

rather than improving. For example, in 1960 the frequency per million man-hours was 1.15, while in 1968, the frequency rate was 1.28 fatalities per million man-hours. I cite these statistics, Mr. President, only to illustrate what is obvious to all of us, that the American coal miner does not now have the protection to which he is entitled.

The record in the safety field is echoed in the area of coal mine health. Coal related diseases are ravaging our mining population to a point where a major crisis is developing in every coal field in this Nation. It has been estimated that 125,000 U.S. coal miners, active and retired, suffer from coal workers' black lung disease. More significantly, medical testimony indicates that there is an increasing incidence of the dust diseases among younger men who face the prospect of this work-related disease during what should be their prime working years.

I am alarmed, as I know you are, by these facts. Assuredly, the record substantiates the need for legislative action by this Congress and the proper enforcement of the coal mine health and safety statutes.

Coal mining is a vital industry in the United States. Coal is produced here by the most modern mining techniques available anywhere in the world. Output per man-day has improved to the point where the American coal miner is the most efficient miner on earth. Production and consumption, after a long period of decline in the early post-war years, has turned upward. Today the coal industry can look to the future with more confidence than it has ever done before. A part of this confidence is based upon the ever growing demand for all forms of energy in the United States. Since coal is the largest indigenous source of energy available to our Nation, it seems to be inevitable that coal

mining must expand to meet a large part of this energy growth.

However, it is imperative that as coal mining grows, the coal miner should not be made to suffer from occupational death and disease. He should not be subjected to the daily threat of a roof fall, a fire, or an explosion, as well as other coal mining hazards, which will kill or maim him. Nor, should he have to face the grim probability that his final years on earth will be spent gasping for breath through lungs filled with deadly coal dust.

The cost of such human misery is more than the American people have to or will bear.

I support the bill (S. 2917) as reported by the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee. However, I feel that it can and should be improved, and I shall support the amendment to be offered by the Senator from Montana (Mr. MERCALF) to make mandatory civil penalties for violation of the act.

It should not be left to the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior as to when penalties should be imposed. There should be no doubt that they will be imposed whenever the coal operator violates the law.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL TOMORROW AT 11 A.M.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate adjourns tonight, it stands in adjournment until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be excused from attendance on the proceed-

ings of the Senate tomorrow, due to a death in the family.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 11 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate this evening, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate adjourn until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 34 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, October 2, 1969, at 11 o'clock a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate October 1, 1969:

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

Robert E. Wiczorowski, of Illinois, to be U.S. Executive Director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a term of 2 years, vice Covey T. Oliver, resigned.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate October 1, 1969:

U.S. CIRCUIT COURT

Arlin M. Adams, of Pennsylvania, to be U.S. circuit judge, third circuit.

FOUR CORNERS REGIONAL COMMISSION

L. Ralph Mecham, of Utah, to be Federal cochairman of the Four Corners Regional Commission.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Wednesday, October 1, 1969

The House met at 12 o'clock noon. The Chaplain, Rev. Edward G. Latch, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Great peace have they who love Thy law; nothing can make them stumble.—Psalm 119: 165.

Almighty and most merciful Father, who art ever coming to Thy children with strengthening spirit, make us strong in Thee that we may serve our country with great and genuine devotion.

Give us steadfast minds with no room for unworthy thoughts, serene hearts which no trouble can disturb, and strong hands with which to do Thy will in lifting our Nation to higher levels of patriotic living.

We commend to Thy loving care all who are giving their lives for our country, that living or dying they may win for our world the fruits of justice and peace.

In the spirit of Christ we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate agrees to the amendment of the House to a bill of the Senate of the following title:

S. 713. An act to designate the Desolation Wilderness, Eldorado National Forest, in the State of California.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed a bill of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 1366. An act to release the conditions in a deed with respect to a certain portion of the land heretofore conveyed by the United States to the Salt Lake City Corp.

SPECIAL ELECTIONS—FOUR OUT OF FIVE

(Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, congratulations to the people

of the Sixth Congressional District of Massachusetts on the election of MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON to Congress yesterday.

MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON, married and the father of four, is a lawyer and member of the State house of representatives.

HARRINGTON is the first Democrat to represent this district in 157 years. He ran a hard-hitting and forceful campaign by taking a stand on the issues and by meeting the people to discuss with them the problems of the district.

MIKE HARRINGTON, who recently turned the age of 33, expressed his position on national and international issues.

Some 60 percent of the district's registered voters turned out, an unusually high figure for a special election.

Complete unofficial returns from the 186 precincts gave HARRINGTON 72,030 votes to 65,453 for his Republican opponent, William L. Saltonstall.

With HARRINGTON's overwhelming victory, he becomes the fourth Democrat to succeed in five special elections this year. Democrats have replaced Republicans in three of the five special elections.

We welcome him to the 91st Congress.

DEMOCRATIC VICTORY IN SPECIAL ELECTION IN SIXTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

(Mr. BOLAND asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join my colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. BURKE), in congratulating MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON, the Democratic candidate, on his spectacular victory in the special election for Congress in the Sixth District of Massachusetts.

Mr. Speaker, this election had particular significance. It was, indeed, a personal victory for MIKE HARRINGTON. It is, surely, a tremendous victory for the Democratic Party. For this is the first time since 1812—157 years—that this district will be represented by a Democrat.

But, Mr. Speaker, above and beyond its significance to our party, the result of the election demonstrated beyond any shadow of a doubt that the people, not alone in this district but throughout the land, are concerned with the issues that perplex them. MIKE HARRINGTON hit the issues head on. The war in Vietnam, our foreign policy, reform of the draft, our national priorities, military expenditures and particular systems like the ABM, and a host of other issues came under scrutiny in this special election. HARRINGTON'S victory reflected the grave concern that the people of his area have for the direction in which this country is headed. Some 137,000 people voted in this special election. I know of no other special election that has attracted such voter attention. This outpouring of people and MIKE HARRINGTON'S win are dramatic evidence that people do interest themselves in the problems that beset our Nation.

Mr. Speaker, MIKE HARRINGTON was an outstanding candidate and the Democratic Party in this House can rejoice in his success. His ability, knowledge, dedication, his willingness to learn, his capacity for work, and his perceptive mind can and will add to the character of this House. I welcome him to this body.

THE MASSACHUSETTS SPECIAL ELECTION

(Mr. ALBERT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I join with the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts who has just stated that yesterday's stunning victory by MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON in Massachusetts is of major national significance.

Mr. Speaker, the Sixth Massachusetts Congressional District has never been represented by a Democrat. It has been held by the Republican Party since before the Civil War. Our late colleague, William Bates, was reelected last November with 66 percent of the vote. He had won the seat in 1962 with 56 percent, in 1964 with 65 percent, and in 1966 with 66 percent. Mr. HARRINGTON captured the seat

for the Democratic Party yesterday by a vote of 72,030 to 65,453. Sixty percent of the registered voters turned out, an excellent showing for a special election.

I assume before long that spokesmen for the Republican Party, based on our experience in recent years, will start issuing statements as to the number of Democratic seats they intend to capture in 1970, and the news media will speculate at length on whether Democratic losses will be 20, 30, or more seats. I would respectfully urge on my Republican friends and the news media a word of caution. We have had five special congressional elections this year, the Democratic Party has won four of them. In three widely scattered sections of the country, Democrats have captured previously held Republican seats. The Seventh Wisconsin District, which has never been held by our party in the 20th century, shifted from Republican to Democratic. We took the Second Montana District which had not elected a Democrat since 1958, and now the Sixth District of Massachusetts, Republican since the 1850's, is ours. In Tennessee, in the face of an all-out Republican effort, we retained a Democratic seat. In California, in a strongly Republican district, the Democratic vote increased from 28 percent in 1968 to 43 percent in 1969. These elections are not isolated events. I believe they represent a national pattern. They reflect a widespread dissatisfaction on the part of the American electorate with the performance of the incumbent administration and the Republican Party. These special elections clearly foretell what is going to happen in next year's midterm congressional election. That election, I have every confidence, will result not in Republican gains in the House but rather a substantial increase in our Democratic majority.

PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS TO FILE PRIVILEGED REPORT ON PUBLIC WORKS AND ATOMIC ENERGY APPROPRIATION BILL

Mr. EVINS of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Appropriations may have until midnight Thursday, October 2, to file a privileged report on the public works and atomic energy appropriation bill for 1970.

Mr. DAVIS of Wisconsin reserved all points of order on the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Tennessee?

There was no objection.

PERMISSION TO COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES TO FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON H.R. 12605

Mr. GARMATZ. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries may file a supplemental report on H.R. 12605 to correct a printing error in that report.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

VIETNAM

(Mr. JACOBS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, let us get specific.

Yesterday morning certain national leaders, including the President himself, called upon the American people to allow thousands more of their sons to die horrible deaths for the dubious cause of defending a dictatorship against a dictatorship in Vietnam.

Yesterday evening the only Americans having an official opportunity to answer that unfortunate request said "No" by electing the first Democrat in 157 years to represent their congressional district in the Speaker's home State of Massachusetts.

That new Member campaigned against our tragic and unnecessary intervention in that unhappy land which we have been able to make no happier by our staggering human and material sacrifice there.

There is a difference between guts and foolhardiness. And what "bugs" me is to hear those whose own lives are not being "bugged in" calling opposition to unnecessary death "bugging out." To them I say, do not be a hero on somebody else's time—or try to save the face of mistaken politicians by somebody else's sacrifice.

STUDENT LOANS

(Mr. SCHERLE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, we are now in the third week since passage of the "emergency and urgent" student loan bill. On September 15, 1969, I stood in this well and asked the Members of this House to vote down the suspension and give the Members of this body an opportunity to amend that bill, regarding interest rates, student riots, and administration. During debate the chairman of the House Rules Committee assured the House that the bill would be granted a rule immediately and back on the House floor, open to amendments.

After passage of the bill dozens of Members of this body came and said to me, "BILL, I am sorry I could not vote with you. We do not like to operate under a 'gag rule,' but because of the urgency of this measure, we have to act on it right away to provide immediate funds for our college students."

Yet, today, in the third week, this "emergency measure" is still tied up in conference. We have met only twice and on two other occasions the meetings were canceled. Where has all the "urgency and emergency" that allegedly prevailed gone? It is doubtful as to when this bill will get out. Were it not for the arbitrary action of the chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee in holding this bill up and not releasing it in time for a rule so that the House could work its will the bill would have been passed long ago in both Houses and more students would have had an opportunity for loans.

Who is responsible for the failure to

obtain the "quick passage" which this House was promised if they swallowed the "gag rule"?

COTTON FARMERS WANT PAYMENT LIMIT

(Mr. FINDLEY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, lobbyists are hard at work on Capitol Hill in attempting once more to rally opposition to the limitation written into the House appropriation bill for agriculture, the limitation that fixes a ceiling of \$20,000 annually on the total amount any single farmer can get under the various programs authorized by the Agriculture Act of 1965 as extended.

Their theme, as I gather it from reports, is that this would be a disaster for the cotton farmer, that the cotton farmer is opposed to a limitation on payments because it would mean his ruin.

What do the farmers in the Cotton Belt really think about the limitation idea? Progressive Farmer is the magazine that is nationally regarded as the chief publication of the Cotton Belt. The magazine circulates almost exclusively in the cotton States. I have just received a copy of the October issue of the magazine, which reports on a survey it has taken of 6,300 farmers in the Cotton Belt. One of the questions asked of these cotton farmers was: Do you favor an annual limitation on payments to any one farmer under Federal farm programs? The answer was: 71 percent favored a limitation on payments.

Then, as a further inquiry this question was asked: At what level do you favor the limitation? Five percent of them favored the limitation at \$100,000; 11 percent of them favored it at \$40,000; and 35 percent at \$20,000; and 44 percent at \$10,000.

So I think it is quite clear from this report by Progressive Farmer magazine that in the land of cotton the farmer definitely wants a limitation on individual payments, and the farmer there thinks even the \$20,000 figure is too high.

DISCLOSURE AND LIMITATION OF CAMPAIGN COSTS

(Mr. CONABLE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CONABLE. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing an election reform bill which would make our law governing Federal election campaign spending consistent with already declared intentions of full disclosure and limited campaign costs. A full summary is being included in today's appendix. Present law may attempt to accomplish these ends, but it offers such a variety of subterfuges that it makes any compliance a voluntary act. I am concerned about the advantage which the wealthy presently have in seeking public office or in influencing the outcome of the election process.

My bill proposes extensive changes in

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three broad aspects of the law: individual contributions, the total amount which may be spent on a campaign, and the administration of the election financing law.

I would place a realistic limit on the amount an individual may contribute to a candidate and on the amount which is spent in a campaign. I also propose that an independent agency administer the disclosure provisions and have broad administrative powers to deal with violators.

In introducing this legislation I am encouraged by the recent passage of the resolution to change the method of electing a President and by the activity of the Rules Committee concerning legislative reorganization. I hope that this atmosphere of change will continue.

During the 90th Congress election reform received a great deal of attention. The other body passed and the House Administration Committee reported bills which would have gone a long way toward reforming our election laws. This session of Congress has not seen a similar interest in this matter, for at present there is only one other bill pending offering meaningful reform of our election financing laws. There is a clear need for activity, for without reform in this area, our government will neither be truly representative nor responsive.

PRESIDENT DOING HIS BEST TO EXTRICATE US FROM VIETNAM

(Mr. CARTER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Speaker, I regret to say that the leadership of the past two Democratic administrations led us into the war in Vietnam. Under President Johnson the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was passed. Under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson the number of men in Vietnam increased from 600 to 542,000.

Voices strangely silent during those years are now blatant and raucous. They would call it Nixon's war. History definitely refutes this.

As a friend said to me years ago when I asked him for one of his red apples, "I guess you do wish it."

As for labeling this Nixon's war, "I guess you do wish it."

Our President is doing his best to extricate us now from this horrible war in Vietnam.

LIMITATION ON PAYMENTS TO FARMERS

(Mr. CONTE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, I was pleased to hear the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) say that he intends to offer a motion to instruct the conferees to maintain the \$20,000 limitation on farm subsidy payments. I welcome his support for this measure.

Earlier this year, my amendment to the agriculture appropriation bill to limit farm subsidy payments to \$20,000 passed in this body by a vote of 224 to 142. It

was a long hard fight, as many of my colleagues may remember.

Now I realize that the gentleman from Illinois has circulated a letter indicating that he will offer the motion I have already described. I read over his letter and certainly do not disagree with the arguments he has set forth in favor of the limitation.

However, for the record, I would like to clarify one point that the distinguished gentleman from Illinois appears to have left out of his letter.

The point, Mr. Speaker, is that it was my amendment to the authorization bill that passed this body last year. And, as I have already stated, it was my amendment that was offered again this year, this time to the appropriation bill, and that was passed by this body.

In addition, Mr. Speaker, I would like at this time to inform the gentleman from Illinois that I intend to offer a motion to instruct the conferees to keep the \$20,000 limitation on farm subsidy payments that passed earlier this year.

ELECTION REFORM

(Mr. HAYS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, I was at a loss to know why I got a couple or three calls this morning from newspaper reporters and TV reporters wanting to know what I was going to do about election reform. Then I heard the gentleman from New York make a speech, and I suppose he circulated a press release about this election reform. One of them asked me what I intended to do about it as a member of the Elections Committee, and I told him nothing. My State has a good, sound election reporting law. You have to report all contributions and all expenditures. All expenditures over \$20 have to be accompanied with a receipt. If the gentleman from New York is so upset about corruption in New York, I suggest that he take it up with the Legislature and the Governor of New York, because it is the States that conduct the elections and not the Federal Government.

PERMISSION FOR SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 5, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, TO SIT DURING GENERAL DEBATE TODAY

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on the Judiciary may sit during general debate today.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

PERMISSION FOR SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS, COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, TO SIT DURING GENERAL DEBATE TODAY

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Elections of the Committee on

House Administration may sit during general debate today.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

A call of the House was ordered.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 194]

Abbitt	Dickinson	Kirwan
Addabbo	Dorn	Koch
Bell, Calif.	Dowdy	Lipscomb
Blanton	Esch	McMillan
Blatnik	Eshleman	Mann
Bolling	Fallon	May
Bow	Farbstein	Mills
Buchanan	Fascell	Murphy, N.Y.
Cahill	Fulton, Tenn.	Ottinger
Carey	Fuqua	Patman
Clark	Gallagher	Pepper
Clawson, Del.	Gettys	Powell
Clay	Hawkins	Sandman
Colmer	Hollfield	Scheuer
Corman	Jacobs	Teague, Tex.
Daddario	Jarman	Whalley
Dawson	Karth	Wydler

The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 379 Members have answered to their names, a quorum.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 1970, AND RESERVE STRENGTH

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 561 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 561

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 14000) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed four hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the Armed Services, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule by title instead of by section. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recom-

mit. After the passage of H.R. 14000 it shall be in order in the House to take from the Speaker's table the bill S. 2546 and move to strike out all after the enacting clause of the said Senate bill and insert in lieu thereof the provisions contained in H.R. 14000 as passed by the House.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. SMITH), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 561 provides an open rule with 4 hours of general debate for consideration of H.R. 14000, the military procurement authorization for fiscal year 1970. The resolution also provides that the bill be read for amendment by title instead of by section and that, after its passage, it shall be in order to take S. 2546 from the Speaker's table and amend it with the House-passed language.

The purpose of H.R. 14000 is:

First, to authorize appropriations during fiscal year 1970 for (a) major procurement, and (b) research, development, test, and evaluation by the Department of Defense;

Second, to continue the authority for merging military assistance financing for South Vietnam, other free world forces there, Laos, and Thailand, with the funding of the Department of Defense.

Third, to authorize the personnel strengths for fiscal year 1970 for the Selected Reserve of each of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces; and

Fourth, to provide other authorities and impose certain limitations with respect to procurement actions, and for other purposes.

The total authorization is \$21,347,860,000. Of this amount \$13,926,460,000 is for procurement, as follows: \$6,963,800,000 for aircraft, \$3,138,260,000 for missiles, \$3,591,500,000 for naval vessels, and \$232,900,000 for tracked combat vehicles.

The balance of the authorization, \$7,421,400,000 is for research, development, test and evaluation, as follows: \$1,664,500,000 for the Army, \$1,990,500,000 for the Navy—including the Marine Corps—\$3,241,200,000 for the Air Force, \$450,200,000 for the defense agencies, and \$75,000,000 for the emergency fund.

H.R. 14000 includes, among other things, a limitation of active duty military personnel strength to 3,285,000, effective July 1, 1970; elimination of \$142 million for TOW missile procurement; \$110 million reduction in tracked vehicle authorizations; a 10-percent cut in research, development, test and evaluation funds; reductions in OV-1 Mohawk, the Cheyenne helicopter, the CH-46E Sea Knight, the Hawk missile, air defense control, XM-43 launcher, and the fast deployment logistics ships.

Mr. Speaker, there is ample time for the bill to be thoroughly gone into during debate and I urge the adoption of House Resolution 561 in order that the bill may be considered.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, as stated by the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. YOUNG), House Joint Resolution 561 does provide 4 hours of debate with an open rule for the consideration of H.R. 14000, the military procurement and research and development authorization for fiscal year 1970. It does provide that the bill will be read by title and that subsequent to the passage of the bill the language of the House bill can be substituted for that of the Senate bill.

I understand there will be a number of amendments offered and we had some question in the Committee on Rules as to the amount of time. The Committee on Armed Services asked for 3 hours. Some Members wanted considerably more. So we agreed on 4 hours. I think that should be adequate time with the time under the 5-minute rule.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the Committee on Armed Services, its distinguished chairman and the ranking minority member, as well as other members, and particularly the staff, for the tremendous cooperation they have extended in connection with this measure. When we wanted to program this bill last week for today, we had to have adherence to our rules. I know that the staff worked well into the night to prepare this report which they hand delivered to our office Saturday so that we could have the report and bill to comply with our rules, which require that we have the bill 24 hours before it is heard in the Committee on Rules.

The purpose of the bill is to authorize funding during fiscal year 1970 for major military procurement programs and the military research, development, and evaluation efforts. The bill also authorizes the personnel strengths for the Selected Reserves of the Armed Forces.

Authorizations contained in the bill total \$21,347,860,000. Of this amount \$13,926,460,000 is for military procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles; \$7,421,400,000 if for research and development programs. This is \$615,800,000 below what the Defense Department formally requested on April 15. When the terminated manned orbiting laboratory and the Cheyenne helicopter costs are removed, the bill is still \$47,100,000 below the Department's revised request.

The procurement authorization is broken down among the Armed Forces as follows:

Army:	
Aircraft	\$570,400,000
Missiles	780,460,000
Tracked combat vehicles	195,200,000
Total	1,546,060,000
Navy and Marine Corps:	
Aircraft	2,391,200,000
Missiles	871,400,000
Tracked combat vehicles	37,700,000
Vessels	3,591,500,000
Total	6,871,700,000
Air Force:	
Aircraft	4,002,200,000
Missiles	1,486,400,000
Total	5,488,600,000

The research and development authorizations are broken down as follows:

Army	\$1,664,500,000
Navy and Marine Corps.....	1,990,500,000
Air Force	3,241,200,000
Defense agencies.....	450,200,000
Emergency fund.....	75,000,000
Total	7,421,400,000

A number of major defense programs or systems are covered by the bill. These include the Safeguard ABM system, the C-5A transport, the construction of nuclear powered surface ships, and the advanced manned strategic aircraft.

The authorizations contained in the bill for the Safeguard system total \$746,400,000; of this total \$345,500,000 is for hardware procurement with the remaining \$400,900,000 for continued research and development. The projected total cost of the complete ABM system called for by the President last March is \$10,300,000,000. The committee believes both that the system will work and that it is necessary to begin deployment this year.

On this last point, the committee points out that the Soviets have deployed their ABM system around Moscow. They also note that the SS-9 ICBM now used by the Soviets is aimed primarily at knocking out our Minuteman missile silos, not at our cities. Protection is necessary. Our Safeguard system would also be very helpful in stopping all-out nuclear attacks by others than the Russians or an accidental launch by any nation.

The bill contains \$940,000,000 for purchase of the C5-A transport. This will purchase the first 23 such planes along with the necessary spare parts. This plane can carry a 100,000-pound payload 2,900 miles and return without refueling. Because of its double-deck construction 83 soldiers can be carried along with all types of heavy equipment, guns, trucks, tanks, and so forth.

The committee discusses the problem of the cost overruns on the C5-A. This overrun is estimated at approximately \$1,300,000,000; all of this was not reasonably foreseeable by either the department or the contractor. The procurement contract technique used in this instance was a new one and not fully perfected. Mistakes have been discovered and cured.

The bill authorizes \$100,200,000 for research and development of the advanced manned strategic aircraft—the new bomber—something the committee believes is vitally necessary and which past Defense Secretaries have opposed. Also authorized is \$44,900,000 for further research and development of the new tank in which we are cooperating with West Germany. No procurement is authorized on either project.

The reported bill adds about \$1 billion to the requested authorizations for shipbuilding, bringing the total authorized for this item to \$3,591,500,000. Authorized is a new nuclear aircraft carrier at \$515,000,000, eight destroyers, three attack submarines, and one nuclear guided missile frigate. Not included in the bill are funds for the fast deployment logistic ships; this continues the policy the committee took last year.

The bill also sets the ceiling on personnel of the Armed Forces selected reserves for fiscal year 1970. These are:

Army National Guard.....	393,298
Army Reserve	255,591
Naval Reserve	129,000
Marine Corps Reserve.....	49,489
Air National Guard.....	86,624
Air Force Reserve.....	50,775
Coast Guard Reserve.....	17,500

Finally, section 407 of the bill establishes a new temporary ceiling of 3,285,000 on the overall active duty personnel of the Armed Forces. This figure will require an actual decrease of 176,300 members by July 1, 1970. The reductions are allocated among the services as follows:

Army	34,000
Navy	72,000
Air Force	50,000
Marine Corps	20,300

This reduction in active duty personnel during fiscal 1970 is expected to result in savings of approximately \$2,000,000,000.

The committee voted to report the bill 36 to 3. The bill is supported by the Defense Department, as shown by departmental letters contained in the report.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of the rule and reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I take this time merely to advise Members that if this bill is finished tomorrow, it will be our plan to adjourn over until Monday. If we do not finish it tomorrow, we will have to continue on with it on Friday. We, of course, want to accommodate the Members while at the same time not wishing to cut off anyone. However, I would like to make this announcement at this time so the Members may be advised accordingly.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ALBERT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I, too, express the hope of the distinguished majority leader that we can complete the general debate today even though the rule provides for 4 hours of general debate—that we may finish that sometime today and then proceed to what the gentleman from Oklahoma has in mind tomorrow and complete action on the bill.

Mr. ALBERT. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. O'NEILL) for the purpose of debate only.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to House Resolution 561, which calls for consideration of H.R. 14000 with 4 hours of debate.

I cannot object too strongly to the great mistake I believe we are making here today.

We are going to discuss an authorization of more than \$21 billion for military procurement, and for new weapons that may mean an entirely new defense and military policy.

Four hours is simply not enough. It is not only that we would be authorizing at a rate of almost \$5½ billion an hour, but

more importantly, we are to consider such major new weapons systems as the antiballistic-missile system, the MIRV, new planes, and missiles.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. I shall be happy to yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. The authorization is not for \$23 billion. It is for \$21.3 billion.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. I am sorry. I thought it was \$23.1 billion. I stand corrected. I misread my notes.

Mr. RIVERS. If the gentleman wants an authorization of \$23 billion I am sure we can amend it to bring it up to that amount.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. Indeed you would. We discussed it before the Rules Committee yesterday and I thought it was \$23.1 billion but the worthy chairman of the Committee on Armed Services says it is \$21.3 billion. However, it is still the largest procurement or authorization bill that has ever come before the Congress, or before any legislative body in the annals of history.

There is disagreement among the Members as to the worth of these systems and equipment. There was a minority report and additional views on the committee's bill.

We cannot dispose of such important legislation in a mere 4 hours.

The other body discussed this bill for 2 months—are we to discuss a bill of this magnitude and significance in 2 days?

In the Rules Committee yesterday I attempted to obtain an open rule, with 10 hours of debate divided equally between the majority and the minority, with each side pledging one-half of its time to the minority view of the bill.

I believe this is the only fair and the only sensible way in which this bill can be discussed and voted on.

The committee's report was not available until Monday morning. This has scarcely been sufficient time to digest the report, the minority views, and to adequately think about each weapon and each weapons system.

Yesterday, our committee was told that there is no need for additional time, that each Member of this body knows how he is going to vote on the bill.

That may be true, but I doubt it. Perhaps each of us knows how he will vote on ABM and MIRV, but there are many other programs and weapons in this bill that have not been widely discussed nor thought about.

I do not believe that intelligent debate will have no effect on Members' decisions.

I have read the committee report and the minority views. I know that I will support certain amendments. But I also know that the five members of the Armed Services Committee who wrote the minority report have much more information that they would like to impart to their colleagues. I would like to hear them and I would like my colleagues to hear them and obtain the benefit of their knowledge and their views; and a dialog will be good for the public.

I intend to vote against the ABM. In 1968 I was one of a handful of Members who voted against it. I think this is

a system that is unproven, unnecessary, and wasteful. I would like my colleagues to have the benefit of the views of the writers of the minority report, and I am sure they have much to say.

I believe we could easily spend the entire 4 hours on that one issue.

MIRV deserves and requires much more time. If the authorization is granted we will be entering an entirely new phase of the arms race—an area I believe that will bring the Nation much more harm than good.

I would like to see much more time spent on the consideration of each weapons system.

There seems to me to be too much waste in the defense budget, uncalled for overruns, needless expenditures.

I am also worried about the timing of some of this procurement. Weapons and systems have not been sufficiently tested or developed to enter this stage of procurement. Why must we buy now when we are not prepared to specify or test what we are buying?

There are other programs that need to be funded. The Nation's needs cry out for help. Our domestic problems need funding of the programs we have passed.

What good will be accomplished by thousands upon thousands of weapons, if there is no nation to save or protect?

In the past 5 years we have granted more than 4 hours' time to at least 10 pieces of legislation.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 10 hours;
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 6 hours;

Medicare, 1965, 10 hours;
OEO Amendments in 1966 and 1967, 8 and 6 hours, respectively;

Model cities in 1966, 6 hours;
ESEA of 1965, 6 hours;

Law enforcement in 1967, 5 hours; and
Extension of the surtax and the electoral college's reform this year, 5 hours and 6 hours.

Today we will begin discussion of extraordinarily important legislation. This legislation may ultimately mean the possibility of war is lessened or increased, that billions are wasted or are used for other programs that the Nation desperately needs.

I believe we need more time to discuss this among ourselves, to give the public the benefit of our views and facts, to insure that the minority opinion has time to make its case and present its view of the facts and its understanding of our defense needs.

I oppose this rule, because the destiny of this great Nation cannot be considered and disposed of in 4 hours.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON).

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I had not intended to take the floor today to speak on this rule. I think my colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. SMITH) has certainly in very adequate fashion performed the duties on our side of the aisle explaining what the rule is about.

I do, however, take 2 minutes to tell this House that I join in many of the sentiments which have been expressed by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. O'NEILL). He knows I supported

him in the Committee on Rules when this question came up, on the motion that would have allowed additional time for discussion of this very important bill. I am not suggesting, when I agree with him on that, that I share all of the reservations that he has about this bill. It so happens that I am for the ABM. He is against it. But I do have to somehow rise to object to the increasing tendency in this House to feel that you should not take the time under general debate or under the 5-minute rule to explore fully the arguments pro and con. There are some, I suppose, who think that only those on the committee are privy to all of the knowledge and all of the expertise on what are admittedly some very complicated and some very technical fields.

But it is for that very reason, I think—for that very reason we ought to have more debate here on the floor of this House, and particularly this bill coming on today as it does—and the announcement that has just been made by the distinguished majority leader, which I think makes it clear that an effort is going to be made to finish this bill in order that we not have a Friday session.

I would express the hope that Members will not be offering motions to cut off debate, when we get to the 5-minute rule and there are people who want to be heard on both sides of these very difficult and controversial questions, and that we will have that opportunity for debate, that is not, unfortunately, available under the rule itself.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Illinois has placed an interpretation on my remarks which I thought should be clarified, and that is why I have asked him to yield.

I did say that if this bill is not finished tomorrow night, we will meet on Friday. I thought it was incumbent upon me as majority leader to let the Members know that there is a very decided possibility of a Friday session and that Members should make arrangements accordingly.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. May I assure the distinguished majority leader that I intended no criticism, actual or implied, of his announcement. I do not mean to imply that he is using that as a device to cut off debate. What I am suggesting, and I think it is realistic to expect, however, in view of the pressures that will begin to mount, because we know that a Friday session is forthcoming, that perhaps Members will become anxious to see a limitation placed upon the debate.

I have some engagements for Friday myself and I would be very happy myself to cancel them to stay here because I think it is important to give the Members a chance to be heard on this bill.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Alabama (Mr. ANDREWS).

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, I agree wholeheartedly with the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. O'NEILL) that this is one of the most important bills ever to come before this House for consideration.

This bill is focused on Vietnam—on that ugly war that has been going on for far too long.

Mr. Speaker, I support this rule and I will support the bill. As a member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, I will do my part to see that the provisions of this bill are implemented with funds.

Now people say "Nixon's war," "Johnson's war," "Kennedy's war." This is America's war. But, unfortunately, it seems that only those who are really interested in the war are those who have loved ones in South Vietnam. We are fighting the smallest country we have ever engaged in a war, and yet the war has lasted longer than any war in the history of this Nation.

We were not fighting to win under the other administration. We are not fighting to win under this administration. I renew my plea to the President: "If you are not going to fight to win, get out of there, lock, stock, and barrel." It is an injustice to our troops in South Vietnam to keep them down there in a war which they know they will not be permitted to win. That is not the American way of fighting a war.

I do not believe in pulling out troops piecemeal, because every time you pull out a contingent of troops, you endanger the lives of the remaining troops.

Those who think any good will come out of the peace conference in Paris are just whistling in the dark. It took them 2 months to decide what size and shape table they would sit around. Do you know it is costing Russia \$1,200 million a year to keep this war going? It is costing Red China \$200 million a year to keep it going. So for \$2 billion Russia and China have their most powerful potential enemy pinned down, and when I say pinned down, in my opinion that is an understatement. Of course they do not want the war to end. Look what the envoys do when they leave Hanoi to go to Paris. They stop first in Peking, in Moscow, and then in Paris. When they leave Paris they go to Moscow, Peking, and back to Hanoi.

There is but one way to get out of South Vietnam honorably, and that is to win the war and defeat the enemy. I have said for years the greatest way to fight this war is just to pick up the telephone and call them in Hanoi and say, "If you are not out of there within 30 days, we are going to bring you to your knees. We think we can do it with conventional weapons."

I have talked to many high-ranking Air Force people. They do not tell our committee, because if they did, their heads would roll off their shoulders. But I get them in the restaurant for a cup of coffee or a bowl of bean soup and they say, "We can win this war if given permission."

Curt LeMay told our committee:

You should not leave two bricks together with mortar in North Vietnam.

Now, let us act like men. Let us act like Americans. Let us fight this war to win or, as was said in the Navy when I was in the Navy, "Get the hell out of there."

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5

minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MOORHEAD).

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Speaker, I have asked for this time on the rule because although I am not a member of the Armed Services Committee I have, through service on other committees, become familiar with some of the matters contained in the bill.

I serve on the Military Operations Subcommittee which this year held extensive hearings on the subject of procurement. I serve on the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee which held extensive hearings this year on the subject of national priorities and the military budget. From both of these hearings I have concluded that the American people, first, will not tolerate waste or mismanagement in procurement and, second, would prefer the Congress to spend less rather than more than amounts requested by the Defense Department.

The C-5A is a classic case of waste and of questionable practices in procurement. It is a buy-in bail-out deal. The contractor bought-in at a figure so much below the Air Force cost estimate that this might have been the reason for a number of corporate officers selling large blocks of stock a few months later.

A few months later when it appeared to Air Force Secretary Brown that there would be cost overruns he believed that he was protected because this was supposed to be a fixed price contract. I discovered a memorandum quoting the Secretary making the following comment:

The overhead rates are Lockheed's problem, aren't they? Can they increase our price beyond the ceiling? I don't think so.

There is a memorandum replying to that comment which says:

You are correct in your statement that Lockheed cannot increase our price of the current C-5A contract beyond the contract ceiling—providing we introduce no changes to that contract.

This memorandum was referred to an Assistant Secretary who was described by a witness before our Military Operations Subcommittee in the following words:

I know of one such Secretary who will tell you that he believes no defense contractor should be allowed to lose money on a government contract.

At that time it seems clear that the Air Force Secretary did not know of the repricing formula under which, if the Air Force was willing, the contractor would be paid so much for the second run, or run B, of the airplanes that it would be bailed out of its losses on the first run.

I understand that the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE) will offer an amendment to delete this bail-out run of 23 C-5 airplanes. Mr. Speaker, this amendment should be adopted because these 23 airplanes are unnecessary; because the 58 C-5's which we will have without the additional 23 will be sufficient; because the aircraft has not yet been brought up to performance specifications; and because it is doubtful that we will ever again authorize the use for which it is intended, which is in connection with the massive intervention of large numbers of American troops into an

underdeveloped country, like Vietnam, which has no improved airports.

The second thing that I learned as a result of the hearings before the Joint Economic Committee was that the people expect us in Congress to be a check upon the Pentagon. This is in accordance with the Constitution. Of late much has been said and written about clause 1 of section 2 of article II of the Constitution which provides:

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

Under the Constitution the President commands whatever Armed Forces are provided to him but the decision as to the number of soldiers and sailors, and whether they shall be equipped with Sheridan tanks, and how many aircraft carriers, under our Constitution, is not his to make.

The so-called "war power" clauses of the Constitution are clauses 11, 12, 13, and 14 of section 8 of Article I of the Constitution.

These clauses provide that Congress has power, "to declare war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a Navy, to make rules for the government and regulations of the land and naval forces."

The war power clauses of the Constitution which give Congress authority "to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a Navy" and so forth, were not inserted for the purpose of endowing the National Government with power to do these things, but rather to designate the branch of Government which should exercise such powers.

These provisions grew out of the conviction that the Executive should be deprived of the sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies which Blackstone attributed to the King under the British Constitution.

I submit, therefore, that while we have the power to authorize, for example, more naval vessels than are requested by the Department of Defense we should be very reluctant to do so. If we do so I believe we are out of step with the American people.

I, therefore, will support the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE) to strike the \$1.023 billion add-on for the shipbuilding program to reduce the program to the level of support agreed to by the administration and authorized by the other body.

Included in the unrequested add-on is money for long-lead items for nuclear carrier No. 70 even though the other body so seriously questioned the future usefulness of carriers that it directed a special study of this subject to be made.

In this connection I note that in his supplemental views the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) says:

I make no pretense that the Committee has considered the greater defense policy issues of the size of or necessity of a 15 carrier task force.

Under our constitutional duty to provide for the common defense and general welfare and "to provide and maintain a Navy," that is exactly what we should consider.

Do we need to maintain our superiority

in attack carriers over the Communist nations at 15 to 0 or will 12 to 0 or some other figure be adequate to provide for the common defense? The Soviet Union does not now have a single attack carrier in their entire fleet. In their modernization program there is no indication that they expect to construct anything but light helicopter carriers. They appear to believe, and they may be right, that large attack carriers are becoming increasingly obsolete.

I recognize that there is a need for modernization of our Navy, and the bill without the add-on provides for modernization. But I think, at this time of inflation, the modernization program should be developed at the slowest safe pace and should not proceed at a pace faster than that requested by the Department of Defense.

I believe that the unrequested add-on should be deleted.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY).

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, I listened with great interest to the remarks by the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. ANDREWS) just a moment ago when he was discussing the dilemma proposed by the conflict in Vietnam. What he said about either getting in or getting out, winning the war or pulling out lock, stock, and barrel reflects sentiments I have heard expressed often in my own district.

I feel we have a responsibility in the Congress to help at least to deal with fundamental questions like this. I would like to ask the gentleman from Alabama, if he feels inclined to respond, whether or not he feels it would be in order under these circumstances, in order to clarify this issue and bring it to a head and get public discussion undertaken here in this great forum, to introduce a resolution of war declaration. Understand, I am not suggesting it because I do not favor that course of action, but I am sure the gentleman was sincere in what he said, and I would appreciate a response if the gentleman would feel inclined to respond.

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, if I thought a resolution would do any good, I would introduce it. I am not a prophet. The gentleman saw what happened in Massachusetts. The war was an issue. The American people are not going to put up with a way of life which results in 1,500 to 2,000 casualties a week. I will make a prediction, and it will not sound good, even though I am not a prophet.

I am going to predict, if this war is going next year 80 percent of us sitting Members will have to find something else to do. The American people are not going to stand for it any longer.

Mr. FINDLEY. Would this not add further justification to the gentleman's action of introducing such a resolution?

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. Perhaps I did not understand the gentleman's suggestion.

Mr. FINDLEY. In other words, the political problem the gentleman says we all face together with this unpopular war, I would think, would motivate the gentleman to give substance to the views he just expressed by causing him to in-

roduce a war declaration and do it quickly.

Mr. ANDREWS of Alabama. I would be willing to introduce it.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. HANNA).

Mr. HANNA. I thank the gentleman for giving me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I assure the Members I am not going to speak as a specialist on military affairs. I will leave that to my leader and friend who heads the committee.

There is an aspect to this I believe needs our close thought and consideration. I should like to speak a little more on the subject brought up by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MOORHEAD) about our procurement policy.

If we are going to spend \$21.3 billion we are going to do it through the procurement policies we have been following, and I suggest that those procurement policies indicate something is wrong or we would not have some of the problems that keep their heads popping up and embarrassing both the Government that is spending the money and the industry that is trying to do the job for the country.

I happen to represent a district in which a good deal of the work is done for some of the programs in defense. Discussing these problems with people in my district I have come to some conclusions I should like to take this opportunity to share with the Members.

It seems very clear to me when we have a procurement policy in new weaponry that starts out with a contract that is trying to describe something which has not yet been built. We then sit down to say, "We are going to have a closed bid operation on that thing which has been very ill-defined," and then come to the point where it is actually to be constructed and find we have to make some adjustments—this means overruns.

When contracts are being made under our present procurement policy, the people who are in charge, who dominate so far as the Government is concerned, and sometimes on the other side, are accountants. When we get to the execution of the contract it is put then in the hands of engineers. Engineers work in the real world with practical demands and practical limitations ultimately the original contract must adjust to their real world. This reads out as negotiated change orders. Change orders read out as overruns. Overruns read as higher costs and then somebody has to take the rap.

It kind of reminds me of a situation which happened in the Army. A certain major was always dreaming up new and different projects for his unit. The fellow who had to see that the men carried them out was the sergeant. One day the major came in to "chew out" the sergeant, as he often did when one of his great ideas failed to achieve success as he had envisioned it. The major said, "Sergeant, what is the trouble?" The sergeant said with immense sarcasm, "The same old thing, I guess, sir; this is a program conceived by a genius and carried out by an idiot."

It seems to me, whenever we have one group in charge of setting up a contract,

which has one frame of reference that includes very broad, ill-defined ideas, and then ask somebody else to do it, the result is usually different than the conception.

We must come on line with some kind of realistic view. Perhaps what we need is a policy that recognizes the difficulties of defining a prototype weapons system. A negotiated contract for the prototype that reflects the difficulties of constructing something that has never been built before is in order. And then once we have a real firm understanding of what can be accomplished we can put the followup contracts out to bid. For then we will be dealing in concrete terms and progress, costs, and delivery can be measured by real standards. What I am suggesting is a separate approach for a contract calling for a first-of-a-kind system. Contracts for followup hardware can then be based on tangible standards determined during the development of the prototype system.

I believe if we do not change our procurement policies to something along the order of which I just suggested we will continue to have overruns, overruns, overruns in negotiated and bid contracts.

Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that we ought to have enough experience to know by now that that is not the way to go. There is another instance that happened that I think you should know about. When we have problems with these things the reaction in the Pentagon is generally to send out some more men to watch over the shoulders of the people who are doing the job. Now these men are coming on the line with no experience, and the result of what they do slows up the whole process. And you have an overrun. Then, in response, a whole group of other people are assigned to try to find out what is going on. This slows things down even more.

It is obvious we cannot continue in this way. We have to find a better way to do it. If we are going to spend \$21.3 billion doing what we have been doing up to now, it seems to me we will not be able to justify to the taxpayers and to the consumers the impact this spending is going to have on this Nation.

I hope that as a part of this program we will somewhere here in this bill or somewhere here in this House indicate that we are asking for—no, demanding—a procurement approach in the expenditure of this money which will leave us where we are not embarrassed every time we try to justify what is being done.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. MOSS).

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Speaker, I want to pay my compliments to the statement made by the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. O'NEILL), and to the concurring remarks made by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON).

I think it is time that this House become concerned over the role it is being relegated to, that of less and less significance in the Government of the United States, that of less and less significance in the legislative processes of the United States. We are being forced time and time again to consider under conditions of limitation the most far-reaching policy

commitments any legislative body in the world is called upon to consider. The gentleman from Massachusetts pointed out that under 4 hours of general debate we will be discussing at the rate of in excess of \$5 billion an hour. More significantly, how many hundreds of billions of dollars are implicit in some of the policy decisions which will be made in connection with the authorization of this bill? Must it always be said of the House that it fails to consider; that it does not know what it is doing; that it does not act upon the facts? I voted this year for an open rule on taxes because I felt that I was sent here as a responsible legislator and I feel that we should have legislated on that issue openly and not forced to take a package or reject it. The other body, with unrestricted debate, has the opportunity for every Member to gain the knowledge he should have as an effective legislator. I say to every Member of this body that there is no issue upon which you are receiving a greater volume of mail today than those which are contained in this bill.

We ought to know what we are doing. We ought to have adequate time to engage in a meaningful debate and not be forced to compact it all into 4 hours. I know what is going to happen. We are going to try to get the 4 hours out of the way probably today and then under the pressure of avoiding a Friday session try to limit debate tomorrow.

If we debated this thing for a week we would be giving it inadequate attention.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MOSS. I would be happy to yield to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. RIVERS. Did the gentleman from California ask the Rules Committee to grant any additional time?

Mr. MOSS. The gentleman from California was occupied in the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in a markup session to attempt to eliminate the problem of overcrowding in the Nation's airways which he regards as one of the most frightening domestic crises we face.

Mr. RIVERS. For which I congratulate the gentleman. The gentleman is doing a terrific job.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. FRASER. Would the gentleman agree that if a vote should occur on the adoption of the rule, a vote against the adoption of the rule would indicate our concern about the problem of having inadequate time during which to discuss this bill?

Mr. MOSS. I would certainly interpret that vote as indicating that we do not have enough time during which to evaluate and debate all of the aspects of this legislation.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MOSS. I yield to the distinguished minority whip.

Mr. ARENDS. It just so happens that I am in charge of 2 hours on this side of the aisle. The manner in which things happen at this time, if the Members stay on the floor this afternoon, I would not be

surprised but what there will be a lot of time for discussion and debate on this issue. I do not feel that anyone will be shut off. I think there will be time available here this afternoon to Members concerned during which to discuss this bill.

Mr. MOSS. I would say to the distinguished minority whip that he is a very wise legislator, one for whom I have tremendous respect. However, the gentleman knows that a lot of Members will not be here because of the 4-hour limitation and because they know unless they are a member of the Committee on Armed Services, they do not have the chance of the proverbial snowball in hell of addressing themselves to the issues contained in this legislation.

Mr. ARENDS. That is why I made the statement to my good friend, that I think they will find within the time allocated for general debate, if they are here, time during which to be heard.

Mr. MOSS. I think we should insure that the time is available.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from California has expired. All time of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. YOUNG) has expired.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, on this statement just made about voting down the rule, I would like to call the attention of the Members of the House to the fact that if we vote down the rule, school is out. They will have to go back to the Rules Committee for another rule and then have it back here on the floor of the House next week for consideration. That will take a considerable amount of time. When the rule was under consideration in the Committee on Rules some wanted general debate limited to 3 hours while others wanted 10 hours. We gave them 4 hours. When the time for general debate was arrived at, the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services said he would not attempt to start cutting off debate and I do not believe that anyone will be foreclosed from speaking on this bill. I think they will get ample time to discuss this issue.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of California. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, I told the members of the distinguished Rules Committee—and it is interesting to note that not one person from the bleeding heart society was there to oppose the rule—that I felt 3 hours of general debate was sufficient. The distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. O'NEILL) said that we needed 10 hours in which to discuss this bill. I said, "Well, give us 10. I did not come here to fight you." If I wanted to take on anyone, it would not be the gentleman from Massachusetts.

I told the Rules Committee to give us what they thought was necessary. If the House does not like this rule, then turn it down. My term ends a year from next January, so I will be here that long. If you want to debate this thing as long as the other body debated it, go ahead and do it.

I am going to read to this House how

many committee meetings we had and, if necessary, I will tell you how much time was taken by those who wrote the additional views. Everyone had his time. As a matter of fact, some people probably had more time than they deserved.

Now, I want the House to understand one thing. If overnight the military has become so terrible, repudiate them.

It is a popular thing to do now to take out after the military. If you want to take out after the military, go ahead and do it.

I was elected by this House as the chairman of our committee, and we have 38 fine members. We have disagreements, and we try to handle them on a high plane.

When this bill was reported out only three members voted against the bill—three members. I will read the vote on 90 percent of the amendments offered during the write up of the bill. Nobody—but nobody—was run over. That is not the way we operate in our committee.

I want this House to do exactly what it wants to do, but I am going to call out the cards; and I am going to give you the facts, if and when I am allowed to give them to you. But until then, if you think 4 hours are not enough, vote the rule down, send it back to the committee. I will take whatever time you give me, and I will be glad to have it, and I will not impugn anybody's motives. I do not believe that overnight lightning struck the intelligence tap of the Rivers family tree, as far as my source of intelligence goes.

Now, insofar as these Johnny-come-lately military experts are concerned, I want them to know that I do not claim to have all the knowledge there is about military matters. I do not question anybody, but I do not like the idea of people throwing darts at this committee by saying that we have led somebody down the primrose path.

We held over 63 committee hearings. We were in session for about 7 weeks, and we had 30 related subcommittee meetings. I do not believe it is going to take us 2½ months to tell the story. If we do, I think the whole Committee on Armed Services ought to resign. I can tell my story in less than 2½ hours.

Now, do what you wish to do, but for heaven's sake let us take up this bill. We are pretty late. The cupboard is pretty bare since the late Robert Strange McNamara once presided over the Defense Department. I remember something about that. I can tell you something about the cost overruns on the F-111, and I can tell you about the cost overruns on other defense items. But the military are not the only people who have had cost overruns; for example, the Kennedy Cultural Center. There are many nondefense cost overruns.

If the gentleman from Massachusetts wants us to take more time to talk, I will take 12 hours. But let me say this, Mr. Speaker: When the gentleman from New York, the beloved MANNY CELLER, came in here with his so-called civil rights bills and his so-called voting right bills—aimed at only six Southern States—we could hardly get sufficient time to say good morning. But I do not recall any complaints from the voices I have heard

here today. It was just that we got in too late. The fellows south of the Mason-Dixon Line just lost their turns, that was all.

Where were these people who were hollering for equality? They did not seem to care about that. I did not complain. I have been here long enough to know that this is a coldblooded place.

But this is your military. If you do not want to provide for it, then go ahead. This is your military, and this is your Committee on Armed Services. If you want to repudiate us, that is your responsibility.

I will give you the facts as best I can. I will not complain about the results. Now, let us vote and see just exactly where we stand. We are very late.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for a 1-minute statement?

Mr. SMITH of California. I will yield briefly to the gentleman. I will yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I just want to comment on the remarks made by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS), the chairman of the committee. He asked for 3 hours and he said that is the prerogative of the Committee on Rules and the Committee on Rules can give or take as much time as they want.

He said:

I have no objection.

He says:

I will take 10 hours or 12 hours or anything you want to give us. I think we can get by with 3 hours.

The truth is we made different motions before the committee and the committee came up with 4 hours. Overnight I have been greatly concerned with the actions of the committee and I do not feel that it is enough time.

Mr. Speaker, I hope that the House votes down the rule and that it will go back and the bill will be brought up next week.

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, I think the matter has been adequately debated on the rule.

I urge the adoption of the rule and yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The SPEAKER. The question is on ordering the previous question.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Doorkeeper will close the doors, the Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members, and the Clerk will call the roll.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 324, nays 61, not voting 45, as follows:

[Roll No. 195]

YEAS—324

Abbitt	Frelinghuysen	Montgomery
Abernethy	Frey	Morgan
Adair	Friedel	Morse
Adams	Fulton, Pa.	Mosher
Albert	Fulton, Tenn.	Murphy, Ill.
Alexander	Fuqua	Myers
Anderson, Ill.	Gallifanakis	Natcher
Andrews, Ala.	Gallagher	Nelsen
Andrews,	Garmatz	Nichols
N. Dak.	Gonzalez	Nix
Annunzio	Goodling	O'Konski
Arends	Gray	Olsen
Ashbrook	Green, Oreg.	O'Neal, Ga.
Aspinall	Griffin	Passman
Ayres	Griffiths	Patman
Baring	Gross	Pelly
Barrett	Grover	Pepper
Beall, Md.	Gubser	Perkins
Belcher	Hagan	Pettis
Bennett	Haley	Philbin
Betts	Hall	Pickle
Bevill	Hamilton	Pirnie
Blackburn	Hammer-	Poage
Boggs	schmidt	Poff
Boland	Hanley	Pollock
Brademas	Hansen, Idaho	Preyer, N.C.
Bray	Harsha	Price, Ill.
Brinkley	Harvey	Price, Tex.
Brock	Hastings	Pucinski
Brooks	Hathaway	Purcell
Broomfield	Hays	Quile
Brotzman	Hébert	Quillen
Brown, Mich.	Heckler, Mass.	Randall
Brown, Ohio	Henderson	Rarick
Broyhill, N.C.	Hicks	Reid, Ill.
Broyhill, Va.	Hogan	Reifel
Burke, Fla.	Horton	Rhodes
Burke, Mass.	Hosmer	Rivers
Burleson, Tex.	Hull	Roberts
Burlison, Mo.	Hungate	Rogers, Colo.
Bush	Hunt	Rogers, Fla.
Byrne, Pa.	Hutchinson	Rooney, N.Y.
Byrnes, Wis.	Ichord	Rooney, Pa.
Cabell	Jacobs	Rostenkowski
Caffery	Jarman	Roth
Camp	Johnson, Calif.	Roudebush
Carter	Johnson, Pa.	Ruppe
Casey	Jonas	Ruth
Cederberg	Jones, Ala.	St Germain
Chamberlain	Jones, N.C.	Sandman
Chappell	Jones, Tenn.	Satterfield
Clancy	Karth	Saylor
Clark	Kazen	Schadeberg
Clausen,	Kee	Scherle
Don H.	Keith	Schneebell
Cleveland	King	Schwengel
Collier	Kleppe	Scott
Collins	Kluczynski	Sebelius
Conable	Kuykendall	Shipley
Conte	Kyl	Shriver
Corbett	Kyros	Sikes
Corman	Landgrebe	Sisk
Cowger	Landrum	Skubitz
Cramer	Langen	Slack
Cunningham	Latta	Smith, Calif.
Daniel, Va.	Lennon	Smith, Iowa
Daniels, N.J.	Lloyd	Smith, N.Y.
Davis, Ga.	Long, La.	Snyder
Davis, Wis.	Long, Md.	Springer
de la Garza	Lujan	Stafford
Delaney	Lukens	Stanton
Dellenback	McClory	Steed
Denney	McCloskey	Steiger, Ariz.
Dennis	McClure	Steiger, Wis.
Dent	McCulloch	Stephens
Devine	McDonald,	Stratton
Dingell	Mich.	Stubblefield
Donohue	McEwen	Stuckey
Dowdy	McFall	Sullivan
Downing	McKneally	Symington
Dulski	Macdonald,	Taft
Duncan	Mass.	Talcott
Dwyer	MacGregor	Taylor
Edmondson	Mahon	Teague, Calif.
Edwards, Ala.	Malliard	Thompson, Ga.
Edwards, La.	Marsh	Thompson, N.J.
Eilberg	Martin	Thomson, Wis.
Eriensborn	Mathias	Tierman
Esch	Matsunaga	Tunney
Evins, Tenn.	Mayne	Udall
Fallon	Melcher	Ullman
Feighan	Meskill	Utt
Findley	Michel	Van Deerlin
Fish	Miller, Calif.	Vander Jagt
Fisher	Miller, Ohio	Vanik
Flood	Minish	Vigorito
Flowers	Minshall	Waggoner
Flynt	Mize	Waldie
Foley	Mizell	Wampler
Ford, Gerald R.	Mollohan	Watkins
Foreman	Monagan	Watson
Fountain		Watts

Welcker	Wilson, Bob	Wylie
Whalen	Wilson,	Wyman
White	Charles H.	Yates
Whitehurst	Winn	Yatron
Whitten	Wold	Young
Widnall	Wolf	Zablocki
Wiggins	Wright	Zion
Williams	Wyatt	Zwach

NAYS—61

Anderson,	Fraser	Nedzi
Calif.	Gaydos	Obey
Ashley	Gibbons	O'Hara
Biaggi	Gilbert	O'Neill, Mass.
Blester	Green, Pa.	Ottinger
Bingham	Gude	Patten
Brasco	Hanna	Pike
Brown, Calif.	Hechler, W. Va.	Podell
Burton, Calif.	Helstoski	Pryor, Ark.
Button	Howard	Railsback
Chisholm	Kastenmeier	Rees
Clay	Koch	Reid, N.Y.
Cohelan	Leggett	Reuss
Conyers	Lowenstein	Riegle
Coughlin	McCarthy	Robison
Culver	McDade	Rosenthal
Derwinski	Madden	Ryan
Eckhardt	Meeds	St. Onge
Edwards, Calif.	Mikva	Stokes
Evans, Colo.	Mink	
Ford	Moorhead	
William D.	Moss	

NOT VOTING—45

Addabbo	Daddario	McMillan
Anderson,	Dawson	Mann
Tenn.	Dickinson	May
Bell, Calif.	Diggs	Mills
Berry	Dorn	Morton
Blanton	Eshleman	Murphy, N.Y.
Blatnik	Farbstein	Powell
Bolling	Fascell	Rodino
Bow	Getty	Roybal
Buchanan	Goldwater	Scheuer
Burton, Utah	Halpern	Staggers
Cahill	Hansen, Wash.	Teague, Tex.
Carey	Hawkins	Whalley
Celler	Hollfield	Wydler
Clawson, Del	Kirwan	
Colmer	Lipscomb	

So the resolution was agreed to.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Addabbo for, with Mr. Hawkins against.
Mr. Hollfield for, with Mr. Farbstein against.
Mr. Rodino for, with Mr. Powell against.
Mr. Teague of Texas for, with Mr. Scheuer against.
Mr. Daddario for, with Mr. Diggs against.

Until further notice:

Mr. Mills with Mr. Bow.
Mr. Carey with Mr. Cahill.
Mr. Murphy of New York with Mr. Wydler.
Mr. Celler with Mr. Morton.
Mr. Blatnik with Mr. Bell of California.
Mr. Kirwan with Mr. Eshleman.
Mr. Staggers with Mr. Berry.
Mr. Gettys with Mr. Dickinson.
Mr. Fascell with Mr. Lipscomb.
Mr. Dorn with Mr. Buchanan.
Mr. Colmer with Mr. Goldwater.
Mr. Blanton with Mrs. May.
Mr. Anderson of Tennessee with Mr. Del Clawson.
Mr. McMillan with Mr. Burton of Utah.
Mr. Mann with Mr. Whalley.
Mr. Roybal with Mr. Halpern.
Mrs. Hansen of Washington with Mr. Dawson.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The doors were opened.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 14000) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for

procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from South Carolina.

The motion was agreed to.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill H.R. 14000, with Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS) will be recognized for 2 hours, and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ARENDS) will be recognized for 2 hours.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. RIVERS).

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

It took a long time to get here, Mr. Chairman, but here I am.

Mr. Chairman, today we consider the annual weapons procurement and research and development bill that totals over \$21 billion—as a matter of fact, it is \$21.3-plus billions.

My remarks will not be too detailed, because many members of the committee are going to participate in this debate, because I observe—or get the inference from what has transpired before the adoption of this rule—that there are a lot of people seeking information, and I will not be surprised if we have a very large attendance here this afternoon—indeed, I hope we will, because if we do have a quorum here I think we can finish this bill reasonably soon.

It is not going to take me 2½ months to present you with all the facts. I can say all I have got to say in a much shorter time than that. I think we have sense enough to solve this question in a much shorter time than that.

This bill is for your security and your country. It provides hardware for our military.

I am expendable. I have been here almost 30 years, but if I lose this one, it will affect all of you.

I hope that I will not in any way say anything that will offend anybody—at least, I will try not to. I want to discuss this matter as dispassionately as we can, and I shall assign, as I said, to each of you the same heart and purpose that I want you to assign to me.

The Congress and the people have seen, this year, a wider discussion of our defense budget than ever before. This, from the overall view, I assure you, in my opinion, is a very good thing. The extent of the debate in the Congress and the wide coverage of this discussion in the press has given everyone, the Congress and the people, a much better understanding, and a much better knowledge of what exactly is involved in defending this country and in keeping our commit-

ments with free nations throughout the world.

World leadership is a tough business. America has assumed this role of world leadership, and we cannot forfeit it. We just cannot forfeit this leadership. We are the only ones who can handle it, so now let us handle it.

But, as helpful as the discussion has been, I feel that, because of the way some of it has been handled in the press, there is pretty good reason to believe that there are some misunderstandings somewhere.

One reference in the press was to the effect that "open season" has been declared on the Armed Forces. This kind of statement would indicate that perhaps things are getting somewhat out of hand. I hope that no responsible person in this country feels that there is an open season on your military. They are your flesh and blood—born of your bodies. They are doing the best they can. I do not think they seek glory on the battlefield of Vietnam, especially since they have been ordered not to seek victory, yet 38,000 American lives have been lost—get that and do not forget it.

Certainly this year has seen greater questioning of our defense budget and of Armed Forces matters generally. As chairman of the committee, I do not object to this.

There are even more questions being asked now than there were, as some of you will remember, in the days of the B-36 controversy when we had a lot of questions being asked.

But this is not, in my opinion, by any reach of the imagination, the declaration of an open season on the men who wear the colors of my country—your country. Perhaps it is time to sit back and do a little self-appraisal. I say this because I feel from my reading of the press that there is a very real danger that the people of the country—through misunderstanding—can come to the point of losing faith in our civilian and military leaders and in the Department of Defense. This is a most dangerous thing.

We, as individuals and Americans, are not militaristic—we are antimilitaristic. The military comes under civilian control—where it belongs. We are fundamentally civilian in our attitudes and beliefs. This is as it should be. Many of our fathers and grandfathers and great-grandfathers came to this country to escape oppressive military rule or to avoid military service to a government in which they could not and did not believe.

Perhaps it is partly this tradition and history that has brought a substantial number of our people and some of their Representatives in the Congress to the point of questioning the very foundation of our national defense itself. I do not object to this. What is wrong with it? Everything should stand the searching light of public questioning.

But a traditional American attitude that is quite reasonable in its genesis—the questioning of any governmental decision whatever it may be—is becoming excessive, and to my mind dangerously excessive, in its application.

If I have the time I am going to answer some of the many erroneous state-

ments that were made in the statement attributed to the gentleman who signed the additional views.

I did not have the time to answer all of those mistakes in that statement, but I will try to get around to answering a couple dozen of them or something in that neighborhood, if I have the time.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. LEGGETT. I would say that the gentleman from South Carolina had the privilege of having the additional views in his hand before you published your main majority report. We did not have your majority views in our hands when we published our additional views. So it was no handicap to the gentleman.

Mr. RIVERS. I would not publish anything of which I am not certain.

A famous writer wrote these words:

A lie will hold its throne a whole age longer if allowed to skulk behind the shield of some fair seeming name.

I would not publish anything of which I am not certain.

We have got to be responsible. Never has there been any virtue in irresponsibility. Our great Speaker has always said we have got to be responsible. We have got to be strong. We have got to uphold our President, regardless of who he may be, because when he makes a decision he is speaking for all of us. And I am going to back him up to the limit of my capacity.

Today, many people in this country are finding their objections to militarism as necessarily extending to a distaste for even commonsense affairs. It is anti-militarism gone completely berserk. This is illogical. This is fraught with danger. There can be no doubt that this misunderstanding, this misinterpretation of the word "militarism" does exist.

We were not ashamed in World War II to call America the arsenal of democracy. Hitler said:

I fear the productive capacity of America.

Our industrial complex was not a bad word then.

Kipling said this:

It's yes, sir, Mr. Atkins, when the bands begin to play—

And, Mr. PIKE, you can quote the other stanza better than I. But I tell you this: Do not let us fall into the ditch blaming somebody else for our own mistakes. There is room enough for us all to participate in this high privilege of saving what is left of this great country.

Our international difficulties do not arise because we have a large Military Establishment. We have a large Military Establishment because there are those who threaten us. That is the only reason. Do you want to bring everyone home from NATO. Go ahead and do it. I do not think it would be wise. I do not think we can bring everybody back from the Pacific. I do not think it would be wise.

We must face the cold facts of life. Are we going to heed these facts or disregard them? There are only two courses. We are not in a debating society now. The question now is preparation for survival. You can participate if you want to.

If you do not want to do so, that is your responsibility.

Have you forgotten the vote in this House, Mr. Chairman, on the fortification of Guam? How many of those people who were here then would like to relive that day? Some of you must remember that vote. We are not saying that we must satisfy some newspaper editor or some TV commentator or the howling mob. We have a higher issue here.

Have you forgotten the Frenchman who said when he saw the mob in the street, "I've got to go out there and see in which direction they are headed, because after all I am their leader."

The other day two young men called on me. They had just been freed. They had just been freed from a jail in Hanoi. One of them came to me and mentioned the names of some Members of this honorable body whose words were played over and over again. He said, "I was so glad to hear your name mentioned."

I said, "What did they say about me?" He said, "It wasn't anything good, but we sure wanted to applaud."

I said, "Why didn't you?"

They said, "We wanted to live."

That is the kind of enemy we face.

This is the kind of enemy we face and he will kill us if we let him.

I am not talking about the things that are necessary to give our men a chance—at least some chance of victory. God forbid that another holocaust should come in our time. We will not have the luxury of time again. Incidentally, should we lose our military superiority, church is out for us all. I am not here referring to the anti-ballistic-missile system or to more or fewer nuclear submarines or to aircraft carriers. I am not talking about the morality or immorality of the war in Vietnam. I am talking about the danger of adopting an inadequate bill.

Heaven help us all if the position prevails of those who say we can grow stronger by lowering our guard or we can achieve a world Utopia if we lay down our guns. I say: "We are a peace-loving people and we will prove it by laying down our weapons. If you are as nice and as reasonable and as free from intention to attack us as we are to attack, of course you will do the same thing."

It just does not work out that way. At least it never has, and I do not think it is going to start in 1969 or during my lifetime. I am not that silly or that naive. I question no one's patriotism in this House. I have something else to do. But I appeal to the judgment of Members and I appeal to their judgment as responsible men, and I appeal to the reason of those who are as dedicated as I am.

As for the objections that have been raised and will be raised in connection with this military procurement and research and development bill, certainly no one can question the right or obligation of Congress to look in the closest fashion into the vast expenditures authorized in this bill. Close analysis of some of these programs can go far toward bringing out the facts and helping to clear the air of suspicion and misapprehen-

sion that is now so prevalent both in the Congress and in the public mind.

But let us exercise the greatest care to avoid the danger of overshooting the mark, of attacking excesses in an excessive fashion. There are indeed defects in our Defense procurement procedures, but there are also deep and abiding dangers which face this country. I feel certain that many share my concern that, in countering the one, we may run the danger of contributing to the growth of the other. We can rightly deal with the excessive costs of weapons systems and the failure of systems to perform in the manner intended, but if our view is limited to errors made and does not extend to the defensive and offensive position that this country needs to achieve, we will have failed to maintain a proper balance in our search for a reasonable and adequate national defense.

We think in generalities, all of us, but unfortunately we must live in detail. It is just a fact of life. It is an acceptable if not proven generality that militarism is bad. Generalities have no surface points to contact that one can grasp, but below the surface are those particulars, those small hard facts that we are sometimes unwilling to grasp or to gather. It is indeed a true generality that war is a terrible thing, but it is a hard fact of life that some wars must be fought.

I wish I knew how to stop them. If I did, I would not be in this Congress. It is an attractive generality that peace and the plucking of fruit from the tree is a way of life devoutly to be sought, but it is also a hard fact that he who would pluck the fruit often is confounded by the common enemy. Remember that.

It is a disturbing generality that the making of machines of destruction is contrary to our higher ethic, but it is a hard fact that someone with a gun is even now on the horizon.

Booby traps and pitfalls, I can assure you, were here long before Vietnam. This world is not a garden of Eden. In the real world in which we live comforting self-serving generalities just do not exist. They just do not exist.

So let us debate matters of defense in an atmosphere of good sense, but let us not make the military the whipping boy in the process.

Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I will yield to the gentleman from North Carolina any time he wants to ask me a question.

Mr. JONAS. The gentleman owns a house in Charleston, S.C., a home?

Mr. RIVERS. That is about the only thing I do own.

Mr. JONAS. The gentleman, I hope, has never experienced a fire in that residence?

Mr. RIVERS. Not in my house.

Mr. JONAS. Does the gentleman carry insurance?

Mr. RIVERS. I pay for it. I have to pay it in installments.

Mr. JONAS. The gentleman does not consider the insurance he pays for protection against fire wasted money, does he?

Mr. RIVERS. I know what the gentleman is talking about. I know what he means.

We must have this insurance. We never need a fire engine until the fire breaks out.

Let me tell the gentleman a story. Once we had a Secretary of Defense—I do not know whether he is still living or not—who was closing up everything. He came to me and he said, "we have got this MATS outfit"—we changed the name of MATS to MAC—"over at the National Airport, and we have got a fire engine. We do not need that fire engine." I said, "why of course you do not need it. Sell it. You are never going to have a fire at National Airport. Those planes are not going to crash. Get rid of it." Do you know what? He did get rid of it.

Mr. JONAS. If you have a fire and do not have fire insurance you are going to be sorry you do not have insurance.

Mr. RIVERS. Then you have had the course.

There is an attractive generality about peace.

We can have our differences. That is a part of our system. But let us avoid the seeking of simple answers to difficult problems through name calling. This does not serve any purpose.

We are all on the same side. In our committee we had some very fine debates. We had differences. When the final analysis came, three out of 39 voted against it. Our batting average is pretty good. Even the good Lord had two out of 12 against him when the going got rough, so I do not think that our batting average is too bad.

I know the imperfections I have. Somebody said I was the southern distributor for mistakes. If somebody did not say it, somebody should have said it.

So let us all start at the same place and end up at the same place in this day of debate and discussion, so we can find some answers.

In another context, John W. Gardner, who is fairly prominent around these parts, said that "America needs physicians, not executioners." John Gardner is right. This is what we need. I agree with that statement.

So now let me deal briefly with the bill. Let me deal briefly with some of the highlights of the bill.

As I said before, other members of the committee will deal with particulars. They are knowledgeable. They will participate in this debate. I do not want to take their time.

This bill before you totals \$21,347,860,000. This includes \$14,926,460,000 for procurement and \$7,421,400,000 for research and development and test and evaluation.

This bill is \$615.8 million less than the revised budget submitted by Defense Secretary Laird on April 15.

It is \$1.8 billion less than the budget originally submitted by Secretary Clifford for the Department of Defense in January. After submitting his budget Secretary Laird terminated the manned orbiting laboratory and the Cheyenne program. If the money saved on these two programs were included, the present bill is \$47.1 million less than the Laird budget of April 15. Our bill is \$1,288,360,000 more than the Armed Services Committee of the Senate approved and \$1,358,974,000 more than the final bill

passed by the Senate. Our bill is still \$277,890,000 less than the authorization bill passed by the House last fiscal year.

Now, you can see, with all of this inflation, that we have combed this with the finest of combs. The committee has given more time to a thorough study of the items contained in this bill than any previously made in my memory, and I went on this committee when it was founded and before that I was on the Naval Affairs Committee. The full committee has been working on this bill for more than 6 months. We had a total of 91 meetings that contributed to the bill before us today. We had 61 full committee meetings on the bill. In addition there were 12 sessions by our Seapower Subcommittee headed by the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT), and nine meetings by a special subcommittee on the Army tank headed by the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON). There were six meetings by the subcommittee headed by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE), which was made up of members formerly on the Research and Development Subcommittee and which will be reestablished. There was also meetings by the Anti-Submarine Warfare Subcommittee.

Every working minute, every working day we have dedicated ourselves to this bill. If we have made a mistake, it may be because we just did not know how to do anything any better. I can assure you we have done the very best we know how to do. I am jealous of this committee. It has been an illustrious group that has headed up this committee, and I do not propose to sit down and see anybody degrade it. I do not propose to sit down and not defend it. I do not hold anything against any member of the committee. This is not my committee. This is your committee. This is your committee. If you do not think it is run democratically, ask every member on it. Everybody has his say.

The hearings of our committees on this legislation to date fill 2,660 pages, not counting the additional hearings by the subcommittees to which I have referred. We have had our full staff devoting virtually its full working time to this bill for about 6 months. I want to say that all members of the committee have worked dilligently on this legislation. All members have had an opportunity to make a contribution, and we have taken time to consider divergent views. Ask any member of the committee.

Now let us get to what this thing is about.

The very real threat posed to this country is the Soviet threat. The Soviet military development of recent years is covered thoroughly in our committee report on pages 8 through 13. I hope you will read them.

Other members of the committee I am sure will want to address themselves to this phenomenon.

I want to particularly stress to all Members of the House the great leap forward taken by the Soviet naval authorities in recent years—and the Soviets have obviously made a conscious decision to compete for the position of dominating seapower, to dominate seapower totally not only in the Russian waters but elsewhere.

At this very minute they are walking into the vacuum of the Indian Ocean. The Soviets are not just modernizing their navy. They are using it. They are demonstrating that they understand the totality of seapower. They understand, the combined effect of a modern naval force—a vigorous and modernized naval fleet, an expanded merchant marine and fishing fleet and then, of course, research, and development in this and other areas is recognized to the fullest in this Soviet effort. Right today there are ships off Nantucket. Right today there are ships off my native South Carolina. They have been there so long that I think that they feel they have a right to occupy the waters off South Carolina. And, they are not kidding; they are not kidding. They have been all around the world. They have got the power to back it up.

The great growth of Russian combat power is discussed fully in the important report of our Seapower Subcommittee which is chaired by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) and which is now a best seller in England.

The Soviets now have the largest submarine force in the world. They have some 350 subs, including 65 nuclear-powered submarines. We have 140; 58 percent of the ships of the Soviet Navy, 58 percent, is under 10 years of age, while 58 percent of ours are over 20 years of age. Less than one-quarter of 1 percent of the ships in the Soviet Navy are over 20 years of age. It is because of these facts which were revealed by a thorough review conducted by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) and his Seapower Subcommittee that the committee added \$960 million to the administration's request for the modernization of the Navy. And, let me say here that this \$960 million was the figure that the Navy recommended. This is not our figure. Every single ship of every category counted in that \$960 million were the ships the Navy asked for. The committee did not put these in as the result of some fanciful idea based solely on its own knowledge. We got the information from headquarters.

This is but the first installment of a 5-year program that shall have to be funded to as much as \$4 billion a year if we are to catch up with the Soviets and again be the first naval power in the world.

Now, the Soviet power is a real threat. It exists now. It speaks more eloquently of the realities which we have to face here today than all of the noble speeches I or any member of this committee, may make on the subject.

We have all manner of experts in this country today telling us that we should be stopping our own national security developments, that the Russian threat will go away. Who believes this? You have not forgotten what happened in Czechoslovakia, have you? They are just plainly not kidding. You do not think that they are in the Mediterranean just for the purpose of a leisurely Mediterranean cruise. If you think so, just go down and look at them. They are loaded for bear. Take that from me. You can get all kinds of brilliant analyses from

people who have never smelled gunpowder.

