

PROGRAM TO ASSIST STUDENTS

HON. CLARENCE D. LONG

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, September 15, 1969

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, a recent survey in Harford County, Md., showed that approximately 200 students in the June 1969 high school graduating classes want to attend college but are unable to do so without financial assistance. I am delighted to learn that a new program of cooperation among members of the Harford County banking community, the Harford County Educational Foundation, and the Harford Junior College will enable students to borrow money for tuition, fees, and books. I would like to commend these Harford County citizens for their interest in higher education by including the following article in the RECORD:

SEVEN BANKS AGREE TO LOANS FOR NEEDY HJC STUDENTS—WILL PERMIT BORROWING FOR BOOKS, FEES, TUITION

A new program, the product of cooperation among members of the Harford county banking community, the Harford County Educational Foundation, and Harford Junior College, is aimed at encouraging those who otherwise would be unable to afford to attend college to do so by borrowing the money for tuition, fees, and books.

According to a state survey approximately 200 students in the June, 1969, graduating high school classes of Harford county indicated that they wished to continue their education in an institution of higher learning, but that they were unable to do so without a scholarship or loan or both.

Following three meetings among representatives of Harford county banks, the Harford Junior College Advisory Board Sub-Committee on Financial Assistance, and College officials, individual meetings of the bank boards, and a meeting of the Harford County Educational Foundation, all held over a period of four months, it was announced Thursday that seven Harford county banks would provide a total of \$10,000 to the Harford County Educational Foundation for the purpose of

providing financial assistance in the form of loans up to \$400 per year (or \$200 per semester) to needy students wishing to attend Harford Junior College.

The banks are: Aberdeen National Bank, Citizens National Bank, Commercial and Savings Bank, The Equitable Trust Company, First National Bank and Trust Company, First National Bank of Harford County, and Forest Hill State Bank.

Those interested in applying may receive the appropriate application forms by calling the Harford Junior College Office of Financial Assistance at 734-7171.

In addition to executives of the banks, noted above, those involved in the planning of this program include: Cornelius Cronin of the Harford Junior College Board of Trustees; the members of the Harford Junior College Advisory Board Sub-Committee on Financial Assistance; John Clark, Mrs. Jacob Hecht, Charles Reed, Jesse Rhoads, Pershing Volkart, and Mrs. John D. Worthington, III; and the members of the newly-appointed Harford County Educational Foundation: John Clark, chairman, Melvin Bosely, Brodnax Cameron, Jr., G. Howlett Cobourn, Phillip Golbin, Dr. Joseph N. Hankin, Joseph Hinder, Edmund Swanke, and I. Dale Snodgrass.

SENATE—Tuesday, September 16, 1969

The Senate met at 11 o'clock a.m. and was called to order by the President pro tempore.

The Chaplain, Rev. Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

O God, most holy, wise, and powerful Preserver and Governor of all Thy creatures and all their actions, keep us this day in health of body and soundness of mind, in purity of heart and cheerfulness of spirit, in contentment of heart and in charity with our neighbor; and further all our undertakings with Thy blessing. In our labor strengthen us; in our pleasure purify us; in our difficulties direct us; in our perils defend us; in our troubles comfort us; and supply all our needs, according to the riches of Thy grace in Christ Jesus our Lord. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Monday, September 15, 1969, be dispensed with.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States submitting nominations were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Leonard, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the President pro tempore laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS DURING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that statements in relation to the transaction of routine morning business be limited to 3 minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION—MODIFICATION OF UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the request will be granted, but the Chair must say it is probably out of order, under the unanimous-consent agreement of yesterday.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that unanimous-consent agreement be amended so that there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, not to extend beyond 11:20 a.m.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

JOINT MEETING OF THE TWO HOUSES

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, the Senate, in a body, will leave the Chamber at 12:13 p.m. to proceed to the House of Representatives for the purpose of a joint meeting which will be addressed by the astronauts.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senate will be cognizant of that statement.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, returned to the Senate, in compliance with its request, the bill (S. 2315) to restore the golden eagle program to the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act.

The message announced that the House had passed, without amendment, the following bills of the Senate:

S. 1686. An act relating to age limits in connection with appointments to the U.S. Park Police; and

S. 1766. An act to provide for the disposition of a judgment recovered by the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, Mont., in paragraph 11, docket numbered 50233, U.S. Court of Claims, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the House had passed the following bills, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 4869. An act to further the economic advancement and general welfare of the Hopi Indian Tribe of the State of Arizona;

H.R. 7066. An act to provide for the establishment of the William Howard Taft National Historic Site;

H.R. 12979. An act to amend title 5, United States Code, to revise, clarify, and extend the provisions relating to court leave for employees of the United States and the District of Columbia; and

H.R. 13194. An act to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to authorize Federal market adjustment payments to lenders with respect to insured student loans when necessary in the light of economic conditions, in order to assure that students will have reasonable access to such loans for financing their education.

HOUSE BILLS REFERRED OR PLACED ON THE CALENDAR

The following bills were severally read twice by their titles and referred or placed on the calendar, as indicated:

H.R. 4869. An act to further the economic advancement and general welfare of the Hopi Indian Tribe of the State of Arizona; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

H.R. 7066. An act to provide for the establishment of the William Howard Taft National Historic Site; placed on the calendar.

H.R. 12979. An act to amend title 5, United States Code, to revise, clarify, and extend the provisions relating to court leave for employees of the United States and the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

OUR NATION AND OUR YOUTH WOULD BENEFIT WHEN GENERAL HERSHEY IS NO LONGER DIRECTOR OF SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, the administration of our Selective Service System under Gen. Lewis B. Hershey is a repugnant mess.

Unfortunately, General Hershey has an inflated view of his power and authority. His arrogance has been monumental. In the most recent of his arbitrary actions he has attempted to undermine and usurp the authority of the National Selective Service Appeals Board. By law, this three-man board, the final arbiter on draft classifications, is supposed to be independent of the Director in all respects. Until recently, it was.

In July, one of the Board's members, Dr. Kenneth W. Clement, a leading member of the medical profession and one of the outstanding civic leaders in my home city of Cleveland, Ohio, ostensibly resigned for personal reasons. However, at that time he publicly complained that General Hershey "exercises an autocratic military control over the System." Then, a second member, Judge Henry Gwiazda, resigned by White House request.

It appears that General Hershey has taken over the functions of the Appeals Board by force and in a most arbitrary manner. General Hershey has appointed one of his own aides, Col. George G. Wendel, to a post with the Board after unsuccessfully attempting to place him as executive secretary of the Board. Colonel Wendel has assumed supervision of the Board's full-time staff, but it is obvious that General Hershey is completely in control, contrary to the intent of the law. General Hershey has outlived his usefulness, if any, and I hope President Nixon will request his resignation.

Since the Appeals Board has the responsibility for making final decisions on Selective Service classifications, it is for good reason that the law stipulates that the Board should remain independent of the Selective Service Director. It is unconscionable that General Hershey should be permitted to assume such autocratic powers and to usurp the functions of the Appeals Board.

This incident is only the most recent example of General Hershey's lust for power and disregard of the law. Newspaper files are replete with stories of his maladministration of the Selective Service System.

When campaigning for the Presidency last year, Vice President Hubert Humphrey and Senator EUGENE McCARTHY both asserted that if elected one of their first official acts would be to fire General Hershey. I wish he had been fired.

It is obvious that he does not understand the feelings of young Americans today and is unable to administer the selective service laws fairly. His attempts to use the selective service laws to stifle dissent have been outrageous. His use of the delinquency regulations to suppress freedom of speech among draft-age men has been so questionable that the Solicitor General of the United States, Erwin N. Griswold, has suggested that the Director was probably using these rules outside the law and perhaps even in contravention of the Constitution.

Mr. President, in removing General Hershey from office, President Nixon would be making a dramatic gesture to young Americans signifying that their Government is beginning to respond to their sentiments. It is bad enough that Congress and the President have done nothing to reform the present outmoded and discriminatory draft law and that inequities in that law continue to exist. It is intolerable to maintain in office a Selective Service Director who is oblivious to the legitimate complaints of draft-age youngsters and who openly flouts the democratic process.

That General Hershey should resign is my hope. Having studied his record in this position, I am confident that he will benefit our Nation by voluntarily leaving this position in which he has usurped so much power. Let us hope, if he does not resign, that President Nixon will request his retirement.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, with all deference to the Senator from Ohio—and I do appreciate him as a Member of this body—I will not stand by and be silent in the face of such strong words about a man who I think has been one of the outstanding administrators in high Government affairs, at least in my time. I have no alliance with General Hershey, of course, or any favors to ask, and he does not know me beyond a speaking acquaintance. But I have said many times in the past that I thought he was perhaps the outstanding administrator in Washington.

Whatever he has done must have been within the law because I do not know of anyone who has successfully challenged him for going beyond the law or acting without authority; and by that I mean charged him before some tribunal.

With respect to what President Nixon may have said in his campaign or what he might wish to do now I do not wish to become involved in.

I am merely referring to General Hershey as an outstanding administrator and a fine patriotic man. One always knows where he stands. There are real problems connected with the Selective Service Act. General Hershey has been very helpful to our committee. He has been very frank and full of candor. I think that over the years his work has

reflected a performance which has been outstanding.

Whether or not he should continue now in view of his age alone is another matter. He has been of tremendous help to me, as one Member of the Senate, and I believe that by and large he has been fair throughout the Nation. This is not an agency of Government that can be run altogether by what we used to call "parlor conversations" or "parlor methods."

With respect to the law, that matter will be coming up in due course and I am sure it will receive the attention of the Senator from Ohio, as well as my attention.

I congratulate General Hershey for his long and outstanding career.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Ohio.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PEARSON in the chair). The time of the Senator from Mississippi has expired.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we may be permitted to proceed for 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished friend, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of which I am proud to be a member.

I have simply asserted that it seemed to me that during the last 6 months the arrogance of General Hershey and the misdirection he has taken have exceeded all bounds. There is an honest difference of opinion between the Senator from Mississippi and me on this subject. However, I might mention in connection with the views which I have strongly expressed this morning, and which I adhere to, that there must be some validity to my contention or else former Vice President Humphrey, when he was campaigning for the Presidency last October, would not have pledged to the American people that one of his first official acts, if elected to the Presidency, would be to fire General Hershey.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield the floor.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may suggest the absence of a quorum, the time to be equally divided between the respective sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears no objection, and it is so ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

PROPOSED STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION

A letter from the Secretary, Smithsonian Institution, transmitting for the information of the Senate, a proposed statement on H.R. 13270, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Finance.

PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF GOVERNMENT COMPTROLLER FOR THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Administration, transmitting, pursuant to law, the information of the planned reassignment of the present incumbent of the position of Government Comptroller for the Virgin Islands, to a position with the Department at the same grade and salary (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO TRADEMARK REGISTRATION ACT

A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Act entitled "An Act to provide for the registration and protection of trademarks used in commerce, to carry out the provisions of international conventions, and for other purposes," approved July 5, 1946, as amended (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

By the PRESIDENT pro tempore:

Resolutions of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; to the Committee on Commerce:

"RESOLUTIONS REQUESTING THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION NOT TO PURCHASE FOREIGN-MADE SHIPS

"Whereas, There is a possibility that the United States Department of Transportation may acquire, by purchase, ships built in foreign countries to break ice for the new oil fields in Alaska; and

"Whereas, The purchase of foreign ships by said Department would be detrimental to the United States and Massachusetts shipbuilding industry, and particularly to the economy of Southeastern Massachusetts; and

"Whereas, It is the responsibility of said Department to promote United States shipbuilding and its trade and labor forces; therefore be it

"Resolved, That the Senate of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts respectfully requests the United States Department of Transportation not to purchase foreign-made ships to the detriment of the United States and Massachusetts shipbuilding industry and the economy of Southeastern Massachusetts; and be it further

"Resolved, That copies of these resolutions be sent forthwith by the Secretary of the Commonwealth to the President of the United States, to John A. Volpe, Secretary of the United States Department of Transportation, to the presiding officer of each

branch of Congress and to the members thereof from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

"Senate, adopted, August 23, 1969.

"NORMAN L. PIDGEON,
"Clerk."

A resolution adopted by the Board of County Commissioners, County of Lake, State of Ohio, remonstrating against proposed legislation to limit the tax-exempt feature of interest paid on public bonds issued by State or local governments; to the Committee on Finance.

A letter, in the nature of a petition, from Sheldon Krizer, of Jersey City, N.J., relating to research in aging; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. TALMADGE, from the Committee on Finance, without amendment:

S. 1479. A bill to amend chapter 19 of title 38, United States Code, in order to increase from \$10,000 to \$15,000 the amount of servicemen's group life insurance for members of the uniformed services (Rept. No. 91-398).

By Mr. TALMADGE, from the Committee on Finance, with an amendment:

S. 2003. A bill to provide a special Government life insurance program for veterans of the Vietnam era (Rept. No. 91-399).

By Mr. TALMADGE, from the Committee on Finance, with amendments:

S. 1471. A bill to amend chapter 13 of title 38, United States Code, to increase dependency and indemnity compensation for widows and children, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 91-400);

S. 1650. A bill to amend chapter 19 of title 38, United States Code, to provide double indemnity coverage under servicemen's group life insurance for members of the uniformed services assigned to duty in a combat zone (Rept. No. 91-401); and

S. 2186. A bill to amend chapter 19, United States Code, so as to provide dismemberment insurance coverage under the servicemen's group life insurance program (Rept. No. 91-402).

By Mr. SPONG, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, without amendment:

H.R. 9526. An act to amend the District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Act to provide that employers contributions do not have to be made under that act with respect to service performed in the employ of certain public international organizations (Rept. No. 91-403).

By Mr. TYDINGS, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, with an amendment:

S. 2335. A bill to authorize the District of Columbia to enter into the Interstate Compact on Juveniles (Rept. No. 91-404).

By Mr. HRUSKA, from the Committee on the Judiciary, without amendment:

H.J. Res. 250. A joint resolution authorizing the President of the United States of America to proclaim September 17, 1969, General von Steuben Memorial Day for the observance and commemoration of the birth of Gen. Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben (Rept. No. 91-406).

REORGANIZATION OF COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA— REPORT OF A COMMITTEE (S. REPT. NO. 91-405)

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, I am today reporting the bill (S.

2601) to reorganize the courts of the District of Columbia, and for other purposes, and I submit a report thereon. The committee thus has become the first in either House of Congress to report for congressional action any part of President Nixon's crime program.

The legislation reported by the committee contains upward of 80 percent of all the proposals contained in President Nixon's crime package. It contains every part of that package which could be reported at this time without further hearings. It contains other innovations added by the committee to insure efficiency in the National Capital's courts and to make them a model court system for the entire country.

The court reorganization bill we have reported contains the heart of the President's District of Columbia crime proposal. By enabling the local courts here to speed the trial of criminal cases, this legislation will do more than any other to meet the National Capital crime crisis. This legislation will drastically reduce the time it takes to get a criminal defendant to judgment. It will get criminals off the street and into jail faster, reduce the amount of new crime committed by criminal defendants awaiting trial, and eliminate the incentive which now exists to commit crime in the belief that one may never be brought to trial because of delay.

Providing speedier trials also means that the innocent can get their acquittals sooner. Likewise, the businessman and average citizen who must sue in the courts on civil matters will be able to get judgments on their cases more rapidly.

In reporting the court reorganization bill, the committee did not delay consideration or reporting of the rest of the President's crime package. Hearings will be held on the rest of the crime package this week and next under a schedule designed to permit reporting that legislation to the Senate by November. This is the fastest possible schedule for consideration of these proposals, particularly in light of the fact that the administration did not submit this bill to Congress at all until a month before the August recess. If we can report these other parts of the President's crime package by November, we will have taken scarcely more than 100 days, including the August recess, to get them to the floor of the Senate for action.

So, what the committee did was not to delay the rest of the President's bill, but rather to accelerate consideration of the court reorganization portions of it. In fact, our committee reported the bill less than 60 days after it was finally submitted to the Congress. I dare say this is close to a record for the consideration of such a major piece of legislation.

At the same time in meeting this timetable, the committee has more than fulfilled its responsibilities to consult the appropriate agencies of Government, the local bar, and the community regarding the provisions of this bill.

The committee staff met for the greater part of 4 full days with the Department of Justice to hammer out the

provisions of this bill. Every community group which evidenced an interest in the bill was heard. In fact an additional day of hearings was scheduled to make sure that everyone who wanted to be heard on this bill had an opportunity to testify.

In addition, the committee staff met extensively with members and committees of the bar and other concerned local and community groups putting this legislation in shape for reporting. At the same time an extraordinary degree of consultation with the administration and the community have occupied the attention of the staff on every day and on weekends and holidays since the bill was introduced.

I would have preferred to be able to report the entire bill at this time. We did our best to make that possible. Three times the committee scheduled hearings on that legislation in the hopes that the administration could get it to the Hill in time for prompt action before the August recess. Unfortunately, the bill did not reach Capitol Hill until midsummer, precluding the possibility of hearings on all of it before the August recess.

We faced a hard choice. We could have held up the court reorganization portions until hearings on all of it had been held, assuring that no part of the bill could be enacted this year. Or, we could devote our full energies to the task of putting this 300-page piece of legislation on court reorganization in shape to be reported now.

We chose to accelerate court reorganization because, if the Senate can pass it promptly and the House proceeds expeditiously upon it, there is a real chance that it, at least, can be enacted this year.

This is not to say that the committee will not do its best to assure that both parts of the President's bill are enacted this year. Our timetable has always been to get this crime legislation enacted as quickly as possible. As I have frequently said, I personally agree with the objectives of the President's proposal. But, as I also warned in June—weeks before the administration had presented its long promised proposal—the time lost by the administration's delay in getting this bill to Capitol Hill has severely jeopardized the chances for enactment this year. Nonetheless, we will do our best.

Finally, I would like to add a word of caution about what to expect from the enactment of this entire bill. Press reports and the Justice Department's and the administration's own presentations have suggested it is a comprehensive approach to crime in the District of Columbia. I regret to say it is not.

However needed individual parts of it may be, the legislation presented by the administration itself is far from an answer to the District of Columbia crime problem.

The court reorganization it provides is a critical need in our crime fight.

However, no part of this bill addresses the grave deficiency in the penitentiary system, which is in fact a crime factory.

No part of the bill addresses the enormous narcotics crime crisis this city faces and which our hearings indicate

accounts for upward of one-half of all the property crime and crimes of violence committed in this city.

No part of this legislation addresses the devastating increase of armed violence in the National Capital.

No part of this legislation or any other part of the President's crime package provides any Federal assistance to the State and local governments in the Washington metropolitan area which share the crime problem which festers in the District of Columbia.

Enactment of all of the President's proposals—which is our immediate goal—will provide important procedural tools in our crime fight. I am disappointed we do not also have the President's recommendations on other serious aspects of the crime fight. However, I will, as soon as our proceedings on the President's proposals permit, be proposing legislation in these other areas to answer the full dimensions of the crime challenge in the National Capital.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be received and printed; and the bill will be placed on the calendar.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia subsequently said: Mr. President, S. 2601 was reported to the Senate from the Committee on the District of Columbia, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. In view of the great length of not only the introduced bill, but also of the committee amendment, and the high cost of reprinting both as reported, I ask unanimous consent that only the committee amendment be reproduced in the calendar print of the bill.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

As in executive session, the following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. YARBOROUGH, from the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare:

George S. Ives, of Maryland, to be a member of the National Mediation Board; and Neil P. Speirs, of New York, to be a member of the Railroad Retirement Board.

By Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary:

Richard A. Pyle, of Oklahoma, to be U.S. attorney for the eastern district of Oklahoma; and

Robert McShane Carney, of the Virgin Islands, to be U.S. attorney for the district of the Virgin Islands.

By Mr. SPARKMAN, from the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Vincent de Roulet, of New York, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Jamaica;

John Patrick Walsh, of Illinois, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the State of Kuwait;

William C. Trueheart, of Florida, a Foreign Service officer of class 1, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Federal Republic of Nigeria;

Joseph S. Farland, of the District of Columbia, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Pakistan;

William E. Schaufele, Jr., of Ohio, a Foreign Service officer of class 2, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Upper Volta; and

Robert H. B. Wade, of Maryland, to be an Assistant Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

BILLS INTRODUCED

Bills were introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota:

S. 2897. A bill to amend section 314(k) of title 38, United States Code, in order to provide for a statutory payment of \$47 a month to a veteran who has lost the use of a lung or kidney as the result of a service-connected disability; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. RIBICOFF:

S. 2898. A bill to establish within the Executive Office of the President a Council of Health Advisers in order to improve the organization of agencies within the executive branch of the Government concerned with health programs and to strengthen the coordination of health programs; to the Committee on Government Operations.

(The remarks of Mr. RIBICOFF when he introduced the bill appear later in the RECORD under an appropriate heading.)

By Mr. CURTIS (for himself and Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware):

S. 2899. A bill to amend the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, so as to require the submission of the budget on an administrative budget, rather than a unified budget, basis; to the Committee on Government Operations.

(The remarks of Mr. CURTIS when he introduced the bill appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

By Mr. GURNEY:

S. 2900. A bill to amend the Public Buildings Act of 1959 to provide for the construction of buildings and improvements by a lessor on land owned by the United States, to authorize the acquisition of options to purchase property leased to the Federal Government and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. EASTLAND:

S. 2901. A bill to amend the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 476, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

S. 2902. A bill for the relief of Enrique Quinones; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HOLLINGS:

S. 2903. A bill to provide relief for Tara Chand Sharma; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HART:

S. 2904. A bill for the relief of Blanca Rosa Juarez Recinos; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DODD:

S. 2905. A bill to authorize the Attorney General to provide financial assistance to States and localities for the construction and modernization of correctional institutions, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(The remarks of Mr. DODD when he introduced the bill appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

By Mr. HOLLAND:

S. 2906. A bill to clarify the liability of national banks for certain taxes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

S. 2898—INTRODUCTION OF A BILL ESTABLISHING A COUNCIL OF HEALTH ADVISERS

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, for almost 2 years, the Subcommittee on Ex-

ecutive Reorganization has been reviewing the Federal role in health care.

We have examined the health problems of the Nation and studied carefully the health programs of the Federal Government.

And we have come to some very important conclusions.

The \$18.3 billion Federal health effort is a planless conglomeration of programs administered by more than a score of agencies and departments.

Moreover, it appears that instead of supporting programs to provide for the health of the people, Federal health expenditures are maintaining a cumbersome, disjointed bureaucracy that even key Government officials have difficulty managing.

All in all, it appears that Federal health programs, instead of eliminating problems, may be adding to factors such as rising costs, limited access to care and the fragmented organization of health services.

In order to determine answers to some serious questions we had, the subcommittee sent letters to the 23 agencies with health expenditures.

We asked each about their health programs. We asked them what they thought was the Government's overall health policy. And we asked how programs are coordinated among the agencies.

The subcommittee found the agencies knew little about their programs, that there is no national health policy and that interagency program coordination is a hit-and-miss proposition.

There are so many programs administered in such bureaucratic confusion that no one—not the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, not the Bureau of the Budget, nor any private organization—was able to tell the subcommittee even how many programs there are.

When the subcommittee asked HEW officials just for a list of health training and education programs, it took them 2 months to provide it. They had to assign full-time personnel to pull each program from the health bureaucracy.

We learned from HEW and the Bureau of the Budget that 13 Federal agencies are involved in health manpower training and education including: Health, Education, and Welfare, the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor, and State.

Agencies involved in health manpower training and education include the Atomic Energy Commission, the Agency for International Development, the National Science Foundation, the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Veterans' Administration.

The sprawl of just health training and education programs reaches the point of the ridiculous.

For example, the Commerce Department is administering programs to train licensed practical nurses and nurse aides.

The Interior Department is also training nurses and giving scholarships to students to become dentists and physicians.

Some agencies have little understanding of programs in fellow agencies. Others act as if they are even unaware that other agencies have the same or related programs.

For example, an assistant secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare should have known but he did not know that the Small Business Administration and the Commerce Department were financing the construction of hospitals.

Furthermore, the Small Business Administration is helping to build hospitals without the knowledge or consent of HEW's Hill-Burton programs. This happens even though SBA is supposed to clear its hospital projects with HEW before it gives such loans.

The lack of knowledge about health programs and the absence of coordination probably stem from the complete lack of an overall health policy.

At no time have Federal health administrators laid out a plan to the billions of dollars we spend on health.

As a result, duplications of funds and effort and less than adequate management of the health effort appear to be more the rule than the exception.

Meanwhile, needs continue to grow as national health resources are depleted.

One of the major barriers to effective health policy formulation is the fragmentation of the Federal health effort. Health programs administration becomes confused because it falls under the separate and distinct primary missions of each of the 23 health agencies.

Health programs become subordinated to these missions which further remove them from effective coordination.

We must begin to solve the problems posed by health program duplication and the lack of coordination. We must do this so that Federal expenditures result in the delivery of health care instead of a health bureaucracy.

We must begin to establish some overall health policy to guide the administration of these billions of dollars.

We must begin to make the Federal health effort responsive to public need.

To accomplish these goals, some steps must be taken with regard to the organization of the Federal health establishment and some mechanisms must be developed to guide its direction.

We must first, however, begin to consider a broad reorganization of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

HEW will spend \$13.6 billion in the current fiscal year on health, 74 percent of all Federal health expenditures.

HEW is the one Government agency with primary responsibility for the Nation's health. Yet within the Department is a microcosm of all the organizational problems we see in the overall Federal Health Establishment.

There is duplication and overlap, a lack of coordination and waste.

Much of this stems from the poor organization of management and policy functions.

For example, the Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs is responsible for health program policy.

He has direct management and policy authority over the Public Health Service, which includes the National Institutes of Health, the Health Services and Mental Health Administration, and the Consumer Protection and Environmental Health Service.

Beyond his management responsibility, however, are programs comprising the Nation's largest health expenditures—medicare and medicaid.

Medicare is managed by the Social Security Administration. Medicaid, along with numerous maternal and child health programs, is managed by the Social and Rehabilitation Service, a welfare agency.

According to figures supplied to the subcommittee by HEW, the Assistant Secretary has direct responsibility over only \$2.8 billion of HEW's \$13.6 billion health budget.

Moreover, this man, who is called the Nation's chief health official, has direct responsibility over only \$2.8 billion or 15 percent of the \$18.3 billion in total Federal health expenditures.

Within HEW, his policy role over all of the Department's health functions becomes somewhat muddled by the organization of the Department.

Take, for example, what former Assistant Health Secretary Dr. Philip Lee told us not long ago.

The Social and Rehabilitation Service was setting up nursing home standards for its medicaid program. Dr. Lee knew of this work but the first time he actually saw the standards was in the newspapers.

The way in which Government is organized is a matter of policy.

And because of this—because of the way HEW has organized its health functions—the man responsible for health policy is actually precluded from exercising his authority.

To begin to change this situation, we propose as a first step toward reorganization of HEW the creation of the Office of Under Secretary for Health.

This position should comprise line responsibilities over health program policy and management.

Furthermore, we propose that the Under Secretary should have four Assistant Secretaries for the following functions: Budget and planning; science, manpower, and education; health care services; and consumer protection.

We do not propose to introduce legislation at this time to effect this reorganization. Rather, we plan to invite Secretary Robert Finch and Assistant Secretary Roger Egeberg to discuss this matter with us.

A broad reorganization of HEW—even the first steps—must involve jointly the executive branch department and the congressional committees with jurisdiction.

Such a reorganization should not be the result of any unilateral action on the part of either the executive branch or the Congress.

Though the situation at HEW must be corrected, there are broader considerations raised by the spread of Federal

health programs across 23 separate departments and agencies.

These are beyond the control of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

We cannot assume that HEW alone can influence the health policy and programs of the Department of Defense, or the Veterans' Administration or even any of the other score of departments and agencies with health programs.

But he can demand that there be some overall health policy. We can give to the executive branch a mechanism to bring about that policy.

We therefore propose the Health Organization Act of 1969.

This legislation would establish in the Executive Office of the President a Council of Health Advisers.

This Council would recommend to the President an overall health policy.

It would suggest to the President means to bring that policy about.

It would maintain an ongoing review of the Federal health bureaucracy and a continuing surveillance of health problems in order to recommend to the President changes that should be made.

This legislation is patterned after the Full Employment Act of 1946, that established the Council of Economic Advisers. But most importantly, it set up a Federal employment policy.

Likewise, the Health Organization Act would make it the official policy of the Government of the United States that all citizens have equal and available access to health care.

For years, we have heard that health care is a matter of right. But at no time has the Congress or the Federal Government placed its intentions and resources squarely behind this principle.

It is high time that we do.

But when we do, we must be sure that the laws and programs that we have passed and will pass relate to that policy.

The Health Organization Act would empower the Council of Health Advisers to recommend to the President procedures to coordinate various Federal health programs across agency lines. It would propose program consolidations. And it would propose where necessary that programs be eliminated.

The Council, would be composed of three individuals, appointed by the President with the advise and consent of the Senate. It would have a staff of specialists to assist it.

Beyond its responsibility of ongoing review of the Federal health bureaucracy, the Council would keep constant watch on developments in the Nation affecting public health.

And it would make determinations as to whether Federal programs are available to effectively deal with problems as they arise.

The Council also would gather timely information on the incidence of morbidity and mortality rates.

Again, this would act as a check against the hundreds of health programs which the Federal Government has established without adequate information.

Furthermore, this legislation would

require the President to send to the Congress an annual health report giving an inventory of the Nation's health problems. He would use this vehicle to propose legislation necessary to make Federal programs responsive to the health care needs of the people.

Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference the Health Organization Act.

I ask unanimous consent that, immediately following my remarks, the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD along with a list of Federal health training and education programs to illustrate the number of programs and their spread throughout the bureaucracy.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill and material will be printed in the RECORD, as requested.

The bill (S. 2898) to establish within the Executive Office of the President a Council of Health Advisers in order to improve the organization of agencies within the executive branch of the Government concerned with health programs and to strengthen the coordination of health programs introduced by Mr. RIBICOFF, was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Government Operations, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 2898

Be it enacted in the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Health Organization Act".

THE COUNCIL OF HEALTH ADVISERS TO THE PRESIDENT

SEC. 2. There is hereby created in the Executive Office of the President a Council of Health Advisers (hereinafter referred to as the "Council"). The Council shall be composed of three members who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and each of whom shall be a person who, as a result of his training, experience, and attainments, is exceptionally qualified to appraise programs and activities of the Federal Government in the light of the policy declared in section 4, and to formulate and recommend programs to carry out such policy. Each member of the Council, other than the Chairman, shall receive compensation at the rate prescribed for Level IV of the Executive Schedule by section 5315 of title 5 of the United States Code. The President shall designate one of the members of the Council as Chairman who shall receive compensation at the rate prescribed for Level II of the Executive Schedule by section 5313 of such title.

(b) The Chairman of the Council is authorized to employ, and fix the compensation of, such specialists and other experts as may be necessary to carry out its functions under this Act, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and without regard to the provisions of Chapter 51 and subchapter III of Chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, and is authorized, subject to such provisions, to employ such other officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out its functions under this Act, and fix their compensation in accordance with the provisions of such chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53.

(c) It shall be the duty and function of the Council—

(1) to assist and advise the President in the preparation of the Health Report pursuant to section 3 of this Act;

(2) to develop and recommend to the President procedures for the interagency coordination of Federal health programs, to propose interagency consolidations of programs and elimination of programs to assure the efficient, effective, and economic operation of all Federal health programs and to avoid waste and duplication;

(3) to appraise all Federal health programs in light of the policy declared in section 4 for the purpose of determining the extent to which each such program is coordinated with other Federal health programs and with State, local and private health programs and make recommendations to the President with respect thereto;

(4) to develop and recommend to the President reallocation of funds expended on Federal health programs in order to assure more efficient and effective health care and to avoid waste and duplication;

(5) to develop and recommend to the President a national health strategy for carrying out the policy declared in section 4 and to maintain a constant surveillance of all matters which have or offer the prospect of impairing health;

(6) to appraise and evaluate the various Federal health programs in light of the policy declared in section 4 for the purpose of determining the extent to which such programs and activities are contributing to the achievement of such policy, and to make recommendations to the President with respect thereto;

(7) to gather timely and authoritative information concerning health developments and health trends, both current and prospective, to analyze and interpret such information in light of the policy declared in section 4 for the purpose of determining whether such developments and trends are interfering, or are likely to interfere, with the achievement of such policy, and to compile and submit to the President studies relating to such developments and trends and their relationship to the organization and coordination of Federal health programs;

(8) to make and furnish such studies, reports, and recommendations with respect to matters of Federal health policy and legislation as the President may request.

(d) The Council shall make an annual report to the President in January of each year.

(e) In exercising its powers, functions, and duties under this Act—

(1) the Council may constitute such advisory committees and may consult with such representatives of the private health services community—including representatives of health care groups, health care underwriters, health researchers and educators—and other groups, organizations, and individuals as it deems advisable;

(2) the Council shall, to the fullest extent possible, use the services, facilities, and information (including statistical information) of other Government agencies as well as of private research agencies, in order to avoid duplication of effort and expense.

HEALTH REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

SEC. 3. (a) The President shall transmit to the Congress not later than March 31 of each year a report to be known as the "Health Report", setting forth (1) the actual and current condition of the health of the people of the United States, the ability of the people to acquire health care, the cost of such care and an evaluation of the state of the nation's health in light of the policy declared in section 4; (2) the current incidence of morbidity and mortality attributable to major disease categories by state; (3) the current

and foreseeable trends in the ability the people of the United States to acquire health care, the cost of such care and state of the nation's health; (4) a review of health conditions affecting employment in the United States and a review of the financial, habitation, industrial, environmental and other conditions affecting the health of the nation and the individual's ability to acquire health care; and (5) a program for carrying out the policy declared in section 4, together with such recommendations for legislation as he may deem necessary or desirable.

(b) The President may transmit from time to time to the Congress reports supplementary to the Health Report, each of which

shall include such supplementary or revised recommendations as he may deem necessary or desirable to achieve the policy declared in section 4.

(c) The Health Report, and all supplementary reports, transmitted under subsection (b) of this section, shall, when transmitted to Congress, be referred to duly authorized committees of the Congress having jurisdiction of the subject matter of the report.

SEC. 4. The Congress hereby declares that it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to effect the improved planning, administration, coordination, and operation of all Federal health programs designed to furnish all citizens

equal and available access to health care; and encourage the assistance and cooperation of health care groups, underwriters of care, health researchers and educators, consumer groups and State and local government in carrying out such policy; and to promote research on disease prevention, control and eradication, techniques in medical education, and new methods of health care delivery and financing.

SEC. 5. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums, not to exceed \$1,250,000, in any fiscal year, as may be necessary to enable the Council to carry out its functions under this Act.

The material presented by Mr. RIBICOFF is as follows:

INVENTORY OF HEALTH MANPOWER TRAINING PROGRAMS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE AND OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES

[See p. 29 for exclusions and footnotes]

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Public Health Service, Consumer Protection and Environmental Health Service Environmental Control Administration			
Legislation	Public Health Service Act, as amended Section 301 (d)	P.L. 78-410, 42 USC 241 Section 301 (c)	Partnership for Health Amendments of 1967 (P.L. 90-174), Section 314(e) of the Public Health Service Act; Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-602), Section 356 (a) (2) and (b) (2) of the Public Health Service Act.	
Program	Environmental Health Research Training Grants at graduate level.	Environmental Health Fellowships at graduate level.	Radiological Health Specialist Project Training Grants.	Radiological Health In-house Training Program.
Type of aid	Project grants to schools for support of graduate or specialized research training in environmental health (water supply, injury control, occupational health, community sanitation, housing hygiene) to increase manpower supply. Also, grants to students thru schools for graduate training of research and teaching personnel.	Direct grants to doctoral and post-doctoral students for specialized research training in environmental health, to increase national competence in the field.	Project grants to schools with programs at the junior college and graduate level of 1 academic year or more offering specialized courses in radiological health and public health, to help meet current and future health manpower needs for specialists and technicians. Also grants to students thru schools.	Short-term training for persons working with radiation or responsible for radiation control, to increase their competence in radiological health practice in Federal, State, local—public and private—agencies (in U.S. and foreign countries).
Level of education ²	PD, D, M	PD, D	PD, D, M, AA	C, all levels
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	Project grants to 30 schools, 244 students (biology, chemistry, engineering, food science, industrial hygiene, medicine, psychology, social science, urban planning).	Grants to 12 students (engineering, psychology, social science, toxicology, urban planning).	Project grants to 40 institutions, 411 students, all in health occupations (including administration, biology, chemistry, engineering, health education, industrial hygiene, medical technology, medicine, pharmacy, physics, public health radiological health, sanitary engineering, veterinary medicine).	1,932 persons trained Occupation Students Administrator..... 67 Chemist..... 113 Dentist..... 74 Engineer..... 203 Health Physicist..... 111 Physician..... 71 Sanitarian..... 68 Technician..... 451 Other..... 774 1,932
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health \$2,069,000	All for health \$73,000	All for health \$2,767,000	All for health \$725,000

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Public Health Service, Consumer Protection and Environmental Health Service Environmental Control Administration		Food and Drug Administration	National Air Pollution Control Administration	
Legislation	Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-272), Sec. 204.	Public Health Service Act.....	Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, as amended.	Air Quality Act of 1967 (P.L. 90-147), Sec. 103(b)(3)(5).	
Program	Solid Wastes Research Training Grants at graduate level.	Environmental Health In-house Training Program.	Food and Drug Administration In-house Training Program.	Air Pollution Training Grants	Air Pollution Special Fellowships.
Type of aid	Project grants to schools for support of graduate or specialized research training for professional health personnel in solid waste treatment, disposal, or management. Also grants to students thru schools, for training of research and teaching personnel.	Short-term training, up to 10 days, for persons concerned with urban and industrial health (solid waste, environmental sanitation, etc.), in Federal, State, local-public and private-agencies, through workshops, seminars, etc.	Short-term training for persons in health agencies at Federal, State, and local levels, to provide comprehensive inspectional techniques (medicated feed mill inspection, food inspection, etc.) through seminars, etc.	Training grants to schools and institutions (public and private) to improve training opportunities for persons interested in careers in air pollution control and related fields.	Direct fellowship grants to qualified individuals thru institutions for continuance of air pollution oriented education.
Level of education	PD, D, M	C, all levels	C, all levels	C, PD, D, M, PB, B, AA, V, HS	C, PD, D, M.
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	Project grants to 10 schools, 49 students (chemistry, engineering urban planning).	3,717 persons trained Occupation Students Administrator..... 106 Chemist..... 141 Engineer..... 433 Industrial Hygienist..... 88 Microbiologist..... 54 Nurse..... 184 Sanitarian..... 715 Statistician..... 68 Other..... 1,928 3,717	440 persons trained Occupation Students Food and Drug inspector..... 440	Training grants, 28 institutions, 289 students. Occupation Students Biological science..... 71 Engineering..... 69 Medicine..... 9 Meteorology..... 17 Physica. science..... 19 Social science..... 30 Technology..... 54 Other..... 20 289	Special Fellowships to 65 students. Occupation Students Biology..... 13 Chemistry..... 19 Engineering..... 19 Meteorology..... 9 Social sciences and administration..... 5 65
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health \$443,307	All for health \$584,900	All for health \$12,000 (excluding faculty salaries).	All for health \$3,276,000	All for health \$468,000.

Footnotes at end of table.

INVENTORY OF HEALTH MANPOWER TRAINING PROGRAMS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,¹ EDUCATION, AND WELFARE AND OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES—Continued

[See p. 29 for exclusions and footnotes]

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE				
	Public Health Service Consumer Protection and Environmental Health Service National Air Pollution Control Administration, Cont.	Health Services and Mental Health Community Health Service	Health Administration Federal Health Programs Service		National Center for Commu- nicable Disease Control.
Legislation	Air Quality Act of 1967 (P.L. 90-148), Sec. 103(b)(3)(5).	Public Health Service Act, as amended by P.L. 89-749, Section 314(c).	Public Health Service Act.		Public Health Service Act, as amended.
Program	Air Pollution In-house Training Program.	Training, studies, and demon- strations in health planning.	In-house training for employes and others who are trained in PHS facilities.	In-house training in emergency health care for health workers from governmental and private agencies, and the general public.	Communicable Disease Pre- vention and Control In-house Training.
Type of aid	Short-term training for persons in Federal, State, and local agencies, and in private organizations, to increase their competence in specific areas of air pollution prevention and control.	General support of education and training in graduate schools, health facilities, and professional societies to meet the need for compre- hensive health planning. Includes consumer training to increase their knowledge in the area of comprehensive health planning.	Training provided for physicians, dentists, nurses, and allied health personnel for career development.	Training for health profes- sionals, health workers, and the public for health needs resulting from emergencies and disasters.	Short-term training for prac- ticing health professionals to strengthen communicable disease prevention and con- trol in health agencies at the Federal, State, and local levels in the U.S., and in health agencies of foreign countries.
Level of education,	C, all levels.	C, M.	All levels.	C, PD, other.	C, all others.
Institutions or individuals supported, FY 68.	Occupations Administrator..... 70 Chemist..... 216 Engineer..... 481 Health Educator..... 6 Industrial Hygienist..... 61 Meteorologist..... 64 Physical Scientist..... 0 Sanitarian..... 171 Statistician..... 13 Technician..... 64 Other..... 118 1,264 Five orientation courses were presented with a total enrollment of 148.	18 institutions and 1,153 students supported.	Occupational Area Dentistry..... 52 Dietetics..... 12 Hospital Administration..... 1 Medical Records librarian..... 11 Medicine..... 194 Nursing..... 2 Pharmacy..... 25 Professional Assistant..... 369 Purser-pharmacist mates..... 27 693	Students 1,350 Health and Medical facilities pre- paredness..... *1,000 Medical self help general public..... 2,355,928 Physician and Nurse (CBW Defense)..... 86 Physicians..... 3,100 Professional schools..... 1,450 Staff training..... 6,600 2,339,514 *Approximate.	12,434 persons trained at 242 courses; included were 3,013 physicians, 2,471 vector control specialists, and 2,022 nurses.
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health \$650,000.	All for health \$1,492,494.	All for health \$2,959,004.	All for health \$562,839.	All for health \$1,451,426.

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE				
	Public Health Service, Health Services and Mental Health Administration Indian Health Service	Health Services and Mental Health Administration	National Center for Health Statistics		
Legislation	Public Health Service Act		Public Health Service Act, as amended P.L. 78-410, 42 U.S.C. 241, Section 301		
Program	Training in Public Health Service Indian Health Service facilities and other institu- tions for the educational advancement of members of Indian groups, PHS Indian Health Service Personnel, and other individuals.	Long-term professional Training	Training for Measurement of Population Change (In-house and University program).	Applied Statistics Training Institute (In-house Program).	Cause-of-Death Coding Work- shops and comparability seminars (In-house Program).
Type of aid	In-service training, per diem and travel allowance, sala- ries, and other forms of aid.	Long-term training in institu- tions of higher learning and other research oriented institutions.	Training of foreign students associated with government, universities, or research foundations in countries where statistics are insuffi- cient to meet needs; pro- vides a thorough foundation in birth- and death-registra- tion methods, sample surveys or evaluation of family plan- ning programs in the NCHS and the University of North Carolina.	Training in practical applica- tions of registration, manage- ment, and statistical meth- ods, primarily for adminis- trators, vital records person- nel, health statisticians, and allied members of public health teams in Federal, State, and local health de- partments.	Training programs on the class- ification of the cause-of-death according to the International Classification of Diseases; Adapted for use in the U.S. primarily for employes of State and local health depart- ments, to develop or improve competencies of nosologists, medical record librarians, or vital statistics clerks. Funds for student travel and per diem.
Level of education	C, PD, D, M, B, AA, O(LPN), OJT, HS, GC	PD, M	C, PB with graduate credit.	C	C
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	Occupational Area In-service short- term training..... 4,000 Social work aide..... 4 Practical nurse..... 87 Advanced LPN..... 2 Alaskan community health aide..... 66 Medical record tech- nician..... 10 COSTEP..... 43 Dental internship..... 3 Medical residency..... 25 Other professional residencies..... 5 4,245	42 individuals supported.	AID PASA provided a budget of \$49,862 for salaries and travel of the training unit and consultants. Seven statisti- cians supported by AID par- ticipated in the program.	The first ASTI course was pre- sented July 1968, or in FY 1968. At that time 58 stu- dents funded by employing agencies were enrolled. In FY 1968 about \$1,300 was spent for course develop- ment.	100 students from 35 states—34 students funded by NCHS; 66 students funded by employing agency. Occupation Clinical supervisors..... 3 Clerks (statistical) and aides..... 42 Coders..... 4 Nosologists..... 22 State registrars..... 7 Statisticians and analyst..... 9 Vital statistics su- pervisors..... 13 100
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health \$1,760,000	\$329,000	See above	All for health \$1,300	\$5,137.37

Footnotes at end of table.

INVENTORY OF HEALTH MANPOWER TRAINING PROGRAMS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE AND OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES—Continued

[See p. 29 for exclusions and footnotes]

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Public Health Service, Health Services and Mental Health Administration National Institute of Mental Health				
Legislation	Public Health Service Act, as amended, P.L. 78-410, Section 301(a).		Regional Medical Programs	Public Health Service Act, Title IX, Sec. 900 as authorized by Dept. of Labor and HEW Appropriations Act (P.L. 90-557)	Public Health Service Act, Section 314(e)—P.L. 89-749 as amended by P.L. 90-174.
Program	Mental Health Training Grants Program for institutional and student support of education and training of physicians, psychologists, nurses, social workers, nursing aides, and other types of mental health workers.	Mental Health research fellowship and research scientist development programs for institutional and student support of education and training of psychologists, psychiatrists, biological and social scientists, and other types of mental health research workers.	Regional Medical Programs	Neurological and Sensory Disease Control Program	Cancer Control Training—Special Procedures Training
Type of aid	Grants to institutions, including graduate and professional schools, senior colleges, junior colleges, hospitals, other health facilities and health agencies to help meet the nation's need for professional personnel in the area of mental health. Includes grants to students thru institutions.	Stipends to students in graduate and professional schools to help meet the need for professional research personnel in the area of mental health.	Project grants to regional medical programs for continuing education and training, to bring to patients the latest advances of heart disease, cancer, stroke, and related diseases.	Project grants to institutions to improve community services by providing additional training of health personnel in fields of neurological and sensory diseases.	Project grants to institutions for short-term training, to increase utilization of procedures important to cancer controls.
Level of education	C, PD, I&R, D, M, B, AA	D, PD	C, V, OJT	C, PD, D, M, V	C
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	Number of institutions supported: 630; 9,614 trainee stipends Occupation Students Nurses..... 1,377 Physicians (D)..... 1,362 Physicians (PD)..... 2,406 Psychologists..... 1,362 Social workers..... 1,779 9,614 Institutional support: \$49,433,000 Student support \$35,358,000	1,100 research fellowships and research scientist awards Occupation Students Biological scientists..... 30 Psychiatrists..... 34 Psychologists..... 683 Social scientists..... 318 Other..... 35 1,100 Institutional support: \$2,704,079 Student support \$7,347,373	Grants to regional medical programs supporting 152 institutions Occupation Students Nurse..... 1,900 Physician..... 860 Other allied health personnel..... 188 2,948	Grants to 41 institutions. Occupation Students Electroencephalographic technician..... 46 Neurological, neuro-surgical nurse..... 8 Ophthalmic assistant..... 5 Physician..... 14 Social worker..... 14 Speech and hearing pathologist..... 119 Other trainees..... 1,071 1,277	Grants to 11 institutions; 592 physicians, dentists, technologists, nurses, and other health workers, trained.
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health \$84,791,000	All for health \$10,051,452	All for health \$9,000,000 est.	All for health \$1,313,171	All for health \$454,197

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Public Health Service, Health Services and Mental Health Administration Regional Medical Programs				
Legislation	Public Health Service Act, Section 314(e)—P.L. 89-749 as amended by P.L. 90-174				
Program	Cancer Control Training—Cancer Specialty Training.	Cancer Control Training—Short Term Medical Technologist Training.	Cancer Control Training—Cytotechnology.	Cancer Control Training—Senior Clinical Traineeships.	Cancer Control Training—Symposia, Conferences.
Type of aid	Project grants to institutions to provide training in application of their specialties to clinical oncology for graduates in other than medicine.	Project grants to institutions to train medical technologists in advances in laboratory procedures and techniques.	Project grants to institutions to train cytotechnologists eligible for certification by the Registry of Medical Technologists, ASCP.	Project grants to institutions for intensive training in clinical oncology within their specialties for physicians who have completed Board-required residencies.	Project grants to institutions to provide multi-specialty and inter-disciplinary summations of status of research, capability, and practice in phases of clinical oncology.
Level of education	PD, M	C, PB	V	PD	
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	Grants to 8 institutions, 29 trained.	Grants to 7 institutions; 416 medical technologists trained.	Grants to 61 institutions; about 437 cytotechnologists trained.	Grants to 60 institutions; 93 physicians trained.	Grants to 5 institutions; symposia and conferences attended by approximately 600 persons.
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health \$195,804	All for health \$234,991	All for health \$1,396,104	All for health \$996,538	All for health \$60,446.

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Public Health Service, Health Services and Mental Health Administration Regional Medical Programs			
Legislation	Public Health Service Act, Section 314(e)—P.L. 89-749, as amended by P.L. 90-174			
Program	Cancer Control Training—Cancer Detection	Cancer Control Training—Cancer Clerkships	Cancer Control Training—Radiation Therapy Technology	Cancer Control Training—Hospital Clinical Training
Type of aid	Project grants to institutions to increase use of cancer detection procedures on asymptomatic patients.	Project grants to institutions for summer training of medical students, to expose them to high standards of oncologic practice.	Project grants to institutions to train technologists to assist radiation therapists, and to test curricula and entrance qualifications.	Project grants to institutions to strengthen continuing education in cancer control for physicians and others associated with community general hospitals.
Level of education	C.	D.	V.	C.
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	Grants to 4 health agencies sponsoring continuing education projects; 1,902 trainees.	Grants to 3 institutions; 11 medical students trained.	Grants to 4 institutions; approximately 34 radiation therapy technologists trained.	Grants to 43 institutions; number of participants in hospital clinical training not available.
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health \$122,980	All for health \$9,112	All for health \$234,633	All for health \$1,092,159.

Footnotes at end of table.

INVENTORY OF HEALTH MANPOWER TRAINING PROGRAMS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE AND OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES—Continued

[See p. 29 for exclusions and footnotes]

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health Bureau of Health Professions Education and Manpower Training				
Legislation	Nurse Training Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-581) as amended by Part D of the Allied Health Professions Personnel Training Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-751) and by Title II Health Manpower Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-490) effective FY 70				
Program	Payments to Diploma Schools of Nursing (expires FY 69); replaced by Institutional Grants to Schools of Nursing (HM Act, Title II, Part B)	Project Grants for Improvement of Nurse Training (amended by HM Act, Title II, Part B)	Construction Grants for Schools of Nursing (amended by HM Act, Title II, Part A)	Nursing Student Loans (amended by HM Act, Title II, Part C)	Nursing Education Opportunity Grants (expires FY 69); replaced by Nursing Scholarship Program.
Type of aid	Formula grants to reimburse schools for partial cost of educating students whose enrollment is attributable to the Nurse Training Act.	Project grants to help schools of nursing strengthen, improve, and expand their educational programs.	Grants to schools for construction or renovation of teaching facilities. Matching requirement: Federal share up to 66 2/3% for major expansion and new schools and up to 50% for renovation.	Loans up to \$1,500 per academic year to students in need thru schools of nursing. Up to 100% in shortage hospitals (aggregate of \$6,000 to any student for all years). Up to 50% forgiveness of loan for full-time service in nursing.	Grants up to \$1,500 per 12-month period for students of exceptional financial need who require such financial assistance to pursue the course of study.
Level of Education	0	M, B, O, AA	D, M, B, O, AA	D, M, B, O, AA	D, M, B, O, AA
Institutions or individuals supported, FY 68.	Formula grants to 382 diploma schools with an enrollment of 47,029 students.	Project grants to 113 institutions: Level Students Masters and baccalaureate..... 11,190 Associate arts..... 595 Diploma..... 5,065 16,850	Construction grants: 27 institutions; 1,235 spaces created and 3,032 spaces improved.	Loans to 24,532 students.	Grants to 7,757 students.
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health, \$3,000,000.	All for health, \$4,000,000.	All for health, \$19,382,000.	All for health, \$16,380,885.	All for health, \$4,120,000.

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health Bureau of Health Professions Education and Manpower Training			
Legislation	Nurse Training Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-581) as amended by Part D of the Allied Health Professions Personnel Training Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-751) and by Title II Health Manpower Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-490) effective FY 70	Public Health Service Act, Section 301 (c) as amended (42 USC 241(c) and (d)) as amended (42 USC 241 (d))		
Program	Professional Nurse Traineeships (extended by HM Act, Title II, Part C)	Special Nurse Research Fellowship Program	Nurse Scientist Graduate Training Program	Faculty Research Development Grants
Type of aid	Traineeships to RN's thru schools of nursing, to prepare for positions as administrators, supervisors, clinical specialists, and teachers.	Fellowships directly to individuals seeking full-time study at the predoctoral or postdoctoral level to prepare nurses to do independent research, to collaborate in interdisciplinary research, and/or to stimulate and guide research of importance to nursing.	Grants usually made to graduate schools of nursing to expand doctoral programs in university departments of basic science and to provide training stipends to nurses who are studying full time towards doctoral degrees in biological, physical, or behavioral science.	To increase research skills and competencies of nurse faculty members.
Level of education	C, M, B	PD, D	PD, D	
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	Traineeships to 5,966 persons (2,095 long-term, and 3,871 short-term)	Fellowships to 114 predoctoral students and 1 postdoctoral student.	Grants to 7 institutions and 65 trainees	Grants to 9 institutions
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health \$10,000,000	All for Health \$520,000	All for health \$580,000	All for health \$388,210

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health Bureau of Health Professions Education and Manpower Training			
Legislation	Public Health Service Act as amended, Section 422(f)		Public Health Service Act, as amended, Section 301(d)	Public Health Service Act, as amended Section 301(c)
Program	Continuing Dental Education	Dental Auxiliary Utilization Program	Predoctoral Research Fellowships in Dental Health	Special Research Fellowships in Dental Health
Type of aid	Project grants to assist schools of dentistry and other public and non-profit institutions to establish, expand and improve organized programs of continuing education that will provide the widest possible source of courses in the science of dentistry in as many decentralized locations as possible in order to assure availability to all practicing dentists.	Project grants to dental schools to assist in developing a formal, continuing program of instruction in methodology of team dentistry. Intended to increase dentist productivity through instruction in utilization of dental auxiliaries.	Fellowships through graduate schools, for predoctoral research relevant to dental public health.	Fellowships directly to individuals with 3 or more years of postdoctoral research, in institutions with appropriate research facilities and staff. Fellowships designated to provide advanced or specialized training relevant to dental health research.
Level of education	C	D	D, M	PD
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	Grants to 5 institutions	Grants to 49 institutions enrolling 8,810 dentists	3 fellowships (1 each to a psychologist, a sociologist, and a statistician)	5 fellowships awarded Occupation Students Epidemiologist..... 1 Health Administrator..... 1 Health Systems Analyst..... 1 Psychologist..... 1 Sociologist..... 1
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health \$200,000	All for health \$3,000,000	All for health \$15,500	All for health \$83,962

Footnotes at end of tables.

INVENTORY OF HEALTH MANPOWER TRAINING PROGRAMS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE AND OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES—Continued

[See p. 29 for exclusions and footnotes]

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health Bureau of Health Professions Education and Manpower Training			
Legislation	Public Health Service Act, Section 301(d) as amended by P.L. 86-798 in 1960			Public Health Service Act, Title VII, Section 704
Program	Biomedical Sciences Support Grants	General Research Support Grants	Health Sciences Advancement Awards	Health Research Facilities Construction Grants
Type of aid	Grants provide funds—complementary to research project system—to be used flexibly by the institutions to advance health related research and research training programs of academic institutions (other than health professional schools).	Grants provide continuing funds to advance health related research and research training programs of health professional schools, hospitals, health departments, and other non-academic research organizations.	Awards assist graduate, academic institutions engaged in biomedical research and research training to achieve specified goals of outstanding national leadership.	Grants to universities or other eligible institutions for construction of facilities for research and research training in sciences related to health
Level of education	PD, D, M	PD, D, M	PD, D, M	PD, D, M
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	Grants to 102 academic institutions	Grants to 311 institutions	Grants to 9 institutions	Grants to 41 institutions
	FY 67 awards for Biomedical Sciences Support Grants, General Research Support Grants, and Health Sciences Advancement Awards—the three programs combined supported 3,457 trainees, principally during the summer and off-quarter periods.			
	Occupation		Students	
	Anatomist.....		48	
	Chemist.....		111	
	Dentist.....		426	
	Microbiologist.....		36	
	Pathologist.....		28	
	Pharmacologist.....		44	
	Osteopathic physician.....		93	
	Physician (Other).....		2,320	
	Physiologist.....		69	
	Other.....		282	
			3,457	
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health \$7,500,000	All for health \$48,174,445	All for health \$4,000,000	All for health \$39,500,000

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health Bureau of Health Professions Education and Manpower Training			
Legislation	Public Health Service Act (Sec. 309(c)) as amended by the Partnership for Health Amendments of 1967 (P.L. 90-174)	Public Health Service Act (Sec. 309(a)) as amended by Health Manpower Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-490) for FY 70	Public Health Service Act (Sec. 306) as amended by Health Manpower Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-490)	
Program	Formula Grants to Schools of Public Health	Project Grants for Public Health Training	Public Health Traineeships	
Type of aid	Formula grants to accredited schools of public health to offset a portion of the difference between tuition income and the costs of educating Federally-sponsored students, and to provide for training and services in fields of public health and in administration of State and local public health programs.	Project grants to schools of dentistry, engineering, medicine, osteopathy, nursing, and public health to strengthen or expand graduate or specialized public health training.	Traineeships to support graduate or specialized training in public health for professional health personnel. Grants both directly to individuals and to training institutions for distribution.	
Level of education	C, PD, R, D, M	C, D, M, B	C, PD, R, D, M, PB, B; and also apprenticeships in public health.	
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	Formula grants to 15 institutions enrolling 2,331 students. Occupations trained include dentists, health administrators, health educators, nurses, physicians, sanitarians, statisticians, and others.	Project grants to 91 institutions which provide training in environmental health and environmental health engineering, preventive medicine and dentistry, public health nursing, and public health.	Traineeships to 1,509 long-term trainees	
			Occupation	Long-term trainees
			Dentist.....	47
			Dental hygienist.....	16
			Environmental health engineer.....	149
			Environmental health, other.....	135
			Health educator.....	132
			Hospital & Medical care Adm.....	214
			Lab. personnel.....	24
			Nurse.....	372
			Nutritionist.....	60
			Physician.....	99
			Sanitarian.....	19
			Statistician.....	18
			Veterinarian.....	6
			Other.....	218
			Sub-total.....	1,509
			Physician-dentist:	
			Apprenticeship.....	547
			Residency.....	60
			Misc. Occup.-short term.....	11,616
			Grand Total.....	13,732
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health \$4,000,000	All for health \$4,498,950	All for health \$7,821,000	

Footnotes at end of tables.

