there may be 15 applicants for places

available at the First or Second Medical Institutes. Students only apply to one medical school. Selection is made almost entirely on the basis of an entrance examination. The examinations cover areas of chemistry, biology, physics and philosophy. They are given over the entire country from about August 1-20 each year. The requirement that the student present himself or herself for the examination explains the reason for the single application to medical schools. The examinations in science are oral and conducted by two professors. A list of questions is prepared and available to the student in advance. Twenty to 30 students are scheduled for a given subject each day for the examining team. At the examination, the student draws a number which will indicate four of the questions he is to answer in a subject. He is given 15 minutes for the answers to his questions. The time seems very short but faculty members told us it is easy to determine the quality of the student within a minute or two after he begins to answer the questions.

A student who receives gold or silver medals for outstanding achievement in secondary school is required to take only one of the science examinations. If he makes an outstanding grade, he is admitted without further examination. However, if he makes only a satisfactory grade, he must take all of the examinations. Other than this, high school records are used only to select among students tying for admission in the entrance examination.

Although 75 percent of the present practicing physicians are women, the number of women in entering classes has been reduced. This will bring an increase in the representation of women in medicine. Present classes are about 40 percent women and 60 percent men. A number of administrators and faculty members stated that in their opinion, the ideal ratio would be 30 percent women and 70 percent men. They gave the reason for this as the difficulty women have in raising families and doing professional work.

It is claimed there is no financial barrier for a student who wishes to study medicine. Seventy percent of the students receive stipends during their medical education. The first-year student receives 28 rubles per month and this increases to 30 rubles in his sixth year. It is estimated it costs him about twice this to live. The stipends are generally given to students with high grades. The other 30 percent depend on family support. If a student comes from a low income family, he is permitted to work during his medical course. Approximately 25 percent often work as feldshers on night ambulance duty or in the hospitals. Students are rarely married upon entering medical school. About 20 percent are married by their sixth year, often to physicians.

The attrition rate is about 10 percent, mostly in the first and second years of study. The students and faculty work together in excluding students from the course of study. In some cases where the student is doing poorly, and his colleagues know there are mitigating circumstances, he is allowed to continue. On the other hand, students who are performing adequately academically may be excluded because of their attitude. It is not clear whether political considerations enter into these decisions.

EDUCATION OF OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS

Health professionals with authority and responsibilities below that of physicians are termed middle medical workers. They include the different types of dentists, feldshers, midwives, nurses, pharmacists, and medical technologists. In 1969, there were 2 million in this category in the U.S.S.R.; about one to every three physicians. In the United States, the ratio is more than one to every 10 physicians. The low number of other health professionals explains in part why physicians are assigned duties in the U.S.S.R.

that are not considered appropriate to their education and training in the U.S.A.

The middle health workers are trained in middle medical schools (technicians) which are separate from the medical schools. The administration and faculty of these schools is made up of physicians and not specially qualified middle medical workers who have received advanced training. This illustrates the concept that medicine in all of its aspects is the responsibility of the physician. There are not independent groups of health professionals.

Middle medical workers enter their course of study after ten years of primary and secondary education, at about age 17. The length of the courses varies from two years and ten months for a dentist, to one year and ten months for feldsher, laboratory worker, nurse, dental technician, and pharmacist.

The length of educational and training programs after completion of secondary school for middle medical workers is as follows:

General Geldsher, Sanitarian Feldsher, Midwife, Dentist; 2 years, 10 months.

Laboratory Feldsher, Nurse, Dental Technician: 1 year, 10 months.

A third group of health workers includes orderlies, maids, and other support and maintenance personnel.

There is a general misconception in the United States about the role of the feldsher. He or she does not serve as a surrogate physician or even as a physician's assistant of the type being trained in this country, except in remote outposts. Even here, there are plans to replace them with physicians as rapidly as possible. Feldshers have defined roles to play in the overall health care system and do not have a position between the physician and nurse. Many serve technical roles in operating complex equipment or carrying out laboratory procedures. Some are sanitary workers with responsibilities like those of some public health workers in the United States. Others man medical stations in industrial establishments and provide first aid and give follow-up treatment to patients under the direction of a physician. In contrast to the plans to substantially increase the number of physicians educated, there is no similar plan for an increase in the education and training of feldshers.

GENERAL IMPRESSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

There have been obvious advances in the level of health care and biomedical research in the Soviet Union over the last half century. These advances are remarkable when one considers the situation that existed at the beginning of the period; 16,000 physicians and relatively fewer other health professionals for the entire country and a biomedical research enterprise limited to a few great investigators.

The high priority assigned to health first by Lenin and by subsequent political leaders of the Soviet Union has been an important factor in achieving the present level of effort in health care and biomedical research. The bureaucracy, so evident in the political system, has also provided some hindrance to developments. The considerable decentralization of control from the Ministry of Health of the U.S.S.R. to the republics may reduce the hindrances to the health care programs.

There are apparently few citizens who do not have access to medical care. In this care, there is much more emphasis on preventive and prophylactic medicine than in the United States. Generally speaking, the level of medical care, for those who receive it in the United States, is much better than the general level in the U.S.S.R. There is good care available in the U.S.S.R., but the range of quality is much greater than in the United States. This is in part due to the necessity in the past to train health personnel without an adequate number of prop-

erly educated and trained faculty to assure high quality of medical education and the lack of specialists. But, by plan, health professionals were prepared over a relatively short period of time to administer care where little existed before. There is general recognition that the main effort should now be directed at improving the quality of education and the quality of care. By lengthening the medical school curriculum, expanding the opportunities for research in the medical school and the participation of students in advancing knowledge, and strengthening specialty training and eliminating general physicians, they give indication of a real concern for improving quality. It is interesting that their approach after a half century of experience with less adequately educated physicians is dramatically opposite to the course of action recommended by some in the United States that would deemphasize biomedical research, emphasize general practice, and return to the preceptorship method of clinical training for medical students.

There is an obvious hierarchy for physicians in the U.S.S.R. The academician, who is a member of the Academy of Medical Sciences, is clearly at the very top of the hierarchy. He not only has great influence in medicine, but derives financial and other important benefits from his position. The faculty member in the medical institutes has the next most important position. The least prestigious position is that of the physician in the health service system.

However, all physicians rank far above the other health professionals and are clearly the undisputed head of the health care team. The other health professionals have quite limited authority and responsibility and only that granted by the physician.

The position of the feldsher is widely misunderstood in other countries. He was developed in the 19th Century to minister to the needs of the proletariat so that the physicians could devote themselves to the bourgeoisie. This concept has had a great influence on the present attitudes in the Soviet Union vis-a-vis feldshers. With the Socialist Revolution came the feeling that the common man deserved and was entitled to care by a bona fide physician. The plans to increase substantially the number of physicians without a corresponding increase in the number of feldshers is an expression of this view. The feldsher is being given more roles as a sanitarian, health educator and a technical assistant to the physician, or as a public health nurse, rather than more responsibility for primary medical care and a first contact for the sick. The feldsher situation is described in some detail by Dr. Victor Sidel in two special articles in the *New England Journal of Medicine*.¹

Although there is some opportunity for upward mobility of middle medical workers, relatively little credit is given for their previous education or experience. They essentially have to complete the same program to qualify for a higher rank. With the closing of the evening divisions of the medical institutes, feldshers may find it more difficult to become physicians.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Quinn, J. R. "Anatomy of East-West Cooperation: U.S.-U.S.S.R. Public Health Exchange Program 1958-1967." John E. Fogarty International Center for Advanced Study in the Health Sciences; Bethesda, Maryland, 1969.

² Field, Mark G. "Soviet Socialized Medicine—An Introduction." The Free Press, New York, 1967.

³ "The Soviet Five-Year Plan for Public Health." John E. Fogarty International Center for Advanced Study in the Health Sciences, September 1970.

⁴ Not included in RECORD.

⁵ "Hospital Services In The U.S.S.R. Report of the U.S. Delegation on Hospital Systems Planning June 26-July 16, 1965." U.S.

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., November 1966, page 9.

⁶ Sidel, Victor W. "Feldshers and Feldsherism." (In two parts.) *New England Journal of Medicine* 278, 934-939, 987-992, 1968.

LIEUTENANT CALLEY—HERO OR NONHERO

(Mr. LEGGETT asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Speaker, to me the public support from certain portions of the country for Lieutenant Calley is almost as disturbing as the My Lai massacre itself.

Lieutenant Calley murdered helpless prisoners who were no threat to anybody, and that is all there is to it. He later referred to it as "no big deal." If the American people regard the murder of 22 Oriental human beings as "no big deal," then we are in a bad way indeed. Columnist Louis Cassels discussed the problem in a perceptive "Of God and Man" column in the *Sacramento Bee* of May 15, 1971, which I include in the RECORD at this point.

CALLEY AS A HERO

(By Louis Cassels)

Americans who disapprove the murder conviction of Lt. William Calley have made their protests heard, loud and clear, all the way up to the White House.

But there is another group of Americans, perhaps quite numerous, whose voices nearly have been drowned out in the uproar. They also are distressed about the Calley case—but for different reasons.

What bothers them is that so many of their fellow citizens—including some who profess to be pious Christians—would make a hero of a man who was found guilty, after a long and fair trial, of the cold-blooded murders of 22 unarmed old men, women and children.

"I have not shed as many despairing tears about anything since John Kennedy was killed as I have over the reaction of the American people to the Calley conviction," writes Mrs. H. O. Dyson of Phoenixville, Pa.

"Was it just a hope and not a reality that we as a people had a certain nobility of character which precluded justification of the murder of innocents? There always have been Americans who could, individually, kill without conscience. But I thought that the majority in this nation would turn in horror from such a person."

Some of Calley's defenders argue that he is being made the scapegoat for a crime that properly rests on the consciences of those who sent him into the hell of Vietnam—which is to say, all of us who have supported or condoned this war.

But Mrs. Dyson feels that "too much has been made of this idea of corporate guilt for individual acts." When the press harps on the theme that "society is to blame" for My Lai, she says, it gravely undermines the efforts of parents who are trying to teach their children that "responsibility for what they do rests with them."

Another argument made by Calley's supporters is that it's unfair to punish him for doing what "everybody was doing" in Vietnam.

But this carries cynicism too far. Granted, there have been a woeful number of instances in which American servicemen have committed atrocities. The fact remains that a great many men have served honorably in Vietnam without stooping to bestial conduct.

Calley was not convicted by civilians or

armchair soldiers, but by a panel of officers who were fellow-veterans of Vietnam combat. They had been in exactly the same boat—and they found his conduct abhorrent and inexcusable.

So did some of the troops in Calley's own platoon who—testimony at the trial revealed—threw down their guns in disgust and refused to comply with his order to "waste" helpless women and babies.

The worst effect of the Calley case may be still to come. By assuring Calley sympathizers he will personally review the verdict, President Nixon has created a very difficult situation for himself and the country.

If Nixon confirms the conviction and lets Calley go to jail, he will redouble the rage of people to whom the young lieutenant has become a martyr-hero. His actions to date indicate he is most unwilling to antagonize this group.

If he obliges them by pardoning Calley or letting him off with a light sentence, the inference can and will be drawn that it is perfectly acceptable to the American conscience for the American soldiers to behave as Calley did. That would amount to a presidential license for indiscriminate brutality by our troops.

The prospect is enough to make others besides Mrs. Dyson shed despairing tears over what has happened to America's conscience.

FRIENDSHIP HOUSING DEVELOPMENT FOR THE ELDERLY—MORGANTOWN, W. VA.

(Mr. STAGGERS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. STAGGERS. Mr. Speaker, the resources of the Government can be put to good use when they are put in the hands of energetic and resourceful people. Such is the case with a housing development for the elderly in Morgantown, W. Va.

The people with the vision and the drive to make the project a reality was the Kiwanis Club of Morgantown. Starting some 15 years ago, they seized whatever resources were available, and cultivated them vigorously until they could open a million-dollar project in May 1970.

Personally, I am proud and happy to have attended some of the meetings when this project was being discussed and studied. Needless to say, there was a real need in the community for such a facility.

Realizing a good thing, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development responded to this appeal with two grants, one of \$600,000 and a supplemental one of \$340,000. I am also very happy to have been helpful in obtaining approval for availability of these funds for the Morgantown project.

Starting with bequests of \$5,000 each from Mrs. Robert Colwell and Dr. A. J. Dadisman, and a donation of \$5,000 from the Kiwanis Club, a tract was purchased from Dr. and Mrs. William E. Paul for \$25,000 several years ago. After some delays until the financing of the plan could be assured, the Department of Housing and Urban Development registered its approval, and construction was started.

A description of the project, written by David B. Williams, was printed in the Kiwanis magazine for June 1971. In the hope that other progressive communities may be inspired to go and do likewise, I include his story in the RECORD.

THE HAPPY INHABITANTS OF FRIENDSHIP MANOR

(By David B. Williams)

On the first day that Mrs. Margaret Brand moved into Friendship Manor, a bird was singing in the willow tree outside her window. "I haven't seen that bird since then," she says, "but with such a cheery welcome I knew right from that moment that I was going to enjoy living here."

Mrs. Brand's satisfaction is shared by all the other residents of Friendship Manor, a 62-unit apartment residence in Morgantown, West Virginia, for people of retirement age and limited income. The result of a 15-year effort which saw the Kiwanis Club of Morgantown parlay an idea and \$5,000 into a million-dollar housing facility for the elderly, Friendship Manor offers the privacy, security, companionship, and independence that senior citizens value—and perhaps most important of all, longtime residents of the Morgantown area can enjoy these benefits in the community where they wish to live, near their friends and relatives.

