

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Tuesday, December 2, 1969

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Edward G. Latch, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Only fear the Lord and serve Him in truth with all your heart: for consider what great things He has done for you.—I Samuel 12: 24.

Our Father, we thank Thee for the inspiration for great living this moment of prayer brings to us and for the insight into the meaning of life which comes as we pray. Never in vain do we call upon Thee. Always art Thou strengthening us with a strength which never lets us down. Always art Thou loving us with a love which never lets us go. Always art Thou leading us in true paths with a spirit which never lets us off. Give us grace to respond to Thee and with reverent courage to walk in Thy ways.

Bless our Nation with Thy gracious favor and these Representatives of our people with Thy loving wisdom. Kneeling before the altar of truth may we be united in the codes of high moral living, deep religious faith, great patriotic fervor, and a genuine desire for peace.

In the Master's name we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed a bill of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 3169. An act to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes.

THE FORT DIX STOCKADE

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Speaker, I take this time to correct some statements attributed to one of our colleagues, the gentleman from New York (Mr. BIAGGI) concerning conditions at the Fort Dix stockade.

In the Philadelphia Inquirer of October 25, 1969, the gentleman from New York, from an AP report stated that conditions were "inhuman" and "very primitive." As chairman of a Special Subcommittee To Investigate Conditions in Places of Military Detention and Correction, I and two members of my subcommittee have visited Fort Dix. Our comments today constitute an interim report. There may be further investigation and further evaluation of our findings.

On November 7 I spent all day at Fort Dix with particular emphasis on the stockade. Other members had made visits on other dates. My observations were substantially different from those of the gentleman from New York (Mr. BIAGGI).

The maximum cells were not "small and dark" as reported in the paper and I found nothing in the Fort Dix stockade

that reminded me of "medieval times," which was the description contained in the newspaper article.

I came away from Fort Dix convinced the commanding general was doing well in a difficult job. I was also convinced the provost marshal in command of the stockade was a dedicated military man who was genuinely concerned that there be no inhuman conditions of any kind in the Fort Dix stockade.

THE FORT DIX STOCKADE SITUATION

(Mr. DANIEL of Virginia asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DANIEL of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, an Associated Press story appearing in the Philadelphia Inquirer on October 24 attributed certain statements to our colleague, the Honorable MARIO BIAGGI. The statements related to reported finding of conditions at Fort Dix, N.J., and are at variance with the facts as we found them to be upon official investigation.

Mr. Speaker, as a member of the subcommittee which has previously been referred to by the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL), we interrogated stockade personnel and prisoners under oath. The story reported the gentleman from New York (Mr. BIAGGI) as saying that heroin is readily available on the base. Heroin may be purchased on the base but at a price servicemen cannot afford and this accounts for some of the men going AWOL in order to obtain their requirements.

We concluded that heroin is no more a problem at Fort Dix than it is at any other place in the United States.

Mr. Speaker, the newspaper article also quotes the gentleman from New York (Mr. BIAGGI) as saying that there were 300 suicide attempts made each month at Fort Dix. The record shows that 300 suicide gestures are made annually at the post with an annual population of 300,000.

The newspaper report also states that one prisoner told the gentleman from New York (Mr. BIAGGI) that he lost 40 pounds on disciplinary chow. I talked to this prisoner and asked him why he made that statement to Mr. BIAGGI after having been on the diet for only 48 hours. He said, "I was only kidding the Senator."

This disciplinary chow, Mr. Speaker, is prescribed only for those who are unresponsive to discipline. No prisoner may stay on the diet for more than 14 days at a time. He is checked daily by a physician.

Mr. Speaker, conditions at Fort Dix are not perfect or ideal but in my judgment are not such as to justify blanket indictment. After the subcommittee's brief visit I came to the conclusion that the men there are doing a responsible job under very trying conditions.

CONDITIONS AT FORT DIX

(Mr. HUNT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, I follow my two learned colleagues from the Subcommittee on Armed Services which investigates disorders on military bases. I was with the gentlemen at Fort Dix, N.J. who have spoken prior to me on November 1, 1969, and November 7, 1969, as the result of an article which appeared in the Philadelphia Inquirer in October 1969 attributed to remarks made by one of my colleagues and friends, Representative MARIO BIAGGI, of New York.

It just so happens that for 4 years I was the sheriff of Gloucester County, and I was the principal keeper of the county prison of Gloucester County. I am familiar with the operation of prisons—perhaps more so than anyone in the House, and as to its terminology and the so-called medieval conditions.

Mr. Speaker, the findings that we made at Fort Dix do not substantiate the facts carried in the paper under the greatest stretch of the imagination.

The so-called withdrawal symptoms of the gentleman who was in the stockade, Eugene Jackson by name, had passed. I might say that I also had the privilege for a good many years to have headed up a narcotics squad, and I therefore know whereof I speak.

I spoke to Eugene Jackson. He told me that he had been the user of marijuana in Vietnam for a number of months, and upon returning to the States had a leave of absence in New York City, where he was able to procure the heroin quite readily. It was in New York City, and not upon the base, that he contracted his addiction to heroin. Further, that while on leave up in New York City he went AWOL, and went from one bag of heroin to 10 bags of heroin a day. When it became so severe he turned himself in as an AWOL deserter. So that the story that the heroin was obtained on the base by Eugene Jackson was erroneous, and he admitted that this was not so.

NATIONAL FOOTBALL CAPITAL IS MIAMI, OKLA.

(Mr. EDMONDSON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, if any of those here today have any doubt about the location of the football capital of the United States, I would like to tell them a thing or two about Miami, Okla.

Miami is the city which produced Steve Owens. My colleagues from Oklahoma, joined me here last week to advise you of Steve's outstanding career as a running back for the University of Oklahoma—a career which won him the Heisman Trophy awarded annually to the

outstanding college football player in the country.

The good people of Miami had only begun to plan appropriate ceremonies to honor Steve on his homecoming when, last Friday night in Savannah, Ga., Northeastern Oklahoma A. & M. College won the national junior college football championship in a decisive 20 to 6 defeat of Arizona Western. And where is Northeastern Oklahoma A. & M. College located? Miami.

Plans are now firm for Steve Owens' homecoming. Next Monday, December 8, there will be a parade through Miami featuring Steve, his parents, and his charming wife. Monday night there will be a banquet, which was an instant sell-out. In fact, the sponsors are looking for a larger hall to meet the demand for tickets.

I plan to be in Miami for Steve's parade and banquet, and I imagine I will have an opportunity to go back to Miami very soon for ceremonies honoring the magnificent Norsemen of Northeastern A. & M.

Steve Owens is Miami's first Heisman Trophy winner, but the citizens of Miami have experience in rolling out the carpet for the members and coaches of national junior college football championship teams. This is Northeastern's second national title in 3 years.

REQUEST FOR SPECIAL ORDER— FORT DIX STOCKADE CONDI- TIONS

(Mr. BIAGGI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Speaker, this morning I was extended the invitation to be present and to act as an observer by the chairman of the Special Subcommittee on Armed Services, my colleague, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RAN-DALL).

I have been here since he and my other two colleagues have testified.

At this point, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for a special order for 30 minutes to address the House today at the close of today's business so I can in fact deal with the facts as they are. On this issue, I will not back off.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

PINKVILLE—THE ULTIMATE RESULT

(Mr. RARICK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous material.)

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, with the Pinkville incident surrounded by disproportionate press sensationalism, the same left which has consistently supported Hanoi now attempts to condemn and disgrace all U.S. fighting men.

If this were all we could expect, it would be atrocious enough punishment for men sent by their Government into a ghastly and unconventional "no win" war.

However, we can anticipate even more disastrous results. We must understand that not only these men but all U.S. military men will be in jeopardy of being considered "war criminals," exploited and propagandized by the enemy to justify its abuse of our captured fighting men—U.S. prisoners of war. Without the Geneva Convention protection requiring humane treatment, any American captured by the enemy can be branded as a "war criminal," imprisoned indefinitely, tried by his accusers, and possibly even executed.

Every American now in the hands of Communist forces is imperiled. Bertrand Russell and other European pinks are already demanding UNO "war crimes" trials of Americans.

Because much of the U.S. news media has presented Hanoi's propaganda as legitimate news—whether by design or merely motivated by greed—the American people can anticipate seeing an endless parade of their sons, as "war criminals," being subjected to any indignity the enemy can devise. And we can expect to hear the rationale for it repeated by the U.S. communications complex.

Soon every U.S. soldier—like our police officers—will need to check with a lawyer before firing his gun.

INCREASE IN CRIME

(Mr. CHAMBERLAIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material.)

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, during the past year or so we have heard much here in the Congress and throughout the land about the shocking increase in criminal activity. The situation, in many areas, has gotten so out of hand that nothing seems to surprise us any more. But this past weekend, when assailants undertook a shooting attack on the police headquarters and a fire station in Jackson, Mich., it would appear that we have reached a new plateau in the escalating violence. If a reminder is needed about the imperative importance of quick action to make the streets of our Nation safe, certainly there could probably be no better example than this.

I feel certain that my colleagues in both the House and Senate will not be surprised to learn that the city of Jackson has pending two applications under the Safe Streets Act. One project deals with the prevention of juvenile delinquency and the other with modernizing police communications equipment. A great many other communities throughout the country are confronted with the same problem of having to wait months for Federal help. Fiscal 1970 funds for this program are currently scheduled to go to conference within the next few days to resolve the differences between the House and Senate versions of the Department of Justice appropriation bill. I am therefore taking this opportunity to urge that the conferees accept the funds for the law enforcement assistance administration as recommended by the Senate in the amount of \$275.5 mil-

lion, which is some \$25 million above the House-approved figure. No one questions, for a minute, that our Government is faced with a fiscal crisis aggravated by the problems of inflation. However, I submit the fight for safe streets in the face of spiraling crime rate cannot wait and that we here in the Congress must make every effort to see that adequate money is provided.

INCENTIVES FOR MILITARY LAWYERS' RETENTION

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the bill (H.R. 4296), to amend title 37, United States Code, to provide for the procurement and retention of judge advocates and law specialist officers for the Armed Forces.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, will the gentleman explain the purpose of the bill?

Mr. PHILBIN. The purpose of H.R. 4296 is to insure the retention of adequate numbers of experienced lawyers in the uniformed services.

This purpose would be effected by providing military personnel performing judge advocate or law specialist duties with an increase in their monetary compensation.

The compensation increases authorized by this legislation provide:

First, a regular monthly payment of special pay ranging from \$50 per month for a second lieutenant and captain, to \$200 per month for lawyers in the grades of colonel and above; and

Second, a one-time lump-sum bonus to be offered to young lawyers who complete their active service obligation and who have less than 10 years of commissioned service.

This latter bonus, called a "continuation pay" bonus, would be payable at the rate of 2 months' basic pay for each additional year the young lawyer agrees to extend his active duty service commitment. The bill provides that the minimum additional obligation would be 3 years, with a maximum obligation of 6 years.

NECESSITY FOR THE LEGISLATION

Department of Defense witnesses strongly support this legislation. It was pointed out that the military has no difficulty in initially procuring the required number of young lawyers. This results because of the pressures of the draft. However, they are faced with a critical retention problem by virtue of their inability to retain on active duty experienced lawyers, once they have completed their obligated period of service.

This bill is therefore primarily designed to cope with this critical problem of retention.

FISCAL ASPECTS

The Department of Defense has advised the Committee on Armed Services that enactment of this legislation would result in annual estimated costs of approximately \$7 million.

COMMITTEE POSITION

The Committee on Armed Services, a quorum being present, unanimously recommended enactment of H.R. 4296, as amended, and strongly urges approval of the House of Representatives.

Mr. GROSS. Have the military personnel in the judge advocate's division not participated in all the military pay increases?

Mr. PHILBIN. Yes, they have, I will say to the distinguished gentleman from Iowa, but notwithstanding that fact they have been leaving and not reenlisting. We are up against the proposition now, in order to retain these experienced personnel, of a need to provide higher pay scales for them.

Mr. GROSS. What is the top increase?

Mr. PHILBIN. The increases range from \$50 a month for a second lieutenant and \$200 a month for the lawyer in the grade of colonel and above.

Mr. GROSS. How much?

Mr. PHILBIN. It is \$50 a month for second lieutenants and captains, and \$200 a month for colonels and higher ranks.

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GROSS. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. PIRNIE. I thank the gentleman, I understand the basis of his inquiry.

Just 4 months ago we established the Military Justice Act of 1968, which came into operation. Under its terms this Congress mandated certain additional burdens upon the Judge Advocate General Corps of the various services, requiring some 800 additional lawyers in uniform.

It has been found that the retention rates at the present time in the Army are 14 percent, in the Navy 11 percent, in the Marine Corps 5.1 percent, and in the Air Force 14 percent.

As the result of a study made over a period of years finally the Department of Defense came up with a recommendation that action had to be taken comparable to that taken with respect to doctors in the existing law in order to retain in the service people of professional legal competence to discharge these responsibilities being imposed upon them.

As a result of that need this legislation was drafted and is brought here today.

Mr. GROSS. This applies only to active-duty personnel; or does it apply equally to Reserve personnel?

Mr. PIRNIE. It applies only to people on active duty, both Reserve and Regular Army.

Mr. GROSS. But, with respect to reservists, only when called?

Mr. PIRNIE. Only when serving as a judge advocate on active duty.

Mr. GROSS. Is it true that the retention percentage figures the gentleman cited may have included some men who were drafted or otherwise serving temporarily who did not remain in the service, or are the percentages based upon active-duty personnel?

Mr. PIRNIE. They are computed after the period of obligation.

Mr. GROSS. Then the figures are based upon all those who come and go?

Mr. PIRNIE. It comprises those who are members of the corps.

I can answer the gentleman this way: a great many of them come in through Reserve status, ROTC, and they are finally commissioned in the Judge Advocate General Corps. They serve a period of 4 years. That is the period of their obligation. It is the retention beyond the obligated period that is computed in the figures I have just given.

This measure, which I introduced last January in anticipation of the effects of the Military Justice Act of 1968, is intended to do only one thing—provide a vehicle which will allow the armed services to compete successfully with the private and civilian government sectors for lawyers. It would do this by authorizing the Secretary of Defense to grant professional pay and a continuation bonus to military lawyers as retention incentives. The need for this type of compensation is clear, verified and immediate.

The undisputed fact is that our services have been and remain unable to retain sufficient military lawyers beyond the initial commitment obligation to carry out their assigned missions. In the Army only 14 percent of the young JAG's remain to the 5-year point and only 10 percent stay 10 years. The Air Force is retaining about 14 percent of its lawyers for a career but estimates that it needs a minimum of 45 percent in order to do its job properly. The Marine Corps has the worst retention rate of all—5.1 percent—and the Navy's 11 percent puts it in the desperate category. These are the realities of the problem. H.R. 4296 can provide the solution.

The remedy embodied in this legislation was not based on speculation but on a very thorough study by the Department of Defense which considered not only the reasons present JAG officers are resigning at alarming rates, but particularly why so many have left the services in the past 5 years. It was commissioned in August of 1967 in response to a growing awareness within DOD of the serious JAG retention problem. Its findings and recommendations are contained in a huge volume which was completed in October of last year. This comprehensive "Report on Military Lawyer Procurement, Utilization and Retention" made several recommendations including one calling for legislation authorizing professional pay and a continuation bonus for JAG's. H.R. 4296 embodies that recommendation and has been reported by the House Armed Services Committee with two minor amendments which were recommended by the Department of Defense.

Basically, it would authorize professional pay ranging from \$50 to \$200 per month for JAG officers and a continuation bonus payable at the rate of 2 months' basic pay for each year for which the JAG agreed to remain on active duty beyond any then outstanding active duty obligation or service commitment. The contract would be for a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 6 years and would be limited to those officers with 10 or fewer years of commissioned service. The purpose of the professional pay is to provide JAG officers with a regular monthly income more nearly commensurate with

that enjoyed by their civilian contemporaries in the Federal Government, industry, and also private practice. The continuation bonus would be offered at the time when a young officer would be faced with the decision to resign or make a career of the service.

It should be made clear that this bill is designed not merely to obtain lawyers but to keep experienced ones. As a result, the major thrust of the remedy in this measure would operate at the point when the young officer concludes his initial obligation. At the end of this 4-year period, the young military lawyer is just coming into his own professionally. He is in the position to make a significant contribution either in the service or elsewhere because he has obtained the knowledge, judgment, and background only experience in the law can provide. Therefore, it is here that the major effort must be made to retain him, as the DOD study showed that it is at this career point that young JAG's are leaving the services.

The importance of experience in the law cannot be overemphasized. Those who have practiced can verify its value. However, more pertinent is the fact that the Military Justice Act of 1968 demands experienced attorneys in the JAG Corps. That law, in addition to requiring that the right-to-counsel guarantees in recent years extended to criminal defendants be afforded servicemen, also mandates that military judges preside over special as well as general courts-martial and insists that a bad conduct discharge not be adjudged by a special court-martial unless a military judge is detailed to the court. Do we want young recent law school graduates as military judges in such matters as bad conduct discharges, felonies and other serious military charges? Of course not. We must have mature lawyers who have experience to make vital judgments.

Yet, at the present time, we do not have them, and as the Department of Defense study concluded, the situation shows no evidence of improving. It ended with this grim forecast:

Unless the trend . . . (of low retention rates) . . . is changed, the overwhelming majority of lawyers in uniform will be obligated four officers recently out of law school who are in the service only as a result of the draft pressures.

With this prospect in view, the Department of Defense and the House Armed Services Committee recommended this legislation realizing that action must be taken now to solve this problem. We in the Congress mandated that a job be done and we have an obligation to provide the uniformed services with the tools needed to do it. We must keep faith with those of whom we have demanded greater service and more responsibility. H.R. 4296 is the fulfillment of that commitment.

As the Members of this body know, the legal arms of our services in the past year have faced mounting problems. They have encountered difficult situations from Presidio to Camp Lejeune, from Long Binh to Hawaii. They are tested at every turn and must, to do their jobs properly, have the cool and level-headedness only experience gives.

Today we consider legislation which will provide the necessary incentive to retain the young lawyer who has gained the experience our services so vitally need. It will make our services competitive with the private practice of the law and the civilian agencies of the government. It will help solve an immediate problem and may prevent a future one. It should insure that our service personnel receive the best possible legal advice and counsel. Finally, it will guarantee that our JAG Corps are filled with career lawyers interested in the military services, not merely law school graduates fulfilling their obligation. It is a sound approach which should be adopted.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the bill as follows:

H.R. 4296

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That chapter 5 of title 37, United States Code, is amended by inserting the following new sections and corresponding items in the analysis:

“§ 302a. Special pay: judge advocates and law specialists

“(a) In addition to any other basic pay, special pay, incentive pay, or allowances to which he is entitled, each judge advocate of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, or law specialist of the Coast Guard, as defined in section 801 of title 10, other than one ordered to active duty for less than one year, is entitled to special pay at the rates set forth below while he is performing judge advocate duties—

“(1) \$50 a month for each month of active duty, if he is in pay grade O 1, O 2, or O 3;

“(2) \$150 a month for each month of active duty if he is in pay grade O 4 or O 5; or

“(3) \$200 a month for each month of active duty, if he is in pay grade above O 5.

“(b) The amounts set forth in subsection (a) of this section may not be included in computing the amount of an increase in pay authorized by any other provision of this title or in computing retired pay or severance pay.

§ 311a. Special pay: continuation pay for judge advocates and law specialists who extend their service on active duty

“(a) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary concerned, a judge advocate of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, or a law specialist of the Coast Guard, who—

“(1) is entitled to special pay under section 302a of this title;

“(2) has completed his initial active duty service commitment as a judge advocate or law specialist; and

“(3) executes a written agreement to remain on active duty for a period of at least three, but not more than six, additional years;

may be paid not more than two months' basic pay at the rate applicable to him when he executes that agreement for each additional year that he agrees to remain on active duty. Pay under this section may, at the election of the officer, be paid to him in a lump sum at the beginning of the additional period or be prorated.

“(b) An officer who has received special pay under subsection (a) of this section may—

“(1) qualify for a second payment of that pay when he becomes eligible for voluntary retirement, with pay, upon completion of twenty years of active service, by executing a written agreement to remain on active duty

for a period prescribed in that subsection; and

“(2) be paid on the same basis as prescribed in that subsection and at the rate of basic pay applicable to him at the time he executes the agreement.

“(c) An officer who does not serve on active duty for the entire period for which he was paid under this section shall refund that percentage of the payment that the unserved part of the period is of the total period for which the payment was made.”

With the following committee amendment:

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following in lieu thereof:

“That chapter 5 of title 37, United States Code, is amended by inserting the following new sections and corresponding items in the analysis:

“Sec. 302a. Special pay: judge advocates and law specialists

“(a) In addition to any other basic pay, special pay, incentive pay or allowances to which he is entitled, each judge advocate of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, or law specialist of the Coast Guard, as defined in section 801 of title 10, other than one ordered to active duty for less than one year, is entitled to special pay at the rates set forth below while he is performing judge advocate duties—

“(1) \$50 a month for each month of active duty, if he is in pay grade O-1, O-2, or O-3;

“(2) \$150 a month for each month of active duty, if he is in pay grade O-4 or O-5; or

“(3) \$200 a month for each month of active duty, if he is in a pay grade above O-5.

“(b) The amounts set forth in subsection (a) of this section may not be included in computing the amount of an increase in pay authorized by any other provision of this title or in computing retired pay or severance pay.

“Sec. 311a. Special pay: continuation pay for judge advocates and law specialists who extend their service on active duty

“(a) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary concerned, a judge advocate of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, or a law specialist of the Coast Guard, who—

“(1) is entitled to special pay under section 302a of this title;

“(2) has completed his initial active duty service commitment as a judge advocate or law specialist and not more than 10 years of active service; and

“(3) executes a written agreement to remain on active duty for a period of at least three, but not more than six, additional years; may be paid not more than two months' basic pay at the rate applicable to him when he executes that agreement for each additional year that he agrees to remain on active duty. Pay under this section shall be paid in equal annual or semiannual installments, as determined by the Secretary of the military department concerned in the case of a judge advocate or by the Secretary of the Department of Transportation in the case of a law specialist of the Coast Guard, in each additional year covered by a written agreement to remain on active duty. However, in meritorious cases the pay may be paid in fewer installments if the Secretary concerned determines it to be in the best interest of the judge advocate or law specialist.

“(b) An officer who does not serve on active duty for the entire period for which he was paid under this section shall refund that percentage of the payment that the unserved part of the period is of the total period for which the payment was made.”

The committee amendment was agreed to.

Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Speaker, I rise

in support of H.R. 4296, which has been introduced and sponsored by my colleague, the Honorable ALEXANDER FIRNIE. I joined my colleague by sponsoring an identical bill, H.R. 8630.

It came as no great surprise that a Department of Defense study documented the existence of a critical, chronic retention problem regarding military lawyers. At a time when court decisions and the Military Justice Act of 1968—which became effective slightly over 3 months ago—are requiring that military personnel have available the services of a military lawyer in court-martial and related proceedings, it is distressing to learn that the military services have not only been operating with a shortage of career force lawyers, but that the number of experienced lawyers is so small and the retention rate of these specialized personnel is minuscule.

The DOD study found the career force in each of the military services to be operating with the following shortages: Army, 323; Navy, 170; Marine Corps, 112; Air Force, 132; and DOD-wide, 737.

The study found that the number of experienced lawyers in relation to the total force in fiscal 1970 will be as follows: Army, 29 percent; Navy, 36 percent; Marine Corps, 16 percent; Air Force, 42 percent; and DOD-wide, 35 percent. Furthermore, the trend is getting worse.

The Committee on Armed Services hearings on this legislation revealed that the retention rate of military lawyers in the Army is only 14 percent up to 5 years and 10 percent thereafter. The Navy retains 11 percent. The Marine Corps retains 5.1 percent. And the Air Force retains 4 percent.

The purpose of this bill is therefore to insure the retention of adequate numbers of experienced lawyers in the military services. This purpose will be effected by providing military personnel performing judge advocate or law specialist duties with an increase in monetary compensation. The Department of Defense after studying the problem and reviewing the budgetary impact, has supported the approach of this bill. The estimated first year cost for the bill would be \$7 million.

The economic stimulus would be made available in two forms, first as the regular monthly payment of a special pay and second as a service continuation pay bonus. The special pay would give professional status to the lawyers comparable to that which is now accorded to the Medical and Dental Corps. It would mean special pay of \$50 a month to the grades of second lieutenant, lieutenant, and captain. The service continuation bonus would be paid at a rate of 2 months' basic pay for each year for which the lawyer agrees to remain in an active service status beyond his existing active duty obligation.

This bill is not designed or intended as an example of favoritism toward lawyers. It is designed and intended to meet a very real and existing crisis. The impending change in the Selective Service System which would make the vulnerable draft age at about 19 may well mean that we will be able to draft fewer lawyers. There is really no provision for drafting lawyers at this time. If there were such

a provision, there would be no crisis. Congress has mandated through the Military Justice Act that lawyers be made available. Now we have found it necessary to provide special incentives to keep available the lawyers now in service. I call upon my friends and colleagues to support this legislation. I would hope it can be speedily passed by the Congress and signed into law by the President.

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I am certainly happy to add my strong support to the measure introduced by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIRNIE), H.R. 4296. As sponsor of a companion bill, H.R. 9075, I am firmly convinced that this legislation is vital if we are to insure fair and prompt military justice. The problem of retaining adequate numbers of military lawyers has been growing for several years. The passage of the Military Justice Act of 1968, coupled with the decision of the U.S. Court of Military Appeals in the Tempia case has only accelerated the problem. A recent summary of retention rates indicates the scope of the problem:

RETENTION RATES FOR MILITARY LAWYERS

	Required rate per year (percent)	Actual rate per year (percent)	Numerical shortage in career force
Army.....	25	17	-323
Navy.....	30	8	-170
Air Force.....	45	4.5	-132
Marine Corps.....	25	3.6	-112

The bill before us would attack the problem from two standpoints. First, it would add to the monthly salary of military lawyers by means of the so-called "professional pay." This provision is in line with current practice in providing professional pay for doctors, dentists, and veterinarians. Professional pay in part compensates for the difference in pay realized by a professional man serving in the military. It certainly does not make private and military pay scale equal, or anywhere near it. It does, however, put the military in a position to more effectively bargain during those crucial first years out of law school. Of particular importance is the fact that this provision will allow effective competition with salaries offered to lawyers under the civil service salary schedule.

The second phase of the legislation deals with the problem which occurs when the military lawyer completes his initial period of obligated service. It is at this point the young lawyer, faced with a choice between the practice of law within the military, or civilian practice, is receiving increasingly tempting offers from the private sector. There has been a good deal of publicity on the salaries in excess of \$15,000 now being offered to young law graduates.

To meet this phase of the problem, this legislation would provide a "continuation bonus" to those military lawyers who agreed to continue on active duty after completion of their obligated service. I feel that this approach will be a tremendous aid in retaining some of the fine young lawyers now in the various Judge Advocate Corps.

I might just remind my colleagues that we have adopted this approach as the solution to an identical problem in the submarine service. The Navy Department felt that its retention rate for nuclear submarine officers was critical in view of the fact it had, or was about to, drop to 40 percent. They felt very strongly that a continuation bonus plan would solve their problem. The high degree of acceptance of this approach to solution of this type of problem is emphasized by the unanimous endorsement that bill received, and the very rapid action taken on the bill here in the Congress.

Mr. Speaker, it seems clear if continuation bonuses are the solution to retention problems in the Navy's submarine service where the retention rate is 40 percent, it certainly should be applied to the lawyers in that service who's retention rate is 8 percent.

If we are to carry out our commitment to a fair, impartial system of military justice, we must move promptly to insure an adequate supply of military lawyers. The urgency is heightened by the passage of the draft lottery legislation which will make recruitment of military lawyers even more difficult.

Through the Military Justice Act of 1968, we renewed our commitment to a high standard of justice in the military. This was certainly appropriate in view of the increasing protection afforded defendants in civilian criminal cases. Our servicemen are entitled to at least as high a caliber representation as is provided civilian criminal defendants. I am sure that many of my colleagues would be somewhat nervous about being represented in a court, military or civilian, by a veterinarian. This exact situation was revealed in a recent case in Federal court in Utah. The Federal court was reviewing, on writ of habeas corpus, an Army case where the defendant was represented by an Army veterinarian. By this comment I cast no aspersions on the abilities of veterinarians engaged in the practice of veterinary medicine for which they were trained.

At a time when our military services are under increasing attack by some segments of the public, we must be doubly certain that every member of the military service has available to him trained, competent military lawyers when he is charged with a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Likewise, that he can obtain a prompt, fair trial free from any influence of his superior officers.

I would urge prompt approval of this important legislation.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Speaker, as one of the cosponsors of H.R. 4296, I take this opportunity to urge its passage today.

This legislation, as reported by the Armed Services Committee, creates a "special pay" category for judge advocates and law specialists. H.R. 4296 provides an additional \$50 per month for second lieutenants through captains, \$150 per month for majors and lieutenant colonels, and \$200 per month for colonels and above. Also incorporated in the measure is a "continuation pay" plan. A judge advocate who agrees to remain on active duty will be entitled to

receive 2 months' basic pay for each year served beyond any then outstanding obligation or commitment. Such a contract for extension of service would require a minimum obligation of three additional years of service and a maximum obligation of 6 years.

Mr. Speaker, for 22 years officers in the medical and dental corps have received "special pay," which is often referred to as "professional pay." Since 1967, this group also has been granted "continuation pay." The enactment of these provisions for medical officers was prompted by the need to increase their retention rate to meet service personnel requirements.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine precisely how successful these monetary inducements have been in accomplishing that goal. Three other factors also have influenced medical retention rates. First, all newly licensed doctors must perform 2 years' military service. Second, a separate, accelerated promotion program has been made applicable to physicians. Third, assistance for medical education expenses is available in return for additional obligated service. Nevertheless, whatever the specific reason, the resignation rate of medical officers has been significantly reduced.

The critical situation which prompted the extensive revision of medical pay policies during the last two decades now confronts the judge advocate division of every branch of the Armed Forces. In July of this year, the Department of Defense stated that the legal career force is operating under shortages amounting to 323 in the Army, 170 in the Navy, 112 in the Marine Corps, and 132 in the Air Force. Should the present trend continue, by 1972 or 1975 the services will be operating their judicial systems with an inordinate number of lawyers who are recent law school graduates.

Mr. Speaker, while H.R. 4296 may not entirely resolve the retention problem, it is a first step toward retaining the lawyers required to insure a strong legal service within our Armed Forces. Thus, I hope that we in this House will begin today to work toward that goal by enacting this legislation.

Mr. TIERNAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 4296, to provide for the procurement and retention of judge advocates and law specialist officers for the armed services. As a sponsor of identical legislation, I am aware of the need to insure the retention of an adequate number of experienced lawyers in the uniformed services.

It is difficult to state how many an adequate number is. However, presently the Department of Defense has a shortage of over 730 experienced military lawyers. As the General Counsel of the Defense Department stated:

Failure to curb the current outflow of experienced lawyers could, within a few years, drastically impair the ability of those remaining military lawyers to provide necessary legal services within the Armed Services.

The major problem involved is that there is a very poor balance between experienced and inexperienced lawyers within the military. DOD statistics show that the problem grows worse by the

year. H.R. 4296 is designed to create incentives that will maintain a career force on the desired experience level. There is no question as to the fairness of such incentives, for military physicians, dentists, and veterinarians presently receive additional compensation.

Mr. Speaker, as you know, there has been a lot of talk recently concerning GI rights. I contend that the passage of this bill and the subsequent increase in the number of experienced lawyers who remain in the uniformed services beyond their obligated tour of 4 years, will greatly enhance the opportunity for these GI rights to be recognized.

We have an opportunity today to help each and every serviceman as an individual. I urge that my colleagues join me in supporting H.R. 4296.

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased that the House has agreed to speedy consideration of H.R. 4296, to provide financial incentives for the retention of military lawyers.

As indicated in the report of the Committee on Armed Services, the military services are having no difficulty obtaining young lawyers fresh out of law school for a 4-year tour of duty. The pressure of the draft is enough to encourage law school graduates to enlist. However, after completing their initial obligation, for various reasons, most military lawyers are leaving the service. As a result, a serious experience gap has been created. The military lawyers are leaving just at the time they have reached a level of expertise that makes them especially valuable. They are then replaced by new, inexperienced officers who must again be upgraded to minimum proficiency. As this process continues, it is obvious that the experience and quality level of the overall Judge Advocate Corps must suffer.

At a time when our military justice system is coming under continued constitutional attack, it is especially important that the Congress provide incentives to retain our well-trained and experienced middle-level military lawyers.

H.R. 4296 provides two new methods of compensation for military attorneys. The first is a regular additional monthly payment ranging from \$50 to \$200 per month depending on grade. The second is the payment of a one-time bonus payable to military lawyers if they agree to continue in the service for a specified period after their initial obligation has been served. The bonus would be computed on the basis of 2 months' "base" pay for each year—3 to 6—that the attorney agrees to reenlist for.

It should be noted that the Congress has, in the past, utilized these methods of financial incentive with great success to encourage career retention of military professionals. At present, doctors, veterinarians, dentists, and certain nuclear-trained submarine officers receive special financial assistance. There is no question that these incentives have increased retention of professionals in these specialties. There is, further, no reason why this same method cannot be used to retain experienced military attorneys.

Mr. Speaker, I encourage my colleagues to support this measure for two basic

reasons. First, as a matter of financial equity for military lawyers. Second, and much more importantly, to alleviate a serious professional deficiency in the legal ranks of our military services.

Mr. DENNEY. Mr. Speaker, consideration of the subject now before the House, professional pay for military lawyers, is long overdue. It is quite common for us to talk in terms of "critical shortages" or "crisis conditions," but those trite phrases still seem in order today.

A Department of Defense study group has determined that there exists an alarming 737-person shortage in career lawyers in the military services. In effect, this determination means that what is needed for our Armed Forces to effectively maintain legal services is another 737 experienced lawyers, those who have stayed on after their initial obligated tour.

In the past several years, this body has asked military lawyers to play an increasing role in our total judicial system. The Military Justice Act is an outstanding example of the added responsibility entrusted to these officers and specialists. Individual rights of servicemen have been expanded, and the military lawyer is the vanguard for their protection.

We have placed added responsibilities on the services; now let us pass the necessary legislation to insure their able administration.

Likewise, judicial activity has placed a great burden on the already understaffed legal corps. O'Callahan against Parker promises to increase their activities in determining jurisdiction in new cases and relief where final cases are reconsidered.

As any lawyer knows, experience is vital in adequately giving legal counsel to a client. With the shortage of experienced personnel mentioned earlier, and the increased need for expert advice, it is evident that we must make a strong effort to retain young lawyers and thereby increase the percentage of seasoned lawyers to total attorneys in service.

During an investigation of this problem, I ran across some floor comments made over 20 years ago when this same problem was being debated with respect to professional pay for medical doctors and dentists.

The same solution presented now, professional pay, was offered in these words by Congressman Blackney from Michigan:

Everyone knows that we live in a chaotic age; that the international situation is extremely acute and, therefore, the maintenance of our Army and Navy is a No. 1 problem to our Nation and to the citizens at large. In order to maintain properly such an Army and Navy, it is highly essential that the Medical Corps of the groups should be maintained at the highest degree of efficiency. No father or mother, no Congressman, or no thinking person, wants to send the boys into service unless they are assured in advance that they will have full, complete, and efficient medical attention. That is the reason why this bill becomes so important.

The scarcity of physicians, surgeons, and dentists in our armed forces is alarming. The financial attractions of civilian life to physicians, surgeons, and dentists have induced many professional men, who were formerly in service, to retire to private life and it now

becomes apparent that some inducement be offered to those groups in the armed forces in order to secure and retain their services therein.

Then, as now, the necessity of offering experienced professional assistance to our military men was recognized. Then the necessity was met by wise congressional action and professional pay was authorized for doctors and dentists to keep them in the service.

I hope that the House chooses that same wise course today.

Mr. ERLÉNORN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 4296, a measure designed to provide an incentive to obtain and retain an adequate number of experienced lawyers in our military services.

In April 1967, the Journal of the Armed Forces carried an article on the increasing difficulty the Armed Forces—all branches—were experiencing in retaining a sufficient number of law specialists and judge advocates. "As a result," the article reported, "much of the legal workload of the services is being handled by young and relatively untried officers whose diplomas still smell of wet ink." In a word, recent law school graduates are willing to serve a 4-year period in our Armed Forces, but then civilian life—and civilian pay—attracts them.

Prompted by this report, the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIRNIE), the author of the proposal before us, did some research. He learned that, in 1968, the Army's retention rate for military lawyers was 12½ percent, the Navy's 12 percent, and the Air Force's 19 percent.

These facts alone are disturbing, but another factor must be taken into consideration. Last year, Congress wisely enacted the Military Justice Act, intending to extend to our service men and women the right-to-counsel safeguards which the Supreme Court has guaranteed to civilians. This means, of course, that our needs for qualified and experienced lawyers in the military will rapidly multiply.

For these reasons, I joined sponsorship of a bill identical to H.R. 4296 as originally introduced.

Since that introduction, the findings on which it was based have been substantiated by a study conducted by the Department of Defense, which recommends enactment of H.R. 4296 with the amendments approved by the Armed Services Committee.

As reported to the House by the committee, this bill would make a special regular monthly payment to our military lawyers, thus providing them with an income that compares more favorably to that which they could earn in civilian life. Professional pay such as this is now paid, as you know, to doctors, dentists, and veterinarians. Similarly, special pay—that is, proficiency pay—is authorized by law for enlisted personnel with specialized occupations.

This bill would also provide the payment of a bonus for military lawyers who agree to extend their service for at least 3 years beyond their original commitment. Bonus payments of this kind are now paid to physicians and others with expertise in various fields. As suggested by the DOD, the bonus would be payable only once in a military lawyer's career.

If we are to provide the men and women of this Nation who serve in our military with the legal services to which they are entitled, I believe that we must take this step to encourage lawyers to make a career of the military.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, as the introducer of H.R. 10463, a similar bill, I rise in support of H.R. 4296, which was introduced by the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. PIRNIE).

I would like to commend the gentleman from New York for recognizing the gravity of the military lawyer retention problem, and I would also like to commend our Committee on Armed Services for its early favorable consideration of this legislation which offers an acceptable solution to that problem.

The Department of Defense describes the situation involving military lawyers as "a critical, chronic retention problem." Unless the current outflow of experienced lawyers is curbed, the Department foresees a time, only a few years hence, when the ability of the remaining military lawyers to provide necessary legal services within the Armed Forces will be "drastically" impaired.

Even if the situation described by the Department of Defense in its report to the chairman of our Committee on Armed Services is a projected one, clearly, present conditions, if unchecked, will lead us inevitably to it. It is imperative, therefore, that we take action now to reverse the trend.

We need only to examine the Department's own figures to be convinced that the Congress must act quickly to retain experienced military lawyers and also to attract younger lawyers to the military service. From the standpoint of the number of experienced military lawyers needed to render legal services of the proper quality, the career force in each of the military services is presently operating with these shortages: Army, 323; Navy, 170; Marine Corps, 112; Air Force, 132.

The ratio between experienced and inexperienced lawyers gives rise to even greater concern. At the beginning of fiscal year 1970, the number of experienced lawyers in relation to the total number of lawyers in each branch of the Armed Forces was reported to be as small as 29 percent in the Army; 36 percent in the Navy; 16 percent in the Marine Corps; and 42 percent in the Air Force.

Mr. Speaker, the military lawyer retention problem has grown to such serious proportions that additional financial incentives are urgently needed to assure our men in uniform that they will continue to receive proper legal counsel and representation. H.R. 4296, as amended by the committee, would provide such financial incentives in the form of professional pay and a continuation bonus. At the highest level, pay grade O-6 and above, military lawyers, who generally will have had 20 or more years of active service, would receive \$200 per month. At the O-3 pay-grade level and below, the special pay would be \$50 per month.

In addition, a continuation bonus would be payable to all military lawyers,

with 10 or fewer years of commissioned service, who extend their service on active duty upon completion of their initial active service commitment as a judge advocate or law specialist. He must execute a written agreement to remain on active duty for a period of at least 3, but not more than 6, additional years. This continuation pay bonus would be divided into equal annual or semiannual installments and would be paid over the period of the extended service as agreed upon by the military lawyer. His continuation bonus would be computed at the time he signs the agreement on the basis of not more than 2 months' basic pay for each additional year of extended active duty.

The Department of Defense has estimated the first year costs of these financial incentives at \$7 million, and subsequent annual costs would not be expected to exceed this amount.

The costs involved appear to be reasonable in view of the critical nature of the retention problem with respect to military lawyers. By extending these career retention incentives to military lawyers, we would be assured that our servicemen would have available the quality of legal assistance to which they are entitled. Denial of this assistance would mean a denial of justice under the law to our servicemen.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4296 deserves our unanimous vote.

Mr. POLLOCK. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 4296, a bill to provide for the procurement and retention of judge advocates and law specialist officers. Specifically, this legislation authorizes special pay for judge advocates and law specialists and also provides for the payment of a continuation pay bonus to those legal officers with not more than 10 years of active service who reenlist upon the completion of their initial active duty commitment.

The necessity for legislation such as H.R. 4296 cannot be overemphasized. At the present time, the Department of Defense is confronted with a critical retention problem which exists with respect to its military lawyers. No major problems are encountered in the initial procurement of junior legal officers, for pressures generated by the Selective Service laws produce an adequate number of applicants. However, great difficulties are encountered in retaining seasoned military lawyers beyond the period of their initial obligation.

This retention problem is graphically illustrated by statistical data compiled in 1968 by the Department of Defense. These findings show that each of the four services suffer severe shortages in their career forces of military lawyers. Thus, for example, the Army is lacking 323 career lawyers and the Navy, 170. As a result of these shortages, the ratio of experienced lawyers to the total number of lawyers is surprisingly low in each of the four services, with the Department of Defense-wide average a low 35 percent. Far from improving, it is expected that this imbalance will worsen in the absence of remedial legislation. As the number of experienced lawyers in the armed services diminishes, we can rea-

sonably expect to find a loss of continuity in many armed services legal projects.

To maintain a career force of the desired experience, adequate numbers of junior officers must be attracted into the career group. Yet, the figures show that this is not occurring. The Navy retains only 10 percent of its legal officers beyond the mandatory 4 year obligation and the Air Force, 14.5 percent.

In considering whether additional financial incentives are necessary in order to retain military lawyers, it is important to note that financial incentives have been used successfully to solve retention problems in other critical professional areas. Thus, for example, both military dentists and doctors receive additional compensation ranging from \$100 to \$350 per month. Moreover, military physicians receive a continuation bonus similar to the one proposed in H.R. 4296. Other financial incentives, such as reenlistment bonuses, are also offered.

The conclusion is inescapable that a severe problem exists with regard to the retention of military lawyers. We have before us today a solution which has proven successful in alleviating the shortage of professional personnel in several other critical areas. The Department of Defense believes that a similar program of financial incentives is necessary to retain skilled legal counsel; the Bureau of the Budget concurs in this judgment. The cost—\$9.9 million—is not prohibitive when compared to the magnitude of the problem. For these reasons, I respectfully urge this distinguished body to give its careful consideration to the immediate passage of H.R. 4296. This legislation is essential if the legal divisions of each of our military services are to continue to perform their functions with the efficiency and skill that we have learned to expect from them.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 4296 which would provide professional pay and a continuation bonus for military lawyers, a companion bill to one which I introduced earlier in the session.

Having helped author H.R. 6555—90th—the proposed Military Personnel Legal Counsel Act, and having supported the Military Justice Act of 1968, I naturally became actively interested in the quality of military justice.

I was very glad that the 90th Congress renewed its promise for providing our men in uniform with a truly just military system; however, I became quite dismayed by the alarming statistics indicating that while there was a greater need for military lawyers, the retention rate of military lawyers was critically low. A comprehensive Department of Defense study completed in October 1968 of military lawyer procurement, utilization, and retention very definitely afforded statistics in this area pointing to a shortage of manpower and an "unsafe" imbalance between the experienced and inexperienced lawyers.

This problem has resulted because of a lack of career retention incentives that are now furnished to physicians, dentists, and veterinarians, but not lawyers. After

a 4-year obligation tour, the military lawyer realizes that he cannot afford to stay in the military. If he leaves the military, he is almost guaranteed to earn approximately \$5,000 more a year. Is it no wonder that there is a critical shortage of JAG's?

The Department of Defense has recognized the criticality of the retention problem, and, thus, has recommended enactment of the proposed legislation, H.R. 4296. The "continuation pay" bonus would be payable when the officer would normally be required to make a decision to continue as a career officer in the military service or return to civilian life—with 10 or fewer years of service. A "special pay" would more nearly commensurate with salaries enjoyed by civilian contemporaries.

The obvious need for legislation in this area is squarely met by H.R. 4296, and accordingly, I strongly urge its prompt enactment.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on H.R. 4296.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

PRIVATE CALENDAR

The SPEAKER. This is Private Calendar Day.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. SPRINGER. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

A call of the House was ordered.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 297]

Ashley	Gettys	Fatman
Blanton	Gialmo	Pepper
Bow	Griffin	Pike
Brown, Calif.	Hanna	Pollock
Button	Hansen, Wash.	Powell
Cabell	Hastings	Pucinski
Cahill	Hawkins	Rallsback
Celler	Hébert	Reid, N.Y.
Chisholm	Hollfield	Reifel
Clay	Hosmer	Rivers
Cunningham	Johnson, Pa.	Sandman
Dawson	Kirwan	Saylor
Dent	Kuykendall	Scheuer
Dickinson	Landrum	Smith, N.Y.
Dorn	Lipscomb	Stuckey
Edwards, La.	Mathias	Teague, Tex.
Ellberg	Meskill	Tunney
Fascell	Mills	Utt
Fulton, Tenn.	Mollohan	Wampler
Galifianakis	Morton	Welcker
Gallagher	O'Neal, Ga.	Whalley

The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 370 Members have answered to their names, a quorum.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON RULES TO FILE PRIVILEGED REPORT

Mr. DELANEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Rules may have until midnight tonight to file a privileged report.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

PERMISSION FOR HOUSE MANAGERS TO FILE CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 14159

Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the managers on the part of the House may have until midnight tonight to file a conference report on the bill (H.R. 14159) making appropriations for public works for water, pollution control, and power development, including the Corps of Engineers—Civil, the Panama Canal, the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, the Bureau of Reclamation, power agencies of the Department of the Interior, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Atomic Energy Commission, and related independent agencies and commissions for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Tennessee?

There was no objection.

OIL DEPLETION ALLOWANCE

(Mr. VANIK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Speaker, I was chagrined at the action of the Senate in increasing the oil depletion allowance to 23 percent. Since the average utilization of the depletion allowance has been at the 23-percent level, this action represents a complete capitulation to the powerful oil interests.

The continuation of the depletion allowance on foreign oil further substantiates the political power of oil.

There is no rational legislative reason for extending the privilege of the depletion allowance to foreign produced oil. The combination of the depletion allowance and the foreign tax credit have made most of these profits tax free.

These tax-free profits of American investment in foreign oil have corrupted and misdirected American foreign policy in many oil-rich countries. This has resulted in American policies of costly military assistance to absolute monarchs and dictators. There is no reason for the American taxpayer to subsidize these activities.

It is now incumbent upon the House conferees, backed by an overwhelming vote in the House of Representatives to insist on the House provisions which eliminated the foreign depletion allowance on oil and reduced the domestic depletion allowance to 20 percent.

By its action, the oil industry has jeopardized the tax bill and has set the stage

for another reform debate in the next Congress. Things may be different the next time around when the taxpayer discovers how he has been done in.

COMMUNICATIONS

(Mr. DERWINSKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, communications—farflung, speedy communications—are the pulsebeat of our modern society. Our success in the far reaches of space, our lifeline here on earth to our scattered national efforts throughout the world, are dependent on fast and accurate communication. Peace may depend ultimately on a microwave.

Yet here at the citizen and business level our communications system is slowing down and showing grave danger of failing utterly. The number of users of our postal system grows monthly; the efficiency of the service slips and drags a little more as it does.

Today, we are locked in by custom and tradition to a creaky, outmoded system of postal service. What we need is a businesslike approach and the most modern methods for handling the mail. A new system, not fettered by partisan politics or hidebound by "gaslight era" methods is needed and is needed soon. President Nixon in his message of October 13 delineated the reform steps to be taken to modernize our postal system. In the name of commonsense, let us take them before it is too late.

PRIVATE CALENDAR

The SPEAKER. This is Private Calendar day. The Clerk will call the first bill on the Private Calendar.

JOHN VINCENT AMIRAULT

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 2552) for the relief of John Vincent Amirault.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

REFERENCE OF CLAIM OF JESUS J. RODRIGUEZ

The Clerk called House Resolution 86, referring the bill (H.R. 1691) to the Chief Commissioner of the Court of Claims.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this resolution be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa?

There was no objection.

AMALIA P. MONTERO

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 6375) for the relief of Amalia P. Montero.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unani-

mous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

VISITACION ENRIQUEZ MAYPA

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 6389) for the relief of Visitacion Enriquez Maypa.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

YAU MING CHINN (GON MING LOO)

The Clerk called the bill (S. 1438) for the relief of Yau Ming Chinn (Gon Ming Loo).

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa?

There was no objection.

MRS. RUTH BRUNNER

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 9488) for the relief of Mrs. Ruth Brunner.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

MRS. IRENE G. QUEJA

The Clerk called the bill (S. 564) for the relief of Mrs. Irene G. Queja.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

S. 564

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, in the administration of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Mrs. Irene G. Queja shall be held and considered to be within the purview of section 203(a)(2) of that Act and the provisions of section 204 of the said Act shall not be applicable in this case.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, as the introducer of a companion bill, H.R. 1801, I rise in support of S. 564, a private bill which would preserve second preference status in behalf of a lawful permanent resident of the United States.

Irene G. Queja, the widow, is a 31-year-old native and citizen of the Philippines. She was married there on November 13, 1967, to Ireneo D. Queja, a lawful permanent resident of the United States since 1930. Mr. Queja returned to Hawaii and filed a second preference visa in behalf of the beneficiary on December 8, 1967. Mrs. Queja intended to apply for a permanent resident visa and join her husband in Hawaii in July 1968, but her husband died of a heart attack in Honolulu on June 3, 1968.

The beneficiary was admitted at Honolulu, Hawaii, as a nonimmigrant visitor for the purpose of attending her husband's funeral. I introduced private bill H.R. 19590 on September 5, 1968, in behalf of the widow, and reintroduced the bill on the opening day of the 91st Congress.

The beneficiary, who has no children and was married but once, is presently living with a widowed female cousin in Honolulu. A high school graduate in her native country, the beneficiary worked approximately 4 years as a restaurant cashier before her marriage. She has savings in excess of \$7,500, and plans to seek employment in Honolulu after her status has been adjusted to that of a permanent resident.

Mr. Speaker, the beneficiary is a person of good moral character and hopes eventually to have the honor and the privilege of becoming a citizen of the United States.

The other body has obviously concluded that there is considerable merit to this widow's plea. I urge that this House give S. 564 the same favorable consideration.

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

FAVORING THE SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF CERTAIN ALIENS

The Clerk called the Senate concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 33) favoring the suspension of deportation of certain aliens.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this concurrent resolution be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

MRS. SABINA RIGGI FARINA

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 3629) for the relief of Mrs. Sabina Riggi Farina.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

PLACIDO VITERBO

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 3955) for the relief of Placido Viterbo.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa?

There was no objection.

WILLIAM PATRICK MAGEE

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 9001) for the relief of William Patrick Magee.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unani-

mous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

WILLIAM D. PENDER

The Clerk called the bill (S. 901) for the relief of William D. Pender.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

MRS. ROSE THOMAS

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 2302) for the relief of Mrs. Rose Thomas.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa?

There was no objection.

MILOYE M. SOKITCH

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 3571) for the relief of Miloye M. Sokitch.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

H.R. 3571

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding any provisions of title III of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as amended, limiting the period within which claims may be filed thereunder, including section 316 of such Act (20 U.S.C. 1641o), the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States is authorized and directed (1) to receive, consider, and act upon any claims of Miloye M. Sokitch, of Washington, District of Columbia, or his legal representative, filed within six months after the date of enactment of this Act, against the Government of Italy, as if such claims had been filed within the time and manner provided in the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, and (2) to certify to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment out of remaining balances in the Italian claims fund any award issued pursuant to such claims. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to pay to the said Miloye M. Sokitch or his legal representative out of such fund, in accordance with the provisions of section 310 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 1641i), the amount of any such award so certified by the Commission. Nothing in this Act shall constitute an admission of liability on the part of the United States.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

CONFERRING JURISDICTION OF CLAIM OF PHILIP J. FICHMAN

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 10658) conferring jurisdiction upon the U.S. Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claim of Philip J. Fichman.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unani-

mous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

CAPT. WILLIAM O. HANLE

The Clerk called the bill (S. 882) for the relief of Capt. William O. Hanle.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

REFERENCE OF CLAIMS OF BRANKA MARDESSICH AND SONIA S. SILVANI

The Clerk called House Resolution 498, to refer the bill (H.R. 4498) entitled "A bill for the relief of Branka Mardessich and Sonia S. Silvani" to the Chief Commissioner of the Court of Claims pursuant to sections 1492 and 2509 of title 28, United States Code.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this resolution be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

MR. AND MRS. JOHN F. FUENTES

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 11500) for the relief of Mr. and Mrs. John F. Fuentes.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

ROSE MINUTILLO

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 12089) for the relief of Rose Minutillo.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

IRVING M. SOBIN CO., INC., AND/OR IRVING M. SOBIN CHEMICAL CO., INC.

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 1782) for the relief of Irving M. Sobin Co., Inc., and/or Irving M. Sobin Chemical Co., Inc.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

DUG FOO WONG

The Clerk called the bill (S. 2019) for the relief of Dug Foo Wong.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

S. 2019

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, for the purposes of sections 203(a)(1) and 204 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Dug Foo Wong shall be held and considered to be the natural-born alien son of Mr. and Mrs. Chun P. Chin, citizens of the United States: Provided, That the parents, brothers, or sisters of the said Dug Foo Wong shall not, by virtue of such relationship, be accorded any right, privilege, or status under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

TIMOTHY L. ANCRUM (ALSO KNOWN AS TIMMIE ROGERS)

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 3590) for the relief of Timothy L. Ancrum (also known as Timmie Rogers).

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

REFERENCE OF CLAIM OF JOHN S. ATTINELLO

The Clerk called House Resolution 533, to refer the bill (H.R. 3722) entitled "A bill for the relief of John S. Attinello" to the Chief Commissioner of the Court of Claims pursuant to sections 1492 and 2059 of title 28, United States Code, as amended.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this resolution be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

MRS. MARJORIE ZUCK

The Clerk called the bill (S. 476) for the relief of Mrs. Marjorie Zuck.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

JACK BROWN

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 1697) for the relief of Jack Brown.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

JOHN T. ANDERSON

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 2241) for the relief of John T. Anderson.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

H.R. 2241

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to pay, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of \$137.50 to John T. Anderson of Morris Plains, New Jersey, in full settlement of his claim against the United States for the cost of shipping his automobile, incident to his separation from the Department of the Air Force, from Bremerhaven, Germany, to Baltimore, Maryland, in 1962. Such shipping costs were incurred after an officer of the United States Army Transportation Corps erroneously refused to authorize shipment of such automobile on a Government vessel.

Sec. 2. No part of the amount appropriated in this Act in excess of 10 per centum thereof shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or attorney on account of services rendered in connection with such claim, and the same shall be unlawful, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding \$1,000.

With the following committee amendment:

Page 2, line 4: Strike "in excess of 10 per centum thereof".

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

COMDR. JOHN W. McCORD

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 2481) for the relief of Comdr. John W. McCord.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

H.R. 2481

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Commander John W. McCord, of Santa Ynez, California, is hereby relieved of all liability to repay to the United States the sum of \$4,724.87, representing overpayments of active duty compensation received by him for the period from June 4, 1948, through February 14, 1967, while he was employed by the United States Navy, such overpayments having been made through administrative error in violation of the Act of July 31, 1894, as amended (5 U.S.C. 62), and which were received in good faith by him.

Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized and directed to pay, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to Commander John W. McCord, an amount equal to the aggregate of the amounts paid by him, or withheld from sums otherwise due him, in complete or partial satisfaction of the liability to the United States specified in the first section.

Sec. 3. No part of the amount appropriated in this Act shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or attorney on account of services rendered in connection with this claim, and the same shall be un-

lawful, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding \$1,000.

With the following committee amendment:

Page 1, lines 6 through 10, and page 2, lines 1 and 2, strike "compensation received by him for the period from June 4, 1948, through February 14, 1967, while he was employed by the United States Navy, such overpayments having been made through administrative error in violation of the Act of July 31, 1894, as amended (5 U.S.C. 62), and which were received in good faith by him." and insert "pay received by him for the period June 4, 1948, through August 26, 1966, as a result of administrative error in establishing his pay entry base date, which payments were received by him in good faith."

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

JANIS ZALCMANIS, GERTRUDE JANSONS, LORENA JANSONS MURPHY, AND ASJA JANSONS LIDERS

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 3530) for the relief of Janis Zalcmnis, Gertrude Jansons, Lorena Jansons Murphy, and Asja Jansons Lidars.

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

DR. EMIL BRUNO

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 4105) for the relief of Dr. Emil Bruno.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

MRS. PEARL C. DAVIS

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 7264) for the relief of Mrs. Pearl C. Davis.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

JAMES HOWARD GIFFIN

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 7830) for the relief of James Howard Giffin.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

H.R. 7830

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, notwithstanding any contrary provision of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, as amended (45 U.S.C., ch. 9; 49 Stat. 967-974, as

amended), the Railroad Retirement Board is authorized and directed to determine and certify to the Secretary of the Treasury the aggregate amount of annuity which would have been payable under such Act to James Howard Giffin, of Bainbridge, Ohio (R.R.B. No. A-572441), for the period beginning on the earliest date for which he could (upon filing application therefor) have become entitled to an annuity under such Act and ending with the date with respect to which he first commenced to receive an annuity under such Act; and the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to pay to the said James Howard Giffin (out of the Railroad Retirement Account in the Treasury) an amount equal to the amount so certified by such Board.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

BURROWES MANUFACTURING CORP.

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 8100) for the relief of the Burrowes Manufacturing Corp.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

THOMAS J. CONDON

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 9092) for the relief of Thomas J. Condon.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill as follows:

H.R. 9092

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to pay, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to Thomas J. Condon, East Weymouth, Massachusetts, letter carrier at the United States post office, Hingham, Massachusetts, a sum which the Postmaster General shall certify to the Secretary as the amount of additional compensation to which the said Thomas J. Condon would have been entitled from October 1, 1946, to January 1, 1948, if he had been placed on October 1, 1946, in the appropriate salary grade at the appropriate rate of compensation in accordance with the Act of July 31, 1946 (60 Stat. 749; Public Law 577, Seventy-ninth Congress). Through administrative error, which was corrected on January 1, 1948, the said Thomas J. Condon was placed in an inappropriate grade at an inappropriate rate of compensation for such period. No part of the amount appropriated in this Act in excess of 10 per centum thereof shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or attorney on account of services rendered in connection with this claim, and the same shall be unlawful, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding \$1,000.

Page 2, line 4, after "gress" insert: "as amended by the Act of April 29, 1950 (64 Stat. 93; Public Law 492, 81st Congress)".

Page 2, line 8, strike "in excess of 10 per centum thereof".

Page 2, line 15, after "\$1,000." insert: "The amount authorized to be paid to the said Thomas J. Condon by this Act shall be reduced by the amount which should have

been deducted as the employee's contribution to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund for that period, and the Secretary of the Treasury is further authorized and directed to deposit that amount in the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund to the credit of the said Thomas J. Condon."

The committee amendments were agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

WALTER L. PARKER

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 10662) for the relief of Walter L. Parker.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

H.R. 10662

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Walter L. Parker of Trenton, New Jersey, is relieved of liability to the United States in the amount of \$278.87 representing overpayments of salary paid to him during the period from January 20, 1966, through October 31, 1967, by the Department of the Navy as a result of administrative error and through no fault of his own. In the audit and settlement of the accounts of any certifying or disbursing officer of the United States, credit shall be given for amounts for which liability is relieved by this section.

With the following committee amendment:

Page 1, line 4, strike "\$278.87" and insert "\$279.05".

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

RUSSELL L. CHANDLER

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 12622) for the relief of Russell L. Chandler.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

H.R. 12622

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to pay, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to Russell L. Chandler, an employee of the National Aeronautical and Space Administration, formerly of Huntsville, Alabama, who was ordered to report for duty at his new duty station in Washington, District of Columbia, on September 18, 1966, for relocation allowances authorized by the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 806), in accordance with the provisions of the regulations of the Bureau of the Budget contained in Circular Numbered A-56 Revised, October 12, 1966, except that the time limits contained in section 4.1d of the circular will not be applied to expenses incurred within six months of the date of the enactment of this Act.

With the following committee amendments:

Page 1, line 5, after "appropriated", insert "a sum not to exceed \$724.65".

Page 2, lines 3, 4, and 5, strike "will not be applied to expenses incurred within six months of the date of the enactment of this

Act." and insert "will not be applied to expenses incurred in connection with said relocation prior to the enactment of this Act."

The committee amendments were agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read a third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

CAPT. NORMAN W. STANLEY

The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 1728) for the relief of Capt. Norman W. Stanley.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

H.R. 1728

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Captain Norman W. Stanley of San Jose, California, is hereby relieved of liability to the United States in the amount of \$2,371.44, representing overpayments of salary from September 18, 1961, through March 17, 1966, paid to him as a member of the United States Air Force as the result of an administrative error which occurred without fault on his part. In the audit and settlement of the accounts of any certifying or disbursing officer of the United States, full credit shall be given for the amount for which liability is relieved by this Act.

Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to pay, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to the said Captain Norman W. Stanley the sum of any amounts received or withheld from him on account of the overpayments referred to in the first section of this Act. No part of the amount appropriated in this Act in excess of 10 per centum thereof shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or attorney on account of services rendered in connection with such claim, and the same shall be unlawful, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding \$1,000.

With the following committee amendment:

Page 2, lines 8 and 9, strike "in excess of 10 per centum thereof".

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

The SPEAKER. That concludes the call of the Private Calendar.

TOWARD PEACE WITH JUSTICE IN VIETNAM

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of House Resolution 613, toward peace with justice in Vietnam.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Ohio.

The motion was agreed to.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further

consideration of House Resolution 613, with Mr. FLYNT in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee rose on yesterday, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS) had 1 hour and 26 minutes remaining and the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. ADAIR) had 1 hour and 28 minutes remaining.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS).

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILBERT).

Mr. GILBERT. Mr. Chairman, I am voting against House Resolution 613, but not because I oppose a "just peace" in Vietnam. What I oppose is the implication of this resolution and the method by which its sponsors have sought to impose it on the House.

There is probably not one of us in this body, Mr. Chairman, who does not favor a "just peace." I am equally sure that President Nixon seeks a "just peace." But one man's "just peace" is another man's "sell-out" and still a third man's military victory. The sponsors of this resolution surely understand that fair-minded, reasonable men differ enormously on what constitutes a "just peace." President Nixon appears to feel that a "just peace" would not include a coalition government. I feel that a coalition government is the bare minimum for a "just peace."

I cannot vote for this resolution, for we have precedents on how an administration can take the words of Congress and impart to them a meaning that was never intended. Can a President of the United States interpret an affirmative vote on this resolution as a sanction for whatever negotiating tactic he chooses to adopt, including the indefinite prolongation of the war? I hope that the answer is negative. But an earlier President took a resolution of the Senate to mean a virtual declaration of war against North Vietnam—an intent which was far removed from the minds of its sponsors. Once the resolution was voted, however, it was no longer in the hands of the Senate, but, for all practical purposes, the property of the administration, to use in the manner that suited its purposes. I am not at all assured by the sponsors of House Resolution 613 that the same fate does not await this resolution. Surely the enthusiasm the President has shown for it, in taking the unprecedented step of speaking on the floor of this Chamber in its behalf, does not suggest that the resolution will be treated with diffidence and restraint.

I further object, as part of the overall pattern which this resolution has followed, to the manner in which the matter has come to us. I see this measure as an excellent vehicle by which the Committee on Foreign Affairs might have questioned the administration on its war policy and its peace policy. We might have learned a great deal from the experience and the country would have had the opportunity to grasp so much more about our Nation's commitment in Vietnam. But, on the contrary, no hearings were set. Neither a member

of the administration nor a sponsor of the bill spoke on it in committee. It was in closed session, the proceedings of which we know very little, that the resolution was sent to the floor. At least a committee hearing might have enabled my colleagues and me to find out, in some reasonably accurate fashion, what substance this resolution is intended to convey.

I further can find no sanction for sending this bill to the floor under a closed rule. Surely there are Members who could clarify the resolution by amendment. There are others who believe the sense of this body could be more precisely expressed if the resolution were amended. The process leads me to wonder why its sponsors fear to have this resolution touched. Is it sacred in its present form? Is it meant, in these words, to convey a degree of support to the President which no other words could achieve? I would myself seek to amend the resolution to express the preference of Congress for a more representative government in South Vietnam. Certainly the House would not oppose such a sentiment, so much in keeping with the democratic aims of our involvement in South Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, I think we will one day be sorry for the passage of this resolution. I believe it attempts to create the impression of a national unity that does not exist—and that the world knows does not exist. We are deluding neither allies nor foes, but ourselves, if we proclaim passage of this resolution as an expression of national unity. We will achieve national unity when the President ceases to cater to every whim of the current Saigon regime and we negotiate a peace that recognizes the realities of Vietnamese political life. I see no reason to believe that passage of this resolution will strengthen our bargaining position in Paris, any more than it will strengthen our military position on the battlefields of the delta. I think it is unworthy of this great body that we dispose of the major questions facing our country in such a fashion. For these reasons, I cannot support this resolution.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. RARICK).

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Chairman, I voted "no" on both the previous question and on the adoption of the rule for House Resolution 613. I have consistently held that the American people are entitled to victory in Vietnam. My conviction is unchanged.

The Vietnam resolution which we now consider conveys great nobility of purpose in calling for broad popular support for the President in his efforts to obtain a just peace in Vietnam. The endeavor here undertaken will prove to involve more than a mere confrontation between popular support for the President and the demands for immediate unilateral withdrawal.

As with any question there are always more than two alternatives.

Most Americans support what they understand to be the President's objectives in Vietnam—a termination of the hostilities as speedily as possible, con-

sistent with our national interests. But many do not necessarily agree with the wisdom of the course which has been chosen—that of negotiating with an undefeated enemy. The best and most certain method to terminate the war promptly and permanently, while discouraging any further such aggressive ventures, is to win it. Hanoi knows this. We should.

Mr. Chairman, this is a popular resolution with most. I have not the slightest doubt that it will pass by a great margin. Yet, I feel compelled to rise and give voice to the viewpoint of many other dedicated Americans who feel as I do on victory.

The real question before us is whether enactment of this resolution would be instrumental in regaining peace, or might it have the unintended result of placing our country in an impasse by severely restricting our President's future alternatives.

Approval of this resolution endorses negotiation and can be interpreted by the President and, more importantly, by the enemy as an instruction to pursue only that course. Thus, we can find ourselves bogged down in endless negotiations over trivia while countless Americans continue to be slaughtered unnecessarily.

When former President Lyndon Johnson stopped the bombing, which was actually hurting the enemy, and began negotiating we spent months in Paris negotiating simply to decide the shape of the conference table. How many American lives did this talk cost? Only yesterday, General Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff and former commander in Vietnam, stated that had the bombing not been stopped the war would have ended last year. How many American lives did stopping the bombing cost? What was accomplished?

This resolution calls for further endless negotiations. How long would it take in negotiations to arrive at agreement over the definition of such terms as "free elections", "open to all", "supervised", "by an impartial international body."

Each word of this resolution is an open invitation to protracted and fruitless discussions in Paris while Americans continue to die in Vietnam and Hanoi's dear American friends escalate operations in the United States.

Have we learned nothing from our recent history in the Korean debacle? In Korea our men fought—and still die—under the UNO flag, in an UNO declared war against Communist China. There has been no peace settlement negotiated—and there is no peace. There is only an uneasy cease-fire where American men—who were not even born when the Korean war broke out—die as we continue to talk at Panmunjom.

Mr. Chairman, passage of this resolution will find 1970 without peace, more talk-fests, with more American casualties and more Americans yet to be killed, disabled or fall prisoner.

Every American surely recognizes that we have been brought to the present stalemate because we bent over backward to appease, negotiate and talk. Passage of the resolution is tantamount to approval by this body of past fail-

ures—policies that have left us 40,000 dead and 300,000 other casualties—policies which were resoundingly repudiated by the American citizens at the polls just last November. We accomplish nothing by attempting to renovate the same bankrupt Johnson policy.

It is time for a change. It is time to pursue a different course. The proven path to peace we have never tried in Vietnam is declaring a positive objective and moving forward to peace through victory.

The American people understand, even if their leaders do not, that you do not end violence by negotiating with criminals. This applies to the international terrorists in Hanoi as well as it does to the domestic type in our cities. Negotiation leads only to appeasement, which leads only to surrender. Surrender invites further violence—making an endless circle.

The people of my district are also opposed to the way this war is being conducted. They did not believe in the namby-pamby UNO diplomacy that got us involved in it in the first place, but now that we are in it, they are strongly opposed to prolonging it. They cannot understand why their sons are sent to fight a dirty little Asian war and are forbidden to win.

It would have been better had this resolution remained in committee. Now that it is before us on a "yes or no" vote, the lesser of the two evils is probably its adoption, if for no other reason than the propaganda value to Hanoi of its defeat. We can well expect the Washington newspapers to claim its adoption as a dove victory because it calls for additional negotiations.

In the long run its effect is to strengthen Hanoi's negotiators, not support our President.

By this instrument we state formally our concessions and severely restrict our flexibility in negotiation. Would it not be of value for us to possess the published instructions given Hanoi's negotiators by their government? We may find to our great regret that this resolution has left us only the formality of surrender.

Yet, this resolution will pass by a lopsided vote. This is not because it has any real meaning, or any intrinsic value. It is simply because Members have been neatly boxed into an impossible position—the same as they were with the former Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Emotion overrules logic.

Many of the Members of this body had voted, in good faith, in favor of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and came to regret it. They found that the resolution was far more encompassing than they had intended. In voting for this Vietnam resolution, many more Members will find themselves in February making the same apologies, for essentially the same reasons. And it is well to remember that these debates will not be carried in the future newspaper analyses—only selected language from the resolution.

It would be easy to remain silent, vote with the majority, and evade the real issue. I do not propose to do so. I cannot, in conscience, support the present resolution, neither can I cast a vote which

will be interpreted by the controlled news media as support for the enemy. I shall, therefore, vote "present."

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. ADAIR).

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. TAFT).

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, in keeping with the unanimous consent previously granted, I would like to insert in the RECORD preceding the remarks of the gentleman from Ohio a telegram from George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, and a telegram from Walter H. Judd, a former Member of the Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

The telegrams referred to are as follows:

WASHINGTON, D.C., December 1, 1969.

HON. JAMES WRIGHT,
Washington, D.C.:

The policies concerning Vietnam set forth in House Resolution 613 closely parallel those the AFL-CIO has adopted in convention resolutions and executive council statements. We strongly urge its adoption.

GEORGE MEANY,
President, AFL-CIO.

DENVER, COLO., December 1, 1969.

HON. JAMES WRIGHT,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.:

Strongly approve your resolution expressing support of the President's efforts to get justice and freedom for the people of South Vietnam without which no peace can be honorable or lasting for Southeast Asia or for our own country.

Best regards,

WALTER H. JUDD.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this resolution and wish to call the attention of the Committee to some information which I do not believe has come to their attention previously.

First, with regard to the general feeling of the American people on this very difficult problem that we are faced with in Vietnam, I would like to report the results of a questionnaire which I distributed on a postal patron basis to my district, some 140,000 copies in late September, and on which I have now had returned over 20,000 copies with the following results.

The questions which I asked were:

Which statement most accurately describes your sentiments regarding a Vietnam settlement?

In reply to that the answer was as follows: On the question and on the alternatives that I put:

(a) The United States should apply whatever military pressure is necessary to end the fighting and assure a stable and secure non-Communist government. 33%.

(c) The United States should continue the policy of withdrawal of American troops, begun in June, 1969, relating it to the war's progress and peace negotiations. 36%.

Thus, we find a total of some 69 percent are in support of the President's position, or of a stronger position.

On the other side, we find the next question:

(b) The United States should begin at once a complete withdrawal of American troops to be carried out regardless of the progress of the war. 18%.

This lines up almost directly, I would point out, to the results of a Gallup poll recently, and it seems to verify that finding.

There were other answers in the area of forcing a Communist coalition only with the Communists, only 3 percent.

Others and no answers—in the neighborhood of 10 percent.

This, I think, does indicate a gain from my particular constituency, the general feeling and general support of the people which I think we are reaffirming and reexpressing in this resolution.

Also I would like to call the attention of the House to a statement made by Ambassador Lodge on November 13 as his opening statement in the plenary session in Paris on that day.

In part he said as follows:

We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis—

Quoting the President—

We have declared that anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Viet-Nam to determine their own future.

Then he proceeds:

We ask you to join us in serious negotiations because we wish: to see this war ended; to spare the brave people of South Viet-Nam further suffering; to save the lives of our soldiers; and to end this waste of so many North Vietnamese troops, whose courage entitles them to a better fate. If progress at these talks is not possible, we can continue with our plan under which we will withdraw our forces from South Viet-Nam on an orderly scheduled timetable in accordance with the three criteria we have mentioned before.

Then he proceeds with reference to this particular resolution which is before the House today as follows:

Yesterday, a remarkable expression of this support took place—

American people for a just peace. And continuing—

Referring to the wide support of the Members of the House of Representatives co-sponsored and signed a House Resolution. I will read the text of the resolution.

Then Ambassador Lodge read the very text of the resolution before this House and he commented further as follows:

It may interest you to know that this resolution was originated by members of the Democratic Party although, of course, members of both parties have signed it. At first, the sponsors had planned to have 50 Republican and 50 Democrat signers. But so many wished to co-sponsor that this idea was dropped and instead the resolution went in with 301 co-sponsors.

I think it is significant that this point was made in the negotiations in Paris. I think it indicates the wisdom of our acting favorably upon this resolution.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention one other area of thought with regard to this resolution because I think it tries to put back into proper context and proper thinking the question as to how American foreign policy is made. While we have a great tradition of freedom of assembly and freedom of speech

in this country, that are guaranteed by the Constitution, and while there may be appropriate areas for mass demonstrations and marches to call upon the public conscience or to dramatize to move public opinion, and possibly even governmental action, on domestic issues, I would submit to you that this can be exceedingly disruptive to the formation of foreign policy.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. OTTINGER).

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution.

We are told that we should support this resolution because it is a peace resolution, calling for support of the President only "in his efforts to negotiate a just peace."

In the history of the world, more war has been waged in the name of peace than in any other name, save perhaps in the name of justice. From time immemorial, each side to military conflicts has justified its participation as in pursuit of peace and to right injustice. The United States has been active in employment of this justification, most notably in entering World War I as the quest of a war to end war.

The minority views of this resolution do a fine service in showing clearly how President Johnson used pursuit of peace as a justification for intensifying our Vietnam military involvement. The Johnson peace quotations and the resulting escalations bear repeating:

On August 5, 1964, President Johnson told the Congress that our objective was only to see that "the peace and security of the area will be preserved." By the end of that year there were 23,000 troops in Vietnam.

On April 7, 1965, President Johnson said "the only path * * * is the path of peaceful settlement." By the end of 1965 there were 181,392 troops in Vietnam.

On October 25, 1966, the President joined in a communique saying that "our united purpose is peace * * * whether through discussion and negotiation or through reciprocal actions by both sides to reduce the violence." By the end of 1966 there were 389,000 troops in Vietnam.

On March 15, 1967, President Johnson said that "I think we have all reached broad agreement on our basic objectives in Vietnam. First, an honorable peace, that will leave the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of terror or intimidation from the North." By the end of 1967 there were 485,000 troops in Vietnam.

This last formulation by President Johnson is almost identical to that in the proposed resolution before us. Its consequence was not progress toward ending the war, but to the contrary, a marked increase in our military commitment.

This is the danger many of us see in supporting the proposed resolution. We will not be euchred into supporting it merely because it calls for a just peace.

Certainly everyone in the country and every Member of Congress is for a just peace in Vietnam. Proponents of the resolution attempt to imply, insidiously I think, that anyone who opposes the resolution must therefore be opposed to a just peace. This, of course, is nonsense. For the phrase, "just peace" merely begs

the basic questions posed by our participation in the war. It fails to answer, or even ask, the basic questions: Just to whom? How? At what price? When?

It seems to me that by this resolution we are endorsing whatever action President Nixon may choose to take in pursuit of his own definition of what may be a just peace—regardless of American and Vietnamese lives that may be sacrificed in this pursuit, regardless of cost, regardless of time.

I think many of the sponsors of this resolution will live to regret the day they supported it, just as many later regretted their support of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Let me remind my colleagues of the assurances that were given by our colleague, H. R. GROSS, during the debate on that hastily considered resolution, so similar to the assurances now being given by proponents of this resolution:

Mr. Speaker, this resolution neither gives nor takes from the President any authority already delegated to him to act in an emergency or crisis.

Neither is it to declare war and it is in the nature of an after-the-fact sense resolution endorsing an action already taken by the President.

President Johnson used the Gulf of Tonkin resolution as congressional authority to commit a half a million troops and \$100 billion in Vietnam. If President Nixon decides that pursuit of a just peace requires escalation of the war, I assure you that he will be waving this resolution, too, in the faces of those who supported it.

The assurances of the proponents of this resolution that it endorses no future military actions ring hollow, indeed, in the face of their rejection in committee of amendments making it clear that the resolution would not afford any authorization for commitment or maintenance of troops in Vietnam or for any enlargement of our military involvement. If this is what they meant, why did they refuse to make it explicit? And why did they insist on a closed rule preventing an amendment on the floor to make these meanings clear? The only conclusion from these refusals is that they wished to leave the resolution open to interpretation as authorizing future military action by the President—as the blank check they so vehemently deny is being granted.

Indeed, many are interpreting this resolution as support for the President's policies as enunciated in his speech on November 3, 1969, in which he explicitly anticipated the possibility of a military escalation in response to any increase in enemy attacks. The President so interpreted it in his unprecedented appearance before the House on November 13 to applaud the resolution's sponsors.

The proponents' principal argument for the resolution appears to be a call for unity to strengthen the President's hand in negotiating a settlement of the war. This resolution will not accomplish that purpose, for it represents a false unity behind a policy on which there is such great disagreement in the country and in Congress.

First of all, more than 300 sponsors of the resolution were obtained only by

drafting the language so loosely that its meaning can be and has been interpreted as backing everything from pursuit of military victory to withdrawal of our troops. The use of the phraseology "just peace" permits each Member to interpret as he will what kind of "just peace" he is supporting, and thus renders the unity illusory.

Second, I am convinced that no amount of unity, real or apparent, will persuade Hanoi to negotiate its surrender in Paris—yet, in my opinion, that is the continuing import of the Nixon administration's Vietnam policies. The President's November 3 speech continues to offer settlement only on terms satisfactory to the military regime in Saigon which is interested only in perpetuating its power. Those terms can only be won on the battlefield, and so long as we maintain them, we are committing ourselves indefinitely to the battle.

If the President wants unity, he can get it only behind a policy of ending the war, not of continuing it, even in the name of peace.

I do not support precipitate unilateral withdrawal which the President and the proponents of this resolution pose falsely as the only alternative to the President's policy of "Vietnamization" and an indefinite military commitment to the Thieu-Ky regime. Nor do I support the Goodell resolution for a fixed timetable of withdrawal, for that, I think, equally precludes settlement and an orderly resolution of the war.

But there are other alternatives worth serious consideration by the administration and Congress, including settlement on realistic terms of partition or coalition reflecting the division of power now existent in South Vietnam or, failing any formal agreement, permitting the fighting to "fade away" as many of our Vietnamese experts have predicted would be the most likely avenue of the war's resolution.

I do not seek to impose a coalition on South Vietnam—neither can I condone continuing to impose the Thieu-Ky tyranny on that beleaguered land.

This resolution fails to encourage the President to take available alternative avenues to end the war. Instead, it endorses whatever measures he may choose to take in the name of a "just peace." It abdicates all congressional responsibility for future Vietnam policies. Despite the enormous pressures to support the President in pursuit of so lofty a goal as a just peace, I am not ready to give the President the kind of blank check endorsement required to permit him to justify whatever action he may decide is needed to achieve his interpretation of that goal.

I urge defeat of the resolution.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OTTINGER. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. Does the gentleman feel that we should abandon our efforts to obtain a just peace based upon the will of the people of South Vietnam?

Mr. OTTINGER. Most certainly not. This is exactly what I deplored as the efforts of the sponsors to imply that op-

position to the resolution constitutes opposition to a just peace. I favor a just peace but I do not favor approving whatever the President may do in the name of a just peace. I do not feel that we should continue the war indefinitely in order to bolster up the existing Government of South Vietnam. I think that is the course on which the President is now involved, and that it will not lead to a just peace. It will not lead to any peace at all.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from South Dakota (Mr. BERRY).

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the majority of the members on that committee. I rise in support of the Speaker, who placed his country ahead of any political connotation. I also rise in support of the majority and minority leaders who were influential in bringing this resolution to the House floor.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, this is the most important action this body has taken or will take in a long time. I say this because I believe this action may hasten the day when a peace, although possibly a nervous peace, will mean the end to the killing in Vietnam and will mean the time when all American boys can be brought home.

The thing that so many people fail to realize is that, as the well-known historian Bernard B. Fall, points out in his history of Vietnam, the Communist philosophy is that politics plays an even greater part in revolutionary and guerrilla warfare than does the military itself. Fall quotes from the North Vietnamese historian Long March in his 1947 book entitled "The Resistance Will Win" in which he says:

Politics and military action. These two questions are closely related: "War is a continuation of politics." (Marx) . . . Military action is a measure by which politics are executed . . . [there are] those who have a tendency only to rely on military action. They tend to believe that everything can be settled by armed force; they do not apply political mobilization, are unwilling to give explanations and to convince people."

What we are seeing in America today is a replay of the history of the French-Indochina war where Paris and France were made the political battlefield with riots, marches, and demonstrations and the streets of France being made the major political battlefield just as it is being done in America today.

I would call your attention to the transcript of the radio interview which I placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD last Tuesday in which Maj. Nick Rowe, who had been a Vietcong prisoner for 5½ years before escaping, told how his captors tried to convince him that his Government was wrong and that they were right and how he was told that they would tell him the truth every day until he would finally believe them.

Major Rowe went on to tell about how in the first years of his captivity they relied on their own sources to provide propaganda, but that along in 1967 they dropped all Communist propaganda sources and began to quote from the American news media, magazines, and wire services, UPI and AP. He said:

I think the most devastating was when they began to quote from prominent men within our own government condemning our efforts in Vietnam and calling for withdrawal.

Then he told about how he was at the Washington Monument during the moratorium march and told how his heart sank when he saw the American flag being desecrated and the Vietcong flags being hoisted above the American flag. He also told of how he felt certain that these are the pictures that would be used by the North Vietnamese and by the Vietcong for propaganda purposes to boost the morale of their people.

Then Major Rowe quoted from a Vietcong major by the name of Nuyen G. Kong, one of the political cadre from the Liberation National Front, and quoted the major as saying:

We do not expect a military victory, nor do we expect an immediate political victory, but through the dissension and disorder in the United States the government, this is the American government, will be deprived of the support of the people and forced to withdraw from Vietnam, and at that time, we, speaking of the Liberation National Front, will have total and final victory.

Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this resolution is to prove to that Vietcong officer and every officer in the Communist effort that the American people have not been forced through dissension and disorder to abandon their support of their fighting men and the purpose for which they have been giving their lives.

The purpose of this resolution is to prove to the negotiators in Paris, to Hanoi and to the Vietcong, that the vast majority of the American people, who we in Congress represent, support the President of the United States in his peace efforts.

That is all this resolution does—its purpose is to counteract Communist propaganda by pointing out that the "silent majority" wants peace, peace the American way, peace the President's way, and this is our way of registering that support and doing what we can to bring about peace.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may require to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CONYERS).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution.

Mr. Chairman, I will vote against this resolution, the first resolution concerning Vietnam this body has considered in 5 years. For the Foreign Affairs Committee to report the resolution without having held hearings is irresponsible. Since President Nixon has already stated that he will consider passage of this resolution as approval of his past, present, and future policies toward Vietnam, to now consider this grave issue under a closed rule is unconscionable. The effects of this resolution, should it be passed, are only too clear. Both Mr. Nixon and Secretary Laird have stated that the possibility of reescalating the war has not been ruled out. Therefore, approval of this resolution will mean to Mr. Nixon what the Gulf of Tonkin resolution meant to Mr. Johnson—before-the-fact justification of future actions, whatever they may be. Furthermore, approval will not give a "clear indication" of popular and political support for the President's poli-

cies. The closed rule and lack of hearings eliminated that possibility. Besides, the deceptions in this resolution are too transparent. The American people will not be fooled any more than Hanoi and the National Liberation Front. Everyone will know of the manner in which this resolution was considered and the intentionally vague language in which it was written. There is, therefore, no reason to support this resolution. Of course, everyone claims to desire peace in Vietnam. That is not the question. The question remains: How do we end the war?

This resolution does not answer that question nor does it call upon the President to do so. The resolution says nothing about urging or requiring further troop withdrawals. It simply supports Mr. Nixon "in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam." The President himself has said that negotiations have not brought progress toward peace. By remaining silent on the matter of troop withdrawals, this resolution, in my judgment, by implication supports the dictatorial Saigon regime of Thieu and Ky whose obdurance in Paris has severely hampered those negotiations. The President claims he has a plan of an orderly, scheduled timetable for complete withdrawal of U.S. combat troops. Yet, this so-called "plan" is riddled with contradictions. He said on November 3 that three factors are conditions for our withdrawal:

First, progress in the negotiations; second, the level of fighting in South Vietnam; and third, the improved capability of the South Vietnamese forces. These are all factors over which the President has little or no control. Vietnamization of the war is a fraud. It is deceptive to think that this policy could have any other result than a prolongation of our involvement. The fundamental error of this resolution is the assumption that we are supporting the principle of self-determination for the Vietnamese people. But, in point of fact, the Thieu-Ky regime has repeatedly opposed any new elections without their supervision. What the President "plans" to do and what Thieu will allow are two different things. Thus, the surest way not to achieve self-determination for the Vietnamese people is for the United States to continue support of the Thieu-Ky regime. The inescapable fact is that as long as we support the Saigon government we can never achieve peace in Vietnam.

Approval of this resolution will only sanction further travel down the same road to an indefinite commitment of extended fighting in an already discredited war. The bringing of peace must not be considered the exclusive domain of Presidents and diplomats, for they have failed, and are failing, to bring an end to this horrible war. Congress must do more than serve up this vague language to a President who has taken only the most meager steps in the direction of peace. I do not support his past policies. Nor can I support his "plan" for the future which only points toward an indefinite prolongation of this war. This is the Tonkin resolution revisited, and as one Member of this House I will have no part of it.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. BURLISON).

Mr. BURLISON of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I intend to vote for House Resolution 613. But it should be understood that this vote is cast only for the clear content of that resolution. Some, including the President, have apparently interpreted support of this resolution to embody endorsement of everything President Nixon has said and done about Vietnam as well as everything he may say or do about this involvement in the future. The purpose of this statement is to divorce my vote from any such interpretation.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. OBEY).

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, because many questions have been raised concerning the implications of the Wright resolution, I would like to put the pending vote on this resolution in correct perspective.

I plan to vote for the resolution because of my recognition of the primacy of the office of the Presidency in the conduct of foreign affairs. But because of the interpretation being placed upon it in some quarters as an endorsement of the President's November 3 speech when the resolution was, in fact, written before that speech was ever delivered, I find it necessary to make clear what passage of this resolution should and should not represent.

First, passage of this resolution should in no way condone the procedures under which this matter was brought before the House. The Foreign Affairs Committee provided no opportunity for a hearing on this resolution. The Rules Committee adopted a closed rule which precluded the offering of amendments to it. Both actions are wrong. A matter of such import should have been open to both hearings in committee and amendment on the House floor.

Second, passage of this resolution should not be interpreted in any quarter as either a blanket endorsement of every facet of the President's November 3 speech or as a pledge of unqualified support for any future Presidential action as yet unknown and undefined.

I support House Resolution 613 with the reservations stated above, because it would misstate my position to imply that I do not endorse the fondest hope:

First, that the President will exert all "his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam";

Second, that the South Vietnamese realize the benefits of a democratic government chosen by them "by means of free elections open to all Vietnamese";

Third, that it would be possible for "an impartial and international body" to aid in securing these benefits; and

Fourth, that the "controversy be peacefully" resolved in order that the war may be ended and peace may be restored at last in Southeast Asia.

But regardless of my vote on the resolution itself, I believe that in addition to further troop withdrawals, future U.S. policy should at least include:

First, efforts to further reduce the level of violence in Vietnam, looking to a cease-fire;

Second, efforts to substantially broaden the South Vietnamese Government; and

Third, the immediate designation of a high-level replacement for retiring delegate Henry Cabot Lodge.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. MIKVA).

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. MIKVA. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, my name is listed as one of the sponsors of this resolution, but I am urging the House today to vote against its adoption. This resolution was written before the President's November 3 speech. Its words were intended to reflect events and statements which took place prior to that speech. However, adoption of this resolution now will be interpreted by all the world in terms of the President's November 3 speech and put the House of Representatives on record as supporting that position. Unfortunately, President Nixon's speech narrowed this country's options to two. He described them as Vietnamization of the war—whatever that now means—and gradual withdrawal, or, using his words, "immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam." He rejected the latter.

Mr. Chairman, at the time I was asked to be a cosponsor of this resolution, I had no intention of endorsing a future Presidential policy, of which I had no informed knowledge. Yet in this case, we apparently are being asked to act prospectively. I can assure you that no one disclosed to me that this resolution had been carefully cleared in advance by the White House. So it is for these reasons—not because of the hopes expressed in the resolution—but because of the manner in which it is being distorted in its usage that compels me to vote against it.

I personally think there were serious omissions in the President's speech—and in the specific light of that speech—there are serious omissions in this resolution. We should not lock ourselves into a box. I—for one—believe there are other alternatives. One of them would be to actually make the Government of Vietnam work for the people of Vietnam. President Thieu has proposed to the Vietnamese National Assembly the most ambitious land reform program ever proposed by any government in power in the history of the world. That program would abolish all tenant farming in Vietnam. The landlords could retain only that land which they personally work with their own two hands. Land to the tiller would go to all those who till it—South Vietnamese and Vietcong alike. Studies by our own Government show that what the peasant wants most—above all else, including his own personal security—is ownership of the land.

Adoption of such a program would cut the Communists off at the ankles. Right now, they are able to recruit guerrillas by promising land to the tiller. In my opinion, the impact of such a land reform program by South Vietnam would do as much to end the war as any other step that could be taken. It also would give many people in America some logical reason to support the Government of South

Vietnam. What is the status of that bold proposal? It is now bogged down in the Vietnamese Senate—that is where it is, that is where it will probably remain.

The South Vietnamese could also do something about inflation and war profiteering. Recently, the Government of South Vietnam increased import taxes on nonessential commodities. Many merchants not only passed this tax increase to the consumer on nonessential commodities but also on the necessities of life, including food. As a result, the cost of living index has gone up another 10 percent. Once again, the little guy in Vietnam is paying through the nose. How we can expect the ordinary man to support a government which permits this to happen is beyond me.

Then there is the matter of free elections, which have never really been permitted in Vietnam. Even the candidates are sanitized. The voting tallies are low and those who are elected are not supported by a majority of the voters. There is suppression of any voice in dissent. The man who secured the next highest number of votes—because he discussed an alternative—has been in prison ever since. So there is no evidence yet that the people of South Vietnam even support the Government.

I, of course, favor the withdrawal of our forces from Vietnam as rapidly as possible consistent with their security.

The time to carefully explore our alternatives is now—while we still have some leverage to influence the course of events. The administration should commit itself, with renewed vigor, to such a course.

Mr. Chairman, this resolution should be returned to the Committee on Foreign Affairs for further study and revision. Adoption by the House in its present form would be a disservice, not only to America, but also to South Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, I also take note of the stringent limitation on time and the fact a closed rule denies any right of amending to perfect the resolution.

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Chairman, I will vote against House Resolution 613 and would like to take just a few minutes to state why.

If one is guided by the words of the resolution alone, without putting them in the context of recent days and months, they seem innocuous enough. Doubtless the resolution was carefully drafted so that it would be innocuous—at least on its face. After all, who can object to supporting the Nation's President in his efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement to a bloody conflict which has already claimed so many American lives and cast such a shadow over the American spirit.

But, of course, things are not that simple. House Resolution 613 cannot be read out of context, and it cannot be voted for out of context. The resolution has been drafted, promoted, and when it is passed it will be heralded as support for President Nixon's present policy in South Vietnam. I do support efforts to end the war in Vietnam; I do support efforts to stop the killing and to negotiate a peace which will do honor both to this country and to the Americans who have died in South Vietnam.

The dispute here is not over ends, it is over the means to achieve those ends. And this is where I believe we must be honest. We cannot obscure the differences over how to end the war in Vietnam by merely agreeing that it should be ended. We cannot avoid taking public positions on what precise steps are necessary to reduce the level of violence and stop the killing by blithely affirming our desire that there be peace on earth and good will toward men. That is why hearings on this resolution would have been so important. That is why an open rule would have been so important. That is why the plea for unity rings a little hollow under such a procedure—like the local union which sent a telegram to the company president wishing him a speedy recovery from an ailment. It included the telegram by saying, "the vote on this issue was 18 to 10."

I would have thought that in the case of South Vietnam especially, it would be clear to most Members of this body that casting a vote on the mere words of a resolution is insufficient. If there were any proof needed, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution should certainly have provided that proof for us. The words of that resolution are also innocuous enough. No one could accuse a legislator voting for that resolution of having been a warmonger or a militarist. But it was the context of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution that was important. It was what that resolution signified to a President in whose behalf it was introduced; it was what it has come to mean since it was passed that cannot be ignored when we vote on House Resolution 613 today.

Let there be no mistake about it: voting for this resolution will be construed just as votes for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution were construed 5 years ago. Those votes will be construed as underwriting an indefinite prolongation of American presence in South Vietnam. They will be interpreted as support for a policy President Nixon has told us will keep American support troops in South Vietnam indefinitely and will keep American combat troops there—he has not told us how long. They will be construed as support of continued spending of billions of dollars in South Vietnam for the foreseeable future. We may tell ourselves that House Resolution 613 means nothing more than the words on the page, but we know that voting for that resolution really means much more.

President Nixon obviously has given up hope that the Paris negotiations will bear fruit. Of his original formula, only the behavior of the enemy on the battlefield and the progress of Vietnamization remain as determining factors in the pace of U.S. withdrawals. Will a slower pace make that withdrawal any more honorable than it would be at a faster pace? Will the world be fooled that we did not make a disastrous miscalculation of American interests when we committed our troops to combat in 1965? Will history judge us as nobler or wiser because we took 3 years to withdraw from South Vietnam after we decided it was a mistake, rather than 1 year? I do not think so. But the question which is really more important than whether we can

fool the world is whether we can continue to fool ourselves.

The Gulf of Tonkin resolution passed this Chamber unanimously. George Santayana said that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. DERWINSKI).

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I regret that, unlike many Members, I have not prepared remarks on this resolution, but I would like to call a few items to the attention of the Members, realizing that they are very properly engrossed in this subject and recognizing that this resolution is one of the more important items that we have taken up for consideration in this session of Congress.

Mr. Chairman, before emphasizing positive arguments in support of the resolution before us, I wish to clarify the reason for my votes when we adopted the rule. Consistent with a personal pattern that I have adopted I support open rules or at least limited open rules in contrast to a closed rule. I follow the same policy when Ways and Means Committee bills have been subject to a closed rule.

There is no doubt in my mind that if we had a complete open rule all amendments would be beaten back. For example, I myself would have vigorously opposed the amendment which would have been offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) and those which would have come from the ultraliberals in the House who are more interested in criticizing the President than in supporting any constructive policy for peace.

There is no doubt that the North Vietnamese hierarchy are keen observers of the American scene and that they are misinterpreting the issue involved in the moratorium performance and the widespread coverage given the so-called peace movement. The so-called antiwar establishment does not have a monopoly on a desire for peace. Certainly no one wants a just peace as much as President Nixon. Our foreign policy goal is to help produce lasting peace with freedom for all peoples of the world.

History shows that peace can be maintained if a nation remains vigilant, strong, and consistent with its legitimate objectives. History further shows that appeasement and compromise of fundamental principles produce failure. The President, fully aware of his responsibility to all people, will continue to pursue an objective policy toward a goal of world peace and freedom. To maintain our national institutions and preserve world stability, he will not be intimidated by street demonstrators nor any other questionable types of organized pressure.

I notice my dear friend from Illinois who just addressed the House was concerned over the language of the resolution. As I read the resolution the very opening sentence states as follows:

Resolved, That the House of Representatives affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam.

I do not think this is language which would give the President any unusual

authority. We want the President to negotiate a just peace. The emphasis is "negotiate a just peace."

I would also like to read from a letter which has just come to my attention from the Prime Minister of Israel, Mrs. Golda Meir, to the President of the United States commending him for his speech of November 3, and I quote from that letter, as follows:

The Prime Minister wishes to congratulate the President on his meaningful speech and expresses her hope that he will speedily succeed in bringing about peace in Vietnam.

The President's speech contains much that encourages and strengthens freedom-loving small nations the world over which, striving to maintain their independent existence, look to that great democracy, the United States of America.

I believe it would be fair for us to say that any President of the United States, regardless of party background is a man who supports peace. I do not think there is anyone who wanted peace during his term of office more than President Johnson did. I do not think there is anyone today who wants peace more than President Nixon does.

I think we in the House of Representatives and the gentlemen in the other body all realize that this is an extremely difficult problem that the President has inherited. Peace is the goal of our foreign policy. We certainly in this House of Representatives in supporting this resolution merely let it be known that we want a just peace and that a just peace is our goal.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. OTTINGER. In connection with Mrs. Meier's letter which the gentleman from Illinois quoted from, is the gentleman aware that during an explanation in Parliament shortly thereafter, she gave the explanation that some small countries stand alone on their own, but they cannot stand up to all outside enemies.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I am sure that the gentleman supports the request which Mrs. Meier has made for certain military equipment and which will be purchased here in the United States, and the efforts she is making to keep her country independent. The aggression by the North Vietnamese Communists against South Vietnam is direct but the aggression against Israel by the Arab States would not be taking place without the involvement of the Soviet Union. It is obvious that the Soviet Union's presence in the Middle East is much of the cause for tension there as is their direction and aid to the North Vietnamese in their invasion of South Vietnam.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I do not see the Vietnamese situation in that context, but I shall not take up the gentleman's time to dispute that. However, Secretary of Defense Laird has indicated that although he desires to achieve peace, there is the further indication that we might increase our military efforts if this is not accomplished.

Does the gentleman from Illinois concede that that is a part of the efforts to achieve a just peace?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I think if the gentleman would be objective he would recognize that one of the things that might bring about a just peace is the recognition by the aggressor in Vietnam that they do not have total and permanent sanctuary. In my opinion it would be effective for them to understand that they cannot continue their deliberate non-cooperative attitude with reference to our efforts to achieve peace in Paris and with reference to many other efforts that have been made.

Mr. MIZE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. MIZE. I do not think we can over-emphasize the fact that the resolution very clearly uses the words "to negotiate a just peace." It does not say "achieve a just peace." It says "negotiate a just peace."

Mr. OTTINGER. It says, "efforts to negotiate a just peace."

Mr. MIZE. All right, "efforts to negotiate a just peace."

Mr. OTTINGER. The gentleman just said that there might be an increase in the war effort itself if this is not done. Could the gentleman interpret that?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Just a minute. I want to be sure that the distinguished gentleman from New York is not innocently misinterpreting what I said. I, in effect, said that our negotiators in Paris and our diplomats ought to have the option to communicate to the aggressor the fact that they are not free to continue as they have in the past believing they have total and permanent sanctuary and that for effective negotiations we must maintain logical and legitimate options so that an adjustment in our policies would produce truly effective negotiations.

Mr. OTTINGER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, it is amazing to me—simply amazing—that there should be any opposition to the pending resolution which supports the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam. Let us reexamine the contents of the resolution:

RESOLUTION TOWARD PEACE WITH JUSTICE IN
VIETNAM

Resolved, That the House of Representatives affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, expresses the earnest hope of the people of the United States for such a peace, calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures which the United States has made in good faith toward the Government of North Vietnam, approves and supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese and supervised by an impartial international body, and that the United States is willing to abide by the results of such elections, and supports the President in his call upon the Government of North Vietnam to announce its willingness to honor such elections and to abide by such results and to allow the issues in controversy to be peacefully so resolved in order that the war may be ended and peace may be restored at last in Southeast Asia.

It is understandable that some Americans may have reservations about the wisdom of ever allowing ourselves to be-

come involved in a land war in Asia. But that issue is not involved here. It is equally understandable that some Americans feel very strongly, as I do, that the no-win policy in fighting that war has been a tragic mistake. But, again, that issue is not involved here. It is likewise understandable that many of us opposed the cessation of bombing of the north, in response to pressures from home and abroad. But that is not involved in this resolution.

What is involved here is the matter of an expression of support for the President in his tireless quest for a just peace in Vietnam. If I were opposed to a just peace in Vietnam I would certainly be opposed to this resolution. But being in favor of a peaceful settlement I, of course, strongly support this expression. In fact, I am a cosponsor of the resolution.

What objective can opposition to this lofty purpose serve? It can, and I assume will, be interpreted by Hanoi as a sign of division on the part of the American people. In that respect such opposition can be expected to encourage the Communists to prolong the war and kill more Americans. It is just that simple. Wittingly or unwittingly, opposition expressed here today to a just peace in Vietnam can, to the extent it is expressed, encourage the enemy.

Fortunately, however, resistance to the achievement of a just peace in Vietnam is confined to a relatively small group.

It is unthinkable that any of the Members of this body are really and sincerely opposed to a just peace. Certainly Hanoi is opposed to a just peace. The Communists have consistently opposed everything contained in this resolution. So, let us think this thing through and be realistic about what is really involved here.

It will be recalled that only last week, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps was quoted in Da Nang as saying that in his judgment the Vietnam war would have been over a year ago if the administration had had the full backing of the American people.

That was Gen. Lewis W. Walt speaking. He went on to say this:

The day the enemy firmly believes we are not going to pull out, that is the day he will start talking in Paris, and not before.

This four-star general spent 2 years in Vietnam as the top marine commander in the war zone. Surely he is more knowledgeable on this subject than any Member of this body. We had better heed his judgment.

General Walt is not alone in this respect. His views are shared by practically all responsible military and civilian leaders in this country, and in my judgment by the overwhelming majority of the American people.

Mr. Chairman, there is much evidence the war in Vietnam has, in effect, been won. Many of our military authorities have said so. But the enemy continues to mount suicidal attacks, undoubtedly inspired by the eruption of antiwar clamor on the part of a noisy but small minority of our people. Now, of all times, there is need for unity in this country. In that way we can exploit our advantages and save American lives. In

pursuance of that objective this resolution should have the unanimous support of this body.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HUNGATE).

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Chairman—

The Congress shall have power . . . to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water (art. I, sec. 8).

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States. (art. II, sec. 2).

On October 6, in accordance and harmony with both of the above constitutional requirements, I joined with a bipartisan group of over 100 members in introducing the following resolution:

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the substantial reductions in United States ground combat forces in Vietnam already directed are in the national interest and that the President be supported in his expressed determination to withdraw our remaining such forces at the earliest practicable date.

In doing so, I made clear that I support the President in his efforts and proposals to beat the Clark Clifford timetable for withdrawal of ground combat forces from Vietnam.

The Clifford timetable called for removal of 100,000 ground combat troops by January 1, 1970. Current reports are that as of December 15, 60,000 such troops will have been removed. I support the President in his proposal, vigorously pronounced in June 1969, to beat the Clifford timetable. This requires the removal of 40,000 additional troops this month, Mr. President, and I reiterate my support of your promised intentions to do so.

As Commander in Chief, no resolutions from me are required for the President to meet this commitment. In fact, it might be considered presumptuous of me, or anyone else, to offer such resolutions instructing the President in his duties.

Furthermore, congressional resolutions tend to be irresolutely construed.

The Gulf of Tonkin resolution became a congressional credit card on which over 39,000 lives, over 200,000 casualties and over \$100 billion were expended, with no constitutional sanction. A vote for a simple appropriations measure—which by our own rules cannot contain legislation—is interpreted as approval for the uses that may be made of bombers, strafers, defoliants, and napalm. Unfortunately, in congressional language “viva voce” has been read to mean “carte blanche.”—CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, volume 112, part 4, page 4429.

Vietnam contains valuable, although frightfully expensive, lessons for the American people and the world. The most powerful air and missile striking force, complete with a trillion dollar arsenal, cannot defeat peasants with punji sticks, if they are willing to resist to the death. The illusion of national security being obtained through airpower should be thoroughly shattered. Corroboration can be found in the celebrated triumph of Israel airpower over Egypt

in the 6-day war, that weeks, months, years later continues, without resolution. Perhaps it is better to be martially unprepared as we were in World Wars I and II, if we can preserve a nation morally united in the causes to which our Constitution commits us.

It seems to shock many that war is a dehumanizing process. It shocks others that while we may commend and promote those who bomb, strafe and burn enemy villages, containing, almost by necessity, the innocent, along with the guilty—the simple child beside the Vietcong cadre—yet their comrades on the ground, who accomplish the same result in a somewhat more personal manner, through the use of rifles, carbines, and knives, must be tried for murder. It requires a high degree of sophistication to appreciate this distinction.

Are draftees to be sent halfway round the world on missions to “search and destroy” then to be tried each time for murder, when, under the strains of combat, they go berserk, killing innocent civilians? Are they to be held fully and legally accountable for their actions under those conditions? What shall we do to those who voluntarily seek the responsibility for running this Government? What is our responsibility to that draftee, his parents, and survivors?

I do not believe that responsibility can be met by passing the buck. Perhaps it cannot even be met by passing resolutions.

In World War II, the infantry school at Fort Benning, Ga., operated a course for reconnaissance patrols in combat areas. In the problem, the purpose of the patrol's mission was to obtain information only. Discovery of the patrol's existence could imperil the entire body of troops, the battalion or regiment to which the patrol belonged. To instill the lesson that the unit's whereabouts must not be learned from the patrol's activities, in one part of the problem you were to enter an enemy field hospital, complete with nurses, doctors, and patients, and kill everyone in it, with one part involving bayoneting patients in their beds.

Vietnam is not the first war in which acts of brutal inhumanity were perpetrated nor, of course, are we the only side who perpetrated them.

If the Vietnam conflict continues, My Lai will most certainly not be the last atrocity to occur. The question is: Are the goals we seek in Vietnam worth the My Lai's, past, present, and future?

The responsibility for that decision must rest with someone who gets about \$200,000 a year and his 500 or more congressional associates drawing around \$42,500. It is not quite fair to place that responsibility on some poor devil who is drafted and sent to Vietnam at \$188 a month.

A vote for this resolution will be an expression of agreement that My Lai and over 200,000 casualties are an acceptable price to attempt to obtain the goals we seek in Vietnam. There are some who find that price too high.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. COUGHLIN).

