

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL TRUST
FUND PROPOSAL

HON. JAMES G. FULTON

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following material:

HARRISBURG, PA,
June 8, 1971.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House
Washington, D.C.

MR. PRESIDENT: On June 2, 1971, I wrote to you about the financial problems facing the nation's educational system. I stressed the need for greater federal participation in this area.

Attached is a memorandum describing a way to make this increased participation feasible and beneficial: by establishing a National Educational Trust Fund. I wish to respectfully call this memorandum to your attention in hopes that you may find merit in it.

Sincerely,

MILTON J. SHAPP,
Governor.

PROPOSAL FOR A NATIONAL EDUCATION TRUST
FUND

To: The President

From: Milton J. Shapp, Governor of Pennsylvania

Date: June 9, 1971

This memorandum deals with the need to adopt an entirely new concept to support the financial needs of the American Educational System.

At no time in the history of our nation has the need for financial innovation been greater.

The ever mounting cost of education is a principal factor in the fiscal crisis which faces government on every level. If we do not seek and find new ways of financing our educational system, then many of our local boards of education and the cities themselves will soon face bankruptcy.

It can no longer be argued that we can continue with present methods and to raise taxes at the State and local levels to meet the ever mounting cost of education. State and local taxes have reached such heights that the taxpayers have reached the limit of tolerance.

Yet we cannot abdicate our responsibility, cut back on funds for education and sit by while our educational system and our entire society erodes.

Already we are seeing the results of much present neglect. Crime and welfare are direct outgrowths of our inability to meet the human needs of our population. For every dollar we fail to put into education, we pay many times over in increased funds for protection and public assistance.

Therefore, I am proposing a new concept and a new method of financing the educational needs of our people.

The method is the creation of a National Education Trust Fund.

The concept is that education is not a cost item but an investment in the future growth of this nation.

As applied to the entire field of education this concept is extremely sound for there is no other investment that can be made in the public sector of our economy that will yield

a direct and measurably higher yield. More and higher quality education leads to greater productivity. Greater productivity leads to higher personal and corporate earning power, in turn, produces more tax revenues. As a result, the initial investment in education pays off handsomely in future yield to the community and to the nation.

There is more than ample evidence to prove this contention. It has been estimated by some economists that the future tax yield that would be generated by a continuing policy of maximizing investment in education would be at least 10 times the investment.

The World War II G. I. Bill of Rights is a clear example of the economic returns that can be expected from Federal investment in education.

The increased tax yield expected from the higher lifetime earnings of the direct beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill will, alone, repay many times over the cost of the program.

It is not possible to calculate the additional economic gain to the nation that resulted from a whole new cycle of technological and economic development made possible by this massive educational breakthrough.

Yet, we continue to consider education as just another operating cost of government and we do so because we have become captives of a tradition.

If we are to break out of the financial chains that throttle educational progress, we can pattern a new mechanism along the lines of the Federal Highway Investment Fund originated during the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration.

The mechanism for handling our investment in education—and for guaranteed repayment of this investment by those who benefit from it—is at hand.

There is ample evidence that the Federal Highway Trust Fund, created in 1956 was not only financially wise, but supplied the major impetus for the modern highway system in America today.

I propose that we utilize this experience to create a National Education Trust Fund (NETF) which would invest in people just as the Highway Trust Fund invests in roads.

We can create a large scale revolving NETF fund by requiring those who would benefit most through increased educational opportunities to repay the fund with a small continuing surtax when they leave the educational system and become wage earners. This parallels the plan whereby relatively low Federal taxes on gasoline and some auto supplies replenish the Highway Trust Fund and pay for the construction of new highways.

It is obvious we would not have our modern interstate highway system today if we had left the task of financing and building new roads to our states, cities and townships. Yet this is precisely what we are doing with our present, fragmented system for financing education throughout the country.

The self-supporting National Education Trust Fund would call for:

1. An initial investment by the Federal government of \$5 to \$10 billion.

2. An annual surcharge on federal income taxes according to a formula based on earning power and years of schooling. That formula would be based upon a number of factors including:

(a) The level of education achieved by the individual taxpayer.

(b) The number of years he has been out of school and earning his livelihood.

(c) The amount of income he receives. (Thus, a Ph.D. in Physics, out of school for 20 years, might pay a higher surcharge on his

federal income tax into the fund while a nurse out of school five years would pay considerably less. A person satisfied not to seek a college education might pay an even lower surtax.)

Normally, as long as a person was pursuing his education, he would pay no surcharge. He would not become liable until he had been out of school for several years, or until his income reached some selected minimum level.

I want to emphasize at this point that details of this program could be worked out in legislative committee and executive policy sessions. I am not wedded to specific figures or formulas, but the above proposals indicate that such formulations are certainly possible.

I do not envision such a program as an attempt at Federal control of education. I firmly believe that educational programs and policies should be decided at the local level as they are today. But I see no conflict between the proposed NETF and traditional local control.

At present, for example, the states pour vast amounts of money into local school districts. Yet, those districts retain their own School Boards and their autonomy. There is no reason why local autonomy cannot be retained while the Federal government establishes a fund and works within the States to assure survival and improvement of the present system.

Financing a self-supporting National Education Trust Fund would permit this nation to guarantee our future by the best business deal ever made—investing in education for all of our citizens, pre-schoolers, school children, college students, trade school and professional school enrollees. It could even supply the necessary funds for the increasingly critical area of on-going retraining and continuing adult education.

For example, the NETF might decide to finance the crucial pre-school years on a 90 per cent federal—10 per cent state and local fund basis—as we do for the principal interstate highways. The NETF might finance elementary and secondary school years on a 50-50 ratio and college and professional training on a 60-40 basis, or some other arrangement based upon more detailed economic studies. The percentages could be flexible, but the principle is clear. We can use this fund to give emphasis where needed in the national interest and the interest of society in general.

Philadelphia along with many other major cities now faces a severe crisis. We cannot afford to delay creation of the self-supporting National Education Trust Fund. The current method of financing education not only falls short of providing adequate funds, but actually leads to considerable financial waste.

Right now, the Federal Government is pouring millions of dollars into the highly successful Get Set pre-school preparatory program. Get Set has proven that it does help disadvantaged children do better when they get into kindergarten and elementary school.

But, because of the virtual bankruptcy of the Philadelphia School System, kindergarten may be eliminated next year—wiping out any beneficial effects of Get Set. In addition, the Philadelphia School Board is considering dropping all varsity and intramural sports next year, a situation which cannot help but worsen and already difficult teen-age gang problem in Philadelphia.

Without increased funding from the Federal government, the dollars now supplied by state and local governments will continue to be inadequate and city school systems will turn out a new "Lost Generation," ill-edu-

cated and unprepared to cope with the growing demands of a technological society.

At present, it costs the state and Federal governments in Pennsylvania about \$3433 to support a welfare family of four for one year. Many families spend ten, twenty or even more years on welfare. In fact, there are some third generation families now on welfare, and the cost of their support is bound to rise.

The alternative I propose is an appealing one. It calls for investment now, and a continuing investment in a constructive policy of education that will create jobs. It will pay dividends on our society for many years to come and reduce the need for additional welfare funds in the future as we provide the opportunity to make a greater percentage of our population self-reliant.

This investment program must be accomplished on the national level because only the Federal government has the power to insure uniformity of taxation, and only the Federal government can absorb the initial cost of priming the self-supporting trust fund. Also, because of the increasing mobility of our society, investments by individual states and cities might never be repaid to those governments.

Our citizens have wide mobility, and it is wrong to penalize a city or state by forcing it to finance a major educational system for people who then move to other communities or states.

People ask: "Can we afford a National Education Trust Fund?" This answer is that we cannot afford not to invest in education.

FLAG DAY

HON. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, today, June 14, is Flag Day.

On January 26, 1971, I introduced a bill, S. 746, to provide that U.S. Flag Day shall be a legal public holiday. This bill is a reintroduction of S. 4250, which I originally introduced in the 91st Congress on August 17, 1970.

Although the United States is one of the world's youngest nations, the U.S. flag is one of the oldest national emblems, even predating the present Union Jack of Great Britain and the French and Italian flags.

The Continental Congress on June 4, 1777 while sitting in Philadelphia, resolved that the flag of the United States shall have—

Thirteen strips of alternate red and white, with a union of thirteen stars of white in a blue field, representing the new constellation.

The design for the new national emblem had been developed by a distinguished committee of the Continental Congress named in 1775 and composed of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Lynch, and Benjamin Harrison.

Flag Day has been celebrated for many years in this country but it has never been designated as a legal public holiday. I believe that it is appropriate for us to pause each year to commemorate the anniversary of our national flag and to have the opportunity to reflect on the timeless ideals of the Founding Fathers which have given this Nation its heritage of freedom and justice.

Mr. President, the Allentown Pennsylvania Flag Day Association, Inc., has thoughtfully provided me with desk-sized U.S. flags for each of my colleagues, and I will be distributing them in the near future as a reminder of the significance of Flag Day.

PROGRAMS FOR JOBLESS: A WORSENING MESS

HON. GERALD R. FORD

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, the Detroit News views the proposed public service employment program as "another multibillion layer to the manpower mess." I think the News' editorial of June 4 is most instructive and commend it to my colleagues:

PROGRAMS FOR JOBLESS: A WORSENING MESS

We are sinking in a sea of manpower training programs, are about to be engulfed in a massive public service employment program and have barely made a ripple in solving the nation's basic unemployment problem.

President Nixon will soon be faced with the Hobson's choice of approving the mess or exercising a veto that could be twisted to mark him "insensitive" to the unemployment situation. We believe the insensitivity lies with Congress.

Manpower training is vital to the well-being of individuals. People must have some way of becoming employable or replacing skills no longer in demand. But what has government done in the name of manpower training?

Detroit and many other cities have over 30 separate federally-funded programs. Between the duplication and muddle of this agency alphabet soup, it's a wonder anyone is actually trained. Yet, Detroit is lucky: Washington, D.C. has 261 publicly funded programs in manpower-related areas.

Obviously, manpower training needs consolidation and simplification so that funds, now in excess of \$3 billion annually, can buy something other than confusion and top-heavy administration. But Congress has passed no consolidating legislation.

Instead, the House and Senate will compromise on separately passed "public service employment" bills that will add another multibillion layer to the manpower mess. The House bill is the most generous with taxpayers' money. It calls for \$5 billion over five years to provide jobs in schools, hospitals, parks, police and fire departments and social service agencies. The programs would be "triggered" whenever unemployment reached 4.5 percent of the labor force for three months in a row.

No one is quite sure what this legislation is supposed to do. Are these jobs supposed to help state and local government provide public services with federal financing? If so, the trigger device suggests extreme instability in the provision of public services.

Are these jobs supposed to provide short-term relief employment for workers displaced by the business cycle? If so, what evidence is there that the characteristics of the unemployed fit or even approximate the characteristics of the public service jobs?

While it could be argued that "anyone" can monitor a school lunchroom or push a pencil in a police station, is that the way we want to employ people? Or do we really want an economic program that improves

opportunities for people in ordinary private jobs for which they are trained?

Moreover, once a public service employment program is instituted, what keeps it from becoming a vested interest, with employees insisting on "job rights" and Congress rushing to legitimize the claims with a permanently funded program? Once that happens, we could bankrupt the ordinary working man with taxes to pay for it.

The unemployed worker is a drowning man. He needs good programs. Why does Congress throw him a lead life ring?

CONGRESSMAN McCLORY'S POLL BACKS PRESIDENT NIXON'S DOMESTIC PROGRAM

HON. ROBERT McCLORY

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Speaker, a record response has been received to my 1971 poll of 12th Congressional District constituents. A total of 154,628 questionnaires were mailed to every postal patron in the 12th Congressional District, comprising Lake and McHenry Counties, and Hanover and Barrington Townships in Cook County. More than 30,000 questionnaires were returned to my office, representing an approximate 20-percent response—the largest response I have experienced during the almost 9 years I have served in the Congress.

Indeed, the response is, in fact, about double that of any previous year, since the questionnaires provided spaces for both husbands and wives to respond—and in most cases, they took advantage of their individual opportunities.

In addition to the generous response received in this biennial survey, it is particularly heartening to me to learn that President Nixon's domestic legislative programs received substantial support.

The most striking expression of support was in response to the question: "Do you feel that the President's plan to consolidate and update executive departments and Federal regulatory agencies has merit?" A total of 85.6 percent of the men and 85.4 percent of the women backed the President on the issue. In line with the popularity of this issue, it is gratifying to note that the House of Representatives has already given its approval to Reorganization Plan No. 1, to consolidate the various voluntary programs, including the Peace Corps, Vista, and others, into a single agency, Action.

To the surprise of many, the President's family assistance plan, as an alternative to the existing and discredited welfare programs, received a 73-percent favorable response from the male voters and a 74.3-percent approval of the women voters.

Mr. Speaker, on the very large issue of revenue sharing, my constituents are backing the President by a majority of better than 2 to 1.

Mr. Speaker, it is not unexpected that a negative response has been recorded relative to our present Vietnam policy. The people of America are weary of this

seemingly endless, expensive, and tragic war. The President has cut our Vietnam forces by more than 250,000 men, and reduced our casualties to a mere 10 percent of the level existing when he took office in 1969. But the American people want our withdrawal to be accelerated. Only 37.7 percent of the male voters gave their approval, while a mere 31.1 percent of the women feel that our present policy will be successful.

Without commenting further on each of the questions, I wish to add that the

questionnaire generated a substantial number of individual replies estimated at more than 3,000 personally composed letters and cards which were returned with the answered questionnaires. I have benefited from these individual communications and have endeavored to respond to each of them.

Mr. Speaker, it goes without saying that the responses to my questionnaire have a great influence on my service and on the votes which I cast in the House of Representatives. But while influencing

me, the responses are, of course, not binding—and some of my votes may be in conflict with the majority opinions.

Mr. Speaker, the questionnaire and the responses are indicated in the following summary:

RESULTS OF 1971 QUESTIONNAIRE OF CONGRESSMAN ROBERT McCLORY

Total number of questionnaires mailed: 154,628.

Questionnaires returned: Approximately 30,000.

[Answers in percent]

	His		Hers			His		Hers	
	Yes	No	Yes	No		Yes	No	Yes	No
1. Do you favor, in principle, the proposed Revenue Sharing Program to return Federal tax funds to the States and communities with a minimum of strings attached?.....	66.5	33.5	68.0	32.0	6. Do you favor our policy of aid to Israel in order to maintain a balance of power in the Middle East?.....	59.3	40.7	55.5	44.5
2. Do you feel that we should abandon the research effort on the SST which was begun in 1965?.....	61.4	38.6	69.8	30.2	7. Do you think our present Vietnam policy will be successful in ending U.S. involvement in that conflict?.....	37.7	62.3	31.1	68.9
3. Do you favor the Family Assistance Plan, containing a guaranteed income floor and work incentives, to replace the existing welfare system?.....	73.0	27.0	74.3	25.7	8. Would you favor an all-volunteer military as an alternative to the present draft system?.....	61.9	38.1	65.1	34.9
4. Do you support additional Federal legislation to define and control obscenity and pornography?.....	62.4	37.6	65.4	34.6	9. Do you favor direct Federal aid to private and parochial schools?.....	39.1	60.9	38.7	61.3
5. Do you feel that the President's plan to consolidate and update executive departments and Federal regulatory agencies has merit?.....	85.6	14.4	85.4	14.6	10. Do you approve the administration's plan to provide Federal assurance of health care services for all citizens?.....	62.2	37.8	63.4	36.6
					11. Should the Federal Government impose mandatory wage and price controls as a method of stemming inflation?.....	63.8	36.2	65.9	34.1
					12. Do you feel that military intelligence activity with respect to civilians is justified?.....	41.1	58.9	38.0	62.0

Mr. Speaker, in addition to circulating these questionnaires to all the postal patrons throughout the 12th Congressional District, I took occasion to secure responses from a large number of high school seniors as well as from the students at the college of Lake County—almost all of whom will be eligible to vote in the national elections next year.

Mr. Speaker, while there was a substantial similarity of views with respect to the President's reform program on domestic issues, there were also some striking differences of opinion expressed by the high school and college students on such issues as first, support for additional Federal legislation to control obscenity and pornography and second, our present

Vietnam policy, and, to a slightly lesser extent, third, our policy of aid to Israel. The responses from more than 2,000 high school students representing Highland Park High School, Zion-Benton High School, Grayslake High School, Waukegan Township High School, and 108 students from the college of Lake County are as follows:

	High school students		College of Lake County			High school students		College of Lake County	
	Yes	No	Yes	No		Yes	No	Yes	No
1. Do you favor, in principle, the proposed Revenue-Sharing Program to return Federal tax funds to the States and communities with a minimum of strings attached?.....	69	31	67	33	7. Do you think our present Vietnam policy will be successful in ending U.S. involvement in that conflict?.....	25	75	14	86
2. Do you feel that we should abandon the research effort on the SST which was begun in 1965?.....	57	43	80	20	8. Would you favor an all-volunteer military as an alternative to the present draft system?.....	74	26	66	34
3. Do you favor the Family Assistance Plan, containing a guaranteed income floor and work incentives, to replace the existing welfare system?.....	71	29	73	27	9. Do you favor direct Federal aid to private and parochial schools?.....	48	52	53	47
4. Do you support additional Federal legislation to define and control obscenity and pornography?.....	42	58	23	77	10. Do you approve the administration's plan to provide Federal assurance of health care services for all citizens?.....	82	18	86	14
5. Do you feel that the President's plan to consolidate and update executive departments and Federal regulatory agencies has merit?.....	67	33	63	37	11. Should the Federal Government impose mandatory wage and price controls as a method of stemming inflation?.....	57	43	62	38
6. Do you favor our policy of aid to Israel in order to maintain a balance of power in the Middle East?.....	54	46	38	62	12. Do you feel that military intelligence activity with respect to civilians is justified?.....	29	71	12	88

IN HONOR OF FLAG DAY

HON. JOHN G. SCHMITZ

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. SCHMITZ. Mr. Speaker, in honor of Flag Day, I would like to share with my colleagues a chronicle concerning the attempts of one of my constituents to remove a North Vietnamese flag from a wall in the Physics-Chemistry Building of the University of California, San Diego.

The following letter from Mr. Steve

Balkam, the man who has been attempting to have the enemy flag removed from the wall of the Physics-Chemistry Building, to the dean of student affairs at the University of California, San Diego, recounts the high points of this struggle.

I highly recommend the following story to all my colleagues. It shows that the righteous indignation of the American citizen is difficult to stem. Mr. Balkam possesses the determination which has made our Nation what it is today. It is because of people such as himself that our flag today stands as a symbol of freedom. It is tough to keep a free man down.

The letter follows:

MAY 23, 1971

Dean GEORGE S. MURPHY, Jr.,
University of California-San Diego,
La Jolla, Calif.

DEAR DEAN MURPHY: Nearly a month has passed since I first queried you about the display, for over a year, of a facsimile of the North Vietnam flag on the west wall of Room # 2101 in the Physics-Chemistry Building at UCSD. It is my belief that certain matters connected therewith should be clarified and placed in clear perspective. I am certain that you will welcome same.

It is my sincere hope that you do not consider me as your adversary. My inability to talk with you on the telephone during the past week, coupled with the remarks heard

on campus, i.e., "Balkam harrassed Murphy for a week before removing the flag and delivering it to the Dean last Monday afternoon," causes me some concern. I would far rather be counted as one of your supporters by standing strong with you for principles deeply rooted in our traditional American heritage.

In the interest of clarity, I recite the following chronological resume:

April 27: I was shocked to learn that the North Vietnam flag still hung in its apparent hallowed sanctuary on the west wall of Room #2101 of the Physics-Chemistry Building . . . shocked because I had been erroneously informed many months ago that said flag had been removed. I immediately went to that office and visited with the research and teaching assistants assigned therein. After a lengthy conversation with them, culminating with their strong statement of dedication to the flag of our enemy and to that for which the Hanoi government stands, I used their telephone and called Chancellor York's office and your office. As both Dr. York and yourself were not available, I advised each of your secretaries as to where I was and the purpose of my call.

April 28: You and I had a very pleasant discussion on the telephone in the morning. You expressed complete surprise to learn of the enemy flag, inquired as to its exact location and assured me that it would be removed within the hour. You expressed your appreciation to me for alerting you to this incredible display.

April 29: Noting that the flag still remained in place, I went to Room #2101 in mid-afternoon and took Polaroid pictures of it and of the anti-American propaganda covering walls and glass of the entrance doors on the exterior of the building. I then called on you in your office and inquired as to the status of the flag removal. You advised that it took quite a period of time to accomplish same and that you were very busy. I then offered to assist you by going back to Room #2101, removing the flag, giving a receipt for it, and then returning immediately to your office asking that you would then give me a receipt upon delivery. You pleaded with me not to do so and then positively assured me that you would call me, "the first thing tomorrow morning," advising, "mission accomplished."

April 30: No telephone call from you. In the afternoon I called your office but could not reach you. I called the Chancellor's office to remind the secretary of my previous request that Dr. York be apprised of my concern, upon his return to the campus on Monday, May 3rd. I was advised that jurisdiction over matters of this kind was entirely your responsibility as Dean of Student Affairs, as well as that of Vice Chancellor.

May 3: The 3' x 5' Hanoi flag remained on display. I went directly to Room #2101, the only occupant at the time being John Dobson, who yelled at me, stating that I had no right to enter. I walked right thru the office to the flag, removed it and offered a sign receipt to him which he refused, screaming that he would call the police. I suggested that he use the telephone to do so. While he was pleading with the operator to get the police, claiming an urgent emergency, I placed the receipt on the desk beside him and requested that he tell the police that I was proceeding to your office to deliver the flag to you personally. It was then fortunate that I found you in your office so that I could hand the flag to you, personally, have you sign the receipt, expecting, of course, that this flag would never be seen again on the campus. After receiving the flag and signing the receipt, you then admonished me for taking such direct action and impressed upon me that you as an administrator were experienced and trained to handle such matters in the proper academic manner. You asked that I never do such a thing in the future. I then reminded you of your

assurance to me, at 10:15 A.M., April 28th, that the flag would be removed "within the hour," then that it would be down "first thing in the morning" on April 30th, and that this was now May 3rd . . . 2:00 P.M. Your response to this statement was: "Wait a minute, don't you realize that this flag has been there for more than a year and I cannot understand what difference another week or more makes in getting it removed!"

After delivering the flag to you, I called the office of the Campus Police and talked to Sergeant Turner and to Chief Torrens. I offered to go to their office if they wanted me for any reason. They assured me that there was no necessity to appear.

May 12: I was shocked to find that the bloody North Vietnam flag was back in its prominent location on public property. Unable to reach you by telephone, I called Regent Dewitt Higgs and asked if he would be willing to try to reach you for an explanation and to ascertain as to whether it could conceivably be the same flag which I had delivered to you on May 3rd. He agreed and a call from Mr. Higgs later in the day revealed that it was the same flag and that you had felt it right to return to the Hanoi Advocates, as they claimed it to be private property. Mr. Higgs advised that he had also talked with Dr. York and with General Counsel.

One of my friends on campus called me late in the afternoon to advise me of a most preposterous rumor that was going around the campus. It essentially was a story of that "wild businessman" who tore the "tablecloth" down from the wall in Room #2101 after he had "harrassed Murphy for a full week" . . . and . . . that perhaps it may prove to be a blessing for it was that same "wildman" who "forced Murphy" to file charges against Soni Ali for his tearing up the "toy American flag" on April 26th in the gymnasium. This absurd story continued: "Well, when Balkam heard this morning that there was a warrant out for his arrest on the charge of larceny (removal of red flag), he rushed to Murphy and on bended knee he pleaded that he prevail upon the boys (#2101) to withdraw their larceny charges and, if so, that he would withdraw his charges against Soni Ali. We think that the deal to free Ali will be made in the morning."

May 13: By pure happenstance, as I passed three students on the campus, I overheard my name being mentioned so lingered near them. I heard essentially the same wild story from these men as that recounted by my friend the day before and recited in the paragraph above.

May 17 to May 21: As your secretary will confirm, I tried many times to reach you on the telephone from my office, from the airport and from the Capitol in Sacramento while there last week. My urgent desire to talk with you this past week concerned the above rumor. I am sure that you will be as anxious as I to set the record straight on this "deal" purported to have been negotiated by you in behalf of Soni Ali (or by whatever alias now used) and in my behalf. Frankly, I would be very willing to be a prosecution witness on the one hand and to defend myself on the other.

As it has been impossible to reach you by telephone, let me make a few remarks:

1. The reported "harrassment of Murphy" puzzles me for this rumor related to the period from April 28th to May 3rd only. During that time my contacts with you were limited to three occasions, as indicated above. How could any person or persons have dreamed up the charge of "harrassment" is beyond my comprehension. Can you possibly explain it?

2. After learning that you had returned the Hanoi flag, I have been at a loss to understand why you were so positive in your promises to me on April 28 and 29 that the wretched flag would be removed at once . . . and then have nothing happen until I took it upon myself to do so and deliver it to you.

3. On May 3 you equated my action to that of playing a game. Sir, I have never been more serious in my life . . . this is no game!

4. I do not understand why I did not receive a call from you as you returned the flag to explain your rationale making it right to support the advocacy of Hanoi. In our discussions on April 28 and 29, you fully agreed with my contention that the North Vietnam flag must come down at once from the wall of the property owned by the People of California. What happened?

Now, that I may set the record straight, I hereby categorically deny any contemplation, negotiation or even mention to anyone of making any "deal" whatsoever relative to the charges for desecration of our flag on April 26th. While I realize, as you do, that such a rumor is completely ridiculous, I feel I must put it in the record. I request that you direct a letter to me setting forth your denial, so that I may have it at hand should any public mention of it ever be made in the future.

The respect of the community for the University should be nurtured and not torn down. However, with such suzerainty of support for North Vietnam is certainly not winning friends for UCSD. I found very serious concern exists at the Capitol when in Sacramento last week.

It is my conviction that the time has come for a forthright man-to-man meeting . . . one with every card face up on the table. The very basic question to which we must address ourselves is: Must we continue to coddle and retreat from those who would destroy us as exemplified by the permissiveness extended to the Hanoi propagandists?

In order to initiate deliberations on this vital question, I have set a meeting at 3:00 P.M. on Friday, May 28 at an appropriate location on the campus. By copies of this communication, I invite Chancellor York, Regent Higgs and Assemblyman Stull of the 80th Assembly District to join with us. I respectfully request a prompt confirmation of your acceptance of this invitation.

Inasmuch as the deadline has passed for the introduction of new legislation in the California Legislature, I am sure that you are as happy as I to learn that the Miller-Bow bill was introduced in the U.S. Congress on May 20, which would make this form of support for Hanoi a Federal crime. It appears to be directly on target and aimed at our specific problem of the moment.

I look forward to your prompt response to this letter.

Respectfully yours,

STEVE BALKAM.

A TRIBUTE TO SENATOR THOMAS DODD

HON. PETER W. RODINO, JR.

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 8, 1971

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Speaker, it was with the deepest sense of sorrow that I mourned the death of my good friend Tom Dodd. Senator Dodd devoted nearly half of his life to public service and to representing his constituents. I am only too sad that he was unable to enjoy a little longer, his leisure and time with his family.

Though there is little that I can say that will lessen the profound feeling of grief over his loss, I sincerely extend my deepest felt sympathy to his grieving family and to his friends.

THE COTTER HEALTH PLAN

HON. WILLIAM R. COTTER

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. COTTER. Mr. Speaker, last month I introduced H.R. 8351, the "Comprehensive Health Care Act of 1971." Since then, my bill and several other health plans have been discussed in various health trade journals and in the general news media.

At the time of introduction I stated:

Before I outline my proposals, I want to inform my colleagues about my general assumption and values.

First, I represent the city of Hartford, the insurance capital of the Nation. It is estimated that thousands of my constituents are involved in health insurance. I am not willing to see those jobs shipped to Baltimore, the home of the Social Security Administration, until such time as it is shown that the insurance industry—scrupulously controlled as I will recommend—is unable to do the job.

Second, from my position as the Insurance Commissioner for the State of Connecticut for 6 years, I have become familiar with the problems of both quality health care and public-private health insurance coverage. Thus, I have studied in detail the strength and weakness of our health delivery system.

The proposal I am placing before the House today reflects this experienced study. I believe that there must be a partnership between private industry and government to assure the highest quality health care at the most reasonable cost.

I am pleased that this theme was endorsed by the Hartford Times in a thoughtful series of editorials which examined each of the major health plans. For the benefit of my colleagues who are studying this very issue, I include the three Times' editorials:

DELIVERING HEALTH CARE: TO AVOID INFLATION AND INSURE THE NATION'S HEALTH

Inflation has played a major part in the health-care crisis that now confronts the United States.

It is a special inflation, two or three times the cost increase of other goods and services during the past decade.

It is an inflation based in part on the age-old concept of supply and demand. Demand for health care has risen dramatically. Our growing affluence; the huge increase in private health insurance, often as part of employment fringe benefits; and growing governmental programs to meet the needs of aging and the poor, such as Medicare and Medicaid, all have contributed to the rising demand.

The supply has not kept pace. People are, in effect, competing for a limited supply of health care, and prices are "bid up".

That is not an entire explanation, but it is an important part.

Equally important has been our failure to reorganize the delivery of health-care services on a larger scale. Short-sighted insurance policies have often encouraged use of hospitals when walk-in clinics would have been just as effective and far less costly for many diagnostic procedures and even minor operations.

The use of pre-paid health plans has caught on very slowly. The medical profession has oversold the importance of the "personal" doctor-patient relationship. The values are real, but may be overshadowed, for many families, by the possibility of having total health care—and preventive health

care—by receiving treatment from doctors in a group practice.

The medical profession must also accept some criticism for allowing—and in some cases encouraging—a shortage of trained personnel to persist. State legislatures have likewise been slow to beef up our medical schools.

And we are still exploring ways that nurses can give some of the care historically reserved to M.D.s, and roles for other "para-medical" people.

As we now debate some form of national health insurance, improving the delivery system deserves top priority—lest we touch off a new round of health-care inflation.

The insurance industry's "Health-care" bill would do this with a broad battery of incentives: Low-cost loans for medical students, payable "in kind" by post-graduate service in areas of need; grants and loan guarantees to stimulate walk-in clinics; more federal muscle to avoid duplication of costly facilities.

Rep. William Cotter (D-Hartford), in his bill, uses many of the same devices, and also would create three new medical and dental "academies", associated with existing military hospitals, to train people required to serve in medically disadvantaged areas.

Both the Cotter and Healthcare plans, and the Nixon Administration proposal, would also set up national minimum standards for health insurance, an indirect way of encouraging pre-paid plans and reorganization of our health care systems.

These are important steps toward overall solution. Other aspects—financing health care, and the role of the federal government—will be discussed in subsequent editorials.

PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: EVERYBODY CAN BE COVERED

Most Americans now have some kind of health insurance.

It is not, for most people, enough. In very few cases do insurance plans cover dental care, mental health services, most "out-patient" care or the pre-paid health care plans where a group of doctors, in team practice, can focus on preventive medicine.

But all those improvements in private health insurance are coming.

They will not come free. Insurance premiums will climb to meet the new costs—although as an editorial yesterday pointed out, an improved health-delivery system may be able dramatically to improve care at a relatively small increase in cost.

Much of the additional cost—both for new insurance coverage, and for the many who now have only nominal insurance plans—will be met by employers through group plans. That will be an indirect cost—but very real—to the employee; it is money that might otherwise go into the pay envelope. It is also a cost that will be passed along to consumers in higher prices.

That leaves two major groups without coverage. The poor simply cannot afford private health insurance, and often can't afford medical care unless they already receive public assistance.

Others, the near-poor, don't work for companies with group plans, or else must pay the major share of such plans. Many feel they must gamble that they won't get sick, rather than paying in advance for care they may not need.

These are important groups to bring within the health-insurance system.

But they can be covered without abandoning the extensive private system that now exists—without going all the way to Senator Kennedy's AFL-CIO backed national health insurance.

The insurance industry's health-care plan, the Cotter plan, and the Nixon Administration proposal would all bring private health insurance to the poor (and also uninsurable

risks) under a state-by-state, federally-subsidized program.

The Administration would require employers to provide group insurance, thus providing wholly-private insurance to the working poor. The Cotter and Healthcare plans would encourage employer plans through tax-reduction regulations.

The difference may be vital. Congress must do everything possible to provide universal coverage. The incentives for employer-paid group insurance, and the economic levels at which families will qualify for federally-subsidized insurance, deserve the most careful attention in the Congress.

FINANCING HEALTH CARE: "SOCIALIZED MEDICINE" SPUR TO A BETTER INSURANCE PLAN

The United States is on the verge of adopting a national health insurance plan: One that will guarantee really comprehensive coverage for everyone.

Politicians will be tempted to stall a decision past the next election; promises can be more alluring than realities.

But the national interest demands action during the 92d Congress.

The nation owes an enormous debt to the labor-based coalition, begun by the late Walter P. Reuther, that began a major drive nearly two years ago for a federally-financed, federally-operated health insurance plan.

Labor's bill is not the one that deserves passage. But without labor's insistence, the alternatives now available would not have evolved.

At the time the labor drive began, no one was seriously talking about solving the health-care crisis in anything less than a decade. The then-new Nixon Administration did not have a program—and in fact still does not have a detailed piece of legislation.

The principal alternative then being talked about was the American Medical Association's "Medicredit" plan. One of today's most promising approaches, the insurance industry's "Healthcare" plan, was still in the early "think" stage.

Since then, the insurance industry and far-sighted legislators have developed a program—or several programs, with minor variations but much in common—that can radically improve the nation's health without scrapping our private health insurance system.

There is self-interest in this approach, of course. No Hartford insurance executive (or clerk-typist) wants to see the nation's health insurance, involving tens of thousands of jobs, moved from Hartford and other cities to be administered by a new federal-bureaucracy complex near Washington.

But more is involved than simply a parochial insistence on keeping jobs in Hartford.

The greatest failing of the Kennedy-Griffith bill that has evolved from the Reuther committee is, ironically, its regressive funding.

It would have the federal government take over virtually the entire cost of health care, and would fund half of that staggering cost from payroll taxes (Social Security), the most regressive instrument in the arsenal of taxing devices. The other half of the funding would come from general revenues.

Even were a more progressive tax base in prospect, there is a strong argument for avoiding federalized health care: It would inevitably postpone the nation's willingness to tackle other pressing social problems. Each of us would pay so much more in taxes than we now do (even though we would save on private health-care costs) that we would resist further taxation for other priority needs.

Federalized medicine would also be less flexible than health care paid through a public-private insurance partnership. There is validity in the insurance industry's argument that we should encourage a variety of

systems for delivering health care, and use federal minimum insurance standards as a "floor" upon which new approaches can be built.

"Socialized medicine," as embodied in the Kennedy-Griffith bill, is still anathema to many Americans.

But many of the soundest elements in the "socialized medicine" concept have now been embodied in the private-enterprise alternatives. In the two years since the Reuther drive began, American business has developed an approach that seems—on wholly pragmatic grounds—better.

With thoughtful analysis, and modification where necessary, the private insurance approach deserves the support of the 92d Congress—and of the nation.

RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES

HON. J. J. PICKLE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Speaker, on Monday, June 7, I was pleased to be joined by over 50 of my distinguished colleagues to discuss the prospects and problems of our rural electric cooperatives. I had hoped to have a full airing of the situation facing many of our cooperatives across the land, and I think that objective was fully achieved. I thank all those who participated in this discussion.

Mr. Speaker, the general manager of one of my own cooperatives has written me a letter which ably sets out once again many of the points which we discussed Monday. This is a description of how it is coming straight from the "horse's mouth," as the saying goes. I would like to reprint that letter at this time to add to Monday's discussion of our rural cooperatives.

The letter follows:

BLUEBONNET ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC.,
Giddings, Tex., June 3, 1971.

HON. J. J. PICKLE,
Congressman of the 10th District, Texas, 231
Cannon House Office Building, Wash-
ington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN: I certainly enjoyed our recent visit and conversation concerning our Cooperative. I sincerely appreciated the opportunity to discuss with you a few of our problems. In fact, I would like to pursue the matter a bit further and list briefly some of the problem areas that I might have overlooked in earlier discussion and correspondence.

In my opinion, in order to clearly understand our basic problem, we need to look back in time some 30 odd years to the birth of rural electrification and in particular to the conception of Bluebonnet Electric Cooperative.

In the beginning it was the philosophy of REA to construct as cheaply as possible the facilities required to serve the rather sparsely settled rural countryside. As a result the very minimum sizes of conductor and poles were installed with the distances between poles sometimes spanning as much as 1000 feet. At this point in time and for the next 10 years these facilities were adequate to serve the loads of the farmers and ranchers requiring electrical services. But then the picture began to change, many farmers and ranchers moved out of the country and into the cities seeking employment and higher

wages and as a result many of the facilities constructed by the cooperatives were left idle bringing no revenues to assist in amortizing the investment required to construct the facilities. At present we have approximately 4100 idle services.

At about this same time those persons remaining in the rural areas began to buy appliances and equipment requiring more power than our creators had ever dreamed possible. These new demands required extensive heavying-up and complete rebuilding of lines in many instances.

The next big change came in the late 1950's and early 1960's and resulted from the more prosperous urbanites looking to the rural areas for weekend retreats, recreation, and retirement homes. It is a bit ironic, but one might be led to believe that the rural area is shouldering much of the burden in solving some of the problems confronting our cities today.

Now to the future. Congressman, if one can rely upon the projections made by our Engineers and by the industry in general the future growth and demands on the electrical industry is so awesome, it staggers one's imagination.

We have just completed a comprehensive 10 year financial forecast, based on projected growth which indicates that by 1980, our small rural system will need to supply more than double the present loading which will require an investment in plant of more than \$10,000,000.00. The forecast also indicates that the year 1980 will see this Cooperative paying as much for purchased power as our total revenue will be for the year 1971. The projection further shows that in the very near future we will be required to construct costly transmission lines and substations with capacities of 138 thousand volts.

Another major and costly problem is that of obtaining the necessary right of way on which to construct these transmission lines and substations.

In short, there seems to be no end to our future growth rate and I suppose when one examines the nation's population growth it would naturally follow that the cities can only provide for a limited number and the balance out of necessity will have to spill over to the rural areas. To point this out, I recently learned that over 75% of all the land transactions in Washington County were made by residents of Harris County. It appears to me that our metropolitan Congressman have a larger stake in our welfare than they might now realize. In fact, a very large share of the problems we now face are being brought on by nomads from the cities.

Congressman, there are two major ingredients needed to meet our future needs and as you might suspect, they are time and money. Congress can exercise little control over the time element but they do exercise complete control over the money that is appropriated annually for rural electrification. I sincerely hope that somehow, someday, we will be able to convey to Congress this very real need for adequate construction funds in order to meet our current and future demands. Time is of the essence.

Thank you again for taking the time to listen to our problems and attempting to help in arriving at some of the solutions.

Best Regards, Bluebonnet Electric Cooperative, Inc.

HENRY UMSCHIED,
General Manager.

BLUEBONNET ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC.,
Giddings, Tex., June 3, 1971.

HON. J. J. PICKLE,
Congressman of the 10th District, Texas,
Cannon House Office Building, Wash-
ington, D.C.

DEAR JAKE: Below are a few statistics that might be of interest.

Month and year	Number of members	Member increase
December 1964.....	16,297	
December 1965.....	16,760	463
December 1966.....	17,063	303
December 1967.....	17,598	535
December 1968.....	18,059	461
December 1969.....	18,710	651
December 1970.....	19,591	881
Total.....		3,294

Our April member count was 19,737. We currently have in service 6,386 miles of line averaging 3.10 members per mile.

Our current plant value as of December, 1970 is \$17,409,327.00.

Should you like further information, please let me know.

Best regards, Bluebonnet Electric Cooperative, Inc.

HENRY UMSCHIED,
General Manager.

FREE WORLD FLAGSHIPS IN
NORTH VIETNAM, 1971

HON. CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, during May there was a total of four vessels of non-Communist registry, all flying the British flag, arriving in North Vietnam, according to information made available to me by the Department of Defense. For the first 5 months of 1971 this amounts to a total of 25 such arrivals involving 13 ships under British or Somali Republic registry, which compares favorably to the 32 arrivals during January to May 1970 and to the 49 arrivals during the same period in 1969.

These figures are encouraging, indeed, and show the considerable progress that has been achieved in drying up sources of aid and comfort to the militaristic Communist regime in Hanoi. I commend the administration for its good mark and urge that a maximum effort continue until this traffic which supports Communist aggression through Indochina is completely choked off. Furthermore, while the British-flag vessels are allegedly owned and controlled by Red Chinese interests based in Hong Kong, I reiterate that it is time for the British Government to take new and effective measures to put an end to this flagrant abuse of their Union Jack which has become a cloak and passport for this trade in tyranny.

The statistics follow:

FREE WORLD FLAG SHIPS IN NORTH VIETNAM 1971

	United Kingdom	Somali	Total
January.....	3	1	4
February.....	5	1	6
March.....	3	2	5
April.....	5	1	6
May.....	4		4
Total.....	20	5	25

AIRCRAFT NOISE ABATEMENT AT
J. F. K. INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, on Monday, June 7, the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Transportation released the first of a series of four studies of aircraft noise and its abatement.

The report, "Metropolitan Aircraft Noise Abatement Policy Study, John F. Kennedy International Airport," was prepared by the Tri-State Transportation Commission of New York under a research contract jointly funded by HUD and DOT. Other airport studies are being conducted to cover O'Hare International Airport, Chicago; Bradley International Airport, Hartford, Conn.; and Cape Kennedy Regional Airport, Melbourne, Fla.

These studies are designed to prepare recommendations for reducing aircraft noise problems in the affected communities. When completed, the four studies will be summarized for use in other airport impact situations. An airport environs planning manual will also be prepared for distribution to local officials and planning agencies.

The Tri-State Transportation Commission's study outlines a series of steps to deal with the tremendous aircraft noise problem near John F. Kennedy Airport. While cautioning that none of these steps alone would stop the noise, and that carrying out each to its fullest extent would be difficult, the study recommended that a start be made on such actions as:

Installing noise mufflers on commercial aircraft engines as possible.

Rapid development of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's "quiet engine" for use in commercial aircraft.

Coordinating zoning to halt further residential construction or to acquire outright land near the noisiest areas of the airport.

Amplifying the State building code to require soundproofing in affected areas of new residences, schools, hospitals, and publicly assisted housing projects.

Offering financial incentives to owners of existing structures to soundproof their property.

The Tri-State Transportation Commission was assisted in this study by the New York City Planning Commission, the Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board, and the Port of New York Authority, among other agencies.

Hopefully, the appropriate agencies will give full consideration to their recommendations. The hazards of aircraft noise can no longer be tolerated.

At this point I am including the "Metropolitan Aircraft Noise Abatement Policy Study for John F. Kennedy International Airport." I commend it to the attention of my colleagues.

METROPOLITAN AIRCRAFT NOISE ABATEMENT
POLICY STUDY, JOHN F. KENNEDY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

PREFACE

The research and studies forming the basis of this report were conducted pursuant to a contract with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The report is official government property and may not be published or reproduced (in toto, in verbatim excerpt, or in form approximating either of these) as an unofficial paper or article, without the express approval of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

TRI-STATE TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

The Tri-State Transportation Commission, an inter-state planning agency, defines and seeks solutions to immediate and long-range transportation, land use and comprehensive planning problems of the New York metropolitan region covering 22 counties in New York and New Jersey and six planning regions in southwest Connecticut.

Established by legislative action on the states of Connecticut, New Jersey and New York in 1965, the Commission succeeds the Tri-State Transportation Committee formed by the governments of these states in 1961.

Designated by the federal government as the official planning agency for the Tri-State Region, the Commission is also a central supporting resource for subregional and local planning. It provides assistance in solving problems that spread beyond local jurisdictional control. It also encourages coordination among all agencies charged with an interest in planning or providing transportation and other federally aided facilities within the Tri-State Region.

The three states and the federal government finance the work of the Commission. Federal funds come from highway planning and mass transportation grants provided by the Department of Transportation, and also from planning grants provided by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Commissioners representing the three states are appointed by the governors in accordance with the laws of their respective states. Federal representatives are appointed by the appropriate officer holding such authority within the Executive branch.

THE COMMISSION MEMBERS

John C. Kohl, Chairman, Commissioner, Department of Transportation, State of New Jersey.

D. David Brandon, Vice-Chairman, Director, Office of Planning Coordination, State of New York.

Frank M. Reinhold, Vice-Chairman, Chairman, Connecticut Transportation Authority.

Donald H. Elliott, Secretary, Chairman, New York City Planning Commission.

Charles J. Urstadt, Past Chairman, Commissioner, Division of Housing and Community Renewal, State of New York.

Frank A. Carbolne, Chief, Airports Division, Eastern Region, Federal Aviation Administration, U. S. Department of Transportation.

George J. Conkling, Commissioner, Department of Transportation, State of Connecticut.

Michael N. Danielson, Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.

Louis I. Gladstone, State Comptroller, State of Connecticut.

S. William Green, Regional Administrator, U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Harlan H. Griswold, Chairman, Connecticut Development Commission.

Edmund T. Hume, Commissioner, Department of Community Affairs, State of New Jersey.

Gerald D. Love, Regional Federal Highway Administrator, U. S. Department of Transportation.

Theodore W. Parker, Commissioner, Department of Transportation, State of New York.

William J. Ronan, Chairman, Metropolitan Transportation Authority.

Frank N. Zullo, Mayor of Norwalk, State of Connecticut.

J. Douglas Carroll, Jr., Executive Director.

Richard S. DeTurk, Deputy Executive Director.

TRI-STATE TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

100 Church Street, New York, N. Y. 10007
(212) 433-4200.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The Tri-State Transportation Commission, under contract to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), has prepared this report as part of the Metropolitan Aircraft Noise Abatement Policy Studies (MANAPS) at four airports in different cities. This report considers alternative measures, or combinations of measures, to provide relief from aircraft noise in affected communities around John F. Kennedy International Airport, and offers recommendations for reducing aircraft-noise problems.

The Commission studied present land use, local development policies and codes, sound insulations of structures, redevelopment, future land-use alternatives, legal aspects and airport operations. Alternative methods of reducing noise at the source were furnished by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). Costs are estimated for the alternative procedures considered.

In carrying out this study, the Commission has been guided by a technical advisory committee. Its members are listed at the bottom of this page.

The project manager for HUD was Richard H. Broun, acting director, Environmental Planning Division (Washington, D.C.), and, for Tri-State, Richard S. DeTurk, deputy executive director.

Arthur Kunz, planning coordinator, Nassau-Suffolk Regional Planning Board.

Ernest Hacker, principal planner, New York City Planning Commission.

Albert H. Odell, assistant chief, Aviation Technical Services Division, Port of New York Authority.

Louis DeRose, chief, Airports Planning Branch, regional office, Federal Aviation Administration.

Howard S. Quinn, director, New York City Office, New York State Office of Planning Coordination.

Roland K. Alexander, air safety consultant, New York State Department of Transportation.

Sheldon Gilbert, planning specialist, regional office, Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Background and limitations of the study

MANAPS, which is jointly funded by HUD and DOT, is being developed under the auspices of the Land Use/Airports Panel of the Interagency Aircraft Noise Abatement Program (of which HUD is chairman), which will study the causes, growth trends and the social and economic impact of aircraft-noise exposure on people and communities. The needs of those in the airport environs are to be examined in relation to airport needs and development. One major objective of the MANAPS program is to provide a methodology for evaluating noise exposure situations in other airport areas as well as providing recommendations that are applicable at other locations.

Because of the nature of the John F. Kennedy (JFK) Airport, and its vicinity, the MANAPS project as outlined by HUD em-

phasized remedial rather than preventive measures. HUD indicated the areas to be studied, set forth the study procedures and work elements, and provided the Commission with five alternative Noise Exposure Forecast (NEF) contour areas, based on varying aircraft operating assumptions, in which "on-the-ground" effects of alternate flight path and related operating procedures are examined. The NEF contours were prepared by Bolt, Beranek and Newman, under contract to the Department of Transportation. Other airports in the New York Metropolitan area and their effect on air traffic at JFK are not a part of this study.

History of JFK International Airport

In 1942, the City of New York started construction of an airport on 1100 acres of the former Idlewild Golf Course and a filled tidal marsh. The site was in southeast Queens County, about 16 miles from midtown Manhattan. The project was expanded to encompass over 4900 acres, but never completed by the city. In 1947, the Port of New York Authority (PONYA) signed a long-term lease with the city for Idlewild Airport. The PONYA commenced a construction program

to complete and make subsequent improvements to the airport. In July 1948, Idlewild, or New York International Airport, opened to domestic and foreign commercial airline service.

Aircraft movements grew from 5900 in 1948 to 431,500 in 1968. Similarly, revenue passengers using the airport grew from 62,000 in 1948 to 19,800,000 in 1968. To meet this growth, the PONYA in February of 1955 began construction of a 655-acre terminal city. The terminal site is presently being expanded to 840 acres. In 1956, the airport Air Cargo Center opened on an 80-acre site, which has since doubled in size, for the handling of air freight. In December 1963, the airport was rededicated as the John F. Kennedy International Airport.

The airport today represents an investment by the city of \$60 million and subsequently by the PONYA of about \$485.5 million. It employs nearly 42,000 persons with an annual payroll of \$480 million. Construction underway or planned will cost about \$650 million, nearly \$300 million of which will be spent in the terminal area alone. A rapid-transit link to the Manhattan business district is planned for the future.

CHAPTER 2. SUMMARY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Existing land use

Examination of existing conditions shows that 55 square miles of land are significantly affected by aircraft noise from JFK airport, as defined by sound-level criteria of the Federal Aviation Administration. Within these 55 square miles stand 97,000 structures and accompanying land worth about \$7.0 billion in real-estate market value. Within these buildings live approximately 550,000 people. Although these figures are taken from a 1963 survey, changes between then and 1970 have followed past patterns and do not significantly alter our general findings.

While we are thus faced with a heavily build-up community, not a newly developing area, it is significant that 11 square miles of developable land, or one fifth of the total, are vacant.

Considerable additional area under the noise contour is unoccupied swamp and water, but most of it is protected against future development by conservation regulations.

TABLE 1.—1968 NOISE EXPOSURE FORECAST CONTOURS¹

	30 NEF	40 NEF	Total		30 NEF	40 NEF	Total
Total land area:				Nonresidential land area:			
Square miles.....	38.25	17.19	55.44	Square miles.....	19.35	12.14	31.50
Square feet.....	1,066,405,000	479,309,300	1,545,714,300	Square feet.....	539,702,300	338,497,700	878,200,000
Vacant land area:				Number of residents.....	486,659	66,016	552,675
Square miles.....	8.49	2.59	11.09	Number of structures/residential.....	72,111	12,918	85,029
Square feet.....	236,924,100	72,442,600	309,366,700	Number of structures/nonresidential.....	9,901	1,856	11,757
Residential land area:				Value of property.....	\$5,160,176,648	\$1,814,633,475	\$6,974,810,123
Square miles.....	10.39	2.45	12.84				
Square feet.....	289,778,600	68,369,600	358,147,600				

¹ Noise exposure forecast is a composite index, developed by Bolt, Beranek & Newman for the Federal Aviation Administration, that is generally used to indicate intensity and frequency of noise and volume of air traffic. 30 NEF corresponds to a range of 84 to 105 PNdB, while 40 NEF

includes the range of 99 to 115 PNdB. In a broad sense for comparison purposes, in terms of perceived noise decibels, traffic noise at a distance of 50 feet from a highway may range on an average from 75 to 100 PNdB, assuming that vehicles have been provided with adequate muffling devices.

Expected growth to 1975

Since 1963 construction continues on land near the airport and in Jamaica Bay, both in New York City and in Nassau County. These locations have been avoided in the past, partly because of aircraft noise, marshy soils and inaccessibility. City and country planning agencies estimate that the population in the noise-affected area will grow from 550,000 in 1963 to 680,000 by 1975, an increase of 24 percent. This land development has occurred and is now occurring in spite of the aircraft noise because: (a) there is a shortage of alternative land sites near Manhattan, (b) there is a demand by many for housing near the airport and (c) the network of roads has improved the access of many nearby sites. Of the 42,000 people employed at the airport, 3020 (7 percent) live in the noisy area.

Despite a long history of zoning and planning for orderly land development, no government agency with jurisdiction over the JFK environs has been able to achieve development that is compatible with aircraft noise.

Existing aircraft operations

All reasonable controls have been applied to airport operations at JFK for lessening the effects of aircraft noise on surrounding land in takeoffs, landing and ground operations. These procedures have reduced peak operations an estimated 5-to-10 percent.

Runway 4R-22L¹ is used primarily for landings under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) requiring straight flight patterns. Parallel to it, runway 4L-22R is used primarily

¹ Runway titles designate direction. Here for example, 4R-224, equals 040 degrees right, and its reverse, 220 degrees left, for the aircraft pilot's right or left and compass bearings based on 360 degrees.

for takeoffs, and its use incorporates curved flight paths for departures to the northeast to avoid conflict with other airports and for noise abatement. For operations that affect the area southeast of the airport, landings are predominantly on Runway 31R and follow virtually a straight line; departures are predominantly on 13R and follow various headings, depending on their destinations. Landing and takeoff operations affecting the area northwest of the airport, with few exceptions, follow curved flight paths over the Shore Parkway and Jamaica Bay for noise abatement and to avoid conflict with traffic at other airports. Noise complaints reflect these flight patterns, as expected.

When weather and air traffic permit, visual approaches are conducted to parallel runways resulting in a dispersal of noise rather than concentrating approaches on a single runway. Also, Runway 22L is used for arrivals in combination with the approaches to Runway 13L and 13R during certain times of the day and weather conditions, which further disperses aircraft noise.

FUTURE OPERATIONAL ALTERNATIVES

The extent of aircraft noise on the lands around JFK Airport could be reduced substantially by altering aircraft engines. Four alternative sets of conditions in the form of Noise Exposure Forecast (NEF) contours furnished by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) illustrate the possibilities. For comparison, a map of 1975 noise contours is shown based on best estimates of aircraft expected to be in operation at that time and on flight volumes and time schedules also projected to 1975. The 1975 maps are not strictly comparable to the 1965 operations map due to differences in time base (peak-hour traffic for 1965 versus average-day traffic for 1975), recent FAA restrictions on total traffic and larger capacity aircraft expected to be in operation by 1975, but all 1975 maps

are comparable. If aircraft engines remained unchanged (zero retrofit) but takeoff and landing procedures were changed to require power cutback soon after take-off and steep glide angle late in landing, the extent of noise-affected lands would not be reduced measurably. However, if in addition to revised takeoff and landing procedures, engine nacelles were lined for maximum sound absorption, the extent of noise-affected lands would be reduced 33 percent, affecting 38 percent fewer persons, based on noise contours furnished by the FAA. This could be completely by 1975 if started now. If new aircraft were equipped with a "quiet engine," presently in the experimental stage at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), (and revised takeoff and landing procedures used), the noise-contour area might be reduced as much as 40 percent affecting 45 percent fewer persons. Although an effective date for the NASA engine is well beyond 1975, the study of such an alternative is pertinent in view of its eventual validity. The nacelle-treatment and quiet-engine alternatives include the application of these operational procedures.

Costs of compatible land use

Modification of the aircraft fleet and operating procedures would begin to bring a solution to the noise problem at JFK within the realm of practical consideration. Without engine modification the total cost of land treatment at JFK would be prohibitive, as the following estimates show:

A. To take all the measures necessary to achieve ideal standards for compatible land use recommended by Bolt, Beranek and Newman (BB&N) to the FAA would cost approximately \$1.2 billion, if current trends of aircraft activity are continued to 1975. (See compatible land-use table.) This includes \$0.6 billion for redevelopment—acquisition and demolition of residences, schools and

hospitals in the noisiest location (40 NEF)—and \$0.5 billion for sound insulation of residences, schools and hospitals in less noisy areas (30 NEF). Moreover, approximately 50,000 people would be displaced from their homes—ten times the largest urban renewal project ever undertaken. And finally, all the anticipated industrial development in Brooklyn, Queens and Nassau for the next 20 years would not be enough to use the acreage made available.

B. If commercial aircraft engines were retrofitted with "noise-mufflers," however, the cost of treating affected land areas would be much less—\$0.5 billion instead of \$1.2 billion. The number of people to be relocated is reduced to about 17,000. Even these costs, in dollars and human disruption, are too high; but they begin to suggest a possible improvement in compatibility between the airport and its neighbors.

C. If NASA's "quiet engine" became operational and were installed on new commercial aircraft, still further reductions in cost and population relocation would be possible—\$0.4 billion and 12,000 people.

TABLE 2.—COSTS AND OTHER ELEMENTS

(Resulting from a comprehensive application of Bolt, Beranek and Newman guidelines for land-use control in noise-affected zones. Source is the Tri-State 1963 land-use inventory, unless noted otherwise)

	(Dollars in millions)		
	1975 base-line	Lined nacelles	Quiet engines
COSTS			
Vacant land acquisition (40 NEF).....	\$136	\$45	\$37
Total redevelopment (40 NEF).....	560	230	143
Acquisition.....	491	204	125
Land.....	(182)	(57)	(38)
Buildings.....	(309)	(147)	(87)
Relocation.....	7	2	2
Demolition.....	11	4	3
Administration.....	51	21	13
Total sound insulation (30 NEF).....	483	322	298
Existing structures.....	(407)	(224)	(199)
Future, on vacant land.....	(76)	(98)	(99)
Total cost.....	1,179	597	478
Proceeds from sale of land.....	128	93	94
Net cost.....	1,051	504	384
OTHER ELEMENTS			
People to be relocated (40 NEF):			
Population 1963.....	50,090	16,766	11,980
Households 1963.....	17,270	5,781	4,130
Total structures to be demolished (40 NEF).....	10,860	3,739	2,505
Residential buildings.....	10,407	3,670	2,493
Hotels, motels.....	1	1	1
Schools and churches.....	64	18	8
Health facilities.....	3	2	0
Offices and other public buildings.....	383	47	2
Theaters, auditoriums.....	2	1	1
Land for noise-compatible uses (40 NEF):			
Industry and commerce (acres).....	920	877	740
Parks and open space (acres).....	1,932	0	0

Since it may not be possible to take all the measures recommended by BB&N for compatible land use, it may be constructive to establish a set of priorities for doing what can be done at a reasonable cost short of a more nearly ideal solution. For example:

A. Spot redevelopment of residential uses could be undertaken initially in blocks just off the end of each runway where noise levels are most extreme.

B. Where public improvements are programmed in noisy areas they could be tied in with noise-abatement measures.

C. Existing residences could be soundproofed, even in very noisy locations, rather than demolished.

D. Land-control programs could be keyed to the most optimistic noise contours, rather than the much larger (and costlier to accommodate) current contours.

E. A further reduction in noise-affected lands might be achieved by relocating Runway 13L-31R at JFK or by limiting it to use by lighter weight aircraft in conjunction with continued use of Runway 13R-31L and construction of a new Runway 13-31. This would entail construction in Jamaica Bay, thereby raising ecological questions. Examination of such an alternative is outside the scope of the present study.

Legal aspects of soundproofing

The legal consultants whom we retained for the purpose of studying the legal implications of compulsory soundproofing (Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton) conclude that extensive compulsory soundproofing requirements, at least in the highest noise areas, affecting such new privately owned structures as multiple dwellings, schools and hospitals and, perhaps, private residences, are likely to be upheld; but that such requirements for existing privately owned structures would not be likely to receive judicial support, except perhaps for multiple dwellings, schools and hospitals. They also concluded that such requirements could be enacted either by the affected municipalities, if state enabling legislation were made adequate, or by the state legislature in mandatory or optional form, but that at JFK state legislation would appear more promising.

Parts of New York City, the City of Long Beach, the Town of Hempstead, at least 14 incorporated communities within the Town of Hempstead, plus the Town of North Hempstead and two incorporated communities within that town are embraced within or are very near to the high-noise areas as defined for this report.

This fragmentation of jurisdictions is the major legal barrier to making required soundproofing in the high-noise areas effective at least on any consistent basis. The Port of New York Authority has no power to impose soundproofing requirements outside the boundaries of JFK and Nassau County has no such powers. However each of these 20 municipalities in the high-noise areas is autonomous in its power to zone and to adopt building codes. Meaningful and consistent soundproofing measures for example, at end of each runway, would thus almost surely require state legislation.

Theoretically, with the approval of the state legislature, the local governmental units involved could adopt parallel legislation or even agree on a common compulsory soundproofing program. As a practical matter, however, their social, political and business orientations are likely to differ to such an extent that such action would not be probable. State legislation might take the form of either (1) a supervening compulsory soundproofing law, or (2) a law that would call for state intervention in any local government jurisdiction that did not meet

specified standards by a certain time, or (3) provision of incentive financial help only to those units of government that met specific standards.

Engineering Aspects of Soundproofing

Our acoustical consultants (Goodfriend-Ostergaard Associates) feel that the sound-reducing constructions and their incremental cost per square foot of occupied floor area of the various building types, as stated in the design summary sheets, provide a feasible and applicable approach in attaining suitable noise reduction from aircraft noise in the 30 and 40 NEF zones in the vicinity of John F. Kennedy International Airport.

TABLE 3.—INSULATION INCREMENTAL COST (SQUARE FEET)

	Existing		New	
	30 NEF	40 NEF	30 NEF	40 NEF
Residential:				
Single family house.....	\$3.00	(1)	\$2.75	(1)
High rise.....	3.30	\$4.30	3.00	\$4.50
Row houses.....	3.30	4.30	3.00	4.50
Commercial:				
Stores.....	2.00	3.00	2.75	4.25
Office building.....	3.00	5.00	2.50	4.50
Hotels.....	3.00	5.00	2.50	4.50
Motels.....	3.00	5.00	2.50	4.50
Offices: public building.....	3.00	3.00	2.50	3.50
Schools and hospitals.....	3.00	3.00	2.50	3.50
Churches.....	3.00	4.00	2.50	3.00
Theatres and auditoriums.....	2.50	4.00	2.00	3.50
Industrial.....	2.50	4.00	2.00	3.50

¹ Not available.

Applying these unit costs to existing structures in the contour areas shows the following total costs:

TABLE 4.—TOTAL INSULATION COSTS

	30 NEF	40 NEF
1975 baseline:		
Residential.....	\$356,491,800	\$54,348,990
Schools, hospitals, churches.....	35,250,600	4,708,550
Commercial.....	37,245,250	3,315,600
Quiet engine:		
Residential.....	172,443,285	11,017,030
Schools, hospitals, churches.....	18,395,400	1,111,250
Commercial.....	12,656,250	558,000
Lined nacelles:		
Residential.....	195,962,130	17,192,260
Schools, hospitals, churches.....	19,664,400	2,230,200
Commercial.....	14,347,750	870,400

The consultant points that an alternative means of reducing intruding aircraft noise levels is available—by introducing a homogeneous background noise. This acoustical principle of "softening" unwanted noise has been used successfully in commercial buildings and is more practical than sound-reducing constructions. However, acceptance of this concept in residences is untested.

The electronic background-noise system consists of commercially available components, specifically, a power amplifier, approved noise generator and loudspeakers.

The estimated cost of this system, including installation, is based on the purchase price of the electronic "package" plus the purchase and installation of the loudspeakers. The costs, when applied to the varied building types, are as follows:

TABLE 5.—COSTS OF INTRODUCING BACKGROUND NOISE

Building type	Electronic package	Loudspeaker cost and installation	
		Existing	New
Residential single family.....	\$2,800/house.....	\$40/room ¹	\$30/room. ¹
Residential high rise or row.....	\$2,800/housing unit.....	do.....	Do.
Hospital, nursing home, hotel, motel rooms.....	\$2,800/50 rooms or less.....	do.....	Do.
Commercial, office and public buildings.....	\$2,800/20,000 sq. ft. or less or 50 offices or less.....	\$40/400 sq. ft. or \$40/office.....	\$30/400 sq. ft. or \$30/office.
Industrial.....	do.....	do.....	Do.

¹ Living, dining, kitchen, family room/den, and bedrooms.

Recommendations

The technical advisory committee respectfully submits the following findings and recommendations to the Tri-State Transportation Commission for transmittal to HUD and the Interagency Aircraft Noise Abatement Program:

A. The U.S. government should expedite its efforts to require that commercial aircraft engines be retrofitted with maximum sound absorption equipment as soon as possible. As with land-use control, this need not be an "all or nothing" effort. A start could be made on some aircraft now, the rest by 1975.

B. The U.S. government should continue development of the NASA "quiet engine" as rapidly as possible for application to commercial aircraft.

C. The government of New York State should amplify the state building code to require soundproofing and new residential structures, schools and hospitals, including publicly assisted projects, in noisy areas (30 NEF or above) around JFK airport and other commercial airports.

D. An appropriate government agency (U.S., New York State or an agency of either) should offer financial incentives to towners of existing residential structures, schools and hospitals in noisy areas (30 NEF or above) for soundproofing their property. In exchange for such financial aid, the agency would obtain a noise aviation easement. The cost of such financial aid should be recovered by appropriate means, including direct or indirect charges against the air traveler. Soundmasking should be tested and possibly offered as an alternative to soundproofing.

E. Where contiguous areas of residentially zoned vacant land totalling 10 acres or more are located within the noisiest zone (40 NEF), they should be foreclosed from residential development, either by rezoning to industrial or commercial use, or by acquisition for industrial, recreational or other nonresidential purposes. In either case action by the City of New York and the County of Nassau (or its towns and villages) would be necessary. A novel approach to this aspect of the problem requires coordinated zoning action upon request of the airport owner or operator, and requires guidelines by the state department of transportation. Even on parcels smaller than ten acres some effort should be made to prevent residential construction. To this end we recommend that federal and state agencies refuse mortgage commitments in the highest (40 NEF) noise contour.

There are a total of about 200 acres in four parcels (ten acres or more) in the 40 NEF contour area of the 1975 baseline map, and the total acquisition cost would be approximately \$22,520,000. In the 1975 lined nacelles contour area there are 45 acres in only one parcel, which would cost \$5,391,000, and in the "quiet engine" contour area, 50 acres in one parcel, costing \$4,356,000.

While not within the contract guidelines, some further questions may be raised for review:

A. To what extent can the air-traffic pattern be dispersed (as opposed to highly concentrated in a single traffic lane) to distribute noise over a wider area, at a reduced frequency, at any single location?

B. To what extent can runway realignment or relocation reduce noise-affected areas and at what cost?

C. To what extent can revised operations (such as mobile lounges taking passengers to more isolated land strips in the ocean or bay) be substituted for current gate operations when noise reduction is possible?

Information compiled for this contract can supply a basis for measuring costs and benefits associated with optional ways of handling aircraft noise in highly urbanized areas.

THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM FOR EDUCATORS

HON. JOHN E. HUNT

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, Ed McDonnell, a personal friend of mine and a junior high school English teacher, visited South Vietnam a year ago to see for himself what has occurred in that war-torn nation. Instead of taking on the political issues of the conflict itself, Mr. McDonnell molds his firsthand observations into a constructive message and challenge to the teachers of America whose responsibilities are unmatched with respect to preparing today's youth for tomorrow's world. In his words:

As I see it—you and I—as teachers, are both burdened with an awesome responsibility, and yet blessed with a unique opportunity. In the final analysis, history will demonstrate that the American system survived or failed because we teachers were or were not able to inspire our students with a passionate love for democracy, freedom, and the American way of life.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to share Mr. McDonnell's thoughts as they appeared in the May 1971 issue of the NJEA Review.

THE LESSON OF VIETNAM FOR EDUCATORS

(By Edward T. McDonnell)

(NOTE.—Last summer, Edward McDonnell, English teacher at Collingswood Jr. H.S., made a trip to South Vietnam at his own expense. While not articulating at length the political pros and cons of the war effort, he feels Vietnam presents a lesson to teachers—a lesson that comes to grips with larger issues facing our nation and its schools today.)

I went to Vietnam last summer for a number of reasons, but the listing of those reasons is not my concern here. Instead, I would like to share with you some of the things I saw and learned on my trip.

In Vietnam, I saw things which moved me deeply, some because they were beautiful, others because they were incredibly horrible.

Our government is teaching the Vietnamese how to grow two crops of rice each year instead of one, and how to spare the female animals until they can reproduce themselves instead of slaughtering them so soon after birth.

We are teaching the people how to use the tractors we have given them. We had been finding the tractors rusting in the fields, because the village chieftains and elders believed it would offend the spirits to plow the land with a machine. In fact, a great deal of time, the most difficult task of all is to convince the villagers to try our new methods.

The really rewarding thing, however, is to see the wonderful work some of our American GIs are doing on their own time. Hundreds of them visit orphanages on their one day off each week. They play with the little children, most of whom are seriously undernourished, many of whom are victims of bubonic plague, malaria, polio, and a thousand other diseases we have long regarded as extinct.

While I was in South Vietnam I saw hundreds of such American men and women extending their hands and hearts to a people who survive in conditions we would have found utterly deplorable two centuries ago.

And yet, I saw other things, too. I saw the United States spending \$1 million every half hour we are in Vietnam. Since our initial expression of interest in this far away place, we have invested \$150 billion on our operations there. And in 1970, we were spending upwards of \$40 million a day.

I saw, furthermore, that President Thieu was elected by only 35 per cent of the popular vote in the September 1967 election, and that Vice-President Nguyen Cao Ky was little more than a playboy before his election. And yet, we have expended 50,000 American boys to support that government, not to mention the thousands of American amputees and paraplegics this war has left. Some 300,000 men have been wounded.

At the Third Field Hospital, just outside of Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base, I saw rescue helicopters land with wounded Americans, and some of the 19 year olds did not look any older than the ninth graders I have taught.

But, they are the lucky guys. The unlucky guys are the ones who are taken off the helicopters in rubber sacks, similar to sleeping bags, but zippered all the way around.

The Vietnam situation may have its good side. It certainly has its horrible side. The essential question is whether or not the good being done is ultimately justifiable in light of the devastation being inflicted both in terms of human bloodshed and the resulting turmoil in our own nation. I don't really know the answer.

But, what does seem relevant today is one particular thought which did occur to me on the 12,000-mile journey home. The depressing thought that occurred to me was the insignificance of my job as an educator, and the utter futility of teaching nouns and adjectives and Shakespeare to 125 children while virtually the entire world is on the verge of chaos—from Saigon and Hanoi, to Israel and Egypt, to Kent State and Jackson State.

In the face of the really pressing problems all over the globe, to expound the virtues of a correct facing in Sewing I, or a correct tense in French II, suddenly seemed to me lunacy of the most uncompromising sort.

What could any of this do toward solving the truly monumental problems of the human race?

WORLD CAN BE STABLE

But now, I honestly think there is an answer. The place we educators occupy in the overall realm of world affairs—far from being microscopic—is in fact huge to the point of being awesome. After all is said and done, the world can only be as stable as each individual nation of which it is composed. And with the possible exception of parents themselves, no one has more to say about the future and stability of our nation than you and I, the teachers of America.

The evidence for this assertion is seen in the fact that millions of Americans of all ages can do little more than shake their heads in disgust and throw up their hands in frustration when college students resist "the system."

The college students of the future are waiting for you and me at the beginning of each day. If we teach them only English and sewing and French, then our jobs will indeed be insignificant, because we will be failures as educators. The proof will be seen when they are protesting three, four, or even 10 years from now.