And let me say this: With reference to this addition for the Navy I speak for the highest authorities.

The President of the United States has promised me that he is going to proceed with this addition in as orderly a fashion as he can, and as fast as he can. And I do not believe Richard Nixon would say that if he did not mean it. He happens to be concerned for the U.S. Navy.

In this connection I inserted into the RECORD yesterday an answer to the study group on two things I do not recall what pages they are on, but if you will look in the RECORD today you will find what I inserted in answer to the study group on the overall defense picture, and also from Adm. Hyman J. Rickover, a fellow well known for his knowledge on nuclear propulsion. Read these. They might help you. It would help to resolve some of the questions that are assailing you because of so much misinformation being put out.

The committee has approved some major programs as recommended by the administration, and in these we are not in conflict with actions of the Senate. These include the ABM, the C-5A, the F-15, the F-14, the AMSA and a nuclear carrier. The Safeguard antiballistic missile system approved in the bill will provide \$345 million to begin procurement. And then there is the additional \$400 million for R.D.T. & E. for the Safeguard system. The House will recall that we already provided in our military construction authorization funds for construction of R.D.T. & E. facilities for the ABM in the Pacific.

Keep in mind that the deployment that would be started by the ABM procurement funds in the bill will not provide the first phase of the Safeguard until 1974. If the second phase is required, it would not be in place until 1976. By that time—the experts tell me that the Russian SS-9 threat, if continued at its present development, will be a serious threat to our land-based retaliatory forces.

Now, this is what worries us. We have spent in the past some \$4 billion on ABM research and development work, and all of that is available to the Safeguard system.

The extensive hearings held by our committee on this issue have shown that the ABM can be made to work, and is technologically feasible. Other members of the committee will express themselves fully on this point. And I will answer you like Senator PASTORE answered some of the skeptics in the other body: Do you not tell me that the brains who sent those boys to the moon, and who brought them back here to tell us—"I walked on the moon."—do not tell me that the brains who sent them and brought them back cannot shoot down something that is man made. Anybody who makes a weapon can find a way to neutralize it. That has never failed in the history of the world. And I would not deprecate the energies and the efforts of my own fellow Americans to say that we cannot shoot down a missile that is headed for New York or Washington, or Philadel-

phia or Chicago or San Francisco, or Los Angeles, or some missile site. I would not say that of my scientists. I believe they can do it.

I know good and well that we can afford it. Any nation that is approaching a trillion dollars gross national product can afford to spend enough to survive.

As Senator PASTORE said:

What good is it to have a belly full of food and no place to live?

Sam Rayburn said:

I would rather be a live American with an empty pocketbook than a dead one with a full one.

It is as simple as that. I would just hate for that missile to head for one of our teeming metropolitan centers and not be able to do something about it. If we do not, somebody will jump up and say: "Why didn't Congress give us the ABM?"

I can say, "Not me—I urged you to adopt it." And I believe you will. And I do not think it is going to be by one vote either.

We have a great group on our side who have been advising us and who have not failed us in the past. I believe like the rock of ages, they will come through now. This is my position on the ABM. It is as simple as that. I would rather have it than want it. How can you beat that? It is like a raincoat. I would rather have it on my arm than want it on my back. Nobody ever dislocated his arm carrying a raincoat.

Now you have read that there are five other people in this nuclear club. Communist China, France, England, Russia, and the United States.

McNamara said that we needed only one radar face to detect an attack. This would give us coverage of only 180 degrees at most. The Russian scientists have radars that cover 360 degrees and I do not know whether the fractional orbital missile that Russia has is going to come up over the North Pole or the Gulf of Mexico to this country. But if it comes, I want to be ready for it. I think the American people want to be prepared.

That is all I am going to say about the ABM.

The bill includes \$940 million for the support of the 4th Squadron C-5A81 aircraft. At the proper time we will tell you about the C-5A.

The \$52 million requested for long lead items for the 5th Squadron was denied on the basis that a decision has not been made to go beyond four squadrons.

The C-5A was started some time ago. It was not laid down yesterday.

Lockheed came before our committee and said they are going to lose money on it.

I want the C-5A. It is a weapons system and nothing anywhere in the world can take its place.

You say—why not the 747, built by the great Boeing Co.? There is no greater company on earth than Boeing. But it cannot fill the bill. It is not a weapons system.

The C-5A has 28 wheels on it. It can come in on a crosswind and land. That did not come out of my head, it came out of some scientist's head. This is the largest plane ever built and it will work as

sure as you are a foot high. It will work just like the Polaris built by the great Lockheed Corp. out in California. They built that Polaris missile. Now it is building the Poseidon. Lockheed is a great company and the Poseidon is working. That great Lockheed Corp. built the fastest airplane that this country or any country has ever seen. It will build the C-5A. I am not going to demean a great corporation which has contributed so much to our land.

Consider the great North American Corp., which was down in the dumps when the RS-70 did not work. We did not give up. We did not say, "Abolish the North American Corporation." The great committee headed by the gentleman from California (GEORGE MILLER) made money available, NASA awarded the Apollo contract to North American and through their leadership sent men to the moon and back.

I am not here to deprecate the efforts of American industry. I am here to say good words for their efforts. That is the least I can do.

Consider the great McDonnell Corp. I remember the time the McDonnell Corp. had a contract to build a Navy plane that never got above the ground. What happened to McDonnell? They did not give up. They built that great 101, in the same series, which is in use today. And I do not have to tell this country or this Congress what the McDonnell Douglas Corp. does today. It is a versatile company, building some of the greatest planes on earth today, like the F-4 and the A-4.

I believe American industry can rise to the challenge. Let us give them a hand. They need a pat on the back. If they ever needed it, now is the time. Experts are mushrooming all over the place like toadstools. I have run across more experts in the last year than there are dogs at a county fair. You know what I am talking about. That is the language you use in Georgia.

But I also know we must have something to take the place of the F-4. The F-4 has reached the end of its growth potential. The F-4 was laid down in 1954. It is high time we were moving on its successor and that will be the F-15.

And then there is the F-14. Someone has suggested restudying the F-14, but I point out that one of the great corporations in the country, Grumman is building it. Let us let them go ahead and continue to build it. The Navy badly needs it.

But I am not going to overlook the great General Dynamics Corp. The General Dynamics Corp. built the B-58 and the F-111. The General Dynamics Corp. builds submarines. General Dynamics does not need a kick from MENDEL RIVERS. But it needs a boost from all of you. Look at Fairchild-Hiller and the great workhorse the F-105. These are all great companies—and America's destiny rests in their industrial capacity and skill.

Of course, they make mistakes. They make a ton of them. But look at their successes.

Now let us get to the advanced manned strategic aircraft, the follow-on for the

B-52. We do not have one new B-52 in Vietnam; did you know that? Not one.

Do Members know what a new B-52 is? It is one that is about 10 years old. We do not have any new ones over there. We have now new pure jet engines, but the new engines in the B-52s have the fans—and they are 10 years old at least.

Do we need an AMSA? I should say we do. I do not want to frighten any Members. I know this Congress is going to vote for an AMSA. There is no question in my mind about it. But there have been some statements that the Russians are not building an advanced bomber. I tell Members I do not believe this, and I have very good reasons for making this statement. That is all I will say.

We had better get on with the AMSA before it is too late. The experts tell me we need an AMSA, and one that can handle the problem. We do not have anything like that, now.

What is wrong with the AMSA? For years we begged Secretary McNamara to start this, and in this bill we give the money for the fuselage and configuration and engine and other parts.

Members of Congress have been recorded in favor of efficiency and economy in government. The MIRV program was a perfect example of a weapons system that does exactly this. It is an offensive capability with a classified number of warheads, and we can achieve the same capability at savings of almost \$7 billion, the multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle. In the case of Minuteman III, we are able to take advantage of an investment already made in the silos and launch facilities for the earlier versions of the Minuteman missile.

In the case of Poseidon, we are able to retrofit existing Polaris-type submarines at a cost far less than that which would be required for a new missile submarine, with this economical missile.

Will MIRV work? Four out of the last five Poseidon MIRV tests have been completely successful, and five of the last seven Minuteman III MIRV tests have been successful with an additional one being partially successful, and only one being a complete failure.

That is how far we have gone. In my opinion this program would truly lend credibility to our strategic deterrent.

Remember, our strategic force is a deterrent. We do not seek to destroy others. Our MIRV'd warheads do not constitute a first strike threat against Soviet hardened missile sites. They, therefore, would not start a new spiral in the arms race. The Soviet SS-9 missile on the other hand can launch three 5-megaton warheads which provide a real threat to our Minuteman silos. They can do this.

Nobody in this country died when the Soviets were getting ready to put all these defenses around Moscow. Why should they worry if we do the same thing in New York or Washington or with our defensive and offensive capabilities?

They could not care less. Positively I could not care less what they think. I want this protection, and our committee is giving the Congress the opportunity to accept it or reject it.

In comparison with the action of the other body, the committee has taken

action on a variety of programs which were deleted or reduced by the Senate in their action on the administration's request. I will not go into these in great detail as they are explained thoroughly in the committee's report on pages 59 through 79. Let me list a few of these: First, we approved \$66 million plus for the E-2C aircraft which had been deleted by the Senate. This is a much needed aircraft to provide the fleet with an airborne early warning capacity. It is something they can see with far away from our ships. We do not have anything this modern. We just want to have our fleet have a plane that can get high enough and see where the enemy is.

We approved \$165 million plus for the S-3A aircraft—and I will tell you what it is—for which the Senate made a reduction of \$25 million. This is a new anti-submarine aircraft designed for carrier use and much needed for the Navy's anti-submarine warfare function. Mr. STRATTON will tell you something about this.

We removed the ban on the A-7D and A-7E aircraft imposed by the Senate. The A-7 aircraft is the only aircraft we have for close ground support. This mission was turned over to the Air Force, and this is the only plane available. It is a new plane, subsonic but a superior close air support weapons system.

The total funds requested for the A-7D and E are \$478.7 million.

The Senate bill reduces to \$15 million the \$60 million requested for the airborne warning and control system, called AWACS. The committee recommends enactment of \$40 million for this airborne surveillance capability with its associated command and control communications system. AWACS will provide valuable airborne intelligence and battle management capability for the Tactical Air Command and the Aerospace Defense Command.

The bill provides the full \$75 million authorization requested for the SAM-D surface-to-air missile system which the Senate deleted. The SAM-D, on which Mr. PHILBIN is an authority, and which he will explain to you fully, will provide a major improvement for defending our field armies against an air threat. It would replace the Hawk and Hercules missiles, which are based on technology that is at least 20 years old. It will cost less than half as much to maintain, and the savings in operation and maintenance alone will pay for the system in 5 to 8 years.

This is a complicated bill. At the same time it is a comprehensive bill.

The bill authorizes \$105 million plus for the short-range attack missile, SRAM, and \$40 million for modifying the B-52 to carry this missile.

The Senate bill provided \$67 million plus for the SRAM and deleted the funds for the modification work on the B-52's. The SRAM encountered difficulties in its development stages, but recent tests that have been held indicate those technical difficulties have been solved.

The SRAM missile is a key element in maintaining the capability of our manned strategic aircraft to carry out their assigned mission through the 1970's.

The bill also provides \$67 million for

the advanced surface missile system; \$20 million for the undersea long-range missile system; \$28.1 million for the T-X navigational trainer; \$10 million for the heavy-lift helicopter; \$1 million for the light intratheater transport; \$38.5 million for the A-37 tactical aircraft; \$15 million for the RF-111 reconnaissance aircraft; and \$18.5 million for the Conus air defense interceptor.

I said earlier in the day, our cupboard is bare. We need many new weapons. We do not now have them. This bill is the beginning.

The committee has worked very hard in trying to report to you a bill that has been considered at great length, and which the committee considers to be at least what this country can afford to maintain if we are threatened.

I urge you, and respectfully request you, to give us your attention. I thank you, too, for having given me yours.

We have done the best we can.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, the Members of the House today are voting on perhaps the most important bill of the year, and it is a moment when all Members of the House must feel the weight of their responsibilities. There has been a new climate in consideration of Defense matters on Capitol Hill this year which reflects a climate of questioning and concern throughout the country. I find all manner of experts ready to give their advice to the Members of Congress on national defense policy. I have seen newspaper advertisements signed by every kind of expert from botanists to football coaches. But it is the Members of the House here today who must make the decision on national defense and he must answer to the American people and to history if that defense is inadequate.

I think of something the late President Kennedy used to like to quote about decisionmaking. It is from the Spanish poet Garcia Lorca:

Bullfight critics row on row
Crowd the vast arena full

But only one man's there who knows
And he's the man who fights the bull.

The Members of the House today are the ones who know. You are the ones who have gotten all of the information and heard all sides of the issues. But you cannot put responsibility for your decision on any number of noted college professors or Nobel Prize winners. You cannot turn the matter over to Vince Lombardi. You must make the decision. You must guarantee the adequacy of America's defense capabilities—not only today but into the foreseeable future.

The bill before you provides \$21,347,860,000. This money would do two principal things: It will provide \$13,926,460,000 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, tracked vehicles, and ships to provide the strength currently needed by our Armed Forces. It will provide \$7,421,400,000 in research, development, test, and evaluation to assure the future readiness of our defense capability.

The amount requested in our bill is \$615,800,000 less than the amount requested by Secretary Laird in his revised budget of April 15. It is \$47.1 mil-

lion less when one excludes the Manned Orbiting Laboratory and Cheyenne programs. The bill is \$1,803,800,000 less than what was originally proposed by former Defense Secretary Clifford in January of this year.

While the totals in our bill are close to what was recommended by the administration I think it should be clear that our bill is selective in its reductions and in its additions. The committee worked its will on this legislation. Nobody could call this a rubber stamp bill. We added roughly \$1 billion in shipbuilding funds to start a needed modernization of the Navy. We made a reduction in research and development, test and evaluation funds of \$801 million. But we exempted certain needed weapons systems from this cut since we felt they were vital to our capabilities. And we specifically directed the reduction and elimination of other programs such as the AX aircraft, the TOW missile, the Sheridan vehicle, the main battle tank—MBT-70—and the M-60 A1E2 tank.

The committee's main reductions are discussed thoroughly in part 3 of the report. Those items which the committee specifically exempted from the R.D.T. & E. cuts are discussed in part 4 of the report where the committee's actions are compared in detail with changes made in the authorization request of the administration by the Senate.

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT

I want to take a little time to mention the effort the committee is making to improve its control of the defense budget. I believe these efforts are in response to the general desires of the House.

Hundreds of thousands of transactions and decisions take place daily in the Pentagon. It is virtually impossible for Congress to examine every action in detail. The committee, therefore, must work to bring about progressive improvements in management techniques and to do this, it has moved to take on more responsibility for surveillance of Defense Department programs.

I ask the Members of the House to reflect a little bit on the great growth in committee work over the last decade. The first law requiring congressional authorization of military expenditures for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels was enacted in 1959. The law was further amended by the 88th and 89th Congresses to require authorization for research and development and for tracked combat vehicles. This year, the committee has included a provision in the bill, section 405, to extend the authorization requirement to all vehicles, all weapons, all ammunition, and the related spare parts for these items. It will aid surveillance over \$3 billion for the annual funding request for procurement.

This will place additional burdens on the committee and on its staff but it is an attempt by the committee to do an even more thorough job on the defense program. I might note that two professional staff members from the General Accounting Office have been assigned to the committee on a continuing basis to aid in the committee's important tasks.

The committee, of course, has had its investigative authority for 20 years, and we have recently sharpened the use of this authority to help the full committee in making decisions on weapons programs. The actions of the committee in the present bill on the General Sheridan tank, the M6A1E2 tank, the MBT-70 tank, and the TOW antitank missile system is an example of how our investigative efforts have aided our weapons decisions. The committee has deleted nearly one-quarter of a billion dollars from the 1970 funding request for these programs. This is because our investigations disclosed basic weaknesses in military management which showed these funds could be safely eliminated. This investigation also made recommendations for correcting the management deficiencies uncovered. We are going to have more of these in-depth examinations of major programs in the future.

Proposals were made in the Senate to have the General Accounting Office handle much of the task of overseeing defense programs. Your committee believes that such oversight and direction should be a committee function of the Congress. The General Accounting Office can aid in this work to a considerable degree but the responsibility must be maintained within the Congress and within the appropriate committee.

As a further effort to improve its surveillance of programs, the committee added title V to the bill. This provides statutory authority to keep the Congress fully and currently informed on defense programs. The language here is similar to the language in the Atomic Energy Act which gave authority to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee to get all the information to be fully and currently informed about the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission. Again this is a step by the committee to help it better perform the function assigned to it by the House.

SOVIET THREAT

We have heard a great deal recently about the desire for stopping the arms race and a need to stop nuclear proliferation throughout the world, but I think Members should keep in mind that it takes two to tango and it takes both nuclear powers to bring about a real reduction in nuclear arms. We see no evidence that the Soviets are stopping their nuclear arms development. The evidence is quite to the contrary. I urge all Members of the House to read the discussion of the Soviet nuclear developments which begins on page 8 of the committee report.

The Soviets have developed a missile, the SS-9, which can lift a 25-megaton warhead and deliver it near one of our Minuteman silos with great accuracy. This missile is much larger, much more accurate in its guidance system, and much more expensive than would be required for a retaliatory weapon. The SS-9 does not seem logical—unless it is being developed to give the Soviets a first strike potential. It is because of this missile primarily that we have to be prepared with ABM defense. At the present rate of deployment and with the MIRV capability that will be within the Soviet grasp within a few years, the SS-9 would give the Soviets a first strike capability

against our land-based strategic forces. They—Russia—are moving militarily full steam ahead.

This is only part of the threat imposed by the Soviets. They have a variety of other ICBM's, may soon pass us in numbers as well as megatonnage of ICBM's, have developed a fractional orbital bombardment system—FOBS—have developed the capability of launching missiles from submarines and, as Chairman RIVERS has indicated, have greatly expanded and enhanced their naval power. They have also expanded and modernized their general purpose forces and they showed in Czechoslovakia that they are willing to use that force to achieve their ends. Finally, they have deployed around Moscow a beginning ABM system, the Golosh, and are pursuing ABM technology with great vigor.

While we all hope and pray for the success of arms limitations talks, let's keep in mind that this Soviet power is very real and that we have to be prepared to counter it if our deterrence is going to be viable in the future.

The committee has approved the Department's request for major weapons programs that will provide an antiballistic missile defense system, the Safeguard; a great addition to our aircraft capability, the C-5A; the much-needed air superiority fighter for the Air Force, the F-15, a long deferred replacement for the F-4 aircraft for the Navy, the F-14; additional assurance of our offensive deterrent, MIRV capability for the Minuteman and the Poseidon; and the new manned strategic aircraft the committee has long sought, the AMSA.

The ABM has been the most discussed program of the year, both in Congress and in the press, and I am sure we are going to hear more about it today. The Safeguard program, recommended by the President and approved by the committee, will use the technology developed for Sentinel and previous systems to provide protection for our land-based nuclear deterrent. It will also provide protection against the potential Chinese threat in the late 1970's and against an accidental launch of an ICBM. The bill provides \$345.5 million for procurement for the ABM and \$400.9 million for research, development, test, and evaluation. Earlier in the military construction bill, we provided \$15.2 million for construction of R. & D. facilities for Safeguard. Our committee gave extensive consideration to the Safeguard proposal, and these deliberations satisfied the majority that the system can be made to work and is required.

The Soviet military capability provides a real threat against our Minuteman missiles and our bomber bases in the mid to late 1970's. The ABM will provide protection for our Minuteman force and will thus be a valuable additional deterrent.

Safeguard will not, as some have claimed, heat up the arms race. The Safeguard is a defensive system which could not reach Soviet territory and could not start a nuclear exchange. I believe it will provide an incentive to arms negotiations by showing the Soviets that we are serious about developing

our deterrent force and convincing them that no amount of expenditure on their part will permit them in achieving a first strike capability. At the same time, it will also show that we are not pressing an attack on the Soviets. I think the ABM can add to world stability, and I think the Russians are going to insist upon having their own because of the threat they face from China.

The C-5A has also been the subject of much discussion and many charges of cost overruns. The Committee's decision to approve the C-5A was based on the military requirement and the capabilities of the aircraft. The C-5A is said to be the world's largest airplane. Under wartime conditions, it will have the capability of delivering a 265,000-lb. payload over 3,100 miles at a speed of over 500 miles per hour. The operating cost of the C-5A will be 2.9 cents per ton-mile compared to 5.3 cents per ton-mile for the present C-141. So the long-range operation and maintenance cost should represent a considerable reduction when compared to present aircraft.

The committee approved the \$940 million for the C-5A in the bill, including \$481 million for procurement of 23 aircraft. The committee deleted \$50 million of the C-5A funds requested for procurement of initial spares.

The F-15 will give the Air Force an air superiority fighter for the mid and late 1970's. Present aircraft cannot be economically modified to fulfill this need.

Failure to develop such an airplane will leave our Air Force at a great disadvantage a decade hence in comparison with the Soviet Air Force, which has developed a variety of firstline fighters, and which has six new prototype fighters in production.

The committee has authorized a total of \$450 million in the bill for the F-14 for the Navy. This includes \$275 million for procurement and \$175 million for R.D.T. & E. The F-14, which will provide fleet air defense, replaces the F-4, which was designed in 1954 and has reached the end of its growth potential. In the years that the F-4 has been operational, the Soviets have developed eight new aircraft.

I would point out that the F-14 must operate off an aircraft carrier, and has a different mission requirement from the F-15. The joint Navy project is developing an advanced engine which will be used in both the F-14 and the F-15. But the different mission requirements and operating environment require different airframes for the two planes.

MIRV, which stands for multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, is a method of carrying more than one warhead on a single rocket with guidance to take each warhead to a different target, or to send all warheads to the same target with spaced arrival times. We are developing MIRV capability on our Minuteman III and on the Poseidon submarine-launched missile, which is a follow-on to the Polaris. I would emphasize that our Minuteman missiles are only a fraction as big as the Soviet ICBM, and when MIRV capability is put into our missiles, the size of each warhead becomes that

much smaller. The relatively small size of these warheads precludes the possibility of them being used against hardened enemy missile sites. Our MIRV, therefore, could not be considered a first strike weapon.

American MIRV'd warheads will be too small in size and number to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force, although they will have a high capability against cities.

The Soviet SS-9, by contrast, is so large that it could launch three 5-megaton vehicles—which are large enough to have a first strike capability against weapon sites. The committee felt it was prudent, therefore, to authorize this continuing developing work on MIRV to make sure our forces are not outstripped by Soviet advances.

The House is aware of the long effort by this committee to assure the development of a manned strategic aircraft. The last B-52 came off the production line many years ago. And our B-52 force is aging badly. The previous administration had sponsored the FB-111 as suitable for the bomber mission and had a long record of roadblocking the AMSA. The current administration, after reevaluation of requirements, recommended an increase in AMSA funding to \$100.2 million for fiscal year 1970, compared to the previous administration's request for \$77.2 million. The speeding up of the development of AMSA is in line with the long-held position of our committee and we recommend it wholeheartedly to the House.

Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State, a distinguished Democrat, when he spoke before the Women's Democratic Club, said this:

I see in America a growing capacity for criticism and a declining capacity for unity.

Then he emphasized that all of us should recognize that the President of the United States is the President of all of us and that we should help him, as he seeks to bring the war in Vietnam to an honorable settlement. An honorable settlement, not a surrender, is what the people want.

These, I say, are the words of a true patriot, who places country above party. I would hope that others would recognize, as Dean Acheson does, that the surest and quickest way to achieve an honorable settlement of the war in Vietnam is to unite behind our President.

I do not believe it is necessary to review in detail all of the many actions that the committee has taken in this bill. A full discussion of all of the changes will be found in the report. I would like to emphasize however, that the development of our future readiness is as important a function of this bill as provision of our present systems. The committee felt so strongly on this that we have, in the R. & D. portion of the bill—title II—earmarked certain funds for specific systems, which will preclude these funds from being subjected to the overall reduction in R.D.T. & E.

The systems so protected include: the heavy lift helicopter and SAM-D missile for the Army the E-2C aircraft, the S-3A aircraft, the undersea long-range missile system, and advanced surface mis-

site system for the Navy; and the RF-III aircraft, the light intratheater transport, the SRAM missile, the airborne weapon and control system—AWACS—and the Conus air defense interceptor for the Air Force.

As I am sure the Members of the House are aware, the present administration, following the submission of the budget, announced cancellation of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory and the Cheyenne helicopter. The committee supported these reductions which mean a \$300 million savings in fiscal year 1970 on the MOL and a net savings of \$420.5 million from the original Cheyenne request. We have also specifically directed in the bill that no funds authorized shall be expended for the Cheyenne helicopter.

R.D.T. & E. REDUCTIONS

While recognizing the importance of research and development in assuring the future readiness of our forces, the Committee was concerned about some of the management aspects of the R.D.T. & E. program. We felt that some savings could be made in this area and a better ordering of priorities provided.

We have, therefore, made a reduction of \$801 million in R.D.T. & E. funds.

The committee has provided in section 402 of the bill requirements for detailed information to the Congress from the DOD concerning R. & D. projects being done at universities and Federal contract research centers affiliated with universities. We feel there has been overlap and duplication in this program and that there has been too great a concentration of the research effort in a relatively few locations.

In addition, the committee was concerned about the sponsorship of research programs which appeared to be inappropriate to the mission of the Department of Defense.

We have, therefore, added section 203 to the bill, which requires no funds authorized may be used for any research project or study unless that project or study has a direct and apparent relationship to a specific military function or operation.

We have included in our bill, also, a provision adopted in the Senate version of the bill which limits the salary of employees of Federal contract research centers to a maximum of \$45,000 unless an annual rate of compensation in excess of that has been approved by the Secretary of Defense and a report of such approval provided to the Committees on Armed Services.

In summary, we have a very big, but very necessary bill. National defense in the threatened world in which we live does not come cheap. All of us would prefer to live in a world where this \$21 billion would be spent for peaceful pursuits. But we can afford this bill because we cannot afford to be without it.

Only by having the shield of national defense that this legislation provides will we be able to have a world in which we can work to solve our other problems. The bill, despite its numerous changes and despite the increase in costs of the recent year, is still \$277,890,000 less than that authorized last fiscal year. It will

support a national defense that takes a smaller percentage of the gross national product than we have spent in the last 3 fiscal years. It is a result of the most thorough and searching review that the Armed Services Committee has ever conducted and I urge all Members of the House to support it.

Mr. PHILBIN. I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT).

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, with five major military bases in my congressional district, I am certainly not going to argue against the passage of the military procurement bill before the House. I do urge moderation, however. Projected Federal budget outlays for 1970 national defense were \$81.542 billion. While the figures we are dealing with today are slightly lower due to public demand, if this military authorization bill is excessive we well might be faced with a very large supplemental appropriations bill later in the fiscal year.

The bill before us, I am sure, is the largest authorization at \$21,347,860,000 to be presented to any legislative body of the free or Communist world. This authorization covers but 25 percent of the \$80 billion defense bill. These are the alleged controllable items over which the 86th Congress gave power to the House Armed Services Committee to control in this 412 authorization. I do not think we have adequately done our job.

I fully support control of the military by the civilians in the executive and I support controlling the executive, including the military, by a civilian legislative body. I abhor a civilian legislative com-

mittee that is a rubber stamp. My committee is not a rubber stamp.

I do charge though that the checks and balances intended by the rules of this House have almost totally broken down.

I say that when our expenditures for defense can be controlled as they were in the period 1955 to 1965, at \$1.4 billion increase per year then there is reason in having perhaps a monolythic committee. When you compare this excellent record to the period 1966 to 1970 and notice that the total expenditure rise was nearly \$10 billion per year average, then I think it is time to question the committee, its method of organization and its orientation.

I will support the statements I just made. I include in national defense expenditures nuclear power—the technology for propulsion and warheads; veterans benefits, the direct cost of past wars, interest on our national debt of past wars and the regular items referred to in national defense—this is the so-called "Udall method" of budget analysis. Total increase, \$15.4 million; average increase in 11 years 1955-65, equals \$1.4 billion per year. Total increase, 1965 to 1969, \$40 billion equals \$10 billion increase per year average.

In 1955 the itemization was as follows:

	[In millions]			
	Defense+nuclear	War interest	Veterans	Total
1955.....	\$40,323	\$6,370	\$4,522	\$51,200
1965.....	49,598	11,346	5,722	66,600
1970.....	70,000	17,300	7,724	107,500

[In percent]

Year	Military budget	Interest on national debt	Veterans cost	Total defense cost	Administrative budget	Percent of administrative budget taken by defense
1952.....	43.8	5.9	4.9	54.6	65.3	83.2
1953.....	50.0	6.5	4.4	60.9	74.1	82.7
1954.....	46.4	6.4	4.3	57.2	67.5	84.9
1955.....	40.3	6.4	4.5	51.2	64.4	80.9
1956.....	40.9	6.8	4.8	52.5	66.2	79.3
1957.....	43.2	7.2	4.9	55.4	69.0	80.3
1958.....	43.7	7.6	5.2	56.5	71.4	79.1
1959.....	46.0	7.6	5.4	59.1	77.1	76.7
1960.....	45.3	9.2	5.4	49.9	74.9	80.0
1961.....	47.1	9.0	5.7	61.8	79.3	77.9
1962.....	50.7	9.1	5.6	65.4	86.6	75.5
1963.....	52.4	9.9	5.5	67.9	90.1	75.4
1964.....	53.3	10.7	5.7	69.6	95.8	72.7
1965.....	49.6	11.3	5.7	66.6	94.8	70.3
1966.....	57.7	12.0	5.9	75.6	106.5	70.9
1967.....	70.8	13.4	6.9	91.1	126.8	72.6
1968.....	80.5	14.6	6.6	102.0	143.1	71.4
1969.....	82.2	16.6	7.7	106.5	147.0	73.1

Now the main committee report on page 7 contains tables whereby a comparison is made between defense expenditures and the gross national product. The tables are fallacious and misleading for at least three reasons because they do not contain the figures included in the official budget summary under national defense for the referenced years as prepared by the Bureau of the Budget.

Second, our administrative income has not kept pace with the increase in our gross national product. As an example: Our administration income in 1953 was \$74.1 billion with a gross national product of \$355.1 billion.

Our administration income today is

only up 100 percent to \$152 billion in 1970 but the gross national product is up almost three times. Unfortunately we cannot pay defense bills with gross national product—all we can use is administrative income or debt.

A third fallacy of the main committee's comparison is that it includes trust fund outlays in its comparisons. This is grossly misleading. In 1953 when we had no medical care for retired, Federal highways, adequate insurance programs, and a thin social security experience. Trust fund outlays were \$2.6 billion, or 3.4 percent of all Federal outlays. The United States came of age socially in 17 years, fortunately. This year trust fund ex-

penditures will be \$48.5 billion, or 25 percent of our total Federal outlays.

I would remind the House that the trust funds are "cookie jarred" and this fund is not available either to pay defense bills, save and except the amounts that have been, in fact, purloined to date to fund the national debt. I said stolen. Surplus trust funds by law go into Government bonds; 70 percent of the money from those bonds goes into defense. To date since 1953 the Federal Government has borrowed from the trust funds \$95 billion. Prepayments by social security recipients, employers, highway users have vanished. They do not really have any money in the bank. It has all been swiped—mostly for defense. Last year we had a \$9 billion trust fund surplus—where is it? This year we should have \$11 billion. If we stick with President Nixon's budget restrictions we may salvage a few billion of the trust funds.

I want to go back to the problems of our committee. Unfortunately, due to the committee success that I mentioned in the 55- to 65-minute time frame, the committee became monolithic. We have a bipartisan committee—partisanship has completely broken down—we have no minority counsel or minority system of checks and balances that you have on every other committee of this House.

Five of us—three Democrats and two Republicans—have tried to constitute ourselves as a viable minority on the committee. This has been a necessity due to the massive unchecked authorizations that have evolved from our committee during the 1960's.

When partisanship is locked up on our committee and here on the floor, I say we have got a sick system when you keep the existing rules of the House that are only designed to protect a partisan minority.

I would say one more thing. We do not have just "average bears" on our committee and I would here address my remarks to the Ways and Means Committee on Committees and the Republican Committee on Committees. My poll indicates that nearly one-third of this House is opposed to the anti-ballistics-missile program. One-half of the Senate is opposed. Yet why is it that only 20 percent of my committee registers opposition. We are not simple random bears.

Not only has partisanship broken down, but due to the great attraction of this committee many Members with military background and orientation like myself populate the committee. There is a vacancy now on the committee. I would hope that the Republican side would have some sympathy for reinforcing the outpost now so gallantly manned by Congressmen CHARLES WHALEN and ROBERT STAFFORD.

I have not addressed myself to the terms of the bill to this point for a very good reason. Probably 95 percent of this House, including myself, will vote for this legislation regardless of the rejection of amendments, so there is little purpose in reviewing the details of the bill.

As had been indicated, at least a dozen amendments will be offered to this bill.

Colleagues, do not be timid. If you are afraid or if you abdicate your responsibility to review the military, you give up 70 percent of your power in the Congress.

You say the military has never been wrong—I say look to the waste that you voted for. Over the last 3 years because we and you did not do a proper job we spent \$1½ billion for an Air Force manned orbiting laboratory which I am sure Secretary Packard calls a boondoggle. The American Legion and the American Security Council have passed resolutions to oppose this curtailment.

OTIS PIKE on the floor last year tried to cut in excess of \$100 million for the Cheyenne helicopter. He said that it is costing too much—you shouted him down—we spent \$150 million more during the year and finally the OSD recognized that when you are losing helicopters at the rate of three per day in Vietnam we cannot afford helos that cost \$3 million each.

We spent \$3 billion on the B-70 bomber a few years ago—built 2½—one crashed and the other one is in a museum. A high-level supersonic bomber is valueless. The original "fearless four" tried to warn this House of that fiscal disaster.

The same people who voted for B-70 to the end now are pushing for a new program called AMSA—advanced manned supersonic attack aircraft—350,000 to 400,000 pounds. Envision a plane 50 percent larger than a 707, larger than the C-141 Starlifter traveling supersonic high and on the deck—a fantastic challenge. We have done it for a cost of nearly \$15 million per unit for the FB-111A. The AMSA will weigh five to six times the FB-111A weight and when you buy airplanes by the pound as we do we are talking about buying 263 airplanes at \$80 million each. This is what you are doing in this bill. I have an amendment to decelerate this program.

On ABM you spent \$1.2 billion last year for the Sentinel system to protect our cities from the Chinese. This year we are protecting our missiles from the Soviets. The CIA does not think there is a Soviet missile threat. But Mel says:

They're going for our missiles—no doubt about it.

How can they go for our missiles when I indicate on page 168 of my remarks on the bill that the United States will have 24,000 nuclear warheads in the middle 1970's.

And talking about mistakes—what happened to all the dough we appropriated last year for the ABM system. You do not protect missiles like you do cities. What happened to all the real estate that was bought? How much research and development funds went down the drain trying to work out the problems of a city defense—several hundred million dollars?

I say if the Department of Defense can somehow wield the magic scalpel to terminate programs, so can this Congress.

We have exercised some options to cut in this bill and I want to congratulate the committee on total abandonment of the AH56A Cheyenne helicopter, halting

the duplicate Shilleagh—Tow missile buy, ignoring the Navy plea on the FDL's, and stopping the AX engineering.

The House Committee on Armed Services has had under consideration the pending bill authorizing appropriations for fiscal 1970 for military procurement for over 6 months. The bill in the total amount of \$21,347,860 is not the total tag for defense since under section 412 of Public Law 86-149 only aircraft, ships, missiles, tracked vehicles, and research requires a specific authorization. The pending bill in section 406 expands this authority for future legislation perhaps \$3 billion.

The House Armed Services Committee for many years last past has not been a divided committee save on rare occasions; the committee while reserving subcommittee chairmanships to certain members on the majority side in fact has no partisan minority, partisan division or minority counsel. Recognizing the benefits resulting from past monolithic policy, but cognizant also of horrendous errors in our defense authorization in the past, four of my committee colleagues and myself determined early in the present session that a much greater debate was required over individual hardware items both in the House committee and on the House floor. I make no pretense that the committee has considered the greater defense policy issues of the size of or necessity of a 15 carrier task force, relative priorities between defense and nondefense needs of the country; nor did we consider the future costs of many multibillion dollar programs in relation to our future ability to pay for them, though the seeds of those programs are in fact conceived in this legislation.

If it is difficult for a 40-man committee with a 50-man staff of lawyers, investigators, and experts to monitor the 3½-million-man Defense Establishment, five members of that committee without a common staff have a more formidable task in formulating themselves into a viable bipartisan minority. Howbeit, the referenced bipartisan minority did commence to meet separately early this year and has continued nearly weekly meetings to this time in an effort to critically analyze the Defense issues that we were able in a nonmilitary environment. We have not agreed on every issue—witness our bifurcation in the support of the pending bill.

I am concerned with moderation in our defense policy because it has escalated beyond all proportion to the military threat posed to this country rising from \$46 billion in 1961 to the budget submission early this year of \$82 billion. Our overmesmerization with winning the war in Vietnam has absorbed at least 40 percent of the Defense funds budgeted, and this, in turn, has led to neglect of our military construction program at home and panic to deploy certain costly systems before they were ready. This action has cost the country billions of dollars. I believe that there is such a thing as an international arms race, that intelligence is such that for every action of the Soviets, or the Chinese, this country makes a response and vice versa ad infinitum.

I believe the United States has overreacted in the past and now is on the brink of moving ahead with another reciprocal round of massive expenditures that invariably leaves each side of the international triangle less secure. I am not a unilateral disarmament and believe in a strong defense until effective arms limitations can be entered into.

I am of the view, as former Secretary McNamara said some years ago, that the United States has bought about as much security as it can through the utilization of military hardware and that our future security lies more in international negotiation, detentes, and effective assistance with reform to those people less fortunate and underdeveloped than ourselves.

Domestically, I believe that a unified society can again be re-created out of the strife torn cities and colleges that pockmark our country. This re-creation, I do not believe, will result from victory in riots and rock throwing, but in effectively turning this country around so that our excellent military effort some years ago can be matched by an excellent effort in higher education, vocational training education, health and housing programs and in full well-paid employment. These efforts have been starved in recent years in favor of an endlessly escalating military appetite.

I am concerned about inflation—nearly 11 percent over the past 2 years. This is tantamount to theft from people on fixed incomes. The Federal Reserve Board has recently indicated that our current runaway economy will either continue to inflate, will be controlled by price and wage controls, or will ebb temporarily due to reduced Federal spending. They also say that when we increase military spending rapidly by \$40 billion, as we did over the past 5 years, that we are bound to get inflation since consumer goods are not produced to balance the large increase in national income.

I believe, therefore, that the resolution lies substantially in reduction of military spending. The current actions of the President halting 75 percent of all construction programs, while perhaps sound from an economic sense of the need to reduce spending, appear to be substantially inconsistent with the recent announcement to increase spending by \$300 million on the SST supersonic aircraft and are clearly inconsistent with the majority committee action here increasing naval shipbuilding by \$960 million.

The pending bill in the amount of \$21,347,860,000 is the largest amount authorized in any one bill in any legislative body in the world. In spite of our joint efforts at reduction, the bill is only \$615.8 million—about 3 percent—less than the Secretary Laird request, and in reality is only \$47.1 million below the DOD request if you exclude \$300 million cut from the MOL—manned orbiting laboratory—program and \$268.7 million net cut from the Cheyenne helicopter, both items by the Department of Defense.

The House bill as passed is \$1,236,360,000 more than the Senate bill and should be substantially reduced before passage.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I intend to restrict my remarks to the air support of ground troops, and discuss the A-7, which is the vehicle that is in the budget and that was recommended by the Navy and the Department of Defense to accomplish this support.

The A-7A is the Navy version of the plane and the A-7D is the Air Force version. In the budget there is \$374 million for the A-7D, and \$104 million for the A-7A. These are planes that are already in existence, although there has been a great deal of electronic equipment added that will make these planes much more efficient.

Mr. Chairman, we, as a nation, have charged the Air Force with a variety of missions. One of the most significant, I feel, is the tactical mission to provide close air support to our ground forces. It is this important close air support role for which the Air Force requires the A-7D. The aircraft currently used in this role are aged—the F-100—or were designed primarily for other type missions—the F-4 for air superiority.

By modifying the Navy A-7A attack aircraft, the Air Force has optimized the A-7D for the close air support mission. I am told that a more powerful turbofan engine for the A-7D will provide the thrust for takeoff and operation with heavy payloads, and, a significantly improved weapon delivery system will provide the visual air-to-ground bombing accuracies afforded by current state-of-the-art technology.

The Air Force has wisely incorporated survivability features to reduce the aircraft's vulnerability to ground fire and improve its probabilities of returning to base. Foam and self-sealant have been used in the fuel system to suppress explosions or fire and a second fuel feed system serves as a backup. A third flight control power system assures the capability to land safely in case the primary and secondary systems have received battle damage. Armor protection has been provided for the cockpit, engine area, and around critical components. No other tactical fighter has been procured with the built-in survivability features of the A-7D.

Mr. Chairman, the Air Force indicates that the range-payload capability of the A-7D is better than any aircraft in its current inventory that is used in the close air support role. I am told that the aircraft has an inflight refueling capability as well as the ability to carry up to four external fuel tanks; over 15,000 pounds of external ordnance can be carried on six wing pylon stations. This combination gives the aircraft great operational flexibility. With its large fuel capacity, the A-7D can be diverted to alternative targets as the battle situation dictates. By using multiple ejection racks, an almost unlimited mix of conventional weapons can be programmed.

Moreover, the A-7 is designed to permit the pilot to adapt his tactics to the ground situation. On a given mission, the aircraft can attack multiple targets or make multiple passes on one target while an automatic, continuous solution bombing system permits the pilot to maneuver or change delivery modes at will. He can,

therefore, avoid the heaviest area of concentration of artillery or ground fire without degrading bombing effectiveness. The communications equipment for the plane has been selected to provide a complete interface between air and ground operations. The pilot can talk to the ground commander, the forward air controller, and the tactical air controller during the mission.

The maintainability and reliability standards established for the A-7D are very high, and operating costs are low when compared to the other tactical fighter aircraft. I doubt that any other tactical fighter has been procured with as many maintenance self-test features integrated into the design. I am sure you will agree that these are important features for an aircraft intended for the forward area support of ground forces.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I support the Air Force's requirement for the A-7D. It is being procured to improve the Air Force capability for close air support. Specific design characteristics have been included in the aircraft toward this end. The aircraft capabilities are such that it can be utilized effectively in other roles but it is the close air support role for which the A-7D is optimized and in which it will be the most effective. The Air Force needs the A-7D to provide an integrated tactical air team. The 128 aircraft in the fiscal year 1970 budget proposal are necessary to fulfill this important requirement.

The action of the Senate in prohibiting the Air Force from procuring A-7's and forcing them to procure F-4's, an aircraft designed 15 years ago, and now outmoded must not be allowed to stand.

Our committee has very properly included the A-7's in the bill now before you and I urge you to support it.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. BOB WILSON).

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Chairman, there is probably no more partisan Member of the Congress than I. Yet, I must say that our committee is probably the least partisan of any committee in the Congress.

We had a special election in Massachusetts yesterday to replace our beloved late Republican on the Armed Services Committee. The man who won was not exactly my first choice, but I salute him and he will be sworn in here shortly, I understand.

Mr. Chairman, for several months the Armed Services Committee during the illness of the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Bates, suffered somewhat I believe. We certainly miss him today and we miss him for the great support he gave to the defense of our country. We are pleased that his place has been taken by the gentleman from Illinois, LES ARENDS, who has been the ranking minority member on that committee for many years and who has had more service in Congress than anyone on the floor today, I believe. He is familiar with the problems of the military as has been demonstrated just a few minutes ago in his brief remarks.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOB WILSON. I shall be glad to yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I hasten to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from California with reference to the late and beloved William Bates and also to associate myself with the remarks which the gentleman has made with reference to our present ranking minority member, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ARENDS).

Mr. Chairman, I meant to say something earlier along this line, but I do want to add my sincere feeling of appreciation both for the memory and service of our late colleague Mr. Bates and my high affection for the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ARENDS) who has taken his place.

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Chairman, there has been no question about the close cooperation over the years between the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services and the Republican side. We have followed "Admiral" RIVERS, as he is sometimes affectionately known, in his leadership of the committee. The committee does realize that the captain runs a taut ship. As one of the last petty officers, I appreciate that fact because there has been some little discussion to the effect that there is a little dissent at this time. However, I can assure you that there have been no captain's masts, no courts-martial and no brig time for any members of the committee, even though there has been a little dissent.

I want to address my remarks to one portion of this bill that is before us, and that is the portion concerning the advanced manned strategic aircraft known as AMSA.

This bill contains \$100 million for research and development for AMSA. This money figure was originally \$77.2 million, but we raised this to the new figure because of a sense of urgency that dictates that further delays in the development of this combat aircraft should not be permitted.

I understand there will be an amendment to reduce the research and development figure \$23 million.

I think it should be made very clear that the \$100 million that the committee has requested in this bill is \$100 million for research and development only. The amount was raised by the Department of Defense from \$77 million to \$100 million with one purpose in mind, and that is to shorten the competitive design phase for this aircraft, and to permit the beginning of full-scale engineering development in fiscal year 1970.

The request of the Department of Defense and the recommendation of the committee that the request be approved by Congress is not necessarily a commitment for the initiation of production in fiscal year 1971. In other words, the House is not deciding here today or tomorrow whether AMSA will be produced. It is merely being asked to approve a step which later on will permit it to decide in the most deliberate and considerate fashion whether the advanced manned strategic aircraft should go into production.

I think it is extremely important that

what we are doing here today should be clearly understood. We are not talking about production of a new bomber. The idea of a new manned bomber is not new, and there is nothing that the Committee on Armed Services has devoted itself to over the years more than to this particular bomber, as important as other projects are.

We are talking about fiscal year 1970, but as far back as fiscal year 1962 the committee was urging the House to approve specific authorization for long-range manned aircraft for the Strategic Air Command. And every year without exception since that time the committee has come before the House to continue urging that this element of our defense not be permitted to fall into decline. And every year the House has supported the committee's recommendation. The difficulty and the lack of progress does not lie with the House of Representatives, or with Congress, because we in Congress have consistently done our part of the job. The trouble has been with the Pentagon—and I am not referring to the military leaders, and I am not referring to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am referring to the civilian leadership that simply took an adamant position with respect to the manner bomber. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, I might mention, have consistently supported AMSA.

We have need for a new bomber. I personally am wholly convinced of this, and the Committee on Armed Services is convinced of this. The record of this House since fiscal year 1962 establishes that the House is similarly convinced that we do need a new bomber. Up to this time the Congress has been frustrated in its efforts to persuade the Department of Defense to pursue with anything like a sense of urgency the expressed will—the frequently expressed will—of the Congress for a new bomber.

Last year's committee report dealt in considerable detail with AMSA and stated at one point, and I quote:

It might be said that AMSA has to this day been pursued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense with a relentless apathy.

This is a good description of the attitude of the civilian leadership in the Department of Defense over the past years. It has indeed pursued the need for a new bomber with a relentless apathy.

Let no one think for one moment that my support and the support of the Committee on Armed Services for a new bomber in any way diminishes its belief in the absolute essentiality of our missile force. This is not in any way involved here.

Very simply stated, in the light of the overall strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union—a balance that is much too close for comfort these days—this country needs to have a triple-threat capability. It needs its Polaris missile submarine; it needs its Minute Man missile force; and it needs a modern and effective bomber force—and that is the whole thing in a nutshell.

A mix of all these three capabilities means this: The effective presence of any one of these forces has a very strong tendency to fortify the viability of an-

other of them, thereby strengthening the credibility of our total deterrent posture. If and when the Soviet Union's missiles are improved to a point of great accuracy, our Minuteman force would be very much more vulnerable than it is today. And in these circumstances a modern bomber force together with our Polaris missile submarines would provide a very real assurance against a devastating first strike by the Soviet Union. Further, should the Soviets make a technological breakthrough in antisubmarine warfare, our Polaris fleet could be seriously affected. In this situation a modern bomber force, plus our land-based missile force, would provide against the consequences of this anti-submarine warfare breakthrough. And the survival of our bomber force depends on adequate warning time of a Soviet missile attack; thus our Minuteman force and our Polaris force give assurance in the event the Soviet Union discovers a way of overcoming our warning systems or countering the capability of our bombers to penetrate.

We have a triple threat with the Polaris, the Minuteman, and with the new bomber.

Before concluding my remarks, I would like to make this observation: I look with some concern on the plans of the Department of Defense—if they really can be called plans at this time—to deactivate some of the older B-52 bombers, and the B-58 bombers.

I think we need them longer than the Department of Defense believes. Thank God we have the B-52's. Certainly, those who have engineered and designed them, and those of us in Congress who authorized and appropriated for them had no idea at the time when we were authorizing and appropriating for the B-52's and the B-58's that they would be used for the mission for which they are being used today. No one could see 10 years ahead as to what bomber we may need or what type of bomber we may need. Certainly, the B-52 was never planned for jungle fighting. Yet, those troops in the jungles today are protected by the threat of the bombers and by the actual use of the bombers to protect our fighting forces.

As strongly as I support AMSA, I do so with full awareness that AMSA cannot join our operating forces for a number of years. I strongly suggest that there be a reexamination of current plans with respect to the B-52's, the B-58's, and the cut in FB-111 bombers.

We have now arrived at a point where it is quite apparent that the long-expressed desires of the Congress are consistent with the intentions of the Pentagon.

At last the Secretary of Defense is willing to support the Congress in its support of AMSA. I urge the House to give full funding to the \$100 million for research and development of this new bomber.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. SIKES).

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, there are

demands from many sources for cuts in America's defense programs. History is repeating itself. All of this is reminiscent of the peaks and valleys expenditures policies of other days and the unfortunate consequences of those policies to world peace. I am one of those who can recall America's postwar policies toward its military services after World War II, and even after World War I. After World War I ended America, disillusioned from its first serious venture into world affairs, turned its back and promptly disbanded all but token Armed Forces. When the outbreak of World War II in Europe finally shocked us into a realization of the pending danger, we had to rebuild our forces almost from the ground up. At either time had there been an aggressive and militarily prepared country on our borders rather than across the sea, we would have been helpless to defend ourselves.

After World War II we accepted a much larger measure of responsibility for what was happening in the world, at least to the point of setting up the Marshall plan to help Greece and Turkey survive against communism, and we talked tough to Russia about such far-away places as Azerbaijan. Russia was still reeling from near defeat in the war and undoubtedly was apprehensive about the fact that we possessed the atomic bomb and they did not. We even launched a United Nations with great hopes for its future value in quieting the problems of the world.

Nevertheless, it is still within recent memory that the tremendous U.S. military machine of World War II was hastily disbanded and much of its equipment left scattered around the world. In the process, the most powerful and effective fighting force ever assembled was decimated within a matter of months. Yet it was but a few years later that it became necessary to resort to the costly crash buildup for the Korean war. I would hope we have not forgotten the waste which goes with this process and the damage which it does to our international stature and prestige.

Now we live in a different world. Aircraft and missiles have shrunk the world to the point that once protective boundaries of oceans or friendly peoples are now meaningless. The effect has been to bring next door to America all of the world's aggressive and militarily competent Communist nations. Russia now is stronger militarily than we, because Russia's modernization of her weapons has not been neglected in any area and because their missile capability is as great as ours. I find nothing which indicates that communism seriously is prepared to adjust to coexistence with the West. Nor do I find indications that Communist intentions towards us are those of a friendly neighbor. The Communists have not changed their spots, or their plans for world domination. The best and surest security we have is afforded by a strong military defense.

The matter does not stop there. There is another problem which surely will come with the defense cuts which now are proposed. Defense cuts will mean an idling of important sectors of Ameri-

can industry. Idle industry means unemployment. Layoffs at military bases also mean unemployment for dedicated competent career personnel and for many others. These things will complicate the problems of the national economy and they will encourage the specter of depression.

I do not question the necessity to save the taxpayers' dollars wherever we can. I realize that there are areas where some cuts are justifiable, and I do not argue that we should spend money for defense that is not absolutely required for our own security. But I say there is now too much emphasis on cuts in defense.

Talk of troop withdrawals and defense cutbacks in the United States plus uncertainty over U.S. policies already have combined to stimulate Communist activity in other parts of the world and may result in adjustments in policy by nations directly under Communist pressure. It would not take much at this stage to encourage defections of some of our friends to the other side.

It is time to talk of improving our military posture by modernizing our military forces. More than anything we need modernization. It is also time to express appreciation for the services of those who wear the uniform. They have overcome tremendous odds time after time to preserve this Nation and prove its leadership. It is time to look first to America's security and America's commitments and the effect that cuts in the military would have on both. I do not think the people of America want the Congress or the administration to cripple our defenses. We must not return to the wasteful peaks-and-valleys policies of other years.

The President has begun a campaign to firm up American public opinion in support of his Vietnam policy of withdrawal of American troops as fast as practical and continued pressure on Hanoi to accept a realistic plan for peace. It is unfortunate that the public has not been more fully apprised of the status of the war all along and the necessity for the continuation of the American presence in Vietnam. It is certain there will be demonstrations against the war and there will be speechmaking in Congress for early and complete withdrawal of U.S. forces. The President should have the support of the American people on this issue, but it will be necessary that he give the people facts which merit their confidence. He will have to provide the leadership. It is going to be difficult to get a realistic peace, difficult not to lose this war if we overemphasize defense cuts which could seriously limit our military effectiveness. A strong defense capability will impress Hanoi and the Communist world much more than rapid de-escalation and defense cuts. Today it is our responsibility. We can give the President the tools with which to work or we can take them away.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER).

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, less than 9 years ago this Nation experienced a hard fought and a very close presidential

election. The campaign of 1960 was certainly a cliffhanger.

As in all close elections, any one of a number of issues could have influenced the result. But in 1960, in those days which followed the launching of Sputnik, the most decisive issue was a missile gap which did not exist.

In 1960 I argued there was no missile gap because I knew otherwise. Others argued as I did, but, for understandable reasons, the shock value of bad news makes better reading and our voices of truth were drowned in a rapid fire of condemnation and belittling of our defense posture.

Only weeks after he took office, Secretary McNamara admitted that we were correct: There was no missile gap.

Yes, the ebb and the flow of public opinion has played curious tricks on public policy, and, to steal a few words from Alice in Wonderland, today things are getting "curiouser and curiouser."

Today we are engaged in an unpopular war, to which civilians committed us, and one which civilians have decided they will not let military men win.

Americans are disgusted—and rightly so—and their disgust has been fanned into a revulsion against anything military. Demagogues who make a profession of sniffing political winds and adjusting their principles accordingly were quick to follow instead of lead. Because negative criticism is more spectacular than the constructive variety, their efforts were rewarded with headlines and prominent spots on television.

So today, 9 years after public opinion anxiously demanded the closing of a nonexistent missile gap, that same public opinion has erupted into broadside opposition to maintaining a national defense superior to the force which threatens it. The irony of ironies is that today there is in fact a strategic gap. In 1960 we had a 15-to-1 advantage against the Soviet Union in ICBM's. Today she has drawn even and has passed us.

I hope we can rise to our moral responsibilities here in this House. We have no right to enslave ourselves to public opinion when it is wrong. We have no right to make reckless accusations on false or incomplete evidence. We have the responsibility to seek truth and to speak it loudly.

I do not expect my words of truth to receive any more attention today than they did in 1960, but my conscience obliges me to speak them, so I make two points:

First, there is a threat to this Nation. Second, time is working against us.

I frankly feel our regulations regarding security are too tight and more should be told the American public about our situation vis-a-vis the Russians. If that were the case, my point would be clinched at the outset. Unfortunately, it is not the case. So let us skirt the fringes of classified information and ask some questions.

Why is Russia continuing to build ICBM's when she already has more than the United States?

Why is Russia fast becoming the world's leading naval power?

Why does Russia have, as our Seapower Subcommittee revealed, a fleet 58

percent of which is less than 10 years old, while we have a fleet, 58 percent of which is more than 20 years old.

Why is Russia building a worldwide navy for operation beyond the Baltic and the Mediterranean with offensive—I repeat offensive—not defensive power?

Why is Russia again working on FOBS, the fractional orbital bombardment system?

Why is Russia stirring up trouble in the Middle East?

Why is Russia building a new bomber capable of reaching United States targets?

Why is Russia concentrating on chemical and biological warfare?

Why does Russia announce she intends to use such weapons?

Why is Russia increasing the type of offensive capability which would be required to overrun Western Europe?

Why has her research and development effort continued to expand through many, many years without fluctuation?

If these questions are answered honestly, how can one reach any other conclusion but this: The course of safety requires that we consider Russia's actions as indicative of aggressive intent.

But some will say in rebuttal, we must look forward to a detente with the Soviet Union, we must show our good faith and hope for disarmament.

Oh, how I would like to buy that argument, but can those who offer it show me one agreement Russia has kept when it served her purpose to break it? Can they show me one earnest and honest step toward international cooperation which Russia has taken? Until they do, this Nation must not err as Neville Chamberlain did.

Time is working against us. In World War II and in Korea we were unprepared to meet aggression, but weapons systems were simple in those days and a holding action by Britain or the beleaguered forces of MacArthur, who fought with their backs to the walls of Pusan, gave us the time to build the hardware we needed.

Today, against one of the world's leading scientific powers, a nuclear power, we will not have even a year. Now, it takes an average of 10 years for research to bloom into hardware. This is the reason why the strategic gap is growing wider in Russia's favor.

For this reason I say thank God for a military-industrial complex. I would be scared to death without it. To harass it out of the defense business by excessive regulation and to unreasonably squeeze profits would be to deny us our greatest strength. Furthermore, without it we invite Government "in-house" research and development and greater control of the military, which no person, even opponents of this bill, wants to see.

Let us be honest in criticizing the military. They are human. They make mistakes. They should be criticized, and they should correct their mistakes. But the mistakes of civilians should not be ascribed to the military in a blanket smear of a great group of people who are prepared to sacrifice their lives in the defense of freedom.

Do not forget that we have civilian

control of the military. Do any of us doubt that civilian control prevailed under Secretary McNamara, who not only selected the targets to be destroyed but prescribed the ordnance to be used in destroying them? Do any of us doubt that he exercised absolute civilian control?

Did a military man make the TFX decision?

Did a military man decide to commit combat troops in Southeast Asia?

Did a military man decide not to close the port of Haiphong?

Did a military man conceive the revolutionary C-5A contract?

Have we not had absolute civilian control and decisionmaking?

So let us blame the military men when they deserve it, but do not ask them to take the rap for purely civilian mistakes.

And while we speak here at this end of the Capitol, let us not overlook the loud cries of condemnation of our military which echoed before the TV cameras at the opposite end of this building.

In the interest of fairness, we should let it be known that civilians in the Senate exert heavy control upon the military.

Military men are today rendering military support for treaty commitments that were ratified by the civilians of the U.S. Senate. Let me list a few of them. Here are treaties ratified by the Senate which would require U.S. military support.

The charter of the United Nations, signed in 1945; the Inter-American Treaty, the Rio Pact, signed in 1941; the general treaty between the United States and Panama, signed in 1936; the NATO treaty of 1949; the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, SEATO, signed in 1954; the security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, the Anzus Pact of 1951; the treaty of mutual cooperation and security between the United States and Japan in 1960.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 2 additional minutes.

Mr. GUBSER. To continue, the mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, signed in 1954; and the mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea in 1953.

Military men today are committed to defend the commitments made in these treaties which were ratified by the civilians of the U.S. Senate. So when we are passing criticism around these days let us be honest and let us direct it where it should be directed.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a firm and a flatfooted prediction. In less than 5 years the Russians can be depended upon to provoke another crisis. The voices in the Senate will heed another convulsion of public opinion. The American people will demand more security, and these same voices will be indicating someone besides themselves for allowing our defenses to deteriorate.

Some time in the future when the American people are demanding better

defense as they did in 1960, the record of this debate will be used by the opponents of Congressmen in this Chamber today to criticize them for failing to support this bill.

Let us be moderate, let us be honest, let us be leaders, let us not be followers and sniffers of the winds of public opinion. Let us cut where we need to cut, but let us not forget two things: there is a threat, and time is against us.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I am one of those who may be classified as a bleeding heart or a Johnny-come-lately or a non-expert or something like that, but I did vote against this bill in the committee and I am going to vote against it on the floor if it remains in its present form. I did this reluctantly and for the first time in 9 years, because obviously I think it is too much money for us to be spending in this area at this time. I offered five amendments in the committee and I managed to get four votes on one of them and a maximum of six on another one of them, so I do not claim any massive successes in the committee, and I will not be terribly surprised if I do not get any massive success in this body when I offer the same amendments here. I fully intend to do so. Frankly, I told the chairman after his speech that I hated to say so, but I thought he had made an awfully good speech. And I really did. The thing he said that I liked the best and which is most significant and most important is the fact that all of us do deal in generalities and we have to act in specifics. I believe that from the word go.

But, having said that, what do we wind up doing? We wind up saying, "Well, we need it like we need a fire engine or like we need an insurance policy or like we need a raincoat." I do not think it is any better to deal in metaphors than it is to deal in generalities.

We talk in generalities because we cannot get the specifics. We try to get specifics. We cannot get the specifics, however, time after time after time.

Mr. Chairman, the greatest problem we have in this country is not something called the military-industrial complex. It is something called "secrecy." We classify everything.

Mr. Chairman, there was a cartoon in the paper a while back which simply said that the highest category of classified information we have is that which does not support our position.

This is essentially what does happen.

I have some specifics right here in my hand. I have the Secretary of the Army, for example, responding to a question. I asked him: Is this for use in Vietnam?

His answer was: "I doubt that it is."

I asked him: Was it included in the money for Vietnam?

His answer was: "I doubt that it is."

And, Mr. Chairman, the Pentagon does not have the right to revise and extend, but they have the right to classify. So what did he classify? He classified "I doubt that." The answer comes back not that "I doubt that it is." The answer comes back, "It is."

That is the version you read, and the hearings you read—and I know you have read all the hearings obviously because they are only 4,000 pages long—but I want to particularly call your attention to page 3726 of the hearings. I asked for the pieces of paper that went over to be printed up in the printed hearings and this is what they looked like. There is that much chopped out of it, and then there is the next page and that is what is chopped out of it. Then there is the next page and it is all chopped out of it. Then you keep on going and finally you come to this page. It has only two little censored holes and here is the witnesses' answer:

If I went any deeper into it I would have to get it classified.

That is in the statement. What did they do? This was an open hearing. My daughter was there sitting in on this session and they have classified everything out of the record.

Mr. Chairman, we deal in generalities because we cannot get specifics. We fight for specifics.

I simply say to you that when we offer amendments, they will be specific amendments on specific issues and I hope you will listen to them as such and I hope we will have time during which to debate them.

Further, I wish to say to you, finally, that there is not anyone who is against national defense. There is not anyone who is in favor of disarming this country. But, we are talking about national priorities. I will give you one specific as to priority.

For the cost of one of the 58 C-5A's that we have researched and built so far we could build in my district 4½ schools each capable of educating 1,000 people a year for 30 years—4½ of those schools. There is a specific.

Is a C-5A worth 4½ schools that can each educate 1,000 kids a year for 30 years? My judgment is that it is not.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute for the purpose of asking him a question.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York is recognized for 1 additional minute.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIKE. Certainly.

Mr. RIVERS. Since we are talking about dealing in generalities rather than specifics, was the gentleman from New York talking about the committee when he said "they," since he constantly said "they"—was he talking about the full committee?

Mr. PIKE. I do not know what you are talking about.

Mr. RIVERS. You said "they" classified this and "they" classified that.

Mr. PIKE. Are you talking about this particular classification?

Mr. RIVERS. Yes.

Mr. PIKE. This particular classification was done over at the Pentagon, I presume. Most of the classification is done at the Pentagon.

Mr. RIVERS. When you said "they," I thought you were referring to us.

Mr. PIKE. Oh, mercy, no. We have the hearings and then we ship them over to the Pentagon and they cut out everything they do not want in them and then they ship them back.

I have a letter here from the Secretary of the Navy in response to a question that I asked, and I was trying to get him to release the operational orders under which the *Pueblo* sailed. And he not only wrote me back saying no, he could not release the operational orders under which the *Pueblo* sailed, the letter saying "no" was classified as secret.

Mr. RIVERS. Oh, yes. Now will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIKE. Of course.

Mr. RIVERS. Is this any reason to destroy the Pentagon in its entirety.

Mr. PIKE. If we cannot get the facts from them I suggest—

Mr. RIVERS. Wait a second. I asked the gentleman a question.

Mr. PIKE. Wait a minute, now. Right at the moment I have the time. I have the time.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has again expired.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman from New York 1 more minute so that I can ask a question.

I appointed the gentleman chairman of the special subcommittee to hold *Pueblo* hearings.

Mr. PIKE. That is right.

Mr. RIVERS. I am the one who assigned you that job. You did a good job, and I helped you get the classified material, but I did not and was not responsible to the things that the gentleman is, by innuendo assigning, to it.

Mr. PIKE. I am not saying that the committee did it. I am saying that right now, for example, the C-5A had a test failure last week, and nobody on the committee has been advised of that, and it failed at less than 100 percent of its design strength, and nobody on the committee has been advised about it.

Mr. RIVERS. I will say this—

Mr. PIKE. Because it does not justify the position of the Department of Defense.

Mr. RIVERS. Is the gentleman fully advised on this alleged failure of the C-5A?

Mr. PIKE. I got advised of it by the Air Force this morning after I found out about it in a bar in California last weekend.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has again expired.

Mr. RIVERS. I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. Chairman, I am not surprised at the gentleman's innuendo. I was apprised of it. I went into this thing that the gentleman is talking about. I was apprised of it.

Mr. PIKE. Does the gentleman not believe that all of the members of the committee should be apprised of it?

Mr. RIVERS. I do not know whether I do now, after hearing what the gentleman is talking about, because he is evidently—

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. Because he is evidently not possessed of all the facts. I have looked into this, and I am looking into it now. I am not ready, nor am I capable, of reporting to this committee the full reason for this alleged failure. I have been informed that some material which had been subjected to one complete life cycle of fatigue testing was put into this test as an expediency. This test failure should not adversely affect the static test or flight test program. I am not going to be a conscious party to assigning fraud to one of the greatest companies just because of an innuendo.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has again expired.

Mr. RIVERS. I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from New York.

I have yielded you 1 additional minute. Now go ahead and make your capital.

Mr. PIKE. I would simply say this: that if the Air Force is testing the C-5A's by a system which uses defective materials, then there is something wrong with the testing techniques of the Air Force, and we darned well ought to look into that also. But when there are test failures—

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIKE. I cannot yield to the gentleman.

But when there are test failures in a program as vital as this program, and at a time like this, and we do not know anything about it and we are not told about it until we drag it out of the Air Force, then that is why we deal in generalities, and that is why we do not deal in specifics.

Mr. RIVERS. Let me tell the gentleman something: We have an investigating committee looking into this matter. When we are ready to report to this Congress we will do it. The C-5A is not operational, and I am not going to accuse in absentia. I do not do business that way. I am not going to be a party to that, but when I find out, and if there is fraud, then I will raise hell about it.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has again expired.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, when the legislation currently before the House, the military procurement authorization for fiscal year 1970, is read for amendment, I intend to propose an amendment to delete \$275 million proposed to be authorized for procurement of six F-14 aircraft over and above the six test prototypes proposed to be provided under the Navy's R.T.D. & E. authorization. I have set out some of the factors that have led me to propose this amendment in a letter which reached all House Members today, reading in part as follows:

This amendment would bring the Authorization into compliance with the recent warnings of experts like Dr. John Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Engineering and Research, that "we should be cautious" in developing the F-14, and Admiral Connolly, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, who disclosed in House hearings that "the least risk program is to build the airplane, build a half dozen perhaps, and don't do another

thing until you fly these airplanes to the point where you are sure you have worked out everything."

The same cut in this program that my amendment proposes was recommended in the Report on Military Spending of the Military Committee of Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, headed by Senator Hatfield.

Passage of this amendment would (1) buy time for us to determine through flight tests of the R.D.T.&E. prototypes whether the F-14 and its component systems (particularly the Phoenix missile and the advanced technology engine) will perform as predicted, and (2) allow further study of cheaper, lighter, speedier, more maneuverable substitutes for the F-14 (like the VF-XX) favored by some experts. It will also, of course, greatly reduce the possibility that we will spend hundreds of millions of dollars on an aircraft which fails to perform adequately (as we did with the F-111B). Finally, should we find it necessary or desirable to substitute an aircraft like the VF-XX for the proposed F-14, we could realize a 10-year saving of about \$15-billion in production and future operations costs.

In addition, many of the issues relating to the procurement of F-14s were examined in the course of consideration by the Senate. That discussion appears on pages 26140 to 26158 of the September 18, 1969, RECORD.

I will have more to say on this issue during debate on my amendment. In the meantime, I want to draw my colleagues' attention to an excellent article on the F-14 controversy by Andrew Hamilton from the sixth prepublication issue—dated September 22, 1969—of the National Journal, edited by former Congressional Quarterly editor, Thomas Schroth. The article, entitled "Air Force, Navy Requests for New Fighter Planes Spur Cost Controversy," follows:

AIR FORCE, NAVY REQUESTS FOR NEW FIGHTER PLANES SPUR COST CONTROVERSY
(By Andrew Hamilton)

In the controversy over military programs which has absorbed Congress this summer, Air Force and Navy proposals for new "air superiority" fighters have received relatively little attention.

Yet these programs may prove, in combination, to be the most expensive new items in the fiscal 1970 defense budget, with a potential cost of over \$40 billion in the next 15 years.

Pentagon critics: The projected costs are so high that some defense officials believe procurement of the new Navy F-14 and Air Force F-15 will force a sharp reduction in the number of tactical aircraft wings, if future defense budgets are kept within present limits.

These officials argue that the new fighters are not only too expensive by a factor of three, but will fail to match projected new Soviet fighters. That could lead to a dangerous shift in the military balance in such areas as the Middle East, Korea and Central Europe, they assert.

Pentagon critics of the F-14 and F-15 argue that the Vietnam war proved that such complex, missile-firing aircraft, weighted with electronics, are ineffective in aerial combat. They believe a simple, highly maneuverable and very speedy fighter can be built for one-third the cost of the proposed new fighters, with a potential saving of at least \$25 billion in the next 10 to 15 years.

Congressional action: The new fighter programs clearly involve the sort of major economic and military questions which have interested the Senate in 1969.

But with the exception of Sen. Vance

Hartke, D-Ind., who has taken an interest in the F-14 program, the fighter issues have failed to gain significant political attention. The reasons for this lack of scrutiny help illustrate the difficulties involved in effective congressional oversight of defense programs.

A central reason, clearly, is the failure of the Defense Department to lay the controversial questions involved before Congress in a systematic way. In part this is due to the normal reluctance of an executive department to disclose internal disputes.

In addition, Congress lacks reliable information on the long-term cost implications of these and many other new projects. Unlike the antiballistic missile system, operating costs are a major factor in aircraft systems. But the "10-year systems cost" concept, routinely used by Pentagon analysts to compare proposed weapons systems, is unfamiliar to Congress.

Moreover, the Senate and House Armed Services Committees strongly back the view of Senior Air Force and Navy officers that the United States must start new fighter programs now if it is to meet the Soviet challenge in the 1970s. Air Force Secretary Robert C. Seamans Jr., told the Senate Armed Services Committee April 16 that American superiority in air-to-air combat has declined from 12-to-1 during the Korean war to "less than one-to-one shortly before the bombing halt" in Vietnam in March 1968. Seamans said new Soviet prototype aircraft, including the Foxbat interceptor, show that the Soviet Union is capable of developing a new air-to-air fighter which is superior to current American Fighters.

Members of Congress confess that it is very hard to start a discussion in the face of massive professional advice to proceed with the proposed new fighters, and without official testimony on alternatives.

For this reason, Hartke decided against challenging procurement funds for the F-14 and chose instead to back an amendment calling for a restudy of the need for the new Navy fighter.

Nevertheless, congressional interest in the F-14, including a critical paper on the program published July 2 by the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, has helped to bring to light a controversy over the design and cost of new fighters that has raged through the Pentagon for the last year. (MCPL is headed by Rep. F. Bradford Morse, R-Mass., and the chairman of its military subcommittee is Sen. Mark Hatfield, R-Ore.)

Impact on industry: The aerospace industry obviously has a large stake in the fighter decision. Although the F-14 airframe contract has been awarded to Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., three airframe manufacturers, at least two electronics companies and two engine companies are competing to produce components of the F-15 and the F-14B engine.

Meanwhile, a number of other companies are known to be in discussion with the Air Force and Navy concerning possible alternatives to the F-15 and F-14, as well as possible new missile and electronic systems for fighter aircraft.

COST ISSUE

The estimate that the F-14 and F-15 may cost more than \$40 billion is derived from a calculation of the expense of buying and operating slightly more than 1,400 of them for 10 years. The cost of associated weapons for the aircraft could add several billion to this figure.

This estimate is several times larger than the procurement figures currently cited by the Air Force and Navy. Indeed, Congress faces a confusing welter of figures in trying to determine how far it is committing itself by approving development and production of the new planes.

For instance, at least three different sets of F-14 cost figures have been put forward.

Sen. John Stennis, D-Miss., chairman of the Armed Services Committee, July 8 reported that the F-14 would cost \$15.5 million a copy for the 287 that have been approved in the five-year defense plan. That works out to about \$4.4 billion. Two days later, Sen. Howard W. Cannon, D-Nev., chairman of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Tactical Airpower, said in floor debate that the F-14 program would cost \$6.4 billion for 463 aircraft.

Yet another committee member, Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., Aug. 11 placed in the *Congressional Record* a statement, prepared with Navy assistance, stating that procurement and support of 716 F-14As and F-14Bs would cost \$7,643,000,000—a figure which apparently excludes approximately \$1.3 billion in research and development. The statement said the "unit flyaway cost" of the F-14 will be \$8.06 million each, taking into account 4 per cent annual inflation. ("Unit flyaway" costs exclude research and development, initial production costs, spares and other support costs such as ground equipment. These costs are included in a total procurement program.)