Mr. COUGHLIN. Mr. Chairman, I am voting in favor of House Resolution 613 as an expression of support for President Nixon's action in reducing U.S. ground combat forces in Vietnam, his expressed determination to withdraw our remaining such forces at the earliest practicable date, and his efforts toward a just peace in that tragic conflict.

My vote should not be misinterpreted as support for renewed escalation, a prolonged delay in the return of our men, or the Thieu-Ky regime. I favor an inexorable and speedy return of our men from Vietnam and believe this can be done most quickly without Congress imposing deadlines that may only delay any activity until the deadline arrives.

With the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution on August 7, 1964, the Congress gave, in effect, a blank check to President Johnson to conduct an undeclared war. This was a dangerous precedent, regardless of who was President. I support President Nixon, but as an elected Member of the legislative branch of the Federal Government, I will not surrender my duties with a blank check to any administration.

From the beginning of our Vietnam involvement, I have expressed serious doubts. I believe our involvement was ill-conceived and that we should bring our men home as fast as is consistent with allowing the “little people” of South Vietnam a fighting chance of survival. I exclude the Thieu-Ky government from my definition, because I feel a critical mistake on our part has been to tie our commitments to a specific regime in Saigon.

In allowing the South Vietnamese people a chance for survival, we either must give them the means to protect their lives or Hanoi must explicitly agree not to conduct a blood bath as we leave.

We Americans may debate the speed of our withdrawal, but the fact is that the President has radically changed our policy in Vietnam. After 6 years of only sending more men over, we are now bringing American men home. After 6 years of Americanizing the war, we are now turning it back to the South Vietnamese. Many of the President's critics now are the ones who failed then.

Therefore, I have sponsored this resolution to back the President as he continues to withdraw our troops from Vietnam and strives for a political settlement of this most unfortunate war. I again emphasize, however, that this support does not include renewed escalation or prolonged delay.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. FARBSTEIN).

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. ADAIR) for being kind enough to yield me this time, inasmuch as I understand that the remaining time is running very close to the requests he has, so I fully appreciate the thoughtfulness of the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I oppose House Resolution 613.

I do not oppose it because I do not support the President in his efforts to achieve peace in Vietnam. I do not op-

pose it because I do not support the President in his program to reduce the U.S. military commitment in South Vietnam. In these efforts he has my prayers and my support.

I oppose this resolution on other grounds. It calls upon the Congress to approve a policy that is not only vague but one over which the United States has little control. The President, in his speech of November 3, 1969, stated that the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam would depend upon: First, progress at the Paris peace talks; second, the level of enemy activity; and, third, progress of training programs of the South Vietnamese forces.

Only over the last of these stipulations does the United States have any control and even that influence depends upon the cooperation of the South Vietnamese.

For too long U.S. policy in Vietnam has been dependent upon the attitudes of Saigon and Hanoi. We must change this policy. We must seize the initiative. We must adopt a policy that is in our own national interest. To do this we must begin by convincing the Government of South Vietnam that we intend to be the masters of our policy. We can do this by announcing our intention to withdraw all our forces at the earliest possible moment.

The best way to insure that the Government of South Vietnam will undertake an accelerated program to gain the support of its people and build a military structure capable of maintaining their territorial and political integrity is to convince that Government that the United States does not intend to remain in Vietnam very long. The Government of South Vietnam must be convinced that the United States intends to withdraw all of her forces as quickly as possible. This will give that Government the impetus and the will to assume the burden of securing their own freedom.

This is one of the glaring weaknesses of the resolution. It does not convey any sense of immediacy or urgency concerning either termination of that war or the withdrawal of American troops. And as long as the South Vietnamese are convinced that the United States will continue to support them, as long as they can rely upon U.S. military forces, there is little likelihood that the Government of South Vietnam will take the action required to reform their political and military structure. By this I mean that the Government of South Vietnam must broaden its base to include all elements of South Vietnamese society. Only in this way will that Government be able to gain the support and confidence necessary to win the peace and to survive as a viable political and economic entity.

There is another weakness in this resolution. The resolution approves and supports the principle that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own Government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese and supervised by an impartial body and that the United States is willing to abide by the results of such elections. It also calls upon the Government of North Vietnam to announce its willingness to honor such elections and to abide by

such results. No such request is made to the Government of South Vietnam where there has already been one "free" election in 1967. It was so free that a number of prominent South Vietnamese were not permitted to run for public office and the man who placed second to Thieu for President was arrested. He is still a prisoner. It seems to me that if this resolution is to be meaningful it should also call upon the Government of South Vietnam to permit free elections without restricting the candidates to those who can be counted on to support the government in power. In a democracy there is strength in diversity.

We are also being asked to support a policy that could result in an increase in U.S. military activity rather than a reduction. Thus the President said in his Vietnam speech of November 3:

If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

Again, our policy will depend upon what South Vietnam does or does not do. If U.S. support, artillery and Air Force troops remain in Vietnam after U.S. ground combat forces have been withdrawn, their safety and well-being will depend upon the actions of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Their safety may very well be jeopardized. If this were to occur would we respond by again sending U.S. combat infantry divisions back to Vietnam? This aspect of the resolution concerns me very much.

I am aware of the dilemma that the President is facing. The problem of how to Vietnamize the war and thereby reduce American casualties is dependent upon forces over which the United States has little control. In my opinion, this problem can only be solved by the South Vietnamese themselves. If they delay or hamper the development of their armed forces, Vietnamization will take a very long time indeed. The Government and people of South Vietnam must win the peace. We cannot do it for them.

We have been in Vietnam long enough and I think it is about time to get out. We have done what we set out to do—prevent the conquest of South Vietnam by the forces of the North.

We have been assured that the Government of South Vietnam is capable of not only governing but also of assuming responsibility for the defense of South Vietnam. So now is the time to withdraw, not in defeat but in the knowledge that the mission has been accomplished.

In committee there were efforts made to amend this resolution to make it more meaningful. Efforts to include language which would have expressed congressional desire that the intent of the resolution was not to escalate the war but to support the President in his efforts to secure a just peace were defeated.

Mr. Chairman, I could support this resolution if it contained language suggesting a sense of urgency concerning our withdrawal; if there were an admonition against escalation, and if it called upon the Government of South Vietnam to hold free elections and to abide by the results. Since we have a closed rule it will not be possible to

amend the resolution. I, therefore, regretfully must vote against the resolution.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FARBSTEIN. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. WRIGHT. Does the gentleman find anything wrong with the principle of free elections open to all of the South Vietnamese including the Vietcong and supervised by an impartial international body?

Mr. FARBSTEIN. None whatsoever.

Mr. WRIGHT. Is not that the thrust of the resolution? Does the gentleman read the resolution properly? The resolution puts that as its central thrust.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. It does not call upon the South Vietnamese to accept that principle and that is the important thing that concerns me.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. FRIEDEL) for a unanimous-consent request.

Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Chairman, prior to the President's Vietnam speech on November 3, I joined some 50 of my colleagues in cosponsoring House Resolution 613. I make a point of the fact that my support for this resolution came prior to my knowledge of what the President was going to propose, because I feel strongly that the resolution should be considered on its face value as a non-partisan expression of the sentiment of the majority of this House and that it should not be interpreted as either directly supporting or opposing the specific content of the President's November 3 speech.

I want to make certain that there is no question in the minds of my colleagues, as there is none in mine, that we are not rubberstamping any future Presidential actions as we unfortunately did in the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution. I specifically call attention to page 7 of the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which accompanies the resolution, which states:

The resolution does not give the President any authority whatsoever, either by reference or implication. It is simply a formal expression by the House of Representatives in support of the President's efforts to negotiate a just peace in Viet Nam.

My colleagues in this House and the people of the United States want an end to the war in Vietnam, but we do not want peace at any price and I believe one good effect of this resolution is that it says to North Vietnam and to the Vietcong that we are still firmly committed to a just peace settlement, one which will guarantee the right of all of the people of South Vietnam to participate in free elections.

I am convinced that such a free election would result in a broader based, more democratic Government in South Vietnam and I am also firmly convinced that such an election, supervised by some appropriate international body, as proposed in House Resolution 613, would not, as some seem to fear, result in a Communist takeover, followed by a bloodbath of reprisals after the withdrawal of all American Armed Forces.

I support this resolution because I am convinced its passage strengthens our country's bargaining position and because I believe it expresses the hopes and expectations of most Americans, just as it expresses the hopes and expectations of the vast majority of the Members of the House of Representatives.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield for a unanimous-consent request to the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYBAL).

Mr. ROYBAL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution before us. I oppose it because neither its meaning nor its intent has been unequivocally stated before this House. Different interpretations have been given the resolution by its proponents and the President has already construed the passage of this resolution as support for his policy on Vietnam. President Nixon told the House and the Nation that the resolution supports a "just peace in Vietnam along the line of the proposals I made in a speech on November 3." He went on to say that "the sponsors of the resolution were well over a majority in the House supporting the policy of the President of the United States."

But the question is—What policy? The policy couched in the vague and general language found in the resolution, or the language in part of his speech of November 3 when he said that if "I conclude that the increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with the situation." "This," he said, "is a statement of policy which as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces I am making in meeting my responsibilities."

I am fearful, Mr. Chairman, that because of the resolution's ambiguity, the different interpretations given the resolution by its proponents as well as the meaning already given the resolution by the President, that it could well become a blank check authorization for Presidential action as that which was embodied in the interpretation of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution. I am afraid, also, that the Vietnamization could mean the retention of 200,000 to 300,000 troops in Vietnam and the indefinite continuation of this war with its huge military spending, more U.S. casualties, and the continued killing of the people of Vietnam. I oppose this resolution, also, because of the fast manner with which it was passed in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, without hearing from the Secretary of Defense or any member of the administration who might have shed some light as to the true intent of the resolution.

My motion to hold hearings was rejected in committee and the closed rule by which this resolution was brought to the House has made it impossible to amend it or add the necessary language to clarify its intent.

I believe that this resolution is most unfortunate primarily because of its vagueness which makes misinterpretation likely. It is unfortunate also because conducting our policy in Vietnam had not been given an opportunity to state their official position. I believe that it

is unfortunate because this high-sounding moralistic resolution merely supports a President who has only altered the tactics of the previous administration, while embracing its premise and its objectives, as seasoned argument is almost silenced, and as amendments are forbidden to a small minority in this House who seek to move back to a course of reason.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute for the purpose of making an observation.

I have not spoken on the resolution yet, but I intend to later.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is interesting to point out that all of the people who are speaking against this resolution are calling upon Saigon to do this and Saigon to do that. But I have not heard one of them call upon Hanoi to do anything.

The other observation I want to make is I have 23 people listed to speak today. There was a charge made yesterday by the gentleman from Washington—the inference of which was that the proponents would have most of the time and therefore the opponents would only get theirs by largesse. I have attempted to be fair, and of the 23 who are listed, and I just say this for the record—13 are opponents and 10 are proponents, and the time is divided about equally between the two. If anything, the opponents have a little more of it.

At this time, Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. ADAMS).

Mr. ADAMS. I thank the chairman for yielding this time to me. I had indicated to the chairman of the committee I wished to ask some questions to clarify the resolution. I would like to propound this question to the sponsors or to anyone on the committee who wishes to answer. On the ticker the following statement appears:

Laird told the committee President Nixon's Vietnam policy is working—and could lead to "a military victory" for the Saigon Government.

But should the process of Vietnamization of the war falter, and North Vietnam step up military aggression, Laird said, the United States is prepared to escalate its war effort.

"I would not rule out that possibility completely," Laird said. He did, however seem to rule out use of nuclear weapons by American forces.

"I would not anticipate the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam," the Defense Chief replied to a question from Representative George Mahon, Democrat-Texas. "I am not, however, ruling out other actions that might be necessary in the event the Vietnamization program does not work, even though I am confident it will work."

In voting for this resolution do we support that policy?

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADAMS. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. HAYS. I would say to the gentleman, as I have said repeatedly before—and I am not sure that any answer is going to satisfy some of the opponents—the resolution merely supports the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace. It does not support him in any escalation. There is nothing implied, direct or otherwise. If the President later

makes the decision that he must escalate the war, and any Member wishes to introduce a resolution of support for the President, it will be debated on its merits as this one is being debated. But this is a peace resolution, pure, simple, and unadulterated.

Mr. ADAMS. I thank the gentleman for that statement. I have a second question, which is the other question propounded to the chairman of the committee. Our chief negotiators in Paris have resigned. Apparently there is no present effort or indication that anyone is going to replace them. I want to know whether, if we go forward with this resolution, we are supporting a policy of leaving that negotiating spot open and not engaging in proceedings there further.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADAMS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. The resolution was, of course, drafted prior to the resignation of our chief negotiator, Mr. Lodge. It does not address itself to that situation. I do not believe the gentleman expected it to address itself to that situation. I believe all of us anticipate that an appointment will be made, and that rather shortly. Mr. Lodge still is serving in that capacity. I believe the President has clearly stated that he is not in any sense downgrading the effort to negotiate, and that in proper time he will replace Mr. Lodge with another high-level negotiator.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADAMS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. YATES. I have read in the press that it may be in the President's mind not to replace Mr. Lodge for some time because there is dissatisfaction with the course of negotiations. I wonder where the gentleman from Texas is getting his information?

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADAMS. I yield to the chairman, who is handling the bill.

Mr. HAYS. I would say to the gentleman I have no knowledge of what the President has in his mind, and I do not generally rely on the press to read his mind. In my opinion if there was one signal that Hanoi was genuinely ready to negotiate, I would call the President and ask him to send the gentleman from Washington (Mr. ADAMS) over there if he would also send me along with him to serve with the gentleman so we would have some balance.

Mr. ADAMS. I would accept the gentleman's offer. If he offers us the opportunity, I am ready to leave this afternoon.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ERLENBORN).

Mr. ERLENBORN. Mr. Chairman, once again, it appears that a totalitarian government has misinterpreted how we do things here in the United States.

We are a free country—so free that it is difficult for us to understand that ideas and opinions are restrained in many countries of the world. And, because the totalitarian countries are so accustomed to hearing uniformity of opinion, they tend to expect an imminent

breakdown in the United States when they hear of our dissent.

German submarines undertook unrestricted war against American merchant ships in 1917, believing that we would not go to war—not after the angry 1916 presidential election campaign.

The heated debate between the isolationists and the interventionists contributed to decisions by Germany and Japan to attack us at the end of 1941. They thought we were ready to fall apart.

Now we are in a war in Vietnam, and we want out. We want peace, and we are willing to negotiate for it.

Our negotiators have been meeting with those of North Vietnam and of the National Liberation Front for more than a year. Xuan Thuy, the leader of the North Vietnam delegation, must answer to his superiors in Hanoi, and that is all. The people of North Vietnam are not looking over his shoulder nor are a gaggle of Hanoi news reporters. There is not a single North Vietnam editorial writer to second guess him.

How different is the problem of Averell Harriman and, more recently, of Henry Cabot Lodge. They must, of course, report to our administration—to the President and his advisers. And they have plentiful help from a myriad of enthusiastic Members of Congress, reporters, columnists, pacifists, commentators, professors, editorialists, and ad hoc committees.

While the North Vietnamese play a diplomatic poker game with all their cards close to the vest, we are in it with all our cards face up.

The North Vietnamese know that we have divisions within our country; know that our President is urged to yield a little more; know that some Americans believe we ought to throw the Saigon government to the wolves; know that a quarter of a million young people marched in Washington in mid-November; know that there was a moratorium in mid-October.

They know that these demonstrations demanded that we pull out of Vietnam without delay, but they do not know that no more than 15 or 20 Members of Congress concur in that demand. They may not have read Congressional Quarterly, which listed one Senator and 14 Representatives as favoring instant withdrawal.

Mr. Chairman, I think the American people want out of Vietnam. I want us to get out of Vietnam. But I do not want peace at any price, and I do not believe the American people do.

I want peace with honor, peace with justice; and I believe that is the feeling of an overwhelming majority of Americans.

There is one man who is going to lead us out of war and into peace. He is the President of the United States. At a time such as this, we must give him our hearts and our hands. We must join him in praying for peace and in working for peace.

Therefore, I support this resolution.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. CONTE).

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, yesterday

I expressed my strong opposition to the closed rule under which we are theoretically debating House Resolution 613. I would repeat again today that I believe this to be blatantly unfair, improper, and in the worst possible traditions of governmental and legislative process.

This is not the first time debate has been choked off in this body. On the contrary, the sad fact is that we have repeatedly been prevented from working our will.

This is becoming, I regret to say, a Congress of fear—a Congress that is afraid to face up to the monumental issues before it.

Example No. 1: When we were debating the highly controversial and very expensive ABM, the leadership refused to let us vote on the real issue. We were forced to vote on both research and development and deployment, even though most questions were being raised about deployment, and deployment alone.

Fortunately, I was able to get a roll-call that reflected House sentiment on the real issue—deployment. Lo and behold, 140 of my colleagues joined me in speaking out, whereas had we followed the leadership, we would have been silenced.

Example No. 2: When we were debating the agriculture appropriation bill, we voted 224 to 142 to limit farm subsidy payments to \$20,000. The other body took this out of the bill. I worked unsuccessfully to put it back in conference.

Then I tried to offer a motion to recommit the conference bill—but I was prevented from doing so. In other words, this body was kept from voting on the real issue—farm subsidy payments.

And finally, example No. 3: We are now debating a Vietnam resolution, and we are using a closed rule to prevent amendments to legislation affecting the most critical issue facing the Nation today.

I am not proud of what is being done, and I hope many of my colleagues feel the same way.

The fact of the matter is that we, the elected representatives of the American people, are being prevented from working our will on this crucial question via the amendment process.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM).

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, first I should like to say it seems to me the sponsors of this resolution have expressed a great many different views as to what it means, and that is part of the difficulty.

The gentleman managing the bill has taken what one might call a minimum view as to what this resolution means, but other sponsors have interpreted it quite differently. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT) yesterday said "yes" in answer to a question as to whether it did embrace the policy of Vietnamization. "Yes, by inference it does," he said.

Other sponsors, such as the gentleman from Illinois who just spoke, have interpreted it as supporting a policy of possible escalation. Yesterday one of the sponsors indicated that he would interpret the resolution as supporting a very

stiff policy, what is often called a hawk-like policy.

It is clear that this resolution, if adopted, will be interpreted in many different ways. It has already been interpreted by the President as representing substantially an endorsement of his position as stated on November 3.

I should like now to turn to a statement made yesterday, which I regret very much. My friend, the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. EDMONDSON) saw fit to attribute certain remarks about this resolution to "the former Ambassador who served in Paris under the previous administration." He was obviously referring to Averell Harriman. His statement was taken out of context and did not correctly represent Governor Harriman's views.

The impression he created was that Governor Harriman approves of House Resolution 613 and would vote for it if he were a Member of the House. As my friend knows, Governor Harriman's position on the matter is quite to the contrary.

Last week, the Governor was asked to meet with a group of Members privately and to give his views on this resolution.

The whole thrust of his comments during the meeting, which lasted for an hour and a half, was that he thought the resolution was ill-advised. He said it would not have any effect on the negotiations one way or the other. In reply to a direct question, he indicated that if he were a Member of Congress he would vote against it.

Mr. Chairman, I regret very much that amendments were not permitted to be submitted in this matter. If permitted, I would have proposed an amendment, for example, urging the President to press for broadening the base of the government in Saigon so as to make it more representative and to include persons capable and willing of making a negotiated settlement. I truly believe that the gentlemen now in charge in Saigon do not want a compromise settlement. Any compromise would weaken or lessen their power; therefore, they are opposed to it, no matter what they say. There are others there, non-Communists, who have a much broader following, who could be brought into the Government, such as Gen. Big Minh, who I believe could achieve a reasonable political settlement that would achieve our objective of assuring to the South Vietnamese the right to determine their own future.

Both sides have come much closer to agreement than they were two years ago. A free election under international supervision might be possible, but not so long as the present Saigon government remains in control.

Other amendments would also have improved the resolution, including an amendment that would have been offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY), approving troop withdrawals to date and supporting the President's announced intention to withdraw all American ground forces as quickly as possible, and another amendment to make clear that the resolution does not imply approval of the President's policies as outlined in his November 3 speech or

constitute a blank check authorizing future actions.

Why will I vote against House Resolution 613, entitled "Resolution Toward Peace With Justice in Vietnam"?

Of course all of us in this House are for "peace with justice in Vietnam," but we have many different views as to how that objective can be achieved. If I thought passage of House Resolution 613 would contribute to the achievement of that objective, I would vote for it and explain that my vote should not be construed as approval of President Nixon's Vietnam policies. Many of my colleagues whose views on Vietnam are not very different from my own will follow that course. However, it is my considered conclusion that passage of House Resolution 613 will not only not advance the objective of "peace with justice in Vietnam," but may well be harmful in the long run. That is so, in my view, because the President may be encouraged by this resolution to follow the sterile and mistaken policies he has been following, which in effect allow Generals Thieu and Ky to exercise a veto over any possibility of settlement.

It is said that overwhelming passage of this resolution will constitute a show of unity behind the President. Again, I believe the result of passage of the resolution, especially by the procedure followed here, will further serve to polarize opinion in this country, and further persuade millions of our young people who loathe this war that our institutions are rigid and undemocratic. As I said yesterday in the debate on the procedure to be followed, it is outrageous—indeed tragic—that this first resolution on our Vietnam policy to come before the House in 5 years should be brought in on a "take it or leave it" basis, with no possibility of amendment.

I cannot vote for this resolution because it will be interpreted by the President and others to represent an endorsement of his Vietnam policies as laid out in his speech of November 3. I am far from satisfied with those policies as I understand them, and I was greatly disturbed by the November 3 speech, as I have previously indicated.

The President's November 3 speech indicated to me that he has no real hope that the war can be brought to an end by peaceful settlement, and that he hopes instead to turn the war over to the South Vietnamese. This policy will not succeed, in my judgment, and the war will drag on and on, with American involvement only slightly reduced.

I believe a peaceful settlement is possible, but only if we insist on a change in the makeup and policies of the Saigon regime. The best way to make clear to Saigon that we mean business about not allowing American boys to go on dying to keep Generals Thieu and Ky in power is to start now on a program of total withdrawal of American forces.

We have made a series of hideous mistakes in Vietnam, going all the way back to 1945. Adoption of House Resolution 613 will only extend the string of mistakes.

I understand that a motion to recommit will be made to add a sentence to the resolution urging the President to press Hanoi to abide by the Geneva Con-

vention on the treatment of prisoners. All of us are appalled by Hanoi's cruelty in this regard, and we will vote for the motion to recommit to add this sentence. But this addition will not change the character of the main part of the resolution or correct its major defects.

The resolution could easily have been made acceptable to practically all of us if two or three reasonable amendments had been adopted. That would have been the way to achieve the greatest degree of unity.

(Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania (at the request of Mr. ADAIR) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, House Resolution 613 is clearly in need of revision on various points. I believe many of the criticisms made on the House floor are justified, and the resolution should have been opened up for amendment and serious extended debate by the House. I voted against the previous question on adopting the rule on House Resolution 613 for this purpose.

House Resolution 613 is clearly defective in omitting and failing even to mention our prisoners of war now held under tragic conditions.

Congress must not forget the continuing heavy sacrifice of these people, military and civilian who now suffer even as we debate. It is intolerable to think of a U.S. pullout of forces from Vietnam either at once or over a period of deescalation, without making sure our prisoners of war are considered as strongly as all other major factors.

I, therefore, recommend that House Resolution 613 be amended to emphasize that the Congress backs the President and our U.S. Paris negotiators, our U.S. Department of State, our Department of Defense, and other Federal agencies, in continuing to press for fair treatment for prisoners of war as adopted by the Red Cross.

I feel so strongly about the present resolution, House Resolution 613, omitting completely the fate of the prisoners of war, that I oppose House Resolution 613 in its present form. This failure is a tragic and major defect.

I hereby give notice of offering again my amendment for our prisoners of war in the form of the motion to recommit House Resolution 613 to the Foreign Affairs Committee at the end of the debate on House Resolution 613.

My motion to recommit House Resolution 613 will direct the House Foreign Affairs Committee to report the resolution back to the House immediately with an amendment as follows:

Requests the President to continue to press the Government of North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949 on treatment of prisoners of war.

If my motion to recommit House Resolution 613 for the prisoner-of-war amendment is not adopted, I shall be forced to vote against House Resolution 613 in its present form. This will point out that in this debate and parliamentary procedure, that somebody is thinking of the dire straits of prisoners of war when they are not in a position to speak for themselves.

I consider prisoners of war among the highest urgency factors on past and future negotiations for peace in Vietnam. I voted against reporting House Resolution 613 out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee because of the glaring omission and lack of consideration of prisoners of war. I will move just as strongly by my proposed motion, to recommit House Resolution 613 to the House Foreign Affairs Committee to have my prisoner-of-war amendment added to the provisions of the resolution, forthwith.

In order that the House and the American people, as well as the families of these prisoners, and the prisoners of war themselves, can know of the history of this issue, as well as international Red Cross resolution, and actions of our U.S. Government I am setting out various documents as follows:

STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON

We are deeply concerned about the lack of information about our prisoners. Some of them have been held four years and longer with little or no words to their families.

It is hard to see what Hanoi hopes to gain by denying the prisoners the basic right to communicate with their families. We are using every possible occasion to raise this subject and to bring about the release of prisoners on both sides.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE 21ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED CROSS, ISTANBUL, TURKEY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1969

PROTECTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

The XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross,

Recalling the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the protection of prisoners of war, and the historic role of the Red Cross as a protector of victims of war,

Considering that the Convention applies to each armed conflict between two or more parties to the Convention without regard to how the conflict may be characterized,

Recognizing that, even apart from the Convention, the International community has consistently demanded humane treatment for prisoners of war, including identification and accounting for all prisoners, provision of an adequate diet and medical care, that prisoners be permitted to communicate with each other and with the exterior, that seriously sick or wounded prisoners be promptly repatriated, and that at all times prisoners be protected from physical and mental torture, abuse and reprisals,

Requests each party to the Convention to take all appropriate measures to ensure humane treatment and prevent violations of the Convention,

Calls upon all parties to abide by the obligations set forth in the Convention and upon all authorities involved in an armed conflict to ensure that all uniformed members of the regular armed forces of another party to the conflict and all other persons entitled to prisoner of war status are treated humanely and given the fullest measure of protection prescribed by the Convention; and further calls upon all parties to provide free access to the prisoners of war and to all places of their detention by a protecting Power or by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Adopted by vote of 114 to 0.

(The International Conference of the Red Cross is held every four years and is the highest governing body of the Red Cross. Its membership consists of governments which have signed the Geneva Conventions of 1949, national Red Cross Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross and The League of Red Cross Societies.)

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MELVIN R. LAIRD

On numerous occasions I have expressed my deep concern for the welfare of our American servicemen who are prisoners of war or missing in action. In this regard, I have directed Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) G. Warren Nutter, who has been named Chairman of the Department of Defense Prisoner of War Policy Committee, to insure that the families of these servicemen are receiving all assistance to which they are entitled.

The North Vietnamese have claimed that they are treating our men humanely. I am distressed by the fact that there is clear evidence that this is not the case.

The United States Government has urged that the enemy respect the requirements of the Geneva Convention. This they have refused to do.

The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong have never identified the names of all the U.S. prisoners whom they hold. For the most part, information on some of these Americans has come in the form of scattered, and often distorted, propaganda films and photographs which the North Vietnamese have chosen to sell or release.

We know that at least several U.S. prisoners were injured at the time of their capture and we are concerned about the medical care they are receiving.

The Geneva Convention requires a free exchange of mail between the prisoners and their families and yet very little mail has been received from only a few prisoners in the past five years.

As of next month, more than 200 American servicemen will have been listed either as prisoners of war or as missing in action for more than three and one-half years. This period of time is longer than any U.S. serviceman was held prisoner during World War II.

The Department of Defense continues to hope for meaningful progress on the matter of prisoner release in the Paris discussions. In the meantime, we appeal to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong to respect the humane rights of those whom they hold prisoners of war.

Specifically, we call for adherence to the Geneva Convention which requires:

1. Release of names of prisoners held.
2. Immediate release of sick and wounded prisoners.
3. Impartial inspections of prisoner of war facilities.
4. Proper treatment of all prisoners.
5. Regular flow of mail.

Most importantly, we seek the prompt release of all American prisoners.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird today issued the following statement:

Xuan Thuy, chief of the North Vietnam delegation to the Paris Peace Talks, has declared that Hanoi would not promptly release a list of U.S. prisoners of war held in North Vietnam.

I am deeply shocked and disappointed by this cruel response of Hanoi's representative to such a basic request for humanitarian action.

Hundreds of American wives, children and parents continue to live in a tragic state of uncertainty caused by the lack of information concerning the fate of their loved ones. This needless anxiety is caused by the persistent refusal by North Vietnam to release the names of U.S. prisoners of war.

I want to reaffirm the continuing hope that Hanoi will provide a list of American prisoners and permit a free flow of mail between U.S. prisoners of war and their families.

We continue to urge the immediate release of sick and wounded prisoners, the neutral inspection of prisoner of war facilities and the prompt release of all American prisoners.

AMBASSADOR LODGE'S STATEMENTS ON PRISONERS OF WAR DURING MAY 22 PARIS TALKS

Opening statement: I cannot leave this subject (PW's) without protesting the attitude which you have expressed most recently last Tuesday May 20, with respect to the prisoners held in North Vietnam. You have refused to provide a list of these prisoners so that their families might know whether they are living or dead. You have refused to discuss the repatriation of the sick and wounded which is a long-established international practice. You should know that the attitude you have expressed with regard to these basic humanitarian requirements cannot have a favorable effect on our negotiations here.

Additional remarks: Let me add one observation about prisoners. It is difficult to understand how you can claim to be treating our prisoners humanely when you refuse to identify the prisoners you hold so that their families can know the fate of their relatives. You refuse to permit regular mail exchanges. You reject impartial international observation of conditions under which prisoners are held: You refuse to discuss release of sick and wounded prisoners. Yet these are basic elements of humanitarian treatment under established international standards. We do not see how you can be hurt by merely publishing the names of those who are alive so that the uncertainty which their families feel may be ended. To express myself for a moment in human terms instead of the language of diplomacy, what is involved here is the prisoner's wife who does not know whether her husband is alive or whether he is dead. It is really hard to believe that the security of North Vietnam would be threatened if this wife were told the truth about her husband's fate. We hope you will reconsider your attitude on these questions so that it will truly reflect the humane policy which you claim to follow.

SECRETARY OF STATE ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE OF JUNE 5, 1969

The following is the State Department's release of Secretary of State William P. Rogers' news conference, which is authorized for direct quotation:

Secretary ROGERS: I want to express my serious concern about the Americans who are prisoners of war in Southeast Asia. Many of these prisoners have been held for three years or more. There is a long tradition among nations that personnel captured in wartime be treated humanely. This principle has been expressed in the Geneva Convention of 1949 and is recognized by more than 120 nations.

A basic requirement of the Convention is that names of prisoners be provided to their families and to an appropriate agency in a neutral country. Communist leaders have failed to observe this simple civilized requirement which would mean so much to the wives and families of the men who are missing in combat.

North Vietnamese officials have frequently declared that the prisoners are treated humanely. Many seriously question these statements. Assurance could readily be provided if North Viet-Nam would permit visits by impartial observers to the prison camps. For the sake of the prisoners and for their families, we continue to hope for a positive response from North Viet-Nam. We are prepared to discuss this subject and to move quickly toward arrangements for the release of prisoners on both sides, and I believe that any sign of good faith by the other side in this matter would provide encouragement for our negotiations in Paris.

STATEMENT ON PRISONERS OF WAR BY U.S. AMBASSADOR HENRY CABOT LODGE AT PARIS MEETINGS ON VIETNAM, 33D PLENARY SESSION, SEPTEMBER 13, 1969

At the last Plenary Session, I repeated our request for the humane treatment of Americans held prisoner in North Vietnam,

stating that international custom, the Geneva Convention, and humanitarian considerations all require that there be impartial inspection of the prisoner of war camps, a guarantee of a regular flow of mail to and from the prisoners, and a release of the sick and wounded prisoners on both sides. In addition, a minimum regard for the peace of mind of the prisoners' next of kin requires that a list of names of the prisoners be made available so that the next of kin—who are assuredly innocent of any warlike act—at least know whether their relative is alive or dead.

To this request, the representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam at our last session responded—and I quote—"The question of captured American military personnel will be settled at the same time as all the other elements of the overall ten-point solution. It cannot be separated." End of quotation.

Let us now consider this answer.

In the first place, it is unresponsive. Our request at the last meeting was concerned solely with the treatment of prisoners during captivity—not with the broader question of the repatriation of prisoners. You repeat your statement that you give humanitarian treatment. But you refuse to talk about camp inspection, flow of mail, release of sick and wounded, and lists of prisoners.

In the second place, your answer is not only unresponsive; it also partakes of the irrelevant. I say this for the following reason: You say that you will not discharge your responsibilities regarding prisoner treatment until you are willing to repatriate the prisoners. But, ladies and gentlemen, when that time comes, your policy concerning treatment of prisoners will be largely academic since the prisoners will have either been repatriated or will be awaiting repatriation. The point is that prisoners are entitled to humane treatment under the protection of the Geneva Convention at all times and under all circumstances—and particularly during the period before repatriation. That is the time that counts. The point is so obvious that it should not require any statement. But your declaration at the last Plenary Session requires us to state it.

While I am on the subject, let me add that we have long been concerned by your refusal to permit impartial inspection of your prisoner camps. Frankly, this refusal inevitably brings up the thought that you fear that an inspection would not confirm your claims of humane treatment.

This concern has now been deepened by statements which have recently been made by two of the Americans recently released from captivity in North Vietnam. One of these Americans, Seaman Douglas B. Hegdahl, said on September 2nd—and I quote—"I was kept in solitary confinement for over a year—7 months and 10 days at a stretch. I was made to stand with my hands over my head for trying to talk with other prisoners of war." Seaman Hegdahl said—and I quote—that "many of the prisoners of war have been in solitary confinement for years"—end of quotation—and he also said—and I quote again—that "many prisoners of war do not write or receive mail." End of quotation.

Another prisoner of war, Navy Lieutenant Robert Frishman, on the same date, pointed out your failure to make available the best medical treatment and to repatriate immediately the sick and wounded. He said that the removal of his elbow had been done in a professional way, and that he was thankful still to have the right arm. However, he also pointed out—and I quote—"They failed to remove the fragments of the SAM missile in my arm. It took six months just for my incision to heal over." End of quotation. He also indicated Lieutenant Commander John McCain will require further medical treatment as soon as he returns to the United States. His remarks underline how impor-

tant it is for sick and wounded prisoners to be repatriated as soon as possible.

Let me also quote what Lieutenant Frishman said about the condition of Lieutenant Commander Richard A. Stratton, another prisoner of war. He said—and I quote—"The North Vietnamese tried to get Lt. Commander Stratton to appear before a press delegation and say that he had received humane and lenient treatment. He refused because his treatment hadn't been humane. He's been tied up with ropes to such a degree that he still has large scars on his arms from rope burns which became infected. He was deprived of sleep, beaten, had his fingernails removed and put in solitary, but the North Vietnamese insisted that he make the false 'humane treatment statement' and threw him into a dark cell alone for 38 days to think about it." End of quotation.

Lieutenant Frishman also said—and I quote again—"Stratton knows that I have been released. He told me not to worry about telling the truth about him. He said that if he gets tortured some more, at least he will know why he is getting it and will feel that it will be worth the sacrifice." End of quotation. We certainly hope that neither Commander Stratton nor any of the other prisoners will suffer as a result of Lieutenant Frishman's statements.

Lieutenant Frishman further indicated that prisoners of war have been made to sit on a stool for days in a hot room until they make statements conforming to the wishes of their captors.

I can do no better than to repeat the words of Lieutenant Frishman, when he said—and I quote—"I don't think solitary confinement, forced statements, living in a cave for three years, being put in straps, not being allowed to sleep or eat, removal of fingernails, and not allowing exchange of mail to prisoners of war are humane." End of quotation. Any impartial observer—and even you yourselves, who do not consider yourselves to be impartial—must agree with this statement.

You should cease this inhuman treatment. You cannot escape the responsibility therefor.

You should also realize that your failure to act in accordance with humane practice flies in the face of world opinion as a whole.

Just this week, 101 Members of the Congress of the United States, including both Democrats and Republicans, have presented in the House of Representatives a resolution condemning your side—and I quote—for "violating the fundamental standards of human decency and grossly deviating from civilized concepts of international accords and agreements on prisoners of war." End of quotation. In addition, 96 Members of the House of Representatives have signed a statement protesting your—and I quote—"inhumane and inexcusable"—unquote—conduct with regard to the Americans you hold prisoner.

The Twenty-First International Red Cross Conference, composed of the parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, is now meeting in Istanbul, Turkey. The International Humanitarian Law Commission of that Conference has adopted without dissent a resolution calling for humane treatment of prisoners of war. The resolution states that the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention—and I quote—"applies to each armed conflict between two or more parties to the Convention without regard to how the conflict may be characterized." End of quotation. The resolution also calls up—and I quote—"all authorities involved in an armed conflict to ensure that all uniformed members of the regular armed forces of another party to the conflict and all other persons entitled to prisoner of war status are accorded the humane treatment and the full measure of protection prescribed by the Convention, including free access to the prisoners of war and all places of their detention by a pro-

tecting power or by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

If I may, I will depart from my prepared statement for just a moment to say that I have just received word during the recess that the International Red Cross Conference in Istanbul this morning passed this resolution without dissent by a vote of a hundred fourteen to nothing.

In contrast with your treatment of the prisoners whom you hold, consider the many thousands of your military personnel held in prisoner of war camps administered by the Republic of Vietnam. In accordance with the Geneva Convention, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has provided lists of prisoners' names to the International Committee of the Red Cross. The prisoners are allowed to correspond with their families. These camps conform to the standards established by the Geneva Convention, and they are visited frequently by representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, who inspect them thoroughly and hold private interviews with prisoners. A number of sick and wounded prisoners have been released, and our side has expressed willingness to make arrangements for the release of all seriously sick or wounded prisoners.

STATEMENT BY HENRY CABOT LODGE,
NOVEMBER 24, 1969

I consider it necessary to comment on an article in the press in which Mr. Xuan Thuy, the North Vietnamese representative, is reported to have made certain allegations concerning the United States position at these Paris meetings.

First, it is not true that I have not been willing to meet privately or otherwise, with Mr. Thuy to discuss general problems concerning Viet Nam—and he knows it very well.

Second, it is also not true that in the private meetings which have been held, I have only been willing to talk on only one question—that of mutual troop withdrawal. He knows that, too.

Third, it is not true, as alleged, that the U.S. wishes to continue the war in Viet Nam and is therefore inflexible.

The facts are that Mr. Thuy has been as intransigent in private meetings as he has been in public meetings. He has avoided engaging in any give and take. Instead his position has been to insist on the U.S. withdrawing completely from South Viet Nam without any indication of what the North Vietnamese would do. He has also demanded that the U.S. overthrow the present government in South Viet Nam as we leave.

For our part, we have made it clear that—far from rejecting—we are willing to discuss all questions relevant to peace. We have made every effort to have the parties concerned discuss all the issues. We have made our proposals and we have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals made by the other side. Contrary to the position of the other side, we do not make proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

At one stage we set forth a list of all the subjects—military and political—that needed discussion if there was to be a peaceful settlement of the conflict. We also invited the other side to clarify their own proposals.

We got nowhere because they either refused to consider our proposals—or demanded that we take unilateral actions without any parallel action by them. And they even declined to have any serious discussion in which the government of South Viet Nam could participate.

Mr. Thuy has tried to make it appear as if he has all along been ready to meet privately for serious discussion. The fact is that every private meeting which we have held has been at the request of the United States. If Mr. Thuy had any desire to meet he managed to conceal that desire very well.

For my part, I sought through every means to engage the other side in genuine negotiations on all issues. The Government of the Republic of Viet Nam has also been willing to talk about any subject without prior conditions.

I shall not speculate on the purposes Mr. Thuy may have in mind in making his allegations. But these allegations are untrue and I believe he knows that they are untrue. There has never been any doubt that the United States has been ready to meet and to negotiate meaningfully at any time and in any meeting place. The same is true of the Republic of Viet Nam.

That has been true in the past, it is true today, and will be true in the future. But negotiation is not a process by which he can make demands and then only be willing to discuss our acceptance of those demands. I also submit that negotiations are not helped by making false charges which are bound to complicate the problem.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GRAHAM MARTIN,
CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DELEGATION,
XXIST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF THE RED CROSS, ISTANBUL, TURKEY,
SEPTEMBER 10, 1969

Those of you who were present at the Twentieth International Conference of the Red Cross in Vienna in October 1965, will recall that the Conference expressed its concern for the treatment of prisoners of war whose confinement removed them from combat and whose presence presented no threat to their captors. The armed conflicts that existed at that time and the conduct of some governments who have acceded to the Geneva Conventions in failing to honor their obligations under the Conventions to provide humane treatment to prisoners of war, showed the need for the resolution which the Conference passed four years ago.

Now four long years have passed since the adoption of that resolution, which called "upon all authorities involved in an armed conflict to ensure that every prisoner of war is given the treatment and full measure of protection prescribed by the Geneva Convention of 1949 . . ." In the case of the Communist authorities in southeast Asia, the solemn appeal of the last conference fell on deaf ears. North Vietnam and the Viet Cong have refused consistently to observe even internationally recognized minimum standards of humanitarian treatment for prisoners they hold as a result of the armed conflict in Vietnam.

The concern of the United States about these prisoners has been expressed by President Nixon and also by Ambassador Lodge at the Paris Peace Talks. Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird also have repeatedly publicly expressed urgent concern about the failure of the Communist authorities in Vietnam to live up to the humanitarian standards of the Convention and to treat humanely personnel who have fallen into their hands.

The concern of these highest officers of the United States is universally shared by all the American people. I am glad to note that we are not alone in our concern. Speaking in London on March 19, Jacques Freymond of the ICRC, said concerning the work of the committee:

"In Vietnam, it has so far had limited success. In fact, in spite of repeated representations, it has not been able to obtain the agreement of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the installation of a delegation in Hanoi nor even to the visiting of prisoners of war.

"The Hanoi authorities have, it is true, assured the ICRC that these prisoners are treated humanely by them. The committee has therefore had to content itself with sending medicines, medical equipment and, more recently, two field hospitals to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Mr. Freymond went on to say: "On the other hand, the ICRC is represented in Saigon and the delegates are able to visit all prisoner of war camps. They also regularly receive nominal rolls of these prisoners."

I might add that the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, in cooperation with its allies, has placed great emphasis on proper treatment of prisoners of war captured by allied forces.

Today, in September 1969, I have the sad duty to report to you that we have seen that the Communist authorities in southeast Asia have refused to cooperate with the ICRC. We also know as a fact that North Vietnam is violating every basic provision of the prisoner of war convention it signed and is in fact seriously mistreating our men it holds as prisoners. We are deeply concerned and outraged by this grave affront to human dignity and international responsibility.

When I said that we know that our men who are captured in Vietnam are being mistreated, I spoke with the assurance of unmistakable evidence—a touching witness provided by one who had himself actually been subjected to this savage and inhumane treatment. Since the time of the last conference we have known that North Vietnam was refusing to provide the names of all the men it held as prisoners, and that they have refused to permit impartial inspection of its prisoner facilities by the ICRC or any other impartial intermediary. It has long been obvious that prisoners have been denied or severely restricted in their right to communicate with their families. The hundreds of waiting families who do not even know if their man is alive today are sad witnesses to this fact. We also have seen the North Vietnamese release photographs of seriously sick or wounded prisoners who should be repatriated immediately.

Today we have confirmation of what has been an even greater concern for us—our men are being seriously, physically and mentally mistreated. The men whom North Vietnam recently chose to release have, in spite of threats by their captors, felt duty bound to tell the world how North Vietnam treats its prisoners. Their story is not a pleasant one and it pleads for prompt and strong action by this Conference. North Vietnam denies universally accepted standards of humanitarian treatment for prisoners and violates the provisions of the Geneva Convention to which it acceded by:

- (1) Refusing to identify the prisoners it holds and account for those missing in North Vietnam.
- (2) Torturing prisoners both physically and mentally.
- (3) Keeping prisoners in isolation cut off from their fellow prisoners and from the outside world.
- (4) Failing to provide an adequate diet.
- (5) Failing to repatriate the seriously sick or wounded.
- (6) Refusing to permit impartial inspection of prisoner facilities by the ICRC or another appropriate intermediary.
- (7) Using prisoners for propaganda purposes.
- (8) Denying regular exchange of mail between all prisoners and their families.
- (9) Failing to provide adequate medical care to all prisoners in need of treatment.

May I ask you to hear the actual words of Lt. Robert F. Frishman, USN, one of the prisoners recently released by North Vietnam. On September 2, 1969, less than a fortnight ago, from our Naval hospital in Bethesda where he is recovering from his ordeal, he had this to say:

"My intentions are not to scare wives and families but Hanoi has given false impressions that all is wine and roses and it isn't so. All I'm interested in is for Hanoi to live up to their claims of humane and lenient treatment of prisoners of war. I don't think

solitary confinement, forced statements, living in a cage for three years, being put in straps, not being allowed to sleep or eat, removal of fingernails, being hung from a ceiling, having an infected arm which was almost lost, not receiving medical care, being dragged along the ground with a broken leg, or not allowing an exchange of mail to prisoners of war are humane.

"Why don't they send out a list of their prisoners of war? Why do they try to keep us from even seeing each other? Certain prisoners of war have received publicity. Others are kept silent. Why aren't their names officially released? If they don't have any secondary alternatives or motives in mind, then release the names of the prisoners of war so their families will know their loved ones' status. I feel as if I am speaking not only for myself, but for my buddies back in camp to whom I promised I would tell the truth. I feel it is time people are aware of the facts."

Lt. Frishman was addressing his own people in America. But it is time for the world to know these facts. Therefore, I share Lt. Frishman's words with you gathered here in this Conference.

In the most recent provisional activity report submitted to this Conference by the ICRC, it is stated that "on 3 June 1969 the ICRC again wrote the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam reminding it of the obligations incumbent on it in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims." And at our opening session the distinguished new President of the ICRC reported to us that North Vietnam had not yet allowed any representative of the ICRC to enter its territory.

Each of us has a moral duty to see that signers of the Convention honor the internationally accepted principles of humane treatment of prisoners of war. We trust that this conference, which has a fundamental and abiding interest in the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention will declare itself clearly and unequivocally concerning the humane treatment of prisoners—all prisoners in all parts of the world. The resolution before us was carefully drafted by the co-sponsors to insure the universality of its coverage to all prisoners of war wherever held, by whatever nation, great or small. We hope, therefore, that all national delegations and all national societies will join those nations and national societies which have already sponsored this resolution. We believe, Mr. Chairman, it should be supported unanimously.

TEXT OF IDENTICAL HOUSE RESOLUTIONS ON U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR IN NORTH VIETNAM

Including: H. Con. Res. 3558—H. Con. Res. 365; H. Con. Res. 373, H. Con. Res. 385, H. Con. Res. 414, H. Con. Res. 431.

Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam complying with the requirements of the Geneva Convention.

Whereas the United States Government and the Republic of Vietnam have continuously honored the requirements of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war; and

Whereas the United States Government has repeatedly appealed to North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam to respect the requirements of the Geneva Convention, which North Vietnam has endorsed; and

Whereas the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam have disregarded the provisions of the Geneva Convention and refused to release the names of prisoners of war who are members of the Armed Forces of the United States, to permit the regular flow of mail to or from those prisoners, and otherwise to accord humane treatment to those prisoners, and to

permit inspection of the facilities in which those prisoners are held: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate Concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that the President, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and all other concerned departments or agencies of the United States Government, the United Nations, and the peoples of the world should appeal to North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam to comply with the requirements of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war and to take such steps as may be appropriate to obtain the humane treatment and prompt release of all members of the Armed Forces of the United States so held as prisoners of war.

TEXT OF IDENTICAL HOUSE RESOLUTIONS ON U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR IN NORTH VIETNAM

Including: H. Con. Res. 332—H. Con. Res. 337; H. Con. Res. 339, 349—350, 352, 370, 383—384, 389, 413.

Condemning the treatment of American prisoners of war by the Government of North Vietnam and urging the President to initiate appropriate action for the purpose of insuring that American prisoners are accorded humane treatment.

Whereas there are at least three hundred and forty and possibly one thousand two hundred American servicemen interned as prisoners of war by the Government of North Vietnam and its allies in South Vietnam; and

Whereas some of these American prisoners have been held captive for as long as five years; and

Whereas intelligence reports and reports from American servicemen who have been released or escaped from such imprisonment indicate that American servicemen, while so imprisoned, are subjected to unusual, cruel and inhumane treatment, to wit: physical torture, psychological terror, public display, insufficient medical care and treatment, neglect of health, dietary and sanitary necessities, prohibition of correspondence with relatives, and forced compliance with propaganda and political exploitation; and

Whereas by inflicting such treatment on American prisoners of war the Government of North Vietnam and its allies in South Vietnam have violated the fundamental standards of human decency and have grossly deviated from civilized concepts of international accords and agreements on prisoners of war: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress condemns the treatment of American prisoners of war by the Government of North Vietnam and its allies in South Vietnam, and hereby urges the President to initiate, diligently through diplomatic, military, and any other available channels, such action as may be necessary to insure that the tenets of fair and humane treatment, as expressed in the Geneva Convention of 1949, which was signed by the Government of North Vietnam in 1957, are accorded to American servicemen held as prisoners of war in North and South Vietnam and especially to require the Government of North Vietnam and its allies to (1) identify prisoners whom they hold, (2) release seriously sick or injured prisoners, (3) permit impartial inspections of all prisoner of war facilities, and (4) permit the free exchange of mail between families and prisoners.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. KEITH).

Mr. KEITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I do not anticipate using but a moment of the 4 minutes I am allotted.

Mr. Chairman, at the time of the Tonkin Gulf resolution the rules under which the House operated did not permit

the extensive exploration of the end results of the course of action which we sanctioned at that time. Had we more fully debated it, we might have anticipated some of the events that history has since revealed.

I feel the resolution before us today might very well have had a more open rule. I feel the extrication of our forces from Vietnam, now that we are committed there, is just as serious in its long range implications as was the initial commitment of our troops to the mainland of Asia.

So I simply want to advise my colleagues in the House and my constituents that I feel the long-range results of the withdrawal anticipated by our President need to have fuller debate than they have had and that much more light could have been shed on the subject if we had had an open rule.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield so that I may propound a question to the chairman of the subcommittee?

Mr. KEITH. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time to the minority side.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. EDMONDSON).

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman from Oklahoma 2 additional minutes.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, I support the resolution which has as its principal objective the construction of a base of national unity in support of the President's efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam.

At the beginning of my brief time in this debate, let me say a word about the origin of this resolution.

It did not originate in the White House and it did not originate with the leadership on either side of this House.

This resolution is the product of a Member of this House—the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT). Ninety-nine percent of its language is the language of JIM WRIGHT. The two or three changes in that language suggested to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT) were all suggested by other Democrats in this House—and were matters of form and not substance.

As a Democrat, I am proud of the origin of this resolution, proud of the spirit which motivates it, and proud of its objectives.

It has been conceived in the highest tradition of our party—a party which has always contended that partisan politics should stop at the water's edge—and I am proud that a majority of Democrats joined in cosponsoring this resolution.

There are some who have criticized it by saying it will strengthen the President domestically—and who say this is not desirable, since the President belongs to another party.

I have campaigned against the man who is our President three times in national elections. I have been cochairman of our national party's speakers' bureau three times in the last 14 years, and I enjoy partisan politics as much as anyone I know. I have no doubt that our

President, as leader of his party, will be out in Oklahoma next November urging Second District voters—as he has done twice before—to send a Republican to Congress.

Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I believe with all my heart that this resolution should be adopted, and adopted overwhelmingly by this House. Its adoption, in my judgment, will be the most important step our Nation has taken in a long time toward a united approach toward solution of the Vietnam problem.

It is a constitutional fact that only one public official can negotiate with full authority for the Nation to conclude a settlement of that problem. No Senator or Congressman—however wise or well-intentioned—can perform that duty which is placed constitutionally in the President.

The resolution we debate does not increase or diminish that constitutional authority and duty—but it does place this House formerly on record in support of our Chief Executive's efforts to get the job done.

In taking that position, the resolution "approves and supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese and supervised by an impartial international body."

Is there anything unacceptable or divisive about that statement?

The right of the people of South Vietnam to decide their own fate in free elections was firmly stated in the 1968 Democratic national platform—and without such a guarantee I do not believe it is possible to withdraw from Vietnam without dishonor to the memory of 40,000 Americans who have fallen there.

President Nixon, like President Eisenhower and President Kennedy and President Johnson, shares that conviction and publicly supports that principle. The right of a free people to self-determination is a right which Americans have treasured since the Declaration of Independence. The President and the resolution honor our finest heritage by restating that principle.

At the same time, the President has firmly stated his intention to withdraw our troops from Vietnam at the earliest time possible, and more than 60,000 already have been withdrawn ahead of the President's announced schedule.

I believe withdrawal of these troops is strong evidence at this time of the President's good faith in bringing an end to American involvement in Vietnam. At the same time, I am convinced that the President commands the support of most American citizens in his determination to conclude a peaceful and just settlement in the process of withdrawal—a settlement, in final analysis, that does not abandon an elected, anti-Communist South Vietnamese Government fighting for survival against invading Communist forces, without assurance that the aggression has been ended and peaceful elections agreed to, or, on the other hand, that the South Vietnamese Government is ready to deal with that aggression with its own combat forces.

Evidence is increasing daily of South Vietnamese ability to do just that, and not many months ago a number of us had lunch with a group of South Vietnamese Congressmen who were confident of their government's ability to assume that full burden during the year 1970.

I hope and pray their confidence proves fully justified, but I share the view of the President and leaders of our Committee on Foreign Affairs that the course of peaceful negotiations in Vietnam will not be served well by enactment of a legislative timetable in this resolution.

The resolution speaks for itself and stands on its own merits.

Throughout this debate I have heard very little criticism of the terms of this resolution. I believe it has been demonstrated that the resolution is understandable and acceptable to a great majority of the membership of this House—and that it can serve as a foundation for national unity both understandable and acceptable to a great majority of our constituents.

Trial lawyers in this body will remember the old saying about the trial of a lawsuit: "When the facts are against you, talk about the law. When the law is against you, talk about the facts. And, when both the facts and the law are against you, talk about the court."

Opponents of this resolution have largely "talked about the court" in this debate. They have been critical of procedure in committee, critical of the rule, and critical of programming of the resolution. They have had very little to say about the resolution itself, and the unifying purpose it serves.

Reference has already been made in this debate to the fact that former Ambassador Harriman, speaking to a group of Democrats last week, had stated that he would not vote for this resolution.

Ambassador Harriman's political advice is always appreciated, but it was far more significant to me that Ambassador Harriman, at the same meeting and in response to a direct question, said he would have liked to have had such a resolution passed by the House while he was negotiating on the Vietnam question in Paris.

Obviously, the Ambassador would have considered such a resolution helpful in 1968.

Just as obviously—and notwithstanding the Ambassador's political advice—the resolution will prove helpful to our negotiators in Paris in 1969.

The President, in an unprecedented visit to this Chamber, has expressed to this entire House his personal appreciation for the resolution and the assistance which it is sure to afford in negotiations.

If this resolution is helpful to our Paris negotiators, and is helpful to our President in concluding a just peace in Vietnam—then surely it is a resolution which is deserving of overwhelming support in this House.

Regardless of whether you agree or not with the President's domestic policies—and I disagree with him on many of those policies—and regardless of whether you approve or disapprove of the speech on November 3—and I found the speech un-

necessarily partisan on some points—the fact remains that this resolution states firmly what needs to be said by this Nation's elected representatives at this time.

"We support the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam."

Let us enact the resolution, and on this base, let us do all in our power to unite the country.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDMONDSON. I am pleased to yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT).

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman from Oklahoma and to express my personal appreciation to the gentleman not only for the very excellent statement which he is making, the very sensible and very timely statement that he is making at this moment, but also for the dedicated help and assistance and cooperation that he gave to the other sponsors and proponents of this resolution. The gentleman from Oklahoma was the very first person with whom I discussed the original draft, and he assisted in perfecting the language of the resolution.

Without the unerringly good counsel, the advice and the energetic, imaginative, and effective help of the gentleman from Oklahoma from its very inception, this resolution would not have reached this point of progression today.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman from Oklahoma for his dedicated, patriotic and deeply sincere efforts.

Mr. EDMONDSON. I thank the gentleman very much.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDMONDSON. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. FRASER. I want to commend the gentleman for his very good statement.

However, is there anything contained in this resolution which is different from the objectives which were stated by President Johnson as to our involvement in Vietnam? In other words, does this resolution contain an objective different from that as stated by President Johnson during his tenure in office?

Mr. EDMONDSON. In terms of Presidential statements with regard to policies in Vietnam I, personally, do not see any difference of any magnitude in the position consistently taken by President Johnson and the position that has been asserted by the present President of the United States in the November 3 speech with regard to his policy.

Mr. FRASER. The view of the gentleman then would be that this resolution in effect is a continuation of the objectives that President Johnson had?

Mr. EDMONDSON. With this substantial difference—that President Nixon has not only announced a policy of withdrawal at the earliest practical time, but has begun this withdrawal and has accomplished the withdrawal of 60,000 troops. I believe this action represents a rather significant and important difference, and I believe when we support the President in what he is doing in this regard that we help the position of the President in negotiating a just settlement.

Mr. FRASER. The gentleman would agree that the resolution is silent as to the policy of withdrawal, and that efforts to amend the resolution to include a statement on withdrawal were defeated both in committee and through the attempt to change the rule?

Mr. EDMONDSON. The resolution is silent on a good many points that have been stated as principles, by President Johnson, President Kennedy, and President Nixon. On the other hand, one can go back to President Kennedy's statements and find support for practically everything that is stated in this resolution.

Mr. FRASER. The only thing I want to do, and I do not want to take the time of the gentleman, is to indicate that on the one change in policy from President Johnson the resolution is silent.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Oklahoma has expired.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ECKHARDT).

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield briefly?

Mr. ECKHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I will yield briefly to the gentleman in just one moment.

First, Mr. Chairman, I wish to say that I was also present at the time when Ambassador Harriman was speaking, and I did not understand in his answers any of the connotations favoring the resolution which have been indicated here.

Now I will yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. BINGHAM. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, since I anticipated that the gentleman from Oklahoma might again quote Governor Harriman, I have discussed the matter today with Governor Harriman and am authorized to quote him as follows:

Asking me whether I would have liked to have such a resolution is like asking me whether I would have liked applause for a speech or a word of approval for something I was doing. But I do not believe the adoption of the resolution will have any effect on the Paris negotiations.

Mr. ECKHARDT. I recall that. And I recall that Ambassador Harriman said that he thought it was most impudent to offer a resolution at this time.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ECKHARDT. I will yield to the gentleman if the gentleman can get me a little more time, as I believe I am nearly running my time out as of now.

Mr. EDMONDSON. I will certainly attempt to get additional time for the gentleman.

Mr. ECKHARDT. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, I hope the gentleman will agree that I have never at any time stated that Ambassador Harriman favored the passage of this resolution today. I think it is very clear he does not, but it is equally clear on the record, without any misunderstanding, that Ambassador Harriman said as a negotiator he would have liked to have had it passed.

Mr. ECKHARDT. Had he been following the same course of negotiations, I

assume, but he most assuredly disagreed with the approach taken.

However, I am prepared to support House Resolution 613 upon the assurances made by its proponents yesterday and today that it does not in any way tie the sense of Congress to the President's speech of November 3 as to any ultimate policy decisions with respect to war or peace, and does not purport to shirk the duty of the Congress to maintain at all times its oversight and review of such policies and decisions.

Mr. Chairman, I have prepared a statement signed by a few other Members and myself, which I shall ask leave in the House to add at the end of this statement to the same effect.

I would like to say though, as to the provisions and the watering down of this resolution in debate, that it is most difficult for me to see that this resolution adds anything to the present approach toward peace. In fact, approximately the same thing was said by Dean Rusk in 1967.

When I first received a copy of this resolution, I started to write to my good friend, the gentleman from Texas, saying that I had left, laying in my box, a resolution that must have been received in 1967 and must have been wrongly dated—because the resolution would have been meaningful at that time. I fail to see how we bring Hanoi closer to the bargaining table by a resolution that calls for almost the same things that were called for in 1967.

I realize that we can have but one president at a time, but why must we have a presidential learning process that operates in tandem?

The only way we are going to resolve this situation, it seems to me, is by regular and measured withdrawals, forthwith, of sufficient troops from the field in order to bring about a broadening of the Saigon government—a government which can bring about and maintain peace, not act as a proxy to continue the war.

Mr. Chairman, the statement to which I referred, signed by myself and 10 others, appears below:

STATEMENT QUALIFYING VOTE ON HOUSE RESOLUTION 613—HOW THE PRESIDENT COMMANDEERED A DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTION

On November 4, H. Res. 612 by Mr. Wright of Texas, and H. Res. 613 by Mr. Hays of Ohio were introduced in the House. Three hundred ten Members of the House in these and identical resolutions affirmed "support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam," approved and supported "the principles enunciated by the President," and supported the President "in his call upon the government of North Vietnam to announce its willingness" to honor elections and resolve controversies in accordance with the President's proposals. Mr. Wright has said that the resolutions were intended as general, non-partisan support of the Presidency in his "efforts to negotiate peace." (Also see Committee Report, p. 1.)

But since the resolutions were introduced on the day after the President addressed the Nation, they were vulnerable to interpretation as a sweeping, prior endorsement of such policies, programs, and demands as might unfold in the present and future conduct of the foreign policy of the Nation. Exploiting such vulnerability, the President on November 13, in what he himself called "perhaps an unprecedented procedure," ap-

peared before the House and embraced what had come to be called the Wright-Hays Resolution (H. Res. 613). He stated that it went along the lines of a proposal made in a speech of November 3, and he characterized it as showing that "a majority [were] supporting the policy of the President of the United States."

Therefore the posture of the Resolution in this political context is now changed. Members who had co-sponsored it, along with those who had refrained from doing so, feel that certain basic points must be made to clarify a common position taken by the undersigned. This is particularly true in view of the fact that within about 48 hours after H. Res. 613's introduction, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in an executive session, reported it out and the Rules Committee has submitted it to the floor under a closed rule.

WHY THE UNDERSIGNED MUST QUALIFY A VOTE OF "AYE" OR "NO"

All of the undersigned entertain the fondest hope that the President will exert all "his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam," all hope that "free election open to all Vietnamese" will ultimately determine political control there, as it should in the rest of the world, and all favor, generally, the influence of "impartial and international" bodies in seeking such ends in Vietnam, as elsewhere in the world. Above all, the undersigned fervently desire that the "controversy—be peacefully—resolved in order that the war may be ended and peace be restored at last in Southeast Asia." Therefore many of the undersigned will vote "aye" but with deep concern about the process by which it has come to the House and with the same reservations as those voting "No."

But additionally, all the undersigned strongly believe that ultimate policy decisions respecting war and peace must continue to be the function of Congress, and it is the duty of Congress to maintain at all times its oversight and review of such policy decisions without delegating the same to any other authority. It is not appropriate nor is it consonant with the authority and dignity of Congress to give any general affirmation to an existing and continuing course of action of the Presidency so as to erode such role of Congress.

Because many feel that the Resolution has an element of such "general affirmation" of an ill-formed policy of the President, a large number of the undersigned are voting against the Resolution.

All of us feel that the Resolution is without much real substance and that it has been employed largely as a political gambit. We feel that Congress should take a more affirmative stand in its proper role as formulator of U.S. policy, both domestic and foreign. In this respect we affirmatively urge—

- (1) Efforts to reduce the level of violence in Vietnam;
- (2) The broadening of the political base of the Saigon government; and
- (3) The immediate designation of a high-level replacement for retiring delegate Henry Cabot Lodge.

Bob Eckhardt, George Brown, Henry Helstoski, James Howard, Edward Koch, Peter Kyros, John Moss, Lucien Nedzi, James Scheuer, Morris Udall, and Jerome Waldie.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY).

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Chairman, I support this resolution.

Mr. Chairman, as a cosponsor of this resolution I urge its overwhelming approval. Once we had a saying in this country that "politics stops at the water's edge."

It was a pretty good saying and went right along with the theory of the times that U.S. foreign policy ought to be bipartisan, that our Nation's best interests in the world community of nations were served best when members and leaders of both parties united behind the President.

Neither the first saying nor the second theory prevented or were meant to prevent honest differences of opinion or legitimate debate on world issues.

But they did serve as guidelines for responsible Congressmen in both parties during times of international crisis involving our country.

Thus we pretty generally united behind President Wilson in World War I. We generally stood behind President Roosevelt in World War II. And we united behind President Truman in the undeclared Korean war.

But, Mr. Chairman, somewhere since then we have lost the feeling of being a unified nation, even as we fight to honor our commitments in South Vietnam.

Today there are those among us who not only disagree with the President, but who also seek to provoke active dissent and in some cases violence. Their purpose is not only to show their disagreement, but actually to force the President into taking actions he knows are contrary to the best interests of our Nation.

Unfortunately, in the recent past the so-called "silent majority" and many who represent them have stood by and let this happen.

Because they have done so, the world has been given a totally false picture. Too often others now see us as a nation torn by dissent, split into factions and hardly able any more to govern ourselves.

Fortunately this is not true.

Those who seek to destroy the President, those who seek unconditional surrender for the United States and a corollary victory for the Communists of North Vietnam make up only a small percentage of our country.

And those in the Congress who profess to speak for the dissenters and who join with them in their retreat from reality make up a very small percentage of the Congress. They not only have misled themselves they have misled the rest of the world.

What these countries fail to understand, however, is that the right of dissent is part of the peculiar nature of our democratic traditions. The success of this democracy in every crisis in the past has hinged on our ability to unite in spite of our differences. In the case of the war in South Vietnam, it has endured one of its most severe tests.

As a proponent of the Vietnam resolution, I believe that passage of this statement will clarify any doubts these nations may have as to our intentions, our unity, and significantly enhance the President's efforts to negotiate a just peace in Southeast Asia.

Therefore, the ramifications of this

measure, should it receive congressional consent are most important both nationally and internationally. Besides formally vocalizing House support for the President's policy, ratification of the Vietnam resolution will be an indicative action to the nations of the world on where the American people stand on this issue.

The image of American unity that would be projected by the passage of the Vietnam resolution is not one that is trumped up or intended to whitewash American sentiment on the Vietnam war. I believe that it would be a true reflection of the feelings of the bulk of the American people who have paid dearly for this war and want peace not only for themselves but also for the people of Southeast Asia.

Extensive bipartisan support of this resolution would indicate that it is not merely an exercise in party politics nor a simple rubberstamp approval of the President's policy. Instead, passage of the Vietnam resolution would manifest that my colleagues in the House and their constituents believe that politics, even today, should stop at the water's edge.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, we have learned from experience—I would say grim experience—that resolutions of the House sometimes are used as justification for measures never contemplated by those who voted for them. The Tonkin resolution of 1964 is an example. It was often cited by President Johnson as a congressional mandate for war measures in Vietnam.

Several speakers yesterday asserted, I was glad to note, that House Resolution 613 conveys absolutely no authority to the President beyond that he already possesses, and does not authorize the employment of military measure in any form.

The author of the resolution, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT), would do us all a great favor, I feel, if he would clarify the intent of some of the words by answering a few questions.

On line seven are the words "approves and supports." The word "approves" is easily understood, but the word "supports" is something else. Support can take many forms—military action, diplomatic initiatives, public statements.

It is my belief that the use of the word "supports" does not contemplate the use of the military measures in any form whatsoever, and therefore is totally related to nonmilitary measures. Am I correct?

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, the verb "supports" must be read in context with the object of the predicate. The Congress by this resolution approves and supports "the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections."

It might be said that American troops are presently engaged in supporting that principle by military means. However, this resolution affirms our support for the President's efforts to negotiate a peace embodying that cardinal princi-

ple. In one sense, this principle is what the war is all about. President Nixon has indicated his conviction that it is the one indispensable basis for a just peace. This resolution declares that the House of Representatives approves and supports that principle and shares that conviction.

Mr. FINDLEY. This response confirms my belief that this use of the word "supports" is totally related to nonmilitary measures. For further clarification of that same point, in regard to the section the gentleman just read, "supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government, government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese and supervised by an impartial international body," do not represent an endorsement of U.S. military measures to accomplish and sustain those conditions. Am I correct?

Mr. WRIGHT. The resolution makes no comment on military measures. It does not constitute military advice.

Mr. FINDLEY. Is there any implication that it is an endorsement of military measures to accomplish and to sustain those conditions, that is the conditions of free elections and the possibility of an impartial international body supervising such?

Mr. WRIGHT. The resolution deals only in the most indirect and inferential manner with any use of military force, simply in the sense that what we are attempting to find is the means of stopping the war on a basis of a settlement which would be worthy of the sacrifices already made and in harmony with our own most cherished convictions.

We believe that the avenue to a peaceful settlement lies through free elections and that is what the resolution addresses itself to.

Mr. FINDLEY. Would it be fair to make this assumption—that the resolution cannot properly be construed to deal in any way, direct or indirect, with the use of military force by the United States? Is that a fair assumption?

Mr. WRIGHT. My answer is the same as it has been to the two previous questions asked by the gentleman. It supports the principle that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections.

That is what the resolution says; that is what the resolution means.

Mr. FINDLEY. But it is not intended to justify the use of military force to accomplish that objective; am I correct in that statement?

Mr. WRIGHT. It says nothing about the use of military force. Whether that basic, cardinal principle which the resolution supports could initially have been vouchsafed and protected without the use of any military force is at this point, it seems to me, a moot question. The resolution states that the House agrees with the President in his efforts to secure a negotiated settlement which will embrace the principle of free and fair elections. By "efforts" we refer in the resolution to nonmilitary efforts. We speak of negotiating efforts. The words

are "efforts to negotiate a just peace." That is all the resolution speaks of.

Mr. FINDLEY. The language of the resolution has caused the gentleman from California (Mr. McCloskey) to raise what I believe to be an important point. The inference could be made from the language of the resolution that the House wishes South Vietnam to be permanently separated from North Vietnam. I do not believe the gentleman from Texas, or any of the sponsors of the resolution, intended to leave that impression. A clearly stated objective of the Geneva Accords of 1954 was the eventual unification of Vietnam, and to the best of my knowledge and belief the United States is unequivocally pledged to that objective. Am I correct that the language of the resolution should not be interpreted as an attempt to modify U.S. support for eventual unification of Vietnam?

Mr. WRIGHT. There is nothing in the resolution which insists upon a permanent separation of the two Vietnams. There is nothing in the resolution which precludes the possibility of eventual unification. I can speak only as one Member. My hope is that any such possible future unification would be based upon a manifest willingness of the majority of the people of both North Vietnam and South Vietnam to determine their own future by the electoral process. If unification is to come, it should come through elections, not through military force.

Mr. FINDLEY. Shortly after introducing the resolution before us, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Wright) sent around a series of questions and answers to allay any apprehensions which Members might have over the wording and the intention of this resolution on Vietnam policy. In the absence of hearings on this resolution, this discussion provided by the gentleman is helpful and appreciated, and I would like to have Mr. Wright's questions and answers included in my remarks at this point:

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON H. RES. 613

TOWARD PEACE WITH JUSTICE IN VIETNAM

Q: Why is this resolution necessary at this time?

A: News from Paris makes it increasingly more clear by the day that there must be an affirmative statement expressing some basic unity of purpose in the United States if there is to be any progress toward genuine negotiation.

It takes two to negotiate. Obviously Hanoi's leaders think they can simply wait us out. Their statements in Paris repeatedly bristle with references to dissent and disunity on the American home front and gratuitous conclusions that the American people do not support the President. Apparently they really believe that we are on the verge of actual internal collapse—and that therefore they shouldn't even try to negotiate, but merely wait for us to give in on all of their demands. This attitude clearly is stalling negotiations and prolonging the war.

Who but the Congress—and particularly the House which most directly represents the people—can clearly and credibly correct that misimpression? Only when Hanoi and the Vietcong understand that there is a basic underlying sense of unity in the United States will they take seriously anything our negotiators say. Only then can there be progress toward a negotiated settlement.

Q: Now, really, didn't the White House initiate the request for this resolution?

A: Absolutely not. This resolution, from its very inception, has been a Congressional initiative. Interestingly enough, the idea originated among Democratic members. The initial draft was drawn up by a Democrat. Minor changes were made at the suggestions of Congressmen Holifield, Hays and Speaker McCormack. It then was discussed with Jerry Ford and Ross Adair. A copy was sent to the White House for comment, and the White House responded with an expression of deep and sincere appreciation. But no person in the Executive Branch suggested one single word in the resolution or asked for one single change! It is wholly the work of the House.

Q: Is this another "Gulf of Tonkin" resolution? Could it be so interpreted?

A: Absolutely not. It is clearly distinguishable from the Gulf of Tonkin resolution on at least three counts: (1) Its thrust is entirely toward peace, not war. The Tonkin resolution specifically refers to acts of military reprisal ("all necessary steps, including the use of armed force"). The present resolution explicitly supports and encourages the President in his efforts to negotiate peace. (2) The Tonkin resolution, by inference at least, seemed to broaden Presidential powers ("the United States is prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps . . ."). Nothing in the present resolution could be in any way so construed. (3) The Tonkin resolution implied approval for future acts by the Executive (" . . . all necessary measures"). This resolution, by contrast, explicitly refers to actions already taken and positions already expressed. It is not "open ended."

Q: Does this amount to a whitewash of the Saigon regime?

A: Not at all. While demonstrating to Hanoi that we are not on the verge of collapse, it also reminds Saigon that we are committed to solution by truly fair and free elections open to all South Vietnamese.

Q: Shouldn't we include some expression urging the President to withdraw American troops more rapidly?

A: It would seriously dilute the message to do so. As Commander-in-Chief, the President must make those decisions on the basis of current information available to him on a day-to-day basis. The House cannot presume foreknowledge of future military possibilities. The resolution does make approving reference to "numerous peaceful overtures which the United States has made in good faith." These obviously include the cessation of bombing ordered by President Johnson and the systematic troop reductions initiated by President Nixon. The House is not attempting herein to advise the President on military matters. It is expressing support for his efforts to negotiate peace.

Q: Shouldn't there have been lengthy hearings in the Foreign Affairs Committee?

A: This is an expression of the House. There is no reason why we should seek advice or testimony from outside sources. Among the resolution's cosponsors are 25 members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. After all the months of our concern with this issue and the literally millions of words that have been spoken on the floor of the House, surely every member knows how he feels on a question so basic as this. If any member of the House still has no opinion, it is doubtful that lengthy hearings would help him arrive at one.

Q: Why did the Rules Committee report this resolution under a closed rule?

A: The Rules Committee examined all the precedents and apparently concluded that resolutions of this type have always come under a closed rule. This was the case with the Formosa Resolution, the Middle East Resolution, the Hungary Resolution, the Ber-

lin Resolution, the Cuban Resolution, the Southeast Asia (Tonkin Gulf) Resolution, and the United Nations Resolution. Significantly, the four hours of general debate exceeds the length of general debate permitted in any of the foregoing cases.

Undoubtedly numerous members would like to change a word here or add a phrase there. To open it up for amendments would require at least a week of debate. It is believed important to make such a statement as this at the earliest practicable time, and scheduling of other legislation apparently did not permit allotting an entire week at this time. The rule requests four hours of general debate.

Q. *Can passage of such a resolution be expected really to make a substantial contribution to the search for peace?*

A. President Nixon thinks so. Ambassador Lodge thinks so. The Democratic and Republican leadership of the House think so. A substantial majority of the Foreign Affairs Committee members think so. Apparently 315 co-sponsors in the House think so. Particularly if we can pass it by an overwhelming majority, the resolution should make a realistic impact. It should help to induce genuine and fruitful negotiation. I earnestly pray that it will.

The answers circulated by Mr. WRIGHT raise some additional questions to which I would like to seek answers. First, Mr. WRIGHT states:

The resolution does make approving reference to "numerous peaceful overtures which the United States has made in good faith." These obviously include the cessation of bombing ordered by President Johnson and the systematic troop reductions initiated by President Nixon.

In his November 3 statement, the President spoke of his "plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front." He said:

We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all United States combat ground forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable.

Clearly, then, the President does not limit the importance of his troop withdrawals—the "systematic troop reductions"—to diplomatic initiatives. Rather, his troop reductions are an initiative on "another front."

I am sure that the House does not mean to so limit to its diplomatic effect the significance of troop withdrawals. At some later date, if all hope for a negotiated settlement has been abandoned, this resolution must not be used as a justification to cancel troop withdrawal plans. The resolution could not properly be used to support such a proposition. Am I correct?

Mr. WRIGHT. The gentleman predicates that upon an assumption that there might be at some time arise the moment when we would abandon the hope of negotiation?

Mr. FINDLEY. Exactly.

Mr. WRIGHT. At that point this resolution, it seems to me, would be utterly moot, because this resolution addresses itself to the hope that a just settlement may be negotiated and, indeed, is prompted by an earnest desire to assist in the negotiation of such a settlement which would embody the freedom of the people of that country.

Mr. FINDLEY. I am very gratified to have that clarification. I assume the same answer would apply to the following question: If it should occur that fair and free elections are out of the question and not in prospect at all—if we should reach that conclusion as a government—under such circumstances am I correct that this resolution could not be a proper point of reference to justify continued U.S. military measures in Vietnam?

Mr. WRIGHT. I am not prepared to speculate on such a contingency. I am not prepared to acknowledge that we are going to reach any such point and say that free elections are impossible. This resolution addresses itself to the hope that there may be settled a just peace which will be fair to both sides and ascertained by free elections.

Mr. FINDLEY. We have to consider contingencies. Who would have dreamed in 1964, at the time of the Tonkin resolution, that events would come to pass putting hundreds of thousands of our men under arms in Vietnam? When the gentleman's splendid resolution was telephoned to Paris, our then Chief Negotiator, Ambassador Lodge, must have been in the process of packing his suitcase, because he was soon to announce his intention to resign in despair, and I think we must face the possibility that fair and free elections may not be in the picture in the foreseeable future.

Mr. WRIGHT. If the gentleman will yield further, I must say I consider this question of the gentleman in the nature of a question asked by a prospective bride before repeating "I do," when she might ask the minister, "Now, is there anything in this ceremony which would permit my husband to mistreat me if later we were to get divorced?"

The question would not be timely at that moment. It has nothing to do with the ceremony.

I believe the gentleman's question is not really timely in connection with this. Of course this resolution says nothing with respect to what might happen if its announced goals and ardent hopes were rendered impossible of achievement. I believe and earnestly hope that those goals are capable of fulfillment. That is the purpose of this resolution.

Mr. FINDLEY. I hope none of us has to hold his breath until the time occurs when fair and free elections are next held throughout South Vietnam.

I thank the gentleman.

VIETNAM ROLL OF HONOR

Mr. Chairman, at intervals this year beginning on March 25, I have placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the names of American military personnel killed by hostile action in Vietnam. The second list was printed on April 3 and the most recent one was printed July 22.

The 2,999 names I am listing today cover the period from June through September 1969, as compiled by the Directorate of Statistical Services, Department of Defense.

The first listing, which required 122 pages of the RECORD, and consisted of 31,379 names, was of those killed prior to President Nixon's inauguration.

The subsequent listings, including the one today, consist of 8,013 names bring-

ing the total to 39,392. Those killed since October 1, including 130 killed last week, are not listed.

Taken together they represent the Vietnam Roll of Honor. The list speaks eloquently in measuring the sacrifice the war has required of our young men.

That measurement has special importance today.

First, because this is the season when we give thanks for our blessings as a nation and rejoice in our Judeo-Christian heritage. It is a time for deep reflection, penitence and resolve—especially crucial this year because of our common determination to keep the Vietnam Roll of Honor from growing one name longer than necessary.

Second, because this is a moment when the decency America has always sought to exalt is clouded by the charge of U.S. massacre of Vietnamese civilians. As never before we need to comprehend the totality of what has developed in Vietnam and the circumstances which may have led some of our soldiers to acts of unspeakable barbarism. The lengthening list of Americans who have suffered violent death there suggests, at least, the bloodshed, agony and, no doubt, brutality that our men have experienced. Last week, for example, 130 Americans died in Vietnam from hostile actions—more than the total allegedly massacred. Is a person less innocent because he wears a uniform? This is a question we may consider as we ponder the innocence of war victims and the total agony of the conflict.

Third, because this is a day when the House of Representatives—for the first time since 1964—makes an official expression about Vietnam war policy.

It is, therefore, a day of grave responsibility for each of us in this Chamber. In my view, nothing can so well convey its gravity as the list of war dead, classified as it is by States and hometowns. Each name must weigh heavily upon us, because of the war decision responsibility which the Constitution places exclusively upon the Congress.

Through protracted neglect of this responsibility, we permitted a small involvement to grow into a major war. Now our President has not only halted the growth but turned it around. He has begun the withdrawal of our ground combat forces and announced a plan for the complete withdrawal of the remaining such forces.

At this juncture the House of Representatives should speak clearly in support of this plan. Official silence on the plan to end our combat involvement is neglect of the same grave order and magnitude as our silence when, step by step, the combat involvement was established.

Silence denies our President and our military forces, as well as the entire Nation, a measure of support which we alone can provide.

Today's RECORD will be filled with statements of support for the President's diplomatic efforts to end the war. This support is easy to extend. Few will hesitate to vote for peace with justice, the concept of free elections, the principle of self-determination, an appeal to

Hanoi to let South Vietnam alone. To do so is natural, like saluting the flag.

Apparently, it is not so easy for the House of Representatives to come to grips with the fundamental decision to withdraw our remaining ground combat forces at the earliest practicable date. The President has made this decision, Secretary of State Rogers has said it is "irreversible," yet the House so far has refused to consider it.

It is not natural to grasp the nettle of basic decision if that chore can be left to others. The Congress shrank from the question of declaring war on Hanoi—we never faced up to it—and now we seem to shrink from the decision to terminate our ground combat involvement. It is more comfortable—easier—to relax in the relatively passive role of supply sergeant to our Nation's military needs and speak only to noncontroversial diplomatic initiatives, leaving the tough basic questions to be handled exclusively by the executive branch.

This is a time for testing of our constitutional system, testing the very mettle of representative government. This is a time for us to rise to a difficult occasion with a clear expression of support for President Nixon's plan for the complete withdrawal of our ground combat forces.

Yesterday the House rejected such an opportunity by refusing to open this resolution to amendment. Another opportunity comes on the motion to recommit. Perhaps other opportunities will follow when hearings on other Vietnam resolutions begin. I say the sooner the better.

By supporting the President's plan for troop withdrawal, we will act in the tradition of others who have served their country's interest with nobility and courage, especially those whose names are listed below:

DEATHS RESULTING FROM HOSTILE ACTION
IN VIETNAM IN JUNE 1969

ALABAMA

Army

Brooks, William Lee, Montgomery.
Crowe, Ronald Gary, Prattville.
Enfinger, Kenneth Earl, Ozark.
Graham, Roger Lee, Aliceville.
Gregory, William Robert, Dothan.
Harris, Benjamin, Hillsboro.
Jones, Albert Junior, Rogersville.
Kenney, Joseph Hayden, Opelika.
Lyle, John Bruce, Athens.
Owens, Thomas Earl, Wetumpka.
Willis, Larry Wayne, Russellville.

Marine Corps

Copeland, Samuel Champion, Birmingham.
Davis, Emmett Lee, Vincent.
Lovett, Terry Wayne, Clanton.
Palmieri, David Harold, Hudson.
Traylor, Fred Edward, Heflin.
Williams, Robert Cleven, Greensboro.

ALASKA

Army

Hibpshman, William Earl, Anchorage.

Navy

Paulsen, Warren, Valdes.

ARIZONA

Army

Daniel, Fred Jacobo, Mesa.
Figueroa, Anthony H., Jr., Temple.
Hughes, John Howard, Phoenix.
Romero, Robert Luis, Superior.
White, Samuel Marlar, Jr., Tucson.

Marine Corps

Montijo, Michael, Tombstone.
Pearson, Bruce Fuller, Williams.
Skaggs, Harold Alonzo, Phoenix.

ARKANSAS

Army

Baker, Danny Ray, Atkins.
Blevins, Hiris Wayne, Little Rock.
Davis, Johnny F., Waldron.
Hampton, Michael Dewayne, North Little Rock.
Holloway, Freddy Lee, North Little Rock.
Rucks, Otis James, Stamps.
Teeter, Norman Wade, Russellville.
Wiles, Johnny, Hardy.
Williams, Lee Arthur, West Helena.

Marine Corps

Charles, Edward William, Gillett.
Green, William Herschell, Corning.

CALIFORNIA

Army

Adams, Leon Henry, El Monte.
Alaniz, Federico, Jr., Watsonville.
Alderson, Benjamin Robert, Redding.
Alvarez, Alex Jim, Compton.
Axton, Edwin Everette, Santa Cruz.
Baca, Richard David, Ventura.
Baker, Ronald Ray, Concord.
Barnes, Richard Leigh, Bellflower.
Barnett, Steven Paul, Burbank.
Baumgardner, Duane Roy, Cloverdale.
Beaman, Ronald Ralph, Oildale.
Bellamy, John Michael, Van Nuys.
Bowen, John Lewis, Monterey.
Burfoot, Phillip Duane, Barstow.
Caraway, Johnnie J., Los Angeles.
Carrasco, Arthuro, Santa Maria.
Christensen, Harold Roy, West Covina.
Corr, Paul, Jr., Anaheim.
de la Torre, Jose Manuel, Fullerton.
Deitrick, George Douglas, Antioch.
Diehl, Harry G., Oceanside.
Evans, Michael John, Maywood.
Freitas, Robert Edwin, Merced.
Frost, Herbert Cornelius, Alhambra.
Goeller, Michael Dennis, Nevada City.
Gonzales, Carlos M., El Monte.
Greenlaw, Alan Heald, Redding.
Guenther, John Carl, Jr., Fair Oaks.
Henry, Frederick John, Van Nuys.
Hensley, John, North Forks.
Herring, Steven Wayne, Freedom.
Horal, Thomas Glen, Sunnyvale.
Horn, Alan Murray, Lakewood.
Howard, David Terrell, La Habra.
Hunt, Calvin Gene, Bakersfield.
Inguillo, John Deogracias, Watsonville.
Kunkel, Alfred Henry, Jr., Lakewood.
Larimer, Keith Wayne, Tulare.
Layton, Ronald Dean, Sacramento.
Lewis, John Stephen, California Hot Springs.

Mardis, James Arnold, Jr., Vandenberg Air Force Base.

Miller, Marvin Ray, Riverside.
Miller, Paul Wayne, San Diego.
Moss, Charles Lee, Jr., San Diego.
Peebler, Christy Albert, Tustin.
Randall, Lynn Murray, San Jose.
Richardson, Donald Harold, Redwood City.
Roberts, Stephen Lord, Redlands.
Ross, Paul R., Huntington Beach.
Rubio, Peter Paul, La Puente.
Russell, Wayne, Los Angeles.
Savage, Douglas Paul, Covina.
Sekva, Robert Glenn, Hayward.
Sellers, Richard Taylor, Jr., Palos Verdes Estate.

Shaughnessy, Edward Jerome, Hawthorne.
Smith Donald Ray, Placerville.
Smith, John Calvin, San Jose.
Strickland, Douglas Lee, Port Chicago.
Taylor, John Raymond, Taft.
Teal, Fred Thomas, Cucamonga.
Tenorio, Rafael Gabriel, Santa Rosa.
Valadez, Richard Paul, Los Angeles.
Valencia, Clement, Jr., Los Angeles.
Villalobos Ignacio L., Pico Rivera.
Walker, James Daniel, Santa Maria.

Weber, Paul Frederick, Lemon Grove.
White, Marvin Charles, Ramona.
Williams, Robert Alwyn, Napa.
Wimer, Robert Arnold, Eureka.
Young, Samuel Lee, Los Angeles.

Marine Corps

Abeyta, Ernest, Los Angeles.
Britton, Murry Lawrence, San Francisco.
Burke, William Davidson, Jr., Oxnard.
Cincotta, Thomas Antone, San Rafael.
Costa, William Carl, Los Molinos.
Council, Arthur Coby, III, Hawthorne.
Cox, Gary Allen, Selma.
Crites, Robert Lincoln, Jr., Colton.
Culverhouse, Leon Thomas, Torrance.
Dycus Rickey Dale, Long Beach.
Elliott, David Ray, Orinda.
Goodlin, Jerry Lee, La Puente.
Gramlick, Michael, Los Angeles.
Hall, James Oscar, Jr., Vista.
Haran, Rory Timothy T., Salinas.
Hicks, Michael Eugene, San Leandro.
Hunnicut, Jason, David, Petaluma.
Johnson, Charles Howard, Baldwin Park.
Juri, Elgin John, Menlo Park.
Keeling, Larry Dewayne, Pioneer Point.
Letson, Gary Wayne, San Francisco.
Lewis Adron Lee, Hacienda Heights.
McConnell, David Wayne, Hemet.
McLean, Ronald Walsh, Beverly Hills.
Miller, Walter Ray, Jr., Garden Grove.
Misa, Tulele, Gardena.
Montgomery, Steven Hugh, Hayward.
Mora, Gregorio Manuel, El Monte.
Nicholas, Robert George, Orange Grove.
Oliver, Erskine Jay, Sacramento.
Paddock, Michael James, Atascadero.
Paris, Guillermo, Los Angeles.
Pearcy, Robert Leslie, Big Bear Lake.
Perez, Jesus Albert, Los Angeles.
Raymond, Edward Robert, III, Riverside.
Roddick, William Henry, Highland.
Rodriguez, Louis, Bakersfield.
Storbo, Ronald Lawrence, San Rafael.
Taylor, Dennis Lee, San Lorenzo.
Trejo, Joseph, Jr., Corona.
Unfried, Barry Lon, Oroville.
Wandro, James Matthew, San Mateo.
Weil, Richard Anthony, Jr., Anaheim.
Wysel, Mitchell Blaine, Ventura.
Young, Carlos Avila, Los Angeles.
Zumwalt, Edwin Allen, Santo Rosa.

Navy

Brown, Bruce Edward, San Francisco.
Holmes, Hugh Bryant, Lakewood.
Page, George Merritt, Jr., Santa Monica.
Stricklin, Robert Guy, Santa Ana.

COLORADO

Army

Bieker, Carl Joseph, Pueblo.
Calkins, Byron Thomas, Denver.
Davis, Richard Lee, Aurora.
Eherton, Steven Paul, Evans.
George, Gordon Milton, Jr., Alamosa.
Peonio, Stephen Joseph, Denver.
Scherf, Michael Gregory, Golden.
Sitton, David Thomas, Pueblo.
Skeen, Steven James, Colorado Springs.

Marine Corps

Brack, David Allan, Denver.
Ince, John David, Greeley.

CONNECTICUT

Army

Artkop, Arthur James, Sterling.
Beveridge, Douglas James, Bristol.
Hardwick, Edward Mahlon, New Haven.
Hill, Thomas Arthur, New Hartford.
Howard, Robert Louis, Norwich.
Manarel, Charles Ross, Terryville.
Marc, Aurele Lionel Lucien, Voluntown.
Palmenta, Edward Vincent, Norwalk.
Pierce, Bernard Lawrence, Windsorville.
Wayman, Donald Michael, Danbury.
Zastowsky, Donald John, Plainfield.

Marine Corps

Beaman, Robert Jon, East Hartford.
Holman, Raymond Clark, Manchester.
Mennone, Michael Giovanni, New Haven.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Army

Farley, Andrew Simmons, Jr., Washington.
Saunders, Emanuel Lawrence, Washington.
Walsh, David William, Washington.

FLORIDA

Army

Ayers, Charles David, Sneads.
Borg, John Michael, Dunedin.
Bowen, Hammett Lee, Jr., Ocala.
Brantley, Alexander Bryant, St. Petersburg.
Brown, Norman Dale, Melbourne.
Cole, Richard Wilson, Winter Haven.
Dipolo, Roland Forrest, Crestview.
Dixon, Robert Dale, Plant City.
Garner, Ronald Ray, Leesburg.
Gomez, Ricardo Jose, Hialeah.
Goolsby, James Ruel, Hollywood.
Hackett, Daniel Harold, North Port
Charlotte.

Hathaway, Steve, Maitland.
Heath, Brian Charles, Tampa.
Hindjosa, Rudolph R., Jr., Tampa.
Ingram, Elijah, Cocoa.
Kinder, Larry Wade, Istachatta.
Langston, Robert Ebert, Tampa.
Marinelli, Anthony John, West Hollywood.
McClenton, Henry, Tallahassee.
McFall, Kenneth Lewis, Daytona Beach.
McPhee, Douglas Wayne, Largo.
Miller, Hollis Gregory, Tallahassee.
Mize, Melvin Lamar, Lake City.
Motes, Carl Gilbert, Webster.
Pettis, Lorenzo Richard, West Palm Beach.
Scott, Joseph Robert, Tampa.
Smith, Joseph Frederick, Jr., Jacksonville.
Vale, Charles, Orlando.
Wittman, Robert Keith, Apopka.
Wright, Clifford Devon, Jay.

Marine Corps

Baker, Howard Ranold, Jacksonville.
Fulgham, Edward Braxton, Jr., Palatka.
Fussell, Felton Roger, Elfers.
Granberry, Johnie Franklin, Round Lake.
Thomas, Issac, Jr., Riviera Beach.
Tyson, Charles Floyd, III, Fellsmore.
Young, Roger Lee, Cocoa.

Navy

Weber, Delbert Ellis, Lakeland.

GEORGIA

Army

Ayers, William Herschel, Toccoa.
Beck, David Michael, Cordele.
Bemis, Earle John, Marietta.
Burgess, William C., Jr., Ellijay.
Cowan, James Alton, Jr., Chamblee.
Crawford, Harold Jerome, Thomson.
Cumbee, Jimmy Dean, Twin City.
Farmer, Charlie Will, Jr., La Grange.
Fowler, Michael Edward, Marietta.
Graham, Larry Alonza, Thomasville.
Harrison, Lonnie Hughlen, Calhoun.
Hopkins, James Harrison, Marietta.
Jones, James Walter, Atlanta.
King, Edward Earl, Decatur.
Norton, Mitchell Earl, Marietta.
Pittman, Edgar Stevan, Newnan.
Rogers, Jerry Eugene, Demorest.
Singleton, Jesse W., Jr., Decatur.
Smith, Eddie Lee, Rentz.
White, Randall Ray, La Grange.
Whitworth, Sammy Howard, Lavonia.

Air Force

Hoag, James Dean, East Point.

Marine Corps

Brittlian, Charles Henry, Jr., Atlanta.
Camp, Anthony Lorin, Dallas.
Carpenter, Charles Edward, Savannah.

GEORGIA

Navy

Gross, Stephen Russell, Savannah.

HAWAII

Marine Corps

Lewis, Allen Lanui, Elelee.
Uli, Sasa, Honolulu.

IDAHO

Army

Earp, Michael Lee, Grangeville.
Hansen, Craig Hayes, Soda Springs.

Marine Corps

Hodges, Teddy Merlin, Jr., Malta.
Hurianek, Jerry Antone, Middleton.
McMaster, Michael Lee, Mountain Home.
Reed, Christopher Ray, Boise.
Small, Kenneth Lloyd, Salmon.

ILLINOIS

Army

Allmeyer, Frederick Allen, Chester.
Barcelona, Ralph Anthony, Rockford.
Benefiel, Dudley James, Jr., Hagarstown.
Clatfelter, Robert Dennis, Springfield.
Dabbert, William Carl, Arlington Heights.
Dalle, Louie Frank, Chicago.
Disselkoe, Donald Gene, Lansing.
Getz, Robert William, Decatur.
Jecmen, Anton James, Jr., Brookfield.
Johnston, Terry Randall, Peoria.
Kiestler, James Larry, Chicago.
Koch, Franklin Leroy, Wheaton.
Labay, Joseph Stanley, Chicago.
Lane, James Joseph, Jr., Chicago.
Lascelles, Don Harrison, Bath.
Maxson, John Robert, Bushnell.
May, Daniel Arnold, Spring Grove.
McCloud, Steven William, Anna.
Miller, Terry Dean, Montrose.
Mills, David Lee, Decatur.
Mlodzinski, Bruno J., Jr., Chicago.
Pagan, Edwin Perez, Chicago.
Pavey, Dale Russell, Chicago.
Peterson, John Kenneth, Waukegan.
Poppenga, Patrick Edward, Chicago.
Porter, Donald John, Naperville.
Rachal, Lionel Thomas, Chicago.
Stevens, Allyn Troy, Chicago.
Taylor, Gary Lynn, Chicago Ridge.
Thornton, Terry Lee, Bloomington.
Trotter, Thomas Michael, Carthage.
Turk, Edwin Francis, Jr., Elgin.
Waterloo, Michael Jeffery, Chicago.
Weiss, David Earl, Granite City.
Willert, Dieter Eric, Chicago.

Air Force

Ford, Kenneth Laverne, New Burnside.
Kinnett, George Delmer, Sycamore.
Peters, George Charles, Roodhouse.

Marine Corps

Brown, James Patrick, Chicago.
Carr, Robert George, South Holland.
Clancy, Craig Michael, Chicago.
Davison, Larry Charles, Chicago.
Gooden, William Elliott, Hoopston.
Gowin, Harry Dale, Wheeler.
Hagle, Michael Wade, Aurora.
Keilums, Dennis Allen, Silvis.
Latimer, Robert Nathaniel, Stone Park.
Trevino, Rudolph Robert, Chicago.

Navy

Crutcher, Terry Lynn, Bloomington.

INDIANA

Army

Ameigh, James Keith, Akron.
Benge, Samuel Edward, New Ross.
Borkholder, Jerry M., New Paris.
Bragg, John Robert, Elwood.
Brown, Bobby Ray, Muncie.
Cleviser, William Henry, Seymour.
Ellsworth, Richard Allen, Crown Point.
Hanselman, Robert Loyd, Knox.
Harvey, Darnell, East Chicago.
Kummings, James Albert, Williamsport.
Lee, Jack Charles, Van Buren.
Loffer, Terry Allen, Eaton.
Logsdon, Herbert, Jr., Clarksville.
Nord, David Lee, Ferdinand.
O'Leary, Michael William, Kokomo.
Paulus, Robert Duane, Wakarusa.
Platt, David Borne, Bluffton.
Platt, Larry Dean, Anderson.
Porter, David Randle, La Porte.
Shoulders, Donald Ray, Griffith.
Terry, Daniel Lee, Noblesville.
Upp, Jeff Harold, Bryant.

Air Force

Collins, David Lee, Lowell.

Marine Corps

Bunn, Donald Wayne, Fort Wayne.
Covington, Darell Lee, Richmond.
Dover, George Richard, Indianapolis.
Ettel, Henry C., Jr., Clarksville.
Lynn, William Thomas, Princeton.
Michalski, James, La Porte.

Navy

Ludban, Glen Charles, Garrett.

Iowa

Army

Bender, Gary Dean, Des Moines.
Bresnahan, Alan Ray, Dorchester.
Dreier, Mark Steven, Postville.
Geronzin, Anson Thorne, Jr., Clinton.
Gosch, Larry Gene, Lineville.
Kopriva, John Gaylord, Traer.
Kruse, James Arthur, West Union.
Lewis, Michael Keith, Lake City.
Mann, David Lyle, Estherville.
Olson, Duane Elmer, Irwin.
Powlistha, Gerald Stephen, Maquoketa.
Snethen, Robert Carl, Lamoni.

Marine Corps

Berstler, Bill Lavern, Ladora.
O'Connor, Michael Maurice, Waterloo.
Peters, William Lee, Jr., Ft. Dodge.

KANSAS

Army

Bishop, James Louis, Wichita.
Bittle, Douglas Robert, Arkansas City.
Brandt, Gearold Lee, Salina.
Chadwick, Billy Raymond, Manhattan.
Clark, Larry Ray, Wichita.
Dornon, Charles William, Wichita.
Hess, Kerry Eugene, Topeka.
Larson, Loren Henry, Leonardville.
Lindquist, William Francis, Kansas City.
Martinez, George Francis, Newton.
Myers, Gene Allen, St. Marys.
Rouchon, Alan Michael, Ft. Leavenworth.
Scott, Larry Eugene, Atchison.
Strube, James Clarence, Powhattan.
Talbur, Raymond Thurl, Wichita.
White, Michael Alan, Eldorado.

Marine Corps

Householter, Terry August, Concordia.
Neer, Gerald King, Winfield.

Navy

Muller, Daniel Scott, Pittsburg.

KENTUCKY

Army

Balitsaris, John Bomar, Knoxville.
Biggs, David Owen, Columbia.
Brown, Harold Milton, Mt. Washington.
Browning, George Robert, East Bernstadt.
Carr, Bertram Anthony, Louisville.
Chappel, Luther Malcolm, Bedford.
Collins, David Burr, Bardstown.
Coots, Jackie, Cumberland.
Duty, Anthony, Neon.
Harlow, Rex Douglas, Glasgow.
Lawson, Ronnie, Siler.
McGowan, Francis Russell, Columbia.
McIlvoy, Joseph Ronald, Willisburg.
Moore, Charles Edward, Pine Knot.
Moore, James Thomas, Bloomfield.
Osborne, Jake, Beattyville.
Phillips, Alton Ray, Campbellsville.
Prewitt, William Earl, Nicholasville.
Reed, Billie Wayne, Murray.
Sholar, Edwin Franklin, Murray.
Simpson, Ronald Earl, Bardstown.
Thompson, Barry Neal, Cocks Creek.
Todtenbier, James Louis, Covington.
Wilson, Edmond Q. Jr., Midway.

Marine Corps

Clayburn, Ronnie Lee, Franklin.
Griffith, Dale Eugene, Tollesboro.
Harris, Kenneth Ray, Grays.
McStoots, Thomas Howard, Louisville.
Paulin, John Thomas, Owensboro.
Sally, Hank, Covington.
Short, James Everette, Lexington.

LOUISIANA

Army

Brown, Warren Fred, Ama.
 Brupbacher, Robert Michael, New Orleans.
 Gorshorn, Edward Francis, Lake Charles.
 Hostetter, Stuart Glen, Alexandria.
 Parker, John Boyd, Monroe.
 Perkins, Luther Rives, Shreveport.
 Pitre, Floyd Leon, Opelousas.
 Pitre, Kenneth Joseph, New Orleans.
 Richardson, Michael Wayne, Lafayette.
 Silman, Gary Willis, West Monroe.
 Theriot, Phillip Finnan, New Orleans.
 Thornton, Evans Jerome, New Orleans.

Air Force

Ginart, Donald Francis, New Orleans.

Marine Corps

Achord, David Paul, Gonzales.
 Kaufman, David Mitchell, Plaquemine.

Navy

Harrington, Iris Hilton, Iowa.

MAINE

Army

Asselin, Leo Roger, Lewiston.
 Drown, Terry Francis, Kennebunkport.
 Hicks, Sheldon Wayne, Carmel.
 Tibbetts, Bruce Harold, Dixfield.

Marine Corps

Fournier, Joseph David, Van Buren.

MARYLAND

Army

Bartley, Kenneth Leonard, Mitchellville.
 De Mey, John, Annapolis.
 Gray, Charles Gonzle, Brandywine.
 Italiano, Harry Richard, Suitland.
 Morrissey, John Dennis, Aberdeen.
 Ruppert, Francis Grover, Cumberland.
 Sewell, William Jerry, Baltimore.
 Sharp, John David, Cumberland.
 Smith, Eugene Willard, Baltimore.

Marine Corps

Brown, Gerald Bernard, Baltimore.
 Hopkins, Danny Lee, Annapolis.
 Martin, Robert Harrison, Jr., Cumberland.
 McMahon, James Edward, Baltimore.
 Pasqualucci, Emidio, Annapolis.
 Stone, William Marvin, Jr., Glen Burnie.

MASSACHUSETTS

Army

Aldam, Kevin Gerry, Pittsfield.
 Bean, Christopher John, Rockland.
 Blazonis, Peter Vincent, Chelmsford.
 Carlson, Gary William, West Bridgewater.
 Coleman, Robert Joseph, Cambridge.
 Crowe, Kevin Robert, Malden.
 Curtin, Donald Leo, Somerville.
 Curtis, Frederick N., Osterville.
 Di Tullio, Franco Antonio, Clinton.
 Frechette, Francis Gerald, Fitchburg.
 Havel, Michael Dennis, Reading.
 Kadlewicz, Zdzislaw Bruno, Fitchburg.
 Kenney, David Edward, Woburn.
 Marcoulier, Leo Rene, Fitchburg.
 Mobilia, Michael Howard, West Medford.
 Palermo, George Robert, East Boston.
 Sestito, Antony John, Malden.
 Wilk, Thomas John, Fairview.
 Zebert, James Donald, Westfield.

Marine Corps

Dolan, Thomas William, III, Springfield.
 Duhy, Harvey Albert, Jr., Wakefield.
 Guilmette, Joseph, Jr., Fall River.
 Kelly, Brian Richard, South Boston.
 McMahon, James Harold, Newton.
 Murdock, John Leo, Medford.
 Shattuck, Harold Leon Jr., Greenfield.
 Webb, Gary Joseph, Quincy.

Navy

Rezendes, Paul Allen, Plymouth.

MICHIGAN

Army

Bosenbark, Samuel Garold, Monroe.
 Braid, John Edward, Bloomfield Hills.
 Brown, David Alan, Dearborn.
 Bushard, William Dean, Mancelona.

Clark, James Nelson, Detroit.
 Dankert, Robert Sheldon, Saginaw.
 Dankowski, James Hillary, Mackinac Island.

Davis, Frederic Hutchison, Union Lake.
 Dodge, Michael James, Gibraltar.
 Elwart, Paul Dean, Ypsilanti.
 Farley, John Harland, Haslett.
 Francisco, Darryl Grant, Hillman.
 Gordon, Rogers Stuart, Middleville.
 Gruke, Barry Richard, Owosso.
 Hawkins, Harold Frederick, Coldwater.
 Hennessey, James Dale, Mt. Clemens.
 Hodge, Michael Leonard, Flint.
 Hurt, Paul Thomas III, St. Clair.
 Jenkins, Larry Rufus, Detroit.
 Johnson, Dale Lloyd, Benton Harbor.
 Knoll, Ray Edward, Muskegon.
 Lahr, Clyde David, Bellevue.
 Landwehr, Duane Henry, Jr., Clinton.
 Nozewski, John Alexander, Dearborn.
 Parkin, Harold Leslie, Pontiac.
 Poe, James Walker, Detroit.
 Poxon, Robert Leslie, Detroit.
 Prince, Dennis Glenn, Westland.
 Reid, Daniel George, Port Huron.
 Revoir, Richard Russell, Mesick.
 Riggs, Joseph Burnitt, Monroe.
 Thurnham, John Brent, Rochester.
 Vallenga, Larry Cosimo, Royal Oak.
 Van Dyke, Stephen Dennis, Detroit.

Air Force

Bakke, Larry Neil, Sebawaing.

Marine Corps

Barnes, Gale Lynn, Marshall.
 Brimmer, Delbert Ellery, Montague.
 Covey, James Herbert, Ypsilanti.
 Eglinsdoerfer, Larry James, Milan.
 Jones, Paul Davis, Inkster.
 Matarazzo, Everett Robert, Souteldled.
 McCollough, Benjamin Lee, Clio.
 McNeill, Kenneth Rex, Alma.
 Morris, Raymond Lester, Haslett.
 Partida, Andrew, Detroit.
 Petrolina, Paul Edward, Lincoln Park.
 Porter, Ronald Harry, Flat Rock.
 Rosenberger, Roger Dale, Swartz Creek.
 Ruehle, Douglas Duane, Summer.
 Scott, William Henry M., Mount Clemens.

