

Mr. MADDEN and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. DADDARIO and to include extraneous matter.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MILLER of Ohio), to extend their remarks and include additional matter:)

Mr. HASTINGS.

Mr. McEWEN in 10 instances.

Mr. GUBSER.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin.

Mr. KEITH in two instances.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. ANDERSON of California), to extend their remarks and include additional matter:)

Mr. PREYER of North Carolina.

Mr. ROONEY of New York.

Mr. LONG of Maryland in three instances.

Mr. CORMAN in five instances.

Mr. FRASER in two instances.

Mr. DADDARIO in five instances.

Mr. GRIFFIN in two instances.

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON.

Mr. GONZALEZ in two instances.

Mr. HELSTOSKI in two instances.

SENATE ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

The SPEAKER announced his signature to an enrolled joint resolution of the Senate of the following title:

S.J. Res. 85. Joint resolution to provide for the designation of the period from August 26, 1969, through September 1, 1969, as "National Archery Week."

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 12 o'clock and 23 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until Monday, August 4, 1969, at 12 o'clock noon.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. COLMER: Committee on Rules. House Resolution 509. Resolution for consideration of H.R. 9951, a bill to provide for the collection of the Federal unemployment tax in quarterly installments during each taxable year; to make status of employer depend on employment during preceding as well as current taxable year; to exclude from the computation of the excess the balance in the employment security administration account as of the close of fiscal years 1970 through 1972; to raise the limitation on the amount authorized to be made available for expenditure out of the employment security administration account by the amounts so excluded; and for other purposes (Rept. No. 91-412). Referred to the House Calendar.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ANDERSON of California:

H.R. 13269. A bill to amend chapter 3 of title 38, United States Code, in order to provide for a veterans outreach services program in the Veterans' Administration to assist eligible veterans, especially those recently separated, in applying for and obtaining benefits and services to which they are entitled, and education, training, and employment, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. MILLS (for himself and Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin):

H.R. 13270. A bill to reform the income tax laws; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BUTTON:

H.R. 13271. A bill to permit expenditures in connection with certain schools in Schenectady, N.Y., to be counted as local grants-in-aid to federally assisted urban renewal projects and neighborhood development programs in Schenectady; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. DADDARIO (for himself and Mr. MOSHER):

H.R. 13272. A bill to establish a national policy for the environment and to establish a Citizens' Advisory Committee on Environ-

mental Quality; to the Committee on Science and Astronautics.

By Mr. FRASER:

H.R. 13273. A bill to amend section 312 of the Housing Act of 1964 to eliminate the provision which presently limits eligibility for residential rehabilitation loans thereunder to persons whose income is within the limits prescribed for below-market-interest-rate mortgages insured under section 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. HASTINGS (for himself and

Mr. SMITH of New York):

H.R. 13274. A bill to amend the Social Security Act to establish a national program of income maintenance payments to needy individuals who are aged, blind, or disabled and Federal-State programs of public assistance to all other needy individuals and families, to provide grants to States for services to all needy individuals and families, to strengthen Federal support of the State medical assistance programs, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. HENDERSON:

H.R. 13275. A bill to amend title 39, United States Code, to exclude from the U.S. mails as a special category of nonmailable matter certain obscene material sold or offered for sale to minors, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. HICKS (for himself, Mr. MEEBS, and Mr. PELLY):

H.R. 13276. A bill to amend the Tariff Schedules of the United States with respect to the rate of duty on whole skins of mink, whether or not dressed; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MONTGOMERY:

H.R. 13277. A bill to amend the Food Stamp Act of 1964, as amended; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. REUSS:

H.R. 13278. A bill to amend the Employment Act of 1946 to bring to bear an informed public opinion upon price and wage behavior which threatens national economic stability; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. MILLS:

H. Res. 510. Resolution authorizing the printing of additional copies of a basic report (pt. I) accompanying the Tax Reform Act of 1969; to the Committee on House Administration.

H. Res. 511. Resolution authorizing the printing of additional copies of a supplementary report (pt. II) accompanying the Tax Reform Act of 1969; to the Committee on House Administration.

SENATE—Friday, August 1, 1969

(Legislative day of Wednesday, July 30, 1969)

The Senate met at 11 o'clock a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by Hon. JAMES B. ALLEN, a Senator from the State of Alabama.

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Hear and help us, Eternal Father, to appropriate the promise of Thy word: "They that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength." When times are tense and nerves are taut, when the body is weary and the going is hard, help us to know that "the Eternal God is our refuge and underneath are the everlasting arms." So may we lean upon the arms which support and strengthen us hour by hour that we may love Thee and serve Thee, and by loving and serving Thee minister to the needs of this Republic. May the words of our mouths,

the meditations of our hearts, and the motives determining our deeds be acceptable in Thy sight, O Lord, our strength and our Redeemer. Amen.

DESIGNATION OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The assistant legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,
Washington, D.C., August 1, 1969.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate, I appoint Hon. JAMES B. ALLEN, a Senator from the State of Alabama, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
President pro tempore.

Mr. ALLEN thereupon took the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, July 31, 1969, be approved.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS DURING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the conclusion of the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Dodd), there be a brief period for the transaction of routine morning business, with statements therein limited to 3 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AUTHORIZATION TO PRINT IN THE RECORD QUORUM CALL NO. 57

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator from Connecticut will allow me a minute or so, I ask unanimous consent that Quorum Call No. 57, which was taken on July 17, 1969, during the closed session of the Senate, be printed in the RECORD of today, for the convenience of those who keep records of attendance and voting records of Senators. No question of security appears to be involved in revealing the names of Senators who were present. This request has been cleared with the minority leader and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), as well as the President pro tempore.

There being no objection, the quorum call was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[No. 57 Leg.]

Aiken	Goodell	Moss
Allen	Gore	Mundt
Allott	Gravel	Murphy
Anderson	Griffin	Muskie
Baker	Gurney	Nelson
Bayh	Hansen	Packwood
Bellmon	Harris	Pastore
Bennett	Hart	Pearson
Bible	Hartke	Pell
Boggs	Hatfield	Percy
Brooke	Holland	Prouty
Burdick	Hollings	Proxmire
Byrd, Va.	Hruska	Randolph
Byrd, W. Va.	Hughes	Ribicoff
Case	Inouye	Russell
Cook	Jackson	Saxbe
Cooper	Javits	Schweiker
Cotton	Jordan, Idaho	Scott
Cranston	Kennedy	Smith
Curtis	Long	Spong
Dirksen	Magnuson	Stennis
Dodd	Mansfield	Stevens
Dole	McCarthy	Symington
Dominick	McClellan	Talmadge
Eagleton	McGee	Thurmond
Eastland	McGovern	Tower
Ellender	McIntyre	Tydings
Ervin	Metcalf	Williams, N.J.
Fannin	Miller	Williams, Del.
Fong	Mordale	Young, N. Dak.
Fulbright	Montoya	Young, Ohio
Goldwater		

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

JACK BELL, WASHINGTON NEWSMAN

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I should like to express my regret at the passing, in a sense, of Jack Bell, from the Washington political scene. He is not going away; he is just shifting from one base of operations to another. It is my understanding that he is going to become a columnist for the Gannett newspapers. I am delighted with the news. I hope that his columns will extend far beyond that initial endeavor.

Jack has been a newspaperman's newspaperman. He has been analytical, he has been cynical, he has been critical, he has been kind, and he has been understanding—and that combination makes a good newsman.

So to Jack we bid a fond farewell from his present position as the chief political

writer for the Associated Press on the Hill, and a fond hello to him on the basis of the new position he is going to undertake and the new responsibilities which will be his.

He is a great and a good newsman. I am delighted that he is not leaving us and is staying close at hand. I wish him well in his many years ahead.

Of his successor, Walter Mears, I want to say that a fine newsman has been chosen to succeed Jack Bell. I am delighted that Walter is going to head the political bureau in Washington. In assuming this position he stands in his own shoes. But, I must say the e is a good deal of Jack Bell in Walter Mears, too. So to Walter Mears, congratulations and hello.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, Jack Bell is really a student of our form of government and a student of the American political system, in the broadest sense of the word. He found time away from his duties as a top man with Associated Press to do a very excellent, scholarly book that he called "Splendid Misery." He took the title from a statement that was once made by Thomas Jefferson about the Presidency. Jefferson referred to it as the "spendid misery." Mr. Bell's book dealt with the Chief Executive and with that office, and it was a tremendous contribution to the literature in that field.

He has been an equally keen observer of the legislative scene over a long period of years and undertook, of course, to call them as he saw them. I always enjoyed the banter that I had with him, day after day and year after year, at the meetings in the Press Gallery which followed the minority part luncheon on Tuesday every week. To me, that was at once an informative, a delightful, and a rather challenging experience; and there I think I got to know Jack Bell better than I had at any other time.

He is in every sense a great reporter, and he goes to an excellent newspaper setup—namely, that of the Gannett chain. I am sure his columns will be stimulating. They will be incisive; sometimes they will be trenchant; sometimes they will carry a few barbs. But we will understand fully that all that will come out of the expertise, the wisdom, and the background that Jack Bell accumulated from the time he was in the Senate Gallery. So I wish him well.

We think often that a man retires to the bliss of retirement, but that will not be the case with him. He leaves one employer; but I have an idea that in assembling information and material for his column, he is going to be infinitely busier than he ever was before.

I discovered, when they wished a column off on me—partly at the instance of the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN)—that I got into the toils of the Los Angeles Times syndicate; and I know what it is to sit around and drool and puzzle and look at a blank wall, wondering what the column would be for that week.

So Mr. Bell, if he is going to do a daily

column, is going to be thinking long and loud about the things that ought to go into it. Perhaps here and now I ought to make a public offer to him that if he gets into difficulties, he can weep on my shoulder, as a fellow columnist, and perhaps I can give him a few ideas. I wish him well.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I wish to join in the compliments that have been paid to Jack Bell with respect to his professional capacity, professional integrity, and fine qualities. He certainly has been of service to the Senate, to Congress, and to the people.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH, AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which will be stated.

The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Chair recognizes the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. DODD) for not to exceed 1 hour.

MORALITY, ARMS CONTROL AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY: THE CASE FOR THE ABM

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, over the past 6 months there has taken place in our country a historic debate on defense policy.

The specific question at issue is whether or not we should deploy the Safeguard anti-missile-defense system proposed by the President.

This debate takes place under the shadow of the so-called balance of terror which has been spawned by the nuclear era.

Winston Churchill described this balance of terror in these dramatic terms in a speech which he made in the House of Commons in 1953, as follows:

I have sometimes the odd thought that the annihilating character of these agencies may bring an utterly unforeseeable security to mankind. It may be . . . that when the advance of destructive weapons enables everyone to kill everybody else, nobody will want to kill anyone at all.

It is a commentary on the awful time we live in that the peace of the world has become dependent on the state of mutual nuclear terror which has characterized Soviet-American relations for the past 15 years or more.

We are obliged to rely on this balance of terror as the surest guarantee against annihilation, until that distant day in the future when agreements are reached abolishing these weapons of mass destruction.

There is general agreement that the peace of the world would become far less secure if this balance were ever to become unbalanced as a result of a major technological breakthrough by one side, in either offensive or defensive weapons.

This, essentially, is what the debate over the Safeguard ABM system is all about.

The Soviets have for more than 5 years now been deploying an ABM system around Moscow, and are carrying on an intensive program of continuing research in this area.

And the question has quite naturally arisen whether the United States can afford to be any less well defended than the Soviet Union.

The issue of whether or not the United States should deploy an antimissile defense system has been debated not only by Congress, both in committees and on the floor, but in the columns of our press, in the academic community, in our high schools, and even in our elementary schools.

It is questionable whether any issue of public policy has ever been discussed by so many people and with such intensity.

In a statement issued on April 7, 1969, the Public Affairs Committee of Freedom House in New York warned that "there is a grave danger that the debate over the ABM may become primarily emotionalized or politicized . . ."

From the mail that I have received in my office, I am afraid that the condition against which Freedom House warned has become very widespread.

Attitudes have become set.

Minds have become closed.

The process of rational discourse seems to have ground to a halt.

Instead, many of the participants in the debate display a disturbing tendency to assume that their side has a monopoly of knowledge, wisdom, and integrity, and that the other side is acting out of some sinister motivation.

Among other things, an effort has been made in certain quarters to characterize the debate on the ABM as a conflict between conservatives and liberals.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

The fact is that there are conservatives and liberals on both sides of this question; and to pretend otherwise only serves to confuse the issue.

It is my hope that the excesses which have characterized the ABM debate in the public domain will not be reflected in the closing debate in the Senate of the United States.

For all of us know that, like so many other problems of our time, the ABM is an issue over which men of equal intelli-

gence and integrity can sharply disagree.

And no matter how committed Senators are at this stage of the discussion, they will, I hope, examine the record of all the testimony and all the debate, conscious of the grave importance of the decision.

Much of the argument is highly technical. This is so particularly in the case of the arguments over the possible effectiveness of the ABM, the possible effectiveness of confusion devices, and whether or not the Soviets can achieve a first-strike capability by the mid-1970's.

When men who have devoted their lives to science and technology can disagree so profoundly on these issues, I feel that it would be presumptuous for a layman to pretend to any final opinion.

Indeed, I feel that the entire debate has been bedeviled, on the one hand, because of the tendency of politicians and laymen to speak like scientists, and, on the other hand, because of a tendency on the part of our scientists to speak like political experts.

The 17th century English scientist, Robert Hooke, once admonished his fellow natural scientists that they should strive to—

Improve the knowledge of all natural things . . . by Experiment, not meddling with Divinity, Metaphysics, Moralls, Politticks, Grammar, Rhetoric, or Logick.

But Robert Hooke notwithstanding, many of our scientists today seem to feel that the discipline to which they submitted themselves in achieving expertise in their own specialties somehow qualifies them to also act as political experts.

I have not been able to find a counterpart of Robert Hooke's admonition, addressed to politicians playing the role of scientists.

But I must say I have been impressed by the dauntless confidence with which so many of my lay friends have bandied about technical estimates and calculations, and offered summary conclusions on highly complex matters where the experts themselves are split down the middle.

I intend to confine my own argument to certain observations that are not dependent on technical expertise, and on certain basic estimates in the field of foreign policy where my personal experience over the years does qualify me, I believe, to speak with some competence.

After weighing all of the evidence, I have arrived at the conclusion that the Safeguard ABM system should be supported.

It should be supported in the interest of peace, because a limited ABM system on both sides will make peace more secure by giving both sides the ability to protect themselves against accidental firings or attacks by any new nuclear powers.

It should be supported in the interest of arms control because the mutual possession of anti-missile-defense systems would create a climate more conducive to agreements limiting the number of weapons of mass destruction.

It should be supported in the interest of our national security because the pro-

tection of our deterrent force protects the American people in the most basic way by reducing the possibility of thermonuclear war.

It should be supported for political reasons, because the entire course of Soviet conduct, especially in recent years, including the massive buildup of thermonuclear weapons by the Kremlin, points to the conclusion that we are entering a period of continuing crisis in which the lack of an ABM system could only serve to encourage Soviet challenges and adventures.

Above all, it should be supported on moral grounds because it is infinitely better to build defensive weapons, designed to protect and save life, than it is to build aggressive weapons, designed to harm and destroy life.

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD ABM

There is absolutely nothing in the Soviet literature that would bear out the charges of the critics that the deployment of Safeguard would be regarded by the U.S.S.R. leaders as an escalation of the arms race.

On the contrary, the Soviets, because they believe in a balanced mix of offensive and defensive weapons, have a much more rational attitude toward antimissile defense than we do.

Essentially they take the stand that defensive systems are not provocative and that they are stabilizing, not destabilizing. Indeed, Soviet spokesmen have made some of the most effective arguments for the ABM.

When Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin at a London news conference in February of 1967 was asked if the Soviets' antimissile system was not a new step in the arms race, he replied:

It seems to me that the system that protects against an attack is not a factor in the arms race. On the contrary, it is a factor that reduces the possibility of the destruction of the people.

This position has been spelled out in much more detail by other spokesmen for the Soviet viewpoint. For example, an article written several years ago by a Soviet strategic writer, Maj. Gen. N. Talensky, said.

Antimissile systems are defensive weapons in the full sense of the word: by their technical nature they go into action only when the rockets of the attacking side take their flight paths, that is, when the act of aggression has been started. The advantage of antimissile systems in the political and international law context is that their use is caused by an act of aggression, and they will simply not work unless an aggressor's rocket makes its appearance in flight over a given area. There will be no difficulty at all in deciding who is the aggressor and who the attacked.

It is obvious that the creation of an antimissile defense merely serves to build up the security of the peaceable, non-aggressive states. The creation of an effective antimissile defense system by a country which is a potential target for aggression merely serves to increase the deterrent effect and so helps to avert aggression. It is said that the international strategic situation cannot be stable where both sides simultaneously strive for deterrence through nuclear rocket power and the creation of defensive antimissile systems. I cannot agree with this statement either. From the viewpoint of strategy, powerful deterrent forces and effective antimissile defense system, when taken together,

substantially increase the stability of mutual deterrence.

Such statements, together with the fact that the Soviet Union has been deploying its own antimissile system for more than 5 years now, effectively demolishes the argument that the Soviets would regard the building of an ABM on our side as a provocation.

I note, parenthetically, that none of the critics has yet suggested that the Soviets would be willing to dismantle their own ABM system if we should decide not to deploy one of our own.

In fact, unless I have missed something, none of them has even suggested that we raise this point in the forthcoming arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Indeed, it would be difficult to think of any approach more calculated to get the Russians to put up their backs.

For such a proposal would really wreck any conference on the limitation of nuclear arms.

And it is not just that the Soviets would insist that the ABM is a purely defensive antiaggressive device, which the Americans need not fear and on which there can be no compromise.

Even if the Soviet leaders were completely satisfied about American intentions, they would still want their ABM system as a protection against Red China. And for this they certainly cannot be blamed.

Before going on to deal with some of the more controversial aspects of the ABM and with some of the other arguments that have been made against it, it would be useful to review certain things which the Safeguard system could almost certainly do or which it would have a very good chance of doing.

THE ABM AND ACCIDENTAL MISSILE FIRINGS

The Safeguard ABM and an equivalent installation in Russia would reduce the danger of accidental thermonuclear war by giving both sides the capability to deal with an accidental missile firing.

The probability of an accidental missile firing or of a firing by unnerved or psychotic commanders on either side is low.

Some of the critics of ABM have argued that the chances of an accidental firing are indeed so negligible that we can ignore this possibility altogether. I do not agree with them.

No one knows for certain whether the chance of an accidental missile firing through technological failure is one in a million or one in 50 million each year. But it is a disturbing thought that, if there is a one in a million chance that there will be an accidental firing in any given year, then, over a 20-year period, the odds would be reduced to one in 50,000. And if the number of existing missiles, worldwide, were to be doubled or tripled over the coming decade, then the odds would be reduced by just that much again.

We take fire insurance on our houses on the basis of odds that are not very dissimilar from this.

Besides, there would probably be a much higher chance of an accidental missile firing by Red China or some other new nuclear power, because it is unlikely

that such powers will build into their offensive missiles the highly sophisticated and very expensive safety controls that are built into American and Soviet missiles.

Moreover, the danger of an accidental missile firing due to human failure is even greater than the danger of an accidental firing due to technological failure.

Consider a situation in which there has been a continuing crisis between the two superpowers, and both sides have for months had their nuclear forces in a state of maximum alert.

