

## SENATE—Friday, June 11, 1971

The Senate met at 11 a.m. and was called to order by Hon. JAMES B. ALLEN, a Senator from the State of Alabama.

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

O Thou Great Shepherd of Thy people, we thank Thee for the sacrament of life, for its great adventure, its glorious opportunities, its work and its hardships, for the things that point beyond themselves to a spiritual realm from which they rise; for failures that quicken hopes; for the pains, sorrows, and sins that spur us on to search for health and redemption; for the beauty of common things, for good work and kind deeds; for all intimations of the infinite and eternal; and for the light of Thy presence upon our daily path.

May our work ever be Thy work. Shepherd us, O Lord, in our going out and our coming in until at length we are gathered in Thy sheepfold safe and strong forever more.

And to Thee shall we give the glory and the praise now and evermore. Amen.

## DESIGNATION OF THE ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore (Mr. ELLENDER).

The legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,  
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,  
Washington, D.C., June 11, 1971.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate, I appoint Hon. JAMES B. ALLEN, a Senator from the State of Alabama, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

ALLEN J. ELLENDER,  
President pro tempore.

Mr. ALLEN thereupon took the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

## MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the following bill, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 8866. An act to amend and extend the provisions of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, and for other purposes.

## HOUSE BILL REFERRED

The following bill was read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on Finance:

H.R. 8866. An act to amend and extend the provisions of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, and for other purposes.

## THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of

the Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, June 10, 1971, be dispensed with.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate go into executive session to consider two nominations on the Executive Calendar.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The nominations on the Executive Calendar will be stated.

## ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

The legislative clerk read the nominations in the Environmental Protection Agency, as follows:

Robert W. Fri, of Maryland, to be Deputy Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

David D. Dominick, of Wyoming, to be an Assistant Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the nominations be considered en bloc.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nominations are considered and confirmed en bloc.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of these nominations.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

The motion was agreed to, and the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

## MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Geisler, one of his secretaries.

## EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the Presiding Officer (Mr. HUGHES) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the

United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

## THE UNITED STATES AND NATO: TROOP REDUCTION—V

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD set No. V of the commentaries, columns, letters to the editor, and editorials, relative to the U.S. troop position in Europe in relation to NATO.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## AGREEING TO TRY TO AGREE

Richard Nixon entered office talking of an "era of negotiation" with the Soviet Union. But something—usually Vietnam or the Middle East—always seemed to get in his way. Last week, the Administration suddenly began to put it all together. Beating back the Senate's stiffest challenge yet to his supremacy in foreign affairs, President Nixon moved toward negotiations aimed at reducing both the U.S. and Soviet garrisons in Central Europe. The next day, he appeared on television to announce "a significant development in breaking the deadlock" in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). And although this speech lasted a bare two minutes, the President still found time for some hopeful hyperbole. The milestone in the SALT talks, he declared, "may be remembered as the beginning of a new era in which all nations can increasingly devote their energies and resources not to the weapons of war, but to the works of peace."

Even Mr. Nixon's own advisers were quick to say that neither of last week's developments really constituted that much of a breakthrough. The two governments had merely agreed to talk about a mutual, balanced reduction of their forces in Central Europe. And as for SALT, they had only agreed on how to talk. Both negotiations, moreover, promised to be extraordinarily long and complicated (page 26). Even so, a beginning had been made, and in time it could conceivably justify the President's hopes for a "new era" in East-West relations. For both Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev had apparently found it worthwhile, for their own separate reasons, to do something about the two classic issues of the cold war: the spiraling nuclear-arms race and the costly and potentially perilous confrontation between American and Soviet troops in the heart of Europe.

Before embarking on their project, however, the Administration had to put down a serious Senatorial uprising: Majority Leader Mike Mansfield's proposal to compel the unilateral, 50 per cent cut in America's European troop strength by the end of this year. Unwittingly, the Russians helped Mr. Nixon to fend off that challenge to his policymaking prerogatives. Two weeks ago, when Brezhnev offered to negotiate a mutual force reduction, many Senators concluded that it would be foolish to give the Kremlin something for nothing. Thus, Mansfield's one-sided troop cut went down to a surprisingly one-sided defeat last week (following story).

Even before the vote was taken, the Soviets had also accepted a plan to break the logjam in the SALT talks. For months, the Russians had been insisting that an agreement would

have to be reached first on limits for anti-ballistic missiles (ABM's), while the U.S. had been demanding a package deal covering both offensive and defensive weapons. Finally, top-level discussions—which, according to White House staffers, included direct contact between Mr. Nixon and Soviet Premier Aleksel Kosygin—produced a face-saving compromise. For the rest of this year, the two countries will concentrate on reaching an ABM agreement. But any such accord would be matched, at the same time, by measures to limit some offensive weapons. Thus, the Kremlin, which played down the SALT compromise, for home consumption, could claim that it was negotiating ABM in a separate context, while the U.S. could point out that, in the end, any interim agreement would cover both offensive and defensive weapons.

## TEXT

Part of the deal was that this vague formula would be released in simultaneous and identical announcements by both Washington and Moscow. Mr. Nixon's performance went off without a hitch, but there was a brief flutter in Administration stomachs when Radio Moscow and Tass, the Soviet news agency, produced a slightly different English-language statement. Apparently because of sloppy translation, this text made it appear that offensive weapons would be forthcoming after an ABM agreement was reached, rather than at the same time. Fearing a Kremlin double cross, the White House immediately protested to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and the Russians quickly responded with a correct translation.

This fastidiousness reinforced the impression that both Washington and Moscow were committed politically to getting at least a partial agreement out of the SALT talks and to making some show of progress over mutual troop reductions. Each government had good reasons. On the American side, Mr. Nixon is already personally identified with the search for rapprochement; he knows that the Mansfield forces will return to the attack and, moreover, he shares their concern over the balance-of-payments deficits imposed by the U.S. troop commitment. Leonid Brezhnev is faced with similar political imperatives. Still embroiled in its feud with China, the Kremlin is anxious to relax tensions with the U.S. and Western Europe, particularly now that Washington and Peking seem to be getting onto better terms with each other. And cuts in nuclear weaponry and ground forces based in Central Europe could also make things easier for the hard-pressed Soviet economy. "Realistic measures in the field of disarmament," Kosygin told visiting Canadian Premier Pierre Trudeau, "would ease the burden of military spending which the peoples of the world have to bear and would contribute effectively to an international détente."

## INERTIA

The geopolitical equation may also have included a bit of bungling on the Soviet side. As America's anxious NATO allies kept pointing out, there was no reason to believe that the Kremlin had abandoned one of the key objectives of its foreign policy—to reduce U.S. influence in Europe. In that light, Brezhnev's offer to negotiate a mutual troop reduction seemed absurd, for if the Soviet leader had only waited, Mansfield might have forced a unilateral U.S. troop cut at no cost to the Kremlin. There were a number of theories in circulation to explain Brezhnev's behavior, but the most persuasive one was simply that the Russians had goofed. Brezhnev's speech proposing the troop negotiations had undoubtedly been written before Mansfield introduced his amendment, and the chronic inertia of Soviet bureaucracy may have prevented Brezhnev from adjusting his

sights when he stood up to speak two days after the Majority Leader acted. "The Russians," said one well-informed senator, "are not flexible enough to scrap a speech like that just because of fresh developments."

Accidental or not, the Soviet stance contributed to a notably successful week for Richard Nixon. There seemed to be some chance for a first-stage agreement in the SALT talks by around the end of the year, and already some Russian diplomats were hinting that such an achievement would be crowned by a U.S.-Soviet summit conference starring Leonid Brezhnev himself. But even the most bullish of Washingtonians were well aware that an almost infinite number of pitfalls lay along the road to rapprochement. "It's all well and good," Rep. F. Edward Hébert, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, remarked after Mr. Nixon announced the SALT compromise. "But let's keep our powder dry."

## SLEDGEHAMMER

It was the first of this spring's series of foreign-policy matches between Richard Nixon and a rebellious U.S. Senate, and when it ended last week the score was the President 1, the mutineers 0. The Administration's troops beat back proposal after proposal to force Mr. Nixon to reduce America's troop commitments to NATO by as much as half and by a cutoff time as early as the end of this year. But winning was not nearly so easy as the 2-to-1 balance of forces suggested: it took a lobbying effort unmatched in recent memory and, more important still, an inadvertent assist from Leonid Brezhnev to stifle the uprising. "I feel like the fellow with the slingshot," said Senator Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, who forced the test—and, if Goliath survived the first shot this time, the sting would be felt for months to come.

What Mansfield proposed, in the form of an amendment to the pending draft-extended bill, was the recall of no fewer than 150,000 of the 320,000 GI's now stationed in Europe by Dec. 31. He has been offering similar legislation in vain for six years, but this time it caught up a whole constellation of discontents in the Senate—over the Vietnam war, over the nagging imbalance of payments, over America's disproportionate share of the burden of defending Western Europe, over the slow erosion of Congress's role in making foreign policy. The news a fortnight ago that Mansfield planned to try again this year set off a reaction verging on panic at the White House. And not without reason: "If his amendment had come to a vote the day he introduced it or the day after," one GOP hierarch remarked to NEWSWEEK's chief Congressional correspondent Samuel Shaffer, "he would have won hands down. Thank God we had a week's grace."

Nothing the Administration did during that week helped its cause quite so much as Brezhnev did by offering to discuss mutual troop reductions in Europe—a gesture that undercut Mansfield's unilateral-withdrawal proposal. Nevertheless, Mr. Nixon's counter-insurgents—headed in the field by his national-security braintruster, Henry Kissinger, and joined at intervals by Mr. Nixon himself—mounted a lobbying campaign that bordered on overkill. Kissinger met daily with strategists from the White House, State and the Pentagon, personally phoned media executives to solicit editorials and helped Dean Acheson line up an all-star team of old cold warriors to join the attack. He got permission through Harry Truman's doctor to use Truman's name. He enlisted Lyndon Johnson (though LBJ declined a Kissinger draft statement and wrote his own instead). Two former Secretaries of State, six Under Secretaries, two Deputy Secretaries of Defense and four supreme Allied Commanders in Europe joined up.

## EFFORT

Senate GOP leader Hugh Scott himself was called home from an official trip to Tokyo. So was GOP Sen. William Roth of Delaware—with a White House helicopter standing by at the airport to pick him up and speed him to the floor on voting day. The Israeli Embassy lobbied friendly senators. Illinois Republican Charles Percy got calls or wires from U.S. ambassadors in London, Brussels, The Hague, Reykjavik and even Henry Cabot Lodge in the Vatican. Maryland's J. Glenn Beall, Jr., recovering from an operation for a burst appendix, checked himself out of the hospital long enough to sit in plain discomfort through the last hours of floor debate and the vote.

There were some sharp moments. Several senators tried to talk Secretary William P. Rogers into a compromise requiring the President to negotiate a reduced U.S. role within NATO and to report progress to Congress every six months. Rogers said no—that would infringe on the President's prerogatives. Snapped New York's Republican Sen. Jacob Javits: "Why won't you be a partner of ours just once in such endeavors?"

Mr. Nixon himself tried to keep the infighting from getting personal. At a meeting with the GOP Congressional leaders, someone started talking about "how to defeat Mansfield." Mr. Nixon, one Republican remembered, broke in sternly: "I'm not interested in that. Senator Mansfield is an honorable man." As President, he said, he had to take the long view—"to maintain the peace and to keep the confidence of our allies and maintain our credibility in that area. . . ."

## WHY U.S. FORCES WILL STAY IN EUROPE

U.S. Troops are going to stay in Europe at full strength for at least another year—and possibly longer.

That was the upshot of a series of Senate votes on May 19 aimed at forcing the President to withdraw 150,000 of the 300,000 servicemen now attached to North Atlantic Treaty forces.

The President and officials of four previous Administrations mounted a massive counterattack to defeat the withdrawal campaign led by Mike Mansfield, the Senate Majority Leader.

The President's reasons for refusing to diminish U.S. forces in NATO were made clear by Administration sources:

A big, unilateral American pullout at this time would be viewed by U.S. allies as betrayal of a clear-cut deal with Washington. Under the agreement, European allies are increasing their NATO spending by 1 billion dollars over five years in exchange for President Nixon's promise that no U.S. troops will be withdrawn from West Europe without similar Soviet cuts in East Europe.

Russian leaders suddenly are showing keen interest in discussing mutual, balanced troop reductions. A 50 per cent cut in U.S. troop strength could kill any chance of successful negotiations with the Soviet Union.

A precipitate American pullout would reinforce growing doubts around the world over American credibility as an effective global power.

Any major pull-back from Europe—coupled with the Vietnam withdrawal—could convince the Russians that they can profit without paying the price at the negotiating table. The result: a tougher Soviet stance in the Middle East, in Berlin and in arms-control talks.

The White House is adamantly opposed to any congressional action that would have the effect of taking foreign policy out of the hands of the President.

The Senate, by a vote of 61 to 36, defeated the Mansfield proposal to halve American NATO forces by the end of the year. It also

rejected five less-sweeping compromise amendments, all aimed at reducing U.S. strength in Europe.

In the opinion of Administration officials, Senator Mansfield could not have chosen a worse time to press for a U.S. pull-back. There is not only the danger of jeopardizing critical negotiations with Russia and alienating U.S. allies, these officials say, but the demand came just as the European Community finally appeared ready to admit Britain. This could lead to West European nations assuming increasing responsibility for their own defense in the years ahead.

#### PAST AND FUTURE CUTS

Strategic experts on both sides of the Atlantic point out that 300,000 is not a permanent figure, beyond mid-1972. Further cuts are inevitable—even if the Russians refuse to reduce their forces in Eastern Europe. As the chart on this page shows, the U.S. already has reduced its NATO forces by 117,000 men over the past decade.

U.S. and European authorities emphasize that the important point is not the number of troops in Europe, but how and when future American withdrawals are carried out. It is vital, these experts say, that the U.S. avoid undermining the credibility of its nuclear commitment in the eyes of the Russians and of American allies.

A leading British strategist explains it this way:

"There is nothing magical about 300,000 American troops. The fact is that 150,000 or 200,000 men might be just as effective as far as U.S. credibility is concerned. The real question is how the reduction is carried out."

The wrong tactic, this expert warns, would be to pull out in a way that would be viewed around the world as a panicky retreat at a critical moment in East-West negotiations, and during the construction of a united Europe.

#### A MYSTERIOUS MUSHINESS

(By Stewart Alsop)

WASHINGTON.—In recent weeks—and last week especially—it has seemed more and more evident that the answer to a question Winston Churchill once asked, at the end of a long and bibulous lunch, is "No."

The year was 1948. I had been wandering about the Continent, and had run into Randolph Churchill, the great man's only son, who asked me to lunch at Chartwell. The lunch (which I described subsequently for the late lamented Saturday Evening Post) was at first an intimidating occasion. I had thought it would be a large gathering, and I could be as inconspicuous as a fly on the wall. Instead, there were only the great man, Randolph, and myself.

Mr. Churchill (as he was then) appeared in a rumpled siren suit, and he looked like a grumpy old baby. When Randolph introduced me, his only response was a disapproving "Hrrumph." There were no cocktails. We sat down and drank our soup in nervous silence, broken only by an occasional "Hrrumph." Then in came a bottle of champagne, and then another. The effect on Mr. Churchill was that of the sun on a flower.

He began to talk, and he talked wonderfully well—wisely, wittily, and maliciously. Over the port and cigars, he talked about the then current scene, which he painted in gloomy colors, and with reason—Stalin had blockaded Berlin, and there has been the take-over attempts in Azerbaijan and Greece, the coup in Czechoslovakia, and much else. The United States had responded, at first with agonized reluctance, with Greek-Turkish aid, the Marshall plan, the beginnings of NATO.

#### STRONG HORSE

"America," Mr. Churchill mused, puffing his cigar. "America. A great and powerful

country, like a strong horse, pulling the rest of the world up behind it, towards peace and prosperity." Then he fixed me with an accusing stare. But will America stay the course?"

I answered the question with a confident (and slightly intoxicated) "Yes." I would now answer the question with an almost equally unequivocal "No."

Times have changed, of course, since Mr. Churchill asked his question. Stalin is dead, and so is the Soviet monopoly of Communist power. In the post-Marshall-plan era, this country suffered from a Miss Fix-it complex, and our commitments were greatly overexpanded. The Europeans' contribution to Europe's defense has for twenty years been grossly inadequate, and the American military bureaucracy has never provided a fair return in combat power on its immense manpower and money investment. Above all, the Vietnam war has been a major national tragedy.

All this is true, but it is also true that Mr. Churchill's question remains the key question today, as it was when he asked it over the port. Churchill saw, with his genius for recognizing the obvious, that only American power could provide an effective counterbalance to Soviet power, and that if the United States ceased to behave like a "strong horse," Soviet power would ultimately prevail.

#### DIFFERENT VIEWS

In intellectual circles here and abroad (except in Israel) this is now a most unfashionable view. The fashionable view is that the nuclear weapons have rendered the old concept of the balance of power obsolete, and that power is not therefore something to worry about. Unfortunately, this view is not shared in Moscow.

The U.S. reconnaissance satellites have brought back indisputable evidence of an immense Soviet effort to gain nuclear-missile superiority. There is equally hard evidence of a major Soviet effort to gain naval superiority, and the Soviets already enjoy decisive ground combat superiority on the Continent.

Meanwhile, this country, while still involved in a costly war, is spending less on national defense in terms of percentage of gross national product than before the Korean War, and much less on strategic weapons than in the Eisenhower era. Defense manpower is being cut back by 40 per cent and more, and if the draft ends we could soon have fewer men in uniform than before the second war.

The fashionable response to this contrast is to dismiss the hard evidence of the Soviet missile program as mere Pentagon propaganda—"The Annual Spring Scare," to quote the title of a recent New York Times editorial. All the Democratic Presidential candidates but one favor further sharp cutbacks in defense. All the Democratic candidates but one are at best equivocal about the New Left demand that all logistic support for the South Vietnamese armed forces be ended, while the Russians and Chinese continue to supply the North Vietnamese with all the arms they need.

But perhaps the best evidence that the answer to Mr. Churchill's question is likely to be "No" was provided by last week's scare over the Mansfield amendment to cut the American troop commitment to NATO in half, without hearings or prolonged debate. The amendment was given a very good chance of passing, with the support of the liberal Democrats. It was only defeated, with a big assist from Leonid Brezhnev, after the Administration had mustered all the elder statesmen of the "strong horse" period, including old Harry S. Truman himself.

But this was a rear-guard action, and almost certainly the last. The elder statesmen

represented the internationalist Democratic tradition of Roosevelt, Truman and John Kennedy. The liberals who now control the majority party have turned instead to the counter-tradition of "America first." Robert A. Taft is their unlikely hero.

#### PRIMACY

There is no doubt that the liberal Democrats are on to a good thing politically. This country's basic instincts are isolationist, and the American voters are clearly fed up, not only with the Vietnam war, but with the whole boring, expensive, dangerous business of being the world's No. 1 power. This being a democracy, the voters will no doubt have their way, and the United States, after its brief period of primacy, will cease to be the world's No. 1 power. It will cease to be "a strong horse."

What will happen then? Perhaps Churchill was wrong, and the left-intellectuals are right, and the Russians, having achieved primacy in both nuclear and conventional power, will choose not to exercise their power. Perhaps they will exercise it all too effectively. My guess, for what it is worth, is that this country will suffer some sort of traumatic shock, something like the Cuban missile crisis in reverse, and that this will have the therapeutic effect that electric shock treatment sometimes has on the emotionally disturbed.

But I am not at all sure this is a good guess. There is a curious new flaccidity, a mysterious mushiness, about American life and thought that may be incurable. So the answer to Mr. Churchill's question is very probably "No."

#### HOW REAL IS NEO-ISOLATIONISM?

(By John L. Steele)

Isolationism, it would seem, is once again on the rise. President Nixon has used the term neo-isolationist to describe certain of his senatorial critics who would alter U.S. foreign policy or who seek a greater role for the Congress in shaping it. Once the name of a popular and viable political doctrine, isolationism today—with or without "neo" attached to it—is a pejorative word. It has no real validity in a world of instant communications, internationally linked economies, and nuclear weapons that can bridge continents at Mach 23 speed. Properly speaking, the term suggests someone who would like to disengage the U.S. from the rest of the world and return to a 19th century insularity. No doubt some Americans are experiencing an emotional recoil from foreign commitments, as a result of Viet Nam and domestic troubles. But apart from a small group of myopic radicals totally obsessed with the need for revolution at home, there are hardly any real isolationists left.

The conflict between the President and an influential minority of the present Senate is real; but the heart of the dispute is not isolationism v. internationalism. At issue is a desire to put space and time limitations on the fighting in Indochina, to strike a new balance between the President and Congress in committing military forces to combat abroad, and to avoid further proliferation of U.S. commitments round the globe without congressional sanction. There is also a feeling that the nation's values should be re-examined so that more money will be spent on domestic priorities and less on extravagant weapons systems that may prove to be redundant, provocative or both.

However arguable their proposed alternatives may be, none of the leading Senate critics of the President's foreign policy can be fairly accused of being isolationist. Republican Jacob Javits of New York—the only Senator who has been cited by name in Nixon's attacks—wants to curb the Presi-

dent's war-making powers. But Javits sided with his party's leader last week in voting against Senator Mike Mansfield's amendment to reduce U.S. forces in Europe by half. John Stennis of Mississippi, who shares Javits's view on war powers, is generally the Senate's stoutest defender of Nixon's defense-budget and national-security policies. Mansfield, whose defeated amendment may have seemed isolationist, supports the President's effort to negotiate peace in the Middle East, an enterprise that certainly depends on U.S. power and willingness to use it. Even the most publicized of the Senate doves who want a speedy and definite end to the Viet Nam War—such men, as John Sherman Cooper, William Fulbright and George McGovern—are not isolationist in any real sense of the word.

In fact, many of the proposals that White House officials have so casually referred to as neo-isolationists no more deserve that description than does the Nixon Doctrine. First enunciated by the President at Guam in July 1969, it was a major effort to rethink U.S. world policy and lower the American profile abroad. Quite rightly, Historian Manfred Jonas argues that applying the term isolationist to contemporary Senators tends to confuse rather than illuminate their stance. "They earnestly believe that there are limits to America's power," he writes in *Isolationism in America*, "and that to overstep these limits means courting failure and nuclear war. To call the course they propose isolationism is to misread both the history of the '30s and the record of American foreign policy prior to that time."

From the perspective of the '70s, it is all too easy to dismiss America's past isolationism as inevitably misguided and foolish. As Sellig Adler points out in *The Isolationist Impulse*, the doctrine in many ways is "woven into the warp and woof of the American epic." From the very beginnings of the U.S. immigrants envisioned it as a way to a new existence. "They reasoned," Adler wrote of the colonists, "that God Himself had intended to divide the globe into separate spheres. America was the 'New Zion,' and Providence had severed this 'American Israel' from a timeworn, corrupt and warring continent."

Until the outbreak of World War I, the U.S. consistently followed a policy of isolationism—at least in the all-important sense of acting alone—even as its actual isolation from the rest of the world gradually disappeared. To be sure, the U.S. invaded Canada in 1812, and gradually eliminated the British, French, Spanish and Mexican presence from within its continental borders. It also fought Spain in Cuba and the Philippines. But in all these enterprises, the U.S. took a unilateral stance and confined most of its treaty obligations to such limited matters as fishing and sealing rights, immigration and trade.

These sporadic ventures into international affairs point to a basic ambiguity in American history. On the one hand, there was a desire to keep clear of other continents' internequine squabbles; on the other, an almost mystical sense that America had a mission to spread freedom and democracy everywhere. This evangelistic belief was strongly reinforced by the waves of immigrants, who periodically tried to involve the U.S. in the revolutionary movements of their homelands. By and large, political leaders of all parties did their best to cool this interventionist ardor. As early as 1821, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams was forced to counter a popular enthusiasm for Greece's struggle against Turkish overlordship. While the U.S. would always view sympathetically the struggles of foreign peoples against tyranny, he said, "she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy."

By the closing decades of the 19th century, time began to run out on the traditional faith. U.S. foreign trade doubled between 1870 and 1890. Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, a visionary military strategist, saw the seas as an "open plain" and urged the country "to cast aside the policy of isolation which befitted her infancy." The isolationist past was decisively rejected by Woodrow Wilson's intervention on the Allied side in World War I, but it was revived by the disillusionment that followed his crusade to make the world safe for democracy. The anti-internationalist movement reached a peak of influence in the years just before World War II. Its primary goal was to prevent the U.S. from becoming entangled in the looming war in Europe. Hapless remnants of isolationism persisted for a decade after the war ended, as a score of Senators (most of them Midwestern Republicans) sought unavailingly to defeat such undertakings as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and NATO. But for all practical purposes, the doctrine died within the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Senator Arthur Vandenberg wrote in his diary: "That day ended isolationism for any realist." The postwar efforts to keep the flame alive were merely, as Arthur Schlesinger Jr. put it, "the last convulsive outbreak of an old nostalgia."

No serious political figure now suggests that the U.S. could or should put aside the burden of global responsibilities it has assumed through necessary and moral conviction. But just how large that burden should be and how it should be borne obviously needs reappraisal. This quest for reappraisal was inspired by Viet Nam. But other factors would have brought it about even without the Indochina conflict.

During World War II, the U.S. acquired a mental habit of considering itself nearly omnipotent and the defender of freedom all over the globe. This self-image carried over into the cold war, when U.S. power was needed to halt Communist expansionism. That stance is no longer possible because reality has changed; the U.S. no longer has a nuclear monopoly, its economic resources have limits, and other nations do not necessarily agree with the U.S. definition of freedom or the good life. Moreover, Communism has become fissiparous and more amenable to negotiated *détente*.

In this new situation, which has actually existed for at least a decade but which the U.S. is not yet really accustomed to, foreign policy will have to depend less on military force and direct Marshall Plan-style economic heft and more on diplomacy, trade and political maneuvering. French Journalist-Politician Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, among others, has argued that the U.S. will have to choose between continued international power and the building of "an ambitious civilization" at home. For the foreseeable future, the U.S. will obviously insist on both, but Servan-Schreiber is right in asserting that the U.S. will have to rely more on sheer intelligence than sheer force. Secretary of State William Rogers puts it another way; he says that "there are lots of ways to influence people. The force of reasoning and the force of public opinion have a lot to do with influencing nations."

Though Japan and China are bound to play a growing role, for a long time to come the position of the U.S. and the Soviet Union as the world's two nuclear supernations will remain intact. Widely held ideas that emergent or neutralist nations can "soften" or replace the two-power role have proved illusory, as even India learned when Peking's 1962 strikes across the northern mountains brought Indian pleas for military aid from any quarter. East-West ideological battles are bound to continue, though perhaps in

abated form, and so will jockeying for political and military advantage. But the two superpowers will carry on laborious negotiations, the Berlin meetings, the SALT talks and the anticipated discussions of mutual force reductions in Europe are examples. This delicate diplomatic work is not helped by Senate efforts to mandate U.S. troop reductions in Europe—or by a hard-nosed presidential response that finds "unacceptable" even a congressional request that negotiations be speeded up.

Most Americans, including most Congressmen, want to prevent American entanglement in future Indochinas. To accomplish that, it is not necessary—or wise—to impose overly stringent and sweeping limitations on U.S. influence abroad. But the nature of that influence must evolve in new ways. Viet Nam should teach us—as it did the French—that modern armies and industrial strength are not effective in all regions of the world or the automatic answer to wars of "national liberation" (even those backed by other nations). Both Congress and the President should jointly re-examine the security treaties and agreements that now bind the U.S. to more than 40 countries. Many of these "commitments" are more apparent than real, since they cannot be carried out without the approval of Congress. The purpose of these agreements, as the late Senator Walter George once noted, was to deter potential aggressors "from reckless conduct by a clear-cut declaration of our intentions." Often it has been shown that intentions cannot be made all that clear—resulting in misunderstanding by friend and foe alike. Rather than bog the nation down in the cement of firm treaties, President and Congress might explore less formal but more flexible commitments in the form of diplomatic notes or presidential statements.

As for the nation's military presence, there is no question that the U.S. today has too many troops scattered about in too many places. Even apart from the dollar drain, it is hard to justify the 375 major foreign military bases and 3,000 minor military facilities that the U.S. has positioned all over the globe in recent years. The White House has talked about "reducing our presence," while maintaining our commitments abroad—and Congress should be clued in more to discussions of how this can be done. One specific proposal: Congress could establish a small, select "National Security Committee," composed of members with expertise in military and foreign affairs, that would periodically discuss diplomatic problems with the President on a secret but utterly frank basis. Both Congress and the President can move away from an inflationary, supercostly military procurement policy that seems, at times, aimed more at breaking the Soviets by outspending them than by providing the U.S. with what it really needs for deterrence and defense. Unless this is done, says former Under Secretary of State George Ball, the U.S. economy is in danger of becoming "a Strasbourg goose with an overdeveloped liver."

These problems, as well as such lesser matters as reorganizing foreign aid and restoring the stature and influence of the State Department, require creativity on the part of Congress and the President. The prickly members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are not alone in thinking that the balance in U.S. diplomatic decision making has tilted too far in the direction of the Chief Executive. Fortunately, there is a fairly recent example of the kind of cooperation needed: the historic postwar collaboration between President and Congress that established the policy of containment against Soviet aggression, the Truman Doctrine and

the Marshall Plan. Then, as now, the White House and the Congress were controlled by opposing parties. Nonetheless, an exceptionally fruitful relationship developed between Democratic President Harry Truman and a Republican-controlled Congress in which Arthur Vandenberg was the foreign relations leader. Why should any less be expected from a Republican White House and a Democratic Congress?

Isolationism carried into the 20th century is essentially a flight from reality. To label the critics and reappraisers of U.S. foreign policy neo-isolationists is equally escapist. Few things threaten U.S. power more seriously than excessive or misguided intervention; the Viet Nam War has done more than any other factor in recent years to reduce U.S. global influence. Seeking to rationalize U.S. commitments abroad is the very opposite of isolationism, because only such rationalization can restore and maintain the U.S. position in the world.

[From the McClatchy Newspapers of California, June 1, 1971]

FOLLOWING THE SUNSHINE

(By Howard H. Dickson)

BATTLE

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana and a number of his like-minded colleagues may have lost the battle in their move to reduce United States troop commitments under the pact creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization but there is a strong possibility they may win the war.

In fact, the conflict may expand from the proposal merely to reduce troop strength in Western Europe to a point where a reduction in US forces may occur throughout the world.

There is strong sentiment in Congress that the nation has too many irons in the fire involving the military and that sentiment can be expected to grow.

The danger of overextension is clear in the history of the fall of the Roman Empire.

Everything was going fine for the Roman emperors until the legions marched off hither thither and yon.

POSTURE

Sen. William Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, says the country should not abandon its defense posture but questions whether some of the installations are necessary.

For instance, there is a base on the Leeward Islands which Fulbright described as "as a very nice place in the Caribbean."

Then there are the Balearic Islands in the Mediterranean, the Seychelles in the Indian Ocean and Malta in the Mediterranean.

"I will say," Fulbright muses dryly, "that in nearly every place which has a nice climate or beach a base will be found."

AGREES

Sen. Mike Gravel of Alaska has reason to agree with Fulbright about the strategic dispersal of the armed forces.

He is puzzled why the Navy's only ice-breaker, the Glacier, is not stationed in Alaska where there is considerable ice to be broken.

Instead, it is stationed in salubrious Long Beach where the only ice breaking activity is in the making of cooling drink.

Then he is nonplussed why one of the Coast Guard planes which patrol Alaskan water on air-sea rescue duty has a home base in Florida.

"For some unknown reason," he stated, "when it gets ready to do its duty they fly all the way to Alaska and go all the way back to Florida."

Gravel does not suggest that Florida has a warm winter climate where the sun shines

while the blizzards take over Alaska but he does theorize this way about the icebreaker situation.

"The putting greens at Long Beach are very green. Unfortunately, Alaska does not have any green putting greens."

NUMBER

Fulbright says the U.S. has 2,000 major and minor bases operating in more than 30 foreign countries ranging from Iceland to South Africa.

There are major facilities in Spain and Portugal which last year cost \$110 million to maintain. The sum of \$250 million went to the United Kingdom, \$31 million to Greece and Cyprus, \$30 million to the Bahamas and \$20 million to Bermuda.

Bases were supported in such wide ranging places as Australia, Cuba, Ethiopia, Morocco, Pakistan, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua, Barbados and the Turks and Caicos Islands.

Some of them are so little known that members of Congress sometimes have to make the embarrassing admission they do not know their general location on the globe.

FINGER

A subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee which is headed by Sen. Stuart Symington of Missouri probably put the finger on the situation with this conclusion:

"In the past the State and Defense Departments have made but limited effort to study the worldwide base situation. It is only to be expected that those in embassies abroad, and also at overseas military facilities, should seek to justify continued operations in their particular areas. Otherwise, they would recommend a reduction in their own position.

"Arguments can always be raised to justify keeping almost any facility open. To the military a contingency use can always be found. To the diplomat a base closing or reduction can always be at the wrong time in terms of relations with the host country and other nations."

The time seems way past due to work out a sensible program of defending the country's vital world interests instead of dissipating its strength with the situation abroad.

[From the Boston Globe, June 2, 1971]

HALTING STEPS TOWARD DETENTE

(By Darius Jhavalva)

WASHINGTON.—A funny thing happened to a proposal as it recently passed through Congress on its way to the NATO forum in Lisbon.

For what was billed just two years ago as a secondary effort of the super powers to lower the level of confrontation in Central Europe has been transformed all of a sudden into a key element to a new East-West detente.

It began last month with an invitation to the Western Powers from Soviet Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev to "taste the wine" of negotiations for mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe.

The entire bi-ministerial meeting of the NATO countries will be devoted to an examination of what should be their response.

There is nothing new about the Brezhnev situation. It was initially made by NATO in 1968 and its terms were expanded in 1970.

That same year the Warsaw Pact responded by suggesting a limited discussion of the questions concerning "the reduction of foreign armed forces" on the territory of European states. But the pact also indicated a preference for delaying any such discussion until a conference on European security had been held.

The agenda for the latter was to be lim-

ited also—to agreement renouncing the use of force, a principle to which states are already committed by the UN Charter and to trade and technical exchanges.

As the West saw it, the intent of that offer was to force the United States out of West Europe and, at the same time, to accord to East Germany an international status.

NATO reacted with caveats of its own. While keeping alive the prospects of an East-West detente, it rejected the idea of a European security conference unless there was progress in the Berlin talks. The latter meant that the three wartime allies would continue to deny East Germany the prestigious status of the sovereign.

For two years there was no movement in either camp to resolve those differences.

But last month the Russians sent some new signals. It is still a puzzle why they did so at the time when the Senate was debating the Mansfield Amendment for a unilateral cut in the U.S. Forces under NATO.

In any case Brezhnev's offer was, in effect, for a new conference that would deal strictly with mutual balanced reductions that were attached to the previous proposal.

One new element was added last week. It is the decision of Moscow and Washington to remove the question of forward based systems of each from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and to throw it into the NATO-Warsaw negotiations hopper.

Those systems include nuclear and conventional weapons and the necessary delivery systems and supporting manpower that confront each other in Central Europe.

Thus by common agreement the initial conception, namely to avoid a nuclear conflict in Europe, has been vastly expanded.

The problem for the NATO ministers to decide a variety of issues—ranging from the sincerity of the Soviet offer to what sort of a forum is desirable for negotiations. Following that they will attempt to devise a common policy of substance.

All of this spells another very long period of setting all the ducks in a row before there can be any meaningful steps towards an East-West agreement.

[From The Washington Daily News, June 2, 1971]

TROOP COSTS AND SAVINGS

(By Bruce Blossat)

They say there will be another "debate" on reduction of our 300,000-man armed force in Europe. If there is, we must all hope it is less of a disgraceful emotional orgy than the debate over the troop-cutting Mansfield amendment.

As that amendment went down to defeat, hard facts seldom had a chance to rub elbows with each other. For the most part, the Senate discussion was mediocre in tone, ill-informed, and often grossly misleading.

Many matters crucial to American policy are involved. This report will deal with just one aspect: the argument over costs and savings.

The most outrageous assertion on this score came from Sen. George McGovern, declared presidential candidate. He said that cutting our NATO troop force by 150,000, as Sen. Mansfield proposed, would save \$7 billion yearly.

There is no mystery about where he got that figure. More than a year ago the Pentagon put the annual cost of U.S. NATO operations at \$14 billion.

Just one difficulty. When that figure was produced, it covered every U.S. military and naval operation related in any way to NATO. That means the \$14 billion included support costs for more than four U.S. divisions stationed in the United States (in a NATO re-

serve), Air Force units committed to NATO, and some air and sea lift activities.

It is obvious that cutting our Europe-based force in half would not cut the cost of all NATO-oriented U.S. military operations in half. So, Sen. McGovern's talk of saving \$7 billion is a patent absurdity.

The real prospect is that there probably would not be any net saving at all from bringing 150,000 U.S. soldiers home from Europe. Very likely, it would be more expensive to keep them at home, in readiness for movement to Europe if needed.

This fall, the responsible Brookings Institution will produce a report on this and other defense cost matters.

Brookings' budget experts estimate that bringing two divisions home from Europe (4 and 1/3 are stationed there) would yield maximum operating savings of \$100 million a year.

But, in the likely event their equipment was left at the ready in Europe, each division brought back would need some \$300 million in new equipment here—since it could hardly keep in training without it.

These troops would be, plainly, a reserve held against the threat of war in Europe. They would need the means to get back there on short notice. That means, according to Brookings, a one-time cost of \$600 million for airlift planes.

The annual cost of maintaining those necessary airlift planes would be \$140 million, PER DIVISION. For two divisions, that would be \$280 million, or nearly three times the estimated savings from bringing them home.

What the very cautious Brookings people are saying is that talk of big savings from troop cuts in Europe is nonsense. There wouldn't be any.

In its penetrating review of the 1972 federal budget, Brookings went to the heart of the troops-in-Europe issue. Real savings would be possible only if forces brought home were deactivated.

To do that would be to reduce what are called the force levels of the regular U.S. army. Some may contend that this should be done. But that is quite a different argument from insisting that huge savings will result merely from bringing our NATO forces home to stations in this country.

A curious sidelight in all this: The pro-Mansfield forces have been so shallow in their work that they haven't noticed that it has been a long time since the Pentagon issued that \$14 billion figure for annual NATO-oriented costs. Brookings says the total is both outdated and limited.

[From the Washington Daily News, June 3, 1971]

#### FAT IN OUR NATO FORCE

(By Bruce Blossat)

What are 300,000 U.S. military men doing in Western Europe 26 years after World War II?

We are all supposed to know much more about this than we did before the Senate heard and defeated the Mike Mansfield proposal to pull 150,000 men out of Europe. But, as we await the promised next debate on the issue, the question is: Do we know more?

From Sen. Mansfield and other troop-cut supporters, the impression is gained variously that our NATO force is laden with fat, that its presence is merely symbolic (trip-wire to touch off our nuclear response if Russia attacks), that it is there to defend Europe for Europe's sake.

It is easy to dispose of this latter notion. Those who say "let prospering Europeans defend themselves" simply haven't examined the military power equation. Only we have the might to give Russia pause. And if Eu-

rope is not our first defense line, why did we fight two world wars at a cost of hundreds of thousands of men?

There is fat in our European force, as elsewhere. But the padding does not come to 170,000 men.

The argument that our NATO force is token, symbol, etc. is not advanced by sophisticated students of defense. For trip-wire purpose, 25,000 would do. An equipped force of 300,000 is intended for real defending.

Some say, yes, but the only practical defending it could do against a huge Soviet onslaught would be with tactical nuclear weapons, of which our NATO force has some 1,700.

Yet there is a very large doubt whether the NATO armies ever would begin tactical nuclear warfare.

Recently an expert in defense affairs told me: "We really don't know what tactical nuclear war means." A strong feeling exists that it would grade quickly into 'The Big One. For one thing, tactical nuclear devices have enormous destructive power. In seeking out combat targets, almost certainly they would devastate some cities. Moreover, their range is great enough to permit them to reach far behind the fighting lines. When does such a weapon become strategic?

One study suggests a tactical nuclear exchange between NATO and the Soviet-Warsaw Pact countries might lead to destruction of 20 per cent of the built-up areas in the combat zone of West Germany, plus the killing of 12 million Germans.

Alain Enthoven, former assistant secretary of defense, is one among many who believe that Moscow has enough tactical nuclear weapons to answer us in kind—and that hence no such exchange is likely.

What does that leave? Just the idea that our forces in Europe, plus those of our NATO allies, are intended to have the capacity to fight a conventional war. Nuclear stalemate wipes out any real alternative.

Many who dabble with the NATO issue believe Western forces are heavily outnumbered and outgunned by the Warsaw Pact armies. The recent "debate" on the Mansfield proposal did make clear, for those who listened, that this is not so. Mr. Enthoven, writing in 1969 with K. Wayne Smith, demonstrated forcefully then that the conventional balance at the East-West line is close. In other words, that the NATO armies, even with some acknowledged shortcomings, are a credible fighting force which could well hold its own until U.S.-based reserves could be airlifted to stiffen defense further.

The next time the troop-cut proposal comes up, it should be discussed in its real terms. It has to do with the kind of defense we want to make of Europe, and hence of ourselves.

To bring home 150,000 or more men but keep them ready for quick airlift to the NATO defense line is to cling to the present conventional war strategy (probably at more rather than less cost.) To deactivate returned NATO units could mean putting all our eggs in the nuclear basket.

[From the Baltimore Sun, June 3, 1971]

#### NATO MEETS

Often in the past the semi-annual meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have been concerned with more or less routine problems within the alliance, as it developed and changed. The sessions that begin today in Lisbon will center on the fundamental issue of levels of troop strength in the future.

More particularly, and less grandly, the discussions will deal with the question of what responses NATO as an organization should make to the new Soviet suggestion for

negotiations on troop reductions in central Europe, West and East. While the tone of the Lisbon meeting will of course be one of skepticism and caution, there is no doubt that the issue has aroused wide public interest, in Europe and in America, and that NATO will want to explore it fully for possible actual movement.

The NATO countries individually are already doing so. The United States for its part has, according to President Nixon, completed within its own government its study of "balanced mutual force reductions," and in advance of the Lisbon gathering Defense Secretary Laird had been in consultation with a number of other NATO defense officials.

A large measure of skepticism has been expressed in advance by West Germany, whose foreign minister talks by custom with his opposite numbers from the United States, Britain and France on the eve of NATO meetings. The West German position is that a satisfactory settlement on Berlin must precede or accompany intimately any agreement on troop reduction.

This view in differing degrees is shared by others. As one Western diplomat said the other day: "We're not going to get anywhere on East-West negotiations until that neuralgic point of Berlin has been removed. It's too sensitive. The Russians can touch it at any time and make us jump."

