

for motor vehicles to replace the internal combustion engine; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. CRAMER:

H. Res. 1190. Resolution expressing the sense of the House with respect to an early resolution by the Supreme Court of the problems involved in desegregating the Na-

tion's public schools; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. PIRNIE:

H. Res. 1191. Resolution to express the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States maintain its sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Panama Canal Zone; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

Mr. SCHWENGEL introduced a bill (H.R. 18919) for the relief of Marina J. Kollias, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

SENATE—Tuesday, August 11, 1970

The Senate met at 10 a.m. and was called to order by Hon. JAMES B. ALLEN, a Senator from the State of Alabama.

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Eternal Father, help us to be masters of ourselves that we may be servants of others.

We commit our eyes, our ears, our minds, our tongues, our beings to Thee. Guard us in temptation. Enable us to speak the truth in love. When the way is hard, the direction vague, and the solution eludes us, grant that our spiritual life may hold its course.

Spare us, O God, from ever giving up until the whole earth is saturated with Thy light and truth, until men learn to walk in the way of peace, and Thy spirit has dominion over all the nations.

In the Master's name we pray. Amen.

DESIGNATION OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore of the Senate (Mr. RUSSELL).

The assistant legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,
Washington, D.C., August 11, 1970.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate, I appoint Hon. James B. Allen, a Senator from the State of Alabama, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
President pro tempore.

Mr. ALLEN thereupon took the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Monday, August 10, 1970, be dispensed with.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. At this time, under the previous order, the Chair now recognizes the distinguished Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) for not to exceed 15 minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Idaho yield to me with out losing any of his time or losing the floor?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR JACKSON TODAY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) be recognized for not to exceed 40 minutes, following the speech by the distinguished Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT) today.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR JAVITS TODAY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes following the speech by the distinguished Senator from Ohio (Mr. YOUNG), which will occur before the Senate proceeds to the transaction of routine morning business.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR THE TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of the speech by the distinguished Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) today, there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, with statements therein limited to 3 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 4212 AND S. 4213—INTRODUCTION OF BILLS RELATING TO THE SAWTOOTH BASIN IN IDAHO

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and my distinguished colleague from Idaho (Mr. JORDAN), I submit for appropriate reference a bill to create a national park in the uplands surrounding the Sawtooth Valley in south-central Idaho. A similar bill is being introduced in the House by the other members of the Idaho delegation. We believe that this spectacular alpine region fully qualifies for national park status and would benefit from the special supervision that such a designation brings.

The Sawtooth Mountains—jagged monoliths of granite piercing the sky like the teeth of a gigantic saw—offer summits of unblemished wilderness. The adjoining White Cloud range, an 8-by-10-mile area of breathtaking grandeur, is bedecked with chains of crystalline lakes. The lofty Boulder Mountains, to the south of the White Clouds, round out the complex.

Mr. President, you will recall that the Senate passed a bill on July 2, 1969, to establish the Sawtooth National Recreation Area. This bill, S. 853, which Senator JORDAN and I sponsored, we amended on the floor just before passage to include the White Clouds and to augment Forest Service regulation of prospecting and mining in this beautiful but fragile region. The bill is still pending in the House, although hearings were conducted by the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee in Washington last year. The House has now scheduled a field trip for August 25 and a hearing on August 26 at Sun Valley, Idaho.

The Senate floor amendment of S. 853 was generated by a threat of a road in the White Clouds and an open pit mine in the very heart of this alpine region, without doubt one of the most beautiful in the Nation. That threat remains, as does the threat of impinging and unsightly commercialization of the Sawtooth Valley, where private ranchlands present an unspoiled remnant of the Old West and a colorful introduction to the mountains.

For several months, the four members of the Idaho congressional delegation have met periodically to discuss an adequate management program for this region. We have concluded that the controversy over possible open pit mining in the White Clouds—which has attracted national attention—must not be permitted to preempt the enactment of legislation needed now to protect the scenic attractions of this superb mountain area.

We have, accordingly, decided to urge prompt enactment by the House of an amended version of the Sawtooth National Recreation Area bill approved by the Senate. This would furnish the Forest Service with urgently needed authority to establish zoning regulations to protect the Sawtooth Valley from defacement. We are also recommending that the House update the bill to provide interim protection, not presently available, to the White Clouds, Boulder, and Sawtooth Ranges. This interim protection, offered in the form of a separate jointly sponsored bill, would confer authority on the Forest Service to prevent injurious disturbance of surface lands in the protected area caused by motorized and mechanical equipment. It would also impose a fixed-term moratorium on the

location of new mining claims pending a final decision on a permanent management plan.

On behalf of myself and my colleague from Idaho (Mr. JORDAN), I now submit for appropriate reference such a bill for Senate consideration.

Vested rights based on prior mining claims could not, under our constitutional system, be extinguished by a national park. The park bill, which we introduce today, would, therefore, establish a park subject to valid existing rights and authorize such special use permits as may be reasonable for the exercise of such rights. If mining operations should occur, they would be subject to regulation by the National Park Service in order to assure the largest feasible measure of protection to the resource.

Mr. President, we believe that a Sawtooth National Park and National Recreation Area complex will best meet the requirements for safeguarding the future of this remarkable mountain region. Such a management plan will prove a perpetual asset to Idaho and the Nation, and assure the proper facilities to accommodate the burgeoning number of visitors now converging on the area.

Although field hearings were held by the Senate Parks and Recreation Subcommittee in Idaho in 1966 on bills for both a Sawtooth Park and for a recreation area, the House committee hearing at Sun Valley this month will again provide Idahoans an opportunity to express their views on the future of the region in relation to the legislative measures we recommend.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the two bills, which I hereby send to the desk, may be printed here in the RECORD.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. ALLEN). Without objection, the bills will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the text of the two bills will be printed in the RECORD.

The bills, introduced by Mr. CHURCH (for himself and Mr. JORDAN of Idaho), were received, read twice by their titles, referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 4212

A bill to establish the Sawtooth Mountains National Park in the State of Idaho, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, in order to preserve for the benefit, use, inspiration, and education of present and future generations certain lands in the State of Idaho containing rugged and unspoiled scenic, scientific, historic, and natural values, high mountain peaks, and unique alpine features, there is hereby established, subject to valid existing rights and permits for special uses of federally owned lands as may be reasonably necessary for the exercise of such rights, the Sawtooth Mountains National Park (hereinafter referred to as the "park"). The park shall comprise two units, the Sawtooth Unit and the White Clouds-Boulder Unit, and it shall consist of the lands, waters, and interests therein within the boundaries of each such unit as generally depicted on the map entitled "Sawtooth Mountains National Park," numbered NP-SAW-20, 014, and dated

April 1970. The map shall be on file and available for public inspection in the offices of the National Park Service, Department of Interior. The Secretary may make minor adjustments in the boundaries of the park by publication of a notice to that effect, together with a revised map or other boundary description, in the Federal Register.

SEC. 2. Within the boundaries of the park the Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary") may acquire lands, waters, and interests therein by donation, purchase with donated or appropriated funds, or exchange, except that any property owned by the State of Idaho or any political subdivision thereof may be acquired only by donation.

SEC. 3. The Secretary shall protect, administer, develop, and maintain the park in accordance with the provisions of the Act of August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535), as amended and supplemented (16 U.S.C. 1 et seq.).

SEC. 4. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, for development, plus or minus such sums, if any, as may be indicated by engineering cost indices applicable to the types of construction involved herein.

SEC. 5. In order to facilitate the administration, public use, and enjoyment of areas within the park and adjacent national forest lands, and to provide for such administration and use in an efficient and economical manner, the Secretary is authorized to enter into agreements with the Secretary of Agriculture whereby administrative or public use facilities may be designated on lands within the park or on national forest lands, and constructed, operated, and maintained in accordance with plans agreed upon by the two Secretaries. Funds available to the Secretary for the purposes of the park and funds available to the Secretary of Agriculture for purposes of the national forests shall be available to carry out the purposes of this section.

SEC. 6. Within two years from the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall review the area within the park, and shall report to the President in accordance with subsections 3(c) and 3(d) of the Wilderness Act, his recommendation as to the suitability or nonsuitability of any area within the park, including the former primitive area, for designation as wilderness. Any designation of any such area as wilderness shall be accomplished in accordance with said subsections of the Wilderness Act.

SEC. 7. The distributive shares of the respective counties of receipts from the national forests from which the park is created, as paid under the provisions of the Act of May 23, 1908 (35 Stat. 260), as amended (16 U.S.C. 500), shall not be affected by the elimination of lands from such national forests by the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 8. With regard to valid claims to any lands within the park made under the United States mining laws, which are existing on the effective date of this Act, a patent to any such claim hereafter issued shall convey title only to the minerals therein, and title to the surface shall remain in the United States.

S. 4213

A bill to temporarily withdraw certain National Forest Land in the State of Idaho from the operation of the United States Mining Laws, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, in order to permit adequate time to study and determine the provisions desirable and needed for management of the national forest lands in the Sawtooth, Challis, and Boise

National Forests in the State of Idaho shown on the map entitled, "Temporary Withdrawal Area—Sawtooth, Challis, and Boise National Forests" dated August 1970, which includes the Sawtooth and Boulder mountains and White Clouds peaks and which is on file and available for public inspection in the office of the Chief, Forest Service, Department of Agriculture, in order to assure the preservation of and to protect the scenic, historic, pastoral, fish and wildlife, recreational, aesthetic, and other environmental values, such lands are hereby withdrawn, subject to valid and existing claims, from all forms of location and entry under, and operation of, the mining laws of the United States for a period of five years from the date of this Act. The Secretary of Agriculture shall, as soon as practicable after the date of this Act and no later than 60 days after such date, publish in the Federal Register a detailed description and map showing the boundaries of such area.

SEC. 2. The Congress hereby recognizes and declares the need for the Secretary of Agriculture, in exercising his authority under the Act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat. 35), as amended and supplemented (16 U.S.C. 551), and otherwise consistent with the purposes and provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (83 Stat. 852), to make provision for and take action to regulate and control the use of, and protect the surface values of, the national forest lands described in section 1 of this Act, including, when deemed by him to be necessary, the control of the use of motorized and mechanical equipment for transportation over, or alteration of, the surface of such national forest land.

SEC. 3. Patents shall not hereafter be issued for locations and claims heretofore or hereafter made in the area described in section 1 under the mining laws of the United States. This shall not be construed as preventing or interfering with the full exercise of the rights of the holder of a valid claim to further prospect, develop, and mine any such claim subject to compliance with the rules and regulations covering the national forest land on which any such claim is located.

SEC. 4. If any provision of this Act is declared to be invalid, such declaration shall not affect the validity of any other provision hereof.

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. Mr. President, today I join my distinguished colleague, Mr. CHURCH, in introducing two measures designed to protect the scenic attractions in an area of breathtaking beauty in south-central Idaho consisting of the White Cloud, Boulder, and Sawtooth Ranges.

By way of background, on July 2, 1969, the Senate considered and passed S. 853, which established the Sawtooth National Recreation Area. This bill, as amended, is designed to safeguard and enhance the outstanding natural beauty of the Sawtooth and White Clouds Ranges and to protect these fragile areas from overuse. Since the passage of S. 853 a great deal of controversy has arisen over mining in the White Clouds area. After many meetings and much discussion, the four members of the Idaho congressional delegation have reached agreement on the legislative proposals which we introduce today to provide a suitable management program for the Sawtooth region.

The first proposal which we introduce today, is designed to provide interim protection, not presently available, to the mountains which surround the Saw-

tooth Valley. These consist of the Sawtooth, White Cloud, and Boulder Ranges. This interim protection would give the Forest Service authority to regulate road building and prospecting activities in the area. Such regulatory authority is necessary in order to prevent irreparable damage to the fragile granitic surface lands in this region. In addition, the bill would provide for a 5-year moratorium on all forms of location and entry under the mining laws of the United States. It should be pointed out that this provision does not extinguish valid and existing mining claims.

This proposal, in conjunction with S. 853, would go a long way toward providing an adequate management program for the Sawtooth-White Clouds area. It is certainly feasible that this package could receive favorable action by both Houses during the current session of Congress.

The second bill which we introduce today would create a national park in the uplands surrounding the Sawtooth Valley. We introduce this bill in order to give full scope to the options that are open to the people of Idaho. This Alpine region, which is a superlative mix of rugged peaks, wooded slopes, and mountain lakes and streams, is fully qualified for national park status. Such status, with the intended special supervision, which such designation brings, would clearly be of great benefit to this area.

Here again, existing vested rights from prior mining claims would not be extinguished. The Secretary of Interior would be authorized to issue such special use permits as may be reasonably necessary for the exercise of valid existing mining rights. The National Park Service, however, would regulate any mining operations to insure the greatest amount of protection for the scenic and ecological values in the White Clouds-Sawtooth-Boulder area.

Mr. President, I believe that the two measures which Senator Church and I introduce today, in conjunction with S. 853, are of great significance to the people of Idaho, as well as to the people of the entire country. I have covered most of the accessible parts of Idaho by car and horseback and have visited many of the national parks and forests and I can assure my colleagues that this is a nationally significant area which is eminently worthy of the protection which we propose for it today and which is concurrently being proposed in the House by the two distinguished Representatives from Idaho. I am hopeful that this legislation, which is the result of a great deal of study over the years, receives expeditious consideration by both Houses. The Sawtooth-White Clouds-Boulder area deserves no less.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR MUSKIE TODAY

Mr. Church. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that upon the conclusion of the remarks of the Senator from Washington (Mr. Jackson) this afternoon, the Senator from Maine (Mr. Muskie) be recognized for not to exceed 30 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FRESH DANGER IN CAMBODIA

Mr. Church. Mr. President, when the Nixon administration concluded its Cambodian military operation earlier this summer, it gave the American people to understand that our future military involvement in that torn country would be strictly limited. President Nixon himself indicated this would be our policy.

The latest newspaper reports now inform us that American planes are conducting bombing missions over Cambodia in response to requests from the Cambodian government. This directly contradicts assurances of the Nixon administration that American air attacks within Cambodia would be restricted to the interdiction of enemy supply lines as required to protect American troops, and other allied forces, located across the border in South Vietnam.

Nevertheless, the Washington Post reported on page 1 in its editions of August 5, 1970, that American jet fighter-bombers have now gone to the direct assistance of Cambodian troops and "will do so again when they are needed."

The Associated Press, in a dispatch printed in the Boston Globe of August 6, 1970, reports that its correspondent, John T. Wheeler, witnessed direct support of Cambodian troops by seven American F-100 fighter-bombers. The dispatch quotes a Cambodian officer describing the American air strikes as "direct support for my battalion. Watch."

Certainly this operation extends beyond the limitations President Nixon announced on June 30 after American combat troops had been withdrawn from Cambodia. In his public announcement, the President listed seven guidelines. One of these states:

We will conduct—with the approval of the Cambodian government—air interdiction missions against the enemy efforts to move supplies and personnel through Cambodia toward South Vietnam and to re-establish base areas relevant to the war in Vietnam. We do this to protect our forces in South Vietnam.

There was not the slightest inference in the President's statement that American planes would soon be flying direct support missions on behalf of Cambodian troops. The conclusion we must draw is that our Cambodian incursion has simply added to the pernicious growth of American military operations in Indochina. We are now embarked upon a policy of creeping involvement in Cambodia. The Pentagon hastens to explain that our planes are merely carrying out the air interdiction missions which the President authorized. But the Washington Post news story, to which I have already referred, carries this exchange:

In Saigon, a U.S. military spokesman was asked Tuesday: "Interdiction covers a lot of ground, doesn't it?" His answer: "Yes, it does." The spokesman would not elaborate.

Direct air support of Cambodian forces by American aircraft would be prohibited by final enactment of the Cooper-Church amendment which

passed the Senate by a vote of 58 to 37 on June 30 of this year. The thrust of this Senate action is to draw tight the pursestrings on the financing of expansionist military involvement in Cambodia. Direct air support operations have been taken in the face of this intended prohibition.

A Washington Post editorial has pointed to the dangers of another American misadventure if such air operations continue. In an editorial on August 7, the opening sentence is a vivid one:

That haunting and all too recognizable beast of the Indochina jungles, the two-toned commitment—also known as the heavy-footed undertaking and the creeping rationale—again seems to be on the prowl, this time in Cambodia.

The editorial then points out, that despite Presidential assurances:

The United States is conducting bombing raids in Cambodia that have only the most tenuous connection with the original rationale of interdicting enemy forces en route to Vietnam. As many as 50 planes a day are flying combat support missions for beleaguered units of the Cambodian army, and the Cambodian army being what it is, there are few active units in it which are not beleaguered.

Now, understandably, the Nixon administration is anxious to explain away the latest news dispatches. The New York Times reported on August 7 that Defense Secretary Laird held a surprise press conference. His explanation is hardly reassuring. He stated that bombing by American jets on August 5, 900 feet in front of a Cambodian battalion at Skoun, was an integral part of a general interdiction campaign aimed at protecting American Forces in South Vietnam. Secretary Laird is then quoted:

That particular area is very much related to the opening up of the sea area for supplies and so forth, and I would merely state that the decision was made by the commanders in the field that it was an important interdiction mission to destroy the, ah, in this case, I believe it was personnel.

The elasticity of this concept of air interdiction is infinite. Measured by Laird's definition, the American Air Force has been given the green light to extend an aerial umbrella over all of Cambodia.

I also want to call attention to two additional newspaper articles.

One appears in the New York Times on August 9, 1970, under the byline of James P. Sterba and is datelined Saigon. It discusses a confidential set of instructions issued to unit commanders as to what they may say in respect to our air activities over Cambodia.

The second is a column by Mary McGrory in the Washington, D.C., Evening Star which is entitled "We Still Bomb the 'Bad Guys.'" She points out that the American direct air support missions still have been unknown had it not been for John Wheeler, the AP reporter, who both witnessed and reported one.

Miss McGrory then notes:

The support missions are forbidden under the Administration's own guidelines, issued when ground troops were pulled out. They also are prohibited by the Cooper-Church amendment which in Section Four outlaws "any combat activity in the air above Cambodia in direct support of Cambodian forces."

I ask unanimous consent that the six articles to which I have referred be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Boston Globe, Aug. 6, 1970]

U.S. PLANES HIT ENEMY IN CAMBODIA IN STRIKE DESCRIBED AS DIRECT TROOP SUPPORT

SAIGON.—U.S. planes struck at enemy positions near Skoun yesterday, and Cambodian troops advancing in their wake recaptured part of the outskirts of that district capitol 40 miles north of Phnom Penh.

The Cambodian appeal for air support when three of their battalions trying to drive away a big Viet Cong and North Vietnamese force on the last four miles to the key road-junction city, were caught in a fire fight.

Associated Press correspondent John T. Wheeler, who witnessed the action, said seven American F100 fighter-bombers bombed and strafed enemy troops about three miles from Skoun.

A Cambodian officer, directing the air strike from the ground, was asked two questions: Were the strikes in direct support of his troops or were they against enemy supply lines leading to South Vietnam?

"This is direct support for my battalion. 'Watch,'" replied the Cambodian officer as an F100 dropped two 250-pound bombs after coming in at treetop level.

The official U.S. position is that the planes fly interdiction raids in Cambodia "as appropriate against enemy troops or material which could threaten U.S. and other free world lives in South Vietnam."

"We have nothing to add beyond our statement," a U.S. Command spokesman said last night, referring to the U.S. position.

The Cambodian officer directed the Skoun strikes in a radio exchange with an American pilot in an unmarked spotter plane.

Wheeler said that while the troops battled into Skoun's outskirts, hard fighting probably lay ahead because a strong enemy force is believed dug in there.

A Cambodian commander at Sre Khlong 45 miles southwest of Phnom Penh—where the enemy cut off Highway 4 leading to Cambodia's south coast oil installations for three days this week—said that U.S. planes also struck the enemy in that region.

The air raids came amid light fighting elsewhere in Cambodia and South Vietnam, save for a sharp clash 50 miles southwest of Da Nang, South Vietnam, at the allied camp at Kham Duc 13 miles from Laos.

The U.S. Command said two Americans were killed and 14 wounded when North Vietnamese troops hit their night defensive position at Kham Duc, moving in under a 60-round barrage of 82-mm mortars.

Fifteen of the enemy were reported killed in the two hour battle, the first serious assault on Kham Duc since it was reopened three weeks ago to support allied operations near the Laotian border.

[From the Washington Post, Aug. 5, 1970]

AMERICAN PLANES BOMBING IN CAMBODIA

U.S. officials in Saigon and Phnom Penh acknowledged Tuesday that American planes are bombing in Cambodia in response to requests from Cambodian authorities.

In the past, the White House and Pentagon have said U.S. air attacks inside Cambodia are used only to protect American and other friendly forces across the border in South Vietnam.

In Phnom Penh, U.S. officials conceded privately that American jet fighter-bombers have gone to the aid of embattled Cambodian troops in the past and will do so again when they are needed.

"We are responding to anyone's request for

interdiction missions in the area of Cambodia," one official in Saigon said.

The direct air support has been given under a U.S. policy described by one official in Phnom Penh as "stay out of it if you can; provide assistance but don't take a leading role."

Under the guidelines, U.S. sources said, policy has been to urge the South Vietnamese air force to provide as much of the required air support as possible to the Cambodians.

U.S. support would be made available only when South Vietnamese warplanes were fully committed elsewhere.

American officials have been reluctant to discuss U.S. air support for the Cambodians possibly because of the lack of any clear policy statement from Washington following the June 31 deadline for U.S. troop involvement in Cambodia.

In Washington, administration officials said there had been no change in U.S. policy but they noted that "oftentimes there are ancillary effects" from U.S. air attacks that could make it appear that they were carried out to aid Cambodians.

The official U.S. position, repeated Tuesday by a Pentagon spokesman, has been that American planes are participating in "interdiction" of Communist supply routes and bases in Cambodia.

In Saigon, a U.S. military spokesman was asked Tuesday: "Interdiction covers a lot of ground, doesn't it?" His answer: "Yes, it does." The spokesman would not elaborate.

Informed sources disclosed that as many as 50 American fighter-bombers, each carrying about eight tons of bombs and rockets are taking part each day in raids on Cambodian territory.

The U.S. Command in Saigon repeated its earlier statement that U.S. air attacks in Cambodia are directed at "enemy troops or material which could threaten U.S. and other free world lives in South Vietnam." But other officials gave the impression that American planes are also attacking Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops that threaten Cambodian forces.

"If the Cambodians say there is an enemy troop concentration or supply area at a given point," said one source, "and U.S. bombers go in to interdict, this seems well within President Nixon's ground rules."

"We sometimes get a peripheral or side benefit," said another official. "If it happens to be enemy troops, we're not going to complain. But officially it's interdiction."

The Cambodian deputy commander in the Kiri Rom area southwest of Phnom Penh told newsmen Monday that U.S. Air Force Phantoms were supporting his troops by regularly bombing enemy forces in his area, which is miles west of any known enemy supply route to South Vietnam.

In Phnom Penh a Cambodian military spokesman claimed Wednesday that allied air strikes have killed 1,500 Communist troops southwest of the capital since Monday.

The spokesman said 1,000 of the Communists were killed by Cambodian air force raids about 75 miles southwest of the capital, and the bodies of another 500 were found by Cambodian troops sweeping near Sre Khlong, about 50 miles southwest of Phnom Penh.

The spokesman said that to the northeast, Communist troops still occupied buildings around the marketplace at Skoun.

Sporadic action was also reported near the center of Kompong Thom and an administrative post at Prey Totung was attacked by the Vietcong.

He said three battalions of Cambodian reinforcements were trying to drive the Communists out of Skoun, 35 miles northeast of Phnom Penh. The road to the south still was closed and the spokesman advised newsmen not to travel on it.

On Highway 4, about 50 miles southwest of Phnom Penh, Cambodian troops Tuesday found the bodies of 11 civilians apparently

gunned down by Vietcong recently. Several of the bodies were decomposed and one was believed that of a European man.

In Vietnam, fighting flared up in three areas of the Mekong Delta, and South Vietnamese forces reported killing 56 Communists while losing eight killed and 51 wounded.

About 200 of 600 Vietnamese prisoners being moved by ship from Conson Island in the South China Sea to a prison near Saigon revolted and freed themselves from their shackles Tuesday while the vessel moved up the Saigon River shipping channel, but they were brought under control by Vietnamese navy forces.

The Thai government, meanwhile, reportedly has launched an emergency mobilization plan to give weapons training to men and women in four provinces on the border with Cambodia. Sources said the volunteers would be allowed to buy arms and ammunition at reduced rates.

[From the Washington Post, Aug. 7, 1970]

A FAMILIAR BEAST IN THE CAMBODIAN JUNGLE

That haunting and all too recognizable beast of the Indochina jungles, the two-toned commitment—also known as the heavy-footed undertaking and the creeping rationale—again seems to be on the prowl, this time in Cambodia. In pulling American ground forces out of that newly troubled land at the end of June, Mr. Nixon had broadcast assurances that future American operations there would be confined to air actions mounted for the purpose of protecting American lives back in South Vietnam. In spirit though assuredly not in letter, the President has seemed anxious to respect the intent of the Senate which, in the Cooper-Church amendment to the foreign military sales act and in the Armed Service Committee's language in the military procurement bill has plainly opposed a policy of supporting the government of Lon Nol.

It now turns out, however—who can say he is really surprised?—that the United States is conducting bombing raids in Cambodia that have only the most tenuous connection with the original rationale of interdicting enemy forces en route to Vietnam. As many as 50 planes a day are flying combat support missions for beleaguered units of the Cambodian army, and the Cambodian army being what it is, there are few active units in it which are not beleaguered. American military officials chose to say that the planes are interdicting "enemy troops or material which could threaten U.S. and other free-world lives in South Vietnam." And Secretary Laird appears further to have broadened the definition of "interdiction." But as a Cambodian officer told a correspondent while American F-100s circled over a local battlefield, "This is direct support for my battalion, watch." And down came the planes, with bombs, napalm and incendiary bullets in turn.

Senator Mansfield voiced his alarm to the Senate on Wednesday. "If this continues," he warned, "it could mean that we will have a repetition of what happened in Vietnam; namely, that first we will provide air support, then send advisers, then deploy troops, and thus get into a full-fledged war." We do not think things will continue that far, to a "full-fledged war." Nonetheless, the inadequate performance of the Cambodian army, despite American air support and South Vietnamese help too; and the planned expansion of the American aid program in Cambodia from \$8 million to \$30 million; and the increasing isolation of the Lon Nol government in one corner of the country; and its deepening dependence on the United States—all these developments are extremely upsetting. The argument for confining American raids strictly to border and trail interdiction of Vietnam-bound men and material grows stronger by the day.

[From the New York Times, Aug. 7, 1970]

LAIRD DENIES JETS SUPPORT CAMBODIANS
(By Nell Sheehan)

WASHINGTON, August 6.—Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird reiterated today the Nixon Administration's contention that American planes were not giving close air support to Cambodian troops despite eyewitness press reports to the contrary.

In a surprise Pentagon news conference this morning, Mr. Laird said bombing by American jets yesterday, 900 feet in front of a Cambodian battalion, was part of a general interdiction campaign aimed at protecting American forces in South Vietnam. Yesterday's bombing at Skoun, he said, was aimed at preventing the Vietnamese communists from reopening sea supply routes through Cambodian coastal towns.

"That particular area," Mr. Laird said, "is very much related to the opening up of the sea area for supplies and so forth, and I would merely state that the decision was made by the commanders in the field that it was an important interdiction mission to destroy the, ah, in this case, I believe it was personnel."

CITES "OVERALL PROGRAM"

"These interdiction missions are flown when it is felt that the personnel is of sufficient magnitude, or the supplies, or the build-up, or it does have an effect on the overall program which we have in Vietnam," he continued.

Skoun is a road-junction town 35 miles northeast of Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital. The nearest coastal town, Kompong Som, the port formerly known as Sihanoukville, is 80 miles southwest of Phnom Penh. Mr. Laird did not explain how Skoun could be connected with coastal supply routes.

According to a dispatch of The Associated Press, a Cambodian captain called in American jets to bomb and napalm an enemy force that had halted an attack by his battalion aimed at retaking Skoun.

In normal military terminology, interdiction is the bombing of rear area supply lines or enemy troops that are not engaged with friendly forces. Close air support, on the other hand, is the bombing of an enemy force that is in contact with allied troops.

Mr. Laird was asked, in light of what happened at Skoun, how he could continue to maintain that the Administration was not providing close air support for the Cambodians.

"It depends on what you refer to as interdiction, I think. I believe it is [interdiction]," he said. "It's very difficult to get these forces together in large numbers and to get concentrations of supplies. The VC and the North Vietnamese are now following a policy of trying to concentrate their supplies and their build-up of supplies, material and men around population centers, and you have to have forward air controls so that you can be in a position where you protect civilians."

Mr. Laird's comments today appeared to be another attempt by the Administration to ward off charges that it is providing the Cambodians with close air support, which would be prohibited by the Cooper-Church Amendment, attached by the Senate to the Foreign Military Sales Act earlier this summer, but not yet accepted by the House.

Designed to block a step-by-step increase in an American military commitment to Cambodia, as took place in Vietnam, the amendment specifically forbids the use of American planes for "any combat activity in the air above Cambodia in support of Cambodian forces."

Mr. Laird made clear today that the Administration's definition of interdiction bombing in Cambodia to protect Americans in South Vietnam encompasses virtually all of Cambodia, or along the sanctuary areas, or along the river route.

He acknowledged that there would be "certain ancillary benefits" for the Cambodians in this bombing, but did not specify what these benefits would be.

A PENTAGON EXPLANATION

Asked to explain the difference between Mr. Laird's "ancillary benefits" and close air support, Jerry W. Friedheim, a Pentagon spokesman, said:

"The difference is how it looks to the Cambodians and how it looks to us. How it looks to the Cambodians is that these ancillary benefits are direct support for his troops. It looks to us like an interdiction campaign conducted in the context of our interdiction operations aimed at protecting the safety and security of our forces in South Vietnam and the Vietnamization program and keeping our casualties down and so forth."

Mr. Laird also denied telling Congressmen that American troops would be out of combat in South Vietnam by May of 1971. Representative Clark MacGregor, the Republican Senatorial candidate in Minnesota, opposing former Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, has been quoting Mr. Laird to this effect.

Mr. Laird said he had deliberately avoided giving anyone a timetable for ending American involvement in the war. He explained that he had, however, both in public and in private meetings with Congressmen many times described the various phases of the Vietnamization program.

Phase One ends in May of 1971 and its end, Mr. Laird has said, will entail the handing over of "ground combat responsibility" to the South Vietnamese. Mr. Laird has never defined what "ground combat responsibility" means.

"Now if anyone wants to draw conclusions and draw up their own timetables based upon these broad, general applications of the Vietnamization program, they are doing that on their own," Mr. Laird said.

[From the New York Times, Aug. 9, 1970]

DIRECTIVE ON U.S. AIR ROLE

(By James P. Sterba)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, Aug. 8.—The United States military command here has issued a confidential set of instructions to all unit commanders on what to say when asked about American air operations in Cambodia.

The instructions were issued after American reporters in Cambodia said they had witnessed United States jet bombers flying close air support missions for Cambodian troops fighting the Communists—something President Nixon said would not be done after American troops withdrew from Cambodia on June 30.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird has insisted that American pilots are flying only interdiction missions, that is, bombing strikes along enemy infiltration routes designed to block the flow of men and materials to the battlefields. Close air support is bombing and strafing of enemy positions actually on the battlefield to help Cambodian ground troops in combat.

United States officials here had denied that American pilots were flying close support missions in Cambodia until American newsmen reported watching such missions and listening to conversations between the American pilot of a plane and an English-speaking Cambodian soldier directing him from the ground.

INSTRUCTIONS CONFIDENTIAL

The classified instructions were issued two days ago under a cover sheet marked "confidential." In them, commanders are ordered not to make any statements other than the following:

"The United States policy on air operations in Cambodia is to conduct operations to interdict enemy supplies, communications

and personnel when in the judgment of U.S. commanders, such operations will have an ancillary effect that directly benefits the present Government in Cambodia, but the reason for carrying on air activities in Cambodia is the interdiction of supplies, material and personnel in order to protect Americans in Vietnam, the Vietnamization program, to enhance continuing American withdrawals and to reduce American casualties."

The instructions also warned: "Public statements will not go beyond the above directly or by allusion, nor will specific details on any mission or numbers of missions be discussed."

STATEMENT IS READ

Today, at the afternoon military briefing, the United States military spokesman refused to say whether close support missions for the Cambodians were being flown by Americans. Rather, he simply read the policy statement.

Meanwhile, outside the briefing room, South Vietnamese newsboys were selling Stars and Stripes, the authorized daily newspaper of the United States armed forces. On page six was an article saying Secretary of Defense Laird avoided comment on the witnessed close air support missions.

Next to the article was a United Press International photograph purporting to show a United States Air Force F-100 jet bomber dropping his bombs next to Cambodian troops in battle. The airplane in the photo is large enough to identify it as an American, not a South Vietnamese jet. The South Vietnamese have none.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Aug. 10, 1970]

WE STILL BOMB THE "BAD GUYS"

(By Mary McGrory)

The best explanation of why U.S. planes are bombing in support of Cambodian government troops may be found in the transcript, just published, of hearings held in May before Sen. Stuart Symington's subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad.

The witness was Maj. Gen. Richard G. Ciccolella, an old Asian hand, now chief of staff of the 1st Army.

"We have never really hurt these people badly enough," the general told Symington when the Senator asked him how he would go about winning the war. "When you hurt them badly enough—I don't care who they are—they are going to quit."

To the general, the struggle in Cambodia is the scenario of a John Wayne movie, with good guys and bad guys. Here are his views of the past and present regimes in that unhappy country:

"Because of his deep-seated hatred of the U.S., I regard Sihanouk with disfavor. However, I consider General Nol, whom I also know, to be an outstanding man and a friend of the U.S."

That is a fair reflection of the White House view, too, although various officials have said we are not committed to the preservation of the Nol government.

It also is claimed that we have always bombed Cambodia, and Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird insists the current raids are "interdictions" undertaken to damage enemy supply lines in the name of protecting troops in Vietnam.

Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield, noting that the targets were "one hell of a long way from the Ho Chi Minh trail," plaintively requested that we "call things what they are."

It is a preposterous request to address to an administration which called a full-throated invasion of Cambodia "an incursion" and a President who speaks of the transition to "a peacetime economy" as the source of our economic ills.

Nobody would have known about the raids except for an Associated Press reporter, John

Wheeler, who was on the scene and heard the Cambodian government commander call on the U.S. bombers for help. Secretary Laird lamely countered that the United States does not answer all such calls.

The support missions are forbidden under the administration's own guidelines, issued when ground troops were pulled out. They also are prohibited by the Cooper-Church amendment which in subsection 4 outlaws "any combat activity in the air above Cambodia in direct support of Cambodian forces."

The authors of the amendment, Sens. John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., and Frank Church, D-Idaho, are protesting this contradiction of the Senate will.

President Nixon, who kept the Senate in the dark on the Cambodia invasion, seems unlikely to be abashed. His apologists will doubtless point out that the amendment has no statutory force, since the House refused to take any action whatever and the measure has been struck for three weeks in a House-Senate conference committee.

Besides, the President acts these days like a man who has won the war for public opinion at home. He knows that the House will countenance anything done under the guise of "protecting American boys."

Administration spokesmen, confident that the end-the-war bill in the Senate is doomed, are getting bolder. Veterans' Administration chief Donald Johnson, speaking in Los Angeles on July 25, excoriated Sens. Hatfield and McGovern and 22 other dove co-sponsors as "salesmen of surrender, selling the 'sell-out' like some sell used cars or potato chips."

The President, like two presidents before him, feels that with a little more pressure, he can bring the war to a victorious conclusion.

At his last press conference, he said, "We are ending the war." With students scattered and anti-war fever below normal, he apparently feels he can, in the surgical, air-power way favored by Republicans since 1964, bomb the enemy to terms.

Gen. Ciccolella last May expressed the philosophy that prevails in the White House and dictates the missions:

"Time has run out for the Communists on the battlefield of Vietnam, and no one knows it better than the Communists themselves."

The President's only task apparently is to get them to admit it in Paris.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, do I have any time remaining?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator's time has expired. At this time the Chair is to recognize the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Idaho may be recognized for 2 additional minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I have asked for this time to commend the distinguished Senator from Idaho for pointing up what I believe to be a most disturbing development with reference to the Cambodian situation, and that is what appears to be very heavy and direct American air support of the Cambodian forces which, as the Senator said, is not only in violation of the Cooper-Church amendment, but also in violation of the repeated assurances the administration has given Congress and the American people that we would not become involved in the direct support of any particular regime in Cambodia.

I commend the Senator not only for the foresight he had months ago in offering the amendment that he did, which would have prevented this type activity, but also for the succinct remarks he has made here today.

As the Senator knows, I intend to address myself to the Cambodian situation presently.

Mr. CHURCH. I know the Senator has that intention and I look forward with much anticipation to his address. I plan to be here while he delivers it and hope to participate in a colloquy with him at some point during, or following, his address.

I can only say that the most recent developments above Cambodia underscore the need to enact the Cooper-Church amendment into law. I hope it will prove possible to reach some agreement in the conference now going on, so that we can bring back the Military Sales Act with the Cooper-Church amendment still affixed to it and still substantially intact.

The single purpose we have in mind, as the Senator well knows, is to prevent the United States from assuming a new set of obligations to another government in Indochina without the consent of Congress.

I should think the recent expansion of the air war over Cambodia is but another danger sign pointing to the wisdom of erecting a legislative barrier against our involvement in a widening war in Indochina, taken on surreptitiously and disclosed only because of the diligence of a few newspaper reporters, all of which flies in contradiction of assurances heretofore given the American people by the President himself.

Mr. McGOVERN. I again commend the Senator, and I wish him well in his efforts in the conference in connection with the Cooper-Church amendment.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The distinguished Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN) is recognized under the previous order for not to exceed 30 minutes.

THE CAMBODIAN TRAGEDY

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, there are two basic points I want to make today about the invasion of Cambodia by American and South Vietnamese troops last spring and the events which have followed. First, the Nixon administration, in my opinion, is deceiving the American people in claiming an important military victory in Cambodia that will shorten the war in Indochina. Second, it is a betrayal of the humanitarian principles of the American people for us to disrupt or destroy the lives of the people of little Cambodia to serve some dubious tactical purpose of our own in the country next door. The destructive impact of the invasion on the Cambodian people and the continued pillage by South Vietnamese forces and American bombers as just detailed by the Senator from Idaho, is a moral and political disaster.

We are being sold a malodorous bill of

goods under a false label and at a price none of us would wish to pay.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from South Dakota yield for a question?

Mr. McGOVERN. I would prefer to finish the address and then I will be happy to yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

The full costs remain to be assessed. But the grim tabulations of American lives lost and mangled in Cambodia—scrupulously left out of the proud accounting of captured booty—reveal 339 dead; 1,501 wounded. And neutral Cambodia, the unwilling but relatively undisturbed host for small Communist sanctuaries on its border a few months back, now finds some two-thirds of its territory held or contested by Communist forces. Vietcong forces, once confined to small border areas, are now shelling the capital of Cambodia.

The venture into Cambodia has been described as a military success. Even some of its critics have begrudgingly accepted that assessment, perhaps in the charitable hope of averting embarrassment for the President.

But it is now becoming clear that the invasion was a military and political blunder. It saved no American lives; it cost American lives; it cost Cambodian lives and is making that little country and its gentle, amiable people the suffering pawns of a war they neither understand nor support.

Consider the terrific costs to Cambodia. There appear on that land now the same scars—from the heavy bombardment of American and Vietnamese warplanes—that have disfigured South Vietnam. Peaceful rural villages are disrupted. Civilians die by firepower which cannot distinguish between enemy and innocent.

A report to the New York Times in early July is illustrative. Correspondent Sydney H. Schanberg told of Cambodian women being forced to strip by South Vietnamese soldiers in order to get at any jewelry that had been hidden in their clothes. Quoting directly from his account:

In Prey Koth, where most of the villagers were robbed of their meager savings and valuables, there were 33 thatch houses. Twenty-eight were sacked by the South Vietnamese.

"Please help us," an old farmer pleaded with a Western visitor. "Please do everything you can to stop this from happening to us again."

Note that this punishment is not inflicted under any pretense that "it is for their own good" as we have sometimes maintained in South Vietnam. It is happening simply because the Cambodians got in the way of our war in Vietnam. Just as Vietnam was pressed into service as the battlefield for our misguided and counterproductive effort to contain Asian Communism, Cambodia is now being disrupted because we believe our tactical military interests justify this sacrifice of innocent people. The Cambodians who suffer now do so in considerable part, because we think it may help in our effort to strengthen the hold

of the Thieu-Ky government upon the Vietnamese.

And what have been the gains to the United States of all of this? Have we achieved the objectives announced by the President when he explained last spring why we were attacking Cambodia? We have neither found nor destroyed the Communist central headquarters which the President said was a basic objective of the invasion. Neither have we ended the threat of Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. Rather, the Communist forces previously confined to a border strip have now fanned out across most of Cambodia.

We captured a few tons of rice, but that is easily replenished from the rich Cambodian harvest. Boasting of captured rice in a rice-surplus area such as Cambodia is so ridiculous that it can only reveal how really desperate the President was to find some reason, however superficial, to justify a mistaken venture.

The President has made much over the capture of arms and ammunition. But the enemy in South Vietnam was armed prior to the invasion and it is still armed. If what we captured would last them 6 to 8 months, as advertised, then they will continue fully equipped because according to American commanders in the field, we captured only 30 to 50 percent of the surplus stocks stored in Cambodia. Moreover, they probably placed little reliance on the obsolete weapons we carted back. Only 2,000 of the 15,251 individual weapons captured were of the AK-47 model currently in use. And in any case, the weapons, too, can be replenished, with relative ease and the enemy has plenty of time.

The assertion that we should be encouraged by the results of the invasion because it illustrated the ambition and competence of the South Vietnamese Army and improved their morale is incredible. If they needed battle testing, they certainly had ample opportunity to engage the enemy in their own country where most forces usually fight, whether or not they do on someone else's soil.

If they were competent, they would not need sideshows next door to prove it. The only unique information about ARVN coming out of Cambodia is that they enjoy fighting where they are not strongly contested and that they have a disturbing tendency to act like a 12th century conquering army toward the people they "liberate"—looting villages, assaulting women, and mistreating the civilian population.

I might say parenthetically, Mr. President, that numerous observers have reported that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong forces in Cambodia are much more considerate in dealing with the Cambodian villagers than are the South Vietnamese troops. Admittedly, this may be from a shrewd judgment of how to win the support of the villagers, but whatever the explanation, I do not find it an encouraging report.

I find it appalling, particularly since South Vietnamese still operating in Cambodia no longer have with them the restraining influence of American troops. Any Southeast Asian observer has known of the longstanding enmity between the

Cambodians and the Vietnamese which adds a serious complication to our "un-leashing" of South Vietnamese forces in the Cambodian countryside. From the standpoint of Cambodia, the sequence of events beginning with the replacement of Prince Sihanouk by Lon Nol followed by the American and South Vietnamese invasion was a national catastrophe that is tearing the little country apart.

But let us return to the beginning, recalling that the seizure of weapons and the elevation of ARVN morale were post facto reasons for the invasion.

In his April 20 announcement on troop withdrawals, the President gave no hint of concern about the threat to American forces in Vietnam posed by the guerrilla forces in Cambodia. He said:

We finally have in sight the just peace we are seeking. We can now say with confidence that pacification is succeeding. We can now say with confidence that the South Vietnamese can develop the capability for their own defense. And we can say with confidence that all American combat forces will be withdrawn.

Secretary of State Rogers reassured the House Armed Services Appropriations Subcommittee on this specific issue on April 23, 3 days after the President's speech, in a statement he subsequently expunged from the record:

We have no incentive to escalate. Our whole incentive is to deescalate. We recognize that if we escalate and get involved in Cambodia, that our whole program is defeated.

Meaning, presumably, the program of Vietnamization.

And he told the subcommittee that no ground forces would be sent to Cambodia.

Just 1 week later, the invasion was launched. Only two groups were forewarned. An assortment of Legion and VFW officials and retired officers knew about it because the President told them. The North Vietnamese and Vietcong knew about it because they saw it coming. But the Congress—the elected representatives of the American people—could not be trusted or consulted; not even the committees with jurisdiction over military and foreign affairs.

The President said on April 30, some 10 days after his speech on the progress of Vietnamization, in announcing the reasons for the Cambodian invasion:

Tonight, American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam.

But there was no enemy "Pentagon" and it was not attacked. The most permanent and least mobile installation captured was a laundry, hardly an essential element of command. In fact, the New York Times had earlier reported on April 4, 3 weeks before the invasion, that the enemy headquarters had been moved out of Cambodia and into South Vietnam.

Official pronouncements quickly dropped the capture of COSVN as the purpose of the assault. But the deception did not end there.

Quoting again from the President's April 30 statement:

The enemy in the past two weeks has stepped up his guerrilla actions and he is

concentrating his main force in these sanctuaries that you see in this map, where they are building up the large massive attacks on our forces and those of South Vietnam.

The President then pointed to several sanctuaries right along the South Vietnamese border where he said the enemy was concentrating his forces in preparation for massive attacks on our forces in South Vietnam, but 3 days later, on May 2, Robert Kaiser reported in the Washington Post:

Military sources said today that they were not sure what President Nixon was talking about Thursday night when he described on television a large and recent Communist buildup in Cambodia.

Defense Secretary Laird was not sure, either. On May 14, he told a breakfast meeting of reporters—listen carefully to this, Mr. President—that:

Starting about mid-April, we found the (enemy) forces facing in the opposite direction and moving away. There was not as great a military confrontation. The risk to American forces (going into Cambodia) was much less.

These statements simply cannot be reconciled. The President told us the enemy was building up for large massive attacks on our forces in Vietnam; yet, at the same time, the Secretary of Defense reported the enemy was moving in the opposite direction. It cannot be that the President acted to prevent an attack from the enemy's rear.

Look, then, at another aspect of the situation prevailing when the invasion was launched. The nimble neutralist government of Prince Sihanouk had been deposed, and Lon Nol was in the process of attempting to consolidate his power in Cambodia. Ironically, one method he employed was the harassment and murder of Cambodians of Vietnamese origin, taking advantage of ethnic antagonisms to increase his own popularity. In addition, probably with the expectation that American help would be forthcoming, he directed his small military forces to move toward Communist sanctuaries.

This prodding of the beehive produced the natural result, in amounts well beyond the protective capacity of Cambodian forces; Lon Nol sent out urgent appeals for help, lest his government fall immediately to advancing Vietcong forces.

During his consideration of those requests, the President heard strong opposition from Members of Congress, including the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. He could not have been unaware of the deep hostility to any U.S. involvement with propping up the new Cambodian Government. And that hostility was present for the best of reasons, at least for anyone who could recall the origins of our involvement in Vietnam.

Militarily, the prospects could not have been worse. Cambodia's sole defense has been its neutrality. Whereas South Vietnam had been blessed with billions in military assistance prior to its near military and political collapse in 1964, Cambodia had only a ragtag army with an assortment of weapons from an assortment of countries, including China and

the Soviet Union—doubtful sources of replacements and spare parts. Secretary Laird offered the best possible illustration of the Cambodian Army's impotence by pointing out that only a third of the Communist forces in Cambodia were involved in the strikes which preceded our invasion. Yet, Phnom Penh was near collapse.

Also paralleling the story in Vietnam, any U.S. support of Lon Nol would result in our identification with an illegitimate government in power only because of its contempt for the processes of self-determination that is professed as our single remaining aim in South Vietnam. For us to intervene would align the United States with the destruction of Cambodian land and people, and would establish Lon Nol as an American puppet in the eyes of his nationalistic countrymen. In short, involvement offered another venture doomed militarily and politically from the start, and it offered another great opportunity for communism in Indochina.

While such considerations dominated discussions of aid to Cambodia on Capitol Hill, the President was apparently being moved by other factors. I suspect the greatest was his realization that his Vietnamization strategy was becoming less and less viable, in large part because of events in Cambodia.

As he said on April 30:

Cambodia . . . has sent out a call to the United States, to a number of nations, for assistance. Because if this enemy effort succeeds, Cambodia would become a vast enemy staging area and a springboard for attacks on South Vietnam along 600 miles of frontier.

Those words, in my view, gave a broad hint of the real reason for the invasion, as did another phrase from the same statement:

I have concluded that actions of the enemy in the last 10 days clearly endanger the lives of Americans who are in Vietnam now and would constitute an unacceptable risk to those who will be there after withdrawal of another 150,000.

During those 10 days, it will be recalled, Secretary Laird told us that enemy forces were facing the opposite direction.

I submit, therefore, that our forces were sent into Cambodia, not only to capture the elusive Communist headquarters, nor to capture tons of rice and weapons, nor to field test the South Vietnamese Army, but at least in considerable part we went in to rescue the Lon Nol government from imminent collapse. That, indeed, may have been a primary goal.

To defuse congressional and public opposition, however, the President devised a different rationale. His tactic seems to have been to open a second front in the Cambodian theater, thus removing some of the military pressure on Phnom Penh, while avoiding the appearance of a direct involvement in yet another Asian country.

All along, that purpose has been denied. According to Secretary Rogers, for example:

We don't intend to become involved militarily in support of the Lon Nol government

or any other (Cambodian) government . . . Now obviously some of the things we are doing have peripheral effects. There are dividends that flow to the present government because it keeps the enemy off base. But that's not our primary purpose, and that will not be our purpose in the future.

Mr. President, the President's own words belie such assertions. Any doubts that remain on that score should certainly be set to rest by events of the past week relating to American air missions over Cambodian territory to which the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) has just addressed himself.

It should be recalled that the President set careful guidelines for air interdiction when U.S. ground troops were withdrawn. He said it would be limited to countering enemy efforts to move supplies and personnel through Cambodia toward South Vietnam and to reestablish base areas relevant to the Vietnam war.

But now Secretary Laird admits that American aircraft have been bombing in support of Cambodian forces holding Cambodian population centers. A Pentagon spokesman confirmed that military commanders are responding to Cambodian requests for air strikes.

Yet, Mr. Laird tosses up another semantic smokescreen. The Pentagon maintains that the guidelines are not being violated, with the explanation that:

When they catch enemy troops in the open, they will go after them even if there happen to be Cambodian troops around.

And Secretary Laird says that there will continue

To be ancillary benefits to the Cambodian ground operations. But the primary mission is interdiction.

Mr. President, this is patently absurd. Are we to believe that Cambodian troops just happen to be around the routes of supply to South Vietnam covered by the President's guidelines? Are we to believe that those routes conveniently run by Cambodian population centers in need of protection? Are we to believe that Cambodian troops just happen to be located in the areas where the Cambodians have requested air strikes?

Mr. President, the pattern of deception has continued long enough. We are today and we have since May first, both directly and through the South Vietnamese, been operating in direct support of the Lon Nol government. That was at least one reason for the invasion. It is a reason for the air strikes. It is a reason why South Vietnamese forces still remain in Cambodia. How long will the administration deny the obvious?

There is more at stake here than the credibility of the Nixon administration. That question is serious enough. But beyond that, if we understand why the Cambodian venture was undertaken, we learn volumes about the prospects for the administration's Indochina policy. And let us be frank, Mr. President. Not one of us can claim to know at this point all of the reasons behind this poorly explained invasion move.

Specifically, we learn that far from assuring the success of Vietnamization, the Cambodian invasion signaled its weakness.

According to the President's own statements, Vietnamization cannot succeed if the Lon Nol regime falls and Cambodia becomes a 600-mile-long sanctuary for the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong. But the Lon Nol government apparently cannot survive without extensive military support from the United States and South Vietnam. And the dilemma is further compounded by the fact that each step in our military pursuit of the Communists into Cambodia weakens Lon Nol politically with his own people, because of the destruction and suffering it imposes upon the people of his beleaguered land. Meanwhile, American forces are left holding the bag in South Vietnam while a large South Vietnamese Army forages in Cambodia to the dismay of much of the Cambodian populace. It is not possible either for the United States or Vietnam to achieve military success in a widening guerrilla war with declining numbers of troops.

Mr. President, the Attorney General, John Mitchell, has advised those who feel the administration is retreating on school desegregation to watch actions rather than words. He suggests there is more to be learned from what the administration does than from what it says.

The same principle applies with equal force to the President's Indochina policy. And when employed on that front, Cambodian action is revealed as an effort to conceal another costly, futile expansion of the war.

It is difficult to believe that so many years of hopeless effort in Indochina have failed to convince this administration that we cannot maintain a government to our liking in Saigon or other Southeast Asia capitals. The President's policy of "decisive moves" with reference to Cambodia is as barren as the gradual escalation that was abandoned more than 2 years ago and which many of us criticized in earlier administrations.

We have heard protests in recent weeks from supporters of the administration's policy who say they resent any implication that they are less devoted to peace than those of us who take a different view. They argue that the President is moving toward peace, that he is withdrawing American troops, and that he deserves the plaudits of those who despise this tragic conflict.

The President doubtless does want peace in Vietnam, but I do not believe his present course will move us in that direction. I intend shortly to address myself in greater depth to the President's so-called Vietnamization policy, which I see as a device for keeping us involved in Indochina—not a method for extricating us. I have tried today, however, simply to place in better perspective what I believe to have been a mistaken action in extending the war so rashly across the face of Cambodia.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the article by Mr. Schanberg to which I referred to be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Times, July 2, 1970]
 LOOTING BY SAIGON UNITS STIRS CAMBODIAN
 HATRED

(By Sydney H. Schanberg)

PNOMPENH, CAMBODIA.—Looting and pillage of Cambodian towns by South Vietnamese troops is increasing and has become a serious problem here at a time when the two countries, traditional enemies, are trying to establish an alliance against North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces.

Publicly, both governments say that the problem is under control, and there is clearly a commitment at the top to try to contain it. But earlier this week, two regiments of South Vietnamese troops moving up from southern Cambodia to help out at a trouble spot 35 miles north of Pnompenh left behind a trail of pillage in at least four villages and towns—and a residue of Cambodian fear and hatred.

In one of the looted villages, Prey Koth, about 12 miles southwest of Pnompenh, the farm people told a visitor how the South Vietnamese soldiers came into their thatch houses late on Sunday afternoon and, holding all protesters at gunpoint, stole gold, money and rice and undressed some of the women to get at the jewelry they had hastily hidden inside their clothes.

SIMILAR COMMENTS MADE

At a news conference Monday Premier Lon Nol of Cambodia said, when asked about earlier South Vietnamese looting, "Where there are injustices, the (South) Vietnamese command deals with them severely. There was some confusion at the beginning. But it is being regularized now."

South Vietnamese officials have made similar comments in this joint attempt to keep the mounting anger in the countryside from undermining the new alliance.

A growing number of informed observers here—noting reports that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops have treated villagers reasonably well, paying for their food, for example, instead of stealing it—fear that the South Vietnamese pillage could spur some villagers into joining the enemy.

So far, only four South Vietnamese soldiers are reported to have been charged with looting. These four, a battalion commander and three of his soldiers, are said to be awaiting court-martial for the sacking two weeks ago of Kompong Speu, a provincial capital 30 miles southwest of Pnompenh.

Some Western diplomats believe that the problem, if not checked, could seriously weaken the already uneasy relationship between Pnompenh and Saigon. And some foreign military experts feel that if the looting continues to spread, it could produce a situation in which South Vietnamese troops would be brought into Cambodia only for quick strikes in embattled areas and then would be taken back to South Vietnam immediately.

There is a minority point of view, however, that holds that the situation is indeed fairly well under control and that the behavior of the South Vietnamese is relatively normal for soldiers under battle pressure. According to this view, the South Vietnamese troops are showing "considerable restraint" considering the massacre of more than 1,000 ethnic Vietnamese here by Cambodian soldiers in the early stages of this war two and a half months ago.

One foreign military attache here acknowledged that the increased looting was "a bad thing" but said he wished reporters would not write about it because he felt publicity would exacerbate the situation.

In Prey Koth, where most of the villagers were robbed of their meager savings and valuables, there are 33 thatch houses. Twenty-eight were sacked by the South Vietnamese.

"Please help us," an old farmer pleaded with a Western visitor, "Please do everything

you can to stop this from happening to us again."

The South Vietnamese troops arrived in Prey Koth at 4 P.M. on Sunday afternoon. They had picked it as a place to camp for the night before making the final leg of the journey to their destination north of Pnompenh, Longvek, the site of a Cambodian arms depot under enemy pressure.

A half mile by dirt road off Route 4, Prey Koth is a poor but pretty village in the shade of tall trees and bambo clumps; its 200 people depend for their livelihood on a scanty rice crop and the crude sugar they make from the juice of the palm-tree fruit.

GIRLS RUN FOR SAFETY

As soon as the villagers saw the South Vietnamese trucks pull up on Sunday, they forced all their young girls to run for safety to a village about a mile away. Rapes have been reported in some of the early looting rampages, but none recently.

The troops immediately began swarming through Prey Koth, grabbing chickens and sacking the houses, most of which are on stilts.

One woman, Huy Kam, 33 years old, who seemed to be still in a state of shock and kept wringing her hands, said, "I hate them for this. I was so afraid they would kill me." She said she had shoved all her savings, about \$55 and a gold necklace in her pocket and had tried to run from the soldiers but that they had caught her and taken everything.

Other villagers came forward to tell similar or even more pitiful stories.

Another woman, Leng Lim, 44, said the South Vietnamese had undressed her to get at the gold-jewelry she had hidden in her skirt. Her 69-year-old brother, Ek Muong, begged them to stop.

"I'm so old I couldn't do anything," said the brother, a bent bony man who walks with a cane. "They pointed a gun at me. So I had to stand there and watch while they took the clothes off my sister."

A pregnant woman was forced to undress because the soldiers accused her of using her swollen stomach to hide things under her skirt. She said that as she undressed, they kept a knife at the neck of her three-year-old daughter. Her husband was working three miles away at the time.

Some observers say that the looting is understandable because the South Vietnamese soldiers are poorly paid and therefore look upon their campaign in Cambodia as a chance to enhance their income.

But no matter what explanation is given, the fact of growing Cambodian hatred for the Vietnamese remains, and this is a bad sign now that American troops have withdrawn from Cambodia and the country—its own army poorly trained and equipped—is left largely dependent on the South Vietnamese.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. McGOVERN. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 5 additional minutes, so that I may be permitted to yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HANSEN, Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from South Dakota for yielding for a question.

I have a copy of the Senator's statement, which I believe has been distributed to the press, and on the third line of that press release I find this statement:

First, the Nixon administration is deceiving the American people in claiming an important military victory in Cambodia that will shorten the war in Indochina.

As I recall the Senator's statement, in reading his statement this morning, he said:

First, the Nixon administration—

Then I think he introduced the words in my opinion, is deceiving the American people.

I presume that what the Senator intends to do is to modify the statement.

Mr. McGOVERN. I will stand on either statement, whichever the Senator prefers.

Mr. HANSEN. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator, then, whether he is aware of the fact that a recent Harris poll discloses that some 61 percent of the American people in this country have indicated that they support the position of the President in Cambodia.

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, I am aware of that, I would say to the Senator; and I would like to cite it as exhibit 1 of proof that the American people have been deceived.

Mr. HANSEN. Would it be fair to say, then, that despite what the President has said and despite what 61 percent of the people say, the distinguished Senator from South Dakota is saying that he and 39 percent who may not agree with the President are better able to discern what have been the actions of the President insofar as a deception is concerned rather than to agree with the 61 percent who agree with the President and not with the distinguished Senator?

Mr. McGOVERN. Let me say to the Senator that, as he knows, I have been speaking out against our policy in Southeast Asia for many years. During most of that time, considerably less than 39 percent of the American people, in various public opinion polls, agreed with the warnings that I and other Members of the Senate were issuing. Most of the American people during the greatest share of that dissent over the last 6 or 7 years have tended to believe the President when he told them that we had to send in more and more troops and more and more planes and more and more military operations of all kinds. Most people tended to believe the President when he said that victory was just around the corner, that we could see light at the end of the tunnel, and that if we would just quit raising questions about the war, everything would go well. It turns out that all those predictions were wrong and that just about everyone now realizes that the minority who issued the early warnings against our involvement in Southeast Asia were right, even though they were in the minority.

What I suggest to the Senator today is that the President of the United States is in a very powerful command position, both in terms of committing American forces abroad and in commanding public attention for the explanation of his actions.

I do not find it very hard to understand why the public opinion polls at the present time show that some 61 percent of the American people tend to go along with the President when he says it was necessary to invade Cambodia in order

to get out of Vietnam. I think it is a mistake in judgment. I think the American people have been misled. I think they were misled, also, as to the purposes of that invasion. I think it is a mistake for the President to announce on nationwide television that we are moving in to capture the central headquarters of the entire Communist apparatus in Southeast Asia and then, after the event, explain that the military operation has been a success because we captured some rice and some modest supplies of weapons which were largely obsolete.

What I am saying to the Senator here today is that I am surprised that even 39 percent of the American people have been able to see through this very strenuous effort on the part of the President to sell the American people on the necessity of this invasion. I can only say that I think it is a mistake in judgment.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator's additional time has expired.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the Harris survey to which I earlier referred, as published in the Washington Post of today.

There being no objection, the Harris survey was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE HARRIS SURVEY: 61 PERCENT NOW BELIEVE NIXON JUSTIFIED IN CAMBODIA MOVE

(By Louis Harris)

In the aftermath of the U.S. move into Cambodia, 61 per cent of the American people believe that President Nixon was "justified" in ordering the action.

Perhaps the most significant finding of a special Harris Survey on Cambodia is that Mr. Nixon has scored an impressive turnaround in what seemed to be a growing credibility gap over the Vietnam war.

Between May 25 and 30, after the dispatch of troops into Cambodia and again between July 25 and 30, after their return, cross sections of households across the nation were asked:

"As far as the war in Vietnam and Cambodia is concerned, do you think President Nixon has been frank and straightforward about the war, or do you think he has not told the American people the real truth about the situation there?"

Frank and straightforward:	Percent
July -----	48
May -----	42
Not told real truth:	
July -----	38
May -----	46
Not sure:	
July -----	14
May -----	12

Not only did the President's credibility rating sharply improve, but confidence that he would keep his pledge of troop withdrawal from Vietnam also turned completely around. The two cross sections were asked:

"President Nixon has said that we still will be able to withdraw 150,000 U.S. troops from Vietnam by next May. In view of the operations in Cambodia, do you think he will be able to bring back the 150,000 U.S. troops by then or not?"

Will be able to:	Percent
July -----	50
May -----	38
Won't be able to:	
July -----	30
May -----	49
Not sure:	
July -----	20
May -----	13

They were also asked:
 "In undertaking the military operations in Cambodia, do you think the Vietnam war has now been widened into a bigger war in all of Indochina, including Laos and Cambodia, or do you think the move into Cambodia prevented a widening of the war?"

Prevented widening of war:	Percent
July -----	42
May -----	33
War has been widened:	
July -----	29
May -----	53
Not sure:	
July -----	29
May -----	14

By 57 to 23 percent, a majority believe that U.S. troops were successful in destroying North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia. By 56 to 24 percent, the public also denies the allegation that the incursion was a "mistake." In addition 55 percent agree with Mr. Nixon's claim that by moving into Cambodia, "the lives of American fighting men in Vietnam were protected."

Just after the action started, most people believed that Mr. Nixon "had widened the war in Indochina—by 53 to 33 percent." But now that U.S. troops have been taken out of Cambodia and the fighting in Vietnam has tended to wind down, a plurality of the public (42 to 29 percent) holds the view that "the war has been prevented from widening."

The public also has reversed its view that Mr. Nixon "did not act properly by not asking permission of Congress to commit U.S. troops in Cambodia." Just after the action started, a majority was critical of the propriety of Mr. Nixon's action, by 54 to 37 percent. Now, by a narrow 45 to 42 percent, most people say the President's course of action was "proper," even though Congress was bypassed.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCGOVERN. The Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) has been here since 10 o'clock and served notice before I spoke. As a courtesy to him, if the Senator from Kansas would agree, I would like to yield to the Senator from Idaho first and then to the Senator from Kansas.

Mr. DOLE. Certainly.

Mr. CHURCH. First, I commend the Senator for his very forthright analysis of the Cambodian episode. I was particularly struck by his statement that today nearly two-thirds of Cambodia is either held, or being contested for, by Communist forces. Prior to the American invasion, something like 10 percent of the Cambodian territory was held by the Communists. Yet, we are told by the President that this operation was the most successful in the whole course of the war.

It seems to me that, as time passes, a growing number of Americans will come to agree with the position taken today by the Senator from South Dakota. In the past, he has been proved right again and again, and I think he will be proved right once more on Cambodia.

As a matter of fact, I recall the day the President invited Members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to the White House, shortly after the invasion commenced, to explain the reasons why he had ordered American troops into Cambodia. I concluded, based upon his explanation and the answers he gave to the questions

asked at that time, and I said publicly, that the President had "taken a large gamble for a small prize." I stated:

If he wins the gamble, he gains no more than the temporary removal of the border sanctuaries in Cambodia, to which the enemy will soon return. If he loses the gamble, the enemy reprisal could well take the form of a Communist takeover of Cambodia.

I issued that statement on May 5, 5 days after the American invasion began.

Today, as the Senator observes, more than half of Cambodia has fallen into Communist hands, while Communist troops contest for two-thirds of Cambodia. Phnom Penh itself is under siege.

It may be that 61 percent of the American people now believe that the Cambodian operation was a great success, but I think that, in a few more months, they will come to realize that what really happened was that we pulled the plug on Cambodia and it went down the drain.

I commend the Senator for his address, and I forecast that he will once more be proved right in days to come.

Mr. MCGOVERN. I thank the Senator from Idaho for his intervention and for what he said about my being right in the past, when of course it applies with even greater relevance to his own analysis of this situation over the years. I cannot recall a single prediction that the Senator has made that has not proved to be accurate in light of subsequent events. I am confident that the judgment both of us share on this mistaken venture into Cambodia will, one day, be the prevailing view of most of the American people.

That is why it is so important for us to continue to report these developments as we have, and why it is so important for discussions of this kind to take place on the floor of the Senate.

Now I yield to the Senator from Kansas.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, let me say to the junior Senator from South Dakota that I am particularly interested in pages 9 and 10 of his prepared remarks wherein he indicates, that some of us resent the implications and are less devoted to peace. I perhaps fall in that category. I believe that a majority of Senators support President Nixon, whether Democrat or Republican, because he has a plan for peace. The Senator from Kansas has listened to the criticisms of the Senator from South Dakota since coming to the Senate in January of last year; but I have yet to hear the junior Senator from South Dakota offer his plan for peace in Southeast Asia unless it is somehow wrapped up in the amendment to end the war, which I designate the amendment to lose the peace, to walk out, to surrender, if you will, Mr. President, to charge off the deaths of 50,000 young Americans, and to have asylum somewhere, as the so-called end the war amendment provides—perhaps in South Dakota, perhaps in Oregon, perhaps in Kansas—I am not certain where.

It is one thing to criticize the President, as the Senator from South Dakota does so very frequently and constantly; but we must recognize that President

Nixon has withdrawn 120,000 troops from Southeast Asia. He has announced the withdrawal of another 150,000 troops, which will be 80 percent of combat troops withdrawn by next May 15.

The Senator from South Dakota, of course, was opposed to the Cambodian incursion. Many of us have expressed doubts, but the Senator from South Dakota omitted one crucial element, which was given by the President, namely, that the incursion into Cambodia was necessary for the protection of American forces—

Mr. McGOVERN. I did list that in—

Mr. DOLE (continuing). And that keep the Vietnamization program on schedule.

Mr. McGOVERN. I did list that as one of the—

Mr. DOLE. This morning, I heard a CBS news report from the Cambodian border that they had not seen a Vietcong in over a month. The reporter on CBS indicated the Cambodian venture was successful, that 2 or 3 months ago the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese were all over the area, but today they have to go out and search for them.

I would remind the Senator from South Dakota that casualties have been reduced as a result of the Cambodian incursion. It did not bring about complete and total victory, nor permit the withdrawal of all U.S. troops immediately.

Talk about deception. That term might be applied to the so-called end-the-war amendment, which I call the lose-the-peace amendment, because it says in effect that at the end of this year we shall pull out of Southeast Asia whatever the situation.

If we want to discuss deception, and I assume we will, as the Senate gets into the so-called end-the-war amendments, to make a blanket criticism of President Nixon, who is making progress toward peace in Southeast Asia and also in the Middle East, does a disservice to him.

Mr. McGOVERN. Let me respond to the Senator from Kansas in two ways, and very briefly.

First, with reference to the importance of the critics having an alternative answer to our policy in Southeast Asia, this comment has always intrigued me. The real alternative was to have listened to what the critics were saying years ago, not to commit American forces.

The Senator from Kansas and the President of the United States for years have advocated the course we have been following in Vietnam until it proved to be a disaster.

No one in this country in past years was any more consistent in advocating every step of our escalation in military involvement in Southeast Asia than Richard Nixon, who is now the President of the United States. As early as 1954 he was advocating sending American forces there. He advocated that from that time until he became convinced, in the 1968 presidential campaign, that it had driven his predecessor from office and it was only since that point that he has emerged as an advocate of withdrawal from Southeast Asia.

The basic alternative to our involvement in Southeast Asia was not to have

made this series of errors over the past 10 years. But I do want to say to the Senator—

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURDICK). The time of the Senator from South Dakota has expired.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 1 additional minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McGOVERN. I do want to say to the Senator that I have offered an alternative plan to this disastrous and indefinite continuance in Southeast Asia, and that is to withdraw on a time certain, to set up a timetable, to notify Saigon, to notify the enemy, and to notify the American people that on such-and-such a date all American forces will have been removed. I think that is the way to disengage. I do not believe we will ever get out by this kind of vague promise, that we will withdraw American forces but, dependent only upon the capacity of the South Vietnamese regime to continue the war, and dependent only on what North Vietnam and the Vietcong do—which, in a sense, gives the veto over American foreign policy into the hands of both Saigon and Hanoi. I object to that.

Mr. DOLE. Let me say to the Senator from South Dakota that President Nixon has been in office only 18 months. He was not President in 1954, neither was he President in 1964 when this body voted 88 to 2 to approve the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

Those facts speak for themselves.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Dakota yield?

Mr. McGOVERN. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, unfortunately, I came into the Chamber at the end of this colloquy, but I did hear the suggestion that President Nixon, when he was Vice President, was in favor of our involvement in Vietnam.

I have in my possession a letter written by a man who served in high office in the Eisenhower, the Kennedy, and the Johnson administrations. In his letter, he points out very clearly that the suggestion of involving the United States of America with troops in Southeast Asia was suggested by, I believe, Mr. Rostow and, it was turned down by the Eisenhower administration.

As the letter states quite vehemently, their purpose was to send instructors and advisers but not involvement.

So that I want the record to show, so far as I am concerned, that it is my understanding, from the letter written by John McCone, who is well known and highly regarded and has served in many administrations, that this is his statement and puts that on the record, which I am pleased to have the opportunity to state for the RECORD, also, under my name, at this time.

Mr. President, I yield the floor. I thank the distinguished Senator from Ohio for permitting me a few minutes in which to make these remarks.

Mr. HANSEN subsequently said: Mr. President, earlier in the day, there was a discussion on the Senate floor about the Cambodian operation. Since the Sen-

ate was then operating under a time-limitation agreement, there was not sufficient opportunity to respond to the remarks of the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN).

May I say, Mr. President, that I and my colleagues on this side of the aisle are most grateful to the distinguished Senator from Ohio (Mr. Young) for his kindness and forbearance in giving us the time that he did. He was most considerate.

The Senator from South Dakota made some very serious charges which should not go unchallenged. As I indicated in my earlier remarks, a recent Harris survey showed that 61 percent of the American people support the President in the action he took in Cambodia.

This view has grown stronger as the weeks have passed and people have begun to realize the effects which those operations have had. They believe that, rather than widening the war, these operations have helped to limit it, to protect our forces, and to insure our Vietnamization program.

I am at a loss to understand the reason for such accusations as the Senator has made. Throughout this episode the President has been frank and forthright, as security permitted, on the purposes of the operation.

On June 3, for example, the President said:

First we have eliminated an immediate danger to the security of the remaining Americans in Vietnam and thereby reduced our future casualties. Second, we have won some precious time for the South Vietnamese to train and prepare themselves to carry the burden of their national defense so that our American forces can be withdrawn. Third, we have insured the continuance and success of our troop withdrawal program. On April 20 I announced an additional 150,000 Americans would be home within a year. We will keep our timetable for troop withdrawals.

On June 30, as his promise on the withdrawal of American troops from Cambodia was being kept, the President said:

We have eliminated an immediate threat to our forces and to the security of South Vietnam—and produced the prospect of fewer American casualties in the future. We have inflicted extensive casualties and very heavy losses in materiel on the enemy. We have ended the concept of Cambodian sanctuaries immune from attack upon which the enemy military had relied for five years. We have dislocated supply lines and disrupted Hanoi's strategy in the Saigon area and the Mekong delta. We have effectively cut off the enemy from resupply by sea. We have, for the time being, separated community main force units from guerrillas in the southern part of South Vietnam. This should provide a boost to pacification efforts. We have guaranteed the continuance of our troop withdrawal program. We have bought time for the South Vietnamese to strengthen themselves. We have witnessed visible proof of the success of Vietnamization as the South Vietnamese performed with skill and valor and competence.

In his remarks the Senator from South Dakota sought to belittle the accomplishments of the operation. Just to keep the record clear, I submit a brief summary of what was actually accomplished.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-

sent that the statistics I have prepared be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the statistics were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

1. We captured or destroyed a great deal of supplies: 14 million pounds of rice; nearly 15 million rounds of small arms ammunition; over 120,000 rounds of rocket, mortar and recoilless rifle ammunition; over 25,000 weapons.

2. We killed or captured about 13,500 communist troops—11,349 killed; 2,328 captured.

3. There already has been a reduction in U.S. casualties in South Vietnam: in that in the five week period ending August 1st the number of U.S. killed in South Vietnam totaled 354—the lowest rate for any equivalent period in 4½ years.

4. The rate of enemy attacks particularly in the southern parts of South Vietnam has decreased.

5. We have been able to continue our program for the withdrawal of U.S. forces which would have been jeopardized if the communists had been able to expand their sanctuaries without challenge.

6. A contributing factor in this has been the increase in confidence and effectiveness of South Vietnamese armed forces.

7. The communists also know they will never again be able to use those sanctuaries without the danger of challenge. This makes it harder for them to use them in the future and means that they will have much more difficulty than before to prepare and mount large unit attacks against our forces or against South Vietnamese cities.

8. We should emphasize that the U.S. did not attack a neutral Cambodia as critics allege. The U.S. attacked enemy bases in Cambodia with the approval of the Cambodian government. It was the communists not the United States who violated the Cambodian neutrality.

9. And with all of this Cambodia is still fighting valiantly to preserve its freedom in the face of North Vietnamese aggression. A country which was threatened by the most blatant aggression is now defending itself. Though the situation is still serious there our actions in the sanctuaries helped to give the time for this country to develop its ability to resist.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, these are convincing reasons why the American people believe as they do and support the President in this operation.

Mr. President, in the Washington Daily News of today, August 11, 1970, there is published an article written by Don Tate, entitled "Cambodia Success Claimed." I ask unanimous consent that that article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMMANDER ANSWERS CHARGES: CAMBODIA SUCCESS CLAIMED

(By Don Tate)

LONG BINH, SOUTH VIETNAM.—Despite the bitter controversy it aroused, the general who commanded some 22,000 American troops in the Cambodian incursion said today he is more firmly convinced than ever of the operation's basic success.

Since his troops rolled back into South Vietnam more than a month ago, Lt. Gen. Michael S. Davison, 53, a tall, slow-talking West Point graduate, has had a chance both to re-evaluate the success and consider the charges of failure leveled by foes of the campaign.

Gen. Davison assumed his second field force command on April 15 and found himself

thrown into the breach with only days to mount the American offensive which kicked off May 1. In a wide-ranging interview he sought today to set the record straight on some of the criticism of that incursion.

COUNT CHALLENGED

Critics have claimed that captured booty counts were systematically inflated thru command levels in order to make the Cambodian venture look good to the American people.

Gen. Davison's answer: "The only thing I can tell you is that right from the beginning we made every effort to get an accurate accounting of what we had taken . . . Gen. Abrams (Cregighton W. Abrams, U.S. commander in Vietnam) never said a damned word to me about how much . . ."

"All I said to the division commanders was that they had to account for these captured materials just like they would account for equipment in their divisions. Fundamentally, when your own future operations depend on how badly you've hurt the enemy, you don't want to make any false assessments."

Gen. Davison's latest figures exceed in impact those given out earlier by the White House. "We've concluded that we left behind only 15 per cent of the material the enemy had in there (the storage areas) originally," he said.

"I'm fully aware that the President said we captured 60 per cent. . . I don't know if the White House took into account what the trucks (two columns of 10 enemy trucks each which escaped) moved out, what our B52s and tactical fighter planes destroyed, the amount of ammunition the enemy fired at us while we were in there, and so . . . I must say in some area where we've found enemy mail, he's giving us credit for capturing more than I thought we had."

Critics say the allied charge into Cambodia sent Red forces scattering thruout that small country, triggering a chain reaction which might well doom Cambodia.

Gen. Davison's reply: "Part of the communist plan was to seize control of large areas of Cambodia, which they embarked on in early April. . . They were already embarked on this project well before we went in (on May 1), and it can be documented. When (Prince) Sihanouk was overthrown March 18, the communists had a whole new ball game, and they recognized it."

"At that point the planning on the part of COSVN (Central Office for South Vietnam—Red headquarters located then and now in Cambodia) was to get another offensive going in South Vietnam. The last week in March they dropped that and started seizing larger areas of Cambodia and setting up a liberation movement."

"At that time their 272nd Regiment moved deeper into Cambodia toward Kompong Cham, and their 175th Regiment moved deeper into Cambodia toward Kratie, and took it in early April, and another newly formed regiment went off to the northwest across the Mekong River. All of that activity started weeks before we went in."

