

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 29, 1969]
GANDHI: CEREMONY FOR "A UNIVERSAL MAN"
 (By B. J. Phillips)

On the 100th anniversary of the birth of Mahatma Gandhi, Indian Foreign Minister Shri Dinesh Singh and former Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey came to the National Cathedral to talk about Gandhi. And Ravi Shankar came to play sitar music composed especially for the centennial celebration of Gandhi's birthday.

What was said bounced and echoed in the high stone ceilings, at times understood, at times not understood. But Shankar's music was never lost in the Cathedral. It turned the ornate home of one culture into a sounding board for another.

"I want the cultures of all lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible," was the quotation from Mahatma Gandhi's writings which appeared on the leaflet passed out by ushers containing the order of service.

In its pomp and prayers, it was a service not unlike that followed by the English men and women who had colonized India. Twenty-two years after he led India to independence from Great Britain, committees across the world have arranged birthday anniversary celebrations such as the United States' observance yesterday at the Cathedral.

Gandhi, the originator of passive resistance and nonviolent political action, was, like his disciple, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., killed by an assassin, less than six months after India became an independent nation.

The service, attended by church ladies in hats and gloves, Shankar devotees in blue jeans and Indian women in saris, began with a processional. It would have seemed like any other service at the Cathedral—altar boys carrying the cross and two giant candles, church officials in purple robes—but for the white-saried members of the Indian Embassy choir and the low platform beneath the pulpit where Shankar would play.

Dean Francis B. Sayre welcomed the worshippers, who included an overflow of several dozen who stood throughout the service, to "a celebration of the grandeur of Gandhi's spirit."

Humphrey read passages from the scriptures of the world's major religions.

Foreign Minister Singh spoke of Gandhi as "a universal man, a man deeply in love with humanity as a whole."

A hymn was sung and, during the last verse, incense carried into the Cathedral heralded Shankar's entrance.

Shankar and Miss Kamala, who accompa-

nied him on the tanpura, removed their sandals and climbed onto the platform. Cradling the sitar with one foot, Shankar began to play.

Ravi Shankar is a delicately-built man, with small hands and feet. When he plays, his chest appears to expand as though he only breathes in, never exhaling. He seems to grow as his music grows, in carefully controlled, intricately developed expansion of the theme.

The National Cathedral reaches seem to hold the low brooding quarter-tones and turn them into a background for the shimmer of the developing theme. For more than 20 minutes, Shankar's sitar owned the Cathedral as fully as the medieval saints carved into the pulpit above his head.

Finally he finished, exhaled, picked up his incense and waited for the long line of choir-boys and officials to file out before falling into the recessional.

At evening services, the Cathedral again was filled to capacity. This time there were no gloved ladies; there were strike buttons and "boycott grapes" lapel pins.

Cesar Chavez, leader of the California farm workers, was the main speaker at a church service-union rally attended by Mrs. Robert F. Kennedy, Sen. Walter Mondale, Rep. John O'Hara, Mrs. Fannie Lou Hamer and an overflow crowd of students and union workers.

The service began with folk singer Joe Glazer leading a two-stage sing-in. First he led the audience in the original words to "John Brown's Body" and "We Are Climbing Jacob's Ladder," followed by the rewritten versions: "Solidarity Forever" (in English and Spanish) and "We Are Building a Strong Union."

Chavez sat quietly in a black vinyl-covered aluminum rocking chair while the speeches by Sen. Mondale, Father John McCarthy, of Texas; Mrs. Hamer, one of the founders of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, and Rep. O'Hara praised him for his efforts to organize farm laborers.

"There is a shameful thing in this country," Chavez said. "Those who plant, irrigate, cultivate and harvest the food that reaches the table of every American have no food for themselves."

Chavez asked that "Americans band together to bring justice to the tortured valleys of our land."

There was another round of songs, led by Mrs. Hamer; then the concert and union hall was quiet after a day Cathedral Dean Sayre said happened "because the church cares."

[From the Evening Star, Sept. 29, 1969]
CESAR CHAVEZ AT THE CATHEDRAL: CHAVEZ SAYS PENTAGON PROLONGS GRAPE STRIKE

The leader of the nationwide grape boycott charged last night that the Pentagon has sharply boosted its purchase of grapes and has thus kept the bitter, 4-year-old strike alive.

Cesar Chavez, beginning a week of boycott activity spoke to an estimated 2,000 persons at Washington Cathedral, claiming the Pentagon had undermined the boycott by increasing its grape purchases by 30 percent last year, and by shipping 350 percent more grapes to Vietnam.

He said the Department of Defense told him that servicemen's "routine craving" for grapes was responsible for the increased purchases.

More grapes are also going into fruit cocktails, and being used as raisins, Chavez said, to make up for what he claimed was a 30 percent decrease in the sale of grapes since the strike began in September, 1965.

Chavez also charged that the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service had ignored his request to summon grape growers back after negotiations broke down recently.

Chavez, 42, accused the Food and Drug Administration of failing to find evidence of dangerous pesticides on grapes after a supermarket chain said it had found the poison. Some 80 percent of the pickers in his native Delano, Calif., are affected by the pesticides, he said.

Sen. Walter Mondale, D-Minn., another speaker at the fund-raising rally, supported Chavez' charge against the FDA. Mondale said the agency's study discounting reports of dangerously contaminated grapes was "partial, unfair, and unresponsive."

Chavez was to testify today on the pesticide question before Sen. Mondale's subcommittee on migratory labor. Sen. George Murphy, R-Calif., a supporter of the grape growers affected by Chavez' strike, was also scheduled to testify.

Chavez told the predominantly young crowd that he pledged his workers' support to the Vietnam moratorium scheduled Oct. 15 in the nation's colleges.

Chavez' appearance here was his first outside of California since he went on a 25-day fast 18 months ago.

The boycott supporters will hold a rally Tuesday night, and then a "surprise-in" led by Chavez. Speakers at last night's meeting indicated the "surprise-in" would include demonstrations at Sen. Murphy's home and at local supermarkets where grapes are sold.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Thursday, October 2, 1969

The House met at 10 o'clock a.m.
 The Chaplain, Rev. Edward G. Latch, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Teach me, O Lord, the way of Thy statutes; and I will keep it unto the end.—Psalm 119: 33.

O Thou who dost reveal Thyself to man in endless ways, deepen within us the sense of Thy presence as we lift our hearts unto Thee in this our morning prayer. As our fathers came to this altar to worship Thee, so do we bow before Thee humbly and reverently.

With grateful hearts may we learn to labor in Thy spirit, to live in harmony with Thy laws, and to let love lighten and brighten our lives.

Turn Thou our strength to the tasks of justice, mercy, and peace that as we work for the common good we may find joy and satisfaction in useful living.

In Thy holy name we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE

(Mr. WALDIE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, last night in northern California there was an earthquake of considerable proportions that had its epicenter in Santa Rosa, which is approximately 50 to 60 miles north of San Francisco. There was considerable damage done in the area of the epicenter, the damage in property costs ranging in the thousands and, in addition, a number of people were injured. There was additional damage done in

the immediate San Francisco Bay area from this particular earthquake.

I joined recently with Representative MINK, of Hawaii, and others expressing concern about the consequences and risks that were unknown relative to the Amchitka underground testing of nuclear weapons that is scheduled for today. At that time my concern was predicated upon the consequences and risks that the Representatives in Hawaii and Alaska believed were present as a result of these proposed nuclear tests.

I am now expressing the concern of the people of the bay area of California, which I represent, which is a seismic unstable area of considerable extent, that this test may further jeopardize that instability which was in motion as of last night's earthquake.

I intend to contact the President today to urge that the test scheduled for this evening in Alaska be reconsidered until

these consequences affecting the seismic stability of the Pacific Basin are fully understood. We believe our area should not be subjected to risks that are not totally and completely understood.

TRIBUTE TO THE LATE JOHN P. WHITE

(Mr. McCORMACK asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I am deeply grieved at the passing of a very dear and valued friend of mine, whom many Members of the House knew and admired as much as I did, John P. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

John White was one of the finest gentlemen I ever met. I knew him back in Massachusetts when he was connected with the Massachusetts Legislature, and I knew him in his associations with our Government and Members of the Congress. For years he occupied a very important position in the State Department, which he performed in an outstanding manner.

His qualifications were rich, not only including his dedication to his duties, but his beautiful outlook on life. He was a man who by those rich qualities inspired others who knew him or came in contact with him.

I saw him only last Tuesday in my office when we were having a chat. Two or three days a week he would drop into my office, as I am sure he dropped into the offices of other Members. We were having a chat and he appeared to be in excellent health. The information I received is he left his house this morning to go to the State Department and while en route death suddenly took place. In any event, we have lost a very valuable public official. The State Department certainly has lost a very able servant and employee, and many of the Members of the House—and particularly myself—have lost a dear and valued friend.

I extend to Mrs. White and her loved ones my deepest sympathy in her bereavement.

(Mr. ZABLOCKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, the news this morning about the sudden passing of John P. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations was a shock. It is an untimely loss not only for his immediate family but for his many friends and associates at the State Department and on Capitol Hill.

I came to know "Skip" White especially well when he served as a State Department escort officer on several trips abroad with my subcommittee. I found him courteous and always willing to be of all possible assistance to me and my colleagues. His reports and counsel on international affairs were deeply appreciated. He was a friend as well as an adviser and he will be sorely missed.

Mrs. Zablocki joins me in extending our heartfelt sympathy to Mrs. White and their son, Scott.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, a close and dear friend, John P. White, died suddenly this morning of a heart attack.

Mr. Speaker, I know you are as grieved as I am at the loss of our good friend, dedicated and extraordinarily able public servant and one of God's noble men.

I first met Skip White when I entered the legislature in 1938. He was a page and legislative attaché to the Massachusetts Legislature and was without a doubt the best liked man in the statehouse. He enlisted in the service in 1940 as a private in Field Artillery. When he was honorably discharged in 1945, he was a captain in the U.S. Air Force. When he returned to the legislature, it was as legislative counsel. He served in that capacity from 1946 to 1953 and gained a reputation as being extremely able, dedicated, and dependable. Everyone in the legislature on both sides of the aisle respected him and loved him.

In 1952, right after he had been elected Governor of the Commonwealth, Christian Herter asked Skip to be his legislative secretary. I remember how hard Skip had worked for the reelection of Paul Dever as Governor. But what concerned Governor Herter most was that Skip was the most able man in the statehouse and the man who could best get his legislative program across to the legislature. In the 4 years that he served in this position, he was responsible more than any other man for getting 23 of the 24 major programs of the Herter administration through the legislature. Although he was a good Democrat, he put the Commonwealth above party and the needs of the people above all other considerations.

In 1957, he rejoined us in Washington as special assistant in the Office of Congressional Relations of the State Department. We, who had served in the legislature while he had been there, were overjoyed to have our good friend in Washington, and while we were working on new legislation and new programs, it was nice to have a reminder of past days in the Massachusetts house. We had watched Skip's career from the time he was a house page going to Boston College. We had watched him come up through the ranks and took a special pride in his being brought to the State Department. I will never forget the party we had for him when he was named Deputy Assistant Secretary for the State Department's Congressional Relations in 1964. That was a joyous time because we saw a good friend, an able public servant rewarded for his diligent work. From 1964 until that day he competently, conscientiously, and brilliantly performed his duties in the Office of Congressional Relations. He was always available, always informed and informative, and always helpful.

I will miss him greatly; he was a good friend, a fine companion, and a wonderful man. His wife, Elaine, and their son, Scott, have my deepest sympathy. The only consolation I can offer them is that the time they had together was the happiest period in his life. He loved them and knew he was loved and his life was fulfilled through them. I hope this knowledge will give them strength and comfort.

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, it is with great sadness and shock that I learned of the passing this morning of John P. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

Born in Winthrop, Mass., in 1915, Skip, as he was known to those of us who were fortunate to be among his many friends, attended the Winthrop public schools until 1933 at which time he entered the New Preparatory School in Cambridge. While attending Boston College between 1934 and 1939 he was legislative attaché to the Massachusetts State Legislature.

In 1940 Skip enlisted in the Air Force as a private and upon discharge 5 years later was a captain and pilot.

Upon separation from the Air Force he became legislative counsel for the Massachusetts State Legislature in which position he served until 1953 at which time he became legal secretary to the Governor.

In 1957 he joined us here in Washington as the Special Assistant for Congressional Relations with the State Department, and in 1964 was promoted to the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

Skip's life was a model of loyalty and service to his country and dedication to his family and friends.

He was a good friend and a capable and hardworking man who will be deeply missed by those of us whose lives were made a little better by his passing through them.

Mr. Speaker, I extend my deepest sympathy to his lovely wife Elaine and his son Scott.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I want to join my colleagues in expressing my deep sense of shock and grief at the passing today of John P. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

"Skip" White was among the most able and amiable men in the State Department. His loss will be felt all over Capitol Hill and throughout the State Department. But he will be especially missed by those of us who serve as members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Skip provided each of us with years of valuable counsel and experience as well as courteous and efficient personal service during the committee's trips abroad. It was on those occasions that many of us got to know Skip personally and were privileged to share his friendship.

His death is an untimely loss for all of us. Mrs. Broomfield joins me in extending our sincere condolences to Mrs. White and their son, Scott.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, I was shocked and saddened to hear of the passing of my warm and personal friend, "Skip" White.

Skip White was one of the greatest men it has been my privilege to know. He rendered magnificent service to the Nation and was loved and respected by Members of the Congress.

There were so many good characteristics about Mr. White. He was always thoughtful, pleasant, and helpful. He was intelligent, industrious, and a dedicated public servant. Skip White possessed the quality of warmth and friendship that drew people to him. Above all,

he loved this Republic. He served our country and the cause of freedom throughout the world with a very special devotion and dedication.

Skip White will be greatly missed by his colleagues in the State Department, by every Member of Congress who knew him, and by a host of friends the world over. Skip White used our office frequently to make calls and hold conferences in connection with the Wednesday morning State Department briefings for House Members. Mrs. Dorn and my staff looked forward to his visits, as he was always courteous and kind. They join me in my deepest and most heartfelt sympathy always to Mrs. White and to all of his family.

Mr. ROONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I was profoundly shocked to learn of the sudden passing this morning of the Honorable John P. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. I knew "Skip" White for many years. He was a true friend. Skip had been with the State Department since 1957; a truly dedicated, informed, hardworking, and warm human being. We shall all miss him greatly. Skip's professional life was one of public service starting back in 1933 when he was a page to the Massachusetts State Legislature while attending Boston College. In 1940 he entered the armed services as a private, emerging 5 years later as a captain and pilot. He became legislative counsel for the Massachusetts State Legislature upon his discharge and held that post until 1953 when he became legal secretary to the Governor. In 1957 he came to the State Department as special assistant for Congressional Relations and, in 1964 was made Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. His dedication to his work was exceeded only by his dedication to his lovely wife, Elaine, and their son, Scott. Mrs. Rooney joins me in extending our prayers and deepest sympathy in this sad hour.

Mr. MURPHY of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I was shocked and saddened to learn of the untimely death of John P. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

Jack White began public service by working as a page and later as legislative counsel for the Massachusetts State Legislature. After serving as legal secretary for the Governor of Massachusetts, Christian Herter, Jack White moved to Washington in 1957 as Special Assistant for Congressional Relations for the State Department. In 1964, he became Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, a post in which he served until his death.

My friendship with Jack White began in 1959, when I first came to Congress and was appointed to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Throughout my years of association with him, I developed a deep appreciation and respect for his reports and wise counsel on international affairs. The State Department has lost an able and dedicated servant, and I have lost a dear and valuable friend.

Mrs. Murphy joins me in extending to his wife, Elaine, and son, Scott, our most heartfelt sympathy.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in sadness over the death of one of our true friends, and one of the Federal Government's most loyal workers.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations John P. White—known to most of us as "Skip" White—died suddenly this morning while on duty for the State Department. He was 53.

"Skip" White was one of those key officials whose roles are often unheralded, but without whom the massive Federal Government cannot function. Many Members of this body, and particularly those of the Massachusetts delegation, are very familiar with the efficient manner in which "Skip" White carried out his duties as a liaison man for the State Department with the Congress.

Always willing to help, "Skip" was adept at avoiding delays in communication between his Department and this body. I know personally of many occasions when his intimate knowledge of the Government, and his knack for getting things done, rescued projects that appeared to be tangled in redtape.

"Skip" was born in Winthrop, Mass., in December 1915. He attended public schools there, the New Preparatory School in Cambridge, and from 1935 until 1940 he was a student at Boston College. He enlisted as a private in the Army in 1940, served in combat in World War II, and was honorably discharged as a captain and a pilot in 1945.

During his years at Cambridge and Boston College, he had served as a page in the Massachusetts general court, and he returned to the State legislature as a legislative counsel from 1946 to 1953. His long and close relationship with former Massachusetts Gov. Christian Herter began in those days, and he served as legislative secretary to the Governor from 1953 to 1957. When Mr. Herter became Secretary of State, "Skip" came to Washington with him and became a special assistant in the Office of Congressional Relations, Department of State. He served in that position from 1957 until 1964 when he was named Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

During my 8 years in the Massachusetts Senate, I came to know "Skip" White well and to appreciate his very special talents.

That death should strike down a man of such stature at such an early age is truly tragic. The Congress, the State Department, and the entire Federal Government is greatly diminished by his passing.

I extend my deepest sympathy to his widow Elaine, and his son Scott B. White.

Mr. HANNA. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HANNA. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I would just like to join the gentleman in expressing my shock and sorrow at the passing of "Skip" White, and in doing so I know that I express the sentiments of many of the Members in this House who have been involved in matters with the State Department, and in connection with for-

eign nations in which "Skip" White played such an important part.

To many the servants of Government beneath the ranks of leadership are faceless ciphers. Not so. More so than not they are warm, wonderful, and valued copartners in the business of Government. No one person typifies the interdependency; the mutual respect that is created and maintained between those that lead and those who serve in less spectacular roles than did John "Skip" White. His untimely passing dramatically demonstrates the respect and affection that so often attaches to our partnership in good government.

I want to remind the House that he was a very active and valuable ally in the recent exchange between Members of the House here in the United States and Members of the National Assembly in Korea.

We have certainly lost a friend and I want to join in our expression of sympathy to the family.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I certainly desire to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from Massachusetts and the gentleman from California. I was among those who had the opportunity of working with "Skip" during our legislative exchange with the Korean National Assembly. His work was outstanding.

I should like to add that over the years I have worked with many representatives of the various executive departments of the Government. I have never known one who was more cooperative, more helpful, or more efficient in the pursuit of his duties than our late friend, "Skip" White.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to my distinguished friend, the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, I want to associate myself with all that has been said about this great loss to good government and our country in the very untimely death of the Honorable John P. White, the good friend of the Members of the House of Representatives for many years and my warm personal friend.

I shall indeed miss his friendly counsel and his important and valuable services.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Speaker, I want to join in the expressions of the gentleman from Massachusetts. I confess to a deep sense of shock on learning of the death of "Skip" White.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, he has been an invaluable ally and aide to every member of the subcommittee. He has been at all times efficient, effective, courteous, and considerate.

I think the Government of the United States has sustained a real loss in the passing of this most dedicated servant.

I offer my deepest sympathy to his family.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, I want to associate myself with the eloquent remarks of the most distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. CONTE). His sentiments of bereavement and those of the other Members are so well said that I can add nothing to them. But I am honored to associate myself in such sincere remarks of sorrow.

Mr. Speaker, this young man was a hallmark of dedication to his country and a magnificent representative of the Department of State. If all other departments of our Government were represented as he represented his country as a member of the State Department, there would be less suspicion and more admiration on the part of those who make the policy and carry out what this Congress is trying to do for this country.

Mr. CONTE. I thank the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. KLEPPE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. KLEPPE. Mr. Speaker, I was a member of the congressional delegation that went to Korea and I had the chance to get to know "Skip" White.

I found out just what kind of representative of our country he was. I also found out what kind a man and friend he was.

Mr. Speaker, I want to join in the remarks made by the gentleman in the well and my colleagues who have just preceded me and extend my sympathies to the family. We have lost a friend and this country has lost a very notable citizen.

Mr. CONTE. I thank my colleague.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CONTE. I yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, I want to join my colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts, in this expression of sorrow over the passing of John White.

I think what has been said here by so many Members is indicative of his character and of his personality. I have known "Skip" White for more than 30 years. I recall being a young member of the Massachusetts Legislature when Leverett Saltonstall was speaker of the house. At that time John White was his personal page. From those days to this day, he dedicated himself to the public service, having been assistant to Governor Herter and then coming down here as one of his assistants when he was Under Secretary and then Secretary of State.

I think the task he had as Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs and the manner in which he performed that particular task showed pretty well his personality and his ability.

Congressional liaison is not the easiest of tasks, but John White performed this chore with great ability, knowledge, and

a pleasing personality. His fine style and manner won the respect and esteem of all all who came in contact with him. He was constantly on the Hill and dropping in to the Members' offices or chatting with them in the corridors on, not alone, matters pertaining to the Department of State but personal problems affecting the constituents of the Members of the Congress. He, indeed, was the ideal congressional liaison man.

I know that this Nation has lost a great public servant. I know the Department of State has lost a spirited and very persuasive member of the Secretary's staff. So I join with my colleagues and all of those who have expressed their sympathy today and those who did so yesterday and those who will do so in the days to come.

I express that sympathy to his wife, Elaine, and his son, Scott, in this hour of deep sorrow.

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the distinguished majority whip, the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to associate myself with the remarks made by my colleagues with respect to "Skip" White. I was shocked, as were the members of my staff in the whip's office, when we learned of the untimely death of Mr. White. We had a very warm, close personal relationship with him. He was an invaluable aide to my office and myself, and I join with all who have expressed their deep sense of loss in a great public official. Mrs. Boggs joins in extending our sympathy to Mrs. White and members of his family.

Mr. CONTE. I yield to the distinguished ranking minority member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. ADAIR).

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Speaker, I am among those who were deeply grieved over the passing of our good friend and counselor, John P. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

"Skip" White was an able professional, and he represented the State Department and his country in a most effective manner. I always found him to be courteous, well informed, and very helpful. I will miss being able to call upon this dedicated American for advice and counsel in the years ahead.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I was shocked at the sad news of the sudden death of John P. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

Many in this House knew "Skip" White longer and better than I, among these our distinguished Speaker of the House, JOHN W. McCORMICK, but I yield to none of these in the depth of my admiration and respect for this faithful public servant.

"Skip" White's passing was sudden as he drove from his home to his office in the Department of State. The news reached Capitol Hill quickly and was received with great sorrow by his hosts of friends.

His assistance to many Members of this House was invaluable to them in their official work. His counsel on inter-

national affairs was a big factor in helping many Members of Congress in forming their own views and making important decisions.

I personally shall miss him. I will always look back with great pleasure to a trip to Southeast Asia last March when "Skip" White was the escort representative of the State Department assigned to the U.S. delegation attending an inter-parliamentary meeting with representatives of the National Assembly of South Korea. I will never forget his many courtesies and his help extended to me and all the other members of the delegation.

Mrs. Price, who holds the same high esteem and admiration for "Skip," joins me in extending our deepest sympathy to Mrs. Smith and their son, Scott.

Mr. BRADEMANS. Mr. Speaker, like many other Members of Congress, I was profoundly grieved to learn of the death of John P. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

John White, or "Skip" as most of us knew him, was a most dedicated and able public servant.

After service for the Massachusetts State Legislature and for the Governor of Massachusetts, Skip White came to Washington in 1957 as the Special Assistant for Congressional Relations for the State Department, and 7 years later became Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

He worked hard at his job, was scrupulously fair to Members of Congress of both political parties, and I know that all of us who knew him will miss him.

I extend to Mrs. White and his son my deepest sympathies.

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Speaker, it was a shock to learn of the untimely death of John P. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

Mr. White was an exemplary public official with a high sense of dedication. The State Department and the Nation has lost a valuable public servant.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the life, character, and public service of the late John P. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Wisconsin?

There was no objection.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 196]

Abbitt	Davis, Ga.	Matsunaga
Addabbo	Dawson	May
Anderson,	Derwinski	Miller, Calif.
Tenn.	Diggs	Mills
Ashley	Edwards, La.	Morton
Aspinall	Farbstein	Ottenger
Barrett	Fascell	Pollock
Bell, Calif.	Feighan	Powell
Blanton	Flowers	Purcell
Blatnik	Ford,	Roberts
Bolling	William D.	Rodino
Brock	Gallagher	Rooney, N.Y.
Byrne, Pa.	Gray	St. Onge
Cahill	Green, Oreg.	Saylor
Carey	Halpern	Springer
Celler	Harvey	Talcott
Chisholm	Hawkins	Taylor
Clark	Hechler, W. Va.	Teague, Tex.
Clawson, Del	Holifield	Waggonner
Clay	Hosmer	Whalley
Collins	Kirwan	Wilson, Bob
Colmer	Lipscomb	Wyder
Culver	MacGregor	Wyman
Cunningham	Mann	
Daddario	Marsh	

The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 359 Members have answered to their names, a quorum.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

CUT IN MODEL CITIES PROGRAM

(Mr. PATMAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, the Nixon administration announced a 42-percent reduction in the funds for the model cities program, along with similar reductions in our 235 and 236 housing programs for low-income people and a reduction in water and sewer loans.

The Model Cities Act, the rent supplements program, and the 1968 Housing Act passed by Democratic Congresses and Democratic administrations are truly milestones and will, if properly carried out, solve our housing programs. The action of the Nixon administration in cutting back funding for these programs constitutes, in my opinion, one of the cruelest and most cold-hearted steps ever taken against our low- and moderate-income families. While, at the same time, the Nixon administration and its Secretary of Housing and Urban Development mouthed pious statements about and concern for housing, they immediately moved to cut the heart out of the model cities program—one of the major housing programs enacted by the Congress. There can be no question that this action by the Nixon administration makes it clear that it is turning its back on the hopes of the low- and moderate-income person in their desire to secure decent, safe, and sanitary housing.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Romney very recently said:

We have to establish for housing and urban development the high national priority which the goals set by Congress require.

Yesterday's action is apparently Secretary Romney's concept of "high national priority."

It is doubly cruel, Mr. Speaker, and especially tragic that the administration has moved to cut back its housing programs at a time when the housing industry is at one of its lowest points in recent history. Housing starts will, no

doubt, drop as low, or lower than 1 million units in 1969—meaning that for the year 1969, we will fall 1.6 million units below that needed to meet our national housing goals for this year.

DEMOCRATIC VICTORIES IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

(Mr. EDMONDSON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, last night a very well-known news commentator, Alan Smith, on WTTG, reporting on the latest development on the campaign front, said the Democrats had just won their third special election this year for a House seat.

I called WTTG to try to get the record straight on it. I was informed the United Press had given them that information. I called the United Press to try to get the record straight, and they said somebody else had given them the information.

So, for the record, for my friends at WTTG, which usually is a very accurate television station, and for United Press International, I just want to make the record clear:

There have been five special elections this year for House seats, and the party of the people, the Democratic Party, has won four of those special elections—not three—and we hope we can continue to see this trend develop and grow in the months ahead, with another great Democratic victory in November of 1970.

INCREASE IN REQUEST FOR FOREIGN AID PROGRAM

(Mr. HAYS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, I was interested in the remarks of the gentleman from Texas about the cut in the model cities program. We are marking up the foreign aid bill now, and I thought the membership would be interested to know that the administration has submitted a bill and asked for a billion dollars more for foreign aid than the Congress voted last year, which comes out to just about a 40-percent increase.

I hope, when this bill gets to the House, we can at least cut it down to size.

CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE AND AEC TESTING IN ALASKA

(Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN. Mr. Speaker, I want to further add to what has been said about the major earthquake that occurred in my congressional district causing extensive damage and personal injury to the area and the people of Santa Rosa and Sonoma County.

With the San Andreas fault located near the western seashore of Sonoma County, everyone familiar with the area recognizes the basic seismic instability of the terrain.

In view of this disaster and the instability factor, a number of my constituents have been calling, expressing concern over the pending Atomic Energy Commission tests to take place in Amchitka, Alaska.

Therefore, I have joined with some of my other congressional colleagues from California in signing a letter to President Nixon, asking that he postpone the nuclear test explosion until such time as we can be satisfied that there will be no adverse affect on our coastal area resulting from or caused by these tests.

You can understand the concern on the part of the people of Hilo, Hawaii, Crescent City, Calif., and other coastal communities when you realize that these areas have been the recipients of major tidal waves caused by earthquakes that have occurred in Alaska.

The tsunami wave action wiped out my hometown of Crescent City, Calif., in 1963, following the earthquake that centered in Anchorage, Alaska. Ten lives were lost and the entire downtown section of Crescent City was totally devastated.

And now, this major earthquake in Sonoma County has developed extreme and very emotional fear among my constituents.

Therefore, I have called the White House, the Department of Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission, asking President Nixon, the DOD, and the AEC to call off the firing of the test explosion in Alaska today.

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 1970, AND RESERVE STRENGTH

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 14000) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina.

The motion was agreed to.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H.R. 14000, with Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee rose on yesterday, it had agreed that title I of the bill would be considered as read and open to amendment at any point.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, today could be a long day, and I suspect it will.

It is not going to be the desire of the chairman of the Armed Services Com-

mittee to keep any Member from saying anything he wants to say. I personally believe that everyone has made up his mind on how he is going to vote on just about everything here. It will be my desire not even to ask for a limitation of debate at this time, or the next 3 or 4 hours, as far as that is concerned. I just hope this Committee will get on and debate the things which are causing the country the greatest concern.

I sincerely recognize a lot of the Members of this body have problems with certain parts of this bill. I want them to look out for what they think is good for the country and for their own welfare. Of course, that would never come before the country's welfare. I recognize this.

I will certainly not impose my will on anybody if I can help it. I just hope that those who want to finish tonight will help us. I will cooperate any way I can. I just ask and plead with everybody, let us debate first things first and let us see if we cannot get the main problems out of the way and then get to the small problems.

I ask, and I am sure I will receive, the full cooperation of everybody.

On yesterday if I hurt the feelings of anybody it was not intentional. That is not my business. One distinguished Member accused me of saying something that hurt his feelings. I am not in the business of making enemies; they pick me out of the crowd. So if I have, I hope that you will accept my apologies, because I have a higher mission than this. I try to reflect what the committee has done. Believe me, if I reflect on anybody, there was absolutely no intention to. I want you to know I would not do it.

In debate I do not mind taking it. I can take care of myself. I did not want to hurt anybody's feelings. I want to set the record straight. I would not hurt anybody's feelings.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. CHARLES H. WILSON

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, are not members of the committee supposed to be recognized by seniority?

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter for the Chair's discretion.

The Clerk will read the amendment. The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON of California: On page 2, line 6, strike out "\$780,460,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$434,960,000".

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, this is the amendment which there has been so much discussion about and which is possibly the most important amendment that will be considered in the bill that is now under consideration. This is the amendment that will strike out the deployment of the Safeguard antiballistic-missile system but which does, however, leave some \$400 million in the

research and development for this program.

There have been reams and reams of publicity both for and against this particular amendment. Everyone is acquainted with the issue, I am sure. I made a commitment to the people in my district that I would support the amendment to eliminate the deployment of the ABM system. I was one of the eight members of the committee who voted against it when we were marking up the bill, and I am submitting this amendment at this time in line with the commitment I have made to the people of the 31st District of California. I would suggest that we debate this thing fully and we consider all aspects of it this morning and proceed with our deliberations on this important legislation as expeditiously as possible.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. LEGGETT. The offering of this amendment at this time disturbs a little bit the timetable we had arranged for today, but I think—

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Who is "we"?

Mr. LEGGETT. I am talking about a number of us on the committee who voted and signed the minority and concurring views. As you know, we have been working for about 6 months trying to develop a viable minority on our committee, and without counsel I might say it has been a very, very difficult chore. I want to commend my colleague from California for offering the amendment at this time. We have a united position on the majority side of the aisle from California.

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEGGETT. I cannot yield at this time. I have only 5 minutes.

We are both opposed, Mr. WILSON and myself, to the deployment of the ABM missile and granting funds for that at this time. I want to say that if we were provincial, probably I would have another position, because certainly 17 percent of our defense budget comes from California. A lot of it comes from my district and a lot of it is spent out there. Certainly I think we have to have cost effectiveness as a prime criterion with respect to the expenditure of Federal funds. I moved in the committee to strike out \$545.5 million for the ABM system. I included \$345 million as my colleague has included in his amendment here today. Actually, this was going to be my amendment. However, he does not include a \$200 million cut for R. & D. that I included in my committee amendment. I thought, since research and development was proceeding parallel with the hardware procurement, if we do not buy the hardware we would be saving a large portion of research and development money.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask the members of the Committee to look at page 164 of the report where they will find a synopsis of some of the things I am going to say here today. I refer particularly to that paragraph wherein the Army states that no R. & D. funds would

be saved if procurement does not advance. When I stated that I felt they did not need the \$200 million for research and development, they say they do. In other words, what happens to the R. & D. if there is no deployment?

The statement to which I refer is as follows:

If fiscal year 1970 authorization to proceed with tactical procurement is denied, the fiscal year 1970 R. & D. program will continue as presently planned because the development and test program has reached a state whereby all of the major components (except the perimeter acquisition radar) are ready in fiscal year 1970 or early fiscal year 1971 for integrated system tests at the Kwajalein Missile Range. Any significant delay in these planned tests would create inefficiencies in utilization of test facilities and personnel and use of previously accumulated test data and materials.

So it is obvious that a full testing program can take place without spending \$4.5 billion to test the system in the Dakotas.

We are going to find out whether this system will work when we fire the missiles out at Kwajalein as best we can without atmospheric testing. I say we are not going to have tests anyway in the Continental United States. We cannot make up our minds now as to whether or not we can actually have the silo tests of the Minuteman which the local farmers tell us really will not work.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for an additional 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, and I shall not object to the gentleman proceeding at this time because I think he made his request quite properly—I believe this is a subject for debate, but, in view of the fact that the Congress convened 2 hours early today, I shall object in the future.

Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the gentleman's consideration. I might say, however, that, if the gentleman is going to object to anyone asking for additional time, Members who have spent much time in studying the ABM system and this bill will be unable to express themselves within the span of 5 minutes fully on this very important subject and I suspect, therefore, we will be out of this House by 2 o'clock this afternoon.

Mr. Chairman, we are spending 70 percent of our total administrative budget either directly or indirectly in this procurement bill. I say it is worthwhile to take some time to determine whether or not all the items we have in this bill are pragmatic and necessary.

Mr. Chairman, the total program with reference to the ABM, as you know, is not to shoot down every incoming missile that is going to be shot by the Soviet

Union. As the Secretary of Defense Mr. Laird has said it is to assure that we are going to have approximately 200 missiles surviving to meet the problem posed in 1970 when the Soviets build the SS-9 and that we want to be sure that they will never feel free to think that they can shoot those SS-9's and effect a first strike.

In the ABM portion of this legislation, we are spending \$10 billion and the other body estimates the figure will be \$20 billion.

Mr. Chairman, Senator SYMINGTON estimated that this escalation could take us to the \$400 billion level over the next 10 years. But what we are doing in this bill now pending before us here today is spending in the order of \$50 million to \$100 million per ICBM silo, to protect the Minuteman missile in the foreseeable future as they do not have such protection today.

If we want to assure that we are going to have a viable, credible deterrent, why, we can buy 200 additional missiles and, by building one-(ulms), ultra-long-range submarines, we can buy 200 missiles for a fraction of the ABM cost. We have money for the (ulms) program in this bill. We have money for all kinds of enhancements to our Minuteman program and the Poseidon program contained in this legislation. So I say we just do not need to spend \$100 million to \$200 million a silo to extend this kind of protection.

I say we are foolish to start off on a very, very expensive program that is going to take us 10 years—admittedly 5 years—to effect a deployment with the very fragile support that we have for this system.

I think it is a good thing that we have had virtually unanimous support in this Congress for the great things we have done in this House, the Polaris program, and our nuclear ship program, and personally I like the Poseidon program—and on that I might differ with some of my colleagues—but I think it is worth while to move ahead with programs where we have got very strong polarization. But we are damned fools to start in with a \$10 billion expenditure when there is the possibility of a 50-50 Mexican standoff—as we have in the other body, especially when the 50 Senators who voted against this bill represent 58 percent of the American population.

If you are wondering about the attitude of the American people, you can refer to the polls and refer to the election that my colleague from Oklahoma referred to just a moment ago in the home State of our Speaker in Massachusetts.

I do not believe the American public likes waste. I think when we moved ahead with the program last year we in effect wasted \$1.2 billion dollars.

You recall we had on the floor at that time the system called Sentinel. This was to protect us from the Chinese, and their ability to lob 20 or 50 missiles over into the United States in the middle seventies. But then over the years suddenly that has not become important at all. Now we are concerned with an alleged massive installation on the part of the Soviet Union and the fact that Secretary Laird discovered that the Soviet Union was in

the process of constructing 35 missiles of the SS-9 variety over the past year.

I moved in committee to strike \$545.5 million from the item "Missiles for the Army." Eight favorable votes were recorded. This reduction includes the procurement amount of \$345.1 million and an additional amount of \$200 million—the estimated research funds attendant to the procurement that would not be spent if the system is not deployed. Were this amendment to carry, there would remain \$200.9 million for Safeguard research and \$125 million for general missile research.

Since the committee hearing I have received a communication from the Army that negates that any R. & D. funds would be saved if procurement does not advance. The Army statement is as follows:

If fiscal year 1970 authorization to proceed with tactical procurement is denied, the fiscal year 1970 R. & D. program will continue as presently planned because the development and test program has reached a state whereby all of the major components (except the perimeter acquisition radar) are ready in fiscal year 1970 or early fiscal year 1971 for integrated system tests at the Kwajalein Missile Range. Any significant delay in these planned tests would create inefficiencies in utilization of test facilities and personnel and use of previously accumulated test data and materials.

I fail to understand the Army logic of this position, however, rather than argue the point I will not ask for an R. & D. reduction on the House floor.

The debate over the necessity for ballistic missile defense, or the adequacy of the proposed ABM systems, has been continuing for a number of years. The proposals have ranged from a heavy city-oriented defense through a light city defense and finally to an offensive missile defense system known as the Safeguard, the system under consideration this year.

I have consistently opposed these proposals for what I and a large number of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and in both Houses of Congress consider to be sound strategic and political reasons.

I do not intend to reiterate all the arguments. Most of them have been fully covered in prior debates. I do, however, wish to discuss the major premises.

I do not believe that the ABM program makes much sense. It is clearly cost ineffective. It is very, very expensive for the limited objectives which could be satisfied with other existing hardware. There is a serious question of its effectiveness in achieving its limited objectives under battle conditions. There is no doubt that it creates a massive real estate, personnel training, and readiness problem never before attempted by modern man. Assuming we are successful in developing an anti-missile-missile system, the whole thing could be easily obviated by more Soviet missiles which leads again to ad infinitum escalation.

MAJORITY OF AMERICANS OPPOSE

The point has been made that major American action is usually accompanied by a two-thirds vote requirement—city bonds, impeachment, constitutional amendments. In the other body, the vote on this issue was divided 50-50—so the

program was not terminated and the tie went to the administration. Ironically, the 50 Senators on the minority represent 58 percent of the American electorate in the States or portions of States they represent—assuming each Senator represents one-half of a State. We think it is fundamentally bad business to start a 10-year or maybe 50-year building program with such a frail even standoff to begin with.

The purpose of the ABM system as it has been described by Secretary Laird is to assure that with our capability to shoot 1,000 Sprint and Spartan antiballistic missiles, perhaps 200 of our offensive ICBM Minuteman II's and III's will survive in the middle 1970's and 1980's in the event the Soviets go for a "first strike" at our missiles.

WASTE LAST YEAR

You will recall in the authorization bill last year, it was not our loss of missiles due to the Soviet threat that engulfed us, but rather the loss of people in our cities due to the Chinese threat. We have apparently forgotten about the Chinese and the Sentinel system, and as of this writing, it's anybody's guess what happened to the \$342.7 million we appropriated for procurement, \$312.9 million for research, and \$263.9 million for construction near cities—totaling \$919.5 million. No doubt these funds have been spent for good national purposes regardless of the complete change of mission.

M'NAMARA WARNING

It was stated in my separate views in the report last year that undoubtedly someday there would be pressure to escalate the system to take on the Soviet Union. Nobody dreamed that the system would be changed in less than a year and the Soviets challenged.

The ABM system, of course, has been under development for over 10 years by the Army and later by the other services—\$4 billion have been spent on research to date for the Nike Zeus, Nike X—then the Sentinel, and now the Safeguard system. From a \$3 billion light city defense in 1967, we have now moved to a \$12 billion Soviet missile defense. It has been estimated in the other body that this escalation may not stop until we reach the \$400 billion level.

The alleged reason for the modification from Sentinel to Safeguard was because of the Defense Department discovery early this year that the Soviets had 35 more SS-9 large missiles than we thought they had, and the mere fact that the Soviet Union had 235 large SS-9 missiles under construction posed a threat to our very existence. As Secretary Laird said, "They're going for our missiles. No doubt about it."

What the OSD forgot, however, was an admonition from former Secretary McNamara—1967, page 395-6 Armed Services Committee hearings:

Once sufficient forces have been procured to give us high confidence of achieving our assured destruction objective, we can then consider the kinds and amounts of forces which might be added to reduce damage to our population and industry in the event deterrence fails. But here we must note another important point; namely, the possible interaction of our strategic forces programs with those of the Soviet Union. If the general

nuclear war policy of the Soviet Union also has as its objective the deterrence of a U.S. first strike (which I believe to be the case), then we must assume that any attempt on our part to reduce damage to ourselves (to what they would estimate we might consider an acceptable level) would put pressure on them to strive for an offsetting improvement in their deterrent forces. Conversely, an increase in their damage limiting capability would require us to make greater investments in assured destruction, which, as I will describe later, is precisely what we now propose to do.

It is this interaction between our strategic forces programs and those of the Soviet Union which leads us to believe that there is a mutuality of interests in limiting the deployment of anti-ballistic-missile defense systems. If our assumption that the Soviets are also striving to achieve an assured destruction capability is correct, and I am convinced that it is, then in all probability all we would accomplish by deploying ABM systems against one another would be to increase greatly our respective defense expenditures, without any gain in real security for either side. * * *

The principal issue in this area of the strategic forces program concerns the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defense system, that is, Nike-X. There are three somewhat overlapping but distinct major purposes for which we might want to deploy such a system at this time:

1. To protect our cities (and their population and industry) against a Soviet missile attack.

2. To protect our cities against a Red Chinese missile attack in the mid-1970's.

3. To help protect our land-based strategic offensive forces (that is, Minuteman) against a Soviet missile attack.

After studying the subject exhaustively, and after hearing the views of our principal military and civilian advisers, we have concluded that we should not initiate an ABM deployment at this time for any of these purposes. We believe that:

1. The Soviet Union would be forced to react to a U.S. ABM deployment by increasing its offensive nuclear force still further with the result that:

(a) The risk of a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States would not be further decreased.

(b) The damage to the United States from a Soviet nuclear attack, in the event deterrence failed, would not be reduced in any meaningful sense.

As I noted earlier, the foundation of our security is the deterrence of a Soviet nuclear attack. We believe such an attack can be prevented if it is understood by the Soviets that we possess strategic nuclear forces so powerful as to be capable of absorbing a Soviet first strike and surviving with sufficient strength to impose unacceptable damage on them.

We have such power today. We must maintain it in the future, adjusting our forces to offset actual or potential changes in theirs.

There is nothing we have seen in either our own or the Soviet Union's technology which would lead us to believe we cannot do this. From the beginning of the Nike-Zeus project in 1955 through the end of this current fiscal year, we will have invested a total of about \$4 billion on ballistic missile defense research—including Nike-Zeus, Nike X, and Project Defender. And during the last 5 or 6 years, we have spent about \$1.2 billion on the development of penetration aids to help insure that our missiles could penetrate the enemy's defenses. As a result of these efforts, we have the technology already in hand to counter any offensive or defensive force changes the Soviet Union might undertake in the foreseeable future.

We believe the Soviet Union has essentially the same requirement for a deterrent or "as-

sured destruction" force as the United States. Therefore, deployment by the United States of an ABM defense which would degrade the destruction capability of the Soviet's offensive force to an unacceptable level would lead to expansion of that force. This would leave us no better off than we were before.

NO EVIDENCE OF FIRST STRIKE INTENT

It is very questionable whether the conclusion is valid that the Soviets are going for our missiles at all in a first strike. In the early 1960's we built very large liquid propellant multimegaton rockets. We've never professed an intent to go for their missiles on a first strike. After building many hundreds of large liquid rockets, we converted to the smaller megaton solid fuel Minuteman. The Soviets, on the other hand, have always had more primitive rockets than the United States. The U.S.S.R. started SS-9's in 1964, carried on an almost level building program through 1967 when they phased down last year and this year. The general intelligence information is based on classified numbers which substantially negate any Soviet massive building program recently.

Of course, the fact that at least 100 of our Minuteman field is out of range of the Soviet SS-9 missile should be the easy answer to those who charge a Soviet first strike intention.

I questioned Secretary Packard at length before our committee with respect to Russia's first strike intentions. I do not believe the Secretary of Defense was fully conscious of American nuclear might when he drew the conclusions he did. In the 1970's the United States, as published in nonclassified documents, will have:

	Warheads
31 submarines × 16 missile tubes ×	
10 + Poseidon MIRV warheads.....	4,230
10 submarines × 16 missile tubes × 3	480
1,054 Minuteman III ICBM's × 2.....	2,108
Tactical nuclear bombs warhead	
Europe	7,000
B-52 bomber capacity.....	4,200
(Plus unknown B-58; FB-111, AMSA load)	
Total	10,018

In addition, we are providing funds in this bill for a new class of—ULMS—ultralong-range submarines that will pose an additional 6,000 warhead threat in the late 1970's.

It is utter and complete nonsense to suggest that the Soviets are going for our missiles. How they would conclude that we might not be going for theirs is hard to imagine.

How 200 warheads could add or detract from the 24,000 warhead threat of the seventies is difficult to contemplate. It can be argued, however, quite plausibly that a 1,000 unit ABM system in reality is intended to pick off a few stray Soviet missiles after we effect our first strike.

UNITED STATES ASLEEP WITH 24,000 WARHEADS

How any country could postulate that they could shoot 225 or 500 ABM's and catch the United States napping with all 24,000 warheads under repair, out of commission or out of effective Presidential control in this modern age is inconceivable.

Mentioned in Newsweek magazine some months ago was the 916 Satellite

warning system. There are funds in this bill to support this foolproof \$2 billion warning system that is designed to give warning 5 minutes after launch and 25 minutes before impact of an enemy attack and the pattern of impact. This warning system upon which the ABM is dependent will also give us adequate time to launch any counterattack contemplated by the President.

OTHER SYSTEMS CHEAPER

If the President wants an ABM system I say he should buy it from the Air Force, not the Army. The Air Force system outlined to the committee could be installed by modifying the nose cone on 100 ICBM's. The 10-year total cost was estimated at \$500 million plus a \$2 billion cost for MSR—missile site radars—and PAR—perimeter area radars. The Air Force has experience at being on ready alert and already has the men and silos in place.

Compare this to the Army system. It is estimated that 10,000 to 20,000 Army personnel will be trained and stationed at the contemplated 1,000 silos around the country to protect our missiles. We are buying annual maintenance charges in this bill of at least \$1 billion per year. This is the most expensive fire department ever conceived by man.

Interestingly enough today we do not have enough money in the Defense Department to keep more than a few hundred of our B-52's on 15-minute alert with highly trained Air Force personnel. With the ABM the plan is to keep 1,000 crews on 3-minute alert waiting for the Soviets to develop a submarine launched fractional orbiting Poseidon type missile that will be accurate enough to catch our Air Force napping on the several score bases to which our planes are currently being scattered.

The Navy, of course, has its SABMIS system guaranteed to cost only \$6 billion that undoubtedly will be presented in next year's budget. I personally think the Navy system is better and cheaper than Safeguard—but we may start to buy both when we probably need neither.

For those who charge that the United States needs an ABM because the Russians have a Golash ABM the answer is simple. The Soviets 5 years ago started a defensive system and installed not 1,000 sophisticated launchers as we are doing in this bill, but 67 primitive non-automatic devices. When we learned of this defensive mechanism many years ago we immediately responded to the challenge. We developed and deployed ICBM's and Polaris with chaff and decoy capability and a multiple warhead capability. In addition, we overtargeted our missiles at Moscow. The net effect of Moscow's efforts was that they were less secure and today they have abandoned their efforts, while two-fifths complete, to provide an ABM Moscow defense.

The Moscow Golash experience is ample proof to answer those who say the ABM system is defensive only and will not escalate the arms race—they have the United States in a panic.

There is another objection to the system. Even if deployed, the Safeguard or any other system for that matter, will remain a "low confidence" system. Under

the present agreements regarding nuclear testing, it will be impossible to test the ABM warheads. Without atmospheric testing of the warhead we will not be able to determine with complete accuracy the answer to blast blackouts and related problems of incoming missile discrimination. Therefore, the ABM will at best be a backstop. In the event of attack I cannot foresee total reliance on the ABM defense, and all indications are that retaliatory offensive missiles will be used, in any case. What we will gain from the ABM, therefore, is the possibility of some damage limitation at the missile bases. These missile bases will in all probability consist of empty holes in any case, as the retaliatory force must be effected in such a low confidence situation. If the strategy of waiting for a hit before a retaliatory launch is considered, the gains of an ABM system are still not commensurate with the cost both political and economic of such a system in that we still have the submersible missiles, the IRBM's, the bomber fleet, and the surviving ICBM's.

As a matter of economics, it is far more sensible to build up the ICBM force. This will not upset the balance of power nor should it be viewed as offensive.

As a practical matter, regardless of the arguments on this floor, we are never going to actually be in the position where we can rely on the ABM and let the Soviet missiles fall, not shooting our own ICBM's—we are never going to be able to take that chance and the Soviets certainly should not be misled on this point. We can never test the system in action. Scientists claim that there well might be a radar blackout negating the whole system under nuclear fire—we will really never know.

WILL THE ABM CONFOUND SALT TALKS?

With Gromyko's current soft line in the United Nations it is expected that strategic arms limitation talks will begin this year. I would certainly hope that regardless of the outcome of the ABM debate that the President would suspend construction on the system during a 6-month negotiating period. The ABM will take 5 years to build. SALT talks could rule out deployment in less than 1 year.

While on the one hand the ABM could be a poker chip in the talks, as already indicated, the President is the banker already with 24,000 chips at his disposal.

The existence of a full-scale R. & D. program, which is agreed to by all sides of the ABM question, is certainly as sufficient a bargaining chip as is a program not ready for deployment.

The SALT talks must necessarily be approached seriously and honestly. It is foolish to enter such talks with a stacked deck by rushing ahead with deployment in order to have a bargaining ploy. Not only will the Soviets not take such deployment seriously, but will also and with just reason accuse us of unfair tactics and lack of good faith.

Knowing the way Secretary Laird became alarmed when he saw the start of construction of six sites last year with possibly 36 Soviet SS-9 missiles, I am sure the Soviets will be similarly un-

duly alarmed when they see the start of construction of our 1,000-silo program. I am well cognizant that many Members of this House do not believe in an arms race detente. This program is sure to fan the flames of the international bonfire they are encouraging.

In conclusion:

First. The expensive safeguard ABM is not designed to save people—only a few hundred missiles in the Dakotas. These surviving missiles constitute but a few percent of our total force that would survive a Russian first strike.

Second. The Safeguard system can be a poker chip in "arms limitation" agreement talks whether or not we spend several billion dollars to start a system.

Third. The Russian ABM has been a net loss for Moscow and this Moscow defense two-fifths complete has been canceled.

Fourth. If the Chinese ever develop a meaningful threat, the Air Force and Navy have much cheaper systems to take down a handful of missiles or an accidental launch than the "Safeguard" system.

Fifth. Our massive nuclear arsenal and the warning system we are deploying are ample deterrent to preclude either the Soviets or Chinese from launching a first strike.

Sixth. There are not threats current or in any hard intelligence estimates for the future that would degrade our Polaris-Poseidon nuclear second strike.

It is interesting to note that 2 years ago when Secretary McNamara yielded to congressional pressure to move in development of an ABM system against the Chinese, he alluded to two imminent dangers, one of which is already upon us—Speech September 18, 1967, in San Francisco:

In reaching this decision, I want to emphasize that it contains two possible dangers, and we should guard carefully against each.

The first danger is that we may psychologically lapse into the old oversimplification about the adequacy of nuclear power. The simple truth is that nuclear weapons can serve to deter only a narrow range of threats. This ABM deployment will strengthen our defensive posture—and will enhance the effectiveness of our land-based ICBM offensive forces. But the independent nations of Asia must realize that these benefits are no substitute for their maintaining, and where necessary strengthening, their own conventional forces in order to deal with the more likely threats to the security of the region.

The second danger is also psychological. There is a kind of mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry. If a weapon system works—and works well—there is strong pressure from many directions to procure and deploy the weapon out of all proportion to the prudent level required.

The danger in deploying this relatively light and reliable Chinese-oriented ABM system is going to be that pressures will develop to expand it into a heavy Soviet-oriented ABM system.

We must resist that temptation firmly—not because we can for a moment afford to relax our vigilance against a possible Soviet first-strike—but precisely because our greatest deterrent against such a strike is not a massive, costly, but highly penetrable ABM shield, but rather a fully credible offensive assured destruction capability.

The so-called heavy ABM shield—at the

present state of technology—would in effect be no adequate shield at all against a Soviet attack, but rather a strong inducement for the Soviets to vastly increase their own offensive forces. That as I have pointed out, would make it necessary for us to respond in turn—and so the arms race would rush hopelessly on to no sensible purpose on either side.

It is said that nothing can prevent a man from suicide, if he is sufficiently determined to commit it.

The question is what is our determination in an era when unlimited war will mean the death of hundreds of millions—and the possible genetic impairment of a million generations to follow?

Man is clearly a compound of folly and wisdom—and history is clearly a consequence of the admixture of those two contradictory traits.

History has placed our particular lives in an era when the consequences of human folly are waxing more and more catastrophic in the matters of war and peace.

In the end, the root of man's security does not lie in his weaponry.

In the end, the root of man's security lies in his mind.

What the world requires in its 22d year of the atomic age is not a new race towards armament.

What the world requires in its 22d year of the atomic age is a new race towards reasonableness.

We had better all run that race.

Not merely we the administrators. But we the people.

Thank you, and good afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has again expired.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to proceed for 5 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I object.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, some time ago I heard a prominent scientist make the statement that if there was anything worse than a scientist or an artist or an actor speaking out in the field of politics, it was a politician speaking out on a subject about which he knew nothing. I have heard politicians speak on something about which they knew nothing. As a matter of fact, I have been guilty of that transgression myself.

But I do not believe we have today that kind of a situation. All of us know something about the complicated anti-ballistic-missile system known as Safeguard.

I have not heard anyone in this body, however, claim to be an expert. If there is a person who claims to know all about the intricate components and the intricate workings of this complicated system that we call Safeguard, he will have difficulty convincing me of the validity of his claim.

But even though we are not experts, we are called upon to make a decision and I think this is a proper decision for the politicians to make.

I rise not as an expert, but as a member of the House Committee on Armed Services who has listened to all the arguments of the experts, both pro and con. I have studied all of the material

I could get my hands on, both pro and con, in order to make this great and difficult decision.

Mr. Chairman, I reject all of the arguments directed against the deployment of the Safeguard. My preference would be not to spend the large sums of money we are spending for national defense. But I, Mr. Chairman, cannot afford to live in a world of fantasy. I cannot afford to approach this issue with emotion. I must accept the world as it is.

There is a great danger that the Soviet Union will soon have a decisive striking advantage over the United States unless some action is taken. There is a very grave danger that our nuclear deterrent credibility will be overcome unless Safeguard is authorized and deployed.

I submit that the balance of the argument weighs in support of a decision to deploy the Safeguard without further delay.

Because, Mr. Chairman, of the widespread allegations that the Safeguard will not work, I would like to discuss particularly this aspect of the system. I do this because I do not believe most of the Members of the House realize the extent to which the development work has progressed on the ABM. The committee voted the initial development funds for the ABM in this bill because the system has developed and advanced to the point where deployment can be initiated.

I would like to go into some of the details of the development work, and which led the committee to believe the system will work.

First, let us look at the missiles. Flight tests of the redesigned Spartan were initiated in March of last year.

The Army has had 12 Spartan flight tests to date and of these, eight have been successful, two partially successful, and two unsuccessful. This is a remarkably fine record for early flights of a redesigned missile. Naturally, there are many more flight tests to come.

In early 1970 all flight tests will be moved to the Meck Island complex for control and execution by the missile site radar—MSR—there. Beginning in the spring of 1970 interceptions of ICBM's will be attempted.

The Army has fabricated and flight tested some 32 Sprint missiles at White Sands Missile Range. Of these, 17 flights have been fully successful, seven partially successful, and eight unsuccessful. Of particular importance, 12 of the last 14 Sprint firings have been successful. The latest successful firing was on September 15 at White Sands Missile Range. Late this year, all testing will be shifted to Meck Island where firings using most of the system components will be conducted.

Let us look now at the radars and the accompanying computers which are a key part of Safeguard.

The missile site radar installation began in August 1967. The radar first operated in May 1968 and was operating at full power by November 1968. Its performance fully met expectations. The computer and computer programs—software—are similarly being phased-in

in an orderly way. The first missile site data processor was installed in January 1968 and operated with software in February 1969. In May 1969, the MSR was successfully tested in closed-loop communications with a Spartan guidance section. By June 1969, the MSR-data processor-software combination was working together and a test sphere was tracked. Before next July 1, missile firings will be conducted with the MSR.

While the data processing function for Safeguard is certainly complex, it is not any more complicated than some of the previously built computers. The data processing job for Safeguard, like that for the successful Apollo program is a difficult one; however, the requirements can be met. Safeguard data processors are operating successfully today, meeting their requirements both at the Bell Telephone Laboratories and at the Kwajalein test facility. Two of four required data processors for the MSR at the Kwajalein test facility have been installed and have operated successfully as a multiprocessor unit.

The PAR will employ demonstrated state-of-the-art components. Its design and characteristics are quite similar to the FPS-85 radar that the Air Force is operating now at Eglin Field, Fla. Because of the demonstrated state-of-the-art capability, a research and development model is not required. The phase I PAR at Grand Forks, N. Dak., will be used initially for checkout and testing purposes, becoming subsequently a tactical component of the phase I Safeguard system.

What is still needed, then, to insure an effective Safeguard ABM system, is the integrated testing of the components. The Kwajalein test facility will not provide for the checkout and operation of the tactical system. Equally important, it will not provide the ability to check out an integrated multiple site defense. The minimum deployment that will provide operational experience, including the initial interaction between sites, is the phase I deployment approved by the committee.

The major task left is the integration of Safeguard system functions in the computer programs.

The computer programs will be developed and tested at data processing centers—with equipment identical to that at the sites—at the Bell Telephone Laboratories. These centers will contain portions of PAR and MSR receivers and the digital equipment that interfaces these receivers with the data processors. All of the computer programs involved in preparing the missiles, launch control, guidance, and the missile commands will have been thoroughly tested for months at either the data processing centers or the Kwajalein test range before they are needed at the Safeguard sites.

Many months will be devoted to on-site final debugging, checking, and testing. Testing will not stop on the operational readiness date. System testing will continue over the years, and the simulations will become more and more realistic.

In summary, the evidence presented to your committee and the program for

development convinces us that the system can work and will work. It should be remembered that the first phase, which includes radars at two sites, will not be operational until 1973, and there will be plenty of time until then to work on the remaining technological problems.

There are always those who say it cannot be done. But we believe that our national defense has succeeded because it does not yield to that negative spirit. This defensive system is a necessary part of our future security, and we have confidence that American technicians can make it work.

I urge the Members to defeat the amendment of the gentleman from California.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has expired.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for an additional 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I object.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word and rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is sort of a unique experience in this House to have an amendment of this magnitude introduced by a person who does support the amendment in his heart but really does not make any great speech in its behalf. I do not mean that it was a bad speech, but simply that he did not use much of his time to support his position and it is fairly obvious that this is a tactical maneuver of one sort or another.

Does the gentleman from California (Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON) want me to yield to him?

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON. I just want to assure the gentleman that I am not a great speechmaker.

Mr. PIKE. I would assure the gentleman that anything he had to say in support of his terribly important amendment I think all of us would have listened to with great interest.

Yes, we all do know something about the ABM system. But there is so much that we do not know about the ABM system. I would probably support it if I thought it had a chance on earth of working. But one of the things that concerns me most is the command and control problem. We say that no one but the President of the United States has the authority to fire nuclear weapons, and the ABM, all of its firing components, is a nuclear machine. The long-range Spartan missile is a nuclear machine and the short-range Sprint missile is a nuclear machine. When the Spartan intercepts, hopefully, at a high altitude, it does not hit the incoming missile and kill it. The theory is that it kills it with X-rays at some distance, and depending on what the distance is, the incoming missile may or may not be deflected. It may come right straight ahead, and radars on the ground are not going to know really whether that is a dead missile or a live missile, whether that incoming missile has been killed or has not been killed, and nobody is going to give the order to fire the Sprint missiles except a com-

puter, and the Sprint missiles go off at a lower altitude, a much lower altitude, and there is a danger of fallout from our own defensive missiles which have been fired, not by a human being, but by a computer.

I think there is so much about this program that the American people really are not aware of—and I for one am going to be very, very slow to risk the danger of nuclear fallout on the people of this country or on the people of any country, based on a decision which, in the final analysis, is made by a computer. That is what we are talking about. We are talking about the command and control.

I think it is a fiction if we try to tell the American people that the President is going to make the decision to use nuclear weapons. This is not an offensive weapon. This is a defensive weapon. But it can, in the Sprint phase, cause fallout. And nuclear fallout can kill people.

We do not know whether what is coming in is what Dr. Foster refers to as a piece of space garbage or a nuclear missile coming in, but should not we at least have the decision as to whether this thing should be fired really in the hands of the President?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

It is not necessary at this time for me to go into a review of the total ABM system. I feel it is fully covered in the committee's report and further clarified by the statements made by the chairman and the ranking minority member.

Incidentally, the additional views referred to were prepared by the House Armed Services Committee staff. I would like to address myself to the apparently misunderstood "cog" in the wheel of our planned deterrent, and I refer to the "command and control aspects."

It has been said that the Safeguard system will not work because there will not be enough decision time available to allow for human intervention. It is further alleged that this could lead to a "computer-made" decision on whether or not there would be a nuclear exchange.

Let me quote the words of our former colleague and now the Secretary of Defense, Mel Laird:

The need for timely response has been recognized in the design of Safeguard communications. We have had a wealth of experience in the operation of a very sophisticated command and control system applied to our air defense against bombers. There are duplicating, multi-routed communication channels which internet among the President, CONAD headquarters in Colorado Springs, and the National Command Center in Washington. Safeguard will build upon this already proved system to provide the President with the power to make his decision in timely fashion.

Let it be quite clear, that a war-or-peace decision will not be left to the determination of a computer. That decision will most certainly be left in the hands of the President of the United States, who has access to the best advice humanly possible to receive. Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard is on record as saying:

I could not recommend any system whereby atomic bombs are released by the decision of a computer. That is not involved, despite what some of the scientists might say.

Much has been made about the technical problems involved in the communications network that controls the Safeguard. Although there are problems to be overcome, it is most certainly safe to say, that they will be no more difficult to solve in Safeguard than in another area, for example, landing two men on the moon.

Secretary of Defense Laird has stated in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, that we have not yet reached the point in time where the decision has to be made, as to the possibility of the President delegating the authority to fire the Safeguard to a lower ranking officer.

The Secretary further pointed out that every President since Harry S. Truman has retained unto himself the authority to release a nuclear weapon. However, it must be understood that in the past we have always been concerned with offensive weapons, which would impact on the territory of an enemy, thus starting a war, undoubtedly involving nuclear detonation and subsequent release of radioactive material.

In response to a question by Mr. PRICE, chairman of our subcommittee, on R.D.T. & E., Secretary Laird said:

As Mr. Price stated, the warhead will not detonate in the nuclear mode unless an actual target is encountered. Specifically, the missile cannot be sent a command to detonate in the nuclear mode unless the interceptor has reached an altitude which is safe to people on the ground, the radar has tracked the target and established the intercept point, and the interceptor is on course to a position near that point. The missile will accept such commands only after its own environmental sensing equipment discerns that a safe detonation point has been reached. Thus, the warhead cannot be armed and fired until a safe altitude has been reached. As Mr. Price also indicated, the system design permits a withholding of the nuclear detonation if a decision not to intercept is made after the missile is launched. In this event, the warhead can either be destroyed in flight, with conventional explosives, or be permitted to return to earth or the ocean intact. Should it return to earth, there will not be a nuclear detonation. The worst that could happen would be that the small conventional high explosive charge in the warhead could explode or burn on impact, thus scattering small amounts of nuclear material.

This makes for three very important points.

First. In the worst of situations, the ABM will not detonate until it is high enough to not cause a dangerous fallout problem.

Second. If fired accidentally, or at a false target, it will not cause a nuclear explosion, because once in the air it can be destroyed, or it can fall to earth with no resulting nuclear detonation.

Third. It is entirely defensive, and trigger control can and probably will be delegated properly and in a timely manner.

We have now arrived at a point, where in an emergency, such as a failure in communications, authority to fire the ABM could be delegated to someone of

responsibility other than the President. This delegation could be made in complete safety, because of the aforementioned "foolproof" design, and the most important fact that the range of the "Spartan" missile—the larger of the two ABM missiles—is limited to 400 miles. Certainly not enough range to even come close to Soviet territory. In fact, not enough range to clear our own shores.

On the basis of this information, I think it can be fairly stated that the President could and should be able to delegate the firing of a defense weapon, in this case the two ABM missiles.

Let me make it quite clear that I do not advocate the delegation of authority to fire an offensive missile such as the Minuteman. On this I am sure that the President would be the first to agree, that only one man's finger should be on the nuclear trigger. Let us not for one moment forget, that the ABM is and always will be a defensive weapon, it cannot be used for any other purpose.

Let me point out once again that we have lived for many years with the authority to fire our offensive weapons strictly in the hands of the President of the United States, and, at the same time, let me point out, that the amount of time the President has to respond to an attack is very limited, even with our advanced technology giving us the ability to see over the horizon. Today, we are talking about minutes to reach a decision.

There is no doubt that the capability of the system has been sufficient to make it a successful deterrent, which would imply a confidence in the communications system on the part of the Russians, as well as on the part of our own military leaders. I think it is safe to assume that the Russians will have the same approach as we do to the communications link in our ABM system, and I seriously doubt that they would be foolhardy enough to assume that our ABM could not be fired in a short enough period of time so as to blunt an attempted first strike. It would, therefore, have real deterrent effect on any Soviet leader contemplating a first-strike attempt.

Let me say as simply as I can, I believe in the entire concept of the ABM system, that includes the command and control aspects. I have said many times before that we need the system. It can and will work. We cannot afford to forgo it. It will save a minimum of 20 million U.S. lives. I urge my colleagues to support the Safeguard ABM.

Mr. DANIEL of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. I come before the House this morning, posing not as an expert on this or any other subject, but as one who is tremendously interested in the security of our Nation, and as one who is distrustful of our adversaries. After our sad experience at Yalta, Potsdam, Teheran, Cairo, Geneva, and Paris, I regret to say I have come to have little faith in the process of international bargaining.

History reveals that nations experience periods of external and internal crisis. This is such a period in the history of our Nation. We are victims of an era of

permissiveness both at the national and international levels which could become our Achilles' heel.

We live in an era when it is popular to downgrade the dangers of communism. They say that it is no longer a monolithic force and therefore poses no threat to the safety and security of our Nation.

Mr. Chairman, I can find no evidence to justify any such conclusion. It is obvious that the adversaries change their tactics from time to time, but their goal remains constant, and that is to bury the United States economically and world domination. This is why, Mr. Chairman, we must remain strong defensively and offensively. This is why, Mr. Chairman, we must deploy the Safeguard system.

As one of the gentlemen before me said, we spend a great deal of time on this subject in the committee. I am convinced that Safeguard provides us a degree of security which is essential and also gives us certain options which are not now available to us.

There are those who say that the suggested money could be spent on more meaningful projects. They talk about rehabilitation of the inner cities. The Congress has many needs to consider. The inner cities are important, as are a number of other projects which have been proposed to this Congress. But, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that unless we build a deterrent capability this entire subject could very well become academic, because there may not be any inner cities to rehabilitate.

There are also those who argue that to deploy the system will dim our prospects for disarmament. Wise old Patrick Henry once said that the only lamp by which his feet were guided was the light of experience. Mr. Henry said:

I know of no better way to judge the future than the past. Those who harbor such thoughts ignore the lessons of history. What little success we have experienced in our international negotiations has been when we have negotiated from a position of strength.

We also hear the argument that deploying the system is immoral. I would ask the question, when did it become a sin to protect ourselves and to protect our country? It is morally right to deploy this system, and any position that is morally right cannot be politically wrong.

Our country has its faults and its shortcomings, but I suggest that the American way of life, based on a fundamental belief in God and propelled by our free enterprise profit-maturated system, has no equal. Mr. Chairman, let us keep it that way. Let us deploy the Safeguard system. Our best approach to the goal of world security is through the security of the United States of America.

Mr. Chairman, I include the following analysis of the Chinese threat:

THE CHINESE THREAT

One of the great values of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System which perhaps has been understated is its capacity to provide protection against limited or accidental attack.

Going to the heart of this problem is the kind of limited attack that Communist China can be expected to mount in the 1970's.

Those who oppose the ABM generally make light of its ability to protect against the Chi-

nese threat on two grounds. The first is that China is simply not likely to do anything as insane and irrational as launching an attack against the United States, since such would appear suicidal. China is far weaker than Russia, so the argument goes, and our power has been sufficient to deter Russia from nuclear war and certainly will deter China, too.

The other part of the argument is that if the Chinese did launch an attack, they would use low-flying aircraft, cruise missiles, sub-launched missiles, or bombs smuggled into the country, against all of which the ABM would be presumably useless.

Finally, the argument is made that China could develop penetration aids against the ABM.

Let us look at the situation of China.

The Chinese ICBM program has been adversely affected by the so-called "cultural revolution" and has slipped from an expectation of the early 1970's to some later period. The Chinese were expected to test a long-range missile before the end of 1967 but did not do so. The Chinese exploded a thermonuclear device in 1966.

I think we should keep in mind, however, that even with this setback, the Chinese can be expected to have a long-range delivery capability in the 1970's. The lead time required for the development of an anti-ballistic missile system is so long that even if we started this year, the Chinese are likely to have missile systems that can reach the United States before we get our ABM fully operational.

Unlike the Soviets, the Chinese Communists could not under any current estimate be considered to have a counter force capability against our strategic force. That is to say, within a few years, the Chinese may present a city-busting threat but will not by any stretch of the imagination have the ability to destroy our ICBM missiles in their silos.

The Red Chinese will, of course, consider an ICBM delivery capability of even a relatively unsophisticated kind as a deterrent against our country and equally against the Russians.

The Chinese could carry out a small demonstration attack to gain the upper hand in a crisis. But the assumption is naturally made that the Chinese would be constrained by our relative capability. The Chinese leader who ordered a nuclear strike against us would have to be completely convinced that moral considerations prevented us from retaliating—or he would have to be insane.

Even with a limited nuclear threat in relation to ours, the Chinese must be reckoned with at the point where they attain ICBM capability. The Chinese have repeatedly demonstrated a readiness to be as brutal as possible if it will serve their purpose. This has been true in their dealings with India, in their brutal invasion of Tibet, in their dealings with U.S. prisoners of war in Korea, and in their attitude towards loss of life among their own troops and their own citizens and their allies. They have frequently displayed the kind of approach the North Vietnamese demonstrate—readiness to see 10 of their own men die in order to kill one American.

It also should not be forgotten that the threat of ICBM retaliation may not mean the same thing to Communist Chinese leaders as to us. Relatively few of their population live in cities, so the destruction from a nuclear attack would not be as concentrated on their cities as would be the case with the United States or even Russia.

A crisis in which the Chinese could seriously threaten to "punish" the United States may prove to be quite difficult under our political and moral system.

At the present we have the capability to punish the Chinese homeland severely, while they can only kill our military men who come within their nation. But when they could

deliver nuclear missiles on our homeland, an entirely different position pertains. So, while any kind of nuclear attack against the United States is unlikely, a lack of resolve on our part could persuade some future Chinese leaders to test the United States with a nuclear confrontation. This would be an enormous problem for an American president.

If during a future crisis Chinese missile-carrying submarines lay off our coastline, it would pose an obvious threat. If cities within the range of these submarine-based missiles were undefended, and assuming the Chinese are attempting to blackmail us in our relations with a third country, the President would be in a most difficult position. His choice would be either the threat of a retaliatory strike against the Chinese mainland or backing off from his course in the third country, abandoning his course to avoid a demonstration strike by the Chinese submarines. A President for moral reasons might seek to avoid a retaliatory strike that might kill millions of innocent civilians in China. In addition, a retaliatory strike by us might trigger additional firing by such nuclear forces as the Chinese had available, threatening a full nuclear exchange.

With the United States with such grim alternatives, it is not inconceivable that the Chinese might fire one missile in a demonstration attack against the U.S. mainland, or against an outlying island under the protection of the United States.

Even the remotest possibility of this kind of thing happening should lead a prudent man to have doubts about foreclosing the option for some other kind of response beyond a simple nuclear exchange. Having an ABM capability with some confidence in the safety of our cities and our mainland forces might spare a president the awful alternative of nuclear warfare or surrender to blackmail.