That is a vivid and an acute way of noting that Berlin remains the key to an ultimate accord between East and West. But a disposition to move toward accord does seem at the moment to be in the air, and we may hope that the disposition can be nurtured to embrace Berlin.

[From the Washington Daily News,  
June 4, 1971]

#### SPECIAL KIND OF LIBERAL

(By Bruce Blossat)

There's a pretty sizeable bunch of liberals around today who work hard at giving liberalism a bad name.

It's also true, of course, at the conservative end of the spectrum. So why pick on the liberals? Simple. They're making the clamor and getting the attention, as the conservatives did in the Goldwater era.

We're talking here about one very special kind of liberal, marked by doctrinaire rigidity, by an arrogant attitude which says "there's only one way to do it and we're telling you," and by a powerful urge to embarrass, demean, penalize and even punish adversaries.

In this town they bear a charmed life. They seem to gain their credibility from knocking the credibility of others. They get a season pass from the journalistic fraternity. Seldom are their assertions and arguments subject to the same hard scrutiny which reporters level at an incumbent administration. Skepticism in Washington is selective.

The rigid liberals tout absurdly bad books like Charles Reich's "The Greening of America." They often manage to overstate the horrors of the war in Indochina, which isn't easy. Looking at the frustrations of the young, the black, the brown and others, they condone rage but deplore the violence it can lead to.

Their criticism of the police and the military, which can be immensely useful when specific and pointed, frequently are cruelly ambiguous. What does it really mean to be "anti-military" in a country that surely is going to have an army for long, long years?

The doctrinaire types are supposed to be smart. Nobody, it is contended, can match them for intellect, insight, etc. Why, then, do so many of them spend so much time shouting schoolboy slogans, flushing with joy when somebody cries "fire J. Edgar Hoo-

ver!" and putting the knock on people who don't subscribe to their narrow little catechism?

Not too many weeks ago, a frail publication called *The New Democrat* listed the fellows it thought were fit to have the 1972 Democratic nominations for President. Pointedly missing was the name of Sen. Edmund Muskie of Maine, top contender.

What's the matter with Big Ed? Critics say he's "indecisive." He says he sees a lot of sides to things, and takes time to make up his mind. The Marching and Shouting Society scorns that kind of nonsense. What's your decision, fella? We want it now!

If there's any fine intellectual discrimination in this kind of appraisal, it's not apparent. What the right liberals seem to say is:

"We've got the brains around here. And if you want to impress us, what you need to do is show emotion, especially anger. That's the big one today. Anybody who isn't in a fury hasn't got it."

Never mind digging deep to discover who really has a good store of knowledge, a capacity for learning and growth, and above all a talent for seasoned, balanced judgment. Who wants balanced judgment when society is at the ragged edge? What we need, man, is action!

Remember those now sidelined public figures like Dean Acheson and John J. McCloy, whom President Nixon marshaled to help kill Senator Mansfield's proposal to cut our NATO European force in half? Mr. Nixon surely was indulging in overkill when he put that aging posse together. But what about the rigid-libs? They ridiculed the old soldiers, all of whom had done heavy and usually selfless duty for their country, as if they were a gang of war criminals (some just said doddering old fools). Really?

You there, you public servant or politician: Do you have the rigid-libs' Good Housekeeping seal of approval? Watch out! You can lose it with one phrase that flunks the old litmus test. A couple of gray spots on your pants, even if they're brown, and you'll be out.

[From the Washington Post, June 4, 1971]

#### U.S. PRESENCE IN EUROPE

The proposal of Sen. Mike Mansfield for a large-scale troop reduction in Western Europe, depending on how you looked at it, was roundly beaten by almost two-thirds of the Senate, or earned, on its first time around, the unquestionably daring support of more than one-third of the Senate.

The proposal was mostly kept in the context of saving U.S. dollars as one part of the response to the recent monetary crisis. Yet it is—and next year it probably will be debated as—an adjustment to the changes that have taken place on the European scene since 1949.

The critical question is, and has been since 1949, "What is the likelihood of a conventional military attack by the Soviet Union on Western Europe?" In 1949 there was a reasonably high likelihood that given a military vacuum in Western Europe, the Russians might attack. The response to this threat was the creation of NATO and the stationing of troops in Western Europe.

Despite the refusal of recognition by the President and his octogenarian foreign policy squad (but it was bipartisan!), the times have changed. Soviet relations with Western Europe are good. Even with American troops stationed there, they pose no serious threat to Russia; indeed, they are more valuable as prosperous trading partners than as devastated colonies.

But the above points presuppose a military vacuum in Western Europe, and such a vacuum would not result from the Mansfield

proposal. The reduction of the number of American troops by half would not at all mean the reduction of American military might by half. The only strategy served by troop presence is a conventional defense against a conventional attack, and by all estimates, the American presence there now is absurdly inadequate to meet a concerted attack. In that respect, then, what difference if there are only half of us there tomorrow?

The true deterrence to a Soviet or Soviet-inspired attack on Western Europe does not lie in the American presence there, but in the commitment, in the terms of the NATO Alliance, of unhesitating and unreserved assistance to our attacked allies. If this commitment is there, then the presence really need not be. Let us hope that in the absence of a monetary crisis next year, the facades may be dropped and this issue be debated on its merits.

JOHN F. POST.

WASHINGTON.

#### ARMY MAY HAVE TOO MUCH FAT

(By Tom Braden)

WASHINGTON.—There are 146,250 children of American soldiers in Europe, and there are 79,000 wives. They live in comfortable bases, 80 of which are in Germany, and what they have to do with the defense of the Free World has been difficult for Sen. Mike Mansfield, D-Mont., to understand.

Mansfield has now lost his Senate battle to bring half the troops in Europe back home. But in the course of the battle he managed to raise some questions which even those who most strongly opposed him found difficult to answer. Such as: Should we pay for all those women and children?

And for the schools and teachers and golf courses and Little Leagues and libraries and post exchanges and clubs which go with them?

It is a very plush Army which we keep in Europe, so senators learned in the debate over Mansfield's amendment, but it is only a part of the "tail" which has become the single outstanding feature of America's defense.

Longest—"Tail" in the military vernacular means that part of an army which does not fight, but must be dragged along behind in order to supply and service the army and make the lives of its soldiers as comfortable as possible. The tails of the world's armies vary a great deal. The Russian tail, for example, is very short. The British is a little longer; the American Army has the longest tail in the history of any army in the world.

Literally, the 225,000 dependents of the Army in Europe do not count as part of its tail, and not counting these dependents makes the figures look better than in fact they are. But the figures are frightening anyhow.

Of the 300,000 men we keep in Europe, more than a third or over 100,000 are support troops, most of them attached to seven command staffs. The largest of these staffs is TASCOM or Theater Army Support Command, a unit of about 50,000 men which has charge of storing weapons and equipment.

Commands—In addition, there are two corps headquarters, supported by another command called COSCOM. It has 7,000 men to do the same job as TASCOM does. Veterans of World War II and Korea may be surprised to learn that it requires two corps commands to take care of the four divisions in the single Seventh Army we maintain in Europe. At the Battle of the Bulge, a corps commanded eight divisions.

What all this means is that for every 8,000 American soldiers who fire at the enemy, 52,000 do not. By comparison, for every 8,000 Russian soldiers who fire at the enemy, 13,000 do not.

It also means jobs for 128 generals and flag officers in NATO, or roughly one general for every 2,000 soldiers. The figure helps to explain why the United States has 1,338 generals and flag officers on active duty today commanding less than 3 million men. In World War II, we managed to get by with a little more than 2,000 generals and flag officers although we had 12 million men under arms.

Discovery—The reasons Sen. Mansfield lost his move to bring some of the Army home were two. First, Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union made what seems to have been an astonishing blunder. He offered to negotiate mutual troop withdrawals from Europe, thus giving Mansfield's allies second thoughts about weakening a United States bargaining position.

Second, Mansfield lost because his opponents ignored the issue of bringing home half the troops and argued as though Mansfield were proposing a total pull-out from Europe, with perhaps a retreat to a defense line on the Mississippi.

In the course of the debate, the Senate discovered that the American Army is top-heavy, fat and pampered. There is even a faint suspicion that it is an Army with so much tail that it might not be able to fight a war.

[From the Los Angeles (Calif.) Times, June 4, 1971]

#### NATO WARY ON RUSS TROOP CUT PROPOSAL

(By Don Cook)

LISBON.—Foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization took a generally cautious attitude here Thursday to the sudden Soviet interest in mutual balanced force reductions. But they agreed to probe the East bloc countries intensively on the subject in the next few months.

The results of these bilateral contacts probably then will be examined at a special meeting of deputy foreign ministers in October or November. A suggestion for such a meeting, put forward by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, was generally supported by most of the other foreign ministers, with Denmark even offering to be host country for the consultations.

While the NATO officials were holding their discussions in a lavishly refurbished former palace, four terrorist bombs went off in Lisbon and its suburbs. The explosions knocked out all of the city's landline communications for five hours apparently in an effort to embarrass the Portuguese government.

#### BLAMED ON REDS

The explosions caused no casualties and were blamed on the Portuguese Communist Party that accuses the government here of colonialism in Africa.

There was a remarkable unanimity of opinion at this semiannual ministerial meeting that Berlin comes first in NATO relations with the Warsaw Pact countries. In the words of British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home: "If we fall in the Berlin negotiations, nothing else is really possible."

This "Berlin first" sentiment also was echoed by members of the alliance who have no direct responsibility in the problem and who are usually more anxious for talks with the Soviet Union.

Norwegian Foreign Minister Andreas Cappelein said, for example, "We should reaffirm in clear language that as soon as the four-power talks on Berlin have been brought to a satisfactory conclusion, the NATO countries will be ready to enter into multilateral exploratory contacts on European security."

#### ROGERS SPEAKS

Rogers made a brief statement near the end of a full day of general political debate. He laid particular stress on mutual balanced force reduction and its effect on the resolu-

tion in the Senate by Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) demanding unilateral American troop reductions in Europe. He noted that he had personally carried much of the fight to defeat the Mansfield resolution.

According to American sources, Rogers then told the ministers that he felt the United States would continue to maintain its force levels in the alliance as long as NATO shows seriousness of purpose in negotiating force reductions.

#### MANSFIELD TO PUSH FOR TROOP REDUCTION

WASHINGTON.—Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) and a bipartisan group of senators Thursday warned America's European allies that efforts to reduce U.S. troop strength in Western Europe will be renewed.

During a Senate floor discussion which coincided with the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Lisbon, they cautioned the Europeans against thinking the idea was dead.

"What our European friends have seen is only the tip of the iceberg, and what we have seen is only the first small step in a journey which will continue until the objective desired by this body and the American people is achieved," Mansfield said.

The Montana senator was referring to the Senate's 61-36 vote on May 19 against his amendment to cut in half the 300,000 American troops stationed in Western Europe.

[From the Baltimore (Md.) Sun,  
June 4, 1971]

#### PERCY TO PROMOTE TROOP-CUT DISCOURSE (By Gene Oishi)

WASHINGTON, June 3.—Senator Charles H. Percy (R., Ill.) reported to the Senate today that North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations had the mistaken notion that the issue of reducing American forces in Europe was dead and that he intended to make weekly speeches to keep it alive.

Last month, Mr. Percy voted against an amendment offered by the majority leader, Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.) to cut the number of U.S. troops in Europe in half.

But today he said that he was distressed to find at a NATO meeting in Brussels last week that the defeat of the Mansfield amendment in the Senate had created the impression that the issue was settled.

#### ADVISORY GROUP

Mr. Percy is one of the American members of the economic committee of the North Atlantic Assembly—an advisory group to NATO made up of representatives of legislative bodies of the NATO nations.

At the committee meeting, Mr. Percy said, he injected a "discordant note" by telling the Europeans that it would be a mistake to think that the Mansfield amendment was dead.

Mr. Percy said that while the Mansfield amendment was denied, a clear majority of the Senate wants the Europeans to assume a greater share of the defense of Western Europe, allowing the United States to reduce its commitment.

#### COMMENDED BY MANSFIELD

Senator Mansfield rose to commend Mr. Percy for his remarks, and added that he intended to pursue his objective of reducing of American forces in Europe "with vigor, with persistence and with determination."

He conceded that his amendment might have been too harsh, but said, "sometimes you have to use a sledgehammer to make a dent and I don't want this dent to be forgotten . . . what our European friends saw was just the tip of the iceberg."

Mr. Mansfield also said that the post of commander in chief of NATO forces should be held by a European rather than by an

American. "This is a way of keeping us hostage," he declared.

#### "SLEDGEHAMMER NEEDED"

Mr. Percy added that he felt "a sledgehammer approach was needed," while Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D., Minn.), who also voted against the Mansfield amendment, said the majority leader "not only made a dent, he rang a bell . . . an alarm to European nations that something has to be done."

The debate in the Senate last month centered around the cost of maintaining 300,000 U.S. troops and more than 200,000 dependents in Europe, and the adverse effects on the U.S. balance of payments.

Mr. Percy said that agitation in the Senate for troop cuts ought to strengthen the hand of the United States in negotiating an easing of the U.S. burden.

After the discussion over U.S. troops in Europe, the Senate resumed its debate on a measure to eliminate the draft.

The amendment to the draft extension bill is scheduled for a vote tomorrow, but it is not expected to pass. The Senate will also vote tomorrow on another amendment to extend the draft for one year instead of two, if the first amendment fails.

Senator Stuart S. Symington (D., Mo.) also informed the Senate today that he will ask for a closed session of the Senate Monday to present a secret report on Laos prepared by the staff of his foreign relations subcommittee on United States security agreements and commitments abroad.

[From the Baltimore (Md.) Sun,  
June 5, 1971]

#### NATO POSTPONES TROOP REDUCTION TALKS (By Scott Sullivan)

LISBON, June 4.—The North Atlantic Treaty Organization agreed today to postpone until this fall the framing of proposals on mutual force reductions in Central Europe.

In the meantime, the NATO ministers decided, the United States and its allies will pursue "bilateral exploratory contacts" with the Warsaw Pact nations in an effort to determine their real intentions on the troop reduction issue.

The NATO communique, released at Lisbon's Ajuda Palace this afternoon, stressed the Atlantic alliance's continuing commitment to the idea of East-West negotiations on mutual force reductions.

#### DIRECT NEGOTIATION POSTPONED

But the practical result of the plan adopted was to postpone still further direct negotiations on a proposal that was initiated by NATO itself in 1968.

The postponement will also provide breathing space for the four-power negotiations on Berlin. The West Germans had feared that if NATO rushed into talks on force reductions, they might overshadow the continuing discussions on Berlin.

The plan adopted by NATO today is double-edged:

1. It calls for a meeting of "deputy foreign ministers or high officials" to be held in Brussels "at an early date to review the results of the exploratory contacts and to consult on substantive and procedural approaches to mutual and balanced force reductions."

#### EXPRESSES WILLINGNESS

2. It expresses NATO's "willingness at the appropriate time" to appoint one or more representatives to conduct exploratory talks with the Eastern bloc nations on the "time, place, arrangements and agenda" for full-scale talks on force reductions.

There is no indication in the communique about when either part of the plan might go into effect, but it is an accepted assumption

that the deputy foreign ministers' meeting would be convened in September or October.

American officials said they thought it unlikely that a representative to travel to the Warsaw Pact countries would be named before the deputy foreign ministers meeting.

Closely involved with the issue of talks on force reduction—though not explicitly linked with it in the communique—is the question of the Soviet-backed proposal for an all-European security conference.

At its meeting in Brussels last December, NATO expressed its willingness to explore the security conference idea with the Warsaw Pact, but only "as soon as the talks on Berlin have reached a satisfactory conclusion and insofar as the other on-going talks are proceeding favorably." The "other on-going talks" were those on strategic arms limitations.

At this week's meeting, Maurice Schumann, the French foreign minister, told his colleagues that he had learned from the Russians that they regarded the wording of the December communique as excessively harsh, and would prefer that the linkage between progress on Berlin and the security conference be obscured.

Today the NATO ministers went along with Mr. Schumann's suggestion for a much milder expression of the link. They said they hoped that before their next meeting, "the negotiations on Berlin will have reached a successful conclusion and that multilateral conversations intended to lead to a conference on security and co-operation in Europe may be undertaken."

There is no reference this time to progress on the arms limitation talks as a precondition to discussions of a security conference.

#### OPTIMISTIC ATTITUDE

On the overall Berlin situation, the ministers adopted a generally optimistic attitude.

They noted "with satisfaction" that the talks have "entered into a more active phase and have enabled progress to be registered in recent weeks."

And, completing their review of recent East-West contacts, the ministers "welcomed" the recent agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the "framework" for the strategic arms limitation talks. They expressed "the sincere hope that it would facilitate discussions leading to the early achievement of concrete results."

Taken as a whole, today's communique represents an overall approach to the separate but clearly interdependent negotiations on Berlin and strategic arms limitations, as well as the proposed discussions on force reductions and a European security conference.

Its language is consistently positive, emphasizing the alliance's willingness to do all it can to broaden and deepen East-West detente on every front.

Much of that language was suggested by William P. Rogers, the United States Secretary of State, who has told his colleagues that the best way to stave off congressional moves for unilateral American force reductions in Europe is to give the impression that NATO is doing its best to achieve mutual and balanced reductions.

#### WARS AGAINST RUSHING

But Mr. Rogers also warned this week against rushing headlong into force reduction talks before Soviet intentions were entirely clear. The communique stresses that the Soviet reactions "require further clarification."

Today's communique is carefully designed to meet both those requirements, and, incidentally, to quiet German fears that the Berlin issue might get lost in the midst of all the other East-West discussions.

While no direct link is made between Berlin and force reductions, and while the previous link between Berlin and a security conference has been blurred, the signal is there for the Eastern bloc to read: Berlin is the key to a meaningful continuation of the East-West contacts that have flourished over the past year.

#### CAUTION CHALLENGED

This very cautious approach was challenged by the Canadians and the Scandinavians who felt that NATO was putting itself in the position of drawing back from its own three-year-old proposal for mutual and balanced force reductions at the very time the Russians were showing some interest in it.

Mitchell Sharp, the Canadian foreign minister, pushed for the appointment of a single man or a single nation to represent the alliance in exploratory talks with the Eastern bloc on balanced force reductions.

Mr. Sharp withdrew his proposal when Mr. Rogers offered to include the promise to appoint such a representative together with the proposal for a deputy foreign ministers' meeting.

The meeting, for which a time is to be set later, will involve officials of 14 of the 15 NATO countries. France, which contributes no troops to NATO, has never been associated with the mutual force reductions plan, and thus will not participate this summer.

The United States will be represented by John Irwin, under-secretary of state. Countries which do not have "deputy foreign ministers" will send officials of equivalent rank.

[From the New York Times, June 5, 1971]

**NATO SEEKS TALKS WITH SOVIET BLOC ON CUT IN TROOPS—MINISTERS ANNOUNCE PLANS FOR EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION ON MUTUAL REDUCTIONS—SESSION IN LISBON ENDS—COMMUNIQUE ALSO CALLS FOR MEETING OF ALLIANCE SOON TO STUDY ANY CONTACTS**  
(By Drew Middleton)

LISBON, June 4.—The North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided today to seek exploratory talks with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies on "mutual and balanced force reductions" in Central Europe.

This decision was announced in a communique at the end of a two-day meeting here of the foreign ministers of the 15-nation Atlantic alliance. This was NATO's response to recent Soviet overtures for the negotiation of troop cuts.

However, the paragraphs dealing with the troop-cut issue represented the views of only 14 of the 15 NATO governments. France, which withdrew from the integrated military command of the alliance in 1966, does not approve of bloc-to-bloc diplomacy.

The 14 powers supporting movement toward force reductions stressed a desire to "move as soon as practicable" toward negotiations.

#### WOULD REVIEW CONTACTS

Adopting a suggestion put forward yesterday by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, they called for a meeting in Brussels "at an early date" of deputy foreign ministers of the NATO countries or officials of comparable rank. This meeting would review diplomatic contacts being made by alliance members with the Russians and their allies on the troop-cut question and consult on "substantive and procedural approaches" to a mutual reduction of forces.

The ministers, the communique said, "further announced their willingness to appoint, at the appropriate time, a representative or representatives who would be responsible to the [NATO ministerial] council for conducting further exploratory talks with the Soviet Government and eventually to work out the

time, place, arrangement and agenda for negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions."

The timing of the allied moves, according to United States officials, was left flexible. Some other delegations considered the timing vague.

According to the United States sources, if discussions in Moscow or western capitals give promise of serious negotiations, then the representative or representatives of the Atlantic alliance could begin their exploring talks fairly soon.

However, these sources said, the envoy or envoys probably will begin soundings in East European capitals after the deputy foreign ministers meet in Brussels in the autumn.

Manlio Brosio, who will retire as Secretary General on Oct. 1, is considered the most likely choice as NATO's envoy to the east. However, United States and other officials emphasized that no decision had been reached on any envoys.

Mr. Brosio is to be succeeded as Secretary General of the alliance by Dr. Joseph M.A.H. Luns, the Netherlands Foreign Minister for more than 19 years. The ministerial council invited Dr. Luns to take the position at this afternoon's closing session.

The communique paragraph proposing the appointment of an envoy was drafted by Mr. Rogers and adopted without change by the council.

The ministers noted in the communique that the Soviet suggestion of exploratory talks on cuts in military forces and armaments in Central Europe had followed by three years their own offer of negotiations. This offer came at a NATO meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland.

#### OFFER MADE BY BREZHNEV

The Soviet offer came in a speech made on May 14 by Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Communist party leader.

Diplomats here agreed that the alliance, on the basis of the communique, could hardly be said to be rushing headlong towards talks with the Russians. However, the consensus, which included the Americans, was that the proposals would demonstrate to critical members of Congress in the United States that the alliance had taken action to meet the Soviet overture.

The ministers made clear that a settlement of Berlin's future is not a condition of the talks, but that it remains so for the conference on European security the Warsaw pact has sought since 1968.

The ministers noted that the negotiations on the status of the divided city and access to it from West Germany by the United States, British and French Ambassadors for the West, and the Soviet Ambassador had entered a more active phase and that "progress has been registered."

The ministers set their next meeting in Brussels this December by which time they hope that negotiations on Berlin will have reached a successful conclusion "and that multilateral conversation in Europe may then be undertaken."

The Russians, the communique made clear, will not get the security conference unless the Berlin agreement meets the West's criteria. An agreement, it is said, must include unhindered movement of persons and goods between West Germany and West Berlin, improved opportunities for movement by residents of Western Berlin and respect for the relationship between it and the federal government in Bonn as this relationship has developed under the three Western powers in the city.

While Berlin does not directly affect progress toward talks on force reductions, United States officials stressed that progress there would speed the entire effort aimed at an

East-West detente. This would apply, especially, United States officials said, to a Soviet guarantee of access routes to the city through East Germany.

[From the New York Times, June 5, 1971]

#### COMMUNIQUE BY NATO MINISTERS' LISBON MEETING

1

The North Atlantic Council met in ministerial session in Lisbon on 3d and 4th June, 1971.

2

The continuing political aim of the Atlantic alliance is to seek peace through initiatives designed to relax tensions and to establish a just and durable peaceful order in Europe, accompanied by effective security guarantees. The alliance remains indispensable to peace and stability in Europe and to the security of all its members.

3

Ministers reviewed the international situation, concentrating their attention on Europe and the Mediterranean.

4

They assessed the state of progress of the several initiatives which allied countries had undertaken within the framework of the established policy of the allegiance to intensify contacts, explorations and negotiations with members of the Warsaw Pact and other European states. The purpose of all these initiatives is to seek just solutions to the fundamental problems of European security and thus to achieve a genuine improvement of East-West relations. They noted with satisfaction the results obtained and expressed the hope that the continuation of these efforts would lead to further progress helping the development of detente. The allies have consulted and will continue to consult closely on these diplomatic activities.

5

Ministers welcomed the continued negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. with the aim of placing limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms. They noted the useful discussions held in the North Atlantic Council on this subject. Ministers also welcomed the agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. announced on 20th May, regarding the framework for further negotiations, and expressed the sincere hope that it would facilitate discussions leading to the early achievement of concrete results enhancing the common security interests of the North Atlantic alliance and stability in the world.

6

In reviewing the Berlin question, ministers underlined the necessity of alleviating the causes of insecurity in and around the city. During the past quarter of a century, much of the tension which has characterized East-West relations in Europe has stemmed from the situation in and around Berlin. Thus, the ministers would regard the successful outcome of the Berlin talks as an encouraging indication of the willingness of the Soviet Union to join in the efforts of the alliance to achieve a meaningful and lasting improvement of East-West relations in Europe.

7

Ministers therefore reaffirmed their full support for the efforts of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States to reach an agreement on Berlin. They shared the view of the three governments that the aim of the negotiations should be to achieve specific improvements on firm commitments without prejudice to the status of Berlin. In this context, they emphasized the importance of reaching agreement on unhindered movement of per-

sons and good between the Federal Republic of Germany and Western sectors of Berlin, on improved opportunities for movement by residents of the Western sectors, and on respect for the relationship between the Western sectors and the Federal Republic as it has developed with the approval of the three governments.

8

Ministers were of the view that progress in the talks between German authorities on a *modus vivendi*, taking into account the special situation in Germany, would be an important contribution to a relaxation of tension in Europe.

9

Ministers, having reviewed the prospects for the establishment of multilateral contacts relating to the essential problems of security and cooperation in Europe, again emphasized the importance they attach to the successful conclusion of the negotiations on Berlin. They noted with satisfaction that these negotiations have entered into a more active phase and have enabled progress to be registered in recent weeks. They hope that before their next meeting the negotiations on Berlin will have reached a successful conclusion and that multilateral conversations intended to lead to a conference on security and co-operation in Europe may then be undertaken. In this spirit they invited the Council in permanent session to continue, in the framework of its normal consultations on the international situation, its periodic review of the results achieved in all contacts and talks relative to security and cooperation in Europe, so that it could without delay take a position on the opening of multilateral talks.

10

In anticipation of these multilateral contacts, the Council in permanent session actively pursued preparations for discussions on the substance and procedures of possible East-West negotiations, and submitted a report to this effect to ministers.

The report stressed that such negotiations would have to be founded on universal respect for the principles governing relations between states as cited by ministers in previous communiqués and declarations. The various prospects for developing cooperation between East and West in the economic, technical, scientific, cultural and environmental fields were closely examined. The report also reviewed in detail the essential elements of which agreement would be desirable in order to promote the freer movement of people, ideas and information so necessary to the development of international cooperation in all fields.

11

Ministers noted these studies and instructed the Council in permanent session to continue them pending the initiation of multilateral contacts between East and West. Ministers stressed that they would press on with their bilateral exploratory conversations with all interested states.

12

Ministers took note of the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared by the Council in permanent session. While welcoming the efforts currently undertaken to re-establish peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, they observed that developments in the area as a whole continue to give cause for concern. In the light of the conclusion of this report, they instructed the Council in permanent session to continue consultations on this situation and to report thereon at their next meeting.

13

The allied governments which issue the declarations at Reykjavik in 1968 and Rome

in 1970 and which subscribed to Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Brussels communiqué of 1970 have consistently urged the Soviet Union and other European countries to discuss mutual and balanced force reductions.

They reaffirmed that the reduction of the military confrontation in Europe—at which M.B.F.R. (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) is aiming—is essential for increased security and stability.

14

Against this background, ministers representing these governments welcomed the response of Soviet leaders indicating possible readiness to consider reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. These Soviet reactions, which require further clarification, are, together with those of other states, receiving the closest attention of the alliance.

15

In the effort to determine whether common ground exists on which to base negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions, these ministers expressed the agreement of their governments to continue and intensify explorations with the Soviet Union and also with other interested governments on the basis of the considerations outlined in Paragraph 3 of the Rome declaration. They expressed their intention to move as soon as may be practical to negotiations. To this end these ministers agreed that deputy foreign ministers or high officials should meet at Brussels at an early date to review the results of the exploratory contacts and to consult on substantive and procedural approaches to mutual and balanced force reductions.

16

These ministers further announced their willingness to appoint, at the appropriate time, a representative or representatives, who would be responsible to the Council for conducting further exploratory talks with the Soviet Government and the other interested governments, and eventually to work out the time, place, arrangements and agenda for negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions.

17

Reviewing other developments in the field of arms control and disarmament, these ministers noted as a significant step forward the conclusion of a treaty banning the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor. Allied ministers noted with satisfaction the work done by the conference of the Committee on Disarmament with a view to reaching an agreement eliminating bacteriological weapons and toxins. They reaffirmed the importance they attach to effective and adequately verified arms limitation and disarmament measures consistent with the security of all states, and invited the Council in permanent session to continue to pursue the alliance efforts and studies in all fields related to arms control and disarmament.

18

Ministers expressed satisfaction at the impressive progress achieved by the committee on the challenges of modern society as reported by the Secretary General. They noted particularly the important contribution made by the allies to combat the pollution on the seas by oil and to the development of road safety. They welcomed the fact that intensive work was under way on problems relating to coastal and inland water pollution and disaster assistance. They further welcomed the contribution the committee had made to alerting governments and public opinion to the problems of modern technology, as well as to the dangers for modern society arising from the deterioration of the environment. They observed that many coun-

tries of the alliance have equipped themselves with new government structures to cope with such problems. Ministers took special note of the fact that the benefits of allied efforts had not been confined to the countries of the alliance but were being felt in other countries as well as in broader based international organizations.

19

Ministers expressed their regret at the impending departure of Mr. Manlio Brosio who had informed them of his intention to resign as Secretary General of the organization. In their tributes to Mr. Brosio, ministers dwelt on his outstanding stewardship in often difficult circumstances and stressed the patience and perseverance which have marked his untiring work for both defense and détente. They expressed to him their deep appreciation for the distinguished service he has rendered to the alliance and to peace in the past seven years.

20

The Council invited Mr. Joseph Luns, Foreign Minister of The Netherlands, to become Secretary General of the organization as from Oct. 1, 1971. Mr. Luns informed the Council of his acceptance of this invitation.

21

The next ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council will be held in Brussels in December 1971.

22

Ministers requested the Foreign Minister of Italy, as President of the Council, to transmit this communiqué on their behalf through diplomatic channels to all other interested parties including neutral and non-aligned governments.

[From the Washington Post, June 6, 1971]

NATO AFTER LISBON

NATO's decision at Lisbon to have its members go ahead separately to scout Soviet intentions on European force reductions sounds like the old NATO molasses but actually is a good deal better. Much Western thinking on the issue has been done and is even public, but nobody knows how much thinking on it has been done in Moscow. Mr. Nixon says he's readied the American "analytical building blocks" of a European agreement but, in distinction to SALT, he must consult with the Allies—necessarily a time-consuming process and one that does not burden Moscow. Moreover, the parity concept guiding SALT is greatly complicated in the European context by the fact that Soviet troops would withdraw a few hundred miles and remain as ready as the Kremlin chooses, while American troops would withdraw beyond the triple barrier of the Atlantic Ocean, the American Congress, and the public mood. So to play for time as NATO did at Lisbon is understandable. The point is to use that time well.

Here it will be crucial to see which of the two broad tactics Moscow will use. It may decide to go down the propaganda path and try to split Europe off from the United States and to split Western public opinion off from its various governments. Our own judgment is that this tactic would produce only bitterness and stagnation but one can understand why the something-for-nothing advocates in the Kremlin might want to give it a whirl. The second tactic possible for the Kremlin is to permit progress on Berlin. It is the belief in NATO, for the best of reasons, that if the security of a single city cannot be improved, it is silly to talk of improving the security of a whole continent. West Germany has fairly indicated its own reasonableness but it remains for Moscow to "deliver" East Germany. That is, in return for steps toward what it will consider as Western recognition

of its sovereignty, East Germany must normalize access to Berlin and confirm the security, status and livability of the isolated city.

At Lisbon the Allies firmly insisted on progress toward a Berlin agreement. Their emphasis should be understood everywhere as proof that NATO does not intend to open the most important negotiation in its history with a sellout of its most vulnerable member.

#### CAPITOL STUFF

(By Jerry Greene)

WASHINGTON.—Secretary of State William Rogers' damper on a quick deal with Russia for mutual reduction of forces in Europe found no favor with Senate critics here—but it put the euphoric bubbling over a great thaw in the cold war back into perspective.

This business of reaching an accord with the Communists—Russian, Chinese, Korean or Vietnamese—is going to be a long, slow process of the sort to try American patience.

Sen. Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) served notice, after the Nato foreign ministers at Lisbon acclaimed the Rogers appeal for delay in negotiations, that he intends to keep up pressure for a cutback in U.S. troop strength in Europe. It was the Mansfield move to slash the forces by half that whipped the Senate to a frenzy a couple of weeks back. He was beaten, 61-36, but it took all the heat President Nixon could generate to do it.

Now the Nato nations are able to notify Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev that they will indeed be glad to meet his offer to "taste the wine"—but only "as soon as it appears practicable." That will be a good many months hence.

Despite his continuing warnings that too much should not be expected too soon from the refreshing signs of cracks in the Iron and Bamboo curtains, Nixon must bear the blame for creating a surge of hope perhaps beyond the realities. He has been enthusiastic and optimistic since Red China opened the doors a little in the great Ping-Pong diplomatic gambit; he has cheered the Brezhnev acceptance, or seeming acceptance, of a three-year-old Nato invitation to talk of troop reductions. He was ecstatic over a break in the strategic arms limitation negotiations.

To a group of editors and publishers at Birmingham, Ala., a couple of weeks ago, Nixon said: "... If there was ever a new era in the field of foreign policy, we are now in the middle of it. We are on the threshold of it.

"I think the most significant changes in the relations between major nations in the world are taking place now than at any period since World War II."

With respectable modesty, the President did not claim all credit for the maybe break in the curtains; he acknowledged only "a role" for his administration in the climax of long-nourished developments.

The fact of the matter is that the U.S.—and the other Western powers—have been trying to get some sort of reasonable accord with Russia for the last 25 years. The record includes numerous approaches and invitations, certainly by every American administration.

Perhaps the most significant was the Baruch plan of 1946. As former Atomic Energy Commissioner Thomas Murray described it: "At a time when we enjoyed an absolute monopoly of atomic energy and the Soviets were three years away from their first atomic achievement, we took the unprecedented step of offering to relinquish our massive power, the key to our strategic security, to an international atomic authority within the UN. . . . Nevertheless—and this has often struck me as even more incredible than our offer itself—the Soviet Union rejected it out of hand."

Fourteen years later, the U.S. laid before the UN General Assembly what was called "a program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world." This was optimism carried to the outer limits.

#### LANGUAGE IS BROAD AND SWEEPING

In this remarkable document the U.S. proposed "disbanding of all national forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever . . . the elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery . . ."

And, all the while, the Communists—Russian and Chinese and other assorted varieties—have maintained a drumfire of invective against U.S. imperialism and "threats" against the designs of the world socialists.

If there has been anything other than reaction and counter-punching in the U.S. foreign policy during these decades, it fails to show in the records. Nato itself was a reaction, the organization of 12 Western allies after Communists with Russian support had seized control of Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Czechoslovakia and set up a network of military power through 23 bilateral treaties.

There is a good deal of additional evidence of the make-do, counterpunch sort of operations in American foreign affairs.

#### KOREA MERELY HEADS THE LIST

The North Korean Communist attack in 1950—spurred by the Russians—was the most spectacular example before Vietnam. Russia put the missiles in Cuba before, not after, the late President Kennedy took action. Russia built the first intercontinental missiles—and the first antiballistic missile system.

A very good case can be made that the U.S. must have done something right in its foreign policy these last 25 years, standing firmly by allies and its treaties, to finally bring signs of interest in a thaw from Moscow and Peking. But, as Rogers made the point in Lisbon, the rest of it won't come easily or quickly either.

The impatient, the over-anxious for instant peace, might find timely guidance in a comment about disarmament dealing with Russia made by former President Harry Truman in 1959: "As long as we are alert, the longer we talk, the better our chances will be of avoiding a third world war. And the longer we talk, the better the chances are of not rushing into ill-considered compromises or sacrificing the rights of other people."

[From the New York Times, June 6, 1971]

#### OUR SUPERPOWER ERA WANES

(By C. L. Sulzberger)

BERNAY, FRANCE.—At the end of a long journey through many lands and five continents, the American traveler is forced to conclude that the United States is entering a new and diminishing phase of national history and international influence. The period of dominance that marked the generation after World War II is rapidly eroding; there never was an American century.

Whether this is good for the U.S.A. or for the world is not the issue and can only be assayed by historians. But there is no doubt that decreasing power and greater reluctance to express that power accord with the present humor of an American generation that is querulous, morally confused, obsessed with problems frequently magnified beyond recognition, and rendered both illogical and hysterical by the tragic Indochina war.

The positive side of the coin is that the U.S. Government's realistic awareness of this mood has induced it to extricate itself from an East Asian policy which the people no longer support, slowly withdrawing from the Vietnam conflict and commitments to Taiwan. Likewise, recognition of public desires has added impetus to efforts to arrange a halt in the arms race.

Nevertheless, the insistent desire of so many vociferous Americans to pull back from overseas commitments hampers Washington in efforts to rearrange an international balance without unnecessary sacrifice.

Despite the defeat of Senator Mansfield's

attempt to amputate our NATO force, pressure continues for reducing this too rapidly and too much, for terminating radio propaganda, for reacting with protective tariffs against momentary trade disadvantages and for opting out of some phases of the technology race, like the supersonic air transport field which has been left to Russia and West Europe.

Even in the arms export field, the U.S.A. is about to fall behind. Gen. Pierre Gallois, a French military intellectual, writes that "aside from the F-4 Phantom . . . the United States has no real military aircraft to offer the rest of the world" and that future planes like the F-111, F-14 and F-15 are so heavy and expensive that they can claim only a limited market in West Germany, Australia and Japan.

Obviously, there is no doubt that the U.S.S.R. continues slowly if undramatically to gain power and prestige in the realms of space, nuclear arms, weapons, naval diplomacy and international politics, even while it plays down its ideological and revolutionary role.

The United States bit off more than it could chew when, after World War II, it undertook to fill political or economic vacuums in the Atlantic, Pacific, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean areas. Quite apart from new popular concepts in the generation born since 1945, economics alone forced an American re-examination.

The dollar has lost and continues to lose value. The vast U.S. investment in the Common Market area will be gradually cut down by the West Europeans themselves. We have dealt ourselves out of the next generation of air transport competition and are already falling behind to Russia and France in arms sales, which we may not regard as a clean enterprise but which will continue until the millennium. And more and more we are lagging in the world trade race vis-a-vis West Germany and Japan, whose economies we restored after their defeat in 1945.

Ideologically we are groping our way back to a policy of unbiased realism, seeking to accept with equal impartiality friendship with China, Russia, Yugoslavia and other Communist lands plus the heirs in Spain, Greece and Brazil of what used to be called fascism in a simple Manichean age.

In the Middle East we find after almost a quarter century of dilemma that we are still torn between our philosophical and political sympathies for Israel and our material and strategic hopes in the Arab world. The only area where our prestige remains solid is the former.

Our influence has waned in U.N., Latin America, Western Europe, Western and Southern Asia and much of Africa. This readjustment was perhaps inevitable and the ultimate result may see the United States assuming a logically rightful place in the world, somewhere between great power and superpower status.

Possibly, with its own agricultural difficulties, its economic adjustments, its increasingly expensive overseas commitments, its troubles with China and its scarcely muffled internal dissension, the same thing could eventually happen in a similar way to Russia; but not yet.

Without doubt the world stature of the United States has declined, both absolutely and relatively. We can only pray the same trend will encompass the Soviet Union—although policy is not built on prayers.

[From the Boston Sunday Globe, June 6, 1971]

#### WITH SAFETY—U.S. TROOPS IN NATO CAN BE CUT BY 50 PERCENT

(By Otto Zausmer)

There have been about a half dozen incidents in the past two weeks which suggest willingness on all sides to reduce the tension and liquidate at least some part of the

Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Perhaps all, perhaps none of them will in the end lead to agreements.

But there is one major action that can be taken in spite of success or failure of current negotiations between the super powers; the United States can safely bring back at least half its troops stationed in Central Europe as part of NATO.

Premier Kosygin told German Chancellor Willy Brandt, as this column reported two months ago, that he was willing to let the United States take part in a European security meeting between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations. Last week, Mr. Kosygin confirmed this in his talks with Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau.

The SALT talks set for Finland in July have an agenda that at least permits optimism; the Big Four in Berlin, talking about relations between the Federal German Republic (West Germany) and the Communist East, are reported to have found at least a basis for a legal formula that would not jeopardize the safety of the city of Berlin; the War Ministers of NATO last week and the Foreign Ministers of NATO this week were less pessimistic about relaxing tensions than before.

Finally, Mr. Brezhnev, the Soviet Party Chief, twice mentioned his willingness to talk about bilateral reduction of military forces in Europe . . . without mentioning that he had thus accepted a suggestion made by NATO two years ago.

But independent of all this, there are reasons why the United States can bring back some of its troops from Europe, reducing its expenses without reducing its commitment. This is not neoisolationism. It's just common sense, accepting conditions as they are today.

Twenty years ago when NATO was set up in order to protect Western Europe from Soviet aggression the situation was quite different.

At that time the United States had drastically reduced its military forces while the Soviet Union had kept up nearly its World War II strength.

Western Europe was a wreck from the British Isles to the Iron Curtain: destroyed, impoverished, unable to defend itself and demoralized by want and fear.

At that time, it was only the United States which could protect Western Europe.

Today, Western Europe has been miraculously restored. In its economy, its morale, its industrial machine, and in its prestige.

There is no reason why a United Western Europe, united as it is in NATO, could not defend itself at least on the ground against a Communist invasion.

The vital contribution the United States would have to make is to provide nuclear defense. While Britain and France have their own nuclear weapons, they would be no match for the vast Soviet atomic arsenal and so what really is required is the American presence and the American nuclear power.

[From Life Magazine, June 11, 1971]

THE PRESIDENCY: THE OLD WARRIORS RALLY ROUND

(By Hugh Sidey)

The oval cabinet table was a deep, silky mahogany, the coffee cups were stamped with the presidential seal, the pewter ashtrays mostly unused, the gold magnetized pencils were meticulously lined up on pads for doodling or something more important.

Old Dean Acheson, 78, sat there precisely seven feet from Richard Nixon, directly across the table. Perhaps he was thinking that he would himself have made a much more suitable President, and also mulling over the memory of Nixon speaking derisively back in 1952 of Acheson's "College of

Cowardly Communist Containment." But just then Acheson and the others were considering the proposition that the United States Senate might vote to cut the NATO forces in half. Acheson's combative spirit rose. For the moment he was back in the federal trenches again, old wounds opened, hearing the commander-in-chief give the battle cry. What he had helped create was in jeopardy, "25 years of effort might be about to go down the tube."