The office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, on the other hand, reportedly calculates that 300 F-14s would cost about \$5.7 billion, or \$19 million each on a total program basis and \$13 million each on a unit flyaway basis. Some 700 F-14s would cost \$11.6 billion, according to the same source. That works out to \$16.5 million each on a program basis and about \$11 million each, unit flyaway cost.

Some informed officials note that the Navy's cost figures, used by Goldwater, put the price of the F-14 very close to the cost of the Air Force fighter, which is smaller. The F-14 certainly will cost more than the F-15, they argue, because its airframe weighs some 8,000 to 9,000 pounds more, because it has over 1,000 pounds more electronic equipment than the Air Force fighter (at a cost of at least \$1,000 a pound) and because it has a moveable wing.

Sen. Cannon July 10 said the Air Force program would cost \$5.14 billion, or about \$10 million a plane. But more recent Air Force cost studies put the price of 737 F-15s at about \$8.9 billion, including research and development.

Systems cost concept: As an aid to defense decision makers, the Office of Systems Analysis at the Pentagon some years ago began pricing weapons systems on a 10-year basis, including development, production and 10-year direct operating costs for a full system. (Although the "10-year system cost" is a somewhat artificial figure, it provides a reliable way of predicting relative costs of different weapons systems. In actual practice, systems costs may be spread over 15 or more years, because more than five years are needed to put a full system into operation.)

None of the 10-year systems cost studies of the F-14, F-15 or alternatives to them have been made available to Congress, insofar as it can be determined.

But it is possible to construct an approximation of the systems costs for the F-14 and F-15 using known Pentagon figures and a common rule of thumb. This rule holds that 10-year direct operating costs of a modern combat aircraft are about double its "unit flyaway" cost. (Actual experience with recent aircraft suggest direct operating costs of up to three times the unit flyaway cost. In the following calculations it is assumed the F-14 and F-15 will be built for easy maintenance. Operating costs could be reduced much more if the electronics items on aircraft are built with better attention to reliability than has been achieved in the past, and, more important, if the whole system is kept simple. But neither the F-14 nor the F-15 is a simple aircraft.)

Using the Navy figure of \$8-million unit flyaway cost for one F-14, 10-year direct operating costs per aircraft will be about

\$16 million. For 500 aircraft—the portion of 716 actually operating at any time—the 10-year direct operating costs will be approximately \$8 billion. When development and production costs of the program are added, the 10-year system cost for 716 aircraft is approximately \$17 billion.

Using the Systems Analysis cost unit flyaway basis for the F-14, the 10-year direct operating costs for 500 aircraft would be about \$11 billion and the 10-year system cost will be close to \$23 billion. Neither of these calculations includes F-14 weapons which could add up to 10 billion to the price.

The 10-year systems cost of the F-15 could exceed \$17 billion based on a unit-flyaway cost of \$8.5 million 10-year direct operating costs of \$8.5 billion for 500 aircraft and a total program of 737 aircraft.

In combination, these replacements for the F-4 could cost \$40 billion to buy and operate, not counting new missiles which will add significantly to the price.

The Systems Analysis Office reportedly calculates that an alternative fighter, described below, can be built and flown at one third this cost.

Phoenix missile: Latest price estimates for this long-range, radar-guided missile, designed to destroy large formations of enemy bombers, put the unit cost at \$400,000. Each F-14 will carry six Phoenix missiles, weighing 1,000 pounds apiece, in its "feet air defense" role. A complete load for 500 aircraft would cost \$1.2 billion, excluding \$500 million to \$700 million in research and development. Ten complete loads—30,000 missiles—would cost nearly \$10 billion (allowing a lower unit price on quantity). Insofar as can be determined, the Navy has not indicated to Congress how many Phoenix missiles it plans to buy over the life of the program.

Improved Sparrow: The Navy is developing an improved version of the Sparrow radar-guided missile for use on the F-4, F-14 and F-15. Known as the AIM-75, it will cost about 50 per cent more than current versions of Sparrow, or over \$60,000 each.

The fighter aircraft will carry four Sparrows each. Ten complete loads for 1,000 aircraft would cost about \$2.5 billion. Defense officials say the current Sparrow has one of the worst performance records of available air-to-air missiles. It reportedly scores a kill approximately one-third as often as the Sidewinder missile when the enemy aircraft is in visual range, and one-fourth as often as simple fixed machine guns aboard fighters.

OTHER SURMERGED ISSUES

Electronics systems: The potential cost of the new fighters is closely linked to the sophisticated systems they are designed to carry, and to the kinds of air battles they are designed to fight.

For the past year, the Systems Analysis Office has argued that electronics and missiles, instead of improving the effectiveness of fighter aircraft, actually reduce it. The argument, although supported by fighter pilots with Vietnam combat experience, has apparently failed so far to make an impact on the Pentagon's research and development bureaucracy.

In the case of aircraft, this bureaucracy consists of the Air Force Systems Command, the Naval Air Systems Command, and the Office of the Director of Defense Engineering and Research. For years it has been dominated by the view that the largest gains in aircraft performance will come from improvements in radar and other forms of electronics warfare, and from longer range missiles. Thus a large portion of Pentagon research and development spending is allocated to these purposes.

A secret Defense Department study, reported in The Washington Post June 28, noted that the fiscal 1969 Air Force research and development budget allocated \$2 bil-

lion to research in electronics, missilery and space and only one-tenth that amount to improving simple tactical aircraft and weapons.

Air Force Secretary Seamans April 16 described the difference between American and Soviet fighters in the following terms: "Since their appearance in the Korean war, Soviet-designed fighters have generally been more maneuverable and have had better acceleration than U.S. fighters. Our fighters, on the other hand, have had better radius of action, firepower, avionics and payload." But, he went on to say, U.S. air-to-air superiority has declined alarmingly since Korea.

Systems Analysis studies of tactical aircraft argue that the decline occurred precisely because the United States has spent its money on aircraft capabilities that have little to do with, and hamper, visual air-to-air combat. For example, the F-4, currently the best U.S. fighter, costs about three times as much as its most direct Soviet competitor, the MIG-21. (The comparison is based on Defense Department calculations that it would cost about \$800,000 to manufacture a MIG-21 in the United States.) The F-4 has six times the gross bomb payload and three times the range of the MIG-21 for combat missions. The F-4 is equipped with self-contained navigational devices, long-range search radar, radar-directed Sparrow missiles and devices to jam enemy radar.

Yet Vietnam experience raised serious questions about the utility of much of this equipment. Due to the large number of American aircraft in North Vietnam and the impossibility of using electronic equipment to reliably separate friend from foe, no "stand-off" aerial battles were fought, although the F-4 was designed precisely for this kind of warfare, in which fighter planes see each other only on radar and engage at ranges beyond eyesight.

Pentagon study: The secret Pentagon study mentioned above found that pilots seldom used their aerial search radar in Vietnam because it exposed them to early detection by the enemy. The radar also was ineffective because enemy pilots, directed from the ground, could easily avoid its narrow search pattern and approach American fighters from behind. Radar-directed bombing systems aboard some tactical aircraft like the Navy's A-6A were found at best to be 30 percent to 60 percent less accurate than eye-aimed bombing conducted in daylight. And night bomb-attacks in defended areas were found to result in more aircraft losses than daylight attacks.

The study found that air-to-air missiles like the Sparrow were one-quarter as effective for shooting down enemy aircraft as a fighter plane's cannon or machine guns, while costing 200 times as much per firing or 800 times as much per kill.

The study also found that electronics devices and missiles on tactical aircraft in Vietnam failed by very large margins to live up to peacetime test accuracies and manufacturer predictions of reliability.

New fighters: The new Navy and Air Force fighters will continue the trend toward greater electronic sophistication.

The micro-miniaturized electronics equipment, costly in itself, also imposes other cost on the fighter programs. In order to keep down total aircraft weight, the F-14 and, to a greater extent, the F-15, will use large amounts of titanium, which is several times more costly than aluminum. The F-14B and F-15 engines must be built with jewelers' care to achieve maximum thrust-to-weight ratios in partial compensation for the added weight of missiles and avionics.

But some defense analysts believe the new equipment will not work any better than current equipment, if as well. Look-down radar for air-to-air combat, for example, has

yet to be successfully developed. Some experts believe it remains impossible to design an effective look-down radar for fighter aircraft. Similarly, the problems involved in developing electronic equipment to separate friend from foe, and long-range missiles that can hit maneuvering targets, make it highly improbable that successful "stand-off" aerial engagements will be feasible in the future, these analysts assert. The most sensible and effective armament for fighter aircraft is a gun, they argue.

Function challenged: The issue of sophistication is closely connected to the purposes for which U.S. tactical aircraft are designed. One basic requirement in recent years has been the "deep interdiction" mission in support of a conventional or tactical nuclear war in Europe. In theory the aircraft would fly deep into East Europe to attack supplies and military units moving toward the front. This mission accounts for the range, payload and low-level, all-weather attack capabilities of the Air Force F-111 tactical bomber, for example.

The F-15 is designed primarily to escort such bombing raids and protect them from enemy fighters. Thus it has been given very long range for a fighter and its equipment is designed to help it survive highly sophisticated enemy defenses, postulated for the future.

Recent Pentagon studies, however, challenge this basic requirement. They argue that deep interdiction is expensive in resources and pilots and highly ineffective because of the ease of duplicating and repairing transport facilities.

Some officials are also concerned that interdiction of Soviet supply lines in Europe will lead to escalation. It could be an open invitation to Soviet submarine attacks on allied ships, for example. The recent studies hold that American tactical airpower should be primarily designed for close support of ground troops and for winning air superiority over the battlefield. The F-15 is viewed as an overly expensive and relatively inefficient aircraft for air superiority.

Similar objections have been raised, both in Congress and at the Pentagon, to the basic requirements for the Navy's F-14. The basic purpose of the Phoenix missile system is to defend the fleet against Soviet bomber attacks. But the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, in a 1968 report on U.S. Tactical Air Power, said this threat "is either limited or does not exist." The Navy has informed Congress since that the Phoenix will also provide protection against Soviet "cruise" missiles carried aboard some patrol craft, destroyers and submarines.

But recent Pentagon studies are said to have cast doubt on the missile's ability to hit such low-flying targets. They also question the ability of the Phoenix to hit maneuvering targets such as enemy fighter planes.

The Pentagon studies argue that the Navy should not spend so much to defend itself against the most sophisticated and least likely Soviet threats that it can predict, but should be more attentive to its limited war and peacekeeping roles. The studies assume that the Soviet Union will develop an improved fighter like the MIG-21 and export this to its client states. The F-14 will be too cumbersome to engage in successful dogfights with such aircraft, they argue. That raises the possibility, for example, that Soviet-equipped Arab air forces will come to dominate much of the Mediterranean.

Recent Air Force and Navy studies cast doubt on the Navy's original claim that the F-14 will be a good dogfighting aircraft. The Air Force examined the F-14A in comparison to the latest F-4s and found it less maneuverable. A recent Navy study reportedly found that the MIG-21 could out-turn the F-14B, particularly at higher altitudes, thus gaining an important edge in dogfighting.

Alternative approach: A recent GAO study, confirming recent Pentagon studies of tactical air power, argues that the United States should develop flying prototypes of aircraft designed to handle various foreseen needs, in effect emulating the Soviet Union.

These test vehicles would be kept simple and inexpensive; their designs would not be enumerated by multirole requirements. In the field of avionics and missiles, primary focus would be reliable, maintainable designs. Thus procurement of large numbers of new aircraft and associated systems could begin with tested technology. This could, it is claimed, lead to potentially large gains in reliability, and major savings in production and maintenance costs. The study, dated July 14, is entitled, "Evaluation of Two Proposed Methods for Enhancing Competition in Weapons Systems Procurement."

FX-X: One aircraft proposal based on such thinking has been put forward by the Systems Analysis Office as a substitute for the F-14 and F-15. Known as the FX-X, it is described as an "austere" aircraft designed primarily as a dogfighter and escort.

The FX-X would weigh under 30,000 pounds at take-off, and have a single engine of about 40,000 pounds thrust, a single pilot, an all-aluminum airframe and would use existing avionics. Its range would be between that of the F-4 and that of the F-15. It would not be designed for a large bomb payload, although its power would allow it to carry bombs.

Systems Analysis calculated that 300 such aircraft would cost \$3.2 million each (unit flyaway cost). The ten-year systems cost for 1,400 such aircraft would be about one-third the cost of the same number of F-14s and F-15s, a potential saving of \$25 billion or more.

The Air Force argues that the technology does not exist for a 40,000-pound-thrust engine. But FX-X proponents note that General Electric is developing engines with 67,000 pounds thrust for the Boeing supersonic transport, and that 35,000 pound-thrust engines were built as long as eight years ago. To answer the Air Force argument that the FX-X lacks sufficient range, the Systems Analysis study claims that the FX-X has a 33-per cent longer range than the F-4, and that a larger internal fuel load would seriously reduce acceleration and maneuverability.

A Navy spokesman said Sept. 5 that at least four airframe manufacturers are discussing a variant of the FX-X with the Naval Air Systems Command. It is known to Navy airmen as the "fall-back fighter," to be pursued in case the F-14 program should be curtailed or eliminated.

WHAT THE AIR FORCE AND NAVY WANT

F-14: The new Navy fighter is planned (1) to substitute for the General Dynamics/Grumman F-111-B (Navy version of the TFX) as a missile-carrying aircraft for defense of the fleet against Soviet bomber attacks and (2) to replace the McDonnell-Douglas F-4 as the main carrier-based fighter aircraft. The presently authorized five-year defense plan contemplates purchase of 287 F-14As and F-14Bs to replace the F-111-B. The Navy has informed Congress it wants 716 planes in all, to replace the F-4s as well. Some estimates place the total number of F-14s that may be bought over the next seven or eight years as high as 1,000 to 1,200. The aircraft will be built by the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., Bethpage, Long Island.

The F-14 will be a large swing-wing, supersonic, two-man, twin-engine aircraft. Its design is based on a slimmed-down version of the F-111-B. Like that aircraft, it is designed primarily to carry six large (1,000-pound) Phoenix air-to-air missiles. With the Phoenix it will weigh about 64,000 pounds (compared to about 80,000 pounds for the F-111-B).

In its "dogfight" role the F-14 will weigh,

by present Navy estimates, 52,000 pounds. It will carry an improved Sparrow missile (20-mile-plus range) and shortrange Sidewinder missiles, plus a cannon.

Present Navy plans call for three models of the F-14: the F-14A, using the same Pratt and Whitney engine as the F-111-B; the F-14B, using a version of an improved engine being developed for the F-15, and the F-14C, due in the latter 1970s, with improved missile and air-to-ground electronics systems.

The fiscal 1970 military procurement and authorization bill (S. 2546) proposes \$464 million for development and initial production of the F-14. The funds will permit purchase of six prototype aircraft and six production models.

F-15: The new Air Force fighter is designed to replace the F-4. It will be a twin-engine, one-man, supersonic aircraft designed primarily for air-to-air combat. It will carry Sparrow missiles, Sidewinder missiles and a cannon.

It will also incorporate a new attack radar (avionics) system to be developed concurrently with the aircraft. The Air Force anticipates that the new radar system will include a "lookdown" capability which permits the plane to spot aircraft rising toward it from the ground. The Air Force also hopes for radar to discriminate between friendly and enemy aircraft. (Identification Friend or Foe).

The F-15 will be smaller than the F-14 and will have a fixed wing. It will have a takeoff weight of about 40,000 pounds, compared to the estimated 52,000 to 54,000-pound weight of the F-14 in its dogfight version. Both the F-14 and the F-15 will use similar engines.

The Air Force anticipates purchasing 737 F-15s. It may also begin developing a new dogfighting missile for the F-15. And it is studying new cannon designs.

HARTKE REQUESTS PENTAGON DOCUMENTS

Sen. Vance Hartke, D-Ind., Sept. 5, announced in a Senate speech that he had asked Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird to supply him and other interested Members with several classified documents spelling out "internal objections" within the Defense Department to the new Navy fighter. Hartke said these documents included:

Development Concept Paper 19, which he described as "a study of the options for improving our air combat strength," which "clarifies the limitations of the F-14 as an air superiority fighter."

A letter from the Office of Systems Analysis to Laird containing new estimates of the cost of the F-14 which put the unit cost of 300 at \$19 million each.

A study entitled "Feasibility Study of Alternative High-Performance/Low-Cost Fighter Designs, FX-X and VFX-X."

The proceedings of the Navy Fighter Pilots Symposium, held for the last three summers at Coronado, Calif. "At these meetings," Hartke said, "dissatisfaction among Navy pilots with the F-14 became such an embarrassment to the top Navy brass that tight restrictions were placed on all public comment with regard to the substance of the discussions that took place."

An internal study, by Systems Analysis, of a compromise alternative to blanket approval of the F-14 program. Hartke said the study recommended scrapping the F-14A and stretching out the remainder of the program for 18 months.

The Major Program Memorandum on tactical air forces for fiscal 1971-75, a paper drafted by Systems Analysis and addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 4. Said Hartke, "This . . . document . . . suggests strict budget guidelines for program expenditures and specifies the mission of tactical airpower in terms of these important capabilities: air-to-air visual combat and close air support, with emphasis on anti-armor. . . . The F-14 is designed for none of

these purposes, but instead to counter a dubious Soviet bomber threat with radar missiles."

LAIRD ON SECRET DEFENSE STUDIES

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird Sept. 2 sent the following letter to Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., in response to a request for two internal Defense Department studies of the C-5A transport.

"DEAR BILL: Thank you for your letter of September 2nd concerning two documents relating to the C-5A prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis. I hope I can clarify any misunderstanding concerning the work of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis and the Assistant Secretary's recommendations to me in connection with the C-5A program.

"The job of the Systems Analysis staff is to make critical appraisals of defense programs. In their review and evaluation they examine both sides of an issue, but especially the critical side, since others will emphasize the positive aspects of an issue. This is an essential function of significant assistance to me. But, critical studies are not the only basis on which decisions are made. They are part of the wide variety of information I need to draw conclusions and make judgments on defense programs. However, if internal, critical studies prepared by the Systems Analysis staff continue to be given public expression and used as the source for attacking DoD programs, their valuable contribution to the defense decision-making process will be significantly reduced. . . .

"With respect to providing unclassified versions of the Major Program Memorandum (MPM) and other internal working papers, these usually lengthy documents are prepared only in classified form for the internal use of the Department of Defense components involved in the decision-making process. The reasons this particular MPM is classified is that it contains defense contingency planning details.

"Sincerely,

"MEL LAIRD."

IMPACT ON INDUSTRY

The developing controversy over the cost and design of tactical combat aircraft has large implications for the aerospace and electronics industries. For example, the potential F-14 and F-15 programs—and associated weaponry—represent possible sales of over \$20 billion in the next 15 years. An alternative "austere" fighter program might be worth only \$5 billion to \$7 billion for the same number of aircraft. The following list shows major contractors associated with the F-14 and F-15 programs.

F-14—Component, contractor, and contracting agency:

Airframe: Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp.; Naval Air Systems Command, Washington, D.C.

F-14A engine: Pratt and Whitney Inc., West Hartford, Conn.

F-14B engine: In competition, Pratt and Whitney Inc., West Hartford, Conn., General Electric Corp., Ivesdale, Ohio (selection March 1970; Competition phase Aeronautical Systems Division, Air Force; Systems Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; Development and production phase to be determined.

Phoenix missile and avionics: Hughes Aircraft Corp., Culver City, Calif.; Naval Air Systems Command, Washington, D.C.

Sidewinder 1-C missile: Raytheon Co., Lowell, Mass.

Sparrow AIM-7F missile: Raytheon Co., Waltham, Mass.

M-61 20mm gun: General Electric Corp., Burlington, Vt.; Army Materiel Command, Washington, D.C.

F-15—Component, contractor, and contracting agency:

Airframe: In competition, Fairchild Hiller Corp., Farmingdale, N.Y.; McDonnell Douglas

Corp., St. Louis, Mo.; North American Rockwell Corp., Los Angeles, Calif. (selection by Jan. 1, 1970); Aeronautical Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.

Engine:¹ In competition: Pratt and Whitney Inc., West Hartford, Conn.; General Electric Corp., Ivendale, Ohio (selection March 1970); Competition phase: Aeronautical Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command; Development and production phase: to be determined.

Avionics: In competition: Hughes Aircraft Corp., Culver City, Calif.; Westinghouse Corp., Baltimore, Md. (selection late 1970); Aeronautical Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command.

M-61 20mm gun: General Electric Corp., Burlington, Vt.; Army Materiel Command, Washington, D.C.

25mm gun: In competition: General Electric Corp., Burlington, Vt.; Philco-Ford Corp., Newport Beach, Calif. (no selection date established); Aeronautical Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command.

Sidewinder I-C missile: Raytheon Co., Lowell, Mass.; Naval Air Systems Command, Washington, D.C.

Sparrow AIM-7F missile: Raytheon Co., Waltham, Mass.

Short-range missile: To be determined by competition; Aeronautical Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command.

COST COMPARISON

The following graph compares the approximate 10-year systems cost (procurement and operation) of 1,400 F-14s/15s with the same number of new F-4s and the same number of the proposed FX-X aircraft.

The graph is intended to illustrate the assertion of the Defense Department's Systems Analysis Office that the new fighter aircraft will cost more than twice as much as a present fighter force of comparable size, and three times as much as a fighter force of FX-X aircraft.

The first figures show the systems cost of the F-14 and F-15 combined, based on present Navy and Air Force estimates of unit fly-away cost. The second figures introduce Systems Analysis estimates of the cost of the Navy fighter, which are somewhat higher than the Navy's figures.

[In billions of dollars]

F-14/15 current estimates:	
Procurement cost	17
Operating cost	17
Total	34
F-14/15 alternate prices:	
Procurement cost	20
Operating cost	20
Total	40
F-4:	
Procurement cost	6
Operating cost	8
Total	14
FX-X:	
Procurement cost	6
Operating cost	6
Total	12

NOTE: These figures are approximate due to interpretation from a bar graph.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIRNIE).

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the

¹ F-14B engine to be used in both F-14 and F-15 and funded jointly by Navy and Air Force.

gentleman yield for a point of clarification?

Mr. PIRNIE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, it might be of interest to the Members of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union that the C-5A 3 took off from Edwards Air Force Base today in an overweighted test flight with more thrust than expected, a 27-percent overload of maximum SOR capability, and gained 18,500 feet in less than the maximum rate of climb.

This report has just come over the press wires, and is a new world's record:

CARGO PLANE

MARIETTA, GA.—Lockheed's huge new cargo plane, the C-5 Galaxy, set an unofficial world record today when it roared into the skies weighing 790,100 pounds.

This was 21,000 pounds heavier than it is expected to fly even under wartime conditions and 28,100 pounds heavier than the old mark it established last June 16.

The record was set by C-5 "No. 3" during a test at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., the company said. The pilot reported the plane lifted off flawlessly and climbed to an altitude of 18,800 feet, burning a total of 21,000 pounds of fuel during its climb.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIRNIE. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina, chairman of our committee.

Mr. RIVERS. As I said before, this is the largest plane in the world and thank God we own it. Who is better to test their own planes than Lockheed? If it does not work we will not take it, and it will not be the first mistake we have made. But how are you going to find out until you have the guts to try to build the plane and test it. This is the largest plane in the world and this plane will work.

When we get the facts, you will get the facts. I am not giving you half truths and half facts. Nor am I rushing in to indict people—I have had that much law and that much experience in the legal profession.

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to take a part of my time to discuss anything that is not directly in this bill. But some of those who have preceded me in the well who complained about time or the lack of it have chosen to deal with other subjects, some of which I believe requires a response—at least I wish to make a response.

I have had the privilege to serve on the Committee on Armed Services during a trying period in our history. I have been proud of the fact that on that committee there seemed to be a general recognition that in the defense of this Nation there was no center aisle. Therefore, we have operated the committee on a bipartisan basis.

The staff of the committee has been available to every Member. I am surprised to hear anyone saying on this floor that this capable staff has been unresponsive. It may be that their requests had not been properly and timely made. I hope we will all remember that every Member of this House shares with the committee an obligation and that there is no center aisle dividing us in our duty

to protect this Nation not only now but for the foreseeable future.

Now we have had a great deal of advice as to how we could spend money elsewhere. We have had expert witnesses on the subject in droves before our committee. But when we asked, "Supposing you were in our place and it was your duty to decide what is in the best interest of the security of this Nation?" some of them have thrown their hands up and said, "Thank God I do not have to decide that."

But we do have to decide, and that is what we are here for today.

Although I fully support H.R. 14000, time permits me to discuss only one phase of this program—the inclusion in the military procurement bill of \$100.2 million for the engineering development of the proposed Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft—AMSA. Since 1964 the Congress and the Air Force have attempted to get on with this vital weapons system. Over \$140 million has been devoted to preliminary design and advanced development in propulsion and avionics for this aircraft, and this year the Department of Defense has asked for funds necessary to begin engineering development of AMSA in fiscal year 1970. There is every reason why they should be granted.

At the outset, I want to emphasize that the approval of these funds in this legislation does not authorize procurement of AMSA but merely allows the Air Force to get into a technical posture where it will be able to proceed with procurement should the Congress, at a later date, so authorize. These funds will allow the Air Force and the Congress to keep open in terms of potential deployment the option to go ahead with this system should the circumstances demand.

The purpose of AMSA is manifold. Let me dwell on some of the more important ones. AMSA is designed to replace an aging B-52 fleet in a way which reflects the technology of the seventies rather than that of the fifties. By the time that AMSA could be operational—1977—our youngest B-52 bombers will be about 15 years old, plagued by 15 years of hard wear and tear and more importantly, technology which at the minimum will be 25 years old. In light of the advances made in technology since the last B-52 came off the production line in 1963, by 1977 the B-52 bomber will be approaching the relic stage.

However, by building AMSA we will not merely be replacing an old aircraft with a new one which has the same basic equipment. We will be increasing the payload of the bomber significantly, we will have a weapon which has far greater penetration capability than the B-52, one which will have a far greater versatility to fly at high and low altitudes than the B-52. It will be faster, smaller, better able to get through enemy defenses than the B-52. This is what AMSA is, but the important question to be answered is why it is needed.

There are those who argue that we should put all our eggs in one basket—the missile basket. They point out that according to our intelligence the Russians are stressing missile capability

rather than manned bombers and that there is little reason in view of vast air defense technology and MIRV's to spend the large amount of money which will be necessary to build AMSA or any bomber. This position assumes that all we need is ICBM's and SLBM's in order to assure an effective deterrent.

However, I would remind the critics that the mixed force concept is not predicated on what a potential enemy may now have but what it may be able to develop between now and the post 1975 period. This time frame is important because that is how long it will take us to get any bomber operational. The most logical argument in favor of AMSA is that it provides us with an effective deterrent capability should our ICBM's be neutralized by MIRV's and in the unlikely event that the Soviets make a breakthrough in antisubmarine warfare which could neutralize the capability of our Polaris submarines. This, of course, assumes the worst but when considering our national defense we cannot afford to look at the possibilities through rose-colored glasses. In dealing with the large uncertainties involved in predicting threats 8 to 10 years in the future, we must keep our options open and remain in a position to move on the AMSA should events continue to verify its need.

In addition to keeping our deterrent credible, there are other reasons why AMSA makes sense. It will provide us with the flexibility to make a response and can be used for missions, such as the B-52 is presently carrying out in Vietnam. Furthermore, you can call back a bomber but not a missile. It can be used in a "show of force" deployment for diplomatic purposes such as was in the case during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

There are of course other arguments in favor of AMSA, but in my view, the most important of all is the fact that you can fly a bomber, you can test and retest a bomber, you can move a bomber as circumstances demand it. We cannot say these things about missiles. The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator STENNIS, put it very well when he said:

No one knows to what extent our ICBM's will operate. We believe they will fly effectively or that a great percentage of them will do so, but it is an unknown quantity.

The same is true of SLBM's. On the other hand, the bomber is a weapon which is a known quantity, and it assures that we have at least one system in our arsenal upon which we can rely in the event others fail or are neutralized.

Those who say we do not need a manned bomber for the post 1975 period continue to claim that our B-52's will do the job. This is not realistic and ignores the technology of today and the anticipated advances of tomorrow. Let us never forget that the Soviets have had many years to improve their methods of defending against the B-52. One area where they have placed great emphasis is in attempting to destroy our bombers prior to launch. Russian FOB's and sea launched ballistic missiles have reduced time and our reaction has been to disperse our B-52 force. One of the prime objectives of AMSA is to provide im-

proved chances of pre-launch survivability through wide dispersal to austere landing bases and quick launch capability. The design of this plane then will make it much less vulnerable to Soviet efforts to destroy our manned bombers prior to launch.

Another question which must be resolved is whether our existing bomber fleet of B-52's can be modernized and restructured to handle the missions anticipated by the Air Force during the post 1975 period. The answer is found in the relative costs and the anticipated performance of AMSA versus the performance of modernized B-52's. First, it will be very costly just to maintain the existing B-52 force as it gets older, not to mention the alterations some have suggested. Clearly at a certain time it becomes more economical to buy new hardware rather than to continue repairing old hardware. If, for example, we restructure the B-52 to incorporate the newest penetrating devices such as missiles and decoys, we will be doing so at the expense of its payload capacity. In contrast, the AMSA will have these new devices including a reduced infrared signature and radar cross section, plus a much larger payload capacity than our existing B-52's presently have without modification. Thus, to take that path would be, in my judgment, a waste of resources and would leave much to be desired in terms of bomber force effectiveness.

I find it interesting that those who feel there is no justification for a new bomber do not attempt to strike all the funds requested for AMSA. Rather, they are hedging their predictions with \$77 million which will allow the Air Force to do part of the work on this program. Although the proponents of reduction of funds may claim that their proposal will not eliminate AMSA, let us face the facts—this merely is step one in a concerted effort to kill this bomber. No one doubts for a moment that if this amendment is adopted, in the future the same persons will come forth with the same arguments and another effort to cut. If they are convinced there is no need for this bomber in the future, why do they employ such deceptive tactics?

Mr. Chairman, the decision we make today on this bomber is not a final one in any sense of the word. As I said earlier, approving the \$100.2 million in this legislation merely allows us to keep open our option to go ahead with this bomber should circumstances demand it. However, it allows us to do so within the time frame which the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States feel is mandatory. The efforts to cut this bill do more than make \$23 million available for other uses, they alter the entire strategic balance of deterrents upon which we will have to depend in the post 1975 period and they weaken seriously the credibility of our determination to be able to respond effectively and completely to any possible first strike threat.

Let us never lose sight of the fact that our ability to avoid nuclear war is predicated on the credibility of our defense

structure. Should we find it necessary to incorporate AMSA into that structure, we must be able to do it on a realistic timetable. Since the proposed reduction of funds will alter that timetable, it should be opposed.

Mr. ARENDS, Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WHALEN).

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, the five so-called dissident members of the Armed Services Committee had planned to undertake a coordinated effort this afternoon. I think it is quite obvious that this coordination suffered a very serious breakdown with the unsolicited compliment given to my colleague, the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD) and me. I do not think I would say to the gentleman from California that this breakdown can be attributed to the members of the staff.

Mr. Chairman, about 6 months ago four of my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee—the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEZZI), the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT), the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE), and the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD), and I—formed an informal discussion group to study in depth our basic defense posture. We had in mind particularly a review of the concepts from which our authorization requests emanate.

We met on a regular basis. We met with many resource individuals, both in and out of Government. During the course of these meetings, we came to a number of conclusions regarding various defense issues and questions. In applying these conclusions to the defense authorization request submitted by Secretary Laird, we decided that his budget required substantial modification. Therefore, we decided to outline a number of amendments which we intended to introduce during the committee mark-up session.

On August 11 of this year we indicated to our distinguished chairman our reservations about the bill that was then being considered in the Senate and the amendments we intended to introduce.

Last week, when we received a copy of the House version of the defense procurement bill, we were very pleased to note a number of our reservations had been overcome. Thus we specifically endorse five provisions of H.R. 14000.

First, we are very pleased with the reduction in the overall troop strength to 3,285,000 personnel. This is approximately 185,000 less than the troop strength as of June 30, 1969.

Second, we are very pleased also with the reduction of \$142 million for the TOW missile.

Third, we endorse the \$110 million reduction in various tracked vehicles.

These latter two cuts were initiated by our colleague from New York (Mr. STRATTON).

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WHALEN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. STRATTON. I appreciate the gentleman's comments and his support. I hope, at the appropriate time, to list

some of the facts on these reductions in more detail.

Mr. WHALEN. I would say to the gentleman from New York, I hope that my compliment will not have the same adverse effect on his side of the aisle as an earlier compliment did on my side of the aisle.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WHALEN. I am delighted to yield to the chairman of the committee.

Mr. RIVERS. The gentleman does not mind the committee making a decision in his favor, does he? He does not have any objection to that?

Mr. WHALEN. No.

Mr. RIVERS. We arrived at these conclusions that the five distinguished gentlemen approved of. The gentleman does not mind if we, somewhere down the line, participate in a decision they thought of first, does he?

Mr. WHALEN. We are not suggesting this, Mr. Chairman. We are just expressing our delight over the fact that we do agree at least in these five areas I am outlining, although there are some disagreements in other areas.

Mr. RIVERS. Before the gentleman came to Congress we had been known to make reductions in bills. We may have stumbled along before he got here, but if he will stay with us, he is helping us along.

Mr. WHALEN. I am expressing my delight.

I just want to indicate to the chairman and to the Members of the Committee of the Whole we do not find the bill completely objectionable.

Let me state the fourth area, the ten percent reduction in research and development, with which we heartily endorse.

Fifth, we also applaud the efforts of the committee to retain certain amendments that were inserted in the bill in the Senate.

Despite this fact, Mr. Chairman, we do have some very serious reservations about the bill which was presented to the committee and which was ultimately approved by the committee.

I believe these objections can be categorized in four areas.

First, we feel that the bill, if it is funded at the figure that is contained in this authorization, is inflationary. It is \$1.8 billion some higher than the appropriation for the same purposes last year. It is \$1,436 million higher than the figure approved by the Senate.

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WHALEN. I am delighted to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. PIRNIE. Would not the gentleman in the well like to make it clear to the House that the increase is due to the opinion of the committee that some reestablishment of our Navy was necessary for our national defense, and that that was not a subject which was taken up by the other body.

Mr. WHALEN. I will touch on this. It is quite evident, of course, that the increase was due to the opinion of the committee. Obviously, if it had not been, we would not have come out with that figure.

Mr. PIRNIE. It was just on that one area.

Mr. WHALEN. Let me finish my formal comments.

We say, second, that we have serious reservations because, if this bill is funded at the level approved by the Armed Services Committee, it will certainly take away funds from needed domestic programs.

Third, this authorization contains many dollars which were not requested by the DOD. I refer specifically to the \$960 million in the bill for naval ship procurement.

Fourth, and finally, we feel that this bill contains a number of authorizations for programs which are not needed. We believe in the instance of these programs that their case has not been proved by the Department of Defense. Therefore, we feel that they can be either deleted or deferred without in any way detracting from our military posture.

To correct these deficiencies, therefore, the aforementioned five members of the Committee on Armed Services introduced a series of nine amendments during the committee markup session. These amendments were defeated. We intend to reintroduce these amendments tomorrow during the consideration of H.R. 14000.

They fall into two different categories. There are seven amendments which, if adopted, will reduce total authorizations by \$2.075 billion. There are two other amendments which contain restrictive language similar to that adopted in the Senate version of the bill.

You have all received a letter from the five aforementioned members of the committee outlining these items. They are also contained in the committee report beginning on page 147. However, for your information here and so that we can perhaps develop the scenario that will unfold tomorrow, let me briefly recite the amendments and review them for you. As I say, they will be introduced by the five aforementioned Members and will be supported by them.

Four of these are in the section dealing with aircraft. The first is a \$86 million reduction in the Cobra helicopter. This will be introduced by Congressman NEDZI. The rationale underlying this reduction is the fact that these will be scheduled for shipment to Vietnam in 1971 and 1972. In all probability there will be no American troops there to utilize them then. We have already provided our allies in South Vietnam with other aircraft which will do an equally good, or better, job.

Second, there will be an amendment proposed by Congressman PIKE calling for a reduction of \$481 million in procurement of the C-5A, specifically 23 aircraft. The principal reason underlying this particular amendment is the fact that there have been production delays. Therefore even deferring this for 1 year will not in any way impair the security of our Nation.

The third will be a series of amendments that will be introduced by Congressman LEGGETT totalling \$77.4 million dealing with SHRAM.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman three additional minutes.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, as you know, this is the short-range attack missile. I am not going to impose on your time at this point, since my time is limited, to go into the rationale of this, because you can find it in the letter which my colleagues and I sent you as well as in the committee report beginning on page 147.

Fourth, Mr. LEGGETT will present an amendment deleting \$38 million from the freedom fighter program. The Department of Defense does not have any provision for this aircraft in its fiscal year 1970 budget request. The committee included funds for this program on the basis of a limited conversation with the Deputy Secretary of Defense to which the Armed Services Committee members were not privy. On this basis, the additional \$38 million does not justify urgency and seems ill-advised.

The fifth amendment will be in the missiles section of H.R. 14000. This will be an amendment calling for a reduction of \$345.5 million for deployment of the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system. This will be introduced by Mr. LEGGETT, of California.

Going on to the next section of the bill—ship procurement—there will be an amendment introduced by Congressman PIKE, of New York, proposing a reduction of \$1.025 billion in naval ship procurement. As I stated previously, this amendment will delete the \$960 million contained in this bill and not requested by the Department of Defense.

Finally, in the research and development area there will be an amendment proposed to reduce by \$23 million the research funds for AMSA. This would reduce total AMSA research from \$100 million to \$77 million. That is the figure originally requested by the former Secretary of Defense.

The two restrictive amendments to which I refer, one a limitation on the procurement, the transportation, the deployment, and the storage of chemical and biological warfare agents, is very similar to the amendment adopted during the Senate floor debate. The second is the so-called Schweiker amendment which attempts to get at the problems we have been seeing with respect to large overruns and program delays.

This was adopted during Senate floor debate and calls for quarterly reports by the Secretary of Defense and an annual audit by the GAO.

Let me just close with two observations:

First of all, I think we should point out that the five members of the House Armed Services Committee who filed our additional views are not in any way conducting a vendetta against the military. For the security of our country we need a strong and sound military establishment. Personally, I feel this is an honorable profession, one of the highest callings, defending one's country.

Second, in making this study and in arriving at our conclusions and the resulting amendments, we in no way seek to reduce the security of our country.

Let me relate this to an analogy that was brought up earlier in this discussion by the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. JONAS) with respect to insurance on his home. I think we all have insurance

policies on our home. I know I do on mine in Dayton, Ohio. But let me point out that it also is true that all of us are not completely covered. Not all contingencies are covered by our household policies. By the same token, we cannot provide funds for every conceivable military contingency.

Mr. Chairman, let me say in conclusion that there will be these nine amendments introduced tomorrow. There will be additional amendments proposed by other Members. I certainly do not want to imply by not discussing them that the five members of the committee are opposed to these. We will make our own individual decisions. All of these amendments which we will consider tomorrow are important amendments. They are important to the future of our country. I am very glad to know that we will be given ample time during which to discuss these amendments. We certainly hope that there will be a full attendance on the part of the Members of the House on the floor during the period of that discussion and that in considering them, you will keep an open mind.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to a former distinguished member of our committee, but one who has now departed it for an assignment on the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, the debate over the necessity of ballistic missile defense has engaged our attention for a number of years. I became involved with this program as far back as 1966 when we were debating the merits of a heavy system, a light system and the Sentinel program oriented toward city defenses. The key word now is "Safeguard." The names may have changed but the melody lingers on and the same sour notes continue to be struck.

We must however look to the history of this program, for past projections and requests by the DOD now look very much out of tune with present realities.

In 1967 testimony before the Armed Services Committee, the Nike X version of a ballistic missile defense was discussed at length. The Nike X was a precursor of the Sentinel which has lately been modified and renamed the Safeguard ABM system. Then Secretary of Defense McNamara presented a combination missile and fallout shelter program estimated at \$22 billion, \$8 billion of which would be allocated for shelters. Secretary McNamara, under questioning, then estimated a possible 6 to 8 billion yearly expenditures in the early 70's to maintain this system.

McNamara, however, did not at that time recommend deployment, recognizing that the quality and quantity of the threat had not been sufficiently determined. I quote from Secretary McNamara:

I believe we should continue or development program . . . this will allow us to develop a system that would have the maximum capability against the Soviet threat . . . It isn't necessary to make that decision to deploy the system today, because the time they require to deploy their offensive system is greater than the time we require to deploy our defensive system.

Fortunately, the advice was correct as the old Sentinel system of area defense has been judged premature. General Wheeler disagreed in 1967 however and urged immediate deployment of an anti-Soviet area defense ABM coupled with an extensive "education" program by the Executive and Congress to sell a multi-billion dollar bomb shelter system to the American public.

The shelter question had been debated in the early 1960's and discarded as unworkable—leading to the decision not to deploy the Nike-Zeus system—the earliest ballistic missile defense program.

But in 1967, General Wheeler was "absolutely convinced of the necessity for concurrent development of missiles and shelters." As in other instances this too was a premature request as DOD's shelter research is now running at a mere \$12 million per year and not tied to ABM like "ham to eggs" as General Wheeler espoused in 1967.

The period following the Nike-Zeus, Nike X era brought on the variation of the Sentinel theme, the heavy 50-city and the light 25-city defense. Both are area defense systems and both are tied to the supposition that we must protect against a massive Soviet strike against population centers, or a light Chinese strike against these same cities. In 1968 this was the last word in ballistic missile defense.

The Joint Chiefs testified to its innocently defensive nature and the proponents in both Houses reiterated the theme that this Sentinel program was only for defense purposes and could only be viewed as defensive by the Soviets. As we remember the ABM appropriation passed last year with 35 dissenting votes in the Senate and 43 in the House.

In the interim, the Safeguard emerged. Concurrent with the administration decision to request the Safeguard site defense system, we were informed that Sentinel could indeed be considered an escalatory and offensive program. Here I quote from Secretary Laird on March 20, 1969:

The modified ABM system has been designed so that its defensive intent is unmistakable. It is not an escalation of the arms race. The original Sentinel Plan could have been interpreted as a first step toward the construction of a heavy system toward the defense of our cities. Indeed, it could have been used for that purpose.

My point is, where are we now. If Sentinel was escalatory, as the administration infers, why is Safeguard not escalatory? The present site defense can be extended to area defense in the same manner as the Sentinel.

The last two administrations changed the thrust of ballistic missile defense three times, and on each occasion claimed the latest version to be the ultimate answer to the supposed threat.

What is to say that the Safeguard system will be the final answer. First we became concerned with Soviet intervention and planned a city defense against a large and sophisticated Russian strike.

Now we are told that our major concern is a small Chinese effort. Are we to believe that it is good sense to enter a program which could escalate the arms

race at the most inappropriate time in order to derive an unknown quantity of protection against the old bugaboo which haunted us since the end of World War II.

I cannot view the ABM program seriously when the Defense Department keeps throwing the Chinese strawman in our face. There is absolutely no evidence that the Chinese, were they to attack, would waste a limited supply of missiles on our offensive capability.

Of course, there is another alleged reason for buying the Safeguard argument. This is the claim by Secretary Laird that the Soviet buildup of SS9 missiles was a clear indication of their intention to attain a first strike capability. Secretary Laird's arguments are not necessarily sound for reasons I shall get to in the course of my remarks.

There are five main points used by the proponents of the Safeguard ABM as reasons for initiating deployment now. I shall take up and rebut each of these points.

First, assuming that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. enter SALT—Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—the existence of an ABM system in the deployment stage will give the United States enhanced bargaining power.

This is a fallacious argument for a number of reasons. First, we expect the SALT talks to begin soon—at least within the year. The Safeguard will not be deployed for quite a few years—in any case, not before SALT begins. The existence of a full scale R. & D. program, which is agreed to by all sides of the ABM question is certainly as sufficient a bargaining ploy as is a program not ready for deployment.

Also, all evidence indicates that the Soviets have had considerable trouble in development of their own Galosh system. All evidence indicates that the deployment has slowed almost to a standstill, and the program is back in the R. & D. stage. Therefore, the Soviets are not likely to take our deployment seriously as a poker chip when they are fully aware of the difficulties inherent in the development of such a system. The SALT talks must necessarily be approached seriously and honestly. It is foolish to enter such talks with a stacked deck by rushing ahead with deployment on order to have a bargaining ploy. Not only will the Soviets not take such deployment seriously, but will also, and with just reason, accuse us of unfair tactics and lack of good faith.

Second, the ABM as now envisioned is a phased deployment system which will start on a small level—two sites—and can be contracted or expanded under congressional direction each year as the situation warrants.

This argument can be turned back on itself. Why deploy a system still in the development stage? The R. & D. funds for Kwajalein are certainly sufficient to prove the adequacy of the PAR and MSR. The Spartan and Sprint are already developed. This is a premature deployment which, even if there is sufficient reason for a workable ABM system, should not be started at this time. While the pro-Safeguard forces argue that long

leadtimes are necessary, there is no firm indication that once tested, we could not get a production run in short order. Past experience has indicated that a large number of complicated systems which have gone into production phase have had to be recalled and modified. This is a \$6 to \$10 billion program. Overruns could be far beyond what we have already experienced in other systems. Why should we not exercise our congressional scrutiny at this time and demand that we be presented with a workable system before we enter deployment. It is against precedent to embark upon procurement of the finished product before R. & D. is finished. The sound move is to continue R. & D. as now programed and at least wait until the test model has proved itself.

Third, a great number of distinguished scientists, Hans Bethe, Herbert York, George Rathjens, among many others, have pointed out grave faults in the system. The proponents of the ABM program argue that these scientists are wrong and point to the detractors who said the H-bomb would never work as an example of the nay sayer who talks through his hat.

In the first place, few of us are capable of making technical judgments. We can only rely on the best advice of the technical community. In the case of the ABM, the preponderance of scientific advice outside the Pentagon has been negative. On the numbers alone the indications are that the system is at best premature if not unworkable. The benefit of the doubt should be given to larger numbers. On the basis of the technical testimony I have seen thus far, we should first attack the problems of penetration and radar blackout before we get into production. All indications are that this phenomenon—blackout—will totally negate the system as now designed.

Fourth, the Soviet Union is stepping up its offensive missile development. Increased production of SS-9 indicates, among other things, that the U.S.S.R. is going after a first strike capability, therefore necessitating the ABM.

There are serious doubts about Secretary Laird's reading of the Soviet intentions. The Secretary stated that the SS-9 development indicates first strike intentions and that we must react. Intelligence indicators can be read both ways however. While the exact numbers are classified, the fluctuation in Soviet deployment closely follows the U.S. development of the ABM.

In other words, SS-9 deployment can be read as a reaction to the American deployment of the ABM and not as an independent program to develop a first strike. The Soviet reaction is exactly what the U.S. defense planners would do in the same situation, that is, attempt to overtarget and overwhelm our proposed ABM defense.

Indications are that the intelligence community disagrees on the interpretation of this raw data. There is no reason to accept the DOD interpretation as binding especially in view of the consequences of this interpretation. A logical view of this data, as stated above, is that the increase in SS-9 production is a reaction to our ABM development. A counter-

reaction on our part would certainly be escalatory.

Fifth, it is argued that the least escalatory program is the ABM. It is defensive in nature and not a threat as would be stepped up deployment of the ICBM, submersible missiles, or other offensive devices. I feel that it is not correct to use the term offensive and defensive in the context of missile hardware development. Any missile system can be offensive or defensive, depending on the intentions of the developer. It is just as sensible to argue that the ABM is offensive. For instance, if the United States were going for an offensive first strike position, it would certainly attempt to strengthen this position by deploying an ABM to counter any Soviet missiles which withstood the first strike. Since all public statements indicate that the ABM Safeguard is designed to provide defense only against a moderate number of enemy missiles—disregarding the site defense argument—it can be logically argued that the ABM is clearly offensive in that it is developed to pick off stray retaliatory missiles surviving our first strike.

Following similar logic, it can be argued that larger deployment of the ICBM force is defensive in nature in that we already have a multimegatonnage overkill and, therefore, more ICBM's are merely a reinforcement of our assured destruction capacity. In the field of nuclear strategy there is no such thing as a totally offensive or defensive missile.

Second, the ICBM, the Polaris, and so forth, are known quantities. Both sides have learned to deal with them and, in political terms, live with them. The ABM is a new equation and the consequences are unknown. At a time when deescalation of the nuclear arms race is approaching feasibility, it is not sensible to introduce a technically unproved and underdeveloped weapon. Both parties to the conflict have learned to live with the present nuclear structure. Both sides have tentatively developed their positions and philosophies relative to arms limitation along the lines of the present technology. The argument that the ABM would in some ways aid the arms limitations will not stand. ABM is an untried equation which could have serious consequences unknown at the present time.

Finally, there is one argument that must be covered if we are fully to understand the results of our actions. Even if deployed as foreseen, the Safeguard, or any other system for that matter, would remain a "low confidence" system. Under the present agreements regarding nuclear testing, it will be impossible to test the ABM warheads. Without atmospheric testing of the ABM warhead we will not be able to determine the answers to the blackout and related problems. Therefore, ABM will at best be a backstop. In the event of attack I cannot foresee reliance on the ABM and all indications are that retaliatory offensive missiles will be used in any case.

What we gain from the ABM, therefore, is the possibility of some damage limitation at the missile bases. These missile bases will in all probability consist of empty holes in any case, as the retaliatory force must be affected in such a low confidence situation. If the strategy

of waiting for a hit before a retaliatory launch is considered is still followed, the gains of an ABM system are still not commensurate with the cost—both political and economic—of such a system in that we still have the submersible missiles, the IRBM's, the bomber fleet and the surviving ICBM's.

As a matter of economics it is far more sensible to build up the ICBM force. This will not upset the balance of power, nor should it be viewed as offensive in that, as stated above, the present ICBM situation is a known quantity to the Russians, and the question of whether a strategic ploy is offensive or defensive is as much a question of the reading of the enemy intentions and past direction as it is the hardware itself.

Mr. Chairman, there is clearly something asked in our priorities and our strategy vis-a-vis the Communist world. As I have stated above, we are embarking on a disastrous course which would escalate the arms race in a dimension we cannot foresee at this time.

Arms limitation talks may soon begin. Our cities are destitute and the air we breathe has its own unhealthy fallout. This is a time for retrenchment from arms expenditures and a firm commitment to satisfying domestic needs.

I therefore, implore my colleagues to support the amendment which will be offered tomorrow to limit the funds for ABM procurement.

As a final matter I wish to recommend to my colleagues this article by Herbert York entitled "Military Technology and National Security." Dr. York is but one of the many outstanding scientists who have opposed the ABM program, and backed up their opposition with the most cogent of arguments.

The article follows:

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

(NOTE.—The ABM debate is analyzed in the context of a larger dilemma: the futility of searching for technological solutions to what is essentially a political problem.)

The recent public hearings in the Senate and the House of Representatives on anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) systems have provided an unprecedented opportunity to expose to the people of this country and the world the inner workings of one of the dominant features of our time: the strategic arms race. Testimony has been given by a wide range of witnesses concerning the development and deployment of all kinds of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons; particular attention has been paid to the interaction between decisions in these matters and the dynamics of the arms race as a whole.

In my view the ABM issue is only a detail in a much larger problem: the feasibility of purely technological approach to national security. What makes the ABM debate so important is that for the first time it has been possible to discuss a major aspect of this large problem entirely in public. The reason for this is that nearly all the relevant facts about the proposed ABM systems either are already declassified or can easily be deduced from logical concepts that have never been classified. Thus it has been possible to consider in a particular case such questions as the following:

1. To what extent is the increasing complexity of modern weapons systems and the need for instant response causing strategic decision-making authority to pass from high political levels to low military-

command levels, and from human beings to machines?

2. To what extent is the factor of secrecy combined with complexity leading to a steadily increasing dominance of military-oriented technicians in some vital areas of decision-making?

3. To what extent do increasing numbers of weapons and increasing complexity—in and of themselves—complicate and accelerate the arms race?

My own conclusion is that the ABM issue constitutes a particularly clear example of the futility of searching for technical solutions to what is essentially a political problem, namely the problem of national security. In support of this conclusion I propose in this article to review the recent history of the strategic arms race, to evaluate what the recent hearings and other public discussions have revealed about its present status and future prospects, and then to suggest what might be done now to deal with the problem of national security in a more rational manner.

The strategic arms race in its present form is a comparatively recent phenomenon. It began in the early 1950's, when it became evident that the state of the art in nuclear weaponry, rocket propulsion and missile guidance and control had reached the point in the U.S. where a strategically useful intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) could be built. At about the same time the fact that a major long-range-missile development program was in progress in the U.S.S.R. was confirmed. As a result of the confluence of these two events the tremendous U.S. long-range-missile program, which dominated the technological scene for more than a decade, was undertaken. The Air Force's Thor, Atlas and Titan programs and the Army's Jupiter program were started almost simultaneously; the Navy's Polaris program and the Air Force's Minuteman program were phased in just a few years later.

More or less at the same time the Army, which had had the responsibility for ground-based air defense (including the Nike Ajax and Nike Hercules surface-to-air missiles, or SAM's), began to study the problem of how to intercept ICBM's, and soon afterward initiated the Nike Zeus program. This program was a straightforward attempt to use existing technology in the design of a nuclear-armed rocket for the purpose of intercepting an uncomplicated incoming warhead. The Air Force proposed more exotic solutions to the missile-defense problem, but these were subsequently absorbed into the Defender Program of the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The Defender Program included the study of designs more advanced than Nike Zeus, and it also incorporated a program of down-range measurements designed to find out what did in fact go on during the terminal phases of missile flight.

By 1960 indications that the Russians were taking the ABM prospect seriously, in addition to progress in our own Nike Zeus program, stimulated our offensive-missile designers into seriously studying the problem of how to penetrate missile defenses. Very quickly a host of "penetration aid" concepts came to light; light and heavy decoys, including balloons, tank fragments and objects resembling children's jacks; electronic countermeasures, including radar-reflecting clouds of the small wires called chaff; radar blackout by means of high-altitude nuclear explosions; tactics such as barrage, local exhaustion and "rollback" of the defense, and, most important insofar as the then unforeseen consequences were concerned, the notion of putting more than one warhead on one launch vehicle. At first this notion simply involved a "shotgun" technique, good only against large-area targets (cities), but it soon developed into what we now call MIRV's (multiple independently targeted reentry

vehicles), which can in principle (and soon in practice) be used against smaller, harder targets such as missile silos, radars and command centers.

This avalanche of concepts forced the ABM designers to go back to the drawing board, and as a result the Nike-X concept was born in 1962. The Nike-X designers attempted to make use of more sophisticated and up-to-date technology in the design of a system that they hoped might be able to cope with a large, sophisticated attack. All through the mid-1960's a vigorous battle of defensive concepts and designs versus offensive concepts and designs took place. This battle was waged partly on the Pacific Missile Range but mostly on paper and in committee meetings. It took place generally in secret, although parts of it have been discussed in earlier articles in this magazine [see "National Security and the Nuclear-Test Ban," by Jerome B. Wiesner and Herbert F. York, October, 1964; "Anti-Ballistic-Missile Systems," by Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe, March, 1968; "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," by George W. Rathjens, April, 1969].

This intellectual battle culminated in a meeting that took place in the White House in January, 1967. In addition to President Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff there were present all past and current Special Assistants to the President for Science and Technology (James R. Killian, Jr., George B. Kistiakowsky, Jerome B. Wiesner and Donald F. Hornig) and all past and current Directors of Defense Research and Engineering (Harold Brown, John S. Foster, Jr., and myself). We were asked that simple kind of question which must be answered after all the complicated ifs, ands and buts have been discussed: "Will it work?" The answer was no, and there was no dissent from that answer. The context, of course, was the Russian threat as it was then interpreted and forecast, and the current and projected state of our own ABM technology.

Later that year Secretary McNamara gave his famous San Francisco speech in which he reiterated his belief that we could not build an ABM system capable of protecting us from destruction in the event of a Russian attack. For the first time, however, he stated that he did believe we could build an ABM system able to cope with a hypothetical Chinese missile attack, which by definition would be "light" and uncomplicated. In recommending that we go ahead with a program to build what came to be known as the Sentinel system, he said that "there are marginal grounds for concluding that a light deployment of U.S. ABM's against this possibility is prudent." A few sentences later, however, he warned: "The danger in deploying this relatively light and reliable Chinese-oriented ABM system is going to be that pressures will develop to expand it into a heavy Soviet-oriented ABM system." The record makes it clear that he was quite right in this prediction.

Meanwhile the U.S.S.R. was going ahead with its own ABM program. The Russian program proceeded by fits and starts, and our understanding of it was, as might be supposed in such a situation, even more erratic. It is now generally agreed that the only ABM system the Russians have deployed is an area defense around Moscow much like our old Nike Zeus system. It appears to have virtually no capability against our offense, and it has been, as we shall see below, extremely counterproductive insofar as its goal of defending Moscow is concerned.

Development and deployment of offensive-weapons systems on both sides progressed rapidly during the 1960's, but rather than discuss these historically I shall go directly to the picture that the Administration has given of the present status and future projection of such forces.

Data recently presented by the Department of Defense show that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are about even in numbers of intercontinental missiles, and that the U.S. is ahead in both long-range aircraft and submarines of the Polaris type. The small Russian missiles are mostly what we call SS-11's, which were described in the hearings as being roughly the equivalent of our Minutemen. The large Russian missile is what we call the SS-9. Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard characterized its capability as one 20-megaton warhead or three five-megaton warheads. Our own missiles are almost entirely the smaller Minutemen. There currently remain only 54 of the larger Titans in our strategic forces. Not covered in the table are "extras" such as the U.S.S.R.'s FOBS (fractional orbital bombardment system) and IRBM's (intermediate-range ballistic missiles), nor the U.S.'s bombardment aircraft deployed on carriers and overseas bases in Europe and elsewhere. There are, of course, many important details that do not come out clearly in such a simple tabular presentation; these include payload capacity, warhead yield, number of warheads per missile and, often the most important, warhead accuracy.

In the area of defensive systems designed to cope with the offensive systems outlined above, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have defenses against bombers that would probably be adequate against a prolonged attack using chemical explosives (where 10 percent attrition is enough) and almost certainly inadequate against a nuclear attack (where 10 percent penetration is enough). In addition the U.S.S.R. has its ineffective ABM deployment around Moscow, usually estimated as consisting of fewer than 100 anti-missile missiles.

What all these complicated details add up to can be expressed in a single word: parity. This is clearly not numerical equality in the number of warheads or in the number of megatons or in the total "throw weight"; in fact, given different design approaches on the two sides, simultaneous equality in these three figures is entirely impossible. It is, rather, parity with respect to strategic objectives; that is, in each case these forces are easily sufficient for deterrence and entirely insufficient for a successful preemptive strike. In the jargon of strategic studies either side would retain, after a massive "first strike" by the other, a sufficiently large "assured destruction capability" against the other in order to deter such a first strike from being made.

There is much argument about exactly what it takes in the way of "assured destruction capability" in order to deter, but even the most conservative strategic planners conclude that the threat of only a few hundred warheads exploding over population and industrial centers would be sufficient for the purpose. The large growing disparity between the number of warheads needed for the purpose and the number actually possessed by each side is what leads to the concept of "overkill." If present trends continue, in the future all or most missiles will be MIRVed, and so this overkill will be increased by perhaps another order of magnitude.

Here let me note that it is sometimes argued that there is a disparity in the present situation because Russian missile warheads are said to be bigger than U.S. warheads, both in weight and megatonnage; similarly, it is argued that MIRVing does not increase overkill because total yield is reduced in going from single to multiple warheads. This argument is based on the false notion that the individual MIRV warheads of the future will be "small" when measured against the purpose assigned to them. Against large, "soft" targets such as cities bombs very much smaller than those that could be used as components of MIRV's are (and in the case of Hiroshima were proved to be) entirely ade-

quate for destroying the heart of a city and killing hundreds of thousands of people. Furthermore, in the case of small, "hard" targets such as missile silos, command posts and other military installations, having explosions bigger than those for which the "kill," or crater, radius slightly exceeds "circular error probable" (CEP) adds little to the probability of destroying such targets. Crater radius depends roughly on the cube root of the explosive power; consequently, if during the period when technology allows us to go from one to 10 warheads per missile it also allows us to improve accuracy by a little more than two-fold, the "kill" per warhead will remain nearly the same in most cases, whereas the number of warheads increases tenfold.

In any case, it is fair to say that in spite of a number of such arguments about details, nearly everyone who testified at the ABM hearings agreed that the present situation is one in which each side possesses forces adequate to deter the other. In short, we now have parity in the only sense that ultimately counts.

Several forecasts have been made of what the strategic-weapons situation will be in the mid-1970's. In most respects here again there is quite general agreement. Part of the presentation by Deputy Secretary Packard to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 26 were two graphs showing the trends in numbers of deployed offensive missiles beginning in 1965 and extending to 1975. There is no serious debate about the basic features of these graphs. It is agreed by all that in the recent past the U.S. has been far ahead of the U.S.S.R. in all areas, and that the Russians began a rapid deployment program a few years ago that will bring them even with us in NCBM's quite soon and that, if extended ahead without any slowdown, would bring them even in submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) sometime between 1971 and 1977.

One important factor that the Department of Defense omitted from its graphs is MIRV. Deployment plans for MIRV's have not been released by either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., although various rough projections were made at the hearings about numbers of warheads per vehicle (three to 10), about accuracies (figures around half a mile were often mentioned, and it was implied that U.S. accuracies were better than Russian ones) and about development status (the U.S. was said to be ahead in developments in this field). A pair of charts emphasizing the impact of MIRV was prepared by the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

One could argue with both of these sets of charts. For example, one might wonder why the Senate charts show so few warheads on the Russian Polaris-type submarine and why they show only three MIRV's on U.S. Minutemen; on the other hand, one might wonder whether the Department of Defense's projected buildup of the Russian Polaris fleet could be that fast, or whether one should count the older Russian missile submarines. Nonetheless, the general picture presented cannot be far wrong. Moreover, the central arguments pursued throughout the ABM hearings (in both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings in March and the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings in April) were not primarily concerned with these numerical matters. Rather, they were concerned with (1) Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird's interpretation of these numbers insofar as Russian intentions were concerned, (2) the validity of the Safeguard ABM system as a response to the purported strategic problems of the 1970's and (3) the arms-race implications of Safeguard.

As for the matter of intentions, those favoring the ABM concept generally held that the only "rational" explanation of the Russians' recent SS-9 buildup, coupled with their multiple-warhead development program and

the Moscow ABM system, was that they were aiming for a first-strike capability. One must admit that almost anything is conceivable as far as intentions are concerned, but there certainly are simpler, and it seems to me much more likely, explanations. The simplest of all is contained in Deputy Secretary Packard's chart. The most surprising feature of this chart is the fact that the Russians were evidently satisfied with being such a poor second for such a long time. This is made more puzzling by the fact that all during this period U.S. defense officials found it necessary to boast about how far ahead we were in order to be able to resist internal pressures for still greater expansion of our offensive forces.

Another possible reason, and one that I believe added to the other in the minds of the Russian planners, was that their strategists concluded in the mid-1960's that, whatever the top officials here might say, certain elements would eventually succeed in getting a large-scale ABM system built, and that penetration-aid devices, including multiple warheads, would be needed to meet the challenge. Whether or not they were correct in this latter hypothetical analysis is still uncertain at this writing. Let us, however, pass on from this question of someone else's intentions and consider whether or not the proposed Safeguard ABM system is a valid, rational and necessary response to the Russian deployments and developments outlined above.

To many of those who have recently written favorably about ABM defenses or who have testified in their favor before the Congressional committees, Safeguard is supported mainly as a prototype of something else: a "thick" defense of the U.S. against a massive Russian missile attack. This is clearly not at all the rationale for the Safeguard decision as presented by President Nixon in his press conference of March 14, nor is it implied as more than a dividend in the defense secretaries' testimony. The President said that he wanted a system that would protect a part of our Minuteman force in order to increase the credibility of our deterrent, and that he had overruled moving in the direction of a massive city defense because "even starting with a thin system and then going to a heavy system tends to be more provocative in terms of making credible a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union. I want no provocation which might deter arms talks." The top civilian defense officials give this same rationale, although they put a little more emphasis on the "prototype" and "growth potential" aspects of the system. For simplicity and clarity I shall focus on the Administration's proposal, as stated in open session by responsible officials.

From a technical point of view and as far as components are concerned, President Nixon's Safeguard system of today is very little different from President Johnson's Sentinel system. There are only minor changes in the location of certain components (away from cities), and elements have been added to some of the radars so that they can now observe submarine-launched missiles coming from directions other than directly from the U.S.S.R. and China. As before, the system consists of a long-range interceptor carrying a large nuclear weapon (Spartan), a fast short-range interceptor carrying a small nuclear weapon (Sprint), two types of radar (perimeter acquisition radar, or PAR, and missile-site radar, or MSR), a computer for directing the battle, and a command and control system for integrating Safeguard with the national command. I shall not describe the equipment in detail at this point but pass on directly to what I believe can be concluded from the hearings and other public sources about each of the following four major questions: (1) Assuming that Safeguard could protect Minuteman, is it needed

to protect our deterrent? (2) Assuming that Safeguard works, can it in fact safeguard Minuteman? (3) Will it work? (4) Anyway, what harm can it do?

First: Assuming that Safeguard could protect Minuteman, is it needed to protect our deterrent?

Perhaps the clearest explanation of why the answer to this first question is "no" was given by Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 22. He described how the deterrent consists of three main components: Polaris submarines, bombers and land-based ICBM's. Each of these components alone is capable of delivering far more warheads than is actually needed for deterrence, and each is currently defended against surprise destruction in a quite different way. ICBM's are in hard silos and are numerous. Polaris are hidden in the seas. Bombers can be placed on various levels of alert and can be dispersed.

Since the warning time in the case of an ICBM attack is generally taken as being about 30 minutes, the people who believe the deterrent may be in serious danger usually imagine that the bombers are attacked by missile submarines, and therefore have only a 15-minute warning. This is important because a 30-minute warning gives the bombers ample time to get off the ground. In that case, however, an attack on all three components cannot be made simultaneously; that is, if the attacking weapons are launched simultaneously, they cannot arrive simultaneously, and vice versa.

Thus it is incredible that all three of our deterrent systems could become vulnerable in the same time period, and it is doubly incredible that we could not know that this would happen without sufficient notice so that we could do something about it. There is, therefore, no basis for a frantic reaction to the hypothetical Russian threat to Minuteman. Still, it is sensible and prudent to begin thinking about the problem, and so we turn to the other questions. We must consider these questions in the technological framework of the mid-1970's, and we shall do this now in the way defense officials currently seem to favor: by assuming that this is the best of all possible technological worlds, that everything works as intended and that direct extrapolations of current capabilities are valid.

Second: Assuming that Safeguard "works," can it in fact safeguard Minuteman?

One good approach to this problem is the one used by George W. Rathjens in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 23. His analysis took as a basis of calculation the implication in Secretary Laird's testimony that the Minuteman force may become seriously imperiled in the mid-1970's. Rathjens then estimated how many SS-9's would have to be deployed at that time in order to achieve this result. From this number, and the estimate of the current number of SS-9's deployed, he got a rate of deployment. He also had to make an assumption about how many Sprints and Spartans would be deployed at that time, and his estimates were based on the first phase of Safeguard deployment. These last numbers have not been released, but a range of reasonable values can be guessed from the cost estimates given. Assuming that the SS-9's would have four or five MIRV warheads each by that time, Rathjens found that by prolonging the SS-9 production program by a few months the Russians would be able to cope with Safeguard by simply exhausting it and would still have enough warheads left to imperil Minuteman, if that is indeed their intention.

The length of this short safe period does depend on the numbers used in the calculations, and they of course can be disputed to a degree. Thus if one assumes that it takes fewer Russian warheads to imperil Minuteman (it can't be less than one for

one!), then the assumed deployment rate is lower and the safe period is lengthened; on the other hand, if one notes that the missile-site radars in our system are much softer than even today's silos, then the first attacking warheads, fired directly at the radars, can be smaller and less accurate, so that a higher degree of MIRVing can be used for attacking these radars and a shorter safe period results. To go further, it was suggested that the accuracy/yield combination of the more numerous SS-11's might be sufficient for attacking the missile-site radars, and therefore, if the Russians were to elect such an option, there would be no safe period at all. In short, the most that Safeguard can do is either delay somewhat the date when Minuteman would be imperiled or cause the attacker to build up his forces at a somewhat higher rate if indeed imperiling Minuteman by a fixed date in his purpose.

In the more general case this problem is often discussed in budgetary terms, and the "cost-exchange ratio" between offense and defense is computed for a wide variety of specific types of weapon. Such calculations give a wide variety of results, and there is much argument about them. However, even using current offense designs (that is, without MIRV), such calculations usually strongly favor the offense. This exchange ratio varies almost linearly with the degree of MIRVing of the offensive missiles, and therefore it seems to me that in the ideal technological future we have taken as our context this exchange ratio will still more strongly favor the offense.

Third: Will it work? By this question I mean: Will operational units be able to intercept enemy warheads accompanied by enemy penetration aids in an atmosphere of total astonishment and uncertainty? I do not mean: Will test equipment and test crews intercept U.S. warheads accompanied by U.S. penetration aids in a contrived atmosphere? A positive answer to the latter question is a necessary condition for obtaining a positive answer to the former, but it is by no stretch of the imagination a sufficient condition.

This basic question has been attacked from two quite different angles: by examining historical analogies and by examining the technical elements of the problem in detail. I shall touch on both here. Design-oriented people who consider this a purely technical question emphasize the second approach. I believe the question is by no means a purely technical question, and I suggest that the historical-analogy approach is more promising, albeit much more difficult to use correctly.

False analogies are common in this argument. We find that some say: "You can't tell me that if we can put a man on the moon we can't build an ABM." Others say: "That's what Oppenheimer told us about the hydrogen bomb." These two statements contain the same basic error. They are examples of successes in a contest between technology and nature, whereas the ABM issue involves a contest between two technologies: offensive weapons and penetration aids versus defensive weapons and discrimination techniques. These analogies would be more pertinent if, in the first case, someone were to jerk the moon away just before the astronauts landed, or if, in the second case, nature were to keep changing the nuclear-reaction probabilities all during the development of the hydrogen bomb and once again after it was deployed.

Proper historical analogies should involve modern high-technology defense systems that have actually been installed and used in combat. If one examines the record of such systems, one finds that they do often produce some attrition of the offense, but not nearly enough to be of use against a nuclear attack. The most up-to-date example is provided by the Russian SAM's and other air-defense

equipment deployed in North Vietnam. This system "works" after a fashion because both the equipment designers and the operating crews have had plenty of opportunities to practice against real U.S. targets equipped with real U.S. countermeasures and employing real U.S. tactics.

The best example of a U.S. system is somewhat older, but I believe it is still relevant. It is the SAGE system, a complex air-defense system designed in the early 1950's. All the components worked on the test range, but by 1960 we came to realize, even without combat testing, that SAGE could not really cope with the offense that was then coming into being. We thereupon greatly curtailed and modified our plans, although we did continue with some parts of the system. To quote from the recent report on the ABM decision prepared by Wiesner, Abram Chayes and others: "Still, after fifteen years, and the expenditure of more than \$20 billion, it is generally conceded that we do not have a significant capability to defend ourselves against a well-planned air attack. The Soviet Union, after even greater effort, has probably not done much better."

So much for analogies; let us turn to the Safeguard system itself. Doubts about its being able to work were raised during the public hearings on a variety of grounds, some of which are as follows:

First, and perhaps foremost, there is the remarkable fact that the new Safeguard system and the old Sentinel system use virtually the same hardware deployed in a very similar manner, and yet they have entirely different primary purposes. Sentinel had as its purpose defending large soft targets against the so-called Chinese threat. The Chinese threat by definition involved virtually no sophisticated penetration aids and no possibilities of exhausting the defense; thus were "solved" two of the most difficult problems that had eliminated Nike Zeus and Nike-X.

Safeguard has as its primary purpose defending a part of the Minuteman force against a Russian attack. It is not credible that a Russian attack against the part of the Minuteman force so defended would be other than massive and sophisticated, so that we are virtually right back to trying to do what in 1967 we said we could not do, and we are trying to do it with no real change in the missiles or the radars. It is true that defending hard points is to a degree easier than defending cities because interception can be accomplished later and at lower altitudes, thus giving discrimination techniques more time to work. Moreover, only those objects headed for specific small areas must be intercepted. These factors do make the problem somewhat easier, but they do not ensure its solution, and plenty of room for doubt remains.

Second, there is the contest between penetration aids and discrimination techniques. This was discussed at length by Garwin and Bethe in their March 1968 article in *Scientific American* and mentioned also in varying degrees of detail by many of those who testified recently concerning the ABM issue. The Russian physicist Andrei D. Sakharov, in his essay "Thoughts on Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom," put the issue this way: "Improvements in the resistance of warheads to shock waves and the radiation effects of neutron and X-ray exposure, the possibility of mass use of relatively light and inexpensive decoys that are virtually indistinguishable from warheads and exhaust the capabilities of an antimissile defense system, a perfection of tactics of massed and concentrated attacks, in time and space, that overstrain the defense detection centers, the use of orbital and fractional-orbital attacks, the use of active and passive jamming and other methods not disclosed in the press—all of this has created technical and economic obstacles

to an effective missile defense that, at the present time, are virtually insurmountable."

I would add only MIRV to Sakharov's list. Pitted against this plethora of penetration aids are variously observational methods designed to discriminate the real warheads. Some of the penetration devices obviously work only at high altitudes, but even these make it necessary for the final "sorting" to be delayed, and thus they still contribute to making the defense problem harder. Other devices can continue to confuse the defense even down to low altitudes. Some of the problems the offense presents to the defense can no doubt be solved (and have been solved) when considered separately and in isolation. That is, they can be solved for a time, until the offense designers react. One must have serious reservations, however, whether these problems can ever be solved for any long period in the complex combinations that even a modestly sophisticated attacker can present. Further, such a contest could result in a catastrophic failure of the system in which all or nearly all interceptions fail.