But China also poses a threat because of the possibility of accidental launch. The Chinese have moved at their highest possible speed to develop atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs. However, the sophisticated command and control systems, which keep these weapons under control in the United States and apparently in the Soviet Union, may not be so easy for the Chinese to develop.

Considering the nature of the Chinese Communist system, their incredible internal leadership struggles, and the speed with which they attempted to achieve a nuclear weapons capability, the danger from an accidental strike against the U.S. from Red China simply cannot be ignored. While the possibility might appear slim and the cost, therefore, not justified, the possibility exists and the alternatives make an anti-ballistic missile defense feasible. An ABM system could negate the threat of a light Chinese attack and leave a number of options open to the United States.

THE LESSON OF MENNON

Consistent with this preparatory approach is the fact that the Chinese Communists have shown themselves reluctant to attack those who prepare an adequate defense. The Chinese, for example, have been reluctant to try to invade the Nationalist-held island of Quemoy, only two miles off the Chinese mainland, because of the strong defense that would be faced.

By contrast, faced with weak defenses the Communists have been ready for quick and ruthless attack, such as their actions on the Indian frontier in 1962 and their ruthless attack on Tibet.

In considering the slippery leadership of the Chinese Communists, one should not forget the lesson of Nehru and his Defense Minister Krishna Menon. How they used to lecture the United States on getting along with China! They knew the Chinese. If one were "reasonable" with China and did not constantly treat her as an enemy and con-

front her with troops, the tensions would drop and any arms race with her would cease. Mr. Mennon apparently had a different theory about how to deal with us, because while he was constantly saying nice things about the Chinese, he was constantly attacking the United States. Nehru and Mennon backed up their theory with action—that is to say, they left their Tibetan border with China virtually undefended. And the Chinese were reasonable enough to charge in and take huge chunks of Indian territory, humiliating India in the process.

By contrast with Indian-type thinking as regards the Communist Chinese, the approach of the Russians would appear to be much more effective. It is to be prepared at all times. It is not impossible to imagine that the Chinese might fire their missiles out of an irrational fear that they were going to be subject to a U.S. attack and that if they did not fire first they would not be able to launch their small and highly vulnerable force. This kind of presumption of U.S. attack is certainly not beyond the realm of possibility considering the irrational nature of Red Chinese leaders.

THE FALLACY OF UNILATERAL CONTROL

There are those in this country today who are so desperate for arms control that they encourage a unilateral attempt at control by the United States.

The argument goes that building an ABM system would be provocative to the Russians and that, therefore, we should refrain from doing so both to avoid encouraging the enemy to build up countermeasures and on the theory that our show of good intentions would encourage these other countries to limit their own nuclear force. The theory is that we create good will in a potential enemy by leaving ourselves unprotected, and this is somehow supposed to lead to the end of the arms race.

Those who make the argument against the ABM today as an upsetting factor in the arms race are the same people who label the Soviet ICBM program as an attempt on their part to achieve parity with us. This was supposed to be a good thing. When they reach parity with us, they would feel secure and we could then negotiate an arms reduction agreement. We stopped our ICBM program at 1,054. The Soviets reached parity, but they kept going. They now have more than 1,200 missiles and appear determined to put at least 1,800 in place. And what is more, they are building missiles with far larger payloads than ours—up to 25 megatons. At the same time, they have a large program going for the development of nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

It is curious that building a defensive system would be maintained to be provocative to the Chinese, whereas the Chinese, by issuing a "no first use" statement about their offensive system, were considered to have adequately quieted the fears of India and Japan and other Asian neighbors about Chinese nuclear intentions.

There are all kinds of holes in the unilateral control argument, political and moral. Even recognizing the danger of the arms race, it is not prudent to foreclose the options to defend oneself against either the great Soviet force or the Chinese force. It would seem almost impossible to maintain the position—that some opponents of the ABM maintain—that defending oneself makes things worse. As indicated earlier, a defensive system gives one an option in a crisis other than all-out exchange.

It must also be remembered that the competition between China and Russia will continue regardless of what action we take. Even if we stopped our nuclear development in hopes of encouraging the Russians to do likewise, no one would seriously maintain that the Chinese would stop theirs. They would continue trying to move forward until they achieve a parity with the Soviets and

at some point in time when they got close, the Russians would continue development to stay ahead of them, not to mention their desires to get ahead of us.

It is also not beyond the realm of possibility that the Chinese might launch an attack against the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. in hopes of creating a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the confusion following the attack.

PENETRATION AIDS

It is claimed by some of the critics that the Chinese People's Republic could cheaply and quickly develop penetration aids which would negate the effectiveness of our Safeguard system. This is simply not correct.

Penetration aids are not simple, and they are certainly not cheap. We have spent over one billion dollars developing penetration aids and are only now reaching a level of success. It would cost the Chinese as much and would take them as long to develop a similar capability.

The radars needed to successfully design and build truly reliable penetration aids requires the sophistication and complexity of the radars to be used with the ABM system. It is absurd to suppose the Communist Chinese can quickly develop such a radar capability. Without this radar capability and extensive R&D expenditures, such penetration aids as could be developed would not be of high reliability and the Chinese would know and we would know that their penetration aids were not a creditable threat.

All in all, an ABM defense against the Chinese should add to world stability. And in the event of an inadvertent firing or even an intentional demonstration attack being fired—which certainly wouldn't be the first irrational act by a Chinese leader—would serve to save lives and property and help avoid World War III. The decision to have an ABM system capable of meeting the Chinese threat, which was an overriding consideration in the Johnson Administration's approval of the Sentinel system, and a key element of President Nixon's Safeguard system, adds up to a lot of good common sense.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. DANIEL of Virginia. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. FRASER. I was impressed by the argument the gentleman made about his conviction that we really had to have this system. One of the questions that remains in my mind is what happened to the Sentinel system, which this committee approved a year ago and which the President then determined was not a wise move to make? Did the gentleman believe that the President was right or the committee was right a year ago?

Mr. DANIEL of Virginia. The gentleman was not on the committee at that time.

I believe the President was right at the time he proposed the Sentinel, and I believe the President is right when he proposes the Safeguard, because we have a different situation now from what we had at that time.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for an additional 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

Mr. HALL. I object.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

Mr. NEDZI. I thank the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. Chairman, I request some additional time not because I am impressed with my powers of oratory or because I like to hear myself talk, but because I think it is vital that we, the bipartisan minority on the Armed Services Committee, make clear what we are trying to accomplish.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NEDZI. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman may have an additional 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Chairman, I object.

Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I object.

Mr. NEDZI. Anyone who has reflected on the process through which we review military authorizations and anyone who has reflected on what has happened yesterday and today and upon the many reports of inadequacies in the military establishment has to conclude that there is lots of room for improvement. Improvements are essential if we are going to survive as a nation. It has to be stated that there is no acrimony on our part against the military or against the committee. As the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN) said, we regard the military among the higher callings, and probably more so than most Members, because we see firsthand the dedication and the competence of our military. Moreover, I want to make clear that we are no more willing to place the destiny of our country in the hands of the Soviets or the Chinese hawks than in the hands of any other hawks and, so long as any nation retains military might capable of inflicting harm on us, we have to have a military defense against it. We understand that, and we are not naive enough to believe that unilateral disarmament will necessarily cause others to disarm. Unilateral disarmament, as a matter of fact, may well create irresistible temptations which would be totally counterproductive as far as peace in the world is concerned. Any disarmament has to be accompanied by adequate safeguards. We understand all of this.

My colleagues, the enormity of the military budget and the highly technical nature of it, coupled with the problems of secrecy that have been alluded to by my colleague from New York, Mr. PIKE, yesterday, combine, in my judgment, to result in a morass that is intimidating the average Member of Congress.

How much more simple to "go along with the chairman," who is the recognized expert in this field, than to have to explain the extremely complicated details of a weapons system. This tendency prevails, my colleagues, on the Armed Services Committee itself. I must confess that to this time, despite spending almost 7 years on the committee and diligent efforts to understand, there are far too many aspects of our military posture which are accepted on faith, with the hope that an absence of protest or sign of approval is in the best interest

of the Nation. The nonpartisan attitude and monolithic character of the committee creates additional doubts since no minority staff is charged with the responsibility of digging to expose weaknesses in the position of the majority. We have an excellent professional staff to whom I would like to extend my compliments and appreciation. I mean this sincerely. The chairman and staff have been extremely generous in providing assistance in specific instances whenever requested, and it is unfair to charge a lack of cooperation in this regard. However, unlike other committees where there is a philosophical division along party lines with full-time staff devoted to serving the minority, our committee staff is committed to the chairman and majority. This is by no means intended, even by implication, as a criticism of either the chairman or staff. This is the structure within which all of us endeavor to carry out our responsibilities.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NEDZI. If the chairman can get me some additional time, I will be delighted to yield to him.

This is the structure which prompted the minority to attempt to determine whether there is another side to the case made within the committee. On the basis of outside sources as well as on a critical review of evidence presented to the committee, we have prepared the amendments for consideration today.

My colleague, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON), said yesterday the "old and comfortable ways" require some revision. The point is emphasized, ladies and gentlemen, when we on the committee learn about a Soviet bomber threat through the press following the chairman's appearance before the Rules Committee; or when we learn about a problem with the C-5A through a chance conversation in a bar; or where we are called upon to approve a reduction of \$52 million in the C-5A program on the basis of a conversation between the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Packard, and the chairman on the morning of the mark up of this bill, which lasted a day, and at the same time we gave approval to an authorization of \$52 million for a controversial Freedom Fighter based upon the same conversation. Page 58 of the report gives you as much information on the \$52 million transfer as the committee had when it voted.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the necessary number of words.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, my colleague from California will offer an amendment later in the day to strike this latter authorization primarily for the reason that the matter received no adequate deliberation in the committee.

Mr. Chairman, page 58 of the report gives to you all the information we had on the \$52 million transferred when we voted on it last week.

These are not generalities, my colleagues, but specific problem areas. I assure all of you that our efforts today are not the result of any mad obsession with the magnitude of our defense budget but are the result of a careful consideration of our requirements and the justifications made by the record as well as the overall condition of our economy and pressing alternative needs. The amendments we offer are conservative and are our best collective judgment of where cuts can be made without affecting the muscle of our defense establishment.

If you are of the opinion that our defense expenditures are excessive, I assure you that your support of the amendments we offer can be justified.

Mr. Chairman, the controversy over the ABM is destined to be one of the most dramatic in American history.

Why? Because the decision over whether or not the United States should deploy an ABM system comes at a moment of opportunity, a potential turning point, a military and political fork in the road. In addition, for the first time in the postwar era, American public opinion is playing a role in a question involving a weapons system.

In such a controversy it is inevitable, I suppose, that there will be some on both sides who will approach the issue on pure emotion, promilitary or antimilitary, pro-Establishment or anti-Establishment, and so forth. So much greater the obligation, then, for serious public officials to search out the facts in as clear-headed a manner as possible, and to be as precise in analysis and argument as possible.

Several basic, valid assumptions have guided our post-World War II policies in the 24 quick years of the atomic age. We should examine and restate these assumptions as a necessary stage-setting to detailed examination of the merits of the ABM.

BASIC PREMISES OF U.S. POLICY

In 1964, a then-popular President of the United States said in his state of the Union message:

We must be constantly prepared for the worst and constantly acting for the best—Strong enough to win a war, and wise enough to prevent one.

This remains a valid premise.

A second premise is that we must so conduct our affairs that it is clear to the Communist giants that it is in their interest, as well as ours, to live in peace. One of the ways we persuade them is by maintaining deterrent nuclear power. We would rather be in the position of having the strength and not needing to use it than to be in the position of needing the strength and not having it.

Third, the advent of nuclear weaponry has accelerated the potential speed and scope of war destruction to awesome levels. Everyone knows that in a nuclear exchange we would not have the luxury of time as we did in World War II. We would have to respond with forces in being. Hence, in the absence of international agreements it is necessary to maintain great and costly forces in a constant state of readiness.

Fourth, we have relied on a strategy of

"assured destruction capability." That is, we have well-dispersed and powerful nuclear forces fully capable of destroying the Soviet Union, even after absorbing an initial surprise attack. We want Soviet planners to know, as a certainty, that the best attack they could launch would still leave us with the capability of destroying their society. At the same time, we fully realize that they could inflict terrible damage on us. A nuclear stalemate exists.

Finally, it has been a conviction among Americans in and out of Government, particularly since the outbreak of the Korean war, that we will always be willing to pay the price for having too much defense rather than risk the danger of having too little defense.

PUBLIC DISCUSSION WELCOME

As a member of the House Armed Services Committee, I am pleased to have this national debate.

I believe we can have a probing and intelligent debate without demeaning one another. Proponents do not favor nuclear holocaust and opponents do not favor abject weakness, regardless of what some partisans on each side would imply.

Wisdom in military affairs is not limited to the military, or even to congressional committees. I could remind you of the fact, for example, that in 1963, the House Armed Services Committee voted 32 to 5 in favor of the construction of the RS-70 bomber. Several billion dollars were spent on just two planes which never became part of our defense weaponry. One was lost in an accident, and the other is a museum piece in Dayton, Ohio.

When the ABM came up for a vote in 1968, the House Armed Services Committee voted 36 to 4 in favor of it. Last week the vote was 32 to 8.

This is preface to two observations which will be familiar to Congress watchers:

First. The Congress, particularly the House, operates largely by committee, with the membership at large coming together to ratify the decisions made earlier by the committee responsible for the legislation in question.

Second. The membership of the Armed Services Committees in both House and Senate is, unfortunately, not truly representative of national public opinion. Nor do minority views on military matters always get wide hearing, unless those views are held by a civilian Secretary like Robert McNamara.

Thus it is very important that Congressmen and Senators who are not on the Armed Services Committee, are, virtually for the first time, seeking to educate themselves on military matters. They are no longer willing to pass perfunctorily, and with almost no debate, military bills hitherto regarded as sacred. Whatever the outcome on ABM, this is a healthy development.

THE ABM—A TURNING POINT

The ABM has all the earmarks of an expensive mistake—expensive financially, politically, and morally.

It is possible, just possible, that this is one of those moments in world history when a turning point has been reached. It may be a moment of opportunity. If so, we should explore it. If we can reach

an accommodation on arms control with the Soviet Union, we must try.

It is an awesome, growing, and insistent fact that the speed of intercontinental missiles is so rapid that some fundamental command concepts are at stake now. Leadtime is so precariously thin that life-and-death decisions are perhaps inexorably passing from political leaders to more narrowly focused technicians, and maybe even from human beings to machines. While the comparison is not totally analogous, it should be noted that we found in the *Pueblo* and the EC-121 cases that by the time the chain of command was negotiated, the time for effective action had long passed.

We have not yet reached a "launch-on-warning" stage in our missile weaponry command system. Such a development, if reached, would remove those precious elements of civilian control and restraint we so cherish.

But if an ABM system is installed, it is my considered judgment that the power of decision in the firing of defensive nuclear weapons must pass from the hands of the President of the United States. Such a development would be of the utmost seriousness. I do not make this warning lightly and it should not be taken lightly. The conclusion is inevitable that the nature of the ABM and the nature of the command structure are such that delegated authority and not the President, will have to be in the position to press a nuclear button.

It may be necessary, if the international situation reaches the gravest dimensions, to place the United States in the position where the civilian Commander in Chief does not have the ultimate responsibility. But before we reach this state we should explore, with all the determination at our command, the desirability and possibility of arms control and a turning down of the spiraling arms race.

SHIFTING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ABM

I have diligently examined the pros and cons of the ABM proposals and there is one point, at least, that is uncontroversial: proponents of the ABM have used and often abandoned one argument after another.

As soon as one argument is knocked down, they shift to another, label it "the argument" and then shift again when that one is shot full of holes. Pretty soon you get the idea that the real reason for deployment is because someone wants to deploy it, no matter what.

The first argument, made with apparent reluctance by then-Secretary Robert S. McNamara, was that a "thin system" was needed to protect us against projected Chinese ICBM capability in the 1970's.

When Clark Clifford became Secretary of Defense this argument was joined, then overshadowed, by the whispered argument made to the Senate that we needed to authorize the ABM, to begin it, as a bargaining point with the Russians. In effect, it was to be a \$5 billion poker chip and let us not worry that it might become a \$50 or \$60 billion mistake. There were also hints that this

"thin system" was a Democratic political tactic to protect L.B.J.'s flank against any "missile gap" charges which might be made by Republican political candidates in the 1968 campaign.

President Nixon shifted the scene away from the cities with his "Modified ABM" speech, which some say was more of a political compromise than a military decision. He told us that ABM's would be placed not around our cities but at two ICBM sites to protect our offensive missiles, and, make our deterrent more credible. There are some suggestions that our nuclear weapons are vulnerable. Accordingly, we can expect implementation of the plan to place ABM's not only at two sites but at 12 sites to provide coverage over the entire country.

All other arguments having fallen short, Secretary Laird tells us that the Russians are preparing a "first strike capability." That is, a strike which can wipe out our second strike, reprisal weaponry. This, too, is questionable and Secretary of State Rogers has already caused Laird to explain this argument.

Finally there is the perennial problem of those in charge of classifying information declassifying portions of it to suit their purposes.

TECHNICAL ADEQUACY

Let us review the question of the technical adequacy of the ABM, and some of the arguments which first demean and then flatter its technical development.

For months we were told that the ABM was not capable of defending against "sophisticated" Soviet attack. The ABM, we were told, would be useful in defending American cities against an "unsophisticated" Chinese attack. Assuming, of course, that the Chinese conveniently devoted themselves to developing unsophisticated missiles and then neatly hurtling them into an American system designed to knock them all down, and great care was taken to assure the Russians that the system was not directed against them. Now we are told that our ABM's can be expected to knock out the "latest sophisticated missiles" of the Soviet Union which may attack our ICBM missile sites, and that protecting cities might be provocative while protecting missile sites is not.

We have been told the Soviets are building an ABM system around Moscow and then we have been assured and reassured that we can penetrate any Soviet defense system with our Polaris submarine missiles, our SAC bombers, and our intercontinental ballistic missiles.

As an opponent of ABM deployment, I caution those who share my general view to avoid the temptation to say the ABM will not work.

We cannot be sure it will not work now or in the future. Highly able men, of great technical competence say we can have a workable American ABM. I cite, for example, the testimony of John S. Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering of the Department of Defense. He is a man I respect and he says the ABM will work.

It is a fact, regrettable but no less a fact, that there are technical experts on both sides and that the technical questions are of such refinement that no sure

judgment on technical feasibility can be made by even the most searching of congressional critics, let alone by the average American.

Since it is logical that technical strategists must stay on the safe side in strategic matters, we are at a decided disadvantage if the ABM question is to be decided on technical aspects alone. However, the ABM question is much broader in scope. Other crucial factors are inextricably involved. These factors include:

First, the effect the ABM deployment would have on arms control discussions;

Second, the effect ABM deployment, by either the Soviet Union, or the United States, or both, would have on the arms race;

Third, the role of the human being in the trigger-quick decisions inherent in the operation of nuclear weapons; and

Fourth, the implications of the demotion of the nuclear weapon from the "last resort" category. When we begin to treat the enormously destructive nuclear weapons as we do conventional weapons then we enter a stage of fantasy mixed with a touch of madness.

Fifth, recent studies indicate the possibility a large nuclear attack would be suicidal to the attacker.

THE IMPACT OF ARMS CONTROL TALKS

There has been a lot of loose talk from both sides about what effect deployment of an ABM system would or would not have on disarmament talks.

Confusing "straw men" have been set up without restraint. Not only that, but partisans on each side ascribe non-existent views to their opponents.

In any event, it is not true, in my opinion, that we will necessarily be unable to get the Russians to agree to arms control if we proclaim a "policy for deployment."

Second, there is no reason why we could not talk even if both Russia and the United States have begun to deploy ABM's.

Nonetheless, it is simply commonsense to make the observation that it would be easier to agree to refrain from beginning deployment than to interrupt deployment once begun. Each weapons system and each governmental policy does develop a momentum of its own, and a self-interested constituency.

THROUGH THICK AND THIN

It is my considered judgment that the deployment of a "thin" or partial ABM system is the first step toward deployment of a "thick" system.

The pressure to approve "modest" changes, all in "modest" billion dollar increments, will be irresistible, especially when the usual experts testify as to how much additional protection we will have. This is akin to the process of gradual commitment which raised our military, political, and financial involvement in Vietnam to such levels. That there will be a Soviet response to an ABM deployment cannot be questioned. The Soviet Minister of Defense would not be doing his job if he were not developing plans to improve Soviet capabilities should we deploy. And another rung on the arms ladder will have been ascended by both parties.

COMMAND PROBLEMS

In all the swiftly—accumulating literature on the ABM, one crucial problem has not been given sufficient attention. It may be the most serious consideration of all. This is the problem of command responsibility.

An accidental attack could not possibly be intercepted under the present chain of command.

The military command structure is such that a missile attack does not allow sufficient "lead time" to respond efficiently.

Under the fundamental American principle of civilian control of the military, the civilian President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Only he has the authority to order the firing of offensive or defensive nuclear weapons.

If we deploy an ABM system, however, and if each ABM site is to be effective, lesser authority will have to be given authority to fire intercept nuclear weapons. Once this is done, civilian control is weakened and persons down the line, without full political and intelligence information, could be making a policy decision which should be reserved for the President. This particular question deserves full debate.

THE "VULNERABILITY" OF OUR DETERRENT

In the last few weeks we have been told for the first time that our deterrent capability is vulnerable in the foreseeable future. This is a sudden evaluation and one which is hotly disputed by Polaris and missile men in the field, as well as by civilians.

There have been no recent breakthroughs in exotic technology to justify such talk.

Soviet deployment of the ICBM's is within predicted levels and our second strike reprisal capability is clear and unmistakable.

It is conceivable that the Soviets could develop a first strike capability. But we must ascertain and weigh "capability" and "intent." Any such Soviet effort would be enormously expensive and we would have intelligence information about it well before the point of critical vulnerability.

And to those who claim we would be defenseless if the Soviets persisted in their current rate of deployment, it should be emphasized that at no expense and with no leadtime we can render Soviet SS-9's targeted at our missiles virtually useless.

We have merely to change our policy to one which would call for immediate retaliation. Any enemy planner has to consider the very practical problem of catching our missiles in their silos. There is no doubt among any in the scientific community that we have the capability of getting our missiles off before enemy missile impact. Certainly, a second strike capability is more desirable for it provides valuable leadtime, however, I submit the probability that Soviet planners would have to consider seriously any provocative acts, however slight, if they forced us to resort to a policy of immediate response. The point is that this kind of posture would still provide us with deterrent strength and "leadtime"

to structure our defenses—thus obviating the need for immediate deployment of the ABM with all of its possible consequences on the arms race.

While we must constantly analyze and counter the military capabilities of potential enemies, we cannot allow ourselves to be mesmerized by "capability" and "potential" to such a degree that the arms race will spiral and spiral at a mad pace. Somewhere civilian political officials must inject themselves and feed other considerations into the processes of decision like political self-interest, morality, and the future of humanity itself.

SUICIDAL TO ATTACKER

Recent studies, though disputed by some, indicate the possibility that any nuclear attack capable of destroying any nation's retaliatory capability would so contaminate the hemisphere's atmosphere with radioactive debris that it would be suicidal. Respected scientists have indicated that a nuclear attack of such dimensions would cause future generations genetic damage to an extent that would require restructure of existing societies. The extent of malformed humans would be so great that contemporary attitudes toward caring for the physically and mentally incapacitated would have to be changed and may require their premeditated elimination. The thought is too ghastly to dwell on.

ARGUMENTS TO SET ASIDE

I realize that my own views will not always coincide four-square with the views of other ABM opponents.

I have no hesitance, in any event, in commenting upon a few anti-ABM arguments which do not persuade those who ultimately must be persuaded.

For example, the charge was made that the cities will become a powder-keg if the ABM system is deployed around cities. The answer is that if there must be deployment, they should be deployed where they will do the most good.

Second, we hear of a "military-industrial complex" conspiracy. There is no conspiracy. There is a community of views and a psychology which develops when men become deeply involved in a project. Their perspectives become subjective.

There must be other men in a position to discount biases and built-in self-interest. But there is no conspiracy. Such talk deflects thought; it does not abet it.

Third, the argument is made that the funds for an ABM system should be used for domestic needs. It is an easy argument, easy to run with and even demagogic. But it does not stand up. Our security deserves primary consideration, even at the expense of domestic needs. So if the ABM truly is imperative for our security it must take priority. In addition, the facts of legislative life are such that any decrease in military expenditures would bear little relation, symmetrical or otherwise, to spending for domestic programs. A concession has to be made, however, that any decrease in defense spending weakens the argument of those who say we cannot afford domestic programs. Unfortunately, it

merely weakens the argument but does not convert.

CONCLUSION

The question of whether or not to deploy an ABM system is of the highest importance to our national security, our foreign policy, and, to some extent, our domestic priorities.

The entire world is listening in on our debate. It should, for the decision has potential consequences for everyone in the world.

We are now on a plateau of nuclear stalemate. If we, and the Russians, are coaxed by technological temptations to slip off the present "plateau" we could be swept into a whirlwind of an expensive and imponderable arms race without end. Faced with such a prospect, we should try once more, and before all, to take the initiative for world peace through arms agreements and control.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, in my remarks I would like to refer to several of the points made in opposition to the deployment of the ABM.

The gentleman from New York made two points. One was that never on earth would this system have a chance to work. The other was the command and control problem.

The gentleman from Michigan in discussing this matter made what he considered to be the main point as he saw it to the effect that it would adversely affect the arms control negotiations.

Now, the argument as to whether this system is workable or not has an old ring to it.

I remember back in the late 1940's and the early 1950's when nine out of 10 scientists of the country and three out of the five members of the Atomic Energy Commission—everyone but one of the 20 or so scientific members of the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission—opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb.

But fortunately there were some scientists who were actually at work on what they then called a superbomb, and they knew that such a bomb would be workable. They were in the laboratory doing the actual work.

The President of the United States at that time, Harry Truman, ordered a special survey to be made to determine the feasibility of developing such a weapon and, after some months of study which included members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Secretary of Defense at the time, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and some other scientists, they reported to the President and he came to the decision that we should go forward as quickly as possible with the development of the hydrogen bomb.

It was very fortunate that we did, because within a few months after we successfully tested the hydrogen bomb the Soviets also successfully tested the hydrogen bomb.

So our very security could be at stake now as it was then, when some people

think that this defensive system will not be workable. I am convinced that it will be workable, maybe not as effectively and efficiently in the first models as it should be, but the reason you start with deployment is so that you can improve upon it step by step, and when you do need it, it will be ready.

For the opponents of the ABM system who say they are not exactly against the ABM system, but this is not the time to deploy it, let me tell you, my friends, that when the time comes when you do need it you cannot deploy it then because it will be too late. You cannot wait until it is needed to start deployment.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. I am sorry, but I cannot yield to the gentleman from Minnesota inasmuch as I only have 5 minutes, and I am sure that an objection would be made if I asked to proceed further.

Let me say something about the point raised by the gentleman from Michigan as to how it would adversely affect arms limitation talks. The record does not show that at all. It shows that when we did move forward with certain defensive programs we speeded up arms limitations negotiations. Why, even the most recent vote in the Senate has helped to speed up discussions on arms limitations.

I would admit that there is some concern on the part of some, and I would like to be able to relate the records to show just how arms limitations have been improved as we increased our offensive and our defensive capabilities. However, in the limited time I do not have the time to do it. We did not withdraw from arms limitation talks when the Soviet Union deployed an ABM system.

Turning now to the command control situation, the rocket engine of this system has not the range to transport the warhead to a potential foreign enemy.

The warhead will not detonate in the nuclear mode unless an actual target is encountered. The system will also be designed so that a launch of the ABM will even be impossible unless an incoming target is detected and identified since computers, radars, and other equipment will prevent launch unless a target is acquired.

And, finally, environmental sensing equipment such as altitude and acceleration sensors will not permit arming when the weapon is on the way up and is close enough to the ground to hurt people by its detonation. The warhead is designed to never return to the ground intact.

If the nuclear destruction command is not given, the warhead will be destroyed by dynamite-type explosives and any contained plutonium will be scattered high in the air. This scattering essentially eliminates any public health hazard.

The problem of firing a defensive ABM type of missile is not insoluble. The President can direct beforehand the conditions under which a missile can be used.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from

Illinois, if he so desires, may have 5 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I object.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, no defense issue in my memory has been involved in more public debate than this current question of the development of an anti-ballistic-missile system. It has been a very emotional issue, often generating more heat than light. When all of the debate and discussions are examined in detail, it becomes apparent that the ABM is not considered an issue in itself, but is a symbol of those who want to question the whole basis of our national defense policy.

They have the right to question and debate defense policy and the other policies in response to which our defense forces are devised. We here today, however, are to vote on the ABM system itself. In doing this, we must remember that the ABM is a part of the whole national defense structure that we need to assure the deterrent capability of our military forces. You may not like the world we live in. You may not like living with the knowledge that hundreds of nuclear weapons exist in the world. You may not like the military-industrial complex. You may not like the Pentagon. But these are not reasons for voting against any one particular weapon system. These are not arguments against the ABM.

In considering the ABM you must ask yourself these questions: Is there a real threat to our land-based strategic forces? Does the Safeguard system give reasonable promise of protecting against that threat? Would the ABM make nuclear war more likely or less likely?

The vast improvement in the Soviet missile forces over the past several years is one of the most dramatic military developments of the last 20 years. The Soviets have improved, expanded and modernized their forces, have greatly improved their naval power, and are rapidly developing a force of huge ICBM's. With their solid-fueled SS-13, the Minuteman-sized SS-11 and their gigantic SS-9, the Soviets soon will have in place as many ICBM's as the United States. Now, because of the concentration of our people, the Soviets could destroy a larger percentage of our population with 200 1-megaton warheads than we could destroy of theirs with 1,200.

But the Soviet SS-9 is a huge missile which can carry up to a 25-megaton warhead and which is highly accurate. According to the best intelligence available to us, the Russians are expected to have about 400 of these operational by the mid-1970's. It is the purpose of this SS-9 that caused the committee the greatest concern. It is much larger, much more accurate and much more expensive than the kind of missile needed for a retaliatory force.

Why would the Soviets spend much more than necessary on a missile if it was only for retaliatory purposes? I am sure they are concerned about the level

of their defense spending, too. I do not suppose their military-industrial complex is any more popular than ours. But with multiple, independently targeted reentry vehicles—MIRV—the SS-9 could launch three 5-megaton warheads toward the United States with an accuracy of within a half-mile of target. Such accuracy with such large warheads would mean a 90-percent chance of destroying Minuteman missiles in their silos. Thus, the force of SS-9, which the Soviets will have in the 1970's, will give them the capability of virtually destroying our land-based ICBM force—unless we do something about it.

Secretary Laird said the SS-9 with MIRV capability could make the survivability of our Minuteman force "virtually nil by the mid-1970's"—it is argued that the Soviets have no intention of developing a first strike force. But we cannot develop our forces according to what their intentions might be. We cannot predict what their intentions will be in the midseventies—we cannot even predict who their leaders will be at that time. But we must develop our forces in such a way as to be able to meet their capabilities regardless of how sanguine some might feel about their intentions.

Can the ABM give a reasonable promise of being able to meet this Soviet threat?

The answer is simply yes. The ABM is a complex system and the technical considerations are also. But it would be foolhardy to assume that their resolution is beyond the capabilities of American scientists and engineers. Research in antiballistic-missile defense has gone on for 13 years. The work has always revolved about the same basic concept—that is, using radars to track the attacking missile, using computers to direct the defensive missile, and using a high speed similar weapon to destroy the incoming missile.

All of the prior work and research, the total cost of which is around \$4 billion, is available and useful to the Safeguard system. We are not starting from scratch.

The missiles used in the Safeguard, the Spartan, and Sprint have been under development for some time. The Spartan was flown over a year ago. There is no question that these missiles can achieve the speed required for their mission. Computer-controlled radars, using electronically beamed steering, as planned for the Safeguard, are operating today. The technical problems of the phased-array radar have been largely solved. The Air Force FBS-85 radar in Florida uses a computer similar to that required for the perimeter acquisition radar—PAR—of the Safeguard system and is tracking thousands of space objects daily.

The job required of the computer is obviously the most technically challenging aspect of the ABM. I do not wish to minimize the difficulty of the job required. However, it is simply true that computers, every bit as complex as those required for Safeguard, have been built. The IBM 360-91 computer exceeds the Safeguard computer in computing capacity and is operating successfully today.

In summary, our committee believes that the system will work.

I would like to note that the committee went into enormous detail to satisfy itself on this point. The committee has reviewed ABM developments yearly since research began. This year, with all of our background, the committee conducted a sweeping reexamination of the whole issue.

We questioned the Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird. We questioned the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Packard. And we questioned Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. We spent 3 days on hearings with these officials alone. In addition, we spent a full day of morning and afternoon sessions questioning expert outside witnesses, including three who opposed the ABM system and three who supported it. We also had available statements of other groups and individuals who have presented arguments for or against the system. Included in our hearings, which are available to all the Members of the House are statements opposing the system from men who have been among the principal public opponents of the ABM. We questioned witnesses repeatedly on the technical feasibility of the system, as well as on their concern for its implications on the arms race.

I can only tell you that I listened as carefully as I could and to me, the witnesses in favor of the ABM were more persuasive.

I know that a particular argument is made against the Safeguard because of what is called the command and control problem. It is alleged that because we have had difficulties in the past with communications systems that word might not be gotten to leaders in time to make the Safeguard work. If that argument was followed through its logical extension, we would give up all kinds of defense capabilities because of system problems. If the communications system is not working properly, the answer is not to give up the whole ABM system. It is to improve the communications link in the system.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ARENDS) has expired.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ARENDS).

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, it is alleged that the time frame for decision is too short for the President to act. Again, logic will not carry that argument very far. It is far better to be in a situation where the President has to react very quickly than be in a situation where he has no hope of reacting at all. The decision time facing the President is not too much different from that facing him now with the Minuteman missile, but certainly no one would recommend we get rid of our Minuteman force.

Finally, it is alleged that authority to release the nuclear weapons would have to be delegated by the President, and that if this were true a lower ranking officer could lead us into war. What Secretary Laird told our committee is that we are not at the point yet when this

decision on delegation has to be met. However, I think it is chiefly important to remember that in no case could the ABM, of itself, start a war. Because of its range, the ABM missile could not reach Soviet territory. It explodes high above the United States—high enough so as not to cause a significant fallout on our own people. If it misses an incoming warhead, or if it is fired by mistake, it would be destroyed in the air without a nuclear detonation. And, of course, it could still not reach Soviet territory.

Finally, would the ABM make a nuclear exchange more likely as some critics claim?

I think it would make it less likely. I have pointed out that it could not reach Soviet territory and accidentally start a war. But it could stop the accidental start of a war because it could eliminate an offensive missile accidentally launched from another country. We must keep in mind that in future years when some smaller nations have a nuclear delivery capability without the sophisticated control techniques developed by this country and by the Soviets, the chances of an accidental launch would be increased. An ABM defense can prevent such a launch from killing millions of people and starting a nuclear exchange. It also would be quite valuable in handling a missile fired by the Chinese when they develop ICBM delivery capability possibly in the late 1970's. I am convinced in my own mind that even if arms negotiations meet their fondest hopes, we will never find the Soviets willing to give up their ABM development because of the concern that they will need it against the Chinese threat.

I did not hear anybody complaining that the ABM was a provocative weapon when the Soviets were developing theirs in recent years, and it is significant that Soviet Premier Kosygin said of the Russian ABM:

I think that a defense system which prevents attack is not a cause for the arms race but represents a factor preventing the death of people.

Finally I would note that some people are much taken with the idea of the strategic arms limitation talks—the so-called SALT negotiations.

I am of the opinion, myself, that any SALT agreement signed by the Soviets must be taken with a large grain thereof.

But in any case, the critics have shown no evidence that ABM development would delay the SALT talks. The Russians announced their interest in SALT negotiations in June of 1968 but 3 months later invaded Czechoslovakia. It is curious to me that those who are so concerned about our ABM development hurting the arms talks did not express the same concern when the Soviets actually invaded another country.

We can and we should pursue the possibilities of the SALT talks, but we also can and we must prepare against the other developments in the Communist world, above all, the threat posed to our nuclear deterrent. The Safeguard system is necessary to be sure we can meet that threat.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the amendment. I support the limited deployment of the ABM. I am

not an expert on this subject. I claim no expertise. I am a member of the committee, though, who has sat through the hearings, and I am a concerned American. No one knows for sure until we reach the point where we need and have to fire them as to how effective antiballistic missiles will be. At some point, we have to make a judgment as to whom we are going to trust and make a decision to defend ourselves.

Mr. Chairman, I submit that we have reached the point now where we must make such a decision. If we err, then we shall have spent money. But if we err in the wrong direction—if we do not go ahead with the development and the token deployment—if we make a mistake in this judgment, then we shall have spent untold millions of American lives.

So if we do not know—no one can say, "I know," with a finality—if we must make a judgment, let us make it on the side of safety and the side of American lives and for a strong defense of America.

I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

The importance of this issue becomes self-evident when we recognize that the lives of 20 to 50 million people are involved. Therefore, it is of the highest importance that this body give the consideration to this that should be given when human lives, more than the technical intricacies involved in weaponry are involved, are involved, in the outcome of the issue. I do not recall that any issue since I have been on the Committee on Armed Services has received as much attention, not only this issue, but every one contained in the mammoth military procurement bill, as was accorded in this instance.

Nearly 3,000 pages of words are contained in the printed hearings. The opposition to this issue and to all the half dozen or so others that arose during the course of deliberations were accorded all the time they could use during the course of the discussion and the inquiry. In fact, I have an idea that if the record were examined, it would be found a disproportionate portion of the time was actually taken by those in opposition—and that was very proper and agreeable with all concerned.

So we have an issue before us now relating to the deployment of the ABM and the further research and development related to it. Let us remember as we vote on this issue, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviets are now deploying ABM's around Moscow. Let us remember that the Soviet version is a third-generation version. Let us remember that not only are the Soviets today deploying the ABM, the third generation of the ABM, but also the Soviets today are engaged in the research and development of the SS-9, the multiple warhead nuclear missile which is designed for one purpose and one purpose only, according to the best authorities in this country, and that purpose is to knock out and destroy our ICBM bases. There is no other purpose for it. They are spending hundreds of millions of dollars and perhaps thousands and thousands of

hours in research in an effort to develop that sort of thing. Yet we debate here whether we should spend money and continue our research and development, and the deployment which would follow, of an effective defense against the SS-9.

Now the question is raised as to whether this weapon will work, and I doubt if there are very many in this body who are really qualified to contribute very much in the way of expertise on that subject. Probably the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE) is about the best experienced and most knowledgeable man in the Congress, at least of those I know, of that caliber.

But if we go beyond that and go outside to seek the views of the real experts, we might confer with Dr. Edward Teller, the father of the H-bomb, and he says this ABM will work. He says it should be deployed now. He supports the Sentinel and the Safeguard. He supports this program we are debating. I would assume his judgment on this subject should be worth appropriate consideration, because surely he knows more than almost anyone in this body knows about it.

As was said a moment ago, Mr. Chairman, the lives of millions and millions of people could be involved in the outcome of this issue. But time is running out. We are playing for keeps. The hour is late. If we make any mistake, let us make it in favor of trying to save 20 million to 50 million lives. That is precisely what is involved in the outcome of this issue here today.

WHY DEPLOY SAFEGUARD NOW?

I am deeply concerned about the statements that have been made as to when Safeguard should be deployed. Many have said there is no urgency to deploy ABM. They have said that the United States has plenty of time to decide how best to defend its deterrent forces. They have said "wait for results of arms talks." We must realize—and our fellow Americans must realize—that Safeguard deployment should start now.

As has been explained in some detail, we know that the Soviets are steadily building up their ICBM forces and show no signs of slowing down. Additionally, the Chinese Communists could have an operational ICBM capability by the mid-1970's. We know that the Soviets are testing multiple warheads on their SS-9's, each with an estimated yield of 5 megatons. We know that, if we attribute to them an accuracy 5 years from now no better than we can achieve now, each of these multiples can achieve a very high kill probability against an undefended Minuteman. If we project a Soviet SS-9 force in the mid-1970's no larger than their current rate of buildup permits, this number could take out over 90 percent of our Minuteman force. With less than 100 Minutemen left, and assuming a reasonable Soviet ABM, this would effectively remove our Minuteman second-strike capability.

The Soviets are also steadily expanding their force of Yankee-class submarines—equivalent to our Polaris ships. If they continue at the estimated rate, these will constitute a very serious threat to our bomber bases in the mid-1970's. This is because the warning time can be so

short that the B-52's will not have time to take off and fly a safe distance. Most of our B-52's will be destroyed, and their second-strike capability negated.

With Polaris we are in much better shape. We do not know of any way in which the Soviets could destroy Polaris. We know, however, that the Soviets are very active in the antisubmarine warfare area, and we can never be sure that some technological breakthrough might not compromise Polaris. It would be the height of imprudence to depend on one type of strategic deterrence only.

The threat is serious, it is real, and we must start defense preparations now.

There are those who argue that a delay of 1 year will give time to see if the U.S.S.R. is ready for arms limitation agreements. They argue that during this year we can continue our research and development and emerge with better designs. Our designs have already reached an advanced stage; little or no improvement can be expected by a year or two of delay. And the whole history of negotiations with the U.S.S.R.—even on simple matters—has been one of long, tedious and repetitious debate. It is far from likely that any binding and effective agreement could be formulated in 1 or 2 years. Yet our capability to deploy would have been delayed 2 or 3 years.

We occasionally hear the argument for delaying Safeguard that if the Soviet threat develops we can always deploy additional Minutemen—and that this can be done in a short time, say 1½ to 2 years. The total time to go from decision to deploy to operational status is considerably more than 1½ to 2 years. To go through the entire budgetary appropriation, procurement, and construction cycle would normally take 4 to 5 years, and even on an expedited basis would require at least 3 to 4 years. A switch to deployment of additional Minutemen missiles would require immediate decisions to provide for a 1974 deployment of these offensive missiles.

The most significant fact, however, is this approach would mean that we meet the Soviet threat by proliferation and not defense. Our option for defense might be lost, and with it the chance of stabilizing the relative posture of the two countries at a lower level of offensive weapons.

Another significant effect of delay would be the loss of the effort which is currently underway—resulting in a substantial delay in defensive readiness in case of a later decision to deploy.

Stopping deployment funds now would mean readiness of the first site would be delayed at least 2 years—until early 1976. Later deployments, such as the so-called phase 2, could not be ready until 1978. This long delay results from the necessity to abandon now and to build up again later the talented and trained personnel base for production, site engineering, construction, and the like. It is questionable whether many of these highly talented individuals would return if once separated from the program.

Delay would also result in a great loss of funds. Congress has already appropriated \$1,744 million for deployment. An estimated \$500 million of these funds would be lost if we decided to cease de-

ployment. Even if we again decided to deploy during the next session of Congress, the cost of a 12-site deployment would be over \$250 million and possibly \$500 million higher than if we continue our current effort.

This cost results from the discharge of the some 5,000 trained personnel we now have on preproduction and construction engineering effort and the necessity to replace them later; the termination of contracts with subcontractors throughout the country who have made commitments for undertaking parts of the program; and the need to reestablish production lines, and build a new construction engineering base.

To illustrate the effect of a delay of 1 year in deployment, let us examine the case of the first site planned for deployment, the missile site radar facility at Grand Forks, N. Dak.

About 7 to 9 months would be required after firm site selection for the completion of the detailed engineering necessary prior to contract award. After contract award, some 24 to 27 months would be required to ready the site to the point where installation and test of radar and data processing equipment and other military equipment could begin. Some 19 to 22 months would be required thereafter for installation, test, checkout, and onsite training prior to site readiness. Procurement of hardware would have been made approximately 30 months prior to delivery to the site. All of these are relatively tight time factors for the work to be accomplished.

If deployment were delayed for a year, with activity restricted to R. & D., DOD would terminate as quickly as possible all procurement and construction engineering activities, packing items already procured, stopping all other production and fabrication, canceling vendor contracts, packing or sealing the production lines, and reassigning people. If the Congress in next year's authorization renewed the authorization and appropriated funds to deploy, the schedules would be approximately as follows: Completion of negotiations for a preproduction contract award in August 1970 at the earliest. Contract would take 2 to 3 months more. About 9 months would then be required to rehire, relocate, and retrain procurement and production personnel, renegotiate and restart the flow of vendor items, and reestablish production lines. Thus, about August 1971, effective production and assembly could be reinitiated in order to deliver all major hardware to site by April 1974. Site readiness would be achieved about January 1976.

Consider the impact of such unilateral action by the United States on the strategic arms limitation negotiation. We would be delaying with a U.S.S.R. which has already initiated deployment of a defensive system, has some sites operational, and is presently carrying on a most active test program on an advanced ballistic-missile defense system. We would enter negotiation having lost great bargaining factor.

In summary, then, a deployment decision is needed now if we are to be able to counter the mid-1970's Soviet and Chinese Communist threat to our land-

based strategic offensive forces and avoid the loss in money and effectiveness that would result if skilled engineering and production talents are allowed to disperse.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. WILSON), which eliminates the deployment money, \$345.5 million from the ABM system, but—let us not lose sight of this—it leaves all of the \$400 million-plus for research and development for ABM.

Mr. Chairman, being a Northerner, a New Englander, it will not be necessary for me to ask unanimous consent to speak more than 5 minutes, and it will not be necessary for anybody to seek the floor in order to yield me any extension of time to talk, because I do not believe I will need the 5 minutes in question.

I am not going to argue any of the ideological questions which are inherent in the discussion we have today on this very important issue. There is only one aspect of the ABM problem which I wish to discuss, so far as deployment is concerned.

I recognize that the majority of the members of the Research and Development Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, upon which I have served, as well as the majority of all the members of the committee disagree with the position I am taking here. I respect their judgment. I hope they will respect my sincere conviction upon this matter.

In my opinion, in spite of the tests and the work which has been done in research and development on the ABM system thus far, this enormously complex system which we are considering today, we have not yet done enough to prove the system; to justify beginning the actual deployment of the system here in the United States of America.

This is one of the most complex undertakings which our technology has encountered.

I am not going to say the system will not work. Perhaps it will as it is now constituted. I am not going to say if the system will not work now, it cannot be made to work, because I believe it can be made to work in the future if that is what we want to do.

In the next 9 months of fiscal year 1970, with the \$400 million available if this amendment is adopted for just such purpose, we ought to continue research and development upon the ABM system and not begin the deployment of that system.

I would say, Mr. Chairman, enough instances have come to light in the past 12 months of expensive, complex military weapons systems, like the Cheyenne helicopter, which have not worked. Let us not have another. Let us not go ahead with the deployment of the ABM system until we are convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that if we do deploy it that system is going to work. Let us go ahead with \$400 million worth of R. & D. in the next 9 months. There are only 9 months left in fiscal year 1970. In that time frame it can be further extensively tested. Then let us review the state of the

ABM system's development in the light of such further tests as we begin consideration of the 1971 budget, which we probably will have under consideration in our committee within 6 or 7 months from the time we meet here today.

I urge the adoption of the amendment.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STAFFORD. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to compliment the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD) for his discussion of why we do not need to deploy the ABM at this time.

I would also like to ask him a question on the immediate need or lack thereof for deploying the ABM. I will preface my question, however, with a few comments on our existing nuclear deterrents.

First, our ground-based ICBM system consists of 54 Titan II rockets and 1,000 Minutemen I missiles. Minuteman I, by 1973, will be replaced by Minuteman II's and Minuteman III's, each possessing longer ranges and heavier payloads.

Second, the U.S. Air Force has on alert about 600 B-52 and B-58 bombers equipped with over 1,000 nuclear-type weapons. It has been estimated by no less an authority than Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner that of the 600 bombers, "about half would get through to their targets."

Third, the fleet ballistic-missile weapon system is comprised of 41 nuclear-powered submarines carrying a total of 656 Polaris missiles. This is really quite a deterrent because on April 7, 1969, Secretary of Defense Laird called it "virtually invulnerable."

Fourth, and finally, we have above and beyond what I have already mentioned over 7,000 nuclear weapons positioned outside the United States. Many of these are capable of striking targets in the Soviet Union.

In view of all this, it certainly seems to me that our national security is not in danger at this time. It looks like we have plenty of time and plenty of elbow room to continue further research on the ABM before we deploy it. We are talking about a huge investment, specifically \$345.5 million for procurement, and I for one want to be sure we really need this before we dump all this money into it.

My question, then, to the distinguished gentleman from Vermont is this—in light of our current nuclear deterrents, which I have just discussed, is not our national security sufficiently protected for the time being to allow us some elbow room to go ahead with further research on the ABM but to delay any deployment of it?

Mr. STAFFORD. I believe the various missile systems we have are a great deterrent force, a great force for peace in the world. I believe under the umbrella which they provide we can use the next 6 or 9 months to further test the ABM system.

Mr. CONTE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STAFFORD. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Chairman, I appre-

ciate the gentleman's yielding to me so that I can announce my support for the pending amendment as offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) that would delete \$345.5 million from the bill as now included for Army missile procurement—and hence deployment—in connection with the so-called Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system.

As others have noted, this amendment would leave untouched and still in the bill the sum of \$400.9 million in research and development funds for the Safeguard or a follow-on—and hopefully—better ABM system in the event there should be clearer evidence than we have today of our need for the same.

In taking this position, I am holding to the same position I have maintained relative to the deployment of any form of an ABM system since September of 1967 when, as I recall, I was one of only 26 Members voting against the first military construction appropriation bill that clearly carried advance deployment moneys for such a system. Subsequent votes on this issue have not been as clearly defined, in a number of instances, as that first vote—and some have occurred within the Committee of the Whole and, thus, were not recorded, but on each such occasion I have voted against ABM deployment moneys.

In so stressing my consistency, I do not wish to give the impression that mine has been a rigid position—or that I have not reviewed my position from time to time, as conditions changed or, indeed, as President Nixon directed a substantial and, to me, welcome modification of the original Johnson-McNamara concept of an ABM system. For there have been few issues during my entire period of service in the Congress to which I have devoted as much time and attention—and study—as I have to the complex and, in many cases almost unanswerable, questions involved in the matter now before us.

It would, thus, have been a simple matter, I suppose, as President Nixon—of my party—succeeded Lyndon Johnson, and then as Mr. Nixon did, as I have mentioned, direct what I regarded as an improved ABM concept over that one originally offered by Mr. Johnson, to have said that in matters of this sort the President knows best; or that, in instances involving the national security, it is always best to err, if at all, on the side of caution.

It would have been easy—in many ways—to have thus accommodated my position to the changed political and, to a lesser extent, technical circumstances.

But I have not done so because I have yet to see any convincing evidence—convincing to me, that is—that even the modified Safeguard system is presently required from the standpoint of our national security.

If I thought it was, I would vote the necessary funds for its deployment regardless of its costs for, though I am well aware of the need to remarshal our resources as between our defense needs and our Nation's social needs as soon as world conditions permit, the time has not yet arrived, unfortunately, when we can do that without some degree of risk.

Thus, my opposition is not based on the system's costs, as set forth in the bill before us, or as contemplated in future years.

Nor is it based on whether or not the system will work.

One has to assume that a nation that can land men on the moon safely and then bring them home can, with equal competence, solve the technological problems remaining before Safeguard becomes a thoroughly reliable weapons system.

At the same time, why begin to put a still-rudimentary and largely-untested system into the field if one is not convinced we need it now or, indeed, may not need it for several years yet to come, if at all?

If one believes that to be the situation—as I do—why not, then, proceed with further research and development of the system's components, and with the necessary testing, rather than beginning deployment of something that may well become obsolete before its installation is complete?

Nor is my opposition based on that difficult question—which I tend to answer in the affirmative—of whether or not our proceeding with deployment could upset the chances of success of the forthcoming arms-limitations—SALT—talks. Our past experiences in attempting to negotiate anything with the Russians ought to have taught us that it is rather useless, in any event, to try to speculate whether or not the Russians will move in this direction, if we move in that. So, while I do not wish us to do anything that might lessen the chance that, this time, at long last, they are prepared to talk realistically about our coming to some sort of arms agreements—so we can each slow down, if not end, the endless and senseless race we have been engaged in for so tragically long—I really do not see how anyone can make much of a case one way or the other on this point.

And, as to that case's other side—that the President needs congressional approval for deployment of an ABM system as a sort of "poker chip" to use in those talks—I do not really see that at all since the existence of a full-scale research and development ABM programs, which he will have in any event, ought to be equally as good a "chip" for him to advance as the very limited deployment of a system not really ready yet for the field.

Nor, finally, does my continuing opposition relate to the fear, as some have expressed it, that our having an ABM system is, in itself, so provocative as to result in an escalation of that arms race which I have mentioned. Such questions as I have had about this, I have tended to answer in the negative, for an ABM system as importantly modified by President Nixon should not be considered by the Russians—who have a partial and rudimentary ABM system of their own which may well have been designed to furnish them with some protection against a future nuclear threat from Red China—as being a provocative move on our part.

Instead, when it all comes down to the final analysis, my continuing objection

to spending money to deploy Safeguard relates to my belief that the same will not buy us \$1 worth more security than we now have against the threat of nuclear war.

In explaining this, one has to state again the basis upon which our strategy for deterring nuclear war—or the threat thereof—has always rested. We have always sought to do this—and have so far succeeded—by maintaining at all times a capability to retaliate against the Russians, or any other would-be nuclear aggressor, with such nuclear force as to cause that aggressor an "unacceptable" amount of damage in return.

I have purposely put quotation marks around that word "unacceptable." Mr. Chairman, because no one really knows what is, or is not, "acceptable" in this sense—and, of course, the answer may differ as we consider different nations, it being generally felt that our retaliatory blow, to constitute a proper deterrent, might have to be heavier, for instance, against Red China some day in the future than as against Russia now.

In any event, when one considers the massive retaliatory strength we now have—with its tremendous "overkill" capacity—in our vast and diversified deterrent force consisting, at last count, of 645 strategic bombers, 41 missile-launching submarines carrying a total of 656 weapons, and 1,054 land-based ICBM's, plus such tactical weapons as we may have here and there in Europe and elsewhere, it would clearly seem that we remain immune from any possible first-strike reach by Russia, if that is even contemplated, for some time to come.

And then when one adds into this strength the fact that, in response to the technological advances both we and Russia have made in recent years, we are fully prepared to begin to MIRV—meaning to replace our existing, single warheads with multiple, independently-targeted, reentry vehicles—both a substantial portion of our land-based Minuteman ICBM force and our Polaris submarine ICBM force, it is most difficult to see how a rudimentary ABM system, protecting only a few of our Minuteman sites, is really necessary now or in the immediate future.

It is important to understand that, by so MIRV-ing our retaliatory nuclear arsenal, we can thus increase its warhead strength by multiples of up to three for Minuteman and up to 14 for Polaris/Poseidon; thereby maintaining a substantial lead over Russia in total number of warheads.

Considering the fact that even the smallest warhead we are discussing is many times more powerful than the rudimentary atom bombs used over Hiroshima and Nagasaki years ago, all this would seem to assure us the continuance of an overkill retaliatory capacity as against Russia for several years yet to come, and for quite a few more years than that insofar as the budding Red Chinese threat may be concerned.

Now, finally, an ABM system is supposed to protect a part of our Minuteman force, as I have said, against a surprise attack, or to give us a flexible response—evidently meaning some alter-

native to all-out retaliation—or to be a defense against stray, accidentally-fired ICBM's.

But I have not yet been told why our Minutemen are now more vulnerable to a surprise attack than they have ever been. Personally, I doubt they are, and surely Russia's attempt, if that is what she is doing, to overcome our long-time lead in numbers of both missiles and warheads would not, alone, make them so vulnerable.

More importantly, however, let us remember that our entire investment in all this will be totally wasted if we ever have to use it.

This is because deterrence is a psychological thing, depending on our keeping our willingness—as well as our ability—to retaliate in full force credible to any would-be aggressor. The key word, here, is "credible."

Our Minutemen are only vulnerable to a surprise attack if they are still in their silos.

I wonder if, in further considering that fact, we have not touched upon what is, perhaps, the basic fallacy in the argument of those advancing the case for ABM.

Each of us can well understand the awesome nature of a Presidential decision to release those Minutemen from their silos—and any President's desire for some degree of flexibility.

But, in the event of an actual attack, it is also difficult to contemplate any President wanting to rely on an untested and uncertain Safeguard system. It would seem to me that our retaliatory missiles would be used in any case—and, then, ABM would be protecting nothing but empty silos.

And I wonder further whether or not, in so seeming to reach for that flexibility, we do not risk somewhat eroding the credibility—key word, again—of our deterrent strength? By seeming to wish to prepare ourselves to ride out a potential Russian first strike against us, do we not invite Russia to essay that first strike—as we wait, with ABM, to see if she really means it?

If we are uncertain about Russia's first-strike capabilities and intentions—and we are—I know of no better way to prevent any attempt by her at a first strike, or even of any better way to cause her to make sure there never is an accidental ICBM launch in our direction, than to leave her in doubt whatsoever about our second-strike capabilities and intentions.

Mr. Chairman, few who have engaged in this debate—either here in this Chamber or in the preceding debate on this issue in the other body—have addressed themselves to this question. But it remains one that troubles me greatly.

In conclusion, I believe that deployment of the Safeguard ABM system, now, adds nothing to our national security, but is something that may, in a wholly unintended and unforeseen manner, actually detract therefrom.

Our assured retaliatory capability, coupled with the certainty of our intended response, represents to my mind our greatest inhibition against any Russian first-strike attack—and even against any accidental ICBM launch.

Thus, for the reasons stated, I will vote

for the Leggett amendment, and I urge my colleagues to do likewise.

Mr. HICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment and move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. CONTE) put his finger on the reason why this system should not be deployed at the present time. That reason is we do not need it at the present time. Let us not lose sight of the fact that the sole reason for the ABM is that we want to make our deterrent credible in the 1970's. Keep in mind this fact, that if we have to use the ABM system, it has not worked. It is just that simple. If we have to use it, it has not worked. All this talk about 30 million people it will save or 50 million people it will save is a lot of nonsense. It is just not designed to save people. The Safeguard system, as contrasted to the Sentinel system, was not designed to save people. It is designed to have the Soviets believe that our missile system can do what it is designed to do; that is, destroy the Soviet Union as a way of life.

The question is: Is that deterrent credible and will it remain credible in the 1970's. That is a judgment matter, as the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) said. He wants to put his judgment on the side of putting in the ABM. I put my judgment on the side of the fact that at the present time and through the period of the eighties we will be able to destroy the Soviet Union with the missiles that we now have. As the gentleman from California says, if we cannot, we had better start building the long-range missile submarines so that we can move them around the ocean so that they cannot be destroyed. That is the reason why I say the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON) stopping the deployment of these missiles should be adopted. Every dollar we spend that we do not need on defense is a dollar too much. On the other hand, I am going to vote against a great many amendments that the dissident minority is offering today, because I am not sure that we do not need them. This is one measure of our defense budget that I am absolutely certain we do not need.

Along with the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD) I agree we should continue our research and development, because who knows when we will have a breakthrough at some time when we will get a system that will save lives. At that point, when we have a defense missile system that will save lives, we ought to deploy it, but at the present time we do not have one and do not contemplate having such a system. We contemplate a system that will make our nuclear deterrent more credible. It is credible today and it will remain credible in the 1970's time frame regardless of whether the ABM is deployed or not deployed, in my judgment. For that reason I think there is \$345 million here that need not be expended.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HICKS. I yield to my distinguished chairman.

Mr. RIVERS. If this system can save a missile site, could it not save a city?

Mr. HICKS. If it could save a missile site, it would make the missiles in that missile site available to shoot back at whoever was shooting at us, but if we have to use it to save a missile site, then it has not worked, because it has not proved to be a deterrent. That is the only reason why we are putting in the Safeguard system. It is to make our missile deterrent credible so that they cannot be destroyed and we can shoot them back.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HICKS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEGGETT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I know that the gentleman in the well is very much concerned about saving people. The fact is that we have totally changed our orientation on this missile system. Last year when we were on the floor those who urged support of the Sentinel were trying to save people from the Chinese. However, that is not the ploy today. The ploy today is to save missiles, which is the virtual exclusive use of the Safeguard missile system. I know that the gentleman is concerned about what happened to the \$1.2 billion we voted on the floor of the House last year for the Sentinel system. There was \$300 million for military construction where we were going to buy up sites near cities and we had the cities erupting and complaining all around the country. There has never really been an adequate explanation given to me as to what has happened to this kind of wasteful expenditure.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, ever since my college days I have had a very healthy respect for the process of debate. That is the reason I am terribly disappointed in this debate today, because thus far it seems that most of the proponents of the amendment have not argued on the merits of the question.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me at that point?

Mr. GUBSER. No; I cannot yield at this point.

Mr. Chairman, they have made the claims of "foul" and charged that they were being gagged and have not been given adequate time during which to discuss this issue.

Very frankly, if I were sitting on the other side of the aisle, I would be asking unanimous consent for everyone's time to be extended in the hope that the boys in the Press Gallery would emphasize the fact that discussion and debate was curtailed.

But, Mr. Chairman, I ask this question: Have you ever known of an issue before the American public which has been so thoroughly discussed and debated as this one? I certainly do not know of one. I think the American people and every Member of this House pretty well knows the issue.

For a moment I would like to address myself to the merits of this matter. I think they involve three questions.

First of all, will it work? Second, will

it upset the balance of power and start a new arms race? Last, do we need it?

The distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. FISHER) pointed out the fact that Harry Truman was faced with a decision and made it in his typical courageous style. Dr. Teller said that the H-bomb would work. Other experts said it would not. Mr. Truman made the decision and I ask you where we would be in this world today if Russia had possessed a thermonuclear weapon while we did not. That would be the case had Mr. Truman followed the advice of some of the so-called scientific experts.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUBSER. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. ARENDS. The gentleman just reminded me of something that happened with reference to the H-bomb. The great scientist, Mr. Oppenheimer, was reported in the press as saying that it would not work. After it did work and he was confronted with the question, "How could you be so wrong?" he said something like this, "I had only hoped it would not work, I did not want it to work."

Mr. GUBSER. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, we put a man on the moon. We will make this system work. I do not say when or how well it will work, but I say we can make it work.

With reference to the question, Will it upset the balance of power and start a new arms race?—there are arguments both pro and con which I shall not dwell upon. However, it is a defensive weapon.

How can a defensive weapon start a new arms race? In our military history we had H-bomb superiority, and Russia met it and surpassed it; we had the B-52 superiority and she met that. With respect to everyone of our deterrents she has met them. We have the ICBM and she is fast meeting that. We have the Polaris deterrent and surely she will meet that.

Mr. Chairman, my point is that this will not set up an arms race because, ladies and gentlemen, there is one in progress right now and Russia is winning it. It is just that simple.

Last, do we need an ABM? The answer lies in another question: Will Russia or China launch a first strike against us? The answer to that question only lies in the minds and the hearts of the men in the Kremlin and in Peking.

Mr. Chairman, I do not have extra-sensory perception and I cannot look into the minds and hearts and consciences of these men. I cannot answer the question and I submit no one else in this room can.

But, as I pointed out yesterday during general debate, I think I established by asking several questions, which if answered honestly would prove conclusively that there is a threat and there is an aggressive intention on the part of the Soviet Union.

So in the interest of safety we must assume that that threat is real, and we must be ready for it. We cannot run the risk of erring as Chamberlain did.

I submit that this is the real and significant issue. What we are buying is a minimum of 1 year's time and prob-

ably 2 years in a deployment schedule. We can come back here next year and repeal all of this, and stop the program dead in its tracks, but we will not have lost 1 year or perhaps 2 in the face of a serious threat.

Mr. Chairman, if anyone favors further research and development is he not really saying, "I am for deployment if it works." If this is not so why support any funds for R. & D., why not cut it off now? Thus the arms race argument is negated and so is the argument that negotiations will be hindered. If one favors further research and development the issue is not deployment, the issue is when it will be deployed.

I believe American scientists will make it work. So if there is a threat from a potential aggressor and time is against us, is it not sensible to save 1 year and probably 2. The year we save may be the difference between having a nation and not having one.

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in support of the amendment.

I will yield part of my time in a moment to members of the committee who wish to discuss this. Before yielding I want to indicate that I rise in support of the amendment.

I might state that my background on the ABM does not come from this debate today, or this week; it started actually, as far as I am concerned, over a year ago when the deployment of the Sentinel ABM on a site within the Seattle area was discussed. Many of us were approached by a group of scientists and physicists, many of whom have worked on the programs for the scientific advancement of defense of the United States. These scientists said that first, the system will not work; and second, if it were used it could destroy the city which it was designed to protect by a fire storm that would result. There are also problems in the control-command area which are involved with an X-ray kill system.

For example, if you use an X-ray kill your radar will still reflect that the missile is coming into the area, and if you give humans control over the Sprint missiles they will fire these short-range missiles at the incoming missile or you have to lock it down and just depend on computers to fire for the X-ray kill, otherwise you will have a massive firing at the missile as it continues to come in, and as the Sprints are fired, and the resulting fire storm will destroy that city.

The Sentinel was then rejected and the Safeguard was picked.

This system we discuss today is not a people saver, it is a missile saver. I would like to mention that I put in the RECORD on July 11, 1968, an article from the Scientific American of March 1968, describing the ABM system in detail, and showing how it cannot work. On February 26, 1969, I did the same thing with another article.

For example, it can be shown that through the use of a simple tandem missile there is a radar blackout. The first explosion knocks out the long-range radar, and in the blackout the second missile goes through. The use of chaff and various other penetration devices are equally dangerous to this system.

Mr. GILBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADAMS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. GILBERT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I wish to associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished gentleman from Washington.

Mr. Chairman, I rise and associate my remarks with those of the distinguished gentleman from Washington (Mr. ADAMS) in support of the Wilson amendment, which would delete \$345,500,000 for limited deployment of the ABM system.

I voted against the ABM appropriation last year and I have not altered my position. The cost is exorbitant; it will be a financial drain on this country. And I believe the deployment of this system threatens to upset our already delicate, strategic balance and encourages escalation of the arms race. In addition, there is the serious risk of accidental explosion near our urban centers, and I certainly believe the deployment of this system would weaken our bargaining position and diminish our capacity to conduct intelligent and rational foreign policy. As I have said in the past, the ABM system is inconsistent with our efforts for the ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the establishment of a Department of Peace. Under the terms of the treaty the nuclear powers are to undertake "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." If there is good faith intent in nuclear disarmament, then deployment of the ABM system is inimical to a non-proliferation treaty. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to dwell longer on the technical shortcomings of such a system. We have heard ample scientific testimony that the system may be of little or no worth to the Nation's security. But I will say with conviction that we have set a grievously bad example to the rest of the world.

Mr. Chairman, I reiterate that I support the Wilson amendment, and I urge my colleagues to support it, also.

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Chairman, I also want to associate myself with the remarks made yesterday by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON) for whom I have the greatest respect, and who I believe stated it so very well when he said that we must change our comfortable, old ways. That is why some of us who are not on the Armed Service Committee are involved in this argument we are engaged in today.

I also want to associate myself with the remarks made by my colleague from Washington (Mr. HICKS). He and I have both gone through a great deal of soul-searching in regard to this situation. We have been involved in it for over 2 years. We are concerned about our people in our cities, and we are concerned about where this program goes if you start with the Safeguard, and then go to the Sentinel, and then go to heavy defenses. And that is why I again urge the members of the committee who have not done so to read the articles I have previously placed in the RECORD on July 11, 1968, and on February 26, 1969.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADAMS. I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) a member of the committee.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I know that the gentleman is appreciative of the great wisdom of Dr. Teller who has been alluded to here on the floor before, intimating that he had contributed measurably to the building of the hydrogen bomb—whether or not he is the father of it or not, I have never been really able to prove.

I do recall, however, Mr. Chairman, that the doctor sometimes has been wrong. For instance, when I was in the California Legislature some 7 or 8 or 9 years ago I recall the doctor appeared before our legislature urging at that time the great necessity for the development of civilian defense shelters. If you take his mathematics and the recommendations of the doctor at that time, it would have meant that the State of California as a State would have expended the amount of \$10 billion to protect the State from the fallout of the nuclear holocaust that was going to come.

Mr. Chairman, now on hearing of the doctor's enthusiasm for the ABM, I am satisfied that really why he was doing that was because he was really anticipating what the nuclear holocaust would be like and what problems would be created in our own atmosphere with this tremendous fallout that we would be getting from the ABM nuclear weapons exploding in our own atmosphere at very short range.

Mr. ADAMS. Will the gentleman agree that the Sprint missile being fired in tandem in great numbers at the incoming missile can establish a fire storm within the area in which they are fired?

Mr. LEGGETT. That is exactly right. It is very interesting to note that we have had some other systems presented to our committee—one an Air Force system, classified by letters and names describing it and the SABM's the Navy surface anti-ballistic-missile system.

Mr. WEICKER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the requisite number of words and rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the great tragedy of the ABM is that it has become a symbolic test of conflicting ideologies. As such, it has already made its first kill—specifically, the commonsense of many who will render judgment on it.

The prevailing rules require that a big "L" liberal must state his opposition to the ABM in order to preserve his reputation for social reform. Similarly, a big "C" conservative finds he must support the system if he is to convince his backers that he has not sold out to creeping socialism.

The mass media has used the ABM issue to symbolize everything from Biafra to tax reform. Conservatively oriented media charge opponents of the ABM with being against national security and soft on communism, while their liberal counterparts insist that only without the ABM will Russia bargain in good faith on arms reduction with the United States.

Let us stop the noise and try to ex-

amine what is really at stake in this issue. We are looking at a proposed weapons system, a piece of military hardware, costing x number of dollars and designed to do a certain job. We are not conducting a symbolic test of feelings toward the administration. We are not symbolically examining our love of country, and we are not attributing any new candor or worthiness of purpose to Sino-Soviet communism.

If we fail to examine this system on its merits, or if we oppose it simply to create an embarrassment for our President, then indeed we have raised an issue even greater than the ABM—specifically, the priority we give to partisanship.

I have always believed in a strong national defense posture and I do not think this is the time to base our national policies simply on trust in the Soviet word. But if we are talking about national security, and putting democracy on the offensive, then commonsense leads this American to a stance of opposition to the ABM Safeguard system.

On the first point—national security. If I recall my military history correctly, the United States became the greatest military nation in the world, not because of our numbers, but because we developed military weapons and tactics which depended on mobility and simplicity of operation. An example of this would be the development by the United States of the principle of indirect artillery fire as compared to the Russian tactic of massing artillery on the ground in a certain pattern to achieve a similar pattern of shell bursts. The ABM system proposed in this bill is neither mobile—this, because of its fixed-site characteristics, nor is it simple of operation—this, because of its reliance on extremely delicate ground-based electronic gear.

As to mobility. Do you honestly believe that fixed installations are superior in this day and age to highly mobile installations such as our nuclear submarines?

As to the electronic part of the system. Do you honestly believe that we are not capable of doing via satellite, what is proposed to be done on the ground?

It is impossible to touch upon the issue of national security without commenting on the balance of nuclear terror which presently exists. I do not know if the ABM system has credibility in Moscow or Peking; what I do know is that our present nuclear arsenal capable of being delivered by ICBM, submarines, or B-52's does. And I also know that those ABM's already constructed by Moscow can in no wise give to any Russian the assurance that at the minimum, he would not be on the receiving end of at least 100 of our missiles. I believe the time has come for this Nation to distinguish between more defense and better defense. Is it not a sad commentary on the creativity of our democracy that we are always talking about military defense or military offense. Again, historically we have displayed a success way beyond the numbers of our population because we not only concentrated on military weaponry, but also on the powerful weapons of scientific discovery and technological advance-

ment for life. If only we can forget our unnatural cynicism and remember that freely creating is where a free society like ours has two punches for every one of the Sino-Soviet military state.

What I am saying is that for every man you can persuade to a political philosophy with CBW, I can persuade 1,000 with a cure for cancer. For every woman that you can persuade with an ABM, I can persuade 1,000 with a system that creates fresh water where none now exists. And so it goes.

I plan to vote for the bill, but also for this amendment. And I think in doing that, I represent the commonsense judgment of a majority of Americans. That judgment accepts reaching the limits of destruction, but very humanly pleads that the work of hope begin.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we can get some idea as to how many additional Members desire to speak on the amendment. I wonder if we could agree to, say, an hour of debate.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, will the distinguished chairman of the committee yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the minority leader.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I had hoped to make a few remarks. Others in the leadership on both sides might like to say a word or two. Even if an hour were now allocated among the Members now standing, it would mean each would have less than 5 minutes.

Mr. RIVERS. I would not wish to deny anyone 5 minutes. Maybe we ought to go on.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I want to assure the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee that I shall not take the full 5 minutes unless members of this Committee would like me to yield to them.

Mr. Chairman, there has been a great deal of talk on this floor about who is and who is not an expert. I come before you obviously making no claim to be an expert. I am a lawyer by training and a politician by trade. But I do remember that as a trial lawyer I had to cross-examine experts. I had to educate myself in their field. I remember a case involving the awful disease of epilepsy. I had to learn enough so I could cross-examine medical experts on that subject.

In this field I tried to do a little cross-examining. I cross-examined an expert as to whether we could now and in the future penetrate whatever kind of defense the Soviets could erect against us, and the expert assured me that there was no system that the Soviets could possibly erect that we could not, with our various penetration aids—chaff, decoys, multiple warheads, maneuverable warheads and, if all fails, a precursor to knock out their radar—there was no system that could be erected that we could not penetrate. Therefore, I asked, Why is it not true that they could also penetrate whatever we would erect?