For all the criticism educators receive, our men on the moon and the fact that all of those kids are in college in the first place are testimony to our efficiency as teachers of science and reading and arithmetic. History teachers have clearly done an exquisite job of teaching the first 10 amendments to the Constitution. (There isn't a student in

grades K through 12 who doesn't know precisely what his and our rights are.)

At the same time, however, I cannot help but think that our jobs would become truly significant and many of our nation's problems better understood and solved if we would emphasize to our students a constitutional theme often overlooked. The simple axiom: My freedom ends where the other guy's begins.

We need to make it clear to our students that you and I do not object to protest. Our country was founded as a result of protest. Reasonable protest is good for democracy. Without it, our government would become stagnant, our leaders inefficient.

USE OUR FREEDOMS

But, we also have to emphasize to our students that our founding fathers intended for us to use our freedoms with responsibility. It is reasonable to march in protest in front of a school, as long as I do not interfere with someone else's right to enter the school. It is completely acceptable to protest against even the President of the United States. But, it is definitely not acceptable to heckle that President when he attempts to deliver a speech, because my freedom of protest ends where his freedom of speech begins.

My right to condemn the ROTC ends where the other guy's right to participate in the ROTC begins, and so on. This is what freedom is all about. And even though campus and school unrest is only one problem in a world troubled with thousands of problems, every evil—from crime in the streets to war itself—is the result of one man or one nation disregarding the rights of another.

It took only a few days in a country like Vietnam—a country where it is not uncommon for a man to be cultivating his rice field one day and see his entire family massacred the next; a place where a man may be born, grow into adulthood, and die without ever having traveled five miles from his own hamlet, or eaten a meal consisting of anything but rice; a place where a large percentage of adult population is not aware that there is a relationship between dirt and disease, or the mosquito and malaria.

It took only a few hours in South Vietnam for me to realize, with shocking clarity, what a blessing it is to be born an American. Now I realize, as never before, the urgency with which you and I must work to insure the survival of the American system. For even with all its faults, our lives could be hell without it.

As I see it—you and I—as teachers, are both burdened with an awesome responsibility, and yet blessed with a unique opportunity. In the final analysis, history will demonstrate that the American system survived or failed because we teachers were or were not able to inspire our students with a passionate love for democracy, freedom, and the American way of life.

EXCHANGE CLUB LAUDS LOCAL LAW ENFORCERS

HON. ANCHER NELSEN

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. NELSEN. Mr. Speaker, the Exchange Club of Washington, D.C., an organization representing a cross section of the business and professional community within the metropolitan area here, has provided me with a copy of a resolution it authorized concerning the recent demon-

strations to shut down the American Government. The resolution commends all participating law enforcement personnel who were on the scene at the time to successfully maintain peace and order.

As ranking Republican on the House District of Columbia Committee, I certainly share the Exchange Club's appreciation of the law enforcement personnel who were on the job during this time to keep the Government open and operating and to protect law-abiding citizens from violent militant radicals. Their exemplary conduct under highly trying circumstances stands as a fine tribute to the general excellence of the Washington, D.C., police force as well as to the excellence of related participating civilian and military agencies.

For the information of congressional colleagues, I am pleased to insert the full text of the resolution at this point in my remarks:

RESOLUTION OF COMMENDATION

Whereas, during the past two days, certain subversive elements under the guise of peaceful demonstration have subjected our nation's capital to violence, property destruction and personal harassment in an attempt to disrupt the operation of the Federal Government; and

Whereas, the various Police jurisdictions within the City of Washington, D.C., in conjunction with a variety of military units and certain civilian agencies have successfully maintained peace and order permitting normal functioning of Government and the conduct of general business within the city; and

Whereas, these personnel have exercised great good humor, patience, politeness and skill in a very trying period, plus great restraint in the performance of their duties:

Now therefore be it resolved that we, the members of the Exchange Club of Washington, D.C. representing a cross section of the business and professional community within the metropolitan area, meeting in regular session, do unanimously commend each and every member of the participating law enforcement units, both civilian and military, together with personnel of the Judicial, Fire, Health and Sanitation Department of the District of Columbia for their high degree of professional efficiency in the exercise of their duties and responsibilities under these trying circumstances.

And further direct that this resolution be sent to appropriate officials within the Federal and local governments, and to all news media.

A CHANGE IN THE TAX LAWS RESTORING THE FULL CHARITABLE DEDUCTION TO CREATIVE ARTISTS

HON. OGDEN R. REID

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing a bill to modify the restrictions contained in section 170(e) of the Internal Revenue Code in the case of certain contributions of literary, musical, or artistic composition, or similar property.

This amendment to the Internal Revenue Code was a part of the Tax Reform

Act of 1969, and it concerns the contributions by artists, writers and composers of their own work to public institutions. Briefly, this section changed the law to permit an artist, writer or composer who contributes his own work to a public institution to take a charitable deduction equal only to the cost of the materials which went into the work. Prior to 1970, the law permitted a charitable deduction in such cases equal to the full market value of the work and, in fact, this benefit is still available to a collector who donates a work of art.

The change in the law has had a severe adverse effect on the financial situation of individual artists and on the receipt of gifts by museums and libraries. Donations by artists, writers and composers of their own works to some institutions have dropped by as much as 75 percent. The Library of Congress, for example, received only one-half the number of self-generated manuscript gifts in 1970 that it received in 1969, and only one-fourth the number of music manuscripts. Universities report a similar decline in their receipt of gifts—90 percent in the case of Columbia University and 75 percent in the case of Syracuse University.

It is generally not recognized that most artists and writers are not rich. In fact, the median income of artists from all sources in 1967 was \$8,000, and nearly a quarter of those polled in one survey earned less than \$5,000 annually. A survey of former participants in the MacDowell Colony showed that 74 percent of the writers and 88 percent of the painters and sculptors could not support themselves from the earnings of their art.

Thus, the change in the tax law has had a severe impact on the financial situation of individual artists. The bill I am introducing would restore the full charitable deduction which these creative artists enjoyed prior to 1970. Although our country is finally beginning to provide Government financial assistance to the arts on a meaningful level, we continue to neglect the plight of those who create our art.

I hope that favorable action will be possible during this session on this important measure.

FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR FREEDOM IN CHILE

HON. GERALD R. FORD

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, Weston H. Agor, assistant professor of political science at Grand Valley State College, Allendale, Mich., has written an excellent article on Chile which has come to my attention. The article reviews events which have transpired in Chile since Marxist Salvador Allende Gossens was elected President and offers us an outlook on the prospects for freedom in Chile. I think my colleagues will find this article profitable reading:

FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR FREEDOM IN CHILE¹

(By Weston Harris Agor)

INTRODUCTION

For the better part of the twentieth century, Chileans have enjoyed one of the most democratic and stable multi-party systems of government in Latin America. In a recent world index of democratization, Chile placed fifth behind Canada, England, the United States, and Switzerland, and well ahead of the important European nations of France, Italy, and Germany.

Many Chile watchers around the world are now increasingly concerned that the country's long tradition of democracy and freedom may gradually be eroded and eventually discontinued altogether. In a close race last September, Chileans shocked the world by electing as president Marxist Salvador Allende Gossens. Despite Allende's frequent assurances that neither he personally, nor the members of his *Unidad Popular* Coalition plan to install a totalitarian government in Chile, several analysts including former Christian-Democrat President Eduardo Frei Montalva fear that the left-wing government is in fact "installing a regime that will make democracy impossible."

Reluctance to accept President Allende's promises at face value is part due to contradictory statements he and other members of his coalition have made. For example, on the one hand Senator Volodia Teitelboim, one of the leading economic thinkers in the Communist Party, stresses the "need to come to terms with western capital and the local bourgeoisie" and criticizes the *miristas* and radical Socialists as "men who failed to self-criticize after September 4th." Yet, last month, Teitelboim told an audience of dignitaries at the theater of the labor confederation in Cuba that "we know we can count on the solidarity of Cuba. From now on, our destinies march together." Similarly, although Allende has said that "we do not intend to escape out of one field of gravity (United States paramountcy) only to fall into another (Russian paramountcy)," Carlos Altamirano, secretary-general of the Socialist party, has been quoted as saying he plans to make Chile, after Cuba, "the second free territory of America." Equally disconcerting is Allende's own apparent inconsistency. *Le Monde Weekly* quotes the president to have said:

The important thing to remember is that what we are doing in Chile is being done in the legal framework of bourgeois legislation and under a democratic, bourgeois regime. We are committed to this procedure and we must honor that commitment.

But, the April 10, 1971 issue of *The Economist* notes that Dr. Allende has made no secret of his impatience with "relics of bourgeois legality," and has called for a "people's constitution" that would provide for a single-chamber congress and people's tribunals as a means of bypassing the independent judiciary.

Also revealing is the Soviet Union's call to developing countries to follow Chile's example and create united fronts of Communists and others favoring non-capital systems. In a recent issue of *Kommunist*, the Communist party's theoretical journal, Rostislav A. Ulyanovsky, the party's leading specialist on developing countries, said that such fronts provide opportunities to increase Communist influence gradually as the country breaks with its Western links. This statement is significant when combined with the

fact Chile presently has an economic mission touring seven Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union to obtain economic aid for Chile's "construction of socialism".

Although it is easy to sympathize with President Allende's humanistic goals of providing a more equitable distribution of income than exists now, and more jobs, better food, housing, education, health, rest and recreation for the marginal groups (all consistent with the objectives of The Alliance for Progress of the 1960's), some observers feel that recent events in Chile suggest that these goals will be achieved (if at all) at the expense of individual freedom and liberty. They base their opinion in part on that fact that illegal seizure of more than 300 farms by rural laborers and peasants has been reported since Dr. Allende's Government took office in November. The Government has not taken any police measure to prevent occupations or evict invaders. Dr. Jacques Chonchol, Minister of Agriculture, is quoted as saying: "This government cannot take up arms against the people. That would be to play into the hands of the reactionaries." Even though Jose Toha, Minister of Interior, announced that the Government would act vigorously against any armed groups operating in rural areas, Juan de Onis of *The New York Times* reports that in practice the Government has been "appointing state administrators and providing technical assistance and credit to peasant groups that seized properties in Cautin province. The farm owners have been unable to recover their properties, even small farms of 100 acres, despite orders issued by local judges for the eviction of invaders." The insecurity created by these illegal seizures is likely to bring a decline in farm production and create food shortages later this year.

Before taking office, President Allende agreed to a series of constitutional amendments guaranteeing among other things freedom of the press, the right to join labor unions and to strike, and an educational system free of official intervention. Although it is generally believed that Allende and the democratic factions of *Unidad Popular* who follow him are trying to respect these guarantees, there appears to be pressure from other quarters within the coalition not to take these commitments seriously. The Inter-American Press Society, composed mainly of the larger and more conservative newspapers in Latin America, has charged the Communist party cadres within the coalition of overtly threatening Chilean editors and menacing press freedom. It has been confirmed that Jorge Insunza, a Communist deputy, visited several radio stations that had not supported his candidacy and pressured them to hire party members. The suspension of Radio Mineira, a pro-Christian-Democrat station, and President Allende's own personal attack on two journalists (Raul Gonzales Alfaro and Rafael Otero) followed by cancellation of the latter's radio programs are but two more examples given.

More covertly, the Government also appears to have adopted a number of measures designed to bring about the economic asphyxiation of the opposition press. *El Mercurio*, the conservative daily, has almost been crippled by the loss of advertising. The strike that in November paralyzed the Zig Zag Publishing House (the most important in the country) resulting in its purchase by the government was encouraged by the political parties and organizations of the *Unidad Popular*. Furthermore, the Government has issued a weekly magazine of its own, *Ahora*, to compete with *Ercilla*, Chile's foremost news review. The latter move seems consistent with the coalition's recent statement that "communications media would be used for the free expression of differing points of view but also to contribute to the creation of a new culture and the rise of a new man." Summarizing these developments,

the special correspondent of *The Economist* writes:

Dr. Allende's strategy here has been to build up the pro-government press, to sponsor the formation of *Unidad Popular* cells in the unions of journalists and printing staff, and to count on economic factors (including the increasing importance of government advertising) to bring around some of the opposition papers or to drive them off the market.

Despite the fact that the Allende forces have also promised to permit strikes, there is no indication as to how far they will allow labor disputes to go. One clue is a recent statement by Luis Corvalán, Secretary-General of the Communist party. He explained that under previous non-Marxist governments, it was correct for unions to press for the highest possible wage increases. "Now that the workers have their own Government," he said, "demands for increases and other aspirations should be moderated to avoid causing it problems." As for educational autonomy, World Wide Information Services, Inc.'s recent report notes that Allende's government has started to revise some promises made during the election campaign last year:

Notwithstanding the fact that Allende promised an educational system free of official intervention, the Ministry of Education has brought twenty-four specialists from Cuba to give advice in the reorientation of the Chilean educational system.

It has also been alleged that the Ministry of Education has begun textbook revisions in the social sciences—especially in the school for teachers. In response to charges that Allende intended to close the French *lycée* in Santiago, he responded, "But why should we close it? In the morning it would give courses for paying students and in the afternoon lessons would be free, for the people. . . ."

In the economic sphere, shadows overshadow the Chilean economy according to Christian Science Monitor correspondent James Nelson Goodsell. Copper production is slowing down while world market prices also weaken, and nationalization legislation is likely to be approved by Congress by mid-year. However, the amount of compensation to be paid to American companies is not clear, and President Allende has threatened not to sign the bill unless the lower house of Congress reconsiders the composition of the five man compensation tribunal to provide for greater government representation. The official jobless total now is over nine percent (some unofficial estimates place the total between fifteen and twenty percent) due to a slump in the construction industry and a lag in government work projects.

The economic strategy of Pedro Vuskovic Bravo, Minister of Economy, has been primarily based not on sweeping expropriations but on indirect manipulation of prices, wages, and credit, plus administrative pressures and inducements that are bringing all important private business as well as banking activities under the control of state planners. Prices of consumer goods as well as raw materials have been frozen while allowing wage increases of 35 to 60 percent for workers. In cases of arbitration of wage disputes, the Government has taken the side of unions. The Government also refuses to permit layoffs, and the few plants that tried or have suspended production were taken over by a state administrator and a workers' council.

Many business leaders believe that eventually all private business will be organized along lines laid down by the State Planning Board and the State Development Corporation. With private banking being taken over by the State as well, there will be no independent source of credit, so it will disappear. Vuskovic and Orlando Letelier (Chile's Ambassador to the United States) deny that

¹ This article is based on an analysis of numerous books and periodicals over the last six months both domestic and foreign, personal interviews, some unpublished source and data gleaned from participation in the Department of State's "Scholar-Diplomat Seminar" in Washington, D.C. January 11-15, 1971.

the Government plans to condemn the private sector to death, but they do admit that the Government wants to lessen its influence within a three-pronged economic establishment of State, mixed and private sectors. Dr. Allende himself has made clear his desire to "socialize the Chilean economy."

Uncertain as to what the Government's long-run plans are, key personnel (both foreign and Chilean) have left or are in the process of secretly leaving the country, and the United States government has received an abnormally large number of requests for asylum in this country. Attempting to stem this flow, the Chilean Government has placed a 30 percent premium on the cost of purchasing foreign exchange to take abroad.

ALLENDE ON FREEDOM

In all fairness to the present administration, it should be noted that there are observers who scoff at the possibility that Allende would restrict freedom in Chile. Selden Rodman, a veteran Latin American observer, reports that although Edward M. Korry (the former United States Ambassador to Chile) is pessimistic about the country's future, he still characterizes Allende as a "populist" and a "humanist." The Peace Corps is said to regard the President as "a democrat at heart, firmly committed to carrying out vital social changes with a maximum of freedom." Some also believe that Allende himself opposes the creation of a socialist dictatorship for fear that the Communist Party, with its superior organization and control of the labor movement, would become the real boss. They also point out that Allende has granted asylum not only to guerrilleros of Brazil and Bolivia, but also to twenty-five rightist military officers from Bolivia who fled their country after trying to overthrow Torres. Rodman adds that some *comerciantes* were somewhat reassured last fall when top editors of Chile's number two Communist newspaper, *Puro Chile*, were promptly jailed for openly advocating defiance of the law in the matter of property seizures, although he is quick to add that they were out on bail the following day.

Similarly, Claudio Véliz of the University of Chile, writing in the April, 1971 issue of *Foreign Affairs* argues that "Chile will not easily abandon the path of democratic legality which President Allende has so emphatically declared to be the one his government is determined to follow," and concludes that Chile, therefore, present not a threat, but a hope to the United States and the Western Hemisphere. He adds:

Perhaps, if *Unidad Popular* succeeds, it would be well to ponder the advantages of a strong dose of domestic pragmatism to qualify the ideological rigidities which all too often inhibit the political arrangements of nations facing such challenging processes of change.

In a series of revealing interviews appearing in the *New York Times* and elsewhere, Allende himself asserts that, if anything, his regime is *increasing freedom*—both at the level of Chilean foreign policy and domestically by improving the social, economic and political status of the common man. As to the former, Dr. Allende argues that "the only thing we really want is our absolute independence. We are supporters of self-determination and non-intervention." By this he means that his coalition "wants to increase cultural and commercial relations with the United States," but also to be free to exercise "the right to open relations with Cuba" and other Eastern Bloc countries.

President Allende emphasizes that although Chile wants "the best—the very best relations with the United States" and will never do anything against the United States or contribute to injuring its sovereignty, "we do not accept from anyone, that they come

and say, 'No, Sir, you can't have relations with Cuba.'" As for Chile's role in the Organization of American States (OAS), the President continues:

It is a platform which we will use for saying what we think. If we approve of something, we shall say so, and if we disapprove, we shall say so too. *But, we shall neither leave it nor allow it to throw us out.* [Emphasis added]

Domestically, Allende defends his "nationalist, popular, democratic, and revolutionary government that will move toward socialism." "I think," he said, "Socialism frees man. . . . I believe that man is freed . . . when he has an economic position that guarantees him work, food, housing, health, rest, and recreation." Citing figures such as one-half of the children in Chile between birth and fifteen years of age are undernourished and that there are 600,000 children who are mentally retarded because they have not had enough protein, Allende states, "We can say that the facts, reality, point to the failure of capitalist governments and Frei's Christian Democratic reformism," and the need for a redistributive socialist revolution in Chile. However, Dr. Allende adds that by establishing three distinct economic sectors of state, mixed, and private enterprise, "there is no concentration or centralism here such as that in some socialist countries."

As for freedom of religion, President Allende is emphatic in guaranteeing that "There will be the widest religions pluralism . . . that will be absolutely respected." He continues, "The church . . . is going to be a factor in our favor because we are going to try to make a reality out of Christian thought." Referring to the Revolutionary Left Movement's (MIR) use of violence and their efforts to encourage peasants to illegally take over farm land, Allende asserts:

"We have said many times that we have no political agreement or understanding with the MIR. The tactics that they have set . . . for themselves are strictly their own responsibility."

Responding to charges that freedom of the press is being threatened in Chile, Allende telegraphed the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) that he had always "accepted the right of others to dissent" and assured the Association that in Chile there is "absolute respect" for the communications media. Asked in mid-April, 1971 (after his coalition won nearly 50 percent of the vote in the municipal elections) whether he planned to call a plebiscite to dissolve Congress and give him power to form a unicameral "people's legislature," Allende insisted that he had no intention of trying it at this time. "I expect that the Congress will meditate on the popular verdict. I expect cooperation. We are not going to become arrogant with the victory we have obtained."

FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR FREEDOM IN CHILE

With this backdrop of contrasting arguments, assertions, charges and countercharges, one of the prime tasks of Nathaniel Davis (new United States Ambassador to Chile) will be to monitor the direction of Allende's regime and estimate the future prospects for freedom in Chile. In what must be regarded as more of an "art" than a "science", the United States Embassy will probably use as one of its benchmark indicators (or indexes) amendments to the Chilean constitution strengthening the guarantees of civil liberties which Allende agreed to respect last fall in exchange for Christian-Democrat support in order to take office.

Particularly important to watch will be the rights of citizens to associate freely in the political parties of their choice; the access granted to state-controlled communications media for all the political parties; freedom of the domestic and foreign press (including the establishment of competing state organs), labor unions (particularly the right

to strike) and civic associations; the independence of (or assaults upon) the judiciary; and an educational system free of political interference (e.g., existence of discrimination in admissions, revisions of textbooks, favoritism in the advancement of teachers). Also important to monitor will be possible covert attempts to indoctrinate and form political action groups in the lower levels of the military, in factories, offices of the mass media, universities and in neighborhoods. Possible censorship of domestic and international mail and controls placed upon international travel (by nationals and foreigners) should also be placed high on any index attempting to measure the expansion or contraction of freedom in Chile.

But, as President Allende correctly emphasized, it seems to me, such an index should also seek to measure the progress of mitigating and alleviating circumstances which encourage the "alienation" of the average or marginal man in Chile. For example, the following question should be asked as objectively and the response measured as accurately as possible, "Is the present regime providing jobs, food, housing, education, health, rest and recreation to more Chileans at a faster pace than ever before?" Also, it should be asked, "Is the present government functioning to move Chile from a client state status (either of the United States or Russia) to a position of a "floaters" (i.e., independent or neutral foreign policy)?"

The results of such an exercise in measurement including all of the factors I have mentioned above should give us all a better understanding of the future prospects for "freedom" in its broadest sense in Chile.

WE MOURN FOR OUR BALTIC FRIENDS

HON. EDWARD J. PATTEN

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Speaker, for 30 years June 14 has been a day of mourning for the Baltic people. On this date in 1941 over 60,000 men, women, and children from the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were herded like animals onto trains and shipped off to desolate regions of the Soviet Union.

This practice continues down to the present day. While the numbers are not so great, citizens of the Baltic States still live in terror of a knock on their door during the night after which they are not heard from again. In the concentration camps to which they are shipped, the Baltic people worked under brutal guard supervision in conditions where they were underclothed, undernourished, and poorly housed. Families were separated. Most of these fine people died, while their efforts went into building showcases where dignitaries are now guided through on their trips to Siberia. Is it any wonder that Baltic people all over the world mourn their lost friends and loved ones?

Mr. Speaker, the purges of the Baltic States by the Russians are having a telling effect on these countries. The latest census figures from the Soviet Union indicate that the native population in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is declining while the influx of ethnic

Russians continues. We must work to stop this trend.

I have come to know many of the immigrants who came to America from the Baltic states. They are hard-working, industrious people. They loved their independence and struggled to maintain it under the auspices of the League of Nations. The Russian occupation forces, however, proved to be too strong, and the tiny Baltic nations were conquered.

Now, 30 years later, we still mourn for the Baltic people, but we also continue to speak out for their freedom from Russian suppression. I would like to take this opportunity to assure my friends of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian descent that I will continue to direct my efforts toward the restoration of their homeland.

VIRGINIA LT. GOV. J. SARGEANT REYNOLDS

HON. DAVID E. SATTERFIELD III

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. SATTERFIELD. Mr. Speaker, Virginia is saddened today by the loss of one of her young sons who has played such a large part in her government, business and civic life. Our distinguished Lieutenant Governor, J. Sargeant Reynolds, was taken away yesterday at the youthful age of 34 after a courageous fight against an inoperative brain tumor. In August of 1970 Sargeant Reynolds learned for the first time of his tragic condition. With an indomitable determination to master this ailment he submitted himself for intensive treatment to overcome what many thought had already brought an end to his service to Virginia.

In the face of almost insurmountable odds, and serious doubt as to his ability to return to an active career, Sarge Reynolds did come back. He made a pledge to be in Richmond for the opening of the Virginia General Assembly in January of 1971. He kept that promise. As presiding officer of Virginia's Senate, he was there, gavel in hand, effectively leading that legislative body.

Not only did he guide the Senate through its deliberations but he further continued his schedule of public appearances and speeches throughout the Commonwealth of Virginia.

Now, on the eve of greater heights of service, Sarge Reynolds has put aside his gavel. Knowing of his determination and stamina I am sure he fought hard to the last against this most final adjournment.

Virginia has indeed lost a promising son and we are sorrowed. His untimely passing, in the prime of life, while still on the threshold of his career, has deprived Virginians of a valuable public servant who gave unselfishly and energetically of his time and talents in their behalf. He will be missed.

Mr. Speaker, I insert the following editorial from the Monday, June 14, 1971, issue of the Richmond Times-Dispatch in the RECORD at this point:

J. SARGEANT REYNOLDS

Nothing seems more tragic than the death of a young man of promise. Julian Sargeant Reynolds was such a man, and his untimely passing at the age of 34 grieves all Virginians who recognized him as a talented leader dedicated to the proposition that the state's future is as rich as its past was glorious. Not even Mr. Reynolds' most determined political adversaries could challenge his devotion to Virginia.

Almost as soon as he entered politics in 1966, Mr. Reynolds became one of the brightest stars in Virginia's political galaxy. Astute, eloquent and captivating, he quickly revealed qualities of leadership that enabled him to eclipse older and more experienced men of influence in his Democratic party. Many men who soar to political prominence often alienate those they pass along the way; but Sarge Reynolds was a man of grace, and at the time of his death he was one of the most highly respected men in the Democratic party. Indeed, he was one of the few men who possessed enough stature and appeal to reunite his party, riven by the bitter battles of 1969. Had he lived and retained good health, Mr. Reynolds almost surely would have marched at the head of his party as it entered the gubernatorial campaign of 1973. And more than one political observer is convinced that this able young man, who rose from a seat in the House of Delegates to the post of lieutenant governor of Virginia in four years, would have been unbeatable.

Mr. Reynolds was, then, a young man of promise. But this is not to say that his past was empty, for his contributions in such important areas of concern as public education, mental health, local government finances, industrial development and constitutional reform were extensive and significant. Thus even as Virginians mourn Mr. Reynolds' death as a loss to their state, they can rejoice in the fact that Virginia surely gained from his tragically short life.

ADMINISTRATION WITHDRAWS ITS SUPPORT FOR A MID-DECADE CENSUS

HON. CHARLES H. WILSON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON. Mr. Speaker, on June 10 of this year the Subcommittee on Census and Statistics of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, which I have the honor to chair, held what we had hoped to be the last in a series of hearings on the establishment of a mid-decade census.

The members of our subcommittee were led to believe that the administration understood the importance of and the need for a mid-decade census. We were, therefore, shocked when Dr. George H. Brown, Director of the Bureau of the Census, representing the administration, testified that the administration "does not recommend a mid-decade census." The members of the subcommittee were deeply disappointed and very perplexed by the administration's refusal to endorse the mid-decade census. Quite frankly, Mr. Speaker, I cannot understand how the administration can oppose the mid-decade census when all levels of the Federal Government, along with State and local governments and including recognized national organiza-

tions representing statistical users of all types, have told us of their unqualified support for a mid-decade census.

Our census subcommittee has heard from hundreds of witnesses over a period of 2 and a half years without hearing one single witness oppose the mid-decade census. Recognizing that a mid-decade census could cost around \$140 million, it must be emphasized that our Nation distributes over \$10 billion in Federal funds using census data as a guide. There is no doubt in my mind that relying on old data from the decennial census later in the decade costs our Government considerably more than \$140 million. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I plan to contact every witness who has appeared before us—Governors, mayors, county supervisors, representatives of census user organizations, and members of the business community—asking them to contact the President advising him of their desperate need for a mid-decade census. Let me make it perfectly clear that if our Nation goes without a mid-decade census, it is the fault of the administration—not Congress. The President will have to accept the responsibility of robbing our Nation, especially our minority citizens and our other citizens in our newly developed suburban areas, of a tool which would develop data of great need while saving our citizens millions in tax dollars.

Hopefully, Mr. Speaker, our subcommittee can be instrumental in making the need for a mid-decade census known to the President. I refuse to believe that this administration with its plans to aid our cities would kill the only chance we have to develop the desperately needed data that a mid-decade census would provide.

In conclusion, I include in the RECORD an excellent article written by Jack Rosenthal of the New York Times clearly outlining the administration's change of position on the establishment of a mid-decade census:

ADMINISTRATION, IN SURPRISE, WITHDRAWS SUPPORT FOR ANY KIND OF SPECIAL CENSUS IN 1975

(By Jack Rosenthal)

WASHINGTON, June 10.—In a reversal of policy that astonished members of a House committee, the Nixon Administration withdrew its support today for any kind of special census in 1975.

The move was immediately characterized as incomprehensible by Representative Charles H. Wilson, California Democrat, chairman of the House Census subcommittee.

"It means the President is denying growing suburbs as well as central cities the needed information for planning and for Federal funds," Mr. Wilson said.

The Administration previously had endorsed a mid-decade census, as did an array of governors, mayors, scholars and commercial users of census data.

Their major reason is that about \$10-billion a year in Federal funds is allocated according to the most recent population figures. But these figures, now developed for the Census Bureau every 10 years, are increasingly obsolete, particularly for rapidly growing areas.

Speaking at the White House last Nov. 30 after a meeting with the President, Secretary of Commerce Maurice H. Stans said, "This Administration has already given its endorsement to a five-year census."

But today, the Census Bureau director, George H. Brown, told Representative Wil-

son's committee that "at this time the Administration does not recommend a mid-decade census."

The committee, which in two years of hearings has heard him and hundreds of other witnesses support the idea, was caught by surprise. Mr. Wilson said he would launch a broad campaign to appeal to the President for reversal.

The explanation for the abrupt turn around, it appeared was financial.

In an interview, Mr. Brown said that the change reflected a desire to explore the possibility of using school enrollment, Medicare, and other administrative statistics as an alternative to mid-decade census.

Speaking privately, however, an official of the White House Office of Management and Budget said that "budgetary reasons were the principal factor" in the policy change. It was decided, he said, not in the Census Bureau but "at a very high level."

In his testimony today, Mr. Brown said a 1975 census would cost from \$150-million to \$250-million, depending on the extent of coverage.

Representative Wilson, in an interview later, discounted the potential economy. "There is no doubt in my mind that relying on old data from the 1970 census later in the decade will cost our Government considerably more."

Further, he said, the cost would likely be spaced out over five years. "A saving of \$25 or \$30-million a year?" he asked with irony, referring to the \$10-billion a year that is allocated according to population.

Mr. Brown, a sandy-haired man with a calm, professional manner, was described by spectators as visibly nervous when he testified today. He read only that half of his prepared text that described alternate types of special census and stating the new Administration position.

The rest of the text, submitted for the record, contained a series of strong arguments for gathering the kinds of information that would result from a mid-decade census.

"The use of data based on benchmarks which are 6 to 10 years old creates the possibility of serious inequities," the statement said. Equitable distribution of Federal funds "requires current information on the population of small areas."

This need, the statement continued, will become even greater because the President's proposed special revenue-sharing programs would allocate billions of dollars in part on the basis of population.

Surveys can produce national and broad regional data, the statement said, but they cannot now give detailed information on minority groups or on smaller cities and towns.

Similarly, the statement continued, there are great difficulties in making good estimates for such places. "Here the margins of possible error are so great that neither the Census Bureau, nor any other organization, has been able to make estimates with the accuracy that is needed to permit their use for administrative purposes."

Later in answer to questions, Mr. Brown said that there was no inconsistency between this position and the Administration's latest stand.

COMPARISON OF H.R. 1 AND AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN

HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, the bill H.R. 1, as recently reported out of the

House Ways and Means Committee after months of intricate deliberation presents to many of us a most formidable document to scrutinize.

Unfortunately, some Members are going to vote for the bill simply because they know that the number of AFDC recipients soared from 7,501,000 in January 1970 to 9,773,000 in January 1971 and this bill has been reported to them as a way to get loafers off the rolls and working. Others will vote against the bill because they believe that the Federal benefit level of \$2,400 a year for a family of four represents a guaranteed annual income, a principle about which they have great forebodings. Still others are going to vote for or vote against the bill according to what it does for the treasuries in their respective States. What everyone seems to forget is the effect that this bill will have on the recipients themselves.

Most of the recipients—in fact 19,400,000 of the estimated 25,600,000 in 1973—will be persons in the family category covered by title IV of H.R. 1. Only 6,200,000 will be included under the aged, blind, and disabled category under this bill. It, therefore, seems most appropriate that title IV family category be closely compared with the system it purports to replace to see just how much of an improvement this legislation offers to the poor themselves.

The black caucus will shortly be reporting on their detailed analysis title IV of the bill. Until that time, I think it appropriate to commend to the attention of my colleagues an analysis of title IV by lawyers of the Columbia Center on Social Welfare. The analysis follows:

COMPARISON OF H.R. 1 AND AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN, TITLE IV OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE

AFDC

The purpose is "to help maintain and strengthen family life" and to assist parents in achieving self support to the maximum "consistent with the maintenance of continued parental care and protection . . ." § 401

The emphasis is on permitting parents to raise their children at home by eliminating economic hardships which might force them to seek alternatives.

H.R. 1

The purpose is to provide for needy families "the man-power services, training, employment, child care and related services which are necessary to prepare them for employment" in return for income maintenance. § 210

Little emphasis is placed on preserving family life.

ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE FOR

PROVIDING BENEFITS

AFDC

All eligible families are under the jurisdiction of a single state agency, which is subject to the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare, § 402(a)(3). In the Work Incentive Program (WIN), the counterpart of the H.R. 1 work requirement, developing jobs and training, and placement therein, is done by the Secretary of Labor, § 433. Eligibility, referral to WIN, and benefit payments remain under the state welfare agency and HEW.

H.R. 1

Families in which any member is deemed employable are under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor. Other families are under

the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Any change in circumstances affecting eligibility (e.g. child-birth, family break-up) requires a new determination of eligibility and benefit levels, and a possible shift from the jurisdiction of Labor to HEW and vice-versa. This could result in frequent loss or delay in receipt of payment and possible conflicting grant determinations. § 2102.

APPLICATION PROCEDURES

AFDC

Application by the declaration method—affidavit of the applicant with spot checks by administrators—is required on an experimental basis and has been used successfully by many states. Instances of incorrect administrative determination are found to exceed recipient error. 45 C.F.R. § 205.20(a)(2)

H.R. 1

Application procedures are left within Secretarial discretion. § 2171(e). The House Ways and Means Committee has stated, however, that "there will be no simple declaration process." The Committee instead wishes to institute extensive documentation and verification of eligibility.

ELIGIBLE FAMILIES

AFDC

A family is defined as a child of an absent, disabled, dead or unemployed parent in the care of a relative, regardless of whether or not the child is legally dependent on such relative and regardless of whether his residence is maintained by a family member as his or her own home. § 406(a) The family must have total countable resources of less than \$2,001 per person, 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3), and total countable income of less than the state standard of need. § 402(a)(7), (8), 45 C.F.R. § 233.20. (For purposes of initial eligibility only, in considering income, student earnings and the \$30 and a third work incentive, as described under item 7, *infra*, are not disregarded. As also noted in item 7, families may accumulate resources to meet "future identifiable needs" of a child; this would include purchase of life insurance on the caretaker relative payable to the child, educational trusts, etc. § 402(a)(8). Income of a stepparent is assumed to be available if stepparents in that state are generally obligated to support their stepchildren under state law. 45 C.F.R. § 203.1, § 233.20(a)(3)(iv).

Residency requirements are prohibited, *Shapiro v. Thompson*, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

Receipt of food stamps has no effect on eligibility for or the amount of benefits. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(4)(ii).

Persons "essential to the well being" of a recipient and living in the same home as a recipient may receive aid. 402(a)(7).

H.R. 1

An eligible family is defined as two or more related persons, at least one of whom is a child dependent on a family member, living in a residence maintained by a family member as his or their own home. The family must have total countable resources of less than \$1,501, and total countable family income of less than the federal benefit amount. (This includes income and resources of a stepparent, regardless of whether or not he is obligated to support his stepchildren under state law. See item 15). § 2155(d).

Persons returning to the U.S. after an absence of 30 days must meet a 30-day residence requirement. The requirement does not apply when absence is due to employment or military service. § 2155(a)(4)(B).

The family may not receive food stamps. § 502.

Self-employed families, e.g. farmers, may be excluded on the basis of "large" gross income, regardless of their net income. § 2152(f).

The head of household cannot be regularly attending college. (See item 12, *infra*.)

If a state supplements it may impose a residence requirement. (See item 13, *infra*.) and exclude ADC-U type families and the "working poor" § 2156(b)(2). (See item 5.)

A family must take all steps to qualify for any other benefits which it could receive. Failure of any member to do so results in the ineligibility of the entire family. § 2152(g).

There is no concept of "essential persons." The requirement of "own home raises a significant barrier to coverage of migrant workers, and may also preclude coverage of families living in the home of a non-related individual. The lowering of resource standards would severely limit eligibility as well as prevent any subsequent efforts by recipients to accumulate savings or provide for the future through life insurance (the cash-surrender value of life insurance is included as a resource). Without state supplementation, families in high cost of living states who are presently eligible but have countable income above the new federal level will be dropped from the rolls. The assumption of income of stepparents does not take into consideration the fact that a stepparent's income may be reduced by required support of his own children or spouses, not living in an eligible family unit. It also imposes a special support burden on the poor which is not applicable to the population as a whole.

AMOUNT OF BENEFITS AFDC

Federal: There is no federal level of benefits or maximum on payments. Benefits are matched by the federal government up to certain ceilings but in no event is matching less than 50% of total payment.

State: The state sets the standard of need based on the cost of items required for daily maintenance. Benefits may equal the difference between countable income and the standard, i.e., meet full need. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20. States may pay less than full need by imposing a maximum on payments or paying a percentage of the determined need. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2), (a)(6)(iii) States may also adjust standards to reflect cost of living increases; at least one such adjustment was required by § 402(a)(23).

Currently 29 states and the District of Columbia have payment levels which exceed \$2400 for a family of 4; payment levels and food stamps combined exceed \$2400 in 45 states and D.C. This accounts for 89.9% of the AFDC population.

H.R. 1

Federal: Payments would equal the income guarantee set out below, minus countable income: \$2400 for a family of 4 with a \$3,600 maximum for families of eight or more (Formula: \$800 for each of the first 2 persons, \$400 for each of the next 3 persons, \$300 for each of the 2 persons and \$200 for any and all additional persons) 2152.

State: State supplementation is optional. The federal government will hold the States harmless against any increases in cost above 1971 benefits level due to increases in the welfare population. However, the states will not be held harmless for any increases in costs which are due to an increase in benefit levels above the federal floor or the extension of eligibility to persons not covered under AFDC, e.g., the employed or unemployed poor. The allowable state level is measured by the actual grants to persons with no income, not by state needs levels. § 2156.

In the 45 states and the District of Columbia where current combined welfare-food stamp levels exceed federal benefits, lack of federal matching will result in pressure to forego supplementation entirely or, at least, reduce standards as a result of fiscal necessity and the negative effect of propaganda that the federal program meets the need. In 21 states, benefit losses could be \$100 or more a month for a family of four. In addition, those states which now do not pay full need

can be expected to continue not to do so, if they supplement at all. Those states which do supplement will not be able to make cost-of-living increases unless they are willing to pay the full cost thereof out of state funds.

States would also probably not supplement AFDC-U and/or the working poor as they could not receive any federal money (for AFDC-U they could receive federal money only if they previously had an AFDC-U program) therefore regardless of costs.

Thus H.R. 1 only perpetuates the present inequities in receipt of payments related to need.

PAYMENT AND DETERMINATION OF BENEFITS AFDC

Payments in all states are made at least monthly and must be paid to "all eligible individuals." § 402(a)(10). Regulations have interpreted this to mean that a family demonstrating present economic need must have its needs met, without reduction for past or future presumed income. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20.

H.R. 1

Benefits are to be paid at least quarterly. § 2151(d)(1). Income received during the previous 3 quarters, in excess of benefit levels, must be applied to reduce grants for the current quarter, regardless of whether a family received benefits during those quarters. Thus a family which suddenly loses its source of income, with no cash assets, may wait up to 9 months before receiving benefits, because it is presumed to have saved all prior income in excess of H.R. 1 grant levels § 2152(d)(2) and (3).

This provision demonstrates that H.R. 1 is a substantial departure from current law in that eligibility for assistance is no longer based on need.

INCOME DISREGARDED IN DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY

1. The following amounts of earned income are disregarded in the following:

A. All earnings of child/student, plus all earnings of a child under 14 regardless of whether he or she is a student. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(iii)

B. Irregular income is fully excluded from consideration by the available income rule. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(C)

C. WIN (the Work Incentive Program—see paragraph entitled "the work requirement" which appears later in this article.) training allowances and income from special work projects.

D. Thirty dollars a month plus 1/3 of the remainder of any other income (applied to gross income). 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(7).

E. From the amount remaining after D, deduct (i) child care costs as actually paid or based on a schedule presumably related to expenses incurred, 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(iv)(A), and (ii) work expenses, e.g. transportation, taxes, lunches.

F. States may also disregard a flat sum of \$5 per month and any income set aside to meet future identifiable needs of a child. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(4) and (a)(11)(iv).

G. Where income is from self-employment, a reasonable proportion may be disregarded to be used to increase capital assets and thereby increase production. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3).

2. The following amounts of unearned income are disregarded:

A. Irregular income is excluded as in 1.B. above.

B. Scholarships and fellowships are excluded 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(iv).

C. States may disregard any assistance received which is for a purpose or items different from the assistance grant. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(vii).

D. Home produce. § 233.20(a)(3)(iv).

E. Child support may be considered only to the extent it is regularly received. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(v).

F. Payments for the care of a foster-child.

G. Food Stamps. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(4)(ii).

H. The value of surplus commodities. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(4)(ii).

I. Relocation assistance. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(4)(ii).

H.R. 1

1. The following amounts of earned income are disregarded in the following order:

A. Earnings of a child/student up to a maximum to be set by the regulations.

B. Irregular income of less than \$31 a quarter.

C. Child care costs, as limited by a schedule to be established by the regulations.

D. The combined disregard for the above three items may not exceed \$2,000 for a family of 4; an additional \$200 is allowed for each individual family member up to a maximum of \$3,000.

E. Training allowances.

F. The remaining income at the rate of \$720 per year plus 1/2 of the remainder.

2. The following amounts of unearned income are disregarded:

A. Irregular income of less than \$61 per quarter, subject to the ceiling in 1. D. above.

B. The tuition part of scholarships and fellowships.

C. Public or private assistance benefits based on need, except veterans' pensions.

D. Home produce.

E. One third of child support and alimony.

F. Payments for the care of foster children.

It is unclear how states which supplement are to apply the disregards in determining payments to a family with income under the state level but in excess of the federal level, § 2156(b)(B).

The appearance of a higher disregard, i.e., \$60 a month plus 1/3 of the remainder, disguises a significantly lower disregard which results from the individual and combined effect of the application of the disregard to net rather than gross income, ceilings on costs now fully disregarded, and omission of any disregard for work expenses. For example, child care costs alone could well use up the \$2000 ceiling for a family of 4; all other income would then be counted subject only to the \$60 plus 1/3 disregard.

Consideration of irregular income, in addition to the financial effect, will impose an administrative problem which would probably result in suspensions "pending" determinations.

As noted in item 4, *supra*, loss of food stamp eligibility the value of which is now disregarded in determining need, substantially lessens the grant.

Families will have no opportunity to conserve any earnings for the future education of a child or for the special needs of a physically or mentally handicapped child.

SPECIAL NEEDS

AFDC

States may (and many do) provide grants for special needs, either for non-recurring needs such as a major household appliance or a winter coat, or for recurring needs, such as specially enriched diet. These are reimbursed by the federal government at the same rate as basic needs (approximately 50%). 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(v).

H.R. 1

There is no provision for meeting acute or unusual family needs. Loss of property due to fire or other disaster, special diets for diabetics or pregnant women, new clothing or school equipment for children must all be provided out of the family's basic grant.

EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE

AFDC

Emergency assistance is authorized in any amount, to avoid destitution and provide living arrangements for dependent children. It may be furnished for up to 30 days per

year. The federal government pays 50% of such assistance. § 406(3), 403(a)(5). This aid is not deducted from any future benefits.

H.R. 1

Emergency assistance is available only to families initially applying for benefits and who show an emergency which must be met before their application is fully processed. They must be presumptively eligible for assistance, and the amount of emergency aid is limited to \$100. This amount is deducted from future benefits. § 2171(a)(4).

BIENNIAL REAPPLICATION

AFDC

Termination of benefits is permitted only if the family is no longer needy (or because of the death, disappearance, or voluntary disappearance, or voluntary withdrawal from the program of a recipient). Benefits may in any event not be terminated without a prior hearing. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10.

H.R. 1

Termination of benefits is automatic after two years. Families must then reapply for aid and will be treated as new applicants. § 2152(e). This is expected to cause extensive hardship in the form of missed benefits, even in families where need is unquestioned.

THE WORK REQUIREMENT

AFDC

The Work Incentive Program contains no mandatory standards for referral. Regulations provide that only unemployed fathers and dependent children and essential persons over age 16 who are not in school, at work or in training and for whom there are no vocational plans under consideration for implementation within the next 3 months must be referred. 45 C.F.R. section 220.35(a)(iv). States specifically may not refer even those persons (or others) if they are (1) persons who are ill, incapacitated, or of advanced age, (2) persons living too far from any WIN project, (3) children who are full-time students or (4) persons who are required to care for another in their own homes (includes mothers without adequate child care, 45 C.F.R. 220.35(a)(2)(v)), Section 402(a)(19). These persons are deemed not "appropriate" for referral, and an individual has a right to a hearing to determine his or her "appropriateness." 45 C.F.R. section 220.35(a)(15).

Work may be refused because the offer was not bona fide or there is "good cause" to refuse. Several reasons which constitute "good cause" are as follows: 1. It takes too long to commute from home to work; 2. Adequate medical care for participation in the program has not been given; 3. The job does not pay enough (does not meet the wage rate requirements set by the Department of Labor); 4. The job is available because of a labor dispute; 5. The job is too difficult for the person; 6. Acceptance of the job would interrupt the person's own plans for permanent rehabilitation or re-employment at his or her regular work; 7. Acceptance of the assignment would be bad for the economic welfare of the family, or the family life of the individual. Department of Labor WIN Handbook section 412(E). An individual has a right to a hearing on whether the offer was bona fide or whether he or she has "good cause" to refuse work. 45 C.F.R. section 220.35(a)(16). If an individual refuses WIN participation payments are continued for 60 days, during which time he or she receives counseling or other services to encourage participation. Section 402(a)(19)(F).

Training, as well as work is encouraged.

H.R. 1

All persons must register for referral for jobs, training, public work programs or vocational rehabilitation, except 1) persons unable to work because of illness, incapacity or

age; 2) mothers of children under 3 (under 6 until July 1, 1974); 3) mothers or caretakers of children if an adult male in the family has registered; 4) children under 16 or under 22 and in school; or 5) persons required to care for an ill or incapacitated member of their household. There is a right to a hearing on whether an individual is "appropriate" under these standards. § 2171(c).

Work may be refused because there is "good cause" to refuse, but "good cause" is not defined. Language in the original bill which defined suitable employment with reference to an individual's health, travel distance, etc. has been taken out. The only reasons specifically listed for which an individual may refuse work are 1) the position is vacant due to a labor dispute, 2) the wages and other conditions are less than applicable federal, state or local minimums or are less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality, or are less than \$1.20 an hour, three-fourths of the federal minimum wage, 3) as a condition of employment the individual must join a company union or refrain from joining a labor organization, or 4) the individual has the demonstrated capacity of securing capacity of securing better work. 2111. There is a right to a hearing on whether there is "good cause" to refuse work. § 2171(c).

Whereas in the WIN program a person is eligible for benefits and only thereafter referred to employment or training, under H.R. 1 an individual must register for referral before benefits will be paid. In addition, persons "appropriate" for work now include all mothers of children over 3 years of age. A person may be forced to work for as little as \$1.20 an hour, and there is no definition in the bill of what constitutes "good cause" to refuse a job.

A. CHILD CARE

AFDC

Under the WIN guidelines a parent is to be consulted in any decision as to use of child care facilities. 44.3 Work may be refused because adequate child care is not available. 45 C.F.R. § 220.35(a)(2)(v). Child care is a fully disregarded work expense (See item 7, *supra*).

H.R. 1

The Secretary of Labor is to provide child care to persons participating in the work program. However a family may not choose for itself the type of care it feels is adequate, and lack of acceptable child care is not a basis for refusal of employment or training. There are no legislative standards for the quality of child care, and recipients may have to pay for part of the cost of child care. § 2112. There is a maximum on the amount of child care costs which may be disregarded (see item 7, *supra*).

B. PRIORITIES FOR REFERRAL TO JOBS OR

TRAINING

AFDC

Under the WIN program states must refer to available jobs and training in the following order: 1) unemployed fathers participating in particular training programs, 2) other unemployed fathers, 3) mothers and other caretaker relatives who volunteer and are participating or have participated in particular training programs, 4) dependent children and essential persons who are over 16 and not in school, at work, or in training, and for whom there are no educational plans under consideration for implementation within the next three months, 5) mothers and others who volunteer but are not participating in a training program and have no pre-school children, 6) any others determined by the state to be appropriate. 45 C.F.R. § 220.35(a)(3).

H.R. 1

The Secretary of Labor is given discretion to establish priorities for referral. § 2114(a)

First priority is to be given to mothers and pregnant women under 19 years of age. Further priorities are to be set by the Secretary of Labor. § 2114(a). The emphasis is clearly not on maximum use of resources to increase employability, but on forced work for those who may be most unable and unwilling to enter the labor market.

C. COMPULSORY VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION

AFDC

There is no compulsory referral to vocational rehabilitation services.

H.R. 1

Persons not required to register because of incapacity must accept referral to vocational rehabilitation services or lose their benefits. A quarterly review must be conducted on the individual's incapacity. §§ 2117, 2132.

EXCLUSION OF COLLEGE STUDENTS

AFDC

There is no exclusion of students. Welfare mothers regularly attend college under the WIN program in order to ultimately achieve maximum self-support.

H.R. 1

Benefits are denied to any family, the head of which is a regular student at a college or university even though he or she is also employed or in the labor market and studies at a free public institution. § 2155(a)(4)(A). This section severely inhibits upward mobility.

DURATIONAL RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT

AFDC

Durational residence requirements for the receipt of welfare benefits have twice been outlawed by the United States Supreme Court. *Shapiro v. Thompson*, 395 U.S. 618 (1969); *Gaddis v. Wyman*, 304 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. N.Y. 1969), *aff'd per curiam sub nom Wyman v. Bowens*, 397 U.S. 49 (1970).

H.R. 1

Any individual who has been out of the United States for thirty days, other than because of employment or military service, is subject to a thirty day residence requirement. § 2155(a)(4)(B). In addition, the federal government, in administering any supplemental benefits on behalf of a state, would be required to recognize a residency requirement if the state decided to impose one. § 2156(c).

OBLIGATION OF DESERTING PARENTS

AFDC

The states are required to attempt to secure support from deserting parents. However, the states may secure such support only through law enforcement officials and not through threatening the family with a loss of benefits if they do not cooperate in locating and securing support from the absent parent. § 402(a)(11)(21), and (22); 45 C.F.R. § 235.70 (Feb. 27, 1971).

H.R. 1

When a person is alleged to have abandoned his spouse or child, he is made liable to the federal government for any welfare benefits made to such spouse or child. This obligation may be satisfied out of any amounts owed to such person by any U.S. agency, such as Social Security benefits. No judicial determination of the debt or the underlying support obligation is necessary. § 2175. Parents traveling inter-state to avoid child support are additionally subject to a \$1000 fine, a year in prison, or both. § 2176.

STEPARENT OBLIGATION

AFDC

No state may require stepparents to support their stepchildren by applying their income to the family, unless state law requires all stepparents to support their stepchildren. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a).

H.R. 1

Stepchildren will be presumed to contribute all their income to their spouse's family. This imposes a liability for the support of stepchildren who are receiving welfare and discourages family stability by imposing this burden on a person who marries a FAP recipient. § 2155(d).

PENALTIES FOR FAILURE TO REPORT INFORMATION
AFDC

States may require reporting of changes in income, but no automatic penalty is imposed for failure to report. Recovery is permitted when current assets exceed needs (see below), but only after a fair hearing.

H.R. 1

Families must report all income and expenses for a quarter within 30 days of its close, or automatically lose their benefits. They must also report any change in circumstances which might affect their benefits, as these changes occur.

Failure to so report or a delay in reporting subjects them to a penalty of \$25 for the first failure, \$50 for the second, and \$100 thereafter, even when failure to report resulted in fewer benefits being paid to the family. § 2171(e).

RECOVERY OF OVERPAYMENTS
AFDC

No recovery is required. States may recover, but current assistance payments may be reduced because of prior overpayments only if the recipient, has income or resources currently available in the amount by which the agency proposes to reduce payments. *Cooper v. Laupheimer*, 316 F.Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1970).

H.R. 1

Overpayments, whatever their source, may be recovered out of future grants, so long as members of a family who were without fault are not penalized, and recovery will not defeat the purpose of the act, be against equity, or against good conscience, or be inefficient. § 2171(b).

HEARINGS
AFDC

Hearings must be held prior to termination or reduction of benefits. Procedures must comport with due process, including adequate notice and the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses and present argument in rebuttal. The decision must rest on evidence presented at the hearing. *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) 45 C.F.R. § 205.10. In the event of an adverse decision, benefits paid pending a prior hearing are not recovered.

Judicial review is permitted in federal courts if the amount in controversy exceeds \$10,000 or a constitutional issue is presented. Review of any issue is also permitted in most state courts, where findings of fact can be challenged as arbitrary or as not supported by substantial evidence.

H.R. 1

A family may challenge any determination against it at a hearing but the bill does not require that they continue to get benefits pending a decision. § 2171(c). The Ways and Means Committee Report states that if payments during the hearing process were continued, they would be considered overpayments if the Secretary's initial determination were sustained.

Although the bill does not specify standards for conducting hearings according to due process, the Committee Report indicates that hearings are to be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.

Judicial review of the hearing decision is permitted in federal court, but there is no

review of any factual determination. § 2171(c).

The absence of a provision clearly guaranteeing the right to a prior hearing is in violation of the Supreme Court's decision in *Goldberg v. Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) in addition to being a substantial departure from the protections contained in the current A.F.D.C. regulation 45 C.F.R. § 205.10. This is not cured by the Committee's reference to the standards contained in the APA, as the APA does not provide for prior hearings.

The limitation of judicial review is also a change in current law.

REPRESENTATION OF CLAIMANTS
AFDC

Recipients are guaranteed their right to a completely free choice of representative, including a friend or relative. This representative may assist the recipient in all contacts with the agency. 45 C.F.R. § 206.10. Recipients are, in fact, often ably represented by laymen or friends, without fee.

H.R. 1

Rules governing who may represent recipients before administrative officials are left to the discretion of the Secretary. He may require that representatives be of "good character and in good repute" and able to render "valuable service." Those who fail to follow the Secretary's rules will be disqualified from further practice before him. § 2171(d).

ADVISORY COMMITTEES
AFDC

AFDC advisory committees must be established in all states to advise on policy development and program administration. These committees must include representatives of other state agencies concerned with services, representatives of professional and civil organizations, private citizens with experience in service programs, and recipients of assistance or services who shall constitute at least one-third of the membership. 45 C.F.R. § 220.4

H.R. 1

Advisory committees would be established composed of representatives of labor, business and the general public, to evaluate the OFF and FAP programs. § 2178(a)

This provision does not permit input by recipients—those most affected by the programs and their administration. Rather it assumes that groups at best only tangentially concerned with public assistance have the greatest right to influence the way in which it is administered.

COST ESTIMATES (WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE FIGURES)
AFDC
(In billions)

1973:		
Federal	-----	3.9
State	-----	3.3
Food stamps	-----	2.3
Total	-----	9.5
Number of families, 3.1 million.		
Amount per family, \$3,065.		
Number of families, 12.1 million.		
Amount per person, \$785.		

H.R. 1

(In billions)

1973:		
Federal	-----	5.5
"Hold harmless"	-----	1.0
State	-----	3.1
Total	-----	10.3
Number of families, 4.0 million.		
Amount per family, \$2,575.		
Number of families, 19.4 million.		
Amount per family, \$531.		

NEW YORK TIMES VIETNAM DOCUMENTS

HON. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, the New York Times this week is making public key documents from a previously secret Department of Defense study of American participation in the Vietnam war. This vast study, commissioned by former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, lays bare many of intimate details of how and why the United States became so deeply involved in Indochina.

There are many lessons to be learned from a careful examination of these documents, not the least of which is the harmfulness of congressional passivity. Never again should Congress sit back in blissful ignorance and permit the executive branch to involve this country in foreign adventures in the name of secretly acquired commitments. I will be offering an amendment to the military procurement bill this week that will assist in the reassertion of congressional control over and interest in U.S. foreign policy and commitments.

At this point in the RECORD I would like to include the New York Times documents and several accompanying articles:

McNAMARA REPORT TO JOHNSON ON THE SITUATION IN SAIGON IN '63

(Memorandum, "Vietnam Situation," from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 21, 1963.)

In accordance with your request this morning, this is a summary of my conclusions after my visit to Vietnam on December 19-20.

1. Summary. The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist controlled state.

2. The new government is the greatest source of concern. It is indecisive and drifting. Although Minh states that he, rather than the Committee of Generals, is making decisions, it is not clear that this is actually so. In any event, neither he nor the Committee are experienced in political administration and so far they show little talent for it. There is no clear concept of how to reshape or conduct the strategic hamlet program; the Province Chiefs, most of whom are new and inexperienced, are receiving little or no direction because the generals are so preoccupied with essentially political affairs. A specific example of the present situation is that General [name illegible] is spending little or no time commanding II Corps, which is in the vital zone around Saigon and needs full-time direction. I made these points as strongly as possible to Minh, Don, Kim, and Tho.

3. The Country Team is the second major weakness. It lacks leadership, has been poorly informed, and is not working to a common plan. A recent example of confusion has been conflicting USOM and military recommendations both to the Government of Vietnam and to Washington on the size of the military budget. Above all, Lodge has virtually no official contact with Harkins. Lodge sends in reports with major military implications without showing them to Har-

kins, and does not show Harkins important incoming traffic. My impression is that Lodge simply does not know how to conduct a coordinated administration. This has of course been stressed to him both by Dean Rusk and myself (and also by John McCone), and I do not think he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has just operated as a loner all his life and cannot readily change now.

Lodge's newly-designated deputy, David Nes, was with us and seems a highly competent team player. I have stated the situation frankly to him and he has said he would do all he could to constitute what would in effect be an executive committee operating below the level of the Ambassador.

As to the grave reporting weakness, both Defense and CIA must take major steps to improve this. John McCone and I have discussed it and are acting vigorously in our respective spheres.

4. Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting. The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon. The Strategic Hamlet Program was seriously over-extended in those provinces, and the Viet Cong has been able to destroy many hamlets, while others have been abandoned or in some cases betrayed or pillaged by the government's own Self Defense Corps. In these key provinces, the Viet Cong have destroyed almost all major roads, and are collecting taxes at will.

As remedial measures, we must get the government to re-allocate its military forces so that its effective strength in these provinces is essentially doubled. We also need to have major increases in both military and USOM staffs, to sizes that will give us a reliable, independent U.S. appraisal of the status of operations. Thirdly, realistic pacification plans must be prepared, allocating adequate time to secure the remaining government-controlled areas and work out from there.

This gloomy picture prevails predominantly in the provinces around the capital and in the Delta. Action to accomplish each of these objectives was started while we were in Saigon. The situation in the northern and central areas is considerably better, and does not seem to have deteriorated substantially in recent months. General Harkins still hopes these areas may be made reasonably secure by the latter half of next year.

In the gloomy southern picture, an exception to the trend of Viet Cong success may be provided by the possible adherence to the government of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, which total three million people and control key areas along the Cambodian border. The Hoa Hao have already made some sort of agreement, and the Cao Dai are expected to do so at the end of this month. However, it is not clear that their influence will be more than neutralized by these agreements, or that they will in fact really pitch in on the government's side.

5. Infiltration of men and equipment from North Vietnam continues using (a) land corridors through Laos and Cambodia; (b) the Mekong River waterways from Cambodia; (c) some possible entry from the sea and the tip of the Delta. The best guess is that 1000-1500 Viet Cong cadres entered South Vietnam from Laos in the first nine months of 1963. The Mekong route (and also the possible sea entry) is apparently used for heavier weapons and ammunition and raw materials which have been turning up in increasing numbers in the south and of which we have captured a few shipments.

To counter this infiltration, we reviewed in Saigon various plans providing for cross-

border operations into Laos. On the scale proposed, I am quite clear that these would not be politically acceptable or even militarily effective. Our first need would be immediate U-2 mapping of the whole Laos and Cambodian border, and this we are preparing on an urgent basis.

One other step we can take is to expand the existing limited but remarkably effective operations on the Laos side, the so-called Operation HARDNOSE, so that it at least provides reasonable intelligence on movements all the way along the Laos corridor; plans to expand this will be prepared and presented for approval in about two weeks.

As to the waterways, the military plans presented in Saigon were unsatisfactory, and a special naval team is being sent at once from Honolulu to determine what more can be done. The whole waterway system is so vast, however, that effective policing may be impossible.

In general, the infiltration problem, while serious and annoying, is a lower priority than the key problems discussed earlier. However, we should do what we can to reduce it.

6. Plans for Covert Action into North Vietnam were prepared as we had requested and were an excellent job. They present a wide variety of sabotage and psychological operations against North Vietnam from which I believe we should aim to select those that provide maximum pressure with minimum risk. In accordance with your direction at the meetings, General Krulak of the JCS is chairing a group that will lay out a program in the next ten days for your consideration.

7. Possible neutralization of Vietnam is strongly opposed by Minh, and our attitude is somewhat suspect because of editorials by the New York Times and mention by Walter Lippmann and others. We reassured them as strongly as possible on this—and in somewhat more general terms on the neutralization of Cambodia. I recommend that you convey to Minh a Presidential message for the New Year that would also be a vehicle to stress the necessity of strong central direction by the government and specifically by Minh himself.

8. U.S. resources and personnel cannot usefully be substantially increased. I have directed a modest artillery supplement, and also the provision of uniforms for the Self Defense Corps, which is the most exposed force and suffers from low morale. Of greater potential significance, I have directed the Military Departments to review urgently the quality of the people we are sending to Vietnam. It seems to have fallen off considerably from the high standards applied in the original selections in 1962, and the JCS fully agree with me that we must have our best men there.

Conclusion. My appraisal may be overly pessimistic. Lodge, Harkins, and Minh would probably agree with me on specific points, but feel that January should see significant improvement. We should watch the situation very carefully running scared, hoping for the best, but preparing for more forceful moves if the situation does not show early signs of improvement.

1964 MEMO BY JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DISCUSSING WIDENING OF THE WAR

(Memorandum from Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense McNamara, Jan. 22, 1964, "Vietnam and Southeast Asia")

1. National Security Action Memorandum No. 273 makes clear the resolve of the President to ensure victory over the externally directed and supported communist insurgency in South Vietnam. In order to achieve that victory, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the United States must be prepared to put aside many of the self-imposed restrictions which now limit our efforts, and to undertake bolder actions which may embody greater risks.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are increasingly mindful that our fortunes in South Vietnam are an accurate barometer of our fortunes in all of Southeast Asia. It is our view that if the US program succeeds in South Vietnam it will go far toward stabilizing the total Southeast Asia situation. Conversely, a loss of South Vietnam to the communists will presage an early erosion of the remainder of our position in that subcontinent.

3. Laos, existing on a most fragile foundation now, would not be able to endure the establishment of a communist—or pseudo neutralist—state on its eastern flank. Thailand, less strong today than a month ago by virtue of the loss of Prime Minister Sarit, would probably be unable to withstand the pressures of infiltration from the north should Laos collapse to the communists in its turn. Cambodia apparently has estimated that our prospects in South Vietnam are not promising and, encouraged by the actions of the French, appears already to be seeking an accommodation with the communists. Should we actually suffer defeat in South Vietnam, there is little reason to believe that Cambodia would maintain even a pretense of neutrality.

4. In a broader sense, the failure of our programs in South Vietnam would have heavy influence on the judgments of Burma, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of the Philippines with respect to US durability, resolution, and trustworthiness. Finally, this being the first real test of our determination to defeat the communist wars of national liberation formula, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there would be a corresponding unfavorable effect upon our image in Africa and in Latin America.

5. All of this underscores the pivotal position now occupied by South Vietnam in our world-wide confrontation with the communists and the essentiality that the conflict there would be brought to a favorable end as soon as possible. However, it would be unrealistic to believe that a complete suppression of the insurgency can take place in one or even two years. The British effort in Malaya is a recent example of a counter-insurgency effort which required approximately ten years before the bulk of the rural population was brought completely under control of the government, the police were able to maintain order, and the armed forces were able to eliminate the guerrilla strongholds.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that, in keeping with the guidance in NSAM 273, the United States must make plain to the enemy our determination to see the Vietnam campaign through to a favorable conclusion. To do this, we must prepare for whatever level of activity may be required and, being prepared, must then proceed to take actions as necessary to achieve our purposes surely and promptly.

7. Our considerations, furthermore, cannot be confined entirely to South Vietnam. Our experience in the war thus far leads us to conclude that, in this respect, we are not now giving sufficient attention to the broader area problems of Southeast Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that our position in Cambodia, our attitude toward Laos, our actions in Thailand, and our great effort in South Vietnam do not comprise a compatible and integrated U.S. policy for Southeast Asia. U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia cannot be achieved by either economic, political, or military measures alone. All three fields must be integrated into a single, broad U.S. program for Southeast Asia. The measures recommended in this memorandum are a partial contribution to such a program.

8. Currently we and the South Vietnamese are fighting the war on the enemy's terms. He has determined the locale, the timing, and the tactics of the battle while our actions are essentially reactive. One reason for this is the fact that we have obliged ourselves to

labor under self-imposed restrictions with respect to impeding external aid to the Viet Cong. These restrictions include keeping the war within the boundaries of South Vietnam, avoiding the direct use of U.S. combat forces, and limiting U.S. direction of the campaign to rendering advice to the Government of Vietnam. These restrictions, while they may make our international position more readily defensible, all tend to make the task in Vietnam more complex, time-consuming, and in the end, more costly. In addition to complicating our own problem, these self-imposed restrictions may well now be conveying signals of irresolution to our enemies—encouraging them to higher levels of vigor and greater risks. A reversal of attitude and the adoption of a more aggressive program would enhance greatly our ability to control the degree to which escalation will occur. It appears probable that the economic and agricultural disappointments suffered by Communist China, plus the current rift with the Soviets, could cause the communists to think twice about undertaking a large-scale military adventure in Southeast Asia.

9. In adverting to actions outside of South Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that the focus of the counterinsurgency battle lies in South Vietnam itself, and that the war must certainly be fought and won primarily in the minds of the Vietnamese people. At the same time, the aid now coming to the Viet Cong from outside the country in men, resources, advice, and direction is sufficiently great in the aggregate to be significant—both as help and as encouragement to the Viet Cong. It is our conviction that if support of the insurgency from outside South Vietnam in terms of operational direction, personnel, and material were stopped completely, the character of the war in South Vietnam would be substantially and favorably altered. Because of this conviction, we are wholly in favor of executing the covert actions against North Vietnam which you have recently proposed to the President. We believe, however, that it would be idle to conclude that these efforts will have a decisive effect on the communist determination to support the insurgency; and it is our view that we must therefore be prepared fully to undertake a much higher level of activity, not only for its beneficial tactical effect, but to make plain our resolution, both to our friends and to our enemies.

10. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States must make ready to conduct increasingly bolder actions in Southeast Asia; specifically as to Vietnam to:

- a. Assign to the US military commander responsibilities for the total US program in Vietnam.
- b. Induce the Government of Vietnam to turn over to the United States military commander, temporarily, the actual tactical direction of the war.
- c. Charge the United States military commander with complete responsibility for conduct of the program against North Vietnam.
- d. Overfly Laos and Cambodia to whatever extent is necessary for acquisition of operational intelligence.
- e. Induce the Government of Vietnam to conduct overt ground operations in Laos of sufficient scope to impede the flow of personnel and material southward.
- f. Arm, equip, advise, and support the Government of Vietnam in its conduct of aerial bombing of critical targets in North Vietnam and in mining the sea approaches to that country.
- g. Advise and support the Government of Vietnam in its conduct of large-scale commando raids against critical targets in North Vietnam.
- h. Conduct aerial bombing of key North

Vietnam targets, using US resources under Vietnamese cover, and with the Vietnamese openly assuming responsibility for the actions.

i. Commit additional US forces, as necessary, in support of the combat action within South Vietnam.

j. Commit US forces as necessary in direct actions against North Vietnam.

II. It is our conviction that any or all of the foregoing actions may be required to enhance our position in Southeast Asia. The past few months have disclosed that considerably higher levels of effort are demanded of us if US objectives are to be attained.

12. The governmental reorganization which followed the coup d'etat in Saigon should be completed very soon, giving basis for concluding just how strong the Vietnamese Government is going to be and how much of the load they will be able to bear themselves. Additionally, the five-month dry season, which is just now beginning, will afford the Vietnamese an opportunity to exhibit their ability to reverse the unfavorable situation in the critical Mekong Delta. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will follow these important developments closely and will recommend to you progressively the execution of such of the above actions as are considered militarily required, providing, in each case, their detailed assessment of the risks involved.

13. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the strategic importance of Vietnam and of Southeast Asia warrants preparations for the actions above and recommend that the substance of this memorandum be discussed with the Secretary of State.

1964 McNAMARA REPORT ON STEPS TO CHANGE THE TREND OF THE WAR

(Excerpts from memorandum, "South Vietnam," from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, March 16, 1964.)

I. U.S. OBJECTIVES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. We do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western Alliance. Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security. This assistance should be able to take the form not only of economic and social pressures but also police and military help to root out and control insurgent elements.

Unless we can achieve this objective in South Vietnam, almost all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist dominance (all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), accommodate to Communism so as to remove effective U.S. and anti-Communist influence (Burma), or fall under the domination of forces not now explicitly Communist but likely then to become so (Indochina taking over Malaysia). Thailand might hold for a period with our help, but would be under grave pressure. Even the Philippines would become shaky, and the threat to India to the west, Australia and New Zealand to the south, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north and east would be greatly increased.

All these consequences would probably have been true even if the U.S. had not since 1954, and especially since 1961, become so heavily engaged in South Vietnam. However, that fact accentuates the impact of a Communist South Vietnam not only in Asia, but in the rest of the world, where the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case of U.S. capacity to help a nation meet a Communist "war of liberation."

Thus, purely in terms of foreign policy, the stakes are high. They are increased by domestic factors.

II. PRESENT U.S. POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

We are now trying to help South Vietnam defeat the Viet Cong, supported from the North, by means short of the unqualified use of U.S. combat forces. We are not acting

against North Vietnam except by a very modest "covert" program operated by South Vietnamese (and a few Chinese Nationalists)—a program so limited that it is unlikely to have any significant effect. In Laos, we are still working largely within the framework of the 1962 Geneva Accords. In Cambodia we are still seeking to keep Sihanouk from abandoning whatever neutrality he may still have and fulfilling his threat of reaching an accommodation with Hanoi and Peking. As a consequence of these policies, we and the GVN have had to condone the extensive use of Cambodian and Laotian territory by the Viet Cong, both as a sanctuary and as infiltration routes.

III. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The key elements in the present situation are as follows:

A. The military tools and concepts of the GVN-US efforts are generally sound and adequate.¹ Substantially more can be done in the effective employment of military forces and in the economic and civic action areas. These improvements may require some selective increases in the U.S. presence, but it does not appear likely the major equipment replacement and additions in U.S. personnel are indicated under current policy.