Third, there is the unquantifiable difference between the test range and the real world. The extraordinary efforts of the Air Force to test operationally deployed Minutemen show that it too regards this as an important problem. Moreover, the tests to date do seem to have revealed important weaknesses in the deployed forces. The problem has many aspects: The possible differences between test equipment and deployed equipment; the certain differences between the offensive warheads and penetration aids supplied by us as test targets and the corresponding equipment and tactics the defense must ultimately be prepared to face; the differences between the installation crews at a test site and at a deployment site; the differences in attitudes and motivation between a test crew and an operational crew (even if it is composed of the same men); the differences between men and equipment that have recently been made ready and whom everyone is watching and men and equipment that have been standing ready for years during which nothing happened; the differences between the emotional atmosphere where everyone knows it is not "for real" and the emotional atmosphere where no one can believe what he has just been told. It may be that all that enormously complex equipment will be ready to work the very first time it must "for real," and it may be that all those thousands of human beings have performed all their interlocking assignments correctly, but I have very substantial doubts about it.

Fourth, there is the closely related "hair-trigger/stiff-trigger" contradiction. Any active defense system such as Safeguard must sit in readiness for two or four or eight years and then fire at precisely the correct second following a warning time of only minutes. Furthermore, the precision needed for the firing time is so fine that machines must be used to choose the exact instant of firing no matter how the decision to fire is made. In the case of offensive missiles the situation is different in an essential way: Although maintaining readiness throughout a long, indefinite period is necessary, the moment of firing is not so precisely controlled in general and hence human decision-makers, including even those at high levels, may readily be permitted to play a part in the decisionmaking process. Thus if we wish to be certain that the defense will respond under conditions of surprise, the trigger of the ABM system, unlike the triggers of the ICBM's and Polarises, must be continuously sensitive and ready—in short, a hair trigger—for indefinitely long periods of time.

On the other hand, it is obvious that we cannot afford to have an ABM missile fire by mistake or in response to a false alarm. Indeed, the Army went to some pains to assure

residents of areas near proposed Sentinel sites that it was imposing requirements to ensure against the accidental launching of the missile and the subsequent detonation of the nuclear warhead it carries. Moreover, Army officials have assured the public that no ABM missiles would ever be launched without the specific approval of "very high authorities."

These two requirements—a hair trigger so that the system can cope with a surprise attack and a stiff trigger so that it will never go off accidentally or without proper authorization—are, I believe, contradictory requirements. In saying this I am not expressing doubt about the stated intentions of the present Army leaders, and I strongly endorse the restrictions implied in their statements. I am saying, however, that if the system cannot be fired without approval of "the highest authorities," then the probability of its being fired under conditions of surprise is less than it would be otherwise. This probability depends to a degree on the highly classified technical details of the Command and Control System, but in the last analysis it depends more on the fact that "the highest authority" is a human being and therefore subject to all the failures and foibles pertaining thereto.

This brings us to our fourth principal question: Anyway, what harm can it do?

We have just found that the total deterrent is very probably not in peril, that the Safeguard system probably cannot safeguard Minuteman even if it "works," that there is, to say the least, considerable uncertainty whether or not it will "work." Nonetheless, if there were no harm in it, we might be prudent and follow the basic motto of the arms race: "Let us err on the side of military safety." There seem to be many answers to the question of what harm building an ABM system would do. First of all, such a system would cost large sums of money needed for nondefense purposes. Second, it would divert money and attention from what may be better military solutions to the strategic problems posed by the Administration. Third, it would intensify the arms race. All these considerations were discussed at the hearings; I shall comment here only on the third, the arms-race implications of the ABM decision.

It is often said that an ABM system is not an accelerating element in the arms race because it is intrinsically defensive. For example, during the hearings Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington, surely one of the best-informed senators in this field, said essentially that, and he quoted Premier Kosygin as having said the same thing. I believe such a notion is in error and is based on what we may call "the fallacy of the last move." I believe that in the real world of constant change in both the technology and the deployed numbers of all kinds of strategic-weapons systems, ABM systems are accelerating elements in the arms race. In support of this view let us recall one of the features of the history recited at the start of this article.

At the beginning of this decade we began to hear about a possible Russian ABM system, and we became concerned about its potential effects on our ICBM and Polaris systems. In response the MIRV concept was invented. Today there are additional justifications for MIRV besides penetration, but that is how it started. Now, the possibility of a Russian MIRV is used as one of the main arguments in support of the Safeguard system. Thus we have come one full turn around the arms-race spiral. No one in 1960 and 1961 thought through the potential destabilizing effects of multiple warheads, and certainly no one predicted, or even could have predicted, that the inexorable logic of the arms race would carry us directly from Russian talk in 1960 about defending Moscow against missiles to a requirement for hard-

point defense of offensive-missile sites in the U.S. in 1969.

By the same token I am sure the Russians did not foresee the large increase in deployed U.S. warheads that will ultimately result from their ABM deployment and that made it so counterproductive. Similarly, no one today can describe in detail the chain reaction the Safeguard deployment would lead to, but it is easy to see the seeds of a future acceleration of the arms race in the Nixon Administration's Safeguard proposal. Soon after Safeguard is started (let us assume for now that it will be) Russian offense planners are going to look at it and say something such as: "It may not work, but we must be prudent and assume it will." They may then plan further deployments, or more complex penetration systems, or maybe they will go to more dangerous systems such as bombs in orbit. A little later, when some of our optimistic statements about how "it will do the job it is supposed to do" have become part of history, our strategic planners are going to look at Safeguard and say something such as: "Maybe it will work as they said, but we must be prudent and assume it will not and besides, now look at what the Russians are doing."

This approach to strategic thinking, known in the trade as "worst-case analysis," leads to a completely hopeless situation in which there is no possibility of achieving a state of affairs that both sides would consider as constituting parity. Unless the arms race is stopped by political action outside the two defense establishments, I feel reasonably sure there will be another "crash program" response analogous to what we had in the days of the "missile gap"—a situation some would like to see repeated.

I also mentioned in my own testimony at the ABM hearings that "we may further expect deployment of these ABM systems to lead to the persistent query 'But how do you know it really works?' and thus to increase the pressures against the current limited nuclear-test ban as well as to work against amplifying it." I mentioned this then, and I mention it again now, in the hope that it will become a self-defeating prediction. It is also important to note that the response of our own defense establishment to the Russian ABM deployment, which I have outlined above, was not the result of our being "provoked," and I emphasize this because we hear so much discussion about what is a "provocative" move and what is not. Rather, our response was motivated by a deep-seated belief that the only appropriate response to any new technical development on the other side is further technical complexity of our own. The arms race is not so much a series of political provocations followed by hot emotional reactions as it is a series of technical challenges followed by cool, calculated responses in the form of ever more costly, more complex and more fully automatic devices. I believe this endless, seemingly uncontrollable process was one of the principal factors President Eisenhower had in mind when he made his other (usually forgotten) warning: "We must be alert to the . . . danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite." He placed this other warning, also from his farewell address, on the same level as the much more familiar comment about the military-industrial complex.

Several alternative approaches to Safeguard for protecting Minuteman have been discussed recently. These include superhardening, proliferation, a "shell game" in which there are more silos than missiles, and land-mobile missiles. Although I was personally hopeful before the hearings that at least one of these approaches would maintain its invulnerability, a review of the recent debates leaves me now with the pessimistic view that none of them holds much promise beyond the next 10 years.

Silo-hardening most probably does work now, in the sense that the combination of SS-11 accuracy and yield and Minuteman silo-hardening works out in such a way that one incoming warhead (and hence one SS-11 missile) has less than a 50-50 chance of destroying a Minuteman. If one considers the technological trends in hardening, yield per unit weight, MIRVing and accuracy, however, it does seem convincing that this is a game in which the offense eventually will win. Albert Wohlstetter, testifying in favor of the Safeguard system before the Senate Armed Services Committee, quoted a paper he wrote with Fred Hoffman in 1954 (long before any ICBM's were actually in place anywhere) predicting that the ability of silo-hardening to protect offensive missiles would run out by the end of the 1960's. That was a remarkably prescient study and is wrong only in numerical detail.

If we take the same rosy view of technology that was taken in almost all the pro-ABM arguments, then hardening will not work for more than another five years. My own view of the technological future is clearly much less rosy, but I do believe that the situation in which hardening is no longer the answer could come by, say, 1980 or, more appropriately, 1984.

Proliferation of Minuteman would have worked in the absence of MIRV. Now, however, it would seem that the ability to MIRV, which no doubt can eventually be carried much further than the fewfold MIRV we see for the immediate future, clearly makes proliferation a losing game as well as the dangerous one it always was.

The "shell game" has not in my view been analyzed in satisfactory detail, but it would appear to have a serious destabilizing effect on the arms race. Schemes have been suggested for verifying that a certain fraction of the missile holes are in fact empty, but one can foresee a growing and persistent belief on each side that the "other missiles" must be hidden somewhere.

Road-mobile and rail-mobile versions of Minuteman have been seriously studied for well over a decade. These ideas have always foundered on two basic difficulties: (1) Such systems are inherently soft and hence can be attacked by large warheads without precise knowledge of where they are, and (2) railroads and highways all pass through population centers, and large political and social problems seem unavoidable.

Where does all this leave us insofar as finding a technical solution for protecting Minuteman is concerned? One and only one technically viable solution seems to have emerged for the long run: Launch on warning. Such an idea has been considered seriously by some politicians, some technical men and some military officers. Launch on warning could either be managed entirely by automatic devices, or the command and control system could be such as to require authorization to launch by some very high human authority.

In the case of the first alternative, people who think about such things envision a system consisting of probably two types of detection device that could, in principle, determine that a massive launch had been made and then somewhat later determine that such a launch consisted of multiple warheads aimed at our missile-silo fields. This information would be processed by a computer, which would then launch the Minutemen so that the incoming missiles would find only empty holes; consequently the Minutemen would be able to carry out their mission of revenge. Thus the steady advance of arms technology may not be leading us to the ultimate weapon but rather to the ultimate absurdity: a completely automatic system for deciding whether or not doomsday has arrived.

To me such an approach to the problem is politically and morally unacceptable, and

if it really is the only approach, then clearly we have been considering the wrong problem. Instead of asking how Minuteman can be protected, we should be asking what the alternatives to Minuteman are. Evidently most other people also find such an idea unacceptable. As I mentioned above, the Army has found it necessary to reassure people repeatedly that ABM missiles would not be launched without approval by "the highest authorities," even though this is clearly a far less serious matter in the case of the ABM missiles than in the case of Minuteman.

The alternative is to require that a human decision-maker, at the level of "the highest authorities," be introduced into the decision-making loop. But is this really satisfactory? We would be asking that a human being make, in just a few minutes, a decision to utterly destroy another country. (After all, there would be no point in firing at their empty silos.) If, for any reason whatever, he was responding to a false alarm, or to some kind of smaller, perhaps "accidental," attack, he would be ensuring that a massive deliberate attack on us would take place moments later. Considering the shortness of the time, the complexity of the information and the awesomeness of the moment, the President would himself have to be properly programmed in order to make such a decision.

Those who argue that the Command and Control System is perfect or perfectable forget that human beings are not. If forced to choose, I would prefer a preprogrammed President to a computer when it came to deciding whether or not doomsday had arrived, but again I feel that this solution too is really unacceptable, and that once again, in attempting to defend Minuteman, we are simply dealing with the wrong problem. For the present it would seem the Polaris and the bombers are not, as systems, subject to the same objections, since there are now enough other approaches to the problem of ensuring their invulnerability to sudden massive destruction.

In my view, all the above once again confirms the utter futility of attempting to achieve national security through military technology alone. We must look elsewhere. Fortunately an opportunity does seem to be in the offing. There appears to be real promise that serious strategic arms-limitation talks will begin soon. The time is propitious. There is in the land a fairly widespread doubt about the strictly military approach to security problems, and even military-minded politicians are genuinely interested in exploring other possibilities. The essay by Academician Sakharov, as well as the statements of Russian officials, indicate genuine interest on the other side. The time is propitious in another sense: both sides will be discussing the matter from a position of parity. Moreover, this parity seems reasonably stable and likely to endure for several years.

Later, however, major deployments of sophisticated ABM systems and, even more important widespread conversion of present single-warhead systems to MIRV will be strongly destabilizing and will at least give the impression that parity is about to be upset. If so, the motto of the arms race, "Let us err on the side of military safety," will come to dominate the scene on both sides and the present opportunity will be lost. Therefore in the short run we must do everything possible to ensure that the talks not only start but also succeed. Although the ABM decisions may not forestall the talks, it would seem that success will be more likely if we avoid starting things that history has shown are difficult to stop once they are started.

Such things surely include deployment of ABM missiles and MIRV's. There have been successes in stopping programs while they were in the development phase, but seldom has anything been stopped after deployment

had started. The idea of a freeze on deployment of new weapons systems at this time and for these reasons is fairly widespread already, but achieving it will require concerted action by those believing strongly in the validity and necessity of arms limitations as a means of increasing national security. Thus the principal result of the recent national debate over the ABM issue has been to make it clear that Safeguard will safeguard nothing, and that the right step for the immediate future is doing whatever is necessary (such as freezing present deployments and developments) to ensure the success of the coming strategic-arms-limitation talks.

In addition, the ABM debate has served to highlight more serious issues (for example the implications of MIRV for the arms race) and to raise serious questions about other weapons systems. For instance, I suggest that we have also found that silo-based missiles will become obsolete. The only sure method for defense of Minuteman beyond, say, the mid-1970's seems to be the unacceptable launch on warning. As long as we must have a strategic deterrent, we must find one of that does not force us to turn the final decision over to either a computer or a preprogrammed President. Minuteman was conceived in the 1950's and served its purpose as a deterrent through the 1960's, but it appears that in the 1970's its threat to us will exceed its value, and that it and other silo-based missiles will have to go. The deterrent must have alternatives other than "go/no-go," and for the 1970's at least it would now appear that other strategic weapons (Polaris/Poseidon and bombers) could provide them. I expect, however, that as the continuing national debate subjects the whole matter of strategic arms to further public scrutiny we shall learn that these other alternatives also have dangerous flaws, and we shall see confirmed the idea that there is no technical solution to the dilemma of the steady decrease in our national security that has for more than 20 years accompanied the steady increase in our military power.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT).

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this legislation and wish to associate myself with the comments which have been made by our distinguished chairman and by the ranking member of the committee.

I think it reflects the many hours of serious deliberation that the committee spent on this bill. I hope you will support the bill in toto. This afternoon, I would particularly like to address myself to title 3 of the bill dealing with the Reserve Forces.

Public Law 90-168, the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act, required that the Congress shall authorize the personnel strength of the selected reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces each fiscal year and that no funds may be appropriated for the pay and allowance of any Reserve component of the Armed Forces unless the personnel strength of the selected reach of such Reserve component had been authorized by law. This authorization is the primary purpose of this title.

This bill provides that for the year beginning July 1, 1969, and ending June 30, 1970, the Selected Reserve will be programmed to obtain an average strength of not less than the following: The Army National Guard, 393,298; the Army Reserve, 255,591; the Naval Reserve, 129,000; the Marine Corps Reserve,

49,489; the Air National Guard of the United States, 86,624; the Air Force Reserve, 50,775; and the Coast Guard Reserve, 17,500.

The average strength contained in this bill are those numbers recommended by the Department of Defense as necessary to meet our military requirements.

When the bill was originally submitted, it called for an end strength rather than an average strength figure as was included last year. Subsequently, however, the Department of Defense notified the committee that they had no objection to including an average strength requirement. This formula precludes the Selected Reserve from dropping below desired strength levels and then meeting the legal requirements by increasing the strength as the fiscal year end nears.

There is a small decline in the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve strengths from last year. This is mainly because some of the units mobilized in May 1968 are scheduled to remain on active duty until December 1969, necessitating a downward man-year adjustment.

The Naval Reserve figure is brought back up to 129,000 because of the early release of two Naval Reserve construction battalions which were previously scheduled for retention on active duty through May 1970.

The Marine Corps Reserve strength is increased by 2,285 man-years for fiscal year 1970, representing an increase in unit manning levels, with no additional units being formed.

The Air National Guard was slightly increased above the figures for fiscal year 1969. The main reason for this increase is the effect of the January 1968 mobilization. A portion of the strength of the recalled unit was not included in the authorized average strength of the Air National Guard for fiscal year 1969. Some Air National Guard units were released from active duty in December 1968 and all the remaining units were demobilized by the end of June of this year.

Last year's authorization provided that the total authorized strengths of the units released from active duty shall proportionately increase the average strength of the Reserve components involved. The President's budget provided for this increase. In addition, a recent decision of the Secretary of Defense to retain seven Air National Guard units previously scheduled for inactivation in fiscal year 1970 accounts for a further increase in the Air National Guard strength. These units included five air defense fighter units—F-102 and F-89—and two Military Airlift Command units—CO97. These units are to be retained and converted to new, higher priority missions resulting in an increase of 1,528 man-years above the figure submitted in the President's budget. The Secretary of Defense decision also included the retention of four Air Force Reserve units scheduled for inactivation in fiscal year 1970.

The U.S. Coast Guard requested an average Selected Reserve strength of 17,500 for fiscal year 1970, and the bill reflects that request.

Section 303 of the bill provides new language governing the responsibility of

the Secretaries of the military departments to furnish the personnel, equipment, facilities, and supplies needed to enable all units and Reserves and the Selected Reserves to meet their mobilization readiness requirements, as established and approved contingency and war plans.

If we are to have a Reserve Force to assist us in an emergency, the force is hardly worth the paper it is written on unless the units are equipped and properly trained to do their job in the case of an emergency. For years, we have been authorizing funds for equipment for the Reserve Forces only to have them diverted to the Active Forces, thus reducing the efficiency and effectiveness of the Reserves. It is time to stop this kind of bookkeeping deception. This section takes care of that.

Section 304 permits the year-end report to be filed with the Congress 90 days rather than 60 days after the end of the fiscal year. Experience has shown us that it takes more than 50 days for the paperwork to go through the computers. Then, after this material is assembled, the results must be reviewed at higher echelons. The result is that the reports are either coming in late or reflecting information at some point previous to the end of the fiscal year. By changing the time to 90 days, we expect to receive current information within the 90-day period.

Gentlemen, we believe we have a strong, defensible bill which will insure our Nation's safety. I urge your support.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to a distinguished member of the committee, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL).

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 14000. It is a privilege to serve on this committee. I wish to associate myself with the remarks which have been made by our chairman and those which were made by the ranking member of the committee.

Mr. Chairman, we are here to consider the bill which involves \$21.3 billion. This is one of the most important bills we will consider in this session of the Congress. We all sincerely hope debate will be responsible. We hope that in the days ahead as amendments are offered that tempers will not flare, that the adrenalin will not be loosed into the blood of those engaged in debate and responsibility will reign instead of emotions.

When we have finished we will have taken one of two courses—either to prepare for our survival or to have lowered our guard with the prayer that heaven will help us and our enemies will not take advantage of us. It seems to me we should all chart our course not so much as whether we are trying to satisfy some editor of a newspaper or a columnist or even those growing numbers who think it is fashionable to declare open season upon the military. We should recall that unlike the past, this time if the war clouds gather we will not have the luxury allowed to us in the past to prepare to defend ourselves.

The great part of the money we are authorizing in this bill could be quite appropriately compared to the insurance policy on one's home. A while ago the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr.

JONAS) pointed out all of us carry insurance on our home but we still do not want a fire. It is true we never need a fire engine until the fire breaks out. But if we have a fire and there is no insurance or a fire department, at that moment there is no chance to provide either.

In the light of the foregoing, I subscribe to the thoughts of my esteemed chairman of the full committee who has said that it is far better to be prepared and be ready than to simply wish we were prepared and hope for the best when danger strikes.

Your House Armed Services Committee has not gone into this bill without adequate study. It is a big bill containing \$21 billion, \$14 billion of which is for procurement and \$7 billion for research, development, and testing. When all is said and done it is \$615 million less than the revised budget of Secretary Laird in April 1969 and \$1.8 billion less than the military budget submitted by Secretary Clifford in January 1969.

We have combed this procurement authorization with the finest of combs. We worked on this bill for 6 months. There have been a total of 91 meetings of the full committee and subcommittees. There have been 61 meetings of the full committee.

The principal addition of funds over and above the request of the administration is \$961 million for the modernization of our Navy. The Soviet Navy is a very real threat. They have quickly filled the vacuum in the Indian Ocean left by the withdrawal of the British fleet. They virtually control the Mediterranean today. Their ships are off Nantucket. Their ships are off our Carolinas. The Russian naval threat will not go away.

Procurement items in the bill include money for C-5A, the F-15, F-14, AMSA, and MIRV as well as funds for the ABM. For the procurement of ABM \$345 million is included and \$400 million for research, development, technology and engineering. There will be much more said about the ABM. Whether the ABM will work or not was answered in the best possible way during the debate in the other body when one of the Members pointed out if this country has the brains to send a man to the moon, there is no doubt but what he has the brains to make the ABM work.

Both in general debate and under the 5-minute rule, we will very likely hear again and again that we cannot afford the money authorized in this procurement bill. The answer is, surely a country with a gross national product which will soon approach \$1 trillion can afford a \$21 billion procurement bill. Put in somewhat different perspective, proponents of a strong defense posture have said what good is it to have a stomach full of food if you are dead. The late Sam Rayburn once said he would rather be a live American with an empty pocketbook than a rich dead American.

There is much dissatisfaction with the Vietnam war but that is not the issue in this debate. Everything we are authorizing here is for our own defense. We have drawn from the inventory of our military weapon vehicles, planes and ships. Largely because of the Vietnam war our cupboard is bare, our ships are

old and our planes are old. We need something new and we do not have it. That is what this procurement bill is all about.

No one of the House Armed Services Committee has set themselves up as experts. We plan to accomplish in 3 or 4 days what the other body took months to achieve. Someone has quite appropriately said of the long debate in the Senate on the Defense procurement bill that never in our history has there been so much said by those who were so little informed on things that should never have been put into print at all.

Repeating, this bill has very little in it for Vietnam. Instead, it provides for long lead items for our own defense against enemies in the world that would hope we would lower our guard. Unlike Vietnam this procurement bill is not a matter of morality or immorality. It is purely and simply a matter of survival. I intend to support H.R. 14000. As a member of the House Armed Services Committee, I know that we have put in countless hours on this procurement bill. This measure deserves the full support of every member who believes we cannot afford to be unprepared.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished member of the Appropriations Committee, the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. STEED).

Mr. STEED. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this legislation.

I have been more than normally interested in the progress of the C-5A military cargo airplane, because the Air Force will conduct its early training programs for the C-5 at Altus Air Force Base, in my district in Oklahoma. Over the past year, I have tried to keep track of the progress this airplane is making and have made several inquiries about the airplane itself and all of its performance characteristics.

Also, during the past 7 or 8 months, I have been reading about the various congressional committee inquiries and of course, followed the Senate debate in connection with the proposed amendment to delete funds for additional C-5A's. That amendment having been defeated, we now have a companion amendment in the House.

Throughout all of the news stories and reports of testimony and debate, I have been very surprised at the concentration and emphasis on the contractual aspects of the C-5A program. Comparatively, there has been far too little said about the airplane itself and its amazing performance abilities.

The C-5 is designed to respond to an extremely difficult Air Force requirement, and every evidence so far is that it will do so with room to spare. I believe it will be welcomed, not only by Air Force pilots, but also by the Army men on the ground who are so dependent on the supplies it will bring.

If we buy enough of them, C-5's will replace all the wornout, obsolete C-133's and C-124's at less than one-quarter of the cost per ton-mile.

In addition to doing it much cheaper, the C-5 can carry many oversized military equipment items that none of the others can carry at all. It will fly almost

anywhere, nonstop, quickly and certainly—and when it gets there, it will land on short, unimproved fields, close to the men who need the items being carried on board.

You marvel that it can carry over 130 tons of supplies—that with lighter loads it can fly 5,500 nautical miles nonstop—that its landing distance can be less than 3,600 feet on a wet, grass-covered runway.

And, if you want to consider its usefulness—here is a list of one typical load that can be carried in just one C-5: One M-48 bridge launcher, weighing more than 128,000 pounds; four M-151 quarter-ton trucks with trailers, weighing a total of more than 16,000 pounds; two M-170 ambulances, weighing more than 7,500 pounds; two UH-1D helicopters, with a combined weight of 9,000 pounds; two M-54 5-ton trucks with trailers, weighing over 70,000 pounds; two M-37 three-quarter ton trucks with trailers, with a total weight of more than 20,000 pounds; plus 52 drivers, troops, and support personnel, who with their equipment weigh more than 12,000 pounds.

The total for this typical load in one C-5 is 264,768 pounds. And that airplane, with that load, can fly 2,500 nautical miles nonstop and land on a wet, grass field in less than 5,000 feet.

Or, if you want another statistic, the C-5 can carry 16, yes 16, three-quarter-ton trucks at the same time.

It will truly be an astounding performer—this C-5A, not only in the sheer size of its capabilities, but also at a ton mile rate lower by far than any other airplane in existence in the world today.

The statements I have just made about the C-5 cannot be made about any other aircraft in the world, and I am glad our Nation has it. But, of course, none of these great capabilities mean much if we do not need them.

But every evidence is that we do.

If this amendment is not defeated, the Air Force has said it will be forced to retain its C-133's and C-124's—despite their excessive cost of operation—despite the cost of further modifications to the C-133's—despite the fact that these airplanes cannot carry the outsized equipment that is needed—and despite the fact that these airplanes are grossly inefficient and hopelessly obsolete.

And even with the continued costly use of these old aircraft, there still would be a glaring deficiency in the strategic airlift rapid deployment capability that has been established as a requirement.

It is inconceivable to me that we would require the Air Force to fly obsolete and costly old airplanes that cannot do the job, when an outstanding new working tool is available in the form of the C-5A.

The C-5A is not only a giant in size—it also is a gigantic step forward in the state of the art—and it will serve an equally great need in the mobility and flexibility of our military forces.

All of the people of the Fourth Congressional District of Oklahoma are looking forward to welcoming the C-5A to Altus Air Force Base in the near future. I feel certain that the "marriage" performed there—between the world's finest military cargo airplane and the

world's finest pilots in the U.S. Air Force—will be a very happy one.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to a distinguished member of the committee, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. FISHER).

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, the increasing evidence of antimilitary sentiment in this country is most disturbing. At a time when the Soviet Union is closing gaps and Red China, while spewing threats and abuse at the United States, is building up a powerful war machine, amazing as it is, we find here in our country antimilitary gestures being manifested on many fronts.

We hear the howls of the antiwar element and the shameless outbursts of the pacifists. College ROTC programs are under attack. The anti-ABM and the anti-MIRV forces have been extremely vocal. The anti-CBW crowd beats their drums. The alleged industrial-military complex is wrongfully pictured as a sinister conspiracy in our society. The draft is under attack by the fuzzy brained professors, the hippies and yuppies, the Spocks, and the Carmichaels. In some quarters it has become stylish to oppose, reduce, and denounce anything related to military preparedness in this country.

Then, there has been the surfacing of the new left, of which the Students for a Democratic Society is very much a part. The pro-Marxist SDS, which claims 30,000 members in American colleges, is aided and abetted by leftwing teachers, Black Panthers, and other militant troublemakers.

The people, goaded and financed—in part, at least—by the Communist Party U.S.A., are forever finding fault with their own country, but never seem to criticize Hanoi or other potential Communist aggressors.

Practically every facet of our military buildup seems to be suspect in the minds of most of these people. Fortunately for America they represent a relatively small minority of our population.

Now this does not mean that we should not exercise prudence and appropriate restraint in expenditures for national defense. Every outlay for this purpose, and indeed for every other Federal expenditure of tax money, should be screened, rejected if unsound, and reconciled with good judgment. Our Committee on Armed Services has done just that, so far as the military is concerned.

Whether by coincidence or not, it is a fact that most of those, whether on the college campuses or elsewhere, who oppose the draft, for example, also oppose the war in Vietnam, the anti-ballistic-missile program, the mythical industrial-military conspiracy, the ROTC, and practically every other move to strengthen our military posture. At the same time, of course, there are those who in good faith oppose various defense programs, who present their views in an orderly manner.

Mr. Chairman, we are living in a time that calls for sanity and soul-searching. It is a time which calls loudly for unity. Indeed, had there been complete unity among our people, backed by a positive win policy, it is safe to say the war against the Communist aggressors in

Vietnam would have been won long ago and thousands of American lives would have been saved.

In dealing with those programs and weapons which our best military minds consider to be essential, let us proceed realistically and always give any doubt in favor of those measures which are designed to strengthen our defense posture. We should not ask for more, nor should we settle for less.

There is something reminiscent about the antimilitary eruption in this country. It reminds us of those critical months which preceded World War II, when the antidraft forces were so strong that only a few weeks before Pearl Harbor the draft was extended by a margin of only one vote in the House of Representatives. It reminds us that not long before the Japanese struck there was a substantial vote recorded against a measure to build up the military effectiveness in the island of Guam. And it reminds us of a strong move against a measure, sponsored by Carl Vinson, to create a two-ocean Navy.

Much of that opposition was in the name of economy and a faint but unrealistic hope for neutrality. Others insisted such measures were unnecessary, war-like, and provocative. And all of that at a time when Hitler was sinking our unarmed merchant ships on the high seas, and when Japan was amassing a war machine of major proportions. Less than a month before Pearl Harbor the Congress, over bitter opposition, managed to amend the Neutrality Act in order for helpless merchant ships to be equipped with deck guns.

It is true that times are different today. But with the balance of world power hanging in the balance, who are we to say there is not a significant similarity of dangers involved? Would we not be well advised to follow Napoleon's advice, hope for the best but be prepared for the worst? Let us remember that Hitler's Germany and Japan were armed to the limit in 1939; now, 1969, the Soviet Union and the Red Chinese are armed to the limit. And both of them point to the United States as their No. 1 enemy.

Above all, let us not be hoodwinked into thinking for a moment that our security is not in jeopardy today. This is a time for us to close ranks and move forward in a spirit of unity and determination. We can ill afford the luxury of unwarranted dissent and division, particularly at the level where definitive actions are taken and where responsibility lies, if an adequate security posture is to be maintained.

The best way, and perhaps the only way, to achieve and maintain peace in this troubled world is to keep America strong and powerful. Anything less is an invitation for disaster.

Mr. Chairman, I enthusiastically support the pending procurement bill. The committee spent weeks on it and evaluated every provision, line by line. We live in an age of technological and scientific marvels which requires research and development in the constant search for better weaponry. The enactment of this bill will make America stronger.

The committee left no stone unturned

in listening to and carefully evaluating every change that was proposed. I am convinced that in view of conditions in this country and in the world today, this bill offers the least for which we can afford to settle. And I am convinced this House, close as it is to the voice and well-being of the American people, will support the measure overwhelmingly.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York (Mr. KING).

Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 14000, the military procurement authorization bill as reported from the Armed Services Committee. I would like to comment briefly on some of the criticism being leveled at the so-called military-industrial complex which I feel is an attempt to downgrade our national military posture.

The strength of our Nation depends on not only the number and quality of the men available to fight for it but also upon the scientific, technological, and productive capacity of the Nation's industries.

It has been through the combined efforts of the military and industrial organizations to design, develop, and deploy necessary weapons systems that has made this Nation great and has kept it free.

What is contributing most to the current debate on national purpose and national resources is the bitter sense of frustration over the war in Vietnam. The enormous and unpredicted costs, combined with a sense of futility, have created social and economic pressures that have been directed toward almost all defense programs.

No one calls a national security budget of \$80 billion a piddling sum. It is big, but contrary to popular belief, the majority of the defense budget is not funneled over to the defense industry for hardware. More than half of all defense dollars go for personnel related costs. We are spending over \$7 billion on research and development vital to our survival. We are spending \$291 million for research and development in some 350 colleges and universities.

The decisions we in Congress are making today will determine our national posture in the middle and late 1970's. There are some who feel that our priorities at home are so demanding that we should direct most of our national resources to them, cutting back drastically our military developments and requirements. These people should be advised that if we unilaterally lower our defenses and if a nuclear war results, the problems of our present world will seem minor indeed in comparison.

The basis for any national security policy must be a threat of intervention or aggression.

No one wants a Military Establishment simply for the glory of having one, least of all those who serve in it, either willingly or unwillingly. But the hard military facts of life today regarding the number of military threats around the world prove that it is hardly the time to cut military expenditures or impair our defense readiness. While some may dis-

agree, I have been unable to find any mellowing on the part of Communist aggressive aims. It is not evident in Vietnam, nor at the Paris Peace Conference, nor in Czechoslovakia, nor in Korea.

Several areas of potential involvement of the United States exist today, requiring not only a large Army and Air Force but also a strong Navy.

Some say that we cannot protect our people from the effects of nuclear war, but in a large sense that is not correct. If we provide for deterrence by maintaining, providing, and protecting our forces, we reduce the probability of an enemy attack and increase the probability that our people will be safe.

Mr. Chairman, passage of the authorization bill as it has been submitted would reassure our military that our Nation stands behind them.

This proposal has received a penetrating review by the House Armed Services Committee, under the outstanding leadership of the distinguished chairman, the Honorable L. MENDEL RIVERS. The committee has been fully cognizant of the costs of defense and other needs of our country. We have already made substantial cuts upon the recommendation of the President and Secretary of Defense in the authorization and I sincerely feel that any further cuts would be an unacceptable risk to our security.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. CLANCY).

Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Chairman, I rise to give my full support to H.R. 14000 now under consideration by this body and urge its immediate passage. In my judgment, this is one of the most important bills to come before Congress each year, if not the most important.

This legislation authorizes appropriations totaling \$21,347,860,000, the bulk of which is for the procurement of urgently needed aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and other military hardware to keep our defenses at the high level needed at this time.

By passage of this bill we make a determination of the defense posture necessary to be maintained by this country to insure our national security. It is difficult to calculate or assign value in dollars and cents to this proposition. It is impossible to repair whatever damage may be caused by the lapse of time or lack of effort applied in keeping our defenses strong and secure.

This measure attempts to deal realistically with the responsibilities the United States faces in a complex, uncertain international setting. It endorses a posture of constant readiness of our defenses and it underwrites a policy of diversification of those defenses permitting a flexible response in any contest. It provides for the supplementation and modernization of our defense system in accordance with the contemporary developments of those who challenge our security.

In this bill, the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system has been designated to receive appropriations totaling \$746.4 million. The adversaries of freedom have made tremendous progress in the technology of mass destruction. We must,

therefore, more than ever before in our Nation's history, have in our military inventory sufficient weapons and force to survive a massive nuclear attack and to deliver a decisive counterblow.

Anti-ballistic-missile defense is not a cureall for the security of the United States. It is not the ultimate defense system, for technology knows no limits and each decade produces fresh challenges and a greater need for response on the part of free nations. Antimissile defense is, however, an essential component in the network of military systems designed to give the American people a seamless garment of security in an age of acute danger.

If an enemy is planning a first strike attack, his utmost consideration is "certainty." He must, therefore, assume the most pessimistic capabilities for his own force and the most optimistic capabilities for a defending force. Since the ABM would greatly reduce any sense of certainty that the enemy might have about the success of his attack, it provides an important deterrent to nuclear attack. Therefore, a broad view of the need for the ABM must take into consideration the attitudes of the enemy toward the United States, the enemies' experience with ABM systems, and present and projected military capability.

The Armed Services Committee has taken the position that our national defense effort, to be truly effective, must be based on a balanced and flexible military force—a force that can be employed at any time and at any place, either wholly or in part, to effectively counter any type of aggression, be it guerrilla warfare or nuclear attack. To that end, we have stressed the grave importance of not relying entirely on our missile capability for our military strength. It is a matter of great urgency to hasten the development of an aircraft that can meet the optimum performance characteristics that are required today. I believe that the C-5A will put this country years ahead in airlift technology. It is more than the world's largest airplane, it is a new kind of defense system. A fleet of U.S. C-5A's, each shouldering 130 tons of helicopters, heavy artillery, tanks, trucks, folding bridges, munitions, medicine, food, fuel, and men, can make this the only country that can move an army across an ocean in a matter of hours. It is like having a military base in nearly every strategic spot on the globe.

Although the C-5A has many virtues, its main value is, as I have mentioned, its unique capability to deploy rapidly all the equipment necessary to enable our ground combat units to go into operation quickly when our treaty commitments require it.

During the late 1950's and early 1960's, the slow, range-limited propeller drive C-124 and the turboprop C-133 were the major aircraft that provided this capability. However, these aircraft cannot provide the fast deployment mobility currently required by our commitments.

The first step in improving our airlift force was the introduction of the C-141, which is currently our largest operational military jet transport. Its performance

has been outstanding. However, about 35 percent of the equipment needed by an infantry division is too large to fit in the aircraft. Such items as tanks, helicopters, and armored personnel carriers, for example, cannot be transported in the C-141.

Eight years ago, Mr. Chairman, the Air Force foresaw the unavoidable retirement of our propeller aircraft and recognized the cargo size limitations of the C-141. Accordingly, the Air Force proposed a large, fast jet aircraft designed to carry all the large items of equipment of an Army division. Further, the design allowed the deployment of the necessary personnel required to man the equipment. This unique capability to airlift the combat troops and their equipment simultaneously is vital to an effective and responsive force deployment.

The C-5A weight is about twice that of the C-141 and it has three times the range/payload capability. Carrying up to 87 Army personnel on its upper deck and 200,000 pounds of heavy equipment or vehicles in the cargo compartment, the C-5A is the heaviest aircraft ever flown—a recordholder. Yet it takes less runway to land than many commercial airliners. Its 28-wheel high flotation landing gear permits the aircraft to land on unpaved primitive airfields and is designed to adjust vertically to allow the aircraft to kneel to match cargo compartment floor heights with loading docks, trucks, and to permit drive-on and drive-off traffic. The cargo compartment has full width openings, fore and aft, which provide a drive through capability and the rear door opens in flight to permit airdrop of materials. Airdrop loads in units of up to 50,000 pounds in size are possible—quite an improvement over the C-141.

Flight testing indications are that the C-5A will successfully meet the primary mission performance requirements.

This includes such requirements as maximum payload and range, takeoff and landing distances, engine thrust and specific fuel consumption, substandard runway operations, and maintainability and reliability.

The C-5A can help deliver completely equipped combat units, support forces, and all types of supplies, including large and heavy weapons virtually anywhere in the world. The C-5A, supplemented as required by the C-141 and civil reserve air fleet, will give U.S. defense forces the capability for instant reaction to global emergencies. For the first time since the development of modern ground combat equipment, both the troops and their supporting equipment can be deployed directly by air from a base in the United States directly to a forward combat area.

The simple fact is that this airplane is the only one of its kind. It is the only aircraft we have available for the unique requirements of operational ground force mobility.

There has been considerable discussion regarding cost overruns on the development and production of the C-5A aircraft. However, mitigating circumstances over which neither the Air Force nor the contractor had any control account for some of the cost increases. Abnormal economic fluctuations or infla-

tion were reflected by increased costs of labor, overhead, material, and subcontractor costs. Other contributing factors were: Technical problems requiring redesign of the airframe; oversaturation of industry supplier capacity—a "seller's market"; use of more expensive material such as titanium and beryllium; and the application of more expensive fabrication techniques. Other reasons for this cost growth were: late specifications and changes, a tight delivery schedule, and the early phaseout of the C-141 production line.

The C-5A program initiated the new procurement technique known as the total package procurement concept. All developmental work and much of the support and production work were, under this new concept, to be procured under competition in one contract containing commitments on price, performance and schedule. However, this was not truly a total package as the contract did not include costs for initial spare parts or their replenishment depot level associated ground equipment, first destination charges facilities, or military construction.

In addition thereto, the C-5A contract was not a firm fixed-price contract. It is a fixed-price incentive contract with both cost and performance incentives.

Relatively little has been said throughout the public debate on the C-5A program about the engines for this airplane. The engine supplier, General Electric, has been able to meet the requirements of its contract with the Air Force and to deliver engines as needed at costs that do not exceed the contract ceiling prices.

Over 200 successful flights involving more than 3,000 engine flight hours have been made with the TF-39 engine manufactured by General Electric, Evendale, Ohio. To date, the total hours of factory testing and flight testing of this engine exceed 23,000 test-hours, an equivalent of 10 years of actual C-5A aircraft life. The engine has performed thus far in a very reliable manner. It has never been necessary to shut down an engine in flight, nor to abort a flight. Compared to other aircraft and engine development programs, this is indeed a remarkable record of success which attests to the greatness of this engine.

By means of factory testing some difficulties were detected during the development of this engine. Corrections were devised and proved in such a way that they were introduced into the production engines without any hold-up in aircraft production. So much effort has gone into making this engine reliable and long wearing that it will be relatively inexpensive to operate in service. General Electric feels that from the standpoint of a product that meets expected performance and delivery schedules, this is one of the most successful aircraft engine developments it has undertaken.

The legislation before us today is consistent with the maintenance of a military posture sufficient to deter aggression on the part of those who strive for world domination. In every instance the committee has worked to provide a bill which balances budgetary considerations

against the realities of power and the impact of dollars saved against the security of the Nation. The result of such considerations is the bill which is before you today. It is one to which I give my full support and recommend for your favorable consideration.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. WHITEHURST).

Mr. WHITEHURST. Mr. Chairman, the proposal to appropriate funds for additional ships for the Navy and to modernize others can only be described as a belated step in the right direction. We as a nation need to be stronger at sea, not weaker as has been so recently suggested. And I also believe that we as a nation need to understand better what the sea offers us now and will offer in the future. The point which seems not to be too well understood is that there is far more at stake here than just whether the Navy can have 35 new ships.

Our non-Communist world is essentially a maritime alliance which is a system dependent upon the sea for communications and economic prosperity as much as for defense. The success of the free societies of the world, and the political integrity of those States are anchored in an economic well-being which in turn is to be found in their trade in the world marketplace. This trade has to go by sea. We are thinking of such countries as the United States, Great Britain, Japan, West Germany, Italy, France, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. This list is not all of the free world States by any means, but it is enough to show that the political and economic fortunes of all are tied to the sea.

Even if we take the selfish viewpoint and consider only the economic health and prosperity of the United States, we find that those free seafarers as guaranteed by the Navy are mandatory for our multibillion-dollar export-import trade, and that they bring us some 60 critical raw materials without which our present way of life could not continue. To that you can add all the shipbuilding, port and yard facilities, labor and other sea-related industries. And this freedom of the seas as preserved by naval power in our hands perhaps is even more necessary if we are to think at all about any future development of those immense marine resources of all kinds which are our rightful heritage in the sea.

Most of us have a pretty good idea of how nations have used the seas from ancient times to the present. Most of us know the classic historical doctrine of the sea and how it was used to turn the tide of empires. Perhaps that has caused some of us to look at our missile-space age and say old-fashioned seapower has no place. And indeed there is not much place for old-fashioned seapower. But the thinking must not be allowed to stop at that point. What we do not know or possibly have not thought about much is how today's advances on all fronts are opening ways to use the sea in the thoroughly modern context.

As we approach the decade of the seventy's we are finding there is much more going on in the modern ocean than

the passage of ships and the swimming of fish. We find the sea itself becoming a competitive place. It is because immutable facts of world geography have placed the sophisticated nations of the world in the Northern Hemisphere near the water, and also many of the new and emerging nations. Nations are competing at sea in five distinct but related areas: the political, the economic, the area of ocean resources and the naval and strategic. The sum of a nation's capabilities in all these areas amounts to its total seapower effort. In our case the key to it all is naval strength, but it is not all naval strength by any means.

For the first 15 years after World War II we could do pretty much as we pleased on the sea because we came out of that war so strong on the sea. Then around 1960 some remarkable and quite important changes began to take place. The new competitive sea began to make itself felt. Other nations were claiming their birthrights in the world ocean. Japan, West Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy, resurging from the shambles of World War II with new economies based in good part upon sea trade, regained world political stature, even to the point of aid to less developed countries. But the country making the biggest splash was the Soviet Union. In addition to a foreign aid program almost as large as our own, the Kremlin forged a massive sea capability which had obvious political and economic talents as well as naval and maritime uses. Now, wherever a Soviet ship goes, naval, merchant, pleasure, icebreaker, fishing, or oceanographic, there also goes Soviet ideology, usually in the form of a hard sell.

Even though the United States is more than holding its own with the world's biggest and best Navy, the biggest world trade volume, and is among the leaders in ocean transport, there must be great significance to us in the rise of the seagoing activities of these other countries. And there is. What they are telling us is what we seem so reluctant to see and admit, even though we traditionally like to think of ourselves not only as a maritime power, but as historically one of the greatest. They are telling us that far from being outdated, national power at sea and national uses of the sea are going to have deep and lasting effects upon present and future world order or the lack of it.

With regard to a use of the sea in today's world, it is nearly time for us to fish or cut bait. That is why the 35 new warships which started this discussion are so important. There will be upon us very soon the hard requirement to set our total goals in the world sea, and along with that will come the equally tough requirement to balance those goals against the national capability in both technology and investment, and to weigh the benefits against the real long term costs.

We think we know something about the sea. But I wonder how much we know about the modern sea. For instance, that the modern sea sets its own imperatives—things a nation must do to realize the benefits justly due them from the

world oceans. And for instance, how tough minded the modern sea is. The sea does not care who understands its imperatives or misunderstands them, as history has shown time and time again. The only difference in our time is that onrushing technology is making both the rewards for understanding and the penalties of misunderstanding so much greater than ever before.

It may seem a trifle odd that this plea for 35 new ships for our Navy has mentioned the Navy hardly at all. Let me assure it is only a matter of putting first things first. I for one am convinced that the first problem we have at sea is the one of gaining a national understanding of what total sea power can do for us now and in the future. Once that understanding is ours, the spearhead and central element of seapower, the Navy, will never have to beg for ships.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Moss).

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, I do want to express my deep appreciation to the distinguished minority whip, and the ranking minority member on the Committee on Armed Services, for granting me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I want to agree with the observations made by my colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER) when he said there were two important things. First, there is a threat to this Nation and, second, that time is running against us in meeting that threat.

I think we ought to recognize in considering this legislation that those who do not speak enthusiastically for every item in it in the full dimension are not bleeding hearts, and their patriotism is as great as any other person, including the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services himself.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, had the gentleman been here, the gentleman would have heard me make that statement.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, I heard the statement, but I heard the continuing innuendo that went on throughout the thread of the remarks.

The fact is that the security of this Nation is also at stake here at home, and that we need some priorities assigned in this Nation. We cannot give to one department of the Government everything that it wants, as we have been doing—and I am as guilty, I think, of that as anyone. This is only the second time that I have stepped into the well to urge that we give the careful attention to priorities which are needed now, and which in my judgment have not been given, and are not reflected in the legislation now before us.

I hope that in the Committee on Appropriations a more careful consideration to those priorities will be given.

I point out to you that the industry and the business of this Nation that is not defense oriented is in deep trouble. It is in deep trouble because of the constantly escalating cost of money which is directly tied to our deep involvement and the escalating involvement in the Far East. I am not unfamiliar with that

involvement, and I am not speaking here against the military. I am speaking for a rational balance for the military in the overall availability of wealth that this Nation has to commit to its many urgent priorities—and we have urgent priorities in every city, in every community in this Nation. We have them in every agency and in every department of the Government in this Nation.

We have been working in the Commerce Committee for the past few weeks to try to create the means of having an air transport system adequate to meet the demands of a great nation.

The Committee on Ways and Means has been considering a further enhancement of the trust funds for highways.

We have a serious disruption of communications in the largest city in this Nation, the city of New York.

We have priorities in every level of education that cry out for more dollars. Yet, the only bill that comes to the floor of this House that is not significantly cut is the one affecting the armed services—and that is not an antimilitary statement. That is a statement of fact—\$47 million are cut out of a bill running to \$21.3 billion. Why that is petty change. That is small cash for the military. That can be wiped out by eliminating waste in almost any activity in which they are engaged. It is not the way for responsible legislating.

I said earlier that there was a lack of time for adequate discussion and I point out that there have been many Members who want to talk and who needed more time who were contributing to the dialog in this House and were unable to get that time. One of my colleagues, the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) wanted more time.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HALL).

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, as one who has kept "book" on closed rules and on waivers of points of order, I would like as a preamble to point out that we are operating here under an open rule with no waivers of points of order. I commend the Committee on Rules for it.

Further, I would like to say that comparisons with the actions of the other body in considering this procurement bill for a matter of 8 to 10 weeks and comparing it to the time allotted here, are odious because I think oftentimes a disservice to the Nation was performed in that discussion, although I am not adverse to public information.

I would simply summarize this by saying that never was so much said by those who were so little informed about something that maybe never should have been discussed in the first place.

Mr. Chairman, today the Committee on Armed Services brings to the Committee of the Whole for its consideration, a bill of over \$21 billion authorization for military procurement.

While the full committee met on 47 separate days, heard 73 witnesses, and published 2,660 pages of hearings testimony, this record does not show the full scope of the committee's preparation for

the bill. All of the authorization and posture hearings of prior years contributed to our preparation for this bill. Indeed, many of the questions which were asked this year, had to be with the relation of the current presentation with those of prior years. There were meetings of subcommittees which bore directly on the subject matter of the bill—and just the daily work of each of us is herein compiled. There were many trips that we took which added to our understanding of the problems of our defense in the same spirit in which the architect oversees the builder. We received a number of briefings which were not recorded as part of the hearings, including our usual classified military intelligence briefings. We have received and examined a large quantity of top classified information.

Out of all of this we have produced H.R. 14000—a 17-page bill and House Report No. 91-522, a 145-page report to which have been added 29 pages of additional views. These are the paper results of the actions of the 39 members presently on the Committee on Armed Services.

You may wonder why I have gone into these statistics in such length. I desire to review for you the history of committee operation.

As has often been quoted to you, article I, section 8, of the Constitution gives the Congress the power—among others—

To raise and support armies;
To provide and maintain a navy;
To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

Article I, section 5, further provides: Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings.

There do not appear to be any references to the use of committees in the Congress in any of the papers relating to the formation of the Union. There is no apparent reference to them in either the Federalist papers or in the debates as recorded by James Madison. However, Jefferson prepared a manual for his guidance as President of the Senate from 1797 to 1801. This manual was adopted by the House in 1837, as a guide for its deliberations in supplement to its rules.

The importance of order in the functioning of the House is stressed at the beginning of the Jefferson Manual:

It is very material that order, decency, and regularity be preserved in a dignified public body.

The Jefferson Manual is generally credited as the best statement of parliamentary law at the time that it was written. The practice of working through committees existed not only in the House of Commons in Great Britain, but also in the early colonial assemblies—for instance Pennsylvania and especially Virginia. In section XI, Jefferson clearly recognized the necessity of using committees:

Standing committees, as of Privileges and Elections &c, are usually appointed at the first meeting, to continue through the session. The person first named is generally permitted to act as chairman. But this is a matter of courtesy; every committee having a right to elect their own chairman, who presides over them, puts questions, and reports their proceedings to the House.

In its early days, the House conducted its business by the use of a number of "ad hoc" committees. Only gradually did it create standing committees. The House Committees on Military Affairs and on Naval Affairs were not formed until 1822. Under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 these two committees were joined into the present Committee on Armed Services.

At the present time the Committee on Armed Services functions in accordance with the provisions of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives:

All proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, other matters relating to the subject listed under the standing committees named below shall be referred to such committees, respectively:

3. Committee on Armed Services.
 - (a) Common defense generally.
 - (b) The Department of Defense generally, including the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force generally.
 - (c) Ammunition depots; forts, arsenals; Army, Navy, and Air Force reservations and establishments.
 - (d) Conservation, development, and use of naval petroleum and oil shale reserves.
 - (e) Pay, promotion, retirement, and other benefits and privileges of members of the armed forces.
 - (f) Scientific research and development in support of the armed services.
 - (g) Selective service.
 - (h) Size and composition of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
 - (i) Soldiers' and sailors' homes.
 - (j) Strategic and critical materials necessary for the common defense.

Acting under these rules—after extensive hearings and other preparations, the Committee on Armed Services, in regular manner, and for the orderly conduct of business of the House has brought the present bill before you today.

The responsibility of the Armed Services Committee has also been set forth in statutes. They have been repeated here once today by the distinguished ranking minority member, and I shall not repeat them again except to add that we should also be cognizant of the responsibility of our committee for oversight, surveillance, and review of an add-on, added like the tail of a dog, which has been sutured by the Curtis-McCormack amendment to an appropriation bill, which has been much misinterpreted and much misconstrued to broaden the present Department of Defense with its oversight of the three constitutionally formed armed services, and I would refer you to the supplemental views in the report of the Joint Committee on the Reorganization of the Congress to find out what I think about this appendage and its need for reamputation.

Before 1959, only military construction and construction of naval vessels required authorization. Starting with Public Law 86-149 of August 10, 1959, the Department of Defense has been required to seek authorization for various kinds of procurement in addition to those items. This requirement was expanded by Public Law 87-436—1962—Public Law 88-174—1963—and Public Law 89-37—1965. Today the procurement of all aircraft, missiles, tracked vehicles and naval vessels as well as all research and

development has to be authorized. This means that these areas receive special scrutiny by the Armed Services Committees on a line-item basis, before the services can go to the Appropriations Committees to receive the funds involved.

In the present bill, we are further expanding this authorization responsibility to include other vehicles, weapons, and munitions.

Having the responsibility of providing for the common defense by raising and supporting armies and providing and maintaining a navy, your Committee on Armed Services has exercised its responsibility by recommending H.R. 14000. This has been done, Mr. Chairman, after backgrounding, prayerful consideration, perception hopefully, and prudent judgment always; based on the sum total answer to three hauntingly persistent and logically basic questions:

First. If not us, whom?

Second. If not there, where?

Third. How else with freedom and honor?

Today there is opposition to the bill the Committee on Armed Services has almost unanimously approved. The opposition has not had the responsibility that this committee bears. Nor has it had the benefit of extensive hearings and testimony from those in the executive branch charged with carrying out the laws relating to our national security. Nor has it received the voluminous amount of classified information which has been made available to the entire Committee on Armed Services.

I have carefully reviewed the materials which have been published from time to time in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD as constituting the work of the "loyal opposition." I must say that there is one gaping omission in their work. There is much discussion of the costs of various military operations. However, there is little relation to the threat we are facing. The Committee on Armed Services has very carefully set forth the major portions of the threat, starting at page 8 of its report. Remember always, our committee is a committee on defense as indeed our Armed Services are defense forces.

Your Committee on Armed Services has long been concerned with the apparent rush of the Soviets to overtake us in the matter of nuclear arms. In order to highlight this problem, we asked the American Security Council to examine the relation between our nuclear arms and those of the Soviets from all unclassified sources. That report, "The Changing Strategic Military Balance, U.S.A. versus U.S.S.R.," was printed as a committee print so that it could receive congressional distribution. This was later followed by "The ABM and the Changed Strategic Military Balance, U.S.S.R. versus U.S.A.," published privately. The committee asked the American Security Council to examine the maritime situation from unclassified sources. That report, "The Changing Strategic Naval Balance, U.S.S.R. versus U.S.A.," was published as a committee print so that it, too, could receive congressional distribution. More recently

our Subcommittee on Seapower issued its report, "The Status of Naval Ships," which has received widespread distribution.

The lesson from all of these unclassified sources—as well as inherent knowledge from a large number of classified sources—is that the Soviets are exerting every effort to better us, not only in strategic nuclear weapons but also in the naval-maritime field. These are two fields in which we have always thought we should predominate. Our ocean borders and friendly neighbors across our boundaries, require it. Our freedom-loving world allies rely upon us.

The report of the Committee on Armed Services this year goes very carefully into the threat. It considers the growing and expanding nuclear threat from the Soviets—not only in numbers, but in sizes of warheads as compared to our posture which has been voluntarily static for a considerable time.

As we go into the multiple warheads for our missiles, the Soviets will also make a similar development. Since their warheads can be much larger, they can either multiply more warheads or multiply larger warheads—in either instance gaining further advantage over us.

In the naval-maritime field we know that the Soviets have produced not only a new navy—but also a new merchant marine, and all since World War II. It is timely that Jane's Fighting Ships says that the Soviets are ahead in new construction and have built a navy "to be reckoned with." On the other hand, he has discouraging remarks to make about the U.S. Navy:

All the same, prodigious though the recent shipbuilding effort has been, especially in the fields of nuclear-powered submarine construction and guided missile development, the U.S. Navy has not overcome its block obsolescence problem. Most of the U.S. aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, escorts and minesweepers, refitted or not, are a quarter of a century old. War potential though they could still just be, they are becoming a liability.

While we have been slow to develop new airplanes—having only had the C-5A, the F-111, and the F-107 in the past few years, the Soviets have been coming out with at least six new fighters and a new bomber as well as a new supersonic transport.

While we have stopped construction of our Polaris submarines, and have only just started two classes of new fast or quiet attack submarines, the Soviets have been coming out with several new classes of both missile and attack submarines.

The review of the Soviet technology shows that it is carefully developed—primarily with the military needs in mind. The Soviet schools are turning out more scientists and engineers now than our schools are—and of course the Soviets can direct them into the fields where they are needed—they are not free to seek employment where they will.

Against this background, Mr. Chairman, our committee has endorsed a bill for over \$21 billion in procurement of missiles, planes, tracked vehicles, naval vessels and research and development.

In one major respect we have gone beyond what the executive branch has asked for—because our committee has long recognized the need for rebuilding the Navy. Unless we are already too late, the time to start that rebuilding is now. We have provided for nearly \$1 billion more for shipbuilding than was requested by the President. We have long been studying the "block-obsolescence" of the Navy. We have recognized the necessity of getting new capital ships. We must have new aircraft carriers, new destroyers, new frigates and new submarines. We also must have new support ships—for our warships cannot function properly if there is delay and problems in replenishing them.

It is against this background of the committee's responsibility and the committee's study of the threat that we are recommending the bill that is before you today. I commend it to your passage.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the distinguished ranking majority Member of the House on our committee, the gentleman from Massachusetts, Representative PHILBIN, such time as he may consume.

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the pending bill.

The bill is necessary to continue the quality and adequacy of our national defense into the 1970's. It must be remembered that this House has a very heavy responsibility, not only to meet the present day needs of our Armed Forces but to prepare for our national defense in the future and make sure it is sufficient to meet all our defense needs.

The Soviets have been modernizing and improving their forces at a surprising rate, and are rapidly pulling ahead in some crucial respects. We must be strong enough to deter Soviet aggression in the decade ahead as in the decades past until total peace comes to this troubled world.

I know this bill comes at a difficult time when people feel frustrated by the tragic burdens and uncertainties of the Vietnam war and the need to solve pressing domestic problems.

But we must not let these unhappy frustrations blind us to the real needs of overall defense so urgently needed at this time, and until, through our most vigorous efforts and concern, we succeed in pressing the Soviet with the urgency of world peace.

All of us very much hope the strategic arms limitation talks—SALT—will begin soon and we will do all in our power to help the President to press for this vital project and work unitedly for its success.

But we cannot let our guard down until some definite agreement can be reached.

With reference to our economy efforts, it should be noted that in approving this \$21.3 billion authorization bill, we authorized \$7,421,400,000 for R.D.T. & E. However, but we also reduced the R.D.T. & E. funds by \$801 million, and the sum of \$260 million from the item for tank procurement, and other sizable cuts. This is a stringent budget.

Moreover, the committee, in response

to what we feel are the wishes of the House for greater emphasis on Defense spending cuts, has put language in the bill to expand the authorization function next year.

This will add authorization jurisdiction to all weapons, all vehicles and all ammunition. This is an additional workload for our committee, adding about \$3 billion in authorizations to the committee's responsibility. But we feel a more thorough review has to be made, we believe the House wants it made and we propose to perform this most vital task.

In summary, this bill provides the present arms requirements of our military services and provides the new systems—such as the C-5A, the F-15, the F-14, the Sam-D, the AMSA and others—that our forces will need in the future to keep this country, its homes and its people safe and secure and help keep the lamps of freedom lighted throughout the world.

I will have more to say about the contents and issues of this very costly, but essential legislation later in the debate and amendment stage since there are other specific provisions that I intend to discuss at some length.

The committee wants all Members of the House to have every opportunity to debate and amend this bill, but we do not believe it requires a 10-week debate such as was experienced in the other body, nor do we believe that amendments should be presented that may be harmful to the bill's adequacy and effectiveness as an instrument for rounding out the national defense, and giving heart and courage to struggling peoples and minorities who are living under the dark shadows and threats of dictatorial governments.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, to a young man who has made a great impact on this Congress, the distinguished Member from New York (Mr. LOWENSTEIN) I yield 5 minutes.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the graciousness of the eloquent chairman of the committee, and I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss for a few minutes the general problem confronting the Congress as we consider this particular bill.

It is not possible, of course, to discuss in detail a bill of this magnitude in the time allotted. What I will do is try to explain some of the things that worry me, and underscore some of the questions that the bill raises for many Americans.

In the first place, all of us agree that the security of this country is primary if we are to survive, and so to have time to resolve other problems. Since that is so, there is neither occasion nor excuse, as the distinguished chairman said, to either impugn the motives or the character of those who oppose—or who support, for that matter—any particular item in the bill.

Second, many of us who have served in the Armed Forces of this country, who have supported its policies in previous wars—who have swum against the tide, at times when isolationism was rampant—many of us share the determination that this country must never forget its obligation to contribute to collective security and to cooperate in the develop-

ment of international institutions that will bring the world closer to peace and social justice.

This is not the time to discuss the merits of the war in Vietnam, but precisely because I am afraid of a renewed isolationism dominating the thinking of the American people, I want to warn that we are inviting exactly that by continuing on our present course there. Nor has the President's failure to answer important questions about the war—and the odd suggestion that his failure to answer these questions should inspire prolonged silence from those who have been asking them so patiently for so long—nor has this attitude gained time or support for his position on these matters.

Since World War II the United States has spent \$1.4 trillion on defense, and we spend today on defense \$1,000 per taxpayer per year. We spend more on defense than is spent by all levels of Government for health and education, old age assistance, housing, and agriculture. In fact, the Government spends more money on defense than the total profits of all American private enterprise combined.

The budget for ammunition in 1 year in Vietnam alone now equals the entire Federal budget for education and health.

In short, we have not been what one could call neglectful of our defense needs, when it has come to spending money. Nor are we militarily vulnerable.

We have the only intercontinental bomber force in the world. We have enough thermonuclear weapons to destroy everyone everywhere repeatedly. We have the only naval carrier force in the world, and the only worldwide helicopter force.

We are the only country that now maintains a ring of military bases of great magnitude around the world at the cost of billions of dollars.

It has been said repeatedly today—and there will be no argument about it—that the Soviet Union is the chief external source of danger to our security. This bill adds almost \$1 billion to the request of the Department of Defense for funds for naval construction. Yet note the primacy of our position *viz-a-viz* the Soviet Union in key categories of naval strength:

Attack aircraft carrier, nuclear:	
U.S.A. -----	1
U.S.S.R. -----	0
Attack aircraft carrier:	
U.S.A. -----	15
U.S.S.R. -----	0
ASW support aircraft carrier:	
U.S.A. -----	7
U.S.S.R. -----	0
Battleship:	
U.S.A. -----	1
U.S.S.R. -----	0
Guided missile cruiser, nuclear:	
U.S.A. -----	1
U.S.S.R. -----	0
Guided missile cruiser:	
U.S.A. -----	3
U.S.S.R. -----	0
Guided missile light cruiser:	
U.S.A. -----	6
U.S.S.R. -----	1
Guided missile destroyer:	
U.S.A. -----	28
U.S.S.R. -----	5
Fleet ballistic missile submarine, nuclear:	
U.S.A. -----	41
U.S.S.R. -----	15

Thus it seems reasonable to ask what security considerations justify the expenditures now before us for approval. And to ask, more profoundly, how we can attain a lasting security—to ask what the greatest threat is to our security, and how that threat can best be met. Is it not possible that our proper concern about threats from abroad has gradually transfixed us into forgetting—or ignoring what has been going on much nearer by?

I fear for the security of my country. I fear too for its health. I fear for its happiness. I believe we are plunging headlong, mostly by habit, almost by inertia, into programs and attitudes that have frustrated and alienated a vast number of our people, until it is no longer certain that we can hold together the delicate fabric that makes democracy function. Is this state of affairs not a threat to the national security, to the national well-being, that deserves some sense of urgency from those charged with the security and well-being of the Republic?

We have produced a generation of young Americans a large part of which would employ any ruse or device to stay out of the same Armed Forces that so many of us used ruses and devices to get in. Yet these are dedicated, intelligent, patriotic young Americans. They are in any case the only young Americans we have. I think it is a measure of the erosion of our security that so many of our young people have come to feel this way about the Armed Forces of their country.

Nor will it help this situation to vilify the vast number of people who feel this way. It might, of course, help to try to find out why they feel this way, and then to do something about the cause of this attitude. It might even help national security, if easing mistrust and division is still considered relevant to national security.

But I am afraid the erosion of our security will continue as long as millions of Americans believe that their problems are not of primary concern to the people who make the decisions—that is, to us.

Alas, the voices of these millions of Americans are not heard here nearly as widely or as frequently as they are in the country at large. That, in its way, is not a help to our security.

So I am very concerned about the future of America, however great our supply of missiles and warships. Is it not clear to everyone by now what will happen to this blessed land if it fails to find the energy and use the resources necessary to overcome the socioeconomic and psychopolitical problems that are leading us toward unraveling at home?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. May I have an additional 2 minutes, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. RIVERS. How much time do I have remaining, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has 29 minutes remaining.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I will settle for 1 minute.

Mr. RIVERS. I yield the gentleman 2 minutes. If I do not have sufficient time, I will find it somewhere. The gentleman is doing pretty well for his side.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I appreciate the

consideration of the chairman and his kind comment.

What I want to say in these last 2 minutes is that many people are watching—more than ever before—how we are going to deal with the threats to the future of this Nation that have nothing to do with the Soviet Union. We can hold our own when we are attacked from abroad. Can we do as well when the danger is from bitterness, division, and the neglected needs of millions of our own people? The voting on the amendments that will be offered to this bill during the next day or two will provide a clue.

I hope everyone here will understand the motives of those of us who cannot support this bill as it now stands, when we urge a reconsideration of the question of whether it is in the best interest of this country to give more money to the Defense Department than it has asked, even recalling the traditional modesty of its requests.

I hope this House will study these amendments bearing in mind what "security" in a free society must encompass. I hope we will vote on them in the light of other needs and expenses so long deferred, in the light of the tax burden inflation, and of the profound resentments now exploding among some of the minority groups that are so pronouncedly underrepresented here as we make these decisions that affect their lives as much as they affect ours. How good it would be if we could emerge from the voting on these amendments unified in voting adequate sums for the military defense of this country, and galvanized to do as much to defend it in other ways as well. I have great respect for the labors of this committee and of its chairman and staff. Their job was to consider military requirements. Our job is to put those considerations into the context of the larger requirements of the whole society, to weigh relative needs and costs, to consider the Nation's security and well-being in its totality.

The debate here on these critical matters will be over very soon. But that is not the end of the story. That debate will rage at length throughout the country because this bill is of special, almost unique, importance. It represents a vast outlay of money, and it will determine direction on critical questions for many years to come. But it also has great symbolic significance for a nation deeply troubled and divided, and in such circumstances it would be gravely irresponsible to vote on amendments by rote or by slogan. Men elected in parallel procedures have equal obligations to consider what is best for the country before they make far-reaching decisions. It is not in derogation of the committee report to suggest that in matters that affect everyone so profoundly, the committee's point of view must be weighed against other points of view, and then a balance must be struck.

We will not stint on money necessary for military security. We must stop stinting in the intensity of our inquiry to see what money is indeed necessary for this purpose, and we must start inquiring urgently what else we must do if we are to survive as a contented people.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5

minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. RYAN).

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chairman of the committee yielding this time to me, giving me the opportunity to raise some very important questions which are implicit in the bill before us.

H.R. 14000 would authorize appropriations of \$21.35 billion—\$21,347,860,000—for the procurement of certain weapons systems and research development, test, and evaluation. It is \$1.29 billion more than the Senate authorized, including \$1.02 billion for new ship construction which the administration did not request. This bill is almost one-fourth of the entire military budget for fiscal year 1970.

According to the Joint Economic Committee, 80 percent of this Nation's "relatively controllable Federal outlays" are military expenditures.

While no one disputes the need to finance the legitimate defense needs of the Nation, I am concerned about the magnitude of the military budget, its relationship to the budget for urgent civilian needs, and the imbalance in national priorities which it represents.

For too many years Congress has given unquestioning approval to the military budget and accepted without serious debate the assumptions upon which it is predicated. At last the Congress is beginning to scrutinize military spending and to ask questions. The long debate in the Senate, the well-reasoned additional views of our colleagues on the Armed Services Committee, and the debate on the amendments to be offered on this bill—all indicate that Congress has a role to exercise in the formulation of defense policy. Congress should no longer permit the Pentagon to set policy.

Of course, we must not forget that this authorization bill underwrites and continues to finance the war in Vietnam, a war which continues to rage on at a cost of some \$30 billion a year. There is no end in sight, for unfortunately this administration seems unable to change the basic strategy of the previous administration.

In considering the bill before us, we should ask whether or not Congress is willing to exercise its responsibility or simply rubberstamp Pentagon requests which have been enlarged by the Committee on Armed Services.

We should ask whether or not Congress will continue to support the tragic war in Vietnam or use the only means which it possesses, that is, the power of the purse, to bring this war to a prompt conclusion.

We should ask whether or not the crucial and urgent domestic needs of our society will continue to play a role subservient to that of the military.

This bill contains many items which challenge our willingness to answer these questions and to make crucial decisions.

Amendments will be offered to reshape expenditures for these items, and the votes on these amendments will show whether or not we are ready to begin to make decisions on priorities and exercise effectively our responsibility.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to point

out some of the areas of concern in this bill.

There are some \$746.4 million for the Safeguard ABM system. In the past I opposed deployment of the Sentinel system, and the same basic objections apply to the Safeguard system. It threatens to upset the already delicate strategic balance, poison the climate for the strategic limitation talks, and to encourage escalation of the arms race.

The bill provides funds for research and development, and procurement for chemical and biological warfare. This program seems to have little relevance to national security requirements and raises grave legal and moral questions. Congress should insist at a minimum on certain guidelines for the development, testing, procurement, storage, and disposal of these weapons.

The \$940 million allocated for the C-5A jet transport includes funds for a fourth squadron—23 airplanes in addition to the 58 airplanes already authorized and programmed. The fourth squadron has not been justified. Moreover, not only are there technical problems but there has already been a cost overrun of at least \$1.3 billion which means the total program will cost about \$2 billion more than the Air Force originally said it would.

Serious questions have been raised about other items in this bill—the advanced manned strategic aircraft; the short-range attack missile for which the Senate deleted procurement funds until the results of new research and development are available; the Cobra helicopter which the Senate did not fund.

The Defense Department asked for \$2,631.4 million for naval vessels. This was cut by the Senate to \$2,568.2 million. The House Armed Services Committee has approved \$3,591,500,000—\$961 million more than the Defense Department asked for and \$1,023.3 million more than authorized by the Senate.

Then there is the \$52 million which the committee has added for the so-called freedom fighter aircraft. A total of \$14 million for the F-5-21 was included on March 27 in the supplemental military procurement authorization bill for fiscal year 1969, but was not acted upon by the Senate. In opposing this project on March 27, I pointed out that this was nothing more than a subsidy to Northrup Aviation to build the F-5-21 for sale abroad and that our Air Force had no plans to incorporate the plane in its inventory.

There are just a few of the examples of unnecessary or unwarranted expenditures in this bill.

I might mention one item that is not in the bill—the manned orbiting laboratory. For years I pointed out that the MOL was a duplication of a similar NASA program. A year ago the Secretary of the Air Force refused to brief individual Members of Congress on the project. On September 12, 1968, I offered an amendment to the Defense appropriations bill to reduce it by 8.5 percent. Included in my amendment, which was based on a well-documented study by Congressional Quarterly, was the deletion of \$550 million for the MOL. Unfortunately, my amendment was not adopt-

ed, but now the Department of Defense has abandoned MOL because, in its words, of the "first, continuing urgency of reducing Federal defense spending and, second, advances in automated techniques for unmanned satellite systems."

This kind of waste cannot be allowed to continue. The amount of money that was spent for the manned orbiting laboratory could have been spent to feed the hungry, build better housing, provide better health and medical care for our citizens, and provide every American child the opportunity to obtain a good education.

We cannot allow massive funds to continue to be used wastefully for military spending while we ignore our problems at home. Out of every \$100 of tax money received by the Federal Government, \$67 goes to military spending: past wars, the war in Vietnam, and preparation for future conflicts.

This leaves \$33 for this Nation's urgent needs: housing, food, education, health care, social security, transportation, and other domestic programs.

The imbalance in our priorities is clear. To support H.R. 14000 is to support that imbalance and to strengthen the military-industrial complex while domestic social programs are being starved.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the distinguished chairman of the Democratic Study Group, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER).

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I wish to thank the chairman of the Armed Services Committee for the courtesy of accommodating me with an additional minute and for affording me the original block of time despite the fact that I am not a member of the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. Chairman, one of the reasons we have to look carefully at this bill is that by our action we shall determine whether there will be what is commonly called a post-Vietnam dividend available to meet the domestic concerns of our country.

When one looks at the \$7 billion in this bill for research, development, testing and evaluation, one can readily identify items which will soon blossom into multi-billion dollar expenditures, using up the \$30 billion that would otherwise be available for nonmilitary purposes at the end of the conflict in Vietnam. There is R.D.T. & E. money in this bill for MIRV, ABM, SRAM, AWACS, SAM-D, SCAD, Phoenix, AMSA, AX, AGMX-3, CONDOR, Maverick, TOW, MBT-70, biological weapons and the F-14 and F-15 fighters.

When we start these weapons systems down the road by authorizing research and development and the testing, we set off an inevitable chain reaction. These weapons systems gain momentum of their own, leading to high levels of defense expenditures in later years.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRASER. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. McCARTHY. I wonder if the gentleman might be able to answer a ques-

tion that is perplexing to me, one to which I cannot get an answer?