Such a situation would inevitably produce a cumulative nervous strain on both sides; and under such a strain it is conceivable that even the most rational and carefully selected group of commanders might crack and act without authorization. So let no one say that we can completely ignore the possibility of an accidental firing.

If, one day, Kosygin were to call the President on the hot line to say that there had been a terrible accident and that an SS-9 was headed toward New York City, the President of the United States, in the absence of a Safeguard system, would have only two choices:

First, he could let the missile destroy New York City without retaliation, writing the affair off as an accident; or

Second, he could order a retaliatory strike against Moscow—which would almost certainly result in all-out thermonuclear war.

What a dreadful position the President of the United States would be in if these were the only choices open to him. But the choice need not be this limited.

For, if we had the Safeguard system, then the President would have a third option: He could simply order the missile shot down.

Even the harshest critics of the Safeguard system do not deny its technical capability to deal with a single incoming missile or with a small salvo of missiles.

The challenge of the critics relates to Safeguard's ability to deal with a saturation attack.

If the Safeguard system could accomplish nothing more than this one thing, that is, protecting the world against the possibility of thermonuclear war by accident, the system would be worth every penny of what it costs.

And so long as offensive thermonuclear missiles exist, it is clear that the world will be a much safer place if both sides carry this kind of insurance for themselves.

As the senior Senator from South Dakota pointed out in his very able statement in support of Safeguard deployment, the cost of this insurance over the coming year would average out to roughly \$4 per year for every man, woman, and child in the United States. In terms of what it insures us against, the Safeguard system is just about the cheapest insurance buy on record.

SAFEGUARD AND RED CHINA OR OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS

The Safeguard system, and its equivalent in the Soviet Union, would provide a high degree of protection against the possibility of an attack by Red China or by some new nuclear power, or "nth"

nation, as it is called in the jargon of nuclear politics.

Just about everyone is prepared to agree that the Chinese Communist leaders are aggressive, irrational, and unpredictable, and that their anticipated missile arsenal could constitute a danger, for ourselves and for the Soviet Union, by the midseventies. By that time, it is estimated, the Chinese Communists will have some 15 to 20 ICBM's.

Moreover, we cannot rule out the possibility of some other psychotic dictator somewhere in the world secretly or openly developing a few nuclear weapons for use against us or other nations.

Many scenarios have been written by strategic experts on the possibility of a Red Chinese nuclear confrontation with the United States.

In one of these scenarios, several missile-carrying submarines, which the Chinese are known to be building, surface off the American west coast and fire a demonstration missile, either against an unpopulated target or else against a small city.

This is accompanied by an ultimatum: Either we agree to withdraw all support from Taiwan, South Vietnam, Thailand, and Korea, and withdraw all air and naval units from the Far East at once, or else Chinese missiles will annihilate Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland, San Diego, and other major population centers on the west coast.

The ultimatum would also say that the Chinese missiles would fire immediately if American missiles were directed against the Chinese mainland or against their submarines.

Now it is true that we have the power to wipe out Red China, or at least to wipe out all of its major population centers.

But would a President of the United States want to invoke this power, knowing that it would result in some 10 to 20 million American dead and the devastation of half a dozen major American cities?

Without Safeguard, the President would have no alternatives but to accept the Chinese Communist terms or to press the thermonuclear button.

With Safeguard, the President would have a choice which would enable him to reject such an ultimatum.

There is another scenario involving the Chinese nuclear capability that has been drawn by experts on the area.

Technologically, the Chinese Communists will almost certainly be capable of striking, or threatening to strike, their neighbors in Asia, and even the U.S.S.R., before they are capable of attacking or threatening the United States.

Our main problem, therefore, may turn out to be whether or not we will honor the nuclear guarantee implicit in the Nonproliferation Treaty if New Delhi or Tokyo should receive a Chinese Communist ultimatum to "do so and so or we will blast your cities off the map."

If both the United States and the Soviet Union possess missile defense systems, they would be in a far stronger position, psychologically and diplomatically, to deal jointly or separately with any such aggressive action in Asia by Red China.

SAFEGUARD AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN UNIDENTIFIED ATTACK

There is a special type of "nth" nation attack that must also be a reason for concern and that is the possibility of an attack from an unidentified source.

Such an attack could take the form of a short-range missile launched from the ocean bed or from a submarine or a ship.

Clearly, if a missile of unidentified origin impacted on an American city, it would create an immediate danger of war.

The President would have no way of knowing for certain whether the missile was fired by the Soviet Union or Red China or Castro Cuba or some other anti-American dictatorship.

But meanwhile, the destruction of one of our metropolitan centers would put him under tremendous pressure to take some action.

The Russians, even if they had not fired the missile, would inevitably develop a nervous trigger finger because, in the uncertain situation thus created, they would have to fear a possible retaliatory strike by the United States.

In such a situation, the possibility of thermonuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States could not be ruled out.

This scenario may seem rather far-fetched. But the experts are agreed that it is a possibility that we cannot ignore.

It is, for example, not inconceivable that the Chinese Communists might seek to launch such an unidentified missile attack on the United States for the purpose of promoting a crisis between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

Here again, if we had Safeguard, we would at least have a good chance of dealing with an unidentified attack by one or several missiles from an offshore position.

Without it, we would have to sit by passively and take the blow, or strike back with massive retaliation, perhaps against the wrong country.

THE ABM AND ARMS CONTROL

By stabilizing the situation as described above, the possession of a limited antimissile defense by both sides would also create a climate more conducive to the negotiation of effective agreements in the field of arms control and disarmament.

There is an additional reason for believing that antimissile defense systems on both sides would be good for future arms control and disarmament talks.

The arms control talks of the 1970's will turn largely around the question of limiting or reducing the number of offensive missiles.

If we achieve an agreement, we will always have to worry about Soviet cheating: First, because it can be taken for granted that they will never agree to inspection, and, second, because of the virtually unbroken record of Soviet cheating and violation of treaties.

If the Soviets were to cheat on such an agreement and get away with it, it could lead to disaster.

If, for example, both sides were to agree to cut back to 100 missiles, but if the Soviets in fact only cut back to 500, this would put us at an almost fatal disadvantage in any confrontation.

If, on the other hand, we had a Safeguard ABM system in existence to protect our arsenal of 100 missiles, we would still have to worry about Soviet cheating, but we would not have to worry as much.

The Soviets, on their side, would have no reason to worry about American cheating, no matter how much they might pretend to do so.

They know that it is virtually impossible for us to cheat because ours is an open society; while they have been able to develop the art of cheating to an all-time high because theirs is a completely closed society.

In the absence of antimissile defense systems, arms control measures by the two superpowers might be risky and destabilizing.

With missile defense, the same arms control measures would be less risky and, to that degree, more acceptable to both sides, and stabilizing.

WILL SAFEGUARD WORK?

As I have said, I would consider it presumptuous to attempt a technical evaluation of the ABM's effectiveness in dealing with a saturation attack. However, I do agree with two commonsense rules for laymen outlined by one of our top defense experts, Mr. Robert C. Sprague, in his testimony on the ABM before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

These are the rules:

Rule No. 1: In assessing the potential of any important new field of technology involving new processes or systems—*half the scientists, or at least a large fraction, are usually wrong.*

Rule No. 2: If a significant percentage of scientists agree, or sometimes if only one or two agree, that something new can be done—it can be.

The validity of these rules have been borne out repeatedly in the postwar period.

The many scientists who said an H-bomb could not be built were wrong, while the minority who said that it could be built were proved right.

The many scientists who said that the Polaris submarine system was technologically impossible were also wrong.

And the incredible success of our moon program, similarly, has given the lie to the negative predictions made by many very able scientists when the project was first broached.

In this connection, I note that Dr. Jerome Wiesner, the chief scientific critic of the Safeguard program, was also one of the most vocal critics of our moon program.

According to a recent article in the Washington press, former NASA Administrator, James E. Webb, was so disturbed by the vehemence of Wiesner's opposition that in July 1962 he called in his assistant, Joe Shea, and said to him:

Jerry Wiesner's in a highly emotional state. He thinks Lunar Orbital Rendezvous is the worst mistake in the world. We'll be risking the lives of the astronauts—everything. Get over there and see him.

The article said:

Shea whipped over to the White House and found Wiesner "screwed up into the ceiling." Shea talked for almost 2 hours, but at the end of it all found Wiesner still completely unconvinced.

It has been claimed that we will never know if the Safeguard will really work against a saturation attack, because it is obviously impossible to conduct a test simulating a saturation nuclear missile attack.

On this point they are completely right. For that matter, we have never tested our Minuteman or Polaris missiles systems under battle conditions.

But the important thing is that the Kremlin, too, will have no way of knowing just how effective the Safeguard system would prove against a Soviet surprise attack.

American technological opinion may be divided on the ultimate workability of the Safeguard system. But the Soviet planners, apart from the fact that they tend to have an enormous respect for American technology, would have to err on the side of crediting the Safeguard system with a higher rather than a lower capability.

Because Safeguard would complicate Soviet calculations, because it would inevitably raise further questions in their minds about the feasibility and the advisability of a first strike, to this extent Safeguard would act as an additional deterrent to the possibility of thermonuclear war.

Although no one can know for certain how effectively Safeguard would function if it were ever put to the final operational test against a saturation attack, there can be no doubt about its political and psychological effectiveness.

In this vital sense, Safeguard would work.

It would not by itself constitute a guarantee against nuclear war or against a Soviet first strike. But it would substantially reduce the possibility.

THE SAFEGUARD SYSTEM AND OUR RESPONSE TO A SOVIET FIRST STRIKE

President Kennedy, in his message to Congress of March 28, 1961, clearly repudiated a first strike by the United States:

Our arms will never be used to strike the first blow in any attack. We are not creating forces for a first strike against any other nation. We shall never threaten, provoke or initiate aggression—but if aggression should come, our response will be swift and effective.

I believe that no free democratic nation will ever engage in a first strike with nuclear weapons against another nation because of the moral and political restraints that govern the action of democratic leaders.

We cannot be so certain, however, about the restraints that govern the actions of the rulers of imperialistic, totalitarian societies. Nor can we be cer-

tain about the restraints that will govern the actions of the various psychotic dictators who are bound to hold power or come to power in a certain number of other nations over the coming decades.

Nor is there any reassurance to be found in a reading of Soviet military doctrine, because the fact is that their military doctrine, with its emphasis on flexibility, devotes serious attention to all possible options, including the option of a first strike.

Soviet military writings do not actually employ the term "first strike." Instead, they discuss the first strike in Aesopian terms. One commonly used formula talks about "frustrating the designs of the imperialists," before they can launch their missiles.

I want to make it clear that I do not say that the Soviets are planning a first strike against the United States.

But I do contend that this is a possibility which cannot be ruled out.

This much is conceded by some of the severest critics of the Safeguard project.

For example, Dr. George W. Rathjens of MIT, a leading opponent of the ABM, said on June 22:

I have never denied that by the late 1970's the Soviet Union could, if it wished, have a capability to destroy nearly all of our Minuteman force in a pre-emptive attack.

There is general agreement between the experts that if a first strike ever comes, it will take the form of an all-out attack designed to destroy, or virtually destroy, our Minuteman force, our Polaris submarines as well as our bombers. It would make no sense for the Soviets to launch a first strike against our cities and leave our deterrent missile force intact, because if they did so, they would be inviting a response that would completely obliterate all of their population centers.

Since the possibility of a Soviet first strike cannot be ruled out, it is also important to consider what options would be open to the President of the United States if he one day received an emergency call informing him that 500 Soviet SS-9's had taken off for the United States, targeted against the ICBM complexes in the Midwest.

If we had no ABM system defending his deterrent force, the President would have only two options in the case of such an attack. He could either sit back and let the Soviet missiles obliterate our Minuteman ICBM's, perhaps hoping that our Polaris submarines will be able to survive; or else he could empty his missile silos in a retaliatory strike against Soviet cities as soon as he received the first radar warning that the Soviet missiles are in flight.

A decision to empty our missile silos before the Soviet first-strike salvo reached its targets would, of course, automatically bring a second wave of Soviet missiles directed against American cities; and the mutual holocaust which we seek to avoid would be upon us.

If he had a Safeguard ABM system, however, the President would have an alternative to the holocaust button. And

this would be true even if 50 percent of our missiles were knocked out, because 500 American ICBM's would be more than enough to devastate the Soviet Union. In fact, the consensus of the experts is that it would be suicidal for any nation to attempt the first strike unless it was certain that it could knock out roughly 90-95 percent of its adversary's strategic missile force.

Coming back to our scenario, if the President had a Safeguard ABM system, he could then decide to wait out the Soviet strike, until he received information on which Soviet silos have fired their missiles and which Soviet missiles remained in reserve. Then, when he ordered our missiles launched, he could target them not against Soviet population centers but against the enemy's remaining strategic forces.

If we could succeed in destroying or largely destroying the enemy's strategic reserve, a mutual holocaust would have been avoided and the stage would be set for negotiations that would, at the very worst, assure us of a draw.

In contemplating the contingency of a Soviet first strike, therefore, it is of the greatest importance that we provide the President of the United States with some alternative other than surrender or the holocaust button.

To date, the Safeguard system is the only alternative that has been suggested which makes sense.

THE ALTERNATIVES TO SAFEGUARD DEPLOYMENT

A number of alternatives to the initial Safeguard deployment proposed by the administration have been suggested in the course of the present debate.

None of them make any sense to me.

For example, it has been suggested that instead of deploying an ABM system we could, if the Soviet buildup warrants it, deploy more Minuteman or more Polaris missiles. Some have even suggested the possibility of doubling our strategic strike force.

I am opposed to this proposal, because I think we have somehow got to bring an end to the piling up on both sides of these terrible aggressive weapons of mass destruction.

I am also opposed to it because I believe that such a step would really be provocative and would therefore increase the danger of thermonuclear war.

It has also been proposed, that, as an alternative to Safeguard, we empty our missile silos against Soviet cities at the first sign of attack.

I find this proposal even more appalling than the proposal that we increase our ICBM force. In fact, it smacks frighteningly of Dr. Strangelove.

This is not a formula for defending the United States; it is a formula for mutual annihilation.

Another proposal which has been submitted in amendment form is that we limit the Safeguard program to research, development, and testing; and that, rather than installing any radars now at the projected operational sites in North Dakota and Montana, we instead build certain prototype radars at our Kwajalein test range. This amendment is currently before us for consideration.

I am opposed to this proposal on three grounds.

First, it would result in greatly increased costs if we ever decide to deploy Safeguard, because then our entire additional investment in the Kwajalein installation would be wasted.

Second, according to knowledgeable estimates, it would result in a delay of more than 2 years in the deployment of Safeguard, and time now is so precious that we cannot afford to squander it in this wanton manner.

Third, as Prof. Albert Wohlstetter, one of this country's leading strategic experts, has pointed out, a satisfactory testing of the entire system could not be carried out at Kwajalein.

In order to test the effective operation of Safeguard, we not only have to test interactions among the many components of the ABM system but also between the Safeguard system itself and other elements of our national defense.

This can only be done by deploying the various components in their intended environment in Montana and North Dakota.

In his testimony before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs, and in subsequent conversations which I had with him, Dr. Edward Teller hammered away at the essential argument that only by a comprehensive test of the entire Safeguard system with its various components and in its intended environment, would we be able to iron out the bugs in the system and determine just how effective Safeguard can be made.

In the absence of such an initial deployment, Dr. Teller holds, we will be voting for ignorance in an area where we cannot afford to be ignorant.

The Russians, he points out, do not suffer from the handicap of ignorance.

Dr. Teller further pointed out that in the period before the limited test ban treaty, the Russians tested an ABM with a live nuclear warhead against an incoming missile.

Since then, they have deployed an extensive ABM system around Moscow.

Furthermore, they are pursuing a vigorous program of refinement with a third generation of ABM missiles which have a "loitering" capability.

Now Dr. Teller is a man whose testimony deserves some attention because it was thanks to him, more than to any other single person, that we were able to run a neck-and-neck race with the Soviets in the development of the H-bomb.

The United States exploded its first hydrogen test device on November 1, 1952, in "Operation Ivy." But this was not a deliverable device.

Our first deliverable weapon was not exploded until March 1, 1954, in "Operation Castle."

Meanwhile, in early August, 1953, the Soviets had staged their first thermonuclear explosion, which, according to our intelligence, did involve a weapon capable of delivery.

It was thanks only to a massive effort and to the inherent superiority of American technology that we were able to pull ahead of the Soviets in thermonuclear weapons over the following years.

As we approach a decision on ABM, let us not forget what might have happened if the Russians had beaten us to the H-bomb.

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

The distinguished junior Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) has made the point that it is impossible to reach sound judgments on ABM or on other aspects of the national defense budget if we do not have a clear conception of the nature of our Soviet adversary.

The Senator's argument on this point is unchallengeable. Without such an understanding, we would be attempting to make our judgments in a political and intellectual vacuum.

The Senator from Washington was responsible for a remarkably profound article on the subject of Soviet policy which appeared in the June issue of Reader's Digest. He added to this presentation in the speech which he made in support of the ABM of July 9 on the floor of the Senate.

The conclusions to which he has come coincide completely with my own.

As Senators know, I have addressed myself in this Chamber repeatedly to the subject of Soviet policy.

I believe that the achievement of a true detente, involving a total cessation of cold war activities, should be a prime objective of our foreign policy.

I cannot, however, accept the judgment of those who hold that such a detente has already been achieved.

I have pointed out that if a detente really did exist, one should be able to find some evidence of this in the record of Soviet pronouncements and actions, but that the evidence is nowhere to be found.

I have also said that it makes no sense to talk about the existence of a detente in a decade that has witnessed the suppression of the Hungarian revolution; Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum; the Communist seizure of Cuba; the Cuban missile crisis; and Soviet involvement in the Laotian uprising of 1961-62, in the Vietnam war, and in the Tricontinental Conference of Revolutionary Parties in Havana.

Nor does it make sense to talk about a detente against the immediate background of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia and the promulgation of the Brezhnev doctrine, under which the Kremlin has claimed the right to intervene in any so-called Socialist country if the Communist dictatorship there is threatened.

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

Nor are prospects for the future rendered any more reassuring by the record of Soviet reaction to the unilateral limitations which we placed on our strategic arms in the mid-1960's.

Acting on the advice of some of the ivory-towered scientists who now are in the forefront of the fight against the ABM, we closed down a number of our nuclear weapons reactors, froze the number of our Polaris submarines at 41 and the number of ICBM's at 1,054, decided not to proceed with a new heavy bomber, and deliberately refrained from deploying a ballistic missile defense.

At that time it was taken as a matter of dogma that the Soviets simply desired to achieve nuclear parity with the United States and that it would be in our national interest if the Soviet Union achieved an "assured destruction capability" because this would reduce the Kremlin's concern over American intentions and make for a more stable situation.

The chief prophet of this policy was Dr. Jerome Wiesner, and his chief disciple was former Secretary of Defense McNamara.

When Wiesner and McNamara spoke about parity, they appeared to have in mind numerical parity in strategic weapons.

However, "parity" is a complex concept that does not lend itself to simple definition.

As Secretary Laird has pointed out, the relative size, or megatonnage, of the weapons on both sides is also a matter that has to be taken into consideration; and here the Soviets have a distinct edge over us.