Opened in May 1970, Friendship Manor is an attractive three-story brick structure located on a hill in a quiet residential area overlooking the campus of West Virginia University. Financed with a loan through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Manor is administered by Friendship Homes, Incorporated, a nonprofit corporation to which each of the 110 members of the Kiwanis Club of Morgantown belongs.

Mrs. Virginia LaQuier, the resident managing director, is quick to point out that Friendship Manor is not a "nursing home." "All of our residents are physically and mentally able to take care of themselves," she explains. "Friendship Manor was designed to give older people the opportunity to do just that with the comfort and privacy they desire and need, at a cost within their small retirement incomes."

The Friendship Manor story began in 1955, when Kiwanian Robert I. Burchinal recognized the need for such a facility in the Morgantown area. "As an attorney," Bob recalls, "I was constantly in contact with people in the higher age brackets who were no longer able to keep their own homes because of the high costs and daily chores involved. But when these people gave up their homes they were unable to find other housing in Morgantown commensurate with their needs or the standards to which they were accustomed. I even knew three people who spent unnecessarily prolonged periods in mental institutions because there was just no other place for them to go."

Margaret Fitch is a spry little woman whose story illustrates the problems that elderly Morgantown residents faced before Friendship Manor opened its doors. Margaret was born in Morgantown and has lived there all of her 82 years. She has no relatives nearby, but as she says, "When you've lived in a spot this long, it's kind of home to you." Unable to keep the old family home by herself, she gave it up to make way for a new municipal parking lot. She moved to a nursing home for a time, but found its institutional atmosphere too confining. "I don't want to be penned up," she says quite vigorously. "I like to get out and get around." She then tried a hotel, but this was both expensive and impersonal. Now she has her own apartment home at Friendship Manor, where she has the satisfaction of taking care of herself while enjoying the comfort and congenial atmosphere that the Manor provides.

"We were urged by many groups to do one thing or another," recalls John Batlas, Jr., a Kiwanian whose experience as a builder provided expert guidance in costs and construction values. "The county nursing home was having difficulties at the time, and the general cry was 'do something for the indigent.' Of course, we were concerned about this problem, and Kiwanians spent two years

getting the nursing home going again before we could really get to work on Friendship Manor. But we saw the need for the large middle group of the elderly who don't need nursing care and want to be self-sufficient within their limited means. We wanted to do something for these people too."

When the idea of doing something for this group of senior citizens was presented to the Morgantown Kiwanians, they responded to the challenge and dedication that would keep them going through fifteen years of difficulties and setbacks before they achieved their goal.

Location, financing, and design were the three major problems that had to be solved before Friendship Manor could become a reality. The club formed a housing committee and began its work by sending two members to a seminar on housing for the elderly in Dillsburg, Pennsylvania, in 1956. From this meeting was born the Friendship Manor concept of gracious living in a homelike atmosphere for senior citizens of limited means.

The Kiwanians spent a great deal of time and effort in careful investigation before deciding just what kind of facility would best meet the needs of the elderly, and committee members visited facilities in several states to gather ideas and advice.

The first positive step was taken when a suitable piece of land owned by a former Kiwanian became available. Immediate action was imperative, so two of the committee members quickly provided their own funds to cover the down payment until the club could arrange for the land's purchase.

Financing and design were interlocking problems, since cost would depend on the size and type of construction. The club members investigated many financing plans, but the magnitude of the project and the goal of low cost to the elderly made government financing the most practical. In December 1964 the Kiwanians consulted with representatives of the US Department of Housing and Urban Development and learned the terms and conditions under which it could provide federal financing.

HUD required preliminary drawings. "Under normal conditions it isn't difficult to find an architect interested in planning with you," Bob Burchinal notes, "but when you don't have any money to guarantee his fee, it's a little more difficult." But then, while examining a facility in Pennsylvania the Morgantown Kiwanians learned that its architect was then-secretary T. Ray Fulton of the Kiwanis Club of Uniontown. When he learned that the Morgantown project was Kiwanis sponsored, he agreed to help.

The site of the planned facility was in a highly restricted residential area, and numerous meetings with officials and revisions of plans took place before the Board of Zoning Appeals granted approval for the project in September 1965. Then followed many trips to Philadelphia to meet with HUD officials to process a loan application for \$600,000, which was approved in September 1966.

But just as the project seemed to be on the final stretch of a long and difficult road, the club's construction bids were returned with every one exceeding the available funds by at least 25 percent. To the faint-hearted this blow would have been the last straw, but for the Morgantown Kiwanians it was merely a setback, not a defeat. They went back to the drawing boards and, to insure that the project would be self-liquidating, revised the plans again—not downward, but upward! They went back to the zoning board and obtained approval for the larger structure. And they went back to HUD, this time with an application for \$940,000.

Final HUD approval came through in August 1968 and construction began on November 28. Less than two years later the members of the Kiwanis Club of Morgantown enjoyed a "sneak preview" of Friendship Manor, with all its furnishings in place,

and on May 1, 1970, the first tenants moved in.

Was this long and exhausting effort worth it? If you ask the happy inhabitants of Friendship Manor, there is no doubt. "I've already convinced several of my friends to move to Friendship Manor," says Glenna Herod, "and I'm still working on some others!" Mrs. Herod had been living with her son in Philadelphia, but moved to Friendship Manor so that she wouldn't be alone in the house at night.

From 1925 until his retirement, Dr. Ralph Hager was a dentist in Morgantown. When he and Mrs. Hager moved to Friendship Manor they liked it so much that they convinced Mrs. Hager's sister in Pennsylvania to join them there.

One of the most appealing features of Friendship Manor for its residents is the way that the privacy of apartment living blends with the congenial companionship of neighbors of similar age and background. "When we want company," explains Miss Blanche Pixler, "we just leave the door open, and when we don't, we close it. There's always someone to visit with when you want to, but when you want to be alone you have the privacy of your own home."

The congeniality at Friendship Manor embraces not only the residents, but the management as well. Dr. John Campbell, president of the Manor's board of directors, and Hubert Marshall, past president, take residents to basketball games at WVU's Coliseum and to Masonic Lodge meetings. Mrs. LaQuier, the managing director, often takes a hand in bridge games in the Manor's decorous lounge. "We usually have one or more games going every evening," she says, "and they've been known to last until midnight."

Another attractive feature of Friendship Manor is its location in Morgantown. Most of the residents were born or have spent many years in the area, and others have relatives or friends there. Mrs. Muriel Rees, for example, lived at a retirement community in Florida for a time, but although the weather was pleasant she really didn't know anyone there. Her daughter's husband teaches at WVU, and they arranged for her to move to Friendship Manor. Before the Manor became available there was no housing of comparable attractiveness and cost in the community.

Mrs. Gussie Campbell had been living in an apartment near her sister in New York, even though she was a longtime Morgantown resident. "I got homesick up in New York," she says, "and when I heard about the plans for Friendship Manor I kept after Bob Burchinal to get it finished. Then wouldn't you know it," she adds with a laugh, "when it was finished I wasn't ready to move in." But now Mrs. Campbell is settled back in Morgantown, with her own comfortable and attractive apartment among the people she knows in the town where she wants to live.

Not all the residents are hometown folks, however, and many have come from out of state simply because the Friendship Manor concept of retirement living is so appealing. Two of Morgantown's new citizens, thanks to Friendship Manor, are Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Foster. Both had lived in Casper, Wyoming, for many years—at least until a friend of Mrs. Foster sent her literature about Friendship Manor. "Friendship Manor is the most appealing retirement home we investigated," says Mr. Foster, who is 92. "We packed up and got in the car and drove the 2200 miles to Morgantown in six days. We're really happy here."

Sally Clark taught school in New York City and Cleveland before retiring, and now keeps active by helping the local girl scouts with arts and crafts. "Morgantown is a town compared to New York or Cleveland," she says, "and I feel much more a part of things here."

Although a few of the units are furnished, most of the residents bring their own fur-

nishings, often including cherished items that have been passed down in their families for generations. "People bring what they especially treasure," says Mrs. Brand. "It's very interesting to hear the stories behind each piece, and you can learn a lot about people by what they bring."

Costs are low at Friendship Manor, despite the spacious rooms, tasteful decorating, carpeting, air conditioning, and other comforts. The basic efficiency unit with pull-man-type kitchenette and bath rents for only \$80 per month and the full one-bedroom units are just \$123. In addition, residents are required to take the evening meal, at a cost of \$52.50 per month, in the Manor's gracious dining room. "Older people tend to eat lightly and don't always get everything they need for good nutrition," Mrs. LaQuier explains. "This requirement insures that each resident has at least one full, balanced meal each day, and it also provides good social contact."

The Friendship Manor concept of retirement living was something new to the Morgantown area and was not fully understood at first. "Morgantown is a small community, and we tend to become satisfied with things as they are," says R. P. Davis, Dean Emeritus of the school of engineering at WVU and another of the Kiwanians who played a large role in launching the Friendship Manor project. "It took a lot of time and work, but now that Friendship Manor is a reality a lot of community agencies have a different attitude about this type of project because they can see what fine things can be done."

Community appreciation and understanding of the Friendship Manor concept has spread rapidly, thanks to the steady stream of visitors who have passed through its doors since their opening. "We have about 200 people come through some weeks," says Mrs. LaQuier, "and almost thirty groups and community clubs have used our facilities for special meetings."

The first thing that impresses these visitors is Friendship Manor's warm, home-like atmosphere. "HUD and the architect originally envisioned a more institutional building," says John Batlas, "but we asked ourselves, 'Why can't we get something really nice for the money, even if it is coming from the government?'" The eye-catching decor and solid, soundproof construction of Friendship Manor attests to the fact that with careful planning the Morgantown Kiwanians got 100 cents value for every dollar spent.

The second feature that impresses every visitor is not so tangible, but just as pleasing; the delight that the residents of Friendship Manor have in their home. Their ready smiles and obvious pride is convincing proof that Friendship Manor is the perfect answer to their retirement needs.

Fifteen years ago the Kiwanis Club of Morgantown began the Friendship Manor project with nothing but a dream and the dedication to see it through. Or, as Bob Burchinal puts it: "The real Friendship Manor story is the story behind Kiwanis. One man has an idea, and his fellow Kiwanians pool their talents and enthusiasm until the idea, however big, becomes a reality."

For the elderly citizens of Morgantown that reality is Friendship Manor, through which they have rediscovered the dignity and independence of self-reliance—even into their golden years.

THE STEEL TRADE ACT OF 1971

(Mr. MORGAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, today I introduce a bill that will provide for orderly trade in iron and steel mill prod-

ucts by establishing quotas for steel imported into this country. It enjoys co-sponsorship from 24 of my colleagues in the Pennsylvania delegation from both sides of the aisle.

We are introducing this measure because of the clear and demonstrable threat that steel import trends pose to our highly essential iron and steel industry and its more than half million steelworkers.

I would like to review these trends and their consequences.

Between the end of 1957 and the end of 1968 our steel trade balance shifted from a surplus of over 4 million net tons to a deficit in the latter year of almost 16 million tons amounting in value to \$1½ billion.

That change was caused by a combination of four factors:

First, the availability of a large amount of excess steel-producing capacity outside the United States and the policies of certain foreign countries as to the use of this capacity;

Second, production costs in other countries which are far less than those in the United States;

Third, resulting low prices in world markets, some of which are below the home market prices of many foreign producers; and

Fourth, measures taken by foreign governments to protect and strengthen their own steel industries and to encourage exports.

In recognition of the fact that steel imports were contributing to our Nation's severe balance of payment problem and sapping the strength of our vital steel industry, a strong measure of support for steel quota legislation built up in 1968 around the country and here in Congress.

Apparently out of concern about the prospects for quota legislation, Japanese steel producers and those of the European Economic Community—the major exporters of steel to the United States—voluntarily committed themselves to curtail somewhat their soaring shipments to the U.S. market for the 3-year period beginning with 1969.

Their commitment was announced in letters from each of the two groups to the then Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. Each letter specified a level of 5¾ million tons for the signatories in 1969, with an annual growth rate of 5 percent in 1970 and 1971.

This arrangement presumed that the countries not parties to the program would not take advantage of the situation, which would mean that total exports of steel-mill products from all nations to this country would not exceed 14 million tons in 1969, 14.7 million tons in 1970 and 15.4 million tons in 1971. The participants expressed their intentions—and I emphasize this—to maintain approximately the same product mix and geographic distribution pattern as previously existed.

High hopes were held in some quarters for this arrangement, although significant flaws in it were immediately evident; notably, the 5-percent growth factor. That is more than double the rate of growth of steel demand in the United States since World War II.

Also, the arrangement—which expires

at the end of this year—does not cover important steel producers outside Japan and the European Economic Community. Their self-restraint was assumed without any declaration of restraint on their part.

Total steel import tonnage in 1969 and 1970 did not exceed the levels of the voluntary limitations. The limitations no doubt played a part in this performance, but most observers of the steel scene believe that a more important factor was the coincidental and—as it turned out—temporary surge of demand for steel in Europe and elsewhere.

Total tonnage did not exceed the voluntary limitations levels, but there has been a startling and dismaying shift of imports to higher valued products and a shift in the geographic distribution pattern of steel imports.

Imports of specialty steels—stainless steels, tool steels, and steel specialty tubular products—have soared.

For example, stainless steel imports from Japan rose nearly 20 percent last year at the same time as shipments of domestic-made stainless fell 22 percent.

Here is just a sampling of what this has done to the marketplace: Imports have taken over some 34 percent of the domestic stainless cold rolled sheet market, 65 percent of the market for stainless wire rod and cold drawn stainless wire, and 16 percent of the market for tool steel. Imports claim nearly 40 percent of the domestic market for seamless carbon and alloy pressure tubing.