Other critics charged the allies didn't achieve all they started out to achieve (did not take COSVN, for example) in the two months the Americans were in Cambodia, and that the continued presence of thousands of South Vietnamese (ARVN) troops inside Cambodia is only imperiling South Vietnam now.

LACK SURPRISE EFFECT

Gen. Davison conceded that "if we had had more planning time, and had the authority, we could have struck simultaneously into all areas and impose a greater strain on the communists."

"Undoubtedly," he went on, "they moved some stuff out after we first went across the border (ARVN troops had crossed April 29,

two days before the Americans, and crossings that followed were staggered days, sometimes weeks apart, losing the surprise value of mass simultaneous assault).

"If he had gone in all at once, I don't think they would have been able to do that. Even so, it was still tremendously effective and I believe has bought an insurance policy for the Vietnamization program."

Gen. Davison stressed that enemy activity in the lower half of South Vietnam has dropped off nearly 50 per cent in the 11 provinces around Saigon since the Cambodian incursion, adding that as long as ARVN forces continue to control highways 1 and 7—important links in Cambodia for enemy troops and supplies moving toward South Vietnam—the enemy "is going to have an awful rough row to hoe to reverse the trend in the delta and around Saigon."

Gen. Davison's overall view of the Cambodian fighting was less optimistic. He said that in Cambodia, it is the Lon Nol forces which travel "the rocky road."

"Whether they can pull it off, I don't know," he said.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, the article begins:

Despite the bitter controversy it aroused, the general who commanded some 22,000 American troops in the Cambodian incursion said today he is more firmly convinced than ever of the operation's basic success.

Since his troops rolled back into South Vietnam more than a month ago, Lt. Gen. Michael S. Davison, 53, a tall, slow-talking West Point graduate, has had a chance both to re-evaluate the success and consider the charges of failure leveled by foes of the campaign.

I shall not read the remainder of the article, except to call attention to two parts that I think are particularly significant:

Critics say the allied charge into Cambodia sent Red forces scattering thruout that small country, triggering a chain reaction which might well doom Cambodia.

Gen. Davison's reply: "Part of the communist plan was to seize control of large areas of Cambodia, which they embarked on in early April. . . They were already embarked on this project well before we went in (on May 1), and it can be documented. When (Prince) Sihanouk was overthrown March 18, the communists had a whole new ball game, and they recognized it."

Then finally, Mr. President, in response to charges made by many, including the distinguished Senator from South Dakota—and I quote from his statement as shown in his press release as of today:

But it is now becoming clear that the invasion was a military and political blunder. It saved no American lives; it cost American lives.

Let me, in order that the record might be set straight, read what General Davison, the man who conducted the Cambodian incursion, said:

Gen. Davison stressed that enemy activity in the lower half of South Vietnam has dropped off nearly 50 per cent in the 11 provinces around Saigon since the Cambodian incursion, adding that as long as ARVN forces continue to control highways 1 and 7—important links in Cambodia for enemy troops and supplies moving toward South Vietnam—the enemy "is going to have an awful rough row to hoe to reverse the trend in the delta and around Saigon."

Mr. President, I think it is important that the people of this country under-

stand what the facts are. I think it is important that we hear both sides of this story. I speak this afternoon in order that those who are interested enough—and I hope that every Senator will be—may read the record to see what has been accomplished in Cambodia, in order better to understand and evaluate an operation which results in a growing number of Americans now finding themselves in wholehearted support of the actions of the President of the United States. The people, by a margin of some 61 percent solidly support the action of the President of the United States in Cambodia.

That does not reflect a smaller percentage of Americans; it reflects a growing number of Americans who, more and more, day by day, recognize that this was indeed one of the most brilliant military maneuvers accomplished in recent times, and one for which the President has been subjected to some very unfair criticism, simply because, in the interests of security, he could not serve notice on the Senate nor on the world as to what our intentions were. Had he done that, the success which brilliantly characterized that 60-day operation into Cambodia would not have been nearly so successful.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURDICK). Under the previous order the Senator from Ohio (Mr. YOUNG) is now recognized for 30 minutes.

ABM: ANOTHER MAGINOT LINE

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, from the very moment the Nixon administration and the officials of the Department of Defense decided to breathe new life into the moribund Nike Zeus, Nike X, Sentinel anti-ballistic-missile system by giving it a new name, the Safeguard system has been the focus of unprecedented debate and study. Much of this debate has been confusing and misleading because of the constantly shifting reasons given by the administration to justify the expenditure of billions of dollars on this monstrosity. The most recent argument used by the supporters of the Safeguard system have been the role it would play in protecting our land-based nuclear deterrent and the need to use it as a bargaining card in the SALT talks now underway in Vienna.

On the surface these might seem to be compelling reasons for continuing or expanding the Safeguard system. Closer examination reveals just how dangerously misleading even these arguments are.

No one would deny that the United States should protect and defend its nuclear retaliatory force as a deterrent to a possible Soviet first strike. Safeguard, however, is the wrong system for such a job. It simply will not work as an effective defense of our land-based deterrent. Moreover, the value of Safeguard as a bargaining card at the SALT talks is highly questionable.

Mr. President, anyone familiar with the composition of the U.S. strategic

arsenal knows that it consists of three separate elements, the land-based missile force, the strategic bomber force, and the Polaris submarine force. Each of these three is designed to present an effective nuclear deterrent force, regardless of the state of the other two. A true first strike capability must be able to knock out all three simultaneously, a feat technically beyond the reach of the Soviet Union within the foreseeable future.

It is also clear that with the rapidly increasing sophistication and accuracy of modern weapons land-based missile forces are becoming overly vulnerable. In fact, at some future date it is quite possible that land-based missile deterrent forces will have to be abandoned altogether. Nevertheless, at this point in time, the need for some protection for our land-based strategic deterrent is undeniable.

Mr. President, the strongest argument against the Safeguard system is that it simply will not work as an effective defense of our land-based deterrent. To claim otherwise not only distorts the facts, but also endangers our national security by preventing us from concentrating our limited resources on a worthless system. Here we might do well to remember what happened to France in World War II as a result of the false sense of security based on the worthless and costly maginot line. This was no defense at all.

In making decisions on how best to protect our deterrent force, we must remember that at best we have only a calculated estimate of future threats. The actual threat may grow at a rate faster or slower than that foreseen, and in the past there have been many intelligence errors in just this area of judging the growth of the Soviet threat. Thus we must consider a band of possible threats and seek those defenses most effective against the widest possible band.

At the present time the Soviet arsenal contains over 200 potential attackers, far below a level which would represent any real danger to the survival of our Minuteman missile force as an effective deterrent. If the Soviets continue to build their arsenal at the present rate with no technological changes, we shall face no threat to our Minuteman deterrent until 1980. If the Russians should improve their arsenal, for example by MIRV'ing their SS-9's or by greatly increasing the accuracy of their SS-11 force, a threat could arise before Safeguard were finished and such a threat could overwhelm Safeguard in any case.

Here it is interesting to remember that Secretary of Defense Laird told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Safeguard was not meant to handle a combination of MIRV'ed SS-9's, improved accuracy of the SS-11 fleet, and an increase in total number of Soviet ICBM's. Dr. John Foster, Pentagon Director of Defense Research and Engineering, has admitted that Safeguard could be overwhelmed by 1974, long before it could be perfected. Many things could influence Soviet strategic decisions, such as a SALT agreement or a decision by the Soviets that they have reached parity and can slow their growth. We

simply must not accept too exact a picture of the Soviet potential threat.

Yet it is here that the weakness of Safeguard becomes most apparent. As Prof. Wolfgang Panofsky, Director of the Stanford University Liner Accelerator Center, and one of America's leading scientists, said in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control on April 13, 1970:

Even if Safeguard functions perfectly it offers significant protection to Minuteman over only a very narrow band of threats; if the threat continues to grow as rapidly as it is at present, Safeguard is obsolete before deployed; if the threat levels off, Safeguard is not needed. . . . Safeguard looks like a very poor use of the shrinking defense dollar indeed.

Mr. President, notice that Dr. Panofsky emphasized the phrase "even if it functions perfectly." To anyone who has followed closely the progress of Safeguard as well as the opinions of America's leading scientists this is a very large "if." Safeguard consists of components taken over with little or no modifications from the old Nike-Sentinel system. The Nike-Sentinel system was designed to defend cities, which are soft, high-value targets. An adequate protection of the Minuteman deterrent force would require hard-point defense of the missile silos, which are hard and individually low-value targets. There has been no change in the engineering of the Safeguard System, despite the clear conflict in the requirements. The administration and Pentagon officials, in trying to make the same equipment do many things, instead have a system which will do nothing at all.

The chief technical weakness in the Safeguard system is that it depends on a single, expensive—\$200 million—radar for each Minuteman complex and on a small number of Sprint missiles to protect both the radar and the Minuteman silos. If the radar malfunctions, or is destroyed, the defense system collapses. Yet the radar itself is a very "soft" target, highly vulnerable to enemy attack and itself dependent on a highly complex computer which may or may not work. Furthermore, members of a Department of Defense advisory panel on Safeguard have admitted their doubts that programs for the computer system could ever be provided. The value of our Minuteman force as a retaliatory deterrent is based on the survival of each silo, independent of any other that might be destroyed. Thus having only one, highly vulnerable radar for each complex of a hundred or more missiles constitutes a real "Achilles heel."

It is crucial to note that the Russians do have the means to destroy the missile site radars and render the defense useless. The Russian SS-11 fleet, though inadequate to destroy the Minuteman silos, is large enough and accurate enough to destroy the radar sites, leaving the Minuteman missile silos open to attack from SS-9's. The cost of erecting a defense for each on-site radar would be prohibitive, and the radar and computer complex is far too expensive to allow use of many redundant radars at each site.

It has also become increasingly clear that the Soviets have inexpensive penetration aids which could sharply reduce the effectiveness of the perimeter acquisition radars. Nobel Laureate Hans Bethe has outlined the devices the Soviet Union could use, from simple decoys to fool the radars to atmospheric nuclear bursts to black out the radars. The small number of Sprint missiles at each site could easily be exhausted by a large incoming fleet, leaving the system defenseless. Quite obviously this supposedly "infallible defense" system is not infallible at all, but indeed highly problematic and vulnerable.

Mr. President, the Senate should remember that last year Secretary of Defense Laird and the President said deployment of Safeguard ABM would be limited to the first two sites until it was fully tested. They stated further that the program would be reviewed annually from the standpoint of its technical progress and the evolving threat. We have heard much, recently, about the Pentagon officials' adoption of a "fly before you buy" policy on weapons procurements. These new procedures are certainly praiseworthy, and should have been standard long ago. Yet, they are all being ignored with regard to Safeguard.

There has been no actual production on the Phase-I deployment approved last year, and little construction activity on the sites authorized. In fact, the contract to develop the first site was awarded only 3 months ago, and there has as yet been no contract awarded on the second site. The dates by which the equipment can be received have now been slipped by almost a year. There has been very little testing of some of the most complex equipment in the system, and, indeed, a great deal of the Safeguard system can never be fully tested. Because of the nature of Safeguard, we shall never know if it will really work until the time comes to use it. Yet the serious questions about the functional validity of key elements in it make proper testing even more crucial.

Mr. President, here I might mention that in fiscal 1969 defense posture hearings I pointed out in regard to Minuteman testings there had been "two failures on silos in North Dakota 2 years ago" which had revealed serious electronic problems. I was assured by the then Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Brown, that the Air Force would correct those problems and were still working on test firings out of operational silos. At that time he planned to acquire and fire from operational silos, missiles with 7-second firing times and to investigate the possibility of full range tests from operational silos.

In the fiscal 1970 hearings I asked what had happened to the proposed test of Minuteman II out of silos. Secretary of Defense Laird replied that the Air Force plan for tests from operational silos had not been delivered and that the matter was "under current consideration," just as it had been for 2 years preceding.

In the fiscal 1971 hearings I again asked about plans for a test operational launch for Minuteman, and was told by Secretary of the Air Force Seamans that

"we would like to do it soon." General Esposito, in reply to Senator SYMINGTON, said that the Air Force was "anticipating direction to proceed" from the Secretary of Defense and was recommending a schedule calling for launch of a Minuteman II 19 months after go-ahead and launch by a Minuteman III 1 year after that. In other words, Mr. President, there has never been any full testing of our Minuteman force to see if it would actually operate out of silos the way it is supposed to. Now we are asked to approve more funds for a defense system which has not been, and can never be, fully tested. I submit this is very definitely a dangerous way to defend ourselves.

Mr. President, last year we accepted phase I of Safeguard with the understanding that it would be tested fully before and further development was sought. In the past year none of the technical results in the on-going development has made it look any better, and many new "bugs" has been discovered. All the most recent technical reviews have agreed that Safeguard is less effective and more costly than other methods of protecting our land-based deterrent.

Dr. Foster, Pentagon's chief Safeguard propagandist, has claimed that a panel of six distinguished scientists reported that Safeguard would do the job planned for it. Two of the scientists on that panel, Dr. Marvin L. Goldberger, of Princeton, and Dr. Sidney D. Drell, of Stanford, have since revealed that the panel said nothing of the kind. Indeed, both these scientists, who had served on the President's Advisory Committee on Science, are against continued work on phase I and any work on phase II. They have pointed out that none of the advocates of Safeguard have ever talked to any congressional committee about the actual operational validity of the system. Instead, they always talk about Soviet threats or Chinese intransigence or national determination, never about the relation between the performance of Safeguard and any potential or actual threat.

Mr. President, Dr. Drell has stated emphatically that no independent analysis of Safeguard by scientists outside the Pentagon has ever endorsed or supported the proposed program for its stated missions. Last week five leading scientists, all members of the Federation of American Scientists, announced their belief that the proposed Safeguard ABM would offer only "negligible protection to the U.S. Minuteman ICBM retaliatory force in the event of a Russian attack."

Furthermore, Members of Congress have just learned of a report made on January 27 to Secretary of Defense Laird by a seven-member science panel. The report concluded that if the only purpose of Safeguard were to protect U.S. Minuteman retaliatory missiles against Soviet attack, expansion of Safeguard "should not proceed." It went on to state that Defense Department officials should seek to develop a "dedicated" alternative Minuteman protection system using "less costly and less technically formidable radars" than Safeguard, with "each

such radar" covering fewer silos than Safeguard. Such a system would be more cost-effective than Safeguard and would provide for more protection if the Soviet anti-Minuteman force became very large.

The facts are quite clear, Mr. President. The Safeguard system has not been adequately tested as yet, and it is too complex to ever be fully tested. Moreover, it is too vulnerable to ever be fully effective. Without substantial and costly modifications and improvements, it simply will not do the job proposed for it as a defense of our land-based missile deterrent force. It is clearly the 1970's version of the old Maginot line.

Mr. President, in recent weeks the administration has shifted its emphasis again and is now urgently pleading for Safeguard to use as a bargaining card in the SALT talks. This is a beguiling and compelling argument. Certainly, all Americans are concerned about the success of the SALT talks, and none of us would knowingly do anything to jeopardize the chances of coming to a meaningful arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union. Yet there is considerable evidence to show that the administration and Pentagon officials are acting irresponsibly in trying to use the threat of failure in the SALT talks to justify the Safeguard system, in effect trying to blackmail the Congress into accepting a worthless system with hysterical cries about SALT.

In the first place, to speak of the need to use Safeguard as a bargaining card with the Russians assumes that without it we would have to bargain from weakness. This is simply not the case—the United States has not become a second-rate power and is not in neutral gear in strategic development. If we were as close to being a second-rate power as the administration claims, one wonders if we should even be seeking any arms limitation agreement.

Moreover, there is no reason to doubt that the Russians realize the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the Safeguard system and probably know full well that it will not do the job proposed for it. What kind of a bargaining agent is a costly and ineffective system? If there is no SALT agreement, we will go ahead and build this worthless monstrosity? On the other hand, the Nixon administration has claimed that Safeguard is absolutely essential as a defense against the Chinese. How can they then justify trying to trade it away to the Russians? If it is an essential system, we should keep it; if, as appears to be the case, it is a worthless boondoggle, the Russians surely know it and there is nothing to be gained by deploying it for bargaining purposes. Safeguard is not the billion-dollar poker chip the administration claims it is.

In fact, Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky has pointed out that any decision to enlarge Safeguard might well threaten the potential success of the SALT talks in limiting strategic offensive and defensive missiles. The Armed Services Committee rejected the full expansion proposed by the administration, but the fact remains that the administration does desire to

expand Safeguard. In light of the clear evidence that expansion of Safeguard might dangerously escalate the arms race and jeopardize any control agreement, one wonders just how much the administration believes their own claim that Safeguard is a necessary bargaining card for SALT.

Mr. President, the facts are that the best bargaining card available to the United States in any arms limitation talks is our willingness to allocate money for research and development of true hard-site, or other suitable defense, for our land-based deterrent. The main threat to the Soviet Union is not the ineffective old Nike-Sentinel system under a new name. It is, rather, the knowledge that the United States could build a truly effective system and massively increase our defenses as well as our offensive power. Our capacity to escalate and continue the arms race, amply demonstrated by our MIRV'ing of Minuteman and our deployment of Poseidon, is our strongest bargaining card. The administration's argument that Safeguard is needed for bargaining would clearly seem to be merely another straw grasped in an effort to justify an unjustifiable system, the latest in a long series of rationales for a worthless boondoggle.

Mr. President, many supporters of the Safeguard system cry that those who oppose this system are antimilitary or anti-American or soft on communism or unaware of strategic realities of world power. That is not true. We are antiboondoggle, antihysteria, anticries of false alarm. No one is saying that the United States should disarm unilaterally or endanger its national security by foolishly reducing its strategic arsenal. There are obviously and undeniably real threats we must be ready to meet.

However, Safeguard ABM is not the answer. In these troubled and dangerous times, with our Nation over-extended abroad, divided at home, and suffering severe economic problems, we must look with great care at every decision we make. For too long the military was given everything they sought, without limitation, with hardly any question. We can no longer afford this luxury.

The military and its defenders must realize that we are not antimilitary, but rather that we are forced by circumstances to choose among alternatives and allocate scarce resources accordingly. We can no longer have everything we want, and the decisions about what we need are hard ones.

Our economy is beset with inflation and high unemployment. We have urgent domestic spending priorities. The Federal Government itself is in severe financial straits. In the light of all these facts, the challenge we face in determining our defense posture is how to get the most defense for our money, whether this be through better contracting procedures, closer supervision of contract work, or more efficient systems. Mr. President, the Safeguard ABM system does not answer this challenge. It is a dangerously costly and ineffective system, which will not do the job proposed for it and which by lulling us into a false

sense of security and draining away scarce dollars from other better systems would do much to reduce our national defense.

There are other, better, less costly ways to do the jobs proposed for Safeguard. We must halt the development of this new "Maginot line."

MIGRANT WORKERS—FORGOTTEN AMERICANS

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, the recently televised NBC white paper on the plight of migrant workers once again awakened Americans to the inhuman circumstances under which so many of our farmworkers must live. Unfortunately, the horrible living and working conditions of these millions of Americans are noticed only at those infrequent intervals when a television program of this type is broadcast. However, the compelling plight of migrant laborers in the United States is a national disgrace that we can no longer afford to ignore. These workers who toil to provide food for our tables live in a twilight world of hunger, abject poverty, and lack of opportunity in the midst of plenty.

More than a quarter of a million migrant farmworkers are today laboring in fields across America, and before the end of the year well over 1 million people—men, women, and children—will have been so employed. They will work in all of the States and will harvest the crops that will feed Americans for the coming year. They and frequently their wives and children engage in the hardest sort of backbreaking manual labor.

According to the U.S. Department of Labor, migrant workers receive an annual wage lower than that of any other income group in the country. In 1969 they worked an average of 85 days a year and they averaged a meager annual salary of only \$891. This is approximately \$30 less than the average migrant salary for 1967 and 1968. Their pitiful income is in shabby contrast to the earnings of American factory workers. The basic necessities of food and clothing consume all of their meager paychecks and more.

This month in my home State of Ohio approximately 15,000 migrant workers are laboring to harvest tomatoes and sugar beets. By November more than 50,000 migrant laborers will have worked, often on their hands and knees, in nearly half the counties of Ohio for the lowest wages paid to any sizable economic group in the State. They will have worked an average of fewer than 100 days and earned an average annual wage of less than \$1,000.

Mr. President, nationwide more than 2½ million men, women, and children are caught in this dismal web of poverty and degradation in the midst of plenty.

Housing for migrants both at home and while traveling is disgracefully below what the average American expects for his own family. Because we have not yet devised programs to eliminate poverty amongst a mobile population, social and poverty legislation have been of minimum benefit to the migrant worker who travels a substantial portion of the year.

Unlike most other labor groups in our society agricultural migrant workers are totally lacking in either political or economic power. Their economic and political weakness is even more disgraceful when compared with the awesome power of the agricultural growers and processors who purchase their labors.

Migrants are excluded from the protection given to other workers in their attempts to organize or strike. They are not protected by age requirements in child labor laws. They are not guaranteed workmen's compensation and they are ineligible for unemployment insurance. In addition, because of residency requirements in most States, they are usually not allowed to vote.

In many localities there are legal restrictions against providing public services to nonresidents, therefore barring the migrant farmer and his family from most of the health and welfare services offered to other citizens. One worker at an Ohio camp had a child who was seriously ill. He was told by local welfare officials to take the child to a public clinic which was open only on Thursday and Friday. Unfortunately, the child was dying on Saturday.

Mr. President, the fate of this child is all too typical of what such an existence does to the children of hapless, helpless migrant workers. Because there is no one to care for the children while their parents are laboring in the fields, many of them must work also. Being constantly on the move, the children cannot stay long enough in one place to receive an adequate education. Thirty percent of all migrant children have less than 8 years of education; 40 percent, less than 11 years. If they survive their early childhood they are virtually doomed to repeating the dismal life of their parents.

The fact is that 17 percent of migrant workers today are functional illiterates. Half are under 25 years of age and one-fourth of them are between 14 and 17. Because of their youth or lack of education, most migrant workers and their youngsters have no awareness or interest in the political process. They move from county to county, and from State to State. They have no Representatives or Senators in the State legislatures or in the U.S. Congress to whom they can turn for help. Theirs are the unheard voices of misery and despair.

In the past, only local remedies were sought. State and local governments and private organizations have in many instances acted to aid these people. However, because of the great number of migrant workers and because of their constant movement their plight is a national problem of concern to all Americans.

While the Congress has enacted legislation to alleviate some of the problems afflicting these people, additional action must be taken to allow them and their children to share in the benefits of our society.

First and foremost, migrant workers urgently require coverage under the National Labor Relations Act. They must have the right to utilize the collective

bargaining process to improve their economic and social status as industrial workers have for more than 30 years.

Mr. President, one of the most critical needs of the migrant agricultural worker and his family is for decent housing and sanitation. Programs must be developed to assist in the construction of adequate housing facilities for these workers and their dependents.

The migrant worker faces unemployment with no reserve in the form of unemployment compensation which the industrial worker has long taken for granted. Our unemployment insurance laws must be amended to provide benefits for workers employed on large commercial farms.

At the present time a farmworker is eligible for social security if he receives \$150 in cash wages from his employer during the year or if he works for the same employer for cash wages for 20 days or more during the year. Because of their constant movement, short periods of employment and low rate of compensation, most migrant workers do not meet the requirements to be eligible for social security benefits. Our social security law should be amended by reducing from \$150 to \$50 the amount which must be earned from a single employer each year by farmworkers. In that one act social security benefits would thereby be extended to 500,000 farmworkers, the great majority of them migrant laborers.

Mr. President, while these proposals recognize the problems of migrant workers and, to some degree, will correct their wretched working and living conditions, they by no means completely solve the problem of bringing the living standard of these forgotten people to the level enjoyed by most other Americans.

The migrant worker and his family face a near hopeless future. Each year as the educational and skill requirements of tomorrow's farm jobs are increased, opportunities for migrants will become further limited. Additional and improved programs for housing, unemployment compensation, and social security will help. These programs must be cohesive, comprehensive, and extensive. We must not allow any group in our affluent society to continue to be so consistently abused and so long forgotten.

It is the duty of the Members of Congress, before adjournment this year, to take affirmative action in their behalf.

ECONOMIC MADNESS

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, interest rates on home mortgages rose 26 percent in 1969. Today, the buyer of a \$20,000 home must pay nearly double that amount—\$35,000—for interest alone. Almost half of the money a home buyer pays goes not to the builder, not to the worker, not to the seller, but to the lender, primarily the big bankers whose 1969 profits ranged from 10 to 50 percent. Bank earnings during the tight money year of 1969 were among the fattest in history. Most families with annual incomes under \$13,000—more than half

of all Americans—cannot really afford to buy homes. After an unprecedented period of prosperity, we have suffered an unfortunate downturn. The overall index of industrial production declined for 6 months in a row. We hope that has now been halted. Unemployment, which was 3.3 percent in December 1968, was above 5 percent last May. At the same time inflation is choking the economy. The cost of living rose 6.3 percent in 1969 and continues soaring. The inflationary effect of the Vietnam war must result ultimately in a 10-percent reduction in the standard of living of the average American. This according to one expert economist. Meanwhile, a few become rich from high interest rates while families' workingmen and small businessmen pay and suffer.

TAKING SALT WITH A GRAIN OF SAFEGUARD

Mr. JAVITS. As a cosponsor, for the third consecutive year, of the Cooper-Hart amendment I wish to state my reasons for supporting the substance of this year's amendment, which I had a hand in shaping. The amendment I support authorizes approximately \$1 billion—including resource and development funds—for continuing work of phase I of Safeguard at Grand Forks and Malmstrom. I am nonetheless convinced that the Safeguard system should not—and may well never be—constructed.

Spokesmen for the President have insisted most urgently that Safeguard is an indispensable "bargaining chip" at the strategic arms limitation talks—SALT—with the Soviet Union. It has been intimated by administration spokesmen that a SALT agreement to limit offensive and defensive strategic systems is within our grasp. It is further intimated that the Senate action to kill Safeguard altogether is the single action most likely to jeopardize the achievement of a SALT agreement at this time.

That is an arresting argument. It has been criticized on several grounds and none of us are happy with it. The Senate has not been consulted, or adequately briefed, on the conduct of the SALT negotiations, as called for in the Constitution. Consequently, we are not in a position to dispute the administration's assertion regarding the direct correlation between Safeguard and the prospects for a SALT agreement. Under the circumstances, we must give the benefit of the doubt to the President. I am prepared to authorize an additional billion dollars for further work on the two sites authorized last year to enhance the prospect of an early SALT agreement—which reportedly calls for the subsequent disbandment of the two authorized sites. In short, I am prepared to take SALT with a grain of Safeguard.

Five distinguished men, with important experience in arms control negotiations in previous administrations, in a letter published in the Washington Post on August 10, have challenged head on the "bargaining chip" rationale for Safeguard. This joint statement by Averell Harriman, Karl Kaysen, Adrian Fisher, Franklin Long, and Herbert Scoville asserts that—

In our judgment, a Senate vote against the ABM is a vote for success in SALT.

On the other hand, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator STENNIS, has stated:

It is my firm opinion—and this is not an overnight thought—that to defeat Safeguard in the Senate this year would be the worst possible setback that we could hand to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Vienna.

Senator JACKSON, the floor manager, has stated:

I remain convinced that deployment of Safeguard is an essential condition for the SALT talks to succeed.

It is no secret that the position asserted by Senator STENNIS and Senator JACKSON is the position of the highest authorities of the administration. It is a position which is also maintained by lower level officials who have been intimately involved in the day-to-day negotiating process of the SALT talks.

In its boldest form, the assertion that Safeguard is essential to the success of SALT lacks a compelling persuasiveness. I have heard one plausible "explanation" of this proposition which has helped to overcome my own skepticism and which I would, accordingly, like to share with the Senate.

It has been explained to me that the Soviet negotiating team represents a coalition of interests having diverse reasons for wanting a SALT agreement. It is said that the Soviet negotiating coalition is a delicately constructed one and that the element representing Soviet military is the most reluctant and suspicious element. The group representing the Soviet Union's military viewpoint is said to be interested primarily in halting the development of an American ABM system. Presumably—using the "worst case" war-gaming approach—the Soviet strategic planners place a higher efficacy factor on Safeguard's capabilities than our own scientific community does. Accordingly, it is contended that the Soviet military component, which is prominently represented in the Soviet negotiating team, might lose interest in achieving SALT agreement if the Safeguard system is killed off in the Senate. The defection of the Soviet military element could disrupt the delicately constructed Soviet negotiating consensus and thus jeopardize an agreement otherwise desired by other elements of the Soviet hierarchy.

I feel that I have no choice but to give the benefit of doubt to the President and his negotiators in this situation. For this reason, in discussions leading to the formulation of the Cooper-Hart amendment I urged that appropriate account must be taken of the administration's "bargaining chip" contention. I am satisfied that this consideration is fully accommodated in the Cooper-Hart amendment, in authorizing further construction only of the two sites authorized by the Senate last year.

In accepting the "bargaining chip" thesis to the extent that it is accommodated by the Cooper-Hart amendment, I nonetheless wish to express my dissatisfaction with the administration's

handling of the crucial question of the relationship of the SALT talks to the Safeguard program.

In my judgment, the Soviet Union undoubtedly has a variety of incentives motivating it to seek an agreement to limit the strategic arms race. In an overall sense, I believe that concern over Safeguard, per se, is a minor factor in Soviet calculations. The broader and more significant incentives I would judge to be such factors as: First, a compulsion to avoid the vast economic expense of an accelerated arms race involving the next generation of strategic nuclear weapons and uncertainty as to the capacity of Soviet technology in the computer and electronics fields to compete successfully with the United States on the next generation of weapons systems; second, a desire to achieve formal international acceptance of its position of strategic parity with the United States; third, a desire to ease and stabilize its strategic relationship with the West, in anticipation of a growing strategic threat from Communist China in the East.

The major incentives of the United States in seeking a SALT agreement are matters which go to the very heart of our national life and values and of our position in the world. In my judgment, concern over the alleged SS-9 threat is also a minor factor in the overall national decision to seek a SALT agreement, with its inevitable far-reaching implications.

The themes and issues of SALT are the great and encompassing questions of our era. They are preeminently the issues most in need of thorough debate and consideration in the Senate. In this context, it is regrettable, in my judgment, that the administration has chosen to depict SALT to the Senate as a bargaining process essentially concerned with trading off ABM against SS-9.

As recently as his July 30 press conference, President Nixon publicly expressed optimism at reaching a SALT agreement. Virtually the whole case for Safeguard this year is being made on the grounds of its indispensability to the prospects of a SALT agreement. It is precisely because the Senate shares the constitutional responsibility for SALT that I consider the Administration's handling of this issue with the Senate to be inadequate and unsatisfactory.

At the opening of my statement I expressed my conviction that the Safeguard system should not—and never may be—constructed. The technical justification for Safeguard has been called into such grave doubt that even the Pentagon has conceded key points in the criticism and has indicated the intention to modify Safeguard extensively along lines suggested earlier by its critics.

In my judgment, the basic flaw of the Safeguard system from the technological viewpoint is the same as that which proved to be the undoing of the TFX. By attempting to design a system which could perform several divergent missions—that is, light area defense as well as hardpoint defense of Minuteman—Safeguard ends up being unable satisfac-

torily to perform any of its assigned missions. The analogy to TFX and its ill-fated albatross of "commonality" is now branded conspicuously onto Safeguard.

Senators COOPER and HART and others have summarized the technological case against Safeguard in some detail. Moreover, there is extensive testimony by a blue-ribbon roster of American scientists—in and out of government—in the printed hearings before four congressional committees detailing at length the technical deficiencies of Safeguard.

It is not surprising that Safeguard should prove to be so vulnerable on technical grounds—considering its diverse background. It was first presented to Congress in its Sentinel configuration as a system intended to provide a light population defense against a Chinese Communist threat. Even in this incarnation, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ranking members of the Armed Services Committee supported the system primarily as a "building block" in a potential "thick" area defense against a Soviet threat. Early in 1969, the system was reconfigured out of the same components, rechristened Safeguard and given the primary mission of "hardpoint" defense of Minuteman deterrent. To this, the subsidiary missions of defense against a Chinese "blackmail" threat and defense against a Soviet "accidental launch" were subsequently added.

This year, the Senate Armed Services Committee has again altered the mission of Safeguard. In the words of Senator JACKSON:

Safeguard has been confined to defense of the deterrent; authorization of a thin area defense has been specifically denied.

However, according to the recommendations of the O'Neill report—specifically solicited by the Defense Department from a blue ribbon panel of defense scientists—

If the only purpose of Safeguard is defined to be to protect Minutemen, Phase IIA as defined in March 1969 should not proceed. Instead, a dedicated system for active defense of Minutemen should replace or . . . augment Phase IIA.

In addition, the O'Neill report specifically states:

Phase I alone is not worth its cost.

These are the technical reasons for my conviction that the Safeguard system should not, and never ought to be, built.

There is an additional ironic, and perhaps more significant, reason for my conviction that Safeguard will never be built—the SALT negotiations which are now cited as the main justification for Safeguard. According to reports, we are on the verge of reaching a SALT agreement which will provide for "zero" ABM, or, more probably, for ABM systems restricted exclusively to protection of the national command authorities—that is, Washington and Moscow. Accordingly, if there is a SALT agreement it is likely to require the dismantling of work completed thus far at Malmstrom and Grand Forks.

If the SALT talks fail, on the other

hand, it will be necessary for us to reconsider the entire question of our strategic posture, both with respect to offensive as well as defensive systems. I do not believe that Safeguard where it is now, could justify its survival under either set of circumstances.

It is precisely because the failure of SALT will result in circumstances which require a thorough—and wholly unpleasant—rethinking of our entire strategic posture and requirements—with the most ominous and dangerous implications for world peace and security, that I am prepared to concede the benefit of the doubt to the administration's contention that it needs Safeguard for the success of SALT. If we are able to get an agreement limiting offensive and defensive weapons—and thus averting a new round of the nuclear arms race—I would consider the \$1 billion authorized for additional work on Safeguard to be money well spent.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, with a limitation of 3 minutes on statements made therein.

THE KENDALL SCHOOL

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 1078, S. 4083, introduced by Mr. YARBOROUGH and other Senators.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 4083) to modify and enlarge the authority of Gallaudet College to maintain and operate the Kendall School as a demonstration elementary school for the deaf to serve primarily the National Capital region, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, the bill, S. 4083, would authorize the board of directors of Gallaudet College to construct and operate a demonstration preschool and elementary school for the deaf in connection with the Kendall School on the campus of Gallaudet College.

In its continuing efforts to serve deaf children from the National Capital re-

gion, the Kendall School must become a national demonstration preschool and elementary school for the deaf. There are a number of reasons why this is so:

First. The evolution of the Kendall School into a demonstration elementary school represents a natural progression in its development;

Second. The establishment and operation of the Model Secondary School for the Deaf—Public Law 89-694—has created a new perspective on the education of the deaf; and

Third. The rubella epidemic of 1963-65 and the predicted epidemic in 1972-73 are creating a need for a more appropriate learning environment. Professionals agree that unless major efforts are directed to the elementary level many deaf students will not be able to benefit from federally supported programs such as the Model Secondary School for the Deaf and the National Technical Institute for the Deaf—Public Law 89-36—because it is too late to bridge the educational gap. Focus must be on the establishment of a demonstration school for preschool and elementary-age deaf children.

The Kendall School is an established school of quality with a competent staff and physical facilities. Therefore, a demonstration elementary program for deaf children can be established with minimum additional expenditures of Federal funds. There is such a demonstration or model school now for high school level operated on the Gallaudet campus. This bill would authorize the same type of demonstration school for pre-high school level.

If what the experts tell us about the "rock generation" is true, the hearing of many people will be affected by this loud, raucous music. The jet planes are injuring the ear drums of many people, and many veterans are losing their hearing because of noise from bombs and cannon fire. So we have a growing incidence of deafness in the populace.

Preschool deals with children who are deaf while quite young. The people who work in this field have warned us that unless a child's deafness is detected at a very early age and treated at a very early age, the child will never catch up in learning with other children.

We know that if a child's deafness is detected while quite young, before he is old enough to go to school, and if he receives training at an early preschool age, then, with proper schooling that child will have a better chance in life.

At the present time, the average deaf person in America earns, on an average half as much money as a nondeaf person; but with proper education from very tender years, they could earn as much money as the average person who can hear.

I will give an illustration, Mr. President. A few years ago, the school for the deaf in my State, established in 1856, asked the new Internal Revenue office there, the district area that covers many States, where they have the computers, to employ some deaf people. They had

great difficulty getting them to try some deaf people. Finally, they put deaf people to work on the computers.

The computers are in vast rooms which are kept dust free and have soundproof walls but there is quite a bit of noise. Occasionally, one employee working on the computer will speak to another. They found, after a year's experience, that the deaf person, because of having less distractions, makes fewer mistakes than the nondeaf person. The deaf person, working with the computers in that great Internal Revenue Center, is a more efficient worker with the machines than the nondeaf person.

With new opportunities opening up for the deaf, with the proper training, we hope to give the deaf a better life and an economic opportunity equal to that enjoyed by the nondeaf.

The interest and commitment of the Congress in the Kendall School and Gallaudet College dates back to February 16, 1857, when the Congress approved an act to incorporate the Columbia Institution for the Deaf, Dumb, and Blind—renamed the Kendall School for the Deaf in 1885. In succeeding acts and in its annual appropriation, Congress has continued its support of and interest in the operations of Gallaudet College and the Kendall School.

It is interesting to note that Kendall School was started in February of 1857, just a year after the Texas School for the Deaf was founded in Austin in 1856.

The original program of education for deaf children began in a log cabin on a 65-acre site in Austin near the Colorado River.

The Texas School for the Deaf has continued to grow since its establishment, and by 1910 it had a residential population in excess of 500 children. A modern building program began 15 years ago, resulting in a modern school unique for its cottage living arrangements. The Texas School has a current enrollment of approximately 680 pupils.

The total population of deaf people in Texas is estimated at approximately 11,500 profoundly deaf people, with another 100,000 hard of hearing individuals.

Although great progress has been made made in the education of deaf children in the Texas school system, there is an imperative need for a national demonstration center to operate in a setting such as that provided on the campus of Gallaudet College where educators of the deaf will have a whole spectrum of deaf students from preschool through college for training under optimum conditions. In this way it is hoped that the best and newest methods of education of deaf children can be put to use with experimental equipment and curriculum.

Over the past decade an extensive body of knowledge has been accumulated concerning new approaches to improvement of the education of young deaf children. The Kendall School for the Deaf must obtain the resources to enable it to develop programs and to disseminate this knowledge to other schools. Demonstration of the success of these programs would facilitate the develop-

ment of other area centers throughout the United States.

Mr. President, I urge passage of this much needed legislation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill (S. 4083) was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed, as follows:

S. 4083

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That for the purpose of providing day and residential facilities for elementary education for persons who are deaf in order to prepare them for high school and other secondary study, and to provide an exemplary educational program to stimulate the development of similar excellent programs throughout the Nation, the directors of Gallaudet College are authorized to maintain and operate Kendall School as a demonstration elementary school for the deaf, to serve primarily residents of the National Capital region.

Sec. 2. As used in this Act—

(a) The term "elementary school" means a school which provides education for deaf children from the age of onset of deafness to age fifteen, inclusive, but not beyond the eighth grade or its equivalent.

(b) The term "construction" includes construction and initial equipment of new buildings, and expansion, remodeling, and alteration of existing buildings and equipment thereof, including architect's services, but excluding off-site improvements.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

Sec. 3. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year such sums as may be necessary for the establishment and operation, including construction and equipment, of the demonstration elementary school provided for in section 1.

(b) Federal funds appropriated for the benefit of the school shall be used only for the purposes for which paid and in accordance with the applicable provisions of this Act.

Sec. 4. In the design and construction of any facilities, maximum attention shall be given to excellence of architecture and design, works of art, and innovative auditory and visual devices and installations appropriate for educational functions of such facilities.

REPEAL OF EXISTING STATUTES

Sec. 5. The following statutes or parts of statutes are hereby repealed:

(a) Section 1 of the Act of March 1, 1901 (31 Stat. 844), as amended.

(b) Section 1 of the Act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat. 962), as amended.

(c) Act of November 7, 1966 (80 Stat. 1399).

(d) Section 1 of the Act of March 1, 1905 (33 Stat. 901), as amended.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed.

Mr. HUGHES. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

ORDER FOR EXTENSION OF PERIOD FOR THE TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I ask unanimous consent that, notwithstanding the previous order providing for the

expiration of the morning hour at 12 noon, the period for the transaction of morning business be briefly extended, with statements therein limited to 3 minutes, upon the conclusion of which the unfinished business will be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, more than 1,400 American men are still held prisoner of war by the North Vietnamese under conditions that violate the Geneva Convention. If it is true, as Syrus Publius said, that the pain of the mind is worse than the pain of the body, then the suffering and distress of these men's wives and children is unimaginable. We pray, Mr. President, that the North Vietnamese will cease this barbaric behavior and join the civilized nations of the world by adhering to at least the minimum standards of the Geneva Convention.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

NEW WELFARE REFORM PROPOSALS

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, in response to questions which I posed during the current Finance Committee hearings on welfare reform, Mr. Elliot Richardson, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, now has disclosed that the costs of the proposed family assistance plan would be higher than the committee had been led to believe.

Throughout most of the hearings, the committee had been told that the estimated Federal cost of the new program would be \$9.1 billion in fiscal year 1971.

Now, according to Secretary Richardson's letter to me dated July 30, the total program cost is estimated to be \$10.8 billion for fiscal year 1971.

The Federal cost for welfare programs for fiscal year 1970 which ended June 30 was \$4.4 billion.

I asked Secretary Richardson to give me also the estimated cost of the administration's new program for fiscal 1972. He puts this figure at \$11.8 billion. Earlier in the committee hearings, in response to questions by me, Secretary Richardson estimated the cost for fiscal year 1972 at between \$10 and \$10.5 billion, stating

he thought this figure probably was high.

In a letter to me, Secretary Richardson explained that in the materials previously made available to the committee:

Projections of maintenance payments for FY 1972 appear in the Committee print, but certain other items do not.

I am glad that Secretary Richardson now has revealed the full cost of the welfare proposals which HEW is advocating. That will enable the committee to deal realistically with the problems involved.

I am not prepared to pass final judgment on the administration proposals. Hearings before the committee are continuing, and I want to have the benefit of all the testimony before making up my mind.

I must say, however, that I have grave doubts about the wisdom of so sharp an increase in welfare costs.

It does seem to me that in reforming our welfare programs we must see to it that there is adequate reward for work, and adequate concern for the taxpayers' dollar.

The Nation has an obligation toward those who are physically or mentally unable to work. But I do not think that taxpayers' funds should be used to support able-bodied citizens who refuse to work.

I want to make it clear that I support the principle of welfare reform. The present system is costly, inefficient, and inequitable.

But before we make a change, I believe we must be sure that we are making a change for the better.

President Nixon has properly focused attention on the swelling Government expenditures, so I feel it appropriate to bring out the facts in regard to the costs of the new welfare plan.

It is obvious that the new proposal will be quite costly when it is realized that while we now have 10 million persons on welfare, this figure will be increased to roughly 24 million if the family assistance program is approved.

At the present time, 41 percent of all welfare recipients reside in five States, California, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Texas.

Under the new proposal, Texas which now has 479,000 on welfare would then have 1,522,000 receiving public assistance.

In a report prepared by the staff of the Senate Finance Committee dated July 1970 a breakdown by State is on pages 54, 55, and 56.

Page 7 of that report asserts that in 13 States—

The welfare rolls will be more than tripled under the Administration's new proposal.

To cite several examples, North Carolina would be increased from 195,000 to 960,000; South Carolina from 84,000 to 491,000; Mississippi from 211,000 to 806,000; Georgia from 328,000 to 1,025,000; Texas from 479,000 to 1,521,000; Puerto Rico from 265,000 to 800,000.

In my view, a welfare program must meet these basic objectives:

First, it must take care of those who are physically or mentally unable to

work. The Nation has an obligation to such people, and it must be fulfilled.

Second, it must not turn over the taxpayer's hard-earned funds to able-bodied persons who refuse to work.

Third, it should seek to reduce, and not expand, the welfare rolls.

Secretary Richardson in his statement before the Senate Committee on Finance July 21, 1970, declared the administration's new welfare proposals to be revolutionary and expensive legislative initiatives.

I feel that we need revolutionary initiatives in regard to the present welfare program. But I am trying to understand, and then reach a conclusion, as to whether the Nation, in the face of continued and heavy budget deficits, can afford at this time to adopt such an expensive new program.

Is it wise to double the number of recipients of public assistance? There are features of the program that I like—but we need to give full consideration to the impact this program will have on the taxpayers and on the inflationary aspects of our economy.

I am withholding judgment until it can be ascertained as to whether this is a sound program, as to whether it is one the taxpayers can afford, and whether it is wise to increase the public assistance rolls from 10 to 24 million persons.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR BELLMON ON THURSDAY, AUGUST 13, 1970

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Thursday next, after the disposition of the Journal, the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON) be recognized for 30 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Geisler, one of his secretaries.

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CORPORATION FOR HOUSING PARTNERSHIPS—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. ALLEN) laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, which, with the accompanying report, was referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency:

To the Congress of the United States:

I am transmitting the first Report of the National Corporation for Housing Partnerships for the period December 16, 1968 to June 30, 1970.

The Corporation was created under Title IX of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 as a private organization to work in partnership with local sponsors and builders, helping to produce housing responsive to local needs. The past year has demonstrated the possibilities of the Corporation. We

should be particularly proud of the success of the initial financing program, which raised more than \$42 million in risk capital. These funds will enable the Corporation to assist in the production of more than 100,000 units of low and moderate income housing over the next few years.

It is my belief that the National Corporation for Housing Partnerships will make an important contribution to solving our Nation's housing problems. I commend this Report to your attention.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, August 11, 1970.

REPORT OF THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. ALLEN) laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, which, with the accompanying report, was referred to the Committee on Public Works:

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with Section 10(a) of Public Law 358, 83rd Congress, as amended, I am transmitting the Annual Report of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation for the year ending December 31, 1969.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, August 11, 1970.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. ALLEN) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(For nominations received today, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. ALLEN) laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

REPORT ON TRANSFER OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES IN ALASKA

A letter from the Secretary of Defense, reporting, pursuant to law, on the transfer of certain government-owned communications facilities in Alaska; to the Committee on Armed Services.

REPORT ON DONATION OF CERTAIN SURPLUS PROPERTY

A letter from the Secretary of the Navy, reporting, pursuant to law, on the intention of the Department of the Navy to donate certain surplus property to the East Carolina Chapter, Inc., National Railway Historical Society, Greenville, N.C.; to the Committee on Armed Services.

REPORTS OF COMPTROLLER GENERAL

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on reduction of cost by improving management of Department of Defense Vehicle Maintenance in Europe, dated August 11, 1970 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on audit of financial statements of Federal Home Loan Banks supervised by Federal Home Loan Bank Board, for the year ended December 31, 1969, dated August 10, 1970 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. GOLDWATER, from the Committee on Armed Services, without amendment:

H.R. 6265. An act to provide that a headstone or marker be furnished at Government expense for the unmarked grave of any Medal of Honor recipient (Rept. No. 91-1085);

H.R. 8662. An act to authorize command of the U.S. ship *Constitution* (IX-21) by retired officers of the U.S. Navy (Rept. No. 91-1086);

H.R. 9052. An act to amend section 716 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the interservice transfers of officers of the Coast Guard (Rept. No. 91-1087); and

H.R. 13195. An act to amend title 10 of the United States Code to provide that U.S. flags may be presented to parents of deceased servicemen (Rept. No. 91-1088).

By Mr. YARBOROUGH, from the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, without amendment:

S. 1196. A bill for the relief of Casa Angelica mental retardation facility of Albuquerque, N. Mex. (Rept. No. 91-1089).

By Mr. YARBOROUGH, from the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, with amendments:

S. 3355. A bill to amend title IX of the Public Health Service Act so as to extend and improve the existing program relating to education, research, training and demonstrations in the fields of heart disease, cancer, stroke, and other major diseases and conditions, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 91-1090).

BILLS INTRODUCED

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. PEARSON:

S. 4211. A bill for the relief of Birender Singh Chopra and his wife, Madhu Chopra, and his children, Aml Chopra, Seema Chopra, and Rakesh Chopra; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CHURCH (for himself and Mr. JORDAN of Idaho):

S. 4212. A bill for the establishment of Sawtooth Mountains National Park; and

S. 4213. A bill for improved management of national forest lands in the Sawtooth, Challis, and Boise National Forests in the State of Idaho; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

(The remarks of Mr. CHURCH when he introduced the bills appear earlier in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

By Mr. ANDERSON:

S. 4214. A bill to amend the act entitled "An Act granting land to the city of Albuquerque for public purposes", approved June 9, 1906; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS

S. 2453

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia, Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS) I ask unanimous

consent that, at the next printing, the name of the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON) be added as a cosponsor of S. 2453, to further promote equal employment opportunities for American workers.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DOMINICK). Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 4041

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing the name of the distinguished Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART) be added as a cosponsor of S. 4041, to repeal section 2775 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, relating to amounts to be shown on airline tickets and advertising.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DOMINICK). Without objection, it is so ordered.

SENATE RESOLUTION 441—RESOLUTION RELATIVE TO THE DEATH OF HON. G. ROBERT WATKINS, LATE A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. SCOTT submitted a resolution (S. Res. 441) relative to the death of Hon. G. Robert Watkins, late a Representative from the State of Pennsylvania, which was considered and agreed to.

(The remarks of Mr. SCOTT when he submitted the resolution, and the discussion in connection with its adoption, appear in the RECORD at the end of today's proceedings.)

FAMILY ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1970—AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 833

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, on November 3, 1969, I introduced amendment No. 267 to S. 2986, the family assistance plan. This amendment provided for a program of grants for the construction of day care facilities to serve primarily the children of mothers receiving welfare who could benefit from job training or secure employment. Today, I am introducing for myself and Senators HARTFIELD, MATHIAS, PACKWOOD, RANDOLPH, SCHWEIKER, and YARBOROUGH a revised version of this amendment.

Today we are confronted with a pressing problem—finding adequate child care for 5 or 6 million children under 14 who are the children of welfare mothers. These mothers could be placed in job training or jobs with the advent of meaningful welfare reform but they have children who cannot be left to roam the streets while their mothers are training and then begin to work. In fact the lack of such facilities will prevent many mothers from working who would far rather hold a job than simply hold down a position on the welfare role.

There are currently 5,296,000 children on AFDC across the country young enough to require some form of supervision during the day; 475,000 of them live in Illinois. Yet, there are only 637,000 day care spaces available for all of these children and only 18,948 of them are in Illinois.

It seems abundantly clear that if we do not increase the number of day care facilities to accommodate these children, we will not be able to remove a significant number of women from the welfare rolls through workfare. No woman should be expected to leave her child at home with inadequate supervision while she goes to work.

The work-incentive—WIN—program illustrates clearly that an employment program lacking a substantial child care component will not work. A total of 1,700 mothers, a significant portion of those involved in this experimental program, could not be referred for job training or placement solely because day care was unavailable for their children. WIN progress reports from many States, including West Virginia, Georgia, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Arkansas, indicate that one of the basic flaws in State programs is the paucity of child care centers.

The family assistance plan provides for expansion of the number of day care spaces available for children of low-income, working mothers. Some of these spaces will result from more home care and from the funds for the remodeling and the acquisition of existing buildings contained in the bill. But many will have to be created through the construction of new facilities, particularly if they are to be filled by children under seven. Code and licensing requirements for facilities housing these children are so stringent that remodeling is often insufficient and there is little the Federal Government can do to change these requirements. Thus, in many cases, only new structures built expressly to meet code provisions will suffice.

There are now approximately 1.6 million children under 7 receiving AFDC, with 85,257 of them residing in Illinois. Thousands more will fill the welfare rolls once family assistance is enacted. The total number will fill existing day care centers three times over. It is little wonder that the Women's Bureau has gone on record as calling for "A special thrust to obtain construction funds for new child care facilities."

The administration has begun this thrust by including construction among the purposes for which day care money authorized by FAP can be expanded. My amendment embodies the principle of the administration's proposal but creates a separate authorization and separate guidelines for the construction program. It is an outgrowth of the information gained during hearings on Family Assistance and a reassessment of our day care needs.

I ask unanimous consent that the amendment, a summary of its provisions, and a distribution of the funds it authorizes be printed in the RECORD at this point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McCLELLAN). The amendment will be received and printed, and will be appropriately referred; and, without objection, the amendment, summary, and chart will be printed in the RECORD.

AMENDMENT No. 833

The amendment (No. 833) was referred to the Committee on Finance, as follows: On page 41, line 20, insert "(A)" immediately after "Sec. 436(a)(1)".

On page 42 line 24 strike out "(2)" and insert in lieu thereof "(B)".

On page 43, line 11, strike out "(3)" and insert in lieu thereof "(C)".

On page 43, line 14, strike out "(b)" and insert in lieu thereof "(2)".

On page 43, line 21, strike out "(C)" and insert in lieu thereof "(3)".

On page 44 between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:

"(b)(1) For the purpose of providing (in accordance with the provisions of this subsection) financial assistance to public and nonprofit agencies and organizations in meeting part of the cost of construction of day care facilities in communities where such facilities are needed there are hereby authorized to be appropriated \$45,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1971, \$49,500,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, \$54,450,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, and the \$59,895,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974.

"(2)(A) The sums appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) for any fiscal year shall be allotted as follows: Each State shall be allotted an amount of such sums which bears the same ratio to such sums as the number of children under age 7 in such State who are receiving welfare assistance bears to the number of children under age 7 in all the States who are receiving welfare assistance. If the allotment of any State, as determined under the preceding sentence is less than \$100,000, the allotment of such State shall be increased to that amount, the total of the increases thereby required being derived by proportionately reducing the allotment (as determined under the preceding sentence) of each of the remaining States but with such adjustment as may be necessary to prevent the allotment of any of such remaining States from being thereby reduced to less than that amount.

"(B) For purposes of this subsection the term 'welfare assistance' means (i) benefits in the form of money payments paid under a State program approved under part A of this title (as in effect prior to July 1, 1971, and (ii) benefits paid under part D of this title (as in effect after June 30, 1971).

"(C) Allotments under subparagraph (A) shall be made on the basis of the most recent data available to the Secretary immediately prior to the fiscal year with respect to which allotments are made. The Secretary, in determining the number of children referred to in subparagraph (A) shall use a monthly average over such period of time (not in excess of one year) as he may deem appropriate.

"(D) Any sum allotted to a State for a fiscal year under this paragraph and remaining unobligated at the end of such year shall remain available to such State, for the purposes for which made, for the next fiscal year (and for such year only), in addition to the sums allotted to such State for such next fiscal year if the Secretary determines that such sum is needed for such next fiscal year in such State to carry out the purposes of this subsection. If the Secretary determines that such sum will not be needed for such next fiscal year in such State for such purposes, he may reallocate such sum from time to time, on such dates as he may fix, to other States which he determines have need for additional sums to carry out the purposes of this subsection. Any sum so reallocated to any State during any fiscal year shall be deemed to be a part of the allotment of such State for such year.

"(3)(A) From the sums allocated to any State for any fiscal year, the Secretary is authorized to make grants to public and nonprofit private agencies and organizations to assist them in the construction of day care facilities in such State.

"(B) Grants under this subsection for any project shall be made only upon application therefor submitted to the Secretary directly by the public or nonprofit private agency or organization seeking such grant or through

the public or nonprofit private agency or organization designated by the appropriate elected or appointed official or officials pursuant to Sec. 436 A 1 (b). If two or more agencies or organizations join in the project, the application may be filed by one or more of such agencies.

"(C) Any application for a grant under this subsection with respect to any project shall contain or be supported by—

"(i) a description of the site for such project

"(ii) a description of the type day care services which will be provided when the project becomes operative and a justification of such project in terms of the needs it is designed to meet;

"(iii) reasonable assurance that title to such site is or will be vested in one or more agencies filing the application or in a public or other nonprofit private agency or organization which is to operate the facility after it is acquired or when construction is completed, as the case may be

"(iv) reasonable assurance that adequate financial support will be available for the construction of the project and for its maintenance and operation when completed

"(v) reasonable assurance that the project upon completion will be operated for a reasonable length of time as a day care facility

"(vi) reasonable assurance that any laborer or mechanic employed by any contractor or subcontractor in the performance of work on the construction of the facility will be paid wages at rates not less than those prevailing on similar construction in the locality as determined by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with the Davis-Bacon Act as amended and the Secretary of Labor shall have, with respect to the labor standards specified in this clause the authority and functions set forth in Reorganization Plan Numbered 14 of 1950 (15 F.R. 3176) and section 2 of the Act of June 13, 1934, as amended (40 U.S.C. 276c)

"(vii) reasonable assurance that use of the facility will not be denied to any child because of his race, creed, color, or national origin.

"(viii) reasonable assurance that the project upon completion, will be a facility which will be designed and operated so as to meet licensing and similar requirements imposed with respect to day care facilities by the State (and any political subdivision thereof) for the area in which the project is to be located and

"(ix) such other information as the Secretary may by regulations require.

"(D) The Secretary shall not approve any application for a grant with respect to any project under this subsection unless—

"(i) such application contains or is supported by the materials, assurances and information required by subparagraph (C)

"(ii) there is available from the allotment of the State in which such project is to be located amounts sufficient to pay the Federal share of the cost of such project, and

"(iii) the Secretary determines that there is a need for such project in such area after taking into consideration the following factors—

"(I) the number of low income working mothers, of mothers engaged in job training and of mothers receiving welfare assistance, in the area in which such project is to be located;

"(II) the availability within such area of opportunities for mothers to secure employment or to participate in job training programs

"(III) the increase if any required in the number or capacity of day care facilities in such area to meet the needs for day care of the mothers in such area who are employed or engaged in job training plus the mothers in such area who are not employed or engaged in job training but who, if their needs for day care were met, would be able to ac-

cept employment or participate in job training programs and

"(IV) the extent to which there are available in such area buildings which are or could become (after appropriate remodeling or conversion), suitable to serve as day care facilities.

"(4) (A) Any grant made by the Secretary under this subsection shall contain provision for the recovery by the United States of an appropriate and equitable portion of such grant in the event the facility with respect to which grant is made ceases, prior to the expiration of such reasonable period as the Secretary shall require, to be used and operated as a day care facility.

"(B) In addition to the provision referred to in subparagraph (A), any such grant shall be made on such terms and subject to such conditions as the Secretary deems proper to protect the financial interests of the United States and to assure that such grant will be used to carry out the purposes for which it was made.

"(C) Payments to the recipient of any such grant shall be made in such installments and on such terms and conditions as the Secretary may prescribe.

"(5) For purposes of this subsection—
 "(A) the term 'Federal share' means with respect to any project, 75 per centum of the cost of construction of such project

"(B) the term 'construction' means the construction of new buildings (including architects' fees and the acquisition of the land upon which such buildings are to be constructed) such term includes initial equipment of any such newly constructed building (but initial equipment shall be taken into account only to the extent that the cost thereof does not exceed 3 per centum of the costs of construction attributable to items other than such equipment) but such term does not include the acquisition of existing buildings or the expansion, remodeling, or alteration of existing buildings.

"(C) the term 'title', when used with reference to a site for a project, means a fee simple, or such other estate or interest (including a leasehold on which the annual rental does not exceed 4 per centum of the value of the land) as the Secretary finds sufficient to assure for a period of not less than fifty years' undisturbed use and possession for the purposes of construction and operation of the project and

"(D) the term 'local share' means with respect to any project, 25 per centum of the cost of construction of such project."

EXPLANATION OF DAY CARE FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION AMENDMENT TO H.R. 16311, THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN

1. This amendment creates a separate program of grants for the construction of day care facilities primarily for the use of children from families receiving Family Assistance.

2. The amendment authorizes the following amounts over a four year period:
 \$45,000,000 for the 1st year of enactment.
 \$49,500,000 for the 2nd year of enactment.
 \$54,450,000 for the 3rd year of enactment.
 \$59,895,000 for the 4th year of enactment.

3. The money provided by this program is allocated by formula to each state. The formula takes into consideration the number of children under 7 receiving welfare in each state. This age cut-off was selected because new facilities are most needed to accommodate children this age. It is a two part formula to provide for the transition from AFDC to FAP.

For the first year the amount allocated to each state will be based on the ratio of the number of children under 7 in the state receiving AFDC to the number of children under 7 in all the states receiving AFDC.

For subsequent years, the amount allocated each state will be based on the ratio of the number of children under 7 in the state receiving Family Assistance to the number

of children in all the states receiving Family Assistance.

4. To ensure a more equitable distribution of funds to all the states, no state will receive less than \$100,000 in grant money. Should a state be unable to utilize its full share of the funds, the remainder will be reallocated among the states.

5. Grants will be made upon application to the Secretary directly by public or non-profit agencies and organizations or through the public or non-profit agency designated by the appropriate official as the prime grantee for a specific city or area. This method of distribution is consistent with the rest of the day care section of FAP.

6. The amendment sets out certain assurances concerning the use of grant money and the construction of facilities that have to be given by grantees.

7. To ensure that money provided by this amendment is allocated to areas with the greatest need for new facilities, the amendment stipulates some of the criteria the Secretary must use in funding a project. He must consider:

- a. the number of low income working mothers, mothers engaged in job training, and mothers receiving welfare in the area in which a project is to be located;
- b. the availability within such area of opportunities for mothers to secure employment or participate in job training programs;
- c. the increase, if any, required in the number or capacity of day care facilities in such area to meet the needs for day care of the mothers in the area who are employed or in training programs or who could be employed or placed in training programs;
- d. the extent to which there are available in such areas buildings that could be re-modeled for day care centers.

8. The federal share of the construction costs for any project will be 75%.

The summary and chart, presented by Mr. PERCY, are as follows:

State	Number of children under 7 years	Proportionate entitlement (percent)	Dollar entitlement fiscal year 1971	Dollar entitlement fiscal year 1972	Dollar entitlement fiscal year 1973	Dollar entitlement fiscal year 1974
United States.....	1,621,476	99.78	45,399,900	49,391,100	54,330,210	59,763,220
Alabama.....	19,532	1.20	546,000	594,000	653,400	718,740
Alaska.....	1,378	.08	36,400	39,600	43,560	47,916
Arizona.....	12,814	.79	359,450	391,050	430,155	473,170
Arkansas.....	9,132	.56	254,800	277,200	304,920	335,412
California.....	255,088	15.73	7,157,150	7,786,350	8,564,985	9,421,483
Colorado.....	19,489	1.20	546,000	594,000	653,400	718,740
Connecticut.....	22,089	1.36	618,800	673,200	740,520	814,572
Delaware.....	66,079	.37	168,350	183,150	201,465	221,611
District of Columbia.....	7,875	.48	218,400	237,600	261,360	287,496
Florida.....	443,164	2.66	1,210,300	1,316,700	1,448,370	1,593,207
Georgia.....	27,780	1.71	778,050	846,450	931,095	1,021,207
Guam.....						
Hawaii.....	6,868	.42	191,100	207,900	228,690	251,559
Idaho.....	3,631	.22	100,100	108,900	119,790	131,769
Illinois.....	85,257	5.25	2,388,750	2,598,750	2,858,625	3,144,487
Indiana.....	14,102	.86	391,300	425,700	468,270	515,097
Iowa.....	13,388	.82	373,100	405,900	446,490	491,139
Kansas.....	11,957	.73	332,150	361,350	397,485	437,233
Kentucky.....	24,745	1.52	691,600	752,400	827,640	910,404
Louisiana.....	27,615	1.70	773,500	841,500	925,650	1,018,215
Maine.....	6,050	.37	168,350	183,150	201,465	221,611
Maryland.....	37,428	2.3	1,046,500	1,138,500	1,252,350	1,377,585
Massachusetts.....	47,914	2.95	1,342,250	1,460,250	1,606,275	1,766,902
Michigan.....	56,860	3.5	1,592,500	1,732,500	1,905,750	2,096,325
Minnesota.....	18,260	1.12	509,600	554,400	609,840	670,824
Mississippi.....	29,201	1.80	819,000	891,000	980,100	1,078,110
Missouri.....	31,838	1.96	891,800	970,200	1,067,220	1,173,942
Montana.....	3,072	.18	81,900	89,100	98,010	107,811
Nebraska.....	7,021	.43	195,650	212,850	234,135	257,548
Nevada.....	2,360	.14	63,700	69,300	76,230	83,853
New Hampshire.....	1,802	.11	50,050	54,450	59,895	65,884
New Jersey.....	47,791	2.94	1,337,700	1,455,300	1,600,830	1,760,913
New Mexico.....	11,576	.71	323,050	351,450	386,595	425,254
New York.....	264,803	16.33	7,430,150	8,038,350	8,891,685	9,780,853
North Carolina.....	27,114	1.67	759,850	826,650	909,315	1,000,246
North Dakota.....	2,626	.16	72,800	79,200	87,120	95,832
Ohio.....	69,894	4.31	1,961,050	2,133,450	2,346,795	2,581,474
Oklahoma.....	24,722	1.52	691,600	752,400	827,640	910,404
Oregon.....	11,668	.71	323,050	351,450	386,595	425,254
Pennsylvania.....	92,456	5.70	2,593,500	2,821,500	3,103,650	3,414,015
Puerto Rico.....	43,494	2.66	1,316,700	1,448,370	1,606,275	1,766,902
Rhode Island.....	9,661	.59	268,450	292,050	321,255	355,380
South Carolina.....	6,168	.38	172,900	188,100	206,910	227,601
South Dakota.....	4,363	.26	118,300	128,700	141,570	155,727
Tennessee.....	26,987	1.66	755,300	821,700	903,870	994,257

State	Number of children under 7 years	Proportionate entitlement (percent)	Dollar entitlement fiscal year 1971	Dollar entitlement fiscal year 1972	Dollar entitlement fiscal year 1973	Dollar entitlement fiscal year 1974
Texas.....	32,987	2.01	914,550	994,950	1,094,445	1,203,889
Utah.....	9,262	.57	259,350	282,150	310,365	341,401
Vermont.....	2,481	.15	68,250	74,250	81,675	89,842
Virgin Islands.....	504	.03	13,650	14,850	16,335	17,968
Virginia.....	12,745	.78	354,900	386,100	424,710	467,181
Washington.....	17,359	1.07	486,850	529,650	582,615	640,876
West Virginia.....	24,403	1.50	682,500	742,500	816,750	898,425
Wisconsin.....	18,632	1.14	518,700	564,300	620,730	682,803
Wyoming.....	1,338	.08	38,400	39,600	43,560	47,916

PUBLIC WORKS APPROPRIATION BILL, 1971—AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENTS NOS. 834 AND 835

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I submit two amendments to H.R. 18127, the public works appropriation bill, and ask that they be printed and lie on the table.

The first amendment would include \$20 million to implement an important new Federal program authorized by the Water Quality Improvement Act signed into law in April for demonstration and preliminary planning projects for pollution removal and prevention in the Great Lakes. This would be the beginning of what must be a major national effort to restore the quality of our deteriorating Great Lakes. We must learn what has to be done, and the most efficient and economic means of doing so, and then we must get on with the job. The demonstration projects authorized by section 15 of the Water Quality Improvement Act are an essential first step which, in view of the grave pollution problems facing the Great Lakes, must be implemented immediately. As passed by the House, H.R. 18127 contains no funds for this new section, and in its action today, the Senate Appropriations Committee sustained the House position.

The second amendment would add \$18,219,000 to appropriations for section 5 of the Federal Water Pollution Act, as amended, for the purpose of fully implementing the section's authorities for water pollution control research, investigations, and information. The Water Quality Improvement Act authorized \$65 million for 12 subsections of this section, seven of which were under the Federal program already authorized by previous Congresses, and five of which were added by the Water Quality Improvement Act. In its bill, the House provided \$46,781,000 for the seven previously authorized subsections, and in its action today, the Senate Appropriations Committee sustained this figure. The \$18.2 million to be proposed by my amendment would bring the figure up to the full \$65 million authorized for this section.

As yet, Congress has not received a budget request to implement either the five new Federal water pollution control research and development provisions of section 5 added by the Water Quality Improvement Act or for the Great Lakes research and development effort authorized by the act. Hopefully, such a request will be received in the near future. But all of these provisions are in my view urgent enough that Congress should act to provide the money without delay, and the

\$20 million proposed in my first amendment for the Great Lakes and the \$18.2 million proposed by my second amendment for other research and development provisions is in my view a small amount of money to invest now compared to the costs to society of the pollution problems this money would help solve.

In my view, providing now for these new subsections as proposed by my second amendment is essential. The Water Quality Improvement Act authorized a program under this section for demonstration projects to abate and prevent the pollution of inland lakes—an urgently needed step in our Nation's commitment to water quality. Hundreds of lakes across the country are being devastated with algae growth and other forms of pollution, because of overdevelopment, overuse, agricultural runoff, and other consequences of a developing, urbanizing, recreation-seeking society. To date, this problem has gained little notice in our Nation's environmental quality efforts, yet the consequences of inland lakes pollution are being felt by millions of people in most of the 50 States. The Water Quality Improvement Act provision would launch an important beginning in our understanding of the best, most effective, most economic means of confronting this critical problem, and should set the stage for a program of major Federal proportions to help rescue our lakes—of which there are some 100,000 across the country.

This year's pollution control act also authorized and directed under section 5 a 2-year study by the Secretary of the Interior to develop criteria for pesticides in our Nation's waters, a necessary step for the eventual establishment of limits in our interstate water quality standards for pesticides. Inasmuch as the study must be completed in 2 years, and was to begin on enactment last April of the legislation, it is essential in my view that we act to provide the funds for the study now.

The Water Quality Improvement Act also added under section 5 a subsection to provide research for the development of technology to effectively control oil spills. The Santa Barbara disaster last year, and subsequent oil accidents in our Nation's waters, and the failure to swiftly and efficiently control the tragic environmental damage, ought to be evidence enough of the urgent need to develop technology adequate to deal with this growing environmental problem. The President's Panel on Oil Spills in its report last year confirmed that we do not have the technology to control a major marine oil spill—and pointed out that if

we continue drilling new offshore oil wells at the present rate, we can expect a Santa Barbara disaster once a year, every year, by 1980.

The act also added under section 5 a subsection for research money to develop new and improved systems of controlling pollution from vessels. My experience with Great Lakes pollution problems leaves no question that this is a very significant factor in the deterioration of water quality of these lakes, and the hearings of the Senate Public Works Committee leave no question that it is a major problem nationwide.

Further, it should be pointed out that in its report on the Water Quality Improvement Act, the Senate Public Works Committee said, regarding the inland lakes research provision, that—

The committee expects that funds to implement the provision of this new research directive shall be made available from the general section 5 authorization and that implementation of this area of research will receive a high priority.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of these amendments be printed in the RECORD at this point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRANSTON). The amendments will be received and printed, and will be appropriately referred; and, without objection, the amendments will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendments (Nos. 834 and 835) were referred to the Committee on Appropriations, as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 834

On page 13, after line 26, insert the following: "For an additional amount to carry out pollution control in the Great Lakes under section 15 of such Act, \$20,000,000."

AMENDMENT NO. 835

On page 13, after line 26, insert the following: "For an additional amount to carry out research, investigations, training and information under section 5 of such Act, \$18,219,000."

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 774 TO S. 3619

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing, the names of the senior Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART) and the junior Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS) be added as a cosponsor of my amendment No. 774 to S. 3619, to create within the office of the President an Office of Disaster Assistance, which would authorize the Small Business Administration to make loans to disaster victims to prevent the dispossession or eviction of

any person from his residence as a result of the foreclosure of any mortgage or lien, cancellation of any contract of sale, or termination of any lease, oral or written of the property which is such person's residence.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURDICK). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. I might add, Mr. President, having viewed the terrible devastation at Corpus Christi, the Aransas area, Gregory, and Rockport last week, after hurricane Celia, that this amendment to the bill is badly needed at this time, in order to protect the people who suffer from hurricanes, tornados, earthquakes, and other natural disasters.

AMENDMENT NO. 793 TO H.R. 17123

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS), I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing of amendment No. 793 to the bill (H.R. 17123) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1971 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, the name of the distinguished junior Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) be added as a cosponsor. Amendment No. 793 calls for restoring to 15,000 the authorized strength of the Coast Guard Selected Reserves.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DOMINICK). Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 819 TO H.R. 17123

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing of amendment No. 819, to House bill 17123, supra, the names of the junior Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF), and the junior Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS) be added cosponsors.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRANSTON). Without objection, it is so ordered.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF HEARING DEALING WITH THE FEDERAL CORRECTION COMMUNITY BASED TREATMENT PROGRAM

Mr. BURDICK. Mr. President, for the information of Members of the Senate and the public, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on National Penitentiaries will be holding a hearing on Tuesday, August 18, to receive testimony on S. 3261, a bill now before the subcommittee that, if enacted, would broaden the Federal corrections community-based treatment program by authorizing the Attorney General to admit to residential community treatment centers persons who are placed on probation, released on parole, or mandatorily released. At present, residence at community treatment centers is restricted by statute to persons committed to terms of confinement and in the custody of the Attorney General. This will be the first in a series of hearings the subcommittee will hold on the

problems and needs of the national corrections system. The hearing on August 18 will be open to the members of the public and will be held in room 2228 of the New Senate Office Building at 10 a.m.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS OF SENATORS

THE ISLANDS OF KAHOOLAWE, HAWAII, AND CULEBRA, P.R.

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I share the concern of the people of the island of Culebra, P.R., about the recently announced plans to acquire additional land on their island to expand training facilities.

Some of us in Hawaii have also long and patiently carried on discussions with the Department of Defense under both Democratic and Republican administrations to bring about a halt to the bombing of Kahoolawe and to restore the island to its former conditions. Therefore, we can well appreciate the frustrations which the people of Culebra feel as they encounter the apparently inexorable determination of the Navy to take over more of the island for targetry and bombing practice.

The island of Kahoolawe was leased to the Federal Government in 1941, and a supplementary agreement in 1944 gave the Government full control. The Army and the Navy used the property jointly for practice bombing purposes, and in 1945 the sublease was transferred to the Department of the Navy. In 1953, the President issued an Executive order which declared that the island would remain in the possession of the United States for public purposes. When the sublease was originally drawn, it was stated that the land would be restored to a condition fit for habitation. However, now the Navy claims that the massive amount of unexploded ordnance makes the island unfit for human use. This experience is relevant to the situation faced by the Culebrans, whose island is noted for its beauty and tranquility.

The Hawaiian flag has eight stripes, one for each of the major islands. This flag has represented our kingdom, republic, and territory, and now it represents our State. There were once eight major inhabited islands, but now, because of the Kahoolawe bombings, we have only seven.

With my small voice, I wish to assure the people of Culebra that their plea for help has been heard by many of us and that we will do our best to bring about a rational solution to their problem.

DEATH OF CORNELIUS C. MOORE, GRAND OLD MAN OF RHODE ISLAND BAR

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, Cornelius C. Moore, the grand old man of our Rhode Island bar, died this morning.

I grieve his death, both as a citizen of Rhode Island and as a warm, personal friend, who was often greatly helped by him.

Mr. Moore had his roots deep in our Newport community. His father was the foreman of the old Torpedo Station. And

although the circle of his friends were vast and far ranging, all Mr. Moore's life and interests were centered around his beloved Newport.

No matter whether the problem involved the starting of new colleges, as was the case with Salve Regina and Vernon Court Junior College, or the bringing of a new industry to our State, as was the case with Raytheon, the fine intelligence and immense sagacity of Mr. Moore were moving forces. In fact, there is not much of lasting good or value that came to our community in the last 40 years in whose accomplishment which Connie Moore did not play a significant role.

He was a man of taste, a true connoisseur whose collection of early American silver is without peer and whose pieces of early American furniture are among the best in our Nation.

Finally, as a lifelong, loyal and strong Democrat, he carried high, with gusto and brilliance, the banner of his party through many battles.

By nature, he was a fighter. He sometimes was impatient with those of lesser intellectual mold, but always fought for fairness and a fair deal for all. He was not interested in high Government office, or other honors, having turned them down in the course of his life.

My wife, who also greatly admired and liked him, and I both join in mourning his death.

LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, there is an increasing awareness that a large segment of the American people are losing confidence in the institution of authority represented by the judicial branch of the Federal Government.

In my opinion the Federal judicial system is at the moment extremely vulnerable. I receive hundreds of letters from responsible citizens of Alabama and citizens from many other States indicating distrust of Federal courts. Nor is criticism and distrust limited to the opinion of ordinary citizens. Members of the bar are likewise a prolific source of criticism.

Mr. President, the Supreme Court of the United States has become an anomaly in our constitutional system of government. When the Federal judiciary assumed the legislative function in determining public policy and the executive function in administering statutory laws of the Nation; and when it assumed the function of amending the Constitution by judicial decree rather than by the methods prescribed by the Constitution, the Court thereupon abandoned the very basis of its legitimacy in our framework of constitutional government.

Mr. President, when the Supreme Court of the United States authorizes and condones withholding public funds and services from innocent schoolchildren; when it presumes the power to administer local public schools by judicial decree; when it mandates racial quotas and altered racial composition of schools as a requirement supposedly imposed by the Constitution of the United States;

when it dictates to State legislatures by mandatory injunctions; and when it enforces its dictates by means of threats of trial of public officials for contempt of court and the imposition of confiscatory fines and imprisonment without benefit of trial by jury; then, Mr. President, the Supreme Court has divorced itself from the source of its powers.

Increasingly, Mr. President, the people of the United States are challenging the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court. It is a serious matter, and it is not surprising that more and more people should ask:

If the Supreme Court is to assume the legislative function, why should its members not be made answerable to the people and be made subject to periodic election?

Mr. President, I recently received a letter from a constituent, Mr. Jack Hoffman, Route 1, Satsuma, Ala., in which he attached a copy of a letter he had written to his local newspaper, the Chickasaw News Herald, which was subsequently printed by the Mobile, Ala., Press Register. The letter indicates how average citizens are beginning to question the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court. I ask unanimous consent that the letter be printed in the RECORD and urge thoughtful consideration of its contents by Senators and the public in general.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SATSUMA, ALA.,
July 22, 1970.