Population concentration is another factor that should be considered in any calculation of "parity." And here, because of our much greater concentrations, we are at a distinct disadvantage compared to the Soviets. In fact, as Secretary Laird stated, 200 Soviet missiles would take just as heavy a death toll in this country as 1,200 American missiles would exact in the Soviet Union.

In terms of their ability to inflict damage on the United States, the Soviets unquestionably passed the point of parity a long time ago.

The achievement of numerical parity by the Soviets would, in fact, give them an enormous strategic advantage instead of simply strategic parity.

This is something that should have been obvious all along, even to the untutored layman. But, despite this, Wiesner and McNamara held to their belief in the protective potential of numerical parity in strategic weapons.

It was also taken as a matter of dogma that once the Soviet Union achieved "parity" it would automatically taper off its missile production, and the stage would thus be set for meaningful talks on arms limitations. This is not happening.

The Wiesner-McNamara doctrine will be recorded historically as a double tribute to the good intentions of its originators and to their capacity for self-delusion.

Three years ago, in July 1966, when our own ICBM strength had already been frozen at the arbitrary figure of 1,054, the Soviet Union had 250 ICBM's.

Today, according to hard intelligence, the U.S.S.R. has some 1,250 ICBM's in addition to a force of 700 medium-range ballistic missiles and some 550 sea-launched missiles.

No one in the United States and no one in our intelligence community and no one in the Pentagon ventured to predict in 1966 that the Soviets would add 1,000 ICBM's to their missile force over the ensuing 3-year period.

Had anyone ventured such a prediction at the time, he would have been assailed as an extremist kook or a warmon-

ger by the apostles of the myth of the detente.

THE INTELLIGENCE GAP

Our satellite reconnaissance enables us to know how many missiles the Soviets have deployed or are deploying at any given time. But when we attempt to determine at what rate the Soviet missile assembly lines are operating or what their production quotas are for the coming period, uncertainties inevitably arise.

I know that Secretary of Defense Laird ran into a lot of flack when he suggested that the Soviets might have a force of 2,500 ICBM's by the midseventies.

But if the Soviets continue to produce ICBM's at the 1966-69 rate, then simple arithmetic points to the conclusion that 4 years hence their ICBM force will in fact total 2,500.

Conceivably an order may come through from the Kremlin to close down the lines because the Soviet leaders now feel that they have "a sufficiency" of nuclear weapons.

On the basis of past experience, however, I consider it far more likely that the Soviet missile assembly lines and armament factories and shipyards and submarine yards will continue to function at the high level of recent years, until the Kremlin has achieved the marked and unmistakable superiority in offensive weapons which is their proclaimed goal.

There has been a lot of loose talk about the so-called "intelligence gap"; that is, about the gap that supposedly exists between the intelligence estimates presented by Secretary Laird and those officially prepared by the Board of National Estimates.

My own reading of the record is that, despite the very sharp questioning to which Secretary Laird and Mr. Richard Helms were subjected in their joint appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee, their testimony failed to disclose the existence of any basic conflict.

Certainly, there was no conflict of any kind over the rapid buildup of Soviet strategic strength, because this is something that is based on "hard" intelligence.

When it comes to estimates of Soviet intentions, however, there is admittedly a lot of guesswork involved. In this area there is apt to be a difference of emphasis between those responsible for gathering intelligence and those responsible for defense policy, for the simple reason that our policymakers must prepare for the worst contingency rather than for the best contingency.

I think it pertinent to point out in this connection that our intelligence community has erred far more frequently on the conservative side than otherwise in their estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions.

In fact, the American intelligence community, although it has performed well in certain situations, has not been impressive when estimating the intentions and plans of our adversaries.

It failed to give us forewarning of Pearl Harbor, the consequences of which are familiar to everyone.

It failed to warn our Government of the impending North Korean Communist attack on South Korea; and, at a slightly later stage, it failed to warn General MacArthur of the impending invasion of Korea by 1 million Chinese.

It failed to predict accurately either the Soviet A-bomb or the Soviet H-bomb. In both cases the estimates were that it would take the Soviets much longer to develop these weapons than actually proved the case.

In 1956, it failed to alert us to the Soviet invasion of Hungary.

In 1957, it was completely without advance information on the Soviet sputnik.

Over the ensuing years, our intelligence community lapsed into one of its very rare periods of overstatement when it advised the Eisenhower administration that there was a massive missile gap between the Soviet Union and ourselves.

Today it has been documented that the so-called missile gap was a Soviet-engineered hoax, and that our intelligence community fell for phony information put out by Khrushchev for the purpose of intimidating us.

In more recent years, conversely, its estimates of Soviet intentions regarding the size of Soviet ICBM forces have turned out to be woefully conservative.

In the period immediately before the Cuban missile crisis, the advance consensus of the intelligence professionals was that the Soviets would not tempt the fates by deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba. And, despite warning signs which many of our lay experts took seriously, they were also disposed to discount the possibility that the Red Army would invade Czechoslovakia to depose the Dubcek regime.

The late Senator Robert F. Kennedy, in his book, "Thirteen Days," had this to say about the performance of our intelligence community during the Cuban missile crisis:

No one had expected or anticipated that the Russians would deploy surface-to-surface ballistic missiles in Cuba.

No official within the government had ever suggested to President Kennedy that the Russian build-up in Cuba would include missiles . . . The intelligence community, in its national estimate of the future course of events, had advised him—on each of the four occasions in 1962 when they furnished him with official reports on Cuba and the Caribbean—that the Russians would not make offensive weapons available to Cuba. The last estimate before our meeting of the 16th of October was dated the 19th of September, and it advised the President that without reservation the U.S. Intelligence Board, after consideration and examination, had concluded that the Soviet Union would not make Cuba a strategic base.

It pointed out that the Soviet Union had not taken this kind of step with any of its satellites in the past and would feel the risk of retaliation from the United States to be too great to take the risk in this case.

This estimate of September 19, I want to note, was after the first missiles had already been landed in Cuba.

All this is not so much a matter of criticism as it is a lament.

But I dwell on this point because, on the record, it is demonstrably true that

our intelligence community has not been realistic, much less extremist in its appraisals of the intentions and capabilities of our adversaries.

I know, too, that it is an exceedingly difficult task to gather intelligence having to do with the policy and intentions and future production schedules of a closed totalitarian society.

And it is better that our intelligence community shun alarmism and concentrate on hard information rather than speculating over Soviet intentions.

Nevertheless, in attempting to weigh the contingencies that may confront us over the coming years, it would be well to bear in mind that, over and over again, the Soviet performance in the field of armaments has either surprised us completely or substantially surpassed our estimates.

There seems to be some difference between our experts over whether or not the Soviets have already achieved nuclear parity with the United States. What is certain, is that if the Soviets continue to build up their nuclear forces at the rate of recent years while the United States stands still, the Soviet Union at a very early date is bound to achieve a substantial numerical superiority in nuclear missiles, on top of the marked superiority they already enjoy in total megatonnage.

THE JUSTIFICATION FOR PESSIMISM

If my own outlook is on the pessimistic side, it is because pessimism is indicated by the entire history of the postwar period.

The one lesson that emerges from this record, as I read it, is that if one assumes the worst about Soviet intentions, he will almost never go wrong.

In applying this rule of thumb, I have on a number of occasions found myself taking stands that were considered unpopular and which brought me a good deal of adverse editorial comment at the time. But almost invariably and unfortunately it has turned out that my apprehensions were right.

I do not like to talk about myself. I do so only because I know of no other way of making this point.

When Castro took over Cuba, there was a widespread tendency in our press and in our State Department and in Congress to regard him as some kind of non-Communist agrarian reformer, or Robin Hood, with whom we could and should continue to do business. Editorial brickbats flew when in mid-1959 I said that the evidence pointed to the conclusion that Castro was bent on establishing a total Communist dictatorship in Cuba and converting Cuba into bastion of Soviet power in the Caribbean.

But then Castro announced to the world that he was, in fact, a Communist; and a short while later our blundering and naivete were rewarded by the Cuban missile crisis.

When we entered into the moratorium on nuclear testing with the Soviet Union, I took the floor of the Senate repeatedly to warn that the moratorium was a trap because we were, in effect, giving the Soviet Union a total test ban treaty without inspection of any kind.

I referred to the moratorium on sev-

eral occasions as "the most egregious act of bipartisan folly in American history."

It was a solitary and unpopular stand.

But then, in August 1961, with our own nuclear technology completely inactivated, the Soviets resumed atmospheric testing. And when the analysis of these tests were completed, it turned out that we had lost the estimated 3-to-4 year lead in nuclear technology which we had previously enjoyed.

The Soviet action was denounced as a betrayal of trust by the President, by Congress, by the press.

But it still amazes me that anyone expected the Soviet Government to behave any differently than they did behave in this situation.

More recently, I recall that I was one of the handful of people in Congress or out of Congress, who, last summer, warned that the Soviets were getting ready to invade Czechoslovakia.

The view was considered an alarmist one at the time. But in this situation, unfortunately, the alarmist view again turned out to be the correct one.

So let us be careful this time.

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

Let me now venture another prediction.

I do not hold that limited agreements with the Soviet Union are impossible.

On the contrary, I believe strongly that, despite all the difficulties, we must continue to seek agreements, no matter how limited, in the field of arms control and in every other area.

I supported the partial test ban treaty, and it pleases me to know that my resolution of May 27, 1963, which was co-sponsored by 33 other Senators, has been widely credited with having played a role in encouraging this new approach to the test ban treaty.

But, while holding to the conviction that we must always be prepared to walk the extra mile, and more, in the difficult quest for peace, I fear that the coming decade will be one of grave and recurring crises. It will be an era during which the Soviets will continue to expand their challenge to the free world and to extend their power and their influence in North and Central Africa, in Latin America, and in Asia, and the massive Soviet missile and arms buildup of recent years will continue. Indeed, within a few years at the most, the unchallengeable evidence will persuade even the most wishful thinkers that the Soviets have achieved their goal of strategic weapons superiority.

When that day comes, many a Senator who will vote against the Safeguard ABM system at the close of the current debate, will have cause to rethink his vote.

It is impossible not to be alarmed by the prospect of having to deal with the Soviets in future crisis situations where they enjoy either parity, or worse still, a distinct superiority in nuclear weapons.

We were able to stand up to Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum of November 1958, despite the flagrant manner in which he rattled his nuclear missiles, because we knew, and the Russians knew, that we possessed massive overall nuclear superiority.

In the Cuban missile crisis of 1962,

President Kennedy, in effect, delivered an ultimatum to the Soviet and Cuban Governments. He told them that if the Soviet missiles were not removed from Cuba, the United States would take the necessary measures in its own self-defense.

The Soviet Government was also informed that we would not permit the delivery of any more nuclear missiles to Cuba, and that if a nuclear missile were fired from Cuba at the United States, we would respond to such an attack in precisely the same way that we would respond to an attack from the territory of Soviet Union itself.

Confronted with this ultimatum, the Soviet leaders backed away from the brink and the Cuban missile crisis came to an end.

But we have to ask ourselves whether the Soviets would have backed down and whether President Kennedy would have dared to take the same brave line if it had not been for our very substantial nuclear superiority at the time of the crisis.

Since the Soviets played a very rough game of nuclear blackmail, even in the years when we had a marked nuclear superiority, there is every reason to believe that the Kremlin will use nuclear blackmail as a political instrument even more frequently and more brutally at the point where it achieves parity or superiority in nuclear weapons.

THE QUESTION OF COST

The question of cost is important, but it is not central to the problem before us.

If the peace of the world and the survival of our Nation are at stake, then, clearly, cost is a matter of secondary importance.

But this does not mean that we can forget about cost.

Everyone is worried about the heavy costs of our defense programs. A tightening up of procurement and management procedure is long overdue. Hopefully, the blue-ribbon panel which has now been set up will bring about a great improvement in these procedures and practices.

To those who fear that Safeguard may wind up costing us astronomical sums of money, let it be remembered that what is involved in the bill now before us is the price of a 1-year deployment, costing some \$800 million. And this is a small sum, compared with our overall defense budget.

And we will not be locking ourselves in to an entire program. For it will be reviewed at every stage, from the standpoints of cost and effectiveness and of the international situation.

And it makes no sense to say that, once committed to a program, we cannot cancel it. It is only necessary to recall the recent cancellation of the F-111 program on the basis of its disappointing performance and its excessive costs.

Where national survival is at stake, it is better to err on the side of over-insurance than on the side of under-insurance.

Today I have set forth the reasons which have led me, after careful thought, to strongly favor the deployment of the Safeguard antimissile defense system.

To summarize, I believe that the ABM

should be supported because it is a moral weapon, a weapon for peace, a weapon that would greatly increase the chances of bringing an end to the arms race and of instituting some meaningful limitation on offensive nuclear weapons.

There is an unfathomable mystery to the rationale of those who call upon us to refrain from deploying an anti-missile defense system in the interest of future arms-control talks.

It would make much more sense for us in any arms-control talks not merely to accept the right of the Soviet Union to deploy an ABM system of its own, but to actually encourage the development of defensive systems as a preliminary to limiting the deployment of city-destroying missiles and MIRV's.

Rather than calling on the United States to abstain from deploying Safeguard, all those who seriously believe in arms control should be focusing their attack on reducing the awesome arsenals of offensive thermonuclear missiles.

Up to now, the Soviets have been a fearsome problem, as they have overwhelmed one country after another.

At this very hour, the Soviets lie in political siege of several free but weak non-Communist countries.

If the past is any guidepost for the future, then there is more trouble in the offing.

We face dark and troublesome days ahead.

Our very freedom is at stake; our very survival is in peril.

Let us remain strong and secure so that we will be free to lead the way to real disarmament and peace.

I take it for granted that every Senator will reweigh the evidence with the utmost care before casting his vote, knowing that the quality of our life and the quality of our national security and the maintenance of world peace are heavily involved in the outcome of this vote.

So I say we should give the President of the United States an alternative to pushing the holocaust button.

Obviously, the Safeguard ABM is not a perfect weapon. But it is the best our people have been able to devise.

What we have to do is to look at our adversaries in the world. They put up a defense system of their own; and it makes sense to me, sitting here with their missiles pointed at us, for us to have a missile defense system of our own.

I earnestly hope that we will not vote the ABM down, for if we do, we may live to regret it. I hope that we will vote, instead, to be strong and safe, and secure.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator from Connecticut yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Were there not some scientists who said that the hydrogen bomb was impossible to build?

Mr. DODD. Yes; it was on this same basis that they opposed the H-bomb, saying that it was impossible to build. There were also many members of the administration and of Congress who said that the hydrogen bomb could not be built. Of course, they were dead wrong. Some of the same scientists now, on

the same basis, are telling us that the Safeguard ABM cannot be made to work and that it should not be deployed.

Of course there were a minority of scientists who said that the hydrogen bomb could be built and they were proven to be right.

There were scientists, I remind the Senator from West Virginia, who said that the Polaris submarine system was technologically impossible. Not very long ago they were telling us that. And they were wrong, too. Thank God we went ahead, and that we now have a Polaris system to protect us.

The incredible success of the recent moon mission is pertinent here also.

As the Senator from West Virginia knows, I serve on the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Subcommittee, where we were told that the Apollo program was impossible, that we were throwing our money away, that it could not possibly succeed, that we would never put a man on the moon, that the whole thing was ridiculous.

I am talking about scientists who took this stand. Now they are telling us the Safeguard ABM cannot be made to work.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Let me ask the Senator, what would be our situation now if we had continued only with research on the hydrogen bomb, if we had continued only with research on the Polaris submarine, if we had continued only with research in connection with the moon shot?

Mr. DODD. Well, with respect to the hydrogen bomb, I shudder to think of what would have happened if we had not succeeded in developing it at the time we did. As it turned out, we beat the Soviet Union to it by only about 6 months.

If we had not developed the Polaris submarine system, I shudder again to think of what might have happened to us during those years.

With respect to the moon shot, I am confident that, if our adversaries had gone ahead and gotten there first, they would turn their accomplishments into some military advantage, to our great disadvantage.

The questions the Senator asks are well taken.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bill and joint resolution, and they were signed by the Acting President pro tempore:

H.R. 13079. An act to continue for a temporary period the existing interest equalization tax; and

S.J. Res. 85. Joint resolution to provide for the designation of the period from August 26, 1969, through September 1, 1969, as "National Archery Week".

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to the consideration of routine morning business.

The Chair recognizes the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Young).

DAVE McNALLY TIES AMERICAN LEAGUE PITCHING MARK

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for some time I have been intending to take the floor to express my commendation to a fellow Montanan, a young man by the name of Dave McNally, from Billings, Mont. Dave has been pitching for the Baltimore Orioles for a few years, and lately he completed his 15th victory for this season, with no defeats. If we add his two straight victories at the end of last season, Dave has a record of 17-0, which I believe is the way the baseball fraternity would refer to it.

Dave McNally is feeling no pressure. He is feeling no pain. But in his own words, he is feeling very lucky. What the 26-year-old Baltimore left-hander must be wondering, after running his record to 15-0, with a 4-2 victory over Kansas City on Wednesday night, is, "Just how lucky can I be, and just how long can this last?"

To use Dave's words:

No, I don't feel any pressure. I think probably I would feel it if I had pitched well in every game, but that hasn't been the case. I pitched badly enough to lose in six or seven games.

I know it has to end sometime, but I'm very happy to get this far, and I'm enjoying it. I'd rather be winning like this than losing but it's taken a lot of luck to do it.

McNally's number 15 put him in the American League record book alongside Johnny Allen of Cleveland. McNally, with two victories at the end of the 1968 season, tied Allen's mark of 17 consecutive triumphs over two seasons, set in 1936-37, and Allen's record of 15 straight victories at the start of a season, 1937.

Dave McNally is just one triumph away from the league mark of 16 successive victories in one season, set by four pitchers.

I know Dave McNally very well; I know his family extremely well. Those of us who come from Montana are very proud of what Dave McNally has been doing since first starting out in American Legion baseball and then graduating to the Baltimore Orioles. We want him to know that we are following every game with trepidation. We are hoping that his unbroken string of wins will continue through the entire season, because we know that even if Dave is lucky on occasion, he is an outstanding man in his own right.

We look upon him as a great Montanan. I look upon him as a close personal friend.

If Dave ever gets word of this, I just want him to know that there are a lot of us who may not see him at the stadium but who, nevertheless, are watching his every effort and wishing him every success.

AMERICANS SHOULD NOT BE DECEIVED

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, Americans are entitled to know the facts regarding the much ballyhooed return

of 25,000 of our combat troops from South Vietnam.

It would give me pleasure to report not only that 25,000 men of our Armed Forces had been returned home from Vietnam but also that at least 75,000 more combat troops would be returned to the United States from Vietnam before next December. Such a report would be contrary to the facts.

Furthermore, in view of President Nixon's recent statements in Thailand and Saigon, Americans have every reason to be gravely concerned that our fearful combat casualties in that undeclared, immoral, unpopular war in Vietnam will go on and on for many months. President Nixon should be reminded that he was elected because of his oft-repeated campaign statement that he had a secret plan to end the war in Vietnam. That plan is still his secret.

I am regretfully reporting the facts. On January 19, 1969, 2 days before Richard Nixon was inaugurated as President of the United States, there were 532,000 men of our Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Coast Guard in Vietnam. Now, Mr. President, in view of reports issued from the Pentagon and from the White House, Americans have been led to believe that at this time the total men of our Armed Forces in Vietnam, 6 months following the time President Nixon was inaugurated, would be approximately 507,500. The fact is that on July 19, 1969, there were more men of our Armed Forces in Vietnam than at the time Richard Nixon became President. The total number of men in our Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Coast Guard in Vietnam on July 19, 1969, was 535,500, whereas it had been 532,000 on the day before he was inaugurated.