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MOORHEAD. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEGGETT. I appreciate the gentleman yielding and giving us the additional time. I appreciate the remarks the gentleman is making on the subject of experts, because I am reminded of the way our Committee on Armed Services selects its experts on the question of deployment of the ABM. We heard many generals, admirals, Air Force generals, and colonels expressing their views on why it was pragmatic that we deploy these various systems. We did set aside, I think, one Friday morning to hear civilian witnesses who might be pro or con on the question of deployment. This was a day when, I believe, we had a bare quorum of the committee present. We had a total of about 3 hours of testimony presented which was split between the distinguished people who thought it was a good idea and those who thought it was a bad idea. I do not purport to be any expert myself. I have familiarized myself, I think, with this subject matter about as much as anybody on the floor.

But still when you come up against a \$10 billion system that envisions this massive expenditure of money, personnel, and training, it is very difficult for anybody to master exactly what it means. But I think that one of the great experts we are forgetting about, Bob McNamara, while I have disagreed with him on a number of subjects, certainly on the question of deployment against the Soviet Union he was immutable.

He said that even though the Sentinel system might be all right—and we recall in October 1967 he said it would be OK, we should release the Sentinel, and we will start with an R. & D. program; he said at the time, however, that we should not initiate an ABM deployment to help protect our land-based strategic offensive forces against a Soviet missile attack.

He said:

1. The Soviet Union would be forced to react to a U.S. ABM deployment by increasing its offensive nuclear force still further with the result that:

(a) The risk of a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States would not be further decreased.

(b) The damage to the United States from a Soviet nuclear attack, in the event deterrence failed, would not be reduced in any meaningful sense.

Those remarks appear on page 167 of the report in my concurring remarks, which I might mention were not prepared by any committee staff lawyer.

I would say that as far as the people who come up and say that we should deploy the ABM because we want to save 50 million people, Bob McNamara has said if we want to save 50 million people, we should not deploy this system against the Soviet Union, because they will have to do what we did. The Soviets deployed not a thousand ABM's, like we are deploying in this program, but they put up 67 around Moscow in the Galosh system and they got it two-fifths completed and then abandoned it. Nothing has happened in the past year on that program. It is a nonautomatic ineffective primitive system.

I think the effect of it has been to make the United States move ahead with this massive deployment and this massive arms race.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. BURLISON of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RANDALL. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. BURLISON of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, a nation's most fundamental interest is its own survival. If I were convinced that the Safeguard ABM system would contribute significantly to our Nation's security I would not be standing here urging my colleagues to vote against it. But, I am convinced otherwise. Some of the best scientific minds in this country have studied the ABM and it is their opinion that at worst the system will not work at all and at best it cannot be depended upon to work at a given time. To a man, James Killian, Donald Hornig, Jerome Wiesner, and George Kistiakowsky, the science advisers to the last three Presidents, oppose the decision to deploy the Safeguard ABM. One of the primary responsibilities of these highly trained scientists was to advise the President on weapons systems. I do not think anyone questions their objectivity or qualifications. What is it about the ABM which inspires such little confidence in its reliability?

For one thing it is the most complicated electronic system ever conceived. Briefly this is how the system is set up. It is composed of two types of missiles and two types of radars, the latter feeding impulses to a computerized central "nervous system."

One radar is a perimeter acquisition radar—PAR—a long-range detection and tracking instrument capable of scanning the horizon. The other radar is a missile site radar—MSR—designed to track incoming targets at shorter ranges than the PAR and to track U.S. missiles to their encounter with an attacking missile.

The larger of the two missiles is Spartan, a three-staged rocket with a range of several hundred miles. It carries a nuclear warhead and is designed to intercept incoming missiles above the earth's atmosphere.

The smaller missile is Sprint. It is also nuclear-tipped; has two stages and like Spartan is fired from an underground silo. It has high speed and limited range and is designed to intercept attacking missiles that have pierced the long range Spartan defenses.

In theory the system would begin to function when incoming missiles were more than 1,000 miles away. PAR would track them for a minute or two, establish their trajectory and feed the data to a computer.

A Spartan missile would be launched to intercept the attacking missiles hundreds of miles distant in outer space. It would fly at about 5,000 miles an hour and at its nearest point to the enemy missile, explode its hydrogen warhead with the impact of millions of tons of TNT.

Any enemy weapons penetrating this nuclear defense would encounter the

short-range Sprint which is capable of climbing thousands of feet in a few seconds and making interceptions between 5,000 and 100,000 feet at ranges between 15 and 25 miles.

Sprint's operation is all within the earth's atmosphere where it is easier for radar to identify decoys and other devices designed to confuse the defender. Its warhead is smaller than that of Spartan; its explosion probably would be about 20 miles in the air.

The computers which guide the Sprint and Spartan are fantastically complex. They must interpret radar signals, identify targets, track incoming objects, predict trajectories, distinguish between warheads and decoys, eliminate false targets, reject signals from earlier nuclear explosions, correct for blackout effects, program, arm and fire the rockets. And it must do it all within 10 minutes.

It is obvious even to a layman that if any one of the components is out of order or does not perform perfectly, the whole system fails not partially but totally. If the missiles misfire or malfunction, no enemy rockets can be intercepted. If the radar does not properly interpret the signals it cannot guide our missiles to their targets. Certainly the enemy would send a large number of decoys along with the actual warheads and if the computers are fooled by the decoys then our rockets will be sent to intercept the decoys and the enemy ICBM's will proceed unharmed. The list could go on ad infinitum. If a showdown ever came and something malfunctioned, it would not be possible to hold the countdown for adjustments and repairs as we are able to do with the Apollo moon shots.

A Bureau of the Budget official recently made a study of 13 major aircraft and missile programs utilizing sophisticated electronic systems. Of the 13, only four could be relied upon to perform at more than 75 percent of their specifications. Two of the systems costing \$10 billion had to be phased out when their low reliability became manifest. Two others were simply canceled after an expenditure of \$2 billion.

Dr. Daniel Fink writing in the October 1968 Science and Technology states that our missiles have a reliability of about 50 percent. Fifty to 75 percent reliability in an offensive weapon is acceptable because of our very high coefficient of overkill. Recent Senate hearings revealed less than 10 percent of our offensive missiles need reach the Soviet Union in order to completely devastate the 50 largest cities. Thus we have a rather large margin for error with offensive missiles. Conversely, since the U.S.S.R. also has a high coefficient of overkill our ABM system must perform with absolute perfection. Even 90 percent is not good enough.

Back in 1960-61 there was great pressure to deploy the Nike-Zeus or its variant, the Nike X. Both were anti-ballistic-missile systems not greatly different than the one now being offered. Much to their credit, President Eisenhower and President Kennedy opposed deployment. Looking back on that decision, Dr. George Kistiakowski, President Eisenhower's science adviser made this observation:

It is interesting to contemplate that had the deployment of Nike Zeus been authorized in 1960-61, we would have just about now the full system in operational readiness, after spending what was then estimated as twenty billion dollars and could have been, judging by analogy with other large weapon systems, twice as much. Considering the current numbers and sophistication of offensive missiles now being deployed by the super powers, it is technically certain that the Nike-Zeus ABM system would now be of little value. It would be obsolescent or even obsolete, judging by the fact that the probably somewhat more modern Soviet ABM defenses around Moscow are rated of little value to the Soviet Union by our competent military experts.

Even if we thought we had built an impenetrable system there would be no means of testing it thoroughly. For example there is no way to know what effect a high altitude nuclear explosion would have on the ABM radar and electronic systems. We cannot test this because the Test Ban Treaty prohibits atmospheric nuclear testing. A great number of scientists feel that such an explosion would completely "black out" our radar. In response to a question by Senator SYMINGTON, Dr. Hans Bethe, professor of physics at Cornell University observed:

An atomic explosion would produce a much higher concentration of electrons and would thus reflect radio waves of much higher frequency than the ionosphere. This gives radar blackout for a certain length of time after the explosion, usually counted in minutes and this has been observed in our own high altitude nuclear weapons tests in 1958 and 1962.

Since the ABM could not be deployed before 1973 at the very earliest, the U.S.S.R. as well as any other potential foe will have 3 years to figure ways to alter their ICBM's so that they can penetrate our ABM. This point has particular relevance to the Chinese threat since Chinese ICBM's are still in the development phase. China will not have to make expensive revisions of her ICBM's. She can simply provide for the penetration aids in her original design.

What will this system of doubtful reliability cost the American taxpayer? The President says \$8.2 billion. That cost does not include the nuclear warheads which will run the price up to about \$11 billion. But if we think we are going to get off that cheaply we are fooling ourselves. In 1967 a system similar to the Safeguard ABM was estimated to cost \$3.7 billion. A Brookings Institute analysis of weapons systems costs revealed that actual costs have exceeded estimates by 300 to 700 percent. If the ABM follows this trend we are going to put out an awfully lot of money. The \$11 billion buys protection for only a few sites. If it turns out that Safeguard is only the prototype for a "thick" system, the total might reach astronomical heights. I do not think any thoughtful American is willing to spend hundreds of billions of dollars for a weapon that has no better record for reliability than the ABM. Applied to domestic problems, \$100 billion would develop and protect our rural economy, rebuild our cities, decontaminate our air and water, educate our children and still leave a surplus.

From strictly the military point of view a multibillion-dollar expenditure for

ABM means that less money will be available to develop new and more effective ways to protect our security. Dr. Jerome Wiesner, Science Adviser to President Kennedy stated:

Some weapons systems are obsolete in their conception, and I think this is probably true for the anti-ballistic-missile system before us. I have in fact come to the conclusion that any system that depends upon projectiles—rather than say nuclear rays or electromagnetic beams or laser beams—is futile.

Would it not be better to devote more funds to further research and development in the field to see if some really effective system might be developed, than to deploy an unprecedentedly expensive system that probably won't work and is sure to become rapidly obsolete?

Not even the most optimistic proponent of ABM will argue that the system proposed will protect our cities. Rather deployment will be directed toward protecting some of our ICBM's. Such protection, the argument continues, will assure that sufficient numbers of our Minuteman ICBM's would survive a sneak attack to devastate the attacking nation. This argument seems to assume that our deterrent credibility is based exclusively on our Minuteman ICBM's. We all know that is not so. Our deterrent or "assured destruction capability" rests on three distinct and independent components: Bombers, missile carrying submarines, and Minuteman ICBM's. The task assigned to Safeguard is to protect only a fraction of our ICBM's. The fact is that if every Minuteman were destroyed, our bomber force and our Polaris submarines would still have the capability to totally destroy the attacker. Therefore, whether or not we deploy the Safeguard ABM our assured destruction capability remains intact.

Some have said that we ought to have an ABM because the Russians have one around Moscow. If we do not deploy we will suffer an ABM gap. That reasoning might be more persuasive if there were any reason to think the Russian model was effective. Our intelligence has confirmed that the Russian ABM system is a primitive type similar to the type President Eisenhower rejected as unworkable back in the late 1950's. It now appears the Russians have recognized the weakness of the system and no longer deploy it. In a letter to former Senator Monroney, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick commented:

It seems generally accepted within our intelligence and scientific community that the ABM system which the Soviets have deployed around Moscow has encountered many technical difficulties and is probably of limited effectiveness.

It would be ludicrous to justify a multi-billion-dollar weapon as a reaction to a weapon you and your adversary both know has marginal utility.

Another of the multitude of alternative uses the administration has attributed to the ABM system is a protection against accidental launch of an ICBM. Of course, any additional protection against an accidental launch would be reassuring, but in this case other more effective means are available. The U.S.S.R. and the United States have

a vital and coinciding interest in this problem, and it would therefore seem preferable to get an agreement with the Russians and anyone else who has operational ICBM's to place self-destruct mechanisms in the ICBM itself. Then if one were accidentally fired its owner could destroy it before it could cause any damage.

Not only does Safeguard allegedly protect against Russian attack, Chinese attack, and accidental launch, but it also is supposed to provide an alternative response when we are faced with a possible attack. We need not, they say, launch our Minuteman, Polaris missiles, and B-52's. If the attack is less than all out we need only launch our ABM's which will intercept the missiles. But, before we buy this facile argument let us imagine ourselves to be the President. A special adviser comes in and tells the President that the radars have picked up what are believed to be Soviet ICBM's and their projected trajectory indicates they are headed for one of our Minuteman sites. The President must make his decision in less than 5 minutes. He knows the ABM's have a failure probability of 50 percent or more. He knows that there is a 72-percent chance that one of the radar installations will not be operational. With these and all the other uncertainties, would you order the Minuteman to remain in their silos and rely on the ABM? Or would you fire the Minuteman immediately and leave the enemy ICBM's to hit empty silos? Viewed in these terms the option is illusory.

The fact that no ICBM or hydrogen bomb has ever exploded accidentally, does not mean that it cannot happen. The specter of such an accident is clearly accentuated by adding many more nuclear rockets to the Minuteman bases. Also of significance is the fact that one of the two types of ABM's used in the Safeguard system is programed to detonate at a comparatively low altitude. We must at least concede that the potential risk to civilian population is increased by the deployment of the ABM. Dr. George Rathjens of MIT observed that if the warhead of a single Spartan missile went off accidentally, it would cause nearly total destruction for a radius of 5 miles. Moreover, Dr. Ralph Lapp points out that if the Sprint rockets are detonated above the sites as they are programed to do, the resulting heat, light, and blast may cause very great damage to nearby cities—such protection we may be able to do without. It naturally follows that the very existence of an ABM installation will attract enemy ICBM's trying to destroy the system.

Aside from the question of whether Russia could achieve a preemptive strike capability, the great weight of the evidence points to the proposition that she is seeking only to maintain a form of missile parity. Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center at Stanford University expressed considerable doubt that the Russians either could or would attempt a preemptive strike against the United States:

I would like to express considerable skepticism that an attack of the kind envisaged

by the Department of Defense witnesses could be mounted by the Soviets with any confidence of success. One has to recognize that such a first strike implies that the Soviet decision makers would have to make a rational decision for such a fully coordinated attack and that in the absence of having carried out any operational tests involving nuclear warheads (forbidden by the atmospheric test ban), they would have confidence that such an attack would actually work. I consider this to be an extremely implausible projection of our available intelligence, including that concerning the SS-9. I can think of no better prescription for accelerating the arms race than taking the position that we must prepare a fully safe countermeasure for any technically imaginable contingency. It is this kind of planning which, from the narrow point of view of the military may appear conservative but which can lead to disastrous consequences for the survival of the U.S. or in fact the entire world.

Deployment of the ABM will surely lend credence to the feeling that the United States is reassessing its world responsibilities and is planning to withdraw to a "fortress America" unconcerned about the protection of our allies in Europe and elsewhere. It is no secret that Canada is miffed about our failure to consult with her on the proposal to deploy the ABM. This is understandable since presumably in case of attack most of the intercepts would occur over her territory.

Finally, let us look at the probable Soviet reaction to ABM deployment. What are they likely to do as a response to our ABM? Will they do nothing since they recognize that ABM is defensive rather than offensive? Or, will they speed up their own work on an ABM system? Or will they feel that their own deterrent is imperiled and launch an effort to enlarge their offensive capability? I submit that they will react just as we reacted when they deployed a rather primitive missile defense system around Moscow. We gave the go ahead to development and deployment of weapons which could penetrate their defense system. I refer of course to the Posiedon and MIRV.

I think the conclusion is inescapable that with the deployment of the ABM we are off on another round of what is euphemistically called the "arms race." Actually "race" is a tragic misnomer. A race implies a finish line and a winner, but the arms race can have no winner because there is no finish line. For every weapon there is a counterweapon; to every offense, a defense, and so the cycle goes on; thrust, parry, thrust, parry. It is a cycle that can terminate in but two ways. The participants can stop voluntarily. They can sit down together and agree to stop the race and they can devote their energy to more practicable and useful pursuits. We all know the alternative. We have lived with it since July 16, 1945. If the experience of those 24 years offers any lesson it is this: the arms race must end or civilization will. So far we have been lucky. Maybe our luck will hold out for a while longer. And maybe it will not.

Wishing will not stop the arms race. In addition to mutual distrust and suspicion, there are powerful vested interests on both sides. Frederick Collins

noted that 28 major contractors for the ABM project employ about 1 million people in 42 States. That adds up to a terrific amount of political pressure that may be brought to bear. It is not easy to vote against a bill that provides employment for your constituents. But, sometime we must apply the brakes and there is no better time than today. Prior to the ABM deployment proposal the Russians had expressed interest in beginning disarmament talks. We can give impetus to those talks by voting not to deploy the ABM. Let the research and development continue, but let us give disarmament a chance.

For too long, Mr. Chairman, we have abdicated our constitutional responsibility to raise and support armies. It is time that we serve notice on the Department of Defense that its requests shall no longer receive only pro forma scrutiny. We in the Congress have been elected to judge what is and is not in the national interest. I am merely suggesting that we exercise that responsibility. Let us say "No" to an expensive new weapons system that does not work and that we do not need. Let us say "Yes" to a reorientation of our national priorities and direct ourselves to the crucial domestic problems that ominously cry for solution. The survival of our Nation demands it.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment of the gentleman from California (Mr. Wilson), which would eliminate all funds for the deployment of the Safeguard system and leave only some money to continue research and development.

I will now yield to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Gross).

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Bob McNamara the gentleman from California was speaking of, is the same Bob McNamara who, as the former Secretary of Defense, was going to have American troops out of Vietnam 3 years ago?

Mr. RANDALL. Yes, I am sure we are speaking of Mr. Robert Strange McNamara. I think it is no secret that I had the opportunity several times to interrogate him about his policy of gradualism on Vietnam which cost us so many lives of the finest young men ever sent on the battlefield. As we all know, this no-win policy became so unbearable that it was finally rejected by former President Johnson who replaced him with a new Secretary, Clark Clifford. For my part one of the few things that I ever said which could be construed to be praiseworthy about Mr. McNamara was the fact that he had served longer than any other Secretary of Defense in the history of that office before he had to be removed by former President Johnson.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to get back on the track to discuss some more the things that were brought out by those on the other side of the aisle concerning the deployment of the hydrogen bomb. Mr. Truman happens to be my fellow townsman. If he had listened to some of the scientists, who urged him to put aside the H-bomb the entire history of the world might today be on a

different course. If Mr. Truman had yielded to the scientists who said to do nothing we might not be engaged in this debate today, because we could already have surrendered to the Soviets and living as a slave of the Soviet Union.

We are behind. We are behind in this race. All the committee asks you to do today is give our Department of Defense the funds to catch up or to become even with our enemies. Regardless of what Members' feelings may be about Vietnam, about the morality or immorality of that war, the Safeguard is something for our own defense. There has been far too little emphasis that the Safeguard is only a defensive weapon. We are not talking about war in Vietnam now or about anything except the defense of our own country. I submit that the defense of our homeland is a worthwhile undertaking. If for no other reason we should defeat this amendment.

May I suggest that if we do not approve deployment of the Safeguard today, then such a failure to act is tantamount to inviting the Russians to take advantage of our indecision.

There has been a great deal of argument back and forth concerning the cost of the ABM. The cost is going to be great. There is no question about that. But, if we do not start this deployment, if we do not start doing something, all the while admitting it may not be 100-percent effective, we are saying we never plan to start the journey toward perfection. No journey starts until one takes the first step.

The defeat of this amendment will mean we can start the deployment. It would be something like lighting a candle instead of continuing to curse the darkness.

Returning to the cost of the ABM, we did not know the cost in terms of lives and money when we determined to win our liberty at the time of our Revolution. I do not think we worried about the cost at the time of the war in 1918. We did not worry over costs at the time of Pearl Harbor. Certainly we should not worry about the cost of our own defense at this time—because that is what we are talking about right here and now. We are considering a defensive weapon to protect the lives of our own people and the land we all love.

A lot more needs to be said.

If I may, I want to quote from a gentleman by the name of Admiral Rickover, who I know we all respect. Concerning the difference between an ideal world of peace and the realism we all must face he said:

In judging between the conflicting views on this matter, either to scrap the ABM or deploy it, the deciding factor must be relevance to the world as it is, not the world we would wish it to be.

As to this issue of whether the deployment of the Safeguard will escalate the arms race, let me emphasize again that if we start today we are still a long way behind the Russians. We in this country have not complained against their defensive missiles. In fact the Russians themselves do not regard the deployment of the ABM as an act of escalation.

Returning to the argument on wheth-

er the Safeguard will save lives; that is whether it is effective, even if it should prove to be less effective than we now believe—nevertheless we must have it as a bargaining device. I am convinced it is a dangerously inaccurate assessment to say that we can sit down with the Russians without this kind of weapon as a bargaining device.

Certainly the Safeguard will cost some money. Priorities have been mentioned with the suggestion many domestic needs are inadequately funded. Let me remind you that I and many others who favor the Safeguard were also among those who voted for the Joelson amendment which provided \$1 billion additional funds for education. We are for education. I am going to support full funding for water pollution control and most of you who are for Safeguard are going to vote for control of water pollution. With a gross national product of \$1 trillion we can provide for these domestic needs and for our own defense.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RANDALL. I yield to my colleague from Missouri.

Mr. HALL. I appreciate the gentleman's statement, and I want to associate myself with him and commend him for what he has said so well.

Does the gentleman not agree with me and the chairman of the Subcommittee on Research and Development, which has labored from long before the days of the original Nike X determination, that there would be no radioactive fallout because of the way the program will be run, because this is a weapon whose nuclear capability cannot be touched off until the guidance motor—rocket—is locked on to a true incoming missile. Because it is a defensive weapon it would be detonated or used only over the seas or at very high altitudes over the continental United States.

Mr. RANDALL. That is an accurate statement. I appreciate the contribution of our colleague from Missouri.

I am glad you stressed the fact the nuclear device would not be activated until it was in outer space, or outside our atmosphere.

Now, Mr. Chairman, if I have any remaining time I want to discuss some of the most commonly used arguments against the ABM and present rebuttals to these arguments. One of the constantly recurring arguments is that the ABM which is developed today may be useless 10 years from now. The best way to answer this opposition is to say that if we develop an ABM system today we can continue to make it so effective that it may be unnecessary to have such a system 10 years from now. But, even if that is wrong, we will have all of those 10 years in which to find improvements to such defensive weapons systems and have the same time, 10 years, to pursue negotiations that will hopefully be meaningful and productive in causing all countries to abandon the arms race.

Another argument is the the deployment of the ABM system is not necessary before we sit down to the bargaining table with the Soviets. Who can forget the fact that the Soviets fully understand only the language of strength.

They began their ABM system 7 years ago and constantly improved and updated that system. My rebuttal to such a shallow argument is that we will be in a position of perilous weakness if we try to bargain with Russia without at least a start on our ABM system. No other country knows better how to capitalize on weakness than the Russians. The history of the past two and one-half decades demonstrates that the strength of her adversaries is far more persuasive with Russia than is the humaneness of any proposal presented to the Soviets.

Mr. Chairman, those who stand against this amendment to cut out all funds for the deployment of the Safeguard are saying you do not want to take a chance on the defense of your country. In essence you are saying you want some insurance. Most important, I think we can all say if we may be in error about the validity of the arguments of the opponents then those who favor deployment can say, though they may be in error, they have erred on the side of strength and security for our Nation.

In my humble opinion, the opponents of the ABM have either forgotten their history or have not read enough of our own history about how between wars we have allowed ourselves to become unprepared. In every instance we have reasoned that it was inconceivable that there could be a First World War, or a Pearl Harbor, or a Korea. But they all happened. We live in a day now that it takes a long leadtime to build sophisticated weapons. We must deploy the Safeguard now while there is still time available.

It is my sincere hope that one who reads the RECORD will not conclude that any of us who favor the deployment of the Safeguard have suggested that we are more patriotic than those who oppose it. There is room for honest differences. I am proud of the record that the House of Representatives has always carried on the tradition that it will support the President in matters of national defense. Mr. Nixon is my President. He is briefed by more high echelon sources of intelligence than any other person in America. He is the Commander in Chief of all of our Armed Forces. He has asked for the Safeguard. I will support him because I believe he knows more about our needs than any other person in America.

The hour is late. We cannot delay any longer. We hope and pray the time will never come that we will need the Safeguard. But, if that time should come, it will be too late to talk about deployment. We must prepare for our own defense now. Today may even be too late.

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment and move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. REID of New York. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Chairman, the bill which is now before us, the Military Procurement Authorization Act of 1969 will have historic impact on this Nation, not only from the standpoint that it will determine to a large extent the di-

rection and growth of our military preparedness for the next several years, but perhaps equally important, the fate of this bill and the many provisions and dollars it contains for defense programs may well mark the beginning of an era when Congress commits itself to a thorough and careful review of funds that are committed for military purposes.

I have taken the floor several times earlier in this session to cite the very real and very desperate need in America for additional Federal commitments to solving some of the problems we face on the domestic scene. It is, to say the least, irresponsible to assume a one-sided view of the question of priorities as between defense and domestic programs in the Federal budget. There can be no question that the position we have in the world demands a strong, a modern, a responsive military; on the other hand there is no question that the Federal Government must take equally seriously the problems it faces within its borders and the commitments that will be required to solve those problems.

Last month, Mr. Chairman, our colleagues in the other body spent day after day after day reviewing and studying and pruning and debating the bill that is now before us. The Senate consideration of this fiscal year's military procurement program was a responsible one. Judging from the seriousness and the accomplishments of that Senate debate I think we can safely say that we are at the end of the era when Congress would hastily and confidently approve almost any and all requests it received for funds from the Department of Defense. We should not pass from that irresponsible, into one equally irresponsible, where the meat ax rather than the magnifying glass is used to scrutinize the programs requested of us by the military.

I have made a very long and careful study of this legislation. I know that many amendments are going to be offered to cut or trim the funds allocated in the bill for various weapon systems development programs and for other programs for procurement of weapons that have already been deployed.

Before specifically stating my views on these amendments, I want to offer well deserved praise to the Secretary of Defense who on his own initiative has already made significant cutbacks in several defense programs. After a review within his own Department, Secretary Laird announced the termination of the manned orbital laboratory. He has further announced significant cutbacks in the numbers of naval ships and in the deployment of Army and Marine manpower. I do not believe that Secretary Laird took these actions in order to head off further cuts that might be made by the Congress in considering this bill. I believe they were made out of sincere conviction within the administration that some sense of priority had to be applied within the military budget in order not to afford the Defense Department a vastly unreasonable share of the total Federal tax dollar in this fiscal year.

On the other hand I do not believe that the action taken by the Secretary of Defense means that all of the cuts that

might or could be warranted or appropriate have already been taken by him. I do think that the Secretary's review of his own procurement programs has been sufficient for us to decide that any procurement item or weapon systems which he did not request from the Congress need not be added on to this authorization bill.

Of the many amendments that are being offered by our colleagues to trim the funds authorized in this bill, I can think of none more important than that being offered to trim deployment funds for the anti-ballistic-missile system. Beginning with the President's announcement of his desire to deploy antiballistic missiles surrounding two hardened Minuteman sites, I have made a thorough study of this request, and while I feel strongly that our Nation must maintain the most up to date possible technology in the area of missile defense, I am not convinced that it is either necessary or wise at this point to take the steps of deploying the antiballistic missile. There have been several thoughtful and well-founded questions raised about the workability of our ABM system as it is presently offered, and there have been even further questions raised about the possible obsolescence of such a missile if and when it became deployed. For that reason, Mr. Chairman, I intend to support the amendment which will delete deployment funds from the ABM program in this authorization bill.

There is another amendment being offered, Mr. Chairman, one which passed the Senate after it was offered by Senator RICHARD SCHWEIKER, of Pennsylvania. His amendment would require the General Accounting Office to make a periodic review of all defense procurement contracts in effect at any given time. After the experience we have had this year with the uncovering of substantial waste and overruns in defense procurement contracts I feel that this is one safeguard which we in the legislative branch can apply in the hopes of avoiding such occurrences in the future. I might mention here that Secretary Laird has himself placed a high priority on the elimination of waste and overrun in defense procurement practices.

But I feel as the oversight body principally responsible for conserving the taxpayers' dollar, the Congress through the General Accounting Office can best provide this review through a current and periodic check on ongoing defense procurement programs.

Other amendments being offered concerning procurement of new armored weapons and tanks, the development of a new Sram missile system, the placing of a ceiling on the overall manpower level in the Armed Forces, and the amendment to delete procurement of the addition squadron of C-5A cargo aircrafts are all worthy of very careful consideration before we include funds for these items.

I commend each of the gentlemen who have researched and prepared these amendments because they are indeed responsible attempts to trim funds from the military budget which might better be utilized elsewhere in the Federal spending picture.

There really has not been much opportunity to review military spending on the floor, so that we can set priorities in both domestic and military spending. I feel that one way to do this is through a total review of our spending and for this reason I cosponsored H.R. 474, a bill to establish a Commission on Government Procurement, which if passed by the Senate will give more opportunity for closer scrutiny of both domestic and military spending.

Mr. Chairman, let me again say, these amendments are not to hack away at the total military budget, but to review spending program by program to make responsible cuts that will not interfere or deter our goals for national and international policy.

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, I should like to address myself briefly today to the remarks of the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services. First I wish to say to him that I am appreciative, as I am sure are my colleagues, that he has placed no limitation on debate. I very much hope that he will give us an assurance today that there will be no limitation on debate, because the Senate took several months on the ABM and I feel very strongly that every Member of the House ought to have an opportunity to speak clearly and fully on this subject.

Would the chairman care to respond?

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. REID of New York. I am happy to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. RIVERS. Is the gentleman asking me a question as to whether or not I am going to move to limit debate on the ABM issue?

Mr. REID of New York. That is correct.

Mr. RIVERS. At this time I have no intention to.

Mr. REID of New York. I appreciate the assurance of the chairman.

Mr. RIVERS. I made that statement earlier in the day.

Mr. REID of New York. I am glad to have it reassured. I thank the chairman.

I believe the debate today has not fully focused on one very simple proposition. Again, I would value any comments of the chairman, if he wishes to make them.

The United States stands at a point in history where it could miss a unique chance for peace. In the history of events it is always possible for nations not to seize an opportunity. I believe the SALT talks, which I hope will be started very promptly, are such an opportunity.

I know of no evidence, no intelligence, that requires that there be any deployment of the ABM at this time. Furthermore, I do know of considerable evidence that suggests we should not make this deployment on the eve of and pending serious talks with the Soviets. I have talked at some length on this question with Bill Foster who, as Members know, was Chairman of the Disarmament Agency for some 8 years. I think he is as knowledgeable as anybody on the subject.

What specifically are we risking? We are risking serious nuclear escalation. We could lose, perhaps irrevocably, a chance for peace and debate. If we start by deployment, there is every indication that the Soviets will follow suit; a macabre chance of escalation and counter-

escalation. I repeat that, as yet, there is no indication that they have made a decision to build the next generation of offensive and defensive weapons. Furthermore, if we once start down this road, it is not a matter of a few billion dollars but, in the estimate of Mr. Foster, which I credit, it could be a \$100 billion decision.

That very clearly would vitiate our opportunities to meet our basic needs at home; it could sharply reduce our diplomatic options bringing on a new chapter of political cold war.

I very much hope that we will show the wisdom in this House today to step back from the precipice while there is yet time.

There is a military-industrial complex in this country, but equally there is one in the Soviet Union. If we proceed to deploy when we do not need to, I think there is every indication that the Soviet marshals will respond. I think in the past we have tended to confuse capability with action. There is no evidence that I am aware of that the Soviets have made any irrevocable decision to deploy.

This amendment does not seek to limit research. Indeed it provides for the continuance of research. What it seeks to do is to avoid the deployment that could trigger massive nuclear escalation. I think if we miss this chance for peace and if the House does not act to limit deployment of the ABM, what we are risking is the potential incineration of our planet. We are risking a very critical diplomatic opportunity to negotiate a moratorium on ABM deployment and on MIRV deployment. If anyone wishes to take that responsibility, I think they would be making a tragic mistake.

Mr. Chairman, I urge that the amendment be supported and that deployment be opposed.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last several words.

Mr. Chairman, there are some observations that I think are very pertinent, or at least they are to me, that I would like to convey to my colleagues for whatever consideration they might be worth to them.

I stood in this well the day after Pearl Harbor and offered the resolution declaring war after the dastardly attack made there upon our fleet and our men. Three months before that I sat in this Chamber and saw the extension of selective service pass this body by one vote. Every Member who voted against that bill was just as good an American as I. But Pearl Harbor happened 3 months later. Nobody could see it. It is difficult, if not impossible, to look into the future. But it happened. If that bill had failed to pass, where would we have been when Pearl Harbor occurred? We did not have much defense with its passage. We could not even get some \$30 million through to fortify Guam in the state of mind that existed. However, fortunately for us, when Pearl Harbor happened the Atlantic was still our first line of defense. No longer. As far as Europe is concerned, the Atlantic is no longer the first line of defense of the United States.

We were very weak after Pearl Harbor. It took us 3 years to marshal our industrial resources and our manpower resources as well as our military re-

sources before we could start taking even a limited offensive.

And, there is something even more important in the fact that the Atlantic is no longer our first line of defense. That is the fact that the United States of America or any other country—and I am speaking about our country—will never have another opportunity to prepare itself after the fact. World War II also settled that fact for all time, whether we like it or not. World War II was the last opportunity that the United States would have to prepare itself after the fact.

Mr. Chairman, if we are going to be prepared, we have got to be prepared before the fact. That applies to all nations. But I am speaking and talking about the country that I love and the country which we all love and of which we are citizens. Now, we cannot question those two facts. The Atlantic is an important area of offensive warfare I will admit, for us and to also the Soviet Union or any other potential enemy powers who would undertake to attack us. I have no question about that. I know all about that.

The President of the United States of America, Harry Truman, had the vision and the doggedness to make the decision over the advice of the members of the General Science Committee to proceed with the hydrogen bomb. Nine members composed that committee and eight of them voted against it. The ninth member was in Europe and did not vote. Three out of the five members of the Atomic Energy Commission voted urging us not to go ahead with it. Sixteen out of the 18 members of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy voted to urge the President to go ahead with it. We can thank God that there were those in good faith who said we did need it and needed it then. We knew the Soviets were experimenting on it. They completed their experiments about 10 months after we completed ours.

Mr. Chairman, where would we have been if Mr. Truman had made the decision not to go ahead with this project? We could never have recovered. We would not have had the time. It would have taken years.

I can tell you another story about the A-bomb. I wonder how many of you realize how close we came to losing World War II? One morning we had a meeting in the late Speaker's office, the late Sam Rayburn's office, and there were three Members of the House present. Sam Rayburn was there, I was present as the majority leader, and the late Joe Martin was present as the minority leader and former Speaker. There was also present Gen. George Marshall and Henry Stimson, Secretary of War; and Dr. Vanderveer Bush.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment and yield to the distinguished Speaker.

Mr. McCORMACK. I do want to indirectly take this additional time, but I thank the gentleman. However, I just

want to call attention to the A-bomb and to one of the most momentous meetings, I think, which took place in the history of our country. General Marshall and Secretary Stimpson were asking for funds to be appropriated by Congress because they could not carry it on themselves within the then budget. We had to get an appropriation of about \$1.6 billion in order to carry it on without letting the Nazi government know it. Both of them said to Sam Rayburn and Joe Martin and myself that they knew that the Hitler government was experimenting on it. We did not know how many projects they had. They started before we did. And, with their heads down on their chins they both said that if the Nazi government perfected it before we did, we could lose the war overnight.

Mr. Chairman, there is much history in connection with the A-bomb.

Now, with reference to the H-bomb, I do not know whether this is the proper time to go into that but, on the other hand, there were many questions involved.

You know all of these motives.

Those who oppose this are just as good Americans as I am, just as concerned for the welfare of our Nation, but I do not want to take a chance. I want insurance for my country in all situations in which it is involved. If I am going to err in judgment, I prefer to err on the side of strength and security than on the side of insecurity and uncertainty. And that feeling is more important today, in my mind, than it was before World War II because then we had a breathing spell to recover. No longer will we have that in the future.

(Mr. ST. ONGE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. ST. ONGE. Mr. Chairman, the current debate on the proposed anti-ballistic-missile system—ABM—is of major national significance and rightly so. On the eve of the congressional decision, residues of political differences are fast dissipating. National interest has taken precedence over party politics, personal commitments, and scientific reputations.

As a concerned citizen, I have listened, read, studied, and wrestled with the question of how I, as a Member of Congress, should respond and ultimately vote on the ABM authorization and appropriation. I have reached the conclusion that I cannot, in all honesty, support this program. This has not been an easy and pleasant task. The Nixon administration, the proponent of the ABM system, has not been consistent in its argument, united in its claim, clear as to its objective, sure of its capabilities, and positive as to its effect on stabilizing the nuclear arms race.

As we approach a decision, the Nixon administration has shifted away from its main argument that the ABM is vital to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving a "first strike" capability that could wipe out American retaliatory forces, as well as from its previous stand that it will work, or that it is even needed. In other words, the administration is now saying that the present American defense system is a potent and effective deterrent to the Soviet Union or Communist China.

The chief argument, now advanced, is that the ABM is needed to strengthen the President's hand as he is about to begin talks on strategic arms limitations with the Russians. This is not a good argument. In my opinion, negotiations should precede any commitment to such an uncertain, expensive, and dangerous course which is bound to accelerate the arms race. There is always some risk in negotiation with the Russians, but I prefer to take such risks in the name of peace and sanity than take chances with nuclear games in the name of security.

The ABM is an enormously expensive system and, as such, cannot be divorced from the question of national priorities. Surely our domestic difficulties—race, poverty, urban blight, inflation—must take precedence. Our Nation can never be strong internationally as long as these problems remain unsolved.

I give and have always given the highest priority for necessary programs contributing to American national security and national defense within the larger world community. I would never hesitate to vote for programs which I believed would secure those ends. I have doubts, however, about the ABM's contribution to our national security. This system is designed to defend the United States by intercepting and detonating in the atmosphere or outer air any missiles with nuclear warheads which might be fired toward the United States. Serious controversy among eminent military, scientific, and political experts raises questions about whether or not the ABM system would actually contribute toward our national defense. Until some of this controversy can be solved, I believe in supporting appropriations only for continued research and development of the system.

In light of the fact that so many experts are so diametrically opposed in evaluation of the above questions and others, I believe that we should at the present time continue our research and development of the ABM system, but not deploy any of its component parts. During this time, we may reach a better consensus and knowledge about the reliability, purpose, and cost of the system, and we may also be able to reach agreement with the Soviet Union which would make unnecessary the new and costly arms systems.

We may, therefore, by delaying decision, not have to deploy the ABM system or the MIRV. We may be able to assert our national community needs over those of a purely military orientation, and devote more of our energies and resources to our urgent national priorities—improving our cities, achieving equal rights and law with justice, combating poverty, creating better educational and health facilities, protecting our national resources, and preventing air and water pollution. Delay or avoidance of deployment of these new weapons systems will, I hope, have positive implications for the quality of our national life and for the direction of our foreign and military policy in the future.

Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, as others have said,

I do not stand here before you as an expert, but do say that perhaps I have had more practical experience with atomic and nuclear explosions than most of the Members in this Chamber. My aircraft has been buffeted by the explosion of atomic bombs. I participated in a joint atomic task force being on the control aircraft directing the movements of sampling aircraft in the first hydrogen bomb test in the Pacific. I have seen the largest atomic bomb that we have ever exploded, exploded. I know some of the terror of these particular weapons.

Our Speaker in a few words capsuled my feelings on this very important question; that is, if there is an error to be made, it should be made on the side of strength rather than on the side of weakness.

What are the arguments that we hear against deployment? Well, first we heard it costs too much. I believe the Speaker effectively answered that question about costs; it does not cost too much. We can deploy and we can still proceed against pollution—and I also will support one billion dollars for pollution.

I also voted for the Joelson amendment. We can do this. We can do both. We can defend and protect the future of this country.

Then we hear that if we in effect have the audacity to protect and defend America through deployment of this system, that we may in effect make the Russians so angry with us that they will not negotiate on disarmament.

Well, I believe as strongly as does the Speaker of the House that we are in a better position to negotiate from strength rather than from weakness. I reject the argument.

Then the gentleman from Washington—I wish he were here—made the statement—and he was assuming, of course, that this system works, when he said that the Sprint missile would explode at such a level that it could possibly cause a fire storm. Well, this simply is not true. The Sprint missile is designed to explode at a height at which it would not cause a firestorm.

Bear in mind that heat diminishes with the square of distance. But would you rather have a city destroyed by a nuclear explosion than take the chance of possibly having some fallout, or having a fire? I would not. I would rather have the chance of fallout, which I do not believe is a very creditable chance and save our cities from being destroyed by a nuclear explosion.

Then you come to the point about the saving of lives. Yes, I am convinced the system can be overcome. It can be overwhelmed. But even in overwhelming it we would still—and I would like to see a wider deployment in the first stage—save 50 or 60 million lives by the missiles we would stop before it is overcome. To me that is worthwhile.

But I believe perhaps one of the greatest arguments against this amendment is simply this: I do not foresee nor expect a massive nuclear attack. I believe the Russians are more rational than that, because they realize what would happen to them.

But I do know human nature being

such as it is, and with the many millions of human beings with some getting into positions of power, that possibly in a moment of insanity and in conjunction with several others, could cause an accidental launch against this country. Put yourself in the position of the President, if one morning you have the hot line from Moscow, ring, and you pick up the phone and the interpreter on the other side says, "Mr. President, we regret to tell you this, but a group of our generals have gone berserk and they have launched a missile against Chicago. We want you to know we are not made at you, Mr. President, and we are not at war with you and we hope you will be understanding of the situation, but in 20 minutes 2 million people in Chicago are going to die."

Now what I would like to see is a deployment of such an ABM system as would provide an alternative to our only present defense of massive retaliation. I would like to see a deployment that I feel would be able to intercept incoming missiles and not have to wait for one of our cities to be destroyed before we act.

I have met and counseled with Dr. Keller and he tells me that with a limited launch of four or five missiles, we have a 95 percent certainty of stopping them and, to me, this is reason enough for deployment even beyond the present proposal.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. If my memory serves me rightly, at the time of Pearl Harbor the Japanese Ambassador was here in conference at the White House.

Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. That is correct; we cannot place the future of this Nation in the hands of Foreign Ambassadors.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Georgia has expired.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word and rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I was impressed with the argument in favor of the ABM that the Speaker of the House made with his use of historical analogies. But it was an historical analogy that thrust us into the Vietnam war—the analogy of Munich—the need to stop aggression or be overrun.

I think the United States has been going through a maturing process for the past 30 years. We are beginning to understand the complexities and difficulties of the world around us.

Sometimes argument by analogy can obscure the complexities rather than help us understand them.

One of the facts about the history of the ABM system that impresses me is that this is the fourth generation of the ABM that has been brought before the U.S. Congress. We began with the Nike-Zeus system. Then it was the Nike X. Then it was the Sentinel system and now it is the Safeguard system. At every step of the way we heard the same argument that it is better to err on the side of strength than on the side of weakness. We are fortunate that we never have

built any of the four versions, because each has proved to be incapable of giving the defense claimed for it.

We had a debate in this Chamber a year ago on the Sentinel system and we heard the same argument made in the well of this House that we are hearing today. Then what happened? The President took another hard look at the Sentinel system, and he went on the air, I think it was on March 14, 1969, and said to the American public that it was not a wise move to deploy the Sentinel system; that this would not be prudent in terms of the reaction it would arouse from the Soviet Union. Instead we should move to a different system—the Safeguard.

Should we have believed the arguments in favor of Sentinel a year ago? Was Congress wise in approving the Sentinel system when in March of this year President Nixon said, "No, it would be a mistake."? This is the kind of sophisticated and complicated judgment with which we are faced.

The argument that has impressed me the most against the ABM system is the fact that if the Soviets do intend to acquire a first-strike capability against the United States, the ABM would be no deterrent to them. They would acquire this capability sometime in the middle 1970's and by simply continuing the production of the SS-9 for another 3 or 4 months they can completely wipe out the effect of a limited ABM system. They could produce sufficient numbers of additional warheads so they could overcome a limited ABM system and proceed to destroy, if they have that capability, our missiles in the ground.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRASER. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. GUBSER. But suppose that one Sentinel or one ABM were able to stop one incoming Russian SS-9: Could the gentleman speculate as to how many thousands of American lives would be saved by that one missile, even if the others failed?

Mr. FRASER. I will say to the gentleman that not even the most fervent advocates of the ABM argue that this system will protect the American people if the Soviets are determined to launch a major strike against the United States. The President himself made that perfectly clear.

If I may make one other point: It has been said that the ABM system is defensive, and hence it will not have any effect on the other side. Turning to the page of the committee report that talks about equipping our offensive missiles with the MIRV, I ask the Members to look at the justification given for the United States going ahead with the MIRV system. Do you know what the reason is? Because of the Soviet ABM. For us to say that an ABM is defensive and it will cause no response on the other side is answered completely in the committee report in which it is made clear that our response to the Soviet ABM is the MIRV, which is clearly the most destabilizing development in nuclear weaponry since the arms race began.

I want to emphasize that this is not a partisan issue. Some of us have been concerned, whether our President was President Johnson or President Nixon, and our concern continues until today. I hope in the House we will not yield to the simplistic arguments of the past, but rather learn from the past to better understand today.

Mr. WAGGONER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I am happy indeed to follow the gentleman from Minnesota in the well directly after his arguments. It is difficult for anyone to expand in a more rational way on the merits of the President's ABM proposal over and beyond what the distinguished speaker has just said, because he has laid it on the line and given us the meat of the coconut. Just a few thoughts since time does not permit more. The gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER), concluded his arguments by saying, in effect, we ought to learn something from history, and I think this is what the speaker was trying to say. We indeed ought to learn something from history. But the people who have advanced the arguments against the ABM system apparently have never learned that, because arguments exactly like those they have made here today have been made between every war in which this country has been engaged and history records that because these agreements have been heeded we as a result have never and I said never been ready for any war. We have always had to play catch up. Between World Wars I and II the cry was to quit spending money on defense and to disarm. And stupidly we did disarm. Every time we sank three battleships the other side burned three sets of plans to provide equity. How foolish can we be?

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WAGGONER. I yield to the distinguished minority whip.

Mr. ARENDS. The gentleman has made a point which reminds me of a statement that appears in the committee report.

As the late Robert F. Kennedy reported in "Thirteen Days," his memoirs of the Cuban crises, this country cannot trust the word of the Soviets concerning their strategic or tactical plans. Just prior to the quarantine, the highest Soviet leaders were giving both private and public assurances that there were only defensive missiles being brought into Cuba. We had photographic proof that the opposite was the case. As Senator Kennedy described it:

Now, as the representatives of the CIA explained the U-2 photographs that morning, Tuesday, October 16, we realized that it had all been lies, one gigantic fabric of lies.

Mr. WAGGONER. The gentleman is exactly correct. Because of arguments like the one I mentioned before yielding, we were not ready for World War I, we were not ready for World War II, we were not ready for Korea, and we were not ready for Vietnam. And we are not ready for an expanded war today. We have said to the world for all to hear, "We are not going to strike first with nuclear weapons." Then why on earth would the Rus-

sians have a defensive system similar to our ABM system except to defend against retaliation from the United States which would come if we were able after we were struck? They have never said that they would not launch a first strike. It was a mistake for us to ever say so. The Russians have both a first strike and defensive capability now.

Let me tell you what the fallacy of the opposition argument is. The gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER) made it perfectly clear. He unwisely believes he can predict their intent. He talks about the intent. I have had letters from a few people who have said it is inconceivable that anybody could or would attack the United States. As has already been pointed out, it was once inconceivable to us that the Japanese would attack us at Pearl Harbor, as they did. But the fallacy in the argument is this. In establishing a Department of Defense, in preparing for the defense of this Nation and its people, we do not and should not do what we do because we think we can estimate intent, and we never have been able to estimate intent, but we prepare ourselves as we should and give primary consideration to what the potential of the enemy might be. Intent is of no value, but potential is. We must be prepared to overmatch their potential. The Russians have tremendous potential.

The argument has been made that it is a waste of money to spend this amount on defense. It has been said we ought to spend it on social welfare. The rate of growth of social welfare costs far exceeds the growth rate of the costs of the Department of Defense. The truth is, if you follow this rationale, every dollar spent on defense is wasted if you do not have a war but if spending money to provide for defense prevents war it is money well spent. You cannot equate lives with dollars. Some say it will not work, but it will.

I am told we will have an amendment offered to strike conventional carriers. Are we going then to be consistent with our arguments and say they will not work? It has been proven that they will work. You can make no argument against carriers except you do not want to provide for defense and want to spend the money for something else.

Let me tell the Members what my impression of the Safeguard system is. I think the President made a wise decision. He recognized we have a fourth generation of ABM missiles, as the gentlemen who preceded me said, and in recognizing so, the President recognizes we are going to get other capabilities which are advanced, so what does he want to do? He wants to protect our retaliatory capability and expand that capability and our defensive capability as technology is gained to do so, and I cannot see anything wrong with that.

Here then is the crux of the issue. The ABM just might be the difference between our surviving and saving this country in a war and not doing so. I do not want to take that chance. It just might be the balance of difference. Vote down this amendment. Do not prostrate the United States before the Russians or anybody else. Do not be led down the road of no return by those who so fool-

ishly believe the Russians or Chinese can be trusted and their future actions predicted.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, we have heard many arguments today, both in favor of and against the deployment of the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system. I think at this point it might be well to list the points on which both the proponents and opponents agree. I think in doing that, we then will be able to narrow the issues.

First. I think both the proponents and opponents agree on the fact that we can indeed afford the cost of deploying the Safeguard ABM system. This point was well stated by one of the most outspoken opponents of the system, Mr. Adolf Berle, Jr., who said in the 1970's with the trillion dollar gross national product, we can afford to excise up to \$50 billion for ABM deployment.

Second. Both the proponents and opponents agree that the Safeguard ABM system cannot protect people, cannot protect urban areas. I think perhaps there has been some misunderstanding on this point. This fact was pointed out very clearly by President Nixon in his message of March 14, when he said "it is not within our power to do so."

Third. The experts are agreed Russia is continuing its ABM research, and it is for this reason that those who oppose deployment of the Safeguard do believe we should continue funding ABM research and development.

Fourth. I think this is the most important: There is unanimity among our military intelligence and scientific experts that the Russian Golosh system does not work, and it can be easily overcome by U.S. missiles.

Having enumerated the areas of agreement, let us next consider the issues which represent the major points of disagreement between Safeguard proponents and opponents. As I see it, there are three.

First. Does the Soviet Union have a first strike intention? I think it is difficult to surmise "intention." Thus, I believe the possibility of a Russian first strike is not a debatable subject. Rather, I agree with Secretary Laird who said we are not concerned so much with intentions as with capabilities.

This leads, then, to the second issue.

Second. Is there a real threat to our nuclear deterrent?

Before answering this question, I believe we ought to enumerate what this deterrence consists of. First, our intercontinental land-based missiles. Second, our SAC intercontinental aircraft. Third, our nuclear-powered submarines. Fourth, our tactical missiles located in Europe.

These are widely dispersed. From available statistics it is obvious that our nuclear strength far surpasses that of the Soviet Union. Therefore, they are in no position to overwhelm us. Further, it is literally impossible to knock out the various deterrents which I have mentioned at one time with one strike. If one of these is knocked out, this will still leave us with a credible deterrent in the other areas. So I believe it is obvious at the present time, and for the foreseeable

future, there is no real threat to our second-strike force.

Third, will the Safeguard system work? Is it operationally feasible? We already have pointed out that the Russian Galosh ABM is not workable. The reasons which cause the Russian Galosh ABM system to be unworkable also apply to Safeguard.

First, Safeguard, like Galosh, can be overwhelmed.

Second, the Safeguard radar is extremely vulnerable. This is the primary weakness of the Russian system. The entire ABM system is dependent upon our radar. I would point out that our MSR radar has one-tenth the hardness of the missile which it is seeking to defend. It is quite obvious there will be a strike against the radar, which can easily be knocked out. Since Safeguard's effectiveness depends upon operable radar system, destruction of that system will render Safeguard ineffective.

Third, Safeguard's computer system is not technically feasible. Why? Simply because the computing task cannot be defined and an effective response, therefore, cannot be programmed.

In view of the fact that there is now no credible threat to our own nuclear deterrent, plus the fact that Safeguard's operational capabilities are extremely doubtful, I urge the adoption of the Wilson amendment.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of the amendment and move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I doubt that there is a Member of this House who does not want the maximum in national security and safety of our Nation and its citizens. Sometime today or tomorrow we will vote on an anti-ballistic-missile system, and by doing so will answer the question of whether we believe our Nation's security will be enhanced or diminished by the development of a weapons system which will cost anywhere from \$10 to \$40 billion.

It is politically difficult to vote against any weapons system. It is difficult because a vote against a weapons system, no matter how many doubts exist about its effectiveness, subjects the man who cast that vote to wild, unfounded attacks upon his patriotism and his dedication to his country's welfare.

But what we are really talking about here today is how best to preserve national security and how best to spend the people's money, and difficult though it may be, that vote must be cast.

Mr. Chairman, for many years the arms budget has received little more than perfunctory review by the Congress as a whole. We are often told that "the military knows best"; that the Congress should not try to override military judgment on weapons system matters. But Mr. Chairman, a few weeks ago a person known by everyone in this House was quoted as saying:

It is not the military people who make our world-wide commitments, it is not the military people who determine our budgetary expenditures, it is not the military people who set the major policies of our nation; all these things are the responsibilities of civilian leaders in executive and legislative branches.

The man who said that was a man who served in this House for 16 years, a man whose seat I was elected to fill 6 months ago, the present Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird.

I think that statement indicates what the facts are.

Mr. Chairman, above all else, I do not want this debate to generate into a clichéd attack upon the so-called "military-industrial complex." I think it would be a dangerous thing to turn this debate and the opposition toward the deployment of an ABM system into an attack upon the military. The country cannot afford that, and the military does not deserve it. I, for one, am not especially shocked because our chief military leaders are requesting approval for another weapons system. If they sincerely believe that weapons system is in the best interest of the country, it is their obligation to the public, to the Congress, and to their own consciences to request such a system.

But, to us falls a different task. We too have our obligations to conscience and our role is quite different.

To us falls the responsibility to examine that request, not only in terms of past military realities and requirements, but also in the context of present and future military, international, economic and domestic considerations.

To us fall the responsibility and the obligation to balance such requests against other requests for hospitals, medical research, pollution control, and a good many other things, including other weapons systems.

So today the Congress must make a decision which should be ours to make. Most of us have studied the questions involving the deployment of the ABM and its implications for our national security and some will say that because of this examination we are for the first time meeting our responsibilities in this area.

That is not really true.

We should not only be debating weapon systems, we should also be examining the foreign commitments, the contingency planning, and the tactical assumptions which make this discussion of weapons systems necessary. Until the Congress is organized to do that, we will really be debating only the last step in the process of constructing a defense or armament budget.

Within that limited context, I cannot help but conclude that our security is not enhanced with the deployment of an ABM system. Debate on the ABM in the Senate and throughout the nation has shown that there are grave and widely held doubts about the invulnerability and reliability of the Safeguard system proposed in this bill.

In case you think that these are far-fetched doubts, the Stubbings report showed that of 11 major electronic weapons systems procured since 1960, only two of them have worked correctly and six—or more than half of them—have met less than 25 percent of their specification standards and these were systems which could be tested.

We are talking about a system of radar, computers and missiles—all of which can never be realistically tested as an integrated system.

There are strong doubts that the long and short-range radar systems, part of which have not yet even been built, will operate with the simultaneous and instantaneous precision necessary in the event of a sudden attack. Dr. Jerome Weisner, former science adviser to President Kennedy has said:

Few competent people expect the extremely complex ABM system to work the first time; yet it must to have any effect.

The computer system of the ABM will contain hundreds of thousands of parts. It has not yet even been built, let alone tested. It must guide radar, detect and track targets, sort out decoys, and with all their other doubts, many leading scientists simply do not believe that the computers can ever be programmed to do the job required. They are also convinced that because the short-range radar is much more vulnerable to nuclear blast than the missile sites, the entire system could be blinded—even by relatively inaccurate missiles.

Equally as significant is the fact that they believe that the Safeguard is designed inadequately to do the job it is supposed to do—to protect our Minuteman missile sites.

The most telling criticism of all is the ease with which our ABM missiles could be overcome by simply raining in more offensive warheads than our defensive system is capable of destroying.

While it will take us until about 1974 to have our first two ABM sites finished, the Soviet Union could manufacture and deploy, in a few short months, enough missiles to completely off-set our ABM system.

To quote Senator STUART SYMINGTON, who, as a past Secretary of the Air Force can hardly be classified as "inexpert" or "naive":

Even if the Safeguard works perfectly, with a slight addition in production by the Soviets of their SS-9 weapon, according to objective and capable scientists and engineers, there will be no increase in the security of the United States; so the money will be wasted.

Senator SYMINGTON has also described the system as "a nuclear space age follow-up to the tragedy that was the maginot line."

In 1958 President Eisenhower prevented the deployment of a Nike-Zeus anti-ballistic-missile system against the wishes of a good portion of the military. So did President Kennedy. Secretary of Defense McNamara testified in 1967 that if President Eisenhower had not won that fight we would have been saddled with a \$12 to \$14 billion white elephant which would have been obsolete before it could have been deployed.

The evidence is all too strong that the same will be true of the Safeguard system. The overwhelming opinion of the scientific community is against it, and the Federation of American Scientists has called the ABM: "irresponsible on fiscal grounds" and "pointless on military grounds."

Perhaps the most distressing of all, however, is the destabilizing effect our decision to deploy an ABM system could have on the balance of terror which has existed between the Soviet Union and the United States for the past two decades.

In September 1967, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said:

What is essential to understand here is that the Soviet Union and the United States mutually influence one another's strategic plans. Whatever be their intentions, whatever be our intentions, actions—or even realistically potential actions—on either side relating to the build-up of nuclear forces, be they either offensive or defensive weapons, necessarily trigger reactions on the other side. It is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an arms race.

The proponents of an ABM system tell us it will not escalate the arms race. Recent history shows differently. In response to the Soviet deployment of their Galosh system around Moscow, we reacted by accelerating our MIRV multiple warhead program and by requesting money for manned bombers. Now we have learned that the Soviet Union has resumed testing of its fractional orbit bombardment system—FOBS—a system which involves the delivery of nuclear weapons from low altitude orbits. That system had not been tested by the Soviets for almost a year. But, in what many consider a direct response to the Senate decision on the ABM, the FOBS testing began again in mid-September.

So the Russians went to Galosh, we responded with ABM and MIRV and they went to FOBS and, no doubt, we will be told that the new tests of FOBS present a danger to which we ought to respond.

How soon will we hear that the "thin" ABM system must be expanded into a "thick" one?

Mr. Chairman, we have an awesome array of weapons that ably guard the security of this Nation.

We have large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 650 nuclear armed strategic Air Force bombers, not to mention our medium range bombers. We have over 1,000 land-based Minutemen missiles and 656 of the most effective weapons in the world—Polaris missiles. With our plans to install the Poseidon in 30 of our 41 submarines, we will have over 5,000 ICBM's in addition to the tactical weapons I have mentioned—enough to retaliate with devastating effect upon any country foolish enough to attack us.

The United States and Russia have stockpiled enough nuclear weapons to equal 15 tons of TNT for every human being on earth. Is not that, in the President's words, "sufficiency" enough?

If such an arsenal does not offer us sufficient protection to try once more to slow the momentum of the arms race, then we might just as well admit it can never be done.

Is it not, less dangerous to try than not to?

If we do not act now before the ABM and MIRV genies get out of the bottle, will we have another chance?

Mr. Chairman, societies can be destroyed from within as well as from without. Either way, the result is the same, a rending of national fabric and a lessening of national security.

The security of a nation is determined not only by the soundness of its weapons, but also by the soundness of its society and the soundness of its dollar. Even in

times of economic stability we are not so rich a nation that we can afford to spend \$10 and possibly eventually \$40 billion on a weapons system of questionable reliability, and inevitable pointlessness.

In a time of inflation, such a decision would not only be unwise, it would be downright risky.

The cost of the ABM program before us today is now set at about \$11 billion. A few months ago that cost was estimated at about half that amount. What it will be 2 years from now we can only guess. But this is the money that will not go to build schools or hospitals, feed the hungry or help our citizens to live a decent life. And the fact that 12 major systems developed by the Department of Defense since 1950 exceeded their estimated cost by an average of 220 percent offers us little hope that the future will be different. What we should do now is to delay deployment of the ABM but continue research and development. If at some future time the cast for deployment becomes compelling, we would be prepared.

Congress should not be surprised when the military asks for new weapons systems. That is their job. But, in the name of fiscal sanity, we must expect Congress to look at those requests in the same way that we do anybody else's. That is our job. So far we have not done it and we have certainly not done it with the ABM. I am convinced that if we applied the same test for cost effectiveness to the ABM that we supposedly apply to our domestic programs, this House would never authorize money for the deployment of Safeguard—nor for several other systems in this bill.

I shall not vote for this system. There is overwhelming evidence that it will not work. History and logic shows that it will leave us at least \$10 billion poorer, and will start another costly and futile round of nuclear armament escalation leaving us in the end with more burdens, but no more security, than before. And that makes no sense at all!

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OBEY. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman for his outstanding statement here today. I know we have been talking about what the American people want. I know the gentleman has come to the Congress fresh from the people in his home State of Wisconsin. As I understand it, they have expressed themselves and you have come in here to give us your views. I think the statement made here today by the gentleman is outstanding.

Mr. OBEY. I appreciate the comments of the gentleman from California. I have not often taken this floor in the past during debate because I know it is felt a freshman does not very often have that much to offer, and that is probably right, but I felt so strongly about this issue that I felt I ought to do it.

Mr. BELCHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I very seldom, if ever, take the well to argue anything concerning another committee, but I have not

gotten clearly in mind exactly what the issue here is, and before I vote on it I would like to know. Apparently the issue is whether or not we are willing to shoot \$345 million in the hope that it might save 50 million people. I am willing to take that kind of a chance, and I am not much of a bettor, either.

I am ranked as one of the conservatives. As conservative as I am I would vote for the \$345 million just in the hope that it would work. I do not know whether it would work and I do not think anyone else knows whether it will work. I do not have any more information than these gentlemen who are proposing this amendment. I am just as ignorant as they are about the whole thing. The thing that surprises me, though, is this: Every time we have a cut in an appropriation you know it is us old mossbacks that are trying to cut it. Those fellows never do. I have never seen them support a cut in an appropriation for foreign aid. I have never seen them cut an appropriation for welfare or anything else. Why does it get to be such a principle that they who are very liberal and are willing to spend money for almost anything under the sun are not willing to spend \$345 million just in the hope that it will save 50 million people? Why, you fellows are not liberal at all; you are more conservative than we are.

Now, why in Heaven's name have you come to be such tightwads all of a sudden? Wait until we get the foreign aid bill up here and see what you do about it. Wait until we get the welfare bill up here and see what you say about it. Even in our Committee on Agriculture we are spending \$3.5 billion a year in subsidies to agriculture. If we are willing to spend that much and if we are willing to spend \$192 billion for the Federal budget, I am willing to spend \$345 million in the hope that we will all be here to enjoy it.

Mr. Chairman, there is one thing about this. You fellows are not taking any chance. If you are proved wrong, there is not going to be anybody left in America to claim that you were wrong.

Mr. ECKHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could arrive at some time limitation on this amendment? I wonder if we could not agree to close debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto at 2 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the gentleman from South Carolina making that unanimous-consent request?

Mr. RIVERS. I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto close at 2 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

Mr. ECKHARDT. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I should like to ask if I had been recognized prior to the time the request was made by the gentleman from South Carolina.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state to the gentleman from Texas that the Chair had not recognized the gentleman.

Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I wonder if I could ask the distinguished chairman of the committee if he would consider a time limitation of 2:30. We have a number of Members standing and this is a very significant issue.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FOLEY. I yield to the chairman of the committee.

Mr. RIVERS. As a matter of fact, the chairman of the committee has not opened his mouth on this amendment. I would like to let people know that I at least have some opinions about it and I would like to say something.

Mr. Chairman, I would like the Chair to state how many Members are standing who wish to be heard on this amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state that 30 Members are standing.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto conclude at 2:30, with the last 5 remaining minutes reserved to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will recognize the Members who were standing for 2 minutes each.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. FARBERSTEIN).

Mr. FARBERSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of the amendment. The anti-ballistic-missile system—ABM—could well turn out to be the most tragic and costly military dud in the Nation's history. There is strong indication that the ABM is not technologically feasible and that spending billions on its development and deployment is little more than a public works program for the defense industry. The thought of throwing away billions of dollars on a weapon system whose only utility is as a museum piece is shocking to me because of the vital domestic social and humanitarian needs of our society which are going unmet.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ECKHARDT).

Mr. ECKHARDT. Mr. Chairman, most of the debate against the amendment, which amendment I support, has been directed at a straw man, a straw man who is for unpreparedness, a straw man who is for unilateral disarmament, yet I know of no man who has taken the floor—and I do not believe there is likely to be one—who stands for either of those principles.

I recall that Winston Churchill said of the early 1938 period:

Poor England! Leading her free, careless life from day to day, amid endless good-tempered parliamentary babble, she followed, wondering, along the downward path which led to all she wanted to avoid. She was continually reassured by the leading articles of the most influential newspapers, with some honorable exceptions, and behaved as if all the world were as easy, uncalculating, and well-meaning as herself.

I also recall at that time that the mightiest military force on earth was the

Luftwaffe, and Britain was unprepared and not concerned with preparedness.

Today the mightiest military force on earth is the U.S. strategic arms force. We are certainly not in the position of an easy, careless, miscalculating England of the late thirties.

Our situation is simply this: to choose whether or not to choose an untested defense mechanism as against a well-tested deterrent force. The United States has in excess of three times as many nuclear warheads—including its Polaris submarines, its ICBM Minuteman, and its warheads on planes—as the Soviet Union at the present time.

The status of the two nations today is as if two persons sat across the table from each other naked, with blowguns with poison darts. Neither dare shoot the poison darts because of the deterrent force of the other side. But let us devise imperfect shields for both sides, and the darts may then fly.

We are not talking about disarmament. We are not talking about unpreparedness, but about the best way to be prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. LOWENSTEIN).

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, people keep saying that we can do things that seem impossible, as if that were at issue in the discussion about the ABM. The point seems to be that because someone has said it is impossible to construct a successful anti-ballistic-missile system, we should deploy at once whatever anti-ballistic missiles we happen to have on hand.

But the question is not, Can we do things that seem impossible? The question is, Should we spend billions of dollars more to deploy more weapons before there is much reason to think that they will work?

Some men once thought they could reach the moon by planting beanstalks. Now eventually we did reach the moon, but we did not do it by deploying large numbers of beanstalks until some of them grew to the moon. Research provided a better way to reach the moon than climbing beanstalks, and in fact it now seems clear that not much was lost by not having spent much on beanstalks.

No one here has opposed continuing research to develop antimissile defenses. But the men who have had the most to do with developing the ABM—the great scientists whose names are a “Who’s Who” of America’s foremost Defense consultants: York, Panofsky, Kilian, Kistiakowsky, and the rest—tell us that it is foolish to deploy what we have now got. The simple fact is that one does not add to one’s security by deploying weapons that will not work, no matter how many of them one deploys. One may, on the contrary, weaken one’s security by spending billions of taxpayer’s dollars pointlessly in the midst of an already dangerous inflation.

People also keep saying, “You cannot trust the Communists,” as if that were at issue. We have been reminded that the Russians lied about missiles in Cuba, as if the lesson of that episode were not that our technology was good enough—

even 7 years ago—to detect deception. The point of course is precisely that we do not need to trust the Russians at all to make agreements with them that would limit the arms race, because if these agreements were violated our technology would tell us so right away, and we could proceed accordingly.

For instance, we know the Russians have deployed ABM’s around Moscow. We would not have known it any the less had they done so in violation of a treaty prohibiting the deployment of ABM’s.

We also know that the Russians have stopped deploying ABM’s. Perhaps they know more about the futility of deploying ABM’s than we do having already deployed some. Perhaps they are hoping that we will balance their waste by deploying some of our own. If it is relevant to keep repeating, “You cannot trust the Communists,” perhaps that is the relevance.

If a few little Galoshes near Moscow can lead the United States into vast expenditures for more useless missile systems, it may well be said accurately one day that the Soviet ABM’s struck a grievous blow against America.

Finally, it has been suggested that we must deploy ABM’s to protect us against a sort of unofficial attack by a mad Russian colonel acting on his own. This line of reasoning apparently agrees with Secretary McNamara’s assessment of the utter uselessness of ABM’s in their present stage of development if we were to be confronted by a massive and deliberate Russian attack. But, it is said, against a stray intercontinental missile or two, deployed ABM’s could save a large number of American lives. And who would begrudge money for that—even if it costs \$400 billion to construct ABM’s that could protect all of our population centers, as Senator SYMINGTON, among other experts, has told us it would?

Which brings us back to the central, incontrovertible fact of this debate: Weapons that do not work do not afford anyone much protection against anything, even against stray missiles fired by madmen, whether they be Russian colonels, Chinese dictators, or anyone else.

That is why money for ABM research makes sense, and why money for ABM deployment at this time does not.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON).

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, obviously in 2 minutes’ time I can only address myself very briefly to one facet of this debate.

I hope perhaps, because of the concern I have expressed here in the well in recent months over the arms race, I may have some small claim to some credentials in this area, of being interested and concerned about the build-up of nuclear power in the world and with the threat that this may pose to the very fragile peace that still exists in the world.

After listening to all of these arguments over the deployment of the ABM or at least the authorization in this bill to proceed toward the goal of operational deployment by 1974, I firmly disagree that it is the kind of provocative gesture

that will upset the forthcoming SALT talks.

It seems to me that the whole subject of anti-ballistic-missile systems is one of the things that might well come up in the talks, an agreement to limit systems of this kind to make sure they do not blossom out or balloon into huge city ABM defense systems which I think would be a potential forerunner of an attempt to achieve a counterforce capability.

But how are we going to bargain at those talks if we are going into those talks and have already indicated that we foreclose completely the option of this country to deploy any kind of an anti-ballistic system and if we deny the President the right that he should have to proceed on a very sound and reasoned and incremental basis.

The program will be reexamined annually, and we will have the opportunity to consider whether diplomatic conditions have changed and whether the technology has changed, to the point where perhaps the decision to go ahead can be altered.

It seems to me the President’s report of the 14th of March did spell out the kind of responsible program that enables those of us who are interested in maintaining this option and also interested in seeing a scaling down of the arms race to support the authorization requested in this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM).

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I am very glad that the distinguished gentleman from Illinois has raised the question of the SALT talks.

I have enormous admiration for the gentleman who, I think, is one of the ablest Members of this House. We agree on the danger of the MIRV weapons system and that there should be a suspension of MIRV testing on both sides, to give us a chance to succeed in the SALT talks.

But I disagree with him on the implications of the ABM decisions before us today with respect to the SALT talks.

I regret that very little attention has been paid during this debate to these talks. In my opinion it is impossible to overstate the significance of these talks. Whether we can achieve a strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union, with adequate safeguards, is perhaps the most important question that lies in front of us, indeed of the whole world.

We are at a crossroads. We can take the road of an accelerated arms race, with MIRV and with the ABM, and spend billions and billions of dollars over the next 10 years, and at the end of 10 years have no greater security than we have today because the Russians will have kept up with every move.

Or we can move toward success in the SALT talks that would mean a substantial limitation of military expenditure on both sides and the possibility of spending on needed programs at home.

Today those SALT talks are not taking place. Why? Because the Russians have

not set a date. We have asked for a date. What are they waiting for?

I submit, Mr. Chairman, that the Russians are nervous today, they are afraid we will achieve a situation dangerous to them by moving ahead with the ABM and MIRV and they have said so in their controlled press.

By holding back on ABM and MIRV, we would create a better atmosphere and hopefully we would be able to get these talks started.

If we accept this amendment, we are not ruling out the possibility of going ahead with the ABM, if we cannot get the talks started or if they do not succeed—that possibility is always there. So, we are not giving up any leverage with the Soviets, which is what the gentleman from Illinois is worried about.

I have stated previously that I think it is literally impossible to exaggerate the importance of this issue. As I said, in a previous discussion on the floor of the House:

I think it is undoubtedly the most important issue that will come before this Congress, because it not only signals a whole new dimension in the arms race between ourselves and the Soviet Union, but it will also determine how we are going to use our resources in the coming years, whether we are going to use them on highly dubious military devices, or whether we are going to use them for the crying needs of our cities and the country as a whole.

I would like, at this point, to review in some detail what my reasons are for opposing deployment of ABM.

First, There is little likelihood of first-strike nuclear attack by ICBM from either China or the Soviet Union—because China lacks the capability, and because any such attack would be likely to rain lethal fallout and/or retaliatory nuclear destruction on the attacking nation itself—and addition of an ABM system would not improve existing defenses against a nuclear attack delivered by means other than missiles.

The Chinese have not developed the degree of missile capability that was predicted and that would require ABM deployment on our part. Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard confirmed in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that he had concluded that "the Communist Chinese threat had slipped somewhat and the exact date it would be realized is not now clear."

The assumption that China would act so irrationally as to attempt to deliver a nuclear strike upon the United States by whatever means is contrary to the record of Chinese international behavior over the past 2 years, during which China has acted, if not spoken, with considerable caution and moderation toward the United States.