INVENTORY OF HEALTH MANPOWER TRAINING PROGRAMS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE AND OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES—Continued
[See p. 29 for exclusions and footnotes]

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health National Library of Medicine			
Legislation	Medical Library Assistance Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-291)			
	Public Health Service Act, Title III, Section 394	Public Health Service Act, Title III, Section 393	Public Health Service Act, Title III, Section 394	National Library of Medicine, Act of 1956 (P.L. 84-941) Public Health Service Act, Title III, Section 371
Program	Training Grants for Biomedical Communications specialists	Medical Library Construction Grants	Postdoctoral Fellowships in Health Communications	In-house Classes for MEDLARS (Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System) Analysts
Type of aid	Project grants to academic institutions to train biomedical communication specialists (including medical librarians). Grants may be for pro- gram support and student stipends.	Construction grants to health science schools, hospitals, and other health institutions to construct or renovate medical library facilities. Federal share not greater than 75% of the necessary construction costs.	Direct grants to librarians or informa- tion specialists for postdoctoral fellowships in research related to health communications.	Training course for NLM librarians and employees of NLM grant re- cipients and contractors as MEDLARS analysts (Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System Information Specialists)—four month duration.
Level of education	C, PD, D, M, and health library internships	—	PD	C, M
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	Grants to 15 institutions Occupation Students Biomedical communications specialist..... 12 Biomedical editor..... 3 Medical historian..... 8 Medical librarian..... 60 83	Grants to 9 institutions in medicine and optometry	Grants to 3 students in health science history	50 individuals received training
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health \$893,190	All for health \$10,000,000	All for health \$29,167	All for health \$100,000 (approximate)

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke			
		Division of Research Grants		
Legislation	Public Health Service Act Title IV, Sec. 433	Sections of the Public Health Service Act establishing the several NIH research institutes, Secs. 301 and 433		Public Health Service Act, Title II, Sec. 301
Program	Direct Traineeships including Special Fellowships and Cerebrovascular Traineeships	NIH Research Fellowships (Predoc- toral, Postdoctoral, and Special)	NIH Training Grants (excluding NLM & BEMT)	Grants Associates Program
Type of aid	Direct grants to students in research and academic medicine, in cerebro- vascular disease area in graduate schools and hospitals.	In the Predoctoral Fellowship Pro- gram, grants for students through educational institutions, whereas in the Postdoctoral (excludes Office of International Research Postdoctoral Fellowship Programs for foreign students) and Special Fellowship Programs direct grants to students in schools, hospitals, and other nonprofit research institutions. These grants promote training for research in health and health related areas.	Grants in support of students and the training institutions (institutions of higher education, hospitals, research institutes, and health agencies) for training for research, teaching, and related services in the health sciences and related fields.	One year in-house training in health science administration of extramural programs of the NIH. Consisting of a formal series of seminars on public administration and manage- ment of Federal programs and a series of informal on-the-job assign- ments to components of the NIH, PHS, and other various Federal agencies.
Level of Education	C, PD	C, PD, D, M (Not first professional)	PD, I&R, D, M (Not first professional)	C, (PD)
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	Grants to 202 students Occupation Students Neurologist..... 38 Neurosurgeon..... 7 Ophthalmologist..... 31 Otolaryngologist..... 6 Pathologist..... 22 Pediatrician..... 45 Physiologist..... 4 Radiologist..... 17 Other..... 32 202	Awards to 3,231 students Field of Training Students Anatomy..... 96 Biochemistry..... 454 Biomedical engineering..... 79 Biophysics..... 180 Cell Biology..... 208 Chemistry..... 546 Genetics..... 152 Microbiology..... 309 Pharmacology..... 81 Physiology..... 320 Social sciences..... 95 Other..... 711 3,231	Grants to 14,997 individuals sup- ported in 1967 Occupation Students Anatomist..... 492 Biomedical engineer..... 314 Chemist..... 1,473 Dentist..... 342 Geneticist..... 556 Math./Stat..... 331 Microbiologist..... 1,037 Pharmacologist..... 578 Physician..... 5,484 Physicist..... 491 Physiologist..... 809 Psychologist..... 392 Other..... 2,698 14,997	10 individuals
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health, \$2,303,000	All for health, \$22,812,707	All for health, \$134,951,000	All for health, \$230,000

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health			
		Division of Research Grants	National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (formerly OD/OIR)	Fogarty International Center
Legislation	Public Health Service Act, Title II, Sec. 207 (g).	Public Health Service Act, Title III, Sec. 308.	Public Health Service Act, Title II, Sec. 207 (g) and (h).	Public Health Service Act, Sections 301 and 308.
Program	Staff Fellowship Program	International Research Career Development Program	The visiting program of the NIH Visiting Fellows, Visiting Associates, Visiting Scientists.	PHS International Postdoctoral Research Fellowships.

Footnotes at end of tables.

INVENTORY OF HEALTH MANPOWER TRAINING PROGRAMS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE AND OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES—Continued

[See p. 29 for exclusions and footnotes]

Type of aid	Two year awards (may be renewed twice for one additional year) to individuals for in-house research training in intramural labs of the NIH. Objective is to strengthen research in the biomedical sciences by insuring a continuous exchange of talented scientists between NIH and other research centers.	Direct appointments of individuals and Commissioned Officers in U.S. Public Health Service for overseas research training in specified health fields.	Awards to individuals (primarily foreign) invited to receive research training and experience in the intramural laboratories of the NIH.	Awards direct and thru institutions, to promote advanced training of foreign biomedical scientists in the U.S. These awards are made to schools, hospitals, health facilities and U.S. Government laboratories provide research training for careers in medical research.
Level of education	PD	C, (PD)	C, (PD)	PD
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	63 individuals.	8 physicians.	Awards to 162 individuals: 96 new appointments and 66 extensions.	Awards to 164 individuals Occupations Students Chemist..... 12 Geneticist..... 1 Immunologist..... 1 Microbiologist..... 6 Pharmacologist..... 2 Physician..... 123 Physicist..... 2 Physiologist..... 4 Veterinarian..... 2 Zoologist..... 1 Other..... 10 164
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health \$640,000	All for health \$165,000	All for health \$1,554,000	All for health \$1,380,000
Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Office of Education Bureau of Adult, Vocational, and Library Programs			Bureau of Education for the Handicapped
Legislation	Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965, P.L. 89-4; as amended in 1967, P.L. 90-103, Sections 211 and 214	Vocational Education Act of 1963, P.L. 88-210; as amended in 1968, P.L. 90-576		Training of Teachers for Handicapped, Act of 1958, P.L. 85-926; as amended in 1963, P.L. 88-164, 42 USC 611-617
Program	Vocational Education Facilities Grants	State Grants for Vocational and Technical Education	State Grants for Construction in Vocational Education	Formula Grants to States: Project Grants to Educational Institutions
Type of aid	Project grants to institutions to provide vocational education facilities in Appalachia (13 States) where such education is unavailable or inadequate. Construction grants for educational facilities with Federal share up to 50% of cost. Grants by Appalachian Regional Commission (Non-Federal) thru OE to applicants in States.	Formula grants to State Boards of Education for use in developing, maintaining, extending, and improving vocational and technical education programs. Federal funds must be matched by at least 50%	Construction grants to schools with a minimum of 5 occupational fields in vocational education. Grants may be used for basic, specialized, or library facilities, either space alteration or new space. Matching requirement: Federal share up to 50% of cost.	Formula grants to States: project grant ^s to colleges and universities, to train speech pathologists/audiologists in senior colleges, graduate schools, and Depts. of Education. Also, grants to students thru institutions.
Level of education	AA, V, HS, O	C, AA, V, HS, OJT, B, M, D, for educational personnel	C, AA, V, HS, OJT, O	D, M, B, C
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	92 grants: data not available on number of institutions and spaces created or improved. (In 3 years ending 6/30/68, 161 new or expanded vocational education facilities were built, accommodating 98,000 more students.)	Formula grants to each State and territory: 18,447 schools received aid, of which 1,115 conducted health occupations training for 143,550 students FY68 estimates: Occupation Students Dental assistant..... 8,500 Dental hygienist..... 2,000 Dental lab. technician..... 2,500 Medical lab. assistant..... 6,500 Medical office assistant..... 5,500 Nurse..... 12,000 Nurse's aide..... 35,200 Practical nurse..... 62,000 Other..... 9,350 143,550	371 projects funded	1,727 speech pathologists/audiologist trained Level Number Doctor's..... 34 Master's..... 506 Baccalaureate..... 59 Other..... 1,128 1,727
FY 68 funds obligated	Total \$13,657,026 Health not available	Total \$255,377,000 (VEA) Health \$10,383,000 (Fed. share)	FY67 expenditures: Total \$62,485,000 Health not available	Total \$24,500,000 Health \$3,700,000
Organization	Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Office of Education—Continued Bureau of Higher Education			
Legislation	Higher Education Act of 1965, P.L. 89-329, Title IV; Part A	Higher Education Amendments of 1968, P.L. 90-575, Title I Part C	Higher Education Amendments of 1968, P.L. 90-575, Title I Part B	Part B (under HEA of 1968, combined with guaranteed Student Loan Program—Higher Education)
Program	Educational Opportunity Grants	College Work-Study Program.	Guaranteed Student Loan Program—Higher Education.	Guaranteed Student Loan Program—Vocational Education.
Type of aid	Grants to students with exceptional financial need thru institutions, to meet any legitimate expenses of higher education in any course of study.	Grants to students with financial need, through reimbursement of educational institutions for part-time employment of such students, at the educational institution or elsewhere.	Student loan insurance programs established at qualified lending institutions such as banks, insurance companies, credit unions, and in some cases States, with interest up to 7% paid by Federal government. After education completed, student repays lender.	Insurance on loans by qualified lenders, or where none is available, by direct loan by the Commissioner of Education. Assistance available to post-high school students in approved programs.
Level of education	B, AA, V	C, PD, D, M, B, AA, V	D, M, B	V, AA, Other
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	Grant support of 292,600 students in FY 69; health occupations data not available.	310,000 total students of whom 5,332 worked in health occupations or at health facilities.	All occupations—488,106 students in 3,287 educational institutions; health occupations data not available.	All occupations—27,302 students in 2,884 vocational and technical schools; health occupations data not available.
FY 68 funds obligated	Total \$125,608,000 Health not available.	Total \$133,750,000 Health \$2,600,000.	Non-Federal loan commitments—\$412,320,601; Federal expenditures for interest—\$20,471,848 Health not available.	Non-Federal loan commitments—\$23,528,120; Federal expenditures for interest—\$517,689 Health not available.

Footnotes at end of tables.

INVENTORY OF HEALTH MANPOWER TRAINING PROGRAMS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,¹ EDUCATION, AND WELFARE AND OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES—Continued
 [See p. 29 for exclusions and footnotes]

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Office of Education		
	Bureau of Higher Education	Bureau of Educational Personnel Development	Bureau of Research
Legislation	Higher Education Act of 1965, P.L. 89-329, Title IV; Higher Education Amendments of 1968, P.L. 90-575, Title I National Defense Education Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-864, Title II, as amended by Part F of HEA Title IV, 1965)	Education Professions Development Act of 1967, P.L. 90-35, as amended in 1968.	Vocational Education Act of 1963, P.L. 88-210, Section 4c
Program	National Defense Student Loan Program	Education Professions Development Act, Parts C, D, and F Grants	Comprehensive and Vocational Education Research
Type of aid	Loan funds established at institutions of higher education, and at approved vocational or technical institutions offering programs of at least one year duration. Needy students may borrow for long term at low interest. Federal share to institutions up to 90%. Forgiveness to students up to 100% for teaching, under set conditions.	Grants to local education agencies, State education agencies, and institutions of higher education to support short-term training and fellowship programs for educational personnel, including some school health personnel such as school psychologists, health and physical education teachers.	Grants to local education agencies, State education agencies, and institutions of higher education to support research and short-term training.
Level of education	D, M, B, AA, V	C, M	C
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	All occupations—429,000 loans (210,000 new and 219,000 continuing) health occupations data not available.	Psychology, Health and Physical Education Fellowship Field Fellowships Psychology..... 58 Health and Physical Education... 105 163	Teacher education institute for new health occupations education teachers—20 Workshop on program development for training homemaker-home health aides—40
FY68 funds obligated	Total \$178,376,000 Health not available	Total \$27,500,000 Health \$1,107,775	Health \$39,892

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Social and Rehabilitation Service Administration on Aging																																																																									
	Children's Bureau																																																																									
Legislation	Older Americans Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-73, Title V) and amendments of 1967 (P.L. 90-42, Sec. 503 (a))	Social Security Act, as amended, (P.L. 90-248) Sec. 503	Sec. 504	Sec. 511																																																																						
Program	Training personnel for the field of aging including personnel for some health service	Training for Maternal and Child Health Services	Training for Crippled Children's Services	Training for Health Care of Mothers and Children																																																																						
Type of aid	Project grants to educational and other appropriate institutions to support programs in aging for the training of personnel in planning, administration, specialized services in aging, teaching, and practice. Also traineeships thru institutions.	Project grants to public or other non-profit institutions of higher learning to support instructional programs for the health care of mothers and children. Also traineeships thru institutions; clinical training includes support of services.	Project grants to public or other non-profit institutions of higher learning to train professional personnel to give health care and related services to crippled children. Also traineeships thru institutions; clinical training includes support of services.	Project grants to public or other non-profit institutions of higher learning to support instructional programs for the health care of mothers and children, particularly the mentally retarded and the handicapped. Also traineeships thru institutions. The funds support operations of university affiliated Mental Retardation Centers, including staffing.																																																																						
Level of education	C, D, M, B, OJT	All professional levels	All professional levels	All professional levels																																																																						
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	Grants to 5 institutions and to 632 trainees in these institutions	Grants to 39 institutions and to 210 long-term trainees; number of short-term trainees not available	Grants to 39 institutions and to 110 long-term trainees; number of short-term trainees not available	Grants to 12 institutions and to 78 long-term trainees; number of short-term trainees not available																																																																						
	<table border="0"> <tr> <th>Occupation</th> <th>Students</th> </tr> <tr> <td>Geriatrician.....</td> <td>411</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Health educator/nutritionist.....</td> <td>22</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Milieu therapist.....</td> <td>20</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nursing home administrator.....</td> <td>103</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nursing home social worker.....</td> <td>7</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Occupational therapist.....</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Registered nurse.....</td> <td>69</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>632</td> </tr> </table>	Occupation	Students	Geriatrician.....	411	Health educator/nutritionist.....	22	Milieu therapist.....	20	Nursing home administrator.....	103	Nursing home social worker.....	7	Occupational therapist.....	0	Registered nurse.....	69		632	<table border="0"> <tr> <th>Occupation</th> <th>Students</th> </tr> <tr> <td>Medical social worker.....</td> <td>21</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nurse.....</td> <td>73</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nutritionist.....</td> <td>26</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Pedodontist.....</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Physical therapist.....</td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Physician.....</td> <td>83</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Psychologist.....</td> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Speech pathologist and audiologist.....</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>210</td> </tr> </table>	Occupation	Students	Medical social worker.....	21	Nurse.....	73	Nutritionist.....	26	Pedodontist.....	1	Physical therapist.....	2	Physician.....	83	Psychologist.....	3	Speech pathologist and audiologist.....	1		210	<table border="0"> <tr> <th>Occupation</th> <th>Students</th> </tr> <tr> <td>Dentist.....</td> <td>5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Medical social worker.....</td> <td>17</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nurse.....</td> <td>5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Physician.....</td> <td>45</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Psychologist.....</td> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Speech pathologist and audiologist.....</td> <td>34</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>110</td> </tr> </table>	Occupation	Students	Dentist.....	5	Medical social worker.....	17	Nurse.....	5	Physician.....	45	Psychologist.....	4	Speech pathologist and audiologist.....	34		110	<table border="0"> <tr> <th>Occupation</th> <th>Students</th> </tr> <tr> <td>Audiologist, speech pathologist.....</td> <td>11</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Dentist.....</td> <td>11</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Medical social worker.....</td> <td>14</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Nutritionist.....</td> <td>7</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Physician.....</td> <td>31</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Psychologist.....</td> <td>14</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>78</td> </tr> </table>	Occupation	Students	Audiologist, speech pathologist.....	11	Dentist.....	11	Medical social worker.....	14	Nutritionist.....	7	Physician.....	31	Psychologist.....	14		78
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Physician.....	45																																																																									
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Speech pathologist and audiologist.....	34																																																																									
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Occupation	Students																																																																									
Audiologist, speech pathologist.....	11																																																																									
Dentist.....	11																																																																									
Medical social worker.....	14																																																																									
Nutritionist.....	7																																																																									
Physician.....	31																																																																									
Psychologist.....	14																																																																									
	78																																																																									
FY68 funds obligated	Total—\$2,221,000 Health, \$188,000	All for health \$4,004,000 to institutions; \$1,143,250 for traineeships	All for health \$4,279,000 to institutions; \$584,823 for traineeships	All for health \$7,000,000 to institutions; \$664,725 for traineeships																																																																						

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Social and Rehabilitation Service Medical Services Administration			
	Rehabilitation Services Administration			
Legislation	Social Security Act, Title XIX as amended, P.L. 90-248, Sections 1902 and 1903	Vocational Rehabilitation Act as amended by P.L. 90-391, Sections 4(a)(1), 4(a)(2)(c), and 7(a)(2)		
Program	Medical Care Administration Seminars—In-service training of State and local medical assistance personnel	Rehabilitation Teaching Grants (Instructional costs)	Traineeships for Rehabilitation Students	Rehabilitation Personnel (In-house training for State vocational rehabilitation agency personnel—not Federal)

Footnotes at end of tables.

INVENTORY OF HEALTH MANPOWER TRAINING PROGRAMS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE AND OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES—Continued

[See p. 29 for exclusions and footnotes]

Type of aid	Training through health agencies and welfare departments for persons employed in the administration of medical assistance.	Formula and project grants to schools or other institutions (a) Grant support to solve problems in State VR agencies; (b) Contract support for short-term training relating to VR services; (c) General support to improve teaching methods, curriculum content, or interdisciplinary functioning of rehabilitation personnel.	Grants to students through institutions with accredited programs to increase supply of rehabilitation personnel.	To develop staff of State Vocational Rehabilitation agencies thru continuing education of State agency employees and other rehabilitation workers.																																																						
Level of education	C	All levels	All levels	C																																																						
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	Grants for 2 seminars training 74 students (Dental care consultant, Medical care administrator, Pharmaceutical consultant, and Social work consultant)	481 grants to approximately 275 different institutions	6,097 trainees of whom 4,547 are in health occupations*	Grants in support of rehabilitation counselors, psychologists, medical consultants, and other disciplines; 9,282 individuals received training in short-term programs																																																						
		<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Occupation</th> <th>Grants</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>Dentist</td><td>3</td></tr> <tr><td>Nurse</td><td>8</td></tr> <tr><td>Occupational therapist</td><td>28</td></tr> <tr><td>Physical therapist</td><td>28</td></tr> <tr><td>Physician</td><td>98</td></tr> <tr><td>Rehabilitation counselor</td><td>77</td></tr> <tr><td>Social worker</td><td>45</td></tr> <tr><td>Speech pathologist and audiologist</td><td>63</td></tr> <tr><td>Total health</td><td>350</td></tr> <tr><td>Other</td><td>131</td></tr> <tr><td>Total</td><td>481</td></tr> </tbody> </table>	Occupation	Grants	Dentist	3	Nurse	8	Occupational therapist	28	Physical therapist	28	Physician	98	Rehabilitation counselor	77	Social worker	45	Speech pathologist and audiologist	63	Total health	350	Other	131	Total	481	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Occupations</th> <th>Grants</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>Dentist</td><td>13</td></tr> <tr><td>Nurse</td><td>66</td></tr> <tr><td>Occupational therapist</td><td>514</td></tr> <tr><td>Physical therapist</td><td>439</td></tr> <tr><td>Physician</td><td>690</td></tr> <tr><td>Prosthetist</td><td>76</td></tr> <tr><td>Recreation</td><td>55</td></tr> <tr><td>Rehabilitation counselor</td><td>2,106</td></tr> <tr><td>Rehabilitation facility administrator</td><td>244</td></tr> <tr><td>Social worker</td><td>344</td></tr> <tr><td>Speech pathologist and audiologist</td><td>655</td></tr> <tr><td>Total health</td><td>5,202</td></tr> <tr><td>Other</td><td>895</td></tr> <tr><td>Total</td><td>6,097</td></tr> </tbody> </table> <p>*Long-term only</p>	Occupations	Grants	Dentist	13	Nurse	66	Occupational therapist	514	Physical therapist	439	Physician	690	Prosthetist	76	Recreation	55	Rehabilitation counselor	2,106	Rehabilitation facility administrator	244	Social worker	344	Speech pathologist and audiologist	655	Total health	5,202	Other	895	Total	6,097	
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FY68 funds obligated	All for health \$25,000	Total—\$13,137,207 ¹ Health—\$9,177,642 ¹ Includes \$254,123 for research training	Total—\$15,745,798 Health—\$13,009,015	Total—\$1,440,741 Health—\$1,000,000 (estimate)																																																						

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Social Security Administration	DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Consumer and Marketing Service	Cooperative State Research Service	Agriculture Research Service	Foreign Agricultural Service Foreign Training Division
Legislation	Social Security Act of 1965, Title XVIII P.L. 89-97	Federal Meat Inspection Act as amended 21 USC 601-624; 641-645; 661; 671-680 Poultry Products Inspection Act as amended 21 USC 451-469	Hatch Act 7 USC (361a-361i) Cooperative Forestry Research Act (16 USC 582-582a-7) Grants for Research (42 USC 1891-1893; 7 USC 4506)		Foreign Assistance Act, as amended Section 632(b)
Program	Reimbursement for an appropriate part of approved education activities (Section 405-421 of Social Security Regulations)	Internal Training for Meat and Poultry Inspectors	Payments to State Agricultural Research Stations	Internal training for veterinarians, laboratory technologists, and laboratory scientists.	Training foreign nationals
Type of aid	Reimbursement to hospitals and other facilities for an appropriate part of the net cost of educational activities (i.e.,—the cost applicable to Medicare beneficiaries). Educational activities include programs for interns, residents, medical students, nurses, etc.	Cost for training Federal inspectors paid from Federal funds; cost for training State personnel shared between USDA and State government	Grants are authorized for research aimed at improving the broad fields of agriculture and forestry. The training of graduate students occurs indirectly through their participation in research on specific projects being conducted at the various institutions.	Training relating to consumer, producer, and public health protection is provided to State and Federal employed veterinarians, laboratory technologists, and laboratory scientists.	Tuition, fees, and maintenance allowances in support of participants under Agency for International Development sponsorship for training in consumer protection aspects of agriculture.
Level of education Institutions of individuals supported FY 68.	PD, D, M, B, AA, V Under Medicare, reimbursement was made to some 6,900 hospitals, 2,100 home health agencies and 4,700 extended care facilities. There were approximately 750 hospitals with medical residency and/or intern programs among the participating hospitals. The amount of reimbursement for educational activities under Medicare is not available.	C, V, OJT 413 Federal employees trained in meat and poultry inspection techniques; 200 State and local employees trained in meat and poultry inspection techniques	C, PD, D, M Precise information on current numbers of students in specific health-related research areas is not available; the best estimate is 350 health-related students under training in 1968	OJT 150 employees	C, D, M, B, OJT 17 Project Implementation Orders Participants. 17 students (food technology, nutrition, veterinary medicine, and meat inspection)
FY 68 funds obligated	Not available for training cost	Total \$687,000 (estimated) All health	Total Grants \$54.6 Million Health \$7.6 million	Total \$32,000 All health	Total \$2,200,000 Health \$85,000

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Economic Development Administration	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Air Force, Army, and Navy	DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT Urban Management Assistance	DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR Office of Territories
Legislation	Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-415) (42 USC 2571-2620) as amended.	Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, (P.L. 89-136) as amended.	National Security Act of 1947, as amended.	Housing Act of 1964 Pt. 1, Title VIII (PL 88-560, 78 Stat. 802; 20 USC 80), amended.

Footnotes at end of tables.

INVENTORY OF HEALTH MANPOWER TRAINING PROGRAMS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE AND OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES—Continued

[See p. 29 for exclusions and footnotes]

Program	Manpower Development and Training Act, Section 241.	Public Works Program under Economic Development Act.	In-house training in health occupations for military personnel.	Community Development Training Program.	Trust Territory School of Nursing.	Trust Territory Scholarship Program (Medical).
Type of aid	Project grants to non-profit institutions for training unemployed or underemployed residents of EDA-designated redevelopment areas.	Public works grants to provide funds for public facilities in economically depressed areas. Non-Federal share of funds required to be from 20% to 50% of the total project cost, depending on the area.	Training programs to provide military services with professional and nonprofessional medical manpower necessary to meet the medical service requirements of DOD personnel, dependents and facilities. Each of the services has an established training program intended for military personnel only and not designed to be related to programs outside the military.	Matching grants to State and local governments to help upgrade skills of professional and technical persons and those with the capacity to attain these skills in community development fields. The State is required to provide at least 50% of the cost of the training program.	Operational budget for a school with a 2½ year curriculum leading to a certificate as a graduate nurse. (Valid only in the Trust Territories).	Scholarships for training personnel in all areas of health service.
Level of education	V, JS, PKT	—	All levels	C, V, OJT	V	C, IR, D, B, AA
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68,	Project grants for health Occupation Insts. Stu. Licensed practical nurse..... 10 259 Nurse aide..... 5 128 Prof. nurse (refresher)..... 1 15 Surgical aide..... 1 10 17 412	Public Works grants for health facilities Type of Facility Inst. Vocational school..... 15 Hospital..... 6 Other health facilities..... 1 22	Not available at this time.	Approximately 150 to 200 persons were trained in the field of environmental health—air pollution specialists, sanitary engineers, sanitarians, and environmental health aides.	One school with 65 students enrolled.	Scholarships to 64 Students Occupations Dentist..... 7 Hospital administrator..... 1 Laboratory personnel..... 1 Medical record librarian..... 1 Nurse..... 13 Physician..... 35 Sanitarian..... 5 Sanitarian engineer..... 1 64
FY 68 funds obligated	Total \$22,000,000 Health \$968,000	Total \$175,000,000 Health \$15,748,000	Not available	Total \$2,792,000 Health \$75,000	All for health \$168,200	All for health \$151,000

Organization	DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR Office of Territories	DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Manpower Administration	DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Manpower Administration	Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-452), as amended in 1967 (P.L. 90-222)
Legislation		Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, as amended in 1965 (P.L. 89-15, Sec. 203 and 231; 42 USC 2583 and 2586).	Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, amended (P.L. 87-415, Sec. 204; 42 USC 2584).	
Program	In-house and other special training for health workers in the Trust Territories	Manpower Development and Training Program (Institutional Training)	Manpower Development and Training Program (On-the-job training)	New Careers Program
Type of aid	Training to upgrade health workers in the Trust Territories	Contracts and agreements usually with local employment services and education agencies, for occupational training of unemployed and underemployed persons. Program administered jointly by Department of Labor and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare	Contracts with hospitals, health facilities or other employers, for on-the-job training of unemployed and under-employed persons who cannot secure fulltime employment without such training.	Contracts with non-profit agencies to develop career opportunities for low-income, unemployed persons in programs to improve community conditions in areas of health, education, welfare, and other areas.
Level OS education	C, OJT	V, HS	OJT	All Levels
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	Training conducted in 6 district hospitals	14,875 persons trained Occupations Students Home health aide..... 326 Medical lab. assistant..... 282 Medical records clerk..... 127 Nurse aide, orderly..... 4, 147 Practical Nurse..... 4, 901 Professional nurse (refresher)..... 3, 612 Psychiatric aide..... 324 Surgical technician..... 182 Other..... 974 14, 875	2,885 persons trained Occupation Trainees Cottage parent (medical service)..... 216 Dental Lab. technician..... 452 Nurse Aide, orderly..... 1, 476 Professional nurse (refresher)..... 200 Surgical technician..... 146 Ward Clerk..... 100 Other..... 295 2, 885	2,392 individuals assisted in all occupations; data not available for health
FY 68 funds obligated	Not available	Total—\$202,000,000 Health—\$27,000,000 (Est)	Total—\$87,000,000 Health—\$2,000,000 (est)	Total—\$7,500,000 Health—not available

Organization	ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Division of Nuclear Education and Training	Special Fellowships in Health Physics..	Special Fellowships in Industrial Medicine.
Legislation	Atomic Energy Act of 1954, amended P.L. (86-373)		
Program	Medical Qualifications Courses (Medical Radioisotopes Courses, Cost-type contracts made with Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) for staff and overhead costs for providing physicians with knowledge and skill needed for AEC license to use radioisotopes.	Fellowships to students to help meet need for health physicists in government, industry, and higher education. Institutional allowances to cover tuition and fees.	Fellowships to students to help satisfy demand for physicians with training in industrial hazards of atomic energy. Institutional allowances to cover tuition and fees.
Type of aid	ORAU trained 57 physicians.....	D, M Fellowships to 70 health physicists.....	C, PD Fellowships to 11 physicians.....
Level of education	C, PD	D, M	C, PD
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	ORAU trained 57 physicians.....	Fellowships to 70 health physicists.....	Fellowships to 11 physicians.....
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health \$74,945 (costs).....	All for health \$488,699.....	All for health \$146,585.....

Footnotes at end of tables.

INVENTORY OF HEALTH MANPOWER TRAINING PROGRAMS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE AND OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES—Continued

[See p. 29 for exclusions and footnotes]

Organization	NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION	OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY Health Services Office Community Action Program.	Job Corps Health Office
Legislation	The National Science Foundation Act of 1950, as amended (42 USC 1861-1875).	Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, amended, Title II, Sec. 222(a)(4)(A), P.L. 90-222, 81 Stat. 672, 1967, 42 USC 2809.	42 USC 2711, Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, as amended, Title I section 101, P.L. 90-222, 81 Stat. 672, Dec. 23, 1967, 42 USC 2711.
Program	NSF Programs Contributing to Support of Education and Training.	Comprehensive Neighborhood Health Services Program.	Job Corps Centers
Type of aid	Grants to institutions for support of science education and research training, and for the construction of facilities. Grants for students thru institutions and direct fellowships support to students.	Project grants to establish health centers offering care to low-income persons. Training and employment opportunities to be offered these persons.	Project grants to vocational training centers for disadvantaged youth ages 15-21. Training in health occupations included in some vocational training program.
Level of education	PD, D, M, PB	OJT	V, HS, OJT
Institutions or individuals supported FY 68.	College or university students supported in a variety of science programs which may or may not be related to health; continuing education programs for secondary school and college teachers of science.	Project grants in 36 health centers Occupation Students Clerical/Other..... 411 Dental aide..... 52 Family health worker..... 324 Lab./X-ray/Pharm. aide..... 31 Medical records aide..... 30 Nurse aide..... 131 Social Service aide..... 82	Calendar year 1968, project grants in 22 Job Corps Centers. Occupation Students Dental lab. assistant..... 40 Medical lab. assistant..... 71 Nurse aide..... 1,611 Physical therapist assistant..... 22 Practical nurse..... 222 Ward clerk..... 82 Other..... 922 2,970
FY 68 funds obligated	Total—\$148,281,520; Health—not available.	All for health \$1,200,000	Not available

Organization	VETERANS ADMINISTRATION Department of Medicine and Surgery	Department of Veterans Benefits		
Legislation	Veterans Hospitalization and Medical Services Modernization Amendments of 1966 (P.L. 89-785)	Title 38 USC, chapter 31	Title 38 USC, chapter 34	Title 38 USC, chapter 35
Program	Medical and Allied Health Services Training	Vocational Rehabilitation for Disabled Veterans	Educational Assistance for Post-Korean Veterans and Servicemen.	Educational Assistance for Families of Deceased or Disabled Veterans
Type of aid	Clinical training is provided in VA hospitals and clinics to physicians and dentists (residents and interns), medical and dental students, graduate students in health fields, students of nursing schools and other professional health schools, students in health fields at community and junior colleges, and to health service trainees in accredited health services programs where college training is not required. Students in some programs receive payments for on-duty training hours	Grants for students, directly or thru institutions, to restore employability lost by a service-connected disability	Direct grants to students to provide educational benefits to qualified persons	Direct grants to students to provide educational opportunities for families of deceased or disabled veterans
Level of education	All levels	All levels	All levels	All levels
Institutions or individuals supported, FY 68.	Occupation Students Dental intern..... 66 Dental resident..... 80 Dental student..... 421 Medical intern..... 353 Medical resident..... 3,754 Medical rehabilitation therapist..... 906 Medical student..... 10,300 Nursing student..... 10,453 Nurse, professional..... 763 Pharmacy student..... 150 Practical nurse..... 1,026 Psychologist..... 726 Social worker..... 670 Other..... 2,091 31,759	13,200 students in all fields, includes 176 in health Occupation Students Medical and dental technician..... 97 Nurse..... 27 Pharmacist..... 16 Physician..... 14 Veterinarian..... 3 Other..... 19 176	604,600 students in all fields, includes 44,079 in health Occupation Students Dentist..... 1,442 Hospital and medical services..... 3,265 Medical and related technician..... 26,816 Medical technologists..... 963 Nurse..... 1,076 Pharmacist..... 797 Physician..... 8,681 Other..... 1,039 44,079	36,900 students in all fields, includes 2,088 in health Occupation Students Dentist..... 78 Hospital and medical services..... 108 Medical and related technician..... 56 Medical technologist..... 274 Nurse..... 1,076 Pharmacist..... 123 Physician..... 206 Other..... 167 2,088
FY 68 funds obligated	All for health, \$60,872,000	Total, \$22,350,000 Health—not available	Total, \$400,000,000 Health—not available	Total, \$37,300,000 Health—not available

1 This inventory of Federal health manpower programs is complete in respect to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and its programs. Not all Federal health manpower training programs are included from other agencies. Those programs not included constitute a small percentage of the total allocation of training dollars and numbers of individuals in training. The data listed under the category "Institutions or Individuals Supported in FY68" refers only to health occupations, unless otherwise specified.

Key to level of training. The following table lists all abbreviations used in the "Level of Education" section of this inventory:
 C..... Continuing education at all levels
 PD..... Post doctoral
 I & R..... Internships and residencies
 D..... Doctoral
 M..... Master's
 PB..... Post baccalaureate
 B..... Baccalaureate
 AA..... Associate of Arts degree/Associate of Science degree
 V..... Vocational education
 O..... Other, diploma RN
 HS..... High school
 OJT..... On-the-job training
 GC..... General consumer/general public

S. 2899—INTRODUCTION OF A BILL TO AMEND THE BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING ACT OF 1921

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference, a bill to amend the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. I do this in behalf of the distinguished Senator from Delaware (Mr. WILLIAMS) and myself.

The objective of this proposal is to require that the official budget transmitted to Congress shall be made up of the receipts and expenditures of the general fund of the Treasury, commonly referred to as the administrative budget. It would make as the official budget of the U.S. Government that budget which shows whether or not the General Treasury is operating in balance, with a surplus, or a deficit. The official budget, if this proposal is enacted, would no longer follow the concepts of the so-called consolidated budget.

Mr. President, a Commission, made up of men of distinction and ability, recommended the use of a budget which combined all of the receipts and expenditures of the general fund of the Treasury with the trust funds handled by the Government. Their report was made on October 10, 1967. The administration, then in power, adopted the recommendations of this Commission and the outgoing President, in his budget recommendations of January 1969, followed this concept of combining trust funds and general funds. The new administration, which came in on January 20, 1969, adhered to the change that had been made and has continued to follow the pattern of combining general funds and trust funds.

It is conceded that this new budget concept contains some factors that are desirable and helpful in ascertaining the total amount of money that the Government is taking out of our economy in taxes and the total amount that the Government is placing back into our economy as expenditures. As it is working out, however, some very serious defects and objections are evident. These defects outweigh the benefits of this new type of budget. I shall try to illustrate:

When the distinguished Director of the Budget appeared before the Committee on Finance earlier this year, his statement indicated to the Congress and to the people that the Government of the United States was living within its income. The fact is, however, that in the fiscal year that ended on June 30, 1969, the national debt was higher than it was 1 year before. You cannot have a balanced budget and experience an increase in debt as a result thereof.

The distinguished Director of the Budget also conveyed the statement to the Congress and to the country that in the current fiscal year it was expected that the Government would operate with a surplus of some \$6 billion. I called his attention to the size of the national debt. I expressed pleasure over the fact that we were going to have a balanced budget, and I pointed out that if we continued with a surplus of that size for 60 years we would pay off the entire national debt. The Director was quick to correct me

and point out that that would not be the case, that the figures he was using included trust funds, and that in this current year we would not have a surplus in the general operating funds of the Government. We would not even have a balanced budget but we would have a deficit. As a matter of fact, if we operate on the same basis for the next 60 years that we are operating on this year, instead of wiping out the national debt, the national debt will have increased from its present \$361.2 billion to \$618 billion.

Mr. President, trust funds are just what the name implies. They are funds held in trust. A prime example of trust funds held by the Federal Government are the social security taxes that are collected. They are held in a special fund and they are dedicated to a special purpose. They are not a part of the funds available for the general running of the Government.

The use of trust funds is common in private life. If a lawyer receives \$2,000 as a fee for his services and \$5,000 for his client, the amount of money available for spending by that lawyer is \$2,000, not \$7,000. The lawyer's decision as to spending, his purchases and his contracts, and the obligations which he creates for himself cannot be geared to receipts of \$7,000. In such a case, he will find himself badly in debt, in serious financial trouble, and he might be disbarred.

This new budget is not at all workable for the committees of the Congress which have the responsibility of recommending tax laws. For instance, I hold in my hand a memorandum that had to be prepared by the staff of the Committee on Finance so that that committee would know what the tax needs of the country are. According to the consolidated budget we ended the fiscal year of 1969 on June 30 last with a surplus of \$3.1 billion. Actually, in the general funds, that is the money available for the ordinary expenses of Government, we ran a deficit of \$5.3 billion.

Mr. President, how can we tell the taxpayers of the country that a surtax is necessary if they are officially informed that we had a surplus of over \$3 billion? The surtax extension is necessary because we had a deficit of over \$5 billion.

Mr. President, how can the Appropriations Committee say "No" to a request for an appropriation or reduce an appropriation if those asking for an appropriation are told that there is a surplus available running into billions of dollars when, in truth and in fact, there is a very sizable deficit?

Mr. President, how can the members of the Committee on Ways and Means and the members of the Committee on Finance resist petitions and requests for lower taxes if the people of the country are told erroneously that we are operating either with a balanced budget or with a surplus?

There are many situations that can be cited to show that if we continue with this so-called consolidated budget we will continue to have confusion, misunderstanding, and even danger of serious financial difficulty. How can it be argued

that the investment credit which reduces revenues by about \$7 billion should be repealed if the country is told that we are operating at a huge surplus?

A short while ago I had a conversation with a very dedicated public servant in the executive branch. He had received orders to cut his budget and it was necessary for him to let one excellent secretary go and operate with three instead of four. The truth is that we are operating with a deficit. The truth is that the Federal Government is having to borrow a lot of money. The truth is that the national debt is increasing because we are not living within our means. The official budget of the United States should tell the people and the Congress these facts. If this public official must go from four secretaries to three and some qualified young lady goes off the payroll, all parties concerned are entitled to know the true facts about our budget situation. In spite of good intentions, the consolidated budget concept does not give them the true facts.

Mr. President, the national debt on June 30, 1968 was \$341.1 billion. On June 30, 1969, it was \$354.3 billion. Yet, by following this consolidated budget concept the Congress and the people were told that we operated with a surplus for that very same year of 3.1 billion dollars. It just cannot be. The consolidated budget idea is unworkable. It is deceptive. It adds to the burden of the Congress. It is confusing and it creates a multitude of problems.

Mr. President, the official budget of the United States, if we are to avoid financial chaos, must be the budget that excludes trust funds. It must be what we heretofore have called the administrative budget and the type of budget which we have followed through the years. This will not make it impossible or unlawful for an additional Presidential message to be sent to the Congress informing the Congress and the country of the total amount of taxes taken out of the economy and the total amount of expenditures returned to the economy. The economists and others will then have the figures necessary to make recommendations for the management of our economy.

The consolidated budget method for the every-day job of levying taxes and handling expenditures in a responsible way does not work. We need a budget that shows whether or not we are in balance or running behind or accumulating a surplus in reference to the funds that are available for the ordinary expenditures of the Government. It is just that simple.

I hope that the Congress will quickly approve this measure.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2899) to amend the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, so as to require the submission of the budget on an administrative budget, rather than a unified budget basis, introduced by Mr. CURTIS (for himself and Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Government Operations.

S. 2905—INTRODUCTION OF THE
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES IM-
PROVEMENT ASSISTANCE ACT

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill that will make \$1 billion in Federal funds available over the next 5 years for the improvement of State and local juvenile and adult training and correctional institutions.

The bill will provide funds both for construction and modernization of correctional facilities and institutions.

It will encourage the development of open, community-based correctional facilities in the place of secluded and isolated institutions.

It will provide for the improvement of treatment and rehabilitation programs in institutions.

It will provide for the improvement of educational and vocational training programs.

It will provide for better trained institutional personnel.

And it will call for a cooperative effort among all law enforcement, correctional and criminal justice agencies to help the juvenile and adult correctional systems.

This bill is based on a nationwide investigation of institutional problems by the Subcommittee To Investigate Juvenile Delinquency and it is based on weeks of hearings conducted by the subcommittee since March of this year.

I introduce this legislation because the correctional field cannot extricate itself from its floundering condition without the kind of assistance I am proposing. The top experts in the correctional field have asked for, pleaded for, this kind of Federal assistance.

Let me explain some of the needs of our institutions and some of the problems faced by States and localities in meeting these needs. Over 100,000 juveniles are today detained in jails contrary to every accepted correctional standard and in many cases contrary to State and local law. These children are confined in filthy jails with hardened adult offenders because there is no money to build detention homes for them. And there is no money to build regional detention homes that could be used by several localities.

I consider it a crime against society to keep juveniles in the jails that have been looked at by our investigators.

I feel that strongly about this, Mr. President, because many of these children are not even delinquent.

Their only crime is that they have been neglected or abandoned by their parents.

Yet, judges use the jails because 93 percent of the Nation's juvenile courts have no separate juvenile detention facilities.

Overall, by 1975, the States and localities will need over a billion dollars for the construction and renovation of institutions. The need exists in the face of great financial difficulty already being experienced by most States and localities. State and local tax structures are stretched to the ultimate limit. Some cities face the problem of shutting down schools if more funds cannot be acquired.

Yet, further increases in taxation would face these States and localities with a mass exodus of the taxpaying population and business establishments.

At the same time, we have been told that the correctional field, including the institutions, are at the very bottom of the "totem pole" of priorities. When budgets are cut, it is in the correctional field where the first cuts occur.

Perhaps the greatest need in the correctional field is not as much for new institutions as it is for new types of institutions to replace the old ones. The existing institutions, the jails, the large training schools and penitentiaries are detrimental to the inmates. They are detrimental to the process of rehabilitation that should be developed. But few States have the funds to convert the system from outdated penal and correctional programs to modern programs of rehabilitation.

These are some of the reasons for the gross mismanagement and mishandling of the inmate population.

When I opened the subcommittee hearings in this field, I said that the public has never been told of what goes on in the training schools, the reformatories, and the penitentiaries throughout the country. I said then that it would be our task to determine how well these institutions are handling and rehabilitating their inmates. From preliminary investigations we suspected that the rehabilitation of confined offenders was inadequate.

We have now confirmed that inadequacy in full measure.

In fact, we have been told by expert witnesses that rather than rehabilitating the inmates, our institutions release "finely honed" criminals who are more disturbed, more deviant, more hardened, and more dangerous than ever.

The subcommittee was told by administrators of juvenile programs that it would be better if many of the delinquents were never apprehended because they deteriorate rather than improve under the guardianship of the State.

The subcommittee was given case histories of young people who entered juvenile institutions as simple truants and received enough education in criminality to leave with the attitudes of hardened felons.

And we heard testimony given by the inmates themselves that they actually look forward to renewing a life of crime, violence, and revenge upon release from confinement.

One of the most distinguished experts in this field told us that perhaps the only solution was to ask the judges not to commit offenders to institutions because of the atrocious conditions that exist there. The logical conclusion of this serious recommendation was that we are probably giving better protection to the public by releasing offenders back into the streets rather than sending them to institutions where they become more dangerous and more crime prone than before.

Mr. President, it is because we need to protect the public that I propose this legislation.

Too long we have shut our eyes to what happens to confined offenders.

Too long we have deceived ourselves by fostering the belief that correctional institutions correct, that training schools train, and that rehabilitation centers rehabilitate.

Too long we have listened only to those "correctional experts" who told us what we wanted to hear.

Today, we are paying for this apathy and self-deception with a critical crime problem in the Nation, much of which is fostered and encouraged in our penal institutions.

Let me tell you what we found in the subcommittee's inquiry. The first witness who testified, the district attorney from Philadelphia, told us of widespread homosexuality and brutal homosexual attacks on inmates in Philadelphia's prisons. His testimony highlighted not only Philadelphia's problem but the problem across the Nation. His testimony was confirmed by virtually every other witness who has appeared since, no matter what part of the country they were from.

Other witnesses outlined the problems of suicide, torture, sexual exploitation and even murder that characterized our so-called correctional system.

We were told of tragic cases of suicide among the 7,000 juveniles committed to the county jails in Minnesota.

We were told of inmates going insane because of extensive confinement, month after month, in isolation cells in Virginia.

We were told of inmates being tortured and burned to death in jail cells in Chicago.

And we were told unbelievable tales of sexually exploited young girls in New York's Youth House where one young inmate had to deliver her own baby for lack of medical care and facilities.

The subcommittee was also told of the brutal torture, beatings, and solitary confinement of offenders in the Ohio penitentiary.

We were given evidence of even worse torture practiced in Arkansas. While the reaction of Arkansas penologists was "so what else is new," I can report that since our hearings 19 persons have been indicted on 47 counts by a Federal grand jury for brutality and excessive punishment perpetrated on the inmates of that state's penal institutions.

The subcommittee was told of brutal beatings suffered by young boys in the juvenile institutions in Texas. Again, the administrators denied this. But 1 week after the hearings a guard named by our witness was fired for beating a young boy so badly he was confined to a hospital with a broken jaw.

There is evidence in our hearing record that prisoners have been murdered by the guard force or other inmates with no legal action taken.

There is evidence in the record submitted by competent investigators that 75 percent of the guards in some institutions are crooked and corrupt.

There is evidence in the hearing record that in every part of the country, inmates, young and old, are exploited, beaten, and dehumanized in ways that could have been understood in the middle ages, but are hard to believe in the 20th century.

I fully realize that even today the public and the Congress would find it hard

to believe the horror stories that are enacted within prison walls.

We find it difficult to believe that these conditions exist because this society has for many years confused the concepts of punishment and rehabilitation. We have considered them as one and the same and we have believed that because of punishment, offenders leave the prison walls better citizens.

The truth is the public has been grossly mistaken in this belief.

The truth is offenders do not leave the prison better citizens.

We must, at long last, face the fact that punishment is not rehabilitation; that punishment cannot be confused with rehabilitation; and that the kind of treatment I have described above can in no way turn a criminal into a law abiding citizen.

When we treat men like wild animals we teach them to act like wild animals.

This is our posture today with respect to prison inmates.

Because of public apathy, because of lack of funds and because of the shortsightedness of the public and the Government, we practice custody rather than correction.

The institutions receive the social failures, the misfits and the psychologically disturbed offenders. These are men who come from the bottom of the heap of humanity. These are men who are most difficult to understand and who, in turn, do not understand society. They are confused, frustrated and ridden with anxiety. It is often for these very reasons that they have turned to crime.

They have been punished enough by chance or circumstance or the social conditions in which they developed. These men need treatment and education and the kind of help that could enable them to adjust to life in the community. This kind of help can be provided only by trained professionals. Instead, we have gone in the other direction, we have placed the offenders under the charge of the least competent, the least trained, and the lowest paid personnel. These are the prison guards who often know only one means of controlling the inmate, by brute force.

Because of public apathy and because of the public's irrational fear we are preoccupied with security rather than treatment.

In most cases, from the guard to the warden, institutional personnel have been conditioned to prevent escape as the main justification for their being. This is a system that has developed for over 100 years. It is a system that the public expects and demands but it is a system that does not allow experimentation with innovative programs.

In this regard let me quote from the testimony of one witness who appeared before our hearings:

We want dedicated, professionally trained individuals to work with these difficult cases, as long as they are willing to be hired for less money than comparable employment would offer them in other vocations. We want to encourage youths to participate fully in beneficial, therapeutic settings, as long as the physical plant is drab and foreboding enough to remind them that they are to be punished and isolated. *We want experimental, innovative approaches utilized, as long as the*

program is in someone else's backyard. We will back you as long as there are no embarrassing, untoward incidents.

Why then should program administrators seek to be creative? Why should they not settle for custody and control instead of treatment? Why then should not the goal of institutions be a trouble free tour of duty rather than true attitudinal change on the part of young offenders?

Today we have custody or what has been called warehousing of offenders, but little else.

We have stood by and allowed the development of what I call the "correctional clique" in this field. It is composed of men many of whom are willing to whitewash the prison story. These are men conditioned by the public's naive belief that once a criminal is out of sight behind the high wall, he can be put out of mind. These are men who have learned that the basic requirement asked of a warden is to run a "quiet place" and "keep the lid on." These are men who practice back scratching and protect one another against outsiders.

I do not want to judge them too harshly because there are brilliant and dedicated professionals among this group but most of them have been unable to improve conditions because the total system will not allow it. All of them are victims of inadequate support from the public. All of them have been allowed too long to run a "quiet place."

The men who operate our institutions need help. They cannot run a quiet place forever under the present conditions. This is evidenced by the jail and prison riots that occur periodically. And this is certainly evidenced by the conditions uncovered during our hearings.

The entire system needs to be overhauled.

The public may not understand this need. It certainly has not understood it in the past.

The Congress may not want to understand it.

And the administration may not want to spend the money I am asking in this bill.

But nothing less than a major overhaul of our institutions can serve to protect the American people from the dangerous criminals that are released by the kinds of institutions we have today.

Crime, is today our most serious social problem. There are over 400,000 offenders in our juvenile and adult institutions. And there are new offenders coming in every day.

There will be more such offenders in the years to come because our statistics indicate a drastic rise in juvenile delinquency. There has been a 60-percent increase in juvenile crime since the beginning of the 1960's.

Crime will not go away because of our wishful thinking. Nor will the criminal.

Crime costs our society over \$20 billion a year. Operating the criminal justice and correctional systems alone will cost us \$9 billion annually by 1975.

My bill calls for \$1 billion over the next 5 years to establish reform, to make certain that the billions we already spend in corrections, on the present system of institutions, are not wasted in making worse criminals out of prison inmates.

We know today that over 70 percent of ex-inmates do repeat in new crimes.

In times past, you could send the offenders to isolated islands away from civilization. Today, we must deal with them in our urban society.

Over 90 percent of the offenders incarcerated will be released in a few years. If we continue to neglect and abuse these men in institutions, thousands of them will again prey on the public with increased hostility in their hearts and violence in their minds.

To prevent this further criminality, I call for the passage of this legislation. Today our training schools and prisons are the "hotbeds" of criminality in this Nation. It is in the institutions where the most dangerous and deviant criminals congregate. It is in the institutions where new knowledge in the methods and techniques of crime is passed on to the younger inmates. Thus it must be in the institutions where we take our stand and make an effort to turn back the tidal wave of lawbreaking that threatens to engulf us.

Because we have so long considered punishment the real answer to criminality, we have built the dungeons and the cell blocks and the high walls and the iron bars. The wardens and the penologists have paid lip service to rehabilitation but they have not practiced it. I consider my bill the first small step to changing the face of these institutions and to developing the kind of procedures that can achieve correction of offenders.

This is not simply a brick and mortar type legislation. It is not simply paying Federal funds to States and localities to build buildings. This bill is designed to improve the entire correctional system in the Nation.

It will help us get rid of the bastille-like penal institutions and the dungeons, many of which date back to the last century. It will enable the States to build new types of small, decentralized, and community-based institutions.

The bill requires that to obtain Federal money States and localities have to develop systems where treatment and rehabilitation rather than custody and indiscriminate punishment are the basic ingredients.

The bill requires that to obtain Federal funds the States and localities must make an effort to train and procure professionally qualified personnel for the institutions.

The bill requires that to obtain Federal funds the recipients must advance proposals to develop employment and vocational training programs for inmates in cooperation with private industry.

The bill requires that to obtain Federal funds States must develop a cooperative effort in the handling of offenders between all agencies for the administration of justice, law enforcement, and corrections.

One of the problems brought out in our subcommittee hearings time and again was the lack of judicial review of the conditions under which offenders are kept in confinement. This bill will force the judges to be concerned with what goes on in the institutions in which they commit offenders.

I believe the amount of money we ask in this legislation is small in comparison with the benefits that the law can achieve in cutting down recidivism among inmates.

I think it is a small price to pay for reduction in our crime rates and for more effective control of the crime problem.

I hope this bill will receive prompt and favorable consideration by both Houses of Congress.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a brief analysis of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the analysis will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 2905) to authorize the Attorney General to provide financial assistance to States and localities for the construction and modernization of correctional institutions, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. DODD, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

The material, presented by Mr. DODD, is as follows:

BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES IMPROVEMENT ASSISTANCE ACT

Section 1 gives the purpose of the Act—to provide financial assistance to States and localities for the construction and modernization of correctional institutions. The Act is cited as the "Correctional Facilities Improvement Assistance Act".

Section 2 sets forth the findings of Congress that to achieve better crime and delinquency control, Federal aid is needed to eliminate serious inadequacies and defects in State and local institutions.

Section 3 authorizes the total of \$1,000,000,000 in Federal funds to be granted between fiscal years 1970 and 1974.

Section 4 authorizes 5 percent of the total appropriations to be subdivided among Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands and the Pacific Islands according to need.

It sets forth the proportionate allotment of the appropriations to each State, which would be related to the number of persons confined in correctional institutions in each State.

Section 5 provides that funding under the Act shall be in response to a State Plan and through a State Agency. However, it also provides that a certain proportion of the funds allotted shall be available to agencies of political subdivisions in each State.

It sets forth certain regulations for the granting of funds. It establishes restrictions on funding which require States to establish treatment and other cooperative programs including regional facilities, in order to receive monies under this Act.

Section 6 requires the Attorney General in consultation with the Bureau of Prisons to develop regulations and criteria for the granting of funds.

Section 7 requires that the Federal allotment paid to each State bears a definite relationship to the non-Federal amount of funds allocated by each State.

This is to assure that the States do not use predominately Federal monies for the purposes of this Act and do not withdraw State funds to other areas.

Section 8 and 9 establish administrative and judicial review with respect to the Attorney General's action in disapproving grant funds under the Act.

Section 10 provides that the Attorney General shall administer this Act through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (established under the Omnibus Crime Bill).

Section 11 provides safeguards to the States against Federal intervention with respect to the supervision or control of any police or correctional agency of the State. It also prohibits expenditure of funds under this Act for religious facilities or instruction.

Section 12 defines correctional institutions, correctional facilities, construction, modernization and the term State.

The important distinction between construction and modernization is that "construction" pertains to planning and erecting buildings and related facilities, while "modernization" relates to improving programs for treatment, for developing qualified personnel, for training and employment and for other similar purposes.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS

S. 60

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BOGGS) I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing, the name of the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) be added as a cosponsor of S. 60, to create a catalog of Federal assistance programs, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 1142

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, at the request of the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing, the name of the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD) be added as a cosponsor of S. 1142, to authorize and direct the Secretary of Agriculture to classify as a wilderness area the national forest lands adjacent to the Eagle Cap Wilderness Area, known as the Minan River Canyon and adjoining area, in Oregon, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 1362

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BOGGS), I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing, the names of the Senator from Maryland (Mr. TYDINGS) and the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), be added as cosponsors of S. 1362, to provide Federal financial assistance to Opportunities Industrialization Centers.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 2035

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing, the names of the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS), and the Senator from Florida (Mr. GURNEY), be added as cosponsors of S. 2035 to amend title 5, United States Code, to authorize consolidation of Federal assistance programs, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 2804

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON) I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing, the names of the Senator from Nevada (Mr. BIBLE), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), the Senator from Michigan

(Mr. GRIFFIN), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. JORDAN), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON), the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) be added as cosponsors of S. 2804, to permit a compact between the several States relating to taxation of multistate taxpayers; to provide a formula for taxing multistate taxpayers for States not entering into this compact to require certain sellers to collect sales and use taxes; and for other related purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 2893

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing, the names of the Senator from New York (Mr. GOODELL) and the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE) be added as cosponsors of S. 2893, to amend the act of June 27, 1960 (74 Stat. 220), relating to the preservation of historical and archeological data.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF JOINT RESOLUTION

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 150

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing the names of the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) and the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH) be added as cosponsors of Senate Joint Resolution 150, to authorize the President to designate the period beginning October 12, 1969, and ending October 18, 1969, as "National Industrial Hygiene Week."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 161

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, I am today submitting an amendment intended to be proposed by me to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, to delete the language of section 531 regarding the tax treatment of cooperative associations.