Acheson straightened his back and his mustache bristled, just as it had long ago when he was secretary of state and America was running the world. "You are the President," he said, turning the full force of his personality on Nixon. "You tell them to go to hell."

The expression was vintage Acheson. The President must have been warmed by it, and by the occasion, as every President is when old enemies and antagonists answer the call. Wisely, Nixon did not tell the Senate "to go to hell," but went on to beat back the challenge by a vote of 61 to 36. The victory gave him profound satisfaction. But the meeting in the cabinet room with "the grand old warriors" had its special meaning.

They are a rare fraternity, these men who helped form the post-World War II world: Acheson, McCloy, Clay, Lodge, Norstad, Ball, Gruenther, Lemnitzer and others. They always answer the trumpet blast promptly: most of them arrived ten minutes early for the meeting with Nixon. They are gentlemen. Mannered. Informed. Bound to duty. They may not even like the President; a few present that day had felt his partisan scorn. But they revere the office of the presidency.

Most of them drifted out of official government ranks in the days of Truman and Eisenhower. They came back to counsel John Kennedy about Berlin and the Cuban missile crisis, and Lyndon Johnson had them in for Vietnam. Indeed, a meeting of "the wise men" (as they were named then) toward the end of L.B.J.'s time was one of the factors which shocked him into changing course in the war.

These men are like monuments, revered almost as much for what they stand for as what they have to say. Gen. Lucius Clay lingered once after a meeting with Truman two decades ago and successfully pleaded for an airlift to break the Berlin blockade. John J. McCloy, the first high commissioner of post-war Germany, was in Frankfurt on business in 1962 when he got a call and turned to the men with him. "Sorry, boys," he said, "I hate to drop names, but the President needs me." He flew home to lend a hand in the United Nations during the missile crisis. Lauris Norstad as air force deputy chief of staff in the late 1940s helped start the missile age.

Each has his style, his role. Acheson lays about with a heavy sword. During last month's meeting, when George Ball asked Nixon if he would compromise on NATO, Acheson thought Ball was recommending a compromise and he snorted that he couldn't disagree more with Ball. No, no, said the others, Ball was simply inquiring. "Well," rasped the haughty Acheson, "he is too damned subtle for me."

McCloy, sometimes considered ex-officio president of the group, reported to Nixon he earlier had laid siege to the editorial offices of the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post* and Time Inc. in search of support. "American troops on the ground in Germany are much more eloquent to the Germans than missile silos in North Dakota," he summed up.

Norstad was still the careful general, calculating forces and weapons and missions. "We need more flexibility in the NATO bow," he cautioned, using one of those favorite military metaphors. The current reduction proposal should be defeated, he said. But we

should "not get stuck in concrete." The best minds in the nation should be put to work on rethinking NATO's future.

Nixon himself had noted the strength of Germany and that she was "potentially the most difficult nation in all of Europe." General Clay echoed those thoughts. He was still convinced, he said, that cutting our forces in half would be tantamount to withdrawing from NATO and would "drive the Germans out of Europe toward the East."

The old warriors talked for an hour and a half that day. It was as if it had been when they were tossing around continents, and yet it wasn't, because their power had passed and the world had changed. Still, one could feel running beneath their words a quiet pride in the institution which had helped hold Europe together for 22 years. Maybe NATO wasn't a perfect creation, but it had worked well in the aftermath of World War II. There was also an unspoken understanding that a new age might be coming in international affairs, that NATO might have to change, that indeed this assembled group would before long start to pass, one by one, from public view.

They gave their statements of resolution to the press that evening, and then they were off into the night. A couple of drinks later they were telling—with magnificent embellishment in some cases—how they had bucked up the President once again. And so, in their special way, they had.

[From Life Magazine, June 6, 1971]

THE PRESIDENT'S WAR POWERS

In their frustration over the interminable and costly Vietnam war, a number of senators and congressmen have been moving over the past year or so to limit the President's war-making powers. Some of the recent proposals to limit the extension of the military draft or abolish it, as well as Senator Mansfield's bill to halve the U.S. military garrison in Europe, are ill-considered. But there is a good deal of merit in another movement, currently under way in the Senate, to restrict the President's power to take the nation into future wars.

In the isolated infant U.S. of 1787, the sparse language of the Constitution seemed sufficient to limit those powers. The President, the Founding Fathers agreed, should have the power as commander-in-chief to make war, but only after it had been declared by Congress. The last war explicitly declared by Congress, however, was in 1941, just after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. After World War II, with the U.S. emerging as world policeman and member of no fewer than eight foreign alliances, the President's powers became virtually unlimited, or at least, unchecked. From the standpoint of Congress, our participation in the Korean war was a presidential fait accompli, justified in part by our obligations as a United Nations member. As for Vietnam, it will be argued for years whether the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution was tantamount to a congressional declaration of war, as Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach later argued. But it was not presented to the American people, or to the Congress, as an explicit declaration of war. Senator Fulbright, who urged passage of that resolution, thinks he was deceived over what happened in the Tonkin Gulf (were those two American destroyers really attacked by North Vietnamese gunboats?). He has been suspicious of administration pronouncements ever since.

Senators Javits of New York, Eagleton of Missouri and Stennis of Mississippi—whose politics range from eastern liberal to southern conservative—have separately introduced resolutions which, while differing in certain details, would reassert Congress's power to declare war. The most recent of the three, introduced by Senator Stennis, would in

some ways place the most restraints on the President. With certain exceptions, it would prohibit the President from using the armed services in any future conflict without congressional authorization. The exceptions would apply only in emergency situations: the President could, on his own, order the armed forces to repel an attack on the U.S. by a foreign power, to prevent an imminent nuclear attack, or to evacuate American citizens from a foreign country if their lives were endangered. The emergency powers would be for a maximum of 30 days, and any extension would require congressional action.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers has opposed all three bills. In particular, he warns that any law circumscribing the President's powers raises the "grave risk of miscalculation by a potential enemy regarding the ability of the United States to act in a crisis." Even the Stennis resolution, however, allows considerable latitude. It probably would not have prohibited Eisenhower's landing of troops in Lebanon in 1958 or Johnson's in the Dominican Republic in 1965, nor would it have hamstrung President Kennedy in deploying naval vessels to deal with the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. On the other hand, the resolution would have made the U.S. involvement in Korea impossible without a specific declaration of war. And Congress would have had to face up to the issue of military involvement in Vietnam in the early 1960s, before the big buildup ordered by President Johnson, when American personnel were already in a period of transition from military advisers to combat soldiers.

The whole matter needs considerable study in a dispassionate atmosphere. The constitutional issues are exceedingly complex, and it is essential that any redressing of the President's virtually unlimited war-making powers not be at the expense of his ability to deter potential aggressors in a convincing fashion. But after two medium-sized wars that have taken 90,000 American lives, one undeclared and the other semideclared, the people are surely entitled to some congressional restraints on the executive branch. Vietnam in particular has been hard on presidential reputations, and this might be less true if Congress shared more in the deliberations, the knowledge and the responsibility. One of the lessons of the painful Vietnam experience is that the country should never again commit American lives to a long struggle on foreign shores unless the people's elected representatives explicitly authorize it.

[From the Los Angeles Times, June 6, 1971]  
WEST GERMANS FIND THEMSELVES WORRYING  
ABOUT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

(By Ernest Conine)

A high-ranking official of the West German government received an American visitor in his Bonn office not long ago. On a nearby table lay a newspaper emblazoned with pictures and headlines concerning the violence and mass arrests which had occurred in the course of an antiwar demonstration in Washington.

The visitor pointed to the newspaper and asked conversationally whether Germans ever find themselves getting nervous about the degree to which their security depends upon a nation suffering such obvious internal torment.

Instead of the polite, diplomatic disclaimer which the American expected, the German official shot back: "Of course we are nervous! How could we be otherwise when we look at what is going on in your country?"

It quickly transpired that he was speaking for himself, not for the German government, and that he was not really talking about demonstrations as such. As he put it, "If we were in a war as frustrating as yours in Vietnam, we would be having the same kind of

violence and unrest that you have. Probably worse."

What really worried him was the negative, neo-isolationist atmosphere which has become prevalent among both politicians and intellectuals—and the fact that America's allies can no longer feel confident in the consistency of American policy.

"We don't know what your policies will be from one year to the next," said the official.

Was he suggesting that Mr. Nixon's qualities of leadership were not all that they should be? Or was he referring to the possibility that Mr. Nixon will be a one-term President?

Both, it turned out.

"Not since John Kennedy," he said, "has there been an American President with the capacity both to see what needs to be done in the world, and to inspire faith among the people—in America and in other countries—that his decisions are right.

"Lyndon Johnson couldn't do it. Nixon obviously cannot do it. And I don't see anybody else on the horizon who can do it, either."

The Democratic presidential aspirants, in the German officials' view, are a disappointing lot from the foreign policy viewpoint.

A few months ago, when Sen Edmund Muskie (D-Me.) passed through Bonn during his trip to Moscow and Israel, Chancellor Willy Brandt seized the opportunity to explain why it would be dangerous—both to European security and the chance to work out a genuine detente with the Russians—to unilaterally withdraw any significant number of U.S. troops from West Germany.

Obviously, the chancellor was persuasive, for after the meeting Muskie reversed his position and came out against a reduction of U.S. forces without reciprocal action by the other side.

When Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) visited Bonn not long ago, Brandt saw the chance to make another convert. This time, however, it didn't work.

A few days later the Senate voted on Sen. Mike Mansfield's proposal to cut U.S. troop strength in Europe by 50%, whether or not the Russians are willing to do likewise.

The resolution was defeated, for now. But Kennedy voted for unilateral withdrawal. And so did three other Democratic presidential hopefuls: Sens. Birch Bayh, Harold Hughes and George McGovern.

Obviously, the question will come up again if an agreement for mutual withdrawal cannot be worked out relatively quickly with the Soviet Union. Next time, Mansfield is likely to win.

All this fills the high German official in question with foreboding.

He noted that Americans, and many Europeans, keep saying that the real deterrent to Soviet aggression is not the number of troops on the Western side, but Moscow's awareness of U.S. nuclear strength.

"The trouble is, though," the official said, "that the balance of power has been shifting in the Russian favor a long time."

Given this fact and the present atmosphere in America, he added, how can anybody believe any longer that it will be the Soviet premier and not the American President who will blink in case of a confrontation over Europe?

"Maybe, when realization of our vulnerability sinks in," he added, "Europeans will be shocked into getting together and really doing something for their own defense. But I doubt it."

It is far more likely, in his view, that Western Europe will seek security through accommodation with the Soviet Union—an accommodation which, in time, could take a form dangerous both to European independence and American interests.

The German official assured his visitor that he is more pessimistic than the Brandt government of which he is a part—that his views should not be taken as representative.

His implication was clear, though, that he expects to have a lot of company if the American disengagement from Europe—so visible now in the sentiment for troop withdrawal—continues.

As he told his visitor, "When I look back to the '20s and the '30s and '40s, I am impressed by how often it was the pessimists who were proved right."

[From the New York Times, June 11, 1971]

SWEET TALK AND SEMANTICS

(By C. L. Sulzberger)

PARIS—Soviet diplomacy is thrusting with unmistakable vigor for a European security conference to be convened as soon as possible. The idea is an old favorite of Moscow's but has been given obvious new life. Almost every Russian embassy on this Continent is pushing it and a deputy foreign minister was sent on tour by the Kremlin in Scandinavia and London to press for its attainment.

One may easily speculate on the reason for this fervor. The U.S.S.R. certainly doesn't like the warm breeze blowing between China and the United States while its own Chinese problems remain unsolved. It would obviously suit Soviet strategy to obtain further ease along its western border.

Moreover, Moscow sees the U.S.A. off balance in its relationship with NATO. Russia has negotiated an accord with the West Germans, while permitting the Poles and Czechs to initiate similar procedures, and Brezhnev, who asked for "a radical turn toward detente and peace on this Continent" ten weeks ago, has publicly favored ending the armaments race.

While this move helped defeat Senator Mansfield's effort to start unilateral American cuts in NATO defenses, the impact of Mansfield's attempt has left the United States diplomatically weaker. Washington must take special pains not to appear lagging in any trend toward mutual security or arms reduction.

The Russians want to use a European security conference as a first step in diminishing United States influence here, an influence which many Americans themselves (as Mansfield demonstrated) are ready to reduce and that is already perceptibly starting to decline.

Moscow feels it could then deal with Western Europe on a more free and easy basis, without any restrictions imposed by Washington, for example, on the sale of allied strategic goods. Slowly the Soviet Union might then turn this highly industrialized region into a kind of economic farm which would help accelerate Russia's own development.

A Western Europe no longer subject to any U.S. restraints could conceivably be developed into a workshop and bank for an apparently friendly and no longer threatening Soviet bloc. As a harbinger of future financial ties, Hungary and Bulgaria have already negotiated loan arrangements with West European banks that are recognized by the U.S.A. as sound institutions.

While the Kremlin's diplomats work with coordinated efficiency toward these aims, NATO sags. During Prime Minister Trudeau's visit to Moscow, for example, the Canadians were reluctant to tell Washington anything about their talks with Soviet leaders.

France, the North Atlantic pact's odd man in, continues to emphasize its independent position. While the U.S.A. again endorsed at NATO's Lisbon meeting the idea of mutual and balanced force reductions (by both East and West), it stressed that any multilateral "preparations" for a security conference must be preceded by a successful outcome to Berlin negotiations.

The French refuse to link the two topics and there have been hints that both Paris and Moscow would be ready to start security talks after only "progress" rather than

"success" in Berlin. The French want to keep flexible prior to the Paris visit of Brezhnev, the Soviet boss, late this summer.

The ice jam congealed over more than two decades with only relative and temporary thaws between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is now showing signs of really starting to fragment. Both coalitions are openly committed to the idea of force reductions and security talks although important semantic differences persist within the Western Alliance and between Washington and Moscow.

The relevance of China to all this is only conjectural. One doesn't even know whether Rumania's original-minded President Ceausescu went to Peking with a message to Mao Tse-tung from either Mr. Nixon, or Mr. Brezhnev, much less both. But what is patently evident is that a reduction of armaments costs and troop maintenance in Europe suits the economic requirements of both America and Russia at this moment.

Moreover, if the Kremlin reckons that the increasingly unbalanced internal position of the United States must be reflected by less U.S. external influence, it may now consider the moment opportune to press forward with old dreams. These dreams would weaken NATO's trans-Atlantic ties and secure an economic lien on what East Europe needs from West Europe. For this Moscow is ready to pay a price.

[From U.S. News & World Report, June 14, 1971]

#### WHY THE UNITED STATES MUST STAY IN EUROPE

(Exclusive interview with German Chancellor Willy Brandt)

Q. Mr. Chancellor, there are still some 300,000 U.S. servicemen in Europe, and about two-thirds of them are in Germany. Do you count on their remaining in such numbers indefinitely?

A. There is no such thing as "indefinitely" in history. But the President of the United States has made it clear that a major U.S. troop presence in Europe is both in the interest of the [North Atlantic] Alliance and of the United States itself.

I think the President is right. And, especially at this time, it would not make sense to start a unilateral weakening of the U.S. presence—when there may, for the first time, be a serious chance to enter into negotiations about a mutual reduction of East-West forces in Europe.

Q. Do you take seriously the Brezhnev-Kosygin remarks about possible talks on troop cutting?

A. I agree with those in Washington and elsewhere who think that one should not regard it just as a propaganda move. One should try to find out, by bilateral and other contacts, what they really mean.

In this case, I would take up Brezhnev's phrase: not to quarrel about the label on the bottle but to taste what is in it. And that you can do only through experience.

Q. In the absence of such an agreement, why are American troops needed in Europe in such great numbers? Are the reasons military or political?

A. It is a combination—a combination of military strength and political stability.

If I had to look upon it from an American point of view, I would value the fact that the United States is thus guaranteed a say in decisions about the future of Europe. But that is not my business. That is a point of interest to the Americans.

From the German point of view, the troop question includes another element: A serious reduction of U.S. military presence in Europe would raise the question of closing the gap—how to replace the U.S. troops. Many people might say, "Well, let the Germans do it." I think this, from the point of view of over-all East-West relations, would be unwise. I don't say this because I want to

avoid the problem of some additional financial burden, but there is a critical size, as far as the German military is concerned. German's numerical role within the Alliance is not only a problem out of the past for Eastern Europe; it is also still a problem of worries and doubts among some of our Western neighbors.

Q. Are you saying that Germany frightens its friends as much as its potential enemies?

A. I wouldn't go as far as that, but you know that parts of the past are still alive.

But beyond that: A strong and considerable U.S. presence is also the shield behind which the construction of a more united Western Europe will make more progress than it otherwise would. We are now at a point—this is in addition to the troop talks with Russia, whatever they may lead to—where Western Europe has a good chance to move faster ahead with economic integration—also closer political and, later on, as a consequence of that, military co-operation.

Q. From the Russian point of view, is one Western division like another? Would Moscow consider that a Belgian and a Dutch division add up to the same thing as two U.S. divisions?

A. This raises the problem of what divisions really mean nowadays. I have great respect for Russian divisions, but a Russian division is not as big a unit as what you in the United States call a division. But it's not only a problem of numbers. The question is: Should only one of the superpowers have a substantial presence in Europe or should both be present? And I mean present not only with their potential destructive power, deterrence, but also in the regular military setup.

Q. You mentioned political stability. Does that mean stability in the Communist states as well? Are American troops useful in that way—in helping keep stability in Eastern Europe as well—or is that stretching it too far?

A. I think that's going much too far. Unfortunately, if one can put it that way, the Russians themselves are strong enough to keep control over their part of the world, at least in Europe.

Q. Do you feel a Berlin settlement should be a prerequisite for an agreement on mutual troop reductions?

A. No. There has been some confusion about this, and it is understandable. Many people have come to believe that MBFR—which stands for Mutual Balanced Force Reductions—would be a point on the agenda of a future European security conference, or would at least be discussed at such a conference.

Of course, the Atlantic Alliance is on record as saying that the road to a conference on security in Europe—a conference in which the United States and Canada would have to take part—would only be open if a reasonable settlement were found for Berlin. And, if one could not solve a very important, but still limited, problem like Berlin, then there would not be much sense in hoping that larger issues could be discussed with any chance of a result at such a conference. So there a kind of link was established.

Now, however, Brezhnev in his Tiflis speech [on May 14] indicated that one might have exchanges of views or even negotiations on the MBFR problem outside a European conference.

It would not now make sense to create a Berlin link. That would be illogical, and it would confuse the entire scene. It would make people forget that the original initiative for discussions on MBFR was taken by NATO. I participated in that myself when I was Foreign Minister. At the Reykjavik NATO Council meeting in June, 1968, we gave what then was called a "signal" to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries that we would be interested in discus-

sions on the problem of mutually reducing our forces.

Berlin was, of course, a problem then, too. What I am saying is: We had this problem then and we did not create a link then, so why should we create it today?

What we would not like would be for someone, anyone, to use MBFR as a pretext for not going on with the Berlin talks with all the energy and intensity they demand.

Q. If you don't believe in German troops "filling the gap," what do you think your country and the other European nations can do to carry more of the NATO defense load?

A. Many people haven't paid too much attention to it, but recently something was done which is a matter of great importance. It is called EDIP—European Defense Improvement Program. For the first time since the Alliance started, a special program was drawn up by the European partners, in this case to improve infrastructure and communications.

Compared with defense budgets, it is not so impressive, but it can be an important starting point. I think it will be, in strengthening consciousness in Western Europe that activities of one's own must be developed in order to get to a better American-European balance in the Alliance.

#### WE MUST BRING FRANCE CLOSER

Q. How much new money is involved in this program?

A. The total is 420 million dollars. The share of the German Federal Republic is roughly 168 million dollars. In addition to this, we share some of the costs of the contribution made by the United Kingdom under this program.

All of this has another important aspect. During the years to come we must try to bring France in closer contact with the Alliance again, in a way which the French themselves can accept.

Q. Is this already happening?

A. A little bit. France participates in part of EDIP—in the communications part of it. But they stick to their principle—that they will not return to the integrated organization. And there is not much sense, I think, in quarreling about it. We will have to find pragmatic answers instead.

Our military people have very good relations with the French. We have some co-operation in the field of armaments. The British have some contacts of this kind. NATO in the Mediterranean has improved relations, too.

But I am thinking beyond these day-to-day things. I'm thinking about the future: EEC [European Economic Community] will be enlarged. Britain and some other countries will come in. This will lead to closer political co-operation and consultation—a new brand, a new style of political cooperation which will come to include problems of security.

By this I don't mean that I see any possibility of a European Defense Community. Even when President Pompidou [of France] and Prime Minister Heath [of Britain] got together, they excluded this prospect from their discussions. Still, the logic would be that closer political co-operation in Western Europe means inclusion of some aspects of security.

Q. Do you foresee Western Europe playing a bigger and more co-ordinated role in the world?

A. Yes. I think we are going into a period of greater Western European responsibility in the world. I think this will be good for the Alliance, and it will be good for the relationship between Europe and the United States.

I am sometimes amused when I read stories about the new triangular world situation into which we may get—Washington, Moscow and Peking. I myself think it will be more of a square or rectangular situation, with Western

Europe the fourth corner—at least if we look as far ahead as the end of this decade.

Q. Chancellor Brandt, during your Washington visit, are you going to get into detailed discussions of monetary problems with President Nixon?

A. Of course, I cannot say how detailed the discussions will be, but there is no doubt that we will discuss international monetary problems. There are some difficulties in the international monetary system with which we are faced. And as an important part of that, we have had some dollar-deutsche mark problems.

I'm afraid some of our friends in the United States believe that we started an action in order to bring as many dollars as possible into the Federal Republic of Germany and into the safes of our Federal Bank. This was not the case. It created certain problems for us to have an influx of 42 billion deutsche marks' worth of dollars during the period when we ourselves had taken 24 billion deutsche marks' worth out of circulation in order to bring about better stability. This was from January last year until this spring. So it would not make sense if President Nixon and I met and we did not discuss the problem.

I think I should add that there has been a very good and friendly contact between the two federal banks. I think if one asked those responsible in the United States, they would agree with me when I say that our Federal Bank, which is an absolutely independent body, has been more co-operative over the years in the monetary field than some of your other partners.

Q. Getting back to American troops in Europe: Are the 5,500 American soldiers stationed in West Berlin a permanent part of the landscape?

A. Berlin has a chance for the first time in many years to put its life on a more normal basis—if the four-power negotiations should succeed. But whatever the details of any four-power arrangement may be, it can only be based upon the status that West Berlin is under the supreme authority of the three Western powers. There is nothing to replace this.

Q. Do you consider that permanent?

A. As permanent as anything can be in international affairs. In the U.S., this may be regarded as a burden. But there are other elements. One is this: As Americans look around the world, I understand that they sometimes get tired of engagement at many places—and not all of them have been very successful. Now look at West Berlin: For years it looked hopeless. But, in spite of the geographic situation, a desert of rubble and ruins has been transformed into a modern city, connected with the Federal Republic. This has been possible only under the protective roof of the United States and its allies. I think this is something of which the U.S. can be proud.

Secondly, being in Berlin means maintaining one's right to help decide which role Germany or the two Germanys might have in a European system of security and co-operation in the future.

Q. Do you worry about a surge of American isolationism?

A. No. Of course, I would not like to interfere with discussions in the U.S. Senate about unilateral troop cuts in Germany. But what I would like to say is this: I understand the feelings which result from years and years of heavy commitment—some of your people say overcommitment. And, at least as important as this, there are all the big problems which an industrial society like the United States faces—urban development and what not—in many areas.

So I could very well understand that there would be important tendencies toward concentrating as much as possible upon national problems and tasks. But this would not, as far as I can see, lead to isolationism,

because isolationism in the traditional sense of the word would go against the interests of the United States.

Q. In what way?

A. The United States, in view of its trade and other interests, cannot be inward-looking. Or let me put it another way: A world power—there are not many world powers nowadays—cannot be an isolationist power in the old sense. If you reach the level of world power, a certain kind of commitment and world responsibility results from it. I think this makes isolationism impossible.

#### "SOME PROGRESS" ON BERLIN TALKS

Q. On the four-power talks in Berlin—how are they going? Are they stalemated?

A. I am a little bit reluctant to answer that because I am not at that conference table. But, of course, we are in close contact. I would not give too optimistic a picture as a result of my reports, but I have the impression that some progress has been made.

Q. What accounts for the relatively stubborn Soviet position? Are they influenced by the East Germans?

A. The Russians stick to certain principles, including legalistic positions. And the GDR [German Democratic Republic] certainly plays a role.

Years ago, one was accustomed to look upon East Germany purely as a satellite. Of course, it still is very much dependent upon the Soviet Union and upon the presence of Soviet forces in many fields, but one should not forget that as the years have passed East Germany has become an important partner, in some areas the most important ally, of the Soviet Union.

My impression is that, in their talks with the three Western powers, the Soviets always include the result of their consultations with East Berlin.

Q. Do you see any changes taking place in East German attitudes because of the recent switch in leadership there?

A. We have only seen the beginning of regrouping of leaders there. During the months ahead, we will see more changes taking place. Let me put it cautiously: I cannot see anything which would reduce the Soviet Union's influence vis-a-vis East Germany as a result of these changes.

Q. Is the connection between the Berlin talks and ratification of your treaties with Moscow and Warsaw an indissoluble one?

A. Yes, but not in a legal sense. At least as far as my Government is concerned, we have always made it clear that this is not a legal thing. It is a political thing. We made this very clear even before we signed the treaty in Moscow August 12 last year.

I think this was and is understood: If we are going to renounce the use of force, if we are going to have a *modus vivendi*, this could not exclude West Berlin, which is closely interconnected with the Federal Republic of Germany. Or to put it another way: It would just not make sense to normalize relations between Bonn and Moscow and, at the same time, leave aside Berlin as a remaining island of the cold war.

Sometimes our normalization of relations is misunderstood. Some people believe that we want to move far ahead of our Western colleagues. The real situation, of course, is that our relations with Moscow were much worse than those of other Western nations, and we want to have working relations at least as normal as our main Western partners have. This also will give us a more-equal position in the talks both in the West and in East-West relations.

Q. The Polish treaty you signed apparently is going to take a back seat to the Soviet treaty when it comes to ratification. Is that your choice or theirs?

A. I wouldn't call it anyone's choice. This is what you call in your language one of the facts of life.

When I was in Poland in December the

leaders—and I mean leaders who have not since been replaced—told me frankly, and they said it in public as well, that since we had signed our treaty with the Soviet Union first and with Poland second, we should go on in this order.

This is, of course, not only a matter of protocol. This also includes problems of political co-ordination within the Warsaw Pact with which I would not interfere.

Q. Since you haven't yet ratified the first two treaties, what is the purpose in discussing pacts with other East European countries?

A. Well, one should make a difference there between the Czechs and the Hungarians or the Bulgarians. In the last two cases we have talks on trade and other practical matters. But with Czechoslovakia it was interest on their side that started the talks. We had said when my Government started in October, 1969, that we are ready to establish normal diplomatic relations with any state which has the same wish. And, in the meantime, we would be prepared to develop our trade relations.

Now, since the Czechs showed interest in discussing problems which might lead up to diplomatic relations, we could not refuse. And we, of course, have a special interest there because the Czechs are our immediate neighbors.

Q. Is there any connection between your treaty with Russia and Poland and a possible American troop reduction? In other words, does it make an accommodation with the East more desirable?

A. No. I would rather turn the argument around. I have the impression that American interest in having a considerable presence in Europe has, at least in responsible circles, not been weakened but strengthened as the result of this rather interesting process of West European integration and desire for more communication and co-operation between the parts of Europe.

But whatever we have tried to do and are going on to do vis-a-vis Eastern Europe has nothing to do with replacing factors with which we live, either U.S. presence or the Alliance. It is the other way around.

We have developed our policy within the framework of the Alliance, based on close contact and consultation with our partners. And many people who didn't understand it well enough last year I think understand it better today: U.S.-Soviet arms talks, MBFR, Berlin negotiations, preparatory talks about an eventual conference on European security, plus our specific, even if limited, activities—they all belong together.

There should be no doubt that for the Federal Republic of Germany our policy is not to replace any of our connections with the West. Our policy is possible only against the background of our membership within the Alliance and our strong participation in the process of West European unification.

Q. It has been suggested that when the Berlin wall was built in 1961, you personally became somewhat disenchanted with the reliability of the U.S. commitment. Is that true?

A. No, not at all, as far as reliability is concerned. But I learned, as others in Europe and in the United States did then, where exactly the area of commitment ended.

#### IN THE WAKE OF THE POLISH RIOTS

Q. On another subject: Do you think there is weakening of Soviet control in Eastern Europe since the December riots in Poland?

A. I hope I am not making things look better than they really are, but I think two things are very interesting:

First, if we look back over the years since the end of the war, there have been a series of difficulties in various countries of the Soviet bloc. But these difficulties in Poland were the first ones which were not described as counterrevolutionary movements. The

Poles themselves presented them as difficulties which they had with their economic system: workers being discontented with their working conditions, housewives and others not being pleased with what they could get or not get in the shops. And, if we still get this same answer a year from now, if the argument has not reverted to a question of "a fight with counterrevolutionaries," then this could indicate a very important thing.

The second point is: The Polish internal difficulty is the first in which neither Germany nor the United States has been blamed for having organized the troubles.

These things should not be overestimated, but both elements are interesting for an analysis of the existing situation.

Q. Do you think we have seen an end to the use of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe—say, as in the Czechoslovak uprising?

A. I think that has first to do with the ideas of Soviet generals. I could imagine that the ideas of Soviet generals don't always correspond with the ideas of political leaders. They do not always correspond in our part of the world. That's quite natural, because everyone has his own area of responsibility.

The Czechoslovak crisis must have led to second thoughts on the part of more than one leader of the Soviet Union. I do not know too much about it, and I have had no chance to discuss it directly, but I would not be surprised if there is more than one responsible Soviet leader today who thinks that the way the crisis was handled might have been counterproductive.

Q. Has any real progress been made in your talks with the East Germans?

A. No. I had those two talks with Willi Stoph, the Chairman of their Council of Ministers, last year. One was in his area, one in mine. We presented to them what we called the 20 points, our basis for possible further discussions in order to get agreements between the two parties. But this didn't lead very far.

Then, since the end of last year, we have had—once a month, sometimes twice a month—meetings of high officials from both sides. They have gone on without any excitement and they have not reached a point which would justify any kind of announcement.

I think it is better that they meet than that they should not meet. They sometimes bring to each other's notice smaller things in which one side or the other is interested. But apart from that it is more an exchange of views on future developments, especially in the field of communications, traffic and other practical things, but without any real progress in sight.

#### BACK OF EAST GERMANY'S ISOLATION

Q. Why do the rulers in East Germany still feel it necessary to run things the way they do—shooting would-be defectors, for example?

A. East Germany has made remarkable progress. One has to admit that, whether one likes their methods or not. The figures show it, especially in the various branches of their industry—and the standard of living is not so bad, especially if you compare it with other countries in the Eastern bloc. The comparison with us is not so favorable, because every time they think they are getting closer to us we move ahead, too.

But apart from the material difference there still is and will be for a long time to come a general feeling of closeness to West Germany, of belonging together because of family links, history, cultural links, etc. But those who rule that other part of Germany believe they still need a period of isolating themselves and their people as much as possible. They need it in order to get stability and to develop a kind of identity of the people with the state. Only after they have gone through this period will it be possible for them to accept the kind of communication

which goes on today between the Federal Republic and other Communist states.

This, of course, is somewhat absurd. Our people can go to Bulgaria and to Rumania—hundreds of thousands do—and they meet their East German relatives on the shores of the Black Sea. This belongs to the ridiculous realities of the world.

But I think the main argument for the East German Government is that more communication, even if it were limited, would go against their dominating interest of stabilizing their regime.

Q. Chancellor Brandt—to return to your visit to Washington—have we covered all the subjects that are likely to arise in your talks with Mr. Nixon?

A. We already mentioned Berlin, we already mentioned MBFR and interrelated problems, we also mentioned NATO. I think a fourth main point will be a subject which I brought up last year but which has become a much more important subject this year. This is the future relationship between the enlarging European Community and the United States.

Q. Do you have no doubt about its enlargement?

A. I have no real doubts about it. I think this will happen. The United States always has been in favor of this development. The United States must have known that this also would create certain problems. I am with those who think that we must find ways and means of avoiding unnecessary areas of economic conflict. That means Americans and Europeans must meet often enough and at a high enough level to accomplish that.

Q. To head off a trade war, for example?

A. I do not see the danger of a trade war. There will be areas where our interests do not correspond, but we have to limit them as much as possible and find reasonable rules for living with conflicting interests. I think we must move in the direction of partnership, especially as far as the growing European Community and the United States are concerned.

#### WHAT TO DO ABOUT RED CHINA

Q. Will you and Mr. Nixon get into more remote areas, such as the new U.S. relationship with China?

A. China is of course also a very interesting subject for us. We have trade relations. But the political problem is not the same for us as it is for the United States. My position on this is known in Washington, and there is no misunderstanding about it.

Dealing with both great Communist powers is, I think, a necessity from the point of view of the United States.

Then there are other nations—either very small, or medium-sized powers like ourselves—who have been active in establishing relations with China.

As for ourselves, you know there was a time some years ago when a German Government wanted to establish relations with China, and the United States Government didn't like it. But in our situation now, we must not overlook—to put it in a very simple way—that Russia is much closer to us than China. We understand that China will have to play her role in the future in the organized family of nations and in international cooperation. And we are interested in having relations with that great nation—great because of its history and culture. But we must not create mistrust. We must not create the impression of trying to play on controversies between China and Russia.

I said in a TV discussion recently that sometimes I think of a story which is told about the time of World War II. A father in Berlin—at that time things had already developed rather badly for Germany—took a globe to explain to his little son where Germany was located and how small it was compared with Russia. After the father had explained this, the little boy asked, "Does Der Führer know this?"

I want everyone to understand that this Government knows where Germany is located. As a result of the past and of our situation of being a divided nation with a number of unsettled problems with Eastern Europe, we must make more progress in this area before we join others in normalizing our relations with China.

I don't underestimate the importance of China or our future interest in relations with China. But in this case—and I hope this is not misunderstood if it is read in Peking—I have to say, first things first.

#### REPORT ON FIRST MONTH'S OPERATION OF AMTRAK

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, it was with considerable optimism that I read the article in the Washington Evening Star, of Wednesday, June 9, 1971, concerning the first month's operation of our new rail system, Amtrak. Mr. Roger Lewis, President of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation—Amtrak—says the major objective is to improve the service. That means finding where the service is improvable. In order to compete, especially with airlines, Mr. Lewis says, "We've got to offer airline quality service." This requires high density markets, a high priority in market research, experimentation, and service improvements.

Our beleaguered rail industry has responded to the changes being guided by the management of Amtrak. As expected, it will take time before the system can operate profitably. The first step has been taken. The service has improved. The equipment is attractive, comfortable and competitive with other modes. The Amtrak system has demonstrated through improved service to the public that a once forgotten and poorly patronized service could be reborn.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Evening Star interview with the president of Amtrak be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### AMTRAK CHIEF LOOKS AHEAD AFTER FIRST MONTH ON JOB

(By Stephen M. Aug)

The first letter that arrived at Roger Lewis's desk shortly after he became president of the new National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Amtrak) was from an old friend—but it wasn't congratulations, he says, it was an offer to sell him some trains.

The letter was from William P. Gwinn, president of United Aircraft Corp., which is looking for customers to purchase its gas-powered Turbo-Trains at about \$2.5 million apiece.

Gwinn's letter was the first of many attempts by suppliers to sell Amtrak some new equipment. "Some people from Budd Co. were here just yesterday," Lewis added in an interview.

But the question of when Amtrak will begin purchasing new equipment wasn't one that Lewis former president of General Dynamics Corp.—was able to answer during an interview with The Star yesterday—his first since becoming Amtrak president April 28.

#### HAS \$40 MILLION

What emerged from the hourlong interview was a picture of a business executive supremely optimistic over the future of his new corporation, yet concerned about a number of problems—not the least of them money.

Amtrak has \$40 million in cash from the federal government under the 1970 legislation that set up the corporation as a means of saving the last vestiges of rail passenger service and turning it into a profit-making business.

It also has authority to issue—with federal guarantees—\$100 million worth of debt securities, and has about \$200 million coming in from railroads joining the Amtrak system.

Lewis indicated that most of this money will have to be used to buy new equipment and refurbish some present equipment—not to make up for losses it sustains through operations.

#### STOCK SALES DEFERRED

Although the corporation also has authority to sell preferred stock to the public, Lewis sees little chance of that for several years. "We couldn't sell any stock to the public until we had an earnings record," he said. Lewis added that his financial advisers had indicated strongly there would be no demand for Amtrak stock at this time.

Lewis suggested that Amtrak would eventually seek more federal money. "If we have an operating deficit here we'll have to go round and talk to the Congress about that," he said.

Lewis declined to say what financial results Amtrak has achieved during its first month's operations. It began operating a nationwide rail passenger system May 1. But he noted that the Department of Transportation had forecast a \$110 million deficit in the first year.

#### MAY SEEK SUBSIDY

Lewis added that an operating deficit "is a question of service to the public, and how it's to be dealt with, and we would expect to discuss this fully and develop a program." Although he didn't say it, the implication is that if Amtrak is required to continue running money-losing trains for market, it would likely seek a federal operating subsidy.

Lewis said he has spent most of his first month as president organizing the corporation. This has included the appointment of five vice presidents—although he anticipates possibly eight or nine.

The five are:

Vice president-marketing, Harold L. Graham, 54, former vice president of service at Pan American World Airways.

Vice-president-planning, David A. Watts, 40, former director of corporate planning, Chesapeake & Ohio-Baltimore & Ohio rail system, former director of passenger services of the C&O-B&O.

Vice president-government relations, Gerald D. Morgan, 63, partner in the Washington law firm of Hamel, Morgan, Park & Saunders, and a former White House assistant during the Eisenhower administration.

Vice president-personnel and administration, Kenneth A. Housman, 46, former assistant postmaster general in the bureau of personnel.

Comptroller, Sidney Smith Sterns, 53, financial consultant and former financial official at Interstate Brands Co., Cudahey Co. and Illinois Power Co.

Still unfilled are vice presidencies in operations—for which a railroad official is sought—public affairs and law.

Lewis conceded there have been no changes in rail passenger service in Amtrak's first month. Virtually all its services are being rented from the railroads—and schedules are almost the same as before May 1. New . . . which it is unable to develop a schedules with some changes to provide better connections are to take effect in several weeks, he said.

Amtrak has about 26 workers who are riding trains to report on the level of service, and "if there are undoubtedly some improvements in attitude they come from the fact it's now certain there's going to be an

effort made by a new organization to operate the rail passenger service."

Asked about upcoming changes, Lewis said "our objectives and our priorities" include, first, "to improve the service. That means finding where the service is improvable."

#### AIRLINE QUALITY

He said the corporation has to compete with airlines, private autos and buses. To compete with airlines, "we've got to offer airline quality service." This means, essentially, high density markets. "We are going to give them a high priority in our market research, experimentation and our service improvements," he said.

He noted also that "the bus is formidable competition for economic reasons, and the private auto is probably the most telling form of competition—there's just something about the mobility of an auto—especially on short trips."

But he noted that all three "suffer from the problem of urban and suburban congestion." He cited the Eastern Airlines shuttle between Washington and New York. "Unless you want to travel in the middle of the day, you get off an airplane at LaGuardia and you get into a cab and you get right into that congestion."

#### RESPONSIBILITY DEFINED

Lewis said he has "a very strong conviction of not whether the country needs rail passenger service—I believe it does—but the question I have is just where is it, and how much of it is there and what it will pay. Our real responsibility here to make the service attractive and to give the people that choice."

On other matters Lewis made these observations:

Although consideration was given to locating the corporate headquarters in New York (because of the concentration of trains), Amtrak has decided to remain in Washington.

Earliest efforts to upgrade equipment will consist largely of acquiring the best now available on railroads (primarily in the West). Amtrak needs only about one-third the equipment the railroads were using to operate its smaller system, or about 1,000 of the 9,000 in use last year.

Amtrak plans to collaborate with the Department of Transportation in developing new equipment, improving roadbeds and eliminating grade crossings to speed passenger trains.

#### UNITED STATES AND JAPAN—THE STEEL INDUSTRY

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, several weeks ago, I traveled to Japan as a member of the U.S. delegation to the Parliamentary Exchange Conference. Included among the many subjects discussed was the general economic relationship between the United States and Japan. It is this matter about which I shall speak today.

First of all, it is essential to look at the current U.S. trade stance from the long view. We have had no major trade legislation in nearly a decade. In that period, we have seen the rise of a stronger, more cohesive, European Common Market. We have seen the emergence of Japan as one of the world's truly great economic powers. However, we have also seen the United States, literally, taking a back seat in these great movements forward. A review of one key industry, steel, will yield some of the reasons for this economic lag.

Inflation knows no bounds—it has no territory. The costs of producing steel

have, in many cases, far surpassed the selling price of steel. The market for steel has shown very little growth, largely due to the support given foreign steel producers by their own governments. Labor costs are high, and may go higher. Certainly, if there is a generous wage increase, a price increase cannot be too far behind.

Now, where does this all leave the steel industry, vis-a-vis Japan? A recent report by Martin N. Ornitz, president of Colt Industries' Crucible Stainless Steel Division in Midland, sheds some valuable light:

It is startling to realize that the tremendous expansion program going on in the Japanese steel industries will by 1975 give Japan capacities far in excess of anything we are producing in the United States. In the stainless steel industry, Japan now has capacities exceeding those of this country.

Overall world capacity is anticipated to increase 27% in the next five years. Of even more importance to the specialty steel producers is the fact that in 1970 the Japanese Stainless Association estimated that their yearly output of stainless will be 1.2 million tons. This is compared to one of the largest production years in United States history of 900,000 tons of stainless steel in 1969. In 1970, this was down to 700,000 tons. Further complicating the future is the fact that in 1971 another fully integrated Japanese stainless steel plant with an output of 20,000 tons per month will be in production.

Mr. President, I raised these points with the Japanese during the Parliamentary Exchange Conference. I said that the United States wanted free trade, but it also wanted fair trade. Import quotas legislated by Congress are really not in anybody's interest—neither in ours nor theirs. Unless a workable voluntary steel agreement can be reached, I said, there will be another drive for legislated import quotas in Congress. Such action, in the long run, could be quite damaging to the United States-Japanese relations. I pointed out that the one sure way to avoid a head-to-head trade confrontation would be to have the United States and Japanese Governments take prompt action in reaching an acceptable, effective voluntary settlement. If no agreement is reached, I said that I would continue to counsel a congressional settlement of the problem.