EDITOR, NEWS-HERALD.

DEAR SIR: I love and respect my God, my country and my flag. I think the ones that desecrate, tear and burn should be forced to live outside the boundaries of the place that is giving them protection. I do believe we need many changes. The most important, as I see it, is a way by law to make a quick change on all Federal Judges. If from the lowest to the highest office in our land has to be voted on by the people, why exclude Federal Judges? Other judges have to run and get elected or defeated by the majority of the people at the polls. From top to bottom all officials are public servants. This country was not formed for any to become masters of the people. Federal Judges, many of them good and deserving are, however, appointed, sometimes through friendship, sometimes paying of a political debt and probably many other reasons. We, the people supply the money and, of course, this tax money pays them a good salary that doesn't only take care of their bread and butter but also choice cuts of meat. They know we can't fire them and it's nearly impossible to move them. That's why so many try to play God. How many would stay in office if the people had anything to say? Even the President who recommends or the legislative body that accepts can do very little after they have placed them in office. Decisions of vital importance to our country are placed in the hands of a very small group to interpret at their will what is right or wrong. Like the old saying: "A doctor makes mistakes and a mortician buries them."

Those great courageous intelligent men that framed our Constitution, one of the wonders of the world, would not put up for fifteen minutes with many of our present day judges. These inferior replacements in recent years have suddenly discovered in our Constitution what the great judges before them failed to discover. They did not discover it because it is not there. Each supreme court justice is sworn in under oath. Why, then, can't a child, if he wishes to do so,

thank God in school? Why can a criminal rape, rob, burn and desecrate our flag and after being convicted be turned loose on some dumb idea about his constitutional rights? What about the rights of the huge law abiding majority that pay these judges' salaries for such interpretations.

I would not be at all surprised that all this plus President Nixon's Southern Strategy would cause George Wallace and Strom Thurmond to combine for his knock-out punch at election time.

On national television July 20, 1970, Roy Wilkins said that Alabama and Mississippi were the two most integrated States in the Union. If so, why continue to brow-beat, threaten and humiliate these proud people of the Southern States?

Yours truly,

JOE B. HOFFMAN.

THE REAL VICTIMS OF OUR INADEQUATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, in a recent speech in Pennsylvania, I pointed out that the real victims of our inadequate criminal justice system are "the millions of citizens who never committed a crime and never will." I ask unanimous consent that an editorial on this subject, published in the West Chester, Pa., Daily Local News, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A HARD-TO-BELIEVE COURTROOM TRAGEDY

It was more like a TV thriller than anything else. Armed with an automatic carbine and pistols, a man walked into a courtroom in San Rafael, Calif., yesterday, and a few minutes later shot the presiding judge to death and in the melee which followed was himself fatally wounded as well as two convicts he tried to free.

How could such a thing happen? That, it seems, is always the first question after an incredible tragedy of this kind. It can happen because of laxity somewhere along the line. It can happen because, too often, those responsible for making certain of the safety of courtroom personnel get the mistaken notion that "it can't happen here".

It seems strange that this tragic happening should occur on the eve of Senator Hugh Scott's appearance today at the Allentown Fair where he spoke of the growing crime rate in this country. He told his audience there that unless the criminal element in the United States feels the heavy hand of the law as it never felt it before, the law-abiding citizen will find himself yielding to the demands of the lawless.

Who are the real victims of our country's inadequate criminal justice system? Pennsylvania's senior senator answered that question in this way: The real victims are "the millions of citizens who have never committed a crime, and never will". Like Judge Harold J. Haley, of San Rafael, who was gunned down by the man who was on trial in his courtroom yesterday? Yes, the innocent are the real victims of these times. And you still are of the opinion that "it can't happen here"?

A RESIGNATION FROM THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I recently received a letter from Mr. L. Ivar Nelson. He told me why he has resigned from the Foreign Service.

I am sorry when our Government loses young men of Mr. Nelson's ability. I believe that Senators may be interested in

his reasons, so ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the text of Mr. Nelson's letter to the Secretary of State, which he consents to having made public.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JULY 17, 1970.

WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am resigning from the Foreign Service.

I can no longer represent, or work for, a Government whose foreign policies I so basically oppose. It is not necessary to agree with all of the Government's policies in order to be an effective Foreign Service Officer. It is essential, however, that a diplomatic representative of the Government be able to support, honestly and energetically, the basic directions of our foreign policy.

I can no longer do this. The boundaries of acceptable policies within which I can act as a Foreign Service Officer have been irrevocably breached. If I am to remain personally responsible for what I do in the world, then I can no longer remain a servant of policies which I do not support.

I take this drastic action only because I believe that the policies of the Government, and the trend of policy-making within the Government, have gone beyond the point where I, or others with views similar to mine, can have any impact on decision-making from within the Executive Branch of the United States Government.

I do not believe that foreign policy decisions are being made within our Government on the basis of an accurate and dispassionate analysis of what is in the common interest of Americans and of all peoples of the world. And I do not believe that they are being made on the basis of the values and goals which are the basis of our society.

Most disturbing is the unwillingness of our Government to understand that the future of our nation in the Twentieth Century is irrevocably tied to the overall development of the Third World. If the inability of our Government to treat fairly the racial minorities in our own country is not to be reflected in a worldwide racial confrontation, then we must make a human commitment to assist the peoples of Latin America, Asia, and Africa to improve their physical and social well-being. And we must act on that commitment.

More effective ways of re-allocating the world's resources must be found in order that they benefit all peoples of the world. And our Government must take the leadership in convincing our people, and other Governments, that this is necessary and for the ultimate good of us all.

The racism of South Africa is a constant threat to the attempts by different peoples throughout the world to live together in equality and mutual respect. Our Government's relationship with the Government of South Africa based, as it is, on a simplistic analysis of its strategic importance to United States national interests, must be changed if our country is to remain a leader in a world, the majority of whose people are non-White. The benefits which our support for South Africa bring us are insignificant compared with the injury which our continued support will do to us in the future.

The Indochina War is one of the greatest strategic and political blunders of the United States in its history. While almost everyone agrees now that it was a mistake to make this localized conflict an American war, our Government does not act on that consensus. I see no plausible reasons of military strategy and/or political power which justify our continued or expanded presence there.

My decision to resign was made before the United States invaded Cambodia. That ac-

tion only confirmed my fear that my views and the policies of our Government not only differ for the present, but would continue to diverge in the future. One can endure a short time disagreement in the expectation of future reconciliation. I see no reason, however, for such an expectation in the present situation.

My leaving the Foreign Service is not a result of dissatisfaction with my personal experience in the Service. I have had two interesting and demanding assignments—in Swaziland and at the United States Mission to the United Nations—and have worked with some very good people.

However, the Foreign Service does have many internal problems which are slowly eroding its effectiveness. Its isolation as an elite, the lack of minority representation, discrimination against women, and unimaginative training are hindering its ability to represent and to advise our Government. The resulting decline in the morale of many officers in the Service, and a profound disagreement with our Government's policies among our youth, explain why the best of our young people no longer consider the Service as a possible career.

While these aspects of the Foreign Service bother me, I would stay in the Service and work within for change if I felt that I could possibly continue to represent our Government. It is clear that I cannot.

Those who can, and especially the younger officers, should continue to press to make the Service more representative—in composition and values—of the United States today. It frightens me, however, that the loyalty of those responsible dissenting within the Service was called into question recently by Under Secretary U Alexis Johnson. The conception of the Foreign Service Officer as a person in total servitude does not promote the imagination, initiative, and understanding which the Foreign Service needs if it is to be useful to our Government. Servants do not make good diplomats.

I intend to permit the public use of this statement as a personal explanation of why I have resigned.

Sincerely,

L. IVAR NELSON,

Advisor, Economic and Social Council.

SELECTIVE USE OF PESTICIDES BY ARIZONA COTTON GROWERS

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, Arizona cotton growers have found that the selective use of pesticides boosts yields at lower costs and, most important, preserves the ecology. This is good news on the ecological front.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article describing how the Arizona cotton farmers devised their own "cotton scout" program to reduce the use of pesticides with greater effectiveness, written by Hal Lancaster, and published in the Wall Street Journal of August 10, 1970.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ARIZONA COTTON GROWERS FIND SELECTIVE USE OF PESTICIDES BOOSTS YIELDS, TRIMS COSTS

(By Hal Lancaster)

SAFFORD, ARIZ.—Cotton growers here in Graham County, are sharply reducing their use of pesticides under a "cotton scout" program that could have nationwide implications for ecology as well as agriculture.

For the past two years, 90% of the county's growers, banded together under an organization called the Pink Bollworm Committee, have discarded regular, wholesale spraying of their fields in favor of more selective ap-

plications at irregular intervals. The results have been gratifying to the growers, if not to sellers of pesticides.

In 1968, the member growers of the Pink Bollworm Committee spent \$199,000 on pesticides. After they adopted the selective program, their 1969 spending on pesticides (together with the cost of the scout operation itself) plunged to less than \$37,000—with yields actually increasing from the previous year. Exceptionally good weather was an important factor in the increase, however.

The Graham County effort revolves around the use of "scouts" supplied by the program's manager, Mike Pursley. The scouts, mainly high school students, are trained by the extension service of the University of Arizona to identify and locate pink bollworms and other pests. Then they are sent in pairs to scan the fields of the committee members weekly. When they report a certain level of infestation in the fields, and only then, the affected areas are sprayed.

UNUSUAL RESULTS ACHIEVED QUICKLY

Similar scout programs have been under way for some time in Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana and other states. Arkansas is believed to have the biggest program, with about 150 scouts working fields scattered over much of the state. If the Agriculture Department has its way, scouts will be popping up over much more of the country soon.

James Brazzell, chief of the methods development branch of the Agriculture Department's plant protection division, says:

"I believe you can get savings on pesticides of anywhere from 25% to 75%, though it's difficult to cite any general figure because every field is a different story and every season is different. But we are extremely interested in these programs and are looking into assisting them to get started in several states."

The Graham County project, which is a private effort and not sponsored by the Agriculture Department, is noteworthy in that it has achieved unusual results in a short period of time. It had its origins in 1968, when the pink bollworm—"a tough little old pest to get," according to program manager Pursley—was chewing its way through Arizona fields at a rate alarming to growers. The Graham County farmers organized their committee and dug in for a long battle.

After consultations with the state extension service, they adopted a crash program of mass spraying at regular intervals. "It worked," says Brooks Daley, a grower and chairman of the committee. "We didn't have a real infestation of pink bollworms." But the spraying also wiped out beneficial insects that help control others destructive to cotton. "By the end of 1968, we found we were getting eaten up," says John Sears, county agent for the extension service.

INDUSTRY IS RILED

So the next year, the committee adopted Mr. Pursley's scout program. Members that year had only 5,500 acre-treatments (one acre sprayed once) compared with 78,000 in 1968. "This is the best thing for avoiding ecological disruption," says Leon Moore, an extension service entomologist who is the program's adviser. "It brings the use of pesticides into a need basis."

The clear implication of the program's result—that pesticide marketers have been overselling growers in the past—riles the industry in Arizona. "The program isn't any different than what we had been doing with our own checkers working the fields. We don't believe in spraying every week just because it's nice to spray," says Jack Wooley, president of the Arizona Agricultural Chemicals Association.

"The word we got around the fields was that the university said the company checkers were biased," says Mr. Wooley. "This was

a slap in the chemical industry's face." He says the industry's main complaint is that the university intruded "in competition with free enterprise, going up there and promoting this." The university, however, says it has been acting only as a consultant and trainer of scouts.

In the meantime, Graham County's three main pesticide sellers have suffered sharp declines in sales. One has all but abandoned pesticides and is relying on feed supplies for most of its revenue. Also, under the new program, the bollworm committee is buying what pesticides it uses under a single contract embracing all member growers, who farm nearly 13,000 of the county's 17,000 acres in cotton. The business goes to the lowest bidder. Previously, farmers contracted with suppliers individually.

Mr. Wooley, who says the agricultural chemical suppliers aren't taking any action because "we don't want to fight," says that the startling contrast between 1968 and 1969 pesticide use by county members of the committee is due in large part to the university-recommended crash, mass spraying program in 1968.

The committee concedes that members used less pesticide in 1967 than in 1968, though figures are lacking. But they are convinced they are saving a good deal of money. "I left it up to the pesticide people and I used more in 1967, when we didn't have that big a bollworm problem, than I did in 1969 under our own program," says committee chairman Daley. "Well, they want to sell their product. I'm more confident in the program we have now."

NLRB DECISION THREATENS SMALL COLLEGES

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, the National Labor Relations Board is on the threshold of adopting a rule which it will apply in determining whether to exercise its jurisdiction in proceedings involving private colleges and universities arising under the National Labor Relations Act.

I have called this serious matter to the attention of the private colleges and universities in North Carolina, pointing out that they have until August 31 to submit to the NLRB their written views and arguments in connection with the proposed rule. To date their response has been overwhelmingly against this action by the Board.

The NLRB reexamined its longstanding jurisdictional policy with respect to private colleges and universities in the Cornell University case, 183 NLRB No. 41, decided June 12, 1970, and concluded that it would exert its jurisdiction over such schools "whose operations have a substantial effect on commerce." The proposed rule would be used to determine which schools meet this requirement of having "a substantial effect on commerce."

Mr. President, every private, nonprofit college and university has a stake in the Board's formulation of its rule, especially the small colleges and junior colleges which do yeoman's work on behalf of education in their local areas. There are 40 such schools in North Carolina, and the presidents of several of these have expressed to me their belief that the NLRB's action in extending jurisdiction into their internal operations may threaten the very existence of their institutions.

President Frank W. Pisani of St.

Mary's Junior College in Raleigh has this to say:

If there is validity to the claim that private colleges make an impact on interstate commerce, this must certainly be limited to large schools.

As president of a private school of 500, I question any significant application of this viewpoint.

Our task is education. Our reason for being is educational. Our contribution to this country in our field will be greatly enhanced as unnecessary governmental interference is removed.

President H. C. Evans, Jr., of Lees-McRae Junior College in Banner Elk, N.C., said of any proposed NLRB rule:

This would seem very clearly to me to be another step in strangulation of the private college, and in our case, perhaps a very final one. We are not big business; we are a mountain college which has struggled financially with impossible odds for survival for 70 years. We are very definitely nonprofit and continue to live off the belief of many small givers that this college has a reason for being.

Other college presidents in North Carolina have impressed upon me the difficulties that may arise because many of their students hold self-help jobs on campus. I quote Wendell Patton, president of High Point College:

The problem of private colleges and universities is further complicated inasmuch as many times we attempt to offer student aid in the form of work programs, regardless of whether or not they are real or needed, but in the belief that it is to the best interest of the student to feel that he is making a contribution for the aid that he receives, rather than a hand-out, which so often weakens the individual and our society. It seems reasonably certain that in some of these gray areas that all private colleges would be in trouble, or perhaps even have to eliminate self-help programs to students and employ clerical, secretarial, maintenance, and food employees outside the campus so as to be able to maintain the standards as prescribed by the NLRB.

In light of these expressions of concern by North Carolina educators, I asked the staff of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, of which I am chairman, to study the NLRB action. The subcommittee staff has prepared a memorandum which mentions certain objections to the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over private colleges and universities and suggests certain guidelines the Board may desire to consider for its proposed rule.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the memorandum prepared by the staff of the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers and the NLRB notice printed in the Federal Register of July 14, 1970, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

To: The Honorable Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, U.S. Senate.

From: Rufus L. Edmisten, Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Subcommittee of Separation of Powers.

Re: Objections to the Assertion of Jurisdiction by the National Labor Relations Board over Private Colleges and Universities.

The first objection to the NLRB's assertion of jurisdiction over private colleges and uni-

versities—an assertion which is the premise, rather than the issue, of the rule-making in which the Board is engaged—is the fact that there have been few, if any, major labor disputes in such schools. So far as can be determined, many private colleges and universities have successful bargaining relationships with unions of their employees, and cases of a refusal to recognize a union representing fifty per cent of the employees in an appropriate unit have been aberrational and insignificant, if non-existent. What positive result is sought by the NLRB's assertion of jurisdiction is, therefore, not at all clear, particularly in light of its woefully crowded docket and the delay all litigants encounter in the Board.

There are, moreover, negative aspects to the assertion of jurisdiction. Litigation in the NLRB can be very expensive. A private college or university involved with the Board might find it necessary to hire a labor law specialist to handle the complex and protracted litigation which frequently results. NLRB rules and doctrines surrounding elections and other representation questions are so complex and detailed and offer such a large range of challenges to the parties involved that litigation may be over very small issues. Retention of an expensive labor law specialist is thus often essential.

This will be severely aggravated by the fact that most NLRB rules are designed to operate in the setting of a profit-making and centralized employer. Private universities are essentially decentralized, non-profit operations. There is no direct chain of command from the executive officers through the supervisory level. This means that many Board precedents will be inapplicable to cases involving colleges or universities and that many unlitigated and novel legal questions will arise. Legal fees are not the only cost involved. In the absence of Board intervention, colleges and universities have been able to resolve these questions amicably and privately. Intervention, however, is likely to encourage one of the two parties to litigate every issue. Outstanding unresolved questions of this kind are disruptive and create an atmosphere of crisis and hostility.

Such litigation will thus be terribly expensive and disruptive and will fall upon private colleges and universities at the very time when they are almost universally in very poor financial condition and facing a major crisis over student unrest. The assertion of jurisdiction by the NLRB may well be the back-breaking straw for a number of colleges and universities and permanently damage higher education in the United States.

The most important reason why the NLRB should decline to exert jurisdiction over private colleges and universities, however, is the fact that NLRB jurisdiction would not extend to all (or, perhaps even most) institutions of higher education in this country. State colleges and universities are not subject to the National Labor Relations Act. That being the case, the assertion of jurisdiction by the Board over private colleges and universities seems arbitrary—as arbitrary, say, as asserting jurisdiction over only half the steel industry—not based on any showing of need and likely to have a very deleterious effect on a critically important aspect of American life.

It may, however, be too late to stop the Board from continuing to assert jurisdiction and the question of what jurisdictional standards are appropriate—the issue raised by the notice in the Federal Register—must be dealt with. Two limitations seem justified.

First, colleges or universities which do not have a national student appeal are of more local than federal importance. Such colleges and universities serve local communities and

perform very important functions within those communities. The NLRB ought not, where that is the case, intervene and perhaps destroy the major cultural and educational opportunities for the youth in a particular area. Some rule of thumb, therefore, seems necessary. I would suggest that the NLRB decline to assert jurisdiction over any private college or university in which fifty per cent of the student body is from the state in which the college or university is located.

Secondly, the NLRB must try to adjust in some way to the fact that it is asserting jurisdiction over only one part of an industry. One way to do this is to limit the exercise of jurisdiction to non-professional employees and not extend it to teachers. Non-professional employees compete in a labor market involving employers other than those involved in higher education. They generally chose between jobs in educational institutions and private industry. Teachers, however, operate in a labor market in which the choice is generally between a private college or university and a state educational institution. The anomaly of asserting jurisdiction over only part of higher education is thus most aggravated where teachers are involved. To decline to exercise jurisdiction over professional employees would go a long way to resolving the problems created.

In sum, it seems rather strange that the NLRB would attempt to assert jurisdiction over private colleges and universities at a time when the overwhelming majority of them are in dire financial straits and at a time when our national policy is aimed toward seeing that every young person in this nation has the opportunity to obtain a higher education if he is qualified to do so. As the extensive hearings conducted by the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers have clearly shown, the NLRB should concentrate its efforts on improving the quality of the justice it metes out under its present jurisdiction.

[From the Federal Register, July 14, 1970]
JURISDICTIONAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO PRIVATE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
 (National Labor Relations Board—29 CFR Part 103—Notice of Proposed Rule Making)

Notice is hereby given that the National Labor Relations Board has under consideration adoption of a proposed rule to prescribe standards which the Board will apply in determining whether to exercise its jurisdiction in proceedings involving private colleges and universities arising under sections 8, 9, and 10 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 140, 143, 146, 29 U.S.C. secs. 158, 159, and 160). The purposes of the proposed rule and the data deemed relevant thereto are set forth in the attached explanatory statement. This rule is proposed pursuant to the authority of sections 6 and 14(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 140, 73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C. secs. 156, 164(c)).

All persons who desire to submit written data, views, or arguments for consideration in connection with the proposed rule should file 25 copies of the same, not later than 30 days after publication hereof in the FEDERAL REGISTER, with the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. 20570. Copies of such communications will be available for examination by interested persons during normal business hours in the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Board, Room 701, 1717 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.

Dated, Washington, D.C., July 8, 1970.

By direction of the Board.

ODGEN W. FIELDS,
 Executive Secretary.

Explanatory statement. The jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board to prevent unfair labor practices and determine sections 8, 9, and 10 of the National Labor

Relations Act, as amended,¹ extends to all such matters which "affect commerce" as defined in section 2(7) of the Act.² In 1950, the Board by rule of decision announced certain specific standards which it would apply to determining whether or not to assert its jurisdiction in specific cases.³ From time to time, the Board has by rule of decision modified existing standards and established new standards.⁴ However, except in exceptional circumstances and in connection with the purely commercial activities of such institutions,⁵ the Board until recently has declined to exercise its jurisdiction over the operations of private colleges and universities without regard to otherwise applicable standards.⁶

In Cornell University, 183 NLRB No. 41, decided June 12, 1970, the Board reexamined its jurisdictional policy with respect to private colleges and universities and concluded that it would henceforth assert jurisdiction on a broader basis "over those private colleges and universities whose operations have a substantial effect on commerce * * *." The Board did not in that case establish standards for the assertion of such jurisdiction over private nonprofit colleges and universities, but determined to leave the development of appropriate jurisdictional standards to further proceedings.

The Board has considered whether to develop such jurisdictional standards by rule of decision or through the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act,⁷ and has tentatively concluded that in view of the nature of the problem and the diverse characteristics of the institutions potentially affected, it would best effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act to utilize such rulemaking procedures. The Board does not have in view any specific jurisdictional standard which it proposes to adopt. The standards utilized by the Board with respect to other classes of enterprises have involved consideration of such factors, singly or in combination, as the nature of the enterprise, the gross dollar volume of business, the value of sales in or affecting commerce, the value of purchases in or affecting commerce, and the relationship of the enterprise to the national defense or other governmental operations.⁸ It may be that with respect to educational institutions, other factors may also be relevant in determining the degree of impact on commerce, such as sources of revenue, total volume and general nature of purchases, the relationship of the institution to other enterprises, the size of

the student body, the proportion of out-of-state students, and the number of employees, academic and nonacademic.

The data which the Board deems desirable to enable it to formulate an appropriate jurisdictional standard for private colleges and universities encompasses a broad spectrum of information relating to the number, class, and size of the various institutions potentially affected by such standard as may be adopted. Specifically such data should to the extent possible include, but need not be limited to, information concerning classifications of institutions generally considered relevant by the affected institutions, such as junior colleges, 4-year colleges, etc., and, with respect to each such classification, the number of institutions therein, and the size of such institutions in terms of income, expenditures, student body, and employees, with such other data or additional feasible refinements and breakdowns of the gross figures as appear to be appropriate in order to reflect the impact of the operations of the affected institutions on interstate commerce. Such information may be submitted on the basis of each individual institution within the class, with or without naming such institutions, or may be submitted on the basis of reasonable groupings within each class. If the data is submitted on the basis of groupings, it should reflect the total number of institutions within each such group, and the total, average, and median with respect to each of the types of information presented. To the extent possible data expressed in terms of money should be correlated to data as expressed in terms of number of students and employees.

The Board further deems it desirable that the views and arguments submitted include specific suggested standards, expressed in such terms as may be deemed relevant, to the end that the Board's jurisdiction may be asserted over those private colleges and universities whose impact on commerce may be deemed substantial, but not over those whose impact may be deemed insubstantial.

It is the Board's intention to apply such standard or standards as may be adopted to all proceedings pending at the time of the adoption thereof, as well as to all proceedings which may arise thereafter.

[F.R. Doc. 70-8928; Filed, July 13, 1970; 8:47 a.m.]

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, recently President Nixon, at the request of the Appalachian State Governors, met in Louisville, Ky., with those governors to discuss among other matters regional development.

I am sure that Senators read of the President's comments urging the adoption of his revenue-sharing proposal. They may not be aware, however, of the unanimous endorsement given both this proposal and a regional development program modeled after the Appalachian Regional Commission.

For several years now, we in Congress have heard various complaints about the proliferation of categorical grant-in-aid programs that require the States to spend large sums of money on these programs which may or may not solve the problems these States face, that may not be in harmony with State plans, that require spending of scarce State funds on programs not necessarily in the priority areas where the State feels it needs to stress.

Recently, at the Midwest governors conference, we heard the angry com-

ments of some governors concerning this problem of too much power concentrated in Washington.

Mr. President, there is a program that operates in a large portion of my State that goes a long way toward solving these problems of intergovernmental relations. It is the program of the Appalachian Regional Commission. I have seen it work time and time again. In Pennsylvania, it is able to get different local communities, the State, and the Federal Government working together. I have seen projects where there has been local money, State assistance, basic Federal assistance, and supplemental Federal assistance from the Appalachian Regional Commission, all in one streamlined project, working together to solve a particular problem.

We need more of this type of cooperation. The Appalachian program may be a model for a program of Federal-State relations which will solve the present lack of planning and coordination between levels of government.

This program allows decisionmaking on the State and local level. It is a framework for planning and coordination on all levels of government. This program provides a mechanism for local people to determine Federal spending priorities. The people who must live with the consequences of Federal spending decisions are able to help make those decisions rather than a bureaucrat far away in Washington. The authorizations for several economic development programs including ARC expire at the end of this fiscal year.

As a result of the Louisville meeting, I understand that the President's Domestic Affairs Council is studying the whole area of economic development, regionalization, and reform of the Federal-State relationship.

WAR AND INFLATION

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, during the debate on the military authorization bill, I have been greatly disturbed at a growing tendency on the part of some Senators to assume that the inflation which is still pinching American consumers is due to the Vietnam war in particular and defense spending in general.

I understand how easy it is to identify two of the things which are causing the most hardship and the most unhappiness in our society and blame one upon the other.

There can be no question that the prolonged, frustrating, disappointing war in Indochina has caused the American people many heartaches, much inconvenience, and enormous amounts of money. By the same token, there is no doubt that the rising cost of living and the hardships and trouble and uncertainty which this causes for American housewives and consumers—especially for elderly, retired folks living on fixed incomes—is also a grave problem. However, it does not follow that the inflation which is still running strong in the U.S. economy is due to the Vietnam war. Nor is it true that the way to bring rising

¹ 61 Stat. 140, 143, 146, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 158, 159, 160.

² 61 Stat. 137, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 152(7). See *N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt*, 306 U.S. 601.

³ See 16th Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, 1951, pp. 15-16.

⁴ See, e.g., 19th Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, 1954, pp. 2-5; 22d Annual Report, 1957, pp. 7-9; 23d Annual Report, 1958, pp. 7-9; *Floridian Hotel of Tampa, Inc.*, 124 NLRB 261; *Carol Management Corporation*, 133 NLRB 1128; *El Dorado, Inc.*, 151 NLRB 579; *Parkview Gardens*, 166 NLRB 697; *Butte Medical Properties*, 168 NLRB No. 52; *University Nursing Home*, 168 NLRB No. 53.

⁵ E.g., *Fort Arthur College*, 92 NLRB 152; *California Institute of Technology*, 102 NLRB 1442; *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*, 110 NLRB 1611; *Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution*, 143 NLRB 568.

⁶ E.g., *Trustees of Columbia University*, 27 NLRB 424; *University of Miami*, 146 NLRB 1448; *Leland Stanford Junior University*, 152 NLRB 704; *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*, 152 NLRB 598.

⁷ 80 Stat. 383, 5 U.S.C. sec. 553.

⁸ See Annual Reports and cases cited in footnotes 3 and 4, supra; see also *Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution*, supra.

prices under control is to cut deeply into our defense appropriations.

This line of reasoning which, as I have pointed out, comes under the heading of an easy answer for a difficult question, can cause the Nation tremendous future problems.

Mr. President, it can even cost us our freedom if we are not careful to provide adequately for the defense of this country and the security of its people.

I believe we can all agree that anything, be it war or new elements added to the welfare state, that costs large amounts of Federal money does play a part in the problem of inflation. This is especially true where large increases in Government spending do not yield increases in the production of goods and services for people to buy. Quite naturally, expenditures for war are nonproductive in this sense. But where those who would have you believe that all inflation is due to the Vietnam war and expenditures for the military are mistaken is in stating that such expenditures are the primary cause of inflation. It is true that defense spending does not provide goods and services for people to buy. But it is also true that defense spending is not unique in this respect. In fact, much non-defense spending by the Government likewise involves no increase in available supplies. But even if this were not true, any overall increase in spending, from whatever cause, can be offset if the people running the Government have the wit and courage to do it through a proper policy of taxation.

Mr. President, what I am saying, to put it bluntly, is that it is not war and it is not defense spending that causes inflation, but the failure to finance war and finance defense spending on a non-inflationary basis, and I can say the same thing about non-defense expenditures.

In this connection a few figures from "Economic Indicators," CEA, July 1970, page 36, may help put things in proper perspective. They show:

First. Although it is commonly agreed that inflation got started in 1965, Department of Defense military outlays were actually lower in fiscal 1965 than in fiscal 1964;

Second. Moreover, in the next 3 fiscal years, as inflation was building up, Department of Defense military outlays did not increase sufficiently faster than non-defense Federal spending to warrant being charged as heavily as it often is with responsibility for what happened to costs and prices; in this 3-year period, fiscal 1966 through fiscal 1968, Department of Defense military outlays increased \$31.4 billion while all other Federal spending rose \$29 billion;

Third. Finally, in fiscal 1969, with inflation accelerating, there was only a relatively small increase in Department of Defense military outlays—\$500 million—while other Federal spending rose \$5.3 billion.

There are two points that I should like to make in connection with the easy assumption that the Vietnam war is the cause of price inflation in the Nation's supermarkets and other places where the consumer spends his dollar. The first point is that proceeding from this as-

sumption, it is quite easy to raise a public hue and cry for vast reductions in necessary defense spending requests and this adds up to what I believe can lead to a serious threat to our national security.

The second point I should like to make is that the easy assumption that the Vietnam war is the primary cause of inflation adds up to a serious intellectual failure and a long step backward in the public understanding of the causes of inflation.

Perhaps I should explain the last point a bit further. If the American consumer is led to believe that inflation is caused solely by war or by spending for military equipment and defense systems, he will be inclined to support unwise reductions in necessary expenditures everytime the cost of living index shows a slight boost. There is no truth in the flat argument, so often heard in connection with the current debate on the Senate floor, that inflation is caused by war regardless of what else happens in the economy, regardless of what else the Government does by the way of spending and regardless of what kind of monetary and fiscal policy the Government pursues.

The problem of inflation may be something of a mystery to many laymen and consequently a source of much confusion and misunderstanding. So I believe it is incumbent upon us to explore this problem and to indulge in repetitive explanations so that more and more of our people will become conversant enough to be able to pursue and work for the proper solution.

I believe it is commonplace in economic science to regard inflation as a monetary phenomenon that does not occur except where there has been, for one reason or another, an excessive expansion of credit and an excessive expansion of the money supply. In the present inflation buildup, we have had money supply increases ranging from 7 percent to over 10 percent, depending on what period you look at and what concept of money supply you use. Rates of increase are highest when one uses the broad definition of money supply that includes time deposits of commercial banks as well as demand deposits and currency. In the present situation we have currently had an inflationary monetary policy wherein the so-called "new economics" constantly urged more and more expansionary increases to melt hardcore unemployment. This is the process that caused inflation.

It is my contention that budget policy is even more important as a cause for inflation than monetary regulations. For when the Government runs a large deficit, the Treasury is forced to do a large amount of financing. And in order to assure success in this effort, the Federal Reserve authorities, like central banks everywhere, step in to help. This means they either buy bonds directly or supply the commercial banks with reserve to enable them to buy the bonds. Thus, we get an increase in bank deposits and in money supply. And the larger the Federal deficit, the greater the pressure and the temptation to do expansionary financing. The fact that Federal budget deficits were rising while inflation was building

up—deficits ran from \$1.6 billion in fiscal 1965 to \$25.2 billion in fiscal 1968—must, accordingly, be rated high as the basic cause or condition that led to inflation.

Mr. President, I am sure that things would have been very much different if the Federal Government had been prepared to follow a sound fiscal policy which could have avoided these large deficits. Specifically, it could have held back nondefense expenditures while imperative defense outlays were rising. And if this were deemed impractical, it could have enacted the necessary additional taxes at an early enough date to offset the deficit. However, I believe the politics of the situation played a major role in preventing the Government in those years from following the dictates of sensible fiscal prerogatives. For example, neither the White House nor Congress was willing, especially in 1966, to apply the expenditure restraint or levy the taxes that the situation called for. Of course, the apostles of the "new economics" were characteristically warning against "overkill" from excessive restraints at precisely the time when those restraints should have been applied.

In conclusion, Mr. President, let me repeat that the whole idea of blaming today's unpopular inflation on today's unpopular war is too easy an explanation. It is not correct, but it is dangerous.

POSTHUMOUS AWARD OF MEDALS OF HONOR TO ARIZONANS

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, yesterday I was privileged to attend a ceremony at the White House bestowing the highest honor that the Nation can grant to its soldiers.

In the name of Congress, the Medal of Honor was awarded posthumously to L. Cpl. Jose F. Jiminez, U.S. Marine Corps, by President Nixon, and to eight others who had served valiantly in Vietnam.

Mr. President, Lance Corporal Jiminez is the son of Mrs. Basilia Jiminez Chagoll of Eloy, Ariz. His father is deceased.

He was born March 20, 1946, in Mexico City, Mexico, and attended school in Mexico until 1956. He was graduated from Red Rock Elementary School, Red Rock, Ariz., in June 1964, and from Santa Cruz Valley Union High School, Eloy, Ariz., in June 1968.

He enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve in Phoenix after his high school graduation and was discharged August 12, 1968, to enlist in the Regular Marine Corps on that date.

Ordered to Vietnam in February 1969, he was promoted to lance corporal June 16, 1969, after serving as guide and fire-team leader with Company K, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division—Rein—FMF. While in action on August 28, 1969, he was mortally wounded.

Attending the ceremony were his mother and sister, Miss Maria del Pilar Jiminez, who resides with her mother, and a cousin, Mr. Matividad Acosta. His Excellency, Hugo B. Margain, Ambassador of Mexico, also accompanied them.

Another Arizonan at the ceremony was Mrs. William A. Jones III of Bisbee, Ariz. The widow of Lt. Col. William A.

Jones III of Virginia, she received the Medal of Honor awarded posthumously to her husband.

Lance Corporal Jimenez is the 43d Marine to be awarded the Medal of Honor for gallantry in action in Vietnam and the third Arizonan to be so honored.

The other Arizonans were Pfc. Oscar P. Austin of Phoenix and Maj. M. Sando Vargas, Jr., of Winslow, Ariz.

Private First Class Austin on February 23, 1969, unhesitatingly left the relative security of his foxhole to race across fire-swept terrain to assist an injured Marine to a covered location. As he neared the casualty, he saw an enemy grenade land nearby. Reacting instantly, he leaped between the injured Marine and the grenade, absorbing its detonation. While injured, he turned to examine the wounded man and while doing so, he saw an enemy soldier aiming a weapon at his unconscious companion. Private First Class Austin threw himself between his friend and the hostile soldier and in doing so was mortally wounded.

On May 2, 1968, Major Vargas, then a captain, although wounded the previous day, led a reserve platoon to the aid of part of his company that was pinned down under intensive fire. He again was wounded and remained in action against repeated enemy probes throughout the night, and the following day was injured a third time in fighting off a massive counterattack including hand-to-hand combat. Still ignoring his wounds, he went to the rescue of his battalion commander who was lying wounded in a fire-swept area, and then helped organize the battalion's perimeter defense.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the citations in regard to Lance Corporal Jimenez and Lieutenant Colonel Jones be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the citations were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MEDAL OF HONOR

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the Medal of Honor posthumously to Lance Corporal Jose F. Jimenez, United States Marine Corps, for service as set forth in the following

Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Fire Team Leader with Company K, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division in operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam on 28 August 1969. On that date Lance Corporal Jimenez's unit came under heavy attack by North Vietnamese Army soldiers concealed in well-camouflaged emplacements. Lance Corporal Jimenez reacted by seizing the initiative and plunging forward toward the enemy positions. He personally destroyed several enemy personnel and silenced an antiaircraft weapon. Shouting encouragement to his companions, Lance Corporal Jimenez continued his aggressive forward movement. He slowly maneuvered to within ten feet of hostile soldiers who were firing automatic weapons from a trench and, in the face of vicious enemy fire, destroyed the position. Although he was by now the target of concentrated fire from hostile gunners intent upon halting his assault, Lance Corporal Jimenez continued to press forward. As he moved to attack another enemy soldier, he was mortally

wounded. Lance Corporal Jimenez's indomitable courage, aggressive fighting spirit and unflinching devotion to duty upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service.

CITATION

The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, March 3, 1863, has awarded in the name of The Congress the Medal of Honor to Lieutenant Colonel William A. Jones, III, United States Air Force, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty:

On 1 September 1968, Colonel Jones distinguished himself as the pilot of an A-1H Skyraider aircraft near Dong Hoi, North Vietnam. On that date, as the on-scene commander in the attempted rescue of a downed United States pilot, Colonel Jones' aircraft was repeatedly hit by heavy and accurate antiaircraft fire. On one of his low passes, Colonel Jones felt an explosion beneath his aircraft and his cockpit rapidly filled with smoke. With complete disregard of the possibility that his aircraft might still be burning, he unhesitatingly continued his search for the downed pilot. On this pass, he sighted the survivor and a multiple-barrel gun position firing at him from near the top of a karst formation. He could not attack the gun position on that pass for fear he would endanger the downed pilot. Leaving himself exposed to the gun position, Colonel Jones attacked the position with cannon and rocket fire on two successive passes. On his second pass, the aircraft was hit with multiple rounds of automatic weapons fire. One round impacted the Yankee Extraction System rocket mounted directly behind his headrest, igniting the rocket. His aircraft was observed to burst into flames in the center fuselage section, with flames engulfing the cockpit area. He pulled the extraction handle, jettisoning the canopy. The influx of fresh air made the fire burn with greater intensity for a few moments, but since the rocket motor had already burned, the extraction system did not pull Colonel Jones from the aircraft. Despite searing pain from severe burns sustained on his arms, hands, neck, shoulders, and face, Colonel Jones pulled his aircraft into a climb and attempted to transmit the location of the downed pilot and the enemy gun position to the other aircraft in the area. His calls were blocked by other aircraft transmissions repeatedly directing him to bail out and within seconds his transmitters were disabled and he could receive only on one channel. Completely disregarding his injuries, he elected to fly his crippled aircraft back to his base and pass on essential information for the rescue rather than bail out. Colonel Jones successfully landed his heavily damaged aircraft and passed the information to a debriefing officer while on the operating table. As a result of his heroic actions and complete disregard for his personal safety, the downed pilot was rescued later in the day. Colonel Jones' conspicuous gallantry, his profound concern for his fellowman, and his intrepidity at the risk of his life, above and beyond the call of duty, are in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Air Force and reflect great credit upon himself and the Armed Forces of his country.

A REPORT ON THE OIL IMPORT QUESTION

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining of the House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs has recently issued "A Report on the Oil Import Question." I believe the entire report is

worthy of the considered attention of all Senators.

For the information of the Senate, however, I will set forth the specific findings of the committee at the conclusion of my remarks.

While I do not necessarily endorse each point made in these findings, they serve, taken as a whole, to point up the magnitude of the ramifications of any decision which would abandon the Nation's present oil import quota system.

I have been greatly impressed by the statements of the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN) with respect to the tremendous effect upon every person in the Nation that such a decision could have, whether he drives a car or uses a gas furnace or not.

I have also taken cognizance of the global facts of life that once these import quotas were abandoned and we began to rely upon other countries for our oil, we would find ourselves in a position where we could not return to the quota system because of our loss of capabilities.

It is clear that we would not only conceivably make an irrevocable decision; it is also clear that such a decision and the resulting closure of marginal wells would irretrievably, at least under existing production abilities, constitute a loss of a great quantity of oil that is now available to us.

I wish to commend the subcommittee for inclusion in its findings the recognition of that great untapped source of oil which the Nation has locked in rocks. Stored in the oil shale reserves of the West is a supply of oil greater than the entire Alaskan North Slope discovery. If we shift our source of supply of oil away from our own resources, the present incentive for the private development of this oil rock will be lost and, then if we find ourselves without foreign oil and in need of these oil shale reserves, we will not be able to utilize them.

The Department of the Interior which many times has emphasized the importance of proceeding with development of a viable oil shale industry, has been working to finalize the last requirements that will be imposed in connection with the leasing of oil shale on public lands, and those requirements should be announced any day. These steps would not have been undertaken had not oil shale been a high national priority.

I ask unanimous consent that the committee findings be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the committee findings were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMMITTEE FINDINGS

The following points summarize the findings of the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining with regard to the hearings held on the matter of oil imports and the proposals of the Cabinet Task Force on Oil Imports:

1. The national security of the United States is, and must remain the overriding objective of any oil import program. Both the task force majority, the separate views by Secretaries Hickel and Stans, and Chairman John N. Nassikas of the Federal Power Commission, as well as witness appearing before the subcommittee, agreed on this as the basic objective. There was also basic agreement that some form of import restriction, whether it is a tariff or quota, is necessary to

prevent undue reliance upon insecure foreign oil.

This subcommittee reaffirms its position that it is necessary to control the inflow of foreign crude and unfinished oils in order to maintain a strong and health domestic petroleum industry for the protection of this Nation in time of emergency.

2. Imports of crude oil and refined products now make up a very substantial portion of this Nation's petroleum requirements. Imports now average approximately one-third of domestic production and one-fifth of domestic demand. In the opinion of this subcommittee any significant increase in the import must be avoided as they have already reached dangerous proportions.

3. Any future estimates of petroleum supply or demand are subject to the uncertainties of forecasting. However, the task force majority report appears to be unrealistically optimistic on the development of as yet undiscovered reserves in the Western Hemisphere and, accordingly, that available from these sources. At the same time it has underestimated the probable need for Eastern Hemisphere oil and the degree of dependency on this insecure source under the majority's recommended program.

4. Supplies of natural gas are already critical and unless immediate relief is provided the shortage will undoubtedly increase. Any decrease in the price of domestic crude, brought about by increased imports, will further discourage the search for both petroleum and natural gas.

5. The estimated cost of the present control program, as compared to no controls, has been greatly overstated. Rather than the \$5 billion annual cost suggested by the task force, a more realistic figure probably is less than \$1 billion. When full consideration is given to intangibles and the very real probability of higher foreign crude prices once this Nation's dependency on foreign sources is well established, there actually may be a net benefit to the economy from the present import program.

6. The immediate effect of the proposed tariff proposal would fall hardest on the small operator. The small producer, the small refiner, and the stripper well operator would be forced out of business.

7. The 5.5 billion barrels of oil now estimated as reserves in stripper wells would be immediately lost. Such a loss cannot be recovered later. This is not proper conservation of a valuable and nonrenewable natural resource. Costly secondary recovery of oil from marginal and partially depleted fields would also be discouraged.

8. Adoption of the task force majority proposal would have an immediate adverse effect on this Nation's balance of payments. This has been estimated at not less than \$2.2 billion per year.

9. The subcommittee recognizes imperfection and inequities in the existing mandatory oil import program. It believes, however, that these are faults of administration rather than deficiencies in the program as conceived.

10. During the past 15 years the petroleum industry has spent about \$68 billion searching for oil and gas. Much larger amounts of capital will be needed in the future. Any decline in the price of domestic crude will not provide the necessary incentive for increased exploration. Less exploration will result in less oil found. However, if proper incentives for exploration and development are provided this Nation has the potential of remaining substantially self-sufficient in the energy field. The vast potential energy reserves in coal and oil shale have not been developed. Our oil shale reserves (estimated at 2 trillion barrels) exceed the petroleum reserves of the Middle East and coal reserves are estimated to exceed 1,000 years supply. Estimated undiscovered oil in the United States is placed at 2 trillion barrels and natural gas at 1,200 trillion cubic feet.

While some small percentage increase in imports may be expected in the normal course of events, this subcommittee must conclude that this is not a nation lacking in energy supplies. The real question is our desire and ability to develop and use the resources available.

11. Prorating, as practiced by the several States, is a necessary conservation practice to assure maximum economic recovery from a field. Elimination of prorating as suggested by the task force majority may result in a temporary increase but would result in an overall loss of production.

12. The task force majority places more confidence and reliance on the estimated shut-in capacity than is justified. Although there is undoubtedly some shut-in capacity in the United States, the subcommittee believes it to be substantially less than that estimated by the majority report. Undue reliance on this source for future supplies may prove unwise.

13. The displacement of coal by oil is of special concern to the subcommittee. The east coast now relies largely upon imported residual fuel oil. The subcommittee does not believe that the amount of residual oil imported is likely to be cut back but it does believe that immediate attention must be given to working out a formula under which imports would be permitted to increase at a rate which would be consistent with the increase in the overall demand for competitive fuels on the east coast. In this way imported residual fuel oil would be permitted to share in, but not dominate, the east coast growth market for industrial fuels.

In reaching this conclusion, the committee took note of the published concern of the Secretary of Defense over the effects of east coast dependence on foreign fuel, as well as the fact that a shift toward North Africa, an unstable area of the world, as a source for imported residual is now beginning to develop.

14. The subcommittee recognizes the problems of the petro-chemical industry and its need for adequate low-cost feedstocks. This was also recognized by both the majority and the separate reports of the task force. If this industry is to retain a competitive position in the world market it will require an improvement in the present feedstock situation, which should be accomplished without increased reliance on distant sources and without penalizing domestic industry, if possible. An in-depth study of this matter is urgently needed.

15. Research should be continued and intensified for the use and development of synthetic fuels. The vast oil shale and coal deposits of this Nation cannot be ignored as they make up the greatest potential source of fossil fuel energy in this country.

This subcommittee reaffirms its position that intensified research and development, both by the Federal Government and private industry, are necessary in the synthetic fuels field. Any cutback in Government research funds in this area at this time could force this Nation into a position of dependency upon unreliable sources of foreign crude.

16. The increasingly omnibus situation in the Middle East is of grave concern to this subcommittee and any increased reliance upon this geographic area as a source of oil appears to be less than prudent. In this respect the reservations expressed by the Secretary of Defense are well taken. The subcommittee fully agrees with Secretary Laird that the tone of the majority report infers a capability of reacting to an oil emergency that is overly optimistic. The subcommittee also fully agrees with his observations that the residual fuel oil question has not been adequately analyzed and that it must be given further consideration. And last, but of utmost importance, the subcommittee fully concurs with the Secretary's views that domestic exploration must be maintained at approximately current rates and that no re-

duction in reserves be allowed. The subcommittee, while agreeing with the Secretary on these and most other reservations he expressed, differs in that it is of the strong opinion that adoption of the majority task force recommendations will prevent the realization of these national security objectives. In view of the very grave storm signals coming from the Middle East this subcommittee cannot stress enough the danger in further reliance upon oil from this area. The subcommittee feels it would be remiss if it did not stress the national security aspect of this problem and strongly advises that top level consideration be given to any additional dependency upon oil from these troubled and unreliable sources.

SAFEGUARD NOW LEADS TO SUCCESSFUL SALT LATER

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I listened with great interest to the speech which my distinguished colleague from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT) made today in support of the committee's position on the ABM. I concur with his reasoning and applaud his logic and forthrightness.

I have also read with interest, but some dismay, and wish to comment on a letter to the editor published in the Washington Post of August 10 entitled "The ABM Vote and the SALT Talks" and is signed by W. Averell Harriman, Carl Kayson, Adrian S. Fisher, Franklin A. Long, and Herbert Scoville, Jr., and was placed in the Record by the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES). I cannot agree with the rationale of the five gentlemen who attached their names to that article and who concluded by stating:

In our judgment, a Senate vote against the ABM is a vote for success in SALT.

It seems to me that quite the opposite is the case and for fairly simple reasons.

First, Safeguard and its ongoing momentum constitutes our principal, if not our only, current leverage to obtain a halt in the buildup of Soviet offensive missiles. The Soviets cannot help considering that a SALT agreement must cover both offensive and defensive systems, since their own statements have expressed clearly the interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive systems. Furthermore, the United States-Soviet agreement to begin SALT negotiations specified that SALT would deal with both offensive and defensive systems. Safeguard has already appeared as one of our principal bargaining agents in the SALT talks. In the present and continuing hard bargaining, as to what specific offensive systems shall be covered, and particularly in achieving our objective of stopping the continuing Soviet construction of 25-megaton SS-9 nuclear missiles, Safeguard plays a most important role.

Next, it is of extreme importance that we do not lose sight of the fact that Safeguard is designed to achieve a number of U.S. strategic objectives in the absence of a SALT agreement. The Soviets continue to build their SS-9 missiles and their nuclear missile submarines even during the commencement of these talks. Certainly, cutting back Safeguard would mean interruption of the orderly and timely prosecution of the program, which includes several elements which have very long leadtimes. A signal flag to the Soviets would be hoisted

indicating to them the prospect of further delaying or blocking the program by protracting negotiation—while, of course, as noted, their own missile construction and testing would continue apace.

In the absence of a SALT agreement, protection of Minuteman would be essential. The defense of Minuteman by Safeguard must deal with the threat of continued build-up of a potential Soviet first-strike capability. A SALT agreement, if reached, would deal with the Soviet first-strike threat in a different way—by stopping construction of SS-9's and also limiting the number of other Soviet missiles, such as the SS-11 which, through increased accuracy, might partially contribute to a first-strike capability. If the Soviet offensive first-strike capability is constrained by a sound SALT agreement, we will have made a significant contribution to the survivability of Minuteman as well as our bombers and, because of the long lead time for Safeguard, would enable us to review the degree of need for continued expansion of Safeguard or enable us to limit this deployment in accord with the terms of the agreement without undue risk or unnecessary expenditures.

Since the Soviets have already deployed their Moscow ABM system, and since it is unlikely that the Soviets would agree to dismantle this system in the face of Chinese capability and uncertain intentions, the United States Safeguard program now under way and anticipated will probably remain.

The authors of the letter have said that history has demonstrated that restraints, not accelerated deployments, pave the way for arms control. This argument is not a good generalization and certainly is not supported in the case of the current SALT. In fact, only after the announcement of the Sentinel deployment—prior to Safeguard—did the Soviets officially announced their willingness to negotiate strategic arms control.

Finally, I find it particularly noteworthy to consider a statement made this year by our chief spokesman of the SALT conferences.

Mr. Gerald Smith, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said in testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 26, 1970:

It seems to me that the program that (the President) recommended will not prejudice the SALT talks, will not make the Soviets lose interest in the talks, and it is a sufficiently moderate program as, I should think, not to lead the Soviets to a reaction in the form of some new weapons system, since the Soviets presently have the beginnings of a defensive missile system.

It is very apparent to me that Mr. Smith, who is, after all, dealing directly with the Soviets, should have a clear feel for Soviet sensitivity. His apparent belief that the Safeguard program should be adopted must carry great weight in this debate.

In short, directly contradictory to the Harriman letter, a Senate vote in favor of the ABM will be a vote in aid of successful SALT negotiations, which we all seek.

I ask unanimous consent that the let-

ter to the editor of the Washington Post be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE ABM VOTE AND THE SALT TALKS

Recently administration spokesmen have been insisting that unless the Congress authorizes the continued construction and expansion of the Safeguard ABM, it will not be possible to negotiate an agreement with the Soviets at SALT to limit strategic armaments. They argue that the negotiators need the Safeguard bargaining chip to induce the Russians to halt the deployment of their large SS-9 ICBMs.

This would appear to be an attempt to exploit the desire of the Senate and the public to achieve success in SALT in order to rescue the Safeguard program from defeat. The administration has always defended the Safeguard ABM defense of Minuteman sites on the basis that it was not a threat to the U.S.S.R. If true, why then should the continuation of this program be a chip to induce the Soviets to agree to limit their offensive missile deployment?

The major U.S. threat to Soviet security lies in the deployment of the U.S. MIRV systems. On April 9, 1970, the Senate passed a resolution by a vote of 72 to 6 urging that the President propose to the U.S.S.R. an immediate suspension by both countries of further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems. Yet this MIRV chip has been thrown away by the accelerated deployment of the Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles with their MIRV warheads and by the reported proposal that any MIRV limitations must be accompanied by Soviet acceptance of extensive inspection of both offensive and defensive missile sites. There is no security justification for such urgent MIRV deployment since the heavy Soviet ABM which they were designed to penetrate could not be deployed and become operational for many, many years.

It has also been reported that the possible outcome of SALT would be an agreement that henceforth the United States and the U.S.S.R. will limit their ABMs to the defense of their capitals. The continued deployment of Safeguard at the Minuteman sites will not in any way contribute to the defense of Washington, and the Senate is being asked to endorse the expenditure of funds for useless hardware if SALT is successful and for an admittedly at best marginally effective system if it is unsuccessful. Why the U.S. should try to get the Soviets to agree to the deployment of ABM defenses for Washington and Moscow instead of a complete ABM ban is not clear, since the defense of Washington will not accomplish any of President Nixon's three objectives for an ABM system. A complete ban would eliminate the need for MIRVs and simplify the problems of verification by obviating any possible need for inspection. It is reported that the Soviets have indicated interest in such a complete ban.

Finally, history has unmistakably demonstrated that restraints, not accelerated weapons programs, pave the road to arms control. Overwhelming superiority did not induce the Soviets to accept the Baruch plan. On the other hand, President Kennedy's American University pledge to halt atmospheric nuclear testing as long as the Soviets did the same rapidly produced agreement to negotiate the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Similarly, the Senate passage without dissenting vote of the Pastore Resolution in 1966 endorsing efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons broke the ice toward starting serious U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations on the Nonproliferation Treaty.

If the Senate wishes to conserve funds and make a maximum contribution toward improving U.S. security by achieving arms limitations and agreement at SALT, it will refuse authorization of funds for the expansion of Safeguard and forbid the expenditure of additional funds for the continued deployment at the two Safeguard sites approved last year until it is satisfied that the negotiators have not been able to persuade the Soviets to agree to limitations on offensive and defensive missile systems.

In our judgment, a Senate vote against the ABM is a vote for success in SALT.

W. AVERELL HARRIMAN.
KARL KAYSEN.
ADRIAN S. FISHER.
FRANKLIN A. LONG.
HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.

WASHINGTON.

THE CAUSE OF OUR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Mr. ALLOTT, Mr. President, the University of Denver magazine, Winter/Spring 1970, contains an article that is written with a sprightly good humor that in no way detracts from its seriousness.

The title of the article is "There's Always More Where This Came From, Baby" and the author is Dr. Jack McCroskey, who holds the chair of finance at the College of Business Administration at the University of Denver. His thesis is that we had better stop hunting fashionable scapegoats for our economic problems and face the truth that the Federal Government is causing a goodly portion of our economic problems.

Dr. McCroskey argues his indictment and suggests some cures with force and clarity. So that all Senators may enjoy his article, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THERE'S ALWAYS MORE WHERE THIS CAME FROM, BABY

There was a time recently when the American economy seemed to be grinding to a halt. The Post Office went out of business. The air lines operated only fitfully. And the trucks and the railroads stood only a hairbreadth from a complete shutdown.

How could the U.S. economy, once hailed as the Eighth Wonder of the World, come to such a sorry state?

Traditionalists have one answer: a breakdown in authority. Radicals have another: a sickness in the society. As an economist, I have still another: a precipitous decline in the value of the dollar.

Economists have long preached against the evils of inflation. We have talked long and fervently about how deeply inflation hurts people on fixed incomes, particularly people who must live on pensions and social security.

But while we have often sympathized with such people, most of us have done so in a detached and abstract sort of way. We generally weren't in that position ourselves, and many of us failed to appreciate the day-to-day hardships these people must endure—although we might have gathered a vague idea if only we had paused to really see the elderly people we encountered in the grocery store (we with our overloaded push carts) who seemed in such torturous self debate about picking up a can of coffee at 89c or a box of tea at 78c.

We moaned and we groaned, but our hearts weren't really in it, primarily because these

senior citizens (and yes the women who eke out an existence on government grants to their dependent children) have no power.

What we didn't talk about was the damaging effect inflation has on almost everyone—the white-collar worker and the blue-collar worker and the aspiring executive and the schoolteacher and the federal employee. Our lapse has proved nearly fatal—for these people do have power. By withholding their services they can bring the economy to its knees, and they have been sorely tempted to withhold their services because they see their sustenance wasted away by erosion in the dollar's purchasing power. The raises they have received, which seemed so brightly appealing at first, have actually provided them a lower standard of living.

FASHIONABLE SCAPEGOATS

Whenever disaster strikes—and our current inflation has proved a much greater disaster than anyone would have dreamed—scapegoats come into fashion.

One fashionable scapegoat is the American union man. Labor unions, so the story goes, in their rapacious greed have pushed wage rates to ridiculous levels—thereby bringing down inflation upon the land. The facts are that through most of our recent troubles, union wage rates have risen less rapidly than price levels. It is a fairly rare union member who is much better off today than he was when our present inflationary spiral took off back in 1965.

The other fashionable scapegoat is the American businessman. Businesses, so the story goes, in their rapacious greed for profits have pushed prices to ridiculous levels. Well, the facts are that businesses operating in our very competitive environment can raise prices only when market conditions permit. It's a fairly rare business that can boost prices without careful consideration of its competitors and customers.

If neither workmen nor businessmen are at fault, then who, in the name of Adam Smith, can the villain possibly be? The answer is crystal clear: the federal government.

In order to understand this answer, let's take a brief backward glance into history.

From 1961 to late 1965—when many of our present problems began to appear—the economy hummed along at a remarkable rate and with remarkably little trouble. Employment was high, corporate profits were rising rapidly, and most consumers were having themselves a ball. Not only were they buying more products, they were buying generally bigger, better and brighter products. They were trading up to more spacious homes with greater luxury; they were buying more powerful automobiles with bucket seats, push-button doors, and swivel steering wheels; they were eating fewer down-home staples and experimenting more with up-town dishes. *And we had accomplished all this with no inflation.*

What went wrong? Primarily, we forgot the basic economic law: "You can't have everything—resources are scarce."

Of course, we didn't forget this rule on the individual level. We've always known and remembered that if baby gets a new blanket, father may have to postpone a new pair of shoes. Or, if we live in a higher income bracket, we remember that a trip to Europe may delay the new swimming pool.

But we seemed to think that the federal government, with all its power and glory, is immune to the basic law. It's not. All the government can do is give the illusion of immunity by creating money. And that is precisely what it has done, during much of the 1960s. It has created so much new money that we have sent too many dollars chasing too few goods. It has created more new dollars than the economy can absorb without inflationary consequences—and inflation is indeed the final upshot.

WRONG THINGS TO DO

Just as disasters generate scapegoats, they also generate quack panaceas. Here are three of the more popular remedies now making the rounds.

Back to the gold standard. The good things a return to the gold standard might bring about, such as removing control of the money supply from the hands of fallible men to the supposedly infallible hands of nature, are far outweighed by the bad things it might produce, such as recessions and inflations. For example, from 1897 to 1914, when the United States relied on the simon-pure gold standard for the only time in our history, we suffered the longest, sustained period of peacetime inflation we have ever undergone. The money supply is much too important to be left to vagaries of mineral discovery and technology.

Gimmicks. One of the more popular gimmicks proposes that we tax "inflationary" profits and wages at higher rates than "non-inflationary" ones. Aside from the fact that our federal tax system is already a house of horrors—replete with pit-falls and booby traps, injustices and dishonesties, inequities and imponderables—one should remark that it would prove quite impossible to distinguish between inflationary gains and non-inflationary ones.

Wage-Price Controls. This is plainly a case in which the cure is worse than the disease. As anyone who lived through the wage-price controls of World War II and Korea should recall, controls do not restrain either wages or prices, and they do not promote either economic justice or efficiency. What wage-price controls fundamentally do is keep the price system—which is the best method yet discovered for allocating resources—from working effectively.

RIGHT THINGS TO DO

The right thing to do is both so simple and so obvious that it seems exceedingly difficult to get across. We should make the money supply, the total of coin and currency in circulation and demand deposits held in the nation's 14,000 commercial banks, grow in a steady and sustained way at about the same rate as our growth in real economic productivity—say, 4% to 6% a year. The seven-man Federal Reserve Board of Governors, which is appointed by the President and which controls the money supply, has full and sufficient powers to accomplish this task.

But in order for the Board to be willing to do so we must first give up two prevailing myths. We must abandon the notion that the nation's resources can simultaneously stretch to run the outside world and to create a social worker's idea of paradise here in the United States—without at the same time any of us giving up any of our dearly beloved libraries, color TVs and vacation trips.

We must also abandon the notion (and these remarks are directed primarily to my fellow economists in the event that any might still be listening) that we can fine tune the economy—that is, that we can iron out every little wrinkle in the curves of Gross National Product, Industrial Production, and Unemployment Rates. We don't know enough to do this; our record in business forecasting clearly confirms that we don't know enough to do this; and we should stop trying to con the public and its political representatives into believing that we actually do know enough to do this.

These are the rules for securing reasonably full employment coupled with reasonable price stability.

Do reasonably full employment and reasonably stable prices constitute the impossible dream?

I am fully convinced that these dual goals can be attained—and that they can be attained without dramatic alterations in our life styles or in our attitudes. Personal ambitions (or personal greed if you prefer) will not have to be eradicated—as they most certainly will not be this side of heaven. Nor will our political and social institutions have to undergo radical reform.

What is required is that we recognize that we can't have everything—at least not all at once. We must also control our money supply so that it grows no more rapidly than potential output.

Perhaps a word or two should also be said about what reasonably stable prices will not do. First of all, they won't smooth out every last dip in the business cycle. Even with the best of intentions and the best policies in the world, we will still have our minor ups and downs.

Secondly, not even stable prices can eliminate poverty, stop crime in the streets, end racial hostility and stave off strangulation by garbage.

What stable prices can do is provide the economic progress and continuity that we so desperately need in order to tackle these problems with a modicum of good will and financial wherewithal. Without them, as they say in rural West Texas, we might just as well spit on the fire and call the dogs.

THE AMENDMENT TO END THE WAR

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, we have been told that we will be hearing a series of attacks on the efforts of Senators sponsoring the Amendment To End the War to gain public support by the use of television and other media.

I suspect that those who are attacking the effort to develop public support for the so-called Amendment To End the War are really doing so to divert the debate from the merits of the amendment. But let us be clear about the facts as to the nature and scope of efforts made on behalf of the amendment.

In the wake of the ill-advised invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State, it seemed essential to me that a carefully prepared television presentation should be made setting forth the reason for an early, systematic withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. Indeed, a number of concerned citizens had suggested to me that they would contribute funds if I were prepared to make a television response to the President. I investigated this possibility and learned that a half hour prime time could be purchased on NBC for this purpose at a cost of approximately \$60,000. In a few days time I raised half of this amount and borrowed the balance. Meanwhile, based on years of experience speaking out against the folly of our Vietnam involvement, I concluded that instead of an appeal by a single Senator, from one party, the proposed television appeal should be bipartisan in nature.

I therefore invited the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), the cosponsor of my original amendment; the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), a principal sponsor of the Church-Cooper amendment; and the Senator from New York (Mr. GOODELL), and the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES) to join in the telecast. They agreed to do so, and we employed the services of Mr. Charles Gug-

genheim to film our presentation. In the general view of television critics who have commented on the program, it was a constructive, highly effective presentation. It represented a rational discussion of the views of Senators favoring a fixed deadline for the withdrawal of American forces from Indochina. There was no attack on President Nixon. In arguing that Congress should play a more responsible role in decisions concerning the war we blamed the erosion of congressional powers not on the President, but upon the Congress itself.

An appeal for funds was made in the space of a few seconds during that telecast which we hoped would bring in enough funds to pay for the telecast and possibly some additional television time. Because of the emotions stirred by the Cambodian invasion, the killings at Kent State, and, I hope, the quality of the broadcast, approximately 70,000 contributors sent a surprising total of more than \$480,000. When we prepared the programs, we were not aware that the depth of sentiment in the Nation would generate a response this great.

We have sought to secure either public service or purchase further broadcasts of this nature but have been consistently refused the opportunity to state our case as we wished while the President has been able to appear regularly in support of his position.

We disagree with the President's Vietnamization formula because we believe it means an indefinite commitment of American forces to the support of the Thieu-Ky regime. We favor instead a definite timetable for the systematic withdrawal of all American forces. Although the President has inaccurately described our amendment during one of his many appearances, the networks have turned down even our request to set the record straight on that point.

I appreciate the complex problems which network officials have in determining who should be sold or granted television time. It may also be a fact that the administration, speaking through its Vice President, has created a climate of fear to which network officials are overreacting.

In any event, full accounts have been published of the receipts and expenditures resulting from the Senator's broadcast. Nearly all of the 70,000 contributors made small contributions. None of the contributions are tax deductible. On the expenditures side, we have published a full accounting in the RECORD and have made updated accounts available to any person who asked for them. No Senator ever requested such accounts.

I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of my remarks the latest statement be published, so that all Senators and other interested parties will be informed of our expenditures.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the funds were paid to the Amendment To End the War Committee, a group of Senators supporting the amendment. The funds are now handled by a fully bonded accountant, who works without payment

for his services. He works under the supervision of two trustees, selected on a bipartisan basis: The distinguished former Senator Ernest Gruening, a Democrat now in private life in Washington, and Edward Burling, a Republican of Washington, D.C., and one of the most eminent lawyers in the Nation. At no time has any person been able to dispose of any of these funds except as agreed to by a bipartisan group of Senators.

There has been some mention made of a number of committees that have been created to support the amendment. I am pleased to say that many committees have been established, as many people have rallied to the support of the amendment. Only two committees involve Members of the Senate. One is the Amendment To End the War Committee, established solely to handle the funds which resulted from the telecast. The other—the Congressional Committee for a Vote on the War—is composed of Members of both the Senate and the House and is devoted to research and publications relating to the war in Indochina. To the best of my knowledge, all other committees have been organized by private individuals. In some cases, very limited funds have been provided for a part of their operations in line with the wishes of a great many contributors that their contribution be used for any purpose which the Senators sponsoring the amendment thought would aid in its passage. Where this has been done, the accounts so indicate.

It has been said that we have established and paid a staff of some 30 people. I am proud to say that not 30, but well over 100 people have worked in this effort. But they have worked as volunteers. In a few cases, where individuals actually left their jobs to volunteer their help, because they felt so strongly about the need to end American military involvement in Indochina, we have paid them living expenses but not full wages.

Finally, we come to the informational campaign. As I have stated before in the Senate, we regarded this effort in the nature of an experiment. We believed that if television appeals were beneficial for candidates seeking high office, this technique might be effective in support of a public issue. Are those who criticize the use of advertising on a single issue also criticizing the use of advertising for political candidates? If so, they are certainly out of step with accepted practice in both parties.

Many of the advertisements have been purchased by private groups who have received no financial support from the Amendment To End the War Committee. Reference has been made to a newspaper advertisement showing a flag-draped coffin. But it should be noted that his advertisement was not sponsored by Senators, but by a private group of citizens. Indeed I never saw that advertisement until it appeared in a Washington paper.

But it has been alleged that the television announcements, most of which were paid for by the Amendment To End the War Committee were concentrated in a few areas as a way of bringing undue

pressure to bear. What purports to be a list of stations on which the spot announcements were shown has been placed in the RECORD. This list is partial and is inaccurate.

Television announcements have been shown or will be shown shortly in 52 cities in 23 States and the District of Columbia. Actual coverage extends into at least 29 States. That is more than half the States of the Union and hardly qualifies as a limited sample. Selections were made with two primary considerations in mind. First, an attempt was made to show the announcements in all parts of the country. Second, an attempt was made to get wide coverage although the amount of money available to purchase television time was quite limited in view of the costs.

We were not experts in the best way to mount a media campaign, but volunteers, who are experts advised us on the appropriate ways to obtain effective coverage. This meant concentrating on medium-sized cities and running a series of announcements. As a result, announcements have not been broadcast in New York, although that would reach into three States, because the cost was too high. But we can let whoever wishes judge if we have concentrated on a few areas. Some States have been covered reasonably well; some have not been covered at all. But the distribution has been as wide as possible, given the funds available and the desire to make the broadcasts effective in line with the advice of advertising experts. I ask unanimous consent that the list of cities where the spots have been shown be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Albuquerque, N. Mex.
Atlanta, Ga.
Beckley, W. Va.
Bellingham, Wash.
Bluefield, W. Va.
Boise, Idaho
Burlington, Vt.
Charleston, W. Va.
Chicago, Ill.
Clarksburg, W. Va.
Columbia, Mo.
Dallas-Fort Worth, Tex.
Denver, Colo.
Des Moines, Iowa
Ensign, Kans.
Eugene, Oreg.
 Fargo, N. Dak.
Harrisonburg, Va.
Idaho Falls, Idaho
Joplin, Mo.
Kansas City, Mo.
Las Vegas, Nev.
Lexington, Ky.
Louisville, Ky.
Manchester, N.H.
Medford, Oreg.
Miami, Fla.
Minot, N. Dak.
Norfolk, Va.
Paducah, Ky.
Parkersburg, W. Va.
Pembina, N. Dak.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Portland, Oreg.
Providence, R.I.
Reno, Nev.
Richmond, Va.
Roanoke, Va.
Roswell, N. Mex.
St. Joseph, Mo.

St. Louis, Mo.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Seattle, Wash.
Sioux Falls, S. Dak.
Spokane, Wash.
Springfield, Mo.
Topeka, Kans.
Twin Falls, Idaho
Washington, D.C.
Wheeling, W. Va.
Wichita, Kans.
Yakima, Wash.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, this list also includes three cities where the spots will be shown, although they are not yet on the air. I might note that the Amendment To End the War Committee has not defrayed the broadcast costs in all cases.

Almost no funds are raised as a result of these television announcements. With one exception, no request is made for funds.

We have encountered little difficulty in purchasing time for the spot announcements. Only in Washington, D.C., did we find that every VHF channel was closed to us. I see this as another example of overreaction to the climate of fear that has been created by the Vice President's statements.

This recitation of the facts answers each of the points that has been raised in the Senate. No doubt more will be raised and answers will be forthcoming. But I must say that I regret what I consider a waste of our efforts and time in a diversionary tactic designed to draw attention away from the substance of the Amendment To End the War.

EXHIBIT 1
AMENDMENT TO END THE WAR
COMMITTEE

(As of August 4, 1970)

RECEIPTS

Contributions:	
Cash: To Committee (net) ---	\$441,513.12
To NBC	6,949.00
To Council for a Livable World	24,050.00
Total	472,512.12
Other: Production Services (Guggenheim Productions)	20,179.43
Total contributions	492,691.55
Interest Earned	229.69
Other Receipts:	
Loan (Stewart Mott)	30,000.00
Contributions received by NBC for the Council for a Livable World	25,105.32
Total	55,105.32
Total receipts	548,026.56

DISBURSEMENTS

For Telecast, May 12, 1970 (half-hour):	
Air Time (NBC)	59,493.30
Production:	
Guggenheim Productions:	
Paid services	9,820.57
Contributed services	20,179.43
Total	30,000.00
Telecolor Productions:	
25 film prints	1,290.00
Air Time, for reshooting in Los Angeles (Carl Ally, Inc.)	2,000.00
Total television expenses	92,783.30

For Newspaper Advertising:	
Space: Carl Ally, Inc.	\$5,847.12
Patrick McKeever	625.00
Robert A. Mann	150.65
Larry Kotkiloff	120.40
Gateway Advertising	3,052.36
Enterprise Agency	2,985.15

Total Space	12,780.88
Production (Advertising People Against the War)	3,876.80

Travel Expenses:	
S. Cohen—Oregon	388.05
Eric Lindauer—Oregon	25.00
Total travel expenses	413.05
Total	17,070.73

For Production Expenses for Telecast, other than original (Guggenheim Productions)		3,512.04
For radio and TV spots:		
Production (Guggenheim Productions)	8,057.10	
Air time (Carl Ally, Inc.)	128,000.00	
Staff travel expenses (N.Y.)	97.75	
Air time (WDCA-TV)	600.00	
Telegrams (for TV availabilities)	388.57	
Total	137,143.42	

For the House Committee for a Vote on the War:		
Administrative services	5,320.00	

For the Congressional Committee for a Vote on the War:		
General report, printing (creative printing)	3,528.00	
General report, reprints (creative printing)	1,606.80	
Legal report, printing (House majority room)	1,581.00	
Legal report, reprints (House majority room)	764.00	
Organizational luncheon	64.80	
Telephone (C. & P. Telephone)	1,587.42	
Letterheads (Acme Printing)	140.17	
Furniture rental (desks and furnishings)	190.32	
Total	9,462.51	

For postage and mailing	2,601.07
For Bread and Peace Committee (C. & P. Telephone)	200.00
For stationery (acknowledgment cards)	822.18
For telegrams (to student leaders)	10,462.70
For expenses in connection with Conference on Feasible Timetable for Withdrawals	2,424.33
For all other expenses:	
Volunteers' support	4,559.00
Telegrams	298.91
Bank charges (collection, service)	502.15
Xeroxing, office supplies	262.51
Total	5,622.57

Total disbursements for expenses	287,424.00
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Other disbursements (see Receipts):		
Loan repayment (Stewart Mott)	30,000.00	
To transfer funds received from NBC for the Council for a Livable World	25,105.32	
Total	55,105.32	
Total disbursements	342,530.17	

Reserve balance (and cash in bank) (total receipts less total disbursements)	\$205,496.39
Respectfully submitted,	
JOHN W. BRANNER,	
Accountant.	

SCIENCE SUPPORT FALLS AT THE SMITHSONIAN

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, in the May issue of the Smithsonian Institution's in-house newspaper, Dr. S. Dillon Ripley, Secretary of the Smithsonian, wrote that the recent flood of criticism surrounding that organization was unfair and slanderous. His statement carried a four column banner headline entitled, "Ripley: 'The Tactics of the Smear.'"

On July 30, Representative FRANK THOMPSON, of the House Subcommittee on Library and Memorials, pulled down the curtain on the first far-reaching series of hearings probing the Smithsonian in over one hundred years. In contrast to the rosy assurances uttered only 2 months earlier, the public record was now filled with the most serious charges that many observers can recall hearing about the Smithsonian in its long history.

Many good things were reported. For example, the active role of Smithsonian researchers in the field of environmental understanding is one area in which the public can take pleasure and be grateful.

But for the first time, many grave questions were raised. One group of workmen appeared before the committee armed with affidavits and their own personnel records to back up allegations of racial discrimination and favoritism in the making of promotions. Mismanagement became an issue when a GAO representative explained his agency's findings of irregular financial activities on the part of several Smithsonian branches.

And weaving through the entire proceedings were the signs of an unmistakable shift in the course of the Smithsonian's philosophy and priorities. When the hearings ended, the conclusion was evident. The Smithsonian has departed from the traditional, fundamental precepts which had guided the Institution since the days of Joseph Henry.

A new Smithsonian has appeared. The historical emphasis on pure scientific research is viewed as being too stuffy. In the new Smithsonian, great attention is put upon pomp and showmanship.

The display begins with a changed cast at the top. Many new policymakers were brought in on the private rolls and then firmly emplaced after added Federal super grade positions were given to the Smithsonian by Congress.

The Office of the Secretary itself has grown three times over in the past decade.

The increase in administrative staff has coincided with the refurbishing of the original Smithsonian building so that it will look the same, or even richer, today than it did in the 1850's when it opened.

This construction, which cost \$2.6 million, will provide impressive quarters for many of the Smithsonian's top officers. Strangely enough, the plans for the dining room in the building did not include a kitchen, and the management may have to ask Congress for additional funds to install one.

Other renovation and construction work done in recent years includes an on-going \$2.4 million project to complete the Renwick Gallery of Art, extensive remodeling of the Belmont Conference Center, \$7 million in restoration work to house the National Portrait Gallery, and a \$16 million project to construct the Hirshhorn Museum.

While the acquisition of elegant structures was underway, a line of showy

projects appeared through which the Smithsonian sought to gain a new "relevance" to contemporary life.

A posh national magazine was introduced named "The Smithsonian." The Museum shops offered an expanded and more expensive selection of bright objects and gifts. Radio Smithsonian was broadcast as an educational outlet.

Entire new units were created or acquired. The Cooper-Hewitt Museum in New York City is one. The Archives of American Art is another. The Office of Academic Programs was founded in 1967 and has enjoyed a phenomenal growth ever since. It now has a yearly budget running well in excess of half-a-million dollars.

Also, the Division of Performing Arts

was created. This office holds an annual Folklife Festival on the Mall and has a \$200,000 budget.