This provision, increasing the mandatory cash patronage refunds of cooperatives from the present 20 percent to 50 percent, was adopted by the House without a word of testimony and without notice of any kind to the taxpayers affected.

It is, in my judgment, a punitive measure which would greatly harm the farmers' ability to generate adequate capital investment in their cooperatives. At the very time when farmers need to strengthen their marketing, purchasing, and farm business service cooperatives as a means of increasing net farm income, this ill-advised tax provision would cripple the equity structure of cooperatives and force many to close. I do not think legislation which would further depress farm income in this country is a proper part of tax reform.

Since the Revenue Act of 1962, farmers

through their cooperatives have undertaken long-term financial obligations and made large investments in physical plant in reliance on the 20 percent earnings retention rate. Millions of dollars in loans in credit extension to cooperatives have been let under terms with fixed obligations to pay sums certain on specific dates. To meet these obligations and to finance future retained capital needs under the new proposal, cooperatives would be forced to enter the commercial loan market where prime rates range from 8½ to 10 percent. In many instances, the small- and moderate-sized farm cooperatives will be unable to carry these additional costs and survive.

Mr. President, I know the members of the Finance Committee will review carefully the precipitous action of the House in drafting this punitive regulation. I think they will find the provision inconsistent with the intrinsic financial requirements of cooperative organization. I know they will find it contrary to the goal of strengthening the agricultural sector of our economy.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received, printed, and appropriately referred.

The amendment (No. 161) was referred to the Committee on Finance.

CONTINUATION OF PROGRAMS AUTHORIZED UNDER THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1964—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 162

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, at present, by virtue of section 5(f) of the Peace Corps Act, as amended, former Peace Corps volunteers who later gain Federal employment are credited for purposes of retirement, seniority, reduction in force, and lay-off rights, leave entitlement, and other privileges based upon length of service with their period of service as volunteers—not including any period of training. However, no similar benefit has ever been granted to volunteers serving in VISTA under title VIII of the Economic Opportunity Act. This disparity in treatment between these two very similar types of voluntary, self-help service is one for which I have been unable to discover any substantive justification.

More than 15,000 individuals have served as VISTA volunteers and more than 5,000 of them are now serving—in almost every State and territory, as well as the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Approximately 50 percent of all VISTA volunteers are assigned to officially-designated community action agencies and another 30 percent to organizations funded through the Office of Economic Opportunity or other Federal agency. VISTA volunteers serve as lawyers in legal services programs, in Headstart, in Job Corps programs, and in almost every conceivable kind of poverty program at the grass roots level. Under section 811 (a) of the Economic Opportunity Act, as amended, and firm agency policy, they are required to live among and at the economic level of the people they serve. In this respect, the hardships they endure are every bit as great—and may well be more so—than those encountered

by Peace Corps volunteers in their service overseas.

When the retirement and other credit provision was enacted in the original Peace Corps Act in 1961, it was explained as designed to encourage volunteers to consider professional careers in Government service. I believe it to be every bit as important to the vitality of Federal service that former VISTA volunteers be encouraged to enter those ranks. The type of fundamental person-to-person experiences they have had and the sensitivities they have developed to the problems of poverty and its victims are very similar to those of Peace Corps volunteers. And these qualities continue to be sorely needed among employees of the Federal Government.

Thus, I intend to propose an amendment to S. 1809, a bill introduced on April 15, 1969, by Senator GAYLORD NELSON, chairman of the Employment, Manpower, and Poverty Subcommittee, to provide for the continuation of programs authorized under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, to authorize advance funding of such programs, to require notice to Congress prior to delegation of any program to another agency, and for other purposes. The amendment would extend to former VISTA volunteers—including volunteer leaders, volunteers serving in special volunteer programs, community volunteers and volunteer associates—the identical length-of-service credit now accorded former Peace Corps volunteers. Enactment of this amendment would mean that VISTA volunteers would for this purpose be treated the same as former military personnel who transfer to civil service jobs.

The proposed amendment, if enacted, would apply to all former VISTA volunteers who become employed or who are presently employed by the U.S. Government on or after the effective date of this act. In order to secure appropriate full credit toward civil service and other Federal systems of retirement, it would be necessary for a former VISTA volunteer to pay into the retirement system the appropriate amount of employee contribution for the period for which he wishes credit.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the amendment I intend to propose be printed in the RECORD at this point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received, printed, and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendment (No. 162) was referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, as follows:

At the end of the bill, add the following new section:

"Sec. 10. (a) Section 833 of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, as amended, is amended by

"(i) striking out in subsection (a) 'subsection (b)' and inserting 'subsections (b) and (c)'; and

"(ii) adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(c) Any period of service of a volunteer who receives a living allowance of a stipend under this title shall be credited in connection with subsequent employment in the

same manner as a like period of civilian employment by the United States Government—

"(1) for the purposes of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. 2251 et seq.), section 852(a)(1) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended (22 U.S.C. 1092(a)(1)), and every other Act establishing a retirement system for civilian employees of any United States Government agency; and

"(2) except as otherwise determined by the President, for the purposes of determining seniority, reduction in force, and layoff rights, leave entitlement, and other rights and privileges based upon length of service under the laws administered by the Civil Service Commission, the Foreign Service Act of 1946, and every other Act establishing or governing terms and conditions of service of civilian employees of the United States Government: *Provided*, That service of a volunteer shall not be credited toward completion of any probationary or trial period or completion of any service requirement for career appointment."

"(b) The amendments made by subsection (a) shall be effective as to all former volunteers employed by the United States Government on or after the effective date of this Act."

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH—AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 163

Mr. PROXMIRE submitted an amendment, intended to be proposed by him, to the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

AMENDMENT NO. 164

Mr. HATFIELD (for himself and Mr. HARTKE) submitted an amendment, intended to be proposed by them, jointly, to Senate bill 2546, supra, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

AMENDMENT NO. 165

Mr. COOPER (for himself, Mr. Cook, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. MCCARTHY, Mr. METCALF, Mr. NELSON, Mr. PELL, and Mr. YOUNG of Ohio) proposed an amendment to Senate bill 2546, supra, which was ordered to be printed.

(The remarks of Mr. COOPER when he proposed the amendment appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

NOTICE OF HEARINGS ON REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 1

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, the Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization will hold hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 1, which would reorganize the Interstate Commerce Commission, at 10 a.m. on October 2, 1969, in room 3302, New Senate Office Building.

NOTICE OF HEARING ON STATE TAXATION OF NATIONAL BANKS

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I wish to announce that the Committee on Banking and Currency will hold a hearing on H.R. 7491 and S. 2065, bills to clarify the liability of national banks for certain taxes.

The hearing will be held on Wednesday, September 24, 1969, and will begin at 10 a.m. in room 5302 New Senate Office Building.

Persons desiring to testify or to submit written statements in connection with this hearing should notify Mr. Hugh H. Smith, Jr., room 5300 New Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20510; telephone 225-7391.

NOTICE OF HEARINGS BY THE AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURPLUS PROPERTY LEGISLATION

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I wish to announce that the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Surplus Property Legislation will hold hearings on Wednesday, September 24, at 10 a.m., on a number of bills which have been referred to the subcommittee. They are as follows:

S. 2583. Mr. McGEE, to convey to the county of Washakie, Wyo., certain real property of the United States.

S. 2584. Mr. McGEE, to authorize the donation of surplus real and personal property to States and political subdivisions for use in establishing and maintaining public museums.

S. 2591. Mr. GURNEY, to authorize the donation of surplus personal property to State and local police organizations.

S. 2563. Mr. HART, to amend the Federal Property Act, to permit the disposal of surplus real property to public housing agencies for public housing purposes.

Anyone wishing to testify or submit a statement for the record on any of the bills should contact Mr. Glenn K. Shriver, room 3308, New Senate Office Building, telephone extension 7464, as soon as possible.

NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the following nominations have been referred to and are now pending before the Committee on the Judiciary:

Duane K. Craske, of Guam, to be U.S. attorney for the district of Guam for the term of 4 years, vice James P. Alger.

Blas C. Herrero, Jr., of Puerto Rico, to be U.S. attorney for the district of Puerto Rico for the term of 4 years, vice Francisco A. Gil, Jr.

Edward R. Neaher, of New York, to be U.S. Attorney for the eastern district of New York for the term of 4 years, vice Joseph P. Hoey, resigned.

On behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all persons interested in these nominations to file with the committee, in writing, on or before Tuesday, September 23, 1969, any representations or objections they may wish to present concerning the above nominations, with a further statement whether it is their intention to appear at any hearing which may be scheduled.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF ADDITIONAL TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM VIETNAM

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I wish to address the Senate on the announcement just made by President Nixon.

The President's announcement of the withdrawal of at least 35,000 additional troops from Vietnam resumes the momentum to his Vietnam peace strategy and should ease the doubts that have arisen concerning the direction of the administration's policy in this regard. Further withdrawals should hopefully be announced so that the President may fulfill his earlier prophecy that he would top the 100,000 figure for troop withdrawals by the end of this year. I urge him to do so and to adopt a timetable for the withdrawal of at least another 100,000 by the end of 1970.

Despite the divided counsel he apparently received, the President has shown that he recognizes the imperative need of moving quickly and decisively forward to a compromise peace settlement and that the phasing in of the ARVN to the main combat responsibility is the most effective course toward that end. His statement that "the time has come to end this war" will find a deep response among the American people—it is the policy they expect of the administration.

Mr. President, I have urged, and I urge again, that the tactic of the phased withdrawal of American troops is the crucial one open to implementation—as part of the Administration's peace strategy—in view of the stalemate in the Paris peace negotiations.

It will test two things: First, whether the government in Saigon can, and will, broaden its base enough to attract sufficient allegiance to assure the survival of a non-Communist government in open competition with the NLF; and, second, whether South Vietnam has the will and the capacity, which it may not recognize now, but will only recognize when faced with this test, of having to stand heavily on its own—especially with respect to shouldering the main combat responsibility.

This does not mean that the United States will not give aid of many kinds, but the fundamental combat responsibility must be transferred, and this is a step in that direction.

One other observation I should like to make: the President, properly, specifies seven items in which his administration has gone forward in an effort to bring about a political settlement. He specified them, as follows:

We have renounced an imposed military solution.

We have proposed free elections under international supervision.

We have offered to withdraw U.S. and allied forces over a 12-month period, if the North Vietnamese did the same.

We have declared that the United States will retain no military bases. We have offered to speed mutual withdrawal under a negotiated and supervised cease-fire.

That we would settle for a de facto removal of the North Vietnamese troops, even if they did not admit they were in there.

And, finally, that we would accept any political outcome arrived at through free elections.

The President properly said the only thing that is not negotiable is the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future.

The question is, Who shall redeem that? They or we? The main argument that people like myself make is that we have shed enough blood and have spent enough of our treasure. It is time to turn that redemption increasingly over to the South Vietnamese themselves.

Finally, these overtures, very real, very substantial, and very creditable, by the United States, deserve more support in the world than they have received. I think the United States ought to initiate appropriate diplomatic actions—and the United Nations meetings, which are starting today, are a good place to begin—to get recognition and support in the world of what we have come forward with. Such support could help materially to persuade the North Vietnamese to adopt a more flexible negotiating position and to join in efforts to reduce, and terminate, the fighting and bloodshed. That, coupled with world disapproval of the harsh prisoner-of-war attitude of the North Vietnamese, upon which the occupant of the Chair (Mr. CRANSTON) and my colleague from New York (Mr. GOODELL) have acted, may result in changing the climate of world opinion, which has been one of the big disadvantages that the United States has faced in the struggle over Vietnam.

I urge our President and our Government to undertake this action. The President's statement today is a fine base for it. I shall do everything I can, as a Member of the Senate, and as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Senator has made a very fine statement.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator.

TRIBUTE TO SENATOR SYMINGTON

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, my distinguished senior colleague from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) has spent the better part of his adult life dealing with the crucial problems of national security in the broadest sense.

As a former Secretary of the Air Force and a longtime member of the Committee on Armed Services, he has acquired an intimate knowledge of the military, its procedures, and its requirements. As a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations and more recently as chairman of its Subcommittee on Foreign Commitments, he possesses expertise and knowledge of the intricacies and demands of a responsible foreign policy. As a member of the Joint Economic Committee, he understands the need for a strong American dollar and prudent fiscal policies.

But more important, he possesses a keen intellect capable of bringing his vast experience to bear on the major issues of the day. His advice and counsel during the debate over the military procurement authorization have been invaluable—although unfortunately it was ignored on the ABM and AMSA.

The Columbia Tribune recently published editorially a well-deserved tribute

to Mr. SYMINGTON. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

THE EMERGING SYMINGTON

Stuart Symington is the senior U.S. Senator from Missouri. He was Secretary of the Air Force back when the branches of the services were organized into separate cabinet agencies. In the Senate he is on the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations (ex officio) and Joint Economic committees.

He has spent his entire governmental career close to the military. His hand has been more or less consistently in the planning of our nation's defense posture. Until perhaps 24 months ago he was considered hawkish—certainly sympathetic to Pentagon programs and a steadily escalating defense configuration.

It is because of this unique combination of past characteristics that Senator Symington has now emerged as the leading antagonist to President Nixon's Anti Ballistic Missile System program.

There are other voices in the Senate just as prestigious and well known which speak forcefully against deployment. But none of them can claim Symington's past or present association with the military aspects of our nation's policy. For this reason the Missouri Senator has steadily assumed a more pivotal role in the debate, and he has been singled out by a variety of national news media as the leading spokesman on the negative side of the question.

Although Symington has always had a distinguished career in public life, it has only in the past couple of years been replete with such a strong projection of leadership. He has previously been more of the solid citizen type, always exuding incredible charm, always presenting the intelligent, urbane image one thinks a Senator should, but seldom rushing into battle like a Mansfield or Fulbright.

Then, beginning with his developing attitude about the Vietnam War (he was among the first to publicly change his mind about de-escalation) he emerged as more of an individual leader. Now, with his posture on the ABM question, the metamorphosis is complete.

There are those who will probably say that Symington is projecting himself now simply because he will be running for re-election in 1970. The six year term of a Senator allows him to be himself most of the time, so this argument goes, and he only has to turn on the steam occasionally.

But this idea is patently silly when applied to Symington's particular case. The Vietnam War and the ABM debate strike us as singularly shaky foundations upon which to build a popular electioneering image. Certainly Symington was in the minority when he first started talking about bombing halts and troop withdrawals in Vietnam, and he is in the minority (though only slightly, it seems) on the ABM issue. Motherhood, the flag, law and order or governmental cost cutting would have been more appropriate for short term personal gain.

No, the truth is that Symington has been performing a distinct public service in his willingness to forcefully join the national debate on sensitive matters of militarism, national defense and the attendant economic and philosophical implications.

He believes that continued escalation of our military budget could destroy the integrity of our economy, and when a man in the U.S. Senate with the background and intelligence of a Stuart Symington comes painfully to such a conclusion, he must speak out if he is to dispatch his duty. If the Senate meets no other national need it must serve as the forum for the most excruciating

of these discussions, and it is to the credit of Missourians that they have elected to that body two men possessing the necessary powers of analysis, articulation and personal appeal to positively affect the swirl of public philosophy that is developed there.

Symington has become more than a man to respect. He has become a man to follow.

BILLBOARD REMOVAL

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, more than 4 years have passed since Congress enacted the Highway Beautification Act of 1965, and we have still found no way to carry out the antibillboard provisions of that act.

A suggestion which is both practical and economical has come from a brilliant young advertising executive of my hometown of Salt Lake City, Utah, Mr. Douglas T. Snarr. The Snarr plan is encompassed in a bill I have introduced—S. 1442. Hearings were held on it early this session by a subcommittee of the Committee on Public Works.

The September issue of *Fortune* summarized the plan in a succinct and effective way. I ask unanimous consent that the brief article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE "SNARR PLAN" FOR BILLBOARD BLIGHT

Douglas T. Snarr is a 35-year-old artist who loves the scenic beauty of his home state of Utah. His is currently the loudest voice pleading for implementation of the dormant antibillboard provisions of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965. What is curious is that Snarr is also president of Snarr Advertising Inc., of Salt Lake City, a company that has 1,600 billboards hiding the scenery in thirteen western states.

Snarr is not trying to commit business suicide. Most states have been considering carrying out the law by condemning signs one by one, just as they acquire parcels of land for new roads, and reimbursing the owners. This cumbersome approach, involving as many as a million unlawful signs nationwide, might drag on interminably, Snarr fears, and the red tape could push total costs as high as \$2 billion—far more than Congress is ever likely to appropriate.

Snarr has a far simpler approach, which, he believes, would cost only about \$500 million nationwide. Under his plan the states would enter into a relatively small number of contracts with outdoor advertising companies, under which each would take down all of its offending signs and receive compensation for them. Having won over twenty outdoor advertising companies with signs in Utah to this plan, Snarr is now lobbying for a bill by that state's Senator Frank E. Moss which would authorize \$5 million for a pilot sign-removal project in one or more states.

A devout Mormon, Snarr believes billboard blight has got out of hand ("It's awful!" he says). Equally important, he sees small rural outdoor advertising companies, such as his, in limbo because of the stalled beautification program—hesitant to put up new signs, yet uncertain about when and how they will be compensated for existing ones. There's a danger, he says, that the countryside will become filled with abandoned signs, which are even uglier than well-maintained ones. Snarr wants to enter another business if he can recover his investment. Meanwhile, he wryly notes, most of the big outdoor companies, whose signs are mainly in urban areas exempt from the 1965 law, continue to prosper.

UNDER SECRETARY CAMPBELL SPEAKS ON OUR ENVIRONMENT

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has long been concerned about the quality of environment and the people and other living things that depend upon this environment for survival. Farmers need pesticides to protect their crops and livestock from harmful insects, weeds, diseases, and other pests. These chemicals also are required to halt the spread of malaria and other deadly human diseases throughout the world. However, the Department is well aware of the potential hazard to the environment that can result from the misuse of pesticides, and it has acted to avoid such hazards through extensive programs of regulation, research, monitoring, and education.

The Department's concern for our environment was demonstrated by two recent actions. Last spring, it launched an intensive study of the Lake Michigan watershed to determine the extent and source of pesticide contamination of the lake. In July, all USDA pest control operations using nine of the most persistent pesticides were temporarily suspended to permit an intensive review of these programs. Reduction in the use of some of these pesticides already has been announced.

The Department's concern for protecting the environment while continuing to help farmers produce the food, fiber, and timber products all Americans require is expressed well in an address by the Honorable J. Phil Campbell, the Under Secretary of Agriculture, September 15 at the annual meeting of the National Agricultural Chemicals Association at White Sulphur Springs, W. Va. Under Secretary Campbell outlines in some detail the efforts of the Department of Agriculture to assure safety in the use of pesticides and to seek out through research new and better means of destroying the pests of man without damage either to man himself or to the environment man shares with all other living creatures.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Under Secretary Campbell's speech be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY UNDER SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
J. PHIL CAMPBELL BEFORE THE NATIONAL
AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS ASSOCIATION,
WHITE SULPHUR SPRINGS, W. VA., SEPTEMBER
15, 1969

I appreciate very much the opportunity to take part in this annual meeting of the National Agricultural Chemicals Association. It's good to see many friends here—many who have been associated with agriculture for most of their lives, just as I have.

We are all deeply dedicated to furthering the progress of American agriculture. We know this is vital to the nation.

We are all keenly concerned with the advancement of agricultural research. We know that research is, and will continue to be, the mainspring of agricultural progress.

And we are all disturbed by what seems to be a growing tendency to make agriculture the scapegoat in the great public awareness over environmental pollution.

That there is environmental pollution is an undisputed fact. That it stems primarily

from agricultural use of pesticides and plant nutrients is not a fact. The danger is that too many uninformed people may tie the fact and the nonfact together in one package.

There is a great deal of uninformed talk today about maintaining nature's balance. I'm reminded of a letter I had from a lady about 12 years ago when I was Georgia Commissioner of Agriculture. She wanted to know if there was any State law that would protect the farm she and her husband owned on the Alabama-Georgia line against fertilizers washing and chemicals blowing from a neighboring farm.

I wrote back telling her there was no such law on the books. She replied by return mail that hers was no routine letter and she hadn't expected a routine answer from me. For my information, she had a M.A. degree and her husband was working on a Ph.D. at Auburn, and she was asking a serious question and expected a serious answer. Then she went on for three pages, single-spaced, about how the so-called technological progress of America was unbalancing nature and the dire results that might be expected therefrom.

I carefully considered my reply and then I wrote to her that the only way I knew of to balance nature in the manner she was proposing would be for all mankind to take off their clothes and move out of their houses and go back to the caves, and I didn't see how we are going to bring this about.

I don't think my answer satisfied her, but she evidently gave up on me because I never heard another word.

Now, I'm not downgrading in the slightest the truly fundamental importance of maintaining a balance in nature. The point I'm making is that in assessing our use of natural and man-made resources to make better living possible for the American people, we need to proceed on the basis of facts and on the basis of practicality.

The way to approach any problem is from the vantage point of truth—of facts—not from false premises based on half-truths and myths.

A few years ago newspaper stories attributed major fish kills in the Mississippi to endrin contained in water runoff from fields in which endrin had been used. Subsequently, a team of scientists uncovered convincing evidence that these fish kills were not related to pesticides on agricultural lands. Unfortunately, this received little attention in the press.

Mr. and Mrs. American Citizen hear a great deal about water pollution. They read in the press or hear over radio and TV that 14 million tons of plant nutrients are applied to soils in the United States every year.

From there it's an easy jump to the conclusion that these plant nutrients, washing off into streams and lakes and feeding the growth of algae, are making the water unusable for domestic purposes, recreation, or fishing.

Scientific evidence indicates that plant nutrients are quite a minor factor in this development. But rumor has a way of out-running fact.

Currently, there is a big controversy about the role of DDT and other persistent pesticides.

DDT was first synthesized in 1874, but it was not until 1939 that a scientist in Switzerland discovered its insecticidal properties.

DDT has served the world very well since its perfection for use as an insecticide by USDA and other scientists. By controlling the malaria mosquito and other pests that transmit diseases, it has saved millions of lives. World Health Organization leaders have said there has never been another chemical that has done so much to control pests that carry diseases to people. DDT has also been an important factor in increasing world food production.

Because DDT has been so widely used

traces of it have turned up in many places—including salmon taken from Lake Michigan. But it is still far from clear what the long-term implications of DDT pervasiveness may be.

We must determine whether or not DDT and other persistent chemicals pose a threat to the environment and the welfare of man and society. If they do, then we must move quickly to minimize or eliminate that danger.

We would all agree that the American public should be concerned about human safety and about the purity of the environment. We would all agree that the American people need to know the true extent of contamination and pollution—and the truth about who and what are responsible.

We would agree also that not only the American public, but people in other countries who buy our agricultural products, have a rightful concern about pesticide contamination.

Within the past two to three years a number of European countries have enacted laws covering the tolerable levels of pesticide residues in foods. Our export markets depend on our ability to meet these requirements.

But the public needs to know also the benefits America and the whole world derive from the efficient, safe use of chemicals.

The public needs to see all aspects of the question in context.

And not only the public but you and I also need to look at this problem from all sides.

From the practical angle there is no question in my mind—as I'm sure there is none in yours—that the vitality of American agriculture will demand the extensive use of chemicals for a long time to come.

We depend very heavily on technology for our standard of living. Much of our agricultural technology is a "package deal." In the package are included mechanization, conservation practices, irrigation, improved varieties of plants, and the most advanced and effective insecticides, herbicides, and fertilizers.

The use of pesticides has risen rapidly since the close of World War II—and is still growing sharply.

U.S. production of synthetic pesticides increased more than 37 percent in the five-year period, 1963 to 1967.

On the other hand, demands for certain pesticides are decreasing. U.S. production of DDT is now less than half what it was five or six years ago, and three-fourths of our production is exported. It seems quite evident that the popularity of DDT is definitely on the wane in the developed world.

Herbicides are now the largest single category of pesticides used in U.S. agriculture.

In 1949 herbicides were used on 23 million acres of agricultural land. By 1965 there was a five-fold increase to more than 120 million acres—or about one-third of our crop acreage.

Just in passing I might point out that Europe uses herbicides on from 80 to 85 percent of its crop acreage.

The public needs to know how great our dependence on the use of chemicals in agriculture actually is. Some 10,000 species of insects in the United States are enemies of man, agriculture, and natural resources. Several hundred of these are particularly destructive.

Besides these insects there are 600 species of weeds, 1,500 plant diseases, and 1,500 species of nematodes and microscopic worms which are capable of causing serious economic loss.

The cost of controlling these pests was estimated at more than \$3 billion a year in the mid-1960's. It is more today. Even with these very large expenditures to curb pests, it is estimated that insects, diseases, nematodes, and weeds cut U.S. agricultural production by about one-fourth.

The public needs to know these facts. The public needs to know also what the effect

would be if we were suddenly to stop the use of pesticides in agriculture.

Potato production in the East could be virtually wiped out. Peaches and citrus fruit might well disappear almost completely from food markets.

Total production of U.S. crops and livestock, it is estimated, could drop by as much as 30 percent.

Now suppose that we also cut out the use of chemical fertilizers and lime. I remember some 15 years ago seeing an estimate that fertilizers and lime accounted for at least 25 percent of U.S. crop yields. Since that time the quantity of fertilizers and lime used annually has jumped about two and one-half times.

Without any of the pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers which we are presently using, I personally doubt that we could provide adequate quantities of food and fiber on our current acreage for more than 40 percent of our population.

Prices of farm products would skyrocket. Instead of getting our diet for 17 percent of our disposable income—easily the lowest in the world—we might be forced to devote 30 or 40 percent, and perhaps even more, for food.

Now this, of course, is a straw man. Nobody seriously advocates the sudden and complete withdrawal of chemicals from agriculture. Yet, I think it is important to point out to the public these facts on the importance of chemicals to our daily living.

These are some of the background facts against which suggestions and recommendations concerning the use of chemicals in agriculture must be considered. What effect will any specific recommendation, if acted on, have on supplies of food and fiber—on food prices—on the cost of living—and on the people's health?

Authorities estimate that 25 million persons in the country have poverty level incomes. What happens to them if their food costs are sharply increased? Many millions of other Americans have incomes not too far above the poverty level. Would they be dragged down into poverty? These questions need to be carefully weighed.

In an even broader context the public needs to consider the role of chemicals in the world food problem.

Two out of three of the world's people live in countries where the average diet falls short of nutritional adequacy. In vast regions of the earth population pressure obviously strains agricultural resources in their present state of development and use. Next to achieving world peace, there is no greater goal facing our generation than to alleviate widespread hunger in the world, and eventually to wipe it out.

But it is important to stress the fact that the world food problem as it presently exists is not primarily a population problem but an economic problem.

People in Belgium are well fed—yet the density of population in Belgium is estimated to be four times that of China. People in the Netherlands have generally good diets—yet their density of population is twice that of India.

Yet, some social scientists, who know little or nothing about agriculture, seem to insist on treating world hunger almost exclusively as a population problem. They arrive at their prognostications by dividing the number of world acres available into the number of people expected at some future date, and on this basis predict mass famine and starvation.

I do not minimize the seriousness of the world food problem. But I strongly believe that research and technology have introduced an entirely new element into the food and people equation. They have developed new breeds of livestock and poultry, new crop varieties, new methods of cultivation, new machines, and many new chemicals and pharmaceuticals.

The result is that one hour of U.S. farm labor last year produced $7\frac{1}{2}$ times as much food and fiber as it did 50 years ago—4 times as much as it did 25 years ago—and $2\frac{1}{2}$ times as much as it did 15 years ago.

We cannot expect such gains in nations which lack our resources and our ability to develop the "package technology" to which I referred earlier. Nevertheless, research and technology, the coming use of nuclear energy, economical processes to de-salt sea water, and other advances could be the genie which would open wide the doors to more abundant food supplies.

I personally believe that within the Continental United States alone there are natural resources enough when combined with the coming technology to provide food and fiber for a billion people.

This is one side of the picture—a side which has not been adequately told to the public. Research and technology—including the use of chemicals in agriculture—have already brought great benefits to America and the world. The wise, prudent, and safe use of chemicals can bring even greater benefits in the future.

But I emphasize those words—wise, prudent, and safe.

We must use chemicals with just regard for the safety of man, wildlife, and the natural environment.

In 1967 the USDA asked the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council to study the problems of pesticide use in the United States. The report of the Committee making the study was released early in June 1969. The report concluded that the present system of controls was providing adequate protection to man for his food supply. But it recommended that further and more effective steps should be taken to reduce the needless or inadvertent release of pesticides into the environment. It recommended further that studies of the possible long-term effects of pesticides be intensified, that research on chemical methods and techniques of pest control be increased, and that regulation and monitoring of persistent pesticides should be strengthened.

With these recommendations in mind and because of a growing concern over environmental contamination, we announced on July 9 the temporary suspension of nine persistent pesticides in our USDA pest control operations. It was determined that with certain exceptions these programs could be temporarily suspended without adverse consequences. We have used this period to make a highly valuable review of our control operations. Last month we arrived at some decisions with respect to certain uses. Further decisions will be announced shortly.

All of our decisions have been, and will be, made on the basis of the need for controlling specific pests balanced against the possible dangers involved and the availability of acceptable alternative control methods. In other words, the total picture must be considered.

Our purpose is to assure maximum feasible protection of our environment consistent with effective measures to halt the spread of destructive pests.

As you know, the Department's scientists for many years have been seeking additional safe and effective control techniques that minimize or avoid environmental contamination.

From past research has come the insect sterilization technique which has virtually wiped out the screwworm parasite in the South, and is being successfully applied to tropical fruit flies.

Other unique approaches being developed include virus insecticides, ultra-violet light and ultra-sonic sound, sex attractants, hormones that interfere with normal insect growth, manipulation of insect genes, and similar highly sophisticated control methods.

Most of these developments, however, are years away from widespread practical use.

For example, the USDA has been importing natural enemies of pests for more than 80 years. About 520 species have been imported. Of these, 115 have become established, but only about 20 have resulted in substantial control of the pests they were imported to combat. And they must be used in combination with other methods to be effective.

For the foreseeable future, therefore, pesticides will continue to be our main weapon against pests.

Consequently, USDA's regulatory responsibilities will continue. The outlook is for stricter control over pesticide production, packaging, labeling, and use.

A recent highly significant development is the recalling of pesticide products to insure quality and safety. Previously, USDA was limited to seizing shipments of family pesticides.

Now, if a pesticide is found to be defective the entire batch is withdrawn from the market.

These are some of the things I wanted to bring before you for your consideration at this annual meeting.

I want to assure you that the new team in Washington believes in and intends to support research. We recognize, as I said in the beginning, that research has been, is, and will continue to be the mainspring of our agricultural progress.

We realize that the struggle between man and pest has been going on for centuries. It is only recently that man has gained the upper hand, and in only a few parts of the world. The job of research is to maintain this position and improve it.

While the USDA will do all it can to help, the development of new pesticides has been and will continue to be primarily the responsibility of private industry. The introduction of new and better products by your industry is essential to the continued availability of chemical pest control tools that are both safe and effective.

All of us who are concerned with agriculture and agricultural research face a great challenge—and at the same time a great opportunity—to make the facts about the environmental problem known to the American people.

We need to pinpoint with as much accuracy as possible where any environmental contamination is coming from. Last spring, we began an intensive study of the Lake Michigan watershed to see if we could determine the source of pesticides entering the lake. Some 400 chemical plants in Michigan, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Illinois are being checked to see if waste disposal and other manufacturing practices are contributing to pollution.

We must work together on research and in the widespread use of research findings to protect and improve the environment while agriculture produces the food, clothing, shelter, and other products vital to our existence and essential to our high standard of living.

We also must get together in emphasizing the fact that agriculture has a deep concern about the environment and is working to protect it—that agriculture is concerned about a clear, clean, abundant water supply—about clean air—about healthy and plentiful wildlife—and about safe, high-quality food.

We must stress our own personal concern about environmental pollution. We ourselves must insist that every precaution be taken to assure an uncontaminated soil, water, and food supply.

Above all, we must learn to speak with a united voice on these problems.

We must speak up for truth—and we must speak up together.

TENNESSEE WALKING HORSE

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, this Wednesday I will preside over hearings

on S. 2543, a bill I have introduced to prevent the "soring" of Tennessee walking horses.

Soring is a barbaric practice whereby the horse's feet are deliberately made sore so that, when they touch the ground, they will hurt and spring up and out in an exaggerated gait. This gait or "walk" can be achieved through patient training and proper breeding, but soring is a cheap way to obtain it. Through soring, a mediocre horse can walk like a champion. What is desired in a Tennessee walking horse is known as "the big lick" where the horse kicks out his front foot as he steps. When the foot is sore, the kick is naturally more pronounced.

Soring is a cruel and inhumane practice. It is condemned by the American Horse Shows Association, the Tennessee Walking Horse Breeders and Exhibitors Association, the Tennessee Walking Horse Trainer's Association, and the organizers of the Tennessee Walking Horse National Celebration, the world series of these horses, recently held in Shelbyville, Tenn. It is even condemned by the State of Tennessee, where it is a misdemeanor to so treat a horse.

However, soring is also condoned by all these groups. They have been either unwilling or unable to stop the practice.

S. 2543 is designed to accomplish what they have not.

During this year's celebration, the Nashville Tennessean published a series of articles on the many problems of the Tennessee walking horse industry. It is an excellent series, and the newspaper's editor, John Sieganthal, is to be commended for it, as is the author, Wendell Rawls, Jr. One problem given prominence is soring.

I ask unanimous consent that the fourth article of the series, devoted entirely to soring, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Nashville Tennessean, Sept. 3, 1969]

WALKING HORSE SORING AN ART—BUT STRICTLY ILLEGAL

(By Wendell Rawls, Jr.)

Effective "soring" of walking horses is an art... strictly an illegal art, but a very widely practiced art.

The delicate practice of this art, designed to persuade the horse to lift its feet in the mincing, professional fashion treasured for exhibition purposes, has been attested to by several Tennessee trainers.

According to them, the most accepted method of soring a walking horse is to deposit a chemical blistering agent called oil of mustard onto the feet of the horse somewhere between the coronet band and the fetlock above the hoof, either in front or in back depending on how the horse reacts.

With the ankle tender from the "scootin' juice" or "hot stuff," as it is commonly called, the horse is then worked with a chain or roller, or both, around the ankle to add weight.

The horse tries to throw off the chain which varies in weight according to the reaction of the horse.

The rubbing of the chain or roller against the hide of the leg can remove the hair and cause a raw sore unless carefully treated after the workout or show.

In the show ring, the horses wear a two-inch boot, supposedly to prevent injury to

the front feet from over-striding of the back legs.

In reality, the boots act about the same as a chain or roller, adding weight to the feet while providing something for the horse to attempt to kick off.

The oil of mustard, a liquid, is applied with an eye dropper. The amount used depends on the reaction of the horse. Some horses require only a drop to reach the desired gait. Others require half an eye dropper.

There are other methods rumored, but knowledgeable horsemen agree that the oil of mustard is far and away the most commonly used.

No walking horseman will acknowledge the use of wood screws, nails, needles or any other method more severe than the blistering agents.

According to industry practitioners, even oxide of mercury, commonly referred to as "creeping cream," is no longer employed.

The reason for the use of any soring method is simple.

The sore horse, as a rule, will produce the desired gait much easier than through the arduous long hours required in training without the help of an outside agent. And the horses generally attain a higher "reach" of the front legs and more "man-like walk" of the back legs with the aid of hot stuff.

The problem comes, trainers agree, when the amateur rider and trainer apply the mustard without knowing the proper method or the proper amount.

The amateur won't spend the time, either to take care of the horse properly after a workout or horse show. He leaves the mustard on the leg, and puts the horse up for the night. This is hard on the horse.

The trainers maintain that proper care after using a blistering agent makes everything all right. They contend that the "big lick"—the climbing, reaching stride of the professional walking horse—is demanded by the public, which would leave the stands in droves without the excitement it provides.

There is some reason for this belief perhaps. But the fact is that walking horses can be trained to the proper stride without soring. Reasons for resorting to soring include: Some trainers don't want to spend the long hours required to train a walking horse without the bottle.

Many trainers feel that they cannot compete with more established trainers unless their horse is sored for an even bigger lick in order to get the attention of the judges.

Unless all trainers stop the practice, no one man will initiate the action and go into the ring against other trainers whose horses have been sored for the big lick.

Vic Thompson, president of the Walking Horse Trainers Association, telephoned The Nashville Tennessean yesterday to complain that some statements attributed to him in this series of articles "have been wrong."

Thompson, who admitted he has been soring horses in order to compete, said he wanted to make it clear he had not volunteered criticism of other horsemen and that news reports attributed to him were taken from a letter he sent to other trainers.

In regard to soring practices, Thompson said, "I'm only talking about myself."

Thompson declined to comment on reports that threats have been leveled at him since this series began.

Even though the rules of every walking horse association forbid soring, not all horse shows abide by the same rules or in the same way.

Many horse show managers fear that to be too strict on soring will cut down on the number of horses appearing in the ring. In fact, there are times when stewards and judges are instructed not to be too severe in the enforcement of such regulations against sore horses.

William C. (Bill) Tune, president of the Walking Horse National Celebration in Shel-

byville, tells a sadly amusing story of his experience in Hartselle, Ala.

Tune was invited as the steward for the Hartselle show and as such disqualified about half the first class before it reached the ring.

"The reaction of both the fans and the officials was not one of joy," Tune said.

After Tune disqualified "about half" of the second class, officials of the show came to him and demanded that he stop disqualifying the horses.

Tune said he was there to act as steward and that he would perform his duties until and unless the officials removed him from his function.

They did just that.

Pressures continue to mount from outside the walking horse industry against the practice of soring horses for show purposes. Humane societies and other animal protection agencies have been "writing their congressmen" for years and are stepping up the attack.

Sen. Joseph D. Tydings, D-Md., had reacted to the pressure with the introduction July 2 of legislation to prohibit the interstate shipment and exhibition of sored horses for show purposes.

As introduced, the bill would give the Department of Agriculture a means of enforcing the regulation and would make violations a federal offense.

Tydings, a gaited horse enthusiast, terms soring practices an example of "man's inhumanity to animals," and will commence a Senate subcommittee hearing on the subject Sept. 17.

The bill carefully defines soring and declares it to be a "cruel and inhumane" practice.

The bill provides for a fine of "not more than \$500 and-or imprisonment of not more than six months for the act.

Tennessee law is more severe but evidently less effective than most walking horse people think the Tydings Bill would be.

The state statute says:

"It shall be unlawful for any owner or exhibitor of horses to make the front legs and hoofs of such horses sore for the practice of competition in horse shows and other similar events by inflicting burns, cuts, lacerations, or other injury or pain upon the front legs or hoofs of said horses by the use of blistering compounds (commonly referred to as "scoting juice"), sharp-pointed instruments, and other devices or drugs.

"It shall be the duty of all persons designated and acting as ringmaster of any horse show or similar event to disqualify any horse determined by the ringmaster to be suffering from abuse or torture resulting from the causes set out in (above paragraph) from further participation in said show, and to make a report of the same, including the name of the horse, the owner of said horse, and the exhibitor of said horse to the manager or chairman of said show, who in turn shall report the same in writing to the district attorney-general of the county wherein the incident occurred for appropriate action.

"Any violation of (the above two paragraphs) by horse owners or exhibitors, and the failure of any person or persons designated as the ringmaster of any horse show or other similar event, or the failure of the manager or chairman of said show to perform the duties required by such officials shall constitute a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment in the county jail or workhouse as in other misdemeanors (\$50 and 11 months, 29 days maximum)."

If the threat of law is not enough, the economic pressures of being unable to sell a Tennessee Walking horse for exhibition outside the state is expected to have the desired effect of halting the practice of soring horses.

With trainers and exhibitors allowed to go

unfettered in many shows in Tennessee, the sored and scarred horse is unable to compete in shows in many other parts of the nation, where the regulations against the practice are rigidly enforced.

Thus, owners will begin to be less interested in paying the high price for a horse they will not be able to show in their locality.

"I want to purchase my horses in Tennessee," said a California buyer, "but if I cannot show them in California, why pay the price even of shipping them there?"

Even after a sore has healed, many times scar tissue develops. That, too, is illegal in most states, and supposedly against the rules for all two and three-year-olds throughout the industry.

There is progress reported on all sides.

The Walking Horse Trainers Association, founded two years ago with the best intentions for cleaning up practices of soring of horses, has been lauded by humane societies across the nation for their efforts.

In truth, however, the practice continues. Only the evidence has been cleaned up.

DEATH OF PAUL H. TODD, SR., KALAMAZOO, MICH.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, headlines and history deal with figures who stand large on the national and world scene. Where history records a period of great success for a nation, one or a few figures appear to be credited with that success. What history too often overlooks, but which each of us should be reminded of every day, is that no one figure, no small group—no matter how well-intentioned and able—can carry a people to success, achieve progress, or avoid disaster. These goals can be won only if there are men and women willing to devote talent and energy to the affairs of each community of the nation. With this kind of community leadership, the nation increases in strength and whoever may be its figures in prominent leadership, their job is being done in large part for them by men and women rarely noted in history.

Three generations of a remarkable family dramatically illustrate this influence. I rise regretfully to announce the death of the distinguished Kalamazoo, Mich., citizen, Paul H. Todd, Sr., the second in this three-generation line of worthy community leaders. Mr. Todd served twice as mayor of Kalamazoo and for 26 years as a member of the Kalamazoo City Commission. In his 81st year, he remained active until the day of his death in the direction of a business that had been founded by his father. His contributions to banking and education in Kalamazoo are as full as his years.

The third generation of this remarkable family, Paul Todd, Jr., represented Michigan's Third Congressional District in the Congress of the United States in the middle 1960's. Former Representative Todd, also active in the business life of Kalamazoo, currently serves as the executive director of Planned Parenthood-World Population, in New York—thus continuing the Todd tradition of service to community and Nation.

To his family I express regret at the passing of this man, of whom any nation has too few.

I ask unanimous consent that an editorial published in the Kalamazoo Gazette of September 5 be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PAUL H. TODD, Sr.

Few persons contribute to their community to the extent as did Paul H. Todd Sr. who died Wednesday at Bronson Hospital at the age of 81.

A two-time mayor of Kalamazoo, he served on the City Commission for 26 years in addition to carrying on and expanding a successful business founded by his father.

A Democrat in philosophy and action in a community and area Republican by tradition, he was a man of firm views and was not hesitant about expounding them. But he held the respect of those who were in political opposition to him as well as those with whom he was aligned.

Paul H. Todd Sr., veteran of World War I, public official and successful businessman, met the challenge of civic responsibility in full measure. His passing is the community's loss.

POWER OF THE PURSE

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, the Pentagon spends almost \$400 million a year on research and development grants to colleges and universities. In 1967 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology received nearly \$95 million making it the 62d largest defense contractor in the Nation. Through these grants the Pentagon exerts a tremendous influence on education. In his farewell address, President Eisenhower warned:

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present—and is gravely to be regarded.

Through the power of the purse the military establishment determines what research shall be done and by whom. It has been able to establish criteria by which certain categories of students have been drafted and certain others deferred. It even influences the subjects young Americans are studying in college. There is the danger that colleges and universities will tailor their whole direction to obtain these research grants. Much research is necessary and can only be accomplished by scholars in academic institutions. However, we must be vigilant that the Department of Defense and the military-industrial establishment do not attain complete control of higher education in America.

THE SOUTH IS A PART OF THE UNION

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, James J. Kilpatrick is one of the Nation's outstanding nationally syndicated columnists and one whose opinions are highly respected for fairness and objectivity by all thoughtful citizens. In his column entitled "Let's Stop Kicking the South Around!" in the Washington Star on Sunday, September 14, 1969, Mr. Kilpatrick took a hefty poke at those in Washington who resort to double standards and hypocrisy in dealing with the South. The column is interesting and instructive reading on this point alone, but I suggest that it is must reading for anyone interested in the subject of any

future southern strategy. The reason is that Mr. Kilpatrick has articulated the feeling of injustice that pervades much southern thinking today, and he captures something of the intangible southern spirit which I believe is destined to play a decisive role in the future national elections. Mr. Kilpatrick's concluding observation reveals the essence of that spirit in these words:

The old Confederacy is part of the Union now; it is a great place; I love it; and it would be pleasant indeed if the damned Yankees who dwell in Washington would stop kicking my South around.

I heartily concur in these sentiments, and I heartily commend the column as worthy of careful consideration by Senators and by the public.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Kilpatrick's column be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Sunday Star, Sept. 14, 1969]

LET'S STOP KICKING THE SOUTH AROUND!

(By James J. Kilpatrick)

Reconstruction came to an end in the South, or so the history books tell us, during the reign of Rutherford Hayes some 90 years ago. But there are times, honest to Pete, when Southerners wonder if the South ever is to regain an equal standing in the Union.

There is something about the South, apparently, that draws an unrelenting anathema from the North. Old abolitionists never die; they write on for The New York Times. It has only to be said, or hinted, that a particular program or appointment may be pleasing to the South—the conservative South, that is—for the program or appointment to be damned out of hand. As a Southerner, I protest.

We are witnessing the syndrome just not in the nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth to the Supreme Court. It is entirely proper, of course, that the Senate Judiciary Committee inquire into his qualifications. No one is suggesting that the Senate's duty to advise and consent should be treated in perfunctory fashion. But the noxious clouds of complaint against this appointment have little to do with qualifications. The objection, at bottom, is that Haynsworth is a Southerner—a moderately conservative Southerner. That is enough. Lynch him!

Thus, an entirely phony challenge is raised that Haynsworth acted unethically by not disqualifying himself eight years ago when the great Deering Milliken case first came to his Circuit Court. The charge is baseless. The Fourth Circuit's major opinion in the Deering Milliken litigation came in November of 1963. Haynsworth did not write the opinion—Judge Albert Bryan wrote it, and Judge Herbert Boreman concurred. Two other judges dissented. Haynsworth's position on the law and the evidence was in no way irrational; it was a position shared not only by Bryan and Boreman, but also by two members of the National Labor Relations Board and by the board's own trial examiner.

Haynsworth's critics know that their charge of a particular conflict of interests is flimsy. Thus they were seeking, last week, to puff it up to a more general charge that Haynsworth is "Mr. Textile Interests." These are the same critics, by and large, who smiled benevolently in other days upon the nominations of Arthur Goldberg and Thurgood Marshall. There are times, in Washington's political rainy season, when we wallow in tides of hypocrisy; and one of those times is upon us now.

It is not only the Haynsworth nomination that suffers the "Southern stigma." Harry Dent is a skilled and dedicated executive, worth his weight in gold at the White House; but he comes from South Carolina—he formerly was with Strom Thurmond—and his appointment as a presidential assistant brought slurs that were simply anti-Southern. No matter what the administration does about school desegregation in the South—no matter what it proposes on voting rights—a hostile reaction arises.

Even Spiro Agnew succumbs. The vice president appeared on Meet the Press the other day, and was asked about the "Southern strategy" that has been urged on his party. He began his response by denying that he was in any sense a traditional Southerner. Then he got even more defensive: "How could someone seeking to court the forces of reaction propose a welfare program of the magnitude and scope the President has just proposed?"

Aargh! The South, with the largest racial problems, has demonstrated the greatest racial peace. It has suffered less than its neighbors from strikes, riots, and campus disorders. The South continues to raise daughters who are ladies and sons who are gentlemen. It is characterized not by "forces of reaction," but by innovation and by solid progress. The old Confederacy is part of the Union now; it is a great place; I love it; and it would be pleasant indeed if the damned Yankees who dwell in Washington would stop kicking my South around.

PUBLIC HEARINGS—TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, today the Committee on Finance received testimony on the general subject of the taxation of capital gains and losses. Included in that testimony were statements concerning restricted stock and lump-sum distributions under pension and profit-sharing plans. The House bill makes a series of changes in this area of the law. The most important of these changes would be extension of the holding period from 6 months to 12 months and repeal of the maximum 25-percent tax rate on long-term capital gains.

So that Senators might follow the progress of these tax reform hearings, I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the testimony be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WITNESSES CAPITAL GAINS

(Changes in the alternative tax, 6-month holding period, and in the treatment of capital losses)

Robert W. Haack, President, New York Stock Exchange, states the House proposals to lengthen the holding period, to eliminate the alternative tax, and to restrict capital loss deductions, would have a serious adverse effect on investment incentives, capital mobility, and stock market liquidity.

Asserts that in determining the most suitable length of the holding period, there is necessarily a trade off between the opposing goals of making the necessary distinction between types of transactions and of stimulating market liquidity. Further states that all available data indicate the existing 6-month holding period is more than ample to filter out the majority of noninvestment transactions.

Points out that relatively few individuals qualify for use of the alternative tax rate, but that it is this group which is the prime source

of venture capital. Expresses the opinion that eliminating the alternative tax would penalize the group from which the largest proportionate share of the national investment pool is expected to be accumulated.

States that the House proposal respecting capital losses assumes that many taxpayers can manage their investments so as to realize gains and losses in different years, and states this assumption is not valid.

Urges the committee to reject all three provisions. Also, urges that any future proposals to revise the capital gains tax structure be preceded or accompanied by a detailed study of all aspects of capital gains taxation.

Donald T. Regan, President, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., on Behalf of the Association of Stock Exchange Firms (changes in the alternative tax, with 6-month holding period, and the treatment of capital losses): Opposes the extension of the holding period, the repeal of the alternative tax, and the limitations on the deductibility of capital losses. Believes these changes would impair capital formation by placing a heavy burden on investment, thus diminishing the flow of private capital into new and expanded businesses.

States the present 25-percent alternative tax rate is an appropriate inducement to individuals capable of accepting the largest risks. Approves, however, the administration's proposal to revise the alternative tax. States the Treasury's recommendations would accomplish the desired end without reducing investment incentives.

Contends the proposed changes in the treatment of capital losses would reduce the willingness of individuals to take risks, and in all likelihood reduce funds available to those investors in the lower income tax brackets.

Disagrees with the House report that the 1-year holding period is an appropriate criterion for determining whether an equity purchase was a speculation or an investment. States that no time period can serve to separate speculation from investment, but it can differentiate ordinary business transactions from capital transactions.

Disputes the revenue estimates in the House report dealing with the repeal of the alternative tax and the extension of the holding period. Contends these estimates are based on the assumption that investors would continue to turn over their holdings at the present rate—i.e., that they would not change their investment habits. Expresses the belief that enactment of these provisions would tend to freeze assets and discourage new investment, resulting in less, not more, revenue.

Roland M. Bixler, chairman, board of directors, the Tax Counsel (capital gains proposal): Suggests the enactment of a new system for the separate taxation of long-term capital gains of individuals, with more moderate rates of tax than at present. Proposes the use of a holding-period test for separating gains to be taxed as transfers of capital under his proposed new system, and ordinary income under the income tax system. Suggests a credit against estate taxes of long-term gains of individuals be provided under the new system. Proposes, also, that the tax be eliminated on gains from sale of owner-occupied homes and of other properties not subject to loss offsets.

States that the enactment of a separate system would make clear that these long-term gains are really a part of capital and not the income stream. Points out that this would alleviate the problem of tax burdens on high incomes by lumping together income and their long-term gains. Points out that the revision of rates on long-term capital gains would be related to factors peculiar to capital use and not to factors peculiar to receipt and use of income as at present.

Unrealized gains at death: Indicates that

the taxation of unrealized gains at death would mean a double simultaneous impost on a transfer of capital. Recognizes, however, the problem of equity when gains are—or are not—recognized before death. States, though, that all possibilities for solution through decreasing taxes should be considered before contemplating an increase in taxes. Indicates that even with long-term capital gains linked with the income tax system, it would be possible to work out an arrangement by which taxes on gains during like were cumulatively recorded and then credited against estate taxes at death.

Allocation of deductions for interest: Recognizes that interest incurred in realized capital gains is a cost which should be deductible against the gains, recommends that, instead of the provision contained in the House bill limiting the deduction of interest, a taxpayer with long-term capital gains, and interest payments in excess of a figure (e.g. \$5,000 annually), the amount in excess of that figure be allocated as follows: first, as a deduction under the income tax system up to the amounts of dividends, interest, and 10 percent of other income; second, as a deduction under the separate proposed capital gains system; and third, the deduction of any remainder under the income tax system.

Individual income tax rates: Suggests rate reductions through the middle brackets be adjusted toward the goal of flattening the curve of graduation. States that it is neither fair nor good economics to impose a sharply ascending scale of tax rates on the more ambitious and successful members of any given generation.

Supports the provision in the House bill providing for a 50-percent maximum rate on earned income.

Corporate income tax: Agrees with the administration's proposal for a reduction in the corporation rate in 1971 and 1972, but recommends that instead of a 1 percentage point cut in each year the total cut be increased to 3 percentage points of 1½ points in each year.

David O. Ehlers, president, Gibraltar Growth Fund Inc. (general): States that changes in the capital gains tax structure will create a further shortage of investment capital and contribute to inflation, higher interest rates, depressed securities markets and unemployment. Indicates that the House bill fails to recognize the significant difference between capital and income. Notes that the practical effect of the capital gain changes will be to discourage needed capital investment at a time when such an investment should be encouraged. Points out that domestic equity markets will become less attractive inviting an outflow of investment moneys to foreign markets. Indicates that to the extent investible capital is eroded by the imposition of taxes, and inflationary expansion of credit results, this problem as it exists today will be aggravated by the changes made in the House bill.

States that the repeal of the investment credit will make less funds available internally to industry from profits; thus, industry will become even more dependent on outside sources of capital.

Alternative capital gains tax and holding period: States that the repeal of the alternative capital gains tax and the lengthening of the holding period will result in investors curtailing investments so that expansion of the economy through creation of new or expanded facilities will be sharply reduced.

Indicates that the 12-month holding period proposal contained in the House bill will reduce to a dangerous extent liquidity in the securities markets and the long-term effect will be to reduce, not increase, revenues to the Federal Government.

Points out that the present alternative capital gains tax (25 percent on net long-

term capital gains) does benefit the wealthy; but more important it encourages the wealthy investor to make his capital available.

Indicates that these proposed changes will force large investors away from common stocks, venture capital and other capital gains situations in favor of either taking capital abroad or deferring the realization of capital gains.

Indicates also that these proposed changes may very well have an adverse effect on our balance of payments, since foreign investors will look to other forms of their areas for investment.

Proposes a Capital Gains Structure: Suggests a separate, graduated capital gains structure—similar, but not identical to the present income tax structure—to give clear recognition to the distinction between capital increase and ordinary income, which would permit incentives needed to attract capital required to benefit the long-range needs of our economy. States that this progressive scale would reach a maximum rate at some point, possibly \$300,000 of capital gains for the year, and thereafter incremental gains would be taxed at a declining rate.

Proposes, also, taxing capital gains of foreign investors. States that this could be done through a kind of withholding tax on foreign investments.

Harley A. Hinrichs, Associate Professor of Economics, U.S. Naval Academy and University of Maryland (capital gains concept): Agrees that capital gains provisions of House bill are an improvement over existing tax law. States that current Treasury proposals are not.

Suggests that further improvement could be made: (a) treating capital gains as ordinary income, with averaging, and lowering top rates (to 50 percent or below) would be the most significant tax reform that Senate could accomplish—generating up to \$8.5 billion in new revenues making other reductions and reforms possible, simplifying the tax code (and H.R. 13270), and producing equity and economic growth; and (b) closing \$3 billion loophole of allowing \$20 billion in capital gains annually to escape taxation by transfer at death—which would unlock capital now frozen in anticipation of tax-free transfer at death and greatly improve equity of tax system. Indicates that, as a minimum, capital gains accrued after 1969 should be included at death.

Thomas L. Waterbury, Professor of Law, University of Minnesota (capital gain tax on transfers of capital assets by gift or at death): Recommends a comprehensive measure for the realization of capital gain or loss on transfers of capital assets by gift or at death, and that unrealized gains in respect of property held in trust be taxed once in each generation.

Points out the inequity in the result which allows an individual to transfer property at death without the payment of an income tax. Recognizes that whereas there is a complete avoidance of an income tax on the transfer of property at death, in the case of inter vivos gifts there is a deferment of tax because of the carryover basis rule. Suggests that this carryover basis rule for gifts is not sufficient and that the capital gains tax should be imposed on such transfers.

Notes that the Kennedy administration presented proposals of this kind to the Ways and Means Committee in 1963, but that the committee did not approve them. Indicates that the reason the Ways and Means Committee did not accept the proposals in 1963 may have been due to errors of judgment made by the administration in developing and supporting the proposal. Feels that the committee may have thought that the realization at death proposal ought not to be enacted until a further case was made for it.

Suggests that gains tax realization at death should become a part of our income tax law because most gifts and transfers at death of appreciated assets are made to, or in trust for the benefit of, members of the transferor's family and that the result of present law is to benefit the transfer of wealth within the family, especially those families which have large appreciated property being transferred at death. Believes that the present practice of forgiving the gains tax upon appreciated assets retained until death is inappropriate because it results in an unjustifiable subsidy to the interests of some families in the inheritance of property, as opposed to the interests of others in such inheritance, and because this subsidy to inheritance seems incongruous in the light of the burdens placed by our mass income tax upon family interests in annual maintenance.

Believes that a capital gains tax at death should not provide an exception for small estates or provide a marital deduction for the purpose of achieving the equality of treatment for surviving spouses in noncommunity property States. Suggests, further, that unrealized gains be realized, periodically, in the case of assets which appreciate in the hands of a multigeneration trustee.