Navy

Maner, Howard Joseph, Inkster.
 Naughton, Thomas Daniel, Jr., Dearborn.

MINNESOTA

Army

Agather, Frederick Gustave, Sauk Rapids.
 Baldwin, Scott Douglas, Duluth.
 Barnes, Gary Lester, Sleepy Eye.
 Berg, Thomas Alan, Minneapolis.
 Edmond, Paul Robert, New Brighton.
 Gilbertson, Larry Russell, Mora.
 Graham, Robert Lee, Eyota.
 Hochstetter, James Jay, Brainerd.
 Jensen, Roger Dale, Staples.
 Johnson, Stephen Duane, Austin.
 Kokesh, Andrew Frank, Aitkin.
 Ledin, Daniel Bing, Minneapolis.
 Lipetzky, Daniel John, Clements.
 Lurth, Melville Albert Jr., St. Peter.
 Matel, Ronald James, Duluth.
 McKenzie, Larry Dean, Mizpah.
 Michel, David George, Harmony.
 Paulsen, Lawrence Edward, St. Paul.
 Puarlea, James Frederick, St. Paul.
 Roberg, James Austin, Minneapolis.
 Vogelsang, John Kim, St. Louis Park.

Air Force

Kearby, Jean Arthur, Austin.

Marine Corps

Hinschberger, Lawrence K., South Moorhead.

Jannetta, Rodney Alan, Duluth.

Navy

Kolmstad, Ronnie Gene, Rochester.

MISSISSIPPI

Army

Bradley, Thomas James, Minneota.
 Felsher, John Alfred, Biloxi.

Hunter, Charles Louis, Starkville.
 McGinnis, Steven Lavelle, Sturgis.
 Metcalf, Claudie, Marks.
 Stringer, William Franklin, Booneville.
 Williams, Thomas Joseph, Bay St. Louis.
 Woodruff, James Ammons, Aberdeen.

MISSOURI

Army

Brashears, Ronald Lee, Stanberry.
 Clubbs, Charles Earl, St. Louis.
 Gaffney, McArthur, St. Louis.
 Hartman, Donald Owen, Independence.
 Heard, Howard Charles, St. Louis.
 Hinderks, Gregg Clifton, Stewartville.
 Hughes, Thomas Edward, Oldfield.
 Johnson, Frank Edward, Auxvasse.
 Jordan, James Samuel, Dixon.
 Kempker, Patrick Benjamin, Eugene.
 Kreutz, Kenneth Joseph, Ferguson.
 Kuhns, William Joseph, Springfield.
 Lewis, Leonard Leroy, St. Louis.
 Long, Harry Leroy, Kansas City.
 Mead, Sammy Louis Jr., Pleasant Hope.
 Miller, William Howard, Kansas City.
 Preston, Mack Lee Jr., Louisiana.
 Stocklin, Gary Dennis, Kansas City.
 Tilleman, Paul Robert, Camdenton.
 Vogler, Gregory Raymond, Florissant.
 Weidner, David Edward, St. Louis.
 Wooten, Bobbie Gene, Harviell.
 Worrell, David Allen, Gallatin.

Marine Corps

Claxton, Richard Rex, Eldon.
 Keshner, Keo Joe, New Florence.
 Kiger, George Alan, Dexter.

Navy

Hudgins, Carl William, Jr., Belton.
 Wilson, William Ralph, Kansas City.

MONTANA

Army

Biberdorf, Dennis Floyd, Great Falls.

NEBRASKA

Army

Bredenkamp, David Joe, York.
 Goc, Paul Stephen, Jr., Omaha.
 Slater, James Allen, Indianola.

NEVADA

Army

Larsen, Stephen Earl, East Ely.
 Themmen, Michael James, Las Vegas.

Marine Corps

Thompson, Dale Earl, Henderson.

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Army

Pratt, Philip Avery, Freemont.
 Sawyer, James Everett, Jr., Laconia.
 Willard, Thomas Alan, Farmington.

Marine Corps

Philbrick, Steven Jay, Hampton.

NEW JERSEY

Army

Andujar, Charles Manuel, Newark.
 Bonine, Thomas Marvin, Glen Ridge.
 Callahan, Michael Patrick, Wildwood Crest.
 Christie, Donald, Hazlet.
 Cyran, Richard Edward, Clifton.
 Daley, Gerald Charles, Uniondale.
 Fanning, Edward Charles, Hazlet.
 Iasello, Dennis Anthony, Newark.
 Lang, James L., Neptune.
 Lewis, Benjamin F., Jr., Ft. Dix.
 Lyons, George Michael, Jersey City.
 Madden, Francis Bernard, Jr., Newark.
 Mills, Karl William, Paramus.
 Robinson, Robert James, Plainfield.
 Tufts, Robert Bruce, Morristown.
 Washington, Albert B., Jr., Asbury Park.
 Wickline, Donald Lee, Jr., Lake Hiawatha.
 Wilkins, Bobby Ray, Newark.
 Zyck, Fred Joseph, Flemington.

Marine Corps

Arribi, Donald, Cliffside Park.
 Barton, James John, Jamesburg.

Benn, William Paul, Lakewood.
Bowen, Larry Hansen, Penns Grove.
Desimone, Alfred, Jersey City.
Watson, Marvin Lerol, Woodstown.

NEW MEXICO

Army

Roman, Victor Munoz, Deming.
Sanchez, Jose L., Dexter.

Marine Corps

Baker, Michael O'Brien, Albuquerque.
Orosco, Stephen, Tularosa.

NEW YORK

Army

Bailey, Fred McKinley, New York.
Bennett, Richard Jay, Earlville.
Collazo, Carlos Manuel, North Bay.
Colon, Harry Joseph, New York.
Conway, Leroy, New York.
Cruise, William Michael, Jr., Wappingers Falls.

Davis, Arthur Raymond, Frankfort.
De Maria, Frank F., Jr., New York.
De Rubels, Fernando, New York.
Deitch, David, New York.
Denardis, Claude Charles, Schenectady.
Dolvin, James Richard, St. Albans.
Echevarria, Jose Anibal, Jr., New York.
Eriksen, Alf Edward, Lindenhurst.
Farella, Lawrence Andrew, Syracuse.
Fields, Michael David, New York.
Flieger, Gerard John, New York.
Fuller, Michael Allan, New York.
Goetzer, Joseph James, Jr., New York.
Gordils, Louis Alfredo, New York.
Griffin, Hallia Leon, Jr., New York.
Horan, John William, New York.
Huggs, Harold Sylvester, Jamaica.
Joy, Richard Dennis, Binghamton.
Kaufman, Jay Allen, New York.
Kazmierczak, Robert Joseph, Lackawanna.
Kurtowicz, James David, Buffalo.
Lee, Marzel Ray, New York.
Lehman, Peter Allen, Cold Spring Harbor.
Little, Paul Frederick, New York.
Lynch, Carl Donald, New York.
Lynch, Peter, Goshen.
MacMillan, Gordon Alan, East Meadow.
McConnyhead, James, Jr., New York.
McNeilly, James H., Scotia.
McParlane, Michael Joseph, Flushing.
McZeal, Martin Allen, Rome.
Mott, Joseph Anthony, Buffalo.
Mulvey, Lawrence Patrick, New York.
Murray, Dennis Brian, Glen Cove.
Nowlin, Fletcher Jacob, Jr., Rochdale Village.

Oberle, Stewart William, New York.
Parker, James Edward, Blauvelt.
Rahilly, Andrew Stephen, New York.
Rose, Andrew Clayton, Burlington Flats.
Rosendietcher, Howard, New York.
Runde, James, Jr., Kingston.
Ryan, John Thomas, New York.
Salanitro, Gary Charles, Huntington Station.

Sandman, Mitchell Harvey, Syosset.
Santiago, Alexander P., Jr., New York.
Santiago, Humberto Ruiz, Jr., New York.
Schiffrin, Raymond Richard, Laurelton.
Schmidt, Daryl Jay, North Tonawanda.
Schofer, Karl Andrew, Massapequa.
Seddig, Walter S., New York.
Settini, Ronald Mark, Niagara Falls.
Shelton, Timothy John, Lindenhurst.
Simancas, Luis Jose, New York.
Toole, Terry Edward, Auburn.
Toro, Jose Miguel, New York.
Tortorici, Frank, New York.
Valesko, Joseph, Jr., Canandaigua.
Van Cook, Donald F., Jr., New York.
Verry, Frederick Alfred, Jamestown.
Wick, Michael Raymond, College Point.
Winkler, Gary John, North Babylon.

Air Force

Dart, Walter Joseph, Jr., Kingston.
Engelhardt, Albert Alois, Bayside.

Marine Corps

Bullock, Dan, New York.
Catherman, Robert Ray, Baldwinsville.
Gatto, Daniel Arthur, Amsterdam.
Hively, Robert Lynn, Corning.
Koehler, David James, Clarence Center.
Landi, George Francis, New York.
McGrade, Gerard, New York.
Murphy, Dennis Gerard, Copiague.
O'Connell, Daniel Gerard, Copiague.
Perez, David, New York.
Riley, Thomas John, Bayside.
Stahlecker, Gary Robert, West Henrietta.
Swanson, Raymond William, New York.
Thompson, Harry Nathaniel, New York.
Turner, Brendan Xavier, Uniondale.

NORTH CAROLINA

Army

Burrage, Wayne R., Durham.
Cahoon, Glynn Thomas, Columbia.
Daniels, Josephus, Winterville.
Daniels, Richard Carlton, Windsor.
Davis, Michael Frank, Waynesville.
Eubanks, Dewey Maynard, Durham.
Hardy, Phillip Dean, Mount Olive.
Hopper, James, Jr., Shelby.
Joyce, Roger Lee, Pilot Mountain.
Poteet, Glen Ervin, Morganton.
Wallace, Eugene Kenneth, Fayetteville.
Watson, Richard Wayne, Goldsboro.
Woods, James Thomas, Ferguson.
Worley, Michael Gregg, Leicester.

Marine Corps

Buck, William Andrew, Jr., Fayetteville.
Buckner, Russell Don, Weaverville.
Hegwood, William David, Charlotte.
Locklear, Eddie Lee, Whiteville.
Roberts, Michael Stephen, Apex.
Rodgers, Moses, Wilson.

Navy

McNeill, Daniel Dixon, Asheville.

NORTH DAKOTA

Army

Bargmann, Gilbert Ray, Hannover.
Buringrud, Richard Allen, Argusville.
Fullmer, Robert Michael, Grand Forks.
Manson, Dennis James, Belcourt.
Nadeau, Eric Daryl, Grand Forks.
Wosick, Dennis Stanley, Grand Forks.

OHIO

Army

Adkins, James Dale, Middletown.
Anderson, Earl Ernest, Ashland.
Battles, Charles Edward, Warren.
Blackwell, Frederic Delano, Columbus.
Bowman, James Ernest, Ironton.
Cahill, Carl Thomas, Akron.
Cameron, Robert Charles, Elyria.
Daniel, Freddie Laws, Lorain.
DeFrang, Mark John, Kent.
Dopp, Richard Ernest, Cincinnati.
Emmert, Charles William, Navarre.
Endicott, Danny G., Columbus.
Evans, Clyde Sampson, Portsmouth.
Fuchs, Gregory Gerald, Brecksville.
Geiger, Waldemar John, Cleveland.
Geldin, Jeffrey Lee, Lindsey.
Hager, Jack Leonard, Columbus.
Hatfield, Jack, Medina.
Heltsley, Joseph Justin, Brookville.
Huebner, Terence Arthur, Monclova.
Jenkins, Terry Lee, Wash. Court House.
Jones, Monte Richard, Sidney.
King, Robert Lee, Delphos.
Kiniyalocts, Charles M., Middletown.
Klute, Jerry Craig, Cincinnati.
LaPointe, Joseph Guy, Jr., Clayton.
Lane, Sharon Ann, Canton.
Laskay, Donald Thomas, Lorain.
Long, Robert Wesley, Haydenville.
Lorence, John Edward, Mantua.
Martin, Tony Lee, Columbus.
McClung, Wayne Oland, Cleveland.
Mesenburg, Terrance R., Huron.
Miller, James Gregory, Newark.
Mingle, Robert Louis, Massillon.

Nesselrotte, James Michael, Painesville.
Oney, Daniel Luther, Jackson.
Picelle, Frank John, Jr., Kent.
Priest, Donald Wayne, Jr., Leesburg.
Raupach, Kim, Doylestown.
Robinson, Randall Charles, Cincinnati.
Shaffer, Victor Thomas, Toledo.
Sigworth, Richard Jacob, Maumee.
Southard, Jerry Lee, Bellefontaine.
Sparks, William Douglas, Stout.
Strasshofer, Steve Otto, Parma.
Tucker, Jerome Ernie, Cincinnati.
Van Duzer, Ronald Lee, Wadsworth.
Voyt, Edward, Cleveland.
Ward, Alan Curtis, Cincinnati.
White, Lawrence Lealand, Middlefield.
Williams, Dennis Michael, Eastlake.
Zindle, Jerome Paul, Medina.

Air Force

Condit, William Howard, Jr., Worthington.
Lefler, Clifford John T., Milford.
Munoz, Rudolph Pina, Toledo.
Svande, Kennard Errol, Fremont.

Marine Corps

Askam, Robert Eugene, Tiffin.
Barnitz, Douglas Wanner, Columbus.
Bloomfield, William David, Springfield.
Broughton, Robert Ballard, Cleveland.
Copley, Bruce, Shelby.
Core, Derrick, Dayton.
Garrard, Jessie Jerome, Bellevue.
Horvath, Wayne Stanley, Amherst.
Kolter, Bruce, Wapakoneta.
Kuhn, Charles Edward, Jr., North Canton.
McClelland, George Dennis, Toronto.
Pucci, Daniel Louis, Berea.
Speakman, Richard Paul, Jr., Williamsport.

OKLAHOMA

Azlin, Luke Junior, Heavener.
Brightman, Donald Lavoyce, Ardmore.
Forney, Dennis Ray, Duncan.
Hargrove, Teddy Earl, Watonga.
Harrison, Buffard Clifton, Terral.
Janto, Paul Chalmers, Altus Air Force Base.
Keahey, Carl John, III, Midwest City.
Lawson, Tommy Ross, Arapaho.
Myers, James Howard, Westville.
Parker, Danny Lynn, Oklahoma City.
Pulley, James Edward, Idabel.
Sales, Harlis Calvin, Chickasha.
Shaw, Ronnie Dean, Comanche.
Smith, Albert Joseph, Anadarko.
Sneed, Carl Michael, Tulsa.

Air Force

East, James Boyd, Oklahoma City.

Marine Corps

Akins, Donald Wayne, Spiro.
Bear, Charles Martin, Newport.
Chambers, Loranze Paul, Tulsa.
Day, Clinton Lee, Tulsa.
Robirds, Patrick Dale, Duncan.
Smith, James Howell, Oklahoma City.
Steele, David Mark, Comanche.
Wilson, Wayne Michael, Beaver.

OREGON

Army

Barrow, Michael Edward, Portland.
Curry, Roy Jerry, Gresham.
De Sully, Max Francis, Jr., Portland.
Hassler, Harvey Joe, Monmouth.
Holman, Richard Jerome, Astoria.
Loew, David William, Eugene.
Moore, Lonnie Dean, Lebanon.
Morelock, Rex Dewey, Jr., North Plains.

Marine Corps

Boyer, Michael David, Portland.
Peck, Darrell Vernon, Medford.

Navy

Cavanagh, Michael Howard, Coos Bay.

PENNSYLVANIA

Army

Aaron, Thomas Milton, Jr., Linwood.
Ambrogi, Allen Robert, Finleyville.
Breski, Joseph, Jr., Kittanning.

Callahan, David Patrick, Erie.
 Engelmeier, James Francis, Pittsburgh.
 Galkowski, James Leonard, Wattsburg.
 Gernert, Edward Harry, Quentin.
 Hagins, Grey Lynn, Johnstown.
 Higgins, Merle Robert, Mercer.
 Hill, Gerald Ray, Linwood.
 Hunsinger, Charles Edward, Alliquippa.
 Jamison, Ernest Cecil, Philadelphia.
 Kelley, Louis James, Conemaugh.
 Laninger, Leon Laverne, Gillett.
 Marchand, Thomas Michael, West Chester.
 Mastramico, Phillip, Monaca.
 Maynard, Bruce Calvin, Coudersport.
 Newell, Craig Allen, Philadelphia.
 Notich, Anthony Michael, Lloydell.
 Rabinovitz, Barry Ivan, Pittsburgh.
 Resinger, Dennis Michael, Dubois.
 Rice, Calvin Charles, Jr., York.
 Ruttle, Robert Preston, Jr., Hatboro.
 Schaeffer, Paul Henry, Coraopolis.
 Scott, Leroy Harry, Ebensburg.
 Shakley, Gerald Wayne, East Brady.
 Shober, Timothy Allen, Ephrata.
 Strathmann, Thomas William, Beaver Falls.
 Susmarski, Kenneth John, Erie.
 Thurston, Daniel Tucker, Ambler.
 Ulrich, Ray Leonard, Milton.
 Wall, Albert Charles, Jr., Philadelphia.
 Warner, Michael Patrick, Philadelphia.
 Wensel, Milford Homer, Monument.

Marine Corps

Gontero, Robert Clyde, Lutherburg.
 Hackett, William Clayton, Lewistown.
 Keller, Richard Alden, Easton.
 Kuhn, Andrew Alan, Ambler.
 Patton, David Alan, Philadelphia.
 Reed, George Joseph, Jr., Philadelphia.
 Werts, Gregory Ira, Philadelphia.

Navy

Staff, John Stanley, Belle Vernon.

RHODE ISLAND

Army

McKenzie, Richard Douglas, Warwick.

Marine Corps

Bosco, Frank Joseph, Providence.
 Hulme, John William, Pawtucket.
 Nelson, Daniel Raymond, Coventry.
 Schanck, William G., Jr., Chepachet.

SOUTH CAROLINA

Army

Brickle, Donald Lever, Cope.
 Campbell, Billy Wayne, Columbia.
 Hopkins, Mylon Ray, Mauldin.
 Jennings, Robert Lee, Bradley.
 Joe, Willie Lee, Bishopville.
 Meetze, Dennis Ray, Lexington.
 Page, Phillip Allen, Greenville.
 Priest, John Henry, Jr., Greenville.
 Rawls, Charles Glenn, Chester.
 Robinson, Charles Henry, Greenville.
 Taylor, Preston, Jr., Sumter.
 White, Melvin Elijah, Windsor.
 Williams, Clark Lee Vern, Early Branch.

Air Force

Gilmore, James Robson, Jr., Columbia.

Marine Corps

Madden, Leon Shirley, Clinton.
 Revell, William James, III, Florence.
 White, Leon, Frogmore.

SOUTH DAKOTA

Army

Baltezore, Theodore Ellis, Gettysburg.
 Barbee, Larry Hulan, Harrold.
 Beckers, John Paul, Burke.
 Brech, Richard Lee, Cottonwood.
 Haider, James Francis, Watertown.
 Hatle, Theodore Magnus, Sisseton.
 Jealous-of-Him, Frank W., Wounded Knee.
 Kjellerson, Myron Dale, Huron.
 Labahn, Darwin Lyn, Burke.
 Miller, Richard Lee, Plankinton.
 Rada, Terry Gene, Geddes.

Marine Corps

Recker, Robert Vincent, Sherman.

TENNESSEE

Army

Burns, Rondal Lee, Hixson.
 Conner, Kenneth Lee, Dover.
 Crabtree, Harvey C., Jr., Loudon.
 Delaney, Donney, Memphis.
 Johnson, Edward, Memphis.
 Jones, Emanuel, Jr., Chattanooga.
 Lucero, James Clifford, Dover.
 Malone, William Franklin, Afton.
 Oliver, Bobby Glenn, Knoxville.
 Rhodes, John David, III, Louisville.

Marine Corps

Ashburn, Ronald Wayne, Nashville.
 Bell, David Lynn, Kingston.
 Dawson, Michael David, Knoxville.
 Martin, Robert Thomas, Jr., Memphis.
 McCarter, Jerry, Sevierville.

TEXAS

Army

Becker, Walter Ward, Beaumont.
 Burton, James Billy, Gordonville.
 Buzzard, Lloyd Lynn, Spearman.
 Camargo, Juan Hipolito, Plainview.
 Cameron, Gerald Wayne, Houston.
 Carr, George Dare, Corpus Christi.
 Castillo, Antonio Gonzales, San Antonio.
 Contreras, Valeriano David, El Paso.
 Crisp, Jimmy Wayne, Menard.
 Dalley, Jerry Michael, Groves.
 Fleitman, Glenn Ray, Muenster.
 Forbes, Michael, Dallas.
 Garcia, Joe Robert, Austin.
 Gardner, Phillip D., Odessa.
 Gargus, Roy Phillip, Lancaster.
 Geurin, Stephen Burl, Amarillo.
 Gibner, George Thomas, Spearman.
 Gonzales, Paul Gutierrez, Lubbock.
 Grant, Robert Lee, Dallas.
 Johnson, Adrian Joseph, Jr., El Paso.
 Jones, Gary Allen, Fort Worth.
 King, Charles Lewis, Prosper.
 Knadler, Robert Stanley, San Angelo.
 Matlock, William Travis, Nacogdoches.
 Melendez, Humberto C. E., El Paso.
 Minor, Armando Alvarez, Crosbyton.
 Mitchell, Malcolm Everett, Waco.
 Mitchell, Torrance, Jr., Houston.
 Narvaez, Paul Reyes, San Antonio.
 Perry, Roddie Lee, Dallas.
 Phillips, Johnny Wendell, Eustace.
 Pilsner, Johnny Mack, Alletton.
 Plumlee, James Leo, Jr., El Paso.
 Prado, Guadalupe, Jr., Mercedes.
 Ramsey, Charles Marlin, New Boston.
 Salazar, Arturo, Laredo.
 Sanders, Alan Earl, Corpus Christi.
 Snell, Robert Michael, Lamesa.
 Stearns, Harrel Earl, Nacogdoches.
 Stover, Clarence Moody, Jr., Cleburne.
 Stuckey, Benny Davis, Longview.
 Tamez, Noe, Edinburg.
 Urdialez, Ruben, San Antonio.
 Vargas, Jorge, Mission.
 Welch, Norman Gene, Splendora.
 White, Larry Joe, Houston.

Air Force

Loftis, Joel Conrad, La Marque.
 McDonald, Billy Wallace, Marneal.
 Reed, Terry Michael, Randolph Air Force Base.

Marine Corps

Cabarubio, James, Odessa.
 Edmund, Edward Joseph, San Marcos.
 Garcia, Jose, Jr., San Antonio.
 Griffin, Walter Joe Louis, Hawkins.
 Martin, Larry Wayne, Liberty.
 Miramontez, Enrique, Anthony.
 Ochoa, Alfredo, Jr., El Paso.
 Pena, Manuel Juan, Corpus Christi.
 Rodriguez, Manuel, Jr., Clint.
 Salazar, Jose Luis, Corpus Christi.
 Smith, Deane Franklin, Jr., Amarillo.
 Trevino, Savas Escamilla, Dallas.
 Ulloa, Hugo Hector, El Paso.

UTAH

Army

Harker, Jack Albert, Jr., Bountiful.
 Jennings, Jim Frank, Paungitch.

Kerkhoff, Richard Lee, Salt Lake City.
 Walker, Henson Frank, Pleasant Grove.
 Wilkey, Blair Cecil, Nephi.

Marine Corps

Welch, Gregory John, Salt Lake City.

VERMONT

Army

Delaney, Richard Lawrence, Essex.
 Thompson, Francis Lloyd, Chelsea.

VIRGINIA

Army

Bartley, Don Laverne, Rockbridge Baths.
 Bryant, Thomas Melvin, Richmond.
 Craig, John Phillip, Roanoke.
 Deel, Stoney Lee, Prater.
 Dunham, Bruce Joel, McLean.
 Gregory, Sherman William, Ruther Glen.
 Grubb, Steve Freeman, Faber.
 Heriot, Theodore S., Jr., Herndon.
 Ingram, Jimmy Anderson, Nathalie.
 Johnson, Lorenzo Raynard, Vienna.
 Korel, Emery Louis, Virginia Beach.
 Landman, Thomas Paul, Richmond.
 Manuel, Jesse Stephen, Jr., Wytheville.
 Minor, Calvin M., Culpeper.
 Moore, John Marshall, Jr., Emporia.
 Robertson, Ronald Edward, Madison Heights.
 Slaughter, Harvey Newton, Portsmouth.
 Thomas, Wilson Decosta, South Hill.
 Wapinski, Daniel Keith, Norfolk.
 Weiss, Richard Earl, Falls Church.

Marine Corps

Bowlin, Paul Madison, Arlington.
 Tyson, Stuart Hanckel, Norfolk.
 Walker, Clovis Bernard, Martinsville.

WASHINGTON

Army

Asbury, David Charles, Foley.
 Bethea, Troy, Seattle.
 Brady, James Patrick, Issaquah.
 Burchett, Timothy Gordon, Spokane.
 Enrico, Enrique Thomas, Bellevue.
 Green, Charles Dee, Richland.
 Nickerson, Philip Eugene, Edmonds.
 Olsen, Kelth, Kelso.
 Reed, Jimmie Lynn, Tacoma.
 Thompson, John Franklin, Tacoma.
 Trusley, Jasper H., Jr., Pasco.

Marine Corps

Blackford, John Melvin, Tacoma.
 Briggs, James Raymond, Everett.
 Cruz, Frank, Yakima.
 Everett, Stanley Oliver, Spokane.
 Graham, Wendell John M., Jr., Seattle.
 Holmawn, Adam, Jr., Wenatchee.
 Lomen, Ralph Terrance, Seattle.
 Oden, Royal Preston, Spokane.

Navy

Underwood, Perry Luke, Rolling Bay.

WEST VIRGINIA

Army

Adkins, Bobby Ray, Mud.
 Franzinger, Kurt Walter, Jr., Martinsburg.
 Martin, Larry Raymond, Charleston.
 Ramey, Roy Lindsey, Huntington.
 Sell, Joseph Wayne, Jr., Fairmont.
 Simpson, Roger Lee, Belington.
 Smith, Wilbur Allen, Bomont.
 Walker, Roy Leacy, Brenton.
 Wells, Michael Alonzo, Enterprise.

Air Force

Dickens, Jackie Lee, Danville.

Marine Corps

Blankenship, Jackie Lee, Bluefield.
 Lockhart, Robert Lee, Parkersburg.

WISCONSIN

Army

Ashburn, Jerry Allen, Port Edwards.
 Asher, James Louis, Elmwood.
 Bach, Lyman Conrad, Medford.
 Bellile, William Marvin, New London.
 Blumer, Kris, Albany.
 Essmann, Robert Charles, Fond du Lac.
 Faber, Thomas Walter, Wilson.

Griesen, Thomas Andrew, Madison.
 Haukeness, Glenn S., Jr., Strum.
 Lubeno, Jerome Deane, Trevor.
 Morneau, Jerome Dale, Neillsville.
 Nichols, Jerry Allen, Portage.
 North, John Alex, Germantown.
 Noth, Wayne Louis, Tomah.
 Proveaux, Richard Blaine, Milwaukeee.
 Tuinstra, Dennis, Racine.
 Utegaard, Thomas Harold, Eau Claire.

Air Force

Brunner, Gary Edward, Racine.

Marine Corps

Ahrens, James John, Green Bay.
 Beneshak, Frederick Lee, Antigo.
 Campbell, Giovanni Henry, Milwaukeee.

Marine Corps

Jenkins, Clayton Dean, Pembine.
 Krzmarcik, John Edward, Wausau.
 Nicholson, Larry James, Hartford.
 Pamoucutt, Martin James, Neopit.
 Thomas, Wayne Roy, Milwaukeee.
 Zahn, William Francis, Jr., Milwaukeee.

WYOMING

Army

Aldrich, John Herrick, Sheridan.
 Cardenas, Leroy Robert, Casper.
 Wilson, William Michael, Boulder.

GUAM

Army

Finney, Harold James, Jr., Asan.

PUERTO RICO

Army

Ayala-Reyes, Wilfredo, Rio Grande.
 Figueroa, Juan Javier, Villa-Nueva.
 Gomez-Robles, Tomas, Caguas.
 Lopez-Merced, Ruben, Guaynabo.
 Mendez-Matos, Jorge Luis, Isabela.
 Padilla-Jorge, Jaime, Mayaguez.

VIRGIN ISLANDS

Army

Hurtault, Cutburt, St. Thomas.

DEATHS RESULTING FROM HOSTILE ACTION IN
VIETNAM IN JULY 1969

ALABAMA

Army

Evans, Rodney Joseph, Florida.
 Hall, Byron Royce, Henagar.
 Parker, Johnny Kendrick, Bay Minette.
 Peterson, Julius Lee, Birmingham.
 Raspberry, Lawrence, Fairfield.
 Terry, Bill Henry, Jr., Birmingham.

Marine Corps

Beasley, George Hutchinson, Montgomery.
 Suttle, William Earl, Prattville.

Navy

Keene, Glen Cameron, Jr., Fairhope.

ARIZONA

Army

Villalobos, Henry Estrella, Phoenix.

ARKANSAS

Army

Cantrell, Jerry Dale, III, Benton.
 Etheridge, Hampton A., III, Crossett.
 Fudge, John T., Little Rock.
 Gilliam, Terry Lynn, Huntsville.
 Hamby, Jackie Dwayne, Bond.
 Lavender, Richard Allen, Little Rock.
 Mathews, Henry Don, Rogers.
 McGinnis, Robert Ray, Jonesboro.
 Sims, William Jess, Compton.

Navy

Hackworth, Charles Lehman, Imboden.

CALIFORNIA

Army

Bartholomew, Michael M., San Francisco.
 Bertagna, Lawrence Joseph, Round Mountain.
 Beverford, Timothy Wayne, Los Angeles.

Bliner, John Edward, Santa Clara.
 Bruner, Mark Leroy, Rio Dell.
 Buckles, Richard Lee, Pacific Grove.
 Carter, Leslie Dean, Jr., Campbell.
 Casey, Daniel Gene, Concord.
 Chiacchio, Joseph S., Jr., Glendale.
 Cisneros, Jose B., Baldwin Park.
 De Marcus, Jerry Dennis, San Diego.
 Delgado, Jose Alejandro, Los Angeles.
 Driscoll, John Raymond, III, San Mateo.
 Enriquez, Lucas R., Milpitas.
 Fladger, Ralph Samuel, Garden Grove.
 Floyd, Garland Dale, El Sobrante.
 Gardiner, Robert Paul, Anaheim.
 Gomolick, Leonard Michael, Cupertino.
 Greville, Leonard George, Crescent City.
 Grove, Cardell, Compton.
 Harrell, Stephen Carl, Sunland.
 Herbst, Thomas William, Northridge.
 Holean, Ronald Steven, Santa Monica.
 Hubbard, Alfred Willie, Florence.
 Huebner, Herman Henry, Reedley.
 Huerta, Tommy, Los Angeles.
 Krom, Michael Lee, Twain.
 Larson, Richard Kemp, Santa Ana.
 Maier, David Roy, Long Beach.
 Matthews, Bernard Julian, North Hollywood.

McNelly, William Robert, Ft. Mason.
 Mitchell, Michael Thomas, Pittsburg.
 Motley, Larry Keith, French Camp.
 Newman, Dennis Earl, Monrovia.
 Nunnally, Timothy Craig, Pico Rivera.
 O'Keefe, Robert William, Davis.
 Olmos, Alfonso, Pico Rivera.
 Pearlstein, Jerrold S., Los Angeles.
 Proctor, William C., Jr., Burbank.
 Reed, Gary Walton, Eureka.
 Reyes, Henry R., Porterville.
 Rizzo, Robert Charles, Santa Clara.
 Rodriguez, Joe Ignacio, San Jose.
 Rogers, Michael Fredrick, San Bernardino.
 Ruebel, Joseph Peter, Los Angeles.
 Sato, Takeshi, Port Hueneme.
 Smith, Jackie Lee, Barstow.
 Sotelo, Luis Alonzo, Tulare.
 Terrazas, Juan Luis, Los Angeles.
 Torres, Raymond, La Mesa.
 Tryon, Lee, Jr., San Diego.
 Weekley, Clifford Wayne, Bellflower.

Air Force

Flinn, John Leroy, San Diego.
 Sizemore, James Elmo, San Diego.

Marine Corps

Anderson, William Olin, Pacoima.
 Dowdell, Stephen, Alhambra.
 Garcia, Arnold Falcon, Moorpark.
 Hamilton, Glenn Anthony, Los Angeles.
 Martinez, Ernie Robles, Fremont.
 Meeks, Charles Henry, Jr., Los Angeles.
 Pearson, John Howard, San Mateo.
 Rocha, Feliciano, Los Angeles.
 Sandoval, Alan Paul, Lomita.
 Sparks, Henry Eugene, Los Angeles.
 Storm, Ralph Dorman, Union City.
 Whiting, Malcolm D., III, Granada Hills.
 Wright, Silas Clifton, Eureka.

Navy

Easton, Robert Glenn, Granada Hills.

COLORADO

Army

Duran, Alfonso Marquez, Colorado Springs.
 Rendon, Joseph, Pueblo.
 Sheehan, Daniel Moreland, Aurora.
 Thomas, Ronald Gene, Denver.

Marine Corps

Fogg, David Edward, Yampa.
 Fuller, Thomas Lee, Northglenn.

CONNECTICUT

Army

Argenta, Allen Charles, Watertown.
 Black, Harry Elsworth, Willimantic.
 Edwards, Paul William, Bridgeport.
 Ericson, William F., II, Roxbury.
 Fabrisi, Paul Eugene, Naugatuck.
 Fowler, Claudie, New London.
 Manning, James Holden, Haddam.

Manning, John Warren, Granby.
 Morascini, John V., North Windham.
 Pascale, George John, New Haven.
 White, Oscar Lee, Carr.

DELAWARE

Army

Geissinger, Alan Gwinn, Newark.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Army

Artis, Vernon Daryle, Washington.

Marine Corps

DuCharm, Paul Medore, Washington.
 Shelton, Edward Lee, Washington.

FLORIDA

Army

Allen, Edwin Charles, Tampa.
 Barfield, Jerry, Dania.
 Beck, Martin Robert, Gainesville.
 Brooks, Steven Karl, Dade City.
 Clotfelter, Mark Dennis, Hialeah.
 Cremer, Ronald Marvin, Miami.
 Cummins, Steven Travis, Eau Gallie.
 Denton, Gregory, John D., Tampa.
 Dukes, Thomas Lester, Jacksonville.
 Gormican, David C. Ft. Lauderdale.
 Harper, Tony, Jacksonville.
 Jones, Ervin, Tallahassee.
 Knowles, James D., Riviera Beach.
 Martino, Thomas Joseph, Tampa.
 McNabb, Richard Dale, Hialeah.
 Poff, Jerry Wayne, Deland.
 Sikes, Charles Michael, Kissimmee.
 Wall, James Neil, Live Oak.

Marine Corps

Brown, Benjamin Freeman, Jr., Jacksonville.

Greco, Steven James, Sanford.
 McClain, Fred Julous, Jacksonville.
 Sprinkle, Michael Duane, Pensacola.

GEORGIA

Army

Anderson, John Ernest, Columbus.
 Baker, Elbert James, Jr., Quitman.
 Brooks, Thomas, Jr., Augusta.
 Daniel, James Robert, Atlanta.
 Farmer, Bobby Gene, Monroe.
 Ford, Charles Edward, Claxton.
 Lewis, Robert Alan, Moultrie.
 Motes, James Jackson, Columbus.
 Parker, Perlum M., Jr., Atlanta.
 Phelps, Herbert Lee, Valdosta.
 Russell, Patrick Anthony, Savannah.
 Singletary, Roy Lee, Newton.

Marine Corps

Ballew, Henry, Jr., Atlanta.
 Elrod, David Lamar, Decatur.
 Haugabook, Willie Clarence, Marshallville.
 Marion Curtis, Alma.
 Tuggle, Lorenzo, Winder.

HAWAII

Army

Andrade, Robert D., Makawad.
 Fujita, Melvin Schoichi, Honolulu.
 Pangan, Robert Rogello, Ewa.
 Quinones, Julio, Jr., Honolulu.
 Sibayan, Franklin Daniel, Waipahu.

Marine Corps

Root, Thomas Richard, Waipahu.

IDAHO

Army

Clark, Conn Kay, Rigby.
 Ireland, Elmer Glenn, Star.

ILLINOIS

Army

Blanchfield, Michael R., Arlington Heights.
 Calkins, Cody Ray, Oglesby.
 Clare, Richard Steven, Chicago.
 Cutler, Richard Allen, Sherrard.
 Dallape, Terry Lee, East Alton.
 England, Richard Alan, Girard.
 Finn, Michael Blake, South Wilmington.

Helm, William Carroll, Cerro Gordo.
Hoffman, Robert Allen, Wheeling.
Javorchik, John Charles, Nashville.
Karas, Walter, Chicago.
Kobor, Frank Louis, Chicago.
Ortmann, Ralph Bernard, Germantown.
Reatherford, Larry Rex, Peoria.
Runser, Robert Joseph, Liberty.
Schoonveld, Richard Jay, Evergreen Park.
Schwidorski, Richard Dean, Henry.
Shaw, Kris Edward, Rockford.
Sullivan, Benjamin Joseph, Granite City.
Wellinghoff, Ralph Alvin, New Baden.
Work, George Allen, Evergreen Park.

Marine Corps

Albert, William David, Posen.
Fordham, John La Verne, Sheffield.
Grensback, Theodore E., Jr., Chicago.
Rogers, Willis, Jr., Chicago.
Tabor, Claude Edward, Salem.
Tate, Gary Denton, Decatur.

INDIANA

Army

Bedell, James Wayne, Vincennes.
Berry, Kurtis Aurel, Ft. Wayne.
Bickel, Barry Wayne, Logansport.
Dennis, Daniel Maurice, New Haven.
Dipert, Marvin Lee, Plymouth.
Eutsler, Johnny Neil, Anderson.
Glassburn, Joe Richard, Kokomo.
Godbey, Samuel Edward, Ligonier.
Karas, William James, Greenwood.
Morton, Gary Ray, Winslow.
Nagy, Steven, Hammond.
Osborn, Barry Lee, Brownsburg.
Sinnott, Daniel Bernard, Richmond.
Withee, James Montgomery, La Porte.

Marine Corps

Criswell, George David, Monticello.
Heroy, Dewey William, South Bend.
McDaniel, John Thomas, Clarksville.
Walters, Michael, Delphi.

IOWA

Army

Barker, William Gayland, Des Moines.
Bingham, Dennis William, Chariton.
Buchanan, Ronald Ivan, Sioux City.
Bunn, Jerry Arthur, Muscatine.
Deutsch, Bernard Francis, Ionia.
Franken, Arlin Dale, Sioux Center.
Havlik, Richard Allan, Elma.
Johnson, Larry Howard, Decorah.
Peterson, Anthony Earl, Mason City.

Air Force

Picking, Franklin William, Cedar Rapids.

Marine Corps

Benson, Albert DuWard, Sidney.
Smith, Frank George, Des Moines.

KANSAS

Army

Bradbury, Steven Wayne, Wichita.
Bray, Ralph Oscar, Jr., Olathe.
Drouhard, Peter August, Wichita.
Herriman, Ronnie Lee, Marquette.
Wilson, Rodney David, Topeka.

Marine Corps

Belden, Larry Gene, Esbon.
Cunningham, Carl Edwin, Neosho Rapids.
Lackey, Jack Vernon, Jr., Iuka.
Lewis, Jessie Roy, Wichita.

KENTUCKY

Army

Bailey, John Spencer, Jr., Glasgow.
Barnes, Thomas Jackson, Jr., Elizabeth-
town.
Buttry, David Eugene, Berea.
Gentry, Bobby Lee, Winchester.
Pierrman, Raymond Lee, Louisville.
Smith, James Howard, Leitchfield.
Watts, Floyd, Watts.

Air Force

Dawson, James Vernon, Ashland.

Marine Corps

Hammons, Philip, Covington.

LOUISIANA

Army

Cassaway, Ambrose, Fisher.
Dedon, Charles Berlin, Livingston.
Grant, Wesley O'Neal, Coushatta.
Greer, Ralph Jerry, Gilbert.
Harris, Calvin, Rosedale.
Hazelton, Herman, Forest Hill.
Key, Richard John, Houma.
Mahl, Kenneth Arthur, New Orleans.
Martin, William Torbert, Lake Charles.
Uptigrove, Jesse, Bastrop.
Warwick, Duncan Albert, Leesville.
Woods, Durel Steven, New Orleans.

Marine Corps

Johnson, Charles Edward, Opelousas.

MAINE

Army

Corriveau, Richard Thomas, Fort Kent.
Geneseo, Louis J., Harrison.
Mace, Dana Leroy, Caribou.
Olsen, William Frank, Portland.

Marine Corps

Chavarie, Norman Joseph, Augusta.
Dellsle, Rodney Jerome, Waterville.
Porter, Steven Lindsey, Presque Isle.

MARYLAND

Army

Cymbalski, Kenneth Julian, Rockville.
Kelley, Joseph Howard, Monkton.
Neville, Anthony Andrew, Hyattsville.
Ward, James Patrick, Bethesda.
Williams, Samuel Louis, Jr., Laurel.

Marine Corps

Mangum, Theodore Edward, Jr., Silver
Spring.
Shegogue, Robert Stephen, La Plata.

MASSACHUSETTS

Army

Cardona, Ronald William, Gardner.
Denton, Randall Morris, Lawrence.
Deyermond, Warren Charles, Andover.
Dwyer, Thomas Richard, Cambridge.
Gerry, Peter James, Quincy.

Marine Corps

Coulombe, Francis Joseph, Gardner.
Ingersoll, David Paul, Waltham.
Keefe, Martin Russell, Quincy.
Sheehan, Paul Henry, Boston.
St. Pierre, Michael Leonard, New Bedford.

MICHIGAN

Army

Bass, William Thomas, Jr., Detroit.
Bryan, Larry Michael, Highland.
Cabala, Duane Jacob, Midland.
Chalou, Ronald David, Mount Clemens.
Clime, Ralph John, Marcellus.
Collins, Thomas Russell, Jr., Taylor.
Cudlike, Charles Joseph, Detroit.
Dion, Thomas James, Grosse Pointe Farm.
Emeigh, Michael George, Port Huron.
Gasco, David Max, Flint.
Holupko, Lon Michael, Detroit.
Hulburt, Thomas Willard, Byron Center.
Johnson, Paul Edward, Flint.
Keil, Duane Richard, Adrian.
Leach, James Edward, Detroit.
Martinez, Reynaldo, Lansing.
McGovern, Patrick Edward, Southgate.
Mitchell, Robert E., Jr., Temperance.
Mosley, John Charles, Detroit.
Richardson Marvin Keith, Hudson.
Russell, David Paul, Jackson.
Slanaker, Robert Jay, Detroit.
Tear, George Bernard, Wyandotte.
Thibault, James William, Anchorville.
Tinker, Gary Lynn, Detroit.
Tobie, David Carl, Livonia.
Troyan, Michael Joseph, Jr., Dearborn.
Urban, Alexander John, Jr., Grand Rapids.
Yelley, Danny Keith, Wyandotte.
Yost, Russell Charles, Flat Rock.

Marine Corps

Clifford, George Henry, Grand Rapids.
Gasser, James Edward, Detroit.

Luster, Larry, Detroit.
Ulrickson, Peter Edward, Ishpeming.
Vorenkamp, David R., Kalamazoo.

MINNESOTA

Army

Jett, Ronald Gene, Champlin.
Johnson, Charles Walter, Minneapolis.
Klukas, Bradley Wilfred, Winthrop.
Mahowald, Michael Allen, Minneapolis.
Meulebroeck, Kenneth John, Murdock.
Polzin, Henry Clarence, New Ulm.
Riddle, Larry Lynn, Minneapolis.
Sires, Robert John, Spring Grove.
Wood, Robert Harold, Fairmont.

Air Force

McCarthy, Thomas Hubert, Wabasso.

Marine Corps

Anderson, Bruce Carlyle, Birchdale.
Proue, James Thomas, St. Paul.

Navy

Colton, Michael Norris, Alexandria.

MISSISSIPPI

Army

Amos, James Albert, Grenada.
Burkett, Elijah Wallace, Hattiesburg.
Delaney, Albert Lee, Greenwood.
Sistrunk, Candy Lewis, Sebastopol.
Spillivan, Daniel, Liberty.
Williamson, Edward Larue, Benoit.

MISSOURI

Army

Armhein, Herbert Franklin, St. Louis.
Baum, Rory Michael, Creve Coeur.
Blake, Richard Thomas, Malden.
Burruano, Samuel Vincent, St. Louis.
Chittwood, James Phillip, Raytown.
Eldson, Ronald Lee, Marshall.
Hupp, Richard Lewis, Jr., Pagedale.
Ives, Phillip Thomas, Valley Park.
Luebker, Bernard Michael, St. Louis.
Martens, Stanley Wayne, Concordia.
O'Hara, James Loyd, Warsaw.
Renne, Myron Keith, Glasgow.
Stockbauer, Charles Thomas, St. Joseph.

Marine Corps

Gish, Benny Thomas, Springfield.
Loyd, Melvin, St. Louis.
Ward, Leroy, St. Louis.

MONTANA

Army

Langaunet, Bruce Magnus, Missoula.
Stembridge, Wayland Dan, Anaconda.

Marine Corps

Srb, Ervin Rynolt, Jr., Great Falls.

NEBRASKA

Army

Crumley, Eldon Gene, Lincoln.
Hempel, Thomas Eugene, Lincoln.
Hunter, Henry David, Omaha.
Kotrc, James Carl, Omaha.
Ruhter, Michael Allen, Minden.

Marine Corps

Bragg, Paul Joseph, Omaha.
Harris, John Henry, Jr., Greeley.

Navy

Smiley, Stanley Kutz, Sidney.

NEVADA

Army

Hagemeler, Thomas Vance, Las Vegas.

Marine Corps

Carter, Timothy Gene, Ely.

Navy

Fransen, Albert Merk, Jr., Las Vegas.

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Army

Lorden, Dennis Franklin, Nashua.

NEW JERSEY

Army

Ackerman, David Foley, Summit.
Anderson, Steve, Newark.

Bacon, Robert Franklin, Phillipsburg.
Coley, Bruce Edward, Freehold.
Halsey, MacDonald Brooke, Summit.
Hayward, Arnold Courtney, Trenton.
Humes, Frank William, Magnolia.
Johnson, James Allen, Jersey City.
Konyu, William Michael, Phillipsburg.
Layton, Robert Allen, Jr., Carneys Point.
Morrighi, Joseph, Garfield.
Sydor, Dennis William, Jersey City.
Vars, Jonathan R., Cherry Hill.
Viehmman, George John, Jr., Vineland.

Marine Corps

Smith, Geoffrey Stephen, Cedar Grove.

NEW MEXICO

Army

Bloomfield, Norman Hubert, Ramah.
Martinez, Alex Ezequiel, Ranchos de Taos.

NEW YORK

Army

Aiken, Larry Delarnard, Jamaica.
Allen, Dean Brooks, Delmar.
Baranowski, Bishop Skip, Cortland.
Beverly, Francis M., Jamaica.
Bonventre, Thomas S., Elmont.
Braithwaite, Arnim N., New York.
Brathwaite, Roger Clayton, New York.
Burt, William Robert, Jr., New York.
Cornwell, John Bruce, Silver Creek.
Daly, Richard Vincent, New York.
Fernhoff, Curtiss, Flushing.
Fry, George Harold, Pavillon.
Hyman, William Alton, Jamaica.
Klotz, Michael Peter, Hudson.
Lee, James Howard, Lockport.
Levato, Frank, New York.
Lyons, Thomas Joseph, Jamaica.
Marasco, Joseph Allen, Somers.
McGrath, Daniel William, Levittown.
Michael, Timothy Shawn, Cicero.
Miller, Cecil Vernon, New York.
Moody, Stephen True, Malverne.
Motto, Thomas Nicholas, Mineola.
Petsos, Phillip Chris, Rochester.
Reggio, Gerard Michael, Point Jefferson Station.
Rivera, Santos, Jr., New York.
Roe, John Phelen, Clinton.
Rountree, Harvey F., Jr., New York.
Santiago, Felipe Obed, New York.
Sisley, William Edward, Angola.
Taisler, Joseph Andrew, Woodside.
Thibodeau, Wallate Fred, Kingston.
Thibou, Allan Courtney, New York.
Williams, Amos Levern, New York.

Marine Corps

Armenio, Robert William, New York.
Cornish, Larry Irving, Canandaigua.
Crudo, Richard Frank, East Meadow.
Diakow, Robert, New York.
Gladney, John Willie, Albany.
Hoppough, Dennis Karl, Rochester.
Jimenez, Anastacio, New York.
Kitson, John Francis, Levittown.
Lackner, Michael Alexander, Deer Park.
Morka, Peter Joseph, New York.
Seiler, William Joseph, Rochester.
Sroka, John Michael, Jr., Clark Mills.
Valle, Hector, New York.

Navy

Caprio, Michael James, Vestal.
Moore, Robert Victor, Cortland.

NORTH CAROLINA

Army

Covington, Donald Lincoln, Hamlet.
Crocker, James Norrie, Jr., Hubert.
Daniels, James Richard, Clinton.
Gainger, John B., Thomasville.
Garner, William Roger, Burlington.
Greene, Ronnie Gene, Newland.
Hughes, Charles Wayne, Edenton.
Johnston, Jack Craven, Jr., Charlotte.
Jones, Wilbert Eugene, Eden.
King, Johnny Lee, Sanford.
Leazer, Abbie Eugene, Huntersville.
McKoy, Larry D., Coats.
Revis, Hugh Edward, Old Fort.

Shaffner, David Wayne, Jonesville.
Shirley, Carl Douglas, High Point.
Smith, Charles Earl, Durham.
Smith, Curtis Dwaine, Bessemer City.
Steele, William Davis, Belmont.
Vick, Albert, Jr., Goldsboro.
Webb, Michael Dean, Marion.
Young, Colon David, Hickory.

Marine Corps

Fletcher, Donald Edward, Mount Airy.

NORTH DAKOTA

Army

Fleck, Wilbert Clemens, Brelen.
Foreman, Roger Earl, New Town.
Kelly, John Edward, Jr., Bismarck.
Mueller, Wesley Erwin, Jamestown.

Marine Corps

Renner, John Michael, Mandan.

OHIO

Army

Bobo, William Charles, Toledo.
Brown, Arthur Daniel, Lancaster.
Carson, Russell Berton, Greentown.
Chandler, Charles Perry, Dayton.
Clark, James Lee, Millersburg.
Collins, David Jim, Cleveland.
Cook, Earl Lloyd, Washington Court House.
Dennull, Edward Michael, Lewisburg.
Felt, Richard Wayne, Maumee.
Hawkins, Terry Lee, Waterville.
Hisey, John Edwin, Marysville.
Huff, Ray Gene, Hinckley.
Johnson, Thomas Willene, London.
Lawson, Roger Dale, Columbia Station.
McCoy, Bobby Lee, Toledo.
McPike, James Edwin, Lakewood.
Middleton, Teddy Eugene, Mason.
Reynolds, Leslie, Jr., McArthur.
Rigdon, William Francis, Manchester.
Rose, Jerry Gene, Cleveland.
Rose, Thomas Elden, Findlay.
Scott, Michael, Columbus.
Semeraro David Alexander, Niles.
Sheen, William Edward, Hanoverton.
Sizemore, Thomas Jefferson, Beaver.

Marine Corps

Ellis, Robert Lee, Youngstown.
Esterly, Lawrence Alan, Lisbon.
Fletcher, Robert Wendell, Lorain.
Geuy, James Robert, Bellefontaine.
Hansley, Timothy Wharton, Rockbridge.
Parker, Leon Victor, Hamilton.
Runzo, Richard Francis, Beloit.
Scharf, Ronald James, Kenton.
Sonneberger, Richard G., Carrollton.

OKLAHOMA

Army

Butts, George Lessie, Oklahoma City.
Gainer, John Robert, Broken Arrow.
Lakey, Howard Wallace, Oklahoma City.
Landrum, James Alford, Fort Gibson.
Lindberg, John David, Oklahoma City.
Reynolds, Eldon Lee, Weatherford.
Scrogum, Jimmie Charles, Okmulgee.
Stephens, Curtis Adron, Boise City.
Ward, Leonard Daniel, Broken Bow.
West, Jimmy Don, Duncan.

Navy

Sikkink, Roy Dean, Tulsa.

OREGON

Army

Buxton, Delos Richard, Vale.
Glecker, Stephen Donald, Salem.
Hansen, John Currie, Cascade Locks.

Marine Corps

Loomis, Rickie Allan, Coquille.

Navy

Buswell, Robert Dale, Willamina.

PENNSYLVANIA

Army

Braxton, John Alan, Philadelphia.
Doloughy, James Cornelius, Pittsburgh.
Fenner, Stanley Stewart, Bethlehem.

Fenush, Thomas Paul, Grassflat.
Gertsch, John Gary, Russell.
Glasgow, Robert Lee, West Sunbury.
Kendle, Randy Truman, Greencastle.
Kimbough, Golsby, Jr., Philadelphia.
Klinry, Andrew John, Coatesville.
Knight, Ronald Eugene, Shippensburg.
Maguire, Calvin Gene, Altoona.
McElhane, Rodger Dennis, Jamestown.
McKnight, Paul David, Fredonia.
McLaughlin, Peter Francis, Shippensburg.
Mummert, George Leonard, Hanover.
Walker, Carl Lynn, Stoystown.
Williams, Richard Harry, Zellenople.
Yingling, Harry Patrick, Export.

Marine Corps

Campbell, Thomas John D., Troy.
Gibel, Raymond, McKeesport.
Gillingham, William David, Philadelphia.
Jones, Daniel John, Jr., Broomall.
Lounsbury, William David, Warren.
Meyer, Joseph John, Jr., Mechanicsburg.
Shuemaker, Michael Thomas, Jessup.
Wunsch, Michael Charles, Feastersville.

RHODE ISLAND

Army

Cox, Harold Anthony, Providence.

SOUTH CAROLINA

Army

Davis, Ronnie Lee, Marion.
Davis, Willie James, Winnsboro.
Ferguson, Benny Harold, Greenville.
Gay, James Nathaniel, North Augusta.
Gibson, James Donald, Nichols.
Jackson, James Cleveland, Chester.
King, Robert Earl, Clinton.
Kitchens, Joel Rhyne, Roebuck.
Liles, Ephriam Rutledge, II, Pickens.
Meadows, Carrol Fayne, Spartanburg.
Mitchell, Mack Lee, Blackville.
Pugh, Gerald Ralph, West Columbia.
Reaves, John Shepard, Gaffney.
Stump, Harold Oliver, Charleston.

SOUTH DAKOTA

Army

Whites, Robert Joseph, Iroquois.

TENNESSEE

Army

Carr, Dannie Arthur, Sevierville.
Courtney, Jimmy Darrell, Morristown.
Erwin, Youeal Dean, Memphis.
Grubb, Donald Lee, Erwin.
King, Robert Earl, Jackson.
Martin, John David, Jasper.
Rainwater, James Ronald, New Market.
Rousseau, Duane Michael, Memphis.
Sneed, Ward Gray, Haydenburg.
Spears, Jerry Wayne, Memphis.
Stashonsky, John Ray, Old Hickory.

Air Force

Andre, Howard Vincent, Jr., Memphis.

Marine Corps

Jackson, Arnold Bryan, Johnson City.
Sesler, John Joseph, Goodlettsville.
Small, William Dale, Nashville.
Wills, Roy Shannon, Brush Creek.

Navy

Luntsford, Jack Edward, Kingsport.
Sloan, Harold Martin, Hendersonville.

TEXAS

Army

Brown, Julis Lavern, Beaumont.
Culver, Archie Glenn, El Paso.
Davis, James Robert, Fort Worth.
Earnest, James Dale, Mission.
Fanning, Thomas F., Jr., Dallas.
Greenman, Drew Marlin, El Paso.
Hamilton, August Franklin, Covington.
Henly, Carl O'Neal, Lubbock.
Howison, Graham Henry, Bogata.
Manning, Jerry, Houston.
Martin, John D., Lamesa.
Montez, Anastacio, Presidio.
Noonan, Michael Dennis, Amarillo.

Pelton, Glenn Eugene, Junction.
Perry, Billy Earl, Dallas.
Ramos, Juan Manuel, Uvalde.
Roberts, Walter Eugene, Dallas.
Roy, Henry John, Jr., Houston.
Strong, David Allen, Houston.
Wilder, Ronald Frederick, Baytown.

Marine Corps

Brown, Robert Allon, Houston.
Coleman, James Larry, Deport.
Droigk, Martin Wayne, Irving.
Griffin, Robert Allen, San Antonio.
Huth, Philip Nicholas, II, Corpus Christi.
Nunez, Santos Silvas, Fort Sam Houston.
Rodriguez, Reynaldo Salas, Snyder.
Salinas, Jaime Arturo, Edinburg.

Navy

Martin, Aubrey Grady, Beeville.

UTAH

Army

Arveseth, Brent Larsen, Salt Lake City.
Cervantez, Luis Godinez, Snowville.
Hales, Raymon Draper, Springville.
Hughes, Michael Donald, Salt Lake City.
Walker, Leslie Elroy, Lapoint.
Yarbrough, Dan Burgess, Tooele.

Marine Corps

Ingman, Bruce Edwin, West Jordan.

VERMONT

Army

Colvin, Gerald Selah, Bennington.

VIRGINIA

Army

Browning, Perry Nathan, Arlington.
Cox, James Michael, Willis.
Dean, Robert William, Alexandria.
Folland, Michael Fleming, Richmond.
Green, Martin L., Jr., Fairfax.
Kelly, James Edward, Westmoreland.
Thomas, Michael Oliver, Alexandria.
Worrell, Robert Earl, Portsmouth.
Yates, David Earl, Chesapeake.

Marine Corps

Carey, Daniel Lester, Norfolk.
Peppin, David Dawson, Jr., McLean.
White, Robert Wesley, Norfolk.

Navy

Bove, Roger Gerhard, Arlington.

WASHINGTON

Army

Hamilton, Charles Odean, Lake Stevens.
Parrott, Brian Gregory, Seattle.
Sanford, Robert Ray, Kent.
St. Laurent, Lance Wilfred, Seattle.
Voss, Raymond Allan, Seattle.
Wagenaar, Daniel Leonard, Richland.

Marine Corps

Barnhart, Beverly Lee, Wenatchee.
Kraabel, John Spaulding, Seattle.
Sanders, Daunt Brunell, Seattle.
Welsford, John August, Jr., Spokane.

Navy

Tucker, Darrell Lee, Connell.

WEST VIRGINIA

Army

McIe, Johnny Ellis, Webster Springs.
Nichols, Darrell Eugene, Montgomery.
Stewart, Byron Duncan, Charleston.

Marine Corps

Workman, Glenn Roger, Chapmanville.

WISCONSIN

Army

Belonger, Dennis Michael, Manitowoc.
Devney, James Robert, Eau Claire.
Eitel, Dennis, Phillips.
Hughes, Charles Fredrick, Hayward.
McGee, Darrell Eugene, Berlin.
Niles, Ronald Robert, Mauston.
Seekamp, Robert Lee Roy, Kendall.
Sticks, Steven Michael, Okauchee.
Techmeir, Larry Lester, Stanley.

Marine Corps

Nielsen, Michael Charles, Beloit.
Quinlan, David Patrick, Milwaukee.

PUERTO RICO

Army

Rodriguez-Cotto, Angel L., Rio Piedras.
Rodriguez-Rodriguez, Pedro, Yabucoa.
Santiago-Arroyo, Anselmo, Penuelas.
Torres-Serrano, Luis, Adjuntas.

DEATHS RESULTING FROM HOSTILE ACTION IN
VIETNAM IN AUGUST 1969

ALABAMA

Army

Barron, Danny Lance, Carbon Hill.
Earp, Billy Wayne, Decatur.
English, Dennis Laverne, Russellville.
Harris, Carl Coleman, Montgomery.
Johnson, James Larry, Eldridge.
Jones, Thomas Dewitt, Gadsden.
Marshall, James Henry, Selma.
Pierce, George Washington, Mobile.
Riddle, Bobby, Selma.
Tosh, James C., III, Mobile.
White, Ted Arnold, Dickinson.

Marine Corps

Davis, William Francis, Jr., Vina.
Hayes, Lawrence Allen, Tuscaloosa.
Morgan, Carl Eugene, Decatur.
Stribbling Gwyman, Birmingham.
Watts, John Raymond, Ensley.
Whiteside, John Curtis, Fayette.

ARIZONA

Army

Kirksey, James Walter, Chandler.
Nieto, Jesus Diez, Phoenix.
Wilson, John William, Tucson.

Marine Corps

Jimenez, Jose Francisco, Red Rock.
Romo, John Rogers, Phoenix.
Schaffer, David Thomas, Phoenix.

ARKANSAS

Army

Bates, Carl Calvin, Jr., Fort Smith.
Dunlap, Jerry, Malvern.
Henry, Gerald Albert, Landis.
Ledbetter, Sanford James, Fayetteville.
Mitchell, Robert Stevens, Rogers.
Snidow, Stephen Allen, Fort Smith.

Marine Corps

Curtis, Jerry James, Camden.
Parker, Benny Bruce, Brinkley.
Schmidt, John Joseph, Pochontas.

CALIFORNIA

Army

Alvarado, Leonard Louis, Bakersfield.
Apodaca, Jack Michael, Lennox.
Bailey, Bernard Phillip, Torrance.
Barrios, Marcello Nunez, Artesia.
Bevard, Bobby Lee, Santa Clara.
Brown, Don Charles, Garden Grove.
Case, Glenn Edward, Live Oak.
Castillo, Thomas, Santa Maria.
Causey, David Louis, Los Angeles.
Cockerham, John Willie, Jr., Menlo Park.
Dance, Robert Lynn, Riverside.
Dawson, William John, Redwood City.
Duenas, Juan Leon Guerrero, San Jose.
Duenas, Roberto Cervantes, San Pedro.
Dunn, Donald Leroy, Red Bluff.
Elson, Jeffrey Charles, Anaheim.
Faran, Daniel Edward, Hawthorne.
Flores, Jose Luis, Los Angeles.
Gaftunik, Robert Ernest, Sacramento.
Gee, Gregory Joseph, Vallejo.
Goins, Chester Leon, Pasadena.
Gollher, Patrick Carl, Granada Hills.
Gomez-Diaz, Rigoberto, Los Angeles.
Gonzales, Robert, San Jose.
Greco, Michael John, San Jose.
Henson, Lesley Herbert, Salinas.
Hernandez, Felipe, Cudahy.
Kerby, Martin John, Sacramento.
Little, Rodney Dwight, Long Beach.
Masuen, Michael Nicholas, Spring Valley.

McMains, Donald Henry, Jr., Garden Grove.
Mendenhall, Thomas James, Riverside.
Gonzalez, Luis Martinez, Perris.
Guy, George Allen, Long Beach.
Guzman, Phillip Jr., Los Angeles.
Jackson, Christopher A., San Diego.
Major, Robert Warren, Sacramento.
Mills, Peter Robert, Inglewood.
Mooney, Michael James, Long Beach.
Ruffner, Russell Miles, Jr., La Puente.
Rymond, Nicholas James, North Hollywood.
Schmidt, William James, San Mateo.
Semans, Thomas Edward, Norwalk.
Shelton, Richard Powell, Los Angeles.
Taufi, Aouliultau, Fatupe, Los Angeles.
Tenorio, Jimmy Joe, Los Angeles.
Velasquez, Charles, Oakland.
Wolfe, Brian Edward, Oxnard.

Navy

Talken, George Francis, Chico.
Tognazzini, Milford Marvin, Santa Maria.

COLORADO

Army

Bloom, Ronald Keith, Lakewood.
Brabo, Henry, Denver.
De Herrera, Pedro, Pueblo.
Lundy, Randy Joe, Fowler.

Marine Corps

Aranda, Ismael Benito, Trinidad.
Bossler, Johnny Steve, Fort Lupton.
Catalano, Sam, Jr., Pueblo.
Lambert, Douglas Joseph, Pine Park.
Mershon, Daniel Lee, Denver.
Ortiz, Randall Isaac-Jed, Denver.
Valdez, John Ben, Rocky Ford.

CONNECTICUT

Demore, Michael George, Berlin.
Freeman, David Michael, Putnam.
McDermott, Terrence M., Hartford.
Paparello, Joseph John, Bristol.
Swan, David Martin, East Hampton.

Marine Corps

Johnson, Richard Arno, Jr., Wallingford.
Mediate, Alan Wayne, Riverside.

DELAWARE

Army

Burris, Reginald Wayne, Ellendale.
Donaway, Robert Hughes, Felton.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Barnes, Alfred, Jr., Washington.

FLORIDA

Army

Abrams, Samuel, Jr., Tampa.
Ard, Howard Carlton, Jay.
Bell, Leroy Lemuel, Monticello.
Conrad, George Dewey, Jr., Plantation.
Cooper, Robert Wayne, Jacksonville.
Ellis, William Walter, III, Fort Lauderdale.
Frangella, Frank A., Fort Pierce.
Harvey, Alan Daryl, Tallahassee.
Hlemez, James Borland, Volusia.
Hogbin, Ronnie Ellis, Miami Beach.
Hurst, James Randolph, Jacksonville.
Kelley, William Francis, Tampa.
Kirkpatrick, Ronald Rene, Ft. Myers.
Linder, James, Jr., Miami.
Llamazales, Humberto, Tampa.
Masciale, Vincent Tommy, Jacksonville.
Mathis, Samuel Judson, Ft. Walton Beach.
Pocher, William Thornton, Fernandina Beach.

Quintana-Soto, Luis E., Miami.
Swindle, Robert Earl, Ft. Lauderdale.

Coast Guard

Kirkpatrick, Michael Ward, Gainesville.

Air Force

Sweet, John Harlan, Coral Gables.

Marine Corps

Carter, Bruce Wayne, Miami Springs.
Milliard, James Gilbert, Tampa.
Sater, Reginald Mark, Eau Gallie.
St. Clair, Clarence H., Jr., Pensacola.
Wilkinson, Dale Sloan, Lighthouse Point.

Navy
Muir, John David, Bradenton.

GEORGIA

Army

Brewer, Grady Lee, Atlanta.
De Loach, David Lloyd, Statesboro.
Fields, Herman Thurston, Winterville.
Fordham, Jerry Lee, Eastman.
Godfrey, Ralph Donald, Columbus.
Heard, Earnest, Jr., La Grange.
McDowall, Francis, Jr., Lawrenceville.
Register, Maxie Dean, Pelham.
Shook, Robert Lynn, Clarksville.
Simmons, Charlie, Jr., Atlanta.
Southerland, Vernon Davey, Summerville.
Speight, William Robert, Ashburn.
St. Germaine, Ronald Hubert, Atlanta.
Watson, Tommie, Savannah.
Weaver, Clinton James, Columbus.

Marine Corps

Morris, Jimmy Tony, Rossville.
Reed, Jerry Donnie, Tucker.

HAWAII

Army

Allagonez, Rodolfo P., Honolulu.
Browne, Walter D., Haku.
Defries, Gaylord Kila, Anahola.
Spillner, Robert K., Waipahu.

Marine Corps

Peleholani, Hayward K. H., Pahoa.

IDAHO

Army

Adakal, Leo Joe, Blackfoot.

Coast Guard

Painter, Michael Harris, Moscow.

ILLINOIS

Army

Ayers, Carl Bracy, Jr., Chicago.
Barnes, Bruce Michael, Ofallon.
Barton, Norman Lee, Alton.
Campbell, William Eugene, Gibson City.
Carey, Daniel Edward, Utica.
Daniels, Eldridge Maurice, Chicago.
Elliott, Tommy Gene, Clinton.
Fitzgerald, David Edward, Oak Lawn.
Fox, Robert Alan, Beardstown.
Gutowski, Walter Joseph, Naperville.
Haake, David Oscar, Nashville.
Havard, Michael John, Northlake.
Jones, Robert Eugene, Nashville.
McGhee, Larry Dale, Rockford.
Mensing, Stanley Alfred Beckemeyer.
Miller, Jimmie, Chicago.
Mitchell, Joseph William, Chicago.
Owen, James Howard, Jr., Rockford.
Placzek, Paul George, Chicago.
Raburn, William Fay, East St. Louis.
Raychel, James Daniel, East Moline.
Shaw, Lee Roy, Buffalo.
Shipley, Ronald Eugene, Vandalla.
Stanley, Frankie, Sheridan.
Story, James Clellon, Berwyn.
Vevera, Philip John, Chicago.
Voyles, John Walter, Chicago.
Walters, Frank Daniels, Morton Grove.
Wilfong, Gil Stevens, Cottage Hills.
Wise, Scott Edward, Glenwood.
Withers, Gary Wayne, Springfield.

Marine Corps

Branham, James Jerome, Moline.
Gonzalez, Francisco, Jr., Chicago.
Hawkey, Louie Elmer, Edgewood.
Heinemeyer, Charles Thomas, Bunker Hill.
Hock, Robert William, Harvey.
Kelly, Stephen James, Sterling.
McCall, Phillip Glen, Grand Chain.
Pinto, Joseph John, Chicago.
Rios, Gerardo Pedro, Chicago.
Rogers, Ronald Dean, West Frankfort.
Schaefer, Charles Harold, Streator.
Wagner, Robert James, Chicago.

Navy

O'Connor, Robert Anthony, Chicago.
Sage, Leland Charles Cooke, Waukegan.

INDIANA

Army

Barrett, Donald Richard, Indianapolis.
Brown, Donald Wayne, Madison.
Creasy, Jerry N., Hillisburg.
Hardesty, Richard Lee, Vernon.
Hash, Jonathan Paul, Kokomo.
Jackson, Charles Edward, East Chicago.
Kaser, Randall Frank, Liberty.
Lawhon, Michael Howard, Noblesville.
Likens, Bobby Joe, Indianapolis.
Maple, Hollis Garnell, Goodland.
Marcum, Kenneth, Connersville.
McDaniel, Kenneth Reed, Lowell.
Miranda, William, Gary.
O'Connor, David Cornelius, Indianapolis.
Roberts, Dennis Ray, Milltown.
Somerville, William Harold, Charlestown.
Steen, James Nelson, Indianapolis.
Talbot, James Franklin, Kewanna.
Vera, Venancio, East Chicago.
Wallen, Ernie Lee, Pierceton.

Marine Corps

Caudill, Billy Joe, Richmond.
Graft, Terry Gene, Roanoke.
Hall, Rickey Wayne, Indianapolis.
Stambones, Gus, East Chicago.
Wallace, James Ralph, Hobart.

Navy

Landis, Duane Gerald, Decatur.
Poe, Steven Melvin, Marion.

IOWA

Army

Carrington, Thomas William, Storm Lake.
Clefsch, Duane Alan, Hazleton.
Crum, Steven Vincent, Ida Grove.
Dostal, Thomas Jerome, Iowa City.
Golliday, William Frank, Des Moines.
Kirchgesler, Daniel James, Rapid City.
Sherlock, David Henry, Worthington.
Skogerboe, Dennis Michael, Forest City.
Swaney, Rickey Eugene, Grand Junction.
Timmer, Akke Jans, Jr., Sheddon.
Walshour, Samuel W., Jr., Waterloo.
Wood, Donald Fred, Smithland.

Marine Corps

Norris, James, Alan, Des Moines.

KANSAS

Army

Barr, Terry Lee, Kansas City.
Jameson, Rodger Lee, Salina.
Llamas, Jose, Newton.
Maslak, John Joseph, Kansas City.
Mohler, Timothy Allen, Quenemo.
Smith, Aaron Bruce, Arkansas City.
Troxel, Charles Leonard, Iola.

Marine Corps

Adams, William Carl, Junction City.
Berrier, Tommy Joe, Kansas City.
Castor, James William, Natoma.

Navy

Breshears, Alan Wayne, Fort Scott.

KENTUCKY

Army

Anderson, James Dwight, Smiths Grove.
Blackburn, William Kendall, Pikeville.
Shea, Larry, Eminence.
Tarter, Bobby Lee, Brownsville.
Workman, Lionel, Clearfield.
Zipp, Marion Louis, Elsmere.

Marine Corps

Everett, Bobby Joe, Shreveport.
Hill, John Michael, Middletown.
Hooks, Ralph Michael, Princeton.
Justice, Thomas Larry, Belfry.
Peay, Harvey A., Drakesboro.

LOUISIANA

Army

Craig, Merlin Joseph, Alexandria.
Furman, Edmund, Donaldsonville.
Mack, James, Harvey.
Mendoza, Milton John, Franklin.

Marine Corps

Bartholomew, Tilmen Verges, New Orleans.
Dukes, Paul Douglas, Minden.
Ruth, Alfred Darnell, Alexandria.

MAINE

Army

Albert, Richard Patrick, St. Agatha.
Brown, Gardner John, Union.
Gagne, Bertrand Ronald, Auburn.
Millett, Laurence Arthur, Norway.
Ryder, Edwin Byron, Greenville Junction.

Marine Corps

Grinnell, Richard Ralph, Machias.
Poliquin, Michael Edward, Bowdoinham.

MARYLAND

Army

Kimmell, George Samuel, Cumberland.
Ligons, Raymond, Baltimore.
Quesenberry, Bobby Ray, Riverdale.
Shields, Robert Hazen, II, Kensington.
Sroka, Stephen Eugene, Frederick.

Marine Corps

Bonnett, George Fabian, Baltimore.
Davis, Dennis Dean, Capitol Heights.
Harp, Michael Lee, Pasadena.
Sands, Joseph Gregory, Baltimore.
Ward, Mark Heywood, Baltimore.

MASSACHUSETTS

Army

Cabral, James Anthony, Jr., Cambridge.
Contarino, Donald Allen, Beverly Farms.
Doughty, James Alden, Chelmsford.
Duncan, John David, Needham.
Grigsby, Mark Weldon, Foxboro.
Holtzer, Richard Eugene, Jr., Brookfield.
Hubis, Brian Andrew, Beverly.
Kane, Terrance Frederick, Grotton.
Litchfield, Frank Edward, Dedham.
Masse, Raymond George, West Springfield.
McArthur, John Douglas, Somerville.
Peterson, Carl Alfred, Winchendon.
Ralston, Thomas Michael, Roslindale.
Stroyman, Arthur, Newton.
Tripp, Donald Delmore, Brockton.

Air Force

Brown, Roger David, Natick.

Marine Corps

DeLorenzo, Fred Joseph, Jr., Somerville.
Dowd, Lawrence Kent, Bridgewater.
Elliott, Donald Lyle, Springfield.
Kristof, Peter Frank, Medfield.
Quinn, Michael Patrick, Charlestown.
Weitz, Monek, Roxbury.

Navy

Penta, Stephen Joseph, Revere.

MICHIGAN

Army

Baldwin, Charles Leroy, Mount Clemens.
Barker, Greg Allen, Belleville.
Bonesteel, David Larry, Davison.
Brancheau, Francis Emil II, Monroe.
Carrier, Albert Joseph III, Warren.
Church, Ricky Wayne, Flint.
Connors, Jack Lee, Fillion.
Cox, Michael Lou, Jr., Midland.
Cunningham, Dennis Anthony, Detroit.
Eckles, James Patrick, Plymouth.
Foster, Dwight Dunard, Detroit.
Gordon, James Lewis, Detroit.
Holtrey, Daniel Perry, Flat Rock.
Hurston, Horatio William, Detroit.
Kelly, Michael Dennis, Big Rapids.
Koski, Gene Raymond, Mohawk.
Lewis, Richard Kenneth, Escanaba.
McKeathon, Dwight Pinza, Detroit.
Moegenborg, Lenard F., Alma.
Nelson, Donald Erwin, Wayne.
Rajala, Stanley Robert, Watton.
Santo, Patrick Angelo, Detroit.
Schonfield, Jeffrey Alan, Detroit.
Smith, Garry Gregory, Deckerville.
Snyder, George Eugene, Ferndale.
Taylor, Darrell Duane, Vicksburg.
Treadway, William Michael, St. Joseph.

Wilcox, Raymond Lee, Mancelona.
 Wilkie, Douglas Wilmer, Lansing.
 Zimmerman, John Randall, Detroit.

Marine Corps

Davis, James William, Ypsilanti.
 Brancheau, Francis Emil II, Monroe.
 Carrier, Albert Joseph III, Warren.
 Glowe, Stephen, Detroit.
 Mutschler, John Lloyd, Clarksville.
 Nelson, David Ellsworth, Battle Creek.

Navy

Beckman, Robert Charles, Lapeer.

MINNESOTA

Army

Graber, Gary David, Stillwater.
 Huso, Wayne Murray, Big Lake.
 Kuefner, John Alan, Duluth.
 Larson, Verle Norman, Dalbo.
 Leppke, Lyle Gordon, Minneota.
 Merrill, Douglas Carroll, North St. Paul.
 Nelson, Paul Albert, Maple Lake.
 Ohman, Gary Alan, Minneapolis.
 Olson, Richard Ralph, Minneapolis.
 Oklemann, John Stewart, St. Paul.
 Panno, Ronald William, St. Cloud.
 Peterson, Jeffrey Charles, Minneapolis.
 Shepersky, Vincent Lloyd, Park Rapids.
 Stradtman, Thomas Lee, St. Cloud.
 Swart, Waldon Jerome, Spicer.
 Whitman, Raymond Lee, Forrest Lake.
 Wimmergren, Edmond Dale, Minneapolis.
 Worthley, Kenneth Wayne, Sherburn.

Air Force

White, James David, St. Paul.

Marine Corps

Barickman, Leon Ross, Lewisville.
 Des Lauriers, Philip Gene, South St. Paul.
 Haney, Robert Alan, Duluth.
 Richardson, Philip Owen, Austin.

MISSISSIPPI

Army

Cochran, Charle Lynn, Durant.
 Crow, David Reid, IV, Jackson.
 Gresham, William Thomas, Jr., Ashland.
 Guest, Roger Thomas, Aberdeen.
 Tucker, Eugene, Vicksburg.
 Vanderford, Gerhard W. C., Corinth.
 Wright, Roger Dale, Roxie.

Marine Corps

Hunt, Eugene, Okolona.
 Martin, William Davis, Magee.
 Stingley, James, Durant.
 Wilson, William Reed, Jr., Jackson.

Navy

Parmley, Donald Wayne, West Point.

MISSOURI

Army

Deters, David Stephen, Bowling Green.
 Donnelly, James Warren, Jr., St. Louis.
 Halbert, Edward Joseph, Steelville.
 Miller, Eugene Lewis, Excelsior Springs.
 Morris, Doyle Anthony, St. Louis.
 Peel, Stephen Blake, Cape Girardeau.
 Platter, George Richard, North Kansas City.
 Plummer, John David, Charleston.

Marine Corps

Amann, Mark Thomas, Hawk Point.
 Shelton, James Edward, Cabool.
 Winfrey, James Arthur, Webster Groves.

MONTANA

Army

Bristol, Clarence Frank, St. Ignatius.
 Kilwine, Richard James, Fromberg.
 Pomeroy, Alexander P., Great Falls.
 Webster, Christopher C., Great Falls.
 White, Richard Joseph, International Fall.

NEBRASKA

Army

Engel, Rodney Louis, Doniphan.
 Fowler, Thomas Lee, Geneva.
 Fruhling, Dale Ervin, Kearney.
 Witt, Mark Steven, Winside.

Marine Corps

Bring, John Dale, Bancroft.
 McLeese, Kenneth Richard, Exeter.

NEVADA

Army

Grant, Melvin Lee, Lemmon Valley.
 MacKay, William Michael, Reno.

Marine Corps

Pue, Charles Alton, Las Vegas.

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Army

Beaudoin, Gaetan Jean Guy, Manchester.
 Blanchette, Guy Andre, Manchester.
 Genest, Richard Edgar, Manchester.
 Raymond Richard Paul, Manchester.
 Robichaud, Roger Edward, Manchester.

NEW JERSEY

Army

Amendola, James Joseph, Closter.
 Ashnault, Raymond John, Cranford.
 Cannito, Dennis John, West New York.
 Colasurdo, Joseph Peter, Edison.
 Crikelair, John Francis, Ridgewood.
 Gooding, William Philip, Edison.
 Green, Leo Frank, Jr., Vineland.
 Hayes, Jeremiah Michael, Jr., Bay Head.
 Hetzel, Norman Ralph, Mahwah.
 Mione Anthony Victor, Bayonne.
 Mobus, Joseph Patrick, Harrison.
 Musselman, Joseph Henry, Millville.
 Nestor Frank Rodney, Branchville.
 Ridge, William Francis, Gloucester.
 Robbins, Ronald, Trenton.
 Schoettner, George Craig, Trenton.
 Solomon, Robert George, Rahway.
 Wickward, William J., North Wildwood.

Marine Corps

Brown, Roger Clinton, Newark.
 Busch, Thomas Leopold, III, Pennsauken.
 Chard, Salum Edward, Jr., Millville.
 Dowd, John Aldysius, Elizabeth.
 Graf, Albert Stephen, Bogota.
 Hesson, Joseph Leonard, III, Pennsauken.
 Kinsler, Frederick C., Jr., North Plainfield.
 Lawrence, Michael James, Maplewood.
 Truex, Glenn Ellsworth, Park Ridge.

Navy

Bell, Larry Gene, Alloway.

NEW MEXICO

Armijo, Frank Charles, Albuquerque.
 Delora, Pedro Ascencion, Santa Fe.
 Vigil, Laurencio, Ocate.

Marine Corps

Muskett, Wayne, Shiprock.

NEW YORK

Army

Adams, Charles Wesley, McLean.
 Benvenuto, Theodore F., Jr., Uniondale.
 Brasile, Terrence Carmine, Ridgewood.
 Bruckner, Howard Russell, Scarsdale.
 Brustman, Douglas John, Jamaica Estates.
 Cushman, Harold Edward, Clark Mills.
 Dickerson, Stanley Heman, Troupsburg.
 Dilberto, Kim Michael, Massapequa.
 Doria, Richard Albert, White Plains.
 Finger, David Harold, Eden.
 Gardner, Wilhimon, New York.
 Graham, Johnnie, Jr., New York.
 Hopkins, Paul Robert, Syracuse.
 Howard, Eli Page, Jr., Pelham.
 Kidd, Peter Alan, Sinclairville.
 Love, Daniel Albert, Watkins Glen.
 Massa, Luis Habley, New York.
 Mezzatesta, Frederick, Whitesboro.
 Miner, George Louis, Southold.
 Musco, Vincent James, Schenectady.
 Nelson, Richard William, Valley Stream.
 Noldin, Richard John, New York.
 Peterson, Roy Keith, New York.
 Potter, James Frank, Newark.
 Pyle, Howard MacDonald, Jr., Pleasantville.
 Quinn, Ronald Gene, Hilton.
 Rutnan, James Earl, Watertown.

Saltz, Eric Donn, Plainview.
 Schell, Robert Charles, Jr., Horseheads.
 Silverstein, Gerald Leon, New York.
 Simmons, Bradley Joseph, Ancramdale.
 Sinclair, John James, New York.
 Wilhelm, Richard Thomas, Rochester.
 Youngkrans, Allan T., Jr., Utica.

Marine Corps

Bruno, Edward, Long Beach.
 Colorio, Joseph, Massapequa.
 Frisbie, Jared Arthur, Selkirk.
 Garity, Charles Joseph, Jr., Flushing.
 Garlo, Michael, Fishkill.
 Ozimek, Ronald Robert, Depew.
 Seminara, Charles Benjamin, Syracuse.
 Shipman, James Robert, Syracuse.
 Smolarek, Edwin Joseph, Jr., Buffalo.
 Zimmer, Jerry Allen, Maine.

Navy

Razzano, Robert Thomas, Cohoes.

NORTH CAROLINA

Army

Abraham, Roosevelt, Jr., Wilmington.
 Barbee, Garry Dwight, Concord.
 Cannon, George Elmer, Sr., Tarboro.
 Clark, Eugene Paul, Albemarle.
 Funderburk, Rupert A., Jr., Monroe.
 Howell, William Glenn, Gastonia.
 Matthews, Charles Crockett, Clyde.
 McCulston, Harvey Richard, Advance.
 Parrish, Rudolph Stephen, Fremont.
 Robertson, Ronnie Lee, Old Fort.
 Rodgers, John Carl, Lumberton.
 Scott, William Benford, Jacksonville.
 Sprinkle, James Larry, Franklin.
 Sykes, Don Richard, Durham.
 Watson, Richard Colon, Lenoir.
 Wellman, Richard Douglas, Gastonia.

Marine Corps

Helms, William Gary, Jr., Oxford.
 Lee, Adren Andrew, Belmont.
 Thomas, Michael Jones, Sanford.

NORTH DAKOTA

Army

Kraft, Robert Leo, Linton.

OHIO

Army

Anderson, William John, Jr., Lorain.
 Baker, La Brossie Lucien, Cleveland.
 Beatty, James Russell, Lancaster.
 Beesler, Charles William, Columbus.
 Bowers, Jerome Earl, Payne.
 Brundage, Michael Lester, Cleveland.
 Carrion, Jose Antonio, Lorain.
 Carter, David Edward, Hamilton.
 Castle, Virgil Lee, Athens.
 Childress, Martin Dean, Marlon.
 Gay, David Austin, Cleveland.
 Geib, Jeffery Lynn, Rootstown.
 Hand, William Harry, Lewisburg.
 Harris, Rickey Elton, Cincinnati.
 Hyatt, Jerald Michael, Newark.
 Jones, Robert Arthur, Girard.
 Kanter, Edward Lee, Cincinnati.
 Kester, James Joseph, Warren.
 Kimsey, Donald Wayne, Parma.
 La Torre, Edgardo Rafael, Lorain.
 Lappin, Denny Ray, Canton.
 Lenio, Dale James, Cleveland.
 Millinger, Glen Allan, Oak Harbor.
 Roy, Daniel Thomas, Cincinnati.
 Shaner, Stephen Paul, Bowling Green.
 Shaw, Larry Lee, Rogers.
 Shuminski, Stanley John, Windsor.
 Small, Sam Jarrell, Jr., Toledo.
 Spilker, James Dennis, Cincinnati.
 Stanley, Thedous Morris, Akron.
 Stevens, Rodney Franklin, Canal Win-
 chester.
 Stone, Thomas David, Kettering.
 Strazzanti, Alan Peter, Northfield.
 Wheeler, Millard Preston, Hamersville.
 Zisko, Richard Joseph, North Olmsted.

Air Force

Walangtang, Benjamin T., Dayton.

Marine Corps

Blake, James William, Sandusky.
 Cashman, Cornelius James, North Royalton.
 Cunningham, Stephen Earl, Cleveland.
 Dickey, William Ronald, Mentor.
 Durham, William James, Columbus.
 Forristal, Russell Patrick, Willoughby.
 Gase, James Florian, New Riegel.
 Gorvet, William Anthony, Youngstown.
 Hites, Allen Lynn, Toledo.
 Hood, Charles Alan, Painesville.
 Hurd, John Lawrence, Cincinnati.
 Lambert, Cecil Wayne, Columbus.
 Marmie, Robert Theodore, Columbus.
 McCabe, Robert Warren, Cincinnati.
 Means, Dana Edward, East Liverpool.
 Porter, Roy Lynn, Dalton.
 Sayers, Thomas Ralph, Gloucester.
 Welsh, Frederick, Mansfield.

Navy

Milano, Joseph John, Canton.

OKLAHOMA

Army

Barnett, Paul Wayne, Dustin.
 Hill, Jerry William, Vinita.
 Hoskins, Gary Lee, Chouteau.
 King, Verlon Donald, Jr., Dewey.
 Mandeville, Ross Edward, Ripley.
 Martino, Stephen Lee, Jay.
 McDonnell, Terry Keith, Sapulpa.
 McDowell, Earl Wayne, Woodward.
 Pitts, Derwin Brooke, Boswell.
 Roberts, Charles Dwayne, Norman.
 Seals, Clifford, Eufaula.
 Wilson, Richard Lee, Sapulpa.

Marine Corps

Constien, John Richard W., Oklahoma City.
 Reeves, John Curtis, Calera.
 Sherrod, Edward Herbert, Oklahoma City.
 Smart, Arvel Ray, Maysville.

OREGON

Army

Armstrong, Levi Lester, Cottage Grove.
 Blair, Anthony Burdette, Portland.
 Cook, Douglas Alex, Portland.
 Greef, Lawrence Day, Portland.
 Lentz, David Burnett, North Bend.
 Mogck, Daryl Milton, Portland.
 Wheeler, Larry Jay, Tangent.
 Wibbens, John Edward, Albany.
 Woods, James Robert, Portland.

Air Force

Dorman, George Stanton, Salem.

Marine Corps

Gilleran, Dennis Michael, Stayton.
 Helntz, Herbert Charles, Portland.
 McClaffin, Robert F., Corvallis.
 McWhorter, James Elmer, Beaverton.
 Torres, David, Eugene.

PENNSYLVANIA

Army

Arnovitz, Richard Michael, McKeesport.
 Barker, Ray Milton, Yatesboro.
 Bean, David Elton, Clarendon.
 Buchanan, Roy Otis, Cochranton.
 Bugar, Joseph Edward, Jr., Coatesville.
 Colletto, Albert V., Jr., Pittsburgh.
 Detwiler, Lawrence R., Jr., Phoenixville.
 Gillen, Frederick Paul, Clairton.
 Hashin, Joseph Michael, Jr., Minersville.
 Hockenberry, Edwin Cloyd, East Waterford.
 Kostick, Paul Francis, Gilberton.
 Labanish, George Michael, Leechburg.
 Lassiter, Kenney Earl, Philadelphia.
 Madonna, Dominick Joseph, Pittsburgh.
 McKerns, Thomas Patrick, Mahanoy City.
 Newell, Ronald Eugene, Shippensburg.
 Polefka, John Arn, Phoenixville.
 Ragland, Fred Michael, Philadelphia.
 Reefer, Charles Lenard, Jamestown.
 Smith, David Francis, Ellwood City.
 Webster, Jay Dennis, Jr., Lititz.
 Zeltner, William J., III, Philadelphia.

Marine Corps

Gibson, Clifford Michael, Irwin.
 Gray, Gary Gerald, Rimersburg.

Hermann, Louis Vincent, Jr., Clifton Heights.

Hughes, John Edward D., Jr., Pittsburgh.
 Kroh, Carl Fred, Ranshaw.
 Magerr, William Leo, III, Chester.
 McGill, Michael Gregory, Pittsburgh.
 Porter, Raymond James, Pittsburgh.
 Ryan, Robert Anthony, Philadelphia.
 Sampson, Gerald Hilbert, Williamsport.
 Sheridan, Michael Franklin, Atglen.
 Stanton, James, Honesdale.
 Wingert, James Albert, Big Run.

RHODE ISLAND

Army

Hill, Frank Allen, III, Warwick.
 Stephenson, Gary Lucky, Barrington.

Navy

Bourne, George Leander, East Providence.

SOUTH CAROLINA

Army

Bell, Newton Thomas, Jr., Spartanburg.
 Bowman, Curtis, Branchville.
 Cureton, Johnny Jacob, Jr., Williamston.
 Miles, Harold Gene, Travelers Rest.
 Rowell, Franklin Delano, Columbia.
 Smith, William Thomas, Summerville.
 Tyler, Jessie James, Neeses.
 Woods, Advert, Jr., Clio.

Air Force

Bratton, Roy Donald, Adamsburg.

Marine Corps

McMakin, Wallace Thomson, Union.
 Turner, Lindsay Clinton, Edgemoor.
 Walker, Luther, Jr., Johnston.

Navy

Parks, Charles H., Jr., Aiken

SOUTH DAKOTA

Army

Overacker, Earl John, Faith.

TENNESSEE

Army

Bradford, John Leslie, Livingston.
 Garrigus, Harry, Dresden.
 Henry, George Edward, Palmer.
 Hicks, James Larry, Hilham.
 Humphrey, Lawrence James, Piney Flats.
 Jones, Jimmy Lewis, Kingsport.
 Kolwyck, John A., Darden.
 Sherlin, Freddie Michael, Athens.
 Smith, Charles Edward, Jr., Chattanooga.
 Snyder, Thomas Dean, Johnson City.
 Torbett, Stephen Justene, Piney Flats.
 Turpin, Gordon James, Jr., Memphis.

Air Force

Morton, James Edward, Jr., Memphis.

Marine Corps

Majors, Daniel William, Memphis.
 Sharpe, Dennis Claude, Linden.
 Stone, Ben Wade, Whitleyville.

TEXAS

Army

Ball, David Martin, Austin.
 Bell, Leslie Raven, San Antonio.
 Bird, Jackie Dean, Jr., Houston.
 Candler, Donald Priestler, Temple.
 Churan, Ronald Bruce, Port Neches.
 Cope, Charles Ricky, Houston.
 Deleon, Mario P., Robstown.
 Deleon, Mario P., Robstown.
 Dykes, Monte Dale, Sherman.
 Freestone, David Edward, Austin.
 Galindo, Guadalupe, Jr., Rockport.
 Green, Melvin, Cleveland.
 Hall, John Stanley, Austin.
 Laxson, Richard Douglas, Denton.
 Marxmiller, Gary Edward, Ft. Worth.
 McDonald, Lonzo O., Amarillo.
 McLennan, Roy Dewayne, Waco.
 Mohn, Laurance Richard, Jr., Fort Worth.
 Munoz, Johnny, Croce.
 Muse, Michael Dennis, Garland.
 Nelson, Sylvester, Jr., Newton.
 Pennington, Edward Lee, Phillips.
 Reyes, Moises A., Jr., El Paso.

Schulte, Norman Douglas, Houston.
 Simon, Thomas James, Houston.
 Sims, John Charles, Jr., Corpus Christi.
 Sparks, Paul Allan, Houston.
 Thompson, Joseph David, Rule.
 Weaver, William Carrell, Harlingen.
 Williams, Freddy Thomas, Friona.
 Young, Gary Eugene, Universal City.
 Zuniga, Daniel Moran, San Antonio.

Marine Corps

Allen, Earnest, Jr., Houston.
 Anderson, Richard Allen, Houston.
 Anzaldua, Alberto Torres, Santa Rosa.
 Jarrell, Kenith Lewis, Odessa.
 McAninch, Michael Alan, Houston.
 Montanio, Andrew, Victoria.
 Ortiz, Jose Angel, Corpus Christi.
 Rivera, Ruben, Weslaco.
 Roberts, Bobby Lee, Dripping Springs.

Navy

Norwood, Joe William, Van Alstyne.
 Smith, Philip Thomas, Austin.

UTAH

Army

Garner, Larry D., Sunset.

Marine Corps

Butcher, Dewey Frank, Ogden.
 Smith, Gerald Allen, Ogden.

VERMONT

Army

Bassignani, William John, Newfane.
 Inkel, Guy Marcel, Beecher Falls.
 Lavigne, Stewart James, Essex Junction.

VIRGINIA

Army

Caton, Gerald Lewis, Springfield.
 Hollifield, Roger Dale, Arlington.
 Lotridge, Gerald Stephen, Arlington.
 Mattox, Dennis Mayon, Roanoke.
 Oxendine, Rodney Glenn, Yorktown.
 Robertson, Marshall Eugene, Portsmouth.
 Talley, Larry James, Richmond.
 Taylor, Howard Franklin, Ashland.
 Washington, Robert Allan, Winchester.

Marine Corps

Buchanan, Charles C., Bristol.
 Collier, Charles Michael, Fishersville.
 Grayson, Welby Herbert III, Vienna.
 Hammerbeck, Edward Cox, Arlington.
 Hemp, Stuart Franklin, Richmond.
 Hoffer, Richard William, Alexandria.
 McIntosh, Richard Robert, Newport News.
 McLaughlin, Francis, Chatham.
 Nadeau, Roland Harold, Fort Belvoir.

WASHINGTON

Army

Dillard, Donald Gary, Wapato.
 Harvey, Gary Wayne, Seattle.
 Miotke, Steven Michael, Puyallup.
 Murphy, John Francis, Wenatchee.
 Prince Stephen Robert, Wenatchee.

Marine Corps

Hombel, Ray Earl, Spokane.
 Honea, Stanley Ray, Seattle.
 Hulbert, Jeffrey Lee, Kirkland.
 Sparkland, Leonard Peter, Mercer Island.

WEST VIRGINIA

Army

Armes, Bobby Wayne, Sophia.
 Bennett, Douglas Alvin, Beckley.
 Davis, John Michael, Saxon.
 Gentry, Terrance Neil, Man.
 Hackney, Donnie Lee, Sissonville.
 Jackson, Lawrence Henry, Red Jacket.
 Mahoney, John Morrison, Bakerton.
 Phifer, Clyde Edward, Jr., Charleston.
 Smith, John Gerdes, Hico.
 Taylor, Russell Allen, Elkins.

Air Force

Hamrick, Kenneth James, Morgantown.

Marine Corps

Ford, Kenneth Raymond, Fairmont.
 Lanham, Donald Gene, Rainelle.

WISCONSIN

Army

Bozinski, John Michael, Superior.
 Goodness, Kenneth Glen, Nekoosa.
 Green, Dennis Joseph, West DePere.
 Heider, William Stephen, Waukesha.
 Kink, David Robert, Middleton.
 Larson, Randolph Louis, Milwaukee.
 Rosenow, Thomas Arthur, Cashton.
 Schmidt, Larry Roman, Oconomowoc.
 Ulrich, Jayson Fred, Milwaukee.
 Unsinn, Michael Joseph, Green Bay.
 Vanderboom, Paul Ward, Jr., Fond Du Lac.

Marine Corps

Gregorius Michael Jon, Appleton.
 Gruszczynski, Edward Roy, Denmark.
 Ray, Ronald John, Greenleaf.
 Rice, James Roy, Cudahy.
 Rossow, Gerald John, La Crosse.

GUAM

Army

Dela-Cruz, Frederico V., Agana.

PUERTO RICO

Army

Cruz-Lebron, Gaspar, San Juan.
 Del Valle, Sanchez Alejo, Bayamon.
 Lopez, Peter, Toa Baja.
 Rodriguez-Guzman Abeladro, Hato Rey.
 Rosado-Borges, Jose F., Arecibo.
 Vasquez-Santiago Efrain, Bayamon.

Marine Corps

Perez-Padin, Juan Ramon, Quebradillas.

VIRGIN ISLANDS

Army

Francis, James Augustus, St. Thomas.

DEATHS RESULTING FROM HOSTILE ACTION IN
VIETNAM IN SEPTEMBER 1969

ALABAMA

Army

Chuchwell, Donald Walter, Birmingham.
 Darwin, James David, Pisgah.
 Foster, Joe Albert, Jr., Birmingham.
 Harwell, Gary Curtis, Athens.
 Jackson, David Rolland, Sheffield.
 Miller, Johnnie Robert, Mount Olive.
 Smith, David Willard, Opelika.

Marine Corps

Lavender, Robert Edward, Montgomery.
 McLeod, Charles William, Gadsden.

ARIZONA

Army

Caamano, Leonard Olguin, Tucson.
 Cruz, Tony, Phoenix.
 Ramirez, Armando, Willcox.

Marine Corps

Childers, Melvin Ronald, Phoenix.

Navy

Kalina, Edward Charles, Phoenix.

ARKANSAS

Army

Metz, Danny Ray, London.
 Moore, Charles Ray, Ferndale.
 Sanders, Wayne Jackson, Ratcliff.
 Thomas, Michael Herman, Hot Springs.

Marine Corps

Ellis, Charles Westley, Jr., Widener.
 Sherril, Richard Wayne, Hartman.
 Williams, Harvey Lee, Camden.

CALIFORNIA

Army

Alcorn, Dale Robert, Jr., Redondo Beach.
 Alford, Mark Carl, Atascadero.
 Ananian, John Moses, San Francisco.
 Barrett, Frederick Harry, Granada Hills.
 Bartlebaugh, Dennis Lee, Los Angeles.
 Bowden, Byron Bill, Ramona.
 Bowen, John Lewis, Monterey.
 Bowles, Theophilus, San Francisco.
 Box, John Robert, Los Angeles.
 Burns, Michael Thomas, San Diego.

Chunko, George David, National City.
 Cochran, Gregg Lawrence, Santa Clara.
 Cooke, Robert Allen, Durham.
 Cuthbert, Lowry Taylor, Compton.
 De Mello, Bryan Joe, Palo Alto.
 Di Bari, Louis Scott, San Jose.
 Field, James Roland, Pacific Palisades.
 Jackson, Chester Lee, Riverside.
 Kish, Ernest, Inglewood.
 Lahna, Gary William, Long Beach.
 Landberg, Peter Thomas, Lynwood.
 Monk, Sherman Dalton, Los Palos.
 Montellano, Michael A., Los Angeles.
 Newsome, Johnny, Los Angeles.
 Ogren, Jerry Lewis, Stockton.
 Rodriguez, Encarnasion, La Mirada.
 Rogers, James Steven, San Fernando.
 Rosenlund, Nels Vern, II, Arcata.
 Ryan, Jerry Van, Walnut Creek.
 Simeth, Thomas James, Sr., San Diego.
 Stanton, Scott Neal, Sherman Oaks.
 Sterling, John Charles, Concord.
 Strouse, Larry Dale, Granada Hills.
 Valadez, Timmy, Los Angeles.
 Ward, Patrick Michael, Arcadia.

Marine Corps

Baade, Robert Richard, II, Long Beach.
 Bohlig, James Richard, Crockett.
 Ford, David Todd, Hayward.
 Goldmeyer, Charles Henry, San Diego.
 Hamilton, Roland Charles, Anaheim.
 Ledbetter, Larry Douglas, Bellflower.
 Lowery, Roger Dale, Arcata.
 Montez, Frank James, Salinas.
 Robillard, Larry Kenneth, Torrance.
 Tidwell, Erich Linwood, El Centro.
 Walker, John Wesley, Orange.
 Young, Thomas Everett, San Diego.

COLORADO

Army

Moore, James Lee, Colorado Springs.

Air Force

McBride, Albert Cayrl, Leadville.

Marine Corps

Ogbourn, Gayman Crandall, Elizabeth.

CONNECTICUT

Army

Goulet, Ronald Marcel, Thompsonville.
 Pepe, George William, East Granby.
 Rolfs, Gerhard, Oakville.

Marine Corps

Bittner, Robert Edward, Jr., Kensington.
 Burns, James Arthur, Granby.
 Clark, Frederick Ralph, Jewett City.
 Moriarty, Patrick O'Neal, Hartford.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Army

Camp, John Holmes, Jr., Washington.
 Moore, John Otis, Washington.
 Pearson, Richard Ellsworth, Washington.
 Pierce, Harry W., Jr., Washington.
 Tompkins, James Ervin, Washington.

FLORIDA

Army

Batts, William George, Avon Park.
 Bustamante, Gilberto, Tampa.
 Byrd, Reginald Tyrone, West Palm Beach.
 Fields, Kenneth Wayne, Fort Pierce.
 Geiger, Charles Richard, Gainesville.
 Gwinn, Richard Alfred, Miami.
 Hatch, Kenneth Neal, Pensacola.
 Labrecque, Robert William, Riviera Beach.
 Lawler, Thomas Frederick, Tampa.
 Odum, Michael Ralph R., Tallahassee.
 Smith, Neal Arthur, Gainesville.
 Tittle, William Edward, West Palm Beach.

Marine Corps

Charles, Terry Lee, Tampa.
 Lafreniere, Paul Joseph, Jr., Pensacola.
 Moultrie, Calvin, Pensacola.
 Scott, James Elvin, Pensacola.

GEORGIA

Army

Barbre, Samuel David, Albany.
 Cagle, Randy Graham, Menlo.

Fordham, Russell Carrell, Albany.
 Glisson, Johnny William, Savannah.
 Jackson, Fred Orr, Jr., Fort Benning.
 Jenkins, Anthony Leroy, Bainbridge.
 McDonald, Thomas R., Jr., Atlanta.
 Merchant, Lonnie Vester, Hazelhurst.
 Swann, Johnny Delbert, Atlanta.

Air Force

Cameron, James Frederick, Simons Island.
 Smith, Fred Winston, Savannah.

Marine Corps

Arthur, Jesse James, III, Atlanta.
 McKenzie, Johnny Ray, Columbus.
 Morgan, Major Boone, Jr., Chamblee.

HAWAII

Army

Andrada, Wilfredo Balagot, Hilo.
 Kauhahao, Johnny Kullei, Honaunau.
 Milar, Alberto, Jr., Hilo.
 Pacheco, Michael Jerome, Paia Maui.
 Pacolba, Alfredo, Honolulu.
 Salvatore, Thomas Anthony, Waimea
 Kauai.

IDAHO

Army

Ward, Johnny Lee, Cambridge.

Marine Corps

Aslett, Allan Theo, Twin Falls.

ILLINOIS

Army

Carlson, John Edward, Round Lake.
 Cartland, Donald Norman, Oak Park.
 Collins, Michael Lee, Rockford.
 Cooney, Phillip Bernard, Berwyn.
 Derrington, Earmon Ray, Rockford.
 Dine, James Charles, Granite City.
 Greco, Michel Jack, Chicago.
 Henderson, Stephen Carl, Kenney.
 Knechtges, Michael Allen, Chicago.
 Knutson, Felix Delano, Chicago.
 Larson, Thomas Lloyd, Rock Island.
 Leopold, Lester Harold, Wilmington.
 Moore, Donald Eugene, Chicago.
 Price, Gary Donald, Hebron.
 Seibert, Michael Robert, Parkersburg.
 Trock, Theodore Allen, Lansing.

Air Force

Newberry, Wayne Ellsworth, East St. Louis.

Marine Corps

Burriss, Joseph Samuel, III, Chicago.
 Clough, Donnie Joe, Charleston.
 Gatlin, Jerry Gene, Waukegan.
 Hammond, Pete B., Belleville.
 Janousek, Ronald James, Posen.
 Lynch, Daniel Michael, Chicago.
 Mullineaux, Steven Paul, Des Plaines.
 Page, Ronnie, Chicago.

Navy

Klerznowski, Terrence E., Crete.

INDIANA

Army

Goodnight, Jackie Lee, Martinsville.
 Higgins, Thomas Andrew, Vincennes.
 Hudson, Ronald Charles, Gary.
 Leming, Charles R., Columbus.
 Morrow, James Ralph, Greensburg.
 Person, Robert Lee, Richmond.

Air Force

Acher, Robert Paul, Jr., Greensburg.
 Ross, Charles Brent, Brazil.

Marine Corps

Fisher, Robert Leroy, Brookston.
 Golc, Joseph Louis, Jr., Indianapolis.
 Hollman, David Lee, Evansville.

IOWA

Army

Reavis, Brett Grant, Grinnell.

Marine Corps

Hartogh, David Michael, Waterloo.
 Hickerson, Jerry Warner, Corydon.

Navy

Sampers, James William, Storm Lake.

KANSAS

Army

Squier, William Russell, Jr., Brownell.
Stanfield, Gary Kelvin, Chanute.
Van Winkle, Jess H., Jr., Junction City.

Marine Corps

Denton, Dennis Alan, Holton.
Metzger, George Leonard, Kansas City.

Navy

White, Michael La Vern, Lenexa.

KENTUCKY

Army

Cottingham, John Edward, Newport.
Daugherty, Cecil, Harrodsburg.
Gabbard, Thomas Jefferson, Highland Heights.