Even so, according to the GAO, the Division of Performing Arts twisted the rules of the Smithsonian on at least 10 occasions during fiscal year 1969 by entering into contracts without checking with the fiscal division to see if there was any money available for its projects and without first obtaining permission from the supply division to make these commitments. I have obtained a list of these incidents from the GAO and ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION
REVIEW OF PROCUREMENT PRACTICES BY GAO SCHEDULE OF SELECTED PROCUREMENTS MADE DIRECTLY WITH CONTRACTORS OR VENDORS WITHOUT PRIOR CLEARANCE WITH THE FISCAL OR SUPPLY DIVISIONS

Contract or purchase order No.	Organizational unit requisitioning goods and/or services	Contractor or vendor	Amount	Types of goods or services
FISCAL YEAR 1969				
SFC-9-0684	Division of Performing Arts	Tesco Co.	\$4,097.00	Rental, installation, and operation of stages, screens lights, 2d Annual Folk Festival July 3 to 7, 1968.
SFC-9-0572	do	Russek Electric Co.	3,652.00	Power and lights for 2d Annual Folk Festival July 3 to 7, 1968.
SIF-9-3039	do	Allan Jaffe	800.00	Consultation and planning for Folk Festival and for 1968 Olympics.
SIF-9-3030	do	Johnny-On-The-Spot, Inc.	500.00	Rental of portable sanitary facilities, Folk Festival July 4 to 7, 1968.
SIF-9-3034	do	Potomac Electric Power Co.	2,227.00	Install and later remove temporary electric power source for Folk Festival July 3 to 7, 1968.
SIF-9-3040	do	Shayne Bros., Inc.	900.00	Pickup and removal of trash, Folk Festival July 4 to 7, 1968.
SIF-9-1880	do	HDO Productions, Inc.	1,350.00	Rental of 16 tents of various sizes to house craftsmen and displays for Folk Festival.
SIF-9-1881	do	do	2,340.00	Rental of 5 marquees for sales tents, Folk Festival.
SIF-9-1882	do	do	2,250.00	Rental of 9 marquees for craft tents, Folk Festival.
SIF-9-1883	do	do	2,200.50	Rental of 7 marquees for food tents, Folk Festival.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, the Division of Performing Arts has unquestionably sponsored many programs which have delighted large audiences at the Mall. Being aware of these contributions, I do not intend to sound overly critical of its conduct in making these 10 contracts. I do wish, however, to point to this activity as an example of the kind of driving enthusiasm with which the Smithsonian plunges full speed ahead on behalf of projects which enjoy the favor of the top management.

In dim contrast to the healthy expansion of such units at the Smithsonian, the National Air and Space Museum and the National Museum of Natural History are both suffering from a serious decline in support. I first revealed this disturbing development on the Senate floor in May, preceding a meeting of the Board of Regents. On July 21, I repeated these charges before the House Subcommittee on Library and Memorials.

In short, I urged Congress and the Smithsonian to devote increased attention to these two major museums. I presented documented evidence establishing the distressing problems confronting each facility.

Mr. President, strong new proof is now at hand which backs up my complaints about the decline of support to the Museum of Natural History. It comes from none other than the Director of the Museum, Dr. Richard S. Cowan.

Dr. Cowan appeared as a witness before Representative THOMPSON's committee on the last day of its hearings. His testimony has not been discussed widely in the news media, but it should be.

The Natural History Director disclosed problem after problem which cause him alarm. He confirmed that the employee picture which I cited to the committee is accurate—there is less than one technician to each scientist, well below the recognized minimum support standards.

Dr. Cowan testified that the lack of adequate technical assistance results in an almost "criminal mismanagement of human resources" because highly trained scientists are required to waste their time doing routine chores.

Dr. Cowan also verified for the committee the charge that I had made that the manpower situation at the Museum of Natural History is worse now than it was several years ago. In his own clear way, Dr. Cowan said:

The available pairs of hands, both professional and supportive, are fewer now than four years ago.

His statement was documented by a description of the plight of the Department of Vertebrate Zoology, where the workload has steadily increased at the same time that the department has lost 10 positions, or one-third of its staff, and suffered a drastic cut in its operating funds. In fact, the money available to the department is so embarrassingly low that it is only able to offer each scientist an allotment for field travel, supplies, and equipment for research, which is less than the research support given to graduate students. In other words, the full-time scientists do not even have the same support provided to apprentices.

Dr. Cowan also confirmed my contention that the large sums of overhead moneys flowing into the Smithsonian as a result of research activities performed

by natural history scientists do not buy the supplies and equipment the research departments need, nor does any of it come back to the Museum directly.

In addition, Dr. Cowan substantiated my claim that restrictions have been placed on the assistance provided to Natural History by the Smithsonian service divisions. Indeed, he added that in many cases the Museum must now buy, without having received any budget increase, items that formerly had been provided out of the supply division's inventory. Consequently, not only have the services furnished to the Museum been cut back, but the Museum must now pay out of its meager operating allowance for things which it used to receive without charge.

On another point, Dr. Cowan reaffirmed the importance of the resolution passed by the Smithsonian council, a development that I had disclosed to the committee. I agree completely with Dr. Cowan when he remarks that—

It is especially significant that the first substantive resolution ever adopted by the Council recognized the current potential peril of the Natural History Museum.

Mr. President, I also share Doctor Cowan's observation that the members represented on the council are appointed "from among the leaders of all branches of knowledge and only a few of the present group would characterize themselves as specialists in the natural sciences." For this reason, I am somewhat surprised by the response of the Smithsonian Secretary, in a memorandum dated May 15, in which he writes that:

We also recognize that the Smithsonian's

many interests in the arts are under-represented on the Council.

If there is a need for additional members on the Council in any areas, I would suggest that it is in the aerospace and basic science fields because that is where the most pressing problems exist.

Finally, I note that Doctor Cowan has also seconded my comment that the general exhibit of specimens is badly in need of renovation at the National History building's World of Mammals. Perhaps if an adequate number of technical aides were attached to the Museum, some of these technicians could take care of the preservation work on a part-time basis.

Mr. President, in order that this strong and revealing statement can be read by the large audience it deserves, I ask unanimous consent that the complete text of Doctor Cowan's testimony be printed in the RECORD at the end of my remarks.

In particular, I hope that this statement will be seen by the scientific community of America. I sincerely hope that a wave of support can be generated for the improvement of conditions at the Museum of Natural History so that the Smithsonian will stop making excuses as to how this happened and start moving to implement specific steps which will correct the situation.

Obviously, more operating money, more manpower, and more support services are needed. The important question is not how this came about, but what can be done to remedy it. I am certain that the House Committee which heard Doctor Cowan's testimony is as eager as I am to learn what the Smithsonian management's answer will be to this question.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY RICHARD S. COWAN, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY, BEFORE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON LIBRARY AND MEMORIALS, JULY 30, 1970

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: The opportunity to appear here is a source of much pleasure, at once an opportunity and challenge because I want to do two things—to expand on some of the points mentioned by Senator Goldwater in his presentation on July 21 and, secondly, to give you a picture of the National Museum of Natural History and its activities.

To set the proper perspective on my remarks, I want initially to emphasize that most of us recognize that, under Dr. Ripley's leadership and stimulation, there have been great changes at the Smithsonian in the past few years and we in the Museum are very grateful indeed for this period of Smithsonian history when it has been possible for us to change procedures, to develop objectives, and to modify attitudes. The position of biology generally, and of systematics/ecology specifically, is at new intellectual and functional levels that must be maintained. We have one of the largest research staffs in the world concerned with the natural sciences. Individually and collectively these scientists are the best ever gathered under the roof of the Museum, engaged in more significant research programs than ever before. Consequently, I am deeply alarmed at any threat to the integrity of the group.

However, before proceeding along these lines, let me categorize the three principal

activities of the Museum as (1) research on and (2) care of (curation) the National Collections of Natural History and (3) education in the broadcast sense. Most people are familiar with the exhibits function, which we look on as an education activity and which we are restudying, developing totally new exhibits concepts, more related to the needs of our visitors. Altogether too few people are aware of the Museum's most basic reason for being—the production of knowledge through scientific research, which undergirds all the exhibits and which adds so significantly to man's knowledge of the world about him. It is the research and collections-caretaking functions that I want to highlight in this presentation.

Among all the animals other than man, a consciousness of the environment appears to be limited to the presence or absence of food, beneficial or harmful temperatures, adequate or inadequate conditions for reproduction, and other life responses. Man alone is able to comprehend the environment in relation to his needs and in aesthetic terms as well; in spite of this unique quality, it is also man who despoils, destroys, and desecrates his environment. On the other hand, only the human species can care enough about the environment to repair at least some of the damage. Whatever improvements are made rest squarely on the natural sciences and the knowledge they generate. The research staff of the National Museum of Natural History—anthropologists, zoologists, botanists, paleontologists, and mineral scientists, working together—contribute importantly to the growing awareness of our living world.

I think it is fair to say that there have always been more scientists of the natural history type in the Smithsonian than of any other class of researcher and from the outset they have been contributing to environmental understanding. We are not late arrivals on the environmental bandwagon—and we are certainly pleased to have so much company on it. Today's concerns for our surroundings by Smithsonian researchers in the life sciences are the modern counterparts of attitudes that were expressed in the earliest formative years of the Institution. In the mid-nineteenth century, when our nation was expanding rapidly, the Smithsonian became the national focus for the exploration of the Great West and its natural wealth. Numerous expeditions sent out by the government went with the advice and collaboration of Joseph Henry's small staff. As they returned from boundary surveys, railroad-route exploration, and pathfinding efforts, the thousands of specimens of plants, animals, rocks, fossils, and Indian lore deposited with the Smithsonian soon made this the most important center of information concerning the American environment. The geographical, ecological, and temporal data attached to each of these and subsequent specimens now provide essential ingredients for our attempts to prevent further deterioration of our natural world, to restore quality where it has been degraded, and to assess probable effects of future environmental manipulation.

For example, using the National Collections, we can establish the natural radiation levels in organisms collected before nuclear weapons testing, the load of metallic compounds carried by them before air pollution advanced to its present threatening proportions, and the biochemical constitution of organisms before we began releasing persistent pesticides into the environment.

The presence or absence of a particular species, or association of species, may be an indication of water pollution, of chemical conditions of the soil, of contamination of the air, or of previous land uses. An asso-

ciation of particular kinds of fossil organisms in a bed of known age is the key that unlocks our understanding of ancient environments, eons of time before there were intelligent observers.

In like manner, our studies, such as the one now developing in arid southwestern Asia, of man's prehistoric use of the land tells us much about both natural and human ecology in distant times. Knowledge of the social systems of earlier civilizations, their failures and successes, provides us with valuable baseline information with which we approach today's not dissimilar problems of population control, land use, and general environmental exploitation.

Similarly, our appreciation of the physical processes that have formed the earth and the moon is enhanced by the research of mineral scientists in the Museum, working with the largest meteorite collection in the world, samples of lunar rocks and dust, and one of the world's most extensive reference collections of rocks, ores, and minerals. These and 50 million other specimens constitute the National Collections, this nation's chief (and often only) resource for documenting our knowledge of earth's environment, past and present, as well as the base for a future capability to predict the probable consequences of major environmental manipulations. The staff of the National Museum of Natural History are dedicated to the care, orderly development, and data-sharing of this scientific treasure-trove.

With the realization that this enormous natural history collection and its associated ecological information constitutes an unrivaled national resource for considering solutions to the dilemmas affecting quality of living, there comes the staggering recognition that the estimated 500 million data-items cannot be controlled and accessed by conventional, manual methods. Fortunately, rapidly developing computer technology has become available for such applications. Museum programs are beginning to mature that will provide access to both library and specimen data in random, highly flexible, permutative ways for the research of Museum scientists, for biologists generally, and especially for environmentalists. One computer system, especially developed for application to museum data storage and retrieval, has now emerged from a three-year study conducted in the National Museum of Natural History and supported by a Department of Health, Education, and Welfare contract. Using FY-71 appropriated funds, we will begin the implementation of that system in a small way. We are working closely with most of the other major natural history museums in this country to make plans for an interactive, national network connecting the resources of all into one master data base. At the same time, we are planning with the National Museum of Canada and the British Museum of Natural History to make the network eventually international.

The natural sciences have a critical, basic role to play in the national ecological effort to meet the most urgent human problem—survival in a decaying environment without loss of our underlying freedoms. (Cf. National Research Council report, "Systematics in Support of Biological Research," January 1970.) The National Museum of Natural History is prepared to accelerate the production and synthesis of information about man and his surroundings and already several hundred publications appear each year embodying the results of staff research. Most are clearly supportive of ecological studies and some are of an advanced order of statistical complexity. There are many long-time projects underway that are going to take continuing support, ranging from accounts of the flora or fauna of a region to population

studies in relation to various factors of the environment. The Smithsonian-based and National Science Foundation-financed Flora North America Program is a good example of the basic studies that will be very helpful to sound resource management in the future. It will also provide a research link with the Flora of Europe now underway and the voluminous Flora of the U.S.S.R. completed only recently. On the animal side, there is the project on African mammals and their parasites, and the study of bird migrations between Africa and Southern Europe in relation to disease transmission.

Now let us turn to the important question—What does the Museum have to work with to accomplish these goals? Most importantly, as I have indicated, we have an outstanding staff of scientists and support people in 245 civil service positions. The ratio cited by Senator Goldwater of technicians to researchers is accurate, less than one-to-one. Even when clerical and secretarial positions are taken into account, it is still below recognized minimum support standards ("Systematic Biology: A Survey of Federal Programs and Needs," pp. 28-29 and 44, published by the Office of Science and Technology, May 1969).

I want to dwell on this imbalance a moment because many years ago we realized that using highly trained, productive young scientists to do routine, repetitive chores is a gross misuse of the scarce talents they represent, if not criminal mismanagement of human resources. In the FY-67 budget hearings we proposed to increase technical support to the level of two technicians per scientist. Now, several years later despite continuing efforts in the budgetary process, we still do not have the minimal ratio. We have made some improvement in the manner in which the abilities of our technicians are organized and used. Several of the Museum's departments have developed a pool-approach,

that is, reorganization of the department's technicians into a central group. This has resulted in more of the repetitive chores getting done in a priority order by people who are specialists in such work. This last flexibility has been used in what must be viewed as only a temporary palliative, not a solution. What has actually happened is that the available pairs of hands, both professional and supportive, are fewer now than four years ago. To illustrate, I'd like to present a representative example of the changes in the fortunes of the National Museum of Natural History in recent years.

The Department of Vertebrate Zoology is one of the larger units and is concerned with biological studies of mammals, fishes, reptiles, amphibians, and birds. Its history of resource allotment and use parallels that of the Museum in this period.

In the early 1960's the four divisions of Vertebrate Zoology were considerably smaller than now, with a total staff of twenty, eight of them scientists. By 1967 (Table 1) the department had doubled due to an influx of younger scientists and recognition of the fact that supportive staff was needed for curation so that the fifteen scientists might pursue the research for which they were employed.

Subsequently, because of resignations and retirements, job freeze and job abolition, ten of the positions filled in 1965-1967, when the department reached its high point, were lost. Then, in 1968 while losses were taking place in ongoing programs, two positions in Primate Biology, a new interdepartmental program, were added. These two positions are not regarded as redeployment of existing personnel resources but as new positions in a totally new program. The scientific competence represented in the ten lost positions is shown in the far right-hand column.

The growth in the collections (Table 2) is one indication of the increase in depart-

mental work load during that time. Other departmental responsibilities, such as loans and outside visitors, have also increased many-fold. A recent report from the natural history museums of the country revealed that two-thirds or more of the collections borrowed from all museums for study each year are from the National Museum of Natural History. These facts indicate an enormous work load but what did Vertebrate Zoology have with which to do its part of the job?

On the basis of non-salary funds available, the department is now at about the same level it was in 1965 (Table 3). The allotment increased well in 1966 and 1967 but during the last three years has dropped slightly below the 1965 total, so that it has not even kept pace with the increased cost of living. In addition, the department now has to buy things out of its \$35,000 which it did not buy in 1965: \$5,000 worth of cases, nearly \$5,000 worth of bottles, computer time, zeroing, and manuscript typing.

Care of the National Collections is a prime responsibility and money from research allocations has been put into curation in this example. The amounts expended for curation have grown, mainly because of purchases of bottles and cases, but to compensate, the department has had to cut funds for equipment and supplies, such as traps, vials, and skeleton boxes. The graph (Figure 1) demonstrates the increasing use of Federal funds in support of the collections at the expense of research. Contracts for illustrating scientific publications and other purposes are down to 57% of what they were in 1965 and supplies and equipment are down about 41%. Currently the department is able to allow each scientist only \$460 for travel and \$200 worth of supplies and equipment for research each year, a total less than the research support often provided to advanced graduate students!

DEPARTMENT OF VERTEBRATE ZOOLOGY

TABLE 1.—SUMMARY OF FEDERAL POSITIONS FISCAL YEAR 1965-70

Division	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Number positions lost from highest total	Competence lost
Mammals:								
Professional.....	3	3	3	2	2	2		1 S.E. Asia specialist.
Technical.....	5	5	5	5	5	5		
Secretarial.....	1	1	2	1	1	1		1 Clerk-typist.
Primate Biology ¹								
Professional.....				(1)	(1)	(1)		
Technical.....								
Secretarial.....				(1)	(1)	(1)		
Birds:								
Professional.....	4	4	4	3	3	3		1 System evolutionist.
Technical.....	2	2	2	2	2	2		
Secretarial.....	2	2	1	1	1	1		1 Clerk-typist.
Reptiles and amphibians:								
Professional.....	2	2	2	2	2	2		
Technical.....	1	1	2	2	2	2		
Secretarial.....	1	1	1	1	1	1		
Fishes:								
Professional.....	6	6	6	6	5	5		1 Shark specialist.
Technical.....	5	7	7	7	5	5		2 Curatorial assistant.
Secretarial.....	1	1	2	2	2	1		1 Clerk-typist.
Office of Chairman:								
Administrative.....			1	1	1	1		
Secretarial.....			1	1	1	1		1 Secretary.
Technician-laborer.....	2	1	1	1	1	1		1 Specimen preparator.
Total.....	35	36	40	37	33	32	10	
Total.....				(2)	(2)	(2)		

¹ New program, not included in Department base.

TABLE 2.—GROWTH OF COLLECTIONS FISCAL YEARS 1965-69

	Mammals	Fishes	Reptiles-amphibians	Birds
Fiscal year 1965.....	325,746	1,791,877	161,564	514,209
Fiscal year 1969.....	411,300	2,108,958	172,609	537,084
Percent growth.....	26	17.5	6.8	4.5

TABLE 3.—SUMMARY OF FEDERAL SPENDING—FISCAL YEAR 1965-70

Fiscal year	Curation					Research							Total
	Cases	Bottles	Tanning	Other supplies and equipment	Subtotal	Contr.	Computer	Xerox	MTST	Other supplies and equipment	Travel	Subtotal	
1965		66	3,013	9,793	12,872	9,343				7,385	6,000	22,728	35,600
1966			4,128	8,809	12,937	9,578				11,165	6,320	27,063	40,000
1967		25	4,067	13,131	17,283	8,388				15,362	5,967	29,717	47,000
1968		3,042	3,300	8,009	14,351	6,325	1,100	1,800		5,527	5,297	20,049	34,400
1969	5,565	3,860	3,500	3,955	16,880	5,700	500	1,300	483	5,022	4,515	17,520	34,400
1970	5,000	4,788	750	7,064	17,602	5,300	700	1,000	1,140	3,158	6,050	17,348	34,950

From this example the reasons for my comments quoted by Senator Goldwater may be more apparent—that the museum had its back to the wall, that we are in some real danger of missing forever constantly occurring opportunities to participate in or initiate research which can contribute importantly to solutions of national problems. I cannot sit by complacently and see that happen. But let me elaborate a bit on the contention that the Museum is in real straits. We now use well above 90 percent of our total Museum budget for salaries and benefits, leaving less than 10 percent for all the research support, the equipment for both research and curation, the travel for field studies, and the increasing amounts of what was once provided by the service divisions of the Smithsonian. The Museum's annual increases in appropriated funds has regularly been below a 7 percent minimal cost-of-living increase. The several across-the-board salary increases, the merit-based adjustments of staff incomes over the past few years, taken with budget increments below the increased costs of doing business, result in ever larger proportions of the total funds being used just to maintain the excellent group of people we have.

But the Museum can provide them less each year in the way of research travel, equipment, research assistants, and publication. It is true that the Museum staff receives some research support through grants and contracts but these are by nature for very specific, limited purposes. Such funds do not buy the supplies and equipment the departments need nor does any of the overhead come to us directly. Without a substantial increase in the Museum's budget this present year, staffing would have to be reduced and, inevitably, many of the best of all classes of employees would leave first. If this should be permitted to happen, I believe the credibility of the Institution as a responsible employer would suffer and certainly the science contributions I have alluded to will not be realized.

At various points in these hearings we have discussed the subject of collections, so I would like to take this opportunity to answer questions we are often asked: Why do biologists need so many collections? Why should the National Collections continue to increase? Is there any policy governing the growth?

Whether human skeletons or other kinds of specimens, the diversity and variability of nature is basic to the answers. If we could summon up the Ancient Greeks who repelled Persian onslaughts and created the themes of our own society, or the American Indian builders of the great midwestern mounds, we could study directly their health, diseases, physiques, and so forth. Lacking that sort of magic recall of past peoples, we can read a physical biography in their skeletal remains and reconstruct much of the history of the culture represented. But one, a few, or even a hundred skeletons may not be sufficient to provide a sound statistical base for interpreting the natural variation one finds within any human population. Similarly, among other animals, and plants, to understand an organism-group, which by its very nature is variable from one indi-

vidual to another, the scientist must be able to look at a large sample. Only in this way is useful scientific classification possible and it is on classification that all other knowledge of an organism is structured for effective retrieval. In one form or another, classification based on the gathering, organizing, and interpreting all knowledge about man, other organisms, and rocks is the chief activity of the Museum staff and most of us are called taxonomists or systematic biologists.

Another reason for large numbers of collections has to do with biogeography. Most kinds of plants and animals occur over considerable areas of the earth—from a few counties in extent to around the world—and a large collection of biological materials of what appear to be very similar items is the only way to learn and document their distribution. Also, the availability of large collections, series from the full geographic range of a group of species enables the scientist to assess environmental change in different areas through historical times, or to describe the evolution of environments through study of fossil organisms. Geographic relationships are likewise important in locating organisms for biological control of noxious pests and weeds to replace pesticide control.

As the Nation's biologists, including our own, become ever more deeply involved in ecological research, these collections increase enormously in research value, for they are the documentary baseline for the living part of our environment in prebomb, prepersistent-pesticide, preindustrial periods of our history when the air was not loaded with lead and our waters with mercury compounds.

The universities and other centers that study and care for such collections do not, indeed cannot, maintain the large natural history collections American scientists must have. This was recognized long ago by the legislation that established the U.S. National Museum as the Federal depository for these documentary materials and, quite properly, other similar centers look to us for leadership and help. If adequate space and support is not provided for the national collections—and space is a serious problem—the problem will not go away, nor will someone else do the job. It just won't be done and U.S. science will suffer.

You will be interested in a sample listing of some of the large collections that have come to us over the past 5 years from the university community. But first, let me emphasize a very important point—we are not the indiscriminating recipient of anything and everything others want to dispose of. We regularly reject large numbers of collections that do not meet the high standards of data quality we have insisted upon for years. If a collection is valuable but not up to what we feel the national collections should accept for one reason or another, we do our best to find the specimens a useful home in another museum or in a teaching collection. We have criteria for growth of the collections and we apply them.

From University of Michigan, crayfishes.
University of Florida, fishes.
University of Kansas, freshwater mollusks and crayfishes.

Goucher College, plants, minerals, archeological artifacts, etc.

University of Maryland, amphibians (salamanders).

Washington University (St. Louis), human skeletal collection.

Johns Hopkins University, tertiary fossils.
Yale University, bryophytes.

In addition, the Museum is the official depository for the study collections of the Department of Agriculture's entomologists, the Department of the Interior's ichthyologists, mammalogists, and ornithologists, and the Geological Survey's paleontologists, all of whom share the Natural History building with us. Also, the Mohole cores and the collections from the National Science Foundation managed Antarctic program are accepted by us as a part of our legislated responsibility to other Federal programs. Additionally, the support of university biology by the National Science Foundation and other Federal agencies oftentimes results in demands on the Museum for preservation of the collections that document these research projects. Because study of pollen at successive rock layers helps locate new oil reserves, oil companies employ pollen specialists who deposit the documentary microscope slides with the Museum for preservation.

On the other hand, I must mention Yale University's Record Wood Collection as an example of a research resource that should have come to the National Herbarium but did not. Because of the lack of funds and space, that collection is elsewhere. It is not lost to science but as the world's largest collection of tropical woods with voucher specimens, it would have greatly strengthened the present wood collection in the National Herbarium and the research thereon.

Now I should like to comment on a couple of the other matters discussed by Senator Goldwater that are not included in the preceding remarks.

The importance of the resolution of the body called the Smithsonian council perhaps might not be fully appreciated, so I want to call it to your attention again. The members are appointed by the Secretary from among the leaders of all branches of knowledge and only a few of the present group would characterize themselves as specialists in the natural sciences. For these reasons, it is especially significant that the first substantive resolution ever adopted by the council recognized the current potential peril of the Natural History Museum.

With respect to the services available to us and other bureaus, I may point out that the buildings management department is now able to do only the most necessary maintenance because of their reduced budget. For example, a recent memorandum to me presented what has become a frequent situation—if the scientific department concerned wants the air-conditioning in one of its rooms to function properly, the department is expected to pay for it out of the meager funds available for nonsalary costs. Another example is the fact that many items the Museum departments must now buy, without a budget increase, were earlier a part of the supply division's inventory.

On the question of the condition of animals on exhibit, I can say that no one is more conscious of the problem than we in the Museum, so I am especially pleased with current developments that will alleviate the problem to some extent.

The general exhibit of mammals is admittedly in need of renovation. A number of the displays need to be replaced because the specimens are old, and because there have been changes in public concern and interest since their installation.

In pleasant contrast, the hall of North American mammals and the habitat displays of African mammals collected by Theodore Roosevelt are in good condition.

We do have two research-specimen preparators in the Department of Vertebrate Zoology, one for mammal study-skins and the other for mammal skeletons. In 1965 we had four preparators but had to cut back because of the shortage of funds. Bird skins are now prepared by a general technician who is, however, quite capable. Since last fall we have been seeking to redeploy a maintenance position so that we could recruit a general vertebrate preparator and we think we have found a good candidate.

As you know, the Museum has both an exhibit and a research orientation and the preparation of materials differs depending on the use to which they are to be put. It has been found that freeze-drying is the best technique for preparing small animals for display, rather than laborious taxidermy techniques that cannot produce better mounts than the freeze-dried whole animal. It is more economical to contract for any sizable taxidermy job than to have a full-time taxidermist incompletely utilized.

Another development which will help is the recent creation of a nucleus for a maintenance team in the Natural History Museum that will be concerned with cleaning and repairing the exhibits. We have repeatedly asked for positions to accomplish this very important task, without success. In desperation, we have just decided to use part of the time of a few people for the job and let other work go undone. It should be a much larger group and new positions will have to be sought again for the purpose; however, it is a start.

In summary, let me stress that in these brief words I have only begun to characterize the great diversity of interests and quality of the science produced by the Museum staff. I have tried to make clear some of the ways in which we can, indeed must, contribute to a new level of quality of life for all our people. With your help, with the sincere concern of citizens and lawmakers like yourselves, we will succeed.

VEKING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS FACING THE NATION

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, Prof. Stefan Possony, director of the international studies program at the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University, has been kind enough to prepare for me a series of memorandums setting forth his views on various aspects of the most vexing international problems facing this Nation.

So that all Senators may be exposed to Professor Possony's thinking, I ask unanimous consent that two of his memorandums be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the memorandums were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CHAPTER X—LIMITED OR MASSIVE MASS MURDER?

There is strong sentiment in the Senate for the ratification of the genocide convention.

However, it is worth noting that, according to the convention, the mass killing of a social class, such as Stalin's "liquidation of the Kulaks", is not considered as genocide, nor is the systematic killing of political parties, e.g. Stalin's mass purge of the CPSU. Since social classes threatened by mass murder may be larger than ethnic or religious groups, this omission in the convention is inexcusable; and a good example of the dullness of our diplomatic tactics.

The convention, while committing the signatories to "prevent and punish" this international crime, does not call for international enforcement against a state practicing genocide. But we certainly would be opposed to genocide on the clearest moral grounds.

Morality may be a stronger argument than strategic requirement and "vital national interest". Actually, the upholding of morality is a most vital interest of this nation. Many of us feel obligated to advocate help to Israel because, in all likelihood, the fall of that country would result in genocide. But why should the U.S. care to become an accomplice in genocide by turning over prospective victims to communist exterminators in Vietnam?

There is a fad among American students to identify war with genocide, which is nonsense and not in line with the meaning of the genocide convention. But there is a campaign to foist genocide crimes upon the United States. This campaign is part of the self-induced demoralization process and of defeatism, a subject which I will discuss later.

The U.S. is *not* dependent upon Middle Eastern oil; Europe, the Common Market, and Japan are. With the partial exception of Britain, the allies who need that oil don't do much for the defense of Israel. For that matter, at this time we are the *only* power which is able to prevent still another Jewish genocide. Naturally, we also do have strong reasons based on our own national interests which compel us to contain aggression in the Middle East.

By the same token, communism must be contained *everywhere*, not just where the Soviets support the Arabs. Communism must be contained because it aims to liquidate certain social classes, notably the "capitalists", the landholders, the middle and upper class peasants, broad groups of intellectuals, and whomsoever they designate. Note that dissident party members also are threatened. In Asia, at any rate, the period of purges is not over—China's "cultural revolution" included killing on a large scale.

This remains true despite the fact that the news has not penetrated deeply into the academic universe.

Liquidation of social classes doesn't necessarily mean that all members of the ostracized groups will be killed, but it *does* mean many will be executed, and others will be put into concentration camps and worked to death; and still others will be subjected to extreme hardships. A certain percentage may escape serious trouble, but on the basis of existing historical precedents it is safe to say that no family belonging to the "hostile classes" will escape unscathed.

President Nixon stated on April 30, 1970, that if we were to desert the South Vietnamese, we would "expose them to the slaughter and savagery which the leaders of North Vietnam inflicted on hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese who chose freedom when the communists took over North Vietnam in 1954". On November 3, 1969, Mr. Nixon placed the number of those murdered at 50,000 and stated that "hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps".

These statements have been the target of criticism, on the ground that there really wasn't a blood bath. Professor George McT. Kahin of Cornell thinks, according to the

New York Times of May 12, 1970, that "perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 may have died" when a peasant revolt was "harshly repressed" in 1955 and 1956. (*Congressional Record*, May 19, 1970, p. 16081.) Mr. Clark Clifford calls this the "best estimate" but fails to indicate why the other estimates are bad. Senator Allott has dealt with this numbers game or the purge body count most effectively on May 21, 1970. (*Congressional Record*, p. 16520.)

The dispute on whether the purges took place in 1954 or in 1955-6 is irrelevant. The relevant question is whether mass murders have occurred or not. Any time attention is riveted on such an irrelevancy, it is fair to say that the critics are attempting a diversion.

The whole approach of singling out one particular massacre is indicative of well-nigh incredible ignorance of communist realities. If there were an occasional massacre and if the massacres were designed to repress a rebellion, such as resistance against a harsh agrarian reform, communist dictatorships would not be much different from other repressive regimes in history. Both communist dictatorships are institutionalized terror systems and their terror is executed on a permanent every-day basis, according to established procedures.

This does not mean that, quantitatively, terror always is at a peak or that lulls in terror are impossible. Actually, such lulls are parts of the procedure. But each communist dictatorship is structured in such a way that large scale exterminations can be carried out whenever the communist rulers find this necessary.

It would be quite reasonable to state that terror in North Vietnam reached one peak during 1956, but anyone who denies that there possibly could have been mass exterminations during 1954 and 1955, is making unsubstantiated statements. Our knowledge about terror in North Vietnam is deficient, and we may hope that it always was kept at a low level. But this does not change the character of the Hanoi dictatorship as that of terroristic totalitarianism.

The communists behaved terroristically even during the Viet Minh period. Thus, reputable observers have reported about a one-month Viet Minh terror campaign in Saigon during 1945. (Lucien Bodard, *The Quicksand War: Prelude to Vietnam*, Boston, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1963, p. 11.) Joseph Buttinger, the first expert on Vietnam in the United States, talked about a "communist policy of killing all true nationalist opponents of the Viet Minh," which had "deep and lasting political consequences for the future of Vietnam" and was "one of the reasons for the weakness of the non-communist national movement." (*Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled*, New York, Praeger, 1967, pp 276-6, 412.) According to Harvey Smith, the North Vietnamese communists began purging landlords in 1955. (*Area Handbook for North Vietnam*, Washington, D.C., American University Foreign Areas Studies, 1967, p. 63.)

The fact is that the land reform program was carried out in two successive campaigns. (Hoang Van Chi, *From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam*, New York, Praeger, 1964.) The first campaign was the land rent reduction campaign 1953 and 1954, the second the land reform campaign 1954 and 1956. The second campaign was interrupted in 1955 to keep down the mass exodus during "the 300 day period laid down by the Geneva Agreements to afford freedom of movement between the two zones". After the exodus was ended, the communists "merged the two campaigns into one" and accomplished their programs "by a single wave of terror". "These two campaigns had but one purpose, namely, the liquidation of the land owning class." In both campaigns the same techniques were used, "the only notable difference being the degree of

violence." The first campaign was intended to suppress the wealthier of the village bourgeoisie, who were described as the "principal reactionaries" . . . The second campaign was aimed at the remainder of the village bourgeoisie, described as "secondary reactionaries".

The two campaigns were carried through in *five* successive waves each one in a strategically placed area. They were carried out by special teams of cadres carefully trained in China and having first-hand experience in Chinese land reform. Deaths occurred because of executions, mortality in jails and camps, suicides and starvation owing to the "isolation policy". (Hoang Van Chi, pp. 163-168.)

The method of the mass killings, essentially the same as has been practiced in China, went through the following stages: Population classification, classification of landlords, extortion of money and valuables, crime revelation, denunciation sessions, trials and convictions, and isolations.

The great terror campaign in North Vietnam began in 1953. (Dennis T. Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Vietnam*, London, Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 173f.) According to Donald Lancaster (*The Emancipation of French Indochina*, London, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 377f.), 12,000 victims of the operation were released from forced labor camps in December 1956. The number of those who had been murdered was unofficially estimated at between 10,000 and 15,000.¹²

Mr. Lancaster's estimate is now given much play but it has no firmer basis than other estimates. Gerard Tongas, a French professor who remained in Hanoi until 1959, claims to have accurate information to the effect that the "butchery" connected with the land reform resulted in 100,000 deaths. All those figures may very well be wrong. They could be lower—but they also could be higher. There is no way to determine the exact toll.

It is erroneous to discuss the problem as though mass exterminations resulted only from land reform. For example, we know that oppositional intellectuals were sent into the mountains to live among tribesmen. It is fair to assume that many of those intellectuals never returned.

The data show that terror was *not* restricted just to 1956 and it was *not* merely a method to repress a peasant rebellion.

The crucial question is this: Have there been mass murders? Even the critics and skeptics don't deny this fact. "According to refugees who reached Saigon in 1957, the whole countryside of North Vietnam was white with the turbans of mourners."¹³

Another dispute has arisen about the number of Catholics who left North Vietnam after the Geneva partition. Mr. Clark Clifford took up the cudgels on this one. (*Congressional Record*, May 18, 1970, p. 15899.) "The figure of one million and a half Catholics who fled to the South, referred to by President Nixon . . . is incorrect . . . The number is 754,710." What accuracy!

This finding is supposedly "significant": "There are still living in North Vietnam today approximately 800,000 Catholics. There are also Catholics among the lead-

ership of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam."¹⁴

One wonders whether Mr. Clifford ever heard of the fact that most members of the Italian, Polish, Austrian, and French CP are nominally Catholics and that Stalin studied for the priesthood in the Orthodox Church. The Vietnamese communists refer to Catholics as "superstitious remnants of the old order" (*Congressional Record*, May 21, 1970, p. 16510.)

The amazed discovery that not all Catholics fled from North Vietnam is extraordinarily naive. There are Catholics and Catholics. We don't know how many Catholics have been suppressed since 1954, how many have abandoned their faith, and how many are wearing camouflage. In any event, an exodus of half (or two-thirds) of a given social group is a very rare event in modern history, especially if such mass migration occurred in a short period. This migration involved approximately 5% of the total population—what would we think if 10 million Americans left the U.S. within a few weeks?¹⁵

The implication of Mr. Clifford's "correction" is that, after all, Catholicism is somewhat alien to Asian culture and that the communists accommodate with the Buddhists or whatever Asian religion he may have in mind. I forego a discussion of religion in North Vietnam. But I do want to recall that the communists carried out very cruel and complete persecutions of Buddhists in Mongolia and Tibet. While some Buddhists join or sympathize with communism and others don't, the Buddhist religion is just as incompatible with the communist doctrine as is Catholicism. And it isn't just the Catholics who resist communism in South Vietnam.

In Europe the question has arisen whether the nazis really gassed six million Jews or a significantly lower number. There have been occasional voices who asserted that no Jew was killed in an extermination program but no one, including most of the apologists for the nazis, takes this denial seriously. It is a perfectly legitimate historical question whether the Jewish death toll really was six million, and it is a proper task to establish the exact number.

The most thorough job on this question was done by Paul Rassinier in *Le Drame des Juifs Européens* (Paris, 1964). Rassinier spent 19 months in nazi camps and he was a socialist, hence he did not aim to whitewash the nazis. His conclusion is that the toll of extermination was 1.5 million, possibly as low as 900,000.

It must be observed that with the German archives accessible to the author, with information worked up by Jewish agencies, and numerous other data, including claims for compensation, Rassinier found it impossible to establish an exact number. All I can say is that I devoutly hope the lowest figures is the most accurate.

Rassinier's "lowest" and "reasonable" figures can be compared with Mr. Kahin's "best estimate" and Mr. Nixon's figure.

BLOOD BATH TOLL

Nazis

Low count: 1 victim per 300 of population.¹⁶
High count: 1 victim per 200 of population.

¹⁴ According to the Cornell Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, "approximately 700,000 Catholics . . . did move from northern Vietnam to southern Vietnam". They explained that this represented *two-thirds* of the Catholic population of North Vietnam. (*Congressional Record*, June 1, 1970, p. 17739.)

¹⁵ Tibetan refugees in India, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sikkim number about 75,000 persons or 6% of the population of Tibet.

¹⁶ Nazi-occupied Europe.

¹⁷ Rassinier's 1.5 million, *not* 6 million.

North Vietnamese Communists

Low count: 1 victim per 1,000 of population.

High count: 1 victim per 150¹⁸ of population.

It should be noted that the nazi figures cover some 4 years, while the Vietnamese figures apply only to the massacre of 1956. This was the massacre about which General Vo Nguyen Giap said: "We . . . executed too many honest people . . . Worse still, torture came to be regarded as a normal practice during party reorganization."¹⁹

If statistics of this sort are disputed, not for the purpose of historical accuracy but for the purpose of formulating policy, I submit that such macabre arguments are useless and nauseating. To determine policy, accuracy is impossible, because the facts are only partially known; and utterly unnecessary, because precise numbers do not affect the nature of the crime. To define the character of the nazi regime, it was merely necessary to find out what the nazis stated officially and what their policy was, to prove or disprove the existence of concentration and extermination camps, and to establish that people, in whatever numbers, were transported to those camps and never were found again. A few witnesses and a few confessions on a few murders clinched the case. Needless to say that extermination was not only applied to Jews and Gypsies but to other groups as well.

The case of soviet extermination policies also is well established, although soviet files are not available. What, for example, would one expect is the life expectancy of a prisoner in a camp on Novaya Zemlya?

With respect to Vietnam, all the basic information that needs to be known was put in the record by Senator Allott in the form of official Hanoi broadcasts, North Vietnamese legislation, and the formulation of the concept of "blood debt". There are, moreover, witnesses of exterminations in the North and of exterminations in the South, like in Huế, as well as *corpora delicti*. (In Red China mass executions are often put on TV.) The terroristic or criminal character of the North Vietnamese regime, therefore, is just as firmly established as that of the nazi and soviet regimes. Note that the United States had no doubts about the criminal intentions and character of the nazi regime as of 1935, when the Nuernberg legislation was enacted, six to seven years *before* the systematic killings began.

Mr. Douglas Pike, whose knowledge of this problem is unsurpassed, has determined from communist documents that 15 categories of citizens are falling "within the scope of the assassination program". If strictly applied to South Vietnam, this list would include at least 3 million victims. "This probably is what Col. Tran Van Duc, the highest ranking *hoi chanh*, meant when he said, 'there are three million South Vietnamese on the (communist) blood debt list'."

The same defector, a party member for 24 years, was quoted by Donald Rochlen, a

¹⁸ The late Bernhard Fall, a very knowledgeable expert, stated that with respect to the summer of 1956, "the best-educated guesses . . . are that probably close to 50,000 North Vietnamese were executed . . . and that at least twice as many were arrested and sent to forced labor camps." (*Congressional Record*, May 21, p. 16506.)

¹⁹ *Nhan Dan*, October 31, 1956, quoted from Hoang Van Chi, p. 210. Khrushchev, also in 1956, confessed Stalin's crimes. During the same period, Mao Tse-tung instituted the "100 flowers" campaign. Since that period, communist spokesmen have become more recalcitrant when talking on terrorism.

¹ The classification was by alphabet, e.g. A,B,C=rich peasants, . . . G,H,I,J=strong middle-level peasants, . . . S,T,U,V=poor peasants, W,X,Y,Z=wage earning or landless peasants. (Hoang Van Chi, p. 164.)

² Many of these quotes are taken from Douglas Pike, *The Vietcong Strategy of Terror*, Saigon, United States Mission, February 1970.

³ Hoang, op. cit., p. 166. White is the Vietnamese color of mourning.

foreign service officer who has studied the problem since 1964. According to Rochlen, the defector thinks that 3 to 5 million would be killed. Rochlen added: "I think about a million would be killed and another million would wish they were dead." (*Congressional Record*, May 21, 1970, pp. 16510 and 16618.)

According to figures disclosed by Mr. Pike, about 2% of the population of Hue and surroundings were killed during 26 days in 1968. An estimated half of this figure was murdered before the communists fled, in order to leave no witnesses. The others were eliminated during the first phase of the operation as "tyrants" and "enemies of the revolution"; and as "social negatives" and "imperialist lackeys" during the second or "social reconstruction phase". This operation shows many similarities with the Katyn murders which were thoroughly investigated by Congress. Of particular significance is that in both cases, the intelligentsia was the prime target of annihilation. (The Katyn murders fooled Mr. Averell Harriman, then American Ambassador to the USSR.)

The Hue example shows that a *blood bath* in which at least one per cent of the population is killed, must be expected within the first few hours of a communist take-over. The major and sustained liquidations follow during consolidation of communist power and throughout the entire period of communist rule.

Again, we don't need such macabre estimates. The certainty of a blood bath was accepted by Senator McGovern who has proposed that the endangered individuals be allowed to emigrate to the U.S. and elsewhere.

Three additional points. (1) The prolonged war has necessarily lengthened the "blood debt list". The communists are not about to allow any of their more able enemies to "live happily thereafter", and they must disarm all unreliable military units. Some of those who are willing to switch sides will be accepted—after prolonged "re-education"; others won't be accepted. In 1954-1956, the task was not to liquidate a war like the present one.

(2) The problem cannot be reduced to one single blood bath. A communist dictatorship is engaged in permanent and unceasing purges. Forced labor camps and executions of political opponents are as communist as free speech and regularly scheduled elections are American.

(3) In their customary purges, the communists never forget to include a goodly number of party members who until a few hours before their execution were in perfectly good standing. Some purges have been directed exclusively against the party. So far as I know this has not yet happened in North Vietnam, though Ho Chi Minh was quite adept in eliminating his opponents. The implication is that if the Hanoi dictatorship wins, many members of the so-called National Liberation Front and of the Vietcong will be killed; while most of the internal security personnel of the Saigon regime will be taken over, just as many Gestapo officers found a haven in East Germany—this sort of thing is routine among the communists.

I do not, of course, regard this threat to the communists as an argument for turning South Vietnam over to North Vietnam.

But the deliberate superficiality or deceptiveness with which problems of mass murder are treated in the current debate is beneath contempt.

Finally, one additional aspect of the problem which has been systematically ignored: the refugee influx from communist-controlled areas in South Vietnam. There have been a total of 3,500,000 refugees in South Vietnam, many of whom fled to protect themselves against the ravages of war. A portion of those refugees came from V.C.-controlled villages. Since escapes from V.C. areas are punishable by death, these people

showed up in our areas whenever the VC's were put to flight.

How many South Vietnamese *did* flee from the communists? Some 400 villages of 2,500 are now under communist control and they harbor about 10% of the total population or roughly 1,750,000. On the assumption that villages average the same size, there should be 2.8 million in those communist villages. Hence 1 million would have fled from the communists. If we assume that the villages in the mountain areas are 20% below average in the numbers of inhabitants, the number of refugees from the VC areas would be 500,000. From these numbers must be deducted those whom the VC purged in the villages, especially all former office holders and all natural leaders.

The statistical games about the number of murder victims and the dishonest attempts to belittle the size of communist terrorism are disgusting. I hate that people who are wrong and hypocritical give advice on what's right.

FOURTH OF JULY ADDRESS BY SENATOR KENNEDY

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, this past July 4, we celebrated our 194th birthday as the "home of the free and land of the brave." This pause to renew our national pledge of allegiance came at a point in our history when increasing domestic tensions, mutual distrust, and open hostility have caused separations and divisions among our people and set citizen against citizen, black against white, and generation against generation. In the summer of 1970 too much of the Nation's collective energy has been directed toward the escalation of rhetorical challenges, denunciations, and shrill epithets rather than to issue the common call to meet the issues and crises which threaten us all.

In this period of domestic dissent and abrasive division, patriotism and the American flag have been wrenched from their symbolic meaning and purpose and have been used as political tools to castigate and inflame passion. This misuse of elements of our national heritage has been perpetrated by all extremes of our political and social spectrum. The flag that is torn and desecrated can no more be condoned than the cry of patriotism that is used to justify the beating of those of differing political beliefs.

On this Fourth of July, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) called the attention of Americans to the fact that the flag has been the symbol of this Nation's unity, not its divisions, and that patriotism has been the unifying force which has rallied this Nation in the pursuit of its ideals and the defense of its freedom. In this speech to the citizens of Wakefield, Mass., Senator KENNEDY reminded us that—

The flag is a symbol around which (we) can rally citizens of all persuasions, nationalities, and beliefs. The flag is big enough to furl around us all. The flag is the soul of America. By standing under the flag, we know that all our divisions are shallow compared to the deep and common faith we share. Standing under the flag, we are no longer white Americans or black Americans, rich or poor, old or young, soldiers or civilians. We are just Americans, sharing our common heritage and moving toward our common destiny.

Senator KENNEDY's reminder was that we must continue to put patriotism and the meaning of the flag in our hearts and our daily actions rather than on our sleeves. A symbol requires constant attention and renewal to maintain its meaning and power. That continual infusion of spirit and energy is required of all of us.

Senator KENNEDY's speech is as appropriate in August of 1970 as on the Fourth of July. I ask unanimous consent that the text of his message be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FOURTH OF JULY, 1970 ADDRESS BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY, WAKEFIELD, MASS.

I am pleased to be here with so many friends in Wakefield to celebrate the 194th anniversary of the birth of America. Today, throughout the land, in all our splendid cities, in every town, village and hamlet, Americans pause to observe another Fourth of July. And it is reassuring for the future of our country to know that in the busy struggle for existence, and the terrible stress of the times, we can lay aside the material things of life to pledge allegiance to the flag, to recall the great principles for which we stand, and to ask how we may better serve our country.

The Revolutionary War won us our existence as a nation. The Civil War ratified it and confirmed it in the blood of our own people. The two World Wars evidenced to the world that Americans were willing to fight any foe, and to die that our ideals and principles of government might live.

Today is the day we recall the great men of our past—men who held high the torch of freedom in the snows of Valley Forge, the rolling hills of Gettysburg, the mud of Flanders Field, the beaches of Normandy, the sands of Iwo Jima. Tyrants in other lands have had the lesson driven home that the flag of the United States, though soft in texture, represents the confined strength, dedication and fury of millions of citizens in a just nation under God.

But today, on this Fourth of July, we cannot sit back and simply enjoy the glorious history of America. For our thoughts today are not for America alone. We cannot rejoice as Americans when we read in every newspaper and hear on every radio and see on every television broadcast the news of bloodshed in Indochina, war in the Middle East, and tyranny in half the world. Whenever suffering humans are yearning to be free, whenever pain and want live side-by-side with happiness and wealth, when the oppressor is on the march—at such a time as this, it is impossible for us to be both American and indifferent. Before we immerse ourselves in the pure joy we have always felt as Americans each year at this birthday celebration of us all, we must pause and reflect on who we are, what we stand for, and why we love our nation and our flag.

The second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence sums up, as well as any other statement I know, the fixed star by which America has always guided itself throughout the noble history of our land. When John Hancock from Braintree and his eloquent compatriots from the 13 colonies met in Philadelphia and affixed their signatures to that Declaration, they were telling us what millions of Americans down through the last two centuries have lived for and died by:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain

inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness."

Today, as rarely before, America is a nation divided against itself by the cry for peace abroad, and the cry for justice and equality at home. Prophets of doom proclaim the end of the American era. But today of all days, we can begin to stand up against that tide. We cannot allow our divisions to mask our common ideals, our dissent to mask our common goals and heritage. Like the Biblical shepherd, we concentrate on finding the lost sheep, but we are secure in the knowledge that the rest of the flock is safe.

America has grown great, and it has grown great because it has been diverse. The umbrella of our Constitution is broad enough to tolerate the broadest possible range of peaceful change and protest. It is no accident that our founding fathers chose the phrase "E pluribus unum"—one out of many—as the motto of the new nation they were creating.

We are all one people, joined together by our common differences and by the ideals on which our nation was founded. In spite of the angry partisan patriotism—left and right, North and South—that the divisions in America have generated in recent years, we are still Americans, and the flag is still the symbol of our unity.

The flag is more, however, than the symbol of our unity. It is also the symbol of our revolution. To me, it has never been the symbol of the stand-patters. It is the symbol of progress we have made, a symbol of the change we know must come, a symbol of the Spirit of '76.

Perhaps never before in the history of the world has there been an emblem so full of the great aspirations of all men everywhere as the flag of the United States. Countless generations of immigrants have sought a new life and new world in America, drawn by the stars and stripes and the promise of liberty and freedom.

The flag our fathers received at their citizenship ceremony initiated them into the new life of love and freedom, and they went forth to build a new nation. Our common aspirations today are as boundless as the mind of man. They surpass all contemporary debate. They exceed even the deepest divisions of our time, because they reflect the timeless quest of men to be free, to live in a society that is open, where the principles of freedom and justice and equality prevail.

It is for this reason that patriotism and the flag can never be the special preserve of any particular party or any particular political philosophy. I love the flag no less because I believe America has lost its way in Vietnam. I love the flag no less because I want America to move ahead to right the wrongs we see in our society at home. Those of us who push America on do so out of love and hope for the America that can be. We are full of the awareness of how much is right with America, how much we have done in years gone by to fulfill the promise of democracy for all our people.

We are not summer soldiers or sunshine patriots. We are patriots for all seasons, holding up to all Americans the mirror of the flag and the ideals it represents. If the lights begin to go out in America because men can no longer think what they feel and say what they think, the lights will begin to go out again all over the world, and the great experiment of 1776 will fail.

But America is full of patriots for all seasons who will not let our experiment fail. And the flag is a symbol around which can rally citizens of all persuasions, nationalities, and beliefs. The flag is big enough to furl round us all. The flag of America is the soul of America. By standing under the flag, we know that all our divisions are shallow compared to the deep and common faith we share. Standing under the flag, we are no

longer white Americans or black Americans, rich or poor, old or young, soldiers or civilians. We are just Americans, sharing our common heritage and moving toward our common destiny.

Too often today, however, when we put on the flag, we wear it on the outside instead of the inside, on our sleeve instead of in our heart. It is not enough simply to paste the flag on our car window and confess "my country right or wrong," any more than it is enough to fly the flag upside down to protest a national policy. Every American has the responsibility to match his country's actions against its principles, and to exert his strongest influence to help his leaders steer the course he thinks is right.

Those who desecrate the flag are worse. A crime against the flag is a crime against everything for which we stand, a crime against our past, against our future. It is as bad to use the flag to beat a demonstrator for peace as it is to tear the flag to demonstrate for peace.

In the midst of all our current troubles, it helps to know that we have overcome dangers in our past far more serious than any we face today. And somehow, because we succeeded so well in the past, we have managed to persuade ourselves that those crises were not as terrible as the ones we face today. In our nature as Americans, we are a modest and unassuming people. We always minimize our past success and maximize our present danger. But we are also an optimistic people, a people capable of tapping unknown sources of energy and commitment to meet new dangers that appear. If we see further today, and we can do more today, it is because we stand on the shoulders of the giants of our history. They remind us of the greatness of our past, and they give us new strength to meet our future. In the face of all the challenges around us, the greatest sin is inaction. We have the strength to meet our task, if only we have the will.

ENVIRONMENTAL DETERIORATION

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, the National Governors' Conference is presently meeting at Lake of the Ozarks, Mo. In the next several days, the Governors will be considering a number of proposed policy statements developed by their Committee on Natural Resources and Environmental Management which deal with the coordinated governmental mechanisms requisite national attitudes necessary to begin to come to grips with the massive and expanding problems of environmental deterioration that challenge this Nation.

The 10 proposed policy statements recommended by this committee, chaired by the Honorable William L. Guy, Governor of North Dakota, offer a significant agenda of many of the issues associated with effective environmental policies and management. Individually, the 10 proposals focus on the requirements for:

First, Comprehensive national planning and coordination of activities;

Second, the need for national goals in the fields of ecology, environment, conservation, and population;

Third, the placement of more responsibility for planning and action at the State and local level;

Fourth, increased and more relevant educational efforts in environment, conservation, and population;

Fifth, a national voluntary population distribution policy;

Sixth, a national and State policy on coastal zone planning and management;

Seventh, a change in national attitudes toward non-replaceable natural resources;

Eighth, a policy for State land use planning;

Ninth, full funding and implementation of State comprehensive outdoor recreation plans; and

Tenth, a revitalization for forestry efforts on a national basis by all ownerships.

Without specifically endorsing any one of these policy statement proposals, I would like to commend the Committee on Natural Resources and Environmental Management and the National Governors' Conference for making these issues an important part of their deliberations. It is certainly a reflection of their concern for improving the quality of the environment and the quality of life for all our citizens. It is also a recognition of the role which State and local units of government must play in the coordinated efforts that will be needed to end the senseless and disastrous destruction of our natural life support systems.

So that the full text of these proposed policy statements which will be presented to the Governors' Conference this week may be brought to the attention of the Congress, I ask unanimous consent that the policy statements of the Committee on Natural Resources and Environmental Management of the National Governors' Conference be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

POLICY STATEMENTS: COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL PLANNING AND COORDINATION IS NEEDED

There is need for a Cabinet level Department of National Planning directly under the President of the United States, who is our Chief Planner. Such a department would be responsible for directing and coordinating all federal planning in all national and federal activities. The National Department of Planning would include environment and conservation as essential ingredients to the planning in every field of national concern.

This department to be effective might contain several closely related bureaus or divisions such as the Office of Management and Budget; Division of Basic Data and Projections; Division of State-Federal Planning Relations; Division of Ecological, Environment and Conservation Planning; and other divisions representing substantial pieces of the national planning action.

Such a Cabinet level Department of Planning would assist the President in developing national goals and would see to it that such goals were considered by all federal agencies in their planning and programing.

There is dire need for massive and comprehensive planning and coordination of effort in many broad fields such as Environment, Conservation, Population Distribution, Transportation, Crime Control, and many others.

There will always be inadequate, fractionated, and uncoordinated planning and programing taking place at the federal level until a mechanism such as a Cabinet level Department of National Planning is developed to enable the President to gain control and direction of his administration's planning efforts.

A Cabinet level Department of National Planning should not be confused with proposals for a national department of federal

government management. The two departments' functions would be very different.

Nor should it be construed that a Department of National Planning would take over individual federal agency or state government responsibility in the field of planning.

States and the private sector, as well as the many federal agencies, will always have trouble developing their local plans in environment, conservation, and population distribution until there is a strong, unified Department of National Planning.

A single federal agency to which all state planning efforts could be directed for federal planning grants and planning matching funds would be preferable to the present system of requiring the states to shop through many federal agencies administering many federal programs to obtain federal planning funds.

NATIONAL GOALS ARE NEEDED

There is a need for the President and Congress to set National Goals in the fields of Ecology, Environment, Conservation, and Population. It would simplify the direction of state and local efforts if they could mesh their goals with national goals. These goals should stand out as signal flags on the halcyons of our ship of state so that all could see them and understand them.

STRONG STATES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM ARE NEEDED

There must be a constant recognition of the need to place as much responsibility as possible in planning and action at the state and local levels. The unique abilities of state and local government to recognize priorities at the grass roots level should be respected and understood by the federal government. State governments should be permitted to set higher minimum standards than the federal government in the fields of environmental management and conservation.

The states need as much flexibility as possible in adjusting state and local programs to those needs unique to the area, economy, etc. Therefore, the block grant approach to federal planning and action funds disbursement is preferred over categorical grants.

MORE RELEVANT EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS IN ENVIRONMENT, CONSERVATION, AND POPULATION ARE NEEDED

We must recognize the urgent need for the teaching of environment, conservation, and population as a major basic educational requirement in primary, secondary, and higher education. Curricula of traditional offerings at all levels of education need to be examined for their relevance to the rapidly changing conditions of environment, natural resources, and population.

The competition for students' attention to a wide range of study matter should not be allowed to prevent a full understanding of the natural forces at play on this planet. Too often in the past, students have not been adequately taught the subjects of environment, conservation and population, and have not learned the interrelationship of these subjects. Yet failure to understand this relationship could possibly spell mankind's doom if informed action based on knowledge is not taken by the public.

States should require a constant updating of educational curricula in order to strengthen the offerings in environment, conservation and population.

A NATIONAL VOLUNTARY POPULATION DISTRIBUTION POLICY IS NEEDED

The United States needs to develop a national policy on voluntary population distribution. It is now projected that the population of the United States will rise from 200 million people at present to more than 300 million people by the year 2000.

Our nation has practiced population distribution incentives in the past through such

devices as the Homestead Act. A new and fresh approach to population distribution at the present time is needed.

The social and economic problems of overpopulated areas include ghettos, poverty, mass transit demands, overloaded educational, health, and recreational services, pollution of air and water, increased crime, and a growing level of individual frustration and nervous tensions.

On the other hand, underpopulated areas are suffering high economic and social costs as well. These costs are brought on by an inadequate tax base and too few people to support necessary institutions on a community basis such as schools, churches, hospitals, recreational areas, etc.

Environmental management and conservation become excessively costly because of the severe population imbalance between the overpopulated states and those which are underpopulated.

The federal government, through its incoherent and uncoordinated planning and programs, is one of the major factors in creating population imbalance.

There are remedies that should be attempted to alleviate population imbalance. Subsidized low interest rates could be offered on loans for industrial expansion in underpopulated areas. Manpower training programs to assure an employee supply to industries which would expand outside of congested areas could be implemented. A revamping of the Interstate Commerce Commission freight rates, which now make economic expansion virtually impossible in some underpopulated areas, could be adjusted to permit industrial expansion in underdeveloped areas.

Federal tax incentives might be given to industries that locate away from overpopulated areas. Special federal grant programs to strengthen the desirability of living in underpopulated areas might be made. Grants for educational, health and recreational services necessary in order to attract people to live in areas now considered underpopulated would lessen the cost and burden of trying to provide these same services to the same people if these people are attracted to densely populated areas.

NATIONAL AND STATE COASTAL ZONE POLICY PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT ARE NEEDED

(a) National Coastal Zone Management: The coastal zone presents one of the most perplexing environmental management challenges. The thirty-one states which border on the Oceans and the Great Lakes contain seventy-five percent of our nation's population. The pressures of population and economic development threaten to overwhelm the balanced and best use of the invaluable and irreplaceable coastal resources in natural, economic, and aesthetic terms.

To resolve these pressures, two actions are required. First, an administrative and legal framework must be developed to promote balance among coastal activities based on scientific, economic, and social considerations. This would entail mediating the differences between conflicting uses and overlapping political jurisdictions.

Second, efforts must be made to gain additional knowledge of the nature of the coastal zoning and the multiple effects that different uses would have upon our environment.

States must assume primary responsibility for assuring that the public interest is served in the multiple use of the land and water of the coastal zone. Local government cannot be expected to cope with the broad spectrum of interrelated coastal problems, nor can local political subdivisions be expected to make their judgments consistent with those of many interlocking political jurisdictions.

Coastal states, because of unique conditions existing along their shorelines, have

advantages in coping with coastal zone planning and management that the federal government does not have. The federal government, however, should establish incentives and assistance to help the coastal states prepare plans and action.

The ultimate success of a coastal management program will depend on the effective cooperation of federal, state, regional, and local agencies. At the federal level, this would require the development of goals and an administrative framework which would avoid the existing duplication, conflict, and piecemeal approach that is too often typical of federal planning assistance programs. Any federal legislation which attempts to establish a coastal program must allow states the necessary flexibility for creating management instruments most suited to their specific conditions.

Basic to a coastal management program are the funds necessary to plan and take action. The requirements for coastal zoning management are so urgently needed in the nation's interest that federal monies must be made available to the states at a level which will not only provide incentive, but will allow an adequate program to be developed based on federal, state and local participation.

Any attempt to diminish the federal financial participation or to shift the burden to the states will result in irreparable delay and inadequacy in bringing under control the serious coastal environment and natural resource conservation problems.

(B) Coastal States Organization:

In recognition of the need for preserving the invaluable and irreplaceable marine resources of the nation, and in response to the National Governors' Conference policy statement calling for the formation of a maritime states organization to pursue those ends, the Coastal States Organization was established.

Among its responsibilities, the Organization will:

(a) contribute to the development of common policy regarding national coastal zone management legislation and programs, and serve as spokesman for the maritime states, territories, and trust territories on marine and coastal affairs;

(b) provide mutual assistance in solving common state and intermarine resource problems;

(c) serve as a clearinghouse for information relative to marine activities of the member states.

In affirmation of the responsibilities and powers of the states in the management of marine and coastal affairs, and in recognition of the purpose of the Coastal States Organization to further these goals, the Governors urge all eligible states to become members of the Organization, and encourage the full cooperation of all states, inland as well as coastal, in the efforts of the Organization.

A CHANGE IN NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD NON-REPLACEABLE NATURAL RESOURCES IS NEEDED

There is a growing need to establish a new attitude in America among consumers which differentiates between quality of living and standards of living, as well as quantitative consumption and quality of life.

For example, we should examine the wisdom of our present system of reduced electric power rates as a reward for heavy consumption when that consumption might be beyond the electric consumption needed for a specific business or residence.

A flat rate for an adequate amount of electric energy based on the size of family or industrial need could be established. Sharply rising rates for electric consumption above the adequate standard set would provide a penalty for that waste which does not contribute to our economy or to the quality of living.

The consumption of non-replaceable coal in the thermo-generation of electricity which is wasted does not add to the quality of life

and is an example of squandering natural resources without significant benefits to mankind.

Waste of fresh water cannot be tolerated indefinitely. Less than one percent of the water on the face of the earth is potable. In the face of rising populations and per capita water use, we are faced with the need to conserve our precious water resources by eliminating unnecessary waste. Wasted water adds nothing to our quality of living.

The same principle which applies to the wasteful use of electric energy and potable water can be applied to the use of petroleum products in our automobile engines. States should consider a policy of encouraging smaller but adequate engines through sharply graduated license fees which discourage larger than necessary engines that do not contribute to the quality of living. There are far too many vehicles in use today which wastefully consume the non-replaceable crude oil resource and add unnecessary pollutants to the air.

The national attitude which equates some forms of waste with a high quality of life needs to be changed. Waste does not add to the quality of life, but in fact denies a high quality of life to future generations.

STATE LAND USE PLANNING IS NEEDED

There is an interest and need for a more efficient and comprehensive system of national and statewide land use planning and decision-making. The proliferating transportation system, large scale industrial and economic growth, conflicts in emerging patterns of land use, the fragmentation of governmental entities exercising land use planning powers, and the increased size, scale and impact of private actions have created a situation in which land use management decisions of national, regional and statewide concern are being made on the basis of expediency, tradition, short term economic considerations, and other factors which are often unrelated to the real concerns of a sound land use policy.

Across the nation, a failure to conduct sound land use planning has required public and private enterprise to delay, litigate, and cancel proposed public utility and industrial and commercial developments because of unresolved land use questions, thereby causing an unnecessary waste of human and economic resources and a threat to public services, often resulting in decisions to locate utilities and industrial and commercial activities in the area of least public and political resistance, but without regard to relevant environmental and economic considerations.

The land use decisions of the Federal Government often have a tremendous impact upon the environment and the patterns of development in local communities; that the substance and the nature of a national land use policy ought to be formulated upon an expression of the needs and interests of State, regional, and local government, as well as those of the Federal Government. Federal land use decisions require greater participation by state and local government to insure that they are in accord with the highest and best standards of land use management and the desires and aspirations of state and local government.

The promotion of the general welfare, and to provide for the full and wise application of the resources of the Federal Government in strengthening the environmental, economic and social well-being of the people of the United States, we believe, is a continuing responsibility of the Federal Government, but should be consistent with and recognize the responsibility of state and local government for land use planning and management.

There should be undertaken the development of a national policy, to be known as the National Land-Use Policy, which shall incorporate environmental, economic, social

and other appropriate factors. Such policy shall serve as a guide in making specific decisions at the national level which affect the pattern of environmental and industrial growth and development on the federal lands, and shall provide a framework for development of interstate, state and local land use policy.

The National Land Use Policy should:

1. Foster the continued economic growth of all states and regions of the United States;

2. Favor patterns of land use planning, management and development which are in accord with sound environmental principles and which offer a range of alternative locations for specific activities and encourage the wise and balanced use of the nation's land and water resources;

3. Favorably influence patterns of population distribution in a manner such that a wide range of scenic, environmental and cultural amenities are available to the American people;

4. Contribute to carrying out the federal responsibility for revitalizing existing rural communities and encourage, where appropriate, new communities which offer diverse opportunities and diversity of living styles;

5. Assist state government to assume responsibility for major land use planning and management decisions which are of regional interstate, and national concern;

6. Facilitate increased coordination in the administration of federal programs so as to encourage desirable patterns of environmental, recreational, and industrial land use planning; and

7. Systematize methods for the exchange of land use, environmental and economic information in order to assist all levels of government in the development and implementation of the National Land Use Policy.

Intelligent land use planning and management provides the single most important institutional device for preserving and enhancing the environment and for maintaining conditions capable of supporting a quality life while providing the material means necessary to improve the national standard of living.

FULL FUNDING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF STATE COMPREHENSIVE OUTDOOR RECREATION PLANS IS NEEDED

Remaining undespoiled natural areas of wetlands, forests, plains, deserts, and mountains are being exploited and despoiled at an alarming rate. The expenditure of outdoor recreational funds should not be diverted from the urgent need to acquire and protect these natural areas.

Crash funding programs that seek to carve urban parks in the midst of urban glut dramatic examples of inadequate planning. The overcoming of inadequate planning in the past through crash programs should not be allowed, through the monopoly of limited funds, to perpetuate inadequate planning, insufficient preservation, and too little and too late acquisition for future generations.

Full funding and implementation of state comprehensive outdoor recreation plans is the best means of solving both short-run and long-run recreational problems of megalopolis.

A REVITALIZATION OF FORESTRY BY ALL OWNERSHIPS IS NEEDED

There is an urgent need to revitalize forestry efforts nationally on all ownerships. The timber supply situation has pointed up the need for strong direction by the Administration.

The future demands for lumber and forest products will provide increased competition between the many uses of a shrinking forest land base. There are presently substantial acreages of state, private and federal lands potentially capable of producing forest products, but are in need of reforestation.

Proven timber management practices could

be instituted by the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management, other public and private forest management agencies to promote increased or high yield timber growth on existing timber-producing lands, provided funds were made available for this purpose.

The federal and state governments need to establish a policy to encourage reforestation of denuded publicly owned commercial forest lands.

Existing programs need to be strengthened to offer greater inducements for private landowners to reforest their lands. A great number of public values would thus accrue, beyond those to the landowner individually. Such benefits as establishing and improving watersheds and water quality, arresting soil erosion, improving flood control and stream sedimentation, wildlife habitat and recreational opportunities would result. The increased fiber would contribute to the housing needs of a growing nation.

THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION IS IN ALL RESPECTS CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAWS, AND THE IDEALS OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the American Bar Association's section on individual rights and responsibilities has recently published an extensive report on the Genocide Convention. The report delves into the varied criticisms of the Convention and the consequences of ratification. After careful study of the treaty the section unconditionally approved the convention and urged the Senate to work toward ratification as quickly as possible.

Section IV of the report deals with the major objections to the treaty, as expressed from the days of its inception. I think this particular passage in the report is especially cogent and timely; therefore, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

IV. THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION IS IN ALL RESPECTS CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAWS, AND THE IDEALS OF THE UNITED STATES

A. THE GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION MADE IN 1949-50 ARE WHOLLY OBSOLETE TODAY

The opposition to the Genocide treaty at the Senate hearings twenty years ago centered around three main points.³⁶ First, a general opposition to the "new concept" of government action by treaties. During the next two decades, the United States has entered into some 4,000 international agreements, without any noticeable diminution of its sovereign independence, nor any noticeable debasement of its standards to an international average. That treaties are the modern means of developing international law, just as statutes are the modern means of developing state and federal law, has been noted earlier, and hardly requires demonstration. If some felt nervous or cautious in 1949 about stepping on the new ground of multilateral treaties, including treaties affecting individuals, that fear is no longer justified. On the contrary, the only concern a United States citizen should have is that this country not be left out as the documents and issues of the new international law are drafted, debated, interpreted and applied.³⁷

Footnotes at end of article.

Second, the opposition expressed the fear that by treaties in general, and by the Genocide Convention in particular, Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter, dealing with matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states" was being undercut. In the words of the ABA Special Committee,³⁸ "Shall we be governed in internal affairs by treaty law or by laws passed by Congress with a constitutional basis?" Again the answer has already been given. Article 2(7) is in no way undercut by the Genocide Convention. Domestic matters are as out of bounds for the United Nations as ever. The only effect of the Genocide Convention is to say that the issues specified in Articles II and III cover not merely one country, but all countries. If the United States wants (1) to take a complete hands-off attitude if genocide should occur somewhere in the world; or (2) to foster, shield, or protect the commission of genocide within the nation's borders, then it should certainly not join the Convention. If neither of these attitudes is real, then the argument has no appeal whatever.

Third, the opposition, focusing on certain enigmatic language of Justice Holmes in *Missouri v. Holland*,³⁹ considered that the Genocide Convention might be the opening wedge in a drive to exceed the legislative powers of the Congress vis-a-vis the states through use of the treaty power. Whatever theoretical merit there might have been with respect to this point, discussed for nearly ten years in the context of the proposed Bricker Amendment,⁴⁰ it has no relevance to the Genocide Convention. No one could have any doubt about the right of the Congress to prohibit genocide. Quite apart from the treaty power, the Constitution expressly grants to the Congress the power "to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas and Offences against the Law of Nations."⁴¹ And if anyone suspected that the Genocide Convention might be used to justify federal legislation in the field of civil rights, the events since 1949 have shown that the United States Constitution as currently understood is quite adequate to sustain any civil rights legislation likely to be proposed and passed, and certainly far more ample to coverage than any authority possibly derived from the Genocide Convention.

It is conceivable that a claim could have been made that depriving a racial group—say Negroes or American Indians—of the right to vote or the right to enjoy public accommodations is comprehended within Article II (b) of the Genocide Convention related to "mental harm". But this thought is hardly more than conceivable: as we have seen, the whole thrust of the convention and its origin suggest quite different goals; moreover, Article II (b) like all of the definitions of the crime of genocide, is governed by the phrase "with intent to destroy", which would not seem to apply to even the most extreme segregationist measures which may be tolerated by statute law in the United States.⁴² At all events the barring of school segregation, which was accomplished without any statute,⁴³ the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957⁴⁴ and 1964⁴⁵ and the Voting Rights Act of 1965⁴⁶ all sustained by the Supreme Court, show that blocking the Genocide Convention has given and will give no comfort to opponents of federal enforcement of rights of minorities, while ratification of the Convention will add no powers to those the Federal Government already possesses.

Unconnected to the state-federal relation in the United States, the objection was also made in 1949-50 that the Convention undertakes to define a crime for which there would be punishment under federal law, without concurrence by the House of Representatives. This is simply a misunderstanding, resulting from a confusion about what is and what is not a "self-executing" treaty. In fact,

ratification of the Convention would obligate the United States internationally to pass the necessary implementing legislation, making the crimes specified punishable under United States law. Failure by the Congress to enact the implementing legislation would leave the United States in breach of an international obligation, but in such eventuality no one could be tried in the United States for a crime not specified in the Criminal Code. It is certain that no one can be accused of or tried for the crime of genocide in the United States until legislation making genocide a crime has been adopted in accordance with our domestic procedure for passage of a law.

FOOTNOTES

³⁸ See *Senate Hearings* (1950) 154-230.

³⁹ This point, in the context of the growth of international law in the post-war period, is developed by Bernard G. Segal, President of the ABA, in a recent address to the World Peace Through Law Conference, Bangkok, Thailand, September 1969.

⁴⁰ 74 A.B.A. Rep. 320 (1949), *Senate Hearings* (1950) 160.

⁴¹ 252 U.S. 416, 433-434 (1920).

⁴² There were several versions of the Amendment. For the principal one, see S.J. Res. 1 as amended and reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary Comm. S. Rep. No. 412, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).

⁴³ U.S. Constitution Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.

⁴⁴ There have been, of course, deliberate lynchings or murders with racist aims. But such acts have always been unlawful.

⁴⁵ *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also *Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), *Griffin v. Prince Edward School Board*, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).

⁴⁶ 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. 1971 (1964), sustained in *United States v. Mississippi*, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).

⁴⁷ 78 Stat. 243 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-h, sustained in *Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States*, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and *Katzenbach v. McClung*, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).

⁴⁸ 79 Stat. 437 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. 1965), sustained in *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).

DISPOSAL OF LETHAL NERVE GAS

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, the Army is going ahead with plans to dump more than 131,000 pounds of lethal nerve gas into the Atlantic Ocean, 282 miles east of Cape Kennedy, Fla.

The gas is loaded in M-55 rockets, and 30 of these are sealed into each of 418 steel and concrete blocks. The nerve agent is of the type GB, developed in World War II. According to a United Nations report, less than a drop of GB can paralyze and kill a human being within minutes by causing irreversible damage to his central nervous system.

The rockets were encased in concrete for disposal at sea after the Army decided to get rid of obsolete chemical weapons in the fall of 1968. Had this not been done, the Army says, the warheads could have been opened and the nerve gas easily detoxified.

At present, studies conducted by the National Academy of Sciences and a committee headed by Duke University scientist Dr. Paul M. Gross, say that ocean dumping may be the only feasible means of disposal.

The rocket propellant apparently becomes increasingly unstable with age, making prolonged aboveground storage hazardous. Because of the danger of detonation, drilling and other solutions become quite complicated.

The Army seems to have created a doomsday machine that, once armed, cannot be defused. It has literally condemned the United States to dropping an ecological time bomb into the Atlantic Ocean, knowing that some day, in part or in whole, it is going to go off.

One scientist estimates that, as the liquid GB is pure and well shielded from sunlight, water and other chemicals, which it will be for years, there is no reason for it not to remain almost permanently stable. This means its killing power could linger on beneath the sea for untold generations.

The Army says it has exhausted every alternative for ridding the world of this environmental menace.

The Gross committee has recommended that the nerve gas be disposed of by August 1 of this year, to avoid leakage or explosions. If this deadline does represent the final safety margin, then time has run out. Regardless of technology or cost, no other disposal plan could be considered because it would take too long.

We have been presented with a solution that is nothing more than a deferral of the problem into the future.

The question of all this is, Why was any department of the U.S. Government able to prepare such a gruesome threat to the world's ecology, in complete secrecy and with callous disregard for the public welfare, and then present it as the lesser of several horrible alternatives? Our choice is this—either we contaminate the ocean, or we gamble on destroying human lives.

Even if this shipment is halted, 1,706 identical vaults have already been sunk in the Atlantic Ocean east of the Naval Ammunition Depot, Earle, N.J., at a depth of 7,200 feet. What about the threat they represent?

Clearly, the United States has been shortsighted enough to turn the high seas into a lethal garbage dump.

This is a dramatic example of the Nation's failure, thus far, to establish a comprehensive policy to protect the marine environment.

The lack of focus of our present marine policies—a problem that has been with us for years—is precisely the reason I have introduced a Senate resolution to reject the administration's Reorganization Plan 4, which would establish a National Atmospheric and Oceanic Administration in the economic development-oriented Department of Commerce.

This action is in no way meant to be critical of President Nixon's environmental policies. He has demonstrated his strong commitment to environmental quality, and his efforts merit the support of Congress and the Nation.

However, until we resolve the question of who in the Federal Government is going to be responsible for protecting the sea from present and future threats, ranging from the dumping of nerve gas offshore to the discharge by industries and municipalities of huge quantities of wastes into the sea and the proposed building of floating airports off some of our cities, putting an oceans agency in the Department of Commerce strikes me as premature and environmentally risky.

The deep water environment is fragile and composed of a remarkably sensitive group of organisms. It must be protected rather than exploited, preserved rather than polluted.

If we are to accept the Army's flagrant disregard for the welfare of mankind in polluting the seas with nerve gas, as it appears we may be forced to do, we can do so only with a deep sense of shame as Americans.

OCEANS

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, responsible marine scientists are warning that at present rates of pollution, productive life in the sea will be destroyed in 50 years or less. It is with this concern that I have questioned the timeliness of the President's Reorganization Plan 4 to establish a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the U.S. Department of Commerce. There are too many unresolved questions about who is going to be responsible for protecting the marine environment in the face of escalating demands on the resources of the sea to proceed now to establish the lead oceans agency of this Nation in a development-oriented department. Thus, I introduced a resolution to reject plan 4 at this time until Congress has had the opportunity to consider fully the ramifications of this and other proposed oceans policy steps, and it is my understanding that the resolution will be reported to the Senate with either a favorable or a negative recommendation for a vote.

In an editorial last Saturday, the Evening Star opposed the NOAA in the Commerce Department which plan 4 proposes. However, the Star supported the Environmental Protection Agency proposed by the President in plan 3. The Star's reasoning in taking these two positions, I think, is quite sound. The editorial said:

The chief argument favoring the creation of EPA—the unification of the effort to preserve the threatened environment—is the strongest argument against NOAA.