RESTRICTED STOCK

John Seath, vice president and director of taxes, International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. (*Restricted property*): States that it is difficult for large corporations to compete for management talent with small closely held corporations because the small companies can offer managers large blocs of stock at very low prices and therefore create the possibility of very large capital gains when their stock is offered to the public. States that restricted stock plans are one of the principal methods of attracting management to large corporations.

Argues that restricted stock plans meet a legitimate need and are not tax gimmicks, and that benefits to these plans were specifically and favorably called to the attention of the Ways and Means Committee during consideration of the Revenue Act of 1964. Contends that qualified stock option plans cannot meet this need because they are no longer particularly attractive as employee incentives in view of the decline of market prices, higher interest rates, and the restrictions added in 1964.

States that the provision has been hastily considered, and would not provide increased revenue for the Treasury.

John A. Cardon and John M. Skilling, Jr., Lee, Toomey & Kent, New York City (Deferred compensation): Opposes the proposal for taxing deferred compensation.

Contends that deferred compensation is fully taxable at ordinary income rates and in no sense represents a tax loophole.

Argues that deferred compensation serves many corporate purposes: it attracts and holds employees; it provides supplemental retirement income; and, when awarded in the corporation's own stock, it creates additional employee incentive. States that its use is not limited to a few highly paid executives, but is applicable to many employees at many levels.

Contends that the proposal is unduly complex and presents a disproportionate compliance burden.

Argues that adoption of the proposal may cause a loss of tax revenue, and that it will be inflationary by encouraging current payments of compensation rather than deferral.

States that the proposed treatment of deferred compensation modifies radically the fundamental concepts of the cash method of accounting and the annual accounting period, and that no adequate revenue purpose has been demonstrated for so drastic a departure from these basic concepts.

Distributions from qualified plans:

Opposes the proposed method of taxing lump sum distributions from qualified employee plans. States that such distributions represent the accumulation of employer contributions and increment thereon over a period of many years, and that the proposal to tax post-1969 employer contributions on a 5-year "averaging" is neither realistic nor equitable.

States that the proposal would substitute a complex set of rules for a very simple tax computation under existing law. Argues that data needed to compute the tax liability under the proposal is not readily obtainable, nor is it always available to the taxpayer.

Contends that the adverse effects of the proposal will be felt by all plan participants receiving lump-sum distributions and not merely by those whose taxes on such distributions might be increased.

States that the attempt to provide a 5-year forward averaging will result in overpayment of taxes by some retired individuals who can least afford it and yet prevent them from recovering overpayments for a period of 5 years.

LUMP-SUM DISTRIBUTIONS UNDER PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS

Arthur M. Wood, president, Sears, Roebuck and Co. (Sears profit-sharing plan): Explains that all regular employees are eligible to join the Plan after 1 year's service; employees contribute 5 percent of salary up to a maximum of \$15,000 salary; the company makes contributions to the plan based on a sliding scale of net profit before taxes; company contributions are allocated under a formula according to employee contributions, length of service, and age; about 86 percent of plan assets are invested in company stock; each employee has a separate account to which contributions and investment earnings are credited, showing number of shares of company stock and dollar value of other plan investments; an employee's account is fully vested after 5 years, after which he can instruct trustees on voting his shares; the plan holds about 22 percent of company's outstanding stock; and that the average benefits received on retirement in 1968 of employees with 25 to 30 years service was \$100,401 (cash and company's stock).

Lump-sum pension distributions: Opposes changes made by section 515 of House bill to treat employer contributions to pension and profit-sharing plans made after 1969 and received in a lump-sum distribution as ordinary income rather than capital gains. Argues that capital gains treatment should be retained in recognition that an interest in a profit-sharing plan is an investment at risk over a long period and is entitled to such treatment. Maintains that capital gains treatment is fair, workable, and easily understood, and that it is a good method for taxing "bunched" income. Asserts that employer contributions to profit-sharing plans are properly treated as a capital asset.

Contends that House bill changes are extremely complex, difficult for employees to understand, and difficult for the Service to administer. States that the 5-year averaging provision would require employees to overpay their tax at retirement and seek a refund after 5 years under the recomputation provision.

Argues that the bill's averaging provision is unsatisfactory because the one-fifth of post-1969 employer contributions is added on top of all other income in the year of retirement, thus increasing the tax bracket for the computation. Notes that the refund provision attempts to correct this; however, claims that this is much too complex, since records may get misplaced and the Service would have to audit to check accuracy of recomputation.

Unrealized appreciation of employer securities: Emphasis that unrealized appreciation of employer securities should remain untaxed until the employee sells, since

other purchasers of securities are not taxed on appreciation until realized through a sale or exchange.

Conclusion: States that if, in spite of arguments against changing current treatment of lump-sum distributions, it is considered desirable to change the tax treatment of employer contributions, "a better averaging device should be found," which should be simple and settle the tax liability at time of retirement so no refund procedure is necessary.

Raymond H. Geisecke, chairman of the board, Council of Profit-Sharing Industries (Taxation of lump-sum distributions under qualified profit-sharing plans): Opposes provisions of House bill which would tax as ordinary income a portion of any lump-sum distribution made under a profit-sharing plan. Believes that this change of law is based upon a misconception as to the nature of profit sharing and the nature of an employee's interest under a qualified profit-sharing plan. Feels that the results which the change in method of taxation would produce are inconsistent with some of the underlying premises of the tax reform bill. Believes that the added cost of administering the revised method of taxation together with other collateral effects which the changed method would produce should be balanced against any estimated revenue gains which would be produced by the change and that when all factors are taken into account, the relatively modest revenue gain now anticipated would be practically eliminated, or might even result in a revenue loss.

Believes that any change to present law should recognize, as does the House bill, that part of an employee's interest in a profit-sharing plan is clearly risk capital and should be taxed as such. States that any averaging method which is to apply to the balance of a lump-sum distribution which is not treated as a long-term capital gain should not be based upon the recipient's income and marginal rates in a single taxable year. Argues that any averaging method which applies to part of a lump-sum distribution should contemplate payment of taxes due on the distributions once and for all at retirement. Maintains, therefore, that the provisions in the House bill providing for the possibility of refunds following calculation and payment of taxes on lump-sum distributions should be avoided. Indicates that any averaging method should be simple and should not entail complications such as those included in the House bill.

William F. Drake and V. Henry Rothschild, II, American Pension Conference (Lump-sum pension distributions): Argues that the 5-year averaging proposal and refund procedure would involve administrative complexities and heavy burdens on Government and taxpayers, especially on retirees who have not customarily retained tax consultants.

Maintains that rules and procedures would have to be developed for determining portion of lump-sum distribution attributable to post-1969 employer contributions to plans. States that allocation of a distribution into portions representing employer contributions, forfeitures and investment earnings would add administrative burdens, especially in the case of the typical aggregate funded pension plan in which individual determinations are rarely made or records kept of amount of employer contributions (including forfeitures) or investment earnings which could be considered attributable to specific individuals. Asserts that ultimately the added administrative costs of such records would be reflected in amount of employee benefits.

States that most employees would be overpaying their tax since their gross income for years of distribution would be increased by the one-half of capital gain portion, plac-

ing him in a higher tax bracket for the computation year.

Notes that the removal of the 25-percent alternative capital gains tax rate and the limit on tax on earned income will remove some of the disparity between the capital gains rate of lump-sum distributions and ordinary income rates on annuity retirement income. Contends that capital gains provides a workable, equitable solution to the bunched-income problem.

MARKET POWER AND DISCRIMINATION

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a news analysis by Mr. Bernard Nossiter, which appeared in the Washington Post on Tuesday, September 9, 1969, be printed in the RECORD. In this account, Mr. Nossiter presents an excellent summary of a most interesting economic study prepared by Prof. William E. Shepherd of the University of Michigan which appeared in the spring 1969 issue of the Antitrust Bulletin. The study by Professor Shepherd is entitled "Market Power and Discrimination in White-Collar Employment."

The work of the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee has been primarily concerned with the economic effects of economic concentration. But in the course of our hearings, it has become clear that in addition to its economic consequences, economic concentration has certain sociological and political effects which, unfortunately, have thus far received relatively little attention. Among the mitigating sociological consequences is the presumed existence of greater employment opportunities for minority races in higher concentrated industries. The large corporations, it is claimed, are more aware than small firms of their social responsibilities. Indeed, it has been claimed it is simply good public relations to have a progressive employment policy for minority groups.

Professor Shepherd's analysis represents perhaps the first effort to subject this widely held belief to the light of objective inquiry. Surprisingly, he finds that the relationship between concentration and employment opportunities is exactly the reverse of what is commonly assumed. Opportunities for Negroes for employment in white-collar jobs are greatest in highly competitive, low-concentration industries and at their minimum in monopolistic industries.

Professor Shepherd speculates that the reason for this unexpected showing is to be found in economic theory. In competitive industries, producers are under constant pressure to minimize costs. Hence, they will tend to utilize the most efficient employees, regardless of their race, color, or any other consideration. But where the employing concern possesses a significant degree of monopoly power, the pressure to minimize costs is less pervasive and management has greater leeway in which to indulge its prejudices.

I shall quote from the conclusions of Professor Shepherd's argument:

If the foregoing interpretations are correct, several lessons for policy might be drawn. The most obvious is that most large and/or market-leading firms which could apply non-discriminatory employment policies had not

done so by 1966, either voluntarily or in response to various inducements and informal pressures. There might have been marginal changes during 1967 and 1968, but these probably would be mostly at the lower levels of blue-collar jobs. One may hope for a reversal of these apparently natural patterns of employment under market power. But one must surely be optimistic to anticipate that action by large and/or secure firms can substantially solve or alleviate the whole range of minority-group employment problems in major urban areas. Doing so would seem to rub against the corporate grain.

In at least partial contrast, policies to promote competition generally may successfully and appreciably reduce discrimination in employment. This effect alone may not justify a quantum rise in antitrust enforcement, including action to reduce concentration in major oligopolies, to broaden antitrust enforcement to local trade, or to narrow the scope of patent privileges. But it would add to the other possible economic gains from greater competition.

Public regulation by commission has evidently had little or no effect toward open hiring. The few utilities (such as telephones) with high Negro white-collar percentages have apparently acted quite independently, and even they are no more than average in their treatment of upper managerial positions. Such other regulated firms as airlines, railroads and electric utilities are distinctly below average, despite the economic leeway which their franchised positions provide them. The contrast with non-profit and competitive enterprises suggests that it is very stringent pressures on costs, rather than the looser constraints of cost-plus regulation, which may be most effective in encouraging neutrality in hiring. Alternatively, regulatory or other public agencies may need to apply very specific and binding directives, in order to overcome the utilities' internal tendencies to discriminate.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STUDY SCORES BIG BUSINESS ON HIRING (By Bernard D. Nossiter)

It is part of accepted wisdom that the most sheltered companies—the distinguished law firm, the large automobile manufacturer, the prestige-conscious airline—boast the most enlightened hiring policies.

Freed to a greater or lesser extent from the rigors of competition they are thought to respond most readily to pleas for equal employment.

The names of their officers adorn boards and foundations urging Negro employment. Even national policy is based in part on the prevailing assumption about their conduct. A major element in the federal campaign for Negro jobs has been the program run by the National Alliance of Businessmen, an organization of blue-chip firms.

Now a young economist from Michigan, William G. Shepherd, has subjected the conventional wisdom to some economic tests and, hard fact shatters the belief.

Shepherd has found that there is a direct relationship between economic concentration or market power and discriminatory hiring. The more competitive a given market is, the more open will be its hiring; the less competitive, the fewer the blacks.

SOME EXCEPTIONS

There are exceptions—notably the telephone companies with their armies of Negro clerks. But in general, Shepherd discloses in The Antitrust Bulletin, spring issue: "Open hiring of Negroes is found mainly in competitive industries, in some lesser firms in concentrated industries, and in non-profit entities."

Shepherd, who is 33, was economic assist-

ant to Donald Turner, head of the Antitrust Division in the Johnson administration. From that vantage point, Shepherd was able to comb through Census Bureau records not easily available to outside scholars. He has respected the Bureau's insistence on protecting the privacy of individual concerns.

His method was ingenious. He looked at 51 "industry" groups, ranging from markets as big as oil and autos to brokers and lawyers. He studied nine cities—Atlanta, Chicago, Cleveland, Kansas City, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York, San Francisco and Washington—and found that there was no essential difference between hiring patterns in the North and South.

EMPLOYMENT SHARE

He then took either the Census Bureau's market power ratios or worked up estimates of his own and measured their relationship to the Negro share of white collar employment for 1966.

Shepherd excluded blue collar hiring patterns on the grounds that they could be affected by union pressure. In other words, his was a test of open employment where management has a relatively free hand.

Plotting the two variables, Negroes as a percentage of all white-collar employment in a given industry group and that industry's concentration ratio, yields a curve showing that highly concentrated airlines, where four firms or fewer control 100 per cent of the market on any given route, rank among the lowest in hiring Negroes for white collar jobs. So do such highly concentrated industries as utilities, law firms and cigarette makers.

COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIES

At the upper end of the curve, where the rate of Negro white collar employment is higher, lie the highly competitive industries—personal services, such as beauty parlors, clothing stores and restaurants. These are also the industries where Negro-owned business is heaviest.

Shepherd ran a similar regression analysis, as it is inelegantly called in the economics craft, for the employment of Negroes as officials, managers and professionals. Once again, the results were the same: the greater the concentration, the smaller the Negro share of the jobs.

In a deadpan style that might have pleased Thorstein Veblen, Shepherd argues that economic theory could have predicted all this.

In effect, he says, a firm bent on maximizing profits and minimizing labor costs will be color blind, hiring anyone available at the lowest possible rate. However, only firms in competitive sectors behave this way.

IMPLICATIONS CITED

Shepherd suggests that his findings have some implications for public policy. One is that it is quixotic to look to big companies—apart from the few in highly competitive industries—to lead the attack on discriminatory hiring.

Another is that an incidental benefit of a vigorous antitrust policy would be increased hiring of blacks.

A third is that regulatory commissions could but don't play any role in hiring of Negroes as is evidenced by the fact that regulated airlines, railroads and utilities—apart from communications—have the whitest payrolls.

A fourth and final point is that the quickest way to open up white collar, managerial and professional jobs for Negroes is to provide more capital for Negro business, a point suggested at various times by proponents of black economic development and also by President Nixon.

SCHOOL INTEGRATION

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, on Monday, September 15, 1969, the Washington Evening Star published a thought-

ful editorial on the pros and cons of school integration. The editorial concludes with this brief paragraph.

Public officials no doubt can be whipped into line. But whether the same will prove true of large numbers of parents is, we think, doubtful to say the least.

We agree, of course, that the threat of withholding public funds appropriated by Congress, including funds used to buy hot breakfasts and lunches and to improve education opportunities for children of the poor, will whip most public officials into line.

We agree also that the barbaric procedure of hauling locally elected public school officials into Federal courts and slapping them with mandatory injunctions and placing them under threats of confiscatory fines of \$300 a day and the threat of having them hauled off to jail, all without benefit of trial by jury, is a most effective means of persuading public officials to accept bureaucratic control of their schools and to accept the racial solution imposed by Federal bureaucrats.

But the question is, are bureaucratic and judicial barbarians prepared to use these weapons of repression to whip parents into line and force them to accept the bureaucratic version of a "humanitarian" racial solution?

I suggest that the issue of means employed transcends the issue of "integration" or "segregation." In this connection, I share the doubt expressed in the editorial that large numbers of parents will submit. I also join in the prayer that the Nation will denounce and renounce the idea that Federal Government has the power to impose racial solutions as they relate to public schools or to any other aspect of our society.

The question of whether or not the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare shall retain the power to use the weapon of deprivation of innocent children in the enforcement of its racial regulations will soon be before the Senate. I therefore ask unanimous consent that the editorial, which sheds some light on the subject, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SCHOOL INTEGRATION—PRO AND CON

The latest verbal shot in the 1969 school integration debate has been fired by HEW Secretary Robert H. Finch. And if he seemed a bit fed up with the attacks on this administration's efforts in the desegregation area, it can hardly be said that there was no justification for his reaction.

The Finch statement, made Saturday at a meeting of the Institute for Black Elected Officials, evidently was a response to criticism by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and Negro leaders.

Earlier last week, the commission headed by the Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, president of Notre Dame, had accused the Nixon administration of beating "a major retreat" in the drive for integrated schools.

This was a reference to the successful move by the administration last month to obtain a delay of three months in imposing integration on 30 Mississippi school districts. Finch was a prime mover in seeking this delay because he thought the additional time was necessary to avoid "chaos, confusion and a catastrophic educational setback" in the 30 school districts. It is worth noting, in

passing, that Father Hesburgh said he is sure that Finch "is deeply committed to desegregation." It is also worth recalling, although the fact is generally ignored, that the Fifth Circuit Court in granting the three-month delay expressly conditioned this action on the preparation of a final desegregation plan that "shall require significant action toward disestablishment of the dual school system" during this school year.

Can this fairly be called a "major retreat" on the desegregation front? The answer, one may suppose, comes down to a matter of opinion. In our opinion the charge by the Civil Rights Commission is pure nonsense.

Although many would disagree, we believe a case can be made for the proposition that the Nixon administration is preparing to push too hard for school integration. For example, Finch has said that the administration will oppose in the Senate the House-approved Whitten amendment which would forbid the denial of federal financial aid to school districts which may try to use the so-called freedom of choice plan in assigning pupils to public schools.

This may not be too significant since it is at least very doubtful that any meaningful freedom of choice plan could survive challenge in the Supreme Court. But it is also doubtful that those who condemn freedom of choice can attain their real objective.

That objective is to invoke the power of the federal government to compel children in the name of integration to attend schools which they do not want to attend or to which their parents are unwilling to send them. If this should require that children be taken out of their home areas and bused long distances, the response is: Bus them. If the result should be an impairment of the quality of education, the compulsory integrationists will say that is someone else's problem.

But all of this overlooks an important point. The drive for what Justice Black calls desegregation now is based on the assumption that the opposition spring from the intransigence of public officials in the South. There is some of that, of course. But it also springs from the strong opposition of parents who want to have some say in the education of their children.

Public officials no doubt can be whipped into line. But whether the same will prove true of large numbers of parents is, we think, doubtful to say the least.

NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION URGES ENACTMENT OF THE URBAN AND RURAL EDUCATION ACT OF 1969

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, on July 15, I introduced a most significant and important bill, S. 2625, the Urban and Rural Education Act of 1969. This measure is a response to the education crises confronting urban and rural America. Basically, the bill authorizes a 30-percent add-on to title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act funds to school districts with a large number or a high percentage of disadvantaged youngsters to educate.

The interest and reception that this legislation has received from Senators, educators, and organizations and individuals interested in education has been overwhelming. I have received communications from across the country strongly backing my bill. I am hopeful that the legislation will be enacted this year. To share with my colleagues the great reception the legislation has received, I intend to place in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD some of the letters and statements endorsing S. 2625.

I am particularly grateful for the support of the National Education Association who, in testimony before the Education Subcommittee, suggested the percentage override that I incorporated in my bill; namely, 30 percent the first year and 40 percent thereafter.

I quoted the following NEA testimony in introducing S. 2625:

The major problem facing America's public schools today lies in our inner-city areas . . . We suggest a 30 per cent override on the appropriation proposed by the Administration with such funds to go to those cities with large centers . . .

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that letters that I have received from the National Education Association, together with a statement in support of the measure, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Washington, D.C., July 24, 1969.

HON. GEORGE MURPHY,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MURPHY: I want to take this opportunity to commend you for introducing S. 2625, the Urban and Rural Education Act of 1969.

As you know, the National Education Association wholeheartedly endorses the intent of this proposal. We are fully aware of the desperate plight of the many schools in disadvantaged urban and rural areas, and we believe that your bill is a necessary and realistic response to the needs of these schools.

NEA President George Fischer, in the testimony from which you quoted in your remarks, suggested the kind of approach which is contained in the language of your bill. We are convinced that such a measure as yours is essential, and we thank you for your continuing concern for education.

Sincerely,

JOHN M. LUMLEY,
Assistant Executive Secretary, Legisla-
tion and Federal Relations.

NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Washington, D.C., July 28, 1969.

HON. GEORGE MURPHY,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MURPHY: Enclosed is a brief statement on behalf of the National Education Association in support of S. 2625, the Urban and Rural Education Act of 1969.

May I compliment you personally, not only on your sponsorship of this important legislation, but also on the very complete and informative statement on the bill which you made to the Senate at the time of introduction.

Sincerely,

JOHN M. LUMLEY,
Assistant Executive Secretary, Legisla-
tion and Federal Relations.

STATEMENT OF JOHN M. LUMLEY, ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, IN SUPPORT OF S. 2625

The National Education Association fully supports S. 2625 and commends the distinguished Senator from California, Senator Murphy, for his sponsorship of this legislation. We urge that S. 2625 be incorporated into the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.

In testimony before the Sub-Committee on June 19, the president of the NEA, Mr. George D. Fischer, urged that at least a 30% override on the appropriation request of the administration for ESEA Title I be made, with such funds specifically designated for urban centers with large concentration of

disadvantaged children. S 2625 makes such a provision for fiscal year 1970, with a 40% override in subsequent years. The bill further provides for similar additional funds for the seriously deprived rural areas, a proposal which the National Education Association also strongly endorses.

S 2625 would answer the concerns of some members of Congress who are not satisfied with the present distribution formula for ESEA Title I funds. By authorizing supplemental funds for the urban and rural schools which are most seriously disadvantaged, S 2625 would provide additional aid to the disadvantaged children in the central cities and poorest rural areas without reducing Title I funds to other districts which also have a need for them. S 2625 can provide immediate relief to the most distressed districts, permitting the school authorities there to more nearly meet the children's needs now. Adjustments to the federal and state formulas for distribution of education funds can be made—as in the case of state formulas they must be made—in an orderly fashion, without serious immediate disruption to the school program.

The formula for distribution of ESEA Title I funds, if implemented to the amount authorized, would provide equitable relief to all districts concerned. In the absence of full funding of the authorization, S 2625, by providing 30% additional funds beyond those appropriated for the present program would bring significant assistance to those districts which have the greatest problems in meeting their responsibilities to disadvantaged children.

We urge favorable action in incorporating S 2625 into the Elementary and Secondary Education Act Amendments of 1969.

THE UNFAIR DRAFT SYSTEM

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I am greatly encouraged by news reports that have been appearing with increasing frequency in recent days that President Nixon is planning to take a number of administrative actions to reform the outmoded and grossly unfair draft system of this Nation.

I certainly hope the reports are true and that the President is indeed planning such actions. If he does carry them out, he should be commended.

Draft reform is long overdue in the country. That is why I joined with several other Senators in introducing a bill for that purpose in February of this year.

The President's draft reform message came along a few months later. I commended the President at that time because his measure contained many of the points in the bill we had already introduced.

But then came word from both the House and the Senate Armed Services Committees that no hearings would be held on the subject of draft reform until next year.

I feel that this is a tremendous oversight on the part of Congress, and that a way should be found to hold hearings this year. I have expressed some suggestions to the Senate Armed Services Committee, but apparently they have been rejected.

Now comes word that President Nixon also is unhappy with the delay of Congress and plans to do what he can by Executive order to reform the draft. I have already publicly commended his apparent decision to draft 19-year-olds first. This will remove the 5 or 6 years

of uncertainty that now faces our young men who do not know until they are 26 whether they face induction or not. Under the 19-year-olds plan, if it comes about, each young man will know during his 19th year what his military obligation will be. This is the approach I have advocated for years, and I encourage the President to take this action.

Last week, before the Senate, I pointed out that Lt. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Director of the Selective Service System for the past 28 years, would become 76 years old on Friday, September 12. I suggested that he retire or be replaced.

I followed that speech with a personal letter to the President. Now I hear news reports that the administration is working on a replacement for General Hershey and an announcement could be made any day.

The drafting of 19-year-olds first, the replacement of General Hershey, and perhaps the lowering of draft quotas will not complete the job of draft reform, but it will be a tremendous beginning, and should demonstrate to our young people that their Government does listen to their urging and does have concern for their ideas on important subjects that affect them directly.

COMPLETION OF REPORT "HAWAII AND THE SEA"

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, I am pleased and proud to tell you that nearly 100 of the leading marine-oriented citizens of the State of Hawaii have just completed a broad study of the marine opportunities in my State. Called "Hawaii and the Sea," this study proposes an action plan for the public and private sectors of our community, as well as some sectors of the Federal Government having interests in the Pacific Basin.

At the request of the Governor's task force, the highly competent study group that prepared "Hawaii and the Sea," was organized and led by Mr. William S. Beller, U.S. Department of the Interior, on loan to the State for this purpose. It is highly significant that this study group included State, Federal, university, and industrial representation.

With this report, Hawaii has become the first State with a report that looks at the marine environment in as broad a fashion as the National Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Resources did earlier this year. In addition, it is the first State to publish a report based in part on the findings of this Marine Commission.

As you may recall, the national report is different from others on marine affairs because it deals with broad policy matters rather than questions of technical detail, unless the details have to be acted upon to effect the policy matters. These policy matters in the marine field involve major interests such as recreation, national defense, food from the sea, research and development, and relations with other lands in the Pacific Basin. They necessarily involve all levels of the State government and of the University of Hawaii. Therefore, the Governor's task force sought a "Commission" report for Hawaii. Because of its concern with the assets of the sea, "Hawaii and the Sea"

will undoubtedly be of interest to all coastal States.

The measure of the intensive interest in the sea in Hawaii is seen in the fact that the report was completed in a period of 3 months and yet is about 300 pages long and has approximately 75 actionable recommendations in it.

One of the major recommendations is for a 5-year marine science program, in which scientists and engineers would seek the best ways to use and conserve the State's marine environment. Projects involving the shoreline, near-shore environment and ecology, and the State's territorial seabed will receive the greatest attention. The projects will include beach and reef studies, skipjack tuna investigations, and water pollution control studies among many others. An important product of the program will be an atlas of the coastal areas of Hawaii, detailing the locations of living and nonliving resources to be found there.

The report points out that there is a demand in the State for an oceanographic research park where marine-oriented industry and Government could work in close proximity to each other. Hawaii's land area, suitable for major combined scientific-technological and related industrial expansion, is limited and, in the near future, may be prohibitively costly. Therefore, it is necessary for the State to study the precise needs for an oceanographic research park in time for the 1970 legislative session to consider the problem.

Among the other recommendations:

That the State organize and assist public and private oceanographic interests in seeking the establishment of an Environmental Forecasting Center in the islands. The report points out that long-range weather and marine prediction, the ability to forecast biological changes in the ocean, and the accurate forecasting and monitoring of unusual phenomena, such as earthquakes and tsunamis, would be of tremendous help to most people in the Pacific Basin.

That the State support the concept of the International Decade of Ocean Exploration—IDOE. This is a time, presumably starting in 1970, when marine scientists and engineers all over the world will be studying the seas with a goal of deriving practical benefits from them. There is little doubt that studies of the Pacific Ocean will be of great benefit not only to Hawaii but also to the Nation. The pressing need for new technology to master the ocean in order to extract fish and minerals from it and to control or ameliorate erosion effects on the coastline, all depend upon our knowing how the ocean operates. The report, therefore, recommends that the Governor urge the President and the Congress to take appropriate action to bring the decade into being.

That if the national administration does not endorse the IDOE, that the State seek a Pacific decade of ocean exploration in order for the State and the Nation to reap the benefits of an intensive study of the Pacific Ocean as soon as possible.

That the State create a marine extension service to aid the developing nations

in the Pacific Basin, as well as Hawaii fishermen. This marine extension service would advise on fishing techniques and on setting up conservation rules to prevent the depletion of stock. It also would provide books, pamphlets, and courses which would deal with the problems of aquaculture, pollution, and other coastal zone processes. This service, a Pacific Center for Marine Sciences, would probably be affiliated with the University of Hawaii.

That counties and cities initiate a program to assure their people that beaches are not walled out by buildings, and to develop additional permanent rights-of-way and access routes to Hawaii's shoreline. The report urges counties and cities to inspect present and future access routes on at least an annual basis, in order to insure that they are properly maintained and unobstructed.

That on all publicly owned shoreline lands that are less than fully developed, there be 300 feet of open space, measured from the sea landward, which would be permanently dedicated to public use. Access routes would also be provided; and the combination of a 300-foot corridor plus the routes, would assure the people of Hawaii the use of their shoreline, one of the State's most valuable assets.

That the program of establishing underwater parks and preserves be accelerated and expanded to include the islands of Maui, Molokai, and Kauai.

That the Hawaii Civil Defense Agency be appointed to organize and head a coordinating body of State and Federal agencies to plan and implement the State's response to spills of oil or other hazardous materials into the waters around Hawaii.

That the State give high priority to the rigorous enforcement of State water quality standards.

That the State give increased assistance to industry and encourage the U.S. Bureau of Commercial Fisheries to accelerate their development of new fishing methods that will help Hawaii fishermen increase their catch of skipjack tuna. The central Pacific and eastern Pacific probably could yield thousands of tons of skipjack every year. Yet the total catch in these areas runs considerably less than 100,000 tons per year. Skipjack tuna is a high-priced fish worth between \$200 and \$265 a ton dockside. At today's prices, a catch of only 100,000 tons of skipjack would bring fishermen almost \$25 million, and processors almost \$62 million. By comparison, the pineapple crop in Hawaii, in 1968, was worth slightly more than \$40 million, and processed value, \$133 million. The problem is that the pole-and-line way of catching skipjack is simply not good enough when volume production is needed.

That the State find out why fresh fish are so highly priced on the islands.

That the Federal Government take the lead in sponsoring research that would show how to recycle sewage waste into food through fish farming. The harvest of fish farms, or aquaculture, could give essential animal protein foods to many of the starving peoples of the world.

That the Federal Government dissuade foreign coral fishermen from operating

in the waters near the Hawaiian Islands, and that the State conduct a survey of the precious coral resources along the Hawaiian Archipelago. Hawaii could become one of the three major centers in the world working with precious coral; the two others, Japan and Italy, turn out roughly \$70 million a year worth of coral jewelry at the wholesale price.

That the University of Hawaii gather the parts of its present program in marine sciences and engineering into a single entity. This new body would have the added advantage of being able to treat, without excessive coordinating effort, entire problem areas, including the economic and sociological implications. The University of Hawaii already has the ideal location and all the other ingredients needed to be one of the leading universities in the Nation in the marine and geophysical sciences. Its overall marine-oriented program is supported by a budget of about \$7 million a year. The university considers the entire Pacific basin as its laboratory and as a special beneficiary for its studies.

That the State government focus on marine affairs by designating the heads of State departments having responsibilities in marine affairs as the Governor's cabinet for marine affairs. This cabinet would also have coordinating responsibilities particularly with problems involving multiple demands on the coastal zone.

The report concludes:

Hawaii can surely gain through the judicious use of the resources in and around the sea; the development of the technology needed to exploit these resources; marine businesses founded and enlarged; safer marine recreational facilities; and programs dedicated to better understanding of the marine environment.

Hawaii can surely lose by damaging its marine environment, perhaps through actions such as dumping excessive pollutants in the water, over-building the shoreline and neglect.

I am happy that Hawaii, as the Nation's only island State, has through "Hawaii and the Sea" looked so perceptively ahead not only to use its marine environment but, more importantly, to preserve it for the enjoyment of other generations.

I commend all the citizens of Hawaii who participated in the study. I particularly congratulate the 23 members of the advisory group which guided the preparation of the report for the Governor's task force, chaired by Mr. Adrian Perry, president of Kentron, Hawaii, Ltd. The caliber and diversity of the advisory group are indicated by the responsible positions held by its members, as listed below:

MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY GROUP

William S. Beller, Chairman, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Water Quality and Research, U.S. Department of the Interior.

John C. Belshe, Technical Director, Ocean Engineering, Kentron Hawaii, Ltd.

Gene T. Blackburn, Research and Development Coordinator, State Department of Planning and Economic Development.

Charles L. Bretschneider, Chairman of Ocean Engineering, University of Hawaii.

Vernon E. Brock, Director, Hawaii Institute of Marine Biology, University of Hawaii.

Robert T. Chuck, Manager-Chief Engineer, Division of Water and Land Development, State Department of Land and Natural Resources.

Sal Comitini, Associate Professor, Economic Research Center, University of Hawaii.

Andrew Gerakas, Executive Officer, Economic Development Division, State Department of Planning and Economic Development.

Thomas H. Hamilton, President, Hawaii Visitors Bureau.

Richard S. Jones, Planner, State Department of Planning and Economic Development.

Hiram Kamaka, Assistant to the President, Makapuu Oceanic Center.

Leonard I. Knowles, Assistant Director, Hawaii Institute of Geophysics, University of Hawaii.

Richard L. Longfield, Assistant to Vice President, Marketing-Maritime Division, Dillingham Corporation.

Donald Mausshardt, Area Director, Federal Water Pollution Control Administration.

Scott McLeod, General Manager, Bumblebee Seafood Company.

John Thomas O'Brien, Director, Look Laboratory, University of Hawaii.

Morton M. Rosenberg, Associate Dean, Research Fellowships, University of Hawaii.

Richard S. Shomura, Acting Area Director, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, U.S. Department of the Interior.

Franklin Y. K. Sunn, President, Sunn, Low, Tom and Hara, Inc.

Nils Ueki, Acting Director, State Department of Budget and Finance.

George Wilkins, Acting Head, Undersea Engineering Division, Naval Undersea Research and Development Center.

George P. Woollard, Director, Hawaii Institute of Geophysics, University of Hawaii.

Fred Zobrist, Chief, Civil Works Branch, Corps of Engineers, Fort Armstrong.

THE EARNINGS OF AMERICAN FARMERS

Mr. TALMADGE, Mr. President, the American farmer comprises only 6 percent of the population of the United States. He has been challenged to provide food and fiber for a growing, affluent nation, and his performance is unmatched anywhere else on the face of the earth.

More than this, such is his efficiency and abundant production, the American farmer is primarily responsible for feeding millions upon millions of other people throughout the world.

Yet, in spite of modern efficiency that costs the farmer billions, in spite of his hard work, in spite of his important role in the Nation's economy, the American farmer on the average still earns only about two-thirds of the income of non-farm segments of our society.

The fact is, the American farmer on the whole has been over the years and still is virtually relegated to second-class citizenship. Of 3 million independent farmers in 1968, according to the Department of Agriculture, some 54 percent—about 1,707,000—made sales before expenses of less than \$4,999.

I repeat, that was before expenses. When we take into account the high cost of production, that puts almost 2 million farmers and their families in the poverty level.

Another 14 percent of our farmers made sales up to \$10,000. Again, this is before expenses.

We can look at the situation in terms of gross versus net income over the past 20 years. The Department of Agriculture takes 1947-49 as a "base period" in compiling farm statistics.

In 1947, gross farm income was \$34.1 billion. Net income was \$17.1 billion.

In 1968, gross farm income was \$50.7 billion. Net income was \$14.8 billion.

This means that net farm income last year was \$2.3 billion less than it was 20 years ago. The rising cost of production, of feed and seed, machinery, and labor has eaten away at the farmer's income.

This is an intolerable state of affairs.

Now we are seeing a great increase in the cost of food. And immediately people put the blame on the farmer. Certain people are getting a sizable chunk of the food dollar, but it is not the farmer. As pointed out in a recent column by the noted financial columnist, Sylvia Porter, the farmer is doing "poorly, as he usually has fared in recent years."

Miss Porter's column gives an excellent picture of what has been taking place in the food market and on the farm, and what happens to the cost of food as it makes its way from the farm to the market.

I commend this article to the attention of the Senate and to everyone who tends to blame the innocent farmer for the high cost of food these days.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Atlanta (Ga.) Journal,
Sept. 11, 1969]

**FOOD PRICES SKYROCKETING BUT FARMERS
DOING POORLY**
(By Sylvia Porter)

With food costs now rising at an annual rate of more than seven per cent and meat prices alone rocketing at a rate of nearly 12 per cent a year, how's the farmer doing?

Poorly. As he usually has fared in recent years, poorly.

Just chew on these facts:

—Of the \$89.5 billion we in the U.S. spend on foods originating on farms, only \$28.9 billion goes to farmers, or 41 cents of every food dollar we spend. The rest, \$60.6 billion, goes to the maze of middlemen who store, transport, process, package, advertise and sell food to us—and to the government in the form of business taxes and to lenders in the form of interest.

—Specifically, for every \$1 we spend on milk, the farmer gets only 50 cents. For every \$1 we spend on bread, the farmer gets a scant 14 cents. For every \$1 on oranges, he gets 22 cents; for onions, 27 cents; for potatoes, 33 cents; for corn flakes, a tiny 9 cents; for frozen peas, 17 cents; for margarine, 25 cents.

—The average net income on a U.S. farm actually dropped between 1966 and 1967, according to the latest statistics available, to \$4,526. And this is in the face of a dramatic increase in farm productivity to the point where today's farm worker supplies enough food to feed 42 people, nearly double the 23 he fed just one decade ago.

—The U.S. farmer's costs of interest, taxes and wages are now rising at nearly 3 per cent a year—almost twice the rate of rise in food prices he is being paid.

—Today, less than 5 cents of every dollar we spend on everything goes to the U.S. farmer for food—vs. 10 cents as recently as 1949.

So who is the winner? The food retailer—the man or woman we see across the counter?

Not according to a recent study of profits by New York's First National City Bank. Citibank reports after-tax profits of leading chain food stores at an average of only 1.1 per cent of sales. It shows the percentage among food processors ranging from one per cent for meat packers to 3.2 per cent for bakeries.

Who are the winners in the food industry, then?

Since 1959, our total food marketing bill has risen about 44 per cent to last year's \$60.6 billion. The table here, based on Department of Agriculture figures, shows you which of the middlemen got the biggest percentage increases of our food dollars during this period.

The table speaks for itself. The farmer has inched ahead financially in the past several months but he remains in a brutal squeeze between soaring costs for machinery, farm labor, interest and taxes and persistently low returns for his goods and services.

He must grapple with the cruel fact that the number of U.S. farms has crumbled from 7 million in 1935 to fewer than 3 million today and with the chilling prediction that the number will fall to only 1.5 million within the next decade or so.

What you're paying for food is not the product which grew on the farm. What you're paying for is what was done to that product after it left the farm. (c-1969)

Source	1968 share (billions)	Percent rise since 1957-59
Laborer.....	\$27.3	53
Transporter.....	4.6	15
Corp. after-tax profits.....	1.8	71
Depreciation.....	2.2	57
Business taxes.....	2.3	92
Advertising.....	2.0	67
Rent.....	1.7	55
Interest.....	.5	150
Repairs, bad debts.....	1.2	71
Other (including packaging)....	15.0	22

HOUSING AND INFLATION

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, in the past, housing has been the "fall guy" in the fight on inflation. Housing, and the institutions connected with it, have borne the brunt of countercyclical policies.

The present inflationary situation is no exception to that tradition. Once again, housing is bearing almost the entire burden in the fight on inflation. As a result, residential construction has dropped 30 percent since the beginning of the year. As a result, it may be impossible to meet our national housing goals. As a result, the 7 million dilapidated and the 4 million overcrowded units will not be replaced and will continue to spawn poverty, crime, and social despair.

If housing were the cause of the inflation, or if cutting housing would stop inflation, one might possibly argue for the present policy.

But housing is not the cause of the inflation. Cutting housing starts will not stop the inflation. The administration and the Federal Reserve are fighting the wrong enemy with the wrong weapons.

Military spending is causing inflation. Excessive expenditures on plant and equipment are causing inflation. The present policies which tighten money, bid up interest rates, but put no real damper on the root causes of inflation and may once again lead to a situation where we have both rampant inflation and excessive unemployment.

One has to work hard to achieve both

inflation and unemployment at the same time. But that could well be the result of the present policies.

I ask unanimous consent that an article written by Mr. Hobart Rowen, which addresses itself to these matters—housing squeeze, the lack of pressure on price and wage decisions, and the possibility of more inflation and excessive unemployment—be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 14, 1969]
**CREDIT SQUEEZE HITS RESIDENTIAL HOUSING
HARDEST**

(By Hobart Rowen)

Selective credit controls, says Federal Reserve Chairman Bill Martin, have "unfortunate effects." Thus, despite "all of its imperfections, general monetary restraint seems clearly preferable."

But the facts, as adduced by his own staff, seem to contradict Mr. Martin. For all practical purposes, the most visible impact of the credit squeeze has been on residential construction, where starts have dropped 30 per cent since the beginning of the year.

The rest of the economy is generally unaffected. As a matter of fact, there is good reason to believe that the capital investment boom—which tight money is intended to short-circuit—will roll merrily on in 1970.

But so far as housing goes, the word is recession—and things are bound to get worse before they get better.

Two out of every three builders in a survey just completed by the National Association of Home Builders say they are unable to obtain future financing. Nearly 9 out of 10 are cutting their actual construction plans (38 per cent by more than half).

Michael Sumichrast, economist for the association, predicts that the annual rate of housing starts will drop below 1 million by the end of the year. (It had been nearly 1.9 million at the beginning of 1969, then dipped to a rate of 1.3 million at mid-year.)

The home builders, who have a well-organized and articulate lobby, are naturally making themselves heard on this issue. But the public doesn't have to take the housing industry's word for it that tight money—so far as they are concerned—is a "selective" control.

Just this past week, FRB Governor J. Dewey Daane revealed the first results of a long-term official study of the impact of monetary policy—and they confirm the fact that housing gets hit first and hardest by tight money.

Daane pointed out that the "first noticeable effects of a monetary policy designed to brake inflationary pressures is an increase in short-term rates." Soon, these higher rates affect the long-term markets, as well as thrift institutions normally feeding the mortgage market.

Indeed, why should pension funds and life insurance companies tie up money for 20 and 30 years in home mortgages, when they can do better elsewhere? Some of the actual data are startling. For example, since 1967, life insurance companies have been liquidating their investments in single-family mortgages, rather than putting new money in. In 1967, their net positions was reduced by \$470 million; in 1968 by \$733 million, and in the first quarter of 1969 by an annual rate of \$572 million.

The consequence of this pattern, as Daane said, "is a rise in mortgage rates and a reduction in the availability of mortgage credit to borrowers—and hence... a relatively prompt and significant effect on housing starts."

It is difficult to understand where Mr. Martin could find a more "selective" impact

than that. In fact, although the real goal of monetary policy has been to choke off an inflationary business investment boom, the Fed study shows that the effects "on plant and equipment expenditures, and expenditures for state and local construction, are somewhat milder (in contrast to housing) and take place with a longer lag."

The Government is not having any real success in cooling off that volatile sector of the economy through tight money. Business decisions to invest in new or improved capacity are not easily changed, especially when doubts persist that wage-price inflation will be contained any time soon. Businessmen tend to conclude—after a shrewd appraisal of Washington policy-making—that they might as well put money into buildings and equipment. With Mr. Nixon staying out of price and wage decisions, expansion delays could be costly.

This hands-off policy was and is a mistake. It encourages excesses (witness General Motors' big increase on 1970 models or construction wage bargains calling for a 14.7 per cent annual increase over the life of the contract.)

Many competent observers fear that if the administration and the Fed persist in the classic approach—a tough fiscal-monetary squeeze with no intervention in price and wage decisions—it will finally succeed in provoking a general recession without ending inflation.

Achieving the worst of both worlds—higher unemployment and continued inflation—is a difficult trick, last accomplished by President Eisenhower. It would be unfortunate if Mr. Nixon, who in 1960 learned the political consequences of even a small recession, lets it happen again in 1970.

THE PESTICIDE PERIL—XLIX

Mr. NELSON. Mr President, the waters of New York State are in serious jeopardy. Pollution from an increasing number of sources has built up over the years so that now many of the fish in these waters are no longer fit to eat. In addition, there are areas where the water is so polluted that a diver literally cannot see his hand in front of his face.

One of the major sources of this pollution has been found to be persistent, toxic pesticides which are threatening the marine fisheries of the world. In an article by Osborn Segerberg, Jr. in the September 1 issued of New Yorker Magazine, Dr. George Woodwell, chief ecologist at Brookhaven National Laboratory is quoted:

In another decade there will be drastic changes in fish populations. If we go on for another 25 years, 50 years at most, we will certainly lose our oceanic fisheries.

Fish in inland waters have already suffered astonishing loss due to pesticide residues. According to the article, the reproductive process of Lake George trout has been halted, and the State health department has warned fishermen against eating trout and other fish in a dozen upstate lakes because of extremely high DDT residue levels.

The New York State Legislature is just one of many State legislatures throughout the Nation sufficiently alarmed about the dangers of pesticides and is now considering measures to regulate their use.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Segerberg's article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles

were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From New Yorker magazine, Sept. 1, 1969]

WHERE HAVE ALL THE FISHES GONE?

(By Osborn Segerberg, Jr.)

Why should a smart sophisticated New Yorker like you care what some upstate farmer is laying down on his back forty? Or that a cotton planter is spraying a chlorinated hydrocarbon in Mississippi? Or that DDT was used in a well-meaning battle against Dutch elm disease in New Hampshire? Why care that single-minded officials in Suffolk County applied so much persistent pesticide to a Brookhaven marsh in trying to extirpate mosquitoes that they damned near killed everything else?

Well, if you are one of those knowledgeable businessmen who cut over to Sweets for a civilized lunch . . . or you work in midtown and prefer Oscar's or King of the Sea . . . if you are a hostess who likes to launch cocktails with sprays of cold, coral shrimp . . . if you are a Catholic, or non-Catholic for that matter, who enjoys a fish dinner—if you are any one of these New Yorkers, what those nice unsophisticated other people are doing threatens your seafood pleasures.

Dr. Charles Wurster Jr., a biochemist at State University of New York at Stony Brook who has experimented with DDT and photosynthesis in phytoplankton, states flatly: "The DDT in the ocean directly threatens the marine fisheries of the world."

Dr. George Woodwell, chief ecologist at Brookhaven National Laboratory, who has worked intensively with DDT for a dozen years, concurs. Says Dr. Woodwell: "In another decade there will be drastic changes in fish populations. If we go on for another 25 years [DDT has been used for a quarter of a century], 50 years at most, we will certainly lose our oceanic fisheries." It is conceivable, he says, that destruction of marine fish populations already has begun and we just don't know it.

For an amazing fact in this age of scientific wonders is our ignorance of oceans. Little is known about habits, life cycles, spawning grounds of ocean fishes. "Marine biology," says diverbiologist Robert Wicklung, "still is in its infancy." Federal scientists are just now amassing the statistics to draw what fishery research biologist Dr. Russell Earnest calls "lethal profiles." Dr. Earnest leads a unique project at the Fish Pesticide Laboratory at Tiburon, California: first, to determine lethal levels—those at which pesticides kill fish outright; then to determine sub-lethal levels—those at which chronic pesticide residues interfere with reproduction. The sub-lethal threshold, say Dr. Earnest, is the crucial one.

His project in San Francisco Bay follows alarming discoveries that pesticide residues now are found through the range of ocean life. In the smallest organisms, the plankton, and the largest, whales. In fish that never rise within more than 300 fathoms of the surface. In birds which live on the open ocean and never come directly into contact with man. The Food and Drug Administration has examined a barracuda containing a staggering amount of DDT residue: 19 parts per million—the approximate amount in 14 tons of Lake Michigan salmon seized by the FDA as contaminated.

"I have to laugh," says Dr. Ross Nigrelli, director of the New York Aquarium and a fish pathologist, "when I hear fishermen boast of catching a big game fish with no fight. Why, those fighters are sick from pollution."

Actually, pesticide contamination of oceanic life should come as no surprise. It stems directly from the fact that DDT, dieldrin, aldrin, endrin and five other marketed chlorinated hydrocarbons are persistent pesticides. They last. No one really knows how long. They do a lot of killing per

treatment. That, combined with the fact that no one has found them harmful to man, has made them an attractive agricultural buy.

But now the question is the same one asked by another generation: how're you gonna keep'em down on the farm?

"You can't," answer Wurster and Woodwell. Wurster, who is championing the fight against DDT, says, "DDT can either get into the air as a gas or as a particle and fly around the world in the normal circulation patterns of the atmosphere and come down in the precipitation, or it can move downstream in the watershed and by river systems drain into the oceans." In reply to people who contend that current troubles result from improper use of pesticides and who recommend controlled application, Woodwell says, "Under no circumstances can DDT be controlled out of doors."

DDT has an affinity for fatty tissue and concentrates as it moves up a food chain, a phenomenon ecologists call "biological magnification." What is one one hundredths part-DDT, let us say, in the phytoplankton becomes one tenth-part in crustaceans, one part in fish and 10 parts or more in birds which feed on the fish.

When the chronic pesticide residue load reaches a certain level, it interferes with reproduction. As studies of trout and salmon have documented, the DDT accumulates in the yolk sacs of eggs and kills the fry after the eggs hatch. Reproductive failure is the nearest way to commit fish genocide. No stinking corpses to offend (or alert) anyone.

In birds, DDT residue interferes with calcium metabolism. Eggshells become too thin and break, preventing the successful production of chicks. This phenomenon now is widespread in birds at the top of their food chains. A few springs back, ornithologists called a meeting to see what could be done to save the peregrine falcon; they came away from the meeting knowing that nothing could be done east of the Rockies. The breeding peregrine falcon disappeared from the eastern two-thirds of the United States before virtually anyone knew what had happened! Many types of hawks are dwindling rapidly in North America and Europe. Bermuda petrels in the Atlantic Ocean . . . bald eagles in the Midwest . . . brown pelicans off the Pacific Coast: all appearing doomed. The eagles and pelicans even have been observed laying eggs with no shells, just a coating of membrane.

Perhaps such an image will not galvanize a city resident into action. Still, fish is a big industry in New York City, a big pleasure for its visitors, a big necessity for feeding its people. And fish in New York waters are in big trouble.

The Hudson River is freighted with oil, sewage, a dash of thermal pesticides. Years after various authorities were supposed to start doing something about the river, Manhattan's Congressman William Ryan recently asked, "Why are we still facing the possible death of the Hudson?" Ryan quoted from a report by Dr. Gwyneth Howells, director of a Hudson River ecology study, that the biological balance "may tip between a healthy river and a noxious one."

Abe Haymes of Lockwood & Winant is a veteran of commercial fishing hereabouts, and a connoisseur of devouring as well as catching fish. "Hudson River shad was the most delicious shad in the world," he told me with a ring of finality. The quality of the river's shad began to be corrupted by pollution 15 years ago. Five years ago, Lockwood & Winant stopped selling Hudson River shad at the Fulton Fish Market, the quality had deteriorated so badly. The firm still takes shad from the river, but only for the roe, and Haymes doesn't know how much longer that will last. The rest of the fish is sold for crab bait at one penny a pound.

Haymes says that the shad now are caught from as far away as the Georgia coast, and he

envisions the day when local fishermen will have to forage off Canada's shores to make a livelihood. He points to the fact that commercial weakfish, butterfish and sea bass have all but disappeared from Long Island Sound.

Why aren't fishermen aroused by this, writing their congressmen, out demonstrating someplace? The answer seems to be that commercial fishermen may be the last great body of individual entrepreneurs in our society. They have no powerful national organizations, as farmers do, nor lobbies, as does the chemical industry. They want to be left alone. And talk of DDT together with fish makes them nervous, fearful that the public will be scared away from buying their product.

Only sport fishermen have some sense of common cause, and it is the pressure from that industry which forced the flap in Michigan. A thriving sport fishing industry sprouted around Lake Michigan after West Coast coho salmon were implanted in the lake in 1966. But the seizure of DDT-contaminated salmon jeopardizes the whole enterprise. In response, Michigan banned DDT. Upstate New York is hardly better off. Trout are unable to reproduce in Lake George. The State Health Department has warned fishermen against eating trout and other fish in a dozen upstate lakes because of extremely high DDT residue levels.

Fishery biologist DeWitt Myatt says that pollution affects inshore Atlantic waters from "about 15 miles to the southward, about Shark River, New Jersey, and to the northward, well, you don't find unaffected waters until you get to Fire Island Inlet."

Fishery research biologist Stuart Wilk, Myatt, oceanographer David Hansen and Bob Wickland formed a pollution research team aboard the research vessel *Challenger*, which serves the Marine Laboratory at Sandy Hook.

This team studied pollution around and beyond Ambrose Light tower. On a morning mission with the young scientists the sky and the ocean to the east gleamed with sunlight. To the west, the refuge turned the slender, graceful Verrazano Bridge to an orange ribbon and delineated the remarkably high apartment houses of Coney Island, today's landmarks for the transatlantic voyager. Even the pall over Manhattan was gilded by the morning's radiance.

We were hardly past the Sandy Hook lighthouse when this sheen of beneficence was pierced. A big, rusted tanker glided by port, riding high out of the water. "That," said Wicklund, who led the small task force, "is Titanium Lead Company's tanker returning from an acid drop." Twice a day the tanker goes to an area about seven miles east of the Ambrose tower to deposit the dregs of the factory's operations. So far, no one has found the discharge to be injurious to aquatic life.

In fact, Ed King, the *Challenger's* deck-hand-chef-assistant skipper, said that bluefish are attracted to the acid waters. Later I learned at the fish market that the blue denizens of the acid community bring only 40 per cent of the normal price because, a worker said, "they taste strange."

That acid drop, Wickland explained, and more importantly, the dumping of New York City sewer sludge about three or four miles southeast of Ambrose—21 miles from Manhattan—are objects of the current pollution study by the Fisheries Bureau. New York City has been dumping sewage and now treated sewer sludge in this same spot since the 1930s. The bureau has been mapping the underwater mound and has found that in a rectangle four by five miles—20 square miles—nothing lives.

The study was begun last October with the placing of 100 markers in the sludge area to chart ocean bottom currents. During the winter, 63 of the sea-bed drifters were recovered, 61 of them on Long Island beaches

from East Rockaway to Fire Island. One bureau official found as a useful guide to pollution drift what he calls a "Tampax Index."

With the warmer months the surface currents from the "big brown stain that smells" also ran into Long Island, but the bottom currents from the sludge area began swinging westward into New Jersey, thus maintaining a balance of trade for the air New Jersey exports across the Hudson.

Wicklund says that when these studies are completed, his bureau hopefully will be able to show the least harmful place to dump sewage and chemicals.

As Wicklund prepared to dive into this Atlantic slum—water so filthy that a submerged diver literally cannot see his hand in front of his face—I suggested that most people imagine the ocean as so big that you can dump and dump . . . well, for God's sake, how can you pollute a whole ocean? (This question was posed before explorer-scientist Thor Heyerdahl reported navigating his papyrus raft through five days of heavily polluted open ocean that he said "looked like a sewer.")

Wicklund's answer was: "The ocean is not as big as people think it is. At least the ocean along the continental shelf." The continental shelf extends at most 200 miles off our Eastern shore: about 120 miles off New York City, only 15 miles off Florida. It supports the most important part of oceanic life.

The muscular biologist said that during dives this summer off Fire Island and New Jersey he has seen fish with fin rot. The rot begins at the edge. When the fins are gone, the fish dies. The theory is that the fish are victims of their polluted environment and are being attacked by some still unidentified bacteria.

Wicklund first noticed fin rot last summer, but not out in the ocean, only in bays. Bays and estuaries are the nursery grounds for Atlantic shelf life. Dr. Philip Butler, one of this country's leading authorities on estuary life, said two years ago: "I feel that pesticides are causing significant changes now in estuaries that are only moderately polluted. The interaction of the many physical and biological factors makes the net effect unpredictable at this time. Despite the fact that the pollution load does not now constitute a human health hazard, the evidence is clear that changes from pesticides may have long-lasting deleterious effects on marine productivity and our food supply."

Ever since Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*, any legislation proposed in Washington to regulate persistent pesticides has gone to the agricultural committees, and died. But now some action has been taken or is being considered in 17 states. In New York State this summer, investigations were begun in the Assembly by a Subcommittee on Environmental Health; in the Senate, at a joint hearing of the Agriculture and Conservation Committees—a curious combination, since the constituency of one is being victimized by what is held as a boon to the constituency of the other.

President Samuel Rotosen of the Montrose Chemical Corporation in Newark, the nation's foremost producer of DDT, says three-quarters of the DDT made in the United States is exported. DDT's major assignment, he says, is to fight malaria in India and other Asian nations. Clearly, those countries will be reluctant to stop using DDT.

Today's complaint is that list of what industry spokesmen euphemistically call "non-target" victims. Someday, you or your children may be on that list. While persistent pesticides so far have not been found harmful to humans, there isn't an authority on earth who knows the long-term effects of living with these chemicals, particularly on youngsters who start out in life getting their dose of DDT in their mother's milk. The

average American carries from eight to 10 parts per million of DDT . . . appreciably more than the Food and Drug Administration permits in marketable foods.

Strangely, no citizen in this constitutional democracy has been asked if he *wants* this burden of poison. It has occurred to no official to wonder if anyone's rights are being violated by this invasion of his body.

But anyone who feels he has a stake in this world now can summon an argument why agricultural poisons are too important to be left to Agriculture officials. And muster an answer to the question: Why clean up the Hudson?

If we don't, the price is the Atlantic Ocean.

ALL ARGUMENTS FAVOR RATIFYING THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, so much has been said in detail of the argument in favor of ratification of the Genocide Convention that I would like to take this opportunity to summarize the position in favor of ratification.

The matter of preventing and punishing genocide is clearly within the necessary objectives of a sound foreign policy. First, it is a powerful weapon in the moral war; second, it is an effort to prevent aggression and an essential step toward preserving peace; third, it deals with the vital question of the dislocation of peoples with attendant international consequences; fourth, it represents our national participation in the suppression of what has been universally condemned by the family of nations; and fifth, it is a strong deterrent to heads of government, warning them that even they can be punished by successors.

The Convention on Genocide is in keeping with our already highly developed system for the protection of human rights. The American experience with the Bill of Rights weighs heavily in favor of the belief that instruments such as these are significant in the advancement of human rights.