Secretary of Defense Laird has argued, on the basis of the size and nature of the ICBM's being produced by the Soviet Union and the rate at which they are being produced, that the Soviet Union is seeking to develop a first-strike capability—that is, an ability to destroy our retaliatory forces with a preemptive attack. He has suggested that the Soviets might be tempted to utilize such a capability in the coming decade, casting the ABM as an essential element in main-

taining the credibility of our deterrent—and indeed in assuring our survival in the face of growing Soviet strength.

There has, however, been serious question whether Secretary Laird has correctly estimated projected Soviet capabilities and future intentions. Secretary of State Rogers, for example, has publicly doubted the Soviet "intention" of launching a first strike.

Second, Neither Chinese nor Soviet missile development and deployment are going forward at such a rate or in such a manner as to suggest a significant change in the capabilities or intentions of either of these nations in the foreseeable future that would justify deployment of an ABM system at this time.

Intelligence experts are in sharp disagreement over both the capabilities of the large Soviet SS-9 missile and the strategy the Russians are currently pursuing. In questioning Secretary Laird's assumptions, several analysts have pointed out—

First, that the United States holds an overwhelming lead in total warheads and is still substantially ahead in development of MIRV's—multiple, independently targeted reentry vehicles—and in submarine-based missiles;

Second, that the Soviet deployment of solid-fuel missiles began only last year—6 years after the United States began deployment;

Third, that the deployment curve for new weapons systems rises sharply in the early stages of deployment, and levels off thereafter. On that basis, the Soviet Union's deployment of SS-9's is currently within normally predictable limits for a new weapons system, and therefore the assumption that the Soviet Union will continue indefinitely to deploy these weapons at the current rate is highly questionable.

In short, current Soviet efforts can equally well be explained as a response to a "missile gap" in which they perceive themselves as lagging, rather than an effort by the Soviets to create a first-strike capability that could destroy our second-strike deterrent capability.

Even if the Soviets did develop a theoretical first-strike capability, that capability would depend on the assumption that their attacking missiles would find our Minutemen in place. In fact, the Soviets could never be sure that—should they launch a first strike at our offensive missile sites—we would not fire our missiles in anticipatory retaliation even before their missiles had reached American soil, a possibility that, in itself, constitutes the needed deterrent to a Soviet first strike without adding an ABM system. This element of uncertainty would persist in the Soviet's minds even though a U.S. President might, in fact, be reluctant to react to radar signals of an incoming attack in such an all-out manner.

Third, Given the current uncertainties about the technical reliability and capability of the ABM system to perform the functions visualized for it, it does not merit our confidence, and additional research and development, rather than deployment, would be appropriate at this time.

A number of prominent scientific and technical experts believe that, based on past experience with complex weapons systems—including current published doubts about the reliability of our Minuteman ICBM force—the ABM, the most complex system of missiles, radars, computers, and command systems ever contemplated, let alone deployed, is unlikely to perform well enough to do its intended job. Evaluating the system is complicated by the fact that its components can never be fully tested, leaving us in a position of having to rely on an unproven system to work effectively on a few minutes' notice.

Some scientists feel that the radar system which would have the task of guiding our ABM's—especially the Spartans—could be confused by any of a number of enemy penetration aids. Though there remains considerable debate over whether decoys could easily be added to the unsophisticated Chinese missile threat, it is generally assumed that Soviet development of radar baffling penetration aids has paralleled our own. In addition, the radars guiding both Spartans and Sprints could be completely blacked out for "several minutes" by initial high-altitude nuclear explosions either of incoming missiles or of our own first wave of ABM's.

Fourth, While greater protection from accidental launch of nuclear missiles toward the United States would be desirable, this alone does not justify deployment of the ABM, especially when there is serious doubt whether an ABM system could perform this function effectively, and there is no evidence that it is either the best or only means of dealing with the accidental launch problem.

A strong case has been made that an ABM system is necessary to fill the void which is alleged presently to exist in the event a nuclear power should accidentally launch an ICBM at the United States. This is a highly unlikely eventuality, and if it were to occur, there is no assurance that the proposed ABM system would be capable of dealing effectively with the situation, or that an ABM system is the only means—or even the most desirable means—of solving the problem of preventing or limiting damage from an accidental strike.

If it could be assumed that the ABM system would provide effective protection against damage due to accidental attack, that alone would hardly justify deploying it given the many other arguments against it. But many foreseeable technical and command problems with the proposed ABM system cast real doubt even on its usefulness for dealing effectively with accidental attack.

Fifth, Before delegating authority to fire offensive or defensive nuclear weapons to officials below the level of the President, which would almost certainly be necessary in the case of ABM, all possible alternatives should be explored.

Under the fundamental American principle of civilian control of the military, the civilian President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Only he has the authority to order the firing of offensive or defensive nuclear

weapons. If we deploy the currently proposed ABM system, lesser officials will have to be given authority to fire intercept nuclear weapons. While the circumstances are not totally analogous, the *Pueblo* and EC-121 incidents indicate that current systems of human command do not respond quickly enough to permit a Presidential decision to launch ABM's within the "lead time" that would be available when enemy missiles appear on the warning radar screens. To respond in time with ABM's would almost certainly require a "launch-on-warning" arrangement that would remove the civilian control over nuclear weapons to which this country has long been committed. In other words, the nature of the command structure and the nature of the ABM are such that delegated authority and not the President would have to be in a position to press the nuclear button. The seriousness of this problem, and the technical problems with the ABM, are even more evident when viewed in the context of certain political considerations, in particular, the long-awaited arms limitations talks.

Sixth. A decision to deploy ABM's, or actual ABM deployment, would add nothing to our arms control bargaining position that we do not already enjoy through our current deployment capability, and in fact might limit our bargaining power by reducing our seeming sincerity in seeking to limit strategic arms.

Proponents of the ABM have contended that deployment would merely match what the Soviets have already done around Moscow, and that it would put us more in step with the traditional emphasis on defense in Soviet strategic doctrine. They further note that the Soviet reaction to Secretary McNamara's initial announcement of our intention to deploy an ABM system was quite restrained. Therefore, such deployment will either leave the prospects for agreement unchanged or will improve them by giving us a new bargaining counter.

On the other side, opponents of deployment have contended that deployment of any new weapons system, whether offensive or defensive, is inevitably destabilizing and a spur to further escalation by both sides. The United States has accelerated its embryonic program to develop MIRV's and its own ABM system largely in response to the Soviet ABM deployment around Moscow. Similarly, it must be assumed that Soviet defense leaders would have to respond to deployment by the United States of an ABM system with a further increase in their own offensive and defensive capabilities.

If the Soviets perceive a "missile gap" in favor of the Americans at the present time, how much wider must the gap seem to them if we now add ABM's, MIRV's, and even AMSA—advanced, manned, strategic aircraft—to our already superior arsenal? Since we have managed to raise the specter of a Soviet first strike despite our present lead, the menace of preemptive action by the United States must seem even more real to worried planners in Moscow. Dr. Marshall Shulman has argued, for example, that an American ABM deployment is likely only

to strengthen the hand of those individuals in the Soviet hierarchy who contend that the United States is too committed to an arms race seriously to be interested in negotiating its halt. Consequently, this American action would reinforce the case for increased Soviet arms deployment and give fresh impetus to the upward spiral of arms. Indeed, it must be assumed that Soviet defense leaders would be regarded as derelict in their duty if they did not propose expanded Soviet armament in response even to the prospects of American ABM's, MIRV's, and AMSA.

Seventh. Arms control negotiations following ABM deployment or a decision to deploy would have reduced potential for reaching agreement due to influences from sources with vested interests in retaining the system and the possible need for one or more parties to dismantle existing hardware and to incur the resulting financial losses. Negotiations conducted prior to any deployment or deployment decision would proceed without these negative influences and constraints, and enjoy a correspondingly better probability of reaching arms control agreement.

It is in this regard that our ABM deployment could well leave us with less rather than more security. For if the ABM has the destabilizing effect which we fear, we may lose our chance to reach agreement with the Soviets on a level of mutual deterrence approximating that toward which they are presently building. We may instead be forced by parallel fears to match, and to top, each other's weapons systems, with neither side able to know with assurance whether it is leading or lagging in the race for national survival. The resulting atmosphere of uncertainty would produce a much less stable international order, in which we might encounter far greater difficulty than at present in insuring American security.

With negotiations on possible arms limitations such an important factor, what of the contention that an ABM system would prove a valuable bargaining counter for the United States? The proposed Safeguard system would not be operational until 1973. So in any negotiations over the next year or two—the period in which prospects for international arms control agreement would be fully tried and tested—the United States would, in fact, be bargaining our capability to deploy an ABM system rather than the actual deployment of such a system. A decision now to deploy, therefore, would add nothing to our bargaining position within this time frame and would probably weaken it by decreasing our ability to convince the Russians that we are sincere in seeking to limit strategic arms.

There is little doubt that arms control negotiations could be conducted even if Russia, the United States, or both had decided to deploy or already begun to deploy ABM's. But once the decision to deploy is made, or deployment undertaken, any arms control agreement is likely to require a dismantling of existing facilities and consequent financial losses—both likely to incur the opposi-

tion of the vested interests that inevitably develop in support of retaining and expanding any weapons system once it is deployed.

Eighth. The resources required to deploy an ABM system would have greater benefits for the Nation if devoted to various domestic needs.

The cost of the Safeguard system for which further funding will be required this year has been estimated by the administration at between \$6 and \$7 billion. About \$900 million of this total will be needed in fiscal year 1970. Opponents of the system have contended that Safeguard is just the opening wedge for a "thick" ABM system which would be designed to defend against a major Soviet attack, at a cost estimated upward from \$40 to \$100 billion. The Nixon administration has not denied this. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were consistent advocates of heavier ABM defenses and only shifted their position to Safeguard recently. Similarly, the testimony on the ABM by successive Secretaries of Defense has consistently emphasized the case with which the initial ABM system can be "upgraded" to deal with improvements in the anticipated offense. Pressures for expansion and refinement of the system, once deployment begins, would be irresistible, no matter how sincere the Pentagon and other proponents of the system may be today in asking only for a "thin" ABM defense. Indeed, the inadequacies of a "thin" system are already being pointed out by such ABM proponents as Dr. Donald Brennan of the Hudson Institute, and the chorus of voices favoring expansion would inevitably swell as the limitations of the Safeguard became increasingly apparent from operational experience.

Some experts have argued that the ABM, in view of the political and technical questions which have been raised about its capability for enhancing national security, is not worth even the relatively limited price for the Safeguard system, and that the American people deserve to have their national resources put to better use than for weapons systems of uncertain value.

It is this last point that carries the ABM argument to a considerable extent into issues of social policy—and, indeed, of moral judgments—in addition to the political and economic considerations already explored. Here, judgments admittedly become increasing subjective; contentions on either side of the case become vitally impossible to quantify or to support conclusively. But it is the conviction that the national security of the United States cannot be assured solely through escalation of military might. National security requires, in addition, the restoration—or creation—of a healthy domestic society which offers each citizen full and equal opportunity for self-development and participation in the affairs of the Nation. From this base, our security also requires that every effort be made to advance the cause of world peace through effective arms control and extension of the rule of law. Exclusive, or even major, reliance on arms can advance neither of these purposes, but can only undermine them, and, in the end,

undermine the national security we all seek to insure.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington (Mr. FOLEY).

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. I must echo the words of the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON), who pointed out that the forthcoming SALT talks will not be advanced by a decision to prohibit the deployment of phase I of the Safeguard system. I feel as he does, that it would be tragic, to deprive the President and our negotiators at the talks of the widest opportunity to reach whatever negotiated agreements are possible and useful regarding strategic weapons.

On the other hand, the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM), who just left the well, has suggested that the Soviets might be unwilling to enter the talks if we should proceed with this authorization or that our action would at least create a bad climate for the talks. Let me quote a brief statement to the Committee which I believe may be of interest. This statement was made by Soviet Premier Kosygin—at a press conference in London on February 9, 1967:

I believe that defensive systems, which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute a factor preventing the death of people. Some argue like this: What is cheaper, to have offensive weapons which can destroy towns and whole states or to have defensive weapons which can prevent this destruction? At present the theory is current somewhere that the system which is cheaper should be developed. Such so-called theoreticians argue as to the cost of killing a man—\$500,000 or \$100,000. Maybe an anti-missile system is more expensive than an offensive system, but it is designed not to kill people but to preserve human lives.

The Soviets have been outspoken in support of ballistic missile defense, they can hardly claim that a decision to authorize the Safeguard system justifies postponing or canceling the SALT. The fear that authorizing ABM will of itself cause a failure or contribute to a failure of the talks does not appear to be supported by what we know of Soviet statements and attitudes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. YATES).

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, my good friend, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON)—and he is my good friend—has suggested that we ought not to take away from the President the chip in the poker game that will be known as the SALT talks. If that were the basis of consideration, I submit that perhaps the President should have recommended about 10 additional weapons systems so he might have available additional chips as well. I think the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM) correctly suggested the fallacies in that argument.

I see my good friend, the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. BELCHER) on the floor. He talked about the fact that he did not know why we are opposed to spending \$345 million to save 50 million lives. The fact is that we are not spending \$345 million as he says. What is in prospect here is the expenditure of \$50 or \$60 billion for a system that probably will not work. That is one very good reason we are opposed to this program.

My authority for the statement that the ABM will not augment our national security is not any of the witnesses who appeared in opposition to the bill but rather a statement made by Dr. Foster himself before the Committee on Appropriations in the last hearings of that committee that are printed. Dr. Foster, of the Department of Defense, is the strongest proponent of the ABM.

This is what Dr. Foster stated in response to a question by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MAHON). Mr. MAHON said:

In your opinion, is there anything we could do today that would make your statement invalid? Is this just a fact of life based on the unilateral strength of the U.S.S.R., with which we must live ad infinitum?

Dr. Foster replied as follows:

One hopes not, Mr. Chairman.

I have tried to explain in the statement that we are making a major effort in research and development of the ABM defense in the hope that it may be possible to evolve a defense.

In other words, we do not have one at the present time, but in the hope that we may evolve a defense that will protect our American people against an all-out Soviet attack.

As you know, we do not feel that current technology permits this capability.

There is a time for research. There is a time for deployment. As far as I am concerned, we have not yet reached the time for deployment. I support the efforts of the ABM proponents to continue research to try to find a system that will resist incoming missiles. We have not yet reached that position.

The notion that it may be possible to provide an effective defense against missile attack is so seductive, on the surface, that most reasonable men would react favorably to such a proposal. Unfortunately, the problems of missile defense are too complex and the implications of an ABM deployment too far reaching to afford us the luxury of easy answers. Too often in the past Pentagon decisions have been accepted as though they were handed down from on high. If the Pentagon was infallible, or if we could even be assured that only national security objectives guided its decisions, our problem would be substantially simpler. As it is, we have some work to do.

On March 14, President Nixon announced his decision to proceed with the deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile system. He called that system Safeguard, to distinguish it from the previous Sentinel deployment which he had rejected. The Sentinel deployment had been proceeding until early February, when local protests in Chicago, Boston, Detroit, and Seattle forced a stoppage. Then, in the short period of 6 weeks, the \$6 billion Sentinel deployment was set aside in favor of the new \$7 billion Safeguard system. The Sentinel had been billed as a population defense, but President Nixon made it very clear that such a defense was not feasible. I found that interesting, since it was the position that myself and several of my congressional colleagues in the House and Senate had held from the outset. We are pleased the President affirmed our creed. I think we ought all to be suspicious of a decision of that magnitude which was arrived

at in so short a time. Every indication is that the Safeguard system will stand close scrutiny no better than its now abandoned predecessor.

The Secretary of Defense has discussed the Safeguard system primarily as a defense for our Minuteman ICBM's. In order to substantiate his position he has stated unequivocally before Senator GORE's Arms Control and Disarmament Subcommittee that the Soviet Union is seeking a first-strike capability against the United States. He has not, however, provided any evidence which would make that statement even remotely plausible. In order to achieve a first-strike capability against the United States the Soviet Union would have to have a high assurance of destroying all but 400 of our offensive nuclear warheads before they reached their targets in the Soviet Union. Moreover, they would have to achieve the destruction of those warheads virtually simultaneously.

Secretary McNamara has testified that 400 1-megaton warheads would kill immediately 74 million Russians and would destroy 76 percent of Soviet industry. At the present time our arsenal consists of some 4,200 separately targetable warheads. By 1975, the year in which Secretary Laird foresees such vulnerability to our forces, it is likely the MIRV technology will have increased the number of our separately targetable warheads to something in the neighborhood of 10,000. In order to achieve a first-strike capability against us, then, the Soviet Union would have to be able to destroy more than 95 percent of our offensive arsenal before it reached its targets. That kind of reliability is simply not possible in the foreseeable future. It is useful to note in passing that the above calculations do not even take into consideration the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons we have stationed in Europe. Neither does it account for the relative invulnerability of our Polaris submarines, which by 1975 will be able to deliver, at any given moment, more than 3,000 warheads on Soviet soil.

Dr. George Rathgens of Massachusetts Institute of Technology has stated that in order for the Soviets to achieve the objective Mr. Laird has set for them they would "need to have a capability of destroying virtually all of our land- and sea-based missiles nearly simultaneously since they could hardly count on our delaying retaliation very long after the first few of our missiles were destroyed. Clearly the Soviet Union has none of these capabilities at present. Development of most of them should be evident to us through our intelligence collection well before they are operational."

Moreover, even if Mr. Laird should succeed in persuading the Congress that a Soviet first-strike capability was a serious possibility, the burden of proof would still be on him to demonstrate that the Safeguard ABM system was the most effective, economical way to protect our retaliatory forces. Dr. W. K. H. Panofsky has suggested that a much less expensive ABM system than the Safeguard deployment could provide adequate protection for the Minuteman. Dr. Rathgens has suggested that since the Safeguard system expends so much of its capabilities

protecting its own radars, it costs something on the order of \$25 to \$100 million to protect a single Minuteman. That figure is made all the more incredible by the fact that the Minuteman itself costs only about \$4 million apiece. The Pentagon has provided no cost-benefit analysis of the Safeguard program. Assuming that protecting the Minuteman fields is a reasonable objective, it is still not clear that it could not be done cheaper and more dependably by some other means, such as improved silo-hardening techniques or dispersal of the missiles.

It is important to understand that in the unlikely event the Soviets should decide to attack the Minutemen, it would be a saturation attack. Under those circumstances, the possibility of a massive, catastrophic failure of a system as complex as the Safeguard is substantial. If just a single warhead reaches the missile site radar, which is about 10 times as vulnerable as a Minuteman silo, then the system collapses. All that is required is that one of the Sprint missiles defending the MSR fail, and the entire defense would be rendered useless.

In many respects the Safeguard deployment, with its components adapted from the Sentinel hardware, is a typical example of how weapons technology tends to feed on itself. The full Safeguard deployment consists of some 12 sites. It has been announced that, though the whole deployment has been described as a thin "area defense," there will be short-range, terminal defense Sprint missiles at each site. Since none of the sites will be located near population centers and only a few will be adjacent to our Minuteman fields and bomber bases, the sole objective of most of the Sprint missiles will be to protect the ABM itself. The Sprints are necessary because the area defense provided by the long-range Spartan missiles is so leaky and undependable.

The Safeguard system, then, is the same old system that we thought had been buried, and it is based on the same old assumptions about national power that have caused us to establish military bases all over the globe. More important, the Safeguard system is, in the final analysis, based not on a rational calculation of our national security needs, but on the continuing illusion that the United States can order the world according to our rather specialized blueprints about how governments ought to be run. The debacle of Vietnam, with its tragic costs in lives and spirit, should have long since laid that illusion to rest. The day has now passed when the United States could seek influence in the name of democracy and international hegemony in the name of defense.

The ABM system is only a single symptom of the disarranged national priorities that are reflected in a Federal budget that spends over \$80 billion for weapons while domestic programs which are designed to give new life to our troubled society continue to be drastically underfunded. Of course we need a strong national defense and adequate appropriations for the purpose. But something must be done to stop the unneeded wasteful military expenditures. Unfortunately,

over the last two decades Pentagon requests for appropriations have not been screened adequately.

McGeorge Bundy, in a recent issue of *Foreign Affairs*, stated the situation very well:

The neglected truth about the present strategic arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union is that in terms of international political behavior that race has now become almost completely irrelevant. The new weapons systems which are being developed by each of the two great powers will provide neither protection nor opportunity in any serious political sense. Politically the strategic nuclear arms race is in a stalemate. It has been this way since the first deliverable hydrogen weapons were exploded, and it will be this way for as far ahead as we can see, even if future developments should be much more heavily one-sided than anything now in prospect. This proposition does not square with the complex measurements of comparative advantage which dominated the ABM debate, but I think it can be supported by both fact and logic.

No purpose can be served by explaining once again the technical case against the ABM. That case is as strong today as ever, and it has never been refuted. The committee report, which contains a quite thorough, if not persuasive, discussion of the ABM, makes no inroads at all into the arguments made by such distinguished scientists as Dr. George Rathgens, Dr. Herbert York, Dr. Hans Bethe, Dr. George Kistiakowsky, Dr. Ralph Lapp and several others. The Safeguard ABM is such a low-confidence system that the "conservative assumptions" by which we guide our strategic planning must assume that it will not work. In an attack situation experts tell us we simply could not rely on it. Conservative planning would require that we launch our Minutemen on warning. This would be the deterrent to forestall any attack, and not a penetrable ABM. The so-called choice given the President by another set of buttons, an \$11 billion complex of radars and missiles, is not really a viable alternative.

The ABM debate has been unique in that for the first time an independent body of technical knowledge has been brought to bear on a major strategic weapons system. The Nation owes a considerable debt to those civilian scientists whose conscience and competence brought them into the ABM discussion. The Congress and the American public knows more about the nuclear age today than ever before, however disquieting that knowledge might be. It is important now to apply the larger lessons implicit in the ABM debate and begin to bring the nuclear arms race under control. We have to understand that technical considerations, despite their importance in the ABM debate, do not hold the key to arms control.

In fact the contrary is true. From a technical standpoint virtually anything is possible as long as the time and money are available. Herman Kahn, a Hudson Institute researcher who specializes in this sort of thing, has projected some technological "advances" in weaponry that are expected to develop in the last two decades of the century if the arms race continues on its present course: New kinds of nuclear weapons; various kinds

of laser or other "death rays"; a menu of techniques for effective chemical and/or biological warfare in various applications; well understood doomsday machines—or near doomsday machines—tidal wave producers; climate changers, earth scorers, or other ways to modify or damage the environment on a large scale; new forms of psychological, or even direct mental warfare; and the invention of a nuclear six-gun technology or at least the development of inexpensive and widely available versions of the nuclear weapons of mass destruction characteristics of the military technologies of the middle and late 20th century.

The ABM system, especially in tandem with the developing MIRV technology, threatens to make it much more likely that Mr. Kahn's predictions will come true. The Safeguard system, if deployed, will not make doomsday machines or tidal wave producers inevitable—technologically they are not related. But if the ABM deployment or the MIRV program are allowed to go ahead unchecked in both the United States and Soviet Union, then an offense-defense race will be in prospect that would result in still higher levels of armaments and a net diminution of security on both sides. I urge passage of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DELLENBACK).

Mr. DELLENBACK. Mr. Chairman, I do not think there is a Member in this body today who is not really sincerely reaching for peace. While we must remain strong militarily to reach for peace, ultimate peace does not lie along the road of indefinite escalation of arms. The world's best chance for peace lies in effective negotiation—negotiation leading to binding and effective international agreements.

We may be on the verge of finally beginning those negotiations with the Russians. President Nixon has called for those negotiations. The Russians may be finally at last about to agree.

Under our government of delegated powers, the responsibility of conducting those negotiations lies with the President of the United States. He will speak for America. He must be a credible negotiator. World peace may well depend upon whether or not the Russians recognize Richard Nixon as such—whether they are convinced that in the ultimate analysis this Nation will follow the President in this critical area.

President Nixon has eloquently set forth his conviction on this issue. He has based that conviction on the broadest possible knowledge, on extensive discussions and on intensive study of all arguments, pro and con. He has called for a limited deployment of the ABM. He has put his credibility completely on the line. In my opinion, without taking away from our right and even from our obligation to disagree with the President on other matters, we dare not destroy the credibility of President Nixon on this particular issue. We must support him on this. This amendment should be defeated.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington (Mr. MEEDS).

Mr. MEEDS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment. I favor further research and development but I am opposed to deployment at this time.

I believe the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN) said we would agree, and I certainly agree with him, that we can afford it. I would add this caveat, however: We can afford it only if we need it. That is, only if we need it.

I think the gentleman from Washington, my colleague (Mr. HICKS) with his classic ability to cut through the chaff, has struck at the heart of this matter, and that is the question of whether this is necessary to preserve the credibility of our deterrent. I agree with him wholeheartedly, it is not necessary to preserve the credibility of our deterrent, and thus, in my judgment, there are \$345 million here which are not necessary.

I know that if we do not spend it for this, that does not mean for certain we will spend it for some other programs, but I also know if we do spend it for this, it will not be available for other programs that are in need of this type of money. There are other programs such as vocational education which need it. The \$345 million is \$100 million more than the President suggested for vocational education for this entire Nation. The \$345 million is six or seven times as much as we have appropriated in this House for library books for the children in this Nation. As the gentleman from New York yesterday pointed out, it would build 10 schools which would educate 1,000 young people each year for 30 years.

I suggest that the domestic budget contributes as much to the national security as does the military budget. A progressive country solving its own problems may do more for peace than a phalanx of antiballistic missiles. Full funding of education and fulfilling of man's hopes must command a higher priority.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. EVANS).

Mr. EVANS of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, one comment I also would like to allude to was made by my distinguished friend, the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. BELCHER) when he made this decision in his mind that he would spend \$345 million on the hope we could save 50 million people. I think everyone in this Chamber, if that were the question, would join with the distinguished gentleman from Oklahoma and vote for this \$345 million. But I submit that is not the question.

The purpose of this appropriation is to protect our own missile sites, not cities. I submit further that in fact we are not simply talking about a thin system. We are talking about making a decision which will ultimately lead to a thick system. If a thin system protects against only 10 percent of the incoming missiles, once we accept the logic, then we will be pushed to develop a thick system without question. Maybe we should develop a thick system. I do not believe the state of the art is now at a point where we can or should make that decision.

I believe we should and can preserve

our option for this. However, I am worried about a remark made by my friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER). He has suggested the possibility of a foreign military officer or politician going insane and some day does get his finger on a trigger of an ICBM. Under those circumstances I might vote for deployment of an ABM to take care of such an event, because goodness knows this world has had insane men in it. But, beyond that eventuality, I would not vote for deployment in this year.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. SIKES).

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, we would be in a better negotiating position if the ABM were deployed now. We will definitely be in a stronger position in defense when it is deployed. There is no rhyme or reason for further delay.

The deployment of Safeguard is pictured by opponents as an escalation of the arms race. It is alleged that it will draw a Soviet reaction to insure their deterrent force. Thus, Safeguard is criticized as causing the initiation of a new round in the arms race.

The truth is the system would not require a Soviet reaction—unless the Soviets are aiming for a first-strike capability.

With the deployment of Safeguard, the United States will qualitatively improve its strategic forces, not quantitatively escalate the total offensive megatonnages. The decision to primarily defend Minuteman and the bomber forces rather than deploy additional offensive forces reflects this.

Defense of our retaliatory forces should, in fact, actually slow down the arms race by enhancing the stability of our deterrent without threatening the Soviet deterrent. Safeguard in any of its proposed phases or options is of modest scope and presents little or no threat to their deterrent. The Sentinel plan called for deployment of radars and missiles in our heavily urban industrial centers, but Safeguard radars will—with the exception of the Washington, D.C., area—be deployed well outside of our cities.

In this vein, I should add the fact that the Soviets show every evidence of understanding the ABM issue. They did not exhibit any concern over the original Sentinel decision and continued thereafter to express their interest in arms limitation talks. Premier Kosygin has declared publicly in regard to the Soviet ABM system, which they began to deploy before we decided on Sentinel, that a defensive system is not a threat to any nation and does not provoke an arms race.

A Soviet reaction to the Safeguard system, as I said, will be necessary only if the Soviets want a first-strike capability against the U.S. bomber and the Minuteman-Titan force.

Of all the actions we might take to preserve our deterrent forces in the face of the growing Soviet threat, deployment of a defense of our deterrent forces is the least provocative.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PUCINSKI).

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, the question is not whether the proponents of this amendment are right. The question is whether they can afford to be wrong.

We have spent \$3 billion on research on this program. The time for action is now.

I will tell you why. If we started building this ABM system tomorrow and all went well, it would take us at least 48 months before it became operational. It just so happens that in 48 months the Red Chinese will have completed a production capability to produce 200 deliverable nuclear warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles every 12 months. This Nation must start building now a defense against a Red Chinese threat which will become very real in 48 months.

So I do not believe we can waste 1 more day. We are behind schedule now.

I am opposed to this amendment because I believe we have to move forward with the deployment of this system.

There is one thing that is certain around here. Our friends say, "We want more research, but we do not want deployment; we do not want procurement." We know the rule around Congress is that the best way to kill a project is to study it to death. This has been studied, researched, and experimented. They have found that it works. Now is the time for action.

I hope the amendment will be defeated.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. RYAN).

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, at long last we have had a real debate in the House on the subject of the ABM. The American people are deeply concerned about the implications of the deployment of any ABM system, and for good reason.

The ABM issue has awakened the Nation to the dangers of the nuclear arms race and the imbalance in our national priorities. Today we have an opportunity to apply the brakes to the spiraling arms race with its inflationary effects upon our economy and at the same time save billions of dollars which might be used to solve urgent domestic problems.

I have presented the arguments against deployment of an ABM system when military procurement and appropriations bills have been before us in the past. This year the system is called Safeguard and is designed to protect offensive Minuteman missile sites against a Soviet attack. Last year it was called Sentinel and was designed to protect our major cities against the possibility of an irrational Chinese attack into the 1970's.

The agility with which ABM supporters shifted from Sentinel to Safeguard suggests that the objective is to initiate deployment of whatever ABM system will create the least public outcry. Then once the camel's nose is under the tent, a "thin" system will become "thick"; a missile site defense system will also become a population center defense system; a project with a cost of \$10.3 billion—according to the committee report at page 18—will become a \$50 to \$100 billion

project; and absolute security in the nuclear age will still be unattainable.

The essential arguments against the ABM are:

It would encourage the Soviet Union to increase its offensive missile capability, which in turn would necessitate that the United States reciprocate, resulting in an expensive and destabilizing increase in the missile race.

Militarily, the United States is in a position of relative strategic parity with the Soviet Union; both have sufficient capacity for retaliation so that it is in the interest of neither to strike first. There is, thus, a stabilized, mutual nuclear deterrence.

If an ABM system is deployed by one country, the calculations of the other's offensive capability may be thrown off by an unknown factor, which would be compensated by an increased offensive strength. This will probably yield the same strategic parity we have now, at a higher level. More likely, it will introduce a dangerous new unstabilizing element in the arms race.

By the time it is deployed, it will be virtually technologically obsolete. Not only will it be obsolete, but it may not work.

As former Secretary of Defense McNamara pointed out, it is more economic to devote our resources to maintaining offensive superiority or parity than to pursue an ABM system.

The deployment of the ABM may well have an adverse effect on the strategic arms limitation talks.

Mr. BURTON of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RYAN. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BURTON of California. I should like to commend the gentleman from New York and to associate myself with his remarks.

Mr. RYAN. I thank the gentleman from California who is one of the most dedicated Members of the House in the quest for peace.

I should like to comment for a minute on one of the arguments espoused by the supporters of the Safeguard, which is that somehow its deployment will strengthen our bargaining position at the conference table with the Soviets. They claim that, if it is approved, the Soviets will have an added incentive to agree to an arms limitation.

There is a fault in that logic. If the Safeguard system is a defensive weapon and in no way provocative, how can it be a bargaining incentive? If the Soviets have nothing to fear from the ABM, why would they be concerned about its deployment?

If, on the other hand, it does present a threat, is it reasonable to expect cooperation from the Soviet leaders?

The notion of using this for a tradeoff is not very logical.

This system has been sold to the American people at various times with various rationales—as a necessary protection against an irrational Chinese attack. This was the concept, when it was presented by Secretary of Defense McNamara. Now it is presented to us as a de-

fense against the offensive missiles of the Soviet Union directed at our missiles.

If the Safeguard is deployed, the Department of Defense will surely find one or more reasons for its continued existence. Should it be offered as a tradeoff in bargaining at arms limitation talks with the Soviets, it is not difficult to imagine the Military Establishment balking and swiftly dredging up the potential Chinese threat to justify it. Weapons systems must not be allowed to dictate defense policy. Defense policy should dictate weapons systems.

The arms race must be brought under control. The adoption of the pending amendment will at least help to stabilize the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. GERALD R. FORD).

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I believe there are three things that each and every one of us would recognize and accept.

First, we have been working on the anti-ballistic-missile for some 16 or more years, if one goes back to the initial studies that were made by the Department of Defense.

I served on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee beginning in January 1953, and one of the first requests made for research and development by the Department of the Army at that time was for money for anti-ballistic-missile studies. We have gone through the various generations of the Nike and then we had Sentinel and now Safeguard. We are still in the research and development stage for any practical purposes on Safeguard.

Secondly, we know that the Soviet Union has deployed an ABM system, the Galosh family of weapons. We know it is a deployed first generation ABM system, and we must assume it is probably a second generation ABM system, and it may well be a third generation ABM system.

We also know that the United States has had no ABM system that is deployable.

With this background it seems to me we ought to take affirmative action in this session of Congress to approve the Safeguard system.

Now, there are some legitimate questions that have been raised. First, is deployment of the Safeguard system a provocative act and, secondly, will it hinder disarmament and, finally, will it work and is it needed.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Mexico (Mr. FOREMAN).

(Mr. FOREMAN asked and was allowed to yield his time to Mr. GERALD R. FORD.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER).

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that I may be allowed to yield my time to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. FORD).

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I object.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. GERALD R. FORD).

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. The question is, Is it provocative? Well, I do not use the words of this gentleman often to back up an argument of my own, but several years ago Mr. Kosygin, a fairly influential member of the Soviet Union hierarchy at the time that Kremlin leaders made the decision to proceed with their ABM system was quoted as saying:

It seems to me that defensive measures do not accelerate the arms race.

If that is a good argument from their point of view, it is certainly equally effective from our point of view.

The next question is, Will it hinder disarmament? Again I think we can look back at history. Either in 1967 or 1968 former President Lyndon B. Johnson announced that he was going to deploy the so-called Sentinel ABM system. There were some at the time who felt that that announcement would preclude a go-ahead on disarmament talks. The contrary is true. The facts are that within 4 weeks after Mr. Johnson as President of the United States announced that we are going to deploy the Sentinel ABM system the Soviet Union asked the United States to begin arms control negotiations.

I do not believe a start on deployment of the Safeguard system will hinder disarmament talks. Actually I think it would be helpful in the initiation of worthwhile and needed discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Let me ask this question: Why should the Soviet Union enter into negotiations involving possible concessions by them on the one hand and concessions by us on the other hand if the United States has already stopped beforehand the undertaking of a weapons system that is negotiable?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has again expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ARENDS).

(Mr. ARENDS asked and was allowed to yield his time to Mr. GERALD R. FORD.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. GERALD R. FORD).

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, if this Congress either by this amendment or by any other amendment precludes the President of the United States from proceeding with the Safeguard system, when the President proceeds to negotiate with the leaders of the Soviet Union he will have one hand tied behind his back.

Let me make this observation: If the United States enters into negotiations naked, we will come out of those negotiations naked.

If we want the United States to be in a bargaining position, a strong position for negotiations, this Congress ought to make available to the executive branch of the Government the authority to proceed with the Safeguard system.

The third question: Will it work? Well, I have read a great deal, some scientific and some otherwise, that it will not. I have read an equal amount of scientific substantiation of the workability of this program. I have listened to others, many very knowledgeable, who have also alleged that it will work. But there is one person I think we all respect—and I have not heard his name mentioned here before—there is one person in the scientific community of the United States who has been the winner of "the Big Four" in the area of the sciences. That is Prof. Eugene Wigner, of Princeton University. He has been the winner of the Nobel Prize for physics, the National Medal of Science, the Enrico Fermi Award and the Atoms for Peace Award.

You should read Dr. Wigner's justification and support for the ABM. His observations will resolve any question or any doubt in your minds. His statement on the ABM was inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for May 1, 1969, page 11049. I urge every Member to read it.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has again expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. GUBSER yielded his time to Mr. GERALD R. FORD.)

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, any Member of this House who questions deployment of the Safeguard system should do as the distinguished Speaker has recommended that we do, and that is to err on the side of strength rather than on the side of weakness.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened to the debate on this occasion and other occasions. I have listened to Members in this body as well as Members in the other body who were here during World War II and the Korean war and when the critical decisions were made with reference to the atom bomb and to the hydrogen bomb. And, let me say this: This country would not be here today if those decisions had not been made affirmatively, despite substantial opposition from segments of the scientific community.

I say as one American along with 200 million other Americans that we are fortunate that those in the White House did make those decisions. The same strong decision must be made today by the President and the Congress.

Let me ask you this question: Is the ABM needed? The answer is yes. Fortunately, President Truman made the decision to proceed with the H-bomb in the early 1950's. The late President Eisenhower stated in 1954:

If the Soviets had beaten us to the hydrogen bomb, Soviet power would today be on the march in every quarter of the globe.

I say to you if we hesitate, if we wait, if we hinder, if we roadblock this program, we would be doing the same thing for the decade of the 1970's that former President Eisenhower predicted would have happened if President Truman had not made the right decision in the early 1950's.

Mr. Chairman, rumors have been rife around the world, and I have heard comments made, that certain weapons tests

have been undertaken or completed by the enemy. If those tests, my colleagues, prove out as the Soviets hope they will, then in my opinion we would be foolhardy, we would be stupid in disapproving the ABM. I strongly favor the Safeguard system.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has again expired.

Mr. FOREMAN. Mr. Chairman, I support H.R. 14000. I oppose the amendment to delete deployment of the anti-ballistic-missile system—ABM. I believe in saving dollars, but I place a priority on the saving of lives.

The argument is advanced that we should use this ABM money to help our people. How better could we help our people than by providing a defensive system to protect them against the adversaries who would, if they thought they had the decisive advantage, destroy them? What good does it do to spend money to build increased model cities, welfare programs and other domestic ideas and programs if there is no one left here to enjoy them?

The argument is made that this system won't work. As a matter of fact, it is the fourth generation of ABM development. It does work. But even if we were still testing to make it work, the Russians, the Chinese, and/or others don't know whether or not it will work either, and no adversary would want to take the chance whether or not it would work.

The argument is advanced that the ABM is provocative. Is a shield in a sword fight provocative? Is a coat of armor provocative? ABM will provoke only those who plan to attack us, because it is only a defensive weapon.

It took courageous leadership, ability and determination for Mr. Nixon to make the decision to deploy the Safeguard-ABM defensive system. Current, reliable, hard intelligence shows us that the Soviets are presently deploying SS-9 ICBM's with 20 to 25-megaton warheads capable of destroying our hardened Minuteman ICBM strike force. In addition, the Chinese threat against our population, as well as the danger of an accidental attack, cannot be ignored. With the Safeguard, a purely defensive weapons system, it is possible to reduce U.S. fatalities to a minimal level in the event of a Chinese nuclear attack in the 1970's, or an accidental attack from any source—and, to protect our retaliatory strike capability against any aggressor. No President, or Congress, with the responsibility for the lives and security for the American people, could fail to provide this protection.

Mr. DONOHUE. Mr. Chairman, as we initiate our examination, discussion, and determination of this amendment, to eliminate funding for the proposed ABM system, and other amendments, to this military procurement authorization bill before us, I most earnestly hope and urge that our legislative mood and movement toward final action will be firmly founded upon an unyielding and immovable "bare bones" policy and scrutiny in the imperative public interest.

Mr. Chairman, shortly after I entered this U.S. House of Representatives, it became quite clear that the mere utter-

ance of the phrase, "necessary for the national defense" was the magic and unchallenged password to the swift and near unanimous congressional approval of any requested military expenditure.

There was then and there is now no gainsaying the fact that "necessary for the national defense" is mighty impressive, and that many military expenditure requests, now and in the past, are and were substantially meritorious and actually urgent in and for our national defense security.

However, many of us, through these past years, have consistently, earnestly, and patriotically questioned the good sense and wisdom of the Congress in repeatedly and customarily attributing, in reality, to the words, "necessary for the national defense" the same significant magic projected in the children's storybook command of "open sesame."

Too often through too many years, the purse strings holding our national taxpayers hard earned money have been burst asunder and nearly the whole content of the purse freely emptied, without any concentrated study or sensible limitation, at the mere sound and pronouncement of the hypnotical expression "necessary for the national defense."

Many of us, through the years, have, perhaps too quietly at times, persistently and conscientiously protested against this "open session" military spending affliction and annually urged, as I repeated here on July 18, 1968, the Congress not to approve a blank check for unlimited military spending.

That is why I placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, on last May 28, 1968, an article by an outstanding columnist revealing grave instances of military waste and extravagance in various parts of the world for the information of my colleagues and commendation of dedicated employees who discovered and revealed these disturbing instances of careless supervision and inventory.

That is why, in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of last June 5, 1969, I inserted an editorial article estimating that sloppy and wasteful procedures in defense contracts had cost the American taxpayers some \$30 billion in sheer waste over the past 20 years. In this article it was indicated that all too often high Pentagon officials tended to try to cover up spending blunders of colossal size in defense contracts instead of publicly revealing them and initiating corrective action.

In my own remarks, I appealed to the Defense authorities on the ground that it was "far better, in the national interest, to 'put out' the facts about such military spending than to have them 'found out,'" pointing out that the confidence of the American people and the Congress is seriously impaired when those in high public trust withhold the truth for no clear and good purpose.

Mr. Chairman, that is why, as the author of similar legislation, H.R. 17357 of the 90th Congress, I urged the adoption and voted for on May 27, 1968, of H.R. 17324, a bill designed to keep the profits, of industries that contract with the Government for the manufacture of military hardware, under realistic bookkeeping control and right reason. The record and

evidence clearly reveal that some contract manufacturers had received unconscionable profits at tremendous and unjust expense to the taxpayers.

Mr. Chairman, that is why I have consistently urged the closest scrutiny and most searching questioning of the legitimate extent and commitment of military spending in the technical areas of research and development.

That is why last February 26, 1969, I again publicly protested and questioned the financial prudence and feasibility of the proposed construction of the antiballistic-missile system for which various estimated costs have ranged anywhere from 5 to 50 or 80 billions of dollars. I am still opposed to this unrestricted expenditure.

Mr. Chairman, those who have been long engaged in this mission of trying to focus the concentrated attention and examination of the Congress and the country upon military expenditures were deeply gratified at the historical action of the U.S. Senate in their recent exhaustive debate and study of military procurement expenditures over a period of 2 months when, in previous years, they had initiated and completed Chamber action on the same subject mostly within 2 days.

I respectfully submit that the unprecedented Senate action, even without actual accomplishment of the substantial expenditure reductions that a good many of us would have liked, still represents, finally, a great moral victory and morale boost for our people and our country at a time in our destiny when it is imperatively needed to sustain and strengthen confidence and faith in the legislative branch of this Government.

Mr. Chairman, there are many more amendments that will be offered in the course of this debate to eliminate and/or lessen requested authorization amendments in several areas of spending in this bill.

Even though the other body may have accepted some of them in their originally proposed figure I would hope and urge that their various decisions will not be permitted to weaken or dilute our higher duty and determination, as the source of national appropriations, to effect sound reductions and sensible savings to taxpayers at whatever point and on whatever items our legislative judgment dictates.

Mr. Chairman, the largest item, by far, in our national budget, some \$77½ billion this fiscal year, is for overall military defense expenditures.

Neither I nor anyone else would attempt to argue against the urgency of insuring the ability of this country to successfully repel any possible armed threat to our national security.

However, the duty of the Defense Establishment to provide our adequate defense does not automatically carry with it the right to a blank check on American taxpayer.

Modern, expert bookkeeping, wise spending projection, and the diligent exercise of frugality can be high marks of military efficiency as well as they are of a modern American private enterprise system.

Experience unhappily proves that loose purse strings are an almost irresistible temptation to careless excess and wasteful extravagance.

I do not question the motives or sincerity of any Congressman or citizen who is conscientiously concerned about insuring the adequacy of our national defense system, but I, just as conscientiously, consider it our highest duty and obligation to the American taxpayer to hold the military expenditure purse strings, and those of any other Federal department, as sensibly and prudently tight as is humanly possible.

Let me quietly and calmly remind you that if and when any emergency may arise, which we pray it will not, immediate, responsive action can be readily taken by the President and the Congress to meet and overcome it, whatever it may be. That is what the Congress is for, and I most earnestly hope that when our deliberations are done on this vitally important measure before us, it will truly represent and reflect a triumph of legislative prudence and responsibility in the disbursement of our people's money in the national interest and the peace of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. JACOBS).

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I listened with interest to my colleague from Oklahoma as he engaged in a little "you-fellowsism." He stated that "none of you fellows will be around to know if you are wrong if it is a mistake not to deploy the ABM system." And, that there will not be anyone around to know if we are wrong.

But, on the other hand, when you other fellows make a mistake we are around to know. For instance, the mistake you made in the midfifties about the educational system in our country, a mistake which has brought about one of the most critical situations this country has ever faced, a woefully inadequate educational system which has allowed our cities to reek with ignorance and therefore unemployment and crime. We are around to see that mistake. And speaking of "fellows," was it not you "other fellows" who told us in the fifties that Lenin predicted the Russians would not defeat us by force of arms but that the Communists would force us to spend ourselves into bankruptcy?

I congratulate you "other" fellows. You are helping to prove that prediction precisely right with this FBM—French bankruptcy maginot line.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I listened with great interest to the remarks of the minority leader, and he is absolutely correct that we have in fact studied this for 16 years now; we have researched it for 16 years and, according to what we are presented with today, for 15 years we have been wrong.

Last year we did come in with a system which was designed to save lives, and this year we have changed that system completely, and all we are talking

about today is a system which is designed to save missiles. We have changed that system 100 percent, in this year.

We have, as the gentleman from Washington said so eloquently a while ago, a system which is not designed to save life, for if we ever use this system, it has already failed; this is a system which is designed to deter war as the other one was, but I simply ask if it fails and if it does not deter war, let us not talk about how many lives will be saved. Let us consider how many lives will be lost.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT).

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, the people who are concerned about saving 50 million lives, and are willing to invest \$345 million to save those lives, I wonder how they voted on the \$1 billion that we put in the education bill to save 50 million lives of the young people around this country, to properly educate them? It is a question of national priorities.

While it is said that we need a fire insurance policy as a rationale for the ABM, I do not think that we need to buy the whole fire department in order to protect us; and that is what we are doing in this case. What we are buying here is 10,000 men who we are going to use to man this system on a 3-minute alert basis for the next 50 or 100 years.

If it is like the ICBM system that we have currently deployed, we are going to buy 48,000 contract civilian personnel like the ones who are now working on the ICBM system around the clock. So what we are buying here is an obligation of about \$1 billion per year maintenance. It is said in argument that the estimated cost is around \$350 million; I think it is going to take a billion dollars to maintain the system. And the net effect is, that all we are going to do is to stimulate the Russians into doing what we have done. They have put up 67 antimissiles, and we are going to put up 1,000.

Of course, the distinguished minority leader says that the ABM's do not lend themselves to the arms race. Well, he can say one thing in one paragraph, and his innuendo in another is a very different point of view.

If you look in the report of the majority on page 26 at the bottom of the page, they say that it is alleged that the Safeguard system could be overcome by a Soviet missile buildup.

What is their answer? They say that obviously Safeguard defenses could also be increased.

So what we are saying, then, is that Senator SYMINGTON is right; we are moving toward a \$400 billion dollar program to try to make ourselves safer, and in the end all we are going to do is to be contaminating and confounding our budget, and making ourselves less safe.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT).

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I support the bill and its provision for the limited ABM. I feel that this will not be a stimulus to an arms race, but as a matter of fact will help us in controlling

arms throughout the United States and the world.

I support President Nixon's Safeguard ABM and I do this after extensive study of the pros and cons and only after being convinced that the Safeguard is necessary to the long-range protection of the United States.

I began my inquiry into the Safeguard, frankly, with skepticism. I was hoping that I could find sufficient evidence that it was not needed and that we could safely vote against it. We have many other important areas where we could use the money, not the least of which is considering relief for the heavily burdened U.S. taxpayer.

But the more I learned about the ABM the more I became convinced that Safeguard is not only vital for the future security of the United States but will make a very real contribution to world stability in the coming decade.

Three things impressed me a great deal in my review of the ABM:

First was the logic of Secretary Laird's statement that we can never be sure of Soviet intentions, but that we must be ready to respond to Soviet capabilities.

All study material available to the Congress and particularly the material made available by the intelligence community will convince an objective observer that the SS-9 missile will give the Soviets the capability in the mid to late 1970's of destroying our Minuteman missiles in their silos.

As Secretary Laird has said, we could not say with certainty that the Soviets are planning a first strike but the SS-9, if its development and deployment are continued at the present rate, could give the Soviets that capability. We must see that the protection for our deterrent is such that the Soviets never have that capability and never have enough of a chance to succeed with a first strike so as to be tempted to try one.

There has been much dispute in the public debate about the intelligence on the Soviet missiles. But if you read that closely, you will find that the disagreement is really a matter of judgment on what the Soviets intend. There is no disagreement in the intelligence as to what the actual developments are and what the Soviet capabilities will be if those developments continue. I do not think we can determine our defense needs on the basis of the hope that the Russians' intentions have become more benign with the passage of time. The invasion of Czechoslovakia, after all, was only a year ago and is at this moment being solidified.

The second point that impressed me greatly in my study was the extent to which past technological developments have contributed to the Safeguard program.

Quite frankly, when one reads much of the public debate one might be led to a belief that the Safeguard is a wholly new and untried approach and that the technological developments required are part of a new guessing game.

In actual fact, two things are apparent. One is that Safeguard is the culmination of years of research and development in which billions of dollars

have been invested and while its deployment concept is somewhat different because the character of the threat is somewhat different, it can logically make use of the work that was previously performed in developing the Nike X and the Sentinel. The benefits of all of these earlier systems are available to Safeguard and the technology required for Safeguard is to be found at least in part in those earlier programs.

Also one should note how much of the development has already taken place. There are actually computers in existence now that are as complicated as those which will be used for Safeguard. Safeguard data processors are operating today and meeting test objectives at the Kwajalein test facility. The Spartan missile was first flown over a year ago. The Sprint missile has been undergoing tests for 2 years and is developing satisfactorily.

The third thing that impressed me in my study of ABM, and to me one of the most crucial reasons for supporting the system, is that I think Safeguard can improve world stability in a decade of the 1970's and 1980's. It is a nonprovocative weapon. It cannot harm a single hair on the head of a single Russian because it cannot go far enough to land on Russian territory. It cannot start a war. Even if fired at a command level lower than the Presidency, it would entail no danger of nuclear exchange even if it had been fired at a false target. It can be destroyed in the air without a nuclear exchange. In addition to warding off the Russian threat, it will be of crucial importance at the time when the Chinese will have a nuclear delivery capability, which is already claimed by them to be a fact. It could handle the threat the Chinese are likely to pose and its very existence would give the President an option to resist demonstration attacks or nuclear blackmail threats in future years when other nations might have a nuclear capability without the sophisticated command control capability we have and the Soviets have. In such a world an ABM defense against an accidental launch could truly save the world from nuclear holocaust. It would give us the opportunity to make sure that an accidental launch does not start world war III.

In summary, I think we should all remember the ABM is not a thing in itself but a part of the whole fabric of national preparedness. We must defend America. And the best defense is the power that wards off initial attack in the first place. Our maintenance of that kind of power has been the best deterrent to general war. And now that a threat to the deterrent is made, we must continue to develop our national defense capabilities to assure the survivability of our deterrents. The ABM is a necessary step in that process. We cannot play guessing games with 40 million American lives, which may be saved by the development of this purely defensive weapon.

I support the ABM and I will urge all of my fellow Members of the House of Representatives to do likewise.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT. I at this point yield to the chairman of the committee.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.

On July 9 the distinguished Senator from Washington, Senator JACKSON, made a speech in which he listed the names of those who composed the Politburo. I have some copies here. I would like to give them to the Members. They are Stalinists. They are the crowd who marched into Czechoslovakia.

This is the crowd who will make the decision as to whether or not to set off a missile in Russia for which we may have to use the ABM. But that is not the only fact.

But I would like the Members to read this. It is a very, very carefully written speech. The Members can read it now from these copies, or they can read it later in the RECORD. I shall include it at the end of my remarks.

But I want to say to the Members that you cannot put any faith in the written word of these Soviet leaders, or on their promises. I call this to the attention of everyone here.

When I get my time on the floor I am going to read a part of the speech by the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, Senator PASTORE, wherein he answers a few questions and pays his respects to the patron saint of the opposition, Dr. Jerome Wiesner.

I think you will be quite interested in what he has to say.

Mr. Chairman, the statement I referred to is as follows:

FISCAL YEAR 1970 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL

(Remarks by Senator Henry M. Jackson, member, Senate Committee on Armed Services, on the floor of the U.S. Senate, July 9, 1969)

In considering the fiscal year 1970 Department of Defense Authorization Bill, which is now before the Senate, I can think of nothing more essential for the Congress than clear thinking about the Soviet Union.

How can we reach sound judgments on the national defense budget if we do not understand the nature of the Soviet adversary?

Can you think of a top American business leader who would make decisions determining the survival of his company before he had carefully studied his chief competitors and what they were up to? Yet many in Congress seem willing to make decisions that could determine the safety and survival of this nation and the future of individual liberty without facing up to what the Soviet Union is up to.

Recently, we have heard a great deal about "national commitments", disarmament, and threats to "cut and cut and cut and cut" the defense budget. But we have heard precious little discerning comment from those same sources about the nature of Soviet leadership and what is really going on in the Soviet Union.

Who are the Kremlin rulers today? What sort of people determine the foreign and defense policy of the Soviet Union?

Briefly, these are the members of the 11-man Politburo, in alphabetical order:

Leonid Brezhnev, age 62, General Secretary of CPSU Central Committee. Russian by birth, he began his career during the Stalin purge of 1936-38 in the Ukraine where there were three survivors of the 102-man local Central Committee. This is one of the men who denounced others on innumerable occasions. Orthodox in outlook, built his career on the political platform of return to doctrinal rigidity, partial rehabilitation of Stalinism, and crackdown on liberal writers. His political priorities are protection of the

supremacy of the party, tightening the ties of the socialist camp under Soviet dominance, protection of defense goals through allocations to heavy industry, with agricultural allocations ranking second.

Andrey Kirilenko, age 62, Secretary of CPSU Central Committee. Russian by birth. Rose from a career of bloody and petty intrigue in the provincial Ukrainian party committees. Thus far one of Brezhnev's most loyal political supporters. Alternates with Suslov in deputizing for Brezhnev when the latter is out of town. Has been increasingly prominent in the past year and may now have edged Suslov out as the number two man in the party. Kirilenko displayed a strong pro-consumer bias during the Khrushchev years and in the period immediately after his ouster. These views have been muted since 1966 when ideological orthodoxy and preoccupation with the needs of defense began increasingly to dominate the thinking of the leadership.

Aleksey Kosygin, age 65, Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers. Russian, born in Leningrad. Took the first moves in his career in the great purge of 1936-38. He played an active role in Party life at a time when the main "activity" was the denunciation and purge of the previous secretaries and bureaus, and when the Leningrad communists were being slaughtered on a very large scale. During that time he advanced rapidly—moving up in four steps, from shop manager in a Leningrad factory to a post in the Soviet government in about two years. Pragmatic with a strong interest in a balanced economy, especially interested in increased attention to consumer goods and "rationalization" of economic planning methods. His age, desire to preserve his privileged position, and orthodox Marxist training, however, limit his receptivity to new ideas and methods.

Kirill Mazurov, age 55, First Deputy Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers. Byelorussian by birth. Started his career in the Party at the time of the 1936-38 purge. He has served some years in KGB operations. Pragmatic in outlook, responsible for light industry, but also interested in agriculture. Is behind a grandiose plan for the "urbanization" of the countryside being strongly pushed by the Byelorussian party organization, but currently hard up for funds. In foreign policy, Mazurov seems to favor an aggressive stance against the West. Alternates with Polyansky in deputizing for Kosygin.

Avid Pelshe, age 70, Chairman of Party Control Commission. Latvian by birth and career, began his rise in the Latvian party during Suslov's pro-consulship of that area, and is reported to owe his present high position to Suslov's patronage. A colorless party functionary, orthodox in outlook, he has spent important years in KGB operations.

Nikolay Podgorny, age 66, Chairman of Presidium USSR Supreme Soviet. Ukrainian by birth and career. Under Khrushchev, identified with relatively liberal views, but since early 1966 has moved steadily toward orthodoxy in support of Brezhnev.

Dmitry Polyansky, age 51, First Deputy Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers. Ukrainian by birth, career ties to the Crimea, and thus far a loyal member of the Ukrainian group in the Politburo. Has served in both party and state positions. As First Deputy Premier is responsible for agricultural production and is a zealous champion of investment in the agricultural production base. As a result has been increasingly in direct competition with the military for scarce resources. He is interested in doing business with the West and acquiring advanced Western technology, but otherwise seems to be ideologically orthodox in his foreign policy views.

Aleksandr Shelepin, age 50, Chairman of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. Russian, made his career in the Komsomol, then as head of the KGB. One of the most powerful figures in the leadership at the

time of Khrushchev's ouster. Since 1966 his political position has steadily weakened. Interested in administrative efficiency and modern methods of control. Was behind move to rehabilitate Stalin in early 1966 and seemed to favor a tough, chauvinistic foreign policy. There are now indications that he is in search of a new platform to "run" on. Is said to have opposed Politburo handling of Czech crisis, but was an advocate of the aggressive line in the 1967 Middle East war.

Peter Shelest, age 61, Ukrainian by birth and career, still based in Kiev. First Secretary of Ukrainian Central Committee. Conservative on most domestic issues though something of a Ukrainian nationalist and champion of the "rights" of the republics, which however does not prevent him from applying harsh measures against his independently minded Ukrainian countrymen. A hard-liner on military matters. His remarks on foreign policy issues have been consistently tough, and he is reported to have pushed hard for a military intervention in the Czech crisis, fearful of the spread of the freedom-virus to the bordering areas of the Ukraine.

Mikhail Suslov, age 66, Secretary of CPSU Central Committee with informal ranking of second-in-command. As the 1936-38 purge struck, Suslov began his spectacular rise, becoming one of the Rostov provincial secretaries. In 1939 he was appointed First Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee, where in 1944 he became involved in the deportation of the Karachai people. Proving successful in this, he was made Chairman of the Bureau of the Central Committee for newly-occupied Lithuania, in 1944, and re-imposed Soviet rule against a bitter resistance. High priest in doctrinal matters with special interest in the cohesion of international Communism. Orthodox in outlook and long opposed to "revisionism" in any field.

Gennady Voronov, age 58, Russian by birth. Grew up in the Soviet Far East and for many years party boss of one of the large districts bordering on Communist China. Chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers. Ambiguous figure with no apparent political ties with other members of the Politburo. Has been outspoken defender of the technocracy and favors establishing western-style management training schools.

The often neglected truth about this group of men who are now on top in Russia is that they are the first generation of rulers who are actually the products of the Stalin system. Those who rose with Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, Kirilenko and the others in the purge of 1936-38 were qualified for promotion by their denunciations of their colleagues. To have moved ahead in those days is a certain sign of complicity in Stalin's terror.

Now, in power, these men have shown themselves unable and apparently unwilling to make the reforms, small or large, required to meet the needs of an increasingly more complex, sophisticated Russian society. As one Russian observer put it: "There are no liberals at the top. Not in the Politburo. No Soviet Dubceks in sight, and no viable faction within the Party that would support one. That's the worst of it all."

Indeed, the repressive measures employed today to intimidate, frighten and stifle expression of dissent approach those of the thirties and forties in their intent and in the dogged intensity with which the Politburo executes them. There are more intellectuals now incarcerated in jails, committed to mental hospitals, or exiled to Siberia than at any time since Stalin's terror—Aleksandr Ginzburg, Yuri Galanskov, Pavel Litvinov, Larissa Daniel, and all the others. In addition, Soviet official organs employ countless other methods of repression. Liberals are slandered in the official press. Travel abroad is denied dissenters. Writers are denied the right to publish their works in their own country.

The lack of qualifications of most of the Politburo in dealing with foreign affairs is obvious. Careerists in the provincial or Central Party apparatus, they are generally narrow-minded, nationalistically oriented, basically hard-boiled communists, limited men, concerned for their own positions and privileges, and knowing little of foreign reality.

After World War II, Maxim Litvinov used to take foreign diplomats and newspapermen aside and warn them that Stalin and his colleagues were thoroughly ignorant of the outside world, and that this constituted a very great danger. It seems that most of the present Politburo are no better off in knowledge of the outside world, some of them probably worse off. Clearly, we cannot discount the danger that these men, who are showing themselves unequal to the need for reforms at home, may make serious errors of judgment in their conduct of affairs abroad.

This is the group that chose to use armed force to strangle the evolutionary democratization of its own friend and ally, Czechoslovakia, which under Dubcek's leadership was indicating to the Soviet Union itself a way out of the vicious circle of repression, fear, repression. This is the group that then concocted the ominous Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty which asserts the right of the Soviet Union to intervene unilaterally in all communist-run countries.

It is difficult to see how one could have thought up a more clumsy and self-defeating rationalization of the Czech invasion. All the talk about the subordination of international law of the "laws of the class struggle" and the double-talk about defending sovereignty by denying sovereignty gives no comfort to any other communist ally, and shows a crude and deliberate disregard for the political interests of other communist parties, particularly many in Western Europe, who, to retain the credibility of their effort to gain power by parliamentary means and of their willingness to support "bourgeois liberties" feel they must repudiate the theory of imperialist communism and Soviet Party predominance.

If anyone had any doubt about the capacity of the Politburo to blunder, its performance in the case of Czechoslovakia should dispel the doubt. The similarities between Moscow's forcible methods and Nazi methods are now fully visible to the peoples of all the Warsaw Pact countries, beginning with Rumania, and to communist comrades around the world whose interests the Soviet leadership brazenly ignored.

Meanwhile, there is little doubt that a struggle for power and influence goes on within the Politburo, and that the outcome is uncertain.

In the Soviet Union a few leaders conspiring when they choose, can make and unmake a man's power without his knowledge or that of the public. That is what happened to Khrushchev in 1964.

Will change when it comes bring merely a reshuffle of the same old Party apparatus (Suslov or Kirilenko in place of Brezhnev; Voronov or Podgorny in place of Kosygin)? Or will it bring a change of generation of Party apparatchiki (Shelepin, Mazurov, Polyansky)?

Will the change continue to restrict Soviet politics to the self-perpetuating Kremlin circles? Even now, the police appear to be gaining ground. As Michel Tatu, one of the most astute analysts of the Soviet scene has said, it is no accident that Yuri Andropov, the KGB chief, has been promoted to be an alternate member of the Politburo, for the first time since the notorious Lavrenti Beria was in the top group. Andropov has presided over the crackdown by the KGB on liberal Soviet intellectuals and signs of him in action during the Czechoslovak crisis have not indicated any doubts on his part concerning the intervention.

Also now, the influence of the Stalinist-type political commissars appears to be on the rise. General Shtemenko, Stalin's former chief of staff, downgraded two ranks on his master's death, has not only been reappointed to high position in the Soviet military hierarchy but is now Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states, and is campaigning to refurbish Stalin's image as a military leader. General Yepishev, a particularly sinister figure, who was Stalin's assistant minister of state security in the horrible Doctor's Plot period, was made chief political commissar of the Soviet armed forces in 1962 and promoted to full membership of the Central Committee following the fall of Khrushchev. He is noted for his continual attacks on the liberal writers and on the so-called "foreign imperialists." And one gets no comfort from Yepishev's chilling article, widely circulated this year in *Kommunist*, the official Communist Party journal. In that article he says that "classical Leninist teaching" on the inevitability of "a series of frightful clashes" between capitalism and communism still applies in the nuclear age, and that World War III would "guarantee the construction of socialism and communism."

The resurgence of Soviet thinking in terms of the class struggle, reflected in military doctrine as well as in the Soviet approach to international law, must cause apprehension about the road ahead.

Now, the fact of the matter is that an increasing number of the informed Western analysts of Soviet developments assess the Soviet Union as a dangerous, unpredictable opponent—on the verge of a leadership crisis, the outcome of which cannot be forecast.

In this perspective, the fast growing military capabilities of the Soviet Union take on added significance.

No one is sure of the future and one has to be prepared for surprises.

I am reminded of the lively discussion of the Czech crisis on August 7, 1968, at a high-powered workshop. The discussion produced a show of hands on the probability of Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia. Twenty present believed such an eventuality unlikely; two thought it probable.

One participant later suggested as a possible subtitle for the workshop, "Or Why We Were So Wrong."

We do not know who will have the finger on the Soviet trigger in the months and years ahead. The enormous Russian arsenal will be at the disposal of whatever "strong man" or ascendant faction of tough, ambitious figures come to the fore in the Soviet power struggle.

Hence, there is everything to be said for the United States to maintain a solid and prudent stance.

Mr. President, the essence of a solid and prudent stance is a protected U.S. second-strike capacity which gives us the capability to retaliate against a strategic nuclear attack, and therefore to discourage such an attack. This is the first essential of national security and individual liberty, and of the survival of us and our allies in freedom.

In recent years recognition has grown decisively among officials and scientists that we want to maintain the second-strike capacity—not of just one, but of all major vehicle types of our strategic force: Minuteman, bombers, and Polaris-Poseidon.

As our Armed Services Committee report states: "Each system has different limitations, is subject to varied uncertainties and requires distinct modes of attack. Each type must be protected, so as to insure no easy defeat of our system by an enemy. It must be of serious concern therefore if any part of our deterrent mixture is adversely affected by changing adverse forces and technologies."

The Senate Armed Services Committee has voted to cut about \$2 billion from the pro-

posed 1970 Defense Department Authorization Bill. I joined in those votes. We can do without some of the less urgent military programs. But in the face of the likely dangers ahead, tampering with the strategic offense and defense core of the Defense budget is a very risky business.

Of real concern is the continuing Soviet development of their gigantic SS-9 missile, on which they have already begun to test multiple reentry vehicles, and not without success. The evidence is firm that the Soviets have more than 230 SS-9's operational or under construction. If the Soviets continue to deploy additional missiles at the same rate as in the past few years, by the mid-1970's the survivability of most of our Minuteman forces as presently deployed, would be in question.

Also of special concern is the threat to our bombers from the growing number of Soviet Polaris-type missile submarines, and the danger to our Polaris system from Soviet efforts in nuclear attack submarine construction and in anti-submarine warfare. As the report of the Armed Services Committee puts it: "We cannot assume that our Polaris system will be the first weapon in history to remain invulnerable."

Also of concern is the hard work which the Soviets have put into their ABM for many years. The Soviets are completing the deployment of some 60 Galosh ABM missiles on launchers around Moscow. And, very important we now have hard evidence that the Soviets are testing an improved long-range ABM, which apparently has a "loiter" capability, so that, after the initial firing, the missiles can coast or "loiter" for a period of time, until a specific target is selected, at which point it can then be restarted and maneuvered to the target. The Tallinn defense system, very extensively deployed throughout the Soviet Union, is believed by many in the intelligence community to be subject to upgrading so as to give it an ABM capability.

Faced with these problems, President Nixon has recommended a phased program to deploy an ABM defense. The functions of the Safeguard ABM program are to help protect (1) the Minuteman silos; (2) our manned bomber force; and (3) the command and other facilities necessary in a crisis to assure national political control of both our land and sea-based strategic forces. It is intended also to (4) provide a partial but useful protection of our people against an accidental, irrational or reckless small missile attack.

The opponents of the Safeguard program initially seemed to deny the fact that we confront increased threats to our deterrent forces in the mid and late 1970's. They now appear to have retreated from that position and are trying to make a case for alternatives to deploying an ABM system which in their view would be better.

Several Senators and scientists have suggested that, rather than defend our offensive forces, we should expand our offensive forces—our Minuteman or our Poseidon, or both. Yet buying more Minuteman without protection is certainly more destabilizing than an active defense of Minuteman silos, since it increases the capacity to strike first. And buying more MIRVed Poseidon forces would surely be viewed from the Russian side as more threatening than a limited ABM defense of our forces.

Moreover, any significant expansion of our offensive nuclear weapons is more costly than the Safeguard program.

The President and the proponents of the Safeguard system are in my judgment the real moderates on this issue.

Some opponents of ABM advocate delay in deployment—of what they call "an inadequately tested, unproven missile defense system." In fact, the Safeguard system is the result of a very comprehensive research and

development effort. The components are more fully advanced and better tested than were the components of the Polaris missile system, when a comparable go-ahead was given.

Mr. President, how can we now prove this system, except through a prototype-like deployment? Phase I of Safeguard is, in effect, a prototype installation that will enable the Defense Department to complete engineering, installation, and shakedown and tests and to have the two stations fully operative by 1974. If we delay the decision for about a year, as some propose, the soonest these two sites could be ready for complete checkout would be in 1976. This would leave us with no option to provide active defense for the essential portion of our Minuteman force on the schedule that may be necessary if we do not reach agreement with the Soviets on limiting or reducing strategic forces. There is obviously no substitute for time. And, what's more, the delay would cost us an extra expenditure of several hundred million dollars.

We can expect, as in the case of every other offense and defense system, that we can improve its effectiveness over the years. But we urgently need the experience of a deployed working prototype. The idea that we should not be getting this experience in this very important defense area of nuclear weaponry, while the potential opponent was not dormant and has had the opportunity to obtain some of this experience for many years, is to me the height of imprudence.

The statement to our Committee by Freeman J. Dyson of the Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton includes this perceptive comment:

"In the long run the battle between offensive and defensive technology is a battle of information. If the defense knows where the offensive warheads are, it is not too difficult to destroy them. For the last 20 years the offensive has had an overwhelming advantage, but this advantage is being reduced as defensive information-handling capability improves. In the long run, I believe the defense will prevail because the defense will have more accurate and timely information than the offense. Defensive batteries within a hundred miles of the battle should ultimately be able to out-maneuver incoming offensive vehicles controlled from a command center 5000 miles away on land or in a submarine off-shore. The offensive command will be fighting the battle blind, without any possibility of quick reaction to defensive moves. I consider that it is only a question of time, perhaps ten or twenty years, before these inherent advantages of the defense become actual. The time that it will take to overturn the doctrine of the supremacy of the offensive will of course depend on political decisions as well as on technological developments."

Some of the campaigners against ABM deployment argue that before deciding to proceed with deployment we should negotiate with the Russians.

Why either one or the other?

Why not both?

If we do not have our ABM system moving along, what inducement is there for the Soviets to negotiate with us on a freeze or a reduction in their ABM deployment? Can anyone seriously maintain that Moscow will agree to limit its ABM's, if we now, and unilaterally, abandon deployment of our ABM's? Nothing in the record of negotiations on the control of arms suggests that this would be the way to have a successful negotiation with the Soviets.

I do not think that we can realistically expect the Politburo to sign an arms agreement that rules out a limited Soviet ABM defense and leaves their country vulnerable to nuclear coercion and attack from Communist China and other secondary nuclear powers? And I also very strongly doubt that the American Congress and people would ac-

cept an agreement under which the Soviets are permitted to have their ABM system while we have no comparable ABM protection well underway here.

Thus I believe the chance is promising that we could come to an agreement with the Soviet Union for a limited ABM defense on both sides—an agreed ceiling on the number of ABM's, for example—provided that we don't foolishly throw that chance away by now scuttling our own program.

In my judgment, anyone who wants a successful negotiation with the Soviets to halt the further evolution of dangerous strategic armaments should be a strong proponent of the Safeguard ABM.

President Nixon has asked us to give him the funds to proceed with the Safeguard ABM as a matter "essential for national security."

After thorough consideration, a majority of the Senate Armed Services Committee has supported the President's request.

President Nixon believes he would be in a much stronger position in the forthcoming negotiations with the Soviets on limitation of offensive and defensive nuclear systems if he had the backing of the Congress on his Safeguard program. I agree with that analysis. Indeed, in my opinion, nothing would be more detrimental to our diplomatic effort—and more shortsighted—than to deny the President the strong hand he needs just as his negotiators are about to sit down at the conference table.

I have no doubt that the Senate will evidence its common sense and vote to go forward with the ABM program as part of the 1970 Department of Defense Authorization Bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. PHILBIN).

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to Chairman RIVERS.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that this yielding to me come when my time comes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I object.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. KOCH).

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KOCH. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, one of the most dubious arguments I have ever heard is the one that proclaims boundless faith in American science and asserts, "If the Russians can build a missile we can figure out a way to shoot it down." In Russia there are equally competent scientists who can claim, "If the Americans can build a missile defense, we can figure out how to penetrate it." Philosophically, the two claims are equally strong; it comes down to a matter of hard technology.

The hard technological fact is that missile offense is far ahead of missile defense and will remain so in the foreseeable future. There is no law of nature that says this should be so; it is simply an empirical fact.