On June 10, 1969, at the time President Nixon announced the withdrawal of 25,000 troops from Vietnam, the total number of men in our Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Coast Guard in Vietnam was 537,500. On July 19, 1969, the total number was 535,000, or only 2,000 less.

Incidentally, I report that on the day President Lyndon Johnson left the White House January 20, 1969, the total of American Armed Forces in Vietnam, off the coast of Vietnam and in Thailand was 613,200. From that date to June 10, 1969, 2 days after President Nixon announced that 25,000 troops would be withdrawn from Vietnam, this total had been increased to 621,200. On July 19, 1969, more than a month after the announced withdrawal and after 6 months of the administration of President Nixon, 618,600 American servicemen remain in Southeast Asia.

It is with a feeling of sadness, Mr. President, that I make this factually correct report.

I am sure I express the feelings of many millions of Americans who are profoundly disappointed over the failure of this administration to make a sincere effort to withdraw at least 100,000 young Americans from the Vietnam quagmire.

Mr. President, during the week July 19 to 26 Americans killed and wounded

in combat numbered 2,926; during that same period South Vietnam friendly forces—too friendly to fight—2,339.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore announced that on today, August 1, 1969, he signed the following enrolled bills, which had previously been signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives:

S. 38. An act to consent to the upper Niobrara River Compact between the States of Wyoming and Nebraska; and

S. 1590. An act to amend the National Commission on Product Safety Act in order to extend the life of the Commission so that it may complete its assigned task.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

REPORTS OF COMPTROLLER GENERAL

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on the administration and effectiveness of work experience and training project under title V of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Wayne County, Mich., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, dated July 31, 1969 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on the effectiveness and administration of the Community Action Program under title II of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Lake County, Ind., Office of Economic Opportunity, dated August 1, 1969 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE

The following reports of a committee were submitted:

By Mr. McGEE, from the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, without amendment:

S. 2754. A bill to amend subchapter III of chapter 83 of title 5, United States Code, relating to civil service retirement, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 91-339).

By Mr. McGEE, from the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, without amendment:

H.R. 9825. An act to amend subchapter III of chapter 83 of title 5, United States Code, relating to civil service retirement, and for other purposes.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE

As in executive session, the following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. MAGNUSON, from the Committee on Commerce:

Lewis M. Branscomb, of Colorado, to be Director of the National Bureau of Standards;

Davie W. Oberlin, of Minnesota, to be Administrator of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation; and

Jacob L. Bernheim, of Wisconsin, Foster S. Brown, of New York, William W. Knight, Jr., of Ohio, Miles F. McKee, of Michigan, and

Joseph N. Thomas, of Indiana, to be members of the Advisory Board of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, from the Committee on Commerce, I also report favorably sundry nominations in the Environmental Science Services Administration and the Coast Guard. Since these names have previously appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, in order to save the expense of printing them on the Executive Calendar, I ask unanimous consent that they be ordered to lie on the Secretary's desk for the information of any Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The nominations, ordered to lie on the desk, are as follows:

David M. Wilson, and sundry other persons, for permanent appointment in the Environmental Science Services Administration;

Philip J. Taetz, and sundry other persons, for permanent appointment in the Environmental Science Services Administration;

George A. Blann, and sundry other officers, to be permanent commissioned officers of the Coast Guard;

Dominic A. Calicchio, and sundry other Reserve officers, to be permanent commissioned officers in the Coast Guard;

Herman J. Lentz, to be a permanent commissioned warrant officer in the Coast Guard; and

George A. Blann, and sundry other officers, for promotion in the Coast Guard.

BILLS INTRODUCED

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. McGEE (for himself, Mr. Boggs, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. FANNIN, Mr. FONG, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. MOSS, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. STEVENS, and Mr. YARBOROUGH):

S. 2754. A bill to amend subchapter III of chapter 83 of title 5, United States Code, relating to civil service retirement, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. BIBLE:

S. 2755. A bill for the relief of Donal N. Callaghan; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. McCLELLAN:

S. 2756. A bill for the general revision of the Patent Laws, title 35 of the United States Code, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(The remarks of Mr. McCLELLAN when he introduced the bill appear later in the RECORD under an appropriate heading.)

By Mr. NELSON:

S. 2757. A bill to provide for the control and prevention of pollution, deterioration of water quality, and damage to lands and waters resulting from erosion to the roadbeds and rights-of-way of existing State, county, and other rural roads and highways, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Works.

(The remarks of Mr. NELSON when he introduced the bill appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

By Mr. MONDALE:

S. 2758. A bill to amend section 312 of the Housing Act of 1964 to eliminate the provision which presently limits eligibility for residential rehabilitation loans thereunder to persons whose income is within the limits prescribed for below-market-interest-rate mortgages insured under section 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

(The remarks of Mr. MONDALE when he introduced the bill appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

By Mr. DODD:

S. 2759. A bill for the relief of Francesco Daniele; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. STEVENS:

S. 2760. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to remove the limitations on the deductibility of expenses for care of dependents incurred to enable a taxpayer to be gainfully employed; to the Committee on Finance.

(The remarks of Mr. STEVENS when he introduced the bill appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

S. 2756—INTRODUCTION OF A BILL FOR THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE PATENT LAWS

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to provide for the general revision of the patent laws, title 35 of the United States Code.

On February 28 I introduced S. 1246 for the general revision of the patent laws. That bill incorporated the best features of several patent revision bills considered by the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights during the 90th Congress. It also reflected a number of suggestions made during and subsequent to the subcommittee's hearings on patent law revision. Although the public hearings were completed last year, the subcommittee delayed action on this legislation at the request of the patent bar. Last winter, I indicated that if President Nixon determined that he wished to select a new Commissioner of Patents, I would further delay the reporting of a bill by the subcommittee until such time as the new Commissioner could review the various legislative proposals. The President did nominate a new Commissioner of Patents and I have met with him. Many suggestions made by the Commissioner have been included in the revised patent bill which I am introducing today.

This legislation has had a long history and can be traced back to a series of 30 studies on the patent system that were commissioned and published by the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights. Following this review, the subcommittee concluded that "The objectives of the patent system are as valid today as at its inception," but "there has not been adequate adjustment of our patent laws and procedures to reflect changing conditions and to respond to the critical problems confronting the Patent Office."

President Johnson subsequently established the President's Commission on the Patent System which submitted a report on November 17, 1966, making 35 recommendations for the improvement of the American patent system. Most of the proposals made by the Commission would require legislative action to be implemented. Many of the recommendations of the Commission that required congressional approval were incorporated in the Patent Reform Act of 1967 that was submitted by the administration. During and subsequent to the subcommittee hearings, the Johnson administration made a number of

suggestions for changes in the proposed legislation.

While certain of the Commission's recommendations engendered considerable opposition, the objectives sought by the Commission warrant the support of the Congress. Any general patent legislation must, therefore, be judged by the extent to which it achieves the objectives of the President's Commission and serves to ameliorate the problems of the patent system which were identified in the earlier reports of the subcommittee. In my judgment, the most important of these objectives are to raise the quality of U.S. patents, to shorten the period of pendency of a patent application from the filing date to final disposition by the Patent Office so as to accelerate the public disclosure of new technology, and to modernize the searching and examination procedures of the Patent Office so that it can more efficiently serve the needs of the public.

The quality of issued patents and the substantial deviation between the standards applied by the Patent Office and the Federal courts in determining the patentability of inventions has been explored in a number of the reports of the subcommittee. A recent survey indicates that during a 2½-year period 72 percent of the adjudicated patents were found invalid. During the period of this study not a single patent litigated in the eighth circuit, which includes Arkansas, was found to be valid. The most important recent Supreme Court decision on the patentability of inventions was the case of Graham against Deere in 1966. The Court declared:

We have observed a notorious difference between the standards applied by the Patent Office and by the courts.

Of course, as Simon Rifkind, the co-chairman of the President's Commission, observed during the subcommittee hearings, part of the explanation for the different standards of the Patent Office and the courts is the ex parte nature of the proceedings in the office.

The Supreme Court again referred to the standard of patentability in its opinion on June 16 of this year in Lear against Adkins. Justice Harlan writing the opinion of the Court described the Graham decision as requiring a "demanding standard of invention." Three Justices in a separate opinion referred to the requirement that a patent applicant must meet the "exacting standards of the patent laws." The subcommittee in its 1967 annual report, approved by each of the current members of the subcommittee, stated:

The Patent Office should be more vigilant in rejecting applications which do not meet the required standard. The issuance of invalid patents serves only to undermine the entire patent system.

Section 103 of title 35 is concerned with the conditions of patentability. The Supreme Court in the Graham case said:

We have been urged to find in section 103 a relaxed standard, supposedly a Congressional reaction to the "increased standard," applied by this Court in its decisions over the last 20 or 30 years. The standard has remained invariable in this Court. The Subcommittee in its 1967 report stated "It does

not appear that it is necessary or desirable to enact additional legislation defining the standard of patentability. Rather, the Patent Office should more closely observe the existing requirements.

Congressional tinkering with section 103 could well sow the seeds of greater confusion, rather than promote the desired clarification. The nature and intent of any revision of section 103 should be carefully studied.

A review of the relevant judicial decisions at all levels of the Federal courts since the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952 does indicate some uncertainty as to the legislative intent, specifically, the correct interpretation to be given to section 103. Furthermore, the language in section 103 is general in nature and has resulted in a variety of judicial interpretations. Under these circumstances I have concluded that a clarification of section 103 is a desirable element of any program to improve the patent system. The bill which I am introducing today clarifies certain of the language currently in section 103, and includes several guidelines to assist the Patent Office and the courts in interpreting the required standard of patentability. It is not the purpose of the revised section 103 to lower the conditions for patentability which have traditionally been required by statute in pursuance of the limited constitutional grant of power to the Congress. The revised 103 should contribute to a reduction in the divergencies and uncertainties which have arisen in the various circuits and promote the orderly development of a consistent standard of patentability. It is to be hoped that these changes will result also in fewer reversals of Federal district court decisions by courts of appeals, and the giving of greater weight to the findings of those courts which have had the opportunity to hear the testimony and observe the witnesses.

In addition to the amendment of sections 102 and 103 enumerating the conditions of patentability, the presumption of patent validity in section 282 has been strengthened by providing that a party challenging the validity of a patent under section 103 "has the burden of establishing obviousness of the claimed invention by clear and convincing evidence." The protection of the public, therefore, requires that the Patent Office be vigilant in rejecting those applications which do not meet the standard of patentability.

Following the Supreme Court decision, the Commissioner of Patents in an address to the professional staff of the Patent Office referred to the language of the court:

It is the duty of the Commissioner of Patents and of the courts in the administration of the patent system to give effect to the constitutional standard by appropriate application, in each case, of the statutory scheme of the Congress.

He instructed the examiners to "keep constantly in mind that the Supreme Court insists upon strict adherence to the requirement that the patents should be granted only for new, useful, and unobvious inventions, and the examiner must thus be so satisfied before allowing an application." It does not appear that the gap between the Patent Office stand-

ard and that required by the statute and judicial decisions has been reduced since the Graham decision and the directive of the Commissioner of Patents.

Section 102 of my bill provides that "an applicant shall be entitled to a patent on the invention defined in each claim of his application upon establishing by a preponderance of proof that the invention meets the conditions for patentability". As under present law, the applicant would file an application including the specification prescribed in section 112, describing the invention and distinguishing it from other inventions and from what is old. The specification must conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter regarded as the invention. It is anticipated that the Commissioner of Patents, pursuant to section 131(c), will issue regulations requiring applicants to cite any relevant patents, publications, and other prior art which the applicant considered in preparing his application, together with an explanation as to why the claims are patentable over the prior art, or if no specific relevant prior art was considered a statement to that effect and an explanation as to why the claims in such application are believed to be patentable. If the examiner determines that the application meets the conditions for patentability required by the statute, the application will be allowed and the patent issued. If the examiner is not satisfied that claims in the application are patentable, the application shall not be allowed unless the applicant establishes by a preponderance of proof that the invention meets the conditions for patentability as set forth in sections 102 and 103. Section 134 provides that an applicant may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Board of Appeals.

The clarification of the conditions for patentability, the strengthening of the presumption of patent validity, and the placing of the burden on the applicant to establish by a preponderance of proof his right to a patent, in my opinion, achieves a fair balance between the rights of the applicant, and of the public.

The report of the President's Commission and various reports of the subcommittee have emphasized the desirability of facilitating an earlier disclosure of a new technology by reducing the protracted delays in the examination of patent applications. Virtually all of the recommendations made by the Commission to promote earlier public disclosure were vigorously opposed by the organized patent bar during the subcommittee hearings. Subsequently, the Patent Office advised the subcommittee that it would not be necessary at this time to undertake major statutory modifications of the examination procedure because the goal of a more rapid disposal of patent applications could be obtained by various administrative actions of the Patent Office. The Patent Office informed the Congress last year that it was its intention, commencing in fiscal year 1972, to reduce the pendency period of patent applications from the recent average of 30 months to 18 months. The new Commissioner of Patents in testifying before

the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 2 assured the committee that he would take appropriate measures to implement this program. On the basis of the assurances made by the Commissioners of Patents, I have decided that no major surgery in the examination procedure is required at the present time.

A major recommendation of the President's Commission which was incorporated in the earlier versions of the bills which I have introduced would have provided for the repeal of section 104 of the current patent law which in effect discriminates against foreign patent applicants by precluding reliance on foreign inventive activities in establishing a date of invention. The Department of Commerce in a letter in 1968 to the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary stated:

Not only does this provision unfairly discriminate against foreign applicants, but it has been a source of considerable difficulty in our negotiations for international patent cooperation.

The Department of State advised me that the repeal of section 104 was essential to the attainment of the greater international cooperation in patent matters, which I have advocated for several years. The current administration has reviewed this subject and I have been advised by the Commissioner of Patents that the administration does not at this time favor the repeal of section 104 and recommends that our patent statute should, for the present, continue to bar proof of foreign inventive activities. I have, therefore, at the request of the administration, retained section 104.

The President's Commission in Recommendation No. 22 proposed the inclusion in the patent statute of language clarifying the licensing of patent rights, field-of-use restrictions and the doctrine of patent misuse. This recommendation was not included in the former administration's Patent Reform Act. During the congressional hearings, the Department of Justice opposed the Commission's recommendation. I have felt that the relationship between the patent and antitrust laws deserved careful consideration and with the change in administration I wrote to the Attorney General on February 28 asking for the current views of the Department of Justice. I received on June 10 a letter from Richard W. McLaren, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, stating:

I strongly urge the committee not to incorporate Proposal No. 22 in any proposed patent legislation.

Mr. McLaren indicated that any necessary development or clarification of the law in this area could be obtained as part of the Department's antitrust enforcement program. He informed me that several cases have recently been filed and that others may be anticipated. No provisions on this subject are included in the bill.

Chapter 30, section 301 of the bill, restates the traditional interpretation that the Federal patent statute does not preempt contractual or other rights or obligations not in the nature of patent rights, imposed by State or Federal law on particular parties with regard to in-

ventions or discoveries, whether or not subject to title 35.

The Congress in 1965 passed legislation revising the patent fee schedule. After a lengthy study there was general agreement that between 65 percent and 75 percent of the costs of the Patent Office operations should be recovered by patent fees. The Johnson administration recommended that Congress authorize the Department of Commerce to set patent fees so that the Patent Office would recover between 65 percent and 75 percent of its costs. The Department of Commerce this year suggested that the adjustment of fees should be considered in separate legislation, and indicated that they would later transmit their recommendations to the Congress. My bill retains the present fee schedule and provides in section 41(e) that the Patent Office shall normally recover 65 percent of its costs. It directs the Commissioner of Patents to transmit his recommendations for adjustment of the fee schedule whenever the recovery rate consistently falls below 65 percent. The current Commissioner of Patents in testifying before the subcommittee in 1965 as the representative of the American Bar Association said "that something of the order of two-thirds of the cost of operating the Patent Office would be a reasonable total amount of fees to be collected."

Too frequently in the consideration of patent legislation, the inventor—especially the independent inventor—is the forgotten American. The subcommittee has received testimony from the American Society of Inventors. This organization has proposed certain amendments to the patent law, such as a statutory prohibition on an employer requiring the assignment of rights in inventions as a condition of employment, and a prohibition on challenges to the validity of a patent more than 5 years after its issuance. A particular cause of concern to inventors is the legal costs involved in obtaining and defending patents. At the request of the senior Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCOTT), the ranking minority member of the subcommittee, the subcommittee has requested the American Patent Law Association, the National Council of Patent Law Associations, and the Section of Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law of the American Bar Association to survey what legal assistance is currently available to indigent patent applicants and patentees, and to recommend what additional assistance, possibly with public funds, may be desirable.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2756) for the general revision of the Patent Laws, title 35 of the United States Code, and for other purposes, was received, read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 2757—INTRODUCTION OF A BILL RELATING TO POLLUTION CONTROL

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I am introducing today legislation which would authorize Federal assistance to fight pollution caused by erosion of streambanks and roadbanks.

Each year erosion along the Nation's streams and rivers damages and destroys valuable land. Channels and lakes are altered or filled, fish and wildlife destroyed and water polluted. Erosion is nothing less than a form of vandalism of the American land that can and must be stopped.

Uncontrolled erosion is as expensive as it is destructive. Each year streambank erosion along 300,000 miles of the Nation's waterways destroys valuable land. The annual cost of removing sediment from channels, harbors and reservoirs is estimated at \$250 million.

Each year we lose 500 million tons of soil from the banks of our streams and rivers. Unless preventive measures are taken immediately, we will see the rapid and substantial destruction of our beautiful rivers and streams.

In Wisconsin alone, 66,000 miles of streambanks are producing or have the potential to produce sediment. Twenty-four thousand miles of these streambanks have critical erosion problems. As much as 30 percent of the total sediment that pollutes streams, lakes, and reservoirs in Wisconsin comes from streambank erosion.

A study by the Department of Interior disclosed that erosion in the red clay area of northwestern Wisconsin has damaged valuable trout and recreational streams, discolored Lake Superior waters off the south shore of the lake and is damaging the lake's aquatic life.

Bank erosion control on large rivers is carried out by the Army Corps of Engineers. Although the Department of Agriculture provides some cost-sharing for streambank erosion control through the agricultural conservation program and the small watersheds program, it is impossible to undertake large-scale community erosion control projects. It is these extensive programs which can be carried out for the entire course of a river or stream which will be most effective.

The bill provides similar assistance for erosion control along the Nation's State and local highways, which needlessly destroys valuable land, defaces the landscape, causes excessive highway maintenance costs and pollutes many of our rivers and streams.

Roadside erosion control on the 875,000 miles of Federal highways is handled by the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads. Another half a million of city streets and roads are handled by municipalities.

This leaves some 2,125,000 miles of State and secondary roads—about 60 percent of the entire U.S. highway system—without adequate protection against roadbank erosion.

Studies have shown that silt losses due to roadbank erosion run as high as 356 tons per acre per year in parts of Wisconsin. An estimated 15 percent of the silt polluting Wisconsin's waters comes from this source.