Why is it that the other body was able to pass unanimously an amendment that would put restrictions on the testing and transportation and disposal of germ and gas warfare weapons which would answer many of the problems that have arisen in this country regarding the safety of our own citizens? Why is it that an amendment like that, one which has been approved by the Secretary of Defense and passed by the other body unanimously, with such bipartisan support as was given by such "unilateral disarmers" as the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), and the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND) all of whom voted for it—why would an amendment like that be voted down in the Armed Services Committee on the House side?

Mr. FRASER. I actually am at a loss to understand why the committee should not allow what seems on its face to be a commonsense amendment.

In this regard, I want to pay tribute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. McCARTHY) in connection with his excellent work on the problems of chemical and biological warfare.

Mr. McCARTHY. Thank you for that compliment but that was not my purpose in arising. I wanted to focus on the fact that the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEDZI) will offer basically the same amendment that passed the other body unanimously. It actually has been changed slightly at the behest of the Pentagon, and it is not even as strong as the one that passed the other body unanimously. I would hope that the Members would give some serious thought to the question. This specific amendment does not deal so much with our posture abroad as it does with the safety of our own citizens in the United States with regard to the transportation of these lethal materials across the United States, and their testing.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield for an answer to the question raised by the gentleman from New York?

Mr. FRASER. I would state that possibly later.

I just want to say—

Mr. STRATTON. I thought the gentleman was seeking information.

Mr. FRASER. Would the gentleman permit me to use my own time?

I understand that the amendment that the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. NEDZI) will offer, will not cost any money, or will not add or subtract any money but provides safeguards that the Department of Defense has agreed to. Is that the understanding of the gentleman?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is right. It would for the first time inform the Congress about what is going on in this program, and remove some of the excessive secrecy that has in effect blanked out most Members of this body and the other body from knowing some of the basic things that are going on in this business of chemical and biological warfare.

Mr. FRASER. I thank the gentleman for his comments.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that bipartisanship is not misused to cover over legitimate differences or to become the fountain for disagreement.

I think that the failure of partisanship occurred during the years involving our deeper and deeper involvement in Vietnam. Day after day on the floor of this House we heard pleas for unanimity behind the President.

I believe it is not right to insist on unanimity when there are serious and important questions to be asked—questions about premises, and about objectives for policies that have led us into the kind of war we have gotten into in Vietnam.

I hope this Nation will never engage in finger pointing at the past, but only learn from that experience. We must understand that honest and open debate is far preferable to cries for unanimity which obscure the actions that the public should be informed about.

Finally, there are just two points that I hope may be cleared up under the 5-minute rule.

There has been reference today to an unidentified threat that the Soviets are indeed, contrary to the knowledge that we have had in the past, planning a new strategic bomber force. This allegation—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota has expired.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. FRASER. This allegation is made in support of the advanced manned strategic aircraft—AMSA. If there is hard intelligence on this, the House ought to know all about it.

Second, I hope that along the way there will be an explanation of the testimony of Under Secretary Packard in which he said that an effort is being made to achieve a hard target capability for the Poseidon missile. This has only one meaning, and that is the capacity to destroy the enemy's missile silos. And if we acquire that capacity, the Soviets then would have legitimate reason to believe that we have acquired a first-strike capability and are no longer willing to rely on our ability to retaliate if we or our allies are attacked.

I hope these questions will be explored, and will be answered in the debate which will follow when we move into the amending stage.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON).

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman from Illinois yielding.

I have been present here in the Chamber for all but about 10 minutes this afternoon as this debate has proceeded. Very frankly, as it has gone on I have not been sorry that I made an issue, as I did earlier, of the somewhat scant amount of time allotted for general debate on this bill.

The debate has been good on this issue. It has been a reasonable debate. It has been a restrained debate. It has been

the kind of responsible discussion of the critical and crucial issues that confront our country and I think possibly we ought to have more.

You know I think it is merely a matter of coincidence that the speakers who have preceded me in the well, at least the last three or four gentlemen, happen to be prominent leading members of the Democratic study group. Well, I would not want you to think that economy stops at the center aisle. I would not want the country to think there are not responsible Republican Members in this Chamber. I do think we do have the responsibility even in this great committee to try to take an intelligent and reasoned look at this very important segment of the budget.

I picked up a copy of Fortune magazine not long ago, the August 1969 issue, and that is scarcely I think a publication of the left wing. What did I see? The lead article in it related to a cut in the defense budget.

I saw the testimony the other day—I heard it or I read it—of a rather distinguished and I think eminently conservative gentleman in this country, Mr. William McChesney Martin. He said he would like to see the defense budget in this country cut down to \$15 billion.

So I do not think you are being radical, I do not think you are being left wing, I do not think you are being irresponsible if you suggest cuts, with all due deference to this great committee, and it is a great committee. I appreciate the fact that they worked for 6 months and have had 91 meetings. But somehow, gentlemen, I think we have to understand this: some of the old ways that we have grown very comfortable with and have grown very accustomed to over the years, I do not think are quite good enough any longer so far as the discussion of public issues is concerned.

With all due respect to my friend the gentleman from Missouri, I cannot agree that the debate that took place in the other body was one that seriously and dangerously compromised the security of our country.

I think the people of this country expect not only the Chamber on the other side of the Capitol but also this Chamber, being the co-equal body that it is, to engage in the same kind of discussion and the same kind of analysis. That is why I made the plea that I did earlier for more time. I am glad we have had this debate, and I hope we may have more like it in the days to come.

I do not think any of us should hang our heads in shame. I do not attack the chairman of the committee or the members of the committee. They are some of the most valuable Members of this House.

I do not rise even to make a broad gaged, broad scale attack against this bill. I would express the hope that we can calmly and dispassionately and reasonably perhaps look at the task that confronts us and decide whether or not we can make some selective cuts.

I think under the conditions that exist in our country, given the budgetary procedures within which we must operate, that this is only discharging the duty that a responsible legislator has.

As a duty to my constituents, from the letters I received from people wondering why we have been spending so much money in this area, I would be the first to admit, as I said a minute ago, to the necessity of giving up some of the old and comfortable ways that we have become so accustomed to.

I would be the first to admit that I have not been as interested as I should have been in times past, and I have not taken the time to look into some of these areas as perhaps I should have done.

Let me, if I have a minute before my time is up, say I read with interest a section of this very excellent report devoted to the subject of MIRV. Much of what I read I like, but there are a couple of statements to which I would have to respectfully take exception. For example, they said in this report:

It is for this very reason that prudence dictates that we should be disturbed about a large force of large-sized and accurate Soviet MIRV's.

It is precisely for this reason, because I was concerned about the possible potential threat to our own land-based deterrent, that I joined with more than 100 Members of the House some weeks ago in urging that we have a mutual moratorium in this area.

At that time we did not know whether we were going to have the SALT talks. Since that time I think it is very apparent that we are going to have those talks. I think it also has become apparent that the administration, the people downtown, are impressed by the urgency of this issue. They are impressed by the fact that a quarter of the Members of this body were sufficiently concerned to file a resolution of the kind that I mention. So I think it is going to be a negotiable issue. It is going to be high—and I hope very high—on the agenda of that forthcoming conference, and it certainly should be.

I am not going to offer any amendment to try to delete any funds dealing with that program because that would be in the nature of a unilateral action. I have never proposed a unilateral action. But I do deeply feel the wisdom of trying to engage in some mutual action that may help us to secure the security of this country that we all want.

The thing to which I did take exception in the report was the language contained on page 36, at which point the committee suggests that you can get deterrents in two ways. You can build credible deterrents in two ways. You can install more boosters, which is very expensive, or, they say, you can go on and do what they are doing with these programs. You can MIRV all our weapons. I quote the report:

In reality it constitutes nothing more than a more efficient and less expensive method of creating a credible deterrent to a potential enemy whose intentions can never be known with any real certainty.

I would not want that language to pass without my at least issuing my personal caveat that I think something more is involved than just doing something more cheaply. I think that this can be and is potentially a destabilizing thing so far as the whole strategic arms race is con-

cerned. I know the administration is concerned about it. If they were not, they would not be agreeing to sitting down and talking with the other side about a possible limitation of strategic arms.

I think we should be mindful that whenever we discuss this subject that what we are endorsing is not giving up any military advantage. Far from it. Rather, to take these reasonable and rational actions that will preserve our land-based nuclear deterrent, that will give us the security to keep us strong and the No. 1 power in the world.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON).

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. GUBSER. Before the gentleman takes the floor, I would like to take note of the fact that he has chaired a subcommittee which has investigated the Sheridan-Shillelagh system. I assumed he will be speaking on that subject.

I would like to say at this time that never in my 17 years in Congress have I served under a more dedicated and enlightened leadership than the gentleman from New York has provided. I think he has done a great service, and the remarks he will make should be listened to intently by the entire House.

Mr. STRATTON. I certainly deeply appreciate the remarks of my friend from California, a very able and very patient member of the subcommittee.

Mr. Chairman, I take this time, as we are moving toward the end of this great debate on this subject, to try to comment on a point that I think has been largely overlooked.

The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON) spoke a moment ago very eloquently about the need to cut. We have to cut here, in defense, as we have to cut elsewhere, he said.

The gentleman from New York (Mr. RYAN) suggested a moment ago that the Committee on Armed Services is really just an outpost of the Pentagon, rubberstamping their suggestions except when we try to raise them.

There has been a good deal of comment made on the fact that this bill includes an increase of \$1 billion in ship construction funds over the requests of the Department of Defense.

But what has been overlooked, I think very largely, although there has been some reference to it, is that we have also made cuts in this bill. We have cut very substantially, for example, in the field of Army tanks by over a quarter of a billion dollars. And I think it ought also to be pointed out that those cuts have not been made merely because of any feeling in our bones that defense ought to be cut or because of the application of any meat-ax or any antimilitary approach, but on the basis of a very careful investigation conducted by our committee through the agency of its special investigating subcommittee.

For after all, we do have in our committee a responsibility to oversee the operations of the Defense Department—not just to pass laws and authorize money and rubberstamp; we also have a

responsibility to look over very closely what they have done.

And this is nothing new in our committee, either. The very distinguished gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT) chaired that investigating subcommittee for many years, and he struck terror into the hearts of many a general and many an admiral when they appeared before him. The distinguished gentleman from Virginia, a former Member of this body, Mr. Hardy, also chaired this subcommittee and he too took a very close look indeed at the expenditures of the Defense Department and its contractors.

This year, as the gentleman from California has indicated, the subcommittee did indeed have an opportunity to look into the Army tank program, and as a result of that investigation we found evidences of waste and duplication. We made our recommendations to the full committee.

And that full committee, which some people say will do only what the uniformed services want them to do, accepted these recommendations unanimously. We have, in fact, not only reduced the tank funds in this bill below what the Department wanted, but we have also cut out even more than the Senate tried to do—and more even than the amendments that were offered on the Senate floor and then later withdrawn—perhaps because we had the advantage of some careful knowledge and investigation in this field.

We have reduced, for example, the proposal for the development of a Tow missile by \$156 million. Why? Because the Tow missile represents an almost exact duplicate of the Shillelagh missile, already produced for use with the Sheridan tank. Since the Army regards both as about equal in reliability and lethality, and since the Tow cost twice as much as the Shillelagh, this duplication seemed to us to be both an unnecessary and an extravagant expense. So we knocked out this money for the Tow missile because it was wasteful that we should be trying to do the same thing with two different missiles.

We knocked out \$57.6 million for the production of additional Sheridan tanks, a tank that is perhaps better known because of the headline that appeared some time ago that it was a "billion-dollar booby." I am not sure whether that designation is completely accurate, but the fact of the matter is we have hundreds of Sheridans now, today, sitting around unused in Army warehouses, as our subcommittee found out. So we have allowed in this bill only the money needed to complete the present contract for these tanks. After that buy is completed we are insisting that the Army fix these hundreds of Sheridans that are sitting around unused instead of contracting for still more off the assembly line.

We also knocked out \$23.8 million for the M-60 tank because of a continuing failure to adapt this weapon to the Sheridan gun system; and we knocked out \$25.4 million for the production of additional pilot models of the MBT-70, that makes a total of \$262 million.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I wish the gentleman from New York would say the reason we are finishing this contract for the Sheridans is that it would cost equally as much to terminate the contract. So we will continue the inventories with the hope that somewhere down the line the suggested improvements made by the distinguished subcommittee will be forthcoming. We cannot possibly reduce this.

Mr. STRATTON. The chairman is absolutely correct. It would cost more to terminate the contract because of the termination costs involved than it would cost to complete the contract. But we are refusing to allow the Army to buy any new Sheridans after that contract is over.

To cut out Sheridan procurement short of this total contract figure would have involved the Army in costly termination charges. But any purchases of additional Sheridans beyond those covered in the original contract would be completely unwarranted. The Army already has hundreds of Sheridans sitting around unused in warehouses or storage yards across the country. To be sure, these stored Sheridans do need various retrofits before they can be utilized. The Army would prefer to buy new ones, fresh off the assembly line, than take the trouble to fix up the ones they already have on hand. But this would be a most wasteful procedure—especially in a program that has already seen far too much waste—and the full committee approved our recommendation that we reject it.

With regard to our action on the MBT-70, let me just make this additional point: Even the Army does not know where it is going on the MBT-70. It is holding a top-level meeting on this very question with the Germans, who are cooperating with us in building the tank, in December. We left in the bill the money needed for further research and development on this new tank, but we deleted funds that had been requested to build additional pilot models. They have enough pilots already, and obviously until a decision is made as to just where this program is headed, it would be wasteful to start construction of any further prototypes. If it turns out that extra construction funds are urgently needed after the Army has made its decision as to where they are going, they can always come back to Congress for supplemental appropriations or for a reprogramming.

Now, if I have another minute remaining, let me point out that while there has been criticism of this naval shipbuilding add-on to our bill, I am a little bit surprised at the people who have been suggesting we do not need a ship modernization program. Even the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) sent out a letter to all Members of the House suggesting we do not need it, because we have so many more ships than the Russians sailing around the seas. Surely the gentleman who is a very able member of our Antisubmarine Warfare Subcommittee knows of the recent dramatic advances in Soviet submarine power. Surely

he knows the truth of our relative strength does not lie in playing a crude, oversimplified numbers game.

I would like to invite the attention of Members to a report by "Jane's Fighting Ships," which is certainly not a subsidiary of the House Armed Services Committee. The Washington Post this morning, if you got a copy, had a report that the editor of Jane's Fighting Ships said today:

The United States Navy faces a crisis—

That is, a crisis of obsolescence. Here is the full article, let me read it:

The Soviet Union soon will have one of the most sophisticated and largest navies in the world, but the United States Navy faces a crisis, the editor of Jane's Fighting Ships said today in a foreword to the 72nd edition.

The Russians are using their fleet to fill the naval void left in the Atlantic, the Northwest Pacific and Indian Oceans which was left as Britain withdraws her decreasing forces to the home islands and the Mediterranean, Raymond Blackman said.

"The U.S. Navy still has not overcome its block obsolescence problem mentioned in these pages six years ago when most of the United States' aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, escorts and minesweepers built during the war were already 20 years old," the editor said.

Mr. Chairman, that is what we are trying to do in this bill, by providing funds to modernize our Navy. We are trying to do something now to overcome this crisis of obsolescence.

Let me quote too from someone else who is not usually regarded as a leading member of the industrial-military complex. In fact, he has had his own problems with the military "brass." I speak of none other than Vice Adm. Hyman G. Rickover. Chairman RIVERS has already put his letter in full in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Members will find it on page 27766, in the RECORD. I believe all ought to read this great statement.

Here is what Admiral Rickover says:

They are the foundation of the future nuclear-powered Navy for which you have worked so long and so hard—the modern Navy the United States needs to retain its position as a world power of the first rank. * * * There are those who deprecate the need to maintain military supremacy or even mere parity with the Communist empires on the grounds that other nations have accepted a decline from first to second or third rank. * * * The former great powers of Europe who have lost their defense capability enjoy political freedom today only because we are strong enough to defend them and ready to do so.

And he adds, if you do not believe what I say then look at what happened to Czechoslovakia.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that, because it gives me an opportunity to read some more of this other section from Admiral Rickover's very eloquent letter:

We observe the tragic drama of Czechoslovakia negotiating with Russia the continuing subjugation of her people.

That, the Admiral says, is what happens if one is not under America's nu-

clear umbrella or under the protection of our Navy.

We have heard some suggestions here this afternoon that these figures we have been quoting to you about Soviet power are all "cooked up." Here is what Admiral Rickover says on that particular point:

Although we lack the data for a precise comparison of U.S. and Soviet military expenditures. It is clear that the U.S.S.R. spends much more annually for new weapons than the United States. Is it then reasonable for us to fail to modernize our defenses on the assumption that the danger of war no longer exists? The first priority of all life is survival.

Mr. Chairman, what is in this bill is the minimum we need to do now to protect ourselves in the dangerous days that lie ahead, whatever happens in Viet Nam. That is the reason this bill should be passed overwhelmingly by this House.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida, the author of the leading ship report, which his committee issued and which has been accepted by the entire world (Mr. BENNETT).

Mr. Chairman, I yield myself whatever time I need to say that without the wonderful work of the gentleman from Florida I do not know how the committee could ever have arrived at the reason for urging the President to accept an additional \$900 million to start at last the rebuilding and replacement of our obsolete and obsolescent—block obsolescent—Navy.

I yield to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT).

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, the primary need of the Navy at this time, according to Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, is for new ships with which to modernize the Navy.

In order to examine into the matter, the Seapower Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee held extensive hearings last January. Those hearings resulted in the report, "The Status of Naval Ships," which clearly and dramatically reveals the sorry shape of our Navy ships. No other set of hearings in recent times has examined into the matter as closely and carefully.

As a result of those hearings, we found that whereas 58 percent of our ships were 20 years old or older, 58 percent of the Soviet ships were 10 years old or younger. Indeed, less than one-fourth of 1 percent of the Soviet fleet was older than 20 years.

Specifically we found that the Soviets have built a whole new fleet since World War II, including a submarine fleet of over 360 ships. This construction has been carried on in modern yards—indeed, there is one submarine yard which is larger and more modern than all of our submarine yards put together. The Soviets can turn out 20 nuclear-powered submarines each year—with one nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine being completed each month. The Soviets have kept their design crews working together on ship after ship. They have an educational background which is pouring trained scientists and engineers into their maritime program.

Do the Soviets really mean business on the seas? Admiral Gorshkov, who is the equivalent of our Chief of Naval Operations, has said:

The flag of the Soviet Navy now proudly flies over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later the United States will have to understand that it no longer has mastery of the seas.

He has also said:

The USSR today has a naval fleet and aviation equipped with nuclear rockets equal to any strategic tasks, including tasks of an offensive nature, on all the seas and oceans of the world.

He has also said:

For the first time in its history, the Soviet nation has acquired a powerful ocean-going navy. It has become the world's greatest naval power, capable of taking its line of defense out into the ocean.

Mr. Chairman, I insert in the RECORD at this point, other statements concerning the Soviet naval aims:

"The mighty Soviet power must have a navy, both on sea and ocean commensurate with its interests and worthy of our great cause." Molotov at First Session of Supreme Soviet, 1938.

"Our Navy has become in full a modern navy, capable of resolving any strategic mission in its area (of responsibility). Overseas, they quite frequently speak and write that the U.S. Navy is capable of delivering an attack and landing at any point on our coastline. But as they say, 'it is easy to boast, but it is also easy to fail.' It seems to me that the people overseas should be thinking about the fate of their own coasts and their extended (lines of) communication, whose vulnerability is now monstrously bare, and about the traditional invulnerability of America which has forever been eliminated."—Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovsky, 21st Congress of the CPSU, Feb. 1959.

"The Soviet Navy is an entirely modern navy, capable of resolving any strategic mission within its area (of responsibility). Our Fleet is in a position not only to defend the sea frontiers of the Soviet nation, but also to carry out successfully combat operations on the ocean expanses and to deliver powerful blows against targets on other continents."—Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, 41 Anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy, Feb. 1959.

"It is correctly believed in advanced military thought that the navy best suited to meet the requirements of modern warfare must be basically a submarine navy. It is in this direction that the Navy of the Soviet Union is now developing. Its combat capabilities have grown substantially, primarily through an increase in the striking power of its submarines. Occupying a worthy place in the system of the state's armed forces, it is capable—in cooperation with all the other branches—of successfully accomplishing the most complex tasks of fighting on the seas."—Admiral Gorshkov, Navy Day 1960.

"The Soviet Navy, the basic armament of which is the submarine, equipped with atomic engines, missiles, and homing torpedoes with nuclear warheads, has received the capability of waging effective battle with the fleet of the enemy at the distant approaches to our shores."—Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky, 1962.

"The Soviet submarine fleet with atomic engines armed with ballistic and homing missiles, vigilantly stands guard over our socialist achievements."—Premier Khrushchev, 22nd Congress 1961.

"The Soviet Navy by the character of her armament of highly maneuverable forces and military capabilities is obliged to be pre-

pared at any moment and at any point of the globe to secure the protection of the interests of our state."—Admiral Gorshkov, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, October 31, 1962.

"The Communist Party and the Soviet government are displaying wise foresight, taking all measures to insure that the armament and organization of our fleet correspond to its growing role in the defense of the country, to the protection of its state interests."—Admiral Gorshkov, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 5 Feb. 1963.

"During the last war, the actions of the fleet occurred basically in the regions close to shore and were conducted mainly in operational and tactical interaction with the army. Now, considering the intention of aggressors and the place given to their navies in the plan of nuclear attack on the socialist countries, we must be prepared to answer them with destructive strikes at naval and shore objectives on the whole territory of the world ocean."—Admiral Gorshkov, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 5 Feb. 1963.

"... the hopes of the strategists across the ocean that their communications, and even more their shores, will be inaccessible to our Navy in time of war have proved illusory."—Admiral Gorshkov, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 5 Feb. 1963.

"In our opinion time has already nullified the significance of such major warships as battleships and cruisers. Aircraft carriers are also losing their importance. Modern weapons make it possible to locate them quickly and to destroy them before they can use their armament."—Admiral Gorshkov, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 6 May 1965.

"The necessity of strengthening the naval might of the USSR is stipulated also by the rapid development of our cargo and commercial fleet, and the broadening of state interests of our country on the seas and oceans. . . . Thanks to the attention and concern of the Party, the government, and the whole Soviet people, our navy has developed in full accordance with the aims and missions of a great naval power and plays an important role in the defense capability of the fatherland."—Editorial, "On guard over the sea defenses", *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 13 July 1965.

Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, when asked by a journalist if the introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles had not decreased the role of the Navy replied, "By no means. On the contrary, the Navy's role has increased, because the missile has also become its basic armament." He went on to assert that the Navy now has everything necessary to repel any aggressor in coordination with the other services.—*Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, July 25, 1965.

He (Kasatonov) later boasted that "the white and blue flag of the USSR Navy, with its red star and hammer and sickle" is seen "in all parts of the world."—*Trud*, July 30, 1966.

"There is no justification for the permanent presence of the military fleet of the USA in the waters washing the shores of Southern Europe. The question is raised as to what basis there is for the fact that, 20 years after the end of the Second World War the 6th Fleet of the USA sails the Mediterranean Sea, using military bases, ports, and replenishment stations in a series of Mediterranean countries. This carries with itself a serious threat to the independence of all countries on this shore. The time has come for the demand to remove the 6th Fleet from the Mediterranean Sea to resound with full voice."—Brezhnev, *Pravda*, April 25, 1967.

"Tens of our submarines and surface ships are constantly located in various regions of the oceans and seas, where they vigilantly serve, safeguarding the state interests of the homeland, protecting the labor of the Soviet people. . . ."—Admiral Gorshkov, *Pravda*, 30 July 1967.

"For the first time in its history, our Navy has in the full sense changed into a long-range offensive arm of the armed forces. . . . Shoulder to shoulder with the Strategic Rocket Forces the Soviet Navy has become the most important weapon of the High Command."—Admiral Kasatonov, "Ha Boevoi Vakhte," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 30 July 1967.

"During the Great Fatherland War (World War II), fleet actions took place basically in the areas close to shore and were conducted for the most part in operational and tactical cooperation with the Army. Now, taking into account the intentions of the imperialist aggressors, and the place given to their navies in the plan of nuclear aggression against the socialist countries, the Soviet Navy must be prepared to answer them with crushing blows at naval objectives on the entire territory of the World Ocean."—Captain (2nd Rank) A. V. Basov in *Boevoi Put' Sovetskogo Voenno-Morskogo Flota* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), p. 596.

"The construction of the Soviet submarine fleet is proceeding successfully. Our enemies are building a submarine fleet armed with ballistic missiles. We are arming our fleet with both ballistic and homing missiles. Conditions oblige us to do this. Our enemies in the opposing military blocs are preparing to bombard the territory of our country as well as the socialist countries from submarines. We are prepared to answer them, firing at their targets on the sea as well as on the land."—Premier Khrushchev, 22nd Party Congress of CPSU, 1961.

ROLE OF THE NAVY

Our Navy is an instrument of foreign policy. It is able to carry force, as that instrument, anywhere in the three-quarters of the world that constitute the oceans. This is distinct and different from the commitment of troops to overseas actions or the stationing of troops in foreign bases. At a time when the troops overseas and the bases in foreign countries are being reduced, we must not jeopardize our ability to exert power in those areas by cutting our Navy.

In carrying out national policy, there are many ways in which the Navy can be used. But this does not mean that only the Navy is important. On the contrary, the Navy is part of a team that provides defense in depth.

The Navy can also help protect this Nation from the threat of thermonuclear weaponry from intercontinental ballistic missiles. Through our Polaris submarines, we can provide part of a believable retaliatory capability that will keep anyone from using ICBM's against us. For the future we can continue this retaliatory threat with the development of the undersea long range missile system—ULMS. These submarines can go on target shortly after leaving their home port and can stay on target. They will have between four times and 10 times as much ocean in which to hide as our Polaris submarines because of their additional range.

At the same time we are faced with a very large fleet of Soviet submarines outfitted with their cruise missiles—hundreds of miles range—or ballistic missiles—thousands of miles range—which can be aimed at our cities or our weapons.

In order to contain this threat, we need a navy with the strongest possible antisubmarine position. This means that we need not only attack submarines which can detect and intercept Soviet

submarines but land- and sea-based airplanes, destroyers, and carriers able to cope with this threat as defenses in depth—and the latest sensors in all of the equipment. Our research and development must be strengthened to keep ahead of this threat.

There is another very important role that the Navy can play in meeting these threats. Now, for the first time since the War of 1812, the United States is threatened with the possibility of a war being carried to its own home land. Perhaps the most important role that the Navy can play is to keep that war away from our lands. No other service can really play this kind of a role. By locating our retaliatory forces at sea with even larger areas in which to operate, it makes the problem of locating and neutralizing them much greater for the Soviets. In addition, the shipborne anti-missile system could be placed between the United States and the Soviet Union in the oceans so as to intercept at an earlier stage any intercontinental ballistic missiles that the U.S.S.R. might want to launch at the United States. Even in only one location we could by this means take the fight away from our land and away from Canada and away from Greenland, and it would put that fight high over the Arctic Ocean.

In the past 30 years we have been involved in military operations on almost every continent in the world. We have some treaty commitments with over 40 nations in the world. We have to be able to fulfill those obligations. At this time we are already shipping by ocean about 2 million tons a month for military purposes—with over half of that petroleum products. Hence, we have to have control of the seas in order to meet our commitments.

A State Department analysis of our foreign defense commitments was inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on September 5, 1969. I include it at this point in the RECORD:

U.S. COMMITMENTS TO FOREIGN POWERS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, D.C., August 15, 1967.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in reply to your letter to Secretary Rusk of August 1, 1967 concerning Senate Resolution 151 "Relative to United States Commitments to Foreign Powers."

You have asked in your letter for the Department's comments on the general subject of Resolution 151 and for answers to four specific questions. We believe the Department's general views on the subject of the resolution can best be presented in testimony before the Committee when hearings are held next week. In this letter the Department undertakes to answer the four specific questions.

Last year at approximately this time, Secretary Rusk appeared before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services to discuss some matters relevant to the specific questions posed in your letter of August 1, 1967. Prior to his appearance, the Department provided that Subcommittee with a compilation of United States commitments and assurances consisting of provisions of formal treaties and agreements, and official declarations by the Congress, the President, the

Vice President, and the Secretary of State concerning actions the United States would take if another country were the victim of aggression. For the convenience of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and to provide a context for the answers to specific questions posed in your letter of August 1, 1967, which appear below, I have attached an updated version of the compilation earlier supplied to the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.

Question 1: Of the 42 countries with which the United States has bilateral treaties or multilateral agreements for collective defense, in how many instances would the Executive Branch view as automatic the American commitment as one upon which the United States would act unilaterally—meaning that we view the obligations not only as collective but individual, as the Department has interpreted the SEATO Treaty? For example, should one of the members of the 1947 Inter-American treaty of reciprocal assistance be attacked by subversion or from an external source, to what extent, if any, would there be a commitment for the United States on its own to supply men or materiel to respond to such attack? We would like to have such nations listed, not only in the American Republics, but elsewhere.

This question raises the issue whether the United States obligation to assist another party to one of these treaties is an individual obligation or an obligation that arises only when there has been a multilateral determination by the treaty parties. The question is asked with regard to responses in the case of armed attack and in the case of subversion.

Under each of our multilateral treaties, the commitment to extend assistance in the event of an armed attack is individual and requires no collective finding or decision by a multilateral organization. The Rio Treaty provides that in the event of an armed attack against an American state "each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack" (Art. 3(1), emphasis added). The Treaty goes on to provide that "each one of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take" (Art. 3(2), emphasis added). In the North Atlantic Treaty, "each" of the signatories "in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action . . ." (Art. 5, emphasis added). In the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and in the Anzus Security Treaty "each party" agrees that "it" will act to meet the common danger (Art. IV in both). The same is true of the bilateral treaties with the Philippines, Korea, Republic of China and Japan. Thus, under each of these treaties there is an individual obligation independent of any collective action.

The question posed in your letter of August 1 is asked also in regard to actions taken in response to attack by subversion. All of our defense treaties call for consultation in the event of a threat other than armed attack—such as externally supported subversion. Article 6 of the Rio Treaty provides for a meeting of the Organ of Consultation "if the inviolability or integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack . . . or by any other fact, or situation that might endanger the peace of America". The Organ of Consultation can determine "the measures which must be taken . . . to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent". Article 4 of the NATO Treaty provides that "[t]he Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any

of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened". Substantially similar language exists in the Anzus and SEATO Treaties (Arts. III and IV(2), respectively). Thus, when the threat takes the form of subversion rather than armed attack, each multilateral treaty calls for consultation. No individual obligation of unilateral action is imposed. The same is true by virtue of similar language under the bilateral treaties with the Philippines and Korea. Under the Japanese treaty consultation is called for "whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened."

Question 2: Specifically, does the United States (United Nations obligations aside) have a national commitment in the event of attack from an external source or from internal subversion to come either to the military or economic aid of Israel or any of the Arab States? In short, is the United States as a nation committed to supply American military or economic resources to protect the territorial integrity of these states?

President Johnson and his three predecessors have stated the United States interest and concern in supporting the political independence and territorial integrity of the countries of the Near East. This is a statement of policy and not a commitment to take particular actions in particular circumstances. Unrest and conflict in the Middle East have been of serious concern to the United States for a long time. The use of armed force in the Middle East can have especially serious consequences for international peace extending far beyond that area. We have bent our efforts to avoid a renewal of conflict there. Thus, we have stated our position in an effort to use our influence in the cause of peace.

Question 3: Bearing in mind recent situations in the Congo and Nigeria, is there any United States national commitment to supply American military or economic resources in the event of aggression or threats to the integrity of those states or any states in Africa?

With regard to the Congo, the United States has supported policies and actions of the United Nations in preserving the territorial integrity, political independence and economic unity of that country. We have no specific commitment to supply military or economic resources to the Congo in the event of aggression or a threat to its integrity. We have extended military and economic assistance to the Congo as a part of the implementation of our foreign assistance legislation. Recently, at the request of the Government of the Congo, we made available to it three C-130 aircraft. The decision to furnish this assistance was not based on any prior commitment of the United States to defend or assist in the defense of the Congo.

The United States has no commitment to come to the defense of Nigeria in the event of an armed attack or subversion. We hope that the current fighting in that country will be brought to an early end, but we have maintained that the crisis is an internal matter and we have refrained from any action that could be interpreted as interference in Nigeria's affairs such as the sale of arms from the United States to that country.

There are two other countries in Africa that should be mentioned in this context. The United States has an agreement of Cooperation with the Government of Liberia (TIAS 4303). Article 1 of that agreement provides: "In the event of aggression or threat of aggression against Liberia, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Liberia will immediately determine what action may be appropriate for the defense of Liberia."

That language does not create a commitment by the United States to supply military or economic resources in defense of Liberia.

The United States has an agreement with

the Kingdom of Libya relating to Wheelus Air Base. The Preamble to that agreement provides in part that the two Governments confirm their determination "to cooperate to the maintenance of peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations" and are "of the opinion that cooperation within the territory of Libya will assist in achieving these objectives." The presence of United States Air Force personnel in Libya makes the security of that country of special interest to the United States. We have recently undertaken discussions with the Government of Libya concerning the phasing out of United States use of the Wheelus airfield.

Question 4: Finally, could the Administration at this time provide the Committee with a full list of all nations which upon the basis of past official statements, communiques, or other public or private understandings, as well as formal treaties, reasonably assume that they have a United States commitment under some set of circumstances involving either an economic or military threat to their existence, to receive either economic or military assistance from the United States?

The attached compilations set forth the provisions of formal treaties and agreements, and official declarations by the Congress, the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State concerning actions the United States would take if another country were the victim of aggression. We have, with the countries covered by these lists and with others, military and economic assistance agreements entered into pursuant to existing legislation. Some of these agreements are present commitments of the United States to provide specified assistance. They are not conditioned on the occurrence of a threat to the peace or security of the recipient country and they involve no commitments of the United States apart from their specific terms.

If the Department can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

U.S. DEFENSE COMMITMENTS AND ASSURANCES,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AUGUST 1967

I. PROVISIONS IN TREATIES AND OTHER FORMAL AGREEMENTS

A. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945¹

Parties

United States

116 other countries [as of June 20, 1966].

Relevant provisions

Art. 42: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Art. 43: All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. . . .

Art. 51: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual

or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

B. Western hemisphere

1. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact, September 2, 1947)²

Parties

United States, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,³ Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Relevant provisions

Art. 3:

(i) The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(ii) On the request of the State or States directly attacked and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System, each one of the Contracting parties may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding paragraph and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. The Organ of Consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character that should be taken.

(iii) The provisions of this Article shall be applied in case of any armed attack which takes place within the region described in Article 4 or within the territory of an American State. When the attack takes place outside of the said areas, the provisions of Article 6 shall be applied.

(iv) * * *

Art. 6: If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intracontinental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.

Art. 8: For the purposes of this Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of Consultation may agree will comprise one or more of the following: . . . and use of armed force.

Art. 20: Decisions which require the application of the measures specified in Article 8 shall be binding upon all the Signatory States which have ratified this Treaty, with the sole exception that no State shall be required to use armed force without its consent.

2. Applicability of North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949

[Canada and Iceland, as signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty, are covered by the

commitments embodied in that Treaty. Greenland, as part of the Kingdom of Denmark, and the Bahamas and Bermuda as "islands under the Jurisdiction of any of the parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer" are likewise covered by that Treaty. For the NATO commitments, see C. 1., below.]

3. Bilateral Agreements

a. Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, Concerning the Defense of Greenland, April 27, 1951.⁴

Relevant provisions

Art. 1: The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, in order to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic Treaty area⁵ by uniting their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security and for the development of their collective capacity to resist armed attack, will each take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry out expeditiously their respective and joint responsibilities in Greenland, in accordance with NATO plans.

Art. 2: In order that the Government of the United States of America as a party to the North Atlantic Treaty may assist the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark by establishing and/or operating such defense areas as the two Governments, on the basis of NATO defense plans, may from time to time agree to be necessary for the development of the defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty Area, and which the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark is unable to establish and operate single-handedly, the two Governments in respect of the defense areas thus selected, agree to the following:

(3) In cases where it is agreed that responsibility for the operation and maintenance of any defense area shall fall to the Government of the United States of America, the following provisions shall apply:

(b) * * * the Government of the United States of America, without compensation to the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, shall be entitled within such defense area and the air spaces and waters adjacent thereto:

(iii) to station and house personnel and to provide for their health, recreation, and welfare.

(4) In cases where it is agreed that responsibility for the operation and maintenance of any defense area shall fall to the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, the following provisions shall apply:

(a) The Government of the United States of America may attach United States military personnel to the staff of the commanding officer of such defense area, under the command of an officer with whom the Danish commanding officer shall consult of all important local matters affecting United States interest pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(b) The Government of the United States of America * * * may use such defense area in cooperation with the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark for the defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area * * *

Art. 4: In connection with activities for the defense of Greenland and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty area, the defense area will so far as practicable, be made available to vessels and aircraft belonging to other Governments parties to the North Atlantic

Footnotes at end of article.

Treaty and to the armed forces of such Governments.

b. *Defense Agreement Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Iceland, May 5, 1951.*⁶

Relevant provisions

Having regard to the fact that the people of Iceland cannot themselves adequately secure their own defenses, * * * [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has requested the U.S. and Iceland to] make arrangements for the use of facilities in Iceland in defense of Iceland. * * *

Art. 1: The United States on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in accordance with its responsibilities under the North Atlantic Treaty will make arrangements regarding the defense of Iceland subject to the conditions set forth in this agreement. For this purpose and in view of the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area, Iceland will provide such facilities in Iceland as are mutually agreed to be necessary.

[Arts. 2-8 relate to the use of facilities, the composition of forces, the status of Keflavik Airport, etc.]

c. *North American Air Defense Command Agreement Effected by Exchange of Notes, United States-Canada, May 12, 1958.*⁷

Relevant provisions

Studies made by representatives of our two Governments led to the conclusion that the problem of the air defence of our two countries could best be met by delegating to an integrated headquarters the task of exercising operational control over combat units of the national forces made available for the air defence of the two countries. * * * The agreed integration is intended to assist the two Governments to develop and maintain their individual and collective capacity to resist air attack on their territories in North America in mutual self-defence.

* * * My Government proposes that the following principles should govern the future organization and operations of the North American Air Defence Command.

1. * * *

2. The North American Air Defence Command will include such combat units and individuals as are specifically allocated to it by the two Governments. The jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief, NORAD, over those units and individuals is limited to operational control as hereinafter defined.

3. "Operational Control" is the power to direct, co-ordinate, and control the operational activities of forces assigned, attached or otherwise made available. * * *

4-11. * * *

d. *General Treaty Between the United States and Panama, March 2, 1936.*⁸

Article X

In case of an international conflagration or the existence of any threat of aggression which would endanger the security of the Republic of Panama or the neutrality or security of the Panama Canal, the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Panama will take such measures of prevention and defense as they may consider necessary for the protection of their common interests. Any measures, in safeguarding such interests, which it shall appear essential to one Government to take, and which may affect the territory under the jurisdiction of the other Government, will be the subject of consultation between the two Governments.

C. Europe

1. North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949⁹
Parties

United States, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom,

Footnotes at end of article.

Greece,¹⁰ Turkey,¹⁰ Federal Republic of Germany.¹¹

Relevant provisions

Art. 3: * * * The Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Art. 4: The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Art. 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them. * * * [on the basis of Art. 51 of the UN Charter] will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. [Provides also for "immediately" reporting to the UN Security Council any armed attacks and all consequent measures, and for terminating such measures when the Security Council has acted to restore and maintain peace and security.]

Art. 6: [As modified by the Protocol on the Accession of Greece and Turkey] For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack—

(i) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France,¹² on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

(ii) on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Art. 11: This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

2. Joint Declaration Concerning the Renewal of the Defense Agreement of September 26, 1953, United States-Spain, September 26, 1963.¹³

Relevant provisions

* * * In affirming the importance of their bilateral Defense Agreement [signed Sept. 26, 1953, TIAS 2850] which will be applied in the new five year period of its validity in the spirit of this Declaration, they [the Governments of the United States of America and of Spain] consider it to be necessary and appropriate that the Agreement form a part of the security arrangements for the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas.

The United States Government reaffirms its recognition of the importance of Spain to the security, well-being and development of the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas. The two governments recognize that the security and integrity of both the United States and Spain are necessary for the common security. A threat to either country, and to the joint facilities that each provides for the common defense, would be a matter of common concern to both countries, and each country would take such action as it may consider appropriate within the frame work of its constitutional processes.

[Signed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk for the United States]

D. Near East-Middle East

1. Applicability of North Atlantic Treaty Since 1952

[On February 18, 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty. Since

that date they have been covered by the commitments of that Treaty. (See C.1., above).]

2. United States Membership in CENTO Committees

The Pact of Mutual Cooperation (Baghdad Pact) between Iraq, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Iran was signed at Baghdad, February 24, 1955. (Text in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, pp. 1257-1259.) It was redesignated the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) by a resolution of the Council of the Treaty Organization adopted August 21, 1959 following the announcement by Iraq of its decision to withdraw. The United States is a member of the Military, Economic, and Anti-Subversion Committees of CENTO and an observer at the Council meetings.

3. Bilateral Agreements

a. *Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States and the Imperial Government of Iran, March 5, 1959.*¹⁴

Relevant provisions

Art. 1: The Imperial Government of Iran is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Iran, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Iran at its request.

b. *Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Turkey, March 5, 1959.*¹⁵

Relevant provisions

1. The Government of Turkey is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Turkey, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Turkey at its request.

e. Africa

a. *Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Liberia, July 8, 1959.*¹⁶

Relevant provisions

Art. 1: In the event of aggression or threat of aggression against Liberia, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Liberia will immediately determine what action may be appropriate for the defense of Liberia.

f. South Asia

1. United States Membership in CENTO Committees

[Pakistan is a member of CENTO, in certain activities of which the United States participates. (See Sect. I.D. 2., above).]

2. Membership of the United States and Pakistan in SEATO

[See Section G.1., "Southeast Asia-Southwest Pacific].

3. Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Pakistan, March 5, 1959.¹⁷

Relevant provisions

Art. 1: The Government of Pakistan is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate

action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request.

g. Southeast Asia-Southwest Pacific

1. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, September 8, 1954:¹⁸

United States, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, Cambodia,¹⁹ Laos,¹⁹ Free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.¹⁹

Relevant provisions

Art. 2. In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

Art. 4:

(i) Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

(ii) If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability of the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or potential independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

(iii) It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

Understanding of the United States of America

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

2. Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS Pact) September 1, 1951²⁰

Relevant provisions

Art. 4: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Footnotes at end of article.

3. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, August 30, 1951²¹

Relevant provisions

Art. 4: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Art. 5: * * * an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

4. Memorandum of Agreement, Ambassador Bohlen and Foreign Secretary Serrano of the Philippines, October 12, 1959²²

Relevant passages

1. In accordance with the understandings reached during our discussions in August, September and October 1959, the following is agreed:

(c) *Mutual Defense:* The policy of the United States with regard to armed attack on the Philippines is contained in the Mutual Defense Treaty. Further the United States reaffirms the policy set forth in the statement of September 7, 1954 of then Secretary of State Dulles which reads as follows:

"Under our Mutual Defense Treaty and related actions, there have resulted air and naval dispositions of the United States in the Philippines, such that an armed attack on the Philippines could not but be also an attack upon the military forces of the United States. As between our nations, it is no legal fiction to say that an attack on one is an attack on both. It is a reality that an attack on the Philippines is an attack also on the United States."

and in the joint communique issued on June 20, 1958 by President Eisenhower and President Garcia the pertinent part of which reads as follows:

"President Eisenhower made clear that, in accordance with these existing alliances and the deployments and dispositions thereunder, any armed attack against the Philippines would involve an attack against United States forces stationed there and against the United States and would instantly be repelled."

5. Exchange of Notes Between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Secretary Ramos of the Philippines, September 16, 1966²³

Relevant provision

[Referring to the Memorandum of Agreement of Foreign Secretary Serrano and Ambassador Bohlen of October 12, 1959:] . . . I have the honor on behalf of my government to reaffirm the policy of the United States regarding mutual defense expressed in the 1959 Memorandum. * * *

H. East Asia

1. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation from Security Between the United States and Japan, January 19, 1960²⁴

Relevant provisions

Art. 5: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territory under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately

reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

2. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China, December 2, 1954²⁵

Relevant provisions

Art. 2: In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

Art. 5: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

[In its report on the Treaty, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations included the following: "It is the understanding of the Senate that the obligations of the parties under Article V apply only in the event of external armed attack; and that military operations by either party from the territories held by the Republic of China shall not be undertaken except by joint agreement."]

3. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and Republic of Korea, October 1, 1953²⁶

Relevant provisions

Art. 2: The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separate and jointly, by self help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will taken suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treaty and to further its purposes.

Art. 3: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

[In advising and consenting to the ratification of the treaty the Senate added the following understanding: "It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under Article III of the above Treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present Treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea."]

II. PROVISIONS OF OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS

A. Western Hemisphere

1. Seventh Annual Message of President Monroe to Congress ("The Monroe Doctrine"), December 2, 1823²⁷

Relevant passages

* * * The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the

rights and interest of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. * * * The political system of the allied powers [the "Holy Alliance"] is essentially different * * * from that of America. * * * We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. * * * With the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. * * *

2. Statement by the Department of State on the Monroe Doctrine July 14, 1960²⁹

Relevant passage

The principles [of the Monroe Doctrine] which the United States Government enunciated in the face of the attempts of the old imperialism to intervene in the affairs of this hemisphere are as valid today for the attempts of the new imperialism. * * * Today, nearly a century and a half later, the United States is gratified that these principles are not professed by itself alone but represent through solemn agreements the views of the American community as a whole.

3. The Ogdensburg Agreement: Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada, August 18, 1940²⁹

Relevant passages

The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual problems of defense in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States.

It has been agreed that a Permanent Joint Board on Defense shall be set up at once by the two countries.

This Permanent Joint Board on Defense shall commence immediate studies relating to sea, land, and air problems including personnel and matériel.

It will consider in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere.

4. Joint Announcement on Defense, United States-Canada, February 12, 1947³⁰

Relevant passages

In the interest of efficiency and economy, each Government has decided that its national defense establishment shall, to the extent authorized by law, continue to collaborate for peacetime joint security purposes. * * *

[Citing the "identity, of view and interest between the two countries", and noting that "no treaty, executive agreement, or contractual obligation has been entered into,"³¹ the announcement quoted the Ogdensburg Agreement of August 1940 which established the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.]

In discharging this continuing responsibility [for the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere] the Board's work led to the building up of a pattern of close defense cooperation. The principles announced on February 12 are in continuance of this cooperation. * * *

5. Joint Resolution Expressing the Determination of the United States With Respect to the Situation in Cuba (Cuban Resolution) October 3, 1962

5. Cuban Resolution—Text of Public Law 87-733 [S.J. Res. 230], 76 Stat. 697, approved October 3, 1962: Joint Resolution expressing the determination of the United States with respect to the situation in Cuba.

Whereas President James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declared that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of European powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety"; and

Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations"; and

Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este in January 1962 declared: "The present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from extra-continental Communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in America on part of the Soviet Union"; and

Whereas the international Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States is determined—

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and

(c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.

6. Joint statement at Washington by President Kennedy and President Betancourt of Venezuela, February 20, 1963³²

Relevant passage

The President of the United States pledged the full support of his country to the Republic of Venezuela in resisting the all-out campaign of the international Communists, aided especially by their Cuban allies, to overthrow the constitutional Government of President Betancourt.

[When asked at a news conference on March 6, 1963 about the nature of the "full support" in case of a serious or successful revolution against Betancourt, President Kennedy replied: "Well, it would depend a good deal on the conditions and what our obligations might be under the Rio treaty. We strongly support President Betancourt's efforts in Venezuela in a good number of ways. But if you are asking me, I would have to see what the conditions were, what the responsibilities were under the Rio treaty, the OAS, if we knew we were going into a more substantial situation. If you are talking about aggression from the outside, the answer is very clear. If you are talking about internal acts, we would have to judge those

acts, and depend a good deal on what the Government of Venezuela decided as the appropriate response."]³³

B. Europe

1. Statement by President Eisenhower on United States Policy Towards the Western European Union, March 10, 1955³⁴

[In a message of the Prime Ministers of the signatories to the Western Europe Union protocols—Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—President Eisenhower referred to a similar statement of principles he had made on April 15, 1954, in anticipation of the European Defense Community, and to the fact that the latter evolved into the Western European Union plan.]

Relevant passages

I am glad to affirm that when the Paris Agreements [establishing the Western European Union arrangements] have been ratified and have come into force, it will be the policy of the United States:

(3) To continue to maintain in Europe including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists and will continue [sic] to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area;

(6) * * * to regard any action from whatever quarter which threatens the integrity and unity of the Western European Union as a threat to the security of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty calling for consultation in accordance with Article 4 of that Treaty.

2. Communiqué, North Atlantic Council Ministerial Session, Athens, May 6, 1962³⁵

Relevant passage

* * * the Ministers welcomed the confirmation by the United States that it will continue to make available for the Alliance the nuclear weapons necessary for NATO defense, concerting with its allies on basic plans and arrangements in regard to these weapons. In addition, both the United Kingdom and the United States Governments have given firm assurances that their strategic forces will continue to provide defense against threats to the Alliance beyond the capability of NATO-committed forces to deal with.

3. Final Act, London Nine-Power Conference, Declaration by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, October 3, 1954³⁶

Relevant passages

5. the security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the Three Powers there are regarded by the Three Powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. Accordingly they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it. They therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves.

6. They will regard as a threat to their own peace and safety any recourse to force which in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter threatens the integrity and unity of the Atlantic alliance or its defensive purposes. In the event any such action the three Governments, . . . will act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty [which calls for consultation] with a view to taking other measures which may be appropriate.

Footnotes at end of article.

4. Statement by President Kennedy Regarding Berlin, in Address to the Nation, July 25, 1961²⁷

Relevant passage

We are there [Berlin] as a result of our victory over Nazi Germany and our basic rights to be there deriving from that victory include both our presence in West Berlin and the enjoyment of access across East Germany. * * * But in addition to those rights is our commitment to sustain—and defend, if need be—the opportunity for more than 2 million people to determine their own future and choose their own way of life. * * * The NATO shield was long ago extended to cover West Berlin, and we have given our word that an attack in that city will be regarded as an attack upon us all.

5. Address by Vice-President Johnson before the West Berlin House of Representatives, August 19, 1961²⁸

Relevant passage

I have come to Berlin by direction of President Kennedy. He wants you to know—and I want you to know—that the pledge he has given to the freedom of West Berlin and to the rights of Western access to Berlin is firm. To the survival and to the creative future of this city we Americans have pledged in effect, what our ancestors pledged in forming the United States: “ * * * our Lives, our Fortunes and our Sacred Honor”. * * *

6. Statement by Secretary of State Rusk Regarding Berlin, in Address at Davidson College, February 22, 1962²⁹

Relevant passage

The Western allies, backed by all the NATO powers have the most solemn obligation to protect the freedom of the West Berliners. * * * To protect this freedom requires the continued presence of Allied troops and free rights of access. * * *

7. Concurrent Resolution 570 (Berlin Resolution), October 10, 1962

Concurrent resolution

Whereas the primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations is and has been to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and

Whereas it is the purpose of the United States to encourage and support the establishment of a free, unified, and democratic Germany; and

Whereas in connection with the termination of hostilities in World War II the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union freely entered into binding agreements under which the four powers have the right to remain in Berlin, with the right of ingress and egress, until the conclusion of a final settlement with the Government of Germany; and

Whereas no such final settlement has been concluded by the four powers and the aforementioned agreements continue in force: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress—

(a) that the continued exercise of United States, British, and French rights in Berlin constitutes a fundamental political and moral determination;

(b) that the United States would regard as intolerable any violation by the Soviet Union directly or through others of those rights in Berlin, including the right of ingress and egress;

(c) that the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, any violation of those rights by the Soviet Union directly or through others, and to fulfill our commitment to the people of Berlin with respect to their resolve for Freedom.

8. Joint Communiqué, President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer of Germany, November 15, 1962³⁰

Relevant passage

It is agreed * * * that the freedom and viability of Berlin will be preserved in all circumstances and with all means.

9. Joint Communiqué, President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard of Germany, June 12, 1964³¹

Relevant passage

The President restated the determination of the United States to carry out fully its commitments with respect to Berlin, including the maintenance of the right of free access to West Berlin and the continued freedom and viability of the city.

C. Near East-Middle East

1. Message of President Truman to Congress (“The Truman Doctrine”), March 12, 1947³²

Relevant passages

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly processes.

2. Joint Resolution To Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East (“The Eisenhower Doctrine”), March 9, 1957³³

Relevant passage

SEC. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring assistance. Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or groups of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: *Provided*, That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.

3. Tripartite Declaration (United States-United Kingdom-France) Regarding Security in the Near East, May 25, 1950³⁴

Relevant passage

3. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these states [i.e. the Arab States and Israel] was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.

4. Multilateral Declaration Respecting the Baghdad Pact, July 28, 1958³⁵

Parties

United States, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, United Kingdom.

Relevant passages

1. The members of the Baghdad Pact attending the Ministerial meeting in London³⁶ * * * declare their determination to main-

tain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect.

4. Article 1 of the Pact of Mutual Co-operation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, provides that the parties will co-operate for their security and defense and that such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements. Similarly, the United States in the interest of world peace, and pursuant to existing Congressional authorization, agrees to co-operate with the nations making this declaration for their security and defense and will promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to this cooperation.

5. Joint Communiqué, President Kennedy and the Shah of Iran (Mohammed Reza Pahlavi), Washington, April 13, 1962³⁷

Relevant passages

Their talks included a review of political and military situations in the world; a discussion of the progress which Iran is making in economic and social advancement; a review of defense arrangements in which the two countries are associated; and aspects of United States economic and military aid programs in Iran.

They discussed and were in complete agreement on the subject of the nature of the threat to the Middle East and to all free peoples. They reaffirmed the provisions of the bilateral agreement of 1959 concerning the maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of Iran, and agreed on the necessity of collective security arrangements to achieve this end.

6. Letter from President Kennedy to Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia, October 25, 1962³⁸

Relevant passage

* * * Under your firm and enlightened leadership I am confident Saudi Arabia will move ahead successfully on the path of modernization and reform which it has already charted for itself. In pursuing this course you may be assured of full United States support for the maintenance of Saudi Arabia's integrity.

7. Statement on Jordan and Saudi Arabia by Secretary of State Rusk, in a News Conference, March 8, 1963³⁹

Relevant passages

[In response to a question on political stability in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, Secretary Rusk stated:]

We of course are concerned about the independence of these Arab states and their freedom from external penetration. * * * We are very much interested in the independence and the security of our friends in Jordan and Arabia and will be very much alert to any threats against them.

8. Reply by President Kennedy to a News Conference Question concerning the Middle East, May 8, 1963⁴⁰

Relevant passage

We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East, and we also seek to limit the spread of communism in the Middle East which would, of course destroy the independence of the people. This government has been and remains strongly opposed to the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East. In the event of aggression or preparations for aggression, whether direct or indirect, we would support appropriate measures in the United Nations, adopt other courses of action on our own to prevent or to put a stop to such aggression.

Footnotes at end of article.

which, of course, has been the policy which the United States has followed for some time.

9. Remarks of President Johnson during Exchange of Toasts with President Shazar of Israel, August 2, 1966⁵¹

Relevant passage

[Reaffirming President Kennedy's statement of May 8, 1963 which expressed American support for the security of both Israel and her neighbors.⁵² President Johnson said:]

We subscribe to that policy.

10. Statement by President Johnson on the Near East Situation, at the White House, May 23, 1967⁵³

Relevant passage

To the leaders of all the nations of the Near East, I wish to say what three American Presidents have said before me—that the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of that area. The United States strongly opposes aggression by anyone in the area, in any form, overt or clandestine.

11. Address by President Johnson at a Foreign Policy Conference of Educators Sponsored by the Department of State, June 19, 1967⁵⁴

Relevant passages

Our country is committed—and we here reiterate that commitment today—to a peace [in the Middle East] that is based on five principles:

- First, the recognized right of national life;
- Second, justice for the refugees;
- Third, innocent maritime passage;
- Fourth, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race; and
- Fifth, political independence and territorial integrity for all.

D. Africa

The Department is not aware of any published official statements by the Congress, the President, the Vice President, or the Secretary of State containing United States defense assurances to African countries.

E. South Asia

1. Letter from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Nehru of India, February 24, 1954⁵⁵

Relevant passage

*** I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the U.N. to thwart such aggression. ***

2. Assurances to Pakistan Respecting the Extension of Military Assistance to India: Statement by the Department of State, November 17, 1962⁵⁶

Relevant passages

[Referring to an exchange of notes between the United States Government and the Government of India released the same day (November 17), which concerned the provision of military aid to India, and citing the assurances given to India in 1954 when similar aid was extended to Pakistan,⁵⁷ the statement continued:]

The Government of the United States of America has similarly assured the Government of Pakistan that, if our assistance to

India should be misused and directed against another in aggression, the United States would undertake immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression.

Needless to say, in giving these assurances the United States is confident that neither of the countries which it is aiding harbors aggressive designs.

F. Southeast Asia

1. Joint Resolution To Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia (Tonkin Gulf Resolution), August 10, 1964⁵⁸

Relevant passages

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

2. Statement of Congressional Policy, March 16, 1967⁵⁹

The Congress hereby declares—

(1) its firm intentions to provide all necessary support for members of the Armed Forces of the United States fighting in Vietnam;

(2) its support of efforts being made by the President of the United States and other men of good will throughout the world to prevent an expansion of the war in Vietnam and to bring that conflict to an end through a negotiated settlement which will preserve the honor of the United States, protect the vital interests of this country, and allow the people of South Vietnam to determine the affairs of that nation in their own way; and

(3) its support for the convening of the nations that participated in the Geneva Conferences or any other meeting of nations similarly involved and interested as soon as possible for the purpose of pursuing the general principles of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 and for formulating plans for bringing the conflict to an honorable conclusion.

3. Joint Statement, Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand, March 6, 1962⁶⁰

Relevant passages

The Secretary of State reaffirmed that the United States regards the preservation of the independence and integrity of Thailand as vital to the national interest of the United States and to world peace. He expressed the firm intention of the United States to aid Thailand, its ally and historic friend, in resisting Communist aggression and subversion.

The Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State *** agreed that the Treaty [Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty] provides the basis for the signatories collectively to assist Thailand in case of [direct] Communist armed attack against that country. The Secretary of State assured the Foreign Minister that in the event of such aggression, the United States intends to give full effect

to its obligations under the Treaty to act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. The Secretary of State reaffirmed that this obligation of the United States does not depend upon the prior agreement of all other parties to the treaty, since this treaty obligation is individual as well as collective.

In reviewing measures to meet indirect aggression, the Secretary of State stated that the United States regards its commitments to Thailand under the Southeast Asia Collective Treaty and under its bilateral economic and military assistance agreements with Thailand as providing an important basis for United States actions to help Thailand meet indirect aggression. In this connection the Secretary reviewed with the Foreign Minister the action being taken by the United States to assist the Republic of Vietnam to meet the threat of indirect aggression.

4. Declaration of Honolulu, President Johnson, Chairman Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime Minister Nguyen Cooky, February 8, 1966⁶¹

Relevant passage

The President of the United States and the Chief of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam are thus pledged again—

- To defense against aggression;
- To the work of social revolution;
- To the goal of free self-government;
- To the attack on hunger, ignorance, and disease; and
- To the unending quest for peace.

5. Communique of Seven Nations, Manila Conference, October 25, 1966 (Australia, Korea, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, United States, Republic of Vietnam)⁶²

"We are united in our determination that the South Vietnamese people shall not be conquered by aggressive force and shall enjoy the inherent right to choose their own way of life and their own form of government. We shall continue our military and all other efforts, as firmly and as long as may be necessary, in close consultation among ourselves until the aggression is ended."

6. Remarks of President Johnson in Offering a Toast to the King of Thailand, Bangkok, October 28, 1966⁶³

Relevant passages

Tonight we stand as allies in a common cause. *** We know the risks that we both run to meet the common dangers. But we know, also, that we act from a joint conviction of common interest.

Let me assure you in this regard that Thailand can count on the United States to meet its obligations under the SEATO treaty. The commitment of the United States under the SEATO treaty is not of a particular political party or administration in my country but is a commitment of the American people.

I repeat to you: America keeps its commitments.⁶⁴

g. East Asia

1. Joint Resolution Authorizing the President To Employ the Armed Forces of the United States for Protecting the Security of Formosa, the Pescadores and Related Positions and Territories of That Area (Formosa Straits Resolution), January 29, 1955⁶⁵

Relevant passage

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such

related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. * * *

2. Statement on Formosa and the Offshore Islands by President Kennedy in a Press Conference, June 27, 1962⁶⁵

Our basic position has always been that we are opposed to the use of force in this area. * * * [In the event of] aggressive action against the offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy * * * the United States will take the action necessary to assure the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. * * * In my own discussion of this issue in the campaign of 1960, * * * I stated this position very plainly, for example, on October 16, 1960: "The position of the administration has been that we would defend Quemoy and Matsu if there were an attack which was part of an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores. * * * Under this policy sustained continuously by the United States Government since 1954, it is clear that any threat to the offshore islands must be judged in relation to its wider meaning for the safety of Formosa and the peace of the area. Exactly what action would be necessary in the event of any such act of force would depend on the situation as it developed. * * *

3. Reply to Question at Press Conference in Korea by Vice President Humphrey, February 23, 1966⁶⁷

Relevant passage

The United States Government and the people of the United States have a firm commitment to the defense of Korea. As long as there is one American soldier on the line of the border, the demarcation line, the whole and the entire power of the United States of America is committed to the security and defense of Korea. Korea today is as strong as the United States and Korea put together. America today is as strong as the United States and Korea put together. We are allies, we are friends, you should have no questions, no doubts.

H. Southwest Pacific

1. Joint Communique, President Johnson and President Macapagal, October 6, 1964⁶⁸

Relevant passage

The two Presidents recognized that the aggressive intentions and activities of Communist China continue to present an imminent threat in the Far East and in Southeast Asia. They reviewed, in this connection, the importance of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the United States in maintaining the security of both countries and reaffirmed their commitment to meet any threat that might arise against their security. President Johnson made it clear that, in accordance with these existing alliances and the deployment and dispositions thereunder, any armed attack against the Philippines would be regarded as an attack against United States forces stationed there and against the United States and would instantly be repelled.

2. Joint Communique, President Johnson and President Marcos of the Philippines, September 15, 1966⁶⁹

Relevant passages

14. Mutual Security. Both Presidents recognized the strategic role which the Philippines plays in the network of allied defenses and agreed to strengthen their mutual defense capabilities.

16. The two Presidents pledged themselves to strengthen the unity of the two countries in meeting any threat to their security. In this regard, they noted the continuing importance of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the United States in maintaining the security of both countries. President Johnson reiterated to President

Marcos the policy of the United States regarding mutual defense as stated by him and by past U.S. Administrations to the Philippine Government since 1954.

FOOTNOTES

¹ 59 Stat. 1031. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945; entered into force for the United States October 24, 1945.

² TIAS 1838. Opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro September 2, 1947; entered into force for the United States December 3, 1948.

³ Resolution VI, of the Final Act of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Punta del Este; signed January 31, 1962, excluded "the present Government of Cuba, which has officially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist government" from participation in the inter-American system.

⁴ TIAS 2292. Signed at Copenhagen April 27, 1951; entered into force June 8, 1951.

⁵ Both the United States and Denmark are members of NATO. See *ante*, p. 10.

⁶ TIAS 2266. Signed at Reykjavik May 5, 1951; entered into force May 5, 1951.

⁷ TIAS 4031. Signed at Washington May 12, 1958; entered into force May 12, 1958.

⁸ Treaty Series No. 945. Signed March 2, 1936; ratification advised by Senate, July 25, 1939; ratified by President, July 26, 1939; proclaimed by President, July 27, 1939.

⁹ TIAS 1964. Signed April 4, 1949; ratification advised by Senate, July 21, 1949; ratified by President, July 25, 1949; proclaimed by President, August 24, 1949; entered into force August 29, 1949.

¹⁰ Acceded by Protocol, February 18, 1952. TIAS 2390, October 17, 1951.

¹¹ Acceded by Protocol, May 5, 1955, TIAS 3428, October 23, 1954.

¹² Considering the independence of Algeria the North Atlantic Council on January 16, 1963, noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned the relevant clauses of this treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

¹³ TIAS 5437. Signed at New York, September 26, 1953.

¹⁴ TIAS 4189. Signed at Ankara March 5, 1959; entered into force March 5, 1959.

¹⁵ TIAS 4191. Signed at Ankara March 5, 1959; entered into force March 5, 1959.

¹⁶ TIAS 4303. Signed July 8, 1959; entered into force July 8, 1959.

¹⁷ TIAS 4190. Signed March 5, 1959; entered into force March 5, 1959. This bilateral agreement of cooperation was entered into pursuant to the Declaration Relating to the Baghdad Pact signed at London July 28, 1958 (see Section D, "Near East-Middle East").

¹⁸ TIAS 3170. Signed September 8, 1954; ratification advised by the Senate, February 1, 1955; ratified by the President, February 4, 1955; proclaimed by the President, February 19, 1955; entered into force, February 19, 1955.

¹⁹ Included (for the purposes of Article IV) by the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, TIAS 3170, signed September 8, 1954; entered into force, February 19, 1955. Cambodia has indicated disinterest in the protection of the Southeast Asia Treaty. In the Geneva Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, the Royal Government of Laos declared that it will not "recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition including SEATO," and the United States and other nations agreed to "respect the wish of the Kingdom of Laos not to recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO."

²⁰ TIAS 2493. Signed September 1, 1951; ratification advised by the Senate, March 20, 1952; ratified by the President, April 15, 1952; proclaimed by the President, May 9, 1952; entered into force April 29, 1952.

²¹ TIAS 2529. Signed August 30, 1951; ratification advised by the Senate, March 20, 1952; ratified by the President, April 15, 1952; proclaimed by the President, September 15, 1952; entered into force, August 27, 1952.

²² File 711.56396/10-1659.

²³ TIAS 6084. Signed at Washington, September 16, 1966.

²⁴ TIAS 4509. Signed January 19, 1960; ratification advised by the Senate, June 22, 1960; entered into force, June 23, 1960.

²⁵ TIAS 3178. Signed December 2, 1954; ratification advised by the Senate, February 9, 1955; ratified by the President, February 11, 1955; proclaimed by the President, April 1, 1955; entered into force, March 8, 1955.

²⁶ TIAS 3097. Signed October 1, 1953; ratification advised by the Senate, with an understanding, January 26, 1954; ratified by the President, subject to the said understanding, February 5, 1954; proclaimed by the President, December 1, 1954; entered into force, November 17, 1954.

²⁷ J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Paper of the Presidents, 1789-1897*, volume 11, pp. 207-220.

²⁸ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1960, pp. 210-212.

²⁹ Made at Ogdensburg, New York; text in *Department of State Bulletin*, August 24, 1940, p. 154.

³⁰ *Department of State Bulletin*, volume XVI, No. 399, February 23, 1947, p. 361.

³¹ Subsequently both Canada and the United States becomes parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

³² *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy* 1963, p. 188.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

³⁴ *American Foreign Policy, 1950-55; Basic Documents*, volume I, pp. 989-991.

³⁵ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1962, pp. 541-543.

³⁶ *American Foreign Policy, 1950-55; Basic Documents*, volume I, pp. 1481-1483.

³⁷ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1961, pp. 604-612.

³⁸ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1962, pp. 634-635.

³⁹ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1962, pp. 689-690.

⁴⁰ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1962, pp. 626-627.

⁴¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, volume L, No. 1305, June 29, 1964, pp. 992-994.

⁴² *Department of State Bulletin Supplement* of May 4, 1947, pp. 829-832. The message was delivered by the President before a joint session of Congress.

⁴³ House Joint Resolution 117, 85th Cong., 1st sess.; approved by the President, March 9, 1957.

⁴⁴ *Department of State Bulletin*, June 5, 1950, p. 886.

⁴⁵ TIAS 4084. Signed at London July 28, 1958; entered into force for the United States July 28, 1958.

⁴⁶ Iraq was not present.

⁴⁷ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1962, pp. 778-779.

⁴⁸ White House press release dated January 8, 1963 (text in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1962, p. 783).

⁴⁹ Department of State Press Release 121 Mar. 8, 1963, text in *Department of State Bulletin* XLVIII, No. 1239, Mar. 25, 1963, p. 435.

⁵⁰ *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy*, 1963, p. 373.

⁵¹ Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Aug. 8, 1966, Vol. 2, No. 31, p. 1019.

⁵² See Item II, C.7., p. 48.

⁵³ White House press release dated May 23, 1967.

⁵⁴ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 26, 1967, pages 889-920.

⁵⁵ Text as printed in *Dept. of State Bulletin*, XXX, No. 768, Mar. 15, 1954, pp. 300-401.

⁵⁶ Dept. of State press release 683, No. 17, 1962, text as printed in *Dept. of State Bulletin*, XLVII, No. 1223, Dec. 3, 1962, pp. 837-838.

⁵⁷ See item E. 1., p. 50.

⁵⁸ House Joint Resolution 1145, 88th Cong., 2d sess., August 10, 1964; 78 Stats. 384.

⁵⁹ Supplemental Appropriation Act, Title IV, 81 Stat. 5-6.

⁶⁰ Department of State Press Release, No. 145, March 6, 1962.

⁶¹ Text in LIV Department of State Bulletin 305-307.

⁶² Press release 252, Oct. 25, 1966.

⁶³ Text in *The Department of State Bulletin*, LV, No. 1430, Nov. 21, 1966, pp. 767-768.

⁶⁴ The President's statement was reiterated by Secretary Rusk in a press release on March 22, 1967, published in *The Department of State Bulletin*, LVI, No. 1450, Apr. 10, 1967, pp. 597-598.

⁶⁵ House Joint Resolution 159, 84th Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 29, 1955 (Text in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents* (2 volumes, Washington: U.S. Government Office, 1957), Volume II, pp. 2486-2487).

⁶⁶ *Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1962*, pp. 509-517.

⁶⁷ *Korea Times*, February 24, 1966.

In two world wars, we found that large enemy submarine forces have nearly cut us off from our allies. Now we face the largest and most modern enemy submarine fleet we have ever faced. We have found that we can effectively use submarines both against submarines and against enemy fleets and merchant marines in forward areas where the enemy has control of the ocean surface. Thus, in World War II our submarines were able to reduce the flow of petroleum to Japan to such an extent that at the end of the way, the Japanese fleet was hard put to find oil needed for operations.

We also learned the value of airpower, flying off carriers, to win our battles—and to cut down on the flow of petroleum to the enemy. We could not have made the step-by-step progress back across the Pacific up to Japan itself without getting control of the seas as we went. It was the use of planes flying off carriers that gave control of the air in our amphibious landing. I know because I was there—and I live today because of that. In Southeast Asia, we have been flying effectively off carriers as well as land bases. The carriers have not been subject to sneak attacks—such as have destroyed so many land aircraft.

When we had the missile crisis with Cuba, it was our seapower thrown around the island that made the effective difference. It gave us many choices of further steps.

With our Navy, our Government has any number of choices as to possible action in case of any trouble in any part of the world. With our large number of commitments we must be ready to back up our word or the Soviet will take over from us. Our choices range from "showing the flag," to blockades, to enemy action of varying kinds and amounts. Having these choices also gives our Government time to consider other possibilities which may be needed in any particular situation.

However, seapower must also be considered in its broader aspects. It is not merely the use and deployment of naval forces in both peacetime and wartime—it is also the use of the merchant marine, of fishing fleets, of oceanography. The Soviets are practicing what we learned long ago and have forgotten—that seapower is the coordinated use of all aspects of our naval and maritime abilities in support of a national policy.

FLEXIBILITY OF NAVAL POWER

Naval power has the great advantage of giving our Government any number of choices as to possible action in support of national policies in any part of

the world. In meeting our treaty commitments and protecting our vital interests, naval power allows great flexibility of response ranging from show-the-flag operations to any level of response that a situation requires.

CUBAN CRISIS

The flexibility and effectiveness of our seapower were so well demonstrated during the Cuban crisis, that is is worthwhile recalling that experience, especially as related by Senator Robert F. Kennedy in "Thirteen Days."

After the United States had photographic proof of the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba furnished by the Soviets, there was considerable debate as to what course we should take. The choices ran from armed invasion to diplomatic action. President John F. Kennedy decided that the first step would be to quarantine Cuba.

At first the quarantine was to extend 800 miles from Cuba, but it was reduced to 500 miles in order to give the Soviets time to consider and send necessary orders to the ships already underway. Two Soviet freighters carrying missiles approached the 500-mile boundary. At first it was planned to have the interception made by a cruiser. However, when a Soviet submarine was located between the two ships, it was decided to send the antisubmarine carrier *Essex* to make the interception. The Soviet freighters stopped at the edge of the 500-mile zone, so there was no need to confront them. However, the Soviets sent a tanker on through. Not wanting a confrontation over a ship not carrying missiles, we sent only an escort of surface ships to accompany it.

The Soviets had six submarines in the area which were constantly watched by our antisubmarine activities. We were able to get a fleet of 25 destroyers, two cruisers, several submarines, three attack carriers, five antisubmarine carriers, and a large number of support ships for the surface quarantine, as well as for antisubmarine work.

When an East German passenger ship appeared and entered the quarantine zone, it was decided to let it pass without stopping it. The possibility of harming 1,500 passengers was the governing consideration. We did not want another *Lusitania*. In order to show that we would insist on boarding and inspecting ships within the zone, a Panamanian freighter was selected. It was stopped, boarded, examined, and permitted to go on its way since it carried no arms. This showed we meant business, still without a direct confrontation with the Soviets.