Nor is there any obligation upon the United States, under the Genocide Convention, to take any action in the form of intervention, although this has been vaguely hinted by its opponents. By article I the contracting parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and punish. The form of the undertaking is, however, clearly restrictive by the specific obligations undertaken in the convention itself.

I hope that it will be clear to all of us that the Genocide Convention is not aimed at the United States; that it has nothing at all to do with discriminations against racial or other groups or denials of elementary human rights to individuals. Genocide relates exclusively to mass exterminations involving thousands of human beings as members of groups, and is characteristically committed, instigated, or condoned by governments.

The heart of the convention is in its provisions for international cooperation through the organs of the United Nations for the prevention and suppression of a crime which strikes at the roots of our civilization by denying our common humanity.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 775) to authorize the President to award, in the name of Congress, Congressional Space Medals of Honor to those astronauts whose particular efforts and contributions to the welfare of the Nation and of mankind have been exceptionally meritorious, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

AWARD OF CONGRESSIONAL SPACE MEDALS OF HONOR TO ASTRONAUTS

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on House Joint Resolution 775.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate House Joint Resolution 775, to authorize the President to award, in the name of Congress, Congressional Space Medals of Honor to those astronauts whose particular efforts and contributions to the welfare of the Nation and of mankind have been exceptionally meritorious, which was read twice by its title.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the present consideration of the joint resolution?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution.

The joint resolution (H.J. Res. 775) was ordered to a third reading, was read the third time, and passed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am delighted that the joint resolution has been sponsored by the distinguished senior Senator from New Mexico, the chairman of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. I compliment the Senator for seeing to it that such expeditious action has been taken on the measure.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, morning business is concluded, and the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business which the clerk will state.

The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. S. 2546, to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the unanimous-consent agreement pro-

viding that the Senate shall begin voting not later than 4 o'clock today, the time is to be equally divided between the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN).

The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Nebraska and such additional time as he may see fit to use.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized for 10 minutes and for such additional time as he may see fit to use.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. President, during this prolonged debate on the Department of Defense authorization bill, we have witnessed a new phenomenon never seen before in the Senate. This phenomenon is an attempt to block the production, on an item-by-item basis, of all of the new and modern military hardware resulting from research and development in the past few years. Let us briefly review some of the weapons that the group calling itself the Members of Congress for Peace through Law has chosen to attack—see, for example: the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of September 3, 1969:

- First. The AMSA manned bomber.
- Second. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.
- Third. The new Navy and Air Force fighters.
- Fourth. The main battle tank.
- Fifth. The C-5A transport airplane.
- Sixth. The new anti-submarine-warfare airplane.

The arguments raised against proceeding with production of these modern weapons systems generally can be distilled down to two basic tenets: First, it cannot be proven that we need the weapon today so, second, let us delay for a few more years until the potential enemy has a weapon in service and proves that we will have to build a counter to him.

Now I am surprised that this rationale for holding up production of modern military hardware, the new equipment reflecting the advancements in technology resulting from the billions invested in research and development over the last 8 or so years—I am surprised that this rationale has not struck a familiar note to those of us who have been alarmed observers of deterioration of our national defense power over the last few years. I would submit that the arguments we are seeing used on the floor of the Senate against modern military hardware are the very ones that held sway when Mr. McNamara and his whiz kids had supremacy in the Pentagon for seven long and nearly disastrous years.

Let us look back just a year and a half ago, to the spring of 1968, when the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee held thorough and extensive hearings into our strategic and tactical air postures. Under the excellent leadership of the chairman of the subcommittee, the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), it was brought out in those hearings that for years a long list of new weapons was needed by the military services, endorsed

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and overruled by Mr. McNamara and his band of amateur military theorists in the Office of Systems Analysis. Included in this list of projects being blocked year after year were AMSA, nuclear carriers, new Air Force and Navy fighters, antisubmarine aircraft, and so forth. As the knowledgeable and experienced Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) pointed out back in 1968, we were spending billions on researching blueprints but were not getting any actual hardware to show for the money.

During those 7 nearly disastrous years under Mr. McNamara, a "defense deficit" began building up—a deficit in funding of hardware projects that needed to be started but were delayed and delayed by the Whiz Kids. Some press observers have commented on this fact and have estimated this "deficit" as amounting to as much as \$25 billion by the time the new administration inherited the management of the Pentagon this January. The idea here in this so-called "deficit" is that had these weapons systems been put into development and production as their technology matured and become ready, then these many projects we are debating this year would have been spread out in orderly fashion over the last 8 years, many of them now would be past their peak spending needs, and we would not today be faced with the need to initiate procurement of a number of new programs in a relatively short period of time.

M'NAMARA'S LAST STAND

I have brought this subject into the debate today for two reasons. First, I think it is important that the American public, as well as the Members of Congress, be reminded of Mr. McNamara's responsibility for what appears to be a sudden surge in new military hardware projects but is in reality caused by the release from his delaying tactics when he was Secretary of Defense. Second, I think it is important that we recognize the source of the basic philosophy behind the peace through law arguments against these many projects. What we are witnessing is in reality "McNamara's last stand," with the same old "Whiz Kids" arguments having been transferred from the private confines of the Secretary of Defense's office to the public forum of the floor of the U.S. Senate.

Again to review some recent history, soon after Secretary McNamara was replaced by Secretary Clifford, the absolute power of the Systems Analysis Office, where the "Whiz Kids" hold forth, began to wane as the factor of seasoned military judgment began to gain more weight in the decisionmaking process. At that time, in the spring of 1968, we began to see leaks to some of the press of arguments against proposed new weapons developments. The Navy F-14 fighter replacement for the F-111B, the Navy TFX, was one such example. Unnamed sources in the Pentagon, in reality the Systems Analysis Office, were quoted as the authority for grossly distorted cost and effectiveness figures purporting to show the old Navy TFX would be superior to the F-14. Despite these attempts to stop that fighter development, the program was approved as the Systems Analysis Office

lost their first skirmish. Recognizing that their power in the Pentagon was swiftly declining, and would be doomed with a change in administration, their next move was a broadside attack against a wide spectrum of defense military hardware programs. This came out in mid-1968 under the general headline that there was \$10 billion of fat in the already deficient McNamara defense budget. This claim, since it was attributed in the press to "high Pentagon sources," naturally was accepted as authoritative by many who were unaware of the existence of an "anti-Defense" element in the Pentagon.

Among the specific programs attacked in the "\$10 Billion of Defense Fat" articles were the following:

First. Nuclear attack carriers.

Second. The new Navy fighter plane.

Third. The new antisubmarine warfare airplane.

That list, by now, begins to have a familiar ring, does it not?

After the change in administration this last January, McNamara's band of "Whiz Kids" found that their specious arguments against these defense projects would not stand up to the scrutiny of rational debate. The long list of deferred programs finally attained full go-ahead. The "Whiz Kids" then transferred their arguments against a strong defense program over to the Congress, where they found some supporters of their general philosophy of unilateral disarmament. In fact, most of the arguments raised against the military programs used by the peace through law group have been supplied by the "Whiz Kids," even though they are still officially employed by the Department of Defense. In other words, they are actively lobbying against their own employer.

THE AMSA PROGRAM

Let us turn now to consider the subject of the current debate, the AMSA program. This new strategic bomber was first requested by the Air Force in 1964 and has been funded by the Congress in each ensuing year. Secretary McNamara refused to allow the appropriated money to be spent, however, to start engineering development of the plane. He limited expenditures to "continuing R. & D. studies" on the design of the plane. A go-ahead finally was allowed in November 1968 by Secretary Clifford after the national elections. The program was accelerated to full development status by Secretary Laird after he had a chance to revise the early Clifford budget. This action was fully approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee in the bill we are now debating. Many members of that committee have been supporting AMSA for the last 5 years—this is certainly no off-the-cuff decision by these knowledgeable members when they authorized this program.

WHAT IS AMSA?

That is, what are its general capabilities as compared to the other bombers in SAC's existing force? Roughly speaking, AMSA has the high-speed penetration capability of the B-58 and FB-111 for the sea-level, on-the-deck "run-in" necessitated by modern air defenses. However, it can sustain that high speed over B-52 type of penetration distances. This means that AMSA has more than

double the penetration range of the B-58 and FB-111 at the same high speed. In addition, it will have a greater payload of weapons than the B-52, and it will carry the most modern electronic countermeasures. Its radar reflectivity will be much less than the B-52, making it harder to detect and shoot down. Thus, to answer the question of what is AMSA, it is a true strategic bomber in the sense of the B-52, but it has vastly improved capability to penetrate enemy territory and survive modern anti-air defenses.

To give a specific example of the advantage of AMSA over the B-52, it will have the speed capability to fly at 550-plus miles per hour at the treetop altitude forced by SAM defenses and radar evasion techniques. This compares with the roughly 350 miles per hour top speed of a B-52, and I can assure you that that extra 200 miles an hour will make SAC's pilots mighty happy. If anyone does not believe me all he needs to do is ask some of our pilots who flew tactical bombers over Hanoi and Haiphong how important that extra speed is to survival.

So in a capsule description, that is what AMSA is. In terms of size, we are talking of an aircraft that is estimated to weigh in the neighborhood of 380,000 pounds, or slightly larger than the largest Boeing 707. By comparison a B-52 grosses 480,000 pounds, a B-58 is a 160,000-pound airplane, and an FB-111 runs 110,000 pounds. We can surmise from these figures that AMSA will be appreciably smaller than a B-52 and nowhere near the size of the SST, which is a 750,000-pound airplane.

Another point to mention is costs. Air Force estimates of flyaway cost, that is, the cost of the airplane itself, are from \$22 to \$25 million per plane. Considering costs of other large airplanes today, these estimates appear reasonable. For example, the Boeing 747 which is a 710,000-pound airplane sells at \$18 to \$29 million and the SST is estimated to cost \$40 million. It appears reasonable, then, that the AMSA cost should fall into the general ball park of the price as given above. It definitely will not be costing anything like the \$40 to \$80 million that the opposition sometimes purports.

Now what purpose is served by my giving this general description of what the AMSA is and what it will cost. The reason is that I want it understood exactly what AMSA is—a true modern strategic bomber that will replace our only other true strategic bomber. AMSA is a B-52 replacement, plain and simple, and any arguments over the need for it should not be confused by bringing in the short-ranged B-58 and FB-111 medium bombers.

THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC BOMBERS

The true debate on this amendment, over whether or not to allow development of AMSA, centers on the point of whether the manned bomber serves a useful and effective role in deterring an enemy from launching a nuclear attack on the United States or any of its allies. Now that one sentence covers a lot of points thrown into the anti-AMSA argument, and I want to elaborate on it somewhat.

In the first place, there should be no mistake about the intent of the amend-

ment. It has only one purpose and that is to block development of AMSA again, as has been done every year since 1964 by McNamara and his fellow antibomber cohorts. Let us not be sidetracked by any rhetoric from the anti-AMSA side that they are only trying to prevent an "accelerated" AMSA program. Their intent is to block a go-ahead on engineering development of the airplane, and, I might add, if their amendment should pass then the \$20 million they would retain for continuing development will be largely wasted since there have been 5 continuous years of such engineering studies as they would get for the \$20 million. Since that is true, I am puzzled why they do not offer an amendment for what they really want—to cancel the AMSA program entirely.

Let us face the real issue here instead of hiding behind the facade of authorizing \$20 million on "more blueprints." I might note parenthetically that we saw an interesting example last Friday of strategic retreat from the real issue when it came time to vote for or against the Navy's aircraft carrier.

To return now to the basic question that I say this debate is really about—the utility of manned bombers—I would point out that the able Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN), in his initial speech last Friday on his present amendment, made a very cogent observation when he stated, and I quote:

The only real defense against a nuclear war is not to have one.

I am sure that there is unanimous agreement on that point within the Pentagon, among the Peace through Law Advocates, all of the Congress, and indeed the whole world. That is what deterrence is all about. Within that context, let us examine how manned bombers can contribute uniquely to that deterrence of nuclear war.

What can the bomber do that missiles cannot do? The arguments for the bombers have been elucidated clearly and well many times here on the floor. Their major virtue, of course, is their flexibility since they are under human control at all times until the time of actual weapon release. This gives the United States the capability to take many short steps during times of crisis in demonstrating its intent and resolve short of actually launching missiles. These steps include dispersal of the bombers from their home base, putting part of the force on airborne alert, orbiting bombers on stations near the periphery of a saber-rattling enemy, all of these being steps of increasing readiness which can be taken should some potential adversary start to threaten us overtly with a superiority in megatonnage for purposes of nuclear blackmail. Compared to that flexibility, the ballistic missile has just two positions, fired or not fired. As a current expression puts it, "How do you show an enemy that you have moved your finger a little closer to the button?"

Now there is another point I would like to make that favors the manned bomber as a deterrent to nuclear war. If any potential enemy military or political planners are going to contemplate nuclear war, are actually going to consider

using such a devastating form of destruction to attain their international goals, then there is one paramount question that they have to think about and that is: How do you win the peace after the missiles have been fired and after a large part of your civilizations have been destroyed? I submit that the side that still has manned bombers left after a nuclear exchange, after the missiles are gone and the holes are empty, that side will still retain a nuclear power status and will control the peace and the world—or what is left of it. To me that is one of the strongest arguments of all in favor of the manned bomber as a deterrent to nuclear war. Our potential adversaries will have to consider very carefully the fact that even if they felt they could destroy a preponderance of our Minuteman and Polaris missiles before launch with a surprise attack, and even if they could limit the damage done to their population by the remaining missiles with their ABM system, if they began to be tempted to try a surprise strike on us, they still would have to consider that our manned bombers would get through to their targets and many would survive to return home afterward.

These bombers then would have the capability of returning time and time again if necessary while our enemy sat there with empty holes and no followup nuclear capability.

As I said before, any potential enemy would not even contemplate initiating nuclear war unless he felt confident he could obtain a long-range advantage after the war was over. For this reason, I am convinced that retaining a strong and capable manned bomber force provides us with a guarantee that we would win any war and we, not they, also would control the postwar peace, and I think that that is the ultimate in deterrence.

SUMMARY OF THE CASE FOR AMSA

To summarize my position in favor of full development of the AMSA, I have stated that this bomber is a B-52 replacement, a true strategic bomber in terms of range and payload. It will have the high speed and modern countermeasures necessary for survival against modern air defenses. It will keep our manned bomber deterrent viable in the decades of the mid-1970's through the 1980's and beyond.

I believe I have given convincing reasons for maintaining that viable bomber deterrent to nuclear war, both because of flexibility in showing force and demonstrating intent before a nuclear war can start and also in maintaining a postwar power status should such a war occur.

Now one final word on the excellent job done by the Senate Armed Services Committee in preparing the basic Defense authorization bill this year. They have, I believe, done outstanding work in examining all programs proposed by the Pentagon and in cutting many back and eliminating others that were marginal in priority. The committee deserves our praise for its outstanding service.

Although the Armed Services Committee is being castigated in some quarters as a Pentagon rubberstamp, let us not

forget that that attack is made by the proponents of the McNamara philosophy on defense. Those unilateral disarmers are now fighting their battle where it should be fought, in the public forum, rather than veiled in secrecy in the Office of Secretary of Defense. I welcome the debate and I urge my colleagues to follow it carefully. I also urge them to support the AMSA bomber program and to defeat the present amendment.

Mr. President, I claim no insight into technical matters of defense. However, I know that when the members of the highway patrol cruise along the highways of the country, they slow everyone down and prevent reckless acts.

Such is the case here. The manned bombers can be called back at the last second. Their very presence is a force for peace and a means of saving human life. I am thoroughly convinced that while the intent in the minds and hearts of all Senators is to do the very best for our country, the real effect of knocking out AMSA would be not only to endanger our country, but also to endanger the lives of those who defend our country and thus invite greater bloodshed.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CURTIS. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I certainly thank the Senator from Nebraska for his very fine speech. He has made a very definite contribution to the debate on this highly important question. His speech will certainly be a worthy monument to him and will be reflected in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

I think the Senator is so correct in all of his points about the deterrent effect of this weapon. It is a weapon that we can call back if need be.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from Mississippi.

We have all observed the hard work that the distinguished chairman of the committee has performed over many weeks in managing the pending bill on the floor. This work, of course, follows many long weeks and months of difficult and tedious hearings.

We appreciate what the Senator has done. The Senator may be criticized in some places. He may lose some battles. However, the RECORD will look very good 5 years from now, 10 years from now and 100 years from now.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 2 additional minutes to the Senator from Nebraska.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized for 2 additional minutes.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the Senator has made an eloquent presentation of his views on the matter. However, I have some questions to direct to his attention.

I believe I heard the Senator say that the impact of the pending amendment would be to block the AMSA project and, in effect, kill off the AMSA bomber.

Mr. CURTIS. I think that is the practical effect of it; yes.

Mr. McGOVERN. The Senator from Mississippi, the distinguished chairman of the committee, has a different view of the amendment. I do also. I call the attention of the Senator to the interpretation that the distinguished committee chairman, the Senator from Mississippi, placed in the RECORD yesterday. He said:

The only difference between the committee and the proponent's amendment is with reference to the rate of progress we make during this fiscal year.

Mr. President, I share the view of the Senator from Mississippi in that respect. That is the impact of the amendment, to hold the research and development and progress of this bomber in the fiscal year 1970 to the same level at which we were operating in 1969.

Mr. CURTIS. That is substantially what I said. It would prevent the making of any progress. We would be treading water as we have been doing for the last several years.

Mr. McGOVERN. The estimate of the Department of Defense—calling attention to the material I had printed in the RECORD on yesterday from Secretary Laird—is that the amendment would have the effect of slowing down the operational capability of the plane by 1 year, and that instead of achieving our goal in 1977, we would achieve it in 1978. The amendment does not cover the funding processes for 1971, and beyond.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator has expired. Who yields time?

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes on my own time for the purpose of continuing the discussion.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the thrust of the amendment relates only to the funding for the fiscal year 1970.

Mr. CURTIS. The Senator is correct. This would cover only 1 year. So, when we say that the effect would be to stop AMSA, the only year it could refer to would be the coming year.

Mr. McGOVERN. The word "stop" is not the correct word. A more accurate description is the one given by the Senator from Mississippi when he said that we are talking about the rate of progress we would make during the current fiscal year. I think that is the correct way in which to look at it.

We would be permitting \$20 million to be spent on the research and development of this bomber. This is what we would spend in the fiscal year, and that should be set against a figure of \$100 million.

There is nothing magic about either of these figures. It is a question of whether we have enough doubts about the bomber so that we ought to question the committee's proposal that we accelerate the program.

Mr. CURTIS. If there were an area in which disastrous floods had occurred and the engineers had been studying and studying the area for years and the Senator were to come in and offer an amendment not to build the structures necessary to hold back the floods but to con-

tinue studying the matter, he would be in effect preventing progress in the project. This would not cover all of the funds. There would still be some paper shuffling. However, it would be knocking out the progress of AMSA.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Who yields time?

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I should like to be recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. President, in the brief time that we have before the Senate recesses for the joint meeting, there is some material that has come to my attention which I would like to place in the RECORD and call to the attention of those Senators who are in the Chamber. It is a series of comparative tables showing the force levels of various types of bombers between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Of the bombers classified as heavy bombers, at the present time the table shows the United States with a force of 450 late model B-52's. We have a total B-52 force of some 646; slightly more

than two-thirds of these are late model bombers, with a maximum speed of 630 miles per hour at 40,000 feet, and a range far longer than any Soviet bomber. B-52H's have flown more than 12,000 miles unrefueled.

The interesting comparison here is that, as against our 646 B-52's, 450 of them being late models, the Soviet Union has only 90 of the Bear bombers, the propeller-driven Russian counterpart. It is true that they have another 50 tankers that could be converted to bombers, for a total heavy bomber force of 140. Even those 140 are operationally inferior to the B-52. There is a maximum speed of 550 against 630 for the B-52, a maximum range of 9,000 against 12,000 miles for the B-52, and a bomb payload of 20 tons as against 37.5 tons for the B-52.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a table showing a comparison of U.S.-U.S.S.R. bombers.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES-U.S.S.R. BOMBERS

PART I: HEAVY BOMBERS

	Speed ¹	Range ¹	Payload ¹
United States: B-52 (450 late models) ²	Maximum 630 miles per hour, at 40,000 feet ³	12,000 miles ³ (maximum) (B-52H).	37.5 tons. ⁴
U.S.S.R.: Bear (about 90, but 50 Bear tankers can be converted to bombers) ³	Maximum 550 miles per hour, at 36,000 feet ³ over-target speed: 500 miles per hour, at 41,000 feet. ³	9,000 miles ³ (maximum).....	20 tons. ⁴

PART II: SUPERSONIC BOMBERS

United States: B-58 (78 deployed) ² ..	Maximum 1,385 miles per hour, at 55,000 feet. ³	Tactical range: 2,400 miles ³ (Mach 2 over target. Range considerably longer if entire mission were at same speed as Blinder.)	6 tons. ⁴
United States: FB-111A (none now but 76 planned by early seventies) ²	Maximum 1,400 miles per hour ³ (this is conservative estimate) sea level: 900 plus miles per hour ³	3,800 miles ³	18.75 tons. ⁴
U.S.S.R.: Blinder (over 700 Badgers and Blinders combined) ²	Maximum 925 miles per hour, at 40,000 feet. ³	Tactical range: 2,800 miles ³ ..	6 tons. ⁴

PART III: TACTICAL BOMBERS

United States: F-4B (over 2,000 F-4's built) ²	Maximum 1,300+ miles per hour (with bombs) ³ sea level: 900+ miles per hour. ³	2,300 miles ³ (maximum).....	8 tons. ⁴
United States: A-4F (over 2,600 A-4's built) ²	Maximum 675 miles per hour ³	2,000+ miles ³	5 tons. ⁴
U.S.S.R.: Bison (60 deployed) ²	638.75 with payload of 59,525 pounds ³	6,050 miles ³ (maximum).....	10 tons. ⁴
U.S.S.R.: Badger (over 700 Badgers and Blinders combined) ²	Maximum 587 miles per hour, at 35,000 feet ³ ..	3,000 miles ³ (with maximum payload).	Do.

¹ London Institute for Strategic Studies.

² Department of Defense.

³ William Green, "The World's Fighting Planes," 1964.

⁴ House Armed Services Committee, July 1967, "The Changing Strategic Military Balance, United States of America versus U.S.S.R."

⁵ John W. R. Taylor, ed., "Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1968-69."

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, regardless of what else might be said about these bomber levels, no one can speak seriously about a bomber gap when we have the Soviets outnumbered four to one.

It is my understanding that the senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), the former Secretary of the Air Force, is going to elaborate a little later on, on the very dramatic gap in our favor that exists on the bomber front at the present time.

Perhaps even more significant is the lack of any indication that the Soviets are moving to build additional bombers, at least on any significant scale. I think that is a situation Senators should keep in mind.

When one turns to the supersonic bombers, in connection with the B-58 we have 78 presently deployed. We expect to have 76 of the FB-111 by the early 1970's.

Mr. President, in view of the time factor, I yield the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate resumes its business after the recess, the distinguished Senator from South Dakota be recognized.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for a quorum call be rescinded.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the Senate will now proceed in a body to the Hall of the House of Representatives for the purpose of a joint meeting which will be addressed by the Apollo 11 astronauts.

Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? The Chair hears no objection, and it is so ordered.

Thereupon (at 12 o'clock and 13 minutes p.m.) the Senate took a recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

The Senate reassembled at 1:12 p.m., when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. GRAVEL in the chair).

AMERICAN FLAG PRESENTED TO SENATE BY ASTRONAUTS ARMSTRONG, ALDRIN, AND COLLINS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. On behalf of the Vice President, the Chair wishes to state that the Senate has received the flag which was presented to it by the astronauts during the joint meeting today. Without objection, the flag will be turned over to the Secretary of the Senate, who will deliver it to the Curator of Art and Antiquities of the Senate, who will be the custodian of the flag for the Senate.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Chair recognizes the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I yield such time as he may require to the Senator from New York (Mr. GOODELL).

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, I thank

the Senator from South Dakota for yielding to me the time.

Mr. President, the amendment on the advanced manned strategic aircraft—AMSA—which I am cosponsoring along with the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), and the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE), is a modest amendment.

It would reduce by \$80 million the amount authorized in S. 2546 for work on a new strategic bomber, AMSA. It would permit continued research on AMSA with expenditures of \$20 million plus \$5 million in carryover funds. This \$25 million for fiscal year 1970 represents the same level as the approved program for AMSA in fiscal year 1969.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN) has previously pointed out that we are at the threshold of a major new expenditure; and he is quite certainly right. Estimates for per unit cost of AMSA have ranged from \$20 to \$80 million. Total cost of the AMSA program is estimated at a minimum of \$12 billion.

Mr. President, the need for further review of AMSA before increases in funding is clear.

At the beginning of this debate on advanced manned bombers, the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN) observed that where AMSA specifically is concerned, we should settle at the outset whether strategic bombers have any meaningful role to play in the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent or counterforce capabilities. Do they add something we must have and which cannot be supplied by the massive destructive capabilities of land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles?

I would agree that we must address ourselves to this question. We must take precautions here today lest funds be spent on a costly weapons system of questionable defense utility, while still not facing this larger issue.

Another point which has been raised in this debate is whether AMSA is really needed given existing strategic bomber forces and tactical aircraft. The legitimacy of Defense requests for increased funds for AMSA must be viewed in the context of alternative weapons, including the existing strategic bomber forces and other bombers in the procurement line, including the B-52, the B-58, and the FB-111. If the case for strategic bombers is made more effectively than it has been made to date, still the question remains as to whether the costly new aircraft, AMSA, is required. Another dimension in arriving at a decision on advanced manned bombers is whether existing and planned tactical aircraft can play a significant part of the role assigned to the strategic bomber force, hence, making the new aircraft, AMSA, unnecessary.

Since 1956 the Air Force has been examining replacement for the B-52 as part of strategic bomber planning.

Regardless of developments in missile defense, the Air Force has insisted on the urgency to invest funds in strategic bomber for added deterrence. Typical of the Air Force's case for bombers over the years, is the statement made in 1963 by

Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee. He said:

We believe, as the General (LeMay) has pointed out, that our proper strategic posture demands some kind of a manned system because of the flexibility it gives you. If the B-70 proves to be a blind alley for any reason we have to explore all the other methods because we have to come up with a manned system, in our opinion.

He then referred to the B-70—2,000 m.p.h. supersonic bomber for reconnaissance—Dromedary—a long-endurance, large, slow airplane designed to fly up to 48 hours, but not to penetrate defenses at all—and a low-altitude penetrator. (House Appropriations Committee Hearing on the Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, 88th Congress, first session, 1963, part II, p. 530.)

Typical also of the case for bombers, is the point made in 1964 by General LeMay, then Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. He said:

I still think that we would be able to complete and get a usable weapons system out of the B-70 program . . . We have gone on with our studies and are proposing something else. If not that manned weapons system, then what can be procured?

Mr. President, the B-70 which was also called the XB-70 since it was experimental, did prove to be a "blind alley." It was obsolete by the time it was built. It added nothing to our Nation's security.

Still, the Air Force appears determined to come up with a new manned strategic bomber. It does seem that the principle of strategic bombers overrides incisive review of the practical utility of bombers.

Today, the B-70 is on display in the Air Museum in Dayton, Ohio. From defense to display, the B-70 cost the American taxpayer \$1.4 billion.

In April of this year, the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOK), the Senator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE) and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD) joined me in a statement of concern over the B-70. We stated that the museum piece B-70 underscores the point that military estimates of what is needed to protect our security are not infallible. The Military Establishment can make mistakes.

The B-70 was one of those mistakes.

There is only one way to avoid this sort of billion-dollar mistake. Members of Congress and independent, unbiased experts must exercise the most searching scrutiny of military spending projects. This process of inquiry will guard against B-70's of the future. It will help prevent billions from being wasted that are needed to meet domestic social needs. It will help assure that the weapons systems that pass the test of impartial, intelligent examination are the best in the world.

In support of our concern over military spending, Senator COOPER and my colleague from New York (Mr. JAVITS) joined in supporting our objective to focus public attention on the need for incisive review of defense spending requests.

Mr. President, hopefully, we have learned a lesson in economy and gained insights in defense planning from the B-70 fiasco. Hopefully, AMSA will not

end up as another piece in the Air Museum.

The Armed Services Committee has acknowledged that there is a need for further study of AMSA.

The special Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Tactical Air Power of the Armed Services Committee emphasized that funding this year for AMSA does not commit us either to full-scale development or to production and deployment of AMSA.

What the additional funds are designed to do is to accelerate the engineering program and to advance the Initial Operating Capability—IOC—of AMSA by 1 year, from 1973 to 1977.

The question remains as to the basis for urgency to accelerate the AMSA program. Indeed, last year, in his 1968 defense posture statement, McNamara said that more important than a new aircraft were new weapons and penetration aids. Since the B-52 with such new equipment could be operational well into the 1970's, the question of urgency appears to be nonexistent.

In addition, and with regard to the perceived manned bomber threat, the Armed Services Committee notes on page 8 of its report on S. 2546 that there is a wide difference of opinion between the national intelligence estimate and the Air Force with respect to the gravity of the Soviet manned bomber threat.

Mr. President, there are simply too many questions raised about the feasibility of AMSA. Answers have yet to be convincing. Questions raised throughout this debate simply must be answered persuasively by the Pentagon before we accelerate the AMSA program.

As long as the Pentagon fails to establish a clear and convincing case for AMSA, we cannot and must not authorize increases in the funding level. Congress must not abdicate its reason and judgment simply in view of the power and prestige of the Military Establishment.

Mr. President, if I may, I would like to ask the Senator from South Dakota a question with reference to the whole justification of the AMSA program. The point has been raised that we need AMSA to supplement our ICBM's and our submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the implication being that in the future our ICBM's and our Polaris and Poseidon will be insufficient for deterrence.

How does the Senator from South Dakota evaluate the specific reason for which the proponents say we need AMSA?

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, before commenting on that specific question, I want to commend the Senator on the statement he has delivered today, because it is a succinct and compelling overview of the issue before us. The Senator from New York, for a number of years, has informed himself very thoroughly on the B-70 controversy. He has followed that through very carefully and has spotlighted the tragic and expensive mistake that was made in moving too quickly on the construction of that plane.

As he pointed out here today, and as he has pointed out at earlier times, at a cost of well in excess of \$1 billion, we built a

large bomber, somewhat along the lines of the one that we are debating here today, which proved to be inadequate and which now resides in a museum in Ohio.

The Senator's question really goes to the heart of the issue before the Senate on this amendment. It is whether or not we really need to accelerate the construction of a new weapon system to provide for the maintenance of our present deterrent against enemy attack.

Let me just say to the Senator that, in order to make the argument that the United States must now move forward on an accelerated basis with the construction of a new bomber, one would have to make a whole range of assumptions no one of which seems to me to be very likely.

It is generally said—and I think this is a conservative estimate—that if we had the capacity to deliver 400 1-megaton warheads on the Soviet Union, that would certainly be enough to deter any conceivable attack on this country.

I frankly cannot imagine any condition under which we would need 400 warheads landing on any country to deter it. Any one of those 400 would be at least 50 times as powerful as the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima a quarter of a century ago. The actual landing of 400 weapons of that kind on any country would result in its utter devastation, doubtless to the point where those who survived would be in a less envious position than those who had been killed in the initial attack.

But assuming that is the fact, assuming that deterrence requires some 400 warheads that are capable of landing on the Soviet Union, let us look at what we have in our present arsenal without the construction of another enormously expensive new bomber.

We have, first of all, a bomber fleet in force today of 646 B-52's, 255 of which are the latest type of B-52, the G and H models.

As the Senator from New York knows, in replying to the letter he and I sent to Secretary Laird, the Secretary assured us that these late model B-52's can remain in operation until the end of the 1980's.

But beyond that, we have a bomber force of 3,000 tactical aircraft, capable of striking a substantial proportion of the targets in the Soviet Union, based either in Europe or on aircraft carriers—tactical bombers that are already in place.

Beyond that, we have over 1,000 land-based missiles in hardened sites that would be very difficult to destroy, any one of which is capable of striking targets in the Soviet Union.

As if all that were not enough, we have built, at considerable expense, some 41 Polaris submarines, each one of which is armed with 16 tubes capable of launching weapons at targets in the Soviet Union—some 656 missiles in the submarine fleet alone.

All of this is before the conversion process, which now promises to change each one of those 16 individual warheads into as many as eight or 10, under the so-called MIRV system.

So what we are talking about here is an existing bomber force several times larger than the Soviet Union's. As the Senator from New York knows, the Soviets are not building new bombers on any significant scale. We have our land-based missile system; we have our submarine-based missile system; we have our tactical aircraft and our aircraft carriers, all capable of carrying nuclear weapons, plus the construction that we have authorized in this session of Congress on a new anti-ballistic-missile system, for whatever additional security that may afford, for protecting our missiles.

One would have to assume that the Soviet Union is so accurate that they have the capacity of simultaneously knocking out all of these forces, to find that we somehow now need an additional weapons system in order to maintain our deterrent. I submit to the Senator from New York that that is a series of assumptions that goes beyond comprehension, and that we do have the capacity to unleash a society-destroying blow against the Soviet Union without the construction of one additional bomb.

Mr. GOODELL. I thank the Senator for his answer. I should like to, with the Senator's permission, explore one other aspect of this matter.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, before the Senator proceeds, will he yield to me?

Mr. GOODELL. I yield.

Mr. COOPER. I direct my question to both the Senator from New York and the Senator from South Dakota.

I have read with great interest the speeches of the Senator from South Dakota, and have listened to the very good speech of the Senator from New York.

I know that a great deal is said about the possibility of conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States—of course, that is always on our minds—and the situations in which this bomber would not be effective.

Is there any other mission, other than one which might be necessary in a conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, which would necessitate, in the Senator's view, going ahead with this program at full speed? Is there any other possible enemy, or any possible conflict?

Mr. McGOVERN. The other major mission that is assigned to every bomber of this kind, I say to the Senator from Kentucky, is the so-called damage limitation function.

Mr. COOPER. That would be a factor in the unhappy event of war between the United States and the Soviet Union. But what I am asking is, is there any other possible enemy or situation in which the United States could become involved in war, as we are now involved in South Vietnam, which, in the Senator's view, would make it rational to go ahead full speed with this system?

Mr. McGOVERN. I would have to say no. I cannot think of any other function.

One thinks of possible danger from mainland China; but it would seem to me that to whatever extent there is cogency in the argument that our present bomber force can take care of any

needs we would have for bombers against the Soviet Union, that argument would be even stronger with reference to mainland China, which is in a much less secure position to defend itself or to launch offensive operations in the event of a war between our two countries.

Mr. COOPER. That is what I would think, also, but I thought it would be well to cover this point.

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. GOODELL. I think there is one other point that should be made. Allegations have been made about AMSA that it could be used for conventional warfare roles such as the B-52's are handling in Vietnam now. I think it should be emphasized that the B-52 was really not designed for the kind of mission for which it has been employed in Vietnam, and we could have, had we built a bomber force for that kind of mission alone, done it at much less expense than the cost of the B-52, which was primarily designed for the strategic nuclear deterrent.

We now have B-52's and B-58's, and the FB-111. Although they do not carry the payloads anticipated for AMSA, they will carry tremendous destructive power. Even our so-called tactical air force, the F-4, A-6, A-7, and F-111, can carry more destructive power than all the bombs dropped in World War II. They can reach many Soviet targets from carriers, and European land bases; and they certainly could reach many of the other targets that might be anticipated in terms of conventional warfare more easily than they could reach Soviet territory.

All of these aircraft are far cheaper than AMSA. Many are in the inventory today, in large numbers. I think there is much to be said for not putting all our eggs in one basket, but putting them in many baskets, such as attacking with large numbers of cheaper bombers, with a view of striking a breakthrough that could lead to large numbers of widely dispersed targets.

I think the arguments for AMSA in terms of conventional warfare are even weaker than those for AMSA in a nuclear deterrent capacity.

Mr. COOPER. As I understand it—and I should like to know if I am correct—an affirmative vote on this amendment, in the event it were successful, would mean, if Congress should later decide to go ahead with the development of this advanced bomber, a delay of 1 year?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, that is the estimate of the Secretary of Defense. The impact of providing the full amount requested by the committee has the effect of quadrupling the 1969 approved program. The effect of that would be to move up the operational level to 1977 instead of 1978, which is the present target date.

Mr. COOPER. I know that both the distinguished Senator from South Dakota and the distinguished Senator from New York have had discussions with the Department of Defense, and I know they have had correspondence with the Secretary of Defense. Has there been, in any of those discussions, briefings, or corre-

spondence, any strong argument, in the Senator's view, that a delay of 1 year, if Congress should later decide to go ahead in this field, would create any period of peril for the United States, in the event of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union?

Mr. McGOVERN. I will say to the Senator, speaking only for myself—perhaps the Senator from New York might wish to add to this—that I cannot conceive of any circumstance under which anything we could call a bomber gap, or a bomber deficiency, would develop prior to the 1980's.

In the reply that Secretary Laird sent to Senator GOODELL, Senator HATFIELD, Senator PROXMIER, and me, he said that the latest B-52's, of which we now have about 450, or three times the level of the comparable Soviet bomber, can be operational until into the 1980's, and that even then, their life could be extended if we reduced the flying time somewhat.

But beyond that, as the Senator from New York has pointed out, we have all these tactical bombers that are capable of striking major targets in the Soviet Union. We have some 3,000 planes in that category. So it is very hard for me to imagine any gap that would develop by 1980; and if, after passage of this amendment, next year, upon further study by the Armed Services Committee, or if the strategic arms limitation talks should fail, or the situation should become more dangerous, or for whatever reason, we decide to accelerate it, I cannot see any reason why we could not then reassess the situation and provide additional funds next year.

The question is why we should authorize these funds now for an accelerated schedule. The Soviet Union has no bomber even remotely comparable to AMSA. There is no bomber gap except the one in our favor. And we have these weapons which constitute the front line of our deterrent, in any event.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New York and the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, on that particular point we are talking about a possible bomber gap in 1977, 8 years from now. We are talking about that bomber gap under circumstances in which we have an overwhelming preponderance of power in bombers today vis-a-vis the entire world—not just the Soviet Union—and in which the Soviet Union from every indication has de-emphasized the bomber and is not undertaking any massive program to build bombers that could create a so-called bomber gap with reference to our power vis-a-vis the Soviets.

I think in this instance that the Soviets are being very wise in setting their priorities. There is great question about the utility of the bomber in any nuclear war today, to say nothing of any projected nuclear war 8 years from now when presumably there will be other new developments in strategic weaponry.

I do not find myself persuaded by the argument that we need this extra money now to move our capability up from 1978 to 1977 when the case has not been made persuasively that we need the AMSA at all, to say nothing about 1977 or 1978.

As the Senator from South Dakota has said, if and when a convincing case is made for our need for AMSA, we can then undertake the program and we can fund the money that is necessary to construct this weapon as quickly as it is needed.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the Senator from New York knows that the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) raised a question about the second proposed function for the advanced manned strategic aircraft, which is the so-called damage limitation mission. It is sometimes argued, as the Senator knows, by proponents of the bomber that it has an advantage over a missile in the event of a nuclear war in that after an initial exchange of missiles or bombardment, the bombers could take off and seek out those missiles that had as yet not been fired.

Can the Senator imagine any enemy country in a wartime situation, after there had been an initial exchange, that would stand by and permit their missiles to remain in their silos without firing them once they were aware that bombers were on the way to knock out the remaining missiles?

Mr. GOODELL. I certainly cannot. Under the circumstances described, it seems to me that the damage-limiting function of a bomber is of questionable utility, particularly when we consider that the bomber's arrival time is measured in hours while the solid fuel ICBM launch time is measured in seconds.

I think this is one of the lesser persuasive arguments that has been made for AMSA.

I also point out, since we are discussing the matter of 1977 and 1978, that Secretary McNamara in the 1968 defense posture statement said that it was more important that we develop our weapons and penetration aids than that we develop new aircraft. And he said that the B-52 with such new equipment could be operational well into the 1970's.

Secretary Laird estimated in his testimony that they could be operational into the 1980's.

Secretary McNamara said there is no urgency on the production and deployment of new bombers.

His Assistant Secretary on Systems Analysis, Alain Enthoven, stated in his testimony in 1968 before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee:

When the Soviets consider the B-52 threat, they are not going to look at the nameplate to see how old it is. . . . It has been hard to figure out how to build a bomber that is significantly more effective than the B-52 except the respects that I have described, the penetrations aids and the standoff (short-range) missile, and they are going on the B-52.

I also point out, since we have talked about the XB-70, that the XB-70 is not the only white elephant in our arsenal.

For the past 15 years we have terminated more than \$8 billion in major military hardware that never became operational. Of this amount, about \$3 billion was spent on aircraft, of which the XB-70 accounted for about one-third. About \$4 billion more was spent on missiles, Snark, Maverick, and Navaho, which were abandoned before they were deployed.

We wonder if we are not going down

that same road again. We can understand that in the years past there may have been reasons for our making these mistakes. However, have we learned by these mistakes? Obviously, there is need for research and development into new weapons. New, theoretical concepts are now off the drawing board. However, we must ask why we build equipment that is obsolete before coming off the assembly line, military hardware that we neither need nor can use.

How much can we afford to spend and then abandon? Significantly, the F-111 plane, the TFX, is a painful case in point. Ever since the design for fighter planes for the Navy and Air Force was proposed in 1961, we have been throwing good money after bad.

Congress has appropriated \$6.5 billion for the system through fiscal year 1969. However, the taxpayer does not get very much for his money.

The Navy version of the plane was cancelled last year because of the cost and technical difficulty.

The Air Force will receive fewer of its version of the plane this year than originally planned. Its cost is too high and other types of aircraft can do the job.

The development of the FB-111, an interim strategic bomber version of the TFX, has often been considered. Nevertheless, too often we forge ahead with the production and deployment of planes despite the cost and technical difficulties.

On March 17 of this year Secretary Laird told the Armed Services Committee that the FB-111 program will be cut back. However, the program will be continued "to salvage what we can of the work in process."

Meanwhile, we will concentrate our efforts, quoting Secretary Laird, on the development of the new strategic bomber, AMSA. As the Secretary put it, the FB-111 will not meet the requirements for a new intercontinental bomber, and the cost per unit has reached a point where AMSA must be considered to fill the void.

It seems to me that we have heard this story before. Certainly Secretary Laird is to be commended for his action in cutting back the FB-111. It was not his responsibility that we went as far as we did.

As a Member of Congress and a member of the important House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Mr. Laird opposed the FB-111 and the TFX. He raised many questions about it.

Now we wonder, with one XB-70 housed in the Air Museum in Dayton, Ohio, if there will be enough museums to house the FB-111's we are producing.

We ask, "How did we agree to spend so much money in the past on these dead-end projects?" It was largely through the exaggerated estimates of our opponents' capabilities and inaccurate surveys of our own defense needs.

Under those circumstances, I believe it would be a wise, reasonable, and intelligent action of the Senate, and of Congress as a whole, to refuse at this point to accelerate the AMSA, to refuse to say that we are convinced of its value sufficiently to move up the deployment date from 1978 to 1977.

I thank the Senator for his generosity in yielding.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I congratulate the Senator from New York on his statement.

There is one question I want to direct to the Senator for any comment he would care to make.

The argument sometimes made for the advanced manned bomber—and I have tried to look at all those arguments very carefully—is that you have more control over a bomber of that kind than you have over missiles. Once the missiles are launched, you cannot call them back. But is not that contention somewhat cancelled out by the fact that you can hold the missile on the ground—we are talking about a 6,000-mile mission to the Soviet Union—while you evaluate any given crisis situation, for 5 or 6 hours, and still can hit any target in the Soviet Union ahead of a bomber that might have been launched 5 or 6 hours earlier? So that you give yourself a period of evaluation time before weapons systems are engaged. It might, in fact, just avert that argument and give us a better control situation with missiles than we have with bombers.

Mr. GOODELL. Yes, I agree with that.

Of course, when you are playing the war games on the drawing board, you want to provide for every contingency. This country could commit all of its resources, of every nature, to the military and still not provide for all contingencies.

I think that in all these situations we must provide a reasonable, secure measure of security, anticipating the potential situation we would face vis-a-vis an enemy. It does not make very much sense to me to say that a bomber that takes anywhere from 4 to 6 hours to reach a point of launching weapons, missiles, or whatever else, gives us a more effective option when we can wait longer with a missile that will reach that target in 15 minutes. The assumption of that argument is that we would not want to hold back pushing a missile button. In a given war game scenario, perhaps there is a rain of missiles coming through the air from the Soviet Union toward the United States. Under those circumstances, any sizable launching of missiles that might destroy our deterrents would be recognized immediately, and we would have no choice but to push the button.

Then we come to a consideration of perhaps one or two missiles, unidentified, coming through the air. Clearly, we do not push the button and send our missiles irrevocably on their way when that is the case. Those missiles, if they are in the air in such small numbers, can be permitted to strike without any danger that they would destroy our deterrent capability, our hardened missiles, or our Polaris and Poseidon roaming the seas.

I do not believe that the bomber, the AMSA, gives us any greater flexibility under foreseeable circumstances in a presumed attack on the United States.

I am sure the Senator from South Dakota would share my sentiments when I say that I would have no part in cutting one sinew of needed military muscle. We

must remain secure. We must have a sufficiency of power in the critical areas, strategic and tactical, to insure the security of our country. When we are talking about the security of our country in military terms, we must anticipate, whether or not it turns out to be true, that we have an enemy, given a particular power relationship with us, who would want to destroy us. That assumption undergirds our whole approach to defense, and it must be continued—tragically, I fear—for the foreseeable future.

That means that this country must be extremely rational in its choice of military weapons. Each strategic system is fantastically expensive; and if we are to pose ourselves vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, I think we must recognize that our society can spend what is necessary to meet a reasonably potential threat, but that our society suffers much more than the closed Soviet society when we spend excessive proportions of our resources on the military. We suffer more in the divisiveness that prevails in our Nation, on the streets of our cities, with the hungry, with the poor, with the urban crisis generally, with the problems of pollution of our environment.

No one is saying that these problems take priority over what is truly necessary for our national security. We do say that today this country has a controllable Federal budget expenditure in the neighborhood of \$145.5 billion a year, and of that amount we are spending over \$80 billion on defense. It is ample. It is more than ample. We must revise our priorities to cut back on the excessive expenditure.

The most important place we can cut back without any danger to our country whatsoever is in strategic weapons systems like AMSA where we are talking about having it available 1 year earlier, in 1977 rather than in 1978. Clearly projections of 8, 9, or 10 years are less reliable than projections of 2, 3, or 4 years. This projection on which the Department of Defense bases its request for AMSA, the 8 years hence, is among the least reliable projections they have given to us in defense of a weapons system.

Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Senator. I think the Senator from New York has come right to the heart of the basic issue that has been before the Senate for several weeks throughout this entire debate. The Senator properly said that no Member of the Senate is indifferent to the security needs of the country. I have felt for a long time that we need to develop a new, broader, and more realistic definition of what constitutes national defense. It certainly has to go beyond the size of our weapons stockpiles, as important as that is.

The Senator may recall that in the other body, near the end of debates relating to funding proposals for education, conservation, health, housing, and programs of that kind, one of the senior Members of that body would always conclude his argument against spending in the health, education, and welfare field by saying that this is a threat to the Nation's security, and he had a quotation which supposedly had been made by Lenin in which Lenin was supposed to have said that they will not destroy the

United States by open attack but by making us spend ourselves to death. I have never found where Lenin actually said that. However, to whatever extent the quotation has validity, that a nation could destroy itself by extensive expenditures, I think the Senator is correct in putting his finger on the enormous budget that goes for military purposes.

Without weakening our defense posture or our military security, we can bring about certain savings in that part of the Federal budget. Far from weakening our defenses, we are making a useful contribution in the defense and security of our country by savings to be used either to reduce tax levels or perhaps more likely for other urgent areas of our national life.

I do not have any doubt that a good case can be made that there are greater dangers to this country in 1978 if we do not face up to what needs to be done—greater dangers to us from other quarters in 1978 than from any expected nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. The entire problem of our environment, the purity of the air we breathe, the purity of the water we drink, the livability of our cities, the painful problem of malnutrition.

Last year, the Senator from New York was a member of the Select Committee on Malnutrition and Human Needs. All of those problems are problems that cry out for solution. I would like to see us consider on an accelerated scale problems of that kind and use this sum of money we are trying to save on this very doubtful bomber system for those problems.

Now, \$75 million in Pentagon language is not very much money, but it is \$75 million that could make the difference in some of our other programs. I have read accounts of the cuts made in medical research programs in NIH and the alarm that medical research people have expressed on the reduction of funds in some of the medical programs dealing with the chief killers of mankind. Here again, while \$75 million is not a lot of money in terms of weapons systems, it can be the crucial difference in some of the needs of our national life.

I commend the Senator on the points he made today both with respect to that issue and the other points he touched upon so effectively this afternoon.

Mr. GOODELL. I thank the Senator. I believe the Senator from South Dakota would join me in saying that, if we were presented with a persuasive case that this country had to increase substantially military spending in order to preserve our security, we would vote for those funds.

Mr. McGOVERN. There is no question at all about that in my mind.

Mr. GOODELL. We do not have that situation today. All authorities, whatever their views on future systems may be, agree this country is secure and that we have sufficient retaliatory power to cope with any conceivable situation today. We are providing the money necessary to sustain that power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or any other conceivable opponent.

We are talking here about those projects that have marginal justification from the Pentagon. People often ask how

we can substitute our judgment for the judgment of the military when those who serve in the military have devoted their entire lives to the military and to defense. The answer is really quite simple. On the technical points we ask them to come to us and justify rationally the various types of challenges that this country might face in the future and our capability to meet those challenges. I fully recognize that in all sincerity the men in the Pentagon, either in the Air Force, Navy, or Army, would like to have and would say it is necessary that we have \$10, \$15, \$20 billion more spent each year on the military. But they are not infallible. They have made many, many mistakes in the past.

Understandably those who work in the military in the Pentagon are not so concerned about the waste of taxpayer's money as we are because we represent the people who pay those taxes and we have to answer to the people who pay those taxes. We also represent the people who desperately are seeking solutions today for our social problems, our urban problems, or the many other problems that divide the people of our country and which truly endanger our society if they are not met effectively in the years ahead.

I agree with the statement of the Senator from South Dakota that unless we set these priorities sensibly today we may have a far greater challenge by 1978 than would be represented by any mythical bomber gap that occurs at that point. We might find ourselves in the position of saying: What does it profit us to have an overage of strategic security in 1978 when we have lost our system as we have known it throughout the years of this Republic? That is the challenge each of us faces in public office today; namely, to assess the rightful demands and meet the rightful demands of the military, but not to give them one penny more than is truly needed for our defense.

I thank the Senator from South Dakota for his leadership on this issue.

Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Senator from New York.

(At this point Mr. CRANSTON assumed the chair.)

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 9 minutes to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, just last year the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee conducted hearings and issued a report on the status of U.S. strategic power.

The present chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), was chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee at that time and presided over these hearings. The report was issued by the subcommittee on September 27 and signed by all subcommittee members except for the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON). The reason I mention these points, Mr. President, is that amendment No. 130 now under discussion runs counter to one of the two main recommendations made in the subcommittee report on the status of U.S. strategic power.

This amendment, offered by the distinguished Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN), would strike from the military procurement bill \$95 million for engineering development of the advanced manned strategic aircraft and substitute \$20 million for continued studies on this project.

Mr. President, this project has been studied in detail, not only by the Defense Department and the Air Force, but by a subcommittee of the Senate. In recent weeks it has been inferred the Armed Services Committee has not examined closely enough the requests of the military, but today we are talking about a project on which intensive hearings were conducted just last year.

These hearings were comprehensive and in depth. The subcommittee explored the entire U.S. strategic power picture, where we are now, and where we need to go if the continued safety of our people is to be assured.

The hearings resulted in testimony and questioning on this subject from all of the top military and civilian authorities. To give my colleagues an idea about the thoroughness which the subcommittee applied in these hearings, I would like to list the witnesses who appeared and their titles. They included: Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering; Dr. Alain C. Enthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis; the Honorable Harold Brown, Secretary of the Air Force; Gen. Joseph J. Nazzaro, commander in chief, Strategic Air Command; Gen. James Ferguson, commander, Air Force Systems Command; Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy, and Gen. Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Honorable Richard Helms, was also heard.

Mr. President, these men represent the best military and civilian brains in the business. Their testimony was heard by the subcommittee. In the wide-ranging review of our U.S. strategic power posture, the subcommittee came up with two key recommendations—one of which called for the acceleration of the advanced manned strategic aircraft program which had already been in research and development.

The Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee made a number of specific recommendations in this report which covered the full range of our present strategic power and the steps needed to maintain it. On the last pages of the report, the subcommittee reiterated its belief that we must have a mixed and balanced force of land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles, plus long-range manned bombers to give us flexibility to respond no matter how an enemy chooses to initiate an attack.

Therefore, in addition to urging deployment of the sea-based Poseidon missile system, the subcommittee listed the two following major recommendations for emphasis, and I quote from the report:

(1) Prompt development and deployment of a new long-range advanced manned strategic bomber; and (2) accelerated research

and development to keep open the option for deploying an advanced ICBM.

Now, Mr. President, it is obvious the subcommittee was doing its job well before there were any signs that practically all major weapon systems would be challenged in the 1970 military procurement budget. In all these hearings on strategic power the recommendations made in the report listed AMSA and advanced ICBM's as the key to maintaining our ability to deter a nuclear attack.

The effect of the McGOVERN amendment would be to reduce the funds to a level which would permit only more study. The amendment does not say strike the AMSA program out of our defense picture, but rather puts off until tomorrow what you should do today. It appears to me the question which we should be considering is whether to go forward with the engineering development of AMSA called for in the bill or drop the program outright.

In the event this amendment is approved, we would be putting \$20 million into studies not needed and delaying by 1 year the initiation of this vital weapon system.

Mr. President, it should also be noted that passage of the AMSA provision presently in the bill will merely get us started toward developing a new bomber in time for inventory introduction in 7 or 8 years. Furthermore, the allocation of the \$95 million only amounts to a production option rather than an irrevocable production decision.

Once again we are talking about a long-term program, one which will develop an airplane for operational use about the time our present bomber force reaches an age where further use or modification would be impractical and expensive. The proposed AMSA would have greatly improved capabilities for both strategic nuclear and contingency nonnuclear operations, supersonic speed, improved penetration aids and enduring survivability. The latter point means the ability of AMSA to operate from shorter, dispersed airfields with a high degree of reliability.

In this case the Secretary of Defense has recommended to the Congress an accelerated development program for AMSA which is the same recommendation made by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee last year. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have strongly endorsed AMSA and the Congress has historically supported it.

Continued delay in the AMSA program increases the possibility the United States will not be in a position to produce and deploy a new bomber when necessary. There has been enough delay in this program. Now is the time for positive action.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to study the report and hearings on U.S. strategic power issued last September by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. After doing so, I believe they will agree with the subcommittee recommendation of 1968 and the full committee's recommendation in 1969 to accelerate development and deployment of an advanced manned strategic aircraft for

the protection of our citizens in the late 1970's and beyond.

Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Mississippi for yielding me this time.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the distinguished Senior Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON) has been in the forefront on all issues that concern the air power of our Nation. Regrettably he has been absent from the Senate on official business during the consideration of this amendment involving the advanced manned strategic aircraft. However, he has prepared a statement on the issue—a statement that, in my opinion, presents a splendid analysis not only of the pending amendment but of many features of our defense posture as we face the 1970's. I commend these thoughtful remarks of Senator MAGNUSON to all Senators and accordingly, ask unanimous consent that his statement appear at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR MAGNUSON

Mr. President, several weeks ago I criticized the "no think" attitude toward military spending that has too often characterized the Pentagon and the Congress. That this attitude has been largely reversed—at least in the Senate—is, I believe, one of the truly historic accomplishments of the 91st Congress. The Senate has shown that it does have the will and the ability to examine a broad range of strategic assumptions and weapons systems. The result has been a promising and rational reduction of some areas of military spending, as well as a general clarification of much of our military policy.

Each member who has sponsored an amendment to limit some aspect of military spending, and each member who has spoken on either side, has made an enormous contribution to our ability to understand and discuss complex issues of national defense.

The current amendment—to reduce from \$100.2 million to \$20 million the authorization for continued research engineering funds on the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA)—is a particularly important one, and even though I oppose this amendment, I commend the distinguished Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN) for his rational and carefully-researched criticisms.

My own view—in contrast to the views of the bomber's opponents and proponents alike—is that we cannot decide either for or against construction of the bomber at this time, and that under the circumstances, our most prudent policy is to keep open the option of producing the bomber at the earliest possible date. If the Senate rejects this amendment—as I hope it will—we will still be keeping development of the bomber on schedule, while deferring a production decision for several years.

Having stated my position, let me clarify it by discussing in necessarily brief terms the basic issues raised by this amendment. There are, it seems to me, three major questions that must be answered with respect to AMSA, although the first is clearly the most important and has been the center of controversy:

1. Do we still need to maintain a bomber force as part of our national defense?

2. If so, does our existing bomber force need to be modified?

3. If the bomber force does need modification, why build AMSA and not some other aircraft?

Let me discuss each of these questions in turn.

Do we still need to maintain a bomber force as part of our national defense?

1. The "triple deterrent" argument.—Our current bombers—the FB-111, B-52 and B-58—are one-third of the United States' "triple deterrent," which also includes land-based ICBMs (Minuteman) and sea-launched ballistic missiles (Polaris and Poseidon). At the present time, the latter two deterrents are "credible," meaning that no potential aggressor today has the capacity to destroy these missiles before launch or to intercept them in flight.

A crucial rationale—but by no means the only one—for maintaining a bomber force as a third deterrent is the potential threat to the credibility of our missile deterrents, a threat that some experts believe is contained in the pattern of Soviet weapons development today. These two missile deterrents could be "degraded" under one of two circumstances: if the Soviets develop the capacity to destroy our Minuteman sites and nuclear-armed submarines simultaneously, or if the Soviets develop a missile defense system that can be relied upon to stop both Minuteman and Poseidon in flight.