Under this bill, the Secretary of Agriculture would be authorized to cooperate with counties and local conservation districts in furnishing financial and technical assistance in planning and installing erosion control measures. Cooperating States, counties, and local public agencies would bear at least one-quarter of the cost of control measures,

with the exception of engineering costs. Those agencies would provide land, easements of rights-of-way and would be responsible for maintenance of the roadside measures.

Mr. President, to consider such measures of minor importance or to ignore them in the name of economy is to be irresponsible and shortsighted. It is only sensible and economical to care for our natural resources and to maintain our highways.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2757) to provide for the control and prevention of pollution, deterioration of water quality, and damage to lands and waters resulting from erosion to the roadbeds and rights-of-way of existing State, county, and other rural roads and highways, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. NELSON, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Public Works.

S. 2758—INTRODUCTION OF A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 312 OF THE HOUSING ACT OF 1964

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to amend section 312 of the Housing Act of 1964. The purpose of the bill is to eliminate the provision in the 1968 Housing Act which imposes an income limitation on the use of section 312 rehabilitation loans.

The section 312 program, first authorized in the Housing Act of 1964, affects property owners in urban renewal and code enforcement areas. It provides them with 3-percent direct loans to finance the rehabilitation of their homes and businesses.

In 1964, section 312 represented a shift in the emphasis of our renewal programs. No longer would the bulldozer be the main tool of urban renewal. Rather, the emphasis would be on conserving and rehabilitating as much existing housing as possible. Since 1964, the section 312 program has been refined and expanded by subsequent legislation. The Housing Act of 1968 contains several useful new provisions which remove certain restrictions on the use of the 3-percent loans. At the same time, however, the 1968 act also restricts loans for residential properties to persons whose incomes fall within the income ceilings of the 221(d)(3) below-market interest rate program.

The 221(d)(3) limits vary significantly from one community to another. In general, the income limits for a family of four are in the \$6,000 to \$8,000 a year range. Local housing agencies throughout the country are finding that this restriction, which is just now taking effect for the section 312 program, is seriously impeding the operation of many projects. The National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials estimates that 40 percent of all rehabilitation activity will be affected by the new limits. The Minneapolis Housing and Redevelopment Authority informs me that approximately 50 percent of the people who had qualified for section 312 loans before the passage of the 1968 act will no longer be eligible.

Under current HUD regulations, those projects which received HUD approval for planning or operation before August 1, 1968, are not subject to the restrictive income limits. However, the cutoff date in this regulation will benefit urban renewal projects more than it does code enforcement projects. Since renewal projects received Federal planning grants, the regulation excuses them from the income restrictions if the project has received HUD planning funds before the cutoff date. On the other hand, code enforcement projects do not receive Federal planning grants and therefore are excluded from coverage by the income limits only if the project is approved for operation by HUD before the August 1968 cutoff date.

Thus, in a community where an urban renewal project and a code enforcement project become operational at the same time, the property owners in one project area will be affected by the income limits while the property owners in the other may not be affected. The Jordan code enforcement project in Minneapolis, Minn., is an example of the confusion caused by this new regulation. The Jordan project was funded in May 1969. No Federal funds were received for planning, but the city had been involved with local residents in planning the project 2 years before the enactment of the 1968 Housing Act.

When local planning activities were initiated, Minneapolis housing officials announced that 3 percent rehabilitation loans would be available to all area homeowners. However, since the project was actually funded after the passage of the 1968 act, Jordan residents found that they could not qualify for loans if their incomes exceeded the 221(d)(3) limits. If the Jordan project had involved urban renewal—and urban renewal planning funds—rather than code enforcement—the income limits would not have applied.

Even more significant than these administrative problems is the impact that the income limits will have on our future efforts to preserve older residential neighborhoods in the central cities. Up to now, rehabilitation and code enforcement has been used effectively to strengthen "tipping point" neighborhoods—residential areas that are not yet severely blighted but that may deteriorate rapidly unless preventive action is taken. The section 312 program has been an extremely useful rehabilitation tool in these areas. But now the income limits mean that the Minneapolis homeowners with an average sized family and an income slightly above the 221(d)(3) limits—say \$8,500 a year—will no longer be able to qualify for a 3-percent loan if he lives in a code enforcement area, even though he may be required to make extensive improvements to his property. A family in this predicament would certainly not be enthusiastic about staying in the neighborhood, since they would be forced to take out a conventional loan at 8 percent interest—and higher—to fix up an old house. Indirectly, then, the income limits will encourage the exodus from the central cities of the younger, stable families we most need to provide leader-

ship in our "tipping point" neighborhoods.

Legislation to remove these limits has been endorsed by a number of officials and residents in my own State, as well as by such national organizations as the Conference of Mayors—League of Cities, the National Housing Conference, and the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials.

The income limits have not improved the operation of our rehabilitation program in any demonstrable way. This unnecessary restriction should be removed as soon as possible.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2758) to amend section 312 of the Housing Act of 1964 to eliminate the provision which presently limits eligibility for residential rehabilitation loans thereunder to persons whose income is within the limits prescribed for below-market-interest-rate mortgages insured under section 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act, introduced by Mr. MONDALE, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

S. 2760—INTRODUCTION OF A BILL TO AMEND THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE RELATING TO WORKING MOTHERS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, today I am introducing a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code. My bill will allow parents to deduct the full cost of child care incurred as the result of working as a legitimate business expense.

In this day of spiraling costs of living, the limitations which prohibit women filing joint returns with husbands of combined incomes of \$6,600 or more from deducting child-care expenses incurred as a result of working are not realistic. The present law imposes an inequitable tax burden on wage earners; particularly mothers, who pursue both a profession or trade and motherhood.

Certainly, the increased benefits to the family, derived from this income, should not be negated by an increased tax liability.

Mr. President, my bill will eliminate any limitations as to income level or amount of child-care costs that may be used as legitimate income tax deductions.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2760) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to remove the limitations on the deductibility of expenses for care of dependents incurred to enable a taxpayer to be gainfully employed, introduced by Mr. STEVENS, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Finance.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS

S. 2422

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH), I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing, the

names of the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. DODD), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. McCARTHY), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN), the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH), and the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SCOTT), be added as cosponsors of S. 2422, a bill to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to provide that the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare shall prescribe the maximum rate of interest for the students insured loan program.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 2632

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FONG), I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing, the names of the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD), the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), the Senator from Nevada (Mr. BIBLE), the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON), the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS), and the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND), be added as cosponsors of S. 2632, authorizing and requesting the President to call in 1970 a White House Conference on Population Growth and Family Planning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 2722

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON), I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing the name of the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), be added as a cosponsor of S. 2722, to amend title II of the Social Security Act to provide a general increase of 25 percent in the amount of the benefits payable thereunder (with a minimum old-age benefit of \$100), to provide for cost-of-living increases in such benefits in the future, to increase the amounts individuals may earn without suffering deductions from such benefits, and to amend title XVIII of such act so as to include eye care, dental care, hearing aids, and routine physical examinations within the services covered by the insurance program established by part B of such title, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF AMENDMENT

NO. 107

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing, the name of the junior Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD) be added as a cosponsor of amendment 107 to S. 2546, the military procurement bill.

The amendment requires annual disclosures by former high-ranking civilian and military Pentagon employees who leave the Government and go to work for major defense contractors.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, August 1, 1969, he presented to the President of the United States the following enrolled bills and joint resolution:

S. 38. An act to consent to the upper Niobrara River compact between the States of Wyoming and Nebraska;

S. 1590. An act to amend the National Commission on Product Safety Act in order to extend the life of the Commission that it may complete its assigned task; and

S.J. Res. 85. Joint resolution to provide for the designation of the period from August 26, 1969, through September 1, 1969, as "National Archery Week".

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES FROM FOREIGN PARLIAMENTS ON APOLLO 11 MISSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have received congratulatory messages on the Apollo 11 mission from the Senate of France, the Senate of Belgium, and the Parliament of Vietnam.

I thank these bodies for their warm sentiments and ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the messages were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

To SENATOR MANSFIELD:

On behalf of myself and my colleagues in the French Senate I wish to express our admiration to Armstrong, Collins and Aldrin and also to all those who have contributed to the complete success of the Apollo 11 mission which constitutes an unprecedented event in the history of humanity.

Signed by:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, PARIS,
FRANCE.

The Belgian Senate has followed with deep emotion and boundless admiration the prodigious exploit of the U.S. astronauts who have accomplished the most extraordinary conquest in world history and who have proven that the victories of peace excel by far the most beautiful military victories. I wish to express to you my congratulations and those of the entire Senate on this brilliant success that reflects the greatest credit on the courageous astronauts, the scientists, the engineers, the intellectual and manual workers of the great American nation which with its traditional nobleness made itself the mes.enger of all mankind. I wish to express my fervent wishes for the happy return of the gallant conquerors of the moon.

PAUL STRUYE,
President of the Senate.

JULY 25, 1969.

To Senator MANSFIELD:

We send our warm and friendly greetings on the success of the Apollo 11 mission. Please make known to the American people that we have communicated our happiness and best wishes on the total success of this mission in its contribution to world peace and to liberty.

Signed by:

PHAN HUY DUC,
Chief of the North American Parliam-
entary Delegation of Viet Nam.

POLLUTION OR BROWNOUTS

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, yesterday I introduced the Intergovernmental Power Coordination and Environmental Protection Act—S. 2752—a bill designed to reconcile the needs of environmental

protection and the generation of adequate supplies of electricity.

Lee C. White, the distinguished former Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, has proposed similar legislation, and his ideas and warnings were discussed in a July 30 article and a July 31 editorial published in the Washington Post. Echoing Mr. White, the Post noted in its editorial:

Congress has a responsibility to move ahead . . . with legislation both to protect the environment and to provide an adequate supply of electricity.

With each month the problem becomes more critical, reaching a point where blackouts or brownouts occur with increasing frequency in periods of normally heavy demand. The Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee of the Government Relations Subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee will soon open hearings on the proposed legislation. I hope that all interested Senators will submit their views on this important legislation.

In the meantime, I commend the excellent article and editorial from the Post to the attention of the Senate and ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, July 31, 1969]

MUST WE CHOOSE BROWNOUTS OR POLLUTION?

The recent power shortages in the Washington area and elsewhere in the East were no surprise to the Federal Power Commission. The retiring chairman of the FPC, Lee C. White, has been warning for some months that "brownouts" are inevitable unless the electric power industry and public agencies find some way of speeding the construction of generating facilities. Rationing of electricity, Mr. White has warned, may be the result.

Demands for power become enormous on hot days because of the widespread use of air conditioning. As an emergency measure it may be necessary for power companies to ask people to turn off their air-conditioning units (at the moment when they need them most), but this merely accentuates the urgency of a long-range solution. It is not merely a question of meeting maximum demands this summer, but also of preparing to cope with a phenomenal increase in the use of electricity. Current estimates are that by the year 2000 the United States will be using seven times the electricity that it consumed in 1965.

The industry is eager enough to provide the additional volume that will be needed, but it is no longer a question of merely selecting sites and building the essential generating plants. Some cities are limiting the type of fuel that generating plants may use to avoid further pollution of their atmosphere. There is much resistance to the location of power plants on rivers where they heat large volumes of water to the disadvantage of fish and other wildlife, and the building of gigantic power lines across the landscape encounters increasingly fierce opposition. The power companies have virtually asked for this opposition by the high-handed manner in which they have planned their plant locations and transmission lines in the past without public hearings and with little consideration for the resulting impact on the environment. Nevertheless, the public has an interest in an adequate supply of electricity as well as in an uncontaminated and uncluttered environment.

Mr. White sponsored legislation two years ago designed to give the FPC a larger role in determining the future of the industry. His bill would have required the power companies to disclose their construction plans in advance so that the impact on the environment could be adequately studied and discussed in the planning stage. In case of emergency it would also permit the FPC to override obstructions in local communities in the interests of the general welfare. While recognizing the need for adequate consideration for esthetic and environmental factors, this approach would permit the timely resolution of controversies so as to avoid future power shortages.

The coolness of the power industry toward this bill appears to have kept it in limbo. But the problem remains, and no solution is at hand. In a recent speech Mr. White predicted that the electric utility industry will come to Congress within two years asking for help in its efforts to meet the mounting demands for power. Meanwhile Congress has a responsibility to move ahead on its own with legislation both to protect the environment and to provide an adequate supply of electricity.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, July 30, 1969]

ELECTRICAL FAILURES: WHITE WARNS OF RATIONING

(By Robert J. Samuelson)

The outgoing chairman of the Federal Power Commission yesterday warned that the United States may eventually have to ration its electricity.

Lee C. White, leaving the commission after three and a half years, said at his farewell news conference that the country is moving "headlong into a situation where we may not have (enough) electric energy to go around."

The glum prediction came less than two weeks after major East-coast utility companies temporarily asked customers to reduce consumption to prevent a major power failure. The companies said that the combination of some plant breakdowns and high summertime use—especially for air-conditioners—had strained the system almost to capacity.

NOT ALARMIST

White said he was not trying to be an alarmist and hedged his forecast by adding, "I do not see it (rationing) in the near future."

Nevertheless, he repeatedly emphasized that power companies, in an attempt to expand their generating capabilities, are encountering the increasingly strong opposition of conservationists.

Consumption of electricity, he said, increases about 7 percent annually. That figure, compounded over a decade, means a doubling of output every ten years.

"We are now doubling pretty big bases," White commented.

UGLY SIDE EFFECTS

Conservationists object to many of the side-effects of new plants—large, unsightly transmission lines, air pollution, and thermal pollution (for atomic reactors, which must recirculate hot water into rivers and lakes).

White cited power projects in New York, New Jersey, Minnesota, and California that have been stalled by political and legal challenges of local groups.

"When the big units aren't generating, you've got big problems," he said.

Utility companies, White said, must adapt to the new concern for the "environment" by accepting more conservationists into corporate ranks.

White also promoted a bill authored by himself and fellow-commissioner Lawrence J. O'Connor. The bill, now pending before Congress, would empower new regional councils, composed of power companies and state and federal regulatory bodies, to coordinate power development.

Congress, he emphasized, must "provide a

mechanism whereby two social goals (more power and preservation of the environment) can be harmonized."

White will be replaced this Friday when John N. Nassikas, a Republican who recently served as the minority counsel for the Senate Committee on Commerce, is sworn in by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger.

White, a native of Nebraska, will remain in Washington and join a local law firm.

SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE REPORTS STRONG COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY BILL

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare has unanimously ordered reported a coal mine health and safety bill. It is a strong measure which will do much to improve the working conditions of miners in West Virginia and other coal producing States.

It is the most comprehensive and complex safety legislation presented to Congress in my experience since the first Coal Mine Safety Act of 1941 authorized a modest Federal role in this field of activity. I labored in the House for that 1941 action when a Member of that body. And it was on my motion in the committee yesterday that the new bill was ordered to be reported to the Senate.

Provisions of the measure to be brought before the Senate would bring into the coal mine safety law for the first time requirements for the control of dust in the air which miners breathe. Safety standards for operations in underground mines have been substantially expanded and strengthened; in fact, standards in provisions recommended by the committee are strict. Segments of the coal industry complain that all of the standards cannot be met in all of the mines. In connection with several of the standards, however, the committee version provides periods of time in which producers can make operations adjustments in order to be better able to comply.

This Congress, I forecast, will pass a coal mine bill this session, and I hope the ultimate legislation will emerge as authorization for a strong, realistic, and workable program to enhance miners' health and safety. This is of vital importance to tens of thousands of West Virginians and to many additional thousands of citizens of other coal producing States.

The costs of achieving better health and safety are high, and the cost burdens which would fall on the coal mine owners and operators to meet the requirements of this legislation would be heavy. Higher prices of coal and many other services and commodities probably would be residual developments.

Then, too, the Secretary of the Interior, the Director of the Bureau of Mines, and their subordinates, as well as the Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health Service and his subordinates, would have assigned to them vastly expanded roles and responsibilities in their administration of new health standards and broadened safety requirements for both underground and surface coal mine operations. This would mean much larger appropriations for bigger Interior Department and Public Health Service operating budgets.

Our committee and its Subcommittee

on Labor, on both of which I am the ranking majority member, started work on this legislation in February. In my long legislative experience, I have seldom seen a measure receive the degree of consideration that has been accorded to the bills which have been crystallized into the committee version now in the process of being reported. I attended every hearing and every executive session of the subcommittee and the committee, as did the diligent chairman of our subcommittee, Senator WILLIAMS of New Jersey. All committee members, under the able chairmanship of Senator YARBOROUGH of Texas, were interested and helpful.

CAMPUS DISORDERS

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to discuss a situation that has given me a great deal of concern in recent months; that is, the serious threat to our security presented by certain militant leftist organizations in this country. The most significant and frightening aspect of this problem is the fact that large segments of the population seemingly have more or less adjusted to the outrageous positions taken by these groups and thus have taken a "ho-hum" attitude toward their activities. It is well known that the human animal has extensive powers of adaptation to its environment, and that this ability has no doubt played a major part in helping him to become the most successful organism ever placed on this earth. But in this case, this important device could prove to be very dangerous indeed.

At one time, we were shocked and dismayed to find that any group could be so presumptuous as to actually take over a public institution by force and arms. Mr. President, such an event seldom is deemed newsworthy enough to make front page news. There was a time when anyone making anti-American statements was someone to be scorned. Individuals openly advocate revolution and give counsel on how to bring America to her knees. Such seditious statements are made daily with impunity and we close our eyes and ears and hope it will all go away. Men preach disobedience of any and all laws which one finds personally repugnant, yet some of these men are respected and honored at the highest levels of Government.

In order to bring this matter into a clearer perspective, let us imagine how the liberal press would react if suddenly all the militancy and arrogance came from the right instead of the left. Suppose members of the Ku Klux Klan or the various Nazi organizations began taking over public buildings and traveling throughout the country to foment dissatisfaction and generally stir up trouble.

Suppose they moved onto a college campus with the avowed purpose of closing it down; then they proceeded to occupy the administration building and held it with barricades and arms. Would we then hear from those liberals who have been so conspicuously silent on these matters? What if they urged people to refuse compliance with laws which they consider disagreeable or unduly restrictive? What if they organized crippling strikes to protest such compliance

by certain corporations? Suppose they marched down the main streets of our cities wearing white sheets and Nazi armbands, yelling obscenities and carrying offensive signs. Would those affected be so hesitant to call in the police? Would some of my colleagues rush in to demand that their rights of assembly and petition be protected? Would the ACLU leap into the fray with their defense of all civil rights? Would movie stars stage benefits to raise money for the defense of these marchers? I doubt it, Mr. President, and I find this most inconsistent. I would like to make it clear at this point that, contrary to what certain columnists would have you believe, I hold no brief for groups such as I have used in this hypothetical example. I do not support extremists whether they be on the left or the right; but I do think we should consider what the reaction would be if "the shoe were on the other foot," and then wonder why such a reaction is not uniformly applied to all who deserve it.

Mr. President, we have adjusted—we have adapted ourselves to a climate of outrage; and while such a mental defense may save our already overburdened minds which are assaulted daily with numerous other worries, it presents a serious danger in the long run—the danger of losing our country by default, by acquiescence.

Mr. President, let us not close our minds to these possibilities. We should try to be aware of what is being done to our country. We should look at our future through the eyes of those professional malcontents who would destroy us, for only then will we recapture the disgust and indignation we felt before our minds mercifully blocked it all out. Armed with this, and the patriotic fervor which is ingrained in us all, perhaps we will be able to reverse the alarming trends which now trouble our country.