While these operations were taking place on the high seas, we were able to put our missile crews on maximum alert and move troops into Florida and the southeastern United States. The 1st Armored Division began to move out of Texas into Georgia. Five more divisions were placed on alert. The base at Guantanamo Bay was strengthened. The Navy deployed 150 ships into the Caribbean. The Strategic Air Command was dispersed to civilian landing fields around the country and the B-52's were ordered into the air with a full load of atomic weapons. Plans were made for all scales of attack, including invasions of Cuba

and overrunning of the missile sites, in case the enemy undertook any of a number of possible kinds of action.

In the meantime, also, the United States was able to undertake diplomatic discussions with the Organization of American States, with the heads of England, France, and Germany, and with the United Nations. It was able to discuss the situation with the ambassadors of a number of countries and with the leaders of Congress.

Through the use of the quarantine, the United States was able to keep making a number of choices of courses of action. It was able to make clear its will and determination without necessarily making such a direct confrontation that the Soviets were not able to retreat. Throughout, there were any number of times when new circumstances made different decisions desirable at the last minute. The flexibility of our naval forces in the area combined with our mastery of the seas, based primarily on our aircraft carriers, gave us time to prepare and the Soviets time to reconsider.

To retain this kind of strategic flexibility, a flexibility which can be an important deterrent to war as this episode proved, is another important reason why we must proceed with the modernization of our Navy.

One hesitates to think what the results might have been in that crisis without the overwhelming mastery of the seas. As former Prime Minister Harold MacMillan has explained in an introduction to "Thirteen Days" by Robert F. Kennedy:

Apart from the various diplomatic weapons which were used with consummate skill, the President's decision to adopt the method of the blockade gave an opportunity both for the Americans to prepare and to the Soviet Government to recede.

H.R. 14000

The bill which is before you contains \$3.591 billion for shipbuilding. This bill does go beyond what the Department of Defense has asked for. However, it was drafted on information supplied by the Navy. Indeed, the Chief of Naval Operations has asked for a \$4 billion shipbuilding bill for at least 5 years in order to get the Navy into a good posture by the 1980's. Even with that construction there will be a period during the middle 1970's when we will have to rely on too many ships over 30 years of age.

The Secretary of the Navy has called for a \$4.5 billion shipbuilding program for 10 years. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has stated that the Navy needs this kind of a shipbuilding bill. The President has told the chairman of the full committee that he agrees with this shipbuilding bill. With this background, the committee decided it had no choice but to bring forth a bill which would restore the Navy to its rightful role.

The biggest differences with the Department of Defense program are in the construction of support ships and in the provision for long leadtime items.

Since the Navy cannot operate efficiently without a full complement of modern support ships, many of these are contained in the bill before you.

One of the most important ships that there is in the bill is the attack carrier.

The attack carrier is the heart of the U.S. surface naval strength and gives us a unique capability which is unmatched by any other nation. The carrier is the one capital ship that the Russians do not yet have, and its flexibility gives us an important leverage in carrying out national policy.

Attack carriers are the one way the United States has of taking its air power almost any place it may be needed. Ninety-five percent of the world's population and 85 percent of the world's contingency areas lie within striking distance from carriers. Carriers are not dependent upon base rights, landing rights, or overflight rights, which can quickly disappear when needed most. Recently our overseas air bases have been greatly curtailed as in France and Morocco, to name some outstanding examples. From 551 overseas bases at the end of the Korean war, we now have dropped to 173. Of 105 operational Air Force bases overseas in 1957, there are now only 35.

The Air Force is said to have a "kit" by which it can turn any civilian airfield into a military air base, so as to be able to use more land bases in a hurry. This presupposes that there will be all of the base rights—as well as overflight rights—which will be necessary to the United States. Upon inquiry, it turns out that the kit consists of 6,000 people, 7,000 tons of cargo and 1,500 vehicles. Thirty-two hundred tons of consumables a day are also required for the operation, including petroleum products.

When all costs of maintaining a fighter wing are compared, the differences between Navy and Air Force are not great—in fact, they are just about even. And the carrier can be placed in a new location immediately.

Attack carriers have been able to provide air power in the Pacific against a large Navy in ending World War II, in Korea when all of the land bases were overrun by the enemy, and for Southeast Asia.

The use of carriers in support of U.S. policy is best shown by the following information:

SUMMARY OF ATTACK CARRIER SUPPORT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE KOREAN WAR

July 1954: Searched for survivors of downed British aircraft in South China Sea. Search aircraft fired on by Chinese Communist fighters. Our aircraft returned the fire downing two Chinese Communist fighters—*Philippine Sea* and *Hornet*.

June to October 1954: Support evacuation of citizens of North Vietnam to the South—"Passage to Freedom"—*Hornet*.

October 1954: Assist victims of hurricane "Hazel" which had devastated part of Haiti. Helicopters dropped medicine, food, clothing and other supplies and relieved the widespread suffering—*Saipan*.

January 24 to February 12 1955: Protected and supported evacuation of more than 18,000 civilians and 20,000 military personnel from Chinese Mainland and Tachen Islands to Taiwan—*Essex*, *Wasp*, *Yorktown*, *Kearsarge*.

August 23, 1956: Search for crewmen of Navy patrol plane shot down off coast of Communist China while prepared to take other military actions if required—*Wasp*.

July to October 1956: Egyptian-Israeli War—Suez Crisis. Protected the evacuation of 2,177 U.S. citizens from Alexandria, Haifa, Tel Aviv, Amman and Damascus. Provided air

cover, and air and surface reconnaissance—*Randolph*, *Coral Sea*, *Antietam*.

October to December 1956: During Suez Crisis provided backup support to Mediterranean Naval Force in Eastern Atlantic—*Forrestal*, *Roosevelt*.

A two-carrier task force in the Western Pacific was prepared to sail to the Mediterranean—*Lexington*, *Bon Homme Richard*.

April 1957: Jordan Crisis. Provided show of force and presence—*Lake Champlain*, *Forrestal*.

September 1957: Participation in NATO exercise Strike Back in North Atlantic, North and Norwegian Sea—largest peacetime naval exercise in history (Canada, France, Netherlands, Norway, UK and US)—*Saratoga*, *Essex*, *Intrepid*, *Wasp*, *Forrestal*.

July to September 1957: US presence and show of force to defend Taiwan during Chinese Communist shelling of Kinmen Island—*Kearsarge*, *Lexington*, *Hancock*, *Bon Homme Richard*.

August to November 1957: US presence and show of force during Syrian political uprisings—*Randolph*, *Intrepid*.

July 14 to August 20, 1958: Lebanon crisis. Supported US Peace Force landing in Beirut. Conducted covering, reconnaissance and patrol missions—*Essex*, *Saratoga*.

August to September 1959: Provided US show of force during shelling of Nationalist Chinese Islands Quemoy and Matsu by Chinese Communists. (*Essex* proceeded from Lebanon crisis to Taiwan area)—*Hancock*, *Lexington*, *Bennington*, *Essex*, *Princeton*, *Midway*, *Shangri La*.

July 5 to 10, 1959: Show of force during Nationalist China-Communist China crisis—*Ranger*, *Lexington*.

August to September 1959: Provided presence and US force in South China Sea during Laotian crisis—*Lexington*, *Hancock*.

September 1959: Distributed food, medicine and evacuated typhoon victims in Nagoya, Japan—*Kearsarge*.

December 3 to 5, 1959: Aided flood victims who survived a broken dam disaster near San Raphael in southern France. Provided medical supplies, doctors, food, communications and news coverage—*Essex*.

April 11-16, 1960: U.S. show of flag to India (first carrier to visit since WWII)—*Bon Homme Richard*.

Fall 1960: Guatemala and Nicaragua requested assistance to guard against invasion. Provided air and surface patrols along Central America—*Shangri La*.

September 1960: Executed President Eisenhower's new policy of keeping at least 3 attack carriers "on the line" in troubled waters of the Far East at all times—*Coral Sea* first to sail as an augmenting carrier in WEST PAC.

September 1960 to June 1961: Major short term buildup of U.S. retaliation capability in response to Soviet pressure on Berlin—3 CVA in Mediterranean by rotation.

1960: U.S. show of flag at Split, Yugoslavia—*Forrestal*.

February to April 1961: Laotian Crisis. Provided U.S. presence in South China Sea and prepared to protect and support amphibious and airborne assault force—*Lexington*, *Midway*, *Coral Sea*.

April 1961: Cuban Crisis (Bay of Pigs)—*Independence*.

June 1961: Dominican Republic Uprising following assassination of Trujillo. Provided show of force—*Intrepid*, *Shangri La*, *Randolph*.

November 19-27, 1961: Dominican Republic Crisis. Provided presence and show of force—*Roosevelt*.

May 1962: Laos-South Vietnam Crisis. Provided presence and show of force in South China Sea and gave air cover for Marines landed in Thailand—*Hancock*, *Lexington*, *Coral Sea*.

June 1962: Quemoy-Matsu off-shore islands crisis. Provided presence and show of force—*Hancock*, *Midway*, *Coral Sea*.

August 25, 1962: Miyako Island, Japan volcano eruption. Assisted survivors—*Midway*.

October 22 to November 21, 1962: Cuban Missile Crisis. Conducted reconnaissance, quarantine and surface surveillance. Other carrier forces assumed higher readiness postures in the Mediterranean and Western Pacific—*Independence*, *Enterprise*, *Saratoga*.

April 28, 1963: Increasing Middle East tensions. Provided U.S. presence and show of force—*Enterprise*, *Saratoga*.

May 1-4, 1963: Laos Crisis. Provided U.S. presence in South China Sea—*Ranger*.

June 1963: Provided 256,500 gallons fresh water to Hong Kong during extended drought period—*Coral Sea*.

November 1963: South Vietnam political crisis following death of President Diem. Provided U.S. presence and show of force—*Oriskany*, *Hancock*, *Coral Sea*.

April to May 1964: Good Will tour of Indian Ocean by "Concord Squadron" and Visits to Diego Suarez, Malagasy, Mombasa, Kenya, Aden and hosted the Shah of Iran—*Bon Homme Richard*.

August 1964: Retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam following Gulf of Tonkin incident.—*Constellation*, *Ticonderoga*.

August 1964 to the present: Vietnam war.—*America*, *Enterprise*, *Constellation*, *Kitty Hawk*, *Independence*, *Ranger*, *Forrestal*, *Coral Sea*, *Hancock*, *Franklin D. Roosevelt*, *Oriskany*, *Midway*, *Bon Homme Richard*, *Intrepid*, *Ticonderoga*.

June 1967: "Six Day" Arab-Israeli War. Protected U.S. interests in Middle East. Provided protection for ships evacuating U.S. nationals from UAR.—*Saratoga*, *America*.

October 1967: Provided presence for possible evacuation of U.S. nationals during Greek attempted political coup.—*Saratoga*, *Roosevelt*.

January to March 1968: Readiness maneuvers after *Pueblo* capture by North Korea in Sea of Japan. Maintained presence in the area, ready to take offensive or defensive actions as directed.—*Enterprise*, *Ranger*, *Ticonderoga*, *Coral Sea*.

April to July 1969: Readiness maneuvers after unarmed Navy reconnaissance aircraft (EC-121) shot down over international waters by North Korean fighters. Maintained presence in Sea of Japan prepared to carry out actions as directed.—*Enterprise*, *Ticonderoga*, *Ranger*, *Kitty Hawk*, *Bon Homme Richard*.

INVULNERABILITY OF CARRIERS

One of the arguments made against funding the new attack carrier is that carriers are extremely vulnerable to enemy attack. The facts belie that argument.

Of the 44 attack carriers which have been built, only five have been sunk by enemy action, the last one being the *Hornet* on October 26, 1942, in the battle for the Solomons. No *Essex* class or later carrier has been sunk by enemy action. Forty-one of these carriers have launched air strikes in combat. The carriers are especially designed to take a large amount of punishment from bombs and torpedoes and still be able to continue flight operations. In the *Enterprise* catastrophe, nine major bombs exploded on the armored flight deck. If it had been the decision to continue flight operations, they could have resumed within hours merely by the removal of the debris from the deck.

The carrier may be subject to attack from either airplanes or submarines, but airfields can be subject to that attack, too, as well as to guerrilla and other enemy action. The carrier has protection from missile attack by its escort screen and by its own aircraft. An air base has protection by its own planes, too, as well

as by ground forces and even naval forces. An attack on a carrier by a nuclear weapon would be about as devastating as the same kind of an attack on an airbase. However, a carrier, being mobile, cannot be pretargeted when it is maneuvering at sea.

During World War II, our attack carriers took some 42 bombings or torpedoings. There was no sinking after the *Hornet* went down on October 26, 1942. Carriers are especially designed to absorb bombings. Their hulls are especially designed and compartmented. There is

armor plate on their flight deck. When the *Enterprise* had its tragic fire, nine major sized bombs exploded on its flight deck. Yet, if it had been desired, the carrier could have been back in flight operation within a few hours—requiring only the removal of the debris on the deck.

Some point to the sinking of the *Elatch* by a Styx missile as being indicative of the danger carriers run. Carriers have escorts whose task is to keep gunboats, such as fired the missile out of range of the carrier. They also can

defend against any missile. The carriers' planes can also defend against a missile. One sub missile will not sink the carrier. Indeed, since the Styx missile is a heat seeking missile, and since a nuclear carrier does not have any stack, there will be no easy target provided to the missile. If the missile locks onto the heat from planes warming on the deck of the carrier, it would do no more harm than the explosions on the *Enterprise*, due to the armor plate in the deck.

A chart of the World War II bombings shows:

SUMMARY OF BATTLE DAMAGE TO U.S. CARRIERS, WORLD WAR II, INCLUDING CAUSE AND EFFECT OF DAMAGE

Ship	Date hit	Cause of damage	Continued in operation	Temporarily out of action (see remarks)	Out of action	Required overhaul or repair	Duration of overhaul or repair	Sunk	Remarks
Lexington	May 8, 1942	2 bombs, 2 or 3 air torpedoes	×	-----	×	-----	Sunk	×	Hit at 1120-1121. Landed 13 planes at 1145. Launched planes at 1243. Large explosion at 1442. Fires out of control at 1450. Ship abandoned and sunk by our own DD torpedoes
Yorktown	(1)	3 bombs: 2 air torpedoes; 2 submarine	×	-----	×	-----	do	×	Hit at 1430. Launched 8 VF at 1600. Torpedoes hit at 1620, ship stopped, later sunk (on 7th).
Wasp	Sept 15, 1942	2 or 3 submarine torpedoes	-----	-----	×	-----	do	×	Finally sunk by own DD torpedoes. Japanese submarine torpedoes struck in way of magazines and exploded partown ammo. Fires and damage appeared manageable until 3 gasoline vapor explosions occurred below deck. Day-long action. Finally sunk by own DD torpedoes and gunfire after ship abandoned
Hornet	Oct. 26, 1942	5 bombs: 3 air torpedoes; 2 kamikaze	-----	-----	×	-----	do	×	Repaired at NYPH and then proceeded to NYPS for installation of bilsters as previously scheduled. Duration of overhaul 4 months, not all chargeable to torpedo damage.
Saratoga	Jan. 11, 1942	1 submarine torpedo	×	-----	×	-----	See remarks	-----	-----
Enterprise	Feb. 1, 1942	1 bomb	×	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	Splitter damage only.
Yorktown	May 8, 1942	3 bombs	×	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	Hit at 1127. Landed planes at 1155; launched at 1215; launched planes at 1230. Not sent in for overhaul or repairs.
Enterprise	Aug. 24, 1942	4 bombs	×	-----	×	×	3 weeks	-----	Hit at 1712, continued to operate planes until 1843 when steering lost. To NYPH.
Saratoga	Aug. 31, 1942	1 submarine torpedo	-----	×	-----	×	7 weeks	-----	Hit at 1948. Stopped at 1953 as result electrical fires. At 0130 back in commission and at 0130 landed 20 VSB and 9 VTB, at 0030 launched and landed A/C.
Enterprise	Oct. 26, 1942	2 bombs	-----	×	-----	×	2 weeks	-----	Hit at 1115, started operating planes again at 1230. To Noumea for repairs.
Independence (CVL)	Nov. 20, 1943	1 air torpedo	-----	-----	×	×	24 weeks	-----	3 shafts knocked out and extensive flooding.
Lexington	Dec. 4, 1943	do	-----	-----	×	×	8 weeks	-----	Hit at 2330, no air operations in progress to PSNY.
Princeton (CVL)	Oct. 24, 1944	1 bomb	-----	-----	×	×	Sunk	×	Hangar deck fires. Finally sunk by own forces.
Intrepid	Feb. 17, 1944	1 air torpedo	-----	-----	×	×	6 days	-----	Steering gear damaged.
Wasp	Feb. 19, 1944	5 bombs	×	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	Fragment damage, local fires.
Bunker Hill	June 19, 1944	1 bomb	×	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	Fragment damage, local fires, minor flooding.
Franklin	Oct. 13, 1944	1 kamikaze	×	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	Negligible damage.
Hancock	Oct. 14, 1944	1 bomb	×	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	Minor fragment damage.
Franklin	Oct. 15, 1944	3 bombs	×	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	Minor fragment damage, small fires, minor damage.
Intrepid	Oct. 29, 1944	1 kamikaze	×	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	Small fire, quickly extinguished.
Franklin	Oct. 30, 1944	do	×	-----	×	-----	10 weeks	-----	Hit at 1046. Recovered planes of strikes in air at 1337. Launched again at 1649. Recovered at 1758. To PSNY. Extensive fires were extinguished in 2½ hours.
Lexington	Nov. 5, 1944	do	×	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	Small fires extinguished in 20 minutes.
Essex	Nov. 25, 1944	do	×	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	Minor fires, minor flight deck damage. Hit at 1256, resumed flight operations at 1326 (30 minutes).
Intrepid	do	2 kamikaze	-----	-----	×	×	7 weeks	-----	Extensive fires and structural damage. Hit at 1254/59. Flight deck fires out at 1314; others under control at 1532. To NYSF.
Belleau Wood (CVL)	Oct. 30, 1944	1 kamikaze	-----	-----	×	×	4½ weeks	-----	Serious fires on flight deck, gallery, and 01 decks. To NYSF.
Cabot (CVL)	Nov. 25, 1944	2 kamikaze	-----	×	-----	-----	2 weeks	-----	Small fires. Minor structural damage. Severe fragment damage. To Ulithi for repairs, operated planes 1 hour 06 minutes after hit.
Ticonderoga	Jan. 21, 1945	do	-----	-----	×	×	9 weeks	-----	Extensive fires and damage to electrical cables under flight deck forward. To NYPS.
Saratoga	Feb. 21, 1945	4 kamikaze; 2 bombs	-----	×	-----	×	10 weeks	-----	Hits over period from 1700 to 1846. Extensive fires and severe structural damage. By 2015 ready to land A/C. To PSNY.
Randolph	Mar. 11, 1945	1 kamikaze	-----	-----	×	×	3 days	-----	Ship at anchor Ulithi when hit. Repaired at Ulithi.
Enterprise	Mar. 18, 1945	1 bomb	×	-----	-----	-----	12 days	-----	Minor fires, minor damage. No interruption of operations (Bomb broke up). Repaired at Ulithi.
Intrepid	Mar. 18, 1945	1 kamikaze	×	-----	-----	×	11 days	-----	Minor gasoline fires, minor fragment damage. Repaired at Ulithi.
Yorktown	do	1 bomb	×	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	Severe blast and fragment damage to exterior shell plating. Minor fires quickly extinguished. No interruption of operations.
Franklin	Mar. 19, 1945	2 bombs	-----	-----	×	×	End of war	-----	Terrific conflagrations and explosions of own bombs, ammo, and Tiny Tims.
Wasp	do	1 bomb	-----	×	-----	×	7 weeks	-----	Severe fires. Moderate structural damage. Resumed routine flight operations day after hit. Withdrawn following day and ordered NY.
Hancock	Apr. 7, 1945	1 kamikaze	-----	×	-----	×	do	-----	Severe fires. Hit at 1210, landed returning strike at 1630. Withdrawn and ordered Pearl Harbor for repair.
Enterprise	Apr. 11, 1945	2 kamikaze	-----	×	-----	×	4 weeks	-----	Minor fires, hull damage and flooding. Heavy shock damage to machinery. Hits at 1410 and 1510. Launched planes at 1652.
Essex	do	1 bomb	×	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	Minor damage, hit 1507. Launched at 1541, landed CAP at 1604.
Intrepid	Apr. 16, 1945	1 kamikaze	-----	×	-----	×	5 weeks	-----	Severe conflagration, moderate blast and fragment damage. Hit at 1336, fires out at 1544 and reported ready to land planes. Repair at Hunter's Point.
Bunker Hill	May 11, 1945	2 kamikaze	-----	×	×	×	16 weeks	-----	Severe fires, moderate structural damage. Out of action. To NYPS.

Footnotes at end of article.

SUMMARY OF BATTLE DAMAGE TO U.S. CARRIERS, WORLD WAR II, INCLUDING CAUSE AND EFFECT OF DAMAGE—Continued

Ship	Date hit	Cause of damage	Continued in operation	Temporarily out of action (see remarks)	Out of action	Required overhaul or repair	Duration of overhaul or repair	Sunk	Remarks
Enterprise	May 11, 1945	1 kamikaze			X	X	14 weeks		Fires controlled in 30 minutes, but bulging of flight deck required sending planes to other ships. 10 PSNY.
Langley (CVL)	Jan. 21, 1945	1 bomb		X		X	9 days		Moderate blast and fragment damage, minor fires. Hit at 1207, recovered planes at 1435, and fleet operations continued thereafter.
San Jacinto (CVL)	Apr. 6, 1945	1 kamikaze	X						Minor damage.

¹ Yorktown, June 4-7, 1942.

NEED FOR A NEW CARRIER

There are presently 16 carriers being used as attack carriers, including one antisubmarine warfare carrier which is temporarily being used in the attack role. The average age of these carriers is 15 years, but five were commissioned between 1944 and 1947 and one was commissioned in 1950, so they are between 19 and 25 years old.

There is no question that these carriers have about reached the end of their useful life. In particular, they will not be able to receive the new fighter planes which are needed to meet the new Soviet Blinders. Their catapults and arresting gear will not take the new planes, and there is not enough capacity to install new electronic equipment. Their equipment is old and falling into greater disre-

pair. Because the tempo of operations on carriers is higher than on other ships, there has been less opportunity for regular maintenance and repair.

In addition, the habitability of the older carriers is not good, and far below modern day standards. This is an important factor. Those who would have us cut back on the number of carriers we use are also those who want us to go to an all-volunteer force. A Navy composed of ships in poor condition and with poor habitability will not attract volunteers who will stay. It will also not be effective against its enemies. Hence, no matter how large the number of carriers may be proper for the Navy, it is essential to have a new carrier in view of the age and condition of the older carriers.

history of the number of attack carriers shows that there has been a variation over the years:

1945	20
1946	14
1947	12
1948	11
1949	8
1950	7
1951	14
1952	16
1953	16
1954	15
1955	17
1956	19
1957	16
1958	15
1959	14
1960	14
1961	15
1962	16
1963	15
1964	15
1965	16
1966	16
1967	16
1968	16
1969	16

ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS OF THE U.S. NAVY

Number	Name	Date commissioned	Age in years as of September 1969	Planned replacement	Age when planned to be replaced
CVA-67	John F. Kennedy	Sept. 7, 1968	1		
CVA-66	America	Jan. 23, 1965	4		
CVA-65	Enterprise	Nov. 25, 1961	7		
CVA-64	Constellation	Oct. 27, 1961	7		
CVA-63	Kitty Hawk	Apr. 23, 1961	8		
CVA-62	Independence	Jan. 10, 1959	8		
CVA-61	Ranger	Aug. 10, 1957	12		
CVA-60	Saratoga	Apr. 14, 1956	13		
CVA-59	Forrestal	Apr. 1, 1955	13		
CVA-43	Coral Sea	Oct. 1, 1947	21	CVAN-72 (1980)	1 33
CVA-42	Franklin D. Roosevelt	Oct. 27, 1945	23	CVAN-71 (1978)	1 33
CVA-41	Midway ²	Sept. 10, 1945	24		
CVA-34	Oriskany	Sept. 25, 1950	19	CVAN-70 (1976)	1 26
CVA-31	Bon Homme Richard	Nov. 26, 1944	24	CVAN-69 (1974)	1 30
CVA-19	Hancock	Apr. 15, 1944	25	Nimitz (1972)	1 28
CVA-14	Ticonderoga	May 8, 1944	25	Midway (1970)	1 26
CVS-38	Shangri-La	Sept. 15, 1944	25	(e)	

¹ To be redesignated as CVS.

² Presently decommissioned undergoing modernization.

³ Temporarily serving as an attack carrier for duration of Vietnam conflict.

There has been considerable discussion about how many attack carriers the Navy should have. The number is examined and reexamined all of the time. At the present time there are 16, with one anti-submarine warfare carrier being used as an attack carrier. With this number we have maintained two carriers in the Mediterranean and five on station off Vietnam. The rest have been deployed in the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, or have been on training or undergoing overhaul. Even with the 16 it has been difficult to meet the missions expected of the Navy.

There are a number of ways to consider how many carriers are needed.

If response time is considered, we need between 12 and 24 carriers. If we have 12, we can respond anywhere in the world in 7 days; if we have 24, the response time is cut to 3½ days.

If matching the Soviet fleet is a factor, it is estimated that in the mid-1970's the Soviets will have about 30 task forces such as they recently sent into the Gulf of Mexico and into the Indian Ocean. If the Soviets keep between one-fifth and one-third deployed, then we will need six to 10 carriers, also, to match their deployments. This would require a total force of between 18 and 30 carriers.

If the number of possible areas for fighting around the world is considered, such as Korea, Southeast Asia, Germany, the Mediterranean, and now the Caribbean, then we need between 15 and 21 carriers.

By all three methods of computation—and the reasoning behind each is highly classified—then we not only do not need fewer carriers—we need more than the present 16.

There is no "magic number" of 15. The

Of the 25 years since the end of World War II, we have had 15 carriers in only 5. Indeed, just before Korea erupted, we had only seven carriers on active duty. We were able to bring that strength up to 14 the next year because we had a reserve fleet. Now we have no really usable reserve of attack carriers.

No matter which way the problem is considered, one new carrier is needed now. Even on the best managed program, it takes about 6½ years to build a carrier from the first approval to buy long leadtime items to commissioning. This is a long enough time to wait for a new carrier without extending it.

One point should be added. One of the lessons from the Cuba missile crisis was that a quick response with an overwhelming use of seapower centered on aircraft carriers can bring about a desired result. We must remember that we no longer have the ability to move our attack carriers through the Panama Canal. No angle-deck carrier can pass through the locks. In case of emergency, the carriers would have to go around Cape Horn, which would increase the response time immeasurably, and perhaps unacceptably. This one factor alone means we have to consider the Atlantic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet separately. It also means we should have carriers able to go around the Horn or through the Northwest Passage with the shortest time taken to replenish before the voyage. This means a nuclear carrier.

The bill provides for 17 other warships than the nuclear carrier, 18 support ships, 21 conversions and long leadtime items for 41 new construction or conversions. The purpose of this kind of shipbuilding program is to attain a balanced fleet by the 1980's without having a crash

program now or in the future. If we do not start this kind of a program now, we will either end with no fleet or with a crash program which will lead in turn to another period of block obsolescence.

As President Kennedy said:

If there is any lesson of the 20th Century, and especially of the past few years, it is that in spite of the advances in space and air . . . this country must still move easily and safely across the seas of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further requests for time, under the rule, the Clerk will now read the bill by title.

The Clerk read as follows:

H.R. 14000

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1970 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

AIRCRAFT

For aircraft: for the Army \$570,400,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, \$2,391,200,000; for the Air Force, \$4,002,200,000.

MISSILES

For missiles: for the Army, \$780,460,000; for the Navy, \$851,300,000; for the Marine Corps, \$20,100,000; for the Air Force, \$1,486,400,000.

NAVAL VESSELS

For naval vessels: for the Navy, \$3,591,500,000: *Provided*, That no funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States shall be expended after January 1, 1970, for the contract procurement of DD 963 class destroyers unless the procurement planned for such vessels makes provision that the vessels in that plan shall be constructed at the facilities of at least three different United States shipbuilders.

TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES

For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, \$195,200,000; for the Marine Corps, \$37,700,000.

Mr. RIVERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the title be dispensed with and that it be printed in the RECORD and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 14000), to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

HOURLY MEETING ON TOMORROW

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet at 11 o'clock tomorrow.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, some comment has been made here today about Members not having enough time during which to speak on this bill. Could we start at 9 o'clock? I wonder if the distinguished majority leader would amend his unanimous-consent request for us to come in at 9 o'clock tomorrow?

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I would say to my distinguished friend from Florida I wish he had spoken to me about that earlier because I have cleared the time of meeting at 11 o'clock with other Members and I am fearful that this word will not get out in time to the Members with whom this has been cleared for us to meet at 10 o'clock tomorrow instead of 11.

Mr. BENNETT. I do not wish to disturb the arrangements which have been made by the leadership, but I would like very much for the majority leader to make the hour of meeting on tomorrow 10 o'clock.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet at 10 o'clock tomorrow.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, is this as a convenience for Members to not be here on Friday or is it for the purpose of making available ample time for the consideration of the bill on Thursday and Friday?

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, if the distinguished minority leader will yield, I would respond by saying, either or both insofar as I am concerned.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, further reserving the right to object, is it the intention of the majority leader and the leadership on that side to work late tomorrow in order to finish this bill or to adjourn at a reasonable time if we have not concluded it by 6 or 7 o'clock tomorrow night and then meet on Friday?

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further—if I may speak without having consulted with the members of the committee on both sides—I would like to play that by ear and then let the circumstances dictate when we reach a late point tomorrow afternoon. If it is obvious that we cannot finish the bill, I would think we would want to go over. However, if we can finish at an early hour, I think we would want to complete it.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. In light of the fact that we have no other business scheduled on Friday, I see no reason whatsoever to go to a late hour tomorrow night.

Mr. ALBERT. I concur in what the gentleman has said and insofar as I am concerned I am willing to meet early and

stay late and if we have not concluded the consideration of the bill, then to meet on Friday. However, I see that there seems to be considerable interest among those present to meet at an earlier hour on tomorrow. We had cleared the hour of meeting for 11 o'clock. But, if I may do so, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet at 10 o'clock tomorrow.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

INTEREST EQUALIZATION TAX EXTENSION ACT

(Mr. CELLER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CELLER. Mr. Speaker, in the other body, the Finance Committee has added a totally nongermane and regressive amendment to the Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act—H.R. 12829. The amendment repeals the ammunition recordkeeping requirements of the Gun Control Act of 1968.

The Senate committee amendment eliminates recordkeeping in sales of, first, shotgun ammunition; second, rifle ammunition; third, .22 caliber rimfire ammunition, and component parts thereof.

The 1968 act prohibits the sale of ammunition to certain juveniles, mental incompetents, known felons, drug addicts, and other irresponsible persons. Requiring a prospective purchaser to give his name, address and substantiate his age is not a nuisance. Clearly, enforcement of the act's prohibitions would be impossible without requiring dealers to keep records of ammunition transactions.

Under the Senate committee rider, ammunition recordkeeping for approximately 90 percent of all firearms would be eliminated.

Recordkeeping will deter those who cannot legally buy ammunition.

Recordkeeping will insure that dealers will exercise a higher degree of care in determining whether the buyer is barred under the statute from buying ammunition.

Availability of ammunition records will aid in the investigation of firearms crimes.

The only way of affecting the 90 million firearms already privately owned is by regulating the flow of ammunition.

According to Senate Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee studies: .22 caliber pistols and revolvers were involved in 30 percent of the handgun murders committed last year; .22 caliber rifles were involved in 60 percent of the rifle murders last year; .22 caliber rimfire bullets accounted for 37 percent of the homicides committed in this country last year; that is, 3,300 Americans were murdered by these bullets.

The weapon used to kill Robert Kennedy was a .22 caliber revolver which fired a .22 caliber rimfire bullet.

Mr. Speaker, the Gun Control Act of 1968 represented one of the outstanding accomplishments of the 90th Congress. It marked the beginning toward

reducing the level of gun violence in this country. Now, without any hearings and only 10 months after the act has become effective, a Senate committee has moved to strike an essential element from the act's regulatory fabric.

No examination of the need or consequences of repealing ammunition controls has been made. It is unwise and regressive to cut back the scope of the act of 1968. Should the other body nevertheless adopt this ammunition rider, it will encounter sustained opposition on the floor of the House. The resulting delay may well jeopardize the enactment of the Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act. The ammunition amendment should be defeated.

INCREASE IN MAXIMUM CRIMINAL PENALTIES UNDER THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT TO \$500,000

(Mr. McCULLOCH asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McCULLOCH. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased today to join with the distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, the Honorable EMANUEL CELLER, in introducing the Nixon administration's bill to increase the maximum criminal penalties under the Sherman Antitrust Act to \$500,000. The enactment of this legislation will provide a more effective and much needed deterrent to pernicious antitrust violations like price-fixing, profit-pooling, market allocation, monopolization and other often predatory practices.

As originally enacted in 1890, the Sherman Act imposed penalties up to \$5,000 for conviction. As a result of the efforts by the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, the law was amended in 1955, to increase the maximum fine to \$50,000. Since then, the profit of corporations has increased greatly and the value of the dollar has decreased. As a result, this potential penalty has not served to punish offenders and has not deterred possible offenders. A maximum \$50,000 fine simply does not dissuade most corporations from engaging in those activities which Congress has found to be inimical to the interests of a free and competitive society.

This legislation is properly limited to corporate defendants. Moreover, because no minimum fine is required, small businesses will not be unduly harmed as the court may, in its discretion, fit the penalty to the crime. In addition, though civil antitrust litigations instituted by the Government may sometimes involve novel or unfamiliar theories of illegality, this is not true in a criminal proceeding. For example, price-fixing agreements in their various forms, have been *per se* illegal since the *United States v. Trenton Pottery Co.*, 273 U.S. 392 (1927). It would be fatuous to argue that a businessman could be surprised by a price-fixing indictment or that a large penalty under those circumstances would be unfair.

Mr. Speaker, the President is attempting to create law and order with justice through a massive attack upon violent

crimes, crimes against property and organized crimes. I commend him for this effort. Likewise, the deterrent to competitive crimes must be made strong. I commend the Nixon administration for its recognition of this principle and I urge prompt enactment of this legislation.

I am pleased to tell the House that in the administration of the late great Dwight D. Eisenhower, when Herbert Brownell was Attorney General, we increased the penalties for this kind of criminal act tenfold, and we propose to increase it that much again.

CALL FOR SHOW OF NATIONAL UNITY BEHIND PRESIDENT NIXON

(Mr. KLEPPE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KLEPPE. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support the call by the minority leadership of the House and the Senate for a show of national unity behind President Nixon in his determined effort to bring the long and agonizing war in Vietnam to an early and honorable conclusion.

The next few weeks could be crucial in our negotiations with the other side. I deplore any words and actions here on the home front now that would help to convince the North Vietnamese that the United States is tired, weak willed, and hopelessly divided. I especially deplore some of the recent efforts to make a political issue out of Vietnam by a few of the leaders of the party which was in power at the time we became so deeply involved in this tragic war.

This is not Mr. Nixon's war. He did not get us into it. He is only trying to get us out with honor. Time after time he has indicated to the Government of North Vietnam and its negotiating team in Paris his willingness to walk the extra mile toward a solution.

Mr. Speaker, on July 17, 1969, I listed in the RECORD a statement outlining the many specific moves the United States has taken to achieve peace. Under unanimous consent I am including as a part of my remarks the following excerpts from that speech:

It may well be that the Communists believe they have only to sit tight and wait for the United States to "cut and run." They must follow, with at least some satisfaction, the mounting attacks here at home on the continuing American military presence in Vietnam. They may believe that the United States is tired, weak-willed, and hopelessly divided.

They hear demands for unilateral withdrawal now from some of the very men who were a part of the preceding administration when the big buildup of U.S. military forces was taking place. One wonders why these experts did not speak out then.

I do not believe the voice of despair is the voice of the American people.

I think President Nixon has the support of most Americans in his quest for an honorable peace. But I do not believe that most Americans want peace at any price—peace under terms dictated entirely by the Communists.

A few weeks ago, I conducted a poll on the Vietnam question in my district. More than 7,500 persons responded, a number far larger than the professional pollsters query in their nationwide samplings of public opinion. I

asked the people which alternatives they would favor "if the Paris peace talks fail to produce agreement leading to at least some disengagement in Vietnam within the next few months."

Ten percent favored "withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Vietnam, even though this might mean a Communist takeover."

"Withdrawing U.S. troops as rapidly as they can be replaced with South Vietnamese forces" was selected by 47 percent as the best course.

Thirty-nine percent favored "an all-out offensive against North Vietnam, utilizing full available military power, short of nuclear weapons, in an effort to win a clear-cut victory."

Only 4 percent were undecided.

Certainly these responses reflect no great support for a "cut and run" policy. And I suspect that public sentiment in most congressional districts across the country is not greatly different from what it is in mine.

President Nixon has not yet had quite 6 months to solve a problem which was many years in the making. For the first time since 1960, the number of American troops in Vietnam is being decreased, rather than increased. A sure and swift route toward peace has been opened to the other side.

The time has come for the Communists to show some willingness to negotiate seriously—to show some evidence of good faith.

I believe the possibility of achieving at least the beginning of a settlement would be enormously improved if a few individuals here in the United States would voutarily stifle their shrill cries of dissent long enough to let the Communists know that these United States are united in their determination to obtain a just and honorable peace in Vietnam.

FEEDING WHEAT TO BEEF CATTLE

(Mr. SEBELIUS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SEBELIUS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity, as the Representative from the largest wheat-producing district in the Nation, the "Big First" District of Kansas, to comment on the current wheat industry crisis and the related farm income problem not only in my district, but throughout rural and smalltown America.

The crisis in wheat today can be summed up in the words of a western Kansas minister who told his Sunday congregation, "Blessed be agriculture—if one does not have too much of it." That, Mr. Speaker, is precisely the problem. Our present domestic wheat surplus is slowly climbing to the 900-million-bushel mark. Our surplus, plus the present world surplus, has depressed the wheat market price to levels below the cost of production for many farmers despite increased efficiency and rapid technological advances.

It is a paradox of enormous irony that at the same time we are constantly being warned of the imminent threat of world hunger and overpopulation, the man whose job it is to feed America and to help feed a troubled world cannot make a decent living.

Yet, despite the fact the farmer is today being forced out of business by the present cost-price squeeze, many mistakenly believe the farmer is the real "fat cat" in our society—the fellow that gets paid for growing nothing.

Let me illustrate the true picture of the very real wheat industry crisis by comparing the plight of the farmer with his city cousin, that much maligned, made over and misinformed consumer. The Kansas wheat farmer actually receives only 14 cents of every \$1 the American consumer spends on bread. At the same time, prices paid by farmers for all items increased 27 percent in the last 10 years. During the same period, costs of services increased 43 percent, transportation costs rose 24 percent, medical care rose 54 percent, production workers' wages increased 42 percent, and the inflationary statistics go on and on. Everything the farmer must buy is going up in price while everything he sells is going down.

This situation is most ironic when you consider the farmer's contribution to our society as a whole. The man who contributes the most is receiving the least. In western Kansas, we have a real emergency. Farm management fieldmen recently reported the average net income of \$1,970 and \$2,225 in the two-farm management districts within my district. This income figure in light of the average farmer's 58-hour week figures out to be 66 cents an hour—a wage that is a disgrace.

Yet, Mr. Speaker, what speeches ring throughout the Halls of Congress? Upon what peg are we hanging our legislative hat today? While the farmer turns an anxious eye to Washington, Washington in turn courts the consumer.

Let me make it perfectly clear I have no quarrel with the consumer in the important fight against inflation. My point is, let us not use the American farmer as the scapegoat. The average consumer today only spends 17 percent of his disposable income for food. Twenty years ago, he spent over 25 percent. The current figure means the American consumer is getting his food at a cheaper cost than any other country in the world and any other country in history.

In effect, the misinformed consumer and an urban oriented Congress do not realize the farmer has been subsidizing the rest of the Nation for many years with more than an adequate supply of food at prices below his own cost. By limiting a family's food expenditure to only 17 cents out of each dollar spent, the farmer has released 83 cents of every consumer dollar for nonfood items. He has made it possible for accelerated rapid growth and prosperity in all segments of our society.

The Kansas wheat industry is directly responsible for generating \$450 million to the Kansas economy. Mr. Speaker, as you can see, it is imperative that we save the farmer from financial ruin. We must protect the traditional and proven way of life that provides the economic backbone to our society. We desperately need solid proposals that will help revitalize rural and smalltown America.

As a partial answer, I support my good friend and former "Big First" Congressman, Kansas Senator BOB DOLE, in his efforts to increase wheat exports under the food for peace program. The food for peace program warrants expansion because it not only helps reduce Commodity Credit Corporation acquisitions

and costs and improves farm product prices, but it also generates sufficient tax receipts through increased labor requirements to cover the Government's costs. It may well be that our mightiest weapon in our quest for peace is this Nation's willingness to share our abundance with those who are less fortunate.

Another partial answer to the wheat surplus dilemma involves increased domestic consumption. With the present concern for health and high cholesterol levels, studies show that a diet high in carbohydrate, including wheat and other cereals, serves to lower the level of susceptibility to heart disease. In this same vein, wheat cereal carbohydrates are a growing source of protein and energy.

Another proposal I would like to specifically emphasize is feeding wheat to beef cattle. Recent statistics show feeding wheat to produce meat has great promise in decreasing our surplus wheat stocks. This approach would convert the wheat surplus to red meat and help meet the growing demand for this quality product at the supermarket.

A fine local example of this approach is the feedlot at Pratt, Kans.—local producers are offered \$1.15 per bushel for No. 2 Hard Red Winter wheat—the grade normally grown and handled by Kansas farmers. This compares with local offerings for cash wheat which range from \$1.06 to \$1.10. The 20,000-head-capacity feedlot will use approximately 90,000 pounds or 1,500 bushels of wheat a day in their feeding operation.

In relation to this development, Mr. Bill Duitsman, superintendent of the Fort Hays Agricultural Experiment Station of Kansas State University in Hays, Kans., recently sent me Bulletin 487 by John Brethour, station herdsman and associate professor, Fort Hays branch station, entitled "Feeding Wheat to Beef Cattle."

In reference to the station's research, Mr. Brethour recently offered an encouraging answer to the wheat farmer's dilemma. He stated the Kansas wheat crop alone represented a 5-pound steak per person in the United States. This crop could also represent 70 loaves of bread per person. I submit to you that beefsteak and good bread make a wonderful combination.

Further, his observations on feeding wheat described in the station bulletin state wheat is a safe and efficient grain to use in a beef cattle ration. In direct comparisons involving various grains: One pound of wheat has been equivalent to 1.09 pounds of corn or 1.15 pounds of sorghum grain. However, the relative value of wheat was 8 percent greater when mixed with corn—1 pound of wheat equivalent to 1.17 pounds of corn—and 9 percent greater when mixed with sorghum grain—1 pound of wheat equivalent to 1.24 pounds of sorghum grain.

To further illustrate the benefit of feeding wheat to beef cattle is the price relationship to other grains. With corn at \$1.30, the value of wheat per bushel, if fed up to 50 percent of the concentrate, would be \$1.63—a considerable increase from the \$1.07 bushel value when marketed as grain at the present time in southwest Kansas.

Recent studies recently released by Purdue University further emphasize the importance of the "feed wheat" concept in reducing surplus wheat. The research reveals the value of wheat as a concentrate in swine finishing rations. The benefit is similar to that mentioned in the previous results regarding beef cattle.

The summary in the experiment station's bulletin presents in capsule form the statistics and technical data that point to the value of wheat as a concentrate in beef cattle finishing rations, as a protein source in balancing a beef cattle ration, and as an energy and protein source in high-roughage wintering rations.

I am happy to present this valuable information to my colleagues and for consideration and study by livestock producers. I feel this vehicle for reducing the wheat surplus and government storage expenses, for satisfying the growing demand for beef by the consumer in a most efficient way, and for boosting the wheat price and returning prosperity to the wheat farmer should be fully utilized.

Mr. Speaker, the consumer may not appreciate nor even understand feeding wheat to beef cattle, but it is through the application of such valuable research that we can find partial answers to the wheat industry crisis. This solution for the wheat farmer can actually represent an investment in our Nation's future food supply, could help our Nation's balance of payments, and will further guarantee to the consumer that his food will continue to be available at the lowest possible price.

INVESTIGATION OF WASHINGTON GAS LIGHT CO. LONG OVERDUE

(Mr. CUNNINGHAM asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I am preparing legislation for a full-scale investigation of the practices of the Washington Gas Light Co.

I had installed in the house I live in in Virginia a brandnew furnace and air-conditioning system. I have had nothing but trouble with it and the Washington Gas Light Co. farmed the installation out to a subcontractor. It is just a little over 3 years old and, although I did not keep accurate track, I would presume that at least 36 calls have been made by me to the gas company because of the malfunction of the unit, both heating and air conditioning. I noted an advertisement in last night's Star which said, in effect, that if you have problems they will respond with instant service. This is not true. I had a problem with the unit last Thursday and nobody showed up until the following Monday.

More important is the farming out of the installation of the furnace-air conditioning combination, and I have evidence at my command of some pretty shady practices involving relationships between the Washington Gas Light Co. and those they direct to make the installation. The furnace is a Bryant,

which is the most antiquated, ill-constructed heating unit I have ever come across, and I have come across many because my late father was in the plumbing and heating business, and I happen to know something about these heating units.

I condemn the Washington Gas Light Co. and their practices, as well as the poor workmanship of the Bryant Co. which has resulted in the furnace practically falling apart, and it is just a little over 3 years old.

I am preparing legislation for a full-scale investigation of the practices of the Washington Gas Light Co., and I have talked to the chairman, Mr. STAGGERS, and I am confident that when the legislation is introduced he will agree to have the investigation and bring out the facts on this terribly bad installation as well as the others.

In conclusion, I call upon all of the citizens who are considering central air conditioning and new heating units to have nothing to do with the Washington Gas Light Co. and their installers. And if they do not heed my advice, they are going to be in for a heck of a lot of trouble. When you spend upwards of \$3,000 for the installation of a new furnace and central air conditioning, you expect it to last from 10 to 20 years. This is not the case so far as I am concerned, as mine is a complete flop after only a little more than 3 years.

REPRESENTATIVE TAFT APPLAUDS FAA DECISION ON TRANSPON- DERS, WELCOMES NTSB STUDY OF MID-AIR COLLISIONS

(Mr. TAFT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. TAFT. Mr. Speaker, I was pleased to learn of the FAA's decision to require transponder equipment on all aircraft operating within designated areas of the country.

It is a step that may help improve air traffic control operations throughout the country and to reduce danger of mid-air collisions.

At the same time, however, I must caution that there are practical and technical difficulties to work out.

Private aircraft operators presently equipped with transponder equipment are frequently directed to turn it off because multiple transponders in crowded areas cloud up present radar screen equipment. This indicates the need for early action on the President's air safety program. Also, private owners are experiencing serious delays in servicing and repairing transponder equipment.

It is encouraging to read of the National Transportation Safety Board's plan to begin immediate hearings into the entire problem of mid-air collisions.

I include the following article from the Wednesday, October 1, 1969, Wall Street Journal in the RECORD:

FAA, SPURRED BY INDIANAPOLIS COLLISION,
ACTS TO CURB TRAFFIC OVER 22 AIRPORTS
(By Albert R. Karr)

WASHINGTON.—Government men, haunted by the specter of midair collisions, took a

safety step that they had been accused of dodging.

The Federal Aviation Administration published a proposed rule designed to control more rigidly the swarm of small, privately owned aircraft around 22 major airports, starting with extra-crowded Washington National. The rule is expected to reduce the number of planes flying near the terminals, and the keep air traffic controllers better informed of the whereabouts of small craft in airport areas. The hope is that the risk of collision between airliners and smaller planes will be lessened.

FAA officials acknowledged that their action was speeded by the recent collision of an Allegheny Airlines DC9 and a small private plane near Indianapolis, which killed 83 persons. But they insist they had been moving ahead on the step anyhow, even before the catastrophe.

Underscoring the new urgency, interested parties will have only 30 days to comment before the new rule is effected, instead of the usual 60 days.

HIGHER ALTITUDES

The FAA, which runs the nation's air traffic system, also will take other action soon. It will direct controllers at all airports to keep arriving jet liners at higher altitudes before descending, and to get departing jetliners up to these heights faster. The aim is to reduce the exposure of airliners to small aircraft at the lower altitudes where the greatest danger of collision exists.

The agency also is considering tougher standards for certifying aircraft and pilots. "If the discipline of flight must be sharpened to prevent risk of life or its loss, then I am in favor of doing what is necessary to prevent a marginal aircraft, an incompetent pilot, or a permissive regulation from being loosed upon the airways," says John H. Shafer, FAA administrator.

The FAA hopes to have the regulation it proposed yesterday in effect at National Airport by mid-December and at 21 other major fields by next July.

At the 22 airports, the rule would apply to all planes entering a space shaped like an inverted wedding cake. They would have to get clearance first from the tower controller, have necessary equipment to insure a good image on his radarscope, and furnish him by radio with such details as their altitude and flight plan. In addition, most nonairline planes would have to avoid designated corridors used by big jets climbing after takeoff or descending for landing.

Around National Airport, the "wedding cake" would roughly have a top layer 40 miles in diameter between 3,000 and 7,000 feet, a middle layer five miles in diameter between 1,500 and 3,000 feet, and a bottom layer three miles in diameter between the ground and 1,500 feet.

The wedding cake will be centered over the airport and planes allowed to enter it will either be passing through or coming down to land. Thus, at peak traffic periods there may be aircraft circling within the wedding cake waiting their turn to land.

With the new rules, controllers will be able to tell airline pilots of the whereabouts of any other craft in the more critical terminal areas, the FAA says. Further, controllers won't give entry clearance to many planes when too busy to handle them, and many aircraft owners would probably forgo flying near the big airports rather than pay for equipment that would satisfy the radar-image requirement.

The FAA also is planning to step up efforts to impress on pilots of all planes the need to be more aware of aircraft which might be near their planes, to complete development of high-intensity flashing lights on planes as a potential collision-preventing device, and to require future aircraft to have improved cockpit visibility.

Memories of the Indianapolis tragedy, plus awareness that the collision peril is increasing, also are spurring other anti-collision efforts within the Government and outside.

The National Transportation Safety Board, a Transportation Department unit that investigates aircraft accidents and recommends accident-prevention measures, will convene public hearings on the Indianapolis accident next week, only a month after it occurred and much faster than usual.

The board will quickly follow with hearings in Washington on the whole problem of midair collisions—the first such hearings ever scheduled. The aim: To put the FAA, the airlines and other groups on the spot, in hopes of producing more preventive action. "We're anxious for more progress," says John H. Reed, chairman of the safety board.

One interested group, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, representing owners of private aircraft, is sure to resist the FAA's proposed restrictions on the small planes. But the owners and the Air Line Pilots Association, a union of airline pilots, are pushing anti-collision proposals of their own. Both favor reserving climb-and-descent corridors for airliners only.

The ALPA-AOPA proposal would establish climb-and-descent corridors rising to 18,000 feet and extending for 45 miles from major airports. These would be limited in usage for big jets only. By contrast, the proposed FAA rule would include more modest corridors; in many cases, such as National Airport, they would be entirely within the wedding cake control area, typically extending 10 miles from the airport and up to 7,000 feet. In others, they would extend out of the control area, but still be much shorter than those envisioned by the ALPA and AOPA.

Meanwhile, Congressional concern over mid-air collisions has received impetus from the Indianapolis accident. "Much of the Congress is now convinced it'll have to carry part of the ball; the Indianapolis collision is moving them along all the faster," say one knowledgeable Senate aide.

Last week, the House Ways and Means Committee, which had always cold-shouldered such proposals, gave tentative approval to a set of new and increased "user charges" to raise \$10 billion for modernizing the nation's airport and airways systems. Committee members, with Indianapolis in mind, took the view that the legislation is urgent. Similar attitudes are evident in the Senate and House Commerce committees, which are dealing with airport-airway improvements that the legislation would authorize.

INCREASING DANGER

The collision danger is unquestionably increasing. Just in the past 2½ years there have been 10 collisions involving at least one airliner, compared with 34 in the entire three decades before. Since the start of 1965, there have been 137 midair collisions including 12 involving at least one airliner, with 403 persons killed. In the preceding five-year period, there were 93 collisions, five of them involving airliners, killing 219 persons. (Other aircraft in the collisions were privately owned or military planes.)

The potential for still greater tragedy shows in an FAA study of near-collisions during 1968. The FAA indicates publicly that pilot reports show there were about 4,500 "hazardous" near-misses, which came dangerously close to being actual collisions. But the FAA's private estimate approaches 9,000. Of all the near-miss reports, fully 30% came from airline pilots, and several involved two airliners.

A persistent safety problem is the presence of small planes, their exact locations unknown, in the airspace also used by airliners. There were 74 near-miss reports from the New York City area last year, and 54 of those involved airliners, most of them narrowly missing a small plane.

Airline pilots rely on traffic controllers to tell them about other aircraft that could be a collision threat. But many small planes don't show up on controllers' radarscopes, and many of these pilots don't let the controller know by radio that they're in the area; they usually aren't required to do so. As a result, an airline pilot often isn't aware of another craft until it's nearly upon him, if he sees it at all.

Even when the small-plane pilot does contact an air traffic facility, it's frequently a station that either doesn't have contact with a tower controller who talks directly with airline pilots or is too busy to relay word of the small plane's location to the tower.

FAA officials say the pilot of the Piper Cherokee that collided with the Allegheny jet over Indianapolis did contact an air traffic flight service station (a place where small-plane pilots file flight plans and get weather reports), but didn't check in with the approach controller. The controller might have told the Allegheny pilot to delay his descent until the small plane passed beneath, the FAA men say. The airliner was struck by the small plane while descending.

Besides the small planes flying near big airports, other factors contribute to midair collisions. The FAA's radar is being criticized. Various air-controller groups say the Indianapolis equipment was faulty. The controller organization goes further, alleging that much of the nation's radar system consists of obsolete, worn-out military hand-me-downs.

David Thomas, deputy FAA administrator, insists the Indianapolis radar is the best available right now. He concedes "a little bit of truth" to the charge regarding the general status of FAA radar, but he says the equipment has been kept in good condition and is usable within its limitations. More modern radar is being developed, Mr. Thomas adds.

MERRIMACK RIVER POLLUTION

(Mr. MORSE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, a 1966 Federal Water Pollution Control Administration study of the pollution problem in the Merrimack River Basin stated that proper pollution control would enable 10.5 million people within a day's drive of the river and thousands in the rest of the country to fully utilize its tremendous fish, wildlife, and recreational potential. This report pointed out that there is a potential \$1 million softshell clam industry in the river itself, but that in 1964 the harvest amounted to only \$14,000.

According to FWPCA figures for 1964, the total income lost from the commercial shellfish industry, recreational visitor income, increased property value, and increased tax revenue, because of pollution, amounted to a minimum of \$37 million. The maximum annual loss was estimated as high as \$70 million—approximately \$65 per year for every man, woman, and child in the basin.

The loss is even more striking when one has the opportunity to travel along these waterways. As I observed that day I accompanied Lowell Sun reporter Franz Scholz during his canoe trip on the Merrimack and Concord Rivers, recreating the journey made by Henry David Thoreau in 1839, the banks are still lush and verdant, and provide easy access to the river. An excursion along this area during the autumn when the foliage is

turning would be one of the most beautiful and breathtaking sights in New England. The fact that the river is hardly used, even for boating, because of its pollution, is a great loss to the residents of the local communities, both in enjoyment and in revenue.

The following is the second in the series of articles in the Lowell Sun by Franz Scholz dealing with the various dimensions of the pollution problem in the Merrimack River Basin. The first article which appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of September 30, described, in vivid terms of colors and odors, the pollution that was observed. This second installment describes in very real terms the effects of pollution on life, both in the river and along its banks:

POLLUTION MENACES RIVERSIDE RESIDENTS

(By Franz Scholz)

LOWELL.—Prior to the 19th century, commerce in the Merrimack Valley depended largely on the Merrimack River.

Henry David Thoreau, traveling the river in 1839 reported seeing ferries, canal and fishing boats plying the river. The bricks from which the factories in the city of Lowell were made, he said, were transported from Manchester on the river.

As we journeyed up the Concord and Merrimack Rivers from Aug. 23 to Aug. 29, following Thoreau's route on the rivers, we saw no signs of commerce. The only boats seen during our seven day journey were pleasure boats on the Concord from the South Concord boat house to Billerica and on the Merrimack from Lowell to the Tyngsboro bridge. Later, above the falls in Manchester other pleasure boats, some equipped for water skiing or hauling fishermen, were seen.

PREDICTED DECLINE

Writing 130 years earlier, Thoreau predicted such a decline in boating on the river: "In a few years there will be an end to boating on this river," he said.

Commerce on the river declined shortly after the advent of the railroad and the construction of super highways alongside the vast bridges over the river.

Outside of the few pleasure boats seen and an occasional young boy fishing, the only other uses we saw being made of the Merrimack was a depository of sewage by the major cities and towns and wastes by the huge factories along its banks, as a source of power for these same cities and factories as a source of water used by farmers to irrigate their crops and as a public water supply for the City of Lowell.

Of these sources, the disposing of waste from both public and industrial sources was far away the most widely practiced.

Fishing and boating, as noted, were seen only occasionally and only on certain sections of the river—Concord, Lowell, Tyngsboro and Manchester. (So rare was boating in the river above Nashua that children who spotted us making our way up the river called their parents and neighborhood friends to witness the unusual sight, and in Manchester, a policeman, who forbade us to rest our boats on the banks of the river a few yards from highway 495, looked at us in disbelief when we told him we had come all the way from Concord, Mass.)

Use of the river for irrigation was also restricted. We saw only a dozen or so farmers and two golf courses using the river's water to irrigate their crops or golfing greens.

Lowell was the only city using the river as a source of public or drinking water. (Further down the river, Lawrence also uses the river for drinking purposes.)

SPILL SEWAGE INTO RIVERS

And, although several of the larger cities and industries were seen using the river's

water to supply electric power, we more often observed large cement pipes through which the cities spill their raw sewage into the rivers—the larger cities each poured sewage at 20 or more points into the rivers. In addition, the industries, also located mainly in the larger cities along the rivers, poured their wastes (for the most part untreated) into the rivers at hundreds of points—some of the largest industries, as pointed out in a previous article in this series, spilled more waste solids into the river's water than did the public sewers in the cities of Lowell and Manchester combined.

This dumping of raw sewage and industrial wastes has gone on for hundreds of years. Thoreau witnessed in 1839: "The river," he said of the Merrimack, "was devoted from the first to the services of manufacturers."

The result, as we learned, was the rivers' waters were so polluted they corresponded to settled raw sewage diluted from 17 to 31 times.

Near the sewage outfalls, the rivers' waters even more nearly approximated raw sewage. A sample taken of the Nashua river, approximately down half mile from the point where it flows into the Merrimack, for example, showed it corresponds to settled raw sewage effluent diluted less than six times.

POLLUTION COUNT IMPROVED

Downstream, further away from the large cities, we found the pollution count somewhat improved as a result of the river's ability to purify itself. Near the Lowell water plant intake, for example, a sample of the water corresponded to settled raw sewage diluted nearly 21 times.

In a previous article we described the effects of this pollution on the water and on the bed of the Merrimack watershed. In this and the next article we will describe the effects of pollution on the environment both within and immediately surrounding the rivers.

Examined in the remainder of this article are the effects of pollution on aquatic life within the rivers and the potential enjoyment it steals from people living along the rivers.

Again, we will rely on Thoreau to provide us with a knowledge of the fish living in the rivers when he made his journey in 1837.

In the Concord, he observed anglers catching a variety of fish: sun-fish, bream, common perch, cousin trout, dace, shiners, pickerel, horned pout, suckers, common eel, and sometimes in the rapids lamprey eel were found. At one point, he described a "king-fisher sat upon a pine over the water and the bream and pickerel swam below."

Formerly, he wrote, salmon, shad and alewives were abundant in the Concord until the "dam and canal at Billerica and factories at Lowell put an end to their migration hitherward."

He reported essentially the same fish living in the Merrimack, where shad, alewives, salmon and bass were in greater abundance. "But," he observed, "locks and dams have proved more or less destructive to the fisheries."

THOREAU WARNED IN 1839

He also warned in 1839 of the destruction factors wastes wrought aquatic life, advising, "it concerns us to attend to the nature of fishes."

Nevertheless, he observed men and boys fishing all along the banks of the two rivers, some marketing their catches and depending on the money they brought for their livelihood.

Gradually, the shad, alewives, and salmon disappeared, partly, perhaps, because of the dams, but also because of the river's pollution.

SPECIES DISAPPEARED IN 1938

Earl Hoover, New Hampshire's state biologist, reported the disappearance of these species in 1938. Surveying the possibilities of

stocking the Merrimack, Hoover wrote, "the problem resolves itself into whether fisheries or pollution are of most significance."

Although the salmon, shad, alewives and finer fish Hoover found to be practically nonexistent in the river at that time, bass and pickerel, he said were found in abundance.

But, he recorded, "they are seldom fished. This anomaly may be attributed to the anglers' dislike of fishing waters which are polluted, but not with pollutants which are toxic or in sufficient quantity to kill fish throughout the entire river."

In a 1966 report, the federal water pollution control administration offers a remarkably similar description of the effect of pollution on the aquatic life in the Merrimack watershed.

AVERSION TO USING FISH

"Parts of the Merrimack River in New Hampshire possess an outstanding fishery," it states. "However," it adds, "there is public aversion to using fish caught from the river for food because of the raw sewage emptied into the river."

Moreover, because of pollution, shellfish beds in the estuary of the river have been closed to harvest since 1926. Today, shellfish can be taken in only certain small sections, but must be treated in the shellfish depuration plant at Newburyport before marketing.

The fish contained in the Merrimack between Nashua and the state line according to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in 1966 are yellow perch, red-breasted sunfish, pumpkinseed, large-mouthed bass, astern chain pickerel, northern yellow bullhead, northern common bullhead, eastern golden shiners, eastern common shiners, fallfish, long-nosed dace, eastern black-nosed dace and eastern common suckers.

In addition, some shad migrate into the river, but cannot make it past the Pawtucket Falls in Lowell.

As for salmon. The Fish and Wildlife Service reports it has not seen a salmon in the Merrimack in almost 50 years. Their disappearance, it says, is attributed mainly to dams and pollution.

We saw fewer species of fish than reported by the Fish and Wildlife Service and considerably fewer fishermen than Thoreau observed.

In Concord, Mass. we saw boys catching horned pout and bass. Other fishermen reported having caught pickerel in the clearer waters of the Concord.

Suckers and carp also reportedly fed off the bottom of the river and occasionally, with the bright sun reflecting off the surface of the calm waters, we could see what appeared to be minnows jumping on the surface.

Turtles also abounded in the river. On one log laying in the water on the left bank of the Concord, we spotted about 20 little sun turtles basking in the sun. Along the shores, the shells of shellfish could also be found, apparently caught by beaver or muskrats, brought ashore, opened and eaten.

When we got into the much larger Merrimack, we observed fewer fish, especially when we passed through the larger cities of Lowell, Nashua and Manchester where the vast majority of sewage and other wastes polluting the water enters the river.

On the long, desolate stretches between the cities, however, more fish could be seen jumping in the water.

Carp and suckers and horned pout were the only fish we saw in the sewage infested water near the large cities. Residents of Lowell and Manchester, however, reported having caught bass and even some perch from the banks of the river in their cities.

Between the cities, the scavenger fish were joined by bass, pickerel, sun fish and minnows.

Some people on these long stretches reported having caught or seen trout in these

waters, although most people agreed that trout were more plentiful in the clean brooks and streams which run into the Merrimack.

FISH PREFER STREAMS

Owen Flynn, sports editor of The Sun, who has fished the river for many years, supports the observations we made. Trout and some of the more delicate fish, he tells us, enter the Merrimack from the clean brooks and streams. Because of the pollution on the larger river, however, most, he says, prefer to stay in the clear streams.

Contrary to what we expected, more anglers were seen in one day along the banks of the smaller Concord than in six days along the Merrimack river. Anglers abounded along the banks and in boats along the Concord river from the Concord bridge, almost to the dam at the old Talbot mills.

In the Merrimack, we saw only six groups of fishers—one between Lowell and the Tyngsboro bridge, two others over sewer outfalls in Nashua, a group of boys at the mouth of a river of blood flowing from a slaughter house in Manchester into the Merrimack, another just above the dam in Manchester, and the last in a boat headed north in Concord, N.H.

Ironically, approximately one half of the anglers on the Concord River happened to be colored people—all adults—from what are predominately all white communities.

The remainder of the anglers were mixed between adults and young boys.

Their main catches consisted of horned pout, bass, perch and sun fish.

On the Merrimack, the staple catch was carp or suckers and horned pout, although further north some people were after bass, pickerel and perch.

Some of the fishermen seen were more lucky than others.

Two men fishing for bass and pickerel along the banks of the Merrimack in Tyngsboro had no luck at all on the Sunday we met them.

Just above the Tyngsboro Bridge on Monday, however, a resident of the area reported his son and a friend had fished 86 horned pout out of the river in a span of two hours the day before.

NOT MUCH LUCK

No one else had such luck, although lads fishing over sewer outfalls in Nashua and Manchester did manage to catch some carp. Fins of the huge carp and suckers could be seen as they fed on the raw sewage which poured out of pipes into the river in Nashua and Manchester.

Perched above the sewer pipes or standing on the banks alongside, youths baited hooks with either kernels of corn or worms and in minutes usually had a large carp on the end of their line. Occasionally, a horned pout nibbled at their baited hook, but their primary catch was carp and suckers.

They fished only for the sport and fun of wrestling with the huge large scaled fish on the end of their lines. They either freed or left the fish they caught on the banks to die.

The other groups of fishermen seen—one just above the dam in Manchester and another in Concord, N.H. heading north—had exactly the same number of worms when we met them as they had when they started fishing. Both groups of fishermen were primarily after bass and pickerel.

From talking with people, we learned that many residents along the banks of the river above the Manchester dam fish the river for sport. On the days we traveled that stretch, however, we did not see any lines in the water.

Nights, after we docked our boats, or while resting during the days, we often spoke with residents about fishing in the river. Most of the more experienced fishermen we spoke with said they prefer to fish the long stretches between the huge cities where sew-

age is not so abundant than in or near the cities where the waters are more polluted.

We found only one person, however, who said he took his catches home for his wife to serve on a platter. The others echoed the words of New Hampshire's former biologist and the fish and wildlife service—"I won't eat those fish. They live on sewage."

The sewage dampens not only their appetite for the fish, but also their desire to go fishing. Most of the fishermen we spoke with told how they used to fish the river every chance they had, but now do not like to put their boats in the sewage infested water or expose their hands or other parts of their bodies to it.

We used to spend weekends fishing between Nashua and Manchester, said one man about 35 years old. Now we won't go near the water. I bought myself a trailer, and when I feel like going fishing I pack my gear in it and go up north or to upstate New York, he said.

In Nashua, we spoke one night with several residents who had come down to the river to survey the progress made on the new Hudson bridge being built on the river. After assessing the progress made, their attention turned to kids fishing over a sewage outfall several yards below the new bridge.

FILTH RUINS FISHING

Watching the young boys reminded them of the days they fished the river. It's probably not as bad (polluted) now as it was then," one said, observing that many of the factories along the river have closed down. Staring at the kids fishing over the sewer, he added, however, that the "dirt and filth the cities pour into the river takes all the enjoyment out of fishing."

"I don't fish any more," a Nashua barber, married with two children said, "at least not in the Merrimack."

Normally, one would believe that people living along a river such as the Merrimack would enjoy not only fishing, but boating, and swimming and other water sports as well. But, as already seen, because of the pollution few fish the river. So even fewer swim in it. Boating is more popular, but water skiing and other sports in which the human body comes into contact with the water is virtually non-existent.

The lone exception again is just above the dam in Manchester, where homes line both banks of the river and virtually all the residents swim and boat on the river—we saw one lady with her two dogs out on a paddle boat—and most water ski.

The only other sport along the river where boating seemed popular was between Lowell and Tyngsboro. We saw perhaps a dozen boats on the Sunday afternoon we plied that stretch of water. Most of the boats were docked at the Lowell Boat Club.

Smaller craft, mainly canoes and row boats were seen on the Concord River.

But, for the most part, residents along both rivers enjoyed few of the advantages expected from a water front home.

We found only one family outside of the people living just above the dam in Manchester, which swam in the Merrimack. "We probably shouldn't swim in the river," the man of the house said. "But we do anyway."

Others observe the "bathing prohibited" sign posted on the old Lowell Bath House on the Pawtucket Boulevard.

Many, perhaps most of the people living along the Merrimack, don't have boats of any kind. Moreover, a great majority do not even have steps or a path leading down to the river.

Most of the residents we spoke with along the river admitted they do not use the river—some even forget it is in their backyards, except on warm summer nights when it gives off gaseous odors.

The only advantage it gives me, one resident said, is a breath of cool air on warm days and a scenic view to look out over. On

warm nights the smell from the river negates all these benefits, he added.

DON'T GO NEAR WATER

Of most interest to us, however, was that many of the residents do along the river, have no access to it. Some have built steps or worn paths to the river, but a surprisingly large number simply do not go near it. "What do I want to go down there for," said one resident, "I can't swim in it and I don't have a boat." He has two children and said that if he had steps or a path leading to the river, it would make it easier for the children to fall in or try to go swimming.

Another interesting aspect of life along the river, is that many of the homes (especially in Hudson, N.H.) are abandoned. Other homes are only summer residents. In Tyngsboro, one man said he saw his neighbor whose home is used only during the summer, one day in the past year.

Finally, the benefits pollution in the river steals from people living along the river is indicated by the fact that for the most part, the banks of the Merrimack are underdeveloped. Large stretches of land along the river (especially between Tyngsboro and Nashua, Nashua and Manchester, and Manchester and Concord) are desolate, the several points with no houses seen for miles.

In this respect, the river remains much the same as Thoreau saw it. "As one ascends the Merrimack," he wrote, "he rarely sees a village, but for the most part, alternate wood and pasture lands, and sometimes a field of corn or potatoes, or rye or oats or English grass, with a few straggling apple trees, and, at still longer intervals, a farmer's house."

Farms still take up much of the land along the river. In Hudson, N.H., we visited with two farmers, although other farms could be seen beyond the trees along the banks. Three golf courses also help make up the banks of the river.

For the most part, however, the river's banks are undeveloped.

THE WAR IN VIETNAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. PATEN). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. BLACKBURN) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. BLACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, I previously addressed the House on this subject matter on Monday evening, but we did have a number of Members who could not appear at that time, and who also desired to express themselves concerning the subject of Vietnam and support of the President.

Mr. Speaker, at this time I will be very happy to recognize the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. STEIGER).

Mr. STEIGER of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Georgia for yielding, and I would like to congratulate the gentleman for his concern and for his being willing to give evidence that all is not as represented in the advertisements paid for by some political circles and in the resolutions that are being circulated in this House even to this date.

Mr. Speaker, everyone in Congress is not happy with the Vietnam positions as stated in recent newspaper advertisements and resolutions being circulated in the House of Representatives. There are still a lot of us around who think that if the United States is in a war we should win it.

There is no doubt that if the Communists continue to refuse meaningful negotiations, we can force a military victory. Some of us have a deadline also

—not a deadline for withdrawal of American forces—but a deadline for the resumption of meaningful military efforts based upon the continued failure of meaningful Communist negotiations. Say January 1 of 1970 is our deadline. If by that time there is no progress in Paris or directly between Hanoi and Washington, we will recognize that good will, conciliation, and conversation are not going to get the job done.

At this point, we should resume the bombing north of the 17th parallel in Vietnam. We should include the dikes of the Red River Delta as primary targets. We should close the harbor at Haiphong, either by bombing or mining. We should utilize the special infiltration teams of South Vietnamese rangers by having them invade North Vietnam in small groups with orders to do as much damage as possible.

We believe that every time Saigon is shelled or civilians are attacked anywhere in South Vietnam, American B-52's should bomb a North Vietnamese target and the North Vietnamese should be told this will happen.

We offer this policy based on the firm conviction that Communists only understand strength. We think it is presumptuous of Congress to attempt to dictate military tactics or specific foreign policies, so we will introduce no legislation. We recognize that every selected voice raised to urge instant withdrawal simply strengthens the Communist conviction that delay means victory for them and death for many more American troops. However, we shall continue to urge the President to take whatever military action he deems appropriate and to assure him that in our view most Americans are not willing to abandon Southeast Asia at the behest of the politically self-seeking.

Mr. Speaker, I again thank the gentleman from Georgia for yielding me this time, and for the indulgence of the Members.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BLACKBURN. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Speaker, several weeks ago, when my colleague from California (Mr. McCLOSKEY) advised me of his and Mr. RIEGLE's plans to introduce their resolution—to conclude our combat operations in Vietnam by December 31, 1970—I made it completely clear that even the serious suggestion of such an ill-conceived and presumptuous action was abhorrent and repugnant.

To seriously offer this resolution for the consideration of the House of Representatives is to suggest that the Members of this body must either be ignorant of established Communist aspirations, objectives, and strategy—or worse, totally indifferent to them.

What this resolution would do would be to tell the President of the United States to surrender to a demand by the House that the President do what he has told the Communists he will not do: order a unilateral American withdrawal which will permit the Communists to gain tyrannical, bloody control of the whole of Vietnam and, in turn, embolden

them to move to repeat their Vietnam strategy in an effort to gain similar control over Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.

What this resolution would do would be to serve notice on the Communists that Vietnam is to be theirs, courtesy of the Congress of the United States, in abject betrayal of the hundreds of thousands of young Americans who have served in Vietnam, of those who have shed their blood there, and of those who have died there.

It must be noted that this effort, like that by Senator GOODELL, is being forced by members of the President's own party in interesting concert with the political plans of such Democrats as Senator McGOVERN and National Chairman Harris.