In his fact sheet on EPA, the President states that an important reason for such an agency is that it would serve to "insulate pollution abatement standard-setting from the promotional interests of other departments." This is an excellent point, and it seems to me the same principle of separation of environmental protection functions from development functions should apply to our activities relating to the sea. Yet it is not at all clear from the documents proposing and explaining plan 4 for NOAA in Commerce whether it is intended to be a development agency, an environmental protection agency, or both.

And an earlier editorial by the Star, on August 2, does an excellent job of describing the opportunities and the problems that all nations face with regard to the sea. The editorial concludes with the very appropriate statement that—

We must learn—and learn quickly—whether the ocean can tolerate the abuse we are inflicting on it. We must hope that such knowledge does not come too late.

This is of the utmost importance—if we enter the sea in full force with all our technology without first understanding and taking account of the environmental implications, we will wreak the same tragic destruction on this fragile resource as we have on land.

It is necessary that we understand—and I do not think we understand yet—the potential mankind has to affect the environment of the sea. A recent article in the New York Times regarding plans and research for mining in the ocean depths gives an excellent picture of our developing marine capabilities. I do not quarrel with development of marine resources—it is necessary, it will come, and it should benefit all mankind. But we must in my view establish the necessary environmental priority as well—and we must do it at this critical early stage in the development of our oceans policies.

As an example of the consequences of not doing so, an article in this morning's Washington Post quotes a leading expert on food and population problems to the effect that the ocean beds are already being ruined by pollution—ironically, even as we look to riches of the sea to feed whole nations. "I still believe we can enhance the world's food supply from the ocean," said Lord Ritchie-Caldar at the third annual Congress of Food Science and Technology meeting in Washington, "but we are rapidly reducing our options if we tolerate the kind of irresponsible and avaricious ignorance which is threatening the living waters of the sea."

These editorials and articles are very helpful in informing the public of the implications and concerns of our national oceans policies and proposals, and I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD at the end of these remarks. We should consider now very carefully the decisions we make with regard to the sea. We have a unique opportunity and we have a responsibility to future generations to do so.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Star, Aug. 8, 1970]

ENVIRONMENTAL BLUNDER

A while back, we had some kind words to say for the President's plan to put most of the government's environmental watchdog activities under a single officer. The creation of the Environmental Protection Agency does not guarantee the success of the fight against pollution. But the independent agency, if it is backed by sufficient determination and adequate funds, makes that vital victory possible.

When EPA was introduced to Congress it was accompanied by a related environmental reorganization plan, involving the creation of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration within the Department of Commerce. And it must regretfully be said that NOAA—despite the appropriate acronym—shows nothing of the bright promise of its organizational sibling.

The chief argument favoring the creation of EPA—the unification of the effort to preserve the threatened environment—is the strongest argument against NOAA. If the concept of consolidation is right—and it is—then it must be wrong to crack off two of the

chief components of the environment and treat them as separate entities.

The fact is that the environment cannot truly be separated into component parts. It is a unity. That which affects the land, the air or the rivers affects the oceans as well. Logic demands that the oceans and the atmosphere be placed under EPA's sheltering roof.

Why that demand was disregarded is not clear. Still more obscure is the rationale for placing NOAA within the Department of Commerce. It is an administrative decision somewhat akin to appointing the undertaker as lifeguard at the beach. Fairness dictates that there must be no assumption of a conflict of interest. But prudence whispers that no swimmer will venture far beyond his depth.

Congress, which must give tacit approval to the reorganization plans, should halt the birth of EPA and should scuttle NOAA. The President should then put the official concern for the oceans and the atmosphere under the independent agency, where it belongs.

[From The Washington Star, Aug. 2, 1970]
POLLUTION, GREED, AND THE VULNERABLE SEA

From the beginning of recorded time, man has looked on the oceans of the earth and reacted alternately with awe or disinterest.

The sea, man has said, is the giver and sustainer of life, eternal and immutable. And man has viewed the ocean as every man's land, so vast that territorial claims are unthinkable and unnecessary, so bountiful a supplier that no thought need be given to the harvest of food that is gathered in, so deep and so forgiving that it can readily absorb all the refuse of human existence.

Long after man's intellect began ringing faint alarms, the myth of the oceans' immunity from the poisonous by-products of civilization persisted. Today, when man's numerical presence threatens to overwhelm the planet, and when humanity's refuse includes deadly garbage and radioactive trash, the oceans are still generally treated as the ultimate receptacle.

For decades men have known that the food supply offered by the seas is not limitless. And yet, as the demands for food increase and the technology of harvesting edible fish improves, there is general unconcern over the effect of this harvest on tomorrow's crop. Men understand now that the area beneath the oceans is not the worthless unreachable territory it was once thought to be. The mineral wealth of the combined nations of the world are a fraction of that which lies untouched in the mountains, valleys and plains of the ocean floor. The ability to tap this treasure is almost within man's technological grasp. Only now have men become joltingly aware of the danger inherent in the fact that more than 70 percent of the earth's surface is unclaimed. Only now, at virtually the last possible moment, has thought been given to reaching some international agreement before human greed reaches the seabed, making it the prize in mankind's ultimate war.

The long tradition of national disinterest in the waters and the ocean bed beyond the continental shelves will be a help in the search for an international accord on the uses of the oceans and the seabeds. The ancient concept of the open ocean as international waters will make it possible for men to approach the problem of codifying the neutrality of the seas and seabeds free of any preordained opposition. International agreements entail a voluntary surrender of some degree of sovereignty. The fact that no nation that gives up rights to the oceans would be surrendering anything it ever considered its own has already produced promising results.

It has allowed Russia and the United States to agree on the terms of a treaty that will, if it is accepted by other nations, keep the seabed free of the weapons that could transform the oceans into nuclear launch pads and battlefields. It has allowed President Nixon to propose a world treaty that would turn over 90 percent of the seabed to an international agency, to be exploited for the benefit of all nations as the "common heritage of mankind." And the tradition of oceanic laissez faire has made it possible for the representatives of 50 nations to meet recently in Malta and to report unusual and encouraging agreement on the need for international control—probably under the United Nations—of all exploitation of the oceans, including the taking of fish.

So the history of national indifference toward the high seas is helpful in establishing an international ocean regime. But that same tradition operates with terrible effectiveness against the belated attempt to save the environment.

Men have developed a fine concern for the air, and are moving to reverse its degradation. We have discovered that some of the chemical blessings of science are mass killers in disguise, and we are phasing out the use of the deadly insecticides and other persistent poisons. We have awakened to the damage we have done to rivers and lakes, and have begun to legislate a program of reclamation.

But we have, in a masterful denial of logic, clung to the primitive supposition that the oceans are indestructible. We have looked at the unmeasurable volume of the seas and have assumed that the total accumulation of all man's refuse cannot possibly affect them. Armed with that assumption we have littered the coastal ocean beds with raw sewage, garbage and trash. We have disposed of stores of poison gas by sinking it in deep waters. We have poured accumulated radioactive wastes into the ocean. And we have done this with no knowledge of the consequences and no serious attempt to gain such knowledge.

The scant information that is available about the oceans is enough, however, to make it clear that the assumption of their indestructibility is false. The seas are vast in volume but delicate in composition. And man's reckless magic has already worked a measurable change on the chemistry of the seas.

In addition to the refuse being dumped directly into the sea, most of the chemical poisons in the air are washed into the sea by rainfall. So too with the pollution of rivers, streams and lakes; the poison will reach the coastal waters, and eventually find its way to the unmoving regions of the deep waters, where it will accumulate and remain indefinitely.

As yet, DDT cannot be found in ocean water, but it has been found in deep ocean fish in concentrations twice the amount considered safe. The use of tetraethyl lead in automobile gasoline means that 250 metric tons of lead are dumped into the waters of the Northern Hemisphere each year by rainfall, and the lead content of the North Pacific has increased more than 300 percent in the last 45 years. At least 5,000 tons of mercury, carried by the rivers, is pumped into the oceans every year and has produced several mass poisonings. One million tons of petroleum is leaked or pumped into the sea annually from tankers, with the result that there are increasing reports of fish tasting of oil, of whole catches being thrown back. And there is a growing concern that the introduction of these hydrocarbons into the marine food chain might have a devastating and lasting effect on the finely balanced cycle of marine life.

Man's political disinterest in the sea is matched, then, by his scientific neglect and

abuse of it. And as a result some dramatic readjustment in thinking and in practice is called for.

President Nixon's bid for a supranational agency to exploit the resources of the seabed for the benefit of all—a proposal that was given short shrift in the press—is one of the most dramatic moves of his administration. Coming from a major maritime nation, one that is in the best position to exploit the oceans for its own benefit, it is a proposal that has been taken seriously throughout the world. There is a good chance that it will form the basis of the most far-reaching and constructive multinational venture ever undertaken.

At the same time, and with an even greater sense of urgency, man must abandon the assumptions and the myths that he has accumulated about the oceans. This country spends billions on space research and years on the study of lunar particles. But the oceans, which gave us life and which offer a hope that the explosive increase of life may be sustained, remain largely unstudied and almost as little understood as they were at the turn of the century. We must learn—and learn quickly—whether the ocean can tolerate the abuse we are inflicting on it. And we must hope that such knowledge does not come too late.

[From the New York Times, Aug. 9, 1970]

MINING OCEAN FLOOR: A NEW METAL SOURCE?

(By Robert Walker)

GLOUCESTER POINT, VA.—Out in the Atlantic the other day, in about 3,000 feet of water and about 120 miles east of Charleston, S.C., a converted cargo vessel dropped a string of nine-inch-diameter steel pipe to the ocean floor. Operating somewhat like a vacuum cleaner, it began to suck into the ship a thundering stream of air, water and nodules—smooth, apple-sized lumps—of rich metallic ore.

From the Research Vessel Deepsea Miner, a jubilant crew of scientists, engineers and sailors flashed the word here to the headquarters of Deepsea Ventures, Inc. "It works," they reported. "Beyond expectations."

Headquarters is a neat, single-story, russet-brick office building, surrounded by trees and grass on the edge of this Virginia coastal town, not far from Newport News and Norfolk.

This successful first test of a revolutionary technique for mining an untapped source of four important metals was only a single step in a long march, much of which still lies ahead of Deepsea Ventures. The ocean-research concern is a wholly owned subsidiary of Tenneco, Inc., a diversified pipeline, petroleum, real-estate, shipbuilding and manufacturing complex, with total 1969 revenues of \$2.5-billion.

The test, however, was one of the biggest strides so far in a program that has absorbed about eight years and \$15-million.

Company officials indicated here last week that the success probably had answered favorably the major questions about the mining technology involved. Questions that remain concern the international legal status of the widespread ocean-bed deposits, the processing and refining of the unique type of ore they contain and the economics of marketing the manganese, nickel, cobalt and copper that would be produced.

If Deepsea Ventures, Tenneco and their existing or potential partners should decide to spend the \$150-million or more that it would take to get into commercial operations, the implications could be enormous, not only for the world's metal markets, but also for other economic and scientific sectors.

For example, Christopher Garside, a British-born oceanographer from New York's Columbia University, was in Charleston last week, waiting impatiently for the weather to moderate so that he could travel by fishing

boat with his own test equipment to the research vessel.

"We wish them luck with their mining venture," Dr. Garside said, "but frankly we couldn't care less about it. We're interested in the effects of bringing so much cold, dense water from the bottom to the surface.

"It will be rich in nutrients, nitrogen and phosphorus, which might generate plankton growth, which might provide food for fish. Suddenly, if this happens, you've got a fish farm and part of the answer to the shortage of food for humans."

It is unlikely that this will happen in the foreseeable future without a sound economic reason for pumping bottom water to the surface, but John E. Flipse, the 50-year-old marine engineer and naval architect who heads Deepsea Ventures, is convinced that the ocean-bed deposits—usually called manganese nodules even though the phrase is not perfectly accurate—are an economic proposition.

More important, Mr. Flipse has convinced officials of Tenneco and a new West German partner, Metallgesellschaft, A.G., that the program is worth continuing, at least through more exploration, testing and evaluation stages.

To operate commercially, a consortium, which probably would include additional partners, would have to begin in the Pacific with a specially built, full-scale mining ship, capable of recovering nodules at depths of 15,000 feet or 18,000 feet. Pacific deposits are richer and more likely to prove economically feasible than the Atlantic ore that was recovered near here in the recent exercise, designed strictly to test the recovery technique.

Also, the mining ship would probably have to be served by transports—as in the accompanying diagram—which would take the ore to a refinery ashore. This refinery, moreover, would have to be a pioneering project, because conventional processing techniques would not work on manganese nodules.

These considerations and others—the need for orderly markets and adequate international agreements on underwater mineral rights—have made some economists, both academic and industrial, rather pessimistic about the future of ocean mining, except for a few existing operations in extremely shallow water where conventional techniques and ores are involved.

OTHER CONCERNS DISCOUNT IT

But Mr. Flipse, who concedes that the proposition has in the past been examined and discounted by such giant concerns as the United States Steel Corporation and the International Nickel Company of Canada, Ltd., insists that none of the doubters "are what you could call qualified authorities."

He contends that they tend to be naive, not fully informed or even apologists for special interests, hostile to the development of new sources of metal.

"We're the opposite," he also admits. "We're enthusiasts. If we were a musical group, we'd be called The Believers."

Solidly built, sunburned and blond, resembling Jack Nicklaus in an apple-green, short-sleeved shirt, Mr. Flipse would be an unusual figure in Wall Street, but he fits this place perfectly.

WORKED WITH NEWPORT NEWS

He was a research director with the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company when it was acquired by Tenneco in 1968. He had been trying without notable success to persuade Newport News to push ahead with a well-financed project to mine nodules.

The origin of the oceanflow deposits is uncertain, but they probably were formed 10 million to 30 million years ago through a natural process somewhat like the electrochemical technique used to manufacture

nickel or copper cathodes. They always have a nucleus, such as a pebble, a shark's tooth or a whale's ear bone.

Thus, in broad terms, the atomically bonded elements can only be recovered by reversing the electro-chemical process, which Deepsea Ventures already is doing on a limited scale in a small pilot plant here. A bigger pilot plant—to use the same jealously guarded techniques—is under construction a few yards away.

In any event, after the Tenneco acquisition of Newport News in 1968, the Houston-based conglomerate, formerly known as the Tennessee Gas Transmission Company, was sufficiently impressed by Mr. Flipse and his proposal to finance the first small experimental ship, the R. V. Prospector. Tenneco also created Deepsea Ventures as a research subsidiary, separate from the big, conventional shipbuilding operation.

While Tenneco and its many subsidiaries have about 62,000 employees, only 60 of them work for Deepsea Ventures. Most of them are scientists, engineers and technicians, the complement one might expect of a small, research enterprise that has yet to market its first pound of metal and probably will not do so before 1975 at the earliest.

CLOSED-CIRCUIT TV USED

However, these men have developed an exclusive capability to see the ocean bottom and the nodules—as well as large obstacles like boulders—by means of powerful lights of closed-circuit television.

They have designed a dredge and a sled to carry it, capable of raking and feeding to the dangling pipe the desired size of nodules. They have, as they demonstrated in the Atlantic the other day, perfected a means of pumping air to the ocean bottom and into the pipe, causing the air, the water and the minerals—helped by hydrostatic pressure—to hurtle toward the surface.

They also have designed a simple circular separating device for the ship, which drops the nodules into a storage area and pours the cold water back into the sea.

Mr. Flipse said last week that, to build a full-scale mining ship, this equipment would only have to be enlarged by a factor of about five, considered a small jump by the usual engineering standards.

MARKET STUDIES GUARDED

Deepsea Ventures did not disclose all the details of its study of the markets for manganese, nickel, cobalt and copper. Mr. Flipse said, however, that "all calculations are extremely conservative."

That is, the concern has assumed there would be good mining weather for only 200 days a year; taken a relatively pessimistic view of the growth in metals consumption; allowed for declines in the prices of various metals, and admitted that its cost estimates, \$40-million for the first ship and \$100-million for the refinery, might prove too low.

Mr. Flipse has urged the Federal Government to seek international agreements on ocean mineral rights, but he emphatically said he did not believe in competitive bidding for leases on given areas, as is the practice in most existing oil and mineral developments.

"There are so many nodule deposits," he declared, "in relation to the number of companies that will have the desire and the money to enter the field, that bidding won't be necessary. The Government will collect its share in the form of taxes."

[From the Washington Post, Aug. 11, 1970]
BRITISH EXPERT CITES PERIL IF OCEAN BEDS ARE POLLUTED

(By Stuart Auerbach)

A leading expert on food and population problems warned yesterday that the world's last great untapped food resource—the ocean beds—is being ruined by pollution.

The food from the ocean floor, both ani-

mal and vegetable, is needed if man is to feed the estimated 7 billion persons who will inhabit the earth by the year 2000. Lord Ritchie-Calder told the third annual Congress of Food Science and Technology meeting here.

"I still believe we can husband the creatures of the sea as we have husbanded the creatures of the land," he said.

"I still believe we can enhance the world's food supply from the ocean, but we are rapidly reducing our options if we tolerate the kind of irresponsible and avaricious ignorance which is threatening the living waters of the sea as it has destroyed so much of the living waters of the land."

Ritchie-Calder said "grim warnings about the impairment of marine biology" were given at a conference on the international uses of sea resources held at Malta.

He said the thin film of oil spreading over all the world's oceans is cutting the amount of sunlight reaching the bottom depths and disturbing the natural process of photosynthesis—the way land and sea plants grow.

He called the Army's plan to dump 66 tons of deadly nerve gas on the ocean bottom "shocking" and "reckless." Using the ocean bottom as a dumping ground for munitions, he added, could interfere with future mining activities.

The British peer, a professor at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, long has advocated the cultivation of "the food riches of the seas" with "sea pastures, sea farms, sea ranches and sea stud farms."

He proposed putting electric fences around areas of the ocean as big as Texas to form huge ranches to grow fish, which could be bred specially, much the way cattle are now bred. These areas, he said should be under international control.

With the world's population growth—a doubling of the present 3.6 billion in 20 years—these resources will be needed to feed residents of the earth. And the ocean's resources must be shared, he said, since three-fourths of all the people on earth will live in underdeveloped countries by 1980.

While he praised the "green revolution" that is producing greater grain yields across the world, Ritchie-Calder said cereals can't fill nutritional needs.

Saying that people need more protein, he declared, "There is a great danger that this belly-filling will be regarded as the answer to the food problem to the disadvantage of better nutrition."

But Dr. George W. Irving Jr., administrator of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Research Service, said that new foods with protein supplementation are winning favor all over the world.

Agriculture Secretary Clifford M. Hardin told the conference that the United States is beginning to win its fight against hunger. He said 10.4 million Americans—50 per cent more than a year ago—are now on food assistance programs and food stamp distribution has risen 64 per cent in six months.

There are now only 15 counties or independent cities in the nation without federal food supplement programs for the poor, he said.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURDICK). Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND OTHER PURPOSES

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to the previous order, the Chair now lays

before the Senate the unfinished business which the clerk will state.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

H.R. 17123, to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1971 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURDICK). Pursuant to the previous order, the distinguished Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN) is now recognized for not to exceed 30 minutes.

SAFEGUARD ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE SYSTEM

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, it is my intention fully to support the action of the Armed Services Committee in the area of the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system funding and authorization. I feel strongly that this course of action will be in the overall, long-range, best interests of our country. It will serve to enhance our national security.

The committee has cut the Safeguard authorization by \$10 million from the House-passed figure. This cut in the request by the Armed Forces will affect the plan to proceed to advance preparation of four area defense sites. According to the committee's report, this kind of cut was possible because of that unit's conviction that there is no compelling need to move now to the deployment of an area defense of our population against a possible Chinese Communist ICBM attack.

It is important to note that while the \$10 million cutback made by the Senate Armed Services Committee is not large, its long-term effect—should the decision be perpetuated in subsequent years—is substantial. By restricting advance site preparation to one site, which is F. E. Warren Air Force Base in my State of Wyoming, rather than the five sites requested, the total projected acquisition cost will be reduced significantly. Those costs will be down from \$10.7 billion for the 12-site deployment to a figure of \$6.5 billion for the four-site deployment protection of our country's Minuteman deterrent.

This will account for an eventual saving of \$4.2 billion. And, of that \$6.5 billion four-site cost, over \$2.2 billion has been obligated already. That means the remaining cost of the four-site Minuteman defense—at Malmstrom, Grand Forks, Whiteman and Warren—is \$4.3 billion.

What we are talking about here, Mr. President, is the need for an adequate defense of the deterrent capability of the United States. As the committee has pointed out, the continued expansion of Soviet strategic forces poses a serious potential threat to the American land-based deterrent.

The committee report notes:

The United States cannot permit such a threat to develop without taking suitable countermeasures to provide for the continuing survivability of sufficient strategic weap-

ons for credible retaliation and confident deterrence.

This, to my mind, is a most important consideration.

The Soviets are continuing to install a number of SS-9's. And, as a matter of fact, the number of missile launchers that the U.S.S.R. has on line serves to provide them already with a delivery capability that is a most serious threat to the United States land-based deterrent force, the Minuteman.

As my colleagues know, we are not in the offensive missile business in this country. This is to our credit, particularly in view of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Vienna and Helsinki.

It is the considered opinion of a number of experts in this field—whose judgment I respect—that further implementation of the Safeguard ABM system will continue to enhance the U.S. SALT position; that, in fact, there is reason to believe that Safeguard may well prove to be the incentive needed to convince the Soviet Union that they should agree to enter into an arms limitation agreement.

If the Safeguard system can accomplish this—helping to persuade the Russians to limit further construction and qualitative improvements in their SS-9 missiles—we will have made a tremendous advance.

If this can be accomplished, if we can agree with the Russians on a way to avoid an all-out arms race, the Safeguard ABM system will have proved its worth.

The Armed Services Committee has pointed out in its report on H.R. 17123, the importance of Safeguard to an agreement at SALT, should be self-evident. The report notes:

As one of the central limitations to be negotiated in conjunction with limitations of offensive forces, the report states, Safeguard is essential to the American position. Without Safeguard the Soviets would have little incentive to agree to constrain increases to the offensive forces. The progress thus far in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks has served to confirm the view that Safeguard is essential to their successful conclusion.

Perhaps one of the most salient statements in this regard is contained in the final two sentences of that section of the committee report dealing with the Safeguard ABM system, and I quote:

Should our best efforts to achieve agreement (at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) fail, however, Safeguard would be an important element in the maintenance of a secure deterrent force.

To delay the modest deployment authorized for fiscal year 1971 would, in the opinion of the Committee, put the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and our national security, at risk.

This, Mr. President, clearly sums up the situation in which we find ourselves.

The Soviet threat is real. They have an impressive number of operational missile launchers; they have gone further and they have gone faster than we originally thought they would. They have made significant advances in the SS-9, the SS-11, and the SS-13.

Under the language of the military procurement that is before us, we plan to spend less than \$100 million in the

1971 fiscal year in the Safeguard ABM field, and only \$10 million by the end of this calendar year. So, if the strategic arms limitation talks bear fruit and an overall specific ceiling is placed on the total number of both land- and sea-based missiles plus bombers, in exchange for a limitation on rival anti-ballistic missile systems, we will have spent relatively little money on the system this year, and at the same time and just as importantly, we will have protected the American people.

In other words, Mr. President, perhaps the best investment we can make in this field, the best protection we can provide for our people, is for a system that cannot be successfully challenged. The best insurance we can have for our country and for our people is a weapons system that is never used.

Two of the able members of the Senate Armed Services Committee recently have addressed themselves to the specific issue of the Hart-Cooper amendment, and I would like to take this means to call the attention of my colleagues to their statements and sound advice.

Both Senator STENNIS and Senator JACKSON have urged approval of the action of the committee as it relates to the Safeguard ABM system. I commend their advice to the attention of all my fellow Senators who will be called upon to cast a vote on this issue Wednesday afternoon.

Senator STENNIS has noted:

The purposes of this phase I deployment are first, to preserve the President's future options by establishing a minimum base for expansion if the threat requires it, and second, to provide a beginning for protecting the Minuteman force against the estimated U.S.S.R. mid-1970's threat.

It is well for us to remember that what we are talking about with respect to this weapon, and it is purely a defensive weapon, is not in terms of the present, but in terms of what the situation may be in 1975 and beyond.

The committee decided, after extensive consideration, to restrict the Safeguard deployment for fiscal year 1971 to defense of our land-based strategic deterrent—our key ICBM bases, or some of them; that is, our Minuteman bases.

It was the committee's considered judgment that this proposed deployment was necessary for our national security requirements and that it is conducive to strategic arms control and, therefore, it deserves the full support of the Senate.

I am convinced that in today's international climate we do not improve the chances for peace by taking the risk of relegating our strategic forces to a position of inferiority to those of the Soviet Union.

Our chances of achieving a just and lasting peace, I believe, rest upon the basic premise of mutual deterrence—that is, the ability of both great powers to ride out a massive attack and still retain the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker in retaliation. It follows that actions which affect this retaliatory capability—such as failing to deploy an ABM system—in turn affect the credibility and stability of mutual deterrence. This is therefore a matter we must consider very carefully.

As concerns the view of some scientists that the ABM may not work:

It is just commonsense that if we wait until we are certain that things will work in this field, we will never have an ABM system.

It is virtually conclusive on this point—that this construction and increased strength by (the Soviets) has now progressed even beyond the predictions of a year ago.

Put simply, the Soviet Union now has enough ICBM ballistic missile launchers, either deployed or under construction, which, with qualitative improvements, could pose a serious and perhaps deadly threat to our Minuteman deterrent in the mid-1970's and beyond . . ."

Further, the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) has pointed out that:

In the last year the Soviet threat to our land-based deterrent has significantly increased, at a rate that has exceeded the intelligence projections made a year ago;

By action of the Armed Services Committee, under the chairmanship of our distinguished colleague, Senator Stennis, Safeguard has been confined to defense of the deterrent; authorization of a thin area defense has been specifically denied;

Contrary to the expectations of many opponents of Safeguard, the SALT talks have convened and made substantial progress toward agreement covering ABM defenses and offensive strategic weapons;

In the last year Safeguard has made excellent technical progress.

What is perhaps most ominous about the growth in the Soviet SS-9 force, according to Senator JACKSON, "is that the SS-9 is an extremely inefficient weapon for retaliating against cities."

Senator JACKSON notes,

I ask: If the Senate stops the forward motion of the Safeguard program, what are our negotiators in the SALT talks going to offer the Russians as an inducement to stop building their SS-9's

As I see it, Mr. President, a convincing active defense of our deterrent says this to the Soviets. It says: 'We intend to keep our second-strike capability; we do not intend to allow you to acquire a first-strike capability. If you want to keep on building SS-9's, that's your business, but for every additional SS-9 that you buy, we are prepared to offset it.' Safeguard as a responsive and dynamic program can say precisely that to Moscow.

My hope—and I think that it's a reasonable hope—is that the Soviet leadership will thereby understand that it is simply a waste of scarce resources for them to continue deploying SS-9's, or other missiles of this type, and that they will therefore turn to the alternative of serious negotiation to limit both offensive and defensive systems.

Senator JACKSON has declared:

If the SALT talks succeed, I for one will not consider whatever small sum has been spent on Safeguard as wasted money. My view of that in spending this money we will be improving the chance of success in reaching a significant arms control treaty; and I personally would pay a very high price to do that.

Continuing, Senator JACKSON stated:

Let me speak plainly: any Senator who is tempted to vote against the proposed deployment of Safeguard must understand the risks that are involved for the President's negotiating position at the SALT talks.

Mr. President, I believe that this country is rich enough in moral and material resources to provide for its security and solve its domestic problems as well. And I'm confident that the Senate will reject the counsel of those who would endanger that security and the prospects for a negotiated arms control agreement simply to achieve a pyrrhic victory over the Pentagon.

Mr. President, the Safeguard system will help guarantee the survivability of our retaliatory capability. It in no way jeopardizes the security of the Soviet deterrent and, because of what has already been accomplished at Vienna and Helsinki, it obviously provides an additional incentive for the Soviet Union to enter into a substantial arms limitation agreement.

This is all to the good.

It is the considered judgment of the Committee on Armed Services Mr. President, "that the proposed Safeguard deployment, sufficient for our national security requirements and conducive to strategic arms control, deserves the full support of the Senate."

To this, I steadfastly agree.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HANSEN. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think the Senator has made one of the most practical, down-to-earth, commonsense speeches about this problem we have had delivered in this chamber. It is a distinct contribution to this debate, and as chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I especially thank him.

One of the proposed bases is going to be in his State if this plan is carried out. He had a very generous and a very fine attitude about that, too. I appreciate it very much.

The Senator emphasizes that this is a deterrent and on this level and in this field of weapons this is our sole deterrent, it might be said, in that it protects what is our effective, our affirmative deterrent.

I like the idea also when the Senator said the best weapon system, after all, is one that never has to be used. We know here that we are not planning an offensive attack on anyone. We are just trying to protect our defenses.

One thing that has been hard for me to understand with respect to opposition to this plan, or any missile system, is an attempt to perfect a weapon; but this one is purely on the defense, and it could turn out to be the only kind of defense we have that is effective. I think that afterward would be too late for many hundreds of millions of people if we cannot have the deterrent that is effective to convince our adversary. It would be a great mistake to try to do anything then, and we would have lost, because however good any ABM system may be, it is not going to be perfect enough to protect hundreds of millions of our people.

I thank the Senator, and I commend him highly.

Mr. HANSEN. I thank the Senator, who is the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services. He has made a most significant contribution to our Nation in calling attention, as he does, and by giving the bipartisan support, which he does, to the efforts of our President and the military in order that we may dwell secure in this country in the knowledge we have taken those steps necessary to assure our protection.

As he points out this is not an offensive weapon; it is a defensive weapon; it is a

weapon to lend credibility to our other weapons, which taken together serve notice on any nation which may have any offensive intentions toward us that it does so at great risk.

I agree with him completely that the best investment we can make is an investment in a system of defense which is so strong and formidable that it will never have to be used.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HANSEN. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from Arizona.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I wish to join in the commendation made by my chairman of the Committee on Armed Services on the talk that the distinguished Senator from Wyoming has just completed.

I like not only the content but the fact that it was short and to the point—which is something we should all learn to do.

I think the Senator has pointed out very concisely one of the most serious considerations that should be kept in the minds of all of us in this body. I wish it were possible to start arms limitations tomorrow with the Soviets. I wish it were possible to get onsite inspections with them so that we could decrease the arms race we are in. I suggest it is not the United States that has caused the arms race, but the Soviets. Everytime they feel they are equal to us in knowledge or performance, we have been led to exercise or create treaty in this body, which we have done, guaranteeing that they remain ahead of us.

In the discussion of the Senator from Wyoming, the effect of the continuance of our deployment of this defense system on the SALT talks I think is the important thing we have to remember. If we do not do it, we are like the man playing poker against the man who has a flush or a full house: We have nothing left that the Russians need and respect us for—and they respect only strength—if we throw the ABM down the drain.

They are now ahead of us in weapons, in ICBM's. They are catching us in submarine-launched missiles. They are catching us in submarines. Their navy will catch us in 2 years. They are very close to being equal to us right now. Their ground strength is greater than ours. While it is true that we are ahead of them in aircraft, and far ahead of them in quality of pilots, they continue, as they have since World War II to develop new tactical aircraft, about one every 3 years, and we have not had a new one in 10 years now.

So I hope the Senate will place emphasis on the importance this system plays on the SALT talks. I appreciate the remarks of the Senator from Wyoming in pointing out that, if there is no other reason, we should retain it for that reason, and reject the amendment that is now before us.

Mr. HANSEN. I thank the distinguished Senator for his very kind words. Sharing as I do with my fellow Senators the greatest respect for our distinguished colleague from Arizona, his praise is doubly pleasing to me.

I am well aware, as everyone must be,

of the great record he has and the intimate knowledge he has of our whole system of weaponry. He keeps constantly aware of the latest improvements in all types of aircraft. I understand that only yesterday he flew what I guess is the most modern plane we have. I think no one can speak with greater background of knowledge. I leave it to those who are willing to examine history how right he was several years ago. It is perhaps ironic that a man finds that those who were detractors of his employed the very techniques he recommended and came to the conclusion he did when he had the forthrightness and honesty to speak out, as he did some several years ago.

I say simply I am most grateful to the distinguished Senator from Arizona.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, communicated to the Senate the intelligence of the death of Hon. G. Robert Watkins, late a Representative from the State of Pennsylvania, and transmitted the resolutions of the House thereon.

The message announced that the House had passed the following bill and joint resolution, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 18725. An act to establish a Commission on the Organization of the Government of the District of Columbia and to provide for a Delegate to the House of Representatives from the District of Columbia; and

H.J. Res. 264. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to equal rights for men and women.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROPOSED RELATIVE TO EQUAL RIGHTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate the message from the House of Representatives on House Joint Resolution 264, and that the joint resolution be read twice by title.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McCLELLAN) laid before the Senate House Joint Resolution 264, proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to equal rights for men and women, which, by unanimous consent, was read twice by its title.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I object to further proceedings on the joint resolution at this time. I make the objection on behalf of the distinguished minority leader, the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCOTT), and myself. I do this to indicate that the joint leadership is working in unison and, that the distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary (Mr. EASTLAND) has been informed about what our intentions are.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under Rule XIV, paragraph 4, and the latest precedents of the Senate, the joint resolution will be placed on the calendar.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, as acting minority leader, I will say that the minority leader is in complete agreement with the action taken by the majority leader, and that

we hope the Judiciary Committee will have early and thorough hearings on this matter, so that this body as a whole will have an opportunity to vote on it this year.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I extend my sincerest thanks to the acting minority leader, the Senator from Arizona.

HOUSE BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTION REFERRED OR PLACED ON THE CALENDAR

The following bill and joint resolution were each read twice by their titles and referred, or placed on the calendar, as indicated:

H.R. 18725. An act to establish a Commission on the Organization of the Government of the District of Columbia and to provide for a Delegate to the House of Representatives from the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

H.J. Res. 264. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to equal rights for men and women; ordered to be placed on the calendar.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND OTHER PURPOSES

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 17123) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1971 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

THE HART-COOPER AMENDMENT

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, 25 years have passed since the world caught a brief, horrifying glimpse of the destructive power of nuclear war when 200,000 lives were lost in an instant at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nuclear weapons have not been used since, but the threat of nuclear war has grown along with the spiraling and increasingly costly arms race. After 20 years of action and reaction in the development of nuclear weapon systems by the United States and the Soviet Union the nuclear balance has not changed. Each possesses greater power to destroy the other and civilization as we know it.

Now, the United States and the Soviet Union are engaging in negotiations seeking means to control nuclear weapons to the end of preventing, or at least limiting, the danger of a nuclear holocaust. Their recognition that the nuclear power each possesses, if ever used, would destroy our countries, a great part of the earth, and those who live upon it, gives to the SALT talks a light of hope. We believe that if the talks are progressing toward agreement, as is reported, it is not because of any "bargaining chip," but because both countries recognize several clear truths:

First. Both the United States and the Soviet Union possess nuclear weapons in assured quantities and diversity to de-

stroy the other even after sustaining a first strike.

Second. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have the technological knowledge and resources to counter any deployment by the other of new nuclear weapons.

Third. Both countries understand that in the absence of mutual nuclear disarmament, a balance of nuclear power—the deterrent—must be maintained.

The Senate, only last year, approved by a vote of 72 to 6, Senate Resolution 211 urging the President to begin the SALT negotiations by proposing to the Soviet Union a mutual moratorium on further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear weapons systems. This approach to the talks was not agreed to by the administration. I believe that it would have been the best initiative, for we have witnessed continued deployment of ABM and the beginning of MIRV deployment by the United States and, on the Soviet side, the continued deployment of SS-9, ICBM's and ABM systems around Moscow that the negotiators seek to limit and control.

On August 4, Senator HART and I with other cosponsors, introduced amendment No. 819 to H.R. 17123, the military procurement bill now before us. We have sought to frame the amendment to fit the negotiating tactics of our country. It permits the continued deployment of phase I of the Safeguard system, which the administration contends is helpful in the SALT talks. But, unlike the administration bill, it would halt Safeguard after phase I because it is an ineffective defense for our missile fields. It would provide funds for an advanced and effective ABM system for the protection of our deterrent and the security of our country, if the administration chooses to use those funds for such a system.

In 1969, the Congress appropriated approximately \$1.2 billion for the deployment of Safeguard at two sites—at Malmstrom and Grand Forks Air Force Bases. I am informed that, as of May 31, 1970, all of this large sum except \$224 million had been obligated. The pending bill would authorize a total of \$1,027,200,000 for continuing work on the two sites. Included is \$35 million for Sprint missiles, additional to the number declared last year by the Department of Defense to be adequate for the defense of the two missile sites. I shall refer to this item later in my statement.

The Hart-Cooper amendment would strike only the \$322.2 million requested for deployment of phase II at Whiteman and Warren Air Force Bases.

Last year, Senator HART and I and other cosponsors offered an amendment to strike all funds for deployment of phase I, and to authorize their use only for an advanced ABM system. Our amendment was defeated by a vote of 51 to 49. An amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Maine (Mrs. SMITH), requiring the use of funds on an advanced system, lost on a tie vote 50 to 50. The case against the vulnerability of the Safeguard system has been made stronger since last year by the testimony of eminent scientists and even officials of the Department of Defense

before several committees of the House and Senate. It may be asked why we have not offered an amendment, as we did last year, to strike all funds for further deployment of Safeguard phase I, if we considered it to be an ineffective system.

The administration has reported in various ways that it considers the continuing deployment of Safeguard of value in the SALT talks. This position, at least logically, is difficult for me to understand. If, as is reported at times in the news media, the United States and the Soviet Union may agree that no ABM systems shall be permitted, the deployment of phase I would be halted and dismantled and phase II would not be permitted. Or, if as has been reported at times, agreement may be reached upon ABM protection for the command centers, that is, Moscow and Washington, again phase I and phase II would not be permitted.

Of greater importance, it seems improbable and unwise that the United States would agree to forego the deployment of a truly effective ABM system unless the Soviets agree to halt or limit the deployment of their SS-9 missiles. For it is the threat of the continuing deployment of SS-9's and SS-11's, their increasing accuracy, and the MIRVing of those missiles upon which the administration has built its case for Safeguard.

But whatever the tactics and methods of the negotiators, we consider SALT talks to be the most important negotiations of our time and they might well be the most important negotiations for mankind in history. For this reason, we decided we would not seek to halt phase I, which the administration claims is of value in the SALT talks.

Our amendment does not limit the use of the vast sum of over \$2 billion provided for phase I in the fiscal year 1970 appropriations voted last year and by the bill before us. As no actual emplacement of the components of Safeguard on the two sites of phase I has taken place, and as tests are still proceeding on its components, there can be no serious argument about the loss of leadtime, breakup of production lines, or interruption of research, development, testing and evaluation as was made in the debate last year.

The Armed Services Committee in its consideration of H.R. 17123 made several important decisions which reflect its caution about the missions of Safeguard. It abandoned the concept of area defense which was urged last year by the administration and the committee, and this year again, by the administration. The Committee asserted that protection of the Minuteman is the proper role for an ABM system, given present and foreseeable technology. This position was advocated by the opponents of Safeguard last year. The committee also refused to provide funds for the preparation of four additional sites for Safeguard deployment. After the action of the committee, I do not believe that it can be reasonably argued that our amendment undercuts the position of the administration in its SALT negotiations. If the administration thought the action of the committee was

harmful to the talks it would be seeking on the floor of the Senate to restore funds for the preparation of these four additional sites. But, I have not heard of any effort by the administration to try to restore funds for the four sites on the floor of the Senate.

If agreement has been reached by the committee after a year of review that area defense of cities and population by Safeguard is unworkable and at best a transitional expedient for 3 or 4 years, then the evidence which has been produced since last year should also compel agreement that a dedicated hard-point system designed specifically for the defense of the Minuteman deterrent must be developed.

This is the chief purpose of the Hart-Cooper amendment—to halt further deployment of an ineffective, wasteful Safeguard system, and to urge that funds be used toward the development of an effective anti-ballistic-missile system to protect our ICBM's and to maintain our deterrent in the event the SALT talks fail and the Soviet Union continues to deploy SS-9 missiles and other sophisticated nuclear systems.

Mr. President (Mr. McCLELLAN), at this point I should like to comment upon the letter written by Secretary of Defense Laird to the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), which was placed in the RECORD yesterday. In the letter, Mr. Laird seems to argue although it is not clear, that one amendment would restrict or limit the use of \$365 million provided in the bill for research, development, evaluation, and testing; that this money could not be spent upon Safeguard phase I.

A careful reading of our amendment shows that such an interpretation is absolutely incorrect. The last section of our amendment authorizes the administration to use funds for the development of an advanced anti-ballistic-missile system, but it does not compel the administration to do so. Many great scientists argue, and I agree that funds should be spent upon such a system. But, I emphasize that nothing in our amendment restricts or limits the use of research, development, evaluation, and testing funds available for phase I.

The Safeguard systems components were designed for an area defense. Safeguard's components PAR, Spartan, Sprint, and the MSR were designed to provide a thin city defense—Sentinel, as it was called under President Johnson.

The testimony of many distinguished scientists over the past 2 years, including Drs. James Killian, Herbert York, George Kistiakowsky, Jerome Wiesner, and Donald Hornig—all advisers to Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson—has been in agreement in declaring Safeguard ineffective for the defense of Minuteman. It has been pointed out by many witnesses that the PAR would be rendered ineffective by exoatmospheric nuclear bursts; that the MSR could be destroyed by the Soviet SS-11 missiles, rendering useless the entire Safeguard system emplaced to protect a Minuteman field; and that the number of Spartan and Sprint interceptors planned for Safeguard is so small that the kind of attack

that Secretary Laird says the Soviets have the capability of mounting would exhaust the defense of the Spartan and Sprint missiles and leave the Minuteman fields open to devastation. The Department of Defense has recognized the validity of the last point, which it refused to admit last year, by requesting in the pending bill \$35 million for additional Sprints and phase I bases.

As an example of the testimony of these witnesses, Dr. Panofsky, a distinguished physicist at Stanford University, supplied for the Foreign Relations Committee an analysis based on unclassified Department of Defense sources showing in a clear manner that Safeguard meets no foreseeable threat. It concludes that if the Soviets continue to produce SS-9's and if they MIRV and increase their accuracy of SS-9's and SS-11's as Secretary Laird has projected as possible, that Safeguard would provide little protection to Minuteman.

Last year, Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and the chief advocate of the scientific community for the deployment of Safeguard, asked a panel of nuclear weapons experts to review the Safeguard program. The panel was chaired by Dr. Lawrence H. O'Neill of Columbia University. It included among its members Dr. Marvin L. Goldberger, professor of physics, who until a few months ago was Chairman of the President's Science Advisory Panel on Strategic Weapons, and Dr. Sidney Drell of Stanford University, also appointed a few months ago a member of the President's Panel on Strategic Weapons, and a longtime weapons expert. I ask unanimous consent that the names of those who served on the panel be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the names were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MEMBERS ON PANEL

Louis M. Branscomb, Director, National Bureau of Standards.

Sidney D. Drell, Professor and Deputy Director, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center.

Marvin L. Goldberger, Professor of Physics, Princeton University.

William G. McMillan, Professor of Chemistry, University of California at Los Angeles.

W. S. Melahn, President, System Development Corporation.

Lawrence H. O'Neill, President, Riverside Research Institute, Professor of Electrical Engineering, Columbia University (on leave of absence).

Allen M. Peterson, Professor of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University, Senior Scientific Adviser, Stanford Research Institute.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, a portion of the testimony of Dr. Foster regarding the work of the panel appears on pages 442 and 443 of the hearings of the Subcommittee on Arms Control of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I quote from his testimony:

AD HOC COMMITTEE OF SCIENTISTS ON SAFEGUARD

Dr. FOSTER. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me just simply point out that I asked a group of scientists to come together as an ad hoc committee and, before the Secretary of Defense made his recommendation to the President, review the program. I deliberately chose scientists who opposed the deployment

of Safeguard as well as those who favored it.

In fact, as I recall, when they met there were more against it than for it. I had, however, one very simple instruction for them—to put politics aside and just ask the question: Will this deployment, with these components, do the job that the Department of Defense is trying to do? And I gave them a range of possible deployments, since the Secretary had not yet made up his mind.

There was considerable concern about this move, but the report sent to the Secretary of Defense said that this equipment will do the job that the Department of Defense wants to do. They had some recommendations; for example, they would like to add development of the smaller radars, a decision we had already made—at least, they concurred in that decision.

I ask unanimous consent that an unclassified version of the report which was given to Dr. Foster and Secretary Laird in January 1970, be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McCLELLAN). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, it is an important document because it concluded that if the purpose of an ABM is to protect Minuteman, further deployment of Safeguard should not proceed, but that work on a dedicated hard-point system should be given priority.

Now, Mr. President, I call attention to the fact that Dr. Foster told the Subcommittee, on Arms Control under the chairmanship of the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE) that this distinguished panel of scientists had determined that Safeguard could do the job. Actually, the report states that it cannot do the job. In addition, scientists who were on the panel, Dr. Drell and Dr. Goldberger, stated that they had never reported to Dr. Foster or to Secretary of Defense Laird or, I think, the President, because I asked the witnesses if they had talked to him—Dr. Drell and Dr. Goldberger—that they had never made such a report and that the members of the panel had not made such a report.

Of great significance is the fact that the Department of Defense has commenced work in the development of a "hardsite" system as it is designated by the Department of the Army, which is the "dedicated" system described by the scientists. Some \$58 million is requested for this work in the pending bill, and Secretary Laird, Deputy Secretary Packard, and Dr. Foster have commented in their testimony on the necessity of developing such a system.

In the letter to the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), which was placed in the RECORD yesterday, Secretary Laird said that the Department of Defense was working on such an advanced ABM system. He went further to say that it could not be developed until the late 1970's, and unless the Soviet threat increased, it might not be necessary to develop it. But my estimates have been challenged by scientists who have actually assisted in the design of these systems.

The very fact that he states such a program is being worked on, is an admission on the part of the Department of Defense—which would not be admitted

last year—that Safeguard is a dubious system for the protection of our missile sites.

In brief, an advantage of the "hard-site" system as contrasted to Safeguard is that it would provide for the emplacement of many small radars throughout a Minuteman field rather than relying on the single vulnerable MSR. These smaller radars could control the guidance of a few interceptors as contrasted to the several hundred interceptors which the MSR must control. There is testimony that the "hard-site" approach would provide the best protection for Minuteman at the lowest cost and that it could be installed in the approximate same time frame as the Safeguard system. Dr. Dreil, in his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, page 905, made the following statement:

All analyses of which I am aware make it clear that if defense of Minuteman is the principal or sole mission of Safeguard, its further deployment cannot be justified. As I hope to have convinced you, it simply fails to respond to the Soviet threats postulated by the Pentagon. What I recommend is moving ahead vigorously with the deployment work on alternative technologies that we know at present can perform the hard point defense more effectively and economically in the mid to late 1970's if needed.

Let me note that Dr. Dreil says that in the mid-1970's to late 1970's this system could be deployed.

The testimony of Department of Defense officials reflects clearly their recognition that Safeguard is not an effective ABM system and of the need for an advanced "hard-site" system. Volume VI of the hearings of the Subcommittee on the Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, discloses an important line of questioning between Chairman MAHON and Mr. Richard L. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Development, General Betts who is in charge of the Army R.D.T. & E. and Dr. Gilstein who is in charge of the Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Agency. I ask unanimous consent that pages 158 to 165 of these hearings dealing with Safeguard, and the "hard-site" program be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks because of their importance to this debate, and also because I do not want the excerpts I shall quote to be out of context.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, General Betts, speaking of the hard-site defense system the Army is working on, said:

When perfected, this hard-site defense system promises to provide greater capability at lower costs than simply proliferating Safeguard components to achieve the same desired level of defense. (Page 159.)

While I do not attempt to present his position on Safeguard, for I do not know it, Chairman MAHON commented:

It generally has been agreed that Safeguard was not, as now conceived, really adequate to defend Minuteman against a Soviet attack that might come with just the numbers of weapons they have today. (Page 160.)

Later in the same testimony referring to the "hard-site" system, Chairman MAHON asks:

What does the scientific community say of all this?

Dr. Gilstein answers:

We have presented these concepts to the President's Scientific Advisory Council and the Defense Science Board. In both cases they expressed great approval of the work we are doing and asked us to continue along the same lines. In general, they approve every approach and every analysis we have made. They agreed with the concept and asked us to continue the work. (Page 165.)

In answer to a question about the state of development of hard-site components, page 162:

Mr. ANDREWS. Is it more or less in the scientist's mind at the present time?

Dr. GILSTEIN. It is more than that. It is in operating condition in various facilities. The data processors exist. The software for the processors is being written. The processes are starting to be demonstrated. The technology for much of the radars, the phased array antennas, the cross-field antenna tubes, modulators, and so on, also exist as components. They exist in full scale right now and have been demonstrated. An integrated radar has not been made.

Mr. President, I read this testimony again to contrast it with the statements made in the letter of Secretary Laird yesterday. His letter gives the impression that the hard-site system is in an inchoate stage, hardly more than the concept; yet we have Dr. Gilstein, who is in charge of the project in the Department of Defense telling a committee that the components exist or are in the process of being developed.

On the basis of the testimony and facts that have become available in the last year, and the continuing doubts about Safeguard's effectiveness, I consider that I would be derelict in my duty if I did not oppose further deployment of Safeguard and if I did not urge the greatest effort to be turned to the development of the advanced, dedicated "hard-site" system for the security of our country in the event the SALT talks fail.

The sponsors of our amendment do not minimize the present Soviet nuclear strength or the threat if the Soviets continue to deploy SS-9 missiles and other nuclear weapons. But I believe—and I think it wrong and unfair to our people—that the representatives of the Department of Defense have minimized the awesome power of our present nuclear deterrent, and the more powerful nuclear weapons the United States is capable of producing and, in fact, is producing. While the Defense Department speaks continually of the development of Soviet offensive weapons, little notice is given to the programs in which the United States is engaged to protect our deterrent, programs which substantially strengthen the offensive nuclear force of our country.

I would like to bring to the attention of the Senators, and ask that they read, the speech the senior Senator from Ohio (Mr. Young) made on the floor yesterday. In his speech, he specified in great detail the programs in which our country is engaged—modifying, developing, and strengthening our nuclear offensive systems. Yet, when press releases and statements are given out by the Department of Defense—just as one was given out yesterday—there is very little said

about what the Department of Defense is doing, and I think properly so, to strengthen the offensive capabilities of our country in the event the Soviet Union continues to increase its nuclear strength.

It is necessary to keep a balanced view and a balanced judgment about the Soviet threat and our own capabilities. The Soviet Union has a larger number of ICBM's and greater megatonnage than the United States, approximately 1,200 to our 1,050. But the U.S. serviceable bombers number over 500 to the Soviet's 200; and our Polaris fleet of 41 submarines with 656 warheads far surpasses the Soviet submarine fleet. The comparative warhead count, the actual agents of destruction, was listed by the Secretary in his statement of February 20, 1970, and as of September 1, 1969—was 4,200 for the United States and 1,350 for the Soviet Union. I understand the total for the Soviet Union has increased by several hundred since that time, but likewise the United States is deploying additional warheads on Minuteman III and the Poseidon submarines.

I think it misleading to speak continually of Soviet nuclear strength, the deployment of SS-9's, their fitting with MRV's and MIRV's, without making it clear to the Congress and the people that the United States also is taking steps to strengthen its nuclear capabilities, offensive as well as defensive. Secretary Laird and Dr. Foster have stated in their testimony that our Polaris and Poseidon submarines can be considered virtually invulnerable today and for a period of years. I will place in the RECORD a statement of Dr. Foster before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, because it sheds light on our present deterrent forces and the development of ULMS—the underwater long-range missile system—destined to be a more powerful and invulnerable submarine fleet than our Polaris fleet.

I have just referred to, and I ask to have placed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks the statement of Dr. Foster.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 3.)

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I might say that the underwater long-range missile system program provides for the stationing of intercontinental ballistic missiles upon submarines to be located near the shores of our country, with from three to 10 warheads that could reach Soviet territory, or any enemy in case of attack.

Experts have estimated that in the event our country and the Soviet Union do not agree at the SALT talks, the United States could add warheads reaching a total of 10,000 or 12,000, through the MRIV'ing of our missiles.

When we consider that two or three warheads could destroy Moscow, New York, Chicago, or any of the great cities of the world, and that the United States has 4,200 warheads today, and with the capability of 10,000 or 12,000 in a short time, I do not think anyone can argue reasonably that our country is as vulnerable as the Department of Defense implies by imbalanced statements.

Testimony by the Department of Defense shows also that the United States is engaging in programs of dispersal of its bomber fleet and a program toward rebasing Minuteman to provide for their greater protection. There are other programs upon which the Department of Defense is now working to insure greater defensive and offensive capabilities for the security of our country. I do not object to these programs—I support them—but I do object to the continued drumfire of statements, which would confuse and mislead the American people concerning our security, as they were misled by the "missile gap" propaganda of 1959-60.

I suppose I will have a chance to talk about the letter sent by the Secretary to the Senator from Washington (Mr. Jackson) yesterday, if it becomes a subject of debate. The letter "red herring"—"mouse tracks" concerning the intention of our amendment for its purpose is clearly expressed in its language and interpretation. Again it is a last minute tactic to which we have become accustomed in the debate on Safeguard.

In all the discussion of the technical, diplomatic, economic, and strategic issues connected with the ABM, there has been little mention of the effect of a Soviet nuclear attack upon our country. Whether Safeguard or any other ABM system failed, or if the defense were successful and our country managed to launch a retaliatory strike, the death and horror that would ensue in either case is beyond our imagination. A nuclear attack and nuclear defense involving thousands of megatons would cause the devastation of vast areas of the United States and the death and suffering of tens of millions of its people.

One must consider and believe that there are rational alternatives. The great necessity of our time is that the United States continue to make every effort to come to agreement with the Soviets to halt the further deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.

In his recent press conference, President Nixon stated incisively the critical importance of the SALT talks:

We can either continue this race in which they continue their offensive missiles and we go forward with our defensive missiles, or we can reach an agreement. That is why at this point we have hopes of attempting to find, either on a comprehensive basis, and lacking a comprehensive basis, a selective basis, the first steps toward which the superpowers will limit the development of and particularly the deployment of more instruments of destruction when both have enough to destroy each other many times over.

That is the statement of our President, a correct statement. The people of the United States should commend his efforts to reach agreement at the SALT talks. I hope very much that agreement will be reached. For if SALT succeeds, our country and the world will be more secure. If SALT fails we must take effective steps to provide the best protection we can for our deterrent in what will be a more dangerous world; and this is the purpose of the Hart-Cooper amendment.

In the meantime, we should base our judgment on reasonable grounds, not on emotional and dubious arguments. I urge

that the Senate consider the purpose of the Hart-Cooper amendment when the Senate makes its decision on the ABM, and that it approve the amendment.

EXHIBIT 1

REPORT OF THE AD HOC GROUP ON SAFEGUARD FOR FISCAL 1971

I. INTRODUCTION

The group was asked to offer advice to DOD concerning the pursuit of a BMD capability by the United States. Its advice was to be based upon the scientific and technical qualifications of its members. Although members of the group hold a range of views concerning the desirability of a BMD deployment and concerning the interactions between a deployment and diplomatic, strategic and political factors, it was not asked for and did not offer advice based on assessment of such things. The members are anxious that their participation in the work of the group not be taken to imply advocacy or opposition to the deployment of ballistic missile defense.

A full day was devoted to attendance at briefings by the Safeguard Systems Command, the Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Agency, and representatives of DDR&E. The material covered in these briefings included: a threat assessment at the top secret level; a Safeguard status report; Safeguard schedules and budgets for various possible deployment programs; ABMDA advanced study and development programs; a joint Safeguard/ABMDA study of active defense of Minuteman; and a description of possible alternatives to active defense for improving the survivability of Minuteman.

A second full day was devoted to discussion within the group, the definition of points of agreement, and an identification of differences in technical judgments.

A final day was devoted to the preparation of working notes for the group's report and for presentation of its advice to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the Principal Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and the Deputy Director (Strategic and Space Systems) ODDR&E.

A set of possible programs for proceeding with further steps toward the deployment of BMD which had been considered in DOD was described to the group. No proposed program was offered for criticism or assessment by the group. Instead the group was invited to present its opinion in any way which, in its judgment, would be appropriate. It was assured that it was under no obligation to arrive at recommendations concurred in by all members.

The President's statement of March 14, 1969, was provided to the group for guidance. The group was advised that the three purposes¹ of Safeguard defined by the President were not "weighted," that no one could be considered more important or desirable than any other. The President's statement also expressed his concern that a limited BMD deployment not be subject to misinterpretation as a first step toward the emplacement of a heavy BMD system. The group took note of this concern and was influenced by it during its work.

Advice pertinent to funding action in FY 1971 and FY 1972 was described to the group as being of particular interest.

On the basis of the guidance described above, the group attempted to formulate ad-

¹ These three purposes are: protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union; defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade; protection against the possibility of accidental attacks from any source.

vice based on scientific, technical, schedule and budgetary considerations, and on the assumption that the President and Congress, after review, decided to continue to approve the obligating of additional funds for BMD. It was not the purpose of the group to judge the wisdom of such an assumed decision.

In the hope that the procedure will improve exposition of the group's reasoning, the results of this review are presented in three parts:

1. Those pertinent actions that might be taken in FY 1971 if BMD were solely for the defense of Minuteman.

2. Those pertinent actions that might be taken in FY 1971 if BMD were intended only to provide thin area coverage of the country.

3. Those pertinent actions that might be taken in FY 1971 if BMD is intended to evolve into a system capable of meeting simultaneously the three objectives defined by the President.

II. MINUTEMAN SURVIVABILITY

The comments offered in this section should be understood to be based upon the assumption that the *only* purpose of deploying BMD is to improve the survivability of the Minuteman force.

On the basis of the size of the Soviet land-based force estimated for mid 1971 as composed of the following weapons:

(Omitted to avoid higher classification.)

And of the estimated growth rate of this force, full use of the Soviet land-based force to attack Minuteman could reduce the expected number of surviving U.S. land-based missiles to below — by —.

This would require that by that time improvements in delivery accuracy (c.e.p.) be achieved which make each delivered Soviet R/V from an SS11 or SS9 highly effective against a Minuteman silo. The group believes such accuracy improvements are technically possible but, of course, might not occur. Intelligence information provided to the group was not sufficient for it to reach a judgment about the likelihood that Soviet operational missiles would exhibit such accuracy in the next three to five years.

Some members of the group believe it might be possible to eliminate or shorten the period in which the Minuteman force could be very vulnerable to a heavy attack by Soviet SS11's and SS9's by adapting some existing U.S. air defense systems for temporary use as Minuteman defenses. The group was not briefed on this subject, and opinions among its members differ concerning the feasibility and practicality of such a program.

The group believes that techniques other than active defense may be practical and may reduce the vulnerability of Minuteman described above. It believes that alternate basing techniques that increase the number or the hardness of the aim points that a Soviet attack would have to target to achieve high assurance of destroying Minuteman merit careful study and may be practical as replacements for or adjuncts to active defense.

The group believes that a more cost effective system for the active terminal defense of Minuteman than Phase IIA of Safeguard can be devised. Such a system, termed a "dedicated" system, would feature less costly and less technically formidable radars than the MSR and each such radar would cover fewer silos than would be covered by an MSR. The system might, or might not, include some MSR's in addition to the smaller radars. The desirability and cost effectiveness of such a mix cannot be reliably judged at this time. The system's advantage over one featuring a proliferation of MSR's would be particularly important if the size of the Soviet anti-Minuteman force became very large.

The date on which a dedicated system for active defense of Minuteman could be complete depends upon its funding level. It seems unlikely that it could be deployed any earlier

than one year or more after a system using only Safeguard components could be deployed. However, it should be realized that if the Soviet missile force suitable for attacking Minuteman grows very large (e.g.² R/V's), the level of protection given the Minuteman force by a dedicated system substantially exceeds that achievable by proliferating Safeguard components, with equal investment in either system.

Against the background of these observations, the group advises that if the President and Congress direct a deployment of an active defense system exclusively designed to protect Minuteman:

1. If there is a foreseeable termination of BMD deployment at completion of Safeguard Phase I, funds (estimated at \$1 B) in FY 1971 should not be obligated for this purpose. Phase I alone is not worth its cost. Obligation of FY 1971 funds for completion of Phase I is justified only if there is a need, or possible need, to continue beyond Phase I.

2. It is necessary to proceed vigorously with the design of a dedicated HPD system and with advanced development of the radar and other technical components to be used in such a system.

3. The desirability of using some MSR's in a dedicated system should be resolved as quickly as possible. There are two ways to "hedge" the uncertainty about the need for MSR's in a dedicated system:

(a) Continue production of MSR's at minimum pace, accepting the possibility that a conclusion that they were not needed would be reached, say six months into FY 1971. Cancellation of MSR procurement at that point would result in a loss estimated at \$250 M to \$300 M.

(b) Cancel production of MSR's at once, accepting the possibility that procurement might be re-initiated twelve months after that decision. This would delay the date of defense system availability at least twelve and possibly twenty-four months. Some "restart" costs would be involved in restoring the production facilities, but these were not estimated.

4. If the only purpose of Safeguard is defined to be to protect Minuteman, Phase IIA as defined in March 1969 should not proceed. Instead, a dedicated system for active defense of Minuteman should replace or, if the need for the MSR is proved, augment Phase IIA. As a minimum step, the complement of Sprints at Grand Forks and Malmstrom could be increased.

5. In view of the possibility that the expected number of surviving Minutemen may be low for several years, techniques other than active defense should be vigorously pursued and necessary advanced developments related to such techniques should be undertaken. Among the techniques that should be considered are those of alternate basing, including techniques for increasing the number of aim points at which Minutemen might be placed. Techniques other than active defense should be evaluated for cost effectiveness when used to replace active defense and when used in combination with active defense.

6. The practicality and effectiveness of an interim active defense system for Minuteman, derived from existing air defense systems, should be appraised by a thorough review of analyses completed in the past and by such new work as may be warranted.

7. Study, research and advanced development funds for the Army's Hard Point Defense Program should be protected from budget cuts because of the great importance of this work with respect to Minuteman survivability.

III. AREA DEFENSE

Comments offered in this section should be understood to be based upon the assumption that the only purpose of a continued deployment of BMD is to provide a "thin" area coverage of the country to:

1. provide protection against a limited attack by the Chinese.

2. provide protection against an accidental or unauthorized launch from any source, including submarines.

3. protect alert SAC bombers, particularly against SLBM's on depressed trajectories.

It is important to recognize an essential difference between a phased deployment of an area defense and a phased deployment of a terminal defense of Minuteman. The latter can, in principle, provide useful protection after partial deployment at a few sites. An incomplete area system provides no protection from "blackmail" by an opponent (e.g. C.P.R.) with a small ICBM force or from an unauthorized attack. It provides only limited protection against accidental launches.

Therefore, initiation of an area defense system is justified only if there is an expectation that it will prove to be necessary or desirable to cover the entire country with such a system.

Against the preceding background, the group offers the following comments:

1. If a start on area defense were uninfluenced by work already completed and if deployment at three sites were possible within budget limits, the logical selection of sites for protection against Chinese ICBM attack would be Safeguard sites designated Northwest, Northeast, and Washington, D.C.

2. Budget limits and schedule advantages resulting from survey and other time-consuming actions authorized under Phase I suggest that a practical start on area defense would involve obligating funds in FY 1971 to establish sites at Whiteman (with an MSR but no PAR) and either N.E. or N.W. (with an MSR and a PAR). Whiteman affords coverage for a substantial population. It can be established relatively early because of survey work already completed. It is relatively inexpensive because it has no PAR.

3. * * *

4. Area defense, even of the thin kind furnished by Safeguard Phase II, has some effect on Soviet estimates of the adequacy of their deterrent because such a defense provides a large number of defensive weapons. Careful assessment of the consequences of the deployment of area defense components on the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union should be undertaken, especially in the light of the President's expressed concern in this matter.

5. Some members of the group suggest the need to estimate the "virtual cost" of area defense. The term refers to the cost of assuring that U.S. missiles could penetrate a Soviet area defense. Such a Soviet defense might be deployed in response to a U.S. deployment or as a result of a U.S.-Soviet agreement.

6. Estimates within the group of the effectiveness of a feasible thin area defense against C.P.R. ICBM attacks vary.³ The range of opinions was between the following bounds:

a) A belief that the probability is high that a thin area defense will be highly effective, possibly achieving damage denial for as much as a decade.

b) A belief that the C.P.R. would respond to the presence of a U.S. area defense and materially reduce its effectiveness by the use of penetration aids or bypass it entirely by other measures (e.g., clandestine weapons).

³ Some members of the group feel it important to recognize that ICBM's are not the only and possibly not the "best" way for the C.P.R. to attack or threaten to attack. The use of clandestine weapons is possible, for example. Some members also question the reliance that the President would be willing to rest on an untried complex system in the face of the threatened attacks.

IV. THREE OBJECTIVE SYSTEM

Comments offered in this section are based on the assumption that the President and Congress direct DOD to proceed with a BMD system intended to place comparable emphasis on each of the three objectives defined by the President in his statement of March 14, 1969.

Studies conducted by the Army indicate that a system based at seven sites could afford thin area coverage against limited ICBM attacks for all of the contiguous 48 states. The seven sites are among the twelve included in the Safeguard Phase II deployment which the Army has described. The seven site system is more vulnerable to a sophisticated attack than the Phase II system because effective radar coverage is reduced by such an attack. However, it does afford nearly complete defensive coverage against simple ICBM (not SLBM) attack at the lowest cost and earliest date achievable with Safeguard components. It is, therefore, a sensible "way station" to pass through on the way to a complete Phase II deployment.

It is of interest to ascertain which of the Safeguard sites provide terminal defense for Minuteman, contribute to area coverage, and are included in the seven site system. These sites are placed in evidence by the following table:

Site	Contributes to area coverage	Contributes to terminal defense for Minuteman	Is part of 7-site system
Grand Forks.....	X	X	X
Malmstrom.....	X	X	X
Northwest.....	X	X	X
Michigan/Ohio.....	X	X	X
Northeast.....	X	X	X
District of Columbia.....	X	X	X
Central California.....	X	X	X
Warren.....	X	X	X
Whiteman.....	X	X	X
Southern California.....	X	X	X
Texas.....	X	X	X
Georgia/Florida.....	X	X	X

Three sites (Grand Forks, Malmstrom, and Whiteman) have all three features mentioned above. The first two have been authorized, and funding has been obligated in Safeguard Phase I.

Against the preceding background, the group offers the following comments:

1. Safeguard full Phase II is a system embodying compromises intended to enable the system to achieve, to some extent, the three objectives stated by the President. It provides thin area coverage and some defense of Minuteman. It retains the possibility of including Safeguard technology in a dedicated system for Minuteman defense.

2. There is a need for a policy decision on whether to give emphasis to Minuteman terminal defense or to divide efforts between Minuteman defense and area defense in the next step taken toward Safeguard Phase II.

3. Obligation of FY 1971 funds for the Safeguard sites at Whiteman and Warren would emphasize protection of Minuteman. Expenditures for these sites would contribute to the growth of a Minuteman defense based on Safeguard technology or on a mixture of the technology of Safeguard and that of a dedicated system.

4. Obligation of FY 1971 funds for Whiteman would contribute to the evolution of both Minuteman terminal defense and thin area defense.

5. FY 1971 funding obligations for either N.W. or N.E. would allow continued progress in the evolution of area defense. There is no significant difference between the two with respect to attack from Communist China. Either provides some coverage against SLBM attacks. However, for this latter capability, the PAR used at the site selected (N.E. or N.W.) should have two faces.

6. It is estimated that FY 1971 funding obligations for Whiteman and either N.E. or

² Omitted to avoid higher classification.

N.W. would be within a budget allowance of \$1.5 B. It is estimated that obligations looking toward a third site would exceed the \$1.5 B allowed in FY 1971.

EXHIBIT 2

General BETTS. In describing his decision on Safeguard to Congress, the President stated that there would be an annual review of the developing ballistic missile threat with deployment decisions based on the threat developments. Defense options incorporating improved state-of-the-art technical developments would be incorporated as they became available. To provide options for improved defense response, an advanced development program totaling \$158 million is requested in fiscal year 1971 for the advanced ballistic missile defense program element. The increase over fiscal year 1970 is accounted for by the relatively recent decision that we should develop the components of a hard-site defense system for Minuteman to counter a possibly greatly enlarged and more sophisticated Soviet threat than can be handled by Safeguard as now conceived.

For the growth threat of the ——— time period as described by Secretary Laird, development is planned that will push the state-of-the-art and will provide us the option to supplement the basic Safeguard deployment with a large number of defense modules, each defending a small portion of the Minuteman force. The concept envisions the use of radars that would be less expensive, require ——— and fewer operating personnel than the Safeguard missile site radars. Because of their greater number, they would be less attractive targets; ———. When perfected, this hard-site defense system promises to provide greater capability at lower costs than simply proliferating Safeguard components to achieve the same desired level of defense.

HARDSITE DEFENSE SYSTEM

Mr. SIKES. Will the hard-site defense system be operational ———?

General BETTS. That is the time frame within which we would expect to be able to have the sort of options I was discussing available in the event needed.

Mr. SIKES. It is very interesting. We are going to get more detail on this later?

General BETTS. I have Dr. Gilstein with me, the Director of the Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Agency, and we will be glad to go into it in whatever depth you wish.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, we should hear Dr. Gilstein at the proper time.

Mr. MAHON. Where is the Doctor? Why don't you tell us something about it right now?

Dr. GILSTEIN. We are now doing concept formulation on radars and data processors, each of which defends a smaller portion of the battlefield than now assigned to the Safeguard system. Whereas the Safeguard system now defends a squadron at a time, these defense modules will defend a smaller fraction of the force, perhaps ——— silos in a clump.

By being given the assignment to handle a smaller portion of the battlefield, the whole engagement becomes easier for the technology to handle and, at the same time, since they are given a smaller assignment, it is far cheaper than the Safeguard components, and we can afford to proliferate them. This complicates the enemy task.

Mr. SIKES. This sounds as if you are simplifying the system. If that is what you are doing, why is it necessary to wait until ——— to have it operational?

Dr. GILSTEIN. There is the problem of completing the concept formulation, going to preliminary design, and the R. & D. demonstration, followed by the engineering design and production procurement, followed by deployment. Stepping through the development

of the system, it takes a certain number of years which brings us to ———.

Also, there is no desire to have the system implemented before that time, because Safeguard can handle the threat that has been hypothesized for the ——— time frame. We are preparing against a much greater and much more sophisticated threat which in actuality may not develop. So, the DOD would like to hold open the option of answering a growth threat, but not make a commitment if it is not necessary.

Mr. MAHON. If this system is preferable, and if what you want is really not Safeguard but this system which you were just describing, where does that leave Safeguard?

Mr. JOHNSON. May I answer that, Mr. Mahon. The hard-site system has capability only for the defense of the Minuteman sites, and it is no cheaper—as a matter of fact, to undertake its development for an earlier, less sophisticated threat, it would be more expensive than the Safeguard in the field to support the Minuteman against the early threat.

The Safeguard has the capability not only to handle the Minuteman defense, but the defense of the airfields, against the sub-launched ballistic missiles and the defense of a wide segment of the population against light attack, whether it be an accidental launch or a Chinese attack. So, the hard-site is only competitive with Safeguard for very severe Minuteman attacks. It is not competitive in the broader utilization of the Safeguard.

Mr. MAHON. With respect to what you said about the threat and the greater and more sophisticated threat which might evolve, the Secretary of Defense has been stating that the Soviet Union has now a very great threat and is approaching now a first strike capability with large numbers of ICBM's.

It generally has been agreed that Safeguard was not, as now conceived, really adequate to defend Minuteman against a Soviet attack that might come with just the numbers of weapons they have today. So, what threat are you talking about over and above the one the Secretary of Defense has been discussing?

Dr. GILSTEIN. We are talking about the growth threat that goes beyond the ——— time frame. This involves a possible carrying of ——— reentry vehicles per booster of the SS-9 class, rather than three per boosters as they are now showing in their R. & D. phase.

Mr. SIKES. I do not think we are getting across to each other. We are talking about building a very few Safeguard sites as a protection primarily against Red China. The protection, of course, against present Russian capability would be extremely limited. If this new concept would give us more protection against the Russian threat than we now have, why don't we proceed immediately into it? That is the point I am trying to get to. We are not talking about a ——— threat. If you think about Russian capability, you have it right now.

General BETTS. The presently planned deployment of Safeguard will in fact defend the Minuteman in a reasonably effective way. There will be some losses, but the proposal that has been made is to have an adequate number of surviving Minuteman missiles so we have a credible deterrence.

To get into the details of that, I would much prefer General Starbird to address this, because I have not maintained close contact with the program. We postulate that if the Soviet chooses to put smaller reentry vehicles on its boosters, he can put more—and that means big numbers—and in the process of making them smaller, he also makes them so they come into the atmosphere much faster and with a much smaller radar image. When you get to that kind of threat, then the Safeguard is not the way to defend.

We are trying to preserve the option to improve our defenses in that late time frame if it turns out to be necessary.

Mr. SIKES. Is this new concept to be expedited, or will it be necessary to use the time between now and ——— to develop it and make it operational?

General BETTS. As now planned, we will use that time for development.

Mr. SIKES. Could it be done in less time?

Mr. JOHNSON. Not significantly less time.

Mr. SIKES. The limiting factor is the time of development?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. What is the cost of development?

Mr. JOHNSON. It depends very much upon the outcome of the concept formulation in terms of whether the devices should have some limited mobility or not; the size of the radar, which is really determined by how many silos you wish to defend by each radar; and, particularly, the magnitude of the threat that you postulate.

Mr. SIKES. Do you think it would be more or less costly than additional Safeguards?

Mr. JOHNSON. If you were to want to defend only against the number of reentry vehicles of the types that they now have and can bring at you from the launches that they will have when they complete their present deployment, if that is the threat you must defend against, the best way is to put a few more Safeguard elements in the field. If the threat grows beyond that point, so you are essentially at the crossover, where they begin to put the three and the ——— reentry vehicles on the SS-9 and to target the SS-11's with enough accuracy, then it is clear that the cheaper way to defend the Minuteman is to utilize something of the nature that Dr. Gilstein talks about and to proliferate them in the field.

Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Secretary, I take what you are saying and what General Betts has been saying is that these two systems are complementary, really; that the new development is for a different mission, really, than Safeguard, and that your decision as to whether or not to develop it will depend upon your information as to the state of the art of the enemy over the next 2 or 3 years. Is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. Almost.

Mr. WYMAN. What is wrong with it?

Mr. JOHNSON. The decision to deploy it would be a function of the growing threat. The decision to develop it is associated with the fact that it is very clear that, should he choose to develop the multiple warhead approach and to upgrade the accuracy of his SS-11 so they now become silo attackers, should he choose to do that, then it is clear you will need it. It would be inappropriate to wait to have the development ready until you see him doing that. So, the decision to proceed with the development is that it is a rather straightforward attack that he could provide if he developed along the lines of the multiple vehicles and the upgraded SS-11's. Therefore, the development, we feel, should proceed. The deployment decision then depends upon your intelligence in the out years.

Mr. WYMAN. According to your information at the present time, will this system be capable of defending smaller locations against a MIRV attack?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, that is exactly it.

Mr. WYMAN. I understand. But will it work?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, indeed; just as the Safeguard will work against a specific kind of attack, this will work against that specific kind of attack.

Mr. WYMAN. This will be a lot lower in range and faster?

Mr. JOHNSON. Actually, it would utilize the same missile for a while. The Sprint missile, as you know, is a very fast missile already. You would simply be utilizing it to try to defend a much smaller area be-

cause of the smaller range of the radar itself. By making the range smaller, you reduce the number of items it sees, and you have then reduced the magnitude of the data processing problem of handling the traffic, really. So, the efficiency of it depends upon its smaller capability in the manner that Dr. Gilstein mentioned. It will clearly operate when you simply choose the size of radar and data processor that is consistent with today's state of the art.

Mr. ANDREWS. Where are you with this program at this time, and how much have you spent on it to date?

Mr. JOHNSON. It is in what we call the concept formulation stage, which is to essentially size the radars and the data processors and to show by analytic approaches that it is a viable system. So, it is in the formulation stage, approaching what I would call the ability to go into a contract definition.

There has not been, in terms of dollars, a great amount spent on it because it all has been analytic effort.

Could you give an approximation, Dr. Gilstein?

Dr. GILSTEIN. We have initiated work that would now come to a bill of about \$6 million. It is primarily supporting technology work.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is it more or less in the scientist's mind at the present time?

Dr. GILSTEIN. It is more than that. It is in operating condition in various facilities.

The data processors exist. The software for the processors is being written. The processes are starting to be demonstrated. The technology for much of the radars, the phased array antennas, the crossfield antenna tubes, modulators, and so on, also exist as components. They exist in full scale right now and have been demonstrated. An integrated radar has not been made.

Mr. ANDREWS. How much are you asking for this project in this budget?

Dr. GILSTEIN. We are asking an increase from the \$10 million level to \$58 million for fiscal year 1971.

Mr. JOHNSON. Because there was \$10 million before, that will mean a level of \$58 million spent on this Hardsite defense in fiscal year 1971.

Mr. ANDREWS. For this particular project?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. What do you call this project?

Mr. JOHNSON. Hardsite.

Mr. WYMAN. Who is the contractor?

Mr. JOHNSON. There is no contractor because we are in the stage in the Government laboratories and at the Secretariat, of establishing the nature of the program that would then proceed to contract definition.

Mr. WYMAN. All of the effort has been in-house to date?

Mr. JOHNSON. No. Excuse me, just as in any of our programs, that are in what we call programs 6.1 and 6.2, and you would call 5,000, component work and techniques are supported, so at the time you wish a system you have the pivotal technology work done.

Mr. WYMAN. Who is doing that?

Dr. GILSTEIN. Some of the radar manufacturers are Raytheon, Hughes, and Bendix. Data processor efforts are with ODC, Texas Instruments, and IBM.