This shift to products of higher value is contrary to the intent of the voluntary limitations program and has imposed severe hardships on domestic specialty steel producers. They are now in a disastrous financial situation as a consequence of this. Some of this country's most modern and up-to-date specialty steel facilities are being operated at a loss—a situation which, of course, cannot continue very long.

Domestic specialty steel tubing producers already have announced that they may be forced to abandon certain import-vulnerable product lines if the situation doesn't change for the better.

Along with the shift in the product mix has come a shift in the geographic distribution pattern of steel imports—a development also contrary to the intent of the voluntary restraint program. It has resulted in imports through our west coast ports actually rising rather than falling as they should have under the voluntary arrangement. In 1970, 16.2 percent more foreign steel came through Pacific coast customs districts than should have under the voluntary restraint program. Domestic steel producers who concentrate on the west coast market have been hard hit by this development.

Even among the large domestic producers with broader product lines and geographically dispersed plants, however, the impact of the growing emphasis by foreign producers on higher value products and in certain market areas has had a significant effect.

Another dangerous but little noticed development has been the import into the United States of steel originating in

the Common Market and Japan through countries not parties to the voluntary limitations.

The picture is grim and getting grimmer. Imports this year through April—the last month for which data are available—are running ahead of their pace during the January-April period of 1968—a year which ultimately saw a record 18 million tons of foreign steel land in this country. Both years are marked by consumer stockpiling against the possibility of domestic steel mill shutdowns with the expiration of labor contracts.

More steel was imported during the first quarter of this year than during the first quarter of any other year. And during the past decade, first quarter steel imports have consistently been lower than second and third quarter imports. In 1968, for example, imports did not peak until August.

And, after that record-setting first quarter, steel imports climbed again in April. A total of 1,363,000 tons of foreign steel entered the United States during the month. This was 109,000 tons more than March's 1,254,000-ton mark, and lifted total steel imports for the first four months of 1971 to 5,152,000 tons—an increase of 56.2 percent over the comparable period of last year. For the full year 1971, we expect the net deficit of the United States in steel trade will exceed \$1.5 billion.

It is because of these developments that my colleagues and I introduce the Iron and Steel Orderly Trade Act. It contains provisions which would effectively prevent disruption of product and geographical markets, and it would establish an import growth rate consistent with the normal growth of domestic demand.

If this bill were enacted, investment by domestic steel companies to better serve their markets would be encouraged. In the long run this means more viability to the domestic industry and more job opportunities for American workers. It now takes about 6,000 employees in steel plants and offices and 1,200 employees in supporting activities to produce a million tons of steel mill products annually.

A strong domestic steel industry is essential to the United States for both economic and security reasons.

Advanced economies like ours need steel in amounts too large and types too varied to be satisfactorily supplied to a significant extent by others, particularly in case of emergencies. Realization of this has been the basis for the continuing drive by the Soviet Union to build up its steel industry, and the steps taken by other governments to insure the viability and expansion of their steel industries.

But the steel import trends I have described threaten the ability of our steel industry to provide the steels needed to support our economy and sustain our national security. We must remove that threat.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have the bill printed at this point in the RECORD. I also urge other Members of the House to support and sponsor this bill.

GENUINE EMERGENCY IN TEXAS

(Mr. KAZEN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Speaker, the words "Dust Bowl" are burned into the hearts of thousands of farmers. That was the term used to describe one of the worst droughts in our Nation's history, one that lasted almost 6 years in the 1930's, when farm families saw their croplands and grazing ranges destroyed. Not only was the land too dry to produce crops or grass, but it was blown away as dust.

I know the people and the lands of that 1930 drought. We saw the same conditions in the 1950's. That is why I bring to the attention of the House today an article in the Washington Post on Sunday that carried the frightening title "Dust Bowl Again." It is a report by Leroy F. Aarons, a reporter whose recent travels covered much of Texas and Oklahoma. He documents the disaster that is there today.

I have urged the Federal Government to provide relief. I made an inspection trip with the Secretary of Agriculture, or perhaps I should say I rode along when he visited Texas and Oklahoma in late April. Secretary Hardin said then that drought conditions were worse than he had feared. Yet the Nixon administration has done little to help the farmers and ranchers. The Secretary of Agriculture has said he is doing all he can, but he is hiding behind legal technicalities. He is the chief adviser to the President on agricultural affairs, and the emergency powers of the President far exceed those of the Secretary of Agriculture, but to this day no Presidential declaration has come.

I hope the President and his advisers, Secretary Hardin and General George Lincoln of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, will read this report. Perhaps they will then recognize that there is a genuine emergency in Texas in the threat of the Dust Bowl of the 1970's.

The article follows:

THE POST REPORT

SAN ANTONIO.—The old Union Stockyard was hopping. One after another, ranchers backed gooseneck trailers or pickups into the bins and unloaded their cattle: brown, glum-faced Herefords, ferocious-looking black Angus, gaunt, bony Brahmans.

Leather-skinned cowboys, oblivious to the rich, pungent smell of cow dung, checked the brands, slapped them on the rump with whips or canes and forced them through the first of several gates, into the maze of cattleways that lead to the auction room. There they would be sold to customers from as far away as Washington state, eager to buy skinny cows cheap, fatten and re-sell them later.

Some of the cows looked weak and thin, the glaze of malnutrition making their eyeballs glisten. Others were average. Very few had the fleshy shiny, coated glow one remembered from a thousand movie cattle drives.

"They're lookin' sorry," said an old-timer. "Too skinny. One day I saw them pull in with nine in the wagon that should have held about five. Two of them were dead. One had to be condemned. They just couldn't get her up. They had to drag 'em out of the trailer. One they had to roll out end over end."

FORCED TO SELL

From all over drought-stricken south-central and southwest Texas the cattle come by the record thousands. Ranchers, unable to coax grass or grain out of the parched land, were forced to buy and haul in feed and hay—some from as far away as New Mexico and Colorado—to keep their herds alive.

But, eventually, the cost of feed began to outweigh the potential value of their animals. Many cattle died of malnutrition. Rather than lose their herds entirely, ranchers decided to sell. First they pulled young calves from their mothers—partly to spare the highly valuable breeding stock—and sold them.

Then, as things got worse and still no rain, they sold their mother herds, and finally the bulls. Hundreds of smaller ranchers simply sold out altogether and went to look for jobs in the city. Thus, today's auction would see a run of nearly 5,000 cattle, the second largest of the year and 2,000 more than last year at the same time. Total cattle sales at Union this year are up more than 40 per cent.

"What hurts me," and Asa (Ace) Fuller, a brand checker at the stockyard, "is that I see these men come here, they usually walk in here and kick the cows in the ass. But now you see 'em pat 'em on the hip and you see the old lady back there cryin' and you know this was one they intended to keep."

"THEY SICK OF WASHINGTON"

Ace Fuller is 31 years old, weighs 330 pounds and once played football in Canada. He is full of the frustrated indignation of a man who is a victim of some form of injustice, yet doesn't really know whom to blame. His vocal anger reflects the quieter frustration of his fellow ranchers.

"We got a bunch of government sons-a-bitches won't do anything for us," said Fuller, whose outfit was "uniform of the day" in these parts—the straw summer Stetson, western shirt, jeans and high, pointed-toe boots. "They send some s.o.b. from Washington in an airplane. He just damn sure didn't look at Wilson County where there's really trouble. People like as how they sick of Washington."

"It's real bad. Even if it does rain now, the young tender grass won't grow. It's too hot. It's going to be 100 degrees from now on. The farmer and rancher is fed up. Ever since Arkansas when Eisenhower was in there, people been fed up."

"THIS IS WORSE"

"When I see these people in the big cities, they getting help. But these farmers, who are working their butts off, they not gettin' nothin'. I went through the drought of the '50s. I saw my daddy plant corn and it wouldn't come up. But this is worse. When I see some of these people I know all my life, just pat 'em like this, they're pattin' 'em good-bye. I tell you, I get so damn mad sometimes I want to spit fire."

On April 21, in response to the pleas and pressure of Texas and Oklahoma congressmen and governors, Agriculture Secretary Clifford Hardin made a personal visit to the drought country. In San Antonio his "tour" of the stricken areas is universally remembered as a "farce." Hardin, they say, spent 30 minutes in a helicopter, 15 of them taxiing and the other 15 making a cursory flight over some of the less ravaged countryside.

When the copter set down, Hardin said Texas and Oklahoma were "major disaster areas" but added that he would not seek such a designation from the President, that actions already taken offered all the aid available.

PRESIDENT IS SILENT

Angered by Hardin's snub, Texas Gov. Preston Smith, a Democrat, issued a statement saying that "we in Texas are not satisfied that the government had done enough

... It has become apparent to us that no one in Washington—1,500 miles away from the drought—can see or feel the problems as we have seen and felt them."

Thus the sides were drawn for a political dispute that could hurt Mr. Nixon in Texas and other hard-hit southwestern states in 1972. The government has offered a wide range of assistance in the drought—including some grain at reduced prices, aid in paying for shipping of hay, and emergency loans from the Farmers Home Administration.

But farmers say they need to sign a "pauper's oath" to get the first two and can only get an FHA loan when they can show all other sources have failed and they were totally desperate. This procedure is undignified, they feel. They want the drought country declared a major disaster area by the President, which would, among other things, make farmers eligible for forgiveness on loans up to \$2,500.

But Mr. Nixon has thus far remained silent.

EARTH IS SCORCHED

Nature has declared a scorched-earth policy. Driving southeast from San Antonio on Route 87 toward La Vernia, one can see some of the driest country of the drought. Row after row of farm tract, bare of grass, hay, milo or anything, sit baking in the 100-degree sun, cracking and chapping under the intense heat. The heat rises in vapors in the distance, making power lines seem to waver like TV test patterns. Occasionally an irrigated field comes into view, its verdant cheerfulness startling against its dull brown surroundings.

Above, puny clouds hover like tiny bursts of ack-ack. (Air Force planes have been out trying to coax rain by seeding some of the clouds—with little success.)

"We've had some bad dust storms down here," said Ed Talk. "This is sandy country all right. You can see where the sand has piled up along the fences. But it's not as bad as in the '30s, mostly 'cause of better farming methods. Surface soil is now plowed under so the harder substance is on top, and land that's not being used is planted with a cover crop, like alfalfa. Still, it can blow up pretty heavy."

Ed Talk is a handsome, softspoken rancher of 47, who owns about 500 acres of land near La Vernia and had 150 head of cattle when the drought started. Now he has none.

"NOTHING CAME UP"

"This is the worst drought I've ever seen. We have had about three inches of rain in the last year; this, in an area that usually gets 28 to 30 inches. I've been in the cattle business all my life. In the '50s it would at least rain periodically and you did grow a little something. I held on through the '50s, but this time I sold out. The feed bill was gettin' too high. Eventually you'll feed up to the price of your animal. It don't take long at \$1.50 a bale of hay."

"They eat from a quarter to a half bushel a day. Plus you got to give 'em protein besides that. I finally sold out at \$50 a head less than normal. A good fat cow will bring around \$200. I sold mine for \$150. It cost me in all about \$6,000, not to mention the lost investment in planting. We planted grass, but nothing came up."

When and if the rains come, Talk will have to borrow money to replace his herd. Since so many cattle are going out of state, the price is certain to be extremely high. This will be reflected in the price of cattle to be sold next year, and ultimately in the cost to the consumer.

How come more farmers don't use irrigation, he was asked.

"It's so dad-blamed expensive. You need a cash crop, like tomatoes or alfalfa, to afford it. It costs about \$10,000 for the pump and the rig, and you need two men to keep mov-

ing the pipes around. Then, butane for the pump costs 26 cents to 30 cents a gallon, and it takes about 500 gallons every four days. We finally did irrigate from 150 to 175 acres, just to sell the hay and keep us goin'."

LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE

The dust storms of the '30s taught everyone a lesson. They happened because the land had been brutally torn up and overworked by farmers ignorant of conservation measures. When the drought came the loosened soil turned dry, was easily picked up by the rushing wind and transported hundreds of miles through the air like a black rain.

Out of the Dust Bowl was born the Soil Conservation Service and a new consciousness of the proper uses of land. Techniques were devised to prevent water from running off crop lands, eroding soil and filling waterways with minerals. Rotated planting was emphasized, with the purpose of giving overused land a chance to recuperate, to hold its moisture and to yield better crops.

Much was done, with the help of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers, to provide dams and reservoirs for irrigation and drinking water.

By the time the seven-year drought of the 1950s came, farmers were better prepared. But the great drought of 1970-71 has demonstrated that the arid regions of the Southwest are still unable to cope with major emergencies.

RESERVOIRS EMPTY

All over the stricken areas of Texas and Oklahoma reservoirs, like Lake Altus, are giving out; irrigation supplies are rapidly being depleted and the water tables dropping dangerously. At San Angelo, Tex., as far back as March, the primary reservoir was already dry and reserves were diminishing.

Clearly, local water projects are insufficient in extended periods of intense drought. The answer is a statewide, comprehensive water plan, as in California, which would utilize surpluses in one part of a state to supply needy areas elsewhere. But these proposals are expensive; they have been rejected by the public in the past—as in Texas, where a multibillion-dollar water plan was turned down in a referendum two years ago.

To the beleaguered farmer and rancher, these issues are distant and exotic. They must cope with the here-and-now realities of impending disaster.

SEEKS TO RE-CREATE RFC

(Mr. PEPPER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, many of our colleagues may not recall the invaluable service which the Reconstruction Finance Corporation performed in the recovery of our national economy from the great depression. I was, however, a part of that era and I know personally that many jobs and enterprises were saved by the emergency financial support which the RFC was able to give.

The agency went out of existence because it was no longer needed; it appeared that the time in our economic life when general recession would threaten the existence of even great corporations was to be a thing of the past.

Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, this has not proven to be the case. We are in a serious economic situation and even the largest of our aerospace contractors is in desperate need of financial assistance.