Kuhlenhoelter, Jimmy, Bowling Green.
Litsey, Michael Lewis, Muldraugh.
Pease, Kenneth Wayne, Hickory.
Yates, James Irvine, Mount Eden.

Air Force

Yates, Manifold, Pikeville.

LOUISIANA

Army

Bradley, Glenn Martin, Owensboro.
Broussard, Leo James, Jr., New Orleans.
Jennings, James, Jr., Independence.
Johnson, Denny Layton, Bunkie.
Maye, Michael McKenzie, New Orleans.
Megehee, James Wood, Minden.

Marine Corps

Lafleur, Robert Wayne, Oberlin.
Wright, Frank, Jr., Monroe.

MAINE

Army

Belanger, Albert Lee, Auburn.
Boobar, Larry Daniel, La Grange.
Duprey, Danny Lee, Ft. Fairfield.
Skidgel, Donald Sidney, Newport.

MARYLAND

Army

Bailey, Tollie, Baltimore.
Britz, Ronald Joseph, Severna Park.
Dean, Carl Andrew, Edgewater.
Piacentino, Michael Allen, Baltimore.
Sapp, Alfred George, Sr., Fort George G. Meade.

Marine Corps

Bailey, Leland Alston, Baltimore.
Burton, John Lee, Baltimore.
Rice, Jerry David, Baltimore.
Seldon, David Scott, Quantico.
Waldman, William Herman, Jr., Berkshire.

MASSACHUSETTS

Army

Benjamin, Gary Thomas, Berkshire Village.
Kalen, John Joseph, Milford.
McCormack, William Edward, Woburn.
Olinsky, Walter Stanley, Jr., Revere.

Marine Corps

McGarry, James Brian, Raynham.

MICHIGAN

Army

Austin, Scotty Gene, Grand Haven.
Benoit, Robert Charles, Jr., Mount Clemens.
Borr, Jeffrey, Grand Rapids.
Cornwell, Thomas Glenn, Port Huron.
Diggs, William Franklin, Howell.
Eichhorn, Monty Jay, Crosswell.
Eiting, Steven Vernon, Vestaburg.
Gibson, Bruce Stewart, Allen Park.
Givens, David Jerry, Warren.
Harris, Hal, Detroit.
Hartsuff, Leo Francis, East Lansing.
Henry, Bernard James, Harrison.
Hoeker, Joseph Alan, Spring Lake.
Hutchinson, Walter Eugene, Durand.
Jaquish, James Ivan, Traverse City.
Miller, Raymond P., II, Algonac.
Nauss, Brent Britten, Howell.
Persicke, Allan Wayne, Benton Harbor.
Petre, Ronnie Joseph, Inkster.
Ray, Dewey Vern, Frankfort.

Sarah, Hugh Henry, Plymouth.
Servantez, Joseph Anthony, Inkster.
Smith, Delbert Ray, Jasper.
Standifer, Anthony, Detroit.
Stockdale, James Byron, Detroit.
Surber, Mark Wayne, Sterling.
Taylor, Charles Franklin, Detroit.
Vliek, Ronald Craig, Decatur.
White, Bedford Frederick, Detroit.
Wilson, Willard Eugene, Flint.

Marine Corps

Baker, Bobby Gene, Grand Junction.
Hughes, Gregory John, Royal Oak.
Kennedy, Donald Lee, Madison Heights.

Navy

Smith, Scott Phillip, Chelsea.
Spennell, Dennis Arthur, Detroit.

MINNESOTA

Army

Ewald, Woodrow Johnsen, Jr., International Falls.

Halder, Michael Edward, St. Paul.
Price, Thomas John, Stephen.
Troy, Peter John, St. Paul.
Weitzel, Billy Dan, Albert Lee.
Ferguson, Dennis Wayne, Minneapolis.
Liebl, Donald Alvin, Fairfax.

MISSISSIPPI

Army

Beard, Asberry, Jr., Vicksburg.
Edmonson, Bobby, Laurel.
Robinson, Joequin, Laurel.

Marine Corps

Walker, Troy Lee, Corinth.

MISSOURI

Army

Bishop, Ronald Burk, Hazelwood.
Cassmeyer, Victor Paul, Jr., Jefferson City.
Miller, Clinton Eugene, Cabool.
Skinner, Larry Rickford, Winfield.
Smith, James Wesley, Napoleon.
White, Cordis Ray, Lamar.

Marine Corps

Atkinson, Charles Leon, St. Joseph.

Navy

Aly, Leslie Morgan, Desoto.

MONTANA

Army

Best, Richard James, Jr., Kalispell.

NEBRASKA

Army

Doak, Stanley Wayne, McCook.
Fork, Norman Kermit, Laurel.
Lamboody, John Patrick, Omaha.
Lange, Dean Richard, Nebraska City.
McAllister, Cameron Trent, Omaha.
Peetzke, Ronald Eugene, Hampton.
Smith, Thomas Leroy, Omaha.

Air Force

Wiesneth, Robert Paul, Louisville.

NEVADA

Army

Howe, Steven Timothy, Ely.

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Army

Brown, Mark Larry, Hampton.
McGlone, Michael Thomas, Dover.
Titcomb, Robert Paul, Farmington.

Marine Corps

Joy, William Clyde, Epsom.

NEW JERSEY

Army

Bullwinkel, Alden John, Dunellen.
Halladay, John Anthony, Merchantville.
Lupu, John William, Middlesex.
Lyons, William Michael, III, Ft. Lee.
Pypniowski, Larry, White House Sta.
Stephanac, Mark John, Garfield.
Woods, James Bernard, Jr., New Milford
Young, Stephen Walter, Collingswood.

Marine Corps

Albert, David, Paramus.
Sylvia, Jerry, Palisades.

NEW MEXICO

Army

Hanawald, Len Martin, Albuquerque.
Romero, Charles Anthony, Albuquerque.
Willard, James Monroe, Albuquerque.
Young, Stephen Andrew, Las Cruces.

NEW YORK

Army

Aviles, Alfredo Edwardo, New York.
Bortle, Jonathan R., Macedon.
Bowlder, Gary Lee, North Tonawanda.
Bruce, Robert, Fishkill.
Dyer, Martin Barry, Jr., New York.
Emery, Charles Henry, Jr., Buffalo.
Gogglin, John Phillip, New York.
Hall, James Henry, Hollis.
Kneeland, Paul James, Lockport.
McGovern, Michael John, Jr., Cambria Heights.

Petteys, Cornel, Wynantskill.

Scott, Duane Carl, Friendship.

Thielges, Charles Theodore, Buffalo.

Air Force

Pitches, James Sutherland, Yonkers.

Marine Corps

Betancourt, James, New York.
Bushey, William Timothy, Mahopac.
Carabba, Richard Aloysius, New York.
Costanza, Kenneth David, Rochester.
Fellows, David Thomas, Caledonia.
Kane, Bruce Edward, Deer Park.
Morrisey, Richard Thomas, Uniondale.
Rivera, David, New York.
Slattery, James Dennis, New York.
Starkey, Richard William, Schenectady.
Steen, Anthony Michael, Troy.
Walker, John Joseph, New York.
Washington, Willie James, Rockaway.

NORTH CAROLINA

Army

Brown, Lonnie, Jr., Williamston.
Burlock, Kenneth George, Jr., Jacksonville.
Campbell, James Clyde, Raeford.
Crosby, James Edward, Greensboro.
Ellis, Larry Wayne, Raleigh.
Genwright, McKenzie W., Winnabow.
Hager, Robert Lee, Jr., Kannapolis.
Hathcock, Larry Cecil, Stanfield.
Jones, Stokely James, Goldsboro.
McGee George Franklin, Lenoir.

Air Force

Norman, Thomas Wiley, Jr., Roper.
Williams, Roy Colon, Jr., Eagle Springs.

Marine Corps

Acker, Odell Bernard Pate, Winston-Salem.
Lemmond, Walter Van, III, Lumberton.
Meeks, Ricky Lee, Mebane.
Pennington, Kenneth Edward, Durham.
Sargent, Edward Ray, King.
Speight, Johnnie Moses, Jr., Farmville.
Wrenn, Larry Curtis, Fayetteville.

NORTH DAKOTA

Army

Elsbernd, David Duane, Crosby.
Schmitz, Robert Eugene, Martin.

OHIO

Army

Brister, James Stanley, Fairview.
Broumas, Andre George, Youngstown.
Carter, William Edwin, Van Wert.
Chaney, Stephen John, Marion.
Clark, Barry Robert, Maple Heights.
Crist, Stephen Edward, Conneaut.
Danison, Joseph William, Columbus.
Denny, Terry Lee, Sandusky.
Foust, Kenneth Edward, Lima.
Franks, Davitt John, Cleveland.
Futo, John Anthony, Cleveland.
Haben, Merle William, Bradford.
Handel, Libero Charles, Cleveland Heights.
Hanna, David Russell, Clinton.

Heidrich, Gregg William, Huron.
Joecken, Richard Kenneth, Columbus.
Kempf, Douglas Scott, Coshocton.
Lalonde, Harry Frank, Jr., Toledo.
Lewis, David, Cleves.
Perry, Kenneth Lee, Franklin.
Prose, Charles William, Jr., McDermott.
Saunders, Clyde William, Springfield.
Scheuer, Bobby Dale, Cincinnati.
Snyder, Thomas Lynn, Amherst.
Stewart, Henry Matt, Jr., Cincinnati.
Tonon, James Anthony, Cleveland.
Vastine, Larry Charles, McDermott.
Wright, John Edward, Circleville.

Air Force

Wilhelm, Frederick, Cincinnati.

Marine Corps

Corsino, Eddie Nelson, Lorain.
Cravens, Danny Carol, West Alexandria.
Douglas, Delbert, Toledo.
Krueger, Randall Lee, Lakeview.

Navy

Turner, Richard Mathias, Youngstown.

OKLAHOMA

Army

Tracy, John Wayne, Seminole.

MARINE CORPS

Heidebrecht, Dale Roger, Bethany.
Lucas, Paul David, Broken Arrow.
Reed, John Arthur, Mulhall.
Tuell, Robert Lee, III, Tulsa.

OREGON

Army

Deaton, Charles Thomas, Klamath Falls.
Hanson, Edward Maynard, Bend.
Montag, Lee Edward, Portland.

Marine Corps

Johnson, William Melvin, Detroit.

PENNSYLVANIA

Army

Fouk, Paul Frederick, Greenville.
Guy, Thomas Edward, Philadelphia.
Harris, Charles Louise, Marianna.
Kilpatrick, Donald Robert, Bethlehem.
Leonard, Kenneth Edward, Havertown.
Long, Charles Elbert, Harrisburg.
Lord, Eric Anthony, Philadelphia.
McDowell, Laurence Thomas, Levittown.
Murphy, Dennis James, Darby.
Nesterak, Norman Louis, Coaldale.
Preslipski, Michael, Jr., Shavertown.
Ream, Eric Allan, Schaeferstown.
Thomas, Raymond Bruce, Columbia.

Air Force

Wecker, Harry Herr, Dauphin.

Marine Corps

Baker, David Richard, Antes.
McGinnis, Michael Brian, Levittown.
Mikula, Carl Stephen, North Braddock.

Navy

Sickles, James Arthur, Johnstown.

SOUTH CAROLINA

Army

Alexander, Barry Kenneth, Clemson.
Barrs, Shelton Ferrell, Charleston.
Bryant, Jerry, Greenwood.
Cox, Joseph William, Johns Island.
Henneghan, Robert Lee, Coward.
Pessier, Steven Leroy, Charleston Heights.
Stenhouse, J. Lynn, Jr., Fountain Inn.
Trusty, Michael Jefferson, Taylors.

Marine Corps

Banks, Michael Francis, Joanna.

Marine Corps

Chesebrough, John Lane, Beaufort.

TENNESSEE

Army

Gibson, Lonnie Lowell, Jellico.
Gold, Fred Edward, Clarksville.
Haynes, Bobby Gene, Flag Pond.
Haynes, Ron Jackson, Vonore.

Koonce, Michael Earl, Ripley.
Potter, James Ralph, Daisy.

Marine Corps

McDermott, Bernard A., III, Nashville.
McGarrity, James Erby, Jr., Ripley.
Rogers, Willie, Jr., Memphis.

TEXAS

Army

Ahlstrom, Robert Ernest, San Antonio.
Chavez, John Manual, Plainview.
Cook, Lester Charles, Iola.
Dennis, Larry Wayne, Lubbock.
Esquero, Johnny Raymond, Lubbock.
Fralicks, Larry Douglas, Cedar Hill.
Henry, David Paul, Keene.
Hughes, Richard Ramsel, Denton.
James Emmett Dwaine, Hurst.
Lowe, Walter Bedford, Jr., Garden City.
Page, M.C., Keltys.
Purifoy, Ray Warren, Dallas.
Salazar, Roberto, Houston.
Sanders, Larry Truman, Thornton.
Sweet, Larry Eugene, Dumas.
Vergara, Eliseo, Anton.
Wills, Robson Ward, San Antonio.

Marine Corps

Coker, Troy Orion, Houston.
Davis, Elton, Jr., Bartlett.
Ramirez, Florencio, Jr., San Antonio.

Navy

Burns, Dewey Ray, Jr., Sulphur Springs.
Meier, Carl Louis, Waco.

UTAH

Army

Haynie, Galen Earl, Salt Lake City.
Weeks, Michael Dale, Bountiful.

Marine Corps

Lund, Steven Danny, Bountiful.

VERMONT

Army

Carr, Freeman Abraham, Northfield.

VIRGINIA

Army

Cox, Sherbert Leon, Norfolk.
Kardos, James Marion, Charlottesville.
Lewis, Arthur, Ashland.
Morgan, Arthur Eugene, Wise.
Watson, Delmis Clayton, Covington.
Webb, Theodore Wood, Swoope.

Air Force

Alley, Willie Warnie, Richlands.

Marine Corps

Harris, Jack, Jr., Sterling Park.
Rush, Thomas Clyde, Jr., Buckingham.

Navy

Jenkins, George W., III, Richmond.

WASHINGTON

Army

Daniels, George Howard, II, Manchester.
Pittigrew, John Floyd, Seattle.
Schimanski, Kenneth Alfred, Colbert.
Scott, Gregory Edward, Colfax.
Turner, Randy Van, Spokane.

Air Force

Cavallin, Lester Melvin, Tacoma.

Marine Corps

Barker, Jerry Edwin, Seattle.

Navy

Mason, Terry Dean, Toppenish.

WEST VIRGINIA

Army

Hicks, Archie Everett, Quincy.
Mitchell, Charlie Howard, Jolo.
Stover, Shelby Dean, Aameagle.
Swiger, Richard Jackson, Clarksburg.
Wright, Charles Herman, Beckley.

WISCONSIN

Army

Babel, Dwight Fabian, Kenosha.
Hagen, Ronald James, Nekoosa.

Ledden, Terrance Edward, Fond Du Lac.
Propson, Bernard Ambrose, Hilbert.
Wojahn, Arthur Edward, La Crosse.

Air Force

Greinke, Neil Norman, Franklin.

Marine Corps

Le, Bosquet Charles R., Madison.
Perez, Richard Eloy, Washington Island.

WYOMING

Army

Powers, Richard Paul, Powell.
Wartchow, Dennis Russell, Jackson.

GUAM

Marine Corps

Cuasito, Ronald Perez, Tamvning.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. REES).

Mr. REES. Mr. Chairman, I am going to vote "no" on House Resolution 613. I really do not see why we have to bring a resolution, with so many ramifications, to the floor under a closed rule.

In fact, sometimes I wonder why we even have a closed rule in the House of Representatives, as it certainly does limit debate and it certainly does prohibit amendments many Members wish to discuss as concerning the complicated negotiations in Paris.

There are two areas which worry me, which are not mentioned in the resolution.

One is the nature of the South Vietnamese Government. This is a military dictatorship. I believe it is a minority government that does not represent the people of South Vietnam. The election they had last year, I believe, was a fraud, because the most qualified candidates for president were not allowed to run, and many of the qualified politicians in South Vietnam are political prisoners.

There is nothing in this resolution about broadening the participation in the Government of South Vietnam. There is nothing in this resolution concerning democracy in a country where we say we are supposedly fighting for democracy.

There is something else that worries me, and that is the troop withdrawal. If we withdraw the troops, what are we going to find happening? If we withdraw, say, 200,000 troops and the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong seem to be on the edge of a military victory, are we going to send the troops back to bail out the South Vietnamese government or not? What is our policy in this area?

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield on that point?

Mr. REES. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. YATES. Secretary Laird said in a hearing made available this morning that if the Vietnamization policy did not work, escalation of the war was a distinct possibility.

Mr. REES. This is the dilemma in which we find ourselves with this resolution. We find ourselves almost with a minor Gulf of Tonkin resolution giving our support to the administration's future policies in the peace negotiations in Paris.

Mr. HAYS. I have heard the gentleman talk about the Government of South Vietnam. If he would care to express his opinion of the Government of North

Vietnam I would be glad to yield him another minute.

Mr. REES. I would be happy to.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman another minute.

Mr. REES. I do not approve of the actions of the Government of North Vietnam. I do not approve of their tactics. I do not approve of the terrorism they have unleashed in the south.

But they are a major factor in these negotiations, they must be contended with at the Paris peace talks.

A very important factor is the Vietcong. How major a factor are they in the peace talks? Perhaps they are a more important factor than the Government of North Vietnam. Do we have a firm policy in negotiating with the National Liberation Front?

To negotiate, one does not have to love him, his adversary. But one has to recognize who he is and what his motives are.

Mr. HAYS. If the gentleman will look at the resolution, it says "free elections" for all the people of South Vietnam. That would include everybody, and those who call themselves the Vietcong and otherwise.

I just point out that the government of North Vietnam was never elected by anyone. The government of South Vietnam was elected by somebody. There is a difference.

Mr. REES. There is nothing in this resolution which refers to a meaningful coalition government of the various factions within South Vietnam. Unfortunately, we find most of the groups either in the prisons or without political rights.

I believe that whole concept of government in South Vietnam should be broadened along a complete political spectrum, if we are ever to deescalate the terror and to have a meaningful peace.

I will be one of those Members of Congress who will be issuing the following statement:

We do not endorse everything said by the President in his statement of November 3.

We specifically do not give advance approval of future decisions on Vietnam.

We affirmatively urge:

First, efforts to reduce the level of violence in Vietnam; second, the broadening of the political base of the Saigon government, and third, the immediate designation of a high-level replacement for retiring delegate Henry Cabot Lodge.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. SCHEUER).

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to address myself, as my distinguished colleague from Ohio has suggested to the government of North Vietnam. All of us who oppose this resolution are horrified at the gross immorality and inhumanity of the North Vietnamese Government. We are appalled at government by terror, blackmail, and assassination, yes, including the murder of innocent women and children. There is nothing good that we can say about the government of North Vietnam. The only significant thing we can say about them is that we are faced with a condition and not a theory. They are there, they

exist, and if we are going to bring this war to an end, then the enemy, no matter how repugnant their conduct, must be talked to, and negotiated with. It is apparent that the government of South Vietnam is not willing to communicate with the north in a meaningful way and to extend their roots and broaden their base to include respected, moderate, non-Communist leaders like General Minh, with whom the North Vietnamese might be willing to enter into negotiations. Until the government of South Vietnam comes to the point of being willing to broaden its base and include within its ranks, spokesmen like big Minh who can communicate with the North Vietnamese, we will be involved indefinitely in this expensive and devastating war. And if we continue the process of Vietnamization by continuing the supply of air power, arms, and equipment to the South Vietnamese Government, we will find that the very size, scope, and scale of our intervention will continue to frustrate the very process of self-determination which we are pledged to support, and, likewise, prevent the process of accommodation and coalition formation, which is an indispensable precondition to commencing meaningful talks with the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong.

I thank my colleague from Ohio for his courtesy in yielding this time to me.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. BUCHANAN).

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I would join my distinguished colleague from Oklahoma who was in the well a few moments ago in praising the gentleman from Texas for his authorship of this resolution and commend both of these gentlemen for their distinguished work leading toward its passage.

When the President of the United States came to this House a few weeks ago to express his appreciation to that large number of Members of the House who had introduced such resolutions, he indicated that he was speaking to us as Americans and not as Democrats or Republicans, and he pointed out when it came to the important issues of foreign policy that we had always responded in Americans.

I am deeply appreciative of the majority of the Members on the Democratic side of this House as well as on the Republican side who have introduced these resolutions and who are standing up for their country in so doing. We are here acting as Americans and as representatives of the people. There has been a good deal of controversy as to who speaks for the people of the United States. We do. In the Federal Government, in the entire judicial branch, all are appointed. In the executive branch all are civil service or appointed people, except for the President and the Vice President, who are elected, although not directly by the people. It is only in the Congress at the Federal level that there is direct representation of the people, and this is most purely true in the House of Representatives. This is where the voice of the people is heard and their influence is directly felt at the Federal level of government. If we are going to have government of the

people, by the people, and for the people, this must be the case. Therefore, the voice of the people of this country cannot be more clearly or purely heard than through the passage of a resolution such as this one which has been introduced by more than 300 Members of the House of Representatives. Through us, the silent majority has found its voice, and speaks out on this issue loud and clear in the passage of this resolution.

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Gladly.

Mr. WALDIE. Is it the gentleman's understanding that in the description used in the resolution, to negotiate a just peace, that a Communist government in South Vietnam which came into power by election would result in a just peace?

Mr. BUCHANAN. It is my understanding that the policy of the President—and I will yield to the gentleman from Texas, as the author of the resolution—is to abide by the results of a full and free election, whatever those results may be. I think I must say to the gentleman that such an outcome as he describes is beyond the realm of possibility, in my considered judgment.

I yield to the gentleman from Texas for a more complete response.

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I refuse to yield further until I yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT).

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Alabama for yielding. I do agree with the response given by the gentleman from Alabama. I do believe that the gentleman from Alabama has correctly interpreted the position of the President of the United States.

In response to the question propounded by the gentleman from California, based upon a hypothetical possibility that if free elections were held and most of the people of South Vietnam voted to embrace a Communist government, the question propounded was, would this constitute a just settlement or a just peace?

In my opinion, whatever responds fairly to the freely expressed will of the people of that or any other country is just. We are not in South Vietnam to impose upon those people a government of our choice. We are there to defend their right to a government of their choice.

Mr. WALDIE. Now, Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield further briefly?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, briefly.

Mr. WALDIE. I want to quote to the gentleman President Nixon's statement in 1960 during the Kennedy-Nixon debate:

We cannot tolerate a Communist government in South Vietnam.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. BUCHANAN. May I say in response that I am confident and I suspect Mr. Nixon is confident that there is no possibility of such a result from his present policy. I think it is an honest policy, a policy based upon reason and knowledgeability concerning this problem. A free election simply would not result in a Communist government in Vietnam.

There is apparently great misunderstanding in our country both of the strength and the virtue of the government now in power in South Vietnam. I think, perhaps, there are many who fail to understand the situation. The President's present policy of Vietnamization and of step-by-step withdrawal has an excellent chance of success. A basic reason is the growing strength and popularity of the government of the Republic of Vietnam.

Unlike any Communist government in the world today, the present government in Saigon is an expression of the self-determination of the people of that country and exists as the result of a free election. Within the past 2 years a constitution has been drafted for the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and ratified by a referendum of the people. It established a tripartite system with an elected executive branch, an elected legislative branch, and an independent judiciary. Elections were held which American observers on the scene at the time characterized as fair and free elections. A higher percentage of the people of the Republic of Vietnam participated in voting than is the case with our own elections in the United States.

It has been my privilege to meet many members of the legislative branch of that Government and a number in responsible positions in the executive branch. I am impressed with the high caliber of these officials and their determination to create a stable, viable, non-Communist government responsive to the needs of the people of that troubled land. It is not by any means a perfect government. Neither is our own. To dismiss this government, created and elected by the people of Vietnam, as just another dictatorship, however, is libelous in the extreme. It is something of a miracle that in a place wracked for a generation by war this infant Republic could even be born while the heat of the conflict continues. Yet this has not only happened, but the strength of that government continues to increase and its base of popular support continues to broaden.

The Tet offensive of 1968, so misunderstood in the United States, was a disaster for the Communists. It was an abortive effort to bring about the collapse of the Saigon government which resulted instead in the loss of much of the military leadership of the Vietcong, substantial loss of their political infrastructure, plus the bulk of Vietcong manpower. Most of the troops against which we now fight are North Vietnamese regulars. The rate of defections to the Republic of Vietnam has dramatically increased. In the pacification program the Vietcong infrastructure has been continually ferreted out, while on the positive side the government, assisted by our Agency for International Development and the civic action programs of our military, has continued to build a better society for the people of Vietnam in the midst of war and has received increasing support from the population at the grassroots level.

Militarily, the Republic of Vietnam's forces have also grown stronger and with the present intensified training program

and the continued supply of adequate weaponry, should be able on a step-by-step basis to take over the combat assignments successfully.

The President's policy of Vietnamization of the conflict can succeed with or without progress at the negotiating table in Paris. It is indeed possible that the resolution which we are about to pass will not result in any visible improvement in these negotiations. In my judgment, the North Vietnamese, who have never admitted their leadership of the Vietcong and other Communist forces in South Vietnam and who have tended to deny the very presence of North Vietnamese regular forces there, may well never make open concessions at the conference table. It would seem to me more likely that when the decision is made to withdraw from South Vietnam, they will simply do so without ever making any admissions or public concessions.

This resolution does, even so, serve a very important purpose in that it makes clear to the Communists and to the world that the American people do stand behind their President in his effort toward a just peace in Vietnam and in his determination that the people of that troubled land shall be guaranteed the right of self-determination. This would logically strengthen the hand of our negotiators in Paris, but whether or not this is the case, it will certainly be of benefit to our troops in Vietnam. This clear expression of our Nation's resolve and commitment cannot but be of benefit to the people of South Vietnam in their struggle for freedom against a Communist aggression which would impose upon them by force a totalitarian government.

It is my profound hope that this message from the people of the United States will be factually reported by the news media here and elsewhere and clearly understood by the Communists. If this is the case, it will in fact serve to shorten the conflict and help to bring a real and lasting peace in Southeast Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Alabama has expired.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. WOLFF.)

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, debate on this resolution has brought forth many definitions of the crucial phrase "just peace," so once again I must wonder what, really, is a just peace?

Have not all the answers given only proved the ambiguity of this phrase?

After all, did not President Johnson seek a just peace when he escalated the conflict?

In fact, whenever our country has gone to war has not a just peace been our goal?

Are we going to use our definition of this ambiguous phrase? Or Saigon's? Or Hanoi's?

To put all this in perspective, is not this one of the most important—perhaps the most important—issue to come before the House this year?

Then, why were no hearings held on this measure?

Why was it closed to amendments in committee and on the floor?

What are the supporters of this resolution afraid of?

Why, on the paramount issue of Vietnam, are we again going to write a blank check that holds the potential of bankrupting this country?

Are not the answers given to this pivotal question really specious?

Why is the House again ready to abdicate its proper role in the determination of policy?

When will we stop being a rubber-stamp for the executive branch?

Could not we just as well fold up and go home if all we are going to do is give blanket, blind support to the President?

Is not this resolution, like the ill-fated Tonkin Gulf resolution, open to whatever interpretation the President may choose to give it?

Did the authors and all who signed this resolution really mean to give a blanket endorsement?

Is it not understood that a vote against this resolution is not a vote against the President or national unity, but a vote against a poorly worded, ambiguous resolution? The fact that the President views the resolution as support for his November 3 speech, even though it was written before then, raises the question—Are not the sponsors' motives already being distorted?

When the President came here, he still did not answer the question: "What is his policy?"

Why do we support an ephemeral policy that has never been explained to us?

Is that policy reflected in the following headline from today's Washington Post?: "Laird Sees Escalation Possible if Nixon Plan Fails To Win War."

But then has not the President said we do not seek a military victory?

What about those of you who want to win in Vietnam—Does an aye vote bind you to a no-win policy? An ultimate communist takeover.

Will not this resolution undermine and make a sham of the Paris negotiations?

How long can we tolerate this ambiguity?

And does not this resolution really compound that ambiguity?

Can not this resolution really pave the way for escalation, surrender or anything in between?

Are the sponsors prepared to accept any of these alternatives?

In another direction, Mr. Chairman, what does Vietnamization mean?

How long do we stay in Vietnam during Vietnamization? 10 years? 50 years? indefinitely?

To those who claim foreign aid is a giveaway, How long do we continue this biggest giveaway?

How long will we let Vietnam play havoc with our economy?

How do we justify to the American people—to our constituents—the higher taxes, prohibitive interest rates and inflation that Vietnam has caused?

How do we resolve the Vietnamization of the war with our goal of peace?

Is it war or peace that we want?

Or are we committed to the endless financing of corruption? Handouts? Giveaways?

This is supposed to be a resolution to help achieve the worthy goal of "bringing us together"—is not it?

But would not it aggravate the divisiveness rather than helping to ease the great stress and tension in this country? Would not passage of the resolution unleash new waves of discontent among Americans of varying views?

For I ask those who have supported the war, Do you realize this resolution opens the door for participation in the electoral process of the very Vietcong we have been fighting?

Is this the reason we have given 45,000 American lives and more than \$100 billion?

Will you who have supported the war be satisfied with the Communist takeover that this resolution is ready to accept?

Will those who have been able to justify our policy in Vietnam, be able to justify to their constituents a Communist government in Saigon?

President Nixon says he has adopted a new policy in Vietnam, so to those who supported President Johnson and now President Nixon I ask: Which policy do you really favor?

And to those sponsoring this resolution who have otherwise questioned policy, are you ready to repeat the error of Tonkin Gulf and possibly prolong the war?

Why did not the author of this resolution offer a similar resolution when President Johnson desired national unity?

These, Mr. Chairman, are the questions that have not been answered. How can we possibly vote "aye" when instead of unity this resolution only brings about confusion?

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. SISK).

(By unanimous consent, Mr. SISK was granted permission to speak out of order.)

FOR A FAIRER FLYING FINGER

Mr. SISK. Mr. Chairman, I understand, although I did not have the pleasure of observing it, that I made national television last night, not necessarily in a commendable fashion, but as a result of what has been reported to me I have sent the following telegram today, dispatched to Rowing and Martian, National Boobcasting Co., Beautiful Downtown Burbank, Calif.:

Laugh-In's decision to give me Flying Finger Award is consistent with standards of performance vigorously defended in recent weeks by executives of major networks and NBC. For prodigious feat of getting my name correct and everything else wrong you are hereby awarded the Spiro T. Agnew Flying Greek citation for outstanding achievement in electronic journalism. Honorable mention certificates go to print media for publishing erroneous information originally and to your research staff (laughter) for not troubling to verify accuracy of published reports. This exceptional accomplishment in broadcast reportage should be of assistance to television industry in fending off charges of irresponsibility and lack of objectivity. At the very least it will be of material help to our congressional reorganization subcommittee, which is currently deliberating whether to open House of Representatives to television coverage. For the record I am

not now and never have been a member of any congressional committee or subcommittee contemplating a trip to Africa to inspect roads or for any other purpose.

Since you are now properly informed, and with an affectionate genuflection toward the Federal Communications Commission and its fairness doctrine, I trust your fierce determination to speak the truth will lead you to take time at the earliest possible moment on a network laugh-in broadcast to make an appropriate correction. Unfortunately, in my humble judgment, a press release acknowledging the error will not do. Yours for a fairer flying finger.

B. F. SISK.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that if this does not produce the proper results I am going to contact Vice President AGNEW and solicit his assistance in this matter.

Back on the subject of the resolution at hand—and seriously, Mr. Chairman—I do support House Resolution 613. I signed this resolution as a cosponsor of the original resolution 612, because I do pledge my full support to the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam.

Since we can have only one President at a time, I have confidence that this President vigorously, sincerely, and with dedication seeks a just peace in Vietnam, just as the previous Presidents have sought it, and I support him in it. I see no earthly reason why anyone today would have any hesitation in supporting the President of the United States, the present one, the past ones, or one in the future, in seeking peace in any area of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. FOUNTAIN).

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Chairman, as one of the original cosponsors of House Resolution 613 I rise to support it.

I think it might be appropriate to report at this point at least one passage from the President's own remarks—a passage that should be read again and again by the war's more intelligent and responsible critics:

A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its Allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest. This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace—in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace. It would bring more war.

This, I am convinced, is the central issue of Vietnam. It is the major reason for our being there. It is the reason we can only get out in an honorable and responsible manner. It is why cries for unilateral, unconditional, total, and immediate American withdrawal are incompatible with this Nation's spirit and ideals—and why such a withdrawal would collapse the confidence which countless millions all over the world have in this country, and thus precipitate eventual disaster for the cause of freedom everywhere.

Mr. Chairman, surely we all want peace with justice in Vietnam. An overwhelming majority of Americans would like to see an early end to the war. In a world torn by violence, every human heart longs for peace.

However, it is apparent, especially after the recent demonstrations in Washington, that there is a sharp division of opinion about how to achieve the desired peace.

I fear there is a serious misunderstanding abroad, and particularly in North Vietnam, Russia and Communist China, as to the degree of support which exists for the President's attempts to end the war with justice and honor through negotiations.

The Communist representatives in Paris have repeatedly thrown up to our negotiators the fact of individual and group dissent within the United States.

Let me make it clear that I strongly support the right of responsible dissent. I also support just as strongly the right to dissent from dissent. Regrettably the Communists do not understand that this is democracy in action under our system.

However, the impression being spread abroad in the world, stemming from selected quotes by prominent Americans, including Members of Congress, is that America is almost wholly unwilling to do anything but precipitately withdraw from South Vietnam, that America is on the verge of internal political collapse.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Americans are still willing to pay any price to further the cause of freedom in the world. The President does have the substantial backing of the American people and of Members of the Congress. In fact, one of the latest polls indicates that 73 percent of our people are behind him.

This resolution would effectively rebut such allegations and show that an overwhelming majority of the American people want a just and responsible peace in Vietnam through negotiations, if humanly possible.

To demonstrate that support in a meaningful way, this resolution, if passed, will affirm the support of the House of Representatives for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just and honorable peace in Vietnam.

Whether right or wrong, the United States has declared it is not seeking a military victory in Vietnam. That is now the declared policy of the United States. It was the policy of the previous administration.

I personally think we were wrong in saying this and in not seeking a military victory which I believe we could have already won by now, especially if we had not halted the bombing and if we had put the proper military pressure upon North Vietnam. But our Government chose rather to fight a defensive war—to fight back, so to speak, in response to attacks from the enemy, and even then our troops were seriously restricted as to what they could do.

Unless we are willing, therefore, to endorse and accept a military and diplomatic defeat—which I am not—either announced or tacitly implied in any hasty withdrawal—then the only re-

maining alternative is a responsible and honorable withdrawal. This means, of course, protecting our own men and enabling those who have relied on us, to protect themselves after we leave.

That is the course the President outlined to the Nation on November 3. I believe he is earnestly trying to end the war and achieve an honorable peace. He needs our unlimited support in this effort. In fact, he must have it if even a semblance of stability and peace in Asia is to be achieved.

But, in order for a negotiated peace to be achieved, there must be some give and take on both sides. If the U.S. position is misunderstood in the world, then the other side will never participate in meaningful negotiations. They have already demonstrated this fact time and time again.

I believe this House resolution, cosponsored by over 300 other Members will help in this regard. At least, it will help set the record straight.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BURKE).

Mr. BURKE of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the House Resolution 613 supporting the President's efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam.

Why? Because I believe that the President, since assuming office on January 20, has pointed the direction for the American people, the way to a peace with honor that hopefully would discourage the Communists from starting other wars of aggression.

If we will now support the President in his efforts to achieve such a peace, this will be at least one kind of victory and perhaps this is the best we can hope for at this point in time.

Certainly no one can deny that it will be a victory if, when we leave South Vietnam as the President plans, we leave it fully able to defend itself if it has the will to do so.

We will not have run out on our allies as some have proposed, and we will not, as a country, have run out on our honor.

Instead, we will have taken a major step in implementing the President's plan for the security of all of Southeast Asia.

The plan that says: The United States will keep all of her treaty commitments.

That we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

That in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested, in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

Mr. Chairman, it is clear to me that our support of this resolution will help the President to follow this plan in Vietnam and to achieve a just and a fair peace.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PUCINSKI).

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this resolution which in my judgment would help the President get us out of Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, I support this resolution without reservation. I am not going to try to read anything into it or to read anything out of it. It simply states that the House of Representatives affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam. That is exactly what we are doing here.

We can talk all around this resolution. The fact remains that when you reduce this debate to its lowest common denominator you come up with only one answer: There is only one man in this country who has the awesome responsibility of bringing peace and that man is the Commander in Chief, under our Constitution, the President of the United States.

I want to affirm my support of the Commander in Chief. The President has spoken forcefully and clearly about his plans to withdraw American troops from Vietnam. I think some of his critics have failed to read his message on November 3. The President has made a commitment—a national commitment—to troop withdrawal. He has a plan for such withdrawal and I think he is wise in not announcing a specific timetable for the removal of these troops from Vietnam.

But certainly the situation is such today that such a troop withdrawal is possible.

President Johnson has said right along that if we can endure—if we can just hold the line, the time will come when the tide will shift in Vietnam and we can start withdrawing our troops. That time has now come.

When we went into South Vietnam there was no government; there was no economy; and South Vietnam had no army. They were on the brink of total collapse to the Communists. They were on the very brink of being completely taken over by the Communists.

Today, whether you like this government or not, there is a stable government. It is a government that has endured longer than any other government in the last 20 years. It is a de facto government in that country. There is a strong healthy economy in South Vietnam.

Just the other day they dedicated a new steel mill outside of Saigon which will produce 20 percent of the steel needs of all of Southeast Asia.

There is an army of a million South Vietnamese in South Vietnam—well trained. I saw those soldiers. I saw them in action.

So the President has properly stated that we can now assume a new posture—a new policy in Vietnam, of a gradual and orderly withdrawal of troops. For South Vietnam is now for the first time ready to assume the major role in its own defense.

I do not pretend to speak for the President or for the administration, but I have every reason to believe that by the end of 1970 there will be less than 200,000 American troops left in Vietnam and these will be mostly service-support troops.

President Nixon has set down a policy of disengagement of combat troops. And even if the war should turn and if there should be a new escalation of the war by the enemy, the President now has many options. He does not have to return American troops to Vietnam nor does he have to limit our help to South Vietnam only to renewed use of American troops.

So what we are saying here today in effect is that the situation has changed. The President has developed a series of new options and is using those options. He has committed this country to troop withdrawal. It would be my hope that we would look at this situation. In the long, hard, costly, difficult war, one that has cost us 40,000 American lives, 300,000 casualties, and countless billions of dollars, there is for the first time hope for American disengagement, and I would hope that this Congress, with the support of Members on both sides of the aisle, will get behind this President. He is our President—not as a Democrat or a Republican. He is our constitutional Commander in Chief. Let us serve notice on Vietnam that under his leadership, we will work our way out of this thing and have the just and honorable peace that this resolution calls for.

Mr. Chairman, I hope we can all see our way clear to join in unanimous support of this very important tool the President needs so urgently at this critical time to bring this tragic conflict to an end, or at least our own involvement in this conflict to an end.

I urge the unanimous support of President Nixon's plan for peace in Vietnam by voting for this resolution.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. McCLORY).

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to express my support today of House Resolution 613 indicating approval by the Members of this body of the President's efforts to bring an early and honorable peace in Vietnam.

It is intended as no reflection on the aims and objectives of the previous administrations to note here unqualifiedly that the President has taken new initiatives and, indeed, has articulated a new Asian policy which is being carried out in Vietnam and elsewhere in the Far East.

This policy which contemplates a reduction in American manpower—yes, and the complete withdrawal of American combat ground forces from Vietnam at the earliest practicable date—gives assurances also that our long held objectives for the people of South Vietnam continue to be in support of self-determination through operation of democratic processes—free elections supervised by an impartial international body.

Mr. Chairman, in my opinion the President's determination to delegate primary responsibility for conducting the Vietnam war to the Vietnamese themselves, and to limit our role to that of a supplier of military and economic assistance and the assigning of military advisers—this, in my opinion, should always have been our role and this should again be our role. Indeed, this appears to

me to be a position consistent with a long-range policy which was developed following World War II. The President's statement in Guam and elsewhere make clear his determination that we should return to that policy.

In addition to the overwhelming support which the President's policy appears to have among the American people, I was impressed during recent brief visits to India, Thailand, South Korea, and Japan, to note the substantial support of the political leaders of those countries in behalf of the Nixon doctrine.

I was particularly impressed in a conversation with the top career officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for India when he expressed concern for the plight of India in the event of a precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. While the Indians have been critical of our presence in Vietnam, they are aware also, as the result of being attacked by the Red Chinese, that any thoughtless and precipitate conduct on our part would endanger their own welfare. The leaders of Thailand, South Korea and Japan, with whom I spoke, praised both the determination of the President to scale down our involvement in the Far East as well as his declaration that the Asian nations themselves must assume the major responsibility for their own defense. It is heartening to know of this support since these nations of the Far East face the Red Chinese literally at gunpoint.

Mr. Chairman, the resolution, House Resolution 613 recognizes the appropriate role of the President in the conduct of the foreign affairs of our Government and particularly in connection with the war in Vietnam. It supports the President's policy for peace and is an honorable and meaningful expression of this body in behalf of the American people whom we represent.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. BURTON).

Mr. BURTON of California. Mr. Chairman, time and procedural limitations make it difficult for the individual Members to express precisely our respective positions on this important question. My own opposition to the war in Vietnam must assume is well known.

Just as the Tonkin Bay resolution has been interpreted as a blank check to conduct a war, so this resolution lends itself to the interpretation of providing *carte blanche* approval—before the fact—as to future negotiations.

The primary thrust of the resolution, in my view, whether intended or not, is to inhibit dissent. This thrust, in my view, will prove to be of little or no avail.

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, among others, I intend to oppose the pending matter.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of California. I yield to my distinguished colleague from New York (Mr. OTTINGER).

Mr. OTTINGER. I should like to ask the chairman of the committee or the author of the resolution, if as they contend the resolution encompasses no authorization for increased military activ-

ity, why, then, did the committee reject amendments that would have made that clear?

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of California. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. The answer to that is that this resolution addresses itself to the subject of our negotiating posture, not our military posture.

I should like to make one comment, if I may—

Mr. BURTON of California. I yield to the gentleman from New York for another question.

Mr. OTTINGER. The fear of many of us is that, as previous resolutions and previous statements in behalf of peace have been interpreted to support increased military activity in the name of peace, this resolution may well be construed by the President and used by him, as congressional support for military escalation in the name of promoting a just peace in the future. Certainly, if he decides to escalate he will use this as justification, despite the ambiguous prostration of the sponsors.

Mr. BURTON of California. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. The purpose of the resolution, contrary to the earlier comment, is not to inhibit dissent. The purpose is to affirm assent. We affirm our assent for the efforts of the President to negotiate a just peace.

Any Member of the House might speculate *ad infinitum* as to some conceivable decision the President might in the future make. This does not address itself to that. This addresses itself to the announced goal of the President to negotiate a peace based on free elections.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute to answer to the gentleman's question.

I suppose the fair answer to it is that it was because nobody offered such an amendment, so therefore it was not put in the bill.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. OTTINGER. The minority views say there were two amendments offered. One was to make it clear that this resolution did not mean approval of any enlargement or escalation of involvement in Vietnam, and the other was to make it clear the resolution did not afford an independent authorization for the commitment or maintenance of troops in Vietnam.

I read from page 16 of the minority views. It says both amendments were offered in the committee and rejected.

Mr. HAYS. I will say to the gentleman, on reading the minutes, there was such an amendment offered. I did not remember it. I thought the gentleman was talking about the resolution to continue troop withdrawal, which was turned down.

The reason I voted against it, and I do not mind telling the gentleman, was to prevent the very things which are being said today, as to giving *carte*

blanche authority to the President to move troops around.

I have said over and over again I do not want to tie the President's hands as to meaningful negotiations. But I have said over and over again this resolution is expressing support for him to negotiate peace—not to make war, not to escalate, not to move in more troops.

I do not know how much more clear we can make it.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. COLLIER).

Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that there is a Member of this body who is not fully aware of the fact that the North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris have used street protests and pronouncements of certain elected public officials against U.S. policy as an effective propaganda tool. I happen to believe that it has been a deterrent to any progress or success in the peace talks up to this time. However, because we enjoy, thank God, the right of free people in a democracy, no one should question the right of orderly or peaceful dissent. Regrettably, though, the dissent of a vocal minority of Americans both in and out of public office has been incorrectly assessed by our adversary. The idea that the expressed attitude of the most vocal and ardent dissenters reflects a consensus of the sentiment of the people of this country both in and out of Congress is lamentable. If we were able to get every adult citizen of this country into this Chamber and read to them the clear and concise language of House Resolution 613 and if it were further possible to have them vote for or against the resolution, can there be any doubt in anyone's mind in this Chamber as to what the outcome would be? I do not think so.

I, like many other Members of this body and many people throughout the country, have had frustrations about the war in Vietnam. I, like many of you, hope and pray for the day when we can extricate ourselves from the quagmire in which we find ourselves in Southeast Asia. Why and how we got there is at this juncture of no consequence in the discussion of this resolution. Certainly these frustrations do not justify the reading into it all of the things that are just not there or setting up of straw men, if you please, based upon what is not in the language. What can possibly be contrary to the hopes and desires of every citizen in this resolution to seek a just peace and to give the people of South Vietnam the right to choose its leaders, to determine its own fate by its own choice.

I have heard so often Members of this body espouse their deep belief in the right of every man everywhere in the world to human dignity. Essential to human dignity is the right of the people to free elections rather than to be placed under the heel of a totalitarian system. Our belief in this principle twice saved the world from disaster since the turn of this century. This principle has shaped the course of this Nation. Can we ask anything less than that for others anywhere in the world? We are today merely reaffirming our belief in this principle and supporting at the same time an ef-

fort to achieve peace on this basis. If we pass this resolution by an overwhelming vote today, it seems to me we will be announcing to the world and to the peace conferees in Paris that we still believe in these ideals. I hope that this House does just that before this day is over.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLLIER. I am delighted to yield to my colleague.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Our colleague from New York (Mr. OTTINGER) asked a question as to why this resolution does not carry a proviso in it that the President cannot increase our troop strength in Vietnam. Would my colleague from Illinois agree with me that if such a proviso were included in the resolution, it would have the same adverse effect that the President's announcement of a timetable would? The President quite wisely said, "I have a timetable, but I will not announce it and tell the enemy how long they will have to wait." Would this not have the same effect if we were to say in here that the President cannot increase troop strength?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman from Illinois 1 additional minute.

Mr. COLLIER. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I thank the gentleman.

We would in effect be saying in this resolution that this House is saying to the President that he cannot use whatever resources are available to bring this conflict to a just peace.

Mr. COLLIER. Yes; I agree with the gentleman. There is certainly no intent—and the gentleman should understand this from the nature of the resolution—that we are not trying to write tactical military policy during the consideration of this resolution.

And, Mr. Chairman, I must go to this point: When you attempt to spell out to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the President of the United States, a blueprint by which the Members of this House think he ought to follow with reference to both policy and the conduct of the war, in my opinion that would be ridiculous. We have never done it before and God forbid we never do it.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLLIER. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. OTTINGER. I do not support the Goodell resolution for a fixed timetable, nor was that the intent of the question. The question was whether this resolution authorizes the President to increase our military activity in South Vietnam—whether we are giving advance blanket approval, abdicating our future congressional prerogatives, to whatever military action the President may decide is needed to produce his definition of a just peace. The amendments rejected in committee would not have tied the President's hands, as indicated by the gentleman from Illinois, but would have merely made it clear—as the resolution sponsors now assert—that the resolution

does not involve approval of any enlargement or escalation of military activities in Vietnam and does not give any authorization for the commitment or maintenance of troops in Vietnam. The rejection of these amendments—and the closed rule prohibiting such amendments from being considered on the floor—leave the resolution open to interpretation that it is a blank check to the President to take any military action he deems appropriate in pursuit of a just peace, as he sees it. The chairman of the subcommittee admitted the rejection of these amendments. In the face of this admission, it is hard to believe later statements that the resolution encompasses the rejected amendments anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has again expired.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER).

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 additional minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER).

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER) is recognized for 6 minutes.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, 11 months after the fateful loss of President Kennedy this House passed a resolution known as the Gulf of Tonkin resolution giving certain authority to the President of the United States with respect to Southeastern Asia. Perhaps it is more than a coincidence that 11 months after President Nixon takes office we are now considering a resolution to express to the President our support for his efforts to achieve a just peace in Vietnam.

I would judge that once this resolution is passed, just as after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, it will probably be another 5 years before this House acts again.

Mr. Chairman, the problem with this resolution is, as the gentleman from Oklahoma so candidly stated, that it simply reiterates the goals that President Johnson stated again and again, which was that all the United States wanted was for the people of South Vietnam to have the freedom to choose their own future. In the name of that objective we first had some 20,000 troops and then several hundred thousand troops and then over one-half million troops in South Vietnam. I wish that in South Vietnam we could have elections for the people of that beleaguered country. But when the question was put even to those who are advocating the resolution, "Do you really want a Communist government in South Vietnam, assuming the people voted for it?" the answer was that it really is not going to happen; it is very unlikely. But, if it happens, that is all right.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRASER. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. HAYS. Do you want a Communist government in South Vietnam?

Mr. FRASER. No.

Mr. HAYS. All right.

Mr. FRASER. In other words, what

the proponents of the resolution are telling this House is that they want a settlement of this war under a procedure which they, themselves, claim would mean that the Communists would gain no political power.

Now the Communists today and the North Vietnamese forces control certain territory and a certain part of the population of South Vietnam. But the sponsors are, in effect, urging that we hold out for a solution to the conflict in Vietnam, which by their own statement would put the Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese forces further behind than they are today. Do you settle a war using diplomacy or procedures of elections which are going to basically change the relative status of the parties held by them while they are in conflict? I think that any student of international affairs would have to acknowledge that you cannot reasonably expect to settle a war in terms that are substantially different than those reflected in the actual conditions on the battlefield.

What does this mean? It means if we persist in the same goals that President Johnson persisted in for 4 long years, since early 1965, we will fight on and on and on.

And we are going to be fighting harder, I regret to say, than the South Vietnamese themselves are fighting. This is one of the tragedies of that war. If there is any one lesson one can draw from South Vietnam, and I think you can draw many, it is that you do not go in to help people when your forces are going to have to fight harder than the forces of the people you are trying to help.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRASER. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, does the gentleman from Minnesota suggest that we should abandon and forsake the idea of a government in South Vietnam based upon the will of the people as ascertained in an election, a free election in which all the people will be privileged to vote?

Mr. FRASER. I know the gentleman asks the question in all seriousness, and in all seriousness I simply have to tell the gentleman that the choice which faces the United States is either to change our objective or to fight on indefinitely.

Let me ask the gentleman a question: Is the gentleman prepared to stay on in South Vietnam indefinitely in order to pursue this objective? Is the gentleman prepared to say that we should stay for another 10 or 20 years in order to see the objective sought come into being?

Mr. WRIGHT. I would answer the gentleman by saying that I do not think it would be necessary to stay there indefinitely.

Mr. FRASER. It may not be necessary to stay there indefinitely, but if it were would you be willing to stay there?

Mr. WRIGHT. I would not be here with this resolution if that were the only alternative. I believe a peaceful settlement can be made.

I apologize to the gentleman for taking up too much of his time, but does the gentleman from Minnesota believe that

we ought to engage in forcing on the South Vietnamese a coalition government from the outside that would not necessarily be ratified by the will of the people?

Mr. FRASER. My own thought is this: that the United States should not seek to impose on the Saigon government anything. It is my view that the United States has done enough. It has done too much. We should proceed to disengage from the war and let the Vietnamese settle the conflict themselves.

Mr. WRIGHT. Will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. FRASER. I yield further to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. Does the gentleman think that is a satisfactory settlement if a way can be seen that will end the conflict?

Mr. FRASER. I think this war is an unmitigated tragedy. It is as bad a tragedy as I know of anywhere in the world. It is the kind of tragedy that we saw in the civil war in China. It is the kind of tragedy that is found in the Nigeria disaster, by what has occurred in Greece. It is the kind of tragedy that is as bad as any that we have seen around the world. I can only say to the gentleman that there are some problems we cannot solve by ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. STEIGER).

Mr. STEIGER of Arizona. Mr. Chairman, I think as everybody else must have observed from listening to the arguments this afternoon, that we have seen a rather interesting development. We have seen what appears to me to be politicians who have painted themselves into a corner by previous rhetoric who are really afraid to vote for this, politicians who are willing to lend themselves to an interpretation that is as farfetched as an interpretation can be. They have tried to make appear ambiguous that which is relatively free from ambiguity. They say that those who support this particular document are enforcing or endorsing a Communist government in South Vietnam, and they have tried to tell that it is asking for a decrease in the rate of withdrawal of troops.

Mr. Chairman, I think they are embarrassed because they are in a position of having to vote against a just peace in Vietnam, and against free elections in Vietnam.

It would seem to me that if they do feel that they are unable to vote for that, then their embarrassment is genuine, and I share it with them.

Mr. Chairman, I congratulate the author of the resolution, and the committee for bringing it out.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maine (Mr. HATHAWAY).

Mr. HATHAWAY. Mr. Chairman, peace in Vietnam is one of the most urgent tasks facing our Nation, and I support President Nixon in his efforts to achieve that peace. This does not mean, however, that I feel this House should

serve as a "rubberstamp" for Presidential policies in the field of foreign affairs. The people of our district did not elect us to sit up here on the Hill flashing green lights to the Executive down the Avenue. It represents no lack of confidence in the President to urge that a resolution of such import as House Resolution 613 be given our most careful study and consideration. We would be defaulting our constitutional obligations if we did otherwise. It is the purpose of our system of checks and balances to bring a balanced judgment to the issues we face. Vietnam, the subject of the resolution before us today, is the most burning issue of our times.

The initiative in the field of foreign relations is with the President, but the Constitution provides for the participation of Congress in foreign affairs both directly and indirectly. It is the responsibility of the Congress to determine national spending priorities, to raise armies, and to initiate revenue measures which support armies. Most importantly the Constitution grants to the Congress the power to declare war.

The Congress can perform a valuable function by assuming responsibility for the careful scrutiny and critical discussion of foreign policies and programs. In this way it can contribute to the clarification of basic policy issues, and help keep the executive agencies more alert, more efficient, and sharper in their own intellectual processes. Legislative hearings and debate on major foreign policy issues can contribute to public understanding and discussion of the issues.

The danger of security leaks during such public hearings and debate can be minimized, and the risk of such leaks is outweighed by the advantages of enlightened debate on the facts. The people should have a proper channel for critical analysis and evaluation of foreign policy decisions, and, through their representatives in Congress, they should share with the President in framing broad national objectives in the field of foreign affairs.

Let us play our constitutional role in contributing toward the formulation of foreign policy. I urge the Members of this House to defeat the resolution before us today and send the measure back to the Foreign Affairs Committee for hearings where we can have the opportunity to question officials and experts regarding the implications of this resolution and the many other resolutions on this subject. We are supposed to be a deliberative body. Let us deliberate and study and question before voting on such an important matter.

Mr. Chairman, I have observed the debate for 2 days now and I have been here most of the time.

Many issues have been raised. I think the most important and overriding one is that there are many disputes on the factual basis upon which this resolution is based and that these disputes could be resolved if proper hearings were held before the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN).

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chair-

man, the debate on this resolution should have clarified a number of issues for many of us.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the resolution. It is my hope, which I believe most of us share, that this resolution in a modest way can be helpful in bringing the war in Vietnam to an early and honorable settlement.

I believe this is a modest contribution. And I pay tribute to the author of the resolution because it does not attempt to take a position on, or to resolve some of the knotty questions with respect to Vietnam. Its basic purpose is simply to support the President in his efforts, which are still continuing, to begin successful negotiations in Vietnam. It takes nothing away from the President in the exercise of his prerogatives and it gives nothing to him. But a public statement of support for his efforts.

The language, of course, could be different. As a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, I pointed out in committee that there were certain changes I might consider advisable. There were major changes offered in the form of amendments in the committee; all these were defeated, in some cases by relatively small margins.

I personally felt that it would not have been inappropriate for our committee to have modified this resolution so as to include some reference to troop withdrawals, those which have taken place or which may take place in the future. At the same time I voted against an open rule on this resolution because without some restriction on debate in the House we could, in an attempt to write legislation in this area, perhaps take until Christmas. I doubt if much would be gained if the House should have been given that opportunity.

However, I personally hope that our Committee on Foreign Affairs does hold hearings on other resolutions in this general area, both with respect to troop withdrawals and other subjects. This will allow both Members of the Congress and members of the executive branch to come and discuss these questions.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I am glad the gentleman made the point about voting for the motion to order the previous question. So did I. It seems to me that those who now raise that point most loudly were the first ones to call for bringing the student loan program before the House under suspension so no amendments could be offered, and similarly on the tax bill they voted to bring it before the House under a closed rule. This is not the first time that an important measure has come before the House under this procedure.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I thank the gentleman for his contribution.

One of the advantages of this resolution, in my opinion, is that it avoids the big policy questions.

For example, except for calling for free elections, it does not go into the difficult question of the kind of government there should be either in Hanoi or

in Saigon, or in what ways it might be desirable to strengthen the local government. Nor does it discuss the character and nature of the troop support which we are supplying, and I think this is perhaps just as well.

We recognize that there is some sensitivity about the advisability of a resolution of this character; indeed, that feeling has been expressed by a number of speakers during this debate. This sensitivity is primarily the result of recent history.

As one Democrat pointed out, President Johnson vastly increased our military involvement in Vietnam in his search for peace. The inference was clear that President Nixon might do the same in the months ahead, relying on the resolution now under consideration as President Johnson made use of the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

Many of us were serving in Congress in 1964 when the Tonkin Gulf resolution was approved. Some fear that with the passage of this resolution it might be used to justify an escalation of our military involvement in Vietnam, or at least to continue our military support there indefinitely.

In this case of this resolution, however, as I have already pointed out, Congress as a body is taking no action—it will be an expression of the feeling of the House only.

Critics of this resolution have charged that approval would represent a blank check for future action, as well as a specific indorsement of what President Nixon has already done. Of course a reading of the language shows that there is no blanket approval of what the President has done or what he may do. I might point out also that the resolution carefully avoids any criticism, direct or indirect, of actions taken up to this point. This is no criticism of actions taken by former President Johnson even though several Members have expressed such views during debate.

Likewise there is no praise for actions already taken by President Nixon to reduce the extent of our commitment in Vietnam. As a Republican perhaps I should regret that such language was not included, but actually I am thankful that partisanship was avoided in the language used.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me say that I hope that the President succeeds in his efforts to end this war. This job will not be easy. To secure a just peace will be even more difficult, yet it is an objective which we must pursue.

In a recent statement to a group of American Governors visiting in Rome Pope Paul VI expressed his fervent wish for an early end to the war in Vietnam. The Pope recognized, however, that:

An appropriate means of putting an end to the conflict requires, in present circumstances, a well-mediated and responsible procedure, not only to assure that international obligations are not neglected, that honor and the need not to betray the trust of allies should be fulfilled, but also for the cause and the ideal held by your fellow citizens for which many have sacrificed their lives: aiding people weak and needy of assistance in defense of their right of self-

determination and the free promotion of their peaceful development. This cause and this ideal should not be negated. We nourish faith and hope that all who have a part in the Vietnam war will contribute to rendering the (peace) negotiations easier and more expeditious and that these negotiations will very soon lead, not only to end of the conflict, but to peace, a true and lasting peace.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. LOWENSTEIN).

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, the one thing that this discussion has made clear is that this resolution means all things to all men. Since it means all things to all men, one might assume it really, in the end, means nothing to anyone. Unfortunately, that is not the case.

Clearly, it means something to the President, or we would not have been treated to the special pressures that have assured its passage in this dubious manner. He has told us what it means to him: a blanket endorsement of his speech of November 3, with all its vagaries, inconsistencies, threats and bad history. Members may say what they wish about their intent if they vote "Aye"; the President will act on his version of what they meant. If Tonkin Gulf taught us nothing else, it surely has taught us that.

To the Saigon government it will mean that we are committed to stay in Vietnam until what are called free elections are held. This can only be a renewed announcement to that government—a government which never has believed in free elections—that as long as it can avoid free elections it can count on our continued military presence.

But the very use of the phrase "free elections" in this situation has to be self-deluding, since the Saigon government, over and over again, has told everyone who will listen that it will never allow a government it regards as pro-Communist to take power. So if we are to take this resolution seriously, we must assume that people the Saigon government calls pro-Communist will agree to take part in elections knowing they cannot win; or, alternatively, we must understand that we are committed to staying in Vietnam until a process has occurred which, by definition, cannot occur. That means that we will have to stay in Vietnam for the foreseeable—and unforeseeable—future, in hot pursuit of something which does not and cannot exist.

The procedure we are using to consider this resolution will not help matters much either. That procedure will add to the bitter and growing disunion in this country that distresses some of us so deeply. For whatever the purposes and protests of its sponsors, this is not a unifying resolution to begin with, and to approach its adoption in this way is to make of it a positive force for further disunion. The unifying of free men cannot take place at the cost of their integrity, or of the democratic process.

For one thing, we are told to take it or leave it. Discuss it for 3 minutes each—it and the vast, endless war it concerns—then vote for it or be damned as helping Hanoi. If you do not know what it means,

if there is no legislative history, if you are denied the chance to ask questions, or to answer questions, or even to answer innuendoes—forget all that and vote aye, or be accused of opposing and obstructing national unity.

But unity of free men in a divided nation is achieved by people counseling together in good faith and with good will. Discussions—and concessions—must seek common denominators, and procedures must be followed that will minimize resentments and encourage a spirit of trust and genuine effort. Then, tensions and division may ease, feelings of unity may be maximized, and some points of agreement may be found or worked out.

None of that can occur in this atmosphere, or on behalf of this resolution. What facade of agreement may be created by this misleading vote will not survive the most cursory glance through the statements even of those who have voted aye, so many of whom are doing so only after specifically noting that they did so because they do not know what the resolution means and so cannot see how voting for it can do any harm.

And that is certainly an understandable position. But while the meaning of the resolution is unclear, what is clear is that passing it in this fashion is a further abdication of the constitutional obligation of the Congress to declare wars if they are to be fought, and to concern itself with the peace and security of the Nation when they are imperiled.

There is, furthermore, something especially objectionable about passing high-sounding moralistic resolutions about American purposes in Vietnam at this particular moment. To pass this resolution as if the world were not still reeling from the relations about Song My shows all the sensitivity of a stone wall.

In short, you do not unify by shutting off the words of those who do not agree with you. You do not further the quest for a "just peace" in Vietnam by passing resolutions that blunder from incorrect historical recitations to the reiterations of high-sounding, unobtainable, and inconsistent—and, therefore, hypocritical and misleading—goals.

If the goal is really free elections, why do we not help the people of Spain and Greece to get free elections? Are we only for "free elections" where they cannot be obtained even at the price of half a million American troops and vast expenditures of lives and resources? There are places where we can support the principle of free elections and actually save some of our money, by refusing to continue to subsidize governments that spend so much of it and still are not willing to allow their people to vote.

If, on the other hand, the goal is a negotiated peace, surely it is clear by now that that goal cannot be achieved while the Thieu-Ky government is in power, since there is no way that government can stay in power without our military presence and no way the other side can be induced to make peace while Thieu and Ky are in power. Given these facts, one might as well expect the wife of

the Attorney General of the United States to lead a peace parade as to expect the Saigon government to let us leave or to negotiate itself out of power.

But it cannot be in the best interests of America to allow our foreign policy—especially on questions of war or peace and life or death—to be determined by foreign governments, least of all, perhaps, by the governments now in power in Saigon and Hanoi.

The national interest of this country requires us to begin immediately the withdrawal of all our Armed Forces from Vietnam on a stated schedule. If, after 7 years of American assistance, after 300,000 U.S. casualties and \$115 billion, if the Saigon government cannot now take care of itself against a ruthless and presumably despised Communist dictatorship ruling a smaller country, then perhaps it is time to face the fact squarely that it is not going to be able to do so if we simply keep propping it up for a few more months or years.

Nor is beginning the total withdrawal of all American servicemen going to encourage Hanoi to "wait things out." Does anyone really think Hanoi needs encouragement to "wait things out"? And if they did need such encouragement could we do anything here that would come close to rivaling the encouragement they must have obtained from the President's announcement of the decision of this Government to withdraw our combat troops as soon as practicable? What beginning the total withdrawal of our forces might do is to stop encouraging Saigon to wait things out. For the Saigon government would at last be put on notice that either it must negotiate a political settlement, or it must take over the fighting.

Mr. Chairman, I oppose this resolution, so innocent at first glance, so deceptive after analysis, so dangerous in the long run, it can only create further illusion in Saigon and further disillusion in this country. For, however cleverly it confuses the options now available, and no matter how many Members vote for it, nothing can long obscure the determination of the American people to get their troops out of Vietnam. We do no one a service by muddying that central fact with archaic rhetoric about equivocal resolutions.

As Mr. Townsend Hoopes, former Under Secretary of the Air Force, puts it in his brilliant book, "The Limits of Intervention":

Should the U.S. government pursue a course of partial withdrawal in Vietnam, while leading the American public to believe all will end well, I am afraid a number of unpleasant shocks, surprises, and politically dangerous consequences would arise to confront us. For at best, such a course is a prescription for an interminable war; partially disguised by the declining level of U.S. participation, it would in fact require our country to sustain a continuing burden of war casualties and heavy dollar costs that would become explicitly open-ended as we leveled off our forces at 100,000 men or thereabouts. Sooner or later, and probably sooner, the American people would reawaken to the fact that they were still committed to the endless support of a group of men in Saigon who represented nobody but themselves, preferred war to the risks of a political settlement, and could not remain in power for more than a few months without our large-scale presence.

I include in the RECORD at this point an especially valuable article and editorial from Look, one of America's most distinguished and widely read magazines:

VIETNAM: GET OUT NOW

(By J. Robert Moskin)

We have also failed to create a Vietnamese Army that can carry on its own struggle. To try to achieve that long shot will cost more tens of thousands of American lives.

And we have failed to help build a popular or democratic or cohesive government in Saigon. The current regime is a military dictatorship that depends wholly on our presence.

I have never been a Vietnam hawk either, but I respected the judgment of four U.S. administrations that called the fate of South Vietnam vital to our national interest.

Now, President Nixon has reversed this judgment, for which 39,000 Americans have died, 250,000 have suffered wounds and about \$100 billion have been spent. In his policy-setting May 14 speech, he said, "We are prepared to accept any government in South Vietnam that results from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves." This means our Government no longer believes that it is in our vital national interest to keep South Vietnam free from Communism.

It is a fair standard that young Americans should not be ordered to die unless their sacrifice is vital to their country.

We have absolutely no sane reason left for killing more than 1,000 young Americans before the end of this year. Our present course—spooning out American lives in an infinitely complex, inscrutable Asian game—is inexcusable.

It is difficult to conceive that the present South Vietnamese Government can survive the end of the hostilities or that South Vietnam, even if we go on fighting, will not be Communist-dominated soon after we leave. It really doesn't seem to matter whether we march to the transports today or dribble out before the 1970 U.S. elections or over the next three years. The results will be the same—except in the number of the dead.

In 1967, I traveled for Look along the frontier of American power on the western edge of the Pacific Ocean, and came home convinced that our involvement in the future of Asia is irreversible. That conviction remains. We are not about to scurry back into a Fortress America. Our presence across the Pacific is too massive, our interest too deep. But on this latest trip to Vietnam, I saw that we have overreached ourselves. America's historic westward-driving wave has crested.

No one I talked with—certainly no Vietnamese—believes we should stay in Vietnam. Everyone said we should get out. They differed only on the speed with which we should do so. The most militant—sometimes those most scared for their own skins—said in three years. At a conservative estimate of 100 U.S. dead per week, that means 15,600 more coffins.

Why is South Vietnam's political self-termination still worth dying for? Because, I was told in Washington and Saigon, we have committed out word, and if we leave precipitously, our word will be dishonored. We will lose face. Three years ago, Secretary of State Dean Rusk gave me the same reason for continuing this war. He called it "the credibility of the American commitment."

The Nixon Administration believes we will be "severely hurt" if we "bug out." It wants "a reasonable solution," praying for reasonableness from Hanoi while recognizing that it is against the Communists' interest to be "reasonable."

But by staying, are we telling Thailand, for example, that if it gets into trouble with Thai or North Vietnamese guerrillas, we would help? No one expects, I was told, that we would then send an expeditionary force to Thailand.

The outcome of this "war of national liberation" has no relevance to the chances of having more such wars in the future. Just about every Asian leader knows we have had enough in Vietnam.

Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew told me, "Vietnam was a bad place to draw the line."

Why then are Americans dying today in Vietnam? To give the South Vietnamese time to prepare to govern themselves and defend themselves. Are these reasonable goals?

We thought they were. We thought the South Vietnamese leaders would use the time we helped buy for them—with American lives and money—to good advantage. But they have not.

You need only go out in the countryside to see the failure of the succession of South Vietnamese governments to win the people's loyalty. Go to the upriver village of Dien Ban, about ten miles south of Danang, our great northern base in Quang Nam Province. You can get in safely only by helicopter. Here, American marines have to wear their flak vests in the road just outside their walled compound. This area has been fought over for years; there is still fighting every day. If the refugees were resettled in the countryside, officials fear, they would join the Vietcong.

I visited Dien Ban with the chief of the pacification program, Ambassador William G. Colby, who ranks Quang Nam 38th out of the 44 provinces in security. Terrorist attacks are heavy; government officials and ordinary civilians are being assassinated, wounded, kidnapped. The province chief, an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) colonel, figures that the Vietcong have 900 officials of their own in the province. Our side sends out "Political Recon Units" to terrorize and kill VC leaders.

Destruction in Quang Nam Province has been massive. Five years ago, the province had 557 hamlets; only 308 are left. The number of refugees has jumped in five years from 35,000 to 124,000. (One of every 12 people in South Vietnam is a refugee today.) Less than half of the province's rice land is cultivated. Fishermen may not return to shore after 6 p.m. Anyone walking about in the countryside after dusk without a light is shot automatically. In this province of 540,000 people, only one Vietnamese doctor remains, and while I was there, he was vacationing in West Germany. The people in the villages know nothing about the peace negotiations in Paris.

"Ninety percent of the people would cut our throats if they had the chance," a top American in Quang Nam told me.

Ambassador Colby says, "It's been a war between two aggressors, and the people wish they would both go away."

Warren E. Parker, senior U.S. adviser in the province, describes the situation today: "It's like a Cadillac pushing a Model T through a muddy road with four flat tires with a driver who doesn't know where he's going and doesn't really care."

On an island in the river below the provincial capital of Ho An sits the Xyuen Long Refugee Camp. It vividly tells part of the story of Vietnam's hopelessness. Here live 3,125 refugees. Only 240 are men. Until this summer, these people all lived on another nearby island that was regarded as a VC stronghold. A swift military sweep scooped up the women and children and a few of the men and transferred them to this desolate sand-dune camp. The rest of the men still are hiding with the VC in the tall grass. Moving their families in this manner made no converts, won no friends.

Yet President Nixon found himself able to tell U.S. troops in Vietnam this summer: "I think history may record this as one of America's finest hours."

In Paris, the diplomats debate semantics over whether troop withdrawals should be called "mutual" or "simultaneous." In Saigon, the politicians, fragmented in doz-

ens of parties, struggle for a piece of the spoils. And out in the countryside—where there is firing every night, assassinations repeatedly, where 12-year-old girls carry rifles—you feel that whatever happens in Paris or Saigon, the word will never get down to the bitter, frightened peasants in the fields and the thatch huts. The struggle, the terror, the dying of this desperate 23-year war—in which more than a million people have been killed and wounded—will go on and on. Says a wise American official there, "You can't negotiate an end of this war. We can only negotiate our way out of it."

In a lovely house in the handsome Paris suburb of Verrières-le-Buisson, Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, foreign minister of the National Liberation Front's self-appointed Provisional Revolutionary Government, told me much the same thing in more dogmatic terms. An attractive woman, she left a husband, a boy, 13, and a girl, 9, in Vietnam to head the VC delegation in Paris. Wearing a pale pink *ao dai* and black silk trousers, she sat in a sunny upstairs parlor next to a vase of red roses. Her eyes were hard, but she smiled as she talked: "I am, politically, a woman who resists American aggression for national independence. I am not a Marxist or a bourgeoisie. I love my country. I long for peace to come back so I can lead a normal life with my children."

But there is no hint of compromise: "If the American Government realizes its erroneous policy of aggression and is willing to end the war of aggression, we are ready to discuss with the American Government putting an end to the conflict. . . . If the American Government obstinately pursues its policy of aggression, the South Vietnamese people are resolved to struggle to victory."

Both sides claim they want elections in South Vietnam, and Mrs. Binh says, "The question is how to organize genuinely free, democratic general elections. The first condition is there must be no presence of American troops of aggression—and without foreign interference."

"I consider the Saigon administration has no competence to organize these elections because if the Saigon administration would organize these elections, they would only give birth to another puppet government."

"The Provisional Revolutionary Government has not asked to organize these elections or put forth election laws, and we [advocate] the formation of a provisional government that will organize the election."

That same day, Nguyen Thanh Le, the thin bespectacled spokesman for the North Vietnamese Government, sat in a room behind a heavily guarded stone wall in the Paris suburb of Choisy-le-Roi, puffed English State Express cigarettes, sipped amber tea from a signeted cup and said, "There can be no genuine free election while 500,000 American troops and 60,000 satellite troops remain in Vietnam." He asked if there could have been free elections in France when it was occupied by Hitler's troops.

I asked him why his government, if its objective is to get the United States out, doesn't agree to a cease-fire and simultaneous withdrawal of U.S. and North Vietnamese troops—and then the Americans would be gone.

Le tapped his right forefinger emphatically on his yellow cigarette box and said slowly, "Let me make it simple. Suppose there is a house, and a robber broke in and wrecks the property and killed the wife and children. The master of the house has the obligation to fight back. Simultaneous mutual withdrawal equates the bandit and the master of the house." He added, "The Johnson war is now becoming the Nixon war. Mr. Nixon is even more cunning, more perfidious."

I asked Le about the fear of many that when U.S. forces get out, there would be a

bloodbath, especially of anti-Communist Catholics. He called this propaganda of the ruling class. "There are now in South Vietnam many Catholic patriots and many Catholics and people of other religions who participate in the advisory council of South Vietnam and in the leadership of the NLF and the PRG."

"We have no discrimination against any religion. We unite with every patriot to defend the country. So far, those who previously participated in the puppet administration or army, no matter how their pasts were, if they favor the independence, peace and neutrality of South Vietnam, we will cooperate with them and we welcome them."

In Saigon, Sen. Nguyen Gia Hien, who heads South Vietnam's largest Catholic party and who studied at the University of Montana and Iowa State for six years, disagrees. He foresees a massacre. "I'm sure of it. We are not scared of it. The killing is going on now already, not only soldiers but civilians. They will attack anyone who is not working with them—not only Catholics."

The truth is somewhere between a massacre and a welcome. Certainly, the Communists will try to eliminate their most ardent opponents, and asylum will have to be provided for thousands. But this is a problem that will have to be met whether we get out now or later.

Hien's party, a member of President Nguyen Van Thieu's six-party coalition, the so-called National Social Democratic Front, is strongly anti-Communist and consists mostly of refugees from the North. Hien says it was originally subsidized by the late Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York, and Hien had a three-hour meeting last winter with Terence Cardinal Cooke in New York. Today, Hien accepts the eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops. "Withdrawal of the main American force should take about three years. It was a period of three years. Two years is too quick for us. If after three years we cannot take care of ourselves, we have nobody else to blame. If the Communists take over, some people will fly off, and we will be guerrillas. And it will go on again."

Meanwhile, he presses Thieu for social and land reforms. "We can do more for peace by being more liberal, being better organized, less corrupt."

Truong Dinh Dzu, who ran second to the Thieu-Ky ticket in the 1967 presidential elections and who favored talking peace with the Vietcong and creating a coalition government, was thrown into jail. But there are still some political figures in Saigon who advocate what Le and Mrs. Binh call "independence, peace and neutrality." One such group of intellectuals calls itself the Progressive Nationalist Force. Its chairman is Tran Ngoc Lieng, a 46-year-old lawyer. He told me, "We advocate a complete and immediate cease-fire. We call for a government of reconciliation that will have the responsibility for holding elections in Vietnam." Such a government, he says, would be composed of non-Communist nationalists of both sides, and all its members would have to be acceptable to both sides. This rather idealistic plan would naturally exclude members of the Thieu government as well as the Communists in PRG.

Although Lieng will not admit it, he is reportedly close to Gen. Duong Van "Big" Minh, who is perhaps the nearest thing South Vietnam has to a popular politician and who has now been allowed to return from exile in Thailand.

Saigon politics is atomized among northerners, southerners, several factions of Buddhists, Catholics, religious sects like the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, neutralists and anti-Communists. Splitting these groups are layers upon layers of individual feuds and historical animosities that go back to the period of French rule. And, above all, most of the politicians are out for their own gain.

Says retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lans-

dale, who knows Vietnamese politics. "It's a family quarrel, and a very savage one, as a family quarrel can be."

The feuding factions seem no longer able to get together before it is too late. But if these anti-Communist and non-Communist nationalists do not unite, there is no chance that they can survive in the postwar political turmoil.

Sen. Tran Van Don, a former general who led the 1963 overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem, says, "The problem is not with the NLF. The problem is inside ourselves . . ."

"I don't believe President Thieu can lead the country alone. He needs to rally the army and the people. It is not enough to rally the United States. But he is very proud. He is very jealous of his power. He wants to keep power for himself. I think he would like to become a dictator."

Responsible estimates of the number of political prisoners being held by the Thieu government range as high as 30,000. Many politicians, editors, intellectuals have been jailed by military courts or by "administrative procedures" at the government's whim. They are held for arbitrary lengths of time. The secretary general of the House of Deputies of the National Assembly, Tran Ngoc Chau, says, "Many times people get kidnapped in the streets and taken to places no one knows about."

A woman secretary in the National Assembly was jailed for a month because she has a relative in the Vietcong. A neutralist politician was given a year in prison for calling an illegal meeting—a press conference. A Saigon University professor's two-year sentence for criticizing U.S. policy was suspended; but ten months later, he was still held on the prison island of Poulo Condore. Publisher Nguyen Lau of the Saigon *Daily News* was sentenced to five years because he talked with a Vietcong agent. (Thirty newspapers have been closed down.) Such cases do not increase confidence in the possibility of free elections.

U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker does not condone these actions, but he says, "We have to remember they are at war. The war is right on their own soil—right in Saigon."

A courageous lawyer, Tran Van Truyen, 56, who has represented a number of such political defendants, says, "We have a national assembly, the president of the republic elected by a general election. But I tell you we have a *seeming* democracy. . . . This government permits no criticism."

Sen. Tran Van Lam, a leader of Thieu's National Social Democratic Front who became South Vietnam's foreign minister in the recent cabinet shuffle, wants the military courts eliminated and all cases tried in civil courts.

Of an American withdrawal, Lam says: "Personally, I think it would be a very good thing. This must be a Vietnamese war."

The government in Saigon is not a popular government. It is basically an army regime, and the people universally fear the army—any army. Hopes that the cabinet changes in September would bring into the government a broader range of civilian views were dashed by the appointment of a right-wing general as prime minister.

The real power behind this government is in the hands of the generals, and Thieu has constantly resisted American pressure to democratize his methods and broaden his political base. What little has been achieved is mainly the result of American persuasion and arm-twisting. Ambassador Bunker, Thieu's confidant, has by all accounts been superb at this. But it has not been enough. A knowledgeable American in Saigon says of Thieu, "He wouldn't have a chance in hell if the Communists weren't pounding at the gates."

The Vietcong obviously want to avoid an election, even if internationally supervised, that would be managed on the rice-roots level by province chiefs, district chiefs, sol-

diers and police beholden to Thieu. The common guess in Saigon is that the Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary Government would win 20 to 25 percent of the vote. But since Thieu won in 1967 with only 35 percent, and a major part of that came from the army and the bureaucracy, he has little margin of safety. With the PRC putting up a common front and the Saigon politicians divided, the political struggle threatens to be as hopeless as the military one has been.

Since a political solution that will leave South Vietnam non-Communist is so iffy, it's up to the army, the Arvin, to hold off the Communists. Crucial is the speed with which the Arvin can replace the GI's. The process of preparing the Arvin to take over the fighting is what we mean by "Vietnamization."

U.S. officers now admit that one of the great failures of our military effort has been our neglect of the Arvin. The result of this—plus the Arvin's war weariness, corruption, low pay and the killing off of many of the best officers—is an army that is incapable of defending its country, even if given all the benefits of the United States technology.

Says one American general in a position to judge, "They'll be reasonably self-sufficient in time—three years from now." The question is, can we wait?

When Vietnamization started, no one expected to prepare the Arvin to handle the North Vietnamese Army. The hope was that, in time, it could stand up to the Vietcong. Now, the Nixon Administration dreams of preparing the Arvin to cope with the NVA, too, as a possible alternative to mutual withdrawal.

Of course, even if a cease-fire or peace were arranged and/or American forces withdrawn, there is no way to insure against reinvansion from the North in overwhelming force months after we go.

Ironically, the greatest American hero of the war, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, who commanded our forces there and now is the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff, has become a scapegoat in Vietnam. Some American officers who want to keep fighting today claim that Westmoreland fought the war all wrong, "clobbering everything in sight" in World War II style with big unit battles and massive air support, while the enemy was fighting a semi-guerrilla war.

The military public relations people's new hero is Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, the able current U.S. military commander, whom they love to call "The Spoiler." Abrams' approach is not to wait until the enemy has massed but to hit him as he is preparing his battlefield and gathering his forces from his headquarters safely out of reach in Cambodia.

Abrams told me, "There is a limit to what the United States can do. The solution here has to be Vietnamese." He adds, "I'm in favor of taking out some American troops. There is such a thing as helping too much."

Yet, the fact remains that the Arvin continues to need a great deal of help. It has three main problems. First, it is hated and feared by its own people. One American official in the field tells how a Vietnamese Ranger battalion, supposedly an elite unit, recently went through a village, stealing chickens and belongings. He says with disgust, "You don't make friends that way."

Second, a tremendous effort is needed to train the Arvin's officers and men to handle complex weapons and communications systems, from radios to helicopters. As an American officer told me sardonically, "We'll know we're making progress when we can get a phone call to the Arvin straight."

Third—and most urgent of all—is the problem of leadership. American observers say the Vietnamese, when properly motivated and led, can be excellent soldiers. But the

Arvin's officers and even noncoms are too often personally overambitious and corrupt.

All in all, I return from Vietnam this time with a sense of hopelessness, deeper perhaps than the personal despair expressed by Look correspondent Sam Castan before he was killed in combat there in 1966.

Politically and militarily, the South Vietnamese are still, after all these years, not yet prepared to take care of themselves. It would cost more thousands of American lives to give them any chance to do so. Now that our Government no longer judges it vital to our security that South Vietnam not go Communist, what justification is there for further American sacrifices?

The simple truth is that the price of keeping South Vietnam non-Communist has been raised to a level the American people are no longer willing to pay. That is a realistic definition of defeat.

If we learn the lesson of Vietnam—that American power has its limitations—this war may at least mark the end of an era and the beginning of a new, less punitive and more imaginative role in the world for the United States.

AN EDITORIAL: A VICTORY WE CAN WIN

LOOK's May 14, 1968, issue carried an editorial which concluded that "the most important national business before us in this year of political debate is to wind up our involvement in the Vietnam war as quickly and as honorably as possible, and to go on from there to the creation of a world order in which America's ingenuity will truly serve the cause of peace."

Eighteen months, scores of meetings, hundreds of speeches, thousands of deaths, millions of tears and billions of wasted dollars later, we think these words are worth repeating—here at the end of Bob Moskin's eloquent report—in the hope that someday soon, someone in Washington will have the courage to say: "We made a mistake. This is not our war. Let's stop it—now."

Simple? Yes. Politically risky? Perhaps. Humiliating? No—because that would be a new kind of American victory—a victory won over our own willful and self-defeating pride. A victory the whole world would applaud.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. SCHADEBERG).

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Resolution 613. One of the reasons we do not yet enjoy peace in Vietnam is that the military junta government in North Vietnam, which is not in power by the expressed will of the people, who have not enjoyed the right of free elections, has interpreted the division in this Nation created over our participation in Vietnam to mean a loss of confidence not only in the leadership of this country, but in our ability to win a military victory in Vietnam. It is not my desire to impugn the loyalty or patriotism of any citizen who chooses to oppose verbally and/or by demonstration the policy of our Government but the fact remains that the prime movers of the organized opposition to our Vietnam policy have intentionally or unintentionally given aid and comfort to the enemy. How else can we interpret it when the Hanoi government openly praises the efforts of the demonstrations that keep the wounds of disunity festering.

Be that as it may the time has come for this House to be about its business of closing ranks to give the President the broad base of support necessary in

his negotiations to bring our participation in this war to its earliest honorable conclusion. Without closing ranks there can be only two alternatives open to us: (a) outright surrender or (b) escalation of the war. To escalate the war in Vietnam would be, I believe, to break faith with the American people. It would put this Nation in the untenable situation of being the aggressors in Vietnam. This is the label, false to be sure, that is pinned on us by an enemy expert, as it is unprincipled, in its propaganda efforts. What is needed is not an escalation but a definite deescalation of the military activities. Our President is committed to a policy of deescalation and he deserves our support.

It would be most unwise to accept outright surrender in Vietnam not only because of the loss of honor for this Nation; or because it would result in having our young men who have served in Vietnam to have made their sacrifices in vain—but because it would open the door for the next world war which must be avoided if at all possible. It would be an admission that we cannot win the war or at least be interpreted by the Communist world as our inability to win. I heard on this floor a statement by one of my colleagues that the war in Vietnam is "a war we cannot win." Nothing could be further from the truth.

To repudiate our responsibility as the leader of the free world would be an admission to the world, friend or foe alike, that we are so weak we cannot cope with a third or fourth rate government like Hanoi.

Worst yet, it would be interpreted as a moral weakness that indicated not only that we did not really believe in freedom but that we lack the moral fibre to meet tyranny face to face and oppose it.

This, Mr. Chairman, is an invitation at appeasement that would merely delay the final confrontation and bring the world to a total war just as appeasement of the Kaiser led to World War II and appeasement of the Communists in Korea to the Korean police action. Because of our appeasement of the North Korean Government the Korean war deteriorated to a point at which our hands were tied. We secured a truce in warfare but could no longer pursue our efforts to bring to Korea a just or even a lasting peace.

If you have any doubts about what the intention of the supporters of Communist tyranny have toward further aggression, or if you have any doubts as to why the supporters of Communist tyranny chose to bog us down in the battlefield, you should read the official report by the Government of China giving its assessment of the United States following the temporary settlement of the Korean war in which we did not demand a victory. In this report the Chinese interpreted our failure to win not only as a lack of will to win, born out of ignorance of our political system and our loyalty to the cause of freedom, but as a lack of military means. It is no wonder the small communistic group of tyrants have chosen to meet us on the battlefields of Vietnam. No one knowledgeable of our

military strength could honestly question our military capacity to wipe the whole of Vietnam off the map in 1 week if we chose to release our full capabilities.

Our leadership, committed to responsible action in this nuclear age, has felt there is another way to solve our differences besides all-out war which might well engulf the world in its clutches. It has chosen the more difficult and painful solution—limited war. After great sacrifices in a limited war policy designed to remove the threat of an all-out war, we are on the verge of bringing the enemy to its knees. But we are being denied victory because some chose to give Hanoi the spark of hope that our will—not our ability, but our will—to preserve freedom for others will soon break and we will turn tail, repudiate our sense of honor, and abandon those who look to us for help.

I want this war to come to an end now, but I do not want peace at the price of honor, or the future of freedom for anyone, including our own loved ones. I believe that this generation would not knowingly want to avoid this confrontation if it means that in a few years their brothers or their children could be faced with the necessity of conflict on the battlefields, either within the continental limits or one of the States separated from our shores, or any other area critical to the division of this Nation.

Mr. Chairman, I support this resolution and urge my colleagues to give to the President a helping hand in his efforts with honor.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. DENNIS).

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I support House Resolution 613 for a number of reasons but chiefly because, under the circumstances in which we now find ourselves, support for the resolution is to be equated with support for the policy of the President of the United States in regard to Vietnam; and I believe that today it is of the first importance to our country to have an overwhelming expression of such support, and that this resolution is the best vehicle available by which to obtain such an expression.

The resolution itself, like most human efforts, is imperfect, and there is at least one point contained therein which I believe requires interpretation and understanding—I refer to the reference to free elections in South Vietnam and the willingness of the United States to abide by the results thereof. It should be emphasized, I think, that free elections mean election's truly free, and consequently that any participation therein by the Vietcong must necessarily be by a reformed and peaceful Vietcong, which has renounced the use of force, and which has itself resolved to abide by the results of a free election. Such a development would seem to be unlikely.

Again while the resolution is a resolution for peace and, as such, properly confines itself basically, and in terms, to that field, it in no sense rules out a peace brought about in part by United States military action or assistance, if that proves to be necessary, nor does it mandate the President to commit our coun-

try to any hasty or ill considered military withdrawal, or to a withdrawal by a date certain to be announced in advance.

On the contrary this resolution, at the time and under the circumstances of its adoption, is and must be preeminently an endorsement of the Vietnam policies of the President; and it is with that understanding that I support and vote for this resolution.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. RIEGLE).

Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, I cosponsored this resolution, and I want to make it clear I did so on the basis of an understanding that the President was specifically requesting my support.

While I believe this resolution is sadly deficient in many ways, I will support a diplomatic initiative which the President judges to serve the cause of ending the war and achieving peace.

I did pose a question to the sponsor of this resolution, the gentleman from Texas, earlier. I asked him if this resolution authorized or delegated any war-making powers to the President in any way.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIEGLE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. HAYS. I am a cosponsor of the resolution, and I have answered that question at least six or seven times during the course of the debate. The answer is categorically "No."

Mr. RIEGLE. I am glad to have it there again.

I believe this resolution in no way repeats the tragedy of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Let me assure the Members that I intend to continue to press for the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution effective December 31, 1970.

Now I am not bothered by what is contained in this resolution, but I am deeply distressed about what is not there.

Let me catalog the major weaknesses in this resolution.

First, it fails to say anything about American troop withdrawals or the Vietnamization program.

Second, it fails to address the question of stopping American combat deaths.

Third, it fails to call on the South Vietnamese regime to end political repression, broaden its base, carry out meaningful land reform, improve the quality of life for the villagers, end government corruption and inefficiency, solve the refugee problem, and take over all combat responsibility—among other things.

But the most discouraging thing about this proceeding has been the total destruction of meaningful legislative process by the power structure of this House.

To ram this resolution through committee—without hearings—to bring it to the floor under a closed rule—to limit debate—and to purposely gut the motion to recommit—is a disappointing use of arbitrary power.

What is it that the leadership in both parties is so afraid of? Why is open debate and an open amendment process so dangerous? Perhaps what we are afraid of is the truth.

We have experienced 8 years of undeclared war. We threw the Constitution of the United States out of the window on this war.

Over 40,000 Americans are dead.

Over 300,000 Americans wounded.

We have dropped more bombs than in all of World War II.

I believe the leadership of both parties condemns itself when, by token actions like these, it shows so little respect for the massive sacrifices and agonies this war has already afflicted on America. The procedures used on this resolution are an act of fear by this House. We are ducking the issue; we are not facing up to it.

If this body had courage equal to our soaring rhetoric and artful dodging on this issue of war, we would go into continuous session, around the clock, 7 days a week, either to require an orderly withdrawal from Vietnam consistent with the safety of our troops—or declare outright war.

I support what is contained in this resolution, but feel a great sadness for what is not contained there.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. RYAN).

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, while House Resolution 613 may appear rather innocuous on its face, it must be viewed in the context of the President's November 3 address to the Nation, its introduction in the House of Representatives on November 4, and the interpretation placed upon it by the President himself in his unprecedented visit to the House on November 13.

The President in thanking the cosponsors said:

Yesterday I was informed by a bipartisan group from the House of Representatives that over 300 Members of the House had joined in sponsoring a resolution for a just peace in Vietnam along the lines of the proposal that I made in a speech on November 3.

The President went on to observe:

But I do not know when the great issues are involved, that in this House, that what happened yesterday with that announcement on the part of Members of both sides of the aisle of well over a majority supporting the policy of the President of the United States, I realize that that was in the great tradition of this country.

So, in the words of the President, this is a "resolution for a just peace in Vietnam along the lines of the proposal that I made in a speech on November 3." It will be used as an endorsement of his policy. In fact, Ambassador Lodge has already used the fact that over 300 Members of Congress support this resolution as evidence of overwhelming support in America for the President's position.

If the House feels that an endorsement of the President's plan of November 3 is justified, then House Resolution 613 should be supported. However, let us not deceive ourselves as to how approval of the resolution will be construed.

This is the first time, except for supplemental Vietnam and other military authorization and appropriation bills, that the House has had the opportunity to deal with U.S. policy in Vietnam since 1964.

There should be a full scale debate

with the opportunity to offer amendments and to consider alternatives to the administration's policy in Vietnam. Instead, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Rules Committee have done their utmost to see that the resolution is swiftly passed with a minimum of debate.

The fact that House Resolution 613 has been brought before the House under a parliamentary procedure which forecloses such a debate on the most crucial issue before the Nation is sufficient reason to oppose it.

The language of the resolution is vague. The phrase "a just peace" is not defined, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee held no hearings to help establish a legislative history.

The lesson of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution should not be disregarded. That resolution was completely distorted and used by President Johnson to justify committing half a million American servicemen to a land war in Asia without a declaration of war. House Resolution 613, as already interpreted by the President, is broad enough to give him a free hand to take whatever action he feels is necessary to achieve "a just peace"—however he may define the term.

Although the resolution speaks of the President's efforts in negotiations, the President's emphasis upon Vietnamization of the conflict and the resignations of Ambassador Lodge and his deputy suggest that the administration is not vigorously pursuing a negotiated settlement.

The Paris talks are not stalled because of domestic criticism of the administration's policy.

Sponsors of the resolution have put together a compilation of statements made by critics of our Vietnam policy which have been used by the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris. This compilation is used to show "how statements and actions by a few Members of the U.S. Congress have given grist to the enemy propaganda mills—and how they are used to delay progress toward a settlement." The effect is to attempt to stifle dissent.

Do the sponsors of the resolution really believe that approval of this resolution will improve our negotiating position in Paris by showing that the Nation is united behind presidential policy on Vietnam?

Approval of this resolution will in no way change the fact that this country is divided over our course in Vietnam. Nor will it be of any assistance to our negotiating position in Paris. The Paris talks are not stalled because of statements made by Members of Congress and other Americans who do not agree with present policy.

One reason that the talks are stalled is because this administration, as did the previous administration, refuses to accept the political reality that the National Liberation Front or the Vietcong has a role in the political future of South Vietnam. Another reason is the administration's failure to seize possible openings for new initiatives.

For instance, in his November 3 speech President Nixon referred to his letter of July 15 to Ho Chi Minh in which he said that he was willing to discuss specifically

the 10-point program of the National Liberation Front.

The response which came back from Ho Chi Minh said clearly that the 10 points of the National Liberation Front were a "logical and reasonable basis for the settlement of the Vietnamese problem."

That letter was dismissed in the President's speech, as showing Hanoi's unwillingness to negotiate, but I suggest that it was dismissed either without a critical analysis of the import of its meaning or else simply in an effort to persuade the American people that a meaningful initiative had been rejected.

Since the night of his speech, the President's interpretation of that letter has been challenged by many Americans, who viewed the letter as an invitation to pursue negotiations.

Ambassador Averell Harriman suggested that the letter's last paragraph was a "wide open invitation."

Senator EDMUND MUSKIE also saw the paragraph as "an invitation" to pursue negotiations. Senator MUSKIE further questioned why the White House not only took the letter as a rejection of the President's negotiating offer, but also why it did not use the letter to discuss the matter further with Ho's successors.

The criteria for the withdrawal of ground combat forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces as stated by the President in his speech are progress at the Paris talks, the level of enemy activity, and the progress of the training program of South Vietnamese forces. These factors are not within our control but will be determined by the Governments of North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

The concept of Vietnamization goes back to our original involvement in Vietnam. Then the policy was to train and provide military assistance to Vietnamese forces. It did not work, and in 1965 the war was Americanized. Throughout the Johnson administration, the concept of Vietnamization was still a basis of our policy.

Now, in 1969, this administration is again talking about Vietnamizing the war. If the quality of the South Vietnamese forces could not be improved in 15 years to the point where they can fight for themselves, how do we expect it to be accomplished in the near future?

The last of the criteria is the level of enemy action. This war has been going on for over 25 years. How can we base our withdrawal on enemy activity when it has ebbed and flowed for over a quarter of a century. The President's unspecified timetable for withdrawal is based upon factors over which we really have little or no control.

In addition, the President stated that, if enemy activity increases, he will not hesitate to react accordingly. Here, he committed the United States to win the peace—and left the door open to possible escalation.

The President has stated that we no longer expect a military victory, but in his speech he spoke in terms of winning, which could mean an indefinite military presence in South Vietnam. Since the start of the Paris talks in May 1968,

more than 17,000 Americans have sacrificed their lives in Vietnam. We cannot afford to let more young men die in order to soothe national pride.

The supporters of the resolution have ignored the problem of the Saigon regime. Although the resolution supports the concept of free elections open to all South Vietnamese, the resolution does not face the problem of the undemocratic, corrupt regime in Saigon.

President Thieu promised a broad-based government and then jailed his opposition. Over 75 percent of the population of South Vietnam, according to Ambassador Averell Harriman, are anti-Communist. However, they do not participate in the government in Saigon. The resolution does not insist upon the broadening of the government of South Vietnam.

At a time when millions of Americans want the United States to withdraw from Vietnam the resolution does not even mention troop withdrawals. Supporters of the resolution argue that the House should not advise the President about a timetable in that it does not know what the future military possibilities are. By not including any reference to withdrawals, this resolution will not impress upon the President that Americans want a withdrawal of troops as soon as possible.

If the House is serious about advising the President upon policy, and not simply giving him a blank check, then it should set forth its views on troop withdrawals.

The House has every right to demand that troop withdrawal continue on a regular basis. I am a cosponsor along with 13 other Members of the House of House Concurrent Resolution 403 which expresses the sense of the Congress that all U.S. forces should now be withdrawn from Vietnam, the pace of the withdrawal to be limited only by steps to insure the safety of our forces, and that the United States should assist in the provision of asylum in friendly countries for those Vietnamese who might be endangered by our disengagement. The sponsors of our resolution feel that the House must heed the concern which was shown throughout the country on October 15 and in Washington on November 15.

Only the U.S. Congress has the constitutional power to declare war. Yet 40,000 American lives have been lost in a war that is undeclared. Certainly the House should let the President know whether or not the war should be continued.

Mr. Chairman, I am not willing to vote for a resolution which will be construed as support for a policy which is perpetuating the tragic war in Vietnam which I have consistently opposed from its inception. The time has come for the House of Representatives to face squarely the consequences both at home and abroad of this disastrous chapter in American history.

I include at this point in the RECORD a very well-reasoned editorial from the New York Times of November 7, 1969, which discusses the administration's open-ended commitment to Saigon which this resolution supports:

COMMITMENT TO SAIGON

The House Foreign Affairs Committee's approval yesterday of President Nixon's efforts "to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam" implies an endorsement of his policies hardly justified by the President's address to the nation earlier this week. Mr. Nixon's long-heralded "plan for peace" has emerged, in fact, as a familiar program that contains nothing new and is founded on old premises and policies that have mired the United States in a debilitating conflict of indeterminate duration in Southeast Asia.

Many Americans, including even some of the strongest former supporters of the war, long ago concluded that Vietnam is not so vital to United States interests as they once thought it was and therefore is not worth the terrible price in American and Vietnamese lives and resources the war is exacting. This tardy public awakening would be a powerful argument in support of a President determined to unite the nation for a compromise peace.

Mr. Nixon instead has chosen to resurrect by implication, the old concept of a Communist monolith poised to conquer the world, which does not conform to the political reality of the present day. He has revived and expanded the thesis of former Secretary Rusk that a row of tottering dominoes stretching from Bangkok to Berlin to Buenos Aires has only the American-backed regime in Saigon standing in the way of worldwide disaster. If the President really believes his own rhetoric, how could he possibly settle for less than the "victory" in South Vietnam that even Lyndon Johnson finally despaired of winning?

Mr. Nixon's plan for victory—to "win America's peace," is the way he put it—depends upon a continuing military effort, but with South Vietnamese troops increasingly relieving American troops of the main burden of fighting. This program of "Vietnamization" is based on assumptions repeatedly advanced in the past and repeatedly discredited; that is, that the present Saigon Government is growing stronger and will soon be able to stand on its own feet, and that the enemy is growing weaker and will fade away.

If during the course of a prolonged American withdrawal enemy forces should strike hard again, as they are likely to do, and if South Vietnamese troops should fail to meet the test, as they have failed in the past, President Nixon has vowed "to take strong and effective measures to deal with the situation." He has thus again committed the United States to protect the present regime in Saigon as long as that regime is unable to protect itself.

This open-ended commitment to Saigon is, in fact, inconsistent with the Asian Doctrine the President wisely enunciated at Guam. It means that the level of American participation in Southeast Asia, and therefore the limits of American capacity to deal with other problems at home and abroad, will be determined not by Washington but by the actions of Saigon and the reactions of Hanoi and its allies.

President Nixon says the only alternative to his strategy is "precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action." This is not the only alternative. Nor is it the position of the sober majority of Vietnam war critics, despite the President's implication that it is. Most critics of Vietnam policies, old and new, believe that what is required is steady, orderly withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam under conditions that offer maximum safeguards against the massacres and other calamities Mr. Nixon predicts.

It is conceivable that this kind of determined, deliberate withdrawal is what Mr. Nixon really has in mind. There are passages in his speech that encourage such an interpretation, as do predictions from Saigon that all American combat troops will be out of

South Vietnam by the end of next year. If this is the case, it is most unfortunate that the President chose to confuse his true purpose with rhetoric reminiscent of the disastrous past, rhetoric which is not likely to deter the enemy or his critics but which could seriously limit his options in the difficult days ahead.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. VIGORITO).

Mr. VIGORITO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Ohio for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I have been very pessimistic with respect to our entire involvement in Vietnam ever since the campaign of 1964. I am still pessimistic about it. I am also pessimistic with regard to the negotiations. I do not believe anything final will come of the negotiations in Paris. The Vietcong and the North Vietnamese will stay in Paris until hell freezes over. We cannot force them to negotiate. They will not fight until they are defeated; they will quit and come back to fight another day. However, let me say that I am in favor of negotiations. I wish the President luck in negotiations, and from the bottom of my heart I wish the President success.

Our country surely needs peace. The world needs peace. I am definitely against escalating the war. No matter what we do, we cannot dictate to the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong. Again, I repeat, I wish the President all the luck in the world in his attempts to bring us peace.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. PELLY).

Mr. PELLY. Mr. Chairman, as a cosponsor of House Resolution 613, I fully support it. I want to support President Nixon in his attempt to obtain a just peace in Vietnam.

This resolution expresses a hope for peace, and it approves the principles expressed by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to their own Government determined by free elections, impartially supervised by an international body.

It states that this Nation is willing to abide by the results of such an election, and it supports the President's call upon North Vietnam to state its willingness to honor such an election and to allow the issues to be peacefully resolved in order that we may end this war and that peace may be restored.

It is my conviction, Mr. Chairman, that the President is best able to make decisions on this war on the basis of facts immediately available to him and not available to the Members of Congress.

I stand behind President Nixon in his efforts to end this war in Vietnam, and I fully support House Resolution 613.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. LENNON).

Mr. LENNON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Resolution 613. I am very proud to announce that I am a cosponsor of an identical resolution, House Resolution 682.

I might say, Mr. Chairman, it is my considered opinion that the language contained in this resolution represents, I

honestly believe, the sentiments of at least 90 or 95 percent of the more than one-half million people that I have the honor to represent in this House of Representatives. They have already indicated that fact to me in a number of petitions which have been signed by tens of thousands of them.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. WALDIE).

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Chairman, I again refer to the President's statement made in 1960 during the Kennedy-Nixon debates—

We cannot tolerate a Communist government in South Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, the authors of this resolution concede that a Communist government would be tolerated and accepted by this House if such government comes into power by reason of elections called for in this resolution.

That brings into contention an awful lot of problems. If the domino theory that the President announced on November 3 and extended to West Berlin has any relevance, a Communist government in South Vietnam, no matter how it comes into being, will bring into play the domino theory and all its catastrophic consequences.

Supporting this resolution is support for the possibility and acceptability of a Communist government in South Vietnam and the acceptability then of the domino theory coming into play.

The other obvious defect with this resolution is that the President's hands are tied as a result of the resolution and if in the opinion of the negotiators in Paris, a coalition government should be established in South Vietnam it places both the President and the negotiators in a very awkward position in an effort to reach such an agreement with the parties at the peace conference, because this resolution precludes such a result.

The only way you can arrive at a government in South Vietnam, if this resolution is passed, is by free elections. I do not think it is in the best interest of our negotiators in Paris nor the President to bind them in any way from considering the proposition of a coalition government by agreement of all parties. This resolution would not permit that.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. REID).

Mr. REID of New York. I thank the distinguished gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution.

First of all, I think that the procedure in the House, both in committee and on the floor, regarding this resolution, has been regrettable.

For instance, I know of no major foreign policy resolution going through the Senate with no hearings and with no possibility for amendment. Indeed, previous resolutions—the Formosa resolution, the Middle East resolution, the Berlin resolution and the Cuban resolution—have at least had hearings, scant as they may have been at times. Surely the House can make no serious pretense to

being a thoughtful deliberative body if on great questions such as Vietnam it refuses to hold hearings or provide for amendments. This proceeding degrades the House.

It is sadly apparent that the House has learned little from the intense feelings that this question of Vietnam is the paramount issue facing America. To be denied an opportunity to amend this resolution in the first formal opportunity that has been given us since August of 1964 is to make this debate largely meaningless and to make a mockery of the democratic process.

There are few who would question that any President of the United States is strengthened by strong support in the Congress and in the country for a particular position. The fundamental point, however, one which Winston Churchill well understood, is that a policy, to be truly meaningful, must be clearly and precisely understood. The people must participate in the decision relative to it, and only if this process is carried forward will any policy have national sanction at home or be respected abroad. The procedure followed here today, let alone the substance of the resolution we are discussing, are not calculated to achieve that objective.

This resolution, I believe, must be read in conjunction with President Nixon's speech of November 3. Specifically, as the President said on the floor of this House:

The resolution for a just peace in Vietnam is along the lines of the proposals that I made in a speech on November 3.

The speech stressed the importance of Vietnamization, a policy which has been largely discredited in the past, implicitly committed this action to defend the present Government of South Vietnam until it can defend itself, and raised the possibility, should there be an increase in violence jeopardizing our remaining forces, that the United States would take "strong and effective measures" to deal with that situation. Moreover, the rate of U.S. withdrawal was posited on the progress at the Paris talks, the level of enemy activity, and the progress of the training program of the South Vietnamese forces.

The problem with this formulation, as I see it, is that it could leave the initiative largely to Hanoi, the NLF, and Saigon, none of whom have shown a total sense of urgency to end the war, rather than with the United States where the initiatives should be.