Mr. WYMAN. They all have a little piece?

Dr. GILSTEIN. They all have a piece.

Mr. JOHNSON. It is correct to say they have been working on technology only. It is not correct to say they have a piece of a Hardsite system.

Mr. ANDREWS. I do not think you have answered to my satisfaction the question that I asked. I wanted to know how much was in this budget for this project. You mentioned \$50 some-odd million, and the Doctor said he had already spent \$6 million on the project. How much are you asking for in this budget?

Mr. JOHNSON. \$58 million.

Mr. ANDREWS. So, through fiscal 1971, you will have spent \$64 million on Hardsite?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

Mr. MAHON. This is a step beyond the Safeguard system, is that right?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MAHON. Of course, by the time you get the Hardsite program well in hand, somebody will come along with a refinement, and by the time you proceed until —, the Hardsite program would be more or less obsolete in concept, would it not?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir; I do not think so. It is no different in that sense than any program that proceeds through development and deployment. By the time you get to deployment, it is true and that you are 4 to 5 years down the line, and you could do something better or differently. If you followed that philosophy all the time, you would never build anything, because by the time you are ready to build it, you would say "I can do better." It is no different in that sense than any program.

In particular, with respect to ballistic missile defense, the technology and the threat have matured. We now understand things well enough that I do not think any of us see a major breakthrough, either in the offense or the defense, that would obsolete clearly the efforts of the next 4 or 5 years.

Mr. MAHON. You are talking about things that might never be developed fully in the event the strategic arms limitation talks prove to be successful.

General BETTS. That is certainly true.

Mr. JOHNSON. I would only comment in that regard that I think it is clear that they would never be deployed. In the event of successful SALT talks that are limiting on the actual installation of units, then you would not deploy.

I question, however, whether the nature of the agreements would or should be such that it should limit the research and development that is required to make sure that you are not surprised.

Mr. SIKES. I am glad you said that. This essentially is point defense, is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. Exactly.

Mr. SIKES. The Air Force, I am told, has a point defense system that is also in R. & D., designed to provide additional protection for Minuteman. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. Is there duplication? Is this something that should be carried on in one service rather than in two?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think the way to look at that is that it is in an even earlier stage of what we call concept formulation, the hot idea stage, than is the Hardsite defense that we are talking about. The only difference, really, when you look at the different ways of doing it, is the size of the defended area measured by how many silos per radar. You can go clear down and put one radar at each silo and one missile or more at each silo to defend each one of the silos. You can make it defend two or four or seven or more silos. There are tradeoffs which to us say that somewhere in the range of — is the minimum-cost area. If you put one on one, it is more expensive. Then if you get bigger to the point where it is — as we have in Safeguard, then it is also more expensive, again, against these very severe threats.

So, I do not think it is inappropriate for the different services to have hot ideas. It would be inappropriate to pursue the active, fullscale development headed for deployment of more than one.

Mr. SIKES. Again, I think you have stated the situation very well. I think the committee will applaud what you are doing.

If I understand you, you are saying that this is at the moment primarily an idea. It is good for two groups of people to be trying to come up with the best idea.

Mr. JOHNSON. I cannot disagree with that approach.

Mr. SIKES. Then when you get further on, before you have invested too much money, presumably a decision will be made between the two ideas.

Mr. JOHNSON. Certainly.

Mr. MAHON. It is a sort of Thor versus Jupiter situation.

Mr. JOHNSON. Except that then both proceeded, instead of one stopping.

Mr. MAHON. How many billions are we talking about in this so-called Hardsite program, probably? Is it more than Safeguard?

Mr. JOHNSON. No. That would be the point. It would be less expensive than Safeguard to defend the Minuteman. If you are talking about the present amount for Safeguard, it would be that or less.

Mr. MAHON. What will be the total development cost of the new point defense system? What would be the individual cost of setting up a unit which we understand would be cheaper than Safeguard but, since you have to have so many more of them, would the numbers equate so that the total deployment cost would be somewhat equivalent to Safeguard?

Mr. JOHNSON. I understand what you are saying. You must understand that we are at the stage, hot idea stage, and there is a considerable band. It could be anywhere from a — program to a — program. We are trying to get the cheapest program that will provide defense, and we are still scrubbing the thing down.

Hence, the wide array of dollar values.

Mr. MAHON. What does the scientific community, Dr. Gilstein, say about all of this?

Dr. GILSTEIN. We have presented these concepts to the President's Scientific Advisory Council and the Defense Science Board. In both cases they expressed great approval of the work we are doing, and asked us to continue along the same lines. In general, they approve every approach and every analysis that we made. They agreed with the concept and asked us to continue to work.

Mr. MAHON. How do you expect this to unfold? In fiscal 1972 and 1973, what would it be like, and in fiscal year 1974, and so forth?

Mr. JOHNSON. In terms of dollars, you mean?

Mr. MAHON. In terms of dollars and effort.

You are going from \$6 million to \$58 million in the time frame of 2 years. Where does it lead to?

Mr. JOHNSON. That depends largely upon the choice of the system. At the moment, we have talked with Dr. Foster and Mr. Packard about something on the order of — a year for several years. We just are not able to predict beyond that —.

EXHIBIT 3

Mr. WYMAN. Has any technology been developed through which an enemy could destroy our Polaris and Poseidon fleets before most of the missiles could be fired? Do you foresee any such developments in this decade?

Dr. FOSTER. According to our best current estimates, we believe that our Polaris and Poseidon submarines at sea can be considered virtually invulnerable today. We know of no existing technology or capability which could destroy our present undersea force—either now or in the relatively distant future—the ULMS systems represents an ultimate counter by requiring the search of an order of magnitude more sea area. However, we must fully understand these techniques in order to assess their potential. We have this year, fiscal year 1970, initiated an SSBN defense program whose express purpose is to obtain a definitive understanding of the potential of all of these techniques and others which may be conceivable, to accurately assess the potential vulnerability of the undersea force, and to develop those

countermeasure techniques which will assure the continued invulnerability of the undersea force.

We do see, however, that the potential exists for the effective developments of counters to our force by the Soviets if we do nothing to improve our own forces. The countermeasure techniques which we expect to derive from the SSBN defense program (conducted by the Navy) and the deployment of ULMS, should allow us to successfully preserve the invulnerability of the undersea force, which we consider vital to the preservation of a stable strategic deterrent for our country.

Mr. WYMAN. You stated on page 13 that "We are not sure that the problems of adequate land-based missile survivability can be solved permanently." Do you anticipate that our next generation ICBM will be an ULMS system rather than a land-based system?

Dr. FOSTER. Our primary efforts on land based systems are currently oriented toward hardening and/or rebasing of existing missiles. We anticipate that any new generation of ICBM's would be a sea-based system, such as ULMS.

Mr. WYMAN. Is the ULMS program funded at an optimum level in the fiscal year 1971 request? Is ULMS the most promising new strategic system now under study?

Dr. FOSTER. The funding level of the ULMS program in the fiscal year 1971 budget is the minimum level which will support preliminary studies and research necessary to support an IOC in the late seventies. We believe that this is the optimum level with respect to the overall ULMS and strategic programs. The prelaunch survivability of the ULMS system currently appears highly favorable as compared to any other proposed system, while its postlaunch penetration and effectiveness are roughly equivalent to the capabilities of other systems. ULMS also has the added advantage of being deployed outside CONUS where it does not attract counterforce strikes on the United States. For these reasons ULMS is the most promising new strategic system now under study.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the orders previously granted by which the able Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) would follow the able Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT) and by which the able Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) would follow Mr. JACKSON, be reversed, and that Mr. MUSKIE be recognized first following the remarks of the able Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT).

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DOMINICK). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT) is recognized under the previous order for 90 minutes.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, before commencing my address, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PHASE II OF THE SAFEGUARD ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on behalf of the proposal to proceed with phase II of the Safeguard

anti-ballistic-missile system, and to urge rejection of the pending amendment.

Once again we have before us the unpleasant task of making statesmanlike provision for our Nation's safety in a very unpleasant world. This task is neither enjoyable nor escapable. It is both costly and nerve racking. It requires that we take the long view with regard to dangers, and that we defer gratifications that would accrue to us if the world were more tame.

The central theme of my remarks is that the ABM proposal formulated by the Armed Services Committee, under the chairmanship of our distinguished colleague, the junior Senator from Mississippi, is a prudent, necessary, and moderate plan to achieve a necessary level of security at a minimum cost in resources and political destabilization.

This proposal is challenged by the pending amendment. I think this amendment is ill founded in reason and ill advised in terms of international realities. In my remarks today, I want to explain why I think this is the case. In doing so I will examine a number of the issues which divide Senators. But it is wise at the outset to understand the broad area of agreement which underlies this debate.

Mr. President, no Senator disagrees with three homely truths.

First, every Senator agrees that, given the deplorable condition of the world for the last several millennia, nations must take prudent measures to insure their own defense.

Second, given the existence of the Soviet Union—an avowed and powerful enemy of the United States—the question confronting American policymakers is not "Should we have elaborate and sophisticated defense systems?" but rather the question is: "How can we attain all the elaborate and sophisticated protection we need when we need it at the least cost in resources?"

Third, every Senator agrees that no considerations of financial convenience will ever be allowed to stand between the United States and whatever she needs in the way of defense.

Mr. President, I stress these three truths, to make an important point. Although there are differences of opinion in the Senate as we regard and consider this important matter, we all are starting from a position of broad and significant agreement. And this broad agreement suggests the areas of contention which we must examine with most care. They are related to two basic questions.

The first question is this. What does a sober, responsible analysis of our enemy's mixture of defensive and offensive weapons tell us about the nature of the threat we face?

The second question is this. What mixture of American weapons—offensive and defensive—constitutes the most expedient response to the enemy's threat? In measuring expediency we must formulate a prudent equation between the assured effectiveness of alternatives and their costs.

THE NATURE OF THE THREAT

First, let us consider the nature of the Soviet threat. Based on what we can guess about Soviet intentions, and what

we know about Soviet capabilities, we must conclude that there are lowering clouds of danger on the horizon.

Obviously it would be too simple to say that rational defense planners must consider only the capabilities of another power, and not that power's intentions. If that were the case, then Canada, judging us only by our proximity and capabilities, would have to have a defense budget considerably larger than its gross national product. Thus it is clear that rational defense planners the world over must make a crucial judgment about both enemy capabilities and intentions. This is a very easy judgment for our defense planners to make when they consider the threat posed by the Soviet Union. All that we can know about Soviet intentions and capabilities suggests danger.

Soviet intentions are either obscure or clearly ominous. The importance of this is threefold.

First, Soviet intentions are never clearly soothing.

Second, when Soviet intentions are indecipherable, then it is the clear duty of our defense planners to strictly and swiftly adjust our weapons mixture according to the changing—and that means increasing—Soviet capability.

Third, when Soviet intentions are not obscure, they are uniformly alarming, not least of all because they suggest what Soviet capabilities strongly suggest—that the Soviet Union is pushing hard to achieve a first-strike capability.

Mr. President, I want to emphasize that those who advise us to base our defense planning on estimates of the Soviet Union's intentions, rather than its capacities, are overlooking two facts. First, the Soviet Union's intentions are often inscrutable until dangerously late. Second—and I must be frank about this—those who urge us to place our trust not in an ABM system but in a reading of Soviet intentions—intentions that, they suggest, will be discernible and benign—do not always have a good record about reading Soviet intentions. And, needless to say, it has been a long time since the Soviet Union has accurately been accused of having an intention that would not require all prudent men to keep their powder dry.

We need only bear in mind three dates. One is August 24, 1939. That was the day on which the Soviet Union and the Third Reich signed their so-called "nonaggression pact" and agreed to carve up Poland, thereby launching the Second World War. The Soviet action was a surprise—their intentions had not been forecast.

The second date to remember is October 22, 1962. It was on that beautiful, terrifying autumn Monday that President John F. Kennedy went on national television to tell us that the Soviet Union had placed offensive missiles in Cuba and that we were going to risk nuclear war to force those missiles out. Again, careful deception and dissembling, and some bold lies, had kept Soviet intentions mysterious until the world was on the brink of nuclear holocaust.

The third date to remember is August 21, 1968. On this date—almost three decades after the signing of the Hitler-Stalin nonaggression pact—the Soviet

Union sent tanks rumbling into Prague to snuff out the flickering light of liberty in Czechoslovakia. Once again, the Soviet action came as a colossal surprise. One need hardly emphasize that it was also surprising to those who recently have devoted so much time and energy to the task of explaining how the Soviet Union is mellowing, and how a détente is about to terminate the cold war.

Thus from what little we can know for certain about Soviet intentions, we can only conclude that this is no time to reverse our field regarding such matters as ABM. Furthermore, prudence dictates that we must look beyond the matter of Soviet intentions and face the grim facts about Soviet capabilities. This is especially vital because these capabilities constitute concrete grounds for making the safest inferences about Soviet intentions.

I will focus special attention on one particular item in the Soviet arsenal.

By now it is clear that the most ominous and destabilizing item in the nuclear equation is a huge piece of complex and lethal hardware designated by the antiseptic appellation SS-9. We have nothing comparable. Moreover, it is, in a vital sense, a redundant and onerous burden for the Soviet military budget—except on one grim condition. That is, it only makes sense as the basis of a mighty first-strike capacity.

In some regions of this Nation the people have a sagacious motto that should enjoy wider currency. It is this: "If you want to know what a politician is up to, do not watch his mouth—watch his feet." This is sound advice at any time, in any country. But it is lifesaving advice when the Nation is dealing with the Machiavellian politicians in the Kremlin.

In dealing with the Soviet leaders we must pay less attention to what they say and more attention to what they do. What they say is fodder for speculation about Soviet intentions. But what they do constitutes concrete evidence of Soviet capabilities. And it constitutes the best possible case for proceeding with the moderate and prudent proposal for the second phase of the Safeguard ABM system. This is so because what the Soviet Union is doing right now involves the most deadly gamble in the nuclear age. The Soviet Union is continuing to deploy the SS-9 missile, and that means the Soviet Union may well be determined to confront us with a first-strike capability.

There is another military use for the SS-9. This use, which is very significant, but not directly relevant to this current debate, is as the launch vehicle for fractional orbital bombardment system vehicles—FOBS. The most recent Soviet test of such a vehicle took place on Tuesday, July 28.

The Soviet Union's substantially more than 800 SS-11's and SS-13's constitute a more than adequate deterrent. They have a range, yield, and accuracy sufficient to make them a formidable countercity weapon. Why, then, it is necessary to ask, are the Soviet taxing their faltering and inferior economy to produce an additional arsenal of the gigantic SS-9's?

The answer is evident when one describes the SS-9's conspicuous features. First, it is huge; it delivers a very large payload. Second, it is accurate; it delivers that large payload with considerable precision. Furthermore, the size of the payload it is designed to deliver is unnecessary for a countercity weapon. And the accuracy that is built into this expensive delivery system is wholly unnecessary to the task of posing a credible threat to our cities.

Thus, the real function of the SS-9 is revealed by the relationship between the size, accuracy, and payload of the missile. The size of the missile reveals that it is designed to deliver a warhead of up to 25 megatons or—and this is what is crucial—three 5-megaton warheads. These three 5-megaton warheads, the newest payload for the SS-9, can certainly be MRV's and may well soon be MIRV's if the SALT negotiations do not produce some kind of agreement to limit MIRV's.

There is one other important detail which completes the portrait of the SS-9 and its function in Soviet strategic planning.

A delivery capacity of three 5-megaton warheads, which makes no sense at all as a countercity weapon, makes perfect sense for only one thing: It is perfectly designed to attack our hardened Minuteman silos. That is, it is a perfect weapon for attacking part of our deterrent—our hardened second-strike capability. This is confirmed by what we know of the reentry pattern achieved by the multiple warheads—of whatever kind—on the SS-9. This reentry pattern closely approximates the spacing of the silos at Minuteman installations.

The lesson is clear. The SS-9, which is the heart of the Soviet strategic weapons effort, is a costly weapon without an American counterpart. It has only one function that could possibly justify its increasing deployment in a strategic arsenal: Its function is to threaten the American second-strike capability—the heart of our strategic arsenal and the very backbone of our deterrent capability. Thus, the development and continuing deployment of the SS-9 constitutes very ominous evidence that the Soviet leadership may have decided to develop a first-strike capability. The Soviet Union is bending its hard-pressed economy to produce the material prerequisites for practicing nuclear blackmail. And no one can doubt that, when the hard and cunning men in the Kremlin are given these material prerequisites, they will have the moral nastiness to practice that blackmail with a vengeance. The three dates I have mentioned before ought to prove this to anyone.

Thus far, Mr. President, I have addressed myself to the questions of Soviet intentions and Soviet capabilities. I have argued that the Soviet threat, far from decreasing, or even stabilizing, is increasing. Now I want to address myself to the question of why the ABM system is a suitable response to that threat.

THE CASE FOR SAFEGUARD AND THE COURSE OF RECENT EVENTS

The proposed phase II of Safeguard is nothing more than the minimal next step envisioned—indeed it is less than

might reasonably have been envisioned—when the Senate decided to begin an ABM system last year. Thus I think we can proceed in this discussion on the assumption that the Senate meant what it said about the general validity of a modest program to protect our deterrent.

The relevant question now is this: What has happened—on the world scene, in testing programs, or elsewhere—that should cause the Senate to do a volte-face? The answer to this question, Mr. President, is that the relevant events reinforce the logic of the ABM system. Indeed, much of the significance of the debate this year stems from the fact that the last 13 months have seen some developments—some encouraging and some ominous—that lend added urgency to the argument in favor of the ABM system.

These developments, which were ably explored last Thursday by the distinguished junior Senator from Washington, have a special significance when considered in the light of some arguments advanced against the ABM system last year. What is now clear is that the last 13 months have not dealt kindly with the case against the ABM system.

I am particularly interested in two events. One I have already mentioned: it is the Soviet decision to continue deploying the SS-9's. The second is the beginning of the SALT negotiations. When we consider these two events we realize that the ABM system is a proper—and minimal—American response. Indeed, the chief virtue of the ABM system is that it is the least destabilizing American response to the obvious Soviet determination to push ahead with an ambitious program of strategic offensive arms deployment.

The crucial point is that phase II Safeguard is not destabilizing, and the alternative to ABM—an increase in our offensive ICBM capability—could be destabilizing, and I must say probably would be. Phase II Safeguard is not politically destabilizing. That is, it does not give the Soviet Union cause to believe that we are trying to achieve a first strike capability, and it does not damage the SALT negotiations. Moreover, the ABM is not economically destabilizing. That is, it puts minimal strain on the American economy.

SAFEGUARD AND THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS

Earlier this year there was some talk about a proposal to put the ABM and MIRV funds in escrow pending some decisive development—either an agreement or a collapse—in the SALT negotiations. The practice of putting such moneys in escrow would have been a most unusual legislative gimmick, and it would not have distinguished this move from a straightforward unilateral freeze. But this escrow proposal is worth pondering if only because significant recent events have taken the wind from its sails.

The escrow proposal was attractive to some persons who became convinced that the Soviet Union was backing off from its program of steadily increasing SS-9 deployments. That is, there was a point in the last year when some persons interpreted Soviet behavior as in-

dicating an intention to cease SS-9 deployment. If this was the Soviet intention—they reasoned—it would not be necessary to push ahead with the second phase of Safeguard.

I do not think this conclusion would have been sound, but it is no longer necessary to rebut it because the ground on which it rested has been washed away. It is true that for a period of several months there was no evidence of new SS-9 site starts. This encouraged the soothing, but illogical, conclusion that the Soviet Union was through with SS-9 deployments. Unfortunately, recently—since the beginning of the Vienna phase of the SALT negotiations on April 16—there has been conclusive evidence of new SS-9 site starts. This has destroyed the case for the escrow plan, which was never anything more than a plan for our half of a system of mutual restraint.

The relevance of the late and unlamented escrow plan to today's debate on the pending amendment is that the escrow plan amounted to a unilateral American moratorium on ABM, and passage of the pending amendment also would amount to at least a unilateral moratorium. If the aim of such a unilateral moratorium is to expedite an agreement in the SALT negotiations, then it would surely be a self-defeating move.

As the distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts has warned—see the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, April 3, 1970, page 10300:

There are many complex systems to be discussed and negotiated at the SALT talks. We have no reason to believe that the SALT talks will not take months, and conceivably years, before they are ultimately concluded.

He has emphasized that his estimate was certainly not a high estimate. If the junior Senator from Massachusetts is correct in his judgment, then he has stated one of the powerful arguments against halting Safeguard pending a conclusion—a favorable conclusion—of the SALT talks.

If, on the one hand, one's desire is to expedite a swift and meaningful agreement at the SALT talks, then a unilateral and indefinitely long moratorium on ABM development and deployment is the last thing one wants. This is so for two reasons.

First, it gives the Soviet Union a huge advantage at absolutely no cost. That is, it commits the United States to a significant and substantial reduction of its defense effort without requiring any reciprocal Soviet move. This is one detrimental—and utterly predictable—consequence of any American strategic arms moratorium that is unilateral and of indefinite duration.

Yet, this is not the worst predictable outcome of such a self-imposed moratorium. Still more pernicious would be the effect of such a move on the SALT negotiations themselves. The effect would be twofold. First, it would insure that the Soviet Union would not come to any significant agreement. Second, it would encourage the Soviet Union to consume as much time as possible in not coming to an agreement.

It is easy to see why this twofold effect would result from any unilateral American moratorium on strategic arms. Such unilateralism would put enormous controlling power in the hands of the Soviet negotiators and the disagreeable men they serve. It would be in the Soviets' interest to dissemble and delay the SALT negotiations indefinitely, all the while playing adroitly on the benevolent but misguided American proclivity to interpret an enemy's garrulity as a sign of good will.

Because passage of the pending amendment would constitute a de facto unilateral moratorium, Mr. President, it is worthwhile to pay some attention to a recent debate in which many Senators spoke quite forcefully against the very idea of any such unilateralism.

It is instructive to consider the Senate debate last April on Senate Resolution 211, the resolution seeking agreement with the Soviet Union on limiting offensive and defensive strategic weapons and the suspension of test flights of reentry vehicles. A significant discussion of that resolution took place on April 3 and can be found on pages 10295 through 10307 of the RECORD for that day.

At that time, the distinguished junior Senator from Arkansas explained the meaning of the resolution in this way, page 10296:

The purpose of Senate Resolution 211 is to freeze the United States and the Soviet Union in a condition of parity for an interim period so that meaningful and lasting arms limitation agreements can be worked out in the talks that are about to begin in Vienna.

Two paragraphs later, on the same page in the RECORD, Senators will find the junior Senator from Arkansas assuring the Senate:

The freeze on further deployment is not a proposal for a unilateral halt by the United States. It would also freeze the further deployment of Soviet SS-9's and SS-11's and of Soviet ABM systems.

The distinguished majority leader concurred. He said, page 10296:

This is a simple resolution. It is not one-sided. It will depend on mutual assistance, mutual agreement, and mutual complementation.

The distinguished majority leader also said, page 10297:

This is a matter which would have to be mutually agreeable, mutually acceptable, and mutually enforceable. It would not in any sense of the word mean, so far as this country was concerned, unilateralism in any shape, manner or form. I think that factor ought to be emphasized time and time again.

Later, the majority leader added, page 10297:

It is going to be a two-sided affair if entered into, or it will be no affair at all.

At this point, the distinguished and able junior Senator from Massachusetts, who first introduced Senate Resolution 211, rose to explain why he approved the expansion of his original resolution beyond a freeze on operational testing and deployment of MIRV's to an expansion which included a freeze on all offensive and defensive weapons systems. In response to this explanation, the dis-

tinguished senior Senator from New Jersey rose to commend the resolution in its current form, noting that the junior Senator from Massachusetts had introduced his resolution to correct what he thought was a liability in a similar resolution proposed by the senior Senator from New Jersey. The senior Senator from New Jersey explained what had transpired in this way:

My own suggestion was a slightly different one, calling for an immediate stoppage on our part and the keeping up of the cooperation on testing so long as the Russians did the same.

The Senator from Massachusetts realized that my approach, regardless of the merits relative to his, was perhaps more susceptible to the charge—although I think equally unfounded—of unilateral disarmament.

Thus the substance of Senate Resolution 211 was influenced in a crucial manner by the universally recognized necessity for avoiding both the reality and the appearance of unilateral concessions on matters that should be the subject of bilateral negotiations and agreements. As the senior Senator from New Jersey said, the aim of Senate Resolution 211 was "a mutual action which is an expression in the most general terms."

Everyone was agreed on the necessity for mutuality. As the junior Senator from Massachusetts put it, page 10300:

We are not saying the United States should stop testing its MIRV, or should stop deploying any of its weapons systems, if the Soviet Union does not at the same time stop testing whatever it is testing or stop deploying any of its weapons systems.

He reemphasized the need for mutuality on page 10302.

The distinguished and able junior Senator from Arizona expressed the hope that this resolution would not have the practical effect of moving us toward unilateralism in cessations or in other forms of disarmament. The distinguished junior Senator from Massachusetts responded by saying:

I would agree with the Senator that we would not want a unilateral cessation.

All Senators favoring the amendment continued to stress the provisions for mutuality, right through the final hours of debate on April 9. Interested Senators may refresh their memories of this debate by consulting the April 9 RECORD on pages 11031 through 11062. On page 11062 it is recorded that I joined with 71 other Senators in supporting Senate Resolution 211. I did so because I was impressed by the provisions stipulating the necessity for reciprocal Soviet action. I was especially gratified by the provision that stipulated that the mutual freeze would be for a 6-month period with an automatic lapse unless renewed in the same or modified form by both sides.

Mr. President (Mr. DOMINICK), at this point it is useful to pause and notice the interesting pattern that emerges from recent events. It would appear that the most soothing predictions made by ABM opponents last year—predictions about Soviet intentions—have turned out to be false. In addition, we should note that the most alarming prediction made by the ABM opponents—a prediction about

the deleterious effect Safeguard would have on the SALT negotiations—also has turned out to be false.

The alarming—and, it would now appear, alarmist—speculation that found its way into the ABM debate 1 year ago revealed that some persons based their opposition to Safeguard on the fear that even a small, moderate start on such a system might make it impossible to get the SALT negotiations started.

Fortunately this is one argument that we need not rehearse this year. It rested on a theory that has been killed by a fact. The theory was that an American start on an ABM system—even a measured start on a limited system—would discourage the Soviets from participating in the SALT negotiations. The fact is that both the ABM system and the SALT negotiations were started last year.

Mr. President, although events have shown that Safeguard and the SALT negotiations are compatible, it is not sufficient to note this and rest content. As I have suggested in discussing the dangers of unilateralism, there is another side to the argument about the relation between Safeguard and the SALT negotiations. I must reemphasize that it is still possible for us to make a decision about Safeguard that would be damaging to those negotiations on which we all have fixed such fervent hopes.

By now it is clear that a sudden reversal of Senate direction on ABM—such as that proposed by the proponents of the pending amendment—could seriously jeopardize the American position in Vienna today and in Helsinki this fall. By now it is clear that Safeguard deployment is not just compatible with the SALT negotiations, but may well be essential for them.

This is apparent to even casual readers of what is widely published in major newspapers. There have been newspaper reports that Gerard C. Smith, the U.S. chief negotiator at the SALT talks, has recently given the Soviet negotiators in Vienna a significant proposal for a strategic arms agreement. According to reports, this proposal includes a mutual freeze on or a reduction in the size of offensive and defensive missile systems.

The proposal is built around three principal limitations.

One limitation would set a quota for all strategic launching systems, including strategic manned bombers, and land and sea-based missiles. It is reported that each side would be permitted to improvise whatever mixture of launching systems it preferred, so long as the aggregate did not exceed the quota.

A second limitation would govern the permissible number of huge SS-9 missiles, or any comparable devices deployed on either side.

The third limitation in this package would concern antimissile defense systems. This might ban such systems, or limit them to sites ringing Moscow and Washington—the Soviet Union already has 64 launchers in its Galosh ABM system in the Moscow region.

Mr. President, only the bare outlines of the Vienna talks are publicly reported. Of course it would be possible for the

Senate to go into closed session and consider the contents of the cables from our negotiators. It is certain that those cables would contain much useful information about the relevance of the Safeguard program to the U.S. approach to a broad arms limitation agreement. But such a session is probably unnecessary. The crucial point is already clear. The three-part proposal we have made at Vienna is a package in which each element is related to the other two in crucial ways.

If we were to pass the pending amendment we would do more than just embarrass our negotiators. We would pull a vital element from the package which is the subject of the most delicate negotiations. This is no time for us to reach over the shoulder of our chief negotiator and tamper with the fabric of the discussion. We might well cause an uncontrollable unraveling of these talks.

Mr. President, thus far I have argued that there are two crucial senses in which our modest Safeguard program avoids contributing to destabilization. It neither raises Soviet anxieties about American offensive intentions, nor does it impede the SALT negotiations. There is one more point to be made about Safeguard and the problem of stability in United States-Soviet relations and it is this: The most destabilizing thing we could do at this point would be to pass the pending amendment and thereby initiate a unilateral freeze. The reason why this would be destabilizing was explained with customary lucidity by the distinguished junior Senator from Washington in his speech in this chamber last Wednesday. This is what he said:

In these annual debates on military procurement, Mr. President, we often hear the arms race explained in terms of an action-reaction cycle. Now I do not deny that there is some truth in this explanation, but I think it is only a partial truth. For an arms race can develop as much through a cycle of inaction-reaction as action-reaction.

We have seen the inaction-reaction cycle at work for the last several years. While U.S. offensive deployments have remained constant since 1965, and while the U.S. strategic budget has been steadily declining the Soviets have been spending increasing sums and adding to their force of ICBM's and missile-firing submarines. The point has now come where it would be dangerously foolish to indulge in continued inaction that might well stimulate continuing action on the part of the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, I have now discussed my reasons for believing that Safeguard, far from being a source of political instability, may be a positive contribution to stability. Now I want to direct some remarks to the matter of Safeguard's cost.

THE COST OF SAFEGUARD

It is well known that 30 percent of every Federal tax dollar is devoted to defense, including the means of deterring our enemies from starting yet another war. Every American wishes that this were not the case. But all that means is that all Americans wish that this weary world would become something very different from the strife-torn world it has always been.

Obviously, every American wishes that

all revenues the Government demands could be applied to creative domestic purposes. Most of all, every American must wish that foreign events and domestic desires, ideologies, and conditions would combine to cause the Government to demand fewer revenues.

But there is something that Americans can do besides just wish for a dramatic change in the nature of the world, or the nature of nations, or the nature of men. We can take a prudent, farsighted approach to cutting expenditures relating to foreign matters. We can try to bring the arms race under control and, pending success in that venture, we can make every effort to get maximum security from our defense purchases.

Clearly, much of what I have already said here today pertains to possible long-range economic benefits from Safeguard. Anything that encourages stability, and gives the SALT negotiations a chance to succeed, is contributing to the most substantial form of saving—a mutual reduction in the overall arms race. But there are two additional lines of argument which clearly establish the economic advantages of the ABM system.

The first argument deals with the economic advantages of the ABM system as it compares with other proposed responses to the particular threat the ABM is designed to counter.

The second deals with the economic advantages of this system as it relates to the interaction between American and Soviet defense expenditures. This argument demonstrates that the ABM system makes the expenditure interaction work favorably to the United States.

I will deal with these two arguments separately.

I am convinced that the ABM system numbers among its merits the fact that it is the least costly to us of the various alternative responses we can make now to the obvious and ominous rapid rate of Soviet strategic arms deployment.

There has been some unhappiness and uneasiness generated by the suggestion that it costs more to defend our missile silos than it does to construct the entire silo offensive system, including the missile.

I fail to see how such an argument can have much force. After all, it would make about as much sense to be disturbed about buying a wrist watch because the hands on the clock perform the essential function—they tell us the time—but they cost next to nothing compared with the 21-jewel works, which we never see.

The argument that it costs more to defend a silo than it does to deploy the silo is debatable and breathtakingly irrelevant. It does not focus on the crucial question which is not how much it costs to build a silo, but how much it costs to guarantee a surviving silo. When one computes the marginal costs of each unit in this way, one realizes that the ABM program is an efficient response that does not get into the great political cost of adding offensive missiles that raise dangerous Soviet anxieties and reduce the chances for arms limitation agreements.

Besides, if we are going to start objecting to every weapons system in which the raw offensive capacity costs less than the equipment that makes it effective, then we are going to have a lot of objections to the sea-launched ballistic missile system built around the Polaris submarine. After all, the submarine itself is only essential to service the missiles—to keep them mobile and hidden. The Polaris missiles cost only a fraction of the cost of the submarine in which they are implaced, and which makes them an operational system.

The second half of the economic benefits of the ABM system concerns the benefits we receive from the interaction between United States and Soviet defense expenditures when using defensive interceptors to counter additions to the Soviet offensive arsenal. Consider the burdens under which the Soviet economy is laboring.

The crushing burden of Soviet expenditures for strategic weapons is easy to estimate. If an SS-9 costs approximately \$30 million, then the approximately 300 SS-9's they have operational or under construction represent an investment of approximately \$9 billion. If we figure a unit cost of \$8 million for each SS-11 and SS-13, that adds an additional \$6.4 billion to the total of Soviet expenditures on currently operative land based ballistic missiles. Notice that this total does not include small missiles that are still operational, such as the SS-7's and SS-8's; nor does it include the investment in the Soviet bomber force; nor does it include the large and growing Soviet investment in missile launching submarines.

It is perfectly clear that the United States has the resources—of material and morale—to expand the protection for our deterrent fast enough to counter any Soviet drive—however intense—to achieve an offensive missile capacity sufficient to overwhelm our ABM system and thereby achieve a first strike capability. All we need to do is to be certain that every time the Soviet Union adds an SS-9 or other offensive missile to its arsenal, we add an offsetting interceptor.

If we make it perfectly clear that we intend to do this—if we make it clear that we will match any pace they set—then the Soviet Union has three, and only three, alternative courses of action.

First, it can decide against going for a first strike capability.

Second, if it already has decided to go for that capability, it can reverse that decision.

Third, the Soviet Union can push ahead on an attempt to match American resources and determination—in which case the Soviet Union can run itself right into bankruptcy.

I hardly need to emphasize that each of these three alternatives—whichever they choose—is in our interest. This demonstrates the weakness of one familiar argument advanced against the ABM system. This is the argument that an ABM system will fail because the Soviet Union has, or is working to achieve, an

offensive missile arsenal sufficient to overwhelm our projected ABM system. This argument collapses of its own weight for the following reason.

The ABM system is designed to protect our second strike or retaliatory capability. Therefore, the only possible reason why the Soviet Union would insist on an offensive capacity sufficient to overwhelm our ABM system and destroy our retaliatory capacity is that the Soviet leaders are determined to achieve a first strike capability. If this is the case—and I think it may be—then the case for building the ABM system becomes not only convincing but desperately urgent. In fact, then the whole debate reduces to one awesomely important question: How fast must we expand the ABM system to insure that the protective shield for our retaliatory capacity is always sufficient to cope with the Soviet Union's ever-expanding offensive capacity?

THE STRANGE ECONOMY OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

Mr. President, while considering questions of economy, I must say that there are some very puzzling aspects about the pending amendment.

For example, the amendment would strike \$322.2 million in funds requested for work at Whiteman and Warren Air Force Bases. This is described by the distinguished senior Senator from Kentucky as a "saving"—page 27269 in the August 4 RECORD—but it is an odd form of economy. It leaves intact the \$992.2 million authorization for continuation of work on phase I at Malstrom Air Force Base in Montana, and Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota. But if the purpose in halting phase II is to terminate—or begin terminating—the Safeguard system, then what is the point in authorizing approximately three times as much money as the proposed amendment would strike?

It is fair and pertinent to raise the question of whether the real intention of the pending amendment is to halt Safeguard altogether. After all, if phase II is found objectionable to the Senate, then it is perfectly clear that the future of the entire Safeguard system is very much in doubt.

In this regard, Mr. President, I am frank to admit that I cannot get a clear understanding of exactly what are the intentions of the proponents of this amendment. Do they want to halt phase II Safeguard? Do they think their amendment would halt research and development needed to perfect phase I Safeguard? Do they want their amendment to halt what they describe as the "momentum" of the Safeguard program?

Last Tuesday—page 27269 in the RECORD of August 4—the distinguished senior Senator from Kentucky said this on the subject of the Cooper-Hart amendment and the matter of "momentum":

Well over \$1 billion was authorized for Safeguard in 1969. There is a carryover, as of May 31, of \$224 million. These amounts, plus this year's authorization, provide ample funds for work on the evolving prototype system at Malstrom and Grand Forks to keep

existing production lines intact, and, by maintaining forward momentum, would provide ample bargaining strength for the SALT talks, the administration requires.

But then the next day—page 27439 in the RECORD of August 5—the distinguished senior Senator from Michigan declared:

Senator Cooper and I do not consider this amendment so much a compromise as a rational, modest but important effort to help stem the ever escalating arms race and, specifically, to stop the momentum of this particular weapons system.

Mr. President, I find this very puzzling, and I look forward to some clarifying remarks from the distinguished and able Senators. There appears to be a mini-debate going on between the cosponsors of this amendment over the real purpose of the amendment and, pending a resolution of that debate, I can only say what I think about their various positions.

I agree with part of the position advanced by the distinguished senior Senator from Kentucky. Specifically, I agree with his contention that forward momentum on Safeguard is required if the SALT negotiations are to progress. But I disagree with his belief that passage of his amendment would not destroy this momentum which we both think is required.

On the other hand, I agree with a portion of the opposing view advanced by the distinguished senior Senator from Michigan. Specifically, I agree with his contention that the amendment sponsored by the two Senators would work to "stop the momentum of this particular weapons system."

Mr. President, there is one thing that has become clear since last year's debate, it is that some persons who object to the Safeguard program are not terribly selective in their criticism of it. That is, if one rebuts all specific criticisms of the Safeguard program—from doubts about feasibility, through fears about the political consequences of deployment—one still runs up against the fact that those who oppose this ABM program would oppose any version of ABM system because they do not like the idea of protecting land-based missiles.

Now this position—which I do not hold—is intellectually defensible, and is sincerely held by many honorable men of good will. But surely we can all agree that those who hold this position should not acquiesce in appropriating nearly a billion dollars for the first phase of a weapons system while at the same time fighting to strike less than a third of a billion dollars, when the effect of striking it would be to reduce the first phase to a doomed and impotent remnant of a system destined never to become operational.

It is fair and pertinent to raise this point because the language of the Cooper-Hart amendment is unclear as to whether the research, development, test, and evaluation funds intended for and needed by Safeguard are to be diverted to development of a new dedicated hard-site defense system. If this is the

case, then there is a fundamental contradiction in the Cooper-Hart amendment. It spends with one hand for the Safeguard system which it is killing with the other hand.

A NOTE ON THE QUESTION OF FEASIBILITY

Mr. President, I now want to meet one recent suggestion that there are new and damaging scientific conclusions about Safeguard's ability to perform the function for which it is designed.

On July 31, the distinguished senior Senator from Kentucky and the distinguished senior Senator from Michigan held a press conference. At that time, according to the report in the New York Times, they charged that the Defense Department had "conceded" that the Safeguard system would not be effective in protecting the Minuteman force against a Soviet attack.

The headline on the Times story said: "ABM Critics Say Pentagon Agrees." But a close reading of the story reveals something different. What the two distinguished Senators did was to take note of two quite unremarkable developments with regard to Safeguard deployment, and to infer from these developments that the Defense Department is worried about the effectiveness of Safeguard. This inference is quite mistaken, as I shall demonstrate.

This is the relevant passage from the Times article in the edition of Saturday, August 1:

The rebuttal of the opponents to the system is that even if the planned Safeguard worked perfectly, which they question, it would be incapable of blunting a Soviet attack.

This contention, Senators Cooper and Hart suggested at a news conference, has been confirmed by recent Defense Department moves to change the Safeguard design in line with objections raised by critics last year.

Senator Cooper cited the following factors:

The Defense Department has started working on smaller cheaper radars for the Safeguard system. One of the principal technical objections raised last year was that a Safeguard site is now dependent upon one Missile Site Radar, which guides the Spartan and Sprint missiles to their targets. This radar, scientific critics argued was highly vulnerable, and its elimination by one nuclear blast would neutralize the entire Safeguard site.

In this year's request, the Defense Department has "conceded" that more short-range Sprint missiles are needed at the first two Safeguard sites in Montana and North Dakota approved last year by Congress. Last year the Safeguard critics maintained that the Soviet Union could penetrate the system by exhausting the supply of Sprint missiles.

It is quite erroneous to describe these moves as "moves to change the Safeguard design in line with objections raised by critics last year." In fact, both of the developments described are long-standing aspects of Safeguard planning. Minuteman defense was designed as an option in the Sentinel system. Moreover, research and development on landsite defense has been going on for the last 10 years. The smaller, cheaper radar is simply the object of a study that is part of prudent planning for future contingencies. Such radar would be built and deployed only if there is some need for

a subsequent program to go beyond Safeguard. This subsequent program would only be necessary if the threat grows beyond current projections.

What is curious about the ABM critics' attack on this radar research is that they seem to be assuming that the radar will be built and deployed. This would seem to imply that they think the future threat to our Minuteman force will be very much greater than current projections indicate. This would seem to involve them in what is known as "worst case analysis." And this is the sort of reasoning which, according to many ABM critics, is to blame for various of the world's woes.

Now consider the second development from which the two distinguished Senators infer that the Defense Department thinks Safeguard will be ineffective. This is the deployment of additional Sprint missiles at the two Safeguard sites authorized last year.

It is quite mistaken to suggest that the Defense Department has "conceded" a need for these Sprints. The truth of the matter is that the increase in the number of Sprints has been projected all along. The radars at these two sites are designed to service a certain number—let us say "x" number—of interceptors. The Malstrom and Grand Forks missile sites currently have "y" number of interceptors, such that "y" is a number less than "x." The Sprint missiles now being added are number "z," this number being the difference between "x" and "y."

Further, it should be understood that "y" is the number stipulated last year for Phase I, and "x" is the number stipulated last year for the Phase II level at the Phase I sites. In other words, the addition of the Sprint missile is nothing more than another step in preparing the sites Congress approved last year. It represents no departure from last year's Safeguard plans.

PHASE II AS A REASONABLE COMPROMISE

Mr. President, one reason why this year's debate has been less lengthy, less heated and less divisive than last year's debate is that the Safeguard proposal before us is the product of three kinds of significant compromises.

First, the number of new sites involved is substantially less than the number which the administration originally indicated that it would like to see authorized as part of Phase II. Thus, the proposal before us is judiciously designed to give our ABM system a safe and credible momentum which we will need, failing a useful SALT agreement. But this proposal does not commit us to the extent that it jeopardizes any plausible SALT agreement.

Second, the proposal before us represents a decision to forgo constructing even a thin area defense of our population. This decision is an act of the highest statesmanship. It represents a willingness to be empathetic toward the Soviet Union. That is, it takes cognizance of the fact that at the moment an area ABM defense of our population could easily be misinterpreted by the Soviet

Union as part of an American drive to achieve a first strike capability. This year's proposal avoids any intimation of population defense planning, and thus allays Soviet fears about American first strike intentions.

The third form of compromise embodied in this proposal is less obvious, but may be even more significant. It also represents a decision to avoid any move that could be construed as provocative, and thus be dangerously destabilizing. This compromise involves a rejection of the idea of responding in kind to the Soviet Union's increases in offensive capacity.

There are only two ways to preserve an assured deterrent in the face of mounting Soviet offensive capacity. One is to protect our deterrent with Safeguard. The other is to augment our offensive capacity.

No Safeguard missile can hit the Soviet Union. All our offensive missiles can hit the Soviet Union. Any addition to the American offensive missile arsenal can be misinterpreted in the Soviet Union. Any such addition can be construed as another element in an emerging American first strike capability. Therefore, the decision to respond to Soviet offensive capacity by increasing our defense represents an American willingness to act with circumspection when dealing with the Soviet Union. It demonstrates a sensitivity toward Soviet fears which one wishes the Soviet officials would reciprocate.

In this regard, Mr. President, it is instructive to cast our attention back 13 months to last year's debate on the ABM system. I want to call Senators' attention to the debate of July 9, and especially to a colloquy that can be found on page 16907 of the RECORD for that day. The colloquy was between my friend and colleague, the junior Senator from Colorado, and the distinguished senior Senator from Kentucky. The distinguished junior Senator from Washington had the floor at the time, and the colloquy went like this:

Mr. DOMINICK. One of the things that has been of increasing concern to me is the semantic somersaults made in some areas of the country where people who say we have an overkill say we should not deploy the ABM because that would be provocative; and they say build more offensive weapons. That does not make sense to me. It seems to me that if we have an overkill, we should maintain the ability of that overkill to be used as needed.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I heard the statement of the able Senator from Colorado regarding the support by opponents of ABM of offensive weapons as an alternative. The distinguished Senator from Washington has made the same statement. In the testimony of Secretary Laird before the House committee, he made a similar statement.

It is said that those who oppose deployment of the anti-ballistic missile system this year, a defensive system, favor additions of missiles to our offensive systems. I must say that is incorrect. The framework in which such a statement has been made is—that if a year from now the Soviets are proceeding

with the deployment of the SS-9, perhaps armed with MRV or MIRV, at that time, if necessary to protect our deterrent, we could protect our assured deterrent by building additional Minuteman missiles and additional Polaris or Poseidon-type submarines. That is the context in which such statements have been made.

One thing must be noted about this statement made last July 9 by the distinguished senior Senator from Kentucky. The hypothetical situation he outlined has come to pass. The Soviet Union is proceeding with the deployment of the SS-9. No one takes any pleasure from this grim fact. We all cherished the hope that the Soviet Union would show restraint. But such hopes are a weak reed on which to lean one's defense policy. And Soviet actions have turned this hope to ashes.

A CAUTIONARY NOTE ABOUT IRRELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS

Mr. President, there is some reason to fear that some persons might favor adopting the pending amendment just to demonstrate Senate free will. It has been apparent throughout the spring and summer that many Senators are anxious to have the Senate behave more assertively regarding matters pertaining to foreign policy.

This is not an ignoble desire. I applaud and share it in general, however, much I may disagree with some of its particular manifestations. But one thing is clear. The ABM should not become a pawn in some intragovernmental power struggle.

It would be culpable shortsightedness for the Senate to sacrifice the ABM system as a gesture of defiance or as a symbolic act, asserting institutional rights. In this regard, I was disturbed when rereading last year's debate to come upon a statement by the distinguished junior Senator from Arkansas. Senators will find on page 16911 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of July 9, 1969, a colloquy in which the junior Senator from Arkansas says the following:

The real point of the debate is not the ABM as such. The whole point of the debate is an effort on the part of some Members of the Senate to reassert some control over the military department.

God forbid that we lapse into such thinking in this serious time.

Mr. President, the issue of who controls whom is not only not the "whole" issue of the ABM debate; it is not an issue with the slightest relevance. The Senate cannot enhance its dignity or demonstrate its responsibility by allowing its decisions on matters of national security to be controlled by institutional anxieties.

CONCLUSION: THE QUESTION OF SUFFICIENCY

Mr. President, I think I have made clear why I think Phase II Safeguard is necessary. We cannot afford the luxury of being mistaken about this.

Others may be able to afford that luxury, Mr. President—others who do not carry in their offices the power and responsibility to vote and to determine the course of this country. But this is a

luxury that we in the Senate cannot afford.

With regard to some complex and important matters it may be inevitable and acceptable for understanding to come only in the distant future. But in matters of basic strategic capability, this is neither necessary nor acceptable.

In matters of such compelling urgency, we cannot afford any period when we see "as through a glass darkly."

In dealing with these matters we must always stand face to face with the facts, however, unpleasant they may be. We must ask ourselves some unpleasant questions.

Has the Soviet Union become a more amicable member of the community of nations? If it has, the news has not gotten through to the Czechoslovaks or the Israelis.

Has the Soviet Union manifested peaceful intentions in its defense budget? If it has, the word has not gotten through to the Soviet people, who are being forced to forgo the basic commodities of a healthy economy in order to purchase such nonconsumer goods as \$9 billion worth of SS-9's.

Has the Soviet Union recently done anything that would manifest a departure from its established policy of piling offensive capacity on offensive capacity? If it has, the manifestations are not being recorded on the face of the Soviet landscape, where earth is being turned on new offensive missile sites.

I have recently compiled an interesting set of figures, comparing the relative strengths of the United States and the Soviet Union in strategic weapons. The figures compare our relative strength at two times—October 1962 and today.

October 1962 is the central date in the history of modern strategic planning. It was then that the two superpowers played nuclear poker in earnest over the placement of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba. It was then that we received a dramatic, dangerous, and invaluable lesson in the value of a prudent, long-term defensive planning. It was then that the United States won a crucial victory that was made possible by the convincing nature of our superiority in strategic weapons.

What has become of that superiority? The figures I have compiled give a sobering answer. The figures concern the five categories of strategic weapons. These categories are first-generation ICBM's, Minuteman-type ICBM's, which include the Soviet SS-11's and SS-13's; very large ICBM's, this category includes only the Soviet SS-9's; nuclear submarine missile launchers; and the bomber force, which includes bombers and tankers. These are the facts.

I want to say, Mr. President, in case there be any question, that the figures I am using are accurate and unclassified.

I ask unanimous consent that the figures be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the figures were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND U.S. ICBM's, SLBM's AND BOMBERS IN OCTOBER 1962 AND NOW

	Late 1962	Today (deployed or under construction)
Bomber force:		
Soviet.....	About 200....	About 200.
United States.....	About 1,440..	550.
Polaris-type subs:		
Soviet.....	None.....	About 25.
United States.....	7.....	41.
1st generation ICBM's:		
Soviet—SS-6, SS-7, SS-8.....	About 40....	About 220.
United States—Atlas and Titan.....	About 100....	54.
Minuteman type:		
Soviet.....	None.....	Over 800
United States.....	do.....	1,000.
SS-9 type:		
Soviet.....	do.....	Approaching 300.
United States.....	do.....	None.

Mr. ALLOTT. Suffice it to say that in the bomber forces, the Soviet bomber force was about the same in 1962 as it is today. In 1962, we had 1,440. Today we have 550, or about a third of the 1962 total.

In Polaris-type submarines, the Russians had none in 1962. They have about 25 now. The United States had seven then, and about 41 now.

In first generation ICBM's, the Russians had about 40, and they now have more than four times that number. In the Atlas and Titan, we had about 100, and now we have approximately half that number.

Of the Minuteman type, in 1962 the Russians had none and we had none. Today they have over 800 of the SS-11's and SS-13's, and we have approximately 1,000.

In the SS-9—the huge, big-bang vehicle about which I have spoken at length this afternoon—the Soviets had none in 1962, and they are approaching 300 now. The United States had none then, and has none today.

Mr. President, the lesson is clear. The strategic weapons superiority which was a matter of life and death in October 1962, has now become tenuous sufficiency. Honorable men of good will can and do vigorously disagree as to whether this is a good thing. I do not want to examine the merits of the argument which holds that the possibility of a meaningful arms limitation agreement rests on an American willingness to acquiesce in the transformation of its superiority into mere sufficiency. But, I do want to suggest, with all the force I can summon, that we have done all that we can conscientiously do in order to assuage Soviet feelings of insecurity.

Unfortunately, mutual restraint is not a game at which only one can play. And the other party to this anticipated game—the Soviet Union—has decided not to play at this time. This does not mean that we cannot be restrained. The proposal for phase II is a restrained response to grave threats. It is also necessary. I urge its passage, and the defeat of the pending amendment.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. ALLOTT. I am very happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I commend the Senator very highly for one of the best and most thorough expositions I have ever heard. I say that as one who has been a member of the Appropriations Committee since before this kind of weapon was a reality, or even in the planning stage. I commend the Senator very highly for getting together these facts in the way he has marshaled them and focused them on the problem, leaving out the petty findings.

As a member of the Appropriations Committee, where he is so valuable in many ways, he is most valuable on this subject, and I appreciate his efforts. I know he is one of the busiest Senators we have, and I especially appreciate his sacrifice in time on this issue.

I want to point out one thing to the Senator, if I may. He clearly illustrates here, by these graphic figures, the contrast between 1962 and 1970 in this field of weaponry by comparisons of our position with that of the Soviet Union.

The bill, however, does not deal with 1970.

Mr. ALLOTT. That is right.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator's whole speech is underscored by the fact that this part of the bill deals with 1975 to 1980. That is the period that we are having to prepare for, as the Senator so well knows. So it lends great strength to his speech, I think, to remember that he is having to project, and the Senator from Colorado is shooting for preparedness, not for today, but for 5 to 10 years from now.

Now, though, is the only time we can act. A few years later, when we see what we should have done, it is too late. We have to look forward now, and prepare for those years ahead.

I think the Senator's speech will be a landmark, and I thank him again.

Mr. ALLOTT. I thank the distinguished Senator very much. I value his remarks because of his great leadership, not only in the Appropriations Committee, but also in the defense planning of this country, as chairman of the Committee on Armed Services. No one else, I believe, is more knowledgeable than he is. I only hope that my own contribution today, in an attempt to dissect the arguments and discuss them rationally and reasonably, will be of some assistance in the determination of this issue.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator very much.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DOMINICK). In accordance with the previous order, the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the administration's request for another billion and a half dollars to expand the Safeguard ABM program is most disturbing. It is disturbing because by the administration's own policy guidelines this request should not have been made. It is disturbing because it comes at a time when pressing domestic needs demand that we in the Congress seek ways of safely reducing our military expenditures. But most of all, the request is

disturbing because it threatens to minimize the potential of the SALT talks currently taking place in Vienna.

We should recall that those talks were planned in the hope of ending the nuclear arms race, not merely controlling its rate of expansion.

Both we and the Soviets have learned the costs and the dangers of attempting to win that race. We have both come to recognize that the runner in first place can never hope to open a comfortable lead over the runner in second place. And neither of us can fail to see that the finish line must be either a mutual halt or a mutual holocaust.

The opening of the SALT talks, then, rested on three fundamental premises:

First, that a situation existed in which both we and the Soviet Union had sufficient nuclear armaments to deter each other from launching a successful nuclear attack;

Second, that a situation existed in which both we and the Soviet Union were roughly equal in nuclear technology, and in the destructive power of deliverable nuclear warheads; and

And third, that a situation existed in which both we and the Soviet Union recognized that continuation of the arms race would burden the economies of both sides with enormous military expenditures, while providing neither side with increased security.

That is why piling more ABM chips on the bargaining table in Vienna—by further testing and developing of offensive and defensive weapons systems—will, in my judgment, diminish the potential of a SALT agreement and possibly the achievement of any agreement at all.

I voted against the ABM last year, because I thought the chips on both sides were already piled high enough.

I am still of that persuasion, especially since the chips have been piled even higher by both sides in recent months—first, by our initial ABM construction and our MIRV deployments—and second, by Soviet resumption of SS-9 construction and commencement of SS-11 multiple warhead testing.

The fact is, of course, that the "bargaining chip" which the administration appears to deem so essential to its negotiating strategy was made available to the administration last year—the authorization of two ABM sites at Malmstrom Air Force Base and Grand Forks Air Force Base.

It is appropriate to inquire why we are being asked to add still another "bargaining chip" this year. Let us look at the administration's own guidelines of a year ago. On March 14, 1969, the President stated that the program would "be reviewed annually from the point of view of first, technical developments; second, the threat; and third, the diplomatic context including any talks on arms limitation."

All three criteria, I submit, now argue against providing the additional "bargaining chip."

Representatives of the administration have practically admitted that defending our ICBM's with Safeguard makes sense only against a very limited, and therefore unlikely, Soviet threat. The

technical outlook has not only failed to improve, but it has in fact worsened. And the administration has demonstrated through actual expenditures and public statements that the cost of Safeguard has risen and will continue to increase.

Turning to the second criterion, what is the "threat" today, as against a year ago?

The pace and character of Soviet missile buildups over the past year have fallen below the administration's estimates. We are given to understand that no new construction of SS-9 ICBM sites took place for a 9-month period starting last August. Similarly, the latest official estimated date for a Chinese ICBM deployment is now further away than it was last year. Our overall deterrent posture, therefore, is not endangered.

As to the third criterion laid down by the President, has the negotiating situation with respect to SALT deteriorated to the point that we now need to build up our nuclear arms?

The facts are that last year no one knew whether SALT would actually begin; that today both sides are in the midst of these vital negotiations and we hear reports that an agreement is in sight—an agreement which may ban ABM's or severely restrict them. Yet, rather than exercising restraint, as suggested by its own criterion, the administration seems to be using this situation to justify an expansion of our ABM program—an expansion which would make the goal of negotiating limits on nuclear armaments far more difficult to attain.

The administration argues that we must move forward with Safeguard in order to "negotiate from strength." Why, then, was phase I of Safeguard limited to two sites? Why did we exercise restraint before the talks began, only to escalate Safeguard when the prospects of agreement are said to be bright?

This kind of perverse persuasion overlooks what seems to me a key factor in the SALT talks—the necessity for at least rough parity—recognized by both powers—as an indispensable condition to successful negotiations.

Any development which threatens to upset that condition can only jeopardize the talks.

Our sincerity in wanting to limit strategic arms could be called into question if we expand our ABM immediately after deploying our first MIRV's. The Soviets could find it hard to avoid making countermoves. It is certainly plausible to view the resumption of SS-9 construction, new SS-11 testing and FOBS development as the first signs of just such a reaction.

Together the administration's MIRV and ABM decisions can undercut the present nuclear parity that made United States-Soviet negotiations possible. An apparent willingness to stabilize this strategic relationship brought the Soviets to SALT. A parallel willingness is in our own self interest. In such circumstances expansion of Safeguard at this time could make a meaningful agreement at SALT much more difficult to obtain and could increase the chance that the talks might fail. All the risks in such a move

run against the prospects of an agreement.

In April the Senate went on record overwhelmingly endorsing a resolution for a comprehensive strategic freeze including a ban on ABM's and MIRV's. At that time, I presented a specific proposal for a mutual interim strategic standstill consistent with this resolution. With our deployment of MIRV's we have already jeopardized the opportunity for a broad agreement. Moving ahead with Safeguard could well close the door completely.

By ignoring the Senate resolution, the administration seems to be saying that it prefers only a limited agreement. How else can we explain the administration's reluctance to defer our MIRV deployments and its lack of candor in not disclosing months ago the Soviet's significant suspension of new SS-9 sites?

Despite the Senate's expressed interest and obvious responsibility in these matters, the administration has all but kept us in the dark about the Vienna talks.

In the pending bill, we have a clear opportunity to examine and test the administration's strategic and tactical wisdom. The Armed Services Committee's action in removing the "area" defense portion of the administration's ABM request does not go far enough, although it is a step in the right direction.

Our aim in evaluating Safeguard should be to maximize the potential benefits of SALT. For a meaningful SALT agreement stands to be our best defense and the most effective way of enhancing our security.

Let me examine these points in detail.

I. SAFEGUARD: MORE QUESTIONABLE PERFORMANCE AT GREATER COST

Last year, in the face of criticisms by an impressive array of scientists, the administration maintained that Safeguard could do the job it was supposed to do. For example, many distinguished scientists argued that the Soviets would have little trouble attacking ABM radars and thus blinding the entire system. But the administration brushed aside such criticism. This year, however, Defense Department officials admit that these radars might well be vulnerable. In fact, they have budgeted funds for research and development of better site radars.

The administration also now effectively admits that Safeguard as envisioned will be unable to handle likely future Soviet threats. In his fiscal year 1971 posture statement, Secretary Laird stated:

If the Soviets deploy a MIRV on the SS-9, improve their ICBM accuracy, and do not stop building SS-9's at this time . . . we would then be faced in the mid-70's with a threat which is much too large to be handled by the level of defense envisioned in the Safeguard system, without substantial improvement and modification.

By the Secretary's own estimates, the Soviet capacity to mount such a threat—and to render Safeguard obsolete—is likely.

The cost-inefficiency of Safeguard is also apparent. Nongovernmental experts have calculated that the minimum price of defending one Minuteman ICBM would run between \$20 and \$25 million,

while the ICBM itself is valued at \$3 million. Moreover, the Soviets could offset any effect of Safeguard with offensive weapons and penetration aids at a fraction of Safeguard's cost.

Many scientists therefore argue that, even if SALT fails, alternative ways of maintaining a sufficient retaliatory capacity in the future should be considered before moving forward any further with Safeguard missile defenses. This is reason enough for halting Safeguard deployment at the present time.

No wonder the administration is actively exploring other alternatives and is budgeting approximately \$160 million for development of land-mobile ICBM's, "super-hardened" missile silos, and advanced sea-based missile systems.

II. THE SOVIET THREAT

Let us examine the administration's alarm about a Soviet SS-9 threat. Apparently, no new SS-9 construction was undertaken by the Soviets between August 1969 and June of this year.

The administration's apparent worries about a major SS-9 threat that the SS-9's will be refitted to carry MIRV's. Last year, it was estimated that the Soviets could have simple MIRV's deployed in 1970 and the more sophisticated MIRV's as early as mid-1972. But there have been no indications that the Soviets did in fact deploy MIRV's last year, and there have been no statements to suggest that they have even flight-tested a MIRV. Since MRV's are considered a technological prelude to MIRV's, it seems even less likely that the Soviets can begin deploying the latter by 1972.

Finally, let us not forget that ICBM's represent only a fraction of our deterrent power. Our fleet of 656 Polaris missiles on 41 submarines, for example, is viewed by the administration as being safe from any attacks the Soviets could conceivably launch in the foreseeable future.

In the case of the supposed Chinese threat, the speculation is still more far-fetched. Last year's estimate of a possible Chinese ICBM level of 10 to 25 by 1975 assumed an initial ICBM test firing in 1970. No firing has yet occurred. Moreover, in his fiscal year 1971 posture statement, Secretary Laird admitted that a force of 10 to 25 Chinese ICBM's is now more likely sometime in 1977 or 1978—a "slippage" of more than 2 years.

Insofar as possible deployment of Chinese ICBM's is concerned, a "thin" ABM for the United States is not needed to cope with this contingency. Our massive deterrent capabilities are clearly more than sufficient to dissuade Chinese leaders from launching a nuclear attack.

The fact that official cost estimates for Safeguard have increased makes the request to proceed with Safeguard now all the more questionable. Even the administration no longer denies the likelihood of future "cost growth" for a technically suspect system directed to meet a no less suspect threat.

This year, for example, estimates for the full Safeguard deployment are up by \$1.6 billion over last year. The official cost estimate of this Minuteman defense system now stands at \$10.7 billion. But

this figure, the so-called "DOD acquisition cost" does not include AEC costs related to nuclear warheads, operation and maintenance expenses, or the many indirect support costs.

Even without "cost growth," the true cost of Safeguard could easily run above \$20 billion. And the full price of the four-site Minuteman defense package alone—based on a DOD acquisition cost of \$6.5 billion—would be at least \$11 billion.

III. THE ABM: A THREAT TO SALT

Last year, no one could be certain whether the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks would in fact begin and, if they did, whether progress could be made. These were the very real uncertainties which appeared to underlie the President's statement that future Safeguard ABM decisions should and would be reviewed in light of SALT. Today, with the Helsinki talks behind us and the Vienna talks in progress, it appears that both sides are seriously seeking ways to contain the strategic competition on a mutually acceptable basis.

At the same time, the administration's present request to expand Safeguard threatens to sharply restrict the range of attainable agreements. It threatens to sweep away the conditions of parity which apparently brought the Soviets to the negotiating table and which make any enduring agreement possible.

The administration argues that the more we deploy the ABM, the more we can negotiate from strength in Vienna. That argument, in my judgment, is both a tactical and a strategic mistake.

What will Moscow's response be if we forge ahead with Safeguard on the heels of our MIRV deployment? We cannot be certain, but we can make educated guesses in terms of negotiating strategy and weapons development.

On the negotiating front, the Soviets could conceivably shift to a harder line. A \$1.5 billion request for expanding a system which is clearly a candidate for limitation at SALT may be viewed by the Soviets as evidence that the United States intends to either legitimize ABM deployment under a SALT agreement, or to trade the ABM for reciprocal concessions.

Under either interpretation, the groups within the Kremlin power structure arguing against SALT, or giving it very low priority, may well be strengthened. Rather than induce Soviet negotiators to accept meaningful limitations on their SS-9 deployments, the administration's use of Safeguard as a "bargaining chip" may be more likely to stimulate Soviet missile expansions—to counter our new chip with another chip of their own.

In April, the Pentagon announced that we would begin deploying the Mirv—a weapon which many of us in the Senate had hopefully thought our negotiators in Vienna would try to ban. The Pentagon began deploying this destabilizing new weapon in June. It has since announced that Poseidon Mirv's will be deployed on our submarines in December, and that a contract has been let for construction of a new strategic bomber—the B-1. For those of us who have ques-

tioned these moves, the recent Soviet resumption of the SS-9 missile program therefore comes as no surprise.

Continued deployment of Safeguard will almost certainly mean further Soviet increase in offensive missile construction—both land- and sea-based—and in multiple warhead tests. After all, Soviet planners faced with an expanding ABM may well feel the need to maintain their deterrent as a "hedge" against the possibility that SALT might fail. The administration justified our MIRV by contending that we had to fear an enlarged Soviet ABM growing out of their small and vulnerable Moscow defense. Would it be surprising if the Soviet now reacted similarly?

In addition to offensive buildups, the Soviets could also react to Safeguard by carrying forward their own ABM program. While strategic analysts may cringe, the political logic here is simple. The Soviets might rationalize more ABMs for three reasons—to bargain away our ABM, to be able to match our ABM under some kind of SALT accommodation, and to avoid being "second-best" in ABM if SALT fails.

Uncertainties and ambiguities in our words and our deeds would have to be resolved by the Soviets in a manner consistent with their own security.

Even though the first phases of Safeguard constitute a relatively small deployment, the Soviets would have a justifiable concern that a Minuteman defense system is simply a first step to a larger one with nationwide coverage, which could pose a threat to their deterrent. Regardless of our own doubts about Safeguard's effectiveness, they could not ignore the technological fact that the radar network, production base, and long-range Spartan missiles associated with a Minuteman defense system make an expanded capacity feasible. And they could not easily distinguish between deployments geared for ICBM defense and deployments supporting area defense.

Furthermore, the Soviets could not be expected to trust our good intentions when it comes to curtailing Safeguard. For they undoubtedly would appreciate the difficulty of trying to halt a military system once deployment has begun. Moreover, an area ABM defense purportedly directed against China would make no sense at all as a "bargaining chip" with the Soviets.

The administration's posture on Safeguard is all the more inexplicable when viewed in the light of probable SALT outcomes. If the talks to date indicated that an agreement would permit fairly high ABM levels, one might begin to understand the administration's argument that the decision to continue with Safeguard is consistent with SALT.

But quite the opposite indication has been reported in the press, and at least unofficially verified from many knowledgeable quarters. At most, it looks as if SALT might come out with very low ABM levels, perhaps limited to protection of Moscow and Washington. There is also still reason to hope and work for a complete ABM ban. Such ABM agreements might well be negotiated with the Soviets. Reports from SALT suggest that

they favor a total ABM ban or at most very low permitted levels.

The reversal of Soviet attitude on ABM's is one of the great ironies of the nuclear age. Throughout the 1960's, we based our policies on the premise that ABM's were costly and destabilizing while the Soviets seemed to believe the contrary. Adding up the administration's statements on the importance of ABM's and its request for funds, we may now have a topsy-turvy situation where the Soviets appear to be more interested in limiting ABM's than we are.

The net result of these moves and countermoves can only be harmful to SALT. Rather than bringing both sides toward agreement, the administration's negotiating tactics are moving both sides away from an acceptance of parity and diminishing the likelihood of reaching meaningful limitations.

An atmosphere of sincerity so essential to progress can turn into one of hostility and polemics. As ABM's increase and offensive force levels rise again. The range of possible agreements will narrow, thus leaving the negotiators with less and less to talk about. We would risk losing the opportunity for a comprehensive agreement which could significantly curtail the arms competition. And all that might be left would be an agreement with limits placed on numbers of offensive launchers, perhaps no ban on MIRV's, and ABM's set at agreed levels—in short, no qualitative restrictions or meaningful reductions.

That is why, when SALT resumed in Vienna last April, I proposed a mutual 6-month freeze on the testing of multiple warhead missiles and the deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems. I offered this as a negotiator's pause—to halt the arms race in all its dimensions so that both sides could determine whether a continuing freeze would be feasible and whether it would facilitate more complex and enduring agreements. At that time, the Senate overwhelmingly endorsed a resolution calling for a comprehensive nuclear weapons freeze.

But these suggestions were ignored, and the administration has instead moved in exactly the opposite direction. The President chose not to defer our MIRV deployments. He is going forward with advanced research and development programs for bombers and missiles. And he has requested funds for expansion of our ABM.

An agreement permitting even limited ABM's and MIRV's would be far less effective than a broader plan. It would codify the balance at higher rather than lower levels. It would be more difficult to verify than an agreement which prohibited these systems completely.

It may be that the administration does not want a comprehensive measure, but is more than willing to settle for a limited one. Why else has it moved forward with major programs which the negotiators are seeking to limit? Why else did the administration fail to inform us that the Soviets had halted new SS-9 construction last August?

But even now there is a chance for

a MIRV ban. It is we who have begun deployment of MIRV, not the Soviets. We should be prepared to halt our program and remove the few MIRV's already deployed within the context of an appropriate agreement.

To be sure, a carefully-designed, though limited, agreement would be better than none. But we need not settle for second-best now. We can at least have a shot at the best. We can control our own ABM program to preserve the option for a broad measure of agreement and maximize the chance of a dramatic and meaningful success at SALT.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Maine yield at that point?

Mr. MUSKIE. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. Is the Senator suggesting that we should unilaterally disband our efforts to develop a MIRV without exacting anything in exchange?

Mr. MUSKIE. No. I have suggested, in the remarks I have just made, that we halt deployment of MIRV at this point. The weapons system has already been developed. I take it that it has been developed satisfactorily, since we have deployed it. I recommended, almost a year ago—last fall—that the first step we ought to recommend at SALT, in Vienna, should be a mutual halt to further development and deployment of any offensive or defensive weapons for 6 months, as a negotiator's pause, so that we would not be caught in the trap of escalating nuclear arms of one kind or another, offensive or defensive, on both sides, to the point that it would be difficult to reach agreement on a halt, let alone a rollback to some reasonable and responsible level.

Mr. TOWER. Is the Senator suggesting that we initiated the arms race, that we are primarily responsible for escalation—in other words, that the Soviets are not equally responsible for escalating the arms race, that it is we who are doing so?

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I made no such evaluation. The arms race probably started with Adam and Eve.

We are talking about stabilizing the nuclear arms race, having once reached rough parity with one another.

That, I take it, is the objective of the administration. That, I take it, is the objective of the Senator from Texas. That is my objective.

My difference with the administration is that I think, having reached rough parity, we should try to stay at that level for a reasonable time until we have explored the possibility of SALT.

Mr. TOWER. In other words, the Senator contends that we should do that whether the Russians do it or not.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, let me point out that I understand the Russians halted the deployment of SS-9's and did not resume it until this June. In that 9 months, we moved on through deployment of MIRV and through beginning construction of an ABM system. During that 9-month period, there was activity on our part that was unmatched by the Russians, to which they responded with the resumption of their SS-9 program.

Mr. TOWER. Has the United States tested the Fractional Orbital Bomb System—FOBS?

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, may I say that undoubtedly, on both sides, each side is exploring new developments that the other side has not touched.

If we undertake to wait for a SALT agreement until each side has fully explored the number of initiatives it has undertaken, we will never get an agreement on stabilizing the nuclear arms race.

At some point we had to achieve rough parity—and I have used that word advisedly—and that may have created some risks. It will take intelligent, alert, and informed evaluation to maintain that kind of rough parity.

That is what moved both sides to engage in the SALT talks. That made the SALT talks possible.

We ought not to upset the balance or risk upsetting the balance in the course of the talks.

Mr. TOWER. Does the Senator from Maine believe that our decision to initiate Phase I of the Safeguard system was a positive inhibition on our effort to arrive at some sort of meaningful agreement in the SALT talks?

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I do not know that one would state my position as a belief. I do not have recourse to the intelligence estimates which would give me the basis for a belief. I have an idea, however, that the talks moved forward in spite of the decision made last year and not because of it. There were indications before the Senate acted.

Mr. TOWER. But the Senator will concede that there were dire predictions that SALT would never come about if we adopted Phase I of the ABM.

Mr. MUSKIE. I heard predictions today. There will always be predictions. It is a serious debate involving a serious policy question about national security. To a great extent those of us not in the administration are operating in the dark and perhaps those inside the administration are also operating in the dark.

Dire predictions remain. They are not always borne out. I am afraid that we have to proceed on our best judgments, on the present evaluation of the situation as it exists.

I did not make dire predictions last year. But I felt that the decision to move ahead with the first phase of Safeguard was not a wise step to take. That step has been taken now. We have to evaluate it. I am willing to do so on the basis of the administration's own guidelines which I evaluated in the beginning of my remarks before the Senator from Texas came to the floor. Using the administration's own guidelines of a year ago, deployment of phase II is not justified.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the administration does not seem to feel that the decision to proceed with phase II of the Safeguard would be somehow an inhibition or disadvantage insofar as it would prevent a successful conclusion of the SALT talks.

Does the Senator from Maine have some intelligence that would lead him to believe otherwise, that is superior to that of the administration's?

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, if the administration believed that deploying phase II of Safeguard would end the

SALT talks and it still proceeded to resume deployment, I would be shocked. Of course, I believe that the administration believes in its position. I do not have any intelligence with regard to this matter at all. I have not been advised by the administration of the status of the Vienna talks. I am not in as informed a position as I would like to be to evaluate this with respect to the Soviet attitude on the talks.

I can only proceed on the basis of consultations with people who have been close to the matter for years and who understand its implications better than I did, and perhaps better than I still do, and on their ideas and evaluation of the moves on both sides.

Mr. TOWER. Has the Senator read the classified testimony given before the subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee by Mr. Smith and Mr. Nitze on the SALT talks?

Mr. MUSKIE. No, I have not.

Mr. TOWER. I would suggest that the Senator read it.

Mr. MUSKIE. I would be happy to do so.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUSKIE. I yield.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, do I understand that the position of the Senator from Maine is that the SS-9, which the Soviets apparently stopped deploying for a period of 8 or 9 months, was resumed by the Soviets because the United States proceeded with phase I of the ABM?

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I stated the facts. The SALT talks began last year, after the Senate had voted on the ABM. Yet, from August until June, the Soviets discontinued new deployments of SS-9s. In the next 9-month period, despite the fact that several in the Senate and in the country urged that we halt MIRV deployment or at least delay MIRV deployment, we went ahead with that system. In July, the Soviets resumed deployment of the SS-9's.

Those are the facts. I think that the conclusion that the Soviet action on the SS-9's was in response to the steps we had taken in that 9-month period is more logical than any other conclusion I have read or heard as to their reason. Maybe the Senator from Iowa has a better reason.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, the Senator from Maine has been responsive to my question, and I appreciate that. But if the Senator wants to pursue that kind of logic, we can say that since the SS-9 was stopped for a few months, we had the World Series baseball games and we had the Redskins playing a lot of football games. Why, since those are the facts, would I necessarily conclude that those facts had any reference to the resumption of the SS-9 deployment?

I would say that the mere fact that we proceeded with the first stage of the ABM, which will take several years to complete, is certainly no basis for saying that the Soviets therefore began the resumption of the SS-9. I cannot see the relevancy of it.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I am sure that the Senator cannot. I assure

the Senator that I do not reach my conclusion on this matter because of the playing of some baseball games. The Senator's remarks regarding my logic is his personal privilege. I suggest it is not as anomalous a sequence of events as the Senator from Iowa logic might seem to suggest.

Mr. MILLER. May I say to the Senator—

Mr. MUSKIE. In the absence of Soviet activity for 9 months, which was followed by resumption of the deployment of the SS-9, following action we took in that period to change our posture offensively and defensively, I say it is a proper conclusion to reach. I have heard similar logic used on the Senator's side of this argument.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Under the previous order, the Chair is to recognize the Senator from Washington at this time.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Maine may have 5 additional minutes so we may conclude our colloquy.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, if I am going to have 5 minutes of time, I would like to finish my speech. We are proceeding, in any case, on the time of the distinguished Senator from Washington. I would not ask for time for either purpose without the agreement of the Senator from Washington, who has been most generous in yielding his place to me this afternoon.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Iowa? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MUSKIE. I hope I may have some of that time.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I know the Senator wishes to finish his speech. My point is that I do not believe the Senator made a valid argument by saying that during this 9-month period a fact took place. The fact that took place was that the ABM first stage was commenced, and it will be years before it is completed so that the Soviets would have any basis for increasing their SS-9 capability. I do not believe the Senator's point is well taken.

It would be unfortunate if he based his conclusion on this amendment by the mere fact that the first stage of a long-time ABM program commenced during that 9-month period.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I have 42 pages of reasons for my position. My reasons are not limited to the one with which the Senator disagrees. Also, the RECORD will show the Senator's opinion of my logic, and my opinion. I guess we should leave it at that.

Mr. President, I shall quickly wrap up the remainder of my prepared remarks.

IV. THE CHOICE WE FACE

The administration's fiscal year 1971 budget request of \$1.45 billion is for the purpose of first, continuing deployment of Safeguard sites at the Minuteman complexes authorized last year; second, initiating deployment of another site at a third Minuteman complex; and third, preparing five additional ABM sites, one more at a Minuteman complex

and four around the country as "area" defense.

If this request is granted, the Safeguard ABM program will have received appropriations totaling over \$3 billion.

Of course, if the money were needed to buy us needed security, it would be worth it. But, as we have seen—by the administration's own statements and measured against its own guidelines—further Safeguard deployment at this time is neither necessary nor appropriate to preserve our deterrent. And it poses the gravest danger to real success at SALT.

Looking at the larger budget items associated with the fiscal year 1971 request, we see a requested authorization of \$1.027 billion to pay for continued procurement, construction, and direct support of the two phase I sites, and \$298.4 million to begin construction of a third Minuteman defense site. Full deployment of the administration "package" for Minuteman defense—which adds to a fourth site—would eventually cost a minimum of \$6.5 billion by DOD accounting but almost twice this amount in total real costs.