It seems to me, however, that it would be most unfair to provide Federal finan-

cial assistance to a large corporation such as Lockheed and not make provision for the smaller companies that play an equally important part in our national economy.

Many smaller enterprises have experienced unusual difficulties as a result of the strange economic situation in which we find ourselves—a combination of rising inflation and high unemployment at the same time. I feel we should have an instrument capable of assisting them and I have, therefore, introduced today legislation to re-create the Reconstruction Finance Corporation with authority to provide loans and loan guarantees up to \$1 billion.

I have chosen to reintroduce the original RFC act to emphasize the connection with the provision we made in the 1930's to salvage so many valuable enterprises. It has, I am sure, many technical imperfections which must be worked out in committee. I have merely sought to increase the resources of the agency to \$1 billion, from the \$250 million in the original act, and to provide for loan guarantees as well as the direct loans authorized in the original legislation. A few obviously outdated provisions have also been stricken.

At this point I would like to include the text of the measure, which is essentially the original RFC Act:

H.R. 9167

A bill to provide emergency financing facilities for financial institutions, to aid in financing agriculture, commerce, and industry, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there be, and is hereby, created a body corporate with the name "Reconstruction Finance Corporation" (herein called the corporation). That the principal office of the corporation shall be located in the District of Columbia, but there may be established agencies or branch offices in any city or cities of the United States under rules and regulations prescribed by the board of directors. This Act may be cited as the "Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act of 1971".

Sec. 2. The corporation shall have capital stock of \$1,000,000,000, subscribed by the United States of America, payment for which shall be subject to call in whole or in part by the board of directors of the corporation.

There is hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of \$1,000,000,000, for the purpose of making payments upon such subscription when called.

Receipts for payments by the United States of America for or on account of such stock shall be issued by the corporation to the Secretary of the Treasury and shall be evidence of the stock ownership of the United States of America.

Sec. 3. The management of the corporation shall be vested in a board of directors consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, who shall be members ex officio, and four other persons appointed by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Of the nine members of the board of directors not more than six shall be members of any one political party and not more than one shall be appointed from any one Federal Reserve district. Each director shall devote his time not otherwise required by the business of the United States

principally to the business of the corporation. Before entering upon his duties each of the directors so appointed and each officer of the corporation shall take an oath faithfully to discharge the duties of his office. Nothing contained in this or in any other Act shall be construed to prevent the appointment and compensation as an employee of the corporation of any officer or employee of the United States in any board, commission, independent establishment, or executive department thereof. The terms of the directors appointed by the President of the United States shall be two years and run from the date of the enactment hereof and until their successors are appointed and qualified. Whenever a vacancy shall occur among the directors so appointed, the person appointed to fill such vacancy shall hold office for the unexpired portion of the term of the director whose place he is selected to fill. No director, officer, attorney, agent, or employee of the corporation shall in any manner, directly or indirectly, participate in the deliberation upon or the determination of any question affecting his personal interests, or the interests of any corporation, partnership, or association in which he is directly or indirectly interested.

Sec. 4. The corporation shall have succession for a period of ten years from the date of the enactment hereof, unless it is sooner dissolved by an Act of Congress. It shall have power to adopt, alter and use a corporate seal; to make contracts; to lease such real estate as may be necessary for the transaction of its business; to sue and be sued, to complain and to defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal; to select, employ, and fix the compensation of such officers, employees, attorneys, and agents as shall be necessary for the transaction of the business of the corporation, without regard to the provisions of other laws applicable to the employment and compensation of officers or employees of the United States; to define their authority and duties, require bonds of them and fix the penalties thereof, and to dismiss at pleasure such officers, employees, attorneys, and agents; and to prescribe, amend, and repeal, by its board of directors, by-laws, rules, and regulations governing the manner in which its general business may be conducted and the powers granted to it by law may be exercised and enjoyed, including the selection of its chairman and vice chairman, together with provision for such committees and the functions thereof as the board of directors may deem necessary for facilitating its business under this Act. The board of directors of the corporation shall determine and prescribe the manner in which its obligations shall be incurred and its expenses allowed and paid. The corporation shall be entitled to the free use of the United States mails in the same manner as the executive departments of the Government. The corporation, with the consent of any board, commission, independent establishment, or executive department of the Government, including any field service thereof, may avail itself of the use of information, services, facilities, officers, and employees thereof in carrying out the provisions of this Act.

Sec. 5. To aid in financing agriculture, commerce, and industry, including facilitating the exportation of agricultural and other products, the corporation is authorized and empowered to make or guarantee loans, upon such terms and conditions not inconsistent with this Act as it may determine, to any bank, savings bank, trust company, building and loan association, insurance company, mortgage loan company, credit union, Federal land bank, joint-stock land bank, Federal intermediate credit bank, agricultural credit corporation, livestock credit corporation, organized under the laws of any State or of the United States, including loans secured by the assets of any bank that is closed, or in process of liquidation to aid

in the reorganization or liquidation of such banks, upon application of the receiver or liquidating agent of such bank and any receiver of any national bank is hereby authorized to contract for such loans and to pledge any assets of the bank for securing the same: *Provided*, That not more than \$200,000,000 shall be used for the relief of banks that are closed or in the process of liquidation.

All loans made and guaranteed under the foregoing provisions shall be fully and adequately secured. The corporation, under such conditions as it shall prescribe, may take over or provide for the administration and liquidation of any collateral accepted by it as security for such loans or guarantees. Such loans may be made directly upon promissory notes or by way of discount or rediscount of obligations tendered for the purpose, or otherwise in such form and in such amount and at such interest or discount rates as the corporation may approve: *Provided*, That no loans or advances shall be made upon foreign securities or foreign acceptances as collateral or for the purpose of assisting in the carrying or liquidation of such foreign securities and foreign acceptances. In no case shall the aggregate amount of advances made under this section to any one corporation and its subsidiary or affiliated organizations exceed at any one time 5 per centum of (1) the authorized capital stock of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation plus (2) the aggregate amount of bonds of the corporation authorized to be outstanding when the capital stock is fully subscribed.

Each such loan may be made for a period not exceeding three years, and the corporation may from time to time extend the time of payment of any such loan, through renewal, substitution of new obligations, or otherwise, but the time for such payment shall not be extended beyond five years from the date upon which such loan was made originally. Except as provided in section 5a hereof, no loan, advancement, or guarantee shall be made by the corporation for the purpose of initiating, setting on foot, or financing any enterprise not initiated, set on foot, or undertaken prior to the adoption of this Act: *Provided*, That the foregoing limitation shall not apply to loans and guarantees made to agricultural or livestock credit corporations, or Federal and banks, joint-stock land banks, or Federal intermediate credit banks, nor to loans and guarantees made to banks for the purpose of financing agricultural operations.

The corporation may make loans and guarantees under this section at any time prior to the expiration of one year from the date of the enactment hereof; and the President may from time to time postpone such date of expiration for such additional period or periods as he may deem necessary, not to exceed two years from the date of the enactment hereof. Within the foregoing limitations of this section, the corporation may also, upon the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission, make loans and guarantees to aid in the temporary financing of railroads and railways engaged in interstate commerce, to railroads and railways in process of construction, and to receivers of such railroads and railways, when in the opinion of the board of directors of the corporation such railroads or railways are unable to obtain funds upon reasonable terms through banking channels or from the general public and the corporation will be adequately secured: *Provided*, That no fee or commission shall be paid by any applicant for a loan or guarantee under the provisions hereof in connection with any such application or any loan or guarantee made or to be made hereunder, and the agreement to pay or payment of any such fee or commission shall be unlawful.

Any such railroad may obligate itself in such form as shall be prescribed and otherwise comply with the requirements of the

Interstate Commerce Commission and the corporation with respect to the deposit or assignment of security hereunder, without the authorization or approval of any authority, State or Federal, and without compliance with any requirement, State or Federal, as to notification, other than such as may be imposed by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the corporation under the provisions of this section.

Sec. 5a. The corporation is authorized and empowered to accept drafts and bills of exchange drawn upon it which grow out of transactions involving the exportation of agricultural or other products actually sold or transported for sale subsequent to the enactment hereof and in process of shipment to buyers in foreign countries: *Provided*, That the corporation shall not make any such acceptances growing out of transactions involving the sale or shipment of armaments, munitions, or other war materials, or the sale or shipment into countries which are at war of any merchandise or commodities except food and supplies for the actual use of non-combatants. No bill of exchange or draft shall be eligible for acceptance if such bill shall have at time of acceptance a maturity of more than twelve months. All drafts and bills of exchange accepted under this section shall be in terms payable in the United States, in currency of the United States, and in addition to the draft or bill of exchange shall at all times be fully secured by American securities deposited as collateral or shall be guaranteed by a bank or trust company of undoubted solvency organized under the laws of the United States or any State, Territory, or insular possession thereof: *Provided*, That such securities shall not include goods stored or in process of shipment in foreign countries or the obligation of any foreign government, corporation, firm, or person.

Sec. 6. Section 5202 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as amended, is hereby amended by striking out the words "War Finance Corporation Act" and inserting in lieu thereof the words "Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act."

Sec. 7. All moneys of the corporation not otherwise employed may be deposited with the Treasurer of the United States subject to check by authority of the corporation or in any Federal reserve bank, or may, by authorization of the board of directors of the corporation, be used in the purchase for redemption and retirement of any notes, debentures, bonds, or other obligations issued by the corporation, and the corporation may reimburse such Federal reserve bank for their services in the manner as may be agreed upon. The Federal reserve banks are authorized and directed to act as depositories, custodians, and fiscal agents for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the general performance of its powers conferred by this Act.

Sec. 8. In order to enable the corporation to carry out the provisions of this Act, the Treasury Department, the Federal Farm Loan Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal reserve banks, and the Interstate Commerce Commission are hereby authorized, under such conditions as they may prescribe, to make available to the corporation, in confidence, such reports, records, or other information as they may have available relating to the condition of financial institutions and railroads or railways with respect to which the corporation has had or contemplates having transactions under this Act, or relating to individuals, associations, partnerships, or corporations whose obligations are offered to or held by the corporation as security for loans to financial institutions or railroads or railways under this Act, and to make through their examiners or other employees for the confidential use of the corporation, examinations of such financial institutions or railroads and railways. Every applicant for a

loan under this Act shall, as a condition precedent thereto, consent to such examinations as the corporations may require for the purposes of this Act and that reports of examinations by constituted authorities may be furnished by such authorities to the corporation upon request therefor.

Sec. 9. The corporation is authorized and empowered, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, to issue, and to have outstanding at any one time in an amount aggregating not more than three times its subscribed capital, its notes, debentures, bonds, or other such obligations; such obligations to mature not more than five years from their respective dates of issue, to be redeemable at the option of the corporation before maturity in such manner as may be stipulated in such obligations, and to bear such rate or rates of interest as may be determined by the corporation: *Provided*, That the corporation, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, may sell on a discount basis short-term obligations payable at maturity without interest. The notes, debentures, bonds, and other obligations of the corporation may be secured by assets of the corporation in such manner as shall be prescribed by its board of directors: *Provided*, That the aggregate of all obligations issued under this section shall not exceed three times the amount of the subscribed capital stock.

Such obligations may be issued in payment of any loan authorized by this Act or may be offered for sale at such price or prices as the corporation may determine with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. The said obligations shall be fully and unconditionally guaranteed both as to interest and principal by the United States and such guaranty shall be expressed on the face thereof. In the event that the corporation shall be unable to pay upon demand, when due, the principal of or interest on notes, debentures, bonds, or other such obligations issued by it, the Secretary of the Treasury shall pay the amount thereof, which is hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, and thereupon to the extent of the amounts so paid the Secretary of the Treasury shall succeed to all the rights of the holders of such notes, debentures, bonds, or other obligations. The Secretary of the Treasury, in his discretion, is authorized to purchase any obligations of the corporation to be issued hereunder, and for such purpose the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to use as a public-debt transaction the proceeds from the sale of any securities hereafter issued under the Second Liberty Bond Act, as amended, and the purposes for which securities may be issued under the Second Liberty Bond Act, as amended, are extended to include any purchases of the corporation's obligations hereunder. The Secretary of the Treasury may, at any time, sell any of the obligations of the corporation acquired by him under this section. All redemptions, purchases, and sales by the Secretary of the Treasury of the obligations of the corporation shall be treated as public-debt transactions of the United States. Such obligations shall not be eligible for discount or purchase by any Federal reserve bank.

Sec. 10. Any and all notes, debentures, bonds, or other such obligations issued by the corporation shall be exempt both as to principal and interest from all taxation (except surtaxes, estate, inheritance, and gift taxes) now or hereafter imposed by the United States, by any Territory, dependency, or possession thereof, or by any State, county, municipality, or local taxing authority. The corporation, including its franchise, its capital, reserves, and surplus, and its income shall be exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States, by any Territory, dependency, or possession thereof, or by any State, county, municipality, or

local taxing authority; except that any real property of the corporation shall be subject to State, Territorial, county, municipal, or local taxation to the same extent according to its value as other real property is taxed.

Sec. 11. In order that the corporation may be supplied with such forms of notes, debentures, bonds, or other obligations as it may need for issuance under this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to prepare such forms as shall be suitable and approved by the corporation, to be held in the Treasury subject to delivery, upon order of the corporation. The engraved plates, dies, bed pieces, and so forth, executed in connection therewith shall remain in the custody of the Secretary of the Treasury. The corporation shall reimburse the Secretary of the Treasury for any expenses incurred in the preparation, custody and delivery of such notes, debentures, bonds, or other obligations.