No one would question the desirability of achieving a just peace. The problem occurs over what this phrase means and whether it implies, directly or indirectly, the perpetuation of a Thieu-Ky regime which to date has narrowed its Cabinet base and refused to change its constitution to permit free elections and self-determination for all South Vietnamese. Moreover a continuation of this regime may make any negotiations impossible. Certainly giving Saigon a veto over the peace talks or U.S. policy is a mistake.

Hence, the danger of this resolution is clear. We can all find phrases in it with which we agree; equally, we can find phrases which are vague and which could represent unspecified commitments for

the future. The difficulty, then, is the interpretation given to it, or to be more precise, the numerous interpretations which could be given to it.

Prior to any action, the simple introduction of the resolution was assigned importance by the President, and by the press, and by the President's negotiators in Paris. As reported by Drew Middleton from Paris in the November 14 New York Times, Ambassador Lodge took the unusual step of introducing into his formal statement at the peace talks the text of the resolution as an indication of support for the policies enunciated in the President's November 3 speech. And this, we recall, was before the House as a body had even begun consideration of the resolution, with signatures collected prior to the President's speech. This presumed on the action the House and Senate might take in a context where the Congress has been derelict in its responsibilities. This did not heighten the credibility of congressional action, nor enhance respect for the resolution—particularly as it coincided with some half a million Americans arriving in Washington to protest these very policies.

As this is a simple House resolution and not a joint resolution, and as it cannot be signed into law, it will not enjoy the importance of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Moreover, the minority leader in the Senate, along with the majority leader, have suggested a significant amendment calling for a mutual ceasefire; hence, whatever action the other body takes will not parallel the action we take in the House today.

Nonetheless, I am constrained to vote against the resolution as the subject is just too important for hasty action, and too significant in its potential implications not to enjoy the degree of national sanction that comes only from full debate, amendments, and the deep conviction of hopefully all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. REID of New York. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I know that my friend, the gentleman from New York, is a fair-minded Member and a constructive Member, and that he would not intentionally cast unfair criticism upon the Committee on Foreign Affairs or upon the Committee on Rules as to the manner in which this resolution has come to the floor.

But the gentleman is aware, I am sure, that on seven occasions in the past 15 years, foreign policy resolutions have come to the House, in all cases under what amounts to a closed rule. It is not accurate either to say that on all of those occasions there were more or longer committee hearings than on this. In one case, in fact, on the resolution which was introduced on Hungary, a resolution in the 85th Congress, it was passed by the House on the same day of its introduction. So there were not any hearings there.

Then on the Cuban resolution, there were executive sessions, but no hearings.

On the United Nations resolution in

the 88th Congress, there were no hearings or calling of witnesses.

In fact, only one of the seven resolutions had printed hearings available for the Members of the House. I am not saying that is always the procedure which should be followed. But I just believe the gentleman from New York in all fairness would want to take note of the fact that this is not an altogether unusual procedure, and that the Committee on Foreign Affairs did consider it and felt that, this being an initiative on the part of the House, they needed no outside advice.

Mr. REID of New York. Let me tell the gentleman that I very much appreciate his comments. Let me say, however, that the precedents the gentleman cites are precisely the reason why there must be changes in our procedures for the future. I would say to him, and this is a point I am trying to make, that the House ought to be coequal with the other body in foreign policy resolutions, and will be only when this House accepts its responsibilities.

In short, what is essential is full hearings, a longer time for debate than 4 hours every 5 years, and an end to closed rules in general. Only as a legislative body truly reflects the commitments and convictions of all American people will its resolutions command the respect and credibility that bespeaks a national purpose and hopefully unity.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GIBBONS).

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I am not a sponsor of this resolution.

But I am going to vote for it here today because I sincerely hope that by voting for it, it may help the cause of peace and that it may in some way—some way that is, frankly, vague to me—help to disengage us from this most unfortunate experience that we have had in this war.

I regret, as have many Members here today, that this House has not taken a more vigorous position in the Vietnam war; that it has not had a more definite position on what should be done about it. I hope though that the leaders of this body will have learned from all these circumstances that it really is impossible to get something very meaningful from this Congress or from the House of Representatives unless the Congress is able to work its will. Procedures that do not allow for committee do not provide for adequate committee hearings and do not allow amendment of resolutions on the floor, really amount to naught.

I come from a part of the country where we have broad beaches and where the tide ebbs and flows every day. Sometimes sitting here and listening to this debate here reminds me of those Florida beaches that I see. Oftentimes you will see very earnest people working down on the beaches building beautiful sand castles. They work all day. When the tide comes in at night, those same castles are washed away and the beach the next day looks as if it had never been disturbed. I hope this resolution will just not turn out to be just another sand castle. But I am afraid it might.

Mr. Chairman, I am impressed with the discussion here today.

There certainly has not been any of the emotionalism which I remember at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The only reasons I am going to vote for this resolution is because I think it is a peace resolution.

I had some misgivings when the debate first began, but most of the debate and the answers by the sponsors and the answers by the people controlling the time on the debate have convinced me that this resolution is designed to achieve a quick and just peace.

I am going to vote for it on that basis and on that basis alone.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida has expired.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. CLARK).

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I support this resolution. First, I would like to congratulate the Speaker for bringing up this resolution at this time.

Mr. Chairman, I congratulate Mr. Hays, of Ohio, who has done such an excellent job on the chairing of this resolution today. He is a forthright, honest, hardworking Congressman who knows how important it is to be American first Democrat second.

I cannot understand why we have these few Members in Congress who oppose this resolution. To me they give promise and hope to the Vietcong and Hanoi.

They talk about the thousands killed. Yet they do not say that it was the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Government who has done it. They talk, instead, about those, our American soldiers have killed. They forget that every time one of our Presidents has called a cessation of bombing or ground attacks that the enemy brought in their artillery and rockets—indiscriminately bombing civilians.

I clearly recognize the constitutional right of any citizen, or group of citizens, to make their views known to their public officials. It is not only their right, but their duty. I also recognize the right of other citizens to disagree. But, I cannot fathom how it is stupid of SPRO AGNEW to support his President—your President—but it is sublime to attack that same President.

Why is it suddenly more American to raise a Vietcong flag at the Washington Monument than to defend the President of the United States? It clearly is not—now, yesterday, or tomorrow.

Relentless, roaring mobs marching through the streets of Washington throwing rocks and flaming bombs were a predictable offshoot of an otherwise peaceful demonstration, but nonetheless one in which the demonstration leadership was unable to control all of the elements that joined it.

Well, things have reached the point where a vast majority of the American people—silent or otherwise—have about had it with mob rule and protesters who offer no constructive alternative other than the wholesale slaughter of millions of South Vietnamese. And God forbid the day that any American President makes that choice at the insistence of churning, chaotic mobs.

I truly believe that the American people have a deep moral commitment to the people of South Vietnam. I respect those who do not agree. I expect them to say so in the same orderly way that I publicly express my views. And I expect them to respect my views as well.

President Nathan Pusey of Harvard has put the entire subject of demonstrations in proper perspective with his comment that the right to dissent does not include the right to force assent.

There is no question in my mind that the majority of Americans support President Nixon. I am equally convinced they will become more and more vocal and then perhaps we can get a clearer view of what the American people really want.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Hawaii (Mrs. MINK).

Mrs. MINK. Mr. Chairman, President Nixon said on November 3 that he believed "that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy." He went on to say:

The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

I wholeheartedly concur with this statement. This House should heed his admonition. It is precisely this reason which has forced me to conclude that it is equally illegitimate to expect this House to support a policy of such magnitude as the life or death of our American men unless we know the whole truth about that policy.

It is pretended that by the November 3 speech the Nixon policy regarding Vietnam became an established fact. Try to walk through its maze.

The President starting by saying that, "The great question is: How can we win America's peace?"

Yet he offered the traditional challenge of why we should continue the war. He said:

A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam would without question promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.

He said he was opposed to "immediate withdrawal of all American forces." He qualified this later in his speech by saying he was opposed to "the precipitate withdrawal of American forces."

But then he said:

We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year.

So one concludes that he only opposes precipitate withdrawal, and that 1 year is not precipitate.

He said:

I choose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battlefield.

But on the negotiating front he said that no progress whatever in the negotiation "has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table." He stated:

There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiations depend *only* on Hanoi's deciding to negotiate.

He said that he has "put into effect another plan to bring peace—a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front."

He described this plan which he called the Nixon Doctrine, and said that—

When you are trying to assist another nation to defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not fight the war for them.

This is his plan for the battlefield; not peace but more war, waged by the Vietnamese with our arms, our material and our money. He has evidently all but abandoned the negotiating table as futile; and his peace plan called "Vietnamization" only means more war, not peace.

The only remaining consolation is that his plan could mean the return of all American combat forces. He said he has a plan worked out "in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable."

He stated that the "rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts. One—progress which can be, or might be made in the Paris talks, the other two factors—are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training program of the South Vietnamese forces."

I hope you have all noted that none of these three factors which will determine our rate of withdrawal is in our control. Hanoi could decide this issue by continuing to stall the Paris talks, and by accelerating the level of enemy activity. Or South Vietnam could prevent our early withdrawal by falling down on the training program. I hardly call any of these prospects as positive affirmative action for peace on our part. Withdrawal on this basis is not our policy but someone else's.

The November 3 speech is full of so many contradictions in and of itself without even trying to compare it to the May 14 speech of the President, which others have done to their great consternation.

I take this time to analyze the President's speech because it has been noted as the justification for adopting House Resolution 613. A quick reading of House Resolution 613 will reveal that it contains nothing on the central issues discussed by the President in his November 3 speech as I have outlined.

House Resolution 613 states no new positions taken by President Nixon. It merely restates the Johnson policy in effect since 1966. What function is served to adopt a resolution which is purely historical, without any new steps for peace?

The President is correct when he says that American confidence is harmed when we do not speak the truth. The truth today is that withdrawal, like "stop the bombing of North Vietnam" of a few years ago, is controversial and therefore we are asked to blind ourselves to its reality.

I happen to support the President's offer of complete withdrawal of all out-

side forces within 1 year. I would vote for House Resolution 613 only if it embodied this principal of withdrawal. Such a resolution would be meaningful and would contribute to the unity which the President wants by confirming our new initiatives for peace. Without facing this truth House Resolution 613 is but an empty gesture and will further exacerbate our lack of specific national goals in our pursuit for peace.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Montana (Mr. MELCHER).

Mr. MELCHER. Mr. Chairman, I am the coauthor of House Resolution 684, which is identical with House Resolution 613, and I shall certainly vote for the resolution in seeking a just peace in Vietnam.

I also coauthored House Resolution 568 backing the President on his troop withdrawal policy. If in the future the President should decide to change his policy from withdrawal of our troops and the rapid pursuit of peace, I believe it is mandatory that he should first consult with the Congress so that we may express ourselves with full knowledge of any change in the Vietnam situation justifying an alteration of our course.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. SCOTT) for a unanimous-consent request.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Resolution 613 and to urge each Member of the House to indicate his support of the President's efforts to bring about a just and honorable peace in Vietnam by voting in favor of this resolution.

Regardless of who is President of the United States or his party affiliation, when he is dealing with foreign nations the country benefits by the strongest possible bipartisan support of his efforts.

As you know, Ambassador Lodge recently announced his resignation as Chief Negotiator with the North Vietnamese and stated that his Government had made every reasonable concession without any agreement except as to the shape of the negotiation table. In my opinion, the North Vietnamese will not make any concession as long as they feel that this Nation is divided and that they can obtain their objective by stubborn refusal to negotiate peace in Vietnam.

President Nixon won renewed respect of the American People, in my opinion, by reasonableness and the frankness of this discussion of the Vietnamese conflict a few weeks ago. In essence, he indicated a willingness of this Nation to continue to attempt to negotiate but, at the same time, having an alternate plan to substitute the South Vietnamese combat soldier for the American soldier and to withdraw our combat forces as early as circumstances would permit.

I do not believe that other nations of the world can expect any more than this. The President has carried out his promise of reducing our troop strength and I understand that we have less troops in Vietnam today than we have had at any time during the last 2 years.

Certainly, I hope that all combat troops can be withdrawn soon but I hesi-

tate for this Congress to suggest to the President when complete withdrawal should take place, and believe it is in the interests of the country to permit latitude for the exercise of judgment by the Commander in Chief based upon circumstances as they develop in Vietnam.

Let us show to the Communist world that America is united in our quest for peace and justice in the world by an overwhelming vote of confidence in the President and his efforts on behalf of the people in the country.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DELLENBACK) for a unanimous-consent request.

Mr. DELLENBACK. Mr. Chairman, a careful reading of the provisions of H.R. 613 makes clear that its primary thrust is for peace in Vietnam. Not peace "at any price," but a "just peace." It expresses the earnest hope of the people of the United States for such a peace. It affirms the support of the House of Representatives for the President of the United States in his efforts to negotiate such a peace. It supports the principle of free elections for the South Vietnamese. These are the heart of this resolution.

This is a short resolution. Like any short comment on a large and complex subject it must be looked at very carefully to see what it does say and what it does not say. I personally feel that we should have added some additional language to cover certain points which are not covered therein and to make certain some points therein which are subject to possible misinterpretation. I voted in favor of an attempt to open the resolution up to amendments which would accomplish those results, but we were unsuccessful. So we must now vote on the resolution as it stands.

This resolution does not say that the House of Representatives gives the President any carte blanche authority in connection with Vietnam. It has been made repeatedly clear during the course of this debate that this resolution does not give to the President any authority of a warmaking nature. This is a peace resolution. There are many other things that this resolution does not say. Some, like the points above, it should not say, and other perhaps it should say. I personally regret that it does not expressly indicate that we approve the President's demonstrated policy of continued deescalation of American involvement in Vietnam. It should have. But any careful examination of the record shows that the President initiated such a policy almost immediately after taking office and that he is definitely following such a policy, and I am convinced that he is committed to the continuation of such a policy. I read into this resolution's support of the President's efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, a steady continuation of such policy of deescalation of American involvement. So long as that policy is continued and followed, I feel that both this House and the American people will continue to support the President's efforts as he seeks to guide this Nation toward a just and early peace.

Because I am convinced that the clear thrust of this resolution is in the di-

rection of such just and early peace, I intend to support it and I urge my colleagues to do likewise.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I now yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished minority leader (Mr. GERALD R. FORD).

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, first I wish to express my appreciation to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS), who has so ably handled the resolution and to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN), chairman of the committee for their tremendously effective help in making certain that the proposal went through the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the House as a whole.

I want to express to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT) my deep appreciation for his initiation on original sponsorship of this resolution.

I believe the action of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT), the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Dr. MORGAN, and the able gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS), in working on and for this resolution, have exhibited statesmanship of the highest order. I want the RECORD to clearly indicate my appreciation and indebtedness to them for their help and assistance.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to announce what the motion to recommit will be. The motion to recommit will be a proposal to insert new language on page 1 of the resolution, line 7. The added language will be as follows:

Requests the President to continue to press the Government of North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949 in the treatment of prisoners of war,

In other words, the resolution would read as follows:

Resolved, That the House of Representatives affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, expresses the earnest hope of the people of the United States for such a peace, calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures which the United States has made in good faith toward the Government of North Vietnam, requests the President to continue to press the Government of North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949 in the treatment of prisoners of war—

And then it would continue as it was reported by the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The decision as to the author of the motion to recommit will depend upon some uncertainties at the moment, but the author will be either the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. GROSS) or the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. FULTON).

I personally hope and trust that this motion to recommit will receive the support of the membership as a whole. Certainly all Members do want the President, on our behalf as a country, to press for the North Vietnamese Government to abide by the Geneva Accords of 1949 in reference to the treatment of prisoners of war.

I believe this is a strengthening and beneficial change in the resolution as recommended by the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. FRASER. I want to say to the gentleman that while I support the objectives of the amendment on the recommittal motion, I want to observe again that the real minority in a question of this kind is denied access to the motion to recommit. I am sorry about that. This is another instance of an effort to confine and limit the options of this House in expressing its will on this resolution. I understand what is going on. I have seen it happen on other resolutions and on other bills. I am sorry that this is the procedure that is being followed.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I am sorry that the gentleman from Minnesota cannot support this motion to recommit. I think it is a very desirable and beneficial change in the resolution.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON).

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me for 10 seconds?

Mr. STRATTON. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. I just want to correct the misapprehension of the gentleman from Michigan.

I did not say that I was opposed to the motion to recommit. I said that I favored its provisions. I was objecting to the abuse of the rules of the House that denied the right—

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I cannot yield any further.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened to a good deal of debate here. I have not listened to it all. But I have been impressed with the fact that most of the debate, at least what I have heard, seems to have been centered around rather technical matters, interpretations of language, and the question as to whether we should or should not have passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution; the question as to whether we should or should not be in Vietnam; or the rate of the withdrawal of troops and so on, I am a little disturbed that we seem to have lost sight in this debate this afternoon of what is, after all, the fundamental issue that surrounds our commitment in Vietnam, just as it has surrounded other American military and political commitments, that is, the basic struggle between freedom and tyranny in the world.

We may complain as to whether we should be in Vietnam or not and whether we should have fought the war in one way or another. But there is no question, I think, in the mind of anyone that the reason why America is in Vietnam today is because of our commitment to freedom and because of our determination to protect ever a small and a relatively weak country against attack and against an attempt to impose tyranny on it from the outside. This is clearly what our Vietnam commitment is all about. We are not there for any personal gain for ourselves or for our country. This is what America has always done. This has been the record, whether foolishly or otherwise, of our involvement in every war.

Today the basic issues with respect to

Vietnam, which is still up in the air, is not an issue of American military strength. It is a matter of American will and determination. No one, not even the Communist leaders, has any doubt about the ability of American arms to achieve any objective that they set out to achieve. But the one thing that is still in doubt in the Communist world is the will and the determination of the American people. The Communists still think that this country does not have the stuff to stay until that objective of freedom is achieved, we are, they say, a "paper tiger."

The other day a number of members of the Committee on Armed Services had the privilege of hearing a personal, firsthand report from Maj. James N. Rowe, who was a captive of the Vietcong for 5 years in the delta area of Vietnam. The one thing that most impressed all of us was the fact that Major Rowe—a remarkable young man with much more intestinal fortitude than I am sure most of us have or ever hope to have—the one thing that impressed us most was when Major Rowe told us that the low point in his captivity came when the Vietcong showed him the statements of leading officials, leading Members of the other body, and leading newspapers around the country, saying that America had no business being in Vietnam and that we ought to get out, lock, stock, and barrel. Those statements, Major Rowe told us really shook his morale. This was the only time he doubted his own convictions. The Communists really believe these dissenters speak for America.

Mr. Chairman, the press of the Nation has played up all of the opposing views to the Vietnam war. We had 250,000 demonstrators in Washington the other day. Two or three pages of the Washington Post and the New York Times were devoted the next day to their activities. But the day before 300 Members of this House, representing an overwhelming majority of the 200 million people of the entire country, had joined in cosponsoring this resolution which is before us today.

And that rather remarkable event got only a very small notice in the Washington Post and none at all in the New York Times, except that the publisher says they did put it in a small box in one edition, but somehow it just was not important enough to get in the edition that came to the Capital of this Nation.

Mr. Chairman, what we are being asked to decide this afternoon is whether this country is solidly in support of our Nation's policy in Vietnam, whether on this vital issue we are going to back up our President, whether we are united in this effort to back up the forces who are fighting for the principle of free, self-determination for the people of South Vietnam. The important thing before us here today on this floor is whether this Nation of ours does have the will and the determination to see their commitment through.

It is not a question of technique we are concerned with today. It is not a question of battle strategy. It is simply a question of whether the greatest nation in the world, with the greatest

armed forces in the world, also has the necessary intestinal fortitude to back up the President of the United States and to stick with our commitment long enough to achieve peace, not at any price, but peace with justice in Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, I think we do have that determination and it is my sincere hope that this resolution will receive an overwhelming vote here today as a manifestation of that determination.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to express my personal gratitude and appreciation to the distinguished gentleman from New York for his ardent endeavors, his advice, counsel, and assistance throughout the time that this question has been under consideration. He has been one of the original and one of the most effective champions of this resolution.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. BARRETT).

(By unanimous consent, Mr. BARRETT was allowed to speak out of order.)

RETAIN RAY LAPIN AS PRESIDENT OF FNMA

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, about a week ago, I brought to the attention of the House what I considered to be a failure on the part of the administration to heed the expressed mandate of the Congress.

At that time I raised the question as to whether the Federal National Mortgage Association would, as the Committee on Banking and Currency had contemplated, be the first to issue mortgage-backed securities.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have an even more blatant case of where the administration has refused to follow the will of Congress.

According to newspaper reports, which I have verified with Fannie Mae, its President will ask the Board of Directors to determine formally that one-third of Fannie Mae's common stock is owned by persons or institutions in the mortgage lending, home building, real estate or related business. This, Mr. Chairman, is the key test which the Congress set out for determining the point when control of the FNMA should pass from the Board of Directors appointed by the President to a new Board elected by the public stockholders. I am delighted that the public, mortgage lenders, builders, and others, have moved so rapidly to acquire the FNMA stock. Their purchase of this stock has been related to their use of FNMA's secondary market facilities, which has been responsible for almost all of the financing of the FHA and VA market, notwithstanding the decline in home building due to the severe credit crunch.

Coupled with this announcement, there now seems to be a powerplay afoot. I am disturbed to learn that the present administration is trying to force the resignation of Ray Lapin, the incumbent president of Fannie Mae. Mr. Chairman, the success of FNMA is due in large part if not entirely to the efforts, actions, and

management of Ray Lapin and the respect and confidence he enjoys among all those concerned with homebuilding and financing. We must recognize but for the date included in the statute, the private stockholders could now elect a new Board of Directors and in turn this Board of Directors could elect a president; thus bringing to a close Fannie Mae's so-called transitional period.

Last year when the legislation was before the Banking and Currency Committee, we specifically provided that the president of the Federal National Mortgage Association, during the transitional period, could be removed from that office only for "good cause."

Mr. Chairman, this was done deliberately because the committee and the Congress felt that the transition period of Fannie Mae should be wholly divorced from partisan politics.

Mr. Chairman, we knew then the power the President has to remove from office and by our actions we sought to limit that power.

I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that if the present administration's plan is to succeed, the will of the Congress will be subverted. Further, Mr. Speaker, this attempt by the administration to remove Mr. Lapin could very well undermine the confidence presently enjoyed by FNMA and handicap its purpose and function, which is so greatly needed at this time when there is a serious shortage of funds for housing, particularly for low- and moderate-income families which has received the bulk of FNMA assistance.

Mr. Chairman, I sincerely hope and most strongly urge the President to reconsider his letter requesting the resignation of Mr. Lapin.

I submit for the RECORD a statement of Mr. Lapin issued today:

STATEMENT OF RAYMOND H. LAPIN, PRESIDENT OF FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, DECEMBER 2, 1969

I have today received a letter dated November 26, 1969, from the President of the United States purporting to remove me as president of the Federal National Mortgage Association. The President's letter does not set forth any specific ground for my removal.

The fact is, as representatives of the Administration have now made clear to me, the President wishes to fill my position with a person of his own choosing. I do not intend to bow to this unlawful desire.

My own attorneys have advised me that, as a matter of law, I am removable by the President only "for good cause". That I was not appointed by the Administration is not the kind of "cause" which Congress referred to in 1968 when it sought to establish FNMA's independence from government control. And the Supreme Court of the United States has unequivocally held that the desire of one Administration to replace members of independent bodies with persons of their own choosing is not a valid basis for action.

Moreover, like any other citizen, I am entitled to due process of law. I am entitled, like any other citizen, to written notice of the charges against me, if any, and a fair opportunity to respond to them. The letter from the President affords me neither of these crucial constitutional rights.

Of course, the President would like to put a person of his own choice in my place. Although I have declined to accept the substantial raise in pay which was scheduled for the president of FNMA when the agency became a private corporation wholly owned

by its stockholders, my successor would be entitled to receive a salary of at least \$85,000. This is the juiciest plum at the President's disposal.

The President may have another, but related, motive for his sudden move. Under the statutory formula, it now appears that the time has come for FNMA's private shareholders to take complete control of the corporation. Under present law, the shareholders could elect a new board, and through them a president, to take office as early as next May. I can understand why the President wishes quickly to place his own man in my job so that he might be able to prepare himself to run for office on a management slate.

Because FNMA has now reached this important milestone, time is running out on the Administration. If they are to control the results of the next shareholders' election, they must move now, and at my expense.

But FNMA is not part of the spoils system, to be plucked by a President at will. In 1968, Congress legislated that FNMA was to become a private corporation, free from control by any Administration. In order to insure this independence, Congress provided job security for the person who was to serve as president until the shareholders could select their own. I can be removed from my office only for good cause, and only in accordance with the procedures mandated by the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution.

Since the President's letter neither reveals good cause for my removal from office nor adheres to the procedural guarantees afforded every American, I shall take every action necessary to vindicate my rights and the purpose of Congress, and have retained private counsel for this purpose. In short, I intend to fight.

During my presidency, FNMA has been responsible for almost all of the financing of the FHA and VA market, notwithstanding the severe credit crunch. In fact, if it had not been for FNMA, the entire FHA/VA market would have been at a complete standstill. While conventional housing starts have declined sharply in the last nine months, FHA and VA-insured housing starts have actually increased thanks to the activity of FNMA. This is particularly significant since the construction supported by FNMA is concentrated in lower and middle income housing.

All of this has been done despite a substantial reduction in FNMA's payroll.

Even the stock market has reflected the high caliber of our performance, tripling the value of an investment in FNMA in just over one year.

Until their decision to obtain my post for another, the Administration was lavish in its praise both for me personally and for FNMA. And well they might, for only through our efforts has it been possible for the Administration to maintain a high level of FHA and VA housing activity, and to keep FHA and VA mortgage rates within reason.

I should note that I have made no secret of my desire eventually to return to private life. But I will not be party to a lawless exercise of raw power, or to the subjection of FNMA to complete control by the Executive Branch. Congress in 1968 provided that FNMA was to be a private corporation, not a patronage pudding. In resisting the President's will, I help carry out that congressional purpose. This is a cause which all men of good will should join.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN), chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Resolution 613. I have listened for 2 days now to the debate and the accusations made against the Committee on Foreign Affairs. I have

here a history of all the close resolutions which have come out of the Foreign Affairs Committee since the 84th Congress, including the Formosa resolution, the Middle East resolution, the Hungarian resolution, the Berlin resolution, the Cuban resolution, the Southeast Asia resolution, and the United Nations resolution. They all came out of the Committee on Foreign Affairs under the same rule under which we are operating today and all with less time. However, I never heard a single word of criticism on any of those resolutions.

Let us take for example the Formosa resolution that was introduced on January 24, 1955. Here was a brandnew Democratic Congress coming in at that time with a Republican President. When he asked for the Formosa resolution, it was introduced on January 24 and referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee. It was reported out the same day. It was taken to the floor of the House the next day and passed in the House of Representatives under the same kind of rule that we are operating under here today.

So, those who have been berating the Committee on Foreign Affairs to death about the lack of hearings in the committee, I just want to say that the committee has operated in the same manner for the last 25 years since I have been a Member.

We did not try to rush this resolution through. The committee was called that morning at 10 o'clock to meet—those mostly who are objecting to the length of time were the ones not there to establish a quorum at 10 o'clock—so as a result we had only an hour and 22 minutes to debate the resolution.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. HAYS. As I pointed out yesterday, Mr. Chairman, one reason we did not have the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense before the committee was because this is a unique resolution. It was a resolution that was written by Members of the House, and it was not sent up to the House from downtown, so there would have been nothing they could have contributed to it.

Mr. MORGAN. I thank the gentleman for his statement, and that is what I also wish to say.

The Formosa resolution was a House joint resolution that had to pass both Houses of the Congress and then go to the President for his signature.

The Middle East resolution was a House joint resolution.

The Hungarian resolution was a concurrent resolution of the two Houses.

The Berlin resolution was a concurrent resolution of the two Houses.

The Cuban resolution was a Senate joint resolution, and had to pass both Houses and be signed by the President.

The Southeast Asia and Bay of Tonkin resolution was a House joint resolution.

The United Nations resolution was a concurrent resolution.

All we are considering in this measure before us today is just that text of a simple House resolution. It does not give the President any power or authority, nor

does it make any commitments. It does not have the force of law as would a joint resolution. It requires neither the consent of nor the approval of the President.

This, however, does not detract from its timely purpose.

Now, there are 170 simple words—and that is all the words that there are in this resolution, just 170 simple words—and they merely affirm the support of the House of Representatives in a most critical period in the President's efforts to negotiate a just peace in Southeast Asia. That is all it says. It is the House of Representatives hoping that the President can negotiate a just peace in Southeast Asia.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I hope very much to vote for this resolution. Of course, I was one of its cosponsors, but one of the arguments against this resolution has been that this is kind of a blank check, and therefore it does in a sense underwrite future Presidential policy. I would like to have the chairman make this explicit for the legislative history.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I will assure the gentleman from Maryland that if this could be a blank check to escalate the war, that the chairman of the committee, a cosponsor of the resolution, would not be among the sponsors of the resolution.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. I thank the gentleman very much for his statement.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN), 3 additional minutes.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the additional time.

Mr. Chairman, as the gentleman from Maryland knows, there was an editorial in the distinguished paper from the State of the gentleman from Maryland, the Baltimore Sun, about sense resolutions, not more than 10 days ago. That editorial expressed much of my own views as well as others, about sense resolutions.

Mr. Chairman, however, in view of all these circumstances, I am very much in favor of this resolution. I congratulate the gentleman for giving us his support.

The President's endeavors have, to a very serious extent, been negated by a fallacy which the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong have deluded themselves into believing. Because this delusion is prolonging the war and is a significant factor in blocking genuine, honest peace negotiations by Hanoi, it is essential that we dispel the misunderstanding. This resolution offers the best means of doing it.

The North Vietnamese have been broadcasting by radio, and repeating in Paris, statements by individual Americans, some of them elective officials, purporting to show that we are a nation deeply divided, almost wholly unwilling to continue the effort in Vietnam, with some of us up in arms against our own

Government, and virtually on the point of internal political collapse. Of course, we here all know that outspoken dissent is a right inherent in our free and democratic society, but it is so alien to Communist concepts that it is little wonder they deceive themselves into believing in the validity of their wishful acceptance of what we recognize as minority dissent.

We cannot underestimate the seriousness of their misconception, because as long as it leads to their refusal to negotiate and a prolongation of the war, it will add to the cost in American lives. The passage of House Resolution 613 today could result in significant progress toward peace, but if it should only lead to the saving of a single American life, it will be more than worth the time we spend on it.

Over three-fourths of the membership of the House have joined in cosponsoring this resolution affirming support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam. Its formal adoption should clinch the evidence convincingly to the North Vietnamese that they are mistaken in their confidence that time and delay will bring about a liquidation of the entire U.S. effort. Our approval will show that our tolerance of protest and dissent does not mitigate or detract from the support of the great majority of the American people for our President's efforts to negotiate a just peace. As strongly and as emphatically as I can, I urge the adoption of this resolution.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I would like to underscore what the chairman of the committee has said. There is nothing hidden and nothing concealed in this resolution. It simply says what it means, and means what it says. It is an effort to show support for the President of the United States, and hopefully to bring to a just conclusion more quickly than might otherwise be the case in the war in Vietnam.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, the chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, would acknowledge, I am sure, that in the case of these other resolutions there was testimony taken by the committee before they were reported to the House?

Mr. MORGAN. I remember the gentleman from Minnesota coming on the committee in, I believe it was 1963, so that he was a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on August 5, 1964, when the Bay of Tonkin resolution was introduced in the House.

On August 6 it was considered in executive session.

Mr. FRASER. But we did hear testimony.

Mr. MORGAN. If the gentleman will let me finish—that morning we had the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State there. We finished the testi-

mony that morning and we discussed the resolution. We voted it out before the committee adjourned and before the House went into session—all in one morning.

Mr. FRASER. I recognize that we had testimony from three different people, from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the testimony of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. MORGAN. Also General Wheeler.

Mr. FRASER. You are right. But I do not know that anybody now advocates the Gulf of Tonkin resolution as an example that this House should follow.

Mr. MORGAN. All I am saying in view of all the criticism and all the argument about procedure here about resolutions coming from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the procedure is no different on this resolution than on previous resolutions.

Mr. FRASER. But we took testimony in those cases.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HAYS. The gentleman from Minnesota makes a great fetish of taking testimony, which is absurd and means nothing. We spent as much time on this resolution as we did on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and we let every member of the committee, including the gentleman from Minnesota, say their piece.

So we had a lot of testimony.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. GROSS).

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I will vote for passage of House Resolution 613 even though it falls far short of the action which I think the House of Representatives ought to take at this time.

In my opinion the time has come to fix a deadline on the so-called peace negotiations in Paris—a deadline for the representatives of the Government of North Vietnam to sit down and launch meaningful negotiations for peace. If the North Vietnamese failed to meet that deadline then the U.S. Government should make the prompt decision to either fight the war to bring about a military decision or get out of Vietnam—lock, stock, and barrel. The United States cannot fight a war of attrition in Asia nor should American forces be expected to do so.

I want peace as badly as any other citizen of this country. For whatever it is worth I will support this resolution to that end as well as provide a further demonstration of unity in support of the President. But patience is wearing thin. This war cannot be permitted to go on interminably and unless the North Vietnamese quickly demonstrate a willingness to negotiate and a desire for peace, U.S. military forces should be unshackled and given the opportunity for the first time since our involvement in Vietnam to force a decision. As I have previously stated, the alternative is to withdraw.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield the time remaining on this side to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS).

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from

Indiana (Mr. ADAIR) yields 8 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS).

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count. One hundred four Members are present, a quorum.

The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS) is recognized for 15 minutes to close debate.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Joint Resolution 613. The resolution is identical to House Resolution 671 which I introduced at about the same time frame as House Resolution 612 and House Resolution 613.

It should be clear to anyone who reads the resolution that its entire purpose is toward peace. I introduced House Resolution 671 because I was convinced that this kind of a resolution expresses the views of the majority of the Members of the House of Representatives and also a substantial majority of the American people.

This resolution deserves the support of every Member of this House because it is in the best tradition of responsible bipartisan congressional support for the foreign policies of the United States. Who can deny that under our Constitution the President is charged with the responsibility of speaking for our country in international situations? As to Southeast Asia, he alone can negotiate peace. On the other hand, if a substantial number of individual Members of Congress should undermine this authority to speak for the Nation, or cause doubts to be raised whether the President speaks for the Nation, then his task becomes much more complex and the goal of a peaceful settlement is made more remote.

After a careful study of the resolution, I became convinced the resolution may not give the President any greater authority that he now possesses. It is a formal expression by the House of Representatives in support of the President's efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam. All of us have heard a lot about escalation of the war. Certainly the intention of all of us who introduced identical resolutions was that this effort would result in an escalation of the peace effort.

It is my appraisal that those who argue this resolution could be a blank check to escalate the war are completely wrong. There is nothing hidden here, there is nothing concealed. The resolution says what it means and means what it says. True, it does not have the force of law, but it is a clear expression of the views of the Members of this House.

There are those who say they are concerned that the resolution, by endorsing free elections in South Vietnam, could mean a Communist takeover. Well, the answer to that is that if the elections are truly free and the South should vote communistic, then they will have to suffer themselves under that form of government. But the best answer is that if there are really free elections, there has never been a single instance anywhere

in the world that a people who were given the privilege of free elections ever voted themselves under communism.

For those who argue that this resolution is nothing more than a pat on the back for Mr. Nixon, I would caution that we should not fall into the error of regarding this resolution as anything of that kind. I, for one, could not find it possible to vote against this resolution just because it might help Mr. Nixon. If it does help the administration, while at the same time we achieve the goal of honorable peace, then I fail to see how any Member can complain.

All that this resolution says is that the Congress supports the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace. It says that we all want to get the war over with and peace restored in Southeast Asia; and that we are for free elections in South Vietnam and we will abide by the results of such elections. That is what this resolution is all about and that is all there is to it.

If the President fails in his present endeavor there will be time enough for all of us to register our disapproval by one of several means. Certainly we can do so through the appropriation process and even through the authorization process. As I have suggested both on and off the floor, there is always the opportunity to consider again the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

The present occupant of the White House is not of my political persuasion. I did not support his campaign. But a sufficient number of Americans expressed their choice as to Mr. Nixon. I recognize he now has the most difficult job in the world. He is now my President. There is no reason that this resolution should be considered as political. It is my strong belief that the American people are much more knowledgeable than many of those with leftist leanings believe. The people are very competent to figure out whether a move is partisan and political or not. On that point it would seem to me that it would be a political mistake for Members to oppose this resolution. Opposition could very well be construed as an effort to hinder the efforts of the President toward peace with justice in Vietnam.

As I understand the present course of the administration, it is that pending an armistice there shall be no degree of military activity in any measure greater than is necessary to meet the aggression of the enemy. The alternatives would be either full-scale war or peace at any price, which means surrender of our honor and the abandonment to a blood bath of a people who have placed their trust in us. If we support an honorable and just peace in Vietnam, no one is looking to the next election. We are looking to the next generation.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from Ohio yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, we have here today a situation that is really a paradox. It is both extremely meaningful and meaningless. For the first time in 5 years the House is considering a resolution concerned with Vietnam. In that sense it is very

meaningful. But on the other hand we are dealing with a resolution that is unclear, ambiguous, that is being interpreted by each member in a different way, that has not the force of law and therefore is meaningless.

We have a closed rule, which I opposed, on this resolution and only 4 hours of debate. If we consider Vietnam as important, then that is a disgrace to this body. We have a choice of voting for the resolution or voting against it. A vote for it can be construed in many ways, and a vote against it is equally unclear in intention. There have been speakers, both yesterday and today, who have taken the resolution apart phrase by phrase and have posted the question "what is wrong with that?" or uttered the phrase "who can object to that?" But it is the meaning of the words with which I find fault. Everyone says, and I am sure, believes, that he is for a just peace, but in statements on the floor both yesterday and today, we see that just peace means something different to each man. Everyone is for free elections, but the resolution does not define that phrase. We have seen in the past 2 days that a legislative history is being accumulated. Every man who speaks either tries to define the resolution or explain his interpretation of the resolution. I think this is fair and that it is right—for since there were no hearings held and because the resolution is being ramrodded through the House, there is no legislative history and some must be created at this time.

I greatly fear how this resolution will be interpreted—not so much abroad but here at home. The President, in an unprecedented visit to this body, thanked the Members for their support, through this resolution, of his policies as described on November 3. I do not support that policy. I support the President. I supported the previous President, and yet I did not support his policy. There are two ways to support a President—as an institution, and I do support the Office of the President and the man who now holds that office. But one can also support an individual man in that office by supporting all of his policies. I do not support this President's policies. The President has put a great deal of pressure on the House by interpreting this resolution, which was conceived and written before his speech, as an endorsement of the policies described in that speech. I use the term describe advisedly, for I listened to that speech very carefully. I read it again many times and I do not know what his policy is. He spoke of Vietnamization, he spoke of troop withdrawals, he spoke of negotiations, but I do not know the order in which he places these things. I do not know the priority he gives these things, and I doubt whether many Members of this House would agree on what that policy is and what he says it would be.

This resolution is much too subject to interpretation for my liking. Instead of a simple statement, like that proposed by the gentleman from California (Mr. TUNNEY) supporting the President's efforts for peace, we have many more words. Is agreement through negotia-

tions, on free elections and a just peace, necessary before we withdraw troops? If so, I cannot support this resolution. Are we merely saying we would like a negotiated peace and free elections, but will continue to withdraw our remaining troops? If so, I could support this resolution.

Are the negotiations and free elections preconditions to our withdrawals? If that is the President's policy, I do not support it. I disagreed with President Johnson's policies in Vietnam, but I continued to support him as the President of the United States and I supported his other policies. I disagree with President Nixon's policies on the war because I think they will not work, but I continue to support him as President.

I firmly believe that the pressure of announced gradual troop withdrawals will force the generals in Saigon to broaden their political base and institute reforms as nothing else will.

We have seen yesterday and today many Members who have said they will vote for this resolution, but only after they explain their ideas of it and their explanation of the resolution's intent. If one will only read yesterday's RECORD, he can see that the views differs with each man as does the interpretation of the resolution. I could make a statement of my thoughts of this resolution as a simple support for peace, hope for negotiations and free elections, but not an endorsement of past, present, and future policies. I can describe what I would have preferred in a resolution, that would have urged and supported further troop withdrawals regardless of what happens in the field or in Paris. But I cannot in good conscience vote for this resolution. I support the President's search for peace, but I think his methods are wrong; that he has made and is making a great mistake, that his policies will not lead any more quickly to peace nor the end of hostilities than did the policies of the former administration.

However, I am even more greatly concerned about this resolution, and feel that it is a mistake, because I can see how it will be used by the way it has been used already. The President calls this resolution a support for his policy. Yet even its authors say it is not. The President says it indicates unity behind his program. Yet we all know that it does not. More frightening, however, is the fact that it is being used to squash dissent. Again, read yesterday's RECORD, and we see that many say that those who oppose this resolution do not support the President. Yet this is patently false and misleading. We find those who dissent and criticize these policies are equated with traitors and extremists. Yet we all know of honorable, patriotic, loyal, intelligent Americans that oppose this policy because they believe it is not in the best interest of the United States nor of the American people and that it will not help save American lives.

I am sorry to say that it appears to me that this is just another attempt on the part of the administration and its supporters to make dissent impossible. The Vice President, the President's director of communications, his Chairman of the

Federal Communications Commission and others in his administration have called dissent dishonest and unpatriotic, but I consider it the highest form of patriotism to attempt to prevent self-destruction on the part of the country we love. False unity and silence are not approval, although the President chooses to interpret them that way, and dissent is not condemnation although some choose to interpret it that way.

I oppose these policies because I think they will harm America and our people. What I propose is what I believe will be best for the United States and all Americans.

Where do we end up with this resolution? In the beginning of my remarks, I said that this was a rather meaningless resolution and innocuous if it only does what its sponsors say it does.

We all support our President: We all support a just peace: We all support free elections. It would be easy to vote for this resolution, preceded by a statement explaining my position on Vietnam and what I hope this resolution will do and what it will not do.

But—and this is too important a condition to be ignored—if negotiations fall or do not go anyplace, that is if all substantive issues continue to be ignored as they have been until this date, what will happen?

The President has said that if in his opinion the conditions in Vietnam necessitate escalation, he will escalate the war. In that case, I am afraid House Resolution 613 will be a mere repeat of the Tonkin Gulf resolution. I am quite happy to learn from previous mistakes, and I do not choose to repeat them. This resolution can be used just as the Tonkin resolution was used.

That may not be the intention of its sponsors. But the President has already interpreted this resolution as support for his policy as declared on November 3. That policy allows for escalation of the war, a return to previous policy. I did not support it in the past, and certainly will not give my approval in advance.

Mr. PURCELL. Mr. Chairman, once again I would like to express my utmost desire to see this great Nation find peace in Southeast Asia. When the people of South Vietnam are given the opportunity to choose for themselves the direction which their government will take, and the men who will lead them, the United States will have fulfilled its obligation to this beleaguered country.

It is essential that we here today give strength to this quest. It is plain now that so long as the Communists feel they can wait us out, there will be no peace. The adoption of this resolution today should convince them that our disagreements are strictly within the United States' family and not a cause for continued delay by the Communists in negotiating a peace in Vietnam.

I am convinced, Mr. Chairman, that our voice must be heard—not just here in this Chamber, but across the world in Paris and Hanoi. The louder that voice, the sooner will North Vietnam accept and recognize our determination to see that South Vietnam dictates her own future.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, all of us

in this House, I am sure, share a desire for early peace in Vietnam.

Whatever our political affiliations, we would like to see the President succeed in making peace on the best possible terms. If he succeeds, we all succeed. If he fails, we all fail.

We can generally applaud the general idea of a negotiated just peace contained in H.R. 613, the Wright resolution. Furthermore, we could have generally applauded many of the Vietnam-related resolutions which came across our desks in the interim between the October 15 and November 15 marches.

Nevertheless, there are aspects of this resolution which are troublesome.

I am troubled less by the resolution's own words than by the administration's seeming eagerness to embrace the resolution as evidence of a sort of open-ended endorsement of the Nixon Vietnam policy. This resolution must be read together with the President's November 3 speech, and I am troubled by a number of statements in that speech.

Let me set forth three particularly troublesome statements:

First. The President said:

At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace—a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.

The President's "other plan to bring peace" is not clear, really, since the "Vietnamization" he talks about literally means continuing and prolonging the war without U.S. combat troops but with U.S. support troops backing up the South Vietnamese. We presently have over 400,000 support troops in Vietnam.

The President's speech also tended to downgrade the negotiation front, yet the Wright resolution is devoted almost entirely to approving our negotiation stance.

Second. The President further said:

The previous Administration policy not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war but even more significantly it did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left. The Vietnamization Plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March.

The fact is that we assumed the primary responsibility of the fighting for the very obvious reason that in 1965 the South Vietnamese Army was on the verge of collapse. Before, during, and since the 1965 change in roles we have attempted to train, equip, and motivate the South Vietnamese Army. The process is old; only the slogan—Vietnamization—is new.

It is also a fact that President Nixon inherited a situation of deescalation when he assumed the Presidency in January 1969. Under President Johnson the bombing of North Vietnam had ended, at least two North Vietnamese divisions had moved out of the DMZ and the infiltration rates had been reduced. There was already a turning down of the war. Indeed, President Nixon may have wasted time and lives by waiting until August to end search and destroy missions.

Third. The President also said:

I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.

The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate in Paris.

In recalling his political campaign it seems the President was enraptured by campaign rhetoric. How else to explain the phrase "end the war in a way that we could win the peace." Having forgone the thought of military victory, it is difficult to see how we can "win" the peace either at the bargaining table or by the exclusive use of South Vietnamese troops.

As for division at home, it does exist. While most Americans want an honorable settlement of the war, all Americans are sick and tired of this war. Vietnam is tearing at the social, political, and spiritual fabric of this Nation and no resolution can hide that. While the Mylai incident is, I trust, an isolated example of the worst aspects of war, our national ethic has been damaged, our regard for human life pounded by the brutalization inherent in such a conflict.

The following is from the November issue of the *Air Force/Space Digest*, which did not endorse the article but noted it was written by "a longtime student of military affairs currently employed in the Department of Defense."

The article said, in part:

In a democratic republic like the United States it has never been possible to unify the country behind a misconceived, controversial, and ill-managed conflict like Vietnam. And let it be added that for too long has the myth persisted that if only this country were united on the war, then the North Vietnamese would immediately begin to negotiate. This does not follow at all—indeed, it never has—and has had a debilitating effect on rational discourse in this country concerning the war.

The higher road of patriotism is to think, to make searching inquiry, to follow one's conscience. The easy way is to respond to the superficial patriotic passion of the moment.

Fourth. Finally, when Vice President AGNEW flew to Montgomery, Ala., a town where the same company owns both newspapers, and attacked the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*, which operate in cities with three competing papers, he used the Wright resolution as a weapon.

He said:

If a theology student in Iowa should get up at a P.T.A. luncheon in Sioux City and attack the President's Vietnam policy, my guess is that you would probably find it reported somewhere the next morning in *The New York Times*. But when 300 congressmen endorse the President's Vietnam policy, the next morning it is apparently not considered news fit to print. (Emphasis supplied.)

Ironically, the *New York Times* did print the report in all but one edition, but the more interesting thing is the Vice President's statement that the Congressmen endorsed the President's Vietnam policy. He was referring to the signers of the Wright resolution.

We should be troubled by this, for the Nixon administration is trying to have it both ways. It is playing the tune of national unity on the one hand while turning loose its partisan political gunners on the other. We do not know to what further use this increasingly political administration will put this resolution.

Let us not walk into a trap. While JIM WRIGHT, I am sure, acted out of patriotic and high-minded motives in presenting his resolution, that resolution was booby-trapped during the night.

In our democratic society, asking questions is a vital part of avoiding error. By asking the right questions you can usually arrive at the truth. The Nixon "plan" for ending the war leaves too many questions unanswered.

Finally, I must object to this resolution on procedural grounds.

H.R. 613 comes to the floor under a closed rule, with no amendments permitted. We are told that under the precedents, a closed rule is called for on foreign policy resolutions. However, in the precedents cited, there were committee hearings before the resolutions came to the floor. No hearings whatsoever were held in this case. Aside from this, however, I believe that regardless of the precedents, we should permit amendments on this first House resolution in 5 years dealing with the open wound of Vietnam policy.

I cannot support a resolution, however high minded, which has been interpreted by this administration as a flat endorsement of a policy that is shrouded in uncertainty and vagueness. I am for peace with justice in Vietnam. I am also for the justice of the House of Representatives meeting its responsibilities by searching inquiry rather than mere acceptance.

Mr. HOWARD. Mr. Chairman, today the House of Representatives is going to vote on one of the most important pieces of legislation in its history, House Resolution 613, "Toward Peace with Justice in Vietnam."

First, I think it is fair to say that every single Member of the House is for peace with justice in Vietnam. There is disagreement in the House as to how we can best achieve peace with justice in Vietnam, but the overriding factor is that we are all searching for an honorable peace in Vietnam as soon as humanly possible.

I think it is a fair question to ask those who disagree with our present policies if they have a better alternative. Some possibly do. Some, I am sure, do not.

The author of the resolution, the distinguished Representative from Texas, JIM WRIGHT, is one of my best friends and has gone out of his way to help me since I came to the House in January 1965.

I have discussed the resolution with JIM WRIGHT in depth. He says flatly that the resolution is not an endorsement of the President's speech of November 3.

But on November 13, 1969, the President, in an address to the House, said:

Yesterday I was informed by a bi-partisan group from the House of Representatives that over 300 members of the House had joined in sponsoring a resolution for a just

peace in Vietnam along the lines of the proposals that I made in a speech on November 3, 1969.

President Nixon went on to say:

But I do know that when the great issues are involved that in this House, that what happened yesterday with the announcement on the part of Members on both sides of the aisle are well over a majority supporting the policy of the President of the United States, I realized that this was in the great tradition of this country.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. WRIGHT's statement that his resolution is not an endorsement of the President's speech, seems to collide head on with what the President said. I mention this fact because I feel it points out the air of confusion that this resolution seems to have brought about.

Since the introduction of this resolution, I have agonized daily over its possible impact on the House and on the country.

I am for peace with justice in Vietnam. I have supported the President's announced plans of troop withdrawals. But this does not mean that by voting in favor of this amendment I am approving any future course of action which might be taken by the President in regard to Vietnam.

This resolution is anything but perfect and for that reason, I have signed the following statement:

Confusion exists with respect to the meaning and intent of the resolution relating to the Vietnam policy. Introduced on November 4, it was widely reported to be an endorsement of President Nixon's statement of November 3. However, the resolution was drafted and signatures collected prior to November 3.

We regret that no hearings were held on the resolution by the House Foreign Affairs Committee so that some of the confusion and uncertainty could have been resolved.

We hope that during the floor discussion on the resolution its meaning will be clarified. Some of us will decide how our vote will be cast after listening to that discussion.

No matter how we may finally vote, however, we are in agreement on the following:

"We do not endorse everything said by the President in his statement of November 3rd.

"We specifically do not give advance approval of future decisions on Vietnam.

"We affirmatively urge efforts to reduce the level of violence in Vietnam; the broadening of the political base of the Saigon government, and the immediate designation of a high-level replacement for retiring delegate Henry Cabot Lodge.

It is important to look briefly at the history of this resolution before deciding if it is in the best interests of the United States.

The resolution was approved in committee without the benefit of a hearing. It was then brought to the floor under a closed rule prohibiting any of us from suggesting minor amendments.

I do agree that the President deserves strong bipartisan support for his efforts to negotiate peace in Vietnam. But amendments—or at least a hearing on this resolution—would have given all of us the opportunity to decide what we mean by a "just peace" as the wording appears in the resolution. When we talk

about free elections in the resolution, do we mean that everyone in South Vietnam should be able to participate, or would certain groups and individuals be barred?

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I want to say that I hope that in the future any such important legislation is first given the benefit of extensive public hearings and that everyone can be very clear on exactly what the intent of the resolution is.

Mr. HAGAN. Mr. Chairman, on November 5 I joined a large number of my colleagues in cosponsoring a House resolution affirming support of the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam. This resolution calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures the United States has made in good faith toward the government of North Vietnam and approves the principle of free elections for the people of South Vietnam.

Because of the recent demonstrations here in Washington and in other cities across the country regarding Vietnam, it has not been hard for Hanoi to misconstrue these demonstrations and take encouragement from them in the hope of more concessions and having negotiations in Paris go their way. It is very important that we, here in Congress, take steps to correct this misinterpretation of opinion. We must let it be known that basically there is a strong sense of unity among our people and that the dissent so loudly proclaimed in our news media is not necessarily the majority speaking. We need to impress the leaders in Hanoi with the unity of purpose underlying this resolution. They seem to believe that our country is about to cave in and surrender to the vocal minority that is presently "making the scene," so to speak. They are hoping this will be true and are perfectly willing to sit back and wait it out. In the meantime, the fighting continues and they refuse to honor cease-fire rules or even show interest in reciprocating while negotiations are going on in Paris.

There are two other points worthy of mention today, one is that this is not another "Gulf of Tonkin" resolution and it is clearly distinguishable on at least three counts: One, its thrust is entirely toward peace not war; two, the Tonkin resolution, by inference at least, seemed to broaden presidential powers whereas nothing in this Vietnam resolution would suggest this; three, the Tonkin resolution implies approval for future acts by the executive while today's resolution has reference to actions already taken and positions already on record. This is not an open-ended resolution.

My second point is that while this resolution demonstrates to Hanoi that we are standing together in support of the President's efforts, it also lets Saigon know that we are committed to freedom of self-government for South Vietnam through free and fair elections for all the South Vietnamese people.

I strongly urge passage of this resolution because of the tremendous impact it can have in bringing out a more realistic view of our stand on peace in Vietnam. Who does not want peace in Vietnam in this country and an end to the war? On

this we can all agree but let it be known that it must be an honorable and fairly negotiated peace. We will not settle for less.

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Resolution 613, "Toward Peace with Justice in Vietnam." I support President Nixon in his effort to end the Vietnam war. We can have only one President of the United States. I strongly believe he has the willingness and the knowledge to conclude this war expeditiously.

The language of the resolution is clear. It simply "affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam." We are not going to end the war in Vietnam with a divided Nation. This resolution is the best way to show Hanoi that we stand united behind our President. I strongly urge its passage.

Mr. Chairman, I also submit another reason we should pass this resolution by a large vote is that we should remember the most important man of all—our serviceman in Vietnam. The passage of this resolution is going to make his job a lot easier for him.

We are all anxious to end this war as soon as possible. Passing this resolution would be a giant step in the right direction. We should remember this is a peace resolution not a war resolution.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, I believe that we sent combat troops to Vietnam in 1965 to prevent an overthrow of the south by the north and to give the elected government of South Vietnam time to build so that it could become strong enough to defend itself from the north or make a political arrangement with the north.

I believe that we have accomplished that objective.

I believe that we did not enter Vietnam to inflict a defeat on North Vietnam but to prevent a defeat of South Vietnam.

I believe that we have accomplished that objective and that we can begin to withdraw our troops, not in a precipitous manner but in an orderly and systematic fashion. This position has been embodied in a resolution which I have cosponsored which provides that American troops should be withdrawn as quickly as possible contingent with the necessity to:

First, provide for the safety of U.S. forces; second, secure the release of American prisoners of war; third, assist any Vietnamese desiring asylum, and fourth, enable the United States to make an orderly disposition of its facilities in South Vietnam.

I believe that this is also President Nixon's policy and if it is, he, of course, has my support.

The difficulty is that I am not sure that this is Mr. Nixon's policy.

During the last year and a half he has made inconsistent statements about Vietnam and, therefore, I am reluctant to give a blanket endorsement of all his policies past, present, and future on Vietnam.

This would not be the first time the Congress was asked to give a blank check on Vietnam.

On August 2 and 4 of 1964 U.S. destroyers on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin were apparently attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.

On August 5 the Congress was asked to adopt and on August 7 did adopt a resolution supporting the President of the United States in his determination—

To take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

I do not believe that any Member of this House ever dreamed that that resolution would be used as the legal basis for a force of over 500,000 U.S. ground forces in Vietnam.

We did not realize that we were giving the President of the United States a blank check.

We are being asked to do the same thing today.

There is a saying:

You fool me once, shame on you, You fool me twice, shame on me.

Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to vote another Vietnam blank check.

I call this resolution a blank check because I do not understand what it means. It states that—

The House of Representatives affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam.

Which efforts?

During the campaign Mr. Nixon said he had a "plan" for ending the war. He has not revealed that "plan." Does this resolution endorse that secret plan?

On March 4, 1969, Mr. Nixon said:*

There are no plans to withdraw any troops at this time or in the near future.

On March 14 Mr. Nixon said:*

There is no prospect for a reduction of American forces in the foreseeable future.

Does this resolution endorse these statements?

On August 25, Ho Chi Minh wrote a letter to Mr. Nixon and concluded with the following paragraph:

With goodwill on both sides we might arrive at common efforts in view of finding a correct solution of the Vietnamese problem.

On November 3, 1969, Mr. Nixon said that Ho's letter "flatly rejected my initiative."

Does this resolution endorse that interpretation of Ho's letter?

For good and understandable reasons Mr. Nixon refused on November 3 to announce a timetable for withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam.

Does this resolution endorse Mr. Nixon's future rate of troop withdrawal however fast or slow that may be?

In his speech on November 3, Mr. Nixon twice used the words "win the peace."

Does this resolution endorse those words and if so, what do they mean? Does it mean that we will not settle unless the treaty nails the coonskin to the wall?

In his speech on November 3, Mr. Nixon

* On March 26, 1969 I introduced with 33 co-sponsors a Resolution which read: "Resolved that it is the sense of Congress that the United States should begin to reduce its military involvement in Vietnam".

warned Hanoi that increased violence might lead to reescalation of the war.

Does this resolution endorse reescalation?

During Secretary of Defense Laird's testimony before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on November 17, 1969, two weeks after President Nixon's November 3 speech, the following exchanges took place:

Mr. MAHON. If Vietnamization does not work, and if the North Vietnamese escalate the war, and if agreements cannot be reached in the Paris peace talks or otherwise, do you foresee the possibility of an escalation of the war in Vietnam?

Secretary LAIRD. I would not rule out that possibility completely, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MINSHALL. You say you are not ruling out any course of action. You mean by that conventional warfare only or would that also include nuclear weapons?

Secretary LAIRD. I would not anticipate the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam. I am not, however, ruling out other actions that might be necessary in the event the Vietnamization program does not work, even though I am confident it will work.

Does this resolution endorse that testimony? According to an article by Harrison Salisbury in the New York Times:

Xuan Thuy, North Vietnam's delegate to the peace talks here, contends that Hanoi is and has been ready at any time to meet the United States in private talks aimed at ending the war.

And—

That Mr. Lodge had rejected this proposal, insisting that the only question he was prepared to discuss was that of "mutual withdrawal."

Does this resolution endorse this position?

In his speech on November 3, Mr. Nixon said:

The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

I honestly do not know the truth of that policy and, therefore, I cannot vote for a resolution that blindly endorses it.

I could support this resolution if seven words were changed so that the first few lines would read as follows:

Resolved, That the House of Representatives urges the President to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam.

Mr. POFF. Mr. Chairman, what is America's Vietnam policy? What are our objectives there? What specifically can be done to achieve those objectives and resolve the conflict?

Everybody in Washington can give a different answer to those questions. It seems to me, so far as official American policy is concerned, the best answers can be found in the words of the President of the United States. Defining what he called "our essential objective in Vietnam," President Nixon has said:

We seek the opportunity for the South Vietnamese people to determine their own political future without outside interference.

We seek bases in Vietnam.

We seek no military ties.

We are willing to agree to neutrality for South Vietnam if that is what the South Vietnamese people freely choose.

We believe there should be an opportunity for full participation in the political life of

South Vietnam by all political elements that are prepared to do so without the use of force or intimidation.

We are prepared to accept any government in South Vietnam that results from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves.

We have no intention of imposing any form of government upon the people of South Vietnam, nor will be a party to such coercion.

We have no objection to reunification, if that turns out to be what the people of North Vietnam and the people of South Vietnam want; we ask only that the decision reflect the free choice of the people concerned.

The President has also articulated specific proposals which have the full approval of President Thieu and which he believes to be "consistent with the principles of all parties." Here in his own words are the specific proposals the President has recommended:

As soon as agreement can be reached, all non-South Vietnamese forces would begin withdrawals from South Vietnam.

Over a period of 12 months, by agreed-upon stages, the major portions of all U.S., allied and other non-South Vietnamese forces would be withdrawn. At the end of this 12-month period, the remaining U.S., allied and other non-South Vietnamese forces would be withdrawn. At the end of this 12-month period, the remaining U.S., allied and other non-South Vietnamese forces would move into designated base areas and would not engage in combat operations.

The remaining U.S. and allied forces would complete their withdrawal as the remaining North Vietnamese forces were withdrawn and returned to North Vietnam.

An international supervisory body, acceptable to both sides, would be created for the purpose of verifying withdrawals, and for any other purposes agreed upon between the two sides.

This international supervisory body would begin operating in accordance with an agreed timetable and would participate in arranging supervised cease-fires in Vietnam.

As soon as possible after the international body was functioning, elections would be held under agreed procedures and under the supervision of the international body.

Arrangements would be made for the release of prisoners of war on both sides at the earliest possible time.

All parties would agree to observe the Geneva Accords of 1954 regarding South Vietnam and Cambodia, and the Laos Accords of 1962.

Let me be quite blunt. Our fighting men are not going to be worn down; our mediators are not going to be talked down; and our allies are not going to be let down.

I frequently have letters from constituents who are earnestly and honestly seeking peace but who are critical of the policies and procedures which are being followed. Unfortunately, few of these letters reflect a familiarity with the generous dimensions of the proposals the President has made. Very few offer any specific alternatives.

It is my earnest conviction that a vast majority of the American people support the President's policy for peace in Vietnam. House Resolution 613 gives voice to and documents that fact. It adds nothing to the President's constitutional reservoir of power, and it subtracts nothing from the congressional reservoir of power. It is not a mandate; it is an affirmation. It is not an injunction; it is an endorsement. At this critical juncture in the struggle for peace, it is the least we can do; it is the most we can do.

As a cosponsor of the legislation, I urge the largest possible affirmative vote.

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Chairman, the conflict in Vietnam is a bitter and tragic one and we must bring it to a speedy end. It has taken a terrible toll in lives and resources and has created a frightening division among Americans.

I am sure few doubt that President Nixon is sincerely following a course of action which he firmly believes to be correct. And as a Member of Congress responsible both to my constituents and to the best interests of the country I believe he deserves our support as he endeavors to fulfill his stated commitment to bring peace.

For this reason only, I joined as one of the original cosponsors of House Resolution 613 when it was first proposed prior to President Nixon's speech to the Nation on November 3. The President, alone under our constitutional system, can speak for the Nation in negotiating peace and it was my hope that our expression of unity and resolve will help in this crucial effort.

Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, I must clearly state my firm conviction that adoption of this resolution will in no way constitute an absolute endorsement of the President's November 3 statement on Vietnam policy or his still undisclosed plan for peace.

While supporting House Resolution 613, therefore, I also reserve my right to disagree and to criticize specific issues or actions. I was, for example, very disappointed that there was no opportunity for more careful consideration of the resolution and, particularly, the possibility of amending it to express support for the withdrawal of troops at the earliest practicable date. The resolution in fact is one sided, for while it expresses support for negotiating a just peace in Vietnam it is silent about the President's proclaimed policy of troop withdrawal and Vietnamization of the war.

Mr. Chairman, like war, the quest for peace is often tortuous and agonizing, and the kind of peace that will finally come to Vietnam is already a matter of great concern. However, although I have some serious doubts and questions about the President's unspecified plan, I am prepared at this time to give him my support in his expressed efforts to negotiate a just peace and to Vietnamize the war.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, we are engaged today in an exercise in futility, an exercise in fantasy, an exercise in rhetoric, ignoring realities.

With all due respect to the honorable gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT), and to all the Members of this House who have signed his resolution, I must disagree with that resolution and its purpose. I believe that it ignores what is happening in Vietnam and what is happening in the United States. In the United States we have a great division over what is happening in Vietnam, and this division cannot be cured by words strung together without meaning. We, of course, support the President when he seeks peace. The question is: Will his

plans for peace produce peace? I do not believe they will, and thus I cannot support the principles "enunciated" by the President.

For 8 years we have heard three Presidents speak of their hopes and prayers for peace in Vietnam, yet there is no peace. Mistakes have been compounded on mistakes. President Nixon is repeating those mistakes.

We have 500,000 men in Vietnam. They are there in support of the South Vietnamese Government, a corrupt, and cruel government which would have fallen if we had not sent 500,000 men into Vietnam. Our support of that Government has cost us more than \$100 billion and almost 40,000 American lives. It survives only because of our sacrifices. It will fall as soon as we withdraw. The United States joined with South Vietnamese Government in refusing to hold elections there, in defying the Geneva accords. President Eisenhower was honest enough to admit the reason. The South Vietnamese Government would have lost the election. I would wish that we could be wise enough to admit what would happen if free elections were held tomorrow in South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese Government would lose that election. As a matter of fact, the present South Vietnamese Government would not allow free elections in Vietnam. It must fall before such elections can be held.

The record of the governments of South Vietnam, our creature-governments, is clear. They are corrupt, and they are not supported by the people of South Vietnam. In the area of corruption, I would like to quote the distinguished Senator from Georgia, HERMAN E. TALMADGE:

The Department of State concedes that there is corruption in Vietnam, but gives no indication of its extent or cost to the taxpayers, or to the war effort. It holds out no real hope for doing anything about it.

The State Department on June 1, 1968, said:

The United States recognizes that there is corruption in Vietnam, and we are pressing in every way that we can to help the South Vietnamese find ways to deal with it . . . Much greater results are needed if the problem of corruption is to be resolved.

We know the cost in American lives in Vietnam, but we do not know the cost of corruption both in lives and in dollars.

William Lederer in his book "Our Own Worst Enemy," quoted a North Vietnamese officer as saying:

Without American money, guns, food, medicine and supplies, we of the National Liberation Front would have a hard time surviving.

Where did the North Vietnamese obtain American money, guns, food, medicine, and supplies? They obtained them from corrupt South Vietnamese officers and government officials.

Conditions in South Vietnam have not changed. On July 7, 1969, Robert G. Kaiser reported in the Washington Post:

Not long ago the Vietnamese maid of a Frenchman living in Saigon heard that her son, a South Vietnamese soldier had been wounded and was in a Saigon hospital. She tried to find him, but the authorities at each

hospital she visited would not tell her if they had the boy as a patient.

They all demanded a bribe to answer the question, and the woman could not afford to pay.

And so the South Vietnamese Government tries to win the minds and hearts of its people.

The same report points out that a pro-Thieu bloc in the National Assembly's lower house was created by paying each Congressman, \$2,500.

We know of the money stolen by past Saigon regimes, of the French banks bought with American funds, of the parties, the girls and the estates. We know that American dollars are going into Swiss banks to care for South Vietnamese politicians who realistically know their days are numbered in Vietnam. The United States will not have to care for most South Vietnamese politicians who would flee a new government. They have already taken care of themselves, at our expense.

How much has corruption cost the United States? It cannot be estimated, but it at least equals \$1,000 for every American life lost in Vietnam—40,000 lives, \$40 million.

Corruption is not the only failure of the South Vietnamese Government. We say we are fighting for freedom in South Vietnam. Is South Vietnam free? A man may run against the present regime, but when he loses, where does he go? He is jailed. There is no viable government in South Vietnam, because the present government rules through force, American force. It cannot stand by itself, because the Vietnamese people do not support it.

The realities in Vietnam, realities not recognized in this resolution, are:

First. The war will continue as long as American troops remain in South Vietnam;

Second. The South Vietnamese Government is a corrupt dictatorship.

Third. U.S. forces, despite our use of massive military force, have not "won" the Vietnam war and cannot win it.

Fourth. Until the United States recognizes and acts on these realities, there cannot be any hope of peace in Vietnam.

Vietnamization of the war is a sham. The President's "plan for peace" will not work.

Therefore, I oppose this resolution, because it is not a solution to the problem, but it is part of the problem. I support the President's hopes and prayers for peace. I do not support the President's present course in Vietnam, because it will not lead to peace.

On November 13, 28 Members of Congress, myself included, offered a resolution which does recognize the realities of Vietnam. It read:

The resolution calls for withdrawal of U.S. forces in South Vietnam on an orderly and fixed schedule—neither precipitate nor contingent on factors beyond U.S. control—to extend only over a period of time as would be necessary to provide for the safety of U.S. forces, secure the release of American prisoners of war, assist any Vietnamese desiring asylum, and enable the United States to make an orderly disposition of its facilities in South Vietnam.

I urge that this House support this resolution or a similar one. I urge this House to act in a constructive manner, to take action which will produce results, and to respond to what is happening. The challenge today is not to support a wrong course, but to change that course.

Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Resolution 613 which says very clearly that the Members of the U.S. House of Representatives support President Nixon in his efforts to bring the Vietnam war to an honorable and just conclusion. Since this body represents the American people more closely than any other elected group, I feel this resolution will dispel any misconceptions that the people of other countries might have about America not being a united people. We are united and we do want peace in Southeast Asia. But in expressing our support for peace, we are also expressing our firm desire that the people of South Vietnam will be allowed to choose their leaders in free and democratic elections. I would urge all of my colleagues to give a vote of approval for House Resolution 613.

Mr. HARRINGTON, Mr. Chairman, the effect of passage of this resolution will not end the war one minute earlier. It may in fact prolong it.

For 11 months the President of the United States has been able to carry on foreign policy affecting, among other areas, Vietnam.

It was felt, I believe justifiably, that an appropriate period of time should be given to the incoming administration to work out their expressed policy aims of concluding the war in Vietnam.

But the President's November 3 speech, which the resolution now before the House endorses, contained no new delineations of policy, contained no series of proposals which would be the basis for total American disengagement, and was notably lacking in specifics regarding American intentions in South Vietnam. It was a speech barren of policy worth endorsing.

The resolution which does endorse this major policy statement by the President on the most critical issue facing our Nation today, comes before this body under unusual circumstances. The House has not been afforded the means to participate in public hearings on the resolution before the Foreign Affairs Committee. Nor has the House been offered the opportunity to amend the resolution on the floor. In sum, the House has been asked to endorse unequivocally the administration's foreign policy on Vietnam and the customary channels of open debate, of free deliberation, of weighing diverse views, have been abruptly curtailed.

The choice therefore before this body is either yes or no, up or down, and while the administration is the architect of our foreign policy the Congress of the United States has a major responsibility in expressing its position.

Though the parallels are not entirely similar, I think reference must be made to earlier congressional action involving this same area of the world. I refer chiefly to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

For my part I have no desire—however laudatory the expressed purpose,

however innocent the choice of language, however sincere the intentions—to participate by giving my formal endorsement of the war aims of the President as set forth in his November 3 speech.

I believe that to join with others in Congress in endorsing this policy as it has been defined will not and cannot result in shortening the war.

The apparent intent of the resolution is to present to the world a facade of unity. But you cannot make what is false true by congressional resolution.

The apparent hope of the resolution is to reduce to simple terms the complexities of our Vietnam policies. But such a broadly worded resolution recalls too clearly the innocuous language of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and reminds us of the dangers inherent when congressional authority is used by a President for aims not originally conceived.

The apparent design of the resolution is to give painless approbation to our Vietnam policy. But no congressional resolution can, despite studied effort, conceal the staggering dilemma faced by Americans viewing the horror of My Lai.

Support for this resolution will only continue the freeze of attitudes on the part of the National Liberation Front, the North Vietnamese, and, their allies, will result in increased cynicism and increased criticism of U.S. foreign policy by the rest of the world, and will result most importantly, in a heightening of the divisiveness, the frustration and the anger which already besets the Nation.

To join therefore in support of this resolution so disarmingly entitled "Peace With Justice," would serve no useful purpose but would, to the contrary, contribute to an entirely unjustified feeling of comfort which suggests the American Nation is satisfied with the conduct of American policy in Vietnam.

Accordingly I will vote against the resolution.

Mr. SEBELIUS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to strongly support House Resolution 613, a resolution that I am hopeful will better enable the President to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam.

It seems to me, and it has been eloquently stated by many Members of this body, that the main point of this resolution is to make sure Hanoi understands the simple fact the people of South Vietnam have a right to a government of their own choosing.

I think the President has made it abundantly clear that our Nation is now in Vietnam with one basic, limited purpose—to protect the right of self-government for the people of South Vietnam. I am extremely hopeful that through this resolution the government of Hanoi, which came to power through violence, terror, and military might, will clearly understand this fundamental American conviction. Once Hanoi clearly understands this point, I think we can expect to see real progress in the President's efforts to achieve a just peace.

Mr. SHRIVER. Mr. Chairman, as one of the original sponsors of this resolution I rise to urge its adoption. It is a resolution which has strong bipartisan support. The entire thrust of this resolu-

tion is in the direction of peace. The statement rattles no sabers. It makes no threats. It is positive in tone and conciliatory rather than belligerent.

This resolution confers no secret powers upon the President. Under our Constitution, the President is charged with the responsibility for speaking for the Nation in critical international situations. His is the responsibility to conduct negotiations in the name of this country. He alone can negotiate peace.

Since becoming President last January, Richard Nixon has worked to bring an end to the war in Vietnam through negotiations with the other side in Paris. Under his leadership, we have seen American troops returning from Vietnam. The program of Vietnamization is working, and I personally hope the President will soon announce further planned troop withdrawals.

The adoption of this resolution at this time can be helpful to the President as he attempts to end the war with justice and honor. It will tell the Government of North Vietnam and the Vietcong that the membership of the U.S. House of Representatives is closely united with the President in his efforts to negotiate peace.

Unity, understanding, and support for the President and our servicemen in Vietnam will contribute to the success of the Nixon plan for peace. We can help deliver a message to Hanoi that will tell the Communists that now is the time to sit down at the bargaining table and negotiate an end to this war. This is the message which this resolution will carry. I urge its passage.

Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Chairman, when I agreed to cosponsor the resolution before us today, I did so in the belief that President Nixon and his administration were committed to peace and the disengagement of the United States from its involvement in the Vietnam war.

The President's speech of November 3 emphasized his commitment to peace. He said:

I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.

The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed.

Mr. Chairman, for more than 2 years I have urged a systematic withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam at a pace that would get us out of Vietnam as rapidly as reasonably possible. This appeared to be the basic message of President Nixon's speech and the fundamental policy of his administration. I was thus prepared to extend my support for what seemed to be a real effort to achieve an early peace.

Nevertheless, I had misgivings. The President's failure to spell out the details of his Vietnam peace plan disturbed me. He said the administration has adopted a plan for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. ground combat forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces. But he declined to announce this timetable.

This omission, I felt, would have several negative effects. It would most likely

weaken the incentive for the South Vietnamese to accept their full responsibility in the defense of their country and the determination of their future economic and political structure.

Second, this failure to commit ourselves publicly to a withdrawal timetable leaves the door wide open to a renewed buildup of U.S. forces. Indeed, the President qualified his peace plan by saying it hinged on the level of enemy activity as well as the progress of the training program of the South Vietnamese forces.

The resolution itself is also somewhat ambiguous. It affirms the House's support "for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam." No mention is made of disengagement or withdrawal on any timetable, public or private.

The simplicity of the resolution is appealing in its expressed desire for peace. But this simplicity also gives rise to the dangers of misinterpretation. The 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution was also a simply stated document that gave basic support to a President's policy. Little did the Congress realize how this resolution would be used by President Johnson as legal justification for the massive escalation of American involvement in Vietnam that followed.

My doubts were deepened when this resolution came before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I had anticipated a public debate during hearings that would allow the administration an opportunity to fill in the blanks of its peace plan. The quiet and precipitate treatment of the resolution by the committee was hardly reassuring, and I thus voted with the minority of my colleagues against a closed rule that shut off debate on the House floor.

Nevertheless, until today I have remained ready to vote for the resolution, believing that President Nixon's search for a just peace was predicated on an irreversible disengagement from the war. This, in my judgment, must be the essence of our Vietnam policy if we are to find peace.

Thus I was shocked to learn today that the administration may not be committed to irreversible withdrawal. In testimony before a House Appropriations Subcommittee released yesterday, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird says that he would "not rule out" the possibility of reescalation of the Vietnam war if the President's policy of Vietnamization does not "lead the way to a military victory."

Secretary Laird's statements place a new interpretation on our Vietnam policy. The emphasis shifts back from a determination to win a just peace to the old game of American willingness in Vietnam to keep all the options open. It is now virtually impossible to believe that the administration is committed to a policy of irreversible withdrawal.

If it is not, it would appear that this resolution can be used to sanction any kind of Presidential policy change in Vietnam, including a new escalation of fighting.

In this light, the resolution takes on the same dangerous coloring as the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. I cannot and will not support a resolution that would con-

done, and perhaps be used to justify, an expanded American combat effort in Vietnam. Until the administration makes completely clear its intention to withdraw irreversibly from Vietnam, I must withhold my support of its policies, and vote against this resolution today.

Mr. HELSTOSKI. Mr. Chairman, in my opinion the House of Representatives is acting with undue haste in approving House Resolution 613.

There are unresolved serious doubts about some sections of the resolution. Some of us believe it contains details which could commit the United States of America to an indefinite continuation of the undeclared war in Vietnam with the power of decision resting in only one person—the President.

We who feel this way thought we might be afforded the opportunity of amending the resolution to remove or correct such sections, but we could not even try because of the procedures under which it was debated and voted upon. There were no committee hearings and the resolution was taken up in the House under the obnoxious closed rule.

We may well have given another President another blank check.

It should be evident to everyone that all thinking Americans want military operations and confrontations brought to an end in Vietnam as rapidly as possible—overnight if it were possible.

We, as Members of the House of Representatives, should be in the forefront of efforts to bring an end to the killing and maiming in Vietnam, but are we?

We all know that we are not.

The passage of House Resolution 613 does not place us in such a position. In fact, it drives us further away from the actions that result in the decisionmaking of the President.

If House Resolution 613, which we consider under the muzzle of a closed rule, does give another blank check to the Chief Executive then it is apparent we have not learned. We know what earlier blank checks brought about. The Gulf of Tonkin resolution of 1964 is cited as one example. Such resolutions are in effect a circumventing of the Constitution.

We all support the President's efforts to bring an honorable end and, I hope, a lasting peace to Vietnam and its surrounding areas, but I could not in good conscience vote to give him a blank check. To have done so would not have been in accordance with my beliefs of a democratic form of government or my responsibilities to the people I represent.

The President actively seeks our support for his efforts. I repeat, I give it to him but not by voting for the questionable resolution that was brought before us.

But I do believe that the President owes something in return to Members of the House of Representatives and the people they represent.

First, I believe that he must explain to all what happened to his 1968 New Hampshire announced but unexplained plan for ending the undeclared war in Vietnam. He held out high hopes for all of us.

What was the plan? What happened to it? The public has a right to know. The

President's failure to explain this promise or utterance has disturbed me for many months. I was just as disturbed about being asked to blindly vote for House Resolution 613.

It is not clear what the administration is doing about the Vietnam situation except that it is slowly withdrawing American troops. That is important and good, but it is not enough. I expect and hope that there is much more of a constructive nature than can be done, but how many Members know what is exactly taking place. We should not play the game of blindly following the leader.

It is my humble opinion that the President should place all of the facts in the Vietnam situation before us. He could appear before a joint session of Congress to set forth all of the facts and problems. If necessary it could be an executive or closed session. He could permit a stated number of questions to be asked of him. He might keep us apprised of developments by appearing before a joint session every 30 days. Through such a procedure, he would be helpful to us and we might be helpful to him.

It is my hope that the leadership on both sides of the House will extend an invitation to the President to appear before us for a series of in-depth discussions of the Vietnam situation.

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Chairman, the issue with which we are confronted today is whether the House of Representatives should endorse the Vietnam peace plan submitted by President Nixon.

Up to the present time, the only plan for peace submitted by the President was in his speech to the Nation on November 3—and the secret plan for peace which he discussed in the presidential elections of last year. The only other clue to the plan of the President includes his proposal for Vietnamization of the war.

Like the fable of the emperor's clothes, there appears to be no plan to end the war. The withdrawal of some troops may increase the relationship of combatant to noncombatant forces and result in increased combat forces. The Vietnamization of the war is nothing new. I thought it was the American goal when the first technicians and military advisers were sent to Vietnam in 1964. Vietnamization of the war was American policy when we had 15,000 advisers in Vietnam. Vietnamization of the war is the slow, cruel process which has taken a toll of 44,000 lives and 106.9 billion taxpayer dollars. How much more will Vietnamization of the war cost in lives? How much more in American spirit? How much more will it sap from American morale? How much more in taxpayer expenditures?

The resolution before us authorizes the President to proceed for a "just peace" in Vietnam. The definition of either of these terms is not made in the resolution, nor can it be found in the legislative history. Therefore the term "just peace" can mean whatever the executive decides it should mean at the time it may serve his purpose. The resolution does not preclude escalation, temporary or permanent.

The resolution does not preclude an increased commitment of men or materiel if this should be necessary to obtain a "just peace." The resolution does not prohibit a resumption of a bombing of the north or the use of nuclear weapons if this is necessary to obtain a "just peace." The resolution does not require any further troop withdrawals or prohibit further exposure of American troops if they are needed to obtain a "just peace." The resolution, therefore, authorizes any further commitment of men, materiel and casualties which the executive may deem necessary to win a "just peace."

Then, further—for whom must peace be just—for those who presently control the government of South Vietnam, the people of South Vietnam, the Liberation Front, the Vietcong, the North Vietnamese, the American people, or the citizens of the remainder of the world. Is America to be a separate party to the peace—or is the peace to be achieved in conjunction with the present South Vietnamese government? Is it possible for the United States to achieve peace terms with the present government of Saigon?

Will the conditions for a "just peace" include concessions for American capital and enterprise to be invested in Vietnam? Will the conditions for a "just peace" insure the integrity of American property rights in Vietnam? Is this why 44,000 lives were spent?

Will a "just peace" demand conditions of a better life for those who are left to live in South Vietnam? Will a "just peace" insure land reform and protect the people from exploitation by either the central government or the military strong men who are left in control of military power and property? Will a "just peace" provide for a redemption of the people and the land for a pursuit of a decent, acceptable life for the Vietnamese?

It is incredible to expect that a "just peace" can be achieved for all the parties to the conflict. What is "just" to one—will be of necessity "unjust" to the other. The attainment of a "just peace" could be interpreted to mean through victory by an overwhelming and conclusive defeat of the enemy. Does the President's proposal—whatever it is—contemplate less than a full and complete military settlement of the conflict?

The resolution further supports the doctrine of free elections to determine the future Government of South Vietnam. Can America enforce this commitment on a government presently in control in Vietnam which it recognizes as the lawful Government of South Vietnam? Is this offer to the enemy enforceable? Can we force a free election upon South Vietnam short of making a military enemy of the present government we sought to befriend?

And who will set the rules of the free election? What will be the qualifications of electors? Will the residency requirements permit those who immigrated to South Vietnam to vote on proof of residency after 1, 3, 5, or 10 years? Will former South Vietnamese residents who migrated to North Vietnam be permitted to return and cast their ballots? Who will

determine the difference between citizen and intruder?

The resolution before us today leaves these questions and many others without answers. In the orderly course of legislative events, interrogation of government witnesses would have provided a legislative history which would have included the administration's policy with respect to these questions and others that may be deemed important. A resolution which is adopted without this kind of clarification provides the administration with authority to do anything which it chooses within the framework of the words of the resolution.

The adoption of this undefined resolution will allow the creation of a false impression that these Vietnam policies have the overwhelming and unqualified approval of the American people. This resolution could be a disservice to the American people who are entitled to be better informed of the administration's intentions with respect to Vietnam. The patience of the American people has been temporarily extended but it has been stretched thin. The American desire is for an end to the killing and a disengagement from the conflict.

This resolution is designed to meet a confrontation with dissent in America on the continuation of the war in Vietnam. Words, however artful, cannot substitute for the deeds and actions which can bring peace. The semantics of peace which could endorse a prolongation of the war are not acceptable.

This resolution could be easily made acceptable if it were to specify a program for peace and disengagement. In its present form, it is a blank check which could be construed to mean peace through more war. I cannot in good conscience endorse such a resolution.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, many Members have expressed their concern about the interpretation which has been placed on House Resolution 613. This concern has been more formally set forth in a statement signed by 82 Members. The statement with the names of the signers follows:

STATEMENT ON HOUSE RESOLUTION 613

Confusion exists with respect to the meaning and intent of H. Res. 613 relating to Vietnam policy. Introduced on November 4th, it was widely reported to be an endorsement of President Nixon's statement on November 3rd and was so construed by the President when he visited the House. However, the resolution was drafted and signatures collected prior to November 3rd.

We regret that no hearings were held on the resolution by the House Foreign Affairs Committee so that some of the confusion and uncertainty could have been resolved.

We hope that during the floor discussion on the resolution its meaning will be clarified. Among us are sponsors of the resolution. Some of us will decide how our vote will be cast after listening to that discussion.

No matter how we may finally vote, however, we are in agreement on the following:

We do not endorse everything said by the President in his statement of November 3rd.

We specifically do not give advance approval of future decisions on Vietnam.

We affirmatively urge efforts to reduce the level of violence in Vietnam, the broadening of the political base of the Saigon government, and the immediate designation of a

high-level replacement for retiring delegate Henry Cabot Lodge.

Brock Adams, Joseph Addabbo, Glenn Anderson, Thomas Ludlow Ashley, Jonathan Bingham, John Blatnik, Edward Boland, John Brademas, Frank Brasco, Jack Brooks, George Brown, Hugh Carey, Shirley Chisholm, William Clay, Jeffery Cohelan, James Corman, John Culver, Emilio Daddario, Charles Diggs, John Dingell, Thaddeus Dulski, Bob Eckhardt, Don Edwards, Frank Evans, Leonard Farbstein, Thomas Foley, William Ford, Don Fraser, Joseph Gaydos, Sam Gibbons, Jacob Gilbert, Henry Gonzalez, William Green, Michael Harrington, Augustus Hawkins, Ken Hechler, Henry Helstoski, Floyd Hicks, James Howard, Andy Jacobs, Joseph Karth.

Edward Koch, Peter Kyros, Robert Leggett, Allard Lowenstein, Richard McCarthy, Paul McCloskey, Ray Madden, Spark Matsunaga, Lloyd Meeds, Abner Mikva, Joseph Minish, Patsy Mink, William Moorhead, John Moss, Luclen Nedzi, Robert Nix, David Obey, James O'Hara, Arnold Olsen, Thomas O'Neill, Richard Ottinger.

Bertram Podell, Thomas Rees, Ogden Reid, Peter Rodino, Robert Roe, Benjamin Rosenthal, Edward Roybal, Fernand St Germain, William St. Onge, James Scheuer, George Shipley, Frank Thompson, John Tunney, Morris Udall, Charles Vanik, Joseph Vigorito, Jerome Waldie, Charles Wilson, Lester Wolf, Sidney Yates.

Mr. ESCH. Mr. Chairman, I will support House Resolution 613 with my vote today. However, I am disappointed that the form of the resolution and the closed rule make it difficult for the House to give full expression to its views on this complex issue. I therefore want to take this opportunity to detail my views on the war in Vietnam more specifically than the broad outlines of the resolution allow.

Since taking office, I have had as a major concern our disengagement from Vietnam. You may recall that in July of 1967 I proposed, along with eight of my colleagues a plan for a mutual disengagement of the war and of the bombing that was underway at that time. The essence of that proposal was gradual, reciprocal, identifiable disengagement of hostilities and of the establishment of a government in which the people of South Vietnam realize true self determination. I believe the most important factor of our proposals was the flexibility which it allowed for both sides. The lack of this flexibility in many current proposals which set public deadlines is their major weakness.

While I believe that President Nixon has made significant progress toward disengagement in Vietnam, I feel that he should accelerate the rate of withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, investigate the feasibility of a deescalatory unilateral cease-fire, and assist in bringing a more responsive and representative government to South Vietnam.

To argue that the President has not changed the posture of the U.S. in South Vietnam is without logic or fact and weakens the cause of those who argue for further disengagement. To gain perspective, it is interesting to reexamine what the "peace" candidate for President, EUGENE MCCARTHY, was proposing

as a means to get out of Vietnam 1 year ago—and the similarity of his proposals to the action which the President has undertaken.

1. Stop the bombing and seek negotiations.
2. Halt the escalation and freeze troop strength.
3. Cease 'search and destroy' missions.
4. Cease attempts to uproot the Viet Cong from areas they have controlled for many years.
5. Conduct a gradual disengagement in the South and a cease-fire on a trial basis in some areas while pressing for negotiation.
6. Insist that the South Vietnamese take on greater military responsibilities.
7. Reexamine military policy.
8. Press the authorities in Saigon to broaden their own political base. (Congressional Record, March 26, 1968.)

One who analytically reviews the steps taken by the current administration in the light of these suggestions will admit that significant progress has been made toward disengagement. This administration does not insist, as did its predecessor, that the result of free elections be favorable to the United States. This administration has forced the South Vietnamese government to publicly agree to NLF political participation in a coalition supervisory election commission. Our orders are no longer for "maximum pressure" but for "protective reaction." Troops are no longer being increased, but are being brought home.

As Senator FULBRIGHT has said:

I am opposed to an unconditional American withdrawal from South Vietnam because such action would betray our obligation to people we have promised to defend, because it would weaken or destroy the credibility of American guarantees to other countries, and because such a withdrawal would encourage the view in Peiping and elsewhere that guerrilla wars supported from outside are a relatively safe and inexpensive way of expanding communist power.

Nonetheless, I believe that major additional efforts must be made. Specifically, I have recommended that we immediately announce new combat troop reductions as a further indication, both to the North Vietnamese and to the world, that we are sincere in our efforts to disengage from the war. We should also take the initiative in a unilateral cease fire.

Even more important is overt action on our part to meet our commitment to full self-determination for the South Vietnamese. Our goals, as stated by the President in his May 14 speech, are laudatory:

We seek no bases in Vietnam. We insist on no military ties. We are willing to agree to neutrality if that is what the South Vietnamese people freely choose. We believe there should be an opportunity for full participation in the political life of South Vietnam for all political elements that are prepared to do so without the use of force or intimidation. We are prepared to accept any government in South Vietnam that results from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves.

Unfortunately, we have seemed to veer from this commitment through indications of continued support for the Thieu-Ky government. It is imperative that we press the government in the South, in every way possible, to broaden the political participation of opposition groups in the nation, and make the government

more representative. Our commitment must not be to the present government, but to a government based on the free choice of all the people. I will continue to express my displeasure with our failures in this area and urge prompt action to correct them. It is vital that we make absolutely clear our commitment for self-determination is not to the Thieu government but to the people as a whole.

Coupled with our insistence on self-determination must come a commitment for the rebuilding of Vietnam both socially and economically. The human havoc which war has wrought on this nation must be repaired—preferably through an international organization where the aid can be free of corruption or hint of political pressure.

There is one other major aspect which I believe needs to be emphasized—a complete prisoner exchange by the two parties. It behooves those who speak out and demonstrate for peace in the name of humanity, also to express openly their concern about prisoners held by both sides. The peace movement would be greatly enhanced if it would directly and overtly encourage the Vietcong and North Vietnamese at least to release the names of prisoners they hold and allow for exchange of mail and inspection by the International Red Cross, as provided for in the Geneva agreements.

The essence of democracy is the right of dissent and the necessity for dialogue among those who dissent and those in a position of power and responsibility. I respect the right of petition to the government and to elected officials and have therefore taken every effort to talk with people from my district who are concerned about the war on every side of the issue.

Mr. UDALL, Mr. Chairman, the debate and vote this week on House Resolution 613 is a frustrating and disappointing experience for me. For 5 years, the House of Representatives—the part of our Government designed to be closest to the people—has almost completely failed to debate or to endeavor to influence the central event of our times: the war in Vietnam. Now, when we finally undertake such debate, we are forced to conduct it under circumstances which make a near mockery of the whole proceedings. Debate is under a closed rule, with even the most minor amendments being out of order, including some which might clarify the ambiguous, vague wording of the resolution.

In addition, House Resolution 613 at best deals only with the peripheral aspects of the Vietnam problem and fails to come to grips with the basic issues. Couched in pious generalities, it is concerned only with negotiated peace, which today is the least likely avenue for ending the war. The President himself places little reliance on the negotiations as a viable way of halting the war. And I doubt that Hanoi's intransigent position in the Paris peace negotiations will be changed one iota by this resolution.

House Resolution 613 does not take up the most vital decision which the President has made concerning the Vietnam war—his secret plan for troop withdrawals. Nor does it consider any other military issues involved in the war.

For these reasons I voted yesterday against the closed rule. By its vote yesterday, the House of Representatives has almost abdicated its right and its obligation to submit the Administration's Vietnam policy to a hard scrutiny and to offer policy alternatives.

Now I am faced with a yes or no vote on the passage of House Resolution 613, when neither vote really reflects my feelings. I share in part many of the apprehensions expressed by some of my colleagues yesterday. My vote for the resolution may possibly be interpreted as:

First, advance approval of future escalation of the war if Hanoi resumes its offensive, as the President has warned he might do in his November 3 speech;

Second, complete approval of the President's policy in Vietnam and support of every aspect of his November 3 speech, which mentioned a plan for peace completely unknown to us.

If we say "yes" to House Resolution 613, this vote may be interpreted by the administration, the press and the American people as support of the President's timetable for withdrawing troops, no matter how drawn out a procedure that turns out to be.

Third, support for the present Saigon Government which definitely does not represent the people of South Vietnam and which has in the past thwarted our attempts at meaningful negotiations in Paris.

I have good reasons for feeling uneasy about approving this measure. Five years ago I voted for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and subsequently found that it was greatly distorted by the Johnson administration to suit its own purposes. So I am definitely apprehensive about what the results of this similar resolution will turn out to be.

On the other hand, a vote against the resolution is almost equally misleading as to my position:

First. This vote would make me appear to be opposed to a "just peace," although the record clearly shows that I have been fighting for peace in Vietnam, long before it was fashionable or politically popular to do so.

Second. It would suggest that I do not support the President in a difficult time. This suggestion could not be further from the truth. I applaud and support the President's first steps toward extricating us from this horrible mistake in Vietnam. While I have some misgivings about several aspects of his policy, I am sure that he is doing what he thinks is best in trying to end the conflict. Thus, though I do support his efforts, I think I should have the option to reserve judgment on any of the President's actions in Vietnam.

For all these reasons, the decision on this vote is not easy. But I have reluctantly concluded that I should vote for passage. In doing so I rely heavily on the repeated assurances of the sponsors of House Resolution 613 that approval of the resolution is to be taken as agreement only on the literal meaning of the words used. I do not object to—surely no one can object to—the actual wording of the resolution which is as follows:

Resolved, That the House of Representatives affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, expresses the earnest hope of the people of the United States for such a peace, calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures which the United States has made in good faith toward the Government of North Vietnam, approves and supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese and supervised by an impartial international body, and that the United States is willing to abide by the results of such elections, and supports the President in his call upon the Government of North Vietnam to announce its willingness to honor such elections and to abide by such results and to allow the issues in controversy to be peacefully so resolved in order that the war may be ended and peace may be restored at last in South-east Asia.

Let me at the same time make clear what I am not saying by my affirmative vote. I am not voting for:

Any open-ended blank check endorsing any action which the President may take regarding Vietnam;

Escalation of the war, in retaliation to a new offensive by Hanoi; and

Blanket support of the present Saigon government or giving that government veto power over our actions.

One strong consideration in my decision is the distinction made by its main author, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT) between House Resolution 613 and the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. His letter to Representative BROCK ADAMS, which was printed in the December 1 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, page 36085, pointed out three differences. He said this resolution is oriented toward peace, not war as was the Tonkin resolution. According to Mr. WRIGHT, House Resolution 613 is also different in that it neither broadens Presidential powers nor implies approval for future decisions by the President.

As I interpret the ambiguities of the resolution, House Resolution 613 emphasizes the importance of making peace and the right of all the people of South Vietnam, including the Communists, to participate in free elections. This is in sharp contrast to the Tonkin resolution which gave the President the mandate to take "all necessary steps" to punish the enemy, to bomb, and to send American troops to Vietnam.

I interpret House passage of the resolution as an endorsement of democracy in Vietnam—democracy which is still opposed by the leaders in Saigon. I view it as a clear signal to the South Vietnamese Government that the U.S. Congress believes this war is being prolonged by the intransigence of Saigon to endorse openly the resolution of Vietnam's political differences by the democratic elective process.

Mr. Chairman, as I said earlier, this debate does not deal with the really tough questions on the war. For this reason, I want to digress for a few minutes and say a few things about where we are and where we may be heading.

It was just 2 years ago when I stood before a Tucson audience to express for the first time publicly my dissent on the conduct of the Vietnam war. What moved

me to make that speech was my concern about the dangerous direction in which the country was moving, the pursuit of a military victory in a war whose only solution could be political. That night 2 years ago I saw the United States mounting a treadmill that goes even faster, a treadmill called escalation, leading not to victory over communism but rather to a steady increase in the loss of American prestige, property and, most important, lives in the jungles of Southeast Asia.

That night in 1967 I gave the President what was thought by many to be pretty radical counsel. "Mr. President," I said, "you are going to have to extricate us from this war by ending the bombing of North Vietnam and ordering a gradual de-escalation of our entire war effort, starting with the removal of American troops from those areas of South Vietnam which can most easily be defended, and leading to the total withdrawal of U.S. troops." Within a reasonable time, I counseled, we should turn over the balance of this war to the South Vietnamese. In keeping with our commitments, we should continue to supply whatever is needed to maintain the South Vietnamese while the threat continues and as long as we are convinced the Saigon Government is working in the interest of its own people.

Mr. Chairman, the "radical" plan I have just described is policy today. Many of the proposals I made in 1967 have been adopted by Presidents Johnson and Nixon. The present administration must be credited for making the first steps toward peace, steps which I suggested. It has publicly rejected a military victory as a goal, it has started troop withdrawals, and it has shifted our military posture in Vietnam from "maximum pressure" to "protective reaction."

In the last 2 years, we have experienced one of the most remarkable turnabouts in American history. When I first spoke out, escalation was our policy and most favored it. Today our policy is one of getting out, and according to a recent Gallup poll, 55 percent of the American people agree that the war was a mistake.

This is not to say that my advice or the advice of others opposing the war has always been correct. Stopping the bombing, many of us claimed, would lead to negotiations in good faith and perhaps even an end to the fighting. By now it is clear that we were wrong.

If the doves have made mistakes in this war it must be argued that the hawks have made some tragically costly blunders, too. There has seemingly been a complete disregard of economics by those, particularly in the last administration, who used the public treasury in an effort to fabricate a picture of wide allied support for the Vietnam war. Thus, we are beginning to see questions raised like these: Did we "buy" the use of 12,000 Thai troops for a billion dollars? Did we pay off the Philippines in the amount of \$38 million for, at most, 2,200 non-combatants? What price have we paid and are we paying for South Korean troops fighting beside American?

Nevertheless, we are now committed to bringing about peaceful settlement of

the Vietnam war or, falling that, an end to America's role in it. That is the real meaning of the resolution we are debating today.

The time then has come for us to stop shouting slogans at each other, to quit arguing about peripheral issues, and to get on with the tough, unpleasant job of working out an early end to the war. "Support the President" is not a policy or program, it is simply a slogan. How are we to give the President total support for a policy he has not yet disclosed? By the same token, what does the phrase "immediate withdrawal" have to offer other than frustration and confusion? The process of leaving, even when that final commitment is made, will take months, perhaps even a year.

Of course, all Americans want to end the war and all of us want to support the President as much as we possibly can. But we must continue to debate the crucial questions: Will the President's policy end or prolong the war? Will an orderly pullout, such as I advocate, bring about a bloodbath of innocents or drastically affect U.S. influence and commitments elsewhere?

So there is honest and intelligent dispute over the tactics for bringing America's role in Vietnam to an end. In resolving this dispute, we get no help from those who claim it is, "Nixon's war" or those who would label as snobs or question the patriotism of sincere people advocating a different plan of withdrawal.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the President now has a plan which he firmly believes will lead to peace. A majority of Americans seem inclined to give the President additional time to try it. For the sake of the country, I really hope it does work, but I feel compelled to register my honest judgment that it will only lead to a new military and diplomatic stalemate at a lower level of violence continuing well into the 1970's. The plan I think is now being contemplated involves a continuation of U.S. logistic and air support with perhaps 200,000 Americans remaining in Vietnam while Asians continue to kill Asians. The fatal defect of this policy is that it apparently leaves the final decisions about America's future in the hands of the ruthless dictatorship in Hanoi and/or a repressive, corrupt and unrepresentative semidictatorship in Saigon.

My own view is that troop withdrawals should be continued at an orderly rate, and on a predetermined schedule, leading to substantially complete disengagement of American troops by the end of 1970. Such predetermined and orderly withdrawals are the only instruments we have for pressuring badly needed reforms on the Saigon government, a regime which still refuses to admit broader participation in the processes of Government, while continuing to censor and close newspapers and jail political opponents.

While we are now going through an acrimonious and troubling time, I believe we are in the process of winding down this war and groping our way toward its termination. Just how it will end I can't really predict, but the process is underway and most probably will not

be reversed. If we all keep our heads and our tempers, the country can come through this frustrating and unsettling experience without being torn apart.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, as one of the many sponsors of the resolution "toward peace with justice in Vietnam," I urge all my colleagues to add their support to the proposal. Since this resolution was first introduced, almost three-fourths of the House membership have cosponsored the resolution or introduced similar ones. These duly-elected Members represent a great majority of the American people, and I am confident they are expressing the overwhelming wishes of their constituents on this matter.

In my view, the resolution before the House is simple, straightforward, and direct. It affirms the support of the House of Representatives for the President of the United States in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam. It expresses the earnest hope of the people of the United States for an honorable negotiated settlement of the war. It calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures the United States has made in good faith to the Government of North Vietnam. It approves and supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese, supervised by an impartial international body. It declares that the United States will abide by the election results, and it calls upon the Government of North Vietnam to do likewise so that the war in Vietnam can be resolved and peace can be restored to Southeast Asia.

Mr. Chairman, there has been much debate about both the terms of the resolution and the supposed policy implications that flow from the terms. This debate, although well intentioned, misses the basic thrust and purpose of the resolution. The House of Representatives, through the resolution, is not attempting to hammer out a Congressional policy position with respect to Vietnam, it is merely attempting to express our feeling of support for the efforts of the President of the United States to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam.

This is a laudable goal, a goal whose noble purpose should be affirmed, and affirmed now. The Communist overlords of North Vietnam think they have the United States on the run. They think the people of the United States are bitterly divided over the war and will not support the President in his quest for peace. They fail to realize that the rumblings of discontent they hear and the demonstrations they see are merely the voices and actions of some, but by no means a majority of the American people. Some of the protestors are dedicated anarchists, others are admitted hard-core Communists. Some are misguided social reformers, others are everyday people trying to express their sense of frustration at a war which has dragged on and on without appearing to have an end in sight.

I disagree with the protestors. I think they are betraying the bloody sacrifices that our American soldiers have made to

bring freedom to the struggling people of South Vietnam. In addition, their actions are creating false illusions in the minds of the North Vietnamese that the American will see the cause of freedom triumph in Southeast Asia is wasting away. As a direct result of their delusions about our national state of mind, the Communists have stalled the Paris peace talks, and are presently waiting in a confident pose for the American forces to depart from Vietnam.

As far as I am concerned, and I am confident that my views are shared by an overwhelming majority of Americans, the United States has no intention of deserting the valiant people of South Vietnam and leaving them to the bloody hands of the Communists. President Nixon has stated that the United States will not settle for anything less than peace with honor in Vietnam. The House resolution Toward Peace with Justice in Vietnam voices congressional support of his efforts for peace. Both the President's efforts and the House resolution merits our total and undivided approval.

Mr. GREEN of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, today I will vote "no" on House Resolution 613, relating to Vietnam policy with great regret because it is my desire to applaud and encourage every initiative of the President toward peace as I have done in the past.

Is it possible, that, after 15 years of involvement, 4½ years of overt military action, the efforts of more than a million men, the deaths of 40,000 servicemen, the wounding of more than 300,000 American young men, the expenditure of billions of dollars, the divisions created here at home, the destruction wrought on Vietnam and the diplomatic efforts engaged in by ourselves and others around the globe—is it possible that, after all this tragic experience, the best that the House of Representatives of the United States of America can produce is a 17-line resolution which vaguely commits us to a peaceful settlement through measures largely unexplained in the resolution itself or omitted entirely?

Surely, we have learned enough in the past few years to come up with something better than this.

And yet, it seems we have not. Having been speedily rushed to the floor without hearings before the Foreign Affairs Committee, under a closed rule which forbids amendment, at a time when we clearly have the concern and the knowledge to conduct a truly meaningful debate on Vietnam, we are asked to approve an amorphous resolution which will become, almost certainly, a constitutional sanction for just about anything the administration desires.

I think we are shirking our responsibility, as elected representatives, to legislate creatively.

And I believe we are blindly taking the same path we took in August of 1964 when we handed the previous administration a similar resolution on the Tonkin Gulf incident which, time and again, was cited as justification for the limitless American involvement in Vietnam, although few Members of this body would have believed so when they voted for it.

Have not we in the legislative branch learned our lesson?

Who here today would defend the Tonkin resolution in terms of what followed? Who would admit that he knew then the implications of his vote?

And yet, this House is doing precisely the same thing today and, in the process, abdicating its responsibility to the American people.

I think the American people deserve better from us than a single page statement of 169 words in a single sentence.

And I believe this body had better start standing up, under this system of checks and balances, and stop acting like a rubber stamp.

What this resolution offers is vague and harmless. It was meant to be vague and harmless so that we in Congress could not make any waves and so that thoughtful people in this body would be trapped in the seeming dilemma of voting "yes" for the President or "no" against peace.

This is no time for political games, played by the administration or by anyone else, in a diplomatic arena whose only foundation is the stark tragedy of Vietnam.

I do not believe there is a thoughtful person left in this country who, after the experience of this decade, cannot see through such an attempt.

What this resolution does not offer is even more significant than what it states. We should be seeking a clear formula for peace, not a vague resolution which seems to support every specific of administration policy by implication but which fails to enunciate it.

Nor does this resolution commit us for 1 minute to future troop withdrawals. It does not spell out our negotiating position and yet it asks us to support the President's efforts.

But most seriously, this resolution—and by extension, this kind of legislative maneuver—asks us to surrender our legislative prerogatives and blindly follow the President, regardless of our convictions and without taking the time even to spell out our position.

I am voting "no" and I look forward to a better alternative, a genuine debate, and a creative legislative discussion more worthy of this body and more worthy of the American people.

I do not intend to vote for any resolution on the vital issue of peace and war which does not spell out our policy clearly and which does not permit the Congress its prerogative to debate, discuss, amend, and thereby check Executive authority.

In the instance of Vietnam, my own position and my differences with the administration are clearly spelled out in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of October 15. I am submitting that speech again today to make my position on this vital issue clear in detail. I wish the sponsor of this resolution and the administration had done likewise with H.R. 613.

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Oct. 15, 1969]

PEACE IN VIETNAM

Mr. GREEN of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, this is a very difficult time for our country.

Perhaps, after so many years of involvement and frustration, we have finally arrived at the moment of truth in Vietnam.

It seems as if the point has been reached

where we either stay indefinitely or disengage ourselves from a tragic experience for America and the world.