WESTERN GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE RESOLUTION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it was my privilege on April 18, acting on behalf of the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Banking and Currency (Mr. SPARKMAN), to introduce the National Timber Supply Act of 1969, S. 1832. I am a cosponsor of this bill as are 14 other Senators.

The aim of the bill was to enhance the productivity of our national timberlands through the application of modern management techniques and thus guarantee the supplies of softwood lumber and plywood urgently required to meet the national housing goals of 26 million units established by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968.

I was most heartened, last evening, to learn that the Western Governors' Conference in annual session at Seattle, Wash., had unanimously adopted a resolution endorsing the general policy as stated in this legislation and urging its immediate enactment into law.

The significance of this action is that the citizens of the Western States not only face the urgent housing problems apparent in the metropolitan, medium-sized cities, and rural areas throughout the United States, but, perhaps, know

better than most Americans the direct relationship between adequate timber supplies and the production of softwood lumber and plywood needed to build dwelling units.

The Western States contain 57 percent of the growing stock and 72 percent of the sawtimber in the entire Nation. It is in these States where the harvesting and regeneration of our critically needed forest resource will largely be accomplished. These same States now contain 86 percent of the total softwood sawtimber essential for the production of lumber and plywood. Moreover, 79 percent of the national forest land which would be intensively managed under the proposed act is within the boundaries of these States.

The positive approach by the Western Governors to overcoming national housing deficiencies by efficient and productive management of our national timber resource, while providing for the protection and enhancement of other forest values, such as recreation, fish and wildlife, grazing, and watershed, is commendable.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Western Governors' Conference resolution be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**RESOLUTION FAVORING NATIONAL FOREST
TIMBER SUPPLY ACT OF 1969**

Whereas the western states and the nation face a desperate need for housing, particularly housing for low and moderate income families; and

Whereas wood products, primarily of softwood species, continue to be the basic materials for residential construction; and

Whereas 60 percent of the nation's softwood timber inventory is on national forests, and concentrated in the western states; and

Whereas the yield from the national forests can be increased by as much as two-thirds by intensive forest management without impairing other forest values such as recreation, fish and wild life, grazing and watershed; and

Whereas the National Forest Timber Supply Act establishes policies and provides funds to improve timber production, while insuring that other multiple-use values of the national forests are protected;

Now, therefore, be it resolved that the 1969 Annual Meeting of The Western Governors' Conference in Seattle, Washington, endorses the general policy as stated in the National Forest Timber Supply Act of 1969 as presently written and urges its immediate enactment into law.

GUN CONTROL NONSENSE

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, on Wednesday, July 30, the Washington Evening Star published an editorial appropriately entitled "More Gun Control Nonsense." It rightfully attacks the recommendation of the President's Violence Commission that some 90 percent of the handguns in America be confiscated.

I heartily endorse the editorial and again express my opposition to the registration or licensing of firearms.

Like the Star, I am firmly convinced that the only person who would register or voluntarily give up his firearm is the law-abiding American. We might as well ask all bank robbers to turn themselves in and all narcotic peddlers to appear at

precinct headquarters as to ask criminals to register or voluntarily give up their firearms.

The Star does, however, support the approach advocated by several Senators, including myself, of stiff mandatory sentences for persons who use firearms in committing a felony under Federal jurisdiction.

I ask unanimous consent that the Star editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MORE GUN CONTROL NONSENSE

As an introductory note to this editorial comment, an item in the crime news is worthy of attention. On Monday there were 22 armed robberies in Washington. This brought the July total as of that date to 450, compared to 332 armed robberies in all of July of 1968.

In the face of this a task force of the President's Violence Commission (appointed by President Johnson) comes forward with a wacky recommendation. Its proposal is, except in a very small number of cases, that all Americans should be required to surrender any hand guns they own to the government.

Here is the task force's reasoning: This is the only way in which the United States can break "the vicious circle of Americans arming to protect themselves from other armed Americans." Now what does this really come down to? Even the task force, we suppose, would concede that criminals are not going to surrender their hand guns. So what they are saying is that no homeowner, to cite one example, should be permitted to keep a hand gun in his own house to protect himself, his wife, and his children against the night when some armed criminal might break into his home. Their argument is that home owners "may" seriously overrate firearms as a method of self-defense against crime. The "loaded gun in the home creates more danger than security."

This strikes us as blithering nonsense. How many members of this task force have been awakened in the middle of the night by a scream for help by some member of his family? Probably not one. But thousands of Americans are exposed to this dreadful experience every year. And in such a situation what is an unarmed householder supposed to do against an armed intruder? Hide under his bed, and never mind what happens to his family?

The major thrust of this soft-in-the-head report is that the requirement to surrender your hand gun, of which there are an estimated 24 million in the country, would reduce crime. This is absurd, for the criminals are not going to surrender their guns. A better and much more realistic way to deal with this problem will be found in legislation now being considered in Congress.

The intent of this legislation is to provide tough, really tough, mandatory penalties for criminals who use guns in the commission of a felony, such as rape, robbery or burglary. For a first offense the penalty generally favored would be a mandatory jail sentence in a federal jurisdiction, which includes Washington, of from one to 10 years. A judge would be forbidden to suspend this sentence or to make it run concurrently with the sentence for the primary offense. In case of a second offense, much stiffer jail sentences are proposed, and they should be written into law.

A similar bill passed the House last year, but was watered down in the Senate before becoming law. The argument then was that mandatory sentences deprive judges of discretion in imposing penalties. And so they would. But in one week at the time the watered-down bill was passed 17 criminals in this city were found guilty of crimes in

which guns were used. In six of these cases, more than one-third, the judge imposed suspended sentences, which means that no jail terms were served for using a gun.

So we say let's make the sentences mandatory. And let's not deprive the law-abiding citizen of hand guns in his own home while the criminal element will remain armed to the teeth.

**JOHN CROSBY: IMPRESARIO OF
SANTE FE**

Mr. MONTROYA. Mr. President, the Santa Fe Opera Co. is one of the wonders of the musical world. Since its first season in 1957, it has established and maintained a reputation as a major source of artistic creativity and innovation. American and world premieres of contemporary additions to the operatic repertory are standard procedure for this troupe of unexcelled standards.

This year's season is no exception. Tonight the company will give the U.S. premiere of "Help! Help! The Globolinks" by the well-known Italian-born composer, Gian-Carlo Menotti. Less than 2 weeks from now, on August 14, "The Devils of Loudon," the first opera of the newest talent of the European scene, the Polish composer Krzysztof Penderecki, is scheduled to have its American premiere at Santa Fe.

The man who has built the Santa Fe Opera Co. "from an experiment to an institution" is John Crosby. For over a decade he has proven himself capable of staging critically acclaimed productions and managing the company with equal competence. Tempering his creative drive with clear-headed objectivity, this remarkable gentleman has insured that the productions his group mounts are a perfect marriage of work and company.

Not even the fire in the summer of 1967 which destroyed the opera house could deter him. The season went on to its completion in the gymnasium of Santa Fe High School. At the same time, Mr. Crosby was working feverishly to transform the catastrophic end of the old Santa Fe Opera House into a new beginning. With the generous assistance of business firms from every corner of New Mexico, as well as donations and contributions from music lovers throughout the world, the Santa Fe Opera Co. opened its 1968 season in a new opera house, larger and finer than the old theater.

For the August issue of High Fidelity/Musical America magazine, Shirley Fleming has written an excellent profile of John Crosby and his accomplishments. The author demonstrates clearly how Mr. Crosby can delineate his purposes and methods with the precision of thought and word that is typical of an astute businessman. A good example of this is the account of why Mr. Crosby chose Santa Fe as the home of his fledgling venture in the 1950's. His reasons are unerringly accurate to those of us who know and love New Mexico's capital city.

He can tell you . . . that Santa Fe was picked as a summer opera site for four reasons: (1) it was a city "hospitable to the arts," very conscious of the culture of the Indians and of Spain and supporting six or seven museums to prove it; (2) it was never a flashy resort town, but appealed to families who might come and stay for a month in

the summer; (3) it is the southernmost cool city; (4) it is within reach of Houston and Dallas.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JOHN CROSBY
(By Shirley Fleming)

John Crosby has probably been described as "elegant" by so many people that one hesitates to trot out the word, but it is unavoidable. The man who is the mastermind behind the Santa Fe Opera Company, which began its thirteenth season last month, is someone whom you couldn't imagine with his sleeves rolled up—though it is obvious that figuratively speaking they must be rolled up a good bit of the time. Only immense toll could achieve what he has achieved—moving "from an experiment to an institution," as he puts it—and if he looks like a board member of a blue-chip corporation, he can also delineate his purposes and methods with the precision of thought and word that is typical of an astute business man. He can tell you, for example, that Santa Fe was picked as a summer opera site for four reasons: 1) it was a city "hospitable to the arts," very conscious of the culture of the Indians and of Spain and supporting six or seven museums to prove it; 2) it was never a flashy resort town, but appealed to families who might come and stay for a month in the summer; 3) it is the southernmost cool city; 4) it is within reach of Houston and Dallas.

Ensnored in an immaculate town house in Manhattan's East Sixties, where the celebrations for Santa Fe go on all winter, John Crosby is more difficult to draw out on the subject of himself. But he will reveal that he is a Yale Music School man who studied conducting with Monteux and got close to opera at the Columbia Opera Workshop. He also admired the work of Leopold Sachse, a stage director at the Metropolitan and New York City Opera (and before the war, head of the Hamburg Opera Company), and it was with Sachse that he founded Santa Fe. "We became very keen on using young talent that was lying idle over the summer. The mid-Fifties were very different from the mid-Sixties in that respect. We talked of starting an opera company, and in 1955 I remember Bill Primrose, the violinist, said 'go ahead and do it now.' It was really a professional beginning for me, as well as the company."

SETTING THE PACE

The 846-seat house was built, and the "idle talent" that first summer set the pace for things to come by plunging right into a world premiere—Marvin David Levy's *The Tower*. Since then the repertory has been probably the most consistently adventurous of any company in the United States, averaging a couple of world or U.S. premieres every season, the latter picked from the wide panorama of European offerings. Crosby is responsible, though he tends to play down his role: "A summer season at Santa Fe, contrary to popular opinion, is not John Crosby's list of favorite operas." Just how he and his board of directors come by the frequently brilliant choices (such as Berg's *Lulu*, given its first American performances in 1963, or Schoenberg's *Jacobleiter*, last summer) is necessarily a little vague, but as Crosby puts it, "You try to keep *au courant*—who's doing what, who's singing what, who's conducting, who's writing." He is entirely candid about limitations, and recalls that after discussing with Schoenberg's widow the possibility of giving the American premiere of *Moses and Aaron* "it became evident to both of us that this was not for Santa Fe." (It was subsequently done by Sarah Caldwell's Boston Opera Company.)

NEW GROUND

Crosby is also quite clear about his company's role in breaking new ground onto which others can later venture, and he deplores the petty spirit of competition which is not unknown among local patriots surrounding various of the major companies. "I will be irate and distressed if I read in some newspaper again, 'why did we let Santa Fe beat us' to this opera or that. I think it's wonderful that operas can be picked up here and then done in other places, and if I were Mr. So-and-So of the X opera company I would damn well let John Crosby stick his neck out on something and see how it worked. It is important that these scores be produced and heard or they can't take their place in the mainstream. Perhaps we can afford to take chances—perhaps the stakes are not so high here . . ."

Although sales at the box office cover only one-quarter of the company's expenditure—and this figure will stand, Crosby says, "as long as we do contemporary repertory, use experimental scenery, have long rehearsal schedules, and make a 'festival presentation' out of the things we give"—foundation grants have materialized in sufficient force to keep the wolf from the door. (Even the destruction of the opera house by fire in the summer of 1967 was, amazingly enough, only a temporary setback; Crosby was on the phone raising money for the new building—successfully—literally before the smoke cleared.) And after being exposed for even a short time to the precision of Crosby's mind, one is inclined to take as understatement his declaration that "We run a tight ship—there's no fat on the budget." With three orchestra dress rehearsals for each opera, plus one "piano dress," it is scarcely surprising that expenses run as high as quality. Meanwhile, Santa Fe makes its contribution to the operatic world at large through its Apprentice Artist program, which gives about forty young singers a forty-hour-a-week season of hard work in learning all aspects of their trade. Some of them go into solo roles in the parent company, and over a hundred have spread out into major companies here and abroad.

What everybody is waiting for this summer at Santa Fe are the American premieres of Menotti's *Help! Help! The Globolinks* and Penderecki's *The Devils of Loudun*. Both are scheduled for this month, and Musical America readers will be hearing more of Mr. Crosby's "tight ship" very happily afloat.

PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT OF ABM SYSTEM

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement prepared by the distinguished junior Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER) and a news release issued by him relating to a poll of Tennesseans concerning the proposed deployment of the ABM system.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR BAKER

Recently I conducted a poll in my monthly newsletter pertaining to the proposed deployment of the ABM system. The results of this poll indicate that nearly 80 percent of Tennesseans are in favor of President Nixon's recommendations.

NEWS RELEASE ISSUED BY SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.

WASHINGTON.—Nearly 80 percent of Tennesseans favor President Nixon's proposed deployment of the anti-ballistic missiles (ABL) system, according to a poll conducted by U.S. Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-Tenn.).

The results of the poll were announced today by Senator Baker.

From more than 2,000 replies in the poll, conducted through his monthly newsletter 79.3 percent said they favored the President's plan, 20.6 percent expressed opposition to it.

"Do you favor President Nixon's proposed ABM system?" was the question asked in the newsletter. "Yes" or "no" answers were requested.

"The only question involved at this time is whether the President's proposal is approved or rejected," Senator Baker stated in his newsletter.

A total of 2,105 replies were received. Of that number 1,627 voted "yes," and 424 voted "no."

In addition to those replying directly to the question 54 others wrote that they were not sufficiently informed to make a decision and "will rely on your judgment."

The newsletter goes to Republicans and Democrats in all 95 counties of Tennessee.

Baker has taken a lead in the U.S. Senate in supporting the President's proposal. At the time he took the opinion poll, Baker said, "While I am confident a majority of Tennesseans support ABM deployment, I am interested in the percentage and also in the views of those who oppose it."

"I respect the position of those against the ABM," he said today. "There are sound arguments on both sides of the question. I just happen to believe that the ABM proposal is the answer to the constant threat from our enemies. It is a defensive proposal, not an escalation of offensive weapons, and, in my judgment, will strengthen our hand in peace negotiations."

Many of the replies, on both sides of the issues, to the poll were highly emotional, commenting on their opinions at length, Baker said.

JOHN FRANCIS SONNETT

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, with deep personal regret, I mark the passing of John Francis Sonnett.

As a senior partner of Cahill, Gordon, Sonnett, Reindel, & Ohl, one of Wall Street's most renowned law firms, John Sonnett was an eminent and eloquent member of the American legal community.

As special assistant to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and as Assistant Attorney General of the United States, Sonnett was a dedicated public servant whose illustrious career touched on many of the most vital issues of the last three decades.

With John Sonnett's death, I have lost a valued friend and a trusted counselor.

Mrs. Dodd joins me in extending heartfelt sympathy to Mrs. Sonnett and the Sonnett family.

INCOME TAX SURCHARGE AND THE NEED FOR TAX REFORM

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I fully support the provisions of the compromise bill passed yesterday by the Senate for extension of the income tax surcharge through the end of the present calendar year. I commend the distinguished majority leader and the distinguished chairman of the Finance Committee for their leadership in developing this highly satisfactory compromise. In light of the present circumstances, I believe that the compromise is well calculated to achieve our twin goals of bringing inflation under control and

achieving the earliest possible enactment of comprehensive tax reform.

Perhaps the most important single point that should be reaffirmed at this time is our intention to press vigorously for the enactment of comprehensive tax reform. I am especially pleased to note that the distinguished chairman and the Democratic members of the Finance Committee have given their assurance that a tax reform package will be reported to the Senate by the end of October. Indeed, in light of the extraordinary progress that is now being made in tax reform by the House Ways and Means Committee, I am hopeful that the present Senate schedule may be accelerated, so that we may be able to enact tax reform legislation for the benefit of all our citizens at an even earlier date.

The need for tax reform is obvious. In a brief but forceful letter to the editor published in yesterday's New York Times, seven of the Nation's leading economists pointed out that the inequities of our tax system become more acute at times such as today, when taxes are being raised. Public opinion is now rightfully aroused against the injustices of our present system, and I am confident that reform will prevail.

By yesterday's action, the Senate has shown its good faith and cooperation with the administration in carrying out a responsible fiscal policy in the war against inflation. I look forward to the early enactment of tax reform through the joint efforts of Senators, Representatives, the administration, and all other persons so vitally interested in the cause of tax justice.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter to the editor to which I referred be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, July 31, 1969]

SURTAX SUPPORTED

As economists, many of us are concerned about inflation and support the tax surcharge and its extension as requested by the Nixon Administration. Many of us are also concerned about inequities in the tax structure and the urgent need for tax reform.

We believe that these two goals are not in conflict. Recent Congressional action extending the surtax withholding rate, but not the surtax rate itself, makes it possible to have serious discussion and legislative action on tax reform, and at the same time to provide responsible anti-inflationary fiscal policy.

When taxes are being increased, the injustices of the existing system become more acute, and therefore responsible public opinion is rightly concerned with the inequities of the present tax system.

In periods of stable or declining tax rates, reform is all too readily delayed, as in 1964, when public support melted away under the intense lobbying of economic pressure groups. Therefore we favor continuation of the surtax withholding rate for a period sufficient for Congress to consider and enact tax reform. [Editorial July 30.]

E. CARY BROWN, ARNOLD C. HARBINGER, WALTER W. HELLER, EDWIN KUR, WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, PAUL A. SAMUELSON,

Cambridge, Mass., July 28, 1969.

CBW NOT MORE HUMANE—NEED TO RATIFY GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, in 1926 the Senate, despite the favorable report of the Foreign Relations Committee, referred the Geneva protocol of 1925, banning chemical and biological weapons back to the committee after a brief debate. That debate took place some time ago, and in view of the alarming proliferation of these weapons, it seems worth our while to reexamine the arguments used against them, to determine whether these arguments are as accurate now as they seem to have been then.

A major argument set forth against the Geneva protocol, was that poison gas was in fact a more humane weapon of war than conventional explosives. Senator Wadsworth, one of the protocol's most vocal opponents, stated that:

We have the information now complete, based upon facts that are incontrovertible, which indicates very, very clearly that, compared with other weapons used in warfare, gas is the least cruel, not only in its effect at the time of its use but in its after effects.

The Senator cited figures indicating that deaths due to gas in World War I were proportionately less numerous than those from other weapons.

Whether or not we agree that the chemical weapons available at that time were more humane than conventional weapons, Mr. President, the fact is that the state of the art and the state of the world have both changed since the time this argument was originally made.

The Senators debating the protocol in 1926 were speaking of gas weapons that pale in comparison with the ones we have developed since. We would be hard put to come up with casualty figures like those Senator Wadsworth cited when we have gases minute quantities of which kill instantly on contact.

At that time, too, the world had not seen biological weapons used in warfare and the Senators had no reason to conceive of the supervirulent weapons that exist today.