B. The U.S. policy of reducing existing personnel where South Vietnamese are in a position to assume the functions is still sound. Its application will not lead to any major reductions in the near future, but adherence to this policy as such has a sound effect in portraying to the U.S. and the world that we continue to regard the war as a conflict the South Vietnamese must win and take ultimate responsibility for. Substantial reductions in the numbers of U.S. military training personnel should be possible before the end of 1965. However, the U.S. should continue to reiterate that it will provide all the assistance and advice required to do the job regardless of how long it takes.

C. The situation has unquestionably been growing worse, at least since September:

1. In terms of government control of the countryside, about 40% of the territory is under Viet Cong control or predominant influence. In 22 of the 43 provinces, the Viet Cong control 50% or more of the land area, including 80% of Phuoc Tuy; 90% of Binh Duong; 75% of Hau Nghia; 90% of Long An; 90% of Kien Tuong; 90% of Dinh Tuong; 90% of Kien-Hoa and 85% of An Xuyen.

2. Large groups of the population are now showing signs of apathy and indifference, and there are some signs of frustration within the U.S. contingent. . . .

a. The ARVN and paramilitary desertion rates, and particularly the latter, are high and increasing.

b. Draft-dodging is high while the Viet Cong are recruiting energetically and effectively.

c. The morale of the hamlet militia and of the Self Defense Corps, on which the security of the hamlets depends, is poor and falling.

3. In the last 90 days the weakening of the government's position has been particularly noticeable. . . .

4. The political control structure extending from Saigon down into the hamlets disappeared following the November coup. . . .

5. North Vietnamese support, always significant, has been increasing. . . .

D. The greatest weakness in the present situation is the uncertainty of the viability of the Khanh government. Khanh himself is a very able man within his experience, but he does

¹ Mr. McCone emphasizes that the GVN/US program can never be considered completely satisfactory so long as it permits the Viet Cong a sanctuary in Cambodia and a continuing uninterrupted and unmolested source of supply and reinforcement from NVN through Laos.

not yet have wide political appeal and his control of the army itself is uncertain . . .

E. On the positive side, we have found many reasons for encouragement in the performance of the Khanh Government to date. Although its top layer is thin, it is highly responsive to U.S. advice, and with a good grasp of the basic elements of rooting out the Viet Cong. . . .

2. Retaliatory Actions. For example:

a. Overt high and/or low-level reconnaissance flights by U.S. or Farmgate aircraft over North Vietnam to assist in locating and identifying the sources of external aid to the Viet Cong.

b. Retaliatory bombing strikes and commando raids on a tit-for-tat basis by the GVN against NVN targets (communication centers, training camps, infiltration routes, etc.)

c. Aerial mining by the GVN aircraft (possibly with U.S. assistance) of the major NVN ports.

3. Graduated Overt Military Pressure by GVN and U.S. Forces.

This program would go beyond reacting on a tit-for-tat basis. It would include air attacks against military and possibly industrial targets. The program would utilize the combined resources of the GVN Air Force and the U.S. Farmgate Squadron, with the latter reinforced by three squadrons of B-57s presently in Japan. Before this program could be implemented it would be necessary to provide some additional air defense for South Vietnam and to ready U.S. forces in the Pacific for possible escalation.

The analysis of the more serious of these military actions (from 2 (b) upward) revealed the extremely delicate nature of such operations, both from the military and political standpoints. There would be the problem of marshalling the case to justify such action, the problem of communist escalation, and the problem of dealing with the pressures for premature or "stacked" negotiations. We would have to calculate the effect of such military actions against a specified political objective. That objective, while being cast in terms of eliminating North Vietnamese control and direction of the insurgency, would in practical terms be directed toward collapsing the morale and the self-assurance of the Viet Cong cadres now operating in South Vietnam and bolstering the morale of the Khanh regime. We could not, of course, be sure that our objective could be achieved by any means within the practical range of our options. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, unless and until the Khanh government has established its position and preferably is making significant progress in the South, an overt extension of operations into the North carries the risk of being mounted from an extremely weak base which might at any moment collapse and leave the posture of political confrontation worsened rather than improved.

The other side of the argument is that the young Khanh Government [two words illegible] reinforcement of some significant sources against the North and without [words illegible] the in-country program, even with the expansion discussed in Section [words illegible] may not be sufficient to stem the tide.

[Words illegible] balance, except to the extent suggested in Section V below, I [words illegible] against initiation at this time of overt GVN and/or U.S. military [word illegible] against North Vietnam.

C. Initiate Measures to Improve the Situation in South Vietnam.

There were and are sound reasons for the limits imposed by present policy—the South Vietnamese must win their own fight; U.S. intervention on a larger scale, and/or GVN actions against the North, would disturb key allies and other nations; etc. In any case, it is vital that we continue to take every reason-

able measure to assure success in South Vietnam. The policy choice is not an "either/or" between this course of action and possible pressures against the North; the former is essential without regard to our decision with respect to the latter. The latter can, at best, only reinforce the former.

The following are the actions we believe can be taken in order to improve the situation both in the immediate future and over a longer-term period. To emphasize that a new phase has begun, the measures to be taken by the Khanh government should be described by some term such as "South Vietnam's Program for National Mobilization."

Basic U.S. posture

1. The U.S. at all levels must continue to make it emphatically clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.

2. The U.S. at all levels should continue to make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are totally opposed to any further coups. The Ambassador should instruct all elements, including the military advisors, to report intelligence information of possible coups promptly, with the decision to be made by the ambassador whether to report such information to Khanh. However, we must recognize that our chances would not be great of detecting and preventing a coup that had major military backing.

3. We should support fully the Pacification Plan now announced by Khanh (described in Annex B), and particularly the basic theory—now fully accepted both on the Vietnamese and U.S. sides—of concentrating on the more secure areas and working out from these through military operations to provide security, followed by necessary civil and economic actions to make the presence of the government felt and to provide economic improvements. . . .

V. POSSIBLE LATER ACTIONS

If the Khanh government takes hold vigorously—inspiring confidence, whether or not noteworthy progress has been made—or if we get hard information of significantly stepped-up VC arms supply from the North, we may wish to mount new and significant pressures against North Vietnam. We should start preparations for such a capability now. (See Annex C for an analysis of the situation in North Vietnam and Communist China.) Specifically, we should develop a capability to initiate within 72 hours the "Border Control" and "Retaliatory Actions" referred to on pages 5 and 6, and we should achieve a capability to initiate within 30 days' notice the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure." The reasoning behind this program of preparations for initiating action against North Vietnam is rooted in the fact that, even with progress in the pacification plan, the Vietnamese Government and the population in the South will still have to face the prospect of a very lengthy campaign based on a war-weary nation and operating against Viet Cong cadres who retain a great measure of motivation and assurance.

In this connection, General Khanh stated that his primary concern is to establish a firm base in the South. He favors continuation of covert activities against North Vietnam, but until such time as "rear-area security" has been established, he does not wish to engage in overt operations against the North.

In order to accelerate the realization of pacification and particularly in order to de-

* Authority should be granted immediately for covert Vietnamese operations into Laos, for the purposes of border control and of "hot pursuit" into Laos. Decision on "hot pursuit" into Cambodia should await further study of our relations with that country.

nigrate the morale of the Viet Cong forces, it may be necessary at some time in the future to put demonstrable retaliatory pressure on the North. Such a course of action might proceed according to the scenario outlined in Annex D. . . .

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

I recommend that you instruct the appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government:

1. To make it clear that we are prepared to furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.

2. To make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are opposed to further coups.

3. To support a Program for National Mobilization (including a national service law) to put South Vietnam on a war footing.

4. To assist the Vietnamese to increase the armed forces (regular plus paramilitary) by at least 50,000 men.

5. To assist the Vietnamese to create a greatly enlarged Civil Administrative Corps for work at province, district and hamlet levels.

6. To assist the Vietnamese to improve and reorganize the paramilitary forces and increase their compensation.

7. To assist the Vietnamese to create an offensive guerrilla force.

8. To provide the Vietnamese Air Force 25 A-1H aircraft in exchange for the present T-28s.

9. To provide the Vietnamese Army additional M-113 armored personnel carriers (withdrawing the M-114s there), additional river boats, and approximately \$5-10 million of other additional material.

10. To announce publicly the Fertilizer Program and to expand it with a view within two years to trebling the amount of fertilizer made available.

11. To authorize continued high-level U.S. overflights of South Vietnam's borders and to authorize "hot pursuit" and South Vietnamese ground operations over the Laotian line for the purpose of border control. More ambitious operations into Laos involving units beyond battalion size should be authorized only with the approval of Souvanna Phouma. Operations across the Cambodian border should depend on the state of relations with Cambodia.

12. To prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian "Border Control" actions (beyond those authorized in Paragraph 11 above) and the "Retaliatory Actions" against North Vietnam, and to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure" against North Vietnam.

GLOSSARY TERMS USED IN TEXT

ARVN—Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam.

BLACK RADIO—In psychological warfare broadcasts by one side that are disguised as broadcasts by the other.

BLUE SPRINGS—Apparently a covert operation not further identified in the study of the documents.

BOX TOP—Apparently a code name for a covert project not further identified in documents.

CANDY MACHINE—Code name for an allied operation in Vietnam not otherwise identified in the documents.

CAP—Combat air patrol.

CI—Counterinsurgency.

CHICOM—Chinese Communist.

CHINAT—Chinese Nationalist.

CINCPAC—Commander in Chief, Pacific. Position held by Adm. Harry D. Felt, 1958-64; Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp, 1964-68.

COMUSMACV—Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Position held by Gen. Paul D. Harkins. In 1964; Gen. William C. Westmoreland, 1964-68; Gen. Creighton W. Abrams since.

COUNTRY TEAM—Council of Senior United States officials in Vietnam, including Ambassador, commander of American forces, C.I.A. chief and others.

DEPTEL—State Department telegram.

DE SOTO PATROLS—United States destroyer patrols in Tonkin Gulf.

EMBTEL—United States Embassy telegram.

PARMGATE—Clandestine United States Air Force strike unit in Vietnam, 1964.

GVN—Government of (South) Vietnam.

HARDNOSE—Code name apparently for a covert project, not otherwise identified in the documents.

I.C.C.—International Control Commission, established under 1954 Geneva accords, comprising representatives of Poland, Canada and India.

JCSM—Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum.

LEAPING LENA—Code name for an allied operation not further identified in the documents.

LUCKY DRAGON—Code name, apparently for a covert allied operation in Vietnam, not otherwise identified.

MACV—Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

NSAM—National security action memorandum.

NVN—North Vietnam.

OPLAN—Operation Plan.

PDJ—Plaine des Jarres.

PIERCE ARROW—Code name for the U.S. reprisal bombing of North Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin incidents.

PL—Pathet Lao.

PL/VM—Pathet Lao/Vietminh.

POL—Petroleum, oil, lubricants.

PSYOPS—Psychological operations.

QUEEN BEE—Code name for an allied operation not otherwise identified in the documents.

RECCE—Reconnaissance.

RLAF—Royal Laotian Air Force.

RLG—Royal Laotian Government.

RTG—Royal Thai Government.

RVNAF—Republic of (South) Vietnam Air Force; also Republic of (South) Vietnam armed forces.

SAR—Search and rescue.

SEPTEL—Separate telegram.

SVN—South Vietnam.

34A—Operation plan, 1964, covering covert ground, air and sea raids against North Vietnam.

TRIANGLE—Code name for an operation in South Vietnam not otherwise identified in the documents.

USOM—United States Operations Mission, the American economic aid apparatus in Saigon.

VNAF—(South) Vietnam Air Force; (South) Vietnam armed forces.

WATER GLASS—Code name of an operation in Vietnam not otherwise identified in the documents.

WHITE RADIO—In psychological warfare, broadcasts that are openly attributed to the side transmitting them.

YANKEE TEAM—Phase of the Indochina bombing operation.

U.S. PREPARATION FOR RETALIATION AND REJECTION OF OTHER ACTIONS

(Excerpts from National Security Action Memorandum 288, "U.S. Objectives in South Vietnam," March 17, 1964, as provided in the body of the Pentagon study. The words in brackets are the study's. The paragraph in italics is the paraphrase by a writer of the study.)

[The United States' policy is] to prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian "Border Control actions" . . . and the "Retaliatory Actions" against North Vietnam, and to be in a position on

30 days' notice to initiate the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure" against North Vietnam. . . .

We seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam. We do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western Alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security. This assistance should be able to take the form not only of economic and social measures but also police and military help to root out and control insurgent elements.

Unless we can achieve this objective in South Vietnam, almost all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist dominance (all of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), accommodate to Communism so as to remove effective U.S. and anti-Communist influence (Burma), or fall under the domination of forces not now explicitly Communist but likely then to become so (Indonesia taking over Malaysia). Thailand might hold for a period without help, but would be under grave pressure. Even the Philippines would become shaky, and the threat to India on the West, Australia and New Zealand to the South, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the North and East would be greatly increased.

All of these consequences would probably have been true even if the U.S. had not since 1954, and especially since 1961, become so heavily engaged in South Vietnam. However, that fact accentuates the impact of a Communist South Vietnam not only in Asia but in the rest of the world, where the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case of U.S. capacity to help a nation to meet the Communist "war of liberation."

Thus, purely in terms of foreign policy, the stakes are high. . . .

We are now trying to help South Vietnam defeat the Viet Cong, supported from the North, by means short of the unqualified use of U.S. combat forces. We are not acting against North Vietnam except by a modest "covert" program operated by South Vietnamese (and a few Chinese Nationalists)—a program so limited that it is unlikely to have any significant effect. . . .

There were and are some sound reasons for the limits imposed by the present policy—the South Vietnamese must win their own fight; U.S. intervention on a larger scale, and/or GVN actions against the North, would disturb key allies and other nations; etc. In any case, it is vital that we continue to take every reasonable measure to assure success in South Vietnam. The policy choice is not an "either/or" between this course of action and possible pressure against the North; the former is essential and without regard to our decision with respect to the latter. The latter can, at best, only reinforce the former. . . .

Many of the actions described in the succeeding paragraphs fit right into the framework of the [pacification] plan as announced by Khanh. Wherever possible, we should tie our urgings of such actions to Khanh's own formulation of them, so that he will be carrying out a Vietnamese plan and not one imposed by the United States. . . .

Among the alternatives considered, but rejected for the time being . . . were overt military pressure on North Vietnam, neutralization, return of U.S. dependents, furnishing of a U.S. combat unit to secure the Saigon area and a full takeover of the command in South Vietnam by the U.S. With respect to this last proposal, it was said that

. . . the judgment of all senior people in Saigon, with which we concur, was that the possible military advantages of such action would be far outweighed by adverse psychological impact. It would cut across the whole basic picture of the Vietnamese winning their own war and lay us wide open to hostile propaganda both within South Vietnam and outside.

CABLE FROM PRESIDENT TO LODGE ON ESCALATION CONTINGENCIES

(Cablegram from President Johnson to Henry Cabot Lodge, United States Ambassador in Saigon, March 20, 1964.)

1. We have studied your 1776 and I am asking State to have Bill Bundy make sure that you get out latest planning documents on ways of applying pressure and power against the North. I understand that some of this was discussed with you by McNamara mission in Saigon, but as plans are refined it would be helpful to have your detailed comments. As we agreed in our previous messages to each other, judgment is reserved for the present on overt military action in view of the consensus from Saigon conversations of McNamara mission with General Khanh and you on judgment that movement against the North at the present would be premature. We have [sic] share General Khanh's judgment that the immediate and essential task is to strengthen the southern base. For this reason our planning for action against the North is on a contingency basis at present, and immediate problem in this area is to develop the strongest possible military and political base for possible later action. There is additional international reason for avoiding immediate overt action in that we expect a showdown between the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties soon and action against the North will be more practicable after than before a showdown. But if at any time you feel that more immediate action is urgent, I count on you to let me know specifically the reasons for such action, together with your recommendations for its size and shape.

2. On dealing with de Gaulle, I continue to think it may be valuable for you to go to Paris after Bohlen has made his first try. (State is sending you draft instruction to Bohlen, which I have not yet reviewed, for your comment.) It ought to be possible to explain in Saigon that your mission is precisely for the purpose of knocking down the idea of neutralization wherever it rears its ugly head and on this point I think that nothing is more important than to stop neutralist talk wherever we can by whatever means we can. I have made this point myself to Mansfield and Lippmann and I expect to use every public opportunity to restate our position firmly. You may want to convey our concern on this point to General Khanh and get his ideas on the best possible joint program to stop such talk in Saigon, in Washington, and in Paris. I imagine that you have kept General Khanh abreast of our efforts in Paris. After we see the results of the Bohlen approach you might wish to sound him out on Paris visit by you.

DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR CONGRESS ON ACTIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(Draft Resolution on Southeast Asia, May 25, 1964, as provided in the body of the Pentagon study. The major paragraphs of the resolution as approved by Congress appear in the article accompanying the texts today.)

Whereas the signatories of the Geneva Accords of 1954, including the Soviet Union, the Communist regime in China, and Viet Nam agreed to respect the independence and territorial integrity of South Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia; and the United States, although not a signatory of the Accords, declared that it would view any renewal of aggression in violation of the Accords with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security;

Whereas the Communist regime in North Viet Nam, with the aid and support of the Communist regime in China, has systematically flouted its obligations under these Ac-

cords and has engaged in aggression against the independence and territorial integrity of South Viet Nam by carrying out a systematic plan for the subversion of the Government of South Viet Nam, by furnishing direction, training, personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare within South Viet Nam, and by the ruthless use of terror against the peaceful population of that country;

Whereas in the face of this Communist aggression and subversion the Government and people of South Viet Nam have bravely undertaken the defense of their independence and territorial integrity, and at the request of that Government the United States has, in accordance with its Declaration of 1954, provided military advice, economic aid and military equipment;

Whereas in the Geneva Agreements of 1962 the United States, the Soviet Union, the Communist regime in China, North Viet Nam and others solemnly undertook to respect the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos;

Whereas in violation of these undertakings the Communist regime in North Viet Nam, with the aid and support of the Communist regime in China, has engaged in aggression against the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Laos by maintaining forces on Laotian territory, by the use of that territory for the infiltration of arms and equipment into South Viet Nam, and by providing direction, men and equipment for persistent armed attacks against the Government of (words illegible);

Whereas in the face of this Communist aggression the Government of National Unification and the non-Communist elements in Laos have striven to maintain the conditions of unity, independence and neutrality envisioned for their country in the Geneva Agreements of 1962;

Whereas the United States has no territorial, military or political ambitions in Southeast Asia, but desires only that the peoples of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia should be left in peace by their neighbors to work out their own destinies in their own way, and, therefore, its objective is that the status established for these countries in the Geneva Accords of 1954 and the Geneva Agreements of 1962 should be restored with effective means of enforcement;

Whereas it is essential that the world fully understand that the American people are united in their determination to take all steps that may be necessary to assist the peoples of South Viet Nam and Laos to maintain their independence and political integrity.

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled:

That the United States regards the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of South Viet Nam and Laos as vital to its national interest and to world peace;

Sec. 2. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared, upon the request of the Government of South Viet Nam or the Government of Laos, to use all measures, including the commitment of armed forces to assist that government in the defense of its independence and territorial integrity against aggression or subversion supported, controlled or directed from any Communist country.

Sec. 3. (a) The President is hereby authorized to use for assistance under this joint resolution not to exceed \$— during the fiscal year 1964, and not to exceed \$— during the fiscal year 1965, from any appropriations made available for carrying out the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, in accordance with the provisions of that Act, except as otherwise

provided in this joint resolution. This authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such appropriations.

(b) Obligations incurred in carrying out the provisions of this joint resolution may be paid either out of appropriations for military assistance or appropriations for other than military assistance except that appropriations made available for Titles I, III, and VI of Chapter 2, Part I, of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, shall not be available for payment of such obligations.

(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, when the President determines it to be important to the security of the United States and in furtherance of the purposes of this joint resolution, he may authorize the use of up to \$— of funds available under subsection (a) in each of the fiscal years 1964 and 1965 under the authority of section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and is authorized to use up to \$— of such funds in each such year pursuant to his certification that it is inadvisable to specify the nature of the use of such funds, which certification shall be deemed to be a sufficient [words illegible].

(d) Upon determination by the head of any agency making personnel available under authority of section 627 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, or otherwise under that Act, for purposes of assistance under this joint resolution, any officer or employee so made available may be provided compensation and allowances at rates other than those provided by the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, the Career Compensation Act of 1949, as amended, and the Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act to extent necessary to carry out the purposes of this joint resolution. The President shall prescribe regulations under which such rates of compensation and allowances may be provided. In addition, the President may utilize such provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, as he deems appropriate to apply to personnel of any agency carrying out functions under this joint resolution.

CABLE FROM TAYLOR WARNING ON THE "MARCH NORTH" CAMPAIGN

(Excerpts from cablegram from Ambassador Taylor in Saigon to the State Department, July 25, 1964.)

The GVN public campaign for "Marching North" (reported EMBTEL 201) may take several courses. In the face of US coolness and absence of evidence of real grassroots support outside certain military quarters, it may die down for a while although it is hardly likely to disappear completely. On the other hand, the proponents of a "Quick Solution" may be able to keep it alive indefinitely as an active issue, in which case it is likely to foment an increasing amount of dissatisfaction with the US (assuming that we continue to give it no support) to the serious detriment of our working relations with the GVN and hence of the ultimate chances of success of the in-country pacification program. In such a case, Vietnamese leaders in and out of government, unable to find a vent to their frustration in "Marching North" may seek other panaceas in various forms of negotiation formulas. General Khanh may find in the situation an excuse or a requirement to resign.

Finally, this "March North" fever can get out of hand in an act of rashness—one maverick pilot taking off for Hanoi with a load of bombs—which could touch off an extension of hostilities at a time and in a form most disadvantageous to US interests.

Faced with these unattractive possibilities, we propose a course of action designed to do several things.

We would try to avoid head-on collision with the GVN which unqualified US opposi-

tion to the "March North" campaign would entail. We could do this by expressing a willingness to engage in joint contingency planning for various forms of extended action against GVN [sic]. Such planning would not only provide an outlet for the martial head of steam now dangerously compressed but would force the generals to look at the hard facts of life which lie behind the neon lights of the "March North" slogans. This planning would also gain time badly needed to stabilize this government and could provide a useful basis for military action if adjudged in our interest at some future time. Finally, it would also afford US an opportunity, for the first time, to have a frank discussion with GVN leaders concerning the political objectives which they would envisage as the purposes inherent in military action against the DRV. . . .

It would be important, however, in initiating such a line of action that we make a clear record that we are not repeat not assuming any commitment to supplement such plans. . . .

U.S. NOTE TO CANADA ON POINTS FOR ENVOY TO RELAY TO HANOI

(United States note delivered at the Canadian Embassy in Washington, Aug. 8, 1964, for transmission to J. Blair Seaborn, Canadian member of the International Control Commission.)

Canadians are urgently asked to have Seaborn during August 10 visit make following points (as having been conveyed to him by US Government since August 6):

A. Re Tonkin Gulf actions, which almost certainly will come up:

1. The DRV has stated that Hon Ngu and Hon Me islands were attacked on July 30. It should be noted that the USS Maddox was all of that day and into the afternoon of the next day, over 100 miles south of those islands, in international waters near the 17th parallel, and that the DRV attack on the Maddox took place on August 2nd, more than two days later. Neither the Maddox or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV islands.

2. Regarding the August 4 attack by the DRV on the two US destroyers, the Americans were and are at a complete loss to understand the DRV motive. They had decided to absorb the August 2 attack on the grounds that it very well might have been the result of some DRV mistake or miscalculation. The August 4 attack, however—from the determined nature of the attack as indicated by the radar, sonar, and eye witness evidence both from the ships and from their protecting aircraft—was, in the American eyes, obviously deliberate and planned and ordered in advance. In addition, premeditation was shown by the evidence that the DRV craft were waiting in ambush for the destroyers. The attack did not seem to be in response to any action by the South Vietnamese nor did it make sense as a tactic to further any diplomatic objective. Since the attack took place at least 60 miles from nearest land, there could have been no question about territorial waters. About the only reasonable hypothesis was that North Vietnam was intent either upon making it appear that the United States was a "paper tiger" or upon provoking the United States.

3. The American response was directed solely to patrol craft and installations acting in direct support of them. As President Johnson stated: "Our response for the present will be limited and fitting."

4. In view of uncertainty aroused by the deliberate and unprovoked DRV attacks this character, US has necessarily carried out precautionary deployments of additional air power to SVN and Thailand.

B. Re basic American position:

5. Mr. Seaborn should again stress that US policy is simply that North Vietnam should contain itself and its ambitions

within the territory allocated to its administration by the 1954 Geneva Agreements. He should stress that US policy in South Vietnam is to preserve the integrity of that state's territory against guerrilla subversion.

6. He should reiterate that the US does not seek military bases in the area and that the US is not seeking to overthrow the Communist regime in Hanoi.

7. He should repeat that the US is fully aware of the degree to which Hanoi controls and directs the guerrilla action in South Vietnam and that the US holds Hanoi directly responsible for that action. He should similarly indicate US awareness of North Vietnamese control over the Pathet Lao movement in Laos and the degree of North Vietnamese involvement in that country. He should specifically indicate US awareness of North Vietnamese violation of Laotian territory along the infiltration route into South Vietnam.

8. Mr. Seaborn can again refer to the many examples of US policy in tolerance of peaceful coexistence with Communist regimes, such as Yugoslavia, Poland, etc. He can hint at the economic and other benefits which have accrued to those countries because their policy of Communism has confined itself to the development of their own national territories and has not sought to expand into other areas.

9. Mr. Seaborn should conclude with the following new points:

a. That the events of the past few days should add credibility to the statement made last time, that "US public and official patience with North Vietnamese aggression is growing extremely thin."

b. That the US Congressional Resolution was passed with near unanimity, strongly reaffirming the unity and determination of the US Government and people not only with respect to any further attacks on US military forces but more broadly to continue to oppose firmly, by all necessary means, DRV efforts to subvert and conquer South Vietnam and Laos.

c. That the US has come to the view that the DRV role in South Vietnam and Laos is critical. If the DRV persists in its present course, it can expect to continue to suffer the consequences.

d. That the DRV knows what it must do if the peace is to be restored.

e. That the US has ways and means of measuring the DRV's participation in, and direction and control of, the war on South Vietnam and in Laos and will be carefully watching the DRV's response to what Mr. Seaborn is telling them.

WILLIAM BUNDY MEMO ON ACTIONS AVAILABLE TO U.S. AFTER TONKIN

(Excerpts from second draft of a memorandum, "Next Courses of Action in Southeast Asia," by William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Aug. 11, 1964. A summary was cabled to the Pacific command and the embassies in Saigon and Vientiane on Aug. 14 with requests for comments. According to the Pentagon study, the full draft was edited in the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton. Words that were deleted at that time are shown below in double parentheses; words that were inserted at that time are shown in italics. Small caps denotes underlining in the original document. Also, according to the McNaughton office's editing, the second paragraph, beginning "We have agreed . . ." was to be moved below, to follow the heading "Phase One—Military Silence" (through August).")

I. INTRODUCTION

This memorandum examines the courses of action the US might pursue, commencing in about two weeks, assuming that the Communist side does not react further [sic] the events of last week.

We have agreed that the intervening period will be in effect a short holding phase, in which we would avoid actions that would in any way take the onus off the Communist side for escalation . . .

III. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF U.S. POLICY

A. South Viet-Nam is still the main theater. Morale and momentum there must be maintained. This means:

1. We must devise means of action that, for minimum risks, get maximum results ((for minimum risks)) in terms of morale in SVN and pressure on NVN

2. We must continue to oppose any Viet-Nam conference, and must play the prospect of a Laos conference very carefully. We must particularly avoid any impression of rushing to a Laos conference, and must show a posture of general firmness into which an eventual Laos conference would fit without serious loss.

3. We particularly need to keep our hands free for at least limited measures against the Laos infiltration areas. . . .

C. *Solution.* Basically, a solution in both South Viet-Nam and Laos will require a combination of military pressures and some form of communication under which Hanoi (and Peiping) eventually accept the idea of getting out. Negotiation without continued pressure, indeed without continued military action will not achieve our objectives in the foreseeable future. But military pressure could be accompanied by attempts to communicate with Hanoi and perhaps Peiping—through third-country channels, through side conversations around a Laos conference of any sort—PROVIDED always that we make it clear both to the Communists and to South Viet-Nam that the pressure will continue until we have achieved our objectives. After, BUT ONLY AFTER, we have ((established a)) know that North Vietnamese are hurting and that the clear pattern of pressures has dispelled suspicions of our motives, we could ((then)) accept a conference broadened to include the Viet-Nam issue. (The UN now looks to be out as a communication forum, though this could conceivably change.)

IV. TIMING AND SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS

A. PHASE ONE—"Military Silence" (through August) (see p. 1)

(A.) B. PHASE TWO—Limited pressures (September through December)

There are a number of limited actions we could take that would tend to maintain the initiative and the morale of the GVN and Khanh, but that would not involve major risks of escalation. Such actions could be such as to foreshadow stronger measures to come, though they would not in themselves go far to change Hanoi's basic actions.

1. 34A. OPERATIONS could be overtly acknowledged and justified by the GVN. Marine operations could be strongly defended on the basis of continued DRV sea infiltration, and successes could be publicized. LEAFLET OPERATIONS could also be admitted and defended, again on the grounds of meeting DRV efforts in the South, and their impunity (we hope) would tend to have its own morale value in both Vietnams. AIR-DROP OPERATIONS are more doubtful; their justification is good and less clear than the other operations, and their successes have been few. With the others admitted, they could be left to speak for themselves—and of course security would forbid any mention of specific operations before they succeeded.

2. JOINT PLANNING² between the US and the GVN already covers possible actions against the DRV and also against the Panhandle. It can be used in itself to maintain the morale of the GVN leadership, as well as to control and inhibit any unilateral GVN moves. With 34A outlined, it could be put right into the same framework. We would not ourselves

publicize this planning but it could be leaked (as it probably would anyway) with desirable effects in Hanoi and elsewhere.

3. STEPPED-UP TRAINING OF VIETNAMESE ON JET AIRCRAFT should now be undertaken in any event in light of the presence of MIG's in North Vietnam. The JCS are preparing a plan, and the existence of training could be publicized both for its morale effect in the GVN and as a signal to Hanoi of possible future action.

4. CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO THE PANHANDLE could be conducted on a limited scale. To be successful, GROUND OPERATIONS would have to be so large in scale as to be beyond what the GVN can spare, and we should not at this time consider major US or Thai ground action from the Thai side. But on the AIR SIDE, there are at least a few worthwhile targets in the infiltration areas, and these could be hit by U.S. and/or (([deleted phrase illegible] and by)) GVN air. Probably we should use both (query if US strike should be under a [word illegible] cover) US & GVN; probably we should avoid publicity so as not to embarrass Souvanna; the Communist side might squawk, but in the past they have been silent on this area. The strikes should probably be timed and plotted on the map to bring them to the borders of North Vietnam at the end of December.

5. DESOTO patrols could be reintroduced at some point. Both for present purposes and to maintain the credibility of our account of the events of last week, they must be clearly dissociated from 34A operations both in fact and in physical appearance. [Sentence deleted here is illegible.] In terms of course patterns, we should probably avoid penetrations of 11 miles or so and stay at least 20 miles off; whatever the importance of asserting our view of territorial waters, it is less than the international drawbacks of appearing to provoke attack unduly. [Previous sentence is marked in handwriting "disagree."]

6. SPECIFIC TIT-FOR-TAT ACTIONS could be undertaken for any VC or DRV activity suited to the treatment. [Deleted sentence illegible.] These would be "actions of opportunity." As Saigon 377 points out, the VC have "unused dirty tricks" such as mining (or attacks) in the Saigon River, sabotage of major POL stocks, and terrorist attacks on US dependents. The first two, at least, would lend themselves to prompt and precise reprisal, e.g., by mining the Haiphong channel and attacking the Haiphong POL storage. Terrorism against US dependents would be harder to find the right reprisal target, and reprisal has some disadvantages in that it could be asked why this was different from the regular pattern of terrorism against South Vietnamese. However, we should look at possible [deleted word is illegible.] classes of tit-for-tat situations.

7. THE SEQUENCE AND MIX OF US AND GVN actions need careful thought. At this point, both the GVN role ((and)) in the actions and the rationales directly ((related)) relating the actions to what is being done to the GVN should be emphasized. Overt 34A actions should ((certainly)) be the first moves, and the GVN might go first in air attacks on the Panhandle. But there are advantages in other respects to actions related to US forces. If we lost an aircraft in the Panhandle ((or a U-2 over the DRV)) we could act hard and fast, and of course similarly for any attack on the DESOTO patrols. The loss of a U-2 over NVN does not offer as good a case. Probably the sequence should be played somewhat by ear.

Summary. The above actions are in general limited and controllable. However, if we accept—as of course we must—the necessity of prompt retaliation especially for attacks on our own forces, they could amount to at least a pretty high noise level that might stimulate some pressures for a conference. The problem is that these actions

Footnotes at end of article.

are not in themselves a truly coherent program of strong enough pressures either to bring Hanoi around or to sustain a pressure posture into some kind of discussions. Hence, while we might communicate privately to Hanoi while all this was going on, we should continue absolutely opposed to any conference.

(B) *C. Phase Three—More Serious Pressures. (January 1965 and following).*

All the above actions would be foreshadowing systematic military action against the DRV, and we might at some point conclude that such action was required either because of incidents arising from the above actions or because of deterioration in the situation in South Viet-Nam, particularly if there were to be clear evidence of greatly increased infiltration from the north. However, in the absence of such major new developments, we should probably be thinking of a contingency date, as suggested by Ambassador Taylor, of 1 January 1965. Possible categories of action ((are)) beginning at about that time, are:

1. ACTION AGAINST INFILTRATION ROUTES AND FACILITIES is probably the best opening gambit. It would follow logically the actions in the Sept.-Dec. Phase Two. It could be justified by evidence that infiltration was continuing and, in all probability, increasing. The family of infiltration-related targets starts with clear military installations near the borders. It can be extended almost at will northward, to inflict progressive damage that would have a meaningful cumulative effect and would always be keyed to one rationale.

2. ACTION in the DRV against selected military-related targets would appear to be the next upward move. POL installations and the mining of Haiphong Harbor (to prevent POL, import as its rationale) would be spectacular actions, as would action against key bridges and railroads. All of these could probably be designed so as to avoid major civilian casualties.

3. BEYOND THESE POINTS it is probably not useful to think at the present time. . . .

FOOTNOTES

¹ We have never defined precisely what we mean by "getting out"—what actions, what proofs, and what future guarantees we would accept. A small group should work on this over the next month. *The actions we want the DRV to take are probably these:*

(a) Stop training and sending personnel to wage war in SVN and Laos.

(b) Stop sending arms and supplies to SVN and Laos.

(c) Stop directing and controlling military actions in SVN and Laos.

(d) Order the VC and PL to stop their insurgencies and military actions.

(e) Remove VM forces and cadres from SVN and Laos.

(f) See that VC and PL stop attacks and incidents in SVN and Laos.

(g) See that VC and PL cease resistance to government forces.

(h) See that VC and PL turn in weapons and relinquish bases.

(i) See that VC and PL surrender for amnesty or expatriation.

² This is in Phase One also

SUMMARY OF TAYLOR'S REPORT SENT TO McNAMARA BY JOINT CHIEFS

(Excerpts from Summary of Ambassador Taylor's first mission report from Saigon, on Aug. 10, 1964; as transmitted on Aug. 14 by Col. A. R. Brownfield, acting special assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for counterinsurgency and special activities, to Secretary McNamara, through Col. Alfred J. F. Moody, the Secretary's military assistant, Colonel Brownfield's covering memorandum said this summary had also been supplied to Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance, for their appearance before the House Armed Services Committee on Aug. 18.)

. . . The basis of this report and monthly reports hereafter are the results of a country-

wide canvass of responsible U.S. advisors and observers. The canvass dealt with: Army and public morale, combat effectiveness of military units, U.S./GVN counterpart relationships, and effectiveness of GVN officials.

In broad terms, the canvass results are surprisingly optimistic at the operational levels of both the civil and military organizations. This feeling of optimism exceeds that of most senior U.S. officials in Saigon. Future reports should determine who is right.

VIET CONG SITUATION

Strategy: The communist strategy as defined by North Vietnam and the puppet National Liberation Front is to seek a political settlement favorable to the communists. This political objective to be achieved by stages, passing first through "neutralism" using the National Liberation Front machinery, and then the technique of a coalition government.

Tactics: The VC tactics are to harass, erode and terrorize the VN population and its leadership into a state of demoralization without an attempt to defeat the RVNAF or seize and conquer terrain by military means. U.S./GVN progress should be measured against this strategy and these tactics.

Status: In terms of equipment and training, the VC are better armed and led today than ever in the past.

VC infiltration continues from Laos and Cambodia.

No indication that the VC are experiencing any difficulty in replacing their losses in men and equipment.

No reason to believe the VC will risk their gains in an overt military confrontation with GVN forces, although they have a sizable force with considerable offensive capability in the central highlands.

GVN SITUATION

Political: The slow pace of the CI campaign and the weakness of his government has caused Khanh to use the March North theme to rally the homefront, and offset the war weariness.

US observers feel the symptoms of defeatism are more in the minds of the inexperienced and untried leadership in Saigon than in the people and the Army.

We may face mounting pressure from the GVN to win the war by direct attack on Hanoi which if resisted will cause local politicians to seriously consider negotiation or local soldiers to consider a military adventure without US consent.

For the present, the Khanh government has the necessary military support to stay in power.

It is estimated that Khanh has a 50-50 chance of lasting out the year.

The government is ineffective, beset by inexperienced ministers who are jealous and suspicious of each other.

Khanh does not have confidence or trust in most of his ministers and is not able to form them into a group with a common loyalty and purpose.

There is no one in sight to replace Khanh. Khanh has, for the moment, allayed the friction between the Buddhists and Catholics. Khanh has won the cooperation of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai.

Khanh has responded to our suggestions for improved relations between GVN and US Mission.

The population is confused and apathetic. Khanh has not succeeded in building active popular support in Saigon.

Population support in the countryside is directly proportionate to the degree of GVN protection.

There are grounds to conclude that no sophisticated psychological approach is necessary to attract the country people to the GVN at this time. The assurance of a reasonably secure life is all that is necessary.

The success of US attacks on North Vietnam, although furnishing a psychological lift

to the GVN, may have whetted their appetite for further moves against the DRV. . . .

Military: The regular and paramilitary personnel strengths are slowly rising and by January 1965 should reach 98% of the target strength of 446,000.

The RVNAF desertion rate has decreased to .572% or 1/2 the rate of last March.

Three VNAF squadrons of A-1H aircraft will be combat ready by 30 September 1964 and the fourth by 1 December 1964 with a two to one pilot to cockpit ratio.

The evaluation of RVNAF units reports the following number combat effective:

28 of 30 regiments
100 of 101 infantry, marine and airborne battalions
17 of 20 ranger battalions
19 of 20 engineer battalions

The principal defects are low present for duty strengths and weak leaderships at the lower levels. Both are receiving corrective treatment.

Extensive intelligence programs are underway to improve our intelligence capability by the end of the year.

GVN OVERALL OBJECTIVE

Increase in percentage of population control represents progress toward stabilizing the in-country situation. Using July figures as a base, the following percentages should be attainable.

	[In percent]			
	Rural		Urban	
	July 31, 1964	Dec. 31, 1964	July 31, 1964	Dec. 31, 1964
GVN control.....	33	40	44	47
VC control.....	20	16	18	14
Contested.....	47	44	42	39

US MISSION OBJECTIVES

Do everything possible to bolster the Khanh Government.

Improve the in-country pacification campaign against the VC.

Concentrating efforts on strategically important areas such as the provinces around Saigon (The Hop Tac Plan).

Undertake "show-window" social and economic projects in secure urban and rural areas.

Be prepared to implement contingency plans against North Vietnam with optimum readiness by January 1, 1965.

Keep the US public informed of what we are doing and why. . . .

PACIFIC COMMANDER'S EVALUATION OF WASHINGTON'S ACTION SCENARIO

(Excerpts from cablegram from Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, commander of Pacific forces to Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Next Courses of Action in Southeast Asia," Aug. 17, 1964)

2. Recent U.S. military actions in Laos and North Vietnam demonstrated our intent to move toward our objectives. Our operations and progress in Laos constitute one step along the route. Our directness and rapidity of reaction in bombing North Vietnamese installations and deploying U.S. combat forces to Southeast Asia were others. Each step played a part. Their effect was to interrupt the continually improving Communist posture, catch the imagination of the Southeast Asian peoples, provide some lift to morale, however temporary, and force CHICOM/DRV assessment or reassessment of U.S. intentions. But these were only steps along the way. What we have not done and must do is to make plain to Hanoi and Peiping the cost of pursuing their current objectives and impeding ours. An essential element of our military action in this course is to proceed in the development of our physical readiness posture: deploying troops, ships, aircraft, and logistic resources in a manner which accords a maximum freedom of action.

This is the thrust we should continue to pursue, one which is intended to provide more than one feasible course for consideration as the changed and changing Southeast Asian situation develops. Remarks in the paragraphs which follow are submitted in light of this assessment and with the view that pressures against the other side once instituted should not be relaxed by any actions or lack of them which would destroy the benefits of the rewarding steps previously taken in Laos and North Vietnam. . . .

3. PARA I

The proposed two weeks suspension of operations is not in consonance with desire to get the message to Hanoi and Peiping. Pierce Arrow showed both force and restraint. Further demonstration of restraint alone could easily be interpreted as period of second thoughts about Pierce Arrow and events leading thereto as well as sign of weakness and lack of resolve. Continuous and effective pressure should be implied to the Communists in both the PDJ and panhandle. Consequently, concur in continued RECCE of DRV, panhandle and PDJ. Concur in attempt to secure Phou Kout and continued T-28 and Triangle operations. Resumption of 34A actions and Desoto Patrols is considered appropriate. Each can be carefully conducted to avoid interference with the other. . . .

7. PARA III A 1

Concur that South Vietnam is current hot spot and main concern in S.E. Asia. RVN cannot be reviewed apart from S.E. Asia. It is merely an area in a large theater occupied by the same enemy. Action to produce significant results in terms of pressure on DRV and improvements of morale in RVN must entail risk. Temptation toward zero action and zero risk must be avoided. . . .

11. PARA III C

Concur with the thesis set forth that we make clear to all that military pressure will continue until we achieve our objectives. Our actions must keep the Communists apprehensive of what further steps we will take if they continue their aggression. In this regard, we have already taken the large initial step of putting U.S. combat forces into Southeast Asia. We must maintain this posture; to reduce it would have a dangerous impact on the morale and will of all people in Southeast Asia. And we must face up to the fact that these forces will be deployed for some time and to their need for protection from ground or air attack. RVN cannot provide necessary ground security without degradation of the counterinsurgency effort and has little air defense capability. A conference to include Vietnam, before we have overcome the insurgency, would lose U.S. our allies in Southeast Asia and represent a defeat for the United States.

12. PARA IV A 1

Knowledge of success of 34A operations would have a highly beneficial effect morale in the RVN. Suggest that these operations might be leaked to the press rather than overtly acknowledging them. 34A operations should be resumed to keep up external pressure on the DRV.

20. In considering more serious pressure, we must recognize that immediate action is required to protect our present heavy military investment in RVN. We have introduced large amounts of expensive equipment into RVN and a successful attack against Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, Danang, or an installation such as a radar or communication site would be a serious psychological defeat for U.S. MACV reports that inability of GVN to provide requisite degree of security and therefore we must rely on U.S. troops. MACV has requested troops for defense of the three locations mentioned above. My comments on this request are being transmitted by separate message. In addition to the above, con-

sideration should be given to creating a U.S. base in RVN. A U.S. base in RVN would provide one more indication of our intent to remain in S.E. Asia until our objectives are achieved. It could also serve as a U.S. command point or control center in event of the chaos which might follow another coup. By an acknowledged concrete U. (as received) commitment, beyond the advisory effort, it informs the Communists that an overt attack on the RVN would be regarded as a threat to U.S. forces. Such a base should be accessible by air and sea, possessed of well developed facilities and installations, and located in an area from which U.S. operations could be launched effectively. Danang meets these criteria. . . .

22. In conclusion, our actions of August 5 have created a momentum which can lead to the attainment of our objectives in S.E. Asia. We have declared ourselves forcefully both by overt acts and by the clear readiness to do more, it is most important that we not lose this momentum.

STATE DEPARTMENT AIDE'S REPORT ON ACTIONS TAKEN AFTER TONKIN

(Part VIII, "Immediate Actions in the Period Prior to Decision," of an outline for Assistant Secretary Bundy, Nov. 7, 1964. Markings indicate that it was drafted by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green.)

The US, together with the RLG and GVN, are involved in a number of operations—34-A, Yankee Team, Recce, and RLAF T-28 ops—designed to warn and harass North Vietnam and to reduce enemy capabilities to utilize the Lao Panhandle for reinforcing the Vietcong in South Vietnam and to cope with PL/VM pressures in Laos. The US also has under consideration De Soto Patrols and Cross Border Ground Operations. The present status and outlook of these operations are described below, together with a checklist of outstanding problems relating to each of the field operations.

In general the working group is agreed that our aim should be to maintain present signal strength and level of harassment, showing no signs of lessening of determination but also avoiding actions that would tend to prejudice the basic decision.

A. OPLAN 34-A

Although not all of Oplan 34-A was suspended after the first Tonkin Gulf incident, in effect little was accomplished during the remainder of August and the month of September. Several successful maritime and airborne operations have been conducted under the October schedule. A schedule for November is under discussion and will probably be approved November 7.

1. Maritime operations

Since the resumption of Marops under the October schedule, the following have been completed:

Recon L Day (Oct. 4) Probe to 12 miles of Vinh Sor.

Recon L + 2 (Oct. 10) Probe 12 miles of Vinh Sor.

Loki IV L + 5 Junk capture failed.

32 & 45 E L 8 (Oct. 28/29) Bombard Vin Son radar and Mui Dai observation post.

The following operation was refused approval:

44c L + 10 Demolition by frog men supported by fire team of bridge on Route 1.

Currently approved is:

34B L + 12 (Nov. 4, on) Bombardment of barracks on Hon Matt and Tiger Island.

The following maritime operations remain on the October schedule and presumably will appear on the November schedule along with some additional similar operations:

L + 13 Capture of prisoner by team from PTF.

L + 15 Junk capture.

L + 19 Bombard Cap Mui Ron and Tiger Island

L + 25 Bombard Yen Phu and Sam Son radar

L + 28 Blow up Bridge Route 1 and bombard Cap Mui Dao

L + 30 Return any captives from L + 1 15

L + 31 Bombard Hon Ne and Hon Me

L + 36 Blow up pier at Phuc Loi and bombard Hon Ngu

L + 38 Cut Hanoi-Vinh rail line

L + 41 Bombard Dong Hoi and Tiger Island

L + 24 Bombard Nightingale Island.

2. AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

Five teams and one singleton agent were in place at the beginning of October. Since then one of the teams has been resupplied and reinforced. The remaining four were scheduled to be resupplied and reinforced but weather prevented flights. These operations, plus the dropping of an additional team, will appear on the November schedule.

Two of the teams carried out successful actions during October. One demolished a bridge, the other ambushed a North Vietnamese patrol. Both teams suffered casualties, the latter sufficient to cast doubt on the wisdom of the action.

3. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Both black and white radio broadcasts have been made daily. Black broadcasts have averaged eight to ten hours weekly, white broadcasts sixty hours weekly.

Letters posted through Hong Kong have averaged about from 50 to 100 weekly.

During September and October only one leaflet delivery was made by air. This was done in conjunction with a resupply mission.

The November schedule will call for a large number of leaflet and deception operations.

4. RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS

An average of four flights per week have covered the bulk of Oplan 34-A targets.

PROBLEMS

1. Surfacing of Marops—The question of whether to surface Marops remains unresolved. While Washington has suggested this be done, General Khanh has been reluctant to do so. It is argued that surfacing the operations would enable the US to offer some protection to them; the counterargument postulates US involvement in North Vietnam and consequent escalation.

2. Security of Operations—The postponement of an operation, whether because of unfavorable weather or failure of Washington to approve at the last moment, jeopardizes the operation. Isolation of teams presents hazards.

3. Base Security—After the Bien Hoa shelling some attention has been given to the security of the Danang base. Perimeter guard has been strengthened, but action remains to be taken for marine security, although a survey is underway.

4. Team welfare—In-place teams Bell and Easy have been in dire need of supplies for several weeks. Weather has prevented resupply, which will be attempted again during the November moon phase.

5. NVN Counteraction—The capability of the North Vietnamese against Marops has improved somewhat, although not yet sufficiently to frustrate these operations.

B. YANKEE TEAM OPERATIONS

For several months now the pattern of Yankee Team Operations has [words illegible] a two-week period and about ten flights during the same time interval [words illegible] for Panhandle coverage. Additionally, we have recently been authorized a maximum of two shallow penetration flights daily to give comprehensive detailed coverage of cross border penetration. We have also recently told MACV that we have a high priority requirement for night photo recce of key motorable routes in Laos. At present

about 2 nights recce flights are flown along Route 7 areas within a two-week span.

YT supplies cap for certain T-28 corridor strikes. Cap aircraft are not authorized to participate in strike or to provide suppressive fire.

Pending questions include: (a) whether YT strikes should be made in support of RLAFF T-28 corridor operations; (b) whether YT recce should be made of areas north of 20° parallel; (c) YT suppressive attacks against Route 7, especially Ban Ken Bridge; and (d) YT activity in event of large-scale ground offensive by PL (this issue has not arisen but undoubtedly would, should the PL undertake an offensive beyond the capabilities of Lao and sheep-dipped Thai to handle).

C. T-28 OPERATIONS

There are now 27 T-28 (including three RT-28) aircraft in Laos, of which 22 are in operation. CINCPAC has taken action, in response to Ambassador Unger's request to build this inventory back up to 40 aircraft for which a pilot capability, including Thai, is present in Laos.

The T-28's are conducting the following operations:

1. General harassing activities against Pathet Lao military installations and movement, primarily in Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua Provinces. This also includes efforts to interdict Route 7.

2. Tactical support missions for Operation Anniversary Victory No. 2 (Saleumsay), the FAR-Meo clearing operation up Route 4 and north of Tha Thom.

3. Tactical support for Operation Victorious Arrow (Sone Sall), a FAR clearing operations in southern Laos.

4. Strikes on targets of opportunity, including in support of FAR defensive actions such as at Ban Khen northwest Thakhek.

5. Corridor interdiction program. The original targets under this program have been hit and plans are now underway to hit four additional targets (including in the Tchepone area), plus restriking some of the original 13 targets. Ambassador Unger has submitted for approval under this program 6 additional targets.

6. The Ambassador has been authorized to discuss with the RLAFF RT-28 reconnaissance in northwest Laos along the area just north of and to the east and west of the line from Veng Phou Kha-Muong Sal.

In recent weeks, the T-28's have been dropping a large number of surrender leaflets on many of their missions. These have already led, in some cases, to PL defections.

US participation in SAR operations for downed T-28's, is authorized.

We are faced by the following problems in connection with the T-28's:

1. Authority for Yankee Team aircraft to engage in suppressive strikes in the corridor area, in support of the T-28 strike program there, has not been given as yet.

2. Also withheld is authorization for YT suppressive fire attack on Ban Ken Bridge on Route 7.

3. We are investigating reports of greatly increased truck movement along Route 7 as well as enemy build-up of tanks and other equipment just across the border in NVN. Counteraction may be required involving attack on Ban Ken.

4. Thai involvement, Hanoi claims to have shot down a T-28 over DRV territory on August 18 and to have captured the Thai pilot flying the plane. Although the information the North Vietnamese have used in connection with this case seems to be accurate, it is not clear the pilot is alive and can be presented to the ICC. The possibility cannot be excluded, however, nor that other Thai pilots might be captured by the PL.

5. The DRV claims T-28's have violated North Vietnamese airspace and bombed/strafed NVN villages on August 1 and 2, and on October 16 and 17 and again on October 28. The charges are probably accurate with

respect to the first two dates (along Route 7) and the last one (Mu Gia Pass area). The October 16 and 17 strikes were actually in disputed territory which was recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements as being in Laos.

6. The Pathet Lao has called to the attention of the ICC T-28 strikes in the corridor area and called for the ICC to stop them and inform the Co-Chairmen. The ICC has already agreed to investigate another PL charge concerning alleged US/SVN activities in the corridor area in violation of the Geneva Agreements.

D. DESOTO PATROLS

Further DeSoto Patrols have been held in abeyance pending top-level decision. Ambassador Taylor (Saigon's 1378) sees no advantage in resuming DeSoto Patrols except for essential intelligence purposes. He believes we should tie our actions to Hanoi's support of Viet Cong, not to the defense of purely US interests.

E. CROSS BORDER GROUND OPERATIONS

Earlier in the year several eight-man reconnaissance teams were parachuted into Laos as part of Operation Leaping Lena. All of these teams were located by the enemy and only four survivors return to RVN. As a result of Leaping Lena, Cross Border Ground Operations have been carefully reviewed and COMUSMACV has stated that he believes no effective Cross Border Ground Operations can be implemented prior to January 1, 1965 at the earliest.

F. COVERT OPERATIONS IN LAOS

Consideration is being given to improving Hardnose (including greater Thai involvement) and getting Hardnose to operate more effectively in the corridor infiltration areas. No change in status of Kha.

G. OTHER SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

These include "Queen Bee", "Box Top", "Lucky Dragon" and "Blue Springs".

1964 MEMO FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS ON SEPTEMBER'S COVERT RAIDS

(Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Rollen H. Anthis, an Air Force aide to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Assistant Secretary of State Bundy and Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton, Aug. 27, 1964. The subject of the memorandum was given as "OPLAN 34A—September Schedule.")

1. Attached hereto is COMUSMACV'S proposed schedule of 34A actions for September.

2. All of the actions listed have either been specifically approved previously or are similar to such approved actions. For example, Action (3) (d) was specifically approved by consideration of JCSM-426-64 dated 19 May 1964, while Action (3) (b) is similar to a previously approved action against a security post.

3. The method of attack has been changed in some instances from destruction by infiltration of demolition teams to the concept of standoff bombardment from PTFs. These actions are so indicated in the attachment.

The proposed September 34A actions are as follows:

(1) INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTION

(a) 1-30 September—Aerial photography to update selected targets along with pre and post-strike coverage of approved actions.

(b) 1-30 September—Two junk capture missions; remove captives for 36-48 hours interrogation; booby trap junk with anti-disturbance devices and release; captives returned after interrogation; timing depends upon sea conditions and current intelligence.

(2) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

(a) 1-30 September—In conjunction with approved overflights and maritime operations, delivery of propaganda leaflets, gift kits, and deception devices simulating resupply of phantom teams.

(b) 1-30 September—Approximately 200 letters of various propaganda themes sent through third country mail channels to North Vietnam.

(c) 1-30 September—Black Radio daily 30-minute programs repeated once, purports to be voice of dissident elements in North Vietnam.

(d) 1-30 September—White Radio broadcast of eight-and-one-half hours daily, propaganda "Voice of Freedom".

(3) Maritime Operations.

(a) 1-30 September—Demolition of Route 1 bridge by infiltrated team accompanied by fire support teams, place short-delay charges against spans and caissons, place antipersonnel mines on road approaches. (This bridge previously hit but now repaired).

(b) 1-30 September—Bombard Cape Mui Dao observation post with 81 MM mortars and 40 MM guns from two PTFs.

(c) 1-30 September—Demolition of another Route 1 bridge (see map), concept same as (3) (a) above.

(d) 1-30 September—Bombard Sam Son radar, same as (3) (b).

(e) 1-30 September—Bombard Tiger Island barracks, same as (3) (b).

(f) 1-30 September—Bombard Hon Ngu Island, same as (3) (b).

(g) 1-30 September—Bombard Hon Matt Island, same as (3) (b) and run concurrently with (3) (f).

(h) 1-30 September—Destruction of section of Hanoi-Vinh railroad by infiltrated demolition team supported by two VN marine squads, by rubber boats from PTFs, place short-delay charges and antipersonnel mines around area.

(i) 1-30 September—Bombard Hon Me Island in conjunction with (3) (a) above, concept same as (3) (b).

(j) 1-30 September—Bombard Cape Falaise gun positions in conjunction with (3) (h) above, concept same as (3) (b).

(k) 1-30 September—Bombard Cape Mui Ron in conjunction with junk capture mission, concept same as (3) (b).

(4) Airborne Operations—Light-of-moon period 16-28 September.

(a) Four missions for resupply of in-place teams.

(b) Four missions for reinforcement of in-place teams.

(c) Four mission to airdrop new psyops/sabotage teams depending upon development of drop zone and target information. These are low-key propaganda and intelligence gathering teams with a capability for small-scale sabotage on order after locating suitable targets.

(5) Dates for actual launch of maritime and airborne operations are contingent upon the intelligence situation and weather conditions.

VIETNAM ARCHIVES PENTAGON STUDY TRACES THREE DECADES OF GROWING U.S. INVOLVEMENT

(By Nell Sheehan)

A massive study of how the United States went to war in Indochina, conducted by the Pentagon three years ago, demonstrates that four administration progressively developed a sense of commitment to a non-Communist Vietnam, a readiness to fight the North to protect the South, and an ultimate frustration with this effort—to a much greater extent than their public statements acknowledged at the time.

The 3,000-page analysis, to which 4,000 pages of official documents are appended, was commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and covers the American involvement in Southeast Asia from World War II to May, 1968—the start of the peace talks in Paris after President Lyndon B. Johnson had set a limit on further military commitments and revealed his intention to retire. Most of the study and many

of the appended documents have been obtained by The New York Times and will be described and presented in a series of articles beginning today.

Though far from a complete history, even at 2.5 million words, the study forms a great archive of government decision-making on Indochina over three decades. The study led its 30 to 40 authors and researchers to many broad conclusions and specific findings, including the following:

That the Truman Administration's decision to give military aid to France in her colonial war against Communist-led Vietnam directly involved the United States in Vietnam and "set" the course of American policy.

That the Eisenhower Administration's decision to rescue a fledgling South Vietnam from a Communist takeover and attempt to undermine the new Communist regime of North Vietnam gave the Administration a "direct role in the ultimate breakdown of the Geneva settlement" for Indochina in 1954.

That the Kennedy Administration, though ultimately spared from major escalation decisions by the death of its leader, transformed a policy of "limited-risk gamble," which it inherited, into a "broad commitment" that left President Johnson with a choice between more war and withdrawal.

That the Johnson Administration, though the President was reluctant and hesitant to take the final decisions, intensified the covert warfare against North Vietnam and began planning in the spring of 1964 to wage overt war, a full year before it publicly revealed the depth of its involvement and its fear of defeat.

That this campaign of growing clandestine military pressure through 1964 and the expanding program of bombing North Vietnam in 1965 were begun despite the judgment of the Government's intelligence community that the measures would not cause Hanoi to cease its support of the Vietcong insurgency in the South, and that the bombing was deemed militarily ineffective within a few months.

That these four succeeding administrations built up the American political, military and psychological stakes in Indochina, often more deeply than they realized at the time, with large-scale military equipment to the French in 1950; with acts of sabotage and terror warfare against North Vietnam beginning in 1954; with moves that encouraged and abetted the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam in 1963; with plans, pledges and threats of further action that sprang to life in the Tonkin Gulf clashes in August, 1964; with the careful preparation of public opinion for the years of open warfare that were to follow; and with the calculation in 1965, as the planes and troops were openly committed to sustained combat, that neither accommodation inside South Vietnam nor early negotiations with North Vietnam would achieve the desired result.

The Pentagon study also ranges beyond such historical judgments. It suggests that the predominant American interest was at first containment of Communism and later the defense of the power, influence and prestige of the United States, in both stages irrespective of conditions in Vietnam.

And it reveals a great deal about the ways in which several administrations conducted their business on a fateful course, with much new information about the roles of dozens of senior officials of both major political parties and a whole generation of military commanders.

The Pentagon study was divided into chronological and thematic chapters of narrative and analysis, each with its own documentation attached. The Times—which has obtained all but one of nearly 40 volumes—

has collated these materials into major segments of varying chronological length, from one that broadly covers the two decades before 1960 to one that deals intensively with the agonizing debate in the weeks following the 1968 Tet offensive.

The months from the beginning of 1964 to the Tonkin Gulf incident in August were a pivotal period, the study makes clear, and the Times begins its series with this phase.

THE COVERT WAR

The Pentagon papers disclose that in this phase the United States had been mounting clandestine military attacks against North Vietnam and planning to obtain a Congressional resolution that the Administration regarded as the equivalent of a declaration of war. The papers make it clear that these far-reaching measures were not improvised in the heat of the Tonkin crisis.

When the Tonkin incident occurred, the Johnson Administration did not reveal these clandestine attacks, and pushed the previously prepared resolution through both houses of Congress on Aug. 7.

Within 72 hours, the Administration, drawing on a prepared plan, then secretly sent a Canadian emissary to Hanoi. He warned Premier Pham Van Dong that the resolution meant North Vietnam must halt the Communist-led insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos or "suffer the consequences." [See text, Page 36.]

The section of the Pentagon study dealing with the internal debate, planning and action in the Johnson Administration from the beginning of 1964 to the August clashes between North Vietnamese PT boats and American destroyers—portrayed as a critical period when the groundwork was laid for the wider war that followed—also reveals that the covert military operations had become so extensive by August, 1964, that Thai pilots flying American T-28 fighter planes apparently bombed and strafed North Vietnamese villages near the Laotian border on Aug. 1 and 2.

Moreover, it reports that the Administration was able to order retaliatory air strikes on less than six hours' notice during the Tonkin incident because planning had progressed so far that a list of targets was available for immediate choice. The target list had been drawn up in May, the study reports, along with a draft of the Congressional resolution—all as part of a proposed "scenario" that was to build toward openly acknowledged air attacks on North Vietnam.

Simultaneously, the papers reveal, Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff also arranged for the deployment of air strike forces to Southeast Asia for the opening phases of the bombing campaign. Within hours of the retaliatory air strikes on Aug. 4 and three days before the passage of the Congressional resolution, the squadrons began their planned moves. [See text.]

"PROGRESSIVELY ESCALATING PRESSURE"

What the Pentagon papers call "an elaborate program of covert military operations against the state of North Vietnam" began on Feb. 1, 1964, under the code name Operation Plan 34A. President Johnson ordered the program, on the recommendation of Secretary McNamara, in the hope, held very faint by the intelligence community, that "progressively escalating pressure" from the clandestine attacks might eventually force Hanoi to order the Vietcong guerrillas and the Pathet Lao to halt their insurrections.

In a memorandum to the President on Dec. 21, 1963, after a two-day trip to Vietnam, Mr. McNamara remarked that the plans, drawn up by the Central Intelligence Agency station and the military command in Saigon, were "an excellent job."

"They present a wide variety of sabotage and psychological operations against North Vietnam from which I believe we should aim

to select those that provide maximum pressure with minimum risk," Mr. McNamara wrote.

President Johnson, in this period, showed a preference for steps that would remain "noncommitting" to combat, the study found. But weakness in South Vietnam and Communist advances kept driving the planning process. This, in turn, caused the Saigon Government and American officials in Saigon to demand ever more action.

Through 1964, the 34A operations ranged from flights over North Vietnam by U-2 spy planes and kidnappings of North Vietnamese citizens for intelligence information, to parachuting sabotage and psychological-warfare teams into the North, commando raids from the sea to blow up rail and highway bridges and the bombardment of North Vietnamese coastal installations by PT boats.

These "destructive undertakings," as they were described in a report to the President on Jan. 2, 1964, from Maj. Gen. Victor H. Krulak of the Marine Corps, were designed "to result in substantial destruction, economic loss and harassment." The tempo and magnitude of the strikes were designed to rise in three phases through 1964 to "targets identified with North Vietnam's economic and industrial well-being."

The clandestine operations were directed for the President by Mr. McNamara through a section of the Joint Chiefs organization called the Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities. The study says that Mr. McNamara was kept regularly informed of planned and conducted raids by memorandums from General Krulak, who first held the position of special assistant, and then from Maj. Gen. Rollen H. Anthis of the Air Force, who succeeded him in February, 1964. The Joint Chiefs themselves periodically evaluated the operations for Mr. McNamara.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk was also informed, if in less detail.

The attacks were given "interagency clearance" in Washington, the study says, by coordinating them with the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, including advance monthly schedules of the raids from General Anthis.

The Pentagon account and the documents shows that William P. Bundy, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and John T. McNaughton, head of the Pentagon's politico-military operations as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, were the senior civilian officials who supervised the distribution of the schedules and the other aspects of interagency coordination for Mr. McNamara and Mr. Rusk.

The analyst notes that the 34A program differed in a significant respect from the relatively low-level and unsuccessful intelligence and sabotage operations that the C.I.A. had earlier been carrying out in North Vietnam.

The 34A attacks were a military effort under the control in Saigon of Gen. Paul D. Harkins, chief of the United States Military Assistance Command there. He ran them through a special branch of his command called the Studies and Observations Group. It drew up the advance monthly schedules for approval in Washington. Planning was done jointly with the South Vietnamese and it was they or "hired personnel," apparently Asian mercenaries, who performed the raids, but General Harkins was in charge.

The second major segment of the Administration's covert war against North Vietnam consisted of air operations in Laos. A force of propeller-driven T-28 fighter-bombers, varying from about 25 to 40 aircraft, had been organized there. The planes bore Laotian Air Force markings, but only some belonged to that air force. The rest were manned by pilots of Air America (a pseudo-private airline run by the C.I.A.) and by Thai

pilots under the control of Ambassador Leonard Unger. [See text]

AID FOR THE BOMBING RAIDS

Reconnaissance flights by regular United States Air Force and Navy jets, code-named Yankee Team, gathered photographic intelligence for bombing raids by the T-28's against North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops in Laos.

The Johnson Administration gradually stepped by these air operations in Laos through the spring and summer of 1964 in what became a kind of preview of the bombing of the North. The escalation occurred both because of ground advances by the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao and because of the Administration's desire to bring more military pressure against North Vietnam.

As the intensity of the T-28 strikes rose, they crept closer to the North Vietnamese border. The United States Yankee Team jets moved from high-altitude reconnaissance at the beginning of the year to low-altitude reconnaissance in May. In June, armed escort jets were added to the reconnaissance missions. The escort jets began to bomb and strafe North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops and installations whenever the reconnaissance planes were fired upon.

The destroyer patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin, code-named De Soto patrols, were the third element in the covert military pressures against North Vietnam. While the purpose of the patrols was mainly psychological, as a show of force, the destroyers collected the kind of intelligence on North Vietnamese warning radars and coastal defenses that would be useful to 34A raiding parties or, in the event of a bombing campaign, to pilots. The first patrol was conducted by the destroyer Craig without incident in February and March, in the early days of the 34A operations.

SEPARATE CHAIN OF COMMAND

The analyst states that before the August Tonkin incident there was no attempt to involve the destroyers with the 34A attacks or to use the ships as bait for North Vietnamese retaliation. The patrols were run through a separate naval chain of command.

Although the highest levels of the Administration sent the destroyers into the gulf while the 34A raids were taking place, the Pentagon study, as part of its argument that a deliberate provocation was not intended, in effect says that the Administration did not believe that the North Vietnamese would dare to attack the ships.

But the study makes it clear that the physical presence of the destroyers provided the elements for the Tonkin clash. And immediately after the reprisal air strikes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton put forward a "provocation strategy" proposing to repeat the clash as a pretext for bombing the North.

Of the three elements of the covert war, the analyst cites the 34A raids as the most important. The "unequivocal" American responsibility for them "carried with it an implicit symbolic and psychological intensification of the U.S. commitment," he writes. "A firebreak had been crossed."

The fact that the intelligence community and even the Joint Chiefs also gave the program little chance of compelling Hanoi to stop the Vietcong and the Pathet Lao, he asserts, meant that "a demand for more was stimulated and an expectation of more was aroused."

WARNING BY THE JOINT CHIEFS

On Jan. 2, 1964, a week before the 34A raids started, the Joint Chiefs warned Mr. McNamara in a memorandum signed by the Chairman, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, that while "we are wholly in favor of executing the covert actions against North Vietnam . . . it

would be idle to conclude that these efforts will have a decisive effect" on Hanoi's will to support the Vietcong.

The Joint Chiefs said the Administration "must make ready to conduct increasingly bolder actions," including "aerial bombing of key North Vietnam targets, using United States resources under Vietnamese cover," sending American ground troops to South Vietnam and employing "United States forces as necessary in direct actions against North Vietnam."

And after a White House strategy meeting on Feb. 20, President Johnson ordered that "contingency planning for pressures against North Vietnam should be speeded up."

"Particular attention should be given to shaping such pressures so as to produce the maximum credible deterrent effect on Hanoi," the order said.

The impelling force behind the Administration's desire to step up the action during this period was its recognition of the steady deterioration in the position of the pro-American government in Laos and South Vietnam, and the corresponding weakening of the United States hold on both countries. North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao advances in Laos were seen as having a direct impact on the morale of the anti-Communist forces in South Vietnam, the central American concern.

This deterioration was also concealed from Congress and the public as much as possible to provide the Administration with maximum flexibility to determine its moves as it chose from behind the scenes.

"THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM"

The United States found itself particularly unable to cope with the Vietcong insurgency, first through the Saigon military regime of Gen. Duong Van Minh and later through that of Gen. Nguyen Khanh, who seized power in a coup d'état on Jan. 30, 1964. Accordingly, attention focused more and more on North Vietnam as "the root of the problem," in the words of the Joint Chiefs.

Walt W. Rostow, the dominant intellectual of the Administration, had given currency to this idea and provided the theoretical framework for escalation. His concept, first enunciated in a speech at Fort Bragg, N.C., in 1961, was that a revolution could be dried up by cutting off external sources of support and supply.

Where North Vietnam was concerned, Mr. Rostow had evolved another theory—that a credible threat to bomb the industry Hanoi had so painstakingly constructed out of the ruins of the French Indochina War would be enough to frighten the country's leaders into ordering the Vietcong to halt their activities in the South.

In a memorandum on Feb. 13, 1964, Mr. Rostow told Secretary of State Rusk that President Ho Chi Minh "has an industrial complex to protect: he is no longer a guerrilla fighter with nothing to lose."

The Administration was firmly convinced from interceptions of radio traffic between North Vietnam and the guerrillas in the South that Hanoi controlled and directed the Vietcong. Intelligence analyses of the time stated, however, that "the primary sources of Communist strength in South Vietnam are indigenous," arising out of the revolutionary social aims of the Communists and their identification with the nationalist cause during the independence struggle against France in the nineteen-fifties.

The study shows that President Johnson and most of his key advisers would not accept this intelligence analysis that bombing the North would have no lasting effect on the situation in the South, although there was division—even among those who favored a bombing campaign if necessary—over the extent to which Vietcong fortunes were dependent on the infiltration of men and arms from North Vietnam.

William Bundy and Mr. Rusk mentioned on several occasions the need to obtain more evidence of this infiltration to build a case publicly for stronger actions against North Vietnam.