Sec. 12. When designated for that purpose by the Secretary of the Treasury, the corporation shall be a depository of public money, except receipts from customs, under such regulations as may be prescribed by said Secretary; and it may also be employed as a financial agent of the Government; and it shall perform all such reasonable duties, as depository of public money and financial agent of the Government, as may be required of it. Obligations of the corporation shall be lawful investments, and may be accepted as security, for all fiduciary, trust, and public funds the investment or deposit of which shall be under the authority or control of the United States or any officer or officers thereof.

Sec. 13. Upon the expiration of the period of one year within which the corporation may make loans, or of any extension thereof by the President under the authority of this Act, the board of directors of the corporation shall, except as otherwise herein specifically authorized, proceed to liquidate its assets and wind up its affairs. It may with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury deposit with the Treasurer of the United States as a special fund any money belonging to the corporation or from time to time received by it in the course of liquidation or otherwise, for the payment of principal and interest of its outstanding obligations or for the purpose of redemption of such obligations in accordance with the terms thereof, which fund may be drawn upon or paid out for no other purposes.

The corporation may also at any time pay to the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts any money belonging to the corporation or from time to time received by it in the course of liquidation or otherwise in excess of reasonable amounts reserved to meet its requirements during liquidations. Upon such deposit being made, such amount of the capital stock of the corporation as may be specified by the corporation with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury but not exceeding in par value the amount so paid in shall be canceled and retired. Any balance remaining after the liquidation of all the corporation's assets and after provision has been made for payment of all legal obligations of any kind and character shall be paid into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts. Thereupon the corporation shall be dissolved and the residue, if any, of its capital stock shall be canceled and retired.

Sec. 14. If at the expiration of the ten years for which the corporation has succession hereunder its board of directors shall not have completed the liquidation of its assets and the winding up of its affairs, the duty of completing such liquidation and winding up of its affairs shall be transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury, who for such purpose shall succeed to all the powers and duties of the board of directors of the corporation under this Act. In such event he may assign to any officer or officers of the

United States in the Treasury Department the exercise and performance, under his general supervision and direction, of such powers and duties; and nothing herein shall be construed to affect any right or privilege accrued, any penalty or liability incurred, any criminal or civil proceeding commenced, or any authority conferred hereunder, except as herein provided in connection with the liquidation of the remaining assets and the winding up of the affairs of the corporation, until the Secretary of the Treasury shall find that such liquidation will no longer be advantageous to the United States and that all of its legal obligations have been provided for, whereupon he shall retire any capital stock then outstanding, pay into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts the unused balance of the moneys belonging to the corporation, and make the final report of the corporation to the Congress. Thereupon the corporation shall be deemed to be dissolved.

Sec. 15. The corporation shall make and publish a report quarterly of its operations to the Congress stating the aggregate loans and guarantees made to each of the classes of borrowers provided for and the number of borrowers by States in each class. The statement shall show the assets and liabilities of the corporation. It shall also show the names and compensation of all persons employed by the corporation whose compensation exceeds \$400 a month.

Sec. 16 (a) Whoever makes any statement knowing it to be false, or whoever willfully overvalues any security, for the purpose or obtaining for himself or for any applicant any loan, or extension thereof by renewal, deferment of action, or otherwise, or the acceptance, release, or substitution of security therefor, or for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of the corporation, or for the purpose of obtaining money, property, or anything of value, under this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$5,000 or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.

(b) Whoever (1) falsely makes, forges, or counterfeits any note, debenture, bond, or other obligation, or coupon, in imitation of or purporting to be a note, debenture, bond, or other obligation, or coupon, issued by the corporation, or (2) passes, utters or publishes, or attempts to pass, utter or publish, any false, forged or counterfeited note, debenture, bond, or other obligation, or coupon, purporting to have been issued by the corporation, knowing the same to be false, forged or counterfeited, or (3) falsely alters any note, debenture, bond, or other obligation, or coupon, issued or purporting to have been issued by the corporation, or (4) passes, utters or publishes, or attempts to pass, utter or publish, as true any falsely altered or spurious note, debenture, bond, or other obligation, or coupon, issued or purporting to have been issued by the corporation, knowing the same to be falsely altered or spurious, or any person who willfully violates any other provision of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.

(c) Whoever, being connected in any capacity with the corporation, (1) embezzles, abstracts, purloins, or willfully misapplies any moneys, funds, securities, or other things of value, whether belonging to it or pledged or otherwise entrusted to it, or (2) with intent to defraud the corporation or any other body politic or corporate, or any individual, or to deceive any officer, auditor, or examiner of the corporation, makes any false entry in any book, report, or statement of or to the corporation, or, without being duly authorized, draws any order or issues, puts forth or assigns any note, debenture, bond,

or other obligation, or draft, bill of exchange, mortgage, judgment, or decree thereof, or (3) with intent to defraud participates, shares, receives directly or indirectly any money, profit, property or benefit through any transaction, loan, commission, contract, or any other act of the corporation, or (4) gives any unauthorized information concerning any future action or plan of the corporation which might affect the value of securities, or, having such knowledge, invests or speculates, directly or indirectly, in the securities or property of any company, bank, or corporation receiving loans or other assistance from the corporation, shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.

(d) No individual, association, partnership, or corporation shall use the words "Reconstruction Finance Corporation" or a combination of these three words, as the name or a part thereof under which he or it shall do business. Every individual, partnership, association, or corporation violating this prohibition shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding \$1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.

Sec. 17. The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby expressly reserved. If any clause, sentence, paragraph, or part of this Act shall for any reason be adjudged by any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder of this Act, but shall be confined in its operation to the clause, sentence, paragraph, or part thereof directly involved in the controversy in which such judgment shall have been rendered.

THE NEDZI-WHALEN AMENDMENT

(Mr. NEDZI asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Speaker, during the House Armed Services Committee consideration of H.R. 8687, Congressman WHALEN and I introduced an amendment which we intend to reintroduce in the course of the House debate on the defense procurement bill. Our amendment would prohibit the expenditure of new procurement money, after December 31, 1971, to support U.S. military deployment or U.S. military operations in or over South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos.

The United States is withdrawing from Vietnam. Steady and continuing withdrawal is our announced policy, although the full extent of the withdrawal remains unclear.

The cost of American involvement in Vietnam is well known to all Americans. By several crucial measurements—the length of time we have stayed, the over 50,000 American lives lost, the money we have spent, the serious strains inflicted on our economy, and the diversion of our Nation's time, energy, and intellectual and moral vitality from other needs at home and abroad—we have honored our commitments well beyond what originally was expected of us.

We offer this amendment in order to provide a clear opportunity for the Members of the House of Representatives to express their sentiments on the question of setting a date for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam, Cambodia,

and Laos. Our hope is that a congressional initiative will not only provide an outlet for the expression of the Nation's mood but will lead to an end to the killing on all sides and a negotiated settlement.

Setting a date for complete withdrawal will call the hand of the North Vietnamese rather than weaken our negotiating stance. They have repeatedly asserted at the Paris negotiations that if our Government will set such a date, they will refrain from attacking our withdrawing troops and will negotiate release of the Americans held prisoners. Our amendment has safeguards and the essential of reciprocity built into it. If the other side is not forthcoming, then we withdraw our concessions.

We have sought to maintain the integrity and the essential thrust of the amendment while drafting it in a manner germane to the nature of the procurement bill. We believe the amendment is meaningful.

It should be observed that there are several additional aspects of the amendment:

First. If the President determines that the limitations of the amendment will not permit safe U.S. withdrawal of troops and return of prisoners of war by December 31, 1971, he is authorized to recommend to Congress setting another date within the fiscal year—ending June 30, 1972—for the accomplishment of these objectives.

If the North Vietnamese remain intransigent, the President retains flexibility, for his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief is specifically recognized.

Second. Consistent with the objective of full military withdrawal, the United States, under the amendment, may continue to provide military and economic assistance to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Third. Recognizing that some citizens of South Vietnam may feel themselves endangered by the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the amendment affirms the President's authority to provide for their safety by asylum or other means.

The prolonged American involvement in the longest war in our history must end. It is time for congressional initiative. Our amendment is introduced in the hope that it will serve to facilitate the early release of our prisoners of war, the safe withdrawal of all our troops, and the beginning of those steps urgently need to repair and heal our Nation's economic and spiritual wounds.

The language of the proposed Nedzi-Whalen amendment is as follows:

NEDZI-WHALEN AMENDMENT

Title IV, General Provisions, of H.R. 8687 (FY 1972 Defense Authorization Bill) is amended by adding the following new section:

"Sec. 502. (a) No funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to this Act may be expended after December 31, 1971, to support the deployment of U.S. military personnel or the conduct of any U.S. military operations in or over South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos.

"(b) If the President determines that the above limitations will not permit the safe

and orderly withdrawal of all U.S. military personnel from Vietnam, or ensure the return of prisoners of war, he shall recommend to the Congress legislation setting another date within the fiscal year which will permit the accomplishment of these objectives.

(c) This section shall not be construed to affect the constitutional power of the President as Commander-in-Chief.

"(d) This section shall not be construed to affect the power of the President to provide for (1) asylum or other means to provide for the safety of citizens of the Republic of Vietnam who may be endangered by withdrawal of U.S. forces, and (2) military and economic assistance to Cambodia, Laos, or the Republic of Vietnam consistent with the objectives of this section.

"(e) This section shall not be construed to limit the use of funds for purposes which may be necessary to ensure the return of prisoners of war.

"(f) This section shall not be construed to prohibit the assignment of customary military personnel to diplomatic missions."

AN ALTERNATIVE DATE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM VIETNAM

(Mr. SAYLOR asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SAYLOR. Mr. Speaker, I have been overwhelmed by the response to my press announcement of June 14 concerning an alternative plan for a withdrawal date for our troops now in Vietnam. Perhaps the historical "revelations" of the New York Times, combined with the impending vote on the McGovern-Hatfield amendment in the other body, and naturally, our discussion here today on the fiscal year 1972 military procurement bill, have worked to heighten interest in my proposal for a specific withdrawal date alternative.

As a former Reserve Navy captain and a senior Republican Member of the House, I will state unequivocally that no one wants the war to end any faster than I do; however, unlike the President's critics, I try to be realistic. The Commander in Chief cannot respond to the armchair diplomats and would-be Presidents and set a date now because of his ultimate responsibility for the safety of American troops and prisoners of war in Vietnam.

I know the President would set a specific date for withdrawal if he could. I believe my plan offers a way to set a specific date, protecting remaining troops during withdrawal, and at the same time guaranteeing the safe return of the American prisoners of war.

My suggestion is this: The President would announce the establishment of a date for total U.S. combat troop withdrawal, 6 months after certification that all American prisoners of war have been released from North Vietnam.

The certification would be made after an inspection tour of North Vietnam by either the International Red Cross or an ad hoc neutral nation inspection team.

Part of the certification would have to include the return of the bodies of U.S. personnel killed in action—this provision

could be handled by an international graves registration unit.

On the exact date all prisoners were certified as released, the President would set a specific date, no more than 6 months in the future, for the completion of the U.S. troop withdrawal program.

I admit that my suggestion does not have the preciseness demanded by some, but it does put the responsibility for ending the war squarely in the hands of the North Vietnamese. It is up to the north—if they are serious about ending the war, here is a means to that end.

I believe my plan is a rational alternative to the uncertainty of the present phased withdrawal plan and that is something deeply desired by the American public. My suggestion is also a rational alternative to the December 31 date as proposed by members of the "presidential aspirants club"—most of whom recognize that date as unrealistic regardless of their public utterances.

We have recently heard that the Secretary of Defense is critical of Congressmen commenting on the conduct of the administration's troop withdrawal program. I hasten to assure him that my suggestion springs for a patriotic motive to help the President end this war. I am sure our distinguished former colleague will agree that had the Democratically controlled Congress really debated the issue of war or peace back in 1963, 1964, 1965, we might never have become involved in a war in Vietnam and the creeping combat policy.

PLAN FOR BICENTENNIAL YEAR

(Mr. SAYLOR asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SAYLOR. Mr. Speaker, I would like to submit for the RECORD the address by David J. Mahoney, Chairman of the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission, before the open plenary session, U.S. Conference of Mayors at Philadelphia, Pa., June 14, 1971. Mr. Mahoney addressed the conference citing the challenges and concepts of the era of the 200th anniversary of our Nation.

The bicentennial era is a time for all Americans to honor the past, to get to know the United States better through travel, and to challenge ourselves with the needs of the future. The Bicentennial Commission translates these three themes as "Heritage '76," "Open House USA," and "Horizons '76."

The Bicentennial Commission is planning one of the world's greatest events—a proper commemoration of the 200th year of American freedom. I have been a member of the Commission since its start.

Every one of the 50 States, every county, city, and town has a part in the celebration. May I direct you to the challenge to U.S. mayors:

AN ADDRESS BY DAVID J. MAHONEY

Good Morning, and thank you Mayor Tate for inviting me. It's always a great pleasure to talk with the people who make America's cities run. I believe it is appropriate for me

to speak to you this day—Flag Day—about America's Bicentennial and let me say that we are grateful for your resolution of encouragement to the cause of the Bicentennial.

For the next five minutes I would like to address myself to an Era which will affect all of America's cities because it will affect all America and all Americans—that is the forthcoming 200th Anniversary of the nation. We have much to do—but one thing is certain—it will be the leadership and involvement of the Mayors of the United States that will forge the goals for achievement, and ensure the success of the Bicentennial.

It is simultaneously a challenge and opportunity. The 200th Anniversary of our nation will be a great nationwide experience. The American Revolution Bicentennial Commission, a bi-partisan Commission, has recommended to the President, and he has agreed with those recommendations, that the Bicentennial is to be national in scope, involving every State, city, community, and individual across the United States.