According to the Washington Post of Saturday, September 27, 1969, Senator HARRIS "wants to help lead the war protests, which last year the Democratic organization tried to muffle."

I would advise the sponsors of this resolution that, under these circumstances, their role is even more incongruous than that of the bewildered chairman of the party whose Johnson administration involved us, 550,000 troops and billions of dollars strong, in this most nightmarish of wars, even as it denied those troops the hope of victory and, in many respects, the chance of survival.

I commend to the attention of the sponsors of this resolution these words, last Friday, by the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania, Senate Minority Leader HUGH SCOTT:

An automatic, precipitous deadline-type withdrawal (from Vietnam) would simply encourage the North Vietnamese to say: "All we have to do is dig in and wait, the Americans will go home, and then we'll massacre the civilian populace."

I commend to the attention of my colleagues the fact that, every time President Nixon, like President Johnson before him, has made a move, has issued a statement, in the interest of real peace, Hanoi's propaganda agencies, like their so-called peace negotiators in Paris, have rushed forth to excoriate him.

I find no cause to do anything that could possibly be used by the Communists to further their effort against this country by attacking not just the President—but more importantly—the Presidency.

I prefer that the RECORD show my position as believing that, if we are to impose a time limit on anything, it should be on the time the President feels impelled to be patient with the Communists—a limit on just how contemptuous we will permit the Communists to be of our desire and efforts for peace.

I believe that if, within a certain reasonable period of time, the Communists continue to demonstrate no desire for peace, the President should take any and all military steps necessary to win the war at the earliest possible moment.

I remind my distinguished colleagues that last October I cited repeated instances of demonstrated Communist contempt for our various ceasefires, our bombing halt, and various and related efforts to deescalate and end the war.

I noted, then, that, in announcing his bombing halt, President Johnson said it

was a "step to really determine the good faith of those who have assured us that progress will result when bombing ceases."

Mr. Speaker, as we look back, that, indeed, was a long, long time ago—a time in which American casualties have increased daily—not in North Vietnam which created the conflict, but in South Vietnam, which continues to be the victim of that conflict. Down through these long and costly months in which, under the new administration of President Nixon, several thousand American troops have been withdrawn in further demonstration of American good faith, we have continued to suffer abundant demonstrations of the real character and meaning of Communist "good faith."

I note that, last Saturday, the distinguished chairman of the Republican Party, Representative ROGERS MORTON, said:

For the first time, there is a significant shaft of light in that long dark tunnel of war . . . In his press conference (last Friday) . . . the President called for national unity in support of his search for a lasting peace . . . I now ask you to close ranks behind our President and, further, urge the support of your friends and neighbors. I do not ask this of you as Republicans—but as concerned Americans. Our country deserves no less.

Mr. Speaker, I commend this statement to the judgment and conscience of every Member of this House—especially to those of the gentlemen who brought this resolution before us.

Mr. BLACKBURN. I thank the gentleman for his observations.

Mr. STEIGER of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I yield to the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. STEIGER of Arizona. Does the gentleman feel that in addition to the lack of apparent political wisdom to which he referred, the action of the Republicans which he named in his statement offers any comfort to the Communists at this point by taking a public position of this kind?

Mr. WILLIAMS. There is no question about it. Actually I covered it in my statement. The resolution we are talking about and some of the actions to which you referred are definitely providing comfort to the Communists, providing comfort to North Vietnam, the Vietcong, and all their Communist supporters.

As I said in my statement, all this resolution is doing is telling the Communists, "Just hold on until December 31, 1970. The Americans will have gone." And then they can resort to their old tactics to massacre—the massacre of civilians in South Vietnam, the murder of their leaders, and the very things which have been the earmark of the campaign of North Vietnam and the Vietcong.

Mr. STEIGER of Arizona. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. BLACKBURN. I thank the gentleman for his remarks. I would like to comment that the observation of a time limit, if there is going to be one, should be on the negotiations in Paris. I personally

think that the leadership of our country, both the former administration and the present, has shown more than reasonable tolerance in the negotiation period. The efforts toward reasonableness have been shunted aside with a genuine mockery from the other side.

I think the sooner we let it be known that the American public is not going to tolerate this loss of life with no end in view for an indefinite period, the sooner we will convince the North Vietnamese seriously to attempt to settle our differences at the negotiating table.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I would like to respond by saying the gentleman is entirely correct. There is no question but that President Nixon is making a number of very sincere moves in an effort to bring peace in Vietnam, and every time the President makes such a move, the Communist propaganda agents, just like the Paris peace negotiators that I referred to in my statement, cannot wait to misrepresent the President's intention.

In all of the time since we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam, back in October of 1968, I personally have not seen one gesture of good will from North Vietnam or the Communists, which leads me to believe that they seek in any way true peace in Vietnam.

Mr. BLACKBURN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BLACKBURN. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

First I should like to commend the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. BLACKBURN) for taking the special order on Monday and again today to provide the opportunity for a colloquy on the Vietnam issue. I commend him for his quick reaction against a so-called "bug out" plan being advocated by some of our colleagues in this body and in the other body.

Every American would like to see the end of the Vietnam war today. Every American would like to see our boys returned home to their loved ones today. We all grow weary of this, our longest war in history. Yet, I feel that those who would bring all of our troops home no matter what are misreading the majority of Americans across this great country which has never before in history said we cannot win so let us give up.

There is no opportunity for a lasting peace if we just simply give up now. There is no point to further negotiations by North Vietnam of any kind of a satisfactory settlement—if they know that by simply killing more American soldiers without retaliation we will pull out in 15 months leaving the South Vietnamese nation to be overrun by Communist hordes who will have the 15 months to prepare for the onslaught. What kind of a solution is that?

Apparently forgotten in the debate is the fact that the North Vietnamese are the aggressors. They are the ones who attack below the DMZ and run for cover to their own country which we have not invaded.

The President has announced the withdrawal of 60,000 American troops to show the world he is intent on peace and not the conquest of another nation. He has offered an olive branch. He has, however, maintained that we not abandon South Vietnam until a peaceful satisfactory solution can be negotiated.

If we abandon South Vietnam now, the whole Indochina Peninsula is lost to the Communists and make no mistake communism is still our real enemy in the conflict in South Vietnam and in the entire world.

Weighing the cost of resistance and the price of capitulation, even a patriot might say we are better off to quit before more blood is spilled. Weak nations throughout history have capitulated to a strong aggressor rather than suffer loss of lives and devastation of their land.

But we are not a weak nation. We do not need to suffer the indignities of a surrender so that communism can continue its march to complete our destruction. Are we ready to say, better Red than dead. Are we ready to say, at the least, to South Vietnam, better for you to be Red than dead.

I do not think the people of this great nation are ready to surrender to communism. Yet, a total surrender in Vietnam could only be interpreted as such and a timetable withdrawal of all forces announced in advance is precisely that.

We have stopped the bombing of military targets in North Vietnam. Since the beginning, we really have fought with one hand tied behind our back. Negotiate—why should they? They have every reason to believe they have nothing to lose.

The President has taken steps he hopes will bring about an early and peaceful settlement to insure the integrity of South Vietnam. Let us support him until we see there is no hope for a peaceful settlement.

If North Vietnam does not want peace, we have the resources to take the offensive. Our biggest error, it seems to me, is that we have not tried to win.

We could easily blockade Haiphong Harbor to all shipping. We could, at least, engage in hot pursuit across the 17th parallel. We could impose economic sanctions on any country supplying North Vietnam with military supplies, certainly, but even to any goods including food.

We must make every effort to negotiate an honorable settlement. History has shown that settlement of a military conflict is not negotiated unless one of the adversaries is placed in a position where a solution to the end of the conflict becomes imperative.

On September 17, over 200 Members of the House participated in a special order designed to call attention to the inhumane treatment of our prisoners of war. The total disregard for the 1949 Geneva Convention clearly shows the kind of an enemy we are fighting in South Vietnam.

Just yesterday, I received a letter from a first lieutenant infantryman, a constituent of mine, who writes:

I would like to return home to my wife and family as much as any man in this country. However, I feel that a tragic mistake

is being made in withdrawing troops from this area without some sort of master plan. Areas and people are being left unprotected and many units are trying to operate at reduced strength. I fear that the same mistake is being made in Vietnam that was made in Korea. We have not stopped Communism. We have not settled anything, and yet we are pulling out.

I have received many letters like this from boys enlisted or drafted into the Armed Forces from my district. I doubt if they are much different from most other young men in the service from other districts over the Nation. We must, of course, support our young men in Vietnam. But, we must also support their Commander in Chief, our President, in those decisions he feels necessary to give him a chance to resolve the conflict.

I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time, and I appreciate the effort which he is making, as I have stated, and giving us this opportunity for discussion and colloquy on this most important subject.

Mr. BLACKBURN. I thank the gentleman for his remarks.

By way of illustration of his sentiment that the majority of the American people do not favor a surrender under any guise, a recent survey which was run in my own district indicated that in excess of 74.6 percent of the people in my district favor setting a definite time limit on the negotiations in Paris and in the absence of meaningful concessions from the North Vietnamese 62.5 percent favor using our maximum military, economic and diplomatic pressure to bring this matter to an honorable conclusion.

I believe this poll is probably representative of a great number of districts throughout the Nation. It would be a tragic error if the North Vietnamese should interpret the very vocal but small group who are crying for peace at any price to be symbolic of the will of the American people. The American people have never surrendered in armed conflict. We certainly are not going to suffer the indignity now at the hands of a fifth-rate power.

Mr. WYLIE. I would hope not. I appreciate the comments of the gentleman.

In my own district a poll has indicated a reflection of views similar to those of the constituents of the gentleman from Georgia.

I have not seen a recent poll on what action the United States should take by some of the professional pollsters, but at no time have I ever seen a poll which said that a majority of the people of this country favored a unilateral surrender in South Vietnam. I do not believe we have come to that place yet.

Mr. BLACKBURN. I certainly agree with the gentleman.

Mr. WYLIE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BLACKBURN. I am happy to yield to my colleague from Georgia.

Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

On the walls of this Chamber are pictures of two great men, Washington and Lafayette, Lafayette was a Frenchman. His contribution to this country was that the French helped us, in effect, guarantee

and insure our freedom. We would not be the Nation we are today were it not for the fact that a foreign power, France, and some foreign individuals in that country, thought enough to come over here and in effect help and support our effort to have our own right of self-determination for the type of government we wanted.

President Kennedy and President Johnson throughout the entire involvement in Vietnam stated over and over our only purpose in Vietnam has been to assure the South Vietnamese of their right to self-determination, their right in a free election, an election in which there is no coercion either by ourselves or the North Vietnamese, to determine their own future.

Perhaps our mistake—and certainly we have made mistakes in this—has been the manner in which we became involved in this war, because we went into this war with the declared intention of not trying to seek victory over the North Vietnamese.

Over and over we heard President Johnson particularly state that we are not trying to defeat North Vietnam but are trying to show them aggression does not pay and that we will, in effect, put up a shield to protect the people of South Vietnam. Regrettably, the political leaders in this country did not stand behind President Johnson. I, for one, was convinced and continue to be convinced that had there been a unified effort behind the President, 1, 2, 3, or even 4 years ago, and the North Vietnamese were convinced that the American politicians were not going to try to make political profit for their own benefit out of cutting at the President, the war would have already been over and President Nixon would not have inherited the situation that he inherited. President Nixon—allow me to say this—is the first President who has, in effect, made any moves at deescalating this particular conflict. We saw constant escalation going on under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. President Nixon is, in effect, trying to end the American involvement in Vietnam.

He has come into this situation not because of choice, but because the American public had confidence in him and elected him to this post. We saw President Johnson in an obvious political move a few days prior to the election, and I believe, in an attempt to influence the outcome of that election, cease the bombing of North Vietnam. This certainly put handcuffs on the incoming President so far as attempting to put any pressure on the North Vietnamese was concerned at the negotiating table. He is operating under the severest of handicaps that any person could possibly have.

Now, Mr. Speaker, the thing that particularly distresses me is to see people within his own party, both within this Chamber and the other body, attempting to and making personal political gain at the sacrifice, in effect, of thousands and thousands of American boys who have died in Vietnam while trying to assure the right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese. Make no mistake about it, there are people both within my party and the other party who are doing this for their own political reasons.

No, it is not popular sometimes to stand behind the President. He has more knowledge of this situation than we have and has more information, and he has a determination to bring this conflict to a close. I believe he will bring it to a close. But if there is going to be any conclusion which will be anything other than absolute surrender for this greatest nation on the face of the earth to a small power, it will require political leaders in this country to stand behind their President.

Let me make an additional point here, and let me make this crystal clear. In asking the political leaders of this country to stand behind their President, I am not asking them to stand behind one who desires to make war. It is not his desire to do so. His desire is to seek peace. But it is very obvious that if the enemy believes there are enough political leaders in the country who will create such diversion and division among the American public that it will be impossible for him to carry out his announced intention of negotiating an honorable settlement, then the North Vietnamese will negotiate in no meaningful fashion.

So, Mr. Speaker, the plea that I am making tonight is simply this: that we do have a moratorium on the undercutting of the President by certainly the members of his own party and the members of the other party, because it is in the national interest and in the interests of freedom-loving people of the world everywhere.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. BLACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman bringing to the attention of our body the fact that we did receive at a very crucial time from another power, France, aid and assistance. Without this assistance we could well never have survived the American Revolution.

Certainly all of us should be grateful for that help and I think in a very real sense the people of South Vietnam have a debt of gratitude to the people of this country in the same sense as has been expressed by my colleague, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. THOMPSON).

Mr. Speaker, as an illustration of the position that the President has stated in public appearances, I insert into the RECORD at this point comments made by President Nixon, one of May 14, 1969, and one of September 1969 as an illustration of the degree with which the South Vietnamese people are reestablishing local government. I am going to insert these comments relating to villages and hamlets as illustrations of what is happening in South Vietnam during the last year and a half.

The matter referred to follows:

Vietnam: President Richard M. Nixon's Pledge

Address to the American People, May 14, 1969

We have also ruled out either a one-sided withdrawal from Vietnam, or the acceptance in Paris of terms that would amount to a disguised American defeat.

When we assumed the burden of helping to defend South Vietnam, millions of South Vietnamese men, women and children placed their trust in us. To abandon them now would risk a massacre that would shock and

dismay everyone in the world who values human life.

Abandoning the South Vietnamese people, however, would jeopardize more than lives in South Vietnam. It would threaten our long-term hopes for peace in the world. A great nation cannot renege on its pledges. A great nation must be worthy of trust. . . .

If we simply abandoned our effort in Vietnam, the cause of peace might not survive the damage that would be done to other nations' confidence in our reliability.

If Hanoi were to succeed in taking over South Vietnam by force—even after the power of the United States had been engaged—it would greatly strengthen those leaders who scorn negotiation, who advocate aggression, who minimize the risks of confrontation with the United States. It would bring peace now but it would enormously increase the danger of a bigger war later.

PRESS CONFERENCE, MARCH 4, 1969

I think that the American people will support a President if they are told by the President why we are there, what our objectives are, what the costs will be, and what the consequences would be if we took another course of action. . . . It is the responsibility of a President to examine all of the options that we have and then if he finds that the course he has to take is one that is not popular, he has to explain it to the American people and gain their support.

VILLAGE AND HAMLET ELECTIONS

A. SEPTEMBER 1969 ELECTIONS

The Republic of Viet-Nam will conduct a third round of 1969 village and hamlet elections during September. Scheduled for the first three Sundays of the month, these elections will bring self-government to more than 700 villages and hamlets in recently pacified areas of the country.

Statistics from previous local elections held since 1967 indicate that elected governments are already functioning in 1,891 (88.8%) of South Viet-Nam's 2,130 villages and 8,776 (81.4%) of the estimated 10,775 hamlets. (These figures are not exact but represent the best estimates by the Ministry of the Interior; precise figures are hard to come by because of population shifts under wartime conditions and consolidation for security purposes under the pacification program.)

The villages and hamlets holding elections this month have been run by appointed officials installed when pacification began. Authorities say elected governments can now operate in these communities because of the improved conditions and increased security.

Local elections will continue to be held during the rest of this year, until self-government is brought to virtually all of South Viet-Nam's villages, completing the electoral process began in April 1967.

The purpose of local elections, as stated by GVN officials, is to restore the centuries-old tradition of village autonomy and move nearer to the goal of full representative democracy. As an important part of the process of restoring local autonomy, the GVN has recently strengthened the powers of elected village officials by giving them authority over budgets and taxes and control of Popular Forces platoon, People's Civil Self-Defense Forces and Revolutionary Development teams operating within their jurisdiction.

B. HISTORY OF LOCAL ELECTIONS

The village

The village is the basic social and political unit of Vietnamese society. It is not a village in the European or American sense but is more akin to a British borough or American county, containing anywhere from two to ten hamlets and embracing rice fields, commons, forests, marketplaces, housing

areas and a generally cohesive population. The village has traditionally been governed by a council of elders and notables chosen for their devotion to Confucian ideals and contributions to village welfare. Within the village the hamlets are like precincts, useful for administration but with no real legal autonomy or budgets of their own.

Village elections suspended

Security reasons and the desire rapidly to establish effective administrative control in the country moved the GVN to suspend village elections in 1956, and all local officials were appointed thereafter. The change occurred during a period of wide-spread terrorism by the Viet Cong directed against local officials who were largely unable to introduce effective local administration. Later, in an effort to improve village and hamlet security, the regime undertook a program of "strategic hamlets" based on organizing and arming the hamlets to contribute to their own defense. By emphasizing the hamlet, this program further contributed to a lessening of village authority and strength.

Election decree of 1964

Every government of Viet-Nam since the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963 has committed itself to a return to village democracy. A village election decree providing for deliberative and executive village organs was issued in May 1964; but the village councils elected were purely advisory, and the village chief and his staff were still appointive officials.

Election decree of 1966

In March 1966 the GVN began to draft laws for the reorganization of village and hamlet governments and election of responsible officials at the local level. Work on these laws was delayed because of government preoccupation with the Buddhist struggle and preparation for the Constituent Assembly elections in September 1966. A decree was finally issued December 1966 governing the village and hamlet elections of 1967 and all subsequent elections. It also gave village councils increased authority over budgets, taxes, land transfers, public services and internal legal matters. It forbade provincial and district interference with village government and put a stop to higher officials tapping village budgets and taxes to defray district and provincial expenses. In January 1969 an amendment to the 1966 decree considerably shortened and simplified the electoral process.

1967 elections

The first round of villages and hamlet elections was held in April, May and June of 1967. These elections were bitterly opposed by the Communists, who killed six and kidnapped 18 candidates, killed 15 and kidnapped 38 voters, in 555 terrorist incidents. Despite Viet Cong attempts to frustrate the elections, 2,511,543 voters (77.6% of those registered) elected officials in 984 villages and 4,600 hamlets.

1968 elections

Local elections during 1968 saw some 300,000 additional voters choose officials in 120 villages and 236 hamlets.

1969 elections

On eight Sundays in March and June of this year, despite dangers posed by the communists' post-Tet offensive, nearly 80% of the eligible electorate turned out in village and hamlet elections around the nation.

The 1,553,308 men and women who went to the polls in March elected 7,741 leaders in 589 additional villages and 3,031 additional hamlets. The average of 1.7 candidates who stood for each post was a high figure in a country where local officials have long been prime targets for Viet Cong assassinations. The March elections reflected the success achieved by the Accelerated Pacification Campaign launched in November, 1968.

During the June elections, 1,092 candidates were elected to membership on local village councils and 1,121 hamlet chiefs were chosen for office, mostly in newly secured areas. It was estimated that close to 90 percent of the eligible voters in the various villages and hamlets turned out to vote—despite communist violence.

Government authorities announced that in the June village council elections, 118,043 of the 132,959 registered voters, or 38.7 percent, went to the polls. Further, 89 percent, or 282,169 of the 316,720 registered voters went to the polls in the hamlets.

C. ELECTION DETAILS

Preparation

The GVN's objective is to hold elections in all villages and hamlets in Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HES) classifications A, B, C, and D without elected officials by the end of 1969. The September elections are the third step in reaching that goal. The Ministries of Information, National Defense and Interior are supporting the information and security aspects of the election. Final lists of voters and candidates are posted not less than ten days before the polling each week. Candidates for village and hamlet posts are permitted to campaign during the five days prior to the election.

Village elections

A Village Council of 6-12 members, depending on the population, is elected for three years. The Village Council chooses the Village Chief from among its members, and he in turn nominates members of his staff, including two deputy chiefs, for Council approval. His staff is then known as the Village Administrative Committee; its members are responsible for security, education, agriculture, public health, administration and tax matters.

The Village Council shares authority with the Village Chief. It must be consulted on some tax collection procedures and on the use of village-owned land. Its concurrence is required before projects, usually public works, can be undertaken in the village. The Province Chief does not have the right of arbitrary removal of Council members and cannot remove the Village Chief without their concurrence.

Hamlet elections

Hamlet Chiefs are directly elected for three years. Deputy Hamlet Chiefs are elected only in hamlets of more than 3,000 population, also for a three-year term. The Hamlet Chief has two assistants, one for security and one for administration, whose appointments must be approved by the Village Council. The hamlet is a sub-unit of the village, and the Hamlet Chief operates under the direction of the Village Chief.

Administrative reforms

An April 1969 GVN decree reinforced the development of local autonomy by further strengthening the powers of elected officials. The Popular Forces (PF) and the Peoples Self-Defense Forces now come under operational control of the Village Councils and Village Chiefs, which means a substantial local defense capability responsive to local direction and under unity of command. Revolutionary Development (RD) cadres assigned to a particular village remain there permanently to further the development of local government, defense and self-help projects. They, too, are now under the control of the Village Council and Chief.

Villages now decide on their own which self-help projects they will undertake, usually with the people supplying the labor and the central government the materials to construct facilities. To help them get started the Ministry of Rural Development has allocated a total of 2,000 million piasters (US \$16,949,153) in self-help funds for an initial 1,681 villages. Each village with an elected

government will receive one million piasters (US \$8,500) to finance its rural development programs. The Village Council may spend the money as it sees fit for projects requested by the people—schools, roads, bridges, wells, dispensaries, marketplaces, etc.

Having set in motion the process of restoring self-rule through elections and encouraging rural people to take a more active role in planning and executing village development projects, the GVN in February 1969 launched a program for training local officials in the political, economic and administrative arts necessary for effective self-rule. By the end of 1969 nearly 63,000 village and hamlet officials will have received training in village development, pacification techniques, deployment of self-defense forces, national politics, budgets, taxation systems and other essential administrative skills.

Mr. FREY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BLACKBURN. I shall be happy to yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. FREY. Mr. Speaker, with four colleagues of mine, we did during the recess visit South Vietnam, two on the other side and three on this side of the aisle. We went with an open mind, really wondering what was happening over there. We learned a lot and, frankly, as a freshman Member of Congress we had read over the years that each time someone went over there they came back with the statement that we were to achieve a military victory. All of us will recall that former Secretary of Defense McNamara went over there nine times and each time when he returned he said that we were going to have a military victory. So, we were wondering what was happening in Vietnam.

I shall not attempt to stand here in front of this body and say that we came back as experts, because that is not true. But I think it is true that we came to a better understanding of what was going on, with a better understanding of what was involved and this is true because you can see and feel it and can talk with the people involved.

One must remember and learn a lesson and that is that the war in Vietnam is a four-part war. It is not a military war. It is a war of pacification, an economic war, a political war, because they are attempting to build a nation over there under extreme circumstances.

We had an opportunity to talk to the legislators over there, some of whom had lived in North Vietnam and one of whom had been a legislator in North Vietnam before about 1 million of his fellow countrymen were driven to the south. That was at the time when Ho Chi Minh killed between 50,000 and 100,000 people who did not agree with him.

The fact of the matter is they have a long way to go. It is no easy task. Their country has been torn apart for years. However, I was amazed that they were doing as good a job as they were under the circumstances.

For instance, the educational level, I believe, is that 86 percent of the young people over there will receive 5 or 6 years of education in South Vietnam.

With reference to the economic situation, next year they will export rice under these circumstances.

We looked at this question also: Are the people in South Vietnam loyal to the

government? Of course, this is really a key question. The real test of that fact is expressed in the action of the government of South Vietnam when it turned over 500,000 arms to the provincial and district troops. These are not the regular ARVN troops but are the troops who are guarding the villages and hamlets. This was a risk, because if they were not loyal to the government and if they did not believe in the government of the South Vietnamese, the arms would be used against them.

We looked at the pacification program in South Vietnam. It has the support of about 86 percent of all the villages. When we use the expression "pacification," this really falls into different categories. Generally, I think pacification means that you can go into one of these villages or hamlets and not get shot. However, it does not mean that you can run around the countryside and not take any risk. However, they are making progress. The road is open all the way to the DMZ and the railroad is being rebuilt.

Mr. Speaker, these people have been in the middle of war and a great many of them have been killed. There have been over 10,000 village chiefs and officers killed over the last 10 or 12 years. They are making progress and are moving forward and are trying to build a government. It is not a grassroots government as we know it here and I think to compare it to our form of government is ridiculous under the circumstances.

They are trying to build a defense machine from the top down. They are trying to do it, for instance, in the delta through the Tillers of the Soil Act. This act, if passed, will give about 800,000 to 1 million acres to the fellow working the land, which did not exist before. They are trying other reforms.

Yes, of course there is the black market, and this black market over there we saw in the streets of Saigon, but yet when you compare it to the situation in Korea at the same time, there is a world of difference, it is much better in Vietnam.

Certainly I think when we look at the military situation, when we realize that we are in a position where the North Vietnamese can hit and run across the border, and come back again; where we have been restricted in our targets that we can hit, where we have the stalemate, and impasse; I, for one, came back with the feeling that what we must do under the circumstances is withdraw our troops at staged intervals, withdraw them and replace them with troops of the South Vietnamese as quickly as possible.

I say that for this reason: I say it because the other alternatives of pulling out unilaterally, I believe, do not make any sense whatsoever. Whether Vietnam was important or was not important years ago, we made it important.

When you are over there I think you understand that the United States just cannot live in isolation in this world. I think all of us at times wish some of the problems would go away. I know I do.

But regardless of your belief in the domino theory, or any other theory, I just wonder what would happen if, for instance, say that whole part of the

world over there was united behind Communist China, I think that Vietnam itself might be regarded as just a warmup.

But to return to what I was saying, I think that the action that the President has taken, frankly, is the only one that makes any sense. The Communists of North Vietnam are playing a crescendo, you might say, as far as the battle goes. They will run up the scale maybe every 60 days or 80 days now to keep the pressure on the United States, to keep the pressure on our troops over there, and then they will back off. It is not a lull. I will tell you, I hope no one uses that word to the troops there. To the troops in the field there is no such thing as a lull, but they will back off in their scale of fighting, but they are continually keeping the pressure on. Frankly, they are trying to pressure the people of the United States into taking some precipitous action.

Time is on our side. By changing the stalemate, by setting for the first time a new course of action where there is an end in sight for the American people, I think in essence we can frustrate the Communists who want to force us to do something; who want to force us to just pull up and leave.

I think this, too: I think that both our friends and our foes alike should know that we are starting on this course; that this appears to be the right course to follow. I feel it is the right course. But do not take anything for granted. I do not believe that if positions change we should not revalue it, and what we are doing, and that we should not look at it again.

Certainly this is not a sign of weakness in any sense, to frankly carry out the policy of allowing Asians to fight an Asian war, and help them logistically.

But I think I want to make that point clear. I know I want to make that one point clear, and that is do not sell us short, do not sell the people in this country short. Certainly the young men over there—and that is all they really are, is young men—I am never going to have any fear for the future of this country. These are fine young men. They are not all happy. Every one of them knows the date that they are going to come back, they have it worked out like we all did down to the last minute and second. But they are doing their job, and it is a tough job, and they are doing this tough job under all kinds of impossible conditions, and in beating Charlie at his own game.

There is no such thing as a good war, and there is no good place to fight. I certainly hope in the future if this country ever does get into another war we are not going to do it unless we assume the obligation of doing everything we can to back up the boys over there. But that is for the future. It is where we are at now that I think we want to do something about. And I for one am glad that we are taking action and are finally going to accomplish something so that there is an end in sight so far as this country's involvement in the war and so far as the war in Vietnam is concerned.

Again I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. BLACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for giving us the

benefit of his experience and his views, having been there. I simply want to state by own personal agreement. No matter what the debate may have been over the value of Vietnam 5 or 10 years ago, the fact of the matter is today that it is extremely important, if for no other reason that America has put her prestige on the line there.

Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Speaker, suddenly, overnight, the Nation is plagued with "instant experts" on foreign policy with easy solutions to U.S. involvement in the Southeast Asia theater. The second-guessers in both political parties are having a field day at the expense of thousands of dedicated American young men who gave their lives in the cause of freedom.

Sometimes it looks like an auction—seeing who can outbid the President on withdrawals. And it is so obvious these vocal hucksters are completely lacking in qualifications to formulate an intelligent judgment. When President Nixon announces a proposed withdrawal of 50,000 troops, an eager politician bids 100,000; then, not to be outdone, a colleague goes for 200,000, and another starry-eyed hero wearing an ensemble of dove feathers, cries out for immediate withdrawal of everybody, yesterday.

Mr. Speaker, the President of the United States inherited a miserable situation, and he has responsibly and methodically gone about the business, for the first time since 1960, of reducing American troops in Vietnam—something neither John Kennedy nor Lyndon Johnson did as President. Yet, this is not enough for the "instant experts." There is no person in the United States of America today that has more accurate and more information available than our President. He also has the advice, guidance, judgment, and suggestions of the Secretary of Defense, Mel Laird, Secretary of State, Bill Rogers, not to mention Henry Cabot Lodge.

I do not know, Mr. Speaker, what solutions are offered by the instant withdrawal crowd, other than to appeal to the emotional responses of families who have loved ones involved; however, I do know it is not a traditional American posture to run up the white flag of surrender, to turn tail and run, to abdicate the honor of our commitments.

Many responsible citizens find it difficult to reconcile our "limited war" posture, and I agree. There are those who feel we should declare an ultimatum: Tell the Communists of North Vietnam that as of a date certain, unless positive steps for peace are taken, and complete cease fire, to get the women and children out of Hanoi and any other target area, because the United States is no longer interested in a prolonged indecisive no-progress negotiation. Let them know we will no longer consider North Vietnam a sanctuary, and we will take whatever responsible steps that may be necessary to win. This, of course, would include bombing dikes, industrial targets, blockading Haiphong, and shutting off supplies of all types.

Mr. Speaker, only the President of the United States has the authority and ca-

pability to win the peace. He should be permitted to do so, without demagoguery and political opportunism.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Speaker, as Members of the House know, I yield to no one in my desire to see the Vietnam war brought to an honorable and speedy conclusion. The killing of American and South Vietnamese boys and the destruction resulting from the effort of North Vietnam and the Vietcong to take over South Vietnam by force represent one of the great tragedies of this century.

We all hope that the Paris peace negotiations ultimately will be successful, but thus far our side has made the concessions and the other side has repudiated them. In my opinion, it is obvious that the Communists believe that if they can only hold out long enough, American public opinion will force the American Government to pull out unilaterally and precipitately in a defeat that will have repercussions for our country and the free world for decades to come.

It is my belief that well-intentioned proposals calling for the complete withdrawal of all American forces by a fixed period, such as the end of 1970, would have the effect of prolonging the killing and of delaying a peaceful settlement. What possible incentive is there for the Communist negotiators in Paris to negotiate an agreement with us if we announce in advance that we are going to pull out anyway by the end of 1970. Meanwhile, the Communists would prosecute the war to enhance their chances for a complete takeover after the Americans had gone.

Not only are such proposals unrealistic, in my opinion, but they do not keep faith with the thousands of Americans who have been wounded, killed and taken prisoner. We should keep these men and their families very much in mind as we consider how to speed the end of this war. Many of them are saying, "Let us not have made our sacrifice in vain."

Mr. LUKENS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in earnest dismay over the attack by some Members of this body on the Nixon administration's handling of the war in Vietnam. They are quick to criticize but offer no proposals for achieving a lasting and honorable peace in Vietnam. The Nixon administration, on the other hand, has been doing everything humanly possible to indicate our sincere and earnest desire for a peaceful settlement.

I deeply regret that some of my colleagues are inserting a knife in the back of a Republican President and a Republican administration which has inherited some of the most severe problems our country has ever faced.

It is obvious that the dissenting Members on either side of the aisle do not have access to hard intelligence information surrounding the situation in South and North Vietnam. It is also obvious that they do not have the experience nor the exposure that the President of the United States has in dealing with this problem. Thus they are not in a position to question the judgment of the Chief Executive of this Nation—a President who has made remarkable

progress in extricating America from the horrible situation he inherited in January of this year.

It is also obvious they have very short memories. Many of those voices among us dispaired because we dared to protect a defenseless people who were faced with invasion by an outside force. They cry out now because we help protect the villages and innocent peasants from inhuman Communist atrocities. These same voices have continuously espoused intolerable concessions to bring about negotiations at any price. They began by influencing decisions which resulted in our failure to block the seaport of Haiphong and to our bombing of cowpaths instead of strategic military targets.

Because of this influence, we held back until antiaircraft missile capability was established by North Vietnam, resulting in many American deaths. We have honored many truces, all of which resulted in the dashing of our hopes for a cease-fire, and in the rebuilding by the enemy of their ability to kill Americans during such lulls. This merely resulted in a stronger enemy, a refreshed enemy; and a better equipped enemy, with an increased capability to kill.

"Stop the bombing of the North," cried those same timid souls to show our sincere desire for a negotiated peace. We did stop. Not once, but 11 times. This bombing cessation resulted only in military escalation by the North Viet Communists, who are now entirely free of harassment in the North. Daily they violate the demilitarized zone, while still fighting and killing innocent civilians in the South.

Still not satisfied, we heard the cry "pull some of our troops out." The President has indeed scheduled the withdrawal of almost 60,000 men as of this date. Their response, "Not enough, merely a political move," "not of any consequence." Yet how they would have ranted and raved if we had sent in an additional 60,000. The result of the pull-out has been, inevitably, more casualties, more atrocities, and more aggressive action by the enemy. Now those same voices are demanding that we must pull all of our men out.

Gentlemen, we have gone that extra mile. Time and time again. The only sure means of achieving peace in the face of this continued Communist aggression, if we are to believe these voices, is to once again turn our backs on an innocent, Communist invaded country and run to "safety." Someday we may not have any place to which we can run. Then our only chance for peace will be submission.

In the name of peace, those people, either naively or intentionally have relayed the enemy propaganda. They have had their say. Their proposals have not been successful because they assumed the Communists want peace. The Communists do not want peace, a fact which they daily prove.

Neither South Vietnam nor the United States are the aggressor. The aggressors are the Communists. The Communists do not want peace so long as they make progress through aggression in all parts of the world. It should be apparent to

any objective observer that we will have peace only when aggression is punished, only when we negotiate from a position of strength.

In order to minimize casualties, perhaps it is time to finally resolve this issue. To do so, we must consider using every conventional resource available to us to achieve what every sensible patriotic American knows we can achieve—a military victory in Vietnam.

I would like to close with a quote, Mr. Speaker, which runs thus:

A coward is a man who does not realize that his safety depends on his courage.

A nation bogged down in the quagmire of indecision, torn by disunity, faced with the dissolution of ethics, is truly a coward. America must realize that the path to greatness, to a meaningful peace, and to real equality and freedom for all has always been to face physical suffering with moral courage born of spiritual belief.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. BLACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members desiring to do so may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the subject of my special order today, the war in Vietnam.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

NATIONAL ADULT-YOUTH COMMUNICATIONS WEEK

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOGAN) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Speaker, as a result of the adoption of Joint Resolution 814, sponsored by myself and many colleagues in this Congress, President Nixon has proclaimed this week as National Adult-Youth Communications Week.

I would, therefore, like to take this opportunity to publicize one area of activity with which I am personally acquainted, where the different generations have been communicating and have produced tangible results. I speak of the dialog and joint efforts which characterize the membership of my task force on youth.

After my election to the 91st Congress, I set about establishing various task forces to enable individual citizens to affect the legislative process and to enhance communication between citizens and the Congress. The purpose of each task force—all of which are completely nonpolitical in nature—is to advise me on matters which are under discussion for possible legislative action. I also expect from them feedback and recommendations and suggestions for improvements after bills have been introduced.

One of the first groups to be launched was the task force on youth. In forming this volunteer committee, we recruited qualified community leaders, well ac-

quainted with the needs and problems of the younger generation. More important, however, than the recruitment of adult advisers was the gathering of youthful participants. Each high school in the Fifth Congressional District was asked to select one outstanding student from the junior and senior class to participate. Also, the colleges in both Prince Georges and Charles Counties were asked to select four outstanding students to serve.

At their first general meeting the task force on youth divided itself into 11 committees on the military draft, alcohol and smoking, education, mental health, race problems, narcotics, human needs, crime, voting age, environmental quality, and county government.

The committee on voting age, composed of several students and one member of the Jaycees as adviser, took it upon themselves to conduct a survey of high school students to gage their opinions on lowering the voting age, after they learned that I was sponsoring a bill to lower the voting age to 18 in Federal elections.

Mr. Speaker, I would like at this time to insert the results of that survey into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD as an example of the cooperation which can be elicited when the different generations take the time to communicate effectively.

I commend all the members of my task force, under the chairmanship of Mr. Robert Crawley, who volunteered their time to participate in this project in order to keep me informed of the sentiments of the youth in my district, and I also thank the students, faculty, and administrators of the high schools who took valuable class time to comply with this request.

The following summary includes the questions and the tabulated results:

1. Are you in favor of lowering the voting age?

Yes	718
No	77
2. What should the voting age be?

17	24
18	588
19	100
20	5
21	74
25	1
No response	3
3. What do you believe justifies lowering the voting age? (Check one or more)

If a person can be drafted, he should be able to vote	589
Young people are civically and politically involved	320
Young people are prepared to vote at an earlier age because of the education they receive today	431
Young people today mature at an earlier age	174
Our nation is becoming "younger"; young people should have a voice of government	276
Other; explain	12
No response	58
4. Should voting age be uniform throughout the nation?

Yes	730
No	59
No response	6
5. How should uniformity of voting age be accomplished?

Constitutional amendment	440
Act of Congress	180
Constitutional convention	28
State legislatures	95
No response	52

6. Do you believe passing an examination should be prerequisite to voting eligibility?

No	468
Yes, only if under 21	123
Yes, all voters	189
No response	15

7. Which elected officials should voters under 21 be eligible to vote for?

No elected officials	48
All elected officials	610
President and Vice President only	48
President, Vice President, Congressmen	8
President, Vice President, State, local	6
Congressmen, State	4
Congressmen, State, local	34
State officials, local	10
Local officials only	14
State only	4
Congressmen only	2
No response	10

THE CASE FOR THE SAFEGUARD ABM SYSTEM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. HOLIFIELD) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, the prevention of nuclear war must be the primary objective of our Nation. We must maintain a position of overall military strength sufficient to deter any nation from believing that it could launch a successful attack against the United States.

Deterrence today rests upon the conviction by leaders of the Soviet Union that the U.S. military power is sufficient to inflict unberable damage on the Soviet Union after a surprise first strike on us.

If the military power of the Soviet Union ever rises to the level where leaders in the Kremlin believe that the U.S. military power is inadequate to inflict such an unbearable retaliatory strike, the basic factor of deterrence no longer exists.

We must at all costs maintain the factor of deterrence, in order to buy time to achieve mutual disarmament.

Failure to negotiate a disarmament agreement, which includes adequate inspection guarantees, must inevitably cause mutual suspicion, mutual fear, and a continuation of the arms race to continue between the United States and U.S.S.R. as each strives to offset the other's military power.

I define offsetting military power as being sufficient power to maintain deterrence. Military power is composed of a mixture of military offensive and defensive capabilities.

No defensive or offensive weapon system can be separated from the "mix" and considered unnecessary, if it contributes to the total offsetting balance of military power upon which overall deterrence depends.

A key objective of our military power mix is to implant the credibility of our deterrence into a potential enemy's calculations, convictions, and intentions.

The respective military, economic, and

geopolitical assets of two potential enemies will, when separately compared, always vary. The important factor is that each nation's total weapon system mix, when compared with the potential enemy mix, will constitute an adequate level of offsetting military power.

In 1962, President Kennedy was faced with a Soviet power play to upset the balance of nuclear terror. He stood firm, and the destabilizing threat receded. Since then two Presidents and their top civilian-military advisers have evaluated the changing total military power mix of the Soviet Union. Each noted the growth of Soviet offensive and defensive military power. Their conclusions have led to additional research, development, and deployment of an ABM system in the United States to offset this developing imbalance created by the recent rapid expansion of Soviet military strength.

Let me cite some examples of this developing threat as seen by top U.S. Defense officials:

Because of the low altitude of the (Soviet) FOBS' orbits, some of their trajectories would avoid detection by some early warning radars, including our BMEWS. Also, the impact point cannot be determined until ignition of the rocket engine that deboosts the payload out of orbit—and that occurs roughly three minutes and some 500 miles from the target. And the flight path can be as much as 10 minutes shorter than that of an ICBM. (Secretary of Defense McNamara, November 3, 1967.)

We estimate that as of 1 September 1968 the Soviets had approximately 900 ICBM launchers operational, compared with 570 in mid-1967 and 250 in mid-1966—an increase of well over threefold in a period of a little more than 2 years. (Secretary of Defense Clifford, January 15, 1969.)

We must compare the 20 to 25 megaton warhead, on the Soviet SS-9, with our own ICBM warhead which are only a fraction as large. Thus, the Soviets by deploying as many ICBMs as the United States, can potentially deliver a much larger megatonnage in an attack than we can with our ICBMs. (Secretary of Defense Laird, March 21, 1969.)

In the single year 1968, the Soviets put to sea a new type ballistic missile submarine as well as several new types of nuclear attack submarines—a feat far exceeding anything we have ever done.

Admiral Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, said recently: "The flag of the Soviet Navy now flies proudly over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later, the U.S. will have to understand that it no longer has mastery of the seas." (Admiral H. G. Rickover, April 25, 1969.)

Also, the following quotes on the effect of ABM defense are worth noting:

A completely different concept of ABM is to deploy it around Minuteman silos, and at command and control centers. This application has gone in and out of Defense Department planning. *I am in favor of such a scheme at the appropriate time.* (Emphasis added.)

My main reason for being in favor is that such a deployment would stabilize the strategic situation rather than the opposite. (Prof. Hans Bether, P. 39 of ABM hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 6, 1969.)

Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Panofsky, I would ask this question: If we are successful in defending Minuteman bases in this way, and if they desire to maintain parity, would they not increase their ICBMs?

Dr. PANOFSKY. Only if they were genuinely interested in a first strike posture. If they

were satisfied by a second strike posture, then, if we increased the defense of our Minuteman bases by ABMs, they would not have to increase their ICBM force. (P. 341 of ABM briefing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 28, 1969.)

CONCLUSION 1

That there is little likelihood of nuclear attack by ICBM from either China or the Soviet Union because China lacks the capability, and because any such attack would be sure to rain lethal fallout and second-strike nuclear destruction on the attacking nation itself and existing defenses therefore provide adequate protection without addition of an ABM system.

REBUTTAL

As responsible legislators we cannot assume away the problem. It is our job to make sure that the likelihood of attack remains small. Therefore, we must be concerned with the evidence of Soviet increases in both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons capability and Red China's growing nuclear arsenal. Those who assert that "there is little likelihood of nuclear attack by ICBM from either China or the Soviet Union" might well have said the same about the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962, and Red China's attack on India in 1962. The fear of "lethal fallout" by leaders of the Soviet Union and Red China is also speculative in view of the extensive civil defense system in the Soviet Union and the relatively dispersed population in the U.S.S.R. and Red China.

CONCLUSION 2

That neither Chinese nor Soviet missile development and deployment are going forward at such a rate or in such a manner as to suggest a significant change in the capabilities or intentions of either of these nations in the foreseeable future that would justify deployment of an ABM system at this time.

REBUTTAL

This is a risky conclusion, considering the Soviet present expansion of both offensive and defensive nuclear firepower. As Secretary Clifford said on January 15:

In the Soviet strategic posture, the large increase in deployments of hardened, land-based ICBMs has been the most significant development of the past year; we project that by the end of 1969 they will have deployed over 1000 intercontinental ballistic missiles. (Emphasis added.)

Everyone can speculate about their intentions, but responsible legislators have to keep their eyes on the capability. To speculate and be wrong would make us the richest Nation in the international cemetery.

CONCLUSION 3

That given the current uncertainties about the technical reliability and capability of the ABM system to perform the functions visualized for it, it does not merit our confidence, and additional research and development, rather than deployment, appears appropriate at this time.

REBUTTAL

The Safeguard system is backed by about 13 years of intensive research and development on ballistic-missile defense. Both the Sprint and Spartan missiles have undergone a number of successful test firings. A missile site radar has been constructed and is being tested at the Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific. In the near future that radar will control test

firing of both the Sprint and the Spartan interceptors. A few months later both radar and missile systems will be integrated in tests to track and intercept incoming ballistic-missile reentry vehicles from Vandenberg. The technology and components for the perimeter acquisition radar have already been tested in similar operational radars at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. In parallel, the AEC will continue to test the warheads in a series of underground shots.

In identifying the need for ABM protection we should avoid overstating or understating the system capabilities. Nor should we advocate research only as a device merely for deferring a decision. To the extent that further research, development and testing are necessary for assurance of satisfactory operation according to performance specifications, such efforts should be made providing that Congress authorizes the Safeguard system. Thereafter it becomes the President's responsibility to determine when the system is ready for deployment in the interest of national security.

CONCLUSION 4

That while greater protection from accidental launch of nuclear missiles toward the United States would be desirable, this alone does not justify deployment of the ABM, especially when there is serious doubt whether an ABM system could perform this function effectively, and there is no evidence that it is either the best or only means of dealing with the accidental launch problem.

REBUTTAL

It is difficult to conceive of any other means which we could use to intercept an accidentally launched ICBM than through the use of an ABM missile. The resolution of doubt as to functional efficiency must rely on testing an operational system—without a nuclear warhead explosion in the atmosphere.

An alternate to noninterception is, of course, our accepting the damage of a delivered enemy ICBM on our deterrent force of Minutemen bases.

Another alternate is to launch our ICBM's after recognition of an incoming enemy missile and before its arrival on target. Either of these two alternates are stark and dangerous choices.

CONCLUSION 5

That before delegating authority to fire offensive or defensive nuclear weapons to officials below the level of the President, which would almost certainly be necessary in case of ABM, all possible alternatives should be explored.

REBUTTAL

The problem of firing a defensive ABM type of missile is not insoluble. The President can direct beforehand the conditions under which such a missile can be used.

An accidental or deliberate firing, because of the relatively short range, however, would not constitute a threat against the Soviet Union. The Kosygin interview in the New York Times of February 10, 1967, discloses the Soviet attitude toward defensive short-range missiles.

CONCLUSION 6

That a decision to deploy ABMs, or actual ABM deployment would add nothing to our arms control bargaining position that we do not already enjoy through our current deploy-

ment capability, and in fact might limit our bargaining power by reducing our seeming sincerity in seeking to limit strategic arms.

REBUTTAL

Logic would seem to argue that the United States would be in a better bargaining position for mutual arms reduction if we had, for trade off purposes, an offsetting ABM system to a similar system in the Soviet weapon mix.

I note the underlining of "capability" in the phrase "our current deployment capability." Does this suggest additional deployment of ICBM's, an offensive weapon?

As to "reducing our seeming sincerity in seeking to limit strategic arms," Kosygin in an interview in the New York Times of February 10, 1967, is quoted as follows:

Question. Doesn't the Soviet Prime Minister share the view that a build up of a Soviet anti-missile system is a new step in the arms race?

Answer. It seems to me that the system that warns of an attack is not a factor in the arms race. On the contrary, it is a factor that reduces the possibility of destruction of people.

We have earnestly advocated and achieved steps toward disarmament; that is, Test Ban Treaty, Nonproliferation Treaty, Geneva Arms Control Conferences, and Presidential offers to negotiate peaceful arrangements. Our sincerity of desiring peace cannot be justifiably challenged.

CONCLUSION 7

(1) That arms control negotiations following ABM deployment or a decision to deploy would have reduced potential for reaching agreement due to influences from sources with vested interests in retaining the system and the possible need for one or more parties to dismantle existing hardware and to incur the resulting financial losses.

(2) Negotiations conducted prior to any deployment or deployment decision would proceed without these negative influences and constraints, and enjoy a correspondingly better probability of reaching arms control agreement.

REBUTTAL TO (1)

This argument applies to all weapon systems in our total weapon system mix. Arms control negotiations must inevitably involve freezing, reduction, or dismantling of existing hardware and cessation of future arms production of weapon systems and must inevitably result in financial loss to arms systems producers.

REBUTTAL TO (2)

If there is one lesson we have learned in Congress, it is that the leaders of the Soviet Union respect military power and understand resolve.

On June 24, 1968, the Senate voted 52 to 34 to support the deployment of a U.S. ABM system. Three days later representatives of the Soviet Union announced that they were inclined to discuss negotiations on offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. I think this timing clearly illustrates that when we show that we are determined to maintain our strength, the Soviets are willing to negotiate. If Congress rejects the ABM it will show the Soviets that the leaders of our Nation are deeply divided on this issue—a division which they

would exploit to our disadvantage without giving us any concessions.

CONCLUSION 8

The resources required to deploy an ABM system would have greater benefits for the Nation if devoted to various domestic needs.

REBUTTAL

This argument is of course a statement which relates to all military expense. Satisfaction of domestic needs could be made from substantial reductions in all military expenses, assuming that the funds would be diverted to domestic needs.

CONCLUSION 9

The request for funds to deploy the A.B.M. system ought, at this time, to be opposed.

REBUTTAL

Conclusion based on the assumption that statements 1 to 8, inclusive, are valid and not subject to challenges.

CONCLUDING COMMENT

Support of the research and development of an antiballistic-missile system is justified on the basis of:

First, it is an offsetting system to the Soviet deployment of the Galosh and Tallinn systems, now in being;

Second, it is part of the overall military mix of the United States which offsets the military mix of the Soviet Union; and

Third, it would be a factor both militarily and psychologically in preserving the factor of deterrence. As long as deterrence obtains, nuclear war will not destroy mankind. As long as deterrence obtains we are buying time for negotiating the terms of peace.

When deterrence fails and nations exchange their deadly nuclear warheads, no military device can protect humanity from catastrophic destruction.

The case for the U.S. decision to develop and eventually deploy a defensive anti-ballistic-missile system therefore rests on the judgment that it would be a balance offset component of our military system mix to a similar component in the Soviet military system mix, and that it would add to the factor of deterrence in the Soviet evaluation of comparative military capability and, therefore, affect their possible decision to start a nuclear war.

Mr. Speaker, I would also like to include a letter written by Adm. H. G. Rickover to Senator PASTORE on the ABM subject:

U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., April 25, 1969.

HON. JOHN O. PASTORE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PASTORE: In your letter of April 15th, you asked me to give an estimate and an opinion as to where we are and where we are going and what needs to be done in a military way in these times of turmoil and peril. There is, as you point out, a division of opinion among the American people regarding the necessity of reinforcing our military strength.

The first point I would like to make is that in judging between conflicting views on this matter, the deciding factor must be their relevance to the world as it is, *not as we would wish it to be*. Granted the hideousness of modern war, can we deduce therefrom that mankind is now wise enough to forego recourse to arms? A look at history should put us on guard against those who claim that humanity has now reached a state where

the possibility of armed aggression can be safely disregarded in formulating national policy.

I am reminded of the intense opposition to the Navy's 15-cruise bill in 1929. It was argued by many that with the signing of the Kellogg Peace Pact the year before it was no longer necessary to build new warships. And this in light of the lessons of World War I which erupted despite the various Hague Peace Treaties! These ships were of inestimable value in helping us win World War II. The war itself was prolonged because Congress—heeding the "merchants of death" argument—in 1939 prohibited shipment of war materials to Britain and France.

Then, too, weight must be given to the credentials of those propounding opposite views. Are they public servants charged with the awesome responsibility to secure our country against foreign conquest, or are they private individuals not accountable for the consequences of their opinions, who feel free to express their personal abhorrence of war and to agitate for a reduction of the financial burden military preparedness imposes on the taxpayer? Would the majority of the electorate accept their argument that, given our unmet domestic needs, we cannot afford an effective defense position vis-à-vis our potential adversaries? Or that war is so horrible that it is better to suffer defeat than to fight?

As for the high cost of preparedness, it is in fact no greater proportional to total U.S. output than 10 years ago—8.8% of total U.S. goods and services. Omitting the costs of the Vietnam War and allowing for inflation, our armed forces have less buying power today than a decade ago. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand—according to the Annual Report of the Congressional Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy issued last June—resources have been diverted from the farm sector to defense, where outlays rose dramatically in 1966-67, after remaining static since 1962. The Report talks about their new preoccupation with national security. And you must bear in mind that actual war costs absorb but a small portion of their expenditures while we are spending some two and a half billion dollars a month in Vietnam.

If history teaches anything it is surely that weakness invites attack; that it takes but one aggressor to plunge the world into war against the wishes of dozens of peace-loving nations if the former is militarily strong and the latter are not. Yet there are those who deprecate the need to maintain military supremacy or at least parity with the communist empires, on the grounds that other nations have accepted a decline from first to second or third rank and that we ourselves for most of our history were militarily a second-rate power yet secure enough within our borders. They forget that we then profited from the *Pax Britannica*, even as the former great powers of Europe who have lost their defense capability enjoy political freedom today only because we are strong enough to defend them and ready to do so. What it means to be weak and without American protection should be evident to all as we observe the tragic drama of Czechoslovakia "negotiating" with Russia the continuing subjugation of her people.

As a lawyer, you are familiar with Blackstone's statement that security of the person is the first, and liberty of the individual the second "absolute right inherent in every Englishman." Just so, the first right of every American is to be protected against foreign attack, and the first duty of government is to keep our nation alive. Given the world situation, this calls for maintenance of a defense capability which is adequate to discourage potential aggressors. Said President Nixon, in discussing the Cuban missile crisis, "It is essential to avoid putting an American

President, either this President or the next President, in the position where the United States would be second rather than first or at least equal to any potential enemy . . . I do not want to see an American President in the future, in the event of any crisis, have his diplomatic credibility be so impaired because the United States was in a second-class or inferior position. We saw what it meant to the Soviets when they were second. I don't want that position to be the United States' in the event of a future diplomatic crisis.

There can surely be no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the American people are opposed to relinquishment of our defense capability, recognizing full well that there will then be no one left to prevent the takeover by communist power. Whether one takes the optimistic view that a permanent East-West detente can be negotiated, or the pessimistic view that ultimately we shall have to fight for our liberties, this nation has no future if it allows itself to be outmatched militarily.

To turn now to specific matters currently in dispute. There is the ABM system which is under heavy fire on grounds that it (a) will escalate the arms race and (b) will not work. It should be stressed that the Soviets have had their own version of the ABM for several years without inducing us to expand our military power. Just as the Soviet ABM version has not added to the Soviet threat, so our own ABM would not add to ours. The Russians have been singularly silent in this respect; the outcry has come mostly from those in this country who habitually apply a double standard when adjudging military developments in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. One must ask how can our defensive capability be considered provocative, while theirs is not? Is there not something deeply disturbing when one observes scientists, formerly holding responsible positions in government, advocate policies directly contrary to those they supported when in office? It must not be forgotten that many of our most prestigious scientists were bitterly opposed to development of the H-bomb. Where would we be today had not the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and President Truman—who had the responsibility for the safety of the U.S.—disregard their advice?

As for the assertion that the ABM cannot be made to work, I must disagree. If there is one lesson I have learned in the many years I have devoted to the development of nuclear propulsion plants it is that, given the soundness of a theoretical concept, it can, with drive and imaginative engineering be made to work.

Contrariwise, for a theoretical concept to be translated into reality it must be worked on. Research alone—no matter how prolonged—will not do it. The very act of developing the concept through detailed engineering work produces improvements in the original concept—improvements which would have been neither obvious nor possible without such actual engineering work.

The Soviets are just as adept in research and development as we are. They have amply proved this by their progress in space, in missiles, in aviation, in military equipment, in nuclear submarines. They know full well from their own experience that with research alone—without development engineering—our ABM system or any other system would not be meaningful and could be discounted. For this reason we must guard against those claiming that we can limit ourselves to research—that research alone will suffice.

You also asked me to comment on what needs to be done in these times of turmoil and peril. As I am more familiar with the threat posed by the Soviets to our naval power, I would like to confine myself to this area, and specifically to submarines. But what I say here is valid for our land, sea, and air power as well.

The Soviet Union is embarked on a program which reveals a singular awareness of the importance of sea power and an unmistakable resolve to become the most powerful maritime force in the world. They demonstrate a thorough understanding of the basic elements of sea power: knowledge of the seas, a strong modern merchant marine, and a powerful new Navy. They are surging forward with a naval and maritime program that is a technological marvel.

At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union had a fleet of 200 diesel-powered submarines. They then embarked on a massive building program, producing over 550 new submarines through 1968, at least 65 of which are nuclear-powered. During the same period, the United States built 99 submarines, 82 of them nuclear-powered. The Soviets have scrapped or given away all their World War II submarines as well as some built since. They now have a new submarine force of about 375; we have 143, which includes 61 diesel submarines most of which are of World War II vintage. Thus the Soviets have a net advantage of about 230 submarines. It is estimated that by the end of 1970 they will have a numerical lead in nuclear submarines.

To achieve this the Soviets greatly expanded and modernized their submarine building facilities. Just one of their numerous submarine building yards has several times the area and facilities of all U.S. submarine yards. They use modern assembly-line techniques under covered ways, permitting large-scale production regardless of weather conditions.

In the single year 1968, the Soviets put to sea a new type ballistic missile submarine as well as several new types of nuclear attack submarines—a feat far exceeding anything we have ever done. In looking to the future, it is estimated that by 1974 they will add about 70 nuclear-powered submarines to their fleet, whereas we will add but 26—further increasing their numerical superiority. In the case of the ballistic missile submarine the Soviets have undertaken a vigorous building program to surpass our Polaris fleet of 41. They have completed seven of the new Polaris-type submarines, and have the capability to turn out one a month. We have no Polaris submarines under construction or planned. We must assume that by the 1973-74 time period they will be up to us.

Numerical superiority, however, does not tell the whole story. Weapon systems, speed, depth, detection devices, quietness of operation, and crew performance all make a significant contribution to the effectiveness of a submarine force. From what we have been able to learn during the past year, the Soviets have attained equality in a number of these characteristics and a superiority in some.

In order to achieve the results so far attained in all areas of modern technology the Soviets had to develop their most important resource—technical and scientific personnel. The Soviet educational program enjoys highest national priority. The statistics on the total numbers of Soviet degree graduates are extremely impressive. The U.S. National Science Foundation data indicates that in 1966 alone, 168,000 engineers were graduated; the U.S., on the other hand, produced but 36,000. With specific application to the Navy, the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute, just one naval institute of several, had over 7,000 students in 1966 studying naval architecture and marine engineering. I doubt we had over 400 enrolled in these subjects in all U.S. colleges.

While we cannot specifically count the number of Soviet scientists and engineers devoted to naval work, it is apparent that they have created a broad technological base. They have committed extensive resources to support development of their naval forces.

The steady build-up of the Soviet submarine Navy from an ineffective coastal defense force at the end of World War II to the world's largest underseas navy today deserves admiration; also it should deeply worry every American. By the end of this year we face the prospect of losing the superiority in nuclear submarines we have held for many years. The threat posed by their submarine force—with their new ballistic and cruise missile launchers and new attack types, is formidable. If more sophisticated types are added in the near future, as is likely considering their large number of designers and their extensive facilities, the threat will rapidly increase.

The Soviets have frequently announced their intent to be the pre-eminent world power. Why do we not believe them? Hitler in *Mein Kampf* plainly announced his intent to dominate the world. We did not believe him either—until it was nearly too late. Admiral Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, said recently: "The flag of the Soviet Navy now flies proudly over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later, the U.S. will have to understand that it no longer has mastery of the seas." And just a few days ago the Russians announced a projected 50% increase in the size of their merchant fleet. These facts should be weighed when assessing the judgment of those who argue for a reduction of American military power while the Soviet military power is rapidly expanding.

The bearer of bad news is always punished. In ancient times, he might be put to death. Today he becomes "controversial" and unpopular. But if there is one subject on which the American people must know the truth, however unpalatable, it is our military position vis-a-vis the Soviets. I believe *no one can better inform them than members of the Congress—who have such close ties to their constituents.*

I suggest that by keeping secret our knowledge of Soviet strength at this time we may lose more than by confiding the truth of the danger we face to the American people.

Respectfully,

H. G. RICKOVER.

THE RED NIGHTMARE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. ASHBROOK) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, Taft radio stations carried a series of broadcasts on the Red nightmare. I listened to this presentation and felt that it was one of the most comprehensive, succinct statements that I had heard on this vital subject. Joe Waldman, producer of this three-part series, has furnished a copy of the program. He and the Taft broadcasting stations are to be commended. I certainly recommend it to all who are interested in receiving a true insight into world communism. The program was as follows, and I quote:

THE RED NIGHTMARE
(By Joe Waldman)

The principle of communism is nothing new. In ages past, several primitive societies were built along communistic lines. The whole tribe lived in common and shared food, property and housing. Communism, as we know it today, is little more than a century old. The brand of communism we now know is called "scientific socialism." It came from the mind of an egotistical, crabby, industrious little man who was born in Germany and lived most of his life in exile. His name was Karl Marx.

Marx was born in Trier, Germany in May of 1818, the son of a successful Germany lawyer. He was an intelligent youngster, and a temperamental one. At school he excelled; and showed one particular trait which was to mark his entire life: a tremendous capacity for work . . . if the work was to his liking.

Marx did not make friends easily. He was tremendously intelligent—but also vain, bitter and rebellious. He fell deeply in love with a lovely young girl named Jenny von Westphalen, a love which was to remain strong throughout his life. They were married in 1843. Their life together was one of great devotion . . . and abject poverty. Marx wrote; and his wife stood by him through incredible misery, including cold, starvation and the death of their children.

A life-long friend of Marx was a man named Friedrich Engels, the son of a wealthy industrialist. Engels supplied the money and Marx supplied the ideology. Both men were socialists and atheists. But rarely were two close friends so widely diverse in character. Engels was well-mannered, hedonistic and happy. Marx was morose, moody and quite rude.

Engels spent much of his time in Manchester, England, tending to his father's business, while Marx lived in London. Engels was tall and thin, blue-eyed, two years younger than Marx and a lover of horses and women.

In contrast, Marx lived in squalor. He was often sick, suffering from headaches, rheumatism and boils. His wife was constantly sick. Following the death of their seventh-born, Jenny's health worsened. The Marx's lived from pawnshop to pawnshop.

It is one of the great ironies of history that the father of communism was kept alive through the generosity of a wealthy capitalist; and that this capitalist's son should become the second father of communism.

The great classics of communism, including *Das Kapital*, were hacked out under these horrible conditions of poverty. But Marx was tough and stubborn. He continued writing, reading and denouncing capitalist poverty.

If the mind of Marx was biased, it was also razor sharp. He was an avid student of history, philosophy and economics. Sitting in his dingy apartment or in the British museum, this German born social theorist surveyed the world. He felt he could recast it on his own terms. Through his writings and his revolutionary organizations he undertook to do so.

Marx was called "the moor" by his children because of his deep black hair and dark, piercing eyes.

And what of this "communism" he fathered? His first line of attack was an atheistic view of the world. He joined two very old ideas:

First: That everything in the universe, whether a blade of grass, a human being, or society itself, is constantly changing and at the same time is in conflict. This is called "dialectics."

And two: That there is no God; that the world is composed only of "living matter." Hence, man is walking dust, without spark or image of any divine creator. This idea is called materialism. Hence, dialectical materialism.

This remarkable concept was to undergird the entire Communist world outlook. Human society, as well as the physical universe, Marx said, is affected by this outlook. The principles have universal application. Non-Communist thinkers, as well as human experience, have since punctured many holes in this thesis—but to Communists it applies with the same certainty as does the law of gravity.

"Constant and bitter struggle is good," said Marx, "because it achieves progress." In fact, Marx viewed the entire recorded history of the world as the story of class struggle. Mankind, he said, has always been divided into classes: groups of people who have special

interests, ideals and ways of doing things. These classes, he said, have been struggling from the very beginning of time . . . and still are. Marx explained this struggle by means of a formula, commonly referred to as the "thesis-antithesis-synthesis dialectic," which he borrowed and altered from the German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel.

This is how it works:

You begin with an economic class—A thesis. This class is the dominant power in any given society. This class controls production—housing, clothing and all else. An opposing class arises—an antithesis—which seeks to overthrow the first class. It has different ideals, motives and ambitions. There is immediate conflict. Soon, a new class—a synthesis—is the result. This new class incorporates only the best of both previous classes. Marx seemed to have overlooked the possibility that it might also absorb some of the bad.

Now, with the synthesis, the process begins again. This is history for, as Marx held, historical materialism was nothing more than applying the concept of dialectical materialism to society. The new synthesis is now dominant and thus becomes, in turn, a new thesis. It directs housing, wealth, fashion and all else. And again, another opposition arises—a new antithesis. They struggle . . . and a new synthesis is the result. And again, the world begins another cycle. Obviously, these theories are a bit distorted. But to understand communism in its 20th century form, it is essential to grasp the underlying theory.

This class struggle, in Marx's reasoning, always produced a higher stage of civilization. First came the slavery of man. The class of slave-owners resulted in the antithesis . . . or those who sought to abolish slavery. The resulting conflict produced feudalism, representing the best of both previous classes. In turn, feudalism was attacked by its own antithesis. For hundreds of years the struggle continued, issuing forth finally in a new synthesis—Capitalism—again representing the best features of both rivals.

During Marx's lifetime history was still in the Capitalist stage. But he said it could not remain there. It must move on to Communism. The Capitalist class had already developed its own antithesis which Marx identified as the Proletariat, or working class, which was striving to overthrow the old system.

"Communism," Marx proclaimed, "Represents the new synthesis of the Capitalist-Proletariat struggle and the Apex of all history." When Communism emerged victorious conflict would cease. The state would wither away. History would come to an end. This new state would be the perfect and final society—stateless, classless, where all property used in production would be held in common and human activities would conform to the principle: "From each according to his abilities; to each according to his needs."

And now, the role of the party. The party, said Marx, was to be the vanguard of the Proletariat. Most workers are stupid, uneducated in Marxism and duped by Capitalists. They could never start a revolution by themselves. They need guidance; and that is the job of the party. Why? Because party members are awake, intelligent and, most important of all, learned in the ways of Marxism. They know the laws of revolution, the mysteries of the development of society. Their task is to be the general staff of the revolution. And what of force and violence? Can they be avoided? Marx said "No!"

Marx emphasized that capitalist society, most naturally, would not of its own volition turn over its factories, banks and money to the workers. Moreover, it would doubtless organize a counter-revolution. Hence, under the leadership of the party the workers must, if necessary, be prepared to utilize force and violent revolution. If the capitalists submit

peacefully, good. If they resist, destroy them. But this is not the end of it. Once power is obtained, opposition will remain which must be stamped out—utterly, completely, ruthlessly. Again, this cannot be left to the untrained, untaught proletariat. It is a task for the dictatorship of the proletariat, conceived as a transitional stage between actual revolution and the arrival of the highest and final form of communism. And, again, guiding the dictatorship would be the party, serving as a steamroller and liquidating through sheer force all capitalist elements. Then—and only then—could new socialist construction begin.

In 1848 Marx, in collaboration with Engels, prepared the platform of the Communist League—a revolutionary organization which included a large number of German exiles. This was the famous "Communist Manifesto," the first sweeping blueprint for Communist ideals. The document is striking, forceful . . . and threatening:

" . . . The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working-men of all countries, unite!"

Marx believed that well-intentioned and good-hearted men cannot be depended upon to improve society. They are dabblers and botchers who only make things worse. Mere social reforms strengthen capitalism, prolong exploitation and keep the corpse alive.

The only solution is to tear down capitalism completely with the use of force and violence and set up a communistic government. In 1864, Marx helped organize the first Communist Internationale—the first Communist congress. Its legacy to the cause of communism lay in giving international structure to the movement.

Communism, as designed by Karl Marx, has never really worked. Virtually all of his precepts, as altruistic as he may have felt they were, have never been borne out in world society simply because they cannot work. Marx said that capitalism is destructive because it destroyed the working man, forcing him to live under subhuman conditions. He believed the industrial revolution would enslave the little man while the idle rich would live in splendor.

The truth: Under capitalism the little man has prospered and gained in a strength hardly dreamed of by Marx. And the industrial revolution has bettered the life of the worker. Capitalism has worked.

The truth: Marx predicted his great revolution would begin in a highly industrialized nation. It did not. It began in an industrially backward nation. And not because the working man was sick of living in a class society, but because he was being crushed from within by an inefficient monarchy and from without by an unsuccessful war.

The truth: Marx placed no trust in either capitalism or the goodness of man. And yet, capitalism has fostered the most unsordid acts of humanity and generosity in the history of the world; and its society has produced innumerable men of greatness and good will.

The final truth: communism has failed miserably. It has become the seat of unrest from the inside to the outside. Tito and Yugoslavia broke with Soviet Russia. Albania sided with Tito. There was open revolt in East Germany, Poland and Hungary. Most recently, tiny Czechoslovakia sought to peacefully institute a policy of liberalism. The result was a crushing blow from Russia. . . . Including the use of tanks, arbitrary arrest and detention and the burning of books. Communist China has broken from the rule of Moscow. A very deep schism has developed in the rigid structure of communism simply because, in the final analysis, it has proven to be an unworkable system.

Stated simply, there is no communism in Russia. Communism is just a name tacked onto an ancient form of government called "dictatorship." Russia experiences no classless society and no freedom of thought or action. It is a power which is fading. But, like a wounded tiger, it is all the more deadly because it is fading.

Communism is a handy title to hang on the Russian Government. In structure it has been likened to Christianity: It has its savior, Karl Marx; its bible, the manifesto; its heaven, the Communist utopian state; and its apostles, Lenin and Stalin.

Marx and Engels laid the groundwork for communism, but they left no guidelines as to the revolutionary methods by which the end result was to be reached.

But for one man, communism might have drowned in a sea of words. This man never knew Marx. He was born Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov. The world came to know him as Lenin.

Vladimir Lenin took Communist theory and galvanized it into Communist organization and action. He became the third great driving force in the success of the great revolution. If Marx is the father of communism, Lenin is the father of the Communist Party.

Lenin was born on April 22, 1870 in Simbirsk, which is now called Ulyanovsk—a town on the Volga River. His father was a school inspector and a devout member of the Russian Orthodox Church. Lenin, one of six children, was a brilliant student. He had a tremendous capacity for deep concentration. What he may have lacked in speed he made up for in dogged perseverance.

At the age of sixteen Lenin became an Atheist. He is said to have ripped a cross from around his neck, thrown it on the ground and spat upon it.

In 1887, when Lenin was seventeen his older brother Alexander was hanged in the courtyard of Schlüsselburg Fortress in St. Petersburg. He had been charged with four others in a plot to assassinate the czar of Russia. The death of Alexander deeply affected the young Lenin and much of his life was altered by this act.

In 1887 Lenin entered Kazan University. In a short while he became involved in student revolutionary organizations. He was arrested and later kept under police surveillance.

At the age of eighteen he discovered Marx. He was soon studying the precepts of communism day and night, discussing and planning with his sister Anna and organizing Marxist study groups.

He passed his law examination in 1891, graduating with honors, and was admitted to the bar.

At the age of twenty-four Lenin already had the appearance of a man who had lived much. A friend remarked that he had wrinkles which seemed better suited to middle age. He was bald. His eyes always seemed to be staring beyond what he was looking at. They were dark and piercing, revealing a quick mind and a sharp wit.

By the 1880s Russia was boiling with discontent. A strong revolutionary movement was in rebellion against the Czarist regime. Many of the revolutionary goals were impractical. Some demanded a greater voice for the peasants or industrial workers. Some preached violent revolution. Still others advocated democratic reform. The ideas were diverse but they all agreed on one thing—it was time for a change.

The more radical of the groups believed in political terrorism. Their violence, however, led only to more oppression.

It is interesting to note that the first foreign translation of Marx's "Das Kapital" was Russian.

In 1883 a Marxist group was founded in Russia. Ten years later, when Lenin joined

the group at St. Petersburg, the movement was a strong and dynamic force.

The early Russian Marxists were deeply divided. They were merely theorists; not apostles of action. Lenin immediately undertook to change all that. And he might have succeeded had he not been arrested in December of 1895. He was imprisoned, then exiled to Siberia.

Lenin was released in 1900 and left Russia, more enflamed than ever with the idea of violent revolution.

Lenin and his wife Nadezhda lived in Western Europe as exiles, moving from city to city and using fictitious names. Most of their time was spent living in Switzerland.

Lenin was happiest when he could talk of revolution. And he would do so far into the night, or anytime he could find a willing audience. His wife was constantly on guard to prevent him from overburdening himself, because he abused his body and his mind through lack of sleep and poor eating habits. Often he would work himself into highly nervous states when discussing his plans for the revolution which he knew must come.

Lenin formulated the principles not only of scientific Marxism, but of violent revolution. He spent much time in London at various libraries studying the principles of warfare, the construction of barricades, home-made weapons, command structure and a good deal more. He made Marxism a highly disciplined, organized and ruthless creed. Ruthless—the key word. It appears again and again in his writings.

"Capitalism cannot be defeated and eradicated without the ruthless suppression of the resistance of the exploiters."

"Contempt for death must spread among the masses and thus secure victory. The ruthless extermination of the enemy will be their task."

And how could the revolution be achieved? Not by democratic reforms. That process is plodding and much too slow. It must be accompanied by violent, naked revolution. "The sword is the weapon," he would say, "Everything must be dedicated to this aim; one's time, talents . . . one's very life. Revolutions do not just happen. They are made."