VAST STUDY OF WAR TOOK A YEAR (By Hedrick Smith)

In June, 1967, at a time of great personal disenchantment with the Indochina war and rising frustration among his colleagues at the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara commissioned a major study of how and why the United States had become so deeply involved in Vietnam.

The project took a year to complete and yielded a vast and highly unusual report of Government self-analysis. It was compiled by a team of 30 to 40 Government officials, civilian and military, many of whom had helped to develop or carry out the policies that they were asked to evaluate and some of whom were simultaneously active in the debates that changed the course of those policies.

While Mr. McNamara turned over his job to Clark M. Clifford, while the war reached a military peak in the 1968 Lunar New Year offensive, while President Johnson cut back the bombing of North Vietnam and announced his plan to retire, and while the peace talks began in Paris, the study group burrowed through Government files.

The members sought to probe American policy toward Southeast Asia from World War II pronouncements of President Franklin D. Roosevelt into the start of Vietnam peace talks in the spring of 1968. They wrote nearly 40 book-length volumes backed up by annexes of cablegrams, memorandums, draft proposals, dissents and other documents.

MANY INCONSISTENCIES

Their report runs to more than 7,000 pages—1.5 million words of historical narratives plus a million words of documents—enough to fill a small crate.

Even so, it is not a complete or polished history. It displays many inconsistencies and lacks a single all-embracing summary. It is an extended internal critique based on the documentary record, which the researchers did not supplement with personal interviews, partly because they were pressed for time.

The study emerged as a middle-echelon and official view of the war, incorporating material from the top-level files of the Defense Department into which flow papers from the White House, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some important gaps appear in the study. The researchers did not have access to the complete files of Presidents or to all the memorandums of their conversations and decisions.

Moreover, there are other important gaps in the copy of the Pentagon study obtained by The New York Times. It lacks the section on the secret diplomacy of the Johnson period.

But whatever its limitations, the Pentagon's study discloses a vast amount of new information about the unfolding American commitment to South Vietnam and the way in which the United States engaged itself in that conflict. It is also rich in insights into the workings of government and the reasoning of the men who ran it.

Throughout the narrative there is ample evidence of vigorous, even acrimonious, debate within the Government—far more than Congress, the press and the public were permitted to discover from official pronouncements.

But the Pentagon account and its accompanying documents also reveal that once the

basic objective of policy was set, the internal debate on Vietnam from 1950 until mid-1967 dealt almost entirely with how to reach those objectives rather than with the basic direction of policy.

The study related that American governments from the Truman Administration onward felt it necessary to take action to prevent Communist control of South Vietnam. As a rationale for policy, the domino theory—that if South Vietnam fell, other countries would inevitably follow—was repeated in endless variations for nearly two decades.

CONFIDENCE AND APPREHENSIONS

Especially during the nineteen-sixties, the Pentagon study discloses, the Government was confident that American power—or even the threat of its use—would bring the war under control.

But the study reveals that high officials in the Johnson Administration were troubled by the potential dangers of Chinese Communist intervention and felt the need for self-restraint to avoid provoking Peking, or the Soviet Union, into combat involvement.

As some top policy makers came to question the effectiveness of the American effort in mid-1967, the report shows, their policy papers began not only to seek to limit the military strategies on the ground and in the air but also to worry about the impact of the war on American society.

"A feeling is widely and strongly held that 'the Establishment' is out of its mind," wrote John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense, in a note to Secretary McNamara in early May, 1967. Mr. McNaughton, who three years earlier had been one of the principal planners of the air war against North Vietnam, went on to say:

"The feeling is that we are trying to impose some U.S. image on distant peoples we cannot understand (any more than we can the younger generation here at home), and that we are carrying the thing to absurd lengths. Related to this feeling is the increased polarization that is taking place in the United States with seeds of the worst split in our people in more than a century."

At the end of June, 1967, Mr. McNamara—deeply disillusioned with the war—decided to commission the Pentagon study of Vietnam policy that Mr. McNaughton and other high officials had encouraged him to undertake.

Mr. McNamara's instructions, conveyed orally and evidently in writing as well, were for the researcher to pull together the Pentagon's documentary record and, according to one well-placed former official, to produce an "objective and encyclopedic" study of the American involvement.

BROADEST POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION

The Pentagon researchers aimed at the broadest possible interpretation of events. They examined not only the policies and motives of American administrations, but also the effectiveness of intelligence, the mechanics and consequences of bureaucratic compromises, the difficulties of imposing American tactics on the South Vietnamese, the governmental uses of the American press, and many other tributaries of their main story.

The authors reveal, for example, that the American intelligence community repeatedly provided the policy makers with what proved to be accurate warnings that desired goals were either unattainable or likely to provoke costly reactions from the enemy. They cite some lapses in the accuracy of reporting and intelligence, but give a generally favorable assessment of the C.I.A. and other intelligence units.

The Pentagon researchers relate many examples of bureaucratic compromise forged by Presidents from the conflicting proposals of their advisers.

In the mid-fifties, they found, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were a restraining force, warning that successful defense of South Vietnam could not be guaranteed under the limits imposed by the 1954 Geneva accords and agreeing to send in American military advisers only on the insistence of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

In the nineteen-sixties, the report found, both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson chose partial measures, overriding advice that some military proposals were valid only as packages and could not be adopted piecemeal.

In examining Washington's constant difficulties with the governments in Saigon, the study found the United States so heavily committed to the regime of the moment and so fearful of instability that it was unable to persuade the South Vietnamese to make the political and economic reforms that Americans deemed necessary to win the allegiance of the people.

Though it ranges widely to explain events, the Pentagon report makes no summary effort to put the blame for the war on any single administration or to find fault with individual officials.

The writers appear to have stood at the political and bureaucratic center of the period, directing their criticisms toward both left and right.

In one section, Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, the antiwar candidate for the 1968 Democratic Presidential nomination, is characterized as "impudent and dovish," and as an "upstart challenger." At another point in the same section the demands of Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, commander of Pacific forces, for all-out bombing of North Vietnam, are characterized as "fulminations."

For the most part, the writers assumed a calm and unemotional tone, dissecting their materials in detached and academic manner. They ventured to answer key questions only when the evidence was at hand. They found no conclusive answers to some of the most widely asked questions about the war, including these:

Precisely how was Ngo Dinh Diem returned to South Vietnam in 1954 from exile and helped to power?

Who took the lead in preventing the 1956 Vietnam elections required under the Geneva accords of 1954—Mr. Diem or the Americans?

If President Kennedy had lived, would he have led the United States into a full-scale ground war in South Vietnam and an air war against North Vietnam as President Johnson did?

Was Secretary of Defense McNamara dismissed for opposing the Johnson strategy in mid-1967 or did he ask to be relieved because of disenchantment with Administration policy?

Did President Johnson's cutback of the bombing to the 20th Parallel in 1968 signal a lowering of American objectives for the war or was it merely an effort to buy more time and patience from a war-weary American public?

The research project was organized in the Pentagon's office of International Security Affairs—I.S.A., as it is known to Government insiders—the politico-military affairs branch, whose head is the third-ranking official in the Defense Department. This was Assistant Secretary McNaughton when the study was commissioned and Assistant Secretary Paul C. Warnke when the study was completed.

"IT REMAINED McNAMARA'S STUDY"

In the fall of 1968, it was transmitted to Mr. Warnke, who reportedly "signed off" on it. Former officials say this meant that he acknowledged completion of the work without endorsing its contents and forwarded it to Mr. Clifford.

Although it had been completed during Mr. Clifford's tenure, "in everyone's mind it always remained Mr. McNamara's study," one official said.

Because of its extreme sensitivity, very few copies were reproduced—from 6 to 15, by various accounts. One copy was delivered by hand to Mr. McNamara, then president of the World Bank. His reaction is not known, but at least one other former policy maker was reportedly displeased by the study's candor.

Other copies were said to have been provided to President Johnson, the State Department and President Nixon's staff, as well as to have been kept for Pentagon files.

The authors, mostly working part-time over several months, were middle-level officials drawn from I.S.A., Systems Analysis, and the military staffs in the Pentagon, or lent by the State Department or White House staff. Probably two-thirds of the group had worked on Vietnam for the Government at one time or another.

Both the writing and editing were described as group efforts, though individuals with academic qualifications as historians, political scientists and the like were in charge of various sections.

For their research, the Pentagon depended primarily on the files of Secretary McNamara and Mr. McNaughton. William P. Bundy, former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, provided some of his files.

For extended periods, probably the most serious limitation of the Pentagon history is the lack of access to White House archives. The researchers did possess the Presidential decision papers that normally circulated to high Pentagon officials, plus White House messages to commanders or ambassadors in Saigon. These provide insight into Presidential moods and motives, but only intermittently.

An equally important handicap is that the Pentagon researchers generally lacked records of the oral discussions of the National Security Council or the most intimate gatherings of Presidents with their closest advisers, where decisions were often reached.

As the authors themselves remark, it is common practice for the final recommendations drafted before a key Presidential decision to be written to the President's spoken specifications on the basis of his reactions to earlier proposals. The missing link is often the meeting of the Administration's inner circle.

Also, because the Pentagon history draws almost entirely on internal Government papers, and primarily papers that circulated through the Defense Department, the picture of so important a figure as Secretary of State Dean Rusk remains shadowy. Mr. Rusk was known as a man who rarely committed himself to paper and who, especially during the Johnson Administration, saved his most sensitive advice for solitary talks with the President.

In the late months of the Johnson Administration, the lack of records of such meetings is a considerable weakness because, as the historians comment, Mr. Johnson operated a split-level Government. Only his most intimate advisers were aware of the policy moves he was contemplating, and some of the most important officials at the second level of government—Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense—were late to learn the drift of the President's thinking.

The Pentagon account notes that at times the highest Administration officials not only kept information about their real intentions from the press and Congress but also kept secret from the Government bureaucracy the real motives for their written recommendations or actions.

"The lesson in this," one Pentagon historian observes, "is that the rationales given in such pieces of paper (intended for fairly wide circulation among the bureaucracy, as opposed to tightly held memoranda limited to those closest to the decision maker), do not reliably indicate why recommendations were

made the way they were." The words in parentheses are the historian's.

Another omission is the absence of any extended discussion of military or political responsibility for such matters as civilian casualties or the restraints imposed by the rules of land warfare.

NECESSARILY FRAGMENTED ACCOUNT

The approach of the writers varies markedly from section to section. Some of the historians are analytical and incisive. Others offer narrative compendiums of the most important available documents for their periods, with little comment or interpretation.

As a bureaucratic history, this account is necessarily fragmented. The writers either lacked time or did not choose to provide a coherent, integrated summary analysis for each of the four administrations that became involved in Vietnam from 1950 to 1968.

The Pentagon account divides the Kennedy period, for example, into five sections—dealing with the key decisions of 1961, the strategic-hamlet programs, the build-up of the American advisory mission in Vietnam, the development of plans for phased American withdrawal, and the coup d'etat that ousted President Diem.

In the Johnson era, four simultaneous stories are told in separate sections—the land war in South Vietnam, the air war against the North, political relations with successive South Vietnamese government and the secret diplomatic search for negotiations. There is some overlapping, but no single section tries to summarize or draw together the various strands.

The over-all effect of the study, nonetheless, is to provide a vast storehouse of new information—the most complete and informative central archive available thus far on the Vietnam era. [See text.]

FOCUS TURNS TO BOMBING

As the Vietcong rebellion gathered strength, so did interest in bombing the North as a substitute for successful prosecution of the counterinsurgency campaign in the South, or at least as an effort to force Hanoi to reduce guerrilla activity to a level where the feeble Saigon Government could handle it.

This progression in Administration thinking was reflected in Mr. McNamara's reports to President Johnson after the Secretary's trips to Vietnam in December and March.

In his December memorandum recommending initiation of the covert 34A raids, Mr. McNamara painted a "gloomy picture" of South Vietnam, with the Vietcong controlling most of the rice and population heartland of the Mekong Delta south and west of Saigon. "We should watch the situation very carefully," he concluded, "running scared, hoping for the best, but preparing for more forceful moves if the situation does not show early signs of improvement."

Then, in his memorandum of March 16 on his latest trip, Mr. McNamara reported that "the situation has unquestionably been growing worse" and recommended military planning for two programs of "new and significant pressures upon North Vietnam."

The first, to be launched on 72 hours' notice, was described as "Border Control and Retaliatory Actions." These would include assaults by Saigon's army against infiltration routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail network of supply lines through southeastern Laos, "hot pursuit" of the guerrillas into Cambodia, "retaliatory bombing strikes" into North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese Air Force "on a tit-for-tat basis" in response to guerrilla attacks, and "aerial mining . . . (possibly with United States assistance) of the major . . . ports in North Vietnam." The words in parentheses are Mr. McNamara's.

BEYOND A TIT-FOR-TAT BASIS

The second program, called "Graduated Overt Military Pressure," was to be readied

to begin on 30 days' notice. "This program would go beyond reacting on a tit-for-tat basis," Mr. McNamara told the President. "It would include air attacks against military and possibly industrial targets." The raids would be carried out by Saigon's air force and by an American air commando squadron code-named Farmgate, then operating in South Vietnam with planes carrying South Vietnamese markings. To conduct the air strikes, they would be reinforced by three squadrons of United States Air Force B-57 jet bombers flown in from Japan.

President Johnson approved Mr. McNamara's recommendations at a National Security Council meeting on March 17, 1964, directing that planning "proceed energetically."

Mr. McNamara had advocated trying a number of measures to improve the Saigon Government's performance first, before resorting to overt escalation. "There would be the problem of marshaling the case to justify such action, the problem of Communist escalation and the problem of dealing with pressures for premature or 'stacked' negotiations," he remarked in his March memorandum.

His description of negotiations echoed a belief in the Administration that the Government of General Khanh was incapable of competing politically with the Communists. Therefore, any attempt to negotiate a compromise political settlement of the war between the Vietnamese themselves was to be avoided because it would result in a Communist take-over and the destruction of the American position in South Vietnam.

Similarly, any internal accommodation between the opposing Vietnamese forces under the vague "neutralization" formula for Vietnam that had been proposed by President Charles de Gaulle of France that June was seen as tantamount to the same thing, a Communist victory. In his March memorandum, Mr. McNamara mentioned the dangerous growth of "neutralist sentiment" in Saigon and the possibility of a coup by neutralist forces who might form a coalition government with the Communists and invite the United States to leave.

A SOLUTION IN DISFAVOR

William Bundy would later refer to this possibility as a "Vietnam solution" that must be prevented.

In a glimpse into the President's thoughts at this time, the study shows he was concerned with the problem. Mr. Johnson told Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in a cablegram to Saigon on March 20, 1964, that he was intent on "knocking down the idea of neutralization wherever it rears its ugly head, and on this point I think nothing is more important than to stop neutralist talk wherever we can by whatever means we can." [See text.]

Mr. Lodge was opposed to planning for "massive destruction actions" before trying what he described as "an essentially diplomatic carrot and stick approach, backed by covert military means."

"This plan, which Mr. Lodge had been proposing since the previous October, involved sending a secret non-American envoy to Hanoi with an offer of economic aid, such as food imports to relieve the rice shortages in North Vietnam, in return for calling off the Vietcong. If the North Vietnamese did not respond favorably, the stick—unpublicized and unacknowledged air strikes, apparently with unmarked planes—would be applied until they did.

The President's message of March 20 shared Mr. Lodge's opinion that it was still too early for open assaults on the North.

"As we agreed in our previous messages to each other," Mr. Johnson cabled, "judgment is reserved for the present on overt military action in view of the consensus from Saigon conversations of McNamara mission with General Khanh and you on judgment

that movement against the North at the present would be premature. We . . . share General Khanh's judgment that the immediate and essential task is to strengthen the southern base. For this reason, our planning for action against the North is on a contingency basis at present, and immediate problem in this area is to develop the strongest possible later action."

Mr. Johnson added that the Administration also expected a "showdown" soon in the Chinese-Soviet dispute "and action against the North will be more practicable" then.

PUSHING, YET HESITATING

This and other sporadic insights the study gives into Mr. Johnson's thoughts and motivations during these months leading up to the Tonkin Gulf incident in August indicate a President who was, on the one hand, pushing his Administration to plan energetically for escalation while, on the other, continually hesitating to translate these plans into military action.

The glimpses are of a Chief Executive who was determined to achieve the goal of an "independent, non-Communist South Vietnam" he had enunciated in a national security action memorandum in March, yet who was holding back on actions to achieve that goal until he believed they were absolutely necessary.

Above all, the narrative indicates a President who was carefully calculating international and domestic political conditions before making any of his moves in public.

By the latter half of April, 1964, accordingly, planning for further attacks against the North had matured sufficiently through several scenarios for Secretary Rusk, William Bundy and Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, the Army Chief of Staff, to review the plans with Ambassador Lodge at a Saigon strategy meeting on April 19 and 20.

The scenario envisioned escalation in three stages from intensification of the current clandestine 34A raids, to "covert U.S. support of overt . . . aerial mining and air strike operations" by Saigon to "overt joint . . . aerial reconnaissance, naval displays, naval bombardments and air attacks" by the United States and South Vietnam.

The analyst does not mention any provision in the April planning scenario for a Congressional resolution that would constitute authority to wage war; he refers instead to "Presidential consultations with key Congressional leaders." But the idea of a resolution was already current by then. The author reports its first emergence in discussions in the State Department in mid-February, 1964, "on the desirability of the President's requesting a Congressional resolution, drawing a line at the borders of South Vietnam." He cites a Feb. 13 letter to Secretary Rusk to this effect from Mr. Rostow, then chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council.

At the April Saigon meeting and in the weeks immediately afterward, the author says, "a deliberate cautious pacing of our actions" prevailed over a near-term escalation approach being pressed by the Joint Chiefs and Mr. Restow.

One reason for this, the study explains, was that the Administration recognized that it "lacked adequate information concerning the nature of magnitude" of infiltration of trained guerrilla leaders and arms from the North and was beginning a major effort to try to gather enough concrete evidence to justify escalation if this became necessary.

ROSTOW PLEA FOR CLARIFICATION

"For example," the study reports, "citing the 'lack of clarity' on the 'role of external intrusion' in South Vietnam, [chairman of the interagency Vietnam coordinating committee] on the eve of [a] March visit to attempt to 'come back from Saigon with as lucid and agreed a picture' as possible on the extent of the infiltration and its influence on the Vietcong."

The direct outcome of Mr. Rusk's April visit to Saigon was his agreement to try Ambassador Lodge's carrot-and-stick approach. On April 30, 1964, the Secretary flew to Ottawa and arranged with the Canadian Government for J. Blair Seaborn, Canada's new representative on the international control Commission, to convey the offer of United States economic aid to Premier Dong when Mr. Seaborn visited Hanoi in June.

On May 4 General Khanh, sensing a decline in his fortunes and beginning to abandon the idea of strengthening his government to the point where it could defeat the Vietcong in the South, told Ambassador Lodge that he wanted to declare war quickly on North Vietnam, have the United States start bombing and send 10,000 Special Forces troops of the United States Army into the South "to cover the whole Cambodian-Laotian border." Mr. Lodge deflected the suggestions.

Secretary McNamara, on a visit to Saigon May 13, was instructed to tell General Khanh that while the United States did not "rule out" bombing the North, "such actions must be supplementary to and not a substitute for successful counter-insurgency in the South" and that "we do not intend to provide military support nor undertake the military objective of 'rolling back' Communist control in North Vietnam."

But on May 17, when the Pathet Lao launched an offensive on the Plaine des Jarres that threatened to collapse the pro-American Government of Premier Souvanna Phouma and with it "the political underpinning of United States-Laotian policy," the study declares, this "deliberate, cautious approach" to escalation planning was suddenly thrown into "crisis management."

The Administration immediately turned the Laotian air operations up a notch by intensifying the T-28 strikes and, on May 21, by starting low-altitude target reconnaissance by United States Navy and Air Force jets over areas held by the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese.

In Washington, the chief planner, William Bundy, assisted by Mr. McNaughton and Mr. Sullivan, worked up a 30-day program culminating in full-scale bombing of the North. He submitted it as a formal draft Presidential memorandum for consideration by an executive committee of the National Security Council.

For a number of reasons, this May 23 scenario was never carried out as written. The President, in fact, delayed another nine months the scenario's dénouement in an air war.

But the document is important because it reveals how far the Administration had progressed in its planning by this point and because a number of the steps in the scenario were carried out piecemeal through June and July and then very rapidly under the political climate of the Tonkin Gulf clash.

For the military side of the scenario, the President's order of March 17 to plan for retaliatory air strikes on 72 hours' notice and for full-scale air raids on 30 days' notice had borne fruit in Operation Plan 37-64.

This plan had been prepared in the Honolulu headquarters of Adm. Harry D. Felt, commander in chief of Pacific forces, or CINCPAC, and had been approved by the Joint Chiefs on April 17. It tabulated how many planes and what bomb tonnages would be required for each phase of the strikes, listed the targets in North Vietnam with damage to be achieved, and programmed the necessary positioning of air forces for the raids. A follow-up operation plan, designated 32-64, calculated the possible reactions of China and North Vietnam and the American ground forces that might be necessary to meet them.

The Joint Staff had refined the bombing plan with more target studies. These estimated that an initial category of targets as-

sociated with infiltration, such as bridges and depots of ammunition and petroleum, could be destroyed in only 12 days if all the air power in the western Pacific were used.

For the political side of the scenario, recommendations from William Bundy and Mr. Rusk had produced more evidence of infiltration by the North for public release to justify escalation. William J. Jordan, a former correspondent of The New York Times who had become a State Department official, had gone to South Vietnam and had pulled together the data available there for a possible new State Department white paper.

PENTAGON VERSION OF SCENARIO

Here is the scenario as the Pentagon analyst quotes it. The words in parentheses—and the numbers designating the length of time to "D-day"—were in the original scenario and the words in brackets were inserted by the analyst for clarification:

"1. Stall off any 'conference [Laos or] Vietnam until D-Day.'

"2. Intermediary (Canadian?) tell North Vietnam in general terms that U.S. does not want to destroy the North Vietnam regime (and indeed is willing 'to provide a carrot') but is determined to protect South Vietnam from North Vietnam.

"3. (D-30) Presidential speech in general terms launching Joint Resolution.

"4. (D-20) Obtain joint resolution approving past actions and authorizing whatever is necessary with respect to Vietnam.

"Concurrently: An effort should be made to strengthen the posture in South Vietnam. Integrating (interlarding in a single chain of command) the South Vietnamese and U.S. military and civilian elements critical to pacification, down at least to the district level, might be undertaken.

"5. (D-16) Direct CINCPAC to take all preposition and logistic actions that can be taken 'quietly' for the D-Day forces. . . .

"6. (D-15) Get Khanh's agreement to start over South Vietnamese aid attacks against targets in the North (see D-Day item 15 below), and inform him of U.S. guarantee to protect South Vietnam in the event of North Vietnamese and/or Chinese retaliation.

"7. (D-14) Consult with Thailand and the Philippines to get permission for U.S. deployments; and consult with them plus U.K., Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan, asking for their open political support for the undertaking and for their participation in the re-enforcing action to be undertaken in anticipation of North Vietnamese and/or Chinese retaliation.

"8. (D-13) Release an expanded 'Jordan Report,' including recent photography and evidence of the communication nets, giving full documentation of North Vietnamese supply and direction of the Vietcong.

"9. (D-12) Direct CINCPAC to begin moving forces and making specific plans on the assumption that strikes will be made on D-Day (see Attachment B* in backup materials for deployments).

"10. (D-10) Khanh makes speech demanding that North Vietnam stop aggression, threatening unspecified military action if he does not. (He could refer to a "carrot.")

"11. (D-9) Discussions with allies not covered in Item above.

"12. (D-8) President informs U.S. public (and thereby North Vietnam) that action may come, referring to Khanh speech (Item 10 above) and declaring support for South Vietnam.

"13. (D-1) Khanh announces that all efforts have failed and that attacks are imminent. (Again he refers to limited goal and possibly to 'carrot'.)

"14. (D-Day) Remove U.S. dependents.

"15. (D-Day) Launch first strikes. . . . Initially, mine their ports and strike North Vietnam's transport and related ability (bridge, trains) to move south; and then against targets which have maximum

psychological effect on the North's willingness to stop insurgency—POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) storage, selected airfields, barracks/training areas, bridges, railroad yards, port facilities, communications, and industries. Initially, these strikes would be by South Vietnamese aircraft; they could then be expanded by adding Farmgate, or U.S. aircraft, or any combination of them.

"16. (D-Day) Call for conference on Vietnam (and go to U.N.). State the limited objective: Not to overthrow the North Vietnam regime nor to destroy the country, but to stop D.R.V.-directed efforts in the South. Essential that it be made clear that attacks on the North will continue (i.e., no ceasefire) until (a) terrorism, armed attacks, and armed resistance to pacification efforts in the South stop, and (b) communications on the networks out of the North are conducted entirely in uncoded form."

THE ANALYST'S DEFINITION

The last paragraph was to provide a capsule definition of what the Administration meant when it later spoke publicly about "negotiations," a definition the analyst describes as "tantamount to unconditional surrender" for the other side.

The covering memorandum on the scenario pointed out that military action would not begin until after "favorable action" on the joint Congressional resolution. William Bundy drafted the resolution on May 25.

Attached to the scenario were assessments of possible Soviet, Chinese and North Vietnamese reactions. These included a provision for reinforcing the South Vietnamese Army "by U.S. ground forces prepositioned in South Vietnam or on board ship nearby" if Hanoi reacted by intensifying Vietcong activity in the South.

After meetings on May 24 and 25, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council—including Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, and McGeorge Bundy, Presidential assistant for national security—decided to recommend to the President only piecemeal elements of the scenario. Among these were the sending of the Canadian emissary to Hanoi and the move for a joint Congressional resolution.

The documents do not provide a clear explanation for their decision, the analyst says, although an important factor seems to have been concern that "our limited objectives might have been obscured" if the Administration had begun a chain of actions to step up the war at this point.

Whether political considerations in an election year also prompted the President to limit the proposed escalation is a question that is not addressed by the study here. The narrative does attribute such motives to Mr. Johnson's similar hesitation to take major overt actions in the following month, June.

In any case, the account explains, the urgency was taken out of the Laos crisis by a Polish diplomatic initiative on May 27 for a new Laos conference that would not include discussions of Vietnam, a major fear of the Administration. The President instructed his senior advisers to convene another strategy conference in Honolulu at the beginning of June "to review for . . . final approval a series of plans for effective action."

On his way to the conference, after attending the funeral of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi, Secretary Rusk stopped off in Saigon for conversations with General Khanh and Ambassador Lodge.

The Ambassador and Gen. William C. Westmoreland, who was replacing General Harkins as chief of the Military Assistance Command in Saigon, flew to Honolulu with Secretary Rusk for the strategy session at Admiral Felt's headquarters there on June 1

and 2, 1964. They were joined by William Bundy, Mr. McNamara, General Taylor, Mr. McCone and Mr. Sullivan.

While he had previously counseled patience, Mr. Lodge's chief recommendation at Honolulu reflected his growing nervousness over the shakiness of the Saigon regime. He argued for bombing the North soon.

The analyst writes: "In answer to Secretary Rusk's query about South Vietnamese popular attitudes, which supported Hanoi's revolutionary aims, the Ambassador stated his conviction that most support for the VC would fade as soon as some 'counterterrorism measures' were begun against the D.R.V.—the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam.

Admiral Felt's record of the first day's session quotes Mr. Lodge as predicting that "a selective bombing campaign against military targets in the North" would "bolster morale and give the population in the South a feeling of unity."

The Honolulu discussions concentrated on an air war, ranging over its entire implications, down to such details as the kind of antiaircraft guns North Vietnam had and how difficult these defenses might make attacks on particular targets. By now the Joint Chiefs had improved on Admiral Felt's Operation Plan 37-64 to the point of producing the first version of a comprehensive list of 94 targets, from bridges to industries, that Mr. McNamara and President Johnson would use to select the actual sites to be struck when sustained air raids began in the coming year.

Obtaining a Congressional resolution prior to wider U.S. action in Southeast Asia was a major topic. The analyst paraphrases and quotes from William Bundy's memorandum of record on the second day's talks to summarize the discussion concerning the resolution:

"Ambassador Lodge questioned the need for it if we were to confine our actions to 'tit-for-tat' air attacks against North Vietnam. However, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk and C.I.A. Director McCone all argued in favor of the resolution. In support, McNamara pointed to the need to guarantee South Vietnam's defense against retaliatory air attacks and against more drastic reactions by North Vietnam and Communist China. He added that it might be necessary, as the action unfolded . . . to deploy as many as seven divisions. Rusk noted that some of the military requirements might involve the calling up of reserves, always a touchy Congressional issue. He also stated that public opinion on our Southeast Asia policy was badly divided in the United States at the moment and that, therefore, the President needed an affirmation of support."

"General Taylor noted that there was a danger of reasoning ourselves into inaction," the memorandum goes on. "From a military point of view, he said the U.S. could function in Southeast Asia about as well as anywhere in the world except Cuba."

MORE TIME FOR ESTIMATES

The upshot of the conference, however, was that major actions "should be delayed for some time yet," the historian says. A separate briefing paper that William Bundy prepared for Secretary Rusk to use in communicating the conference's findings to the President at a White House meeting late on the afternoon of June 3 counseled more time "to refine our plans and estimates." Mr. Bundy emphasized the need for an "urgent" public relations campaign at home to "get at the basic doubts of the value of Southeast Asia and the importance of our stake there."

Secretary McNamara, General Taylor and Mr. McCone joined Secretary Rusk in making the June 3 report to the President on the Honolulu conference. A documentary record of this White House meeting is not available,

but the study deduces the President's reaction and decisions from the subsequent actions taken by his senior advisers.

Where decisive military actions were concerned, "the President apparently recognized the need for more and better information, but did not convey a sense of urgency regarding its acquisition," the analyst says. He notes that on the same day as the White House meeting, "possibly just following," Secretary McNamara told the Joint Chiefs that he wanted to meet with them on June 8, five days later, "to discuss North Vietnamese targets and troop movement capabilities."

But one element of the May 23 scenario, the positioning of forces for later action, began to fall into place right after the White House meeting. The Pentagon study says that "noncommitting military actions . . . were given immediate approval."

On June 4 Mr. McNamara directed the Army to take "immediate action . . . to improve the effectiveness and readiness status of its materiel prestocked for possible use in Southeast Asia."

The Secretary's directive specifically ordered the Army to augment stocks previously placed with Thailand's agreement at Korat, a town south of the Laotian border, to support potential combat operations by a United States Army infantry brigade and to give "first priority at the Okinawa Army Forward Depot to stocking non-air-transportable equipment" that would be required by another Army infantry brigade flown to the island staging base on sudden notice.

The President also "apparently encouraged" they intensified public-relations campaign recommended by William Bundy and the other Honolulu conference participants, the study asserts.

"In June, State and Defense Department sources made repeated leaks to the press affirming U.S. intentions to support its allies and uphold its treaty commitments in Southeast Asia," the analyst explains, citing several articles that month in *The New York Times*. The Administration also focused publicity through June and into July on its military repositioning moves. The augmentation of the Army war stocks at Korat in Thailand was given "extensive press coverage," the account says, citing a dispatch in *The Times* on June 21, 1964.

And what the analyst calls "the broad purpose" of these positioning moves—to serve as steps in the operation plans—was not explained to the public.

DOWNING TWO NAVY JETS

The Administration did openly step up its air operations in Laos in mid-June, after the enemy provided it with a rationale of self-defense. On June 6 and 7 two Navy jets on low-altitude target reconnaissance flights were shot down by enemy ground fire. Washington immediately added armed escort jets to the reconnaissance flights and on June 9 the escort jets struck Pathet Lao gun positions and attacked a Pathet Lao headquarters.

A similar escalation of the T-28 operations and the involvement of Thai pilots was unofficially acknowledged in Washington, although the responsibility for these operations was laid to the Laotian Government. And subsequent strikes by the American escort jets against enemy positions were not made public.

At the end of June the Royal Laotian Air Force was secretly strengthened with more T-28's, and American planes began conducting troop transport operations and night reconnaissance flights for a successful counter-offensive by the Laotian Army to protect the key position of Muong Soui.

HIGHLIGHTS OF TONKIN PERIOD

Here, in chronological sequence, are highlights of the period covered in this article:

FEBRUARY 1964

Start of Operation Plan 34A program of clandestine military operations against North Vietnam;

MARCH 1964

Plans for "new and significant pressures on North Vietnam" urged by Mr. McNamara on return from Vietnam; since new Government of Gen. Nguyen Khanh considered unable to improve South Vietnam outlook.

President Johnson approves; cables Henry Cabot Lodge, United States Ambassador in Saigon, that "our planning for action against the North is on a contingency basis at the present."

APRIL 1964

Scenarios for escalation reviewed in Saigon by Mr. Lodge, William P. Bundy, Dean Rusk, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler. Plans cover details of stepping up United States military involvement to conform with Administration conviction that Hanoi controls Vietcong. Extent of Hanoi's involvement should be "proven to the satisfaction of our own public, of our own allies and of the neutralists," according to Mr. Rusk.

List of 94 potential targets for bombing in North drawn up by Joint Chiefs.

MAY 1964

General Khanh asks United States attacks on the North, tells Mr. Lodge Saigon wants to declare war on North Vietnam. Mr. McNamara does not "rule out" possibility of bombing, but stresses "such actions must be supplementary to and not a substitute for" success against Vietcong in South. Mr. Lodge cables Mr. Rusk that United States cannot "expect a much better performance" from Saigon Government "unless something" in the way of United States action is forthcoming.

William Bundy sends President 30-day scenario for graduated military pressure against the North that would culminate in full-scale bombing attacks. Includes joint Congressional resolution "authorizing whatever is necessary with respect to Vietnam."

JUNE 1964

Honolulu strategy meeting, Ambassador Lodge urges "a selective bombing campaign against military target in the North" to bolster shaky morale in South. He questions need for Congressional resolution; Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNamara, John McCone of C.I.A., support it.

Preparatory military deployments under way in Southeast Asia.

J. Blair Seaborn, Canadian diplomat, meets secretly in Hanoi with Pham Van Dong, North Vietnam's Premier, warns of "the greatest devastation" that would result from escalation by North Vietnam.

President resists pressure to ask for Congressional resolution immediately and to step up the war effort.

Mr. Johnson queries C.I.A. on "domino theory." Agency replies only Cambodia is, likely to "quickly succumb to Communism" if Laos and South Vietnam fall, but says U.S. prestige would be damaged.

JULY 1964

General Khanh announces "March North" propaganda campaign.

South Vietnamese naval commandos raid two North Vietnamese islands in Gulf of Tonkin. Part of "growing operational capabilities" of 34A program, the Pentagon study says.

AUGUST 1964

Destroyer Maddox, on Gulf of Tonkin intelligence patrol, attacked by North Vietnamese PT boats seeking South Vietnamese raiders. Joined by the C. Turner Joy, attacked again by torpedo boats, history reports.

Less than 12 hours after news of second attack reaches Washington, bombers on way to North Vietnam on reprisal raiders from carrier.

Tonkin Gulf resolution, drafted by Administration, introduced. Administration officials testify; Mr. McNamara disclaims knowledge South Vietnamese attacks on islands. Resolution passes.

What study calls "an important threshold in the war"—U.S. reprisal air strikes against North—crossed with "virtually no domestic criticism."

FIRMNESS, BUT RESTRAINT

President Johnson was projecting an image of firmness but moderation, the study notes. In early June, he first requested and then rejected a draft from Mr. Rostow for a major policy speech on Southeast Asia that took an "aggressive approach," and instead relied "on news conferences and speeches by other officials to state the official view," the account continues. "In contrast to the Rostow approach, [the President's] news conference on 23 June and Secretary Rusk's speech at Williams College, 14 June, emphasized the U.S. determination to support its Southeast Asian allies, but avoided any direct challenge to Hanoi and Peking or any hint of intent to increase our military commitment."

A formal question the President submitted to the C.I.A. in June also indicated what was on his mind. "Would the rest of Southeast Asia necessarily fall if Laos and South Vietnam came under North Vietnamese control?" he asked. The agency's reply on June 9 challenged the domino theory, widely believed in one form or another within the Administration.

"With the possible exception of Cambodia," the C.I.A. memorandum said, "it is likely that no nation in the area would quickly succumb to Communism as a result of the fall of Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a continuation of the spread of Communism in the area would not be inexorable, and any spread which did occur would take time—time in which the total situation might change in any number of ways unfavorable to the Communist cause."

The C.I.A. analysis conceded that the loss of South Vietnam and Laos "would be profoundly damaging to the U.S. position in the Far East" and would raise the prestige of China "as a leader of world Communism" at the expense of a more moderate Soviet Union. But the analysis argued that so long as the United States could retain its island bases, such as those on Okinawa, Guam, the Philippines and Japan, it could wield enough military power in Asia to deter China and North Vietnam from overt military aggression against Southeast Asia in general.

SOME LEVERAGE AVAILABLE

Even in the "worst case," if South Vietnam and Laos were to fall through "a clear-cut Communist victory," the United States would still retain some leverage to affect the final outcome in Southeast Asia, according to the analysis.

It said that "the extent to which individual countries would move away from the U.S. towards the Communists would be significantly affected by the substance and manner of U.S. policy in the period following the loss of Laos and South Vietnam."

As in the case of the earlier C.I.A. analysis stating that the real roots of Vietcong strength lay in South Vietnam, the study shows that the President and his senior officials were not inclined to adjust policy along the lines of this analysis challenging the domino theory.

Only the Joint Chiefs, Mr. Rostow and General Taylor appear to have accepted the domino theory in its literal sense—that all of the countries of Southeast Asia, from Cambodia to Malaysia, would tumble automatically into the Communist camp if the linchpin, South Vietnam were knocked out, and that the United States position in the rest of the Far East, from Indonesia through the Philippines to Japan and Korea, would also be irrevocably harmed.

Yet the President and most of his closest civilian advisers—Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNamara and McGeorge Bundy—seem to have regarded the struggle over South Vietnam in more or less these terms. [See text.]

In 1964, the Administration also feared an outbreak of other "wars of national liberation" in the Asian, African and Latin American countries, and, Mr. McNamara wrote in his March 16 memorandum to the President, "the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case."

THE THREAT OF CHINA

The struggle in South Vietnam was likewise bound up with the idea of "containing China," whose potential shadow over Southeast Asia was viewed as a palpable threat by Rusk because of his World War II experience in Asia and the victory of Mao Tse-tung's revolution in China.

But behind these foreign-policy axioms about domino effects, wars of liberation and the containment of China, the study reveals a deeper perception among the President and his aides that the United States was now the most powerful nation in the world and that the outcome in South Vietnam would demonstrate the will and the ability of the United States to have its way in world affairs.

The study conveys an impression that the war was thus considered less important for what it meant to the South Vietnamese people than for what it meant to the position of the United States in the world.

Mr. McNaughton would later capsule this perception in a memorandum to Mr. McNamara seeking to apportion American aims in South Vietnam:

"70 pct.—To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor).

"20 pct.—To keep SVN (and then adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.

"10 pct.—To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life.

"Also—To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used.

"NOT—To 'help a friend,' although it would be hard to stay in if asked out."

The words in parentheses are Mr. McNaughton's.

Thus, he had reasoned in another memorandum, even if bombing North Vietnam did not force Hanoi to call off the Vietcong, "it would demonstrate that U.S. was a 'good doctor' willing to keep promises, be tough, take risks, get bloodied and hurt the enemy badly."

CONFIDENCE AT THE TOP

And while the study shows doubt and worry in the Administration, it also reveals an underlying confidence among the decision makers at the top, whose attitude would count, that if this mightiest nation resolved to use its vast power, the other side would buckle.

Mr. Rostow would articulate this confidence in a memorandum to Secretary Rusk that fall: "I know well the anxieties and complications on our side of the line. But there may be a tendency to underestimate both the anxieties and complications on the other side and also to underestimate that limited but real margin of influence on the outcome that flows from the simple fact that we are the greatest power in the world—if we behave like it."

Accordingly, in mid-June, the Administration carried out another element of the May 23 scenario, the element that had first been formulated by Ambassador Lodge as his "carrot and stick." On June 18, at the Administration's request, Mr. Seaborn, the new Canadian representative on the International Control Commission, paid the first of his two secret calls on Premier Dong in Hanoi.

Washington sought to convey to North Vietnam through Mr. Seaborn the more precise and threatening meaning of the preparatory military deployments to Southeast Asia that it was publicizing on a vaguer level in public. Back in May, Mr. Lodge had

urged an unacknowledged air strike on some target in the North "as a prelude to his [Mr. Seaborn's] arrival" if the Vietcong had recently committed some terrorist act "of the proper magnitude" in the South, but the President apparently did not see fit to act on the suggestion by June.

The analyst says Mr. Seaborn stressed to Premier Dong that while the United States' ambitions in Southeast Asia were limited and its intentions "essentially peaceful," its patience was not limitless. The United States was fully aware of the degree to which Hanoi controlled the Vietcong, Mr. Seaborn said, and "in the event of escalation the greatest devastation would of course result for the D.R.V. itself."

NO REPORT ON THE 'CARROT'

The North Vietnamese Premier, the study relates, "fully understood the seriousness and import of the warning conveyed by Seaborn." Whether Mr. Seaborn also proffered the "carrot" of food and other economic aid is not reported.

At the June 3 meeting at the White House, the President had also apparently approved continued work for the Congressional resolution, the historian says, because planning for it continued apace. "Its intended purpose," the historian comments, "was to dramatize and make clear to other nations the firm resolve of the United States Government in an election year to support the President in taking whatever action was necessary to resist Communist aggression in Southeast Asia."

By June 10, there was "firm support" from most of the foreign-policy-making machinery of the Government for obtaining the resolution, although the account notes that at an interagency meeting that day "five basic 'disagreeable questions' were identified for which the Administration would have to provide convincing answers to assure public support."

"These included: (1) Does this imply a blank check for the President to go to war in Southeast Asia? (2) What kinds of force could he employ under this authorization? (3) What change in the situation (if any) requires the resolution now? (4) Can't our objectives be attained by means other than U.S. military force? (5) Does Southeast Asia mean enough to U.S. national interests?"

Despite the prospect of having to answer these questions publicly, William Bundy wrote in a memorandum for a second interagency meeting on June 12, the Administration required a Congressional resolution immediately as "a continuing demonstration of U.S. firmness and for complete flexibility in the hands of the executive in the coming political months." While the United States did not expect "to move in the near future to military action against North Vietnam," he said, events in South Vietnam or Laos might force it to reconsider this position.

POSTPONED FOR THE PRESENT

But in the opinion of the analyst, the President in June, 1964, already felt "the political conventions just around the corner and the election issues regarding Vietnam clearly drawn," and so he recoiled at this time from the repercussions of major escalation and of seeking a Congressional resolution. At a high-level meeting on both subjects June 15, McGeorge Bundy, the historian says, brought Presidential guidance to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara in the form of a White House memorandum that postponed a decision for the present.

On July 19, he started a "March North" campaign of militant slogans and oratory at a "unification rally" in Saigon. The same day, as the analyst puts it, Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, then chief of the South Vietnamese Air Force, "spilled the beans to reporters" on joint planning that the United States and the Saigon Government had secretly been conducting since June, with President Johnson's approval, for ground and

air assaults in Laos. The planning envisioned eventual battalion-size attacks by Saigon's army and air strikes by the South Vietnamese against Communist infiltration routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail network.

In an emotional meeting on July 23 with General Taylor, who had just replaced Mr. Lodge as Ambassador, General Khanh asserted that North Vietnamese draftees had been taken prisoner with Vietcong guerrillas in fighting in the northern provinces. The United States should realize, he said, that the war had entered a new phase that called for new measures.

ANOTHER HEATED MEETING

During another heated meeting on July 24, General Khanh asked Ambassador Taylor whether to resign. The Ambassador asked him not to do so and cabled Washington urging that the United States undertake covert joint planning with the South Vietnamese for bombing the North.

The State Department, the study says, immediately authorized Ambassador Taylor "to tell Khanh the U. S. G. had considered attacks on North Vietnam that might begin, for example, if the pressure from dissident South Vietnamese factions became too great. He must keep this confidential."

To restrain the South Vietnamese military, the Ambassador was also authorized to undertake joint planning for an air campaign.

The Pentagon narrative skims over the last few days in July, 1964, but a summary of a command and control study of the Tonkin Gulf incident done by the Defense Department's Weapons System Evaluation Group in 1965, which The Times obtained along with the Pentagon narratives, fills in the events of these few days.

The study discloses that after a National Security Council meeting called on July 25, apparently to discuss these critical developments in Saigon, the Joint Chiefs proposed air strikes by unmarked planes flown by non-American crews against several targets in North Vietnam, including the coastal bases for Hanoi's flotilla of torpedo boats.

Assistant Secretary McNaughton sent the Joint Chiefs' memorandum to Secretary Rusk on July 30, the study reports, the same day that a chain of events was to unfold that would make it unnecessary to carry out the Joint Chiefs' plan, even if the President had wanted to accept it.

The Pentagon narrative now remarks that the clandestine 34A raids against North Vietnam—after getting off to what the Joint Chiefs had called "a slow beginning" in a report to Mr. McNamara on May 19—picked up in tempo and size during the summer, although the analyst provides few details. The Joint Chiefs had informed Mr. McNamara that trained sabotage teams, electronic intelligence-gathering equipment, C-123 transports for the airdrops and fast PT boats for the coastal raids were giving the program "growing operational capabilities. [See text.]

ATTACK ON TWO ISLANDS

At midnight on July 30, South Vietnamese naval commandos under General Westmoreland's command staged an amphibious raid on the North Vietnamese islands of Hon Me and Hon Nieu in the Gulf of Tonkin.

While the assault was occurring, the United States destroyer Maddox was 120 to 130 miles away, heading north into the gulf on the year's second De Soto intelligence-gathering patrol. Her sailing orders said she was not to approach closer than eight nautical miles to the North Vietnamese coast and four nautical miles to North Vietnamese islands in the gulf.

The account does not say whether the captain of the Maddox had been informed about the 34A raid. He does state that the Maddox altered course twice on Aug. 2 to avoid a concentration of three North Vietnamese

torpedo boats and a fleet of junks that were still searching the seas around the islands for the raiders.

The destroyer reached the northernmost point of her assigned patrol track the same day and headed south again.

"When the [North Vietnamese] PT boats began their high-speed run at her at a distance of approximately 10 miles, the destroyer was 23 miles from the coast and heading further into international waters," the study says. "Apparently," it explains, "these boats . . . had mistaken Maddox for a South Vietnamese escort vessel."

In the ensuing engagement, two of the torpedo boats were damaged by planes launched from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga, stationed to the south for reasons the study does not explain. A third PT boat was knocked dead in the water, sunk by a direct hit from one of the Maddox's five-inch guns.

NEW ORDERS FOR MADDOX

The next day, Aug. 3, President Johnson ordered the Maddox reinforced by the destroyer C. Turner Joy and directed that both destroyers be sent back into the gulf, this time with instructions not to approach closer than 11 nautical miles to the North Vietnamese coast. A second aircraft carrier, the Constellation, on a visit to Hong Kong, was instructed to make steam and join the Ticonderoga as quickly as possible.

The study terms these reinforcing actions "a normal precaution" in the light of the first attack on the Maddox and not an attempt to use the destroyers as bait for another attack that would provide a pretext for reprisal air strikes against the North. "Moreover," it comments, "since the augmentation was coupled with a clear [public] statement of intent to continue the patrols and a firm warning to the D.R.V. that a repetition would bring dire consequences, their addition to the patrol could be expected to serve more as a deterrent than a provocation."

The study gives a clear impression that the Administration at this moment did not believe the North Vietnamese would dare to attack the reinforced destroyer patrol.

For on the night of Aug. 3, while the De Soto patrol was resuming, two more clandestine 34A attacks were staged. PT boats manned by South Vietnamese crews bombarded the Rhon River estuary and a radar installation at Vinhson. This time the Maddox and the Turner Joy were definitely warned that the clandestine assaults were going to take place, the documents show.

Apparently expecting the President to order a resumption of the patrol, the admiral commanding the Seventh Fleet asked General Westmoreland on Aug. 2 to furnish him the general location of the planned raids so that the destroyers could steer clear of the 34A force. There was a good deal of cable traffic back and forth between the two commanders through the Pentagon communications center in Washington to modify the patrol's course on Aug. 3 to avoid any interference with the raiders.

On the night of Aug. 4, Tonkin Gulf time, approximately 24 hours after this second 34A assault, North Vietnamese torpedo boats then attacked both the Maddox and the Turner Joy in what was to be the fateful clash in the gulf.

MOTIVES STILL UNCLEAR

The Pentagon account says that Hanoi's motives for this second attack on the destroyers are still unclear. The narrative ties the attack to the chain of events set off by the 34A raids of July 30, but says that Hanoi's precise motive may have been to recover from the embarrassment of having two torpedo boats damaged and another sunk in the first engagement with the Maddox without any harm to the American destroyer.

"Perhaps closer to the mark is the narrow purpose of prompt retaliation for an embarrassing and well-publicized rebuff by

a much-maligned enemy," the narrative says. "Inexperienced in modern naval operations, D.R.V. leaders may have believed that under the cover of darkness it would be possible to even the score or to provide at least a psychological victory by severely damaging a U.S. ship."

The study does not raise the question whether the second 34A raid on the night of Aug. 3, or the apparent air strikes on North Vietnamese villages just across the Laotian border on Aug. 1 and 2 by T-28 planes, motivated the Hanoi leadership in any way to order the second engagement with the destroyers.

Marshall Green, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, mentioned the apparent bombing of the villages in a lengthy memorandum to William Bundy dated Nov. 7, 1964, on United States covert activities in Indochina. [See text.]

Listing complaints that North Vietnam had been making to the International Control Commission over the T-28 operations with Thai pilots, Mr. Green noted charges by Hanoi that "T-28's have violated North Vietnamese airspace and bombed/strafed NVN villages on Aug. 1 and 2, and on Oct. 16 and 17 and gain on Oct. 28. The charges are probably accurate with respect to the first two dates (along Route 7) and the last one (Mugia Pass area)." The words in parentheses are Mr. Green's.

RAIDS POSSIBLY INADVERTENT

The context of the memorandum indicates that the raids on the North Vietnamese villages may have been inadvertent. But neither the narrative nor Mr. Green's memorandum says whether Hanoi thought this at the time the air strikes occurred.

Whatever the North Vietnamese motives for the second clash, President Johnson moved quickly now to carry out what the analyst calls "recommendations made . . . by his principal advisers earlier that summer and subsequently placed on the shelf."

Because of the Pacific time difference, the Pentagon received the first word that an attack on the Maddox and the Turner Joy might be imminent at 9:20 A.M. on the morning of Aug. 4, after the destroyers had intercepted North Vietnamese radio traffic indicating preparations for an assault. The flash message that the destroyers were actually engaged came into the communications center at 11 A.M.

The Joint Chiefs' staff began selecting target options for reprisal air strikes from the 94-target list, the first version of which was drawn up at the end of May. Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp, who had replaced Admiral Felt as commander in chief of Pacific forces, telephoned from Honolulu to suggest bombing the coastal bases for the torpedo boats.

Within 10 minutes, Mr. McNamara convened a meeting with the Joint Chiefs in his conference room on the third floor of the Pentagon to discuss possibilities for retaliation. Secretary Rusk and McGeorge Bundy came over to join them.

MEETING ALREADY SCHEDULED

Twenty-five minutes later the two secretaries and Mr. Bundy left for a previously scheduled National Security Council meeting at the White House. They would recommend reprisal strikes to the President, while the Joint Chiefs stayed at the Pentagon to decide on specific targets.

At 1:25 P.M., two and a half hours after the flash message of the engagement and possibly while Mr. McNamara, Mr. Rusk, Mr. McCone and McGeorge Bundy were still at lunch with the President, the director of the Joint Staff telephoned Mr. McNamara to say that the Chiefs had unanimously agreed on the targets. Fighter-bombers from the carriers Constellation and Ticonderoga should strike four torpedo boat bases at Hongay, Lochau, Phuclou and Quangkhe, and an oil

storage depot near Vinh that held some 10 per cent of North Vietnam's petroleum supply.

At a second National Security Council meeting that afternoon, President Johnson ordered the reprisals, decided to seek the Congressional resolution immediately and discussed with his advisors the swift Southeast Asia deployment of the air strike forces designated in Operation Plan 37-64 for the opening blows in a possible bombing campaign against the North. His approval for these preparatory air deployments, and for the readiness of Marine Corps and Army units planned to meet any Chinese or North Vietnamese retaliation to a bombing campaign, was apparently given later that day, the study shows.

Mr. McNamara returned to the Pentagon at 3 P.M. to approve the details of the reprisal strikes, code-named Pierce Arrow. An execution order was prepared by the Joint Staff, but at 4 P.M. Mr. McNamara learned from Admiral Sharp in a telephone conversation that there was now confusion over whether an attack on the destroyers had actually taken place.

The Secretary told Admiral Sharp that the reprisal order would remain in effect, but that the admiral was to check and make certain that an attack had really occurred before actually launching the planes. At 4:49 P.M., less than six hours after the first message of the attack had flashed into the Pentagon communications center, the formal execution order for the reprisals was transmitted to Honolulu. Admiral Sharp had not yet called back with confirming details of the attack. The order specified that the carriers were to launch their planes within about two and a half hours.

The admiral called back at 5:23 P.M. and again a few minutes after 6 o'clock to say that he was satisfied, on the basis of information from the task group commander of the two destroyers, that the attack had been genuine. The study says that in the meantime Mr. McNamara and the Joint Chiefs had also examined the confirming evidence, including intercepted radio messages from the North Vietnamese saying that their vessels were engaging the destroyers and that two torpedo boats had been sunk.

By now Mr. McNamara and the Chiefs had moved on to discussing the pre-positioning of the air strike forces under Operation Plan 37-64.

At 6:45 P.M., President Johnson met with 16 Congressional leaders from both parties whom he had summoned to the White House. He told them that because of the second unprovoked attack on the American destroyers, he had decided to launch reprisal air strikes against the North and to ask for a Congressional resolution, the study says.

The Pentagon study gives no indication that Mr. Johnson informed the Congressional leaders of United States responsibility for and command of the covert 34A raids on July 30 and Aug. 3.

Nor does the history give any indication that Mr. Johnson told the Congressional leaders of what the historian describes as "the broader purpose of the deployments" under Operation Plan 37-64, which Mr. McNamara was to announce at a Pentagon news conference the next day and describe as a precautionary move.

"It is significant," the analyst writes, "that few of these additional units were removed from the western Pacific when the immediate crisis subsided. In late September the fourth attack aircraft carrier was authorized to resume its normal station in the eastern Pacific as soon as the regularly assigned carrier completed repairs. The other forces remained in the vicinity of their August deployment."

PLANES LEAVE TICONDEROGA

At 8:30 P.M. on Aug. 4, Mr. McNamara returned to the Pentagon and at 11:30 P.M., after several telephone calls to Admiral

Sharp, he learned that the Ticonderoga had launched her bomb laden aircraft at 10:43 P.M. They were expected to arrive over their targets in about an hour and 50 minutes.

The carriers had needed more time to get into launching position than the execution order had envisioned. The Constellation, steaming from Hong Kong, was not to launch her planes for another couple of hours.

The President did not wait. Sixteen minutes after Mr. McNamara's last phone call to Admiral Sharp, at 11:36 P.M., he went on television to tell the nation of the reprisal strikes. He characterized his actions as a "limited and fitting" response. "We still seek no wider war," he said.

Almost simultaneously, the air deployments under Operation Plan 37-64 had begun.

The first F-102 Delta Dagger jet fighters were landing at Saigon's airport around the time Mr. McNamara described the deployments at a Pentagon news conference on Aug. 5. He had given a brief post-midnight conference the same day to describe the reprisal strikes. He reported now that 25 North Vietnamese patrol craft had been destroyed or damaged along with 90 per cent of the oil storage tanks near Vinh.

"Last night I announced that moves were under way to reinforce our forces in the Pacific areas," he continued. "These moves include the following actions:

"First, an attack carrier group has been transferred from the First Fleet on the Pacific coast to the western Pacific. Secondly, interceptor and fighter-bomber aircraft have been moved into South Vietnam. Thirdly, fighter-bomber aircraft have been moved into Thailand. Fourthly, interceptor and fighter-bomber squadrons have been transferred from the United States into advance bases in the Pacific. Fifthly, and antisubmarine task force group has been moved into the South China Sea. And finally, selected Army and Marine forces have been alerted and readied for movement."

FULBRIGHT A SENATE SPONSOR

The study notes that the Administration drafted the Congressional resolution for the two men who would sponsor its passage through both houses for the President: Senator J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Representative Thomas E. Morgan of Pennsylvania, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Precisely who drafted this final version of the resolution is not mentioned. The wording was less precise than that of the resolution drafted by William Bundy for the May 23 scenario, but the key language making the resolution in effect a declaration of war remained:

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approve and support the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

"Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

Mr. McNamara and Secretary Rusk both testified on behalf of the resolution in secret sessions of the Senate and House for-

eign relations committees on Aug. 6. In his narrative, the Pentagon Analyst occasionally quotes from and refers to portions of their testimony, which have never been made public by the Pentagon. Along with the study, The Times also obtained more extensive quotations from this portion of the hearing transcript. The following account of the testimony on Aug. 6 thus contains both quotations used by the Pentagon analyst and the fuller quotations obtained by The Times.

MORSE LEARNS OF ATTACKS

Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon had learned that boats manned by South Vietnamese crews had attacked the two North Vietnamese islands on July 30. Mr. Morse, one of two Senators who were to vote against the Tonkin Gulf resolution—the other was Ernest L. Gruening of Alaska—alleged during the secret hearing on Aug. 6 that Mr. McNamara had known about the raids and that the destroyers had been associated with it.

"First," Mr. McNamara replied, "our Navy played absolutely no part in, was not associated with, was not aware of, any South Vietnamese actions, if there were any. . . . The Maddox was operating in international waters, was carrying out a routine patrol of the type we carry out all over the world at all times."

"I did not have knowledge at the time of the attack on the island," he said. "There is no connection between this patrol and any action by South Vietnam."

Mr. McNamara contended that whatever action had taken place against these North Vietnamese islands had been part of an anti-infiltration operation being conducted by a fleet of coastal patrol junks the United States had helped South Vietnam to organize in December, 1961.

"In the first seven months of this year they have searched 149,000 junks, some 570,000 people," he is quoted as telling the committee in this secret session. "This is a tremendous operation endeavoring to close the seacoasts of over 900 miles. In the process of that action, as the junk patrol has increased in strength, they have moved farther and farther north endeavoring to find the source of the infiltration."

"As part of that, as I reported to you earlier this week, [Mr. McNamara had testified before the committee in a secret session on Aug. 3 after the first attack on the Maddox], we understand that the South Vietnamese sea force carried out patrol action around these islands and actually shelled the ports they felt were associated with this infiltration."

"Our ships had absolutely no knowledge of it, were not connected with it; in no sense of the word can be considered to have backstopped the effort," he said.

Senator Frank Church of Idaho then asked Secretary Rusk at the same secret session: "I take it that our government which supplied these boats . . . did know that the boats would be used for attacks on North Vietnamese targets, and that we acquiesced in that policy, is that correct?"

". . . In the larger sense, that is so, but as far as any particular detail is concerned we don't from Washington follow that in great detail," Mr. Rusk replied.

CHURCH PRESSES QUESTIONS

"They are doing it with our acquiescence and consent, is that correct?" Senator Church continued.

"But within very limited levels as far as North Vietnam is concerned," Mr. Rusk said.

At a Pentagon news conference after his testimony before the committee, Mr. McNamara spoke about the coastal patrol junks again and avoided any specific mention of the July 30 raid:

Q. Mr. Secretary

A. Yes?

Q. Have there been any incidents that you know involving the South Vietnamese vessels and the North Vietnamese?

A. No, none that I know of, although I think that I should mention to you the South Vietnamese naval patrol activities that are carried on to prevent the infiltration of men and materiel from the North into the South.

In the last seven months of 1961, for example, about 1,400 men were infiltrated across the 17th Parallel from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. To prevent further infiltration of that kind, the South Vietnamese with our assistance have set up a naval patrol which is very active in that area which continues to inspect and examine junks and their personnel.

In one eight-month period that I can recall they discovered 140 Vietcong infiltrators.

Q. They operate on their own?

A. They operate on their own. They are part of the South Vietnamese Navy, commanded by the South Vietnamese Navy, operating in the coastal waters inspecting suspicious incoming junks, seeking to deter and prevent the infiltration of both men and materiel from North Vietnam into South Vietnam.

Q. Mr. Secretary. Do these junks go north into North Vietnam areas?

A. They have advanced closer and closer to the 17th Parallel and in some cases I think have moved beyond that in an effort to stop the infiltration closer to the point of origin.

Q. Do our naval vessels afford any cover for these operations?

A. Our naval vessels afford no cover whatsoever. Our naval personnel do not participate in the junk operations.

When Senator George S. McGovern of South Dakota subsequently brought up the July 30 attack on the islands during the Senate floor debate on the resolution, Senator Fulbright replied that he had been assured by the Administration that "our boats did not convoy or support or back up any South Vietnamese naval vessels" and that the destroyer patrol "was entirely unconnected or unassociated with any coastal forays the South Vietnamese themselves may have conducted."

The Congressional resolution passed on Aug. 7 by a vote of 88 to 2 in the Senate and 416 to 0 in the House.

The history shows that besides the May 19 progress report from the Joint Chiefs on the 34A Operations, Mr. McNamara had received other memorandums on the clandestine attacks from General Anthis, the special assistant to the Joint Chiefs, on June 13, July 1 and July 28, 1964. General Anthis drew up the advance monthly schedules of the covert operations for approval by William Bundy and Mr. McNaughton.

Where Mr. Rusk is concerned, the study reveals that he was kept reasonably well informed.

The study also makes it clear that there was no connection between the 34A raids and the coastal patrol junk fleet described by Mr. McNamara and referred to by Mr. Rusk.

TWO KEY ELEMENTS IN PLACE

Thus, in the space of three days, the Administration had put firmly into place two key elements of the May 23 scenario—pre-positioning of major air strike forces and Congressional authorization for wider action.

Internal Administration planning for Congressional authorization to escalate also now disappears from the documentary record. The account notes that during the next round of planning "the question of Congressional authority for open acts of war against a sovereign nation was never seriously raised."

There was confusion in Congress, however, over precisely what the resolution meant, the historian says, commenting:

"Despite the nearly unanimous votes of support for the resolution, Congressional opinions varied as to the policy implications and the meaning of such support. The central belief seemed to be that the occasion necessitated demonstrating the nation's unity and collective will in support of the President's action and affirming U.S. determination to oppose further aggression. However, beyond that theme, there was a considerable variety of opinion. . . . Several spokesmen stressed that the resolution did not constitute a declaration of war, did not abdicate Congressional responsibility for determining national policy commitments and did not give the President carte blanche to involve the nation in a major Asian war."

The Administration would now communicate the meaning of the resolution to Hanoi by carrying out in a more significant manner an element of the May 23 scenario that Washington had already used once in June when the Canadian emissary had paid his first visit to Hanoi.

SECOND SEABORN MISSION

On Aug. 10, Mr. Seaborn was sent back with a second message for Premier Dong, which concluded:

"a. That the events of the past few days should add credibility to the statement made last time, that 'U.S. public and official patience with North Vietnamese aggression is growing extremely thin.'

"b. That the U.S. Congressional resolution was passed with near unanimity, strongly reaffirming the unity and determination of the U.S. Government and people not only with respect to any further attacks on U.S. military forces but more broadly to continue to oppose firmly, by all necessary means, D.R.V. efforts to subvert and conquer South Viet-Nam and Laos.

"c. That the U.S. has come to the view that the D.R.V. role in South Vietnam and Laos is critical. If the D.R.V. persists in its present course, it can expect to continue to suffer the consequences. [The word "continue" referred to the reprisal air strikes that followed the Tonkin incident.]

"d. That the D.R.V. knows what it must do if the peace is to be restored.

"e. That the U.S. has ways and means of measuring the D.R.V.'s participation in, and direction and control of, the war on South Vietnam and in Laos and will be carefully watching the D.R.V.'s response to what Mr. Seaborn is telling them" [See text.]

Mr. McNaughton had drafted the message on the day the resolution was passed.

During this, as in his first meeting with Mr. Seaborn in June, the history says, "Pham Van Dong showed himself utterly unintimidated and calmly resolved to pursue the course upon which the D.R.V. was embarked to what he confidently expected would be its successful conclusion."

In the heat of the Tonkin clash, the Administration had also accomplished one of the major recommendations of the June strategy conference at Honolulu—preparing the American public for escalation.

AN IMPORTANT FIREBREAK

"The Tonkin Gulf reprisal constituted an important firebreak and the Tonkin Gulf resolution set U.S. public support for virtually any action," the study remarks.

Almost none of the "disagreeable questions" the Administration might have to answer about the resolution, which had given the President pause in mid-June, had been asked in the emotional atmosphere of the crisis.

And inside the Administration the planners were moving more quickly now.

On Aug. 10, three days after passage of the resolution, Ambassador Taylor cabled the President a situation report on South Vietnam. It said that the Khanh regime had only "a 50-50 chance of lasting out the

year." Therefore, a major objective of the United States Mission in Saigon was to "be prepared to implement contingency plans against North Vietnam with optimum readiness by Jan. 1, 1965."

On Aug. 11, four days after passage of the resolution, William Bundy drew up a memorandum for a high-level State-Defense Departments policy meeting. The memorandum outlined graduated steps towards a possible full-scale air war against North Vietnam with "a contingency date, as suggested by Ambassador Taylor, of 1 January 1965." But until the end of August, Mr. Bundy said, there should be "a short holding phase, in which we would avoid actions that would in any way take the onus off the Communist side for escalation." [See text.]

On Aug. 14, a lengthy summary of Mr. Bundy's memorandum was cabled to Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Unger in Vientiane, and to Admiral Sharp in Honolulu for comments that would permit "further review and refinement."

The Tonkin Gulf reprisal air strikes, the analyst writes, "marked the crossing of an important threshold in the war, and it was accomplished with virtually no domestic criticism, indeed, with an evident increase in public support for the Administration. The precedent for strikes against the North was thus established and at very little apparent cost."

"There was a real cost, however," he concludes, in that the Administration was psychologically preparing itself for further escalation. "The number of unused measures short of direct military action against the North had been depleted. Greater visible commitment was purchased at the price of reduced flexibility." And "for all these reasons, when a decision to strike the North was faced again, it was much easier to take."

Admiral Sharp, in his cable to Washington on Aug. 17 commenting on Mr. Bundy's memorandum, "candidly" summed up this psychological commitment, the analyst says.

"Pressures against the other side once instituted should not be relaxed by any actions or lack of them which would destroy the benefits of the rewarding steps previously taken," the admiral wrote.

VIETNAM ARCHIVE: A CONSENSUS TO BOMB DEVELOPED BEFORE 1964 ELECTION, STUDY SAYS

(By Nell Sheehan)

The Johnson Administration reached a "general consensus" at a White House strategy meeting on Sept. 7, 1964, that air attacks against North Vietnam would probably have to be launched, a Pentagon study of the Vietnam war states. It was expected that "these operations would begin early in the new year."

"It is important to differentiate the consensus of the principals at this September meeting," the study says, "from the views which they had urged on the President in the preceding spring. In the spring the use of force had been clearly contingent on a major reversal—principally in Laos—and had been advanced with the apparent assumption that military actions hopefully would not be required. Now, however, their views were advanced with a sense that such actions were inevitable."

The administration consensus on bombing came at the height of the Presidential election contest between President Johnson and Senator Barry Goldwater, whose advocacy of full-scale air attacks on North Vietnam had become a major issue. That such a consensus had been reached as early as September is a major disclosure of the Pentagon study.

The consensus was reflected, the analysis says, in the final paragraph of a formal national security action memorandum issued by the President three days later, on Sept. 10.

This paragraph spoke of "larger decisions" that might be "required at any time."

The last round of detailed planning of various political and military strategies for a bombing campaign began "in earnest," the study says, on Nov. 3, 1964, the day that Mr. Johnson was elected President in his own right.

Less than 100 days later, on Feb. 8, 1965, he ordered new reprisal strikes against the North. Then, on Feb. 13, the President gave the order for the sustained bombing of North Vietnam, code-named Rolling Thunder.

This period of evolving decision to attack North Vietnam, openly and directly, is shown in the Pentagon papers to be the second major phase of President Johnson's defense of South Vietnam. The same period forms the second phase of the presentation of those papers by The New York Times.

The papers, prepared by a team of 30 to 40 authors in 1967-68 as an official study of how the United States went to war in Indochina, consist of 3,000 pages of analysis and 4,000 pages of supporting documents. The study covers nearly three decades of American policy on Southeast Asia. Yesterday The Times's first report on this study, and presentation of key documents, covered the period of clandestine warfare and planning before the Tonkin Gulf incidents in 1964.

In its glimpses into Lyndon B. Johnson's personal thoughts and motivations between the fateful September meeting and his decision to embark on an air war, the Pentagon study shows a President moving and being moved toward war, but reluctant and hesitant to act until the end.

But, the analyst explains, "from the September meeting forward, there was little basic disagreement among the principals [the term the study uses for the senior policy makers] on the need for military operations against the North. What prevented action for the time being was a set of tactical considerations."

The first tactical consideration, the analyst says, was that "the President was in the midst of an election campaign in which he was presenting himself as the candidate of reason and restraint as opposed to the quixotic Barry Goldwater," who was publicly advocating full-scale bombing of North Vietnam. The historian also mentions other "temporary reasons of tactics":

The "shakiness" of the Saigon Government.

A wish to hold the line militarily and diplomatically in Laos.

The "need to design whatever actions were taken so as to achieve maximum public and Congressional support..."

The "implicit belief that overt actions at this time might bring pressure for premature negotiations—that is negotiations before the D.R.V. [Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam] was hurting."

Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton, the head of the Pentagon's Office of International Security Affairs, summed up these tactical considerations in the final paragraph of a Sept. 3 memorandum to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, in preparation for the crucial White House strategy session four days later:

"Special considerations during the next two months. The relevant audiences of U.S. actions are the Communists (who must feel strong pressures), the South Vietnamese (whose morale must be buoyed), our allies (who must trust us as 'underwriters'), and the U.S. public (which must support our risk-taking with U.S. lives and prestige). During the next two months, because of the lack of 'rebuttal time' before election to justify particular actions which may be distorted to the U.S. public, we must act with special care—signaling to the D.R.V. that initiatives are being taken, to the G.V.N. [Government of (South) Vietnam] that we

are behaving energetically despite the restraints of our political season, and to the U.S. public that we are behaving with good purpose and restraint." The words in parentheses are Mr. McNaughton's.

RUSK CABLE TO EMBASSY IN LAOS ON SEARCH AND RESCUE FLIGHTS

(Cablegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the United States Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, Aug. 26, 1964. A copy of this message was sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific.)

We agree with your assessment of importance SAR operations that Air America pilots can play critically important role, and SAR efforts should not discriminate between rescuing American, Thai and Lao. You are also hereby granted as requested discretionary authority to use AA pilots in T-28's for SAR operations when you consider this indispensable to success of operation and with understanding that you will seek advance Washington authorization wherever situation permits.