Any one of a long list of inherent defects renders the Safeguard system hopelessly inadequate. Consider, for example, the missile site radar. It is too complex, too expensive, and too fragile. It is only one-tenth as hard as the ICBM silos it is supposed to protect. This means it can be destroyed by a warhead only one thirty-

second as powerful as that needed to destroy an ICBM. Even if we very optimistically assume the ABM to be 80 percent effective, the Soviet Union need only direct two SS-9 missiles, each bearing 15 warheads of perhaps 150 kilotons each, against a missile site radar to have a better than 90 percent chance of destroying the radar. Thus, by spending perhaps \$120 million on four SS-9's, they could destroy both missile site radars of Safeguard phase I and render the entire \$2.1 billion system inoperable. This is not a good cost-exchange ratio, and it gets no better as the system is expanded into phase II.

There is no doubt in my mind that Safeguard is nothing more than a make-work project for the military-industrial complex.

But even more important than the question of technical adequacy is the question of national priorities. Some of the better political cartoonists have taken to depicting our cities as dilapidated, vermin-infested shantytowns squatting in the shadows of glistening, gigantic antiballistic missiles. In my view, this is a dead accurate representation of the situation. We do not need augmented military protection for our country; our existing nuclear deterrent is more than sufficient to do this many times over. We need to take this money and use it to improve the society we are so concerned about protecting.

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Rather than restate the many valid reasons for opposing the appropriation for the ABM that my colleagues have given, I just want to say that I support those reasons.

I also want to bring the attention of the House to something that occurred yesterday which indicates the order of our national priorities as the Nixon administration views them.

Yesterday, the Nixon administration announced that it is going to cut by \$215 million the model cities program—a slash this year of 42 percent—and, yet, here today we are going to willy nilly spend for the commencement of the deployment of the ABM, as one gentleman said, \$345 million. We all know expenditures for the ABM ultimately will cost the taxpayers of this country close to \$60 billion, and the authorization today will be the first installment payment.

I say to the gentlemen who are supporting this bill that some of us who are opposed to it are not necessarily unalterably opposed to it in principle, we are saying—wait until the SALT talks take place. Then if the talks prove unsuccessful in their goal of ending the arms race and if we think we must therefore go ahead, we can debate its merits then. But until those talks occur, we ought not to embark upon this course of expenditure. It appears that the Nixon philosophy is committed to saving silos and destroying our own cities by permitting them to fall into decay for lack of funds.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER).

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. COHELAN).

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment to delete a total of \$545.5 million from Safeguard ABM procurement and research and development.

A number of amendments are being offered today, but none in my opinion involve a program with the potential for disastrous consequences found in ABM deployment. The Senate recognized the grave questions when they ended in a tie vote. The House Armed Services Committee—generally a bastion of unanimity—recorded eight dissenting votes on the committee bill which we seek to amend.

It seems abundantly clear that this lack of agreement coupled with the consequences of development and deployment can lead to only one conclusion—we must halt this system now.

Secretary of Defense Laird points to Soviet missile development, the SS-9 in particular, as a reason for immediate deployment, reasoning that the Soviets are preparing for a first-strike capability.

Dr. Jerome Wiesner and Abram Chayes disagree. In their recent book, "ABM, an Evaluation of the Decision To Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System," they state:

Our present intelligence on Soviet strategic forces shows an ICBM force of about 1,000. It may be that some 200 more are in the process of deployment.

About 600 of these are SS-11's, comparable to our Minuteman; about 230 are SS-9's, capable of carrying considerably larger payloads. The remainder are of other models. The bulk of this force has been deployed in the last three years. In addition, the Soviets have 150 intercontinental bombers, a few nuclear submarines and large numbers of intermediate-range missiles and planes that could be used to attack targets in Europe or in the bordering oceans.

Carl Kaysen, formerly White House policy planner and currently director of the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton, also challenges Laird's perception of the threat. He states:

He (Laird) has particularly emphasized his projections of the rate of build-up of Soviet offensive weapons, especially of SS-9 missiles, capable of carrying large warheads or multiple warheads. The facts on which this argument rests, so far as can be determined, are essentially the same facts from which the two preceding Secretaries of Defense drew quite different conclusions. These show a rapid growth of Soviet land-based intercontinental missile forces: from 250 launchers in total in mid-1966; 570 in mid-1967; to some 1,000 by early 1969. Of these some 200 to 250 are of the SS-9 type, all of which were added since 1966. In addition, the Soviet Union is building a missile-launching submarine force which now has some 50 to 100 missiles and is similar to our Polaris fleet. Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, in describing the situation of the Soviet land-based missile force, said late in 1968, "The rate of increase over the past year has been somewhat greater than estimated a year ago. However, we believe the rate of increase will be considerably smaller over the next two or three years. Beyond that point, our estimates become less firm."

Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara considered the possibility of a Soviet first strike and said:

It would not be sensible for either side to launch a maximum effort to achieve a first-strike capability. It would not be sensible because the intelligence-gathering capability of each side being what it is, and the realities of leadtime from technological breakthrough to operational readiness being what they are, neither of us would be able to acquire a first-strike capability in secret.

Jeremy Stone, a longtime opponent of the ABM also discounts the probability of a sudden strike from Russia.

A large-scale Soviet attack against American cities is plainly and simply not rational, since the American response is primed to destroy the Soviet Union in return. The Soviet leadership is aware of this. That nuclear war is mutual suicide has attained the status of a cliché with both super-powers. Wide-scale nuclear attacks on American forces are so unlikely to succeed, and so dangerous in any case, that it is very hard to imagine a Soviet leader, or Soviet committee, attempting them.

One can talk of war occurring through escalation. But it still requires, at some stage, that one major power launch nuclear weapons against the other. This will be, and can be expected to be perceived as, a self-destructive act. For the foreseeable future, war calculations will not seem promising; moreover, leaders are unlikely to believe them if they do seem so. And there is ample evidence in the three decades since World War II of great-power caution in treating events that might risk general nuclear war.

Finally, we must look at this situation in the light of our domestic needs which are generating pressures equal to anything facing our national security. We are operating with a budget that has a ceiling of about \$92 billion. There are uncontrollable expenses such as Medicare, veterans payments, and other trust accounts which bring us down to about \$72 billion. Out of this I ask you what funds are available for our cities, our open spaces, education, and welfare. Just about \$9 billion. This is \$9 billion to fund the incredible problems that are facing us on the domestic scene. Compared to the numbers that we are discussing today, this is a mere pittance. I have had continual discussions with the officials in the cities I represent and I can assure you that the problems are acute and cannot be put off indefinitely.

We must reorient our fiscal thinking and recognize that a country facing the crises we have today cannot blithely spend \$80 billion a year for a military machine. This is not a question of national security. This is a question of condoning massive waste in the military sphere and refusing to look at the pressing needs of the people in the cities. I am for national security, but I view national security in the full sense of the word. National security means security for all the people, not just a bloated military machine. I hope the time has finally come when we can recognize that an insecure domestic population is as much of a threat to our existence and the quality of our life as is the threat from outside aggressive powers.

As the scientists I have quoted point out, the ABM is dangerous. Its technical merits are under serious question. It will in all probability lead to an escalation of the arms race.

On the policy level, it is an example of the waste and sloth in our thinking on national priorities.

I sincerely request that my colleagues pass this amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON).

Mr. GREEN of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. GREEN of Pennsylvania. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I rise to announce for the RECORD my support of this amendment and to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER), the gentlemen from New York (Mr. LOWENSTEIN and Mr. BINGHAM), and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. YATES), the gentleman about to speak, and many of the others who oppose deployment of the ABM at this time.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I suppose I might be looked upon as a second-generation weapon in this discussion, a distant second, certainly, in understanding of the subject and influence in the debate, but not in concern for the result, or the third generation it will affect. Defeat of the amendment is widely predicted. It is traditional for this House to support Presidential initiatives in matters involving national security. It is equally traditional for this House to expect great things of our Presidents in the search for peace, diplomatic success, and the projection of America as a Nation to be trusted, loved, and respected.

But we must not think that by merely giving the President a mighty weapon he requests, we are discharging our duty, much less exhausting our opportunity, to prepare a legacy of peace for our children. For the very request itself is predicated on failures of international communication and understanding for which the President does not bear any more responsibility than we do. Nor is it a question of trust. Our relations with recognized adversaries throughout history have been based upon mutual distrust. When powerful adversaries meet to talk, they are not beguiled by suggestions of mutual trust. They concentrate on what is in their mutual interest. The question is how to translate mutual interest into an agreed series of moves which need not be considered "trusting," yet which will turn man back from the brink.

Today's wisdom will be measured in years to come by whether it fosters or inhibits such moves. In Dr. Brennan's familiar article supporting the ABM he quotes Premier Kosygin as approving its adoption by this country. A trusting government would accept such "approval" at face value—a Soviet endorsement of purely defensive systems. A less trusting interpretation would arise from the suspicion that the Soviets would like us to invest in a costly defense system that would be born obsolete and, like their own, abandoned. Self-deception is not self-interest.

Finally, the issue before us is not solely one of national security, but of the security and hope of the whole world. And this is something no one nation can guarantee. It will take broad and historically unique agreements between parties who somehow are induced to as-

sign a lower priority to the next generation of weapons than the next generation of children.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HALL).

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman, along with all others, has engaged in good debate. It has been long. It has been to the point. I think we have perhaps demonstrated that there is nothing as impervious as a logic-tight idea in the minds of some. Certainly, with disposal of the theory of the electromagnetic pulse, ordinarily known as the Fireball, we have disillusioned those who say the arms race is even or that we are ahead. Good intelligence indicates to the contrary.

We have heard much about the Galosh-U.S.S.R. ABM, and, little orientations on the redirection of the direct-phased array of radar toward China. The proponents of the amendment conveniently fail to mention the Tallinn U.S.S.R.-ABM ringing their principal cities. We have discussed the SALT talks and disabused them, because it still takes two to tango, and one does not get in bed with a snake without getting bit. On the other side we have proved that the ABM is defensive. We cannot afford not to have it because of the lives lost, and I am disabused with the argument about whether those lives were preserved by direct or by indirect action. If our Safeguard deters the Soviet first strike "turkey-shoot," it has been completely successful. We have proved also that we can delegate the trigger control to a trustworthy man who can control, and this is purely a defensive weapon, which would be exo-atmospheric in its motivation and carefully controlled, or it would be overseas beyond an area of 400 miles to the point of origin.

For all of these reasons, because we are within the state of the art and the technological know-how of knocking down incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles, to the point of saving American lives, whether we live thereafter in fallout shelters or not, I say we cannot afford to do anything less than to deploy this system and do it now while there is still time available.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. HALPERN).

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

ABM AND AMERICA'S FUTURE

For 2 years an increasingly disturbed American public questioned the need for an anti-ballistic-missiles system—scientists doubted whether it would work; many of my colleagues thought the money could be more profitably spent on domestic priorities; citizens were frightened by it; and civilian defense analysts felt it was a useless strategy. And yet, today we are being asked to appropriate funds to deploy an ABM system that could escalate the arms race and inject national life with a new militarism.

The Nation's defenses must be maintained, and I do not pretend to be a defense expert, but when such a vast array of respected opinion questions the wisdom of spending billions on a nuclear defensive system that may not even work,

then the Safeguard ABM system must be viewed with skepticism.

The ABM would commit America to a military strategy that has never been tested and relies as much upon ambiguous logic as it does on its ability to function.

While we all wish to secure "peace among nations," it is difficult to view this rash ABM decision as anything but provoking the Soviet Union and other hostile Communist countries. The Pentagon says an anti-ballistic-missile system would improve our bargaining position with Russia. But is this not the old, discredited gamesmanship of the cold war?

I think the time has come when the United States should take the lead in seeking peace, instead of risking our national security on a nuclear gamble.

Indeed, the time has come when Americans must stand up to what former President Eisenhower called the "influence of the military-industrial complex." For years we have let our foreign policy be set in accordance with unquestioned judgments made by military men. Generals, no doubt, have rights as citizens, but in our democracy, they traditionally are supposed to carry out civilian-made policy, not dictate it.

Yet the Pentagon now has come up with an ABM system that modifies the previous administration's \$5 billion Sentinel system. This new "thin" nuclear defensive system will be phased over several years, costing \$6 to \$7 billion. It alters the original ABM sites, from the cities to rural America—in hope of detracting popular opposition—and focuses on defending existing defensive networks through detection, interception, and destruction of enemy nuclear missiles. It has been estimated that this supposedly modest "thin" system would eventually escalate until we have poured \$25 billion or more into a full-scale ABM network.

Just from a technical point of view, there are many reasons that militate against an effective ABM. No computer has ever been built that can approximate the performance that will be required of the Safeguard system. Time and again, it has been pointed out that the Soviets have numerous means at their disposal to circumvent the Safeguard system. Chaff can be dispersed to confuse our radars; a nuclear explosion would probably make radar penetration impossible; and electronic countermeasures could be used to jam our radar. Since the radar constitutes the core of the Safeguard system, it is highly unlikely that effective ABM defense can be developed.

Perhaps even more dangerous than the system itself may be its effect on the strategic arms limitation talks—SALT. At a time when the Nation is seeking a means of accommodation with the Soviet Union on arms limitation, it appears that we are prepared to take another step down the perilous road of escalation of the arms race. I am quite certain that the Soviets will view this development with extreme suspicion. They may well conclude that successful arms limitation talks with the United States are out of the question. This would be one of the most tragic developments for the American people and the people of the world.

Almost a quarter of a century has gone by since the skies over Japan were besmirched by the detonation of the atomic bomb. Surely such an event must never happen again. If we do not maintain an atmosphere wherein the SALT talks may proceed, we may only be bringing ourselves that much closer to nuclear destruction. I firmly believe that the deployment of the ABM system will create a situation wherein arms limitation talks will be fruitless.

As an alternative to giving the go-ahead on the ABM, Congress should insist that the system's effectiveness be carefully tested, and in view of considerable criticism, I believe strongly that additional research should be carried on before the antiballistic missile system can be called operational. Let us set our sights in that direction and then let us consider our pressing domestic problems. I feel democracy would be best served by spending the proposed billions now on human needs.

In the last analysis, I feel the Nation will be losing a great stride toward peace if this missile system is deployed at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. FISHER).

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee (Mr. RIVERS).

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas very much.

Mr. Chairman, we have come to the end of this debate now. We have got to make up our minds. I think there has been a good debate. It has been on a high plane. I think everybody has had his say. We have had some very knowledgeable statements.

I want to say this. Whether we like it or not, Richard Nixon is the President of the United States. Like Harry Truman, who used to have on his desk, a sign like this: "The buck stops here." We cannot pass the buck beyond Richard Nixon. He has to make the ultimate decision, and from his decision there is no appeal. This is Richard Nixon's responsibility, and the responsibility of each one of us is to back our President when it comes to our country's survival.

What do we do? Someone says, do not use this. When you use it, church is out. We do not plan to use it. There is no mistake about that. But, we do not plan to put all our eggs in one basket.

During the discussions in the other body, Dr. Jerome Wiesner's name was thrown around quite a bit.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HEBERT).

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS).

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Louisiana.

We had learned gentlemen come before our committee. We had three from the opposition and three from those who were for this. One of the great scientists who favored this was Dr. John Wheeler, Palmer Physical Laboratory, Princeton

University. I was quite impressed with his testimony. He left no doubt as to where the scientists of his group stood.

Dr. Wiesner could not get there, and he sent Dr. Rathjens, if my memory serves me, and he presented Dr. Wiesner's paper and one of his own. There were others. Over in the other body the distinguished Senator from Washington, Senator JACKSON, asked the Senator from Rhode Island, Senator PASTORE, to yield. I want to quote for the House what transpired, and I hope the Members will listen:

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PASTORE. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I should like to ask the Senator if he is aware that, in 1962, it was said that the lunar orbital rendezvous technique would be a poor way to send a man to the moon, that it would not work, that it would involve too great risks for the lives of the astronauts, and so on. Is the Senator aware that the man who said that was Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, the science adviser to President Kennedy? Fortunately, President Kennedy did not follow the counsel of Dr. Wiesner on that issue. Dr. Wiesner is now the leading opponent of the ABM. President Kennedy followed the advice of the responsible technical experts in NASA.

Says Senator PASTORE:

The best way I can answer that is that Jerome Wiesner—and he is a good friend of mine; I know all about Jerome. He was the scientific adviser to President Kennedy in 1961, 1962, and 1963; and while he was scientific adviser, John Kennedy spent \$800 million on the ABM. So it is either one of two things: He was either advising Kennedy wrong, or Kennedy was not listening to him.

In here it has "laughter." I can tell you that, because I was there.

I mean, there you are. I studied geometry. You cannot have it both ways—

Says the distinguished Senator—

I will admit that this is not the ultimate answer, and I do not think we should have to prove that it is.

Let me tell you something else, about taking care of the poor. Here is one man—

Speaking of himself—

who apologizes to no one about taking care of the poor. I stood on this floor alone and offered an amendment to override the House of Representatives and override my Appropriations Committee by increasing a cut that the House made, and was sustained by the Appropriations Committee on an amendment to raise it by \$225 million.

Let nobody tell me that I am taking bread out of the mouths of the hungry in order to get the bomb. Let him tell that to somebody else.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Louisiana has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina to close debate.

Mr. RIVERS. I thank the distinguished Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, am I now on my own time?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. RIVERS. I thank the Chairman.

Now, says the Senator:

Furthermore, who ever said we had to make a choice? After all, if we need the ballistic missile for the security of the Nation, let us have it. If we do not need it, let us do away with it. That was the purpose of the Smith amendment. If we do not need it, let

us do away with it. Let us be honest about it.

The only question is: Will it work? I have already covered that ground. It is said that the ballistic missile is expensive. Everything is expensive. What are we talking about in the bill? A difference of \$345 million. Yet we spend almost \$500 million in Vietnam every week. If we can spend \$500 million on strangers to keep them free, why can we not spend \$345 million to save our American population? We are not so poor that we have to give up the security of our country.

Says the distinguished Senator:

Now as to the miracle of our time: Today is the 24th anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

I am now speaking for myself. I am the only Member of this body here today who was among the first Members of Congress to see Hiroshima in 1946. The late George Bates was there. The late John Fogarty was there. It was a horrible sight—a horrible sight. I saw the wounds and the burned and charred flesh of those people in that hospital. Part of the hospital survived, and the only other building, if I recall correctly, was a brewery, and it was standing with all the windows knocked out.

I do not want that to happen to my people.

The President of the United States says we need to talk to the Russians about disarmament. We have got to give him what he says he needs. John F. Kennedy said:

Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us not fail to negotiate.

I asked President Nixon point blank, "Do you need this?" He said, "I do." Now, this is all I need to know. President Nixon is the most briefed man in the United States. He gets the highest information. And he says he needs it. I know it will work. It will shoot down the incoming missiles.

As chairman of your committee, presiding over your committee, after hearing testimony that went on for about 6 months on the whole bill, we came to this conclusion. We had a rollcall vote on it. The vote was about 31 to 8.

I know there are many of you who have a problem. I do not deny the reasons for your decisions nor do I assign myself any more patriotism than I do to you. Yours is an honest difference, and this I hasten to say, but it is my firm conviction that we need this system. We have already spent money on it, and we must spend money on the long leadtime items. It will take at least 4 years to do it. We must spend the money on the hardware for it. This is what we must do.

We should turn this amendment down and get on with the business of saving America.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I fully share the distinguished chairman's view, one, that it will work and, two, if there is any question, we ought to proceed simply because it will be helpful to the President of the United States in any negotiations that he might have with the Soviet Union or others on disarmament.

It seems to me the crux of the argument for the Safeguard system is precisely this: It adds to the credibility of our strategic nuclear deterrent and if it is deployed it will be a deterrent against any attack from any source. If that is true and it is successful in deterring war—and I believe it is and will be—then we will save every American's life and not just a few.

Mr. RIVERS. The speech of the great Speaker of the House should be the answer. Mine, of course, any way you look at it, is anticlimatic, but mine, nevertheless, comes as the authority from your committee. We conducted the hearings and we arrived at the decisions. America is too young to die. Do not let us participate in that funeral, so help us God.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. Chairman, we are again today considering the deployment of the ABM. This is one of the most important issues facing our Nation today. The issue is important because how it is decided could drastically alter our future national priorities. The issue has received extensive debate—one of the few times that a weapons system has been thoroughly examined. Since the end of World War II we have spent \$23 billion on missile systems that were never completed, or when completed were obsolete.

The debate has convinced me of the undesirability of deploying the ABM at this time. I am convinced that not only is ABM not needed but it probably will not work. This so-called defensive system would in actuality only create a danger to the cities and families it is purported to protect. Misplaced confidence in an unsure weapons system does not strengthen but only weakens our national security.

I believe that a more rational approach would be to freeze further deployment of the ABM and continue with research and development. Let us explore this vital issue with great care before committing expenditures of almost \$10 billion now and up to \$100 billion in the future.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara once said:

Every ABM system now feasible involves firing defensive missiles at incoming offensive warheads in an effort to destroy them. What is overlooked is that any such system can rather obviously be defeated by an enemy simply sending more offensive warheads, or dummy warheads, than there are defensive missiles capable of destroying them.

Many knowledgeable scientists have argued that the so-called thin ABM will be obsolete by the time it is ready to cope with a mid-1970 Chinese missile threat.

Dr. George Rathjens has stated:

If the numbers of Chinese ICBM's and United States interceptors are both doubled, the chances of at least one Chinese missile getting to its target rises to over 70 percent, to over 90 percent if the numbers of ICBM's and interceptors are both quadrupled, and so on. In the long run then (and it may not be too long a run), defense clearly becomes a losing game even against a relatively weak adversary. The costs of defense required to maintain any given level of protection will rise much more sharply than the costs of improving the offense.

We stand at a critical juncture to move with the momentum of the arms race or

apply reason to this vicious cycle and at the same time rearrange our national priorities.

For example let us consider that our total human and physical environment is slowly deteriorating while less and less money is spent for its improvement. Let us not leave as a heritage for future generations cities ringed with useless ABM's; but these same cities populated by undereducated children, consisting of substandard housing, bisected by polluted waterways and covered by noxious smog.

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Mr. Chairman, those who are members of the Armed Services Committee that has spent many hours in the study of the vital issues so involved in the future security of our Nation, and those who have made a cause celebre of their opposition, have more than adequately dealt with the subject of deployment of the ABM system. Yet, not one Member of the House of Representatives will have his mind changed by what has been said during debate. Each Member has made it his responsibility not only to inform himself about this legislation before he came to the Chamber, but to weigh the possible alternatives. This has been done in order to make a responsible judgment in keeping with what each Member believes to be in the best interest of the security of this Nation. That we come to different conclusions is testimony to the fact that there are good arguments for and against this amendment to delete funds for the deployment of the ABM. In the end, each one of us has to make his own judgment and stand by it.

In weighing the arguments in support for the amendment to strike out authorization to build the ABM system, it is clear that this is a matter of spending priorities. There are many demands being placed on our tax dollars, but in my mind the answer is clear. No matter how successful we are in solving the many problems that beset us, our successes will be of little avail if there is no one around to enjoy them and to enjoy them in an atmosphere of freedom.

In addition to the argument that we can ill afford to build the system from an economic standpoint, a second argument in favor of the anti-ABM amendment has been that "it will not work." I do not know, for certain, whether it will work or not, nor does any one who has spoken pro or con the question. Even the "experts" are divided in their opinions. I was not elected by the people of Wisconsin's First District to vote away their security or, if I should err in my judgment, to err on the side of insufficient defenses. I would sooner spend money for a system of promised security and discover, in a case of critical need, that it does not work as efficiently as we anticipated, than not to provide the system and discover at a time of vital need that we do not have a defense that might have worked to meet an enemy threat.

The people, to whom we have been given the responsibility of protecting, deserve to have more than two alternatives—total annihilation or surrender. They must have an alternative besides the choice between future capitulation before the force of an enemy and all-out

nuclear war—the protection of our Nation that makes possible the preservation not only our own freedom, but that of the freedom-loving peoples of the world.

We cannot afford not to provide the ABM defense. If we cannot afford it now we need never be able to afford it because time will have run out. Should we be forced to surrender or to go down to defeat, we will no longer have the choice even to debate the issue.

I want to make it clear to my colleagues that what I fear is not really understood as clearly as it ought to be. That is, that after all is said and done in this august body, our ultimate defense, our security, and our future does not depend on anything we say here or do here. Our future depends not upon the people of Russia or China, but of their Governments which, incidentally, do not exist by the expressed will of those governed. Until such time when despotic governments determined to rule the world are no longer a threat to the freedom of the world, we do not have a choice but a moral responsibility to leave no stone unturned in the defense of this Nation. The ABM system will not give us peace. Perhaps it will not even prevent war. But, with it, we will have a chance to pursue peace and freedom. Without it we may not even have a future.

Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the amendment which would strike the authorization of the ABM system from this bill.

Mr. GAYDOS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. WILSON), to cut \$345 million from the military procurement authorization for the deployment of the Safeguard antiballistic missile system. I have read and listened to arguments for and against the system. I have reached the conclusion that there has not been a strong case presented for the expenditure of the total amount earmarked for this project. I emphasize here, however, I am not opposed to the expenditure of some \$400 million to continue research and development of a defensive system.

There are several factors which have led me to the conclusion that the Safeguard system is not practical for deployment. It is a highly complicated fragile system. We never will really know if it works except under combat conditions and if it should fail, then it will be far too late to correct the mistake.

Scientists have said the effectiveness of Safeguard could be nullified by nuclear explosions causing a radar blackout and preventing missiles from leaving the ground. They would, therefore, be completely useless as defensive weapons. There are other sophisticated methods of changing the radar system, accomplishing the same effect. An enemy could overcome Safeguard simply by saturating the air with incoming attack missiles; or it could send over a fleet of missiles with dummy warheads on which our ABM's would be wasted, leaving the prime targets open for a followup attack.

When deployed, the Safeguard system will not protect people but military targets. Nor will it bring about any dra-

matic change in arms limitation talks. In fact, it could have the opposite effect and trigger an acceleration in the arms race.

This country's growing stockpile of offensive missiles is expected to number 24,000 in the 1970's. This in itself is a defensive weapon. What nation can expect to eliminate all our land and submarine-based missiles in a single first-strike effort? There would be more than enough of our missiles left after such an attack to retaliate with devastating results. Should a nation be foolish enough to take such a gamble? I fail to see how that nation will be deterred from its suicidal course simply because we have deployed the Safeguard system.

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, the mere fact that a nation attempts a first-strike attack is proof positive that Safeguard or any other defensive system would not work. The idea of such system, of course, is to be a deterrent against such strikes. If a foreign power did send in waves of missiles do you honestly believe we would launch only the ABM in defense and then sit back and wait to see how many of the enemy's missiles hit us and how much damage they cause? Nonsense. I expect we would send up our retaliatory missiles as soon as we were convinced a major attack had been launched against us. Then what would the ABM's be protecting? Empty silos.

Mr. Chairman, I urge adoption of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from South Carolina has expired. All time has expired.

The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON).

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, on that I demand tellers.

Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON and Mr. RIVERS.

The Committee divided, and the tellers reported that there were—ayes 105, noes 219.

So the amendment was rejected.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. PIKE

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. PIKE: On page 2, line 10, strike "\$3,591,500,000", and insert "\$2,568,200,000".

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, my staff yesterday, my own personal loyal staff, advised me that I have done a very bad thing—I had done something the President of the United States has asked us not to do—I raised my voice.

I apologize to the Members of this House and to the President of the United States, if I have raised it too loud. But I am going to try to make my amends now because what this amendment does is to take the authorization of money for naval ship construction back to what the President of the United States asked for.

We heard an awful lot in the last hour about how we have got to support the President of the United States. I heard yesterday the President of the United States supports this billion dollar add-on that the Armed Services Committee has put in this bill, which is \$960 million

more than the President asked for. It is \$1,024 million more than the Senate approved. So just as a round figure, let us talk about a \$1 billion add-on.

I find it hard to believe that the President who excoriated this Congress because we added a billion dollars for education is going to embrace this Congress if we add a billion dollars for naval warships. I find it very, very hard to believe.

My amendment, to be specific, gives to the Navy precisely what the President asked for minus three FDL ships plus one nuclear submarine. That is the action that the other body took. It is so close to the President's position that I am going to be interested in seeing how many are really going to support the President's position.

I simply want to start by saying that the chairman of the subcommittee that heard the testimony on the need for additional ships is one of the men who I really value most highly on the committee, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT).

When the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) says that something is so, you can hang your hat on it. By that I do not mean that I agree that the \$3½ billion which is in the bill would really come to \$3½ billion because we all know there is an escalation in all these costs and we all know there is an overrun on these costs. The head man himself is telling us precisely what the Navy said. I believe the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) and I believe the committee report when it says that the need or the reason for this billion dollar add-on is because our ships are old. Of course, that is absolutely right. Our ships are old. But there are an awful lot of things in this country that are old. We have some old schools in this country. We have some old hospitals in this country and we have some old highways in this country. We have air that smells old and water that is just as old. More importantly, we have people who are old and who are not being adequately taken care of. We have all kinds of people who are ill and who are not being adequately taken care of. We have people who are not being adequately fed. This is simply a question of national priorities. That is all it is. Are we going to turn our backs on the American people for the benefit of the U.S. Navy? Are we going to add on a billion dollars more than the President requested? I do not believe the President is nervous about this. If he really wanted this money, I suspect he would have had the Secretary of Defense come to the committee and ask for it.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, when we were talking yesterday about the bill in general, I mentioned the fact that this is a matter of conscience that we have before us now in this bill. The question is whether we will do what we should in our time for our country. That has been clearly testified to, and that is what this provision in the bill would do. It is true that it is just an authorization bill. Ultimately the appropriations procedure may cut it down considerably. That is always true.

But the testimony before our committee was clear. There was not any doubt about it at all. The facts were right on the line that our Navy is becoming very antique, that there are specific vessels of the Russians that can outrun our vessels vessel-for-vessel and can outshoot our vessels vessel-for-vessel, and are fitted with better weapons of war than ours. Our vessels are the counterparts of those vessels. They are side-by-side with those vessels.

Members will recall the Israel situation, although we, ourselves, were not involved in it. If we had been involved in it, we would have found our own war vessels would not have been able to measure up to those others. They would have been outrun by the counterparts of the Russians, and shooting could be outdone by the Russians. The measure of the weapons was greater with the Russians.

Mr. Chairman, that situation must be rectified. We cannot avoid the responsibility. It is our responsibility in the Armed Services Committee to bring this situation to the Committee of the Whole and show the situation as it actually is. We cannot get political about it. We must tell you what the need of our country is. Our country needs these vessels.

I hope that the provision to which the amendment is directed will be allowed to stand in the bill, because I think it is essential to tell the country what lies ahead of it—\$5 to \$10 billion of new military construction to put ourselves vis-a-vis on a par with the Russians. We must do that. If we do not do it in the next half decade or whole decade from now, this country will be in grave danger indeed.

I caution all Members to consider the amendment very carefully. It is an important amendment. It is true that the authorization may not be fully funded by the Appropriations Committee, but we ought to have the authorization. A full study has been made. Incidentally, as subcommittee chairman, I ask the question, Why have a subcommittee study for hour after hour, day after day, week after week, and take testimony after testimony in order to arrive at conclusions unless those conclusions are going to be looked at? Nobody made any attack on the actions of the committee. Everyone agreed that what was concluded by the subcommittee was so. Read what Jane's said yesterday about the American Navy. See what foreign people have said about the American Navy. Do not take my word if you do not want to. But why should a committee make an investigation and study of a matter such as this, coming back with the actual facts, and then find that others turn their backs on that study? That should not be the way to legislate. We should get the facts and live with the facts.

Not only the subcommittee but also the full committee and everyone present who commented on this matter found the facts to be true. Those facts show that America must, in this period of history, do something very dramatic with regard to its Navy. It must get these 30-year-old ships off the sea and get modern ships built and in their place, in the interest of preserving our national security and world peace in our time.

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. PIRNIE. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I take this moment to observe that the gentleman from Florida is the chairman of a very important committee that made a very intensive study. I have heard many times on this floor pleas for studies. Now that we have one, a very good one founded on fact, I think we would do well to heed this study very, very seriously. I trust that the authorization will be approved.

Mr. BENNETT. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment.

The U.S. Navy is in a serious situation primarily because of the age of its ships. According to the Bennett seapower report, our seapower has reached a state of block obsolescence with over 58 percent of our combatant ships being 20 years old or older. Since 1964, the Navy has had funded only three ships capable of living on a total environment; that is, capable of fighting air, surface, and subsurface opposition.

It is not a question of enlarging our present Navy, it is a question of maintaining an adequate Navy capable of defending the country should that occasion ever arise.

The experts have told us, in no uncertain terms, that our present Navy is in a deplorable and dangerous condition. They have literally begged the Congress to take immediate action. And now is our opportunity to fulfill this responsibility.

The naval shipbuilding part of the bill was based upon a Navy request. The Secretary of the Navy has called for a 10-year \$3.5 billion annual shipbuilding program. The Chief of Naval Operations has asked for a \$4 billion annual program for at least 5 years. Even with these programs, there will be a serious gap during the midseventies, because we have waited too long to get started.

The Navy has presented us with a package program giving careful, expert consideration as to the mix of the various type of vessels needed.

The nuclear attack carrier, CVAN-6A, is the second nuclear-powered attack carrier of the *Nimitz* class. This ship and a third planned in fiscal year 1971 will be procured on a multiyear contract from a single shipbuilder in order to acquire them at the least cost.

This ship is authorized in order to maintain our carrier force capability. She is scheduled to replace the *Bon Homme Richard* which will be 30 years old on her replacement date in 1974.

The third carrier, CVAN-70, is scheduled for delivery in 1976 replacing the *Oriskany* which at that time will be 30 years old.

Secretaries McNamara and Clifford previously approved the third carrier in the fiscal 1971 program. Secretary Laird has conferred to the chairman of the Senate and House Armed Services Committee that this carrier is still planned for 1971.

I understand the gentleman's amendment would delete the funds for the CVAN-69, the second of the nuclear carriers in this program. We have already spent \$132 million in leadtime items. Delay in completing the funding of this vessel will only increase its cost. But all this is academic because we have to have it now.

I think the words of Adm. H. G. Rickover, the father of the nuclear Navy, are pertinent at this point in our deliberation. He said:

What of those who advocate reduction in our military strength prove to be in error? What ultimate gain will there be if we have money but lose our freedom?

Is the decision to build or not build a weapon to be based on cost, or is it to be based on need. The cost of weapons is one of the sacrifices we must pay in order to remain free. I, too, wish the world were different and that it were not necessary to lose lives and expend irreplaceable natural resources for defense. But we must survive in the world as it is, not as we dream it should be.

Freedom comes at a price. If we fail to pay for adequate defense now, and our weakness invites attack, we will pay many times as much in dollars to wage war and infinitely more in young lives lost.

We cannot afford not to do what is necessary. I urge the defeat of this amendment.

Mr. BENNETT. I thank the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. EDMONDSON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I share the very high respect which the gentleman from New York has stated he holds for the gentleman from Florida. I hold it so strongly that I agree 100 percent with the gentleman from Florida that the amendment of the gentleman from New York should be defeated. The overwhelming arguments at this time for a stronger, modernized Navy are, in my opinion, greatly strengthened by the moves which we are making toward disengagement from some land-mass commitments. The U.S. Navy must be kept up to date as the world's strongest naval force. The Pike amendment must be rejected.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

Mr. Chairman, the amendment offered reduces the authorization in this bill for naval shipbuilding only from the \$3.5 billion figure which has come out of the Committee on Armed Services to a figure which approximates that requested by the administration of \$2.5 billion. The only difference between the Senate figure, which is contained in the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE), and the request of the administration is to add one nuclear attack submarine and to delete three fast-deployment logistic ships, which action was agreed to in our committee, and, as I recall, in the Senate bill as well.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to say I find the decision to speak out on this issue to be one of the most difficult deci-

sions I have made in the 9 years I have served in the House of Representatives. I have the greatest admiration and respect for the chairman of my committee and the ranking member and for the decision of the majority of members of the committee to the effect that we should recommend an additional billion dollars for shipbuilding beyond the administration's budget request. I dislike being in a different position from the chairman on this matter.

Another factor which makes my decision difficult is the fact that I have served through two wars in the U.S. Navy. I revere the Navy. I am proud of the fact that I have had service in it. I would not knowingly deny it anything it really needs that is also essential now to the security of the United States of America.

Moreover, I have served on the Seapower Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee for some time and I can appreciate the necessity for maintaining our ability as a country to insure the freedom of the seas, so that the raw materials from around the world which are necessary to our industrial complex can reach our shores and the finished materials from our factories can reach markets abroad.

I know also of the problems generated in our Navy by the aging and block obsolescence of our ships.

I think the Navy needs every ship which it has requested this year, and it ought to have every ship which it has requested. I know it could use the additional ships which my committee seeks to make available to the Navy through this inflated authorization, but I think those additional ships beyond the President's budget request run into another paramount need of the United States of America, and that is the need to control inflation in this country, inflation which is robbing our senior people of their purchasing power, inflation which has been one of the causes of the cost overruns which have been plaguing the military and which threaten to run the cost of ships, planes, missiles, tanks, and aircraft out of sight in the stratosphere.

I think we need to get inflation under control. I believe the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Navy have recognized this and it has been a major factor in the size of the budget request which they have made this year.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STAFFORD. I yield to my chairman, the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, is the gentleman from Vermont aware that these additions are precisely what the Secretary of the Navy requested of the Department of Defense as a minimum need to begin an orderly 5-year replacement program for the obsolete ships and for the obsolescence of our Navy? Is the gentleman aware of this?

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I am aware that the Navy and the other departments of the armed services would all like much more than the final submission made for them contained. I understand that the Navy could use these other ships.

Mr. RIVERS. Is the gentleman aware

that the Chief of Naval Operations said he needed these? These are his figures, not those of the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that.

Mr. RIVERS. Is the gentleman also aware the President of the United States agreed he would accept this as a need?

Mr. STAFFORD. I think anybody would agree that the additional ships are needed, but I say, Mr. Chairman, that when we have inflation under better control than we do today, and we may be able to accomplish that by next fiscal year, then and not now would be the time to give the additional ships authorization to the Navy. I say this year let us give the Navy what the President has requested for it in the official budget submission. Let us give the Navy this full request and nothing more.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, yesterday there was some comment both on the floor and off the floor about the result in the Massachusetts runoff election to fill the seat of our late beloved colleague, Bill Bates of Massachusetts. The young man who was elected the day before yesterday will probably be here to take his seat in a short time, but I am sure even when he arrives it will be a long time before any of us will forget Bill Bates. Many of us journeyed to Salem to attend his funeral, and we paid an unusual tribute to him here on this floor. His voice is one we miss today in this Chamber as we debate this bill under probably more opposition than we have had certainly in the 11 years I have had the privilege of serving in this body.

In all those 11 years there was one thing Bill Bates said and one thing he fought for and one thing he tried hard to get, and that was the end of the block obsolescence of the U.S. Navy. Bill Bates was a sailor. He knew the condition of the Navy and he knew we cannot continue year after year, year after year, to sail the same ships without having them wear out. So Bill Bates year after year stood up here and said, "I think we ought to have a program to lick this block obsolescence."

And year after year that program somehow got eroded away. In spite of what the gentleman from Massachusetts did and in spite of what the gentleman from South Carolina has done in fighting for new nuclear frigates, and ships of that kind, as we on our committee have usually found, somehow they always got chopped out.

The obsolescence crisis we face today is a much greater crisis than we faced 11 years ago when I first came to this body and when the gentleman from Massachusetts, Bill Bates, was first speaking out on that subject.

The gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) referred a moment ago to a story that appeared yesterday in the Washington Post, for those who were lucky enough to get a copy. It came from Jane's Fighting Ships. This is not the committee speaking. This is not the Member from New York speaking. This is Jane's:

The Soviet Union soon will have one of the most sophisticated and largest navies in

the world. but the United States Navy faces a crisis, the editor of Jane's Fighting Ships said today in a foreword to the 72d edition.

The Russians are using their fleet to fill the naval void left in the Atlantic, the Northwest Pacific and Indian Oceans which was left as Britain withdraws her decreasing forces to the home islands and the Mediterranean, Raymond Blackman said.

"The U.S. Navy still has not overcome its block obsolescence problem mentioned in these pages six years ago."

This is the reason for this add-on. It is to provide the ships that we need. Jane's recognizes the problem, and have, as they say, for more than 6 years.

Finally, the chairman of our committee took the bull by the horns and put in this year's bill a total program to provide the ships we need if we are ever going to stay up with this competition.

Where are the Russians today? What are they doing? Look at their submarine forces. The Soviet submarine forces today are 375 to our 146. When it comes to nuclear submarines, they have 65 to our 79, but 41 of those 79 are Polaris submarines, so they cannot fight other submarines.

The Soviets are building today at a rate of eight submarines a month, and they have the capacity to go up to 20. This is a frightening picture, and no one has expressed it more clearly than Admiral Rickover.

Take a look at the letter from Admiral Rickover, which the gentleman from South Carolina put into the Record the day before yesterday.

The Soviet Navy has undergone a continuing modernization program including the building of missile-armed cruisers and destroyers, helicopter carriers and several new classes of nuclear and conventional submarines. As a result, their Navy has become a fleet capable of sustained open ocean operations. For the first time in her history, the Soviet Union is using a deployed naval force in support of foreign policy in areas not contiguous to its borders.

They are not backing down; they are pushing out hard and pushing out fast, and we need to recognize that blunt fact if we are to protect the future security and survival of our country.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON).

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate my friend from Texas yielding to me, because I think that the remainder of these words by Admiral Rickover are very important in connection with this amendment, and certainly, in my judgment, it is a very dangerous amendment.

Their force in the Mediterranean includes warships armed with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, amphibious ships with naval infantry embarked, as well as attack and missile submarines.

All you have to do is look at the papers. The Soviet Navy has already cruised in the Gulf of Mexico. They have more ships in the Mediterranean today than we do in our 6th Fleet. As our Committee on National Defense posture brought out a year ago, under the very able leadership of our former colleague from Virginia, Mr. Hardy, there are very serious problems of neglect and obsolescence

in ships of the 6th Fleet right on the edge of the Soviet empire. This bill is designed to correct that situation, and this amendment is dangerous because it will kill this effort. Not only will it knock out those new ships that we need but it will also knock out the third nuclear aircraft carrier of the *Nimitz* class which we have scheduled, the CVAN 70. That is just what you are doing if you vote for this amendment. You are voting to keep our Navy, as it says on page 10 of our committee report, saddled with 58 percent of its ships over 20 years of age, while the Soviets have 58 percent of their ships under 10 years of age.

Mr. Chairman, I remember the strong words of Franklin D. Roosevelt which he sent to Winston Churchill in those days when England was fighting with her back against the wall. We should remember those words in connection with this amendment when the question is whether we are going to keep the U.S. Navy supreme. Roosevelt sent to Churchill those famous lines from Longfellow:

Sail on, oh Ship of State,
Sail on, oh Union strong and great.
Humanity, with all her fears,
And all her hopes of future years,
Is hanging breathless on thy fate.

The free world today is literally hanging breathless on the future of a strong and modern American Navy, and you are going to gut that great Navy if you adopt this amendment.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to describe to the House exactly what this amendment does. We have been given the impression that if this authorization does not go through as it appears in the bill, we are going to be in danger of survival, but the fact here is that this cut does not affect the full funding of an aircraft carrier this year. It does not affect the funding of three nuclear attack submarines, and it does not affect the construction of the nuclear-powered frigates which have already been approved. The only warship construction affected is the DD963, and there the only effect is to cut the number being authorized this year from eight to five, which is the number requested by the DOD. In all of the material that has come before the House today we have relied on the DOD to give us their expertise and to make a determination as to which services should receive the priorities. All of a sudden we find that advice is not sound. There is a certain inconsistency in what has taken place.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me for a question?

Mr. NEDZI. Briefly.

Mr. FINDLEY. The administration made very plain its opposition to the ABM amendment which was just rejected. Has there been any indication whatever that the administration is opposed to the amendment now under consideration? I have heard of none, and I wonder if the gentleman has.

Mr. NEDZI. I have to be candid with the gentleman and say that I am not aware of any, and I think the reason is quite obvious.

If the money is appropriated, it does not have to be spent.

We went through a similar exercise on the B-70 a few years ago.

The point is that before the House approves such an open-ended authorization and hands a blank check to the Department of Defense and to the Department of the Navy, it seems to me that we should have some extensive hearings on this. In fact, the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense should come in and, in effect, say that the money cannot be better spent some place else.

What the Department has requested is a \$2.5 billion shipbuilding program. So it is not as if you are not going to modernize the Navy at all. There are substantial funds in the bill for that purpose. The point is that here is a gratuitous \$1 billion added on which primarily affects support vessels.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NEDZI. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. WHALEN. Would the gentleman agree that if the administration, indeed, approved of this \$90 million ship procurement add-on, there is a vehicle by which this can communicate that to us, namely, an authorization request?

Mr. NEDZI. Well, I know that my lines are open but perhaps they choose not to use them.

Mr. WHALEN. The point I am making is simply this: Did the administration request these funds in its budget submitted to the Congress by Secretary of Defense Laird?

Mr. NEDZI. Absolutely not.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, is not this the normal vehicle through which this is accomplished?

Mr. NEDZI. It certainly is. I would say to the gentleman that the committee has under consideration at the present time the difference between a \$2½ and \$3½ billion program. It is not as if you are wiping out everything the Navy asked for by supporting the amendment. You are supporting what the Department of Defense asked for and in so doing what is in the best interest of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to revert—as the fundamental matter we are dealing with today—to the questions which the distinguished chairman of the committee put to our colleague, the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD), a few moments ago, when he asked him whether he was aware that it was the Secretary of the Navy who requested the additional billion dollars for fleet modernization.

Mr. Chairman, we face two challenges: No. 1, the capability of the administration, of the executive branch of the Government to sift and evaluate and judge requests of the military, as between the competing requests of the various serv-

ices, and as against the competing demands of our domestic economy, with its enormous unmet needs, its deteriorating public services, its polluted air and waters.

Second, the capability and the willingness of this Congress to support or not to support the administration by exercise of its own independent judgment, rather than continuing to acquiesce supinely to the requests of each military service and continue to give them, to all intents and purposes, carte blanche authority over military budgets.

In 1968, approximately a year and a half ago, our administration came to the basic conclusion that unlimited military expenditures—unlimited application of military force alone—as applied to Vietnam—could not prevail, that we had to work to achieve a nonmilitary solution to that war. That decision involved a gradual—hopefully not too gradual—deescalation of military expenditures. I sense that the present administration is pursuing that goal in order to fulfill the hopes and dreams of 200 million Americans.

Mr. Chairman, in a recent Gallup poll 52 percent of the American people thought we ought to limit military expenditures. We have heard complaint after complaint that this Congress has been frozen out of the basic decision-making process with reference to the warmaking power, that we have abdicated our constitutional function.

Mr. Chairman, here is a perfectly clear case where the Congress should make its own independent judgment as to the balance of expenditures between the services, and the proper balance between expenditures for our total military capability and the needs of our domestic economy.

In this case we are supporting an administration that apparently judges that we do not need this extra \$1 billion which the committee supports, a 40-percent increase in a budget item for this particular authorization.

It is high time that the Congress supported not only the capability of the executive department to make decisions independent of the military, but also, our own integrity as a Congress in making decisions that are going to affect the form and substance and quality of the life in America for decades to come.

This is one case in which we ought to support the administration and the President in the evaluation and the judgment that they have made. This is a \$1 billion item, a 40-percent increase in requested administration budget. We ought to support our President, and our own independent judgment by acceding to the President's judgment and the determination of the Senate on this point.

Mr. Chairman, in March 1968, the historic reversal of our Vietnam policy took place amidst pleas for change from both within and without the executive branch of Government. When experienced, perceptive advisers like McGeorge Bundy and Dean Acheson saw the folly of that policy, the voters had expressed their own dissatisfaction with the Johnson policy at the polls. As of today the public has already spoken on the

military budget. Just as in 1968, the representatives of the public interest must pay attention to the calls of the populace. We must seize this opportunity. We must stop this escalation of the military budget. We must restore the budget to the Senate's moderate requests. We must regain the faith and the support of a majority of our own people.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, we are working here—and apparently we are going to continue working with all of these amendments—until very late this afternoon, and I was a little amazed when I took this off the ticker, in view of the fact that the President has been talking about the Congress not doing much.

This is the President's schedule for today:

At 9 o'clock he met with a group of at least six Republican Senators. That would be a rigorous thing, I am sure.

At 12:15 he had a meeting with Harold Lee, an old friend who owns the Mandarin Hotel in Hong Kong.

At 12:30 he met with Aubrey M. Meyers, of Pomona, Calif., a classmate at Whittier High School.

At 5:30 he departs for the weekend in Florida with Mrs. Nixon and the White House staff members.

Now, in view of the House working late tonight, I think at the end of our deliberations we ought to pass a resolution and ask the President of the United States to slow down. No man can stand a pace like this very long.

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would like to point out many of the problems of the shipbuilding yards, as a result of an arbitrary decision handed down by the Secretary of the Navy a short time ago in canceling out the General Dynamics' Fore River Shipyard at Quincy, Mass. from further consideration of the DD-963 class destroyer, package contract.

Under a concept the Navy Department established a few years ago, a shipyard winning design competition would be awarded total construction contract. The plan offered the opportunity to shipyards to apply mass production, from start to finish, development techniques to major shipbuilding projects. The winner would receive whopping contracts assuring the yard a steady workload and multimillion dollar volume of business. The Navy would benefit by having the opportunity of gaining the best design from the competitors, and from the economics of applying mass production techniques to a large number of vessels. It would allow for modernization of the shipyard, and a total package procurement system promised a number of identical class ships at a lower unit cost, thereby making maximum use of taxpayers' dollars.

I endorse and support this concept, if it is to be carried out, however, when the Navy announced its arbitrary decision, canceling the General Dynamics' Fore River Shipyard from further consideration, I immediately tried to make several inquiries to the Secretary of the

Navy and the Naval Ship Systems Command. I ran into a blank wall of silence. No one in authority seemed able to give any clear cut explanation why the Fore River Shipyard was excluded from further consideration.

The Secretary of the Navy failed to answer for several weeks and then his response was vague and failed to give answers as to cost and other factors important to this over-\$1-billion program.

I sought out those in the Navy Department in charge of selection of design and, of course, I am not at liberty to disclose my sources of information. I was reliably informed that the designs submitted by General Dynamics' Fore River Shipyard were considered to be superior than those submitted by the other two yards by those making the appraisal.

Of course, none of us want to up the cost to the taxpayer, but the information I have indicates that the Navy has no intention of carrying out a package deal to one shipyard. Litton, it is reported, will be awarded a full package contract, but will then fragment by subletting part of the destroyer contract to Bath Iron Works, thereby taking care of the States represented by the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the ranking minority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Both appear to be not unhappy at the elimination of the Fore River Shipyard from further consideration.

There is talk around Capitol Hill that Massachusetts will be punished for those who have attacked the military complex, and some have pointed out that the Senator from Maine cast the deciding vote in the Senate in favor of the ABM.

I am a realist, and when the Navy Department fails to come up with the proper answers, I step forward and start questioning their actions. I feel that the Secretary of the Navy has failed to answer why General Dynamics' Fore River Shipyard was eliminated for further consideration of the gigantic program.

As a Congressman from the district where Fore River Shipyard is located, I would be remiss in my duties to my district, and indeed the Nation at large, if I kept silent in this matter.

If the Navy is abandoning its original concept, I can see no alternative but to support the procurement bill providing that these contracts be constructed in the facilities of at least three different shipyards, or else, the yard that is being awarded the contract should be compelled to adhere to the original concept set up by the Navy Department in streamlining its yard, in improving its production methods, and in cutting down unit cost in each ship to be built. It does not appear at this time that the Navy will insist on naval yards completing one contract, so the original concept would be nullified.

I cannot change my decision until the Navy Department comes forward with information on cost and design that can justify the unusual hasty decision a few weeks ago.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto close in 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I think, in view of the number of people who still want to be heard on this amendment, that 10 minutes is simply not adequate to do it in. We are talking about a \$1 billion add-on; a \$1 billion amendment. I would have to object to the request.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. RIVERS

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto close in 15 minutes.

The motion was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The Members who were on their feet will be recognized for 1¼ minute.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. RIEGLE).

Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE) to cut approximately \$1 billion from the Navy procurement section of this bill.

Of the allocable and controllable portions of the Federal budget, approximately 80 percent is for the defense budget, and that is an enormous portion. Of the total \$193 billion Federal budget, only \$1 in \$10 is spent on nonmilitary controllable items. That is about as small as we dare let that fraction be.

Today we have one of the best minds who ever came out of this Congress serving as Secretary of Defense. Probably no man here is better qualified to serve in that position than Mel Laird, and I do not believe he would submit a defense budget to the Congress that would compromise our defense posture, and that would be insufficient to our needs. There might be times when he would ask for too much, but I cannot believe of there ever being a time when he would ask for too little, nor do I think the President would okay a budget that asked for too little. If these extra naval funds were strategically important, I am sure they would have been included in the budget.

Further, we are strapped for funds. This billion dollars is critically needed for urgent human needs here at home.

These funds could: First, provide 30,000 additional hospital beds; second, construct and equip 20,000 schoolrooms; third, increase by five times our national expenditures on cancer and heart disease research; and fourth, increase by 15 times our national anti-air-pollution efforts.

Let us put these dollars where they will really help America—not in additional materials of war that exceed the requests of the Defense Department.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MOORHEAD).

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment to strike the unrequested \$1 billion add-on to the shipbuilding program.

In this connection, I would like to associate myself with the remarks made by the distinguished gentleman from Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD) because today the nation is facing almost unprecedented inflation which is steadily robbing

not only our taxpayers on fixed income and retirement income, but also those in the prime of their earning life.

The plea to engage in defense spending adds nothing to consumer goods and services, and does add to inflation.

The American people recognize this and they expect us in the Congress to do our duty and cut rather than add to the Pentagon request.

The President also recognizes the urgency of controlling it. He has deferred federal construction. He has criticized this House for our action on education. He is now beginning to indicate that he may veto this tax reform bill out of fear for its inflationary impact. Yesterday, in this period of urban crisis the administration cut the model cities program by \$215 million.

Surely at this time we should support an amendment which would delete a budget busting unrequested \$1 billion add-on.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN).

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

In so doing I would like to make three observations.

First, reference was made earlier to the recent Janes report on naval vessels and naval construction.

I think it is significant that the conclusion of this report was not read to the committee this afternoon. The conclusion of that report states that the United States today is by far the leading seapower of the world and will continue to remain so for many years to come.

Second, it has been inferred that the President supports the \$960 million ship procurement add-on.

I suggest that if the President favored this add-on he would have indicated his support by inserting a request for an additional \$960 million in his military authorization request.

Third, it has been suggested that the Navy needs additional vessels. We certainly do not quarrel with this. We do not quarrel with the fact that the Air Force needs additional planes.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. RAILSBACK).

Mr. RAILSBACK. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the time allotted to me may be granted to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN).

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

Mr. WHALEN. I thank my colleague. As I was saying, Mr. Chairman, we recognize that the Air Force needs additional aircraft. These additional funds have not been provided.

We recognize that additional funds are needed for education. Those additional funds have not been provided.

We recognize that additional funds are needed for welfare programs. These additional funds have not been provided.

So, Mr. Chairman, I am simply stating that if we add up all the needs expressed by the various departments and bureaus,

the budget would be astronomical. We have to establish some kind of priority and in the case of defense spending, the President has done this. I urge, therefore, that the House go along with the budget submitted by Secretary Laird by supporting the Pike amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER).

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I can hardly hold back my disappointment that the chairman of the committee saw fit to cut off debate so peremptorily on an amendment of this size. I know that this is a matter that is dear to his heart. I am sure he thinks he is doing the right thing in adding another \$1 billion to the \$2½ billion that the administration asked for. He wants to have a 5-year replacement program instead of the scheduled 10-year replacement program.

The truth of the matter is that in a confrontation with the Soviet Union, we would not be engaged in a naval battle. We are not going to keep a naval fleet out of the Gulf of Mexico by buying some support ships.

Mr. Chairman, the kind of argument that we have heard here is fallacious. Of course, we need a navy. I have very strong respect for its role in maintaining the U.S. presence around the world. But this kind of addition of \$1 billion above the amount asked for by President Nixon in a time of severe inflation is sheer folly.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM).

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, this morning the chairman of the committee spoke of the principle of civilian supremacy in our Government and of its importance. But here is a case where the reverse principle is being applied. The civilian chief of the Defense Department submitted to the Congress a proposal for naval shipbuilding. Instead of going along with that proposal, the committee now asks us to reverse the Secretary's decision and accept the amount requested by the admirals.

My good friend from New York, Mr. STRATTON, referred to this as a very dangerous amendment. I hardly think our former colleague, Secretary Laird, would come in here with a very dangerous recommendation. But then, as is so often the case, my good friend from New York also represents the point of view of the Navy. Perhaps from the point of view strictly of the Navy, bearing in mind how important service priorities may be, this could be a "very dangerous amendment," but it is not dangerous for the people of this country.

We may need new ships to replace old ones. But I say we need new hospitals, new schools, new subway cars, new houses, more, much more. We also must give greater priority to the needs of our older citizens.

It seems to me incredible that this House should even consider adding \$1 billion to the DOD's request to the Congress, when we are constantly told we must cut back on our homefront needs.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. RYAN).

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, the amendment before us offers us an opportunity to reduce this massive \$21.3 billion military spending bill by \$1.023 billion.

The Department of Defense originally asked for \$2.631 billion for ship construction in its revised budget. The Senate Armed Services Committee cut this figure by \$63.2 million, which was approved by the Senate. The new figure, \$2.568 billion, was also approved by the Department of Defense following Senate action.

The House Armed Services Committee, however, on the grounds that our Navy is in "deplorable and dangerous condition" not only restored the funds cut by the Senate, but also added \$960.1 million, making a total of \$1.023 billion.

I certainly believe that our Navy must be modernized to meet the demands that face it in the nuclear age. However, I do not feel that the House should substitute its judgment for that of the Department of Defense which has the concurrence of the Senate.

The Department of Defense has set up a modernization program keeping in mind that the resources of this Nation are not unlimited.

This amendment to reduce procurement funds to the level of support asked by the Defense Department will not cut back on our warship building program.

Funds would still be available for the CVAN-69, construction of a nuclear-powered frigate, three nuclear attack submarines, and the two LHA's which were approved previously. Only one warship would be affected. The number of DD-963's would be five, the original number requested by the Department of Defense, instead of eight.

This amendment would eliminate funds, however, for those ships added by the House committee—support vessels not requested by the Department of Defense. These are not first-line ships. If the building of these ships were a matter of national security, I am sure that the Defense Department would have included them.

This amendment will cut back on the building of two nuclear ships: a carrier, costing \$100 million and a cruiser, costing \$32.1 million. It will cut back on support construction funds for five research ships, five ocean minesweepers, four salvage tugs, three fleet supply ships, and a floating drydock. The cost: \$662 million.

It will cut back funds for three additional DD-963-class destroyers. The cost: \$157.3 million. It will cut back funds for three additional LHA assault ships, costing \$112.3 million. And it will cut back \$154.4 million for general ship construction and conversion.

None of these items were requested by the Defense Department.

Throughout this debate I have talked about national priorities. This is a blatant example of our distorted sense of priorities, a willingness to expend huge sums, \$1.023 billion to be exact, on unnecessary military items. Yet, when the House recognized the importance of education and adopted the Joelson amendment increasing appropriations for education by some \$900 million, the President, and those in the House who are the foremost advocates of this \$1 billion

add-on, deplored the actions of the House.

Where the Defense Department has not even asked for this additional \$1 billion, how can it be justified? How can it be argued that the national defense will be in danger if this amendment is adopted?

There is danger closer to us than on the high seas. We have a dangerous domestic crisis facing us daily. It is time to face that crisis and allocate our resources toward its solution.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, because of the lack of time we have to consider this, some of the Members may be in doubt as to what the effect of the amendment is.

I ask you to look at page 57 of the report. It will show that the President's submission was \$2.631 billion. It will show the Senate bill and the ships involved therein, which are \$2.568 billion. And it shows what we have done in the House, which is to add \$1 billion and make it \$3.591 billion.

My amendment simply takes it back to the Senate bill, which is essentially what the President asked for. I simply do not think that this is any time in our national history to be adding 40 percent to the amount the President requested for naval ship construction.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON).

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, reference was made a moment ago, I believe, by the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER), that what we are voting for here are just support ships. Make no mistake about that. This bill does not call here for support ships. Admiral Rickover's letter gives the clear details of this add-on. He lists what it involves: three high-speed nuclear submarines this year, with long lead-time items for five more; completion of funding for the next nuclear carrier, CVA-69, and long lead-time items for the next one, CVAN-70; and completion of one nuclear-powered guided-missile frigate this year, with long lead-time items for three more.

It may well be that the American Navy is stronger today than the Soviet Navy, but the important thing is that we are going down while they are going up, and very rapidly so. Unless we are going to get a long-range shipbuilding program going, we can never lick the problem of obsolescence. That was the lesson of Mr. BENNETT's subcommittee on the status of seapower in America. It is also the lesson Mr. Bates never fully succeeded in getting over to this House or to the executive branch. This is the job we must do, to build for the future, not just for 1 year ahead, but for the long-range future, for our Navy, yes, but even more for our country.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. DOWNING).

Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Chairman, for the life of me I cannot understand the thinking of some of my dear friends who are

proposing this amendment. What other warning signals do we have to have? The experts have told us that our fleet is in a "dangerous and deplorable" condition. Our able colleague, CHARLES BENNETT from Florida, and his subcommittee went into this and they said, "We are subject to block obsolescence." With 58 percent of our present combatant ships being 20 years old or older.

We are not enlarging the Navy with this bill. We are just trying to maintain an adequate Navy. But no words of mine can excel those of Admiral Rickover who said:

What if those who advocate reduction in our military strength prove to be in error? What ultimate gain will it be if we have money but lose our freedom? Is a decision to build or not build a weapon to be based on cost or is it to be based on need? Freedom comes at a price. If we fail to pay for adequate defense now and our weakness invites attack, we will pay many times as much in dollars to wage war and infinitely more in young lives lost.

We must defeat this amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ARENDS).

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I strongly oppose the adoption of this amendment, and I adhere to the report of the subcommittee chaired by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT).

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER), who was a member of that subcommittee.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I was privileged to serve on the subcommittee chaired by the gentleman from Florida. I believe we have compiled a report which should be a bible so far as future needs of the U.S. Navy are concerned. It is known as a best seller across the world, because it clearly shows we are lagging behind.

The gentleman from New York referred to page 57 of the report. I invite him to look at the opposite page, at page 56, where it is clearly shown that it will take us until the year 1983 to build ourselves back to parity with ships that are less than 20 years of age.

I remind the House this is not an executive dictatorship. This is a republic. We have a responsibility in this House to formulate policy. We believe this is what the U.S. Navy needs, and we should vote for it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS) to close the debate on this amendment.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, these are not the chairman's figures. They came from the Navy, and the President of the United States has accepted the figures in his conversation with me. It is known to everyone on this committee. In the committee there was a vote of 35 to 4, and even the gentleman from California, (Mr. LEGGETT) did not follow the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE) on this one.

If there is anything wrong with the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations could not have come in and testified as he did. Who knows better than he?

The gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE) knows this is for our Navy. We

need at least \$4 billion a year if we are going to have a modern Navy by 1990. How much time do we need?

What else do we need to convince us? This is our Navy. If the Members want to sink it, that is their right. But the President is for this. The Secretary of Defense is for this. The Armed Services Committee by a rollcall vote has approved it by 35 to 4. It has been debated, Members can bet their bottom dollar on this, and we have reams of testimony attesting to this fact of life.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. It seems to me that "modernity" is the main thrust of the subject here. It is not modernization or modernizing, for those terms imply an updating or refurbishment. As I see it, we are mainly concerned here with one day having on hand new ships—a significant number of new ships—and not ships that essentially are new weapons systems mounted aboard old hull or ships that are driven across the waves by powerplants built a quarter of a century ago.

It is true that within this section of the bill there are provisions for some conversions and updating. But for the greater part the subject is modernity: ships that are new from the keel to the topmost antenna.

Somewhere behind the thought of these proposed ships lies the idea of the Russian threat at sea. I need not dwell on this, except to say it is major—it does not abate—and it is taking some forms that should give us all concern. As a recent example, there was the deployment in July of a Red navy squadron that proceeded to Cuba and the Gulf of Mexico by way of the waters off our own east coast. Whoever it was that laid out the course of that seven-ship group saw fit to have them steam a few score miles off U.S. shores.

In viewing the Soviet maritime threat we see some certainties and some uncertainties. Russian warships have not been tested in fleet actions since the early days of this century, and thus we do not really know how they would stand up in battle. From appearances the technology of their fleet units would seem first rate. But here, again, we do not know how they would hold up under conditions of prolonged and arduous service. These, I submit, are uncertainties. We know the capabilities of our own fleet units in these respects, but do not—to any degree of certainty—know those of the Soviet Navy.

As it pertains to modernity, however, we are on much firmer ground. We are now dealing with figures and can thus talk with a measure of mathematical precision. The facts are on hand, and I should like to present them later.

I do not hold myself forth as an expert in naval tactics. It would seem, though, in a contest between a group of new ships and a group of old ships a pronounced advantage would lie with the former. It would also seem that in a noncombat situation newer ships make a better impression than old ships. Concepts of that nature are, perhaps, what lie at the base of my concern with modernity.

As an example of impressions in a noncombat situation, I present a scene

that often takes place in ports at many locations throughout the world: the Mediterranean, Latin America, Africa, and so on. Some of our Navy's ships are in port and are open to general visiting. Groups of college students come aboard and tour the ships. However favorable the initial impressions of these young people, they are diluted somewhat when they realize that the hull, the engineering plant, the living spaces, and the very decks they're walking on were built even before they were born.

There is also the difference between the product that is of a whole in its time frame as contrasted to that which represents varying inputs over the decades. Creative and energetic young Americans can take the body of a Model-A Ford, add to it an engine and accessories of more recent make, and come forth with a product that is the curiosity and pride of the neighborhood. But no manufacturer of automobiles could stay solvent producing such a machine. Their successful products are one in technology, in form, and in structure—all brought together in a specific time frame. Something of this, too, should pertain in the building of a nation's ships of war.

I am well aware of the fact that the Navy must, for certain reasons, resort to major alterations and conversions in its efforts to keep the fleet up to a desired standard. But that practice is not the Navy's ideal choice—even though it is the course often chosen. This is not to degrade conversions and alterations. They do serve a purpose; and I believe those listed for the 1970 program are valid. Nonetheless, the end result is modernizing—and that's not quite the same as modernity, as I have attempted to show.

Referring to my earlier statement about modernity figures for the U.S. Navy and the Russian Navy. The certainty here is that ours is the older Navy. Perhaps the most meaningful set of figures is 58 and 99. The former figure—58—refers to the percentage of our total combatant tonnage that is of World War II basic design. In contrast, 99 percent of Russia's combatant tonnage was placed in commission within the past 20—not 25 but 20—years.

When we go into ship types, we find that none of their approximately 375 submarines was built before 1948.

Among destroyers, 90 percent of our conventional types were built before 1948. However, all equivalent Russian types were built since that year.

The pattern is all too clear.

But there is more to this matter than a Navy-by-Navy rundown of ships' ages. Things grow old merely through the passage of time. Consider the year 1949—20 years ago. Nine out of 10 of our present auxiliary ships were sailing the seas even then. As were 65 percent of our present amphibious warfare ships.

The rigors of continuous service have been just as strenuous on these work-horse types as they have been on our destroyers, submarines, and aircraft carriers. It is odd when you think of it—our career Navy men can retire from active duty after 20 years' service, but the ships they man seem destined to sail on and on.

Our aircraft carriers have been the subject of increased discussion in recent months. Age patterns among this type are somewhat different from the norm. While all of our ASW support aircraft carriers were built 20 or more years ago, we do have a fairly even spread among our 15 attack carriers.

Five are less than 10 years old. Four are in or approaching their mid-teens. The others, however, are nearing or already past the 20-year marker. Old age is truly at hand for these veterans of wartime and immediate postwar building efforts. They are beyond modernizing.

Mr. Chairman, I realize that while speaking in support of the section on shipbuilding, I have dwelt at some length upon modernity—a factor that is often overlooked. And yet, when you build something—ships or whatever—you necessarily build something new. Modernity and the benefits it brings must thus be considered as one with the building of a ship.

I strongly urge that the amendment be defeated.

Mr. KYROS. Mr. Chairman, I have long admired the outstanding and effective support which the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina, has given to our programs of national defense. Our Nation can be particularly grateful for the dedication which this committee has shown in its efforts to provide our fighting men at sea with the equipment necessary for maintaining not only our own defense but that of the free world. I have always given my full support to the gentleman from South Carolina and to his committee in these efforts, and I was particularly impressed by the committee's study of the status of U.S. Navy ships released earlier this year.

As a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, a former naval officer with 10 years of active duty, and a person with great pride in my own State's seafaring traditions, I have done everything possible to assist our Government in meeting the continuing demands placed upon our naval fleet and its men. I have, while in the Congress, sailed aboard our fleet in many parts of the world and recently visited aboard the *John F. Kennedy*, with the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. While I have welcomed every opportunity to remain in constant contact with the U.S. Navy, I have also been profoundly disturbed by the deteriorating condition of many of our vessels. Our destroyer fleet, in large part consisting of World War II vintage vessels, is in particularly bad shape. I would like, therefore, to commend the distinguished gentlemen from South Carolina and the members of his committee for the dedication which they have shown in providing for a renewed and modern destroyer fleet, which I believe to be a most essential ingredient of our Navy's defense and peacekeeping capabilities.

The committee has wisely allocated a considerable amount of funds for this purpose and provided for the necessary level of commitment in constructing new, multipurpose destroyers, now designated to be the DD963 class.

I am seriously disturbed, however, by

one aspect of the military authorization and procurement bill now before this body. The bill states that no funds shall be allocated for the construction of these vessels unless such plans call for construction at the facilities of at least three different U.S. shipbuilders.

From the outset of the DD963 program the Navy premised its plan on the fact that very real benefits accrue to the Nation and the Navy by awarding a large number of ships to a single prime contractor. It is my opinion that the above provision in H.R. 14000 represents a significant change in the procurement concept which may reduce the benefits.

I am concerned that the special provisions of the bill calling for a three-way division of the contract could have consequences which are far-reaching and extremely costly. It is my understanding that such a division of the contract would substantially increase costs of the program, possibly in the magnitude of \$200 million. Moreover, this act could conceivably delay the construction of badly needed replacements for our huge destroyer fleet by months or years and this, I believe, cannot be tolerated.

Of equal significance, the special provision relating to the DD963 program could reduce to a minimum the advantages gained by a single design and production plan for all the ships in the program. If this were to be the case, the desired standardization within the fleet could not be achieved and problems which have historically hampered our fleets relating to maintenance, repair and overhauling would continue.

Procurement of large numbers of ships from a single contractor was a vehicle devised, among other features, to assure a continuity of work for a single shipbuilder. This concept was implemented to correct a flaw in previous ship procurements which spread the work within a single program to a number of contractors covering wide geographical areas. While the former approach appeared to protect a vital national resource, our shipbuilding industry, it in fact spread the work to such an extent that individual shipbuilding companies rarely had sufficient backlogs to justify the capital expenditures required to modernize the industry or maintain a competitive posture on a world-wide basis.

The DD963 contract as originally conceived made it possible for the contractor receiving the award to justify the cost associated with construction of a completely new facility, a facility which when completed would become a vital national asset. A three-way division of the contract will seriously impair this opportunity to improve our Nation's shipbuilding abilities.

In my opinion neither the Congress nor the Navy will benefit if the contract is divided as proposed in H.R. 14000. In any event at least 60 or 65 percent of the work would be subcontracted out by any prime contractor involving over 30 States.

The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers.

Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. PIKE and Mr. BENNETT.

The Committee divided, and the tellers reported that there were—ayes 92, noes 131.

So the amendment was rejected.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. NEDZI

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. NEDZI: On page 2, line 2, after the word "Army" strike out "\$570,400,000" and insert "\$484,400,000" and add the following language: "Provided, that none of the funds herein authorized shall be used for the procurement of Cobra helicopters."

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that it is getting late in the afternoon and we started early this morning. I will try not to take the full 5 minutes. But the amendment I have presented to the Committee at this time is one of those that the bipartisan minority has worked on. It deals with helicopters. I suppose most of you realize at the present time there is unanimity that the Cheyenne helicopter program, in the words of the committee report, "has been a costly experiment." I might remind the Committee that this now abandoned program is the same one that our colleague from New York (Mr. PIKE) expressed so much concern about many months ago. Had his concerns then been heeded, many thousands and perhaps millions of dollars could have been saved. Though the program is now abandoned, the tendency to hang on to at least some of these funds persists. We are asked in the bill to authorize the purchase of 170 of these gun ships for \$86 million. This gun ship obviously is an interim one. It is not due for delivery until 1971 or 1972. The missile which is to be used on this helicopter has been canceled. A decision as to whether to use a 20 or 30 millimeter gun has not been made. In addition to these shortcomings, the final determination as to whether a twin-engine helicopter is preferable still remains to be made. As a matter of fact, the Marine Corps is presently testing for the purpose of determining whether a twin-engine helicopter is preferable or not.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think that there is any question we are endeavoring to scale down our efforts in Vietnam. In view of the thousands of the helicopters in our inventory—and mind you, an additional authorization of almost half a billion dollars in this bill for Army aircraft which are mostly helicopters—it truly taxes the imagination to conclude that our national security is jeopardized because of the failure to authorize 170 experimental interim Cobra helicopters in fiscal 1970. We may well find ourselves in 1972 with obsolescent aircraft with no requirement for them. In the words of the committee report in commenting on the Cheyenne, "We must carefully confirm our development progress on complex new systems before entering the production phase." This decision to authorize can clearly be deferred until we understand with greater certainty what

we are actually authorizing. I ask your support to strike \$86 million from the bill through this amendment.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Because of the cancellation of the Cheyenne helicopter program, this bill is already \$371 million below the original administration request for aircraft for the Army. The only thing that can possibly take up that void created by cancellation of the Cheyenne is an improved version of the Cobra, which has been performing with such superlative capability in Vietnam.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WRIGHT. I did not ask the gentleman to yield to me during his remarks.