The current voluntary agreement, under which steel shipments to the United States are supposedly controlled, expires at the end of the year. The problem with that agreement is that it does not include specialty and stainless steels. As these steels are the higher-priced, finished steels, the rising level of imports does even greater damage. Furthermore, a number of foreign countries which compete with us in this area are not covered by the voluntary agreement. The combination of these factors puts our stainless steel industry at a tremendous disadvantage. The rules of the game, so to speak, are not applying equally to all, and our domestic stainless steel industry, simply, can no longer compete.

The ongoing negotiations between the United States and Japan will be most beneficial to both countries if the voluntary agreement is extended for at least 2 years, and strengthened to include stainless steels. In addition, there must

be an agreement to accept a base year other than 1970 upon which to compute the quota on stainless—the year 1968 would be more realistic. Additionally, there must be an agreement to adhere more strictly to the so-called product mix. By exporting greater proportions of higher priced stainless steels, the Japanese are taking a greater share of our market in terms of dollars, if not tons. We do recognize that there must be an allowance of an annual growth rate—so, something on the order of 2½ percent over each of the next 2 years would seem to be reasonable. Also, an agreement must be reached on the selection of the various ports of entry, so as to distribute more widely the imported material. Just yesterday, Japanese Ambassador Ushiba paid me a visit and we discussed this very subject. The Ambassador, I am pleased to note, expressed great hope that final agreement could soon be reached on a voluntary steel quota settlement. Pennsylvania Congressman HERMAN SCHNEEBELI, who participated in yesterday's meeting, said that he was very much encouraged by the Ambassador's statement. As a high-ranking member of the House Ways and Means Committee, which has jurisdiction over international trade matters, Congressman SCHNEEBELI also attended the recent Parliamentary Exchange Conference in Japan with me and other Members of Congress.

Having given a review of our steel industry and one of its key components, specialty and stainless steel, and the relationship with the Japanese, we can see that this is only one industry, out of many, which finds itself in serious difficulty. Now, we must look to the future. What can the Government do to help?

The administration can take a more aggressive stance in its economic dealings with other countries. We must assure that American interests are treated abroad in the same way that foreign interests are treated here. Reciprocal agreements must be negotiated on an entirely flexible, give-and-take basis. But a strong posture, on our part, is absolutely essential.

The Congress can take a fresh look at the ways in which it can lift the industry out of its doldrums. Such a review ought to include a more realistic study of our trade laws, our tax laws, and our antitrust laws. The law must be continually responsive to changing needs.

In this spirit, I heartily endorse the administration's current efforts to convene an international conference to discuss matters of trade and investment. Such a conference coming at this critical time, insofar as the U.S. balance-of-payments situation is concerned, could only help our Nation, and others, to achieve true equality in the world's business markets. We have heard some strong language from all sides—however, now is the time to seek an accord.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. At this time, in accordance with the previous order, the distinguished Sen-

ator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) is now recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

#### REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE—THE MANSFIELD AMENDMENT

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, last week, as the distinguished majority leader will recall, I indicated that I felt the subject of the Mansfield amendment was not a dead issue, that it was not behind us, and that I had advised the members of the military committee at the NATO North Atlantic Assembly, while in Brussels 2 weeks ago, that they would continue to hear about this matter until such time as a more equitable arrangement has been worked out within NATO relative to the burden the United States is carrying.

Mr. President, from this side of the aisle, I intend to keep this issue alive. Once again I commend the distinguished majority leader for the great service he has rendered in using, as he said, a sledge-hammer approach. Certainly he impressed the world and the country with the fact that this is an issue that we should resolve. A quarter of a century after the end of World War II, it should be resolved on a somewhat different basis than it was at the time NATO was established. We helped set up NATO taking into account the impoverished condition of the nations of Europe at that time. Today, the situation is different.

#### NATO

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, within the next few days, Chancellor Willy Brandt of the Federal Republic of Germany will be in Washington for talks with President Nixon and other members of the Government.

One of the prime topics of conversation undoubtedly will be the status of a new offset arrangement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany to replace the current one, which expires on June 30 of this year. To date there have been two negotiating sessions between the United States and Germany, with the third having been postponed due to the dollar crisis. Without going into any details, it can simply be said that both sides are far apart on what they consider an equitable arrangement. It is quite possible that the final arrangements—if and when they are worked out—will be unsatisfactory to one, or possibly both, countries.

Mr. President, this country must impress upon Chancellor Brandt the need for a better offset arrangement for the next 2 years, an agreement which will help reduce the balance-of-payments deficit associated with the U.S. military commitment to NATO.

To briefly review the situation: Last year direct American expenditures in Europe for NATO costs were over \$3 billion, with a net military balance-of-payments deficit associated with these expenditures of \$1.4 billion—\$2 billion in expenditures entering the balance-of-payments account were offset by \$600 million in receipts from military sales and repayment of military sales credits.

Mr. President, I cannot, for one, accept the fact that the \$600 million was all additionality. I think some of those sales would have come anyway, because certainly when nations buy military equipment, they generally buy where they can get the best for their money, the best equipment, the best service, the best spare parts and the best performance.

The United States is the manufacturer—and the largest in the world—of military equipment so that the logical market for many nations to come to is here. So that these are not always additional purchases made because of our NATO expenditures, as many of those purchases would be made anyway.

The deficit attributable to NATO costs was approximately one-third of the total U.S. military balance-of-payments deficit of \$3.976 billion, and was a substantial part of the overall American balance-of-payments deficit of over \$9 billion in 1970.

The situation is not expected to improve very much, if at all, in 1971. The U.S. NATO military balance-of-payments deficit is again expected to be \$2 billion—\$1.2 billion in Germany alone—before any allowance for offset arrangements. In the first quarter of 1971 alone, the overall U.S. balance-of-payments deficit was \$5.5 billion.

The continuing American foreign exchange deficit led over the past few weeks to a lessening of confidence in the dollar and the ensuing international monetary crisis. European NATO countries must face up to the fact that their currencies are gaining strength at the expense of the dollar because they have been unwilling to relieve the United States of its military balance-of-payments deficit associated with our commitment to NATO.

Mr. President, I am very pleased to see that the Secretary of the Treasury, John Connally, recognizes the fact that our European allies have chosen to ignore. In a recent speech to bankers in Munich, Germany, the Secretary said:

Specifically, we today spend nearly 9 percent of our Gross National Product on defense—nearly \$5 billion of that overseas, much of it in western Europe and Japan. Financing a military shield is a part of the burden of leadership; the responsibilities cannot and should not be cast off. But 25 years after World War II, legitimate questions arise over how the cost of these responsibilities should be allocated among the free world allies who benefit from that shield. The nations of western Europe and Japan are again strong and vigorous, and their capacities to contribute have vastly increased.

I find it an impressive fact, and a depressing fact, that the persistent underlying balance-of-payments deficit which causes such concern, is more than covered, year in and year out, by our net military expenditures abroad, over and above amounts received from foreign military purchases in the U.S.

To document the fact that the United States is bearing a much larger share of the burden of the defense of NATO and the Western World than other NATO countries, it is only necessary to examine the figures showing military expenditures as a percentage of GNP.

The United States spends 8.8 percent of its GNP for defense. The figures for other countries are:

	Percent
Canada .....	2.7
Belgium .....	2.9
Denmark .....	2.8
France .....	4.8
West Germany.....	4.0
Greece .....	4.8
Italy .....	3.0
Luxemburg .....	1.0
Netherlands .....	3.6
Norway .....	3.6
Portugal .....	7.2
Turkey .....	4.9
United Kingdom.....	5.4

Mr. President, I have not given, of course, the figure for Israel because Israel is not a member of NATO. However, all of us know that Israel is one country which, when faced with the threat of extermination, has had to face up to the high cost of defending itself. The percentage of the gross national product in Israel for defense runs as high as 23 percent. That is what happens when a nation is under fire and in danger. That is the degree of sacrifice it is willing to make.

If there were a real threat to Europe, a threat the NATO allies have said was the cause of their admonishing us not to draw our forces out of Europe, why is it that some of those nations spend only as little as 1 percent of GNP for defense? They seem willing to have us spend almost 9 percent. But they seem unwilling in most cases to spend even half of that amount in their own self-defense.

Mr. President, I look forward to welcoming our distinguished visitor, one of the most able and distinguished world leaders, Chancellor Brandt, when he arrives next week.

In my own conversations with Chancellor Brandt last year in Bad Godesberg, Germany, I tried to impress upon him as best I could, with the knowledge I had of the feelings of the American people on this matter, the necessity of NATO nations facing up to their responsibility mutually and jointly.

I spoke to him and pointed out my feelings, which I thought was eminently right and fair, that no nation should benefit balance-of-payments-wise for expenditures made for the common defense. This is a principle and proposition that is so eminently fair that I cannot see that logical arguments can be made against it.

It is a matter of how we implement it. The Chancellor pointed out to me the desire to have multilateral arrangements. Yet, here we are a year later with a bilateral negotiation with West Germany.

When I continue these conversations with the Chancellor next week, I will do so in the spirit of two good friends and nations speaking together. And I know that this is the spirit in which he will carry on his conversations with other Members of the Senate, with the Defense Department and with the President of the United States.

I hope we can speak with the same kind of candor and honesty that characterizes the friendship between two good friends. And West Germany has been a good friend of the United States for at

least a quarter of a century. But I think only candor can bring us to the heart of this matter. I think that other Members of the Senate who are privileged to speak to him will speak with the same candor to acquaint him and the leadership that is with him with the fact that any feeling that the Mansfield amendment is behind us because it was defeated in the Senate, is erroneous.

I remind the Senate that if the Mansfield amendment and the Mathias amendment votes were taken together, 58 Members of the Senate were in favor of the idea that something had to be done about our balance-of-payments question and about our troop levels abroad. I think the message will come through loud and clear to the Chancellor next week because I feel that is the truly deeply held feeling of the American people.

I trust that the result will be firm and realistic and that we can work out a realistic and worthwhile offset arrangement for the next 2 years.

Obviously we are looking for an agreement that will take away the onus of these bilateral, often bitter, negotiations.

#### SAME OLD STORY

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I will have printed in the RECORD an editorial from last night's Washington Star that reports on the report made by the General Accounting Office of conditions in nursing homes.

It is a sordid story that has been unfolding for some time.

I have personally visited nursing homes in Chicago. The same conditions have been shown to exist here by the General Accounting Office in this editorial.

I ask unanimous consent to have the editorial printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### SAME OLD STORY

The recent General Accounting Office report on nursing homes was just more of the same story that has been unfolding, in one sordid chapter after another, for many months. Many old and infirm people are receiving atrocious care at high cost, much of which is being paid by the taxpayers. And Congress still isn't hurrying to investigate the matter.

The GAO looked into 90 nursing homes serving Medicaid patients and certified as rendering skilled care. Dismal deficiencies were found in more than half of the institutions. Forty-seven of them failed to comply with the federal rule that physicians make at least one visit per month to each patient. In one case, a patient had gone seven months without a doctor's attention. Most of the facilities didn't meet federal nurse-staffing standards, and almost half were not in compliance with fire protection rules.

This is in perfect harmony with the avalanche of nauseous revelations about nursing homes that came out last year. Deficiencies in the District of Columbia and Maryland were among those brought to light in sensational reports. But by far the broadest view of the dilemma was given in a free-wheeling forum conducted by Representative David H. Pryor of Arkansas. People came from all over the country to tell of awful conditions in some nursing institutions. Pryor has talked of "human junkyards" and said that state in-

spection of nursing homes is "a national farce."

The weakness of both state and federal oversight is a familiar theme that is repeated in the GAO study report. But another primary conclusion is disturbing. The GAO decided that most patients in the so-called skilled nursing homes it surveyed should be somewhere else—possibly in lower-cost intermediate-care homes. Some of the worst reports have been coming from the intermediate facilities. Too many indigent elderly folks already may have been shifted over to those cut-rate homes in the interest of federal economy.

Of course many nursing homes are providing excellent service, and blanket indictments are unfair. But more than enough gross deficiencies have been documented to warrant the creation of the House select committee which Pryor is proposing, to investigate this and other matters affecting the aging. Last year his legislation died in the Rules Committee, but now he has about 235 cosponsors of a new version, and the committee should release it for a House vote.

#### TRADE WITH CHINA

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I should also like to have provided in the RECORD, a release from the White House on the decision by the President to take an initiative in terminating U.S. controls on a large list of nonstrategic U.S. exports to the People's Republic of China.

I think the President has made a remarkable additional step in a long series of steps that he has taken in an attempt to normalize relations with 750 million to 800 million people in the world. I think it is a very courageous and wise decision to remove the 50 percent American ship bottom requirement that has so hindered our exports of agricultural products to other countries throughout the world.

The suspension of this requirement was a well conceived and well thought move by the President. It is in the national interest. It will strengthen our overall economy, especially agriculture.

This step will make American products more available and on a competitive basis throughout the world. It certainly serves our national economic interest as well as our political and diplomatic interests throughout the world.

I ask unanimous consent that this White House release be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the release was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follow:

#### WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE, JUNE 10, 1971

The President announced today the first broad steps in the termination of U.S. controls on a large list of non-strategic U.S. exports to the People's Republic of China. In the future, a range of U.S. products listed on the attached sheet may be freely sold to China under open general export licenses without the need to obtain Department of Commerce permission for each specific transaction.

The items to be released from trade controls have been recommended by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee chaired by the Department of State. They include: most farm, fish and forestry products; tobacco; fertilizers; coal; selected chemicals; rubber; textiles, certain metals; agricultural, industrial and office equipment; household appliances; electrical apparatus in general industrial or commercial use certain electronic

and communications equipment; certain automotive equipment and consumer goods.

The President has also decided to terminate the need to obtain Department of Commerce permission for the export of wheat, flour and other grains, to China, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, suspending the 50% U.S. shipping requirement for these items.

Items not on the open general license list may be considered for specific licensing consistent with the requirements of U.S. national security. The Department of Commerce and other agencies will continue to review our export controls.

The President has also decided to permit all imports to enter from China under a general license, while retaining standby authority for future controls if necessary. Imports from the People's Republic of China will be subject to the tariff rates generally applicable to goods from most Communist countries. They will also be subject to the normal conditions governing our imports from all sources such as cotton textile controls and anti-dumping and countervailing duty legislation.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article which appeared in the May 23, 1971 issue of the Washington Sunday Star be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GRIFFIN ON CHINA THAW

(By Senator ROBERT P. GRIFFIN)

President Nixon was consistently and persistently engaged from the time of his inauguration in a carefully orchestrated campaign to convince Peking of our sincere desire to improve relations.

That a response from Peking finally came was not a surprise to President Nixon. But I can tell you that no one was more surprised than he when ping-pong became the vehicle for delivery.

Throughout the period of the Nixon Administration, while we were making a series of unilateral moves, we were also "cooling the rhetoric," as the saying goes. We toned down our criticism of the Peking regime.

It cannot be said that the Communist Chinese responded exactly in kind, but Peking did take a less polemical, more practical approach.

It opened diplomatic relations with nations of a different view. In the six-month period from last October to this April, Peking agreed to exchange ambassadors with eight nations, including Canada and Italy, two members of NATO.

And in those two cases, it is significant to observe that the mainland Chinese government modified a position long and adamantly held. In order to establish diplomatic relations, it was not necessary for Italy or Canada to recognize Peking's claim to Taiwan—it was considered sufficient that they merely "took note" of it.

MAJOR STEP

This may appear to some as a minor concession but in my opinion it was a major step on the part of the Communist Chinese in the direction of broader diplomatic horizons.

Now, Peking has relations with seven of the 15 NATO nations: Canada, Italy, France, Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway.

Peking has recently offered aid, for the first time, to non-Communist nations: flood relief to Malaysia and the Philippines, earthquake relief to Peru.

In retrospect, then it should be apparent that both sides have been more flexible and have made important moves. So far the

future is concerned, however, we still have a long way to go.

Of course, we should not be under any illusions at this point. Peking still has its objectives and Washington has a set of its own. In the broadest sense, Peking wants the United States out of Asia and the Western Pacific. But while the United States, under the Nixon doctrine, proceeds to reduce our military presence in that area of the world, we do not intend to abandon the area, because our own national security interests are involved.

In a more immediate sense Peking's objectives are probably these:

1. A seat in the U.N. General Assembly, and a permanent seat in the Security Council.
2. The ouster of Nationalist China from the U.N.
3. Any available support it can get from the United States in the event of trouble on the long border between China and Russia.
4. To continue to seek active and recognized sovereignty over Taiwan.
5. Possibly to establish diplomatic relations with the United States.

We think we have a better reading now than we had 20 years ago on Chinese intentions. We see less likelihood of across-the-border moves than we did just after the Korean War. However, the threat of Chinese support for indigenous "wars of liberation," so-called, has not diminished.

A principal objective of the United States is to bring Mainland China into the real world without a catastrophic war.

We also seek a position of dignity for Taiwan.

We see Asia as a quadrilateral arena involving four great powers: The Soviet Union, China, Japan and the United States.

Within these guidelines we can afford to be flexible.

We have told both Peking and Moscow we do not wish to take sides in their dispute—or to gain from it.

We can say now that we no longer seek isolation of the People's Republic of China. We are ready to accept her as a major power, with a legitimate role. But we want Peking to refrain from imposing its will by force on its neighbors.

We do not presume to tell either China how to deal with the other. We hope that the differences between Peking and Taipei can somehow be adjusted. But we insist that any such adjustment must come about peacefully.

The bedrock of our policies toward Taiwan has not changed.

We continue to protect Taiwan against external attack.

We not only maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but we continue to provide her with important military and other assistance.

Many people may not realize the significance of the Nationalist Chinese contribution as a member of the international community. Taiwan's 14-million population is larger than that of two-thirds of the 126 members of the United Nations.

Her gross national product has increased about 10 percent a year in the last eight years. Taiwan's per capita GNP is third highest in Asia.

AID PROGRAMS

Twenty-seven of the less-developed countries of the world are now receiving economic and technical assistance from Nationalist China.

It would be unthinkable for the United States to brush aside this staunch ally and responsible citizen of the world community to accommodate Mainland China's wish to join the U.N.

As I see it, the United States has three options open as we consider Mainland China's bid for U.N. membership.

1. We can continue as before, actively opposing last year's 51-49 majority view in the

United Nations that Chinese Communist representatives should replace the Nationalist Chinese in the Security Council and in the General Assembly.

2. We could stand back—or abstain—in which case the majority probably would work its will. Thereafter, we could continue to stand by Nationalist China despite her loss of a United Nations role.

3. We could be positive about it and support the admission of Red China to the U.N. so long as Nationalist China is not excluded.

My preference now is this third course.

Of course, we still have four months or more before the General Assembly takes up the China representation issue. We need not fix our attitude in concrete.

But an inclination now toward flexibility, an expression of interest in "dual representation" for the two Chinas, could help to smooth whatever transition evolves.

It is not my assumption that the United States and Mainland China are anywhere near establishing diplomatic relations.

But there are several steps, some reciprocal, some unilateral, the United States could take. In the process, however, we should be careful not to smother Peking with so many overtures and opportunities that she feels no necessity to respond in kind.

SOME PROPOSALS

It is my hope that the Nixon administration is now considering—or perhaps privately advancing—such proposals requiring mutual agreement as the following:

Elevation of the off-and-on Sino-American talks in Warsaw to the level of deputy foreign minister or foreign minister, and moving them from Warsaw to Peking and Washington, on a home-and-home basis.

Exchange of unofficial trade missions.

Exchange of news service correspondents between Peking and Washington on a one-for-one basis and exchange of some special correspondents. If communications would be facilitated, the United States might well offer the use of its satellite communications facilities for special Sino-American events, including sports events.

Exchange of 10 to 20 eminent scholars, on a one-for-one basis for two-year sabbaticals, to study subjects of their choice at universities of their choice. These scholars should be from all disciplines, and the host country should provide full expenses.

There are certain unilateral steps which I believe the United States should be ready to take—given a continuation of the thaw at a congenial temperature:

We should begin immediately to invite Peking to send representatives to non-governmental conferences as well, if the Chinese are willing—on such basis international problems as arms control, high-jacking, pollution control, population studies, offshore oil rights, laws of the sea, and use of sea beds.

We could proceed in time to thin out the garrison of 9,000 American troops on Formosa, half of whom are there because of the Vietnam conflict and can be withdrawn as that war winds down. Whatever residual American force is then maintained on Taiwan would be clearly and purely defensive—and this should be emphasized publicly and repeatedly.

Given the uncertainties of the American situation with respect to Okinawa, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, however, there would be no logic in unilateral and complete abandonment of all military presence in Taiwan.

The occasional naval patrols of the Formosa Straits which now have replaced the regular patrols could be conducted farther out to sea.

As we consider and proceed to make some of these moves, we must closely examine

and evaluate the new image and new flexibility of Peking to be sure it is not a mirage. Fortunately, we have many options to test it, and I believe we should proceed with cautious optimism to do so.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. In accordance with the previous order, the Senator from Alaska is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, before the distinguished Senator from Illinois leaves the floor, I would like to ask whether the figures he cited this morning are different from the figures he cited last year in a very fine article he had inserted in the RECORD. Are they more up to date?

Are the figures the Senator cited concerning the national defense commitment by our NATO allies different from those in the fine article which was previously put in the RECORD?

Mr. PERCY. The Senator refers to the contribution of our allies?

Mr. GRAVEL. The Senator is correct. Mr. PERCY. I really did not check it against the RECORD. However, I would presume it is reasonably close.

Mr. GRAVEL. I would be very happy to receive a copy of it. I would like to pursue that matter because I have been interested in following my colleague's remarks on this matter, as they have been very informative.

I compliment him. I marvel at the meticulousness and grace with which he pursues this matter. I wish I were gifted with such grace. However, I am not. All I can say is that it seems to me we are a bunch of suckers. I mean in regard to the way we are treating ourselves. This is obvious when we juxtapose the effort we put forth to that our allies put forth.

It is obvious to me, and I am sure it is obvious to some of my colleagues, that they do not see the dangers in the world that we see. Either those dangers are there and they are too stupid to see them, or else they are not there and we are suffering from paranoia. If that is the case, this paranoia is the greatest luxury this Nation has ever entertained. I hope we will, as soon as possible seek psychiatric help to put aside this paranoia, because we cannot afford it.

Mr. President, I wish to refer to an article which appeared in this morning's Washington Post, written by Colman McCarthy, relating to Carl Gustav Jung. I have always admired Carl Gustav Jung. The great wisdom of great men lasts for centuries. In the article, Colman McCarthy quotes one statement in respect to the arms race that was made by Carl Jung many years ago. This is a direct quote from Carl Jung:

Let man but accumulate sufficient engines of destruction and the devil himself will soon be unable to resist putting them to their fated use.

What great wisdom from a time past from a great man.

Then, Carl Jung is quoted as follows with respect to cold warriors we have unleashed upon our society:

Man is constantly inclined to forget that what was once good does not remain good eternally. He follows the old ways that once were good long after they have become bad,

and only with the greatest sacrifices and untold suffering can he rid himself of this delusion and see that what was once good is now perhaps grown old and is good no longer.

How germane that is to the discussion of NATO and the situation in Europe.

I spoke in this Chamber on the day after the Lisbon negotiations. My information is very meager, but I gave my conclusion at that time as to what this Government is doing in its lack of leadership and in its efforts to deflect what could have been an aggressive, intelligent, responsive position. We should begin negotiations and insist on sitting down with the Soviets as soon as possible on force reductions; but no, we took a tack that I thought at the time was dilatory—and I hate to be this strong in my statement, I would prefer to be more gracious—but it seemed to me that we decided, to effect delay.

I, as a Senator, do not like to seek affirmation of my views from the head of the Soviet Government. It is not politically astute; in fact, it is politically dangerous. But here there is either fact or fiction. If it is fact, we have done a bad thing; if it is fiction we have played into the hands of the Soviet Union.

I have before me an article from the Washington Post which states:

At a meeting in Lisbon last week, NATO foreign ministers called for country-to-country talks with the Soviet Union "to determine whether common ground exists" for such negotiations.

If we are to determine whether common ground exists, how far must we travel before we recognize what the situation is today? There is so much common ground there is no other ground around.

The obvious conclusion drawn by the reporter in this article was that the tactics adopted were to produce delay. That was the conclusion of the reporter, and it was my conclusion at the time of the conference.

Now, I wish to quote a statement by Mr. Kosygin. I do not like to quote his views. It is not politically wise to do so. But here are his words and they are very interesting:

"As a rule," Kosygin said, "they say this or that Soviet proposal is supposedly very complicated, demanding much time for study and (they) put forward different preliminary conditions in order to withdraw from solution of these questions.

"We are not, of course, against a careful preparation and study of questions. But one must discriminate when the matter concerns preparations and when efforts are made under the guise of preparations to frustrate the peace proposals," he said.

I think he made the point very succinctly. I would hope the leaders of our country could be as succinct. If this is mere rhetoric, I give him one point for rhetoric superior to what we have been using. I hope it is not rhetoric on either side, and that we put this aside and go to the truth of it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the two articles to which I have referred, which were published in the Washington Post.

There being no objection, the articles

were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### JUNG AND THE DREAMS OF LIFE

(By Colman McCarthy)

Dead ten years this week, Carl Gustav Jung is perhaps the best read and even the most understood in the competition between himself, Freud and Adler. Jung paperbacks are everywhere, thanks to book companies who know the sales value of the drugstore rack. Purists might twitch on seeing a copy of "Psychological Reflections" sharing shelf space with "The Love Machine," but why shouldn't genius compete in the shops against trash?

Far from watering down the mysteries of the unconscious, Jung risked drenching the reader with them, knowing that every person is a test-case for psychic experiences. Stand aside from life for a moment, he says, and trust rather than fear the conscious conflicts within you. "We yield too much," Jung wrote, "to the ridiculous fear that we are at bottom quite impossible beings, that if everyone were to appear as he really is a frightful social catastrophe would ensue."

Although Jung wrote in the earlier part of this century, his thought applies to this morning's front page.

The arms race. "Let man but accumulate sufficient engines of destruction and the devil himself will soon be unable to resist putting them to their fated use."

Aged cold-warriors who won't quit. "Man is constantly inclined to forget that what was once good does not remain good eternally. He follows the old ways that once were good long after they have become bad, and only with the greatest sacrifices and untold suffering can he rid himself of this delusion and see that what was once good is now perhaps grown old and is good no longer."

The masks of tough-guy politicians. "The social 'strong man' is in his private life often a mere child where his own states of feeling are concerned: his discipline in public goes miserably to pieces in private. His 'happiness in his work' assumes a woeful countenance at home . . . and the wives of such men would have a pretty tale to tell. As to his selfless altruism, his children have decided views about that."

Community. "Most people need someone to confess to, otherwise the basis of experience is not sufficiently real."

Those are usable thoughts, but Jung is valuable for other reasons than his wisdom. More lastingly important is his work in interpreting spontaneous symbols of the unconscious, i.e., analyzing dreams. As a doctor of the psyche who kept crashing into the walls of blank personalities—his patients—Jung often relied on the sick person's dreams as a source of information about him. "No amount of skepticism and criticism," he wrote, "has yet enabled me to regard dreams as negligible occurrences. Often enough they appear senseless but it is obviously we who lack the sense and ingenuity to read the enigmatic message from the nocturnal realm of the psyche . . . Nobody doubts the importance of conscious experience; why then should we doubt the significance of unconscious happenings?"

Dreams are essentially that—the unconscious speaking to the conscious, trying to tell it something, offering new points of view about the stale old routines of trapped lives. The language used is not the symbols of words—the conscious medium—but the symbols of objects (for example, the famous phallic symbol so cherished by Freudians), or events (the Fourth of July symbolizes patriotism) or people (the super-mammary sex symbols of Hollywood). These symbols are now familiar enough to be easily interpreted in a person's waking life. But other symbols are not so easily figured, and when found in one's dreams often seem like paste-

ups of confusion. Yet who and what appear in our dreams are usually the symbolic messages of the unconscious rapping at the door of the conscious, saying "let my reality come in, too." In each of us, Jung insisted, "there is another whom we do not know. He speaks to us in dreams and tells us how differently he sees us from the way we see ourselves. When, therefore, we find ourselves in a difficult situation to which there is no solution, he can sometimes kindle a light that radically alters our attitude—the very attitude that led us into the difficult situation."

Americans, large numbers of whom prefer to take their doses of truth in pill form, like to think they have a taste for things unconscious. It is common now for otherwise steady people to refer to their "vibes" before making a decision. An avid use of astrology, yoga, tarot cards and other parlor pastimes are popular breezes that supposedly get the vibes moving. A trouble with this busywork is the created illusion that one is "inner-directed," when all that has happened is a case of boredom with the outer. It won't work, said Jung. "Together the patient and I address ourselves to the two million-year-old man that is in all of us. In the last analysis, most of our difficulties come from losing contact with our instincts, with the age-old unforgotten wisdom stored up in us. And where do we make contact with this old man in us? In our dreams."

Followers of Jung—whether Jungian analysts, teachers, students or patients—are a passionate bunch, and no outsider should mention the master's name without bracing for a stream of stories and remembrances. A Jung Foundation is active in New York. Many cities, including Washington, have Jungian centers where therapy, teaching and discussion is provided. Aside from Jung's own works, a balanced guide to dream analysis and analytical psychology is "The Symbolic Quest," by Edward C. Whitmont (Putnam's). Slow going in parts, it explains carefully the theories of Jung on his old favorites: individuation, archetypes, anima and animus myth, persona. Few who ever read a little of Jung ever fall in time to read a lot.

The importance of Jung's method of the unconscious is that, in his words, "the interpretation of dreams enriches consciousness to such an extent that it relearns the forgotten language of the instincts." Forgotten is right. Where else but in this country at this time is the passion for abstracting and objectifying getting such a workout? The phrase, "everything is so depersonalized," is a comment on the West's often sick dependence on logic, or what Whitmont called the disregarding of "the emotional and intuitive sides of man." Thus, instead of a rich nation like America being moved by feelings of empathy, emotions of generosity or instincts of compassion to go and feed the world's starving, these faculties are suppressed in favor of abstractly and objectively solving "the problem" of hunger. Dying people are treated like math puzzles; it is never starving human beings who need food, but always the hunger "problem" or the welfare "problem." Better to solve a problem than feed a man.

This is dangerous, warns Jung. "The psychological rule says that when an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside, as fate. That is to say, when the individual remains undivided and does not become conscious of his inner opposite, the world must act out the conflict and be torn into opposing halves."

The Third World, the peace movement, the communes—the best of these are primordial expressions of the collective unconscious by which a hungry, warring and impersonal world can be led away from its worst self and old instincts long ago buried to be dug up. As Jung knew, it is not a bad time in history to be returning to the unconscious for our wisdom. So much is there in waiting.

#### KOSYGIN CRITICIZES U.S. ROLE—PRAISES PARIS, BONN FOR STEPS TOWARD PEACE

(By Dusko Doder)

Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin blamed the United States yesterday for its "resistance" to reducing tensions in Europe, while he praised "positive" policies of France and West Germany.

Kosygin said that the United States, because of its deficit in balance of payments, "compels the states of Western Europe, Japan and other countries to participate in the financing" of various U.S. "foreign policy adventures."

In a speech that played on the political differences between the United States and its NATO allies, Kosygin reaffirmed Soviet readiness to open businesslike talks with the West while criticizing American policies in Europe, Indochina and the Middle East.

"Such actions of the United States as the actual support for Israel's expansion in the Middle East and resistance to a relaxation of tensions in Europe cannot but have a negative effect on Soviet-American relations," he said.

U.S. analysts suggested that the speech reflected Kremlin displeasure over Western responses to Soviet proposals for East-West negotiations on reduction of troops and armaments in Europe.

At a meeting in Lisbon last week, NATO foreign ministers called for country-to-country talks with the Soviet Union "to determine whether common ground exists" for such negotiations.

Kosygin, in a nationally televised election speech, made no direct reference to the Lisbon meeting, although he suggested that it had adopted delaying tactics on the Soviet initiative.

He accused unspecified opponents of Soviet proposals of using "all means to prevent their implementation."

"As a rule," Kosygin said, "they say this or that Soviet proposal is supposedly very complicated, demanding much time for study, and (they) put forward different preliminary conditions in order to withdraw from solution of these questions."

"We are not, of course, against a careful preparation and study of questions. But one must discriminate when the matter concerns preparations and when efforts are made under the guise of preparations to frustrate the peace proposals," he said.

Kosygin's notably sharp criticism of the United States was in contrast to the tribute he paid France as a "serious factor of peace and security in Europe" and to his description of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's policy toward Eastern Europe as "an example of how to attain equal partnership in the building of peace."

#### U.S. ALLIES

Kosygin warned America's allies that U.S. financial policies and the weakening of the dollar due to various "foreign adventures" were affecting their societies.

"The United States' allies have to pay for this by an increase of their own economic instability, the growth of inflation, and exacerbation of social conflicts," he said.

While noting that Soviet-American relations were not satisfactory, Kosygin said: "We are ready to talk in a businesslike way with the United States on a broad range of questions."

Kosygin also rejected as a "malicious anti-Soviet concoction" Chinese charges that Moscow and Washington claim joint monopoly on solutions of international problems, disregarding other nations.

#### TWO SUPER POWERS

"It goes without saying that our constructive position never had, and does not have, absolutely anything in common with the so-called policy of two super powers," he said.

"The Soviet Union is really a world power that exerts a big influence on the develop-

ment of events in the world," he said. "But we are a Socialist power. We will never agree to an assertion of world hegemony by one or several powers."

Kosygin's speech to a party audience at the Bolshoi Theater was his only campaign pronouncement. He is a candidate for deputy in the Soviet of the Russian Republic, a state parliament, and his reelection was a foregone conclusion.

Mr. GRAVEL, Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Illinois. I think that he has done yeoman service in his research in this area.

#### MAYDAY ARRESTS

Mr. GRAVEL, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "Nixon Defense of Mayday Arrests Won't Wash," written by Carl T. Rowan, published in the Washington Evening Star of June 9, 1971. The allegation is very clear.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### NIXON DEFENSE OF MAYDAY ARRESTS WON'T WASH

(By Carl T. Rowan)

You can almost always tell when administration leaders feel that they have been caught with their trousers at half mast. The White House fires a defensive salvo and then turns on a fusillade of talk by other officials, hoping that verbiage will override logic and facts.

This tactic of rhetorical overkill was much in evidence in recent days as the administration sought to justify locking up thousands of innocent people during the Mayday war protests a month ago.

The simple fact is that, at the behest of the President and Atty. Gen. John Mitchell, the police ran roughshod over the Constitution as the administration moved in something close to panic to prove that it could squelch a seedy, foolish bunch of Mayday extremists. Of the 12,000 people arrested in those protests, a mere 700 have been found guilty in the courts, and many of those would have gone free had they waited for police to prove their guilt.

Criticism from the courts about "cruel and unusual punishment" of persons detained, and of unlawful arrest procedures, has clearly rankled the administration. With Democrats and Republicans deploring tactics in which police arrested everyone within reach, holding many totally innocent people incommunicado for hours, the administration concluded that it must counterattack or take a public relations beating.

So President Nixon went to last week's press conference briefed to the hilt on how to emotionalize and sway the public by lashing out at "vandals and hoodlums and lawbreakers."

The President praised the police performance, talking only of the arrested persons who destroyed property and broke laws, always avoiding comment about the many passersby and bystanders who were swept up in the great detention roundup.

But an unusually persistent press corps was not buying. Speaking of the thousands arrested, one reporter asked: "If they were lawfully and properly arrested, why are the courts letting them out?"

A flustered President replied that "... arrest does not mean that an individual was guilty," a towering concession to constitutionality that was followed by an implication that the releases proved only that those arrested got fair trials.

Incredibly, when Nixon looked around the room for some accommodating newsmen to ask him when the price of pickles will go

down, there was a reporter prodding him further: "Mr. President, they are not being released on the grounds that guilt isn't proved. They are being released on the grounds that they weren't properly arrested."

Nixon ducked that point and retreated to his dogmatic position that he approved what the police did and hopes police do that well again in future confrontations.

Here was a situation where, because thousands of arrests were unlawful and improper, judges who revere and respect the Bill of Rights felt compelled to let thousands go free.

It was obvious that that press conference caper failed to sell a policy of mass, indiscriminate arrests. So Mitchell and Deputy Atty. Gen. Richard Kleindienst took to the firing line, attacking columnists and congressmen, dragging in that old "Communist" bogeyman by implying that since a few of the demonstrators had visited Communist countries, all those arrested people were somehow agents of the enemy and deserving of detention.

I can understand how, under the pressures of mass disruptions, petty vandalism and angering rhetoric, the police could err into making numbers of arrests unlawfully. I can't understand why the President of the United States and his chief law enforcement officer feel compelled to defend unlawful procedures and urge them on other cities.

It is true that if government can be stopped by any mob that comes along we are in trouble. But it also is true that if government can only be saved through the mass, lawless detention of innocent citizens, then we shall soon have a government that no lover of liberty will want to save.

#### THE RED PERIL

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I wish to refer to an article which I think locates what is probably the touchstone or the linchpin of our paranoia. The article was written by Frank Getlein and is entitled "Who Are We Without Red Peril?" The article goes to the crux of the paranoia, and that is this fear with respect to the Soviet Union, a nation that has one-half of our gross national product, a nation whose defensive posture has been aggressive largely in order to counter our own aggressiveness, a nation that I feel is not as mature as our Nation.

Many times we who are against the war or a foreign policy are accused of attacking our country and defending our opponents. Of course, that is not the case. I am not a part of that government; I am a part of this government. I hope that as a result of improvements I can make in my government the example will bring about other improvements. We will not succeed in bringing about improvements here if we permit viler elements to rise to the fore, either the viler elements in our society or throughout the world.

There is much accuracy in the old truism that hate begets hate, fear begets fear, love begets love, and peace begets peace. I hope this Nation realizes that, and that our leadership will work in that direction.

The article by Mr. Getlein entitled "Who Are We Without Red Peril?" is self-explanatory and I ask unanimous consent that it may be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### WHO ARE WE WITHOUT RED PERIL?

(By Frank Getlein)

With pingpong diplomacy moving swiftly from the little green tables to letting the rescals into the United Nation, with a thin edge of agreement arising in the strategic arms limitation negotiations and the appearance of mutual U.S.-U.S.S.R. willingness to discuss troop reductions in Europe, it is time to think seriously about the increasing danger of our losing communism as our mortal enemy. It is just possible that we can't afford the loss.

This is not basically a question of all those jobs in the missile industry; eventually even the United States can figure out something to do with unemployed talent besides letting it drift onto the already distressed market of the unskilled.

It is, rather, a question of identity, of purpose in the world and time, of who we are and what we are doing.

For a long time now, almost since the closing days of World War II, all those questions have been answered for us by the Russians and the Chinese. At moments, they even have been answered for us by Fidel Castro, of all people.

Thus: What is the United States of America? Answer: The United States is the bastion of the free world against the menace of international communism.

And: What does the United States do? Answer: The States opposes all efforts of international communism to bring countries into the socialist camp by means of armed invasion and internal subversion. To achieve these ends, the United States occasionally mounts an armed invasion of some free country or practices the subversion of a friendly country's government. When we do these things, however, there is no ethical onus, as there is when the Russians and the Chinese do them, because we do them in the name of freedom, while they do them in the name of tyranny.

For all the occasional talk about "national purposes," the ones sketched above actually have been much closer than anything else to having been our national purpose for more than 20 years.

It is bound to be unsettling to the country suddenly to find itself with no national purpose, or to find its leaders, most notably President Nixon, suddenly abandoning the national purpose they have served so long with such single-minded dedication.

Moreover, the loss of such a purpose is different from the loss of a different kind of purpose. The purpose that has ruled our lives, directed our foreign policy and the shape of much of the economy at home, has been, after all, a negative policy.

This is not necessarily bad. The purposes of World War II, although usually phrased positively by the propaganda apparatus, were essentially negative, too—namely, the defeat of Hitler and the Japanese militarists, with that of Mussolini thrown in for laughs. But these were goals that could be—and were—accomplished. Our opposition to communism has been something quite different.

The measure of the difference may be seen in our absolute unwillingness to take on the presumed threat at its source. If we really believed, as Senator Nixon and Vice President Nixon proclaimed so regularly, that communism was absolutely evil, to be opposed absolutely, then obviously we should have been preparing for World War III with the two great Communist empires and provoking that war so as to get it over with.

We never did that. If we really believed that international communism was single-minded in its determination to destroy us, obviously we should have been taking on that threat where it began, not in such penny-ante diversions as Korea, Vietnam, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. We never did.

It is therefore reasonable to believe that

we never did believe quite as deeply as we said we did in the absolute evil of communism. Yet we believed in it enough—or failed to believe enough in anything else—to have allowed that belief to shape our lives, to bring us into grave financial difficulties in the world marketing community, to allow poverty and unemployment to become more thoroughly institutionalized at home than they were even in the Depression, to turn great chunks of our national budget into fantasy weapons of all sorts, and to provide us with whatever national identity we have had for close to a quarter of a century.

There is a certain historical irony in Nixon's presiding over the dismantlement of our anti-Communist obsession, since he was assuredly one of the architects—or, more accurately perhaps, conjurers—of that policy in the first place. Historical irony, however, is much easier to appreciate at a distance of a generation or two.

As the Communist menace softens, we are in the position of a man walking into a very strong wind and leaning as he walks. If the wind abruptly stops, he falls on his face. It is cold comfort indeed to find that the wind may have been coming out of a wind machine now disconnected. But eventually, he struggles to his feet and learns a different way to walk—upright, like a man.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUGHES). The Senator has 3 minutes remaining.

Mr. GRAVEL. I yield back the remainder of my time.

#### TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to the previous order there will now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business not to extend beyond 12 o'clock noon, with a limitation of 3 minutes on each statement.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ENROLLED BILL PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that today, June 11, 1971, he presented to the President of the United States the enrolled bill (S. 557) to amend the Wagner-O'Day Act to extend its provisions relating to Government procurement of commodities produced by the blind to commodities produced by other severely handicapped individuals, and for other purposes.

#### QUORUM CALL

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. ALLEN) laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

#### REPORTS ON FINAL DETERMINATIONS RELATING TO CERTAIN INDIAN CLAIMS

A letter from the Chairman, Indian Claims Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on final determination with respect to docket No. 271, the Cherokee Nation, Plaintiff v. The United States of America, Defendant (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Appropriations.

A letter from the Chairman, Indian Claims Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on its final determination with respect to docket No. 297, the Cherokee Nation, Plaintiff, v. The United States of America, Defendant (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Appropriations.

#### PROSPECTUS FOR PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION UNDER NATIONAL TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY ACT

A letter from the Secretary of Transportation, transmitting, pursuant to law, a prospectus for proposed construction of the Ohio Highway Transportation Research Center, East Liberty, Ohio (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Commerce.