More important, Mr. President, not only have the weapons changed since the time this argument was made, but the context in which they are used has been drastically altered as well. Modern, worldwide war, in which noncombatants suffer heavily along with combatants, was nothing new to the Senators debating the Geneva protocol. But with the advent of nuclear arms—which these men did not foresee—has come the era of total war, in which there is no combatant-noncombatant distinction and vast numbers of people can be eliminated indiscriminately. The modern chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems are very much a part of this warfare.

The senatorial opponents of the Geneva protocol in 1926 may or may not have been right in their time, Mr. President, but I submit that generally speaking today, the use of chemical and biological weapons is not more humane than conventional weapons.

This, as I hope to demonstrate in the

future, is only one of a series of arguments used in 1926 that are inapplicable today. If these arguments are insufficient today, Mr. President, then the only obstacle to our approval of the Geneva protocol is our own apathy. And CBW is far too important a matter to ignore through apathy.

COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY BILL

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, it is a proud moment for me to announce to the Senate that yesterday the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare by unanimous bipartisan record vote, ordered the strongest coal mine health and safety bill in the Nation's history reported to the Senate.

As chairman of the Labor Subcommittee, I will shortly be introducing a clean bill and an accompanying report. I hope that the Senate will be ready for action on the measure when it convenes after Labor Day.

It has been said that the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act is aimed at a relatively small segment of the industrial health and safety problem. In terms of the number of deaths and injuries each year this is true, in terms of the numbers of hard-working men who will be protected, this is true; however, in terms of the size of the problem we are attacking, and more importantly in terms of the debt we individually and as a nation owe to our coal miners, no statement could be more misleading. Day after day and year after year tens of thousands of men go down into the mines to bring forth the coal which provides the energy to heat our homes, to keep our wheels of industry spinning.

With its small numbers, coal mining had one of the highest fatality rates of any industry in the United States last year. The odds were 500 to one that a coal miner would be killed on the job. If the miner managed to survive the roof falls, the electrical hazards, the explosions, the fires, the mine inundation, he would go home at night knowing that with each breath he took in the mines, he was inhaling more and more of the deadly coal dust, more and more of these invisible particles of dust which cause black lung, which brings 20 years of breathlessness and ultimately death to thousands of our miners.

This bill not only is a hallmark for coal miners, it would represent a major victory for all workers.

Only 1 month ago, the Senate passed the Construction Safety Act which is now awaiting the President's signature. Later on in this session the Senate, I hope, will begin consideration of the omnibus Occupational Health and Safety Act, on which the Labor Subcommittee will soon begin hearings.

I am proud to be the sponsor of each of these three pieces of legislation. I am even more grateful for the opportunity, as chairman of the Labor Subcommittee, to be the floor manager for each of these three acts. Most important, however, I am honored to be a Member of the Senate and the Congress which has

recognized its obligation to protect the health and safety of America's working men.

I would certainly like to commend most sincerely the diligence and interest displayed by the chairman and my fellow members of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee during the deliberations on this bill. Their untiring efforts played a major role in reporting this historic measure.

LAKE SUPERIOR

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, one of the key tests of our willingness in this country to deal with pollution problems is now underway for Lake Superior, the third largest body of fresh water in the world and the last pure Great Lake. A news report in *The Trail*, published by the National Audubon Society and the North Central Audubon Council, does a good job of putting the Lake Superior situation in perspective, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at the end of these remarks. As I have pointed out on a number of occasions, all sources of pollution of this lake could readily be dealt with if the Governors of Wisconsin and Minnesota would request the Secretary of the Interior to include intrastate pollution under the jurisdiction of the enforcement conference on the lake. Without such a step, there is a real danger that nothing will be done about major pollutants such as the 60,000 long tons of taconite tailings now being dumped into Lake Superior every day.

There being no objection, the news report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LAKE SUPERIOR—"BEGINNING WRINKLES OF AGE . . ."

Lake Superior is showing the "beginning wrinkles of age". So said A. F. Bartsch at the water pollution enforcement conference in Duluth, May 13-15. Bartsch, director of the Pacific Northwest Water Laboratory, testified that Lake Superior is in the early aging process since its formation 12,000 years ago, and has "admirably withstood the pressures of time." He cautioned, however, that this greatest of the Great Lakes is not immune to the eutrophication (aging) process.

The conference, called by former Interior Secretary Udall, was one of the most controversial of such conferences conducted by the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, largely because of the activities of one company. The company is the Reserve Mining Company at Silver Bay, Minnesota. The activity is the discharge of approximately 60,000 long tons of taconite tailings per day into Lake Superior. Evidence indicates that this pollutant, which can remain in suspension for long periods of time, reduces the abundance of fish food organisms and in so doing has a deleterious effect on the ecology of at least a portion of the lake.

Chairing the conference was FWPCA's new and youthful commissioner, David Dominick, who at one point disallowed new data that showed tailings in Wisconsin waters (which would have demonstrated interstate pollution), but later was forced to allow such data to enter the record for official consideration by the conferees from the water resource agencies of Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin.

A frightening point was made by Edwin Geldreich, of the U.S. Public Health Service, when he said that the minute taconite tailings could serve as vehicles for the spread

of disease producing microbes, although evidence on this point is not complete.

Pollution by metals is an especially dangerous threat in Lake Superior because of the very soft water which seems to increase their toxicity. For this reason, concentrations which would allow life in other waters are not acceptable in Lake Superior warned Dr. Donald Mount, director of FWPCA's water quality laboratory in Duluth.

The conferees are now studying the testimony and will reconvene in executive session at a later date. One discouraging note in the conference: both the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency and the Minnesota Conservation Department turned out to be the chief apologists for Reserve Mining Company. This was perhaps balanced by an encouraging note: The Army Corps of Engineers does not propose to act on revalidating Reserve's permit until the results of the conference become available and definite recommendations are received from the Interior Department.

SENATOR SCOTT TESTIFIES BEFORE HOUSE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION ON BEHALF OF AFRO-AMERICAN HISTORY AND CULTURE BILLS S. 14 AND H.R. 3295

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, on Monday, July 28, Senator SCOTT appeared before the Select Committee on Education of the House Education and Labor Committee in support of legislation to establish a Commission on Afro-American History and Culture (H.R. 3295 and S. 14). I cosponsored S. 14 when Senator SCOTT introduced it on January 15 of this year.

I ask unanimous consent that the testimony of Senator SCOTT on behalf of this proposed legislation be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the testimony was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF SENATOR HUGH SCOTT, REPUBLICAN, OF PENNSYLVANIA, BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, HOUSE EDUCATION AND LABOR COMMITTEE, JULY 28, 1969

Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee. I appreciate your kindness in calling upon me at this time. We seem to be at a point of indicating our various origins, and I may add that I am of Scottish, Welsh, Irish, English "infraction" and I find no longer any need for the defense of any of these minorities in the United States. I am not going to expend sympathy upon the Irish, because they have done very well in this country and they began by being policemen, keeping all the rest of us in order, and they moved from there to the highest of all possible posts which can be held.

I think the distinction has been well made by Dr. Wesley that the Negro's physical visibility is what has contributed so much to his relative political invisibility because he was the victim of decisions made as far back as the second of July 1776, when the drafters of the Declaration of Independence left out of that draft Mr. Jefferson's emotional and moving paragraph in condemnation of slavery, and in 1784, when the State of Virginia, by three votes, defeated Mr. Jefferson's provision in the draft of that constitution abolishing slavery in that State by 1800.

I think the history of suppression and history of disadvantage and inequality is all well known and is certainly to be found in many of our history books; but the history of achievement, contribution, and participation and the history of rising aspirations is not

yet a part of that American history commonly taught at all levels in all of our educational institutions; and therefore I am pleased to appear today in support of the bill to establish a Commission on Afro-American History and Culture.

I may add that my first appearance before this committee was in 1943, where one of the members of the committee from Texas made the same arguments I have heard here today precisely. After 26 years I am overwhelmed by reminiscence.

This commission would be composed of 22 members appointed by the President who would be authorities on African-American history, American history, education, journalism, communications, and other related fields.

I was very encouraged last year by passage of this proposal by the House of Representatives and a subsequent favorable report by the Subcommittee on Arts and Humanities headed by Mr. Pell. The imminence of adjournment prevented the Ninetieth Congress from completing action on the proposals.

During the first month of the Ninety-first Congress, I again joined with the distinguished member of this committee Representative Scheuer in this effort by introducing in the Senate an identical bill, S. 14.

The void in recorded American history created by the inadvertent "conspiracy of silence" about the black American is now pretty well known. I have watched with growing pleasure some overt steps by our communications media and educational institutions to fill this void. For example, *Newsweek* magazine on June 30 featured on its front cover six black faces and its third report on the Negro in America since 1963. This latest report is entitled "Report from Black America."

As I look over the newspapers, I see advertisements of books responding to the "demand for Negro history." I see feature stories about historical landmarks made by black Americans such as the Frederick Douglass Institute here in Washington. I see a pictorial and easy portrait series entitled "They Had a Dream" in the *Washington Evening Star*, which digests the lives of little-known black Americans such as a celebrated conductor, Dean Dixon; a black Catholic Bishop, James Augustine Healy; an inventor, Elijah McCoy; B. O. Davis, Sr., a U.S. Army General; Bill Pickett, the cowboy who invented the rodeo sport bulldogging, and many more.

There has been a great stirring within the academic community toward teaching black history—partly in response to student demands. Academic institutions such as the National Endowment for the Humanities and the American Association of State Colleges and Universities are rousing activity in the area of ethnic teaching and knowledge. Recently the Ford Foundation announced a series of grants to colleges and universities totaling more than \$1 million for the development of Afro-American studies.

However, the May issue of *The School Review*, a University of Chicago Department of Education quarterly publication, contained an article by Professor Mark M. Krug which concluded that the role of the Negro in recorded American history is still "incomplete and often distorted." The time is ripe for national leadership to foster better understanding and knowledge of the black experience, heritage, and contributions to our total society.

I believe a Commission on Afro-American History and Culture, such as that proposed in the bill before you today, could coordinate intercultural programs of foundations, educational institutions, and the news media and help bring them to public attention.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I urge favorable action on H.R. 3295, which will establish a

Commission on Afro-American History and Culture to make a comprehensive study of all proposals designed to create better knowledge of the black experience and its influence on today's American society.

I would like to conclude with a plea that action on this bill and I hope action in the other body will likewise be motivated by bipartisan concerns.

The quiet whispers against legislation of this sort usually turn on the question of political advantage, and we might as well bring it to the surface and expose it. We can either admit or deny political advantage as our own convenience advises us. I can only say that when I came to Congress, the proportion of Negroes in my district was 1 percent, and my support of civil rights measures, beginning with HEPC, has been constant and I am proud of this.

To knock down any feeling that the bill is regional or political, I think the greatest possible cohesiveness from both sides of the aisle would offer this kind of legislation its best chance for adoption.

Therefore I think it is extremely important that all of us seek to avoid the sheer, stark outlines of political opportunism or of a person's seeking publicity for the sake of alerting one minority to the fact that there is concern for it.

The concern exists whether minorities are alerted or not. They do not need to be alerted. They were never more aware than they are today for the necessity for the elimination of those last areas of discrimination or those enclaves of apathy, those pockets of indifference which themselves contribute to the frustrations, and the frustrations in turn contribute to civic confrontations.

So I think what you are doing here is the laying of some bricks in the wall of the American determination to establish that what the Constitution said, what the Declaration of Independence said is truly being given an opportunity to enter the field of reality. Therefore, I am very pleased to support the bill and urge the favorable action of the committee. Thank you, sir.

PEACEFUL USE OF THE SEABEDS

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, at a time when reductions are being called for in defense expenditures and the emphasis the United States is placing on matters of military procurement, the recent statement of the Defense Department before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Ocean Space cannot be met with anything but dismay. The implication of Assistant Secretary Nutter's statement decrying a prohibition of the use of seabeds for other than peaceful purposes and labeling it as neither feasible nor desirable is that plans are already underway by the Defense Department for the expansion of defense facilities beyond the territorial waters of the United States.

Such a claim is not only appalling when the goal of the United States is being announced as one of peace, but it indicates an unwillingness on the part of our Nation to turn attention to the begging problems on the homefront at the abandonment of current levels of defense spending, and, with the Soviet Union, to establish a mutual agreement for the solely constructive use of the earth's one yet undeveloped resources.

In the United States alone \$80 billion was spent last year on defense, while considerably less than that amount went to meet all domestic programs of our Nation. Health services remained wanting,

housing inadequate, social security benefits insufficient, educational opportunities limited, transportation facilities crowded, pollution problems burgeoning, and natural resources unattended. Such an imbalance in resource allocation would seem to indicate that the last investment our Nation needs to consider is the expansion of military installations and fortifications to the world's seabeds.

It is my opinion that scrutiny needs to be given the proclamation of Mr. Nutter, and that of Gerard C. Smith, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who indicated at the May disarmament conference at Geneva that the United States would oppose the Soviet proposal to limit the use of seabeds exclusively to peaceful purposes.

Each day an estimated 10,000 people in the world die from undernutrition and malnutrition, while the Department of Interior conservatively estimates that the food potential of the sea can supply minimal animal protein needs for twice the present world population.

In addition to the protein potential of the ocean environment lies unrefined plenty in terms of petroleum, minerals, chemicals, and even possibilities for improved weather forecasting.

It is my firm conviction that the United States needs to re-examine its posture on the use of ocean resources. As inviting as the threshold to the moon is that beyond the shores of the world's continents, which through cooperative, international development could enhance the lives of men around the globe.

THE PESTICIDE PERIL—XXXVII

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, a witness before Senator WALTER MONDALE's Subcommittee on Migratory Labor revealed this morning that—

Fifty million pounds of a pesticide originally developed in World War II as a German Nerve Gas are being spread unchecked on America's farms and gardens. The result is that uncounted thousands of the nation's migrant farm workers, farmers and suburban homeowners have been fatally overcome or seriously disabled.

The testimony of Jerome B. Gordon, president of Delphic Systems & Research Corp., in New York City, adds a new dimension to the current controversy over the use of persistent, toxic pesticides. Farm workers are daily exposed to hard pesticides at levels believed to be hazardous to human health, yet efforts to protect them are virtually nonexistent.

Last fall the U.S. General Accounting Office reported there was little effective compliance action on regulations set by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, and there was no request for prosecution by the Justice Department in 13 years, despite the existence of repeated major violations.

The seriousness of the lack of enforcement of the few regulations we now have is alarming when reading reports in the November 1968 issue of *Mayday* of actual pesticide poisonings. In 1963 a heavy spraying of the pesticide parathion on a peach crop in California caused an outbreak of poisoning which resulted in one death and hospitalization for

many others. It was eventually discovered that the real cause was the presence of a compound derived from parathion, but considerably more toxic which was carelessly identified simply as parathion. More recently, just in the past 18 months in California there have been six deaths among farm workers due to accidental pesticide poisoning.

And evidently, pesticide poisoning is not just limited to the workers. The California Department of Public Health last summer declared the local water supply in Delano unfit for the consumption of infants below the age of 6 months, because of the heavy presence of nitrate residues from the applications of fertilizer to the crops in the fields.

I ask unanimous consent that the press release issued by Delphic Systems & Research Corp. regarding Mr. Gordon's testimony and also the article from *Mayday* on pesticide contamination be printed in the *RECORD* at this point.

There being no objection, the press release and article were ordered to be printed in the *RECORD*, as follows:

"Fifty Million Pounds of a pesticide originally developed in WW II as a German Nerve Gas are being spread unchecked on America's Farms and Gardens. The result is that uncounted thousands of the nation's migrant farm workers, farmers and suburban homeowners have been fatally overcome or seriously disabled." This is one of several allegations made in a statement by worker safety advocate Jerome B. Gordon in testimony released today at a Hearing in Washington held by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor, headed by Sen. Walter Mondale of Minn.

The pesticides in question derived from German nerve gas research, are called organic phosphors and appear under such trade names as Parathion, Methyl Parathion, TEPP, and in less lethal dosages, as Malathion. They are first cousins, chemically, to the nerve agents GB and VX involved in the current chemical and biological warfare controversy.

The odorless, colorless liquid or powder form of the pesticide is so powerful that a minute amount—less than .00424 of an ounce, swallowed by a human is fatal in less than five minutes! Even under ideal conditions, continued cumulative exposure can result in disabling partial paralysis and mental debility.

Both the organic phosphor compounds and the war gas nerve agents GB and VX use the same "kill mechanism." They prevent the manufacture of enzymes which carry body "messages" controlling respiration. In other words, victims simply suffocate. Early symptoms include pinpointing of eye pupils, tightness in the chest, convulsions, paralysis and finally respiratory failure. Even more insidious is that less than lethal dosages of the pesticides have symptoms resembling the onslaught of an attack of flu!

Mr. Gordon further contends that the occupational and general health danger from insecticides such as Methyl Parathion, Parathion and Malathion could ironically increase in the future, with the probable banning of persistent insecticides such as DDT and DDD by many states and the federal government. To quote Mr. Gordon: "This bizarre situation is the product of an unwieldy and unresponsive federal and state pesticide regulatory program that has permitted the increased production and use of these deadly nerve agents, but has not subsidized the development of more selective and less toxic substitute pesticides by the U.S. agricultural chemical industry even in the wake of the pesticide crisis raised by the publication of

Rachel Carson's book, the "Silent Spring" in the early nineteen sixties."

"The situation is not helped any by the facts uncovered by pesticide researchers of the existence of more toxic "frankensteins-like" compounds evolved from excessive and frequent application of organic phosphorus pesticides. One of these derivative compounds, Parathion has 2 to 3 times the toxicity of Parathion."

Citing specific instances of pesticide poisoning and government research findings, Mr. Gordon goes on to state that "we are not counting over one hundred thousand cases of pesticide poisoning and several hundred fatalities annually. This anomalous situation is the product of: a) the fact that physicians frequently mis-diagnose deadly Parathion poisoning as "flu"; b) persons directly affected by exposure to potentially fatal organic phosphorus pesticide poisoning are least well informed about the potential hazards; c) pesticide poisoning is not a recordable occupational disease event in most states."

Major victims of this state of affairs, according to Mr. Gordon are the nation's migrant farm workers. "These people are prey to the most unspeakable of occupational health hazards—death through nerve gas asphyxiation, and yet they are unprotected by safety legislation in all states save California. They have no recourse to workmen's compensation medical and income benefits in almost two thirds of our country and they can't even inspect public records in states where they exist like California to ascertain whether existing pesticide rules have been violated." It is astounding to think that the U.S. Department of Agriculture spends over \$132 million on pesticide-related research, while allocating less than \$160 thousand annually for pesticide safety and not even include farm workers in any of the programs. It is almost beyond comprehension that within the highly subsidized American agricultural business that there is outright refusal on the part of embattled grape industry to "bargain" on control of pesticides in the fields with the grape workers.

"Part of the problem, Mr. Gordon suggests, is the non-think attitude of the Agricultural Chemical Industry. In their zeal to become a \$3 billion industry by the mid-seventies, they have proliferated an uninformed agricultural service superstructure—signified by the appearance of pesticide "detail men" in major commercial growing areas in this country. The net result has been the proliferation of sales of less than effective but highly toxic pesticide formulations to applicators and users. This can be seen in the fact that average consumption of pesticides per farm acreage has trebled in volume over the period from the mid fifties to the late sixties. In the case of the highly toxic organic phosphorus pesticide Parathion, this has resulted in an increase in production volume of 183 per cent over the seven year period from 1960 to 1967. Industry consultants expect this rate of increase to be maintained into the seventies."