At same time, we believe time has come to review scope and control arrangements for T-28 operations extending into future. Such a review is especially indicated view fact that these operations more or less automatically impose demands for use of US personnel in SAR operations. Moreover, increased AA capability clearly means possibilities of loss somewhat increased, and each loss with accompanying SAR operations involves chance of escalation from one action to another in ways that may not be desirable in wider picture. On other side, we naturally recognize T-28 operations are vital both for their military and psychological effects in Laos and as negotiating card in support of Souvanna's position. Request your view whether balance of above factors would call for some reduction in scale of operations and/or dropping of some of better-defended targets. (Possible extension T-28 operations to Panhandle would be separate issue and will be covered by septel.)

On central problem our understanding is that Thai pilots fly missions strictly controlled by your Air Command Center with [word illegible] in effective control, but that this not true of Lao pilots. We have impression latter not really under any kind of firm control.

Request your evaluation and recommendations as to future scope T-28 operations and your comments as to whether our impressions present control structure correct and whether steps could be taken to tighten this.

RUSK QUERY TO VIENTIANE EMBASSY ON DESIRABILITY OF LAOS CEASE-FIRE

(Cablegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the United States Embassy in Laos, Aug. 7, 1964. Copies were also sent, with a request for comment to the American missions in London, Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, Ottawa, New Delhi, Moscow, Phompenh and Hong Kong, and to the Pacific command and the mission of the United Nations.)

1. As pointed out in your 219, our objective in Laos is to stabilize the situation again, if possible within framework of the 1962 Geneva settlement. Essential to stabilization would be establishment of military equilibrium in the country. Moreover, we have some concern that recent RLG successes and reported low PL morale may lead to some escalation from Communist aide, which we do not now wish to have to deal with.

2. Until now, Souvanna's and our position has been that military equilibrium would require Pathet Lao withdrawal from areas seized in PDJ since May 15 and that such withdrawal is also basic precondition to convening 14-nation conference. Question now arises whether territorial gains of Op-

eration Triangle, provided they can be consolidated, have in practice brought about a situation of equilibrium and whether, therefore, it is no longer necessary to insist on Pathet Lao withdrawal from PDJ as precondition to 14-nation conference. This is in fact thought which has previously occurred to Souvanna (Vientiane's 191) and is also touched on in Secretary's letter to Butler (Deptel 88 to Vientiane). If Souvanna and we continued to insist on PDJ withdrawal other side would inevitably insist on our yielding. Triangle gains, and our judgment is that such arrangement substantially worse than present fairly coherent geographical division. If withdrawal precondition were to be dropped, it could probably best be done at tripartite meetings where it might be used by Souvanna as bargaining counter in obtaining satisfaction on his other condition that he attend conference as head of Laotian Government. Remaining condition would be cease-fire. While under present conditions cease-fire might not be of net advantage to Souvanna—we are thinking primarily of T-28 operations—Pathet Lao would no doubt insist on it. If so, Souvanna could press for effective ICC policing of cease-fire. Latter could be of importance in upcoming period.

3. Above is written with thought in mind that Polish proposals [one word illegible] effectively collapsed and that pressures continue for Geneva [word illegible] conference and will no doubt be intensified by current crisis brought on by DRV naval attacks. Conference on Laos might be useful safety valve for these generalized pressures while at same time providing some deterrent to escalation of hostilities on that part of the "front." We would insist that conference be limited to Laos and believe that it could in fact be so limited, if necessary by our withdrawing from the conference room if any other subject brought up, as we did in 1961-62. Side discussions on other topics could not be avoided but we see no great difficulty with this; venue for informal corridor discussion with PL, DRV, and Chicoms could be valuable at this juncture.

4. In considering this course of action, key initial question is of course whether Souvanna himself is prepared to drop his withdrawal precondition and whether, if he did, he could maintain himself in power in Vientiane. We gather that answer to first question is probably yes but we are much more dubious about the second. Request Vientiane's judgment on these points. Views of other addresses are so requested, including estimated reactions host governments. It is essential that these estimates take account of recent development; military successes non-Communist forces in Laos and latest demonstration US determination resist Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

SAIGON EMBASSY'S RESPONSE ON DRAWBACKS IN LAOS TALKS

(Cablegram from Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor in Saigon to Secretary Rusk, Aug. 9, 1964, with copies to the embassies in Vientiane and Bangkok and the Pacific command.)

From our vantage point we can see positive disadvantages to our position in SEA in pursuing course of action outlined REFTTEL.

1. In first place rush to conference table would serve to confirm to Chicoms that US retaliation for destroyer attacks was transient phenomenon and that firm Chicom response in form of commitment to defend NVN has given US "paper tiger" second thoughts. Moreover, much of beneficial effects elsewhere resulting from our strong reaction to events in Gulf of Tonkin would be swiftly dissipated.

2. In Vietnam sudden backdown from previous strongly held US position on PDJ withdrawal prior to conf on Laos would

have potentially disastrous effect. Morale and will to fight, particularly willingness to push ahead with arduous pacification task and to enforce stern measure on Khanh's new emergency decree, would be undermined by what would look like evidence that US seeking to take advantage of any slight improvement in non-Communist position as excuse for extricating itself from Indochina via conf route. This would give strength to probable pro-Gaullist contention that GVN should think about following Laotian example by seeking negotiated solution before advantage of temporarily strengthened anti-Communist position recedes.

3. General letdown in Vietnam which would result from softening of our stand in Laos just after we had made great show of firmness vis-a-vis Communists would undoubtedly erode Khanh's personal position with prospects of increased political instability and coup plotting.

4. It should be remembered that our retaliatory action in Gulf of Tonkin is in effect an isolated US-DRV incident. Although this has relation, as Amb. Stevenson has pointed out, to larger problem of DRV aggression by subversion in Vietnam and Laos, we have not rpt not yet come to grips in a forceful way with DRV over the issue of this larger and much more complex problem. Instead, we are engaged, both in Vietnam and Laos, in proxy actions against proxy agents of DRV. If, as both Khanh and Souvanna hope, we are to parlay the consequences of our recent clash with the DRV into actions which specifically direct themselves against DRV violations of the 1954 and 1962 agreements, we must avoid becoming involved in political engagements which will tie our hands and inhibit our action. For example, any effort to undertake credible joint planning operations with GVN re interdiction air strikes upon infiltration network in southern DRV and especially in panhandle would be completely undercut if we were engaged in conf discussing the Laos territory in question.

5. Similarly, it would seem to us that Souvanna's willingness to hold fast on pre-conditions or substantive negotiations bears direct relationship to his assessment of US willingness to meet the problem where it originates—in North Vietnam itself. This fact shines clearly through his recent brief letter to Pres. Johnson. Moreover, it would be folly to assume that Khanh, who is now in fairly euphoric state as result of our Gulf of Tonkin action, would do anything other than slump into deepest funk if we sought to persuade him to send GVN del. to conf. [Two illegible] is that he would resign rather than send [Two words illegible].

Intensified pressures for Geneva-type conf. cited in REPTTEL would appear to us to be coming almost entirely from those who are opposed to US policy objectives in SEA (except possibly UK which seems prepared jump on bandwagon). Under circumstances, we see very little hope that results of such conference would be advantageous to US. Moreover, prospects of limiting it to consideration of only Laotian problem appear at this time juncture to be dimmer than ever. Even though prior agreement reached to limit conf., we do not see how in actual practice we could limit discussion solely to Laos if others insist on raising other issues. To best of our knowledge we never "withdrew" from room when DRV attempted raise extraneous issues during 1961-1962 conf. Instead, we insisted to chair on point of order and had DRV ruled out of order. Prospect of informal corridor discussions with PL, DRV and Chicom is just what GVN would fear most and may well increase pressures on GVN to undertake negotiated solution so as to avoid their fear of being faced with "fait accompli" by US.

7. Rather than searching for "safety valve" to dissipate current "generalized pressures" SEA, it seems to us we should be looking for means which will channel those pressures against DRV; seems to us "safety valve," if needed (for example by Soviets), exists in current UNSC discussion. We should continue to focus attention in all forms on Communist aggressive actions as root cause of tension in SEA and reinforce our current stance. In the final analysis, this stance would be more valid deterrent to escalation by PL/VM than attempt seek accommodation within context Laos problem alone.

While not rpt not specifically within our province, we would point out that PL/VM appear to have capability of retaking territory regained by RLG in Operation Triangle at any time of their choosing and that therefore "territorial swap" envisaged in DEPTTEL may be highly illusory. Moreover, any territorial deal which seems to confirm permanent PL/VM control over corridor as an arrangement acceptable to US would be anathema to GVN and indicate our willingness infiltration networks as tolerable condition on GVN frontiers. Such situation would in their and US mission opinions vitiate against any hope of successful pacification of GVN territory.

U.S. MISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON FURTHER MILITARY STEPS

(Cablegram from the United States Mission in Saigon to the State Department, Aug. 18, 1964.)

This is US Mission message.

In preparing our reply, we have found it simpler to produce a new paper which undertakes to state the problem in South Viet Nam as we see it in two possible forms and then to provide course of action responding to each statement of the problem.

Underlying our analysis is the apparent assumption of Deptel 439 (which we believe is correct) that the present in-country pacification plan is not enough in itself to maintain national morale or to offer reasonable hope of eventual success. Something must be added in the coming months.

Statement of the problem—A. The course which U.S. policy in South Viet Nam should take during the coming months can be expressed in terms of four objectives. The first and most important objective is to gain time for the Khanh government to develop a certain stability and to give some firm evidence of viability. Since any of the courses of action considered in this cable carry a considerable measure of risk to the US, we should be slow to get too deeply involved in them until we have a better feel of the quality of our ally. In particular, if we can avoid it, we should not get involved militarily with North Viet Nam and possibly with Red China if our base in South Viet Nam is insecure and Khanh's army is tied down everywhere by the VC insurgency. Hence, it is our interest to gain sufficient time not only to allow Khanh to prove that he can govern, but also to free Saigon from the VC threat which presently reigns (as received) it and assure that sufficient GVN ground forces will be available to provide a reasonable measure of defense against any DRV ground reaction which may develop in the execution of our program and thus avoid the possible requirement for a major US ground force commitment.

A second objective in this period is the maintenance of morale in South Viet Nam particularly within the Khanh Government. This should not be difficult in the case of the government if we can give Khanh assurance of our readiness to bring added pressure on Hanoi if he provides evidence of ability to do his part. Thirdly while gaining time for Khanh, we must be able to hold the DRV in check and restrain a further buildup of Viet

Cong strength by way of infiltration from the North. Finally, throughout this period, we should be developing a posture of maximum readiness for a deliberate escalation of pressure against North Viet Nam, using January 1, 1965 as a target D-Day. We must always recognize, however, that events may force US to advance D-Day to a considerably earlier date.

[Start of sentence illegible] we then need to design a course of action which will achieve the four objectives enumerated above. Such a course of action would consist of three parts: the first, a series of actions directed at the Khanh Government; the second, actions directed at the Hanoi Government; the third, following a pause of some duration, initiation of an orchestrated air attack against North Viet Nam.

In approaching the Khanh Government, we should express our willingness to Khanh to engage in planning and eventually to exert intense pressure on North Viet Nam, providing certain conditions are met in advance. In the first place before we would agree to go all out against the DRV, he must stabilize his government and make some progress in cleaning up his operational backyard. Specifically, he must execute the initial phases of the Hop Tac Plan successfully to the extent of pushing the Viet Cong from the doors of Saigon. The overall pacification program, including Hop Tac, should progress sufficiently to allow earmarking at least three division equivalents for the defense in I Corps if the DRV step up military operations in that area.

Finally we should reach some fundamental understanding with Khanh and his government concerning war aims. We must make clear that we will engage in actions against North Viet Nam only for the purpose of assuring the security and independence of South Viet Nam within the territory assigned by the 1954 agreements; that we will not (rpt not) join in a crusade to unify the north and south; that we will not (rpt not) even seek to overthrow the Hanoi regime provided the latter will cease its efforts to take over the south by subversive warfare.

With these understandings reached, we would be ready to set in motion the following:

(1) Resume at once 34A (with emphasis on Marine operations) and Desoto patrols. These could start without awaiting outcome of discussions with Khanh.

(2) Resume U-2 overflights over all NVN.

(3) Initiate air and ground strikes in Laos against infiltration targets as soon as joint plans now being worked out with the Khanh Government are ready. Such plans will have to be related to the situation in Laos. It appears to US that Souvanna Phouma should be informed at an appropriate time of the full scope of our plans and one would hope to obtain his acquiescence in the anti-infiltration actions in Laos. In any case we should always seek to preserve our freedom of action in the Laotian corridor.

By means of these actions, Hanoi will get the word that the operational rules with respect to the DRV are changing. We should perhaps consider message to DRV that shooting down of U-2 would result in reprisals. We should now lay public base for justifying such flights and have plans for prompt execution in contingency to shoot down. One might be inclined to consider including at this state tit-for-tat bombing operations in our plans to compensate for VC depredations in SVN. However, the initiation of air attacks from SVN against NVN is likely to release a new order of military reaction from both sides, the outcome of which is impossible to predict. Thus, we do not visualize initiating this form of reprisal as a desirable tactic in the current plan but would reserve the capability as an emergency response if needed.

Before proceeding beyond this point, we should raise the level of precautionary military readiness (if not already done) by taking such visible measures as [word illegible] Hawk units to Danang and Saigon, landing a Marine force at Danang for defense of the airfield and beefing up MACV's support base. By this time (assumed to be late fall) we should have some reading on Khanh's performance.

Assuming that his performance has been satisfactory and that Hanoi has failed to respond favorably, it will be time to embark on the final phase of course of action A, a carefully orchestrated bombing attack on NVN directed primarily at infiltration and other military targets. At some point prior thereto it may be desirable to open direct communications with Hanoi if this has not been done before. With all preparations made, political and military, the bombing program would begin, using U.S. reconnaissance planes, VNAF/Farmgate aircraft against those targets which could be attacked safely in spite of the presence of the MIG's and additional U.S. combat aircraft if necessary for the effective execution of the bombing programs.

Pros and cons of course of action—A. If successful course of action A will accomplish the objectives set forth at the outset as essential to the support of U.S. policy in South Viet Nam. I will press the Khanh Government into doing its homework in pacification and will limit the diversion of interest to the out-of-country ventures it gives adequate time for careful preparation estimated at several months, while doing sufficient at once to maintain internal morale. It also provides ample warning to Hanoi and Peking to allow them to adjust their conduct before becoming overcommitted.

On the other hand, course of action A relies heavily upon the durability of the Khanh government. It assumes that there is little danger of its collapse without notice or of its possible replacement by a weaker or more unreliable successor. Also, because of the drawn-out nature of the program it is exposed to the danger of international political pressure to enter into negotiations before NVN is really hurting from the pressure directed against it.

Statement of the Problem—B. It may well be that the problem of U.S. policy in SVN is more urgent than that depicted in the foregoing statement. It is far from clear at the present moment that the Khanh Government can last until January 1, 1965, although the application of course of action A should have the effect of strengthening the government [rest of sentence illegible].

[Start of sentence illegible] we would have to restate the problem in the following terms. Our objective avoid the possible consequences of a collapse of national morale. To accomplish these purposes, we would have to open the campaign against the DRV without delay, seeking to force Hanoi as rapidly as possible to resist from aiding the VC and to convince the DRV that it must cooperate in calling off the VC insurgency.

Course of Action—B. To meet this statement of the problem, we need an accelerated course of action, seeking to obtain results faster than under course of action A. Such an accelerated program would include the following actions:

Again we must inform Khanh of our intentions, this time expressing a willingness to begin military pressures against Hanoi at once, providing that he will undertake to perform as in course of action A. However, US action would not await evidence of performance.

Again we may wish to communicate directly on this subject with Hanoi or awaiting effect of our military actions. The scenario of the ensuing events would be essentially the same as under Course A but the

execution would await only the readiness of plans to expedite relying almost exclusively on US military means.

Pros and cons of Course of Action B. This course of action asks virtually nothing from the Khanh Government, primarily because it is assumed that little can be expected from it. It avoids the consequence of the sudden collapse of the Khanh Government and gets underway with minimum delay the punitive actions against Hanoi. Thus, it lessens the chance of an interruption of the program by an international demand for negotiation by presenting a fait accompli to international critics. However, it increases the likelihood of US involvement in ground action since Khanh will have almost no available ground forces which can be released from pacification employment to mobile resistance of DRV attacks.

Conclusion: It is concluded that Course of Action A offers the greater promised achievement of US policy objectives in SVN during the coming months. However, we should always bear in mind the fragility of the Khanh Government and be prepared to shift quickly to Course of Action B if the situation requires. In either case, we must be militarily ready for any response which may be initiated by NVN or by Chicom.

Miscellaneous: as indicated above, we believe that 34A operations should resume at once at maximum tempo, still on a covert basis; similarly, Desoto patrols should begin advance, operating outside 12-mile limit. We concur that a number of VNAF pilots should be trained on B-57's between now and first of year. There should be no change now with regard to policy on evacuation of US dependents.

Recommendation: It is recommended that USG adopt Course of Action A while maintaining readiness to shift to Course of Action B.

JOINT CHIEFS' RECOMMENDATION ON MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION

(Excerpts from memorandum, "Recommended Courses of Action—Southeast Asia," from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Aug. 26, 1964.)

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered Ambassador Taylor's statements of objectives and courses of action. In recognition of recent events in SVN, however, they consider that his proposed course of action B is more in accord with the current situation and consider that such an accelerated program of actions with respect to the DRV is essential to prevent a complete collapse of the US position in Southeast Asia. Additionally, they do not agree that we should be slow to get deeply involved until we have a better feel for the quality of our ally. The United States is already deeply involved. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that only significantly stronger military pressures on the DRV are likely to provide the relief and psychological boost necessary for attainment of the requisite government stability and viability.

4. Recent US military actions in Laos and against the DRV have demonstrated our resolve more clearly than any other US actions in some time. These actions showed force and restraint. Failure to resume and maintain a program of pressure through military actions could be misinterpreted to mean we have had second thoughts about Pierce Arrow and the events leading thereto, and could signal a lack of resolve. Accordingly, while maintaining a posture of readiness in the Western Pacific, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the U.S. program should have as concurrent objectives: (1) improvements in South Vietnam, including emphasis on the Pacification Program and the Hop Tac plan to clear Saigon and its surroundings; (2) interdiction of the relatively unmolested VC

lines of communication (LOC) through Laos by operations in the Panhandle and of the LOC through Cambodia by strict control of the waterways leading therefrom; (3) denial of Viet Cong (VC) sanctuaries in the Cambodia-South Vietnam border area through the conduct of "hot pursuit" operations into Cambodia, as required; (4) increased pressure on North Vietnam through military actions. As part of the program for increased pressures, the OPLAN 34A operations and the Desoto patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin should be resumed, the former on an intensified but still covert basis.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe, however, that more direct and forceful actions than these will, in all probability, be required. In anticipation of a pattern of further successful VC and Pathet Lao (PL) actions in RVN and Laos, and in order to increase pressure on the DRV, the US program should also provide for prompt and calculated responses to such VC/PL actions in the form of air strikes and other operations against appropriate military targets in the DRV.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that defining what might constitute appropriate counteroperations in advance is a most difficult task. We should therefore maintain our prompt readiness to execute a range of selected responses, tailored to the developing circumstances and reflecting the principles in the Gulf of Tonkin actions, that such counter-operations will result in clear military disadvantage to the DRV. These responses, therefore, must be greater than the provocation in degree, and not necessarily limited to response in kind against similar targets. Air strikes in response might be purely VNAF; VNAF with US escort to provide protection from possible employment of MIG's; VNAF with US escort support in the offensive as well as the defensive role; or entirely US. The precise combination should be determined by the effect we wish to produce and the assets available. Targets for attack by air or other forces may be selected from appropriate plans including the Target Study for North Vietnam consisting of 94 targets, recently forwarded to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . . .

"PLAN OF ACTION" ATTRIBUTED TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY McNAUGHTON

(Excerpts from memorandum, Sept. 3, 1964, "Plan of Action for South Vietnam," which the Pentagon study indicates was drawn up by Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton.)

1. Analysis of the present situation. The situation in South Vietnam is deteriorating. Even before the government sank into confusion last week, the course of the war in South Vietnam had been downward, with Viet Cong incidents increasing in number and intensity and military actions becoming larger and more successful, and with less and less territory meaningfully under the control of the government. Successful ambushes had demonstrated an unwillingness of the population even in what were thought to be pacified areas to run the risk of informing on the Viet Cong. War weariness was apparent. The crisis of the end of August—especially since the competing forces have left the government largely "faceless" and have damaged the government's ability to manage the pacification program—promises to lead to further and more rapid deterioration. . . . The objective of the United States is to reverse the present downward trend. Failing that, the alternative objective is to emerge from the situation with as good an image as possible in US, allied and enemy eyes.

2. Inside South Vietnam. We must in any event keep hard at work inside South Vietnam. This means, inter alia, immediate action:

(a) to press the presently visible leaders to get a real government in operation;

(b) to prevent extensive personnel changes down the line;

(c) to see that lines of authority for carrying out the pacification program are clear.

New initiatives might include action:

(d) to establish a US Naval base, perhaps at Danang;

(e) to embark on a major effort to pacify one province adjacent to Saigon.

A separate analysis is being made of a proposal:

(f) to enlarge significantly the US military role in the pacification program inside South Vietnam—e.g., large numbers of US special forces, divisions of regular combat troops, US air, etc., to "interlard" with or to take over functions of geographical areas from the South Vietnamese armed forces.

3. Outside the borders of South Vietnam. There is a chance that the downward trend can be reversed—or a new situation created offering new opportunities, or at least a convincing demonstration made of the great costs and risks incurred by a country which commits aggression against an ally of ours—if the following course of action is followed. The course of action is made up of actions outside the borders of South Vietnam designed to put increasing pressure on North Vietnam but designed also both to create as little risk as possible of the kind of military action which would be difficult to justify to the American public and to preserve where possible the option to have no US military action at all.

Actions. The actions, in addition to present continuing "extra-territorial" actions (US U-2 recon of DRV; US jet recon of Laos, T-28 activity in Laos), would be by way of an orchestration of three classes of actions, all designed to meet these five desiderata—(1) points of view, they should be legitimate from the US, GVN and hopefully allied things to do under the circumstances, (2) they should cause apprehension, ideally increasing apprehension, in the DRV, (3) they should be likely at some point to provoke a military DRV response, (4) the provoked response should be likely to provide good grounds for us to escalate if we wished, and (5) the timing and crescendo should be under our control, with the scenario capable of being turned off at any time.

4. Actions of opportunity. While the above course of action is being pursued, we should watch for other DRV actions which would justify [words illegible]. Among such DRV actions might be the following:

a. Downing of US recon or US rescue aircraft in Laos (likely by AA, unlikely by MIG).

b. MIG action in Laos or South Vietnam (unlikely).

c. Mining of Saigon Harbor (unlikely).

d. VC attacks on South Vietnamese POL storage, RR bridge, etc. (dramatic incident required).

e. VC attacks (e.g., by mortars) on, or takeover of, air fields on which US aircraft are deployed (likely).

f. Some barbaric act of terrorism which inflames US and world opinion (unlikely).

6. Chances to resolve the situation. Throughout the scenario, we should be alert to chances to resolve the situation:

a. To back the DRV down, so South Vietnam can be pacified.

b. To evolve a tolerable settlement:

I. Explicit settlement (e.g., via a bargaining-from-strength conference, etc.).

II. Tacit settlement (e.g., via piecemeal live-and-let-live Vietnamese "settlements," a de facto "writing off" of indefensible portions of SVN, etc.).

c. If worst comes and South Vietnam disintegrates or their behavior becomes abominable, to "disown" South Vietnam, hopefully leaving the image of "a patient who died despite the extraordinary efforts of a good doctor."

7. Special considerations during next two months. The relevant "audiences" of US actions are the Communists (who must feel strong pressures), the South Vietnamese (whose morale must be buoyed), our allies (who must trust us as "underwriters"), and the US public (which must support our risk-taking with US lives and prestige). During the next two months, because of the lack of "rebuttal time" before election to justify particular actions which may be distorted to the US public, we must act with special care—signalling to the DRV that initiatives are being taken, to the GVN that we are behaving energetically despite the restraints of our political season, and to the US public that we are behaving with good purpose and restraint.

TOP AIDE'S PROPOSAL TO JOHNSON ON MILITARY STEPS IN LATE '64

(Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, William P. Bundy, for President Johnson, Sept. 8, 1964. The memorandum was headed "Courses of Action for South Vietnam.")

This memorandum records the consensus reached in discussions between Ambassador Taylor and Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler, for review and decision by the President.

THE SITUATION

1. Khanh will probably stay in control and may make some headway in the next two-three months in strengthening the Government (GVN). The best we can expect is that he and the GVN will be able to maintain order, keep the pacification program ticking over (but not progressing markedly) and give the appearance of a valid Government.

2. Khanh and the GVN leaders are temporarily too exhausted to be thinking much about moves against the North. However, they do need to be reassured that the US continues to mean business, and as Khanh goes along in his Government efforts, he will probably want more US effort visible, and some GVN role in external actions.

3. The GVN over the next 2-3 months will be too weak for us to take any major deliberate risks of escalation that would involve a major role for, or threat to, South Vietnam. However, escalation arising from and directed against U.S. action would tend to lift GVN morale at least temporarily.

4. The Communist side will probably avoid provocative action against the US, and it is uncertain how much they will step up VC activity. They do need to be shown that we and the GVN are not simply sitting back after the Gulf of Tonkin.

COURSES OF ACTION

We recommend in any event:

1. US naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin should be resumed immediately (about September 12). They should operate initially beyond the 12-mile limit and be clearly dissociated from 34A maritime operations. The patrols would comprise 2-3 destroyers and would have air cover from carriers; the destroyers would have their own ASW capability. 2. 34A operations by the GVN should be resumed immediately thereafter (next week). The maritime operations are by far the most important. North Vietnam is likely to publicize them, and at this point we should have the GVN ready to admit that they are taking place and to justify and legitimize them on the basis of the facts on VC infiltration by sea. 34A air drop and leaflet operations should also be resumed but are secondary in importance. We should not consider air strikes under 34A for the present.

3. Limited GVN air and ground operations into the corridor areas of Laos should be undertaken in the near future, together with Lao air strikes as soon as we can get Souvanna's permission.

These operations will have only limited effect, however.

4. We should be prepared to respond on a tit-for-tat basis against the DRV in the event of any attack on US units or any special DRV/VC action against SVN. The response for an attack on US units should be along the lines of the Gulf of Tonkin attacks, against specific and related targets. The response to special action against SVN should likewise be aimed at specific and comparable targets.

The main further question is the extent to which we should add elements to the above actions that would tend deliberately to provoke a DRV reaction, and consequent retaliation by us. Example of actions to be considered would be running US naval patrols increasingly close to the North Vietnamese coast and/or associating them with 34A operations. We believe such deliberately provocative elements should not be added in the immediate future while the GVN is still struggling to its feet. By early October, however, we may recommend such actions depending on GVN progress and Communist reaction in the meantime, especially to US naval patrols.

The aim of the above actions, external to South Vietnam, would be to assist morale in SVN and show the Communists we still mean business, while at the same time seeking to keep the risks low and under our control at each stage.

Further actions within South Vietnam are not covered in this memorandum. We believe that there are a number of immediate-impact actions we can take, such as pay raises for the police and civil administrators and spot projects in the cities and selected rural areas. These actions would be within current policy and will be refined for decision during Ambassador Taylor's visit. We are also considering minor changes in the US air role within South Vietnam, but these would not involve decisions until November.

MEMO ON JOHNSON'S APPROVAL OF RENEWED NAVAL OPERATIONS

(National security action memorandum from McGeorge Bundy, adviser to the President on national security, to Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of State Rusk, Sept. 10, 1964.)

The President has now reviewed the situation in South Vietnam with Ambassador Taylor and with other advisers and has approved the following actions:

1. U.S. naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin will be resumed promptly after Ambassador Taylor's return. They will operate initially well beyond the 12-mile limit and be clearly dissociated from 31A maritime operations. The patrols will comprise two or three destroyers and would have air cover from carriers; the destroyers will have their own ASW capability.

2. 34A operations by the GVN will be resumed after completion of a first DeSoto patrol. The maritime operations are by far the most important. North Vietnam has already publicized them, and is likely to publicize them even more, and at this point we should have the GVN ready to admit that they are taking place and to justify and legitimize them on the basis of the facts of VC infiltration by sea. 34A air drop and leaflet operations should also be resumed but are secondary in importance. We should not consider air strikes under 34A for the present.

3. We should promptly discuss with the Government of Laos plans for limited GVN air and ground operations into the corridor areas of Laos, together with Lao air strikes and possible use of U.S. armed aerial reconnaissance. On the basis of these discussions a decision on action will be taken, but it should be recognized that these operations will in any case have only limited effect.

4. We should be prepared to respond as appropriate against the DRV in the event of any attack on US units or any special DRV/VC action against SVN.

5. The results of these decisions will be kept under constant review, and recommendations for changes or modifications or additions will be promptly considered.

6. The President reemphasizes the importance of economic and political actions having immediate impact in South Vietnam, such as pay raises for civilian personnel and spot projects in the cities and selected rural areas. The President emphasizes again that no activity of this kind should be delayed in any way by any feeling that our resources for these purposes are restricted. We can find the money which is needed for all worthwhile projects in this field. He expects that Ambassador Taylor and the country team will take most prompt and energetic action in this field.

7. These decisions are governed by a prevailing judgment that the first order of business at present is to take actions which will help to strengthen the fabric of the Government of South Vietnam; to the extent that the situation permits, such action should precede larger decisions. If such larger decisions are required at any time by a change in the situation, they will be taken.

CABLE AUTHORIZING AIR STRIKES ON LAOS INFILTRATION ROUTES

(Cablegram from the State Department and the Defense Department to the United States Embassy in Vientiane, Oct. 6, 1964. Copies of the cablegram were sent to the United States Embassies in Saigon and Bangkok and to the commander in chief of Pacific forces. The embassy in Saigon was asked to relay the message to the United States commander in Vietnam.)

You are authorized to urge the RLG to begin air attacks against Viet Cong infiltration routes and facilities in the Laos Panhandle by RLAF T-28 aircraft as soon as possible. Such strikes should be spread over a period of several weeks, and targets should be limited to those deemed suitable for attack by T-28's and listed Para. Vientiane's 581, excluding Mu Gia pass and any target which Lao will not hit without U.S. air cover or fire support since decision this matter not yet made.

You are further authorized to inform Lao that YANKEE TEAM suppressive fire strikes against certain difficult targets in Panhandle, interspersing with further T-28 strikes, are part of the over-all concept and are to be anticipated later but that such US strikes are not repeat not authorized at this time.

Report soonest proposed schedule of strikes and, upon implementation, all actual commitment of RLG T-28s, including targets attacked, results achieved, and enemy opposition. Also give us any views in addition to those in Vientiane's 581 as to any targets which are deemed too difficult for RLG air strikes are on which US suppressive strikes desired.

FYI: Highest levels have not authorized YANKEE TEAM strikes at this time against Route 7 targets. Since we wish to avoid the impression that we are taking first step in escalation, we inclined defer decision on Route 7 strikes until we have strong evidence Hanoi's preparation for new attack in PDJ, some of which might come from RLAF operations over the Route. END FYI.

You may inform RLG, however, that US will fly additional RECOE over Route 7 to keep current on use being made of the Route by the PL and to identify Route 7 targets and air defenses. The subject of possible decision to conduct strikes on Route 7 being given study in Washington.

FYI: Cross border ground operations not repeat not authorized at this time.

WILLIAM BUNDY DRAFT ON HANDLING WORLD AND PUBLIC OPINION

(Draft section of a paper, "Conditions for Action and Key Actions Surrounding Any

Decision," by Assistant Secretary of State Bundy, Nov. 5, 1964.)

1. Bien Hoa may be repeated at any time. This would tend to force our hand, but would also give us a good springboard for any decision for stronger action. The President is clearly thinking in terms of maximum use of a Gulf of Tonkin rationale, either for an action that would show toughness and hold the line till we can decide the big issue, or as a basis for starting a clear course of action under the broad options.

2. Congress must be consulted before any major action, perhaps only by notification if we do a reprisal against another Bien Hoa, but preferably by careful talks with such key leaders as Mansfield, Dirksen, the Speaker, Albert, Halleck, Fulbright, Hickenlooper, Morgan, Mrs. Bolton, Russell, Saltonstall, Rivers, (Vinson?), Arends, Ford, etc. He probably should wait till his mind is moving clearly in one direction before such a consultation, which would point to some time next week. Query if it should be combined with other topics (budget?) to lessen the heat.

3. We probably do not need additional Congressional authority, even if we decide on very strong action. A session of this rump Congress might well be the scene of a messy Republican effort.

4. We are on the verge of intelligence agreement that infiltration has in fact mounted, and Saigon is urging that we surface this by the end of the week or early next week. Query how loud we want to make this sound. Actually Grose in the Times had the new estimate on Monday; so the splash and sense of hot new news may be less. We should decide this today if possible. . . . In general, we all feel the problem of proving North Vietnamese participation is less than in the past, but we should have the Jordan Report updated for use as necessary.

5. A Presidential statement with the rationale for action is high on any check list. An intervening fairly strong Presidential noise to prepare a climate for an action statement is probably indicated and would be important in any event to counter any SVN fears of a softening in our policy. We should decide the latter today too if possible.

6. Secretary Rusk is talking today to Dobrynin. For more direct communication Seaborn can be revved up to go up the 15th if we think it wise. He is not going anyway, and we could probably hold him back so that the absence of any message was not itself a signal.

7. Our international soundings appear to divide as follows:

a. We should probably consult with the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, and possibly Thailand before we reach a decision. We would hope for firm moral support from the U.K. and for participation in at least token form from the others.

b. SEATO as a body should be consulted concurrently with stronger action. We should consult the Philippines a day or so before such action but not necessarily before we have made up our minds.

c. The NATO Council should be notified on the Cuban model, i.e., concurrently, by a distinguished representative.

d. For negative reasons, France probably deserves VIP treatment also.

e. In the UN, we must be ready with an immediate affirmative presentation of our rationale to proceed concurrently either with a single reprisal action or with the initiation of a broader course of action.

f. World-wide, we should select reasonably friendly chiefs of state for special treatment seeking their sympathy and support, and should arm all our representatives with the rationale and defense of our action whether individual reprisal or broader.

8. USIA must be brought into the planning process not later than early next week, so

that it is getting the right kind of materials ready for all our information media, on a contingency basis. The same [word illegible] true of CIA's outlets.

MCAUGHTON'S NOVEMBER DRAFT ON VIETNAM AIMS AND CHOICES

(Second draft of a paper, "Action for South Vietnam," by Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton, Nov. 6, 1964.)

1. U.S. aims:
(a) To protect US reputation as a counter-subversion guarantor.
(b) To avoid domino effect especially in Southeast Asia.
(c) To keep South Vietnamese territory from Red hands.
(d) To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods.

2. Present situation:
The situation in South Vietnam is deteriorating. Unless new actions are taken, the new government will probably be unstable and ineffectual, and the VC will probably continue to extend their hold over the population and territory. It can be expected that, soon (6 months? two years?), (a) government officials at all levels will adjust their behavior to an eventual VC take-over; (b) defections of significant military forces will take place; (c) whole integrated regions of the country will be totally denied to the GVN (d) neutral and/or left-wing elements will enter the government; (e) a popular front regime will emerge which will invite the US out; and (f) fundamental concessions to the VC and accommodations to the DRV will put South Vietnam behind the Curtain.

3. Urgency:
"Bien Hoa" having passed, no urgent decision is required regarding military action against the DRV, but (a) such a decision, related to the general deteriorating situation in South Vietnam, should be made soon, and (b) in the event of another VC or DRV "spectacular," a decision (for at least a reprisal) would be urgently needed.

4. Inside South Vietnam:
Progress inside SVN is important, but it is unlikely despite our best ideas and efforts (and progress, if made, will take at least several months). Nevertheless, whatever other actions might be taken, great efforts should be made within South Vietnam; (a) to strengthen the government, its bureaucracy, and its civil-military coordination and planning; (b) to dampen ethnic, religious, urban and civil-military strife by a broad and positive GVN program designed (with US team help) to enlist the support of important groups, and (c) to press the pacification program in the countryside.

5. Action against DRV:
Action against North Vietnam is to some extent a substitute for strengthening the government in South Vietnam. That is, a less active VC (on orders from DRV) can be matched by a less efficient GVN. We therefore should consider squeezing North Vietnam.

6. Option open to us:
We have three options open to us (all envision reprisals in the DRV for DRV/VC "spectaculars" against GVN as well as US assets in South Vietnam).

Option A. Continue present policies. Maximum assistance within SVN and limited external actions in Laos and by the GVN covertly against North Vietnam. The aim of any reprisal actions would be to deter and punish large VC actions in the South, but not to a degree that would create strong international negotiating pressures. Basic to this option is the continued rejection of negotiating in the hope that the situation will improve.

Option B. Fast full squeeze. Present policies plus a systematic program of military pressures against the north, meshing at some point with negotiation, but with pressure

actions to be continued at a fairly rapid pace and without interruption until we achieve our central present objectives.

Option C. Progressive squeeze-and-talk. Present policies plus an orchestration of communications with Hanoi and a crescendo of additional military moves against infiltration targets, first in Laos and then in the DRV, and then against other targets in North Vietnam. The scenario would be designed to give the US the option at any point to proceed or not, to escalate or not, and to quicken the pace or not. The decision in these regards would be made from time to time in view of all relevant factors.

7. Analysis of Option A. (To be provided)

8. Analysis of Option B. (To be provided)

9. Analysis of Option C.

(a) Military actions. Present policy, in addition to providing for reprisals in DRV for DRV actions against the US, envisions (1) 34A Airoops and Marops, (2) deSoto patrols, for intelligence purposes, (3) South Vietnamese shallow ground actions in Laos when practicable, and (4) T28 strikes against infiltration-associated targets in Laos. Additional actions should be:

Phase one (in addition to reprisals in DRV for VC "spectaculars" in South Vietnam): (5) US strikes against infiltration-associated targets in Laos.

Phase two (in addition to reprisals in DRV against a broader range of VC actions): (6) Low-level reconnaissance in southern DRV, (7) US/VNAF strikes against infiltration-associated targets in southern DRV.

Phase three: Either continue only the above actions or add one or more of the following, making timely deployment of US forces: (8) Aerial mining of DRV ports, (9) Naval quarantine of DRV, and (10) US/VNAF, in "crescendo," strike additional targets on "94 target list."

South Vietnamese forces should play a role in any action taken against the DRV.

(b) Political actions. Establish immediately a channel for bilateral US-DRV communication. This could be in Warsaw or via Seaborn in Hanoi. Hanoi should be told that we do not seek to destroy North Vietnam or to acquire a colony or base, but that North Vietnam must:

(1) Stop training and sending personnel to wage war in SVN and Laos.

(2) Stop sending arms and supplies to SVN and Laos.

(3) Stop directing and controlling military actions in SVN and Laos.

(4) Order the VC and PL to stop their insurgencies and military actions.

(5) Remove VM forces and cadres from SVN and Laos.

(6) Stop propaganda broadcasts to South Vietnam.

[(7) See that VC and PL stop attacks and incidents in SVN and Laos?]

[(8) See that VC and PL cease resistance to government forces?]

[(9) See that VC and PL turn in weapons and relinquish bases?]

[(10) See that VC and PL surrender for amnesty of expatriation?]

US demands should be accompanied by offers (1) to arrange a rice-barter deal between two halves of Vietnam and (2) to withdraw US forces from South Vietnam for so long as the terms are complied with.

We should not seek wider negotiations—in the UN, in Geneva, etc.—but we should evaluate and pass on each negotiating opportunity as it is pressed on us.

(c) Information actions. The start of military actions against the DRV will have to be accompanied by a convincing world-wide public information program. (The information problem will be easier if the first US action against the DRV is related in time and kind to a DRV or VC outrage or "spectacular", preferably against SVN as well as US assets.)

(d) VS/DRV/Chicom-USSR reactions. (To be elaborated later.) The DRV and China will

probably not invade South Vietnam, Laos or Burma, nor is it likely that they will conduct air strikes on these countries. The USSR will almost certainly confine herself to political actions. If the DRV or China strike or invade South Vietnam, US forces will be sufficient to handle the problem.

(e) GVN Reactions. Military action against the DRV could be counter-productive in South Vietnam because (1) the VC could step up its activities, (2) the South Vietnamese could panic, (3) they could resent our striking their "brothers", and (4) they could tire of waiting for results. Should South Vietnam disintegrate completely beneath us, we should try to hold it together long enough to permit us to try to evacuate our forces and to convince the world to accept the uniqueness (and congenial impossibility) of the South Vietnamese case.

(f) Allied and neutral reactions. (To be elaborated later.) (1) Even if OPTION C failed, it would, by demonstrating US willingness to go to the mat, tend to bolster allied confidence in the US as an ally. (2) US military action against the DRV will probably prompt military actions elsewhere in the world—e.g., Indonesia against Malaysia or Timor, or Turkey against Cyprus.

TAYLOR'S BRIEFING OF KEY OFFICIALS ON SITUATION IN NOVEMBER 1964

(Excerpts from prepared briefing by Ambassador Taylor, "The Current Situation in South Vietnam—November, 1964," delivered to the "principals"—the senior officials to whom the Southeast Asia working group reported—at a Washington meeting on Nov. 27, 1964.)

After a year of changing and ineffective government, the counter-insurgency program country-wide is bogged down and will require heroic treatment to assure revival. Even in the Saigon area, in spite of the planning and the special treatment accorded the Hop Tac plan, this area also is lagging. The northern provinces of South Viet-Nam which a year ago were considered almost free of Viet-Cong are now in deep trouble. In the Quang Ngai-Binh Dinh area, the gains of the Viet-Cong have been so serious that once more we are threatened with a partition of the country by a Viet-Cong salient driven to the sea. The pressure on this area has been accompanied by continuous sabotage of the railroad and of Highway 1 which in combination threaten an economic strangulation of northern provinces.

This deterioration of the pacification program has taken place in spite of the very heavy losses inflicted almost daily on the Viet-Cong and the increase in strength and professional competence of the Armed Forces of South Viet-Nam. Not only have the Viet-Cong apparently made good their losses, but of late, have demonstrated three new or newly expanded tactics: the use of stand-off mortar fire against important targets, as in the attack on the Bien Hoa airfield; economic strangulation on limited areas; finally, the stepped-up infiltration of DRV military personnel moving from the north. These new or improved tactics employed against the background of general deterioration offer a serious threat to the pacification program in general and to the safety of important bases and installations in particular.

Perhaps more serious than the downward trend in the pacification situation, because it is the prime cause, is the continued weakness of the central government. Although the Huong government has been installed after executing faithfully and successfully the program laid out by the Khanh government for its own replacement, the chances for the long life and effective performance of the new line-up appear small. Indeed, in view of the factionalism existing in Saigon and elsewhere throughout the country it is impossible to foresee a stable and effective government under any name in anything like the

near future. Nonetheless, we do draw some encouragement from the character and seriousness of purpose of Prime Minister Huong and his cabinet and the apparent intention of General Khanh to keep the Army out of politics, at least for the time being.

As our programs plod along or mark time, we sense the mounting feeling of war weariness and hopelessness which pervade South Viet-Nam, particularly in the urban areas. Although the provinces for the most part appear steadfast undoubtedly there is chronic discouragement there as well as in the cities. Although the military leaders have not talked recently with much conviction about the need for "marching North," assuredly many of them are convinced that some new and drastic action must be taken to reverse the present trends and to offer hope of ending the insurgency in some finite time.

The causes for the present unsatisfactory situation are not hard to find. It stems from two primary causes, both already mentioned above, the continued ineffectiveness of the central government, and the other, the increasing strength and effectiveness of the Viet-Cong and their ability to replace losses.

While, in view of the historical record of South Viet-Nam, it is not surprising to have these governmental difficulties, this chronic weakness is a critical liability to future plans. Without an effective central government with which to mesh the U.S. effort the latter is a spinning wheel unable to transmit impulsion to the machinery of the GVN. While the most critical governmental weaknesses are in Saigon, they are duplicated to a degree in the provinces. It is most difficult to find adequate provincial chiefs and supporting administrative personnel to carry forward the complex programs which are required in the field for successful pacification. It is true that when one regards the limited background of the provincial chiefs and their associates, one should perhaps be surprised by the results which they have accomplished, but unfortunately, these results are generally not adequate for the complex task at hand or for the time schedule which we would like to establish.

As the past history of this country shows, there seems to be a national attribute which makes for factionalism and limits the development of a truly national spirit. Whether this tendency is innate or a development growing out of the conditions of political suppression under which successive generations have lived is hard to determine. But it is an inescapable fact that there is no national tendency toward team play or mutual loyalty to be found among many of the leaders and political groups within South Viet-Nam. Given time, many of these [words illegible] undoubtedly change for the better, but we are unfortunately pressed for time and unhappily perceive no short term solution for the establishment of stable and sound government.

The ability of the Viet-Cong continuously to rebuild their units and to make good their losses is one of the mysteries of this guerrilla war. We are aware of the recruiting methods by which local boys are induced or compelled to join the Viet-Cong ranks and have some general appreciation of the amount of infiltration personnel from the outside. Yet taking both of these sources into account, we still find no plausible explanation of the continued strength of the Viet-Cong if our data on Viet-Cong losses are even approximately correct. Not only do the Viet-Cong units have the recuperative powers of the phoenix, but they have an amazing ability to maintain morale. Only in rare cases have we found evidences of bad morale among Viet-Cong prisoners or recorded in captured Viet-Cong documents.

Undoubtedly one cause for the growing strength of the Viet-Cong is the increased direction and support of their campaign by the government of North Viet-Nam. This di-

rection and support take the form of endless radioed orders and instruction and the continuous dispatch to South Viet-Nam of trained cadre and military equipment over infiltration routes by land and by water. While in the aggregate, this contribution to the guerrilla campaign over the years must represent a serious drain on the resources of the DRV, that government shows no sign of relaxing its support of the Viet-Cong. In fact, the evidence points to an increased contribution over the last year, a plausible development, since one would expect the DRV to press hard to exploit the obvious internal weaknesses in the south.

If, as the evidence shows, we are playing a losing game in South Viet-Nam, it is high time we change and find a better way. To change the situation, it is quite clear that we need to do three things: first, establish an adequate government in SVN; second, improve the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign; and finally, persuade or force the DRV to stop its aid to the Viet-Cong and to use its directive powers to make the Viet-Cong desist from their efforts to overthrow the government of South Viet-Nam. . . .

In bringing military pressure to bear on North Viet-Nam, there are a number of variations which are possible. At the bottom of the ladder of escalation, we have the initiation of intensified covert operations, anti-infiltration attacks in Laos, and reprisal bombings mentioned above as a means for stiffening South Vietnamese morale. From this level of operations, we could begin to escalate progressively by attacking appropriate targets in North Viet-Nam. If we justified our action primarily upon the need to reduce infiltration, it would be natural to direct these attacks on infiltration-related targets such as staging areas, training facilities, communications centers and the like. The tempo and weight of the attacks could be varied according to the effects sought. In its final forms, this kind of attack could extend to the destruction of all important fixed targets in North Viet-Nam and to the interdiction of movement on all lines of communication.

We reach the point where a decision must be taken as to what course or courses of action we should undertake to change the tide which is running against us. It seems perfectly clear that we must work to the maximum to make something out of the present Huong government or any successor thereto. While doing so, we must be thinking constantly of what we would do if our efforts are unsuccessful and the government collapses. Concurrently, we should stay on the present in-country program, intensifying it as possible in proportion to the current capabilities of the government. To bolster the local morale and restrain the Viet-Cong during this period, we should step up the 34-A operations, engage in bombing attacks and armed reconnaissance in the Laotian corridor and undertake reprisal bombing as required. It will be important that United States forces take part in the Laotian operations in order to demonstrate to South Viet-Nam our willingness to share in the risks of attacking the North.

If this course of action is inadequate, and the government falls then we must start over again or try a new approach. At this moment, it is premature to say exactly what these new measures should be. In any case, we should be prepared for emergency military action against the North if only to shore up a collapsing situation.

If, on the other hand as we hope, the government maintains and proves itself, then we should be prepared to embark on a methodical program of mounting air attacks in order to accomplish our pressure objectives vis-a-vis the DRV and at the same time do our best to improve in-country pacification program.

We will leave negotiation initiatives to Hanoi. Throughout this period, our guard must be up in the Western Pacific, ready for any reaction by the DRV or of Red China. Annex I suggests the train of events which we might set in motion. . . .

VIEW OF CHIEF'S REPRESENTATIVE ON OPTIONS B AND C

(Memorandum from Vice Adm. Lloyd M. Mustin of the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Assistant Secretary Bundy as chairman of the Working Group on Southeast Asia, Nov. 14, 1964. The memorandum was headed "Additional Material for Project on Courses of Action in Southeast Asia.")

References: a. Your memorandum of 13 November 1964 to the NSC Working Group.

b. JCSM 902-64, dated 27 October 1964

c. JCSM 933-64, dated 4 November 1964

d. JCSM 955-64, dated 14 November 1964

1. Reference a requests JCS views spelling out Option "B" as a preferred alternative, with something like Option "C" as a fall-back alternative. Because of the way in which formal JCS views in the premises have been developed and expressed, this requires some degree of interpretation.

2. Reference b is the most recent recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for courses of action with respect to South Viet-Nam, framed in context of initiation "in cold blood." Various JCS papers, the most recent dated 22 October 1964, identify the corresponding recommendations with respect to Laos. Reference b specifically identifies certain of its listed action to begin now, with the balance of them "implemented as required, to achieve US objectives in Southeast Asia."

3. Reference c formalized the most recent JCS recommendation for reprisal (hot blood) actions and reference d provided an analysis of DRV/CHICOM reactions to these strikes, and the probable results thereof. The proposed actions are essentially the same as in reference c except for the principal difference that the "hot blood" actions are initiated at a substantial higher level of military activity.

4. Only in that the courses of action in either of these sets of documents can be completed in minimum time consistent with proper conduct of military operations do they match Option "B" as defined for purposes of the NSC Working Group study. The distinction is that while the Joint Chiefs of Staff offer the capability for pursuing Option "B" as defined, they have not explicitly recommended that the operations be conducted on a basis necessarily that inflexible. All implementing plans do in fact explicitly recognize a controlled phase which would permit suspension whenever desired by national authority.

5. I believe my draft contribution to PART VI provides a reasonable application of the JCS recommendations to Option "B" as defined for the study, but this does not mean that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended Option "B" as defined in the study.

6. There is in an advanced state of completion a JCS fall-back recommendation for a course of action which, subject to possible further modifications by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will provide essentially the same military actions listed in my draft input to PART VII. These include the same military actions listed in the above, but without the stress upon starting forthwith, and with more specific emphasis on some extension of the over-all time for execution of the complete list. Thus it imposes what amounts to some arbitrary delays, which would provide additional intervals for diplomatic exchanges.

7. Because of the time delays which it reflects, it is specifically the JCS fall-back position.

8. For information, the analysis in reference d develops and supports the conclusion

that the United States and its Allies can deal adequately with any course of action the DRV and/or CHICOM decide to pursue. You may note that this conclusion is developed in the context of the most intense of all courses of action prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This reflects a position less pessimistic than some which have appeared in project drafts.

9. A final overall comment by the Joint Staff member of the Working Group:

We recognize quite clearly that any effective military action taken by the United States will generate a hue and cry in various quarters. The influence that this kind of "pressure" may have upon the United States acting in support of its national interests will be no more than what we choose to permit it to be. There are repeated expressions in various project draft materials indicating that this influence will necessarily be great. We do not agree. There are too many current examples of countries acting in what they presumably believe to be their own [word illegible] self-interest, in utter disregard for "world opinion," for us to accept the position that the United States must at all times conduct all its affairs on the basis of a world popularity contest. In short, we believe that certain strong US actions are required in Southeast Asia, that we must take them regardless of opinion in various other quarters, and that results of our failing to take them would be substantially more serious to the United States than would be any results of world opinions if we did take them. And as far as that goes, we do not believe that if we took the necessary actions the adverse pressures from other countries would prove to be very serious after all—at least from countries that matter to us.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN TEXTS

CHICOM—Chinese Communists.
DEPTEL—State Department telegram.
D.R.V.—Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam.
GVN—Government of (South) Vietnam.
H.N.C.—High National Council.
I.C.C.—International Control Commission.
J.C.S.—Joint Chiefs of Staff.
J.C.S.M.—Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum.
MACV—Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
MAROPS—Marine Operations.
NSC—National Security Council.
OPERATION TRIANGLE—Code name for an operation not otherwise identified.
P.D.J.—Plaines des Jarres.
P.L. Pathet Lao.
P.O.L.—Petroleum, oil, lubricants.
RECCE—Reconnaissance.
R.L.A.F.—Royal Laotian Air Force.
R.L.G.—Royal Laotian Government.
RVNAF—Republic of (South) Vietnam Armed (or Air) Forces.
SEA—Southeast Asia.
SVN—South Vietnam.
U.S.G.—U. S. Government.
VM—Vietminh.
SVAF—(South) Vietnamese Armed Forces.

FINAL DRAFT POSITION PAPER PRODUCED BY WORKING GROUP

"Draft Position Paper on Southeast Asia" circulated to the principal top-level officials concerned, Nov. 29, 1964. The draft was accompanied by a memorandum from William Bundy saying "I attach a draft action paper for review at the meeting at 1:30 on Monday in Secretary Rusk's conference room. Secretary Rusk has generally approved the format of these papers, and they have been given a preliminary review for substance by Ambassador Taylor and Messrs. McNaughton and Forrestal. However, I am necessarily responsible for the way they are now drafted." The Pentagon study says this paper was originally a draft national security action memorandum

but that it was changed to a draft position paper at the instructions of the principals. (Words and phrases that were deleted from the final version are shown in italics. Hand-written interpolations or revisions are shown in double parentheses.)

I. CONCEPT

A. US objectives in South Vietnam (SVN) are unchanged. They are to:

1. Get Hanoi and North Vietnam (DRV) support and direction removed from South Vietnam, and, to the extent possible, obtain DRV cooperation in ending Viet Cong (VC) operations in SVN.

2. Re-establish an independent and secure South Vietnam with appropriate international safeguards, including the freedom to accept US and other external assistance as required.

3. Maintain the security of other non-Communist nations in Southeast Asia including specifically the maintenance and observance of the Geneva Accords of 1962 in Laos.

B. We will continue to press the South Vietnamese Government (GVN) in every possible way to make the government itself more effective and to push forward with the pacification program.

C. We will join at once with the South Vietnamese and Lao Governments in a determined action program aimed at DRV activities in both countries and designed to help GVN morale and to increase the costs and strain on Hanoi, foreshadowing still greater pressures to come. Under this program the first phase actions ((see TAB D)) within the next thirty days will be intensified forms of action already under way, plus (1) US armed reconnaissance strikes in Laos, and (2) GVN and possible US air strikes against the DRV, as reprisals against any major or spectacular Viet Cong action in the south, whether against US personnel and installations or not.

D. Beyond the thirty-day period, first phase actions may be continued without change, or additional military measures may be taken including the withdrawal or dependents and the possible initiation of strikes a short distance across the border against the infiltration routes from the DRV. In the latter case this would become a transitional phase. ((Be prepared to stop flow of dependents to SVN at (illegible word) time we start air strikes in force.))

E. Thereafter, if the GVN improves its effectiveness to an acceptable degree and Hanoi does not yield on acceptable terms, or if the GVN can only be kept going by stronger action the US is prepared—at a time to be determined—to enter into a second phase program, in support of the GVN and RLG, of graduated military pressures directed systematically against the DRV. Such a program would consist principally of progressively more serious air strikes, of a weight and tempo adjusted to the situation as it develops (possibly running from two to six months). Targets in the DRV would start with infiltration targets south of the 19th parallel and work up to targets north of that point. This could eventually lead to such measures as air strikes on all major military-related targets, aerial mining of DRV ports, and a US naval blockade of the DRV. The whole sequence of military actions would be designed to give the impression of a steady, deliberate approach, and to give the US the option at any time (subject to enemy reaction) to proceed or not, to escalate or not, and to quicken the pace or not. Concurrently, the US would be alert to any sign of yielding by Hanoi, and would be prepared to explore negotiated solutions that attain US objectives in an acceptable manner. *The US would seek to control any negotiations and would oppose any independent South Vietnamese efforts to negotiate.*

HEADING ILLEGIBLE

A. A White House statement will be issued following the meeting with Ambassador Taylor, with the text as in Tab B, attached.

B. Ambassador Taylor will consult with the GVN promptly on his return, making a general presentation ((in accordance with the draft instructions)) as stated in Tab B, attached. He will further press for the adoption of specific measures as listed in the Annex to Tab B.

C. *At the earliest feasible date, we will publicize the evidence of increased DRV infiltration. This action will be coordinated by Mr. Chester Cooper in order to insure that the evidence is sound and that senior government officials who have testified on this subject in the past are in a position to defend and explain the differences between the present estimates and those given in the past. The publicizing will take four forms:*

1. *An on-the-record presentation to the press in Washington, concurrently with an on-the-record or background presentation to the press in Saigon.*

2. *Available Congressional leaders will be given special briefings. (No special leadership meeting will be convened for this purpose).*

3. *The Ambassadors of key allied nations will be given special briefings.*

4. *A written report will be prepared and published within the next ten days giving greater depth and background to the evidence.*

D. Laos and Thailand.

The US Ambassadors in these countries will inform the government leaders ((in general terms)) of the concept we propose to follow and of specific actions requiring their concurrence or participation. In the case of Laos, we will obtain RLG approval of an intensified program of ((US armed)) reconnaissance strikes both in the Panhandle area of Laos and along the key infiltration routes in central Laos. These actions will not be publicized except to the degree approved by the RLG. It is important, however, for purposes of morale in SV, that their existence be generally known.

Thailand will be asked to support our program fully, to intensify its own efforts in the north and northeast, and to give further support to operations in Laos, such as additional pilots and possibly artillery teams.

E. Key Allies.

We will consult immediately with the UK, ((DC)) Australia, New Zealand, ((Bundy)) and the Philippines ((Humphrey?))

1. UK. The President will explain the concept and proposed actions fully to Prime Minister Wilson, seeking full British support, but without asking for any additional British contribution in view of the British role in Malaysia.

2. Australia and New Zealand will be pressed through their Ambassadors, not only for support but for additional contributions.

3. The Philippines will be particularly pressed for contributions along the lines of the program for approximately 1800 men already submitted to President Macapagal.

F. We will press generally for more third country aid, stressing the gravity of the situation and our deepening concern. A summary of existing third country aid and of the types of aid that might now be obtained is in Tab C, attached.

G. Communist Countries.

1. We will convey to Hanoi our unchanged determination ((and)) our objectives, and that we have a growing concern at the DRV role, to see if there is any sign of change in Hanoi's position.

2. We will make no special approaches to Communist China in this period.

3. We will convey our determination and grave concern to the Soviets, not in the expectation of any change in their position but in effect to warn them to stay out, and with

some hope they will pass on the message to Hanoi and Peiping.

H. Other Countries.

1. We will convey our grave concern to key interested governments such as Canada, India, and France, but avoid spelling out the concept fully.

2. In the event of a reprisal action, we will explain and defend our action in the UN as at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident. We do not plan to raise the issue otherwise in the UN. (The Lao Government may stress the DRV infiltration in Laos in its speech, and we should support this and spread the information.)

I. Intensified Military Actions.

1. The GVN maritime operations (MA ROPS) will be intensified, ((including U.S. air protection of GVN vessels from attacks by MIGs or DRV surface vessels)) and we will urge the GVN to surface and defend these as wholly justified in response to the wholly illegal DRV actions.

2. Lao air operations will be intensified, especially in the corridor areas and close to the DRV border. US air cover and flak suppression will ((may)) be applied where ((if)) needed.

3. US high-level reconnaissance over the DRV will be stepped up.

4. US armed ((air)) reconnaissance ((and air)) strikes will be carried out in Laos, first against the corridor area and within a short time against Route 7 and other infiltration routes, in a major operation to cut key bridges. (These actions will be publicized only to the degree agreed with Souvanna.) ((At this time we prepare to stop flow of dependents to V.N.))

J. Reprisal Actions.

For any VC provocation similar to the following, a reprisal will be undertaken, preferably within 24 hours, against one or more selected targets in the DRV. GVN forces will be used to the maximum extent, supplemented as necessary by US forces. The exact reprisal will be decided at the time, in accordance with a quick-reaction procedure which will be worked out.

The following may be appropriate occasions for reprisals, but we should be alert for any appropriate occasion.

1. Attacks on airfields.
2. Attack on Saigon.
3. Attacks on provincial or district capitals.
4. Major attacks on US citizens.
5. Attacks on major POL facilities.

((expand))

6. Attacks on bridges and railroad lines after the presently damaged facilities have been restored and warning given.

7. Other "spectaculars" such as earlier attack on a US transport carrier at a pier in Saigon.

In these or similar cases, the reprisal action would be linked as directly as possible to DRV infiltration, so that we have a common threat of justification.

A flexible list of reprisal targets has been prepared running from infiltration targets in the southern part of the DRV up to airfields, ports, and naval bases also located south of the 19th parallel.

K. US/GVN joint planning will be initiated both for reprisal actions and for possible later air strikes across the border into the DRV.

L. *Major statement or speech. Depending on US public reaction, a major statement or speech may be undertaken by the President during this period. This will necessarily be required if a reprisal action is taken, but some other significant action, such as the stopping of the flow of US dependents, might be the occasion. Such a statement or speech would re-state our objectives and our determination, why we are in South Vietnam, and how gravely we view the situation. It should in any event follow the full publicizing of infiltration evidence.*

M. Dependents. The flow of dependents to South Vietnam will be stopped [at an early date, probably immediately after Ambassador Taylor has consulted with the GVN] [at the start of the second phase], and this will be publicly announced.

N. Deferred Actions ((See TAB D))

The following actions will not be taken within the thirty-day period, but will be considered for adoption in the transitional or second phases of the program:

1. Major air deployment to the area.

2. Furnishing US air cover for CVN MAROPS.

(2) 3. ((Be required to resume)) Resuming destroyer patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin. If attacked, these would be an alternative basis for reprisals, and should be considered primarily in this light.

(5) 4. ((Be prepared to evacuate)) Evacuation of US dependents

(3) 5. US low-level reconnaissance into the DRV.

(4) 6. GVN/((LOA/)) US air strikes across the border ((s)), initially against the infiltration routes and installations and then against other targets south of the 19th parallel.

NOTE.—The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend immediate initiation of sharply intensified military pressures against the DRV, starting with a sharp and early attack in force on the DRV, subsequent to brief operations in Laos and US low-level reconnaissance north of the boundary to divert DRV attention prior to the attack in force. This program would be designed to destroy in the first three days Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi, other airfields, and major POL facilities, clearly to establish the fact that the US intends to use military force to the full limits of what military force can contribute to achieving US objectives in Southeast Asia, and to afford the GVN respite by curtailing DRV assistance to and direction of the Viet Cong. The follow-on-military program—involving armed reconnaissance of infiltration routes in Laos, air strikes on infiltration targets in the DRV, and then progressive strikes throughout North Vietnam—could be suspended short of full destruction of the DRV if our objectives were earlier achieved. The military program would be conducted rather swiftly, but the tempo could be adjusted as needed to contribute to achieving our objectives.

REPORT OF MEETING OF U.S. ENVOYS TO REVIEW OPERATIONS IN LAOS

Excerpts from cablegram, signed by Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor, from United States Embassy in Saigon to State Department, Defense Department and Commander in Chief, Pacific, Sept. 19, 1964.

Following is a summary, coordinated with Vientiane and Bangkok, of the conclusions of the meeting of the three posts held at Saigon September 11 to review air and limited ground operations of the Lao corridor:

1. Air operations in corridor. This involves attack of 22 targets for which folders available at Vientiane and Saigon. If objective is primarily military, i.e., to inflict maximum damage to targets, to prevent VN/PL dispersal and protective measures, and impede rapid VN/PL riposte, it was agreed that a series of sharp, heavy attacks must be made in a relatively short time span, which would involve substantial U.S. and/or VNAF/Farmgate attacks. If objective primarily psychological, military disadvantages of attacks over longer time frame would be acceptable and chief reliance could be placed on RLAFF T-28s with some Yankee team strikes against harder targets, e.g., five bridges. Estimated sortie requirements for this second option 188 T-28 sorties and 80 USAF sorties. Time required [number illegible] days. Vientiane representatives believe Souvanna would [words illegible] would probably wish [word illegible] such attacks spread out

over considerable period of time. Also felt Souvanna would prefer VNAF not conduct air strikes in corridor. It was general consensus that best division of targeting for immediate future would be RLAFF/Yankee team mix.

Vientiane is very reluctant to see VNAF participation such strikes and would hope that by keeping GVN informed of actions being taken by RLAFF and US in corridor, psychological needs of GVN could reasonably be met. Saigon will seek to do this, but if there are compelling reasons for covert VNAF participation Vientiane would be given prior info on necessity, timing, and place of such strikes.

Alternatively, it was agreed that, if possible, joint Lao, Thai, RVN, and US participation in a common effort against a common enemy would be desirable but, recognizing that, even if possible, arrangements for such an effort would take some time to achieve. If such negotiations are conducted, however, RLAFF/Yankee team strikes should not be precluded. Vientiane has since stated it does not consider that it would be desirable to seek to formalize such four country participation in corridor operations as to do so would raise question of degree of Souvanna Phouma's knowledge and involvement which Vientiane feels would jeopardize success of operations.

2. Ground operations.

A. Although it was agreed that northern Route 9 area offered most profitable targets, conference proceeded on assumption that Vientiane would find operations astride Route 9 politically unacceptable at this time. However, Vientiane's 448 to dept, dispatched after return of conferees, now indicates that "shallow penetration raids (20 kilometers) . . . in Rte 9 area . . . by company-sized units" would be acceptable and would not require clearance by the RLG.

F. It was the view of Saigon group that authority for US advisors to accompany units is a prerequisite to successful operations. Without this US participation probability of success is judged so low that the advisability of conducting cross border operations would be questionable. Vientiane representatives were strongly opposed to presence of US advisors because of difficulty with current SAR operations in Laos and political importance of US maintaining credible stance of adhering to provisions Geneva accords.

F. Embassy Vientiane had earlier indicated that they would insist on advanced clearance of cross border operations. All representatives agreed that this requirement would be met by Vientiane having opportunity to comment on all plans submitted to Washington for approval. Once approval to execute is received, Vientiane would be kept informed of day-to-day operations as information addressee on operational traffic between Saigon/Washington/CINCPAC. . . .

ACCOUNT OF TAYLOR'S MEETING WITH SAIGON GENERALS ON UNREST

Excerpts from Saigon airmail to the State Department, Dec. 24, 1964, as provided in the body of the Pentagon study. Ambassador Taylor and his deputy, U. Alexis Johnson met with the so-called Young Turk leaders, among them Generals Nguyen Cao Ky, Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Chanh Thi and an Admiral identified as Cang.

Ambassador TAYLOR. Do all of you understand English? (Vietnamese officers indicated they did, although the understanding of General Thi was known to be weak.) I told you all clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner we Americans were tired of coups. Apparently I wasted my words. Maybe this is because something is wrong with my French because you evidently didn't understand. I made it clear that all the military plans which I know you would like to carry out are dependent on governmental stability. Now you have made a real mess. We can-

not carry you forever if you do things like this. Who speaks for this group? Do you have a spokesman?

General Ky. I am not the spokesman for the group but I do speak English. I will explain why the Armed Forces took this action last night.

We understand English very well. We are aware of our responsibilities, we are aware of the sacrifices of our people over twenty years. We know you want stability, but you cannot have stability until you have unity. . . . But still there are rumors of coups and doubts among groups. We think these rumors come from the HNC, not as an organization but from some of its members. Both military and civilian leaders regard the presence of these people in the HNC as divisive of the Armed Forces due to their influence.

Recently the Prime Minister showed us a letter he had received from the Chairman of the HNC. This letter told the Prime Minister to beware of the military, and said that maybe the military would want to come back to power. Also the HNC illegally sought to block the retirement of the generals that the Armed Forces Council unanimously recommended be retired in order to improve unity in the Armed Forces.

General THIEU. The HNC cannot be bosses because of the Constitution. Its members must prove that they want to fight.

General Ky. It looks as though the HNC does not want unity. It does not want to fight the Communists.

It has been rumored that our action of last night was an intrigue of Khanh against Minh, who must be retired. Why do we seek to retire these generals? Because they had their chance and did badly . . .

Yesterday we met, twenty of us, from 1430 to 2030. We reached agreement that we must take some action. We decided to arrest the bad members of the HNC; bad politicians, bad student leaders, and the leaders of the Committee of National Salvation, which is a Communist organization. We must put the trouble-making organizations out of action and ask the Prime Minister and the Chief of State to stay in office.

After we explain to the people why we did this at a press conference, we would like to return to our fighting units. We have no political ambitions. We seek strong, unified, and stable Armed Forces to support the struggle and a stable government. Chief of State Suu agrees with us. General Khanh saw Huong who also agreed.

We did what we thought was good for this country; we tried to have a civilian government clean house. If we have achieved it, fine. We are now ready to go back to our units.

Ambassador TAYLOR. I respect the sincerity of you gentlemen. Now I would like to talk to you about the consequences of what you have done. But first, would any of the other officers wish to speak?

Admiral CANG. It seems that we are being treated as though we were guilty. What we did was good and we did it only for the good of the country.

Ambassador TAYLOR. Now let me tell you how I feel about it, what I think the consequences are: first of all, this is a military coup that has destroyed the government-making process that, to the admiration of the whole world, was set up last fall largely through the statesman-like acts of the Armed Forces.

You cannot go back to your units, General Ky. You military are now back in power. You are up to your neck in politics.

Your statement makes it clear that you have constituted yourselves again substantially as a Military Revolutionary Committee. The dissolution of the HNC was totally illegal. Your decree recognized the Chief of State and the Huong Government but this recognition is something that you could with-

draw. This will be interpreted as a return of the military to power. . . .

Who commands the Armed Forces? General Khanh?

General Ky. Yes, sir. . . .

General THIEU. In spite of what you say, it should be noted that the Vietnamese Commander-in-Chief is in a special situation. He therefore needs advisors. We do not want to force General Khanh; we advise him. We will do what he orders. . . .

Ambassador TAYLOR. Would your officers be willing to come into a government if called upon to do so by Huong? I have been impressed by the high quality of many Vietnamese officers. I am sure that many of the most able men in this country are in uniform. Last fall when the HNC and Huong Government was being formed, I suggested to General Khanh there should be some military participation, but my suggestions were not accepted. It would therefore be natural for some of them now to be called upon to serve in the government. Would you be willing to do so? . . .

General Ky. Nonetheless, I would object to the idea of the military going back into the government right away. People will say it is a military coup.

Ambassador TAYLOR and Ambassador JOHNSON. (together) People will say it anyway. . . .

Ambassador TAYLOR. You have destroyed the Charter. The Chief of State will still have to prepare for elections. Nobody believes that the Chief of State has either the power or the ability to do this without the HNC or some other advisory body. If I were the Prime Minister, I would simply overlook the destruction of the HNC. But we are preserving the HNC itself. You need a legislative branch and you need this particular step in the formation of a government with National Assembly. . . .