In the absence of an American bomber force, or so the pro-bomber argument runs, the Soviets might be tempted to launch a "first strike" attack against us once they developed the capacity to neutralize both our land- and sea-based missiles. Obviously this is a capacity well beyond the reach of the Soviets at the present time, but their current military build-up creates doubt as to their intentions. The deployment of SS-9 rockets, development of attack submarines, and construction of missile defense systems—do these actions by the Soviets represent a "catch-up" effort, or are they a prelude to a first-strike capability? And if the Soviets are in fact trying for that first-strike capability, is it realistic to assume they can achieve it?

The President and the Secretary of Defense have interpreted Soviet actions as an effort to gain this first-strike capability. That was the prime justification for the ABM. Others have examined similar evidence and come to the opposite conclusion as to the Soviet intent.

There is, in addition, a great deal of evidence to suggest that the Soviets cannot attain a first-strike capability even if they are attempting to do so. Herbert York, a man of distinguished scientific and military credentials, has argued this point persuasively in a recent issue of *Scientific American*. Recent research by Dr. Ernest Sternglass, widely published, suggests that a first strike cannot be safely launched by the Soviets, because the radioactive fallout from such a massive attack would seal the fate of the Soviets themselves.

In short, we simply do not know—surrounded as we are by conflicting scientific evidence and intelligence reports—whether or not the "first strike" can ever become a reality. Faced with this uncertainty, it seems to me prudent, as stated above, to keep our options open. Since a bomber force would act as a deterrent if "first strike" became possible against our missiles, we should continue the current AMSA development schedule while continuing to examine the evidence that might make a bomber unnecessary.

There is nothing magical about the number "three" when speaking of deterrents. We can and should reduce or expand the number of our deterrents in response to technological change, scientific evidence, and international agreement. My point is that any reduction in deterrent at the present time, when so much uncertainty clouds Soviet intentions and capabilities, would clearly be premature.

2. The "flexibility" argument.—One claim made on behalf of the bomber as an arm

of our nuclear force is that a manned aircraft, as opposed to a missile, has greater flexibility in the event of actual combat. This flexibility consists of the ability to be recalled, to change targets at any time, to mix warhead sizes, and to participate in limited and conventional war.

Critics of the bomber have disputed the meaningfulness of this flexibility, and have expressed doubt that the scenarios described to demonstrate such flexibility would be likely to occur in the event of nuclear war.

I do not share the sentiments of the critics on this point. The particular scenario that the Senator from South Dakota has taken issue with—a sequence that begins with a limited Soviet attack on our military, but not on our urban targets—is worth discussing. In the event our deterrent has failed, and such a strike has been launched, a massive response by the United States could only lead to another salvo by the Soviets, and so on until all civilization has been destroyed.

The bomber, however, would allow us another option in response to this attack. We would retaliate, not with massive destruction by missiles (even the launch of missiles would increase the incentive for immediate, all-out war), but by selective destruction of certain non-urban targets within the Soviet Union. This would demonstrate two things: first, that we do not desire all-out war, and second, that it would be insane for the Soviets to continue the nuclear exchange in the face of assured destruction.

Despite the views of the bomber's critics, this is an option the President might very well wish to exercise before accepting the destruction of America or launching the destruction of the world.

3. The "leverage" argument.—According to its military and civilian advocates, the bomber creates "leverage" by forcing the Soviets, in response to our building a bomber, to spend billions of dollars on air defense—billions that might have gone into the production of offensive weapons or into the civilian sector of the Soviet economy. Thus, for an expenditure of perhaps ten billion dollars, we may divert perhaps forty or fifty billion dollars worth of Soviet resources to the construction, operation and maintenance of air defenses.

Although I believe that such leverage may in fact result from our building a new bomber, I do not regard it as an argument in the bomber's favor. Forcing the Soviets to spend more on military expenditures, I believe, is not a commendable objective of American military spending. It represents, in fact, the most cynical aspect of the arms race.

There is, however, a more useful type of "leverage" that continuation of the manned bomber program gives us. That is leverage at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). I am reminded of a somewhat analogous "leverage" applied by the United States at another important arms limitation talk nearly fifty years ago—the Washington Naval Conference. At that time, our Secretary of State Elihu Root astounded the emissaries of the assembled naval powers by announcing the willingness of the United States to scrap huge amounts of naval tonnage under construction, in return for an agreement limiting fleet sizes.

That agreement was in fact reached, largely because Root's offer was dramatic testimony to the desire of the United States for peace and an end to naval construction races. Many American vessels under construction—including the virtually completed battleship U.S.S. *Washington*—were sunk or scrapped under the terms of this agreement. The Washington Naval Conference may not have brought peace—only men can do that—but for over a decade the major nations of the world enjoyed a needed respite

from the economic drain of naval construction.

The arms race is even more crushing today than at the time of the Washington Naval Conference, and the dangers of war are infinitely greater. The need to negotiate an end to the arms race is compelling, and offensive weapons are the only credible trading stock today. In return for Soviet renunciation of first-strike ambitions—which must center in agreements on MIRV, attack submarines, depressed trajectory missiles, and fractional orbital bombardment—the United States should consider a renunciation of the new manned bomber and other weapons. The value of the bomber program in this situation will be lessened considerably unless it is proceeding on schedule.

Thus, if the Soviets are willing to forswear the potential for a first-strike, and if they stick to that agreement, the bomber will have to be reconsidered. If, however, they persist in their arms development without renouncing the first-strike, the need for the bomber becomes more apparent. In any event, our best choice is to continue the program on schedule.

Does our existing bomber force need to be modified?

In the above section, I have discussed several reasons why I believe the United States should retain the option of having a bomber force, at least in the immediate future. Since we already have such a force today, the question becomes whether or not that force needs to be modified.

This question is almost exclusively a matter of cost—particularly the relative cost-effectiveness of different force components—and unfortunately, many of the costs and much of the effectiveness cannot be predicted with certainty. There comes a time, obviously, when it is cheaper to buy a new car than to continue trying to keep up the old one. Similarly, it is obvious that at some point it is cheaper to build a new bomber than to continue maintenance, operation, and repair of the old one. The question is, have we reached that point?

Our existing bomber force is made up largely of B-52's—surely one of the most successful and most extraordinary airplanes ever built. And yet, to maintain the B-52 into the 1980's is a difficult task, for strategic as well as mechanical reasons. On the mechanical side, the cost of maintenance and repairs, modification and operation, will continue to rise due to wear and fatigue. The B-52 has been flying at low altitudes, which are quite demanding on the airframe, and yet it was designed for use at more benign upper altitudes. At some point, even the newest of the B-52's will simply wear out.

The cost of maintaining the B-52's will be billions of dollars. Critics of a new bomber often forget that it is our commitment to bombers in general—not to a particular aircraft—that forces us to spend such huge sums. A new bomber might in fact be a more economical weapon than the existing ones.

In addition, the B-52 has strategic limitations—limitations that will become more glaring as Soviet air defenses become more sophisticated. In order to penetrate those defenses, a bomber in the coming decades will have to carry a large variety and quantity of "penetration aids"—missiles, decoys, and electronic devices designed to neutralize the Soviets' ability to detect and destroy the aircraft in flight. Every pound of "pen-aids" that are added to the B-52 diminishes by a pound the payload the B-52 can carry, thus reducing its cost-effectiveness.

What is needed, of course, is an aircraft inherently more effective in terms of penetration; an aircraft that can carry a larger payload and that contains "growth potential" for adding "pen-aids" as these become necessary in the future. To continue the AMSA

program is to give ourselves the option of having such an aircraft by 1977 or 1978, assuming no delays in research or production. To postpone that capability still further is to run the risk of severe added costs in B-52 maintenance, because the ability of the B-52 to remain operational in the period of 1980 and beyond is most uncertain.

If the bomber force does need modification, why build AMSA and not some other aircraft?

Assuming we decide to maintain a bomber force, and assuming that force needs modification, does AMSA represent the most desirable new bomber in terms of cost-effectiveness? This, too, is a question I do not believe we can yet answer, for AMSA has not yet progressed to the stage where we can judge it as against other alternatives. There are other alternatives, of course, including a subsonic bomber with a greatly increased capacity, and these are alternatives that may be resorted to ultimately. But these are alternatives whose development and production time are considerably shorter than that of AMSA—particularly since most involve the conversion of existing military and commercial aircraft—and AMSA must be developed further in order to be evaluated in comparison.

The AMSA program should continue, therefore, but it is worthwhile, in light of previous experience with weapons systems development, for the Senate to attach some provisions.

AMSA is a weapons system first, and an aircraft second. We are seeking to add to our security, not to the technology of aviation. Our goal is not "to advance the state of the art", but to preserve least-cost procurement in pursuit of national defense objectives. We do not want a weapon whose capabilities exceed its mission requirements, for such excesses have negative value in terms of cost-effectiveness.

Above all, it is important for the Air Force and for the Senate to remember that we will be considering AMSA and the bomber question again—not once, but many times. We will have the opportunity—the responsibility—of reviewing this program before any production decision is made.

At the present time, AMSA program officials appear to understand the need for an austere aircraft that fulfills these criteria. The Air Force is aware of the increasing scrutiny being devoted to military expenditures, and they are aware of the growing concern over waste and overruns. Since final Congressional approval of this aircraft is some time in the future and by no means certain, AMSA program officials have a tremendous incentive to be realistic and efficient.

The essence of civilian control over the military lies in the retention of decision-making within the Congress. We cannot escape the responsibility of judging programs such as this at every major decision point, and we must not abdicate continuing review in the course of a single decision. To do so would be to undo all the good that has been done in this year's debates on military procurement.

In approving a full continuation of bomber research engineering, we are not giving a "green light" to production of a multi-billion dollar system. In the past, our decision might have been interpreted that way, but today each Senator knows that we have begun to look very closely at military spending, and that this trend will continue. Next year we will have new evidence—how the arms talks are progressing, how feasible different offensive and defensive systems are, how AMSA itself looks during advanced research engineering.

Next year, on the basis of that new evidence, we will have to decide what the next step in the manned bomber program should

be. This process of continuing review, evaluation, and decision is a difficult one, but in it lies the only hope for rational policies of national defense.

THE REQUIREMENT FOR A NEW BOMBER

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, on behalf of the distinguished Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK), I ask unanimous consent that a statement prepared by him relative to the requirement for a new bomber be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR DOMINICK

I have listened to and read with keen interest the dialog concerning the requirement for a new bomber. There have been some very interesting and formidable questions posed that require the deepest understanding of our national policies and the strategic forces required to carry out these policies.

I have attempted to reduce this very complex issue into comprehensible terms. In doing so, it seems to me that there are three questions that the Senate must address in arriving at the decision to initiate the development of the AMSA at this time, as recommended by our Armed Services Committee. They are in the order in which they should be considered.

First, do we need a mixed force of bombers and missiles? Secondly, if we do need a bomber force, should the bomber force be modernized for the post-1975 time period? And finally, if we are to improve the bomber force, should engineering development of AMSA be initiated at this time?

Now it seems to me, with regard to the first question concerning the requirement for both a missile and a bomber force, that it makes good sense to have a strategic force that presents to a potential enemy defense planner the necessity to cope with entirely different problems. I would like to make the point here that although we talk about having sub-launched ballistic missiles and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, in terms of defense these two systems present the same problem to the enemy. Therefore, a missile defense that would be effective against one system would also be effective against the other. Fortunately, however, the pre-launch survival of the two missile systems present quite dissimilar, but not insoluble, problems to the enemy.

From the standpoint of defending against a bomber that could penetrate at very low altitude at high speeds from any direction around the periphery of the Soviet Union, the problem of defense is in many ways more difficult than against ballistic missiles. And I believe we should present both of these problems to the Soviet defenses for the foreseeable future.

The discussion on the ABM system and the offensive and defensive missile capabilities of both ourselves and the Soviet Union only tends to strengthen my position in this regard. The ABM defense has progressed from what was thought to be an impossible task (at the time we initially deployed ballistic missiles) to where ABM defense now appears to be a very attractive alternative to buying more missiles. The point being that with any offensive system, given time and resources, an enemy will find a way to reduce its effectiveness. In this regard the Soviets are improving their air defense in an attempt to counter our bomber forces.

I would like to digress a moment prior to addressing the second question that I have posed, and speak a little about cost-effectiveness studies. I have listened, to my amusement at times, to the arguments for the C-5 and other systems, and invariably, the individuals who use cost-effectiveness as a

rationale for taking or not taking a position on an issue, use the results of systems analyses and cost-effectiveness studies in unequivocal terms. To me, this is bordering on the ridiculous. When one considers that we are talking about forces for the 1975 time period and one contemplates the uncertainty associated with such prognostications, I cannot help but discern that things are not as clear cut as they are sometimes made out to be. Any cost-effectiveness study or analysis that deals 8-10 years in the future must by necessity make assumptions, and a lot of assumptions. These assumptions are based on judgments—judgments that can greatly influence the conclusions that are reached in the study. The point being that there is large room for uncertainty in any of these analyses, and in the end, one must make a judgment.

It is the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Laird, and his immediate predecessor, Secretary Clifford, that a mixed force is required to maintain our strategic deterrence beyond the 1980's. And after careful consideration of the arguments for and against a mixed force, I am convinced this is a sound judgment. To do otherwise, would be to take unwarranted risk with our national security.

Let me now briefly address the second question. Given that the continued pursuance of a mixed force is a sound policy, should the bomber force be modernized for the post-1975 time period? Obviously, modernization of our strategic forces must be accomplished if we are to maintain a viable and effective deterrence in the face of continuing improvements in Soviet defenses. The B-52 force has been effective for a long time and by the time we could have a new bomber force, the B-52 will have been around for about 20 years. More importantly though, it will be based on a design that was initially laid out in the early 1950's. Technology advancements have been significant since the development of the B-52. In this regard one of the comments suggested was that we must show the Soviets are taking steps that would "end" the usefulness of the B-52 force before we could make the judgment that we needed to replace it. I am sure someone can come up with a cost-effectiveness study that will show just that. I would not believe it though. But I do believe we must modernize our strategic forces, and I fully recognize that it is going to cost a lot of money.

Certainly there are steps that can and must be taken, such as adding advanced bomber penetration aids and other improvements, to permit the B-52 to operate until we can replace it with a new bomber. There are, however, many characteristics, such as speed and payload, the B-52 lacks and a new bomber could possess by taking advantage of the advances in technology that have been recognized in the past 20 years. I personally believe that steps should be taken to modernize the bomber force so that we can provide for an effective strategic bomber force in the 1980's and beyond. As a result, we will have greater confidence that we won't have to depend entirely on the assurance provided by the missile force that our strategic deterrence will not fail.

Turning to the last question, why do we need to start development of AMSA at this time? Now let me make this clear—there is only one way that we can reduce the time to realize the deployment of a new bomber, that is to initiate the first step—start development of the aircraft. Now this does not imply that you have to make a procurement decision or deployment decision at this time, but what it says is that there are certain things that have to be accomplished before you can get to that decision and the accomplishment of these steps reduces the time required to realize an operational force.

The previous administration, as well as the current administration, recognized that the

time to take this initial step is in fiscal 1970. Both administrations proposed the initiation of design and development in fiscal 1970, the only difference being in the duration of competition for the development program. Secretary Laird proposed to reduce this competition based on the fact that over \$140 million has been devoted to competitive studies and advance development programs during the past few years. Incidentally, the currently proposed program will now allow the R&D to be accomplished for about \$350 million less than under the previous program.

The Department of Defense has examined and reexamined the manned bomber concept for several years. The technology to support the development of the advanced bomber concept resulting from these efforts is available today. As a matter of fact, the Congress has wisely provided funds so that we would be in the best position to make the decision we are facing today.

In summary, I feel the answers to the basic questions I have presented are clearly in favor of the initiation of the development of the AMSA at this time. In my judgment, we do need a mixed force. That bomber force should be modernized and the first step is to start an orderly development program now to provide for the option to deploy a new bomber in a timely manner.

We have reached the point where we should make a decision to initiate engineering development and eliminate further needless study. This action will provide us with a modern bomber force that will be needed to cope with the many challenges to the security of the free world in the post-1975 time period.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I have previously expressed my views on the proposed level of authorization for the advanced manned strategic aircraft during earlier debate on the defense authorization bill. On September 3, I stated:

The bill before us includes authorization of \$90.2 million for the Advanced Manned Strategic Bomber. The total costs of these bombers could run anywhere between \$8 and \$23 billion, depending upon the eventual unit costs of each plane and the number that are procured. We remain unconvinced of the need for this weapons system. Underlying the proposal is the assumption that we need a triple deterrent—bombers, land-based missiles, and sea-based missiles—to preserve our security against any possible nuclear strike. We believe this assumption should not go unexamined. There are serious doubts that in this age of missiles, bombers remain a necessary component of our strategic forces.

Even if one does conclude that bombers have some useful strategic role, questions remain about the need for a new bomber such as the AMSA. We have a present force of B-52s and B-58s, and are acquiring FB-111s. This current force is able to deliver enormous megatons of bombs upon targets in the Soviet Union even against their extensive air defense system. Why is it that these planes, when equipped with such technological innovations as SRAMS (Short Range Attack Missiles) and SCADS (Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy) cannot effectively perform any strategic mission of bombers against even greatly improved defenses?

Senator McGovern, along with Senators Goodell, Proxmire, and myself, are offering an amendment which would limit the funds authorized for the AMSA to \$20 million. In his speech on the floor of August 13, Senator McGovern outlined in great detail the questions and considerations which would justify withholding the full amount of the requested authorization. We are not proposing the immediate termination of the AMSA program; we are simply suggesting that full approval of

requested funds would begin the commitment to an expenditure of several billion dollars for a system which is likely to be strategically unnecessary and not required for the defense of our country.

Since that time, we have been able to study the answers to the questions that were submitted to Secretary Laird by us as cosponsors of this amendment. During the course of this present debate, Senator McGovern has made it abundantly clear that there is no sound justification for accelerating the AMSA program at this time. Issues have been raised regarding the need and urgency of this weapons system, and they have not been resolved.

I am convinced, therefore, that the most advisable course of action for us to take is that proposed by this amendment: maintain only the current level of funding for the AMSA of \$20 million, rather than substantially increase that amount as has been proposed. This amendment will allow for careful study to be undertaken regarding the need for this weapons system before we begin committing ourselves to a nearly irreversible expenditure possibly billions of dollars. I commend the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGovern) for the comprehensive and incisive analysis of this entire question which he has offered before this body.

AMSA—THE PRECISE ISSUE

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, the issue involved in our amendment has been outlined quite precisely over the past several days. As the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee (Mr. STENNIS) pointed out yesterday, the proponents of this amendment are not pressing for abandonment of the advanced manned strategic aircraft. Instead, and I quote the Senator from Mississippi:

The only difference between the committee and the proponents of the amendment is with reference to the rate of progress that we make during this fiscal year.

That is an exact description of our amendment. Last year the approved program for AMSA was \$25 million dollars. Before the recess the cosponsors of our proposal, Senators PROXMIRE, GOODELL, and HATFIELD and I sent Secretary of Defense Laird a series of questions on this issue and we asked specifically:

If Congress were to decide not to go forward with the planned program for fiscal 1970, what level of funding would preserve the option of moving ahead at a later date?

The Secretary responded:

The amendment proposes to reduce the AMSA funding for fiscal 1970 from \$100 million to \$20 million. In the event funds are not provided for the initiation of engineering development of the AMSA weapons system in fiscal 1970, the introduction of a new bomber into the inventory would be delayed by one year.

At most, therefore, we propose only that the program not be accelerated this year—by the expenditure of \$75 million more than the fiscal 1969 figure. The only negative result would be a 12-month delay in operational capability.

But the Secretary went on to say:

A level of expenditures of \$20 million per year would be sufficient to support studies and continue advanced development efforts—

Our amendment, therefore, would be fully adequate for those purposes—

but (it) would not reduce either the development lead time of this system or the time required to realize an operational capa-

bility. If we maintain this expenditure until the need becomes a reality (i.e., a discovered ineffectiveness in our strategic forces) we will still be about 7-8 years away from having the system in operationally significant numbers.

Mr. President, I stress, and it is important that all Senators recognize this fact, that the last sentence in the statement I have just quoted and I read it again: "If we maintain this expenditure until the need becomes a reality," is very clearly not what we propose to do. We are obviously not touching the fiscal 1971 authorization, the fiscal 1972 authorization, or any authorization but the one included in this bill. Our amendment would allow operational capability by 1978 instead of by 1977.

THE NEW BOMBER GAP PROBLEM

Now it has been argued quite strenuously, particularly in Secretary Laird's answers to our questions, that the AMSA development program placed before us this year is necessary because of the long lead times associated with this system—some 7 to 8 years—and because of the structural obsolescence of the B-52. In a sense it is argued that there might be a period of time in which we will not have a full bomber deterrent.

It should be clear that this is not an assertion that the Soviet Union will have something which we will not. As I have noted, their intercontinental bomber force is composed of some 150 aircraft.

Its primary components are the Bison and the Bear, and both are distinctly inferior to our B-52's. The Bear, in fact, is not even a jet. It is a turboprop with a top speed of 550 miles per hour.

In fact, the Armed Services Committee has eliminated three-fourths of the bomber defense funding authority requested in this bill on the grounds that the threat from Soviet bombers is not "sufficiently clear and imminent" to justify a full go-ahead on the air defense program. Citing the limited nature of the threat found by the national intelligence estimate, the committee also directed the Secretary of Defense to study the possibility of phasing down bomber defenses which already exist.

So obviously, if our Armed Services Committee, is very dramatically decreasing funds for the bomber defense programs, it is convinced that the Soviets have made a judgment not to go ahead with the construction of a significant number of new bombers.

There is apparently no danger that the Soviets will overtake us in this field—even if we stand absolutely still.

Instead, it is argued that there might be a gap in time at the beginning of the 1980's when our own bomber force will not be fully operational.

In response it is, of course, necessary first to consider the precise terms of our amendment. I emphasize again that we do not propose to kill the AMSA program for all time. The amendment deals with this year's funds. It will, at most, result in a delay of only 1 year in the time when AMSA could be operationally ready, moving it back to 1978.

I presume this means that the AMSA could have an initial operational capa-

bility by 1978, instead of by 1977 as made out in the Secretary's revised budget statement. The question on structural age, therefore, is whether the B-52 can be made to last until 1978 or a few years beyond, until the new bomber—if we decide we need it—could enter the force.

I must cite conflicting reports on how long the B-52 G's and H's can continue to operate. Most of the argument for AMSA is based on the contention that the B-52 is strategically obsolete rather than structurally unsound.

Mr. President, I would like to know how much time the proponents of the amendment have.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Nineteen minutes remain for the proponents.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I find no difference of opinion over the contention that the B-52 can last beyond 1980. In fact, again quoting from Secretary Laird's letter:

It is presently expected that the structural life of the newest model B-52's will last, under projected usage, until sometime in the early 1980's with appropriate modifications.

Moreover, the same letter tells us:

The B-52's will spend a large part of the time operating in a low altitude flight environment for which they were not initially designed, thereby increasing the possibility of structural problems.

This must refer to the B-52 C through F models still in operation, since it is my understanding that the later versions, the 255 G's and H's, were built to fly at low altitudes. But in any event it suggests one way in which the B-52 operational life could be extended still further—by simply reducing the amount of flying time. I cannot see, therefore, how the question of physical age has any direct relationship to our amendment.

Beyond this, I think it is important to look at the actual period of time in which it is feared that this new bomber gap might exist. Earlier in my remarks I noted that, in order to justify the need for any bomber force at all, we have to accept a whole series of untenable assumptions about the insufficiency of our ICBM's and SLBM's to provide a deterrent against attack. I suggested a long list of technological breakthroughs which the Soviet Union would have to achieve in order to degrade our deterrent.

To be concerned about a possible gap in our own bomber capabilities we have to add still another assumption to that list. We have to assume that they can not only destroy or intercept all or most of our ICBM's and SLBM's—plus improvements which could be made in those systems, including MIRV warheads—but that they can also accomplish this enormous technological feat by 1980, and that they can get all of those systems operational by that time.

Mr. President, they simply cannot do it. There is not a shred of evidence that they can.

Therefore, if there is any concern about a bomber gap, it should be completely dispelled by the fact that it will be meaningless even if it does come to pass.

THE B-70 EXPERIENCE

Mr. President, the amount of money involved in our amendment is comparatively modest. We are talking about roughly \$75 million.

I think most Senators would agree, however, that the principle we seek to establish is vitally important. We have had some experience to implant the lesson that we should study first and accelerate later on these costly weapons systems.

Earlier this year, prior to the vote on the Safeguard ABM system, several Senators made the trip to Dayton, Ohio, on a sort of pilgrimage, to look at one of the most prominent mistakes we have made in voting through military authorization and appropriations bills. They looked at the last remaining RS-70, now a museum piece.

The original XB-70, when first conceived in the 1950's, was supposed to be the ultimate in winged aerial warfare. Plans called for a fleet of 200, each capable of carrying hydrogen bombs anywhere in the world at speeds and altitudes beyond the reach of fighters then flying. The first made its maiden flight in April of 1964. Within 13 months it was flying at a speed of 2,000 miles per hour and at 70,000 feet in the air.

Two were built. The other was lost in June of 1966 when it collided with a jet escort plane. In January of this year the death notice was finally delivered for the first, when it was consigned to the air museum. Total cost was \$1.5 billion.

Mr. President, in this connection I think it is entirely pertinent to quote from the recommendations of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee in July of 1960, at the end of a 2-year investigation of the B-70 program.

The chairman of that subcommittee, Senator Lyndon Johnson, said in his letter of transmittal:

Our findings in substance conclude that the B-70 should be developed as a weapon system; that unless an operational supersonic bomber is developed now there will be no replacement for the B-52 at the time at which it enters its period of obsolescence (mid-1960's) and that experience has demonstrated that stretching out an essential military development program not only increases ultimate total costs but loses valuable time.

The recommendations of that report, which I have here, were that—

The Secretary of Defense, in realization that a mixed force will be required for some time to come, take such action as is necessary, within his area of responsibility, to provide this country with a manned bomber force embodying the latest "state of the art" developments and one capable of successfully performing the strategic strike mission.

Mr. President, how familiar those arguments sound. They are being made again today in connection with AMSA. Is there not a strong possibility that we may be heading down the same mistaken course?

The B-70 was canceled, after \$1.5 billion was spent, because it was concluded that surface-to-air missiles could intercept it. We decided then that a low-flying aircraft would be the proper configuration. We went through the TFX,

four squadrons of which are being acquired. But that was also unsatisfactory. Now the Air Force is back with another version, which will not be operational until the 1980's, when the environment will doubtless have changed again.

THE AMENDMENT

Mr. President, the simple principle for which we are contending is that we ought to satisfy ourselves that costly new weapons systems are necessary and appropriate—or at least that there is some perceivable chance that they are—before we accelerate them.

I do not expect today to convince a majority of the Senate that we will not need a manned bomber in the 1980's. But I submit that the proponents of this system have not yet convinced a majority that we will. I suggest, further, that the burden of satisfaction should be upon those who advocate that such expenditures be accelerated. This amendment will not block the new bomber; it will only prevent a new acceleration beyond our present research and development level.

That is what our amendment is about. Mr. President, I want to hold some time for the Senator from Missouri, who is on his way to the floor.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how much time remains for those in opposition to the amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Sixty-nine minutes remain to the opponents.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 15 minutes.

Let me point out, with all the emphasis I can, that virtually everyone who has spoken so far during this debate, on whatever subject, has emphasized that he favors research, that he is strongly for research in the field of weapons.

With great deference to our friend from South Dakota, I submit that the \$20 million that his amendment leaves in the bill, under the heading of research, does not, as a practical matter, add any meaning or does not add anything to the problem here that goes to getting the necessary research done with reference to the probability or possibility of such a bomber.

I say that because this part of it has been researched over and over and over again. This matter has been pending over there and has been postponed from year to year. As they have strongly represented to us, this is just a rerun of this paper matter. The research that we are talking about in this bill is getting beyond that paper work and will really have an additional meaning.

So I submit the real, live question here is, Are we going to continue constructive, effective, additional needed research on this project?

The new research we are talking about, Mr. President, fits hand in glove with the kind of research that has been done in past years on military planes, and particularly on bombers, that has overflowed so successfully, and with great profit, into civilian aviation. Every time a rider or passenger gets on a modern passenger plane, he reaps the benefits of long years of unending, highly successful and productive research and development that have been done on those

planes, starting with the B-17, and continuing through the B family. The B-47 was the first major jet. The B-52 was the one in the military field. Right along behind all that has been this tremendous advancement of our bombers and the ultramodern jet plane.

When we stop getting into this on these larger bombers, then we have the SST come in, and there we are carrying out a very special kind of research which requires Federal money to make it go.

So I think that I can assure every Senator that there is a profit, a benefit, and constructive fallout here in this money we are talking about, for the benefit of civilian research and development in the future.

Now, Mr. President, I wish to more formally address myself to this \$95.2 million in the bill that the committee approved.

I am sure everyone agrees that it is folly to take unnecessary risks with our defense posture. We must make decisions now which will give us adequate protection when and if the need arises. Paper studies and plans are useless in fighting a war. A strong posture decreases the likelihood of confrontation and, thus, aids in preventing war.

Since we must not overlook the current Soviet development and deployment of new military systems at a very rapid rate, I believe that these critics who urge further major cuts in and elimination of major programs from this bill are advocating a very dangerous course—a course which could be counterproductive. History is replete with examples proving that it is not an arms race, but the loss of an arms race, which triggers wars. Under such circumstances, and in the absence of a credible defense posture on the part of his adversary, the prospects of success becomes too inviting for a would-be aggressor to resist. This is a fact of life which should be clearly recognized.

As I have said, the McGovern amendment would reduce the fiscal year 1970 authorization for the new big bomber, or AMSA, to \$20 million. With the \$5 million left over from fiscal year 1969, this would provide 1970 funding of \$25 million, an amount sufficient only for the continuation of more paper and advance design studies. More such studies are absolutely unnecessary, since the operational concept and the design and performance specification has been refined, defined, and reexamined by the Air Force and the Department of Defense in depth on numerous occasions since 1964. There is no reason whatsoever to repeat this process.

Each year since fiscal year 1965 the Air Force has sought approval of weapon systems engineering development for AMSA. It has been supported in this by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Congress itself historically has supported AMSA development and, in fact, has appropriated funds each year specifically for AMSA development. When Secretary Laird revised the fiscal year 1970 budget, an additional \$23 million was included in the AMSA request to shorten the competitive design phase and to initiate full-scale engineering development, if that was the will of Congress. His reasoning

was that adequate paper and design studies have already been conducted. He has stated that this revised approach would permit: First, a reduction of the R.D.T. & E. cost by about \$350 million as the result of shortening the competitive design phase; and second, an earlier procurement decision and advancement of the initial operational capability if necessary and if the decision is made to go into production and deployment.

Let me emphasize that the AMSA program approved by the committee is designed to create and maintain a production option and that it is not a production decision.

Yesterday, I read from page 9 of the report, which unmistakably and fully cuts off the funds at this research level, and does not permit entering into the production at all, not even to the extent of a prototype. I read that key sentence from the committee report once more:

The decision on production and deployment of AMSA is not a matter for consideration at this time and as stated above, there are no procurement funds in the authorization bill.

The program, if followed, will reduce the time required to achieve an initial operational capability. Should it be decided later to move into production, the postponement of adequate funds to initiate the required engineering development as proposed by the McGovern amendment increases the risk that the United States will not be in a position to produce and deploy a new bomber when necessary.

We are still talking about that time here, of 1977 or that area. For many years I have supported the development and deployment of such an aircraft for many reasons, some of which are now outlined.

Mr. President, we are very proud of our successful ICBM. We are very proud of Polaris. But as year follows year, I have decided that even though we do have continuing wars, the great probability is that those nuclear weapons will never be intentionally fired. There might be an accidental or unintentional firing, but I believe, as time goes on, it is more and more remote that mankind will ever resort, on a massive scale, to that weaponry.

At the same time, it is very apparent, in the present wars and threats of wars that we have been having the last 10 years—and we are in one now—that we are not going to be living in a millennium; we are going to have strife and turmoil, conflicts of interest, and conflicts between nations.

Here is a weapon that does not have to reach the point of ultimate and final decision after it has been started into operation. It can be called back; and I believe right there is a very vital point in the thinking of humanity, and in our planning for our effective defense.

If the conditions should exist which seemed to indicate we were going to have to defend with ICBM's, if we have sufficient bombers, with effective range, capability, and capacity, we could put them in motion, and there would be relatively a great deal more time to explore and make that final decision. I think the fact that

we had them would be a very powerful factor in our own thinking as well as that of an adversary.

Another thing that I shall not enlarge upon, though I know it is a part of the picture and I think it ought to be mentioned: No one knows to what extent our ICBM's will operate.

It is believed they will operate effectively, or a great percentage of them will; but that is an unknown quantity. The same is true as to the Polaris, and as to the Soviet ICBM's. That is just not a field of exact science. No one knows what would be the situation should they be called on.

But here is a weapon, a manned weapon with this additional capability of the power to think, which can be called back, can be put into maneuver, can be put on alert, and it can be moved closer to the trouble spot in advance, with all the advantages that go with all these different kinds of choices; and I simply do not believe, yet, in totally abandoning to computers and to science all the choices of human reasoning that go into the making of decisions. That is why I have thought all the time that we should not let time run out on us with reference to having some big bombers. We are almost letting that time run out. We have more advanced models, our B-52's, which have been highly successful weapons, as were their predecessors; but they have been used up, so to speak, in this war. Perhaps some of them were used in raids that may have proved useless, and this weapon might have been overused, but nevertheless, they are burning up, being consumed, and wearing out; and in the course of these intervening years from now until 1977, they will become a thing of the past.

So I think time has already been running. We have been burning daylight. We have delayed longer than we should have. Others have shared that belief. Virtually all the members of the committee shared it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 2 additional minutes.

That is why we are here, as a hedge against the future, as an additional option to be at our command should we need it. We have put this money in the bill, which will be the final figure for this major preliminary research.

Most of you are aware of the fact that I am not a newcomer to the ranks of those who believe that the orderly development of a new long-range strategic bomber is very much in our national interest. For many years I have supported the development and deployment of such an aircraft for many reasons, some of which I will discuss later.

At this point, however, I would like to remind the Senate that last year the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, which I chair, conducted an exhaustive and detailed study into the status of our strategic power vis-a-vis that of the Soviet Union and held extensive hearings on the subject. On September 27, 1968, we issued an extensive report and, among other things, we said:

We feel that the prompt development and deployment of a new long-range advanced manned strategic bomber is essential to assure that we retain this flexibility into the late 1970's and 1980's when the aging B-52's and the interim FB-111's may be incapable of coping with the sophisticated defense environment which is expected during that time period.

This conclusion was subscribed to by seven members of the subcommittee including in addition to myself, Senators JACKSON, CANNON, BYRD of West Virginia, SMITH, THURMOND, and MILLER. Only Senator SYMINGTON declined to join in this recommendation.

Having said that, I emphasize again that the pending bill does not go nearly as far as the subcommittee recommended. The approval of research and development funds for fiscal year 1970 and the authorization for engineering development will not in any way commit us to procurement or deployment. There will be a number of significant measurable milestones in the program, and each year we will be in a position to assess its progress and make a decision as to whether it should continue as planned. I do believe, however, that it is very important that we get the program off the ground to the extent proposed by Secretary Laird.

Now, what is the requirement for AMSA? In other words, why do we need it?

AMSA is intended to replace our aging force of B-52's with a bomber possessing superior survivability, effectiveness, and capability. The advances in airframe, engine technology, and avionics during the past few years will greatly improve the capability of the AMSA to survive and penetrate to enemy targets in all types of war, both nuclear and nonnuclear.

The requirement for AMSA is based upon our concept of maintaining a mixed force of bombers and missiles in order to insure that our strategic deterrent capability during the foreseeable future will truly be credible. An important aspect of our strategic posture and deterrent capability has to do with our ability to withstand any attempt at a disarming first strike by the Soviets. To this end, it is essential that we maintain a deterrent posture with a mix of all three elements of our strategic forces—bombers, land-based missiles, and sea-based missiles.

Such a mix provides the best assurance that the Soviet will not be able to render our strategic forces ineffective by technological advances or breakthroughs in one or more areas. A mix of bombers and missiles burdens the Soviets' defenses and resources. They must defend against both bombers and missiles. If they do not "balance" their defenses, we will be able to use bombers to attack targets defended against warheads from missiles and vice versa. Thus a mix of forces on our part compels the Soviets to spend considerably more to get the same level of defense.

Our missile and bomber forces complement each other in providing us both with effective deterrent forces and a war-fighting capability against a broad

range of possible conflict situations, nuclear or nonnuclear. This mixed force provides assurance that a technological breakthrough on the part of the enemy against any one element of our deterrent would comprise only a part of our forces. For example, bombers and land-based missiles provide assurance against an enemy breakthrough in antisubmarine warfare which would threaten our sea-based missiles. Sea-based missiles and land-based missiles provide assurance against an enemy breakthrough negating our warning systems which would make our manned bomber force vulnerable. Bombers and sea-based missiles provide assurance against an enemy breakthrough in yield/accuracy which would threaten our land-based ICBM's.

The AMSA requirement is based upon the mixed force concept and on studies and expert military and civilian judgment which establish that such a mixed force of bombers and missiles is necessary in order to assure our strategic deterrent capability during the late 1970's and 1980's. For operational reasons it is imperative that we continue a mixed force to provide us with the required deterrent and, importantly, in the event deterrence fails, the capability to respond against a broad range of possible conflict situations.

There are many other requirements for a long-range manned bomber which, in my opinion, justify the decision to initiate full-scale engineering development. For example, the requirement for selective response and precision delivery may exist in a nuclear conflict where constraints preclude the commitment of our missile forces. We all know that large high performance bombers can provide effective augmentation of our general purpose forces in nonnuclear conflicts. For example, the contribution of our B-52's in South Vietnam has been of tremendous value. With the aging and growing obsolescence of the B-52's, modernization of our bomber forces is essential if our strategic forces are to remain a credible deterrent to an enemy who continues to devote a large portion of his total resources to both offensive and defensive weapon systems. Initiation of the development of AMSA will place us in a better position to modernize our aging bomber forces in order to maintain our deterrent posture.

Let me point out that, if the development of AMSA is initiated as proposed, the very earliest that we could have initial operational capability would be fiscal year 1977 and a few years later before we could have a full force. At that time the B-52's would be 17 to 20 years old. The suggestion has been made that we can continue a credible bomber threat by additional modifications and replacements of the structures of the B-52's. However, the latest model B-52, the "H" model, represents about the maximum growth obtainable within the basic B-52 design. While we would be able to use new weapons and penetration aids on the B-52 against an enhanced threat, we have now reached the point where the sounder investment is to acquire a new bomber rather than to keep modifying the old.

Further, improvements necessary to provide for B-52's self-sufficiency and for wide dispersal to improve prelaunch survivability involves large costs and excessive fleet downtime. Equally important, we still cannot predict as well as we would like how aircraft structure will respond to long usage. The problem here is that by the time we detect structural fatigue, it may be too late to acquire replacement aircraft on a timely basis. We do know that as age increases so does the risk of incurring modification costs, and at some point in time the cost of modifying and beefing up the B-52's will become prohibitive. The entire problem is compounded by large uncertainties in the magnitude of the cost that may be required to keep the old B-52's operable.

I believe that we are now ready to move forward with AMSA. The Air Force has studied extensively the requirements for an advanced bomber as a replacement for the B-52 in the post-1975 time period. The operational concept and the design and performance specifications have been refined and reexamined in depth on numerous occasions. The AMSA characteristics that have evolved satisfy the objectives for a modern and sophisticated bomber force. These include: First, prelaunch survivability through wide dispersal and quick reaction capability; second, ability to be withheld from immediate execution through the capability to operate from austere landing sites; third, aircraft characteristics—reduced infrared signature and radar cross section—to increase penetration capability; fourth, large payload capacity to accommodate a wide variety of penetration aids and weapons; fifth, speed and altitude versatility to provide a broad range of operational tactics in the fact of future threat uncertainties sixth, long useful operational life; and seventh, high utility across the spectrum of conflict.

The approach recommended by the committee would reduce the production and deployment leadtime for AMSA by 1 year. The level of expenditure and the approach proposed by the McGovern amendment would delay it by at least a year, and we will still be 8 to 9 years away from the capability of having a new bomber in operationally significant numbers. In that case, we would have two equally unattractive alternatives: First, attempt to adapt "off-the-shelf" systems to fill the gap; or second, accept the risk that our reduced effectiveness will continue to be a credible deterrent.

In conclusion, I point out that during the past several years, our development and production of new strategic weapons systems has been deemphasized partly on the basis of hope for reciprocal and comparable Soviet action. Instead the Soviets have accelerated significantly the buildup of their strategic weapon delivery capability during the past 3 years to the extent that their ICBM forces are currently about equal in number and collectively much greater in total megatonnage of warheads. Intelligence estimates are that they will continue to modernize and expand their forces.

I believe, therefore, that we must take the necessary steps to modernize both our strategic offensive and defensive

forces. Initiation of full scale engineering development of a new strategic bomber is one of the actions which I believe is important to maintain our strategic deterrent.

Before concluding I should say a word about the question of AMSA costs. Any estimate of costs at this time is but an educated guess because it is made without the benefit of a firm contractor proposal, and without any decision upon the number of production aircraft to be procured. Assertions have been made that AMSA would cost about \$50 million per aircraft, which is about twice as high as the Air Force is estimating. I can say that there is absolutely no validity to this \$50 million figure unless there is included, not only the investment cost, but R.D.T. & E. costs and the cost of 10 years of operation. This, of course, will involve an expenditure of funds over about 18 years.

Since the adoption of the McGovern amendment would entirely nullify the purpose of the recommendation of the Committee on Armed Services and would result only in further unneeded, unnecessary, and useless paper studies, I sincerely hope that it will be defeated. I believe that the further postponement of adequate funds to initiate the required engineering development program is not in our national interest and increases the risk that we will not be in a position to produce and deploy a new bomber if and when it should become necessary. I urge that you vote against the amendment.

I do not see how anyone could have much serious objection to this. Next year is when we will make the final decision, the real decision, as to whether we will go further with this weapon. If things look then as they do now, I am certain that my opinion will be as it is now. Anyway, it will be a new start and a new day. And everyone will have the chance at that time to make his decision. In the meantime, this relatively small amount of money that is being spent on research in this field will by no mean be thrown away or lost or wasted. We just cannot call it a loss or a waste when it contributes so much, as it has done in past years, to our civilian aviation.

Mr. President, how much time remains?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Fifty-two minutes remain to the opponents.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose time?

Mr. JACKSON. I ask unanimous consent that the time be divided equally between both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the senior Senator from Missouri.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, in a way it is with a feeling of sadness that I rise to support the amendment currently offered by the able Senator from South Dakota.

For many years it was my privilege to have worked with and for the Air Force; and the formative years of that great service, with which I was somewhat involved, were perhaps the most pleasant and rewarding years of my life.

But one has to call them as one sees them, else there is no true satisfaction in this work; and I believe the time has come to recognize, based on these serious—to the point of being critical—financial problems which are now faced by the United States, that if we are to continue as the world's greatest nation, we must use the same type and character of discrimination in the choosing of our weapons systems as we do when considering all other requests for Federal funds.

That is not a new position on my part, because for some years there has been developing in the back of my mind the thought that we were substituting "bigness" for effectiveness in new weaponry; and this at some sacrifice to full recognition of the new technologies which have become known to us in this nuclear space age. It was for this reason that I opposed the last suggested big bomber, the B-70, in which latter case the cost of 150 planes would have been between \$8 and \$10 billion; and each and every one of them could have been shot down in flight by a missile which in turn could cost less than 1 percent of the cost of the plane.

How many people realize that no B-52, except possibly through error, has flown over North Vietnam? We had testimony that possibly 50 percent of all the B-52's on one raid would be lost as they made their bombing run; and one who had great expertise on this subject said later, "It would probably be more."

The negative answer to these large and relatively very slow proposed new weapons can be summed up in one word—missiles.

Let us not forget that the Sam-2's which the Soviets have given the North Vietnamese are relatively obsolescent; and remember that if in the future a new big bomber attempted to penetrate the territory of a hostile aggressor, it would be certain to run into various forms of missileery which would make the Sam-2 look like a model T.

When it comes to new weaponry, therefore, I am certain in my own mind that "bigness" no longer automatically connotes "betterness."

The Soviet Union obviously now recognizes that fact. They have never laid down a single carrier, even though that country is now the second strongest naval power in the world; but today it is a fact that they have a great number of smaller surface ships; also hun-

dreds more attack submarines than does the United States.

The Soviets also have thousands more modern fighter planes than do we; but they have not built any modern long-range bombers for a number of years. In other words, they have never adopted the concept of the big combat ship; and, in effect, have abandoned the concept of the big combat plane.

The reasons would now appear clear. Except for their recognition of the importance of air superiority fighters and small fighter bombers—the latter now reinforced in range by the standardized art of refueling—the Soviets are putting their money on missiles: ground to air, ground to ground, air to ground, which means ground to sea, sea to sea, and air to sea.

It would appear they have abandoned bigness in favor of modernity and mobility.

They know, as does the rest of the world, that the Israel destroyer *Eilat* was first crippled and then sunk by missiles which came from what was hardly more than a big motorboat.

At the same time, the Soviets have built 18 new fighter plane models since 1954. We have not built one.

These are but a few of the thoughts which run through my mind as so many other pressing problems increase the demands on our limited resources.

Actually, if it was determined that we still need large long-range planes to be utilized as missile-launching platform, it would be equally effective, and many billions of dollars less expensive, to build more of the latest model B-52's; and then use them as perhaps the Soviets would use the relatively old medium-range bombers which they now have stationed in the Mediterranean area—that is, for air-to-ground or air-to-sea missile attack.

If we are to maintain the integrity of the dollar, on which depends not only our future prosperity and well-being, but also our security, it is becoming ever more clear that we should utilize all possible discrimination in the choice of new weapons systems.

We must be careful to put up the tens of billions of dollars required for what we do need. But let us be equally careful not to put up tens of billions of dollars for anything we do not need.

I have read the remarks of the able Senator from South Dakota; and although I do not agree with everything he says, I do believe that in the main it is the cogent and well-reasoned argument of an able, courageous, and experienced bomber pilot, whose outstanding record in air battle speaks for itself.

It is for these reasons, Mr. President, that I shall support the amendment in question.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I should like to add a word of commendation to the Senator from Missouri. I think every Member of the Senate recognizes that the Senator speaks with special force on the matter of bomber strategy, on the issue that is before us.

I think I can appreciate the feeling that is in his mind, as a former Secre-

tary of the Air Force, and one thoroughly conversant with the arguments pro and con on this issue, when he says he speaks with some sadness in urging that we not accelerate plans at this time for another advanced manned bomber. His judgment on that was right at an earlier time, when he stood up against the RS-70 a plane that we built at a cost of some \$1.5 billion, which has never been put into service and now has no useful purpose.

So I think that the points of the Senator from Missouri are extremely well taken, and I am tremendously encouraged and fortified in my own views on this issue by his support.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the senior Senator from Maine.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, I will be very brief, but there are some matters relating to AMSA, the follow-on bomber, that must be said.

I believe this item is very high on the list of priorities in the research and development portion of the bill. It is very high indeed when we consider that the Congress has unsuccessfully pressed the Defense Department to proceed with development of a follow-on bomber to the aging fleet of B-52's. Since 1965 the congressional appropriation has exceeded the budget request except for fiscal year 1969.

In fiscal year 1965 the Department of Defense requested \$5 million and the Congress appropriated \$52 million. In fiscal year 1966 the Department request was \$15 million and the Congress appropriated \$22 million. In fiscal year 1967 the request of \$11.8 million was doubled by the Congress and we appropriated \$22.8 million. In fiscal year 1968 the amount requested was \$26 million and the Congress appropriated \$47 million.

Mr. President, I will not dwell on the past. It is the future that concerns me and that should be the concern of everyone. Those of us who are charged with the responsibility of scrutinizing our defense needs have long recommended development of a follow-on bomber to continue to provide credence to our strategic deterrence.

Today the Nation remains strong with our land- and sea-based missiles and our modified B-52's. But I must emphasize that these aging aircraft will see our strategic deterrence deteriorating at a rapid pace in the immediate years ahead.

Mr. President, there are no funds in this authorization bill for procurement, nor would its approval in any way commit our Government to the production of this aircraft. The funds in the bill are for vitally needed research and development which will be used to continue the competitive design phase. A decision at this time to approve the research does not represent a decision to deploy.

I will make my position clear. I strongly endorse a military posture that preserves our options.

During this debate, doubts have been expressed on the reliability of our mis-

sile forces. This would add support to my view that we must have absolute reliance on our retaliatory capability.

I am not suggesting that there be a tradeoff of missiles for bombers. In my view these forces are complementary. A technological breakthrough by the enemy against any element of our force would not eliminate nor neutralize our entire force.

I do not hold with the theory of placing all our eggs in one basket.

I favor talks on arms limitation with the Soviets. But I would hope that such talks would be meaningful and productive. An AMSA in our gun holster would provide a position of strength that the Soviets understand.

I think it imperative that we move promptly with this vital research and development on the AMSA program.

We are all understandably weary with the subject of arms and weapons, but we cannot deny that in the world of tomorrow much depends on the precautions we take today.

By approving this item in the bill we preserve not only the options for the future, we preserve also our own integrity and credibility. It is we in the Congress who have pressed for the development of the follow-on bomber for 5 years. Now that the executive branch has agreed to our often voiced recommendations—the least we can do is add our support.

The studies have been completed. The demonstration programs for the engines and electronic equipment have been successfully completed. All of the preliminary work has been completed.

Now the proposed amendment would reduce the AMSA funding for fiscal year 1970 from \$95 million to \$20 million, a savings of \$75 million in the name of economy. The \$20 million would supposedly be used to proceed slowly, while we study the problem some more.

The AMSA program obviously does not need any more "studying." In fact, the Congress has spent a very large sum of money—over \$140 million for these studies and development.

Therefore, I submit we have reached the time where we must decide whether to fish or cut bait.

We have reached the point where we will get very little in return for any further moneys spent for studies or for preliminary development.

The proposed amendment does not so much save \$80 million as it recommends wasting \$20 million for studies not required.

The amendment, therefore, does not address the central issue of whether we should, or should not, proceed with the orderly development of the AMSA or forget the whole thing.

It would be far more direct for those who oppose the AMSA and feel it is a waste of funds to propose deleting all funding for the AMSA instead of spending another \$20 million to study something which has, if anything, been over-studied. This would be a far truer test of opposition to AMSA by those who do not believe in it than the amendment before us.

Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from South Dakota has performed outstanding service to the Nation and the Congress. His scholarly presentation reflects painstaking research and a thorough understanding of his subject matter. I would like to take this opportunity to commend Senator MCGOVERN for his enlightening presentation.

But, Mr. President, I must continue to support this program. I believe that a modern manned bomber represents the "clincher" for our future deterrent posture.

I firmly believe that our B-52 strategic bomber force was the principle instrument of peace in our time. I think the generation of the next decade should have a deterrent in their time that has a reliability our ICBM's may not have.

Finally, Mr. President I will make a further observation. The tasks on strategic arms limitation have been heralded for months as the panacea for reducing the Defense budget. It has been urged that we are on the threshold of an agreement with the Soviets which would see the end of costly weapons systems.

Mr. President, it is my understanding that our Government informed the Soviets that we were prepared to begin the strategic arms limitation talks between August 1-15 of this year. It is also my understanding that the Kremlin remained silent.

I know that President Nixon's efforts in this field are sincere and I think also that it is his earnest hope that meaningful agreement can be reached. But, Mr. President, without demonstrable action on the part of the Soviets we have no choice but to remain steadfast in maintaining the security of this Nation.

The decision lies with the leaders of the Kremlin who have not even bothered to acknowledge the overtures of President Nixon which were made in June of this year.

I will vote against this amendment and I urge my colleagues to join me in its rejection.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mrs. SMITH. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I wish to commend the able senior Senator from Maine for making such a well-reasoned and well-balanced presentation of this weapons system. I know that over the years she has made it her business to follow very closely the research and development for follow-on aircraft. Her presentation today is one of the finest made on this subject.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, I would like to express my appreciation to the distinguished Senator from Washington, my colleague on the Committee on Armed Services, and say that it has been my association with such people as Senator JACKSON; Senator STENNIS, the chairman; Senator RUSSELL, and others that I have been able to come up with such thinking.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRANSTON in the chair). The Senator is recognized.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank

the Senator for the very fine speech she made. She always has something constructive; she never fails to have a fine suggestion as well as a challenge to our thought. This is another illustration of the very earnest consideration and high obligation she has toward her duty. I thank her for the committee as well as for myself.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for 10 minutes?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I wish to speak in opposition to the pending amendment which would reduce the funding for a new manned bomber—the AMSA—in the fiscal year 1970 Department of Defense authorization bill from \$95 million to \$20 million.

My opposition to this amendment stems from five principal factors:

First. In designing a second strike nuclear force, there are convincing reasons for making it a substantial mixture of vehicles of several different types: land as well as sea based, manned as well as unmanned. Bombers, land-based missiles and sea-based missiles have differing limitations, are subject to distinctive uncertainties, require varied modes of attack, and, if each type is protected, complicate the problems for any enemy attack. This mixture offers the best hope of discouraging and deterring Soviet assault. It also provides the best assurance that the Soviets will be unable to negate the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent by technological breakthroughs and advances in one or more fields. Furthermore, a mixture of bombers and missiles compounds the adversary's defense problems, making him spend much more to get a given level of defense and causing him to divert substantial resources that might otherwise be spent on more offensive capability.

In short, to rely on a single strategic system—missiles or bombers—is a dangerously high-risk approach to deterrence. I, for one, intend to do what I can to see that Congress does not take the country down that garden path.

Second. For the foreseeable future the manned aircraft is the most versatile weapon system for delivering munitions. High performance bombers have many important uses for a wide variety of conflict situations, both nuclear and non-nuclear:

They can provide a capability for selective response and precision delivery where political or other constraints preclude committing our missile forces.

They can be recovered and reconstituted and used to hit additional targets detected by our assessments and surveillance systems or to hit targets not struck initially.

They can be used as a tool of crisis management and launched as a show of force to evidence our determination at a time of international tension. In the Cuban crisis, for example, we placed a significant number of bombers in the air as a "show of firmness;" and

They can be used to augment our general purpose forces in conventional conflicts.

It would not make sense to deny this

country—in the post-1975 time period—the flexibility inherent in high performance manned bombers.

Third. The hard fact is that changing adversary forces and technologies have resulted in the danger of destruction of our bombers. The improvements in Soviet capabilities—especially sea-launched ballistic missiles and FOBS—have progressively reduced the warning time for launching our bomber forces. We have responded by a dispersal of the alert B-52 bomber force. But what is further needed, and what is one of the chief design objectives of the AMSA, is to increase the chances of pre-launch survivability through very wide dispersal to austere landing bases and very quick reaction capability. This objective is being sought in two ways. First, the new system's takeoff and landing characteristics will allow dispersal to a very large number of airfields throughout the country, further complicating the targeting problem of an attacker. Second, the plane will be designed so that it can be a safe distance away from the base within the very few minutes available.

Fourth. The Soviets continue to make significant improvements in their manned aircraft defense systems. Looking ahead, therefore, we need to take full advantage of advanced aircraft design and advanced penetration aids to assure that we could reach the targets in the post-1975 period. This, too, is one of the main objectives of the AMSA. Its design features include speed, versatility at high and low altitude, smaller radar and infrared signatures, and the capacity to penetrate at low altitudes thereby reducing detectability by ground radars and also making easier the problem of designing penetration aids. The larger payload capacity of the AMSA should make room for a wide variety of penetration aids and weapons, including many missiles such as the short-range attack missile—SRAM—and the subsonic cruise armed decoy—SCAD.

Fifth. The suggested AMSA program has been thoroughly reviewed by the Department of Defense and is recommended by the Secretary of Defense and the President. The Armed Services Committee has again looked into it this year and a great majority of the committee believe we should proceed with it on the basis proposed.

The program does not involve a commitment for production or procurement of a new bomber force on the part of the Government: it maintains a production option and it would keep the program moving steadily ahead.

The recommended program recognizes a basic problem in lead times. The leadtime to develop and produce a new manned bomber is about 8 years. The leadtime for intelligence on the specific threat is about 3 or 4 years. It follows that once a specific threat is known there is no way to develop a new bomber system in time to meet it. Therefore, we have to make the best guess we can as to what the threat will be and get ourselves into a position to tailor the system to the threat as it emerges.

Under the proposed program the basic plane would be configured and the avionics options available in time to adapt

the production of the plane to the threat as we see it about 3 years from now. This is the fundamental reason why we need to initiate engineering development of the new system at this time, while not yet making a production commitment.

In the event the pending amendment were adopted—in effect striking out of the bill the funds for the initiation of engineering development of the AMSA weapon system in fiscal 1970—the introduction of an advanced bomber into the operational inventory, if we later decide we must have it, would be delayed by at least 1 year.

Given our dangerous and unpredictable world situation and given the unabated Soviet advances in nuclear offensive and defensive systems, I see no point in taking the unnecessary risk involved in the pending amendment. I shall vote against it.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I certainly thank the distinguished Senator from Washington for his remarks. They are so pertinent, so conclusive, and so logical.

The Senator from Washington, as always, is thorough. He has done a lot of splendid work on this bill in all its phases.

Mr. JACKSON. I thank the able Senator from Mississippi for his kind comments.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Nevada.

Mr. CANNON. I thank the distinguished Senator for yielding to me.

Mr. President, on August 11, Senator GOLDWATER filed a detailed response to the Hatfield committee report on the ASMA bomber program. On September 3, Senator HATFIELD responded to Senator GOLDWATER's comments. The distinguished Senator from Arizona is away at this time and has asked that I present his comments on the response to Senator HATFIELD's committee. I ask that this point be made a part of the RECORD at this point, on behalf of the Senator from Arizona.