The other alternative—once thought of as possible—military victory and a reasonably speedy compromise negotiated settlement—have all but vanished.

The choice we have left is not easy.

The consequences of either course of action can be far reaching for ourselves, for the Vietnamese and for the rest of the world.

If we stay, it means the sacrifice of more American lives, the expenditure of more billions of dollars, deeper division at home and the neglect of many other national priorities, both foreign and domestic.

If we leave, the future will be largely uncertain. Some contend that South Vietnam will go Communist and that Southeast Asia will follow suit. They warn that America's commitments will be placed in doubt and we shall be left to fight a larger war somewhere else.

Others, casting aside these warnings, believe that withdrawal offers more possibilities and greater opportunities.

Because these are the alternatives, it is, indeed, a very difficult time for our country.

And all of us—regardless of our politics, our way of looking at the world or our past position in Vietnam—must, if we truly love this country, approach these choices without prejudice and without rancor for those with whom we disagree.

Motives on all sides may be good. But what we seek is a solution which will do justice to our good motivations.

Today, there is no room for those who would attempt to make this Nixon's war.

Nor is there room for those who would continue to make it Johnson's war.

There is no room for those who lash out at critics, equating patriotism with mindless unquestioning of the facts in Vietnam.

Nor is there room for those who believe that Vietnam has proven America to be sick, and dominated by military-industrial forces beyond our control.

Young and old, Democrat and Republican: All of us had better recognize the enormity of what faces us. And all of us had better act with reason and wisdom larger than ourselves.

As the moment of truth arrives, all of our preconceptions must give way to a single concern: What is the right thing for our country and how will our decision affect the peace of the world.

It is unfortunate that these are the only alternatives.

But they are.

Virtually no one any longer believes that military victory is a possible alternative.

President Johnson ruled that out as early as March of 1968.

And President Nixon specifically so stated in May 1969 when he addressed the Nation with the following words: "We have ruled out attempting to impose a purely military solution on the battlefield."

Yet, there is another alternative which still seems possible to some and that is the alternative of a compromise settlement, a negotiated peace which would salvage a non-Communist South Vietnam or a partially non-Communist South Vietnam or, at the very least, a neutralized South Vietnam.

The search for a compromise settlement has been the true issue of the past few years. It was the initial thrust of the antiadministration forces during the 1968 presidential campaign.

Then, the question was: Which candidate was flexible enough, in contrast to the inflexibility of President Johnson, to offer compromise terms sufficiently attractive to the North Vietnamese.

Proposals for a coalition government were followed by suggestions for mutual troop withdrawal. And, finally, late in the campaign, we had a total bombing halt which

Vice President Humphrey endorsed as an acceptable risk for peace.

All of these suggestions, sincere and well-intentioned, were made in the hope that, by throwing another bone, we would tempt the North Vietnamese to give and take in the traditional manner of western diplomacy.

Finally, in May of 1969, determined as were his predecessor and his competitors in 1968, a new President spoke of "neutrality for South Vietnam," "acceptance of any government in South Vietnam that results from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves," and "reunification."

All of these proposals have spanned the course of the past few years. And, as each was proposed, there was renewed hope of a breakthrough on the diplomatic front.

Recall, if you will, the wave of hope which swept the country and the world when President Johnson announced that the enemy was prepared to negotiate in Paris.

And then recall the renewed hope when he announced the total bombing halt a year ago.

And finally, recall the optimism with which we greeted President Nixon's first major address on Vietnam last May.

Yet, today, the deadlock remains in Paris and the stalemate continues on the battlefield.

After nearly 2 years of specific concessions, the latest reports from Paris, according to Time magazine of October 17, tell of "The dispiriting sense of tedium and pessimism that envelops the talks and the American delegation."

In asking ourselves why the deadlock remains, I think we must honestly face the possibility that North Vietnam will not negotiate seriously as long as there is dissent here in America.

A few years ago, the same argument appeared in different colors.

At that time, those in favor of ending the war cried out for negotiations. And the supporters of the war replied that, we would, in effect, be inviting the North Vietnamese to win at the conference table what they could not win on the battlefield.

Well, today we are negotiating.

And today, those same people are now saying that, in dissenting here at home, we are, in effect, inviting the North Vietnamese to win in America what they cannot win at the conference table.

Where does this downward spiral end? Where do we go next?

The fact is that there has been virtually no criticism for 9 months.

The voices which echoed through 1968 have been largely still.

Republicans, Democrats and concerned Americans everywhere have sat back, waiting for a break in Paris, hoping that a new President, untied, as he said, to the mistake of the past, would extricate us from the quicksand.

Yet, during the time we have remained silent, the North Vietnamese have remained inscrutable.

And today, because the question of Vietnam is once again raised publicly, some of our policymakers recoil from the renewed debate and warn that the only thing which will defeat us is ourselves.

They equate patriotism with mindless acquiescence and unquestioning support.

They suggest that those who are unhappy with our policy "tell it to Hanoi." But this is our country and it is our policy we are deeply concerned about. It is not inconsistent to discuss our policy while at the same time repudiating Hanoi and its methods.

The deadlock has remained at Paris, through protest and through silence, and that fact alone tells us that we must look somewhere else for the root cause of the lack of movement.

In fact, the deadlock remains because the other side continues to say what it has said

for years. There is no room for a compromise, they say because this is a Vietnamese affair. It is a civil dispute. It is a matter to be settled—not by concession of an American President or the force of American arms—but by the Vietnamese themselves.

And that settlement will come when the Americans go home and stop interfering in the affairs of their country.

How simple that fact is. And yet, how often have we overlooked it in our endless search for a formula and, indeed, in our initial rationale for entering this war.

Dean Rusk, the former Secretary of State, was fond of saying that the war will end when the North Vietnamese leave their neighbors alone. The implication was clear: America, in the role of policeman, intends to keep peace in the neighborhood.

To the other side, this is not the case.

In the eyes of the Vietnamese, the North and South are not two neighbors who happen to live on the same block. They are residents of the same house and the American policeman is guilty of invasion of privacy.

Whether one agrees with this viewpoint or not, in fact, whether one wishes to face it or not, it is nonetheless, what the other side has been saying for years.

And today, after we cut away the agony and complexity of the past, we must come face to face with that central fact. In the eyes of the Vietnamese, the war is a civil conflict which will be settled, if at all, only by the Vietnamese.

Misunderstanding of the facts of history has led to misunderstanding here at home.

Those who took the time and made the effort to understand what was happening in Vietnam, sooner or later came to the conclusion that this is, indeed, a civil conflict.

And because they believed this, they felt that our involvement was immoral. This feeling, in turn, led to a crisis of conscience among many of our own people and often to civil disobedience, particularly by the younger generation, not merely because the younger generation had to fight the war but because the younger generation began to understand the war.

All of the debate of the past few years sprang, not from the question of whether the war was winnable or unwinnable, but from the growing conviction that the war was unjust.

On the other hand, those who did not take the time to understand the war—and its complexity is so deep that this position is understandable too—those particularly who fought other wars for America, could not see where this war was any different.

"We of an older generation fought to keep this nation free in Europe and the Pacific," they say. "We gave our lives in Korea. What makes you so special that you take it upon yourself to judge this war. Maybe you're just afraid to go and fight like we did. Maybe you're getting too soft."

Thus does the division deepen and the misunderstanding grow. The tragic flaw of recent American leadership has been its inability to understand the moral implications of Vietnam.

It is hardly surprising, then, that the average American, who depends on his leaders for enlightenment, cannot fully comprehend today the notion of an unjust war and cannot understand why we do not win and, therefore, cannot accept dissent at home.

And yet, as I said in the beginning, what is needed now is not censure and division but the calm and enlightened determination to choose one of only two alternatives which we have left: An indefinite American presence in Vietnam or the liquidation of a tragic situation.

The consequences of the first alternative are clear—more fighting, more killing, greater cost, deeper division here at home, neglect of our other priorities and all of this with little likelihood of a diplomatic settlement. The

only concrete achievement would be the continued propping up of an artificial, unrepresentative, corrupt and unreformable military dictatorship in Saigon.

Our willingness in word to accept the free choice of the South Vietnamese does not correspond to our over-willingness indeed to prop up the Saigon regime and that fact alone presents an insurmountable barrier to peace.

And so, I have come to believe, with many other Americans and with many other elected officials and government servants, that the United States must simply extricate itself from Vietnam by beginning now an orderly, total, relentless and publicly announced withdrawal and disengagement.

In suggesting such a course of action, I do not believe that we can set a specific timetable. Withdrawal is not going to occur overnight. Nor is it likely to occur within the artificial limits of an arbitrary deadline.

I do believe that the orderly and systematic withdrawal must allow for adjustments, not only in Vietnam but here at home.

In Vietnam, withdrawal should be accompanied by efforts on our part to encourage the development of the many and diversified political forces within the country to take on renewed life, a life ruthlessly and thoughtlessly suppressed by Saigon, in behalf of their own future.

The key question—indeed, the realistic question—is not when the last man will leave Vietnam. It is whether or not we, as a nation, are committed to the inevitable and total withdrawal of all forces as soon as possible as a matter of policy. The chief need is to be publicly and irrevocably committed to disengagement.

There are voices which say we simply cannot withdraw, as if this were a simple decision.

It is not a simple decision.

It challenges the American people to face up to the facts and we have been notoriously unwilling to do so throughout this war.

It demands of our leaders the courage, the leadership and the persuasive powers to make such a decision acceptable to many who believe withdrawal to be unthinkable.

Such things are never easy.

They are agonizingly difficult.

But the time has come. Mr. Nixon must simply summon up the will to think the unthinkable and face the inevitable. It will be better if he does so now because sooner or later, he will inevitably be forced to do so anyway.

I believe the President wants to end this war.

And I believe that his recent actions—particularly the withdrawal of 60,000 American troops—are steps in the right direction.

But the difference between his position and that of his critics is an essential difference.

On the one hand, Mr. Nixon hints at further reductions in troops during 1970.

But, on the other, he solemnly warns against a "disguised American defeat" and hopes to "Vietnamize" the war.

Those who disagree with his policies, while they support the moves he has already taken, want a commitment to complete withdrawal based on a firm Executive decision to extricate this country from Vietnam.

In reality, he reserves the option to stay indefinitely or to go back in with additional force, presumably at the point where Vietnamization does not work and at the point where the Saigon government begins to fall apart.

The Saigon government knows that.

As long as they know that the United States is not totally and publicly committed to a planned withdrawal, we can expect nothing from them except further dependence.

They have no intention of letting us go.

And, at times, it seems as if Mr. Nixon has no intention of letting them go.

Therefore, what seems at first glance to be

the beginning of withdrawal is on the other side of the coin a formula for an indefinite stay.

And that is the point at which we disagree—not on the desire to end the war, not on the desire to get out, and not even on the common agreement that the Vietnamese must solve their own problems. Mr. Nixon is reluctant to commit us to a final decision. And his critics suspect that, as long as this is his policy we probably are committed to staying indefinitely.

I have not come to the decision to support a committed withdrawal without considering all of the possible dire consequences lurking in the dark recesses of the cold war mind.

Nor can I totally censure those whose beliefs based on the assumptions of their own experience immediately after World War II.

At that time the world was in dire need of American help.

The military hardware of Stalinist communism was locking up the gates of Eastern Europe and Russia's Asian partner had just seized the most populated nation in the world.

We soon found ourselves in a bloody conflict of naked aggression in Korea, and a movement at home which saw a Communist behind every State Department file box.

I suspect that that era has passed.

But two Presidents seem to tell me differently.

And many policymakers in Washington agree with them.

They warn us sternly of the consequences if we take the unheard of step and leave Vietnam.

They point to Czechoslovakia and say: "See, the Russians have not changed." And this should rightfully cause us concern.

And, although Russia and China have come to the brink of war, we are still asked to live under the shadow of the international monolithic and single-minded Communist conspiracy.

For a moment, let us have an end to the glowing, muttering, and warning of dark consequences and let us look at the possible results of withdrawal.

Let us examine the contention that South Vietnam will go Communist.

And before we rend our garments, let us also admit that this possibility is precisely admitted by President Nixon. In saying that he would have no objection to a united Vietnam and in admitting the necessity of free election, he is admitting the possibility of Communist victory.

But there are other possibilities and these other possibilities are just as likely to occur when we announce withdrawal.

At present, literally hundreds of non-Communist political factions in the South, in the least of which is the Buddhist, are inactive due to resentment of our presence or in jail due to the repression of the Saigon regime.

Is it not just as likely that, with our steady departure, non-Communist South Vietnam, will begin to exercise its own freedom within the country.

I am not sure. But, in any event, I suggest that the viability of political life in South Vietnam will be encouraged more by our departure than by our consistent propping up of the military dictatorship with our power and prestige.

And what of the million South Vietnamese in the armed forces. Like all armies, they certainly are not going to do the job as long as America is so willing to shed its blood in their place.

Perhaps, if the Saigon government is worth saving, its million men just may fight for it.

Or perhaps they might overthrow it.

Or perhaps the regime itself, no longer shielded by American military strength, may,

in its desperation, grant the freedoms and give the inspiration which the nation needs.

At any rate, if the million man army cannot do any of these things, then the question again arises whether we ever could do so or whether that million man army is worth being shielded by American soldiers.

Disregarding the other possibilities, however, opponents of withdrawal, convinced of an imminent Communist takeover, have added another dire consequence and that is the possibility of mass slaughter in the South.

We do not know if this will happen. There seems to be no evidence that it will any more than there is evidence that it will not.

America has proven itself a generous nation in the past. Provision can be made for relief, asylum, and even additional economic aid to South Vietnam. Certainly, these are legitimate accommodations to make in return for the liquidation of the war.

And what of the rest of Southeast Asia.

If one accepts the domino theory, one believes that all or most of Southeast Asia will fall into Communist hands once American troops leave South Vietnam.

And yet, one of the most compelling sections of Defense Secretary Clifford's narrative, which documents his own change in thinking, concerns the other countries of Southeast Asia.

Returning from South Vietnam in 1967, Clifford said:

"It was strikingly apparent that the other troop contributing countries no longer shared our degree of concern about the war."

Thailand, he said "Was in no hurry to allocate more troops."

He continued:

"The President of the Philippines advised President Johnson that he preferred we not stop there because of possible adverse public reaction."

Australia's Prime Minister, Clifford continues, "presented a long list of reasons why Australia was already close to its maximum effort."

New Zealand "made it clear that any appreciable increase was out of the question" and the Prime Minister of Singapore, when asked to help with troops, said he "saw no possibility of that taking place because of the adverse political effect in Singapore."

Finally, Clifford looks at the situation in Southeast Asia in this way:

"The security of the Pacific region will depend upon the ability of the countries there to meet the legitimate growing demands of their own people. No military strength we can bring to bear can give them internal stability or popular acceptance. In Southeast Asia, and elsewhere in the less developed regions of the world, our ability to understand and to control the basic forces that are at play is a very limited one. We can advise, we can urge, we can furnish economic aid. But American military power cannot build nations, any more than it can solve the social and economic problems that face us here at home."

And again, a few months ago, President Nixon, in his Pacific doctrine, told the Asians that America's vital interests are no longer concerned with sending massive numbers of Americans to the mainland of Asia.

As in South Vietnam itself, withdrawal opens as many possibilities as it does pitfalls for Southeast Asia. The possibility of increased economic activity, greater concentration by America itself on broad programs to improve the social and economic life of the region and the development of indigenous democratic governments—all these things are just as possible as the facile, automatic response that says, take away American troops and the inevitable answer is communism.

Such an answer is not only narrow. It is far too simplistic for a complex world. And it betrays a defeatism which ill befits American leadership. In place of our single-

minded obsession with Vietnam, we could today be using our technology and resources to create a better world.

One other question about America's role in the world comes up whenever withdrawal from Vietnam is suggested. What about America's commitments. Will our word ever be heeded again. Because we show lack of faith, will not our relative role, vis-a-vis the Communists, begin to decline in world affairs.

In the first place, no nation in the history of the world has ever committed so much for so long a period in so many places throughout the world and stuck by its treaties and agreements with such tenacity. In Vietnam alone, that commitment has amounted to 40,000 dead Americans and more than \$100 billion over the course of 8 years. And all this despite the fact that there is considerable debate about the genuineness of that commitment in the first place. The question is not whether we honor our commitments because our activity has certainly been some commitment. The question is whether we alone in the world are being asked to do the impossible. Our own leaders who pose this question evidently believe that the rest of the world sees us as the superhuman, transcendental force which dares not to put a ceiling on how far it is prepared to go lest the rest of the world react with utter dismay.

And yet, the rest of the world's powers can go blithely ahead doing just as they please—abandoning allies, subverting countries and waging war.

Only America is put to the impossible test. If we dare waver for a moment—regardless of the merits—then the world itself will shake with concern.

I suspect that we judge ourselves too harshly.

I believe that we demand a standard from ourselves that few others expect and that fewer others are prepared to live up to.

We are not superhuman.

We do not by ourselves control the destiny of the world.

And a change of policy in Vietnam will be greeted throughout the world more with relief than dismay anyhow.

Here at home, it is another matter.

It is said the President fears, privately, that a systematic withdrawal from Vietnam will not only cause us to lose our leadership position in the world but will, as Stewart Alsop said last week, turn the nation "angrily in upon itself."

This need not be and it should not be. It hardly does justice to us as a people. At any rate, such a situation remains a leadership problem. If the President and other leaders of our Nation choose to permit us to turn angrily upon ourselves, it may well happen. But, if they lead us out of the quagmire in Vietnam into a constructive and hopeful future, no such conclusion need be drawn.

None of these thoughts are comfortable.

And nothing is sure.

Choosing the alternative of withdrawal has its uncertainties.

But the ambiguity of present policy presents more.

I am suggesting that such a decision, articulated by enlightened leadership, opens up more possibilities for America than pitfalls.

It opens the possibility for a country united once again with this burden lifted from our minds.

It opens the possibility for greater attention to our domestic problems.

It may give us the chance to chart a new foreign policy, concerned with turning our technology and compassion to human needs and to the great problems of bringing peace and stability among all nations.

Emerson—and other distinguished Ameri-

can thinkers after him—have spoken about two distinct strains in the American spirit. One is the party of hope. The other is the party of despair.

I believe we have, in the recent past, been too often concerned with the inhibitions of the party of despair.

We have been generous. We have been great. Perhaps we have saved the world.

But we have also largely conducted ourselves in the world as if the most dire consequences were also the most real and immediate. And feeling this way, we have been very reluctant to test new directions.

Today, I think it is time for all Americans not to join the partisan interests of either Republicans or Democrats but to join the party of hope.

Let us end this war in Vietnam.

And let us use that decision as a departure point for shaping a more stable and hopeful society here at home and peace around the world.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, I have read this resolution many many times. It is a short resolution and apparently almost nobody disagrees with any one clause in the resolution. About all it says is that we hope peace can be secured in South Vietnam. Of course, everyone is for peace; but what concerns me the most is that almost everyone, including President Nixon, seems to read things into this resolution which it simply does not say.

For almost 2 years, our Government has been pursuing what might be called the Clark Clifford plan. Under that plan, it was determined that we will Vietnamize the war and withdraw our troops if the South Vietnamese can be trained to defend themselves and protect their citizens against mass slaughter for mere political and religious reasons. Under this plan, troops have been in training and a major effort has been made in that direction for about 2 years. Under the plan, it reached the place about 6 months ago where our withdrawals could start and be coincided with the South Vietnamese troops replacing our troops. In other words, this has been the plan for about 2 years and it has been gradually executed over that period of time. I do not see where there has been any change of policy whatsoever.

This resolution merely says that we endorse and support efforts to secure peace in Vietnam. The claims that this is some kind of a resolution to endorse a "new" plan or that it is some kind of an endorsement in blank for further action simply cannot be justified by reading the resolution. In fact I tend to agree with those who say the resolution itself does nothing other than to afford a vehicle for further debate in the House on our overall policies.

What this resolution does not do and what neither "doves" nor "hawks" are not talking about is a study and complete review of our treaty obligations with Japan. Following World War II, we negotiated a treaty with Japan under which we prohibited them from rearming and in return we agreed to furnish the balance of power in that area. We did this on the theory that there would be less risk of another all-out war if we furnished the balance of power instead of letting them become strong enough militarily to defend themselves against

potential enemies. Due to their development and industrial capacity, Japan would be a real prize for China or Russia and an armed force sufficient to defend themselves would also have the capacity to wage war. Our policy under this treaty may have been partly the reason why we have not had a nuclear war in the past 25 years and an all-out mobilization with millions being killed; but no one can prove what would have happened. I do think it is time that we faced all of the facts involved in South-east Asia and meet new decisions concerning our alliances both with Japan and other countries.

My vote on the resolution will not indicate that I think that the resolution is an endorsement of any particular type of action and I believe that is one point upon which the vast majority can agree.

Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, let us assume at the outset that the universal desire among our people is to end the tragedy in Vietnam by achieving a just peace. How could it be otherwise? Who is there among us who seeks an unjust peace? To ask the question is to answer it. But while men may agree as to the goal of a just peace in Vietnam, reasonable men may differ as to how peace is to be achieved, or indeed, what the definition of just peace is.

Five years ago, this House, in near unanimity, passed another resolution to support executive policy in Vietnam. I venture to think few of us who voted for the Tonkin Gulf resolution conceived at that time that our action would be utilized to justify the sending of 500,000 American troops into combat. This House has received a good deal of criticism since that time for abdicating our responsibility to give adequate consideration to the contents or ramifications of the Tonkin resolution.

Now, we are presented with another resolution calling for support of executive policy in Vietnam—a resolution whose contents received but cursory review in the Foreign Affairs Committee and which was brought before us under a rule which bars all amendatory language, no matter how pertinent to the issue. As our able and distinguished Republican colleague from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY), has said—the resolution does not even incorporate the most significant aspect of the President's policy—his decision to withdraw American combat troops from Vietnam.

But there is an even more serious flaw in this resolution—an ambiguity which has been alluded to in the debate on the rule. The flaw lies in the fact that the resolution was drafted prior to the President's speech of November 3. In that speech the President holds out the prospect of our indefinite presence in Vietnam at some undefined level of involvement. Moreover, he does not foreclose the possibility of some future escalation of that involvement. But there is nothing whatever in the body of this resolution alluding to a possible escalation of the American presence.

Mr. Chairman, the stated rationale for adoption of this resolution is to present a united front to North Vietnam—to convince the adversary that the President

speaks for all the American people. If that is indeed the purpose of the resolution, why was it deemed necessary to stifle any measured consideration of its contents in committee? Why was it brought here under a gag rule in defiance of all democratic principles? Would it not have been the better part of wisdom to have the contents of this resolution receive the most thorough and reasoned consideration of which this House is capable?

Mr. Chairman, we would all like to see an expression emerge from this House which would at once sustain the President and express the deepest hopes of the American people in their desire for a just peace in Vietnam. Such an expression could have emerged had consideration been given to the amendatory language advanced by the gentleman from Illinois and if the resolution could have incorporated the terminology suggested by the distinguished gentlelady from Hawaii.

Mr. Chairman, I shall vote against the resolution, for the subject matter is infinitely too important and complex to be properly disposed of by 435 Members of the House in such circumstances and with so little consideration.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States recently initiated and promoted a patriotic project known as "Operation Speak Out." This project was designed to promote national unity and to encourage the American people to show their support of their Government in its efforts to achieve a just peace in Vietnam. Many civic and patriotic groups and organizations across our Nation saw the merit in "Operation Speak Out" and have given it their support. The action of the House of Representatives today in overwhelmingly adopting the "Peace with Justice in Vietnam" resolution can in some measure be attributed to the great support of the American people awakened by the speech of President Nixon on November 3 and expressed by the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the many other patriotic organizations and individuals who felt that the time had come for patriots to be heard.

The message of the true patriot is a simple one. "My country, right or wrong." A patriot will not give aid and comfort to the enemy, by word or deed. A patriot will not jeopardize the lives of his countrymen, our troops on the battlefields of Vietnam, by seeking to undermine his country before world opinion. Patriotism does not mean that one's country is always without fault, but it does mean that one has enough love and respect for his homeland to try to correct its errors within the framework of its laws. Patriotism does not mean that one must refrain from debate or dissent, but it does mean that one viewing this Nation from beyond its boundaries should see only unity of purpose, the national purpose, arrived at by the processes of government as we, the people have designed them. One would hope that the world could see us, as a country, as the psalmist in the Scriptures envisioned when in Psalm 133, he wrote:

Behold, how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity.

There are those today who believe in the brotherhood of all mankind. I am one of them. However, there are those who are under the mistaken belief that patriotic love of one's country is inconsistent with love of all mankind. How would these exercise their love of mankind? What better mechanism to serve mankind is there than the United States of America? If they are not prepared to love America first, one has reason to doubt that their professed love of mankind is sincere. Certainly it is not practical. Rudyard Kipling helped us with this dilemma when he wrote:

God gave all men all earth to love,
But since our hearts are small,
Ordained for each one spot should prove
Beloved over all.

Let us show our capacity to love by loving our neighbor first, by loving America first. If we are to make the world a better place in which to live, let us start at home. And let our effort be in peace, in tolerance, and in appreciation of the rights of our fellow man. Let no one of us think that he has a monopoly on the desire for peace. Let no one of us set ourselves up as judge, because to do so is to perhaps cause another American to die in Vietnam. Let us go forward in unity and harmony, toward a common goal, peace and justice in all the world. If you doubt that this is America's goal, then you reject the lessons of history and the sacrifices of American patriots whose lives have made it possible for you to have the freedom to reject or to dissent with impunity.

Today I want to reaffirm my belief in the American patriot, patriots like the members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, who to a man, believe that the blows which their country called upon them to strike, were struck for all mankind.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Chairman, this resolution, House Resolution 613, on its face, would seem to do no more than to express the hope of the American people for a just peace, approve South Vietnamese self-determination through free and open elections and support the President's efforts to negotiate a just peace. Certainly I support the negotiation of a just peace in Vietnam and Vietnamese self-determination through free and open elections.

My vote in favor of this resolution is simply an expression of support for these objectives and for all reasonable and responsible efforts by the President to achieve such objectives.

It has also been suggested that adoption of the resolution will enhance the possibilities for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. I hope that this is the case but I doubt it. In any event, the President has the responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs. If a peaceful settlement is to be negotiated, it is the President who must negotiate it. In such an effort, I repeat, he certainly has my support.

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, some apparently believe that the resolution has a broader significance. The President himself appears to be one of those who would give this resolution such significance. On his visit to the House last

month, he embraced the resolution as "a resolution for a just peace in Vietnam along the lines of the proposal I made in a speech on November 3."

But, Mr. Chairman, the resolution was drafted and circulated before, not after, the President's November 3 speech. The drafter of the resolution, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT), and its floor manager, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS), have now both denied that the resolution was intended to or that it does constitute an endorsement of the contents of the President's November 3 statement or that it gives advance approval to any action the President might decide will improve prospects for a just peace.

Their action in doing so has helped me to resolve my own doubts about this resolution.

Mr. Chairman, when I came to Congress in 1959 a Republican President occupied the White House. I supported his policies when I thought they were right and opposed them when I thought they were wrong. In doing so I ended up supporting his foreign policies more often than most Republican Members. But as much as I respected President Eisenhower I did not agree with everything he did nor did I ever give him a blank check for any policy he might adopt.

I shall try to follow the same policy with respect to President Nixon, reserving judgment on his policies until I know what they are, supporting him when I think he is right and opposing him when I think he is wrong.

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose the resolution. I suppose I must say that I do so not because I oppose a just peace, or self-determination in Vietnam, or because I secretly hope for a Communist victory. One would think that this kind of unctuous explanation would be unnecessary in a body of this stature, but, unfortunately, some of my recent mail and a few of the statements of my more hawkish colleagues indicates the contrary.

No, Mr. Chairman, I do not even oppose the language of the resolution. While much of importance is omitted, on its face the measure is really quite innocuous. Nevertheless, despite all the backing and filling that has pervaded this Chamber today, there is absolutely no doubt in my mind that this resolution has been offered for one, and only one, purpose—to give a total endorsement to President Nixon's Vietnam policy as delineated in his November 3 speech. That, to my mind, is far from innocuous, and is the sole reason I shall vote "no" on House Resolution 613.

When I think of some of Mr. Nixon's recent handiwork: the appointment of Clement Haynsworth; the attempt to delay desegregation of southern schools; the abandonment of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission hearings; the decision to let the Voting Rights Act die; and the general unconcern for pressing domestic problems, I would have a difficult time supporting the President's war policies even if I thought they were sound—which I do not. I would be much more inclined to support a resolution that we turn our attention back to America.

Mr. DONOHUE. Mr. Chairman, yesterday I voted against the closed-rule procedure under which this resolution is now being considered. I voted against the closed rule with the hope and the purpose of permitting a thorough discussion and promoting a definite understanding of the precise meaning, extent, and application of the resolution. Let us remember that no committee hearings were held on this resolution and I think every Member here will recall that the Congress and the country has suffered, in the past, some sad experiences and unfortunate misunderstandings about the exact meaning and application of this type of resolution.

However, since the majority approved the closed-rule procedure, I intend to vote in favor of the resolution, on the patriotic and practical principle that we cannot afford, in our agonizing pursuit of the earliest possible peace in Vietnam, to give any further ammunition to the Communist propaganda machine to strengthen the determination of their people or provide any additional grounds for the Hanoi leaders to possibly misunderstand the general willingness of Congress to cooperate with our Commander in Chief to honorably end the Vietnam war at the earliest possible moment.

The resolution, as it stands, in simple language and substance, proposes only to support the President of the United States in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, proclaims the peaceful overtures this Government has already made, again advocates the principles of free elections by the people of South Vietnam and this country's willingness to abide by them, and further exhorts the Government of North Vietnam to do likewise.

I would like to emphasize what has, I hope, already been made very clear here; namely, that this resolution is not meant or intended and should not be construed to preendorse and preapprove every and any future specific action that the Commander in Chief may see fit to take in his plans and desire to bring the earliest possible ending to the Vietnam war. With that understanding, House Resolution 613 is a simple and summary reaffirmation of our common desire for speedy peace in Vietnam which I shall support, rather than take a chance of strengthening obvious Communist strategy to prolong the war in order to gain the most advantageous terms for peaceful agreement.

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Chairman, two unrelated events—one occurring last evening and the other this morning—that touched my life and my thoughts concerning our terrible dilemma in Vietnam, give added meaning to the action we are about to take.

As we all know, last evening the lottery system was again brought into play as a method for helping us select, as a nation, those young men who might in the future be called upon for service in the Armed Forces and, possibly, even in Vietnam if our involvement in the conflict there is to continue.

My own 19-year-old son, Howard, Jr., was one of those millions of young Americans whose life and future—with

the outcome yet to be determined—was affected by the proceedings last evening at selective service headquarters.

Then, this morning, I was invited to attend a ceremony at the White House at which time Vice President AGNEW was to award, posthumously, a Medal of Honor—the Nation's highest military decoration—to Mr. and Mrs. Leslie C. Graves, of Groton, N.Y., in my congressional district, the parents of Marine Corps 2d Lt. Terrence C. Graves who was killed in action, in Vietnam, on February 16, 1968.

Unhappily, my attendance to other duties here this morning prevented my attendance at that ceremony, but the packet of information relating thereto—including a photograph of Lieutenant Graves—has since been delivered to my office.

Mr. Chairman, I have spent some long moments in the quiet of my office this afternoon looking at Lieutenant Graves' photo—and in reading and rereading the bare statistics of his short life as well as the terse words of the citation describing his heroism above and beyond the call of all duty in the action near Con Thien, in Vietnam, a year ago last February 16 when, as it is written, "He gallantly gave his life for his country."

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman and colleagues, that Lieutenant Graves epitomizes all the brave and gallant young Americans who have served—and died—in far-off Vietnam, even as my son epitomizes those other young Americans who may yet be called to such duty, all in pursuit of something we are discussing here which is called a just peace in Vietnam.

I have been listening, as time required by other duties has permitted, to much of the debate we have had on yesterday and today concerning the resolution before us. It has been an interesting and, I think, a useful debate. I would have preferred—as my vote on the previous question on the rule yesterday indicates—that it was not as narrowly focused as it now necessarily is by virtue of the closed rule that was adopted. But I believe those of us who felt that way—and sought by our votes to open this resolution up to constructive amendments—can now accept House Resolution 613, at face value, for what it actually says and what most of us understand it to mean.

The words of the resolution before us stand on their own two feet—if words can ever be considered as doing so. They are words expressing the American peoples' desire for peace in Vietnam in accordance with principles that none of us could think of in any terms other than just. They are words, too, reaffirming our long-held national commitment to the concept of self-determination for all peoples, everywhere; and they are words declaring our traditional conviction that all disputes between nations or between disputing citizens within a nation might better be settled by ballots rather than bullets. In short, they are words defining an idea for a just peace in Vietnam—or, for that matter, any other trouble spot in a sadly troubled world—to which we can all subscribe.

I shall vote for that idea—as expressed by this resolution of which I am a cosponsor—and I shall do so gladly and without reservations because I can find no real merit in the semantical questions or occasionally semipartisan charges that have here been raised about its true meaning or purpose.

But, after all, House Resolution 613 is but a collection of words—and almost any other combination thereof could have served the same purpose so there is nothing magic about these. And though our acceptance of House Resolution 613, by whatever margin of support it eventually garners, will, I think, be a helpful thing for the Nation and, perhaps, for the cause of a just peace in Vietnam, its enactment, alone, will not produce that peace we all so ardently desire. Its enactment, alone, will not forestall the future selection of still more young Americans to be sent to Vietnam nor end, for at least a time, such tragic but, somehow, uplifting award ceremonies as took place at the White House this morning.

Only our actions from now on with respect to our dilemma in Vietnam can do that—actions that, largely, will have to be of the President's determination and for the direction of which he will need all the courage and wisdom any man, even with God's help, can summon forth.

In that effort—an effort in which all of us, as citizens, will at least indirectly participate—President Nixon shall have my continuing support and prayers.

For I believe him to be now on the right track toward a just peace in Vietnam.

His actions in that respect speak louder, it seems to me, than the words he has addressed to us on this subject—knowing, as he must, that every time he speaks to us he is also speaking to Hanoi and to those other nations who have, unfortunately, assisted Hanoi in her support of the efforts of the Vietcong.

The most significant action President Nixon has yet taken with respect to re-directing our Vietnam policy is, as the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) pointed out on yesterday, to begin the withdrawal of at least our ground troops from the conflict. As we now know, our total forces in Vietnam are now down to their lowest point in some 2 years, and I strongly hope that there will soon be further announcements from the White House regarding still further force reductions.

Such troop withdrawals—made in concert with our success in Vietnamizing such actual ground combat as may still go on—lies at the heart, as Mr. FINDLEY has noted, of what I understand to be the plan by which the President, in his own words, hopes to "bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front."

I believe the American people—or a substantial majority of them—appreciate and support Mr. Nixon's action in this respect, for a winding down of the war insofar as we are concerned, and that they also understand, given the nature of the problem, that deescalation in this fashion can only properly be directed by the President and that, given

the hazards it may call into play for both our remaining forces in Vietnam and the South Vietnamese people themselves, this process cannot be hurried too much, will take some time to work out even from the logistical standpoint, and that a stated deadline for the completion of such withdrawals—whether self-imposed by the President and so publicly announced or whether imposed upon him by action of the Congress—would not be helpful and might, indeed, even be counterproductive insofar as any hope of useful negotiations may remain.

Believing, as I have said, that there is a substantial majority of popular support for such a policy, along with an understanding of its complications, I had also hoped—if the previous question on the rule had been voted down on yesterday—that then Mr. FINDLEY could have been recognized, as had been his purpose, to offer an amendment to the resolution before us inserting therein the thrust of his own separate resolution—House Resolution 564—of which I am a cosponsor, endorsing this withdrawal policy and urging its continuation by the President. The additional words that would have thus been added to House Resolution 613 were these:

"and supports the President's expressed determination to withdraw our remaining ground combat forces at the earliest practicable date".

Reference being had, of course, to House of Representatives support of that policy and emphasis being given, to reflect popular opinion, on that phrase "at the earliest practicable date."

For it would be my opinion, Mr. Chairman, that the average American believes we have, by now, more than fulfilled whatever commitment we may once have had to the people of South Vietnam in pursuit of helping them preserve their freedoms, and that it is past time for them, in their developing strength, albeit with some continuing assistance from us for some months yet to come, to take over "their war" once again and to go on to win it, if they possibly can, for we have long since learned the hard way that we cannot win it for them.

I would like it to be noted, for the record, then, Mr. Chairman, that my support of House Resolution 613, specifically includes—though this, unfortunately, cannot now formally be made a part of that resolution's wording—my support of our withdrawal policy, and of the "Vietnamization" of whatever remains of the conflict, and should be taken to indicate my urging of the President to complete the withdrawal of at least all our ground forces from Vietnam at the earliest practicable date.

In so saying, I am not purposely ignoring the opinions of a solid and vocal minority viewpoint within my own congressional district—at least, I believe it to be a minority viewpoint—that worries about the timing of such a withdrawal process, wants it speeded up even further by the President, or at the direction of the Congress, if necessary, and even beyond that point worries about the ultimate meaning of our attempt to "Vietnamize" the war with its possible connotations of an intent on our part to go on prolonging

the conflict, with its death and destruction, through our support of the present Saigon regime, though the burden of that death and destruction would shortly be carried less and less by us and more and more by the people of South Vietnam.

Those who subscribe to this minority viewpoint ask, in truth, some legitimate policy questions—questions to which we have not, in our consideration of House Resolution 613, really addressed ourselves.

To them, permit me merely to say, let the debate go on—as it will in any event—but let it go on through constructive channels, not in the streets where foreign policy cannot be made, but here in such places as this Chamber, and through the more familiar and traditional manner of working of our governmental institutions.

The adoption of this resolution does not not preclude such an event—it may, in fact, encourage such a process and, if so, that is another reason why I am glad to vote for its enactment.

Mr. Chairman, we face together—as a Congress and as a Nation—one of the most difficult problems ever encountered in the history of this Republic. That problem is composed of mistaken public attitudes—and presidential decisions in past years that have proven to be unwise but that more alert and more responsible Congresses in those years might have prevented; it is composed, too, of our awareness of our responsibility to those young men who, by lot, may have been chosen last night for future service in the Armed Forces in such places as Vietnam, and of the selfless sacrifice the parents of such as 2d Lt. Terrence C. Graves have made in behalf of this Nation's often uncertain purposes, a sacrifice that, somehow, must not altogether have been made in vain.

It is a heavy burden we bear—but a burden we must bear, along with President Nixon, with all the courage and wisdom we can summon forth.

Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Chairman, while we are today considering the House resolution for a just peace in Vietnam, I would like to offer as substantiating evidence of the people's support for the President's policy the results of a survey which I recently conducted among my constituents.

This survey, which was sent to all my constituents—over 688,000—indicates that the great majority support President Nixon's Vietnam policy. The preliminary results have been tabulated as follows:

- I support President Nixon's Vietnam plans: 60%.
- I favor immediate unilateral withdrawal of all troops: 23%.
- I favor an all-out effort to win the war in Vietnam: 17%.

Mr. Chairman, judging from the opinions of my constituents, I believe that congressional approval of this resolution will indicate that the views of the people are truly represented in the Halls of Government.

These views from the citizens of Maryland's Fifth Congressional District correlate highly with the recent Gallup poll conducted on the final day of the November Vietnam moratorium which indicated

that only one adult in five backs the war protesters who favor immediate and total withdrawal of troops from Vietnam.

I firmly believe that most Americans now realize, as a result of the President's November 3 speech, that this country is committed to a just and honorable solution to the Vietnam conflict. Most Americans want our boys to come home but they are aware of the time element required for a true and effective Vietnamization of the war. It is clear that gradual withdrawal is the only feasible or possible alternative for U.S. policy.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to listen to the voices of American citizens around the country who are articulating the views of the silent majority in letters, opinion polls, demonstrations, and many other forms—to listen and to heed their call by exhibiting a resounding measure of support for our President through approval of this resolution.

Mr. OLSEN. Mr. Chairman, although I have today voted in support of the President's efforts to find a just end to the war in Vietnam, I have done so with strong reservations. I regret that the House resolution made not mention of scheduled troop withdrawals, the continuation of which I most adamantly endorse. I will continue to seek aggressively further commitment from the administration in this regard.

I further consider it not only the right of the Congress to advise the President in his efforts toward peace, but I submit that we have an obligation to do so. I intend to fulfill this obligation.

In the drafting of this resolution, I would have much preferred the version cosponsored in the Senate by my Montana colleagues, MIKE MANSFIELD and LEE METCALF. However, I would go beyond this resolution also, in expressing the unqualified intention of the Congress to end this disastrous war and bring peace to Southeast Asia.

I can support this resolution in that it is designed as an effort toward peace. But this must not be construed as congressional approval of a blank check for future actions by the administration.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I have listened to the debate and quite frankly I was first disposed to vote for the resolution. However, the more I listened to the variety of interpretations that are possible and the doubtful value and effect of the resolution itself has convinced me to cast my vote against the resolution.

With all the sound and the fury of the discussion in these hours of debate, the ambiguity of the resolution stands out. It badly needs clarification and amendment. This is the reason I voted against the previous question and against the closed rule. The haste with which the bill was brought to the floor without hearings suggests that it badly needs perfecting amendments.

Let me say in spite of my vote against this vague and imperfect resolution I want it to be known that I support the President of the United States in liquidating this war with all deliberate speed. It was because of this position that I recently cosponsored a resolution that offered more direction to the President. This resolution stated:

Resolved, That it is the sense of Congress that U.S. forces in South Vietnam should be systematically withdrawn on an orderly and fixed schedule—neither precipitate nor contingent on factors beyond our control—to extend only over such period of time as shall be necessary to (a) provide for the safety of United States forces, (b) secure the release of American prisoners of war, (c) assist any Vietnamese desiring asylum, and (d) enable the United States to make an orderly disposition of its facilities in South Vietnam.

Unfortunately, this resolution did not receive the "legislative speed-up" of House Resolution 613. We are now faced with a vote on a resolution that is susceptible to many interpretations.

Even though this House Resolution 613 is vague, I do not feel that it provides blanket authority for the President in South Vietnam. Indeed the two original sponsors from our side of the aisle, Mr. HAYS and Mr. WRIGHT, said that this resolution was to be a "peace" not a war resolution. All Members of this House desire peace, but as has been pointed out so many times, there is considerable division as to the means to achieve peace. I am convinced that whatever the vote on this resolution, each Member of this Chamber will continue to speak out constructively on Vietnam. I certainly intend to do so.

There is a related point I wish to make. This resolution can be interpreted as an unqualified endorsement of the President's November 3 speech. This can be seen from the words of the President himself in his unprecedented appearance before this Chamber in which he said:

Over 300 Members of the House had joined in sponsoring a resolution for a just peace in Vietnam along the lines of the proposal that I made in a speech on November 3.

In addition, the media has interpreted this resolution as an unqualified endorsement of the President's policy. I do not agree with this interpretation, nor do I think it a fair and legitimate evaluation. For myself, I choose to reserve judgment on the President's handling of the war, yet I must admit that I was disappointed in the rhetorical November 3 statement that seems more bellicose than the President's prior statements on Vietnam.

I yield to no man in supporting the President in foreign affairs, but given the divisive nature of this war, the President must be judged by his actions.

In place of a clear statement of intention, we have the November 3 speech and several informal reports that are confusing and somewhat contradictory to say the least. There are reports that the Department of Defense will continue withdrawal of U.S. troops unannounced, yet Secretary of Defense Laird is reported to have said that our support troop commitment will be on the order of 150,000 to 200,000 for the foreseeable future. Thus, I feel that it is imperative for the President—perhaps at his December 8 news conference—to specify his plans and timetable for Vietnam.

There are other steps the President could take.

He must rapidly appoint a leading well-known negotiator to the Paris talks to keep these negotiations viable. Most importantly we must actively use our in-

fluence to make the Government of South Vietnam more representative to the people. It seems foolhardy to speak of "Vietnamization" of the war when the Government of South Vietnam is held in such low esteem by its own citizens. I have commented on numerous occasions on the vital aspect of a solution to the Vietnam war. The President's speech of November 3 and this resolution do nothing to take this vital factor into account. Finally, the President must continue to reduce the level of fighting in South Vietnam.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, given my grave doubts about the current direction of this war, the desire of the present Government of South Vietnam to broaden its base or facilitate free elections, and the uncertain pace of the liquidation of the U.S. commitment, I will not support this resolution. I will continue to support the President as he takes constructive steps toward the liquidation of this Vietnam quagmire.

Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Chairman, yesterday the House of Representatives passed the rule on House Resolution 613, entitled "Toward Peace With Justice in Vietnam," thus limiting debate and closing the resolution to amendment. I voted against that action.

Today, I plan again to vote against this resolution, which I view as a hastily conceived, open-ended, and ill-defined commitment.

This resolution does not give the President any power he does not already have. It does not add to his flexibility, but rather places the House of Representatives in a most inflexible position and one which detracts from its ability to operate as a separate unit from the executive branch—which is, perhaps, its greatest strength. By our action here today, we abrogate this power, and on a subject which causes such a great distress to the people of our country and, indeed, to people everywhere.

House Resolution 613 is the first Vietnam resolution to be brought to the floor of the House in 5 years. It was drafted prior to the President's November 3, 1969 policy statement and was not intended, therefore, to specifically support that policy.

Despite this fact, the President thanked the cosponsors of this resolution on November 13 for their complete endorsement of his policy as stated on November 3. On that same day, the resolution was reported out by the House Foreign Affairs Committee after only 1 hour and 20 minutes of closed-door consideration and without any hearings. It was brought up on the floor yesterday under a closed rule, which limited debate and prevented amendment. This series of hasty steps has not only added to the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the resolution, but has been a mockery of the legislative responsibilities of this body.

The very simplicity of this resolution belies the great complexities of the issues involved. We in the Congress must recognize that we cannot attack extremely complex problems such as this with oversimplified solutions and insufficient means. We have sought to resolve a history of conflict in Vietnam through an hour-and-a-half closed-door hearing

and less than 4 hours of debate. We in the Congress owe more than this to the American people.

I am especially concerned, furthermore, that some of the constructive suggestions of many of my colleagues concerning this resolution have been precluded under this rule. For example, the language introduced by Representative PAUL FINDLEY in House Resolution 564 stated:

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the substantial reductions in the United States ground combat forces in Vietnam already directed are in the national interest and that the President be supported in his expressed determination to withdraw our remaining such forces at the earliest practicable date.

The President has clearly expressed his support for this language in a letter to Representative FINDLEY. However, this language, which is only one example of many constructive suggestions, has not been afforded the opportunity of being introduced on the floor. There has been no chance to add or change so much as one single word of this resolution.

I do not support House Resolution 613 for these reasons, and for one other very critical reason. And that is this. We in the Congress should have learned, I believe, the inherent dangers of such open-ended resolutions as House Resolution 613. The Gulf of Tonkin resolution has been mentioned several times already this afternoon as an example. And I think that the simple facts are clear: resolutions of this kind are often easy to pass, but are very, very difficult to repeal. As experience has shown, the language in resolutions such as this, while susceptible to the problem or issue at hand, can often be made to fit any set of circumstances in the future, no matter how much conditions may have changed. Moreover, this resolution allows the President to pursue such divergent alternatives as escalating the war or making a precipitous withdrawal of our forces—neither of which extreme alternatives countenance.

There is no doubt that this resolution will be viewed by many as a vaguely worded expression of general support for the President in his efforts to extricate this country from our involvement in Vietnam. There is no doubt that most of its supporters intend it to be exactly that. But it is also true that many of us here recall all too clearly another such general expression of support, which was employed in circumstances and for purposes well beyond the remotest intentions of those who voted for it only five years ago. And yet, this body devoted more effort to the consideration of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution than we have to this, its successor.

I have said that I support the President's efforts to withdraw our troops and I will support his greater efforts in this direction. I now reaffirm that support. But I should not endorse a blanket statement which reads as an open-ended commitment to continue our effort in South Vietnam until such time as forces beyond the control of this body decree otherwise.

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Resolution 613

which is designed to bring about peace with justice in Vietnam. Since the President of the United States, the Honorable Richard Nixon went to the people of this country with his Vietnam policy, I have received untold numbers of letters indicating my constituency's support of the President and asking me to lend my support wherever and whenever possible to his program.

It takes two to negotiate, and it is quite evident that Hanoi feels they can wait us out, particularly when they view the demonstrations throughout our country which lend credence to the statement that we are divided on the subject of Vietnam. Who, but the Congress, and particularly the House of Representatives who are closely associated with the people, can come most nearly to correcting this false impression. Only when the Communists are convinced that this country is united in their efforts and goals in Vietnam, can we sit across the negotiating table from them with strength in our convictions and attain some goals toward peace. The adoption of this resolution will give the President the symbol of unanimity he needs to move swiftly ahead on his program for peace.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, I agree with proponents of this resolution who have said this is not a partisan matter. It is above partisanship and I would take the same position I take today were there a Democratic President in the White House. I conceive the issue presented by this resolution to be: Should this House give blanket approval to the President's policies in Vietnam without being fully aware of what those policies are and where they may lead?

Taken in the abstract, who can find fault with the language in this resolution? We are all for peace. We are all for a just peace. We are all for negotiations looking to the establishment of a just peace. All of us want this horrible war to be over and our troops returned to their homes.

But, Mr. Chairman, the words in this resolution cannot be considered in the abstract. President Nixon gave new meaning to the words of the resolution when he appeared in the House on November 13 and referred to this resolution as "a resolution for a just peace in Vietnam along the lines of the proposal that I made in a speech on November 3." He also in that statement described supporters of the resolution as "well over a majority supporting the policy of the President of the United States." The President's statements make this resolution a policy statement, for no matter how vehemently those who support this resolution may deny any connection, one exists. It cannot be gainsaid that he added a very important element. His speech of November 3 has become an inseparable part of this bill. It is most important, therefore, that we must know the full implications of his policy statements in that speech before we approve this resolution. No effort was made by the Committee on Foreign Affairs to determine these.

Why did the Committee on Foreign Affairs not hold hearings on this resolution? Why should Members of the House

be prevented from presenting their ideas and amendments?

I would have thought that the after-taste of the Bay of Tonkin resolution was still in Members' mouths, strong enough to require a strict and careful analysis of any resolution approving Presidential action in Vietnam both retrospectively and prospectively as this does. It is clear from this debate that this resolution has as many meanings as there are Members of this House. There is difference and contradiction of its meaning even among its sponsors.

One is reminded of the allegory of the three blind men who felt different parts of an elephant and came to differing views on what the elephant represented. Proponents say this resolution is no affirmation of any policy. They reject the President's interpretation and say "that does not control. It is what we in this House mean it to say." But this resolution specifically is an affirmation of the President's efforts, of what he has done. His views, therefore, of what he conceives the effect of this resolution to be will control his actions. No matter what is said in this House to the contrary, this resolution will be heralded far and wide as support for the President's November 3 statement by this House.

What are the implications of the President's Vietnamization policy which is said by his administration to be the path to peace? Does that policy mean that we will stay in Vietnam in force if negotiations in Paris fail?

Does it mean that this Government will support the Thieu-Ky regime until the next Vietnamese election? Do the proponents of this resolution approve the indefinite open endedness of the Vietnamization process even if it takes many years? That possibility is certainly in prospect, for the administration in its statement of agreement with Japan on Okinawa asked for the use in 1972 of that island for our planes in the event the war in Vietnam is still going on.

These are only some of the questions that come readily to mind. What are the answers to these questions? The answer given by the committee on the floor is "read the words of the resolution," as though it had the answers which obviously it does not.

Mr. Chairman, this might have been a most constructive debate, one that might have resulted in fashioning a resolution in which all of us could take pride. But this debate was doomed from the beginning because of lack of time for members to speak their thoughts and because of the closed rule procedure which forbade amendments.

The Vietnam issue is much too complex to be treated in this arbitrary manner which does little justice to the resolution or to the great traditions of this House. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in the case of *Towne v. Eisner*, 245 U.S. 418 said:

A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged. It is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances in the time in which it is used.

I am convinced that the words of this resolution may be given implications and

meanings unknown even to the sponsors—that it may be used, even as was the Bay of Tonkin resolution, to launch Presidential initiatives not intended by those approving it. I want to know what I am voting for before I give my approval to an important policy measure of this kind. There has not been adequate deliberation given to this resolution. Accordingly, I will vote against it.

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Chairman, I am voting in support of House Resolution 613. Some time ago, I cosponsored a resolution which was similar to the one which is presently under consideration.

With the language of this resolution before us it seems to me impossible to do other than support it. Certainly few would willingly express opposition to the objectives stated therein.

We do support the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam and we affirm the hope of the people of the United States for such a peace. Therefore it would seem to me that support should be automatically forthcoming.

Now I can understand that many people do not like the war in Vietnam. I am not happy about it myself. Many wish to differ with the President about his conduct of the peace negotiations and his management of our withdrawal. I certainly reserve to myself the right to criticize these activities whenever I deem it advisable, but I do not consider that this resolution limits me in any way in such criticism.

Having now experienced several of these "sense of Congress" resolutions in moments of international crises, I am free to say that I have very grave reservations about their value. Circumstances change and factual situations change and the fact remains that there are better ways of supporting a Presidential search for peace than by means of congressional resolutions.

It has been said that no resolution is needed to express the hope of the Congress and the public for peace in Vietnam and the belief that President Nixon does seek peace there.

I feel that this is true, but having the resolution before us one would not wish for international reasons to do other than give it clear and substantial support.

It is with this reasoning therefore, that I support the resolution, taking it as a general expression of support, but reserving all options to differ at any time in the future with any specific policy of the President or the administration with which I disagree.

Mr. GAYDOS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the "peace in Vietnam" resolution. I am for peace. I am for any plan which will result in a "just peace." I do not see how any Member of this House or the other body can object to a call for peace in Vietnam or anywhere in the world.

But, I am uneasy about the resolution now before us. I am uneasy about what the end results of this particular resolution could be. I have the feeling we may be buying a pie that is all crust and no filling.

The resolution calls for formal endorsement of President Nixon's plan to achieve a "just peace"; but, it does not

spell out how that goal is to be achieved. We have no details of the President's plan to obtain his objective. We have no definition of the President's interpretation of a "just peace." Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had their particular ideas of a "just peace." Does Mr. Nixon's plan follow along the same line?

The resolution before us says little except we are for the President's plan whatever it is. This resolution was considered for less than 2 hours by the Foreign Affairs Committee. There were no hearings held on it and the measure is reported out under closed rule. This prevents the House from working its will on the resolution; from offering amendments or changing the language. I feel we should have had the opportunity to refine the resolution; to offer suggestions and debate their merits.

While I support the resolution, I am concerned that if it passes we will be giving President Nixon, in effect, a blank check to purchase his "just peace." We have endorsed the check, but the amount we will have to pay has not been specified. We will have given President Nixon a carte blanche for whatever his plans are to achieve his "just peace." I sincerely pray our action will not come back to haunt us. I am supporting the resolution in the fervent hope it brings us the peace we all desire.

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, in view of the intense and lengthy debate on House Resolution 613 on the floor of the House I think it only proper and responsible that I record my reasons for giving the resolution my support.

The opponents contended that the resolution gives blanket support to the President's future conduct of the war regardless of what changes in conditions or policy might occur in the future. I do not agree.

If such were the plain meaning interpretation of the resolution I could not and would not in good conscience support it. A resolution so worded as to conform to the interpretation given House Resolution 613 by its opponents would fly in the face of the constitutional responsibility of this House.

House Resolution 613, however, does not give such blanket support. Chairman WAYNE HAYS, who managed the bill, gave such assurances upon which I relied and with which I concur when he stated:

There is no authority in [the resolution] to escalate the war. There is no blank check about troops. We are simply affirming that this House of Representatives [is] saying here that we are for peace with justice in Vietnam; we are for free elections, and we are for getting the war over. [We] are not saying anything else but that. . . . The language of the resolution is simple and direct. There are no hidden meanings. It gives no authority to the President and takes none away. Its entire thrust is in the direction of peace.

With those assurances, given and taken in good faith, I believe that I have represented the earnest desire of my constituency and myself for a "just peace."

Mr. BLATNIK. Mr. Chairman, for the first time in 5 years, this House has an opportunity to take a thoroughgoing look at Vietnam policy, and yet this reso-

lution has been rushed through the committee in an 80-minute executive session, with no opportunity for testimony from the public—either for or against—nor was there any opportunity until this moment for Members of Congress to express their views. That procedure was deplorable in itself, but to make matters worse, the resolution is now presented on the House floor under a closed rule, precluding any opportunity for amendment.

How can we have a meaningful debate on so crucial an issue when each Member of this House is effectively limited to a mere 30 seconds in which to express his views.

Moreover, the 80 minutes of committee consideration in executive session did not even establish a public record which would serve as an official document and basis for debate on the House floor. Limitations such as these on the most critical issue in this country's foreign relations are unconscionable.

Several aspects of this resolution are deeply disturbing: It is so ambiguous that it dangerously approaches writing a blank check for the administration to act unilaterally on foreign policy matters.

Moreover, the fact that the administration so eagerly embraced the resolution shortly after the President's November 3 statement makes it look all the more that we are writing a blanket endorsement of his conduct of the war.

Moreover, this resolution proposes to support a plan of managing the Vietnam war which the President has yet to spell out. He told the Nation during his campaign last year that he had a plan to end the war. We have waited patiently for almost a year, and still have no idea of what that plan is. Nor does this resolution give us any better idea of what it may be.

Yet today we are asked blindly to endorse that plan, under a closed rule, with no consideration of such alternatives as a specific, precise schedule of troop withdrawal; internationally supervised free elections; establishment of a coalition government, and so forth.

I feel very strongly that we must have as broad and open and complete a discussion as possible on an issue so vital as this before the measure is brought up for consideration on the House floor.

I strongly feel that the resolution should be sent back to committee for broad-scale policy hearings, and, accordingly, I voted for recommittal. Since that effort did not succeed, I voted against the resolution.

This House has been known to spend years considering even the most minor legislative innovation, yet this afternoon we witness the spectacle of one of the most important issues of this decade, and certainly one which has dominated recent history, being rushed through in a matter of hours and with no public hearings.

We abuse the historic processes of this body with such a procedure; we abuse the trust reposed in us by our constituents; and I cannot in good conscience give such a procedure my support.

I do wholeheartedly support any initiative, any imaginative effort, which

will end this tragic war. I hope and pray that the President will use all the resources at his command and call upon all that is best in the American people to respond to the challenge of peace.

I call also upon those on the international scene who are vitally concerned with the cessation of this war to help our President, and I urge him to accept that help, in every way possible, to come to a just decision for a lasting peace both for the United States and for Vietnam.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, it was an honor for me to join our distinguished colleague from Texas, JIM WRIGHT, in co-sponsoring, together with more than three-fourths of the membership of this House, this resolution toward peace with justice in Vietnam.

In the past, I have never cherished illusions on the potential efficacy of some of the sense resolutions that have been brought before this House for approval. Such resolutions do not have either the force or effect of law, and they are simply formal expressions of the opinion of the majority of our membership. The present resolution and circumstances are uniquely different. A very great deal indeed depends on whether we vote for or against the resolution which is before us today.

Hanoi has remained intransigent and there has been no progress at the Paris peace talks because the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong believe we are a "nation deeply divided, almost wholly unwilling to continue the effort—and virtually on the point of internal political collapse." They have come to believe their own propaganda that they have only to hold out, and growing U.S. disunity and opposition to the war will force U.S. abandonment.

Why do they believe this? They believe it is because it is inconceivable to them that a strong and purposeful democracy can pursue its course while permitting the strongest expressions of dissent from people in all walks of life.

From what we know of the repressions of communism, it is not too difficult to understand their misconception of the U.S. position. Every time an elected official in the United States speaks out against our involvement in Vietnam, he is avidly read and quoted in North Vietnam and other parts of the Communist world. Instead of realizing he is simply exercising his inherent right of dissent, the other side takes it as proof we are falling apart at the seams.

I recently obtained a list of quotations used by the Communists which they took from public statements made by U.S. elected officials. Let me read several of them which were broadcast over Hanoi radio and also tauntingly flung at our Paris negotiators as evidence that our President lacked public support for his peace efforts. Here they are:

We cannot use the blood of American youth to save a corrupt regime like the regime to which the United States is tied in Saigon.

To continue the war in Vietnam can bring only tragedy to the country.

The American people must not continue indefinitely to sacrifice its youth or link its national interest to the fate of the military regime in Saigon.

The most correct and reasonable course of action is withdrawal and not to go on with that error.

It is stupid and irresponsible to continue to send our young men to their death.

The only way to put an end to the war is to withdraw our troops.

The executive branch in our country has been and continues to be dishonest vis-à-vis the American people.

There are many more. I have cited only these as representative examples. They are from the speeches of less than a score of elected individuals, but is it any wonder that the wishful thinkers of Hanoi have let themselves be hoodwinked by such statements emanating from such impressively high sources? I do not question the sincerity or the patriotism of those Americans who have been so quoted. They want to see the end of the war, but they do not want to see the end of the war any quicker than I or the rest of us do. They want peace, but they do not want peace any more earnestly than I or the rest of us do. I would not make such statements myself, first because I do not believe they are correct, and second because I would not want to say anything which could mistakenly encourage the other side to prolong the war and refuse to negotiate meaningfully.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count.

Eighty-four Members are present, not a quorum. The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 298]		
Anderson, Tenn.	Gettys	O'Neal, Ga.
Ashley	Gialmo	Patman
Bow	Griffin	Pepper
Brown, Calif.	Gude	Follock
Button	Halpern	Powell
Cabell	Hanna	Railsback
Cahill	Hansen, Wash.	Reifel
Clark	Hébert	Rivers
Dawson	Hollifield	Rosenthal
Dent	Hosmer	Sandman
Dickinson	Johnson, Pa.	Saylor
Edwards, La.	Kirwan	Stuckey
Eilberg	Kuykendall	Taft
Fulton, Tenn.	Lipscomb	Teague, Tex.
Gallagher	Mathias	Utt
	Meskill	Wilson,
	Mills	Charles H.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. FLYNT, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration House Resolution 613, and finding itself without a quorum, he had directed the roll to be called, when 384 Members responded to their names, a quorum, and he submitted herewith the names of the absentees to be spread upon the Journal.

The Committee resumed its sitting.

The CHAIRMAN. When the point of order that a quorum was not present was made, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS) had 10 minutes remaining. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, when the Committee rose I had just finished reading a series of quotations from Members of the House and Senate which have

been read back to our negotiators in Paris by the North Vietnamese, leading them to believe that all they have to do is sit it out and they can get their own way.

I will read the last one again for the benefit of those who were not there. One of the quotes is:

The executive branch in our country has been and continues to be dishonest vis-a-vis the American people.

There are many more. I have cited only these as representative examples. They are from the speeches of less than a score of elected individuals, but is it any wonder that the wishful thinkers of Hanoi have let themselves be hoodwinked by such statements emanating from impressively high sources?

Mr. Chairman, we will be voting on this resolution in a very few minutes under the rule. I understand there will be a motion to recommit offered, I hear now by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. FULTON) which will insert a sentence urging the President to continue to press Hanoi to accept the Geneva protocol on the treatment of prisoners of war.

I will say that the gentleman was the only Member on his side to vote against the resolution in the committee. If getting this in under his name will bring him over on the resolution, I guess the price is worth it. I have no objection. I believe it might do some good.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. I, too, understand the motion to recommit to be of the same nature. If that is the case, I would have no objection to the addition of such a clause, and feel that most Members probably support such a clause.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. ADAIR. I believe it is fair to say that the attitude on this side of the aisle is the same as that previously expressed. We have no objection to the motion.

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield, very briefly.

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. My feeling is that we should not be pulling out our forces and abandoning our prisoners of war.

Mr. HAYS. I do not yield for a speech. I want the gentleman to talk about the motion to recommit.

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. That is why I put the language in the motion to recommit.

Mr. BURTON of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BURTON of California. I should like to pose a question to the chief sponsor of the resolution, the gentleman from Texas.

Did I correctly hear the gentleman that this amendment was acceptable to the gentleman?

Mr. WRIGHT. I have seen a copy of

the amendment. If the original motion is as it was represented to me, yes. I want North Vietnam to abide by the protocol on the treatment of prisoners of war; yes, I do.

Mr. BURTON of California. I expect that some Members on this side of the aisle would have appreciated such alacrity in compliance with some of the suggestions they had for clarification of this resolution.

Mr. HAYS. I will say to the gentleman, under the rule we had no way of getting at it. I told the Rules Committee I had no objection to a rule making it in order.

Mr. BURTON of California. My remarks were not addressed to the gentleman.

Mr. HAYS. I will say personally, as one individual, I will accept what the rules put before the House.

I should like to continue my statement if I may. If I have time at the end, I will yield further.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for one quick question?

Mr. HAYS. All right; I yield.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. I would hope that the gentleman and all the gentlemen in support of this resolution will commit to all of us that we will have an opportunity to have a record vote on the motion to recommit.

Mr. HAYS. Under the rules of the House, if enough Members stand up there is no way I can prevent it.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. In other words, the gentleman is going to stand up, too?

Mr. HAYS. No, I am not. I do not see any reason to. If the gentleman can get enough Members to stand up, that is up to him. Probably he can. I have no objection if he does. I am not averse to voting.

Mr. Chairman, there have been charges made here that this resolution is a resolution of disunity. Nothing could be further from the truth. I have said repeatedly in the debate, without many Members on the floor, that there is no hidden meaning. It is a resolution for negotiated peace, and it says it is the sense of the House that we ought to have free elections in South Vietnam. That is all there is to it—nothing more and nothing less. And I do not mind saying that I was slightly amazed when I heard the gentleman from New York (Mr. LOWENSTEIN) say that this is a resolution of disunity. And it shook me a little bit, because he ought to be an authority on that subject; he has made a career out of it. He is the outstanding example of how to get into Congress by dissent. And I am not criticizing him. But this resolution is not a resolution of disunity. It is a resolution of unity. This is a resolution to show the world the people of this country want a just, negotiated peace.

Some people, very cutely, I think, try to trap some of us by saying, "Well, if you have free elections in South Vietnam and you get a Communist government, where does that leave you?" If the people of South Vietnam under free elections supervised by neutrals vote for com-

munist, then I say they ought to have it and it is good enough for them, if that is what they want.

However, I will say this to you: There has never been a nation in the history of the world that has freely voted communism upon themselves. Not one—not one. I heard a lot of criticism about the Saigon government. I do not stand here vouching that the Saigon government is perfect, near perfect, or half perfect, but the Saigon government is no worse than and probably a lot better than the Hanoi government. I think that the Saigon government will agree to free elections, when all we are trying to get Hanoi to do is to do likewise.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to close by talking to my friends on the Democratic side of the aisle. Some of you were here and some were not in the Eisenhower administration. I remember two people that many of you have forgotten who both happened to be from Texas who called us into caucus on more than one occasion and said, "You cannot win elections by being against the President just because he is a Republican; by saying we will support him when he is right and we will disagree with him when he is wrong." Mr. Eisenhower, the greatest popular figure up to that time in the history of this country in election processes brought in a Republican Congress which he kept for 2 years. The other 6 years we were in the majority because we were a responsible majority. Those two distinguished gentlemen were Sam Rayburn and the previous President Lyndon Johnson, who was the last Democratic President of this country. That was their philosophy. I have heard Members say to me in the cloakroom and other places, "I will not vote for this resolution because it helps Nixon." Let me say to you today that if this resolution helps Mr. Nixon, that is all right with me, too. I simply want to say to the country as one person, and I think the majority of this House and I hope the majority of my party will, that we are responsible, we are for peace, we are for peace with justice, we are for free elections, we are for getting this war over.

And, you know something? The American people are not as stupid as some of the New Left would have you believe. They can figure out why you might vote for this resolution and they can figure out why you might vote against it, and any man and any woman in this House has the right to vote, of course, as they please. I will not go into their districts and criticize them for it. I am just saying again for the last time that there is no hidden meaning in this resolution. There is no authority in it to escalate the war. There is no blank check about troops. We are simply affirming that this House of Representatives in a resolution which was written here—not written downtown and sent up here but written here—largely by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT), although some of us suggested a change or two—which was certainly widely signed, by more than 300 Members of the House—we are saying here that we are for a peace with justice in Vietnam; we

are for free elections; and we are for getting the war over. You are not saying anything else but that if you vote for it. And do not think that the American people cannot figure out whether you are playing politics or whether you are not.

That is why I said a minute ago that there is a vast difference between this simple House resolution and some of the previous sense resolutions we have voted on in past years. I am not talking about the so-called Gulf of Tonkin resolution. It was not a simple sense resolution, but a joint resolution having the full force and effect of law.

The timing of this resolution and its urgency is directly related to the lives of our boys now serving in Vietnam. Its primary purpose is to give proof to the Communists that they are wrong in their assessment of the U.S. position. It is to assure them that, despite the disagreement of a relatively few, the House of Representatives and the Americans we represent do, by a tremendous majority, support our President "in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam."

The language of the resolution is simple and direct. There are no hidden meanings. It gives no authority to the President and it takes none away. Its entire thrust is in the direction of peace. In just one sentence, it emphasizes and reemphasizes our earnest hope for a just peace in Vietnam. I think most of us realize that it is just about impossible to combine any given number of words into a formula that would please everybody. JIM WRIGHT has succeeded in drafting an affirmation of support which over three-fourths of us have been glad to cosponsor. Some few would have liked to hedge it with restrictions; some would have preferred to broaden it to the point of reemphasizing the authorities of the Tonkin Gulf resolution. The single simple sentence of House Resolution 613 offers a focal point for us to bypass all our minor differences, because all of us have a common objective, the end of the war through a just peace.

A minority of the committee was disappointed because hearings were not held on the resolution. The complaint was made by a few that the committee failed to follow past precedents and hear witnesses on this resolution. I respectfully suggest that if hearings had been held, they would have changed no opinions, shifted no votes, nor provided any new information. If there has ever been a subject which has evoked continuous study, constant comment, and the need and desire to keep informed on developments, it is that of our involvement in Vietnam. Millions of words on Vietnam have been printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. All of us have listened to countless speeches and have ourselves spoken on this question. The day before House Resolution 613 was introduced, the Nation was given a full and detailed report by the Commander in Chief of the United States himself on his efforts to secure peace. I do not know of any single witness who could have contributed more than the President to our understanding of the present situation. We ordinarily

ask for witnesses to learn the effects of proposed legislation. We certainly did not need to ask anybody to assess the force and effect of the adoption of this simple one-sentence resolution by the 435 Members of this House. I am also convinced that the membership of the House is so well versed on the facts that it needs no outside help in drafting the words of a resolution to express support for the President "in his efforts to negotiate a just peace."

I want to close these remarks with my most earnest appeal that we show unity in backing the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam. This resolution will be confirming evidence by the House of Representatives that our tolerance and acceptance of dissent here at home is a measure of the true strength of a democracy such as ours, and not the imminent sign of collapse the Communists think. We have every reason to hope this affirmation of our support of the President in his efforts will promote peace and help save American as well as Vietnamese lives. I urge its unanimous adoption.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio has expired. All time has expired.

Under the rule, House Resolution 613 shall be considered as having been read for amendment.

The resolution is as follows:

H. RES. 613

Resolved, That the House of Representatives affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, expresses the earnest hope of the people of the United States for such a peace, calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures which the United States has made in good faith toward the Government of North Vietnam, approves and supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese and supervised by an impartial international body, and that the United States is willing to abide by the results of such elections, and supports the President in his call upon the Government of North Vietnam to announce its willingness to honor such elections and to abide by such results and to allow the issues in controversy to be peacefully so resolved in order that the war may be ended and peace may be restored at last in Southeast Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, no amendments are in order to the resolution except amendments offered by direction of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Are there any committee amendments?

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, there are no committee amendments.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. FLYNT, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration House Resolution 613, toward peace with justice in Vietnam, pursuant to House Resolution 722, he reported the resolution back to the House.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the resolution.

MOTION TO RECOMMIT OFFERED BY MR. FULTON OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman opposed to the resolution?

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. I am, Mr. Speaker, in its present form.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania moves to recommit H. Res. 613 to the Committee on Foreign Affairs with instructions to the Committee to report the Resolution back to the House forthwith with the following amendment: On page 1, line 7, after the comma, insert the following: "requests the President to continue to press the Government of North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949 in the treatment of prisoners of war."

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to recommit.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to recommit.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 392, nays 0, not voting 41, as follows:

[Roll No. 299]

YEAS—392

Abbott	Buchanan	Dennis
Abernethy	Burke, Fla.	Derwinski
Adair	Burke, Mass.	Devine
Adams	Burleson, Tex.	Diggs
Addabbo	Burlison, Mo.	Dingell
Albert	Burton, Calif.	Donohue
Alexander	Burton, Utah	Dorn
Anderson, Calif.	Bush	Dowdy
Anderson, Ill.	Byrne, Pa.	Downing
Anderson, Tenn.	Byrnes, Wis.	Dulski
Andrews, Ala.	Caffery	Duncan
Andrews, N. Dak.	Camp	Dwyer
Annunzio	Carey	Eckhardt
Arends	Carter	Edmondson
Ashbrook	Casey	Edwards, Ala.
Ashley	Cederberg	Edwards, Calif.
Aspinall	Celler	Erlenborn
Ayres	Chamberlain	Esch
Baring	Chappell	Eshleman
Barrett	Chisholm	Evans, Colo.
Beall, Md.	Clancy	Evans, Tenn.
Belcher	Clark	Fallon
Bell, Calif.	Clausen,	Farbstein
Bennett	Don H.	Fascell
Berry	Clawson, Del.	Felghan
Betts	Clay	Findley
Bevill	Cleveland	Fish
Blaggi	Cohelan	Fisher
Blester	Collier	Flood
Bingham	Collins	Flowers
Blackburn	Colmer	Flynt
Blanton	Conable	Foley
Blatnik	Conte	Ford, Gerald R.
Boggs	Conyers	Ford,
Boland	Corbett	William D.
Bolling	Corman	Foreman
Brademas	Coughlin	Fountain
Brasco	Cowger	Fraser
Bray	Cramer	Frelinghuysen
Brinkley	Crane	Frey
Brock	Culver	Friedel
Brooks	Cunningham	Fulton, Pa.
Broomfield	Daddario	Fuqua
Brotzman	Daniel, Va.	Garmatz
Brown, Mich.	Daniels, N.J.	Gaydos
Brown, Ohio	Davis, Ga.	Gibbons
Broyhill, N.C.	Davis, Wis.	Gilbert
Broyhill, Va.	de la Garza	Goldwater
	Delaney	Gonzalez
	Dellenback	Gooding
	Denney	Gray

Green, Oreg. Mailliard
 Green, Pa. Mann
 Griffiths Marsh
 Gross Martin
 Grover Matsunaga
 Gubser May
 Gude Mayne
 Hagan Meeds
 Haley Melcher
 Hall Michel
 Halpern Mikva
 Hamilton Miller, Calif.
 Hammer- Miller, Ohio
 schmidt Minish
 Hanley Mink
 Hansen, Idaho Minshall
 Harrington Mize
 Harsha Mizell
 Harvey Mollohan
 Hastings Monagan
 Hathaway Montgomery
 Hawkins Moorhead
 Hays Morgan
 Heckler, W. Va. Morse
 Heckler, Mass. Morton
 Helstoski Mosher
 Henderson Moss
 Hicks Murphy, Ill.
 Hogan Murphy, N.Y.
 Horton Myers
 Howard Natcher
 Hull Nedzi
 Hungate Nelsen
 Hunt Nichols
 Hutchinson Nix
 Ichord Obey
 Jacobs O'Hara
 Jarman O'Konski
 Johnson, Calif. Olsen
 Jonas O'Neill, Mass.
 Jones, Ala. Ottinger
 Jones, N.C. Passman
 Jones, Tenn. Patten
 Karth Pelly
 Kastenmeier Perkins
 Kazen Pettis
 Kee Philbin
 Keith Pickle
 King Pike
 Kleppe Pirnie
 Kluczynski Poage
 Koch Podell
 Kyl Poff
 Kyros Preyer, N.C.
 Landgrebe Price, Ill.
 Landrum Price, Tex.
 Langen Fryor, Ark.
 Latta Pucinski
 Leggett Purcell
 Lennon Quie
 Lloyd Quillen
 Long, La. Randall
 Long, Md. Rarick
 Lowenstein Rees
 Lujan Reid, Ill.
 Lukens Reid, N.Y.
 McCarthy Reuss
 McClory Rhodes
 McCloskey Riegle
 McClure Roberts
 McCulloch Robison
 McDade Rodino
 McDonald, Roe
 Mich. Rogers, Colo.
 McEwen Rogers, Fla.
 McFall Rooney, N.Y.
 McKneally Rooney, Pa.
 McMillan Rosenthal
 Macdonald, Rostenkowski
 Mass. Roth
 MacGregor Roubush
 Madden Roybal
 Mahon Ruppe

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—41

Bow Gialmo
 Brown, Calif. Griffin
 Button Hanna
 Cabell Hansen, Wash.
 Cahill Hébert
 Dawson Holifield
 Dent Hosmer
 Dickinson Johnson, Pa.
 Edwards, La. Kirwan
 Eilberg Kuykendall
 Fulton, Tenn. Lipscomb
 Galifianakis Mathias
 Gallagher Meskill
 Gettys Mills

So the motion to recommit was agreed to.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Mr. Hébert with Mr. Bow.
 Mr. Holifield with Mr. Hosmer.
 Mr. Dent with Mr. Saylor.
 Mr. Gallagher with Mr. Cahill.
 Mr. Hanna with Mr. Utt.
 Mr. Mills with Mr. Sandman.
 Mr. Pepper with Mr. Kuykendall.
 Mr. Rivers with Mr. Lipscomb.
 Mr. Teague of Texas with Mr. Meskill.
 Mr. Kirwan with Mr. Button.
 Mr. Patman with Mr. Reifel.
 Mr. Fulton of Tennessee with Mr. Pollock.
 Mr. Griffin with Mr. Rallsback.
 Mr. Cabell with Mr. Mathias.
 Mr. Gettys with Mr. Dickinson.
 Mr. Gialmo with Mr. Johnson of Pennsylvania.
 Mr. Brown of California with Mr. Powell.
 Mr. Edwards of Louisiana with Mr. O'Neal of Georgia.
 Mr. Galifianakis with Mr. Ellberg.
 Mrs. Hansen of Washington with Mr. Stuckey.

Messrs. BOB WILSON and HARRINGTON changed their votes from "nay" to "yea."

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Mr. HAYS, Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the instructions of the House in the motion to recommit, I report back House Resolution 613 with an amendment.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

On page 1, line 7, after the comma, insert the following: "requests the President to continue to press the Government of North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949 in the treatment of prisoners of war."

The amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution.

Mr. HAYS, Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 334, nays 55, answered "present" 1, not voting 43, as follows:

[Roll No. 300]

YEAS 334

Abbt
 Abernethy
 Adair
 Addabbo
 Albert
 Alexander
 Anderson, Calif.
 Anderson, Ill.
 Anderson, Tenn.
 Andrews, Ala.
 Andrews, N. Dak.
 Annunzio
 Arends
 Ashbrook
 Ashley
 Aspinall
 Ayres
 Baring
 Barrett
 Beall, Md.
 Belcher
 Bell, Calif.
 Bennett
 Berry
 Betts
 Bevill
 Biaggi
 Biester
 Blackburn
 Blanton
 Boggs
 Boland
 Bolling
 Brademas
 Bray
 Brinkley
 Brock
 Brooks
 Broomfield
 Brotzman
 Brown, Mich.
 Brown, Ohio
 Broyles, N.C.
 Broyhill, Va.
 Buchanan
 Burke, Fla.
 Burke, Mass.
 Burlington, Tex.
 Burlison, Mo.
 Burton, Utah
 Bush
 Byrne, Pa.
 Byrnes, Wis.
 Caffery
 Camp
 Carter
 Casey
 Cederberg
 Celler
 Chamberlain
 Chappell
 Clancy
 Clark
 Clausen, Don H.
 Clawson, Del.
 Cleveland
 Collier
 Collins
 Colmer
 Conable
 Conte
 Corbett
 Corman
 Coughlin
 Cowger
 Cramer
 Crane
 Culver
 Cunningham
 Daniel, Va.
 Daniels, N.J.
 Davis, Ga.
 Davis, Wis.
 de la Garza
 Delaney
 Dellenback
 Denney
 Dennis
 Derwinski
 Devine
 Donohue
 Dorn
 Dowdy
 Downing
 Dulski
 Duncan
 Dwyer
 Eckhardt
 Edmondson
 Edwards, Ala.
 Erlenborn
 Esch
 Eshleman
 Evans, Colo.
 Ewins, Tenn.
 Fallon
 Fascell
 Feighan
 Findley
 Fish

Fisher
 Flood
 Flowers
 Flynt
 Foley
 Ford, Gerald R.
 Foreman
 Fountain
 Frelinghuysen
 Frey
 Friedel
 Fulton, Pa.
 Fuqua
 Garmatz
 Gaydos
 Gibbons
 Goldwater
 Gonzalez
 Goodling
 Gray
 Green, Oreg.
 Griffiths
 Gross
 Grover
 Gubser
 Gude
 Hagan
 Haley
 Hall
 Halpern
 Hamilton
 Hammer- schmidt
 Hanley
 Hansen, Idaho
 Harsha
 Harvey
 Hastings
 Hays
 Heckler, Mass.
 Henderson
 Hicks
 Hogan
 Horton
 Howard
 Hull
 Hunt
 Hutchinson
 Ichord
 Jacobs
 Jarman
 Johnson, Calif.
 Jones, Ala.
 Jones, N.C.
 Jones, Tenn.
 Kazen
 Kee
 Keith
 King
 Kleppe
 Kluczynski
 Kyl
 Kyros
 Landgrebe
 Landrum
 Langen
 Latta
 Lennon
 Lloyd
 Long, La.
 Long, Md.
 Lowenstein
 Lujan
 Lukens
 McCarthy
 McClory
 McCloskey
 McClure
 McCulloch
 McDade
 McDonald, Mich.
 McEwen
 McFall
 McKneally
 McMillan
 Macdonald, Mass.
 MacGregor
 Madden
 Mahon
 McCulloch
 McDade
 McDonald, Mich.
 McEwen
 McFall
 McKneally
 McMillan
 Macdonald, Mass.
 MacGregor
 Madden
 Mahon
 Rostenkowski
 Roth
 Roubush
 Ruppe
 Ruth
 Ryan
 St Germain
 St. Onge
 Satterfield
 Schadeberg
 Scherle
 Scheuer
 Schneebeli
 Schwengel
 Scott
 Sebelius
 Shipley
 Shriver
 Sikes
 Slisk
 Skubitz
 Slack
 Smith, Calif.
 Smith, Iowa
 Smith, N.Y.
 Snyder
 Springer
 Stafford
 Staggers
 Stanton
 Steed
 Steiger, Ariz.
 Steiger, Wis.
 Stephens
 Stokes
 Stratton
 Stubblefield
 Sullivan
 Symington
 Taft
 Talcott
 Taylor
 Teague, Calif.
 Thompson, Ga.
 Thompson, N.J.
 Thomson, Wis.
 Tiernan
 Tunney
 Udall
 Ullman
 Van Deerlin
 Vander Jagt
 Vanik
 Vigorito
 Waggonner
 Waldie
 Wampler
 Watkins
 Watson
 Watts
 Welcker
 Whalen
 Whalley
 White
 Whitehurst
 Whitten
 Widnall
 Wiggins
 Williams
 Williams, Bob
 Wilson, Charles H.
 Winn
 Wold
 Wolf
 Wright
 Wyatt
 Wyder
 Wylie
 Wyman
 Yatron
 Young
 Zablocki
 Zion
 Zwach

NAYS—55

Adams
 Bingham
 Blatnik
 Brasco
 Burton, Calif.
 Carey
 Chisholm
 Clay
 Cohelan
 Conyers
 Daddario
 Diggs
 Edwards, Calif.
 Farbstain
 Ford, William D.
 Fraser
 Gilbert
 Green, Pa.
 Harrington
 Hathaway
 Hawkins
 Hechler, W. Va.
 Helstoski
 Hungate
 Karth
 Kastenmeier
 Koch
 Leggett
 Lowenstein
 McCarthy
 Macdonald, Mass.
 Mikva
 Mink
 Moorhead
 Moss
 Nedzi
 O'Neill, Mass.
 Ottinger
 Podell
 Reid, N.Y.
 Reuss
 Rosenthal
 Roybal
 Ryan
 St. Onge
 Scheuer
 Stokes
 Thompson, N.J.
 Tunney
 Ullman
 Vanik
 Waldie
 Woff
 Yates

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—1

NOT VOTING—43

Bow
 Brown, Calif.
 Button
 Cabell
 Cahill
 Dawson
 Dent
 Dickinson
 Rarick
 Dingell
 Edwards, La.
 Ellberg
 Fulton, Tenn.

Galifianakis	Kirwan	Powell
Gallagher	Kuykendall	Rallsback
Gettys	Lipscomb	Reifel
Gialmo	Long, Md.	Rivers
Griffin	Mathias	Sandman
Hanna	Meskill	Saylor
Hansen, Wash.	Mills	Stuckey
Hébert	O'Neal, Ga.	Teague, Tex.
Holifield	Patman	Utt
Hosmer	Pepper	
Johnson, Pa.	Pollock	

So the resolution was agreed to.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Mr. Hébert for, with Mr. Brown of California against.

Until further notice:

Mr. Holifield with Mr. Hosmer.
 Mr. Dent with Mr. Saylor.
 Mr. Gallagher with Mr. Cahill.
 Mr. Hanna with Mr. Utt.
 Mr. Mills with Mr. Bow.
 Mr. Pepper with Mr. Kuykendall.
 Mr. Rivers with Mr. Sandman.
 Mr. Teague of Texas with Mr. Lipscomb.
 Mr. Kirwan with Mr. Meskill.
 Mr. Patman with Mr. Button.
 Mr. Fulton of Tennessee with Mr. Reifel.
 Mr. Griffin with Mr. Rallsback.
 Mr. Cabell with Mr. Mathias.
 Mr. Gettys with Mr. Dickinson.
 Mr. Gialmo with Mr. Pollock.
 Mr. Edwards of Louisiana with Mr. Stuckey.
 Mr. Galifianakis with Mr. O'Neal of Georgia.
 Mrs. Hansen of Washington with Mr. Johnson of Pennsylvania.
 Mr. Dingell with Mr. Eilberg.
 Mr. Long of Maryland with Mr. Powell.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. HAYS, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks and include extraneous matter on the resolution just agreed to.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio? There was no objection.

PUBLIC WORKS APPROPRIATION— CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. KIRWAN submitted the following conference report and statement on the bill (H.R. 14159) making appropriations for public works for water, pollution control, and power development, including the Corps of Engineers—Civil, the Panama Canal, the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, the Bureau of Reclamation, power agencies of the Department of the Interior, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Atomic Energy Commission, and related independent agencies and commissions for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes:

CONFERENCE REPORT (H. REPT. NO. 91-697)

The Committee of Conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 14159) "making appropriations for public works for water, pollution control, and power development, including the Corps of Engineers—Civil, the Panama Canal, the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, the Bureau of Reclamation, power agencies of the Department of the Interior, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Atomic Energy Commission, and related independent agen-

cies and commissions for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes," having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows: That the Senate recede from its amendment numbered 19.

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 7, 14, 17, 20, and 21, and agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 1: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 1, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$1,862,269,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 2: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 2, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$355,500,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 3: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 3, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$41,191,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 4: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 4, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$711,992,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 6: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 6, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$80,820,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 8: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 8, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$22,680,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 9: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 9, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$176,500,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 10: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 10, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$86,382,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 11: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 11, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$800,000,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 12: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 12, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$16,030,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 13: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 13, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$14,930,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 15: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 15, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$28,240,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 16: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 16, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert "\$25,740,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

The committee of conference report in disagreement amendments numbered 5, and 18.

MICHAEL J. KIRWAN,
 JOE L. EVINS,
 EDWARD P. BOLAND
 JAMES L. WHITTEN,
 GEORGE ANDREWS,
 GEORGE MAHON,
 JOHN J. RHODES,
 GLENN R. DAVIS,
 (Except as to amendments
 10 and 11),
 HOWARD W. ROBISON,
 E. A. CEDERBERG,
Managers on the Part of the House.

ALLEN J. ELLENDER,
 RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
 JOHN L. MCCLELLAN,
 WARREN G. MAGNUSON,
 SPESSARD L. HOLLAND,
 JOHN STENNIS,
 JOHN O. PASTORE,
 JENNINGS RANDOLPH,
 MILTON R. YOUNG,
 ROMAN L. HRUSKA,
 KARL E. MUNDT,
Managers on the Part of the Senate.

STATEMENT

The Managers on the part of the House at a conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 14159) making appropriations for Public Works for water, pollution control, and power development, including the Corps of Engineers—Civil, the Panama Canal, the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, the Bureau of Reclamation, power agencies of the Department of the Interior, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Atomic Energy Commission, and related independent agencies and commissions for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes, submit the following statement in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon and recommended in the accompanying conference report as to each of such amendments; namely:

TITLE I—ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Operating expenses

Amendment No. 1: Appropriates \$1,862,269,000 instead of \$1,884,269,000 as proposed by the House, and \$1,840,269,000 as proposed by the Senate. The reduction below the House bill is based on anticipated slippage in the operating programs. The conferees are in agreement that within the funds made available provision should be made for the full operation of the two K reactors at Richland, Washington.

Plant and capital equipment

Amendment No. 2: Appropriates \$355,500,000 instead of \$343,500,000 as proposed by the House, and \$377,525,000 as proposed by the Senate. The increase over the House bill consists of \$6,000,000 for the 200-BEV accelerator and \$6,000,000 for capital equipment not related to construction. The conferees are in agreement that provision should be made within available funds for construction of the waste storage tanks at Richland, Washington, required in connection with full operation of the two K reactors.

TITLE II—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—CIVIL

Department of the Army Corps of Engineers—Civil

General investigations

Amendment No. 3: Appropriates \$41,191,000 instead of \$40,600,000 as proposed

by the House and \$41,760,000 as proposed by the Senate. The increase over the House bill includes \$200,000 to initiate the International Field Year on the Great Lakes, \$40,000 for the Texas water and pollution study; and \$351,000 for studies as listed below.

The conferees are in agreement that the International Field Year on the Great Lakes shall be so planned as to minimize annual funding requirements until the general fiscal situation improves.

The increase provided over the House bill shall be allocated to the following studies:

Alaska: (N) Cook Inlet.....	\$20,000
California: (N) San Francisco Bay Area (in depth).....	30,000
Florida: (N) St. Lucie Inlet.....	25,000
Georgia: (FC) Alapahah River plus tributaries.....	20,000

Louisiana:	
(FC) Louisiana Coastal area.....	40,000
(FC) Mermentau, Vermillion and Calcasieu Rivers and Bayou Teche.....	6,000
Missouri: (FC) Metropolitan St. Louis area.....	10,000
Nevada: (FC) Virgin River.....	15,000
New Mexico: (FC) Pecos River above Santa Rosa.....	10,000
North Carolina: (FC) Neuse River.....	15,000
North Dakota:	
(FC) Cannonball River.....	10,000
(FC) Red River of the North, Minn. and N.D.....	25,000
South Carolina: (N) Charleston Harbor.....	30,000
Tennessee: (FC) West Fork of Drakes Creek.....	15,000

Virginia:	
(N) Norfolk Harbor, Craney Island.....	35,000
(N) Norfolk Harbor.....	15,000
Washington:	
(FC) Puyallup River.....	10,000
(N) Seattle Harbor, Duwamish Waterway.....	10,000
(N) Snohomish River and tributaries.....	10,000

¹ Increase in House bill figure.