It should be noted that Prime Minister Huong has not accepted the dissolution of the HNC. . . .

General THIEU. What kind of concession does Huong want from us?

Ambassador Taylor again noted the need for the HNC function.

General Ky. Perhaps it is better if we now let General Khanh and Prime Minister Huong talk.

General THIEU. After all, we did not arrest all the members of the HNC. Of nine members we detained only five. These people are not under arrest. They are simply under controlled residence. . . .

Ambassador TAYLOR. Our problem now, gentlemen, is to organize our work for the rest of the day. For one thing, the government will have to issue a communique.

General THIEU. We will still have a press conference this afternoon but only to say why we acted as we did.

Ambassador TAYLOR. I have real troubles on the US side. I don't know whether we will continue to support you after this. Why don't you tell your friends before you act? I regret the need for my blunt talk today but we have lots at stake. . . .

And was it really all that necessary to carry out the arrests that very night? Couldn't this have been put off a day or two? . . .

In taking a friendly leave, Ambassador Taylor said: You people have broken a lot of dishes and now we have to see how we can straighten out this mess.

NOT TO ENLARGE THE WAR

The President was already communicating this sense of restraint to the voters. On the night of Aug. 29, in an address to a crowd at an outdoor barbecue a few miles from his ranch in Texas, when two tons of beef were served in a belated celebration of his 56th birthday, he made a statement that he was to repeat in numerous election speeches.

"I have had advice to load our planes with bombs," the President said, "and to drop them on certain areas that I think would

enlarge the war and escalate the war, and result in our committing a good many American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land."

The policy of the United States toward Vietnam, the President explained later in his speech, was "to furnish advice, give counsel, express good judgment, give them trained counselors, and help them with equipment to help themselves."

IT IS A WAR AND A BIG WAR

"We are doing that," he said. "We have lost less than 200 men in the last several years, but to each one of those 200 men—and we lost about that many in Texas on accidents on the Fourth of July—to each of those 200 men who have given their life to preserve freedom, it is a war and a big war and we recognize it.

"But we think it is better to lose 200 than to lose 200,000. For that reason we have tried very carefully to restrain ourselves and not to enlarge the war."

Eleven days earlier, on Aug. 18, Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor had cabled from Saigon that he agreed with an "assumption" now held in the Administration in Washington that the Vietcong guerrillas—the VC, as they were usually termed—could not be defeated and the Saigon Government preserved by a counterinsurgency war confined to South Vietnam itself.

"Something must be added in the coming months," the Ambassador said in his message. What General Taylor proposed to add was "a carefully orchestrated bombing attack on NVN [North Vietnam], directed primarily at infiltration and other military targets" with "Jan. 1, 1965, as a target D-Day."

The bombing should be undertaken under either of two courses of action, the Ambassador said. The first course would entail using the promise of the air attacks as an inducement to persuade the regime of Gen. Nguyen Khanh to achieve some political stability and get on seriously with the pacification program. Under the second course, the United States would bomb the North, regardless of whatever progress General Khanh made, to prevent "a collapse of national morale" in Saigon.

For the Ambassador cautioned that "it is far from clear at the present moment that the Khanh Government can last until Jan. 1, 1965." The Ambassador said that before bombing the North the United States would also have to send Army Hawk antiaircraft missile units to the Saigon and Danang areas to protect the airfields there against retaliatory Communist air attacks—assumed possible from China or North Vietnam—and to land a force of American Marines at Danang to protect the air base there against possible ground assaults.

His cable was designated a joint United States mission message, meaning that Deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson and Gen. William C. Westmoreland, chief of the United States Military Assistance Command, had concurred with the Ambassador's views.

On Aug. 26, three days before the President's speech at the barbecue in Stonewall, Tex., the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a memorandum to Secretary McNamara agreeing with Ambassador Taylor. They said that bombing under his second criterion, to stave off a breakdown in Saigon, was "more in accord with the current situation" in their view and added that an air war against the North was now "essential to prevent a complete collapse of the U.S. position in Southeast Asia."

The Joint Chiefs' memorandum was the first appearance, the account says, of a "provocation strategy" that was to be discussed at the Sept. 7 White House session—in the words of the narrative, "deliberate attempts to provoke the D. R. V. into taking actions which could then be answered by a systematic U.S. air campaign."

The memorandum itself is not this explicit, although it does seem to suggest attempting to repeat the Tonkin Gulf clashes as a pretext for escalation.

In a Sept. 3 memorandum to Secretary McNamara, however, Mr. McNaughton was specific. He outlined several means of provocation that could culminate in a sustained air war. In the meantime, they could be employed to conduct reprisal air strikes that would help hold the situation in South Vietnam together and, the analyst notes, permit postponing "probably until November or December any decision as to serious escalation."

DEFINES SERIOUS ESCALATION

This serious escalation Mr. McNaughton defined as "a crescendo of GVN-U.S. military actions against the D.R.V.," such as mining harbors and gradually escalating air raids.

He described his provocation program to Mr. McNamara as "an orchestration of three classes of actions, all designed to meet these five desiderata—(1) From the U.S., GVN and hopefully allied points of view they should be legitimate things to do under the circumstances, (2) they should cause apprehension, ideally increasing apprehension, in the D.R.V., (3) they should be likely at some point to provoke a military D.R.V. response, (4) the provoked response should be likely to provide good grounds for us to escalate if we wished, and (5) the timing and crescendo should be under our control, with the scenario capable of being turned off at any time." [See text McNamara plan, Sept. 3.]

The classes of actions were:

South Vietnamese air strikes at enemy infiltration routes through southeastern Laos that would "begin in Laos near the South Vietnamese border and eventually across the North Vietnamese border."

A resumption of the covert coastal raids on North Vietnam under Operation Plan 34A, which President Johnson had temporarily suspended since the Tonkin Gulf incident. The South Vietnamese Government would announce them publicly, declaring them "fully justified as necessary to assist in interdiction of infiltration by sea."

A resumption of patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin by United States destroyers, code-named De Soto patrols, although these would still be physically "disassociated" from the 34A attacks. Mr. McNaughton noted that "the U.S. public is sympathetic to reasonable insistence on the right of the U.S. Navy to ply international waters."

MAJORITY IN DISAGREEMENT

But a majority of the officials at the Sept. 7 White House strategy meeting disagreed. They decided for the present against adopting a provocation strategy for reprisal air attacks, precisely because the Khanh regime was so weak and vulnerable and the morale-lifting benefits of such strikes might be offset by possible Communist retaliation, the analyst says. The meeting was attended by the President; Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Secretary McNamara; Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; Ambassador Taylor, who had flown in from Saigon, and John A. McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence.

"We believe such deliberately provocative elements should not be added in the immediate future while the GVN is still struggling to its feet," Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy wrote in a memorandum recording the consensus recommendations formally made to the President after the meeting.

"By early October, however, we may recommend such actions depending on GVN progress and Communist reaction in the meantime, especially to U.S. naval patrols." A resumption of the destroyer patrols was one outcome of the Sept. 7 meeting.

The analyst says that a similar reason was given for the decision against beginning a

sustained bombing campaign against the North, with or without a provocation strategy, in the near future. "The GVN over the next 2-3 months will be too weak for us to take any major deliberate risks of escalation that would involve a major role for, or threat to, South Vietnam," the Bundy memorandum states.

Ambassador Taylor had acknowledged in his cable of Aug. 18 that bombing the North to prevent a collapse in the South if the Khanh regime continued to decline "increase the likelihood of U.S. involvement in ground action since Khanh will have almost no available ground forces which can be released from pacification employment to mobile resistance of D.R.V. attacks."

A BASE FOR WIDER ACTION

The Pentagon account concludes from the Sept. 7 strategy discussions that by now the Saigon regime was being regarded less and less as a government capable of defeating the Vietcong insurgency than "in terms of its suitability as a base for wider action."

Despite the pessimistic analyses of Ambassador Taylor and the Joint Chiefs for future escalation, some of those at the White House meeting hoped the Khanh regime could be somewhat stabilized. Citing handwritten notes of the meeting in the Pentagon files, the analyst, quotes Mr. McNamara as saying that he understood "we are not acting more strongly because there is a clear hope of strengthening the GVN."

"But he went on," the account continues, "to urge that the way be kept open for stronger actions even if the GVN did not improve or in the event the war were widened by the Communists."

The handwritten notes of the meeting quote the President as asking, "Can we really strengthen the GVN?"

And in his memorandum of the consensus, William Bundy wrote: "Khanh will probably stay in control and may make some headway in the next 2-3 months in strengthening the Government (GVN). The best we can expect is that he and the GVN will be able to maintain order, keep the pacification program ticking over (but not progressing markedly), and give the appearance of a valid government."

On Sept. 10, therefore, the President ordered a number of interim measures in National Security Action Memorandum 314, issued over the signature of his special assistant, McGeorge Bundy. These were intended, in the words of William Bundy's memorandum of consensus, "to assist morale in SVN and show the Communists we will mean business, while at the same time seeking to keep the risks low and under our control at each stage."

A REFLECTION OF CONSENSUS

The most important orders Mr. Johnson gave dealt with covert measures. The final paragraph in the President's memorandum also reflected the consensus, the analyst finds, of the Sept. 7 meeting and other strategy discussions of the time—"the extent to which the new year was anticipated as the occasion for beginning overt military operations against North Vietnam."

This final paragraph read: "These decisions are governed by a prevailing judgment that the first order of business at present is to take actions which will help to strengthen the fabric of the Government of South Vietnam; to the extent that the situation permits, such action should precede larger decisions. If such larger decisions are required at any time by a change in the situation, they will be taken." [See text, McGeorge Bundy memo, Sept. 10.]

The interim measures Mr. Johnson ordered included these:

Resumption of the De Soto patrols by American destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf. They would "operate initially well beyond the 12-mile limit and be clearly disassociated

from 34A maritime operations," but the destroyers "would have air cover from carriers."

Reactivation of the 34A coastal raids, this time after completion of the first De Soto patrol. The directive added that "we should have the GVN ready to admit they are taking place and to justify and legitimize them on the basis of the facts of VC infiltration by sea." The account explains, "It was believed that this step would be useful in establishing a climate of opinion more receptive to expanded (air) operations against North Vietnam when they became necessary." The word in parentheses is the historian's.

An arrangement with the Laotian Government of Premier Souvanna Phouma to permit "limited GVN air and ground operations into the corridor areas of [southeastern] Laos, together with Lao air strikes and possible use of U.S. armed aerial reconnaissance." Armed aerial reconnaissance is a military operation in which the pilot has authority to attack unprogrammed targets, such as gun installations or trucks, at his own discretion.

The United States "should be prepared" to launch "tit for tat" reprisal air strikes like those during the Tonkin Gulf incident "as appropriate against the D.R.V. in the event of any attack on U.S. units or any special D.R.V.-VC action against SVN."

The President also ordered "economic and political actions" in South Vietnam, such as pay raises for Vietnamese civil servants out of American funds, to try to strengthen the Saigon regime.

The United States destroyers Morton and Edwards resumed the De Soto patrols in the Tonkin Gulf on Sept. 12, two days after Mr. Johnson's directive. They were attacked in a third Tonkin incident on the night of Sept. 18, and the President glossed over it.

However, he went ahead with his decision to resume the 34A coastal raids, still covertly, the account says. The order to reactivate them was issued by Mr. Johnson on Oct. 4, with the specification that they were to be conducted under tightened American controls.

Each operation on the monthly schedules now had to be "approved in advance" by Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance for Secretary McNamara, Llewellyn A. Thompson, acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs for Secretary Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy at the White House for the President.

During October, a subsequent report to William Bundy on covert activities said, the 34A coastal raids consisted of two shallow probes of North Vietnamese defenses, an attempt to capture a junk, and successful shelling of the radar station at Vinhson and the observation post at Muiddao.

TWO SABOTAGE ACTIONS

Two of the sabotage teams that had previously been parachuted into the North also "carried out successful actions during October," the report said. "One demolished a bridge, the other ambushed a North Vietnamese patrol. Both teams suffered casualties, the latter sufficient to cast doubt on the wisdom of the action."

The U-2 spy plane flights over North Vietnam and the parachuting of supplies and reinforcements to sabotage and psychological warfare teams in the North continued throughout this period and had not been affected by the President's suspension of the coastal raids after the original Tonkin Gulf incident.

The covert step-up in the air operations in Laos ordered by the President did not take place until mid-October. The Pentagon account says that one reason for the delay was the Administration's need to "await the uncertain outcome" of negotiations then taking place in Paris between the right-wing, neutralist and pro-Communist factions in Laos. The objective of the talks was to ar-

range a cease-fire that might lead to a new 14-nation Geneva conference to end the Laotian civil war.

"However, a Laotian cease-fire was not compatible with current perceptions of U.S. interest," the analyst writes.

The Administration feared that during an ensuing Geneva conference on Laos, international pressures, particularly from the Communist countries, might force the discussions onto the subject of Vietnam. Negotiations in the present circumstances were considered certain to unravel the shaky anti-Communist regime in Saigon.

The Administration also believed that even the convening of a conference on Laos might create an impression in Saigon that Washington was going to seek a negotiated withdrawal from South Vietnam and set off a political collapse there and the emergence of a neutralist coalition regime that would ask the United States to leave.

The account notes that in his Aug. 11 high-level policy memorandum on Southeast Asia, William Bundy had "characterized U.S. strategy" toward the Paris talks with the statement that "we should wish to slow down any progress toward a conference and to hold Souvanna to the firmest possible position." Mr. Bundy had referred to a suggestion by Ambassador Leonard Unger that Prince Souvanna Phouma insist on three-factor administration of the Plaine des Jarres as "a useful delaying gambit."

"Significantly," the analyst says, "this proposal was advanced at Paris by Souvanna Phouma on 1 September—illustrating the fact that Souvanna was carefully advised by U.S. diplomats both prior to and during the Paris meetings. Other features of Souvanna's negotiating posture which apparently were encouraged as likely to have the effect of drawing out the discussions were insistence on Communist acceptance of (1) Souvanna's political status as Premier and (2) unhampered operations by the I.C.C. [International Control Commission]."

"Insistence on Souvanna's position is another point on which he should insist, and there would also be play in the hand on the question of free I.C.C. operations," Mr. Bundy wrote in his Aug. 11 memorandum.

BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS

"It will be recalled that the latter point was the issue on which progress toward a cease-fire became stalled," the analyst remarks. The negotiations broke down in Paris late in September.

American mission representatives from Bangkok and Vientiane met in Saigon on Sept. 11 under Ambassador Taylor's auspices, however, and decided that the South Vietnamese Air Force should not participate in the stepped-up air action in Laos authorized by the President in his directive of Sept. 10.

A list of 22 targets in the Laotian panhandle had been drawn up during the summer for the possibility of such raids, including one on a control point at the Muga Pass, just across the North Vietnamese border.

South Vietnamese air strikes would offend Premier Souvanna Phouma by complicating his political position, the meeting determined, so the air attacks would be confined to clandestine raids by the T-28's in Laos and the United States Navy and Air Force jets—code-named Yankee Team—operating over Laos. Accord was also reached that South Vietnamese troops, possibly accompanied by American advisers, would also make ground forays into Laos up to a depth of 20 kilometers, or 12 miles.

"The mission representatives agreed that, once the [air and ground] operations began, they should not be acknowledged publicly," the analyst writes. "In effect, then, they would supplement the other covert pressures being exerted against North Vietnam. Moreover, while the Lao Government would of course know about the operations of their

T-28's Souvanna was not to be informed of the GVN/U.S. [ground] operations. The unacknowledged nature of these operations would thus be easier to maintain."

JOINT DEPARTMENTAL MESSAGE

On Oct. 6, a joint State and Defense Department message authorized Ambassador Unger in Laos to obtain Premier Souvanna Phouma's approval for the T-28 strikes "as soon as possible."

But as the analyst points out, the message showed that the President had decided to postpone the accompanying strikes by Yankee Team jets, the "U.S. armed aerial reconnaissance" mentioned in Mr. Johnson's National Security Action Memorandum 314.

Five of the targets in the Laotian panhandle, well-defended bridges, had been specifically marked for the American jets, and fire by the Yankee Team planes would also be required against anti-aircraft batteries defending the Mugla Pass. The message from Washington excluded these targets from the list of 22.

"You are further authorized to inform Lao that Yankee Team suppressive-fire strikes against certain difficult targets in pandle, interspersing with further T-28 strikes, are part of the over-all concept and are to be anticipated later, but that such U.S. strikes are not repeat not authorized at this time," the cable said. [See text, cable on Laos Strikes, Sept. 10.]

Ambassadors Unger and Taylor both warned that the Laotian Government, without some participation by the American jets, would not persevere in attacking targets on the Communist infiltration routes. Accordingly, the day before the T-28 strikes began on Oct. 14 with Premier Souvanna Phouma's approval, Washington authorized the Yankee Team jets to fly combat air patrol over the T-28's to raise morale and protect them from any interference by North Vietnamese MIG's.

"MINOR EXTENSION" ONLY

Ambassador Taylor said in his cable that the combat air patrol missions could be achieved by "a relatively minor extension" of the current rules of engagement for American aircraft in Indochina.

The President also postponed for the present the planned ground forays into Laos by the South Vietnamese. Ambassador Taylor pointed out in a cable on Oct. 9 that these would not be possible "in foreseeable future" in any case because the South Vietnamese Army was so tied down fighting the guerrillas in its own country.

Several eight-man South Vietnamese reconnaissance teams were parachuted into Laos in an operation called Leaping Lena, but the Nov. 7 report to William Bundy on covert operations would note that "all of these teams were located by the enemy and only four survivors returned. . . ."

On Nov. 1, two days before the election, the Vietcong struck with a devastating mortar barrage on American planes and facilities at Bienhoa airfield near Saigon. The attack put the President under great internal pressure, the analyst says, to strike back openly, as he had said in his directive of Sept. 10 that he was prepared to do "in the event of any attack on U.S. units or any special D.R.V./VC action against SVN."

In the enemy's barrage, four Americans were killed, five B-57 bombers were destroyed and eight damaged. These were some of the B-57's that had earlier been sent from Japan to the Philippines at Mr. McNamara's suggestion as part of the preparations for possible bombing of the North. They had since been moved into South Vietnam, however, to try to shore up the Khanh Government's military position by bringing more air power to bear upon the Vietcong.

"As of the end of October (in anticipation of resumed De Soto patrols), elements of our Pacific forces were reported as 'poised and ready' to execute reprisals for any D.R.V.

attacks on our naval vessels. Thus, there was a rather large expectancy among Administration officials that the United States would do something in retaliation," the analyst writes. The words in parentheses are his.

CHANGE OF GROUND RULES

The Joint Chiefs told Mr. McNamara that the Bienhoa attack had been a "deliberate act of escalation and a change of the ground rules under which the VC had operated up to now." Asserting that "a prompt and strong response is clearly justified," they proposed, on the same day as the incident, "that the following specific actions be taken" (the words in parentheses are those of the Joint Chiefs; words in brackets have been inserted by The Times for clarification):

"a. Within 24-36 hours Pacific Command (PACOM) forces take initial U.S. military actions as follows:

"(1) Conduct air strikes in Laos against targets No. 3 (Tchepone barracks northwest), No. 4 (Tchepone military area), No. 19 (Banthay military area), No. 8 (Nape highway bridge), and the Banken bridge on Route 7.

"(2) Conduct low-level air reconnaissance of infiltration routes and of targets in North Vietnam south of Latitude 19 degrees.

"b. Prior to air attacks on the D.R.V., land the Marine special landing forces at Danang and airlift Army or Marine units from Okinawa to the Saigon-Tan Son Nhut-Bienhoa area, to provide increased security for US personnel and installations.

"c. Use aircraft engaged in airlift (subparagraph b, above) to assist in evacuation of U.S. dependents from Saigon, to commence concurrently with the daylight air strikes against the D.R.V. (subparagraph d, below).

"d. Assemble and prepare necessary forces so that:

"(1) Within 60 to 72 hours, 30 B-52s from Guam conduct a night strike on D.R.V. target No. 6 (Phucyen airfield). [Phucyen, 13 miles from Hanoi, is the principal North Vietnamese air base].

"(2) Commencing at first flight on the day following subparagraph (1) above, PACOM air and naval forces conduct air strikes against D.R.V. targets No. 6 (Phucyen airfield) (daylight follow-up on the above night strike), No. 3 (Hanoi Glam airfield), No. 8 (Haliphong Catbi airfield), No. 48 (Haliphong POL), and No. 49 (Hanoi POL). [POL is a military abbreviation for petroleum, oil and lubricants.]

"(3) Concurrently with subparagraph (2), above the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) will strike DRV target No. 36 (Vitthulu barracks).

"(4) Combat air patrols (CAP), flak suppressive fire, strike photographic reconnaissance (S.A.R.) are conducted as appropriate.

"(5) The above actions are followed by:

"(a) Armed reconnaissance on infiltration routes in Laos.

"(b) Air strikes against infiltration routes and targets in the D.R.V.

"(c) Progressive PACOM and SAC [Strategic Air Command] strikes against the targets listed in 94 Target Study.

"(c) That bases be used as necessary in connection with the foregoing, with authority to be obtained through appropriate channels. . . .

"Recognizing that security of this plan is of critical importance, they [the Joint Chiefs] consider that external agencies, such as the VNAF, should be apprised only of those parts of the plan necessary to insure proper and effective coordination. The same limited revelation of plans should govern discussions with the Thais in securing authority for unlimited use of Thai bases."

CAUTION FROM SAIGON

From Saigon, Ambassador Taylor cabled for a more restrained response consisting of "retaliatory bombing attacks on selected D.R.V. targets" using both American and South Vietnamese planes and for a "policy statement that we will act similarly in like cases in the future."

But the President felt otherwise for the moment. "Apparently, the decision was made to do nothing," the analyst says, adding that the documentary evidence does not provide an adequate explanation.

At a White House meeting the same day, the account continued, the President expressed concern that United States retaliatory strikes might bring counterretaliation by North Vietnam or China against American bases and civilian dependents in the South.

In briefing the press, Administration officials, unidentified in the study, drew a contrast "between this incident and the Tonkin Gulf attacks where our destroyers were 'on United States business.'"

"A second [White House] meeting to discuss possible U.S. actions was 'tentatively scheduled' for 2 November, but the available materials contain no evidence that it was held," the account continues. "President Johnson was scheduled to appear in Houston that afternoon, for his final pre-election address, and it may be that the second White House meeting was called off."

"One thing is certain," the writer concludes. "There were no retaliatory strikes authorized following the attack on the U.S. bomber base."

A PANEL UNDER BUNDY

But the President had not altogether declined to act on Nov. 1. He had appointed an interagency working group under William Bundy to draw up various political and military options for direct action against North Vietnam. This was the one "concrete result" of the Nov. 1 mortar raid on Bienhoa, the account reports.

The Bundy working group, as it would be unofficially called in the Government, held its first meeting at 9:30 A.M. on Nov. 3, the day that Mr. Johnson was elected to the Presidency in his own right by a huge landslide.

"Bienhoa may be repeated at any time," Mr. Bundy wrote in a memorandum to the group on Nov. 5. "This would tend to force our hand, but would also give us a good springboard for any decision for stronger action. The President is clearly thinking in terms of maximum use of a Gulf of Tonkin rationale, either for an action that would show toughness and hold the line till we can decide the big issue, or as a basis for starting a clear course of action under the broad options." [See text McGeorge Bundy drafts, Nov. 5.]

Ostensibly, the Bundy group had a mandate to re-examine the entire American policy toward Vietnam and to recommend to the National Security Council a broad range of options. Its membership represented the entire foreign-policy-making machine of the Government—Mr. Bundy; Marshall Green; Michael V. Forrestal, head of the interagency Vietnam coordinating committee, and Robert Johnson of the State Department; Mr. McNaughton from the civilian hierarchy of the Pentagon; Vice Adm. Lloyd M. Mustin from the Joint Chiefs' staff and Harold Ford of the Central Intelligence Agency.

"REMARKABLE LITTLE LATITUDE"

But, the account says, "there appears to have been, in fact, remarkably little latitude for reopening the basic question about U.S. involvement in the Vietnam struggle."

The basic national objective of "an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam," established by the President's National Security Action Memorandum 288 of the previous March, "did not seem open to question."

THE OPTIONS HARDENED

The September discussions had established a consensus that bombing of the North "would be required at some proximate future date for a variety of reasons" and individual and institutional pressures all tended to

harden the options toward this end as they were finally presented to the National Security Council and then the President.

The analyst gives a number of examples of this stiffening process from the successive draft papers developed by the group during its three weeks of deliberations.

"The extreme withdrawal option was rejected almost without surfacing for consideration" because of its conflict with the policy memorandums. "Fallback positions" outlined in an original working-group draft suffered a similar fate.

FIRST FALLBACK POSITION

The first fallback position, the study says, "would have meant holding the line—placing an immediate, low ceiling on the number of U.S. personnel in SVN, and taking vigorous efforts to build on a stronger base elsewhere, possibly Thailand."

"The second alternative would have been to undertake some spectacular, highly visible supporting action like a limited-duration selective bombing campaign as a last effort to save the South; to have accompanied it with a propaganda campaign about the unwinnability of the war given the GVN's ineptness and, then, to have sought negotiations through compromise and neutralization when the bombing failed."

But because of "forceful objections" by Admiral Mustin, the Joint Chiefs representative, both of these possibilities were downgraded in the final paper presented to the National Security Council on Nov. 21. In effect they were "rejected before they were fully explored," the study says.

Thus all three options, labeled A, B and C, entailed some form of bombing, with "the distinctions between them" tending to blur as they evolved during the group's three weeks of deliberations, the analyst says. Mr. McNaughton and William Bundy collaborated closely on their formulation.

A similar convergence occurred on the question of negotiations.

THE MINIMUM POSITION

Here the minimum United States position was defined as forcing Hanoi to halt the insurgency in the South and to agree to the establishment of a secure, non-Communist state there, a position the analyst defines as "acceptance or else." Moreover, talks of any kind with Hanoi were to be avoided until the effects of bombing had put the United States into a position to obtain this minimum goal in negotiations.

"The only option that provided for bargaining in the usual sense of the word was Option C," the study says. Here the United States would be willing to bargain away international supervisory machinery to verify Hanoi's agreement.

"The policy climate in Washington simply was not receptive to any suggestion that U.S. goals might have to be compromised," the study comments.

These are the options in their final form as the study summarizes them:

OPTION A—Conduct U.S. reprisal air strikes on North Vietnam "not only against any recurrence of VC 'spectaculars' such as Bienhoa," intensify the coastal raids of Operation Plan 34A, resume the destroyer patrols in the gulf, step up the air strikes by T-28's against infiltration targets in Laos and seek reforms in South Vietnam.

OPTION B—What Mr. McNaughton called "a fast/full squeeze." Bomb the North "at a fairly rapid pace and without interruption," including early air raids on Phuoc Airfield near Hanoi and key bridges along the road and rail links with China until full American demands are met. "Should pressures for negotiations become too formidable to resist and discussion begin before a Communist agreement to comply," the analyst writes, "it stressed that the United States should define its negotiating position 'in a way which makes Communist acceptance

unlikely.' In this manner it would be 'very likely that the conference would break up rather rapidly,' thus enabling our military pressures to be resumed."

OPTION C—Mr. McNaughton's "slow squeeze"; the option he and William Bundy favored. Gradually increasing air strikes "against infiltration targets, first in Laos and then in the D.R.V., and then against other targets in North Vietnam" intended to "give the impression of a steady deliberate approach . . . designed to give the United States the option at any time to proceed or not, to escalate or not and to quicken the pace or not." This option also included the possibility of a "significant ground deployment to the northern part of South Vietnam" as an additional bargaining counter.

A SELECT COMMITTEE MEETS

On Nov. 24, a select committee of the National Security Council met to discuss the option papers formally presented to the council three days earlier. This group comprised Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Mr. McCone, General Wheeler, McGeorge Bundy and Under Secretary of State George W. Ball. William Bundy attended to keep a record and to represent the working group.

In the account of this meeting, Mr. Ball makes his first appearance in the Pentagon history as the Administration dissenter on Vietnam. William Bundy's memorandum of record says Mr. Ball "indicated doubt" that bombing the North in any fashion would improve the situation in South Vietnam and "argued against" a judgment that a Vietcong victory in South Vietnam would have a falling-domino effect on the rest of Asia.

While the working group sessions had been in progress, the study discloses, Mr. Ball had been writing a quite different policy paper "suggesting a U.S. diplomatic strategy in the event of an imminent GVN collapse."

"In it, he advocated working through the U.K. [United Kingdom, or Britain] who would in turn seek cooperation from the U.S.S.R., in arranging an international conference (or smaller proportions than those at Geneva) which would work out a compromise political settlement for South Vietnam," the analyst says. The words in parentheses are the analyst's.

Of those present at the November 24 meeting, the memorandum of record indicates, only Mr. Ball favored Option A. The study gives the impression this was conceived as a throwaway option by the Working Group. The group's analysis labeled it "an indefinite course of action" whose "sole advantages" were these:

"(a) Defeat would be clearly due to GVN failure, and we ourselves would be less implicated than if we tried Option B or Option C, and failed.

"(b) The most likely result would be a Vietnamese negotiated deal, under which an eventually unified Communist Vietnam would reassert its traditional hostility to Communist China and limit its own ambitions to Laos and Cambodia."

SECRETARY RUSK DISAGREES

At the Nov. 24 meeting, however, Mr. Rusk said that while he favored bombing North Vietnam, he did not accept an analysis by Mr. McNaughton and William Bundy that if the bombing failed to save South Vietnam "we would obtain international credit merely for trying."

"In his view," the analyst writes, "the harder we tried and then failed, the worse our situation would be."

McGeorge Bundy demurred to some extent, the account goes on, but Mr. Ball "expressed strong agreement with the last Rusk point."

General Wheeler, reflecting the viewpoint of the Joint Chiefs, argued that the hard, fast bombing campaign of Option B actually entailed "less risk of a major conflict before achieving success," in words of the study,

than the gradually risking air strikes of Option C.

The study adds that Mr. Bundy and Mr. McNaughton may have deliberately loaded the language of Option B to try to frighten the President out of adopting it lest it create severe international pressure for quick negotiations.

General Wheeler's argument presaged a running controversy between the Joint Chiefs and the civilian leadership after the bombing campaign began in the coming year.

The meeting on Nov. 24 ended without a clear majority decision on which option should be recommended to the President. The principals resumed when Ambassador Taylor reached Washington to join the strategy talks on Nov. 27, 1964.

TAYLOR'S THREE PURPOSES

In a written briefing paper, he told the conferees:

"If, as the evidence shows, we are playing a losing game in South Vietnam . . . it is high time we change and find a better way." He proposed gradually increasing air strikes against the North for a threefold purpose:

"First, establish an adequate government in SVN; second, improve the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign; finally persuade or force the D.R.V. to stop its aid to the Vietcong and to use its directive powers to make the Vietcong desist from their efforts to overthrow the Government of South Vietnam."

To improve anti-Communist prospects in the South, the Ambassador proposed using the lever of American air strikes against the North to obtain promises from the Saigon leaders that they would achieve political stability, strengthen the army and the police, suppress dissident Buddhist and student factions, replace incompetent officials and get on with the war effort.

The analyst says that the Ambassador had thus revised his earlier view that Washington should bomb the North merely to prevent "a collapse of national morale" in Saigon. He still favored some form of bombing in an emergency, but now he wanted something solid from the Saigon leaders in exchange for a coherent program of rising air war.

In the course of discussions on Nov. 27, however, the Ambassador acknowledged that while bombing "would definitely have a favorable effect" in South Vietnam, ". . . he was not sure this would be enough really to improve the situation," the analyst reports, again quoting from William Bundy's memorandum of record.

"Others, including McNamara, agreed with Taylor's evaluation, but the Secretary [Mr. McNamara] added that 'the strengthening effect of Option C could at least buy time, possibly measured in years.'"

Ambassador Taylor proposed that the Administration therefore adopt a two-phase program culminating in the bombing of infiltration facilities south of 19th Parallel in North Vietnam, in effect Option A plus the first stages of Option C. Phase I would consist of 30 days of the Option A type of actions, such as intensification of the coastal raids on the North, air strikes by American jets at infiltration routes and one or two reprisal raids against the North. Meanwhile, Ambassador Taylor would obtain the promises of improvement from the Saigon leadership.

At the end of the 30 days, with the promises in hand, the United States would then move into Phase II, the air war. The air raids were to last two to six months, during which Hanoi was apparently expected to yield.

The others agreed, and the proposal was redefined further at a meeting on Nov. 28. William Bundy was assigned the task of drawing up a formal policy paper outlining the proposal. The Cabinet-level officials agreed to recommend it to the President at a White House meeting scheduled for Dec. 1,

right after Mr. Johnson's Thanksgiving holiday at his ranch.

On Nov. 28, the same day that his closest advisers made their decision to advise him to bomb North Vietnam, Mr. Johnson was asked at a news conference at the ranch:

"Mr. President, is expansion of the Vietnam war into Laos or North Vietnam a live possibility at this moment?"

"WHEN YOU CRAWL OUT . . ."

"I don't want to give you any particular guide posts as to your conduct in the matter," Mr. Johnson told the newsmen about their articles. "But when you crawl out on a limb, you always have to find another one to crawl back on."

"I have just been sitting here in this serene atmosphere of the Federales for the last few days reading about the wars that you [speculating newsmen] have involved us in and the additional undertakings that I have made decisions on or that General Taylor has recommended or that Mr. McNamara plans or Secretary Rusk envisages. I would say, generally speaking, that some people are speculating and taking positions that I think are somewhat premature."

"At the moment," he concluded, "General Taylor will report to us on developments. We will carefully consider these reports . . . I will meet with him in the early part of the week. I anticipate there will be no dramatic announcement to come out of these meetings except in the form of your speculation."

William Bundy's draft policy paper, written the next day, said the bombing campaign "would consist principally of progressively more serious air strikes, of a weight and tempo adjusted to the situation as it develops (possibly running from two to six months)." The words in parentheses are Mr. Bundy's.

The draft paper added: "Targets in the D.R.V. would start with infiltration targets south of the 19th Parallel and work up to targets north of that point. This could eventually lead to such measures as air strikes on all major military-related targets, aerial mining of D.R.V. ports, and a U.S. naval blockade of the D.R.V."

"Concurrently," it continued, "the U.S. would be alert to any sign of yielding by Hanoi, and would be prepared to explore negotiated solutions that attain U.S. objectives in an acceptable manner." [See text, working group's draft, Nov. 29.]

Apparently at Mr. McNamara's suggestion, the analyst says, a final sentence in this paragraph was deleted; it read, "The U.S. would seek to control any negotiations and would oppose any independent South Vietnamese efforts to negotiate." Also removed, possibly during a final meeting of the top officials on Nov. 30 to review the policy paper and "apparently on the advice of McGeorge Bundy," was a proposal that the President make a major speech indicating the new direction that Washington's policy was taking.

Likewise deleted was a provision to brief "available Congressional leaders . . . (no special leadership meeting will be convened for this purpose)" on new evidence being compiled on North Vietnamese infiltration into the South, as a public justification of the bombing.

A separate recommendation from the Joint Chiefs for a series of major raids—like those in their retaliation proposal for the Vietcong mortar strike at Bienhoa air base on Nov. 1—was deleted for unspecified reasons, the analyst says, "in effect, presenting a united front to the President."

The paper that was sent to the President made no mention of American ground troops to provide security for airfields in the South when the bombing began, as General Wheeler had reminded the conferees on Nov. 24 would be necessary.

The writer notes the "gap" between the

drastic concessions expected from Hanoi and the relatively modest bombing campaign that was expected to break Hanoi's will. He puts forward "two by no means contradictory explanations of this gap." This is the first:

CALCULATED 'DOSES OF FORCE'

"There is some reason to believe that the principals thought that carefully calculated doses of force could bring about predictable and desirable responses from Hanoi. Underlying this optimistic view was a significant underestimate of the level of the D.R.V. commitment to victory in the South and an overestimate of the effectiveness of U.S. pressures in weakening that resolve."

A related factor, the account says, "which, no doubt, commended the proposal to the Administration was the relatively low cost—in political terms—of such action." The context here indicates that the Administration thought the public would find an air war less repugnant than a ground war.

The President seems to have shared the view of his chief advisers, the analyst writes, that "the threat implicit in minimum but increasing amounts of force ('slow squeeze') would . . . ultimately bring Hanoi to the table on terms favorable to the U.S."

"McGeorge Bundy, as the President's assistant for national security affairs, was in a position to convey President Johnson's mood to the group," the account goes on. It adds that notes taken at a White House meeting on Dec. 1 when the senior officials met with Mr. Johnson to present the bombing plan "tend to confirm that the President's mood was more closely akin to the measures recommended" than to other, harsher bombing plans.

"A second explanation of the gap between ends and means is a more simple one," the account comments. "In a phrase, we had run out of alternatives other than pressures."

A memorandum by Assistant Secretary McNaughton on Nov. 6, 1964, made the point succinctly: "Action against North Vietnam is to some extent a substitute for strengthening the Government in South Vietnam. That is, a less active VC (on orders from D.R.V.) can be matched by a less efficient GVN. We therefore should consider squeezing North Vietnam." The words in parentheses are Mr. McNaughton's. [See text.]

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PERIOD

Between the Tonkin Gulf resolution of August, 1964, and the start of concentrated United States bombing of North Vietnam in 1965, the details of such an air war were being planned, discussed and debated in the Johnson Administration, according to the secret Pentagon chronicle.

Here, chronologically, are highlights of those months of decision-making.

AUGUST 1964

Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor cables agreement with Administration "assumption" that "something must be added in the coming months" to forestall "a collapse of national morale" in Saigon. Suggests "carefully orchestrated bombing attack" on North.

Joint Chiefs of Staff concur, call air war "essential to prevent a complete collapse of the U.S. position in Southeast Asia." Propose what study calls "provocation strategy."

SEPTEMBER 1964

John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, outlines provocation plan "to provide good grounds for us to escalate if we wished. . . ." Includes South Vietnamese air strikes on Laos infiltration routes; coastal raids on North; resumption U.S. destroyer patrols in Gulf of Tonkin.

White House strategy meeting. Analyst finds "general consensus" on necessity for early 1965 air strikes but says "tactical considerations" require delay. Cites President's "presenting himself as the candidate of reason and restraint," need for "maximum pub-

lic and Congressional support," fear of "premature negotiations," Saigon weakness.

President orders low-risk interim measures, says William P. Bundy memo, "to assist morale . . . and show the Communists we still mean business. . . ." Coastal raids, destroyer patrols included.

OCTOBER 1964

Air strikes on Laos infiltration routes start, following delay awaiting outcome Laotian cease-fire talks. U.S. feared new Geneva conference. Analyst says this "not compatible with current perception of U.S. interest."

NOVEMBER 1964

Vietcong attack Bienhoa airfield. Joint Chiefs urge "prompt and strong response" including air strikes on North. Ambassador Taylor urges bombing "selected" targets.

President declines, directs interagency working group under Bundy to consider, recommend Vietnam options, policy.

Group's three recommended options all include bombing North. Analyst says group's deliberations showed "remarkably little latitude for reopening the basic questions about U.S. involvement."

Option A—reprisal air strikes, covert pressure intensified.

Option B—bomb North "at a fairly rapid pace and without interruption" till all U.S. demands met; U.S. to define negotiating position, chronicle says, "in a way which makes Communist acceptance unlikely" if U.S. pressed to negotiate "before a Communist agreement to comply."

Option C—graduated air war, possible deployment ground troops.

National Security Council select committee meets. George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, indicates "doubt" about effectiveness bombing North, argues against domino theory, says Bundy memo. Mr. Ball's policy paper suggests diplomatic strategy leading to international Vietnam conference.

DECEMBER 1964

President approves recommended plan—Option A for 30 days, then Option C. Stresses he feels "pulling the South Vietnamese together" basic to any other action.

Operation Barrel Roll—U.S. air strikes at infiltration-routes Laotian panhandle—under way. National Security Council agrees to "no public statements" unless a plane is lost, then "to insist that we were merely escorting reconnaissance flights."

Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky and ex-Premier Nguyen Khanh attempt coup. Ambassador Taylor tells them U.S. is "tired of coups," warns that "all the military plans which I know you would like to carry out are dependent on government stability."

JANUARY 1965

Two U.S. jets lost over Laos. Press reports on "Barrel Roll."

South Vietnam forces trounced at Binhia. Study says Saigon "final collapse" and Vietcong take-over seem "distinct possibility."

Mr. Bundy, in memo, says "shaky" Saigon morale due partly to "widespread feeling that the U.S. is not ready for stronger action" and is "insisting on perfectionism" in Saigon. Urges "stronger action" despite "grave difficulties."

Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNaughton favor "initiating air strikes"; agree U.S. aim "not to 'help friend' but to contain China," chronicle says.

FEBRUARY 1965

Vietcong attack U.S. military advisers' compound at Pleiku. Study says this "triggered a swift, though long-contemplated Presidential decision to give an 'appropriate and fitting response'."

Forty-nine U.S. jets in first reprisal strike, raid Conghoh.

Second reprisal strike follows guerrilla attack on U.S. barracks.

Operation Rolling Thunder—sustained air war—ordered.

DOUBTS AT TWO POLES

The two dissenters from the view that "calculated doses of force" would bring Hanoi around were, at opposite poles, the Joint Chiefs and the intelligence agencies.

"The J.C.S. differed from this view on the grounds that if we were really interested in affecting Hanoi's will, we would have to hit hard at its capabilities," the account says. The Joint Chiefs wanted the United States to demonstrate a willingness to apply unlimited force.

Their bombing plan, deleted from the position paper before it was presented to the President, asserted that the destruction of all of North Vietnam's major airfields and its petroleum supplies "in the first three days" was intended to "clearly . . . establish the fact that the U.S. intends to use military force to the full limits of what military force can contribute to achieving U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia . . . The follow-on military program—involving armed reconnaissance of infiltration routes in Laos, air strikes on infiltration targets in the D.R.V. and then progressive strikes throughout North Vietnam—could be suspended short of full destruction of the D.R.V. if our objectives were achieved earlier."

The analyst remarks that the Joint Chiefs' plan was "shunted aside because both its risks and costs were too high," but the author does not attempt to evaluate the possible effect of his plan on Hanoi's will.

Like Mr. Ball, the account says, the intelligence community "tended toward a pessimistic view" of the effect of bombing on the Hanoi leaders.

The intelligence panel within the Bundy working group, composed of representatives from the three leading intelligence agencies—the C.I.A., the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency—"did not concede very strong chances for breaking the will of Hanoi," the author writes.

ANALYSIS OF ENEMY POLICY

"The course of actions the Communists have pursued in South Vietnam over the past few years implies a fundamental estimate on their part that the difficulties facing the U.S. are so great that U.S. will and ability to maintain resistance in that area can be gradually eroded—without running high risks that this would wreck heavy destruction on the D.R.V. or Communist China," the panel's report said.

If the United States now began bombing, the panel said, the Hanoi leadership would have to ask itself "a basic question" about how far the United States was willing to step up the war "regardless of the danger of war with Communist China and regardless of the international pressures that could be brought to bear. . . ." The decision of the Hanoi leadership was thus uncertain for a number of reasons, the panel cautioned, and "in any event, comprehension of the other's intentions would almost certainly be difficult on both sides, and especially as the scale of hostilities mounted."

The panel then cast doubt on the so called Rostow thesis of how much Hanoi feared destruction of its industry. This thesis, named for its proponent, Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, underlay much of the Administration's hope for the success of a bombing campaign.

The panel said: "We have many indications that the Hanoi leadership is acutely and nervously aware of the extent to which North Vietnam's transportation system and industrial plant is vulnerable to attack. On the other hand, North Vietnam's economy is overwhelmingly agricultural and, to a large extent, decentralized in a myriad of more or less economically self-sufficient villages. Interdiction of imports and extensive destruction of transportation facilities and industrial plants would cripple D.R.V. industry.

These actions would also seriously restrict D.R.V. military capabilities, and would degrade, though to a lesser extent, Hanoi's capabilities to support guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam and Laos. We do not believe that such actions would have a crucial effect on the daily lives of the overwhelming majority of the North Vietnam population. We do not believe that attacks on industrial targets would so greatly exacerbate current economic difficulties as to create unmanageable control problems. It is reasonable to infer that the D.R.V. leaders have a psychological investment in the work of reconstruction they have accomplished over the last decade. Nevertheless, they would probably be willing to suffer some damage to the country in the course of a test of wills with the U.S. over the course of events in South Vietnam."

NO CHANGE OF POLICY

As in the case of earlier intelligence findings that contradicted policy intentions, the study indicates no effort on the part of the President or his most trusted advisers to reshape their policy along the lines of this analysis.

One part of the intelligence panel's report that the Administration did accept was a prediction that China would not react in any major way to a bombing campaign unless American or South Vietnamese troops invaded North Vietnam or northern Laos. The study indicates that this analysis eased Administration fears on this point.

Chinese reaction to systematic bombing of North Vietnam was expected to be limited to providing Hanoi with anti-aircraft artillery, jet fighters and naval patrol craft. The panel predicted that the Soviet role was "likely to remain a minor one," even where military equipment was concerned. However, the Russians subsequently sent large-scale shipments of formidable anti-aircraft equipment to North Vietnam.

"CAUTIOUS AND EQUIVOCAL"

Now that a decision to bomb North Vietnam was drawing near, the study says, Mr. Johnson became "cautious and equivocal" in approaching it. Two analysts of this period, in fact, differ in their characterization of his decision at the two-and-a-half-hour White House meeting on Dec. 1, 1964, a month after the election, when the bombing plan was presented to him.

One analyst says that at this meeting the President "made a tentative decision" to bomb, ordering the preparatory Phase I put into effect and approving Phase II, the air war itself, "in principle."

The second analyst says that while the President approved the entire bombing plan "in general outline at least . . . it is also clear that he gave his approval to implement only the first phase of the concept."

The President tied the actual waging of air war to reforms by the Saigon Government, this analyst says, and left an impression by the end of the meeting that he was "considerably less than certain that future U.S. actions against North Vietnam [the air war] would be taken, or that they would be desirable."

NO FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM

The study notes that "the precise nature of the President's decisions" at the meeting is not known because a national security action memorandum was not issued afterward.

"However, the study continues, "from handwritten notes of the meeting, from instructions issued to action agencies and from later reports of diplomatic and military actions taken, it is possible to reconstruct the approximate nature of the discussion and the decisions reached." The footnotes do not indicate who made the handwritten notes found in the Pentagon files, although the indication is that it was Mr. McNaughton or Mr. McNamara.

After a briefing by Ambassador Taylor on the situation in South Vietnam, the discussion turned to a draft statement, prepared by William Bundy, that the Ambassador was to deliver to the Saigon leaders. The statement explained the two-phase bombing plan and tied Phase II to a serious attempt by the Saigon leadership to achieve some political stability and get on with the war effort against the Vietcong.

In Saigon, General Khanh had nominally surrendered authority to a civilian cabinet headed by Premier Tran Van Huong. The general was intriguing against the Huong Cabinet, however, as the ostensible commander in chief of the armed forces and head of a Military Revolutionary Committee of South Vietnamese generals. Within this council, a group headed by Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, the chief of the air force, was intriguing both with and against General Khanh.

Against this background, the study says of the White House meeting:

"The President made it clear that he considered that pulling the South Vietnamese together was basic to anything else the United States might do. He asked the Ambassador specifically which groups he (Ambassador Taylor) might talk to and what more we might do to help bring unity among South Vietnam's leaders. He asked whether we could not say to them 'we just can't go on' unless they pulled together. To this, Taylor replied that we must temper our insistence somewhat. . . ."

WHICH ONES TO BRIEF

The meeting then moved into a discussion of which allied countries were to be briefed on the proposed air war. The President said he wanted "new, dramatic effective" forms of assistance from several, specifically mentioning Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the Philippines. These briefings by special envoys were included in the draft position paper laying out the bombing plan as the important diplomatic element in Phase I.

"In each case," the study says, "the representative was to explain our concept and proposed actions and request additional contributions by way of forces in the event the second phase of U.S. actions were entered."

The plan made no provision for similar consultations with Congressional leaders and there is no evidence in the study that Mr. Johnson conducted any.

In approving the statement General Taylor was to make to the Saigon leaders, the President also gave his assent to ready the military signal that was formally to sound the beginning of the 30 days of Phase I—Operation Barrel Roll, air strikes by United States Air Force and Navy jets of Yankee Team against infiltration routes and facilities in the Laotian panhandle, which was to be the final step-up in the Laos air operations.

At the end of the meeting, the account continues, Ambassador Taylor "slipped out the White House rear entrance" to avoid the press and "only a brief, formal statement" was issued. The analyst, remarks that the White House press statement released immediately afterward "contained only two comments regarding any determinations that had been reached."

INSTRUCTIONS FOR TAYLOR

One said, "The President instructed Ambassador Taylor to consult urgently with the South Vietnamese Government as to measures that should be taken to improve the situation in all its aspects."

The other, the concluding paragraph, said the President had "reaffirmed the basic U.S. policy of providing all possible and useful assistance to the South Vietnamese people and Government in their struggle to defeat the externally supported insurgency and aggression being conducted against them."

The final sentence in this paragraph, the analyst notes, was one "specifically linking

this policy" with Congress's Tonkin Gulf resolution. The sentence read: "It was noted that this policy accords with the terms of the Congressional joint resolution of Aug. 10, 1964, which remains in full force and effect."

Then, on Dec. 3, emerging from a second meeting with Mr. Johnson, "presumably having received the final version of his instructions," the account goes on, Ambassador Taylor told reporters assembled at the White House "that he was going to hold 'across-the-board' discussions with the GVN."

"Asserting that U.S. policy for South Vietnam remained the same, he stated that his aim would be to improve the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. Although he hinted of changes 'in tactics and method,' he quite naturally did not disclose the kind of operations in which the United States was about to engage or any future actions to which immediate activity could lead."

The Administration now moved quickly. William Bundy left for Australia and New Zealand the next day, Dec. 4, to brief their governments on both phases of the bombing plan, the writer says.

WILSON VISITS WASHINGTON

Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Britain was "thoroughly briefed on the forthcoming U.S. actions" during a state visit to Washington Dec. 7 to 9, the narrative continues, while other envoys briefed the Canadians and the Asian allies. The writer notes that while Britain, Australia and New Zealand were given "the full picture," the Canadians were "told slightly less" and the Philippines, South Korea and the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan were "briefed on Phase I only." What the Thais and the Laotians were told is not made explicit.

The New Zealand Government "expressed grave doubts" that the bombing would break Hanoi's will, the writer says, and predicted that it might increase infiltration to South Vietnam.

In meetings in Saigon on Dec. 7 and 9 with General Khanh and Premier Huong, Ambassador Taylor exacted the desired promises in exchange for the bombing. At the second meeting, the Ambassador presented them with a draft press release describing the desired improvements, including strengthening of the army and the police, which the Saigon Government released in its own name, at the United States' request, on Dec. 11.

William H. Sullivan, newly appointed as Ambassador to Laos, obtained Premier Souvanna Phouma's agreement on Dec. 10 to the American air strikes at infiltration routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail supply network through the Laotian panhandle, and Operation Barrel Roll got under way on Dec. 14 with attacks by American jets on "targets of opportunity"—that is, unprogramed targets sighted by the pilots.

At a meeting of the National Security Council on Dec. 12, when the final details for Barrel Roll were reviewed and approved, the study reports, it was "agreed that there would be no public operations statements about armed reconnaissance in Laos unless a plane were lost."

"In such an event, the principals stated, the Government should continue to insist that we were merely escorting reconnaissance flights as requested by the Laotian Government."

LEVEL OF ATTACKS SET

McGeorge Bundy was quoted in the memorandum of record as stating that the agreed plan "fulfilled precisely the President's wishes."

On Dec. 18 Secretary McNamara set the level of Barrel Roll attacks for the 30 days of Phase I—the analyst indicates that he did so at the President's wishes—at two missions of four aircraft apiece each week.

The Administration also stepped up the raids by T-28 fighter planes in Laos with a joint message on Dec. 8 from Secretaries

McNamara and Rusk to Ambassador Sullivan. The cable instructed him to have the Laotians intensify bombing "in the corridor areas and close to the D.R.V. border."

The analyst reports that in the three months between the beginning of October and the end of December there were 77 sorties by the T-28's in the panhandle area—a sortie is a strike by a single plane—and that by early December the air raids had "already precipitated several complaints from the D.R.V." to the International Control Commission "alleging U.S.-sponsored air attacks on North Vietnamese territory."

Events in Saigon had meanwhile gone awry. Political turmoil broke out there again with Buddhist and student demonstrations against Premier Huong's Cabinet.

On Dec. 20, in defiance of Ambassador Taylor's wishes, General Khanh, in a temporary alliance with the so-called Young Turks—the young generals led by Marshal Ky—announced the dissolution of the High National Council, a body that was supposed to be functioning as a temporary legislature to draw up a constitution for a permanent civilian government. They also made a large number of political arrests by night, seizing several members of the High National Council.

That day, Ambassador Taylor summoned the Young Turks to the embassy and, in the writer's words, read them "the riot act." They included Gen Nguyen Van Thieu, now President of South Vietnam.

According to the embassy's cable to Washington, the conversation began like this:

Ambassador Taylor: Do all of you understand English? (Vietnamese officers indicated they did . . .)

I told you all clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner we Americans were tired of coups. Apparently I wasted my words. Maybe this is because something is wrong with my French because you evidently didn't understand. I made it clear that all the military plans which I know you would like to carry out are dependent on government stability. Now you have made a real mess. We cannot carry you forever if you do things like this.

Marshal Ky and other Vietnamese generals denied that they had staged a coup and said they were trying to achieve unity by getting rid of divisive elements, the account goes on.

The Ambassador tried to persuade them to support the civilian regime of Premier Huong and apparently to restore the High National Council. The Vietnamese officers would not agree.

The embassy cable describes the end of the conversation:

"In taking a friendly leave, Ambassador Taylor said: 'You people have broken a lot of dishes and now we have to see how we can straighten out this mess.'" [See text, Taylor message, Dec 12.]

By the end of the month, Ambassador Taylor, Deputy Ambassador Johnson and General Westmoreland had apparently despaired of trading a bombing campaign against the North for a stable Saigon Government that would prosecute the war in the South. On Dec. 31, the account continues, they sent a joint message to Washington saying, in effect, that the United States should go ahead with the air campaign against the North "under any conceivable alliance condition short of complete abandonment of South Vietnam."

A FIRMER BASE SOUGHT

The account indicates, however, that the President was reluctant to proceed into Phase II without at least the appearance of a firmer base in Saigon since the turmoil there was making it more difficult for him to justify escalation to the American public.

The writer remarks that at the meeting of the senior National Security Council Members on Dec. 24, Secretary Rusk "raised an issue that was high among Administration

concerns—namely that the American public was worried about the chaos in the GVN, and particularly with respect to its viability as an object of increased U.S. commitment."

On Christmas Eve, the Vietcong planted a bomb in the Brinks, an officers billet in Saigon, killing two Americans in the blast and wounding 58 others; the President declined to authorize reprisal air strikes against the North, despite vigorous recommendations from Ambassador Taylor, Admiral Sharp in Honolulu and the Joint Chiefs, who were now pressing hard for escalation.

"Highest levels today reached negative decision on proposal . . . for reprisal action," Mr. Rusk cabled the Ambassador on Dec. 29.

Five days earlier, Mr. Rusk had also instructed Ambassador Taylor to halt, until the turmoil in Saigon subsided, the planned, piecemeal release to the press of evidence of a major increase in infiltration from the North during 1964, the writer says. The Ambassador had first reported the increase to Washington in October, along with a report of the appearance of individual North Vietnamese Army regulars, and the Administration began leaking the information in November through background briefings.

MAKING A CASE IN PUBLIC

By this time, the Administration felt that it had sufficient information on infiltration to make a public case for bombing the North. The intelligence community had obtained evidence that a minimum of 19,000 and a maximum of 34,000 infiltrators, mostly former southerners who had fought against the French in the Vietminh, had entered the South since 1959. Chester L. Cooper, a former intelligence officer, had put together a major report on Hanoi's support and direction of the guerrillas, but the Administration had decided earlier in December against public disclosure of the document itself because this might create "undesirable speculation," and had instead instructed the Ambassador to continue the piecemeal approach. Now, the analyst says, Mr. Rusk wanted this halted as well for fear that more publicity might create pressure for action prematurely.

DEBATE GROWS IN CONGRESS

The political upheaval in Saigon, the writer continues, was fueling a Vietnam debate in Congress, which, while it did not exhibit much antiwar sentiment, did show considerable confusion and dismay, the writer says.

Secretary Rusk, on television on Jan. 3, 1965, felt it necessary to defend the Administration "in the context of a year-end foreign policy report," the account adds.

Mr. Rusk did not hint at the Administration's plans for possible bombing of the North. "Ruling out either a U.S. withdrawal or a major expansion of the war," the writer says, "Rusk gave assurances that with internal unity, and our aid and persistence the South Vietnamese could themselves defeat the insurgency."

On Jan. 14, however, as a result of the loss of two American jets over Laos in Operation Barrel Roll, "accounts of U.S. air operations against Laotian infiltration routes gained wide circulation for the first time," the writer says. A dispatch from Laos by United Press International, he adds, "in effect blew the lid on the entire Yankee Team operation in Laos since May of 1964."

"Despite official State or Defense refusal to comment on the nature of the Laotian air missions, these disclosures added new fuel to the public policy debate," the writer continues. The disclosures were complicating matters for the President by giving ammunition to the very small minority of antiwar senators who were taking seriously the press speculation that the United States might be getting ready to bomb the North.

In a Senate speech on Jan. 19, the account goes on, Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon charged that the Yankee Team air strikes

had ignored the 1962 Geneva accords on Laos and "violated the nation's belief in 'substituting the rule of law for the jungle law of military might.' Broadening his attack, he warned, that 'there is no hope of avoiding a massive war in Asia' if U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia were to continue without change."

Within the Administration in Washington, key policy makers were coming to the same conclusion that Ambassador Taylor and his colleagues had reached in Saigon—that it was desirable to bomb the North regardless of what state of government existed in the South.

The political turmoil in Saigon, the narrative says, appears "to have been interpreted in Washington as an impending sellout" to the National Liberation Front. Fear increased that a neutralist coalition government would emerge and invite the United States to leave.

VICTORY FOR THE VIETCONG

Washington's sense of crumbling in the military situation was heightened when Saigon's army suffered a "highly visible" setback in a ferocious battle at Binhgia, south-east of the capital, between Dec. 26 and Jan. 2. Vietcong guerrillas nearly destroyed two South Vietnamese Marine battalions.

"All evidence pointed to a situation in which a final collapse of the GVN appeared probable and a victorious consolidation of VC power a distinct possibility," the narrative says.

AS THE HOUR APPROACHED

William Bundy communicated the feeling in a memorandum he wrote to Secretary Rusk on Jan. 6 for a meeting Mr. Rusk was to have with the President that afternoon. Mr. Bundy explained that the memorandum encompassed, besides his own thoughts, those of Michael V. Forrestal, head of the inter-agency coordinating committee, and Ambassador Unger, who had recently been transferred back to Washington from Vientiane.

"I think we must accept that Saigon morale in all quarters is now very shaky indeed," he said in part, "and that this relates directly to a widespread feeling that the U.S. is not ready for stronger action and indeed is possibly looking for a way out. We may regard this feeling as irrational and contradicted by our repeated statements, but Bill Sullivan was very vivid in describing the existence of such feelings in October, and we must honestly concede that our actions and statements since the election have not done anything to offset it. The blunt fact is that we have appeared to the Vietnamese (and to wide circles in Asia and even in Europe) to be insisting on a more perfect government than can reasonably be expected, before we consider any additional action—and that we might even pull out our support unless such a government emerges.

"In key parts of the rest of Asia, notably Thailand, our present posture also appears weak. As such key parts of Asia see us, we looked strong in May and early June, weaker in later June and July, and then appeared to be taking a quite firm line in August with the Gulf of Tonkin. Since then we must have seemed to be gradually weakening—and, again, insisting on perfectionism in the Saigon Government before we moved.

"The sum total of the above seems to us to point—together with almost certainly stepped-up Vietcong actions in the current favorable weather—to a prognosis that the situation in Vietnam is now likely to come apart more rapidly than we had anticipated in November. We would still stick to the estimate that the most likely form of coming apart would be a government of key groups starting to negotiate covertly with the Liberation Front or Hanoi, perhaps not asking in the first instance that we get out, but with that necessarily following at a fairly early stage. In one sense this would

be a "Vietnam solution," with some hope that it would produce a Communist Vietnam that would assert its own degree of independence from Peiping and that would produce a pause in Communist pressure in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, it would still be virtually certain than [sic] Laos would then become untenable and that Cambodia would accommodate in some way. Most seriously, there is grave question whether the Thai in these circumstances would retain any confidence at all in our continued support. In short, the outcome would be regarded in Asia, and particularly among our friends, as just as humiliating a defeat as any other form. As events have developed, the American public would probably not be too sharply critical, but the real question would be whether Thailand and other nations were weakened and taken over thereafter.

"The alternative of stronger action obviously has grave difficulties. It commits the U.S. more deeply, at a time when the picture of South Vietnamese will is extremely weak. To the extent that it included actions against North Vietnam, it would be vigorously attacked by many nations and disapproved initially even by such nations as Japan and India, on present indications. Most basically, it stiffening effect on the Saigon political situation would not be at all sure to bring about a more effective government, nor would limited actions against the southern D.R.V. in fact sharply reduce infiltration or, in present circumstances, be at all likely to induce Hanoi to call it off.

"Nonetheless, on balance we believe that such action would have some faint hope of really improving the Vietnamese situation, and, above all, would put us in a much stronger position to hold the next line of defense, namely Thailand. Accepting the present situation—or any negotiation on the basis of it—would be far weaker from this latter key standpoint. If we moved into stronger actions, we should have in mind that negotiations would be likely to emerge from some quarter in any event, and that under existing circumstances, even with the additional element of pressure, we could not expect to get an outcome that would really secure an independent South Vietnam. Yet even on an outcome that produced a progressive deterioration in South Vietnam and an eventual Communist take-over, we would still have appeared to Asians to have done a lot more about it.

"In specific terms, the kinds of action we might take in the near future would be:

"a. An early occasion for reprisal action against the D.R.V.

"b. Possibly beginning low-level reconnaissance of the D.R.V. at once.

"Concurrently with a or b, an early orderly withdrawal of our dependents [from Saigon, but only if] stronger action [is contemplated]. If we are to clear our decks in this way—and we are more and more inclined to think we should—it simply must be, for this reason alone, in the context of some stronger action. . . .

"Introduction of limited U.S. ground forces into the northern area of South Vietnam still has great appeal to many of us, concurrently with the first air attacks into the D.R.V. It would have a real stiffening effect in Saigon, and a strong signal effect to Hanoi. On the disadvantage side, such forces would be possible attrition targets for the Vietcong."

A SIMILAR MEMORANDUM

Mr. McNaughton, Mr. Bundy's counterpart at the Pentagon, had given Mr. McNamara a similar memorandum three days earlier.

"The impact of these views can be seen in the policy guidance emanating from Washington in mid and late January, 1965," the Pentagon's narrative says.

In a cablegram to Saigon on Jan. 11, the writer goes on, Secretary Rusk instructed Ambassador Taylor "to avoid actions that would further commit the United States to any particular form of political solution" to the turmoil there. If another military regime emerged from the squabbling "we might well have to swallow our pride and work with it," Mr. Rusk said.

Another memorandum to Mr. McNamara from Mr. McNaughton, on Jan. 27, along with Mr. McNamara's penciled comments on it, "adds perspective to this viewpoint," the historian says. Mr. McNaughton stated "and Mr. McNamara agreed" that the United States objective in South Vietnam was "not to 'help friend' but to contain China," and "both favored initiating strikes against North Vietnam."

Paraphrasing the memorandum and Mr. McNamara's comments, the writer says, "At first they believed these [air attacks] should take the form of reprisals; beyond that, the Administration would have to 'feel its way' into stronger, graduated pressures. McNaughton doubted that such strikes would actually help the situation in South Vietnam, but thought they should be carried out anyway. McNamara believed they probably would help the situation, in addition to their broader impacts on the U.S. position in Southeast Asia."

"Clear indication that the Administration was contemplating some kind of increased military activity" had gone out to Saigon two days earlier in another cablegram from Mr. Rusk, the account goes on. "Ambassador Taylor was asked to comment on the 'departmental view' that U.S. dependents should be withdrawn to 'clear the decks' in Saigon and enable better concentration of U.S. efforts on behalf of South Vietnam."

THE SIGNAL FOR "D-DAY"

Ever since the original bombing scenario of May 23, 1964, the evacuation of American women and children had been the signal for "D-Day."

"The Rusk cable made specific reference to a current interest in reprisal actions," the analyst says.

The initial blow came in about two weeks. The Vietcong attacked the United States military advisers' compound at Pleiku in the Central Highlands and an Army helicopter base at Camp Holloway, four miles away. Nine Americans were killed and 76 wounded.

"The first flash from Saigon about the assault came on the ticker at the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon at 2:38 P.M. Saturday, Feb. 6, Washington time," the narrative says. "It triggered a swift, though long-contemplated Presidential decision to give an 'appropriate and fitting' response. Within less than 14 hours, by 4 P.M. Sunday, Vietnam time, 49 U.S. Navy jets—A-4 Skyhawks and F-8 Crusaders from the Seventh Fleet carriers U.S.S. Coral Sea and U.S.S. Hancock—had penetrated a heavy layer of monsoon clouds to deliver their bombs and rockets upon North Vietnamese barracks and staging areas at Donghoi, a guerrilla training garrison 40 miles north of the 17th Parallel.

"Though conceived and executed as a limited one-shot tit-for-tat reprisal, the drastic U.S. action, long on the military planners' drawing boards under the operational code name Flaming Dart precipitated a rapidly moving sequence of events that transformed the character of the Vietnam war and the U.S. role in it."

When the guerrillas attacked an American barracks at Quinhon, on the central coast, and on Feb. 11, the President launched a second and heavier reprisal raid, Flaming Dart II.

Two days later, on Feb. 13, he decided to begin Operation Rolling Thunder, the sustained air war against North Vietnam.

"As is readily apparent," the analyst con-

cludes, "there was no dearth of reasons for striking North. Indeed, one almost has the impression that there were more reasons than were required. But in the end, the decision to go ahead with the strikes seems to have resulted as much from the lack of alternative proposals as from any compelling logic in their favor."

SOME KEY FIGURES IN THE PENTAGON NARRATIVE: WHO THEY ARE AND WHERE THEY ARE NOW

M'GEORGE BUNDY

Special assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson for national security affairs, 1961-66 . . . since 1966, president of the Ford Foundation. Born Boston March 30, 1919 . . . graduated from Yale, 1940, majoring in classics and mathematics . . . ran as a Republican for seat on Boston City Council, 1941 . . . served as aide to Adm. Alan G. Kirk, World War II . . . foreign-policy adviser to Thomas E. Dewey, Republican Presidential candidate, 1948 . . . joined Harvard faculty, 1949 . . . became dean of Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 1953 . . . named by President Kennedy to White House post . . . often described as principal architect of U.S. Vietnam policy . . . was recalled briefly by President Johnson during the Arab-Israeli crisis in summer of 1967 . . . often seen as a potential Secretary of State . . . just as visible—and controversial—as foundation head as when directing foreign policy from White House basement office . . . now lives in New York.

WILLIAM PUTNAM BUNDY

From 1951 to end of Johnson Administration, "the other Bundy" held sensitive positions in government departments, from the Central Intelligence Agency to State Department . . . now a senior research associate at Center for International Studies of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and will assume editorship of Foreign Affairs, the quarterly, after October, 1972. Born in Washington, Sept. 24, 1917 . . . earned bachelor's degree from Yale, 1939; master's from Harvard, 1940; law degree from Harvard, 1947 . . . married to a daughter of Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State . . . practiced law, Washington, 1947-51 . . . a Democrat . . . with the C.I.A., 1951-61 . . . served consecutively as Assistant and Deputy Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1961-64 . . . Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1964-69 . . . always, compared with young brother McGeorge, an anonymous figure . . . lives in Cambridge, Mass.

MICHAEL VINCENT FORRESTAL

White House specialist on Vietnam, 1962-65 . . . in private law practice New York now . . . newly elected chairman of board, Metropolitan Opera Guild, Born Nov. 26, 1927, in New York . . . graduated from Phillips Exeter Academy . . . studies at Princeton interrupted to serve on staff of W. Averell Harriman at Paris headquarters of Economic Cooperation Administration, 1948-50 . . . his father, late James V. Forrestal, was the first Secretary of Defense . . . received law degree from Harvard, 1953 and practiced in New York till 1960 . . . returned to firm of Shearman & Sterling, where he is a partner, in 1965 . . . as Kennedy and Johnson aide, served on National Security Council . . . in July, 1964, appointed chairman White House interdepartmental Vietnam coordinating committee . . . accompanied Mrs. John F. Kennedy on 1967 visit to Cambodia . . . early supporter of the late Sen. Robert F. Kennedy's Presidential bid . . . member Council on Foreign Relations . . . lives in New York.

NGUYEN KHANH

South Vietnam's Premier—on and off—from February, 1964, through Mid-February, 1965. Since 1968, in exile in Paris. Born in Travinh, South Vietnam, Nov. 8, 1927 . . . educated military academy at Dalat, 1950,

also in France, at U.S. Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. . . fought as guerrilla against French . . . sent to Saigon on mission . . . joined French colonial forces . . . paratrooper, reached rank of major . . . helped foil 1960 coup against Ngo Dinh Diem . . . stayed on sidelines during 1963 coup . . . ousted Gen. Duong Van Minh Jan. 30, 1964 . . . in August, assumed dictatorial powers . . . forced out . . . remained Army chief . . . led coup against incumbent . . . survived coup attempt February . . . is deposed as commander in chief by military . . . sent abroad as roving ambassador . . . a Buddhist, but not popular with Buddhists . . . short, jaunty, goateed . . . liked to wear paratrooper's red beret . . . fond of saying: "I am a fighter."

JOHN T. M'NAUGHTON

Mr. McNaughton a close and trusted associate of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara from 1961 to 1967, and his wife and their younger son died in plane collision near Asheville, N.C., July 19, 1967, a week before he was to be sworn in as Secretary of Navy. Born Nov. 21, 1921, in Bicknell, Ind. . . graduated from DePauw University, 1942 . . . served four years in Navy during World War II . . . graduated from Harvard Law School, 1948 . . . studied at Oxford as Rhodes scholar, working with European Cooperation Administration in Paris during vacations . . . also wrote for *Pekin (Ill.) Times*, owned by father . . . two years as editor of that paper . . . returned to Harvard as assistant professor, 1953, professor, 1956 . . . chosen by Mr. McNamara in 1961 to serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs . . . general counsel to Defense Department, 1962 . . . Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1964-67, heading Pentagon's foreign-affairs planning staff.