#### PROPOSED NATIONAL CAPITAL TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1971

A letter from the Secretary of Transportation, Commissioner of the District of Columbia, and Chairman, Board of Directors, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation cited as the "National Capital Transportation Act of 1971" (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

#### PROPOSED DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEVELOPMENT BANK ACT OF 1971

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation cited as the "District of Columbia Development Bank Act of 1971" (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

#### REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

The following report of a committee was submitted:

By Mr. MAGNUSON, from the Committee on Commerce, with an amendment:

S. 979. A bill to extend the Act of September 30, 1965, as amended by the Acts of July 24, 1968, and October 13, 1970, relating to high-speed ground transportation, by removing the termination date thereof, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 92-147).

#### BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. HRUSKA:  
S. 2054. A bill to create the Office of Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice of the United States, to provide for the ap-

pointment of justices and judges to the offices of Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice, Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Director, Federal Judicial Center, and for other purposes. Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. GRIFFIN:

S. 2055. A bill to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and the Interstate Commerce Act to authorize reduced fare transportation on a space-available basis for persons who are 65 years of age or older. Referred to the Committee on Commerce.

By Mr. INOUE:

S. 2056. A bill to amend Titles 10 and 32, United States Code, to authorize the establishment of a National Guard for Guam. Referred to the Committee on Armed Services; and

S. 2057. A bill for the relief of James H. Davidson, Vincent W. S. Hee, and Kay M. Mochizuki. Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

#### STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. HRUSKA:

S. 2054. A bill to create the Office of Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice of the United States, to provide for the appointment of justices and judges to the offices of Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice, Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Director, Federal Judicial Center, and for other purposes. Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I send to the desk a bill to create the office of Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice of the United States, to provide for the appointment of justices and judges to certain positions, and for other purposes. I ask that it be properly referred and that at the conclusion of my remarks the text of the bill together with two letters from the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts be printed in the RECORD.

Mr. President, the Chief Justice is the head of one of the three coequal branches of the Federal Government. He has a tremendous number of duties and a large volume of correspondence to take care of in connection with this position. However, at the present time he has only six assistants, including secretaries and a driver, to help him carry this load. Contrast this if you will with the very large number of employees assigned to the Executive and Legislative branches. This bill that I am introducing today would grant the Chief Justice the authority to appoint an administrative assistant to help him with his nonjudicial duties. This is a much needed addition to his staff and it is my hope that the Senate will see the wisdom of this action and move quickly to approve this bill.

In addition to the authority to appoint a new assistant, this bill would permit the Chief Justice to select from among other qualified candidates present and retired Federal judges to fill this new position and certain other positions within the judicial branch. If in the opinion of the Chief Justice one of these positions could best be filled by a present or retired judge, this bill would enable such an appointment to be made in contrast to present legal restrictions.

Both of these proposals are well-explained in letters from Mr. Rowland F. Kirks, Director of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, for which unanimous consent is asked to be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. STATE COURTS,

Washington, D.C., March 26, 1971.

HON. SPIRO T. AGNEW,  
President, U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Pursuant to the direction of the Judicial Conference of the United States I transmit herewith for the consideration of the Congress a draft bill to create the Office of Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice of the United States.

At the present time the Chief Justice has no regularly assigned officer to assist him in discharging his administrative duties as head of the federal judiciary. This bill proposes an office to assist him solely in connection with the administrative aspects of the federal judicial system. This would include his regular communications and relations with the Chief Judges of the eleven circuits and of the ninety-three district courts as well as his duties as Chairman of the Board of the Federal Judicial Center and as Chairman of the Judicial Conference of the United States. In the latter connection he is in regular contact with the committees of the Conference and with the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts whose office furnishes staff assistance to the Conference and its committees.

The Judicial Conference of the United States believes this bill would render a distinct service to the cause of sound judicial administration. Members of the Conference and of my office will be pleased to answer any questions which the Committees of the Congress may have in connection with the proposed legislation.

Respectfully submitted,

ROWLAND F. KIRKS,  
Director.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,

Washington, D.C., March 26, 1971.

HON. SPIRO T. AGNEW,  
President, U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Pursuant to the direction of the Judicial Conference of the United States I transmit herewith a proposed bill to permit a federal judge to serve as Director of the Federal Judicial Center or as Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts without loss of status or seniority in his own court. The proposal would extend to the Office of Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice if the Congress accepts this recommendation of the Judicial Conference.

At the present time a federal judge who has taken senior status pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 17 of Title 28, United States Code, occupies the post of Director of the Federal Judicial Center. His predecessor, the prior director, was a retired Justice of the Supreme Court. No judge in regular active service has thus far occupied the position of Director of either the Federal Judicial Center or the Administrative Office. The Judicial Conference is of the view that it would be desirable to permit sufficient flexibility in selecting incumbents of these posts so that judges in regular active service who might have particular aptitude for the work would be free to accept. This proposed statute would enable a judge in regular active service to serve either for a fixed term or for

an indefinite term, in either post (or as Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice if such post is created) without loss of status or seniority in his own court. The proposal would, however, permit the vacancy created by his appointment to one of the three posts to be filled in the manner in which temporary judgeships are now established. If he later returns to his court, he would, of course, be an additional judge in the court but he would not have lost his status or seniority in that court.

The Judicial Conference recommends this legislation to the Congress. Members of the Conference or of this office will be pleased to be of such assistance as may be required in consideration of this proposed bill.

Respectfully submitted.

ROWLAND F. KIRKS,  
Director.

#### ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

S. 455

At the request of Mr. INOUE, the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. McINTYRE) was added as a cosponsor of S. 455, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow a deduction from gross income for social agency, legal, and related expenses incurred in connection with the adoption of a child by the taxpayer.

S. 1775

At the request of Mr. CURTIS, the Senator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1775, the National Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act.

#### ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

##### RETIREMENT LEGISLATION FOR FEDERAL FIREFIGHTERS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, on February 23, 1971, I introduced S. 916, a bill to allow Federal firefighters to retire early because of the hazardous nature of their work. I had introduced this legislation during the 91st Congress; it passed both Houses only to be vetoed by the President.

At this time I would like to bring to the attention of this body a letter which was written to the President of the United States by the president of the U.S. Navy Fire Protection Association, which re-figures the basis for the Presidential veto. S. 916 is an important piece of legislation, and I would hope that this letter will be influential in persuading the President to change his position.

I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in its entirety in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. NAVY,  
FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION,  
Oceanside, Calif., May 28, 1971.  
President RICHARD NIXON,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: A number of Chief Fire Officers in the Federal Fire Service recently requested that the U.S. Navy Fire Protection Association conduct a statistical survey of Federal civilian fire fighter injuries, heart attacks, deaths and disabilities. They made this request as a result of your veto of S-578, a bill to provide hazardous

duty retirement of 40 percent at age 50 with 20 years of service that had been passed by the Ninety-First Congress. They felt that the information contained in your Memorandum of Disapproval was not true in many respects and that you had been ill-advised by those administration officials who opposed this Bill from its inception. They also knew, based on personal experience and observation, that the statistics presented at the Congressional hearings by these same individuals were false.

A report reflecting the results of our statistical survey is enclosed to reveal to you, the actual consequences resulting from the hazards of Federal fire fighter positions. As a number of the Fire Chiefs pointed out in their letters to you on this subject, a large segment of our fire fighters never reach normal retirement age as they are dying or are disabled at an earlier age. The statistics show that over 15 percent fall into this category. Out of a total of only 11,000 Federal fire fighters, it is appalling to find that over 22 of these fire fighters are being disabled every month and that over 9 are suffering heart attacks each month.

Mr. President, the fighting is now considered by the U.S. Department of Labor to be the most hazardous occupation in the world. Heart attacks continue to be the number one killer and disabler of fire fighters throughout the United States and Federal fire fighters are no exception as revealed by the enclosed report.

On behalf of all Federal fire fighters and as President of the U.S. Navy Fire Protection Association, I am requesting your support of H.R. 1414, H.R. 227 and S-916, which are the Hazardous Retirement Bills for Federal civilian fire fighters currently being considered by the Ninety-Second Congress. These Bills are identical to the S-578 Bill that you vetoed.

Your influence to expedite support for and passage of these bills by the Congress, would restore faith in all Federal fire fighters that real justice can still be obtained in our country by utilization of the democratic process. All fire fighters throughout the United States would also be made aware of your correction of a prior injustice.

Thanking you in advance for your consideration and support in this instance, I remain.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT G. SAVAGE,  
President, U.S. NavFPA.

##### REPORT OF INJURY, HEART ATTACK, DEATH AND DISABILITY STATISTICS FOR FEDERAL CIVILIAN FIREFIGHTERS

This report is a compilation of statistics from questionnaires sent to Navy and Marine Corps Fire Chiefs by the Naval Fire Officers Association on 4 February 1971. A total of eighty (80) questionnaires were completed and returned to the Association. They covered 2,707 Federal Civilian Fire Fighters, approximately one fourth of the estimated total of 11,000 Federal Civilian Fire Fighters who are employed primarily by the Department of Defense.

##### ON THE JOB INJURIES, PAST FIVE YEARS

Total Number of Employees Covered—2,707.

Total Number of Injuries—1,390.

##### HEART ATTACKS, PAST FIVE YEARS

On Duty—51 Average Age of Victims 50.

Off Duty—91 Average Age of Victims 54.

Total Number—142 Average Age of Victims 52.

##### DEATHS, PAST FIVE YEARS

On Duty—11 Average Age of Victims 51.

Off Duty—71 Average Age of Victims 54.

Total Number—82 Average Age of Victims 53.

Major cause of deaths was heart attacks which accounted for 49 of the total listed.

DISABILITY RETIREMENTS, PAST FIVE YEARS  
Heart—79, Back Injuries—44, Hypertension—37, Emphysema—21, Eyesight—20, Hearing—19, Arthritis—19, Other—97.

Total Number—336.

Average Age of Disability Retirees—53.

##### AVERAGE AGE OF FEDERAL FIREFIGHTERS

Total Number 2,707 Average Age—45.

NOTE: Average Age of Washington, D.C. Fire Fighters—35.

This report was prepared by a committee of five Navy Fire Chiefs on 23 March 1971.

The figures were obtained from the eighty questionnaires received.

The high incidence of heart attacks (142) together with the extremely high number of disability retirements (336) compels this committee to recommend the establishment of a compulsory injury, death and disability statistical report for annual compilation by proper authority. If these figures were extended to cover the approximately 11,000 Federal Civilian Fire Fighters, the proportion of heart attacks and disability retirements would then quadruple (568 heart attacks) and (1,344 disability retirements) within the five year period covered by these statistics. Respectfully submitted.

R. G. SAVAGE, Fire Chief,  
Naval Station, Treasure Island.  
L. H. McNEIL, Fire Chief,  
Naval Air Station, Alameda.  
J. L. TSCHIDA, Fire Chief,  
Mare Island Naval Shipyard.  
G. J. GRINSELL, Fire Chief,  
Hunters Point Naval Shipyard.  
L. J. CUNNINGHAM, Fire Chief,  
Naval Supply Center.  
WILLIAM B. CLAYTON, Chairman,  
Naval Fire Officers Association.

#### RETIREMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE McCULLOCH

Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, an editorial in today's Washington Post, entitled, "Mr. McCULLOCH Decides To Retire," is an eloquent and thoughtful tribute to a man who deserves it. I could go on at some length in singing the praises of this quiet, gentleman from Ohio. But I shall let the editorial speak for itself, and I shall add only this: I will miss working with him.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[Washington Post Editorial, June 11, 1971]

##### MR. McCULLOCH DECIDES TO RETIRE

It is sad but not surprising news that Rep. William McCulloch has decided not to run for reelection next year. The Ohio Republican, who is ranking minority member of the House Judiciary Committee, has not been well in consequence of a fall he took a while ago, and it would not be his style to retain a public office to which he did not feel he could devote his full energy and time. Quiet, direct, hardworking, conservative in taste and stubborn in principle, Mr. McCulloch has been the kind of representative who shows up at 7 a.m. to begin the day's business. This may have worked some hardship on his staff, but it also worked to the enormous advantage of the country. For the fact is that no man can claim a larger role in the passage of the landmark civil rights legislation of the past 14 years than Mr. McCulloch. The subject had become his quiet passion.

What put his commitment beyond challenge was the fact that there was nothing in his background to suggest that it proceeded from fashion, social pressure or political urgencies. On the contrary, he grew up on a working farm in that part of rural, white Ohio he has represented since he was elected to the 80th Congress, and before he came to

Washington he had served an extended term as member and then as Republican leader of the Ohio House of Representatives. In fact, Mr. McCulloch's polite and relentless pressure for civil rights legislation often as not brought him into conflict with numerous of his Republican colleagues in the House, whose views he generally shared on questions of, say, economic and foreign policy. He fought hard (and prevailed) during the deliberations on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to keep his anxious and unhappy fellow Republicans in the House from going over the side. More recently, when the Nixon administration attempted to gut the crucial Voting Rights Act of 1965, it was Mr. McCulloch who led the unyielding opposition to Attorney General Mitchell in the House.

In a town that does not take kindly to behavior that is inconsistent with its cherished stereotypes ("rural Republican congressmen," "big city liberals," and the rest) and a town that is never quite comfortable until it has unearthed some practical, if vaguely discreditable, political motive for seeming acts of principle and independence, Mr. McCulloch, of course, has not escaped the motive-seekers. One tortured theory holds that his dedication to the cause of civil rights is based on the fact that Lima, Ohio is within his district and that there is an increasingly militant black population there. How this fact could be expected to explain the flak Mr. McCulloch has risked over the years from his principal constituents and the total absence of showboating with which he has pursued his objectives defies imagination. We prefer to stick with the explanation offered by an associate: "He is a very stubborn man, and he thinks it is right." The Judiciary Committee, the House and the capital itself will be the poorer when Mr. McCulloch retires. He has done as much as any man could to shatter some of this city's more patronizing generalities.

#### TEXTILES UNDER SIEGE

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, there appeared in the Atlanta Journal on June 6, 7, and 8 a three-part series entitled, "Textiles Under Siege," which very effectively illustrates the seriousness of the textile import problem to American industry.

This problem increases in its severity every month of every year. Low-wage foreign textile imports, principally from Japan and the Far East, flood the American market and take a tremendous toll of American jobs. As I have pointed out in the Senate on so many occasions, Congress and our Government needs at this time to do everything possible to create more jobs and to strengthen our economy, rather than permitting a policy of exporting American jobs and American dollars abroad. It is for this reason that I have urged the Senate to adopt import quota legislation in order to bring the situation under control.

To my way of thinking, it is simply an economic matter. I stand with American workers on this issue, and in the absence of suitable agreements between our Government and the other parties involved, the Congress has no other alternative but to act decisively to keep American jobs from going under and to permit growth in the American textile industry that will produce more jobs.

I bring this newspaper series to the attention of the Senate and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, June 6, 1971]

#### TEXTILES UNDER SIEGE—No. 1: STAKES HIGH IN STRUGGLE

(By Jeff Tucker)

A battle to save the South's largest industry is afoot and before it is over the future of not only the Southern economy but perhaps even of the presidency will lie in the balance.

The textile industry, statistically the South's largest, is struggling to maintain quality while facing fragmentation from within, a dwindling labor force and voracious competition from low-wage imports.

In many other industries, losses in the last 12 months would be enough to force them under.

Since 1969, at least 98 textile plants in the South and Northeast have closed their doors, many because of competition from low-priced imported textile products which undercut the American textile markets.

"We have a great future if we can persuade our government to negotiate reasonable controls on the growth of imports," said John Reeves, president of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute, recently.

Reeves echoed the cries of countless textile industry men who have clamored for more restrictions on imports. Their battle is far from over and before it ends the battleground may encompass not only the South, but the White House.

The industry is looking to President Nixon for protection against imports—a shift that could put Nixon on the spot in the South.

Many textile executives expect Nixon to make another big push before the 1972 elections for a negotiated agreement with Japan to dam the flood of cheap imports from that country and several of its neighbors.

They have virtually abandoned hope of getting legislated quotas from Congress this year, now that Rep. Wilbur Mills, chairman of the House Ways and Means committee, has withdrawn his support. Mills favors trying voluntary restraint by Japan which the industry says is inadequate.

The President, who promised relief for the textile industry in his 1968 campaign, has reiterated his assurances that legislated quotas and strong executive agreements are necessary.

But textile leaders say the industry is suffering now. They want any assurances translated into action this year and some express hope the 1972 elections will prompt Nixon to deliver on his promises.

In Georgia alone the industry has lost 4,500 workers in the 12 months from March, 1970 to March, 1971. Those figures, compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, mean a loss in dollars of \$11,250 an hour, according to Frank Carter, head of the Georgia Textile Manufacturers Association.

Carter said in addition to the loss in the labor force, nine mills in the state have closed completely. Included are Piedmont Cotton Mills, East Point; Fitzgerald Textile Mills, Fitzgerald; Exposition Plant, Cotton Division, J. P. Stevens & Co., Atlanta; Crown Cotton Mills, Dalton; Aragon Mills Division, United Merchants and Manufacturers, Inc., Aragon; one of two Canton Textile Mills, Canton; Whittier Mills, Atlanta; Mary-Lella Mills, Greensboro, and Archer Mills at Columbus.

Cutbacks in three or four other mills in the state indicate they too are hovering at the brink of extinction, Carter added.

"And in almost every instance the major factor has been imports," Carter said, adding quickly, "but that is not the sole factor."

"Imports are just killing us," Carter said.

"We don't ask that imports be barred from our shores nor are we asking for high tariffs, what we want is a limitation on the imports foreign powers can send here and allow them to have a reasonable share of our market and its growth, but not a major share."

The push for those limitations may have politically far-reaching effects in 1972.

Frederick Dent, former chairman of the international trade committee of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute and president of Mayfair Mills in Spartanburg, S.C., said he thinks the problem surrounding the textile industry is a "social and economic one; it is a festering sore and something must be done about it before 1972," he said.

F. Sadler Love, executive officer for the ATMI in Charlotte, N.C., said he had no indication the White House is planning to act, but he said there is a certain amount of logic involved.

"I don't believe anyone who falls to carry the textile industry can carry the South. And I don't believe anyone who falls to carry the South can get the presidency."

#### TEXTILES UNDER SIEGE—No. 2: INDUSTRY'S PICTURE IS NOT ENTIRELY BLEAK

(By Jeff Tucker)

Along the rim of Asia, from Korea to Pakistan, the last decade has brought a remarkable explosion of growth in textile manufacturing, one of the world's most venerable industries.

Inevitably, Japan's aggressive industrialists are leading the boom, but other Asian entrepreneurs are moving swiftly to get in on the textile export bonanza.

The resulting surge of Asian exports, especially from Japan and especially to the United States, is creating new stresses in the world market, stresses which many American textile manufacturers say could dangerously weaken the Southern economy and create an imbalance in trade surpluses.

The main explanation for the Asians' success is the competitive advantage they realize from the gap between Asian and American wages. For example, the United States textile worker averages \$2.48 an hour in yarn and fabric plants, compared to an average of 11 cents an hour in South Korea, Pakistan and Taiwan, 15 cents in India, 31 cents in Hong Kong and 45 cents in Japan.

According to F. Sadler Love, executive officer at the American Textile Manufacturers Institute, the wages in all of the highly competitive Asian textile plants would be illegal in the United States.

But cheap labor is only a part of the story.

In the past few years productivity of Asian workers has been raised to the same level as that of American workers through the introduction of modern plants and technology.

The increase in technical knowledge has made the Asian product highly competitive with the quality of the American textile product, yet industry leaders here think the domestic product is better produced to last longer.

Problems in the textile manufacturing industry have found their way into other related industries, namely garment production and eventually into sales receipts in domestic department stores.

While imports of textiles have doubled since 1962, according to the U.S. Department of Labor, garment imports have more than tripled to \$960 million. About two-thirds come from the Far East.

The two industries are rather thoroughly intertwined, since the garment industry is textile's largest customer.

But things may not be as bleak on the whole for textiles as would be thought, judging from profits.

Although textile net profits were off 5 per cent last year, in a slow economy, they have

almost doubled since 1960 and are expected to double again in the next 10 years, according to industry leaders in the South.

It is not unusual for an industry to experience setbacks during a busy time of expansion, and, they point out, the textile industry is just emerging from an era of rapid modernization and change. That can be evidenced in the many modern mills in the Southeast, many of which are new and air conditioned to help assure good working conditions.

In all, only 17 per cent of the individual plants were considered outmoded in 1969, a significant improvement from 29 per cent six years earlier, says the ATMI. And, it points out, machinery in the mills is modern.

Wide looms, shuttle looms, dyeing and finishing machines that work on assembly-line principles and high-speed knitting machines are standard in many Southern mills.

ATMI executive Love said, "By and large textile mills have very good working conditions, and the industry is also very safe." He added that most mills offer better working conditions than other manufacturing industries, due chiefly to the cleanliness of the job.

He and Frank Carter, head of the Georgia Textile Manufacturer's Association, agree that a depressed national economy and increased importation are causing the biggest textile problems.

"When the economy is down, it hits us all," Love said recently.

"Textile profits are far lower than other industries (although they have increased in the last decade) and when there is no money left at the end of the year for increased wages, there also is no money to keep us the modern industry we are," Love added.

He foresees the day when the vast textile complexes will drop to a handful of large concentrated mills. "That may be the only way to stay alive," he said.

#### TEXTILES UNDER SIEGE—No. 3: FRAGMENTATION'S THE KEY (By Jeff Tucker)

With foreign imports eating away at American textile markets and a depressed economy making it harder and harder for the industry to realize any profit, the greatest problem confronting textiles may be fragmentation, a dogged holdover from the old days of small family firms.

Although statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor and the Georgia Textile Manufacturers Association show that imports have jumped 21 per cent from March 1970 to March 1971 and although the American Textile Manufacturers Institute says profits are down five per cent, the single most startling feature about textiles is severe fragmentation.

The industry remains split into comparatively tiny companies which are often limited to narrow choices of product lines. About 1,000 firms (70 per cent in the South) spin, weave, knit and dye more than \$20 billion worth of yarn and fabrics each year.

Burlington Industries, the single biggest textile firm in the world, with \$1.8 billion in sales in 1970, holds only 8 per cent of the domestic textile market.

Only four of the American textile companies are as large as the Japanese chemical textile plants which are our biggest competition.

Those five Japanese corporations command 80 per cent of their nation's entire textile and fiber outputs, while all 10 of America's largest fabric makers—Burlington Industries included—claim only 28 per cent of domestic textile production, according to industry figures.

Thus U.S. firms have neither the strength, the size nor breadth of product mix that their major foreign competitors have.

And, many industry leaders claim, the

Federal Trade Commission has dealt a near fatal blow to any textile hopes of consolidating.

Earlier this year, the FTC issued an order with a proviso that no merger in the textile industry shall result in a company with more than \$300 million in annual sales.

The guidelines protect the small family-owned mills which still exist, but they are the exact opposite of what the competition is doing.

In Japan, the government is now offering a tax incentive to encourage its small textile companies to merge.

Last-minute changes in the FTC order could ease the situation, textile leaders say, but meanwhile the severe problems in the industry are making their way into the world trade picture.

In 1961, the United States enjoyed a \$53.7 million trade surplus in cotton, wool and synthetic fibers.

Last year the unbalance in surplus climbed 60 per cent to \$807 million. Today 47 per cent of all woman's synthetic fiber sweaters and 46 per cent of all the wool sweaters sold in the United States are manufactured abroad. One of every three men's all-wool suits is made from Japanese worsteds, and a quarter of men's shirts are imported.

It is hard to overemphasize the severity of the textile situation, since the textile industry is the South's largest single employer.

Commanding 70 per cent of the total textile industry, the South (the remaining 30 per cent remains in New England) bases a large portion of its economy on workers in the industry. Recently the work force has begun to dwindle and industry leaders are reluctant to predict the future.

In the past year (March 1970 to March 1971) 23,400 jobs have been lost in the South due to closed mills and related textile problems, according to Brunswick Bagdon of the U.S. Department of Labor Statistics. The major loss share was attributed to Georgia (4,500) and North Carolina (8,600).

Other states included South Carolina with a loss of 4,000 jobs, Tennessee with 2,000; Virginia, 1,600; Mississippi, 1,500 and Alabama with a loss of 1,300. Florida was the only state to show an increase in textile employment but its minuscule addition of 100 jobs was hardly significant, especially since the industry there is very small.

More than 98 plants have gone out of business in the South since January 1969, when the economic effects of foreign shipments, principally from Hong Kong and Japan, first were felt. The annual loss in the South due to the job losses and closings was \$18 million last year.

And imports continue to increase in volume, with 523 million square yards of fiber in March of this year (43 per cent above the March total for 1970). Their dollar value climbed to \$2.6 billion, last year, an increase of more than 11 per cent over 1969 which had been the record year for imports.

In contrast, American-made textile exports in 1970 totalled only \$768 million. That leaves a textile trade deficit of \$1.6 billion.

Industry leaders are insisting the government intervention in the textile dilemma, but any action may be put off until late this year which would put textiles in the middle of what could be a political fight for campaign support of the strong southern bloc by northern politicians.

#### THE MORAL AND MATERIAL COST OF THE WAR

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement prepared for delivery by the distinguished Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR McGOVERN

#### THE MORAL AND MATERIAL COST OF THE WAR

A few weeks ago, an American Lieutenant was sentenced to life imprisonment for causing the death of innocent Vietnamese. The verdict brought dismay throughout our society. In its wake, we struggle with perplexing legal and moral questions.

Who must bear, or at least share, the ultimate responsibility for such acts? Do we hold ourselves to the same standards we have applied to other nations, including our defeated adversaries in World War II? How do Lieutenant Calley's acts differ from orders to bomb and strafe villages where civilians also reside?

We have a moral imperative to seek answers. But as we ponder these issues, we should also ask, "Why punish anyone for such crimes?"

Is it out of concern for the victims, to prevent more suffering for the innocent?

If it is, then recognize that no matter how many trials we conduct, no matter who is charged, the suffering of helpless Asians will not stop until this war is ended.

The intention behind the trigger has made little difference to the 300,000 Vietnamese civilians, and the uncounted thousands of Laotians and Cambodians, who have perished before our firepower, or to the million and more whose bodies have been crippled and whose flesh has been torn and burned.

Nor has the motive behind the bombsights made any difference to the one-fourth of those countries' populations who have been forced to flee their homes and villages, before twice the bombing force we dropped in all theaters in World War II and the Korean War combined—the equivalent of 280 times the Hiroshima and Nagasaki blasts.

That dreadful pounding of Asian men, women and children goes on today. The punishment worsens as we shift from a ground to an air strategy—as we shift from infantry to bombers still less capable of distinguishing between enemy and innocent.

If we are concerned about preventing suffering like that at Mylai, then in God's name, let us stop the slaughter now ravaging the face of Indochina.

No matter how many Lieutenant Calleys are charged and tried, we will not feel clean or be clean until this entire murderous business is ended.

The moral cost of our involvement in Indochina is the highest price that any nation can be called upon to pay. But we have also become aware that we are paying an exorbitant material cost because we are in Indochina.

It has become almost axiomatic these days to say that the war is likely to recede as an issue while the Nation's economic woes become a greater source of concern. In fact, we must recognize that the war and the state of our economy are inextricably related. The main source of our economic problems—inflation, unemployment, the drain on the dollar, rising local property taxes—is the war.

This war bears a price tag that is almost beyond comprehension. Defense Department spending alone for the war totals at least \$119 billion. And we do not have the figures for CIA and other covert operations nor do we count programs of other government departments which are the direct result of the war.

But that is not all the cost. Because of conscription, made possible by the very legislation that is now before the Congress, millions of draftees and reluctant volunteers have been called into service and forced to forego civilian incomes. The amount of civilian income lost as a result of the Vietnam mobilization undoubtedly exceeds \$15 billion.

No price can be placed on the lost American lives. But 50,000 war dead would have produced \$20 billion worth of goods and services in their lifetime. In terms of current dollars, this means a total loss of some \$12 billion. Virtually an equal amount will have been lost because of the inability of our disabled to enrich fully our society.

All of this amounts to a total cost of the war that is rapidly approaching \$160 billion. Is there anyone who thinks that our Nation, however great its wealth, can afford this kind of outlay for an immoral and futile war?

In the mid-1960's we apparently thought we could have guns and butter. But our productive capacity was insufficient to meet the demands of the war and our domestic economy. The result was inflation as goods became more scarce.

The tax surcharge was simply too little and too late. Then, as inflation continued to mount, the Nixon Administration adopted a policy of tight money and high interest rates. To slow inflation, the Administration had to reduce economic activity and those who had to bear the burden of this battle are the millions of unemployed. The unemployment rate has just climbed to a new high. Yet there is every indication that we will continue to be plagued by inflation this year and next. So we are all paying the price for the Administration's determination to back the Saigon regime instead of keeping faith with its own people.

And all through the years of the war, the U.S. dollar has been in trouble. The reason is clear: the United States allows more money to flow out each year than it takes in from foreign sources. The largest single contributor to that outflow is the war in Vietnam which has caused losses as high as \$4 billion a year to our balance of payments.

Instead of facing up to the underlying cause of our dollar outflow, the Administration has taken the attitude that the monetary crisis is the problem of European countries. In fact, by their willingness to hold dollars and not demand gold, these countries are acquiescing in our Vietnam adventure.

Most harmful of all to our economy is the effect of the war on the allocation of our resources. We can safely estimate that one-tenth of our national budget has gone each year to the war. In other words, at least \$20 billion a year has gone for direct Defense Department expenditures related to the war out of budgets that have totalled about \$200 million.

Every state in the Union and every American has felt the effects of this unwise allocation of our national treasure. To take an example, the Federal government spends less for veterans' hospitals and veterans' medical care each year in South Dakota than it spends supporting the corrupt regime in Saigon for two hours.

If we look at what the taxpayers in a few of our states are paying for the war, we can see why they demand revenue sharing as a way of meeting their needs. New York has paid \$3.2 billion a year; Virginia some \$260 million. California has contributed \$1.5 billion; New Hampshire \$41 million a year, Kansas \$109 million, Kentucky \$241 million, South Dakota \$20 million.

How can we share revenue—parceling it out among equally needed programs—when we are squandering revenue? There is nothing available to aid the states and so local income, sales and property taxes are forced higher.

With just \$1 billion dollars, 100 new schools could be built and 10 fully equipped major new hospitals could be created and scores of mass transportation vehicles could be put into service. And that is for just \$1 billion in one year. We have been wasting \$20 billion each year. How much wiser it would be to use this money to pay men to build those

schools and hospitals instead of paying them to kill Vietnamese.

We can judge a country by its national budget. Where does the collective wisdom of the people determine that their public funds should be spent? If we give a moment's thought to that question, we can see why 73% of Americans want the Indochina war brought to an end this year. They are tired of seeing their country bleed away its resources in a mistaken war.

#### WHY ARE THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS NECESSARY?

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, the Convention on the Political Rights of Women and the Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor guarantee nothing new for Americans. The political equality of women and the prohibition of forced labor already are grounded firmly in Federal and State law.

But our concern for human rights should extend beyond our borders. If the Senate is interested in world peace, it must be concerned with human rights for all men throughout the world. The human rights conventions are a step toward peace. They are a statement to the world of this Nation's position on human rights—not simply American rights.

An exchange between the Honorable Arthur Goldberg and former Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa during the 1967 hearings on the human rights conventions is pertinent to understanding why the human rights conventions are necessary. I call upon the Senate to heed Mr. Goldberg's words and ratify the human rights conventions. I ask unanimous consent of the Senate to print an excerpt of the hearings at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are there any human rights referred to or established or promoted or advocated in any of these conventions, that are not already existent in the laws of the United States, Federal and State?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. No, there are none. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Therefore, the adoption of these conventions or any of them would neither impose on the United States nor compel the United States to the adoption of any laws which we do not already have on the books.

Ambassador GOLDBERG. That is correct, Senator Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then what is the use of having them?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. For this good reason. Precisely for this reason, I would think: Our country, which expounds these doctrines, and which believes that they ought to be followed throughout the world if we are going to have a reasonable, peaceful world devoted to stability, advancement of human progress, should be a supporter and a signer, because our signature will have a great—our ratification will have a great impact—while a large number of countries have signed, the world community is still much larger and other countries have not signed—we would set a good example, and it also would give us a voice in seeing to it that some of these practices which adversely affect our interests for example, are adhered to.

#### UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA PROFESSOR FOSTER-HARRIS

Mr. BELLMON. Mr. President, during the latter part of May, I had the privilege

of participating in a recognition ceremony for University of Oklahoma Professor Foster-Harris, who is said to have taught more people to write successfully than any other person in the world.

During an illustrious career of more than 30 years as instructor in professional writing at the university, Foster-Harris has so mastered the techniques of writing for publication that his students have established an unprecedented record of success in this highly competitive field.

More than 400 books, from scholarly works to popular best sellers, have been published by his students. Sales of shorter pieces are well beyond the 2,000 mark.

In appreciation for his service, some of his students and friends got together and presented him an award at the 33d annual professional writers short course at Norman, Okla. The award recognized his contribution to professional writing not only in Oklahoma but everywhere his writers have gone.

This is a highly deserved tribute to a man who has devoted his life to helping others. I ask unanimous consent that an article by Helen Reagan Smith describing the career of Professor Foster-Harris be made a part of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### FOSTER-HARRIS TURNS WRITERS ON (By Helen Reagan Smith)

It has been said that Oklahoma University Professor Foster-Harris has taught more people to write than any person in the world.

Best selling authors such as Bill Scott (Weldon Hill), Al Dewlen, and Bill Gulick have dedicated books to "Foster-Harris, who showed me how." In the last two years over 40 books have been written and sold by his students and graduates. Doubleday alone has published more than 100 of OU-trained authors.

The last story purchased by the late Walt Disney was written by one of the graduates. The Oklahoma University School of Writing was the only one ever recognized in print by the Saturday Evening Post, but the Post mentioned this school twice.

Foster-Harris was brought to Oklahoma University by the writing school's founder, Walter Campbell (Stanley Vestal).

"Just anybody won't do," Professor Campbell explained to the president. "We planned this school for the professionals—people who make their living by writing. We can't use a man in an ivory tower of theories. Degrees after his name do not substitute for the man who has made a first-class living in the sweat of the market place."

The president agreed and Walter Campbell picked a top-selling author in the western magazine field—Foster-Harris.

Now, more than twenty-eight years later, Foster-Harris gets a quiet satisfaction out of the result. The student display case and office files spill over with copies of published works. Sales of shorter pieces are well beyond the 2,000 mark.

There are more than 400 published books by students and graduates, including a number one best-seller, scholarly works, histories, biographies, travel books, religious books, juveniles, including winners of the Newberry award, western books, and books in foreign languages.

Students come in all ages. Mrs. Ennen Reaves Hall was a grandmother when she came to study. Today she has earned over \$80,000 for her short stories, and is the author of two books.

Success of students does not mean that Foster-Harris teaches them their skills overnight. "What a lot of people are looking for," he explained as he tapped fresh tobacco in his pipe, "is some magic oil which they can pour over their typewriter that will turn out stories.

"It doesn't work. There is no formula for instant authorship. Time is required to become an author."

"How long do I need to study?" I asked when I first enrolled in his courses.

"Studying never stops. But about two years are needed to learn to write a short story and about eight years to write a novel. We prefer the long look. What a writer can do after working ten years is more important than his first five."

In his classes Professor Harris takes the current magazines and shows students how the contents mirror the reader. He shows them the age, income, sex interests, politics, social status, occupation, reaction, prejudices, superstitions, tastes, and interests.

The student, stripped of nebulous goals, is squared up against real situations as to who will pay the printer and whether or not the article will serve the editor's need.

Afterwards Foster-Harris analyzes each story or article of the magazine being studied, showing the student the methods by which the writer made the story leap into life for the reader.

A year before the death of the American and six months before the passing of Collier's, he pointed out the reasons why they would fade from the magazine field.

"Why does he teach confession story writing?" Mark Jaffe, Vice-President and Editorial Director of Bantam Books, asked me during one of our annual professional writing workshops. It was a question I had asked myself as a student until I had learned the wisdom of the teacher's way.

"Writers have to learn discipline. Also, they have to become skilled in showing the inner relationships of emotions as they react upon their main character as well as those with whom the main character deals.

In the confessions you emphasize emotions, and the writer can become skilled. This does not mean to say the Professor points to lesser ideals. In confessions, too, the moral laws must balance.

"You are going to become what you write," he warns. "You better write what you want to become."

Foster-Harris's wife Jill learned early that their modest white frame home would always overflow with writers. In the early days she helped the newcomers celebrate first sales by baking each a chocolate cake, but soon there were too many sales.

It was in the Harris' living room long ago that the artist of a comic strip was searching for a name for the main character.

"Why not call him, Ally Oop?" Jill suggested. The name was adopted and immediately the comic strip began to grow.

"To learn to write is not hard, although it takes a great deal of work," Foster-Harris explains. "The secret lies in the author's spirit which in sincere emotion must reach out and evoke a like response from his reader. The writer is a broadcasting station which must find a receiver turned on and tuned in."

#### HON. WILLIAM M. McCULLOCH

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, in an age of widespread skepticism about the morality of politics and the motives of public officials, it is particularly valuable to identify men who set and fulfill the highest standards of public service. In a time of questions of the efficiency and insight of the Congress, it is especially important to recognize those Members

of Congress who have dedicated their careers to making Congress meet its national responsibilities.

Such a man is the Honorable WILLIAM M. McCULLOCH, who has represented the Fourth District of Ohio in the House of Representatives since 1948. It is therefore a great blow not only to his constituents but also to the Congress and the country that Congressman McCULLOCH has concluded that his health will not permit him to seek reelection in 1972.

Mr. President, this announcement is a personal loss to me, as I have had the privilege and education of working with BILL McCULLOCH since 1961. Throughout my 8 years in the other body, I served under his leadership on the great Committee on the Judiciary, which was then—as it is now—in the forefront of the unending fight for equal rights and justice for all Americans. During these years of fierce legislative struggles, BILL McCULLOCH was a source of constant strength, encouragement and guidance to me. Since my election to the Senate in 1968, I have continued to depend upon his wisdom and sound judgment on the difficult issues of law enforcement and justice. He has been an irreplaceable colleague and a friend.

A staunch Republican and a stout partisan, he understands the value of the two-party system, but he has never let it stand in the way of a remarkable working relationship with Chairman EMANUEL CELLER.

Mr. President, as noted in many editorials and commentaries this week, Congressman McCULLOCH's talents have been devoted not to making headlines but to writing laws. His influence has been exerted quietly, both on the floor of the House and behind the closed doors of executive sessions of his committee and conference committees. Throughout each of the great civil rights battles of the past 14 years, he has been a voice of reasoned principle and unwavering commitment. The softness of his tones has not masked, to those who know him, the strength of his dedication and the force of his belief.

When historians review the work of the Congress on civil rights, they will recount the Civil Rights Act of 1960, the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the open housing and equal justice legislation which passed the House in 1966 and was enacted into law in 1967 and 1968, and the Voting Rights Act extension of 1970. In each of these cases, without exception, those who analyze the history of these laws will conclude that BILL McCULLOCH made the difference. His efforts made the difference between triumph and tokenism, between constructive legislation and destructive compromise, between bipartisan progress and partisan squabbling—in many cases, between great legislative victories and no legislation at all.

Many may claim more credit, but no man in Congress has earned more.

The editorials of this week and the tributes which will be heard during the months to come in honor of Congressman McCULLOCH are sadly overdue. One of

the failings of the Congress, perhaps understandable in the constant rush of business, is our tendency to take for granted the strong men in our ranks, drawing on their leadership without stopping to thank them along the way. As one man who owes a great deal to BILL McCULLOCH, I want to pay at least an installment on my personal debt to him today.

I ask unanimous consent to include in the RECORD a perceptive editorial from today's Washington Post.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, June 11, 1971]

#### MR. McCULLOCH DECIDES TO RETIRE

It is sad but not surprising news that Rep. William McCulloch has decided not to run for reelection next year. The Ohio Republican, who is ranking minority member of the House Judiciary Committee, has not been well in consequence of a fall he took a while ago, and it would not be his style to retain a public office to which he did not feel he could devote his full energy and time. Quiet, direct, hardworking, conservative in taste and stubborn in principle, Mr. McCulloch has been the kind of representative who shows up at 7 a.m. to begin the day's business. This may have worked some hardship on his staff, but it also worked to the enormous advantage of the country. For the fact is that no man can claim a larger role in the passage of the landmark civil rights legislation of the past 14 years than Mr. McCulloch. The subject had become his quiet passion.

What put his commitment beyond challenge was the fact that there was nothing in his background to suggest that it proceeded from fashion, social pressure or political urgencies. On the contrary, he grew up on a working farm in that part of rural, white Ohio he has represented since he was elected to the 80th Congress, and before he came to Washington he had served an extended term as member and then as Republican leader of the Ohio House of Representatives. In fact, Mr. McCulloch's polite and relentless pressure for civil rights legislation often as not brought him into conflict with numerous of his Republican colleagues in the House, whose views he generally shared on questions of, say, economic and foreign policy. He fought hard (and prevailed) during the deliberations on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to keep his anxious and unhappy fellow Republicans in the House from going over the side. More recently, when the Nixon administration attempted to gut the crucial Voting Rights Act of 1965, it was Mr. McCulloch who led the unyielding opposition to Attorney General Mitchell in the House.

In a town that does not take kindly to behavior that is inconsistent with its cherished stereotypes ("rural Republican congressmen," "big city liberals," and the rest) and a town that is never quite comfortable until it has unearthed some practical, if vaguely discreditable, political motive for seeming acts of principle and independence, Mr. McCulloch, of course, has not escaped the motive-seekers. One tortured theory holds that his dedication to the cause of civil rights is based on the fact that Lima, Ohio is within his district and that there is an increasingly militant black population there. How this fact could be expected to explain the flak Mr. McCulloch has risked over the years from his principal constituents and the total absence of showboating with which he has pursued his objectives defies imagination. We prefer to stick with the explanation offered by an associate: "He is a very stubborn man, and he thinks it is right." The Judiciary Committee, the House and the capital

itself will be the poorer when Mr. McCulloch retires. He has done as much as any man could to shatter some of this city's more patronizing generalities.

#### CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that morning business be closed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 6531) to amend the Military Selective Service Act of 1967; to increase military pay; to authorize military active duty strengths for fiscal year 1972; and for other purposes.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending amendment is the amendment of the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from South Dakota, amendment No. 143, and the time is under control.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, the Pastore germaneness rule has been waived for today.

I suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask unanimous consent that the time be charged equally against both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOLLINGS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Who yields time?