Lenin conceived of the party as the cornerstone of the revolution. Marx, in his philosophical abstractions, had never thought out the day-to-day composition of the party. But Lenin did. The party, he said, must be a small, tightly-controlled, deeply loyal group. Membership was not to be the key—but fanaticism was. Members must live, eat, breathe and dream revolution. They must lie, cheat, steal and murder if the party was to be served. Family ties and years of goodness did not count. The only thing that mattered was the party and its existence.

In 1903 the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party—the Russian Marxist Party—met in convention in Brussels. The proceedings were later transferred to London after Belgian authorities had warned several of the delegates to leave the city.

A dispute arose. Should party membership be restricted . . . or open to anyone? Lenin, quite naturally, fought for restricted membership, and his views won out. His group became known as the Bolsheviks, or majority party. The losers were known as the Mensheviks, or minority party. The party, said Lenin, must contain the hard core, loyal and fanatic followers. To permit just anyone to join the party would weaken it. Each member was to be strong. To admit a weakling would place a large crack in the strength of the party. Discipline was an important word.

The masses could not be expected to make the revolution. They would run at the first sound of gunfire. They must be led . . . or pushed . . . by fanatical party members who would attack if the party so ordered, or to die if so ordered.

This principle of discipline has made the communist party the most successful recruiting organization in the world. The precepts of discipline exist in no equal form anywhere in the world today. In 1900 Lenin helped found a revolutionary paper called "Iskra," or "The Spark." It was printed in Germany and smuggled past customs into Russia. One man who religiously read this clandestine newspaper was a young ex-seminary student in Southern Russia named Joseph Vissarionovich Djughashvili. He later changed his name to Stalin. Lenin's newspaper offered directions to the secret revolutionaries all over Russia, informed them of the lines to follow and pushed for improved party organization.

Marx avoided the more violent aspects of the proposed revolution. Lenin filled in the gaps. Any weapon would do—a gun, a knife, hatchets, hammers or bare hands. Use any weapon just so it does the job. A man was either your friend or your enemy. If he is a friend, clasp his hand. If he is an enemy—kill him.

Lenin labored day and night for seventeen years studying the methods of revolution and hoping that it would come in his lifetime. And it did come—in November of 1917.

The First World War had erupted like a hideous chain reaction. Russia honored her blood relationship with England and declared war against the central powers. The name of the Russian capital of St. Petersburg was changed to the less Germanic "Petrograd." The Russian people answered the call gallantly as a wave of patriotic fever gripped the country.

Russia fared badly from the very beginning. The Russian footsoldier fought bravely but he was ill-equipped, poorly trained and suffered from poor leadership. The battlefield losses were appalling. In the words of German Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg: "In regard to Russian casualties, the page has been torn from the book." Conditions were ripe for revolution. The soldiers were suffering at the front and the peasants were starving and taxed to death at home. In the Imperial Palace Czar Nicholas was taking orders from his wife who was taking orders from Gregory Rasputin, a self-proclaimed holy man who had the royal family in his hands.

The government was tottering and in March of 1917 gave way to the regime of Alexander Kerensky. Kerensky instituted a liberal regime. Czar Nicholas was forced to abdicate; and this became the signal for all revolutionaries to return from exile to Russia. Leon Trotsky returned from his exile in New York. Stalin returned from Siberia. Lenin was in Switzerland, unable to become a part of the revolution—the revolution which was beginning without him.

Suddenly, Lenin received help from an unexpected source. The German high command, hopeful that Lenin could take Russia out of the war, offered to transport him through Germany by train and deliver him to Russia. With Russia out of the war, nearly a million German soldiers would be freed from the eastern front. Germany could throw them against the allies in France and break the four-year deadlock. Lenin, they reasoned correctly, was the man for the job.

And so, as Winston Churchill said, Lenin was shipped across Germany in the sealed boxcar of a train like some deadly plague bacillus to be loosed upon Russia.

The great revolution was on and it came not from the ignorant poor but from the intellectual rich. The half-century of Russian communism was beginning upside down. The revolution had begun without Lenin. But now, thanks to the German general staff, he was on his way to the motherland in a sealed boxcar.

Lenin was wildly greeted upon his arrival and he immediately began working against

the regime of Alexander Kerensky. He began a systematic program of dissention and unrest in the armed forces. Lenin refused to co-operate with the government except on his own terms. All the time he was building the strength of the Bolsheviks. Crash programs were instituted to train all members in warfare and party organization. Command structures were assigned and filled in virtually every area of Russia.

Lenin had almost a sixth sense when it came to diagnosing revolutionary situations. He knew when to act and when to remain silent. He was the true leader of the Russian revolution.

Joseph Stalin, fresh from exile in Siberia, was relatively unknown but he studied Lenin closely and began learning the skills that would, in a few short years, catapult him to absolute power.

In the fall of 1917 the Bolsheviks seized power during the October revolution. At last Lenin was the undisputed ruler of all the Russias. Communism had breached the first wall of capitalism.

The Bolsheviks immediately instituted the dictatorship of the proletariat. Karl Marx had conceived the dictatorship of the proletariat as merely a transitional period between revolution and the establishment of the final communistic society. But Lenin created more of a reign of terror.

A brutal campaign followed the Bolshevik takeover. Thousands were executed, including the czar and his entire family. The secret police—the cheka—were under direction to arrest, imprison and execute anyone who might, even in the slightest, interfere with the formation of the new state.

The loyalty test was simplicity itself. To what class did the individual belong? How much food in his home? How well educated was he? If a man owned too much, or if he was too well dressed, he might be accused of being an exploiter or capitalist and sent before an execution squad.

For the next three years the Bolsheviks were forced to defend their positions against the Poles and the White Russians—those loyal to the czar.

A bitter civil war raged from one corner of Russia to the other. American, British, French and Japanese troops were sent into Russia to protect their interests. And the Communists declared war on them as well.

In Red Square, the voice of Vladimir Lenin: "Comrades," he said, "the capitalists are waging war against Russia. They are sending money and military supplies to the Russian landowners hoping to restore the power of the czar, the power of the landowners, the power of the capitalists. No!! That shall never be!!"

Lenin immediately instituted a policy of war communism. Industry was nationalized. The government took over the task of distributing manufactured goods to the people. Trade and commerce were abolished. Food supplies were confiscated. Poor peasants were assembled into special committees to inform on their more wealthy neighbors who might be hiding their grain.

1921—and the revolution came to a close. The White Russians were either dead, in prison or in exile. Russia lay in a shambles. The Bolsheviks attempted to adapt Marxist theory to rural Russia. The result was chaos and confusion.

Industrial production was virtually nonexistent. The peasants were in open revolt. Private incentive had been destroyed. By 1922 famine was sweeping the land with millions starving or existing on a semi-starvation diet. Nearly five million people died.

Lenin became concerned as he saw his government slipping away. The very survival of communism hung in the balance. With uncharacteristic panic, Lenin embarked upon a crash program to preserve the state. Conformity became mandatory. Slave labor camps were increased in number to accom-

modate dissenters. "Religion is the opiate of the people," he said; and the churches were closed. Uprisings were brutally suppressed.

Lenin soon discovered that suppression was the worst possible answer to the problem. The people were not about to endure another brutal regime.

In March of 1921 sailors of the Red Navy at Kronstadt rose in open revolt.

With his customary keen sense of timing, Lenin realized that it was time for a change.

The result was the N.E.P., the new economic policy. Capitalist policies which were previously denounced were temporarily introduced to save the crumbling government. Peasants were allowed to keep surplus grain. The people were permitted to dispose of their supplies as they chose. And private trade was again allowed.

In industry many businesses were returned to private ownership, although the government retained control over the larger firms.

To the complete surprise of the Bolsheviks the N.E.P. was mildly successful; and it gave the government time to consolidate its gains. Years before capitalism had saved the father of communism. Now, capitalist theory was saving the Communist state.

The work had just begun. In March of 1919, even as the civil war was still raging, Lenin founded the third internationale. This meeting provided the keystone of Soviet policy. The most far reaching decision: Communism was to become truly international. Moscow, the new Russian capital, would guide the movement throughout the world. Victory in Russia was only the first step. The ultimate goal was world communism.

Ironically, the first powerful weapon of Soviet Russia was official recognition by the United States and Great Britain. Without this recognition communism might have been stillborn.

Under the leadership of Herbert Hoover millions of dollars in food and financial aid came to Russia from the people of the United States. America sought not to aid communism, but to save the lives of millions. For the third time, communism survived because of capitalism.

Lenin hoped passionately that the new Communist state would survive; and he could have chosen no better man to head the office of secretary general of the party. The man he chose was the son of a cobbler, a former seminary student turned atheist and an old line Bolshevik . . . Joseph Stalin.

In January of 1924 Vladimir Lenin died following a long illness. His death left open a struggle for supremacy within the party that was to last into the 1930s. Lenin could never have foreseen the lofty pedestal on which he would stand in Moscow a generation after his death.

To this day his body lies encased under glass in a magnificent tomb in Red Square. Each day, thousands pass by to gaze upon his remains. Next to Karl Marx, Lenin stands highest in Communist reverence. But his nation and his party were to pass under the control of an ambitious, scowling, mustached revolutionary from the province of Georgia in southern Russia.

Winston Churchill once said: "The worst thing that ever happened to the Russian people was the birth of Lenin. The next worst thing was his death."

He was right. Lenin's death opened the door to the most callous and brutal dictator in world history.

Joseph Stalin was born in 1879. As a young man he had attended a seminary in Tiflis in the Caucasus. He was expelled in 1899. At the age of twenty he was already a revolutionary. From 1902 until 1913 he was arrested seven times, exiled six times and escaped five times from exile.

Stalin was not brilliant. He was slow and plodding; yet his grasp of the Russian men-

tality was enormous. The years he spent as an agitator, prisoner and political schemer gave him an insight into Communist intrigue that other party leaders seemed to sorely lack. Working quietly and meticulously he was quick to exploit any opportunity that might increase his personal power.

Stalin liked to represent himself as the heir of Lenin—the man predestined to carry on the great Bolshevik revolution. This claim, however, is not borne out by the facts. Shortly before his death Lenin wrote:

"Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, has concentrated an enormous power in his hands; and I am not sure that he always knows how to use that power with sufficient caution."

Ten days later Lenin added this postscript: "Stalin is too rude; and this fault, entirely supportable in relations among we Communists, become insupportable in the Office of General Secretary. Therefore, I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from that position."

But it was too late. And Lenin was too sick. Within days he was dead.

A bitter struggle for power began between Stalin and Leon Trotsky. Trotsky, whose real name was Bronstein, was born in 1879, the same year as Stalin. He was an early revolutionary and had spent many years in exile.

Following the revolution he served as Lenin's Commissar of Foreign Affairs and later did much to organize the Red Army. There were many differences which separated Stalin and Trotsky. The most important ideological dispute was one of basic policy. Stalin felt that Russia should concentrate on making itself powerful first, before undertaking extensive revolutionary action abroad. Trotsky felt that the revolution could survive only if Communist revolutions were promoted in other countries. Both men, however, sought world conquest.

Their dispute centered on how to achieve it. Stalin won out. In 1929 Trotsky was exiled by Stalin. Eventually he found refuge in Mexico.

There has never been proof that Trotsky was murdered on orders from Moscow. But very few believe that he was not. In any case Leon Trotsky was discovered in bed, hacked to death with a pick axe. It has long been thought that Stalin feared Trotsky's influence even in exile. Joseph Stalin was now undisputed dictator of Russia. He was to become the most successful dictator in world history. His power was absolute. This short, red-haired, stocky man would, through sheer force of will, weld Russia into a solid, powerful Communist nation.

Stalin can be called the "ideal" dictator. He was utterly ruthless. He knew and understood the Russian mind. He knew and understood every aspect of the Communist organization. He would let nothing stand in the way of his personal power. During the Second World War he permitted his own son to die in a German concentration camp rather than deal with the Nazis for his release. His own daughter recently published her memoirs and one is jarred by the total lack of emotion in the Russian ruler.

Stalin broke the first rule of Marxist theory. The state, which was to wither away, became even stronger. It became an agent of sheer oppression. The army, navy, secret police and all political structures grew even more powerful and permanent. Slave labor camps multiplied. Soviet society became ironclad, more rigid than under the most autocratic czar. Army officials, party henchmen, industrial managers; all emerged as classes, each jealous of the other.

Stalin carried to the extreme Lenin's concepts of the party as a fanatical, disciplined group. Stalin used the party not only as a tool with which to seize and maintain power, but also as a method of liquidating all personal opposition.

The party was, indeed, kept pure. Only the fiercely loyal and obedient belonged.

Each and every one of Stalin's actions had to be justified by Marxist-Leninist theory. The solution was quite simple. If the theory did not fit, it was re-interpreted. To deviate was to court disaster. In 1928 the first of a series of five year plans, designed to strengthen heavy industry and collectivize agriculture, was launched. Step by step Lenin's new economic policy disappeared. Rigid government control was instituted. Production quotas were set and they had to be met. Compulsory labor increased. Private trade disappeared once again. Consumer goods were at a premium. Small farms were abolished. The peasants were moved to large, co-operative farms.

Rather than join the collectivization process a large group of peasants, the Kulaks, burned their crops and killed their livestock. It was an open denial of Soviet policy. Stalin's reply was to send in the Red Army. Tens of hundreds of thousands of Kulaks were annihilated; but the Kulaks achieved their goal: They crippled the Communist state. For thirty years Soviet food supplies were nil.

The first five year plan was a dismal failure. Food was scarce. Transportation broke down in every area of the country. Famine re-appeared. Disease stalked the land. And millions died.

Stalin held firm. Heavy industry was expanded. Steel mills, automobile and tractor factories were operating day and night. Emphasis was placed on armament.

Stalin's tight control extended to the arts. Literature, sculpture, painting and music were to conform to the party line. It can be noted that very little greatness exists in Russian art from 1935 to 1953.

In the early 1930s Stalin began sensing discontent within the ranks of the party. It was the old story again. A power struggle was in the making. With customary efficiency, Stalin solved the problem in a matter of months. Between 1934 and 1938 the Soviet state was brutally purged. The world was a witness to the public trials in Moscow as hundreds of old line Bolsheviks such as Grigori Zinoviev and Nikolai Bukharin faced the firing squads. Many had fought to create the 1917 revolution. Hundreds died. Then thousands. One thing was certain; Stalin was liquidating all opposition. The purge was effective. Any possible threat to Stalin was now gone. But Stalin made one terrible mistake, one he could not have foreseen in the 1930s. Among those who went before the firing squads were the cream of the Russian officer corps. And they disappeared at a time when they would be needed most.

In Germany another former revolutionary was building an empire; and he, too, was building on an ideology.

On August 24, 1939, the world was jolted when Stalin entered into a mutual non-aggression pact with Adolf Hitler. Winston Churchill had called Russia "a riddle inside a question mark surrounded by an enigma." The key, he said, rested with Russian national interest.

Churchill was right. Stalin was buying time—time to rebuild the army he had destroyed during the purges. But time was against him. The men he needed were gone.

The world Communist movement was terribly shaken by the pact. The Communist parties in every country in the world were in a state of shock. For years Stalin had spoken out against Hitler and all that he stood for. Now he was doing an about-face and clasping hands with the German tyrant. In the half-century of world communism, this was the most demoralizing blow, as thousands left the party in disgust. On September 1, 1939, another aspect of the non-aggression pact became evident. German forces invaded Poland. The second World War had begun. Sixteen days later Russian forces crossed the Polish frontier and raced to the Vistula river. It

was now clear that Russia and Germany had agreed to carve Poland in two.

This time Stalin was buying protection. In conquering the north of Poland he was shortening up the defensive perimeters of Russia. But he needed more before he could turn the Soviet Union into a fortress. Next, he demanded that Finland give him the Karelian Isthmus in exchange for some land north of Lake Ladoga. The Finns refused. Stalin was enraged. Huge armies were sent into Finland to bring the tiny country to its knees.

It is doubtful that Stalin fully understood the tough fibre of the Finns. Their defense was tight rate. Within weeks the Finnish countryside was littered with the frozen bodies of an utterly destroyed Russian army.

This was a double-barreled blast for Russian communism. First, Stalin had launched an unprovoked attack on tiny Finland. Second, his armies were crushed.

A second invasion was launched, this time with the finest troops in the Soviet Union. By March of 1940 it was over; and tiny Finland was forced to surrender even more territory to the Russians.

Stalin got what he wanted, but time was still against him. He knew that it was only a matter of time before Hitler turned his armies east and he was racing the clock to prepare for it.

The year of 1940 was one of underlying tension. Stalin hurriedly assigned War Commissar Timoshenko to the enormous task of reorganizing the Russian army. He worked day and night for months plotting supply lines, troop movements, accelerated training schedules and defense installations. He would still be working on June 22nd, 1941 when Hitler's armies crossed the Bug river into Russia.

The German blow was unequalled in history. The attack was calculated to stun and demoralize the Russians and bring about their defeat before they could organize an effective defense.

The German timetable called for victory in a matter of months, and it seemed as though the timetable was right. In less than thirty days the Germans had killed half a million Russian soldiers and captured a half-million more.

Germany had developed modern warfare to an exact science. The German soldier was highly-trained and dedicated. He used the finest weapons and drove the finest tanks. The German Air Force was the best in the world.

The Russian soldier was ill-equipped and ill-trained. He was basically an ignorant peasant. The vast majority of Russian soldiers did not even carry adequate rifles. Most of them could not even drive a car. And Russian morale was non-existent.

By November the German army could see the outline of the Kremlin in Moscow. Hitler announced to the world, "the Russian Bear is beaten. He will never rise again."

Then, as it had a hundred thirty years before, the great Russian winter descended upon the north. The German Army ground to a halt. Then it froze. And thousands died in the snow.

By now the Russians had consolidated their forces. They counterattacked and pushed the Germans back.

It was a significant moment. The invincible German Army had suffered its first defeat; and the Russian Army its first victory.

The following year the winter descended again. The German Army was marching backward.

Hitler had made the mistake of treating the Russian population with unparalleled brutality. Now they rose up as one to drive the invader from Russia. Even Stalin was forced to admit that the people were fighting not for communism . . . but for mother Russia.

Stalin welcomed military and economic aid

from the United States. Across the North Sea to the Port of Murmansk, millions of tons of military equipment were being delivered to the Russian Army and Air Force.

By now the allies were in North Africa, Italy and Sicily. Their bombers were pounding Germany day and night.

On June 6, 1944 American forces landed in France. The German Army was now caught in a vise. Eleven months later she lay in a shambles, the most completely destroyed nation in history.

Hitler was dead. Germany's thousand year state was nothing. President Roosevelt was dead.

Roosevelt made the mistake of trusting Stalin. During their conference at Yalta Roosevelt granted Stalin millions of miles of territory north of Greece. Thirty years of post-war controversy was born at Yalta. The war was over. The old prejudice and suspicion was born anew. President Truman and British Prime Minister Atlee accused Russia of violating the Yalta Agreement. Russia was suspicious of British intentions in Greece and of the American attitude toward German reparations.

On July 26, 1945 a meeting of the Big Three took place in Potsdam. Though suspicious of Stalin's motives Truman and Atlee reluctantly conceded the validity of the Yalta Agreements. Russia was given much of eastern Europe. Germany was divided into four zones of occupation.

And the final scene was yet to come. On August 6, 1945 an atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan. Two days later Russia entered the war against Japan and opened the door to Russian influence in China. On August 9 another bomb was dropped. The second world war ended.

Russia was now in a paradoxical position. She had been totally ravaged by the war. But she now stood at the summit. She had gained millions of square miles in territory, millions in population, an experienced army and an influence only dreamed of six years before.

Great Britain had been drained and weakened by the war, as had France. Two giants remained—the United States and the Soviet Union. The hot war had ended. The cold war was about to begin. It is a difficult thing to estimate Russia's loss during the war. Statistics can give us some idea. She lost seven million horses, seventeen million cattle, twenty million hogs, twenty seven million sheep, sixty per cent of her industry, forty-eight per cent of her electricity and twenty five million human beings.

The Second World War had finally placed a cheap price tag on human life. Its value has not yet returned.

The four power rule of Germany was one of daily tension and incident. Those Nazi war criminals who escaped to the West faced the Nuremberg Trials. Most were set free. Those captured by the Russians were quickly and simply shot.

Russia began moving westward. They swallowed up Poland, Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. All political resistance was crushed. In the Katyn Forest in Poland nearly ten thousand bodies were discovered in shallow graves. All men. All officers in the Polish Army. All with their hands tied behind them. In one simple, efficient moment, Russia had assured that she would have no opposition in the post-war government of Poland.

Greece was ripe for revolution. The Communist Party in Greece rose up to overthrow the monarchy. The Reds were put down violently and the survivors were imprisoned. Before their defeat they kidnapped more than thirty thousand Greek children and transported them to Russia. They would return years later as Communist espionage agents. There was trouble in Berlin.

The Russians, who were bound by agreement to allow free access into the divided city, suddenly closed the gates. They were

placing the city under seige to starve the inhabitants into submission. The United States and Great Britain had only one alternative. Rather than crash the barricades and precipitate another war they took to the air. For months the city of Berlin was fed, clothed and kept free by airplane. The Russians were beaten and the barricades came down.

At a small college in Fulton, Missouri the old warrior Winston Churchill once again sounded the alert against tyranny with a phrase which would leap into the headlines. He called upon the world to recognize that an "iron curtain" had descended upon eastern Europe.

The Communist revolution in China came to an end. Chaing Kai Chek and his army were pushed onto Formosa.

The Communist movement worldwide was at its apex.

A scientist once said, "there is only one thing worse than one nation having the atomic bomb—and that's two nations having it."

By 1949 the Russians had it. And with it they had another powerful weapon—not only for war but for diplomatic strength as well. In June of 1950 Communist North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel and launched an unprovoked attack on the Free Republic of South Korea. Through sheer chance the Russian ambassador to the United Nations was absent when the general assembly voted to fight the aggression. Without Russia's veto to hinder them the entire assembly voted to oppose the North Koreans. Russia would not make the same mistake again.

Russia supported the North Korean armies and later supported China when she entered the war. Officially, the Soviets denied any support but the undeniable proof was there. The North Koreans and Chinese used Russian tanks, machine-guns, mortars, rifles, trucks, jeeps and airplanes.

The war ended in 1954. Twenty-two thousand men never returned. On March 6, 1953 Joseph Stalin finally proved he had something in common with the rest of mankind. He died.

Another power struggle developed. The result was Georgi Malenkov as premier and Nikita Khrushchev as first secretary of the Communist Party.

For the first time in years Russia took a warm approach to the west. Malenkov was a moderate. He sought co-operation with the western world. He bettered the lot of the Russian commoner. Even the head of the dreaded secret police, Lavrenti Beria, was executed.

Former enemies of the state were given their freedom. It appeared that a new era of peace might develop. But it was not to be.

The real power in the Kremlin is the 12-man comintern. They saw to it that Malenkov was taken out. In his place: Nikita Khrushchev, and a return to hard line communism.

In his book, "Darkness at Noon," Arthur Koestler made the point that Soviet Russia must, from time to time, destroy her idols and replace them with new ones. And so it was with Khrushchev and Stalin. Before a world Communist congress in Moscow, Nikita Khrushchev damned Stalin and all that he had stood for. One of the greatest of Communist leaders had come in for one of the most thorough condemnations in all Communist history. As Koestler had predicted, former enemies of the state were elevated to glory while others were defiled.

Khrushchev told the United States, "We will bury you." Since making that irrational statement the Soviet Union has taken great pains to point out that the statement referred to victory in an economic sense. Another untruth.

Khrushchev visited the United Nations and, in full view of the world, behaved much more like a disagreeable schoolboy than the ruler of millions.

He visited the United States and played the role of the benevolent dictator. At virtually the same moment Russian secret police were rounding up and executing thousands in Hungary in the wake of the Hungarian fight for freedom.

Ninety miles from the coast of the United States Fidel Castro led his guerrilla armies against the dictator Fulgencio Batista in Cuba. Millions the world over cheered his fight against tyranny.

Author George Orwell, in his book, "The Animal Farm," told the story of the animals who rose up against their master. . . . And of a few who assumed command. In time, the animal-leaders were indistinguishable from the hated humans they overthrew. And so it was in Cuba. In time, Castro replaced Batista's tyranny with his own. Communism now had a firm foothold in the western hemisphere.

As long as we are quoting some rather famous authors, let's consider this excerpt from the writings of Vladimir Lenin:

"The Russian bear, when confronting the enemies of communism, must strike quickly and withdraw his paw. If his opponent strikes back . . . then we must retreat. If he does nothing, strike again!!!"

And so it has been in Berlin and Cuba. When the West takes a firm stand against Communist aggression, the Red bear pulls back his paw. When the West does nothing, the arrogance of the Red bear is unbearable.

In the fifty-odd years since the October revolution, communism—in the final analysis—must be termed a failure. It has, indeed, reached powerful proportions. It still stands as a deadly threat to human freedom. But there are massive cracks in the structure. They can be seen in the open schism with China, Yugoslavia, Albania and Czechoslovakia. They can be seen in the Polish, East German and Hungarian revolts. They can be seen in the break with Cuba. They can be seen when world-famous Russian ballet dancers and Olympic sportsmen and writers defect to the West.

Most of all, the cracks in the superstructure of communism can be seen in the stone walls and barbed wire fences and deadly minefields which surround the Communist block. A Soviet official was once asked the reason behind all these barriers. He replied: "To keep people out." If so, they are unnecessary. For the world has so rejected the concept of the Soviet totalitarian state that it is doubtful anyone would ever want to get in. No—the walls are there to keep people in; stone and barbed wire monuments to the largest prison in all history.

Communism has failed; but that does not make it any less deadly. So long as the reigns of Communist government rest with the more fanatic members of the party, communism will remain an ever-present threat to individual thought and action.

One of the great symbols of the United States is the American eagle. It is an appropriate symbol and readily indicates the character of the people of this country. In one talon it holds the olive branch of peace; in the other, the arrows of war.

This country will always offer the hand of friendship to any nation that sincerely seeks peace and harmony. But it will rebuff with terrible fury any nation which seeks world conquest and war. It is appropriate, indeed, that our first President should supply the guiding words which we live by to this very day:

"Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."—George Washington.

AMERICAN SST IS VITAL TO NATION'S FUTURE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentle-

man from Washington (Mr. PELLY) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. PELLY. Mr. Speaker, it was announced this morning that the British-French supersonic transport, the Concorde, flew yesterday at supersonic speeds for the first time. This clearly demonstrates the wise decision President Nixon made last week when he announced a go-ahead for America's SST program for the Russians flew their TU-144 at supersonic speeds months ago.

The SST is here, Mr. Speaker, and we must accept it and cope with it. We can best cope with it by continuing research on noise abatement. Also, research in SST designs must be continued; flight techniques must be improved and flight maneuvers must be rigidly controlled; adaptation of the airplane to its mission—land or sea—must become a fixed policy. All of these steps will decrease the number of sonic booms and minimize those that do occur.

Above all, Mr. Speaker, surely a people intelligent enough to develop a supersonic airplane must be ingenious enough to render it acceptable.

With the strongest conviction, I believe outlawing the SST in America is not a sensible answer to any problems it may present. Again, Mr. Speaker, the SST is here.

What faces us in this matter is the opportunity to save a vital American industry; that of aircraft manufacturing which is spread throughout our land.

No one knows better than President Nixon that in America's endeavor to increase our standard of living through increased wages we have priced our products out of many world markets. Even in our automobile industry, where our mass production methods have helped exports, presently foreign automobile manufacturers, especially in Germany and Japan, are threatening our leadership.

In the air transport manufacturing field, we have been supreme, and as a result our sales abroad have contributed heavily toward our balance of international payments. However, in the years ahead, unless we advance, through new technology, from subsonic to supersonic travel, our supremacy will end. The President realizes what this would do to our world trade and economy. He knows there will be an SST and that if we don't build one our airlines will be forced to buy a foreign-built SST in order to compete.

Mr. Speaker, presently the Boeing Co. has 122 orders for the American SST; orders placed despite the fact that the Russians and the British-French consortium will be in the air in advance of our SST, and most importantly, because of our supremacy in building aircraft.

These 122 orders represent \$4,880,000,000, at \$40 million a piece. Fifty-seven of these orders are from foreign airlines, meaning that \$2,280,000,000 would come from overseas, dramatically affecting our balance of payments. Even on just the 122 orders presently held by the United States, our balance of payments would be substantially benefited. Yet, without the aircraft that figure would be a negative \$2,600,000,000 on the loss of sales to airlines in the United States. Sheer com-

petition would force them to purchase the foreign-built aircraft.

In addition, Mr. Speaker, Boeing Co. has projected a market of 500 for the U.S. SST, 270 of them for foreign airlines. The sales, based on this projection, just to foreign carriers would total a staggering \$10,800,000,000. This is money that would come into the U.S. economy in the middle and late 1970's and early 1980's providing we have an SST to sell.

Some people say the Boeing 747 will do the job, but nobody knows that this is not true better than Boeing. The 747 and the SST are designed to accomplish completely different tasks.

Russia is determined to capture the SST market just as the Soviet Union has plans to become the leading maritime power by building a modern merchant fleet.

Mr. Nixon knows the public opposition to noise and the problems of the sonic boom, so wisely he has limited the SST to overwater flights until this problem is overcome.

This research and promotion of American supersonic transportation by the Government is well within precedent. Congress legislated funds to develop low-cost, fast, frequent air transportation when I first came to Congress in 1953 and has subsidized this public service ever since. There is nothing new about this.

However, this is a program for the future, and delay could well be its doom. Certainly, anyone who knows anything about long-term investment funds recognizes private enterprise cannot do the job. Later, after the original research, private enterprise can enter the picture. On the matter of the Government backing, Mr. Speaker, it will be repaid with interest from royalties on sales of the aircraft.

I hope my colleagues who have not favored the SST in the past will restudy the issues and lend their support to the \$9 million President Nixon is requesting of Congress.

The SST is an investment in the future of all Americans. In the years ahead it means jobs in nearly every State of the Union. But, just as important it means continued civil air supremacy and a vital contribution to our world trade and our ever-increasing living standard.

Finally, let me remind my friends that while this is a civil project, I hope no one will overlook that it has important military implications. We need the SST for defense and our airlift capability.

I urge support of the House for this vital program for the future of our Nation.

Meanwhile, Mr. Speaker, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer on September 26, presented an excellent editorial on the President's decision regarding the SST, and I ask unanimous permission that this editorial appear at this point in the RECORD:

THE SST DECISION

A P-I View: President Nixon's decision to proceed with the development of the supersonic transport plane (SST) should greatly aid this nation in keeping the aviation leadership it has enjoyed over the past 60 years.

The Boeing Co. people got a tremendous

shot in the arm with President Nixon's announcement he would push forward with plans to develop two prototypes on the supersonic transport aircraft.

Although the proposal faces tough going in the Congress, particularly the House of Representatives, the President's action has done much to improve the sagging morale of Boeing officials and employees involved in the project. After a somewhat lengthy delay in waiting for Mr. Nixon's decision, his remarks were most encouraging.

We applaud the President's "difficult" decision in giving the go ahead for construction of the SST. At the same time we don't see how he could very well have failed to do so.

The SST—a monster able to carry 300 passengers at a speed of 1,800 miles an hour—admittedly is almost as controversial as the ABM antiballistic missile system. And for very good reasons.

Its practical economic value is unproven. Its potential sonic booms over residential areas could be intolerable. Many engineering and technological problems remain unsolved. Its immediate development program promises to cost a tremendous amount of money—ultimately as much as \$4.5 billion.

To many of the critics, it is the cost of the program which should rule it out at this time of urban crisis and the war in Vietnam. "They insist—and will insist in the coming congressional appropriation debate—that the SST does not merit its recommended priority treatment.

All these are pretty impressive reasons for continuing to stall on a plane which was first planned under the Kennedy administration. Yet the fact is that other nations are not stalling. Russia's supersonic airliner, the TU-144, and its British-French counterpart, the Concorde, already have been test flown for many hours.

To President Nixon, and to us, this fact overrides all others. As happened in the space race, it is imperative this nation catch up and recapture leadership in another of mankind's major thrusts into the future.

Technical problems even sonic booms, can be solved if we really try. Money will be found for the war and for our social problems. What we must not lose, and certainly not by default, is the world pre-eminence we have earned by topping the competition in every really important challenge.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S ENDORSEMENT OF DIRECT ELECTION

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. CONTE) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased that President Nixon has endorsed the direct election amendment that this body overwhelmingly adopted last month. I think the President's action represents a great step forward in our efforts to achieve a truly representative system, and I applaud him for it.

During the debate over this measure, we had the opportunity to hear all the arguments both pro and con. I think we faced the issue squarely and came out in the right place.

As the President stated, however, the issue is no longer the same. The issue now is how to achieve the goal of electoral reform in the shortest possible time.

Time is clearly of the essence. One only has to look back to 1968 to recognize the truth of this statement.

For this reason, I hope that some-

thing can be done by 1972, and if not then, by 1976 at the latest.

I think President Nixon's leadership in this fight will give it a tremendous boost. I congratulate him again for his forthright endorsement of the direct election amendment.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker, for the opportunity to make these brief remarks.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE'S TREMENDOUS SUCCESS IN 1969 SUMMER PROGRAM FOR AFDC CHILDREN AND YOUTHS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. GONZALEZ) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to bring to the attention of my colleagues the excellent work of the Texas State Department of Public Welfare in the execution of their 1969 summer program for AFDC children and youths. The program was a great success, especially in my own county and the 24 other counties within the San Antonio coordinated region.

The program is aimed at gainfully employing as many children and youths as possible in summer activities which range from education, including the Headstart program, to health care, recreation, and summer employment. In Bexar County—part of which I represent—some 16,076 children participated.

Much of the credit for the enormous success of this year's program is due to the public welfare caseworkers. The entire field staff was mobilized in the 24 counties in my region in late May to plan the available resources for summer activity for the children. These efforts were coordinated with the staffs of public and private agencies to insure maximum participation in every possible area. Youths were placed in Federal installations under the youth opportunities program. Jobs ranged from IBM apprentice in Bexar County to fieldwork picking cotton in Wilson and Karnes Counties. The Headstart program, besides schooling, included complete health and dental checkups. Recreational activities for children included camping, organized sports, sewing, and so forth. There was also an extensive summer school program for those needing or desiring summer courses. The Upward Bound program and commercial schools were employed and some youths even attended colleges on their own.

It is clear to me, Mr. Speaker, that this program has helped one very needy segment of our society and, as such, deserves recognition and commendation. It is for this reason that I would like to commend its coordinators: Mr. Joel E. Falcon, the program director; Mr. Raymond G. Cheves, the director of field staff; and Mr. Roy A. Broussard, the program coordinator; along with the many caseworkers. It is their dedication and enthusiasm that is making this project a success. I insert a table of the activities by the various programs used at this point for your information:

Summer activity by programs	Counties											
	Atascosa	Bandera	Bexar	Comal	Dimmit	Edwards	Frio	Gillespie	Gonzales	Guadalupe	Karnes	Kendal
Headstart program.....	3	7	576	45	20	8	8	4	15	130	34	0
Summer employment.....	83	5	1,100	25	12	5	0	0	6	132	102	3
Summer school and college.....	14	2	400	50	0	3	30	1	18	100	46	3
Recreation.....	7	60	7,000	87	10	40	53	5	20	161	82	8
Health care.....	1	0	7,000	45	0	0	0	0	0	123	21	0
Total.....	98	74	16,076	252	42	56	91	10	59	646	285	14

Summer activity by programs	Counties											
	Kerr	Kimble	Kinney	La Salle	Mason	Maverick	Medina	Real	Uvalde	Val Verde	Wilson	Zavala
Headstart program.....	7	7	6	32	0	10	5	4	9	6	34	8
Summer employment.....	0	15	5	1	0	9	5	5	9	6	102	6
Summer school and college.....	49	23	4	32	0	150	5	3	5	3	46	38
Recreation.....	15	19	20	22	0	158	5	10	10	5	82	3
Health Care.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	21	0
Total.....	71	64	35	87		327	20	22	33	20	285	55

	Number		Number
Activities in all counties:		Activities in all counties—Continued	
Headstart program.....	978	Recreation.....	7,889
Summer employment.....	1,636	Health care.....	7,211
Summer school and college.....	1,025	Grand total.....	18,739

¹ For all activities in all counties.

ANYBODY FOR DIRTY MEAT?

(Mr. PODELL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. PODELL. Mr. Speaker, several years ago the public was stunned to discover that approximately 15 percent of all red meat consumed in this country was slaughtered and processed without adequate inspection. The meat in question moved through packing facilities involved in intrastate commerce. Not crossing a State line, it came solely under State jurisdiction. More often than not, this meat was poorly inspected, recalling all the old horrid specters of the times of Upton Sinclair and his work, "The Jungle." In State after State, the picture was the same. Poor inspection. Putrid meat being doctored to look healthy and consumable. Unsanitary conditions. Special dealers in the "four D's"; animals which were dead, dying, disabled, or diseased. A national outcry went up from coast to coast and, under vigorous prodding, the consumer was extended protection by passage of the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967. This measure went into effect on December 15, 1967. A 2-year grace period was provided under the act, allowing individual States leeway for that period of time to bring inspection procedures and facilities up to Federal levels and standards. This deadline expires on December 15, 1969.

One further year of grace is provided for in the act for a given State which has attempted to live up to provisions of the law, but which does require some further extension in order to complete its updating of standards. Discretion is allowed the Secretary of Agriculture in extending such an additional grace period.

It is a fact that regulations promulgating this act have been published by the Department of Agriculture only about a month ago. Many States have entered into agreements with the Department of Agriculture under which

they promise to live up to terms of the law.

If States have not lived up to the letter of the law by the expiration date, the Federal Government is empowered to move in and take over inspection of red meat in such facilities in the consumer interest.

It is interesting to note that Nebraska, home State of the Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Hardin, has failed to enter into such an agreement with the Federal Government. An oversight, I am sure.

Mr. Speaker, it is already obvious that a good many States which tolerated such lax inspection have been equally lax in bringing their standards up to snuff. It is also obvious that a good many of them are preparing to ask for the extra 1-year extension from the Department of Agriculture, using the excuse that late publication of regulations leaves them with too little time to interpret and put them into actual force. They obviously are counting on aid and assistance from the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture in charge of enforcing the act itself. Mr. J. Phillip Campbell is the former Commissioner of Agriculture of Georgia. In that former capacity he bitterly opposed the entire Wholesome Meat Act when it was originally promulgated. He remained intransigent to the end, fighting the bill in the final form it now takes. It is clear to any who would see what is coming.

After December 15, a stream of exceptions for an additional year will emanate from the Department of Agriculture, allowing millions of consumers to be exposed to dirty meat for yet another year. Consumers will be able to purchase such unwholesome meat in one State and cross a State line with it into other jurisdictions. There is not a doubt but that such products will continue to endanger lives and public health. Unless the Department of Agriculture moves swiftly to inform all involved States that foot-dragging will be intolerable and extensions difficult to come by, the worst will occur.

We have already seen how standards are being relaxed in this department of Government. Recently we have seen a ruling allowing 15 percent of all hot dogs to be composed of garbage chicken meat. Also, they are to be allowed to contain up to 30 percent pure fat. Garbage dogs would be a more apt name for them. Will a relaxation of hard-won standards regarding meat inspection be added to the fast-growing list?

LAOS: THE SECOND VIETNAM

(Mr. PODELL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. PODELL. Mr. Speaker, as the fighting obviously escalates in Laos and excuses of the most feeble sort spill out of the administration, I have the chilling, despairing feeling that we have learned nothing from all the agony of the past few years.

It is a fact that the American air war in Laos is immense, equaling past air offensives in Southeast Asia. The automatic secondary target for our air strikes in case of truces is Laos. Foreign troops, possibly both Thai and American, are now engaged in combat there. At the very least, American air support and logistics support is increasing significantly.

We know B-52 raids on North Vietnamese supply routes running through Laos have been stepped up to compensate for a halt in bombing of the north. In March, tactical bombing was increased in support of Laotian forces fighting the Pathet Lao.

Already the American chain of command is the ultimate decisionmaker in the war because of our command of supplies and air support. Our total annual assistance to the government there is in the neighborhood of \$250 million. Of this, only \$60 million is accounted for publicly. The rest is, of course, going for military purposes.

It is no secret that the North Vietnamese are invading that nation, aiding

the native Pathet Lao. For almost a decade, we have sought to beef up the native troops to counter this threat. It is the same sad tale as in South Vietnam. They will allow us to turn them into a client state which profits while American dying escalates. Have we no ability to learn from the past? Then we are, of course, doomed to repeat it.

We know that American advisers are attached to a good many Laotian units, participating in planning and tactics. American personnel are servicing Laotian combat aircraft. One entire American base in Thailand is being used totally to support our Laotian effort.

Laos is a collection of tribes with no national feeling comparable to that found in the West or in other Asian areas. Civil war of some kind is a permanent state of affairs there. Yet we are involving ourselves in it just as we did in Vietnam. Our involvement is similar to that of a man who enters a quicksand bog in the hope of walking across it without sinking more than ankle deep.

As the Vietnamese war spills across the Laotian borders, intermingling with Laotian internal strife, we are now, in the name of fighting the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao, diving headfirst into another Vietnam. A surrogate, if you will, for the Asian swamp we are already desperately striving to extricate ourselves from.

It is appallingly obvious that military and civilian personnel on the spot are seeking to edge us in a cumulative manner into the same insanity. Also, it is being done in secret, without permission of the Congress and in spite of the demand from coast to coast that such activity should end in Vietnam, much less commence in Laos.

By what right is the Government of this country pursuing such action? By what right does the Department of State dare to publicly stand up and tell the U.S. Congress such outrageous lies as they have been doing in the past few days about the Laotian question? Do they feel we are as frightened, stupid, and supine as they are?

Mr. Speaker, I am beginning to believe that these gentlemen who are making these decisions are functioning in a vacuum. Outside, they are utterly oblivious to the anger, mounting impatience and shortening tempers of the people of this country. It is about time that these gentlemen were told that if they intend to give another war, the attendance will be very sparse. If they are willing to go we shall be glad to cheer them on, wish them bon voyage.

MORE ON THE CASE AGAINST EXTENSION OF THE WEST FRONT

(Mr. STRATTON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, one of the difficulties in the recent action of the House in approving \$2 million for undertaking plans and specifications for the proposed 4½-acre extension of the west front of the Capitol is that with the limited time available to the opposition

I never had a real chance to answer some of the rather plausible sounding but nevertheless inaccurate arguments offered by proponents of this elaborate and expensive extension project.

I tried to make up for that deficiency the other day, however, when I testified on this same proposal before the Legislative Appropriations Subcommittee of the Senate. For some of those who heard the debate on this subject in the House, it may be of interest to peruse this additional testimony of mine on this costly project. We still have a chance to beat it.

Under leave to extend my remarks, I include my testimony before the Senate subcommittee:

TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN SAMUEL S. STRATTON BEFORE THE SENATE LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE, SEPTEMBER 24, 1969

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appear here this morning in opposition to the appropriation of \$2 million under the heading Extension of the Capitol contained in H.R. 13763, the Legislative Appropriation Act for 1970 which passed the House last Friday. As some members of this subcommittee are perhaps already aware, I not only fought, somewhat unsuccessfully, to have this appropriation deleted in the House but I have been fighting for more than three years to block the elaborate, expensive, and to me unnecessary proposal to extend the West Front of the Capitol which is referred to and in effect endorsed by this \$2 million appropriation. I have opposed this not only because I believe that it would be unwise for us to cover up and destroy for all time the last remaining original section of the historic United States Capitol building that has been standing since 1800, but also because I do not believe that we need to spend the kind of money involved in this proposal for the additional space which it would provide, certainly not at a time when the President of the United States himself has cut back on construction funds by 75 percent.

In previous years it was to a large extent the action of the Senate in opposing this project that prevented its adoption, in particular the opposition of former Senator Monroney of Oklahoma and Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin, and Senator Young of Ohio. In fact in 1966, largely in response to the opposition of members of this body and the public outcry of aroused citizens, the leaders of the House Appropriations Committee indicated that they did not intend to attempt to fund this project while the Viet Nam War was still under way.

Nevertheless a fresh effort has suddenly been made late this summer to revive the whole program, in spite of the fact that the war is still on and the inflationary problems connected with it are even more disturbing than before. Largely the argument justifying this revival is that new cracks have developed in the West Front and unless Congress moves swiftly to approve the original expansive project the building may collapse at any moment around our heads with untold disaster to ourselves, our visitors and the Republic.

There is no disputing the fact, Mr. Chairman, that the West Front is in need of repair and certainly no one would deny that some steps must be taken to prevent its collapse and to restore it to a safe and sound condition. What is at issue is whether the only way to preform this job of preventing the collapse of the West Front is through the very elaborate extension plan which the Architect has been pushing for all these years and which in effect would be officially and formally endorsed by the Congress if this \$2 million appropriation is approved.

As I am sure members of this subcommittee are aware, this extension is by no means a simple or a modest undertaking. It involves an increase in floor space of the Capitol of 4½ acres. It includes the addition of two dining rooms, two cafeterias, two auditoriums, 38 toilets, 8 elevators, two escalators, and a total of 98 offices, most of these presumably to be used as hideaways for especially favored members of the House or Senate. It should be obvious to anyone that we do not really need two escalators or two cafeterias or 98 additional hideaway offices just to keep the West Front of the Capitol from falling down.

My position for some time has been that before we proceed with this elaborate project, which would cover up the last remaining portion of the original Capitol building for all time, and would extend the West Front by some 44 to 88 feet, completely change its present architecture to a kind of poor man's replica of the East Front, and involve the destruction and duplication of the present Olmstead terraces, we ought to pause for a moment to find out whether there is any better, cheaper, easier way to save the West Front of the Capitol without doing all of this untold damage and costing the taxpayers so much money. In that connection, incidentally, the present bill for the West Front extension proposal is \$45 million, an increase of \$11 million from the price tag which the Architect fixed in 1966, and judging by our experience with his cost estimates for the East Front extension and for the Rayburn Building, I would judge we would be likely to end up with a final price tag of perhaps \$60 or \$70 billion. Even at Mr. Stewart's own figures the fact is that the present square foot cost of the West Front extension is 5 times the present square foot cost of what had hitherto been generally regarded as the most expensive of all office buildings, the Rayburn Building. The Rayburn Building, with 2,375,000 square feet and a total cost of \$81,367,000, cost \$34.26 per square foot. The West Front extension by contrast, using the Architect's own figures, would provide us with 269,000 square feet at a cost of \$45 million, or \$166.95 per square foot, nearly 5 times the cost of the Rayburn Building.

The arguments that have been given to the House Committees and to the House itself in support of this elaborate expansion project have claimed that it is impossible to determine how the West Front might be saved without being transformed and extended, that it would be impossible to determine in advance how much it would cost, and it has been argued that in any event the whole west side of the Capitol would have to be vacated for a very long period if anything except an extension project were carried out. I am not an architect myself, but the American Institute of Architects, which includes 80 percent of the professional architects of the country, maintains, on the other hand, that none of these three arguments will hold water. They claim that the West Front can be restored without being extended, they claim that a reasonably reliable estimate of its cost can be made, and they claim that only those sections of the Capitol immediately being worked on would have to be vacated during the restoration process.

The really incredible fact in this whole matter of the Capitol extension is that in all of these years that this proposal has been kicking around here nobody has ever undertaken to make a careful, thorough, impartial engineering study of what needs to be done in order to prevent the West Front from collapsing and how much it would cost. A good deal is made of a study made by the Thompson & Lichtner firm of Boston, Massachusetts, of the condition of the West Front. This study appears in 5 volumes, and I have looked at all 5 volumes. However, in all of

these 5 volumes there is only one small paragraph which simply states flatly, without any description or analysis, that restoration is impossible and extension is the only solution. The balance of the volume is a detailed analysis of some of the cracks and crumbling that have occurred in the West Front. This is not an engineering study of restoration or of the problems associated with it, and it does not represent an argument that restoration is impossible. The firm was engaged by the Architect, and I am sure they were well aware of what the Architect wanted done. Like a good employee or consultant the study that they produced was designed to assist their client achieve the end that he wanted.

My recommendation has been, and I made the proposal in the House and I would make it to this subcommittee, that we delete the \$2 million for plans and specifications for the extension project and substitute instead \$100,000 to finance an independent engineering survey of just what would be required to keep the West Front from collapsing and how much it would cost.

Two years ago, I believe in 1967, this subcommittee and the Senate itself adopted a resolution directing the Architect of the Capitol to have such a study conducted, since this subcommittee and the Senate shared my conviction that nothing had been done to explore this alternative. However, the provision was knocked out in the Conference Committee and the assurance that nothing would be done on the item during the present emergency was made at that time, as I recall it.

This subcommittee should know that although the \$2 million appropriation did pass the House last Friday, a day when normally many members of the House are not in attendance, it did not exactly sweep the House. The only vote which we were able, from a parliamentary situation, to take, was a non-recorded vote of 92 to 59. Moreover, those speaking in favor of the extension project received nearly 2 hours in debate while I, speaking against it, got all of 8 minutes. I would say that the House was swayed primarily by these arguments: (a) Those supporting the extension were not interested in additional space for the Capitol, they were only interested in saving the building and its occupants from the hazard and calamity of a sudden collapse.

Yet the fact is that by approving this \$2 million, we get the particular plan which the Architect has been pushing for years, the Plan No. 2 which involves this elaborate expansion with all of the facilities which I have already indicated, and the fact remains that there has still not been any study made of whether we can in fact save this building and prevent the collapse which we have been told is imminent in any simpler, less elaborate and cheaper way.

(b) Both Representative Yates and Representative Andrews of North Dakota made eloquent statements in defense of the proposal that the extension project was the only way to save the Capitol and that no alternative was feasible. However, their statements in this regard do not really represent an independent engineering or architectural judgment, in my opinion. They were based on three sources: (1) the Thompson & Lichtner report, which was commissioned by the Architect of the Capitol; (2) Mr. Campioli, the Assistant Architect of the Capitol, an employee of Mr. Stewart, who, incidentally, prior to becoming associated with Mr. Stewart was associated with the architectural firm of Alfred Poor & Associates, the group that designed the East Front extension, helped design the West Front extension, as well as the Cannon renovation and the garages of the Rayburn Building. Obviously, Mr. Campioli is hardly an independent witness on this particular subject; (3) a Mr. Severud, questioned by telephone by Congressman Yates, who was also identified as being on Mr. Stewart's payroll as an engineer consultant, so that he, too,

like any good lawyer, would be expected to support the proposal of his client rather than oppose it.

All of this, Mr. Chairman, suggests to me that what we really need to do to make sense is to make certain that no construction work begins on this West Front until after we have had an independent engineering study made of what is the minimum we need to do to keep the West Front from falling and how much it would cost. Mr. Stewart or his associates have given their own figure for the cost of this restoration, ranging from \$10 to \$50 million, but that is not the result of any study and is hardly a disinterested quotation. If by spending \$100,000 now we can perhaps save the taxpayers \$10 or \$15 or \$20 million later on in avoiding the construction of unnecessary office space, and unnecessary cafeterias, and unnecessary auditoriums in the Nation's No. 1 historic shrine, I think we would be very wise and would be indeed well served. Some people have raised the question as to whether a study directly commissioned by the Architect of the Capitol himself, who is so deeply committed to this particular extension project, would be meaningful since he might well influence the decision of the firm which he engaged with this \$100,000. I am not sure whether this is a wise concern or not, but if it is impossible for us to get a genuinely independent engineering survey made by some firm engaged by the Architect of the Capitol, perhaps the National Trust Foundation or even the Interior Department might be qualified to take on this particular assignment.

Let me make just one additional point. Much has been made of the urgent necessity of preventing the West Front from collapsing. In that connection, I ought to point out that the Architect's own statement makes it perfectly clear that if this \$2 million for plans and specifications is appropriated it will be some 18 months before we have these plans and specifications available for further construction. Thus the blunt fact is that even if we go along with this requested appropriation we are not going to be doing anything to prevent the Capitol from collapsing around our heads for another 18 months. If the danger is really great now, we are going to have to live with it for another 18 months. If we can in fact survive for that 18 months' period without the building collapsing around our heads, certainly we can survive long enough for the 6 or 8 months that it might take to conduct the detailed, independent engineering study which I have suggested should be made. Then we will have not just one option before us but some alternative choice, and then we can act much more intelligently in deciding which course of action would be the best and the most economical to take.

Mr. Chairman, may I just conclude by inserting in the record with my remarks a letter which the American Institute of Architects addressed to me earlier this year in response to certain questions addressed to them last fall by our late, beloved colleague, Senator Bob Bartlett of Alaska. Senator Bartlett was as concerned with the damage that might be done by this West Front extension as I was and as a member of this subcommittee he did a magnificent job in preventing any hasty extension action. On November 25th, he addressed a letter to the President of the AIA asking for his comments on certain statements by Mr. Campioli with respect to the imminence of the collapse of the Capitol. The reply of the AIA was forwarded to me on February 17, 1969. Because a distinguished former member of this subcommittee and this body was deeply concerned over this subject, I believe that it would be particularly appropriate that this exchange of correspondence be included in the record at this point. It should be noted particularly that the reply of the AIA spells out the points which I have made earlier, namely, that the entire West Front of the

Capitol would not have to be evacuated for a period of from 5 to 10 years, that the West Front restoration is feasible, and that a relatively precise cost figure could be placed upon it.

The AIA letter is attached.

THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE
OF ARCHITECTS,

St. Louis, Mo., February 17, 1969.

HON. SAMUEL S. STRATTON,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN STRATTON: This is my belated reply to the late Senator E. L. Bartlett's letter of November 25, 1968 (enclosed), in which he asked the American Institute of Architects to comment on a speech given by Mario E. Campioli, Assistant Architect of the Capitol, before the Convention of American Registered Architects. Since you have long been interested in plans for correcting the condition of the West Front of the Capitol, I am directing my reply to you.

The American Institute of Architects believes that the West Front of the Capitol can and should be restored in its present location using existing standstone where possible or new sandstone where necessary. Like any prudent owner, Congress should commission an impartial structural engineer to study all aspects of restoration and to recommend a program for restoration complete with cost and risk evaluations and detailing any disruption of Capitol activities. Only then will Congress be able to make an effective comparison between restoration and extension.

The questions which Senator Bartlett asked illuminate one glaring fact: no one knows exactly what restoration will entail.

The engineering report prepared in 1964 by Thompson and Lichtner (which was commissioned by the Architect of the Capitol) is devoted solely to the feasibility of extension—nowhere does it state that restoration is impossible. This report professionally justifies extension but does not professionally analyze the expected risk, cost and disruption factors which would be encountered in restoration.

Without the benefit of a feasibility study we and the members of Congress can do no better than to make educated guesses about the risk, cost, and the extent of restoration needed. Yet, we are certain that restoration is possible. On this basis then we answer Senator Bartlett's questions which were prompted by the picture of horrors painted by Mr. Campioli.

Will restoration of the existing structure entail vacating the entire West Front "for a period of five to ten years"?

By using modern technological developments, the entire West Front would not have to be vacated "for a period of five to ten years." Only those spaces immediately adjacent to active restoration would have to be vacated.

Is it true that there would be no limit on risk or cost, if the West Front were restored rather than extended?

Of course, there would be a limit to cost and risk of restoration. We firmly believe restoration will prove much less costly than extension (much structural repair must be done in either event). A feasibility study would provide Congress with cost information.

Does the structural preservation of the Capitol indicate an extension of the building to the west?

The structural preservation of the Capitol does not necessarily indicate an extension to the West. Structural preservation can be accomplished by several means, including either restoration or extension. We strongly urge Congress to choose restoration.

Senator Bartlett also asks: "Am I mistaken in believing that nothing of the original Capitol building will remain if the West Front were extended?" The Senator was not

mistaken: the West Front is the last remaining exterior portion of the original Capitol building. And for this very reason, we argue that Congress should restore the West Front.

As you know, the West Front of the original Capitol building is substantially unchanged from its appearance in 1825. In that year, Charles Bulfinch completed the West Front of the Capitol, slightly modifying William Thornton's prize-winning design of 1793. In 1800, under the direction of James Hoban, the north wing of the original Capitol—Congress House—was completed and the legislators moved in. In 1807, the south wing was finished under the charge of Benjamin Latrobe. Bulfinch then completed Thornton's conception of the Capitol by constructing the central portion, including its West Front. For reasons of economy, President George Washington chose sandstone as the building material.

In 1851, Thomas Walter began to add the present House and Senate chamber to the north and south wings. At this time, too he designed the present steel dome to replace Bulfinch's low brass dome which was dwarfed by the new wings.

No further changes were made in the Capitol until the late 1950's when the Associate Architects, commissioned by the Architect of the Capitol, J. George Stewart, extended the original East Front 32½ feet in order to eliminate the impression that the huge dome overhung the original central portico. In so doing, Mr. Stewart also replaced the sandstone of the East Front with marble. Thus, even though the original East Front was preserved as an interior wall, it has disappeared from view.

Now the Architect of the Capitol and Speaker McCormack want to extend the West Front in the same manner: replacing sandstone with marble and preserving the West Front as an interior wall. If this is done, all vestiges of the original Capitol will be buried beneath marble.

Since 1800, parts of the West Front have witnessed the unfolding of the story of the United States as a Nation. Surely, now when Americans are beginning to appreciate the heritage of their past, we can afford to restore the West Front in its original place for historical reasons.

Thus, we urge restoration in order to bequeath to the future a reliable representation of an original portion of the Capitol in the place where it was built. Restoring the wall in its present position is important to preserve a position in time without change: a position in time which will be credible to generations of Americans now and in the future. Certainly in our hierarchy of buildings there is none more important to our Nation than the Capitol. If a small portion of it is not worth restoring, what is?

Finally, Senator Bartlett inquired about The Institute's consistency in supporting restoration of the West Front. Once again he points to the AIA MEMO (see enclosed article) of January, 1958, which states in part: "It is believed that the space requirements could be better filled—and at far less cost—by leaving the East Front alone and instead developing a proposed scheme for expansion of the West side of the building." The above quotation was contained in an article reporting the activities of the Committee on the Preservation of the Capitol which was not an AIA committee, but composed of a group of architects (some AIA members), architectural historians, as well as other prominent citizens outside the profession, to rally support against the proposed extension of the East Front of the Capitol. This quotation is entirely out of context and misrepresents The Institute's long-standing position in favor of restoration. The American Institute of Architects has never officially or unofficially espoused any proposal for extending the West Front of the Capitol." While opposing destruction of the historic East Front, and reporting activities of that

nature, The Institute has been cast by proponents of a West Front extension, in the position of recommending extension of the West Front.

In 1958, we urged restoration of the East Front for historical reasons. Now, extension of the East Front makes stronger our historical argument in favor of preserving the West Front as the last remaining exterior portion of the original Capitol. Only Congress can and should make the decision to restore the West Front. In so doing, Congress should not let its current and future space needs (which can and should be accommodated elsewhere) dictate; rather it should consider what our Capitol means to Americans now and will mean to future generations of Americans.

I feel that the controversy over restoration or extension of the West Front of the Capitol poignantly emphasizes the need for a professional commission to plan the comprehensive development of Capitol Hill. I hope that legislation such as S.J. Res. 74, which passed the Senate last year, will be reintroduced this session and enacted into law. Only then will there be an orderly resolution of controversies such as this.

I appreciate the opportunity to express once again The Institute's position on this most important matter.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE F. KASSABAUM,

President, American Institute of Architects.

SDS PROMOTES DISCORD IN HIGH SCHOOLS

(Mr. ICHORD asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Speaker, high schools across our Nation are being disrupted by Students for a Democratic Society—SDS—militants who are intent on promoting racial discord and violence. In nearly a score of States since the fall semester began, high schools have become the staging areas for the spread of the SDS revolutionary philosophy.

A national SDS high school policy was first inaugurated in October 1968, at an SDS national council meeting in Boulder, Colo., where a special "high school resolution" was adopted. The resolution called for: First, the hiring of a national high school coordinator; second, regional organizations of the SDS to make high school organizing a main part of their program; and third, the national circulation of an underground paper published by the Los Angeles high school SDS chapter.

SDS leaders feel they have found a new outlet in high schools for SDS militancy. They have emphasized the need to recruit new members on the high school level, to circulate SDS literature and to "radicalize" high school students. One SDS pamphlet for high school readers states:

Even such seemingly destructive actions as starting trash can fires and pulling fire alarms are actually forms of protest directed at the school as it is now constituted. Not only the defense of hair and clothing styles against administration attack, but the adoption of such styles themselves indicates a general disgust with the values and attitudes that our generation has been forced.

Exploitation of racial unrest in many of our Nation's high schools appears to be of the SDS. For example, a few days ago in Pittsburgh, Pa., several high

schools were closed for a time because of racial fighting blamed in part by police on SDS agitation. SDS members by painting slogans favoring "Black Power" and "Victory for the Vietcong" on the outside of Pittsburgh's racially tense Oliver High School touched off an incident of violence. At Pittsburgh's South Hills High School, a bare-breasted female SDS member ran through the halls urging pupils to leave class while a group of 30 SDS members distributed SDS literature to the pupils. In Detroit, a group of 15 SDS members painted SDS slogans on high school walls and assaulted two teachers who tried to stop them.

For immature young high school students the advent of the SDS activists in their schools may provide a new and different outlet for excitement. SDS does not hesitate to take advantage of these teenagers, for they are enthusiastic workers and a source of needed "bodies" to join in SDS-sponsored demonstrations. The tragedy is that the young people often do not know for what reason they are demonstrating and do not realize the deeper, more serious activity which could follow. The real catastrophe is that those who join the SDS with an honest and sincere belief that they may be helping minority groups or the poor are being exploited. The ability of the SDS activists to seize upon items of discontent and to fan the sparks of discontent into actual violence presents a clear and present danger.

In the days ahead, we can expect the SDS to concentrate even more on high schools in large cities where there are college SDS chapters. These chapters have been instructed by the SDS national leadership to direct and encourage SDS activities in local high schools. Likewise, they have been instructed to help the young students prepare attacks on high school principals and policies. In addition, they have been instructed to help publish "free press" type newspapers and urge disruptive tactics inside the school.

As chairman of the Committee on Internal Security I have presided over a series of hearings concerning the involvement of the SDS in revolutionary violence. I have heard outstanding educators, college and university administrators, and other outstanding academic leaders report on the willingness and readiness of SDS to engage in violence to accomplish its goals. As a committee, we are focusing our attention on the degree and the intensity of the threat SDS poses and the proper means to meet the threat—whether by school administrative action, by local or State government action, or by Federal legislation.

We have already seen the effect of SDS disruptive tactics and a vast majority of the American public is disgusted and sickened by such vicious activity. It is time to let it be known that we do not intend to stand idly by and let these malcontents make a mockery of our educational system because our schools are like any other community. In the presence of violence, the rights of the law-abiding residents—the students who want to learn, the teachers who want to teach—have to be defended at any cost. These come first. Any compromise with this principle is an invitation to anarchy.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. POLLOCK (at the request of Mr. GERALD R. FORD), for October 2 and the balance of the week, on account of official business.

Mr. TALCOTT (at the request of Mr. GERALD R. FORD), for the balance of the week, on account of official business.

Mr. SAYLOR (at the request of Mr. GERALD R. FORD), for October 2 and the balance of the week, on account of official business.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

Mr. HOLIFIELD (at the request of Mr. PRICE of Illinois), for 30 minutes, today; to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. ASHBROOK, for 30 minutes, today; to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. COWGER); to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous matter:)

Mr. PELLY, for 10 minutes, on October 1.

Mr. CONTE, for 5 minutes, today.
(The following Members to address the House (at the request of Mr. MIKVA); to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous matter:)

Mr. GONZALEZ, for 10 minutes, today.
Mr. WOLFF, for 15 minutes, on October 15.

Mr. TUNNEY, for 15 minutes, on October 2.

Mr. JACOBS, for 60 minutes, on October 14.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. BOLAND to revise and extend his remarks with reference to the congressional election in the Sixth District of the State of Massachusetts.

Mr. CONABLE and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. BINGHAM to include extraneous matter with his remarks in the Committee of the Whole, today.

Mr. LEGGETT to include a table during his remarks today on H.R. 14000.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN (at the request of Mr. LEGGETT) to insert a table in his remarks during general debate today.

Mr. BENNETT to include tables and other extraneous matter during his remarks on H.R. 14000.

Mr. COHELAN to revise and extend remarks made in Committee of the Whole and to include extraneous matter.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. COWGER) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. MCKNEALLY.

Mr. VANDER JAGT.

Mr. WYMAN.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN.

Mr. SCOTT in two instances.

Mr. ASHBROOK.

Mr. MATHIAS.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin.

Mr. COUGHLIN.

Mr. ZWACH.

Mr. DERWINSKI.

Mr. MORTON.

Mr. HASTINGS.

Mr. MINSHALL.

Mr. BRAY in two instances.

Mr. SCHWENGEL.

Mr. KEITH.

Mr. FOREMAN in two instances.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MIKVA) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. CORMAN in five instances.

Mr. CLARK in two instances.

Mr. BIAGGI.

Mr. GARMATZ.

Mr. RARICK in four instances.

Mr. GONZALEZ in two instances.

Mr. DOWNING in three instances.

Mr. BENNETT in two instances.

Mr. MIKVA in six instances.

Mr. HUNGATE.

Mr. MOSS in two instances.

Mr. MARSH in two instances.

Mr. EILBERG.

Mr. HATHAWAY in two instances.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON.

Mr. HAGAN.

Mr. FASCELL in two instances.

Mr. OTTINGER.

Mr. PREYER of North Carolina.

Mr. WALDIE in three instances.

Mr. SCHEUER in two instances.

Mr. HANNA in four instances.

Mr. WOLFF.

Mr. BROWN of California in three instances.

SENATE BILL REFERRED

A bill of the Senate of the following title was taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S. 1366. An act to release the conditions in a deed with respect to a certain portion of the land heretofore conveyed by the United States to the Salt Lake City Corporation; to the Committee on Government Operations.

SENATE ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

The SPEAKER announced his signature to an enrolled bill of the Senate of the following title:

S. 713. An act to designate the Desolation Wilderness, Eldorado National Forest, in the State of California.

BILL PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. FRIEDEL, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee did on this day present to the President, for his approval, a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 10420. An act to permit certain real property in the State of Maryland to be used for highway purposes.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 7 o'clock and 12 minutes p.m.), under

its previous order, the House adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, October 2, 1969, at 10 o'clock a.m.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1203. A letter from the Acting Secretary of Agriculture, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to extend the act establishing Federal agricultural services to Guam; to the Committee on Agriculture.

1204. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a report on the effectiveness and administrative efficiency of the Neighborhood Youth Corps program under title IB of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Detroit, Mich., Department of Labor; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

1205. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a proposed plan for supplying the power requirements of the central Arizona project and augmenting the Lower Colorado River Basin Development Fund, pursuant to the provisions of section 303(c) of the Colorado River Basin Act, Public Law 90-537; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

1206. A letter from the Director, Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior, transmitting a copy of a proposed contract with Monsanto Research Corp., for research and development to study foam properties and to develop foam generation and foam application systems that will collect coal dust while maintaining an enveloping blanket of foam, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 89-672; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. GARMATZ: Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Supplemental report (pt. II) on H.R. 12605 (Rept. No. 91-518). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. MILLS: Committee on Ways and Means. H.R. 14020. A bill to amend the Second Liberty Bond Act to increase the maximum interest rate permitted on U.S. savings bonds; without amendment (Rept. No. 91-545). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. TAYLOR: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. S. 2564. An act to amend the act fixing the boundary of Everglades National Park, Fla., and authorizing the acquisition of land therein, in order to authorize an additional amount for the acquisition of certain lands for such park; with amendments (Rept. No. 91-546). Referred to the Committee on the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. EDMONDSON: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. H.R. 1706. A bill to provide for the conveyance of certain mineral rights in and under lands in Pike County, Ga.; with amendments (Rept. No. 91-547). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ASPINALL (by request):

H.R. 14114. A bill to improve the administration of the national park system by the Secretary of the Interior, and to clarify the authorities applicable to the system, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. SAYLOR:

H.R. 14115. A bill to improve the administration of the national park system by the Secretary of the Interior, and to clarify the authorities applicable to the system, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. CELLER:

H.R. 14116. A bill to increase criminal penalties under the Sherman Antitrust Act; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. McCULLOCH:

H.R. 14117. A bill to increase criminal penalties under the Sherman Antitrust Act; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CELLER:

H.R. 14118. A bill to amend section 213 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 14119. A bill to amend section 355 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, to eliminate mandatory submission for approval by the Attorney General of the title to lands acquired for or on behalf of the United States, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CONABLE:

H.R. 14120. A bill to revise the Federal election laws, and for other purposes; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. CONYERS:

H.R. 14121. A bill to authorize the Small Business Administration to indemnify corporate sureties on bonds covering contracts of sound small business concerns where such action will further the purposes of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

H.R. 14122. A bill to increase the participation of small business concerns in the construction industry by providing for a Federal guarantee of certain construction bonds and authorizing the acceptance of certifications of competency in lieu of bonding in connection with certain Federal projects, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

H.R. 14123. A bill to amend the act of August 24, 1935 (commonly referred to as the "Miller Act"), to exempt construction contracts not exceeding \$20,000 in amount from the bonding requirements of such act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. GARMATZ:

H.R. 14124. A bill to amend section 4 of the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, as amended, to extend the term during which the Secretary of the Interior can make fisheries loans under the act; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. HANSEN of Idaho (for himself, Mr. CARTER, and Mr. RODINO):

H.R. 14125. A bill to amend title 38 of the United States Code to permit certain active duty for training to be counted as active duty for purposes of entitlement to educational benefits under chapter 34 of such title; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. MacGREGOR:

H.R. 14126. A bill to amend the Social Security Act to provide an increase in benefits under the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance program, provide for automatic benefit increases thereafter in the event of future increases in the cost of living, provide for future automatic increases in the earnings and contribution base, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. PATMAN (for himself and Mr. WIDNALL):

H.R. 14127. A bill to carry out the recom-

mendations of the Joint Commission on the Coinage, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. PICKLE:

H.R. 14128. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act so as to extend for an additional period the authority to make formula grants to schools of public health; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. ROTH:

H.R. 14129. A bill to protect the privacy of the American home from the invasion by mail of sexually provocative material, to prohibit the use of the U.S. mails to disseminate material harmful to minors, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. ROUDEBUSH (for himself, Mr. BRAY, Mr. ADAIR, Mr. ZION, Mr. MYERS, Mr. LANDGREBE, Mr. WATKINS, Mr. BROYHILL of North Carolina, Mr. KYL, Mr. HUNT, Mr. SKUBITZ, Mr. SEBELIUS, Mr. DEVINE, and Mr. McKNEALLY):

H.R. 14130. A bill to increase the availability of guaranteed home loan financing for veterans and to increase the income of the national service life insurance fund; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. SAYLOR:

H.R. 14131. A bill to amend chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, to exempt ammunition from Federal regulation under the Gun Control Act of 1968; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SLACK:

H.R. 14132. A bill to increase the availability of guaranteed home loan financing for veterans and to increase the income of the national service life insurance fund; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. ASHBROOK:

H.R. 14133. A bill to encourage the growth of international trade on a fair and equitable basis; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CHAMBERLAIN:

H.R. 14134. A bill to amend the Social Security Act to provide an increase in benefits under the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance program, provide for automatic benefit increases thereafter in the event of future increases in the cost of living, provide for future automatic increases in the earnings and contribution base, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. DUNCAN:

H.R. 14135. A bill to adjust agricultural production, to provide a transitional program for farmers, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. HANNA:

H.R. 14136. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to require private foundations, qualified pension, profit sharing, and stock bonus plans, and certain other exempt organizations to hold a portion of their assets in housing investments; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. KOCH (for himself, Mr. LEGGETT, Mr. McKNEALLY, Mr. MURPHY of New York, Mr. MOORHEAD, and Mr. STOKES):

H.R. 14137. A bill to provide for the establishment of a Commission on Marihuana; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MEEDS:

H.R. 14138. A bill to amend the Employment Act of 1946 to bring to bear an informed public opinion upon price and wage behavior which threatens national economic stability; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. POFF:

H.R. 14139. A bill to amend the act entitled "An act to provide for the registration and protection of trademarks used in commerce, to carry out the provisions of international conventions, and for other purposes," approved July 5, 1946, as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 14140. A bill to amend section 6 of title 35, United States Code, "Patents," to authorize domestic and international studies and programs relating to patents and trademarks; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CONTE:

H.J. Res. 917. Joint resolution to authorize the President to proclaim the month of January of each year as "National Blood Donor Month"; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HAGAN:

H.J. Res. 918. Joint resolution to supplement the joint resolution making continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1970 in order to provide for carrying out programs and projects, and for payments to State educational agencies and local educational agencies, institutions of higher education, and other educational agencies and organizations, based upon appropriation levels as provided in H.R. 13111, which passed the House of Representatives July 31, 1969, and entitled "An act making appropriations for the Departments of Labor, and Health, Education and Welfare, and related agencies, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes"; to the Committee on Appropriations.

By Mr. NICHOLS:

H.J. Res. 919. Joint resolution to supplement the joint resolution making continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1970 in order to provide for carrying out programs and projects, and for payments to State educational agencies and local educational agencies, institutions of higher education, and other educational agencies and organizations, based upon appropriation levels as provided in H.R. 13111, which passed the House of Representatives July 31, 1969, and entitled "An act making appropriations for the Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare, and related agencies, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes"; to the Committee on Appropriations.

By Mr. POLLOCK:

H.J. Res. 920. Joint resolution to provide for a study and evaluation of international and other foreign policy aspects of underground weapons testing; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. ROSENTHAL:

H. Con. Res. 394. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to international agreements providing for mandatory extradition of aircraft hijackers; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. TEAGUE of Texas:

H. Con. Res. 395. Concurrent resolution urging the adoption of policies to offset the adverse effects of governmental monetary restrictions upon the housing industry; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. GIAIMO:

H.R. 14141. A bill for the relief of David Joseph Huntington and Beatrice Huntington; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. PEPPER:

H.R. 14142. A bill for the relief of Dr. Fuad S. Ashkar; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII.

272. The SPEAKER presented a petition of Domingo C. Castaneda, Munoz, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, relative to compensating the Philippine Scouts for their services during World War II; to the Committee on Armed Services.