Construction, general

Amendment No. 4: Appropriates \$711,992,000 instead of \$671,982,000 as proposed by the House and \$740,469,000 as proposed by the Senate. The funds appropriated are to be allocated as shown in the following tabulation:

Construction, general, State, and project	Budget estimate for fiscal year 1970 (as amended)		Conference allowance	
	Construction	Planning	Construction	Planning
Alabama:				
(N) Alabama River channel improvement.....	\$100,000		\$100,000	
(N) Claiborne lock and dam.....	3,000,000		3,600,000	
(R) John Hollis Bankhead lock and dam.....	2,000,000		2,000,000	
(MP) Jones Bluff lock and dam.....	11,000,000		12,000,000	
(MP) Millers Ferry lock and dam.....	2,584,000		2,584,000	
(N) Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, Ala. and Miss. Tombigbee River and tributaries, Alabama and Mississippi. (See Mississippi.) West Point Dam, Ala. and Ga. (See Georgia.)		\$500,000		\$500,000
Alaska:				
(MP) Bradley Lake power project.....		100,000		100,000
(FC) Chena River Reservoirs, Fairbanks.....		150,000		150,000
(N) King Cove Harbor.....				60,000
(MP) Snettisham power project.....	2,200,000		5,350,000	
Arizona:				
(FC) Gila River and tributaries below Painted Rock Reservoir.....		774,000		2,489,000
(FC) Phoenix and vicinity.....		1,000,000		1,000,000
(FC) Santa Rosa Wash (Tat Momolikot Dam).....	100,000		150,000	
(FC) Winslow.....	100,000		550,000	
Arkansas:				
(N) Arkansas River and tributaries, Arkansas and Oklahoma: (a) Bank stabilization and channel rectification.....	3,500,000		3,500,000	
(b) Navigation locks and dams.....	58,000,000		59,500,000	
(FC) Bayou Bartholomew (1950 and 1966 acts), Arkansas and Louisiana.....		119,000		119,000
(FC) Bell Feley Dam.....				150,000
(MP) Dardanelle lock and dam.....	4,346,000		4,346,000	
(MP) De Gray Reservoir.....	5,600,000		5,600,000	
(FC) De Queen Reservoir.....	300,000		300,000	
(FC) Dierks Reservoir.....	466,000		466,000	
(FC) Garland City.....	200,000		200,000	
(FC) Gilliam Reservoir.....	1,100,000		1,600,000	
(MP) Narrows Dam (3d unit).....	200,000		200,000	
(N) Ouachita and Black Rivers, Arkansas and Louisiana.....	9,000,000		9,560,000	
(MP) Ozark lock and dam.....	8,000,000		8,000,000	
(FC) Red River levees and bank stabilization below Denison Dam, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas.....	600,000		1,000,000	
California:				
(FC) Alameda Creek, Del Valle Dam.....	2,200,000		2,200,000	
(FC) Bear Creek.....	127,000		127,000	
(FC) Buchanan Reservoir.....	150,000		500,000	
(FC) Butler Valley Reservoir.....		200,000		200,000
(N) Corte Madera Creek.....	1,850,000		1,850,000	
(N) Crescent City Harbor.....		25,000		25,000
(FC) Cucamonga Creek.....				400,000
(FC) Dry Creek (Warm Springs) Reservoir.....	1,500,000		2,500,000	
(FC) Hidden Reservoir.....	360,000		600,000	
(FC) Klamath River.....	100,000		447,000	
(FC) Lakeport Reservoirs, Scotts Creek.....		359,000		359,000
(FC) Los Angeles County drainage area.....	200,000		200,000	
(MP) Martis Creek Reservoir, Calif. and Nev. (See Nevada.)				
(MP) Marysville Reservoir.....		750,000		750,000
(FC) Mojave River Reservoir (West Fork).....	3,600,000		4,000,000	
(FC) Napa River.....				50,000
(FC) New Bullards Bar Reservoir (reimbursement).....	3,155,000		4,500,000	
(FC) New Don Pedro Reservoir (reimbursement).....	1,940,000		1,940,000	
(MP) New Melones Reservoir.....	1,230,000		3,000,000	
(N) Oakland Harbor.....	100,000		100,000	
(FC) Pajaro River (1966 act).....		200,000		200,000
(FC) Pine Flat Reservoir.....	266,000		266,000	
(BE) Point Mugu to San Pedro breakwater (reimbursement).....	900,000		900,000	
(N) Port Hueneme.....				50,000
(FC) Russian River Basin (Coyote Valley Dam).....	100,000		100,000	
(FC) Sacramento River and major and minor tributaries.....	200,000		200,000	
(FC) Sacramento River bank protection.....	2,000,000		2,500,000	
(N) Sacramento River deepwater ship channel.....	100,000		100,000	
(N) San Diego Harbor.....				100,000
(N) San Diego River and Mission Bay.....	670,000		670,000	
(FC) San Diego River and Mission Valley.....		400,000		400,000
(N) San Francisco Bay to Stockton.....	300,000		550,000	
(N) Santa Cruz Harbor (resumption).....				260,000
(FC) Santa Paula Creek.....				250,000
(FC) Sonoma Creek.....		343,000		343,000
(BE) Surfside-Sunset, Newport Beach (reimbursement).....	1,754,000		1,754,000	
(FC) Sweetwater River.....		150,000		150,000
(FC) Tahquitz Creek.....				250,000
(FC) Walnut Creek.....	1,800,000		1,800,000	
Colorado:				
(FC) Bear Creek (Mount Carbon) Reservoir.....		150,000		150,000
(FC) Chatfield Reservoir.....	7,000,000		9,500,000	
(FC) Trinidad Reservoir.....	2,100,000		2,350,000	

Construction, general, State, and project	Budget estimate for fiscal year 1970 (as amended)		Conference allowance	
	Construction	Planning	Construction	Planning
Connecticut:				
(FC) Ansonia-Derby.....	\$4,000,000		\$4,000,000	
(FC) Black Rock Reservoir.....	1,335,000		1,335,000	
(FC) Derby.....	100,000		700,000	
(FC) New London barrier.....	100,000		100,000	
(FC) Stratford.....		\$246,000		\$246,000
(FC) Trumbull Pond Reservoir.....		255,000		255,000
Delaware:				
(N) Inland waterway, Delaware River to Chesapeake Bay (Chesapeake and Delaware Canal), pt. II, Delaware and Maryland.....	6,000,000		6,500,000	
Florida:				
(N) Apalachicola River channel improvement.....	500,000		500,000	
(N) Canaveral Harbor.....			150,000	
(FC) Central and southern Florida.....	9,000,000		9,500,000	
(N) Cross-Florida Barge Canal.....	6,000,000		7,500,000	
(FC) Four Rivers basins.....	3,000,000		3,500,000	
(N) Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (St. Marks to Tampa Bay, ecological study only).....				20,000
(N) Jacksonville Harbor (1965 act).....	200,000		700,000	
(N) Miami Harbor.....				140,000
(BE) Palm Beach County, Lake Worth Inlet to South Lake Worth Inlet (reimbursement).....	4,000		4,000	
Georgia:				
(MP) Carters Dam.....	6,300,000		6,700,000	
(N) Savannah Harbor, 40 feet (1965 act).....	1,500,000		1,850,000	
(N) Savannah Harbor (sediment basin).....	500,000		1,100,000	
(MP) Spewrell Bluff Dam (land acquisition).....			750,000	
(MP) Trotters Shoals Reservoir, Ga. and S.C.....		900,000		900,000
(MP) West Point Reservoir, Ala. and Ga.....	10,200,000		10,200,000	
Hawaii:				
(N) Kawaihae Harbor.....			750,000	
(BE) Waikiki Beach.....			500,000	
Idaho:				
(FC) Blackfoot Reservoir.....		90,000		90,000
(MP) Dworshak (Bruce Eddy) Reservoir.....	44,700,000		46,350,000	
(FC) Ririe Reservoir.....	600,000		700,000	
Illinois:				
(FC) East St. Louis and vicinity.....		200,000		229,000
(FC) Fulton.....		30,000		30,000
(N) Horse Island and Crescent Bridge (Mississippi River), Illinois and Iowa.....	750,000		750,000	
(FC) Hunt drainage district and Lima Lake drainage district.....	831,000		831,000	
(N) Illinois Waterway, Calumet-Sag modification, pt. I, Illinois and Indiana.....	2,700,000		2,700,000	
(N) Illinois Waterway, Calumet-Sag modification, pt. II, Illinois and Indiana.....		50,000		50,000
(FC) Indian Grave drainage district.....	277,000		277,000	
(N) Kaskaskia River (navigation).....	9,377,000		11,000,000	
(FC) Levee district 21 (Vandalia), Kaskaskia River.....		59,000		59,000
(FC) Levee district 23 (Dively), Kaskaskia River.....		75,000		75,000
(FC) Levee unit No. 1, Wabash River (restudy).....		10,000		10,000
(FC) Lincoln Reservoir (land acquisition).....			500,000	
(N) Lock and dam 26, Alton, Mississippi River.....				350,000
(FC) Lock and dam 52, Illinois and Kentucky. (See Kentucky.).....				75,000
(FC) Louisville Reservoir.....				30,000
(FC) Milan.....				75,000
(N) Mississippi River between Ohio and Missouri Rivers, Ill. and Mo.: (a) Regulating works.....	1,000,000		1,500,000	
(N) Mound City lock and dam, Illinois and Kentucky.....		436,000		436,000
(FC) Oakley Reservoir (land acquisition).....	500,000		300,000	
(FC) Peoria.....		50,000		50,000
(FC) Rend Lake Reservoir.....	8,200,000		8,200,000	
(FC) Rockford.....		155,000		155,000
(FC) Rock Island.....	150,000		150,000	
(FC) Saline River and tributaries.....	1,200,000		1,350,000	
(FC) Shawneetown (restudy).....		30,000		30,000
(FC) Shelbyville Reservoir.....	3,000,000		3,150,000	
(N) Smithland locks and dam, Illinois and Kentucky.....	500,000		750,000	
(FC) Wood River drainage and levee district.....		31,000		31,000
Indiana:				
(FC) Big Walnut Reservoir (restudy).....		50,000		35,000
(FC) Brookville Reservoir.....	1,400,000		1,400,000	
(N) Burns Waterway Harbor (reimbursement).....	5,520,000		5,520,000	
(N) Cannelton locks and dam, Indiana and Kentucky.....	7,100,000		7,100,000	
(FC) Evansville (resumption).....			500,000	
(FC) Illinois Waterway, Calumet-Sag modification, pts. I and II, Illinois and Indiana. (See Illinois.).....				
(FC) Island levee.....	100,000		100,000	
(FC) Lafayette Reservoir (land acquisition).....			400,000	
(N) Newburgh locks and dam, Indiana and Kentucky.....	2,100,000		3,200,000	
(FC) Niblack levee pumps.....				40,000
(FC) Patoka Reservoir (land acquisition).....	400,000		400,000	
(N) Uniontown locks and dam, Indiana and Kentucky.....	4,500,000		4,500,000	
(FC) West Terre Haute.....	170,000		235,000	
Iowa:				
(FC) Ames Reservoir (land acquisition).....			400,000	
(FC) Big Sioux River at Sioux City, Iowa, and South Dakota.....				70,000
(FC) Clinton.....		30,000		30,000
(FC) Davids Creek Dam and Reservoir.....				100,000
(FC) Dubuque.....	2,100,000		2,550,000	
(FC) Guttenberg (resumption).....			100,000	
(FC) Horse Island and Crescent Bridge, Mississippi River, Ill. and Iowa. (See Illinois.).....				
(FC) Iowa River Flint Creek levee district No. 16.....	100,000		150,000	
(FC) Missouri River levee system, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska.....	1,200,000		1,500,000	
(N) Missouri River, Sioux City to mouth, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska.....	4,500,000		5,250,000	
(FC) Rathbun Reservoir.....	2,600,000		3,000,000	
(FC) Red Rock Dam and Lake Red Rock.....	2,000,000		2,000,000	
(FC) Saylorville Reservoir.....	3,700,000		3,700,000	
(FC) Waterloo.....			200,000	
Kansas:				
(FC) Arkansas—Red River chloride control, Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas. (See Texas.).....				75,000
(FC) Cedar Point Reservoir.....				200,000
(FC) Clinton Reservoir (land acquisition).....	1,000,000		1,000,000	
(FC) Cow Creek, Hutchinson.....	100,000		700,000	
(FC) El Dorado Reservoir (land acquisition).....				275,000
(FC) Hiisdale Reservoir.....		275,000		275,000
(FC) Kansas City (1962 modification).....	350,000		425,000	
(FC) Lawrence.....	1,000,000		1,200,000	

Construction, general, State, and project	Budget estimate for fiscal year 1970 (as amended)		Conference allowance	
	Construction	Planning	Construction	Planning
Kansas—Continued				
(FC) Melvern Reservoir	\$7,700,000		\$7,700,000	
Missouri River levee system, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska. (See Iowa.)				
Missouri River, Sioux City to mouth, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska. (See Iowa.)				
(FC) Onaga Reservoir		\$250,000		\$250,000
(FC) Osawatimie	\$962,000		962,000	
(FC) Perry Reservoir	3,800,000		4,000,000	
(FC) Topeka	850,000		850,000	
Kentucky:				
(FC) Booneville Reservoir		230,000		230,000
Cannelton locks and dam, Indiana and Kentucky. (See Indiana.)				
(FC) Carr Fork Reservoir	2,130,000		3,380,000	
(FC) Cave Run Reservoir	3,800,000		3,800,000	
(FC) Dayton		89,000		89,000
(FC) Eagle Creek Reservoir		178,000		178,000
(FC) Falmouth Reservoir				50,000
(FC) Frankfort, North Frankfort Area	824,000		824,000	
(FC) Kehoe Reservoir		150,000		150,000
(MP) Laurel River Reservoir	2,740,000		2,740,000	
(N) Lock and Dam 52, Ill. and Ky.	1,684,000		1,684,000	
(FC) Martin local protection			150,000	
Martins Fork Reservoir (land acquisition)			300,000	
Mound City lock and dam, Illinois and Kentucky. (See Illinois.)				
Newburgh locks and dam, Indiana and Kentucky. (See Indiana.)				
(FC) Paintsville Reservoir		157,000		157,000
(FC) Red River Reservoir	500,000			500,000
Smithland lock and dam, Illinois and Kentucky. (See Illinois.)				
(FC) Southwestern Jefferson County		50,000		50,000
(FC) Taylorsville Reservoir		236,000		236,000
Uniontown locks and dam, Indiana and Kentucky. (See Indiana.)				
(FC) Yatesville Reservoir		181,000		181,000
Louisiana:				
(N) Atchafalaya River, Bayous Chene, Boeuf and Black				50,000
Bayou Bartholomew, Ark. and La. (See Arkansas.)				
(FC) Bayou Bodcau and tributaries			100,000	
(N) Bayou LaFourche and LaFourche Jump Waterway	100,000		250,000	
(FC) Caddo Dam	1,200,000		1,200,000	
(FC) Lake Pontchartrain and vicinity	6,000,000		8,500,000	
(FC) Mermentau River			500,000	
(N) Michoud Canal		15,000		50,000
(N) Mississippi River, gulf outlet	800,000		800,000	
(FC) Monroe floodwall (1965 and 1966 acts)		116,000		116,000
(FC) Morgan City and vicinity	150,000		175,000	
(FC) New Orleans to Venice hurricane protection	500,000		1,400,000	
(N) Ouachita and Black Rivers, Ark. and La. (See Arkansas.)				
Overton-Red River Waterway (lower 31 miles only)	200,000		600,000	
Red River emergency bank protection			1,900,000	
Red River levees and bank stabilization below Denison Dam, Ark., La., and Tex. (See Arkansas.)				
(N) Vermilion lock (replacement)		70,000		70,000
Maine:				
(MP) Dickey-Lincoln School Dam and Reservoirs		807,000		
Maryland:				
(FC) Bloomington Reservoir, Md. and W. Va.	1,300,000		1,400,000	
Inland waterway, Delaware River to Chesapeake Bay, Del. and Md. (Chesapeake and Delaware Canal), pt. II. (See Delaware.)				
Massachusetts:				
(FC) Charles River Dam		150,000		150,000
(N) Fall River Harbor, Mass. and R.I.		100,000		150,000
(FC) Hookagee Reservoir		200,000		200,000
(R) Plymouth Harbor	395,000		395,000	
(N) Provincetown Harbor	100,000		250,000	
(N) Weymouth Fore and Towne Rivers	100,000		1,000,000	
(FC) Whitmanville Reservoir		245,000		245,000
Michigan:				
(N) Lexington Harbor				45,000
(FC) River Rouge	500,000		500,000	
(FC) Saginaw River (flood control)	1,200,000		1,200,000	
(N) Saginaw River (navigation)	2,496,000		2,496,000	
(R) St. Joseph Harbor	350,000		350,000	
Minnesota:				
(FE) Big Stone Lake-Whetstone River, Minn. and S. Dak. (land acquisition, resumption)			200,000	
(FC) Roseau River			50,000	
(FC) Warroad River and Bulldog Creek		50,000		50,000
Mississippi:				
(N) Biloxi Harbor	330,000		330,000	
(FC) Tallahala Reservoir				200,000
Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, Ala. and Miss. (See Alabama.)				
(FC) Tombigbee River and tributaries, Alabama and Mississippi	300,000		650,000	
Missouri:				
(FC) Brookfield Reservoir				100,000
(FC) Chariton River (1944 act)	1,300,000		1,400,000	
(MP) Clarence Cannon (Joanna) Reservoir	2,750,000		2,925,000	
(FC) Gregory drainage district	538,000		538,000	
(MP) Kaysinger Bluff Reservoir	6,500,000		9,500,000	
(FC) Little Blue River Reservoir (land acquisition)	500,000		650,000	
(FC) Long Branch Reservoir		54,000		54,000
(FC) Meramec Park Reservoir (land acquisition)	700,000		700,000	
Mississippi River between Ohio and Missouri Rivers, Ill. and Mo. (See Illinois.)				
Missouri River levee system, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska. (See Iowa.)				
Missouri River, Sioux City to mouth, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska. (See Iowa.)				
(FC) Pattonburg Reservoir (Highway I-35 crossing)	500,000		500,000	
(FC) Platte River		103,000		103,000
(FC) St. Louis	2,700,000		2,800,000	
(FC) Smithville Reservoir		275,000		275,000
(MP) Stockton Reservoir	5,000,000		5,000,000	
(FC) Union Reservoir		500,000	300,000	500,000
Montana:				
(FC) Great Falls			400,000	
(MP) Libby Reservoir	48,500,000		50,800,000	
Nebraska:				
Missouri River levee system, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska. (See Iowa.)				
Missouri River, Sioux City to mouth, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska. (See Iowa.)				
(FC) Papillion Creek		75,000		300,000
Nevada:				
(FC) Martis Creek Reservoir, Calif. and Nev.	520,000		520,000	

Construction, general, State, and project	Budget estimate for fiscal year 1970 (as amended)		Conference allowance	
	Construction	Planning	Construction	Planning
New Hampshire:				
(FC) Beaver Brook Reservoir.....		\$25,000		\$25,000
New Jersey:				
(FC) Elizabeth.....	\$100,000		\$100,000	
(N) Newark Bay, Hackensack and Passaic Rivers (1966 act).....	500,000		2,000,000	
(FC) Raritan and Sandy Hook Bays.....	2,350,000		2,350,000	
(N) Shrewsbury River Inlet.....		153,000		153,000
(FC) South Orange, Rahway River.....			125,000	
(MP) Tocks Island Reservoir, Pa., N.J., and N.Y. (land acquisition).....	4,000,000		4,000,000	
New Mexico:				
(FC) Albuquerque diversion channels.....	1,700,000		2,200,000	
(FC) Cochiti Reservoir.....	700,000		1,850,000	
(FC) Galisteo Reservoir.....	2,069,000		2,069,000	
(FC) Los Esteros Reservoir and modification of Alamogordo Dam.....		100,000		100,000
New York:				
(BE) Fire Island Inlet to Jones Inlet.....			500,000	
(FC) Fire Island Inlet to Montauk Point.....	500,000		690,000	
(N) Hamlin Beach Harbor.....				40,000
(N) Irondequoit Bay.....			100,000	
(N) New York Harbor (anchorage).....	500,000		1,700,000	
(FC) North Ellenville.....	50,000		50,000	
(FC) Rosendale.....	1,300,000		1,300,000	
(FC) Salamanca.....	799,000		799,000	
(FC) Tocks Island Reservoir, Pa., N.J., and N.Y. (See New Jersey.)				
(FC) Yonkers.....				25,000
North Carolina:				
(N) Cape Fear River above Wilmington.....	357,000		357,000	
(FC) Falls Reservoir (land acquisition).....			500,000	
(FC) New Hope Reservoir.....	2,500,000		4,700,000	
(FC) Randleman Reservoir.....				100,000
(FC) Reddies River Reservoir.....				150,000
(N) Wilmington Harbor, 38- and 40-foot depth (1962 act).....	1,765,000		1,765,000	
(N) Wilmington Harbor (32-ft. project, resumption).....			200,000	
North Dakota:				
(R) Garrison Reservoir (embankment repair).....	1,800,000		1,800,000	
(FC) Minot.....				75,000
(FC) Oahe Reservoir, S. Dak. and N. Dak. (See South Dakota.)				
(FC) Missouri River, Garrison Dam to Lake Oahe.....	900,000		900,000	
(FC) Pipestem Reservoir.....	400,000		400,000	
Ohio:				
(FC) Alum Creek Reservoir.....	1,300,000		1,400,000	
(FC) Athens.....	2,800,000		2,800,000	
(FC) Bellaire (restudy).....		40,000		40,000
(FC) Caesar Creek Reservoir.....	1,800,000		2,250,000	
(FC) Clarence J. Brown Dam and Reservoir.....	1,600,000		1,600,000	
(FC) East Fork Reservoir.....	1,900,000		1,900,000	
(FC) Fremont.....			200,000	
(N) Hannibal locks and dam, Ohio and West Virginia.....	11,000,000		11,000,000	
(N) Huron Harbor (restudy).....				20,000
(FC) Ironton.....			62,000	
(FC) Newark local protection.....				75,000
(FC) North Branch Kokosing River Reservoir.....	300,000		800,000	
(FC) Paint Creek Reservoir.....	2,400,000		2,400,000	
(N) Racine locks and dam, Ohio and West Virginia.....	11,000,000		11,000,000	
(FC) Salt Creek Reservoir.....		227,000		227,000
(FC) Utica Reservoir.....		75,000		75,000
(N) Willow Island locks and dam, West Virginia and Ohio (see West Virginia)				
(FC) Youngstown, Crab Creek.....	100,000		100,000	
Oklahoma:				
Arkansas Red River chloride control, Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas. (See Texas.)				
Arkansas River and tributaries, Arkansas and Oklahoma. (See Arkansas.)				
(MP) Broken Bow Reservoir.....	2,328,000		2,328,000	
(FC) Candy Reservoir.....		232,000		232,000
(FC) Clayton Reservoir.....		225,000		225,000
(FC) Copan Reservoir (land acquisition).....			600,000	
(FC) Crutcho Creek.....	100,000		300,000	
(FC) Hugo Reservoir.....	7,500,000		7,500,000	
(FC) Kaw Reservoir.....	6,400,000		6,850,000	
(FC) Lukfata Reservoir.....			525,000	
(FC) Oologah Reservoir.....	3,400,000		3,400,000	
(FC) Optima Reservoir.....	500,000		500,000	
(MP) Robert S. Kerr (Short Mountain) lock and dam.....	8,800,000		8,800,000	
(FC) Waurika Reservoir.....	1,100,000		1,100,000	
(MP) Webbers Falls lock and dam.....	10,000,000		10,000,000	
Oregon:				
(MP) Bonneville lock and dam (2d power unit), Oregon and Washington.....		715,000		715,000
(MP) Bonneville lock and dam (modification for peaking), Oregon and Washington.....	350,000		400,000	
(FC) Catherine Creek Reservoir.....		300,000		300,000
(N) Chetco River.....	614,000		614,000	
(N) Columbia River and lower Willamette River, 35- and 40-foot projects, Oregon and Washington.....	2,000,000		2,000,000	
(MP) John Day lock and dam, Oregon and Washington.....	14,500,000		14,500,000	
(MP) Lost Creek Reservoir.....	1,750,000		3,850,000	
(FC) Lower Columbia River bank protection, Oregon and Washington.....	400,000		575,000	
(MP) McNary lock and dam, Oregon and Washington.....	2,500,000		2,500,000	
(FC) Scappoose drainage district.....		46,000		46,000
(MP) The Dalles lock and dam, Oregon and Washington (additional power units).....	8,000,000		9,000,000	
(N) Tillamook Bay (south jetty).....	1,800,000		1,800,000	
(FC) Willamette River Basin bank protection.....	375,000		500,000	
(N) Yaquina Bay and Harbor.....	100,000		325,000	
Pennsylvania:				
(FC) Beltzville Reservoir.....	4,200,000		4,200,000	
(FC) Blue Marsh Reservoir (land acquisition).....	700,000		700,000	
(FC) Chartiers Creek.....	2,600,000		2,600,000	
(FC) Cowanesque Reservoir.....		316,000		316,000
(FC) Dubois.....			100,000	
(FC) Foster Joseph Sayers Dam (Blanchard).....	1,912,000		1,912,000	
(FC) Muddy Creek Reservoir.....		100,000		100,000
(BE) Presque Isle Peninsula (reimbursement).....	300,000		300,000	
(FC) Raystown Reservoir.....	8,200,000		8,400,000	
(FC) Tioga-Hammond Reservoir (land acquisition).....	1,000,000		1,000,000	
(FC) Tocks Island Reservoir, Pa., N.J., and N.Y. (See New Jersey.)				
(FC) Tyrone.....		72,000		72,000
(FC) Union City Reservoir.....	4,500,000		4,500,000	
(FC) Woodcock Creek.....	1,550,000		1,550,000	

Construction, general, State, and project	Budget estimate for fiscal year 1970 (as amended)		Conference allowance	
	Construction	Planning	Construction	Planning
Rhode Island:				
(BE) Cliff Walk	\$100,000		\$100,000	
(N) Fall River Harbor, Mass. and R.I. (See Massachusetts.)				
(N) Providence River and Harbor	4,000,000		5,000,000	
South Carolina:				
(N) Cooper River				\$200,000
(N) Trotters Shoals Reservoir, Ga. and S.C. (See Georgia.)				
South Dakota:				
(MP) Big Ben Dam-Lake Sharpe	900,000		1,100,000	
(FC) Big Sioux River at Sioux City. (See Iowa.)				
(FC) Big Stone Lake-Whetstone River, Minn. and S. Dak. (See Minnesota.)				
(FC) Cottonwood Springs Reservoir	540,000		540,000	
(MP) Oahe Reservoir, S. Dak. and N. Dak.	2,000,000		2,300,000	
Tennessee:				
(MP) Cordell Hull lock and dam	7,550,000		7,550,000	
(MP) J. Percy Priest Reservoir	2,136,000		2,136,000	
Texas:				
(FC) Arkansas-Red River chloride control, pt. I, Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas		\$436,000		436,000
(FC) Arkansas-Red River chloride control (supplemental studies), Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas		749,000		749,000
(FC) Aubrey Reservoir				150,000
(FC) Belton Reservoir (raise water level)	100,000		200,000	
(FC) Buffalo Bayou and tributaries	1,000,000		1,000,000	
(N) Cedar Bayou (restudy)				15,000
(FC) Cooper Reservoir and channels	500,000		1,580,000	
(N) Corpus Christi ship channel				35,000
(FC) Duck Channel Channel improvement		125,000		125,000
(FC) Elm Fork Floodway		50,000		50,000
(FC) El Paso	300,000		350,000	
(FC) Fort Worth Floodway, Clear Fork extension	1,360,000		1,360,000	
(FC) Freeport and vicinity	2,200,000		2,200,000	
(R) Galveston Harbor and Channel (groins)	940,000		940,000	
(FC) Highland Bayou	100,000		300,000	
(FC) Lake Kemp Reservoir	1,000,000		1,000,000	
(FC) Lakeview Reservoir		300,000		300,000
(FC) Lavon Reservoir modification and channel improvement	2,500,000		3,750,000	
(N) Mouth of the Colorado River				75,000
(FC) Pat Mayse Reservoir	200,000		200,000	
(FC) Port Arthur and vicinity (hurricane flood protection)	5,000,000		5,000,000	
(N) Red River levees and bank stabilization, below Denison Dam, Ark., La., and Tex. (See Arkansas.)				
(FC) Sabine-Neches Waterway 40 feet and channel to Echo	4,700,000		5,000,000	
(FC) San Antonio Channel	900,000		1,200,000	
(FC) San Gabriel River tributary to Brazos River (land acquisition)	750,000		900,000	
(FC) Taylors Bayou			250,000	
(FC) Texas City, hurricane protection	1,100,000		1,100,000	
(N) Trinity River bridges	1,300,000		1,400,000	
(N) Trinity River project		150,000		150,000
(FC) Vince and Little Vince Bayous	700,000		700,000	
(N) Wallisville Reservoir, Trinity River	1,900,000		1,900,000	
(MP) Whitney Reservoir			300,000	
Utah:				
(FC) Little Dell Reservoir				400,000
Vermont:				
(FC) Gaysville Reservoir		500,000		
Virginia:				
(FC) Gathright Reservoir	1,500,000		1,900,000	
(N) Hampton Roads	2,300,000		3,500,000	
(N) James River (restudy)				50,000
(MP) Salem Church Reservoir		150,000		150,000
(BE) Virginia Beach (reimbursement)	85,000		85,000	
Washington:				
(MP) Bonneville lock and dam (2d power unit), Oregon and Washington. (See Oregon.)		500,000		500,000
(N) Chief Joseph Dam (additional power units)				
(N) Columbia River and lower Willamette River, 35- and 40-foot projects, Oregon and Washington. (See Oregon.)		52,000		52,000
(MP) Everett Harbor and Snohomish River (1968 act)				
(MP) John Day lock and dam, Oregon and Washington. (See Oregon.)	13,000,000		13,000,000	
(MP) Little Goose lock and dam				
(MP) Lower Columbia River bank protection, Oregon and Washington. (See Oregon.)				
(MP) Lower Granite lock and dam			2,000,000	
(MP) Lower Monumental lock and dam	8,000,000		8,000,000	
(FC) McNary lock and dam, Oregon and Washington. (See Oregon.)				
(FC) The Dalles lock and dam, Oregon and Washington. (See Oregon.)				
(FC) Vancouver Lake				50,000
(FC) Wynoochee River Reservoir	750,000		2,000,000	
(FC) Yakima River at Ellensburg (restudy)		13,000		13,000
West Virginia:				
(FC) Beech Fork Lake	1,000,000		1,000,000	
(FC) Bloomington Reservoir, Md. and W. Va. (See Maryland.)				
(FC) Burnsville Lake (land acquisition)	700,000		850,000	
(FC) East Lynn Lake	7,800,000		7,800,000	
(FC) Hannibal locks and dam, Ohio and West Virginia. (See Ohio.)				
(FC) R. D. Bailey (Justice) Lake	10,700,000		10,700,000	
(FC) Racine locks and dam, Ohio and West Virginia. (See Ohio.)				
(FC) Rowlesburg Lake (land acquisition)			900,000	
(FC) Stonewall Jackson Lake (land acquisition)			600,000	
(FC) West Fork Lake		250,000		250,000
(N) Willow Island lock and dam, West Virginia and Ohio	12,000,000		13,500,000	
Wisconsin:				
(N) Green Bay Harbor (1962 act)	1,250,000		1,250,000	
(FC) La Farge Reservoir, Kickapoo River (land acquisition)	750,000		750,000	
(R) Racine Harbor	100,000		100,000	
Miscellaneous:				
(FC) Emergency bank protection	300,000			
(FC) Small projects for flood control and related purposes not requiring specific legislation (sec. 205)	8,000,000		7,250,000	
(FC) Snagging and clearing	200,000			
(N) Small navigation projects not requiring specific legislation costing up to \$500,000 (sec. 107)	2,500,000		2,000,000	
(BE) Small beach erosion control projects not requiring specific legislation costing up to \$500,000 (sec. 103)	500,000		500,000	
Recreation facilities, completed projects	6,000,000		6,548,000	
Fish and wildlife studies (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service)	600,000		600,000	
Aquatic plant control (1965 act)	1,000,000		1,500,000	
Employees compensation	705,000		705,000	
Reduction for anticipated savings and slippages	-44,100,000		-44,100,000	
1969 reserve applied in fiscal year 1970	-43,785,000		-43,785,000	
Grand total, construction, general	608,681,000	18,374,000	688,821,000	23,171,000
	(627,055,000)		(711,992,000)	

Falmouth Reservoir, Kentucky: The \$50,000 approved by the conferees includes provision for a study of alternatives, including local protection for the cities of Falmouth, Covington, and Newport, which shall be conducted concurrently with the resumption of pre-construction planning.

Fort Pierce Beach Erosion Control, Florida: The conferees have approved, as proposed by the Senate, a contract between the Corps of Engineers and the Board of County Commissioners of St. Lucie County, Florida, for reimbursement of certain beach erosion work to be performed by the Commissioners pursuant to section 215 of the Flood Control Act of 1968.

Mermentau River project, Louisiana: The allocation of \$500,000 is for the replacement of the Lake Arthur Bridge.

Dickey-Lincoln School Dam and Reservoirs, Maine: The conferees have disallowed without prejudice the \$807,000 inserted in the bill by the Senate to resume planning. The Senate conferees are unanimous, together with a majority of the House conferees, that the project is fully justified and required to provide hydro-power in the area. Although it is believed that funding of the project should again be considered in subsequent bills, it is not recommended at this time in light of the House action in recent years deleting funds for continuation of the project.

Union Reservoir project, Missouri: The \$300,000 allowed under construction is solely for advance participation by the Corps of Engineers with the Missouri State Highway Commission in the reconstruction of Missouri Highway No. 185 across the future reservoir pool. The allowance does not constitute any commitment as to the initiation of project construction.

Wilson Harbor, New York (1968 Modification): The conferees are in agreement that the project should be constructed with funds available under the lump sum appropriation for small authorized navigation projects.

Cape Lookout, North Carolina: As the benefits are almost wholly recreational and are to protect the Cape Lookout National Seashore, the conferees have not approved the \$70,000 proposed by the Senate to initiate planning of this hurricane protection project by the Corps of Engineers. The conferees recommend construction of the project by the National Park Service.

Tocks Island Reservoir, Pa., N.J., and N.Y.: The conferees note the statement in the Senate Committee's Report concerning the major increase in recreation benefits attributed to this project and its effect on the repayment to the Federal Government from non-Federal interests and are in agreement that this shall not constitute a precedent for other projects as a means of reducing local participation. The conferees also expect, in the event the pumped storage proposed is approved, that the private power companies will make adequate payments to the Federal Government for use of the Federal facilities.

Salem Church Reservoir, Virginia: The \$150,000 allowed includes funds for a restudy, to be conducted concurrently with the initiation of pre-construction planning, to determine the extent to which the plan can be modified to minimize any adverse effects on natural values in the area.

Amendment No. 5: Reported in disagreement.

Flood control, Mississippi River and tributaries

Amendment No. 6: Appropriates \$80,820,000 instead of \$74,600,000 as proposed by the House, and \$87,040,000 as proposed by the Senate. The increase provided over the House bill includes: \$10,000 for the Wolf and Loosahatchie Rivers study; an increase of

\$50,000 for the Old and Atchafalaya River Control study; \$950,000 for the Mississippi River levees; \$1,000,000 for channel improvement; \$1,000,000 for the St. Francis Basin; \$1,000,000 for the Atchafalaya Basin; \$2,210,000 for maintenance.

In addition, \$250,000 in available carryover unobligated balances shall be available for land acquisition on the St. Francis Basin project.

It is the view of the conferees that the Corps of Engineers shall adhere to the provisions of Public Law 678, 74th Congress, concerning the local cooperation requirements for bridge maintenance in connection with the Upper Auxiliary Channel of the Yazoo Basin Headwater Project.

Operation and maintenance, general

Amendment No. 7: Appropriates \$253,000,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of \$245,700,000 as proposed by the House. The increase provided over the House bill is for extraordinary maintenance costs in the Gulf Coast area as a result of Hurricane Camille.

General expenses

Amendment No. 8: Appropriates \$22,680,000 instead of \$22,600,000 as proposed by the House and \$22,980,000 as proposed by the Senate. The increase over the House bill amount includes \$35,000 for new positions in the Office of the Chief and \$45,000 for full-year funding of positions approved for fiscal year 1969.

Administrative provisions

Amendment No. 9: Provides a limitation of \$176,500,000 on the capital of the Revolving Fund, Corps of Engineers, instead of \$175,000,000 as proposed by the House, and \$178,000,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The conferees have approved the use of the Revolving Fund for the rehabilitation of the cutterhead dredge Collins, as proposed by the Senate.

Cemeterial expenses

The Senate report inadvertently included a figure of \$257,800 for the Federal share of the cost of the permanent gravesite for the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy at Arlington National Cemetery. The correct figure is \$181,000, the same as the House allowance.

TITLE III—DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Federal water pollution control administration

Pollution control operations and research

Amendment No. 10: Appropriates \$86,382,000 instead of \$85,382,000 as proposed by the House and \$86,482,000 as proposed by the Senate. The increase provided over the House bill includes \$800,000 to provide a total of \$3,000,000 for initiating contracts and grants to demonstrate new methods and techniques and to develop preliminary plans for elimination and control of pollution in the Great Lakes area, and \$200,000 for the additional workload involved in administration of the construction grant program.

The amount provided for research and planning assistance includes \$250,000 for participation in the Galveston Bay, Texas study.

Construction Grants for Waste Treatment Works

Amendment No. 11: Appropriates \$800,000,000 instead of \$600,000,000 as proposed by the House and \$1,000,000,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Bureau of Reclamation

General Investigations

Amendments Nos. 12 and 13: Appropriate \$16,030,000 instead of \$16,000,000 as proposed by the House and \$16,060,000 as proposed by the Senate. The increase provided over the House bill is for initiation of the study of the Wilburton project, Oklahoma.

Construction and Rehabilitation

Amendment No. 14: Appropriates \$149,381,500 as proposed by the Senate instead of \$146,381,500 as proposed by the House. The increase provided over the House bill shall be allocated to the Central Valley project, California as follows: San Luis Unit, Westlands distribution and drainage system, \$1,000,000; San Luis Drain, \$1,000,000; and Auburn-Folsom Unit, Folsom-South Canal, \$1,000,000.

Upper Colorado River Storage Project

Amendments Nos. 15 and 16: Appropriate \$28,240,000 instead of \$26,110,000 as proposed by the House and \$30,240,000 as proposed by the Senate. The increase provided over the House bill includes \$2,000,000 for the Central Utah project, Bonneville Unit, and \$130,000 to initiate advance planning on the Dallas Creek project, Colorado. The conferees have approved the acceptance by the Bureau of Reclamation of an advance of funds by local interests to permit initiation of advance planning on the Animas-LaPlata project, Colorado.

Colorado River Basin Project

Amendment No. 17: Appropriates \$1,200,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of \$1,000,000 as proposed by the House. The increase provided over the House bill is for advance planning on the Central Arizona project.

Bonneville Power Administration

CONSTRUCTION

Amendment No. 18: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer an amendment to recede and concur in the Senate amendment inserting language providing that not more than \$100,000 shall be available for preliminary engineering in connection with the proposed agreements with the Portland General Electric Company and the Eugene Water and Electric Board to acquire from preference customers and pay by net billing for generating capability from non-federally financed thermal generating plants.

The conferees are in agreement that approval of the implementation of the program is limited at this time to the two proposed agreements pending an opportunity for detailed review by the Committees on Appropriations of the long-range hydro-thermal plan.

The conferees have approved the reprogramming within the funds available as proposed by the Administration subsequent to the House action on the bill.

TITLE IV—INDEPENDENT OFFICES

Tennessee Valley Authority

Payment to Tennessee Valley Authority Fund

Amendment No. 19: Appropriates \$50,600,000 as proposed by the House instead of \$50,300,000 as proposed by the Senate. The conferees have approved \$1,300,000 for the initiation of land acquisition on the Duck River (Normandy and Columbia Dams) project, Tennessee; and \$400,000 for the Mills River Reservoir, Upper French Broad project, North Carolina, including \$100,000 for planning and \$300,000, within available funds, for initiation of land acquisition. The \$450,000 made available for the Yellow Creek Port project, Mississippi, shall be used for preliminary planning and design of the project and for dredging of the port.

Water Resources Council

Water Resources Planning

Amendments Nos. 20 and 21: Adjust the limitations in the appropriation language as proposed by the Senate. The adjustment provides for a transfer of \$35,000 from the limitation for River Basin Commissions to the limitation for Federal coordination to permit initiation of the Second National Water As-

assessment scheduled for completion in February, 1972.

MICHAEL J. KIRWAN,
JOE L. EVINS,
EDWARD P. BOLAND,
JAMIE L. WHITTEN,
GEORGE W. ANDREWS,
GEORGE MAHON,
JOHN J. RHODES,
GLENN R. DAVIS (except
as to amendments Nos.
10 and 11),
HOWARD W. ROBISON,
ELFORD CEDERBERG,
Managers on the Part of the House.

HAPPY BRITHDAY, MIKE KIRWAN

(Mr. HAYS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, I should like to bring before the House a matter of interest. Today is the birthday, Mr. Speaker, of one of our Members who has been here a long time, who has contributed a great deal to legislation in this country over the past 30 years and more.

I refer to the distinguished Member from Ohio (MIKE KIRWAN) who has been ill and in the hospital for several months. I understand he is going to be able to get out of the hospital tonight to attend a birthday celebration. It is his 83d birthday.

He has been an institution in Ohio. The name MIKE KIRWAN is known the length and breadth of the State. It is known favorably and known well.

I want to congratulate him on his birthday. I wish him many more of them. I wish him a happy birthday.

I yield to the distinguished minority leader, the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased and honored to have been invited to the birthday party for MIKE KIRWAN on the occasion of his 83d birthday. MIKE is one of the "Grand Old Men" of the House. He is a great guy. I am proud to have served with him on the Committee on Appropriations. I have found him a superb legislator, not only in committee but also on the floor.

It has been a privilege to know MIKE KIRWAN and to have worked with him in the Congress. It is an honor to go to his birthday party tonight.

Mr. HAYS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I want to join the distinguished gentleman from Ohio and the minority leader in wishing MIKE KIRWAN a happy birthday.

We have missed MIKE these last few months here in the House. Not only is he an institution in Ohio, but I think he is an institution in the Nation.

He is well known in Oklahoma. His contributions toward the development of the river basins of Oklahoma have been second to none.

MIKE has been a stalwart, one of the strong men of our times, a man of tremendous determination and will. He has always had the vision and tenacity to succeed in whatever goal he sets for himself.

Though he rose from humble origins, he has served his country and his people

with great distinction and with great ability. He has certainly been one of the outstanding Members of Congress in my time, and I join all others in wishing him a very happy birthday today. I shall delight in meeting him and greeting him personally tonight. I wish him every happiness on this day and many more happy birthdays in the years to come.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to yield to our distinguished Speaker, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. McCORMACK).

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, the name of MIKE KIRWAN and his service in this body will always occupy the most prominent pages in the history of this great body. MIKE KIRWAN is a gentleman of humility but of strength and firmness. He has been one of the most outstanding legislators who has ever served in this body. We are all sorry about his illness and we are very happy to note that he is able to attend the birthday party that will be tendered to him this evening. Not only for myself personally as a Member of the House but as Speaker of the House of Representatives, I know I express the sentiments of all my colleagues, whether Democratic or Republican, in extending to MIKE KIRWAN our hearty congratulations on his birthday anniversary and wishing that God will continue to bless him for countless years to come.

Mr. HAYS. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. I now yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. EDMONDSON).

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Ohio for yielding.

I know it is almost impossible to add anything to the accolades that have been spoken on the floor here this evening in honor of this great American and great legislator. MIKE is one of the truly great Americans of our day. The contributions he had made to strengthening America and making it a better place to live are innumerable. I count him a dear friend. I rejoice in the fact that he is enjoying improved health and spirits and can celebrate his birthday at a dinner party this evening.

Mr. HAYS. I thank the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. Speaker, I now am delighted to yield to the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. MATSUNAGA).

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, I, too, wish to join the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS) in extending congratulations to MIKE KIRWAN as he celebrates his 83d birthday. MIKE was one of those rare oldtimers whom I first met when he visited Hawaii and who, when I arrived here as a freshman Member, took me under his wing and gave me wise counsel. He took a personal interest in my welfare, as he put it, to assure my reelection. I am certain that had it not been for MIKE's counsel, I would have made many mistakes which probably would have cost my reelection. I join my colleagues in extending best wishes to MIKE and asking for God's blessing upon him.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Hawaii. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT).

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, on MIKE KIRWAN's birthday we all have much to celebrate. MIKE KIRWAN is the American's American, a man's man, a friend's friend, and a legislator's legislator. He always has been deeply dedicated to those principles which impelled him into public service. MIKE KIRWAN occupies a position which is unique in this House and surely in the hearts of many of his friends and fellow countrymen. On this, his birthday, I take great pleasure in wishing to MIKE KIRWAN many, many happy returns of the day and may they all be joyous.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Texas and now yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. STEED).

Mr. STEED. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to have the opportunity to join with my colleagues in wishing a happy birthday to this great American, MIKE KIRWAN. It gives me an opportunity not only to express my appreciation for the great statesman he is but also my personal gratitude for all of the very fine help and courtesies he has extended to me since I have had the privilege of serving in the Congress with him. I think you have really to be in a position as I have been fortunate to be in recent years of working on a committee with MIKE KIRWAN to appreciate all of his high qualities.

He has been one of the senior members of the Committee on Appropriations since I have served on that committee. I must say that whatever contribution or success I have been able to make since being a member of that committee has been largely through the wise counsel and guidance which he has always so generously given to me.

Mr. Speaker, MIKE KIRWAN has been a great friend of my State. He has been a great friend to the natural resources of America. I think of all the men with whom I have served, he occupies one of the most unique and treasured positions of all. It is my sincere hope that he may continue to enjoy the great blessings that a fine public servant and a fine gentleman can look forward to.

Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman from West Virginia.

Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I would like to join my colleagues in wishing a happy birthday to a great American, MIKE KIRWAN, who has done so much in strengthening the Nation and particularly the Appalachian area. We appreciate MIKE KIRWAN for all that he has done for the natural resources of our area. In 1964 MIKE KIRWAN flew in to help me in my campaign, and I am personally grateful for all of the assistance which he has given to the Democratic Party and to the Nation.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to join in wishing him a happy birthday on this occasion.

Mr. HAYS. I thank the gentleman for his remarks.

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Speaker, when I

came to the 89th Congress, one of the first gentlemen I had the privilege to hear was MIKE KIRWAN. His advice was good, his stories were excellent, and his courtesy toward new Members was unexcelled. He had great patience in listening to the problems of the new Members and to the projects which we needed in our districts. He always gave us a fair and impartial hearing.

Mr. Speaker, I wish to join in wishing him a happy birthday.

Mr. HAYS. I thank the gentleman for his remarks.

Mr. TIERNAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman from Rhode Island.

Mr. TIERNAN. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding to me. I want to join my colleagues in wishing one of the finest gentlemen in the House the best of health and congratulations on his birthday. I wish he were here with us today. However, I am sure those of us who plan to attend his birthday party look forward to tonight and to extending to him in person our sincere congratulations.

Mr. HAYS. I thank the gentleman for his remarks.

Mr. Speaker, I want to say one final word in closing. MIKE KIRWAN was supporting long ago what has become fashionably known as the control of our environmental problems, long ago when it was called clean water and clean air. I think he will be remembered for many, many years, probably forever in the history of this country, as a man who was interested in preserving the natural resources and the scenic beauty of our land. If he were here I am sure he would say, "If you see the point I mean."

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I wish to join with my colleagues in the Congress in wishing a happy birthday to my good friend, Congressman MICHAEL KIRWAN, of Ohio. MIKE, as he is affectionately known, has been a stalwart in the Halls of Congress for many years. One of the most effective Members of this august body, he has made a contribution to this Nation unequalled in all of its history.

MIKE, borne in the coal mining regions of Pennsylvania, carried with him during his entire life a great love of country and a real concern for his fellow man.

He is a Congressman's Congressman.

We all love MIKE because of his sterling qualities, his determination, and his ever readiness to be of help to his colleagues.

I visited with MIKE at the Bethesda Hospital a short while ago and I am pleased to hear that MIKE has been improving in health.

With his legion of friends I wish him God's blessing and many happy returns of the day.

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I am very thankful to the distinguished gentlemen from Ohio, my good friend (Mr. HAYS) for arranging this impromptu tribute to our esteemed, beloved friend Congressman MIKE KIRWAN, on his 83d birthday.

I had the pleasure of visiting MIKE not too long ago, and I found him as chipper, spry, and vigorous as ever. I talked to

him for some time, and it was easy to see that he was himself—interested, militant, and intent upon an early return to the midst of his colleagues. I am very happy that the return has been set for tonight and that MIKE will be with us in all his glory to celebrate his birthday.

It can well be said of MIKE KIRWAN that when the good Lord made him, He destroyed the mold.

MIKE was not born with a silver spoon in his mouth. He had to work hard, struggle and sacrifice for everything he got.

His career in the House and the public service was one of the most unusual and illustrious in American history, one that even the great American writer and author of so many American success stories, the incomparable Horatio Alger, must have anticipated in substance when he wrote "Only an Irish Boy."

As our great Speaker said, MIKE is an outstanding legislator. He is also a fearless and fiery debater with skill and power to confound the opposition with withering rejoinder, a man of deep conviction and unswerving determination, endowed with superb qualities of leadership as he has exemplified so brilliantly in his long, outstanding career.

As we all know, MIKE KIRWAN is an able, quick-witted advocate, well able to hold its own in any company, and cross swords with the best and come out on top.

I do not have time or space here to set forth many fine things MIKE has accomplished during his long service in the House. They would fill several large volumes.

He has been a leader of achievement for many good causes, a staunch, compassionate worker for the poor, the lowly, the downtrodden and the underprivileged.

He has never spared himself in working for and helping those who cannot help themselves, and who are therefore, dependent upon great leaders like MIKE himself to solve their problems, which are so often a question of survival itself, in a harsh, bitter world of frustration and want.

MIKE KIRWAN possesses so many wonderful, lovable qualities that defy description or enumeration.

Steeped in his religious faith, proud of his Irish heritage, possessed of a ready wit and sparkling repartee, moved by profound sympathy for the underdog, and fairly obsessed with his irrevocable commitments to his friends and all the virtues of loyalty, personal and abstract. MIKE stands out among men like the Washington Monument.

He is a man to admire, a man to respect and a man to love for the warmth of his nature and the promptings of his generous heart.

Mr. Speaker, this is a great day for all of us, since it signalizes the return of our dear friend, MIKE, to the circle of his many friends and the charged atmosphere of the House, whose Members rise to hail and salute this glowing tribune of the people and beloved friend from Ohio on his birthday.

May he have many happy returns of this joyous day and may the good Lord shower his choicest blessings upon him for many years to come.

God love you, MIKE.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the subject of this tribute to MIKE KIRWAN.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

LT. WILLIAM L. CALLEY, JR.

(Mr. TAYLOR asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks).

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Speaker, Lt. William L. Calley, Jr.'s home of record is Waynesville, N.C., in the congressional district that I represent, even though he has spent most of his life in the Miami, Fla., area where his next of kin, a father and a sister, now live. I have written Lieutenant Calley a letter offering to aid him in any way possible in protecting his constitutional rights.

We all deplore terrorism and cruelty and the killing of innocent civilians in war. I also deplore the manner in which this young man has been tried and convicted—not in a court of law, but by the press. This case has been horribly handled, both by the Army and the news media. Lieutenant Calley's constitutional rights have been violated, as witnesses have been interrogated by news reporters and their testimony published nationwide. These constitutional rights have been violated by the publication of revolting pictures of horror and death with cutlines leaving the impression that such was caused by this lieutenant. Liberal newspapers have been using this incident as a vehicle to embarrass the military and to build up opposition to the war in Vietnam, without proper regard for Lieutenant Calley's rights for a fair trial.

Any man has a right to be tried in a court where he can cross-examine witnesses and have incompetent testimony excluded—not on the front pages of big-city newspapers.

While not passing judgment on Lieutenant Calley's guilt or innocence, we must remember that war is war and at best, it is destructive, cruel, and stupid. In this peculiar war in Vietnam, it is difficult to distinguish friend from foe. The innocent-looking civilian by day becomes the treacherous killer by night. While most American boys would not kill needlessly, the Communists would.

If this is a case of one lieutenant cracking up in combat and becoming sick and irresponsible, why was he left in command of his unit? Why was the investigation delayed for 20 months?

We are not dealing with a long-haired draft dodger or a flag burner, but with a patriotic young man who entered service with a splendid civilian record. We are dealing with a young man who received the Bronze Star Medal with oak leaf cluster, the Purple Heart, the Good Conduct Medal, and four other decorations. The press should discipline itself and give him an opportunity for a fair trial in a proper court.

VIETNAM

(Mr. ADDABBO asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, I support House Resolution 613 and I am in support of the principle of U.S. disengagement from Vietnam as soon as possible and with the South Vietnamese assumption of their full responsibilities. This resolution expresses the support of the House of Representatives for the President's efforts to secure a just peace in Vietnam and for that reason, I believe all Members of the House can in good conscience support the language reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Of course, there are many Members who disagree with the President's policies in Vietnam, who would prefer to see a much faster disengagement. There are others who would escalate military efforts to bring about a settlement. House Resolution 613 does not address itself to those differences and other minor differences which I believe should have been allowed to be offered as amendments and debated and it was for that reason I opposed a close rule. Let me make it quite clear that I do not consider that my vote in favor of this resolution an endorsement of policies which the President may establish tomorrow or at any time in the future. This is an expression of support for American disengagement and Vietnamization and a reminder that even while we participate in vigorous debate over the course of the war, there remains a wide area of agreement.

Mr. Speaker, the Long Island Press in its November 26, 1969, editorial discusses the common ground which does exist between divided Americans. I place the text of the Long Island Press editorial in the RECORD at this point:

DEAR MICHELLE AND RITA

An exchange of letters to the editor between two 17-year-old girls typifies the sad split that separates so many Americans from Americans these trying days.

Wrote Michelle Lombardo, in part, last Thursday: "... This Moratorium is wasted... Sure everyone wants the war to end, but they are going about it the wrong way... I wonder if anything happens inside these kids when they hear the National Anthem, 'God Bless America,' and 'America'... If they don't feel anything they don't deserve this country... 'Love America or Leave it.'"

She was answered in a letter to the editor by Rita Nethersole who wrote: "... I feel that anyone who really loves this country will help it. They will let their voices be heard when they disagree, they will refuse to do what they believe to be wrong both for God and for the country. I feel nothing when I hear the National Anthem or 'God Bless America'... But I do feel something when I watch people join together in peaceful dissent... when I watch a black man vote... when I see people taking an active part in their government. This is what America is. America is freedom to believe and to express that belief..."

Here are two idealistic young girls at opposite poles, each convinced she is the greater patriot. Yet it never seems to occur to them—as with so many of their adult counterparts—that each, in her own way is deeply patriotic. The crucial difference be-

tween them is that each sees only parts of America, forgetting the whole. It's the old story of two people looking at the same cup of water. One says it is half full; the other says it is half empty.

What we need is not an end to our differences so much as an understanding of them. A small step might be made in that direction if Michelle and Rita understood that each, in her own way, loves America. One sings her praises because she focuses on the positive; the other refuses to sing because she is dismayed by the negative. One feels her love is fulfilled; the other feels it is unrequited.

And so it is with much of this divided nation. On this Thanksgiving Eve, it might be time for us all to see America whole, to consider what we have and what we do not have. Between the poles that separate us, there is a lot of common ground where we can all join in prayerful thanks for what we have and where we are lacking, we can join in rededicating ourselves to a renewed effort to fill our cup.

SYRIA ILLEGALLY DETAINS TWO ISRAELI PASSENGERS

(Mr. FARBSTEIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, on August 29, 1969, a Trans-World Airlines aircraft was illegally seized by air pirates and diverted to Damascus, Syria. On board that aircraft as passengers were six Israel citizens, four women and two men, all of whom were illegally detained by the Government of Syria. After a few days, the women were released. As of this date the two men continue to be illegally detained by the Syrian Government.

As a result of this action, on September 4, 1969, I introduced a resolution which would express the sense of the House of Representatives that the President instruct the permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations to request a special session of the Security Council to seek ways of bringing air piracy to an end.

I was pleased to learn that the President personally urged the United Nations to take steps to deal with air piracy on September 18, 1969.

Mr. Speaker, 3 months have passed since this illegal kidnaping took place and all efforts by the U.S. Government, of Trans-World Airlines, and of various international agencies concerned with civil aviation, to secure the release of the two Israel civilian passengers have been unsuccessful.

During this period Syria was elected to serve on the Security Council of the United Nations. I do not understand how the United Nations could reward a government who, by her actions, ignores the principles of civil and human rights contained in the Charter of the United Nations. A government which so blatantly flouts the rules of common decency and civilized behavior as the Government of Syria has in this instance is not responsible enough to serve on such an important and sensitive international body.

For this reason, I am introducing a resolution asking the Congress to condemn the Government of Syria for the illegal detention of the two Israel passengers and asking that government to

release the prisoners immediately. This resolution would also urge the President to instruct the permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations to place the matter of the Israel passengers before the General Assembly and that that body determine the fitness of Syria to serve on the Security Council in view of her failure to abide by the principles of the United Nations.

How can the world survive in peace and law when an illegal action by two deranged individuals who hijacked the aircraft in the first place is condoned by an irresponsible Syrian Government.

Somehow Syria must be prevailed upon to take the humane action of releasing the persons immediately.

Passage of my resolution would help to focus world attention on this unfortunate situation.

I urge passage of my resolution.

THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM OF THE OEO

(Mr. BIESTER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BIESTER. Mr. Speaker, two Pittsburgh papers, the Post-Gazette and the Press, have recently published editorials which I would like to bring to my colleagues' attention. The editorials discuss the Senate-passed amendment which would provide a Governor with an item veto over the operation of legal services programs within his State.

Some controversy has arisen over the legal services program of the Office of Economic Opportunity due to the fact that legal services lawyers sometimes bring suit against public agencies. But these cases are not undertaken merely to harass public officials. The attorneys are working to guarantee each individual citizen his legal rights. The legal services program seeks to provide the poor with legal recourse against unlawful actions on the part of another individual or, where necessary, on the part of a government body.

As the Post-Gazette editorial states:

In a society which has made a shibboleth of "law and order," the Legal Services Program is an invaluable means of assurance that the legitimate protest of the poor will be expressed in an orderly manner.

I believe that programs which promote law and order are programs which should be supported.

The editorials follow:

[From the Pittsburgh (Pa.) Post-Gazette, Oct. 22, 1969]

CURB ON LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR

The right of the poorest citizen to seek redress against an unjust governmental action is a fundamental bastion of democracy. The Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity has distinguished itself not only in championing the rights of the indigent but also in pressing for essential law reform. The dedicated lawyers of the program have successfully challenged the rulings of federal and state agencies seeking to deprive the uninformed poor of their basic rights. Since their efforts have often proved costly to some economy-minded state governments, it was inevitable that a strategy would be devised to cripple their effectiveness.

At the behest of Governor Ronald Reagan, Senator George Murphy, California Republican, has proposed an amendment to a bill which would extend the life of the OEO for two years. The amendment would make the Legal Services Program subservient to the will of any state governor by giving him veto power over its actions. The provision would wrest control of the program from the OEO director by denying him the authority to override the governor's veto.

Although the Legal Services Program has won the commendation of President Nixon and the organized bar, the Senate has approved the amendment by a 45-40 vote. The new director of the OEO, former Rep. Donald Rumsfeld, has condemned the Senate's action and is mustering support to reverse it in the House. Despite an administration desire to take OEO out of the storm center of controversy, Mr. Rumsfeld has expressed his unqualified belief in the program: "The Legal Services Program has come to symbolize much of the mission of this agency (OEO): justice for the poor, and orderly institutional change within the framework of the legal system."

The Legal Services Program fulfills an indispensable function in providing the poor with legal recourse against the unfair actions of a powerful bureaucracy. In doing so, it has enlisted the idealism of lawyers eager to correct the legal imbalance existing between the poor and the privileged. Senator Murphy's devious amendment poses a special threat to the needy in states like his own where legislators seek to effect economies at the expense of the poor. In a society which has made a shibboleth of "law and order," the Legal Services Program is an invaluable means of assurance that the legitimate protest of the poor will be expressed in an orderly manner.

[From the Pittsburgh (Pa.) Press, Oct. 23, 1969]

SAME LAW FOR ALL

A Senate amendment to the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) extension bill threatens one of the anti-poverty agency's most successful and least expensive programs.

By a 45-40 vote, the Senate adopted the proposal of Sen. George Murphy, California Republican, to enable state governors to veto projects undertaken by OEO's neighborhood legal services program.

Through this program about 1800 lawyers now advise 600,000 poor people in 800 neighborhoods. They handle the normal legal services most people need—not criminal cases—and the rather special matters affecting the poor, such as usury and public housing eligibility.

These lawyers also perform another service. They handle what is known in their trade as "class actions"—that is, they go into court and seek for the poor the rights which, in many instances, the poor aren't even aware they have.

For example, the OEO lawyers in 1967 forced California Gov. Ronald Reagan to restore a \$16 million cut in the state's Medicaid program.

Sen. Murphy and his cohorts think the taxpayers should not have to subsidize suits against themselves through the legal services program. On the other hand, the law is supposed to treat everyone equally, and if the poor don't know their rights they can't receive equal treatment.

This is not a question of subsidizing troublemakers to harass public officials. This is a question of guaranteeing an individual citizen the rights that are supposed to be his.

The American Bar Assn. calls Sen. Murphy's amendment "oppressive interference with the freedom of the lawyer and the citizen."

The head of the National Legal Aid and Defender Assn. says the amendment could cause the poor to look on the legal services program "as a paternalistic handout, meant to deceive . . . not to help effectively."

OEO Director Donald Rumsfeld opposes the amendment and says he'll work against it in the House.

If we're going to have law and order in this country, those virtues are going to have to apply across the board. That means the same law for rich and poor.

THE ARMS TRADE—PART IX

(Mr. COUGHLIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. COUGHLIN. Mr. Speaker, today I have introduced a bipartisan resolution, cosponsored by 29 of my colleagues, calling for the curtailment of the global trade in conventional weapons of war.

This resolution urges the President to institute a thorough and comprehensive review of our military aid programs, particularly those aspects concerned with arms sales. It also asks the President to take the necessary steps to have the trade in arms brought up as a topic for debate in the United Nations, to initiate multilateral arms control talks among the major conventional arms producing nations of the world, and to use the power and prestige of his office to signify the intention of the United States to work to check and control the trade.

This resolution is not designed to prohibit arms sales to nations, such as West Germany and Israel, for reasons of self-defense; the purpose is to eliminate unnecessary oversupply of arms, particularly to underdeveloped nations. This oversupply constitutes much of the trade today, and contributes heavily to the current high level of international tension. It is also my hope that this resolution will, if passed, bring this entire problem to the general attention of the public.

I am pleased to note that strategic arms limitation talks are currently taking place in Helsinki between the United States and the Soviet Union. These talks offer, in my opinion, an opportunity for initiating discussions on controlling the rapidly growing trade in conventional arms.

Mr. Speaker, since Hiroshima, mankind has been rightly preoccupied with devising ways in which atomic weapons will never again be used. Yet, while we have focused our attention on this most worthy goal, we have all but ignored the critical need to control the vast proliferation of conventional arms that has been a stark fact of life for the past 24 years.

There have been 56 wars of significant size in the world since 1945, 54 of which have been fought in the underdeveloped areas of the world. The nations doing most of the fighting do not have the capacity to make their own arms. Thus, the weapons they use to fight these wars have been imported from the major industrial powers.

Fifteen years ago, the worldwide volume of the trade in arms was \$2.5 billion yearly. Today, the trade has doubled to \$5 billion a year. It is estimated that within the next decade the trade will double yet again to \$10 billion a year. This trade is carried out today largely unimpeded by any international agreements or restraints.

The United States is the world's largest arms merchant. Through an office in the Pentagon, it currently distributes in excess of \$2 billion in arms a year to some 70 countries. The Soviet Union is the next largest arms merchant; it is distributing some \$1 billion in arms a year, mostly to the Middle East. Its aid to Arab States, in fact, has been so great that these excessive arms have led the Arab states to provoke two wars in the last 13 years and now threatens to provoke a third. Vying for third are the British and French, each of which is selling \$400 to \$500 million in arms a year. Also intimately involved in the arms trade are Belgium, Canada, Italy, West Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Red China.

In addition to these government arms merchants, there exist quite a few large private arms traders who buy and sell weapons for personal gain. Collectively, their volume of business runs to approximately \$100 million a year, only a fraction of what governments purvey. The largest private dealer in the world is the International Armament Corp., or Interarms for short, which is located just across the Potomac River from Washington in Alexandria.

Since 1945 some \$66 billion worth of armaments have been pumped into the world markets by both government and private arms merchants. This is a staggering figure. Of this total, the United States alone has been responsible for \$50 billion. We often forget that in the Atomic Age it is these conventional arms that are doing all the killing, and virtually nothing is being done to stop the proliferation of these weapons of death.

There are virtually no international regulations or agreements controlling the international trade in arms today. The few domestic rules each country has on its book are breaking down, partly because the trade is growing so fast that it is overwhelming the existing machinery, and partly because there has developed an excess of bureaucratic obscurantism, intellectual rigidity and sheer human ignorance and greed.

Beyond the horror of the conventional wars that it has helped to induce, the real danger of the conventional trade in arms lies in the fact that it may be just these arms that will trigger a nuclear war. An atomic war could break out, because a conventional war, being fought among developing nations with pistols, rifles, tanks, and jet planes, escalates out of control and involves the super powers.

I am also concerned that the arms-selling nations are involving themselves in the trade less for real reasons of national security and more in support of temporary military juntas and for economic reasons. In other words, nations are selling arms these days for expedience and money. The fact that a nation does not need certain sophisticated weaponry and that such a transaction may have serious long-term repercussions have become less important considerations than the short-term advantage and the international balance of payments. This is a long way from the days when we provided allies with a relatively small quantity of arms strictly for military reasons.

Selling arms, some say, is good for business, it brings in gold, keeps people employed, strengthens international relationships, keeps our friends up in the state of the art, and promotes the international flow of technology. To me and many other people, this reasoning is not only specious but ultimately self-defeating. I can think of no more misguided policy than selling arms to approximately 70 countries for the money—if that policy may result in either local killing or nuclear war.

Equally important is the question of long-term national security versus short-term political advantage. Does the huge 1969 increase in our arms sales to Greece, Chile and Morocco, for example, result in increased national security or represent an oversupply which may eventually be used against our own interests? Has anyone asked what these arms are really for or who is their enemy? Are Greece, Chile, and Morocco under imminent threat of attack, or are these arms to curry temporary favor with a government and more likely to be used for suppression or military adventures?

It is time, therefore, that a full-scale review of our policy be initiated, that the subject be debated not only in Congress, but in the United Nations and, hopefully, in other arms-selling countries as well. We want to see our arms aid policy returned to the point where it is once again subordinate to our overall, long-term foreign policy, and that, in all circumstances, it be flexible, reasonable and minimal. Today, it is none of these. To do this we need international understandings.

I have been in responsive contact with the administration on this question and have urged that useful discussions about controlling the international trade in conventional arms could take place at the SALT talks.

This resolution will strengthen our Government's position and could be the beginning of a long and necessary process of reexamination. The resolution reads in full as follows:

H. Res. 735

A resolution urging new initiatives to stem the escalating \$5 billion yearly international trade in conventional weapons of war

Whereas, the House of Representatives finds there exists a \$5 billion yearly trade in conventional weapons of war throughout the world that threatens to double to \$10 billion within the next five years, and

Whereas, the House of Representatives finds that sold, bartered or given away arms have figured prominently in 56 wars of consequence since 1945, 54 of them fought in underdeveloped countries, and

Whereas, the House of Representatives finds that the United States Government sells more than \$2 billion worth of conventional arms each year to some 60 to 80 nations while the remaining \$3 billion are sold by 25 nations including major powers such as the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, West Germany and Italy, and

Whereas, the House of Representatives finds that the United States Government should supply arms to other nations only to the extent necessary for their self-defense and that over-supply fosters military coups d'etat, promotes economic and fiscal instability and encourages military adventures that endanger peace, and

Whereas, the House of Representatives finds that the expanding trade in armaments fuels regional and localized conflicts that could escalate out of control to involve the nuclear powers in a catastrophic worldwide atomic war: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, it is the sense of the House of Representatives that

(1) the President should immediately institute a thorough and comprehensive review of the military aid programs of the United States, particularly with respect to the military assistance and sales operations of the Department of Defense, and

(2) the President should take such actions as may be appropriate—

(A) to initiate multilateral discussions among the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and other countries on the control of the worldwide trade in armaments, and

(B) to commence a general debate in the United Nations with respect to the control of the conventional arms trade, and

(C) to use the power and prestige of his office to signify the intention of the United States to work actively with all nations to check and control the international sales and distribution of conventional weapons of death and destruction.

Joining me in this Resolution as co-sponsors are:

John B. Anderson, Republican, of Illinois.
George E. Brown, Jr., Democrat, of California.

George Bush, Republican, of Texas.

Daniel E. Button, Republican, of New York.

Shirley Chisholm, Democrat, of New York.

John Conyers, Jr., Democrat, of Michigan.

John R. Dellenback, Republican, of Oregon.

Don Edwards, Democrat, of California.

Donald M. Fraser, Democrat, of Minnesota.

Thoms S. Foley, Democrat, of Washington.

William J. Green, Democrat, of Pennsylvania.

Frank Horton, Republican, of New York.

Albert W. Johnson, Republican, of Pennsylvania.

Edward I. Koch, Democrat, of New York.

Robert L. Leggett, Democrat, of California.

Paul N. McCloskey, Republican, of California.

Joseph M. McDade, Republican, of Pennsylvania.

Thomas J. Meskill, Republican, of Connecticut.

Abner J. Mikva, Democrat, of Illinois.

F. Bradford Morse, Republican, of Massachusetts.

Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat, of Michigan.

Richard L. Ottinger, Democrat, of New York.

Edward J. Patten, Democrat, of New Jersey.

David Pryor, Democrat, of Arkansas.

Henry S. Reuss, Democrat, of Wisconsin.

Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Republican, of Michigan.

Herman T. Schneebell, Republican, of Pennsylvania.

Charles W. Whalen, Jr., Republican, of Ohio.

G. William Whitehurst, Republican, of Virginia.

on October 20. In order to gain maximum benefits under the new law, employees had to retire no later than October 31 in order to take advantage of a 5-percent cost-of-living increase in retirement annuities. This gave them a scant 11 days to make the decision, make their plans and retire.

On October 29 a different complexion was added to the status of many employees when the Department of Defense announced the first of sweeping cutbacks in its work force. Although additional reductions were announced November 14, it undoubtedly will be several months before the full impact is known.

There are numbers of employees today who would welcome the opportunity to reconsider retirement if it still were possible for them to take advantage of the 5-percent increase which expired on October 31. I am certain that administrative and personnel officials would welcome these additional retirements because they undoubtedly would eliminate the need for a part of the reduction in force which is already starting to take effect.

I hate to see anyone lose his job, particularly when it happens as a result of circumstances over which the employee has no control. The Congress in this instance has control. I propose today a way through which we can exert a portion of that control and in so doing give certain employees a second opportunity to gain maximum retirement benefits, permit others to retain their jobs, and still accomplish the cutback in personnel ceilings which the administration has called for.

The bill which I offer today would give to all civil service employees who retire within 6 months after October 31 the same 5-percent increase in their retirement annuities.

OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

(Mr. BROWN of Ohio asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, Don Rumsfeld, when he was our colleague here in the House, was convinced of the need for increasing the involvement of local governments in the conduct of community action and other antipoverty activities.

Now that he has accepted President Nixon's appointment as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, it is gratifying to see that, as his friends expected, he has already taken positive action to assure greater local participation in OEO programs.

For example, the Director has had prepared, and is circulating for comment, a revision of OEO's regulation on the Green amendment which is intended to make it easier for local governments to designate community action agencies of their choice and to improve the quality of broad representation. Some of the changes would:

Ease the requirements relating to CAA program capability;

Provide for waiver of certain personnel

policy requirements where public agencies are restricted by civil service laws and regulations;

Heighten requirements for private sector group representation on community action boards;

Reduce the minimum population standard; and

Elimination of the restriction that changes in designations of community action agencies will take effect only at the ends of program years.

In addition, OEO is planning specific program activities to increase communication between OEO and local governments throughout the Nation. For example, work already is underway to fund innovative programs designed to find better ways for local government to serve the poor. Rumsfeld also has ordered the development of training programs for OEO personnel so that they get a better understanding of the problems faced by public officials at the local level in their attempts to find solutions for the difficulties faced by the poor.

In my mind, these few examples demonstrate clearly to me that Don Rumsfeld is fully attuned to the need for more local government involvement in the activities of the OEO. He plans to be responsive to local elected officials and their problems, and has, in fact, already taken significant steps in this direction.

I commend him for his efforts in this regard.

POSTAL PROGRESS

(Mr. OLSEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OLSEN. Mr. Speaker, all the major recommendations that came out of the Kappel Commission, after that Commission spent a million dollars and an entire year, were embodied in an internal, administratively confidential task force report—of the O'Brien era—headed by Ronald Lee, Tim May, and Ira Kapenstein. Mr. Kappel could have foregone the more than 2,000 pages and five volumes comprising the report if he had handed the Commission staff this 38-page internal report and said, "Gentleman, this is it."

In fact, the many similarities between the Kappel Commission million dollar tome and the task force report are so great that, as I recently compared the two, I could not help but think that Mr. O'Brien must have handed the internal task force report to Mr. Kappel and said, "Fred, here are your guidelines."

I wonder how much more progress we would have had today in the postal system, Mr. Speaker, if Mr. O'Brien had asked Mr. Kappel to spend his year and the million dollars on developing a set of mail standards whereby the mail could be handled to an ever-increasing degree by mechanization? Perhaps the whole corporate imbroglia would have been avoided and today we would see a continuing decline in the cost of handling mail and a proportionate decrease in the so-called Post Office deficit.

Now, some may say such mechanization will be harmful to the postal unions

in that it will deplete their members. But this is not true. Such progress will result in a slowing down in the increase in numbers of clerks, carriers, mail handlers, etc. But those that are hired and trained will have better jobs in careers that lead to advancements as their technical skills improve.

Union leaders themselves have envisioned the day when increasing postal volume will make it extremely difficult to find personnel to fill the hundreds of thousands of jobs required in the postal system if the present do-it-by-hand policy is continued.

It is becoming a situation comparable to that in which the Bell Telephone System found itself some years ago.

At that time Bell officials were widely quoted to the effect that if the change was not made from manual operators to automatic switching and routing equipment, the system would soon require all the women in the country being divided into three work shifts per day as operators to keep the system from suffering serious breakdown.

Mr. Speaker, Bell is making the change to meet the future. The Post Office will too, I believe if there is a concerted effort to promote change rather than the continual criticism and carping by Department officials.

FREE OFFICE SPACE FOR EX-JUSTICE EARL WARREN

(Mr. WAGGONNER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Speaker, it has come to my attention that former Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren still maintains an office in the Supreme Court Building. I have written the present Chief Justice to ascertain if the information I have is correct and, if it is, to find out under what authority he is still receiving this benefit from the Federal taxpayers.

From my own reading of the United States Code and from an independent opinion I have obtained from the Library of Congress, there is no authority for such a practice. I have also been advised that the Clerk of the Court concurs that there is no express authority for providing office space for retired Justices.

A great deal has been said of late concerning the code of ethics which should be followed by members of the Court. Certain Members of the other body have wept copious crocodile tears on this subject while considering Judge Haynsworth's nomination. At that time, however, they were attacking a man of strict constructionist views of the Constitution, so it is doubtful if they will cry as vastly if I raise the question as to the ethics of a former Justice still poaching on Federal property after his long-overdue dismissal—as long as he is of the liberal stripe of Warren.

It would be interesting to know what ex-Justice Warren is doing in that office. Is he engaged in a private law practice? Is he gathering up Government files to donate to some institution so he can gain himself a tax writeoff? Just

what is he doing and what is the reason for the Federal subsidy in space and prestige he is still receiving?

Neither the House nor the Senate provides office space for ex-Members and they should not. I know of no reason nor any excuse in law for doing so for ex-Justices of the Supreme Court. When I have received Justice Burger's reply, I will make it available for your information.

MISUSE OF THE PUBLIC AIRWAYS BY AN INDIANAPOLIS LICENSEE

(Mr. TIERNAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TIERNAN. Mr. Speaker, on October 7, 1969, I spoke on the floor of the House concerning the misuse of the public airwaves by an Indianapolis licensee. I brought to the attention of the Congress a situation where the Federal Communications Commission renewed the license of WIFE radio, despite the fact that the licensee had admitted fraudulent billing and false advertising contests. I felt this to be a clear breach of the public trust and in blatant conflict with the aims and goals established by the Communications Act of 1934.

Fifteen days after my statement on the floor concerning WIFE, the Special Subcommittee on Investigations subpoenaed FCC Chairman Rosel Hyde to deliver to the subcommittee various records, files and other materials concerning WIFE. Chairman Hyde refused on technical grounds and was cited for contempt by the committee. The Washington Post ran an editorial castigating the subcommittee action as "shabby contempt charges." They went on to say:

Mr. Hyde should be cited, not for contempt, but for courage and fairness in standing firm against threatened intimidation, in keeping with his long record of public service. It is difficult to believe that the House, which is so far behind in tending to its legitimate business, will permit itself to be used in this shabby bid for power by one of its committees.

Now it has come to light that at the time of the 1969 vote to renew the license, Chairman Hyde knew facts showing that the licensee had violated the fairness doctrine and had made substantially valuable presents to certain public officials and did not disclose this information to his fellow commissioners at the time of the vote. It should be noted that Chairman Hyde patently denied any knowledge of such wrongdoing while appearing before the subcommittee. He specifically said:

If we had any evidence of corruption in this case, we would re-open it on our own motion and prosecute the investigation vigorously.

We did not go ahead with formal actions of contempt against Mr. Hyde, for he was stepping down as Chairman of the FCC. It is obvious now that the Chairman should be fully investigated, for it seems plain that he has misused his authority and deliberately withheld information from Congress. We must now vigorously push this matter, for the in-

tegrity of the Commission, the authority of the Congress and the ethics of a number of individuals are at stake.

Contrary to the Washington Post, Mr. Hyde was not being courageous and Congress was acting legitimately, not out of a desire for power. The fact that there are documents and files missing from the nonpublic records of the FCC points up the depth of the problem. The documents are critical of certain public officials, showing that the licensee had given away as gifts items of considerable value. The second missing document related to WIFE furnishing free political advertising to a single candidate for Federal office during the 1964 campaign while withholding it from others.

On October 30, I urged that the House of Representatives adopt an appropriate resolution condemning the contemptuous refusal of Chairman Hyde to obey the subpoena and to make clear that any future similar refusal will not be tolerated. I did this because I felt that Chairman Hyde's act was prohibiting Congress from fulfilling the goals we were elected to accomplish. It is our mandate to protect the public against infringement of their interest by public agencies.

The entire WIFE case smacks of impropriety and fraud. The fact that the station received a license renewal despite its improper actions raises grave doubts about the entire FCC license-renewal process. It further brings out that the Commission in the future should be more vigilant concerning licenses rather than less. We in Congress must go on record with bills to protect the public and not just the licensee—who is a mere trustee of the public airwaves.

Congress does not own the airwaves, the Chairman of the FCC does not own them, neither do the licensees of WIFE. It is the public that owns them. We who have authority over them must make sure that profit, selfishness, and fraud are not the end products of this valuable franchise. We must insure that the people listening and viewing are served.

Representative Luther A. Johnson spoke to the 67th Congress at the time of the passage of the 1927 Radio Act. He noted:

There is no agency so fraught with possibilities for service of good or evil to the American people as radio. As a means of entertainment, education, information and communication it has limitless possibilities.

It is now up to us here in Congress to assure that this media is used for good, not evil. What we do concerning Chairman Hyde and WIFE will be a step in the direction we choose. I hope we will choose wisely, for the future of communications is at stake.

LANDMARK ISSUE IN OIL BATTLE

(Mr. FEIGHAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, as the Members recall, during the floor debate in April of this year on H.R. 4148, the oil pollution bill, it was acknowledged by all the participants to the discussion that pollution in Lake Erie had reached the critical point. It was the consensus that

Lake Erie was indeed a disaster area due to its cumulative unmitigated pollution.

In view of my great concern with the pollution of Lake Erie in particular, and pollution in general, I would like to comment on a novel theory being advanced in a lawsuit concerning the Santa Barbara tragedy of last winter. In a suit seeking to restrain oil drilling in the Santa Barbara Channel, the American Civil Liberties Union contends that there is a basic personal right to live in and enjoy our environment free from destruction and pollution.

I will include with my remarks an editorial which appeared November 20 in the Cleveland Plain Dealer which comments on this matter:

LANDMARK ISSUE IN OIL BATTLE

A landmark decision, establishing in law a new human right, could emerge from the legal battle over oil drilling in Santa Barbara channel off California.

In its suit seeking to restrain oil drilling in the channel, the American Civil Liberties Union contends there exists a basic "personal right" to live in and enjoy an environment free from improvident destruction or pollution.

The ACLU contends that this right was impaired by the federal government's decision to permit drilling, and that this was done without due process of law.

Its immediate objective is to obtain a public hearing on drilling, so that the effect of offshore drilling on esthetics, conservation, wildlife and ecology can be evaluated before further drilling is permitted.

The Santa Barbara area was badly polluted with oil when an offshore well blew out in January. Drilling was temporarily halted, but was resumed when a presidential task force recommended that pumping the oil field dry was the best way to stop the well leak. The panel conceded that this might take 10 to 20 years.

The ACLU contends that the U.S. Corps of Engineers, which has the final authority to issue drilling permits, violated its regulations by acting without a public hearing.

It has won a temporary restraining order blocking further issuance of drilling permits while the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at San Francisco considers the basic arguments.

If the court should agree with the ACLU's "personal right" concept, conservationists and pollution foes throughout the nation would have a powerful new weapon to challenge private or government projects that could lead to degradation of the environment.

Whether or not the court agrees, this right, we believe, will sooner or later be established. Conservationists have been pressing for amendments to state and national constitutions guaranteeing the right of citizens to enjoy a clean and healthful environment. Support for such amendments will grow as public awareness of the pollution menace increases.

FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF MILITARY PRISON CONFINEMENT PROCEDURES

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. BIAGGI) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Speaker, I received a letter yesterday afternoon from our colleague, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL), a member of the House Committee on Armed Services. The letter read:

DEAR MR. BIAGGI: As you are aware, the Special Subcommittee to probe disturbances on military bases has been investigating conditions in military confinement facilities, including reports of alleged maltreatment of prisoners.

Included in our itinerary was the stockade at Fort Dix which was visited by members of my subcommittee on two different occasions for detailed observation and inquiry.

At the beginning of the session of the House of Representatives on Tuesday, December 2, 1969, it is the intention of some members of my subcommittee to comment on their visits to Fort Dix under the one minute rule.

Since it is anticipated that these comments will be at variance with your releases to the news media following your visit to Fort Dix in late October, I thought you might wish to be present to have the benefit of our observations.

The letter was signed by Mr. RANDALL in his capacity as chairman of the special subcommittee.

Now I was here earlier in the day and I listened and I observed when comments were offered by my colleagues Mr. RANDALL and JOHN E. HUNT of New Jersey and W. C. DANIEL of Virginia.

As I listened and observed, I recall thinking how extraordinary all of it was because these three gentlemen were really attacking me while acknowledging that their own investigation was incomplete. If we are to take Mr. RANDALL at his word, they were merely submitting "an interim report."

Frankly, if the comments of these three gentlemen constituted "an interim report," I want to suggest here and now that it be entitled: "How to Paint With a White Brush."

I would also suggest that they return to Fort Dix for a third visit and try a little harder to focus on the problems burdening so many of our enlisted men.

To set the record straight, I want to review some of the events that have transpired in recent months so you can measure the kind of investigation the special subcommittee has conducted to date.

Last July 20, racial violence erupted at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, claiming the life of one marine and leaving 14 others injured. Following this outbreak of violence, members of a Marine Reserve unit from my district who were in training at Camp Lejeune telephoned and sent telegrams, informing me that they feared for their lives because of racial unrest on that military base.

As a result, I went to Camp Lejeune on July 23 to see what was really going on there. Members of the Reserve unit and their senior officers told me that they were sleeping with entrenching tools, pipes, and chains which they regarded as defensive weapons in the event of an assault on their barracks.

They also padlocked the doors of their barracks after dark and undertook a system of posting night guards inside the barracks.

Further, senior officers had issued orders instructing members of the Reserve unit to walk in groups of four or five in the event that they had to carry out any duties after dark.

As I listened and observed earlier today, I could not help but recall that all

of this was taking place on a military base right here in the United States little more than 4 months ago.

As I listened and observed, I could not help but recall that Cpl. Edward Bankston survived his wounds in Vietnam only to return home and die when racial violence erupted at Camp Lejeune. Bankston was just 20 years old and he wore three purple hearts.

Following my return from Camp Lejeune, I received reports of racial unrest at other military bases. Not long afterward, racial violence did, in fact, break but at several of the bases.

On July 31, 8 days after I returned from Camp Lejeune, I introduced a resolution calling for the formation of a select seven-member House committee to investigate crime and general disorders on military bases.

At the time, I said that I felt the House Armed Services Committee was overburdened with so many other problems and that the investigation was sufficiently important to warrant the exclusive attention of a select committee.

The next day, Chairman L. MENDEL RIVERS announced to the news media that his House Armed Services Committee would undertake the investigation.

Then, within a few days, Chairman RANDALL gave us another one of his "interim reports" and announced that the racial violence at Camp Lejeune was "an isolated incident." Again, if he is to be taken at his word, I suppose we should simply disregard the news accounts of the violence that erupted at a series of military bases shortly thereafter.

Perhaps, the news media was simply engaging in what the chairman obviously regards as the playful pastime of fictionalizing the bloodshed, the assaults, and the injuries.

Now let me tell you about how the gentleman's subcommittee has sought my cooperation.

During the late afternoon of August 11, I received a telephone call from Mr. RANDALL, who invited me to testify before his subcommittee the next morning. I promptly sent this letter:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I was unable to cancel the New York appointment scheduled for Monday evening, August 11, which I disclosed to you during our telephone conversation that afternoon when you called to ask me to testify the next morning.

I am sure you share my utmost interest in the inquiry your committee is conducting. In view of that, I want you to know that I am still receiving considerable information about conditions on some of our military bases. This information is presently being correlated, reviewed, checked and developed by my staff. Therefore, if my appearance before your subcommittee is to be meaningful and thorough, I do require the opportunity of completing the work I and my staff are presently engaged in. I suggest that my appearance before the committee be scheduled sometime after the first week of September. I am sure you will agree that in this manner both I and the committee can feel that we have given this very important matter our maximum effort.

I trust that I will hear from you in the near future.

I did hear from Mr. RANDALL again. That was on Friday, September 12, when I received a letter from him inviting me

to testify before the special subcommittee 4 days later.

On that occasion, I went before the subcommittee and submitted 24 pages of testimony.

Following my testimony before the subcommittee, I visited three more military bases—including Fort Dix in New Jersey. But the subcommittee has not seen fit to even ask me for my findings in regard to these military bases.

I hasten to add that I have spent more than \$2,000 of my own money conducting this inquiry and have loaded an already overworked staff with so much additional work.

As I listened and observed today, I recalled that I had spent 23 years on the New York City police force.

I am familiar with prisoners. I probably had more in my time than many towns have had during a corresponding period. I am familiar with the fact that prisoners seldom admit guilt. I am able to separate the wheat from the chaff. I am not a naive boy. I have been through this the hard way. I do not think my credentials should be required to be continually waved. I do this for a reason. It was implied today that perhaps, while interviewing the prisoners, I was susceptible of a snow job. I prefer to offer my credentials. As testimony to my ability to distinguish the truth.

But I hope my message is clear. My efforts on behalf of our enlisted men are far from exhausted.

I agree that there are many ranking military officers worthy of respect and admiration from all of us because of their distinguished service to our Nation. Regrettably, I have also found that one cannot count on the credibility of all of these ranking military officers.

It seems that my colleagues would have us believe that the only liars on earth are enlisted men who complain of abuses—or those of us who would defend these enlisted men and try to improve the system.

I suppose, however, that these three gentlemen have a right to be sensitive in view of all that has happened in the Armed Forces in recent months.

Unfortunately, we have had officers taking the fifth amendment during investigations of military service clubs, the Green Beret scandal that was so conveniently kicked under the rug by the Secretary of the Army, and more recently, the reported atrocities in Vietnam.

Though I regard the problems that I found at Fort Dix as serious enough, I think it is time we started to deal with the whole military situation in a manner that really manifests our desire to clean house and improve the lot of our enlisted men. In the context of recent events, Fort Dix is but a ripple on the murky waters.

Now, I want to tell you something about the credibility gap I encountered at Fort Dix and, perhaps my colleagues should listen and observe in this instance.

During my visit to Fort Dix on October 24, Lt. Col. A. J. Nealon told me that a diet which the Army calls disciplinary chow includes everything but meat. Colonel Nealon also told me that the diet

cannot extend for more than 7 days. Later in the day, he made the same assertions to members of the news media.

Now, Colonel Nealon is the information officer at Fort Dix. He should know what he is talking about.

Army regulations 190-2 and 190-4 clearly note that disciplinary chow is a diet restricted to bread, water, spaghetti, and some raw and/or cooked vegetables. That is all the diet can include. In fact, it is even devoid of condiments such as sugar, salt, pepper, catsup, and mustard.

The Army regulations also note that disciplinary chow can be extended for 14 days, not 7 days as contended by Colonel Nealon, and can be repeated for the same period of time after intervals of 14 days have elapsed.

My files are filled with cases of enlisted men who had to live on this diet for 14-day intervals.

I, for one, absolutely consider this diet to be inhuman, primitive, and medieval. I defy any penologist in our modern-day society to claim otherwise.

As another instance of the credibility gap among the ranking personnel at Fort Dix, I have a letter dated July 31, 1969, from A. F. Zoda, chief of the congressional affairs division in the office, chief of staff, of Fort Dix. He writes:

To date we have had no serious disturbances at Fort Dix.

But the fact is that less than 2 months earlier some 200 prisoners participated in a riot in the stockade at Fort Dix.

Fortunately I do not rely solely on the chief of the congressional affairs division at Fort Dix for my information in this instance or any other. Happily we have been able to apply the advantage of my experience over 23 years of investigation in this military scene. I am grateful for that.

Yes, I stick to every word I have said about the problems at Fort Dix. If anything, I feel I have tended to minimize the problems that are there. That is a fact; I have tended to minimize the problems, because it is not our purpose to destroy the military. It is our purpose to have the military clean their house. It is our purpose to have the GI protected and provided with his rights. That is our purpose.

If my colleagues do not believe my findings at Fort Dix, I respectfully suggest they go back and recheck their information.

As I listened and observed earlier today, I heard Mr. HUNT say he felt qualified to conduct such an investigation because of the work he did for 4 years at the Gloucester County, N.J., prison. Possibly that is a part of the problem, the matter of trying to relate a civilian prison, that had a population of 69 as of 3 o'clock this afternoon, and comparing that with the operation of complex military stockades.

I want to remind my colleagues that the morale of our troops is reduced every time an enlisted man's life is treated cheaply and a curtain of camouflage is dropped on abuses in stateside training camps.

I had occasion to deal with several of the very graphic illustrations of the

brutality which have been covered by the press on which we have initiated our investigation—and have purposely omitted them today so as not to inflame the situation.

Hopefully the military will deal with them expeditiously.

Some people say it is universal. It is immaterial whether it be 1 or 1,000. There is not room for even one. If we have sadism, it should be eliminated. We are dealing with the military and with hundreds of thousands of people. No one would dare to stand here and defend all of them or the conduct of all. For those who would whitewash the military problems at the expense of our enlisted men, I serve notice here and now that I will continue to do all in my power to give human dignity and pride to the enlisted men. I ask that the subcommittee do nothing less.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BIAGGI. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. First, I want to say what everyone feels who knows the gentleman; namely, that the House is honored by his presence in it. He adds not only his great experience in his particular profession, but also qualities of integrity, intelligence, and commitment that are so rare in public life and add so much when they are present.

Second, I want to say that the gentleman has made great contributions to the public good in the field of military justice. He has spent freely of his time and resources to track down instances of injustice and alleged injustice, and to bring them to light, and in this way he has given a sense to many Americans that their elected representatives can be concerned about injustice and unfairness even when the going is rough and the victims are not influential figures. We are all aware of disturbing instances of harassment and unfair treatment of enlisted men from the Presidio to Fort Jackson and Fort Dix, and we are indebted to Mr. BIAGGI for his efforts in this special field.

Third, Mr. Speaker, I want to support the gentleman's contention this afternoon that so far these probes into problems of military justice, stockade conditions, and the security of servicemen against violence on military bases—that these probes have so far barely skimmed the surface of some very murky waters. That's what makes his pioneering work take on such great import. The Congress must follow through on the beginnings he has made, so we can find out what the facts are and improve conditions where they need improving. The Armed Forces should welcome this kind of assistance in meeting some of the problems that are becoming acute wherever there are military bases. Improved morale would not be a blow to the best interests of the Armed Forces, and it is clear by now that morale is a growing problem on military installations everywhere.

So, Mr. Speaker, I want to repeat how grateful many of us in the House are to

Mr. BIAGGI for his leadership and persistence in these matters. We will do whatever we can to help him in his efforts. I hope he will not let a few diversionary comments discourage him or confuse him about the broad support he enjoys among his colleagues.

Mr. BIAGGI. I thank the gentleman.

In response to the gentleman, on the question of military justice, my office is preparing a bill that we will submit to the House with regard to establishing a military justice commission for the sole purpose of helping the military.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BIAGGI. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. ADDABBO. I wish to commend the gentleman for his forthright statement. I agree with the comments made here by the other gentleman and wish to applaud him for his interest in the welfare of the enlisted personnel wherever they may be.

Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. BIAGGI. Yes.

Mr. ADDABBO. In your investigations in the various camps where these investigations were made, were these investigations made on your own or as a member of the committee?

Mr. BIAGGI. They were made on my own.

Mr. ADDABBO. In your investigations, in your visits to these camps, were they prearranged visits; did you give them notice, or did you take them unawares?

Mr. BIAGGI. On one occasion I had given notice. On the other occasions we gave no notice.

Mr. ADDABBO. And therefore your findings possibly would have been greater?

Mr. BIAGGI. Otherwise we would find a good deal more.

Mr. GILBERT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BIAGGI. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. GILBERT. I want to compliment my colleague from New York and particularly from my county for the wonderful work he has done in this field. Personally, I wish to advise the House that my colleague from New York has quite an expertise in this field. He has a great deal of knowledge and background.

I would suggest to the subcommittee that instead of arguing with my colleague, the gentleman from New York, that instead of intimating that, perhaps, he is attempting to place the military in a poor light, that they rely upon his knowledge and background and that they use his information so that, as he has indicated, he is seeking justice for the military, the men of the military. Further, that the service will be better off for this type of an investigation rather than trying to sweep it under the rug.

I know the gentleman from New York is sincerely motivated and dedicated in this instance. Therefore, it is my opinion that he is trying to do a service to the military itself so that we will not have future scandals, so that we will not have

situations such as we witnessed in Vietnam.

Therefore, I want to personally compliment and commend the gentleman for his courage and for his tenacity. I know that ultimately the subcommittee is going to agree with the gentleman.

Mr. BIAGGI. I thank the gentleman for those kind remarks.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BIAGGI. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, I would like to join my colleagues in congratulating the gentleman from New York, my good friend (Mr. BIAGGI), for the fine service that he has rendered to the country in revealing the conditions that do exist in the military stockades.

It is another demonstration of his courage. He should not have to be standing up here this evening defending himself from attacks for his public service. He should be joined by the rest of this body in seeing to it that military justice is carried out at every military installation in this country.

Mr. Speaker, for far too long the military has been sacrosanct from criticism no matter what abuses it may have committed, whether economically in terms of the wasting of funds on nonessential projects, or spending far more for items than they would cost if they had been purchased commercially. Now the worthy gentleman from New York has revealed physical abuses to the people in the service as well.

This simply has to end. It is not that everything the military does is bad or that what the gentleman is talking about is in derogation to the military. However, I know the gentleman wants to make the military completely beyond criticism and maintain the high standards that we would expect for it and make it an institution of which we can all be justly proud.

Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman has contributed to that kind of an effort in a very salutary and meaningful manner.

Mr. BIAGGI. I could not be more emphatic on that point. The Americans rely so heavily on the great military tradition of this Nation. By virtue of it we have managed to establish and maintain a free America. But Americans also expect to find that when young men and women go into the services that they should be regarded as human beings and treated with dignity. Anything less is less than American.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

COLLOQUY ON ENDING THE VIETNAM WAR

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. WALDIE). Under a previous order of the House the gentleman from New York (Mr. OTTINGER) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, I have taken this special order under a program initiated by my colleague, the gentleman from New York (Mr. WOLFF) in order to

give to the Members of this body an opportunity to express themselves with respect to our policies in Vietnam, every Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday evening. Under Mr. WOLFF's plan various Members will take special orders to continue giving them this opportunity until such time as the war is ended.

I think Mr. WOLFF's program is very worthy of praise, and I am very pleased indeed to participate in it.

It is particularly opportune to have this opportunity this evening at the conclusion of debate and the vote on the first resolution with regard to the situation in Vietnam that this House has considered since it hastily passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution 5 years ago.

Mr. Speaker, I do not think the House rendered much credit to itself today in the debate on this resolution. The debate certainly did not result in a freely arrived at consensus because the Members of the House were precluded by the rule from changing one dot on the "i" or one cross on the "t" with regard to the resolution, and because the resolution itself was brought to the floor of the House without any hearings, without any expert testimony on it to clarify its meaning, and with only very minimal discussion in executive session within the Committee on Foreign Affairs itself.

This whole procedure of a closed rule is really in derogation of democracy. A closed rule is founded on fear of what Members of the Congress, the representatives of the people of this country, might do, how they might express themselves.

It seems to me that Members of Congress should never operate under a closed rule restricting our opportunity to allow free expression to a majority. We should never restrict amendments on Committee on Ways and Means recommendations that come out traditionally under a closed rule, foreign policy matters or any others. If we cannot trust ourselves in this deliberative body then it seems to me that the country cannot have much trust in us, and we certainly do not hold ourselves up as much of an example of democracy.

To handle important matters like the discussion of the war in Vietnam, which is the most important matter before the country, under a closed rule, and not to permit amendments, is a discredit to this House.

I think in large part the closed rule procedure renders the resolution today meaningless. It certainly is not a free expression of the will of this House because the Members, representatives of the people, have not had a chance to test the resolution against various amendments that would have been offered to clarify or change it. The House was left only two alternatives, to vote for or against the proposition presented. Even many who voted for it expressed great dissatisfaction with its formulation.

Mr. Speaker, many of us sought amendments to merely clarify the intent of the resolution, to show quite clearly that it did not, as its sponsors said it did not, imply any endorsement of future military escalation in Vietnam—yet that opportunity was artificially denied by the closed rule.

Many, as a matter of fact, more than 100 Members, sponsored a different resolution which expressed support of the President for his past troop withdrawals and accelerated future withdrawals, yet that opportunity was also denied.

As a result, we have a resolution about which there is a great deal of confusion as to its meaning, and a great deal of dissension. I think that the purpose of expressing any kind of consensus with respect to Vietnam, was thus frustrated.

Mr. Speaker, despite the operation of this rule I would like to personally congratulate the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS), the chairman of the subcommittee that handled this resolution on the floor, and the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. ADAIR), the minority manager, for the very fair way in which they allotted time to all the points of view with respect to the resolution.

We had the opportunity to be heard, even though the ideas we expressed could not be adequately considered by the House.

I would also like to say of the chief of sponsors of this resolution, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT) and the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. EDMONDSON), these are men for whom I have a tremendous amount of admiration. I am sure they were sincere in putting forth the resolution and that they very honestly believed that a large majority for this resolution would promote the hastening of the day that we could achieve peace in Vietnam.

I just disagree with their conclusion. I do not think the resolution will achieve the end that they desire. But I would not want to see any aspersions cast at all upon the sincerity of their effort.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OTTINGER. I am glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the gentleman, and our other colleague, the gentleman from New York (Mr. WOLFF), for their part in the effort to make it possible for Members of the House of Representatives to consider and discuss adequately the problems presented by the continuing involvement of the United States in the undeclared war in Vietnam.

The performance of the House yesterday and today certainly makes it difficult to defend the procedures by which we conduct our affairs, especially on something as crucial as the war. But it also underscores how useful sessions like these can be. We are extremely lucky to have men as concerned and hard working as Congressmen OTTINGER and WOLFF in the House to organize and lead this kind of effort. After all, not too many Congressmen can discuss fully the issues presented by this resolution in 3 or 4 minutes, or even in 5.

I wonder if you felt, as I did, a sort of haunting resentment this afternoon. What a great pity that we could not have had discussion and debate, instead of a parody of discussion and debate, before voting for the first time in 5 years on a resolution that purports to reflect the views of the House—and therefore of the country—on something as central to these times as the war.

Mr. OTTINGER. Yes, I certainly do agree with my good friend from New York that this procedure which allowed Members only 3 to 5 minutes in general debate is a very inadequate procedure. I think the matter should have been considered fully in committee and then under the 5-minute rule amendment procedure. Consideration of amendments is really the cutting edge of the legislative process, when you have different alternatives proposed by Members and these changes can be discussed by any Member for 5 minutes.

I must say I think that permitting extended general debate procedure is a farce and we really ought to cut back on that very drastically in our rules. If there is any record a Member wants to make on a bill in general debate he can always put his remarks in the RECORD without his actually appearing and taking the time of his colleagues to say it. Really meaningful debate on any issue on the floor of the House occurs in the amending process where alternatives are offered and where people have a chance to offer substitutes or amendments, and the House then can really decide what shape the legislation ought to take.

Under the closed rule, the amending process was foreclosed and the only debate possible occurred under the sterile procedures of general debate. Members could gesture and criticize to their hearts content—within the few minutes allotted them—but they were rendered impotent by the rule to take any action to effectuate their views.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. As the day wore on I could not help worrying about how little connection there is between what we were doing here and what is going on in the country. What must it do to the health of a representative democracy if the highest collection of representatives loses sight of their most urgent function, or at least goes about performing that function in a kind of ritualistic, offhand way? I tried, in the limits of my allotted 3 minutes, to raise this terribly crucial question today, only to hear myself denounced as a leading voice for disunity.

What fantasies occupy the brains of ostriches. If you describe the reasons there is disunity; you become the reason there is disunity. If you try to explain that millions of Americans are increasingly alienated and frustrated because they feel inadequately represented, you of course become the cause of the alienation and frustration.

It was also said today that I am a leading example of getting elected to Congress by dissenting. In a sense, that is true. There is much that is going on in this country and that this country is doing elsewhere that I dissent from.

But the viewpoints I have expressed here are the viewpoints I expressed throughout my district before I was elected, and I was elected from a district that is preponderantly Republican. That does not give either me or this district any special virtue; but it does suggest that maybe those of us who feel as I do about the war and related problems are not dissenters because we are a minority. On the contrary, the evidence seems rather overwhelming that we have to go on dissenting because the policies the

majority of the people want to see implemented have not in fact been implemented. That situation explains much of the bitterness and disunion that now mar the political dialog of America. And the muddying of issues that obscures alternatives and robs words of their meaning contributes to this bitterness too.

That is one reason that I think passing today's resolution was a disservice to the country. It has to confuse people further. Listening to its proponents explain it today, it was hard not to feel that some of them at least have that precise purpose in mind—to muddy issues and confuse people.

Is it not perfectly clear by now that the American people do not want an open-ended commitment to stay in Vietnam? Does anyone think they would support this resolution if they knew that it condones keeping our Armed Forces in Vietnam until what are called "free elections" are held, and that given the present situation that means our Armed Forces could well be there forever?

Yet now we will be told that the heavy vote for this resolution means that the American people support the very policies that, if carried out, quite clearly must frustrate their desire for an early end to their involvement in the war. In the short run, this kind of political sleight of hand may seem clever. In the long run, it produces credibility problems, even for Presidents, and that is not in the interest of anyone who loves this country.

This kind of deception, intentional or not, will add to bitterness. It will not make it easier to govern the United States in the way a democracy should be governed. It will give further ammunition to those who say that the processes of democracy in America do not work, that words do not have the meanings they are supposed to have.

So I am deeply troubled, both about the procedures and about the substantive results that these procedures helped produce. I would welcome your thoughts and comments on these matters, as well as on the war itself.

Mr. OTTINGER. I quite agree with my esteemed colleague on the unfortunate consequences of shutting off debate and not allowing the voiceless' voices be adequately represented. Such action can only increase frustration. It can only increase dissension. It can only encourage those who believe they do not have adequate recourse under our democratic process, and they have to resort, therefore, to extralegal activities. The frustration that many people are feeling today is very great indeed, particularly some of the people who have to live in rat-infested, unsafe, and unsanitary housing, who do not have enough to eat. There are millions of people in that category in the United States. The Federal funds that might go to help to alleviate those situations are going into the military in general and the war in particular. Certainly, when they see that their representatives cannot even attempt to influence colleagues with respect to changes in the resolution that might hasten the day when we see an end to the war and see adequate funds devoted to

their needs; it is going to increase their frustration very greatly.

I commend the gentleman for the role he has played—and it is very great indeed—in giving these neglected people a voice and giving them some confidence that they do have some representation in the House. I think he has performed a great service and did not deserve the criticism that he received today. He deserves the plaudits of us all because I think in a very responsible and effective way he has represented interests that very much deserved to be represented in this House.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I appreciate the generous remarks of my colleague. But I would like to return, for another few minutes, to the assertion that this resolution represents the feeling of the overwhelming majority of the American people. That, it seems to me, would be true only if it were true that the American people are prepared to stay in Vietnam until free elections are held.

I wonder if those of us who deny that is the view of the American people, and who oppose the resolution not only on its merits but also because we believe it to be unrepresentative of what the American people want—I wonder if we should not invite those who support this resolution to join in an effort to give people an opportunity to express themselves directly on this central question: Do you want American troops to stay in Vietnam until free elections have been held? Alternatively, do you want to stay until Hanoi agrees to a "reciprocal withdrawal" of troops and Saigon is able to take over the war on its own? If Americans wish to stay until those things occur, we should adopt a declaration of war, we should try to equalize the sacrifices that will be necessary until unobtainable goals are obtained. In any case, some men ought not to go on making excessive profits on the war while others die. But my main point is that it is high time the American people had a chance to express themselves directly on what they want to do about their participation in the war in Vietnam. We do not have the British system, and the next election is a long time off, as time goes during wars. Should we not begin to think of ways that a national referendum, or lots of local referendums, could be held on this matter?

Mr. OTTINGER. If I may comment on that for 1 minute, I believe the gentleman is quite correct. Referendums on the war and specific means of ending it would do much to clarify the state of public opinion about the war and dispel myths about silent—and likely nonexistent—majorities for continuing it.

There is no question in my mind, for instance, that there were 300-odd sponsors of this resolution and some 333 votes for it today only because its language was so vague that people could interpret its meaning as supporting the President in his efforts in pursuit of a just peace virtually any way they wanted to, supporting an unlimited military escalation in support of a just peace or supporting a total withdrawal in pursuit of a just peace.

Were it not for that, if the real meaning of this had been tacked down tightly, they would never have gotten that kind of support.

I believe the significance of the resolution is very much diminished by the vagueness of its language and the confusion of its meaning.

There is another thing I am really concerned about, and I will talk a little more about it later. It is the intimidation that contributed to the kind of majority the resolution received. There was a clear effort on behalf of many Members in this debate to imply that those who opposed the resolution were opposed to a just peace and favored Hanoi. It seems to me that is as far from the truth as one can get.

This suppression of dissent we see so much today, on behalf of the Vice President, and other Government officials, equating dissent with disloyalty, attacking people who disagree with the Government as Communist-inspired or Communist sympathizers, is a very dangerous phenomenon that harks us back to the days of the reign of terror of Senator Joseph McCarthy in this country.

If we get to the point in this country where people have to fear for their jobs or their reputations in the community simply because they dare to express disagreement with policies of the Government, we shall have forgone one of the most basic tenets of the democracy we are supposed to be fighting for. It is a most serious matter.

I believe the fear, the ugly emotion, the hate, the bitterness, the prejudice that the Vice President has churned up in our society, and other spokesmen for the administration have churned up, contributed as strongly to the vote we saw as much as anything else. Members of Congress became afraid of the kinds of accusations they would have to face if they did not support this resolution.

I see more hate mail in my own congressional office today than I have seen since I have been a Member of Congress as a result of this effort.

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OTTINGER. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from California, who contributed greatly to the debate today, and for whom I have very great admiration.

Mr. WALDIE. I should like to join in this colloquy. May I first seek to associate myself entirely with the remarks of the gentleman in the well, as well as the remarks of the gentleman from New York (Mr. LOWENSTEIN).

May I also comment briefly on the peculiar umbrella which this resolution today provided the House. Members will recall when we sought to express some comments on the President's November 3 speech, that morning after the speech there was a considerable cheering section that expressed delight with what the President said; but there was a dissenting voice that was most difficult to understand. That was a voice expressed in a letter circulated by the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. STEIGER) signed, I believe, by 17 Members including the chairman of the National Republican Com-

mittee, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. MORRIS), calling for a massive escalation of the war, including the mining of Haiphong Harbor and the bombing of Hanoi, I believe, or the outskirts of Hanoi.

It is of interest that every signatory to that letter found his views expressed within this resolution passed today, as well as those who voted for the resolution and who I know from personal knowledge have called for an immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. They, too, found their views expressed within the broad umbrella of that resolution.

I only comment on that fact to make clear my own personal belief that a constructed, manufactured unity such as was sought by this resolution is clearly not going to deceive the enemy in Hanoi, who have not been deceived by a pretended unity by a Gallup poll up to this point, nor were they convinced, let alone deceived—certainly they were not convinced when there in fact was in the early years of the Johnson administration considerable unity for a military victory in Vietnam.

That did not persuade them to come to the bargaining table; that did not persuade them even with knowledge of an honest, real unity in the country. Prior unity did not ameliorate their conditions for settlement in any way, but it seemed to me it hardened their conditions. So, if the sponsors of this resolution, by a constructed, artificial unity and an umbrella that would encompass those who are calling for the bombing of Haiphong and the mining of Haiphong as well as those calling for immediate withdrawal—if they can find in this resolution enough comfort to vote for it, then it seems to me to be pretty apparent to the enemy that the unity we seek to present to them is not really there. I think that would be an honest interpretation on their part, too.

May I comment a little bit further. I was not aware of this program of holding regular Vietnam discussions, and it is a wonderful program for young Members such as the three of us represent. Apparently it is about the only time we will ever get a chance to debate and discuss the Vietnam war other than 2 minutes at a time allotted on this floor in debate of today's resolution.

I was personally concerned when the President announced that he was renouncing military victory in Vietnam and was withdrawing our troops. What was left to negotiate at the bargaining table? If those who claim that we who criticize the President are encouraging Hanoi to hang on, think what encouragement they got to hang on when the President of this country said:

We no longer seek military victory and are bringing home all of our troops.

Why should they not hang on forever in Paris with that announcement? I am not condemning that announcement, because I happen to support it, but rather the inconsistency of saying that the President who says we are no longer fighting to win the war because we cannot win it and that we are bringing our troops home—to say he does not give encouragement to the enemy to hold out, whereas

we who criticize him for not getting the troops out faster do give comfort to the enemy. This seems to me to be the great inconsistency of the entire debate.

The other thing that leaves me absolutely unable to comprehend those who protest the views that we or I have expressed is their assertion that we cannot withdraw because it would lead to an alleged slaughter of non-Communist South Vietnamese.

May I define my views first. We should withdraw as quickly as we can, consistent with the safety of our troops; and the American interest should be defined in terms of American troops—not in response to what Hanoi or South Vietnam does but only as to what is good for America.

When I suggest we should withdraw only consistent with what is good for our troops and the safety of our men, I am always met with an immediate response that you would invite a blood bath in South Vietnam. It is my understanding that there are over 1.2 million South Vietnamese under arms—our arms, our airplanes, our uniforms, our money, everything ours except our bodies—1.2 million men opposing at the highest figure I have ever heard since the Vietnam war has been in existence—opposing at the highest figure—400,000 of the enemy composed of 200,000 Vietcong and 200,000 North Vietnamese. We are led to believe that if we withdraw our now 470,000 troops that those 1.2 million South Vietnamese under arms will be subjected to a blood bath, so we cannot withdraw as a result. If they will be subjected to a blood bath, I believe, one, either they have laid down their arms and bared their throats to this 400,000 minority enemy; or, two, they do not care; or, three, they are incompetent. I suspect one and two are fairly accurate. If that be the case, then why in God's name should American troops remain in South Vietnam to wait until the war in South Vietnam becomes, as the President now says, Vietnamized?

How can you Vietnamize 1.2 million men under arms that cannot now handle 400,000 irregulars? It is absurd and I do not understand that theory.

I recognize that I probably am not asking those who are quite conversant with the President's policy, but if you can understand the rhetoric that would justify the statement that there would be a blood bath, I would appreciate hearing it. I have heard the phrase that a blood bath would occur if we withdrew our men. What do they mean by that?

Mr. OTTINGER. I think the gentleman has made a number of good points, but I am not totally in agreement with his certainty there would not be a blood bath if we withdrew unilaterally.

The South Vietnamese demonstrated, before we entered the war, that they were not capable of dealing with the Vietcong alone, to say nothing of the North Vietnamese troops since added. The South Vietnamese were fast losing ground, I think because they had no unity of purpose, because they had a government that was not responsive to the people. The Government was highly corrupt and did not really represent to

the people of South Vietnam any hope for a better way of life. Perhaps, too, the South Vietnamese just have a natural lack of deftness in the art of war.

I do not know what all the reasons might be, but at any rate they were making a sorry mess of defending themselves. We felt we had to intervene, on a very inadequate and I think false premise, but there seemed little doubt that had we not intervened, they could not have survived. If they could not contend with the Vietcong alone, it is hard to see how they can contend with the Vietcong plus the North Vietnamese. Indeed, even a half million of our own troops have not had much luck in this regard. And our own generals in South Vietnam have probably expressed skepticism that the South Vietnam Army could ever do more than cope with the Vietcong.

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, does the gentleman believe that were we to withdraw our troops solely upon the condition with reference to the speed of that withdrawal of the safety of our own troops, does the gentleman believe that a "blood bath" then would ensue in South Vietnam?

Mr. OTTINGER. I think there is a serious danger that there would be such a blood bath, a mass slaughter.

Mr. WALDIE. How would that mass slaughter come about? Would the 1.2 million South Vietnamese now under arms simply be unable to prevent that mass slaughter?

Mr. OTTINGER. Well, they were in the past. There were not quite that many South Vietnamese under arms then, but there was a considerable number under arms at that time and virtually every village chief was slaughtered and many, many others who took any responsibility in the countryside were slaughtered.

Mr. WALDIE. Is that the case now, that those 1.2 million men would lay down their arms to permit slaughter in your view?

Mr. OTTINGER. I do not have the expertise to be able to answer my friend from California. Based on the experience of the past and the opinions of our own generals who lean towards optimism, I would have to conclude there would be a grave danger of such a slaughter.

But there is another matter with which I am concerned. I feel we ought to look for some kind of an orderly withdrawal under a settlement which I think we can get if we do not insist, as we have in the past, upon perpetuating the regime of generals Thieu and Ky. I think a settlement is possible which recognizes the actual present division of power in South Vietnam either by way of partition or of coalition.

There is another aspect that concerns me about unilateral withdrawal. It is not just the slaughter of people who have come to depend upon us because of our incorrect intervention, but there is a tremendous struggle going on today in the Communist world between their own hawks and doves, China espousing militarism in advancing the aims of communism and the Soviet Union espousing a policy of coexistence and economic competition with the free world.

I am very fearful that if we were to withdraw unilaterally as my friend from California suggests, we would hand a victory to the most militant Communists and we would have far greater problems dealing with Communist states in the future. That situation concerns me. Therefore, I prefer a genuine effort toward settlement.

Mr. WALDIE. What is there to settle if we have renounced military victory and say that we are withdrawing our troops?

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OTTINGER. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I agree with the gentleman from California on these points.

Of course we must be concerned about the possibility of further massacres, by anyone of anyone. And it seems clear to me that there is a real danger of a massacre of Thieu-Ky supporters by the Vietcong when our troops leave.

But if we are really worried about massacres, there are two facts we should remember: First, presumably we are going to leave sometime. That means that sooner or later we will have to face the question of what happens when we leave. That will, of course, depend in part on whether the present Saigon government decides to negotiate toward its own replacement by some kind of coalition government, which Thieu and Ky insist they will never do, or decides to fight on on its own. I do not think we should try to impose a decision on them about what they should do when we leave, but neither do I think we should let them blackmail us into staying on the grounds that if we leave there will be a massacre. If they will negotiate a political settlement, which cannot mean their own continuing in power, I think we could help protect them from massacres, but if they insist on trying to retain power without enough popular support, I do not see that there is much we can do to reduce the likelihood that when the change of regimes occurs, it will come with a good deal of additional bloodshed.

But still the fact is that sooner or later we are going to leave, and we do not save lives by squandering more and more until we finally go. After all the Saigon government has had our help for 7 years. We have contributed 300,000 American casualties and \$110 billion American dollars. If, after all that, it cannot stay in power against a country which has fewer people, many of whom presumably hate their oppressive Communist government—a country which is far less developed economically, and which has had no foreign troops and far less outside assistance in weapons and money—well, if that is the way things are, I do not see that another 10,000 or 20,000 American casualties and another \$25 or \$30 billion are going to change them.

If they cannot hold up without us after all we have already done, what magic is going to happen if we stay on 2 or 3 years more? And may I add that when I was in Vietnam not very long ago, I found no official of their Government or of ours, civilian or military who

thought they could conceivably take over in less time than that—and then only if a lot of "ifs" take place in the meantime that are clearly not taking place.

So massacres are a valid worry, but we ought to face it now instead of protracting our own agony there, and then having to face it anyway.

I will yield back to my colleague from New York without adding my thoughts about the relevance of the revelations about Songmy to this whole terrible question. But I would like to come back to that after he has commented.

Mr. OTTINGER. I certainly do not think we ought to stay in Vietnam for any prolonged length of time. The gentleman is quite correct. We have to face the problems of withdrawal sooner or later. But I think we will face fewer withdrawal problems and repercussions if we can reach some kind of an accord governing our withdrawal, with some kind of international machinery set up to supervise the conditions in South Vietnam after we leave, than if we just leave unilaterally.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Would the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. OTTINGER. I do think that Hanoi would be quite willing, indeed, they have said they would be quite willing to settle under terms that accept a commitment to safeguard the South Vietnamese population and some orderly method of determination for the future of the South Vietnamese Government. We should at least test their offer to settle on such terms.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. That raises the second point of disagreement between the gentleman from New York and the gentleman from California—the question of whether there is any hope for successful negotiations.

I had supported for years the general proposition that we ought to seek a negotiated settlement through a coalition government and a political arrangement, but I think under present circumstances that approach is a trap. The South Vietnamese Government is adamant that it would rather fight on alone than accept any political settlement that could be worked out short of the military defeat of its enemies. And the U.S. Government has made it clear that we are committed to supporting the present South Vietnamese Government.

So, to be realistic, the American people now must either repudiate that commitment and tell the Thieu-Ky government that, no, we are not going to stay there to keep it in power, or they must deceive themselves that somehow or other our staying there can produce a military situation that will lead the other side to accept the Thieu-Ky government. In short, I do not see what there is to negotiate as long as the Thieu-Ky government makes its clear that any solution that might be negotiable is unacceptable to them, and as long as the maintenance of that government is the purpose of our own presence in Vietnam.

Mr. OTTINGER. That I think would be a great mistake—and I will yield to the gentleman from California in just one moment.

That is fundamentally our error at the present time, the error of the present administration policy that we are asked to endorse in the resolution passed today.

It seems to me what we have to negotiate is our withdrawal of the troops from Vietnam and that is a very real subject that is negotiable and we should do that with Hanoi regardless of what the Saigon government may desire or say about it.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Then you two are not really very far apart. I am just not sure that simply negotiating the modalities of our withdrawal is what some people have in mind when they talk about negotiations.

Mr. OTTINGER. I do not think we are very far apart.

Mr. WALDIE. I do not think we are, either.

Mr. OTTINGER. But we should make that effort rather than just unilaterally withdraw the troops.

Mr. WALDIE. My point is that once the President set this policy—and I happen to agree with him that we should withdraw—but once he set this policy that we are going to withdraw, the only thing left open in terms of a quid pro quo to negotiate, and there is much to negotiate—but the only quid pro quo we have to compel the acquisition of any negotiable points is the rate of withdrawal. That really puts our fellows over there, in my view, in a terrible situation.

Mr. OTTINGER. But the President only talked about withdrawing combat troops and at that leaving a large contingent of troops indefinitely.

Mr. WALDIE. But that is even worse, as the President has told the Communists, we are not going to build up military forces because we have given up on a military victory. The speed by which we bring our men home to America is a negotiating point and if they make some concessions we will bring them home faster and if they do not, then we will bring them home more slowly. But while we are bringing them home, leaving them there with no effort to attain anything other than a delay in their trip home—if I had a kid over there and the President announced, while he was waiting for a boat to come home, that he would have to wait for that boat until the other side made some concessions and in the meantime he would go out on search-and-destroy missions, I would be furious. I would be outraged over that kind of Presidential policy that says we are not going to try to win the war militarily, but you fellows stay and get shot at in search-and-destroy operations so that maybe we can get concessions.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. What makes it even more tragic is that the concessions we are supposed to be trying to attain by continuing our military activities—with all that means in lives and money lost—what makes it all even less acceptable is that we can never find out what these "concessions" are, or why we want them, short, of course, of the kind of concessions you cannot get when you are not dealing with a defeated foe.

The "concessions" we ought to have demanded if we were going to stay this long were from the Saigon government. But when you mention that, some right-

ous official announces we cannot treat our allies like "puppets"—we cannot "impose a government" on them, and it would be meddling in their internal affairs to tell them that we will not continue to prop them up if they do not let Dzu out of jail, and so forth. Of course financing them and having thousands of Americans die so a particular government can stay in power is not "meddling in their internal affairs." That is the kind of reasoning that has made many of us worry that if there is a problem of someone becoming someone else's puppet, we might be wise to see exactly who is pulling what strings, and who is jumping through whose hoops.

Meanwhile, we keep sending kids to destroy hamlets and to die, and we keep paying enormous amounts of money to obtain "concessions" that are never defined, because if they were defined it would be clear to everyone that they are the kind of "concessions" that would not be worth the price we are paying for them. And that in any event would go up in smoke as soon as they were attained, if they could ever be attained at all. In the final analysis, that is what makes the present policy so utterly indefensible.