President Nixon, in a portion of his transmittal message to the Congress, stated the following: "The Report of the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission, which I am transmitting to the Congress today, presents cogent suggestions for commemoration of the 200th Anniversary of the birth of our nation. I strongly endorse the Commission's primary recommendations that:

"The commemoration be national in scope; seeking to involve every State, city and community;

"The Bicentennial be a focal point for a review and reaffirmation of the principles on which the nation was founded and for a new understanding of our heritage;

"This be the occasion for looking ahead, for defining and dedicating ourselves to our common purposes, and for speeding the accomplishment of specific local projects responsive to our changing national priorities.

"The goal which the Commission has established is most appropriate for our nation at this time: 'to forge a new national commitment, a new spirit for '76, a spirit which will unite the nation in purpose and dedication to the advancement of human welfare as it moves into its third century.'

"I concur with the Commission's concept of a Bicentennial Era with its focal point in 1976."

This mandate provides us with the opportunity to not only put our past into perspective, but also an opportunity to look ahead, an opportunity to ask of ourselves and of our institutions what it is that we as Americans want to be, as we end the second century of American life. That 200th Anniversary provides an occasion for us to develop priorities for entering a new period of national life—century three.

There is something that is beginning to happen across this country. A sense of awakening—a sense of value judgments taking hold—a desire to provide a higher quality of life. We submit that the Bicentennial Era can help to fulfill these goals.

The Bicentennial Commission should significantly assist our citizens in their hopes to carve their future in our local communities across the land. The Commission was created to plan, encourage, develop, and coordinate observances and activities associated with America's quest and fight for independence. Great emphasis on this commemoration aspect is presently under way—by many local groups. But an equally important aspect is the local development of future goals.

You are the ladies and gentlemen who must lead the way. There is no formula for this call; no program can be transported to a given community. Goals must fit the cir-

cumstances and problems of a particular locality; programs to discover goals will differ one to another; and each will present complexities and difficulties that will be discouraging. But a sufficient number and variety of citizens can set the project in motion, as has been demonstrated by cities which already have such programs under way. Former Mayor Erik Jonsson in Dallas has done a magnificent job in implementing the Goals for Dallas program.

There are many others.

Someone said that if we didn't have a Bicentennial we would have to invent one because need it, as a country. I think we are fortunate that the 200th Anniversary of this country is approaching. It has great magic associated with it and will have an impact on all our lives. It is an important time for all of us here today.

This Bicentennial is not to be parochial, it is not geographically confined. It is not purely looking backward as some may think. It is importantly honoring our past, looking at ourselves as we are in the present, but primarily an opportunity to ask ourselves where we want to go and what we want to be as a country and as individuals. It is an opportunity to rally together around some ideas, some very basic ideas on which the country was founded and which are still relevant to all of us today. How each of us finds significance in the Bicentennial will be the significance of the Bicentennial.

I would also like to suggest that as the managers of America's cities that you put in front of your people, the people you work with daily, the proposition that they look at themselves, not as residents of Albuquerque or Seattle or Knoxville or New York City, but also that they look at themselves as part of a greater whole, as a part of a nation that is approaching its 200th Anniversary. Let us ask ourselves what it is that we want to do, and where it is we want to be, as we end two hundred years of American life. What are our aspirations? What is it we want to have accomplished by 1976? What are the goals and objectives of our communities? What is it that the people of our cities want to have achieved by 1976? That is a very important date for us to place in our minds. It is a very magical date. It is a date we should all use for setting goals for ourselves, our communities, and our country, goals that are a little beyond those that we know we can reach, goals that make us stretch, that makes us reach beyond those which we would normally set or think of setting.

There are many important aspects to the Bicentennial. Lack of time this morning does not permit me to elaborate to any great extent. Basically, however, the Bicentennial has three components: *Heritage '76* is a nationwide summons to recall our heritage and to place it in its historical perspective. Through *Heritage '76* programs, all groups within our society are urged to re-examine our origins, our values, and the meaning of America—to take pride in our accomplishments and to dramatize our development.

Open House USA is a nationwide opportunity to program activities and events which will stimulate travel and thus encourage our citizens to expand their knowledge of our country and to extend a particular welcome to visitors.

Horizons '76 is a nationwide challenge to every American, acting individually or with others, to undertake at least one principal project which manifests the pride, the priorities, and the hopes of his community. The Commission encourages every group, especially our youth and those young in spirit, to pool their resources and their talents in a constructive effort to demonstrate concern for human welfare, happiness, and freedom.

Philadelphia, we know, will host a meaningful Bicentennial program—an international exposition or a program of major international participation . . . and it is fitting and right that the cradle of liberty . . . Philadelphia . . . be a major focal point of the Bicentennial. But every other city will participate in some meaningful and effective way. Those gold and blue license tags that all of you have seen in the past few days bear witness to the fact that you are indeed in a State with great interest in the Bicentennial, but let me assure you every State in this Union will be sharing the spotlight. Each will be given its own week to focus attention on its heritage and accomplishments.

Cities like Denver, which will host the '76 Winter Olympics, and many others including Detroit, Boston, Miami, Washington, D.C., New York, San Antonio, San Diego, Houston, Des Moines, and Spokane, have already begun to plan major Bicentennial commemorations. So you see, an Expo is not all there is to our Bicentennial celebration.

If we want the 200th Anniversary of our nation to be a success we must start now to make it a success. 1976 has been designated as the focal year of our country's birthday, but we must start now to prepare our cities, and States, and ourselves for 1976. All of America will be affected by the 200th Anniversary.

Our States have been requested to, and many have formed Bicentennial Commissions. Many cities across the country have formed Bicentennial Commissions to plan for 1976. If there is one request that I would hope you would honor it is that when you go back to your cities, back to urban America, that you ask your most dynamic community leaders to form a Bicentennial Commission that will plan for your cities' participation in the Bicentennial. It is important that you select your communities' aggressive and dynamic leaders, young and old, so that your city and therefore your people can become a part of the Call for Achievement directed toward 1976. I hope you will invite us back to your next meeting—we will then provide a further progress report of our efforts and results.

I assure you we at the National Bicentennial Commission in Washington earnestly solicit your assistance. We in turn assure you our complete cooperation, but, as I said at the outset, it will be the leadership and involvement of the Mayors of the United States that will establish the goals for achievement and ensure the success of the Bicentennial. It will be an exciting Era—a milestone in our history—and a springboard into our future.

Thank you.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

(Mr. LLOYD asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. LLOYD. Mr. Speaker, I present for appropriate reference a bill to amend the National Labor Relations Act.

There are four areas encompassed in this bill, Mr. Speaker. First, it would provide that a person who buys a business in good faith cannot be held to have any obligation to remedy unfair labor practices committed by individuals who may have owned the business before he did. Second, it would provide that only those employers and unions who have agreed to be bound by a collective bargaining agreement would in fact be bound by it. Third, it would clarify the matter of in-

terpretation of contracts with respect to arbitration, and clarify the scope of an arbitrator's authority in collective bargaining agreements. Fourth, it would give employers equal standing with unions in the matter of judicial relief where the National Labor Relations Board may exceed its statutory authority in union representation matters.

The first amendment in this bill, Mr. Speaker, is made necessary by a series of National Labor Relations Board decisions which tend to impose on a good faith purchaser of a business the responsibility of remedying unfair labor practices committed by the previous owner. The principal recent ruling by the NLRB in this area came in the 1968 *Perma-Vinyl* case (164 NLRB 119). There the Board held that a bona fide purchaser of a business would be jointly liable with a previous owner who had committed unfair labor practices. The amendment would relieve only bona fide purchasers from responsibility. At the same time it would not in any way impair the rights of employees who were the victims of the previous owner's unfair labor practices. The previous owner would continue to be responsible for reimbursing these employees for any wages they might have lost as a result of his unlawful conduct. Furthermore, the present law would still apply insofar as it requires the bona fide purchaser to recognize and bargain with his predecessor's union if he takes over the business, operating it with essentially the same work force as did his predecessor.

The second amendment is very closely related to the first. It provides that no collective bargaining agreement will be enforceable against any employer or union not agreeing to be bound by it. In the case of *Wylie v. Livingston* (376 U.S. 543), the Supreme Court held that where a business has been under a collective bargaining contract a purchaser of that business can be required to arbitrate the extent to which the previous owner's collective bargaining contract will be binding on him. In the case of *Wackenhut Corporation v. Plant Guards* (322 F. 2d 954), the *Wylie* decision was broadened in a holding that the purchaser must adhere to all the provisions of the prior owner's contract—if he operates the business substantially as his predecessor did and carries it on with substantially the same employees. This amendment will make it clear that rulings such as these will no longer apply, and that one must agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of someone else's contract before they can be held to apply to him.

The third amendment would clarify a substantial area of confusion surrounding the matter of arbitration. In doing so, it would amend section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. A number of Supreme Court decisions bear upon this arbitration issue, Chief among these is the so-called *Warrior and Gulf* trilogy—see 363 U.S. 574, and related cases. The essence of these cases is that any dispute under a collective bargaining contract is subject to arbitration unless the agreement

in clear language excludes it. Growing out of these cases also is the situation where an arbitrator may decide what his own jurisdiction is going to be. Further, these holdings open the door to a filing of patently frivolous arbitration claims. The amendment, Mr. Speaker, would provide that arbitration shall apply only in those cases where the parties have agreed it will apply; that frivolous claims are not sufficient to raise issues for arbitration under a contract; that the terms of the arbitration provision, not the arbitrator himself, will determine what the arbitrator's jurisdiction shall be; and that any party may attack an arbitrator's award because he may have exceeded his jurisdiction.

The fourth amendment, Mr. Speaker, would restore a much-needed balance between employers and unions in the matter of their entitlement to judicial relief where the NLRB exceeds its authority in representation cases. In the case of *Leedom v. Kyne* (358 U.S. 184), the Supreme Court said either employers or unions could seek equitable relief in U.S. District Courts where the Board clearly exceeded its statutory authority in representation cases. They would not have to wait for the General Counsel to issue a refusal to bargain complaint and then seek judicial review on that basis. It has become necessary to restate the Supreme Court's *Leedom* against *Kyne* decision, because some Circuit Courts of Appeals have ruled that employers are not entitled to the same equitable relief as unions in these situations. See *General Cable Corp. v. Leedom* (278 F. 2d 44). With some circuits following the Supreme Court's *Leedom* against *Kyne* ruling—see *Boire v. Miami Herald*, 343 F. 2d 17—and others not doing so—as in the *General Cable* case—this amendment is necessary to clear up the confusion. It makes clear that in representation cases where the NLRB has exceeded its statutory authority, employers and unions will have equal standing to sue for equitable relief in Federal courts.

Mr. Speaker, this legislation merits the early attention of the House.

HERETOFORE SECRET PENTAGON DOCUMENTS

(Mr. MINSHALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Speaker, in view of the fact that heretofore secret Pentagon documents are now appearing in the *New York Times*, history may well demand: "Where was Congress when the lights went out on the Johnson-McNamara plan to escalate the Vietnam war after the 1964 presidential election?"

The answer in the case of this member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee most emphatically is "not in the dark." I did what I could, without breaching the "Top Secret" stamp the Johnson administration had placed on this information, to warn the American public that then President Johnson and

Defense Secretary McNamara had put the wraps on the truth lest it damage Johnson's image as the presidential candidate who would not commit "American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys."

As early as April 22, 1964, in a Plain Dealer story datelined Washington, I attacked political motivation in Pentagon censorship of the printed records of our Defense Subcommittee. Let me quote from that April 1964 article:

Minshall, a subcommittee member, noted that more than 3,000 pages in five volumes had been released after closed-door hearings. "But, examining the original typewritten transcripts, which are locked in the subcommittee safes, I was repeatedly disturbed by the excessive number of deletions made under the guise of national security."

A May 26, 1964, *Cleveland Press* story by Robert Crater, headed, "Minshall Says LBJ Plays Down Viet Story," says:

President Johnson is trying to play down the true story of what is going on in South Vietnam, Cong. William E. Minshall of Cleveland charged today.

"The Administration, especially Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, is trying to sweep the whole Southeast Asia mess under the rug until after the election," said the congressman.

The UPI carried this item on May 26, 1964:

Rep. William E. Minshall, R-Ohio, said . . . "I think that this Administration is trying to sweep Vietnam under the rug until after the election . . . Defense Secretary McNamara has made 16 trips there and he comes back each time and reports all is well. And then it gets worse."

The June 1964, edition of *Air Force* magazine, carried an article entitled "The Rest of the Record" by Claude Witze which included these comments:

Another important criticism of the McNamara administration came from Rep. William E. Minshall, an Ohio Republican. Also a member of the Appropriations Committee, he said the bill is a good one, designed to provide adequate protection. But Mr. Minshall is unhappy about the censorship invoked by the Administration over the transcript of the Defense Subcommittee hearings. He said there were too many deletions made "under the guise of national security." Mr. Minshall continued in the debate:

"More times than not the only security involved was the political security of the present Administration. It was political censorship, not national security, that was the guideline in determining what should be left for you to read in the final printed copies of the hearings. If partisanship had not put a false security stamp on much of the hearings, the five volumes would have been doubled in number.

"By striking off the record questions and answers not pertaining to genuine security matters, much of the five volumes is rendered meaningless. The public record has been transformed into a document to nurture the myth of the infallibility of top Pentagon civilians."

Mr. Minshall went on to charge that there is left only a "hint" of what the Defense Secretary said about defense and foreign policies, although within days after being on the stand he issued similar public statements "with the emphasis carefully shifted." He said intelligence estimates were censored out of the subcommittee record but used by Mr. McNamara in public when they served his purpose. . . .