There being no objection, the comments were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMMENTS ON THE SENATOR HATFIELD RESPONSE TO SENATOR GOLDWATER'S PAPER ON THE REPORT ON MILITARY SPENDING

(1) It is agreed that it is quite difficult to understand why the figure 263 is used. As pointed out previously the number the Air Force has planned for order is not 263, nor has the number 263 been used by the Air Force in making program cost estimates.

(2) It is entirely possible that the Soviet Union could achieve by the mid-1970s a capability to reduce in a surprise attack, our surviving strategic offensive forces below the minimum level required for "Assured Destruction", and thus gravely weaken our deterrent. The overall strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union is much too close to run that risk.

An important aspect of our strategic pos-

ture has to do with our ability to withstand any attempt at a disarming first strike by the Soviets. To this end it is essential that we maintain a deterrent posture with a mix of all three elements of our strategic force—bombers, land-based missiles and sea-based missiles.

Such a mix provides the best assurance that the Soviets will not be able to negate the effectiveness of our strategic forces by technological advances in one or more areas. The presence of one force element tends to fortify the viability of another, thereby strengthening the credibility of our total deterrent posture. The survival of bombers is insensitive to improved Soviet missile accuracy and Soviet anti-ballistic missile capabilities. For example, if and when Soviet missiles should have very low CEPs, our land-based missiles would be more vulnerable than at present. In this situation our bombers, along with sea-based missiles, would provide assurance against a crippling Soviet first strike. Should the Soviets make a breakthrough in antisubmarine warfare, our sea-based systems would be affected. Bombers and land-based missiles would provide protection against the consequences of a breakthrough in this area. Bomber survival, in turn, is dependent on adequate warning time of incoming Soviet missiles and its ability to penetrate enemy air defenses; thus land-based and sea-based missiles provide assurance in the event the Soviets find ways of negating our warning systems or offsetting the penetration capability of our bombers.

For operational reasons it is imperative that we continue a mixed force to provide us with an effective deterrent and importantly, in the event deterrence fails, the capability to respond across a broad range of possible conflict situations. We cannot preclude the possibility that the Soviets in the next few years may devise some weapon, technique or tactic which could critically increase the vulnerability of one or two of the elements of our strategic force. We cannot rule out the possibility that degradation of our ICBMs and SLBMs could occur within a time period (e.g., 2 or 3 years) in which it would be difficult for us to respond due to inadequate lead time. Moreover, from the standpoint of Soviet defenses, the ICBMs and SLBMs present similar problems. Hence, it is likely that a defense that will degrade one missile system will also be effective against the other. This is yet another reason why it is to our advantage to continue to modernize the bomber force which presents a dissimilar, and in many ways a more demanding, problem to the Soviet defenses.

To arrive at a single system (missiles or bombers) for our strategic deterrent is a high-risk approach and in view of the consequences is not an approach consistent with our national security objectives.

All indications today are that the Soviets are working to negate our missile capability with an ABM defense and improvements in missile accuracy. The Soviets are continuing to make great improvements in their air defense capability. We will undoubtedly continue to use bombers in conventional conflicts to augment the capabilities of our general purpose forces. And finally, we have reached the point where it is more prudent to acquire a new bomber rather than to keep modifying the old force. In short, bombers are and will continue to be an important element of our strategic forces because they effectively contribute to our country's nuclear deterrent and provide unique capabilities at lesser levels of conflict. These factors are developed more fully in subsequent comments.

(3) The development of advanced penetration aids will certainly enhance the capability of existing bombers to penetrate area defenses and permit standoff weapon delivery against terminal defenses when necessary. However, the ability of bombers to penetrate air defenses is a function of both

aircraft characteristics and the quality of penetration aids carried on the bomber. Experience indicates that both carefully designed aircraft characteristics and carefully designed penaid qualities are required. The AMSA will incorporate basic design characteristics that will provide significant penetration survival improvement over current bombers. These design features include reduced radar cross section and infrared signatures, speed versatility at high and low altitude, and the capability to penetrate at lower altitudes. These characteristics not only improve the basic aircraft penetrability, but also make the problem of designing penaids less difficult. The AMSA with its higher speed would be exposed to the defenses for a shorter time; for a given level of protection its ECM requirements are less than the B-52 because of smaller radar signature; and its lower penetration altitude reduces detectability by ground radars. In addition, as defenses improve, a greater portion of the bomber's effective payload must be devoted to advanced penetration aids to enhance effectiveness. The larger payload capacity of the AMSA will accommodate a wide variety of penetration aids and weapons which means more targets killed per aircraft for any given level of defense.

(4) A mix of bombers and missiles does task the Soviets' defenses; they must defend all targets against both bombers and missiles. If they did not "balance" their defenses, we could use bombers to attack targets defended against warheads from missiles, and vice versa. Thus a mix of forces on our part makes the Soviet spend considerably more to get a certain level of defense. Alternatively, for a given Soviet expenditure on defense, we do not need as many forces to do the job as if all our forces were either bombers or missiles. Funds we devote to bombers rather than to missile offense or defense, also insure against gross failure of our missile systems.

Additionally, there are many uses for the bomber force other than the real and extensive diversion of Soviet funds into air defenses. High performance bombers can provide a capability for selective response and precision delivery where constraints preclude commitment of our missile forces. Bombers can be recovered and reconstituted and used to strike additional targets. Bombers can also provide effective augmentation of our general purpose forces in non-nuclear conflicts (e.g., B-52s in South Vietnam).

It should be recognized that in a general war, there would be targets other than those in the Soviet Union (such as satellite countries) which might have to be attacked with nuclear weapons. Tactical fighter aircraft are ideally suited to strike these other targets because their range/payload capability is compatible with target distance. The tactical fighter aircraft do not meet the range/payload requirements for a true intercontinental bomber such as the B-52.

With respect to the B-52 force there is of course the question of how long they can be made to last through continuing modifications. Physical age becomes a problem to the extent that deterioration does occur in the structure, wiring, cables, engine performance, etc. and continuous modifications are required. It is presently expected that the structural life of the newest model B-52s will last, under projected usage, until sometime in the early 1980's with appropriate modifications. However, the extension achieved by these modifications is a calculated estimate based on, for example, such factors as the impact of vibration during taxi on structural fatigue. Thus the service life of the B-52 force has significant uncertainty.

We cannot predict, as well as we would like, how aircraft structure will respond to usage. The B-52s will spend a large part of the time operating in a low altitude flight

environment for which they were not initially designed, thereby increasing the possibility of structural problems. If and when we detect a major structural fatigue in the B-52 force, it may be too late to produce a timely replacement aircraft. This problem is compounded by large uncertainties in the magnitude of the costs that may be required to keep old systems viable. We do know, however, that as age increases so does the risk of incurring large modification costs.

The Air Force has carefully planned and proposed an orderly, well-balanced and low-risk development program starting in fiscal 1970 leading to the first flight of a new bomber in 1973. No production commitment on the part of the government is currently proposed; however, if a production decision is subsequently made we could achieve an initial operational capability in fiscal 1977 and a fully operational force a few years later. By that time the B-52s will be 17-20 years old. The best B-52, the "H" model, represents the maximum growth economically attainable within the constraints of the basic B-52 design. It would be tremendously expensive to make the B-52 faster, carry more payload, fly lower or have a smaller radar cross section. Additionally, certain improvements such as to provide for B-52 self-sufficiency for wide dispersal to improve pre-launch survivability would involve high costs and excessive fleet downtime. It is reemphasized that while we would be able to use new weapons or penetration aids on the aircraft against an improving threat, we have reached the point where a sounder investment is to acquire a new bomber rather than to keep modifying the old.

(5) Basically, AMSA is viewed as an economical replacement for the current strategic bomber force because it would incorporate improved capabilities made possible by the advances in technology during the 20 years since the B-52 was in the design phase. The AMSA would have a larger payload capability and improved penetration characteristics. Thus, a smaller AMSA force can be deployed that will provide the same effectiveness for assured destruction as the current strategic bomber force for less cost over the 1969-1987 time period. AMSA costs include R&D, investment and O&M versus O&M costs for the current bomber force during the time period specified. Or alternatively, an equal cost (1969-1987) AMSA force could provide much greater effectiveness across the spectrum of conflicts than the current strategic bomber force. In short, it will be less costly in the long run to proceed with development of the AMSA now.

Comparisons of the type suggested are extremely sensitive to the assumed scenario and there are, of course, a large number of possible war scenarios and a wide range of assumptions associated with each. For example, the number of Minuteman III (MIRVed) missiles required to equal the effectiveness of a given bomber force is significantly influenced by the degree of strategic warning assumed and the generation rate of the bomber force during this warning period. For instance, assuming no Minuteman III's destroyed before launch, the ratio of Minuteman III 5-year costs to AMSA 5-year costs to deliver the same number of weapons to target would be about 0.58 for a bomber generation rate of 40 percent (60 percent assumed to be destroyed). For a bomber force generation of 90 percent the ratio would be about 1.34. Similarly, the number of missiles assumed to be destroyed before launch is also a driving factor and this is dependent on a host of assumptions regarding attack timing, warning time, launch doctrine, attacking missile accuracy, etc. To illustrate this point, the above ratios would change to 0.73 and 1.67 if only 20 percent of the missiles are assumed to be destroyed before launch. Further, the described comparisons are relevant to soft tar-

gets where delivery accuracy is not a significant factor. If hard targets are considered, the better delivery accuracy of the AMSA would alter the ratios in favor of the AMSA assuming time urgency of the targets is not a deciding factor.

The improving Soviet capabilities have resulted in the danger of pre-launch destruction of our bomber forces. These measures have progressively reduced the warning time for launching the bomber force. Our response has been to disperse the alert bomber force. In this regard, one of the major design objectives of the AMSA is to enhance the system pre-launch survivability through quick reaction capability and wide dispersal to austere landing sites. This is to be accomplished in two ways. First, the system will be designed so that it can be a safe distance away from the base within the very short time available. Second, its short take-off and landing characteristics will permit dispersal to a very large number of airfields throughout the country, compounding the targeting problem of the attacker and thus minimizing the requirement for airborne alert.

(6) Many calculations have been made to assess the desirability of a mixed force of missiles and bombers on the basis of the "cost-effectiveness" of each system. We know enough about the results of these calculations to make the judgment that none of the systems should be ruled out on the basis of "cost-effectiveness." Generally, these calculations are made in cases where each system is weighed against an unknown and totally different threat. While one can make reasonable judgments on systems that are subject to the same threat, it is next to impossible to get real truths from analyses about systems that operate against quite different threats. The results are simply too volatile. There are not large differences between the cost-effectiveness of missiles and bombers in the first place, and one can change the relative ranking in the "cost-effectiveness" scale by simply changing our estimate (guess) as to the character and level of the Soviet threat against each system in the uncertain future—1975 and beyond. Sometimes it is shown that the system that is added last in the calculations of Soviet fatalities contributes few Soviet fatalities—assuming the other systems operated as advertised. On this basis the "tail-end" approach is sometimes used, illogically, as a basis for ruling out or decreasing the level of some particular system. On the other hand were this system applied first, it would produce approximately the same fatalities as the other systems. It is submitted that any differences in "cost-effectiveness" between missiles and bombers are swamped by the uncertainties in the analyses.

In general, past studies have shown that the relative cost effectiveness of pure missile and pure bomber forces varies as the scenarios and assumptions are changed. Studies have also shown that a mixed force of missiles and bombers can, against an uncertain threat, provide a more cost-effective deterrent than a pure force of either system. In short, a mix of bombers and missiles compounds the enemy's defense problems and makes him spend considerably more to obtain a given level of defense and diverts his resources that might otherwise be spent on offensive systems.

(7) Quite obviously, the Soviets do believe that bombers are necessary since they continue to improve, develop and produce them. Further, the Soviets now have a much larger bomber force than the 155 figure cited. Moreover, the Soviet bomber threat is even greater, when consideration is given to "one way" missions as suggested for our tactical forces.

Thus far, our strategic forces (bombers and missiles) have been sufficient to deter an all-out Soviet surprise attack against the United States. If we are to continue to deter the initiation of a nuclear war, it is absolutely

essential that we make two things clear to the Soviets (or any other potential enemy): (i) our intention to respond to a first strike; and (ii) the gain which they might achieve by initiating a war against us will be more than matched by the damage which we will inflict in return. Deterrence could fail if the Soviets miscalculated our intentions to respond to their military forces and urban-industrial base after sustaining damage from a first strike. It is not clear that the Soviets would be deterred from initiating a first strike, if their estimate showed that they could inflict a high level of fatalities against the United States and suffer a low level of fatalities in return. Such calculations could be made by the Soviets if we allow one or two elements of our offensive forces to deteriorate in strength and our remaining forces are negated (at least in part) through technological advancement or tactical surprise.

During the past several years, our development and production of new strategic weapon systems have been deemphasized with the hope of comparable Soviet actions. However, the Soviets have instead accelerated a major build-up of their strategic weapon delivery capability during the past three years to the extent that their ICBM forces are currently about equal in number and collectively, greater in total megatonnage of warheads. They continue to modernize and expand their forces. Accordingly, we must take certain steps to modernize our strategic offensive and defensive forces. In this regard, the initiation of the development of a new strategic bomber is an important step required to maintain our strategic deterrent.

(8) Flexibility is attributed to manned bombers because of their utility in a wide variety of conflict situations, both nuclear and nonnuclear, and their versatility within these several applications. Some of the capabilities which make up the "flexibility" attributed to manned bombers include the following:

Launch to test operational readiness and use as a show of force during periods of tension anywhere in the world.

Return to base prior to commitment of the force, thus enabling authorities to cease military operations if political decisions require.

Use in a conventional role or limited nuclear exchange where extreme accuracy not attainable by ballistic missiles is required.

Assign multiple targets, releasing weapons preplanned or an alternate targets as dictated by the tactical situations, and react to the threat by changing or maneuvering on penetration to the target.

Recovery and reconstitute subsequent to an initial nuclear exchange and use to strike additional targets detected by our reconnaissance and surveillance systems or to strike targets not struck initially.

It is reiterated that such "flexibility" while not readily amenable to cost-effectiveness analyses is real none-the-less, and is not possessed by ballistic missiles. The manned aircraft still remains the most versatile weapon system yet devised for delivering munitions.

The President's ability to launch ballistic missiles is as real as his ability to put bombers in the air, but not as apparent. The bomber provides a visual means to portray national intent to an adversary. Moving a large number of bombers to a higher state of readiness in obvious preparation for a nuclear strike, if required, is much more convincing than verbal communication or "moving your finger a few inches closer to the launch button." Missiles are always in a strike posture but cannot become more so without being committed. A unique capability of manned aircraft is their recallability under these circumstances.

(9) It is true that ballistic missiles provide a quick response to time-urgent targets for possible damage limiting because of their much shorter time of flight. However, once the bomber has been launched under positive

control there is no problem of survival prior to the penetration of Soviet air space, whereas the missiles must either be launched or survive an attack to be useful. Further, it is true that with satellite communications, bomber weapons could be retargeted or withheld up to the point of weapon release which would only be seconds away from impact.

Damage assessment of a prior ballistic missile strike can be accomplished by two means: manned aircraft and reconnaissance satellites. First, to ensure real-time sensing of continuing strikes a large number of reconnaissance satellites would have to be in orbit. Assuming the Soviets do not have an anti-satellite capability, the most difficult problem would be development of sensors for real-time bomb damage assessment (BDA) for all-weather operation. The most likely prospect would be a ground mapping radar. The necessary maps would have to be gathered within a few minutes of the detonation and relayed to surviving ground stations in near-real time. After the data is interpreted and a decision is reached to restrike a particular target (not necessarily withheld ICBMs), another ICBM must be launched, requiring another 30 minutes to reach the target and restart the BDA cycle. Consequently, each strike and BDA cycle would be expected to require one or more hours under the most favorable conditions.

(10) A unique and necessary strategic mission for the manned bomber has been recognized for many years as BDA of prior strikes against the enemy's hardened military targets (e.g., command and control centers, nuclear storage facilities, missile sites, etc.) and prompt restrike using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs). The manned bomber would fly very low in the target area and be equipped with high resolution radar, forward-looking and vertical sensors and real-time displays. One unique advantage of the manned bomber is discrimination and decision in real time. Accordingly, the man, assisted by the bombing system avionics, determines the requirement for restrike and if necessary, can immediately launch an air-to-surface missile to destroy the target.

The entire process of BDA and restrike from AMSA would require less than ten minutes. Overall, the process would be much faster than using satellites, independent of the much greater reliability, lesser cost and greater probability of proper interpretation using a manned bomber.

Our planning must provide for a range of attack options and execution choices including countries and tasks to be performed under varying conditions of war outbreak. These options range from the capability to execute selective strikes on targets to full execution of strategic forces. We would be remiss if we did not plan for the capability to respond across a broad range of possible conflict situations.

(11) It is certainly important to recognize the specific character of the enemy's defensive problem against our strategic bomber force. The FB-111 and the B-58 are range limited to such an extent that only a small portion of the Soviet Union need be postured for defense against these systems. Even the B-52, with its significantly greater range must still approach deep targets from a limited azimuth. The greater range/payload capability of the AMSA will permit penetration of the Soviet Union from virtually any direction. The AMSA will also penetrate faster and at a lower altitude than the B-52 and thus, will be much more difficult for enemy radars to detect. These factors greatly increase the area that must be defended and compound the command and control problems of the air defense. In short, notwithstanding the assumption that this would not require significantly greater technological capability, the AMSA will create a problem for the Soviet air defense several times greater than that created by the current strategic bomber force.

(12) In a permissive air environment, the most important aircraft characteristic is ton-mile economy, that is, minimum cost per pound of munitions delivered. However, as we saw in North Vietnam, bombing may have to be conducted in a very hostile nonnuclear environment. When this is the case, ton-mile economy is no longer the predominant factor. Probability of survival becomes extremely important even to the point where the relatively poor ton-mile economy of the F-105, as compared to the B-52, is preferred. To exploit these economies the large aircraft must have penetration survival similar to that of small aircraft and must be able to deliver its larger payload efficiently.

The AMSA combines the good ton-mile economy of the large aircraft with much of the performance of a fighter-bomber. The speed and altitude versatility of the AMSA would permit avoidance of concentrated AAA and small arms defenses and would provide better modes for coping with all but very high performance interceptors. Interceptors and nonnuclear surface-to-air missiles can be degraded by electronic countermeasures particularly as detailed knowledge of the defense system is obtained. Because of the advantages which accrue from night, all-weather delivery with high accuracy, the AMSA has greater potential for effective nonnuclear attack of fixed targets in hostile defense environments and could provide much more effective augmentation to the capabilities of our General Purpose forces than can be achieved with the current bomber force.

The rate of build-up and location of a nonnuclear conflict influences the relative utility of long-range bombers versus tactical aircraft. For example, if the conflict develops suddenly in an area remote from normal carrier operating stations or major tactical air facilities, a small number of long-range bombers can deliver very large payloads in a few hours. Should the conflict be located near the interior of a large land mass where the range/payload capability of the carrier or land-based tactical fighter is significantly reduced, the long-range bomber may be the only aircraft that could be immediately responsive to the situation.

The use of B-52s in Vietnam is one recent example of how bombers can be used as opposed to tactical fighters. The fighters are used in close air support, interdiction, and air superiority roles and are not free for the saturation bombing that can be accomplished by the large bomber to prevent massing of troop concentrations (e.g., Khe Sahn) and to harass enemy troops. In future nonnuclear conflicts, the AMSA will be a far greater asset to our war fighting capabilities than the current bomber force.

The massive application of aerial firepower early in a nonnuclear conflict would be much more effective at less cost than attempting to destroy the same targets several months after sophisticated defenses have been established. When the tactical air forces are in place, air support can best be provided using the smaller tactical aircraft. However, the large bomber may still be best used when saturation bombing is required for a major ground offensive or when there is a vital need for long-range interdiction missions.

One can postulate nonnuclear scenarios involving sophisticated air defense where we could not afford to attack on a repetitive sortie basis with any aircraft. Accordingly, the use of AMSA in nonnuclear conflicts would require assessment of the importance of the objectives versus the cost. Certainly an expensive weapon system would not be exposed to high risks unless the objectives were deemed important enough and lower cost options were not available.

However, the existence of the strategic bomber, primarily designed for the nuclear role but possessing excellent nonnuclear capabilities, affords an important choice. The existence of this option is and will continue to be a deterrent to potential enemies across the spectrum of conflict.

(13) The O&M costs for an AMSA force are not neglected in the economical replacement argument that has been presented. Obviously, there is uncertainty associated with the cost estimates made at this time for a weapon system to be developed and deployed over the next 10 years. Just as there is uncertainty associated with the cost of modify an aging bomber force in the next 20 years. However, as with all complex machinery at some point it becomes cheaper to buy a new system rather than continue to repair the older system.

(14) The economical aspects of bomber force modernization to replace the aging bomber force and also to provide improved capabilities are discussed earlier in this response. (See (5)). The argument does not neglect the research and development costs of the AMSA.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, yesterday the distinguished Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN) and the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) made some reference to the B-70 program and derogated that program very materially. I think I should set the record straight. These gentlemen stated that the AMSA is "roughly the same old mistake" as the B-70 and, further, that the B-70 "turned out to be an almost unmitigated disaster." Senator McGOVERN stated that "some \$1.5 billion was wasted on it—an airplane that had a mission that it was not capable of carrying out."

Nothing could be further from the truth than those statements. I would like to place the B-70 and the AMSA program in better perspective.

It is true that the B-70 program cost \$1.468 billion. Two B-70's were built. The aircraft requirement was to be capable of mach 3 flight at 70,000 feet. It did reach these performance characteristics. There was no failure on the part of the aircraft to meet its performance characteristics. The Department of Defense subsequently canceled the B-70 program because it felt that ICBM's and subsonic bombers carrying missiles would offer a better solution to the strategic strike problem.

I must point out that the B-70 program was a research and development program. It was not a production program approved by the Congress nor undertaken by the Congress.

The basic B-70 mission was for a high altitude, high-speed penetration of enemy airspace. Subsequently the Soviets developed and deployed large numbers of the SA-2 high altitude bomber interceptor defense missile system. This system, utilizing high altitude-burst nuclear warheads, had the potential of defeating the B-70 as a high altitude penetrator. The electronic state of the art at that time did not allow sufficient countermeasures for high altitude penetration to be carried without unacceptable weight penalties.

Most importantly, the design of the B-70 did not permit the flexibility necessary to adapt to the changing enemy threat. It was not known what ground-to-air missile developments the Soviets would initiate and pursue to deployment. I think this is an extremely important fact, Mr. President—that it was the dramatic change in the Soviet threat that brought about the demise of the B-70 and not any performance inadequacies

on the part of the B-70 itself. As a result of the increasing Soviet threat which made the B-70 more vulnerable, it was determined by our highest decision-makers that an aircraft to survive enemy airspace must penetrate at low altitudes. The B-70 not having a design capability for this mission, was, therefore, canceled as an ongoing program.

I might point out that the B-52, when it was designed, was designed for high altitude penetration capability; and when the threat changed, as I have described here, the attempt was then made to change the mission of the B-52 to give it a dual capability—a high altitude penetration capability and a low altitude penetration capability, at a reasonably high speed—of course, less than supersonic speed, because the B-52 is not a supersonic airplane.

When that program was undertaken, we found it necessary, through a modification program, to beef up the wings, to add structurally, very materially, to the B-52, in order that it could carry out a low altitude penetration mission.

What did we learn from the B-70? The B-70 had many technological challenges which it met. Many of these technical developments have proven to great merit on other more recent military programs.

The B-70 flight research program yielded vital information required in the design and evaluation of large supersonic cruise aircraft, including both the SST and AMSA. It provided valuable information on design and operational characteristics of systems, structures, and equipment.

The major objectives of the flight research program were to gain new and essential knowledge in the areas of flight dynamics, stability and control handling qualities, effects of gusts and dynamic loads, performance of engine and inlet combination, sonic boom investigation and the collection of supersonic data in the mach 2 to 3 region.

The Air Force provided over 1,400 technical documents to the Department of Transportation and Industry for the supersonic transport program.

In addition to the many valuable contributions realized from the flight test program, there were hundreds of new developments made during the design and manufacturing phases of the B-70 program. These involve the development of new materials and new manufacturing methods. For example, totally new metallurgical concepts were developed to form titanium. New stainless steel alloys were developed to meet critical strength and temperature requirements. New techniques of heat treating, machine welding, processing, and forming stainless steels were developed. Special high temperature metals and air-cooled turbine blades were developed, enabling much higher engine turbine temperatures. These are only a few of the hundreds of benefits flowing from this program.

I would now like to say a few words, Mr. President, about the key distinctions between the B-70 and the proposed AMSA program.

First and foremost is the fact that the AMSA program will not be confined to

a supersonic, high-altitude penetration of enemy airspace. It is specifically designed for a low-altitude penetration—at high speeds, I might add—and at the same time has the capability to penetrate supersonically at high altitudes if it is required.

The AMSA will have a greatly improved and smaller radar cross-section than the B-52, thus reducing its vulnerability to enemy radar detection. This is a very important part of the program.

The B-70 required lengthy runways for takeoff and landing. The AMSA will have the capability to operate from short runways, thus permitting the use of many runways in the United States which provides a key capability to disperse them. This adds dramatically to their prelaunch and survivability.

The AMSA will be able to carry a significantly greater payload than the B-70 and even the B-52.

The AMSA will also be capable of making very valuable contributions in the delivery of conventional or nonnuclear ordnance which mission the B-70 could not perform.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I want to assure the Senate that the AMSA is not in any sense of the word a "warmed-over" B-70.

Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from South Dakota stated today, as I understood him, that we have 650 B-52's, and 450 are of the latest type.

I do not know where the distinguished Senator gets his information, but that simply is not a fact from the standpoint of accuracy. We do not have anywhere near that number of B-52's, and nowhere near the number of B-52's he has noted are of the latest type. We have less than 500 B-52's today, and only 280 are of the latest type.

The suggestion has also been made here today that we should initiate construction of B-52's again, and add to the B-52 fleet we now have.

Mr. President, when I spoke on this subject yesterday, I pointed out that the B-52 will be 15 or 20 years old at the time the AMSA comes into being. That means that it is based on a technology of approximately 5 years earlier than that. So we are talking about a technology that is 20 to 25 years old, in the mid-1970's time-frame, to meet a threat that may exist at that time—a current threat, Mr. President—to give us the options that are desirable as an alternative, and as an added burden to impose on the Russians if they are going to attempt to meet a threat that may confront them.

So I submit, Mr. President, that the amendment of the distinguished Senator from South Dakota should be defeated, and we should proceed with the development of the AMSA on the basis that has been suggested, which, I again point out, is not a production go-ahead. That option could be retained open for a couple of years, to make a decision, but at least we would save 1 year's time. If we eventually need that aircraft, we would save 1 year's time from the time that we commenced to develop a prototype until the time it would come into an actual production-type model.

Again I point out, as I have already

stated, Mr. President, that the deletion of the FB-111 from the program this year was on the basis that the AMSA would be speeded up. We are saving approximately \$444 million by deletion of the FB-111 from the program as initially requested this year; so the saving is substantially that over what the military has recommended if we do not go ahead with a speeded up program for the AMSA.

So I would respectfully submit, Mr. President, that the amendment should be defeated.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one or two questions, since he has mentioned statistics that I put into the RECORD?

Mr. CANNON. I am happy to yield.
Mr. McGOVERN. I am not sure that I caught the exact correction that the Senator was making. Did I understand him to say that I had listed the level of the American B-52 force at a higher figure than is actually the case?

Mr. CANNON. The Senator's statement, as I understood it, was that we have 650 B-52's, and 450 are of the latest type.

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes.

Mr. CANNON. If I understood the Senator correctly, we do not have 650 B-52's, and we do not have 450 of the latest type, either.

Mr. McGOVERN. I think there may have been a misstatement there, to this extent: It should have read "intercontinental bombers," which would include the rest of the B-52's and the B-58, both of which, I think the Senator will agree, are superior to the Soviet intercontinental bomber, the Bear, which is not even a jet aircraft, but a turboprop, as the Senator knows, similar to our old B-36, which we now have discarded.

Mr. CANNON. I would certainly agree that both these aircraft are superior to that; but you do not pit a bomber against a bomber in a comparison of this kind; you pit a bomber against the defenses that would be put up against it, or a bomber against a fighter.

But I would submit that the Senator's figures are still wrong. We do not have 650—

Mr. McGOVERN. I think 646 is the figure I quoted, including both types.

Mr. CANNON. Even so, that would mean we would have to have 146 B-58's, and we never did build 146 B-58's. I think the total figure was 86 B-58's that we built.

Mr. McGOVERN. The figures were based on tables prepared by the House Armed Services Committee, and another study by a reputable authority that appeared in a recent issue of Jane's "Fighting Ships."

But I shall not quibble with the Senator. Whether it is 500 or 600, the point is that at the time I was talking about, the total mix of our weapons systems was far superior.

I drew attention to the fact that the Soviets had some 90 intercontinental bombers. So, let us take a round figure of 500 for the United States; we would still have them outnumbered better than 5 to 1 on bombers; and we have a superior bomber, as the Senator himself readily agrees.

In Secretary Clifford's posture statement, he used the figure 646.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from South Dakota 3 additional minutes.

Mr. McGOVERN. But I do not think that is the point, whether it is right at 646 or whether it is 546. The point is that we have an overwhelming superiority. What I was stressing at the time I used those figures was the total mix. I cited over a thousand ICBM's that we have, the 656 warheads that we have mounted on our submarine force, our 3,000 tactical aircraft that are capable of striking targets in the Soviet Union, and then, on top of that, a bomber which the Department of Defense tells us can be completely operational into the 1980's. I think in view of the overwhelming nature of that strike force, a principal argument on our strike capacity is not to question whether there is a dispute about the exact number we might have. I defer to the Senator on that, if that is of concern.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I point out that it is not a matter of comparing the number of bombers we have against the number of bombers the Russians have. It is not a matter of bomber against bomber. The question is whether we are strategically superior so that we could accept a first strike and inflict unacceptable damage on them in return.

I have no doubt today in my mind that we could do that.

I am concerned about the mid-70's, 1975 through 1977. As we know, the Russians are practically even with us on ICBM capacity and ICBM's. True, they have less capacity to inflict damage on us with bombers than we have to inflict damage on them.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The additional 3 minutes have expired.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield an additional minute to the Senator from Nevada.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada is recognized for 1 additional minute.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, we have to keep in mind that we are talking about the mid-70's with respect to the airplane we are talking about. Of the less than 500 B-52's we have now, a lot of them are older models. I believe there are 280 G and H models.

I find it very difficult to believe that an airplane based on a technology 25 years old could keep ahead with the defenses that could be put against it. That is my objection against an airplane that could be overwhelmed by other defenses.

Mr. McGOVERN. The Senator's argument would carry more force if we were solely dependent upon the bomber. But we have an enormous striking power from submarines and from land. This involves an enormous expenditure. Then there would be an additional system on top of that recognized superiority. Our missile power is not for defense. I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, that would not give us one bit of added capability. It would merely add to the capa-

bility we have today for the bombers. It is a logical development. Just as the talk now is about the follow-on with the Poseiden, for the Polaris, it is a continuation to give us the capability which would make the Russians defend against three possibilities, and not merely have to worry about one, if they have a surprise attack.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I understand that the opposition has only 2 minutes. I shall use that time to cover quite briefly for the benefit of those who have come to the Chamber that the amount that the committee put in the bill is altogether and exclusively for research. It would not start production of even a prototype plane. However, it will bring us up to the real decision to be made next year.

Mr. President, certainly we have heard a great deal about surveys. I point out that this is not anything that has mushroomed up lately. A year ago our Preparedness Subcommittee conducted an exhaustive and detailed study into the status of our strategic power as compared to that of the Soviet Union. We held extensive hearings on the subject.

In September of 1968 we issued an extensive report. Among other things, we said:

We feel that the prompt development and deployment of a new long-range advance manned strategic bomber is essential to assure that we retain this flexibility into the late seventies and eighties, when the aging B-52 and the interim FB-111 may be incapable of coping with the sophisticated defense environment which is expected during that time.

That report was concurred in by all members of the subcommittee at that time with the exception of the Senator from Missouri. The membership of the subcommittee at that time included the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD), whom we regret losing to another committee.

Mr. President, I rest the case upon the showing that has been made here. I yield the floor.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I should like to use my few remaining minutes to summarize the arguments that have been made.

I stress in the first instance that the pending amendment would not kill the advanced manned strategic aircraft program. I cite the words of the Senator from Mississippi, the distinguished chairman of the committee, on yesterday when he said:

The alternative between the committee and the proponents of the amendment is with reference to the rate of progress that we make during this fiscal year.

That is an exact statement of the thrust of the amendment which would reduce the \$100 million listed in the bill for continued research and development and testing and evaluation of this bomber to \$20 million, for a practical saving of some \$80 million in fiscal 1970.

That would have the effect, if we move at that level in fiscal 1970, of delaying by 1 year the availability of the plane. They will come in, according to the Department of Defense, in 1978 instead of in 1977.

Mr. President, I can find no compelling need to move ahead on an accelerated scale this year. The B-52's presently in force, in combination with the FB-111's and the B-58's, are expected to last into the 1980's.

If we need any bomber capability in our offensive or deterrent mix, we will have it well after the time it is expected that this bomber under consideration today will become operational, even if the amendment under consideration is agreed to.

In light of the experience with the B-70 which was canceled after an expenditure of nearly \$1.5 billion and the construction of two prototype planes, I think the Senate should satisfy itself that programs of this kind are clearly needed before they are accelerated.

Keep in mind that the committee is calling for a fourfold increase of funds for the research and development phases of this bomber, unless the amendment is agreed to. I think the Senator from Missouri made a most persuasive point in reminding us that the preeminent role of the bomber in our strategic role has been assumed by the missiles, both land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missile, which are superior from the standpoint of speed, reliability, penetrability, and certainty of the probe.

There are other factors to be taken into consideration before we accelerate this very costly bomber program.

I hope that Senators will ask themselves why the Soviets have made a decision not to move ahead with any significant expansion of the bomber.

I hope that they will keep in mind that this project, fully funded, will cost up to \$12 billion by the time the operation of the plane is made possible, and that one would have to double that figure in terms of operational cost over a 10-year period.

We are talking about weapons systems here on which the cost is similar to that of the ABM that we debated here for many weeks.

I strongly urge the Senators to support the amendment which would not only save some \$80 million in fiscal 1970 that we urgently need for other purposes, but would also give us a little more time to look thoughtfully and critically at what could prove to be a very costly and disastrous mistake.

I strongly urge the adoption of the amendment.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time on the amendment has expired.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, what is the pending question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the adoption of amendment No. 130, offered by the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a point of order. The hour of 4 o'clock has arrived.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.

The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD (when his name was called). On this vote I have a pair with the senior Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON). If he were present and voting, he would vote "nay." If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "yea." I therefore withhold my vote.

Mr. SPARKMAN (when his name was called). On this vote I have a pair with the junior Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT). If he were present and voting, he would vote "yea." If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "nay." I therefore withhold my vote.

The bill clerk resumed and concluded the call of the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) and the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON) are absent on official business.

I further announce that the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), and the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH), are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), would vote yea.

On this vote, the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK) is paired with the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK). If present and voting, the Senator from North Dakota would vote "yea" and the Senator from Colorado would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) is paired with the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER). If present and voting, the Senator from Indiana would vote "yea" and the Senator from Arizona would vote "nay."

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Vermont (Mr. PROUTY) is detained on official business.

On this vote, the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK) is paired with the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK). If present and voting, the Senator from Colorado would vote "nay" and the Senator from North Dakota would vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) is paired with the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE). If present and voting, the Senator from Arizona would vote "nay" and the Senator from Indiana would vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 32, nays 56, as follows:

[No. 88 Leg.]
YEAS—32

Byrd, W. Va.	Hatfield	Pastore
Case	Javits	Pell
Church	Kennedy	Proxmire
Cook	Mathias	Randolph
Cooper	McCarthy	Ribicoff
Cranston	McGovern	Saxbe
Eagleton	Mondale	Symington
Goodell	Moss	Tydings
Gravel	Muskie	Williams, N.J.
Harris	Nelson	Young, Ohio
Hart	Packwood	

NAYS—56

Aiken	Bible	Dodd
Allen	Boggs	Dole
Allott	Brooke	Eastland
Anderson	Byrd, Va.	Ellender
Baker	Cannon	Ervin
Bellmon	Cotton	Fannin
Bennett	Curtis	Fong

Gore	McClellan	Scott
Griffin	McGee	Smith
Gurney	McIntyre	Spong
Hansen	Metcalf	Stennis
Holland	Miller	Stevens
Hollings	Montoya	Talmadge
Hruska	Mundt	Thurmond
Inouye	Murphy	Tower
Jackson	Pearson	Williams, Del.
Jordan, N.C.	Percy	Yarborough
Jordan, Idaho	Russell	Young, N. Dak.
Long	Schweiker	

PRESENT AND GIVING LIVE PAIRS, AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED—2

Mansfield, for.
Sparkman, against.

NOT VOTING—9

Bayh	Fulbright	Hughes
Burdick	Goldwater	Magnuson
Dominick	Hartke	Prouty

So Mr. McGOVERN's amendment (No. 130) was rejected.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move that the Senate reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. PROXMIRE obtained the floor.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, so far as the chairman knows, the amendment just rejected was the last major amendment that relates to what we call the weaponry or hardware of the bill. There may be another amendment that will affect one of the weapons, but I understand that it is not proposed to strike out any of the money authorized.

There are several additional regulatory amendments, which I shall mention quite briefly.

The Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) has an amendment regarding research, a matter as to which, perhaps, the committee and the Senator from Wisconsin can make a joint recommendation to the Senate.

Another amendment relates to military foreign aid, which was before the Senate at one time, and which will be offered by the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER).

Another amendment relates to outside reports and will be offered by the Senator from Arkansas. I think we can now agree upon language with reference to that amendment.

The Senator from Massachusetts may offer an amendment with reference to creation of a committee.

So far as the chairman knows, that is a summary of the amendments that may be offered.

There is another amendment that relates to an inquiry by the GAO with reference to profits on defense contracts. We will work on that some more with the Senator from Connecticut, who is holding hearings on the GAO now.

That is a quick summary of the situation.

If we can move along now, I do not see why we should not be able to finish up the bill, with a little luck, tomorrow.

AMENDMENT NO. 123, AS MODIFIED

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I should like to call up my amendment. I withdraw amendment No. 123 and send

to the desk another amendment designed to take its place, an amendment we worked out with the chairman of the committee.

I ask unanimous consent that the amendment not be read. I shall explain it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 123 is withdrawn, as requested by the Senator.

The amendment offered by Mr. PROXMIRE is as follows:

At the end of the bill, add a new section, as follows:

"Sec. 402. Funds authorized for appropriation under the provisions of this Act shall not be available for payment of independent research and development, bid and proposal, and other technical effort costs in a total amount in excess of \$468,000,000. The foregoing limitation shall not apply in the case of formally advertised contracts or to other firmly fixed price contracts competitively awarded."

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I expect this will take just a short time, less than half an hour.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a time limitation on the pending amendment of 30 minutes; 15 minutes under the control of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), and 15 minutes under the control of the proposer of the amendment, the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Idaho. Provided I do not lose my right to the floor.

VISIT TO THE SENATE BY MEMBERS OF THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, if I may have the attention of the Senate, we have with us in the Chamber today seven Members of the Canadian House of Commons who are our guests. It is my privilege at this time to introduce them to the Senate.

As all of us know, we have no better friends in the world than the Canadians. They have been good and stalwart neighbors in every way. I consider it an honor today to present to the Senate the group of gentlemen now standing in the far corner of the Chamber. If they will remain standing while I introduce them by name, we will give them our cordial greeting.

Robert Douglas George Stanbury, Member from York-Scarborough; member of Broadcasting Films and Assistance to the Arts Committee, and Official Languages Bill C-120 Committee.

Mr. Jean-Pierre Goyer, Member from Saint-Laurent; member of External Affairs and National Defence Committee.

Mr. Marcel Prudhomme, Member from Montreal; member of External Affairs and National Defence and Library of Parliament Committees.

Mr. Warren Allmand, Member from Montreal; member of External Affairs and National Defence and of Transport and Communications Committees.

Mr. Lincoln MacCaulay Alexander, Member from Hamilton; member of Justice and Legal Affairs and of Labour, Manpower and Immigration Committees.

Mr. John Edward Broadbent, Member from Oshawa-Whitby Riding; member of Labour, Manpower and Immigration and Regional Development Committees.

Mr. John Michael Forrestall, Member from Nova Scotia; member of External Affairs and National Defence and of Printing Committees.

[Applause, Senators rising.]

RECESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess for 2 minutes, so that Senators may meet our distinguished guests, with the time not to be taken out of the unanimous-consent agreement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Thereupon, at 4 o'clock and 24 minutes p.m., the Senate took a recess until 4 o'clock and 26 minutes p.m.

During the recess, the distinguished guests were greeted by Members of the Senate.

On the expiration of the recess, the Senate reassembled and was called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. Packwood in the chair).

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills, and they were signed by the President pro tempore:

S. 1686. An act relating to age limits in connection with appointments to the U.S. Park Police; and

S. 1766. An act to provide for the disposition of a judgment recovered by the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, Montana, in paragraph 11, docket numbered 50233, United States Court of Claims, and for other purposes.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and

ask unanimous consent that the time not be taken out of either side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senate will please be in order.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, we must have quiet so that the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) may be heard. This is a highly important matter and concerns about \$600 million.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will please be in order.

The Senator from Wisconsin may proceed.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the Department of Defense spends billions of dollars each year on research and development contracts. Many persons have questioned the high level of military spending in this area, and the Armed Services Committee made a significant reduction in the funds authorized this year, a reduction which I certainly applaud and support.

There is another, lesser known R. & D. program, however, distinct from the multibillion-dollar contract program which goes by the name of Independent R. & D. It is an apt title for this program, for the contractors who receive I.R. & D. funds are free to spend them independent of any contracts they may have with the Government, and independent of almost all Government controls.

Last year \$685 million was spent by the Department of Defense for I.R. & D. In view of the fact that no contractual controls were exercised over these public funds, and very little administrative controls of any kind, very serious questions need to be raised about the management of this program.

But in view of the fact that the Pentagon is already spending billions of dollars on its R. & D. contracts, an even more serious question must be asked: What is the justification for this program? How do we justify spending about \$8 billion a year on military R. & D. contracts, and another \$685 million on non-contracted Independent R. & D.? Does this not represent duplication of effort of the most extreme kind?

Independent R. & D. represents one of the most serious and little known problems in Government procurement. It is a disturbing fact that the Department of Defense exercises little or no control over the amount of public money paid to contractors for Independent R. & D. and related expenses. What is even more disturbing is the fact that Department of Defense is now planning to completely eliminate the little control it now exercises and instead to substitute a formula to pay such costs.

In order to fully understand the magnitude of the problem, a full explanation of independent research and development and its related costs is necessary.

Let me point out first of all that Independent R. & D. is not the same as research and development. It is essential

that the two programs be clearly distinguished. In contrast to federally contracted research and development, I.R. & D. is not sponsored, or administered directly by the Government. Under an I.R. & D. program, as distinguished from a Government contracted R. & D. program, the contractor is free to decide whether to perform I.R. & D. in the area of military products or commercial items. Under I.R. & D. programs, the initiation, control, and direction of I.R. & D. projects rests with the independent contractor, not the Government, as under normal R. & D. of crucial importance under an I.R. & D. program is the fact that the work done does not have to be directed toward the completion of government contract work. It can be totally unrelated to government business.

Closely related to I.R. & D. are two other technical cost items normally considered with I.R. & D. The first of these are bidding and proposal expenses. These costs result from the technical effort involved in preparing bids and proposals for Government contract work. These costs are always underwritten 100 percent by the Government. The significance of this fact will become clear shortly. The second related area of technical expense is known as Other Technical Effort—OTE. Despite repeated efforts, I have been unable to obtain a clear and satisfactory definition of this category of expense from the Pentagon. No one seems to be able to precisely define the nature or purposes of this expense item. The Government Accounting Office, in an extensive study released last July, suggests that other technical effort should be considered along with independent research and development since "it appears that a substantial portion of this amount involves technical effort similar to I.R. & D." Like bidding and proposal expenses, other technical effort expenses are always underwritten 100 percent by the Government.

Essential to an understanding of independent research and development and these two related areas of technical costs is the fact that the Government does not contract for the work. In effect, the Government is presented a bill for services rendered which it never specifically requested. The usual justification for this astonishing practice is that I.R. & D. provides the broad technical capability needed by a company to meet future Government contract needs. Exactly what capabilities are being developed has never been clear. The term "technical capability" is so broad and so vague that literally anything has been accepted. Current armed services procurement regulations state:

An I.R. & D. project, to be acceptable, must be related to the product lines for which the government has contracts.

The interpretation of the term "product lines" has been unclear since the publication of the armed services procurement regulations. Just exactly what type of I.R. & D. work has been accepted in the past is shown by the following examples:

EXAMPLES

A report issued by the General Accounting Office in March 1967 contains

several interesting examples of technical efforts undertaken by a contractor for private purposes which were charged to the Government. For instance, the contractor spent funds on an analysis and commentary on a proposal by Euro-space, a nonprofit, nonpolitical organization whose members were from European industry. The purpose of Euro-space was to promote space activities in Europe. The contractor, as a corresponding member, had been invited by Euro-space to undertake a study. However, the contractor charged the cost of the study to bid and proposal expense and ultimately allocated these costs to Government contracts.

In another example, the same contractor claimed reimbursement under Government contracts for studies pursued after it had been notified that the Government was not interested in the proposals. While part of this cost was disallowed by the Government, more than half was not questioned even though the work was not desired by the Government.

In still another case, the same company charged to Government contracts what it termed "contract capability costs." These were costs incurred in support of four major proposals after they had been submitted. Some of these costs were incurred after the company was informed that contracts had been awarded to other companies. Some of the work involved was reported by the company to have been company funded but nevertheless the cost was charged to contract capability work orders and ultimately was passed to Government contracts.

What is more frightening is the fact that a recent "clarification" of the term "product lines" issued by the Defense Department would seem to condone such practices. Defense Procurement Circular No. 7 specifically states that the quoted ASPR requirement does not mean that the I.R. & D. project must directly benefit, or be related specifically to products for which the Government has contracts. Perhaps the most astonishing result of all of this is that under the proposed amendment to the armed services procurement regulation, the Government would appear to give up all hope of controlling such expenditures. The proposed ASPR revision does not require a showing that independent research and development bears any relationship at all to Government contract product lines. The inescapable conclusion is that the Defense Department, faced with widespread abuse of I.R. & D. provisions, has decided to throw in the towel completely and let the contractor decide how much the Government should pay him.

Faced with a rising crescendo of protest over the abuses of the I.R. & D. program, the contractors involved have rallied in justification of I.R. & D. expenditures. Recently, I received a letter from Mr. Thomas Rogers of the Mitre Corp. Mr. Rogers, former Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, also served for a short time with the Department of Housing and Urban Development. In his letter to me, he makes a very interesting point in support of continuing

I.R. & D. programs. He first of all quotes a letter from Secretary Weaver to Secretary of Defense Clifford, in which the Housing Secretary suggests that a broad interpretation of the Armed Forces procurement regulations applicable to I.R. & D. could encourage Defense contractors to address a larger fraction of their I.R. & D. work to domestic related areas. Mr. Rogers is completely in favor of this idea, and enthusiastically endorses "technological progress made by Defense contractors in such areas as low-cost military housing, more efficient hospital design, and so forth."

Mr. President, I could not agree more with Mr. Rogers that this country needs better low-cost housing and improved hospital design. But the question may be asked: Why should funds appropriated to the military be used for nonmilitary purposes? Would it not be more proper and efficient to appropriate funds to civilian agencies to manage civilian programs? Mr. Rogers, in his own way, has presented us with the crux of the I.R. & D. problem. More and more the continued justification for the provision of I.R. & D. has rested on arguments such as those advanced by Mr. Rogers. The expenditure of I.R. & D. moneys is going for research activities totally unrelated to military needs. Defense contractors are encouraged to use DOD funds to expand their commercial business and on projects designed to assist in the solution of our domestic problems. Mr. President, if we need better housing, why should not the money be given to the Department of Housing and Urban Development which specializes in this area? Does it make sense to use our military program to support nonmilitary projects in order to justify an outmoded form of expenditure known as independent research and development? If the Government really needs increased research into our domestic problems, let us give the money to those who are best equipped to spend it—those people who are specialists in the field who can give the taxpayer the most for his research dollar.

The almost total lack of control over independent R. & D. by the Government is dramatically shown by a review of recent expenditures for this work. A recent DOD audit covering 94 of the Department's major contractors shows that from a total of \$459 million in 1963, I.R. & D. and related costs have skyrocketed to \$685 million in 1968. Although sales by the contractors to DOD have increased by only 28 percent between 1963 and 1968—\$17,916,000,000 to \$22,875,000,000—for those covered by the study, the amount of combined I.R. & D. and related costs reimbursed by the Government to these same contractors has increased by 49.2 percent—\$459,000,000 to \$685,000,000—a percentage increase almost double the percentage increase in sales to DOT. The problem has become especially acute in the past year. Although contractor sales to DOD increased by only 7.4 percent between 1967 and 1968, the amount of I.R. & D. and related costs reimbursed by the Government for the same period increased by 14.3 percent, a percentage increase almost twice the percentage in-

crease in Government contract work. All of this in spite of the fact that the Government is already spending over \$8 billion a year for regularly contracted research and development.

What this amounts to is that the public is being asked to support uncontrolled spending.

Contrary to the practices of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Pentagon does not know how much it will pay and does not control the amount it will pay for independent R. & D. On occasion, advanced agreements with contractors are made by the service branches for future I.R. & D. in defense work. But this is the exception, not the rule. The Government does not normally know even the programs for which it will end up paying the costs. In other words, the Department of Defense often does not even know what kind of programs or even the areas in which independent R. & D. money will be applied by the contractors.

Furthermore, the Government obtains no rights whatsoever to any inventions arising from the hundreds of millions of dollars of public spending in the Pentagon I.R. & D. program.

The general Government policy expressed in the Presidential memorandum of October 10, 1963, provides that the Government should receive at least a nonexclusive royalty-free license in any case where an invention or discovery is made under a Government contract for research and development. Yet, the Government does not obtain even a license to use inventions which it has paid the contractor to invent with independent R. & D. funds. In one case, a single contractor received 23 patents during a 3-year period, 22 of which were supported by I.R. & D. funds.

The bizarre result is that the public first subsidizes the invention through the independent R. & D. program. The contractor then obtains a patent for the invention and, in effect, has a Government-guaranteed monopoly which he can market to the consumer at monopoly prices, or sell back to the Government; that is, if the Government wants to use the invention brought about through Government funds, it may actually have to pay a royalty to its contractor.

Last week Senator FULBRIGHT referred to military procurement as a degenerate form of capitalism. Some may think that a somewhat harsh description of the overall program, but there is no more accurate way to describe I.R. & D. in my judgment.

The I.R. & D. program is an uncontrolled Government subsidy and an unjustified public dole. The funds expended represent an extreme form of waste, mismanagement, and a misallocation of public resources.

Perhaps the best way to understand the wasted money resulting from the DOD policy is to look at the policy of the Atomic Energy Commission on I.R. & D. AEC does not allow a contractor to charge to the Government the cost of independent R. & D. unless it is specifically set forth in a contract. In addition, costs are allowed only to the extent that they provide a direct or indirect benefit to contract work. The pertinent AEC regulation states the following:

AEC does not accept a general allocation of independent research and development costs. Such costs are considered unallowable except to the extent specifically set forth in the contract. Research and development costs may be made allowable only to the extent that they provide a direct or indirect benefit to the contract work.

The regulation specifically describes the nature of unallowable projects. For example, individual I.R. & D. projects are not accepted when: First, they are primarily of a promotional nature, that is, projects directed toward the development of new business unrelated to the Government contract; second, they are studies or projects which are undertaken in whole or in part for other customers; third, they duplicate R. & D. work that AEC has sponsored.

The difference in cost to the Government under the two different policies, that of DOD and that of AEC, is illustrated by the following example: A recent AEC survey indicates that for 77 contracts with contract costs totaling \$150 million, AEC allowed about 1.4 percent of contract costs for I.R. & D.—\$2.1 million. Had DOD principles been applied, AEC estimates that 2.15 percent of contract costs would have been reimbursed for I.R. & D., a percentage almost double the amount for I.R. & D. expenses allowed under AEC policy.

As I mentioned earlier, some contractors enter into advance agreements with the Government with respect to the projects for which I.R. & D. funds will be spent over the following year. If we are to have an I.R. & D. program at all, advance agreements certainly give to the Government a degree of control over it that it does not presently have. Advance agreements at least give the Government an opportunity to decide whether proposed expenditures by a private contractor will in any way benefit the Government.

However, contractors have resisted even this modicum of government control. Many contractors have been unwilling to negotiate advance agreements. And in a case decided by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals on August 8, 1967—ASBCA No. 11931—it was ruled that where an advance agreement is not reached between the contractor and the Government, the Defense Department is still authorized to allow 100 percent of the contractor's I.R. & D. costs. Under the present policy, therefore, the contractor actually has an incentive not to enter into advance agreements.

Even if advance agreements were entered into in every case, however, the major question surrounding the I.R. & D. program would not be answered. Why do we need to spend \$685 million for an I.R. & D. program when we are already spending billions of dollars on R. & D. contracts?

I believe this question needs to be asked and answered. From the study I have made, I can frankly see no justification for this program. If there is any justification for it, that fact needs to be demonstrated.

But even if the program is justified, it is not justified in its current, uncontrolled condition.

I have felt for a long time that this program should not only be questioned but deleted, but I have discussed this issue with the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. McINTYRE), who is the expert on the Armed Services Committee on R. & D. work, and with the distinguished chairman of the committee. I have concluded, in view of the fact that this is an extraordinarily complicated area and there are very sincere and able people who contend that the program should continue, that a compromise would be more logical. For that reason I have agreed to an amendment which places a ceiling on I.R. & D. funds authorized to be spent in the current fiscal year in the amount of \$468 million.

This will reduce the amount by about \$117 million below what it otherwise would be.

In addition, I intend to introduce further proposed legislation on this matter, and I have been informed that the Committee on Armed Services will hold hearings on it next year, and have been told that if I did this, I would be invited to appear as a witness for that bill.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think this is an important matter. It involves an item in the bill for a special kind of research that has been described by the Senator from Wisconsin. The sum for this year was \$585 million. Last year it was \$685 million. It varies according to the number of contracts we have, especially for weaponry.

In this connection, I do not like that word "compromise" too much; I simply could not agree to the Senator's original amendment, far reaching as it is, being adopted without hearings. So we agreed that the Senator would introduce the main part of his amendment as a bill, and the Committee on Armed Services would give full hearings on it, because it is something that ought to be developed with a better formula, a better understanding, and a better rationale. I do think, however, that there is great merit in some of this research.

We talked about reducing it somewhat this year, and we agreed on a 20-percent reduction, as the Senator stated; and his amendment, modified to carry that point only, will be supported by the members of the committee who have had a chance to look at it, including the chairman.

Mr. President, I wish to yield some time to the Senator from New Hampshire, who has held some very important hearings for us on the subject of research and development. I shall yield to the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), later. I now yield 5 minutes to the Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I believe our colleague from Wisconsin has done the Senate a service in bringing up this amendment. It directs itself at business practices which are not well understood and yet are of a critical nature to the DOD overall mission. We need to understand these activities.

These are not carried as line items in the Defense Department budget but are part of the overhead costs of DOD con-

tractors. This means that they are treated as part of the normal administrative costs of running a business, just like the contractor's accounting department or the salary of the company president. It is estimated that these expenditures are now running in the neighborhood of some \$600 million a year.

As the chairman of the committee, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), has stated, no hearings have been held in the Senate directly related to this subject.

I am not suggesting, Mr. President, that because we have not had the chance to look at this in detail means that these activities are running slipshod or out of hand. I think the record will show that they have been well managed to date and have made an enormous contribution to the Defense effort. This does not mean that their management cannot be improved—indeed the DOD jointly with NASA are currently working on an improvement in these areas.

I.R. & D. is that research and development function of Department of Defense contractors which is not directly tied to a specific contract, grant or other item of the budget or precise function of the Department, but consists of projects undertaken independently by contractors to increase their technical knowledge and capability and to develop products for future sales. The purpose of the I.R. & D. effort is to assure the continuation and growth of the company by improving the contractor's technical competitive position and giving him new products and technology of value to the Department of Defense.

So, with the concurrence of the Senator from Mississippi, we have not only agreed with the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIER) on this 20-percent reduction, but also, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Research and Development, I have assured the Senator from Wisconsin that we will commence hearings on his amendment, which, as I understand, will be introduced as a bill, before the end of this year; and next year when we come back, we will all have a better grasp of it and can work more intelligently on it.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator for a very fine statement.

Mr. President, I am authorized to say also for the Senator from Maine (Mrs. SMITH), the ranking minority member of the committee, that she is in support of this amendment.

I yield now to the Senator from California, who has expressed an interest in this subject matter and is concerned about it also.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I wish to express my pleasure in the agreement that has been worked out between the Senator from Wisconsin and the chairman of the committee. Senator PROXMIER has stimulated some very productive discussions in this body, and I think has performed a great service.

However, I did have some grave reservations about his amendment, and I am delighted that he and the chairman have worked out a compromise that will permit hearings and very careful study before the matter is acted upon.

I believe that delaying technological research could have a grave ill effect upon national security. Back in the 1930's, a young physicist named Enrico Fermi went to the Defense Establishment of that day—I believe it was specifically to the Navy Department—and explained to them the concept of chain reaction and of nuclear developments.