The smallest item in the ABM request for this year is \$40 million to begin advance preparation of five additional ABM sites. Four of those sites would be designated as area defense against China. But such a defense means an ultimate goal of eight area sites for the continental United States—at a total cost of at least \$8.5 billion—plus sites for Alaska and Hawaii.

The Armed Services Committee has recommended authorization for the Safeguard sites located at Minuteman complexes, and has rejected the request for "area" defense sites. These recommendations make better sense in terms of their impact on SALT than the administration's request. By eliminating the administration's request for a start on the area ABM sites, the Armed Services Committee has performed a great service to the American public and to the possible success of SALT.

But, as I have pointed out, the committee recommendation does not go far enough:

Continued Safeguard construction of any kind runs the risk of ruining SALT, or at the very least, severely restricting the range of negotiation.

The ability of Safeguard to perform as designed and to cope with a serious Soviet threat is highly questionable.

The total cost for even a marginal amount of short-lived Minuteman protection will be enormous.

And if SALT results in a ban on ABM or a low ABM level perhaps limited to Washington and Moscow, Minuteman defense efforts would have been incredibly wasteful, or at best only highly inefficient.

Finally, it is wishful thinking to believe that approving essentially the entire budget request for Minuteman defense this year will diminish future demands for area defense. The logic of weapons development does not work that way.

For these reasons, we must explore other alternatives.

Even as we explore these alternatives, we must urge the administration to let the Congress and the public know the progress and the prospects in Vienna. The administration's reluctance to do so makes intelligent cooperation most difficult.

The Senate's authority in this area cannot be denied. Its interest and judgment are reflected in resolution 211. And its desire to relate military procurement request to foreign policy is a responsible one.

Of course, we cannot dictate from the sidelines the particular negotiating tactics to be best employed at the SALT talks in Vienna. Indeed, because the administration has undertaken no sufficient consultation with the Congress, we have no complete picture of how these negotiations stand. But we do know enough to be able to reach the sound and sensible judgment that neither our national security nor the prospects for effective control over strategic arms competition can be well served by the expansion of Safeguard at this time.

The question before us, then, is what further restrictions, if any, are appropriate at a time when we are engaged in an effort to put an end to this costly and dangerous expansion of strategic forces.

The logical alternative at this critical stage of SALT would be to withhold any further funds for ABM deployment and limit expenditures to the continuation of a research and development program. If, indeed, it is the fear of an ABM that motivates the Soviet negotiators, then this action could in no sense weaken our bargaining position. Obviously, the Soviets would have to recognize that ABM deployment could be renewed or even enlarged if the negotiations should fail.

The denial of any funds for deployment would prevent further erosion of a truly meaningful SALT agreement and avoid wasting money in the event that SALT succeeds in banning or tightly limiting ABM's. Research and development efforts would focus on carefully testing ABM components, exploring the effectiveness of Safeguard, and looking for better technical solutions.

This is the choice that logic and reason would dictate. Nevertheless, the administration has continued to argue that continuation of ABM deployment is essential as a "bargaining chip" in the SALT negotiations.

Even accepting this argument—which I find most unpersuasive—there is no justification for going beyond deployment at the two sites authorized last year. This is the alternative that has been introduced as an amendment by Senators COOPER and HART. Since it aims in the direction of arms control, I shall vote for this amendment.

It preserves fully the "bargaining chip" which the administration claims it needs in Vienna. It should satisfy those Senators concerned about maximum success at SALT but unwilling to support a total rejection of the administration's request. But it adds no more chips to our side of the table—chips that could and probably would be matched on the other side—chips that neither side may, thereafter, be willing to give up, even to

achieve an effective agreement. This chip escalation is now taking place, even as both sides talk in Vienna. The Cooper-Hart amendment, however, recognizes that the way to slow down the arms race is not first to speed it up.

Given our powerful and secure deterrent forces, in the sea as well as on land and in the air, there is no threat which makes expanded deployment of Safeguard either wise or necessary. Indeed, since SALT has the potential of further improving our security, any move to make it pay off is clearly in our interest.

Some years ago, Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer drew the picture of two scorpions, locked in a bottle, aware that a sting by either of them would mean the death of both of them. The question we must, therefore, address ourselves to in the Senate is not how to accumulate more sting, but rather how to open the bottle.

Mr. President, as we review the persuasive scientific and diplomatic arguments against the ABM, I would like to draw attention to the opposition to the proposed weapons systems of a group of concerned citizens in Maine. I ask unanimous consent that the names of the signers and their petition be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TO THE CONGRESS: STOP THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM

It's Ineffective—It's Dangerous—It's Wasteful—a threat to world peace.

We strongly oppose deployment of the "Safeguard" ABM system because:

1. It would provide little protection for the United States.
2. It would become obsolete before it could be operational.
3. It would be likely to trigger a new escalation of the arms race.
4. It would hinder negotiations for disarmament.
5. Its enormous cost would be highly inflationary.
6. It would prevent the adequate funding of essential domestic programs.

We urge: that the proposed deployment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile System be opposed and prevented.

Peter R. Aceres, Harrison, Me., Rinda Aceres, Harrison, Me., Helen A. Adams, Buckfield, Me., M. C. Ainsworth, Portland, Me., Laura Sewall Aitken, Bath, Me., Frances Albert, Orono, Me., Stanley L. Aldrich, South Windham, Me., Pamela Alexander, Lewiston, Me., L. Allard, Gorham, Me., Charles W. Allen, Portland, Me.

Genevieve L. Allen, Portland, Me., John D. Amour, Mechanic Falls, Me., R. R. Anderson, Chicago, Ill., Weston Anderson, East Boothbay, Me., Florence Annear, Auburn, Me., Cushman D. Anthony, Portland, Me., Ruth Appel, Sebago Lake, Me., Patricia Arbour, Topsham, Me., G. L. Archibald, Scarborough, Me., Carroll Arnett, Kennebunk, Me.

Claudia Arnett, Kennebunk, Me., John Asatuan, Brunswick, Me., Cecile Asselin, Lewiston, Me., Leo B. Atkins, Camden, Me., Louise Atwater, Lewiston, Me., Edna Auspeland, Portland, Me., Lena E. Austin, So. China, Me., Carroll C. Ayer, Lewiston, Me., Joyce Babokine, Camden, Me.

John D. Bachman, Ellsworth, Me., Gary Bagley, Waterville, Me., Gertrude Bagley, Waterville, Me., Lee Baier, Cumberland Center, Me., Mary Ann Bailey, Eliot, Me., Ricky C. Baker, Brunswick, Me., Barbara Ballon, Portland, Me., Albin Banis, East Millinocket, Me., Herbert W. Barker, South Paris,

Me. Nancy Barker, Rumford Center, Me., Earl G. Barlow, East Boothbay, Me.

Helen B. Barlow, East Boothbay, Me., Karl W. Barnard, Mechanic Falls, Me., Edward C. Barrows, Lewiston, Me., R. Barter, II, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Judy Barter, Gouldsboro, Me., Kendall D. Bass, Camden, Me., Margaret J. Bass, Camden, Me., Eileen Bates, Lewiston, Me., Patricia M. Bates, Bangor, Me., D. M. Bazar, Highland Park, N.J.

Velma Bazar, Highland Park, N.J., Carolyn Beane, Gorham, Me., Joan Beard, New Gloucester, Me., Gary Beckwith, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Jane Beckwith, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Joel Beckwith, Bath, Me., Frank M. Bedell, Tenants Harbor, Me., Kathryn Bell, West Hartford, Conn., Richard C. Bell, Camden, Me., Brenda Bellevue, Lewiston, Me.

Robert A. Benjamin, Orr's Island, Me., Marilyn Benken, Bucksfield, Me., Jacob Bennett, Orono, Me., John E. Bent, Springvale, Me., Roberta W. Berenson, Portland, Me., Robert J. Bergeron, Brunswick, Me., Bernice R. Berk, Portland, Me., R. D. Bernstein, Augusta, Me., Rosalye Bernstein, Portland, Me., Sumner T. Bernstein, Portland, Me.

David L. Berry, Bowdoinham, Me., Randy Berry, Bangor, Me., Sharon E. Berry, Bowdoinham, Me., Thomas G. Berry, Jr., Brunswick, Me., Thomas Berry, Brunswick, Me., Wallace Billard, Boothbay, Me., Dorothy M. Billings, Damariscotta, Me., Jane S. Birge, Waterville, Me., K. H. Birge, Waterville, Me., James J. Bishop, Orono, Me.

Joan W. Bishop, Orono, Me., Robert H. Bishop, Skowhegan, Me., Holly Bittner, Orono, Me., Bonnie Black, Orono, Me., Donna L. Blackwell, Orono, Me., Muriel Blanchard, Scarborough, Me., Margo Blaser, Quincy, Mass., Marc Blesoff, Brunswick, Me., Ellis K. Bliss, So. Portland, Me., Harry A. Bliss, So. Portland, Me.

Margaret Blizard, Bar Harbor, Me., Annie M. Blomgren, Deer Isle, Me., Sren A. Blomgren, Deer Isle, Me., Karen Blomquist, Lewiston, Me., Carolyn M. Blouin, So. Berwick, Me., Pauline Bockus, Auburn, Me., D. Bodde, West Tremont, Me., Anthony I. Bok, Vinalhaven, Me., Mary B. Bok, Vinalhaven, Me., Judy K. Bollweg, Portland, Me.

William A. Bonsall, Orono, Me., Lucille Bonsaint, Biddeford, Me., Gene Bongun, Westport, Me., Wm. L. Bongun, Westport, Me., Anna Booth, Newcastle, Me., Anne C. Booth, Newcastle, Me., Stephen Booth, Falmouth, Me., Bob Borden, Portland, Me., Emily S. Bosley, Kittery Point, Me., Elizabeth P. Boston, Nobleboro, Me.

Lawrence G. Boston, Sanford, Me., Robert Boucher, Biddeford, Me., Dorothy L. Bouchles, Mechanic Falls, Me., Mary Margaret Boulos, So. Portland, Me., Karin A. Bourne, Cumberland Center, Me.

George N. Bowden, Sebaste Estates, Me., Richard Bowman, Wiscasset, Me., Ruth B. Bowman, Wiscasset, Me., Jean W. Boyce, Lewiston, Me., Wentworth D. Boynton, Jr., Waterville, Me., Susan E. Bradbury, Auburn, Me., Joan Brahmer, Portland, Me., Joseph C. Brannigan, Fairfield, Me., Leslie S. Breen, Lebanon, N.H., Richard F. Breen, Jr., Lebanon, N.H.

Carol Brewster, Manchester, Me., Elizabeth B. Brewster, Kittery Point, Me., Joan R. Brewster, Pleasant Point, Me., George W. W. Brewster, Pleasant Point, Me., Seward Brewster, Manchester, Me., J. L. Briggs, Bass Harbor, Me., Wilma Briggs, Mechanic Falls, Me., Carl A. Brinkman, Gorham, Me., Neal A. Brinnick, Westbrook, Me., Shelly J. Brinnick, Westbrook, Me.

Alfred L. Brodeur, Auburn, Me., Hope Brogrenier, Bangor, Me., Mrs. Harvey Brooks, Freeport, Me., Lawson D. Brooks, Freeport, Me., Robin B. Brooks, Bailey Island, Me., Arthur M. Brown, Lewiston, Me., Barbara K. Brown, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Brian Brown, Bangor, Me., Elizabeth M. Brown, Lewiston, Me., Fletcher H. Brown, Sr., Cape Elizabeth, Me.

George R. Brown, Norway, Me., Judith Brown, Freeport, Me., Lois E. Brown, Cambridge, Mass., O. Brown, Newport, Me., Onell A. Brown, Norway, Me., Robert A. Brown, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Mrs. W. R. Brown, Falmouth, Me., Giles Browne, Topsham, Me., Barry H. Browning, Brunswick, Me., James Brune, Portland, Me.

Dorothy Buch, Buckfield, Me., Robert Buckland, Brunswick, Me., Thomas D. Buckley, Waterville, Me., William Buffington, Norway, Me., Paul H. Burditt, Westbrook, Me., Pauline Burditt, Westbrook, Me., Pam Burghart, Lewiston, Me., Joseph A. Burkhardt, Jr., Waterville, Me., James E. Burke, Brunswick, Me., T. J. Burke, Brunswick, Me.

Mary Ann Burn, Kittery Point, Me., Paula Burult, Topsham, Me., Giny Burnham, Brunswick, Me., Raymond Burnham, Portland, Me., Raymond L. Burnham, Bryant Point, Me.

R. Peter Burnham, Portland, Me., James H. Burr, Brunswick, Me., Mike Bushey, Framingham, Mass., Vera W. Buggell, Springvale, Me., Eric A. Bye, Lewiston, Me., George B. Cable, Newcastle, Me., O. H. Cable, Newcastle, Me., David O. Cadigan, East Sullivan, Me., Kenneth Cadigan, Portland, Me., Kathe Cahn, Waterville, Me.

John Callahan, Portland, Me., Betty Campbell, Auburn, Me., Bruce Campbell, Brunswick, Me., Cheryl H. Campbell, Skowhegan, Me., E. Mac Campbell, Brunswick, Me., Greg Carbone, Waterville, Me., Joyce L. Cardan, Augusta, Me., Dan Carey, Houlton, Me., Maurice Carleton, Camden, Me., David R. Carnes, Brunswick, Me.

Dorothy Carpenter, Waterville, Me., Florence M. Carpenter, Hingham, Mass., James Carpenter, Waterville, Me., Janet H. Carper, Cornish, Me., Thomas R. Carper, Cornish, Me., Ellen Carros, Lewiston, Me., Helen P. Carson, Brunswick, Me., R. S. Carson, Brunswick, Me., Marian P. Cartland, Portland, Me., F. W. Carver, So. Portland, Me.

Diane Cary, Falmouth, Me., Paula F. Casey, Lewiston, Me., Lois A. Cash, Portland, Me., Janet Cashin, Orono, Me., Carrie M. Chadbourne, Sanford, Me., Roy Chamberlin, Gorham, Me., Elizabeth Champlin, Northeast Harbor, Me., Arline Chandler, Mechanic Falls, Me., Stuart Chapin, Woolwich, Me., Eileen P. Chapman, Milbridge, Me.

Irene Chase, Westbrook, Me., Richard Chase, Lewiston, Me., Theo Chase, Westbrook, Me., Patrick Chasse, Orono, Me., Valerie Chelonis, Portland, Me., Brian Chernaek, York, Me., Kendrick H. Child, Portland, Me., Robert M. Chute, Naples, Me., Virginia Chute, Naples, Me., Susan Ciampa, Lewiston, Me., Charles H. Clapp, Brunswick, Me.

Dan B. Clark, Peaks Island, Me., Jeffrey C. Clark, Lewiston, Me., P. A. Clark, Westbrook, Me., Dorothy Clasby, Quincy, Mass.

Vickery Cleaves, Lewiston, Me., Patricia Clemente, Portland, Me., Matt Cienott, Portland, Me., Stanley Clifford, Deer Isle, Me., Ethel Clifford, Deer Isle, Me., Albert P. Cloutier, Portland, Me., Anthony Cocco, Gorham, Me., Angelyn Coe, Orono, Me., Robert L. Coe, Orono, Me.

Calvert Coggeshall, Newcastle, Me., S. W. Coggeshall, Newcastle, Me., Jim Colburn, Waterville, Me., Alan W. Colby, Waterville, Me., Arlene Colby, No. Windham, Me., Mrs. Alan Cole, Falmouth, Me., Edith Cole, Harrington, Me., Helen M. Cole, Winslow, Me., Janice A. Colley, Hingham, Mass., E. Collins, Hingham, Mass.

Robert E. Collins, Freeport, Me., Stephen B. Comee, Lewiston, Me., Daniel Connell III, Athol, Mass., Phyllis Connell, Athol, Mass., Arthur B. Corner, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Bradford Cook, Bangor, Me., H. M. Cook, Tenants Harbor, Me., Jane Cook, Camden, Me., Kristin Cook, Bangor, Me., Marjorie J. Cook, Tenants Harbor, Me.

Ralph Cook, Camden, Me., Ruth S. Cook, Portland, Me., Steven R. Cook, Bangor, Me., Connie Coombs, Portland, Me., Leyhton

Cooney, Sabattus, Me., Michael Corday, Fairfield, Me., Vivian Cote, Orono, Me., Wilbur R. Cote, Dixfield, Me., Richard Coty, Portland, Me., Eugene C. Coughun, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Clyde H. Cox, Jr., Portland, Me., Evelyn Cox, Portland, Me., Albert E. Crawford, Kittery Pt., Me., Dashiell W. Cripler, Waterville, Me., Loraine P. Crosby, Georgetown, Me., Jeffrey P. Cross, Guilford, Me., Sue Crowl, Kittery Point, Me., Donna M. Crowley, Kennebunk, Me., Edna Crowley, Auburn, Me., Alice E. Cummins, Bowdoinham, Me.

Robert Cummins, Bowdoinham, Me., Carol Ann Cyr, Auburn, Me., Timothy Cyr, Portland, Me., Brenda Rae Daigle, Waterville, Me., John D. Dalahanty, Brunswick, Me., Kenneth Dame, Eliot, Me.

Greg Darling, Brunswick, Me., Paula Davis, Orono, Me., Ronald D. Davis, Oakland, Me., Shirley L. Davis, Oakland, Me., Wendy Davis, Portland, Me., John M. Day, Kezar Falls, Me., William Day, Lewiston, Me., Lawrence De Blois, Camden, Me., Helen Decker, Oxford, Me., B. S. deFrees, No. Rumford, Me.

Jane deFrees, No. Rumford, Me., Werner J. Deiman, Lewiston, Me., Mary DeLorme, Vassalboro, Me., Douglas Dennett, Brunswick, Me., Glenda B. Derbyshire, Brunswick, Me., P. A. Devine, Waterville, Me., Roger W. Dewey, South Portland, Me., Marjorie DeWick, Wiscasset, Me., Michael DeWick, Wiscasset, Me., Nancy C. DeWick, Rumford Center, Me.

Robert E. DeWick, Woolwich, Me., Richard Dexter, Augusta, Me., Vincent A. DiCara, Brunswick, Me., Albert G. Dietrich, Orrington, Me., David Dietrich, Orrington, Me., Mary Louise Dietrich, Orrington, Me., Mary M. Dietrich, Orrington, Me., Charles L. Dignam, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Rosemary A. Dignam, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Barbara E. Dillon, Bar Harbor, Me.

Dana Dimock, Lewiston, Me., Chuck Dinsmore, Brunswick, Me., Carmela DiNunno, Hingham, Mass., D. L. Dionne, Norway, Me., Elaine Dodge, So. Portland, Me., Mrs. J. D. Dole, Honolulu, Hawaii, Charlotte C. Donnell, Sheepscot, Me., Eva M. Downs, Kennebunkport, Me., J. M. Downs, Kennebunkport, Me., Dorothy Doyle, Bangor, Me.

Louis L. Doyle, Bangor, Me., Paul C. Dragon, Bangor, Me., Albert Duclos, Portland, Me., Gloria S. Duclos, Portland, Me., Susan Dudley, Old Orchard Beach, Me., Sylvia Dugery, Mexico, Me., Donna Duggan, So. Orrington, Me., Paul W. Duggan, So. Orrington, Me., Grace S. Dunbar, Portland, Me., Robert J. Dunfee, Portland, Me.

Sharon Dunlap, Auburn, Me., Antoinette L. Dunn, Poland Springs, Me., Eric A. Duplisea, Bangor, Me., Albert Durinski, Limestone, Me., Mark Durinski, Limestone, Me.

Pearl Durinski, Limestone, Me., Ruth Durinski, Limestone, Me., O. H. Durrell, Kennebunkport, Me., Zoe C. Durrell, Kennebunkport, Me., J. Raymond Dyer, Wiscasset, Me., Jean R. Dyer, Wiscasset, Me., John B. Eaten Jr., Gray Me., Linda Eberhard, Lewiston, Me., Even E. Edfors, Saco, Me., Florance E. Edfors, Saco, Me.

Bob Edgerton, Stillwater, Me., Elizabeth Edgerton, Stillwater, Me., Simon P. Edkins, Brunswick, Me., Joyce E. Elliott, Lewiston, Me., Harwood Ellis, Jr., Wiscasset, Me., Margaret A. Ellis, Wiscasset, Me., Calvin C. Elwell, Northport, Me., Jeff D. Emerson, Brunswick, Me., John M. Emery, Ellsworth, Me., James E. Erskine, Springvale, Me.

Lynda Estas, Auburn, Me., Thomas Eurlay, Bangor, Me., Lucile Fairbanks, Livermore, Me., Olive Fanin, Boothbay Harbor, Me., Anne Faragher, Bar Harbor, Me., Marlin D. Farnim, Buckfield, Me., Melva M. Farnum, Buckfield, Me., Jocelyn Farr, Prout's Neck, Me., N. C. Fay, Portland, Me., Jacqueline Fearlier, Lewiston, Me., Mrs. Harold A. Ferguson, Westbrook, Me., Louise F. Fettingier, Falmouth, Me., Dolores E. Field, Portland, Me., Donald E. Field, Portland, Me., Hilda M. Fife, Kittery, Me., Elizabeth S. Fine, Phippsbury, Me., Carolyn W. Fish, North Windham, Me., Phyllis J. Fish, Jefferson, Me.,

Lucy Fisher, Lewiston, Me., Deborah Fitton, Waterville, Me.,

Bartley A. Flaherty, Portland, Me., Judy Fleurant, Springvale, Me., John F. Fleurant, Springvale, Me., Joan B. Flynt, Poland, Me., Jane Fogg, Auburn, Me., Hugh Pollensbee, Jr., Portland, Me., Wilder Foote, Camden, Me., Jack R. Ford, Orrington, Me., Cynthia Fortier, Fairfield, Me., Dennis Foss, Haverhill, Mass.

Dianne E. Foster, Kennebunk, Me., Joan Foster, Lisbon Falls, Me., Joel E. Foster, Lisbon Falls, Me., Paul R. Foster, Kennebunk, Me., Anna Fredrickson, Bucksport, Me., Charles Fredrickson, Bucksport, Me., Mary Elizabeth Alcorn, Portland, Me., Carl S. Andrews, Skowhegan, Me., Constance D. Andrews, Skowhegan, Me., Spencer Apollonio, Boothbay Harbor, Me., Marguerite Bernstein, Hulls Cove, Me., David Berrill, Van Buren, Me., Martha Biscoe, Orono, Me., Homer Booker, Jonesport, Me., Mrs. Homer Booker, Jonesport, Me., Paul J. Bradeen, Milo, Me.

Muriel K. Branz, Portland, Me., James Breuer, Yarmouth, Me., Patricia Breuer, Yarmouth, Me., Dawn I. Campbell, Portland, Me., Allen Casey, Orono, Me., Dorothy E. Christopher, Portland, Me., Irvin Cohen, Portland, Me., Mrs. Irvin Cohen, Portland, Me., Rebecca L. Cole, Raymond, Me., James F. Connors, Orono, Me.

Mrs. James F. Connors, Orono, Me., Peter W. Cox, Topsham, Me., Philip G. Cushman, Portland, Me., Marian Dwyer, Newcastle, Me., Catherine E. Emond, Lewiston, Me., Robert J. Fenderson, Saco, Me., Martha E. Ferguson, Stow, Mass., Steven Freedman, Orono, Me., Mrs. Steven Freedman, Orono, Me., A. M. Freeman, Bath, Me.

M. D. Freeman, Bath, Me., Grace Frick, Northeast Harbor, Me., Thomas Friedlander, Augusta, Me., Robert Friend III, Goshen, Mass., Theodore Fritsch, Portland, Me., John L. Fuller, Hulls Cove, Me., Ruth P. Fuller, Hulls Cove, Me., Diane Gallagher, Hingham, Mass., Sarah N. Gallagher, Hingham, Mass., David B. Gallup, Orono, Me.

Rae N. Gallup, Orono, Me., Theresa Garnett, Ellsworth, Me., Paul H. Garvin, Portland, Me., Mrs. Eugene Gendron, South Portland, Me., Karen Gerapowicz, Lewiston, Me., Peter Gerken, Waterville, Me., A. Stanley Getchell, Bangor, Me., Carl Ghelson, Cranberry Isles, Me., N. G. Gideon, Portland, Me.

Dianna Ginn, Portland, Me., Roger O. Ginn, Portland, Me., Alice Giovannella, Kezar Falls, Me., R. Giovannella, Kezar Falls, Me.

Gerald Girard, Orono, Me., Mike Girard, Biddeford, Me., Alan Glanville, Orono, Me., Frances Glidden, Wiscasset, Me., E. R. Glines, Norway, Me., Timothy T. Harrington, Rochester, N.Y., Jonathan Glynn, Waterville, Me., Edward S. Godfrey, Portland, Me., Janet P. Godfrey, Bangor, Me., Martin F. Godfrey, Bangor, Me.

Esther M. Gold, Springvale, Me., William Goldstein, Waterville, Me., Margaret K. Gonyea, Sebago Lake, Me., Terry Goodhue, Oakland, Me., Charles Goodman, Lewiston, Me., Eleanor Goodrich, Brunswick, Me., M. Goodrich, Brunswick, Me., Harland Goodwin, Jr., Arono, Me., Virginia Goodwin, Kennebunkport, Me., Peter J. Goranites, Portland, Me.

D. P. Gould, Orono, Me., Judith A. Gould, Springvale, Me., John Grabold, Portland, Me., Gertrude M. Gover, Bangor, Me., Ada Graham, Milbridge, Me., David L. Graham, Freeport, Me., Nymie L. Graham, Freeport, Me., Marion Grandeman, Kennebunkport, Me., Mary Grandeman, Kennebunkport, Me., Francis P. Greane, Bangor, Me.

Al L. Greason, Jr., Brunswick, Me., Sharon G. Greaves, Portland, Me., W. H. Greaves, Portland, Me., Brian Green, Stillwater, Me., Bruce Greene, Norway, Me., S. Green, Lewiston, Me., Sterling A. Green, Waterville, Me., Paul Gregoire, Augusta, Me., Charles W. Griffin, Waterville, Me., Phyllis Griffin, Portland, Me.

George Griggs, Brunswick, Me., M. J. Groetsch, New Brunswick, N.J., Carolyn

Gross, Lisbon, Me., Fanny Guerlain, Camden, Me., Chris Gvinn, Camden, Me., Carleton Gunn, Bangor, Me., Jo Nancy Gunn, Bangor, Me., James M. Gunn, Northeast Harbor, Me., Linda Gurelonis, Lewiston, Me., Larry Haag, Gorham, Me.

Sonia M. Hackey, Waterville, Me., Terry Hadlock, Kezar Falls, Me., Susan Haga, Orrington, Me., F. J. Haigney, Peaks Island, Me., Maria Haigney, Peaks Islands, Me.

Ann Hall, Lewiston, Me., Jeanne Hall, Lewiston, Me., Beverly Hallam, Ogunquit, Me., David J. Halperin, Falmouth, Me., Patricia M. Hamel, Greenville, Me., William F. Hamel, Greenville, Me., Harold Hamilton, Stillwater, Me., Muriel Hamilton, Westbrook, Me., William R. Hamilton, Camden, Me., Cyrus Hamlin, Kennebunk, Me.

Joan B. Hamlin, Kennebunk, Me., Sheryl E. Hamlin, S. Waterford, Me., Richard Handel, Waterville, Me., B. Hanley, Lewiston, Me., Pauline T. Hannaford, Brunswick, Me., Reginald L. Hannaford, Brunswick, Me., W. E. Hannum, Lewiston, Me., Nan Hansell, Camden, Me., Gertrude G. Hansen, Portland, Me., Joan B. Hansen, Portland, Me.

Pauline Hanson, Springvale, Me., Mary Hardwicke, Waterville, Me., D. Hardy, Lewiston, Me., Lona Hardy, Waterville, Me., William P. Hardy, Waterville, Me., Wm. A. Harkins, Topsfield, Me., Bradford D. Harmon, Houlton, Me., Maude Harper, Auburn, Me., James D. Harrington, Orono, Me., Arlene Harris, Lewiston, Me.

Federica Hart, Ogunquit, Me., Patricia Harvey, Orono, Me., Sarah S. Hasbrouck, Orono, Me., Sherman Hasbrouck, Orono, Me., Ethel M. Haskell, Northeast Harbor, Me., Stanley B. Haskell, N. E. Harbor, Me., Chris Hastedt, Scarborough, Me., Charles G. Hatch, Jr., Brunswick, Me., Dorothy Hatch, Scarborough, Me., Robert L. Hatch, Scarborough, Me.

Georgiana Hatstat, Lewiston, Me., Douglas Hayman, Lewiston, Me., Belle Heald, Georgetown, Me., Frank Heald, Georgetown, Me., Kathryn Heald, Georgetown, Me., Stephen Heald, Georgetown, Me., Kathryn G. Heater, S. Freeport, Me., Wm. Thomas Heater, S. Freeport, Me., Michael Heath, Lewiston, Me., Ronald M. Helle, Brunswick, Me.

E. C. Helmreich, Brunswick, Me., L. R. Helmreich, Brunswick, Me., Lloyd N. Hender-son, Brunswick, Me., Hug L. Hennedy, Biddeford Pool, Me., Gertrude Hennigar, Springvale, Me.

Linda D. Henry, Portland, Me., Merton G. Henry, Portland, Me., Paul J. Herer, Bangor, Me., Dennis Hermans, Portland, Me., Constance Hersey, Lewiston, Me., Dennis Hett, Hingham, Mass., Clement A. Hiebert, Portland, Me., Barbara Higgins, Waterville, Me., Sandra Higgins, Auburn, Me., Vivian S. Hill, So. Portland, Me.

Henry Hilton, Weld, Me., Francis Hitchcock, Manset, Me., Harold B. Hitchcock, Lewiston, Me., Paul Hitchcock, Manset, Me., Phyllis Hodgkins, Lewiston, Me., Charlotte Hodgman, Wiscasset, Me., Crosby Hodgman, Wiscasset, Me., A. Marion Holmes, Hingham, Mass., Cecil T. Holmes, Brunswick, Me., David N. Holmes, Brunswick, Me.,

Edward M. Holmes, Old Town, Me., Jane M. Holmes, Old Town, Me., Lyman Holmes, Machias, Me., Marion C. Holmes, Brunswick, Me., Rebecca Holmes, Brunswick, Me., Virginia Holmes, Chicago, Ill., Peter Hope, Lincolnville, Me., Jane E. Hopkins, Brunswick, Me., Thomas D. Hopkins, Brunswick, Me., Helen Horigan, Mattapan, Mass.

Daniel C. Horton, Elliot, Me., Peter Houghton, Sebasco Estates, Me., C. Arthur Hover, Sanford, Me., Patricia C. Howard, Newcastle, Me., S. C. Howard, Newcastle, Me., Carlene Howe, Cumberland, Me., David Howe, South Paris, Me., S. R. Howe, Bethel, Me., John N. M. Howells, Kittery Point, Me., Katharine F. Howells, Kittery Point, Me.

Christine T. Howes, Kennebunkport, Me., Robert M. Howes, Kennebunkport, Me., Laura Lee Huckoff, Waterville, Me., Lou Huckel, Lewiston, Me., Laouise H. Hudson, Waterville,

Me., Yaeger Hudson, Waterville, Me., Stephen T. Hughes, Auburn, Me., H. Draper Hunt, South Portland, Me., Nancy Hunter, Orono, Me., Ellen Huntington, Mt. Vernon, Me.,

Whitman Huntington, Mt. Vernon, Me., Harold Hurlbert, Patten, Me., Elizabeth G. Huston, Peaks Island, Me., Robert C. Huston, Peaks Island, Me., Marion O. Hussey, Kennebunkport, Me.

Glenice Hutchins, Falmouth, Me., Kenneth Y. Hutchins, S. W. Harbor, Me., Meredith Hutchins, S. W. Harbor, Me., Mildred W. Hutchins, Springvale, Me., Eva Hutchinson, Auburn, Me., George R. Hutchinson, S. Portland, Me., Cecily Hyams, Brunswick, Me., Ivan J. Hyams, Brunswick, Me., Fay Hynd, Cushing, Me., Andy Ingalls, Brunswick, Me.

M. E. Ireland, Boston, Mass., Carleen Irwin, Bangor, Me., Robert E. Ives, Brunswick, Me., Elsie V. Jackson, S. Portland, Me., Elwin Jackson, S. Portland, Me., Nancy Jackson, S. Portland, Me., Stephen Jackson, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Charles A. Jacobs, Dexter, Me., Arthur P. Jacobson, Waterford, Me., Ronald N. Jalbert, Portland, Me.

George R. Jamain, Topsham, Me., Faughn James, Camden, Me., Rick James, Lewiston, Me., Mary C. Jane, Newcastle, Me., Pamela Jaspersohn, Waterville, Me., Mrs. C. Jensen, Portland, Me., Madelene C. Jeppesen, Brunswick, Me., Myron A. Jeppesen, Brunswick, Me., Eric A. Johnson, Hollis, Me., Marjorie S. Johnson, Portland, Me.

Philip E. Johnson, Brunswick, Me., Rebecca Johnson, Oakland, Me., R. E. Johnson, Houlton, Me., Robert H. Johnson, Portland, Me., Sharon Johnson, Lewiston, Me., Alan J. Jones, North Windham, Me., Carol J. Jones, North Windham, Me., Esther C. Jones, South China, Me., Ethyl M. Jones, Hingham, Mass., Marion E. Jones, South China, Me.

Miles Jones, Belfast, Me., Mrs. Miles Jones, Belfast, Me., Millam P. Jones, Deer Isle, Me., P. Jones, Center Lebanon, Me., Peter H. Jones, Portland, Me., Bruce E. Jordan, Brunswick, Me., Henry A. Jordan, Northeast Harbor, Me., Jim Jordan, Hallowell, Me., Mary L. Jordan, Northeast Harbor, Me., Wendy Gilpatrick Joy, Portland, Me.

Susan T. Julavits, Yarmouth, Me., Don Kaiser, Lewiston, Me., Nathan Kaliss, Bar Harbor, Me., Rebecca B. Kaliss, Bar Harbor, Me., Alva Kamulainen, Paris, Me., Roberta L. Kasper, Lewiston, Me., Theresa Kass, Lewiston, Me.

Edward A. Kaustinen, Harrison, Me., Gloria Kaustinen, Harrison, Me., Alan P. Keefe, Springvale, Me., Carrie B. Kelley, East Machias, Me., M. T. Kelley, Portland, Me., Mark Kelley, Brunswick, Me., Aurora Kellman, Springvale, Me., Carol Kellman, Springvale, Me., Wendy Kellman, Springvale, Me., Daryl Keller, Rochester, N.H.

James H. Keller, Portland, Me., Mrs. F. B. Kellogg, Boothbay, Me., Robert Kellogg, Bangor, Me., Mrs. Robert Kellogg, Bangor, Me., J. C. Kelly, Portland, Me., Steve Kelly, W. Hartford, Conn., Anne G. Kempers, Waterville, Me., John Kempers, Waterville, Me., Richard F. Kendall, Dennis, Mass., Eleanor Kenny, Bar Harbor, Me.

John J. Kenny, Bar Harbor, Me., Janet Kenoyer, Winthrop, Me., W. Erik Kesting, W. Scituate, Mass., Donald J. King, Portland, Me., Nan N. Kingsbury, Kennebunk, Me., Theodore O. Kingsbury, Kennebunk, Me., Elmer G. Kittredge, S. Portland, Me., Bonnie Kittredge, Waterville, Me., Helen B. Knapp, Kittery Point, Me., Brian Knowlton, Belfast, Me.

Dorothy S. Knowlton, Brunswick, Me., Robert E. Knowlton, Brunswick, Me., Catherine Knox, Fairfield, Me., John Koons, Oakland, Me., Gordon E. Kulberg, Bangor, Me., Dorothy D. Kurzenknabe, Seal Harbor, Me., Ernest A. Labbe, Jr., Norway, Me., Madeline LaBrecque, Biddeford, Me., Roland A. LaBrecque, Biddeford, Me., Jean La Croix, Westbrook, Me.

Lenore La Croix, Westbrook, Me., Elizabeth R. Lamb, Springvale, Me., D. B. Lamont,

Vinalhaven, Me., Patti Lane, Portland, Me., Marie Langdon, Orono, Me., Marie Langlois, S. Portland, Me., Caroline Lanier, Eliot, Me., Marilyn Lantery, Lewiston, Me., John Lappen, Lewiston, Me., David N. Larsen, South Portland, Me.

Elaine M. Larsen, South Portland, Me., Carolyn G. Lathbury, Camden, Me., Vincent T. Lathbury, Rockland, Me., Margaret Lauck, Bar Mills, Me., Virginia Laurence, Portland, Me., Ada A. Laurie, Hingham, Mass., Marie R. Katz, Bangor, Me.

Blanche T. Laurie, Hingham, Mass., Joan M. Laurila, East Lansing, Mich., Elsie Lauten, Lewiston, Me., Carl J. Laws, Waterville, Me., Gratia Laws, Waterville, Me., John W. Laws, Waterville, Me., Donn R. Layton, Brownville, Me., Sylvia Leamon, Lewiston, Me., Paula Leathers, Winslow, Me., Ronald Lebel, Auburn, Me.

Bruce E. Leddy, Portland, Me., John D. Leddy, Jr., Portland, Me., Mary F. Lee, Freeport, Me., Roscoe Lee, Jr., Lewiston, Me., Edward P. Legg, Bath, Me., Anne E. Legg, Bath, Me., Ruth H. Leibold, Sanford, Me., Charlotte Leland, Cohasset, Mass., J. N. Lello, Norway, Me., Louise Lennon, Portland, Me.

Eleanor Leo, Waterville, Me., Michael Lerman, Portland, Me., Janet Levinson, Northfield, Minn., Ben Lewando, Ogunquit, Me., Isabel Lewando, Ogunquit, Me., Alan Lewis, Bangor, Me., Joel O. Lewis, Boothbay, Me., Joan T. Libbey, Portland, Me., Norman P. Libbey, Portland, Me., Cheryl Libby, Scarborough, Me.

Douglas C. Libby, Falmouth, Me., Judy Lindahl, Rockport, Me., Nancy S. Link, Tenants Harbor, Me., Betty Lee Lins, Portland, Me., Stephen M. Lipman, Portland, Me., Traute Lippmann, Augusta, Me., W. Lippmann, Augusta, Me., Florence Littlefield, Sanford, Me., Frank Littlefield, Kezar Falls, Me., Roger B. Littlefield, N. Berwick, Me.

Wm. R. Littlefield, Jr., Sanford, Me., Robert A. Loel, Brunswick, Me., M. C. Loizeaux, Vinalhaven, Me., Rosamund Lombard, Lewiston, Me., Leonard Lookner, Freedom, Me., Deborah Lookner, Freedom, Me., Daniel J. Lord, Jr., S. Portland, Me., Leslie R. Lord, Old Town, Me., John Lorence, Cranberry Isles, Me., Laura Barr Lougee, Parsonsfield, Me.

Louise Love, Brunswick, Me., Donald Love-ly, Northeast Harbor, Me., Richard C. Law, Jr., Ogunquit, Me., Wilfred A. Lowe, Bryant Pond, Me., Bernard Lowell, Norway, Me.

Donald Grey Lowry, Falmouth, Me., Lois Lowry, Falmouth, Me., Jon A. Lund, Augusta, Me., Cassandra M. Luttis, Kittery Point, Me., Guy Lyons, South Windham, Me., Elizabeth Mabrand, Portland, Me., Mrs. Ian MacInnes, Bangor, Me., Jeff McDougal, Portland, Me., Norma MacDougal, Portland, Me., Donald Mackay, Portland, Me.

Mary A. MacKay, Springvale, Me., Selma Mackie, Hingham, Mass., Wade Mackie, Hingham, Mass., Frank MacKinnon, Topsham, Me., Mary MacKinnon, Topsham, Me., Bonnie MacLean, Bangor, Me., Mark MacLean, Portland, Me., Nancy MacLean, Lewistown, Me., Neil MacLean, Bangor, Me., William C. Madden, Waterville, Me.

L. A. R. Maher, Biddeford Pool, Me., Hugh MacMahon, Falmouth, Me., Thomas M. Malley, Orono, Me., Jane H. Malme, Hingham, Mass., Jean Mangini, Falmouth, Me., Winifred Mann, Southwest Harbor, Me., Judith A. Marden, Minot, Me., James Markos, Jr., Ellsworth, Me., Joan Marks, Waterville, Me., Stephen R. Marks, Waterville, Me.

Katharine F. Marshall, Bangor, Me., Ken Marshall, Portland, Me., Rita Martin, Lewiston, Me., Robert L. Martin, Farmington, Me., Linda Martocchio, Lewiston, Me., Harriet Matthews, Waterville, Me., M. K. Matzen, Lewiston, Me., Wayne A. Mayo, Brunswick, Me.

Florence McAlister, Lewiston, Me., M. P. McArdle IV, Mt. Vernon, Me., F. J. McCarthy, Jr., Portland, Me., Suzanne McCarthy, Camden, Me., Barbara McCleave, Orono, Me.,

James McCleave, Orono, Me., Joe F. McClurken, Croton, N.Y., A. P. McCoy, South Portland, Me., Margaret K. McDonald, Boothbay, Me.

Paul MacDonald, Boothbay, Me., Martha R. McDowell, Orono, Me., Philip E. McDowell, Orono, Me., C. Douglas, McGee, South Freeport, Me., Douglas R. McGee, South Freeport, Me., Lawrence McGee, Northeast Harbor, Me., Marcia McGee, Northeast Harbor, Me., Mary B. McGee, South Freeport, Me.

Rose A. McGee, South Freeport, Me., Patricia McGilleuddy, Houlton, Me., J. H. McGrath Sr., Brunswick, Me., Daniel E. McGuillen, South Windham, Me., Gregory H. McIntyre, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Robert McIntyre, Gorham, Me., A. McKeen, Harrison, Me., A. O. McKeen, Winterport, Me., E. F. McKeen, Winterport, Me., Nicholas J. McKenney, S. Windham, Me.

Gael McKibben, Portland, Me., R. McKibben, Portland, Me., G. McKruger, S. Harpswell, Me., Lynn McMillan, Woodcliff Lake, N. J., Winnie McMorrow, Poland Spring, Me., Katharine McNear, Leeds, Me., Nancy McNinch, Portland, Me., Jerry McNinch, Portland, Me., Bruce W. McQuaid, Dover, N.H., Mrs. Bruce McQuaid, Dover, N. H.

Margaret McQuaid, N. Edgecomb, Me., Frank McQuaid, N. Edgecomb, Me., Robert K. McWilliam, Lewiston, Me., Abbott Meader, Oakland, Me., Nancy Meader, Oakland, Me., John Medeira, Brunswick, Me., Robert Merchant, Lincoln Center, Me., Kurtis Meredith, Portland, Me., Gary Merrill, Falmouth Foreside, Me., Jerry M. Merrill, Cape Elizabeth, Me.

Francis S. Merritt, Deer Isle, Me., Priscilla H. Merritt, Deer Isle, Me., George D. Mesirtz, Waterville, Me., Janet Michaud, South Portland, Me., Herman Michelson, Westport, Me., Naomi Michelson, Westport, Me., Antoinette J. Mike, Portland, Me., Henry N. Milburn, Falmouth Foreside, Me., Christine R. Millar, Portland, Me., Elinor Miller, Waterville, Me.,

Eva M. Miller, Portland, Me., Florence Miller, Orrington, Me., Lewis Miller, Roslindale, Mass., Waldo B. Miller, Orrington, Me., Grace Mills, Auburn, Me., Edward Minister, Brunswick, Me., Kristina Minister, Brunswick, Me., Paul R. Minton, Cumberland Ctr. Me., Sally W. Minton, Cumberland Ctr. Me., Joanie Mitchell, Lewiston, Me.

Michael Moffat, Freedom, Me., Rhia Moffat, Freedom, Me., Richard W. Moll, Brunswick, Me., Anne S. Molloy, Bucks Harbor, Me., Paul S. Molloy, Bucks Harbor, Me.

Bob Moran, Westbrook, Me., Frederick Morgan, East Blue Hill, Me., Paula Dietz Morgan, East Blue Hill, Me., Barbara W. Moriarty, Auburn, Me., Steve Moriarty, Auburn, Me., Suzanne Morin, Sanford, Me., Cassandra Moros, Old Town, Me., J. Moros, Old Town, Me., Nancy Morrell, Brunswick, Me., Robert Morrell, Brunswick, Me.

James T. Morris, South Eliot, Me., Sara E. Morris, South Eliot, Me., K. M. Morrison, Mil-lyocket, Me., Robert J. Morrison, Old Orchard B. Me., Helen I. Morse, Waterford, Me., Marian L. Morse, Falmouth, Me., Susan Morse, New Gloucester, Me., Wilson Morse, Waterford, Me., Thomas F. Moser, New Gloucester, Me., Larry Moskowitz, Scarborough, Me.

Denzil Mosteller, Eliot, Me., Willard R. Moulton, Sebago Lake, Me., Hallie Muldoon, Portland, Me., S. Muldoon, Portland, Me., Mara L. Mulligan, Sheepscott, Me., Tom Munson, Waterville, Me., Ralph Murdock, Norway, Me., Constance Murray, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Jerry R. Murray, Orono, Me., Peter Murray, Lewiston, Me.

Susan Murray, Orono, Me., Stephen Muskie, Orono, Me., Robert J. Muzzy, Portland, Me., Jerome Nadelhaft, Bangor, Me., Ruth Nadelhaft, Bangor, Me., Carol A. Nason, Portland, Me., Helen Nearing, Harborside, Me., Scott Nearing, Harborside, Me., John W. Neff, Orono, Me., Bruce Nelson, East Boothbay, Me.

David Nelson, Lewiston, Me., Jack Nelson, Spruce Head, Me., Jean Nelson, East Booth-

bay, Me., Margaret Nelson, Spruce Head, Me., Mildred Nelson, Portland, Me., Pauline Nelson, Brunswick, Me., Selma Nelson, Lewiston, Me., Stephen C. Nelson, Lewiston, Me., Thomas F. Nemeec, Chicago, Ill., Phillip Nesbit, Orono, Me.

Mrs. Phillip Nesbit, Orono, Me., David Neufeld, Spring Valley, N.Y., Grace Nevens, Damariscotta, Me., Irene Nevens, Norway, Me., Janice Nichols, Auburn, Me.

Susan D. Nichols, Bar Harbor, Me., Mary L. Niles, Hingham, Mass., Linda H. Nixon, Orono, Me., John O. Noble, Jr., Stillwater, Me., Diane K. Nolan, Portland, Me., Jeri Norris, Lewiston, Me., Caroline B. Norwood, Tenants Har., Me., Ronald N. Nowell, York Beach, Me., Jacqueline Nowell, York Beach, Me., Anne Noyes, Portland, Me.

Ted. Noyes, Portland, Me., M. Nuernberger, York, Me., Tyrone Nugent, Camden, Me., Elizabeth J. Nute, Rockland, Me., Margaret K. O'Brien, Waterville, Me., Ryszard Obuchowicz, Brighton, Mass., Tom O'Donnell, Westbrook, Me., T. E. O'Flaherty, Jr., Fortunes Rocks, Phyllis Ogrodnik, Lewiston, Me., O. Jerry Oleson, North Bridgton, Me.

Patricia Oliver, Brunswick, Me., Randy O'Neal, Lewiston, Me., Tomas M. O'Neil, Portland, Me., Ivan C. Orcutt, Sheepscott, Me., Laura L. Orcutt, Sheepscott, Me., Martha O'Shea, Lewiston, Me., David O. Ostrom, Portland, Me., Candace Otterson, Harrison, Me., Mark Otterson, Harrison, Me., Lynne Page, Lewiston, Me.

Sheila Paine, Seal Cove, Me., Joanne E. Painter, Portland, Me., John W. Painter, Portland, Me., Stephen Palmer, Portland, Me., Fred J. Parent, Lewiston, Me., Maxene L. Parent, Lewiston, Me., Pamela L. Parent, Lewiston, Me., Dorothy Parker, Lewiston, Me., Lucinda R. Parker, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Jennie M. Parkinson, Camden, Me.

Linda Parlin, Framingham, Mass., Maurice G. Parlin, Jefferson, Me., Scott Parlin, North Berwick, Me., Grace Passano, Staten Island, N.Y., Frederick W. Patch, Kennebunk, Me., Ann S. Paul, S. Windham, Me., Joseph Pavline, Portland, Me., Bradford C. Payne, Southwest Harbor, Me., Amy Payson, South Thomaston, Me., Harold C. Payson, Falmouth, Me.

Harold H. Payson, South Thomaston, Me., Jim Payson, Portland, Me., William A. Peabody, Brunswick, Me., Pamela Pearson, Poland Spring, Me., Howard F. Peckworth, Richmond, Me.

Mrs. Howard F. Peckworth, Richmond, Me., Ellen Peirce, Searsport, Me., Karen Peirce, Searsport, Me., Constance Peirce, Kittery Point, Me., Victor J. Palosi, Jr., Portland, Me., Oliver H. P. Pepper, Somesville, Me., Pamela Pepper, Somesville, Me., Sue Percival, Orono, Me., Paul Perez, Vassalboro, Me., Mrs. Paul Perez, Vassalboro, Me.

Beatrice Perkins, Portland, Me., June F. Perkins, Springvale, Me., Arthur R. Perrin, Jr., So. Windham, Me., Chris Perrin, So. Windham, Me., Janet Perrin, So. Windham, Me., Maudie Perrin, So. Windham, Me., Mazie Perry, Livermore Falls, Me., Rita Perry, Kittery Point, Me., Stephen M. Perry, Augusta, Me., Ted. Perry, Livermore Falls, Me.

Tom Perry, Portland, Me., Charles A. D. Peters, Portland, Me., Carl Petersen, Gorham, Me., Mrs. Carl Peterson, Gorham, Me., Donald W. Peterson, Portland, Me., Jane L. Peterson, Portland, Me., Charlene B. Petrucelli, Cape Eliz., Me., Gerald F. Petrucelli, Cape Eliz., Me., Paul H. Pfeiffer, Waterville, Me., Valerie O. Pfeiffer, Waterville, Me.

Gregory Phelan, Brunswick, Me., Leona Phelan, Brunswick, Me., Harriet Philbrick, York, Me., Margaret D. Philbrick, Falmouth, Me., Richard Philbrick, York, Me., Bob Philbrook, Portland, Me., Vandra Philbrook, Portland, Me., Augustus D. Phillips, No. East Harb., Me., Mary Phillips, N. E. Harbor, Me., John Philson, Waterville, Me.

John W. Pickering, Orono, Me., Marysue Pickering, Orono, Me., Ferrar R. Pierce, Springvale, Me., D. C. Pierson, Manchester, Conn., Kaine Piirainen, South Paris, Me.,

Richard W. Pinansky, Portland, Me., Duane Pinkham, Boothbay Harbor, Me., Walter N. Plaut, Jr., Brunswick, Me., David Plimpton, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Paul Polkonen, East Waterford, Me.

A. Ploks, Westport, Me., Janice P. Plunkett, So. Portland, Me., Adrian E. Pols, Brunswick, Me., Edward Pols, Brunswick, Me., Eileen Pols, Brunswick, Me.

Terrill Polman, Wickenburg, Ariz., Pauline N. Polstein, Augusta, Me., Anne Pomroy, Hancock, Me., Edris Porter, Buckfield, Me., Frances E. Porter, Buckfield, Me., Arnold Potter, Portland, Me., Dale Potter, Portland, Me., Esther E. Prosser, Falmouth, Me., Gerta Prosser, Camden, Me., William H. Prosser, Camden, Me.

William R. Prosser, Falmouth, Me., Clarence M. Purington, Brunswick, Me., Ruth Putnam, Kittery Point, Me., Marjorie Marsh Quigg, Bangor, Me., Paul H. Quigg, Bangor, Me., Marlis Quimby, Portland, Me., Lin Rafuse, Crono, Me., Lucy E. Ragan, Livermore Falls, Me., Lawrence Rakovan, Brunswick, Me., G. Rand, Portland, Me.

John A. Rand, Lewiston, Me., Thelma Rand, Portland, Me., Carrie H. Rane, Bangor, Me., Helen M. Ranlett, Bangor, Me., L. Felix Ranlett, Bangor, Me., Frances Ray, Auburn, Me., Helen W. Ray, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Roger R. Ray, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Helen E. Rayer, Cushing, Me., Ronald J. Rayer, Cushing, Me.

David Rayfield, Defiance, Ohio, Marilyn Rayfield, Defiance, Ohio, Cheryl Read, Allston, Mass., Pat Reardon, Yarmouth, Me., Freeland Record, Norway, Me., James Redwine, Brunswick, Me., Andrew Reicher, Brunswick, Me., Walter Reitz, Brunswick, Me., Fred Reils, Bronx, N.Y., Ginny Remeika, Lewiston, Me.

A. Charles Remmel, Portland, Me., Kathleen Remmel, Portland, Me., Emily Renaud, Lewiston, Me., Abby Rich, Hampden, Me., Gary Rich, Hampden, Me., Daniel J. Richard, Camden, Me., Margaret Richard, Orono, Me., F. Richards, Lewiston, Me., Mary T. Richards, East Sullivan, Me., Virginia Richardson, Scarborough, Me.

Selah Richmond, So. Portland, Me., Linda Ridley, Topsham, Me., Anne Rieder, Portland, Me., Ann S. Riley, Brunswick, Me., Ellen Riley, Carlsle, Pa.

Joanna Riley, Brunswick, Me., Matthew Riley, Brunswick, Me., Loretta A. Rittle, Brunswick, Me., Robert H. Rittle, Brunswick, Me., Frances K. Ritter, Lewiston, Me., Paul Roach, Bangor, Me., Jeanne Robbins, Machias, Me., Bruce Roberts, So. Portland, Me., Bruce W. Roberts, Winterport, Me., Mrs. Bruce W. Roberts, Winterport, Me.

James Roberts, Portland, Me., Ruth Roberts, So. Portland, Me., Carol Robinson, Hingham, Mass., Marian Robinson, Warren, Me., Regina Rodrigue, Waterville, Me., Roger Rodrigue, Waterville, Me., David P. Rogers, Lewiston, Me., Olivia Rogers, Portland, Me., Karen Rohnbach, Princeton Jct., N.J., John Romanyshyn, Portland, Me.

Annie Romanyshyn, Portland, Me., James J. Ronan, Biddeford Pool, Me., Pauline Root, Brunswick, Me., Robert D. Rosenbaum, Lewiston, Me., Marvin Rosenblum, East Boothbay, Me., Jack C. Ross, Tampa, Fla., David B. Roth, Vinalhaven, Me., Lucy Roth, Vinalhaven, Me., Helen S. Rowe, Springvale, Me., Margaret Rowe, Sebago Lake, Me.

Deborah Roy, Lewiston, Me., Rick Rudolph, Springvale, Me., Dexter Rumsey, East Boothbay, Me., Kathryn Rumsey, East Boothbay, Me., Roger Rush, So. Portland, Me., Elizabeth S. Russell, Bar Harbor, Me., Bette Saleebey, Bangor, Me., Michael Saleebey, Bangor, Me., Donna Sallsbury, Steuben, Me., Christopher B. Sample, Boothbay Harb., Me.

Shirley Sampson, Portland, Me., Armand J. Samson, Lewiston, Me., Steve Sanders, Gardiner, Me., Elwin M. Saple, Bangor, Me., J. Sardone, Columbia, Conn., L. Sargent, Kezar Falls, Me., Richard Sargent, Bangor, Me., Hugh C. Saunders, South Freeport, Me., Katharine L. Savage, Northeast Harbor, Me., Richard M. Savage, Northeast Harbor, Me.

J. E. Sawyer, Augusta, Me., Timothy J. Sayh, Portland, Me., Carole Scannel, Lewiston, Me., William Scarlett, Castine, Me., Eberhard W. Schmidt, North Edgecomb, Me.

Loraine B. Schmidt, N. Edgecomb, Me., Mrs. Elliott Schwartz, Brunswick, Me., Alice Seaward, Kittery Point, Me., Cheryl Seaward, Lewiston, Me., J. L. Seeley, North Berwick, Me., Suzanne Selig, Orono, Me., Gladys Setford, Minot, Me., Betsey Shaffer, Bangor, Me., Jonathan Sharlin, Springvale, Me., Louise Sharp, Camden, Me.

Klip Shaw, Athol, Mass., Charlene E. Shepard, Ellsworth, Me., L. A. Sheridan, Newport, Me., Paul Sheridan, Mattapan, Mass., Pierre Shevenell, Portland, Me., Stell Shevis, Camden, Me., W. A. Shevis, Camden, Me., Richard Shippee, Waterville, Me., Bruce E. Shotland, Houlton, Me., Clarice Shur, Portland, Me.

Freda P. Signer, Camden, Me., Leah Siebert, Springvale, Me., Allan J. Silberger, Brunswick, Me., John W. Sims, Camden, Me., Hazel Sinclair, Kittery Point, Me., Arthur Skop, Kennebunkport, Me., Dorothy Small, Portland, Me., Ruth Small, Lewiston, Me., Mary-Leigh Smart, Ogunquit, Me., Anlla Smith, Waterville, Me.

Anna Smith, Leeds, Me., Barbara H. Smith, Augusta, Me., Bruce Smith, Leeds, Me., Elizabeth F. Smith, Houlton, Me., Gary Smith, Augusta, Me., Gary V. Smith, Houlton, Me., Louise S. Smith, Waterville, Me., Roy R. Smith, Norway, Me., Susan Smith, Swans Island, Me., Teresa Smith, Gray, Me.

Rhoda C. Snell, Bar Harbor, Me., Gail D. Snow, Freeport, Me., Nancy Lee Snow, Falmouth, Me., Robert P. Snow, Freeport, Me., Mary E. Snyder, Orono, Me., Monica H. Snyder, Kittery, Me., Virginia A. Snyder, Sabattus, Me., William H. Snyder, Kittery, Me., John Sobel, Rockville Centre, N.Y., Barbara Sommer, Cumberland Fores., Me.

Caroline Southall, Yarmouth, Me., Bradford Spear, Lewiston, Me., Hilda Spencer, Belfast, Me., Anne Sperry, Newcastle, Me., Herbert S. Sperry, Newcastle, Me.

Barbara J. Spiegelburg, E. Vassalboro, Me., Bruce Spiegelburg, E. Vassalboro, Me., La Rue Spiker, Southeast Harbor, Me., Marjorie Spock, East Sullivan, Me., Russell Sprague, West Baldwin, Me., F. N. Springsteel, Brunswick, Me., Karen Springsteel, Brunswick, Me., A. Staires, Lewiston, Me., A. H. Stanley, Southwest Harbor, Me., Elizabeth Stanley, South China, Me.

Lula M. Stanley, Northeast Harbor, Me., Woodbury A. Stanley, Northeast Harbor, Me., Charles C. Staples, Springvale, Me., Bessie A. Staples, Springvale, Me., Claire Staples, Orono, Me., T. S. Staples, Orono, Me., Andrej Starkis, Waterville, Me., Cody Stearns, Freeport, Me., L. C. Stearns, Freeport, Me., Mrs. L. C. Stearns, Freeport, Me.

Robert A. Stebbens, King of Prussia, Pa., Caroline Steinman, Portland, Me., R. Steinman, Portland, Me., Richard Stern, New York, N.Y., David G. Stevens, Bangor, Me., William Stevenson, Waterville, Me., Arlene R. Steward, Norway, Me., Elliott Steward, Norway, Me., D. L. Stoffe, Sebasco Estates, Me., James W. Stone, Orono, Me.

J. Stone, Norway, Me., Marcia Stone, Orono, Me., T. H. Stone, Norway, Me., Jean Streeter, Lewiston, Me., Ashley Streetman, Brunswick, Me., Barbara Streetman, Brunswick, Me., L. N. Stuart, Newport, Me., Michelle Stuckey, Portland, Me., Susan Stump, Thomaston, Me., Carol W. Sutor, Raymond, Me.

John H. Sutor, Jr., Raymond, Me., Mary Sullivan, Camden, Me., J. L. Sweet, Brunswick, Me., Nancy Syme, Camden, Me., Grace Tagliabue, Lewiston, Me., John Tagliabue, Lewiston, Me., J. Talbot, Northeast Harbor, Me., Lucinda Talbot, Northeast Harbor, Me., Tim Talbot, Portland, Me., D. Talley, Norway, Me.

Phyllis R. Talley, Orono, Me., Samuel Talley, Orono, Me., Edward Tansey, Fairfield, Me., Richard E. Tauck, Bar Mills, Me., Nancy Tavelli, Lewiston, Me.

Linda Bufano, San Francisco, Cal., Clyde

Greenfield Cooper, San Francisco, Cal., Carol Cravens, San Francisco, Cal., Jane Edgenton, Oakland, Cal., Julia Ellis, San Francisco, Cal., Christie Hakim, San Francisco, Cal., Judith Halstead, San Francisco, Cal., Anne Irving, San Francisco, Cal., Christopher Jackson, San Francisco, Cal., Edith Jones, San Francisco, Cal.

Barbara Kane, San Francisco, Cal., Angela Littlefield, San Francisco, Cal., Anna Love, San Francisco, Cal., Luana Meacham, San Francisco, Cal., Susan E. Miller, Oakland, Cal., David H. Miltstone, San Francisco, Cal., Anne Lise Mitchell, San Francisco, Cal., Harriet T. Parsons, San Francisco, Cal., Susan Porterfield, San Francisco, Cal., Thelma Prichard, Greenbrae, Cal.

James Ramsey, San Francisco, Cal., Virginia Riggs, San Bruno, Cal., Elizabeth W. Rogers, San Francisco, Cal., Luella K. Sawyer, Mill Valley, Cal., J. D. Schaa, San Francisco, Cal., Ada E. Schwartz, San Francisco, Cal., Janet M. Stake, San Francisco, Cal., Elizabeth Taylor, San Francisco, Cal., Eugene E. Taylor, San Francisco, Cal., Thomas R. Vandenburg, San Francisco, Cal.

Colburn S. Wilbur, Palo Alto, Cal., Earl R. Taylor, Brunswick, Me., R. Taylor, Northeast Harbor, Me., Stephen Taylor, Ogunquit, Me., J. Temple, Williamantic, Conn., Janet R. Tenbroeck, Bar Harbor, Me., Marion Tenney, Livermore Falls, Me., Harold D. Thaler, East Lansing, Mich., Dorothy Thaxter, Kittery Point, Me., Rosamond Thaxter, Kittery Point, Me.

Ann Theberge, Lewiston, Me., Corice W. Therrien, Biddeford, Me., Ernest R. Therrien, Biddeford, Me., Paul R. Therrien, Portland, Me., Roy Thibeault, Norway, Me., Stephen Thibeault, Lewiston, Me., Philip Thibodeau, Orono, Me., Doris Thomas, Lincolnville, Me., Ethel Thomas, Northeast Harbor, Me., Joseph B. Thomas IV, Northeast Harbor, Me.

Ralph Thomas, Norway, Me., Dorothy E. Thombs, Standish, Me., Doreen Thompson, Portland, Me., Helen Thompson, North Jonesport, Me., Jeffrey Thompson, Sea Cliff, N.Y.

A. Thurston, Norway, Me., Lois M. Thurston, Wiscasset, Me., Dana F. Thurlow, Brunswick, Me., Harold Thurlow, Bangor, Me., Theresa Thurlow, Bangor, Me., William Thurlow, Brunswick, Me., Sherry Thyng, Waterboro, Me., Sheila Tibbetts, Readville, Me., Jim Tierney, Portland, Me., Joel Tilley, Orono, Me.

Lura Titcomb, Augusta, Me., C. Toal, Portland, Me., Elizabeth C. Todorank, Waterville, Me., Mildred Tonge, Gardiner, Me., John G. Toner, South Portland, Me., Hazel D. Town, Peaks Island, Me., Peter Towne, Norway, Me., David E. Traister, Waterville, Me., Donald E. Trammel, East Lansing, Mich., Claudia Treadwell, West Buxton, Me.

David Trider, Leeds, Me., Nancy L. Trider, Leeds, Me., E. L. Tripp, Newport, Me., Karen True, Bangor, Me., James D. Tuck, Boston, Mass., Gerard M. J. Tucker, Lewiston, Me., Joanne Tulonen, Lewiston, Me., B. Twitchell, Auburn, Me., Terry Lee Vance, Portland, Me., Karen L. Van Pelt, Ellsworth, Me.

Maureen Vaughan, Waterville, Me., Merle B. Veigel, Yarmouth, Me., Shella Verrill, Manchester, Me., Virginia Verrill, Springvale, Me., Barbara S. Vickers, Portland, Me., Dennis Vickers, Portland, Me., Fred D. Voelker, Jr., Ellsworth, Me., Aimee Von Huene, Brunswick, Me., Charles E. Wadsworth, Cranberry Isles, Me., Jean G. Wadsworth, Cranberry Isles, Me.

Diane E. Walas, Bangor, Me., John A. Wales, Bangor, Me., W. Bennett Walbridge, Brunswick, Me., Charlotte M. Walker, Falmouth Foreside, Me., Donna Walker, Auburn, Me., K. B. Walker, Falmouth Foreside, Me., Sally Walker, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Thomas S. Walker, Melrose, Mass., Pearle A. Wall, Tenants Harbor, Me., Michael H. Walsh, Brunswick, Me.

Sharon J. Walton, Gray, Me., Ann Ward, Lewiston, Me., Karen Ward, Lewiston, Me., Edith N. Ware, Portland, Me., Kathleen Washburn, Orrington, Me.

Robert Washburn, Orrington, Me., Rosa-

lind Wasserman, Waterville, Me., Ann Watson, Marion, Mass., Richard Watson, Freeport, Me., Herbert Watson, Norway, Me., Lea Watson, Freeport, Me., Sharon Watson, Freeport, Me., Bobby N. Weaver, Orono, Me., Donna Webber, Waterville, Me., Faye Webber, Portland, Me.

Charles Webster, Brunswick, Me., Cliff Webster, Brunswick, Me., Claire Weeks, Portland, Me., Paul L. Weeks, Preque Isle, Me., Beatrice Wehmeyer, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Robert Wehmeyer, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Eric M. Weis, Brunswick, Me., Ted Weissman, Waterville, Me., W. Harper Welch, Portland, Me., M. Wentworth, Kennebunkport, Me.

Stacy H. Wentworth, Kennebunkport, Me., Elsa West, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Martha West, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Robert G. West, Lewiston, Me., Gina Davis Wexler, East Sullivan, Me., Arthur Wenster, Orono, Me., Helen L. Wheeler, Portland, Me., Maryjane White, Portland, Me., Jon Whitman, Falmouth, Me., Elsbeth Whitten, Bar Harbor, Me.

Jane Whitten, Bar Harbor, Me., Penny Whitten, Bar Harbor, Me., Don Wiener, Lewiston, Me., Evelyn W. Wiesner, Oxford, Me., Ella H. Wight, Pittsfield, Me., Nelson G. Wight, Pittsfield, Me., Florence Wider, Ashville, Me., Paul Wiley, Brunswick, Me., Barbara L. Wilkinson, Portland, Me., Raymond B. Anderson, Bangor, Me.

Andrew Banning, Bangor, Me., Clarice M. Bowman, Bangor, Me., Kenneth C. Brookes, Bangor, Me., Gary Chamberlain, Searsport, Me., Walter L. Cook, Bangor, Me., Clifton G. Davis, Bangor, Me., L. J. Van Durlin, Bangor, Me., Harold Farkas, Bangor, Me., Susan C. Farkas, Bangor, Me.

Laurel Greenwood, Bangor, Me., Windsor Haskell, Temple, Me., Marshall B. Hughes, Bangor, Me., Michael E. Jones, Bangor, Me.

Ralph H. Wilkinson, Portland, Me., Adrris I. Willard, Sanford, Me., George S. Willard, Sanford, Me., Helen G. Williams, Damariscotta, Me., Albert E. Willis, Oxford, Me., Ruth A. Willis, Oxford, Me., Bruce Wilson, Lewiston, Me., Dorothy C. Wilson, Orono, Me., Elwin L. Wilson, Orono, Me., J. R. Wilson, East Holden, Me.

Peter Wilson, Brunswick, Me., John D. Wing, Lewiston, Me., Mark Winne, Lewiston, Me., Delmar Wise, Houlton, Me., Hope Wise, Houlton, Me., Jerry J. Wisecarner, Bangor, Me., Ronald B. Wisecarner, Bangor, Me., Kendall Witham, East Sullivan, Me., Elaine Witham, East Sullivan, Me., Frederick B. Wolf, Portland, Me.

Helen J. Wolfhagen, Orono, Me., James L. Wolfhagen, Orono, Me., Esther E. Wood, Gorham, Me., F. R. Wood, Scarborough, Me., Matthew A. Wood, South Portland, Me., Barbara C. Woodbury, Portland, Me., Wendy Woodcock, Lewiston, Me., Linda Woodside, Waterville, Me., Richard J. Wright, Lewiston, Me., Robin Wright, Lewiston, Me.

Lydia S. Yauck, De Kalb, Ill., Paul Yeargans, New York, N.Y., Burnham Young, Camden, Me., William C. Young, Jr., Sebasco Estates, Me., Marguerite Yourcenar, Northeast Harbor, Me., R. Warwick Zeamer, Brunswick, Me., Mark D. Zeichner, Teaneck, N.J., Bernadine A. Ziemke, Springvale, Me., Stephen Jay Zimmer, Orono, Me., Lary E. Kalp, Bangor, Me.

Saul E. Katz, Bangor, Me., Harold Lloyd, Bangor, Me., Evan Neil Reilly, Bangor, Me., Dave McLeod, Bangor, Me., Keith G. Peterson, Bangor, Me., Evans Neil Reilly, Bangor, Me., Bradley Ryant, Bangor, Me., Sam Sampson, Bangor, Me., David C. Stillman, Bangor, Me.

Anslcy C. Throckmorton, Bangor, Me., George R. Tyson, Bangor, Me., Francis C. Utsch, Bangor, Me., Dwight L. Wilson, Bangor, Me.

Robert E. Maygerf, Bucyrus, Ohio, Nancy M. P. Bell, Orono, Me., Paula P. Atubn, Philadelphia, Pa., Deborah C. Rathbun, Bangor, Me., Jay P. McCloskey, Bangor, Me., David Morgan, Andover, Mass., William A. Joy, Ellsworth, Me., Mary Totman, Topsham, Me., Westoy Gerry, Lincoln, Me., Kathleen Moura, Rangeby, Me.

John Nickless, Hampden, Me., Rosemarie

Campbell, Brewer, Me., Wm. G. Yerga II, Bridgewater, Me., Katherine Laman, Orono, Sandra L. Speaven, Bangor, Me., Betsy Spruce, Milford, Me., Laurie Meishelmer, Plattsburgh, N.Y., James A. Simpson, Fairfield, Me., Jo Anne Dauphine, Bangor, Me., Bernice M. Singer, Cape Elizabeth, Me., Daniel Singer, Cape Elizabeth, Me.

Debbie Wincherysaw, Friendship, Me., G. M. Palmer, Jr., Bangor, Me., Laurence V. Hills, Waldoboro, Me., Barbara Abbey, Orono, Me., Karen Manchester, Orono, Me., John A. Steenstra, W. Concord, Mass., Sharon Parker, Fort Fairfield, Me., Franz Martin, Locke Mills, Me., E. Lyle Flynn, Jr., South Portland, Me.

Edward H. Reid, Rockland, Me., Catherine Palmer, Andover, Mass., Roberta Robinson, Northeast Harbor, Mass., Ann Nerrefield, Seaford, Me., Dan Sergeant, Bangor, Me., Tom Cassey, No. Anson, Me., Rae S. Coasins, North Harbor, Me., Bill Eames, Bethel, Me., Robert Krummona, Sidney, Me., Remigins Jimenas, Port Clyde, Me., John Smith, Plattsburgh, N.Y., Ormar Hines, Brunswick, Me., J. Entwisth, Owls Head, Me., J. Brown, Hamden, Conn., D. Morgan, Andover, Mass., Walter Bugaz, Teaneck, N.J.

Joel Tilley, North Haven, Conn.; Steve R. Wheaton, Bar Harbor, Me.; Cecil N. Collins, St. Agatha, Me.; Louise Chamberland, St. Agatha, Me.; Dwight Hines, Bangor, Me.; Ontly L. Redzt, Bangor, Me.; Rosemary Warren, Reading, Mass.; Karen J. Edwards, Salem, Mass.; Allan Rodway, Portland, Me.; Thomas James, Newcastle, Me.; Jane Rush, Houlton, Me.; Debbie Lane, Queens, N.Y.; R. Bennett, Bangor, Me.; Janice Bailey, Bangor, Me.; Catherine Henderson, McLean, Va.; Carolyn Thomson, Byfield, Mass.

Mr. President, I wish to thank the distinguished Senator from Washington for yielding his place to me.

Mr. JACKSON. I thank the able Senator from Maine for the expeditious way in which he moved in connection with his remarks.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 17711) to amend the District of Columbia Cooperative Association Act.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND OTHER PURPOSES

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 17123) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1971 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized for 40 minutes.

THE ABM AUTHORIZATION DEBATE

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, in recent weeks there has emerged out of the seemingly endless technical dispute over Safeguard, an argument that the New

York Times has referred to as "the principal technical argument of the ABM opposition." The argument I have in mind is one that many Senators will recognize immediately, so great is the prominence it has been given by the opponents to Safeguard in the case they have been trying to make both on and off the floor of the Senate. Reduced to its simplest expression, this is the argument that Safeguard, even if it functions perfectly, offers "negligible protection" to the Minuteman force, or could be "easily overwhelmed," or at most offers protection to Minuteman over a "very narrow band of threats."

This argument has been most persistently advanced by Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky. A recent statement issued by the Federation of American Scientists, along with a supporting chart, embraced the "negligible protection" view and was joined in or agreed to not only by Dr. Panofsky but also by Jerome Wiesner, Marvin Goldberger, Herbert York, and Herbert Scoville, Jr. Dr. George Kistiakowsky has associated himself with the Panofsky argument.

The remarkable fact is that so many of the Senators opposing Safeguard have accepted at face value one form or another of the argument made by this group of scientists.

Now, this argument, in its most important aspect, is a strategic argument, not a narrowly technical one, and should be evaluated in those terms. I received yesterday from a very distinguished group of men with long professional experience in the national security area a statement which definitively refutes the Panofsky analysis and which I am confident will be of great interest to all Members of the Senate.

The signers of this statement are well known to many Senators; they are:

Dr. Albert Wohlstetter, university professor, University of Chicago.

Dr. Charles M. Herzfeld, physicist, former director, Advanced Research Projects Agency.

Dr. Willard Libby, Nobel Prize winner in chemistry, professor of chemistry and director of the Institute of Geophysics and Planetary Physics at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Dr. William G. McMillan, professor of chemistry, UCLA.

I bring this statement to the attention of the Senate because I believe that it clearly demonstrates the strategic fallacy on which the "negligible protection" argument rests.

The statement reads as follows:

STATEMENT ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SAFEGUARD ABM SYSTEM

(By Dr. Albert Wohlstetter, Dr. Charles M. Herzfeld, Dr. Willard Libby, and Dr. William G. McMillan)

The statement widely publicized by the Federation of American Scientists and signed by Drs. Wiesner, Panofsky, Goldberger, Scoville and York asserts that a Safeguard ABM that worked perfectly would nonetheless offer negligible protection. They suggested that a Soviet ICBM threat large enough to destroy the Minuteman force not protected by Safeguard need only grow by a small percentage to destroy the Minuteman force protected by Safeguard and that Safeguard is therefore effective "only over a very narrow band of threats." This repeats an argument made somewhat more specifically by Profes-

Professor Panofsky last year and in the following statement this year:

"Let us assume that the survival of 300 Minutemen under attack would constitute an adequate retaliatory force . . . Without Safeguard protection the Soviets could achieve this result with 700 incoming warheads . . . With the expanded Safeguard now before this Committee, about 800 would do the job."

Professor Sidney Drell, using a chart prepared by Professor Panofsky, repeated these same numerical arguments on June 29, 1970 (pp. 430, 544, *Hearings*, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations). According to *The New York Times* this is the "principal technical argument of the ABM opposition." This "principal argument" is based on several fundamental errors.

The first—and very gross—error is manifest in the statement quoted above of Professor Panofsky. He assumes that "the survival of 300 Minutemen under attack would constitute an adequate retaliatory force." Yet he also assumes that the objective of the Russian attack is to destroy only 700 out of 1,000 Minuteman missiles. That is to say, he takes as the Russian goal an attack that would leave us with an adequate retaliatory force. It is hard to imagine a more absurd Soviet strategic aim. This absurdity, moreover, is central to the result. For, as common sense would suggest, the more an attack aims to accomplish, the larger the effort the attacker must put forward.

A moderately sensible Russian adversary, if he attacks at all, would aim at destroying as much of the Minuteman force as he could; he would want to leave surviving no more than, say, about 50 Minutemen. In any case, he would want the remainder to be clearly "inadequate." Without the extra protection for Minuteman provided by Safeguard, 500 SS-9s, in the mid or late 1970's, with the accuracy, yield and number of MIRVs per booster projected by pre-Nixon as well as post-Nixon intelligence, could destroy all but about 50 Minuteman. Safeguard would prevent the Russians from achieving that objective with such an attack. For the attacker to assure, in the face of Safeguard, that no more than 50 Minuteman missiles survive—his objective—he would have to buy some 800 more re-entry vehicles than he would require to leave 300 of the protected Minuteman missiles surviving—our objective. This 800 is eight times as many as the number so widely circulated by the opposition to the ABM.

The opposition's estimate of 100 re-entry vehicles is wrong even at the Minuteman 300 survival level; but the mistake is to take 300 Minuteman survivors as a rational Russian objective. For a more reasonable attack objective, the Russians would need 800 extra re-entry vehicles on launchers. Based on all official estimates of Russian missile costs, such an increment would require a very large extra investment—one that is far from negligible.