Mr. Minshall said he protests the withholding of this information, although it is available to him in the original transcripts now locked in subcommittee safes. A vast majority of the 365 men who voted for the fiscal 1965 defense appropriation bill never did see it and never will. There has been no outcry from the vigilantes in the press gallery and no prominent publicity for Mr. Minshall's criticism.

For the RECORD I have underscored that last paragraph for particular emphasis.

I carried my message of concern into the 23d Congressional District of Ohio, which I represent. My remarks made on September 20, 1964, to a group in Bedford, Ohio, are a matter of public record:

Just about a year ago the American people were told that everything would be over in Vietnam early in 1965. We were told that we were winning. Mr. McNamara and Admiral Felt, in charge of the Pacific, told our committee and made public announcements that many of the 14,000 American "advisors" then there would be brought home.

We were told that we were winning and things looked good. But suddenly a White House iron curtain separates the people from the war in Vietnam. Why the iron curtain? What are they hiding? Are they afraid that the skeletons in the closet will fall out before election day?

Now the answer is plain enough after thousands of American casualties and billions of American tax dollars.

TAKE PRIDE IN AMERICA

(Mr. MILLER of Ohio asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MILLER of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, today we should take note of America's great accomplishments and in so doing renew our faith and confidence in ourselves as individuals and as a nation. One of America's engineering pioneers was Henry Larcom Abbot, an 1854 West Point graduate. Assisted Capt. A. A. Humphrey's investigation of channel improvement along lower Mississippi and with him advocated use of levees in flood control. After serving in Civil War, developed the Army's Engineer School of Application making it a research center for problems of military engineering. Promoted to brigadier general upon retirement in 1895. Acted as consulting engineer to French and American Panama Canal companies; the decision to build a lock canal rather than a sea-level canal was based on his report. Professor of hydraulic engineering, George Washington University, 1905-10.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

(Mr. KOCH asked and as given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Speaker, I was absent from the House yesterday due to business in my district on behalf of my constituents. Had I been present, I would have voted "yea" on rollcall 131, which was the vote on bill H.R. 8794, to provide for payment of the cost of medical serv-

ices for totally disabled firemen and policemen in the District of Columbia.

I am pleased that this bill passed by a vote of 311 to 1.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1971

(Mr. KOCH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Speaker, in January of 1970 the President signed into law the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. At the heart of the act is the requirement of section 102(2)(c) that all Federal agencies prepare detailed environmental statements in connection with all "proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." These reports must be submitted to the President, to the newly-established Council on Environmental Quality and to the public.

Eighteen months have passed and we now have some perspective as to how this landmark law works. The CEQ has recently revised its regulations under the law in an effort to meet the rising criticism of those in the environmental field. But there still is much that should be done to improve the law and so, Mr. Speaker, I have introduced the Environmental Policy Act Amendments of 1971, H.R. 8984.

My bill includes the following strengthening amendments:

First, protecting the public against those Federal agency officials who may be inclined to interpret narrowly the occasions on which such a statement is required. My bill empowers CEQ to order submission by an agency of an environmental statement in those instances where CEQ believes the agency has wrongfully refrained from preparing one and to stay further agency action pending completion of the statement;

Second, protecting the public against those Federal agency officials who may be inclined to prepare superficial statements which deal only with the favorable environmental aspects of the project, who withhold relevant data and who even rely on a "regulated industry" in preparing the agency's statement. My bill would give CEQ the authority to reject inadequate agency statements, and return them with appropriate instructions for improvement and supplementation;

Third, requiring that an environmental impact statement be made public before the submission of a related legislative proposal to Congress. If, for example, a draft statement on the SST had been made public before the actual introduction of legislation, the Nixon administration would have had a salutary opportunity to avoid becoming so politically committed to the venture;

Fourth, permitting the public to examine draft and completed environmental statements by requiring the distribution of all Federal impact statements with regional and metropolitan clearinghouses

established under the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act. At present, CEQ guidelines do employ the clearinghouse device but there are several exceptions. My bill would make such method of distribution a blanket requirement;

Fifth, requiring the Agency for International Development to prepare and issue environmental impact statements with respect to its assistance programs abroad. Congress made clear in the new law, its concern for the world environment. It was recognized then that "most forms of environmental pollution cross international boundaries as easily as they cross State lines."

I commend H.R. 8984 to our colleagues and I hope that it will receive consideration by the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries in the near future. The text of the Environmental Policy Act Amendments of 1971 follows:

H.R. 8984

A bill to amend the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 is amended to read as follows—

"(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, whether domestic, foreign, or international, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—

"(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,

"(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,

"(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

"(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and

"(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.

"Upon completing the draft of any such detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall furnish copies thereof to the Council on Environmental Quality and at the same time make available to the public and furnish to and obtain the written comment of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Upon completing the detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall furnish copies thereof, together with the written comments of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, to the President and the Council on Environmental Quality and at the same time make such documents available to the public. Circulation of the detailed statement and to the draft thereof shall include circulation of any maps, blueprints, and other data which were of material use in preparing or would be of material assistance in analyzing such statement or draft. The agency shall not make the proposal for legislation or take the administrative action for which such detailed statement is required sooner than ninety days after the draft thereof has been circulated as above provided, nor sooner than thirty days after the completed statement has been circulated as above provided, except as the Council may modify such minimum time periods upon the written application of the agency establishing the existence of emergency circumstances;"

SEC. 2. Section 204 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 is amended by renumbering paragraphs (3) through (8) as (5) through (10) respectively, including any reference thereto, and by inserting immediately after paragraph (2) the following new paragraphs:

"(3) Upon learning of a proposal for legislation or a Federal action, planned or consummated by an agency, which the Council believes may significantly affect the quality of the human environment, to take any of the following steps as the Council shall deem necessary or advisable—

"(A) require a written statement by the agency within a time period designated by the Council setting forth the nature of such proposal or action, expressing the agency's intention regarding the making of a detailed statement in accordance with section 102(2)(C) of this Act, and, if applicable, setting forth the reasons why the agency considers that such a statement is not required by such section;

"(B) require the making of such a statement by the agency within a time period designated by the Council, in accordance with all the procedures regularly applicable to such statements, including but not limited to those procedures pertaining to agency review and availability to the public; and

"(C) issue instructions to the agency regarding the deferral, discontinuance, or retroaction of such agency proposal or action for a time period deemed sufficient by the Council to permit analysis of such statement.

"(4) Upon receipt from any agency of a detailed statement submitted pursuant to section 102(2)(C) of this Act which statement the Council considers to be inadequate in any respect, to take any of the following steps:

"(A) return such statement to the agency for improvement, designating with specificity any inadequacies to be corrected, inquires to be answered and supplemental data to be supplied, and designating a time period within which such improved statements is to be completed; and

"(B) issue any instruction to the agency which the Council shall deem necessary or appropriate regarding the deferral, discontinuance, or retroaction of such agency proposal or action for a time period deemed sufficient by the Council to permit analysis of such improved statement;"

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. CORMAN for June 15, 1971, on account of official business.

Mr. DENT (at the request of Mr. RANDALL), for Monday June 14, and the balance of the week on account of illness.

Mr. FLYNT (at the request of Mr. RANDALL), for today, on account of official business.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

Mr. VANIK, for 20 minutes, on Thursday, June 17.

Mr. RANDALL, for 20 minutes, today, and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. YOUNG of Florida) to address the House and to revise and extend

their remarks and include extraneous matter:)

Mr. FREY, for 1 hour, on June 16.
Mr. McCLOSKEY, for 5 minutes, on June 15.
Mr. POFF, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. RUPPE, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. PRICE of Texas, for 30 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GONZALEZ) and to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous matter:)

Mr. ROSENTHAL, for 10 minutes, today.
Mr. ASPIN, for 30 minutes, today.
Mr. RARICK, for 10 minutes, today.
Mr. FRASER, for 10 minutes, today.
Mr. FOUNTAIN, for 15 minutes, today.
Mr. DINGELL, for 20 minutes, today.
Mr. MURPHY of New York, for 20 minutes, today.
Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts, for 15 minutes, today.
Mr. PODELL, for 30 minutes, today.
Mr. KEE, for 5 minutes, today.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN.
(The following Members (at the request of Mr. YOUNG of Florida) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. HORTON in three instances.
Mr. DERWINSKI in two instances.
Mr. DUNCAN.
Mr. FRENZEL.
Mr. MILLER of Ohio.
Mr. McCLORY.
Mr. SCHMITZ.
Mr. PETTIS.
Mr. HOSMER in two instances.
Mr. SCHWENDEL in two instances.
Mr. HOGAN in five instances.
Mr. LENT.
Mr. GOLDWATER.
Mr. GOODLING.
Mr. STEIGER of Arizona.
Mr. KEMP in two instances.
Mr. CARTER.
Mr. BUCHANAN.
Mr. NELSEN.
Mr. HARSHA.
Mr. MYERS in two instances.
Mr. WHITEHURST.
Mr. KEITH.
Mr. SMITH of California.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GONZALEZ) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. DENT.
Mr. BEGICH in four instances.
Mr. ROONEY of New York.
Mr. LONG of Maryland.
Mr. BADILLO in two instances.
Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey in two instances.
Mr. COTTER.
Mrs. HICKS of Massachusetts in three instances.
Mr. PICKLE in five instances.
Mr. HAMILTON.
Mr. HOWARD.
Mr. RODINO in three instances.
Mr. O'NEILL in two instances.
Mr. ASPIN in two instances.
Mr. JACOBS in three instances.
Mr. BYRON in 10 instances.

Mr. FRASER in two instances.
Mr. ROE.
Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD in three instances.
Mrs. GRIFFITHS in two instances.
Mr. DELLUMS in 10 instances.
Mr. MAZZOLI.
Mr. RARICK in three instances.
Mr. ROYBAL in 10 instances.
Mr. WOLFF in five instances.
Mr. OBEY in six instances.
Mr. ADDABBO in four instances.
Mr. HANNA in six instances.
Mr. SCHEUER in five instances.
Mr. GRIFFIN in two instances.
Mr. MIKVA in six instances.
Mr. PERKINS.
Mr. DINGELL.
Mr. EVINS of Tennessee in two instances.
Mr. MINISH in three instances.
Mrs. ABZUG.
Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey.
Mr. WALDIE in 10 instances.
Mr. BENNETT in two instances.
Mr. TEAGUE of Texas in eight instances.
Mr. EILBERG.
Mr. KYROS in two instances.
Mr. MOORHEAD in two instances.
Mr. ANDERSON of California.
Mr. HARRINGTON in five instances.
Mr. TIERNAN in three instances.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. GONZALES. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 5 o'clock and 38 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, June 16, 1971, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

851. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting amendments to the request for appropriations transmitted in the budget for fiscal year 1972 for the Department of Agriculture (H. Doc. No. 92-128); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

852. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting amendments to the request for appropriations transmitted in the budget for fiscal year 1972 for the Department of the Interior (H. Doc. No. 92-128); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

853. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to convey certain federally owned lands to the Twenty-nine Palms Park and Recreation District; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

854. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a copy of a proposed concession contract for the continuation of accommodations, facilities, and services for the public at Lees Ferry Site in Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, Ariz., for the 20-year period to end December 31, 1990, pursuant to 67 Stat. 271 and 70 Stat. 543; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

855. A letter from the Chairman, Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, transmitting notice of an action of the Council taken at its meeting May 5-6, 1971, with regard to

plans affecting the Pennsylvania Avenue National Historic Site, Washington, D.C., and with particular reference to the Old Post Office at 12th Street, pursuant to title II of Public Law 89-665; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

856. A letter from the Postmaster General, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to correct deficiencies in the law relating to the crimes of counterfeiting and forgery; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

857. A letter from the Acting Secretary of Commerce, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend section 466 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and the act of January 5, 1971, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

RECEIVED FROM THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

858. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a report of the examination of the financial statements of the Government National Mortgage Association, Department of Housing and Urban Development for fiscal year 1970, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 841 (H. Doc. No. 92-129); to the Committee on Government Operations and ordered to be printed.

859. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a report on opportunities to improve the redistribution of the Federal Government's excess automatic data processing equipment; to the Committee on Government Operations.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. HOLIFIELD: Committee on Government Operations. H.R. 8712. A bill to amend the act entitled "An act to authorize any executive department or independent establishment of the Government, or any bureau or office thereof, to make appropriate accounting adjustment or reimbursement between the respective appropriations available to such departments and establishments, or any bureau or office thereof, approved June 29, 1966, so as to include within its coverage the government of the District of Columbia (Rept. No. 92-271). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. CELLER: Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 8699. A bill to provide an Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice of the United States (Rept. No. 92-272). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. NIX: Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. H.R. 8805. A bill to amend title 39, United States Code, to exclude from the mails as a special category of nonmailable matter certain material offered for sale to minors, to improve the protection of the right of privacy by defining obscene mail matter, and for other purposes; with amendments (Rept. No. 92-273). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. HOLIFIELD: Committee on Government Operations. H.R. 7586. A bill to amend the act of December 30, 1969, establishing the Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish-Speaking People, to authorize appropriations for 2 additional years (Rept. No. 92-274). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. BOLLING: Committee on Rules. House Resolution 434. Resolution to authorize additional investigative authority to the Committee on Education and Labor; with amendments (Rept. No. 92-275). Referred to the House Calendar.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ALEXANDER:

H.R. 9119. A bill to provide for the establishment of the Buffalo National River in the State of Arkansas, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. BERGLAND:

H.R. 9120. A bill to extend benefits under section 8191 of title 5, United States Code, to law enforcement officers and firemen not employed by the United States who are killed or totally disabled in the line of duty; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 9121. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide income tax simplification, reform, and relief for small business; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CHAMBERLAIN:

H.R. 9122. A bill to provide a tax incentive for the razing of old buildings within blighted areas in our cities; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. FRENZEL:

H.R. 9123. A bill to amend the Social Security Act to require employers to make an approved basic health care plan available to their employees, to provide a family health insurance plan for low-income families not covered by an employer's basic health care plan, to facilitate provision of health services to beneficiaries of the family health insurance plan by health maintenance organizations, by prohibiting State law interference with such organizations providing such services, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mrs. HICKS of Massachusetts:

H.R. 9124. A bill to amend title 38 of the United States Code to authorize the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to provide care and treatment for certain former members of the Armed Forces addicted to narcotic drugs; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

H.R. 9125. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to restore the investment credit; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. JOHNSON of California (for himself and Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN):
H.R. 9126. A bill to extend the provisions of the act of October 23, 1962, relating to relief for occupants of certain unpatented mining claims; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. KARTH:

H.R. 9127. A bill to extend to all unmarried individuals the full tax benefits of income splitting now enjoyed by married individuals filing joint returns; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. LEGGETT:

H.R. 9128. A bill to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal Maritime Commission over certain movements of merchandise by barge in foreign commerce; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. LUJAN:

H.R. 9129. A bill to amend the act of August 9, 1955 to authorize longer term leases of land in the Pueblo of Isleta; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. McDADE:

H.R. 9130. A bill to extend for an additional year the existing program for payment of black lung benefits; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

H.R. 9131. A bill to amend section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to suspend, in whole or in part, economic and military assistance and certain sales to any country which fails to take appropriate steps to prevent narcotic drugs, produced or processed, in whole or in part, in such country from en-

tering the United States unlawfully, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. McMILLAN:

H.R. 9132. A bill to amend title V of the Housing Act of 1949 to assure borrowers of the right to employ qualified attorneys of their choice in performing necessary legal services in connection with loans under that title; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. MATHIS of Georgia:

H.R. 9133. A bill concerning legal counsel of recipients of loans under programs administered by the Department of Agriculture; to the Committee on Agriculture.