Mr. NEDZI. I would have been pleased to yield had the gentleman requested me.

I think the record should be set straight that the administration has not asked for the Cheyenne helicopter.

Mr. WRIGHT. If the gentleman will refer to his own committee report on the pages where the Cheyenne helicopter is discussed, pages 41 and 42, he will see that the Army requested funds that had been earlier earmarked for the Cheyenne to be used instead to acquire Cobra helicopters. The committee bill allows \$86 million for this purpose, but eliminates \$429 million originally requested for the Cheyenne and \$28 million requested for the Mohawk. This amounts to a total reduction below the administration's defense budget when these three items are considered in tandem.

If the gentleman will be kind enough to bear with me while I attempt to develop two or three specific thoughts, I would appreciate it very much.

First of all, the Vietnam war has demonstrated as never before the utility and the enormous potential of the helicopter as a tactical military weapon. The Cobra has been largely responsible for this. It was the first great and effective helicopter to be used in numbers for a variety of military purposes. The Cobra has more than proved itself. I have met returning pilots who eloquently sing the praises of the Cobra. As contrasted with my experience and that of others during World War II, when with 30 or 40 combat missions we were allowed to come back to the States, many of these fellows have flown as many as 750 combat missions in the Cobra helicopter.

The helicopter, and the Cobra in particular, is one of the principal reasons why we have maintained superiority in this difficult bush war, this type of guerrilla operation, so foreign to our past experience. When we take into consideration the fatality record, it is something like 8 to 1 or 10 to 1 in our favor. Surely we do not want to abandon helicopter development. The Army declares its need for an improved Cobra with night visibility and an antitank missile.

The second basic thought we need to consider is that this is the one combat aircraft we can still get in numbers, in numbers if you please, for a relatively modest amount of dollars.

The amendment which the gentleman has offered seeks to strike out \$86 million for this purpose. This \$86 million will

buy 170 improved aircraft, with all the new developments. That comes to approximately \$500,000 apiece. We simply cannot get any other kind of modern military aircraft for that amount of money.

Finally, for this very reason, the helicopter is one combat aircraft that can be supplied in some numbers to our friends with which to defend themselves. In other words, I would say to those who declare that they want to get our boys out of Vietnam and let the South Vietnamese take over and defend themselves, remember that they cannot defend themselves without equipment. And the multipurpose helicopter is the prime equipment needed.

Unless you are prepared to say with certainty that the Vietnam war will end this year, and further that there will never be any other guerrilla-type operation such as this, and unless you are prepared to say that there will not be any situation in which a small country has to defend itself from an aggressor then certainly you cannot conclude that we have no further need for helicopters.

Mr. Chairman, I suggest for these reasons that it would be an act of great folly for us to eliminate this modest request for the improved Cobra helicopters.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. These helicopters are needed. The helicopters which they had planned to use did not work out. If we do not need this helicopter, we do not need any rifles in South Vietnam. My goodness, what on earth are we talking about? If you take this away from the U.S. Army you might as well tell them to come home.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know of any further arguments to be raised in support of this amendment and I ask for a vote.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEDZI).

The question was taken; and (on a division demanded by Mr. NEDZI) there were—ayes 36, noes 92.

So the amendment was rejected.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. PIKE

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. PIKE: On page 2, line 4, strike out "\$4,002,200,000" and insert "\$3,521,200,000" and add the following language: "Provided, That none of the funds herein authorized shall be used for the procurement of C5A aircraft beyond the number of 58 previously authorized."

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could arrive at a time to vote on this amendment?

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object—

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I have not made the proposal yet. I just asked to see if we could arrive at some time limitation.

What about 30 minutes?

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I pointed out to the distinguished chairman on yesterday, and I made the point when the 4-hour

rule was discussed, that on today we would be faced with an effort to force this thing through the House before today was over, and that there would be efforts to propose severe limitations upon debate, a debate which would cover 21.3 billions of dollars. Precisely that has happened. There have been—I am speaking in regular order. If you want to make a point, stand on your feet.

That has happened, so that there have been many Members forced to step into the well here for a minute and three-quarters, or under 2 minutes in time. That does not permit logical or rational debate. It is for that reason I object.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I have made no motion. I have not set the time on anything. Everything has either been agreed upon by unanimous consent or voted on by the House. The chairman does not have that much power. If the House did not vote to cut off debate, then it was not done. I think that is still the rule.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask: Is this all to come out of my time?

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, is this coming out of the time of the gentleman from New York? I certainly do not want to cut off anybody, and I certainly would not want to cut off the distinguished gentleman from California for all the tea in China. But I do want to say I would not be surprised if we finish tonight, if you do not mind going through supper time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE) for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman from New York yield to the gentleman from California?

Mr. PIKE. Does the gentleman from California ask me to yield?

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as the gentleman only has 5 minutes, I will take my own 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York is recognized in support of his amendment.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I am not at all sure, really, that prolonging this debate at this particular time is particularly useful because we can see the way things are going.

By the same token, I think there are things which ought to be said, and which are important not only to us who have worked hard on these matters—and everybody on the committee has worked hard on these matters—but that are important to the Nation as a whole.

For example, it was pointed out that the prior amendment which I offered to reduce the Navy shipbuilding authorization was defeated in the committee by a vote of approximately 35 to 4.

Yet, it was defeated here on a teller vote of 131 to 92. So I think it honestly can be said that there are some currents afoot in the land, and there are some ideas afoot in the land which are not necessarily represented when we take a vote in our committee.

The amendment which I have just offered cuts out additional procurement of the C-5A aircraft. You have all heard about the C-5A aircraft. I am not going

to change any votes by a speech I make here today. It has fantastic capabilities. It has fantastic cost overruns. Lockheed can, indeed, build magnificent aircraft. The question again is one of national priorities. How much is it worth to us? Every one of the aircraft that we have authorized and built thus far has cost us, if you apportion the R. & D. money over the 58 that we procured—five R. & D. models and 53 procurement models—approximately \$45 million each.

Now that is an awful lot of money per aircraft. We are told in this procurement that the 23 which are authorized this year will only cost about \$21.5 million each—per plane. I do not deny that it is a great big plane. It is. It is a huge plane. It is the biggest plane that the world has ever seen. The question is, Is it worth what we are paying for it?

Now Lockheed has engaged in a massive advertising campaign. Here is a little bitty ad that was in Life magazine here in the Washington region a couple of weeks ago for the C-5A. They say all kinds of things about it. They say it has beryllium brakes and it has, I have forgotten, how many wheels—but it has an awful lot of wheels. It says that a fleet of U.S. Air Force C-5A's will make this the only country that can move an army across an ocean in hours.

Well, if I read my mail right, the only direction that my people want to move an army across an ocean is toward home. I do not think they really care if it is in a matter of hours. I think they would be willing to spend even a few days on it.

So the question is, Do we want this? There is a further question. We do not know what the planes we have already authorized are going to cost. I sent each of you a mimeographed thing this morning. They have troubles with that plane. I do not say that they cannot fix the troubles. This is the same argument I made last year on the Cheyenne helicopter. But I said, "Let us do the research and development first before we buy any more of these planes."

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, a member of the committee (Mr. LEGGETT).

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment offered by my colleague, the gentleman from New York. I do not think there is any particular magic about 81 C-5A airplanes. I say that this House, and I said it before, should use its discretion. We should not abandon totally the power to control 70 percent of our budget to our House Committee on Armed Services.

There has been some indication that the currents on our committee are not exactly the currents in this House. I have alluded to that before.

I want to say in answer to the question—Do we have democracy on our committee? That I would have to answer that at first blush—yes—we have on things that the majority controls and we never report anything to the floor of the House that the majority does not control.

But we have another thing on our committee. It is called the policy committee. I have indicted this committee in public before. I do not know what it is. I have been on the committee only 4½ years.

I do not know who the members of the policy committee are. I think they might be on the majority and the minority sides, but I am not sure of that. I have never seen a scratch of a pen before our committee authorizing what the policy committee does. I know on the day of our committee markup, it was reported to us that the policy committee had recommended such and such with respect to all of these various systems, but I have never heard one member of the policy committee, wherever they are—and whoever they are I wish they would stand up and identify themselves—but I have never heard one member relate what was happening, relate an argument, or relate some of the democracy that has taken place on that very important committee.

I value my membership on the House Armed Services Committee very much. I am one of 40 members on that committee. Certainly I do not ingratiate myself with our leadership on the committee by making statements such as this. But I think this kind of nondemocracy has got to come to a stop. The idea of rewarding people who vote with the leadership by chairmanships, subcommittee chairmanships, and those of us who have not voted with the leadership, giving us no subcommittee assignments, relatively none, is wrong. We have a committee now working on the draft. But if you look at the membership on the majority side on the draft committee, the most important subject matter now being reviewed by this Congress, you will find that on the majority side we do not have experienced men save and except the subcommittee chairman. We have two junior members of the committee who have only been in the House about 8 months.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEGGETT. I do not have the time to yield.

Mr. HÉBERT. Do you know the facts?

Mr. LEGGETT. You can take your own time to explain them. I do not yield.

Mr. HÉBERT. You refuse to know the facts?

Mr. LEGGETT. I refuse to know the facts.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California refuses to yield.

Mr. LEGGETT. I say there is nothing magic in the power of the Department of Defense. They came down to our committee on the day of our hearing and they said, "We do not need the fifth squadron of C-5A's. Authorize only the fourth. We have the money for the third, but we do not need the fifth squadron" they said.

All of a sudden our committee chairman went into a conference. The chairman, with the Assistant Secretary of Defense, related to us, "I had a conference with the Secretary this morning. He said he does not need the fifth squadron. That \$52 million is out."

Oh, by the way—and this is not a direct quote—I want to tell you that that \$52 million we agreed that that was going into a new aircraft, what we call a world freedom fighter aircraft—not the F-5, not necessarily the F-5-21, but a

new airplane, there was not a scratch of the pen from the Department of Defense in support of that action. For those of you who abdicate your responsibilities as a Member of this House to our committee to act in this fashion, I put you on your conscience; and to sit around and say, "Well, if we are going to err for national defense, let us err on the part of safety," I do not think this is an adequate cliché to rely on.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last two words.

I think it is high time that we really gave some consideration to the amendment before us rather than some of what I would refer to as idle chatter going on around the floor of the House this afternoon, some of it based on facts, a little bit on misrepresentation. We are here this afternoon trying to do a job on this bill. Everyone is being afforded an opportunity to make his speech and express his will. Nobody has been shut off. But I wish we would stick to facts.

The gentleman who just spoke before the House went into some detail about who he believes is on the Armed Services policy committee. If he does not know who is on the policy committee of our committee, that is his fault. It is very simple. If he has not learned in 4½ years, that is his fault. He should ask who is on the policy committee. This is no secret. I have told many people when they have asked.

On this particular policy committee are majority members and minority members. I happen to be the ranking member on the Republican side. Contrary to what the gentleman from California says, I have no chairmanship of a subcommittee. No one has rewarded me for anything in our committee. I am not asking for any favors.

I wish my colleague from California would stay around and pay some attention to what is going on in the committee, and not make rash statements about what he thinks is wrong with the policy committee and the Armed Services Committee as a whole. The gentleman must remember that, during committee discussion, he used as much time as any other single member. About that, I have no complaint but wish he would stop implying our committee does not try at all times to act fairly and reflect the views of each and every member.

Mr. RIVERS. Nine percent of the total time taken up in the committee's voluminous hearings was taken up by the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) despite the fact that he is only one of 39 members. Does this suggest that our committee is not democratic? Of course not. I have no complaints from the gentleman about his taking up the time, but I have had complaints about the time taken up by the gentleman.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for some further statistics on that time?

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I have the time. I have yielded to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, this same thing happens on every bill. This same gentleman gets up and talks about the committee. Ask the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE). Ask anyone. I do not

know what more time the gentleman wants. I have given him time.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I refuse to yield.

Mr. Chairman, one further thing. I have served on this committee, and there is no question of partisanship. I stand on the judgment of the committee. If it is not good, then the House ought to do something about it.

Mr. LEGGETT. That is the whole problem.

Mr. ARENDS. If that is the whole problem, then the gentleman should do something about the committee, and maybe he will be around here long enough to do it, but I doubt it.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Chairman, in his supplemental views on the committee report and in his letter to the Members of the House, Mr. LEGGETT correctly identifies the number of the bill as H.R. 14000. Beyond that, I cannot vouch for the veracity of his remarks.

Mr. LEGGETT says the committee has a 50-man staff of lawyers, investigators, and experts. The committee has 15 professional personnel including the staff of the investigating subcommittee and two GAO investigators assigned to the committee on a continuing basis. Even with all our secretaries and clerical staff included, we do not have 50 employees.

Mr. LEGGETT says that the war in Vietnam absorbs at least 40 percent of the budget. The Defense budget is approximately \$77 billion a year. The annual cost associated with Vietnam is \$24 billion.

Mr. LEGGETT claims that the committee's report outlines an alleged Soviet buildup of military power. That buildup is very real.

Mr. LEGGETT says that we have budgeted \$7.8 billion for veterans' benefits. Of course, veterans' benefits are not in the present bill, are not under the jurisdiction of our committee, and are the cost of past wars, not future ones. However, since Mr. LEGGETT thinks this is too much, perhaps he would be kind enough to tell the House and his constituents which veterans' benefits he wants to reduce.

Mr. LEGGETT says:

Today, virtually all income taxes paid by individuals feed the military appetite.

Since the military outlay takes less than 50 percent of the total Federal budget, it is impossible for me to understand how Mr. LEGGETT can say this.

The gentleman points out that the orientation of our ABM effort has changed over the years. This is correct because the nature of the threat has changed. The gentleman also says that the ABM will confound SALT talks and heat up the arms race. The Safeguard is not designed to be a defense of cities. It is to defend our strategic offense capabilities. So, it is clearly not a first-strike weapon, and it will not require the action on the Soviet's part—unless the Soviets are going for a first-strike capability.

Mr. LEGGETT says that even the success of the ABM could be obviated by more Soviet missiles. The fact is that at the point of time when the ABM is in place, the cost of Russian offensive missiles will

be higher than our defensive missiles. Deploying sufficient missiles to keep a first-strike capability would be prohibitively expensive and strategically uncertain for the Russians.

Mr. LEGGETT makes the novel suggestion that we should have something like a two-thirds vote before an undertaking of this importance is approved. Perhaps he is prepared to suggest that we should not elect a President unless he has a two-thirds vote.

Mr. LEGGETT says that the ABM is "clearly cost ineffective." If it stopped one accidental offensive ICBM, the ABM could save 20 million American lives. Members can draw their own conclusions about cost effectiveness.

Mr. LEGGETT claims that the Soviets could not possibly be going for a first-strike capability since they have 200 warheads and he alleges we have many thousands. As the evidence presented to the committee clearly shows, the Russians in the mid or late 1970's will have over 400 SS-9's and with MIRV capability, they provide a serious threat to our Minuteman force. Mr. LEGGETT seems unable to understand that it is the period of the late 1970's that we are preparing for and, of course, he is unable to explain the purpose of so large a missile as the SS-9 if it is not a first-strike weapon.

He makes the very dangerous statement that "it is quite plausible that a 1000-unit ABM system could be intended to pick off stray Soviet missiles after we effect our first strike."

Mr. LEGGETT knows perfectly well that we do not have first-strike intentions. But, more important, he should certainly understand that our offensive missiles are too small in size to have a first-strike capability against hardened missile sites.

Mr. LEGGETT alleges there is a much cheaper system available. The non-nuclear approach being studied by the Air Force is unfortunately not a system that is now available. This bill does not preclude further study of that approach. But it is in the elemental stages of development whereas the radar, the computer, and the missiles for the Safeguard are well along on their development with most of the technological problems solved.

Mr. LEGGETT claims the annual maintenance charges on the Safeguard will be \$1 billion per year. The only figures available to us indicate our annual maintenance cost at \$350 million a year. No \$1 billion figure has ever been presented to our committee.

Speaking of the Soviet ABM effort Mr. LEGGETT says the net effect of Moscow's efforts was that the Russians were less secure as a result of those efforts and today they have abandoned their attempts to put an ABM defense around Moscow although it is only two-fifths complete. There is no evidence that the Soviets are less secure as a result of having built an ABM system around Moscow and it is certainly incorrect to assert that they have abandoned their efforts to build an ABM defense. On the contrary, the Moscow ABM system has achieved a state of operational readiness. The Moscow system has an effective radar network, and it must be remem-

bered, the big radars are the long lead-time elements of their ABM system. It is true they have installed only a limited number of Galosh interceptor missile launchers. But more launchers can be installed rapidly. Furthermore, we have heard evidence that the Soviets are testing an improved interceptor which can coast or "loiter" until a specific target is selected and then be maneuvered to its target. It is certainly reasonable to anticipate the addition of this new interceptor to the Moscow system. The Soviet ABM capability reduces the effectiveness of our deterrent forces in penetrating a large urban-industrial complex. Their level of defense can be expanded quickly and will probably be qualitatively improved.

I could go on with numerous inaccuracies in this statement. But it would be a pointless exercise. It should be clear that this is an emotional outburst that is not based on fact, and would be a dangerous document for Members of the House to depend on.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I have been here about 10 years, and I have been on the Committee on Armed Services all that time, and I am not on the policy committee nor am I the chairman of any subcommittee. I would like, however, to address myself to the comparison of the C-5A with the oncoming SST, the 747, and other civil reserve air fleet planes—CRAF—with which our Department of Defense contracts in order to handle strategic and military airlift. I have had the privilege of serving from its inception on the Military Airlift Subcommittee.

I think the main fact that remains, after the gentleman from New York with whom I often agree in some of his perceptive and delving excavations, is that we need enhanced and increased strategic military airlift capability if we are going to fly men thoroughly equipped from points at home to points overseas, and if we are going to return from overseas our forces we have kept there much too long and in much too great a concentration. The C-52 can handle this. The Galaxy is eminently successful. Costly? Yes. Mistakes? Of course. Overruns? Assuredly. But we cannot brush it all away by simply saying that the differential is between \$21 million a copy and \$45 million a copy in a piece of equipment we need.

This committee has listened to the industrialists. This committee has had "on the pan" the militarists who have engaged in this. There is a new concept originated during a past administration, known as "a total package concept" contract. I believe even the gentleman who proposed this amendment will agree with that the only way we can get the reduced rate for the necessary numbers of copies of the Galaxy is to go through with this total package concept contract which the committee in its wisdom decided was not so bad anyway. We have to do it to come out. We have to do it in order to provide for our need for total capability of lift in the military. We have to do it in order to keep our word. We

have to do it in order not to destroy by a writ of the pen a contract on which we have agreed in solemn covenant with a great industrial producer that has provided the "Starlifter" and many others.

I think this amendment should be defeated out of hand because of the wisdom of the committee and the entire work they have done for it, and because of the needs of the services and the hope of returning our men from overseas so that they can better serve at home and be available on call for strategic airlift overseas when needed.

COMPARISON OF THE C-5A WITH THE 747 AND OTHER CRAF AIRPLANES

One of the arguments introduced against the C-5A is that aircraft in the civil reserve air fleet can be used at least in partial substitution for the C-5A. It is argued that the new Boeing commercial airplane, the 747, particularly makes this an attractive alternate.

Once again, this argument presents a comparison between apples and oranges, and we have economic arguments presented which really are beside the point.

There is a tendency to forget, in the case of the 747, that it is designed to carry commercial passengers and/or commercial cargo, and all indications is that it is a fine airplane for these purposes. And, also, it generally is forgotten or not known that of the approximate 200 747's on order, only three are convertible cargo models and none are all cargo models. Therefore, 747's in the CRAF program essentially will carry only passengers or troops, and what little cargo they can carry would have to fit into the small compartments beneath the passenger floor.

Even if 747's were to be ordered as all cargo models by the Air Force today, or by commercial carriers for CRAF use, the delivery of them would be some 24 months later than C-5's because of the current production status of the 747, and because of present delivery commitments of these aircraft to commercial users. This in turn would force the use of obsolete and expensive C-133's and C-124's for 2 more years.

But let us also remember, that in comparison with the 747 or other commercial carriers, the C-5A is designed to carry military equipment and cargo—not troops—and under military conditions. It is true that the C-5A can be converted to commercial cargo use, but it would be changed very substantially for this purpose. The reverse is not true—as the 747 simply could not be converted—except at huge expense—to perform C-5 type military missions.

Let us examine why this is so.

First, the C-5 can land on short, unimproved runways at remote points, with unsophisticated or no landing aids from the ground—and the 747 cannot make such landings. Under some conditions, the C-5 can require no more than 3,500-foot runways, and under other conditions it may take 5,000-foot runways. These runways can be grass instead of cement, and the grass can be wet instead of dry. An expensive air terminal, with all the sophisticated and complicated radar and guidance systems, is not required.

For example, there are over 1,300 paved

airports throughout the world suitable for the C-5 to land with its wartime load of 265,000 pounds. This does not include the thousands of unpaved sites which the C-5 can use. The 747, however, can land this kind of a load at only 415 airports. This means there are over three times as many places to which C-5 missions can be deployed, not even counting the unpaved sites. The value of this asset, in case of a national emergency, is beyond measure.

As it arrives at a landing area, the C-5 cross-wind landing gear again gives it the flexibility to operate from substandard fields, for it has a system which permits positioning the landing gear up to 20 degrees on either side of neutral. The 747 does not have such an ability, nor does it need it for commercial missions, since it is designed for operation from civilian fields or large military fields which normally have more than one runway, allowing it to pick a direction dictated by current wind conditions.

After the C-5 arrives at the field, it can kneel its landing gear to lower the fuselage, and then employ its forward and aft ramps to drive equipment off the airplane under its own power, or roll it off, very quickly and ready for action. The 747, on the other hand, would require extensive ground handling equipment, in place on the ground, to lift the equipment off the airplane from 16-foot heights—a tortuous, time-consuming and expensive operation, assuming the ground handling equipment is available in the first place.

Or, if the C-5A crew wishes, and conditions require it, the C-5 load can be air dropped to the ground by parachute, using built-in air-drop equipment. This is impossible in a 747.

At the start of a mission, the question arises as to loading efficiency and the ability to carry all kinds of equipment.

In the first place, there are many pieces of equipment that can be carried in the C-5 but cannot be carried in the 747. Only 53 percent of the military equipment items which need to be airlifted can get through the 747 door, again assuming you have the necessary and expensive ground handling equipment available and prepositioned in the first place.

Still speaking of load carrying ability, the C-5 has a heavy floor, which will accommodate heavy wheeled or track loads. The 747 floor is normal for commercial type loads, but will not accommodate heavy loads.

But even the pieces that can be carried in the 747 would require a much longer time to load. Because of the specialized loading systems and ramps that are built in on the C-5, the average loading time for a 1970 infantry division is 35 minutes for a C-5, whereas it would take 85 minutes to load the 747 with just those portions of the infantry division which it is capable of carrying. And here again, this assumes the existence in the first place of the expensive but necessary ground handling equipment required to load a 747.

Then, after the equipment load is on board, the C-5 has seats on an upper deck for 75 troops and equipment handlers, so that when it lands the entire unit of

equipment and men is ready to go. The 747 has no such room for troops and equipment handlers.

Now that we have loaded the C-5 and we are in the air, let us see what other differences there might be.

First, let me call to your minds a picture in the Washington Post on Sunday, August 31. It showed a C-5 being refueled in the air—one more unique feature built into the C-5, but not available in the 747. Even if ground bases for refueling were denied the C-5, after commencement of hostilities, the C-5 could continue to operate, whereas operation of the 747 would be severely limited.

Next, the C-5 has a built-in guidance system providing for terrain following, terrain avoidance, and station keeping for formation flying. This capability does not exist in the 747.

The C-5 is designed and stressed for flying "on the deck" at 200 or 300 feet altitudes, following mountainous terrain at speeds as high as 350 knots. A commercial airplane, such as the 747, would experience premature fatigue failure in this kind of operation.

Also, while enroute, the C-5 has a built-in Madar system. This means—malfunction, detection, analysis, and recording system. This unique feature enables the ordering of necessary spares while the aircraft is still in flight, and it is uniquely compatible with the U.S. Air Force spares support system. This is a significant advance, in comparison with the rudimentary engine analyzer systems on other aircraft such as the 747.

Still speaking of maintenance features, in view of the kinds of conditions the C-5 is expected to encounter on landing at unimproved fields, there is danger of damage to its wheels. In this event, the C-5 can be taxied, or even landed with one bogie retracted—a bogie is a group of 6 wheels. This permits tire or wheel changes without the use of jacks, and allows the airplane to be moved off the runway to a work area for repairs on wheels, brakes or tires. The 747 cannot do this.

The list of differences for military cargo missions goes on and on, and the plain fact is that the 747 is simply not capable of performing C-5 missions, nor is any other commercial airplane. Cost comparisons are beside the point.

None of this should be construed to be a criticism of the 747. All reports indicate it is a fine airplane and will perform very well the commercial missions it was designed for.

The C-5A, on the other hand, was designed for military missions, and all test results to date indicate it will perform them superbly and at a very low cost.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

I recognize the facts that have been brought out with relation to the C-5A program. We are all aware of the stories that have appeared through the press over the months on the cost overrun. The Committee on Armed Services and other committees of the House and the other body have held extensive hearings on overruns in the C-5A program.

There is not a single Member of the

House who condones these excessive overruns. They wish they would not happen. We would like to see them renegotiated. I am certain that in accordance with existing law they will be.

But this is not the first aircraft that has been involved in a cost overrun. I doubt if any new type of aircraft at any time in the history of this country has not cost more than people thought it would when it was originally contracted for.

There have been papers written on the subject of overruns in Government work, and even in municipal work, and in private building. There are cost overruns on our public roads program. There are cost overruns in the atomic energy program. Every reactor ever built cost from 50 to 100 percent more than people estimated it would cost at the beginning.

As a matter of fact, studies have been done from time to time on cost overruns and estimates have been made that in the area of weapons procurement during a period in the 1950's, the overruns ran as high as 200 percent. The lowest one ran about 100 percent.

This is not anything new to the House. It is something we do not like. From time to time we pass legislation to try to tighten it up. The military should concentrate more in taking steps to avoid such overruns.

But we are not talking here this afternoon about a cost overrun on the C-5A. We are concerned with whether or not it is a valuable aircraft for use in the military airlift.

Mr. EVANS of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. EVANS of Colorado. I have looked at the report to find out whether the effect of the amendment would be to strike out all funds for the further development of the C-5A. Could the gentleman inform us, if the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PRICE) is passed, would this eliminate all funds for further C-5A development?

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. I believe the gentleman from New York (Mr. PRICE) could explain that a little better than I. I do not have time to explain his amendment. Since it is a reduction in funds, I assume it will substantially reduce the number of aircraft. I am opposed to it, and I hope the House will not accept it.

The C-5A is a valuable aircraft for the military airlift. I hope that the House will oppose this amendment.

The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HALL) reviewed some of the capabilities of the C-5A, and did a very fine job.

I find it extremely difficult to question the need for the C-5A. Who was it who first indicated a need for it? Actually, it was the Congress itself, through studies of the Military Airlift Subcommittee, which originally supported a program known as the CX-4. What was the CX-4? It is the C-5A. Who pushed it? The Congress of the United States did, because existing aircraft were not capable of meeting the contingencies in the future with respect to the need for adequate military airlift.

This type of aircraft is the idea of the Congress. Why did we want it? We wanted it because we knew there was a need for it. We sought development of a new aircraft to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of our airlift—and reduce the cost of operation. And we have. The C-5A will cut down the cost of operation.

It is estimated now the cost is 5.3 cents per ton mile for the C-141, and that is a lot lower than the aircraft previous to that. But the C-5A cost per ton mile of hauling is 2.9 cents per ton mile.

It would take a long time, I know, to save some of the money lost in this overrun, but in the years to come this money will be retrieved by the efficiency of the operations of the C-5A.

On the overrun questions I would like to refer to a report released by the Air Force in July 1969. This report titled, "Review of the C-5A Program," resulted from an in-depth review of the program which was one of the initial actions directed by the new Secretary of Defense. The objectivity of the report is further reinforced by the fact that four persons outside of the Air Force, who are experts in their field and were not previously involved in the C-5A program, also presented their findings in the report.

What does the C-5A report say concerning the cost increase? The cost estimate in the report is the same given to Congress as being \$4,831 million for 120 aircraft for research and development, production and initial operating spares. In October 1965 when the contracts were signed with Lockheed and General Electric, the comparable figure was \$3,369 million. The latest figure is an increase of \$1,462 million or a 44 percent cost growth for a program 7½ years in duration.

While not condoning the cost growth in the C-5A program, I would like to point out that the C-5A report indicated that a significant part of the contractors' cost increases was beyond their control. That is to say, any airplane manufacturer, no matter how great his engineering and management talent, would also have been victimized by the inflation that has occurred in our economy over the past several years.

There are further reasons for the cost growth cited in the C-5A report which I recommend be read. It should be noted that although the report itself is a comprehensive one, it is but a small part of one of the most exhaustive reviews ever conducted on a weapon system by Members of the Congress and the Department of Defense. Most of the information, except that which is classified, is a matter of public record for all to see and examine in minute detail.

After reviewing these records, I find it extremely difficult to question the need for the C-5A's truly tremendous capability to move quickly, a military force anywhere in the world. It opens a new era in rapid mobility and air operations. It does both more economically, even at its increased costs, than can be done any other way. I said a moment ago one of the greatest assets of the C-5A which is often overlooked is that it will carry cargo at a cost of 2.9 cents per ton mile based on airlift industrial fund. This

compares with the cost of 5.3 cents per ton mile for the C-141 whose low cost per ton mile is considered an exceptional achievement. Putting the economic gains on an annual operating cost basis, six C-5A squadrons will provide an increased airlift capability of almost four times that of the 16 squadrons of aging C-124's and C-133's, which the C-5A will replace at only a slight increase of 4 percent in annual operating costs.

And as previously stated, I respectfully remind the Members that your Special Subcommittee on Military Airlift of the Committee on Armed Services in 1963, recommended that the C-5A, previously identified as the CX-4 be built to satisfy future airlift requirements.

Gentlemen, I am convinced that this decision to build the C-5A was a wise one, the need is valid, and we should buy the aircraft under consideration for the fourth squadron.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, so far as I know, in the debate on this amendment, no reference has been made to the fact the House Committee on Armed Services has already cut out \$102 million on the C-5A. What is proposed by this amendment is to cut out the C-5A entirely and completely. In the course of the debate today I have observed that those who are for this amendment referred in several instances with approval to our senior Senator from Missouri and his stand on the procurement bill in the other body. Mr. SYMINGTON was the first Secretary of the Air Force. The senior Senator from Missouri is, in my opinion, sincere when he says he is quite concerned about the magnitude of military expenditures. No one can charge he has abandoned his views on the importance of a strong national defense. He is concerned about the staggering costs of defense. Nearly everything he has proposed is in the effort to save some money in defense expenditures. Right here is an illustration of a way the Senator has proposed we save money on defense costs, because with the C-5A we are provided with a "remote presence."

That is what we are talking about. With the C-5A we can do something which we have not been able to do with any other plane we have; namely, we can avoid the necessity of stationing a large military force overseas.

The "remote presence" concept enunciated by Senator SYMINGTON in the Senate debate provides an additional reason for C-5A's—beyond those requirements based on JCS plans.

Senator SYMINGTON as well as other Members of Congress have addressed themselves to this subject from time to time. Senator SYMINGTON's "remote presence" speech was made on the Senate floor September 9, 1969.

The latest figures available indicate some 593,000 American troops are stationed abroad, not including the troops in Vietnam. It has been estimated that the cost of these men averages about \$8,600 per man—in pay, in allowances, and in supplementary benefits, a total of more than \$5 billion per year. Additionally, there are about 500,000 dependents and 250,000 foreign employees located on

the more than 3,300 major and minor U.S. military bases overseas. In direct cost, it is a staggering bill—and the adverse effect on our international balance of payments is perhaps even more important, in spite of the offset we receive in West Germany.

Full exploitation of the C-5A in this way would allow the United States to reduce its troops abroad to token forces in many cases, and in an emergency to rapidly reinforce the military presence by massive airlift.

With airplanes like the C-5, able to carry all kinds of military equipment including the outsized pieces like tanks and helicopters, and able to land in remote areas on short and unimproved fields, it would be unnecessary to risk the hazards of prepositioning. And it would be unnecessary to pay the huge cost of duplicating an inventory of equipment abroad and at home.

The C-5A makes the "remote presence" concept credible. It can carry tanks, fuel trucks, bridge launchers, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, and all the other outsized pieces of equipment that are unable to be carried in today's cargo airplanes. It can carry many combinations or multiples of these pieces of equipment. It can carry the equipment handlers and technicians who go with the equipment. It can fly non-stop 6,000 miles at jet speeds, and then land on short, wet grass fields. It has its own built-in loading and unloading ramps—or it can drop equipment from the air.

Ten of these C-5A's could have accomplished the Berlin Airlift job it took 300 then-current transports to do.

With a sufficient number of C-5A's, able to pick up many pieces of equipment from inventories positioned in the United States and transport them quickly to wherever they are needed, the "remote presence" is not only credible—the "presence" is not really very remote.

Thus, the C-5A can be a "peacemaker" in this "remote presence" concept, rather than an instrumentality of war. It can satisfy our obligations and our commitments abroad, without the necessity of so many troops and so much equipment being physically stationed abroad.

The not-so-remote presence of the C-5A makes the "remote presence" concept a viable, exciting theory—worthy of the fullest possible exploitation of our Defense Department and our State Department and the Congress as they consider the important questions of our involvement abroad.

Those who oppose this amendment to further cut funds for the C-5A over the \$102 million already cut by the committee are not voting for a saving of defense money, except the original amount cut out. If you vote for the C-5A you are voting for great saving in defense costs over the entire life of this great plane with its massive airlift. The Senate rejected a similar effort to cut the C-5A by a vote of 64 to 23. Those who really want to save on defense costs will prevent knocking out the great C-5A because it is one of our greatest money savers.

Mr. LANDRUM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, it is rare indeed in all the time that I have been privileged to be a Member of this House for me to attempt or presume to speak on a subject coming from a committee on which I am not a member. However, it occurs to me in the examination of this question that most of the opposition to the continuation of this program for the C-5A is built more on a notion brought about by some bad publicity than it is on hard, cold facts. I have been impressed here by the very profound remarks of the distinguished gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HALL) about what the C-5A will do and what it is doing and how it has already shown completely that it can meet the demands that the Air Force requires and that our defense needs will require. I think we also ought to think a little bit about what some of the individuals connected with this program, one of whom, not a Georgian but a former Alabama boy and a very distinguished man of business, Dan Haughton, chairman of the board of Lockheed Aircraft Corp., said. He has been in the "boiler room"—actually and literally in the boiler room—of the University of Alabama where he worked his way through the college and up from that point, mind you, to the present high position of chairman of the board of this great and successful corporation. Let us listen a little bit to what Mr. Haughton said before the committee. The distinguished chairman held hearings on this, and here is what Mr. Haughton said to the people of the United States:

The issue is this—do the people of the United States need the kinds of products we produce? If they do, they should procure them from the most efficient companies available. If procurement on that basis excludes Lockheed, then we will have deserved it.

There is not anything any more American than that.

Now I have heard here today the eloquent plea of my warm friend and very able and distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New York (Mr. FIFE), for hospitals, for schools, and for money to take care of the things that go with operating this great social order that we have. His record bears out his concern in this area.

But, let me say to my distinguished friend, and my warm friend, this: Here is a way to save some money for those schools. Here is a way to save some money for those hospitals. Here is the way to provide some money to build those roads you want over which the people may travel. This will save money. Here is a way to let those who would become an aggressor against this Nation know that we will continue to be equipped to meet that aggression and do it in a most economical and efficient fashion.

Mr. Chairman, I can think of nothing more unwise or more imprudent, in my judgment at least, than at this moment to hamper or hamstring the continued production of this great aircraft. I think the Air Force has demonstrated that our defense needs it. I think it is important for them, and despite the mistakes that have been made, as the distinguished gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HALL) has said they were made for the same reasons all mistakes are made; on

the basis of trial and error, trying to get the best that we can. The good minds that are behind this program building this aircraft are giving the best that they have. I think that is good enough to justify our continued support of the C-5A and defeat the amendment.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the distinguished minority whip gave us some good advice today. He said let us talk about some facts. I join the gentleman in that. I think it is time that we talk about facts and get over the emotionalism that has characterized very much of the debate here this afternoon. There are some very important facts connected with this C-5A. It is perhaps—well, there is no question about it—the most costly plane we have ever acquired. The overruns are far above average and we are not getting what we have expected in the three squadrons of 58 with reference to their cost and no one knows how much the next 23 will cost. We know how much we are authorizing in dollars, but we do not know how much it is going to cost. Every Member of this House who has followed this in the press and who has attempted to follow the confused information from the Pentagon, knows that you can select any one of a half dozen figures as to the cost per plane or the cost of the overrun.

Now, do we need the plane? I think it is an excellent plane. I think 58 of them probably fulfill our requirements at the moment and will do for some years into the future, because this does not represent the totality of military aircraft available to this Nation.

Now, I am not talking about something I know nothing of. I have been here for 17 years, and I have been on the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce for the past 13 years dealing with the problem of aviation. I know that we are having a whole new generation of aircraft, the 747's, the first delivery having been made to one of the major airlines, and that these are going to come off in increasing numbers and constitute an important part of the reserve fleet available to this Nation, and you can buy two of them, having about 50 percent more carrying capacity, for the same number of dollars, as you can the C-5A's.

I know the whole story, about how many wheels the thing has, and it will sit down in marshland, but I would be willing to wager that no one is going to be damned fool enough to set it down in marshland at a time when we might be depending on it. We will have the runways as we had the runways in World War II, and as we had the runways in Korea, and as we have them in Vietnam, and every one of you who has been out there, as I have, knows that we do have them.

Then we have the tremendous fleet of 707's, and the Douglas counterpart, and that fleet is not being fully utilized in civilian aviation. Any of you who travel by air—and I think most of you do—know that since the day before yesterday your fares went way up. They went

up because our civilian fleet is operating at approximately 32 percent of capacity. So we have the airlift ability to meet the most urgent demands of this Nation.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MOSS. I will yield to the gentleman from New York for a question.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, does the gentleman know how you could get a tank into a 747?

Mr. MOSS. I do not think that you are going to have to have 82 C-5A's full of tanks.

Mr. STRATTON. Well, the fact of the matter is, the C-5A is not to be compared to the 747. The C-5A has a roll-on roll-off capacity, which the 747 does not have.

Mr. MOSS. I do not yield further. I answered the gentleman's question. I do not yield further.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman declines to yield.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, we have transported tanks in other aircraft, and we can transport them again, and the gentleman knows it. But I thought that the policy of this Nation was going to be one now of switching to a defensive posture. I did not think that the policy of the Nation was to continue to underwrite a world policeman's role and move into every troubled spot on the globe.

I think it has become the firm conviction of this administration as enunciated by the President that you cannot win a military victory in Vietnam, and if you cannot win it there, you cannot win it in a lot of other parts of the globe.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I think the point the gentleman from California (Mr. Moss) is missing is that this aircraft, the C-5A is uniquely adapted for a military purpose. The 747 is a very fine aircraft, and it has a tremendous capability, but the fact of the matter is that it was not built for military missions.

The basic purpose of the C-5A aircraft is to transport equipment as well as personnel to overseas spots where they may be needed. You can roll this equipment on and off the C-5A something you cannot do with a 747 or even a 707.

There are many Members of this House and of the other body who say we ought to bring our troops back quickly from Vietnam, and who say we ought to bring our troops back from other places too, like Europe. If we are going to do that, then we need the facilities to get back there if there should be a new emergency. If we cannot keep our troops in Europe, for example, if we cannot keep our equipment there, then we are going to need a vast airlift capability to move in quickly in case of a Soviet attack.

If you really want to establish an effective fortress America, and bring back many of our troops from Europe so as to make an appreciable dent in military budget, you are going to have to have this kind of aircraft. We need it to maintain our credibility and our deterrent power in Europe, as well as elsewhere in the world where we may have vital interests to protect.

Mr. EVANS of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I am most concerned with this decision that we are making because I am impressed with this aircraft. I am also very concerned about the difficulties that this aircraft has experienced.

I would like to address a question or two then to the sponsor of this amendment, the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE), if I could please.

If the gentleman's amendment is passed, would there be any funds left for the production and development of this aircraft in this coming fiscal year 1970?

Mr. PIKE. Yes, of course.

There is \$34 million for research and development including flight tests.

There is \$160 million for initial spares. There is \$40 million for replenishment spares.

There is \$225 million to cover previous years overruns which is for production of prior authorized aircraft.

We simply do not have the slightest conception of what this new aircraft is going to cost because under the formula of the contract, the cost of this new addition of aircraft depends on what the cost of the present aircraft is. We do not know what the cost of the present aircraft is because they are still having difficulties with the development of it. The more that the present authorized aircraft costs us, the more the new 23 aircraft are going to cost.

But there is \$459 million in the bill for the C-5A's, even if my amendment passes.

Mr. EVANS of Colorado. If I may prevail upon the gentleman to ask one more question.

Assuming the gentleman's amendment was to fail and this money were in the bill for the construction of the additional 23 C-5A's. Could the gentleman tell the committee what his opinion is, from the hearings that he has attended, as to whether or not these 23 can be made in the next fiscal year and what period of time it would take them to construct these airplanes?

Mr. PIKE. I do not think anybody can answer that question at this time.

As I indicated yesterday, they had a test failure last week. It was not a great big test failure, but it was a serious test failure.

In July they had a wing problem. So they developed a fix for that wing problem. Last week the fix they had developed failed under a test at 83 percent of its designed load. Well, they said, it was not a valid test because they used bad equipment or material to test it with. It was their test—Lockheed's test. But they do not want to accept the results of their own test. They may be right, I do not know. But what we do know is that when they develop a "fix," every one of the aircraft which has been made so far is going to have to go back and to some degree have to be taken apart. There are 22 locations on each plane where they have to stick this fix in. Obviously, this is going to cause a delay and, obviously, it is going to cost an awful lot of money.

I do not say that Lockheed cannot fix them. Of course, they can fix them. But

we do not have the slightest idea how long it is going to take and we do not have the slightest idea how much it is going to cost.

Mr. EVANS of Colorado. If I may ask the gentleman a further question and if he would give us the answer, if he knows the answer. Have we finished production of those aircraft which we have purchased at the present time?

Mr. PIKE. No, we will not finish the production of aircraft that we have already authorized money for until 1971.

Mr. EVANS of Colorado. In other words, money that has been authorized and appropriated and available for this aircraft as of this date will carry construction through 1971?

Mr. PIKE. Well, no—to be fair to the company—there comes a point in any aircraft procurement when you start stopping. The production line does not stop all at once. But they are 6 months behind schedule right now. They are going to get further behind schedule because of the difficulties that they are having. I honestly think we could delay this authorization another year without seriously turning down the production line of aircraft because of the fact that it is already behind schedule and because of the difficulties they are having.

Mr. EVANS of Colorado. I thank the gentleman very much.

Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word and rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think that anyone in this Chamber disputes the fact that there has been an overrun. There has been an overrun in a number of various projects. A short time ago we discussed the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, and it was pointed out that percentagewise there was a much greater cost overrun there than we have in this particular area.

The cold, hard facts of life are simple. We are in a period of inflation. Where the manufacturer had projected production based on maybe 3 percent inflation, we have had 7 percent. But even the proponents of reducing the commitment to Lockheed acknowledge this fact without any question of doubt, the C-5A is the finest cargo aircraft ever developed. In fact, we will be able to transport cargo for the lowest cost per-ton-mile ever in the history of the world with this aircraft.

Heretofore, the C-141 held this record. With the C-5A we will be able to transport at a rate much lower than that. But even that is not the real reason for continuing the commitment on this aircraft, nor is the full employment of Lockheed. This is a concern to me because I recognize that even if the amendment were to succeed, production would continue for some period of time. But the very future of this Nation and our foreign policy very definitely can hinge upon the decision we make in this area.

Why do I make that statement? I say that simply because we appear to have engaged in a process of diminishing our bases overseas. We are in trouble in Libya right now. I do not know what is going

to happen to our bases in Libya. Certainly in Vietnam the President has made very clear that in a relatively few years we will no longer have a presence in Vietnam. In the Peace Treaty with Japan we gave our written pledge that Okinawa would be returned to Japan. Hopefully, and I am assured of the fact, we will retain bases there. But I do not know for how long.

The point is simply this: the C-5A will give a mobility to foreign policy that we have never had before, because rather than just being able to transport men, as we could by utilizing our civilian fleet of aircraft—the 747, the 707, and so forth—we can now transport a complete military unit, including all the tanks and hardware. As our bases diminish overseas, we know that our foreign policy need not be ineffective or disastrous, so far as influence on world matters is concerned, if we have the mobility which the proper numbers of the C-5A aircraft can give us.

Let me emphasize the point that there is no other aircraft in the entire world that can do the job that this particular aircraft can do.

The gentleman from California (Mr. Moss) mentioned the fact that it has a number of wheels and can land in a marsh area. The C-5A's 28 wheels may not actually allow it to land in a marsh but it can land certainly in an unimproved cleared area. I do not know what is going to happen in Europe or throughout the world, whether we would have improved landing fields available or not. But the designers of this aircraft have so designed it that it can operate on unimproved cleared land. It can land in an unimproved cleared area and carry the greatest load that any aircraft has ever hauled and land in a distance shorter than the DC-9 uses.

I am not knowledgeable on the question of military plane needs or the needs of our country in this field. But I do place confidence in the Pentagon in trying to provide for the defense and protection of this country. The Pentagon has stated we need more than the 58 aircraft, and I am willing to stand behind those who have the full facts and support them because I feel, just as the gentleman from Georgia, the Dean of our delegation, has pointed out, this aircraft will in effect end up saving money because if we do reduce our bases overseas, we will still have mobility without a negative effect on foreign affairs.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could agree on a time to vote on all amendments thereto end at a quarter to 5.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, will the gentleman repeat his request?

Mr. RIVERS. I would propose that debate continue for 15 minutes longer, until a quarter to 5.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that debate on the amendment and all amendments thereto end at a quarter to 5.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman,

reserving the right to object, I would like to point out that the C-5A is manufactured in my district, and, since that is so, I would like to deliver the remarks that I have prepared on the subject.

Several Members have been recognized and the airplane is not made in their districts.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Georgia object to the unanimous-consent request?

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. I do, for the time being.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I want the gentleman from Georgia to be recognized for his 5 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that after the gentleman from Georgia has concluded his statement, the committee conclude debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto within 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. DAVIS).

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I thank the Chairman, and I thank the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS).

I will not use my 5 minutes, but at the outset of my few remarks, I do want the Committee not to misunderstand the fact that I do represent the district in which this airplane is made. We have 28,000 employees there, most of whom reside in my district.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of my colleagues in opposition to this amendment.

Also I would like to point out this airplane represents a new conquest in the ocean of space. I am convinced from my conferences with the engineers and with Lockheed Aircraft Corp. and with other people that we will wind up with a method of transportation that actually will be more economical than water transportation, if we figure in the time element, because, of course, while water transportation is cheaper, it is also a great consumer of time.

Based on the studies I am familiar with—and I ask you to accept my word for it—we are going to conquer the ocean of air in a more economical way than we have conquered the ocean of water or than we have conquered land transportation.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, it is so very easy to put out figures that the layman does not comprehend. As the gentleman knows, these tests referred to are static tests conducted in a laboratory on the ground. The manufacturer wants to be sure his planes are going to work. He wants to get 150 percent safety on this plane, and it got up to 83 percent of capacity. Listen to what this plane has done in the air. It is not a failure. It is a great success. The C-5A aircraft itself

weighs 320,000 pounds. As part of its program testing at Edwards Air Force Base, a C-5A lifted off at 790,000 pounds. In essence, the airplane lifted 470,000 pounds in addition to lifting itself. This represents lifting of 247 percent of its own weight.

This is a world's record. This plane is no failure. There is nothing to compare with it since man took to the air down at Kitty Hawk, N.C.

The gentleman knows what he is talking about. This is a great company. They want to be sure it will work. Believe me, it will work. We will be the only nation on earth to have anything like this for airlift logistics or any type of mobility.

This is no pipe dream. It is a fact of life. Our committee has gone into this thing. We know something about airplanes too. This plane has 28 wheels on it. It can land in a crosswind with the wind blowing against it, and it can land sideways. There is nothing in the world like it. We are not selling you a bag of bones. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. May I endorse every remark the chairman of the committee just made.

Mr. Chairman, I want the Members to know that this is the biggest airplane in the world, the biggest in the world. Russia has nothing to compete with it. No other nation in the world does. And it is adaptable to civilian uses. It is conquering the air.

Throughout the months of various congressional hearings on the C-5A, and in view of the newspaper stories that have followed these hearings, there has occurred a greater distortion of public information than any I have ever witnessed in my years in Congress. The distortions, half-truths, and gross inaccuracies culminated in the introduction, both in the other body and now in this body, of amendments that would delete authorization for those C-5's that constitute the fourth squadron of aircraft.

The central issue, of course, is whether the United States needs the additional 23 C-5A's which are included in the committee bill but which are sought to be deleted by the amendment offered by my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE). On the question of need, the Armed Services Committee has ample testimony and information from the military to defend the requirement for these additional 23 C-5A's. I support strongly the committee views on this central question of need.

However, as the representative of the district in which C-5's are built and where over 28,000 men and women are employed in their production, there is another aspect of this subject I wish to discuss.

The proponents of this amendment have said that "a final decision on whether to go ahead with the added 23 aircraft can be deferred." Previously they had talked about a "1-year moratorium" on C-5 production. In the other body the sponsor of a companion amendment was a bit franker. He said his amendment was necessary in order to "put the Air Force in the driver's seat" in its negotiations with Lockheed for amendments to the C-5 contract.

I shall not presume to stand before this Committee and say that I am familiar with all the details of the contract between the U.S. Government and the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. But I will say that I have been a member of the bar since 1939 and have practiced law from every position in the courtroom, including that of having been a superior court judge. To me, it is unthinkable that the Government is immune from the solemn obligations of a contract and that persons who enter into agreements with the Government must run the risk of whimsical abrogation when a few members of our Military Establishment take sudden flight at the behest of a tiny minority of members of this Committee.

The Air Force and Lockheed are negotiating changes in the C-5 contract which are desired by the Government. I would dislike very much for the U.S. Congress to enter into those negotiations, as this amendment would have us do, so as to put the Government in the driver's seat.

This would mean that the Government has abrogated unto itself the power to disavow the terms of a solemn obligation and to wreak havoc with the plans of the management and employees of a major company which has in good faith engaged its personnel in the protection of our national security and which had a right, peculiar to free countries, to rely on its covenant with our Government.

The amendment's proponents also propose to abrogate the repricing clause in the C-5 contract. In this respect, it should be remembered that extensive testimony on this clause was made both by the Government and the contractor before the Armed Services Committee.

In this testimony, it was explained that this clause was not a "special agreement for Lockheed" as it was called by a Washington Post reporter. Nor was it a "golden handshake" with all the implications that go with that phrase. Instead, it was a contract clause offered to all three competitors in the 1965 competition for the C-5, and was designed to avoid catastrophic losses for the winning contractor, in the event unforeseen cost increases were to occur.

Lockheed testified that it could not have signed the contract without such a clause—the risk would have been too great. Now it is proposed that this contract clause be abrogated by the Government—that the Government should fail to live up to its agreement with Lockheed.

But what is the ultimate aim of this amendment? We already have heard voluminous testimony before the Armed Services Committee that Lockheed cannot make any profit on the C-5 contract and might lose \$200, \$300 million on it. And that is on the basis of the present terms of the contract. Does the amendment seek to go further than that, and put the Air Force into the driver's seat so far that Lockheed is driven into bankruptcy?

This, of course, would put the Congress in the position of punishing the Nation's most efficient and dependable defense contractor and cause layoffs of 20,000 of Lockheed's employees and layoffs of 20,000 more employees of subcontractors

and suppliers. Even more importantly, it would put us in the position of denying the Air Force a badly needed logistics support program that is designed to help our fighting men, who depend so much on the supplies and equipment that would be carried by the C-5.

Again I say that this last point—the need for these aircraft—should be not only the central issue, but the only issue in this debate. All of the members of the committee who have been victimized by misinformation on this procurement question, I submit—without meaning to impugn the motives of anyone—are, in the words of the late minority leader of the other body, simply leading us down the road to defeat.

Mr. HAGAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. I yield to my colleague from Georgia.

Mr. HAGAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly discuss the C-5A program and why I consider it essential that we proceed in an orderly manner to procure additional C-5 aircraft.

The C-5A program has been under examination for quite some time. All aspects of the program have been examined by our distinguished colleagues in the Senate and by us. The results of this investigation have produced supporters of the program and those who oppose spending any more money for additional aircraft. Today, I would like to say a few words in support of the program.

In carrying out our national commitments, a rapid response to regional contingencies is vital. The capability to provide this response with effective U.S. forces reduces the risk of localized crises and threatened aggression expanding into major conflicts. Rapid deployment of effective forces, of course, may require the capability to airlift necessary ground combat troops and their equipments.

During the late 1950's and early 1960's, the slow, range-limited C-124 was the major aircraft that provided this capability. However, this airplane and the other propeller-driven cargo aircraft can no longer provide the deployment mobility required by our commitments. In 1961, foreseeing the unavoidable retirement of our propeller aircraft, the Air Force proposed a large, fast aircraft designed to carry all of the large items of equipment of an Army division. This aircraft, the C-5A, was designed to be complementary to the C-141 which was developed as the first step in improving our airlift force.

In recent statements in this Chamber and in the Senate we have been reminded of our existing collective defense agreements with some 45 or 50 different countries around the world. These commitments and the overseas force we maintain to support them are subjects of substantial controversy. Congressional critics have said that "our overseas establishment which consists of 1.45 million troops, 500,000 dependents, and 250,000 foreign employees on 429 major and 2,980 minor bases is excessive." The senior Senator from Missouri stated in the Senate that these overseas establish-

ments could be reduced by creating a "remote presence."

Now I do not want to discuss the pros and cons of "remote presence" nor do I want to delve into the various facets of our foreign commitments. I just want to make the point that either continuing our present overseas forces the way they are now or establishing a "remote presence" requires an improvement in our airlift capability. The C-5 is the only way to satisfy the requirement for effective, rapid responses in the event of aggression in the various treaty areas. The Boeing 747 and other civilian aircraft will be able to assist in solving the airlift problem, but these will not be able to operate into and from unimproved fields, carry outside cargo, nor to function in an air drop role.

We have had considerable discussion about the number of airlift aircraft, including the C-5, needed to achieve our airlift objectives. Obviously, a great number of variables are involved in making this determination including the number of Army divisions to be deployed, the number of contingencies that have to be dealt with, and many others. From hearing these discussions, it is clear to me that the number of C-5 aircraft needed depends on our intentions to meet our treaty commitments and a judgment as to the military force these commitments would require. Our professional experts in determining required force levels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, continually evaluate these variables. They have consistently stated a need for more than three squadrons of C-5's.

If the funds for the C-5 for fiscal year 1970 are not approved, the minimum impact would be a delay of several months in the procurement of additional aircraft, and in view of the increased costs caused by any delay, it could possibly result in termination of the program. It is estimated that a 1 year funding delay would increase the costs of the full-scale 120-aircraft program by \$400 to \$575 million with a 1½-year delay in the delivery of the first additional aircraft. Even with only a 3-month delay, it is estimated costs would increase by \$135 to \$175 million.

Mr. Chairman, we cannot afford any delay or a chance of terminating this vital program. If we are to meet our commitments, the procurement of additional C-5's is imperative. I request all of you to support the authorization bill as written.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the unanimous-consent agreement. Members will be recognized for 1¼ minutes each for debate.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MOORHEAD).

(By unanimous consent, Mr. LEGGETT yielded his time to Mr. MOORHEAD.)

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, the case against the C-5A procurement is probably the best documented of any system within the authorization bill currently before the House. Beginning almost a year ago, the Joint Economic Committee, on which I serve, determined that these mammoth airplanes were going to cost the American taxpayers almost \$2 billion more than the original estimate. It is clear that—

First. The Air Force entered into a contract that was poorly conceived and which did not protect the taxpayers' interest, but even worse that—

Second. The Air Force purposefully withheld knowledge of the exorbitant overruns that were occurring—from Congress and from the public to protect itself against criticism which may be understandable but also to protect the position of Lockheed in the common stock market.

That, Mr. Chairman, is not the function of Air Force officials.

Furthermore, we are now told by the Air Force that costs will escalate even more, but they refuse to say how much.

With this long history of deceit and purposeful misleading of both bodies of the Congress and the public, I am more than a little dubious about one aspect of the C-5A airplane that has not been addressed adequately either here in the House or in the Senate—its performance. We have been furnished with glowing reports by the Air Force and other advocates of the plane including many members from Georgia which indicate that despite its cost it is a fine airplane. But is it? Do you know? I certainly do not.

It failed its recent wing strength test. We do know that the weight has been increased, full flap speed changed, and the landing sink rate decreased. There have been 46 design and performance changes—but the Air Force tells us that it will meet or exceed all specifications. We also know that the performance has been degraded so that its takeoff weight from unimproved runways has been decreased by 100,000 pounds. This means that it must carry less cargo or fuel for its return trip. However, there have been some 789 specification changes.

My question, Mr. Chairman, is: Will the plane meet the specifications or will the specifications meet the plane? What is going on? I have been trying to find out for 4 months. In June an Air Force witness promised to supply information relating to contract changes as they affect performance for the record of hearings by the Subcommittee on Economy in Government. That record is still open today. As recently as last week, I again attempted to obtain this information. The Air Force has systematically avoided responding to my requests. Why should they avoid responding? It is not a question of security classification. It is not a question of time—they have had almost 4 months to reply. In view of their past practice of withholding "bad news" from the Congress, I am becoming more and more suspicious all the time that we may end up with a plane that does indeed fly—but one which must be flown so gingerly that it will be of little utility to us under the stringent military conditions we are expecting it to operate. Why else would they refuse to supply this information?

It would be the height of irony if we were to end up with a complete fiasco on this program—a fantastically priced plane that barely works and which we do not really need. Let us not compound the error. Let us support the Pike amendment to delete funds for acquiring the fourth squadron of C-5A airplanes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PUCINSKI).

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, it is difficult to try to second guess the Armed Services Committee. It is obvious they are all experts in their field. They have done their homework well.

One does not quite know where the facts lie, because both sides are compelling in their arguments.

But I should like to point out to the House that the expenditures in this budget are based on an estimate of revenue made by the Bureau of the Budget and the Treasury Department a year ago, when they anticipated a \$5.5 billion surplus for 1969. When we consider that we have lost \$100 billion in value in the stock market so far this year, and Members have talked to building contractors in the last 2 days and know what has happened in that industry, and we know the auto industry this year is cutting back its production runs because of a slowdown in orders for 1970, there is a good possibility some \$15 billion to \$20 billion of revenue that had been anticipated in 1969 will never materialize.

I believe the Members ought to take that into consideration as they debate these amendments.

I supported the ABM because I believe it is absolutely necessary to our defense but I believe there is merit in all the other amendments to reduce the budget.

I believe the House should be advised this budget will lead to a substantial normal deficit for fiscal 1970 if we do not trim sail. Obviously, I shall have to vote for this bill in final passage but I do believe we ought to substantially reduce the unnecessary expenditures.

I intend to offer an amendment later if I am recognized which would provide this authorization shall be reduced by 10 percent of any debt we might have in anticipated revenues for 1969. It is obvious we must do everything possible to keep expenditures down. And I shall continue supporting amendments which will reduce this tremendous expenditure.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON).

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I may have the attention of the proponent of this amendment to answer a question.

Mr. Chairman, I believe everyone is pretty well familiar with the fact that contracts are entered into under a penalty provision. Whoever breaches the contract usually suffers a penalty.

If, for instance, Lockheed should fail to perform, they are subject to certain penalties each day for this failure. We have talked about what it will cost and what it is costing, but how much more will it cost the United States. That is one question. First of all, are we obligated, if your amendment prevails, to purchase them?

Mr. PIKE. If I understand the gentleman's question correctly, I would answer this way: We have already gone over the penalty figure for delay that Lockheed was responsible for, and all of the additional failures are chargeable to the taxpayers of America.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

Mr. PIKE. I will be happy to yield further to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. I appreciate the gentleman yielding, because I do not think I understand you and, if I did understand you, I do not agree with you. If I understand the situation correctly—and I heard the testimony just as you did—if we do this and correct this contract as we are supposed to do by your amendment—

Mr. PIKE. No, no. I hope they are not building the aircraft that we have not yet authorized, because, if they are, then there is something really wrong with our operation.

Mr. DICKINSON. Let me say to the gentleman, is there not an opinion by many that we are already obligated to purchase these planes? Are we not obligated?

Mr. PIKE. The Air Force said specifically that they did tell Lockheed they would do it subject to the action of the Congress, and that is what we are here for today.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BRAY).

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, something was said about experts on airplanes. I am certainly not one, although I have been on every subcommittee that was set up dealing with airlift that has been formed by the Committee on Armed Services, and I have been for many years the ranking minority member of the Air Lift Subcommittee. There was a great need for a plane like the C-5A. There is no question about that. Nothing like it has ever been produced before. Congress has nothing to do with making the contracts. We do need this plane badly and we need it even worse today than we did before. There has been an enormous amount of money spent on the C-5A. I am not at this time going to go into the argument as to the reasons for these costs, but I say it is a condition and not a theory that confronts us here today. It is the finest plane in the world for its purpose and no other nation has one that even approaches it. Most of the expense has already been incurred, and if we stop it today we will wreck something that we need.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. MONTGOMERY).

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, the Air Force made a flat statement that the military cargo planes are needed. Our own Armed Services Committee said we need it. The C-5A seems to be the answer. You know you cannot compare the Boeing 747 with the C-5A. The 747 is mainly a passenger plane. Of the 200 Boeing 747's ordered only three will be converted to cargo hauling. The C-5A can land on 1,300 runways around the world whereas the 747 can land on only 300 runways around the globe.

Mr. Chairman, I hope this amendment will be defeated.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT).

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, on the question of the funds in this bill for the

C-5A, I would like to make comments on the issues that have been raised.

It is said: "The Department of Defense has not justified the military necessity for the 4th squadron—planes 59 to 81—of C-5A aircraft."

ANSWER

The presently programed force of 6 C-5A squadrons was decided upon as a result of a series of studies in the early 1960's and culminated in a joint Army-Air Force study in 1964 known as "Airtrans 70's." This study analyzed the force closure times achievable with several alternatives airlift forces, based on the total military forces then planned for deployment under several potential contingency situations.

The study concluded that the closure times achievable justified an airlift force of at least 13 squadrons of C-141's and six squadrons of outsize transport aircraft.

The critical time in any deployment situation is the first several weeks. Sealift offers little help during this early time unless it is pre-positioned under a concept similar to that intended for the fast deployment logistic ships. However, in view of the lack of support for the FDL program by the Congress, it is unlikely that the United States will have that sealift capability to meet the initial requirements for a military deployment. Without that sealift capability, it is highly possible that the requirement for C-5A's will increase rather than decrease.

The requirements for strategic airlift including the C-5A are reviewed and approved annually by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

ISSUE NO. 2

During the Senate debate it was stated that the C-5A would provide a "remote presence" capability. That is, we could bring our boys home from foreign bases and only deploy them when required. This did not establish the need for additional airplanes for the following reasons:

It was not established that we do not already have this capability with our existing airlift capability of C-5A's already under contract, and C-141's. Senator SYMINGTON who enunciated this "remote presence" admitted this when he stated "Without benefit of a detailed analysis of the logistics problems involved, it is not possible to make an exact quantitative estimate of the effect of this revised threat scenario on U.S. heavy airlift requirements."

Additionally, the C-5A is not designed as a troop carrying plane. Its purpose is to carry the outsized equipment for an armed division in the first few days of an emergency. For troops or for longer periods of time, other planes and ships are as efficient and less costly.

ANSWER

In meeting a contingency requiring U.S. troops, we must either have our forces on the scene or capable of deploying them to the scene in the shortest amount of time to prevent the emergency situation from expanding beyond control.

It is more costly to keep our forces overseas in the hopes of preventing crises than it would be to keep a major portion

in the United States and deploy them rapidly as needed when emergency situations arise.

The C-5A is designed to carry approximately 99 percent of the heavy equipment of an Army division on the main cargo deck. Simultaneously on the upper deck the C-5A accommodates up to 83 drivers, troops, or support personnel. The balance of the troops and lighter equipment and cargo are carried in the C-141's and in the commercial aircraft of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet that are under contract.

As previously stated, the critical time for any deployment is the first several weeks. During this time MSTs vessels and notional ships cannot deliver from the United States to an overseas destination.

ISSUE NO. 3—COST OF THE C-5A AIRPLANE

It is said: First. The C-5A is a tremendously expensive airplane. Including amortized development costs, the plane has increased in cost from \$28 million apiece to approximately \$43.4 million apiece. This is almost double the cost of the 747 jumbo jet which is approximately the same size.

Second. These cost increases mean that the total program will cost about \$2 billion more than the Air Force originally said it would.

ANSWER

General Accounting Office witnesses testified before the committee that it looked like the overrun on the 115 aircraft that are now under contract with Lockheed will be \$1.3 billion.

The General Accounting Office also estimated the cost per airplane would be \$38 million for the first 58, or through run A, and \$30.2 million per aircraft for the 57 airplanes in run B. This is not almost double the cost of the 747 jumbo jet.

The Boeing 747 is comparable in overall size to the C-5A and was designed for commercial airlines primarily to carry as many passengers as possible. According to the Air Force, it is not an acceptable substitute to perform the missions planned for the C-5A. Although the 747 has a large cargo floor area, its irregularly shaped cargo door has a clear rectangular opening smaller than the cargo door of the C-141. Thus the 747 can not carry the outsize cargo for which the C-5A was designed. The main cargo deck of the 747 is over 16 feet off of the ground so that the aircraft can be loaded or unloaded only at airfields where special loading equipment has been located in advance. Also, as presently designed, the 747 is intended principally to move containers of cargo, while the military requirement involves the movement of substantial quantities of vehicles. The floor of the 747 is not stressed to carry heavy tanks, bridge launchers, cranes or other very heavy combat equipment. Finally, the 747 is not designed for operation on semi-prepared, short runways, for air dropping cargo, or for formation flying.

ISSUE NO. 4—AIR FORCE MANAGEMENT OF THE C-5A PROGRAM

It is said:

First. The Air Force has systematically refused to make public the facts about

the C-5A and has misled the Congress about the costs and the nature of the C-5A contract.

Second. The last Air Force cost estimate is almost 1 year old, and despite the huge cost overrun, and the fact that the Air Force admits that there will be further cost increases, the Air Force has failed to bring their cost estimate up to date.

Third. The Air Force entered into a contract with Lockheed that clearly does not protect the taxpayer's interests. It contains a reverse incentive in the so-called repricing formula, whereby Lockheed will be paid back more than 1 dollar on run B airplanes, for each dollar they overrun on run A.

ANSWER

The System Project Office—SPO—reporting to higher Air Force headquarters has been accomplished in an extensive, detailed, periodic, and timely manner. Review of minutes of the Designated Systems Management Group—DSMG—consisting of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, and their immediate staff meeting held throughout the period 1966-69 have revealed no withholding of known cost or performance problems by the System Project Office. Known cost growth estimates were reported to higher echelon at all times and as early as 1966 potential cost growth was discussed at the Designated Systems Management Group meeting. All official Air Force congressional testimony has been researched during this same period. Again, all cost and technical data known at the time of testimony was disclosed. However, this research did reveal that the context in which these figures were given varied.

The most critical period in this respect was found to be the May-June period. In March, testimony was given to the House Appropriations Committee to the effect that Air Force estimated an overrun of about \$250 million. The May 1968 cost study revealed for the first time that Lockheed costs might be running over contract ceiling. In June, after a detailed review of the May estimates, top Air Force and Department of Defense management decided to make a bottoms up estimate to confirm the May study results. The decision was also made to reflect the May estimates only in the selected acquisition reports—SAR's—and program change requests—PCR's—to OSD until the sudden rise in costs could be absolutely confirmed.

It was also decided that no other internal reports would reflect these costs until confirmed. Two specific Air Force reports were involved—the contract summary report and the USAF cost performance report. The contract summary report had actually not reflected an overrun since the first report of February 2, 1966, due to the System Project Office interpretation that the overrun related to overcelling costs. The reports submitted from May through December 31, 1968, did not reflect an overrun in accordance with the June decision to treat the estimates as tentative pending confirmation by the new bottoms up estimate. The USAF cost performance reports during the period May 1, 1968,

through December 29, were not updated to reflect the May estimates—no reports were submitted during the periods of July 1 through August 31 and November 4 through December 29. In addition, since the headquarters USAF management summary is based on these reports, it also did not reflect the latest cost estimates during this period. The reports for January 1969 all reflected the latest cost estimates.

It is at this juncture that the Air Force management judgment could be questioned by someone outside DOD not knowing all the considerations that went into the decision to wait until the bottoms up cost study was completed. These considerations were that: First, the May cost estimate resulted from extremely preliminary data; second, Lockheed contested its accuracy; third, potential inequity which this preliminary data, if made public, might have on Lockheed's overall financial health.

It is pertinent to point out that there were no procedural or policy requirements in the Department of Defense or Air Force that called any further disclosure of the May cost estimate. Then current procedures required only that reprogramming actions of the current fiscal year be reported—not changes in total program estimates, and that program status normally be provided Congress during budget hearings or on request of the committees.

To proceed, the "bottoms up" cost estimate was completed and reflected in the September 30 Selected Acquisition Report—SAR. This reflected an even greater total program estimate—\$4.3 billion.

Again, Department of Defense procedures did not require disclosure of this estimate. Providing no reprogramming action was required, the next logical point would be to reflect the \$4.3 billion in connection with the fiscal year 1970 budget—to be presented in early 1969. However, the C-5A came up in other congressional proceedings in November and, of course, the Air Force then acknowledged the increases, and subsequent detailed discussions were held with Armed Services and Appropriations Committee staffs.

One thing is clear, neither the Air Force nor the Department of Defense withheld requested data on costs to the Government for the C-5A from Congress. Cost data was reported internally within OSD at top management levels but, under the existing agreed upon procedures, was not automatically reported to the Congress. The information would have been, and was, furnished when requested. There is certainly room for disagreement between reasonable people as to whether additional data should have been voluntarily offered to Congress.

Continuing issue No. 4, it is said: Air Force failed to bring cost estimates up to date.

ANSWER

More accurate assessments of cost increases will be available as production progresses. The magnitude of the overrun cannot be established with absolute certainty however until 1971 when all actual costs through production run A

are known and agreed to between the contractors and the Government.

Continuing issue No. 4, it is said: "The Air Force entered into a contract with Lockheed that clearly does not protect the taxpayer's interests. It contains a reverse incentive in the so-called repricing formula, whereby Lockheed will be paid back more than one dollar on run B airplanes, for each dollar they overrun on run A."

ANSWER

The repricing formula was made part of the contract to preclude catastrophic loss if unknown risks, such as those which actually materialized, increased the cost of the C-5A beyond the range of foreseeable risk. This formula was developed in recognition of the fact that, as the time of the Request for Proposals, bidders were committing themselves to operational aircraft prior to their development and covering a long span of time.

Price adjustments resulting from the application of the repricing formula were not intended to turn a loss into a profit, and, in fact, do not. The clause was in the model contract to which all competitors bid and signed their contract before one was selected. Hence, it was not a special afterthought designed to protect Lockheed. It has been determined that, under a selected set of conditions, not fully understood at the time the contract was written, the price adjustment provisions of the contract can result in a "reverse incentive." A point can be reached where, for each additional dollar of cost occurring in the production of run A aircraft, the result is an increase in total contract target and ceiling of more than a dollar. This potential could encourage a contractor to add costs to run A so as to reduce his overall loss on both the run A and the run B production.

The provisions of the price adjustment clause are both vague and ambiguous as regards implementation. The clause is vague as to the technique of applying the multiplier factors of 1.5 and 2. It is vague with respect to the relationship of abnormal economic fluctuation to the repricing formula. There is no specific language to indicate if the formula's denominator—target cost—is all run A target costs or just run A target costs for those Materiel Procurement Codes in the numerator—actual costs. In addition, it does not address the question of whether the provision goes into effect when any portion of run B option is exercised. Based on the latest Air Force estimate of cost to complete, the contractor's net loss position could vary from \$56 million to \$285 million depending on how this ambiguity is resolved.

In summary, a recent Air Force review conducted by Assistant Secretary Whitaker found that this provision was well intentioned but poorly structured, and not fully comprehended at the time of award. In operation, it is beset with ambiguities, complicating its implementation and raising the prospect of a reverse incentive. The amount of reverse incentive and the point of its effectivity—the number of run B airplanes—depends upon resolution of all of the aforementioned. The supplemental agreement for

option B aircraft and engines limited the Government's obligation to funds for 99 more engines and for only the long lead-time material for the run B aircraft. This was done to avoid exceeding statutory authority regarding obligations.