MAXWELL DAVENPORT TAYLOR

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962-64; United States Ambassador to South Vietnam, 1964-65; special consultant to the President, 1965-69. Now on the board of the Institute for Defense Analyses, chairman of Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Born Keytesville, Mo., Aug. 26, 1901 . . . graduated from United States Military Academy, 1922 . . . Command and General Staff School, 1933 . . . Army War College, 1940 . . . taught French, Spanish, at West Point . . . assistant military attaché, Peking 1937 . . . commander 101st Airborne Division, World War II . . . took part invasions. Normally, Holland . . . Superintendent United States Military Academy, 1945-49 . . . United States Commander, Berlin, 1950 Commander of Eighth Army, Korea, 1953 . . . Army Chief of Staff, 1955 . . . resigned 1959 in "limited war" strategy dispute . . . recalled as adviser by President Kennedy, 1961 . . . was influential in both Kennedy, Johnson administrations . . . scholarly, much-decorated . . . now living in Chevy Chase, Md.

**MAN'S INHUMANITY TO MAN—
HOW LONG?**

HON. WILLIAM J. SCHERLE

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, a child asks: "Where is daddy?" A mother asks: "How is my son?" A wife asks: "Is my husband alive or dead?"

Communist North Vietnam is sadistically practicing spiritual and mental genocide on over 1,600 American prisoners of war and their families.

How long?

COMDR. ROBERT W. COLLINS, U.S. NAVY RESERVE, RETIRED, ADDRESSES A LETTER TO MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE REGARDING THE AMERICAN FLAG

HON. HALE BOGGS

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, a patriot is a man who loves his country. Few men fit that description better than Comdr. Robert W. Collins, U.S. Naval Reserve, retired, of Yazoo City, Miss. Commander Collins is an authority on the American flag, and believes that a chart should be published which depicts the various stages of Old Glory. He has addressed a letter to the Members of the House, and I am inserting it in the RECORD and calling it to the attention of my colleagues:

WHAT THIS COUNTRY NEEDS: A CHART PORTRAYING THE 27 AUTHORIZED U.S. FLAGS

YAZOO CITY, MISS.,

June 7, 1971.

To the Members of the House from all the States of our Union: June 14 is Flag Day. On June 14 the House will mark the 194th anniversary of Flag Day. For many years the House has had proper observations commemorating the Resolution of the Continental Congress of June 14, 1777, which gave us our first national flag and ensign known as the Stars and Stripes.

Congress has enacted only two statutes regulating our national flag and ensign: the flag law of January 8, 1794, effective May 1, 1795, and our permanent flag law of April 4, 1818, effective July 4, 1818. It is still in effect and has given our Nation the design for all of our flags and ensigns since the 20-star flag and ensign of July 4, 1818, to our present flag and ensign of 50 stars and 13 stripes of July 4, 1960, to date.

At this time permit me to urge the Members of the House from all our States to direct their attention to the laws on the design of our flags and ensigns, the symbols of our great Nation. Herewith is a compilation of those laws which I call *Our Flag Laws—A Chronology*.

No illustrated chart of the flags and ensigns of the United States of America authorized by law is to be found anywhere. The time has come for such a chart. What this country needs is an illustrated chart portraying the authorized flags and ensigns of our great Nation. Our Bi-Centennial is near at hand. Accordingly, the premises considered, the Members of the House from all the States are urged as strongly as politeness and tact will permit that the House enact a Resolution authorizing and directing the Public Printer to produce a chart portraying the Grand Union Flag which General Washington hoisted over his headquarters at Cambridge, Massachusetts, on January 1, 1776, and the 27 National Flags and Ensigns authorized by the Continental Congress and the Congress from 1794 to date.

OUR FLAG LAWS—A CHRONOLOGY

(By Comdr. Robert W. Collins, U.S. Naval Reserve, Retired)

THE STARS AND STRIPES

(Continental Congress, June 14, 1777)

Resolved, That the flag of the thirteen United States be thirteen stripes, alternate red and white; that the union be thirteen stars, while in a blue field, representing a new constellation.

THE STAR SPANGLED BANNER, MAY 1, 1795

(U.S. Flag Law, January 8, 1794)

Be it enacted, That from and after the 1st day of May, A.D. 1795, the flag of the United States be fifteen stripes, alternate red and white. That the Union be fifteen stars, white in a blue field.

OUR PERMANENT FLAG LAW, APRIL 4, 1818

Be it enacted, That from and after the 4th day of July next, the flag of the United States be thirteen horizontal stripes, alternate red and white; that the union have twenty stars, white in a blue field. That on the admission of every new State into the Union, one star be added to the union of the flag; and that such addition shall take effect on the 4th of July next succeeding such admission.

NELLO FERRARA RECEIVES ISRAEL PRIME MINISTER'S MEDAL

HON. FRANK ANNUNZIO

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, yesterday evening at the Chateau Royale in Chicago, Nello Ferrara, president of the Ferrara Pan Candy Co., 7301 West Harrison Street, Chicago, was honored by the State of Israel. Hundreds of people attended the dinner to pay tribute to one of Chicago's distinguished citizens and to witness the presentation of the Israel Prime Minister's Medal to him for his humanitarian endeavors.

Nello, whom I have known for many, many years, has always been vitally concerned with the best interests of our community, and has extended his best efforts in behalf of his fellow man, regardless of race, color, nationality or origin. Not only has he been a leader in our community in civic affairs, but he also has been a national leader in the confectionery industry and has played a prominent role in this field. In America today we need more outstanding and dedicated men like Nello Ferrara who unselfishly concern themselves with the plight of others.

Through the State of Israel Bonds Tribute Banquet in honor of Nello Ferrara, over half a million dollars was raised to help insure the continuation of Israel's freedom and well-being by protecting and encouraging her economic development. All of us know that Israel has been fighting for her very life and existence, and today, she is still under siege by the Arab people and the Soviet Union. Yet, despite the great odds, Israel stands firm against the enemies which threaten her freedom and her democratic government.

Israel presently is a bulwark against totalitarianism and communism in the Middle East, and her courageous stand has made the world a safer place in which to live. I know that Americans will never accept a totalitarian state, but will stand side by side to protect in every way possible the freedom-loving peoples of the world. I am, therefore, confident that the future will bring a just and lasting peace to Israel with the full status and rights of a sovereign nation that she deserves and the territorial integrity that this status entails.

It gives me great pleasure to extend warmest congratulations to Nello Ferrara on receiving the Israel Prime Minister's Medal, to his lovely wife, Marilyn, to his wonderful mother, Serafina, and to his children, and also my best wishes for continuing good health and good fortune in the years ahead.

HOMEOWNERS DESERVE TAX RELIEF

HON. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, amidst all the talk of reducing fiscal pressures on State, county, and city governments we have lost sight, I believe, of the one segment of our society most in need of financial relief: The individual citizen and, more particularly, the individual homeowner. Federal, State and local taxation on real estate has increased dramatically over the last decade, leaving homeowners to bear the brunt of our new revenue efforts. More and more Americans, burdened by heavy taxation at all levels of government and forced to be mobile under changing employment opportunities and conditions, are exchanging the stability of homeownership for the flexibility of apartment-style living.

In the meantime, the owner of residential rental property continues to prosper with the significant tax advantages he has over the individual homeowner. In another day, Federal tax laws designed to promote corporate interests at the expense of the individual were probably necessary and useful; today they are just plain unrealistic.

Individual homeowners can and should be given tax breaks similar to those we give corporate owners. That is the purpose of the bill I am cosponsoring today, and I trust it will receive the full attention of this body.

Under this legislation, entitled the Home Owners' Tax Relief Act of 1971, a citizen can depreciate the investment in his home in the same manner as residential property held for rental purposes can be depreciated. The deduction is limited to \$1,500, so that it will not be used for tax writeoff purposes by wealthy taxpayers purchasing homes they will not live in. But even with this limit the depreciation should be of great help to the middle-class homeowner.

A related provision authorizes the taxpayer to utilize the standard deduction as well as the proposed deductions for homeownership—including real estate taxes and home finance interest charges. At the present time these are deductible only if the standard deduction is not taken. In operation, therefore, this section also gives the homeowner parallel tax status with the investor in residential rental property.

A third provision of the bill would allow a taxpayer 65 or older to take a \$1,000 deduction, if he has a life interest in a retirement home which represents

an investment of at least \$5,000. Under present regulations a life interest in a retirement home does not constitute a "principal residence" as defined by the tax code. An elderly taxpayer should not be denied tax relief just because he does not hold legal title to his residence.

In another vein, my bill would enable a taxpayer to deduct up to \$1,000 for home repairs and maintenance, thereby giving the middle-class homeowner a chance to expand and improve his residence, should he lack the finances to acquire a larger home. This provision should go a long way toward cleaning up many of our decayed residential areas.

A fifth section of the proposed legislation would allow the taxpayer to deduct as a capital loss any economic loss up to \$5,000 resulting from the sale of his home. While this \$5,000 limit helps alleviate the problems of an individual who must buy and sell his home within a short space of time, it is low enough to minimize potential abuse as a tax loophole.

Finally, the bill would eliminate the regressive taxation of those over 65 who elect nonrecognition of gain in the sale of their home. At the present time, many older persons frequently end up paying more taxes by choosing nonrecognition than they would have had they waived the privilege.

In addition to eliminating this abuse, my bill would raise the nonrecognition limitation for the sale of a home by persons over 65 from \$20,000 to \$40,000. This increase represents a much needed adjustment in the face of inflation's higher costs.

Clearly, Mr. Speaker, this legislation is absolutely necessary, if the individual homeowner is to continue to play a major part in our Nation's development. The man who owns his home tends to have a greater interest in local affairs and community life than a renter or transient. Even more important, the man who owns his home has invested in the future, assuring himself the financial security he will need in his later years.

Mr. Speaker, we cannot allow the individual homeowner to be discouraged by the high cost of government. This tax relief package deserves immediate consideration by the House of Representatives.

BALTIC STATES' GENOCIDE DAY

HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, today is Genocide Day, the 30th anniversary of the mass deportation of people from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to slave labor camps in Siberia and other sections of the Soviet Union. This terrible instance of Communist brutality occurred in 1941, shortly before National Socialist Germany's armed forces invaded Communist Russia, its erstwhile ally.

The three Baltic republics had enjoyed

a short-lived freedom, having secured their independence shortly after the end of World War I, only to lose it soon after the National Socialists and the Communists collaborated to trigger World War II. The territory of the three small countries was invaded first by Soviet troops and then by their Nazi counterparts.

Toward the end of World War II when Soviet troops reoccupied the Baltic States, the U.S.S.R. illegally incorporated these three nations into its structure, an action which our Government has never recognized. Since then, the Baltic peoples have suffered from the collectivization of their farms and the nationalization of their industries. They have suffered religious persecution and their children have been subject, through Communist educational institutions, to Communist brainwashing.

Hundreds of thousands of Estonians, Letts, and Lithuanians were shipped from their homelands like cattle, to be replaced by peoples from other parts of the Soviet Empire. This wholesale exchange of populations has radically altered the ethnic compositions of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Mr. Speaker, it is not pleasant to have to invite the House's attention to such an occasion as Genocide Day. Unfortunately, we must take note of it, so long as the Soviet Union continues to treat the Baltic peoples as colonials to be exploited, as chattels to be exported, and as inferior creatures to be exterminated. Genocide is wrong, no matter who practices it, no matter who the victims are, and regardless of whether they be many or few.

However, I direct the attention of the Members to the fact that throughout the free world the peoples of Estonia, Lithuanian, and Latvian origins maintained their traditional civic, cultural, and church organizations and continue their efforts on behalf of their enslaved compatriots held captive within the U.S.S.R. The legitimate spokesmen for the Baltic peoples are found in the free world rather than the Russian puppets in the three so-called Soviet Socialist Republics. I am confident, Mr. Speaker, that the perseverance of the Baltic peoples will triumph over communism and that freedom will ultimately be restored to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

A SPECIAL SALUTE TO J. EDGAR HOOVER

HON. W. S. (BILL) STUCKEY

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. STUCKEY. Mr. Speaker, it is a privilege for me to be able to serve the Eighth Congressional District of Georgia in the Congress. The people of our district are concerned with the affairs of the Government, and they are informed on important issues. At this point in the RECORD I would like to include a letter to the editor of the Telfair Enterprise in McRae, Ga. And, I would like to commend Mr. Emory B. Hulett who wrote

the letter and the editor of the Telfair Enterprise who published the letter. It is seldom that a private citizen takes the time to publicly praise a dedicated public official. I believe that Mr. Hulett's remarks on Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's 47 years of service with the Federal Bureau of Investigation deserve recognition.

The remarks follow:

[From Telfair Enterprise (McRae, Ga.)

May 13, 1971]

A SPECIAL SALUTE TO J. EDGAR HOOVER
(By Emory B. Hulett, Telfair County Coroner, Mlan, Ga.)

On May 10, 1971, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, marked 47 years with the FBI.

He has served under seven Presidents and 16 Attorney Generals. Mr. Hoover has served the FBI very well. In the last 47 years he has given the best of his life to his country.

Under the leadership of J. Edgar Hoover the FBI has come a long way and has done an excellent job. Mr. Hoover has operated this department in a way in which great Americans appreciate. When Mr. Hoover makes a public statement, people listen and what he says remains in their minds and his statements are solid and trust-worthy.

The FBI has a 10 "most wanted" criminal and law violators list that is compiled on the 10 "most wanted" criminals in the United States, whether it be plane HI-jackers, bank robbers, kidnapping or President assassins, the FBI lends a helping hand and goes wherever is necessary to serve.

Many attacks are directed at Mr. Hoover and the way he operates the FBI Department. Some critics accuse his department of wire tapping and some have to do with him driving a new Cadillac.

Many critics have their names in the news with their charges at Mr. Hoover, but without evidence and weight to stand, only to end up with embarrassment to the critics themselves.

Mr. Hoover has served well and I only hope that he remains with the department just as long as he is able to serve and operate it in the manner he has for the past 47 years. As the old saying goes, "one bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." Congratulations for an excellent job.

PEACE SYMBOL? ARE YOU SURE?

HON. JOHN E. HUNT

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, sometimes lightly referred to as the footprint of the American chicken, the so-called peace symbol has a much more sinister meaning as manifested by those who frequently sport it in place of the American flag.

For those who have wondered about the derivation of the symbol, the following explanation was printed in the May 1971 issue of the Pennsauken Résumé:

This is the symbol worn by many of today's young people and is known as the "Peace Symbol." We wonder how many of them, or you, for that matter, know the real meaning of this Symbol?

The "Peace Symbol" is not something that is the product of today's restless youth. It was well known back in the Middle Ages and was known either as the "Crow's Foot" or the "Witch's Foot." Now are you ready for the real shock? This was the sign of those who were opposed to Christianity! It was (and is) the Anti-Christ symbol. Look at it

closely. What do you see? It is a Broken Cross turned upside down. Now do you see why it is a subtle sign of those who are opposed to Christianity?

It is used today as a central part of the national symbolism of Communist Russia. It appears the Communists are winning their battle for the minds of our youth. They are making special efforts to capture the attention of today's youth in America. Many young people are familiar with the "Peace Symbol" and wear it as jewelry and even paint it on their cars.

There are those in the garment industry who have the Broken Cross embroidered on their jackets and many other garments. It is manufactured as a metal trinket and worn on a chain and many young people wear it as a "Fad Gadget," not realizing they are supporting the emblem of the Anti-Christ, the Broken Cross.

Be sure of this—every person who knowingly or thoughtlessly wears this emblem is bringing joy to the hearts of those dedicated to the destruction of everything we hold dear.

The Communists are gleeful when they see this symbol worn by Americans. It is the mark of atheism.

PROBLEMS FACING OUR RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES

HON. OMAR BURLESON

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 7, 1971

Mr. BURLESON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I join with my colleagues to discuss the problems facing our rural electric cooperatives. As we all know, of course, the Rural Electrification Administration has continued to receive funds for loans to cooperatives at the same level, while demands for service have been increasing by leaps and bounds.

In a recent survey of 61 electric cooperatives in Texas, the needs of the Texas Electric Cooperative for fiscal year 1972 were shown. The average basic need, for distribution cooperatives only is \$65,-823,835. This average multiplied by the 986 nationwide cooperatives would show a need for \$842,887,030 for fiscal year 1972, while the administration has requested only \$345 million.

If a cooperative has a reserve higher than 8 percent as the desired working capital they are not eligible for a new loan and not eligible to submit a requisition for funds previously approved. The 8-percent limitation is dangerously low. This survey shows the average Texas cooperative now has reserved at the 4.3-percent level. Since this is only an average we can conclude that some of the fast-growing cooperatives may have no reserves at all and there is a likelihood of a deterioration of service as they struggle with their present financial situation.

A rural America without adequate electricity would be a step backward. All of us know that these electric cooperatives have meant to areas such as the west Texas area I represent—progress—the ability to feed the Nation. The need for additional funds is quite apparent. These funds are loans, not grants or gifts, and our cooperatives have an outstanding record for repayment.

CORPS OF ENGINEERS PROVES ITS WORTH

HON. ED EDMONDSON

OF OKLAHOMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, the many great achievements of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the fields of flood control and navigation projects are well known to the American public.

What is less well-known, however, is the great capability of the Corps to assist and advise local governments in times of critical emergencies.

No greater example can be found of the Corps' ability to act quickly and decisively to avert a major crisis than the events which occurred last week in New York City. During the attempted blockade of the city by striking New York City employees, the Corps made its engineering expertise available to the city's highway department employees, who in turn were successful in restoring a smooth flow of traffic in and out of the city.

This tremendous effort by the Corps of Engineers, and the true story of how important the Corps is to America, is well documented in a very fine article written by Alice Widener which appeared in the Tulsa Tribune of June 12. I insert this story of the Corps' remarkable efforts during the New York City crisis in the RECORD at this point:

RESCUE BY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

(By Alice Widener)

NEW YORK.—Seems as how the U.S. Army is good for nothing, anytime, anywhere, until it's vitally needed. Then, folks, it shows what it is, thank Heaven! And believe you me, we New Yorkers learned that lesson in nothing flat when illegally striking workers left the drawbridges open and virtually shut down the city, endangering lives and imperiling essential city services.

At 3 p.m. Monday, Mayor Lindsay phoned U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Col. James W. Barnett in New York City with an urgent request for "technical assistance" to highway department employees who were going to attempt to close the 29 drawbridges left open by strikers and thus open them up for traffic.

Col. Barnett, 44, a West Pointer and Vietnam combat veteran, assisted by Maj. Robert S. Lindsay, 33, a graduate of Clemson University and Vietnam combat veteran, immediately organized four advisory teams, each composed of four experts in the technical fields required for closing the bridges, an extremely hazardous enterprise owing to the high voltage electrical equipment used to operate the bridges and to other very dangerous factors.

Col. Barnett and Maj. Lindsay were charged with the heaviest kind of responsibility in insuring the safety of those working on the bridges under their direction and in re-establishing the safety of the bridges to support heavy traffic.

The feats accomplished by the Corps of Engineers were well nigh miraculous. Under Public Law 90577, which restrains the Army from any kind of strike-breaking activity, the Corps experts had to keep their hands in their pockets while directing workers carrying out wholly unprecedented and dangerous operations.

Not knowing what sabotage might have been committed, the engineers had to analyze each individual bridge situation during the night to determine what had to be done. Two of the four teams were forced to con-

duct operations from boats because the bridges are accessible only by water.

The bridge rescue operation began at 6 p.m. Monday. By early Tuesday morning, eight of the bridges were closed and in perfect condition for heavy traffic, including three of the four principal bridges. The competence and heroism of the Army and of the men working under its direction were truly exceptional.

In the middle of the night, men had to go along catwalks to release bridge brakes by hand. In the middle of the night, men had to locate and replace hundreds and hundreds of blown fuses.

It is an absolutely remarkable fact that not a single Army team expert or a single worker advised by the teams of experts was injured in the entire undertaking, one that shut 14 out of 18 essential bridges in time for 5 p.m. rush hour traffic on Tuesday, within 26 hours after the mayor's "S.O.S."

Perhaps, now, out of New York City's travail, the entire American people, as well as New Yorkers, have had a chance to learn about the competence, efficiency, courage and command-decision capability of the U.S. Army and give it due credit. If that happens, then the tragic example given to the nation by the New York City crisis might turn out to have been a blessing.

Doesn't it seem strange that the tv networks and New York Times haven't told the public the thrilling story? It so happens that this month marks the 196th anniversary of the Corps of Engineers, founded, June 16, 1775, by Gen. George Washington.

Folks, without the great U.S. Army—and Navy and Air Force—where would we be? There's only one answer: We'd be helpless victims of domestic and foreign aggressors, anarchists and dictators.

HONEST TAXICAB DRIVER RETURNS PACKAGE

HON. JERRY L. PETTIS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. PETTIS. Mr. Speaker, in a time when we decry the lack of general courtesy and kindness shown by people in contemporary society, it is refreshing to learn of an instance where an individual displays a bountiful amount of these virtues. My wife, Shirley, experienced an overwhelming act of personal thoughtfulness that was totally unsolicited, and I feel that such an action should not go unrecognized.

She and a companion inadvertently left a package in a taxicab in Washington last week during the course of a shopping tour. They believed it was misplaced forever.

However, Mr. Paul W. Ford, the taxi driver, discovered the package in his cab and went out of his way to discover the owner's identity and to return it. He went to the store where he dispatched them, and then to a second one before learning the purchaser's name. Mr. Ford refused to take the package to the cab company's office where it would be routinely processed. Instead, he drove all the way to our home in Northwest Washington to make sure that it was safely and expeditiously returned.

It is highly unusual when something of this extraordinary nature occurs, and I thus want to take this opportunity to thank and commend Mr. Ford and to let him be an example to all of us.

A SECOND CHANCE ON THE WORK-STUDY PROGRAM

HON. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, all of us like to believe that America is a land of opportunity. We generally perceive of education as a springboard for such opportunity. Recently, however, the House jeopardized the ability of thousands of individuals to afford a college education by passing the education appropriation bill with inadequate funding for the college work-study program.

Work-study is the major financial aid program for many of our Nation's colleges and universities. It offers employment, both during the school year and during the summer, in important university, community, and government jobs. Students earn enough money via work-study to help pay for their college educations, while important programs are able to continue only as a result of work-study funding. The Federal Government pays 80 percent of the students' salaries, while employers pay 20 percent.

This year, work-study programs have been cut as a result of inadequate funding. Massachusetts colleges have lost an average of 40 to 50 percent of the work-study funds they have traditionally been granted. At Salem State College, in my own district, work-study funds were cut by 65 percent; the same reduction took place at Boston College as well. As a result, both colleges had to cancel their summer work-study programs. At Salem State College alone, this meant that 60 people suddenly found themselves without summer jobs. I need not remind anyone of how difficult it will be for these individuals to find employment, given the current economic situation.

Cutting off funds for work-study has also meant cutting off funds for other valuable programs. Important community-action programs have been threatened as a result of cuts in work-study funding. The acting director of the model cities program of Cambridge, Mass., has informed me that if that program is not able to count on work-study students next year, "the agency will be compelled to eliminate some of its work, and service to people of the community will be curtailed."

This past year, over 250 new colleges have sought to participate in the work-study program. Within each college, more and more students are applying for work-study grants. Continuing to fund these programs with the same allotment as in years past will not meet the growing needs of the work-study program. We must increase significantly the funding of this program.

Unfortunately, we failed to do this last April. The House passed an education bill which would fund work-study for the next 2 academic years with a total of \$442 million. This is not enough. Fortunately, our colleagues in the Senate recognized this fact and appropriated an additional \$75.4 million for work-study, thus allotting a total of \$517.4 million.

Soon the education appropriation bill, with its allotment for work-study, will be before a joint House-Senate conference committee. We, in the House, can make up for our previous error by urging members of the conference committee to agree to the Senate work-study allotment of \$517.4 million. Only by urging this full appropriation can we insure that work-study programs for this fall will be able to survive.

Work-study benefits thousands of individual students who would not be able to afford a college education without such a program. In helping individuals, however, work-study also makes a significant contribution to society as a whole. John F. Tierney, president of the class of 1973 at Salem State College, has written:

At a time when the need for people with leadership qualities and honorable directions is so amplified, I hardly think that we can afford to abort their attempts at seeking the necessary foundation for their future efforts.

Work-study is a future-oriented program that will build both individuals and society as a whole. We must insure that it receives its adequate appropriation when the conference committee meets to discuss its funding for the next 2 years.

MRS. MOLLIE PARKS, 102, PASSES

HON. CLARENCE D. LONG

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, one of my constituents, Mr. Joseph B. Culbreth, Route 15, Box 154, Baltimore, Md. 21220, wrote me that his mother-in-law, Mrs. Mollie Parks, passed away on May 21, 1971, at the age of 102. Born in 1869, Mrs. Parks saw much of our country's history unfold before her eyes, and was a source of great wisdom and understanding to her family. Mr. Culbreth wrote me a very touching letter about his mother-in-law—a lady who was never too busy to help her family and friends in times of need. It is a pleasure to pay tribute to this very fine lady's full and active life by including Mr. Culbreth's eulogy in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

JUNE 4, 1971.

CONGRESSMAN LONG: The following is a resume of the life of Mrs. Mollie Parks who passed away on May 21, 1971 in Pulaski, Virginia at the age of 102, years, 3 months, 2 week and 4 days.

Mrs. Parks, born February 3, 1869, was the first child of Mr. and Mrs. Robert Boyles, Grayson County, Virginia. On November 26, 1888 she married William Sanford Parks. Ten children were born to this union. Three died in infancy. Six children survived Mrs. Parks at her death, i.e., Mrs. Beatrice Culbreth, Baltimore, Maryland, Mrs. Addie Bell, Mrs. Georgia Phillips, Mrs. Mettie Doss, Mrs. Juanita Mayo and Mr. William S. Parks, Jr., all of Pulaski, Virginia. Also surviving are fourteen grandchildren, thirty-two great grandchildren and twenty great-great grandchildren.

She was a member of the Thornspring Methodist Church and was a Charter Member of the Women's Society of Christian Service. When she was 100 years old, Mrs. Parks gave permission to the Pulaski news-

paper to publish her Social Security benefits. This was done to call attention to the Social Security Program for which she was a beneficiary. She received \$40.00 per month "Special Age 72" benefits. She was also covered by Medicare from its' beginning in July 1966, but had not used it when she was 100 years old. When she was 100 years old, she received a birthday card from President Nixon.

Mrs. Parks was a special kind of person with a very alert mind. She could recall with vivid detail an earthquake when she was six years old; also the flu epidemic of 1918. Her formal education was sparse, but her self-taught education never stopped.

She could be counted on during any emergency. If someone wanted a wedding gown made, Mrs. Parks made it; if a baby was coming with no doctor there, she delivered it; and if someone passed away, Mrs. Parks could make the shroud and 'lay out the body'.

Mrs. Parks remained active until December 1970 when she first became ill. She was confined to her bed most of the time from then until she passed away. However, she remained mentally alert and talked to members of her family a few moments before her death.

She was truly an inspiration to all who were fortunate enough to know her.

Yours truly,

JOSEPH B. CULBRETH.

REMARKS OF SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ROGERS C. B. MORTON, WASHINGTON COLLEGE COMMENCEMENT, CHESTERTOWN, MD.

HON. WILLIAM O. MILLS

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. MILLS. Mr. Speaker, on Sunday, June 6, the Secretary of the Interior, Rogers C. B. Morton, spoke at the commencement of Washington College in Chestertown, Md. This timely and excellent speech brings home to us the need for all of us to stop and consider the part we must play in the protection of our environment. Realizing the importance of Secretary Morton's speech, I am inserting it in the RECORD:

REMARKS OF SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ROGERS C. B. MORTON, WASHINGTON COLLEGE COMMENCEMENT, CHESTERTOWN, MD.

It would be easy for me to begin with the story of what is happening around us—to the land—to the waters of the world—to the air. I could even join those who have speculated on the survival of man as a relatively short term reality.

There is no doubt that there is reason for concern. Much of the price for what we have in the way of works and machines which ease the burden of living has been paid by other life systems—by the symmetry and balance of nature—or expressed another way—by the degradation of the world's environment.

This is just a plain fact. We have known it for years. The tendency now is to wring our hands—to scream at ourselves in anger and self incrimination—to hang the blame on industry and government. In short we have become aware of what has been going on for a long time because we are beginning to feel the pinch.

Our eyes are running.

Our lungs are burning.

Our sense of beauty is offended.

Our fishing creels are empty.

Something within our spirit is dying.

We are mad and we are sacred. But mostly we are mad at each other and not at our-

selves. This gives us an individual pang of conscience and adds to our being sacred.

Added to our maladjustment to the biosphere is our uneasiness and discomfort with our individual positions in the humanisphere. Poverty, despair, crime, ignorance, and discrimination are too elements of our environment. When and if we can, we leave them for others to worry about. We flock together in our own societal enclaves and build around ourselves a protective life style. This leaves a smoldering, malignant, turbulence mostly in the center cities. Some describe this as a force in the society to be reckoned with. More accurately, like the erosion of the physical environment, it is part of—and a great part of—the price we are paying for our energy, our mobility, our leisure, and the sophisticated materialism of our culture.

All this being true and in spite of the fear and apprehension of trends and conditions seemingly beyond our control—there is no reason to lose confidence in our ability to make the adjustments in the course of our civilization that will reverse the failures of the past. We have the capability—we understand the technology. I believe we are endowed with the compassion and the motivation to pay the full price for a life as we seek it in this great country.

The price is not the loss of our freedom.

The price is not the abandonment of our system of government.

The price is not the sacrifice of a generation of peace which is our immediate goal.

The price is not the dynamics of our economy.

The price is one that we can pay. It is a matter of welding your idealism to the knowledge and technology of your time. The sacrifices that have been made in the biosphere and in the patterns of humanity have resulted in your generation—the most educated and best equipped generation of all time. The price is a little more from each of us.

There is no mystery about good house-keeping in our communities or in our countryside. There is no vast unknown to be conquered in the husbandry of the land or the waters. The know how is at hand to hold clean the air. What remains is the decision—the confidence—the action—the discipline—and too the sacrifice from which will come the rich personal reward of success.

Already we are on the road to restoration. In January 1970 the President laid it squarely before the Congress. He said:

"Restoring nature to its natural state is a cause beyond party and beyond factions. It has become a common cause of all people of this country. It is of particular concern to young Americans—because they, more than we, will reap the grim consequences of our failure to act on programs which are needed now if we are to prevent disaster later."

There has been a great response in government across the board. New initiatives and priority changes have brought direction and action toward:

More parks to the people—close at hand.

More wilderness set aside—1.8 million acres for 1972.

More historical preservation.

More open space in the cities and towns.

More facilities for handling sewage and waste.

More, much more, research, for clean energy.

More action in every sector against pollution, and

At last a realistic effort to achieve a national land use plan.

All of this and more is only a beginning. We are at least recognizing that this world and most of its resources are finite. For man this earth is all there is.

There is a long difficult but fascinating and exciting road ahead. No generation has been better prepared to cope with the difficulties or to enjoy the rewards. You have no alternative but to exercise great care and self control.

In the great Department of the Interior where I work, I feel the excitement in our lives generated by the realization that we are in the dawn of a new era in the relationship between man and his environment.

For us then, there is a new goal. A goal as rewarding as the freedom of America for the people who came here to find it.

We are now ready and eager to share this planet with the rest of nature—with its beauty—with its land—with its divine life systems—with its sky—with its music—and with its silence.

Are we prepared to share it fully with each other—other nations—other creeds—other races? If we are the imperfections of the past have been protocol to this civilization. We can accept them. We can deal with them.

Each day as I join hands with you to move against the great task to which I have been assigned, I feel more of your wisdom and more of your strength. I am becoming confident in your willingness and desire to share your environment with your fellow man.

Though we may be further in the night, I believe the day is near for mankind and a higher order. Your parents, your neighbors, this institution, and mostly yourselves have brought you to the most challenging and exciting opportunity in man's time on earth. Don't let it escape.

BALTIC STATES FREEDOM COMMEMORATION

HON. JOSEPH G. MINISH

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. MINISH. Mr. Speaker, this week we mark with sadness the 30th anniversary of the mass deportation to Russia of thousands of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians.

Although the Soviet Government in 1920 had signed treaties with the independent Baltic States and had renounced all sovereignty to these Republics, nonetheless Russian troops forcefully invaded and overran these free nations on June 14, 1941.

Mass deportations of men, women, and children to the slave labor camps of Siberia ensued, and thousands of the Baltic peoples were thus ruthlessly herded and taken from their native land.

Mr. Speaker, I believe it is necessary to mark this anniversary to insure that the history of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is known to all, in order to prevent similar atrocities from happening in the future. Moreover, by recalling the history of the proud Baltic peoples, we thereby demonstrate that their suffering is not in vain and will not be forgotten by freedom-loving peoples elsewhere.

In recognition of the proud history of the Baltic States, the 89th Congress of the United States unanimously passed House Concurrent Resolution 416. This measure urges the U.S. President to bring the question of the Baltic States to the United Nations, in an attempt to restore the freedom of the Baltic States citizens.

For the information of my colleagues, I include below a copy of this measure, which was passed by the House on June 21, 1965, and by the Senate on October 22, 1966:

H. CON. RES. 416

Whereas the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation; and

Whereas all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, cultural, and religious development; and

Whereas the Baltic peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been forcibly deprived of these rights by the Government of the Soviet Union; and

Whereas the Government of the Soviet Union, through a program of deportations and resettlement of peoples, continues in its effort to change the ethnic character of the populations of the Baltic States; and

Whereas it has been the firm and consistent policy of the Government of the United States to support the aspirations of Baltic peoples for self-determination and national independence; and

Whereas there exist many historical, cultural, and family ties between the peoples of the Baltic States and the American people: Be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the House of Representatives of the United States urge the President of the United States—

(a) to direct the attention of world opinion at the United Nations and at other appropriate international forums and by such means as he deems appropriate, to the denial of the rights of self-determination for the peoples of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and

(b) to bring the force of world opinion to bear on behalf of the restoration of these rights to the Baltic peoples.

LEST WE FORGET

HON. CLARENCE E. MILLER

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. MILLER of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, in a land of progress and prosperity, it is often easy to assume an "out of sight, out of mind" attitude about matters which are not consistently brought to our attention. The fact exists that today more than 1,550 American servicemen are listed as prisoners or missing in Southeast Asia. The wives, children, and parents of these men have not forgotten, and I would hope that my colleagues in Congress and our countrymen across America will not neglect the fact that all men are not free for as long as one of our number is enslaved. I insert the name of one of the missing.

Sp4c. James H. Turner, U.S. Army, **XXXX** Columbus, Ohio. Married and the father of two children. The son of Mr. and Mrs. John M. Turner, Sr., Columbus, Ohio. Officially listed as missing October 9, 1969. As of today, Specialist Fourth Class Turner has been missing in action in Southeast Asia for 613 days.

THE EXCELLENCE OF OUR VA HOSPITALS MUST BE MAINTAINED

HON. NICK BEGICH

OF ALASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. BEGICH. Mr. Speaker, at the end of the First World War, this Nation undertook a commitment to establish a system of medical care for our veterans. In its early years, that system was not, unfortunately, all that might have been wished for over the years, though, it has been improved and expanded until today it can fairly be called one of the world's largest and finest medical care delivery systems.

The primary role of the VA hospital system, is of course, to furnish medical care for our veterans: first for those with service-connected disabilities and then, as space is available, for veterans with disabilities not related to their services. In addition to fulfilling this basic commitment to our veterans, the VA has also profoundly influenced the state of medical care in America generally through its many major medical research projects and by serving as a prime training ground for a substantial proportion of the doctors and other medical care personnel who serve the health needs of the people of this country.

I am, therefore, deeply disturbed to find indications that the VA hospital system is being downgraded. In the past year or two, a number of experts in the health care field including such prestigious persons as Dr. Philip Lee, the former HEW Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs, have called attention to deficiencies which have developed in the VA medical system. To some extent, it is understandable that deficiencies have developed. Great pressure has been placed on the VA system by the rapidly growing veteran population which is now increasing at a rate of several hundred thousand per year and by the soaring costs of medical services. But, now that these deficiencies have been recognized, one would expect that the VA hospital system would be expanded at least sufficiently to meet the increased demands upon it. One would expect that sufficient resources would be devoted to that system to offset rising costs so that the quality of care could be, if not improved, at least maintained.

But, as I look at the Federal budget for fiscal 1972, I am shocked to learn that what one might reasonably expect is not what one will in actuality find. The administration has requested a 1972 appropriation in the basic VA medical care category of \$2,027,750,000. In absolute dollars, this is an increase over this year's budget of some \$125 million. But, in terms of what the money will buy, it is a step backward.

In fiscal year 1970, the average daily patient census in VA hospitals was 85,500. The budget estimates show an expected decline in this number for 1971 to 83,000, and a further decrease is projected for 1972 to 79,000. Thus over the 2-year period, the average number of patients be-

ing treated in VA hospitals on any given day has been cut by a total of 6,500.

Thus, the administration's budget not only fails to expand the VA hospital system to meet the increased demands upon it but actually calls for cutting it back from its present level to one that is even more inadequate. This is truly incredible. It is hard to see how the returning veteran, who faces many other problems including an extremely high prospect of unemployment, can view this cutback as anything other than a failure of gratitude on the part of the Nation in whose uniform he so generously served. And it is hard to see how any citizen who is at all aware of the health crisis our Nation faces can view the VA cutback as anything but a colossal misordering of priorities. I earnestly hope that the Congress will augment the President's requested appropriation for VA medical care by an amount sufficient to assure that that Agency will again be able adequately to provide our veterans with care of the very highest quality.

POSTAL REFORM

HON. MORRIS K. UDALL

OF ARIZONA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. UDALL. Mr. Speaker, many of my colleagues have heard and have voiced complaints concerning the Postal Reorganization Act that we passed last year. An editorial has appeared in the recent issue of Federal Times which rightly points out that improvement cannot come overnight. There are many problems to be solved, but the Postal Service has taken steps to bring about change.

I direct the attention of my colleagues to this editorial for it points up two major needs: the Service must move to implement changes, and we in the Congress and the public we represent must give the system a chance to begin its operations and then to function. The editorial follows:

POSTAL REFORM

Even the most optimistic observers now realize that postal reorganizations is not going to bring improvement over night. It might be fair at this point to ask if it ever was realistic or reasonable to expect so miraculous a transformation.

It took many years for the postal service to reach a point where reform was not only desirable but mandatory. It is going to take several more years before effective change can be fully accomplished.

It will be easier if the postal situation were static. But, that isn't the case. The mail load is growing, as are the demands for service. A public, upset by a huge increase in postage costs without a corresponding increase in service, is adding to the problem by demanding immediate action.

Let's look at some of the changes and see if any real progress is being made.

The patronage system has been abolished. This not only gave a boost to the merit system, it also broke the long drought during which thousands of postmaster vacancies went unfilled.

The reduction of the number of postal regions and the recruitment of top executives to fill major slots is bound to bring at

least a new approach to the solution of the postal service problems.

There have been moves to decentralize authority and allow some decision making at the operational level. This is a step needed, not only in the postal service, but throughout the entire civil service system.

The postal service is taking a new look at its manpower needs. The results are sure to anger some of the employe organizations. The department would have done well to have been a little less glib in its early promises that no jobs would be cut. This may prove to be an exercise in semantics. Maybe no jobs will be cut, but there are bound to be changes in types of service offered and consequent reassignment of people now rendering those services. As more regional mail handling centers develop, for instance, it seems inevitable that people will have to be transferred and some offices closed or reduced.

The plan to finance building costs through a bond issue is a big step. Haphazard methods in the past left many areas without new buildings or even modernization of existing facilities. Some postal people work in deplorable conditions. There was no chance for improvement under the old system.

Electronic mail sorting systems now are a reality in about two dozen post offices. This is progress from the time when the equipment was limited to "experimental" stations.

The postal service is gathering statistics which will pinpoint bottlenecks and thus speed delivery.

For the first time, postmasters in 172 offices will have a chance to assemble their own operating budgets. Thus, the men responsible for getting the job done will be able to control some of the factors which make it possible for them to meet this responsibility.

Postmaster General Blount has his work cut out for him. Congress will part with its postal authority with the greatest reluctance.

Blount has added fuel to the argument by his apparent unwillingness to play word games with the legislators.

The labor organizations are indicating that their pay and other demands will be high. They have much catching up to do before postal conditions are at a level commensurate with the demands on the employes.

So, the postal planners are faced not only with the problem of improving service. They also must pay past debts and make provision for meeting higher costs.

In the light of these developments, two courses of action seem imperative. First, the postal service must move with "deliberate speed" to implement the changes. Second, the Congress—and the public they represent—must give the new system a chance to work.

The time for meaningless criticism is past. The time for constructive action is now.

EULOGY TO SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD

HON. STEWART B. MCKINNEY

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 8, 1971

Mr. MCKINNEY. Mr. Speaker, from time to time, men of insight walk among us, men who see before others see, warn us of danger before it is upon us; unusual men, men of foresight, men of vision, men of whom we see too few in a generation.

Mr. Speaker, Thomas J. Dodd was one of these men. As a champion of civil rights, a prosecutor of Nazis, a distinguished Member of this House, and a

two-term Member of the other body. Tom Dodd devoted most of his adult life to the service of people, all of the people but most importantly those in his beloved Connecticut.

His resoluteness and steadfastness to his beliefs won him the respect of those he came in contact with, though they may occasionally disagree, they did not deny him his courage.

As you know, Mr. Speaker, he has now passed from our midst. He served long and he was willing to give more. He will be missed by many. Mrs. McKinney has joined me in extending our deepest sympathy to Mrs. Dodd and her family.

TRIBUTE TO CHARLES A. BERNS

HON. JOHN M. MURPHY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. MURPHY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I wish to insert in the RECORD a eulogy delivered at the funeral services for Charles A. Berns who was described as one of the "true New Yorkers." The eulogy was delivered by one of his many close friends, Joseph T. P. Sullivan, on the 24th of February, 1971.

Charles Berns was cherished by his friends who were legion, and revered by thousands more who knew him for his charitable work, his civic activity, and his lengthy public career.

CHARLES A. BERNS, 1901-71

It is with deep humility that I raise my voice to speak of Charlie Berns.

I shall not dwell upon his public career, his charities—civic or other activities but rather I shall speak of the private Charlie Berns I knew.

He was the true New Yorker—born, educated, married, raising his family, and establishing his business interests in this city. He knew New York, its people, their habits, customs, tastes and desires better than any man of his time.

An adoring and devoted husband, he was a patient, understanding, concerned, and loving father.

He had an inexhaustible capacity for friendship—he never lost a friend—and he had more friends in more segments of New York, and throughout the country, than any man I know. His friendships were lasting—the best example of this was his friendship with the Kriendler Family that endured through success, tragedy and stresses and strains of daily contact for over 45 years—and there were many other friendships of long standing.

What about the 21 Club and 21 Brands. Did they make him a success? Of course not—he fashioned them. It was he who gave them character—direction and continuity. They were merely the reflection of the man—the man who would have been a success in any field.

He was a happy man—with a zest for life, which really means that he loved people and wanted to share with them the happiness, excitement, beauty and all other phases of life. Wherever he went, he brought joy and gaiety—laughter and good fellowship. Though his humor was gentle, not biting, he ridiculed pomposity and hypocrisy, for he had that wonderful intuitive sense that penetrated sham; his sympathy quick—never lagging—his understanding keen and intelli-

gent—his kindness without end and his charity broad and deep excluding no one.

He was a compassionate man. Thirty years ago I was bereaved by the loss of my wife. For two years I rattled around aimlessly and almost in despair; then Charlie took me to his heart and put his arms around me and he never let go of me—not until the hour of his death. I know that Charlie did comparable things for countless others in many and varying ways.

It is written in the Bible, Second Kings, Verse 18, "And David went in and sat before the Lord and said who am I, O Lord God, and what is my house that Thou has brought me thus far." I can just hear Charlie saying this very same thing. Though Charlie may not have been of the lineage of David—surely he is a spiritual son of David—for he loved God and he practiced his religion not only publicly but in the innermost privacy of his life—with deep reverence and devotion.

Many of us have been able to tell him in his lifetime how dear and vital he was to us—but now, what do we do now. We can and should enshrine him in our hearts—keeping the memory of him green and alive by often and regularly looking inward so that we may still enjoy the warmth and assurance of his smile.

A great man is a rarity—but rarer still is a great and good man.

Charlie was a great and good man.
He was my friend and I loved him.

REPORT TO NINTH DISTRICT CONSTITUENTS

HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, under the leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following commentary on the Nation's health care crisis:

WASHINGTON REPORT

(By Congressman LEE HAMILTON, Ninth District, Indiana)

One of the major debates in Congress this year is focusing on the Nation's health care crisis. At its best, our health care system is spectacular. But there has been a growing disparity between the system's capabilities and the availability of adequate health care to large numbers of Americans.

Before any solutions are considered, a statement of the problems may be helpful:

THE STATUS OF HEALTH CARE

At the outset, it should be said that there has been a long-term trend of improvement. Life expectancy in this country has been lengthened by some 30 percent in the last 50 years. Infant mortality rates have declined sharply in recent years, and days of disability because of illness have been reduced.

The crisis in health care is to be found in its disparities. While American medicine has achieved dramatic breakthroughs in the treatment of tuberculosis, the prevention of polio, measles and rubella, the poor and the isolated still suffer a higher rate of chronic and debilitating illness, higher infant and maternal mortality rates and a lesser life expectancy.

The differences between the U.S. and other nations in several important indicators of national health suggest that the U.S. is not performing as well as other advanced nations. For example, the U.S. ranks 13th in infant mortality.

HEALTH CARE MANPOWER

While the supply of health manpower and facilities is catching up to our population

growth, there are disparities in the distribution of those services. Rural areas are chronically short of physicians. The primary care physician is in increasingly short supply as more and more medical students have gone into specialized fields.

ORGANIZATION OF HEALTH SERVICES

Improper management of our available health care resources contributes to the crisis in care. While the "para-medical" concept is getting limited acceptance, physicians continue to be burdened with tasks which could be performed by trained assistants. The National Pediatric Council reports that 75 percent of the tasks now performed by pediatric physicians could be performed by assistants. The productivity of dentists could be increased by 50 percent through the use of an assistant. Nurses in hospitals still spend 65 percent of their time in administrative duties.

Studies of hospital use also have shown varying percentages of patients who should be using more appropriate facilities—patients who could be treated in physician's office or getting laboratory services from clinics instead of occupying hospital beds. Others could be equally well cared for in extended care facilities or nursing homes. The studies also showed that many hospitals have expensive, sophisticated equipment that is used too rarely to justify its expense.

FINANCING

While 75 percent of the U.S. population is covered by some form of health insurance, only about one-third of its medical bills are paid through insurance. Many forms of coverage do not include preventative medicine and services and outpatient care, and most particularly, protection from catastrophic incidents.

The key problems are the financial barriers to getting adequate care for large numbers of the working poor, and inadequate protection for many who do have private insurance or are covered by Medicare or Medicaid. This system of financing health care has tended to reinforce the system of delivering health care, including its defects.

COSTS

In Fiscal Year 1970, the Nation spent \$67 billion on health, nearly three-fifths again as much as had been spent only four years earlier. In the decade of the 1960s, medical care prices rose far more rapidly than prices in general. The spiraling health costs have been prompted by poor utilization of our health care resources, incentives for the use of the highest cost facilities, and a lack of cost control measures, inadequate health care information, and lagging productivity.

EDUCATION

A large number of the Nation's medical and dental schools are in a financial crisis, and at a time when they are being urged to expand enrollments to meet health service needs. While there have been efforts in recent years to prune and reform curriculums and reduce the length of medical education, there is need for more incentive for efficiency in the educational process.

IT IS UP TO CITIZENS TO DEMAND LAW ENFORCEMENT

HON. JOHN J. DUNCAN

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Speaker, a young lady from my district had an interesting idea in her recent letter to the editor of the Knoxville, Tenn., News-Sentinel. Here follows a letter worth our attention:

What ever happened to law enforcement? Why is a policeman punished for using his gun? I'm surprised they're allowed to even carry bullets! Perhaps cap pistols would be more appropriate.

Why have National Guard protection if the only law enforcement they can carry out is to carry an unloaded gun (or if loaded, never use it), grit their teeth and try to ignore the bottles, rocks, and bricks thrown at them and while telling the "dear" rioters that what they are doing is a "no-no." If that's all the protection and law enforcement they can give—thanks for nothing!

A citizen can no longer even protect himself. If he does, he's punished! The one protecting himself gets the blame and the real criminal practically gets a merit badge! Sick, sick, sick!

Maybe if we citizens would wake up and demand law enforcement, we would get it.

ROSEMARY CAMERON.

FIRST DISTRICT EDUCATION VIEWS ON SCHOOL ISSUES

HON. FRED SCHWENGL

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. SCHWENGL. Mr. Speaker, each year it seems that the challenge of education becomes even greater. The issues involving education become more complex. The problem of adequate financing for education becomes more critical.

The responsibility for quality education is shared by many people. School board members, administrators, and teachers share the immediate responsibility at the local level. Needless to say, State legislatures and State departments of public instruction or education have assumed more important roles. The passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act—ESEA—of 1965 firmly and irrevocably placed a large measure of the responsibility on the Congress and the U.S. Office of Education.

Obviously, it has become more critical that open lines of communication exist for those at all levels of education.

As a former teacher and as former chairman of the schools committee when I was in the State legislature, my interest in elementary and secondary education is considerable and continuing in nature.

To help maintain a high degree of awareness of the views of educators and in order to stay abreast of the current issues I asked the teachers and school administrators in the First District of Iowa to give me their views on several questions concerning elementary and secondary education. Their views and thoughts were very helpful to me and increased my understanding of the problem.

The questions along with the answers and some typical comments of the educators in my district follow.

ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: YOUR VIEWS

1. President Nixon has proposed a \$3.0 billion Education Revenue Sharing program. It would combine over 30 categorical programs into one and automatically distribute funds to the States on the basis of total school age population in each State, the number of students whose parents live or

work on Federal property, and the number of students from low income families.

Do you favor this proposal?

	Percent
Favor	69
Oppose	21
Unsure	10

One educator commented:

Yes, if the federal government doesn't insist on administering it. We always have to pay so many administrators that there is never any money left for what it is meant for.

Another said:

Yes, I believe I would, providing it was a simple formula whereby each Superintendent and Board could figure to the penny what was coming. Too often there is the fear of monies being dribbled away in the process of going from Federal to State to local community.

2. Some education leaders have and continue to advocate year-round school terms. What are your views on this issue.

	Percent
Favor	51
Oppose	46
Unsure	3

An educator from Fairfield, Iowa, said:

Only for those districts which have a large population, money for air conditioning, and provide time for instructors to attend college as they do now during the summer.

Another commented:

I believe schools should offer the following during the summer—enrichment courses, vocational training, many types of courses a student is interested in but can't work into his schedule during the regular year, and special problems that students have. For the most part it ought to be voluntary for the student.

3. Do you favor Federal funding to help upgrade State Departments of Public Instruction or Education?

	Percent
Favor	78
Oppose	16
Unsure	6

Several educators commented in the following way:

I believe its going to be necessary. Most state legislatures are too archaic to properly fund the state department properly.

One stated that he favored:

This proposal as a method to help local schools receive guidance for their particular problem in their particular locality.

4. Do you believe teachers should have the right to strike?

	Percent
Yes	67
No	31
Unsure	2

A favorite comment to this question was "teachers should strike only as a last resort and only under the most extreme of conditions." One gentleman said:

Yes, I do believe teachers have the right to strike, but professionally they should not exercise this right because it can only cause more hard feelings than it can help. After all, we are here to educate the children of our community and how can we do it if we are not here.

5. How would you rate the effectiveness of present Federal education programs?

	Percent
Excellent	2
Good	24
Fair	54
Poor	20

6. If Educational Revenue Sharing is not adopted, what do you feel the thrust of Fed-

eral programs in elementary and secondary education should be?

Most comments to this question were along the lines of establishing a Cabinet-level Department of Education in the Federal Government. Other often-repeated suggestions were improving teacher education, equalizing school districts, and providing better schooling for handicapped and ghetto children.

7. President Nixon has also proposed the creation of a National Institute of Education to do research and experimentation in education. How important do you consider this proposal?

	Percent
Very important.....	41
Of some importance.....	22
Of no importance.....	37

It was again demonstrated with the responses to this question that most educators feel the extreme necessity for a Department of Education on the Federal level. One educator commented:

This proposal is critically important in theory, but I feel a cabinet level Department of Education with a Secretary level of leadership (as already presented in Congress) is the only practical answer.

Another said:

If an effective central organization, such as the creation of a Department of Education in the President's cabinet could occur, I would favor the work proposed in this National Institute of Education. However, I feel it would be a flop without the strength and assistance offered through a cabinet post.

It appears to this Congressman that educators in the First District of Iowa overwhelmingly favor the President's proposed \$3 billion education revenue sharing program. They are even more overwhelming in their support for Federal funding to help upgrade State departments of public instruction or education. It has been strongly suggested by these educators that education is a priority in Federal spending and should maintain a level of Cabinet-level importance in our Federal structure. The right to strike by teachers has been upheld by the educators in the First District of Iowa, however, the most prevalent view was that teachers should strike only as a last resort and only under the most extreme of conditions.

The educators in my district believe that to solve the problems facing our Nation today in the area of education of our children we need realistic solutions. They feel that there is not enough reality in our actions today. More must be done to improve the quality of education that our children are receiving. One teacher summed it up in the following way:

We would not allow a man who is supposed to be a surgeon operate on our children without first serving an internship in practical work under the guidance of an experienced surgeon for at least a year or more. We do, however, allow a person to teach your children, my children and all other children with only six weeks practice teaching experience. Our children are our most important commodity and anything in the education field will presently do for them—sloppy teaching, poor college training, and so on. Having a degree in education and a teachers certificate does not make an educator—somehow and somewhere along the line and through the years, however, we have been led to believe it does.

It has been my consistent feeling that we in Congress and at home must strive to upgrade the quality of our children's education. To raise and maintain the quality of our educational system, local control by school boards and administrators is essential. It has been and will continue to be my duty as an elected representative of the people to try to insure our children a quality education.

SEA LAMPREY—MENACE TO GREAT LAKES FISH

HON. GUY VANDER JAGT

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. VANDER JAGT. Mr. Speaker, I wish to call my colleagues' attention to an informative account of the continuing battle against the sea lamprey which is conducted under the auspices of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission.

The program was initiated in 1958 under a treaty between the United States and Canada. Accordingly, the U.S. portion is covered in the State Department budget, while the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Interior Department administers the American participation in the program.

There are alarming indications that the lamprey program, having shown marked success throughout its history, is now beginning to fall short of its task. Many more fish currently being taken in the Great Lakes bear lamprey scars than was the case 2 years ago. Among the bigger and older fish, approximately 80 percent of the current catch have been attacked by this parasite.

The major problem is that appropriations have not kept pace with the expanding breadth of the program and increasing costs. Over a span of 12 years, the U.S. allocation has increased just 14 percent, while costs have risen by over 50 percent.

Extensive plantings of trout and salmon have laid the groundwork for a revival of fishing on the Great Lakes. But the success of that program depends upon controlling the lamprey threat, through procedures which are effective, economical, and compatible with rigorous standards of environmental protection.

I commend the following article by Mr. Tom Dammann of the Grand Rapids Press to my colleagues' attention:

LAMPREY IN GREAT LAKES RETURN AS FUNDS DWINDLE

(By Tom Dammann)

CHARLEVOIX—Contrary to some widely held opinions, control of the parasitic and deadly sea lamprey has not been achieved in the Great Lakes, and all could still be lost in the campaign to stock these waters with great fighting game fish.

That's the unhappy view of Myrl Keller, biologist in charge of the state Department of Natural Resources station here, who notes that federal sources are cutting back badly needed funds for lamprey control just when they should be increased.

Keller points out that lamprey scars on lake trout of the 24 to 32-inch size have been running more than 50 per cent, far over the

level of just a couple of years ago. Among the bigger and older fish, wounding runs up to 80 per cent.

Not many of the fish 17 inches and under have lamprey wounds, but fish biologists are not sure whether this means the lamprey do not attack the smaller fish—or kill them when they do.

SHORTSIGHTED ECONOMY

It had appeared that a great day was coming in Great Lakes fishing, with the heavy plantings of coho and chinook salmon, steelhead trout, brown trout and coaster brooks, but federal shortsightedness may well wreak havoc with the plans.

"A great job has been done, but we still have a problem," Keller says. "The wound rate is far too high. And it is not only among lake trout. Last year almost every salmon taken in Lake Huron had been attacked by the sea lamprey."

Keller emphasizes that the success of the gigantic efforts of Canada and the United States and the various individual states to restore the Great Lakes fishery depends on control of the sea lamprey.

"There is no use carrying on large plantings of trout and salmon unless we can control the sea lamprey," he says. "The public, the state Legislature and Congress must realize that more money is needed to fund the control program."

The program is conducted by the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, representing the United States, Canada and Great Lakes states.

The United States puts up 69 per cent of the costs, Canada 31 per cent. Because the program was worked out in a treaty between the two nations the U.S. share of the money comes from the State Department. The Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior, acting as a contractor for the commission, executes the U.S. part of the program. If the United States cuts back its funds, Canada reduces its share accordingly, thus multiplying the loss.

"But the State Department is too busy with the Vietnam War and international crises to care much about a fishery problem, so we have difficulty getting enough money," Keller says.

Another difficulty is that there has been relatively little increase in the amount of money allocated to sea lamprey control since it was initiated in Lake Superior in 1958, despite the fact that the program now covers Lakes Michigan and Huron and will soon include Lake Ontario.

Still another worry is caused by the fact that the chemical TFM, used to kill off the lamprey larvae, now must undergo rigid testing by the Federal Food and Drug Administration to determine whether it conforms to new antipollution standards.

"If FDA finds it doesn't, then we'll have to begin all over again," Keller points out.

Robert Saalfeld, executive secretary of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Ann Arbor, supports Keller in most respects.

Saalfeld says that the United States allocated \$1,339,000 for the Lake Superior program in 1958, the first year. In 1970 it allocated \$1,948,000 to cover Lakes Superior, Michigan and Huron.

"There has been a 14 per cent increase in funds, while our costs have risen by more than 50 percent, which means we've had to reduce some very important research, such as on larvae in river estuaries," Saalfeld says. And now top federal authorities are talking of cutting the budget further.

Nevertheless, Saalfeld feels that if the sea lamprey population can be checked at its present level, the program is on the way to success.

"Another \$300,000 to \$400,000 a year would do that," Saalfeld says.

The sea lamprey is not a true eel, as is so often said, according to Keller. It lacks the

jaw and teeth. It has a disc mouth which fastens on to the side of its prey, like a suction cup, and sucks out the blood of the victim.

This parasite entered the Great Lakes via the Welland Canal about 1921. By 1950 it had virtually wiped out lake trout stocks in Lakes Superior, Michigan and Huron, a commercial fishery which had yielded an annual production of 15.5 million pounds.

Like rainbow trout, coho and chinook, the lamprey spawns in streams. The female lays some 60,000 eggs. The resultant larvae spend five years in river bottom mud. They then move into the lakes, spending a year and a half to two years feeding on trout, salmon and white fish before returning to the rivers to spawn.

At first an electronic shock method was used to kill the adult lamprey as they swam upstream. But this was replaced by the heavy chemical, TFM, which works into the river bottoms and kills the larvae.

There are some experts, including Keller, who feel that now is the time to devote more effort to locating the natural enemy of the sea lamprey as the most ecologically safe and effective way of controlling it.

LOUISIANA JUSTICE OPPOSES NATIONALIZATION OF STATE SUPREME COURTS

HON. JOHN R. RARICK

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, on June 4, 1971, I spoke out on the real threat of a national judiciary system that faced the American people through a revenue-sharing plan conducted by the LEAA, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 18343.

Today, I received a copy of correspondence to the Louisiana Commission of Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice from an associate justice of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the Honorable Frank W. Summers.

Justice Summers in his letter of opposition to the receipt of Federal funds for the Supreme Court of Louisiana states:

Federal grants will not strengthen our local governmental units . . . this Court particularly . . . but in time the Federal help will bring with it Federal domination.

If the LEAA "on-going" plan is permitted to involve this Court, it is only a question of time until we find ourselves so much enmeshed in Federal "help" and then "control," which inevitably follows, that the Court's identity as a State institution will have ceased to exist.

I submit that the independence we have heretofore enjoyed as a State Court will be impaired by the requested grant, the purpose of the Act will not be served, and this Court will enjoy no benefit by the use of Federal funds.

I am proud that a member of the supreme court of my State recognizes and warns our people of the inherent dangers to the Federal system in a procedure that will nationalize our State judiciary and courts.

I insert at this point the full text of Associate Justice Frank W. Summers, bearing the concurrence of Associate Justice Walter B. Hamlin, both of the Supreme Court of Louisiana:

NEW ORLEANS, LA.,

June 10, 1971.

Lt. Gen. DAVID WADE,
Chairman, Louisiana Commission of Law Enforcement, and Administration of Criminal Justice, Baton Rouge, La.

DEAR SIR: This will refer to my letter of June 8 requesting additional time within which to file a response in opposition to the application of the Judicial Administrator, dated June 7, on behalf of four members of this Court for "Grants for Law Enforcement Purposes" purportedly authorized by Title I of the "Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968" (Public Law 90-351; 82 Stat. 197, as amended). Because I consider this application unauthorized by the Crime Control Act and not founded on facts warranting a grant, and because justices of this Court are elected officials operating as the court of last resort in the State judicial system, responsible to their constituents, I am compelled to point out that I do not subscribe to the application made by the Judicial Administrator of this Court on behalf of four of its members.

Ordinarily it may be suggested that if I do not choose to avail myself of these grant funds, I have only to refuse to use them or the facilities they provide. But, the joint use we make of facilities in this Court is so indispensable to economy, efficiency and the physical plan of the courthouse, I cannot envision how, under this sharing plan, I can avoid the use of facilities provided by the requested grant. For instance, using a pro-saic example, there will be no designation under existing regulations under the Act, I am sure, as to which of the books in our libraries are purchased with Federal funds and which are purchased with State funds. I do not feel that it is unreasonable for the sake of economy to request that the justices accommodate themselves to this plan. However, leaving this and other considerations aside, the most important consideration involves the integrity of this Court as a State institution.

I seriously question that the funds available under Title I of P.L. 90-351, as amended by P.L. 91-644, are intended to be utilized in accordance with the proposed uses set out in the Judicial Administrator's letter of June 7. Section 4, Subsection (1) of P.L. 91-644 refers to "criminal courts." This Court, as you are undoubtedly aware, has both criminal and civil jurisdiction and it does not properly fall within a reference to "criminal courts" as such.

Under "Grants for Correctional Institutions and Facilities", "Correctional Institutions" are defined in Part E of the Act to mean "any place for the confinement or rehabilitation of juvenile offenders or individuals charged with or convicted of criminal offenses." It seems farfetched to contend that this court falls within the intentment of this language.

First, answering the application seriatim, I question the legal correctness of paying more than 50% of the salaries of law clerks with funds provided by your agency. Section 301 (d) of the Act seems to require that "not more than one-third of grant made under this part may be expended for the compensation of personnel." By the proposal of four members of this Court, the \$33,000 requested for law clerks would necessarily exceed the one-third limitation. The representation that "60% of the work of the Supreme Court is involved in criminal writs of habeas corpus" is questionable. I am not aware that any accurate calculation has been made to substantiate this statement. I would say that we do not devote 66% of our time to criminal writs of habeas corpus.

Second, at this time, each chamber of each justice of this Court is furnished with a complete set of Louisiana Reports, the official reports of the Court; a subscription to

Southern Reporter 2d Series and advance sheets; Corpus Juris Secundum; American Jurisprudence; West Louisiana Digest; West Louisiana Statutes, Codes and Constitution Annotated; Shepard's Louisiana Citator; the Acts of the Legislature as they are promulgated and published; and, from time to time, a limited number of special treatises. These are the reference works we use 98% of the time.

In addition, due to the efficient arrangement of the building, a conference library is located on the same floor within very close proximity (a few feet) to each chamber. This conference library, available to all justices and their law clerks, contains two complete sets of the Louisiana Reports; a complete set of Southern Reporter 2d Series; a set of West Louisiana Digest; the New Louisiana Digest, and all other Louisiana Digests; Shepard's Louisiana Citator; West Louisiana Statutes, Codes and Constitution Annotated; Louisiana Law Review; Tulane Law Review; Loyola Law Journal; Acts of the Legislature of the State of Louisiana (Complete); a complete set of American Law Reports, and American Law Reports 2d and 3d Series; Corpus Juris Secundum; Shepard's U.S. Citations; U.S. Supreme Court Reports, Lawyer's Edition; U.S. Code Annotated; a set of Words and Phrases for which shelving will be provided; and a limited number of special works.

In order to make room for the ever-growing existing publications, it has been necessary to transfer some books, not mentioned here, from the conference library to the basement for storage.

All facilities of the Louisiana State Law Library, one of the most complete and comprehensive law libraries in the State, are available from the conference library by a small elevator on which any book can be sent up quickly. In isolated instances when rare or unusual books are not available when needed, the law libraries at Tulane University and Loyola University will probably have the book. I have found them willing to permit use of their library.

Third, the Louisiana Law Library, on the first floor of the Supreme Court Building, below the justices' chambers, is accessible by elevator just down the hall. The design of the Supreme Court Building is such that access to any book is available in the shortest practicable time. There is little available space for duplication of books on hand without a redesign of the existing plan of the building. In fact, funds provided by the State referred to in the Judicial Administrator's letter are, in my opinion, more than adequate for our present needs. There is, therefore, no justification even under "E.9" of your regulations to buy books, which can hardly be referred to as "Equipment Purchases".

Insofar as the purchase of new books for the Louisiana State Law Library is concerned, I feel the legislative appropriation of \$40,000 is entirely adequate. I suggest that a minimum justification for the expenditure of public funds would require documentation of books alleged to be needed, which has not been done by the applicants.

As Richard W. Velde, Associate Administrator of LEAA wrote recently, "Unlike the National Crime Commission, which went out of existence after completing its report, this new effort (of LEAA) will be an on-going one." To substantiate this statement, he points out that block action grants have grown from \$25 million in fiscal 1969, to \$183 million in fiscal 1970, to \$340 million this year (1971). Velde states, "We are asking Congress for block grants totaling \$413 million in the year starting July 1." 54 Judicature 433 (1971).

No showing has been made that this Court's function has been responsible in any way for "the high incidence of crime in the United States," which Congress found, in the

Declarations and Purpose of the Act, "threatens the peace, security, and general welfare of the Nation and its citizens." Absent a finding to this effect, I submit that any grants to this Court will not serve to carry out the purposes of Title I. This Court enjoys the enviable reputation of ranking high among State Courts of last resort in prompt disposition of its case load.

It is my view, and the Congress was careful to point out, that the functions of this Court and like state units are a local problem to be solved by local officials responsible, in this case, to the people of Louisiana. Federal grants will not strengthen our local governmental units—this Court particularly—but in time the Federal help will bring with it Federal domination. That the Federal program is "on-going" is graphically illustrated by the annual marked increase in grants to which I have already referred. That the Federal help will supplant, rather than strengthen local systems, is illustrated by the action of four members of this court petitioning LEAA for funds to supplant the Louisiana Legislature's considered determination that stated amounts were adequate for the purposes these Federal grants will serve. Thus, under our State governmental structure, the legislative prerogative of fixing, and limiting, amounts this Court can expend has been supplanted. Thereby one of our legislature's basic functions, the appropriation of funds, will have been supplanted, at least insofar as this Court is concerned. If the LEAA "on-going" plan is permitted to involve this Court, it is only a question of time until we find ourselves so much enmeshed in Federal "help" and then "control," which inevitably follows, that the Court's identity as a State institution will have ceased to exist. Witness the enlarged scope of activities authorized by the 1970 amendment to the Act, just two years after the initial enactment, and other examples of Federal intervention into State affairs, too numerous to mention.

I submit that the independence we have heretofore enjoyed as a State Court will be impaired by the requested grant, the purpose of the Act will not be served, and this Court will enjoy no benefit by the use of Federal funds.

I have sought heretofore not to resort to outside-of-conference activities involving this Court, except when I find the members of this Court or others initiate activity outside our Court conferences which I consider inimical to the interest of our Court, our State and our Nation. The application in question I believe, poses such a problem. I respectfully urge you to earnestly consider this response in opposition to the request and deny any LEAA grants.

Finally, I make reference to a resolution of the State Senate adopted June 8 requesting that this Court not apply for Federal grants, a copy of which will be furnished when available.

Very truly yours,

FRANK W. SUMMERS,

I concur in the above statements.

WALTER R. HAMLIN,

Associate Justice.

FLAG TOWN U.S.A.

HON. JOHN T. MYERS

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. MYERS. Mr. Speaker, as we pause to salute the flag of the United States this day I wish to pay tribute to Mellott, Ind., which has earned a nationwide reputation as Flag Town U.S.A. for its promotion of the sale and display of the flag.

It was my honor to participate in Flag Appreciation Day ceremonies in Mellott yesterday which drew several thousand persons to this small rural community of just over 300.

I am proud to report that patriotism is not dead in the heartland of America. I would like to share with my colleagues the following tribute to Mellott and to James L. Heigers, commander of the American Legion Post there, who has nourished this dream of Flag Town U.S.A. into a reality:

"FLAG TOWN U.S.A."

(By John Kell (Former Township Trustee of Richland Township))

There is a little town named Mellott,
You might have had to look twice to see the spot.

But that day is in the past,
For it has made a place upon the map;
For a man they call Jim,
Began to reign
And with his imagination and determination

His brain storm took on formation.
So he set to work with just an idea
Of seeing Old Glory flying near,
He started out to test his plot,
And soon had a flag pole on every lot,
With our colors flying all over Mellott,
It makes one stop and think alot,
Of our nation strong and brave
That our boys did not die in vain.
So Mellott has gained it's fame
And a trademark to it's name.
We call it Flag Town U.S.A.
And will for many a day.

WHAT RURAL ELECTRIFICATION MEANS TO ME AND MY COMMUNITY: FOUR WINNING ESSAYS BY NEBRASKA TEENAGERS

HON. CHARLES THONE

OF NEBRASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. THONE. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to request inclusion in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of four essays written by Nebraska teenagers who have been competing for a place on the annual Nebraska Rural Electric Youth Tour of Washington. The essays all concern the impact that electricity has in the modern agriculture community, and explain in a very personal way the vital and continuing role that our electrical systems play in rural America.

These four young people were selected as winners in their respective public power districts. It is my pleasure to have these winning essays inserted in the RECORD:

THE VALUE OF RURAL ELECTRIFICATION TO OUR HOME AND COMMUNITY

(By DeMaris Brosh)

As a teenage girl of today, I have never been without electricity in my home and I find I take this convenience for granted. I must admit, listening to my ancestors talk about the days before they had rural electrification makes me more appreciative of electricity.

Rural electrification has done a wonderful job of making a more meaningful way of life for the rural people. The farmer can enjoy his country home with all the benefits that are found in the city. At the same time he is away from air pollution, riots, racial problems and slums.

Dad might swelter in the fields on a summer afternoon, but he can sleep in coolness at night. Mom might still can, but she can work in an air-conditioned kitchen over a cooler range than the old cookstove. Automatic washers make laundry a daily talk instead of a weekly chore. There is no comparison in the old sadiron and today's thermostatically controlled light-weight iron and permanent press clothing.

Today's higher standard of living demands more water. Perhaps the pressure water system is one of the most used electrical appliances. It does so many jobs by providing water for drinking, cooking, cleaning and bathing. Automatic washers and dishwashers need an abundant supply of water. High pressure hoses for cleaning feedlots, modern dairy sanitation and general farm cleanup all make greater demands on the farm water system.