H.R. 9134. A bill to provide that Flag Day shall be a legal public holiday; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mrs. MINK (for herself and Mr. MATSUNAGA):

H.R. 9135. A bill to amend the act of August 19, 1964, to remove the limitation on the maximum number of members of the board of trustees of the Pacific Tropical Botanical Garden; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MORGAN (for himself, Mr. BARRETT, Mr. BIESTER, Mr. BYRNE of Pennsylvania, Mr. CLARK, Mr. COUGHLIN, Mr. DENT, Mr. EILBERG, Mr. ESHELMAN, Mr. FLOOD, Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania, Mr. GAYDOS, Mr. GREEN of Pennsylvania, Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania, Mr. McDADE, Mr. MOORHEAD, Mr. NIX, Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania, Mr. SAYLOR, Mr. SCHNEEBELI, Mr. VIGORITO, Mr. WARE, Mr. WHALLEY, Mr. WILLIAMS, and Mr. YATRON):

H.R. 9136. A bill to provide for orderly trade in iron and steel products; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MURPHY of Illinois (for himself and Mr. STEELE):

H.R. 9137. A bill to provide comprehensive treatment for servicemen and veterans who suffer from abuse of, or dependency on, narcotic drugs, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. PERKINS:

H.R. 9138. A bill to include the holders of star route and certain other contracts for the carrying of mail under the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. POFF (for himself, Mr. HUTCHINSON, Mr. McCLORY, Mr. SMITH of New York, Mr. SANDMAN, Mr. RAILSBACK, Mr. BIESTER, Mr. FISH, Mr. COUGHLIN, Mr. MAYNE, Mr. HOGAN, Mr. KEATING, and Mr. McKEVITT):

H.R. 9139. A bill to amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, to provide benefits to survivors of police officers killed in the line of duty; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. POWELL:

H.R. 9140. A bill to create a National Agricultural Bargaining Board, to provide standards for the qualification of associations of producers, to define the mutual obligation of handlers and associations of producers to negotiate regarding agricultural products, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. ROSENTHAL (for himself, Mr. ASPIN, Mr. BADILLO, Mr. BURTON, Mrs. CHISHOLM, Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. EILBERG, Mr. GRAY, Mrs. GREEN of Oregon, Mr. HALPERN, Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. KOCH, and Mr. MADDEN):

H.R. 9141. A bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to require the labels on all foods to disclose each of their ingredients; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. ROSENTHAL (for himself, Mr. MELCHER, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. MOORHEAD, Mr. PATTEN, Mr. PIKE, Mr. POBELL, Mr. REES, Mr. RODINO, Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania, Mr. ROYBAL, Mr. RYAN, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. SEIBERLING, Mr. STOKES, and Mr. VANIK):

H.R. 9142. A bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to require the labels on all foods to disclose each of their ingredients; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. SIKES:

H.R. 9143. A bill to provide that Flag Day shall be a legal public holiday; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SLACK:

H.R. 9144. A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act to increase all benefits thereunder by 20 percent, and to provide that full benefits (when based on attainment of retirement age) will be payable to both men and women at age 60; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. STEED:

H.R. 9145. A bill: Conquest of Cancer Act; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

H.R. 9146. A bill to amend title 5, United States Code, to include as creditable service for civil service retirement purposes, service as an enrollee of the Civilian Conservation Corps, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. STEELE:

H.R. 9147. A bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WINN:

H.R. 9148. A bill to amend the National Labor Relations Act to further secure and protect the constitutional guarantee of free speech belonging to employers and employees; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

H.R. 9149. A bill to amend the National Labor Relations Act to make certain limitations on penalties levied by a labor organization upon its members, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mrs. ABZUG:

H.R. 9150. A bill to provide for the sale of certain Federal property, at cost, to the city of New York for the purpose of constructing low- and moderate-income housing; to the Committee on Public Works.

Mr. BIAGGI:

H.R. 9151. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide payment under the supplementary medical insurance program for optometrists' services and eyeglasses; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BIAGGI (for himself, Mr. VIGORITO, Mr. BYRNE of Pennsylvania, Mr. DANIEL of Virginia, Mr. GROVER, Mr. HAYS, Mr. J. WILLIAM STANTON, Mr. KING, Mr. CHAPPELL, Mr. CLEVELAND, Mr. FLOOD and Mr. BEVILL):

H.R. 9152. A bill to make it a Federal crime to kill or assault a fireman or law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his duties when the offender travels in interstate commerce or uses any facility of interstate commerce for such purpose; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DICKINSON:

H.R. 9153. A bill to increase to 5 years the maximum term for which broadcasting licenses may be granted; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

H.R. 9154. A bill to amend the Communications Act of 1934 to establish orderly procedures for the consideration of applications for renewal of broadcast licenses; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. DULSKI:

H.R. 9155. A bill to insure the separation of Federal powers by requiring the President to notify the Congress whenever he impounds funds, or authorizes the impounding of funds, and by providing a procedure under which the Senate and House of Representatives may disapprove the President's action; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. DUNCAN (for himself, Mr. DERWINSKI, Mr. ARCHER, Mr. CRANE, Mr. COLLINS of Texas, Mr. DEVINE, Mr. DICKINSON, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. HUNT, Mr. SCHERLE, Mr. STEIGER of Arizona, Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia, Mr. BAKER, Mr. PRICE of Texas, Mr. BLACKBURN, and Mr. DEL CLAWSON):

H.R. 9156. A bill to amend the Social Security Act to provide for revenue-sharing grants to the States to assist them in meeting the costs incurred in operating public assistance programs; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. EDWARDS of Louisiana:

H.R. 9157. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide for the continuation of the investment credit for farmers and small businesses; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. FREY:

H.R. 9158. A bill to amend the act of August 13, 1946, to increase the Federal contribution to 90 percent of the cost of shore restoration and protection projects; to the Committee on Public Works.

H.R. 9159. A bill to authorize a program to develop and demonstrate low-cost means of preventing shoreline erosion; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. GALLAGHER:

H.R. 9160. A bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to suspend all assistance to the Government of Pakistan; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. GRIFFIN (for himself and Mr. PICKLE):

H.R. 9161. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to authorize a program to promote the production and marketing of farm-raised fish through the extension of credit, technical assistance, marketing assistance and research, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. HENDERSON (for himself, Mr. ABBITT, Mr. ABERNETHY, Mr. ABOUREZK, Mr. BRINKLEY, Mr. BROOKS, Mr. DANIEL of Virginia, Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey, Mr. DANIELSON, Mr. DAVIS of South Carolina, Mr. DONOHUE, Mr. DOWDY, Mr. DRINAN, Mr. EVANS of Colorado, Mr. FISHER, Mr. FLOWER, M. FLYNT, Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD, Mr. FOUNTAIN, Mr. FRASER, Mr. GRIFFIN, Mr. HALEY, Mr. HARRINGTON, and Mr. LENNON):

H.R. 9162. A bill concerning legal counsel of recipients of loans under programs administered by the Department of Agriculture; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. HENDERSON (for himself, Mr. MATSUNAGA, Mr. MAZZOLI, Mr. McMILLAN, Mr. MELCHER, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. MOSS, Mr. NICHOLS, Mr. PEPPER, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. PICKLE, Mr. PIKE, Mr. PREYER of North Carolina, Mr. PURCELL, Mr. RARICK, Mr. St GERMAIN, Mr. SEIBERLING, Mr. SIKES, Mr. STUBBLEFIELD, and Mr. VIGORITO):

H.R. 9163. A bill concerning legal counsel of recipients of loans under programs administered by the Department of Agriculture; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. HOGAN:

H.R. 9164. A bill to provide an equitable system for fixing and adjusting the rates of

pay for prevailing rate employees of the Government, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. HUNT (for himself, Mr. SAYLOR, Mr. SANDMAN, Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Mr. GROVER, Mr. DICKINSON, Mr. DEVINE, Mr. ESHLEMAN, Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania, Mr. WIDNALL, Mr. DANIEL of Virginia, Mr. NICHOLS, Mr. BRINKLEY, Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. PASSMAN, Mr. WAGGONER, Mr. STEIGER of Arizona, Mr. KING and Mr. CLANCY):

H.R. 9165. A bill to transfer the Coast Guard to the Department of Defense; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. MORGAN:

H.R. 9166. A bill to amend further the Peace Corps Act (75 Stat. 612), as amended; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. PEPPER:

H.R. 9167. A bill to provide emergency financing facilities for financial institutions, to aid in financing agriculture, commerce, and industry, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. PERKINS:

H.R. 9168. A bill to improve intergovernmental relationships, and the economy and efficiency of all levels of government, by providing Federal block grants for States and localities where there is a demonstration of intention to modernize State and local government; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. PREYER of North Carolina:

H.R. 9169. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide payment for chiropractors' services under the program of supplementary medical insurance benefits for the aged; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. PREYER of North Carolina (for himself and Mr. WINN):

H.R. 9170. A bill to create a National Agricultural Bargaining Board, to provide standards for the qualification of associations of producers, to define the mutual obligation of handlers and associations of producers to negotiate regarding agricultural products, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. St GERMAIN (for himself, Mr. HARRINGTON, Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin, Mr. TIERNAN, and Mr. BOB WILSON):

H.R. 9171. A bill to establish a comprehensive program of insurance and reimbursement with respect to losses sustained by the fisheries trades as a result of environment disasters; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. SMITH of New York:

H.R. 9172. A bill to facilitate the amendment of the governing instruments of certain charitable trusts and corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia, in order to conform to the requirements of section 508 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. BROOMFIELD:

H. Res. 478. Resolution calling upon the Voice of America to broadcast in the Yiddish language to Soviet Jewry; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

H.J. Res. 706. Joint resolution instructing the Secretary of State to call for an international moratorium of 10 years on the killing of all species of whales; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. BURKE of Florida:

H.J. Res. 707. Joint resolution: Stable Purchasing Power resolution of 1971; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mrs. CHISHOLM:

H.J. Res. 708. Joint resolution extending for 2 years the existing authority for the erection in the District of Columbia of a memorial to Mary McLeod Bethune; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. GUBSER:

H.J. Res. 709. Joint resolution designating April 30 of each year as "Pledge Allegiance to Our Flag Day"; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MINSHALL:

H.J. Res. 710. Joint resolution: Stable Purchasing Power resolution of 1971; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. TAYLOR:

H.J. Res. 711. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to equal rights for men and women; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WHALLEY:

H.J. Res. 712. Joint resolution: Stable Purchasing Power resolution of 1971; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. THOMSON of Wisconsin:

H.J. Res. 713. Joint resolution: Stable Purchasing Power resolution of 1971; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. McCLORY (for himself, Mr. BARING, Mr. CARTER, Mr. COLLIER, Mr. DERWINSKI, Mr. ERLENBORN, Mr. FINDLEY, Mr. FISHER, Mr. GIBBONS, Mr. GRAY, Mr. GRIFFIN, Mr. HALPERN, Mr. HANLEY, Mr. HANSEN of Idaho, Mr. HELSTOSKI, Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania, Mr. QUIE, Mr. RUPPE, Mr. SEBELIUS, Mr. SMITH of New York, and Mr. ZWACH):

H. Con. Res. 334. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey:

H. Con. Res. 335. Concurrent resolution authorizing the placing of a bust or statue of Martin Luther King, Jr., in the Capitol; to the Committee on House Administration.

MEMORIALS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII.

215. The SPEAKER presented a memorial of the House of Representatives of the State of Oklahoma, relative to permitting the manufacture of a vaccine for the disease Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis; to the Committee on Agriculture.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. BENNETT:

H.R. 9173. A bill for the relief of Cmdr. Robert J. Thomas, U.S. Navy; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SCHNEEBELI:

H.R. 9174. A bill to provide for the conveyance of certain real property of the United States situated in the State of Pennsylvania; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII.

85. The SPEAKER presented petition of the city council, Philadelphia, Pa., relative to a national shrine to Thaddeus Kosciuszko; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.