No reverse incentive exists with the 23 aircraft being requested for fiscal year 1970. The Air Force is negotiating with Lockheed to eliminate the possibility of a reverse incentive, before more than the 23 fiscal year 1970 run B aircraft are procured.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment to delete \$481 million for procurement of 23 additional C-5A's pending a cost review by the Comptroller General.

There have been 58 C-5A's, three squadrons, authorized by Congress. This request for a fourth squadron at a cost of \$481 million does not seem necessary at this time. Studies made by the Systems Analysis Group of the Department of Defense have challenged the military and economic necessity of 23 additional planes. Although the Secretary of Defense overruled the opinion voiced in these studies, he has not provided Members of Congress with justification for the additional planes.

Even if a fourth squadron of 23 planes could be justified, this amendment would not hamper production schedules since they are already 6 months behind. Further delays are expected. Delivery is not planned until fiscal year 1972.

The C-5A program has been an extremely costly one. There have been numerous technical problems such as the failure of the wing spars. Only the Lockheed Corp. has benefited from the program. A repricing clause in the contract has made it quite profitable for Lockheed, but a fiscal disaster for the Government.

The Government has already had to pay at least \$1.3 billion more than the original estimate for research and development of the first three squadrons; and the cost overruns are expected to reach \$2 billion.

Delaying the decision will allow for a cost-benefit analysis, and will give the Government the ability to negotiate with Lockheed, instead of being forced to be victim to the repricing clause of the present contract.

The amendment is a sound amendment. Its adoption will signal the intent of Congress to exercise some measure of control over military procurement contracts.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS) to close debate.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, now that the figure of \$2 billion has been bandied around here by some of the opponents of this bill, we asked the GAO about it and they said it would be \$1.3 billion.

The Air Force says it will be \$1.4 billion.

Mr. Chairman, as everyone knows there are overruns on everything. I told you yesterday that there are overruns.

Overruns are no mortal sin. We have got to have this thing whether or not there are overruns. We are watching it. We have the GAO on it. We did not tell former Secretary of Defense McNamara to go out here and make a total package concept. We had nothing to do with that.

President Nixon now has a milestone concept and at regular intervals of about every 6 months he is advised as to the cost of these things.

But, if you are going to fight somebody, fight the former Secretary of Defense. We are trying to do something about it. If you terminate this thing now, listen to me, the Air Force says it will cost between \$400 million and \$500 million to get started again. They have got to have these planes. We cannot get rid of this plane.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from South Carolina has expired. All time has expired.

The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers.

Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. PIKE and Mr. RIVERS.

The committee divided, and the tellers reported that there were—ayes 60, noes 136.

So the amendment was rejected.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. LATTA

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. LATTA: On page 2, line 20, strike out the period and substitute a semicolon and add the following: "Provided, That none of the funds authorized herein shall be utilized for the procurement of Sheridan Assault Vehicles (M-551) under any new or additional contract."

Mr. LATTA. Mr. Chairman, I discussed this amendment before the Committee on Rules on Tuesday. I have since discussed it with the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and I have discussed it with the ranking Republican member of that committee, and they are in agreement with it.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the committee for accepting this amendment and recognizing in this bill that this Sheridan tank has not only been a costly failure but according to reports, it constitutes a safety hazard for its occupants. It is, therefore, time to bring the program to a halt. Believe it or not, \$1 billion of taxpayer's money has been expended on this unworthable tank since 1959 and some army people still want to continue it.

By adopting my amendment there would be no further contracts entered into for these Sheridan tanks, or better known as Sheridan assault vehicles, after the present contract expires.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LATTA. I will be happy to yield, but first let me point out to the gentleman from New York that I do not believe I have ever read a more comprehensive report on any given subject than

the one that the gentleman and his subcommittee prepared on this subject and I commend him for it.

Mr. STRATTON. I certainly appreciate the gentleman's very generous words.

I was not quite clear on listening to the gentleman's amendment whether his amendment would alter the bill to the extent that we are funding those tanks which would represent completion of the original contract which was signed back in 1964.

The committee felt, after examining the situation, that to terminate this contract short of the remaining number of vehicles—and I have forgotten the exact number, but I think it is 20 or something like that—we would actually run into more expense, with increased costs. I do not know whether the gentleman is trying to prevent us completing that.

Mr. LATTA. No, I am not attempting to do that. I agree with the gentleman's finding in his report that it would probably cost more money to terminate the present contract than to permit them to fulfill what remains of it.

By reason of that fact, my amendment does not terminate the present contract but says none of the funds authorized herein shall be utilized for the procurement of them under any new or additional contract.

Mr. STRATTON. I appreciate the gentleman's explanation.

Mr. LATTA. I want to make it clear, however, that we want no more of these tanks.

Mr. STRATTON. I think I am in complete agreement with the gentleman.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I do not see how I can oppose this amendment, and so far as I am concerned, I accept the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LATTA).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. LEGGETT

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT: On page 2, line 4, strike out "\$4,002,200,000" and insert "\$3,962,200,000".

On page 2, line 8, strike out "\$1,486,400,000" and insert "\$1,466,000".

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) is recognized.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, this may be the last amendment to the hardware items in this bill. This is your last opportunity to register a vote for economy, if you are so inclined. If you are inclined to err ad infinitum on behalf of safety, why then shout this amendment down.

I want to tell you in spite of how it may appear on the floor here that some of we dissidents from the committee might lay bare our defenses; certainly that is not true.

We are recorded by not making our objection in this bill for the F-14 aircraft, the F-15 aircraft, the VSX aircraft, the EC-3A aircraft, for the SAM-D and I could go on and list another 50

programs that we have approved up to this point and that we are going to approve.

So we are not nitpicking and we are not singling out every single item in the bill to object to.

But with the SRAM particularly, that program appealed to us for curtailment. It appealed to the Department of Defense for curtailment because this year they cut out of that program \$326 million out of the development costs. They are not totally terminating the program. They would leave in the bill on the order of 84 million for research and development and \$40 million for SRAM modification of the B-52. Twenty million dollars for the development of the SRAM missile itself. The SRAM is defined in the Air Force Space Digest as a short-range supersonic air-to-ground launch and standoff attack missile.

It is going to replace the Hound Dog missile but it is supersonic. It is nuclear and it is expensive, I say, if it is the will of this House to impose some limitations on the unreasonable expenditures of contractors, then I say, this is the place to go ahead and include some discipline. As I note in my remarks, at page 172 of the report, in this one contract alone we thought it would cost us, about three years ago, \$161 million to develop this program with the great company of Boeing. They have been doing other things, but I guess they have not been able to zero-in on just exactly what we are doing here, because their development costs now are \$314 million, a 94-percent overrun, a greater percentage overrun than we have any place in the Department of Defense or the Department of the Air Force.

The cause of it, as has been explained in the report, is the fact that this is in part a program in which we need to work with the Atomic Energy Commission to develop nuclear warheads. It so happened, over in the AEC section, they developed a warhead that was an inch out of kilter with the balance of the missile. This seems totally impossible in this day and age when we can put a man on the moon within a half minute of the time we prognosticate. But that is what they did with this program.

We were supposed to have a flying air-to-ground supersonic nuclear missile tested in February of this year. The tests did not come off because the program did not jell. It was not until July of this year that we finally got the solid-propellant engine in this missile to reignite in flight but the missile still missed its target.

I would say another thing. This missile is supposed to be developed in the early seventies so that it can attach to the B-52. The B-52, according to other sections of the majority report is scheduled to be phased out in the mid-seventies—so how long will the system be useful?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to proceed for 2 additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mr. HALL. I object.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. I shall not consume the time allotted to me, because I feel the Members would like to hear the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Hicks) when he addresses himself to this subject. I know he is knowledgeable about it, and I know he has some very strong views.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment should be defeated. As you can readily determine by turning to page 74 of the committee report, authorization for the further R. & D. and early production of the short range attack missile—SRAM—is of the highest urgency. It will fill a vacuum in our family of missiles. SRAM missiles will provide our deterrent force with greatly increased capabilities to penetrate terminal defenses and present a variety of threats for the enemy to worry about. The range is about 350 miles.

Early deployment of the SRAM will produce three distinct cost advantages. The useful life of the B-52 can be extended into the mid-1970's, thereby reducing the need for their earlier replacement. It will permit a leveling off of FB-111 aircraft. And it will be needed for the advanced manned strategic aircraft.

As is not uncommon in the development of highly sophisticated weapons, many technical difficulties have plagued the SRAM development effort. Fortunately most of the bugs have been removed. There was a successful test from a B-52 at White Sands on July 29, and another is scheduled within a few days from now. Perfecting this weapon has been a long and rocky road to travel. And it has been expensive, but very rewarding.

It has now been determined that the technology is sound and that a reliable system will emerge. After additional tests, procurement will be in order, but there will be no procurement until further tests are concluded.

In case funds for procurement are not provided, the Air Force will have a proven missile system in April 1970 but no funds to provide for its deployment, causing a slippage of operational use by an estimated 18 months.

It is imperative that this funding be provided—now. It is foolhardy to deny the Air Force the opportunity to deploy the SRAM at the earliest possible date and at the same time cause a very costly delay, both in time and money, and above all—the strategic strength of our Nation.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. DELLENBACK. A parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. DELLENBACK. Mr. Chairman, did I understand the reading clerk correctly when he read the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Leggett) on page 2, line 8 to call for a reduction of the figure from "\$1,486,400,000" to a grand total of "\$1,466,000", a reduction of \$1,485,000,000?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, that

was a Freudian slip. That really should have read "\$1.46 billion" in the last part of my amendment. I ask unanimous consent that my amendment be so corrected.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will reread the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT: On page 2, line 4, strike "\$4,002,200,000" and insert "\$3,962,200,000".

On page 2, line 8 strike "\$1,486,400,000" and insert "\$1,466,000,000".

Mr. HICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the gentleman from California.

The hour is late and we are getting tired. I suspect this amendment is going to be defeated anyway, and it should be defeated.

The SRAM missile is part of our strategic nuclear deterrent. It is just exactly the same as the missile on the ground, the Minuteman, and the Polaris submarine in the ocean, and this is the weapon we use on our aircraft.

As pointed out by the gentleman from Texas, it is a nuclear tipped missile, about 14 feet long. A B-52 will carry 20 of them. The FB-111 will carry six of them. It is to be used and is used as part of our nuclear deterrent.

There will be probably amendments offered later to strike funds for the AMSA (the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft) now called the B-1.

People say we do not need a new bomber. Well, if we do not need a new bomber, certainly we need to be able to use the bomber we now have, and the bomber we now have is the B-52, and the B-52 is not usable against the defenses of the Soviet Union if it has to carry bombs over the target and deposit them.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. HICKS. I yield briefly.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to take up the gentleman's time, but I am curious about one fact. As I understand it, although the Soviet Union has no strategic bomber force and we do, the Russians therefore have a relatively good air defense system.

Mr. HICKS. I so understand.

Mr. FRASER. If we equip our B-52's with this new missile, the SRAM, the Soviet Union would probably be forced to operate their air defense system.

Mr. HICKS. We will anticipate that they will continue to operate their air defense system regardless.

Mr. FRASER. So what we will be doing as we add the SRAM to our inventory is force the Soviet Union to a further expenditure in defense, which may be good, because that will use up all her resources and thereby make it more difficult for her system to work.

Mr. HICKS. Of course, that is one of the theories behind having the mix of offensive weapons we have, so that they have to be equipped to defend against all three of them. There is no question about that. That would be one of the subjects we hope that would be taken up in the

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—SALT—if they occur.

Mr. FRASER. At least it would be fair to say the Soviet Union has no counterpart to the U.S. strategic bomber force.

They do not have the same forces, and as far as the gentleman knows they are not planning to acquire a larger force?

Mr. HICKS. That is my understanding.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. HALL. I appreciate the gentleman's yielding, because that is certainly not my understanding.

I am a little tired of hearing the assumptions that we are ahead in nuclear capacity, in fleet capacity, in capital ship capacity, and now in strategic capacity. I do not know on what intelligence or on what basis these assumptions are handed out here willy-nilly, and on which some of the debate is based.

The gentleman is a member of the committee. He hears about the Bison, the Bear, and the Badger. He knows of the overflights and the long-range TU-41. We know, within reasonable figures, the exact numbers available, and the capability of the aggressor's strategic air force.

I believe we should straighten out the record as to the assumption that there is no strategic air capability in the aggressor.

Mr. HICKS. The gentleman is exactly right that we know the Soviet capability. He also knows as well as I know that the Soviets do not begin to have the capability of the Strategic Air Force we do, despite all the names he so glibly reeled off just a moment ago. They do not begin to be able to compete with our Strategic Air Force.

Nevertheless, we still need the SRAM missile to make our Strategic Air Force even better, to keep it at top capacity, so that if we do not get the AMSA now called the B-1 we will still have the very best in the way of a nuclear deterrent.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

I appreciate the candor of the gentleman from Washington in his discussion of the Soviet bomber threat.

Here we have a contest between the United States strategic bomber offensive capability and a growing Soviet air defense which they are trying to maintain so as to offset our bomber threat. Now we are being asked to spend more money to make our bomber threat more credible, which will force the Soviets to spend more money to make their defense more effective.

I am not against making our bombers more effective, but it seems to me at some point we ought to recognize that all we are doing is fueling the arms race. We are seeking to improve an arm of our strategic force which has not substantial counterpart in the Soviet Union. Because they obtain some kind of a defense against what we have, we try to go to an even higher plateau of effectiveness.

When does reason intervene to stop this kind of ever-increasing rise in the arms expenditures? When can we say we have a sufficiently credible bomber deterrent? Perhaps it has some prob-

lems of penetration, but we do not have to face a comparable threat from the Soviet Union.

Before this debate is over, I hope that it will be made crystal clear that when we have put Poseidon missiles into 31 nuclear submarines we will have in every single submarine the capacity to destroy 160 Soviet cities, more cities than are worth destroying. There is nobody on the floor of the House who even pretends that our submarine fleet at the present time is vulnerable to any Soviet destruction. If they should try to destroy our submarine fleet, and they miss but one, then we would destroy 160 cities.

It is this kind of madness, it is this kind of unrealistic effort to meet contingencies which are remote, which is bothering the people of the United States.

We have, as has been said here before, very real threats to the United States that emanate from within. We have problems in our cities and racial tensions; we have alienation; we have young people marching. Yet we go blithely forward spending, spending, spending for military expenses against contingencies which are neither real or substantial. I hope at some time this House will feel the concern that the American people have as we move this spiral upward, and that instead we will begin to respond to their desire for a balanced and improved defense program which is related to the real world and protects our security, but not a program that goes after every conceivable, marginal threat.

Mr. HAGAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I have followed closely the development of the short range attack missile—SRAM.

The original program for its development was approved in 1965 based on the Air Force estimate of \$161.6 million, excluding contract definition. Since the inception of the SRAM, a total of \$297.4 million has been appropriated for research, development, test and evaluation only.

The development cost has grown to an estimated total of \$413.4 million.

There has been two principal reasons for this cost increase:

First, various technical problems encountered during development have required more time and effort to solve than had been originally estimated.

Second, design changes and schedule availability changes in Government supplied interfacing equipment have caused redesign and rescheduling of SRAM system components.

As you may know, the major area of technical problems was the development of the missile rocket motor.

Although progress is now being made, the motor subcontractor faced very serious problems in 1967 and 1968 due in part to stretching the state-of-the-art required to build this small motor in a compact body.

Solving these problems involved major efforts including the redesign of this motor, which has run the subcontractor's costs over the ceiling of the subcontract.

Under the incentive sharing arrangement of the subcontracts, the prime con-

tractor must pay a portion of the costs over the target price up to the ceiling price.

The Government pays a portion of these costs up to the prime contractor's ceiling price in accordance with the cost sharing provisions of the contract.

Costs over the ceiling price are paid solely by the contractor.

These technical problems also extend the period of time the development program must be carried prior to going into production.

The first powered missile launch, scheduled in August 1968 was accomplished from a B-52 over the White Sands Missile Range, N. Mex., on July 29, 1969.

The contract test objectives were satisfactorily accomplished on this mission which gives high confidence that the motor problems have been solved.

In my review of the program, I have found that the biggest part of the cost increase in the design changes and availability of Government supplied equipment are in the FB-111 interface and the availability of the FB-111 for test purposes.

The SRAM development contract incorporated a specific baseline for each of the SRAM carrier aircraft configuration, this being the aircraft's performance including the avionics and the availability of these aircraft as Government furnished property to the SRAM contractor.

Under the total package contract which outlined correction of deficiencies responsibility for the total combined B-52/SRAM and FB-111/SRAM systems, including the interface specifications, the Government became liable whenever its side of the interface specifications or its requirement to furnish equipment could not be met.

I further found that the principal difficulty had to do with the large numbers of changes that were required as a result of the concurrent development of the FB-111 aircraft, the SRAM missile itself and the warhead.

The result is that as a problem shows up requiring a design change on the aircraft it necessitates a design change on the missile to insure compatibility as both evolve into operational hardware.

Since the SRAM must also be compatible with the B-52, it also resulted in many engineering hours and hardware redesigns for this aircraft.

Some of these major interface problems were:

The change of the engine inlet on the FB-111, the redesign of the bomb bay doors, the interface with the Mark I, then the change to the Mark II Avionics, redesign of the warhead to incorporate Permissive Action Link—another nuclear Safeguard which is classified—and the updating of the B-52 Bomb Navigation Capability, and additional B-52 emergency power requirements.

Further, various developments and changes in the FB-111 program—slips, reduced buys, and so forth—have caused the availability of test aircraft for SRAM to slide significantly since the start of the SRAM program.

This has required rephasing and stretchout of the SRAM test program.

Due to the reasons I have just enumerated, the original program cost estimate of \$161.6 million for SRAM development has grown to an estimated \$413.4 million, of which \$190.1 million is related to the interface and schedule changes discussed. Since these changes are directed by the Government, these are costs which must be borne by the Government.

The estimated over-target costs of \$60 million is the Government's portion of the cost increases due to the unforeseen technical problems I discussed earlier.

On the surface, it would appear the program suffered from weaknesses in coordination of the program which, no doubt, cost the taxpayer a substantial sum.

And perhaps some of this could have been avoided by better planning and coordination.

To that extent, improvements must be made within the Department.

Despite the high cost of the SRAM program, however, we should not lose sight of the fact that the program is now on the threshold of production. We should not deny this request for funds because we have incurred seemingly exorbitant costs.

We must not take away the opportunity from the Air Force to prepare for production when it appears to be within grasp.

The earlier this weapon is introduced into the weapon inventory, the more savings we will derive.

The real savings are derived from the extension of the useful life of our B-52 bomber forces and the reduction of large numbers of strategic bomber forces.

I urge my colleagues to carefully consider the SRAM program from this viewpoint before consideration is given to any hasty reduction in funding.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT).

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. LEGGETT), there were—ayes 34, noes 88.

So the amendment was rejected.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. PIKE

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. PIKE: On page 2, line 6, before the semicolon, insert the following language: "No funds authorized and appropriated for the deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile system shall be expended until the Congress has been advised by the executive branch of Government of a clear policy and definitive plans for the command and control of such system. Such definitive plans shall include at a minimum the following information: The titles of the person or persons authorized and responsible to order the launch of the missiles; the manner in which that person or persons shall be informed of an impending attack and shall give the order to launch; any provisions which are made for contingencies regarding the absence, death, or disability of such persons and the titles of all persons authorized to and responsible for the exercise of command and control under such contingencies."

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I think that this should not be a long discussion. But I do think it is an important discussion.

Let us start by saying this is one which to the best of my knowledge no one sup-

ported me over in the committee and I do not want there to be any question that I come here fresh from some other triumph on the Armed Services Committee. No, I will take that back. I am advised that I did have one vote of support.

We have authorized the deployment of an ABM. Our basic law, as I understand it, on the control of nuclear weapons and who can authorize the use of them, is in the Atomic Energy Act, and it says that:

The President from time to time may direct the Commission to deliver such quantities of special nuclear material or atomic weapons to the Department of Defense for such use as he deems necessary in the interest of national defense.

The report which accompanied that legislation said this:

In view of their enormous military significance the atomic weapons are subject under the bill to full control by the President as Commander-in-Chief.

In our hearings—and I refer you now specifically to page 1927—we discussed the question. And there are many people who disagreed with me as to the validity of the ABM concept who share with me a troubled feeling as to who is going to authorize the firing of the ABMs, and perhaps with some people it is a question of whether it will get authorized in time or not. My own feeling is that if we continue to say, as we have said that only the President has this power, the system simply cannot work. I read from page 1927 of the hearings and this is a question I asked of Secretary Packard:

Mr. PIKE. You were quoted, I think, personally, as saying that there would be no delegation of this power. I think this is very vital, Mr. Chairman, this point that you raised.

The CHAIRMAN. I think so, too.

Mr. PIKE. You were quoted in the New York Times as saying there would be no delegation of this power. Is this an accurate quotation?

Secretary PACKARD. I believe it is very important. The nuclear weapon is such a dangerous device that I think it is necessary that it be kept under the control of the President.

I should say, just to put this in context, that we were talking about the ABM.

On the following page, page 1928, Dr. Foster said:

Now, to release this weapon under these conditions—

He was talking about the different types of nuclear attack on America—requires the authority of the President.

As we said yesterday, the President is never away from the communications that tie him to the civilian military authorities that operate the system.

Well, I just submit to you that that is poppycock. The President is away from the civilian military authorities that tie him to the system. The President may be throwing out a ball at the opening ball game. He may be doing some very important work in southeast Asia. He may be in all kinds of places, but he is not available all the time.

He was not available at the time of Pearl Harbor. The message did not get there.

He was not available at the time of the *Liberty* incident—the message did not get through.

The *Pueblo* messages did not get through, and the EC-121 messages did not get through.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, is it not also true that he was not necessarily available at the time when he was visiting an Iron Curtain country recently.

Mr. PIKE. Of course it is true that he was not instantly available.

I simply submit to you that there are people who are in favor of delegating this power. There are people who are not in favor of delegating this power. I think the very least we have to do is establish some lines of command and control, and be honest with the American people about what we are doing, because if you are not honest with the American people about what you are doing we are telling them that we are depending upon a system that we know cannot work, because the President is never going to get the message in time to use it.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, the amendment of the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE) would preclude deployment of any anti-ballistic-missile system until the President revealed to Congress the persons who would be authorized—delegated—the responsibility of firing the defensive weapon. The Chief Executive would have to reveal the manner in which the Congress would be informed. In addition, the Commander in Chief would have to reveal the manner in which the order would be given and, finally, who would succeed to the authority.

Mr. Chairman, I hope the amendment will be defeated on the basis that the President is the Commander in Chief. I have already spoken about our responsibility as a Committee and as the Congress to raise, provide for, and support the Armed Services and will not repeat it at this time. I am very jealous of the duties of the Congress, and anxious that we fulfill our committee responsibilities, but there is such a thing as the principle of the separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Having served in the executive branch during World War II, I am anxious that the Commander in Chief be allowed to continue operating our forces, and indeed be the Chief Executive and administrator of the executive branch. This amendment would require an infringement on his constitutional prerogative—and indeed his responsibilities—and change operational control to "advisory to the legislative branch." It would lock the President in. Second, the release of this information would increase the possibility of sabotage of our command and control system to say nothing of our defensive system. I believe the amendment should be defeated.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. PIKE), there were—ayes 32, noes 86.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks immediately prior to the action on the previous amendment.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I object.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word, and I am not going to take any time.

But we have just seen a rather unprecedented incident take place in this House where any Member of Congress is denied the right to extend his remarks in the RECORD. I wish the gentleman would reconsider and withdraw his objection.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. PIKE

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. PIKE: On page 2, line 4, add the following language: "of which \$42,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the procurement of OV-10 aircraft".

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I regret to say that this amendment does not save a dime.

It does this. It does not say where the money is to come from, but it would be my hope that we would take the price, or at least the alleged price of two C-5A aircraft and with it buy approximately 100 OV-10 aircraft.

The OV-10 aircraft is not a glamorous plane. It is a relatively small plane optimized for the light attack role in a guerrilla environment.

It recently had writeups in both the Navy Aviation News and the Armed Forces Journal. The Armed Forces Journal referred to the fact that over half of the engagements in Vietnam last less than 20 minutes. The OV-10 in a test which the Air Force recently ran was available in 5 minutes. The nearest any other aircraft we have, for the close-air-support role, can come is an average of 50 minutes. If half of the engagements are over in 20 minutes and the planes do not get there for 50 minutes, you really do not have anything you can call close air support.

The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BRAY) yesterday made a fine speech about the A-7 as a close-air-support aircraft. The A-7 started as a plane called the F-8. It was made by Ling-Temco-Vought. It was a fighter plane. They did not have anything else, so they decided to make an attack plane out of it. At that time the project was called Val. So they gave some to the Navy and they gave some to the Air Force, and the Air Force found that with the engine they had in it they couldn't get it off the ground. Literally, on a hot day, with a full load in Vietnam, the plane would not fly. So they had to put a more powerful engine in it, and they did it.

But it is not a close-air-support aircraft. It is a conversion of an obsolete fighter. That is what it is.

Later on in this bill you will find a provision prohibiting the Air Force from developing the only close-air-support plane that the Air Force has ever come close to supporting. It is a plane called the Ax. The committee bill says, "Don't

develop the Ax." And I am saying, for heaven's sake, if we really care about the people who are on the ground in Vietnam or anywhere else, let us get them an aircraft that can get to them within the timeframe in which they need it. If the OV-10 can do it in 5 minutes and it takes anything else 50 minutes, let us give them an OV-10. For the price of two C-5A's you can get 100 of them. I happen to believe that we are not really going to have the nuclear holocaust. I happen to believe that our deterrent power plus the simple sanity of world leaders is going to prevent this all-out nuclear exchange that we all dread.

So what are we left with? If you were a Communist leader and you saw what was going into Vietnam, what would you do? I would submit you would try to start more Vietnams, and I would suggest to you that we ought to have the kind of plane which is performing magnificently over there. We have an opportunity to buy it. The production line for us is over, but the Germans are buying some. This is the last opportunity we will have to do it, and I think it is important.

Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. (Mr. ROONEY of New York). The gentleman from Ohio is recognized.

Mr. DEVINE. I rise for economic reasons as they relate to the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York. The OV-10A is also known as the Bronco. This is a counter-insurgency-type aircraft. It happens to be the product of a manufacturing company in my district, in Columbus, Ohio, the North American Rockwell Co. They worked for many years developing this aircraft, and it is currently in use.

Last month I put a rather detailed, comprehensive report on the performance of this aircraft into the RECORD, and I would invite our Members' attention to it. This will not give us any additional funds. It is my understanding the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York would merely substitute an OV-10 aircraft in place of two C-5A's and it would serve the purposes that are needed in our current conflict in Vietnam.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE). I am in full agreement with his proposal that \$42,000,000 be authorized to be appropriated from the suggested aircraft allotment for the Air Force, and utilized solely for the procurement of the OV-10A aircraft manufactured by North American Rockwell.

I support this particular procurement from a rather unique perspective, at least for a Member of Congress. I have logged several hours flying time in the OV-10A aircraft. I have put the Bronco, as it is called, through several series of maneuvers and flight tests similar to those I employed when I flew combat in jet fighter planes during the Korean war. I found the Bronco to be highly maneuverable and extremely flexible in terms of the combat support functions it could provide our troops in the field.

The record that the Bronco has com-

plied in only 7 months of combat operations in Southeast Asia is an enviable one. It is a matter of record that during the 7 months Air Force OV-10A's were used in the combat zone, they compiled an average monthly utilization rate of 94 hours. In addition, the average operational readiness rate for the 7-month period was 87 percent, as compared with the Air Force standard rate of 71 percent. The Marine Corps has maintained high utilization and operational ready rates with the Bronco, accumulating 16,100 combat hours through April 1969. Together, the Air Force, Marine Corps, and the Navy, totaled almost 36,000 combat hours through April of this year using this aircraft.

The OV-10A has some special attributes which are worthy of mention. A Bronco piloted by two veteran Marine Corps officers has claimed a new class distance record with a nonstop flight of better than 2,500 miles. With the exception of auxiliary fuel tanks, the record-breaking aircraft is identical to those now in service in Vietnam.

The Navy is presently using OV-10A's to power its light attack squadron which, in addition to fulfilling valuable forward control and spotting functions, is providing much-needed firepower support for U.S. ground troops operating in the enemy-infested delta region. Normal firepower for the Bronco includes machineguns and rockets of various sizes.

I know from experience how valuable these armaments can be. If a pilot is flying a forward position and he spots an enemy tank that has American troops pinned down with deadly gunfire, there is no time to call up planes with heavy armament. In situations such as this, the enemy tank must be knocked out on the spot. The Bronco can perform this task. In tight spots, it can help save American lives.

The operational successes of the Bronco have been recognized by our allies. At the recommendation of the German Air Force, the German Ministry of Defense is buying 18 OV-10A aircraft through the U.S. Government, with follow-on production orders. Performance, not advertising, sells contracts such as this; we would be wise to profit from it.

Mr. Chairman, on the basis of my personal experience with the OV-10A Bronco, coupled with its outstanding performance in the field, I can recommend its increased utilization by the U.S. Air Force. I think that earmarking \$42,000,000 in the general Air Force aircraft procurement quota is a good way of insuring that the Bronco will see further action; I hope, however, that all the services will employ the OV-10A, as its flexibility, versatility, and durability, makes it ideally suited for our air combat needs.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I oppose the amendment. The plane called Bronco was built as a counterinsurgency aircraft. I have in my hand a picture of it. It has done a terrific job. Nobody, but nobody, but nobody ever dreamed that this fine little aircraft would be for close ground support. It is fine as a forward air control aircraft—FAC—but they could not use it for close ground support. In any area but South Vietnam, they would

shoot it to kingdom come. When you get over the frontlines, you have to get in and out fast. This plane is just not designed for that purpose. We have a close ground-support plane, the A-7, which is a magnificent aircraft and a subsonic aircraft. They made a deal with the Army that the Air Force would take the close ground support and the Army would yield certain aircraft they had for that purpose.

Yet, they did not try under the last Chief of Staff to make the A-7 work. We made them take those or we would take the close ground support from them. This little aircraft has great capability. It is a magnificent aircraft, but the plane is not designed for this sort of thing. It just cannot operate that way. Now we have a plane doing that. We have never yet fulfilled the mission of the A-7. We have the plane. Let us make the Air Force use it. But the OV-10A is not for this purpose.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that we vote on the amendment.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE) to close the debate.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I asked that we vote on the amendment.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman from California was recognized.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state the Chair recognized the gentleman from California for 5 minutes for purposes of debate. He has yielded to the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, it is absolutely true, as the Chairman states, that the Air Force has never used the OE-10 in the role of close support, but the OE-10 is flown not only by the Air Force, but also by the Marine Corps, and it does act in that role, and also the Navy does use it in that role.

This plane is an armed aircraft in the Marines and in the Navy. It has never been an armed aircraft in the Air Force until they finished their evaluation of it this year. It is an armed aircraft today, and it can be used for close air support, as it is in the Marines.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, the Marines have an altogether different mission. Everything in the Marines, when they talk about obstacles, is close ground support—even the cooks and the bottle-washers. This has nothing to do with close ground support as we have it on the battlefield. We have a close air-ground support but this is not it. We cannot compare the Marines with the U.S. Army. Theirs is a different mission.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I will read from the U.S. Air Force Digest, on page 215, talking about the OV-10, where they say this aircraft carries more armament and can perform close support duties.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on

the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

The amendment was rejected.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BINGHAM

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BINGHAM: On page 2, line 3, strike "\$2,391,200,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$2,116,200,000".

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, my amendment eliminates \$275 million in procurement funds for the first production models of the airplane. The amendment does not affect research and development—R.T.D. & E.—funds, \$175 million, or the Navy's plan to build and fly six test models, three of which are provided for in the \$175 million. Let us not have another TFX fiasco.

The health of the American aircraft industry has been sorely tested by the boom-to-bust pattern of military procurement in recent years. We have seen many projects, which we backed in good faith, terminated or threatened with termination after costs got out of hand because Pentagon managers had acted with undue haste and optimism in deciding to go into production. This cycle is wasteful. It is unfair to the workers at defense plants which lose business. And it is harmful to national security. The experts are unanimous in agreeing that the way to prevent this disastrous sequence in the future is to build flying prototypes of new aircraft before making the commitment to introduce them into the military inventory.

My amendment says to the Navy: go slow. Build the first six test models with R.T.D. & E. funds and see how they fly. Be sure the aircraft can be built to weight and performance specifications before you pay to tool up for production. Make sure the new engines will live up to expectations, and that the Phoenix missile and electronics systems will work as you want them to. If and when all these systems work, it will be time enough to start production.

The early production models of the F-14 will be equipped with obsolete engines designed for the F-111, because an improved engine will not be available for at least 3 years. The F-111 engines will serve well on test models. But it is acknowledged that they have inadequate thrust for air-to-air combat with existing Soviet fighters, not to mention those that will surely come. The only stated purpose for rushing the F-14 into production now is to have a handful of aircraft—less than 100—to defend our fleet against Soviet bombers and ship-launched cruise missiles by 1973. But both the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee in a 1968 report on tactical airpower, and the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MAHON), have told us that the Soviet bomber threat to our fleet has failed to materialize as predicted. In 1961, Congress was told that it was imperative to have a fleet air defense system using the Phoe-

nix missile against Soviet bombers by 1969. Last year we were told it was safe to put this defense off another 4 or 5 years. Nothing has happened since then to challenge the conclusion that this defense can be safely delayed at least another year beyond that while the large technical problems involved in this new aircraft system are worked out.

Because they will lack the new engines, the early production models of the F-14 will serve only to carry the Phoenix missile. This will cost at least \$400,000 a copy, according to the latest estimates. Indeed, the whole Phoenix system could cost several billion dollars in addition to the cost of the F-14. Yet the Phoenix has not been tested against supersonic or maneuvering targets. The tests to date have been carefully structured. They are hardly a fair measure of the performance to be expected from this very expensive, very complex system under ordinary conditions of maintenance and combat. Clearly the Phoenix needs more testing. It would be foolish to authorize procurement of aircraft which can be used only for the Phoenix before it is clear that either the aircraft and the missile will work effectively.

Dr. John Foster, Jr., the Director of Defense Engineering and Research, has warned us that "we should be cautious" in developing the F-14, because, he says:

Despite the best efforts of the professionals in the Navy and the contractors, we will have difficulties in fitting the Phoenix fire-control system into the new aircraft, and in mating the new engines.

And Admiral Connolly, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, has declared:

The least risk program is to build the airplane, build a half dozen perhaps and don't do another thing until you fly these airplanes to the point where you are sure you have worked out everything.

These gentlemen did, nevertheless, recommend against the "least risk" program.

The production aircraft proposed to be deleted by my amendment would be, pound for pound, the most expensive tactical aircraft we have ever put into production. Each of them would cost nearly \$46 million. At a weight of 36,000 pounds each, that works out to over \$1,270 a pound, more than twice the cost of gold. Once in mass production, the airplanes will cost close to \$12 million each, and perhaps as high as \$19 million. Recent Pentagon and industry studies are said to prove that a very good fighter can be built by 1974 for one-third as much, or less.

An impressive body of evidence based on Vietnam combat experience has been marshaled in recent months to show that the national interest could be better served by building a highly maneuverable fighter with great acceleration—characteristics in which, the Navy acknowledges, the F-14 is somewhat deficient. It was for this reason that the Air Force flatly rejected the notion that the F-14, even with advanced engines, could serve its needs for an air superiority fighter.

The most this amendment could cost us would be a short further delay in

introducing a new fighter into the Navy, a delay which would be entirely compatible with the Air Force schedule for its new fighter, the F-15. We have had expert assurances that the delay would not entail a dangerous military risk. But from it we could gain a better, more reliable fighter. This could be an F-14 with most of the bugs worked out in advance of production. But it might be a substitute fighter, like the proposed VF-XX or a similar aircraft designed strictly for dogfighting. Many experts believe such an aircraft is not only more desirable than the F-14, but could be built and flown for some \$15 billion less over a 10-year period. What Members of this Congress could wish to be accused, in years to come, of voting for a multibillion-dollar disaster in defense spending when the chance was offered to say to the Pentagon: be prudent, be absolutely sure you are buying what we need, and that it will perform, before committing us to production?

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is a case of trying to be holier than a pope.

The amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM) was considered by the "fearless five" who probably know more about this particular weapon than he does, and they rejected it.

As a matter of fact, I should not be standing up here talking about the F-14. The distinguished and able gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE) is probably one of its most eloquent spokesmen. As a matter of fact, he and I entertained a number of Members of the House several months ago in the Rayburn Building, at which time the manufacturers of this aircraft appeared before us and spoke very eloquently about not only the job it would do but also the capacity of the company to perform the job.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. PIKE. That was the F-15.

Mr. STRATTON. It was the F-14, too. We talked about both of them. Would the gentleman suggest he is opposed to the F-14?

Mr. PIKE. I guarantee the gentleman if I were opposed to the F-14 I would offer the amendment.

Mr. STRATTON. The gentleman is an eloquent spokesman for both these aircraft.

The simple fact is that this is the Navy's answer to the F-111 fiasco. We have been all through the F-111, the TFX. They tried for years to adapt it to a Navy version. It would not work. As a matter of fact, it is not working very well even in the Air Force version. It was just too heavy for the Navy carriers.

Finally, a couple of years ago the Navy admirals persuaded the Department of Defense—with some help from the Congress—to forget about the F-111 and switch to a new Navy plane, now called the F-14. This is an aircraft which embodies all the good things that were in the F-111, but does it with less weight

and does it more quickly. It has the variable wing, for example, the air-weather avionics, the powerful TF-30 engine, the supersonic speed, and the Phoenix, stand-off missile. Because it embodies so much of the F-111 there is a much lower level of risk in its construction. And it is being developed, as Mr. PIKE, will tell you, by the company that probably has done more over the years in developing successful carrier aircraft for the Navy, the Grumman Corp. of New York.

Now, I am a little surprised that the gentleman from New York should have tried to create the impression in what he put into the RECORD on yesterday on page 27973, that both Dr. Foster, the head of R. & D. for the Defense Department, and Admiral Connolly are against this aircraft and are in favor of his amendment. I have here in my hand a letter to the chairman of our committee dated today and signed by Dr. Foster which I would like to read to this House:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The F-14 is an advanced design, carrier-based fighter aircraft. The program has been laid out to proceed through the test phases in an orderly manner. It was thoroughly reviewed prior to initiation by all elements of the OSD, and has since been under constant surveillance by both Secretary Packard and myself. By using the engine and avionics from the F-111B program, and designing solely against Navy requirements, the technical risk is considered to be low. The flight test phase is, of course, the first real opportunity to confirm the design and identify where modifications are needed. While the initial six research and development aircraft can gather some data, experience has proven that additional numbers are required to provide timely investigation of all elements of the system. The magnitude of the testing requires these additional aircraft.

The program enjoys high priority in the Navy, and accordingly, people of the highest professional competence have been assigned to manage it. Progress is being reported on a quarterly basis and evaluated against defined milestones. Specific inquiries are initiated as the situation warrants. For example, last spring the NASA was asked to make an independent performance evaluation of the design. Their results essentially confirmed the Navy and contractor calculations. To date the program is on schedule and meeting the design objectives.

Inasmuch as the F-14A is urgently needed to replace the aging F-4 and fill a Fleet Air Defense gap, I strongly urge that the DOD request for \$275 million PAMN FY 70 be authorized and appropriated to continue the test and development phase of the program.

Sincerely,

JOHN S. FOSTER, Jr.

Mr. Chairman, we have already waited long enough in the Navy because of all of the fiascos connected with the F-111. Let us not delay further, as this amendment would do, because of the urgent need of the Navy for a modern carrier airplane. The gentleman from New York in the RECORD quotes Admiral Connolly as saying that:

The least risk program is to build the airplane, build half a dozen perhaps, and don't do another thing until you fly these airplanes.

The gentleman from New York quoted this statement entirely out of context. The admiral said that would be the least risky policy, but he emphatically did not advocate it. Instead of that he said that

we should go ahead with the program included in this bill, building 12 of these planes, because since we are applying here so many of the techniques which were worked out in the F-111 we are not taking any very serious technical risks.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I am glad to yield to the chairman of my committee.

Mr. RIVERS. If you adopt this amendment, you might as well say that you are going to do away with the nuclear carriers, because this is to be based on the new nuclear carrier fleet, to replace one of the best planes we ever had, the F-4. You could not do anything like that, because it would sink the new Navy. This is being done by a good company, Grumman, and there is no better company on earth. We cannot be serious about this. Why do you want to take any more time on this? Why not just vote on this and get it out of the way?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

I yield to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. SIKES).

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we can speedily get down to facts on the proposal to eliminate procurement of the F-14. Proponents of the amendment would take away the opportunity to acquire in the shortest possible time, a well-designed and almost certainly effective fighter, and offer instead something which is vague and indefinite and completely unknown for tomorrow. In the intervening time between the availability of the F-14, which would be 1973 at the earliest, and some hypothetical future date for a later aircraft, possibly 5 years later, we would have lost precious time to the Russians. It is an inescapable fact that while we have been preoccupied with the Vietnamese war, we have neglected modernization. This problem has been complicated by the failure of the F-111 series to measure up to expectations. The Russians have a new generation of fighter aircraft which soon will be coming into inventory and which undoubtedly will be superior to anything we now have. It should not be forgotten that only one or two of our aircraft are a match for their present Mig-21.

I do not want and I do not think the House wants to limit and possibly to condemn American fliers to the possibility of combat against obviously superior enemy aircraft in future years. The new Russian aircraft which will be coming into inventory may be as good as the F-14. Undoubtedly, they will be better than anything we now have. Money is not as all important as the sponsors of this amendment apparently believe. I would rather spend \$275 million for the prospects of a better aircraft if it will insure even a reasonable chance that we will be as effective in the air as enemy forces. I do not think the House will want to forget that the F-4 which is now our best aircraft, has been in service since 1958.

It has been a great airplane, but in order to keep it effective, we have already improved it in every possible way. We

have milked dry the possibility of future improvement. We must have a new aircraft. The House would be making a very serious mistake to refuse to approve the funds for the F-14. The Navy is as completely certain that this will be an effective aircraft as I have ever seen, and I have heard them testify on many, many weapons systems in my time here. I am willing to risk their judgment. I am convinced the House should do so.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. HUNT), a member of the committee.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Chairman, I have listened intently to the debate on the F-14. Likewise, I read with great interest the debate in the other body about the F-14. The subject matter that revolved around debate was great indeed and in many respects went way beyond the case itself. The credibility of everything—cost, performance, strategy, tactical usage, and so forth—was opened to attack on an almost indiscriminate basis. The very R. & D. nature of weapon system development and procurement creates an environment that is fraught with uncertainties and unknowns. When the Defense Department legislates in this environment with arrogance and a sense of cleverness as it has for the past 6 to 7 years, we are bound to experience a "credibility" gap. If we react to that credibility gap with a slashing attack at all programs—and we all know it is possible to find something wrong in hindsight with any major development program—we should ask ourselves if we are in reality closing or opening that gap even further.

Let me make one specific point on the F-14 program to illustrate my point. Those in opposition to the F-14 have cited a wide range of cost figures that create a picture of the F-14 as an extremely expensive weapon system when compared to an F-4 or even the proposed new F-15 airplane. I do not know where these cost figures are generated or how—they are certainly not to be found in the Navy Program Office that has responsibility for the determination and validation of such figures. The incredible point is that in the development of a large weapon system, you can find any combination or range of figures you want. With an overabundance of figures and statistics you can prove anything you want.

In this environment of widely varying rules for program costing and interpretation, it is possible to tell a "truth" that is so misleading as to destroy perspective and understanding. What is needed is to tell a simple whole truth that is constrained and purposely expressed to give understanding and confidence. We find for example unqualified estimates of the F-14 program costing \$25 billion being entered into the Record. I can find no basis for such an estimate.

Such an estimate can only be due to a glib treatment of cost data and estimating factors and is inexcusable in the environment of debate and discussion.

There is a much simpler whole truth. The Navy has contracted with the Grumman Corp. for 469 F-14 aircraft—six R. & D. and 463 production aircraft—subject to the approval of the Congress. The

information I have shows the program will cost \$6.4 billion. This includes all three models, the F-14A, the F-14B, and the F-14C. It includes \$1.3 billion for R. & D. and \$5.1 billion for production. Most importantly, these figures are based on escalated dollars which means that provision has been made for a 4-percent compounded annual increase in cost for inflation from 1970 to 1976.

Gentlemen, let us concentrate on simple truths that we can understand—to my mind the Navy needs an F-14; the F-4 is rapidly becoming obsolete. The background of the F-14 design and development is comprehensive and as thorough as any program I have reviewed. The contract is correctly structured with incentives and safeguards. The management team within the Navy is a strong one. It is matched with a dedicated and strong contractor management team that has been in place with outstanding technical expertise from the inception of studies initiated some 2½ years ago. The program is on schedule, it has met a number of tough milestones to date with regard to mockup, release of drawings, and fully negotiated subcontracts.

I concur with the previous recommendations that we support this program and not jeopardize the future of this Nation by further needless, irresponsible, and naive debate.

I urge the defeat of this amendment.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. However, I shall not take the full 5 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that I believe the F-14 is a very necessary aircraft for the U.S. Navy and that we should go ahead with its procurement as rapidly as we can, and that if we do that, we can have the first test flight in 1971 and we can have the aircraft operational and going into the inventory in 1973.

Mr. Chairman, it has been almost 15 years since the last air superiority fighter was designed in this country. If we do not move now with the new one, the Soviet Union will have at least two aircraft which will be superior as air superiority fighters over our present F-4 in its latest modification.

Mr. Chairman, without taking more time, I urge that the amendment be defeated.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STAFFORD. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. PIKE. As I have so frequently done today—I am tremendously impressed with the gentleman's judgment—and I would like to associate myself with his remarks.

Mr. QUILLLEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 14000, to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

A number of major defense programs

or systems are covered by the bill, all of which I support. These include the Safeguard ABM system, the C-5A transport, the construction of nuclear-powered surface ships, and the advanced manned strategic aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the passage of this bill without further delay.

Mr. BRADEMAS. Mr. Chairman, section 402 of the military procurement bill—H.R. 14000—contains a provision which has very grave implications for the future of American higher education.

This section requires the Department of Defense to submit to Congress 60 days prior to the award of a contract or grant for research and development at any given university a report on the status of previously funded research and development projects at that university.

This report must include "a statement summarizing the record of the school, college or university with regard to cooperation on military matters such as the Reserve Officer Training Corps and military recruiting on its campus."

While section 402 contains no provision for the cutoff of research and development funds to any university, it requires little imagination to see the intent of the legislation. Section 402 is little more than a thinly veiled threat to universities which, for their own reasons, decide to change the status of ROTC and military recruiting on their campuses. In this section, Congress is serving notice on our universities that abolition of ROTC or campus military recruiting will not be looked upon with favor, and could eventually result in the loss of defense research contracts.

This interpretation of section 402 is supported by the report of the Armed Services Committee on H.R. 14000—House Report 91-522—which states that section 402 "ties together the attitudes of colleges and universities and their record of cooperation with the Department of Defense and the Armed Forces in the areas of the Reserve Officers Training Corps and military recruiting on the campus with contracts and grants for research and development to the school and to individuals on the faculty and staff of that school."

The report continues:

We also believe that when the scientific efforts are believed to be equal at several institutions, such research projects should be placed in universities which are cooperating fully with the Department of Defense in the national defense efforts.

Mr. Chairman, it would, indeed, be unfortunate if this potentially punitive provision is allowed to stand in the final version of the bill. Section 402 would constitute an irresponsible use of the power of the purse by the Federal Government to influence the internal decisionmaking processes of American universities. Universities already hard pressed by conflicting internal pressures, must not be stripped of their freedom to make decisions concerning ROTC and military recruiting on campus. It is not the role of the Federal Government to tell our universities how they should proceed in such areas.

But even more important, section 402 would play directly into the hands of those extremist elements on our cam-

puses who want to destroy our universities. Many of our finest universities depend very heavily upon the funds they obtain through Federal research to maintain their standards of excellence, especially in the technical fields so vital to national defense. By successfully mobilizing the pressures against ROTC, which already exist on many campuses, the extremists could succeed in bringing to bear upon the university the official displeasure of the Federal Government, with, under section 402 of H.R. 14000, the implied threat of the cutoff of funds. The result could be irreparable damage to the quality of American higher education.

The militants on our campuses claim that involvement in Government-financed research has compromised the freedom of American universities, making them little more than appendages of our Nation's Defense Establishment. Section 402 would only serve to substantiate this argument.

I doubt very much that the Department of Defense is at all satisfied with section 402. I doubt that our military planners are willing to accept the 2-month delay in research and development programs which the reporting provisions of section 402 will involve. I doubt that the Pentagon will accept with equanimity the possibility of losing the services of some of our most important research installations. If this should happen, the national security of the United States would suffer.

At a time when our universities are being subjected to such intense pressures, it is especially important that Congress exercise prudence in dealing with the problems that affect higher education. Section 402 would serve to aggravate rather than to solve these problems.

I, therefore, hope that when the military procurement bill, as passed by the House, goes to conference with the Senate, section 402 will be deleted. As it now stands, section 402 is a big, fat gift to the extremists on the Nation's university campuses.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, an important item found in the House bill before us now is authorization for funds to provide the Air Force with 128 A-7D aircraft. In the other body there is no provision for A-7D procurement.

In extensive hearings before the House Armed Services Committee justification for the inclusion of an authorization of \$347.7 million was made and the committee urges the House to support its action.

Testimony before the committee indicated that there is no question in the minds of both Navy and Air Force personnel intimately familiar with the operating characteristics of the A-7D and its Navy counterpart the A-7E, that these aircraft more than meet the specifications designed to fulfill their mission.

The A-7D is essential to the Air Force in its close support missions. Both the A-7D and A-7E represent a dramatic step forward in navigation and weapons delivery capability.

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. RIVERS

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto do now close.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina.

The motion was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM).

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my objection to the unanimous-consent request of the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HALL).

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I am sorry the last debate was cut off, because I wanted to ask the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) the question, because earlier today he had commented on the necessity for increasing the fleet—and as an ex-Navy man I understand the reasons for wanting to increase the fleet—then just in the argument just completed there were some comments about this being a fighter plane, and that we needed the fighter airplanes.

Not knowing about the merits of the F-14 or the F-15, or the TFX or F-111, or whatever it is, I want to know about where we are going to fight this naval war?

In other words, it seems to be that we are going to place fighters on our carriers in the anticipation of fighting the type of war we fought in World War II. And it is my understanding, and I do not pretend to be the military expert, perhaps, that the gentleman is, that the Russians do not have any carriers, and that we are not fighting a carrier to carrier battle, or a plane to plane battle, we are not fighting a fighter to fighter battle, and that instead we are fighting with missiles, and with nuclear weapons and other nuclear armament.

There is no other navy in the world today that anybody has to speak of except our friends. So I am trying to visualize this. Maybe we need the F-14 as a support fighter if we are going to fight off Vietnam, or someplace, as a fighter-interceptor together, on our carriers, and to take up the room from the bombers. If I understand what our idea is in having nuclear carriers to use them as a floating base, then it seems to me they should be doing it.

I would like to know the kind of concept the war that we are to be fighting.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, the gentleman apparently is not aware that we have carriers in Vietnam, and that we are not dropping nuclear bombs from them; they are not part of our strategic force, they are down there doing the day-to-day support work in Vietnam, and the plane that is doing the job is the F-4.

We also have carriers in the Mediterranean as part of our defense forces over there, and they do have a strategic role. They also are providing a lot of our attack power, our F-4's which, as the gentleman from Florida said, was first conceived in 1954.

Even Mr. McNamara, who has been both praised and excoriated on this floor,

insisted that we needed a new plane when he first came in, and his proposal was the F-111 because he wanted the same plane for the Air Force and for the Navy, but it never worked. So our Navy has waited all these years to get a plane to replace the aging F-4.

I wish that I was as assured as the gentleman seems to be that we will never have to fight another engagement in which we will use carriers, but if the time should occur then we are going to have to have our carriers to bring our fighting power in where it may be needed, whether it is Korea or Vietnam, or whether it is in the Mediterranean, and I want to see those carriers equipped with the best possible planes.

Mr. ADAMS. I want the gentleman to answer my question. I agree with what the gentleman says, I am not arguing that point at all. My problem is this: If we are going to use these as attack carriers off Vietnam, and so on, we should have bombers and perhaps fighter bombers on them.

Now, the problem that I have, as I understand this is a fighter, and perhaps an interceptor, and that you are going to put on some jury rigs and let the F-4 carry out tactical support, or something else, but if you want to use them as attack carriers for some purposes so that they can go off on a mission, then put bombers on them and do not put fighters on them.

I want to know whether we are going on a fighter program or is this to be a bomber program.

Mr. STRATTON. I think the gentleman misunderstands the role of these aircraft. Some are called fighters, and some are called attack planes. The fighters have the capability of engaging other planes just as our F-4's have engaged the Mig's over in Vietnam, but they also have an attack capability, and the same thing is true of attack planes.

This is nothing new. We are not changing our role. This is simply a faster and swifter plane to deal with the threat. The Soviets have laid down eight new aircraft since the F-4 was first developed and we have not come up with a single new plane in this category.

The F-111 apparently is a lemon. It has not produced for the Air Force and it was grounded in Thailand. The F-111b was washed out for the Navy and apparently the FB-11 is being washed out. It is time that we at least tried to stay up with the Soviets in this field.

Mr. ADAMS. That is what I wanted to ask the gentleman. Are we developing a plane to match the Mig or something that is going to be a package like the F-111?

Mr. STRATTON. Exactly like the F-111.

Mr. ADAMS. Then I do not want it if it is like the F-111.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I will not take the 5 minutes, but I have asked for this time simply for the purpose of assuring this House that I would not mislead the House.

I greatly regret the fact that the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) suggested that I did mislead the House. If the gentleman had been listening to

me, he would have heard me say, after I quoted Admiral Connolly and Dr. Foster, that they did, nevertheless, recommend the F-14 program. After having spoken of another course as the "least-risk" program, they did not recommend that "least-risk" program.

I also regret that the chairman of the committee for the first time today moved to close debate without giving anybody else a chance to speak when there were a number of Members on their feet and the gentleman for the first time today moved to close debate without further time being yielded to anyone.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BINGHAM. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. RIVERS. I have no intention of cutting the gentleman off. I asked if everyone had finished speaking and I thought we were ready to vote.

Mr. BINGHAM. But members of the committee were on their feet, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RIVERS. I did not know the gentleman wanted to speak twice on his amendment.

I thought since the gentleman had spoken once that that is what he wanted to do. If the gentleman had asked me to yield, I would have yielded.

Mr. BINGHAM. You asked the gentleman from New York to yield, but after I had asked the gentleman to yield several times during the course of his remarks to straighten out what he was saying.

Mr. RIVERS. There was not any intention of doing that and the gentleman knows that, I am sure.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BINGHAM. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. STRATTON. I might not have heard what the gentleman said in offering his amendment. I was preparing my own remarks in opposition. I apologize to him for not catching his statement that the admiral did not support his amendment. But I read the fact sheet which the gentleman put out on this amendment earlier today and I read the remarks he put in the RECORD yesterday on page 27973. In both cases he quoted Admiral Connolly in support of his position, and without mentioning that the admiral was actually opposed to his amendment.

Let me read to the gentleman what Admiral Connolly did say on page 3006 of our hearings about the proposal the gentleman offered as an amendment:

Stopping the F-14A program and proceeding only with the F-14B will result in additional program costs of \$340M.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I decline to yield further and yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.
The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

SEC. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1970 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, development, test, and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

For the Army, \$1,664,500,000, of which (a) \$10,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the Heavy Lift Helicopter and (b) \$75,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the SAM-D system: *Provided*, That none of the funds herein authorized shall be expended for research, development, test, and evaluation of the Cheyenne helicopter;

For the Navy (including the Marine Corps), \$1,990,500,000, of which (a) \$66,091,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the E-2C aircraft (b) \$165,400,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the S-3A aircraft, (c) \$20,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the Undersea Long-range Missile System, (d) \$67,900,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the Advanced Surface Missile System, and (e) \$517,300,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the research and development of Anti-Submarine Warfare Systems;

For the Air Force, \$3,241,200,000, of which (a) \$15,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the RF-111D aircraft, (b) \$1,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the Light Intratheater Transport aircraft, (c) \$18,500,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the CONUS Air Defense Interceptor, (d) \$84,700,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM), and (e) \$40,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated only for the development of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS): *Provided*, That none of the funds herein authorized shall be expended for research, development, test and evaluation of the A-X aircraft; and

For the Defense Agencies, \$450,200,000.
SEC. 202. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense during fiscal year 1970 for use as an emergency fund for research, development, test, and evaluation or procurement or production related thereto, \$75,000,000.

SEC. 203. None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to carry out any research project or study unless such project or study has a direct and apparent relationship to a specific military function or operation.

Mr. RIVERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title II of the bill be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I wonder if the chairman could tell us what his plans are with respect to having the Committee rise tonight.

Mr. RIVERS. I am ready to move that the Committee rise right now.

Mr. FRASER. So if the gentleman's request is granted, you expect to have the Committee rise?

Mr. RIVERS. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS)?

There was no objection.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the

Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 14000) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

HOURLY OF MEETING TOMORROW

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, at the request of several Members, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, and I shall not object, the Committee on Banking and Currency has a very important bill which was set down for hearing at 10 o'clock this morning. We had to postpone the meeting until tomorrow morning on account of the fact that the House met today at 10 a.m. If the gentleman from Oklahoma would change his request to 11 a.m., we could hear the witnesses who are in town for the purpose of testifying. That is the reason for the request being changed.

Mr. DANIELS of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, also reserving the right to object, I am likewise in the same position. A number of witnesses from the State of New Jersey are scheduled to testify tomorrow before the Committee on Education and Labor. It would cost these people not only a great deal of expense but a great deal of inconvenience, and it may not be possible for them to come back. I join in the request, and ask the distinguished majority leader if he would make the time 11 o'clock.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today that it adjourn to meet at 11 a.m. tomorrow.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

RESIGNATION OF CONFEREES AND APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON S. 1075

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communication:

OCTOBER 2, 1969.

HON. JOHN W. MCCORMACK,
Speaker of the House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: At this time, I would like to resign as a conferee on S. 1075.

I will be out of town on official business, attending the Third Annual Fish Expo in Seattle.

I respectfully request an alternate be appointed in my place.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

THOMAS M. PELLY,
Representative in Congress.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The Chair appoints as a manager on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the bill S. 1075 the gentleman from California (Mr. MAILLIARD) to fill the existing vacancy thereon caused by the resignation of the gentleman from Washington (Mr. PELLY).

The Clerk will notify the Senate of the action of the House.

THE GREEN BERETS

(Mr. FULTON of Tennessee asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FULTON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, most Americans, I am sure, joined with us in applause when Chairman RIVERS announced that Army Secretary Resor had dropped charges against the Green Berets accused of murdering a suspected South Vietnamese double agent.

In the words of this morning's edition of the Washington Post the Secretary's action "closes the official curtain on a dark side of the Vietnam war."

It may close the official curtain but it leaves many questions unanswered and the fate of the Green Berets allegedly involved uncertain.

According to the press the case against Col. Robert Rheault and his men was being pushed by the Department of the Army at the highest level. Indeed, it was not until the Central Intelligence Agency "declined" to produce certain material prosecution witnesses that the case was dropped.

Under the circumstances Secretary Resor said he doubted the defendants could receive a fair trial. Even before the announcement that the charges were to be dropped there was concern that the defendants would not receive a fair trial.

Just what these men actually did and under what orders they acted is not known publicly and may never be. This much is apparently clear, however:

A South Vietnamese national was executed.

This man was suspected of being a double agent.

The Central Intelligence Agency apparently was involved.

It is also apparent that what the Green Berets did was done during time of war in the belief that orders were being followed.

From this one can conclude that, notwithstanding the dismissal of charges against them, the military careers of these Green Berets are henceforth stagnate at best and ruined at worst.

It can also be concluded that the Central Intelligence Agency has again erred and is attempting to cover up what apparently is a very serious mistake.

Notwithstanding Secretary Resor's assurances that he wants to "make it clear that the acts which were charged, but not proven, represent a fundamental violation of Army regulations, orders, and

principles," this type of activity has been carried on in the past. The question seems not to be whether but by whom and how often.

Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that Col. Robert Rheault and the men charged with him have been caught in the middle of a bizarre and clandestine operation not of their design nor their choosing for which they may well suffer throughout their lives. This is a tragedy. The whole episode is a tragedy in the shameful history of the Vietnam war.

FUNDS FOR POLLUTION CONTROL

(Mr. McCLORY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Speaker, the need for adequate funding of water pollution control projects has been recognized by a majority or substantial number of the Members of this body. It is heartening to know that the American public—and this means the American taxpayer—is wholeheartedly in support of funding programs designed to improve the quality of the Nation's water.

The very influential Chicago Tribune editorialized on this subject in yesterday's issue and I am including a reprint of that editorial for the information of all of my colleagues:

FUNDS FOR POLLUTION CONTROL

When Congress enacted the clean waters restoration act of 1966, it was regarded as a significant step in the nation-wide campaign against water pollution. But since then Congress has failed to fulfill its obligations under the act by falling far short of appropriating all the funds authorized. Such funds are to be used as federal cost sharing grants for construction of municipal sewage treatment plants.

In Illinois, for example, there are federal grant applications for 273 water pollution control projects but proposed federal funding sufficient for only 20 to 25 of them. Gov. Ogilvie points out that this short funding has a serious impact on this state's progress toward construction of necessary pollution abatement works, particularly in cities along the Illinois river, Lake Michigan, and other interstate waters. Other authorities warn that the whole national anti-pollution effort is being crippled.

Altho the 1966 act authorized one billion dollars for such purposes in fiscal 1970, the Nixon administration's budget calls for appropriations of only 214 million dollars. To stimulate the cities to get on with the job of cleaning up pollution, a strong movement is under way in the House to persuade the administration to provide full funding under the act. This movement has the support of most state governors, mayors of many cities, and nearly 40 conservation, civic, and other groups and agencies, including the AFL-CIO, the Chicago metropolitan sanitary district, the Izaak Walton league, and the League of Women Voters.

Sponsors of the movement assert they have 219 "firm" votes pledged in the House—enough to approve an amendment to increase appropriations to the full billion dollars in the event the House appropriations committee fails to recommend this sum. Pollution control costs money, but it is necessary if Americans are to avoid fouling their environment even more seriously than they have already. The longer control measures are delayed, the more it will cost eventually to stop pollution.

A 25-PERCENT BENEFIT INCREASE AND EXPANDING COVERAGE FOR ELDERLY AND DISABLED CITIZENS

(Mr. KASTENMEIER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, I am introducing a bill today to reform our social security program by providing a 25-percent benefit increase and expanding coverage for our elderly and disabled citizens.

Since the last increase in social security benefits in February 1968, the cost of living has gone up dramatically and is continuing to rise. The escalating costs of the staples of human life—food, housing, clothing, and medical care—have created a real crisis for the elderly.

The President's proposal for a 10-percent increase in social security payments, effective in March 1970, is totally unresponsive to the needs of our elderly and retired citizens and, due to inflation and rising taxes, does not constitute a real increase at all. In terms of actual buying power, it would represent a reduction in social security benefits by next March.

In my congressional district alone, about 54,000 individuals receive social security benefits. Many of these citizens who must rely on this fixed income have written to me describing their desperate situation and their inability to cope with the rising costs of essential goods, services, and taxes. It is ironic that our modern society, which has realized the enormous benefits of medical breakthroughs that have dramatically prolonged human life, has not made adequate provision for our senior citizens in their years of retirement when they need it most.

As originally conceived, the social security program was based on the theory that benefits received would be in relation to the contributions a worker made and would not necessarily be his sole means of support. If a retired worker and his wife have a total income of \$105 a month with which they have to budget for food, housing, and drugs and other medical expenses, then clearly this sum is inadequate and the social security program has failed in its purpose. Now, however, we must acknowledge the fact that social security payments are relied upon by many of our elderly as their prime income and the present level of benefits is not enough for many of them to meet their basic expenses and live in dignity.

It is a sad and inexcusable commentary on our society that the aged are the largest single group making up our poverty rolls. Almost one-third of all Americans over the age of 65, nearly 6 million, live in poverty and this number is increasing.

I believe a substantial raise in benefits is essential and my bill provides a 25-percent across-the-board hike for all social security recipients.

In addition, my bill would double the minimum primary benefit by raising the present level of \$55 a month for an individual to a much more realistic \$110

monthly. The minimum amount for a couple also would increase from \$82.50 to \$165 a month.

It also raises the amount persons may earn without losing benefits, adds prescription drugs to the medicare program, extends medicare coverage to the disabled, and provides for automatic cost-of-living increases in benefits in the future.

The present \$1,680 limitation on earnings is quite unrealistic and I feel it should be raised to at least \$2,400 annually. My bill would accomplish this by increasing the monthly earnings limit from \$140 to \$200 and it also would enable a retired worker to keep \$1 of every \$2 he earned from \$2,400 to \$3,600.

Since drug costs are a substantial portion of the budget of every older American, my bill broadens the medicare program to include the cost of prescription drugs.

A formulary committee would be established to determine the drugs and biologicals which are to be covered. The reimbursement for these would be based on the lowest priced generic or brand name drugs available, consistent with Federal Food and Drug Administration standards.

I also propose extending medicare coverage to those receiving social security disability benefits who presently are not covered. Many of these disabled citizens have sizable medical expenses, often related to their disability, and they often cannot secure private health insurance coverage at a reasonable rate.

By providing for automatic cost-of-living benefit increases in the future, we can insure that the elderly will not have to wait on congressional action when living costs rise. Civil service annuitants already receive automatic cost-of-living increases. My bill would establish the same system for those receiving social security benefits so that their payments would be increased by the amount the cost-of-living index has risen whenever this is more than 3 percent.

In order to insure that the social security trust funds will be maintained on a fiscally sound basis, my bill would raise the level of wages subject to social security taxes from \$7,800 to \$9,000 and supplement this with general tax revenues in meeting the cost of certain features of the program. This financing plan seems practical in view of the administration's announcement it anticipates a budget surplus for this fiscal year. In future years, the likelihood of termination of our involvement in Vietnam and reduced military expenditures, coupled with additional revenue coming from the closing tax loopholes should provide the Treasury with more than enough general tax funds to cover the cost of higher benefits.

I am pleased the House Ways and Means Committee plans to begin hearings on various social security proposals later this month and I expect this will be one of the most important areas of legislation Congress will consider in the coming months. I hope it will act promptly to put this increase into effect by January 1, 1970, since higher payments are so urgently needed by so many people.

THE PRICE OF BEEF VERSUS THE PRICE OF CATTLE

(Mr. POAGE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. POAGE. Mr. Speaker, retail meat prices are always a matter of concern to the housewife, so I think some information recently developed by our Committee on Agriculture would be of interest to those who prepare the family menu and handle the family budget.

During the past year the price of live cattle of choice grade moved up from approximately \$29 a hundred pounds last January to a high of \$35.14 the last week of June. Every housewife is aware of this and most of them attribute the rise in the retail meat market prices to this move. Actually, the retail price of meat in the Nation as a whole, figuring a combined average of all cuts, rose from 90 cents a pound in January to a July high of \$1.01, and there has been little decline since that time. The Department's estimate for September is 99.4 cents, a decline of approximately 2 percent.

The consumer naturally is more conscious of any rise in the price of food than of any drop which might occur and certainly of any decline in the price paid to the producer. Therefore, what has been happening in the price of cattle in recent weeks may well have escaped the attention of the public generally.

A number of members of the House Committee on Agriculture returned from an observation tour of livestock centers in the Southwest, visiting operations on the farms and ranches, through the cattle auctions and feedlots, to the slaughterhouses and packing plants. We saw cattle selling at appreciably lower prices than the same kind of cattle were bringing a few months ago, notwithstanding the fact that the production costs had continued to go up, just as other costs in our economy. As a matter of fact, on the first of this month livestock growers were receiving just about the same price for choice steers that they had received on the first of January, and about 17 percent less than they received in June. In short, as far as the producers' price for his cattle is concerned, there is no justification whatever for any higher retail prices than existed a year ago. And if measured by the price of cattle, beef should today actually retail for 18.3 percent less than it did 18 years ago, inasmuch as the cowman is today taking approximately 6½ cents per pound less for his live animals than he received in 1951.

Unfortunately, the retail price of food items always very quickly reflects, and generally greatly magnifies, any upward movement of farm prices, while any downward movement of retail prices always lags far behind a drop in the farmers' prices, and very seldom, if ever, reflects the entire drop which has occurred in the farm products.

Let me therefore suggest that when the housewife goes to look for a scapegoat for the high price of retail meat, that she look somewhere other than on the farm or ranch.

REMOVAL OF LIMITATION ON INCOME UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY

(Mr. DE LA GARZA asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing legislation to remove the limitation on income for our citizens receiving social security payments.

The earnings limitation system should be removed. The Government has reported that almost 1½ million people lost some or all of their social security benefits last year because they had income from work. There are probably millions of others who deliberately held their earnings down because they did not want to get involved with a complicated provision and a computer-run bureaucracy.

In a period when older people are being hard hit by inflation, older people with needed skills are being shunted out of work. This makes no sense at all. People need to be encouraged to work—not discouraged. It is high time for the Congress to remove this archaic provision and take this step to get an additional \$2½ billion a year into the hands of our inflation-hit aged population.

This is the least we can do for our older Americans, many of whom are still earning below the poverty level with their social security because of this limitation.

CUTS IN FUNDS FOR HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Speaker, the callous action of the administration in slashing the funds available for Housing and Urban Development was a long step backward and one that will do lasting damage to some of our most important programs. Not only will these budget cuts have a serious impact on the important programs directly affected but the fundamental message they carry must be clear to everyone—this administration is turning its back on the problems of our cities and all those who need decent housing. Nothing can explain away that fact, particularly, in view of the stark contrast with the administration's position favoring \$10 billion for an ABM system which experts have said is not needed, hundreds of millions of dollars in subsidy money to aircraft manufacturers to develop a supersonic transport, and nearly \$3 billion for foreign aid. Moreover, the administration's opposition to tax relief for those of average or below average income while favoring tax benefits for wealthy corporations, shows the true position of this administration.

The tragically misguided cuts in Federal aid for Housing and Urban Development must come as a shock to everyone who believes in our national housing goals and the improvement of our cities. For 20 years the Federal Government has pursued the policy of "a decent home and a suitable environment for every American family," established by the Housing Act of 1949. Now in 1 day we have seen a major reversal of that policy.

Secretary Romney apologized for the President's announced 75-percent cut in

Federal construction spending on the grounds that this would supposedly help to produce more housing. Obviously the Secretary is not calling the shots. His own programs have been riddled by this latest blast from the White House.

The model cities program enacted in 1966 is the keystone to our efforts to improve not only housing conditions in our city slums but the whole range of education, employment, and social benefits needed by the underprivileged. After the years of hard fighting to obtain even the present inadequate budget level we see that these funds are cut by nearly one-half with a stroke of a pen.

One of the most critical problems facing the homebuilding industry and the home buying public is the present record high level of interest rates. And yet, in the face of this, the administration has announced its intention to cut the interest subsidy assistance enacted by Congress just last year to help low-income families.

The water and sewer grant program was approved by the Congress with overwhelming support. This reflects the urgent need for more adequate facilities to meet the population pressure in our growing towns and cities. In spite of this, Federal grant funds for local water and sewer construction have also been cut.

The administration has also obstinately refused to use the \$2 billion available to them in the Government National Mortgage Association fund for mortgage loans on low- and moderate-income families. They even asked the Congress to repeal \$500 million of this which became available on July 1, but neither body of Congress would accept this. The administration is also opposing our efforts to provide additional funds for the program of low-interest loans for housing for the elderly. On top of this they have administratively frozen funds for public housing and have set an arbitrary limit on urban renewal funds for the new neighborhood development program created by Congress last year.

The intentions of the Nixon administration become clearer every day—it is their policy to repeal, through tight money and freezing Federal funds, all of the gains in housing legislation made over the past two decades. There can be no justification for the latest cuts which are aimed at our neediest families and the most urgent problems of our cities.

MODEL CITIES PROGRAM

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Speaker, I find the plans by the administration to cut \$215 million from the model cities program an incredible act of stupidity. How can the President ignore the plight of our urban areas and discuss budget cutbacks in the one sector that is grossly underfunded—in relation to its needs—to begin with?

I think that every Member of this Chamber will agree that frugality is desirable in this time of inflation, but the administration need look no further than an overfat military budget for a place to trim expenditures.

This Congress authorized \$515 million for the model cities program and we expect the administration to spend

this amount. This body did not call for a 42-percent cutback in the program. This body did not deem this worthwhile program could begin adequately the revitalization of our cities with only \$315 million.

I, for one, am not going to be taken in by the shilly-shally excuse that the \$215 million reduction represents a lack of applications or a faulty bureaucratic effort.

What sort of priorities is the President setting for this Nation when he calls for a slash in an area where, if anything, twice the authorized amount would still be inadequate to do the job of building our cities?

If the President is truly concerned with trimming the budget, I can give him an item to do away with that will save the taxpayers \$1.023 billion. We seem to find funds for an unnecessary nuclear carrier but there is not a fifth of that amount available for the millions of Americans who inhabit our ailing urban areas.