They thought that he was not talking sense and did not follow the matter up, and a great deal of very valuable time was lost. I would hate to see a situation where every research project relating to national defense would have to be reviewed before it could be undertaken. We need innovative research in national defense matters. We will have to pay for it, one way or another; but we may get less research, and we may get less value for our dollar, if we circumscribe independent research and development.

Another aspect of independent research and development is that it stimulates and encourages the competitive bidding that we want in relation to defense contracts. Independent research and development led to the S-64 helicopter, the so-called flying crane. The independent R. & D. cost something like \$12 million. The DOD estimates that under normal prescribed and supervised R. & D., the cost in terms of research would have been \$30 million to \$40 million.

I am delighted that a compromise has been worked out. I look forward with interest to the hearings where this matter can be explored in greater depth, and I support the modified amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the amendment as modified now simply provides that not more than \$468 million out of all this research money may be used for the purposes we have been talking about. That is a reduction of 20 percent. All that money does not have to be used this year, but it applies to the sum that is in the bill and may be appropriated this year.

I trust that is satisfactory. I support the substitute amendment, and I believe that all members of the Armed Services Committee do also.

I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Packwood in the chair). All remaining time having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin, as modified.

On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) and the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE), the Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MCCARTHY), the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), and the Senator

from Indiana (Mr. BAYH) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH), the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE), the Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL) would each vote "yea."

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Vermont (Mr. PROUTY) and the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. YOUNG) are detained on official business. If present and voting the Senator from Colorado (Mr. DOMINICK) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 85, nays 0, as follows:

[No. 89 Leg.]
YEAS—85

Alken	Gore	Muskie
Allen	Gravel	Nelson
Allott	Griffin	Packwood
Anderson	Gurney	Pastore
Baker	Hansen	Pearson
Bellmon	Harris	Pell
Bennett	Hart	Percy
Bible	Hatfield	Proxmire
Boggs	Holland	Randolph
Brooke	Hollings	Ribicoff
Byrd, Va.	Hruska	Saxbe
Byrd, W. Va.	Inouye	Schweiker
Cannon	Jackson	Scott
Case	Javits	Smith
Church	Jordan, N.C.	Sparkman
Cook	Jordan, Idaho	Spong
Cooper	Kennedy	Stennis
Cotton	Long	Stevens
Cranston	Mansfield	Symington
Curtis	Mathias	Talmadge
Dodd	McClellan	Thurmond
Dole	McGovern	Tower
Eagleton	McIntyre	Tydings
Eastland	Miller	Williams, N.J.
Ellender	Mondale	Williams, Del.
Ervin	Montoya	Yarborough
Fannin	Moss	Young, Ohio
Fong	Mundt	
Goodell	Murphy	

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—14

Bayh	Hartke	Metcalf
Burdick	Hughes	Proutty
Dominick	Magnuson	Russell
Fulbright	McCarthy	Young, N. Dak.
Goldwater	McGee	

So Mr. PROXMIRE's amendment, as modified, was agreed to.

AMENDMENT NO. 165

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask that it be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 5, line 14, strike out "to support: (1)" and insert in lieu thereof "(1) to support".

On page 5, line 15, strike out "(2) local forces in Laos and Thailand; and", and insert in lieu thereof "(2) to support local forces in Laos and Thailand, but support to such local forces shall be limited to the providing of supplies, materiel, equipment, and facilities, including maintenance thereof, and to the providing of training for such local forces, and (3)".

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield, without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

GENERAL VON STEUBEN MEMORIAL DAY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of House Joint Resolution 250, reported today by the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, this is a matter of a deadline that must be complied with, because it is a resolution which would set aside a day to commemorate the exploits and the life and the meaning of General von Steuben.

This resolution was presented to the Committee on the Judiciary by the late Senator from Illinois, Mr. Dirksen, and in a special executive meeting this morning it was reported favorably. If it is in order, I should like to ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed at this time to its consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be stated.

The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A resolution (H.J. Res. 250) authorizing the President of the United States of America to proclaim September 17, 1969, General von Steuben Memorial Day for the observance and commemoration of the birth of Gen. Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the resolution?

There being no objection, the resolution was considered, ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed, without amendment, the following bills and joint resolution of the Senate:

S. 83. An act for the relief of certain civilian employees and former civilian employees of the Bureau of Reclamation;

S. 85. An act for the relief of Dr. Jagir Singh Randhawa;

S. 348. An act for the relief of Cheng-hual Li;

S. 728. An act for the relief of Capt. Richard L. Schumaker, U.S. Army; and

S.J. Res. 149. A joint resolution to extend for 3 months the authority to limit the rates of interest or dividends payable on time and savings deposits and accounts.

The message also announced that the House had agreed to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 4658) for the relief of Bernard L. Coulter.

AMENDMENT OF THE HIGHER
EDUCATION ACT OF 1965

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on H.R. 13194.

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate H.R. 13194, amending the Higher Education Act of 1965 to authorize Federal market adjustment payments to lenders with respect to insured student loans when necessary, in the light of economic conditions, in order to assure that students will have reasonable access to such loans for financing their education, which was read twice by its title.

Mr. PELL. I ask unanimous consent that the bill be considered as having been read the first and second times and that the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I move to strike out all after the enacting clause of H.R. 13194 and to insert the language of the Senate passed version of S. 2721, which was passed by the Senate on August 12, 1969.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Rhode Island.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the amendment cannot be agreed to with the Senator having the floor. He loses the floor when the Chair puts the question. I make that point of order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The point of order is well taken.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, we are about to act on something that we better understand, because it is a serious matter. I agree with the Senator from Rhode Island but we do not want to whisk this matter through silently.

The Senate passed a bill to help students who had to get student loans for colleges and universities for this term. Unfortunately, the House did not go along with the Senate because of various things we put in the bill—which I disagreed with but that is neither here nor there—relating to student loans generally rather than just high interest rates. The House passed the bill without certain provisions which were contained in the Senate bill.

Mr. President, what is being sought is how to get to conference at the earliest possible moment, in view of the fact that the majority, represented by the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), who is chairman of the subcommittee, feel they cannot take the House bill. If it were left to me, I would take the House bill in order to get the legislation enacted. However, if I am made a conferee, as I probably will be, I would, as I am sure would the Senator from Rhode Island, sustain the position of the Senate. On balance, everything considered, and notwithstanding the views I have expressed, I believe the course now laid out for us through these procedural moves is most likely to bring about enactment of the

legislation most quickly. That is why I told the Senator from Rhode Island I would go along with him. I thank the Senator.

Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator from New York for his cooperation in this regard.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to a third reading, was read the third time, and passed.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I move to amend the title of H.R. 13194 to read as follows:

A bill to increase funds for college student loans by increasing the authorization of appropriations for the national defense student loan program, and by providing for an incentive allowance for insured loans under title IV-B of the Higher Education Act of 1965 on a temporary basis, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Rhode Island.

The motion was agreed to.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the amendment I have offered will not be called up for a vote this evening but that after the morning hour tomorrow it will be the pending business and will be the subject of debate.

I remind the Senate that on August 12 I offered an amendment almost identical to the one I have sent to the desk today. During that time it was late in the evening and the amendment had not been printed. A lively debate ensued. Several Senators said at that time they would like to have time to consider it. I withdrew the amendment then and announced that when Congress reconvened I would again introduce it. I shall speak more at length in connection with the amendment tomorrow so that interested Senators will have an opportunity to read my explanation of the purpose of this amendment.

Section 401 of title IV on page 5 of the bill before us concerns itself with appropriations authorized under the bill, or any other act, for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States which may be allocated, in clause (1) to the support of the Vietnamese and other free world forces fighting in Vietnam; and in clause (2) to the support of local forces in Laos and Thailand.

On August 12 an amendment was offered by the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) and was modified by an amendment offered by the manager of the bill, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS). By agreement it was voted upon that the amount that could be provided under this section to these two clauses should not exceed \$2.5 billion.

If one reads this section it will be seen that no distinction is made in the language of section 401 between the types of aid that can be provided to the Vietnamese and allied forces fighting in Vietnam, and the types of aid which can be provided to the local forces who, I assume, are fighting against insurgents in Laos and Thailand.

It could be said that the legislative intent was that the same types of aid provided in Vietnam could be provided to the local forces in Laos and Vietnam. We are at war in Vietnam. We know we are providing to those forces in Vietnam not only equipment and materiel and supplies and everything necessary to conduct the war, but we are also providing something much more important, the young men of this country and many women who serve the wounded. There is much debate yet over Vietnam but we know we are at war. My amendment is intended to make a distinction between the types of aid which can be provided to the forces fighting in Vietnam, where we know we are at war, and to the local Laotian or Thailand forces which are fighting in those countries. It would restrict the provision of aid to those local forces, to which aid I would class generally as equipment supplies, materiel, and training that are necessary for them to carry on a war.

Some may object to that. If so they can offer an amendment upon that subject. But I assume we have been doing that for many years. I know that we have, first in the form of military aid provided through the regular foreign aid bill and, lately, through the Defense authorization bill.

I want it to be clearly understood that my amendment is intended to prohibit absolutely the use of our Armed Forces in combat to support the local forces in Laos and Thailand. It is intended, if it is possible, to do at least all that Congress can do to prevent the United States from moving step by step progressively into a new war, either in Laos or Thailand.

In my view, it does not invade the constitutional powers of the President of the United States. This question has been raised in debate. I shall answer it tomorrow, but I say now that we have the constitutional right, under section 8 of article 1 of the Constitution. It is one of the certain constitutional rights which Congress has; that is, to limit the appropriation of funds to carry on a war which at least we do not believe is in the interests of or is essential to the security of this Nation.

Mr. President, I think the amendment has some importance. Recently, we passed the national commitments resolution by a vote, as I recall, of 70 to 16; that resolution states the sense of the Senate. This amendment, dealing as it does with appropriations, is within our

constitutional power, and Congress can do what we think proper to assure that we shall not move into a war in Laos or Thailand as we moved slowly, step by step—unintentionally, I am sure, at first—into war in Vietnam.

Mr. President, I have sent a copy of the amendment to every Senator, together with a short statement in explanation of it.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point, first, the amendment which I have submitted; second, section 401 as the bill would read if my amendment were to be adopted; and, third, a copy of the letter which I sent to every Senator as a brief explanation of the amendment.

There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMENDMENT

On page 5, line 14, strike out "to support: (1)" and insert lieu thereof "(1) to support".

On page 5, line 15, strike out "(2) local forces in Laos and Thailand; and", and insert in lieu thereof "(2) to support local forces in Laos and Thailand, but support to such local forces shall be limited to the providing of supplies, materiel, equipment, and facilities, including maintenance thereof, and to the providing of training for such local forces, and (3)".

Mr. COOPER. Title IV, section 401 would read as follows if the amendment were adopted:

(a) Not to exceed \$2,500,000,000 of the funds authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes: (1) to support Vietnamese and other free world forces in Vietnam, (2) to support local forces in Laos and Thailand, but support to such local forces shall be limited to the providing of supplies, materiel, equipment, and facilities, including maintenance thereof, and to the providing of training for such local forces, and (3) for related costs, during the fiscal year 1970 on such terms and conditions under presidential regulations as the President may determine.

The letter follows:

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, D.C., September 15, 1969.

DEAR SENATOR: On August 12 I offered an amendment to clause (2), Section 401, Title IV of S. 2546, now pending before the Senate. Its purpose was to restrict the use of the funds appropriated under Section 401 in support of "local forces in Laos and Thailand" to equipment, materiel, supplies and training of such local forces and, to prevent the use of the armed forces of the United States in combat in support of local forces in Laos and Thailand.

After some debate, I withdrew the amendment as several members had suggested they wanted additional time for its study. I stated that I would introduce such an amendment when the Congress reconvened in September. The debate may be found on pages 23511-23518 in the Congressional Record of August 12.

I will introduce the enclosed amendment, or one substantially similar on September 17 and will ask that it be made the pending business at the first opportunity. The amendment would not affect clause (1), or restrict the support of Vietnamese or other free world forces fighting in Vietnam. It would prohibit the use of funds for the engagement of the armed forces of the United States in combat in Laos and Thailand in support of local forces of Laos and

Thailand. Its purpose is to prevent, if possible, the United States from becoming involved in a domestic war in Laos and Thailand, without the authority of the Congress.

If you should desire to become a cosponsor of the amendment, I would appreciate very much if you would advise me or have a member of your staff contact Mr. Will Haley on telephone extension 2542.

With kindest regards, I am

Yours sincerely,

JOHN SHERMAN COOPER.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, that is all I shall say this evening, but I will do my best tomorrow to see that this argument is made to as many Senators as possible. I shall ask for a yea-and-nay vote on the amendment. We can then make our decision as a body whether in this first test of the national commitments resolution, we intend to follow it. Most important, we shall decide, while we have an opportunity, and while there may be time, whether we will take the necessary step to prevent this country's becoming involved step by step, in a new war either in Laos or Thailand.

Mr. STENNIS. Will the Senator from Kentucky yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I have listened with interest to the Senator from Kentucky. As I understand it, the Senator proposes by his amendment to prevent the use of funds in Laos and Thailand that would be spent in connection with helping the troops of those countries engaged in war, and that the amendment would apply only to the \$2.5 billion in the bill, in this section of the bill.

Mr. COOPER. No. This section provides that the funds be authorized for appropriation "under this or any other act." We do not change that language. This would reach, as I understand it—

Mr. STENNIS. That is the way to get at it.

Mr. COOPER. It would reach, as I believe and intend, not only the funds provided under the bill but, as the language in section 401 provides, "under this or any other act."

Mr. STENNIS. So the Senator's amendment, then, would be sweeping in application—

Mr. COOPER. Yes, sweeping in application—

Mr. STENNIS. And would apply to any other funds under any other act.

Mr. COOPER. Except, as I pointed out, it only restricts the funds to the assistance designated by my amendment which, I believe, covers what is generally believed to be the types of assistance we are furnishing. There may be other types I do not know about, and I would like to be informed about them. But it is intended—and this is the thrust of the amendment—to prevent the funds appropriated to our Armed Forces to be used to put our Armed Forces in combat in Laos or Thailand to assist local forces. It does not involve the war in Vietnam in any way. I wish it were possible but we cannot do that.

Mr. STENNIS. The act here states "any other funds—in this act or any other funds." I think the Senator is correct in his interpretation, under this or any other act.

Mr. COOPER. That is the language of section 401.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. I want to comment here that I think the aid should be handled in a separate bill. I am not talking about the Senator's amendment. I am talking about the whole concept of this kind of aid. The bill we have here is what we call the hardware bill for tanks, guns, submarines, and so forth. This section applies to the whole military foreign aid program, for those countries, and takes in all the other acts.

Mr. COOPER. That is right. As the Senator knows, prior to 1967, this aid to Laos and Thailand, was provided for through the foreign aid bill.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. COOPER. Then the request came from the Department of Defense, agreed to by the Department of State, to put the aid previously provided in the foreign aid bill for Vietnam into the defense bill. One year later, they requested military assistance for Laos and Thailand be placed in the defense bill and the language in the letters addressed both to the Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Committees bears that out.

Mr. STENNIS. My point is that it should be a separate bill.

Mr. COOPER. I agree.

Mr. STENNIS. And handled with regard to the Senate, to come in here where it can be debated. The language as it reads now in the bill, even though it refers to this act or any other act, there is a limit of \$2.5 billion, a ceiling on it. It could not apply beyond that. So we have another—

Mr. COOPER. We have another problem—

Mr. STENNIS. We have another problem there to straighten out.

Mr. COOPER. If it is in the bill that comes along with money provided for this same purpose, I would expect to offer an amendment to that bill.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Kentucky yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. I am honored to be a cosponsor of the amendment. Will the Senator confirm to me that what he is seeking really to do is to pass a Gulf of Tonkin resolution in reverse; that, instead of permitting the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States for the given purposes which got us into Vietnam, we would prohibit the President from using the Armed Forces of the United States for purposes of defending with American troops whatever the President may think are our American interests?

Mr. COOPER. Yes. I do not assume the President wants to involve us in any war in Laos and Thailand. I assume he does not and I believe he does not. But the Senate has its responsibility. I believe this is the way to insure, as far as we can, that we do not become so involved.

Mr. JAVITS. This helps measurably to clear the way for another bill which would set out the affirmative policy. The real problem in the distinction between the Commander in Chief's power and the power of the Congress is that it gets blurred in its assertion. The Senator

may not have found the perfect way, but he is reaching for a way to assert our authority, not after the fact—and that is why he and I could not vote against appropriations to supply our troops in Vietnam—but before the fact, because this is advanced funding of precisely the kind of operations that could get us into another Vietnam.

Mr. COOPER. The Senator is correct. I never have, and the Senator never has, voted against appropriations for our Armed Forces in Vietnam needed for fighting there, but, as he has said, we were dealing with that matter after the fact. So far there has been no declaration by the President that we are at war in Laos or Thailand. Neither has Congress so declared. So this is before the fact. This is an opportunity to prevent it through the exercise of our constitutional processes, in our control over the money.

The Senator from New York has stated the purpose clearly, as he always does.

Mr. JAVITS. One other point which I think is very essential in this matter: This is not trying to anticipate a problem without our already seeing that the problem has substance and certain delineations. For example, I have had correspondence with the State Department going back to January 1968.

I ask unanimous consent that parts of that correspondence and certain other material may be made a part of this colloquy.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JANUARY 22, 1969.

HON. WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations,
Department of State, Washington,
D.C.

DEAR BILL: I believe you will recall from past correspondence my interest in the situation in Thailand and the evolution of United States policy and involvement in that nation. I am particularly concerned over the continuing possibility of the United States slipping by almost imperceptible steps—steps which have not received Congressional and public sanction—into another Vietnam-type situation.

A rather disturbing article concerning United States involvement in Thailand, written by Stanley Karnow, was published recently in the Washington Post. A copy of the article is attached. I would appreciate receiving the Department's comments on Mr. Karnow's article, and especially on the statement in the last paragraph: "One of the shortcomings of American policy here over the years has been its military rather than political orientation."

With best regards,

Sincerely,

JACOB K. JAVITS.

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 20, 1969]
AMERICANS ARE TRYING TO FEED THAI CULTURE
INTO A COMPUTER
(By Stanley Karnow)

BANGKOK.—The profusion of stylish American research outfits currently operating here under Pentagon auspices has lent a kind of Doctor Strangelove quality to the extensive U.S. military presence in this Southeast Asian kingdom.

There is a good deal of doubt, however, whether these outfits are producing anything worth the amounts of money they are spending—or, indeed, whether they are producing much of value at all.

It has even been suggested by knowledgeable sources that the effort to study and computerize almost every aspect of Thailand may be positively harmful in ways that are not immediately apparent.

About a dozen different research firms employing nearly 200 American specialists spend some \$11 million a year in Defense Department subsidies on various projects here.

Among these firms are the Stanford Research Institute, which has no connection with Stanford University, the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratories, which has no connection with Cornell University, and Associates in Research, or AIR, which evaluates the findings of the other groups.

Also present are Michigan State University, which used to function under the aegis of the Central Intelligence Agency in Vietnam, and Booz-Allen, a major U.S. management consultant company engaged here in what it calls "applied research." These and other outfits operate under contract to an organization known as the Advanced Research Projects Agency, or ARPA, which coordinates with the Military Research Development Center, whose initials form an acronym locally referred to as "Murdoch."

This elaborate structure burgeoned about four years ago when the State Department, unable to find funds to increase the U.S. Embassy staff in Bangkok, accepted a Defense Department offer to set up a research apparatus here.

The growth of this apparatus since then has paralleled the American military buildup in Thailand. In the process, the availability of Pentagon money has led to the mania for research that is, as one senior U.S. diplomat here described it, simply a "big boondoggle."

Some of the research outfits have undertaken such high-cost projects as the publication, for an estimated \$100,000, of a study entitled "The Blue Book of Coastal Vessels"—which is merely a book filled with pictures of Thai fishing boats.

Among other projects, an American specialist earning \$36,000 a year has spent the past two years trying to develop local "research capabilities" at Chiangmai University in the pleasantly cool hills of northern Thailand. The project is said to be still in the "organization stage."

A somewhat embarrassing situation arose not long ago when a former Oakland policeman working for the Stanford Research Institute undertook a \$280,000 project to test the use of infra-red photography to detect Communist guerrillas in southern Thailand.

But instead of concentrating on his experiments, this researcher befriended Laotian General Phoumi Nosavan, the one-time CIA protegee living in exile in southern Thailand. Soon the ex-cop was engaged in promoting Phoumi's plans to recapture Laos and, despite official sanctions against him, he is reported to be still acting as a free-lance adviser to the Laotian general.

In many respects, informed sources here submit, the cost to the American taxpayer of these activities is less significant than their effect on the Thais as well as the U.S. establishment here.

For one thing, members of these research outfits are unfamiliar with the intricacies of Thai culture and appear to believe that here, as back in the United States, large inputs of money and know-how are the key to progress. But just the reverse is often true.

An American education expert who has worked here for years points out, for example, that these outfits are disrupting Thai universities by handing them more money than they can absorb for programs they are unprepared to carry out.

As in Vietnam, moreover, the research groups here operate largely on the dubious thesis that "systems analysis" can measure local attitude. As a result, they are creating the illusion that they really know how Thais

feel because they have fed data into a computer.

Perhaps more important, the proliferation of these outfits functioning with Defense Department support has given the Pentagon a large role in gathering and analyzing intelligence and making policy decisions for Thailand.

One of the shortcomings of American policy here over the years has been its military rather than political orientation. And at this time, as the United States seeks diplomatic solutions for Southeast Asia, subduing the influence of the military establishment may be more imperative than ever.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, D.C., February 20, 1969.

HON. JACOB K. JAVITS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR JAVITS: I have received your letter of January 22, 1969 concerning a recent newspaper article about the research activities of the Department of Defense in Thailand.

The Advanced Research Projects Agency Field Unit (ARPA) in Bangkok, which is the organization conducting the research, is responsible to the Department of Defense and we believe questions concerning the details of the operation should be directed to that agency. However, knowing of your interest in U.S. policy in Thailand, I am pleased to comment on the broader issues your letter raises.

I note that you have expressed particular concern about a statement in the article that U.S. policy in Thailand has had a military rather than political orientation. Given the situation in Southeast Asia at present, the United States has necessarily had to undertake a number of significant military measures in Thailand: the deployment of substantial U.S. forces, large-scale military construction and increased assistance to the Thai armed forces. However, and particularly in our support for Thai counter-insurgency activities, we have made special efforts to ensure a balanced mixture of civil development programs, intelligence, police and information activities. There is, of course, a proper role for the military in a counter-insurgency program, but we believe that one of the lessons the Thai have learned from the Malayan and Vietnam experiences (thanks in part to some ARPA studies) has been the need to keep civil and police officials in the forefront of the counter-insurgency effort; and avoid "militarization" of the program. The balance of our Military Assistance Program and also the AID, and USIS programs in Thailand is designed to reflect this.

We are also mindful of the importance of political development in this situation, and you have no doubt seen reports in the press about the national elections which were held throughout Thailand on February 10. The decision to move toward political liberalization through promulgation of a Constitution and holding elections has, of course, been one for the Thai to make for themselves, and we have made this quite clear to them. However, numerous Thai leaders have been educated in the United States and Western Europe and are well aware of American views on these matters. It is from this group that the impetus for constitutional rule and elections has come.

In summary, then, we believe our policy has had the proper political balance and, as I hope the foregoing information makes clear, we have sought to avoid a number of the problems raised in the article.

If I can be of further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

MAY 6, 1968.

HON. WILLIAM B. MACOMBER,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations,
Department of State, Washington,
D.C.

DEAR BILL: I refer to my letter to you of February 6, 1968, and your thoughtful reply of February 23, concerning the situation in Thailand and U.S. involvement there.

I enclose an article from the New York Times of May 5, entitled "Thai Insurgency Raises Fears of a New Vietnam". I would appreciate receiving the State Department's comments on this article. I am particularly interested in the Department's assessment of the article's assertions, for instance, that: "More often than not, the (Thai) Government has met the challenge with a heavy-handed conventional response that has caused more problems than it solved"; and "The parallels to the early, clumsy stages of the allied effort in South Vietnam were uncomfortably apt. But with few exceptions, the American advice was ignored."

I would also appreciate the Department's comments on the accuracy of the report that the Thai government is considering the employment of Chinese Nationalist mercenaries in the anti-insurgency struggle, as well as the Department's view of the wisdom of such a course, if it is actually being considered.

Finally, I am also enclosing a copy of a colloquy I had with Senator Stennis on April 19, regarding U.S. involvement in Thailand, which expresses my concern that far reaching strategic decisions ought not be made on the basis of ad hoc tactical situations in the field, without appropriate consideration by the Senate and the nation.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

JACOB K. JAVITS.

THAI INSURGENCY RAISES FEARS OF A NEW VIETNAM

(By Terence Smith)

CHIANG KLANG, THAILAND, May 2.—Early one misty morning in February, an eight-man team of Communist terrorists slipped into the peaceful village of Meo Maw in the jungled mountains of northern Thailand.

Moving quietly between the thatch-roofed huts, they closed in on a shack where five members of the Government's Border Patrol Police lay sleeping. They opened fire with carbines and automatic weapons, pouring more than 300 rounds into the hut, killing four of the men inside and wounding the fifth.

Before the terrorists left the stunned village, the leader of the team told the headman: "The Thai Government claims to be your friends. Wait and see what they do about this. They will bomb your village and burn it."

Four days later, the Thai Government fulfilled the leader's prediction, thereby accomplishing more for the terrorists' cause than the terrorists could ever have achieved by themselves. Presumably convinced that the village was a Communist stronghold despite evidence to the contrary, the Thai Air Force sent three T-28 bombers to level the place.

Except for the school and three rice grainaries, Meo Maw is now ashes. The villagers, who previously harbored no ill will toward the Government, are scattered in the neighboring villages, dispossessed and disaffected.

THIRD FRONT OPENS

The tragedy of Meo Maw has been repeated dozens of times in the last five months as an ominous third front has opened in Thailand's flickering war with Communist insurgents.

More often than not, the Government has met the challenge with a heavy-handed conventional response that has caused more problems than it solved.

The new wave of assassinations, ambushes and violent jungle clashes broke out in December in the provinces of Nan and Chean-

gral, just to the south and east of the intersection of the Thai, Burmese and Laotian borders.

Though it is only five months old, the terrorism has already become the most pressing military problem of the Government in Bangkok. The efforts to combat the insurgency, which in themselves have aroused bitter debate, are costing more than \$250,000 a month.

The action in the north is a classic case study in how to start an insurgency movement from scratch and how to capitalize on the blunders of the Establishment. The terrorists in the north probably total no more than 300, but they have managed to produce results vastly out of proportion to their number and armed strength.

Government forces have been battling insurgents on two other fronts for the last three years. In a major effort assisted by more than \$100-million in United States military and economic aid, they have managed to contain terrorists operating in the drab, neglected provinces of the northeast, and in the tropical Kra Peninsula, to the south of Bangkok. In both cases, Government troops seem to be holding their own.

CHINA ANNOUNCED TARGET

The insurgent movements first broke to the surface, in 1965, shortly after Communist China announced Thailand as a target for a "people war of revolution."

The new campaign in the north has the same ideological bent, but it poses a far more difficult military problem. The jungled, mountainous terrain provides the insurgents with nearly impenetrable cover, and the presence of a large and disaffected group of hill tribesmen offers them a potential source of intelligence, food and manpower.

The tribesmen are largely Meo and Yao and there are about 250,000 of them scattered throughout the northern section of Thailand. Semimadic and ethnically apart from the Thais, they have long been wary of the Government in Bangkok, though not openly hostile.

The relationship was strained in recent years when the Government outlawed the tribesmen's favorite crop, opium, and ordered them to cease their "slash and burn" farming technique, which was denuding the forests of the north.

Into this area of discontent came the original bands of Communist terrorists last year. Composed largely of Meos, with some Thais, they had been trained in leftist ideology and insurgency techniques by the North Vietnamese in Hoabinh, 50 miles southwest of Hanoi.

The terrorists spent most of the year seeking recruits in the remote Meo villages and preaching their gospel. In enforced propaganda sessions, where the villagers listened at gunpoint, they would harangue about the perfidy of the Thai Government and the imperialist United States presence in Thailand.

By the end of the year, they were ready to come into the open. The first incident occurred Dec. 2 in Houi Kon, a mountain village near the Laotian border. An eight-man patrol of the paramilitary Border Patrol Police was ambushed by a band of terrorists. Two policemen were killed and four were wounded, but two escaped to tell the story at provincial headquarters. In a pique, the police command ordered the village where the terrorists supposedly had been based evacuated and burned.

AMBUSH RATE ROSE

The rate of ambushes and engagements rose sharply during the next several weeks and the Government responded by rushing heavy concentrations of troops and firepower to the area.

Unfamiliar with the territory and unaccustomed to the terrain, the regular forces were decimated by booby traps and cut down in confused jungle battles. Again they re-

sponded with force. Meo villages that were suspected of harboring Communists were evacuated and the air force was called in to drop bombs and napalm on wide swatches of the angled, green hillsides.

After five months of fighting, and more than 60 engagements, the Government's forces have killed about 200 terrorists and captured about 60, according to Col. Sima Panigbutra, the chief of staff of the Thai Third Army. Most of these, he concedes, are probably not from the basic group of trained Communists, but rather Meo sympathizers. The figure of 200 dead is an estimate, since the terrorists have carried away nearly all their casualties.

The Government forces, who number about 4,000 in the area, have suffered 150 casualties, according to Colonel Sima. Fifteen others were killed last week when a terrorist band wiped out a police outpost in Chiangrai Province.

MAY 24, 1968.

HON. JACOB K. JAVITS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR JAVITS: Thank you for your comments in your letter of May 6 regarding our reply to your February letter about Thailand. I sincerely regret the delay in responding to your latest inquiry.

The newspaper article to which you refer is correct in its general import, that initial Thai suppression efforts against tribal insurgency along the northern border were indiscriminate and unduly harsh. However, rather than a quarter million Meo and Yao tribesmen, there are probably fewer than 75,000, and the number of armed tribal insurgents is estimated at 250. More important, is the fact that the northern insurgency is in part an outgrowth of long-standing antagonism between the hill tribes and the Thai plains population. For this reason, Communist activity among the tribes is likely to arouse a negative reaction among the Thai majority, and as a result will probably prove self-limiting.

Fortunately, the unimpressive results of initial suppression campaigns coupled with the continuing efforts of American advisors have led the Thai authorities to reassess the tribal insurgency problem and abandon their earlier harsh tactics. Showing a commendable willingness to acknowledge their mistakes, the Thai have now abandoned relocation plans in favour of permitting tribal villagers to remain where they are. Civic action measures are under way to improve living conditions for the tribes and thus encourage better relations with the Thai Government, and the Army and Police are forming security units of tribal volunteers for service in the insurgency-threatened areas.

No one expects the Thai Government's new approach to show immediate results, particularly in view of the traditional lack of communication and understanding between the lowland Thais and the Meo and Yao tribesmen. However, we believe that the new policy is a hopeful development and will in time win and retain for the Thai Government and people the friendship and loyalty of the tribes.

As for the report that the Thai Government is considering the employment of Chinese Nationalist mercenaries, our information is that the "troops" involved are the so-called "KMT" irregulars, who have been in the Thai-Laos-Burma border area since 1950. The degree of control over these forces exercised by the Government of the Republic of China is very tenuous indeed. The Thai Government is not in a position to expel or resettle these irregulars and, recognizing this fact, has been willing to tolerate their presence as a potential anti-Communist force in relatively inaccessible border areas.

There have been reports of contacts with the "KMT" irregulars by local officials suggesting that they might take over the role of the Border Patrol Police and Thai Army forces, which have been deployed away from the border area to meet the Communist threat elsewhere in North Thailand. However, we have seen no confirmation that the Thai Government has entered into any agreement with the "KMT" or proposes to use them in military operations.

We have read with interest your exchange with Senator Stennis regarding U.S. involvement in Thailand and your concern that we may be slipping inadvertently into another Viet-Nam-type situation in Thailand. In this connection, I invite your attention to the joint communique issued by President Johnson and Prime Minister Thanom on May 9 in which the latter noted that "while welcoming foreign assistance in the form of training, equipment and advice, the Royal Thai Government regarded defeating the insurgency as a Thai responsibility to be carried out by its own forces. The President made clear the intention of the United States to continue its assistance to Thailand to help the Royal Thai Government with the means of meeting illegal Communist activities."

All U.S. advisors in Thailand, both civilian and military, operate under instructions from the Ambassador which strictly enjoin them from becoming involved in any combat situation in connection with the insurgency. This reflects the wishes of the Thai Government as well.

If I can be of further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, JR.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

FEBRUARY 6, 1968.

Mr. WILLIAM MACOMBER, JR.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

DEAR BILL: Attached is a recent article from the New York Times which maintains that "the underlying hostility" of many Thais has "exploded into the open" in recent weeks.

In view of the extent of our involvement of Thailand, its central role in our whole strategy in Southeast Asia and especially Vietnam, I would appreciate receiving the State Department's comments on Mr. Gruson's article and the basic issues it raises. What I especially desire is the Department's assessment of the viability of our strategy in Thailand, which must rest upon the assumptions that the Thai people welcome our assistance wholeheartedly and that the Government of Thailand is willing and able to institute reforms which will effectively combat the communist insurrection now taking place there.

With warm regards,
Sincerely,

JACOB K. JAVITS.

THAIS VENT ANGER OVER U.S. BUILD-UP—
AMERICAN OFFICIALS PUZZLED BY RECENT
PUBLIC HOSTILITY

(By Sidney Gruson)

BANGKOK, THAILAND, February 3.—The underlying hostility felt by many Thais to the build-up of United States military and civilian personnel in Thailand has exploded into the open in recent weeks, causing official American concern and also bafflement over how to meet the problem.

Relations at the official level remain proper. In many individual cases they are close and good. But the American impact on the Thai society and economy is beginning to be felt at nearly all levels as Thailand's commitment in the Vietnam war increases.

There are about 43,000 American military men and about 7,000 civilians in Thailand on a more or less permanent basis, four-fifths of them involved in the air war against Vietnam. There are also about 5,000 American soldiers from Vietnam on rest and recreation each month.

IMPACT IS EVIDENT

The American impact is easy to see in Bangkok, with a population of more than two million, but it is even more evident in the small towns near the huge Air Force bases on which most of the 33,000 Air Force personnel live.

Thailand's need to line up firmly on the United States in Vietnam does not seem in question in the increasingly public debate over the American presence here. The Government recently committed itself to raising the number of Thai combat troops in Vietnam from 3,000 men to a full division, or 12,000 to 13,000.

A critical book about Thailand by Louis Lomax, a free-lance writer and a radio and television commentator in Los Angeles, sparked the current criticism of the American presence. As read by the Thais, the book, entitled "The War That Is, the War That Will Be," insulted King Phumiphon Aduldet and indicated that Thailand was ripe to become another Vietnam.

IRKED BY NEWSWEEK ITEM

An item in the magazine Newsweek, which the Thais felt impugned the King's courage on a visit to the northeastern insurgency area, sharpened the hostility. But many Americans here feel that the violence of the reaction disclosed deep feelings that had only awaited an excuse to be aired.

The most violent hostility was expressed in the writings of a respected journalist, Kukrit Pramoj, who had never been considered anti-American but is distantly related to the royal family. Some Americans here try to dismiss Mr. Kukrit's outburst as a momentary fit of temper, but he has deliberately refrained from taking anything back in the exchanges with readers that his attack provoked.

Writing last December in his paper Siam Rath, Mr. Kukrit blamed the Americans for practically every evil in Thai social and economic life and referred to them as "mung," a word of contempt in Thai used instead of "they" or "you."

If the Americans were not careful, he said, the Thais might one day "smash down your embassy and burn down the United States Information Service." He concluded his lengthy article: "You American beasts, return to your holes."

ACCUSED OF EXPLOITATION

According to Mr. Kukrit, the Americans detest the Thais because the United States has only relatively recently freed itself from colonial status while Thais have always been independent. "It is a characteristic of slaves to prefer fellow slaves," he said.

He accused the United States of economic exploitation of Thailand, of seeking to destroy Thai independence and of destroying the nation's economy. He said American troops were not only creating vast numbers of prostitutes but were also teaching Thai boys "to indulge in sexual perversion."

"It is frankly admitted," he wrote, "that every one in six American men is a sexual pervert."

The Thai press is strictly controlled by the Government, an authoritarian military-administration. No one in the Government sought to correct the impression that Mr. Kukrit's article might have spread.

READERS DISPUTE VIEW

Some readers did, however, pointing out that an economy that was moving ahead at an annual growth rate of 8 per cent was not being destroyed. They also criticized him for generalizing about Americans because of the possible bad behavior of a few soldiers.

When the few Thais who have regular social contact with Americans are asked what it is they dislike about the American presence here, they usually lead off, as Mr. Kukrit did, with criticism of soldiers holding girls' hands or kissing girls in public. Next there usually is comment on the proliferation of euphemistically called "massage" parlors, as though Americans and not Thais ran the parlors.

No one seems to know why the Thais do not forbid the parlors.

The outburst by Mr. Kukrit and others led the American Ambassador, Leonard Unger, to issue a statement that the people writing books and articles about Thailand were definitely not speaking for the United States Government or for the American people.

In a speech to the American Chamber of Commerce last month, the Ambassador warily took up the issue again.

SERIOUSLY TROUBLED

"In the course of political battles over Vietnam," he said, "many Americans naturally want to examine our commitments elsewhere in the area."

"I do not quarrel with the usefulness of responsible free debate," he added. "I am seriously troubled, however, when I see certain facts about Thai-United States cooperation misread in ways that damage Thai-American interests, and encumber the Vietnam problem with negative and discouraging implications which do not actually exist."

"Having governed themselves for over 700 years," Ambassador Unger continued, "the Thais feel no need to adjust their way of doing things to meet foreign concepts of how things should be done. Moreover, having decided that defending Vietnam is in Thailand's own best interests, they do not want their actions interpreted—or misinterpreted—in lights cast by the clash of conflicting views over similar United States policies."

"Understandably, they resent the bland assumption that the pattern of events in a neighboring state inevitably will be repeated in their own," he said.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, D.C., February 23, 1968.

HON. JACOB K. JAVITS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR JAVITS: I have received your letter of February 6, 1968 in which you raise questions about the viability of American policy in Thailand.

There is no question that the presence of nearly 45,000 American servicemen in Thailand raises problems in U.S.-Thai relations. Basically, the presence of these forces is welcomed by both the Thai Government and its people as evidence of the United States determination to defend Thailand and Southeast Asia against Communist expansion. Also, the incidents record for American servicemen in Thailand is one of the lowest in the world. This reflects the firm discipline exercised by the commanders and the excellent behavior of our troops, in which I believe we can all take considerable pride.

However, the very size of our forces has inevitably resulted in friction because of differences in standard of living and cultural patterns between American servicemen and Thais in the areas where our forces are stationed. The problems arising from the presence of these forces are clearly recognized by all elements of the United States Mission in Thailand and extensive efforts are being made through joint Thai-U.S. committees in the base areas, indoctrination programs, and close supervision on the part of base commanders to reduce these inevitable frictions to an absolute minimum. Our Embassy's overall assessment of this problem is that so far there are no meaningful indications of anti-Americanism although we are experiencing a loss of pro-Americanism in Thailand.

While U.S. press coverage of Thailand by

and large has been fair and favorable, there have been a number of critical articles in recent months to which the Thai have taken strong exception. Unfortunately, both in these articles and in Thai rebuttals, the basically separate issues of (1) U.S. troop presence and problems arising therefrom, and (2) U.S. press criticism of Thailand, have tended to become mixed together. Late last year our Ambassador in Bangkok issued a statement in which he sought to set the record straight on the latter point and put the critical press articles in proper perspective. The statement was widely publicized by the Thai press, and reports reaching the Department indicate that it had a salutary effect.

The increased Thai sensitivity to the press criticism is also a reflection of the increasingly political atmosphere in Bangkok resulting from growing anticipation of an early return to Constitutional rule. An attendant feeling of greater nationalism is to be expected in these circumstances, and results in strong reactions against foreign criticism. This is a problem in U.S. foreign relations that is not unique to Thailand. Both we and the Thai Government are seeking to explain our policies as clearly and openly as possible, but there are obvious (and proper) limits to governmental influence on a free press.

You have also raised the question of whether the Thai Government is willing to institute measures which will effectively combat the Communist insurgency now taking place there. We believe there is considerable evidence that the Thai are doing so. There are increasing signs that the new Constitution will be promulgated soon. In addition, Thailand has just held the first municipal and provincial elections in ten years. It is the view of our Embassy and other observers that these were conducted fairly and honestly. The Thai Government, with U.S. support, is engaged in a wide variety of programs designed to raise the standard of living and provide greater security for its rural population in areas threatened by Communist insurgency. These programs include not only economic measures, but also provide for considerable decentralization of power to the local authorities. Systematic programs are being carried out to train local leaders to ensure that the government's economic measures respond to the needs of the local population.

For all of these reasons, we believe that our policies toward Thailand do rest on a viable basis. However, both we and the Thai Government are keenly aware of the problems which you have high-lighted in your letter and these matters are receiving continuing high-level attention.

If I can be of assistance to you at any time, please do not hesitate to let me know. Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, JR.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the correspondence deals with concern as to what kind of arrangements and agreements have been entered into, arrangements and agreements negotiated by the executive branch without the concurrence of the Senate. What is this contingency plan that we hear so much about with respect to Thailand? What are our troops actually engaged in there? What might they be engaged in? U.S. troops are in there, as we all know. So, acting in a forehanded way, as the Senator is, is he not rather than imagining an alarm, actually seeing a state of facts which might lead in that direction?

Mr. COOPER. Absolutely. We have had the example and experience of almost 20 years in our association and con-

nection with the war in Vietnam. Now in looking back we can see the path, step by step, that we moved into that war. As I said, and as the Senator from New York said, we were sure that neither President Eisenhower nor President Kennedy nor President Johnson intended it to come to this stage of war, but it did. Some of the things that happened in Vietnam in the beginning are beginning to happen in Laos and Thailand.

Mr. JAVITS. Another thing I know the Senator would wish to make very clear is that this represents no derogation or denigration of the very strong, high-level, self-dependency which has been shown by the Thais and their passionate attachment to their own national integrity and independence. I am sure the Senator, like I, would want to do everything to shore that up, to support it and to help it, and not that we in any way entertain any doubts about our stout ally.

Mr. COOPER. I agree. I have been in Thailand. I have never been in Laos. I have talked with some of the leaders in Thailand. The Senator is correct. The amendment does not limit in any way the types and kinds of aid I understand we are furnishing both Laos and Thailand. The amendment does not derogate or denigrate the Thais or their country or the Laotians or their country in the struggle they have undertaken. We are supporting them. The amendment would reserve to the Congress its control over the aid so that, if we were approaching a war in those countries, we could insist that we make our judgment, along with the President, as to whether it was essential to our national interest.

Mr. JAVITS. Will the Senator yield just once more?

Mr. COOPER. Yes.

Mr. JAVITS. Is it a fact also that what we are seeking is a better accommodation between the legislative and executive power in this area of vital national concern? This is an effort to protect the legislative power, but we would continue to welcome the more effective and precise articulation of the executive powers so that we may come to a much more perfect arrangement than what we feel has been the source of the difficulty in these last few years. Somehow or other, the inherent authority of Congress has slipped from its hands by the ad hoc authorities which it has surrogated to the President from time to time, which it thought was essential to the national security under the conditions prevailing.

Mr. COOPER. Absolutely. I am very glad to raise the level of this proposal to that scale, because, in a sense, we are saying that in the future we expect to assure a better relationship between the legislative and executive branches of the Government in this field which is so vital. The Senator has raised it to a high level.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank my colleague.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, for the information of Members of the Senate, it is my hope that when we conclude with the debate over the Cooper amendment, which is the pending amendment, I will call up a revised "defense profits study amendment."

My amendment would call for a single study by the GAO of defense profits.

The amendment has the support of the Comptroller General, who has written me that such a study needs to be done, that he is willing to do it, and that he has the staff to do it.

The study would be made as soon as practicable, but a report on it to Congress is called for by December 31, 1970. If additional time is needed, it can be asked for.

My amendment provides that any additional studies of profits could be made by the GAO, under the authority of this amendment, at the direction of either the House or Senate Armed Services Committee.

My amendment gives the Comptroller General the authority to examine the records of defense contractors which he must have, but prohibits him from making public any information about a company's commercial profits or commercial business data which is confidential.

I may point out that this amendment has the unanimous support of the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, including Republican and Democratic members alike.

This amendment differs from my previous amendment in that it provides for a single, rather than a continuing, study. It has the support of the Comptroller General. It was called for by a unanimous report, as I said, of the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee. Confidential commercial information cannot be made public.

We need a profits study. We do not now have one. I hope the Senate will support my amendment when I call it up, hopefully after we complete work on the present amendment.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my amendment be printed at this point in the RECORD. This is a revised amendment, not the one that was printed a week or so ago.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter which I received from Mr. Staats and to which I have referred, concerning the amendment, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the amendment and the letter were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMENDMENT

At the end of title IV of the bill add a new section as follows:

"SEC. 402. (a) The Comptroller General of the United States (hereinafter in this section referred to as the 'Comptroller General') is authorized and directed, as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this section, to conduct a study and review on a selective basis of the profits made by contractors and subcontractors on contracts entered into by the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, the Coast Guard, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under the authority of chapter 137 of title 10, United States Code, and on contracts entered into by the Atomic Energy Commission to meet requirements of the Department of Defense. The results of such study and review shall be submitted to the Congress as soon as practicable, but in no event later

than December 31, 1970. The Comptroller General is further authorized, upon request of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate or the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, to conduct a study and review regarding the amount of profit which has been or may be realized under any contract referred to in the first sentence of this subsection. The Comptroller General shall submit to the committee which requested such study and review a written report of the results of such study and review as soon as practicable.

"(b) Any contractor or subcontractor referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall, upon the request of the Comptroller General, prepare and submit to the General Accounting Office such information as the Comptroller General determines necessary or appropriate in conducting any study and review authorized by subsection (a) of this section. Information required under this subsection shall be submitted by a contractor or subcontractor in response to a written request made by the Comptroller General and shall be submitted in such form and detail as the Comptroller General may prescribe and shall be submitted within a reasonable period of time.

"(c) In order to determine the costs, including all types of direct and indirect costs, of performing any contract or subcontract referred to in subsection (a) of this section, and to determine the profit, if any, realized under any such contract or subcontract, either on a percentage of cost basis or a return on private capital employed basis, the Comptroller General and authorized representatives of the General Accounting Office are authorized to audit and inspect and to make copies of any books, accounts, or other records of any such contractor or subcontractor.

"(d) The Comptroller General, or any officer or employee designated by him for such purpose, may sign and issue subpoenas requiring the production of such books, accounts, or other records as may be material to the study and review carried out by the Comptroller General under this section.

"(e) In case of disobedience to a subpoena, the Comptroller General or his designee may invoke the aid of any district court of the United States in requiring the production of books, accounts, or other records. Any district court of the United States within the jurisdiction in which the contractor or subcontractor is found or resides or in which the contractor or subcontractor transacts business may, in case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued by the Comptroller General, issue an order requiring the contractor or subcontractor to produce books, accounts, and other records; and any failure to obey such order of the court shall be punished by the court as a contempt thereof.

"(f) No book, account, or other record, or copy of any book, account, or record, of any contractor or subcontractor obtained by the Comptroller General under authority of this section which is not necessary for determining the profitability on any contract between such contractor or subcontractor and the Department of Defense shall be available for examination, without the consent of such contractor or subcontractor, by any individual other than a duly authorized officer or employee of the General Accounting Office; and no officer or employee of the General Accounting Office shall disclose, to any person not authorized by the Comptroller General to receive such information, any information obtained under authority of this section relating to cost, expense, or profitability on any non-defense business transaction of any contractor or subcontractor.

"(g) The Comptroller General shall not disclose in any report made by him to the Congress or to either Committee on Armed Services under authority of this section any confidential information relating to the cost,

expense, or profit of any contractor or subcontractor on any non-defense business transaction of such contractor or subcontractor."

COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES,
Washington, D.C., September 15, 1969.
Hon. WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: Reference is made to your amendment to the Military Procurement Authorization Bill which would direct the Comptroller General to make a present study and review of profits made by defense contractors and subcontractors and to make future studies of defense profits when directed to do so by either the Senate or House Committees on Armed Services.

As we have previously testified before your Subcommittee on Economy in Government, we think a study of profits of defense contractors and subcontractors is desirable. We are willing to undertake this task in the event Congress should adopt your amendment, and we believe we can make at least the initial study within our present staff capability.

Sincerely yours,
ELMER B. STAATS,
Comptroller General of the United States.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

POLLUTION AT CAPE COD

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, it has just come to my attention—in the past 4 hours, as a matter of fact—that a barge named the *Florida* has run aground just off the entrance of the harbor at West Falmouth, Mass. The barge, carrying 147,000 gallons of oil, has sprung a number of leaks, and at the present time oil is spilling out at a rapid rate. There is a strong wind down there on Buzzards Bay this evening, and in spite of the fact that the Coast Guard is on the job, as well as the Federal and State Water Pollution Control Administrations, and they are all attempting to work together at trying to provide a barrier around the leak and stop it, or control it, it still appears that, as the tide runs out in Buzzards Bay, there will be thousands of gallons of oil spreading all over the shore areas. This will cause serious damage to the coastal area, not to mention the damage caused to the marine sanctuary areas and the wildlife that exist on that part of Cape Cod, Martha's Vineyard, the Elizabeth Islands, and southeastern Massachusetts.

Anyone who is familiar with the area knows that the Elizabeth Islands are a preserve for many of the birds which will be migrating about this time of the year; and this kind of disaster will bring great suffering and loss of much wildlife, as well as severely damaging a considerable amount of property and number of boats in the area.

I think all of us are aware of the problems of the sea and of the natural disasters associated with it. For example, we

have heard only in the past few days statements by those who represent Mississippi, who talked about the hurricanes which have come through that part of our country and wrought tremendous disasters.

We could all agree that it is about time, Mr. President, when we have seen in this country the extraordinary kinds of disasters that the spillage of oil has wrought in such places as Santa Barbara, Calif., and 2 years ago when there was a considerable amount of spillage in the lower part of the Cape when some sea-going vessel spilled oil at Nauset Beach on Cape Cod.

In hearings before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, we have learned that even since Santa Barbara, there have been a series of other incidents—for example, in the Gulf of Mexico and in Cook Inlet in Alaska, three incidents under U.S. jurisdiction, involving oil spillage. Still, Mr. President, whether it is oil gushing out of a well at the bottom of the sea, or whether the cause of the damage is, as in this case, some of these coastal carriers, we still do not have an intelligent, concise policy as to what will be done and what should be done in terms of providing some protection not only for those who live along the sea, but for the many people who live in our urban areas and enjoy the national parks which abut the sea.

I strongly feel, first of all, Mr. President, that at least the carriers of oil along the coast certainly ought to carry some kind of bonding, which all transporters of oil would be required to have. Furthermore, the burden of proof should be shifted. They would have to demonstrate that there was no negligence or fault in order that the cost of any clean-up in such cases—and that is about the best we can do—will not be borne by either the Federal Government, the State government, the local government, or the private citizen.

We are not talking in the same terms, when we speak of transportation of oil along the coastal areas, as when speaking of transportation of lumber or bricks. If ships carrying such commodities go aground, and the bricks sink to the bottom of the ocean, that certainly is a loss to those who have an investment in them, but that is not the kind of damage to others we have seen caused far too often by those who make a profit by traveling along the sea.

At the present time, such coastal shippers are civilly liable for damages. We realize that the burden of proof is not severe, but nevertheless, the penalties, even under civil liability, are extremely inadequate. We are talking about a few thousand dollars, when the damage can be in the millions of dollars.

Therefore, Mr. President, I hope that we can, and I intend to, introduce legislation which would reach this problem, to provide some kind of bonding mechanism to assure that those who live along the coastal areas will be afforded some assurance that when damage is done, and it is not the fault of natural disaster, but is due to fault or negligence, there will be some kind of procedure to insure it will be effectively cleaned up by those at fault.

Second, Mr. President, I intend to propose an amendment to the Water Pollution Control Act, directing the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration to set standards for emulsifiers and dispersants. At the present time, it is problematical whether the Water Pollution Control Administration will develop any firm standards. I think we should obviate that, and that information should be made available to State and local authorities so the various States will have a very clear idea as to the most effective measures that they could take in a given kind of situation, and the various State authorities would then be able to be equipped with various kinds of emulsifiers, to assure at least that the problem could be handled expeditiously.

So I intend to offer, in due course, such an amendment to the Water Pollution Control Act.

Mr. President, I certainly hope, in spite of the extraordinary efforts which I know are underway at this very moment by the Corps of Engineers, the Coast Guard, and various other Federal agencies, that we can establish at least some centralized emergency task force—within, perhaps, the Corps of Engineers, which has an extensive responsibility in this area, on perhaps within the Department of Interior.

This concept is sufficiently flexible so that under it a community or State would be able to make one call to one authority and receive the latest information, the best kind of assistance, and the most expeditious kind of action that

could be taken to meet the peculiar fact situation that a community faces, instead of relying upon Members of Congress to do it.

I had the opportunity this afternoon to call the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of the Interior, and various other agency representatives who would be interested in this matter to try to alert them. They acted quickly, but it does seem to me that we could have a group of officials which could fly to the immediate scene of an oil spill, with the latest information and techniques at their fingertips. We have a similar technique for aircraft accidents, and we should have the same for oil spill disasters.

We have learned a great deal in the recent past, and we have a great deal of knowhow and technology in this area. That information should be made available to any of the communities involved.

I am hopeful that the administration—and I am sure they will—will give this matter the first priority. We are in desperate need there of this kind of help and assistance. And there is every indication that this will be a priority item.

I wanted to draw this matter to the attention of the Members of the Senate this evening, because I feel that once again we have suffered a considerable tragedy in our coastal areas. And no matter how much we know or how skilled we are—the oil is spreading, now, over beaches, boats, and wildlife. And much of the damage will be permanent.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 54 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, September 17, 1969, at 12 o'clock noon.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate September 16, 1969:

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

Henry J. Costanzo, of the District of Columbia, to be Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank for a term of 3 years and until his successor has been appointed.

U.S. ATTORNEY

Bert C. Hurn, of Missouri, to be U.S. attorney for the western district of Missouri for the term of 4 years, vice Calvin K. Hamilton.

U.S. MARSHAL

John T. Pierpont, Jr., of Missouri, to be U.S. marshal for the western district of Missouri for the term of 4 years, vice Francis M. Wilson, term expired.

IN THE AIR FORCE

Judge Advocate General

Brig. Gen. James S. Cheney, SSAN [redacted] to be the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force, and appointment to the temporary and permanent grade of major general under the provisions of section 8072 and chapter 839, title 10 of the United States Code.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Tuesday, September 16, 1969

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

Rev. James H. Weber, St. Joseph Church, Oil City, Pa., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, bless our Nation and keep it faithful to the ideas of freedom, justice, and brotherhood for all which make it great. Lord, You claim that if You are lifted up, You will draw all men to Yourself. Our astronauts have demonstrated literally and successfully this principle. Be close to our President and our Congress. Give them vision and courage as they ponder decisions affecting peace and the future of the world. Give all of us the wisdom to listen and to understand and not to judge. Keep us compassionate toward our fellow citizens who are struggling for an identity. Help us Americans humbly to be aware not just of our human limitations and weaknesses but also of our extraordinary potential. Reawaken personal confidence in ourselves as individuals and in our beloved country. Make this great land and all its peoples know clearly Thy will so that we live vigorously, courageously, and uprightly. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

RECESS

The SPEAKER. The Chair declares a recess subject to the call of the Chair.

Accordingly (at 12 o'clock and 3 minutes p.m.) the House stood in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

JOINT MEETING OF THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS TO RECEIVE THE APOLLO 11 ASTRONAUTS

The SPEAKER of the House presided. At 12 o'clock and 19 minutes p.m., the Doorkeeper (William M. Miller) announced the Vice President and Members of the U.S. Senate who entered the Hall of the House of Representatives, the Vice President taking the chair at the right of the Speaker, and the Members of the Senate the seats reserved for them.

The SPEAKER. The Chair appoints as members of the committee on the part of the House to escort our distinguished visitors into the Chamber the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. ALBERT; the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. BOGGS; the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. HEBERT; the gentleman from California, Mr. MILLER; the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. RODINO; the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. GERALD R. FORD; the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. ARENDS; the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. FULTON; and the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. McCULLOCH.

The VICE PRESIDENT. On behalf of the Senate the Vice President appoints the following Senators to escort our distinguished astronauts into the Chamber:

Senator RICHARD RUSSELL, of Georgia; Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, of Montana; Senator CLINTON ANDERSON, of New Mexico; Senator EDWARD M. KENNEDY, of Massachusetts; Senator ROBERT C. BYRD, of West Virginia; Senator HUGH SCOTT, of Pennsylvania; Senator MARGARET CHASE SMITH, of Maine; Senator MILTON R. YOUNG, of North Dakota; and Senator GORDON ALLOTT, of Colorado.

The Doorkeeper announced the ambassadors, ministers, and chargés d'affaires of foreign governments.

The ambassadors, ministers, and chargés d'affaires of foreign governments entered the Hall of the House of Representatives and took the seats reserved for them.

The Doorkeeper announced the Cabinet of the President of the United States.

The members of the Cabinet of the President of the United States entered the Hall of the House of Representatives and took the seats reserved for them in front of the Speaker's rostrum.

At 12 o'clock and 34 minutes p.m., the Doorkeeper announced the Apollo 11 astronauts.

Mr. Neil A. Armstrong; Lt. Col. Michael Collins, U.S. Air Force; and Col. Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., U.S. Air Force, accompanied by the committee of the escort, entered the Chamber and stood at the Clerk's desk.

[Applause, the Members rising.]

The SPEAKER. My distinguished colleagues of the Congress, we are honoring today three men who represent the