Second, supposing that the Russians were to contemplate this very large resource expenditure, they would have to consider the fact that the defense could counter it at a fraction of the Soviet offensive cost—a fifth or less. Detailed supporting calculations for a related set of cases were presented in the Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee this past May (pages 2402-2410). As one of the signers of this statement said in those hearings:

"The point of Safeguard Phase II is that it puts the United States in a position to offset any increment in the Soviet first-strike capability against Minuteman and to do this more cheaply than the Soviets can get that increment in their offense. If we clearly indicate our intention to protect Minuteman, we may discourage them from continuing to expand their offense force. We indicate that we value our second-strike capability at least

as much as they value their first-strike capability. Nothing compels them to get a first strike capability. The SS-9 and the SS-11 are expensive; increasing their number involves a serious resource expenditure for the Russians: Perhaps worth it if we indicate we have no intention of protecting Minuteman; not worth it if we make clear we intend to protect it and can do so more cheaply than they can overcome the protection." (p. 2273)

As alternatives to protecting our second-strike force with Safeguard, various ABM critics have suggested:

(a) proliferating Minuteman missiles—though this would increase our first-strike capability, and therefore, unlike the Safeguard defense of Minuteman, provoke a quantitative arms race;

(b) putting our SAC bombers on armed airborne alert though this would increase the likelihood of nuclear accidents;

(c) adopting a policy of launching all our Minuteman missiles at Russian civilians on the basis of electromagnetic indications—thus recklessly increasing the probability not merely of a nuclear accident, but of an accidental nuclear holocaust; and

(d) waiting for some future, hopefully better, ABM for which there is as yet not even a system definition.

Their estimates of the costs, effects, and time schedules of their various alternatives have been extremely careless. For example, they have understated the unit systems cost of Minuteman by a factor of nearly 300%, and air-alert costs by 400%. Their statements about the availability of alternatives neglect all realistic considerations of the time necessary to complete the system definition, obtain Congressional authorization, select the contractor and sub-contractors, acquire land, complete detailed engineering design, production release, equipment procurement, construction, installation, tests and shake-down.

Their recently repeated statement about the number of Russian re-entry vehicles required to cancel the effectiveness of Safeguard is perhaps the most far-fetched and careless of all. It assumes that the Russians, in attacking our Minuteman force, would take as their objective the preservation of our ability to retaliate adequately.

Mr. President, "absurd" is not too strong an adjective to apply to the assumption that the Soviets would launch a first strike against Minuteman with the intention of allowing 300 Minuteman missiles—adequate for our retaliation—to survive. It is wholly unwarranted to assume "that the Russians, in attacking our Minuteman force, would take as their objective the preservation of our ability to retaliate adequately."

It is no wonder that Safeguard appears to buy only a small degree of protection for the Minuteman force if one makes this wholly unreasonable assumption. The fact is that if the Soviets were prepared to leave our retaliatory capability intact, then we would not need Safeguard—nor any other means of protection, including the alternatives recommended by Dr. Panofsky and others.

As the statement I have just read demonstrates, without this unreasonable assumption, the "negligible protection" argument collapses. When this faulty assumption is replaced by a reasonable assumption about the minimum Soviet goal were they to undertake a first strike, the importance of the Safeguard ABM system becomes clear.

Mr. President, I hope that the Members of the Senate who have doubts about the effectiveness of the Safeguard ABM system will take the time before tomorrow's

votes to study the statement I have just read submitted by Professor Wohlstetter, Dr. Herzfeld, Dr. Libby, and Dr. McMullan. I am sure that my colleagues would not wish to allow a decision of great national importance to be determined by a case built on a gross strategic fallacy.

I would be surprised if even one of my colleagues were to now agree that our security should be based on the strange assumption that the Soviets in initiating a nuclear war would be so foolish as to design their own destruction. Mr. President, I am confident that those of us charged with responsibility for protecting our deterrent force would not knowingly make such an assumption, or persist in arguments based upon it.

Mr. TOWER, Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a comment?

Mr. JACKSON. I am pleased to yield to the distinguished Senator from Texas.

Mr. TOWER. I thank my distinguished colleague from Washington for offering a very closely reasoned rebuttal to the technical arguments offered in opposition to the ABM. I wish to add that I know of no man in public life who has more completely subordinated personal and political considerations to what he conceives to be in the best interests of his country. I have very often disagreed with the Senator from Washington, but I think his conduct through the course of the ABM debate has been an example of superlative statesmanship.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished friend and colleague from Texas for his very kind and generous remarks.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, it may be that, with the exception of the Senator from Tennessee, this will conclude the debate today. I think that tomorrow we will have some amendments that relate one to the other very closely, and I hope we can have a good attendance for the debate; because the bill has one thing in it and the Cooper-Hart amendment another; then there is another proposal by the Senator from Iowa and still another by the Senator from Pennsylvania. A great many figures are involved, and it will not be easy to keep up with them. I mention that because I think it might be well to put Senators on guard.

Mr. President, I want to emphasize a few points that I think have a practical bearing on this matter. We have already authorized and appropriated money for two sites—that is phase I. This bill, the committee recommendation, provides for two additional sites.

Someone asked me:

If the 2 sites are coming along and moving forward and there is research and development money, why do you insist on 4 sites?

I think that is a very practical question, and there is a very practical answer. We have to assume that we would not

need anything if there was not a threat. I think there is a proven threat. So, starting with that, if we just stop at two sites, frankly, I do not think that is sufficient quantitatively to give us the protection we are trying to provide. The purpose—the sole purpose—of the ABM in this form is to try to protect our ICBM sites. That is our land-based deterrent strength, and that is what we put our hope and our strength in for a land-based weapon.

If we have something that probably will be effective—and I do not think there is any doubt about it; the great weight of the evidence is in favor of it being effective—and we are going to just start two sites and then stop for an indefinite period of time and set it up 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, or 5 years later, the time that is precious and necessary will have run out. If we are really going to try this thing, we certainly have to start with more than two major sites. I think that is as clear as a bell, and I do not think it can be challenged.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. I think the Senator from Mississippi has made an excellent point; and I think he has made it, as he has said, "as clear as a bell."

It has been suggested that if we pursue the line advocated by the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE), simply to add additional MSR's to the two existing sites, this will provide us as much defense. But what is not mentioned is the fact that it would cost us several million dollars more. Beyond that, it is argued that this would be less provocative and less of an incentive or a stimulant to the arms race than the additional deployment of the two sites. But if, as is argued, it provides as much defense, then it seems to me that it would be fully as provocative—if, indeed, additional deployment and improvement of the ABM is provocative—and would be more expensive and probably, in the final analysis, less effective.

Mr. STENNIS. I think the Senator is correct. It would have the added feature of showing hesitation or doubt and backing up of the very worst kind to show to our adversaries.

This leads into the matter of the SALT talks. Again, I like to use my common sense on things—whatever amount I have—rather than a lot of theories and speculation.

If adversaries are sitting down at a table and are trying to reach something that they can agree on, if they think they are in a position where they ought to agree on something, if possible, because each feels he is in danger to a degree, and suddenly one just withdraws the weapon or the posture he has which creates apprehension in the mind on the other side of the table, and if the one who withdraws does not know he is out of business, everybody else knows he is out of business, because he has just withdrawn from the game. He is no longer a contender, regardless of what the arguments may be. He has voluntarily withdrawn.

I am not accusing anybody now of any unilateral disarmament. We do not have

to get into that realm at all. The person who takes that step back has just withdrawn for an indefinite time. He says he is doing it just for a year because the Senate voted one way. But he is out of business from then on, until he takes another affirmative start. That is another reason why we just cannot just stand idle without some excuse.

Mr. TOWER. Is not the Senator from Mississippi convinced that the President of the United States is sincere in his desire to arrive at some meaningful result in the strategic arms limitation talks? Does not the Senator agree that it would be the crowning achievement of this President's administration if he could arrive at some kind of strategic arms limitation? Does not the Senator believe that the President is convinced that he should work toward that end?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. I think the Senator is correct. But I do not believe that the President is working just for a crowning achievement. I think he is working because of the responsibility he feels is on him.

Mr. TOWER. I concur with the Senator.

Mr. STENNIS. In the position he has been put into.

Mr. TOWER. I agree.

Does not the Senator further agree that the President is the one best capable of determining what posture he and his country must be in to arrive at some sort of meaningful agreement and that his judgment is probably better than almost anybody else's?

Mr. STENNIS. I think that is so. He has the responsibility, and he has all the facts, and he is the man who has to make the negotiation maneuvers. That is the heart throb, that is the nerve center of the whole problem and of any prospective solution we may hope for.

Mr. TOWER. Would not the Senator agree that it would be unlikely that the President would knowingly advance for consideration by the Senate of the United States any kind of proposal that he thought would inhibit him in his pursuit of the achievement of that goal?

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct. The President, naturally, for many reasons, wants to move ahead with success.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Mississippi yield to me?

Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. Does the Senator recall the amount of the funds appropriated last year for phase I on Safeguard?

Mr. STENNIS. It is somewhere around a total of \$1 billion. \$793 million—three-quarters of a billion dollars-plus.

Mr. COOPER. There were additional funds appropriated for the warheads.

Mr. STENNIS. I have the figures here somewhere.

Mr. COOPER. As I recall, \$1.2 billion was appropriated last year for phase 1.

Mr. STENNIS. We will get the exact figures for the Senator. It is close to \$1 billion.

Mr. COOPER. The Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART) and I would like to know, if our amendment is adopted, how much money would be left in the bill for use on phase I?

Mr. STENNIS. It would be a sizable amount of money, but it would be limited. Mr. COOPER. \$1,037,000,000. Mr. STENNIS. It is over \$900 million, but—

Mr. COOPER. A billion—

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. COOPER. \$1,027,200,000.

Mr. STENNIS. All right.

Mr. COOPER. The point I am making is that if our amendment should be approved and appropriations were made in the sum of \$1,027,200,000, the Congress will have authorized and appropriated over \$2 billion for phase I—

Mr. STENNIS. That is substantially correct, yes.

Mr. COOPER. If our amendment is agreed to, it would strike \$322 million for phase 2. Considering the vast sum of \$2.2 billion or more that would be appropriated for Safeguard on phase I, it is difficult to say that the Congress is retreating, as the Senator has characterized such action.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator from Kentucky is talking in terms of dollars. The Senator from Mississippi is talking in terms of coverage. My point is that two sites, however successful they may be, are just not enough to do the job. It is not enough in quantity. It is not enough of an umbrella over our ICBM's.

Mr. COOPER. Does the Senator recall, if it is not classified—and I do not believe it is—how many Minuteman would be in place on the two phase I sites?

Mr. STENNIS. It would be quite a few.

Mr. COOPER. It is about the number that the administration stated—

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. COOPER (continuing). Is necessary to be protected for a second strike capability.

Mr. STENNIS. That is a classified subject, Senator, but it would be more than the number of the sites.

Mr. COOPER. It would be as many, if Safeguard is an effective system—it would be enough for a second strike.

Mr. STENNIS. Some. But a second strike capability would be in doubt. My point is, though, not enough.

Mr. COOPER. It would be enough for an effective second strike. I will stand on the statement, after hearing and reading the testimony, and having been briefed. I am making the point that if phase I is retained, as it would be retained under our amendment, the Department of Defense would go forward having been provided in the pending bill a great sum of money for the two phase I sites.

Does the Senator consider that to be a setback in the program?

Mr. STENNIS. We did not consider it as one.

Mr. COOPER. Does the Senator consider that it would limit the bargaining power of our country?

Mr. STENNIS. I think not, Senator. That is my idea about it. The amount of time available had a lot to do with these decisions, with all of us. Time-wise on these other matters we had more of a margin on time, in my opinion.

Mr. COOPER. I understand the Senator. I respect his judgment. All of us, however, have to look at these matters. I want to be sure that I am correct in quoting the Senator, that the Senator has characterized adoption of our

amendment as an act giving the impression that our Government was falling behind in support of SALT talks.

By the committee struck funds for the initiation and preparation of four sites which the administration claims is necessary for its bargaining power at SALT. What is the distinction? How can our amendment be characterized as one which would affect the SALT talks and the action of the committee in striking funds for four sites does not affect the SALT talks?

Mr. STENNIS. My quick answer to that is that the sites in the bill pertain to the ICBM's protecting our deterrent force—our strike force. The ones we took out of the bill go to the area defense concept rather than our missile bases. The distinction and the difference there speak loudly, just to mention those terms.

Mr. COOPER. I understand. The four sites were for area defense, but also to give some protection to missiles, too.

Mr. STENNIS. They added a little protection. I understand that this is not classified, that this major added base that we have in the bill would give about 40 percent more coverage—prospectively 40 percent more coverage to our Minuteman bases than would be true with a force with just the two—just the two bases to protect. So that, within itself, is a major factor.

Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator. I should like now to address another question to the Senator, if he will not mind, to see if there is any difference in the viewpoint of the sponsors of the Hart-Cooper amendment and the Senator from Mississippi, chairman of the committee. I am sorry that the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) is not on the floor at this time for several days ago the Senator from Mississippi, the Senator from Washington, and I had some colloquy about the purpose of the use of \$365 million provided in the bill for R.D. T. & E. on phase I.

It was indicated from the Senator's questions and answers that day—and I want the Senator to tell me if I am not correct—that the Senator from Washington, not to the Senator from Mississippi thought our amendment would restrict the use of the \$365 million, and that it could not be used on phase I. The Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART) and I have issued statements saying that is not correct. Nevertheless, I read in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD this morning, on page 27947, a letter from the Secretary of Defense, Hon. Mel Laird to the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), it does not directly state that our amendment would restrict the use but, as an assumption, conveys the impression that the money in the amendment would not allow the use of the \$365 million on phase I.

I would like to know from the Senator from Mississippi—because this may become an issue—if the view is actually held by the chairman of the committee and the members of the committee that our amendment would restrict the use of the \$365 million and would not permit R.D.T. & E. on phase I?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, there is a dispute here now about how we interpret some of the Senator's language. The Secretary of Defense did not write me

anything about it. He has not said anything about it to me. I would rather let him interpret his language and the Senator interpret his.

Mr. COOPER. I am just reading the letter.

Mr. STENNIS. I understand. I know that the Senator intends exactly what he says. I am sure of that. If the language does not bear him out, he would want to modify that language, I am sure.

The Senator gave the legislative history. It does leave this money available for these two sites. It is just a matter that grown men ought not to be arguing about, it seems to me, when language is uncertain that can be made certain. That is how I feel about it.

Mr. COOPER. I agree with the Senator. Mr. STENNIS. I take it the Senator stated exactly what he means.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, if there is any question, we would like it to be absolutely clear. The misapprehension could have occurred from language I used when I introduced the measure. I made the statement that it would permit or allow its use. The exact words are "would be available."

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think the uncertainty comes from the language, if I may refer to the amendment, on page 2, line 19:

Any advanced antiballistic missile program at sites heretofore established for such purpose.

There is some mention in the R. & D. part of the bill as being exclusively for another item that is related to something that is farther over the horizon as a possible future system of some kind.

It seems to me that the Senator's language ties this down to the sites heretofore established for such purpose. That looks to me as if it is talking about sites that are in being.

Mr. COOPER. We named the sites—Malmstrom Air Force Base and Grand Forks Air Force Base. Those are the two sites that were approved last year in phase I.

Subsection (b) reads:

The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to the obligation or expenditure of funds for research, development, testing, and evaluation activities carried out in support of any advanced antiballistic missile program at sites heretofore established for such purpose.

It is clear. It simply says that it authorizes the Department of Defense to undertake such research and development and testing and evaluation activities on an advanced system if, on its own determination, it wanted to do so. But it was not intended, and the language does not require, that the Department of Defense do so.

I wanted to have this colloquy with the Senator because I can state without any reservation—and I know that the Senator from Michigan will join me—that there is no intention of any kind to restrict in any way, by law or by interpretation, the use of the \$365 million or any other sum of money that is made available for phase I.

Mr. STENNIS. I accept the Senator's interpretation of his own amendment. If the Secretary of Defense had had the statement before him that the Senator has made now, undoubtedly he would

have understood it exactly the way the Senator intended.

Mr. President, I did not mean to speak at great length here. The Senator from Tennessee is in the Chamber. He wants to make some remarks. I just want to add one other point.

Mr. President, like it or not, the authors of this amendment, it seems clear to me, approve all that we did here last year in starting to get off on phase I at these first two sites. They propose to leave the full amount in the bill for those two sites to move forward and continue.

That is the very thing that the debate was over last year. The contention was that it was just for research and development.

That is an affirmation that we made a good start last year and did the right thing. I think the amendment is an affirmation of what the committee did and, in addition, it puts a second layer on top of the foundation we laid last year.

Another thing that people ask me about in letters and in person and in telegrams is that they want to know what we are worried about, since we have so many.

We are not worried about 1970. Let us remember that the crucial vote on tomorrow means that we are standing on the very threshold and the brink of a very crucial vote. This vote tomorrow is not shooting for 1970. It is talking about our security in 1975, from that period into the 1980's.

We have to lift our sights. If we wait until those years roll around, time will be gone and it will then have been delayed.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Mississippi for the very cogent point he has made in the course of this debate.

Mr. President, I further note that the provision as it now appears in the bill as reported from the committee was voted on favorably by a majority of the members of that committee and, I might say, a concurrent majority of both Democrats and Republicans. It is a bipartisan position. But more than that, it is a compromise. It is less than was asked for by the administration.

We have already compromised on this measure. I know that the administration feels that it cannot compromise further.

It should be understood that the administration opposes the adoption of any amendment to this provision of the bill and that the administration wants the committee position sustained.

Mr. President, a vote for any amendment is a vote against the position of the administration. The administration feels that this is the minimum that it must have to defend the country against a first strike capability and to proceed from a reasonable posture to negotiate for the limitation of strategic arms.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I have certain fact sheets here containing a statement from the testimony of Mr. O'Neill, together with a copy of a letter from him to me under date of August 7,

1970. This refers to Mr. Lawrence H. O'Neill, one of those assigned to this matter by the Secretary of Defense, along with Dr. Foster, on a panel.

I ask unanimous consent that this material be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NEW YORK, N.Y.,
August 7, 1970.

Hon. JOHN STENNIS,
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Several times I have heard of references to the so-called "O'Neill" report in hearings before committees and in other discussions in the Senate. I have been particularly disturbed by suggestions that seem to have been made at various times that Dr. John S. Foster misrepresented the views of the members of the panel that prepared the report when he stated that the panel felt that Safeguard components would "do the job" the Department of Defense wants to do in ABM.

Dr. Foster was aware, as all panel members were, that our membership included men of considerable distinction who believed Safeguard deployment was a poor idea from a political and strategic point of view and that some members felt that approaches to ABM other than Safeguard might be preferable from a technical point of view.

Nevertheless, it should be realized that Dr. Foster's inference is a reasonable one in view of the way the panel presented its advice. In addition to the submission of its written report, the panel twice participated in spoken presentations of its work to senior officers of the Defense Department and the Department of the Army. Dr. Foster was present on both occasions. Both discussions were of an "open forum" type at which any panel member had full opportunity and encouragement to speak out. Although it was clear that some panel members would have preferred to pursue technical approaches different from Safeguard, no panel member offered the opinion that pursuit of Safeguard was so unpromising as to be clearly inadvisable. In the circumstances of these conversations, as in the written report, Dr. Foster would, in my judgment, have been fully justified in concluding that we thought Safeguard was a reasonable approach although not, in the opinion of some, the best possible approach. In a complicated technical situation it is usual, indeed inevitable, for such a range of opinions to exist.

Dr. Foster's comment suffered from normal difficulties resulting from the brevity that is usual in the answer to a question during testimony. It cannot, in my opinion, be fairly viewed as a misrepresentation or as substantially different from the reply that most (in my opinion) members of the panel would have offered in Dr. Foster's place.

In short, in my opinion, given the constraints of funding and schedule that had been specified to the panel, most members believed that Safeguard was a reasonable approach to ABM and conveyed that impression to Dr. Foster and others.

I hope this will be of some assistance in clarifying a matter which might have some bearing on the difficult judgments that Senators will soon be called upon to make.

With best personal regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

LAWRENCE H. O'NEILL.

EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY OF DR. FOSTER

Dr. FOSTER. Mr. Chairman, you have indicated the number of scientists who oppose this Safeguard deployment.

Senator FULBRIGHT. There are several grounds. They oppose it on the SALT talks alone. Then in addition they oppose it on

the ground that it isn't technically feasible at the present time at least.

AD HOC COMMITTEE OF SCIENTISTS ON
SAFEGUARD

Dr. FOSTER. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me just simply point out that I asked a group of scientists to come together as an ad hoc committee and, before the Secretary of Defense made his recommendation to the President, review the program, I deliberately chose scientists who opposed the deployment of Safeguard as well as those who favored it. In fact, as I recall, when they met there were more against it than for it. I had, however, one very simple instruction for them—to put politics aside and just ask the question: Will this deployment, with these components, do the job that the Department of Defense is trying to do? And I gave them a range of possible deployments, since the Secretary had not yet made up his mind.

There was considerable concern about this move, but the report sent to the Secretary of Defense said that this equipment will do the job that the Department of Defense wants to do. They had some recommendations; for example, they would like to add development of the smaller radars, a decision we had already made—at least, they concurred in that decision.

I think it is extremely important that, when you ask a scientist for his opinion, you make sure that you have found a way to rule out political factors, because, as you and Secretary Laird noted at our last hearing, the scientist doesn't have special competence in that area.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Who were the scientists that you had on this committee?

Dr. FOSTER. It was a group of scientists under the chairmanship of Prof. Larry O'Neill of Columbia University. I would be delighted to furnish the complete list.

Senator FULBRIGHT. How many were there?

Dr. FOSTER. About a half dozen, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Can't you furnish them now? Don't you know who they were? Were they in the employ, directly or indirectly, of the Pentagon?

Dr. FOSTER. No, sir; generally they were not.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Who were they?

Dr. FOSTER. Prof. Sidney Drell, a close colleague of Professor Panofsky, who was mentioned earlier, at Stanford University was a member. It is so long ago I am embarrassed to say I have forgotten some of their names.

Senator GORE. You would have a record in the Department that you could supply.

Dr. FOSTER. Certainly, I have the list. There was Professor Goldberger of Princeton University; Prof. Allen Peterson, also of Stanford; Richard Latter of the Rand Corp. was a consultant. He is now over in Vienna on the talks. I don't have the others at the moment.

AD HOC PANEL ON FISCAL 1971 SAFEGUARD
PLAN

Professor Lawrence H. O'Neill, Chairman, Professor of Electronic Engineering and Director of Electronics Research Laboratory, Riverside Research Institute, 632 West 125th Street, New York, New York.

Dr. Lewis M. Branscomb, Director, National Bureau of Standards, Washington, D.C.

Dr. Sidney D. Drell, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University, P. O. Box 4349, Stanford, California.

Dr. Marvin L. Goldberger, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

Dr. William G. McMillan, The Rand Corporation, 1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, California.

Mr. W. S. Melahn, President, Systems Development Corporation, 2500 Colorado Avenue, Santa Monica, California.

Dr. Allen M. Peterson, Stanford Research Institute, 333 Ravenswood Avenue, Menlo Park, California.

Senator FULBRIGHT. These men are not in the employ of the Pentagon. They didn't have research contracts.

Dr. FOSTER. I don't know, Senator Fulbright, the degree to which Professor O'Neill has contracts from the Government, or Professor Drell or Professor Goldberger. But I understand that, as a result of section 203, Professor Goldberger lost his support from the Pentagon.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I want to talk about section 203 in a moment.

Senator CASE. Will the Senator yield just for a moment, please?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Senator CASE. May I suggest we ask Dr. Foster to provide it later.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I would like it now. By the time it comes we will have long since passed on to something else.

MEETING OF AD HOC COMMITTEE ON
SAFEGUARD

How long ago was this meeting?

Dr. FOSTER. This was before the Secretary's decision.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Was it 6 months ago or a month or how long?

Dr. FOSTER. I believe it was in December.

Senator FULBRIGHT. How long did they meet?

Dr. FOSTER. For about a week.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Here in Washington?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. In December.

You can supply them, but that will be long after the fact.

Senator CASE. No, I say would the Senator consent to an insertion of the report itself in the record.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That will be long after the impact of the hearing. It has happened before.

Senator CASE. Not before we vote on the ABM.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I think we will get it next fall.

Senator CASE. This is a matter we could follow up.

Senator FULBRIGHT. This matter came to the floor and I asked the chairman of the Armed Services Committee if in their deliberations they had ever invited any outside scientists to testify. He said no, he couldn't think of one. In other words this is just an in-house operation primarily and usually anyone outside the group is not consulted.

Dr. FOSTER. Senator Fulbright, I beg to differ with you on this. I went out of my way to select people who I believed were knowledgeable and, in fact, some of whom had formed opinions counter to that of the Department of Defense. And I asked them to serve. The only thing I asked them was to disregard their political feelings about the matter and to stick closely to the technical matters involved in which I personally believed they had great professional competence.

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SALT

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are you suggesting that, in considering what kind of agreements they might come to at the SALT talks in Vienna, that political matters and relations between countries have no significance? Is this strictly and solely a technical conference?

Dr. FOSTER. Absolutely not, Senator Fulbright.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Of course not.

Dr. FOSTER. Political aspects, in fact, are dominant.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I think they are too.

How you can say that Safeguard and MIRV have no effect on SALT is beyond my comprehension. The political agency, the Senate, expressed very overwhelmingly its support of the Cooper-Brooke resolution which advised the Department and the Government not to proceed with the deployment of these. Of course, this has been ignored completely. Apparently no one has paid any

attention to them at all. These are political judgments.

Dr. FOSTER. Excuse me, Senator Fulbright, with regard to this ad hoc group that I brought together, I was referring to the inclusion of technical people on both sides of the argument in an effort to review in advance the range of possible decisions that the Department of Defense might make with regard to Safeguard. It had nothing to do with SALT.

CHANGES IN WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND THEIR JUSTIFICATION

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Foster, even on the technical side, the way that the Department of Defense has vacillated between the Sentinel and the Safeguard and the justification being the Chinese and then someone else, together with this well-known record on many . . .

Senator FULBRIGHT. I haven't really looked at the list. Did you have any projects concerning the mosquitoes in Cambodia before you intervened there?

Dr. FOSTER. I don't recall any.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You don't recall it, but this would have been, it seems to me, much more appropriate than Malaya.

CONDUCT OF SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS

Senator COOPER. Mr. Chairman, I am going to raise a question.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am through.

Senator COOPER. He has been trying to answer these questions as well as he can. I think we should have order in this room.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It is the chairman's responsibility to keep order in the room.

Senator GORE. Let there be order in the room.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am through, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I call attention to the fact it is now 12 o'clock. Dr. Foster took perhaps 15 minutes. Senator Alken took, I think, five, and without questioning the propriety of it, I just note the fact that the balance of the time has been taken by the chairman and Senator Fulbright. This is something that is a continuing process, and I just note it for the record. I do that partly because the chairman of the full committee, Senator Fulbright, somewhat irascibly called me to account when he thought I had taken a little too long the other day in questioning a witness, and I would just like to make the suggestion that we do a little better job of evenhanded handling of these sessions.

REPORT OF AD HOC COMMITTEE OF SCIENTISTS ON SAFEGUARD

Now, Dr. Foster, you spoke about a report by an ad hoc committee of scientists that you had asked to make an examination of the antiballistic missile situation, and you mentioned Dr. Drell, Dr. Goldberger, and others as being members of that.

I would ask you if you will supply this committee with their report.

Dr. FOSTER. Senator Case, this was a report to the Secretary of Defense, and I believe before agreeing to that I should consult with the Secretary and see if we can make this report available to you.

Senator CASE. Will you do that?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, sir, I certainly shall.

(The information is classified and in the committee files.)

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, I repeat what Senator Cooper said earlier. I think that this should be regarded as it should be, a serious inquiry.

What would your recommendation to the Secretary be on my request?

Dr. FOSTER. Senator Case, you are asking me to reveal to you the personal advice that I would give to the Secretary of Defense in my capacity as his science adviser on your question. I find that one a bit difficult to answer.

Senator CASE. Well, perhaps it is executive privilege in advance that you are suggesting. If that is the ground that you put it on, I don't question it. Let me get at it another way. What did they say?

Dr. FOSTER. The committee concluded that leaving aside political—

Senator CASE. Yes; you made that point before.

Dr. FOSTER (continuing). Political considerations, they believed that—and I have to paraphrase here.

Senator CASE. Sure.

Dr. FOSTER. They believed that the Safeguard approach was a reasonable way to try and accomplish the several objectives required by the Department of Defense—that is to say, defense of our strategic forces, the Minuteman and the bombers, protection against the light attacks such as might be launched from Communist China, and protection against accidental launches from any source.

SPECIFICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF CONTRACTORS

Senator CASE. Now, you mentioned earlier, and I will come back to the requirements point, because I think we want to be somewhat more precise, and we haven't been at all in any of these discussions to what the requirements are. I want the specifications that were given to the contractors who have been asked to build these things. I would like to know now what you were referring to when you said they had certain recommendations to make.

Dr. FOSTER. They had recommendations, Senator Case, with respect to which additional site, or sites, should be chosen, and additional research and development that should take place to provide for additional capability should the threat require it. Those were the key points as I recall them.

Senator CASE. That is stated in very general points.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes.

Senator CASE. What recommendations did they make in regard to additional capability?

Dr. FOSTER. Senator Case, I am not yet sure that I can get Secretary Laird's agreement on supplying the document, and here we are in the process of your asking me for the details of the document. I find that a little awkward.

Senator CASE. Well, of course, I understand. I don't want any security information.

Dr. FOSTER. No, sir.

Senator CASE. But I do want the facts, and this we have been talking, I think, too much in generalities.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes.

SUBCOMMITTEE EFFORT TO ASCERTAIN IF SAFEGUARD WILL DO THE JOB

Senator CASE. This effort on the part of the chairman is a most worthwhile job to try to express in general terms what we regard as the problem. That is to say is the Safeguard designed to take care of a kind of threat, is it designed in the best way to accomplish that moneywise, and are there other choices that ought to be considered and dealt with? The chairman is trying, and this committee has been trying, it seems to us from unwilling witnesses, to drag it out, to get the basic facts, not just your conclusions, not just the recommendation that this be done, because we have very great doubt, not that you are not perfectly honest in what you say but that as to whether we really have something worth spending this enormous amount of money and time on, whether it will do a significant job, whether something else would be better. That is what we are trying to find out.

We have a strong suspicion, and you must know this; it is more than a suspicion in some cases, that what we are doing is just deploying something because it has been worked on for a long time, and that it is

not calculated to do the job that we all want done. We are not, and we refuse to be put in this position. Speaking for myself, we want the best system we can get for the defense of our missile force, and for the defense of our strategic weapons systems overall.

We don't want to spend one nickel on something just for the sake of completing a program that is being kicked around for a long time under various names and because there are vested interests in getting this thing built. That is the question that we want this information to answer, and I don't see why we can't have this information since we have to authorize the money to pay for it.

Dr. FOSTER. Senator Case, if I may—

Senator CASE. You may.

Dr. FOSTER. I should like to respond to your statements. First of all, in closed sessions, I have spent perhaps 20 hours or more trying to gain the understanding of people such as you who care very much about your country. You want the answers you have been asking for and I believe we have given them to you.

Let me be very clear about it: Safeguard is not a solution that is looking for a problem.

The United States has a very serious defense problem, and Safeguard is the best solution that I know of that is within the available technology and is compatible with plans to meet the several objectives we had to face in the fiscal year 71 transitional budget.

Senator CASE. Now, Dr. Foster, I know you believe this, you have said it many times. But that is a conclusion.

Dr. FOSTER. I understand.

Senator CASE. What we want to find out in terms that we can understand and in terms that the public can understand is precisely just what we are talking about in factual terms as a basis for that conclusion, and we haven't got it. We haven't got it. And the reason that our doubts continue and continue to mount is that we have judgments from you, and we respect your judgment, but also recognize you are wearing several hats at the same time.

When we have people from the outside, who have had in the past the kind of experience that you have had, continually telling us that this is a poor solution, that it is a waste of enormous amounts of money, and that we ought not to authorize it, just on the ground of effectiveness and cost, to say nothing of other considerations, and other considerations do enter into this of a political nature, but I am not talking about political things. I am talking about effectiveness and costs of the Safeguard system for the various kinds of things that it is supposed to do.

REQUEST FOR SPECIFICATIONS FOR SAFEGUARD

First of all, I have tried to get a copy of the specifications that you have given to your contractors, so that we will know what it is that this is intended to do. It is all very well for the contractors to tell us, and they will, that they can do what they have agreed to do, but what have they agreed to do?

This I can't get. I asked the staff of this committee months ago to get from you a copy of the specifications for this thing. I don't know whether the request was ever made.

I ask you now, can you provide this to us, in confidence of course? I would like to know what the facts are, because we would do much better at getting sound answers if we can get the facts on this thing out on the table and know what we are talking about and not have to talk generalities from now until kingdom come.

Dr. FOSTER. Senator Case, I understand your point, and let me make my answer very clear. We can and will provide you with the specifications for the Safeguard system. By

specifications, I understand you to mean not just the detailed characteristics of radar, but what the threat is that this system is supposed to cope with.

Senator CASE. You have to do it in terms that a layman can understand.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, sir; I will do that.

Senator CASE. Because a layman has to make the judgment as to whether the money is to be spent for this.

Dr. FOSTER. Absolutely.

Senator CASE. And that is very definitely what I want, but not just judgments, but factual statements.

Dr. FOSTER. No, sir; I personally formulated the range of threats that I believed Safeguard would have to counter and sent that information to the Army on several different occasions, to make sure that they laid plans that could cope with that range of threats; so I am quite familiar with this question and am fully prepared to give you the answer.

Now, as you pointed out, a statement of exactly what the system will be able to cope with at various times is a sensitive matter, but it can be made available to you, sir.

Senator CASE. I ask now that you assemble it and then notify us when it is ready so that we can deal with it in depth because this I think is the heart of the question as far as most of the people of the country are concerned. Are we wasting our money? Are we getting something that is worth having? Is our effort in this direction impairing development of an effective ABM, or will we get something really worthwhile in the way of defense against strategic threats? That is the kind of question I am interested in and I think the public is too.

Dr. FOSTER. I quite understand, sir.

Senator CASE. So we will wait to hear from you when that is ready.

(The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.)

Now, Mr. Chairman, I shall not despite my remarks at the beginning of my questioning, take more than a couple of minutes because Senator Cooper has been waiting even longer than I.

Senator GORE. Would you yield just a moment?

Senator CASE. I want to make a point. Yes.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, last Thursday the unclassified text of a report submitted to the Secretary of Defense by an ad hoc group of seven scientists concerning Safeguard was printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. The ad hoc group was chaired by Dr. Lawrence H. O'Neill, president, Riverside Research Institute—professor of electrical engineering, Columbia University.

Dr. O'Neill testified before the Armed Services Committee on May 19th of this year on Safeguard. His statement appears on pages 2293 and 2294 of the printed hearings of the military procurement authorization bill. At that time he made a very thoughtful and concise statement. Since there is considerable controversy concerning the report, I believe it would be beneficial to the Members of this body to consider his statement to the Armed Services Committee which is as follows:

STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE H. O'NEILL, PRESIDENT, RIVERSIDE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PROFESSOR OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Dr. O'NEILL. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to testify to you today. I have prepared a very brief statement on my views on the subject you are considering and, with your permission, I would like to present it to you.

In determining what the U.S. policy ought to be in the matter of deploying defenses against ballistic missiles, I believe four considerations are important:

1. The observed increases in the size and lethality of the Soviet strategic offensive force and plausible projections of those increases into the future represent, in my judgment, a worrisome hazard to the survivability of the land-based missiles and bombers of the U.S. strategic offensive force.

2. The Safeguard system is, from a technical point of view, and with respect to the deployment schedule thus far recommended by the administration, a moderate response to the increase in the capability of the Soviet force. It is not, in my opinion, a panicked or excessive response, and so long as the discontinuation or limitation of that deployment remains open to negotiation, I cannot see how it can be regarded as a provocation to the Soviet Union.

3. The Safeguard system in its full Phase II deployment will have the capabilities originally ascribed to it by the President: namely—and those capabilities are well known to you:

(a) The protection of the American strategic forces against a direct attack by the forces of the Soviet Union.

(b) Protection of the people of our country against a limited but deliberate attack such as Communist China could conceivably launch within the next 10 years, and

(c) Protection of the people of the United States against small attacks resulting from accidental or unauthorized launches.

There is no question that Safeguard is a compromise system because it attempts in its design to accommodate all three purposes and not only one of them. It is also a compromise because it attempts to respond to a hypothesized Soviet strategic force which is not as large or as potent as some have suggested it could be or as limited and as inaccurate as some have said it will be. There is no doubt that if one could prudently narrow the range of objective of Safeguard and to specify the size and nature of the future Soviet force very precisely, a better ballistic missile defense system could be designed.

However, in my opinion, to prescribe very narrowly at this point the purposes for which we might want missile defense and especially to state very precisely the Soviet force that defense might face would represent very irresponsible system design.

In my opinion, it is very doubtful that a better system could be deployed as early as one deploying Safeguard components or with as limited expenditures as are forecast for Safeguard. Overall, and speaking entirely from an engineering point of view, Safeguard represents a reasonable approach to ballistic missile defense if the Congress and President decide that such a defense is needed.

In addition to its own capabilities, it is suitable for augmentation and improvement by new components should such new components be found to be necessary.

4. Speaking now not as an engineer but as an ordinary citizen, I think it is important to bear in mind that, while the scientific and technical aspects of ballistic missile defense are important, they are by no means the subjects that ought to dominate the debate that will precede Congressional action in the matter. The issue is predominantly one to be decided on the basis of estimates of the effects of the congressional decision on the security of the country, on its domestic tranquility, and on its ability to deal with the very large range of problems, domestic and foreign, now before the Government. Although I am as deeply concerned as possible about the domestic turmoil now prevailing in the country, although I recognize—indeed, I live in the midst of—pressing difficulties that

now afflict our society, my own judgment is that the Administration's proposal for Safeguard in fiscal 1971 should be approved by the Congress. I think it would be easy, but potentially disastrous, to permit our deep concern for the turmoil now present in the country and for the deep division of the country resulting from the war in Southeast Asia to divert our attention from a hazard posed by the Soviet forces that could in the future cause extreme difficulty for the United States.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

SAFEGUARD ABM

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, 4 months ago on April 9, the Senate debated in this Chamber a resolution on mutual strategic weapons suspension. This resolution, introduced by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKS) and which I supported as a cosponsor, expressed the opinion of the Senate that the President seek immediate mutual suspension by the United States and the Soviet Union of further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems.

The Senate passed this resolution by a vote of 72 to 6.

Our sentiment then was clear. We called for a freeze on strategic armaments. We called for a halt—a mutual halt—on the spiraling arms race between this country and the Soviet Union. This sentiment for strategic arms control is shared by millions of Americans. It is this sentiment of reasoned arms restraint which should be with us now as we continue debate on the Military Procurement bill—the bill which authorizes funds for the procurement, research and development of aircraft, missiles and for the construction of facilities for the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system.

STRATEGIC WEAPONS FUNDING

The bill as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee includes the following funding levels for strategic weapons programs:

First Safeguard ABM. There is \$1.349 billion in funds for continuing Safeguard ABM at the two sites under phase I, that is, at Malmstrom, Mont., and Grand Forks, N. Dak.; and for expanding Safeguard to phase II-A, that is, deployment at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri; advance preparation at Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming; and equipment for the Ballistic Missile Defense Center at Washington, D.C.

Second. Navy missiles Polaris/Poseidon—There is \$559 million in funds for the Navy ballistic missile program, including \$540.5 million for Poseidon and \$18.5 million for Polaris.

Third. Air Force missiles Minuteman II/III. There is \$475.7 million in funds for the Minuteman II and III programs. The committee points out in its report:

All Minuteman I Missiles will be replaced. A portion have been replaced with Minuteman II which provides improvements in range, payload, accuracy and flexible targeting.

Minuteman III will replace the remaining Minuteman I Missiles. Minuteman III possesses improved survivability, penetration capability, payload, and accuracy over the older systems. Minuteman III has the potential of attacking different targets, and it

will be able to carry the necessary penetration aids to reduce vulnerability to enemy defenses.

The 1970 and 1971 requests reflect a slowdown in the previously planned rate of Minuteman III deployment. As of June 30, 1970, the conversion program had progressed to where the force consisted of 490 Minuteman I, 500 Minuteman II, and 10 Minuteman III.

It will be recalled that the first Minuteman version with multiple warheads, Minuteman III, was ordered developed in the spring of 1966, was test flown in August 1968, and was first installed this June.

Fourth. Minuteman rebasing options: R. & D. programs for improving the survivability of land-based ICBM's. A cut of \$27 million for phasing out the "hardened and hard-rock silos" program leaves \$50 million for work on such options as "hard point defense" and the mobile Minuteman programs.

Fifth. Advanced ballistic reentry system—ABRES. A cut of \$5 million related to a reduction of research into "hard-target kill capability," leaves \$100 million for the advanced development of reentry systems and penetration aids to provide improvements in the capabilities of land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles designed to penetrate enemy defenses in retaliatory attack.

Sixth. Advanced ballistic missile defense. A cut of \$20 million leaves \$138 million for research work on advanced development programs, including the "hardsite development" program.

Seventh. Advanced manned strategic aircraft, B-1.—A cut of \$50 million leaves \$50 million in research and development funds for the B-1 added to \$65 million in carry-over funds for the same purpose.

Mr. President, these are just some of the strategic weapons programs which we are being asked to fund in this bill.

I am pleased to note the committee reductions of \$102 million in the research and development of strategic weapons programs which I have just outlined.

Regarding Safeguard, phase II-A, I am pleased that the committee has moved to strike from authorization the House approved administration request to proceed with a Chinese-oriented ABM component, that is, the advance preparation of four additional areas defense sites. In cutting \$10 million for this purpose, the committee states in its report that there is "no compelling need to move now" to protect against a Chinese ICBM attack.

In taking this action, the committee has deemphasized the "China rationale" and the "accidental launch rationale" for Safeguard area defense. The committee maintains that the major mission for Safeguard is to protect the land-based Minuteman deterrent against direct attack by the Soviet Union. In short, the committee emphasizes the "Soviet rationale" for Safeguard hard point or active terminal defense.

IN RE THE O'NEILL REPORT

Mr. President, while noting that the committee wishes to establish the primacy of active terminal defense as the mission for Safeguard, it should be recalled that Safeguard sites at Malmstrom, Grand Forks, and Whiteman are

intended to provide terminal defense for Minuteman as well as area defense as indicated in the following chart:

THE 3 OBJECTIVE SAFEGUARD SYSTEM

Site	Contributes to area coverage	Contributes to terminal defense for Minuteman	Is part of 7-site system ¹
Grand Forks.....	X	X	X
Malmstrom.....	X	X	X
Northwest.....	X	X	X
Michigan/Ohio.....	X	X	X
Northeast.....	X	X	X
District of Columbia.....	X	X	X
Central California.....	X	X	X
Warren.....	X	X	X
Whiteman.....	X	X	X
Southern California.....	X	X	X
Texas.....	X	X	X
Georgia/Florida.....	X	X	X

¹ 7-site system: The 7 sites are among the 12 included in the Safeguard phase II deployment which the Army has described. The 7-site system is considered a "way station" to pass through on the way to a complete phase II deployment.

Source: Report of the AD HOC group on Safeguard for fiscal year 1971 u/k/a. The O'Neill report, submitted to the Secretary of Defense, Jan. 27, 1970.

Last Thursday, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Mr. FULBRIGHT) inserted the so-called O'Neill report in the RECORD. This is the report submitted by a 7-member panel of scientists chaired by Prof. Lawrence H. O'Neill of Columbia University. The panel was set up by Dr. John Foster, director of Defense Research and Engineering to advise the Secretary of Defense on scientific aspects of Safeguard.

Several observations in the report, I think, bear repeating:

(1) If the only purpose of Safeguard is defined to be to protect Minuteman, Phase IIA as defined in March 1969 should not proceed. Instead, a dedicated system for active defense of Minuteman should replace or, if the need for the MSR (Missile Site Radar) is proved, augment Phase IIA. As a minimum step, the complement of Sprints at Grand Forks and Malmstrom could be increased.

(2) If the only purpose of Safeguard is defined to be a "thin" area defense, then it is important to recognize: "an incomplete area system provides no protection from 'blackmail' by an opponent (e.g., C.P.R.) with a small ICBM force or from an unauthorized attack. It provides only limited protection against accidental launches. Therefore, initiation of an area defense system is justified only if there is an expectation that it will prove to be necessary or desirable to cover the entire country with such a system."

(3) If the three purposes of Safeguard are defined to protect Minuteman ICBMs against any direct Soviet attack; to protect the American people against a Chinese attack; and to protect against accidental attack from any source, then "there is a need for a policy decision on whether to give emphasis to Minuteman terminal defense or to divide effort between Minuteman defense and area defense in the next step taken toward Safeguard Phase II."

Mr. President, over many years, Congress has examined varieties of proposed ABM systems. There was the Chinese-oriented "light" ABM area defense. There was the Soviet-oriented "heavy" ABM area defense. Now there is the so-called "limited" and "phased" Safeguard ABM mix of area defense and missile defense. Each of these defenses, it appears, can be viewed as anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese oriented especially in the

context of "growth threat"—that is, in view of any number of possible perceptions of what the Soviet or Chinese threat to our deterrent could be over the next decades.

My examination of this year's testimony on the administration request for expansion of Safeguard phase I to phase II-A leads me to underscore the very real danger of being sucked further into the whirlwind of nuclear weaponry—that insane spiraling of armaments—which we as a nation have repeatedly declared we want stopped.

Mr. President, I have not to date opposed research on an ABM system. Research on an ABM system is one thing; deployment and expanded deployment are others requiring separate decisions on the basis of progress in research and on the basis of actual need perceived by continuous assessment of enemy threat.

Last year, the administration asked Congress to authorize funds for deployment of Safeguard at the two sites of Malmstrom and Grand Forks.

OPPOSITION TO SAFEGUARD DEPLOYMENT

I have opposed deployment of Safeguard as my record clearly shows. Last summer in a series of ABM amendments before the Senate I voted against an amendment which would have prohibited even research and evaluation of Safeguard ABM components. I voted for the amendments which would bar deployment of Safeguard. When the amendments failed to pass in the summer votes, I was one of the 36 Senators who moved to bar funds for the deployment when the Defense appropriations bill reached the floor in December.

Last year, in opposing deployment of Safeguard phase I, I said:

The burden of proof for an ABM rests on the Pentagon. We have been told that it is needed to plug a "deterrent gap." Yet to date, there has been no confirmed evidence that such a gap exists. Over the years, we have been told of a "bomber gap"; then of a "missile gap." We found out later that there had been errors in estimates of Soviet strength and that the military strength of the United States had all along been in fact superior.

Unilateral armament is the net effect of so many of the Pentagon's programs. "Confirmed" and "probable" estimates of potential enemy capability in war planning seem to give way to what war-game strategists think is "possible." For the "possible," and for just another option in contingency planning, we have spent billions on weapons. Far too often, it appears that funds for weapons are merely spent on an arms race against ourselves.

So it is that over the years we have spent billions of dollars to fill gaps that have not existed.

SAFEGUARD AND SALT CHIPS: 1970

Mr. President, this year, the Pentagon tells us that we need to expand Safeguard to phase II-A including deployment at a third site, that is at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. We have been told that phase II-A is needed to plug a "bargaining gap" in our portfolio of negotiable instruments at the strategic arms limitation talks—SALT.

We have been told by the Defense Department that we must expand Safeguard to let the Russians know that their strategic weapons buildup is unacceptable.

able to us. In short, it is the Pentagon's hope that U.S. buildup in defensive strategic weapons—and here let us not forget the other items in the bill for offensive strategic weapons—will provide the incentive for the Soviets to halt buildups in strategic armaments.

The approach to SALT then appears to be one of "arming to disarm." The Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART) has already questioned this approach and I share his skepticism.

Regarding bargaining chips and the incentive we can provide to check Soviet increases in strategic weapons, the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) has observed, and I think rightly so:

The United States already has ample bargaining chips in its unquestioned capacity to continue and even accelerate the arms race. It is this capacity which the Russians are concerned with, not an un-built ABM system of dubious efficacy. The Russians recognize that if no agreement is reached at SALT, we can eventually build far more effective ABM systems than Safeguard, and can massively increase our defensive strength. This is their incentive to negotiate meaningfully at Vienna.

Mr. President, we do not know the specifics of the administration's instructions to our negotiators at SALT. We do not know such details as instructions on quantitative and qualitative limitations on the strategic weapons arsenal; the time framework of limitation; the rate of limitation and the extent of limitation.

What we know is that the administration is asking us to authorize additions—not limitations—to our strategic weapons program. We know that with each request goes the argument of yet still another bargaining chip for SALT.

AVOIDING THE INSATIABILITY FOR SALT CHIPS

SALT must not become an "instrument for armament" by the United States and the Soviet Union. Nor should it become an "incentive for armament" by other countries. I, along with many Americans, fear these very developments.

Let us seek with the Soviet Union an acceptable "strategic parity" or "security sufficiency" in strategic weapons systems. But let us seek such agreement through formulas implementing a freeze or reduction in armament, not through actions aimed at building up armament.

Strategic weapons buildup by the United States and the Soviet Union—the very arms race we fear—appears to be the present approach to SALT. Let us recall the exchange between the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) and Secretary Laird during hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee. When asked how a decision to "stretch out" MIRV deployment with deferral contingent upon concrete progress at SALT, Secretary Laird said:

"I do not find this proposal inconsistent with the spirit of strategic arms limitation—but I do believe that it is inconsistent with the purpose of the arms limitation talks, which is to sit down at the table with the Soviet Union and work out an agreement that provides essential security and is acceptable to both sides." (Page 2171, Authorization for Military Procurement, Research, and Development, Fiscal Year 1971, Hearings before Senate Armed Services Committee).

SAFEGUARD AND SALT AND GRIT

Mr. President, the momentum in the development, procurement and production of strategic weapons must be halted in the name of sanity. It can be halted by sound decisionmaking as to national priorities. It must be halted for the lasting and genuine security of this nation and the nations of the world.

This year the Senate again faces a series of amendments on Safeguard deployment. I have cosponsored two amendments. The first, to be called up by Senator HUGHES, bars Safeguard deployment at sites under both phase I and phase II-A. The second, introduced by Senator COOPER and Senator HART, limits Safeguard to Phase I sites by barring deployment at Whiteman AFB and the advance preparation at Warren AFB.

These are reasonable amendments. If, however, the first fails, then the second still provides a check on the Safeguard spillover to additional sites called for under phase II-A.

In considering the reasonableness of these amendments, let us recall that our strategic weapons investments over the years presently yields a kill-power 10 times that needed to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union. Against this, we must weigh the present increases in Soviet developments on the SS-9, SS-11 and SS-13. We know, that in weighing numerical increases in weapons, quantitative increases are not as significant as qualitative improvements such as the accuracy and penetration of warheads to potential targets.

Our strategic deterrent is not in danger of being overwhelmed now, nor is it likely to be in the coming decade. Still we must be alert to the "growth threat", that is, what the Soviet Union could do and what the Chinese could do to our deterrent by building up and improving their strategic weapons arsenals.

To meet "growth threat" in enemy buildups, the Defense Department asks us to build up our over-kill and alleges that by so doing the enemy will halt its buildup.

Mr. President, if there is any reasonable premise of human behavior on which this logic is based it escapes me. The fact is that this logic has failed in the past and it fails now as we and the Soviet Union expand our arsenals.

I hope that the strategic arms limitation talks will prove successful in achieving a limit in strategic armaments—a mutual limit in all categories of strategic armaments. I am of the firm conviction, however, that such arms agreement limitation should not be based on mutual increases in armaments, but rather by mutual ceilings and reductions on present levels of armaments.

Gradual reduction in terror, GRIT is hopefully what we will achieve at the strategic arms limitation talks, SALT. Meanwhile, funds in this bill—funds for increasing our offensive and defensive weapons programs, including an expansion of Safeguard ABM, take us from the terror reducing objective.

We can move toward gradual reduction in terror by checking Safeguard expansion. For the sake of genuine national security of this Nation, I hope we will be successful.

THE ABM SYSTEM

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, for many Americans the ABM is no longer a part of a specific weapons system; it has become the symbol of an increasing public concern about the goals of this Nation's foreign policy and the wisdom of those who make and administer it. It is seen as the most recent and most politically vulnerable example of the way an unholy though natural alliance of military and industrial leaders can promote for its own purposes an expensive weapon of dubious need and technical efficacy. In a time of serious domestic crisis, it is viewed as evidence that the political and economic establishment is either unwilling or unable to respond to growing public demand for a major shift in funding priorities, from defense spending to social programs.

In my view, much good has come from this new, critical public interest in defense expenditures, such as the recent announcement by Secretary of Defense Laird that future weapons contracts will stress testing and evaluation before large amounts of money are appropriated. However, there also lies in this same public interest a grave danger. First, the formulation and execution of a genuinely responsible foreign policy and defense strategy may be impeded or even rendered impossible by an uncritical and categorical public opposition to anything military. Second, there is a growing number of Americans who feel that international realities now permit the formulation of an effective foreign policy that would not include a strong defense posture. There is a great difference between a demand that defense expenditures be efficiently administered and the view that the maintenance of American military strength is unwarranted and even immoral.

To me, all this suggests that public debate on the Safeguard system has lost sight of the system itself. Whether the system has merit has become largely irrelevant. I do not mean to imply that the large and symbolic issues that pertain to the system are not important. They clearly are. But I am deeply concerned that the factors that should control the decision of whether to deploy the Safeguard may have little to do with that decision, and that it may be sacrificed to broad national concerns and commitments that would be advanced and protected by the ABM system.

In brief, I find that the arguments against further deployment of the Safeguard system are: First, the system is at best unnecessary and at worst will seriously limit the prospects for productive arms talks with the Soviet Union; second, it represents a dangerous and immoral commitment to an expanded arms race at a time when there exists a unique historical opportunity for the United States to exercise restraint, which is consistent with its national ideals and its desire for peace; third, it is technologically unreliable and could be easily overwhelmed or neutralized by the Soviet Union; and fourth, it diverts to military purposes public resources critically needed for social progress at home.

It is my carefully reached and strongly

held conviction that, on the contrary, further deployment of Safeguard: First, is necessary for national security and will greatly enhance the possibility of meaningful arms agreements with the Soviet Union; second, will not provoke escalation of the offensive arms race and is, in fact, far more moral than the alternatives available to us; third, is technologically adequate for the restricted function that it is designed to fulfill; and fourth, is not properly viewed as an alternative to domestic spending but is influenced by considerations of a wholly different nature.

I held these views during our consideration of phase I of the Safeguard system and feel even more strongly about them now in light of having had the opportunity to more adequately understand what is actually included and excluded, the complete lack of alternatives, and most important, what has transpired at the strategic arms limitation talks in Vienna since April.

President Nixon is widely criticized for having simply repackaged the Sentinel system. What this argument ignores is the fact that while several Presidential justifications have been offered for the ABM, only one basic justification has been offered by President Nixon. He concluded that the Sentinel system and the purposes for which it had been authorized were not consonant with what he saw happening in the Communist world and with the avenue that he perceived as holding the greatest prospects for significant deescalation of world tensions and the arms race. With a few minor changes, the physical configuration of the Sentinel and Safeguard systems are about the same, but the concept of defending only our land-based retaliatory capacity makes the Safeguard argument one that overcomes the questions of absolute reliability. To begin with, an offensive missile launched by the Soviet Union against a hardened Minuteman silo in the remote plains of Montana and North Dakota would have to be targeted with extraordinary accuracy. Second, penetration by such an accurately targeted warhead and a direct hit would mean the loss of only a single American ICBM, not the massive loss of human life. Third, Soviet military planners would be required to impute to our defense system a far greater degree of reliability than it might actually possess.

In considering how real the Soviet threat is, one only has to look to the fact that during the past 2 years, the Soviet missile force has tripled to more than 1,000 ICBM's, including the giant SS-9. In addition, the Soviet influence in both the diplomatic and arms crisis in the Middle East cannot be easily brushed aside. While they have not deployed more missiles since the SALT talks began, there is substantial evidence that the Soviet Union is still constructing ICBM launchers for future deployment. Opponents of the system delight in pointing out the seeming discrepancy between the assertion by Secretary of Defense Laird that the Soviet Union is going for a first-strike capability and a subsequent statement by Secretary of State Rogers that, in his view, there was

no intention on the part of the Soviets to launch a first strike against the United States.

The two statements are in no way inconsistent; they simply draw attention to the difference between capability and intention. As President Nixon has said:

I believe that defensive decisions must be made on the hard realities of the offensive capabilities of our adversaries, and not on our fervent hopes about their intentions.

Although the Safeguard system in no way lessens the U.S. reliance upon its retaliatory strike capacity to deter nuclear aggression by an enemy, those who oppose Safeguard would have us rely solely on the deterrent and would do nothing to provide an alternate response. Without Safeguard, in the event of a minor, accidental or unauthorized attack, the United States would have no alternative to unleashing the full fury of its deterrent against the country believed to be the origin of attack.

It seems to me that the largest nation on earth, and by our own claim the most moral nation on earth, ought to find a defense posture more moral and more appropriate than reliance on offensive weaponry in terms of retaliatory strike capacity. It is chilling to me to hear opponents of Safeguard allege that the program ought not to be authorized and deployed because it is cheaper to have an equivalent amount of defense for the United States by building more nuclear strike capacity with systems such as Minuteman and Poseidon.

I think it is time that we take a calm, dispassionate look at our post-World War II policy of retaliatory deterrent and consider instead an active defense system. Put another way, I think it is time we laid aside our ICBM mentality, even if at greater cost. Put still another way, I think that if I were a citizen of the Soviet Union and I saw the United States of America elect against a defensive system and in favor of an offensive strike system, I might be a little upset.

Those in opposition to Safeguard have heretofore relied heavily on the argument that our ABM was provocative and would certainly dampen the prospects of the United States obtaining any sort of agreement, limited or comprehensive, at SALT. Although the details of the talks have not been made public, there is every indication that the decision to deploy phase I of Safeguard has not altered the eagerness of the Soviet Union to proceed with arms talks. In fact, it soon became apparent in Helsinki late last year that the Soviets had zeroed in on the U.S. ABM while paying very little attention to our already-completed Minuteman force. The Soviet concentration on Safeguard has reinforced my belief that the program is the one critical bargaining chip at Vienna.

The importance of the ABM at SALT should not come as a surprise to the United States, however, since the Soviet leaders have long held the belief that a government should provide for the defense and safety of its people and property. In addition, the vast expenditures necessary to build an ICBM system of such quality that it can overcome even a "thin" hard-point defensive system

would cause great difficulty in the Soviet Union in view of their current domestic needs.

The effect of the initiative taken by the United States in approving phase I is also not without precedent in that the Soviet willingness to seriously participate at SALT is strikingly similar to the publicly announced readiness of Russia to participate in arms talks which came only three days after the Senate had voted appropriations for Sentinel in June 1968. Shortly thereafter, a prestigious Soviet scientific journal offered to publish a speech by the director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the thesis of which is that defensive systems can be deployed in such a way as to decelerate the offensive arms race.

Whatever progress has been made at SALT can be credited in part to the fact that our delegates had a negotiable point that highly interested the Soviet Union, and to undermine the American bargaining position at this time by refusing to approve the request for phase II of Safeguard would greatly diminish the likelihood of a successful agreement. With their chief target removed by congressional action, the Soviets would have little incentive to halt deployment or decrease their offensive forces.

As pointed out so well in the Senate Armed Services Committee report on H.R. 17123, the United States would certainly welcome an agreement that would obviate the need for Safeguard, but there is no assurance at this time that such an agreement will be reached. The risk to the success of our negotiators at SALT in striving toward a workable arms agreement and the strategic and moral need for a good defense to secure our deterrent force, should an agreement not be possible, is, to me, the serious question involved. I believe that the burden of proof is upon those who assert that deployment of the Safeguard system raises a significant obstacle to fruitful negotiations; proof that is most difficult to come by in view of the basic thinking of the Soviet leaders and negotiators as evidenced by their past and present activity.

Mr. President, the decision to proceed with phase II of the Safeguard system may be, when combined with phase I, the most important step any nation in the world has taken to end the offensive arms spiral. At the same time, it may well serve to discourage the Soviet Union from using the threat of a first-strike capability to gain a one-sided agreement. Until tangible progress is made on arriving at, and even beginning to implement, mutually acceptable SALT agreements, it is in the national interest of both the United States and Russia to retain at all times a credible capability to deter attack by the other.

It should be borne in mind that the credibility of our respective deterrents can and ought to be predicated at least in part on an active defense system rather than an offensive system. As long as one side continues to introduce new offensive weapons systems into its inventory, the other side risks the credibility of its deterrent if it fails to respond. I

also firmly believe that both sides will require some deterrent forces, both defensive and offensive, even under a SALT agreement. Neither side can be sure what Communist China and others will do with their nuclear weapons as their ability to deliver an attack develops.

Both the United States and Russia are on record as endorsing the principle that neither side should gain strategic advantage over the other as a consequence of SALT. The entire problem of what to keep and what to prohibit under SALT arrangements takes time to work out. The chances for eventually arriving at a mutually acceptable SALT arrangement will be enhanced if there occurs, in this country, a surge of public realism and patience. Strategic deterrence is the most vital protection we have to insure our continued national existence. If it can be obtained eventually at less cost and risk through SALT arrangements, this will be a real step forward. But no one will know until the negotiators have had sufficient time to do their work—behind closed doors and without any pressures to hurry.

I believe that the committee's recommendations constitute the minimum requirements necessary for maintaining a strong deterrent irrespective of success or failure at SALT, and I therefore urge the Senate to approve the \$1.349 billion needed to continue the Safeguard program.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I appreciate the observations made by the distinguished and astute Senator from Tennessee. I hope his remarks, which display a great amount of in-depth research, will be read and carefully considered by all of our colleagues. I think he has approached the question in a very dispassionate manner and has arrived at the conclusions which he has reached after careful and thoughtful consideration; and I certainly commend him for a very worthwhile and learned presentation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. What is the will of the Senate?

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATORS MURPHY AND PACKWOOD TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on tomorrow, at the completion of the remarks of the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN), a period of not to exceed 30 minutes be allotted to the Senator from California (Mr. MURPHY) and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECESS UNTIL 9 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in recess until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(Subsequently, this order was modified to provide for a recess until 10 a.m. tomorrow.)

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT REQUEST

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I am about to propose a unanimous-consent request.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have quiet, so that we may hear the Senator?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, this proposed request has been discussed with the able majority leader, the able minority leader, the able minority whip, and the various Senators who are sponsors and cosponsors of the known amendments to be discussed, debated, and voted on tomorrow.

Mr. President, in lieu of the unanimous-consent agreement adopted on August 6, I make the following unanimous-consent request:

Ordered, that the vote on the adoption of the Cooper-Hart amendment, as pending or as amended, occur at 3:45 p.m. tomorrow, Wednesday, August 12.

That debate on any amendment offered from 9 a.m. until 10:30 a.m. on tomorrow be limited to 30 minutes, the time to be equally divided and controlled between the proposer of the amendment and the majority leader, if he is opposed to the amendment, or the minority leader if the majority leader is not opposed to the amendment, or their designee.

Ordered further, that from 10:30 a.m. until 12:15 p.m. it be in order for the Senate to debate the amendment to be proposed by the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), to be considered en bloc; and that the time be equally divided between the Senator from Iowa and the majority leader, if he is opposed to the amendment, or the minority leader if the majority leader is not so opposed, or their designee.

Ordered further, that the Senate proceed to consider the Brooke amendment at 12:15 p.m., with debate thereon limited to 1 hour, the time to be equally divided between the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) and the majority leader, if he opposes the amendment, or the minority leader if the majority leader does not oppose the amendment, or their designee.

Ordered further, that thereupon the Senate proceed to the consideration of the amendment by the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the debate to be limited to 15 minutes and controlled by the Senator from Iowa, after which the Senate will immediately proceed to vote on the Hughes amendment.

After the vote on the amendment by the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), that there be 15 minutes of debate on the Brooke amendment, with the time under the control of the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE), the vote thereon following immediately thereafter.

Provided further, that following the vote on the Brooke amendment, the remaining time until 3:45 p.m. on the Cooper-Hart amendment be equally divided and controlled by the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) or the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART), and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—and I do not know that I would object—I notice here, as to all these amendments except the Cooper-Hart amendment, the time is designated to be controlled by the minority and majority leaders.

I do not object to them personally, but it is customary for the one who has the bill to have the privilege of controlling the time, and the proponent of an amendment controls his time. Will the Senator give an explanation as to why he is departing from that?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, may I say that I have no personal feeling about that matter. I would be very glad to change the unanimous-consent request to read accordingly.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object for that purpose, I would suggest that we indicate that time is to be equally divided in all instances between proponents and opponents of the amendment, if the distinguished Senator has no objection. I have just had notice that the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND) would like to be notified of any time agreements. I did not know that when I discussed the matter with the distinguished Senator from West Virginia. If the Senator from West Virginia can withhold his request for a few moments, without having to read it all again, we will have word from the Senator from South Carolina.

I think we can protect the proponents and opponents by making it clear in this colloquy that that is the intention of the unanimous-consent request.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. The intention of the request was that the proponent of the amendment, of course, have control over half the time and that the majority leader or the minority leader—or their designee—depending upon the position of the majority leader vis-à-vis the amendment—have control over the other half.

It would be perfectly agreeable to change the unanimous-consent request and place the time in opposition to each amendment under the control of the able manager of the bill.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, it is quite an added burden to have to control that time. I think the Senator who is presenting the bill and carrying that load should have control of the time on any amendment that seeks to change the committee bill. He is representing the committee.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, may I say to the able Senator that there was no motive whatsoever in writing the unanimous-consent request as it has been read.

Mr. STENNIS. I understand that.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I will change the verbiage in accordance with our discussion here, so that time in opposition to amendments will be controlled by the manager of the bill.

Mr. SCOTT. In order that we may understand what is being proposed here, there is to be no vote on any amendment

prior to 1:30 p.m. tomorrow. Is that correct?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. That would be the understanding.

Mr. SCOTT. I withdraw my reservation of objection, with the exception that I would like the distinguished Senator to withhold the actual putting of the question until we have heard from the distinguished Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Very well. I think the RECORD should show, however, in response to the query by the able minority leader, that if a Senator were to offer an amendment at 9 a.m. or 9:30 a.m. or 10 a.m., it would be an amendment concerning which we are not informed at the moment. Of course, that Senator would have a right to ask for a vote on that amendment. But insofar as the votes on presently known amendments are concerned, no vote would occur before 1:30 p.m. tomorrow under the agreement if it is adopted.

Mr. SCOTT. Because, as the distinguished Senator from West Virginia knows, there is a funeral of a Member of the other body tomorrow morning, and the two Senators from Pennsylvania will be there. I state this so that Senators may be advised of our expressed hope that no vote will occur on other amendments prior to 1:30 p.m. as well as those which are presently under consideration.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Acting on behalf of the majority leader, I concur in that hope. Every possible action would be taken to protect Senators in accordance with that understanding.

Mr. President, I withdraw the proposed agreement for the time being.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair, with the understanding that the recess not extend beyond 15 minutes.

The motion was agreed to; and, at 5:16 p.m., the Senate took a recess subject to the call of the Chair.

At 5:29 p.m., the Senate reassembled, when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. CRANSTON).

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I ask that the floor be cleared and Senators take

their seats, and that Senators' aides take seats in the rear of the Chamber, and that the Senate be in order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

INFLATION "ALERT" DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR PRICE AND INCOME GUIDEPOSTS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, as we all know, the Council of Economic Advisers issued its first "inflation alert" last Friday. This document was lengthy and belated, and the unfortunate title "inflation alert" has, of course, invited humorous and belittling comments. However, in our dismay that the administration has not seen fit to employ more vigorous and specific anti-inflationary policy, we should not overlook the value of the document released last week as a source of information on what is happening to prices and wages.

What is happening in many sectors of the economy is no less than alarming; and, as Hobart Rowen points out in an article in this morning's Washington Post, the Council's "inflation alert" is its own best evidence that "what this country needs is a stronger wage-price policy to curb inflationary pressures that are not being halted by other Government measures."

Much of the first part of the Council's lengthy "alert" is a review of past history; but, if we turn to chapter III entitled "The First Half of 1970" and chapter IV entitled "Selected Recent Price and Wage Developments," we find what Mr. Rowen describes as "a straightaway rundown of price and wage increases that have gotten out of hand." One example is the price of bituminous coal, which has increased 35 percent during the 12 months ended in June. Not only that, but the rate of this price increase has been accelerating. During the first 6 months of 1970, the rate of price increase reached an annual rate of 56 percent. If we take only the second quarter of 1970, the price increase for bituminous coal was at an annual rate of 81 percent. The price of residual fuel oil has also increased rapidly, and at an accelerating rate, reaching an annual rate of increase of 60 percent in the second quarter of this year.

Now, of course, there are special factors in the fuels industry. There are always special factors in any specific case which is identified. But does this mean that we should sit back and let the public suffer price increases of this magnitude while waiting for the special factors to go away? I need not dwell on how basic coal and oil are to our economy. Over half of the electric power in the country is generated by burning coal. The effect which these increases in the price of coal will have on the price of electricity is alarmingly obvious.

The main special factor driving up the price of fuels seems to be that they are in extremely short supply. Of course, when demand outruns supply, market prices will rise. But are we to sit still and wait for the free market to increase fuel supplies and bring prices back down—a process which might take years? Is this not clearly a case in which the Govern-

ment has a duty to specify price behavior which is in the public interest? And also, of course, to take whatever other steps may be necessary and useful to alleviate the shortage?

Coal and oil prices are only one example of the specific sectors of the economy where inflation is rampant, where there is no evidence of a slowdown in the rate of price increase. The price and wage spiral in the construction industry is another, more familiar, example which the Council identifies in its inflation alert. Others are rubber prices, wage pressures in the trucking industry, the rising cost of public transportation, and, of course, the very recent development not highlighted in the "inflation alert"—the prospective 5 to 6 percent increase in automobile prices. In none of these areas will inflation be brought under control by slowing down the economy, by continuing to tolerate unemployment of 5 percent or more. It is clear that there is no more mileage to be gained from holding down the overall growth in the economy.

What is needed is a direct attack on the specific sectors where inflation continues unabated. It has long been my belief that this can best be done through a vigorously executed guidepost policy—a policy of identifying the pattern of price and wage changes which would be in the public interest and of employing the full prestige of the Presidential office to secure voluntary compliance with these guideposts. Of course, such a policy should be accompanied by major efforts to remove the structural inefficiencies which plague our economy—to relax the absurd restrictions on oil imports, to improve government procurement policies, to revamp our regulatory practices, and so forth.

Mr. President, I commend the Council of Economic Advisers for making available the information that they did concerning this continuing problem of inflation, and I call on the administration not only to continue to provide these useful documents, but to institute the price and incomes policies the need for which is so clearly demonstrated by their own studies.

I ask unanimous consent that Hobart Rowen's article entitled "Inflation 'Alert' is Fine as a Start", published in today's Washington Post, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

INFLATION "ALERT" IS FINE AS A START (By Hobart Rowen)

Mr. Nixon's "inflation alert" of last Saturday is the best evidence so far that what this country needs is a stronger wage-price policy to curb inflationary pressures that aren't being halted by other government measures.

First, let it be said that the administration deserves a good deal of credit for publishing the "alert," which included a straightaway rundown of price and wages increases that have gotten out of hand.

There were some among Mr. Nixon's advisers who would have preferred to release a long academic history of the causes of inflation, and let it go at that. But the Council of Economic Advisers put together, as

well, a summary of the most pressing areas of current inflationary pressure, and the entire document prepared for the new Commission on Productivity was published.

Arm-twisting and criticism by the President was side-stepped. But there didn't have to be any name-calling: the essential story came through. And that is, as everybody knew, that some unions have gotten wage increases that exceed a reasonable level; and some industries are raising prices beyond any measure required by their costs. The question now becomes what, if anything, Mr. Nixon proposes to do about these situations beyond CEA Chairman Paul McCracken's prayerful hope that in some "inscrutable way," things will right themselves.

It is significant that the "alert" (which is probably a bad name for the exercise) did not simply discuss past price rises. That would have been, as Prof. Robert Solow once suggested, not much more of a clue to the future than an old weather report. Instead, the long and serious document detailed areas of incipient trouble, including rising transportation, trucking, and home heating and power costs that haven't yet been fully reflected in the published indexes.

Precisely as McCracken suggested, the report lifted "the level of visibility on prices and costs in these areas." It was a wholly worthwhile educational process, particularly the detailed discussion of inflated consumer bills for gas and electric power.

It should be a shock for the public to learn that the price of coal has gone up 35 per cent this year, and home heating oils 25 per cent. And since power companies must borrow heavily to finance expansion, the 21.5 per cent boost in interest rates last year is another factor contributing to higher electric utility bills. (Remember the old conventional wisdom that high interest rates would control inflation?)

But a responsible government must do more than point out what is happening; that is a good first step, but it is not enough.

By the same token, it is fair to observe that price problems in the service area—like the recent boost in bus fares in Washington—are the toughest to cope with although a strong and determined government could find ways of alleviating the situation, at least for low income groups.

In the other areas cited—rising coal and electric power costs, higher natural gas prices, advances in rubber tire and cigarette prices—government policy of a broad nature could more effectively protect the consumer. What is needed is a new attitude on the part of regulatory agencies whose instincts are normally to protect industry's profit margins first and the consuming public's needs second (if at all); in addition, stronger measures are needed to deal with industries like rubber tire producers and unions such as the Teamsters which call their own shots on prices and wages without any government interference.

Similar problems exist in the construction industry, and these—because the local unions have so much autonomy—are undoubtedly difficult to cope with.

But an effort needs to be made, shucking off the wistful belief that prices and wages are set in the spirit of free competitive enterprise, and that nothing, therefore—even a raging inflation—should be allowed to interfere with the "market place" process.

This is utter nonsense, and no better proof has been offered than the President's own report. Take the rubber tire example: during April and May, the union negotiated with the major rubber companies for a 7 to 8 per cent hourly increase in wages for a three-year period.

The most important single product group is tires and tubes, and here, productivity has been rising steadily, at an average of 5.1 per cent during the 1960s. Productivity is a simple measure of labor efficiency; in

tires and tubes, it means that a tire worker on the average has been turning out 5.1 per cent more goods per hour. Thus, his compensation can increase by about the same amount without raising prices.

Indeed, in the best of all free enterprise worlds, if wages did not increase in the face of such a gain in productivity, the industry would reduce prices and still maintain its profit margins.

But back to the real world: the 7 to 8 per cent boost in tire worker compensation, being greater than the productivity gain means a boost of 2 per cent or perhaps 3 per cent in unit labor costs. But because labor compensation represents only 30 per cent of the value of the tires, the wage hike translates into only 1 per cent in production costs. And what did the companies do? They announced in June and July a 5 per cent hike in replacement tire prices.

The worry here is that having turned out a lengthy "alert" with lots of history and basic economics, Mr. Nixon's inflation-watchers may consider the job done. There was no specific timetable for the next "alert." But one should come soon, and be more specific. As Maurice Mann, scheduled to be George Shultz's economic aide, said in a speech back in June, "The economy can't endure the types of excessive wage and price increases we've seen recently."

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECESS UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DEATH OF REPRESENTATIVE G. ROBERT WATKINS OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on House Resolution 1183.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DOMINICK) laid before the Senate House Resolution 1183 which was read as follows:

Resolved, That the House has heard with profound sorrow of the death of the Honorable G. Robert Watkins, a Representative from the State of Pennsylvania.

Resolved, That a committee of sixty-three Members of the House, with such Members of the Senate as may be joined, be appointed to attend the funeral.

Resolved, That the Sergeant at Arms of the House be authorized and directed to take such steps as may be necessary for carrying out the provisions of these resolutions and that the necessary expenses in connection therewith be paid out of the contingent fund of the House.

Resolved, That the Clerk communicate these resolutions to the Senate and transmit a copy thereof to the family of the deceased.

Resolved, That as a further mark of respect the House do now adjourn.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I submit a resolution and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the resolution (S. Res. 441) was considered and unanimously agreed to, as follows:

S. RES. 441

Resolved, That the Senate has heard with profound sorrow the announcement of the death of Hon. G. Robert Watkins, late a Representative from the State of Pennsylvania.

Resolved, That a committee of two Senators be appointed by the Presiding Officer to join the committee appointed on the part of the House of Representatives to attend the funeral of the deceased Representative.

Resolved, That the Secretary communicate these resolutions to the House of Representatives and transmit an enrolled copy thereof to the family of the deceased.

Resolved, That, as a further mark of respect to the memory of the deceased, the Senate do now recess.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the second resolving clause, the Chair appoints the two distinguished Senators from the State of Pennsylvania (Mr. SCOTT and Mr. SCHWEIKER) as the committee on the part of the Senate to join the committee from the House to attend the funeral of the late Representative Watkins.

RECESS TO 10 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, and, pursuant to Senate Resolution 441, as a further mark of respect to the memory of Representative G. Robert Watkins, of Pennsylvania, that the Senate stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6 o'clock and 15 minutes p.m.), the Senate took a recess until tomorrow, Wednesday, August 12, 1970, at 10 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate, August 11, 1970:

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

William Robert McLellan, of California, to be an Assistant Secretary of Commerce, vice Kenneth N. Davis, Jr., resigned.

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Carl O. Bue, Jr., of Texas, to be a U.S. district judge for the southern district of Texas, vice Joe McDonald Ingraham, elevated.

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

Artemus E. Weatherbee, of Maine, to be U.S. Director of the Asian Development Bank, vice Bernard Zagorin.

IN THE ARMY

The following named officer under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 3066, to be assigned to a position of importance and responsibility designated by the President under subsection (a) of section 3066, in grade as follows:

To be general

Lt. Gen. Frederick Carlton Weyand, ~~xxxx~~ ~~xxx-xx-xxxx~~ Army of the United States (major general, U.S. Army).