THE TIME HAS COME TO END THIS WAR

(Mr. WOLFF asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, I do wish to emphasize at the outset of this statement that I believe the first responsibility of our Government is to provide for our security. For without that security our national ideals and goals are immediately in danger. So I speak, not as a pacifist, but as one who believes firmly in the importance of maintaining adequate defenses to insure our national security.

However, time and again since I took the oath of office almost 5 years ago, I have felt it my responsibility to speak out against what I regard as our tragic, futile policy in Vietnam. This war, that has taken 40,000 American lives and left 130,000 of our young men maimed and wounded, has been and remains the focus of our attention.

This is appropriate for it is clear that the prolonged war is the principal cause of the sharp divisions among Americans. The war is the single most important reason that our economy is beset by serious inflation, tight money, and other dangers. The war has prevented the United States from correcting certain grave domestic problems to which we awakened only in this decade; and even our great country is unable to fight a land war in Asia and, at the same time, address itself to pressing domestic problems.

Despite the problems it has bred it would be our responsibility to prosecute this war if it was vital to our national interest. But on balance, weighing the enormous costs against what we might possibly gain if all went our way in Vietnam—something that is quite unlikely—on balance, prolonging this war is not in our national interest. In fact, a continuation of the war, with the accompanying loss of American lives and the great drain on our national resources, is clearly contrary to the best interest of the United States.

I am drawn inexorably to the conclusion that we must begin immediately what former Under Secretary of the Air Force Townsend W. Hoopes has called "deliberate, orderly but complete withdrawal" from Vietnam. This total withdrawal must begin now, for as President Nixon said several weeks ago, "The time has come to end this war." The President is correct and I urge him to use the power at his disposal to give true meaning to his words; for it is deeds and not words that will stop the killing of 200 young Americans every week.

We must have an end to the side-stepping that appears to be our current policy. Just as we drifted into this war and the overwhelming American combat role it seems as though the administration would have us drift out. The consequence of such a policy would be substantial, unnecessary loss of thousands of American lives and protecting our men now in Vietnam must be our first concern.

The withdrawal that I seek, I might add, is not susceptible to any fixed timetable. To establish some far away date for the end of American fighting in Vietnam would probably insure that we will be involved up until that deadline. Rather than indirectly prolonging the war by picking some future date arbitrarily we should move promptly in the manner suggested by Mr. Hoopes.

Moreover, I believe we should, at the same time, propose in Paris an immediate, standstill cease-fire. I have come to believe that the beginning of the end of American combat involvement in Vietnam must start immediately for the following reasons:

There is no reason to give 25 American lives every day to sustain the corruption in a South Vietnamese regime that is more interested in perpetuating its own power and waging war than it is in seeking peace.

Nor is there any reason to suffer the thousands of deaths that will ensue during a fictitious withdrawal such as the one already begun. The slim chance of saving face is not sufficient justification for additional American deaths and casualties.

Even today, more than 4 years after major escalation was begun, the South Vietnamese have not established a truly democratic government. Some time ago I saw a glimmer of hope that democracy might be achieved but that glimmer has been extinguished. I shall only cite as a salient example the continued imprisonment of Truong Dinh Dzu, the man who ran second in the Vietnamese national elections, for alleged "treasonous statements"—charges never proven.

The South Vietnamese have provided no substantial moves to undertake their proper responsibility in fighting what is primarily their war.

At the same time some South Vietnamese government leaders provide impediments to peace with intransigent or unreasonable demands. I might note here the remarkable assertion last weekend by Vice President Ky in which he proposed to dictate American policy.

There is, here at home, a justifiable anxiety about the war that threatens to

aggravate serious, existing differences among the American people.

There is, as has been charged so often of late, a confusion of priorities when we can fight this war, with its fantastic cost of 40,000 lives and more than \$100 billion of our resources, while failing to act against more pressing problems here at home. The focus of American interest is blurred; we must attack isolationism, but we must, at the same time, recognize that the primary needs of our own people come first.

Now I know it has been said that those who are critical of American policy should remain silent. I cannot accept this; if freedom of expression is ever to be stifled then we will have begun to forfeit our greatness. Americans have a responsibility not to be silent about our national problems and national needs, but rather to be honest, vocal and outspoken. Anything less than full freedom of expression would be a contradiction of our creed.

I believe the American errors in Vietnam can be identified in four separate administrations. It is not, under any circumstances, a partisan issue and nothing is to be gained from futile efforts to place the blame here or there, with this individual or that.

My purpose, and I trust the purpose of all who differ with the evolution of our Vietnam policy, is not to affix blame. Rather, I seek to correct the errors of the past and substitute for a failing policy new directions that will extricate us from a war that we cannot justify in terms of its cost to the American people.

The simple truth is that we cannot save face, salvage prestige, or aid American interests in any way by permitting this war to continue.

I urge the President, in all good faith and with the conviction that what I propose is what the American people want and need, not to protract our disengagement.

The President seeks, as all Presidents should, the broad support of a majority of the American people. The only way this can be achieved is to begin immediately a reordering of our national priorities by undertaking without further delay the call for a standstill cease-fire and the "deliberate, orderly but complete withdrawal" of American combat forces from Vietnam.

TO END ABUSE OF TENNESSEE WALKING HORSE

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. DEVINE) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced legislation designed to end the cruel and unnecessary practice of deliberately making the legs, ankles, and hooves of the Tennessee walking horse sore to alter its natural gait.

Unscrupulous owners and trainers have discovered that, if the front feet of the walking horse are deliberately irritated, he will lift them quickly and take longer strides in an effort to reduce his pain. This desired gait is thus accomplished quickly without months of training.

Soring is done by the use of chains, tacks, or small rollers attached together by chain. Some are also sored by the use of oil of mustard or oxide of mercury. Many horses lie down in the ring because the pain is so severe.

My bill joins Congressmen KUYKEN-DALL, of Tennessee, and WHITEHURST, of Virginia, to prohibit the movement in commerce of horses which are sored. The penalty provided for each violation is a fine of \$500 and/or 6 months in jail.

In the latest issue of a national magazine this cruel and inhumane practice is being brought to the attention of the public, and I am sure all Members of Congress will receive considerable mail on this subject. Soring is a cheap substitute for careful training, and a practice which should have been outlawed many years ago.

FARM PAYMENT LIMIT

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, the long-awaited action of the House to go to conference with the other body on agriculture appropriation disagreements was momentarily scheduled this past Monday, but delayed once more. While no announcement has been made, action could occur at any moment.

Certainly this step has been a long time coming. The House completed its own work on the appropriation bill in May and the other body shortly after. Senate conferees were named several months ago.

It is generally accepted that the reason the House conferees have not as yet been named arises from the disagreement over House language establishing a \$20,000 limitation on the amount of payments any single farmer can get for the 1970 crop year under various farm commodity programs.

On a substantial record vote this provision was accepted by the House. It was subsequently rejected by the other body.

Before House conferees are named, an attempt will be made to instruct House conferees to insist on the limitation provision now in the House version.

As you know, the limitation, although voted 224 to 142 by the House on May 27, is not popular with prospective conferees and in my opinion certainly will be deleted in conference unless they are instructed.

Here are the principal arguments being advanced against the payment limit:

ARGUMENT

It is legislative in character and should be considered later in legislation, not tacked on an appropriation bill.

RESPONSE

This argument is dilatory nonsense. The relatively few wealthy cotton producers who are the beneficiaries of individual payments running into hundreds of thousands of dollars a year have been fighting an effective rearguard action against payment limits for years wherever they are proposed—on legislation or appropriations.

Their lobbyists are shrewd and re-

sourceful. I am confident they are covering House offices in their usual discreet but potent way.

Last year when the same payment limit was scuttled in conference on a legislative bill, the plea was for just one more year to draw up something better. So what is new?

ARGUMENT

The new Secretary of Agriculture has given assurances that new legislation will include a payment limit.

RESPONSE

At no point has the Agriculture Secretary indicated support for payment limits. His statement this past Wednesday to the House Agriculture Committee gave no assurance that administration proposals will include a payment limit of any kind. He listed arguments for and against a payment limitation, but he stated that there was "legitimate concern" amongst those who espoused the negative arguments.

ARGUMENT

Because of the snapback provision of the present cotton law, the \$20,000 payment limit would actually increase program cost. As you will recall, this argument was used widely and with great effect during earlier debate in both the House and Senate. The basis for it was a forecast by the Agriculture Secretary in which he said flatly that the payment limit would have the effect of increasing the cotton program cost by \$160 million.

RESPONSE

I have in writing an acknowledgment from the Agriculture Department to the effect that the Secretary's use of the word cost was "unfortunate."

This admission followed my investigation of the assumptions and computations on which the Secretary based his forecast. Details may be found in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD August 4, page 22145. In summary, he failed to adjust for the recoverable value of the inventory increase he predicted would occur. This oversight was a \$334 million boner. Making adjustment for this error alone shows the payment limit effecting a cotton program cost reduction of \$96 million, instead of cost increase of \$160 million. In his assumptions he used an unrealistic yield figure—550 pounds per acre—which also tended to inflate substantially the cost estimate. Yield this year is now reported at only 474 pounds, and never in history has come close to 550.

The Department's statistical work actually supports my forecast that, with or without snapback, the limitation amendment will cut costs substantially.

ARGUMENT

Instructing conferees is unnecessary, because an opportunity will exist for a recommittal motion with instructions if the amendment is deleted in conference.

RESPONSE

Last year I learned my lesson. Scrapping normal procedure, the conference report which had deleted a \$20,000 payment limit was taken first to the Senate, not the House. The effect of this deliberate shuffling of papers was to deny me the opportunity to attempt to recommit with instructions to insist on the payment limit.

ARGUMENT

The \$20,000 limit will impoverish cotton farmers and may cause a shortage of cotton.

RESPONSE

On the face of it, the argument is ludicrous. Using the Department's own assumptions and computations—except for the boner on inventory value—1970 crop income of cotton farmers would be up \$60 million, not down. Assuming the snapback provisions would not take effect, the result would hardly put farmers in the poorhouse. Take Eastland Plantation in Sunflower County, Miss., for example. It would still get \$20,000, surely enough to grubstake the owner for a year.

WOULD LIMITATION HELP EASTLAND PLANTATION?

One of my colleagues from the land of cotton, in his enthusiasm for big payments for wealthy farmers, has been privately stating in the cloakroom that Eastland Plantation would actually get more money from the Government under the \$20,000 limit.

His explanation is that the snapback provision would be in effect and this would mean that the Government would purchase at a high price all of the Eastland cotton, representing an outlay considerably higher than under the present program.

Unfortunately this explanation suffers from the same gross shortcoming as Secretary Hardin's mistaken cost estimate. It treats the inventory value of Eastland cotton as zero, which of course is preposterous.

Under the snapback provision, Eastland Plantation, like other producers, would be eligible to receive a Government loan at 65 percent of parity. This year that would come to about 32 cents a pound. That figure, however, does not represent Government cost; rather, it is inventory investment. The realized loss—or cost—would, based on past experience, likely be about 12 cents a pound—not 32 cents.

Under the present program, Eastland Plantation would be eligible for a direct payment of about 15 cents a pound, in addition to income from sale or loan of about 20 cents. Thus the combined payment-loan this year would be about 35 cents a pound, compared with 32 cents if the snapback provision had been operating. While parity value, as well as payment level, will climb next year, figures will remain comparable.

This means that net Government cost of handling Eastland Plantation cotton under the snapback provision next year would clearly be less than under the present program.

In mentioning this, I do not wish to leave the impression that I am defending the snapback provision. This provision should not be in the law. I voted to delete it from the bill when it was first proposed.

On the other hand, the existence of the snapback provision is not sufficient reason to justify opposition to the \$20,000 limitation provision.

Sustaining the House position on the limitation is our only chance to limit payments on 1970 crops, because subsequent amendments—whether on appro-

pration or legislative bills—cannot be effective until 1971 crops at the earliest.

The hard-pressed taxpayers of the United States should not longer be required to finance big payments to wealthy farmers.

For the convenience of Members who may wish to reflect on the cost advantage of the \$20,000 limitation, here is the text of correspondence I have had with the Department of Agriculture:

JULY 30, 1969.

HON. CLIFFORD M. HARDIN,
Secretary of Agriculture.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In your statement to the Senate Appropriations Agriculture Subcommittee on June 4 in opposition to the \$20,000 limitation on individual payments to farmers, you stated that the provisions of the snapback clause of the present cotton program would increase the "cost" to the government by \$160 million if they became operative for the 1970 crop.

The use of the word "cost" was unfortunate, because it left the erroneous impression that the expenditure would be entirely non-recoverable.

Actually, a careful examination of the computations and assumptions your staff uses in analyzing the effect of the snapback clause leads inevitably to the conclusion that it would reduce program costs to the government and at the same time increase income to producers. Accepting as valid all the assumptions your staff made, the snapback clause would give cotton farmers in 1970 a \$350 million boost in income, compared with last year. Program cost, \$879 million compared with \$975 million, would be down \$96 million.

In Table 5 appended to your statement, you showed a net change of \$432 million in stocks at loan rate. This item can hardly be termed cost in the usual sense, unless the words cost and investment are used interchangeably. Using the last 3-year average market price for cotton, 24 cents, we could assume the government in time would recover about \$120 for each bale that went into the increased carryover. This would mean a projected net loss in this increased carryover of \$98 million, not the \$432 million gross outlay you listed.

Under the snapback clause, the major expense items based on the assumptions you used would be \$156 million for diversion payments, \$595 million for losses on sales and \$98 million predictable loss on increased carryover—making a total of \$879 million. This is \$117 million less than the \$960 million in payments forecast under the present program for the 1970 crop.

Accordingly, I feel that you may wish to correct your statement as to "cost" under the snapback clause.

By your own figures, cost under snapback will actually be less, not more. Your figures show cotton producers getting \$60 million more from the 1970 crop under snapback than the present program (farm value of production plus payments), and \$350 million more than in 1968. This makes the argument against snapback difficult to comprehend.

Moreover, several assumptions made in producing the estimates are open to question. Understandably they are designed to make snapback look unattractive. Reasonable modifications in the assumptions would reduce sharply the cost estimates under snapback.

For example:

In light of the import controls on raw cotton, it can reasonably be anticipated that the higher support price under the operation of the snapback clause would result in a market price higher than 24 cents.

If the market price should rise to 26 cents, for example, the net loss on the increased carryover would drop by \$27 million. Each one-cent increase in market price would reduce carryover losses by \$13.5 million.

Corresponding cost reduction would also of course occur on CCC sales.

In your forecast you assume a yield of 550 pounds per acre. With the 1968 yield at 515, and the 1969 forecast at 520, a yield of 530 would surely be more reasonable than 550. Yield has never reached 550 pounds average. A diversion payment rate higher than the 10 cents you specified could be expected to take additional acres out of production. In 1968 the program secured a diversion of 3.2 million acres for payment. Acceptance of your figure of only 2.4 million would therefore seem debatable at best.

These variable factors, together with the recoverable character of the item you described erroneously to be cost, led me to conclude that net program cost under the snapback clause for the 1970 crop would actually be substantially less than the cost you project under the present direct-payment program. At the same time farmer income would go up.

If, as I have suggested, you administer the snapback clause under the option of simultaneous purchase and sale—a procedure which the Comptroller General has described as a payment program and therefore, in my view, subject to the \$20,000 individual limitation—even greater program-cost reductions would be realized.

I would appreciate a word of clarification for the benefit of those who may have been misled by your statement to the subcommittee.

Sincerely,

PAUL FINDLEY,
Member of Congress.

Following is the text of the transmittal letter from Mr. Frick, together with the worksheet and assumptions for snapback computations that he supplied to me:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION AND
CONSERVATION SERVICE,
Washington, D.C., July 11, 1969.

HON. PAUL FINDLEY,
House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. FINDLEY: Per your request I am enclosing detailed notes concerning the computations and assumptions we used in analyzing the effect of the implementation of a snap-back program for cotton.

Sincerely yours,

KENNETH E. FRICK,
Administrator.

WORK SHEET AND ASSUMPTIONS FOR SNAPBACK COMPUTATIONS

1. Assume the Secretary would offer voluntary diversion at a payment rate of 10 cents per pound on up to 35 percent of the producer's allotment.
2. Planted plus diverted is estimated at 12.7 plus 2.4 equals 15.1 million acres; this compares with an adjusted allotment of 15.3 (16.2 minus .9). The incentives for either diversion or planting are so high that there would be very little "slippage."
3. Voluntary diversion payments would be subject to a limit of \$20,000; therefore, we have assumed that only about half of the 5 million acres eligible for diversion would be diverted.
4. The difference between planted and harvested is estimated at only 600,000 due to the fact that under the snap-back, benefits accrue to farmers on actual production rather than projected production.
5. Average yield is estimated at 20 pounds higher due to the above reason and additional acres planted in skip-row patterns.
6. Ending stocks are estimated to be 1.5 million bales higher than under present program; CCC stocks, however, are estimated to be 2.1 million bales higher. This is due to the fact that with surpluses beginning to build up again the trade would carry less

stock. This results in a nonrecurring CCC outlay of \$96 million (\$160 per bale times 600,000 bales).

7. Current parity for cotton is approximately 48 cents; the minimum support rate of 65 percent would indicate that the support price for average of the crop could not be less than 31.2 cents.

8. The expenditures of \$432 million is merely the 2.7 increase in CCC stocks times \$160 per bale.

9. Storage and handling costs are estimated up 50 percent in the line with the increase in CCC stocks.

10. Producer payments are calculated as follows; 2.4 million acres diverted at projected yield of 520 pounds equal \$125 million plus \$31 million in small farm payments for a total of \$156 million.

11. Total disappearance of 11.9 million bales at a CCC loss of \$50 per bale accounts for the snap-back loss of \$595.

TABLE 5.—UPLAND COTTON—ESTIMATES OF BASIC DATA FOR 1968 THROUGH 1970 CROPS (BASED ON PRESENT PROGRAM) AND 1970 UNDER THE SNAPBACK PROVISION

Item	1968 crop (1)	1969 crop (2)	1970 crop	
			Present program (3)	Snapback (4)
Acreage (thousands):				
Allotted	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2
CAP, CR, adjustment, etc.	1.0	.9	.9	.9
Diverted for payment	3.2			2.4
Planted	10.9	11.9	11.9	12.7
Harvested	10.1	11.1	11.2	12.1
Field: Pound per acre harvested	515	520	530	550
Supply and utilization (1,000 bales):				
Production (including imports and city crop)	10.9	12.1	12.5	14.0
Beginning stocks (including preseason ginnings)	6.3	6.6	7.2	7.2
Domestic disappearance	8.1	8.3	8.4	8.4
Exports	2.5	3.2	3.5	3.5
Ending stocks	6.6	7.2	7.8	9.3
CCC stocks July 31	3.0	3.6	4.2	6.3
Price (in cents):				
Support price per pound (middling 1 inch)	20.25	20.25	20.25	32
Support price per pound (average of crop)	19.69	19.71	19.71	31.25
Price support payment rate	12.24	14.73	17.31	
Diversion payment rate	10.76+6			110
Producer payments:	784	826	966	156
Farm value of production (million dollars):	1,192	1,290	1,302	2,172
Total (million dollars):	1,976	2,116	2,268	2,328
Major receipts or expenditures (million dollars):				
Net change in stocks at loan rate	-230	-60	-60	-432
Storage, handling, and loan settlement	-3	-18	-20	-30
Producer payments	-742	-826	+966	-156
Snapback loss on sales or loan repayments				-595
Subtotal, price support expenditures:	-975	-904	-1,046	-1213
Public Law 480	-82	-70	-70	-
Estimated major expenditures	-1,057	-974	-1,116	-1,283
Change in CCC stocks (million bales) (from June 30 of prior year):	+2.2	+0.6	+0.6	+2.7

¹ Volume.

² Fiscal year.

Since this correspondence occurred, USDA reports on 1969 crop cotton yield tend to discredit even further the cost estimate under snapback for the 1970 crop. The yield for 1969 is now put at 474 pounds per acre, which contrasts with the 520 yield figure used in table 5, and makes even more unrealistic the 550-pound yield figure used in forecasting the cost of the snapback provision for the 1970 crop. Yield has never in history approached 550 pounds per acre.

GOV. MARVIN MANDEL FIGHTS MALNUTRITION IN MARYLAND

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. FRIEDEL) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Speaker, in Maryland we do not have a lieutenant governor. Under our constitution when a Governor dies or resigns, his place is taken temporarily by the president of the senate until such time as a successor is chosen by the members of the general assembly.

When the Vice President of the United States, SPIRO T. AGNEW, resigned the governorship of Maryland, the general assembly chose as the new Governor the distinguished speaker of the house of delegates, Marvin Mandel, a resident of

the Seventh Congressional District of Maryland, which I have the honor to represent in this House.

Mr. Speaker, Marvin Mandel is a quiet unassuming man, who has nothing about him of the demagog. A superb craftsman, who knows the business of government as few in America do, he believes in doing his job with a minimum of fanfare and a maximum of results.

Many very serious problems faced the new Governor, but one of the most awesome is the problem of childhood malnutrition in our State, a problem which the State had through the years left to the political subdivisions. Unfortunately, despite their best efforts the problem has grown to a level beyond the fiscal capabilities of the subdivisions.

Rather than delaying action on this problem, Governor Mandel conceded the point that conditions in our State had reached scandalous proportions and typical of Marvin Mandel, he set out to correct the situation.

Earlier this year he appointed a blue ribbon task force with a mandate to report back to him by the opening of the present school year. Working closely with the task force, Governor Mandel, made available \$1,200,000 in State funds to assist the city of Baltimore and the 23 counties of Maryland. In addition, he

has maintained close liaison with the congressional delegation of our State in an effort to obtain badly needed Federal assistance.

On October 1, 1969, Governor Mandel's national relations officer, Gerard F. Devlin, presented a hard-hitting report to the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, which is considering amendments to the School Lunch Act. His testimony paints a picture which is far from pretty, but he "tells it like it is." Mr. Speaker, I insert Mr. Devlin's statement and a very pertinent series of articles published earlier this year in the Baltimore Sun in the RECORD following my remarks. I know many other States face the same problem and I believe these articles will be of interest to my colleagues.

Mr. Speaker, I am very proud of my most distinguished constituent and if, to coin a phrase, the name of Marvin Mandel is not exactly a household word, rest assured that before he leaves office his name will be known across this Nation as a Governor who gets the job done.

The material follows:

TESTIMONY OF GERALD F. DEVLIN, NATIONAL RELATIONS OFFICER FOR THE STATE OF MARYLAND, BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY CONSIDERING AMENDMENTS TO THE SCHOOL LUNCH ACT

Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry:

My name is Gerald F. Devlin. I am National Relations Officer for the State of Maryland and I am here today representing Governor Marvin Mandel, who shares the deep concern of members of this Committee on the problem of malnutrition and especially malnutrition among our school children. We would like to commend the very distinguished junior Senator from the State of Georgia, the Honorable Herman E. Talmadge for his sponsorship of Senate Bill No. 2548 and his commitment to the concept that no child who comes to school hungry will go home hungry.

I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your promptness in scheduling hearings on pending bills to amend the School Lunch Act.

Mr. Chairman, statistically speaking, Maryland is perhaps the most typical American state. We rank near the middle of the 50 states in population, in per capita income, in poverty. We are a state with a great industrial base, but also a great agricultural state. We are part of the industrial Northeast, part of the rural South and, three counties are part of Appalachia.

I point this out, Mr. Chairman, in order to show that Maryland's problems are similar to those of the other 49 states. A close look at hunger in the State of Maryland shows a truly appalling picture, but it is rivaled by conditions in other parts of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, earlier this year Weldon Wallace of the Baltimore Sun wrote a four-part series on hunger in the City of Baltimore. With your consent, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this series made a part of the permanent record of this committee, in order that all members of the Senate and all persons interested in malnutrition may look at this factual report of conditions in a large American city.

Mr. Wallace points out that the problem of malnutrition in parts of Baltimore is worse than that in some of the so-called "underdeveloped" nations. For example, Mr. Wallace cites a study conducted by Dr. Ray Hepner, who heads the Community Pediatrics Center at the University of Maryland's Medical School. Dr. Hepner, who is also Chairman of

Governor Mandel's Commission on Childhood Malnutrition, notes that a study which he made of children below school age in Baltimore and in poverty-ridden West Pakistan indicates that iron-deficiency anemia is twice as prevalent among children in Baltimore's Inner City than among children in the poorest areas of West Pakistan.

In similar nutrition studies, Vitamin A deficiency was found to be far more severe in the poorer parts of the City of Baltimore than it was in Ethiopia. The normal value of Vitamin A level in blood serum is considered 37 micrograms per 100 mm. For Ethiopian children, the range is 31 to 50. For Inner City Baltimore children, it is 19 to 38. Among 4 and 5-year olds examined by the Community Pediatrics Center at the University of Maryland, 16% had a Vitamin A level below 15 micrograms or less than half the normal. This record is no better than the situation in Thailand and South Vietnam.

Dr. Hepner's investigations also pointed out that among Baltimore Inner City children between the ages of 5 and 15 years, 23% got less Vitamin A than the required daily allowance.

Mr. Chairman, without going on at length, I think that we in Maryland concur with the very accurate appraisal of the effects of malnutrition made by the distinguished Senator from Georgia on the floor of the Senate on July 7, 1969. He said then that "An improper diet in the formative years has resulted in mental retardation, individual lack of energy and initiative in unknown segments of our adult population. The most tragic aspect of this is that many of those deprived adults are producing offspring who must endure the same unfortunate cycle of poverty."

I think our experience in Maryland and the studies conducted by Dr. Hepner and others have underscored the accuracy of the Senator's remarks—and I might add—the human tragedy that goes with the repetition of the poverty cycle. Mr. Chairman, in Maryland we are at this time taking dynamic action to alleviate childhood malnutrition. For example, within the past month the Governor has allocated \$1,200,000 to serve 40,500 additional needy children free, or reduced-price, meals each day. Further, the Governor has indicated his willingness to recommend additional funds to alleviate this problem.

It has been estimated that there are 90,000 children in need of free or reduced-rate lunches in the State of Maryland. About half of this number are to be found in Baltimore, and the other half in the 23 counties outside of the city. At this time the House Committee on Appropriations is considering the Appropriation bills adopted by the House and Senate which include funds for school lunch programs. With these funds, and the supplemental funds made available by Governor Mandel, we still would not have enough money to solve the problem and to feed the 70,000 Maryland children who need free or reduced-rate lunches each day of the school year. It is for this reason that Governor Mandel earlier announced his strong support of HR 11651, a bill which would make available \$100,000,000 in additional funds in the present fiscal year, of which Maryland's share would amount to something between \$1,900,000 and \$2,000,000.

Governor Mandel urged the members of the Maryland House Delegation to give their full support to this emergency measure when it was considered under suspension of rules in the other body. I am happy to report that the Maryland Delegation, four of whom are Democrats and four of whom are Republicans, supported this measure unanimously, indicating the fact that hunger is not a partisan issue.

Funds along this order are desperately needed, and it is our hope that this great Committee will authorize the expenditure of

at least the amount of money contained in HR 11651.

Mr. Chairman, there are so many other witnesses who have testified upon this same subject that I shall not take time of this great Committee any further. I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your deep and personal interest in this subject, an interest which extends back more than three decades, and to Senator Talmadge for his deep and humane interest in the well-being of American school children. It is my hope, and the hope of Governor Mandel, whom I represent today, that you will authorize funds to assist the states in providing proper nutrition for our school children. I commend this Committee for its energy and its diligence. Thank you.

[From the Baltimore Sun, May 19, 1969]

HUNGER IN BALTIMORE—I: CITY'S CHILD ANEMIA RATE RIVALS PAKISTAN'S

(By Weldon Wallace)

Eighteen-year-old Marcia is the anemic mother of a 10-month-old boy and a 2-year-old girl. They live in West Baltimore.

The boy was placed in foster care recently. At the age of 9 months he weighed 9 pounds—11 pounds under normal expectancy.

The girl has been diagnosed as severely anemic at the Provident Comprehensive Neighborhood Health Center. She has not tried to stand alone, and characteristically she keeps her feet in a curled-up position. She is receiving physical therapy.

The cause of the children's poor condition: Bad diet.

Such cases are commonplace here.

The proportion of Baltimore children whose growth is severely stunted because of malnutrition far exceeds the national average.

In certain other conditions reflecting poor diet, the city's record compares unfavorably even with some of the so-called "underdeveloped nations."

As but one example, the rate of anemia traceable to iron deficiency is twice as high among children in Baltimore's inner city than among children in rural areas of West Pakistan.

This was reported by Dr. Ray Hepner, who heads the community pediatrics center operated by the University of Maryland with federal funds. His conclusions are based on comparative studies he made of children below school age—650 in Baltimore and 474 in West Pakistan.

Iron-deficiency anemia is the result of a diet poor in meat, eggs, vegetables and fruits.

The effect of such a diet is to lower levels of hemoglobin, a substance in red blood cells that transports oxygen and removes carbon dioxide. When hemoglobin is deficient, heart and blood vessels must work harder to meet the body's demands for oxygen.

Symptoms include apathy, poor attention and performance and increased susceptibility to fatigue and disease.

Iron-deficiency anemia is no respecter of race, creed or color. It is however, definitely a disease of the poor.

In a sampling of children from Baltimore suburban homes made by the University of Maryland pediatrics department not one case was found. By contrast, studies in an area radiating out from University Hospital, at Greene and Lombard streets, revealed severe iron-deficiency anemia in 36 percent of children 6 months old; 54 per cent at 12 months; 18 per cent at 4 years, and 25 per cent at 15 years.

These findings are matched by records in other sections of the inner city.

A Johns Hopkins survey showed that among 8,000 East Baltimore children in the so-called "Broadway corridor," 20 per cent had hemoglobin levels lower than 10 grams per

100 milliliters of blood. Translated, that means "truly severe anemia."

At the Johns Hopkins Hospital, 88 children were treated for iron-deficiency anemia in the last six months of 1963 alone, it was reported by Dr. Henry Seidel, associate professor of pediatrics.

In another nutrition study, Vitamin-A deficiency was found to be far more severe in Baltimore's inner city than in Ethiopia, according to the University of Maryland. The normal value for Vitamin-A level in blood serum is considered 37 micrograms per hundred milliliters. For Ethiopian children the range is from 31 to 50; for inner-city Baltimore children, it is 18 to 38.

Among 4- and 5-year-olds examined by the community pediatrics center of the University of Maryland, 16 per cent had a Vitamin-A level below 15 micrograms, less than half the normal. This record is no better than the situation in Thailand and South Vietnam.

The source of statistics on Ethiopia, Thailand and South Vietnam was the International Committee for Nutrition in National Development. The University of Maryland conducted the comparison study for Baltimore.

The local investigation involved inner-city children between the ages of 5 and 15 years. It revealed that 23 per cent got less Vitamin A than the recommended daily allowance.

At the age of 4 years, Patty is 37 inches tall—4 inches below normal expectancy for her age—and thus is rated as severely stunted. But at 45 pounds Patty is obese—9 pounds overweight. Her wobbly head indicates all too clearly the unhealthy nature of her fat.

This child is anemic, with a hemoglobin level of less than 8 grams per 100 milliliters of blood. The normal level for her age is about 13 grams.

Patty is one of six children in a fatherless white family of Southwest Baltimore. She is overfed on starches but deprived of milk, meat, fruits and vegetables.

A typical day's menu, as recorded by a social worker, consisted of the following:

Breakfast—Sugar-coated cereal with water.

Lunch—None.

Dinner—Hominy grits and gravy.

The typical child admitted to a Baltimore hospital for treatment of ordinary pneumonia, gastro-enteritis or dehydration is an inner-city dweller who lives on a poor diet. Almost never is it a youngster from the suburbs.

Of 22 beds in the sick-infant ward at University Hospital, 20 to 50 per cent, depending on the season, are occupied by patients suffering from some preventable illness reflecting malnutrition.

Aside from human considerations, this is sheer financial waste.

The cost of hospitalizing a child is nearly \$100 a day, including laboratory and other charges, and the average stay is 14 to 25 days. Meanwhile, preventive services available at the University of Maryland community pediatrics center cost \$100 for each child each year.

As already pointed out, one of the chief effects of malnutrition is stunted growth, and Baltimore's record in this area is much worse than that of the nation as a whole, according to Dr. Alexander J. Schaffer, a world-renowned pediatrician at Johns Hopkins. Dr. Schaffer is consultant to the city Health Department and the federal government on child-health programs in Baltimore.

In a special study of height and weight, he examined 2,000 children chosen randomly from four health centers in different parts of the inner city, white and black. Their ages ranged from 2½ to 9 years.

He found that 15 per cent of the children were severely stunted in height, and that 12 per cent were severely deficient in weight.

By the same scientific measure in the na-

tion as a whole, 9 per cent of deprived children stand at the severely stunted level in both height and weight.

Findings more extreme than Dr. Schaffer's were obtained by Dr. Zsolt Koppanyi in the O'Donnell Heights section of southeast Baltimore, a predominately white area.

In a study of school children from the first through sixth grades, Dr. Koppanyi tabulated almost 300 out of 900 as severely stunted.

Statistically, one would expect only 30 of these children to be small for hereditary reasons. High excesses above that figure, physicians say, are attributable to other causes—chiefly, malnutrition.

Studies of malnutrition in animals, reported earlier this year in *Science* magazine, contain extremely disturbing implications for mankind.

These investigations proved that nutritional deficiencies in animals at a very early age not only retard physical growth but also produce irreversible mental and emotional damage. The studies were described by two eminent pediatricians, Drs. Heinz F. Eichenwald and Peggy Crooke Fry.

Research of this kind obviously would be impossible among humans, for scientists cannot deliberately starve subjects for study purposes. But there is no scientific reason to doubt that what Dr. Eichenwald and Dr. Fry and other investigators noted in animals is also true of humans.

A child's brain, like an animal's grows far more rapidly than other parts of the body. By the age of 3, the normal human brain is 80 per cent of its adult size, while body weight is only 20 percent of what it will be at maturity.

In rats and pigs, comparable development takes place by weaning time. The Eichenwald report showed that the brain never attained normal size at maturity in animals deprived of adequate nutrition during the early period of rapid brain growth, even if they received a consistently good diet after weaning.

Ten-year-old Raymond, of Baltimore's O'Donnell Heights, was described by a physician as being at least "two years behind in his normal development." He is anemic. He is only 49 inches tall—6 inches below normal expectancy—and weighs only 49 pounds, 25 pounds under the normal weight for his age.

His performance also lags. He has failed a grade in school.

What Raymond ate on the day before a physician examined him recently is typical of the diet of many deprived families—enough to keep going, even token amounts of foods necessary for normal development, but far from adequate to sustain healthy growth.

For breakfast, Raymond had one egg, a glass of milk and toast. For lunch, nothing, and for dinner a hot dog on one slice of bread, with soda pop.

Raymond is one of eight children in a white family. His father earns \$172 a month.

The malnutrition responsible for intellectual retardation is not simply a deficiency in the quantity of food eaten or in the calories consumed. The crucial factor is the amount of protein in the diet. For young infants, protein is derived almost entirely from milk, while for older babies and young children the sources are not only milk but also meat and eggs.

In numerous cases the malnourished are well fed so far as calories are concerned but starved of proteins. Indeed this is one of the most common types of malnutrition found in Baltimore.

The evidence is that failure to nourish a child adequately in the earliest years may not only do physical harm but may also leave him ill equipped to compete fairly in school and in work—never able to realize a potential which was, in fact, inborn.

[From the Baltimore Sun, May 20, 1969]
HUNGER IN BALTIMORE—II: A MEAGER MEAL
(By Weldon Wallace)
A DAY IS COMMON

The Johnson family, consisting of a mother and four children, ages 5 to 9, shares a six-room house in East Baltimore with a family of six (the mothers are sisters).

Terry, the oldest of the Johnson children, is an epileptic who cannot read or write.

Six-year-old Allen has asthma and severe anemia. His hemoglobin level is less than 6 grams per 100 milliliters of blood. A level of 12 would be normal for his age. He also has a heart murmur.

A social worker found that the family ordinarily eats nothing for breakfast. Lunch consists of soup or crackers or sometimes a dry, sugarcoated cereal, served with water.

A typical dinner would be hamhock, which is mostly bone, skin and gristle; green beans, and boiled potatoes.

How many people in Baltimore go to bed hungry?

The answer to that question depends on the definition of hunger.

Outright starvation, as in a concentration camp or the streets of Calcutta, is rare—though such cases do appear in Baltimore hospitals from time to time.

But if hunger means subsisting on one meager meal daily, then it is common in this city.

If hunger means dullness at school or work because of protein deficiency, it is widespread here.

Malnutrition is often disguised by appearances. Many Baltimoreans who suffer malnutrition because they are deprived of meat, fresh vegetables and eggs look well-filled out because their diets are heavy with starches.

Though it is easy to find evidence of hunger simply by making random visits to the kitchens of inner-city homes, there are more precise ways to form an idea of the number of Baltimoreans for whom its pangs are part of daily living.

As of February, nearly 19,800 families with dependent children were receiving payments from the city Department of Social Services. These families included more than 61,000 children.

Health Department officials estimate that the population also includes perhaps 60,000 children whose parents work but earn very little more, and sometimes less, than the welfare scale.

Scientific evidence indicates that out of an estimated 120,000 indigent children in Baltimore, 12,000 are severely stunted because of malnutrition. That figure is obtained by applying to all such children in the population the findings of Dr. Alexander J. Schaffer, who studied a representative cross-section of them.

In addition to the severely stunted there are at least 15,000 preschool children—and that figure is probably far too low—who are malnourished to a degree that impairs function and hampers normal development.

It is also estimated that among the inner city, about 2,400 in every grade are malnourished to a severe degree, plus others who are moderately so.

These calculations are based on a conservative interpretation of findings made in a variety of studies at University, Johns Hopkins, Sinai and City hospitals.

An uncounted number of Baltimore adults are also hungry, malnourished or both. The situation is especially bad for the old, of whom 4,000 are on welfare rolls. Many are stranded in their quarters by infirmities and often are forced to subsist on so little food that their survival itself is miraculous.

It is among the young, however, that malnutrition is most ominous, in view of scientific studies indicating that protein

deficiency early in life permanently impairs brain growth and mental capacity.

What, actually, do deprived Baltimoreans eat?

Families stock up mainly on potatoes, rice, spaghetti, grits, baked beans and bread—foods that meet the most immediate demand, relief of the feeling of emptiness.

Meats eaten by the poor are, for the most part, not the ones high in protein value but those which are cheap because they consist chiefly of bone and fat. These are pig knuckles; pig feet; pork neckbone; "fat-back" (a part of the hog that has no lean); chicken wings and back; and hamburgers that may contain as much as 50 percent fat. Luncheon meats are eaten, too, but these are relatively expensive, and the quantities taken are generally so small as to provide negligible protein.

Even the above meats are by no means daily fare.

Walter Crane, a laborer, supports his wife and 12 children on earnings of about \$425 a month.

Monthly expenditures include: \$100 for an unfurnished house in South Baltimore; \$20 for gas and electricity; \$30 for clothing and household maintenance and \$15 to pay off a debt. This leaves no more than \$260 for food and other expenses—\$18.50 for each person.

For breakfast the family eats grits or toast.

Lunch is a peanut-butter-and-molasses sandwich, with half a pint of milk bought by those of the children who are in school.

Dinner may consist of neckbone or pig-feet—chicken or pork chop on Sunday—with rice or potatoes and a canned vegetable, usually string beans. The children get powdered milk.

Perhaps because of the milk, limited though it may be, the children have developed no major diet-deficiency diseases, but they tend to be anemic; they are below par in energy and school performance, and they are not thriving like children on balanced diets.

When a youngster enters the comprehensive child-care clinic of the University of Maryland, a record is taken of the food he has consumed during the preceding 24 hours.

Sample records, chosen at random, illustrate vividly how indigent Baltimoreans manage to keep going on diets that maintain existence but lack balance and offer almost none of the protein, iron or vitamins needed by the body.

SAMPLE DIETS

For a 2-year-old from a family of four:
Breakfast: Applesauce.
Lunch: Lunchmeat on one slice of bread.
Dinner: Nothing.
For a 4-year-old from a family of six:
Breakfast: Grits, scrambled egg, coffee with milk and sugar.
Lunch: Collard greens, white potatoes, rice and fatback.
Dinner: Collard greens, rice, chicken wing.
Snack: Cookie, potato chips, soda pop.
For a 7-year-old girl:
Breakfast: Nothing.
Lunch: Nothing.
Dinner: Pork Shoulder, candied sweet potatoes, white potatoes, string beans.
A 4-year-old girl from a family of four:
Breakfast: Hard-boiled egg and orange juice.
Lunch: Cornflakes and one orange.
Dinner: Hamburger and orange juice.
A 7-year-old girl:
Breakfast: Nothing.
Lunch: Bean sandwich with margarine; chocolate milk.
Dinner: Nothing.
A 3-year-old girl:
Breakfast: Cornflakes with milk and sugar.
Lunch: Nothing.
Dinner: Pork roast, potatoes, cabbage.
Snack: Two jam sandwiches.

The following menu of a 6-year-old girl is unusual in that it is nutritionally adequate:

Breakfast: Bacon, scrambled eggs, grits, milk.

Lunch: Cookies and milk.

Dinner: Ham, collard greens, white potatoes, milk and bread.

Snack: Cake and frozen strawberries.

A 2-year-old had:

Breakfast: Pancakes with syrup and applesauce.

Lunch: Nothing.

Dinner: Frozen chicken-pot pie.

For several of these children the only drink was a popular beverage which consists of nothing more than flavored water.

Sweets are common substitutes for something more substantial, and it is not unusual to see a child enter an innercity store in the morning to exchange a coke bottle for candy that may serve as breakfast or lunch. If the child has a little money, coke and potato chips commonly are purchased.

The last week of the month may find a family subsisting on a single food three times a day—oat meal, for example, with nothing more than cinnamon and sugar to vary the taste.

Sometimes one food will predominate for several days because a large supply has been purchased.

EGGS, ALL WEEK

One mother of six recently bought several dozen eggs, and for lunch all the next week she served her children two egg sandwiches apiece. Breakfast in that household normally consists of cornflakes with watered cream the first two weeks of the month and a piece of cake or toast for each person the rest of the time. Dinner might be hamburger or a portion of sausage or bacon served with eggs. No milk.

Some poor persons become so used to bulky foods that they are not tempted by proteins and green vegetables even when those are available.

"Nothing tastes right to me anymore," said one inner-city mother, "except bread with margarine and salt."

[From the Baltimore Sun, May 21, 1969]

HUNGER IN BALTIMORE—III: EIGHT EAT ON \$77 A MONTH WITH NO MILK, GREENS, FRUIT (By Weldon Wallace)

Shirley, a 12-year-old girl who lives in West Baltimore, has reached only the fourth grade level in an upgraded class. She lags not only in her studies but also in physical development.

Shirley is 52 inches tall, 8 inches below the 5 feet normal for her age, and she weighs 63 pounds, 24½ pounds less than the average healthy 12-year-old. Physicians rate her severely stunted.

Shirley is the oldest of seven children in a fatherless family. An examiner found she had "rampant" tooth decay and other evidences of poor condition.

Shirley's 3-year-old brother is even more retarded, proportionately. He weighs 25 pounds, little more than two thirds of the 34 pounds normally expected at that age.

The mother, by contrast, is obese at 190 pounds.

The children's retarded development and the mother's fat both reflect a diet heavy in starches but lacking in the iron, proteins and vitamins mandatory to health.

A social worker recorded the following menu on a typical day in the family:

Breakfast: Sausage and grits.

Lunch: Lunchmeat and bread.

Dinner: Turkey wings and mashed potatoes with gravy.

No milk, no green vegetables, no fruit.

Shirley's family has a monthly income of \$282, which comes from the Department of Social Services and child support paid by the absent father. The monthly rent for a large house, which was found by the social

worker to be in "horrible condition," is \$100. Since gas is used for heating, the gas bill in winter can run as high as \$70. Electricity takes another \$15. Clothing and the most minimal of needs for household maintenance account for another \$20 at least.

This means that in cold weather the average money available for food each month is \$77, little more than \$9.50 a person—less than 32 cents a day.

The problem of hunger in Baltimore cannot be solved solely by pouring more money into welfare, say more than a dozen top-ranking medical and social specialists whose opinion was sought.

Yet all of these experts believe some money increases are necessary.

As they see the situation, hunger cannot be isolated from other social ills. Its correction requires a drastic upgrading of inner-city life as a whole.

"Nutrition is a part of nurture," says Dr. Ray Hepner, University of Maryland pediatrician. It does not go with a sense of hopelessness. It demands at least minimum economic and social stability, which cannot be achieved without the basic education and vocational training that innumerable Baltimore families lack.

Yet malnutrition in itself is such an urgent problem for the young that truly heroic efforts are called for to prevent a new generation from growing up here stunted in body and mind. That is the conviction of Baltimore physicians who live with the problem every day.

To these doctors, there is no question that more money for food is a desperate and immediate need.

Simple arithmetic shows the reason.

The Baltimore Department of Social Services pays a family of four \$128 monthly for subsistence and \$50 for shelter, including utilities. Subsistence is allocated on the following basis: \$95 for food; \$20 for clothing; \$13 for personal and household maintenance.

But the United States Department of Labor says a family of four needs \$192 for minimal subsistence. This exceeds the Maryland allowance by \$64 or one-third of the welfare subsistence grant.

The federal government breaks down the total this way: \$112 for food; \$40 for clothing; \$40 for personal and household maintenance.

To achieve a moderate standard of living, which means all necessities but no luxuries, a family of four needs \$266 for subsistence, according to studies made by the Maryland State Department of Social Services.

This is divided into \$149 for food; \$58 for shelter; \$58 for personal and household maintenance.

For shelter, a family of four requires \$118 to meet a moderate standard of living, the state Department of Social Services estimates. This is more than three times the \$50 Maryland welfare allotment, which has not changed since 1958.

A welfare family may live in a public-housing project at the rate allowed for shelter by the Department of Social Services—if units in the project are available, but few are.

Of 10,280 such units in Baltimore, all but 111 are presently taken. Tenants include 5,000 welfare families, according to Robert C. Embry, Jr., the city housing commissioner, and that figure represents only one-quarter of the nearly 20,000 families in the single welfare category of Aid to Families with Dependent Children.

The other public-housing units are rented to indigent families not on welfare. These pay a higher rate, which is necessary in order to make the housing projects self-supporting.

What the average welfare family of four actually pays for rent is \$86 monthly, the

state Department of Social Services found in a sampling it made.

Since that is \$36 above the \$50 earmarked in the grant for shelter, clients must dig into their subsistence allotment to make up the difference. Almost inevitably the family skimps on food.

As it is, the \$95 food allotment amounts to less than 79 cents a person a day. To subtract \$36 leaves only \$69—57½ cents daily for each person. That amount may be subject to further depletion from the incidentals and emergencies that are part of the experience of almost any family.

Further, the \$69 is only \$9 more than the lump sum the family-of-four householder must put down in order to buy food stamps, which are designed to stretch the buying power of his grocery dollars.

Many people cannot use the food-stamp program simply because they are unable to pay out a large proportion of their monthly grant at one time. The money is just not there.

Figures reveal how far the program falls short.

In March, 9,400 clients bought food stamps. That is less than half the families with dependent children on relief, to say nothing of clients in other categories.

Only 1,000 householders who were not on public assistance purchased the stamps in March—and there are probably as many self-supporting indigents as there are welfare clients.

In buying food stamps a householder who is not on welfare is subject to the same rules that apply to public-assistance clients. If his family totals four, and his net earnings, for example, are \$190 a month, he is not eligible for stamps because his income exceeds the \$178 basic welfare grant.

Several plans and proposals are now under consideration to ease the workings of the food-stamp program and to permit the indigent to enjoy the great benefits it was designed to provide.

A federal source of free food to supplement the diet of indigents has been available in recent years, but Maryland has not taken advantage of it.

The Department of Agriculture would send foods to this state for donation to the indigent when prescribed by a physician or requested by nurse or social worker. However, Maryland has never made the appropriations necessary to stockpile this food and distribute it.

Even the few dollars which indigent Baltimoreans have to spend for food may not go as far as an equal number of dollars spent by the more fortunate consumer. The inner-city householder generally cannot afford taxi or bus fare to shop for bargains among chain stores beyond her neighborhood and must go to the corner grocery, where prices are often higher for poorer food.

A substandard diet not only deprives body and mind of nutrition; it also helps to weaken family relationships. In comfortable homes the dinner table is a source of unity, drawing the family together at least once daily and often providing the only opportunity for leisurely interchange among parents and children.

But in many ghetto homes, food is so scarce and monotonous that the family has no interest in sitting down at the table together. The mother may simply put a pot of beans or potatoes or cabbage on the stove, and family members go there at random to help themselves.

And food alone, even the best of it, may not provide adequate nutrition if an unhealthy or unsettled emotional tone in the environment interferes with the body's processes of digestion and assimilation, physicians say.

Nothing contributes to instability more than the absence of a father from the house-

hold—one of the most depressing problems of the ghetto.

Ironically, the welfare system tends to perpetuate rather than alleviate the problem of the fatherless home.

A father who works may be unable, for one reason or another, to earn as much as his family could receive from a welfare grant. Often he lacks the training to do so. His family, however, is not eligible for public assistance so long as he remains at home. It is tempting, therefore, for the father to desert his family for its own economic good.

The Monroe family consists of husband, wife and 15 children. Because Mrs. Monroe is a devout Catholic, she has refused to practice contraception.

Mr. Monroe works for a construction firm, so his employment is often dependent on the weather. He also has a problem with alcohol but, nevertheless, he is employable by standards of the Department of Social Services.

The wife is the family's main support. Each night she travels by bus from her Schroeder street home to Dundalk to work as a janitor for \$60 a week. She has to pay for her own carfare and lunch.

If Mr. Monroe were to leave home, his wife and children would draw a minimum of \$250 in public assistance and Mrs. Monroe would not have to make that nightly journey to Dundalk. But the couple will not hear of this.

"We will stay together," Mrs. Monroe says, "and, if necessary die together."

Welfare clients heretofore have found little encouragement to seek work, since whatever they have earned above \$10 and expenses is deducted from their welfare grant. As of July this will be changed to permit a worker to retain \$30 plus one-third of additional earnings.

Some knowledgeable persons would go even further. As they see it, the client should be allowed to retain both his grant and his full wages if neither alone can provide him with basic subsistence. This would give him a toe-hold on a better life for his family and would be an incentive to push further up. As his lot became better, the welfare grant would taper off.

One new undertaking of the department of special services which shows great promise is the work incentive program, designed to provide job-training opportunities for clients. The interest this has aroused, and the response to it, belie the popular belief that welfare clients are happy to remain wards of the state.

[From the Baltimore Sun, May 22, 1969]

HUNGER IN BALTIMORE—IV: WAR ON ANEMIA IS URGED IN SLUMS

(By Weldon Wallace)

A group of leading Baltimore pediatricians has presented to the federal government a plan to protect infants from iron-deficiency anemia, which now affects thousands of young Baltimoreans.

Under this proposal, drafted by Dr. Alexander J. Schaffer, all infants born in the Model Cities area of Baltimore would receive iron-enriched milk from birth through the age of 9 months. This preventive measure would benefit a vast deprived section of Baltimore, extending from Monroe street in the west across the business district and to Broadway in the east. The population of the area is at least 100,000.

Dr. Schaffer is consultant on all public child-health programs in the city.

His recommendation is one of several moves taken recently in Baltimore by public and private agencies as the city becomes more sharply aware that hunger is chronic here and that malnutrition is a constant drain on the energies of the poor.

Another move is a proposal by the School Board to double the free lunches offered in city schools, bringing the number to 10,000.

Though health officials say that at least twice that many are needed, the increase sought is regarded as a substantial advance in the attack on hunger. If the budget for the additional lunches is approved, the city would pay about 45 per cent of the cost, and the remainder would be made up from federal sources.

Dr. Schaffer's proposal contains two provisions. The first concerns the iron enrichment of milk for infants. The second calls for a program of systematic and widespread nutritional education for parents. Dr. Schaffer emphasizes the second just as strongly as the first.

Such education would be given to expectant mothers along with other training in child care. The instructors would be organized as neighborhood teams headed by 12 full-time persons employed from among residents of the Model Cities area, all under a project director.

Dr. Schaffer computes the cost of his two-part proposal at nearly \$212,000 annually, and in return for this money he believes the infant population of Baltimore would be virtually freed of iron-deficiency anemia.

Such anemia lowers the levels of hemoglobin in red blood cells, thus impairing the delivery of oxygen to the body and the removal of carbon dioxide. Its symptoms include apathy, poor attention and performance and increased susceptibility to fatigue and disease.

A scientific sampling of the population has shown that more than a third of the infants born to indigent parents in Baltimore have iron-deficiency anemia by the age of 6 months. Among indigent 15-year-olds, one-quarter are affected.

It is believed that the iron formula Dr. Schaffer wishes to add to milk would have a number of beneficial side effects, including improvement in the assimilation of proteins, which are necessary for the infant's physical and mental development.

Dr. Schaffer is only one of the experts in infant and child care who consider nutritional education of the public an indispensable weapon in the battle against hunger.

Even big increases in food grants to welfare recipients will not be reflected by comparable improvement in nutrition unless householders know what foods to buy—this is the conviction of all experts who were questioned.

Numerous indigent mothers do not understand that there is a vital nutritional difference between a diet of bread, spaghetti and potatoes and a menu that offers meats, eggs and fresh vegetables.

Many of the poor, especially those who have come from rural areas, think of food in terms of cornbread, syrup, grits and other starches, prepared with ethnic flavorings. Foods high in protein and other elements necessary for growth and health are often unwelcome to palates unaccustomed to them. Even with more money to spend for food many persons would probably continue eating the foods they know and like.

It is the consensus of experts that any other measure to aid nutrition will be only partially successful without a vast training program in food habits and tastes, in shopping practices and menu planning.

Understandably, in view of the meager food money available to them, inner-city householders feed their families primarily on cheap but filling starches. Yet even with very limited resources, householders who have some knowledge of nutrition manage by resourceful shopping and adroit menu-planning to give their families the basic foods needed for growth.

If the job that must be done to improve the lot of poor Baltimoreans nutritionally, nothing is more hopeful and promising than the fact that a great deal of nutrition can be provided on a small budget.

At a cost of hardly more than \$6 a day a

family of 10 can eat meals that are both tasty and adequate to meet the body's nutritional demands.

Proof is a booklet prepared by Mrs. Norma Malden, nutritionist of the University of Maryland Community Pediatric Center.

This booklet contains menus and recipes designed to enable a family of 10 to eat for a week at a cost of \$43, based on food prices in corner grocery stores.

Listed are such dishes as omelets, barbecued chicken, hamburger "submarines," meat loaf, baked fish, beef stew and "her-ringburgers."

Mrs. Malden includes price lists of all foods bought. She also offers suggestions on how to use leftovers and how and when to shop to get the best value.

Public and private organizations are considering plans to train people to serve as instructors in nutrition in the ghetto.

But to be successful, such a program must be part of an intensive overall drive to eliminate illiteracy, provide job training and otherwise prepare indigent people to make a better life for themselves. Hunger, the experts insist, does not stand isolated from other problems. It is part of the total pattern of deprived living.

Family stability is the base of a better life, and a job is essential to stability.

Dr. Henry Seidel, Johns Hopkins pediatrician, has said, that "if I had \$100,000,000 to give to the poor, I would not spend it on food or health but on jobs."

Education and job placement, better nutrition and social circumstances—all should help in the abatement of alcoholism, drug addiction and illegitimacy, in the opinion of people who work with these problems every day.

For many indigent persons alcohol has been the only escape from a world without hope; a world where even when jobs become available, the unemployed lack training to fill them.

As for illegitimate parenthood, there is a popular notion that numerous unmarried women become pregnant repeatedly because each additional child produces more welfare revenue. In truth the money allotted for each new child is \$24.50 per month, a slim amount indeed for the nurture of a child and hardly an inducement for maternal profligacy.

And, until very recently, the welfare department imposed a maximum in grants, so that each extra child after the fourth produced no increase in benefits at all.

Dr. Ray Hepner, who heads the University of Maryland Community Pediatric Center, offers clear evidence to refute the idea that repeated pregnancies are desired by these women or are viewed by them with indifference.

Four years ago the university started education in family planning. For a quarter of a century, the birth rate in the area around University Hospital, Greene and Lombard streets, had been rising sharply. After programs in family planning were started, the birth rate began to decline and today it stands at the level that prevailed 25 years ago.

No factor in the present attack on ghetto problems is more encouraging than the sheer build-up of public concern about hunger and malnutrition.

There has been something like a national awakening. Hunger is a pressing topic in Congress, in state legislatures, in magazines and newspapers, on television and radio. Many churches have entered the inner city as the most important area of their ministry today.

And while Baltimore has the unwanted distinction of leading the country in many evidences of malnutrition, it was also the first city to create a task force on nutrition. This unit, established by Mayor D'Alessandro, has brought together numerous agencies,

public, private and religious, for a concerted attack on the problem.

All are needed to regenerate the other side of the land of plenty.

SOCIAL SECURITY

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from West Virginia (Mr. STAGGERS) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. STAGGERS. Mr. Speaker, our elderly citizens, dependent for the most part upon social security benefits, were given every reason to believe that changes in the system would go into effect before the close of 1969. The administration's recent proposal for an increase in benefits, effective April 1, 1970, is obviously an unreasonable delay. Further, the increase proposed is insufficient to cover the increase in cost of living since the last change was made in the system.

We will fail in our duty to social security beneficiaries if we do not provide earlier and more substantial relief. I am therefore suggesting that Congress amend the Social Security Act so as to provide:

First. Changes effective with checks mailed out in early January 1970.

Second. An increase in minimum benefits to \$75 per month.

Third. A general increase of benefits of 15 percent of the present scale.

Fourth. A cost-of-living increase on a scale equivalent to those used by industry in fixing wage scales, such increases to be calculated every 6 months.

Fifth. Modifications in employer and employee contributions to the system which will make the above increases possible.

Mr. Speaker, the present social security system has demonstrated the correct answer to the aging problem. It has proved itself to the satisfaction of the public as a concrete and workable method of assuring a serene and unworried old age. It needs modification from time to time to meet changing conditions. If those modifications must be made by successive congressional acts, those changes will necessarily become involved in partisan political manipulations. The social security system has not at any time been a partisan measure. Frequent automatic assessments of changing conditions will help to preserve its non-partisan character.

I feel that this suggestion is just and proper at the present time, and that it will assure a satisfactory operation of the system for some time to come.

OUR COURSE IN VIETNAM

(Mr. KYL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, since becoming involved in Vietnam, we have had three basic courses we could pursue:

We could seek military victory.

We could withdraw unilaterally.

We could attempt to negotiate some kind of settlement between those first two extremes.

Our Government has been trying to

negotiate. There is no question about the seriousness of our desire. We have taken steps to indicate our good faith in seeking a solution. I do not know how much has been achieved. This is a diplomatic process. Diplomacy cannot exist in public.

In recent days, we have had an increasing tempo of criticism over Vietnam policy. The agitation has centered chiefly on the schedule for withdrawing troops from Vietnam. The argument has been carried on primarily by press release. It is obvious that there is an effect on public opinion. A decision is being forced.

In this brief discourse, I am not attempting to say that opposition is good or bad or whether silence would be better. I am saying that what is happening will result in some easily predictable results.

Most important, opposition to our foreign policy effectively removes the option to negotiate. For what we are saying to the enemy is this: "You better hurry and negotiate with us soon because we are going to have all our troops removed by a certain date, and then it will be too late to negotiate."

It is as simple as that.

This will leave us with but two options. We will have the option to pull out. But we will also have the alternative of seeking military victory. And once the middle option is removed we will have to move one way or the other.

What is the cost of accepting either alternative? I do not think anyone needs briefing on the costs of an all-out war in Vietnam. I am not so sure we all understand the possible costs of withdrawal.

For when we get ready to make the decision for withdrawal, we have to ask ourselves if this means withdrawal from all Southeast Asia. If it does not, how do we specify where or when or how we can or will be involved in that portion of the globe. And if our policy determination at that time is to be meaningful, we will have to express our intention clearly or we will be tested at every geographic point in Southeast Asia.

We will also have to make it obvious very quickly, what our interests are in other parts of the world, particularly in those acute trouble spots like the Middle East.

It is always easier to have an opinion than to make a decision.

In attempting to pressure others into making decisions that we ourselves cannot make, we are advised to estimate all possible consequences of our recommendations. And, we must all be prepared to share the responsibility for the decisions others make at our insistence.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate agrees to the amendments of the House to a bill and joint resolution of the Senate of the following titles:

S. 2068. An act to amend section 302(c) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 to permit employer contributions to trust funds to provide employees, their families,

and dependents with scholarships for study at educational institutions or the establishment of child-care centers for preschool and school-age dependents of employees; and

S.J. Res. 46. Joint resolution to authorize the President to designate the period beginning November 16, 1969, and ending November 22, 1969, as "National Family Health Week."

The message also announced that Mr. BELLMON be appointed a conferee on the bill (H.R. 10505) entitled "An act to amend the act of August 7, 1956 (70 Stat. 1115), as amended, providing for a Great Plains conservation program" in lieu of Mr. COOK, excused.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed bills of the following titles, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 2163. An act to establish, in the House of Representatives, the office of Delegate from the District of Columbia, to amend the District of Columbia Election Act, and for other purposes; and

S. 1264. An act to establish a Commission on Government for the District of Columbia.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the Pike amendment opposing the construction of naval vessels to the bill, H.R. 14000.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. PUCINSKI). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Alabama?

There was no objection.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. FOREMAN) and to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous matter:)

Mr. DEVINE for 5 minutes today.

Mr. FINDLEY for 15 minutes today.

Mr. RHODES for 5 minutes today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. ANDERSON of California) and to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous matter:)

Mr. GONZALEZ for 10 minutes today.

Mr. FRIEDEL for 10 minutes today.

Mr. STAGGERS for 10 minutes today.

Mr. ROSENTHAL for 60 minutes on October 14.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. FULTON of Tennessee in three instances, and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. HUNT to extend his remarks following those of Mr. ARENDS in the Committee of the Whole today.

Mr. PRICE of Texas to extend his remarks following those of Mr. Devine in the Committee of the Whole today.

Mr. TUNNEY, to revise and extend his remarks immediately preceding the vote on the ABM amendment.

Mr. ECKHARDT, to extend his remarks and to add extraneous matter on the bill H.R. 14000 on amendment No. 1.

Mr. DANIEL of Virginia, and to include extraneous matter following his remarks on the ABM today.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois, to extend his remarks on the final amendment on H.R. 14000.

Mr. BRADEMAs, to extend his remarks at the end of the debate today on H.R. 14000.

Mr. SCHADEBERG to extend his remarks during debate on the ABM on H.R. 14000.

Mr. QUILLEN to revise and extend his remarks made during debate on H.R. 14000.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. FOREMAN) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. ROUDEBUSH.

Mr. ZWACH.

Mr. TAFT.

Mr. WINN in two instances.

Mr. PELL in five instances.

Mr. CARTER.

Mr. COLLIER in five instances.

Mr. ESHLEMAN.

Mr. WYMAN in two instances.

Mrs. REID of Illinois.

Mr. POLLOCK in five instances.

Mr. HORTON.

Mr. DERWINSKI.

Mr. WATSON in two instances.

Mr. ESCH.

Mr. FOREMAN.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. ANDERSON of California) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. NATCHER in two instances.

Mr. LONG of Maryland.

Mr. RARICK in four instances.

Mr. GONZALEZ in two instances.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON.

Mr. COHELAN in two instances.

Mr. ADDABBO in two instances.

Mr. WATTS in two instances.

Mr. TIERNAN.

Mr. DIGGS.

Mr. HATHAWAY in two instances.

Mr. GRIFFIN in three instances.

Mr. MONAGAN in two instances.

Mr. KASTENMEIER.

Mr. BROWN of California in two instances.

Mr. MINISH.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts in four instances.

Mr. BRADEMAs in 10 instances.

Mr. BIAGGI.

Mr. ROGERS of Florida in five instances.

Mr. ASHLEY.

Mr. TUNNEY.

Mr. OLSEN in two instances.

SENATE BILLS REFERRED

Bills of the Senate of the following titles were taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S. 2163. An act to establish, in the House of Representatives, the office of Delegate from the District of Columbia, to amend the District of Columbia Election Act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

S. 2164. An act to establish a Commission on Government for the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

SENATE ENROLLED BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

The Speaker announced his signature to an enrolled bill and a joint resolution of the Senate of the following titles:

S. 2068. An act to amend section 302(c) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 to permit employer contributions to trust funds to provide employees, their families, and dependents with scholarships for study at educational institutions or the establishment of child-care centers for preschool and school-age dependents of employees; and

S.J. Res. 46. Joint resolution to authorize the President to designate the period beginning November 16, 1969, and ending November 22, 1969, as "National Family Health Week."

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 6 o'clock and 20 minutes p.m.) under its previous order, the House adjourned until tomorrow, Friday, October 3, 1969, at 11 o'clock a.m.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1207. A letter from the Director, U.S. Information Agency, transmitting the report of the Agency on activities under section 401 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (Public Law 81-152); to the Committee on Government Operations.

1208. A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice, transmitting copies of orders entered in the cases of certain aliens found admissible to the United States under the provisions of section 212(a) (28) (I) (ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1209. A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice, transmitting copies of orders entered in cases in which the authority contained in section 212(d) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act was exercised in behalf of certain aliens, together with a list of the persons involved, pursuant to the provisions of section 212(d) (6) of the act; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1210. A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice, transmitting copies of orders suspending deportation, together with a list of the persons involved, pursuant to the provisions of section 244(a) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1211. A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice, transmitting copies of orders suspending deportation, together with a list of the persons involved, pursuant to the provisions of section 244(a) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1212. A letter from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to authorize a family assistance plan providing basic benefits to low-income families with children, to provide incentives for employment and training to improve the capacity for employment of members of such families, to achieve greater uniformity of treatment of recipients under the Federal-State public assistance programs and to otherwise improve such programs, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. KIRWAN: Committee on Appropriations. H.R. 14159. A bill making appropriations for public works for water, pollution control, and power development, including the Corps of Engineers—Civil, the Panama Canal, the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, the Bureau of Reclamation, power agencies of the Department of the Interior, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Atomic Energy Commission, and related independent agencies and commissions for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes; without amendment (Rept. No. 91-548). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ASHLEY:

H.R. 14143. A bill to amend the Employment Act of 1946 to bring to bear an informed public opinion upon price and wage behavior which threatens national economic stability; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. CEDERBERG:

H.R. 14144. A bill to provide that the fiscal year of the United States shall coincide with the calendar year; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. DEVINE:

H.R. 14145. A bill to protect interstate and foreign commerce by prohibiting the movement in such commerce of horses which are "sored" and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. DINGELL:

H.R. 14146. A bill to authorize the release of 12,366 short dry tons of non-stockpile-grade fluorspar from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. FREY:

H.R. 14147. A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act to provide a 15-percent across-the-board increase in benefits thereunder and a minimum primary benefit of \$70; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. GILBERT (for himself, Mr.

ADAMS, Mr. ADDABBO, Mr. ANNUNZIO, Mr. BRASCO, Mr. BUTTON, Mr. BYRNE of Pennsylvania, Mrs. CHISHOLM, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. DENT, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. FARBSSTEIN, Mr. FEIGHAN, and Mr. FLOOD):

H.R. 14148. A bill to amend the Social Security Act to provide increases in benefits under the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance program, to provide health insurance benefits for the disabled and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. GILBERT (for himself, Mr.

HALPERN, Mr. HICKS, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. KOCH, Mr. LEGGETT, Mr. MATSUNAGA, Mr. MIKVA, Mr. O'KONSKI, Mr. OLSEN, Mr. PODELL, Mr. PUCINSKI, Mr. REES, Mr. TIERNAN, and Mr. TUNNEY):

H.R. 14149. A bill to amend the Social Security Act to provide increases in benefits under the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance program, to provide health insurance benefits for the disabled, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. HORTON:

H.R. 14150. A bill to provide a deduction for income tax purposes, in the case of a disabled individual, for expenses for transporta-

tion to and from work; and to provide an additional exemption for income tax purposes for a taxpayer or spouse who is disabled; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. JARMAN:

H.R. 14151. A bill to protect interstate and foreign commerce by prohibiting the movement in such commerce of horses which are "sored," and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. KASTENMEIER:

H.R. 14152. A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act to provide a 25-percent across-the-board increase in benefits thereunder, with a minimum primary benefit of \$110 and subsequent cost-of-living increases, and to raise the amount individuals may earn without suffering loss of benefits; to amend title XVIII of such act to make health insurance benefits available without regard to age to all individuals receiving cash benefits based on disability, and to provide coverage for qualified drugs under part B of such title; and to authorize appropriations to finance the cost of these changes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. LONG of Maryland:

H.R. 14153. A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act to provide a 15-percent across-the-board increase in the monthly benefits payable thereunder, with a minimum primary benefit of \$80, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MOLLOHAN:

H.R. 14154. A bill to amend the Randolph-Sheppard Act for the blind so as to make certain improvements therein, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

H.R. 14155. A bill to modify ammunition recordkeeping requirements; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. QUIE:

H.R. 14156. A bill to exclude from Federal income taxation amounts received under insurance contracts for increased living expenses necessitated by damage to or destruction of an individual's residence; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. QUILLEN:

H.R. 14157. A bill to provide for the orderly marketing of flat glass imported into the United States by affording foreign supplying nations a fair share of the growth or change in the U.S. flat glass market; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. ROYBAL:

H.R. 14158. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide that pay-

ment may be made under the hospital insurance program for emergency inpatient hospital services furnished in Canada or Mexico regardless of where the emergency occurred; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. KIRWAN:

H.R. 14159. A bill making appropriations for public works for water, pollution control, and power development, including the Corps of Engineers-Civil, the Panama Canal, the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, the Bureau of Reclamation, power agencies of the Department of the Interior, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Atomic Energy Commission, and related independent agencies and commissions for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes.

By Mr. ASHLEY:

H.R. 14160. A bill to provide additional mortgage credit, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. BROTZMAN:

H.R. 14161. A bill to protect interstate and foreign commerce by prohibiting the movement in such commerce of horses which are "sored," and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. COLLIER:

H.R. 14162. A bill to amend the Social Security Act to provide an increase in benefits under the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance program, provide for automatic benefit increases thereafter in the event of future increases in the cost of living, provide for future automatic increases in the earnings and contribution base, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CUNNINGHAM:

H.R. 14163. A bill to provide for the distribution to the several States, for display to the public in museums and other appropriate institutions, samples of the lunar rocks and other lunar materials brought back by the Apollo 11 mission; to the Committee on Science and Astronautics.

By Mr. DE LA GARZA:

H.R. 14164. A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act so as to remove the limitation upon the amount of outside income which an individual may earn while receiving benefits thereunder; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. ICHORD:

H.R. 14165. A bill to provide for the orderly marketing of flat glass imported into the United States by affording foreign supplying nations a fair share of the growth or change in the U.S. flat glass market; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MACGREGOR:

H.R. 14166. A bill to provide for the prototype construction of a commercial supersonic transport airplane, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

H.R. 14167. A bill to amend section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to allow the imposition by a State of more restrictive standards relating to the discharge into the navigable waters of the United States of radioactive materials; to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

By Mr. POAGE:

H.R. 14168. A bill to extend the act establishing Federal agricultural services to Guam; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. SISK:

H.R. 14169. A bill to amend section 402 of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, in order to remove certain restrictions against domestic wine under title I of such act; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. STAGGERS:

H.R. 14170. A bill to amend section 13a of the Interstate Commerce Act, to authorize a study of essential railroad passenger service by the Secretary of Transportation, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. TIERNAN:

H. Con. Res. 396. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress relating to the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from South Vietnam; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. VANIK:

H. Res. 563. Resolution to establish a Select Committee on Post-War National Priorities; to the Committee on Rules.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ICHORD:

H.R. 14171. A bill to except Col. Alexander M. Hearn, U.S. Marine Corps (retired), from the application of the provisions of section 283, title 18, United States Code; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KEITH:

H.R. 14172. A bill for the relief of Maria dos Anjos Branco Silva and her minor children Jose, Octavio, and Germina; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

SENATE—Thursday, October 2, 1969

The Senate met at 11 o'clock a.m. and was called to order by Hon. JAMES B. ALLEN, a Senator from the State of Alabama.

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, our Father and Preserver, we give Thee thanks that of Thy goodness Thou hast watched over us during the night that is past and brought us to this new day; and we beseech Thee to renew and strengthen us by Thy spirit as we dedicate ourselves to Thy service.

Uphold this Nation in all her righteous endeavors. Draw together the broken multitude into one united people strong in the Lord and in the power of His might that the good life may be fulfilled in all men. Protect the protectors of our safety and guard the guardians of our lives and property that our ways may be

the way of peace and justice. Give wisdom to all who teach and all who are taught that the young may be nurtured in Thy truth and qualified to lead in the days of promise and hope into which Thy providence guides us.

In Thy holy name we pray. Amen.

DESIGNATION OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate.

The assistant legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,
Washington, D.C., October 2, 1969.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate, I appoint Hon. JAMES B. ALLEN, a Senator

from the State of Alabama, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
President pro tempore.

Mr. ALLEN thereupon took the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Wednesday, October 1, 1969, be dispensed with.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS DURING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that statements in