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Alaska.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I probably would have asked for the 5 minutes for these remarks from the Senator from Mississippi, but I do thank my colleague from Oregon for being so gracious, and I do support his amendment, but in an indirect fashion. The indirection stems from the statement made by the distinguished Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK)—a very fine colleague in this body—who placed in the RECORD a statement in which there were a few points that struck me as odd. The points he made went to the conventional wisdom of people in the United States concerning the People's Republic of China. This, I think, in a direct manner, is associated with the events in Southeast Asia.

The basic thrust of his point, and I would be prepared to stand corrected, was that the People's Republic of China should not become a member of the

United Nations; that, by and large, mainland China is essentially a nation not worthy of membership in the august body of the United Nations. The reason for that, of course, is that, in his mind, the People's Republic of China has been supplying arms and economic aid to North Vietnam.

I find his effort to establish a rationale to prove the intransigence of the People's Republic of China very difficult to accept. If one really wanted to place an objective view on it, he would come up, obviously, with a different conclusion.

To an objective man looking at the situation, what difference is there between a nation like the United States which not only gives economic aid, but goes in with 800,000 men, as my colleague from Missouri stated—and I was astounded because I have been constantly using the figure of 500,000 Americans, but when we consider the Navy and the Air Force the figure approximates 800,000 Americans—and the People's Republic of China, which gives only economic aid and arms to North Vietnam. Should they not be equally distrustful of us when we not only give economic aid to South Vietnam and military aid as well, but then turn around and use 800,000 of our own citizens to prosecute a war at their doorstep?

I find it difficult as an American, because of the love I have for my country; but certainly any other member of the world would objectively have to say that there is more reason for the Chinese to have fear of us than for us to have fear of them. Yet, my colleague from Colorado makes the case that we should nurture our paranoia concerning the Chinese because of the danger they pose to us.

Then he talks in terms of the bodies that were found in the Tonkin Gulf as evidence of the warlike nature of the Chinese people. Of course he says nothing of the bodies that were floating down the Mekong when South Vietnam went into Cambodia, and the butchery that took place then.

Mr. President, if I were a Swiss citizen and I were a student of warfare, and I were to sit back and make an objective judgment of who is really the more dangerous, I would ask an American, "Have you ever heard in recent history of the Chinese, let us say in the past 100 years, occupying the United States?"

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Alaska has expired.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I yield such time to the Senator from Alaska as he may yet require.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska may proceed.

Mr. GRAVEL. So, Mr. President, if I were a Swiss citizen and I were talking to an American in Geneva, I would say, "Mr. American, do you know of any instance where the Chinese people have invaded the United States of America and occupied your country for a period of time?"

I would have to say, "No, I do not know of any instance where Chinese soldiers with guns have been anywhere in the United States or in a portion of it."

Then the Swiss citizen would say, "Well, Mr. American, do you know of any instance where Americans have had guns in their hands and wore the American uniform and were occupying the territory of China?"

I would have to say, "Well, we sure were there prior to the Second World War. We were there helping them out against the Japanese." I am sure the Chinese are still grateful for that.

Then the Swiss citizen would ask, "But, Mr. American, do you know of any other instance?"

I would have to search history, and I would be compelled to come up with the instance from 1900 to 1934 when we had American military forces in China, not as part of lend-lease, not as part of any AID, but as part of an occupying force, arm-in-arm with the other colonial powers of the world.

Thus, how could we expect any person who was a resident of China and who was born in 1900 and lived there from 1900 to 1934, during that occupation, which stemmed from the Boxer Rebellion, not to think of us as anything other than "yellow dogs"?

Many of us have seen the movie, "Seven Days in Peking," and the movie, "The Sand Pebbles," where they talk of that American intervention—that American involvement. Then we wonder why we might read in Chinese newspapers about them calling us yellow dogs.

What would we call them had they occupied our land?

This is the objectivity that we must search for in order to understand the occasion for their actions. We had it brought out in secret session—it was not very secret, because I had read about it in the newspapers before that—that we bombed, not a little bit, but on a level that had not been attained at any prior time in history.

During this bombing, we bombed perilously close; miles, and perhaps only yards, from the Chinese border in northwest Laos.

How can the Chinese leaders read the reports—and obviously their intelligence sources read the statements of the President of the United States, and they must sit in their offices and read the statements of President Nixon about how we want peace and seek peace—and not really wonder how such statements can be made by our leaders when they need but go to the highest hill in their country with their binoculars to view the bombs dropped at their very doorstep?

Could any objective person think that they could possibly believe in the sincerity of our statements? These statements have to be viewed as hollow by the Chinese.

I think our statements are sincere. We are a peace-loving nation. But obviously any objective person looking at both sides has to come away with the conclusion that these people cannot accept our statements at face value because our actions do not warrant that type of interpretation.

I find it difficult to see how the American leadership could step forward with great moral certitude and comment on how peaceful we are.

I realize the statement that I am about

to make it a serious one. It is an adjunct to the statement I made last year when I was trying to fight the appropriations for the military for Cambodia.

When we look at the figures on the tonnage of bombs that were dropped in Southeast Asia, never minding the ground killing, the eyeball to eyeball killing, we can see what it means.

I can recall as a young boy of 12, 13, or 14 years old, though I had never been to Europe at that time, when they talked about the bombs in Europe and about the skies being filled with bombers as far as the eye could see, I thought, in my little experience, what havoc there must be in that land.

The papers had articles about this bombing. We all had a very close, direct feeling of reaction to the bombing that was taking place. We knew that the bombing of open cities was something that had a great impact and great destructive power. Unfortunately, however, for many reasons, not the least of which is the racial disparity between ourselves and the peoples of Indochina, we have lost all concept of what these bombings mean. So, when a person like myself stands on the floor of the Senate of the United States and tells the American people and the people of the world that during the Second World War we dropped approximately 2,164,000 tons of bombs in Europe and the South Pacific combined—and that is what this Nation dropped in the way of bombs during that war—and when we realize that in the Korean war we dropped slightly in excess of 600,000 tons, and then we come forward with a figure that thus far in Southeast Asia—in Laos, Cambodia, and North and South Vietnam—this country has dropped slightly in excess of 2,600,000 tons of bombs, what does it mean?

It is incomprehensible to us. The reason why it is incomprehensible is that we do not have the means with which to appreciate it. We cannot get the television cameras over there and view the scene as the bombs drop, and as the people are burned and incinerated with napalm. We cannot get the television cameras to focus on these hamlets and villages where people run around like little animals trying to avoid being butchered.

The best that we can accomplish is to get newspaper coverage so that the American people can partially understand what is happening.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GRAVEL. I yield.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, the Senator finds the same difficulty I have in translating the tonnage of bombs into something that we can get a handle on.

I would like to interject this further analogy at this point. When we translate the total tonnage of bombs dropped in Indochina, it comes out at 160 pounds for every man, woman, and child. That 160 pounds of explosives still has to be translated further into something we can understand.

As the Senator will recall, when the explosion went off in the Capitol Building that penetrated and pierced the thick, huge walls of this building, it was

estimated, according to the report I read, that that perhaps consisted of 22 or 25 pounds of explosives.

So, here we see I think even more graphically the tremendous firepower and the tremendous explosive and destructive power that this tonnage really represents when we think in terms of people. We tend so often in these reports we have concerning the number of bombs not to think in terms of people.

When we translate it into a relationship with people, it comes out to 160 pounds of explosives which I think is really quite a dramatic way of understanding exactly what our policy represents.

I would further add, as the Senator from Alaska indicated before with his great fund of knowledge on this subject, that we have dropped more tons of bombs on Indochina than we dropped in all of World War II and Korea put together.

Having been in World War II, I can remember the tremendous impact of the bombing as I came into Tokyo on September 2, 1945, as part of the occupation forces and saw some of the results of our bombing there on a major city of the world.

I saw the Yokosuka Naval Yards at Yokohama and saw the results there.

Then we try to relate that to a primitive agricultural rural area of the world like Indochina in which we do not have the kind of military target that we had to bomb in Europe, such as Hamburg, which was a great port into which they brought the material and weapons of war for Hitler and the Krupp steelworks that manufactured armaments. However, these are villages in Indochina and the areas in Germany could hardly be characterized as rural areas.

It is beyond my comprehension with all the tonnage of bombs we have dropped to understand what kind of military advantage we have and what kind of military gain we have experienced.

Would the Senator from Alaska care to comment on what we have gained from this bombing? Are we closer to peace? Have we resolved the military problem or any problem?

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I think the statement of a person who was much closer to this activity than I was, or am, is Robert McNamara, who stated it very clearly. I can provide that for the record. I do not want to look through my files at this point.

I think my colleague has put his finger on part of a psychological problem that faces this Nation. We have no way to comprehend this situation. It is so big that it cannot be comprehended. If we were able to turn around and measure it in pounds and point to the buildings and photographs and see the destruction we might be better able to comprehend it. But when we talk about millions of tons of bombs in an undeveloped area we cannot appreciate it.

That is the point I am leading up to and it is the point I want to make today. In looking at the enormity of this matter and probing my conscience for a description of its enormity, I ask myself, "What have these poor people in Indo-

china done to warrant this scourge?" If one were to take an overall view from another planet, all that could be seen would be these little human beings running around being butchered by a cleaver. What have they done to be subjected to this inhumane brutality, and to have this visitation upon them? I do not know. I am not knowledgeable about the history of that part of the world. I know a little bit about our history and the history of Western man.

So I ask the next question. What have we done as American people, freedom-loving people, good people, people who have brought man to his highest plateau of physical beneficence, to be the curse, to be the tool of their scourge. It is not fair that America should have to be this violent tool, this curse, the one that wields this instrument. We previously have done no great harm to mankind. In fact, we have tried to do good and we mean good. What have we done in our history that we must be so punished, that we must be the executioner?

When this is all done and history renders its judgment, it will render a harsh judgment. It will be a harsh judgment, as the judgment against the people of Germany.

I served in Germany, and I have dined with fine German families. This was during 1952 and 1953. I was there as a young American officer. I was cognizant of the fact that they lost the war and that we won the war, because in my formative years, from the age of 10 to 15 years, I was subjected to the propaganda of the righteousness of that war and how we were fighting Nazism and Prussianism. So I went to Germany as a young officer and I had deep-seated roots of resentment. I found myself sitting as a guest in a gasthaus in Germany. A fine family had invited me over. They barely spoke English and I speak no German. They knew I was a soldier away from home and they felt sorry for me. It was interesting that they felt sorry for me, a second lieutenant, who was there as a conqueror. I joined them. I took lunch with them and spent that Sunday afternoon with them in a gasthaus somewhere in the Black Forest. What went through my mind then and has always gone through my mind ever since was: What could these nice people, who have such delicate feelings toward a conqueror, have been doing when the Germans were stoking the ovens at Dachau and Buchenwald? How could they have lived through that?

Whenever I could get close to a German, in my own mind I would probe and try to develop how a people could permit Adolf Hitler to come to power. He came to power in peaceful times. He had his black shirts and his storm troopers, but there had to be a broad acquiescence on the part of the German people. How could people live in Munich who knew but did not know. Because they lived there they had to know. Testimony was replete at the Nuremberg trials, and great writings since World War II, of the pains of conscience, how they suspected, but it was such a colossal crime no one ever thought of it, because their minds could not think of it.

The psychic issue that faced the German people is one of the great problems of mankind, and it will go down in history along with the massacres of Genghis Khan and many other visitations in history.

I hate to say this as an American, but in looking ahead, one of the items that will go down in the history of man as a great scourge that was visited upon human beings, will be the scourge of the last decade in Southeast Asia, and particularly Indochina, and the curse that will walk hand in hand with that scourge will be the curse that has been visited upon the American people, good people, honest people, industrious people, a hard working people, and a loving people—as much as one could like all those virtues of the German people, of old and of today.

With that curse they will go forward. It will be measured in the annals of history on a par with the curse that has been visited upon the German people.

That I, as an American citizen, and others as Americans, should have to partake of this moment in our history is a deep affliction, a very deep affliction. How will it be resolved? We will look back 10 or 20 years from now and ask, "How could we have done this; how could we all have been parties to it?"

All of us are parties to it. We all pay taxes. Part of the tax money is being used today to maim and kill human beings. We can stand in this air-conditioned Chamber, and it is comfortable—but we forget—no, we do not forget. We do not have the human capacity. I think that is probably the only way to say it. We do not have the human capacity to realize that at this instant some place in the world there is a human being having his guts blown out.

There is a child that is being dismembered. There is a pregnant mother that is being napalmed. These are not extreme exaggerations. This is not oratorical rhetoric. These are things that are going on right now. They are terrible. They are unbelievably terrible. Yet, in every instance, these things are being done by the tax dollars of an honest people, a hard-working people, a decent, freedom-loving people, with good motivations, good desires to help our fellow man.

What is the solution to all this? We are told that the President is trying; he is withdrawing troops as fast as he can, trying to disengage. There is no end to the number and size of the arguments, and the intricacies of the arguments, that are used to say we are trying our best.

When history looks back and judges this administration, and the prior administration, and judges the American people, all of these intricate, debatable points will amount to naught, because what will be so overwhelming will be the gargantuan size of the crime that was committed.

Last December I placed in the RECORD, and read repeatedly, an analysis made by Walter Lippmann. No good can come out of what we are party to, and I do not know if history will be so generous in assessing our actions, but if there can be a benefit, that benefit lies in the direction of recognizing error.

The problem we have in withdrawing from Southeast Asia is that we want to save face. We want to get out within a parameter of justice. We want to leave and know that we have left a viable government there that we call a democracy, so that we can have a rationale for what we have done, and so we can take this rational into history and feel comfortable with it.

As Lippmann so ably stated in his article, that is going to be the greatest danger of all, just as it was a danger, and is a danger, for the German people to not look at what happened with the "final solution." The only chance, and this may be the great catharsis that has taken place amongst the Germans, is to look upon what happened at Dachau and Buchenwald, look at it and realize that, to some degree, they are all party to it.

That is, of course, what we will have to do. We will have to look at Indochina from this perspective and realize that, regardless of our motivation—which motivation was just, was the motivation of honest people, the motivation of decent people—what we did was wrong, and hope and pray that this will never occur again in the history of man.

We are the most powerful nation on earth. If mankind has a chance of getting to the 21st century, it can only be done through our leadership. If mankind, in its insane arms race, has a chance of survival, it can only be done with our leadership, because we are the strongest in the world.

So if what we have done in Southeast Asia brands upon our soul and our psyche a character that now permits us to play, and will permit us to play in the decades ahead, a leadership role in the family of nations that can bring about a lasting and human and mature peace, then—and I will not say it—then what we did in Southeast Asia will not have been worthwhile, because it will never be worthwhile; it is like an affliction; it is like an infirmity.

As I stated earlier, I know not what the poor people of Indochina have done in their history as a part of mankind to warrant the scourge that has been visited upon them. And in my knowledge of American history and the history of Western man, I know not what the American people have done to warrant their being cursed to be the instrument of that scourge.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

#### QUORUM CALL

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask unanimous consent that the time be equally charged to both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL).

#### WHERE DOES VIETNAMIZATION LEAD US?

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I believe it is time we examined closely the progress and the objectives of the present U.S. policy of Vietnamization. It is time we determined exactly where this policy is leading us, and where it is leading the people of Southeast Asia.

As I have stated frequently before here in the Senate, I believe the principal goal of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia should be a political settlement, among the Vietnamese themselves, reflecting the actual political forces in existence.

We have learned through tragic experience that an overpowering direct U.S. military presence did not permit us to dictate a military settlement; the question now is whether we are attempting through Vietnamization to reach the same objective—an imposed settlement. Indeed, the goal of present policy appears to be to accomplish with massive amounts of American money and American material and American bombing what could not be accomplished with massive amounts of American money and material and bombing plus American manpower.

If this be true, then the essence of Vietnamization is simply the removal of American manpower from the equation, leaving unchanged the basic objectives.

That in itself certainly must be counted as no small improvement, for it means, and has meant, a continued reduction in deaths and wounds suffered by American men. And certainly the withdrawal of U.S. forces should be continued and accelerated. It is for that reason that I am a cosponsor of the amendment introduced by Senators MCGOVERN and HATFIELD.

But what else does Vietnamization mean? The evidence indicates that it means continuation of the long and tragic war in Southeast Asia by other means, by proxy, by air, and by utilizing mercenaries.

It means that Vietnam continues to be a divided country. It means that bombing and killing continue, with more of the corpses being yellow instead of white and black.

According to Defense Department statistics, while the casualties of U.S. forces have, thankfully, declined dramatically, combat deaths of South Vietnamese forces continue at a high level. South Vietnamese combat deaths reached a high of 27,915 recorded in the Tet offensive year of 1968. But the number of combat deaths increased from 21,833 in 1969, to 23,346 in 1970. And during the first 3 months of this year, combat deaths totaled 7,504.

It means that the American role in the killing will be conducted largely from the air, from a distance that provides a certain clinical detachment to the mayhem. The psychological advantages of that clinical detachment, however, may well be lost on Vietnamese who die. For them, death from napalm or a fragmentation bomb is as final and brutal as death from a rifle shot or at the point of a bayonet.

The stated objective of our present policy in Vietnam is to permit the South Vietnamese to determine their own fu-

ture. And yet the preparation underway for the upcoming elections in South Vietnam suggest strongly that the Thieu regime, which we support so unstintingly, is not about to permit such a free choice.

In no sense do I mean to condone, even by implication, the activities of the North Vietnamese forces, nor of the National Liberation Front. War is brutal, and they have displayed repeatedly their willingness to resort to brutality to achieve their goals.

However, we cannot control the behavior or tactics of the NLF and North Vietnamese; nor are we responsible for their actions. But we are responsible for our own policies and actions and those of our clients, and that is why I address myself to them.

We do have responsibilities that we have incurred as the result of our massive involvement in Southeast Asia. We have a primary responsibility to the men held prisoner by North Vietnam and the NLF, a responsibility to see that those men are released.

We have a responsibility also, I believe, to see that contingency arrangements are made for asylum for those South Vietnamese whose lives might be endangered by our withdrawal combined with a genuinely Vietnamese political settlement.

But it seems to me that we should be concentrating on these requirements, rather than planning on pouring additional billions of dollars into Vietnam for military assistance in the hopes of propping up indefinitely a regime whose support by the U.S. Government does not appear matched by support from her own Vietnamese people.

From my own knowledge, I believe it imperative, in the interests of the release of our men held as prisoners, that the United States be prepared to halt its bombing. Without such a readiness, I see little likelihood of progress at the Paris peace talks.

The amendment we are now considering, I believe, will do much, not only to expedite the withdrawal of our forces in Southeast Asia, but to press a basic re-examination of the current policy objectives in Southeast Asia.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, may I speak on another subject, or is the rule of germaneness in application?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Germaneness has been waived.

Mr. PELL. Will the Senator from Iowa yield me an additional 5 minutes?

Mr. HUGHES. I yield an additional 5 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island.

#### TRAGEDY IN EAST PAKISTAN

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, a vast human tragedy is unfolding in East Pakistan, a tragedy exceeding in its scope even the terrible toll of the cyclone that struck that country in November.

The civil war in East Pakistan has brought violent death; disease has followed, and the threat of famine looms.

Yesterday, the Foreign Relations Committee, of which I am a member, received

eloquent and compelling testimony on the situation in East Pakistan from Dr. Jon Rohde, a native of Barrington, R.I.

Dr. Rohde, a physician, spent the past 3 years in East Pakistan, as a U.S. Public Health Service officer, at the Pakistan-SEATO Cholera Research Laboratory in Dacca. It is clear from Dr. Rohde's testimony that unless strong and appropriate steps are taken promptly by the United States and international agencies, the future for millions in East Pakistan will be bleak indeed.

It is also clear that assistance in itself may be fruitless unless it is provided and distributed in the proper manner.

Yesterday, the senior Senator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE) and the senior Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) introduced an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act to assure that the United States, in its assistance efforts, helps the people of East Pakistan, rather than either party in the civil conflict in Pakistan. I have joined as a cosponsor of that amendment.

Mr. President, because of the urgency of this situation and the compelling nature of Dr. Rohde's presentation, I ask unanimous consent that his statement be printed in the RECORD at this point, so my colleagues may have the timely benefit of the information he has presented. I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement issued by OXFAM and War on Want on April 19, and an article from the New York Times of December 30, 1970, on relief efforts in Pakistan.

There being no objection, the statements and the article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TESTIMONY OF JON ROHDE BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, JUNE 10, 1971

My name is Jon Rohde. I am a physician, graduate of Harvard Medical School and have spent the last three years as an officer in the United States Public Health Service, assigned to the Pakistan-SEATO Cholera Research Laboratory in Dacca, East Pakistan. I am reasonably fluent in the Bengali language.

My basic work in East Pakistan was to improve the methods of treatment and investigate the cause of cholera. With my Bengali and American colleagues I was responsible for the care of more than 8000 cholera patients at the main treatment center in Dacca. I also treated large numbers of patients during various epidemics in the rural areas of Pabna, Barisal and Comilla Districts. Following the cyclone of November 12, 1970, I lived for three weeks on a coastal island which had been devastated by a tidal wave. Working with the surviving village leaders, we established essential working relations that permitted equitable distribution of more than \$600,000 worth of food and other relief supplies. Furthermore, from this effort, we were able to initiate a rehabilitation program designed to foster self-sufficiency through cooperative farming. This project was abruptly halted on March 25th.

On the night of March 25, my wife and I were awakened in our home in Dacca by the sound of bombs and machine gun fire. From our roof, we saw many areas of Dacca aflame, as heavy artillery, mortars and incendiary shells illuminated the entire city. We saw over a dozen tanks including American M-24 Pattons, roll from the cantonment to the central city which was already burning. Over the ensuing twelve days, I witnessed the results throughout the city of the Army's in-

discriminate massacre of large numbers of people and their selective killing of political figures, university teachers, students, and in particular, Hindus. My report of this, written on April 9 and inserted by Senator Saxbe into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on April 29, chronicles the events which my wife and I saw from March 25 to April 6. On that date, we were evacuated from Dacca to Tehran in an airlift of American citizens.

During the past two months in Teheran, I received direct reports from a variety of sources in East Pakistan. These sources include foreigners, Bengalis, and acquaintances in the Pakistan Army. They have reported their direct observations of conditions and incidents both in the cities and in many areas of the countryside.

With this information in hand, I am shocked to learn that Members of Congress have been denied factual information of the occurrences in East Pakistan over the past two and a half months from our own officials still in Dacca. This information is, of course, essential to any considered judgment with regard to the formulation of foreign policy in this crisis. I know that an extensive body of factual information continues to be sent daily from East Pakistan to the State Department. When I was still there I, along with many other Americans, contributed to that data. Many of the sources who have continued to send information directly to me over the past two months have provided the same factual reporting to the American officials in Dacca and have been assured of its relay through proper channels to the State Department. During his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 30, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Christopher Van Hollen admitted the existence of factual reports from Dacca, but refused to make them available to the members of that Committee, as Senate Report No. 92-105 clearly points out. It seems ironic, indeed, that while I have worked for the United States Government for 3 years as a cholera expert, I should be here giving you information that the State Department has, while a cholera epidemic rages amongst the refugees in India with no American physicians to help.

Perhaps it would be useful at this point to relay to you a sampling of the information currently available from East Pakistan. The Army says it is in control of the country. However, on May 17, the Rocket, the largest river steamer in the country was hijacked and scuttled; on May 31 the key ferry on the only road between Dacca and Chittagong was destroyed; on May 17 bombs exploded in the major banks and the main government office building of Dacca; and every night trucks are seen rolling into Dacca loaded with bodies of West Pakistani troops. Although the automatic weapons of the 60,000 man Army have made possible a superficial kind of control over the province, it appears that only the urban population is dominated.

The Army says that conditions have returned to normal. In order to ensure that normality, on April 27, Martial Law Order No. 148 was announced, stating that a community will be held collectively responsible and subject to death for crimes occurring in the area. This supposedly justified the destruction of three villages near Tongi on May 2 in reprisal for the derailment of a train. Following the "punishment, approximately 200 bodies, many women and children, were seen by a foreign observer. This incident is shocking by itself. Yet it is even more so in light of the discovery the following day by the Army itself, that the derailment was due to settling of the railbed caused by recent heavy rains. No act of sabotage had occurred. Incidentally, Martial Law Order No. 148 reminds me of pacification edicts issued in the late 1930s in Nazi Germany. I ask, Mr. Chairman, that the full

text of that order be inserted in the *Record* at the end of my prepared testimony.

The incident of the Tongi atrocity is characteristic of the countrywide program by the Army of the destruction of villages thought to harbor any of the nation's 10 million Hindus. I have a list of 31 villages in the Dacca area, and a further 12 in Barisal District that were destroyed during mid-May by the Army. The number of documented examples are limited by the few observers who have been able to communicate with me directly about such occurrences. The names of the villages, the dates and circumstances of their destruction, an estimate from witnesses of numbers left dead or homeless, and direct statements by reliable eyewitness observers are here before me. These documents are available to the Members of this Committee, but must be treated as a privileged communication for the protection of those remaining survivors of these incidents.

In an effort to repopulate deserted cities and restore operation of factories to provide the badly needed foreign exchange, the Martial Law authorities, headed in Dacca by Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan, have been repeatedly offering through the public media amnesty to those who fled from their jobs. This amnesty was demonstrated in a reported incident at a sugar mill near Golpapur in Rajshahi District on May 2nd. Workers who had returned to work expecting fair treatment were called together, ostensibly for a meeting. They were then executed en masse. Such occurrences have been frequent and can be documented with other examples, no doubt accounting for the present severe labor shortage in a country where in normal times, millions of jobless adult men are searching for work.

In fact, conditions remain so abnormal that to this city a steady stream of refugees floods into India, their number having reached close to five million already. Meanwhile, a British worker in the cyclone area reported that the vanguard of hundreds of thousands of Hindus fleeing the Army in Barisal and Khulna Districts reached the sea in late May, all routes of escape had been closed to them by the advancing army. Overall from four to eight million persons are currently moving within East Pakistan, either driven toward the refugee centers along the Indian border, or to the cyclone affected coastal regions that have been without food since early March.

For those Bengalis-Muslim and Hindu—that remain behind the prospects are bleak. The food situation is rapidly deteriorating. Inflation has doubled the price of rice and continuing military activity has severely restricted the movement of labor in this crucial planting season. The need for relief food aid in many villages is already urgent. With the major planting season half gone, a majority of the land still lies fallow; future food deficits will be staggering. Grain depots in the ports are said to be full and promises of additional food from abroad have been made. Yet these offer little hope, for it is unlikely ever to reach the needy. Major rail and road communications will remain unusable for months until many bridges can be repaired. Furthermore, the rails and ties themselves along segments of the main rail lines have been thrown into the rivers. The extensive river network, normally alive with commerce, is virtually deserted. At best, the Army will be able to provide food only in some of the cities, where they can control the population. The hostile countryside will be left to starvation.

Pakistan has asked that all foreign assistance and relief supplies be given to the Army for distribution. The assumption of the military government of Pakistan that the Army can manage relief distribution to the whole province is believed by its performance following the November cyclone.

Its delayed and inadequate response to the tragedy was widely criticized throughout the world. From the floor of the Senate (Nov. 24, 1970), Senator Edward M. Kennedy stated:

"What is certain is that reports from East Pakistan continue to tell a horrifying story of massive human suffering made all the more horrifying by the mounting evidence of confusion and inexcusable delay."

As late as December 30, in a feature article in the *New York Times*, Sydney Schanberg detailed the reticence as well as the inability of the Army to carry out necessary relief activities. I ask, Mr. Chairman, that this dispatch be inserted at the end of my testimony. The cyclone affected about 4 million people. Approximately 30% of the area had to be "written off" by the Army, left to fend for themselves because the Army lacked enough men and equipment to go there. How can the Army now deliver relief to an area 20 times larger with a bitterly hostile population?

The private relief program in which I was involved, centered in one such "written off" area. The Army finally arrived 18 days after the disaster, and only then to assert its control over an already smoothly operating, Bengali-led relief operation. In many areas of Bhola and Patuakhali, the Army never managed to establish relief camps.

Although sharing the Muslim religion, the Urdu-speaking troops encountered great difficulty in their relief duties, largely because they do not speak or understand Bengali.

Open hostilities occasionally broke out between Army personnel and villagers. A delegation of elders of the islands on which I worked came to me to ask the Army to leave, stating they would rather die of starvation than be further insulted by the "Punjabis". Today those same feelings are stronger, and exist throughout the country. I quote from a recorded message from Dacca on May 24: "As was pointed out to me, there is not a family in this whole country that has not been affected, that has not lost family members who've been shot, or have not been looted, or had their women raped or their young girls taken away. . . . The regime has absolutely no support from the people." He continues, "Bengali men of well-trained intellectual sophisticated background and even down to peons have time and again said to me, 'Please do not have your country send any aid to this country, not even food. The food will only go to the Army and prolong our agony.'" I myself heard these same pleas before I left East Pakistan on April 6.

In addition to inefficient organization and ineffective local relief distribution, it is now apparent that the Central Government never allowed the majority of funds given for cyclone relief to reach the Eastern Provincial Government, much less to make its way to the survivors. To the best of my knowledge, neither private donations from Americans nor USAID contributions to the Central Government have ever been accounted for in full. In short, the cyclone provided up to \$50 million in much needed hard currency to the Military Government of Pakistan. Thus, relief moneys was one of the largest earners of foreign exchange in 1970, although East Pakistan jute is normally the predominate earner.

The army has misused boats donated by the United States for cyclone relief. Photographs have appeared in newspapers and eyewitness testimony of Americans still in East Pakistan reveal that over half of the grain-carrying coastal vessels currently operating in East Pakistan are being used exclusively for the transport of military vehicles, weapons and supplies.

Mounting evidence shows that the needs for relief distribution to the people of East Pakistan cannot and will not be met by the Pakistan Army. In light of the well-docu-

mented behaviour of the Army towards the people of Bengal over the past several months, it is not unreasonable to assume that any assistance given for the starving Bengalis is likely to be diverted by the Army to be used against the very people it is intended to help. By providing assistance of any kind directly to the Government of Pakistan, our Government would be actively supporting the military action in East Pakistan. That is why I strongly support the new Saxbe-Church amendment cutting off all military and economic aid to Pakistan until: "distribution of food and other relief measures, supervised by international agencies, takes place on a regular basis, throughout East Pakistan and the majority of refugees in India are repatriated to East Pakistan; provided, however, that these provisions shall not prohibit expenditures of previously appropriated funds pursuant to binding written agreements between the Government of Pakistan and the Agency for International Development in force on or prior to June 8, 1971.

Problems are going to arise with any relief operation. However, the most optimal solution is an extensive relief effort carried out by international agencies, in order to ensure the support of the citizenry, so essential to its success. If American assistance of food-grains and other necessities is immediately channelled through a supervised program independent of the Army, it is possible that a major famine may be mitigated. The flow of refugees, however, will slow and eventually reverse its direction only when they can be assured of safety in their own homeland once again. They have learned the hard way not to trust the rhetoric of the military regime. They want no part of its brand of "amnesty and mercy". As long as the Army controls the very means of life—food—the endless line of people will continue its trek towards the relative safety of India. The present refugee population, already more than double the number in Palestine, could become an even more explosive and chronic threat to peace on the Indian subcontinent. At the present time, the cost of feeding these refugees alone exceeds the estimated cost of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. This, coupled with the political implications, will clearly encourage direct intervention by India if international pressures are unable to achieve repatriation of the refugees to their homeland.

I have seen the important role played by military supplies and equipment furnished by the United States. For the individual or group being fired upon, it makes no difference whether the equipment which kills his family and lays waste to his home comes directly from the United States or has been routed through another country such as Turkey or Iran. Functions of the Army are entirely dependent on the day-to-day supplies from Lockheed C-130's. Huey Cobra jungle warfare helicopters, a recent gift from Iran, still depend on spare parts from the United States. Furthermore, although U.S. project aid of \$40 million a year is not easily diverted from its intended purposes, our annual assistance of \$100 million in commodity aid frees up other foreign exchange for the direct purchase of weapons. PL 480 Assistance provides the foodgrain necessary to feed the population, allowing a sizeable export of rice, which yields a significant sum of uncommitted foreign exchange. Clearly the provision of \$200 million of U.S. aid to the military Government of Pakistan, makes possible the continued military activities in East Pakistan. This fact indicates that the U.S. Government is decisively involved in supporting one side of this continuing civil war.

One is reminded of other situations in Southern Asia in which massive U.S. support of a military elite has dragged us into a continuing commitment of unforeseen magni-

tude. The United States faces a crucial decision. Through continuance of economic assistance of any kind to the military Government of Pakistan we are a partner to what may become the greatest loss of human life in one area in this century. By denying that same aid and making a portion of it directly available to the citizens of East Pakistan through neutral relief teams, we can hasten the end of this horrible conflict, and mitigate the effects of famine and epidemic disease, which are already taking an enormous toll both within East Pakistan and in West Bengal among the refugees.

#### EAST PAKISTAN—AID AND FAMINE

(Issued by OXFAM and War on Want, private relief agencies, April 19, 1971, in United Kingdom)

1. The cyclone of November, 1970, in East Pakistan caused considerable damage and loss (Appendix I) in a large sector of the Delta area. It also highlighted the lack of development in the Delta area over the past, the relatively slow progress of the coastal embankment construction and the inadequacy of the cyclone warning system.

2. As a result of the international pressure fostered by the massive press coverage of the initial lack of internal aid to the cyclone affected areas, a wide variety of aid agreements was offered to the Pakistan Government, for the Delta area construction. (Appendix II). The East Pakistan Government prepared a full reconstruction plan amounting to Rs860,000,000 (\$180,000,000), which depended heavily on foreign aid for its implementation.

3. In all cases, pressure was exerted by the East Pakistan authorities and foreign agencies to ensure that all funds offered were transferred directly to East Pakistan, as there was considerable doubt in the minds of both outsiders and East Pakistan leaders and Government officials as to what purposes finance outsiders and East Pakistan leaders and Government authorities in West Pakistan would be put.

4. In view of the undeveloped nature of the region, all reconstruction planned was very much at the mercy of the very inadequate communications system in the area.

5. The Civil War has led to a complete breakdown of all existing communications by deliberate destruction of boats and vehicles by the army, and of bridges and railways by the Bengali nationalists, the commendeering of vehicles by the army, the interruption of fuel supplies, and the general dislocation of large numbers of the urban population.

6. This breakdown in communications is particularly damaging to the food situation. In normal years, East Pakistan imports over 10% of its food grains, and this year, as a result of the cyclone, was intending to import a much greater proportion (estimated to be between 15% and 20% of its requirements). The cessation of imports (due to the battles in Chittagong, the main port) together with the disruption of communications will lead to a famine in the cyclone affected areas firstly and in the urban centers and other parts of the country where grain production is inadequate. The civil war will also tend to interfere with the normal harvesting and planting of crops.

7. The whole approach of the military government in its army operations has been totally logical, once the initial decision to take control of East Pakistan once again had been taken, and it is reasonable to assume that the Government will continue to be ruthlessly logical in its attempts to implement that decision. As the deliberate killing of all leaders and destruction of property has so far failed to break the back of the resistance, it is logical for the army to ensure that only areas over which they have completed and totally accepted control will be ensured of a satisfactory food supply in a coun-

try-wide, food shortage situation. There will be no reason whatsoever for the army to permit food to enter other areas of the country, and thus bolster resistance to the army take-over. Further, from reliable reports not appearing in the press, as well as from the sheer military and logistical compulsion of the situation with which the army will be faced once the monsoon rains commence, it is apparent that the army can and does only have effective, but not accepted, control over the main towns, sections of the border areas, and the main line of communication from Chittagong to Dacca.

8. Consequently, it is manifest that the army will have to use hunger as a deliberate weapon against the bulk of the people of East Pakistan. Any aid, therefore, which enters the country under the terms of the Army Government, will be used to support that policy in East Pakistan, or will be used, as much of the aid already given to East and West Pakistan has already been used, to support the army operations in East Pakistan.

9. If, therefore, one accepts the basic political decision of the Central Pakistan Government to reunite the two halves of Pakistan, logically it is necessary to accept all that the army has done and will be forced to do to implement that decision with limited resources. Alternately, if one considers that the basic decision was politically and morally wrong, then one must, equally logically, reject any support given to the central Government which has been, and will continue to be, used to implement that incorrect decision.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 30, 1970]  
AFTER PAKISTANI STORM: GRIEF, INDIFFERENCE

(By Sidney H. Schanberg)

DACCA, PAKISTAN.—Munshi's wife cries all the time now. She sits in the flimsy lean-to her husband has pieced together from the debris of the storm, hidden from strangers in the Moslem tradition. Her breasts ache because the baby is no longer there to nurse.

She speaks to a visitor through the thatch. "It is so kind you have come" she whimpers in a barely audible voice, "but it is a very bad time. We are ashamed we cannot invite you to sit with us on something comfortable and have some tea. But we have lost our daughters, our sons, our property, our cattle. We have nothing. It is a disgrace that we are living on charity."

The ordeal of her family tells much of the fearful story of the cyclone and tidal wave that swept in from the Bay of Bengal on the night of Nov. 12 and crushed the coastal areas of East Pakistan. An extended tour of the stricken islands and interviews with officials, survivors and relief workers disclosed tales of terror and heartbreak, madness and grief—and a chronicle of public indifference and delay in helping the two million miserable survivors.

In the fields, men taking the place of their lost livestock, can be seen pulling plows across the still-muddy land.

A lone dog, a mangy brown mongrel, survived on the island of Shakuchia. Most of the birds are gone, killed or driven off by the cyclone. That is why no vultures descended on the corpses, which had lain untouched and blackened in the sun until they were haphazardly buried.

An occasional bloated body still washes up on the shore or in a family pond, and hundreds float in the streams and channels. Some of the poorly covered graves still smell.

Villagers wander through the paddies, only their heads visible above the rotting rice plants, searching for bits of debris to fashion into shelters. One boy finds pieces of a boat, a bamboo support from a hut and the lactern board that used to hold the Koran at the mosque.

Aminul Huq, who is 14 years old, is the sole survivor of a family of 20 on Shakuchia.

His eyes are glazed and he seems to be in a trance. When he walks alone, he falls into a faint.

"The whole world is blank," he drones. "When I try to think of what lies ahead, my head spins and I cannot stand up. From inside I want to cry, but I cannot."

Aminul, who is living with an uncle now, wanders to his father's grave every day and asks passers-by to kill him and bury him there. Only the strong and the lucky survived. The storm claimed old men and women and children—especially the children who did not have the stamina to hold onto a tree or a floating dead cow or a roof during the five dark hours or more that the tidal wave pummeled and rolled over them.

Of the 13,000 people who survived on Shakuchia, which has an area of 20 square miles, fewer than 1,000 were aged 12 or under. Normally young children would make up more than half the population.

The true death toll will never be known for no accurate census has been taken in the region. An uncounted number of migrant workers had gathered there for the rice harvest. Thousands of bodies were washed out to sea.

It seems inescapable from the evidence available that at least 500,000 East Pakistanis, poor rice farmers, fishermen and boatmen and their families, were killed. Nearly 2.5 million were left homeless and starving and will have to be sustained with relief food for a year, until the next harvest.

It is the worst natural disaster of this century, if the toll was a million or more, as some Pakistani newspapers report, it is the worst in recorded history. The Yellow River flood of 1887, which took the lives of 900,000 Chinese, is listed as the worst on record.

Nov. 12 was cloudy on the Ganges Delta and the wind was rising. On Shakuchia, Munshi Mustanser Billa, a 40 year-old indigent farmer with three acres of rice who is perpetually in debt to usurious money lenders, was busy with the harvest.

He had heard a storm report on a neighbor's transistor radio, but storms are a part of life here and this one did not sound severe, so he paid little attention. The wind grew stronger in the afternoon and the rain began to slant down. Suddenly, some time after dark, the radio issued a new warning—"moha bipod shanket" ("great danger signal").

'SAVE MY CHILDREN! SAVE ME!'

Munshi, his wife and their five children— one of them a boy less than a year old who was still being nursed—huddled worried, in their palm-thatched hut, which sat on a four-foot-high earthen platform that served as protection against normal flooding and storms. As they talked they tried to console each other with the thought that they were a mile from the sea.

Then, near midnight, they saw the first surge, waist high. Munshi's wife began to cry: "Save my children! Save me! Take me somewhere safe!" But there was nowhere safe. Her husband ran outside and cut his water buffalo and cows loose to give them a chance.

All at once it was on them—the full tidal wave, a churning, muddy wall at least 20 feet high. It sounded to Munshi, even over the howl of the rain and wind—now 150 miles an hour—like the roar of many airplanes, like the bombing raid it so resembled.

The water engulfed them and swept them off their feet. "Where are you? Where are you?" they cried. Everyone was screaming. Drowning dogs and goats were yowling in terror.

Somehow, as they were swirled higher and higher, the family managed to grab the palm trees around their compound. The wave pounded them back and forth against the trunk as, choking on swallowed water, they tried to hang on with their arms and legs.

One son, aged 20, was clutching his two sisters while he clung to a tree. Suddenly he called out: "I can't hold them any longer. I have to let go!" Munshi and his wife saw one of the daughters carried away, then the other.

The wave surged again, crashing over their heads, and when they could see the tree again the son was gone. A second son was knocked out of another tree.

Then Munshi's right arm, holding his last son, grew numb from the freezing, stinging rain. The infant slipped away as Munshi, sobbing helplessly, clung on with his other arm.

"You were holding my baby," his wife called from her tree. "Is he all right?"

"I couldn't hold on to him," Munshi shrieked, "the wave was too strong." His wife's wail then seemed louder than the storm.

Without warning the tidal wave began receding with all its fury and snatched Munshi from his tree. He grabbed at other trees, lost one and then another but finally caught hold of the last one in their yard—just in time to hear his wife scream: "My sons are gone, my daughters are gone, now my husband is gone! I am going too. I don't want to live anymore!"

She let go and was swept toward her husband, who grabbed at her, caught her and hung on for an hour or so until the water finally went down.

The first dawn was streaking the sky when Munshi and his wife came down slowly and painfully from the tree.

In water still knee deep they stumbled—weak, dazed, nearly mad with grief—through floating bodies and animal carcasses toward a neighbor's house, hoping to find at least some rags to hide their shame.

The neighbors were dead, their hut smashed, but a stranger, a boy who had survived, found Munshi and his wife some strips of cloth he had taken from trees and corpses. Sapped of all strength, they fell down on the sodden earth and wept themselves to sleep. Skin had been scraped raw—on the arms, chest and thighs—where they had been battered against the palm bark. Their clothes had been ripped off by the storm.

#### SLEEPING, WANING, WEEPING

They woke after a few hours and staggered back to the void where their hut and cowshed had stood. There they slept again, and woke, and wept, and went to a friend's. All the survivors were weeping too.