With irrigation, drying bins, and REA service, the farmer has a combination that gives him better yields in his crops and lets him store his grain without loss. New electric farm equipment makes farming more profitable when used effectively.

To a teenage girl, rural electrification means just about all the comforts of life. It means light at the flick of a switch, music at the turn of a dial and softly dried towels at the press of a button. It means drying your hair in a jiffy or typing up a term paper with the speed of an electric typewriter. When electricity is off for even ten minutes, all activity on the farm stops and I realize how much I depend on this friend.

The list of jobs made easier by electricity—rural electrification—is endless; but the effect on the farmer, his family, his work, and his leisure is very evident. Modern conveniences give us leisure time to take part in community affairs, church activities, and to share in Nebraska's growing recreational opportunities.

Cultural development has also followed with new found leisure time. Rural Nebraskans read more, attend training sessions, register for college evening classes, and travel. Through radio and television we are kept informed of all state, national, and world happenings. The entertainment world is brought to our homes and we enjoy the performances of master artists.

The value of rural electrification to our home and community will never end. Rural Americans and rural Nebraskans can be healthier and happier, more comfortable and secure with rural electrification. Electricity can be our ever-more useful servant throughout our lifetime.

WHAT RURAL ELECTRIFICATION MEANS TO ME AND MY COMMUNITY (By Bonnie Hain)

Rural electrification has done a wonderful job of making a more meaningful way of life for the rural people, especially the farmer. He can now retire in his country home with all the benefits that are found in the city. At the same time he is away from air pollution, riots, racial problems and slums.

He can stay on the farm where his heart is and where his neighbors and friends are nearby. He is not drawn into the hustle and bustle of the city, but at the same time he has all the conveniences found in the city.

Rural Electrification means an entirely new world. The change from kerosene lamps to electric lights is a miracle. Now light is throughout the whole room, not in just one small area. No smelly kerosene, no need to worry about the lamp being tipped over and starting a fire—no need for carrying a lamp from one room to another. Just step inside the room, flip a switch and behold, the whole room is lit up.

Electricity is also money making for the rancher and cattle man. The average steer drinks about five-thousand gallons of water by the time he reaches market weight of 1,000 pounds. That's about 41 times as much

water as the steer weighs. You can see that water is big business. Fortunately it's also cheap and plentiful throughout most of Nebraska. Efficient electric pumps can provide an automatic supply at a cost of pennies a day with low-cost electricity.

Knowing how to use electricity wisely can save endless labor. Many farm jobs can not only be mechanized but can be automated so that no one has to spend his time tending a machine, just as he no longer has to scoop corn, ensilage or manure.

Where does my electricity come from? Most people expect a simple answer such as "Electricity for this area is generated one mile north of the Marietta Church." But it's not that simple. At this moment your electricity probably is coming from several sources.

Your rural electric system does not generate electricity. It buys electricity at wholesale rates, distributes it throughout its service area and sells it to you at retail rates.

In the eastern two-thirds of Nebraska, rural electric systems buy electricity from Nebraska Electric Generation and Transmission Cooperative of Columbus. This agency buys from Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD). NPPD operates a statewide network of high-voltage transmission lines that connect many generation stations in Nebraska and sources outside the state. This network—called a grid—delivers electricity to 27 rural electric systems some municipal electric systems and some large industries.

The NPPD grid, which supplies most of rural Nebraska, receives electricity from hydroelectric plants on the Platte and Loup Rivers and from steam-powered plants at Lincoln, Hallam, Bellevue, and Lexington.

All in all our Willie Wirehand was a true blessing and can be called our right hand.

WHAT RURAL ELECTRIFICATION MEANS TO ME AND MY COMMUNITY (By Jennie Herink)

In the days of ancient Rome, Julius Caesar had a palace full of servants, ready to satisfy his every need. Today, man has a servant working for him too—more efficient and more reliable than anyone in Caesar's Empire. We call this modern day servant "Electric Power." He serves almost every home, farm, store and factory in the United States. He works 24 hours a day, seven days a week—never takes a coffee break and seldom a vacation. He demands very little in wages.

While practically everyone uses electricity, few people realize how it affects their lives. Electricity can mean the difference between life and death to a patient in a hospital. Electricity is a miracle for a pilot attempting to land his aircraft on a foggy night. Electricity is a feeling of warmth and security for everyone during a raging blizzard. Yes, "Electric Power" is truly man's most useful servant.

Electricity has raised the standard of living for every family in my community. Before electrification came to the rural areas, a typical Midwestern farm and farm couple looked like Grant Wood's painting, "American Gothic." Today thanks to the progress of electricity, farming is an efficient and profitable business. The majority of farmers in my community have doubled and even tripled their farming operation over the past 10 years. This has been made possible through advanced mechanization and that ever-dependable hired hand, "Electric Power." The farmer's wife has also profited from this improved standard of living. In my community new homes are being built and old homes remodeled to contain every modern conceivable—manned by that faithful servant, "Electricity."

An estimated total of 2,895,000 farms will be operated during 1971. This is the lowest number in a century and represents a decline of 2.6 percent from 1969 and 27 percent from 1960. For the past 35 years, United States farms have declined in number.

Yet, because of modern efficiencies, today's

fewer farmers produce more food of higher quality for more people than ever before. Impossible? Not when you realize that when the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) was established in 1935, fewer than 11 out of every 100 farms in the United States had electric service. Today REA provides electric service to about 5,100,000 customers in nearly all the states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Electric power has aided the economic development of rural communities by increasing farm production and encouraging the establishment of local businesses and industries.

In spite of the rising cost of labor, seed, feed, fertilizer, and machinery, the price of electricity has stayed the same because American farmers have increased their use of electricity enough in the last decade to keep the cost from rising and even lower it. As farming continues to grow, we can be certain that rural electrification will continue to serve us, ever growing and expanding.

In evaluating my community and this great nation of ours, I realize that thanks to the foresight of Senator George W. Norris 36 years ago, rural electrification has changed the farming profession from a state of meager existence to the largest business in America. No wonder we say "Live Better—Electrically."

THE VALUE OF RURAL ELECTRIFICATION IN OUR HOME AND COMMUNITY (By Barbara Luhr)

Rural electricity has a very high value in our home and community. It plays an enormous role in our lives today, larger than we think! Without electricity, most of us would not have running water, heat, lights, ranges, refrigerators, deep freeze, dishwashers, clothes washers and dryers, irons, vacuum cleaners, mixers, blenders, clocks, radios, sewing machines, toasters, irrigation pumps, air compressors or milkers. This list could practically go on forever!

Thanks to the Rural Electrification Act of 1936, this equipment is found in rural homes and communities today. This Act provides that the administrator can loan money to finance the building of power plants, transmission of electricity, and for constructing power lines to new rural areas. These loans can be made to people, corporations, territories, states and subdivisions.

This Rural Electrification Act was supported by Nebraska's Senator George Norris and Representative Sam Rayburn of Texas. It was passed during the depression, when many people were without a job and regular income. By passing this law, several things were accomplished. Many people were given a job, the farmers' standards of living were raised by bringing electricity to the rural farms and communities. In raising the standard of living for the farmer, many improvements have been made over the years. A refrigerator and deep freeze are found in the home keeping the food cold, a stove is there to cook and bake the food, a television and stereo are the entertainment center of the home, and push-button feeding is seen in the cattle yards to feed the livestock.

Before the act was passed, 10% of rural farms and communities had electricity. Today, close to 98% of rural areas have electricity.

Rural electrification means more to me than having a refrigerator, deep freeze or stove. In the winter, it means waking up to a heated room with electric lights to see to get dressed. In the summer, it means being cool and comfortable on a hot and humid day. Staying up late to finish some work or getting up early to start a new project is no problem now because of electric lights in your home and security lights in your yards. You no longer have to wait for Mother Nature, for you can see without her. Yes, rural electrification can mean more than refrigerators, stoves, and deep freezes—a lot more!

Every day since 1936 we have come to de-

pend on electricity more and more. We keep adding new equipment and luxuries to our ownership, such as a color television, an electric adding machine, a hair dryer, an organ, or a can opener are found in the home. Such things as welders, drying bins, augers, drills for the farm are added to make life a little easier. Automatic egg breakers in our local egg plant have made work faster and more mechanized and computers are added in many other communities each day to ease the workload.

Many people do not think it would be hard to live without electricity. Being without electricity for a short time would make people quickly realize the great value of electricity. It is hard to estimate the amount of electricity used until we just sit down and think about it. Rural electricity has a great value in our rural home and community, and it's growing—every day!

NO WONDER WE ARE BROKE

HON. LAMAR BAKER

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Speaker, a constituent of mine, D. F. Black, of Chattanooga, has called my attention to the Warner & Swasey Co. advertisement which appeared in U.S. News & World Report on May 24, 1971. This advertisement lists the countries and the amounts in American dollars which each has received under our foreign aid program.

Just in case any of my colleagues missed seeing this list, I think it is important to have it appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD along with the copy in the advertisement under the headline, "No Wonder We're Broke."

I should also include Mr. Black's comment when he sent the copy of the advertisement to me. He noted, "This is real revenue sharing."

The advertisement follows:

NO WONDER WE'RE BROKE

Here is the tragic list of 138 billion dollars (one hundred and thirty-eight billion!) this country has been giving or "loaning to foreign countries, 1946 through 1969 (even higher today). We have borrowed billions so we could give them away—the interest alone on our debt is now in the billions of dollars every year! And we are still borrowing more to give more away.

Yet every few days we hear that another one of these nations has insulted Americans, stolen even more of our property, driven us out of its country which we saved and rebuilt.

What—what—have all these American billions accomplished?

Afghanistan	\$407,000,000
Ceylon	165,600,000
Cyprus	22,200,000
Greece	3,886,500,000
India	8,246,700,000
Iran	2,336,000,000
Iraq	102,000,000
Israel	1,226,100,000
Jordan	643,000,000
Kuwait	50,000,000
Lebanon	93,000,000
Nepal	137,500,000
Pakistan	3,721,600,000
Sauda Arabia	93,200,000
Syrian Arab Republic	60,500,000
Turkey	5,600,400,000

United Arab Republic (Egypt)	\$912,200,000
Yemen	42,600,000
Central Treaty Organization	54,100,000
Near East and South Asia Regional	1,510,600,000
Argentina	888,000,000
Bahamas	35,100,000
Barbados	100,000
Bolivia	548,100,000
Brazil	3,779,300,000
British Honduras	5,300,000
Chile	1,704,300,000
Colombia	1,205,500,000
Costa Rica	191,500,000
Cuba	52,100,000
Dominican Republic	463,900,000
Ecuador	311,200,000
El Salvador	135,200,000
Guatemala	331,000,000
Guyana	61,000,000
Haiti	118,700,000
Honduras	119,000,000
Jamaica	74,800,000
Mexico	1,168,200,000
Nicaragua	176,000,000
Panama	246,300,000
Paraguay	135,700,000
Peru	759,400,000
Surinam	10,500,000
Trinidad and Tobago	62,900,000
Uruguay	162,200,000
Venezuela	490,600,000
Other West Indies	8,000,000
Central America Regional	144,200,000
Latin America Regional	1,891,300,000
Vietnam	5,895,400,000
Burma	100,500,000
Cambodia	341,300,000
China (Republic of)	5,141,800,000
Hong Kong	43,700,000
Indochina Undistributed	1,535,200,000
Indonesia	1,128,300,000
Korea	7,829,000,000
Laos	641,100,000
Malaysia	90,200,000
Philippines	2,078,800,000
Ryukyu Islands	387,400,000
Singapore	40,000,000
Thailand	1,192,400,000
Western Samoa	1,500,000
East Asia Regional	767,100,000
Algeria	185,300,000
Botswana	16,500,000
Burundi	6,800,000
Cameroon	32,900,000
Central African Republic	5,000,000
Chad	8,700,000
Congo (Brazzaville)	2,100,000
Congo (Kinshasa)	430,700,000
Dahomey	12,200,000
Ethiopia	375,700,000
Gabon	7,500,000
Gambia	2,200,000
Ghana	267,300,000
Guinea	107,800,000
Ivory Coast	73,400,000
Kenya	66,200,000
Lesotho	4,800,000
Liberia	272,100,000
Libya	229,700,000
Malagasy Republic	13,200,000
Malawi	25,000,000
Mali, Republic of	25,300,000
Mauritania	3,300,000
Mauritius	1,500,000
Morocco	758,900,000
Niger	16,600,000
Nigeria	289,100,000
Rwanda	6,900,000
Senegal	38,100,000
Sierra Leone	43,100,000
Somali Republic	76,800,000
Southern Rhodesia	7,000,000
Sudan	104,800,000
Swaziland	700,000
Tanzania	65,000,000
Togo	15,100,000

Tunisia	\$627,100,000
Uganda	36,000,000
Upper Volta	12,700,000
Zambia	40,800,000
Central and west Africa regional	8,000,000
East Africa regional	26,400,000
Africa regional	165,300,000
Malta	8,200,000
Spain	2,228,100,000
Yugoslavia	2,890,700,000
Oceania-Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands	230,800,000
British Oceania	1,500,000
Nonregional	6,610,400,000
Albania	20,400,000
Austria	1,166,600,000
Belgium-Luxembourg	2,005,200,000
Czechoslovakia	193,000,000
Denmark	919,600,000
East Germany	800,000
Finland	151,500,000
France	9,415,900,000
Germany (Federal Republic)	5,020,300,000
Berlin	131,900,000
Hungary	31,500,000
Iceland	89,300,000
Ireland	193,000,000
Italy	6,043,000,000
Netherlands	2,470,300,000
Norway	1,253,300,000
Poland	577,300,000
Portugal	534,400,000
Sweden	188,100,000
United Kingdom	9,697,500,000
U.S.S.R.	186,400,000
Europe regional	2,763,900,000
Japan	4,137,900,000
Republic of South Africa	*150,600,000
Canada	51,600,000
Oceania-Australia	825,900,000
Oceania-New Zealand	88,100,000
Nonregional	1,434,000,000

Grant total 138,028,500,000

Source: Agency for International Development, U.S. State Department.

* Repaid in full with interest. Some other countries have paid some interest and principal (18½ billion) on some of their borrowings from the United States.

"Charity begins at home", and that always seems to mean America. Maybe it should have stayed here.

POW RESOLUTION

HON. ANDREW JACOBS, JR.

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, the following is the language of House Resolution 319, which I introduced on March 17, 1971. I was hoping it might catch the attention of the administration:

H. RES. 319

Whereas the President of the United States on March 4, 1971, stated that his policy is that: "as long as there are American POW's in North Vietnam we will have to maintain a residual force in South Vietnam. That is the least we can negotiate for."

Whereas Madam Nguyen Thi Binh, chief delegate of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam stated on September 17, 1970, that the policy of her government is "In case the United States Government declares it will withdraw from South Vietnam all its troops and those of the other foreign countries in the United States camp, and the parties will engage at once in discussion on:

"the question of ensuring safety for the total withdrawal from South Vietnam of United States troops and those of the other foreign countries in the United States camp.

"the question of releasing captured military men."

Resolved, That the United States shall forthwith propose at the Paris peace talks that in return for the return of all American prisoners held in Indochina, the United States shall withdraw all its Armed Forces from Vietnam within sixty days following the signing of the agreement: *Provided*, That the agreement shall contain guarantee by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of safe conduct out of Vietnam for all American prisoners and all American Armed Forces simultaneously.

THEODORE FRED KUPER, A GREAT JEFFERSON SCHOLAR, IS HONORED

HON. CHET HOLIFIELD

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, it is my great pleasure to announce that Theodore Fred Kuper, a resident of Whittier, Calif., was honored by the Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation for his 48 years of devotion to the memory and the ideals of Thomas Jefferson. During his first 12 years on the Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation, from 1923, to 1935, Kuper served as national director, planning and conducting the nationwide educational and fund raising campaign that saved the home and burial place of the author of the Declaration of Independence and established his beloved Monticello as a self-supporting patriotic shrine. During the years since 1935, Kuper continued his research, writing, and publishing widely circulated to the American people, school children especially, all without any profit to himself.

Kuper's first little book, "Thomas Jefferson the Giant," with an introduction by the late Claude G. Bowers, sold over 250,000 copies from 1925 to 1968 for the benefit of Monticello.

Then in 1968 with Monticello fully paid for and with the approaching bicentennial of the Declaration of Independence, Kuper felt that today's children and adults needed a reminder of their American heritage. So, to help even in a small way, he decided to produce his present booklet, using for its title "Thomas Jefferson Still Lives," the dying words of John Adams, the champion of the Declaration.

Kuper explains that he was encouraged by Kenney E. Williamson and his Jefferson Birthday Committee of Peoria, Ill., where financial institutions in the downtown area of Jefferson Avenue corner Liberty Street, have contributed funds each year since 1962 to celebrate Jefferson's birthday with a civic luncheon and the presentation of a copy of Kuper's booklet on Jefferson to every member of every senior class in every high school in Peoria.

Irving Dillard, former editor of the editorial page of the St. Louis Post Dispatch and now at Princeton University as Ferris professor of journalism and senior fellow in the Council of the Hu-

manities, contributed the introduction to the new booklet as the late American Ambassador, journalist, and biographer, Claude G. Bowers, had done for the first book by Kuper.

The Arthur Price Foundation, a New York nonprofit corporation which has gathered a definitive collection of printed matter pertaining to our late President Kennedy for presentation to an outstanding library or university, undertook to be the publisher. Even the Atlee Printing Co. of New York, which had printed Kuper's first book, offered to assume part of the cost of the designing and first printing.

When asked to explain why he never takes any royalties for his Jefferson writings, Kuper says:

My family learned the hard way to appreciate the American heritage. I was born in Moscow, Russia. When I was about three years old, I witnessed the tyranny of the Czar's soldiers, surrounding our home and my father's business next door to examine all our passports, including those of our household and our factory workers. Then in October 1891, at age 5, I was one of the many thousands who emigrated to America because of Russian religious persecution. As the ship sailed up New York Harbor, my mother took my older sister, brother and me up on deck, pointed to the Statue of Liberty and explained the blessings the United States had in store for us. Father lost practically all he had in the business and our big home in Moscow, so we moved into a basement apartment in New York's lower East Side. My father got a job in Newark, New Jersey, at \$7 a week. My mother ran a soda water stand outside a corner beer saloon.

Kuper added:

Fortunately, for us immigrant kids, the Educational Alliance on East Broadway in New York's lower East Side provided special classes, one of which I attended for a few months until I learned enough English to enter public school. No one dared to dream then that one day I would assist the President of the United States in the White House at the organization meeting of the commission created by Act of Congress to celebrate the 150th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, or that I should have the privilege of being one of the working founders of Monticello.

Kuper continued:

On East Broadway corner Jefferson Street in New York, I started my education at the Educational Alliance. Eighty years later, my wife and I live on East Broadway in Whittier, California, and I am writing and lecturing about Jefferson and our American heritage! My little books and my lectures are only a tiny payment on account of the great debt I owe my country.

Gilbert Chinard, author of "Thomas Jefferson, the Apostle of Americanism", writes:

This little book, "Thomas Jefferson Still Lives," has an extraordinary value and impact for young minds that do not yet know Jefferson. I am showing it eagerly to my friends and all of them want copies.

Writes Richard B. Morris, author of "The American Revolution Reconstructed" and editor "Encyclopedia of American History":

Mr. Kuper's little book should be in the hands of every school child in the land.

The little book of 32 pages is handsomely illustrated with a chart headed "Thomas Jefferson, the Architect of our

American Heritage" printed on the two center pages, a gold medalion of Jefferson embossed on the front cover and the following as "Jefferson's Advice to Youth," printed on the back cover:

Adore God.
Reverence and cherish your parents.
Love your neighbor as yourself,
Love your neighbor as yourself, and your country more than yourself.
Be just. Be true.

At the 48th annual meeting meeting of the Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation, resolutions were adopted honoring Kuper. A copy of those resolutions, signed by Charles Barham, Jr., president of the foundation, was presented to Kuper at the Jefferson Birthday Dinner held in Jefferson's beloved home, Monticello, on April 12, in Jefferson's dining room and at Jefferson's dining table, with only candle light. Mr. and Mrs. Kuper, their daughter Mrs. Terry Kirker, and their granddaughter Janet Kirker, age 12, all from Whittier, Calif., were guests of the Jefferson Foundation.

The text of the resolutions, is as follows:

THOMAS JEFFERSON MEMORIAL FOUNDATION

Whereas, Theodore Fred Kuper prepared and filed in April, 1923, the Certificate of Incorporation of the Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation, which he subsequently served until 1936 as National Director, conducting with selfless dedication its successful nation-wide educational and fund raising campaigns, establishing Monticello as an independent patriotic shrine; and whereas he has continued during the succeeding thirty-five years to serve the memory of Thomas Jefferson in essays and books widely circulated without profit to himself to the American public;

Be it resolved by the Board of Directors on this 228th anniversary of the birth of Thomas Jefferson, the 48th anniversary of our happy association with Theodore Fred Kuper, that we express to him our great appreciation of his devoted services to the Foundation and of his fidelity through these many years to the noble aims to which it is dedicated;

Be it resolved further, that we extend to him our best wishes upon his approaching 85th birthday and our deep pleasure in the prospect of continued association with him as a cherished friend.

WHAT TENNESSEE WOULD GAIN

HON. JOHN J. DUNCAN

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Speaker, revenue sharing is an important issue at this time, of course, with our Committee on Ways and Means conducting hearings people throughout the country are showing greater interest.

I would like to share an editorial from the Knoxville, Tenn., Journal of May 31, 1971:

WHAT TENNESSEE WOULD GAIN

In Congress President Nixon faces an expanded brand of the obstructionism that has plagued Gov. Winfield Dunn in regard to virtually every proposed program.

In both cases the automatic opposition is definitely partisan in nature and often lacking in logic. In both cases the Democrats in

control of the legislative process have chosen to put forth their own proposals—meaning that they recognize the problem but choose to disagree on the method of solution.

One example of this can be found in proposed federal solutions to the problems of state and local governments which are financial in nature and relate, more often than not, to the ever expanding welfare burden.

The President has proposed two primary programs in this area: welfare reform and revenue sharing.

Under the latter proposal Tennessee would receive more than \$80 million during the first year of revenue sharing, to be divided among local governments for use in areas of need.

One phase of the welfare reform proposal has been approved by the House Ways and Means Committee, with backing by the President. Passage by the full House and the Senate, however, appears quite doubtful, due simply to the obstructionism prevailing in the two bodies.

This particular phase of the welfare reform proposal would save \$1.6 billion for the states in fiscal 1973 by removing some of their present burdens. Tennessee would receive \$31 million to \$38 million in "relief." This would mean that Tennessee would have this amount of money to put into other programs.

Only an obstructionist Congress stands in the way.

ADMINISTRATION'S NUCLEAR POWER PLAN OVERS IMPLIED

HON. WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY

OF MAINE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. HATHAWAY. Mr. Speaker, earlier this month the Nixon administration sent a message to Congress calling for \$2 billion to hasten development of an atomic power reactor that breeds its own fuel. Last week, the Atomic Energy Commission proposed radiation standards for nuclear powerplants said to be several times more strict than those recommended by even the most severe nuclear power critics. The AEC is to be congratulated for its courageous proposal, for the proposal seems to comprise an admission on the part of the Commission of its past overpromotion of nuclear energy and its present regret over having participated in this misleading campaign. The unfortunate results of AEC's overpromotion are detailed in a letter I received recently from the National Committee To Stop Environmental Pollution, and in an article authored by Robert Gillette which appears in a recent issue of Science magazine. Both the letter and the article appear at the conclusion of my remarks. But let me first address another effect of the AEC's announcement; that of pointing up the oversimplification of the earlier administration message.

What the administration has told us, in effect, is that nuclear power is the answer to all the Nation's power needs. We have been told that it can produce electric energy cheaply and cleanly, and we have been asked to endorse its development to the virtual exclusion of all other power sources. The Atomic Energy Commission proposal, on the other hand, tells us that nuclear power sources are not safe, and that until their safety can

be guaranteed, their use will threaten large segments of the American population with deadly radiation. There are also strong indications that the present level of nuclear-power technology is insufficient to meet present and future power needs. The AEC is now reviewing nuclear-plant design problems which could cause delay in making five atomic plants operational, shut down the 21 plants now operating, and push back plans to get 51 more plants off the drawing boards. These plants account for more than 42,000,000 kilowatts of planned power and delays would cause further power shortages all across the Nation.

The upshot of all this is that, contrary to what the administration has suggested, the time has not come to put all our power eggs in one nuclear basket. There is a very great role for nuclear power in the future and the Government should invest sizable funds in its development. But that future day when nuclear-plant design is perfected and nuclear-plant safety assured may be 10 to 20 years away. For the present, we must continue to rely on what we know can do the job, and this includes inland hydroelectric power sources, such as the proposed Dickey-Lincoln project in northern Maine, and possibly even coastal hydro facilities, such as that once proposed to harness the huge tides which surge and recede through Maine's Passamaquoddy and Cobscook Bays.

The National Committee To Stop Environmental Pollution letter and Science magazine article follow:

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STOP ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION Washington, D.C., June 3, 1971.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN HATHAWAY: The United States is about to experience the consequences of the overpromotion of nuclear power by the Atomic Energy Commission. In spite of the warning sounded by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in April 1969—that utilities should not depend on this new technology for essential power requirements, this summer large experimental reactors will be called on to perform reliably.

The squeeze is on. More plants are needed—in a hurry. Impatient with long construction delays, utilities are pressuring the AEC and the Joint Committee to speed the licensing process, which appears to have virtually broken down.

At the same time, we have become aware of grave deficiencies in reactor research and development. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has called attention to the failure to do adequate studies on the safety of large reactors. Now about 15 of these huge nuclear furnaces are nearing completion. Many of them are close to populated areas because AEC erroneously assumed that the all-important safety systems would function as designed.

To accommodate utilities who wanted nukes sited close to load centers, the AEC gave "credits" for these "engineered safeguards," reducing the distance which should separate large reactors from major population centers according to siting guidelines. The Emergency Core Cooling System and the Spray Removal System must come into operation immediately following an accident to forestall a meltdown. If they don't work a cloud of deadly radioactive fission products—far more intense than from any nuclear bomb—could move downwind killing thousands, injuring hundreds of thousands, requiring the evacuation of millions and causing damage in the billions of dollars.

These systems have never been functionally tested. No prototypes have been built. The Loss-of-Fluid Test facility in Idaho, which was to have been completed years ago, is not going to be ready to test these systems before 1975.

Late last year small-scale tests of simulated equipment showed the margin of performance for these safety systems was below that expected. They don't work. A senior task force has been named by the AEC to review this situation and the agency has asked Congress for more money for "accelerated research," bringing to \$38 million the amount sought for nuclear safety in FY 1972.

The AEC has also proposed an expanded \$100 million program to develop a sodium-cooled fast neutron reactor. This "breeder" is so hazardous it has been condemned by many scientists, but in New York State Governor Rockefeller is trying to ram a bill through the Legislature to allow "fast-breeders" to be started. Estimates for the first demonstration plant run up to \$800 million.

In the light of so many unresolved safety and economic questions, there is a need for full-scale Public Hearings on Nuclear Safety by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Sincerely,

LARRY BOGART.

NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY: A SKELETON AT THE FEAST?

(By Robert Gillette)

The nation's electrical utilities are engaged in a nuclear buying spree this year, apparently undeterred by a running controversy among industrial and government authorities over the adequacy of a crucial emergency safeguard system used on nearly every nuclear power plant.

Since January, power companies have ordered 13 new reactor units, in contrast with 14 during all last year and 7 in 1969. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) predicts that, if the utilities sustain their purchasing pace, then by 1980 nuclear power will be producing 150,000 megawatts of electricity or one-fifth the nation's demand.

Such enthusiasm, however, tends to obscure the fact that important technical issues of reactor safety—quite apart from those of thermal or radioactive pollution—still remain to be settled.

EMERGENCY COOLING

Currently the most controversial of these lingering safety issues concerns the adequacy of the emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) used on light water reactors. Since March, a newly created "senior task force" of four AEC executives has been evaluating recent research which suggests to some authorities that the backup cooling systems of these reactors might not perform satisfactorily. The research in question is said to be especially disquieting in regard to pressurized water reactors, although the task force has asked manufacturers for performance information on backup coolers for boiling-water reactors as well. All of the reactors aboard the Navy's nuclear-powered vessels are the pressurized water type, as are nine of the 22 civilian nuclear plants in operation as of the end of March.

The AEC task force was established to "provide overall management review of important safety issues," the commission chairman, Glenn T. Seaborg, has said. The group expects to finish its scrutiny of cooling systems sometime in June.

Until then, the issue's significance to public safety will remain difficult to judge, although some AEC officials are frankly skeptical that it has more than remote bearing on the public interest. Milton Shaw, AEC's director of reactor development and technology, scoffs that the issue of backup cooling performance has been exaggerated by "some people who have taken a little data

and made a big thing out of it." Shaw contends that "this is just part of a debate that has gone on for 2 or 3 years" concerning the development of more stringent design codes for reactor emergency cooling. He also suggests that talk among researchers who are worried that their reactor safety work may be phased out for lack of money might have helped inflate the importance to public safety of this "little data."

But the AEC's official responses to the cooling system "flap" may be the best measure of its significance. The agency has held up operating license hearings and one safety review for five big new power reactors until the task force finishes its work. (Harold Price, the AEC's director of regulation, declines to speculate as to how ten other reactors scheduled to begin operating this year, or the 22 now generating electricity, may be affected by the deliberations.) In addition, the AEC asked Congress this month for an extra \$2 million in fiscal 1972 for research on the safety of light water reactors. This would be above and beyond \$36 million requested for the entire safety program in 1972. A staff member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy describes this constellation of events as "not unheard of" but still "uncommon."

The issue of backup cooling performance bubbled up into public view early this month when the joint committee released a letter that Seaborg had written to Senator John O. Pastore (D-R.I.), vice chairman of the committee, on 27 April. In the letter, Seaborg said he anticipated reactor licensing delays while the new task force took a long, hard look at emergency cooling systems. The reasons for this scrutiny, as Seaborg explained them were that:

"The use of recently developed improved techniques for calculating fuel cladding temperatures following postulated loss-of-coolant accidents, and the results of recent preliminary safety research experiments, have indicated that the predicted margins of ECCS performance may not be as large as those predicted previously."

Emergency core cooling systems are intended to quench a reactor's extremely hot core in the unlikely event that it loses its normal bath of cooling water through a ruptured pipe, a broken weld, or a key valve opened in error. Deprived of cooling water, a reactor's core temperature would quickly rise to the melting point of fuel element metals. A scenario of an uncooled reactor's fate, composed several years ago by an AEC advisory group, depicts the 250-ton core of a large reactor as dripping and finally slumping into a molten pool at the bottom of the reactor vessels within an hour after the reactor has lost its coolant.

Experts saw that a loss of neutron-moderating water would prevent a nuclear "excursion" from occurring, but residual heat in the core—plus heat released by decaying fission products in the fuel and by violent chemical reaction between metal and remaining water—could still amount to 50 megawatts. This would be more than enough to allow the core to melt through the steel reactor vessel, and to carry it through tons of concrete beneath, within another hour or so. Beyond this point, nuclear engineers speak, half tongue-in-cheek, of the "Chinese Syndrome," a term derived from the presumption that the core would continue melting its way into the earth, in the general direction of Asia.

UNEXPECTED RESULTS

As a final result, steam explosions and gas pressure could breach the reactor containment building, scattering radioactive material. Or, as the scenario script delicately phrased it, there might be "subsequent deposition at undesirable locations" of fission-product material.

In the view of responsible nuclear scientists and engineers, emergency cooling sys-

tems now in use make such events highly improbable. Last year, however, a series of small-scale experiments which the AEC conducted at its National Reactor Testing Station near Arco, Idaho, indicated to some researchers that emergency cooling water might have unexpected difficulty in entering a reactor that had lost its normal cooling water. The experiments, which were performed in November and December, used a 9-inch mock-up of a reactor pressure vessel containing electrically heated "fuel" elements bathed in cooling water. In half a dozen tries, investigators found that when they allowed 30 to 100 percent of the tiny vessel's cooling water to escape—as it would in a "loss-of-coolant accident"—high steam pressures inside the vessel kept all but about 10 percent of "emergency" cooling water from entering. A brief description of the work which the AEC filed with the Joint Committee in March indicated that the high-pressure steam in the vessel blew the remainder of the "emergency" water through an outlet before it reached the "core."

The experiments were part of preliminary work leading up to research with the Loss of Fluid Test (LOFT) facility in Idaho, a \$35-million domelike structure in which the AEC will progressively starve a 55-megawatt reactor of cooling water and measure its behavior. The LOFT experiments, which are scheduled to begin in 1975, will provide the first test of an emergency core cooling system under actual operating conditions.

A second point of concern which Seaborg's letter touched upon involves new analytical evidence showing that temperatures of some of the long, thin fuel elements in reactor cores may go higher during loss of coolant than previously believed. This is a matter of concern because the higher a fuel element's temperature rises, the more likely it is to fracture, spilling intensely radioactive fission products into the reactor vessel. Moreover, the higher temperature of the fuel rods, which are typically clad in zirconium alloy, would intensify a chemical reaction between the metal and quenching water. This would release hydrogen, generate still more heat, and thus place an even heavier demand on the emergency cooling system.

WHEN A CORE RUNS DRY

A power reactor's core typically consists of a bundle of thin metal tubes, or fuel elements, containing uranium dioxide. The tubes are suspended vertically inside a thick steel vessel as tall (inside) as 72 feet, with a diameter of as much as 21 feet. Heat generated by a controlled fission reaction among the fuel elements is removed by circulating ordinary water around and between the elements. Normal operating temperature of the elements is about 315° C, but in the absence of cooling water the temperature would rise to the melting point of zirconium (1800° C) in 1 minute or less. Water-metal reactions are said to become "significant" at about 1100° C.

Shaw insists these findings have little direct bearing on the safety of nuclear reactors. While some fuel elements may be hotter than would be expected during loss of coolant, he says that others may be cooler, leaving no net effect on safety. As for the Idaho experiments, he points out that their objective was to help refine mathematical models to be used for predicting the course of LOFT experiments, and not to evaluate systems used on real reactors. The 9-inch vessel was not meant to fully simulate a reactor, he said in an interview. "You can't use that phraseology. It's just not in that ball game."

SAFETY DATA LACKING

Nevertheless, Seaborg and a delegation of AEC executives appeared before the Joint Committee in supplemental authorization hearings on 13 May to request, among other things, \$2 million more for next year to

"help resolve significant technical issues" of water reactor safety. George M. Kavanagh, the assistant general manager for reactors, explained in part that, "Heavy reliance has been placed on engineering safety features such as the ECCS, where the technology is complex. . . . Some of the information needed to confirm convincingly the adequacy of such systems, which are intended to arrest the course of hypothetical large primary system failures is not yet available."

Kavanagh told the committee that limited AEC budgets and a certain reluctance on the part of industry to support more research have prevented gathering all the technical information necessary to fully confirm the adequacy of reactor safeguards.

The committee had already been briefed on the apparent import of the Idaho experiments and the activities of AEC's senior task force, so there was understandably little discussion of such matters in the day-long hearing. Kavanagh, however, did mention that "limited experiments" supported by the AEC at its Idaho test site "have not resolved some of the areas of major uncertainty raised by differences among the analyses [furnished by reactor manufacturers] particularly with regard to their evaluation of the operating effectiveness of emergency core cooling."

His remark prompted Senator Howard H. Baker (R-Tenn.) to ask what "differences" he was talking about. This question led to the following interchange:

Kavanagh: ". . . [The experiments] have had results which have not been confirmatory of what the people doing those experiments thought might happen. Now, they are not conclusive. . . ."

Baker: ". . . meaning that it was worse than you thought?"

Kavanagh: "Yes, worse. If it were better we might not have been allowed to come up here asking for money. But they [the results] are not conclusive. In other words, the experiment was done on something far from a reactor. . . . It is difficult to draw conclusions from those experiments. . . . What we want to do are more of those experiments."

Little else was said during the May hearing, but the subject is sure to come up again in nuclear reactor safety hearings, which the Joint Committee expects to hold late in June. "We couldn't avoid the issue if we wanted to," a committee staff member said.

It remains to be seen whether an obscure research project in a desolate corner of Idaho has indeed uncovered a flaw in nuclear reactor safeguards, or whether it has merely triggered a troublesome false alarm. In either instance, the current controversy has at least served to illuminate a chronic complaint from the AEC's division of reactor development that its safety research program is being shortchanged. That complaint will be discussed in another article.

JUDD REJECTS APPEASEMENT OF CHINA

REMARKS OF HON. PHILIP M. CRANE

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, at this time when our policy with regard to Communist China is experiencing a reappraisal in Washington it is important that we listen to the words of one of our foremost China experts.

Dr. Walter Judd, for many years a Representative from Minnesota and a leading member of the House Foreign

Affairs Committee, has served as a medical missionary in China and is fluent in the languages of China. His 10 years of residence in China and his frequent trips to Asia make his a voice to be heard in the current debate.

It is Dr. Judd's view that—

To admit Communist China to the United Nations now would be the most cynical and dishonorable act in American history and would turn out to be the most disastrous.

Dr. Judd points out that far from being resigned to communism, the Chinese people maintain their culture, their civilization, and their desire to be free. He said:

Just a few weeks ago 200 escaped within ten days. Mao taught them to swim and that's what they're doing.

The projected policy of reconciliation with Communist China is viewed by Dr. Judd, who now heads the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations, as one of "appeasement of a lawless element," the hopelessness of which we should understand from our experience at the Paris peace talks.

Recently Dr. Judd was interviewed by Solveig Eggerz. Miss Eggerz, an able reporter who is on the staff of the Washington Daily News and contributes to a variety of newspapers and magazines, presents a report of this interview in the June 12, 1971, issue of Human Events.

Dr. Judd's words are so important that I want to share them with my colleagues, and place this article in the RECORD at this point:

WALTER JUDD ON NIXON'S RED CHINA POLICY:
"APPEASEMENT OF A LAWLESS ELEMENT"
(By Solveig Eggerz)

While President Nixon basks in the afterglow of his ping-pong diplomacy and plans rapprochement to Communist China after 22 years of non-recognition, there's at least one veteran observer of communism who views these events with great skepticism.

The dissenting voice is that of Dr. Walter Judd, a former Republican congressman, a medical doctor and a medical missionary to China for ten years.

"To admit Communist China to the United Nations now would be the most cynical and dishonorable act in American history and would turn out to be the most disastrous," says Judd, who chairs the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

While the media expound now almost daily on how "happy" the Mainland Chinese are, how they've "accepted" the Communist regime as the benefactor of "the greatest revolution the world has ever known," Judd—like a man shouting in a vacuum, says, "it's just not true. The people are obviously unhappy."

Notes Judd, "Whenever the Chinese people bend to say they've accepted Communism. The Oriental saying goes 'the wise man bends' but the oak which refuses to bend is pulled up by the roots."

As proof of the opposition to the regime, Judd cites the steady flow of escapees willing to swim the six miles to get away from the mainland.

"They're escaping from communism wherever they can," he says. "Just a few weeks ago 200 escaped within ten days. Mao taught them to swim and that's what they're doing. The weather got warm early this year so they began swimming earlier."

He speaks of one escape story as "the best use for ping pong I've yet heard of." Two

young men, says Judd, left the mainland, one with an inner tube and the other with a plastic bag full of ping-pong balls, which he used as a buoy to get across the channel.

Judd views Nixon's Red China policy as one of "appeasement of a lawless element," the hopelessness of which we should understand from our experience at the Paris Peace Talks.

"Nixon's been sold the line that China's hostile because we've isolated her," says Judd. "Whereas the fact is that we had to isolate them because they were hostile and they're hostile because they're Communist bent on world communization."

Judd attributes Nixon's policies largely to "a lot of the old pros in the State Department whom he never cleaned out."

"When they've run out of one argument they use another." "Now the line is 'be nice to Communist China, make concessions and they will modify.' Johnson followed this policy and stopped bombing the North and now we've been negotiating for three years with Viet Nam without one bit of progress."

If appeasement doesn't work and relations don't improve, says Judd, Nixon "wants to be able to say, 'we tried our level best,' which to me is no argument at all."

Dourly he says, "When you know ahead of time for certain there isn't going to be any concession on their part, then we have no business weakening our position and that of our allies in the hope that the most unlikely of all probabilities in the world is going to occur."

The Peking regime looks more stable from the outside than it did during the Cultural Revolution, but Judd doesn't believe it's "basically" more stable inside.

"They've purged even their allies and gotten a more united hierarchy, but it's been at the price of accepting military dominance. Mao has always said the party must control the gun and the gun must never control the party, but he had to accept the military so that they appear superficially more stable."

The potential unrest, says Judd, is due to the fact that "the military never likes, in any country, to be dominated by a bunch of theoreticians who spend their time or Mao Tse Tung's little Red Book without any attention to the art and science of warfare."

Judd feels that those here who insist that once Peking has been recognized and admitted to the United Nations the United States will stand by Taiwan and prevent her fall are "kidding themselves and the people."

"Taiwan can't survive under those conditions," says Judd, "and then those people will come running up and say, 'Well, we were going to stand by Taiwan but the Taiwanese didn't stand by themselves.'"

The Orientals, says Judd, are fatalists and therefore will say to themselves, "If the big countries like the United States can't stand up, how can we small countries do it?"

He predicts that Taiwan will "go back to Peking" before it accepts being placed under the United Nations Trusteeship Council as some advocates of the Albanian Resolution have suggested be done to protect the Taiwanese.

"That would be the most insulting thing of all," he says. "Why don't they put Peking under the Trusteeship Council, since she's the one in violation of the [UN] Charter? Nobody can say that the Republic of China on Taiwan has violated any principles of the Charter."

Judd says there are at least three reasons Chou chooses to smile at this particular time and invites us for ping-pong:

"First of all," says Judd, "he invites in a team so that they can beat us. And don't underestimate the thrill that goes through hundreds of millions of non-Caucasian hearts when they see the white man under whom they've suffered defeated. Their second team defeated our first."

Secondly, he notes "they want to whet the appetite of the commercial forces in our country. I've been told that the greatest pressure on the President came from commercial interests. They want to get into Peking, Shanghai and Canton, but nobody seems to ask what the Chinese regime is going to use for payment. They've got endless amounts of opium, maybe they can pay with opium."

"You know what Lenin said, 'We can always count on the cupidity of the capitalists.' Offer them trade, they say, but as soon as they get their political objectives trade goes down."

"In 1933," Judd adds, "they took Roosevelt down this road. We recognized the Soviet Union and our trade went down. We never had as much trade with the Soviet Union a single year after we recognized them as we had the five years before."

The third reason behind Chou's sudden friendliness and his "real" objective, says Judd, "is to set the American people against their own government."

"They're convinced that the American people are sick and tired and, just given a little hope, will coerce the Administration into a deal. They intend, by these means, to win in America the war for Asia that they can't win out there. Mao Tse-tung's operation right now is more for Viet Nam than it is for China."

Judd would rather not speculate on whether Taiwan would leave the United Nations were Peking to be admitted.

"When I call in a patient," he says. "I don't say to him 'you'll have to make up your mind what undertaker I'm to send your body to if I fail.' No, I don't intend to speculate on that because I don't intend to send the body to an undertaker."

Judd says the Chinese have a "much greater dedication to principle than we have" and "to bring Taiwan under the mainland would be one of the most indefensible, most cruel acts of history."

About the Taiwanese he says, "They think it's no disgrace to be defeated but it's a disgrace to default on your principles."

IMPORTANCE OF RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES

HON. JOHN C. CULVER

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 7, 1971

Mr. CULVER. Mr. Speaker, it is a great pleasure for me to have this opportunity to discuss the importance of rural electric cooperatives. I wish to commend the gentleman from Texas (Mr. PRICKLE), and the gentleman from Montana (Mr. MELCHER), for organizing this special program to focus attention on the problems our rural electric cooperatives are facing, their prospects for the future, and the role of Congress in that future.

An adequate, reliable, and low-cost source of electricity is essential for rural development. Rural electric systems have met the challenge so far. They understand the importance of area coverage—even the most remote rural areas must be provided with a dependable source of electricity. And in order for the coverage to be maintained, electricity must be reliably provided in the quantity demanded and when it is required.

Thirty-five years ago, when the Rural Electrification Administration was first

created, less than 15 percent of the farms in Iowa were receiving electrical service. Today, as a result of the growth of rural electric systems, over 99 percent of Iowa's farms are electrified. Almost 544,000 people are now being served. Over 60,193 miles of line have been erected to extend electric service to the most remote regions of the State and 57 electric system borrowers hold a total plant investment of over \$241 million with 1,287 employees throughout the State. Moreover, it is important to note that over \$2 million in taxes are being paid by the systems to the State each year. Iowa's rural electrification program is among the largest in the Nation and we rank third among the States in the number of borrowers. For the Nation as a whole, during the 1960's, nearly 4,100 commercial, industrial, and community facility projects were assisted by REA borrowers with the result that an estimated 186,000 jobs were directly created in rural America in addition to 120,000 more jobs which were created indirectly by these projects.

Certainly that is a record about which we can be justifiably proud. But rather than looking back to past accomplishments, we must look forward to the enormous challenges which lie ahead; impressive as this record is, we must focus on the tasks remaining.

It has been estimated that rural electric cooperatives will need about 67 million feet of underground cable in calendar year 1973—almost twice the amount purchased just 2 years ago. In addition, it has been calculated that 776,000 new poles and replacements for another 312,000 poles will be needed to supply new consumers which are increasing at a rate of between 150,000 and 225,000 each year.

Furthermore, power demands in general are increasing at an awesome rate. The Rural Electric Association has calculated that average monthly consumption per residential customer almost doubled between 1960 and 1970. To these new demands for the future must be added the backlog of unfunded loans which have been accumulating at a seriously increasing rate. This backlog has been estimated at almost \$300 million in December of 1970 by the NRECA with an increase to \$435 expected by the beginning of fiscal year 1972.

According to the NRECA's annual loan fund survey for 1972, Iowa finished 1970 with a loan backlog of more than \$3.8 million. That same survey indicated that Iowa rural electric intended to submit, during the first 6 months of calendar 1971, loan requests of more than \$3.1 million. And in the 12 months beginning in July of this year, Iowa co-ops have indicated they will submit additional loan requests of more than \$11.5 million.

Moreover, the loans that are being made too often are funded far below the request made. In my own State of Iowa for example, one co-op requested \$380,000 but received only half that amount—\$190,000; another even less than half—\$292,000 compared to a request for \$550,000; and still another only \$286,000 for a request totaling \$755,000. The result is simply false economy. While needed services are denied, the ultimate cost of providing them increases with the delay.

Nevertheless, despite the accumulating

backlog and increasing new demand, appropriations to handle these needs have remained relatively stagnant in recent years at about \$350 million annually. This funding inadequacy was seriously compounded by the administration freezing \$15 million of last years funds.

Even now that the administration has responded to substantial pressure to release those frozen funds—to allow the loan program for fiscal year 1971 to be funded at the full \$360 million authorized by Congress—this level of funding falls far short of the \$555 million proposed to fund fully expected needs for fiscal 1972—\$530 for anticipated applications and \$25 million to begin reducing the backlog projected to reach \$435 million by July 1.

Those of us from States such as Iowa, and increasingly urban dwellers as well, have long realized the importance of developing our rural areas—to keep our young men and women with their talents, their energies, and their education in these areas. Moreover, in our interdependent society and economy, there can be no national progress if one section of the country or segment of the population is left behind. As we look for answers to the problems of our cities, we must also find a way to slow the movement of people to them, for already 70 percent of our people are jammed into just 1 percent of our land and migration from the countryside continues at a rate of more than half a million a year.

To reverse this trend, in the best interests of rural and urban America alike, rural America must be developed as an attractive alternative to urban living. And it should go without saying that electrical service to those areas is one of the bare minimums if we are to accomplish that end.

RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE FINANCIAL WOES

HON. WILLIAM R. ANDERSON

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 7, 1971

Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I am deeply grateful to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. PICKLE) and the gentleman from Montana (Mr. MELCHER) for taking the time to discuss the plight of the local rural electric cooperatives in special orders.

For 7 years, the REA program for making loans to local cooperatives has been held down to an authorization of \$350 million per year despite the fact that the co-ops are handling the increase load of 150,000 rural members per year, and operating on facilities which were the subject of loans 20 to 25 years ago.

Many of the small cooperatives in rural and agricultural areas are operating at a reserve funding level of as low as 2 percent, although a 15-percent level was suggested by REA in a study made several years ago. In the event of a natural disaster, an earthquake or severe storm, the financial strain could conceivably push these small co-ops over the brink into bankruptcy.

And again this year, we find that the fiscal 1972 budget contains a figure for loan purposes which is substantially below the needs of the Nation's utility users, who will look to REA to discriminate and select only a small portion of loan requests for approval out of a total of \$800 million requested.

Two years ago, faced with the increasing loan demands and low REA funding, a number of cooperatives banded together to form an independent credit institution, the National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance Corp., to provide financing to members. At present, about 80 percent of the Nation's rural electric cooperatives are members of this self-help project; yet it cannot continue to meet the daily and long-term needs of power users without a much more substantial funding program from REA.

Until a union of the cooperatives, such as the CFC effort, can put the utilities on solid financial footing, with access to reasonably priced capital, the Government, through REA, must continue to offset the increasing costs of maintenance of old equipment and new construction needed by electric utilities in rural America.

At the present level of authorization, the REA loan program cannot continue to be a good banker for these small and fledgling rural enterprises. It is imperative that Congress, in determining its funding priorities, give close scrutiny to the needs of local utilities for access to capital, and that it appropriate a much larger sum to this end than that which is proposed in the budget. In this day when aid to foreign governments is at an alltime high, it is difficult to understand why our rural residents from our own country should have to come hat in hand to an administration which will not recognize the need for a growing energy crisis within our own borders.

REMARKS OF DEAN OF SCHOOL OF LAW OF VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY ON THE OCCASION OF THE INVESTITURE CEREMONIES OF THE GRADUATING CLASS OF 1971

HON. JOE L. EVINS

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, Dean John Wade, of the School of Law of Vanderbilt University, made some very interesting remarks on the occasion of the investiture ceremony of the graduating class of May 30, 1971.

He said:

To function effectively, law requires civility. It can impose and enforce order, but it cannot insure or create civility or amiability.

He pointed out that—

Advocacy and the adversary system require enthusiasm and zeal. They do not require or justify invective . . . nastiness or disruption of courtroom procedures.

Because of the importance of these remarks and their timeliness it gives me great pleasure to insert his remarks in the Record:

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW: REMARK OF THE DEAN AT THE INVESTITURE CEREMONY FOR THE GRADUATING CLASS OF 1971

You have surely heard the metaphor: Law is the cement which holds civilization together. And the statement: Law is the technique of peace—providing the means for adjusting of disputes without violence. But even in a law-regulated society like ours, law sometimes breaks down and violence occurs. At Kent State, for example, the Guard "fired into the crowd" and four students were killed. This act was preceded by other violent acts. All of them went back to a polarization of viewpoints produced by incivility between conflicting groups.

To function effectively, law requires civility. It can impose and enforce order, but it cannot insure or create civility or amiability. What is civility? Is it mere etiquette or outward politeness? If it were confined to that, it would still be vital. The suggestion has been made that the etiquette of diplomacy—its somewhat artificial politeness—has "avoided more wars than all the generals ever won."

But civility is more, for it enables us to carry on rational discussion, reach understandings and make balanced decisions. True civility involves respect for the other party—respect for the individual, his dignity, his right to his own opinion (even his privilege to be wrong) and a sincere desire to understand his position. Civility also involves respect for one's self—as a being possessing dignity and relying upon rational mental processes, rather than self-denigrating invective. The man who will not listen to a view which disagrees with his own, or allow it to be presented to others, bespeaks a lack of confidence in himself and his position. It is not without significance that we use the word civil, including its meaning of politeness and considerateness, and then speak of becoming civilized and of civilization.

There is abroad today a pervasive sense of frustration which we all feel and which we are inclined to vent on somebody else. Violence is not uncommon. Incivility is rife. The rhetoric is vituperative. Rather than conferences, we seek confrontations. "Non-negotiable demands" are promulgated. The attitude often is, I don't agree with you but I insist that you agree with me, and there is no point in discussing it. Are we becoming less civilized? Or is this a temporary period of unusual growth in which new ideas must force their way in because the "establishment" is not ready to listen to them? The implications are two-fold: (1) If manners are utilized simply as a means of preserving the status quo, they are doomed to failure and disruption. The "ins" must listen to the new ideas understandingly and assess them objectively. (2) The "outs" must consider carefully how to present their ideas—whether as demands to be rammed down the throat of their adversaries, or as rational propositions to be thoughtfully considered.

The generation gap seems wider now than we have known it to be. Vituperation and recrimination, with closed minds on both sides, seem almost to be expected. Yet, as a distinguished educator suggests, the gap is not dangerous, so long as there are bridges across it so that the generations may visit each other occasionally.

"There would be something wrong, something signifying stagnation and despair, if the young always agreed with us, and something wrong, signifying irresponsibility and abdication, if we always agreed with them. We can agree to disagree on many issues. But if we can talk or even shout across the gap, the process of orderly change will be served. It's when we start 'shooting into the crowd' that we have failed."

What does all of this mean for you as graduates in the Class of 1971? It affects you, first, in your daily life. You are a part of the

younger generation, starting today to become a part of the establishment. You are going out as citizens who will surely take a position of leadership in your communities. It affects you, second, in your profession. Consider now the role which civility plays in the practice of law.

As a law student, you have normally been free to reach your own decisions as to the proper resolution of a legal issue—you have learned to use your reasoning powers, and your trained instincts for justice and your knowledge of human nature and human endeavors to select the side of the issue to espouse. It will be different, henceforth, for most of you. You will be representing a client. You will be an advocate. You will be participating in the adversary system. You are aware of all this, of course. But knowing of it is not experiencing it. Do not allow the change to stampede you.

Advocacy and the adversary system require enthusiasm and zeal. They do not require—or justify—invective, or biting sarcasm, or nastiness or disruption of courtroom procedures and other manners. The lawyer of mean disposition soon alienates the judges and his fellow members of the bar, and comes to be a loner. His brow-beating tactics frequently alienate the jury, too, and lose his case. Sometimes these tactics and the use of invective may impress his client; but the principal advantage of this is to make it easier to explain why they lost the case."

Listen to the Chief Justice of the United States, speaking less than a fortnight ago:

"[T]he most brilliant legal intellect we can train is a grave menace to the administration of justice in a free and open society if he has not learned how to act and how to behave. This is so because in a free democratic society the most crucial restraints are not those imposed by the constitutions and statutes, but the restraints free men and women impose on themselves. Nowhere is this more crucial than in the administration of justice."

He would seek to "locate responsibility for regulating what is inherently a contentious profession and then place rigorous powers of discipline wherever we place the responsibility." I need not go as far on this occasion. What I am doing is counselling with you, and telling you that your alma mater expects you to be courteous and civil in your professional career.

Another great chief justice, with a name appropriate for this occasion—that of Vanderbilt—epitomized what I have in mind: "All advocacy involves conflict and calls for the will to win. But the conflicts of advocacy proceed under very definite rules, the first of which is that the contestants must be gentlemen. They must have character. This means that they have certain standards of conduct, of manners, and of expression that are so habitually theirs that they do not have to stop in an emergency to argue with themselves as to whether or not they should conform to them. They are free to concentrate on the task at hand."

If civility is required in the courtroom, even to the point of being enforced by disciplinary action, still more is it necessary in the other activities of the lawyer. You see, lawyers do not deal with legal problems so much as they deal with human problems in a legal context. The basic principle in human relations is mutual respect. This respect requires civility and tact. Tact is the ability to respect others even while disagreeing with them, and to convey that respect. Let me quote for you one more statement, this time from a man with the more prosaic name of Smith:

"[M]any of our severest battles are with our own clients; anger and vengeance have to be extirpated from their minds, and a sense of justice instilled. We have to teach them the limits of law; that, for example, no statute or code can rekindle the flame of love

that has been extinguished between a husband and wife. We learn that all opposing parties are not rogues and liars; that there is much on their side—sometimes too much. We learn that opposing counsel are not only able and alert, but also in most cases, with only tragic exceptions, prove to be honorable gentlemen. We learn that misunderstanding rather than greed or spite, is at the root of many quarrels."

As you go forth into the honorable practice of the law, I urge you to be better citizens and better lawyers by making civility instinctive with you. And I offer you the Rule of Z's: Be zealous for your cause; do not become a zealot for it.

ADMINISTRATION IGNORES PROPOSAL TO HELP UNEMPLOYED VIETNAM VETERANS

HON. OLIN E. TEAGUE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, it has been quite evident for some time that returning Vietnam era veterans were encountering problems of major proportions in obtaining jobs after discharge from military service. According to recent reports, veterans are being released at the rate of 1.1 million each year and about 370,000 are now unemployed. The rate of unemployment among these veterans is almost 11 percent whereas the national unemployment rate approximates about 7 percent. Congress is presently in the final stages of enacting legislation to help relieve this problem on a national basis and the pending legislation contains a provision for veterans preference.

Mr. Speaker, in early April of this year I wrote to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs recommending that one positive step be taken to make a major breakthrough in helping relieve the problem of jobless veterans. I have not even had the courtesy of an acknowledgment of my letter to Director Schultz, and while an acknowledgement of my communication was received from the Veterans' Administration, no substantive reply has been forthcoming from that agency.

Mr. Speaker, in my communication to these administration officials I pointed out steps which could be taken which would produce positive and immediate results. The on-job training program for veterans functions primarily with small employers with 10 employees or less in smaller towns and cities throughout the country. It is a program that especially fits the small employer. It gives the small employers some assistance during the early training phase when an employee is not productive.

Mr. Speaker, I am convinced that this program is not being sufficiently exploited because of the undue budgetary restrictions imposed on certain aspects of the program by the Office of Management and Budget. Approval of job training is accomplished by the State approving agencies of the various States on a

contract basis with the Veterans' Administration. The fiscal 1972 budget recommends \$7 million for this activity. Under existing contracts the State approving agencies are funded only for approvals where a veteran has been employed. They are not permitted to make advance approval so that an employer could establish his training program before seeking to recruit veterans. State approving agencies are not provided funds for any promotional or development programs.

Mr. Speaker, the personnel of these State agencies have vast experience in developing job training programs. They travel through their respective States making daily contacts with employers and logically they are the best equipped groups to promote the job training programs and obtain positive results at minimum expense.

Mr. Speaker, in early April I requested the administration to add \$1.5 million to the VA budget to permit expanded service of the State approving agencies as outlined above. Much valuable time has already been lost. The administration's answer to my request has been virtual silence. If the administration is truly interested in making some meaningful and simple effort to launch a new "intensive effort" to find jobs or provide training for returning Vietnam veterans as reported today in the news media, I suggest that they act on the suggestion I made in April which they have so far chosen to ignore.

PROUD TO BE AN AMERICAN

HON. CLARENCE J. BROWN

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, young Americans today are conscious of their great heritage and realize that although this country faces many problems, America is still a nation of which they can be proud.

This thought was pointed out recently by students of the Saville Elementary School, Madriver Township, Montgomery County, in the Seventh Ohio District. Mrs. Jeannette Freed, principal of Saville Elementary School, sent me four outstanding essays written by 4th, 5th and 6th grade students entitled "Why I Am Proud to be an American." I was greatly impressed with the thought and care which went into the writing of these essays and want to share these thoughts with my colleagues:

WHY I AM PROUD TO BE AN AMERICAN

(By Ted Voise, 6th Grade)

I sat at my desk in my comfortable bedroom, chewing my pencil and trying to think of the reasons why I am proud to be an American. What could I, a 12 year old boy, say? I live with my parents, brothers and sisters in a cozy and comfortable house not far from my school. I had never known hardship and Christmas time and birthdays always meant lots of cheer and many toys. I have many friends and my parents allow me to roam the woods nearby. Yes, I was

happy with my way of life, but could this be a reason to say that I am proud to be an American? I wasn't so sure. I never had reason to think about such a profound thought before. I guess when you don't have to think about such things, you don't.

Then my mother walked in. She looked over my shoulder and read what I had written. Then she sat down and told me something that made me change my mind altogether. Here's approximately what she told me—"When I was a little girl, I was caught up in the middle of World War II. The war was awful, but somehow didn't seem as bad as the iron rule of the country that had occupied most of Europe at that time. You weren't allowed to speak the truth, you weren't allowed to write the truth, because all your letters to friends were censored. You were afraid to trust your friends. You didn't have a chance to do anything, but to follow someone nobody elected. You lived in constant fear." Then she left.

And as I sat and thought about it, suddenly it occurred to me what my problem was—I was taking everything for granted. I had not known any other way of life, except the American way. I was so busy enjoying it that I had never stopped to think that there was any other way to live. Now that I have been given a comparison, I suddenly knew the reason why I am proud to be an American is: the freedom to write, to speak, the chance to elect someone we want to be our president, but most of all the choice and freedom to live in a country we want to live in and love, my home. Yes, these are my reasons.

Funny somehow, some familiar words just come to my mind from a song I learned long ago. America! America! God shed His grace on thee. And crown thy good with brotherhood from sea to shining sea.

WHY I AM PROUD TO BE AN AMERICAN

(By Susan Lewis, 5th grade)

There are many different reasons why I'm proud to be an American. I can say what I want to say and do what I want to do, as long as I don't hurt anyone.

When I am at a certain age I can vote. I can vote for the man I want to be President. I can go to the church of my choice. I can go to any part of the United States to visit or live. I'm proud to be an American because of the beautiful scenery; the valleys, the mountains, the various trees, flowers and streams.

God Bless America!

WHY I AM PROUD TO BE AN AMERICAN

(By Jimmy North, 5th grade)

I am proud to be an American because: the United States is a free country and the people of the United States have certain rights and privileges given to them in the Declaration of Independence, which other countries of the world do not have.

I am also proud to be an American because: the United States is not as old as some of the other countries of the world, but we are among the most advanced.

I am proud to be an American because: the United States has helped other countries not only at wartime, but at peace time.

I am also proud to be an American because: the United States offers a better education than some of the other countries of the world. I am especially proud because a man from the United States was the first man to walk on the moon.

WHY I AM PROUD TO BE AN AMERICAN

(By Shirlann Knight, 6th grade)

Being an American is a little more than being proud, it is an honor.

But before I go on telling how proud I

am to be one, I would like to say this. Sometimes it is a little hard to be so proud when people are not treated free and equal. When just because you are an Indian, you are put on a reservation. Or because you are of a different color, you can't get work.

These are a few of our nation's problems. All nations have some. Despite these problems, our country has struggled and has come a long way. Because we have freedom of speech, religion and can live our lives the way we choose, it is a peaceful nation.

We have reserve parks, animals, and nature scenes. We have sympathetic people who try to help each other the best they can. We have intelligent scientists who are discovering new things to improve our country and I thank God I am an American. Most of all I am very proud to be an American.

THE SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE: FIGHTER FOR AMERICA

HON. ANCHER NELSEN

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. NELSEN. Mr. Speaker, the Worthington Globe, Worthington, Minn., recently put in perspective the enormous importance of the U.S. Soil Conservation Service to the American people. The SCS is, indeed, in the front ranks of those fighting to preserve America's natural resources. Its skilled cadre of personnel too infrequently receive the public acclaim to which they are entitled. I include the full text of the Globe editorial at this point in my remarks:

AGENCY TO SAVE AMERICA LACKING FUNDS

An official of the new Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) advised this week that his commission is both in action and anxious for more action in the nation's unfolding war against pollution. Citizens of Birmingham, Ala., were advised by EPA regarding a five-day-old air pollution crisis that, "If we had known about it earlier we'd have had a Justice Department lawyer down there so fast it would make your head swim."

Governmental machinery to combat the air, soil and water pollution which threatens to foul the continent is under construction. The first gears are beginning to turn. The profound and universal insistence that "something must be done" is receiving response.

Meanwhile—to introduce both an element of irony and another concern—the nation has been advised that all the conditions which created the Dust Bowl and the stifling dirt blizzards of the 1930's are again coming together in ominous coincidence. Through the first four months of this year Texas has experienced 22 dust storms. Dirt is beginning to fill ditches and to drift along fence lines from Texas and Oklahoma through Kansas and into South Dakota. A great part of the winter wheat crop has been lost to drought.

In the dust-filled, dry winds sweeping the continent is heard the wail, "Something must be done . . . something must be done . . ." Action from EPA? A new national program? Emergency appropriations?

The note of irony: There is an existing and highly-effective agency dedicated to conservation and experienced in the battle to preserve natural resources which is prepared to pursue its urgent task but which continues to be restrained and hamstrung by inadequate appropriations.

The agency is the U.S. Soil Conservation Service which, along with the rest of the beleaguered Department of Agriculture, has been pulling its belt tighter year by year. Since 1967 the SCS work force has been reduced 10 percent. All the while the remaining SCS staff, the most experienced and knowledgeable conservation work force in the nation, has listened with dismay and frustration as the clamor has mounted for meaningful efforts to preserve and restore the natural environment.

The achievements of the SCS through three decades have been monumental. (To cite a single example: every inch of the topsoil of Nobles county has been mapped. This chore, at once tiny and enormous, was the necessary first step in governing and controlling a part of the pollution which threatens man and beast and the earth they inhabit. Through vast areas this mapping has not been done. In some areas it may be too late.)

Through long years before the nation generally was concerned, SCS was concerned for what was happening to America's land, air and water. It sounded alarms which went unheeded. And it suffered continuing setbacks in its quest for funding.

The cadre and skeletal machinery which SCS has brought together and which could be mobilized for swift and meaningful efforts to conserve and preserve the environment is suggested by a partial listing of its branches and divisions:

Watershed planning; watershed operations; resource development; engineering—hydrology branch, design branch, water supply forecasting branch, construction, irrigation, sedimentation geology, groundwater geology; plant science division—agronomy, range conservation, biology, woodland conservation; soil survey operations, soil survey classification and correlation.

The need is for expanded funding.

From its beginning, SCS was given staggering challenges. "Stop the dust storms; don't let them recur," as an example. It was akin to challenging, "Put men on the moon." The problem was (and is) there has never been funding which even approaches the funds lavished on the moonshot and space programs.

Now the Dust Bowl stirs again. Pollution threatens to overwhelm us all.

The directors and technicians of SCS know what needs to be done. Their need is funds and personnel—plus some sharpened dentures for existing laws.

All who are concerned with preserving the environment should lend support to the perennially forlorn effort of SCS and USDA to receive significantly increased appropriations. In the order of priorities, SCS has an urgency greater than aircraft carriers, commercial airliners or moon walks.

SCS is a great part of what the battle to preserve America—land, air and water—is all about.

**RESOLUTION OF ALASKA STATE
LEGISLATURE GIVES THANKS TO
SENATORS JACKSON AND ALLOTT**

HON. NICK BEGICH

OF ALASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. BEGICH. Mr. Speaker, presently the State of Alaska is concerned with

two major issues. The first is the construction of the Alaska oil pipeline and the second, the Alaska native land claims.

As you know, there are various native land claims bills pending before the House of Representatives. Each bill is the result of many long and tedious hours of discussion, debate, and research. Whatever the outcome is concerning the just settlement of the native land claims, two Senators have devoted endless hours of research, study and have held hearings regarding this issue. Senator HENRY JACKSON, of Washington, and Senator GORDON ALLOTT, of Colorado, have spent much time in careful consideration of each bill. The Alaska State Legislature has recently passed a resolution thanking the two distinguished Senators for their painstaking review and study of the native land claims question and expressing confidence that the final settlement will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time. I would like to take this opportunity to include that resolution into the RECORD.

**SENATE RESOLUTION NO. 12, RELATING TO
NATIVE LAND CLAIMS LEGISLATION**

Be it resolved by the Senate:

Whereas settlement of the Native land claims is of the highest priority for the State of Alaska and its citizens; and

Whereas various proposals have been introduced in Congress which proposes solutions to the Native land claims question; and

Whereas the U.S. Congress is divided, to a great extent, over the merits of these legislative proposals; and

Whereas irrespective of their views concerning what a proper settlement of the Native land claims should entail, two senators have devoted endless hours to research, study, and the holding of hearings regarding the Native land claims; and

Whereas, as a result of their obvious interest and concern in seeking out all pertinent information and their willingness to listen to all persons and organizations concerned with the Native land claims, Alaska and Alaskans can only benefit from the fruits of this arduous task;

Be it resolved by the Alaska Legislature, That it commends Senators Henry Jackson of Washington and Gordon Allott of Colorado for their painstaking review and study of the Native land claims question and expresses its confidence that, largely through the efforts and devotion to duty of these two men, a final settlement of the Native land claims will be forthcoming at the earliest possible time.

SUMMER INTERN PROGRAM

HON. W. S. (BILL) STUCKEY

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 14, 1971

Mr. STUCKEY. Mr. Speaker, when the summer program giving students the opportunity to work in their Nation's Capital was discontinued in 1968, I continued to offer the young people of my congressional district the chance of working in Washington.

Each year the presidents of the four colleges located in the Eighth Congressional District select two students who live in the Eighth District, regardless of where they attend college or vocational training school, to work in my Washington office. These young people are selected on the basis of their academic standing and their activities outside the classroom.

I cannot say how proud I am of each and every young man and woman who has participated in this program, and I intend to continue it as long as I am in the Congress.

I would like to enclose at this point in the RECORD a clipping from the Valdosta Daily Times newspaper. The young man that the article refers to is Laurence Day. Laurence was one of the first interns I had in my office after the Congress discontinued the official program and the funding for it.

I am proud of Laurence Day. I am proud of the young people of the Eighth District of Georgia. I wish they all had the opportunity to work in Washington and better understand our Government and how it works.

I am, indeed, happy that we have seen fit to reinstate the summer intern program, and I hope that we can continue this program for many years to come.

The article follows:

[From Valdosta Daily Times, June 4, 1971]

DOUGLAS STUDENT IS TOPS AT VSC

With a perfect overall grade-point average of 4.0 to his credit, Laurence Virgil Day of Douglas is the top honor graduate at Valdosta State College this year.

VSC president Dr. S. Walter Martin said the history major is also the winner of the Rotary Club's annual award to the student graduate with the highest scholarship average.

Day received a \$100 check from the local club Wednesday at the group's weekly luncheon meeting, said Martin.

His name has been engraved on the Rotary Scholarship Award plaque located in Nevins Hall on campus. His perfect average is the highest among the 438 June graduates.

Besides graduating Summa Cum Laude, Day is also the recipient of several of the college's top honors. He is a member of Omicron Delta Kappa, highest national leadership fraternity for college men, Who's Who in American Colleges and Universities and Sigma Alpha Chi Honor society.

The son of Mr. and Mrs. Virgil Day of Douglas, he was associate justice of the student court and this year's winner of the history and political science department award.

He was named Mac of the senior college this year, designating him the most all round man in the junior and senior classes on campus.

Day attended South Georgia College in Douglas for two years before transferring to VSC. He received the top academic average awards in both his freshman and sophomore years with 4.0 averages.

He is to enter the University of Georgia law school in Athens this fall.

"He is one of the most outstanding young men we've had on this campus. Laurence is one of those unusual persons who excels in anything he attempts," said Dr. William Gabard head of the department of history and political science.