Someone always says, "Do you not want to do something for the prisoners of war?" Of course we do—that is one of the reasons it seems to me so urgent to end our involvement in the war. If you want prisoners of war released, you get them released by stopping the war. We do not get prisoners of war released by continuing the war. What an outrage that some people use the plight of prisoners of war as an excuse to continue the war—as if we owe it to our prisoners of war to keep them in prison longer. That is exactly what you do when you go on fighting the war.

Mr. OTTINGER. I agree with the gentleman. I think the difference between us is small. But I do think we can and should negotiate. After all you are not going to be able to go out in a day at any rate, with the amount of equipment and personnel that we have committed in Vietnam. I do think you could negotiate and put tremendous international pressure on Hanoi to negotiate some reasonable accommodations for the future protection of the South Vietnamese and permit this country to save some face which will perhaps contribute to the stability of Southeast Asia.

I think you could negotiate a reasonable settlement tomorrow provided you dropped the indefinite commitment that we have made to the present Saigon military government. I think today we are just as much imposing an unwanted government on the South Vietnamese as we suggest that Hanoi is seeking to do.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Are we not close to a synthesis between our position and your position?

Would it not be acceptable from your point of view for the United States to begin immediate withdrawal of all of our troops as fast as is consistent with their safety, with the understanding that if the South Vietnamese Government reverses itself and agrees to a coalition government and a political settlement,

we would be prepared to accept the cease-fire that could then be arranged, and help with the relocation of people who were afraid to stay on under a new regime? Ironically, if we would announce our withdrawal and begin it, and suspend all offensive military activity, negotiations might suddenly become possible and desirable—if we remember the limits of what is negotiable given the present military situation and the history of past negotiations.

But if we do not begin the total withdrawal of our troops—and make clear that that is what we are doing—nothing on earth will induce the South Vietnam Government to change their attitude. Don't we know at least that much after all these years of experience? But by this course of action—by doing what the gentleman from California has proposed—we could obtain at least the flexibility that you seek in determining the final manner of our exit. We might even help to get the killing and carnage over with, and not simply get ourselves out of it. Would not that be the best possible solution, given where things are at now?

Mr. OTTINGER. I think that gets very close to reconciling the similar positions all three of us have. Many of our best experts on Southeast Asia, people like Ambassador Reischauer, have said that the war would not end by formal signature of a document, but in the fading away of the military conflict. We have never allowed this war to fade away, however. As soon as the North Vietnamese have drawn back, we have said, "Ha Ha, this is a sign of weakness. Let's go in and clean them up." We now have come into a period of an unprecedented lull, yet our generals are saying again that a military victory is just around the corner. The Secretary of Defense has reiterated in testimony just revealed today that military victory is in sight. This taunting response to enemy de-escalation prohibits a fading away of the war—in fact, what it really does is to invite enemy attacks, perhaps another Tet offensive.

The idea that North Vietnamese pull-backs are a sign of weakness is a myth that time and again has proved fallacious in the past. Hanoi has been fighting this war for 20 years, and there is no evidence that they are about to give up.

We have not let the war fade away. The war keeps up, and if Hanoi resumes its military activity, we say we must add more military forces to protect our own troops and the South Vietnamese from being overrun. We thus have ourselves completely boxed in to prevent mutual withdrawal. Whether Hanoi escalates or de-escalates, we find reason in their actions for increasing our own military effort. That seems to be the petard on which we have been hung since the war started.

Many people in the debate today said we are just following the policies that Johnson initiated. President Nixon is indeed following the same policies. That is true. The trouble is President Nixon is following the errors of the Johnson administration, and he is going to be subjected to the same embarrassment that eventually caused Johnson not to seek

reelection. I believe we opponents of existing Vietnam policies are doing more for President Nixon by voting against the resolution today and protecting him from the kind of fate that overcame President Johnson than do those who supported the resolution speaking for perpetuation of the disastrous errors of the past.

Mr. WALDIE. I think the gentleman's analysis of the peculiarity of this war—whenever enemy activity decreases, we believe we have them on the run and step up our activity; and whenever it increases, we have to step up our activity—is a correct analysis.

Two weeks ago our Postmaster General came back from Vietnam and said, "We have Charlie on the run." He implied that by stiffening our position we are winning the war.

I think that is an interesting analysis. It had not occurred to me in terms of the synthesis the gentleman from New York suggested—I think that is probably a fair description—with one exception. I am not quite sure. As I understood your proposal, in terms of the synthesis, the negotiation we would be engaging in would really be with the South Vietnamese Government and not the Hanoi Government.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Precisely.

Mr. WALDIE. With that understanding I thoroughly agree. It is the South Vietnamese Government that is most insistent of all on our presence in South Vietnam because that Government, first, will never become self-reliant as long as we are there; second, it has no interest in going up Hamburger Hill when there are American kids to do it. Why should they? They will never go up a Hamburger Hill as long as there are Americans to do it. Until we get the Americans out of there, they will never acquire the competency to become self-supporting, because they do not have the desire.

Mr. OTTINGER. I have some difficulty with that. I do not think there is much sense in negotiating with the South Vietnamese Government. I do not think you will ever influence them to support the kind of policies you are talking about. They are a military regime and are interested in perpetuating their own power. They are not interested in broadening the base of their own Government or supporting democratic rule.

What they are seeking is a military victory, and we are backing that.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Well, that is really only a semantic distinction. When we say "Negotiate with Saigon," we do not mean necessarily that we should sit down and attempt to make an arrangement. What we mean is that, when we start to leave, if Saigon decides not to go it alone, we could discuss the transition period, the protection of people against massacres, and so on—the things that would become negotiable if Saigon were interested in negotiating anything besides what you call a military victory.

Mr. OTTINGER. I do think we could negotiate with the North Vietnamese.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. The details of our withdrawal could usefully be negotiated. That, and a political settlement in South

Vietnam, is what many of us thought was to be negotiated in Paris.

None of us have any illusions about the nature of the Government of North Vietnam. It is a tyrannical, brutal government.

But we do not have a half million troops defending that Government. Given the nature of both those governments, and given the security interests of this country, it is a mystery why we should take sides between them. Therefore, we should say very simply that we are prepared to negotiate our withdrawal and to help with negotiations toward a political settlement, but, if they want to keep on fighting, it is not our job either to keep our troops there or to umpire. If ever in history one nation has fulfilled its "commitment" to another, the United States has fulfilled its commitment to South Vietnam. And now we must leave, or be prepared to undertake new commitments that make absolutely no sense at all.

Mr. OTTINGER. I agree with that formulation. These things are very complex. As we see here, the semantic problems arise between people who are basically in accord with our policies. These problems are very difficult.

I believe the kind of colloquy our colleague from New York (Mr. WOLFF) has promoted, this program for discussion, is very useful. Hopefully we can perform an educating process to help all of us and all the American people understand these problems, to better work our way out of the dilemmas of the Vietnam war, through this kind of discussion.

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OTTINGER. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. WALDIE. Again I appreciate the gentleman's taking this time and permitting me to participate in the colloquy, which certainly has been very helpful and constructive to me.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Amen.

Mr. OTTINGER. I thank both the gentlemen from California and my colleague from New York for participating in this colloquy. It has been educational for me to have your ideas and I think you have added greatly to the discussion.

I should like to say one or two additional words in closing.

I do not believe that by failing to support this resolution any of us questions the sincerity of the President and his desire for peace. I am sure he desires peace. President Johnson desired peace.

It is the terms of the peace, the risks that he is willing to take for peace, the manpower and money he is willing to continue to commit in Vietnam, the commitment to the existing South Vietnamese Government, that we question—and that as an error of judgment not as an error of motive. Really, it is the means of achieving peace we who opposed this resolution today dispute, not the desire for peace.

I should like to make it quite clear, because a number of people in the debate today indicated our opposition was partisan, that we as Democrats were not at all afraid of supporting a Republican President. I guarantee them that if President Nixon really showed his determina-

tion to get out of Vietnam, I would support him, and those other people would. I would assure my colleagues also that the 55 members who voted against this resolution were almost to a man equally opposed to President Johnson's policies while he was President. I do not believe opposition by Democrats to today's resolution was a partisan matter at all.

The President wants unity in this country. The only way he can get it is by ending the war, not by continuing it on any pretext. There are too many people in this country who feel as we do, that there is no justification for continuing the war, that there will not be any better settlement after 1 year or 2 years or 5 years than we can get today. If the administration continues to take the word of the generals that we are starting to win the war, we are just repeating the frustrations of the past.

In opposing this resolution today we are trying to say to the President that he can have unity and put this country back together again and devote our resources to the real needs of our people only if he will stop his indefinite commitment to the existing Saigon government and really make a commitment to ending this war and ending it promptly.

The forced unity attempted today under a closed rule to back an ambiguous resolution giving a blank check to continue the war is no unity at all. It does nothing to assuage the substantial doubts so many Americans hold about the counterproductivity of both past and current policies. It is divisive instead of healing.

By all means, let us have unity—but let it be unity to end the war, not to continue it.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION TO STUDY TRUCK SAFETY

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. WALDIE). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. SCHWENGEL) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. Speaker, a good deal of heat, and not an awful lot of light has been generated by the proposed legislation to increase the size and weight of trucks. This is the second year the legislation has been before the Congress. It would appear to me, the most significant point developed to date is the woeful lack of accurate, unbiased data on the present safety record of trucks, and the effect of the proposed increase on highway safety. It also appears that we lack information, or else that available information has not been very well organized and presented, on the questions of economic benefits of this legislation, and the corresponding increase in the costs of our highway programs. With respect to the latter area, it is my feeling that sufficient data should be available through the AASHO road study, the cost allocation study, and other studies. The major effort that is needed here is to correlate the data and put it in more understandable form.

The principal area that needs further original research is that of the effect of

this proposed legislation on highway safety. I first recognized this need during hearings on the truck bill in the 90th Congress. Despite efforts of proponents to ride roughshod over those with legitimate questions about the bill, it became clear we did not have sufficient, reliable data on the questions of safety. Hearings this year have clearly justified the position which I took last year. Testifying before our committee in May of this year, Dr. Robert Brenner, Acting Director of the National Highway Safety Bureau stated:

As to the specific of what the extra width does or does not do in the safety picture, I am not aware of any work specifically in that regard.

I think we have to learn a great deal more about the problem of truck stability.

There is an awful lot we do not know about why some of these vehicles flip over and why some of them do not.

Mr. Speaker, this testimony is especially significant in view of the fact that Dr. Brenner would have to be classified as the one person in the Federal Government who would be most knowledgeable on the safety question. When the Government's leading authority in the area says that "there is an awful lot we do not know," it is high time we establish procedures to obtain sufficient information so that we do know an awful lot before we increase sizes and weights.

Even more incredible, but certainly in accord with Dr. Brenner's statement, is the testimony given by Frank Turner, the Federal Highway Administrator. Mr. Turner stated:

Our review of the available data bearing on highway safety considerations does not permit the reaching of a definitive conclusion—we do not have sufficiently reliable evidence to make a clear case for or against the proposal on safety grounds.

With the foregoing statements, the need for the safety studies proposed by the bill which I am introducing today appears to be quite obvious.

Mr. Speaker, the whole truck issue was highlighted by President Nixon's statement during the campaign last fall. He stated:

This proposal raises serious issues, including the safety and convenience of the motoring public. Questions remain about the extent to which greater truck size and weight would impose additional wear and tear on a road network.

I believe these matters are so important to so many of our people that I favor postponement of action on the bill now before the House.

As President, I would want this entire matter most carefully reconsidered. I would direct the Secretary of Transportation to take a hard look to make certain that the interest of the traveling public and also the life of our highways are fully protected as we facilitate the vital movement of goods in the Nation's commerce.

The bill which I am introducing would fulfill the requirements for study of this problem set forth by President Nixon in his statement. I would hasten to add at this point that no hard look such as the one directed in the President's statement has been taken. The Department of Transportation belatedly undertook a "quicky 30-day study" after hearings commenced, and after they were remind-

ed of the President's statement. I am certain President Nixon would never let this "quick study" pass as his "hard look," especially on the question of safety.

The bill which I am introducing today would create a 15-member Presidential Commission to take this hard look at the safety and economic considerations involved in the big truck legislation. The Commission would be required to report their findings within 3 years. Membership in the Commission would be representative of the many groups that have a special interest in the outcome of the legislation. The Commission would be directed to study all ramifications of any change in size and weight limits. This would include, in addition to safety, economic benefits to be realized, increased costs which would be incurred for our highway programs, and the Commission would consider the equitability of the costs of highway programs borne by various classes of highway users.

With the exception of the safety question, little new research will be required. As indicated above, much data is available on economic aspects and cost allocation. The safety problems presented will require a good deal of new research. I am confident that with proper supervision it can be completed in the allotted time.

The text of the bill follows:

H.R. 15051

A bill to establish a commission to study the effects on highway safety and expense of changing the existing limitations on the weight and dimensions of motor vehicles using the highways of this Nation

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there is hereby established a Commission on Highway Safety and Expense (hereafter referred to in this Act as the "Commission").

SEC. 2. The Commission shall make a full and complete investigation and study of all effects on highway safety and the expense of constructing, reconstructing, repairing and maintaining highways resulting from any changes in the weight and dimension limitations established by section 127 of title 23, United States Code, including the possible imposition of weight and dimension limitations on other highways. Such investigation and study shall include, but not be limited to, a specific examination of the following:

(1) What share of highway construction and maintenance costs is allocable to each class of highway users?

(2) What would be the effect on the costs of the Federal-aid highway systems (both original costs and recurring costs) of permitting motor vehicles having greater weights or dimensions, or both, than those permitted under existing law to use the highways?

(3) What overall economic benefits would accrue from permitting motor vehicles having greater weights or dimensions, or both, than those permitted under existing law to use the highways, and which sectors of the economy would receive these benefits?

(4) How should the costs referred to in paragraph (2) be allocated on the basis of the economic benefits referred to in paragraph (3)?

(5) What would be the effect of permitting motor vehicles having greater weights or dimensions, or both, than those permitted under existing law to use the highways on all aspects of highway safety?

SEC. 3. (a) The Commission shall be composed of 15 members appointed by the President, one of whom he shall appoint as Chairman, and shall serve at the pleasure of the President. Two members shall be Members of the House of Representatives, one from the majority political party, and one from the minority political party. Two members shall be Members of the Senate, one from the majority political party, and one from the minority political party. One member shall represent the American Trucking Association, one the American Automobile Association, one the American Association of State Highway Officials, one the National League of Cities, one the American Association of County Engineers, one the National Safety Council, one the National Highway Safety Bureau, and three members shall represent the general public.

(b) A vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.

SEC. 4. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), members of the Commission shall each be entitled to receive \$100 for each day (including travel time) during which they are engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Commission.

(b) Members of the Commission who are Members of Congress or full-time officers or employees of the United States shall receive no additional compensation on account of their service on the Commission.

(c) While away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as the expenses authorized by section 5703(b) of title 5, United States Code, for persons in the Government service employed intermittently.

SEC. 5. (a) The Commission may appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as it deems advisable.

(b) The staff of the Commission may be appointed without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates.

SEC. 6. (a) The Commission may for the purpose of carrying out this Act hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and receive such evidence as the Commission may deem advisable. The Commission may administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses appearing before it.

(b) (1) The Commission shall have power to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence that relates to any matter which the Commission is empowered to investigate by section 2 of this Act. Such attendance of witnesses and the production of such evidence may be required from any place within the United States.

(2) If a person issued a subpoena under paragraph (1) refuses to obey such subpoena or is guilty of contempt, any court of the United States within the judicial district within which the hearing is conducted or within the judicial district within which such person is found or resides or transacts business may (upon application by the Commission) order such person to appear before the Commission to produce evidence or to give testimony touching the matter under investigation. Any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof.

(3) The subpoenas of the Commission shall be served in the manner provided for subpoenas issued by a District Court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts.

(4) All process of any court to which ap-

plication may be made under this section may be served in the judicial district wherein the person required to be served resides or may be found.

SEC. 7. (a) The Commission may secure directly from any department or agency of the United States information necessary to enable it to carry out this Act. Upon request of the Chairman of the Commission such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission.

(b) The Commission shall, in carrying out this Act, utilize the existing test and other facilities of the departments, agencies and instrumentalities of the United States, to the fullest extent possible.

SEC. 8. Not later than two years after the date of enactment of this Act the Commission shall submit a report of the results of the investigation and study required by this Act to each House of Congress, and to the President, together with its recommendations, including specific recommendations with respect to each matter referred to in paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 2 of this Act.

SEC. 9. The Commission shall cease to exist 90 days after submitting its final report pursuant to section 8.

FIFTH COLUMN: SUBVERSION IN THE ARMED FORCES

(Mr. RARICK asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD, and to include extraneous material.)

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, the Nation's Capital City on November 14 and 15, 1969, was the scene of a large assembly and demonstration of people from various parts of the Nation. Massive advance preparations were needed and made. High Government officials who witnessed the march on Pennsylvania Avenue and the violence the previous evening have stated that it was like observing a Red revolution. It was, in effect, a Communist fifth column drilling on the streets of Washington.

Because the forces mobilized to meet the crisis were adequate, the mobs were kept under control. Even so, many question the extent of subversive activities in the Armed Forces which have the ultimate responsibility in the insurance of domestic tranquility.

The revelations in a recent article by David Emerson Gumaer are disturbing. Among its charges are, first, that some "American" soldiers in the Vietnam war known as "Red Berets" have been operating with the enemy against U.S. forces; second, that revolutionary cells have been formed on U.S. bases at home and abroad, including two aircraft carriers of the Navy; third, that "coffee houses" near U.S. military installations have been established as centers for subversive propaganda; and fourth, that unit commanders have been restrained by superior officers from taking proper corrective measures.

Mr. Speaker, an alarming feature in the situation was the recent action of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in authorizing a minority in the Corps to adapt the Afro haircut and to make the Communist "clenched fist" salute as a racial emblem. In commenting on the action, which contains the seeds of major mutiny, many distinguished senior officers argue that the Commandant be-

trayed the Corps, and that rather than having issued the order that he did, regardless of its origin, he should have resigned his position and thus alerted the people of our country.

Because the situation as presented in the Gumaer article is so serious, I include its text in my remarks and urgently suggest that the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Internal Security, or a select committee conduct an immediate investigation into all the allegations.

The article follows:

FIFTH COLUMN: SUBVERSION IN THE
U.S. MILITARY

(NOTE.—David Emerson Gumaer spent two years within the youth apparatus of the Communist Party as an undercover operative for Chicago Police Intelligence. In December of 1967 he accepted the invitation of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee to testify in executive session regarding his knowledge of the activities and personnel of the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs and the Students for a Democratic Society. Mr. Gumaer is currently a Contributing Editor to The Review of The News (an outstanding new national news-weekly) and has lectured widely.)

As forty thousand young Americans have died on the battlefield in Vietnam in the ugliest kind of war, allies of the Vietcong in America have brought the war home. The American military is now as thoroughly under attack in the United States as it is in the swamps and jungles of Vietnam. In a report on subversion of our Armed Forces, U.S. News & World Report noted last May:

The military establishment, chiefly the Army, is now beset by cases of mutiny, disobedience, racial strife, desertion and an ever-increasing number of AWOLs. . . .

The Army in particular is being confronted with a type of draftee hitherto extremely rare in U.S. experience—the man who refuses to pledge allegiance to the United States and who will not swear to fight for the nation.

Examples of this have been legion.

In 1967 a number of black extremists were court-martialed and received long prison sentences after staging a bloody rebellion at the Marine base at California's Camp Pendleton. A steady escalation of Communist propaganda within the military resulted in forty-three Leftist soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas, refusing Army orders to go to Chicago for anti-riot duty during the Democrat National Convention. At the Presidio Army stockade near San Francisco, twenty-seven prisoners staged yet another rebellion in 1968, resulting in their court-martial and a mammoth propaganda campaign by the Communists to secure their release.

The real action, however, was just beginning.

On March 20, 1969, over a hundred dissident soldiers held an anti-war rally at Fort Jackson, followed shortly thereafter by violent clashes between troops at a naval base outside Jacksonville, Florida. On June fifth, riots erupted at New Jersey's Fort Dix stockade, the largest on-base Armed Forces prison in the country. They were led by members of the Communist Black Panther Party. At Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where thirty-five radicalized blacks attacked other GIs at a base dance, black militants wore toothpicks thrust through their earlobes as a symbol of stockade "suppression." In July 1969, 584 prisoners captured the stockade at Fort Riley, holding the compound for seven hours and ransacking the mess hall and dispensary. On July twentieth, following a farewell party at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, a roving band of black revolutionaries beat one young Marine to death and injured fourteen others. After twenty-six Marines and a sailor were court-martialed for that attack, Congressman Wil-

liam M. Colmer commented: "If our boys are called to serve their country, they at least should have protection from the militant agitators in their own ranks."

Yet, Marine Corps Commandant General Leonard F. Chapman Jr., declared on August fifteenth that there was "no evidence of a conspiracy of any kind in these repeated insurrections." And, the following month, the New York Times carried the full text of a special message to all Marine commanders by General Chapman, in which he directed that "in addition to allowing the Afro haircut, the corps would not bar the 'Black Power' clenched-first salute"—a salute which has long been the symbol of Communist revolution. The General added that "soul music" will hereafter be provided for Negroes in the Marine Corps—to "ease racial tensions."

Meanwhile, in South Vietnam, our soldiers—black and white—continue to die at the hands of a Communist enemy whose very salute is delivered with impunity by Vietcong sympathizers wearing American uniforms. At Camranh Bay in Vietnam, Marxist agitators created a series of racial eruptions among our troops during June, July, and August of 1968, followed by a massive riot at Longbinh stockade near Saigon. The latter encounter resulted in the brutal killing of a white GI when radicalized blacks, dressed in African robes, took over the jail. In October of 1968 another American died when a riot by Marxist black militants exploded at a recreation camp on Da Nang's China Beach, which was followed immediately by another uprising at Camp Tien Sha naval base.

All over South Vietnam the Communist Black Panthers and Black Muslims have stirred bloody dissension, spreading the Red contagion throughout the military command. There are reports that military units have refused orders to "move out," some as many as five times, while others have engaged in mess-hall riots, mass sick calls, and general insurrection. As one Colonel put it: "Acts that I would have had a man court-martialed for two years ago I ignore now." Even our Marine base at Kaneohe, Hawaii, has come under siege by these subversives. News-week noted in its issue of August 25, 1969:

At the lowering of the colors [American flag], some fifty blacks suddenly thrust their fists skyward in the militant black-power salute. With that, an estimated 250 leather-necks, white and black, were at each other with sticks, pipes and entrenching tools in a four-hour, base-wide battle. . . .

That "black-power salute," again, has been the official symbol of Communist revolutionaries for more than half a century. It is the standard salute also of the Vietcong.

Then, too, there are the chilling reports of a special unit of "American" soldiers which has been fighting the war on the side of the Vietcong. Known to intelligence officials as the "Red Berets," this Black Power platoon has plagued our forces all over South Vietnam, having not only provided the enemy with weapons and supplies, but actually trained them in a heavily fortified Mekong Valley stronghold. It has been revealed that these GI deserters are using radios to distort Army frequencies, resulting in misdirected U.S. helicopter and artillery fire in the Mekong Delta. According to reports this summer in the London Express, New York Post, and by the revolutionary Liberation News Service, this Red cadre of "Yankee Vietcong" is made up largely of radicalized Negroes who have defected to fight our men as a "symbol" of solidarity with Black Liberation Comrades back home.

Desertion from the military, coupled with draft evasion, subversion, and drug addiction is also causing a major crisis among our troops. In Congressional testimony released last June, Vice Admiral G. M. Davis, chief of Navy medicine, said that "2,372 sailors were discharged for drug abuse in 1968—a three-fold climb over 1967." Addi-

tional testimony revealed that the Army expects fifty thousand soldiers will have deserted by the end of the current fiscal year, an increase of nearly thirty percent over 1968. That year 39,239 American soldiers (the equivalent of 2.5 Infantry divisions) were classified as "deserters," yet only 209 have even been tried. During that same year 809 men were convicted for attempting to evade the draft, while over five thousand are known to have fled to Canada. There are presently over two hundred American soldiers taking refuge in Sweden alone. Aiding them in their cowardice has been a world-wide network of Communist organizations.

In July of 1967, F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover said that the Communist Party is leaving no stone unturned to hamper the U.S. war effort in Vietnam, and that the Party has urged a "mobilization" of the masses of youth opposing the draft. New Left Notes, the official publication of the Communist Students for a Democratic Society, declared in its issue of September 29, 1969:

The Army's Falling Apart! In spite of the heavy sentences, harassment and intimidations soldiers face, nearly every military installation has felt the rising anger of dissatisfied GIs. . . . Reports from Vietnam have it that small groups of Black GIs are now fighting on the side of the Vietnamese people. A special unit of Green Berets have been assigned to capture or kill them. . . .

Yesterday's high school rebel is today's angry GI. To him, a burnt down stockade is the same as a burnt out high school. . . . V signs and fists have replaced the traditional salute. But it is already unmistakably clear that GIs still have on the wrong uniform. . . . Call GIs pigs, but also tell them to join us! Force them to turn their guns around. Yell FTA—f*** the Army. They'll dig it.

It was no less "Liberal" a newspaper than the New York Times which declared on April 6, 1969:

. . . the anti-war soldier may become the most disruptively effective peace activist yet, with an impact that could far exceed his small numbers in the 3.5 million-man Armed Forces.

You can bet the Communists know it! As the Communist People's World recently counseled: "No revolution can succeed without the support of the rank and file soldier. If he's with us, we can win." Their target is the American soldier! And, their successes are frightening.

Committees of both the House and the Senate have established beyond any doubt that infiltration and subversion of the military forces of the non-Communist world have for years been priority objectives of the International Communist Conspiracy. Writing last spring in Voice Of Intelligence, the authoritative publication of the National Counter Intelligence Corps Association, retired Army Intelligence officer Bernard J. Sweeney reviewed the cases of Communist agents enrolled in the U.S. Army for purposes of subversion as long ago as 1924. As part of the Communist effort to start a labor union of American soldiers, these agents went so far as to issue a broad list of radical "demands" to the Army. Mr. Sweeney notes:

While conducting their work they were in contact with Moscow. They were court-martialed, sentenced to Alcatraz and, while there, officially became members of the Communist Party. A world-wide campaign was developed by the Communist International to secure their release. It was successful and they went to Moscow as consultants. In 1928 they presented a plan for democracy [sic] in the armies of capitalist countries—but not for Soviet armies. It became a part of the Resolution of the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International in 1928. In late 1940 and early 1941 the demands were part of the subversive operation against our military establishment. But when Stalin needed Amer-

ican help to save Soviet Russia from his erstwhile ally, Hitler, the plan was abandoned [temporarily] because, unless the United States could provide the strength to beat Hitler, Communism would collapse. . . .

You will remember that when the German legions suddenly invaded Russia, and literally millions were rejoicing at their imminent liberation from the Communists instead of fighting the advancing Germans, Stalin ordered the cadres of his fifth column in America to join the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines—at all levels—to ensure the defeat of the German forces attacking the U.S.S.R. Most Americans are unaware, however, that at the conclusion of the War some fifty thousand security files¹ on subversives known to be operating within the American military were destroyed on orders from top officials in our own government. Many of these agents have doubtless remained in uniform—a Soviet time bomb within the citadel of our national defense.

It is with this long-established core of subversives as a base, says Intelligence specialist Sweeney, that the Comrades are now moving to escalate their subversion of the military forces of the United States. He notes:

The time is now opportune, according to Communist strategy, to again [emphasize] the subverting of our national defense organization, hence the demands have been sent to subversives and dupes for present and future agitation and propaganda.

Of course, the overt phase of this Communist program was begun more than three years ago, on June 30, 1966, with a much-publicized press conference held in New York by three young soldiers. Dressed casually in civilian clothing and surrounded by a host of well-known Communists and radicals, these GIs announced that they were the first enlisted men to "refuse orders to go to Vietnam and that they had filed in a federal court in Washington, D.C., a suit challenging the orders on the grounds that the Vietnam war is illegal." A subsequent press release revealed the following details:

The suit, in the form of an application for a permanent injunction, was filed by their attorney Stanley Faulkner, 9 E. 40th St., through associate counsel, Selma Samols, of Washington. The three men, all draftees, said they were prepared to face a court-martial.

As you might expect, the two attorneys in this case are both long-time members of the National Lawyers Guild, cited by the House

¹ In early 1944 Alexander Barmine, a former Soviet General who had since become an American citizen and was working as an advisor to the Office of Strategic Services, wrote in *Reader's Digest*:

"... tremendous pressure was exerted to bring about... a dismantling of those branches of the Army and Navy Intelligence which dealt with the activities of Communists and Communist-fronters, and a destruction of their files.

"In the Third Naval District which includes New York City, headquarters of the American Communists, the Navy had built up an intelligently informed 'Communist desk' which since Pearl Harbor had accumulated extensive files on subversive individuals and organizations. So authoritative had this intelligence unit become that its weekly reports of 'trends' in the American Communist movement went regularly to the FBI, Army Intelligence and the highest Navy officers in Washington. . . . Several months ago, after the equivalent 'desk' in the Washington Office of Navy Intelligence was partially dismantled, the New York 'desk' was virtually abolished and its trained experts sent to remote and unrelated assignments elsewhere. . . ."

The day after Mr. Barmine's article appeared, he was dismissed from the O.S.S. without a hearing.

Committee on Un-American Activities as "the foremost legal bulwark of the Communist Party . . . [which] since its inception has never failed to rally to the legal defense of . . . known espionage agents." Mr. Faulkner is, in fact, Vice President of the National Lawyers Guild.

One week after the press conference which opened this assault, and shortly before the three young Vietnaks were scheduled to address a Communist rally in New York, they were arrested by Military Police and taken to the stockade at Fort Dix for "administrative confinement." On July 14, 1966, Army officials gave them an ultimatum: Either immediately board a plane for Vietnam, as ordered, or face a court-martial. They refused, and were summarily court-martialed, given sentences of from three to five years, and sent to the military prison at Fort Leavenworth.

Thus began a cause célèbre that the Communist Party and its "Liberal" propagandists have turned into an intensive campaign of disruption and subversion within the American military. So well planned was the scheme that, immediately after their incredible press conference in late June of 1966, the Reds announced formation of a Front called the Fort Hood Three Defense Committee and began cranking out tons of anti-military propaganda. The Committee, they claimed, made for "unity between the peace movement, the Afro-American movement, and the soldiers." Support poured in from every quarter of the Communist underworld.

Just as anticipated by the Communists the Army caved in under pressure, releasing the three GIs after they had served less than half of their sentences. The three were James Johnson, Dennis Mora, and David Samos. James Johnson, a militant black nationalist, has resumed his activities in the phony "peace" movement, helping to organize radical demonstrations to support the Vietcong. Last summer, he was part of a "pacifist" contingent which flew to meet with the kindly butchers in Hanoi. Dennis Mora, for his part, has been a long-time member of the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs, youth apparatus of the Communist Party. In fact, your reporter first met Comrade Mora in Chicago at the Third National Convention of the Communist W.E.B. DuBois Clubs—less than two weeks before his now famous press conference. I listened as he discussed strategy with another Communist named Bettina Aptheker.

During the Communists' Hemispheric Conference in Montreal last winter, the guest speakers included Dennis Mora and James Johnson. They proudly posed for pictures while giving the Communist clenched-fist salute.

That the Fort Hood affair was a Communist project is beyond doubt. Initial sponsors and officers of the Fort Hood Three Defense Committee included such notorious Communists as: A. J. Muste (Co-Chairman), David Dellinger (Secretary), Professor Donald Kalish, Reverend Lee H. Ball, Stokely Carmichael, Dr. Otto Nathan, William Epton, Dr. Herbert Aptheker (chief theoretician for the Communist Party), and Trotskyite Communists Judy White and Fred Halstead.

Following up swiftly on this first salvo the Comrades quickly fired off another barrage in support of a radical GI at Fort Hood named Howard Petrick, an admitted member of both the Trotskyite Communists' Socialist Workers Party and its youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance. Pfc. Petrick was interrogated by Military Intelligence shortly after he had attended a Y.S.A. convention at Detroit in late March of 1967, and was found to have distributed copies of the Communist *Militant* and the equally subversive *Bring The Troops Home Now Newsletter*. An active member of the Minnesota Committee to End the War in Vietnam since 1965, Comrade Petrick had refused to sign a loyalty oath when first called for induction in July of 1966. Yet, several months later—even

though his Communist background was known to the military—he was inducted into the Army and sent through basic training at Fort Leonard Wood. When charges were finally brought against Petrick, a full nine months later, he had already organized a cadre among his fellow GIs.

With the threat of court-martial and a long jail term now hanging over his head, the Communists rushed to Petrick's defense—this time using the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee and retaining such "distinguished constitutional attorneys as Leonard Boudin and Victor Rabinowitz of New York acting as civilian counsel." Needless to say, the E.C.L.C. has been formally cited by both the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (1956) and the House Committee on Un-American Activities (1959) as a Front for the Communist Party, and attorneys Boudin and Rabinowitz have been identified as registered agents of Fidel Castro. Both are also leading members of the notorious National Lawyers Guild, of which Rabinowitz is currently President. Emulating their predecessors in the trial of the Fort Hood Three, they quickly created a Front called the Committee to Defend the Rights of Pfc. Howard Petrick. Comrade Petrick also escaped a long prison term and was soon on the outside and up to his Red neck in further anti-military activity. In December of 1968 he was instrumental in organizing a GI-Civilian Anti-War Action Conference in Chicago. Not surprisingly, the emphasis of this gathering of key Reds (which your reporter attended with the benefit of misleading credentials) was to lay plans for using military installations as recruiting grounds for Communist revolution.

Shortly after Howard Petrick began his operations, yet another young agitator was brought to trial for similar subversive activity, this time at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. As in the Petrick case, legal aid was immediately provided by the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, which adopted its present name in 1951, having first appeared in 1924 as the International Labor Defense, a section of the International Red Aid directed from Moscow. The attorney this time was David Rein, one of the most notorious Communists in the Reds' legal apparatus. The client was a private named Andrew Dean Stapp.

In a fascinating article entitled "Mass Mutiny in the Military," Len Guttridge notes of Andy Stapp in *Saga* magazine for October 1969:

"... On May 13, 1966, he donned uniform with the concealed intent of undermining the Army from within. Assigned to Ft. Sill he turned-on most of his squad with a textbook on Cuban guerrilla warfare—borrowed from the base library. A last-minute cancellation of orders shipping him to Germany was inspired by Army Intelligence who wanted to keep an eye on him.

Stapp's conduct was hardly out of character. An early supporter of the Reds' Students for a Democratic Society, Andy Stapp had come under the influence of the Communist Progressive Labor Party. By late 1965 he had been arrested in Washington, D.C., while demonstrating for the Vietcong and served eleven days in jail. It was during that brief incarceration, he now says, that he realized he was a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist.

Upon entering the Army, young Stapp became a distributor in his barracks of such crimson publications as *Challenge*, *National Guardian*, *Ramparts*, and *Minority of One*. Within weeks he had gathered about himself a small cadre of incipient revolutionaries and began expanding his indoctrination program throughout the camp. Before long, he was facing his first court-martial.

The "plight" of Andrew Stapp was the subject of a feature article in *Esquire* magazine for August 1968. Entitled "The Plot to Unionize the U.S. Army," this little cup of apology was written by Leftist Robert

Christgau, who explained how nine kindly organizers from the New York headquarters of the Communists' Youth Against War and Fascism sat in on Stapp's trial that fall to disrupt proceedings. The organizers were led by Y.A.W.F. National Coordinator Maryann Weismann, who didn't bother to tell anyone that her group is an arm of the Trotskyite Communists' Workers World Party, long a major force in the Reds' phony "peace" movement.

As expected, Stapp was declared guilty and sentenced to forty-five days in the stockade. The sentence was later rescinded under mysterious circumstances.

Several of Andy Stapp's recruits, Corporal Dick Ilg and Private Richard Perrin, were later court-martialed also for Red activity. A former Indiana Highway Patrolman, Corporal Ilg "considered himself an unequivocal revolutionary Marxist-Leninist." Perrin was later reassigned to a post in Germany, from which he defected—turning up in Paris, where he began publication of a radical newspaper for fellow deserters.

After his second court-martial, Stapp realized that his organizing days in the Army were numbered and began to escalate his activity. In September of 1967, he and Deirdre Griswald—editor of Y.A.W.F.'s *The Partisan*, and now Mrs. Andy Stapp—began formulating Phase Two of the plan. Incredibly, it was the hoary old Communist scheme to unionize the Army.² Together, the Stapps formed the American Servicemen's Union (A.S.U.), and with the help of a radical from Berkeley named Bill Gallison began publicizing their organization.

Gallison had by this time used a student loan under the National Defense Education Act to start an anti-Army newspaper for GIs called *The Bond*. He gave the paper to Stapp, who while still in the Army became its official editor. With the help of the revolutionary Youth Against War and Fascism, they began publishing the paper out of the A.S.U. headquarters in New York at 156 Fifth Avenue. Acting both as editor of *The Bond* and as Chairman of the Provisional Organizing Committee of the American Servicemen's Union, Private Stapp somehow found time away from his military duties to prove himself a highly competent organizer, solidifying his organization and greatly increasing the circulation of *The Bond*, which is now sent free and unsolicited to thousands of active U.S. military personnel around the world.

Glancing through a random issue of Stapp's newspaper is a sobering experience. Here, Red propaganda is cleverly geared to gripes which have doubtless plagued all soldiers in all armies for centuries. Listed as major A.S.U. demands are: An end to saluting and "sirring" of officers; election of officers by vote of the men; racial equality; control of court-martial boards by the rank and file; federal minimum wages; the right of free political association; the right to disobey "illegal" orders; and, the right to collective bargaining. The object is obvious.

By January of 1968 Andrew Stapp had been informed by his Comrades "that he was slated to be discharged on a 604-10 for subversive activities." He immediately contacted his battery of attorneys, demanded of the Army another hearing, and got it. Stapp's case was made to order for the Communists. After being drafted in 1966, he had explained that he wouldn't protest the action since, he said, "my view was to go in and oppose the war from the inside." And that is precisely what he did.

When a nine-officer board found Private Stapp unfit for military service and suc-

ceeded in giving him a dishonorable discharge in May of 1968, he was delighted to be able to devote full time to A.S.U. His stint in the service had served its purpose. As Len Guttridge pointed out in *Saga*, "his infiltrators [were] cozily planted in sensitive base-staff posts and even in Army Intelligence. . . ." Robert Christgau gloated in *Esquire* that: "It may shock the authorities at [Fort] Sill to learn that one of their trusted intelligence clerks, since honorably discharged, was a member of Stapp's gang." The primary A.S.U. recruiting grounds, however, have been the now-overflowing military stockades, where the A.S.U. has actually managed to recruit guards to distribute *The Bond* and other Communist material. Bob Lemay, Executive Director of A.S.U., says that some 260 of its members are now confined in military stockades "for all kinds of reasons."

By late 1968, civilian Andrew Stapp and his cadre had expanded the A.S.U. to the point where it had some twenty-nine large cells, and many smaller ones, on military bases across the nation—including solid support at Fort Sill, Fort Gordon, Fort Story, Fort Benning, and Tinker Air Force Base. In an interview with the Communist *Daily World* last December, civilian Stapp bragged that his organization has agents on "every major military installation in the United States and on U.S. bases abroad, including men in Vietnam." According to an article by Stapp in the Communist *Guardian* of September 27, 1968, A.S.U. organizers are "active on sixty bases in the U.S. and forty abroad." And, he later claimed, they are also operating on two Navy carriers off the coast of South Vietnam as well as at Da Nang, in tank units, military hospitals, and in the Pentagon itself.

The *Esquire* article on the A.S.U. revealed the painful truth about the tragedy taking place on our military bases when it commented:

"A remarkable aspect of Stapp's siege of Fort Sill is that the self-proclaimed Communist has never been lynched by his fellow GIs . . . [even though] GIs are taught to kill Communists."

Our servicemen are simply not being told about the danger of internal Communist subversion. And that is the crux of the matter.

Perhaps one of the most blatant of the A.S.U. organizers has been Seaman Roger Priest, currently stationed at the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C. His picture appeared in a wildly Leftist article called "An Extraordinary Military Dilemma," published in *Life* magazine for May 23, 1969. That ten-page hallucination was little more than a tract propagandizing for dissension in the military. It carefully avoided mentioning the fact that A.S.U. organizer Roger Priest, while stationed in the Pentagon ("where his duty was to answer public queries about the Navy"), prepared his own anti-military newsletter right at his Pentagon desk, and is now facing a court-martial and a possible thirty-five-year prison sentence on a charge of subversion. Your reporter interviewed Seaman Priest last January in Washington, D.C., during the Reds' "counter-inaugural" demonstrations. As we marched along Pennsylvania Avenue with some ten-thousand Vietnams, many of whom carried Vietcong flags, he told me that he had taken out a \$10,000 life insurance policy payable to the pro-Communist War Resisters League.

The first two pages of the *Life* article carried a picture of Pfc. Allen Myers, sitting with his lawyer before a Ft. Dix court-martial. *Life* gave the impression that Myers is an innocent GI being victimized by the military. He is, in fact, a leading activist for the Vietcong and a member of the Trotskyite Communists' Socialist Workers Party, serving as an organizer for the American Servicemen's Union. According to reports from Mil-

tary Intelligence, the A.S.U. which Pfc. Myers serves so vigorously has declared in secret session that its agents are working "for disintegration of the armed forces through democratization," a program roughly analogous to the fraud called "participatory democracy" pushed by the Communist S.D.S. It translates from the Marxist jargon into Revolution.

Pursuing a similar objective and working closely with the A.S.U., have been a score of Red-controlled organizations geared to moral, legal, and physical disruption of our military forces. They include: The Committee for GI Rights, Vietnam Veterans Against the War (which ran a full-page ad in the *New York Times* on November 19, 1967, listing some sixty-seven GI sponsors), G.I.s United Against the War, G.I. Civil Liberties Defense Committee (coordinated by Trotskyite Matilde Zimmerman in New York), the Servicemen's LINK to Peace, Veterans for Peace in Vietnam (headed by Chicago Communists Leroy Wolins and Charles Fisher), and the Seattle G.I.-Civilian Alliance for Peace. Still others are: the Resistance, the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors, the Draft Resistance Unions, Negotiation Now, and the American Friends Service Committee. On an international scale, the two most active have been an outfit called R.I.T.A. (Resisters Inside the Army) and its "Friends" affiliate, F.R.I.T.A.

Possibly one of the most insidious of these Communist operations has been a Gordian knot of hate called the Summer of Support project (S.O.S.), organized in September of 1967 by a Marxist graduate of Harvard named Fred Gardner. A former editor for *Scientific American*, Gardner is credited by the New Left with having conceived the idea of establishing a network of "coffee houses" near military installations to compete with U.S.O. enterprises and to propagandize GIs with radical literature. It was to be a "new form of attack" on the military, polarizing the political activities of malcontents, Leftists, and hippies who have been drafted. The plot proved an overnight bonanza.

Fred Gardner's inspiration for the S.O.S. project came upon him—no doubt out of a crimson sunrise—just at the time Andy Stapp was facing his first court-martial in the fall of 1966. He claims to have been further inspired by Captain Howard Levy, a radical Brooklyn Marxist cashiered from the Army in 1967 after refusing to instruct medics of our Viet-bound Special Forces in techniques of medical care for the wounded. Levy was fond of referring to our Green Berets as "killers of peasants."

The Levy case spurred the Summer of Support into a hearty gallop, and a small staff of activists was chosen by Gardner to further develop the program. About the same time another anti-war Leftist formed Vietnam GI, a monthly radical newspaper aimed at enlisted men. Its creator, Jeffrey Sharlet, had enlisted in the Army in 1961 and served in Vietnam before the action escalated there. Sharlet soon teamed up with the S.O.S. crew. By spring of 1968, Summer of Support had succeeded in establishing three bases of operation at strategic locations near key Army installations. The S.O.S. "coffee houses" proved highly successful as Red indoctrination centers, distributing hardcore Communist propaganda, pornography, and even narcotics to the youthful soldiers attracted to them. Entertainment was provided by such Leftist folksingers as Phil Ochs, Barbara Dane, and Judy Collins. Communist Pete Seeger was also scheduled, as were hard-rock groups like Country Joe and the Fish, Mothers of Invention, and the Grateful Dead. It was a scheme worthy of Dr. Fu Manchu.

On April 22, 1968, the Summer of Support headquarters in Chicago received an important letter from a young Marxist in San Diego named Mike Davis, who explained:

² The A.S.U. was of course patterned after the union envisioned for the American Army by the Comrades as far back as 1924, and has since consistently followed the Party line as laid down by Moscow.

A group of us, primarily from S.D.S. and U.C.M. [University Christian Movement], are trying to organize a summer program of "fraternization." Most of our ideas have been similar to the peace USO approach, and we share the same sense of urgency and responsibility about reaching the troops. San Diego, of course, is one of the major military centers in the U.S., and there is very real evidence of disaffection and skepticism about the war throughout the 7th fleet. Therefore, we would really like to tie into the summer activities, especially if there is some prospect of a USO [type] project here.

It is indicative of the background received by the Summer of Support project that Mike Davis, author of the above, has been working diligently for the past four years as a member of the Communist W. E. B. DuBois Clubs. He has also served as a member of the Southern California staff of the Communists' Students for a Democratic Society. It is the S.D.S., you will remember, which has openly admitted:

We're going to make a revolution. . . . Our goal is to organize an army to overthrow the United States government.

During a brief visit to the Summer of Support headquarters in August of 1968, your reporter talked at length with some of the project organizers and collected an armload of literature explaining their operation. Headquartered in Room 315 of a rundown building at 407 South Dearborn Street in Chicago, S.O.S. served as one of the command posts for the Yippee riots that engulfed that city during the 1968 Democratic National Convention. Scattered around the office during my visit were a number of opened letters and printed leaflets detailing the plan of attack on our military. One of those letters (dated May 14, 1968) was from an S.O.S. organizer named "Johnny," who explained that he was "out in Seattle setting up a Coffee House near Fort Lewis, which is one of the nine main army bases in the country." The letter continued as follows:

One of the good things about these coffee houses is that their rationale is vigorous enough that they actually break even or sometimes make a profit once their [sic] set up. . . . Also it's very open at the moment what will happen to the coffee houses and the army in general this summer when the students hit the army—not to mention the war and the country itself. . . .

"Johnny" concluded his letter by noting: "Anyway the guy who's coordinating the thing from Chicago is Rennie Davis. . . . This is the same Rennie Davis who has gained notoriety over the past four years as a top official of the Communists' Students for a Democratic Society; who has led a number of delegations to Hanoi; and, who is currently on trial at Chicago for his part in the Communist conspiracy that brought thousands of Comrades to that city for the "spontaneous" anti-police riots there in August of 1968. Rennie is also "credited" with having helped create the subversive Resisters Inside the Army, whose tentacles now reach around the world.

In response to the letter I quoted earlier from Mike Davis of the Communist DuBois Clubs, Rennie Davis answered: "We would like to work with you and possibly set up a coffee house in San Diego. . . . I guess the nearest other coffee house project to you will be Tacoma, Washington (Fort Lewis)." Comrade Rennie (who is no relative of Comrade Mike) further suggested:

You might want to contact Fred Gardner who is currently working at Ramparts magazine. . . . Fred set up the first coffee house at Fort Jackson (Columbia, S.C.) and knows as much as anyone about this kind of work. Also, Tom Hayden will be in San Francisco. . . . [and] is actively involved in Summer of Support and could answer any question you might have about it. . . . Use any of

our literature, sponsors, etc., for your own purposes, as you see fit.

Fred Gardner, you know about. Tom Hayden is one of the founders of the Communist S.D.S., and is presently on trial with Rennie in Chicago as one of the subversive "Conspiracy Eight." Four years ago, Hayden made an important trip to Hanoi with top Communist Party theoretician Herbert Aptheker.

Rennie Davis has conducted a campaign which has gathered considerable support for his anti-military project. One of the initial sponsors³ was Marlon Brando. On May 19, 1968, Rennie wrote in response to the actor's endorsement:

I want to thank you for joining our committee of sponsors and signing the enclosed fund raising letter for Summer of Support. . . .

Many students and veterans have responded enthusiastically to the idea. . . . this summer by asking to work in one of our coffee houses. . . . [which] are now open in Columbia, South Carolina (Fort Jackson), Waynesville, Missouri (Fort Leonard Wood), and Killeen, Texas (Fort Hood). We have staff on the job establishing new projects in Leesville, Louisiana (Fort Polk), Tacoma, Washington, Chicago, Illinois (Fort Sheridan), and Washington, D.C. If funds permit, operations will be established at Seaside, California (Fort Ord) and Norman, Oklahoma (Fort Sill) as well.

Marlon Brando knows very well what he is doing. He has for several years been a major supporter for the Marxist-Leninist Black Panther Party.

Perhaps one of the most shocking statements regarding the extent to which the operatives of S.O.S. are penetrating the military appeared in a letter dated June 17, 1968, from Killeen, Texas. This two-page report, addressed to Rennie Davis and signed "Raoul," revealed:

Our best contacts here are M.P.s and intelligence section people. They are ripe for organizing and already provide a defensive network for the ["coffee house"] . . .

Since the initial thrust two years ago, more than a score of the Red "coffee houses" have sprung up adjacent to key military posts across the country. Each base has likewise harbored Leftist GIs who crank out for on-base distribution thousands of underground newspapers and propaganda tracts. In addition to The Bond, tabloids with the largest circulation have been The Ally and Task Force (both published in Berkeley), Vietnam G.I. (published in Chicago), and Veterans Stars and Stripes for Peace (published by the Communist Front Vets for Peace⁴). All five

³ Other sponsors of the Summer of Support (according to an August, 1968, letterhead) include such Leftists as: the "Reverend" James Bevel, who refers repeatedly to the American flag as "a rag on a stick"; Communist David Dellinger, one of the "Conspiracy Eight" defendants; playwright Edward Albee; Monsignor Charles Rice, a sponsor of the subversive Vietnam Summer project; Admiral Arnold E. True, Commander of the notorious Bay Area Veterans for Peace in Vietnam; and, an "actor" named Dustin Hoffman.

⁴ Some of the G.I. underground newspapers distributed nationwide by the Communists have been: Fatigue Press (issued at Fort Hood from the Oleo Strut "coffee house" at Killeen, Texas); Counterpoint (distributed at Fort Lewis from both the Electric Bakery and the Shelter Half "coffee houses" in Seattle and Tacoma); Shakedown and The Ultimate Weapon (both issued at Fort Dix from the Free Speech Movement "coffee house" at Wrightsville, New Jersey); and Open Sights (released at Fort Belvoir in Northern Virginia; Fort Meyer; the Quantico Marine base; and, Maryland's Fort Meade and Andrews Field). Still others include: Logistics (at

newspapers are distributed to servicemen around the world and contain the most radical smears against the U.S. military this reporter has ever seen.

Commenting on the serious nature of this Communist attack on our military, U.S. News & World Report noted in its issue of May 26, 1969:

Time was when publication of an anti-military newspaper could be considered in violation of Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice—the basic law of the services. Article 134 is a sort of catchall statute dealing with anything not mentioned elsewhere in the Code that is considered "to the prejudice of good order and discipline." The courts are now saying that . . . what is prejudicial to good order and discipline is often a matter of opinion.

In the past, Communist editors and contributors on GI newspapers were either transferred to other bases or discharged. All that has changed now, thanks to a Pentagon memorandum called "Guidance on Dissent," which gives virtual carte blanche to enemy propagandists within the military. This memorandum, says the New York Times, "has laid down guidelines for its principle commanding officers as to how to handle dissent among the troops, requiring officers 'to impose only such minimum restraints as are necessary to enable the Army to perform its mission.'"

As a result of this order, issued last May, commanding officers in the U.S. Army are no longer allowed to prohibit either the purchase, possession, or distribution of Communist literature on or off base; they cannot now prevent their soldiers from entering and being indoctrinated in Communist-directed "coffee houses"; they are not allowed to discipline soldiers who work on Red projects off the post, on their own time, and with their own money (which includes the Reds' underground newspapers); they are directed to recognize that membership in a servicemen's union is not against Army regulations; and, finally, all commanders must telephone Army headquarters in Washington to request approval before they can prohibit the distribution on base of any subversive publication.

This crippling directive has been issued to all military commanders in the continental United States, Alaska, Europe, and the Pacific, and was signed by the Adjutant General, Major General Kenneth G. Wickham. Though it might as well have been written by Izvestia or Komsomolskaya Pravda, it was authorized by Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor.

Yes, Secretary Resor is a civilian. A political appointee. The scheme is called "pressure from below and pressure from above." The Communists used it to take Czecho-Slovakia. They're using it here, now. We either move to stop it—and stop it now—or we cash in our military chips. Which is it going to be?

FRANKLIN, N.H., JOURNAL-TRANSCRIPT NOTES INTERESTING PERSPECTIVE TOWARD VIETNAM WAR

(Mr. CLEVELAND asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD, and to include extraneous material.)

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, it is an oddity, hard to explain, that there seems

Fort Sheridan, Illinois); Last Harass (at Fort Gordon in Augusta, Georgia); Flag-in-Action (at Fort Campbell in Kentucky); Bragg Brief (at Fort Bragg in North Carolina); Reveille (published for Fort Ord in California); GI Voice (published for Fort Sheridan near Chicago); and, FTA (at Fort Knox in Louisville). FTA is not an acronym for Fun in The Army.

to be little animosity in this country toward the enemy we are fighting in Vietnam. Sometimes it seems that we are angrier at our allies in South Vietnam than we are at the tyrannical regime in Hanoi.

These thoughts were very well expressed in an editorial published October 16 in the Franklin, N.H., Journal-Transcript. The editorial has been sitting on my desk since that time and I have given it much thought.

Editor Richard P. Lewis has been perceptive and constructive in writing it. It is certainly apparent that, for some reason or another, the reasons for our intervention have not been fully explained in terms acceptable or even understandable to many American people. As Mr. Lewis says, it is the strangest war we have ever seen.

The editorial follows:

IT'S A WEIRD WAR

It's puzzling.

Have you noticed one strange facet of our whole involvement in Vietnam?

Everybody blames somebody here in the United States for difficulty of ending it.

Those of peaceful persuasion—though their expression of said sentiment is often couched in remarkably violent deeds—are inclined to blame the administration and the military for fighting too fiercely. Cool it, they indicate, and the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong will behave.

Uh, huh.

On the other hand, the administration (Nixon and Johnson before him) is inclined to be impatient with those in this country who take a dim view of the war and who are brazen enough to say so publicly. Hold the criticism says the administration, present a semblance of unity, and the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong will thereby be deceived and give up their effort as a lost cause.

Uh, huh.

Ah, and then are those whose anger seems to be concentrated upon the administration's reluctance to "unleash" our forces in Vietnam. Level North Vietnam, and there will be no further problem, say these.

Likely not . . . not in Vietnam, anyway.

The peace people are sore at the administration for fighting too much. The war people are sore at the administration for fighting too little. The administration is peeved with the people who disagree with administration policy.

Isn't anybody around here sore at the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese?

They did start the whole thing, after all, and they do have quite a lot to do with ending it. They are the people who are killing our men. Certainly, nothing's going to cool in Vietnam without their concurrence, voluntary or otherwise.

Too, an awful lot of people appear to dislike the South Vietnamese.

The peace people are sore at the South Vietnamese for not wishing to be taken over by the North Vietnamese, and being unable to prevent this by themselves. The war people are sore at the South Vietnamese for fielding inadequate armies. The administration is often sore at the South Vietnamese—quietly so—because the government at Saigon occasionally disagrees, at least in detail, with administration policy. At times, the administration seems almost to regret that South Vietnam ever even existed, because of the severe domestic political problems that center about that nation.

But hardly anybody but the South Vietnamese seems to be particularly sore at the Viet Cong or the North Vietnamese.

The peace people profess to be concerned

deeply about the damage being done to our national image. Imagine doing such a terrible thing as fighting a war! What will mankind think of next? The war people, on the other hand, seem to be terribly worked up about the damage that might be done our international reputation should be fail to "win" this war. Never lost before, you know. Surely, we would lose points. The administration's concern seems to be whether or not its approach is going to get the United States out of Vietnam quicker than somebody else proposes. If a Democrat argues that we ought have our forces out of there by the end of 1970, the administration makes cute cracks about what's the matter with getting them out before 1970. There's an impression, too, that the President is terrified at the possibility that this will be labeled "Nixon's War".

But nobody hereabouts seems too much annoyed with the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese.

Even the military takes a remarkably impersonal view of the whole thing. Progress is measured by comparative body counts—and when you count by cold numbers they seem somehow less like dead people. There's no great sense that even the military is angry with the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese.

It's the strangest war we've ever seen.

UNITED WE STAND

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, the Monett, Mo., Junior Chamber of Commerce, joining with other Jaycee organizations throughout the country, are taking part in a patriotic "united we stand" project, and have invited all Monett, Mo., area residents to personally participate in the program.

The purpose of their "united we stand" organization is to provide the American people with a means to directly participate in the great issues of our time.

In cooperation with the Monett Times newspaper, the Jaycees have included in each copy of the paper a postcard addressed to the President of the United States, and carrying the following message:

MR. PRESIDENT: You have my support in your efforts to bring about a just and lasting peace.

The postcard is to be signed with the name and address of each individual participating and mailed to the President.

Mr. Speaker, this kind of patriotic activity is typical of the people of the Seventh Congressional District of Missouri. I am proud to serve as their Representative in the Congress.

To explain more fully the purpose of this project, I offer an article which recently appeared in the Monett Times newspaper explaining in more detail.

The article follows:

THE MAJORITY SPEAKS

America is our country and our country is in danger today because the vast majority has remained silent too long. Because of our dedication and unwavering belief the Monett Jaycees and the United States Jaycees feel that it is our obligation to give the vast majority the opportunity to speak for their nation.

We must act immediately! The enemies of our country have interpreted the actions

and words of the vocal minority as the true mood of the American public. The North Vietnamese will continue their war policies as long as they believe there is a possibility of an internal revolt against the President's policy.

We must activate the silent majority to demonstrate their support. We must act today—every moment we hesitate literally cost American lives.

The purpose of this letter is to supply you with some information of united we stand and seek your assistance to aid us in achieving our goal.

United we stand is an organization whose purpose is to provide the American people with a means to directly participate in the great issues in our country. Initially, we are providing a method to allow the American people to have a strong voice in securing a just and lasting peace in Vietnam and in obtaining humane treatment and the early release of our Prisoners of War.

By uniting behind our President, we are putting him in the strongest possible position to achieve lasting peace. It is our sincere belief that the majority of the American people want to express themselves on these and many other issues of national significance.

Our objective is to obtain support from the majority of Americans for the united we stand effort and the concept for which it is intended. Most of us have remained silent on basic issues far too long, and it is now time for all Americans to start making their opinions known.

Your support can most effectively be demonstrated by filling out the card and dropping it into the mail box.

Mail your card immediately—they must be received by Friday, November 28.

THE MONETT JAYCEES.

HOO-RAY FOR SPIRO

(Mr. CLEVELAND asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD, and to include extraneous material.)

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, the reaction to the Vice President's address in Montgomery, Ala., has been heavily favorable in my district.

The Vice President leveled his criticisms fairly, strongly, and in a very statesmanlike manner. The truth of his criticism is reflected in the outpouring of agreement with which the country greeted his remarks. For so long, the general public of this country has developed a gnawing mistrust of the news media. It was a general, unspecified thing, but the Vice President wrapped it up well and sounded a sentiment which most of the country feels most of the time.

The Claremont Eagle, published in Claremont, N.H., strongly applauded Mr. AGNEW in an excellent editorial. I believe the editorial is representative of the opinion in the Granite State and I offer it for the RECORD:

HOO-RAY FOR SPIRO

We applaud Vice President Agnew's more recent criticism of the communication media, more recently of the press, and in particular, the Washington Post and New York Times.

Prior to this speech Agnew levelled some well-deserved blows at the unfair TV coverage given President Nixon's address to the nation, not to mention distorted commentary coverage by TV of the Democratic National Convention and certain phases of the Vietnam war.

As many congressmen will privately tell you, the Washington Post has a reputation for bias and its coverage of the Vietnam war has often been distorted and inaccurate.

The New York Times, especially since most competition has evaporated, has become less responsible in its reporting, or putting it more bluntly, writes "up" or "down" events according to the personal dictates of writers or editors.

One problem with the bigtime press is that it has become so large that writers and reporters are no longer under the direction of editors and editors under the direction of management.

Reporters can write biased accounts of events and these stories are turned into the desk as "hand-on-the-Bible" accounts of what went on.

No one is checking on much of this erroneous reporting; editors and the publishers are in too many instances being run by their reporters.

Management has, in too many instances, abdicated the responsibility of the press to irresponsible men and women with axes to grind.

Too much news is being edited and censored by too many reporters at the source.

They write what they want to hear and see and not what is actually heard and seen.

They take it easy on political candidates on their own and personally favor and come down heavily on candidates and office holders "out of favor."

The management of the Washington Post and the New York Times got a deserved kick in the pants from the vice president.

We applaud both of Agnew's most recent speeches.

We hope he has more like them.

And so, we believe, do a majority of Americans who are sick and tired of being brain-washed and spoon-fed by monopolistic and biased interests in TV and the press.

TAKE PRIDE IN AMERICA

(Mr. MILLER of Ohio asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MILLER of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, at the end of 1967 the United States had an installed electric generating capacity of 269,252,000 kilowatts. Our electrical energy production in 1967 totaled 1,214,365 million kilowatt-hours, almost one-third of the world total of 3,843,600 million kilowatt-hours.

THE BECKONING ABYSS OF BARBARISM

(Mr. PODELL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PODELL. Mr. Speaker, no civilization is immune to excesses on the part of its individual representatives. Over the centuries the most mature societies have produced monstrous injustice and perpetrated barbaric cruelties. Rome could produce both a Virgil and a Caligula. France could give the world an Emile Zola, as well as an Esterhazy and a Gen. Du Paty De Clam. Britain could bring forth a Byron and a Cromwell. Russia lays claim to both Tolstoy and Rasputin, Pasternak and Beria. Germany stands before the world with two souls. On one side is the Germany of "kultur," Goethe, Heine, and Beethoven. On the other she stands disgraced by Himmler, Hitler, and the many thousands of inhuman murderers who massacred millions of inno-

cents. No nation is ever immune from the disease of barbarism.

It comes as a thunderous shock to us all, nevertheless, that the United States also possesses the capability of perpetrating inhuman acts in pursuit of its avowed national goals. Such acts have recently come to light in relation to our military efforts in Southeast Asia. Obviously, there can be no denial that butcheries of civilians have been perpetrated by American military personnel. To say more would be to prejudice the case against those who stand accused. Nevertheless, we must accept the growing realization of these happenings, and seek reasons, causes, and cures. A nation's soul is reflected in its policies and interactions with other states. When we make national policy and carry it out, all of us bear part of the blame, just as all of us share in any credit. Nor can we shrink from such responsibilities. There can be no possible evasion of the awful situation now confronting us.

Whenever an army in the field moves and fights, its leaders, both military and political, are generally and specifically aware of what is being done in their name. Examples are always set by those in command. Ideals of a society must be reflected in those examples, or there can be no rationale for following policies which the armed forces are charged with carrying out. This is the dilemma facing any nation at war, and we are now confronted with the knowledge that at least once our country, its ideals, its leaders, and some of its individual soldiers have failed the test, betraying our noblest, most precious principles in the process.

Remember Nuremberg? Many of us stared in mute horror at those rows of innocuous appearing men who pleaded "Not Guilty" to those unspeakable crimes. Millions among us remember the stupefying, sense-numbing mood which crept over us as films of concentration camps were shown. How could human beings have done this? That question was on so many minds. Their answer? One and all, they stated they were following orders. Final result? Brutalization of a mighty nation. Degradation of a massive, rich culture. Destruction of an entire society. And upon the lips of millions for generations to come certain words will ever be uttered with a curse or a shudder of revulsion. Shall this be the fate of our own land? Are we to allow such a step as has been revealed to be followed by another, and another, and another still? I pray not.

If one act of this type can be committed, others are certainly possible. No doubt other depredations will come to light similar to those already revealed. What will we do then? Condemn those who drew aside the curtain?

We are committed to a useless war which is poisoning the very soul of our land. Before this conflict American boys went to war to perform a necessary job which required killing. We were never first to draw the sword, and always last to sheathe it. We never fought to enslave other men, but to free them. Our military tradition was as honorable as it was long. As unstained as it was victorious. Today it lies befouled and dishonored by a brutal act of barbarism.

These revelations in themselves pose a

supreme test for America. For we have begun to approach an abyss in the name of freedom. Germ warfare. Nerve gas. Poison bullets. Defoliation. MIRV. Green Beret assassinations. Murder squads. And now the latest disgusting happening. Cumulatively, they challenge the very soul of our people and imperil the future of our society. If we allow such means to be employed, and such actions to be taken, eventually we shall become hardened as a society to even worse transgressions. Eventually we shall be able to rationalize almost anything, as the people of Germany did when it was too late. They averted their eyes and said they did not see—but they did.

Let us therefore rise to this ultimate moral challenge as a mature people, relying upon our ideals and demanding that they be adhered to; whether at home in doing justice to the humble or abroad in pursuit of any goals the Nation chooses to embrace. If we act so, then there is a chance future horrors may be averted, although the stain upon our escutcheon will ever be there as a reminder of what happened—once.

All military and political leaders of this Nation must search their own hearts just as the average American must; examining this entire present situation in light of their own principles and lives. We must give thought to the heritage our children will inherit. When Hitler was at last brought to earth, Winston Churchill went to a devastated Berlin and delivered a never-to-be-forgotten epilog to the cancer that was Nazi Germany. He spoke of Hitler and said "If you seek his monument, look around you."

Remains of dead and gone civilizations litter the world. Many of us are more than passing familiar with them. Each left some mark—small or large. All are remembered in some manner. Some with a blessing. Others with a curse.

A thousand years from now, what will some father say to his son, looking at some representative relic of today's America? Will he say "They were a nation of killers in the name of liberty and barbarians in the name of defense"?

Or will he say "Just look at that, my son. The Americans built it. They were a nation of strength, true. But also a society of men who loved the lowly, and who even when they struck out in anger, tempered their violence with compassion and their might with understanding."

What will it be? The broad uplands of enlightenment and national maturity? Or the beckoning abyss of barbarism?

RETIREMENT OF GEN. GEORGE H. DECKER

(Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, it is an honor and a pleasure for me to pay tribute to a great American and a close friend on the occasion of his retirement.

This is, for Gen. George H. Decker, a second retirement, the culmination of a second career.

For almost 40 years he wore the uniform of his country, rising all the way from second lieutenant in our peacetime Regular Army to its topmost post, Chief of Staff. It was my privilege to know him well as a frequent witness before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations. We on the committee always respected his frank and constructive views. For the past 6 years General Decker has been president of the Manufacturing Chemists Association. In that role he has spoken for one of the largest and most progressive industries of our country.

Both in uniform and in civilian life, he has served his country and its people with high distinction. He has held—and merited—universal respect.

On September 28, 1962, the late President Kennedy presented General Decker with the Distinguished Service Medal. He cited the general for qualities such as these—and I quote—"wisdom, great moral strength, and confident determination; imagination, versatility, and prescience; objectivity, tact, and diplomacy."

These are high words of praise. But, as all who know General Decker will agree, they are amply deserved.

To me, however, the most telling phrases in the citation are these: "Eminent sense of fairness, understanding, and consideration in contacts with others."

It is these qualities General Decker showed to a high degree in his contacts with Members of Congress—qualities which made working with him so pleasant and rewarding.

Significantly, General Decker does not see Government and business as antagonists. Rather, he regards them as the twin pillars of our free enterprise system.

None of the pressing domestic problems which confront us—inflation, the quality of our air and water, and occupational safety, among others—can be solved unless all elements of our pluralistic society, notably Government and business, pull together rather than apart.

It is to this overriding purpose that General Decker has dedicated himself over the past 6 years. For what he has sought to do—and for what he has achieved—he deserves our highest regard and lasting gratitude.

On his second retirement I extend to George Decker my very best.

OPPOSES MURPHY AMENDMENT

(Mrs. MINK asked and was given permission to extend her remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mrs. MINK. Mr. Speaker, on October 14, 1969, the Senate passed an amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act Amendments of 1969 (S. 3016) that empowers the Governor of a State to veto OEO legal services for the poor. This provision, sponsored by Senator GEORGE MURPHY, is not contained in the companion bill (H.R. 12321) which has been reported by the House Committee on Education and Labor. As a member of that Committee, I strongly urge my col-

leagues to reject the Murphy amendment if and when it is considered by the House.

The legal services provisions of OEO are among the foundations of our anti-poverty program. They give the poor access to the courts and legal aid in seeking redress of their grievances.

Placing the Governor of a State in a position of blocking such legal services would defeat the purposes of the OEO legal services program and delegate millions of disadvantaged people to second-class citizenship.

The legal services program of the Office of Economic Opportunity must be kept intact and strengthened, not crippled as it would be by the Murphy amendment. This is not only my conviction, but that of the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity. He called it a fundamental aspect of the anti-poverty program and opposed the Murphy amendment, as the administration as a whole has opposed it.

It is the conviction of Dr. Milton Eisenhower and the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. On November 1, 1969, the Commission declared its opposition to the Murphy amendment, asserting that OEO-type legal programs "are still only a small beginning in the long-range task of assuring justice for the poor" and the poor are already at a "great disadvantage" before the law.

The U.S. Judicial Conference, organ of the Federal judiciary under the chairmanship of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger of the U.S. Supreme Court, is unanimously opposed to the Murphy amendment. Its distinguished president, Bernard G. Segal, has written:

I hope you will oppose my amendments to S. 3016 which would result in exposing legal services lawyers to inhibiting political pressures or otherwise restrict the range or scope of cases in which poverty lawyers may represent the poor.

At this critical juncture of our national life, when we need to bolster our war on poverty rather than deescalate it, I urge the House to emphatically reject the Murphy amendment. I insert at this point in the RECORD and commend to the attention of my colleagues the statements of organizations that have communicated to me their opposition to the Murphy amendment:

U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
Washington, D.C., November 24, 1969.

HON. PATSY T. MINK,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MRS. MINK: I am enclosing for your information a copy of the statement by the Members of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in opposition to amendments to legislation authorizing programs at the Office of Economic Opportunity which would enable a governor to veto legal services programs in his State.

The Commissioners in their statement opposing the so-called "Murphy Amendment" to OEO legislation said:

"The right of disadvantaged groups to have full and effective access to the courts must not be fettered by the political restrictions imposed by the amendment."

At a time when the Nation is concerned that persons not seek redress in the streets, it

is inconsistent with the national interest to place restrictions on disadvantaged groups seeking access to the courts through Government-financed lawyers. I urge your careful consideration of the statement of the Commissioners.

Sincerely yours,
HOWARD A. GLICKSTEIN,
Designate.

STATEMENT BY U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS ON VETO POWER FOR GOVERNORS OF LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS

The United States Commission on Civil Rights wholeheartedly supports the American Bar Association, The United States Judicial Conference, The National Legal Aid and Defenders Association, as well as local and State bar associations and other interested groups in their opposition to the proposed amendment to the Office of Economic Opportunity authorization bill providing State governors veto power over OEO funded legal services programs. The adoption of this amendment would critically weaken the most successful and fulfilling of all of the OEO programs and undermine the concept of equal legal representation for all. It especially would jeopardize survival of legal services programs that vigorously represent Negroes, Mexican Americans and Indians.

The need for vigorous and aggressive legal representation on behalf of the poor of all races cannot be overemphasized. "Equality before the law," said former Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge, "in a true democracy is a matter of right. It cannot be a matter of charity or of favor or of grace or of discretion." In many areas such as housing, welfare rights and consumer protection, legal services groups have provided the best hope for a system of effective representation for the poor—not just in providing day to day legal counsel on an individual basis—but in attending to those activities which establish legal precedents and law reform affecting large numbers of people.

In a recent speech President Nixon set for the OEO Office of Legal Services the following goal:

"It will take on central responsibility for programs which help provide advocates for the poor in their dealings with social institutions. The sluggishness of many institutions—at all levels of society—in responding to the needs of individual citizens is one of the central problems of our time. Disadvantaged persons in particular must be assisted so that they fully understand the lawful means of making their needs known and having those needs met."

Those legal services programs which have proven most vigorous, resourceful and innovative in the assistance of their clients and which have been responsible for the most far-reaching legal reforms are the very programs which are put in greatest jeopardy by the proposed amendment. The right of disadvantaged groups to have full and defective access to the courts must not be fettered by the political restrictions imposed by the amendment. Such an amendment would be a regressive step that can only serve to discourage the poor from bringing their grievances to the courts rather than to the streets.

LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF HAWAII,
Honolulu, Hawaii, October 22, 1969.

Re Murphy amendment, Senate bill 3016.
Representative PATSY MINK,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE MINK: The professional staff of the Legal Aid Society of Hawaii, Civil Division consists of seventeen lawyers, four are Vistas and one a Smith Fellow. We wish to call your attention to and note our opposition to the Murphy Amendment, Senate Bill 3016.

This amendment that passed the Senate

on October 14 was proposed by Senator George Murphy (R-Calif.). It in effect provides that the governor of each state would have an absolute veto over the funding of any Legal Services Program assisted by the Office of Economic Opportunity. Although another amendment also has been passed that would give the President power to override the governor's veto, it is unlikely that this safeguard will be effective or even remain in any final bill. Through the threatened or actual use of this veto, a governor could impose crippling restrictions and curbs upon the activities of legal aid offices assisting the poor of this country.

Providing a state official with the power to dictate the scope of services to which the poor are entitled courts the demise of the Legal Services Program. To tell the poor that now legal services are making a significant impact on their legal problems those services are to be restricted would destroy all the gains already achieved by the program. More, the threat of restrictions would cause the poor to view the program as another false hope, an institutionalized frustration, a paternalistic handout meant to deceive but not to help effectively.

In addition, the morale of the 2,000 new lawyers now working in the program would suffer tremendously if their independence of action on behalf of the poor were curtailed or restricted. These advocates, as are all other attorneys, are subject only to the interest of their clients and the ethical standards of their profession. We are willing to answer for our conduct to our clients and our brethren at the bar. We are not willing to answer to one whose standing is subject to the passing tides of popular opinion.

The Legal Aid Society of Hawaii, Civil Division, supports the principle that a poor person unable to pay legal fees should receive the same quality of effective legal services as his more affluent brother. Professional associations, including the NLADA, ABA, ATLA and NBA, have supported this program because it has assured full independence to the lawyer and a total responsiveness to the needs of the poverty community. This is as it should be!

Although we of Hawaii do not envisage that a governor of our state would take advantage of such veto power, we do consider ourselves an integral part of the Legal Services Program. We, therefore, ask your help on behalf of our mainland colleagues and ourselves to actively oppose this amendment.

Thank you for your *KOKUA*.

Very truly yours,

ROBERT G. JOHNSTON,
Chief, Civil Division.

CHICAGO COUNCIL OF LAWYERS,
Chicago, Ill., October 24, 1969.

HON. PATSY T. MINK,
*House Committee on Education and Labor,
House Office Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR HONORABLE Mrs. MINK: On October 14, 1969, the Senate passed an amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. The amendment was proposed by Senator GEORGE MURPHY and gives the governor of each state an absolute veto over the funding of any Legal Services program assisted by the Office of Economic Opportunity. An amendment to the Murphy proposal was subsequently adopted that would give the President power to override the governor's veto.

The Chicago Council of Lawyers believes that there should be no gubernatorial veto power over any of the activities of Legal Services Programs. The allegiance of Legal Service Attorneys must be to their clients, untainted by any suggestion that his professional judgment might be affected by local political considerations.

This vitally important matter will soon be considered by the House of Representatives. For reasons more fully developed in the attached statement adopted by the Board of

Governors of the Council, we urge you to vote to eliminate the governor's veto altogether.

Very truly yours,

JUDSON H. MINER,
President.

[Enclosure]

CHICAGO COUNCIL OF LAWYERS

Last week the United States Senate, by a close vote, approved an amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, giving a state governor an absolute veto over grants for legal services programs operating within his state. An amendment to the Murphy proposal, offered by Senator Nelson and passed by voice vote subject to later confirmation, would give the President power to override the veto. (Power to override a governor's veto now rest with the Director of OEO.)

The Chicago Council of Lawyers believes that a gubernatorial veto power, with or without an appeal to the President, threatens the independence and integrity of a legal services program. Instead of strengthening the governor's veto, the Senate should have eliminated it altogether.

The amendment was passed at the behest of Senator George Murphy of California, who argued in its behalf that efforts to reform the law for the benefit of the poor should not be part of a legal services program. The motive behind the amendment is plainly to hobble those legal services programs that have been truly effective. The Bar cannot afford to permit such a sham if it expects to retain any shred of professional integrity and public respect.

It has become painfully obvious that the legal services programs likely to be vetoed are those programs with the aggressiveness and skill to successfully challenge entrenched interests. For example, Murphy's target is unquestionably California Rural Legal Assistance, a program with a nationwide reputation for vigorous and effective advocacy in behalf of California's impoverished migrant farm workers. In the past, it has avoided a veto by Governor Reagan only because it was clear that a veto would be overridden by the Directors of OEO. Local political opposition also recently threatened the South Florida Migrant Legal Services Program and a Navajo reservation program. The South Florida program had aroused the ire of powerful local interests by taking major farm operators to court, the Navajo program by representing members of the tribe in cases in which the tribal government was interested. An excellent program in North Mississippi has been filing school desegregation suits and challenging the inequality of municipal services provided in black residential areas. The pressure of antagonistic local interests forced the University of Mississippi Law School to drop the program, and it now operates on its own with direct funding from Washington. Can there be any doubt about its fate if the governor is given the power to veto re-funding?

The Murphy proposal creates an immediate threat to some of the most effective legal services programs OEO has developed. It also threatens to destroy all hope of developing independent legal services programs supported by government funds. The Bar must defend the professional independence of its legal services programs lest it confirm the widespread belief that the promise of equal justice under the law is hollow, and that solutions are to be found only in the streets.

The Chicago Council of Lawyers calls upon fellow lawyers and their professional associations to demonstrate that the promise of legal service is not an empty one, to make unmistakably clear to Congress that the profession cannot accept the threat to its integrity and independence represented by the Murphy amendment.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE
CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE U.S.A.,
New York, N.Y., October 29, 1969.
To all Members of the House Education and
Labor Committee:
HON. PATSY T. MINK,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSWOMAN MINK: I understand that the House Education and Labor Committee is in the process of hearings on the authorization for the Office of Economic Opportunity.

Not only was I astounded at the Senate acceptance of the Murphy amendment to this authorization which would give absolute veto power to the Governors of states on programs of rural legal assistance, but I was further absolutely dumbfounded to realize that the Senate would accept such an abrogation of civil rights on the part of any group of people.

The General Board of the National Council of Churches has indicated again and again its affirmation of the fact that "all citizens should have access to adequate legal counsel, and that the poor in particular should be assisted in obtaining their rights without veto by local or state officials."

Any such veto power on the part of state officials is a direct abrogation of civil rights, and I assure you that we will do everything within our power so that the public recognizes this as a civil rights issue.

Therefore I would urge that in the Education and Labor Committee no positive consideration be given to any such amendment to the authorization bill for the Office of Economic Opportunity in relation to rural legal assistance for the poor.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM E. SCHOLES,
Associate for Field Services.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE
CHURCHES OF CHRIST, IN THE U.S.A.,
New York, N.Y., October 31, 1969.
To each Member of the House Education and
Labor Committee:

DEAR CONGRESSWOMAN: Legal services are crucial to the poor. Justice is vital in this Nation. No restricting authority of a Governor's veto on OEO Legal Services in major areas of the Nation will provide either.

Please do not, with your vote, permit a Murphy-type amendment to carry.

Sincerely yours,

JACK H. ALFORD,
D.C.L.M. Field Representative.

SACRAMENTO, CALIF.,
November 3, 1969.

HON. PATSY MINK,
*Rayburn Building,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CONGRESSWOMAN: On behalf of the Sacramento Chapter of the Kennedy Action Corps, I am writing to urge you to vote against the amendment to OEO legislation (now under consideration by the House Education and Labor Committee) that would give state governors an absolute veto over the activities of federally financed antipoverty lawyers. This amendment would be a fatal blow to the California Rural Legal Aid program, financed by OEO, and to all such legal aid programs that would then be at the mercy of the partisan political policies of individual governors.

Both President Nixon and the American Bar Association have urged strengthening the help given to the poor to air their legitimate grievances in court. This is part of the orderly conduct of a democratic society. Today Dr. Milton Eisenhower, Chairman of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, urged retention of legal help for the poor, financed by federal money. Passage of the OEO bill, with the amendment sponsored by Senator Murphy, would be a serious blow to the law and order society strives to maintain. If the poor cannot be heard in court, they will resort to

the streets and their problems will be compounded.

We respectfully urge you to vote against the Murphy amendment giving the governors veto power over the work of those giving legal aid to the poor.

Very truly yours,

AGNES C. SOWER,
Chairman, Legislative Committee, Kennedy Action Corps.

NEW YORK, N.Y.

Representative PATSY MINK,
Longworth House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSWOMAN: Assembled at its 81st annual meeting, the National Council of Women of the United States (an organization of some 30 women's organizations with a combined membership of 23 million women) expressed serious concern and dismay at the proposed amendment to the Anti-Poverty Bill which would give State governors veto power over OEO store front legal help to the poor. We agree with American Bar Association that this amendment would be oppressive interference with the freedom of the lawyer and the citizen.

May we urge nonacceptance of this amendment.

BELLE S. SPAFFORD,
President.

THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

New York, November 7, 1969.

MY DEAR CONGRESSWOMAN: I am directed by the Executive Committee of The Association of the Bar to call to your attention the following resolution adopted at a meeting of the Committee on November 6, 1969:

"Whereas, the adoption (45-50) by the United States Senate of an amendment to the pending OEO authorization bill (S. 3016) would give to state governors a veto over OEO funded legal service programs, in whole or in part, at the time of initial funding or refunding, and

"Whereas, such veto power would conflict with the traditional right and obligation of the lawyer to give faithful representation to his client, regardless of whether the client or his cause is unpopular or community reaction is adverse, and

"Whereas, it is important that vigorous and effective legal service be provided to the poor by denying to no person in our society his right to equal justice under law, which includes the right to independent counsel free from outside interference; and

"Whereas, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the American Bar Association, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, the Director of OEO and numerous others have urged the amendment be defeated, now be it

"Resolved, that The Association of the Bar of the City of New York urges the defeat of any amendment to S. 3016 or the defeat of any other legislation that would permit gubernatorial veto or any action that constitutes such potential for interference with the freedom of the lawyer and the rights of the citizen."

Sincerely yours,

PAUL B. DE WITT,
Executive Secretary.

FAMILY SERVICE AGENCY
OF SAN FRANCISCO,

San Francisco, Calif., November 7, 1969.

HON. PATSY T. MINK,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSWOMAN MINK: As you know, the Senate has just passed legislation referred to as the Murphy Amendment which gives governors of each state veto power over the funding of Neighborhood Legal Assistance programs.

We strongly and respectfully request your opposition to similar legislation in the House.

We believe that the passage of such legislation is blatantly discriminatory against

poor and minority persons because, in effect, it would give state governors the power to determine which socio-economic groups in our society are entitled to legal services.

Respectfully,

JOHN E. DEARMAN,
President.

L. WARDE LAIDMAN,
Executive Director.

PHILADELPHIA BAR ASSOCIATION,
Philadelphia, Pa., November 12, 1969.

HON. PATSY T. MINK,
House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSWOMAN MINK: I am taking the liberty of enclosing herewith a resolution unanimously adopted by the Board of Governors a few days ago. We urge you to oppose the amendment to SB-3016, which seeks to place in the hands of the Governors in the various states a power to veto activities of legal service programs. We feel that such an amendment is not in the public interest and urge you to join us and other community-minded organizations in attempting to prevent its enactment.

Sincerely,

LOUIS J. GOFFMAN.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE PHILADELPHIA BAR ASSOCIATION

Whereas, the enactment by the United States Senate of an amendment to S.B. 3016 seeks to place in the hands of the Governors of the various States a power to veto the activities of Legal Services Programs funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity;

And whereas, the Philadelphia Bar Association is committed to assuring effective legal services to every person who needs them, whether or not they can pay for them;

And whereas, the quality, the zeal and the professional competence of legal counsel should be inspired by the client's need and the validity of his case rather than his ability to pay for his lawyer's services;

And whereas, the relationship of lawyer and client should not be impaired by vouchsafing to an elected official a veto power over the resources of funds for legal services which may be required in litigation directed against government action or in support of causes which may be politically unpopular or inconsonant with partisan political objectives;

And whereas, a community legal services program which truly serves the needs of the community should not be exposed to the hazard of executive veto power which might impair the freedom of counsel to represent the real interests of those whose interests would not otherwise be fairly presented;

Now, therefore, be it resolved, that the Philadelphia Bar association declares that the Legal Services Program should continue its operations with the complete assurance of the independence of lawyers to represent their clients within the program, even though the interests of their clients might involve actions which seek to accomplish significant institutional changes affecting governmental agencies;

And, further resolved, that the representatives of the Philadelphia Bar Association express the will of the Association to the Senators and Representatives of the people that this amendment should not be enacted.

NOVEMBER 13, 1969.

HON. PATSY T. MINK,
House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSWOMAN MINK: This letter is sent to you from elected student government leaders and Law Student Division representatives of the American Bar Association of every major law school in Northern California. It marks the first time that we have issued a joint statement regarding

an issue before Congress; the Murphy amendment to the O.E.O. Appropriations Bill makes our present action necessary. Its social impact is so broad, and its implications to the legal profession so important, that it becomes imperative to express our vigorous opposition to Senator Murphy's amendment.

The Murphy amendment gives the governor of each state a final veto over every O.E.O. legal service project in his state. In so doing, it permits one man in the state capital to dictate the nature and extent of legal services to be provided to thousands of low-income citizens. By injecting the threat of this political veto to the O.E.O. attorney's representation of his client, it denies the poor person in our society access to the independent professional services of a lawyer of integrity and competence. It creates a potential conflict of interest for the attorney—similar to the ethical situation which impels a judge to disqualify himself from a case. In doing so, the amendment jeopardizes the basic structure of our adversary system. It asks an attorney to choose between the immediate best interests of his client and the long-range interests of his office. The American Bar Association has stated that such a limitation constitutes "oppressive interference with the freedom of the lawyer and the citizen".

As Senator Murphy has stated, the purpose of his amendment is to prevent O.E.O. attorneys from litigating cases against government agencies. It would be complete folly to so constrain the activities of the low-income litigant's lawyer. Preventing poor persons from bringing suits against the government, a right enjoyed and frequently exercised by the more affluent members of our society, would violate all the principles of equal protection and fair play in our democratic system of laws and government. To so restrict the legal services available to the poor person makes him a second-class citizen. Furthermore, the ethical attorney would have no choice but to ignore any gubernatorial stricture not to litigate causes against the government; the O.E.O. attorney, like all attorneys in the United States, is guided in his legal practice by the A.B.A.'s Canon of Professional Ethics. Canon 15 states, "The lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied". Obviously cases do arise wherein the best interests of the client require that the government be named a party to a suit. It is the O.E.O. attorney's professional duty to bring an action against the government in these cases, and he cannot be restrained by a governmental edict telling him not to do so.

The Murphy amendment is an anti-civil rights provision. To tell the poor that their legal services are to be cut back and that their lawyers cannot entertain cases of broad social significance would destroy all the gains already achieved by the O.E.O. legal services program. Moreover, the threat of restrictions would cause the poor to view the program as a paternalistic handout meant to look good, but not to effectively represent them.

The effect of the Murphy amendment is to foreclose the opportunity of poor persons to obtain necessary reform of the laws through the exercise of their legal rights within the orderly system of the judiciary. The judiciary plays an important part in our democratic government as a check on the powers of the legislative and executive branches. The strength of our democracy lies with this system of checks and balances. The traditional role of the judiciary has been to protect the interests of minorities be they the political, racial, or economic. To deny to the poor the effective redress of their grievances through the judicial system would be a most tragic action, both morally and politically.

For the above reasons, we call upon you to preserve the integrity of the American legal and governmental system. We urge you to actively oppose the Murphy amendment to the O.E.O. Appropriations Bill.

Sincerely,

Robert P. Etienne, LSD/ABA Representative, Stanford; Gilbert C. Berkeley, Jr., President Law Association, Stanford Law School; Martin H. Kresse, Hastings College of the Law; John Rutledge, Golden Gate College of the Law; Harvey R. Levinson, LSD/ABA Representative, Golden Gate College of the Law.

Rich Beserra, Boalt Hall, University of California, Berkeley; Luke G. Conley, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Russell E. Templeton, University of California at Davis; Warren W. Goedert, University of San Francisco; Dennis W. DeCuir, University of Santa Clara; Phillip M. Sims, University of Santa Clara.

NATIONAL SHARECROPPERS FUND,
New York, N.Y., November 18, 1969.

HON. PATSY T. MINK,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE MINK: In the coming days you will be voting on the 1969 Anti-Poverty Bill (H.R. 12321). The National Sharecroppers Fund feels it is a reasonably good bill, although surely an increased appropriation similar to that voted by the U.S. Senate would be more appropriate at this time to meet the many and urgent needs of the nation's rural and urban poor.

We view, however, with considerable alarm any effort to restrict the Office of Economic Opportunity Legal Services Program by giving state governors an absolute line-by-line veto power over the program. As the American Bar Association has noted, such a power is an "oppressive interference with the freedom of the lawyer and the citizen."

Recently in the U.S. Senate, as you know, contrary to the wishes of OEO Director Donald Rumsfeld and President Nixon, Sen. George Murphy (Rep.-Calif.) was successful in getting an amendment attached to S. 3016 which would give state governors this veto.

One of the most serious consequences of such an amendment would be to either kill or drastically curtail the activities of the California Rural Legal Assistance, the largest and most successful program of its type in the United States. NSF has for the past three years supported the work of this worthwhile program which has done so much to bring a new respect for the law, lawyers, courts and justice among the state's rural poor.

It is also obvious that this type of veto power by a governor could have broad and restrictive civil rights implications throughout the nation.

Because NSF shares your concern for "equal justice under law" we strongly urge you to be present and affirmatively approve H.R. 12321 in the form recently accepted by your distinguished Education and Labor Committee.

Thank you for your consideration.

Respectfully,

A. V. KREBS, JR.,
Director of Public Information.

NATIONAL LEGAL AID
AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION,
Chicago, Ill.

Opposition to the Murphy Amendment, which would give state governors absolute veto power over Legal Services Programs in their states, has steadily mounted since it was passed by the Senate a month ago. The ABA, state and local bar associations, civic organizations, and many other concerned citizen groups have spoken out against the Amendment as a dangerous threat to the independence of the legal profession and to

the integrity of the attorney-client relationship. Through resolutions, public statements, and letters to the President and Congress, they have urged the defeat of the Murphy Amendment of any other legislation that would limit the scope and effectiveness of Legal Services Programs.

A partial list of groups opposing the limiting legislation is attached:

ELECTED OFFICIALS, STATE AND LOCAL

Governor Frank Licht, Rhode Island.
Governor Francis W. Sargent, Massachusetts.

Governor Dan Evans, Washington.
Governor Kenneth M. Curtis, Maine.
U.S. Conference of Mayors.
National League of Cities.
Mayor Charles Evers, Fayette, Mississippi.
Mayor Robert J. Harris, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Mayor Kevin White, Boston, Massachusetts.
Samuel Massell, Mayor-elect of Atlanta, Georgia.
State Legislator Robert Clark, Mississippi.

NATIONAL

League of Women Voters.
National Council of Senior Citizens.
National Council of Churches.
American Friends Service Committee.
Baptist Ministers of the United States.
Friends of Farm Workers.
National Welfare Rights Organization.
Southern Christian Leadership Conference.
United Presbyterian Church.

STATE

Alaska Federation of Natives.
Alaska Native Brotherhood.
California Farmer-Consumer Information Committee.
California Federation of Labor.
California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO.
Church Women, Unified Southern California-Southern Nevada.
Community Relations Conference of Southern California.
Illinois League of Women Voters.
Mississippi Action for Community Education.
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.
Mississippi State Conference of NAACP.
Ohio AFL-CIO.
Ohio Council of Churches.

LOCAL

American Friends Service Committee, San Francisco.
Association of California Consumers, Southern California, L.A.
Board of Christian Social Concerns—at Los Angeles.
Commission on Christian Citizenship, Episcopal Diocese of L.A.
Community Relations Committee of Santa Rosa, California.
Community Service Organization, Porterville, California.
Council for the Spanish Speaking, Stockton, California.
County Bar of Supervisors of San Francisco.
Delta-Miss. Ministry of National Council of Churches.
Delta-Miss. Opportunities Corporation.
Detroit Metro Black Club.
Human Relations Committee, City of New Orleans.

Interfaith Committee for Social Justice.
Local 1140 of Teamsters Union of Minneapolis.

Marin Ecumenical Committee for Action.
Metal Trades Council of Southern California, Huntington Park, California.
Minneapolis Central Labor Union, AFL-CIO.

Minneapolis League of Women Voters.
National Council of Negro Women, Sunflower County, California.
Painters' Union, Local 1146—Redwood City, California.
Paintmakers' Union, Local 1101—Oakland, California.

Pilot Cities Board, Minneapolis.
Program of Retired Citizens, Los Angeles.
Protective Council of California Senior Citizens, Long Beach, California.

San Francisco—Bay Area Urban League, Inc.

San Francisco Chapter, Medical Committee for Human Rights.

South Pasadena, California Democratic Club.

Southside Community Mission, Brooklyn, New York.

Spanish Speaking/Surnamed Political Association, San Francisco.

Typographical Union, Local 174—Los Angeles.

Welfare Rights, Wayne County, Michigan.
Women of Legislative Action, Valley Bay, California.

American Civil Liberties Union.
American Jewish Committee.

American Jewish Congress.
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

Community Relations Committee of the Jewish Federation Council.

Episcopal Society for Cultural and Racial Unity.

Fellowship of Reconciliation.
Japanese American Citizens.

Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, Southern California Joint Board.

International Ladies Garment Workers Union, Los Angeles Cloak Joint Board, AFL-CIO.

And 80 other members of the Community Relations Conference of Southern California.

INDIVIDUALS

Lucy W. Benson, President of National League of Women Voters.

Ann Klein, League of Women Voters of New Jersey.

Marian Watson, League of Women Voters of Minnesota.

Janis P. Lathan, League of Women Voters of Connecticut.

Barbara Stuhler, League of Women Voters of Minnesota.

Jean Thomas, League of Women Voters of Oklahoma.

Anna M. Miller, League of Women Voters of Swarthmore, Penn.

Carol Czarnecki, League of Women Voters of Milwaukee.

Lillian Agard, League of Women Voters of Kansas City.

Felicia Kahn, League of Women Voters of New Orleans.

Julia D. Stuart, past President of the National League of Women Voters.

Unita Blackwell, National Council of Negro Women.

Anne Wexler, McGovern Commission (Democratic Commission on Party Reform and Delegate Selection.)

Margaret Nick, Alaska Federation of Natives.

Terry Watson, U.S. Youth Council.

Clinton Deveaux, National Student Association.

Donal A. Shall, Pennsylvania Association of College Students and National Supervisory Board of USNSA.

Michael Shaughnessy, University of Notre Dame Student Government and National Supervisory Board of USNSA.

JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZENS

LEAGUE, SAN JOSE CHAPTER,

San Jose, Calif., November 18, 1969.

Re Murphy amendment to restrict legal services attorneys.

HON. PATSY MINK,
U.S. Congress,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSWOMAN MINK: It has come to the attention of our Chapter that Senator George Murphy has added an amendment to the OEO Appropriations Bill that gives local governors the power to veto all or part of any legal services program within his jurisdiction. Appallingly, it passed by a narrow margin in the Senate and will be

introduced before your august body very soon. We urge that you vote against this dangerous piece of legislation.

We in the Santa Clara Valley have learned the value the legal service program has been to the poor through the Legal Aid Society and the California Rural Legal Assistance. It is the first time that the lower echelon of our economy have had advocates to fight for their rights to enjoy the fruits of our country. This right should not be hindered by a law that would emasculate their advocates to sheep.

We are not alone in this matter, i.e., the American Bar Association, California Bar and Santa Clara Bar Associations are against the bill. We urge that you represent our community against this bill.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES N. ONO,
Chapter President.

LA RAZA UNIDA,
Union City, Ohio, November 20, 1969.
Representative PATSY MINK,
Member, the House Education and Labor
Committee, Washington, D.C.

THE HONORABLE PATSY MINK: As I am aware that you are a member of the House Education and Labor Committee of the 91st Congress—I would like to address to you a few comments. The comments are:

1. That you please not let the Murphy amendment as proposed by Senator Murphy of California pass.

2. The amendment would only hinder the poor people's right to justice.

3. This amendment would give all the power to the governor.

4. Having only limited education, I feel that the poor people must have the same power as the rich and political powers. It has been too long that the political powers have taken the poor for a ride!

Sincerely,

DAVID HERNANDEZ,
A constituent of the U.S. Government.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. POLLOCK (at the request of Mr. GERALD R. FORD), for the week of December 1, on account of official business.

Mr. ASPINALL, from 5 p.m. December 4, 1969, until 12 o'clock noon December 8, 1969, on account of official business.

Mr. STEIGER of Arizona (at the request of Mr. GERALD R. FORD), for the balance of the week, on account of official business as a member of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

Mr. BOW (at the request of Mr. GERALD R. FORD), for the week of December 1, on account of official business as a member of the House Committee on Appropriations.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

Mr. BIAGGI, for 30 minutes, today.

Mr. SCHWENDEL (at the request of Mr. FREY), for 15 minutes today; to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. WRIGHT to include extraneous ma-

terial in connection with the general debate today.

Mr. FINDLEY to include extraneous material when the Committee resumes consideration of House Resolution 613.

Messrs. RAILSBACK, SCHWENDEL, and WHALEN (at the request of Mr. PIRNIE) to extend their remarks during consideration of H.R. 4296, today.

Mr. DENNEY to include extraneous matter in his remarks on H.R. 4296.

Mr. ECKHARDT to include extraneous matter with his remarks made today on House Resolution 613 in the Committee of the Whole.

Mr. MATSUNAGA immediately preceding the adoption of H.R. 4296.

Mr. MATSUNAGA immediately preceding the passage of S. 564.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. FREY) and to include extraneous material:)

Mr. PETTIS in two instances.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN in two instances.

Mr. HALPERN.

Mr. McCLURE.

Mr. LLOYD.

Mr. SCHWENDEL.

Mr. DUNCAN.

Mr. FOREMAN.

Mr. MAILLIARD in four instances.

Mr. BOB WILSON.

Mr. WYMAN in two instances.

Mr. COLLINS in four instances.

Mr. McCLOSKEY.

Mr. BERRY in two instances.

Mr. ASHBROOK.

Mr. MORSE.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois.

Mr. McDADE.

Mr. ESCH.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN.

Mr. BURTON of Utah in five instances.

Mr. COWGER.

Mr. BROWN of Michigan.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GONZALEZ) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. BOLLING.

Mr. LONG of Maryland in six instances.

Mr. CORMAN.

Mrs. GRIFFITHS.

Mr. RODINO in two instances.

Mr. HUNGATE in three instances.

Mr. KASTENMEIER in three instances.

Mr. FRIEDEL in two instances.

Mr. KLUCZYNSKI.

Mr. RARICK in three instances.

Mr. PICKLE in three instances.

Mr. DANIEL of Virginia in two instances.

Mr. TUNNEY in two instances.

Mr. PIKE in two instances.

Mr. RYAN in four instances.

Mr. BROWN of California in four instances.

Mr. HICKS.

Mr. DELANEY.

Mr. BINGHAM in three instances.

Mr. MATSUNAGA.

Mr. MOORHEAD in two instances.

Mr. HAGAN in two instances.

Mr. GONZALEZ in two instances.

Mr. VAN DEERLIN in two instances.

Mr. BENNETT.

SENATE ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

The SPEAKER announced his signature unto enrolled joint resolution of the Senate of the following title:

S.J. Res. 143. Joint resolution extending the duration of copyright protection in certain cases.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 7 o'clock and 30 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, December 3, 1969, at 12 o'clock noon.

OATH OF OFFICE

The oath of office required by the sixth article of the Constitution of the United States, and as provided by section 2 of the act of May 13, 1884 (23 Stat. 22), to be administered to Members and Delegates of the House of Representatives, the text of which is carried in section 1757 of title XIX of the Revised Statutes of the United States and being as follows:

"I A B, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God."

has been subscribed to in person and filed in duplicate with the Clerk of the House of Representatives by the following Member of the 91st Congress, pursuant to Public Law 412 of the 80th Congress entitled "An act to amend section 30 of the Revised Statutes of the United States" (U.S.C., title 2, sec. 25), approved February 18, 1948; PHILIP M. CRANE, Thirteenth District, Illinois.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1371. A letter from the Under Secretary of the Army, transmitting notification of the transportation of certain chemical warfare agents to a military installation in the United States, as required by section 409(b) of Public Law 91-121; to the Committee on Armed Services.

1372. A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice, transmitting copies of orders suspending deportation, together with a list of the persons involved, pursuant to the provisions of section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1373. A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice, transmitting copies of orders suspending deportation, together with a list of the persons involved, pursuant to the provisions of section 244(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1374. A letter from the national adjutant-paymaster, Marine Corps League, transmitting the annual report of the auditors of

the Marine Corps League for the year ended July 31, 1969, together with the minutes of the 1968 convention of the league, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 88-504; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. MATSUNAGA: Committee on Rules. House Resolution 734. Resolution providing for consideration of H.R. 12321, a bill to provide for the continuation of programs authorized under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 91-696). Referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. KIRWAN: Committee of conference. Conference report on H.R. 14159 (Rept. No. 91-697). Ordered to be printed.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. DINGELL (for himself, Mr. REUSS, Mr. SAYLOR, Mr. FEIGHAN, and Mr. McCLOSKEY):

H.R. 15037. A bill to amend section 8(c) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to provide a new formula for the allocation of construction grant funds for the fiscal years beginning on or after July 1, 1970; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. DONOHUE:

H.R. 15038. A bill to permit State agreements for coverage under the hospital insurance program for the aged; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. DOWNING:

H.R. 15039. A bill to provide a 5-percent increase in certain annuities payable from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mrs. DWYER:

H.R. 15040. A bill to amend the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 1963 to assist the States in developing a plan for the provision of comprehensive services to persons affected by mental retardation and other developmental disabilities originating in childhood, to assist the States in the provision of such services in accordance with such plan, to assist in the construction of facilities to provide the services needed to carry out such plan, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. GARMATZ (for himself and Mr. CLARK):

H.R. 15041. A bill to provide for a coordinated national boating safety program; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. HAGAN (for himself, Mr. BRINKLEY, Mr. FLOWERS, Mr. MCKNEALLY, Mr. MATSUNAGA, Mr. OLSEN, Mr. O'NEAL of Georgia, Mr. SANDMAN, Mr. SISK, Mr. STEPHENS, Mr. STUCKEY, and Mr. BLANTON):

H.R. 15042. A bill to end discrimination in the availability of Federal crop insurance and to authorize the appropriation of additional funds for the administration of the Federal crop insurance program; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. HELSTOSKI:

H.R. 15043. A bill to amend title 18 of the United States Code by adding a new chapter 404 to establish an Institute for Continuing

Studies of Juvenile Justice; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 15044. A bill to provide a program of pollution control in selected river basins and waterways of the United States through comprehensive planning and financial assistance to municipalities and regional management associations for the construction of waste treatment facilities; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. HORTON:

H.R. 15045. A bill to amend the Communications Act of 1934 to establish orderly procedures for the consideration of applications for renewal of broadcast licenses; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. KASTENMEIER:

H.R. 15046. A bill to amend chapter 313 of title 18 of the United States Code; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mrs. MINK:

H.R. 15047. A bill to provide for uniform and equitable treatment of persons displaced from their homes, businesses, or farms by Federal and federally assisted programs and to establish uniform and equitable land acquisition policies for Federal and federally assisted programs; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. PURCELL:

H.R. 15048. A bill to extend the fourth-class mail rate for books and educational materials to photographic prints mailed to and from amateur photographers and nonprofit photographic exhibitions, photographic societies, and photographic print study groups; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. QUILLEN:

H.R. 15049. A bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to include a definition of food supplements, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

H.R. 15050. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow a credit against income tax to employers for the expenses of providing job training programs; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. SCHWENGEL:

H.R. 15051. A bill to establish a commission to study the effects on highway safety and expense of changing the existing limitations on the weight and dimensions of motor vehicles using the highways of this Nation; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. SIKES:

H.R. 15052. A bill to suspend for a 3-year period the import duty on certain raw silk and certain yarns of silk wholly of noncontinuous silk fibers; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. STEPHENS:

H.R. 15053. A bill to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to increase the funds available to commercial lenders who make insured student loans under such act; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. THOMSON of Wisconsin:

H.R. 15054. A bill to encourage the growth of international trade on a fair and equitable basis; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. TUNNEY:

H.R. 15055. A bill to recognize a Federal responsibility to alleviate wind erosion problems in the Coachella Valley, Calif., and other similarly affected areas and to provide for a determination of the specific actions necessary to meet that responsibility; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. CELLER:

H.R. 15056. A bill to amend title 18 of the United States Code, section 702, relating to the unauthorized wearing of uniforms of the Armed Forces and the Public Health Service; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CHAPPELL:

H.R. 15057. A bill to restrict travel in viola-

tion of area restrictions; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. PHILBIN:

H.R. 15058. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide payment for chiropractors' services under the program of supplementary medical insurance benefits for the aged; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H.R. 15059. A bill to permit State agreements for coverage under the hospital insurance program for the aged; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. RYAN:

H.R. 15060. A bill to amend the Truth in Lending Act to require the statements under open end credit plans be mailed in time to permit payment prior to the imposition of finance charges; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. BUSH:

H. Con. Res. 460. Concurrent resolution relating to an Atlantic Union delegation; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. FARBSTEIN:

H. Con. Res. 461. Concurrent resolution condemning Syria for illegally detaining two Israeli citizens who were passengers aboard a TWA aircraft hijacked by air pirates on August 29, 1969; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. COUGHLIN (for himself, Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. BUSH, Mr. BUTTON, Mrs. CHISHOLM, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. DELLENBACK, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. FOLEY, Mr. FRASER, Mr. GREEN of Pennsylvania, Mr. HORTON, Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania, Mr. KOCH, Mr. LEGGETT, Mr. McCLOSKEY, Mr. MCDADE, Mr. MESKILL, Mr. MIKVA, Mr. MORSE, Mr. NEDZI, Mr. OTTINGER, Mr. PATTEN, and Mr. PRYOR of Arkansas):

H. Res. 735. A resolution urging new initiatives to stem the escalating \$5 billion yearly international trade in conventional weapons of war; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. COUGHLIN (for himself, Mr. REUSS, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. SCHNEEBELI, Mr. WHALEN, and Mr. WHITEHURST):

H. Res. 736. A resolution urging new initiatives to stem the escalating \$5 billion yearly international trade in conventional weapons of war; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. CRANE:

H. Res. 737. Resolution toward peace with justice in Vietnam; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. BARRETT:

H.R. 15061. A bill for the relief of Vincenzo Paparo; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DONOHUE:

H.R. 15062. A bill for the relief of sundry claimants and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MATHIAS:

H.R. 15063. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Ruth Falk; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

347. The SPEAKER presented a petition of Claude Parks, Whitney, Tex., relative to pensions for veterans of World War I, which was referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.