Bodies, human and animal, were everywhere—stuck in trees, lying in rice paddies, beginning to surface from the small ponds where they had sunk. Most were of strangers, carried miles by the awesome wave, sometimes even from distant islands.

People wandered naked, wailing the names of kin who did not respond.

Surrounded by death, Munshi shook with fright. "This must be doomsday," he thought. They did not eat that day.

Though they were still in shock the next day, hunger overwhelmed them. Munshi and his wife and their friends began scratching with their fingers in the mud of the blackened paddy fields, hoping that some of the unhusked rice they had harvested and piled up before the storm had been swept there.

After hours of digging they found a few handfuls and ate it raw, though they were afraid it had been contaminated. They had to eat it raw because they had no matches until the first Government relief boat arrived a week later.

#### UNUSAL PROGRAMS ON THE AIR

That Friday morning in Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan, which is a hundred miles to the north, no one had the slightest inkling of the magnitude of the catastrophe—partly because all communications had been knocked out but also because the Govern-

ment weather experts, despite their "great danger" signal, had described the storm in no more alarming terms than they had a mild cyclone on Oct. 23 that killed 300 people.

The morning newspapers reported that the damage had not been as severe as that of the previous storm. Radio and television continued the usual programs. By nightfall the official death toll was 50.

In Islamabad, the national capital, in West Pakistan, a thousand miles across Indian territory, the size of the disaster was not appreciated by the Government either.

Though newspapers had begun to talk of tens of thousands of dead (by Saturday), and by Sunday of hundreds of thousands, the Government figure did not rise above 40,000 until eight days after the storm—thereby confusing foreign governments about the disaster's magnitude and delaying international relief.

Gen. Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan, the head of the military government, was on an official visit to communist China when the storm struck. He returned, as scheduled, two days later, stopping in Dacca to make a brief aerial tour of the devastated area.

"I am very much distressed," he said afterward, adding that he had ordered all Government agencies to mobilize for relief.

He then flew back to Islamabad—a departure that was to be criticized later by political leaders as indicative of the callousness of the Punjabi-dominated national government in West Pakistan toward the Bengalis of East Pakistan. The eastern province has been exploited economically by the West since independence in 1947.

President Yahya's orders have not been disclosed. For whatever reason, no national mobilization was visible and there was no Government commitment on the scale that was necessary. Even for an undeveloped country with limited human and technical resources, the effort seemed deficient.

Though the Government is a military one, the army was not fully mobilized for 10 days. Though airdrops were the only way to get relief supplies to most of the survivors—roads were washed out and virtually all the boats had been shattered—not a single one was made in the first few days.

#### YAHYA VISITS THE REGION

As the days passed and little was done—those facilities and materials that existed were ill utilized—there was mounting criticism of the relief effort in the press and among the public. President Yahya, after eight days in Islamabad, returned to East Pakistan to oversee the effort and to try to reduce the furor.

On Shakuchia Island Mohammed Islam Mia, a farmer who lost the younger two of his four sons, spoke venomously:

"The Government did nothing. After seven days two Government officers came in a launch and gave out a few pounds of rice and a tin of kerosene oil for 4,000 survivors. They told us to be patient, that more supplies were coming, then they slipped away at night without telling us."

"Let the world know what our Government did," he went on. "All the relief work is being done by foreigners."

Foreign relief—after being delayed by Pakistani indecision, sluggishness and mismanagement—had finally become a massive effort. In all foreign countries, international organizations and private agencies—led by the United States—flew in \$50 million worth of food, clothing, tents and medicine.

They also flew in nearly 30 helicopters and 200 river boats to move supplies to the victims. The British sent four navy ships from Singapore with 800 army engineers and commandos, who fanned out to repair roads and bridges, provide fresh water and bury the dead.

Still, it was 10 days after the storm before this relief effort began to move into full swing. Furthermore, when India—with

which Pakistan has fought two wars over Kashmir, the last in 1965—offered helicopters, transport planes, river craft and mobile hospitals. Pakistan turned them down.

#### DESOLATION AND HUNGER

In the villages throughout the delta the peasants sat in the emptiness of their flattened compounds, desolate, hungry and ill under the cruel sun.

Not far away a police inspector emerged from his sturdy bungalow, starched and freshly shaven after a long sleep, and reported to a foreign journalist that he could not release his pickup truck for relief work until it had delivered the week's food to the nearby police barracks.

On every mud road and lane, people begged and cried out for food. In one village, which had received no rations for several days, frantic peasants swarmed over a small truck that was carrying tins of biscuits. Those who managed to claw their way into possession of a tin were jumped on by several others and thrown to the ground.

Many survivors were close to madness, and some broke. An old man on Jabbar Island who had lost 52 of his relatives collected the bodies, dug a grave and buried them together. Now he sits on the grave and shouts: "Here is my family!"

#### LAUGHTER AMID TEARS

A young woman whose husband and three children perished stood naked, laughing maniacally as tears streaked her cheeks.

"Can you give me an airplane?" she asks. "I want to go to heaven. I want to bring back my children." She bursts into cackles again.

Ghulam Murshed Choudhry, 31, a member of an influential family on Manpura Island, lost none of his relatives. But his senses left him after 17 days of burying bodies and he was still babbling about the corpses of all his "brothers" when he was finally flown to Dacca in a helicopter for psychiatric care.

It is no accident that the Moslems of East Pakistan are more devout than their brethren in West Pakistan. In the delta especially, all of nature's furies are accepted as manifestations of Allah's will.

"It is the wish of Allah that this wind and water came," a fisherman said, in a comment echoed all over the region. "We have sinned. It would not have happened if we had not sinned." He did not know what sins were being punished, only that the people must have strayed from the path of Islam.

The burdens of life that have made the peasants of the delta fatalistic have also made them socially introverted—even selfish, by the standards of more affluent cultures.

Life centers on the family and people rarely think of asking for help from others or of offering any. Sharing is an alien concept, except within the family—and even there, brothers do not necessarily share their food.

Because there was so little food available immediately after the cyclone, Manpura villagers rounded up the migrant workers who had survived, put them in boats beached by the storm and shoved them off into the surging Meghna River—telling them to go back where they had come from.

When the first relief workers arrived on Manpura, male villagers besieged them not only for food, clothing and medicine, but also, after a day or so, for more women from the outside. They wanted to replace their lost wives immediately because a woman is a necessity here: She cooks the food, husks the rice and tends the cattle and children.

At a relief center a man began quarreling with local officials because they would not add some saris to his relief bundle of food and blankets.

"What do you need saris for?" he was asked. "Your wife was killed."

"Yes," the man replied, "but I want to get married again, and I need them for a dowry."

There were also signs of greed. Despite the

terrible stench and the threat of cholera, some villagers refused to bury the bodies of strangers unless they were paid. Others, after initial hunger had been satisfied, took the same attitude toward unloading relief goods.

#### TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT OF RICE SALVAGEABLE

Contrary to the first reports, some rice—perhaps 25 per cent of the crop—was still salvageable in parts of the devastated region. The question was whether it would be largely consumed or sold or saved for seed, without which there will not be a good harvest next year.

Foreign agricultural advisers and relief workers are trying to convince the villagers that they must save the rice and live on relief food until the next harvest, but that is an overwhelming missionary task among people who have barely lived from day to day.

There are other obstacles to rehabilitation. Those survivors who had lived along the shore refused to go back and rebuild on their homesites. Struck by the full fury of "the white monster," they are afraid to go near the water.

Many beggars have been arriving from the outside, hoping to cash in on the relief goods. When relief officials offered them 5 rupees (about a dollar) a day to work, they refused. Still other outsiders came to try to grab the land of families that had perished.

Corruption occurred in many places, with local elected officials demanding as much as 20 rupees to put a family on the relief list. Some of the relief goods began appearing in black-market shops.

#### NIGHTS WERE BITTER COLD

The days after the storm were sunny but the winter nights were bitter cold to the warmth-loving Bengalis. Despite their fright they picked from the corpses whatever clothes remained wrapped themselves in the tatters and huddled together on the open flats for warmth. Women without clothes hid, some refusing to come out even to eat.

In that way they lived through that grim first week, drinking polluted water, clawing rice out of the mud, finding an occasional coconut, whose milk and white meat they carefully divided, and sometimes—when their bellies were so empty that they were in pain—eating the roots of banana trees.

On the third day after the storm the stench from the decomposing bodies grew so bad that Munshi's group, stunned as they were, started burying them. Holding pieces of cloth over their noses and mouths to keep out the smell, they slowly began to put the corpses in shallow graves—which sometimes simply meant throwing a layer of muddy earth over them.

On many islands the peasants merely piled bodies on makeshift rafts and pushed them to sea. "They were floating like water hyacinths for miles," a survivor said.

Many people never found their dead. Of his five children Munshi found only his oldest son.

Most of the survivors badly needed solace from sympathetic people in the early weeks after the storm. Villagers sometimes waited outside relief tents long into the night, just to talk with, and weep to, the volunteers. Loneliness had descended on the islands once the first terror—hunger—abated.

For days, and even weeks, there was a terrible silence where children by the dozen used to chatter and play—except for one persistent sound, the deep, rasping cough that can be heard across the fields as the respiratory legacy of the storm.

In what seemed a miracle to laymen but was quite unsurprising to doctors, the cyclone caused no cholera epidemic beyond the one East Pakistan normally suffers at this time of year. (Some 200,000 to 300,000 will get cholera this year, and half will die because of the lack of treatment.)

Some people—no one knows how many—died of exposure, dysentery, respiratory diseases and other infections, but in general, the medical problems were no more severe after the cyclone than before.

Hellish as life was in the ravaged area after the cyclone, it was grim enough before.

Pestilence, cyclones, monsoon floods and vicious economic exploitation are as much a part of the Ganges Delta as the rice that is the only reason for living there at all.

Few would choose such a precarious existence were it not for the relentless pressure of East Pakistan's exploding population—75 million to 80 million in an area roughly the size of Arkansas, which has two million. (Even if all the Government's family planning goals are achieved, population will double in 27 years.)

#### RICH BUT CROWDED LAND

No land is left in the northern regions—virtually every arable square inch is being cultivated—so the marginal people, the poorest, are pushed farther and farther southward into the vulnerable, low-lying coastal areas and offshore islands, some only three or four feet above sea level.

The flat, swampy delta with its three million people—before the storm—is the thinnest-populated part of East Pakistan, but even here about a thousand people live on every square mile—a density as heavy as in some cities and matched only in places like Japan and Communist China.

The soil is wonderfully fertile—pure, rich silt brought down from the Himalayas by the massive flow of the Ganges-Brahmaputra river system, the equivalent of seven Mississippi, which veins the region like the back of an old man's hand. But it is this same flow, swollen by the monsoon rains of May through September, that so often floods the paddy fields and destroys part of the crop.

Still, it is the monsoon that makes the crop possible at all, for only when it washes away the accumulated tidal salts and sweetens the earth can the rice be planted. There can be only one crop a year, for after the monsoon season comes the dry season, and no irrigation system exists.

"Sometimes we think about moving to another island," said Abdul Matin, a 45-year-old Moslem priest on Shakuchia who lost six children, one of his two wives and his mother. "But it is only talk. We never take ourselves seriously. Cyclones hit all the islands. No place is safe. There is no peace anywhere."

While the villagers tried to rebuild their lives, the debate continued, both in Pakistan and in international circles over why the national Government was so slow in moving to the rescue. Most knowledgeable observers attributed the delays to an enfeebled, timorous bureaucracy, a lack of imagination, an inability to make decisions, and a pervasive incompetence—"a bum government," as a foreign diplomat put it.

The observers generally discount the idea of a deliberate decision to ignore the victims' plight. Yet they agree that there were elements of the Government's behavior that verged on the deliberate—the fact, for example, that military preparedness against India took priority over the disaster.

At a party in Dacca a week after the storm, an air force pilot mentioned that he was under strain because of long hours of flying. It turned out that he had not been air-dropping relief but had been practicing bombing and strafing runs.

"This disaster has made us terribly vulnerable," he explained. "The Indians could walk right in and take over. We've got to stay alert."

No one realized the scope of the calamity for the first two days, and few blame the Government for its lethargy during that

time, but the same cannot be said for its reaction after it became known that hundreds of thousands were dead and millions were homeless and hungry.

Because natural disasters are so common and so difficult to control in East Pakistan and because resources are so limited, the central Government, pleading helplessness, has tended to ignore the disasters and invest its resources elsewhere.

This time, foreign press reports and foreign relief efforts focused the spotlight on East Pakistan and embarrassed the Government into doing more than it had before—meager and chaotic as the effort was.

One widely held view is that fear of jeopardizing the elections to a constituent assembly scheduled for Dec. 7 paralyzed the Government into inaction. It was reported to be apprehensive about what might happen if troops were sent into East Pakistan.

On Bhola Island, less than half an hour by pedicab from where bodies lay decomposing, laughing, young men in new white clothes played badminton. The Dacca jet set, in mod bellbottoms, never stirred from the pool of the Hotel Intercontinental. Many families splurged on their presents for the Moslem counterpart of Christmas despite appeals from Government to donate the money to relief. Some boat owners tampered with their engines to avoid being called into relief service at rates below their usual ones.

Several students heading back to Dacca from the stricken area on a river steamer were asked by a foreigner why they had not stayed to do relief work. "We are young and cannot do much," one said sheepishly. "When we get home, we will tell them to send other boys."

What of the future? Will things improve for the abject people, or will the Government go back to ignoring them again as soon as the foreign relief workers leave and the foreign press turns to other matters?

Three weeks after the storm a key official told a foreign expert that no rehabilitation program was being planned for the outer islands because they had not been included in the 1961 census.

For all the skepticism, most experts foresee at least some improvements, if only because of the momentum generated by the international relief effort.

The World Bank has proposed a \$185-million reconstruction plan, to be tied to its current three-year \$1.6-billion flood control and economic-development program, which has already seen the construction of some walls to hold back the tides. Washington is expected to be a heavy contributor.

Whatever the political future, the development proposals do not come to what it would really cost to lift this region to even subsistence living. It would take many billions, probably tens of billions just to build a comprehensive water-control and irrigation system, according to engineering experts. Billions more would be needed to replace the lost livestock, crops, fishing boats and farm tools and to provide basic living requirements—housing, schools, medical facilities, electricity and sanitation.

#### CAN'T SIT AND MOPE AND GROAN

"We can't afford to be pessimistic," said A. M. S. Ahmad, chairman of the East Pakistan Development Board, who is in charge of cyclone rehabilitation, "because we jolly well have to do something. We can't sit and mope and groan."

"For one thing," he added, "it's not impossible." Perhaps not, but most experts are convinced it would require a massive international rescue effort, and they agree that though the money may come from outside, the inspiration and initiative must come from the people of East Pakistan.

"We know we will have to do it ourselves," said Kaiser Zaman, a 25-year-old business

executive who volunteered for relief work. "We Bengalis have a saying: 'It takes a thorn to remove a thorn.'"

[From the New York Times, Dec. 20, 1970]  
LIFE AT BEST WRETCHED ON  
GANGES DELTA ISLANDS

DACCA, PAKISTAN.—Average life expectancy on the Ganges Delta Islands is less than 40 years. A quarter of the children die of cholera, smallpox, typhoid and other diseases before they are 5. Tuberculosis is like the common cold.

A farmer has to produce seven or eight children to get the two or three sons he needs to care for him in his old age. Since children are a necessity, there is little incentive for birth control.

Rice farming is carried on much as it has been for generations—with crude plows, cow dung for fertilizer and home-made wooden devices for husking the rice.

Even when the crop is bountiful it is impossible to get a fair price. Cut off from the main trading centers, lacking storage facilities, the peasants must sell to slick traders who arrive at harvest time in November and December in big launches. The traders pay 15 rupees (about \$3) for about a mound (about 85 pounds) and sell it several months later, when rice is scarce, at 40 rupees or more.

The lucky peasant family is the one that ends up with an income of perhaps \$6 a person a month. The unlucky ones are the tenant farmers who work for absentee landlords and the migrants and local laborers who have no land at all.

Tenant farmers are supposed to get 50 per cent of the crop, but in practice they get to keep less because they usually have to borrow from the landowner at interest rates of 25 per cent and higher.

Life is even more miserable for the landless field laborer. Shafiqul Alam, 35, all four of whose children died in the storm, made an average of 3 rupees a day—when there was work. In a year he earned about 600 rupees, which is a little over \$20 a year for each member of his family.

There is virtually no government presence on most of the islands—no electricity or sanitation facilities, no doctors or even dispensaries despite repeated appeals no flood embankments have been built on such islands as Manpura and Shakuchia. There is nothing that resembles a bicycle path, let alone a road; in fact, wheeled vehicles would be useless.

The shelter of the permanent population is among the flimsiest in Asia—huts of thatch, rags, a little bamboo, sometimes a corrugated metal sheet for a roof—meager defense against floods and pure flotsam for a tidal wave. Only a handful of farmers can afford to build two-story houses of brick and cement that might withstand nature's forces.

#### CALLEY: A VIEW FROM SAIGON

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, it is always interesting to see the perspective of a war from the eyes of those who are most directly involved than we.

In this connection, I believe my colleagues would be interested in the very perceptive, sensitive, and, I believe, truthful article on the subject of our Vietnam war that recently appeared in a Saigon newspaper and was reprinted in the New York Times on June 3, 1971.

I ask unanimous consent that "Calley: A View From Saigon" be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### CALLEY: A VIEW FROM SAIGON

(By Tran Tan Quoc)

(NOTE.—Tran Tan Quoc is editor and publisher of the Saigon newspaper Duoc Nha Nam. (This excerpt was translated from the Vietnamese by The New York Times Saigon Bureau.)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM.—It should be noted that the horrible massacre at My Lai was first brought to light by the Americans themselves. It was denounced by American G.I.'s back from Vietnam and it was brought before American and world public opinion by the American press. Without them, the Vietnamese—it is shameful and painful to admit, with our poor means of communication and our restricted free press—would never know of the My Lai massacre.

If, immediately after the affair was brought to light, the United States military command in Vietnam had issued a communique promising serious investigation of the case and punishment of the culprits; if high United States officials visiting Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Laird, for example, could forget for awhile their (justified) complex of superiority as representatives of a free world leader and benefactor of the South Vietnamese people and take the trouble of calling at My Lai and consoling the survivors of the massacre, with words and with tactfully given gifts—as we say, "your way of giving is more important than what you give"—then I am sure that no Vietnamese would want Lieutenant Calley's death and I am sure that we would certainly welcome with understanding any attenuated sentence given him.

The Vietnamese, either nationalist or Communist, and in the last analysis, Vietnamese, and it was often painful to see many Vietcong killed, maimed by the hands of foreign troops fighting on our own land.

It is thus easy to see that, beside an abundance of military means and a whole arsenal of modern weapons, the American fighting men must also have tactfulness and a thorough understanding of the Vietnamese psychology, if their battle here is to be successful.

Some people tried to defend Calley, attributing all his crimes to the war. And when the tribunal had no other way than to sentence Calley to life at hard labor, President Nixon immediately ordered this notorious criminal to be set free pending an appeal.

In Vietnamese eyes, this decision is a challenge to the self-esteem of the Vietnamese race, and, at the same time, it showed others that, among the human mass on earth, only white American lives have value and must be highly respected by all other peoples.

In meeting domestic political needs, President Nixon has damaged the noble tradition of the American people and blotted out the meaning of the American military presence in South Vietnam.

In short, wanting to calm the public protest against the Calley verdict, President Nixon has forgotten the destiny of over 300,000 American troops in Vietnam.

Imbued with this Buddhist philosophy: "If we take vengeance on vengeance, vengeance will never end," the Vietnamese will do nothing in retaliation against American troops in Vietnam. But in this war without front lines, the Americans have come to be considered as mighty murderers who can destroy the lives of innocent people with impunity. The American Army in South Vietnam has lost all sympathy from the Vietnamese people around them, in a war where winning the people's hearts has been said to be a decisive factor. Their presence in this country has lost any meaning and the longer they stay, for whatever reason, the more boiling is the hate in the heart of the local people.

I wonder if President Nixon has ever

thought of these consequences since the minute when he ordered to free Calley, 24 hours after the latter was sentenced to hard labor for life by the court.

Now, concerning the more than 300,000 American troops that are still in Vietnam, there seems to be only one thing left to be done for them and that is to send them back home quickly. Let them be pulled out of South Vietnam, and pulled out altogether, earlier than planned by President Nixon. The sooner they leave, the better.

#### THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 6531) to amend the Military Selective Service Act of 1967; to increase military pay; to authorize military active duty strengths for fiscal year 1972; and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STEVENSON). Who yields time?

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and I ask unanimous consent that the time be charged equally to both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STEVENSON). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, as I have listened over the last few days to the debate in relation to amendment No. 143 that has been commonly known around the country by various other names—either the McGovern-Hatfield amendment, the end the war amendment, or a time certain amendment, or whatever it may be—I think we can realize from the debate last year over a very similar amendment and from the discussion this year that there is a difference in the amendments. It is nearly 1 year since the time we were discussing the McGovern-Hatfield amendment. The casualties are continuing. The troop reductions are being made. Thousands fewer American troops are in Southeast Asia.

We have seen over the course of time the invasion or incursion into two other countries in Indochina. No one any longer calls it the Vietnamese war. It is the war in Indochina.

We have heard of the casualties of the war, both American and Vietnamese casualties, that are byproducts of the war.

During the course of the next 3 or 4 days we will hear much more of that. We are all familiar at this time with the fact that approximately 45,000 American men have been killed in combat and that another 10,000 have been killed by other means. Approximately 300,000 American soldiers have been wounded.

No one knows really how many Vietnamese have been killed on both sides of the line or how many have been wounded.

We have had a large amount of killing and wounding of civilians and the wiping out of villages in order to save them. We have had a saturation bombing that has dropped more bombs on this country than have been dropped on any other nation in any combination of wars.

We have forced the migration of people from their home regions, where there was an agrarian economy. Millions of people have been forced into cities where they did not want to go.

The question of destruction has not been raised, or the casualties. The casualties we have had the opportunity to discuss have seared the souls not only of tens of thousands of men who have been fighting the war, but also their wives, brothers, sisters, mothers, and fathers. This war has divided our Nation. There are casualties in our own country that we can directly attribute to the vast drain of economic resource and manpower into that part of the world, consuming at least \$150 billion in the last 8 years.

There are the casualties resulting from our being unable to face the problems existing in our central cities. Mass transportation systems are failing. Poverty programs have suffered. There is increased poverty.

These situations are directly attributable to the wartime economy that continues to be very destructive.

In recent weeks we have seen casualties that have affected the hearts, minds, and souls of Americans.

We saw the Senate this week pass an amendment to try to have the Pentagon and the military face up to the serious problem of narcotic and drug addiction in the Army.

That is something that we heard very little about over the course of my time. Over the course of the last 30 years that I have been an adult, narcotic addiction in the military has been generally unheard of. There were a few cases now and then, certainly, but they were very minimal.

In hearings this week we had evidence given that in the last 2 calendar years 16,000 American soldiers were discharged from the Army with drug dependence or narcotic addiction, and 11,000 of those men have received less than honorable discharges.

We find a Veterans' Administration that cannot provide services for men without a special ruling, at least for those who have had something between an honorable and a dishonorable discharge. But for the vast majority even that was cut off. They have no services available.

We find a Veterans' Administration that had fewer than 300 beds, let alone the personnel, available to treat these individuals who have become addicted to narcotics or heroin while we have been in Vietnam. We have talked primarily about Southeast Asia, although this is a worldwide problem.

The staff members of my subcommittee made an investigation in Europe, Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, Vietnam, and Thai-

land. The evidence is that this situation is worldwide.

We explored the reasons why this happened. There is no longer any reason to wonder why. There is a realization that in spite of the fact that, though the present policy of the Government is toward a continual reduction of the forces in Vietnam, the more the troops are reduced, the higher the percentage of addiction has increased.

These are casualties of war. They are casualties. Probably a very high percentage of them are men who were drafted into the service, who did not want to go in the service, who had to face up to their own conscience and make a decision over which many other men had left the country or for other reasons had failed to serve because they did not believe in this war which we were fighting.

These young men did go because they felt in the final analysis they must respond to the call of their country, even though they did not believe in or understand the war, even as many of us do not understand the war. Now, as a result of that and what has happened in Indochina they have experienced and they are experiencing a living death, a living death that has struck fear into the hearts of almost every American with children today, because not only is it a problem in the Armed Forces, but it is also a problem in our country, in our domestic society, in every school in the land. Mothers and fathers do not send their children off to high school and junior high school, let alone college, and now even the elementary schools of our country, without fearing what they will be exposed to.

Admittedly, the military does not ask too many questions at the induction centers about whether a young man may smoke marihuana or may use other forms of drugs because they are afraid if they ask those questions men will turn to heroin to avoid going into the service. They are afraid, as a matter of fact, that a youngster will snort heroin the day before he takes his physical examination so that the analysis will show that he is using it and he will be rejected. They would not dare ask a question with regard to marihuana.

The news media are bringing back the evidence. Our subcommittee staff completed an investigation over there long ago. We had several days of testimony long ago disclosing the facts with regard to heroin addiction. Now, we know we have an epidemic on our doorstep.

The Senate has taken action that, if agreed to in conference and in the House, could support the Pentagon in eventually and, I hope, rapidly building up methods of identifying, treating, and rehabilitating those men who have become addicted. But this does not go to the point of why they become addicted and it does not go to the point of preventing others from becoming addicted, but only trying to do something about it after they are addicted.

We listen to the debate and we are told we must not tell the enemy what our plans are in the future or set a time certain for leaving Indochina because if we were to do that the enemy would know

our final withdrawal date and escalate their capacity and casualties would increase and, as a result, we would suffer greatly from that.

I suggest we are telling the enemy what we are doing. He can read the last three announcements of the increased troop reductions and he can speculate about the next one in October as accurately as the rest of us can speculate. He can figure the exact date we will no longer have enough combat troops in Indochina to be effective. We should no longer mislead ourselves about telling the enemy what our plans are. We are and have been doing so for a long time.

Speaking about the war, which strikes at the heartstrings of every American, we could save those men, bring them back, and I believe we could save the casualties between now and that date, if we were to set a date, because the enemy obviously sees that if we were to set a date certain and give profound assurance that that was the time we were going to leave, there would be immediate response on the question of prisoners of war. This amendment speaks to that point. If the enemy does not respond, it provides an extension, and if there is no response by then we can take other action. But why should not we, the Congress, now take this step to assure the beginning of the end? That is the question I raise. When the battle casualties are being reduced from 39 to 19 dead and 20 others from causes other than combat, are the deaths of young men so acceptable that with reduced casualties we no longer care about them? Mr. President, does it have to strike in your own family before we weep any more about American dead?

I will not deal too long with the prisoners of war or combat casualties, but I do wish to speak now about the heroin casualties from heroin being supplied by the very nations we are defending. No one questions that the vast majority of heroin produced is produced in the highlands of north Thailand and Laos, and some in Communist China, and that it traverses these countries, across the borders, many times in American-operated airplanes.

Opium can be bought as safely on the streets of Vietnam and other cities of South Vietnam as one can buy chewing gum. It is being sold by kids, and in some instances representatives of the police department.

This is the Government our men are fighting and dying for; to support the type government that allows this to go on. Yes, we want them to have freedom of choice and a right to peace. But there are 25,000 more American young boys addicted to heroin. Is that the price? The estimate of 10 percent to 15 percent given by the provost marshal in Saigon has not been disputed by the Pentagon or the President. As a maximum percentage, this could run into 40,000 men addicted to heroin.

One representative, testifying before the subcommittee, estimated the figure could be as high as 60,000 American soldiers. These are casualties of a drug that kills not only the body and the mind, a physical addiction, but they are spirit-

ually destroyed as well. It destroys not only the body, but also will and the spirit. They walk as the living dead, not buried in the grave somewhere, but returned to the streets of America, driven to steal because they must feed an addictive habit they no longer can control.

What price are we willing to pay? What price are we willing to pay and where is the compassionate heart of the American people? Where are we in Congress when 73 percent of the people of this country have indicated they want to set a time to leave Indochina? Where is our response, Mr. President? How long can we tolerate the living deaths of our own sons and in how many tens of thousands of instances must we tolerate it before we say "Enough"? How long before we say, "You accept the responsibility of cleaning up your country or policing it, of stopping this massive influx of living death into our troops"? Those are questions every family in America has the right to ask, and ask not only of those countries but the Congress of the United States and members of the committees. Are we going to continue it?

I am happy to say we have passed a measure that can help to identify, treat, and rehabilitate these troops, but we have not taken the step to prevent them from getting into this, Mr. President.

I want to raise a question on the floor of the Senate today also of another casualty in the Vietnamese war, the Indochina war, one in which, if this country is the compassionate civilized nation I believe it is, we have a heavy obligation and a deep concern. I refer to the babies of American soldiers and Vietnamese women that have been born during the 10 long years of this conflict, the sons and daughters of American soldiers, both black and white, with Vietnamese mothers. The Vietnamese reject these children as much as we have rejected them, and yet these children have been given life as a result of our participation in a war 12,000 miles from our shores. In the process of that participation we bear the responsibility for those children. When France left South Vietnam, she made provision for children born of French soldiers and Vietnamese mothers by providing they had the option to take French citizenship.

We have reached the point now when the question is no longer victory or defeat, when the question is not whether we will stay or not stay, but the question is when we leave. The only question that remains is when we leave. That is all we are talking about, because everyone believes that we must leave and that there will be no military victory.

It is high time in this discussion that we recognize the casualties of the yet unborn children of our soldiers. The more time they have on their hands, the fewer duties they have to perform, the higher the rate of births of those children is going to be, as well as the higher the incidence of narcotic addiction.

This country does have a moral obligation. We have heard talk of killing men, women, and children in useless bombing and combat. I shall not contribute to that debate today, but we are

contributing to the birth of hopeless children also unless we accept our responsibilities as a Nation to face the problems of the rights of those children in the future. And we must face them as a nation. The births are increasing, they are not decreasing, the longer this war progresses.

It is not a question of signaling the enemy any longer. We are telling the enemy that, by 10 degrees or 15 degrees or 25 degrees we are leaving. The difference in this amendment is, we tell them 100 percent when we leave. We say, "This is the final date. Now you keep your word and we will keep ours." The provision is in the amendment that if they do not keep their word, we extend our period of time there.

There is no risk, as I see it, involved in this, but there is much to be gained to prevent the living death of our men who even live through it.

I would predict, by way of conclusion, that if we make this decision, it will have a psychological impact on this Nation that will generate the thought processes in constructive ways that we have been hoping and praying for for so long, that it will ignite the hearts and hopes of the young people again, to believe again in the reality of facing the stance of a nation, of identifying its true goals, of believing that we do care for the lives of people, wherever they might live, and that we do care about hardcore centers of our own cities and the schools that have become almost disaster areas, and the lack of jobs and opportunity for our children when they return home from fighting a war they did not want and that they believed immoral, and submitting to a draft that they did not like and detested.

Mr. President, the hour is with us for a decision, a decision on the side of justice for all Americans as well as for the world, a signal of hope that would lighten the hearts of people again, that would have more meaning and more fulfillment than any single act this Congress could take now or in the foreseeable future, to say that we are a determined people, we have supported our allies, we have paid with our resources and our blood, we have among us the tens of thousands of living dead who are the casualties of war. Now, those who have become hopeless will be given hope that we will dedicate our resources and manpower to the rebuilding of an America that is beautiful and that we have a right to believe can be strong, free, and decent.

Mr. President, I think this is the most important decision that this Congress could make.

Mr. President, I would like to suggest the absence of a quorum, with the agreement of the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, that the time for it be equally divided between both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER TO PRINT H.R. 6531 AS AMENDED TO DATE

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, it would be helpful both for Senators who are inquiring and also to inform Members of the House of Representatives if we could now have the pending bill, H.R. 6531, with the amendments as of this date, reprinted. I have discussed this matter with the Parliamentarian, and find that is often done with complicated bills.

So, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that H.R. 6531 be reprinted with the amendments that have been adopted up to this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes, I yield the floor.

#### QUORUM CALL

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I suggest that absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 6531) to amend the Military Selective Service Act of 1967; to increase military pay; to authorize military active duty strengths for fiscal year 1972; and for other purposes.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, much attention has been focused on the prisoner issue in this discussion, as was evidenced in yesterday's debate. I think that certain elements of this issue must be clarified.

Yesterday, the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE), for example, said:

Remarks of North Vietnam's chief Paris negotiator, Xuan Thuy, quoted in yesterday's *Washington Post*, removed the last doubt as to North Vietnam's intentions regarding our prisoners. Thuy reiterated the North Vietnamese position that release of any U.S. prisoners would not come before complete cessation of all military and economic assistance to South Vietnam.

Mr. President, that statement is simply not true. Let us examine the statement made by Xuan Thuy during that interview. Mr. Roberts asked:

Q. Then as a condition for prisoner release there must be no such continuing military and economic aid?

Xuan Thuy avoided a direct answer. After the question has been put three times in various forms, he said that "I think you should read again the PRG's eight points. It is clearer than my explanation." When the interviewer said the eight points were not all that clear, he took another tack. "Have you ever asked Nixon these questions?" he

said. "Nixon has troops there and he wants to control the Saigon administration. So you can get clear answers from him on what are his intentions. I understand he doesn't want a total withdrawal and wants to maintain the Saigon administration."

Thus, the North Vietnamese left this point unclear. They did not answer the question directly. And it is incorrect for the Senator from Kansas to claim that the North Vietnamese position is that "release of any prisoners would not come before complete cessation of all military and economic assistance to South Vietnam." They have never stated that as their position, and did not do so in the interview with Chalmers Roberts.

Further, other aspects of that interview should be noted. For instance, Xuan Thuy stated that if the withdrawal date is set, the prisoner release can be settled even if the Thieu-Ky regime remain in power.

Q. Still, given a satisfactory withdrawal date, the prisoner issue will be settled even if Thieu and Ky are still in power in Saigon and there is no political settlement?

A. Right. Moreover, this has been laid down in point one of the PRG program of September, 1970.

Finally, one other point of that interview deserves our careful attention. Roberts asked:

But if a reasonable date is set the question of prisoners may be settled?

A. Yes, you can put it down "will be settled." From now on it is "will."

Thus, the North Vietnamese have said that the prisoner issue will be settled after we set a reasonable date for withdrawal. This is the thrust of their position. This is the thrust of our amendment.

We are not proposing that they be taken at their word. This is not what our amendment asks.

Rather, our amendment simply puts their word to the test. That is why we make it clear that our total withdrawal will depend upon them keeping their word on the prisoner issue.

This morning's Washington Post includes a report that Mr. Le stated that the release of U.S. prisoners is tied solely to the withdrawal of U.S. forces and "to no other questions." This should further emphasize that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE) and others do not have the evidence for claiming that military and economic aid have been stated as a condition for prisoner release.

Now, of course, considerable ambiguity on these questions exists. This is certainly so. But there is one way to clear up all such ambiguity and find out exactly what the details of our adversary's position are. That is to set a date for withdrawal, making it clear that we expect the prisoner release by that time, and leaving open our options if that release is not forthcoming.

Let me further emphasize that such a date for withdrawal relates to our military forces. It does not cover any possible military or economic assistance, which could be authorized, if desired, under separate legislation. I do not believe that the language could be made more clear in the amendment on this point than is presently stated.

Finally, the Washington Post clarifies these points in its editorial this morning.

I ask unanimous consent that this editorial, the article by Chalmers Roberts from yesterday and the article from Anatole Shub from this morning's Post all be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, June 11, 1971]  
PROMISE ON VIETNAM?

Something of real significance may be happening in respect to Vietnam. Shifts by domestic war critics and by Hanoi in recent days seem to have brought them, separately, somewhat closer to political hailing distance of President Nixon. As a result, it becomes possible to see how it might be possible to end quickly at least the American combat role in the war—if Mr. Nixon were to respond in turn.

The domestic critics have moved on two fronts, prisoners of war and post-withdrawal aid. Both the McGovern-Hatfield amendment in the Senate and the Nedzi-Whelan amendment in the House condition final withdrawal of troops on a return of the prisoners. The peace plan offered by Clark Clifford would have Hanoi release our POWs 30 days after a withdrawal date was proclaimed. We happen to believe that a formula providing for parallel troop withdrawals and prisoner release—carried out step by step in tandem—has the best chance of overcoming the massive mutual distrust that plainly exists. But the main point is: all responsible critics share the President's insistence on release of the prisoners before the last of our troops leave.

Similarly, we believe all responsible critics—and this is the second standard by which we would define "responsible"—are prepared to see the United States offer aid to Saigon after American participation in combat ends. McGovern-Hatfield would let the President "provide assistance to the nations of Indochina, in amounts approved by the Congress . . ." Nedzi-Whelan, in like language, would let him provide "military and economic assistance." It is simply false to charge that the critics would do nothing at all to help South Vietnam after we have disengaged militarily from the war. Assuredly most critics do not share Mr. Nixon's partiality for the Thieu regime. But knowing that in South Vietnam the United States has created a governmental and military machine that cannot conceivably operate without American aid, they are prepared to countenance that aid.

Let us turn to the nuances in the interview given our correspondent Chalmers Roberts this week by North Vietnam's representative in Paris, Xuan Thuy. For prisoner release to be arranged, said Xuan Thuy, the United States must set a date for withdrawal of "all" its forces in Indochina—this would include advisers and a residual force and it would preclude combat missions by air or naval units based in Thailand or on the high seas. This would leave no American military men "in or over" Indochina, as American critics put it.

The Hanoi representative further said that removal of the Thieu-Ky regime and formation of a coalition government are not a condition for prisoner release. Finally, in his most significant statement, he pointedly refused to demand that the United States halt military and economic aid to Saigon, after withdrawal. Mr. Roberts repeatedly tried to pin him down on the question and Xuan Thuy repeatedly hedged.

What may all this add up to? At home, it now is clear that if Mr. Nixon were willing to set a withdrawal date, he could have the support of domestic critics—that is to say, he could unite the country—on retrieving the prisoners and on providing some form of post-withdrawal aid for Saigon. The resultant advantages to him in bargaining with

Hanoi could be immense, since Hanoi would no longer be able to play on divisions within the American body politic.

Furthermore, since it appears that Hanoi is prepared under certain conditions to let Thieu stay in office and to have Thieu receive American military and economic aid, then it means Mr. Nixon could set a withdrawal date without doing what he has always said he will never do—bug out on Thieu. By aid, though not by further combat support, he could give the South Vietnamese that "reasonable chance" of saving themselves which he has consistently cited as his prime war aim. It would be silly, of course, to conclude that Hanoi has become resigned to Thieu's continued rule. A safe conclusion is that North Vietnam is so eager to pry the United States out of the war that it is willing to take its chances in a struggle or—who knows—in an accommodation with Saigon.

This is, in short, a promising moment. It is a moment for the broadest vision and statesmanship on the part of President Nixon. He could lose it by continuing to throw political sand in the eyes of his domestic critics; they, too, have their own responsibility. He could lose it by clinging unnecessarily tightly to Mr. Thieu. Now that a foundation for post-withdrawal aid to South Vietnam seems to be hardening, there is much less reason to fear that an American move in advance of the Vietnamese elections next October would demoralize Saigon. And he could lose it by a continuing show of indifference, if not outright antipathy, to any sign, however much limited to nuances, of evolution in the position of Hanoi.

#### THUY OUTLINES REQUISITE FOR POW TALKS

(By Chalmers M. Roberts)

PARIS.—The top North Vietnamese representative at the Paris peace talks said today that the prisoner of war issue, properly coupled with a total American withdrawal, could be settled while the Thieu-Ky regime is still in power in Saigon, but he indicated that Hanoi will not agree if the United States intends to continue to arm and support the South Vietnamese forces.

These points emerged during a 90-minute interview with Xuan Thuy, chief of the North Vietnamese delegation, at his suburban Paris headquarters, Cholsy-le-roi. The veteran diplomat answered a series of questions with a minimum of the political polemics so familiar at the weekly meetings in the Paris forum.

The questions and answers went this way:

Q. You have said the United States should fix a "reasonable" date for complete and unconditional withdrawal of "all" American forces. Would you clarify the word "all"?

A. "When I use the word 'all' I mean the totality of U.S. forces in Vietnam. It includes all kinds of arms—ground, air, naval forces—on the territory, air space, water of Vietnam including U.S. military personnel, American military advisers . . . We don't have any objections if U.S. planes are based in foreign countries provided they are not used against Vietnam. The 7th Fleet may be located on the high seas provided it does not violate Vietnamese territorial waters or is used against Vietnam."

The reference to planes based in foreign countries was in response to a query about the U.S. Air Force in Thailand. When he was reminded that his spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le, who was present at today's interview, had mentioned last week American use of both Japan and Okinawa, Xuan Thuy said that was because they had been used in the war against Vietnam.

His response also included a statement that it is "the scheme of the Nixon administration to seize not only South Vietnam but also to control Laos and Cambodia for the implementation of U.S. policy in these countries and also for encircling the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and also

to hold in the American grasp the whole area of South Asia," and some related statements which were not new.

Q. Does the word "all" include both any form of a so-called residual force and a military training and assistance group?

A. "These military personnel are included in the word 'all.'"

Q. Does the word also include the forces of South Korea, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand now in South Vietnam?

A. "Yes."

Q. When you say that if a "reasonable" date is set for total withdrawal and then the question of American prisoners could be "rapidly" and "easily" settled, are you speaking of those held only in North Vietnam or also in the South, in Laos and in Cambodia?

Xuan Thuy replied, in short, that he was speaking of those held in both North and South Vietnam since the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (the Vietcong), which he said had first proposed that the U.S. set a withdrawal date, was speaking only of the south. He had added the North. As to Laos, Prince Souphanouvone, leader of the rebel Pathet Lao movement, has said that those captured will be released when all bombing of Laos is stopped. As to Cambodia, that comes under the competence of Prince Sihanouk.

Q. If President Nixon set a withdrawal date to your satisfaction, would the prisoners be immediately released, released only after the end of withdrawal or concurrently at the same pace with withdrawal?

A. Here Xuan Thuy threw up his hands. "I cannot answer for the time being for this is the key to settlement. As long as Nixon does not set a date we cannot go into details of a settlement. The question of prisoners relates to the aftermath."

Q. What would you consider a "reasonable" date for withdrawal, given the logistic problem—six months, nine months, one year from the date of an announcement?

A. "A reasonable date was proposed" by the provisional Revolutionary Government which, he noted, on Sept. 17, 1970, had proposed withdrawal by June 30, 1971. "But Nixon did not agree. Let him propose a date. He should set it." When asked if the Vietcong timetable of just over nine months was reasonable, he replied that "I don't mention any period of time now. Now I'm not willing to mention any time." He recalled that Mr. Nixon had proposed withdrawal in 12 months but Xuan Thuy did not mention that that was a call for North Vietnamese withdrawal from the South as well.

Q. You have repeatedly referred to "two crucial questions" involved in settling the Vietnam problem, the military and the political questions, and have said they are "inseparable." (Xuan Thuy made this statement again at the June 3 Paris meeting.) The political question has been posed as removing the Thieu-Ky regime from office and the formation of a coalition government. Is this political issue also a condition for prisoner release?

A. "The question of the release of prisoners is related only to the military question. This shows our flexibility. It should have been linked to the political question."

Q. But what does "inseparable" mean then?

A. "If we speak of the whole question of Vietnam, of the settlement of the war, of ending U.S. aggression, then the military and political questions should be linked. But if a reasonable date is set the question of prisoners may be settled."

Q. Why do you say "may" and not "will"?

A. "Yes, you can put in down 'will' be settled.' From now on it is 'will.'"

Q. You know Mr. Nixon has said you have offered only to discuss prisoner release.

A. "Nixon is unwilling to withdraw. Therefore he tries to use one pretext and another Nixon's allegation about discussing and not settling is because he is unwilling to settle. He wants to split hairs."

Q. Still, given a satisfactory withdrawal date, the prisoner issue will be settled even if Thieu and Ky are still in power in Saigon and there is no political settlement?

A. "Right. Moreover, this has been laid down in point one of the PRG program of September, 1970."

Q. How automatic would prisoner release be once a satisfactory withdrawal date is set?

A. "Let Nixon set the date and we will discuss that."

Q. Since you have said withdrawal and prisoner release could be accomplished while Thieu and Ky are still in power, what about military and economic aid from the U.S. to their regime afterwards?

A. "That is the point of linking political. . . . It should also settle the question of the Saigon administration because suppose the U.S. withdraws but it maintains the Saigon administration and continues to give it military aid and that administration continues to repress the people of the South. We would return to the period prior to the introduction of the American expeditionary force. It is what we call neo-colonialism and the U.S. would remain involved in Vietnam."

Q. Then as a condition for prisoner release there must be no such continuing military and economic aid?

Xuan Thuy avoided a direct answer. After the question had been put three times in various forms, he said that "I think you should read again the PRG's eight points. It is clearer than my explanation." When the interviewer said the eight points were not all that clear, he took another tack.

"Have you ever asked Nixon these questions?" he said. "Nixon has troops there and he wants to control the Saigon administration. So you can get clear answers from him on what are his intentions. I understand he doesn't want a total withdrawal and wants to maintain the Saigon administration."

Q. The impression you have left by your answers is that you are not willing to make a clear differentiation between the military and political questions, though the military one is primary. Is that correct?

A. "Quite right" because "a radical, thorough settlement" of Vietnam is necessary. "If the U.S. withdraws all its forces but maintained an advisory mission and continued to give military equipment aid to the Saigon administration, then the people of the South will continue to oppose the Saigon administration and then the U.S. would have to step up military aid. But Thieu-Ky would not be stable and the U.S. would have to send troops and we would return to the previous situation."

In concluding, Xuan Thuy said that "our desire is a total U.S. withdrawal and a change from the Thieu-Ky regime so the people of South Vietnam can form their own government of their own choice. Then the people of the South will accept American aid on the basis of mutual agreement."

The North, too, he added when asked, would be prepared to establish relations with all countries, including the U.S. and to accept aid on the same basis.

#### HANOI, VC ELUSIVE ON POW'S—NO CLARIFICATION GIVEN IN PARIS

(By Anatole Shub)

PARIS, June 10—Vietnamese Communist spokesmen today remained elusive as to how quickly American prisoners of war might be released after the United States named a date for total withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam.

At the 116th session of the deadlocked Vietnam peace talks U.S. negotiator David K. E. Bruce asked the Communist delegates to "clarify the ambiguous and contradictory comments attributed to your spokesmen" on the question.

According to Stephen Ledogar, the U.S. press spokesman, North Vietnam's Xuan

Thuy and the Vietcong's Nguyen Thi Binh "totally avoided our questions."

Afterwards, newsmen questioned Communist press spokesmen closely on the statement by former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford that, if President Nixon promised total withdrawal by the end of the year, he had "reason to believe" the prisoners would be released "within 30 days."

However, Nguyen Thanh Le for North Vietnam and Duong Dinh Thao for the Vietcong declined either to confirm or deny Clifford's assertion.

Instead, they reiterated previous promises that naming a withdrawal date would lead to "immediate discussion" of prisoner release. Thao said that "we wish to settle the question quickly," and rejected what he called a "play on words" by the Nixon administration, which has called attention to the gap between "discussing" prisoner release and the actual release.

"Discussion would serve to bring about the liberation" of the prisoners, Thao insisted, but he declined to specify how long that might take.

Le emphasized that the release of American prisoners was tied solely to the withdrawal of U.S. forces (including "advisers") from South Vietnam, and "to no other questions."

He explicitly reaffirmed the statement by Xuan Thuy, in an interview with Chalmers Roberts of The Washington Post Tuesday, that the prisoners' release would not depend on a change of government in Saigon.

Le noted that the prisoner question had been linked with U.S. withdrawal as far back as the first point of Mrs. Binh's eight-point peace plan presented last September.

"The first point is not tied to any other points," he said.

Nguyen Thanh Le was not asked whether continued U.S. economic and material aid to Saigon would affect prisoner release.

He did, however, indicate that total withdrawal would have to include all U.S. military advisers.

Lee said, "Xuan Thuy expressed our position clearly in his interview with Chalmers Roberts."

For the United States, Bruce condemned the Communist attacks May 30, June 5 and June 7 on Danang, where more than 54 civilians were killed and wounded in what he called "indiscriminate shellings" by 120mm rockets. Bruce said the attacks violated the "understandings" reached in October, 1968, when the United States stopped bombing North Vietnam.

According to the United States, the Communists undertook at that time to halt shelling of cities. The Communists publicly deny the U.S. version of the "understandings."

It was also disclosed that the United States over the past 18 months had made renewed attempts to hold so-called "restricted sessions" of the Paris talks. These would be formal sessions (like the SALT or Berlin negotiations) which everyone knew were taking place, but at which neither side would publicize what happened except by mutual agreement.

Such sessions, in the U.S. view, would enable some frank exchanges, instead of the current propaganda sessions in which delegates' speeches are distributed to the press and spokesmen immediately report whatever discussion follows the prepared speeches.

Ledogar said that the most recent U.S. request for restricted sessions was made "about four weeks ago"—apparently just before Bruce went to Washington for consultations—but that the Communists "didn't even answer" the request.

There have never been restricted sessions at the Paris talks. Even since secret talks between the United States and North Vietnam broke down in the summer of 1969, the Communist position has been that the for-

mat of discussions is less important than the substantive issues.

Until the United States is ready to discuss total military withdrawal or a change of government in Saigon, the Communists have said, there is nothing to talk about in secret or restricted talks.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brock). The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, in view of the time of day and the day of the week, and the fact that quite a few speakers are interested in speaking in opposition to the amendment, I think it is really best not to wait for any of them today. They wish to speak next week, anyway, nearer the time for the vote.

I have other remarks to make—maybe more than one time—before the vote comes, but I do not care to take up the time of the Senate further today. So I yield my right to speak and yield back time if that is necessary.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from West Virginia yield for a question?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.

Mr. HATFIELD. Could I make inquiry as to what the relative time factor has been, thus far, as far as expending time on the amendment is concerned.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I refer that question to the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brock). The Senator from Oregon has used 243 minutes. The Senator from Mississippi has used 136 minutes to date.

Mr. HATFIELD. I thank the Chair and I thank the Senator from West Virginia.

#### ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT TO MONDAY, JUNE 14, 1971

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon Monday next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER FOR THE RECOGNITION OF SENATOR GRAVEL ON MONDAY

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Monday next, immediately following the recognition of the two leaders under the standing order, the distinguished Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL) be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER FOR PERIOD FOR THE TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS ON MONDAY

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Monday next, following the remarks of

the able Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business not to extend beyond 12:30 p.m. that day, with statements therein limited to 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS ON MONDAY

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of morning business on Monday next, the Chair lay before the Senate the unfinished business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, what is the pending question before the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment of the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN) and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), No. 143.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank the distinguished Presiding Officer.

#### ORDER FOR WAIVER OF GERMANENESS RULE ON MONDAY

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, in view of the fact that the time is controlled on the pending amendment No. 143 by Senator McGOVERN, and others, that the Pastore rule of germaneness be waived for the day on Monday next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### PROGRAM

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, the program for Monday is as follows:

The Senate will convene at 12 o'clock noon. Immediately following the recognition of the two leaders under the standing order, the distinguished Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL) will be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

At the conclusion of his remarks, there will be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, with statements therein limited to 3 minutes, with the period not to extend beyond 12:30 p.m.

Immediately upon conclusion of the period for the transaction of routine morning business, the Chair will lay before the Senate the unfinished business, H.R. 6531, and the pending question before the Senate will be on amendment No. 143 by Senator McGOVERN, and others. Time on the amendment will be controlled.

The Pastore rule of germaneness has been waived for the day on Monday.

Rollcall votes are not scheduled but are possible, in view of the fact that amendments to the amendment could be offered, and tabling motions are in order. I do not anticipate such, however, on Monday.

A vote on the McGOVERN amendment No. 143 as amended, if amended, will occur not later than 5 o'clock p.m. on Wednesday next, June 16, 1971.

#### ADJOURNMENT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon on Monday next.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 2 o'clock and 7 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until Monday, June 14, 1971, at 12 o'clock noon.

#### NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate June 11, 1971:

##### IN THE U.S. AIR FORCE

The following-named officers for promotion in the Regular Air Force, under the appropriate provisions of chapter 835, title 10, United States Code, as amended. All officers are subject to physical examination required by law.

##### LINE

##### Lieutenant colonel to colonel

Abolt, Warren G. XXXX  
 Adams, Gerald M. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Adelman, Frederick J. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Akerland, Gustav J. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Alexander, Richard L. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Alford, Frank B., Jr. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Allen, James R. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Allen, Ledewey E., Jr. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Allen, Milton E. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Alvarado, Ricardo R. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Amador, Earl M. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Amery, Robert S. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Anderson, Andrew B., Jr. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Anderson, Carl A. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Anderson, James R. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Anderson, Marvin J. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Anderson, Mont R. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Andrews, Melvin H. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Apple, John J. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Atkins, Edwin L. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Baden, Vernon E. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Baker, Charles E. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Baldwin, Richard F. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Ball, John C. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Banks, Ernest S. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Banner, Alvin W. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Bare, Merle M. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Barnard, Martin J. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Barnett, Willard XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Barondes, Arthur D. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Barr, Ellis L. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Barrett, Lewis E., Jr. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Barsom, George K., Jr. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Barta, John J. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Batson, Gerald M. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Baughn, Richard M. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Beach, William J. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Beatie, Charles F., Jr. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Becher, Donald F. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Beckham, Ross A., Jr. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Bedell, Charles H. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Bedford, Ernest D. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Benedict, Warren V. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Benson, Hollis A. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Benson, Jack R. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Bergman, Lloyd H. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Berkenpas, Nepht. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Bernard, Duane R. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Berrier, Raymond S. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Bertoni, Waldo E. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Best, Warren E. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Bettinger, Stephen L. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Bettis, William E. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Bishop, Tedd L. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Black, Donald C., Jr. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Blaine, Jay M., Jr. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Bland, Kenneth E. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Bloom, John P. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Bobbett, Robert L. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Bohnhoff, Wilbur C. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Bolton, Howard F. XXX-XX-XXXX  
 Bortness, Lawrence E. XXX-XX-XXXX

Botzong, Willbur B. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Bower, Archie F., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Bowman, John H. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Branch, Robert, Sr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Brandes, Harry E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Braswell, Arnold W. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Braun, Louis D., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Brenholtz, George E., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Brewer, Zane G. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Briggs, Josephus A., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Brill, Jay R. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Britton, Charles L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Britton, Raymond P. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Broadway, Roy D. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Brown, Calvin W. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Brown, James F. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Brown, Robert D. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Brown, William Y. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Buechler, Theodore B. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Bundick, Paul S. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Burkhardt, John W. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Burkholder, Richard W. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Burlingame, Colin P. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Burman, John R. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Burris, Rupert H. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Burrows, William C. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Burt, Robert L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Butcher, Budd H. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Butler, Blaine R., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Butler, Robert K. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Buttery, Thomas W. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cafarella, Joseph R. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Callahan, Daniel H. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Campbell, Claude P. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Campbell, Robert H. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Canady, Thomas H., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cap, George W. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Carey, Richard J. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Carlisle, Joe L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Carlson, Carl R. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Carroll, Arthur B. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Carter, Duffey A. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Carver, Allen W., Sr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Catron, Ward J. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cavalli, George A. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cavanaugh, Thomas J. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Caviness, Jamie N. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Chanatry, Fred I. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Chandler, Van E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Chapman, Charles V., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Charpillot, Kenneth L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Chenot, Richard P. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Christianson, William C. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Chrzastek, Myron J. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cimino, Anthony P. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Clark, Loren D. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Clark, Raymond S. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Clayville, Howard G. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Clemenson, Robert C. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Clift, William H. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cloud, Lester A., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Coapman, A. L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cocherell, Robert, Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cochran, Robert W. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Coleman, Kermit xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Coleman, William E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Coleman, William D. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Colip, Robert C. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cone, Charles L., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cone, Norris C. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Connolly, Thomas J. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cook, Emmerson C. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cook, Norman W. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cook, William R. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Coon, William R., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cooper, Robert W. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cooper, William E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Coover, Jean L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Corey, Alexander E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Coulahan, John E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Coury, Robert A. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Coward, Roderick W. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cox, William H. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Crawford, William A., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Creech, William T. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Creveling, Louis G. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Crisp, Harold N., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Crutchlow, Russell F. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cund, Francis T. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Cuny, Roy A. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Currie, James B. xxx-xx-xxxx

Curry, Clarence G., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Daman, Robert C. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Daniel, John I., III xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Davies, Bill M. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Davis, Carl F. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Davis, Robert M. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Davison, Clark E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Depyssler, Steven L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Desens, Sherwin G. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Dickson, Harry H. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Dill, Kenneth xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Dixon, Jack C., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Doolittle, John P. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Doria, Oswald xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Douglas, Tommy L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Douglas, Wilson D. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Downs, Eldon W. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Drack, Warren E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Drake, Flavious F. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Driscoll, James J. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Dubois, Joseph M. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Dunning, Leslie L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Duys, Dirk xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Echabarne, Paul xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Echols, Barney F., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Economy, Peter xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Eddy, Egbert B. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Edwards, Harry M. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Egginton, Jack H. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Eggleston, Telford S., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Ehrhardt, Robert F. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Eisenhart, William E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Eklund, Robert G. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Emmons, Richard A. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Erickson, Robert E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Estes, Carl A. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Evans, Richard L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Favorite, Walter B. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Fedele, Frank xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Ferryman, Neil R. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Field, Harry W. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Fifer, Reginald D., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Finch, J. P. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Fleckenstein, George J. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Fletcher, Westwood H., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Flowers, Idus R. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Flynn, Robert E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Ford, John R. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Fordham, Joseph T. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Foster, Donald E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Foster, Herbert R. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Fought, Oliver C. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Fowler, June B. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Frankie, Merton J. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Frey, Ivan R. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Fulton, Fay D. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gabel, Wilfred V. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gabriel, Joseph A. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gaddis, Norman C. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gagnon, Lawrence xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gallagher, Gilbert G. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gallagher, Walter J. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Galpin, Harry T. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Galyon, Hershel E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Garrigus, Norman F. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Garvey, Joseph J. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gavin, Herbert J. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gayikian, Hyko xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Geller, Walter N. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 George, Edsel L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Georgl, William F. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gervais, Frederick B. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Geurtz, James E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gibson, Charles V. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gibson, Millard L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gilbert, Raymond H., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gillespie, Clinton G. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gillogly, Harold S. xxx-xx-xxxx  
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 Gobrecht, William W. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Goff, Willbur xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gomes, Louis A. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Goodlett, John R. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gosdin, Malcolm E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Grant, Harold E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gray, Prichard E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Green, Paul L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Grencl, Bruno J. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gribling, Richard I. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Grindle, Frederick W., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Grossholz, Theodore G. xxx-xx-xxxx

Grunzke, Marvin E. XXXX  
 Guarino, Lawrence N. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gunnarson, Kenneth I. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Gutches, William H. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hadley, Russell J. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Haggerty, Stanley K. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hall, James K. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hall, Robert S. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Halpenny, Robert P. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hamilton, William C., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hamlin, Ralph E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hammock, Frank M. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hammond, Winton G. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hand, Clarence B. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hankins, William R. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hansen, Paul K. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hansen, Robin xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Harbst, Kenneth E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
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 Henson, Archie L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Herman, Robert L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hernandez, Edward xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hess, Warren C. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hewitt, Ray R. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hichew, Alan L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
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 Higgins, William M. xxx-xx-xxxx  
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 Hodge, Phillip E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
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 Hoffman, John N., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hoh, John E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Holcomb, Albert L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Holladay, Jean D. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Holloway, Kenneth M. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Holmes, Lester E. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Holt, Emmett L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Horn, Robert P. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Horne, Wickliff H. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Howarth, Albert R. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Howell, Eugene S. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hoyt, Ralph A. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hubbard, Robert S. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hubka, Rudolph J. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hughes, Arthur L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hughes, Harson B. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hughes, Jack L. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Humkey, Marion F. xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hunt, Senour xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Hunter, Charles M., Jr. xxx-xx-xxxx  
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 Remy, Thomas J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Reynolds, William L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Rice, Rob R., III, xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Richardson, James C., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Richey, Chester R., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Richmond, Elmer R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Rider, Warrick W., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Rigby, David J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Riley, Michael A., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Roark, David D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Roark, Robert L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Robbert, Albert A., III, xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Roberts, Harold I., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Roberts, James W., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Robertson, Herschel E., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Robey, William A., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Robinson, Mark, xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Rodriguez, Ignacio, xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Roll, David F., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Rondeau, Daniel M., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Ross, Michael I., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Ross, Thomas L., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Roswell, Donald F., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Rudolph, Franklin A., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Rumble, Paul W., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Rupp, Kenneth D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Rupp, Robert J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Russell, Clark B., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Rustemeyer, William G., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Ruzicka, Joseph L., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Ryan, Thomas G., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Rygielski, Joseph J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sackvillewest, Arthur J., III, xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Samanie, Donald P., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sams, John B., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Samson, David R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sander, John L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sanders, Ernest L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sanders, George A., III, xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sands, Gene C., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sandstrom, Kerry R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Saunders, Jack D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sauvain, Claude R., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Schaad, Richard M., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Scherer, David P., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Schindler, James C., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Schmitt, Harold R., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Schreck, Dan R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Schrettenbrunner, Michael K., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Schroyer, Anthony J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Schryer, Donald R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Schultz, Terry L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Schwab, Ronald P., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Schwertfeger, William R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Scoskie, Robert R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sears, Joel L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 See, Henry S., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Seitz, Robert A., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Selig, Kenneth R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sert, Louis R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sharpe, Ervin C., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Shaw, Graham, xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Shaw, Gregory R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sheeran, Edward J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sherry Robert R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Shields, Kent L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Shipe, John A., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Shofner, Larry L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Shope, James D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Shradel, Jan M., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Shull, Walter B., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Shupe, Dwight A., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Siers, Edwin, Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sievers, Stanley E., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Siler, Larry G., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sipos, Larry, xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sizemore, Edward J., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Skluzacek, Roger J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Slattery, Neil A., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Slocum, Norman M., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Smart, William W., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Smith, James L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Smith, James V., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Smith, James D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Smith, Lyndell D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sorensen, Roger W., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sornberger, John T., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Southwick, Larry E., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Spell, Clyde, xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Spinney, Franklin C., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Spitz, Frederick L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Spurrier, Randall R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Squire, James M., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stacy, Robert A., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stalnaker, Gerard W., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Standish, Richard W., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stanley, Andrew M., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stark, Philip E., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Starr, George T., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stenberg, William D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stevens, Gary L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stewart, Cameron R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stewart, James B., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stewart, Raymond, xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stewart, Warren E., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stuhlmann, Lyle A., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stolee, Eric M., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stolz, Lawrence G., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stone, Bruce H., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stoops, Carl E., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Strantz, Roger J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Strnad, Randolph L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Strohm, David A., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stromain, Roberta L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stubblefield, William G., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stuermer, Thomas D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Stump, Thomas K., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sturtevant, James S., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Survillas, Roy G., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Sutton, James P., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Swadley, Leonard R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Swiney, John F., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Tafs, William D., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Tarbell, Terry C., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Tart, Howard G., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Tate, Stephen B., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Tawes, John P., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Taylor, Donald R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Taylor, Emerson B., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Taylor, Richard C., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Teach, Everett A., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Thomas, Donald S., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Thomas, George R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Thomas, Ronald N., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Thompson, Norman T., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Thompson, Samuel B., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Thorey, Volker, xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Thornhill, John D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Thorpe, Jack A., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Tillman, Donald E., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Tillman, Luther J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Tirado, Jesus S., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Toavs, Dwight V., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Tockston, John G., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Tomasetti, Robert J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Tomlins, Frederick L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Tootle, Alvin E., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Treadwell, Benjamin B., III, xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Trimble, Thomas N., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Tripp, Robert S., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Truitt, James F., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Trujillo, Henry P., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Turner, James F. A., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Turner, Michael W., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Tye, Donald M., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Tyson, John P., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Underwood, Gary R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Uptegraph, Clarence E., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Urbach, Keith J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Valentino, Rudolph J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Vanover, Fairly, xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Veeder, Robert N., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Velez, Jose N., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Vertenten, James A., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Vickers, Richard N., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Viers, Marion A., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Vincent, Joseph P., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Voellger, Gary A., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Vogt, Richard J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Wagner, Daniel J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Wagner, Paul D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Waite, Robert L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Walen, Darrell J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Walker, Billy F., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Walters, Charles W., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Walters, John D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Wansack, James K., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Ward, Floyd E., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Warden, Wayne E., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Warren, George C., III, xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Washburn, John D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Waters, James T., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Waypa, John, Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Weaver, Richard A., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Weber, Nelson J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Weber, Paul R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Webster, Dale D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Weiland, John D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Weiss, Edward H., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Welch, Thomas D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Wenzel, David E., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Westenbarger, Martin L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Westerbeck, John W., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Westerfield, Melvin L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Westergom, Earl L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Weustermann, Elsa J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Wheeler, Steven L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Wheeler, William H. G., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 White, John L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Whitley, Willard H., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Whitman, Charles T., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Whitney, Randle L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Will, Joseph H. M., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Willett, Richard D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Willhoite, Robert R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Williams, John B., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Williams, Philip J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Williams, Robert D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Wilson, Bruce A., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Wilson, Charles G., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Windham, Thomas D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Wise, Chesley G., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Wittel, Edward F., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Wolfe, James L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Woodard, Wendell O., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Woodhouse, Dennis M., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Woodside, Bertram J., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Worden, Douglas L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Woronicz, Robert C., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Worrall, Gary R., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Wright, David L., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Yorman, James M., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Yoshida, Rolan S., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Young, Gerald T., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Zak, Francis X., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Zebelean, John P., III, xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Zehr, Frederick J., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Zorn, Thomas O., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Harrison, Warren T., xxx-xx-xxxx

## MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

Cunningham, Terence T., III, xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Everett, Warren D., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Lott, Larry K., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Maso, Eugene C., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Pettigrew, Alan G., Jr., xxx-xx-xxxx  
 Starr, Gerald A., xxx-xx-xxxx

BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES CORPS

Cairney, William J. ... Collins, Richard ... Moran, Jeanne R. ... Swede, Benjamin M. ... Carol LeVann Holley, ... For re-appointment to the active list of the Regular Air Force, in the grade of major, from the temporary disability retired list, under the provisions of sections 1210 and 1211, title 10, United States Code.

IN THE ARMY

The following-named persons for appointment in the Regular Army, by transfer in the grade specified, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3283 through 3294:

To be first lieutenant

Blackwell, Russell R. ... The following-named persons for appointment in the Regular Army of the United States, in the grades specified, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3283 through 3294 and 3311:

To be major

Bainbridge, Clarence A., III, ... Brown, Charles T., Jr. ... Brown, Milton C., II ... Cummins, Clark H. ... Hammond, William H. ... Holt, Gerald A. ... Keoleian, Diran A. ... Mazyck, William L. ... Miller, Billy G. ... Tromly, Robert R.

To be captain

Alexander, Alfred A. ... Astarita, Robert W. ... Autry, Jerry D. ... Ayerdi, Evalt. ... Baldwin, Charles S. ... Beman, Charles E. ... Berbiglia, James O. ... Bogue, John P., Sr. ... Braeuer, Norbert R. ... Carey, John C. ... Carr, Edward L. ... Carter, John L., Jr. ... Caruso, Louis H. ... Childree, William C. ... Choate, Jeffery J. ... Craft, Jimmie L. ... Davis, Stephen S. ... Dolloff, Theodore J. ... Ennis, Robert J. ... Fersch, Stephen J. ... Flores, George H. P. ... Foley, James G., Jr. ... Forsberg, Paul O. ... Fraker, Thomas R. ... Ganino, Joseph. ... Gladfelter, Terry T. ... Goette, Detlef K. ... Groome, George C. ... Gunhus, Gaylord T. ... Hawley, Eric B. ... Hill, Thomas M. ... Irwin, Glen D. ... Jasper, Willard O. ... Johnson, James H. ... Jones, John P. ... Juliano, Anthony J. ... Kockx, Duane F. ... Kusumoto, Howard H. ... Laduzenski, Eugene A. ... Lazik, Peter R. ... Magee, Ivan E., Jr. ... Martin, Thomas L. ... McCarthy, Paul J. ... McElroy, James W. ... Mekkelson, Peter W. ... Miles, Ralph A. ... Millican, Charles W. ... Mills, Ivan R. ... Mitchell, Sim C. ... Mock, Wayne E. ... Norton, Jay F.

O'Brien, John D. ... O'Loughlin, Stanley J. ... Osborn, Roger J. ... Parker, Glynn E. ... Provant, Delbert R., Jr. ... Ragland, Richard C. ... Redd, Fred E. ... Resch, Robert E. ... Richards, John W. ... Robinson, Phillip H. ... Saxonn, Rufus C. ... Schackel, William A. ... Shields, Harold J., Jr. ... Sloan, Murrell L. ... Smindak, Jean ... Smith, William H. ... Solander, Gary G. ... Taylor, John W. ... Van Wagoner, Frank A. ... Wall, Richard W. ... Whitlaw, Joseph T., Jr.

To be first lieutenant

Adams, John B. ... Addcox, Thomas W. ... Alexander, Gus N., Jr. ... Allen, Douglas L., Jr. ... Allen, Jon J. ... Allen, Richard D. ... Anthony, Edward H. ... Asbury, Glendin D. ... Averbuch, Michael E. ... Bailey, Ray H. ... Baillon, Larry P. ... Bare, Jimmy C. ... Bartnik, Richard J. ... Baxley, Homer W. ... Beahm, Michael R. ... Becker, Larry E. ... Bettencourt, George G. ... Bhalla, Arun K. ... Blanchard, Robert C., Jr. ... Boggs, John A. ... Bolton, Paul J. ... Bonn, Larry L. ... Bowers, Frank W., III. ... Bowman, Lewis A. ... Brackett, Thomas R. ... Breedon, Kenneth R. ... Brenner, Paul F. ... Brewer, Donald L. ... Brittigan, Robert L. ... Brown, Allen W., Jr. ... Bushaw, John W. ... Calahan, Robert H. ... Carmack, James W., II ... Cercone, Joseph A. ... Chartier, Larry M. ... Chilcote, Ted C. ... Cobb, Richard L. ... Conley, John E. ... Cox, Frank J. ... Coyle, Raymond A. ... Davis, Benjamin K. ... Deden, Stanley N. ... Delia, Richard. ... Del Sesto, Anne M. ... Devine, Jerry P. ... Doherty, Daniel A. ... Donahue, Terrence R. ... Dooley, Buryl E. ... Downard, Jerry R. ... Duffy, James J. ... Duncan, William H., Jr. ... Emory, Sherwood L., Jr. ... Fender, Charles K. ... Forry, Ronald P. ... Frizzo, Robert A. ... Gill, Paul C. ... Greene, George K. ... Griffin, Floyd L. ... Griffith, Robert G., Jr. ... Hadden, Mayo A., III. ... Hale, Ronald C. ... Hanratty, Eugene J. ... Harris, Robert O., III. ... Hartley, Lonnie G. ... Hataway, Jimmie J. ... Haugen, Lawrence A. ... Heerdink, Paul L. ... Hesse, August H. ... Hill, Herbert M. ... Hobby, Robert J. ... Hollis, Joseph P., Jr. ... Hooper, William R., Jr. ... Hudgins, James W. ... Hudson, Royce T. ... Hughes, Everett A., Jr. ... Hulet, Glenn E. ... Hurban, James. ... Jasper, William R. ... Jeffers, Fred. ... Jerney, James L. ... Johnson, Thomas E. ... Jones, Richard E. ... Kaleta, August J. ... Katz, Darrell W. ... Keohane, Michael F. ... Kesler, Dickson E. ... Killion, Norvel, Jr. ... Kimerer, Philip H. ... King, Thomas W., Jr. ... Knutson, James R. ... Konieczny, Jerome J. ... Leader, Jason A. ... Letzer, Larry L., Sr. ... Loudermilk, Kenneth G. ... Mauldin, Terry M. ... McGookin, Denna. ... McMahan, Robert L. ... McNeil, James W. ... Melancon, Steven L. ... Meyer, Michael P. ... Mielke, Charles L. ... Miller, Dewey R. ... Mote, Edgar F. ... Naranjo, Carmen J. ... Neely, Robert A. ... Ohrt, Richard C. ... Park, Percival D. ... Peat, Richard T. ... Perales, Juan A. ... Perkins, Philip H. ... Pick, Robert O. ... Pleasant, Richard H. ... Powers, George F., Jr. ... Pulliam, James B. ... Querfeld, John W. ... Reardon, John C. ... Rees, Richard M. ... Reid, Michael J. ... Riley, Ellen E. ... Riou, Ann M. ... Robinson, John E. ... Robles, Josue R., Jr. ... Rogers, Glenn F., Jr. ... Roper, Robert C. ... Roscoe, Ronald R. ... Russell, Carolyn E. ... Rzonca, Raymond J. ... Samuel, Victor J., Jr. ... Schaumberg, Thomas J. ... Schuck, William J. ... Seaman, Lee E. ... Sharp, Harry L. ... Sharp, Thomas S. ... Shirk, Lloyd D. ... Short, Thomas E. ... Silverman, Marita S. ... Simiele, Frank A. ... Simpson, James M. ... Smith, Gale N. ... Smith, John E., III. ... Snelgrove, Alfred G. ... Sole, Larry D. ... Spreng, Frederick C. ... Stein, Kenneth R. ... Stobie, John P. ... Sweet, Paul W., Jr. ... Thurman, Jerry W. ... Treybig, Kennard R. ... Turman, Robert R. ... Uribe, Rodrigo L. ... Walker, Marshall K. ... Weinberg, Paul ... White, Donel D. ... Whitehead, John B., III. ... Whiteman, Steven H. ... Williams, John S. ... Wilson, Hogan M.

Wogan, James W. [redacted]  
 Wright, Richard W. [redacted]  
 Zudrell, Elizabeth A. [redacted]

To be second lieutenant

Abbott, Claude L. [redacted]  
 Andrews, Zalph H., Jr. [redacted]  
 Barclay, Robert P. [redacted]  
 Bennett, Gary L. [redacted]  
 Blasdel, Carolyn S. [redacted]  
 Bolles, Christopher E. [redacted]  
 Burns, James W. [redacted]  
 Deaton, Lloyd R. [redacted]  
 De Martinis, Nicholas A. [redacted]  
 Drackett, Gary F. [redacted]  
 Dunn, John F., Jr. [redacted]  
 Duvencok, William S. [redacted]  
 Epting, Richard M. [redacted]  
 Finley, Stephen A. [redacted]  
 Glave, Charles M. [redacted]  
 Hack, Stephen E., Jr. [redacted]  
 Jacobsen, William W. [redacted]  
 Kennedy, Robert E. [redacted]  
 Le Donne, Joseph A., Jr. [redacted]  
 Lee, David A., Jr. [redacted]  
 Level, Dennis L. [redacted]  
 McCampbell, James L. [redacted]  
 Miller, Donald H. [redacted]  
 Miller, Thomas H. [redacted]  
 Muckenthaler, Charles J. [redacted]  
 Neyland, Mayo W. [redacted]  
 Nichols, Patrick A. [redacted]  
 Owens, Seth M., Jr. [redacted]  
 Ray, Roland C. [redacted]  
 Roberts, Lyman W. [redacted]  
 Rosenbaum, Henry M., Jr. [redacted]  
 Schaefer, Richard W. [redacted]  
 Seland, Charles [redacted]  
 Shaw, Peter B. [redacted]  
 Strohmeier, Michael E. [redacted]  
 Thompson, William K. [redacted]  
 Vinyard, Wayne A. [redacted]  
 Wagner, John C. [redacted]  
 Wilka, Norman A. [redacted]  
 Zamora, Richard O., Jr. [redacted]  
 Zappacosta, Thomas R., Jr. [redacted]

The following-named distinguished military students for appointment in the Regular Army of the United States, in the grade of second lieutenant, under provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 2106, 3283, 3284, 3286, 3287, 3288, and 3290:

Anderson, Duwayne K. [redacted]  
 Anglin, Roger I. [redacted]  
 Attig, Douglas L. [redacted]  
 Bailey, Alfred W. [redacted]  
 Bendele, John L., Jr. [redacted]  
 Berry, Steven C. [redacted]  
 Blain, Bernard F. [redacted]  
 Boner, William M. [redacted]  
 Bowab, Joseph W. [redacted]  
 Bowe, Thomas G. [redacted]  
 Britt, Randy M. [redacted]  
 Brown, Douglas E. [redacted]  
 Buckley, Kerry A. [redacted]  
 Buhrkuhl, Robert L. [redacted]  
 Burchett, Paul J., Jr. [redacted]  
 Burgess, John B. [redacted]  
 Burlison, Jean F. M. [redacted]  
 Burton, Lloyd R. [redacted]  
 Calabro, David Jr. [redacted]  
 Calverley, Mickey J. [redacted]  
 Cantrell, Earl S. [redacted]  
 Carter, William J. [redacted]  
 Cisneros, Guillermo [redacted]  
 Clark, Paul L. [redacted]  
 Clark, Raymond C. [redacted]  
 Coleman, George W., Jr. [redacted]  
 Cornell, Floyd M. [redacted]  
 Cornett, Terry L. [redacted]  
 Crews, Ralph L. [redacted]  
 Damon, Philip S. [redacted]  
 Davis, Ford R. [redacted]  
 Dimiterchik, Michael L. [redacted]  
 Dorroh, Thomas L. [redacted]  
 Duple, Keith T. [redacted]  
 Duff, William E. [redacted]  
 Earle, Richard W. [redacted]

Ellis, Steve P. [redacted]  
 Essman, Phillip C. [redacted]  
 Eyster, George S., IV [redacted]  
 Faulkner, George R. [redacted]  
 Fortuna, Lawrence J. [redacted]  
 Funderburg, Gus L., Jr. [redacted]  
 Genton, Robert E. [redacted]  
 Graham, John A. [redacted]  
 Griffey, Bobby G. [redacted]  
 Gross, Edwin M., Jr. [redacted]  
 Hackedorn, James M. [redacted]  
 Hamilton, John A. [redacted]  
 Hampton, Larry E. [redacted]  
 Harlan, Daniel J. [redacted]  
 Harvey, Christopher L. [redacted]  
 Helin, John N. [redacted]  
 Herb, William E. [redacted]  
 Holcomb, Henry G. [redacted]  
 Johnson, Michael [redacted]  
 Johnson, Norman A. [redacted]  
 Jones, Larry D. [redacted]  
 Jordi, Howard C. [redacted]  
 Jorgensen, Terrill M. [redacted]  
 Kajen, Michael J. [redacted]  
 Kaylor, Michael R. [redacted]  
 Kent, Richard F., Jr. [redacted]  
 Kimel, Michael L. [redacted]  
 Krepinevich, Michael C. [redacted]  
 Kretz, Arthur R., Jr. [redacted]  
 Lagerstrom, Eric J. [redacted]  
 Landowski, Paul J. [redacted]  
 Langhans, Lawrence A. [redacted]  
 Langley, Jimmy W. [redacted]  
 Larry, Isaac D. [redacted]  
 Lenhart, Michael M. [redacted]  
 Leonard, Samuel B. [redacted]  
 Lovelady, Rex E. [redacted]  
 Luedeke, Arthur P. [redacted]  
 Mallicoat, Norman L. [redacted]  
 Marshall, Francis M. [redacted]  
 Marshall, William E., Jr. [redacted]  
 Matlock, Ronald A. [redacted]  
 Matisziw, Boris [redacted]  
 McCool, James A., Jr. [redacted]  
 McCullough, Michael D. [redacted]  
 McMullen, Kieran E. [redacted]  
 Mobley, Ray [redacted]  
 Moore, Darryl F. [redacted]  
 Moratz, Michael T. [redacted]  
 Mortensen, Lee K. [redacted]  
 Norton, George D. [redacted]  
 Nunley, Michael E. [redacted]  
 Nusbaum, Charles M. [redacted]  
 Otis, Harrison G. III [redacted]  
 Owen, Roy W. [redacted]  
 Plautz, Henry S. [redacted]  
 Powers, James F., Jr. [redacted]  
 Reid, Michael L. [redacted]  
 Rivera, Anibal, Jr. [redacted]  
 Roberts, Lowell H., Jr. [redacted]  
 Rosen, Alan M. [redacted]  
 Ross, Allan L. [redacted]  
 Rosson, Claude P. III [redacted]  
 Ruiz, Ronald E. [redacted]  
 Schmit, Steven J. [redacted]  
 Schmitt, John K. [redacted]  
 Schreiber, Mark G. [redacted]  
 Schwarting, Robert H. [redacted]  
 Sepulveda, Salvatore, Jr. [redacted]  
 Simon, Charles N. [redacted]  
 Somers, Bruce W. [redacted]  
 Stout, Thomas E., Jr. [redacted]  
 Stowe, Garnett R., Jr. [redacted]  
 Stowe, Walter B., Jr. [redacted]  
 Sullivan, Rodney A. [redacted]  
 Swayne, Royce B. [redacted]  
 Timmons, Patrick F., Jr. [redacted]  
 Trauger, Craig M. [redacted]  
 Trauger, Gary M. [redacted]  
 Treue, Thomas N. [redacted]  
 Truett, Walter K. [redacted]  
 Tryon, Orrin A., Jr. [redacted]  
 Wade, Daniel P. [redacted]  
 Wanzer, Christopher R. [redacted]  
 Warren, Joel E. [redacted]  
 Weersing, Gary M. [redacted]  
 Welling, Richard D. [redacted]  
 Whitley, William H. [redacted]  
 Williams, John H., Jr. [redacted]

Willers, Jock R. [redacted]  
 Williamson, Joel E. [redacted]  
 Wilson, Edward R. [redacted]  
 Wise, Jack P., Jr. [redacted]  
 Wueste, Ernest D., Jr. [redacted]  
 Yelser, Ted M., Jr. [redacted]  
 Young, Douglas B. [redacted]

The following-named scholarship students for appointment in the Regular Army of the United States in the grade of second lieutenant, under provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 2107, 3283, 3284, 3286, 3287, 3288, and 3290:

Allen, Kenneth E. [redacted]  
 Aurentz, Forrest W. [redacted]  
 Bartle, William J. [redacted]  
 Beard, Casey F. [redacted]  
 Boyd, James F. [redacted]  
 Butherus, Ted F. [redacted]  
 Campbell, Thomas A. [redacted]  
 Caraganis, Alfred J. [redacted]  
 Christianson, Claude [redacted]  
 Conlan, Lawrence S. [redacted]  
 Cornelius, John I. [redacted]  
 Craddock, Bantz J. [redacted]  
 Delary, James L. [redacted]  
 De Leo, Anthony N. [redacted]  
 Dellorto, Daniel J. [redacted]  
 Dempsey, Frederick G., Jr. [redacted]  
 Dong, Francis H. [redacted]  
 Donnell, James M., Jr. [redacted]  
 Dumais, Joseph A. [redacted]  
 Felt, David D. [redacted]  
 Fiegenschuh, Karl F. III [redacted]  
 Gedrose, Howard G. [redacted]  
 Geiger, Paul J. [redacted]  
 Gerber, Charles M. [redacted]  
 Goodwin, James J. [redacted]  
 Graham, Donald L. [redacted]  
 Hange, Richard H., Jr. [redacted]  
 Hazelton, William K. [redacted]  
 Heinemann, Dean W. [redacted]  
 Holm, William N., Jr. [redacted]  
 Humphries, George S. [redacted]  
 Huston, John D. [redacted]  
 Jackson, James K. [redacted]  
 Lees, Raymond R., Jr. [redacted]  
 Livers, Timothy H. [redacted]  
 Lovell, Rickie D. [redacted]  
 Madden, Gary E. [redacted]  
 McKay, John R. [redacted]  
 Mizell, Jerry A. [redacted]  
 Moise, Philip H. [redacted]  
 Morris, Philip S. [redacted]  
 Myers, John W. [redacted]  
 New, Edward F. [redacted]  
 Paskowski, Michael E., Jr. [redacted]  
 Pingley, Randall L. [redacted]  
 Rivera, Luis R. [redacted]  
 Rosander, David J. [redacted]  
 Ryan, William J. [redacted]  
 Sands, Michael C. [redacted]  
 Schaak, John F. [redacted]  
 Schlund, Bradley D. [redacted]  
 Sergio, Stephen T. [redacted]  
 Shanahan, Dennis F. [redacted]  
 Shriver, Bryce L. [redacted]  
 Stinson, Karl R. [redacted]  
 Sweat, Lawrence R. [redacted]  
 Tone, Brian P. [redacted]  
 Trauger, Gary M. [redacted]  
 Trauger, Craig M. [redacted]  
 Vecchione, Michael [redacted]  
 Wilson, Fred R. [redacted]  
 Yee, Bobby [redacted]  
 Zimmermann, John C. [redacted]

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate June 11, 1971:

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Robert W. Fri, of Maryland, to be Deputy Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

David D. Dominick, of Wyoming, to be an Assistant Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.