Among the possible remedies recommended by Mr. Gordon in his testimony are the following:

1. A phased ban of the use of organic phosphorus pesticides.
2. Federal subsidization of the development of new families of selective less toxic pesticides as substitutes for the broad spectrum organic phosphorus.
3. A minimum of a ten fold increase in the funding of Department of Health, Education and Welfare Pesticide Research and Surveillance Programs from its present level of less than \$2 million annually.
4. Enactment of a special workmen's compensation program for the nation's farm workers to provide adequate medical and income benefits to fill-in present non-existent protection against the hazards of work in the nation's fields and vineyards.
5. Revision of the existing federal pesti-

cide regulatory legislation to shift the present responsibilities split between the U.S. Agricultural Research Service and the Food and Drug Administration into a proposed executive level environmental health protection agency.

6. The earmarking of Department of Defense C.B.W. defensive systems research and development and procurement funds to serve the dual purposes of protecting the nation against the very slim likelihood of chemical warfare attack and the nation's farm workers, farmers and suburbanites against the very strong possibility of pesticide poisoning of ourselves and our environment.

Mr. Gordon is President and founder of the New York-based policy research consulting firm, Delphic Systems and Research Corporation. Mr. Gordon has authored a number of articles on worker safety and health and collaborated in the preparation of one of the strongest versions of the Coal Mine and Safety and Health Act of 1969, co-sponsored by Rep. Ken Hechler of W. Virginia and Sen. Harrison Williams of New Jersey.

Mr. Gordon is a resident of Ossining, New York and a native of Lynn, Mass.

PESTICIDES: SLOW OR SUDDEN DEATH FOR CALIFORNIA FARMWORKERS

Three months ago a group of Cuban refugees escaped to the U.S. on a Soviet-built Antonov crop-dusting aircraft. When the plane touched down in Florida, it was immediately quarantined by Federal immigration and Florida State Health officials and returned to Cuba the following day. The passengers in the aircraft emerged retching and vomiting and were rushed to nearby clinics; they had been made ill by the noxious pesticide parathion that was all over the aircraft.

In 1965 twenty eight persons in San Diego, Calif., were poisoned by the pesticide diazinon which accidentally contaminated doughnut mix in a local bakery.

In 1967, in nearby Tijuana, Mexico, 17 persons were fatally poisoned and 300 were reported ill when parathion was carelessly spilled on a truck which was later used to transport confectionery sugar.

But the worst disaster from pesticide contamination of food occurred in Colombia last year: 77 people fatally poisoned, 146 were hospitalized and upwards of 600 were reported ill from flour contaminated by the traces of parathion spilled on the floor bed of a truck used to transport the flour.

On September 10, the U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report on regulatory enforcement of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. The substance of the GAO review was that there was little effective compliance action and no request for prosecution by the Justice Department in 13 years. "This was true," the GAO found, "even in instances where repeated major violations of the law were cited by the Agricultural Research Service [of the Department of Agriculture] and when shippers did not take satisfactory action to correct violations or ignored ARS notifications the prosecution was being contemplated." ARS conceded the truth of the GAO's charges.

As usual the GAO report was hardly noticed. Little action has been taken since Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* raised important public health issues in 1964 and the chemical-agri-business bloc squelched them before fundamental, enduring reforms were developed.

While regulations exist in this country for registration, dosage limitations and residue tolerances, violations or misapplications can have tragic consequences reaching far into the lives of an affected people. Farm workers in California know this to be true:

In August and September of 1963 an outbreak of pesticide poisoning among 94 peach harvesters was traced to the residues on the foliage of the orchard in which they were

working. The cause of poisoning was the amount of parathion applied and not the premature entry into the orchard by the harvesting crews according to the California Department of Public Health. (California law stipulates a waiting period between the application of a pesticide and crop harvest so that the chemical will have deteriorated to the point where residue on the fruit are within "safe" limits.) The final cause was determined to be the presence in the spray residues of a compound evolved from parathion alteration which was considerably more toxic than parathion; but it was identified by routine analysis simply as parathion. The mishap resulted in one death and lengthy hospitalization for many others.

It is difficult to work through bureaucracies for compliance of existing safety standards—and next to impossible to campaign politically for additional safeguards. A case in point is the recent experience of Cesar Chavez and his United Farm Workers. Over the past 18 months in California there have been six deaths among farm workers due to accidental ingestion of pesticides mistaken for water or wine. Some of the pesticides were improperly stored in empty plastic bleach containers. The bottles were either mislabeled—or the workers, many of whom cannot readily read or write English, misunderstood the labels. This is in spite of the fact that California State Safety Orders explicitly require farm operators to properly inform farm workers of hazards, even for workers who do not understand English.

This summer, as part of their organizing operations, the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee sent legal aides into the fields to get affidavits from the grape-pickers about specific instances of pesticide poisoning. The affidavits—as well as information in the application and use registers kept by the State County Agricultural Commissioner's office—would have revealed the extent of possible violations of State pesticide standards.

The information is presumably open to the public, and the Farm Workers requested access to the records through the Kern County Agricultural Commissioner. They were summarily informed they could not obtain access to such information; two hours after their appearance at the Commissioner's office an injunction was issued by the Kern County Court barring them from looking at the records.

A hearing is under way to determine the legality of that move on the part of the State agency.

Chavez's troubles are not limited to the effects of toxic pesticides on his workers, but also involve the pollution of the local water supply beyond the tolerance of even the most moribund suburbanites. Last summer, the State Department of Public Health condemned the use of the local water supply in Delano for the consumption of infants below the age of six months. The ground water supply—the major source of supply for the water system in the Delano area—is loaded with nitrate residues from the applications of fertilizer to the crops in the fields surrounding the Delano area. Nitrates are normally tolerable in the digestive systems of children and adults beyond the age of one year; but to infants below one year of age—and particularly to infants during the first six months of life—the residues are highly toxic.

AMERICAN BABY FOOD POISONS EUROPEAN INFANTS

Prof. Barry Commoner, of the Washington University in St. Louis, recently reported on the increasing incidents of nitrate poisoning uncovered by European public health officials among infants traced to the consumption of unrefrigerated American-processed baby food.

Chavez's people now are forced to purchase bottled water for their children. On an average income of \$1,232 per year for farm

workers, buying bottled water—for which local public officials provide no funds—can be an intolerable necessity.

Large scale grass roots efforts aimed at controlling the spread and use of pesticides have met with something less than success in California. In 1964, a petition banning the use of most pesticides in California's agriculture failed by only a few thousand signatures to reach the ballot. The Brown administration—in the wake of the 1962 peach harvest debacle—tried to avoid the problem by appointing a commission to investigate and report on recommendations for regulating the use of pesticides. The Reagan administration has done nothing to expand significant control over the registration and use of pesticides in California; and Reagan may even dismantle existing machinery for doing the job.

In California, fruits and vegetables, not cheesecake on the silver screen or the esoteric production of integrated circuits for complex electronic gear, is the leading industry. Production of table grapes is a billion dollar industry. Over one hundred million pounds of pesticides—twenty percent of the nation's total—are used in California's agribusiness. Not so surprising, the agricultural industry has the highest occupational disease rate—over fifty percent higher than the industry in second place and almost three times as high as the average rate for all industries in the state.

Pesticide poisoning is high among the most serious causes of fatal and non-fatal occupational diseases. The number of doctors' reports involving pesticides and other agricultural chemicals have doubled since 1951 and in California have ranged from 800 to 1,100 reports annually. Over the ten-year period from 1955 to 1965 about one occupational death from pesticides has been reported for each 100 reports of occupational poisoning from these chemicals. The villains in these cases are the familiar family of phosphate ester pesticides—parathion, phosdrin and thimet, demeton and tetraethyl pyrophosphate (TEPP). The wonders of chemical technology have made the unit costs of these pesticides so cheap that, for example, \$5 worth of parathion is sufficient to cause the death of seven thousand people if dispensed without proper controls.

The growth and use of pesticides in this country has been enormous. More than 650 varieties have been invented over the last quarter-century. These new chemical compounds, as well as several others, have been formulated into 60,000 trade names. About 59 percent of the pesticides used are insecticides, 15 percent fungicides, another 15 percent defoliants and herbicides, ten percent fumigants and one percent rodenticides. In contrast to many areas of the world, only one percent of all pesticides produced in the United States are used for control of diseases, such as malaria. By far the greatest use of pesticides in this country is in commercial agriculture.

While farm workers in California are exposed to considerable risk of pesticide poisoning, the most formidable record of occupational disease and injury is in the agricultural aircraft industry. Pesticides are applied by air to half of the acreage treated in California.

The complement of 1,000 agricultural pilots apply about 10 to 15 percent of the nation's pesticides, at a considerable price. One pilot is killed in an air accident for each million acres treated. In addition to having the highest fatal injury rate of any occupation in California, over half the disabling work injuries are due to pesticide poisoning. For most other industries the occupational disease injury rate is five percent or less of total work injuries. However, considering the amount of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals used by this group, the cost in occupational disease is considerably less than among farm workers and ground applicators who apply the other half of these chemicals.

The frequent victims of pesticide poisoning are children. In the period from 1951 to 1965, roughly 60 percent of the accidental deaths attributable to poisoning from pesticides in California were among children. The most frequent causes for this toll are the improper safeguards—in the private home or farm—for the storage of pesticides and the contamination of clothing by adults in the household or on the job who apply the chemicals. Two incidents drawn from the annals of the California Department of Public Health files are representative:

An 18-month-old child of an agricultural aircraft pilot was found at home in a state of acute respiratory distress, semi-conscious and with "pinpoint" pupils of the eyes. She was rushed to a local hospital and treated by a physician for severe organic phosphate poisoning. Fortunately, she recovered. On the morning of her illness, her father had come home after applying a highly toxic phosphate ester pesticide. He cleaned his boots with paper towels, threw them in a nearby wastebasket and put his boots in the bathroom. The child contracted the poisoning from either the boots or the paper towels.

A 4-YEAR OLD DIES IN 20 MINUTES

In the second instance, a group of families, with children, were picking berries on a farm. They were followed by a spray rig carrying a five gallon tank of TEPP concentrate. A four-year old girl sampled the can, which her older brother had opened. She died in twenty minutes.

Because of readily available supplies of pesticides for both commercial and private use, suicide and accidental deaths from pesticide poisoning is an increasing problem. While only 13 percent of pesticides are used in the home for pest control, 50 percent of all accidental deaths and suicides, traced to pesticide poisoning, are from non-agricultural uses of pesticides. For example, in just one of Florida's 67 counties there were eight accidental and five suicidal deaths from phosphate pesticide poisoning in 1963 alone.

California is better than most states in the regulation and use of pesticides; but the form of regulation leads to abuses by special interest groups that have severely weakened the national pesticide regulatory program and have blocked efforts to seek increased protection of farm workers.

The four-part regulatory structure consists of: a) registration or licensing of pesticide products; b) licensing of agricultural pest control operators; c) the registration and use, by permit, of injurious materials such as the highly toxic phosphate ester pesticide family; d) sampling of crops for pesticide residue inspection. As in the federal program and some other state programs, the responsibility for regulation of pesticides is in the hands of the Department of Agriculture and, in the case of California, the County Agricultural Commissioner.

GOVERNMENT IGNORES MOST PESTICIDE VIOLATIONS

With the exception of registration, testing and evaluation of specific pesticide products, the California program is effectively run by the County Agricultural Commissioner. For example, an agricultural pest control operator must register with the Commissioner in each county in which he does business and supply a monthly report of his operations in the county. The Commissioner also issues licenses for agricultural aircraft operators and administers special examinations for agricultural aircraft pilots. Most important, the Commissioner issues permits for the use by farm operators of chemicals registered by the California Department of Agriculture as injurious materials. These include the toxic phosphate ester family of pesticides and 14 other pesticides.

The State Department of Agriculture, to ensure quality control over application of pesticides, inspects and analyzes samples of fruits, produce and meats in wholesale

marketing distribution facilities to check on pesticide residues on food offered for sale in the State. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration does the same thing in interstate traffic. Tolerances for pesticide residues used in California are the same as those developed by the Federal Food and Drug Administration.

These tolerance levels are set for the particular crop and practically none are developed for the foliage on which the crop is grown. The outbreak of pesticide poisoning among the 95 peach harvesters in California in 1963 was traced to excessive application of parathion on the foliage, *but not the crop*.

The effectiveness of this program of regulation by state and federal agricultural authorities has come under serious attack recently in a salient area—registration, evaluation and testing of pesticide products. Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, the U.S. Agricultural Research Service can take action to remove products from the market, cancel the registration of products and prosecute those who ship products that violate the law.

The GAO report last September detailed that Research Service's concept of "law and order" is for the benefit of pesticide industry. The report went on to show that of 2,751 samples of products tested and reviewed during fiscal 1966, 750 were found to be in violation of the law. Of these, 70 percent or 520 were in "major" violation of the law. In 1967, of 4,958 samples taken 23 percent or 1,147 were found in violation.

Part of the reason for the situation is the old complaint of fiscal starvation and bureaucratic passivity toward vested interests. The pesticides regulation division has a staff of about 150 of which 26 are field supervisors and 5 are supervisory inspectors. In fiscal 1968 the total budget of the agency was \$3.6 million. By way of contrast, the California State Assembly appropriated and spent \$20 million last year for agricultural research support for its state university and college system.

Obviously, federal and state agricultural agencies are oriented towards maximizing the productivity-increasing features of agricultural chemicals, generally, and pesticides, specifically. The fact that no research in the U.S. is currently conducted into the occupational health hazards of agricultural and industrial chemicals is indicative of the general lack of concern in the regulatory organization for worker interests.

A portent of the future direction of public policy in this area is the fact that the budget of the Bureau of Occupational Health of the California State Department of Public Health was cut by one-third as part of Governor Reagan's attempt to bring "efficiency" into government operations.

If a severe budget cut were not enough, the Bureau of Occupational Health was also in jeopardy of being legislated out of existence. The chief legislative analyst of the California State Assembly, Alan Post, uncovered the fact that the Bureau's existence was subject to legislative approval. Recently legislation has been introduced into the Assembly to rectify the anomaly before the Bureau's existence becomes an object of lobby pressure. This may seem like just another administrative oversight, but the Bureau is practically the only source of information on occupational disease and health hazards among farm workers for the United States. (California is the only state in the country where injuries among farm workers are counted and where farm workers are also covered by Workmen's Compensation.)

California is one of the few states to have developed safety standards for agricultural operations. The standards are administered by the Division of Industrial Safety of the State Department of Industrial Relations. Safety orders for injurious materials (as defined in Section 2461 of Title 3 of the California Administrative Code) cover four areas:

first, the provision of medical services by an employer engaged in commercial operation who uses toxic pesticides; second, decontamination of equipment; third, precautions for aircraft crop dusting and spraying; and fourth, standards for equipment used in both ground and air application of pesticides and other injurious agricultural chemicals. By far the most important of these for protection of the farm worker is the standard of medical supervision over application of pesticides. Even this is weakened, since control over recommendations and reports filed with the Division of Industrial Safety covering the determination of restricted activities for employees exposed to injurious materials, is under the employer.

Part of the pesticide problem comes from our failure to recognize that a problem really exists. Dr. Irma West, a leading champion of pesticide control among environmental health specialists, writing in *California Medicine* has summarized the issues involved clearly:

"Man has manipulated his environment on so large a scale that he has inadvertently invented and produced a multitude of the most complicated new problems ever to confront the health professions. Unfortunately, we have been slow to realize that plans for health and safety should be built into technological advances in the planning stages. By the time technical tools are in operation and their use results in undesirable and unexpected effects upon people and their environment, the best opportunity to minimize these effects efficiently and humanely is largely lost."

DEATH STALKS THE GARDEN

Thousands of home-gardeners have suffered peculiar "flu" symptoms after spraying their flowers and shrubs with a common form of pesticide. They rarely learn that they have been mildly "poisoned" by an organo phosphor compound. In more lethal strengths, the same chemical agent is used in "nerve gas," and can wipe out huge populations of men or animals in a few minutes. But despite the obvious hazards, very little is being done to control the widespread foreign and domestic sale of highly toxic pesticides; beyond that, the Army is continuing its secret tests of nerve gas as a weapon of mass annihilation.

Army experimenters had an unexpected windfall of data from the accidental exposure of several thousand sheep to air-sprayed nerve gas near Dugway, Utah. The chemical that killed these sheep also goes into the organo phosphors pesticides—such as the widely distributed garden product called Parathion. Until the end of World War II, Parathion itself was the favorite candidate for the standard nerve gas in the Army Chemical Corps' arsenal. Then the Army "liberated" the secret German nerve gas, "GB," and it won out over Parathion, for two reasons: it was easier to disseminate, and it would not so readily arouse public fears as would the use of a common pesticide like Parathion. "GB" was saved for people and Parathion relegated to weeds.

Both agents have the same toxicity: .2 milligrams per kilogram of body weight. Both use the same "kill mechanism": they prevent the manufacture of enzymes which carry body "messages" controlling respiration. In other words, victims simply suffocate. Early symptoms (the whole process can take less than five minutes) include pinpointing of eye pupils, tightness in the chest, convulsions, paralysis, and finally respiratory failure. If the dose is less than lethal, the symptoms resemble the onslaught of an attack of the flu.

Current hearings in Wisconsin into the environmental hazards of the chlorinated family of insecticides—the most notable of which is DDT—focus concern about the chemical "synergy" of simultaneous and continued exposure to different pesticides: there is some evidence that since both the organic

phosphor pesticides and the chlorinated insecticides accumulate in the fatty body tissues, under certain conditions (such as malnutrition stress), genetic damage could occur.

In 1966 alone, over 55 million lbs. of organic phosphor pesticides were manufactured for use in US agri-business. The passage of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act and the public disclosures of pesticide abuses had indicated that some reduction or stabilization in manufacture and use would occur. But there has been a growth of 188 percent in the production of organic phosphor pesticides over the period from 1960 to 1966, as compared to an increase of 25 percent in the production of all classes of pesticides over the same period. Effective substitutes exist, such as the pesticide Malathion with 1/2,000 of the toxicity of the organic phosphors, and the price differential between the two is nominal.

In 1966 alone, U.S. manufacturers exported 59 million lbs. of organo phosphor pesticides to users overseas, the largest consumers being Canada and Mexico. Within domestic agri-business the big users are the commercial fruit-crop growers in California (the villains of the current United Farm Workers Organizing Committee confrontation with the California pesticide regulatory program), and the cotton producers in Mississippi and Texas. Together, they account for almost one-half of the acreage treated by pesticides annually in the US.

Federal and state governments subsidize the organo phosphor business through secret military chemical and biological warfare research, agricultural pesticide research and bio-chemical research. In fiscal 1967, a total of \$70 million in unclassified pesticides research was funded by the Department of Agriculture and the Public Health Service. An equal amount is estimated to be spent on pesticide chemical research by private industry and state universities. Only \$5 million is currently allocated for the support of research into the occupational and environmental health hazards of pesticides by the PHS.

In the legislative lexicon, pesticides are called "economic poisons," a euphemism devised by Congress and the Agriculture Department to distinguish between the purportedly beneficial nature of the potentially lethal stuff and "hazardous materials" generally. In fact, the "economic poisons" are specifically exempted from coverage under the Federal Hazardous Materials Act.

With well over 60,000 trade names of pesticides in existence, the job of industry surveillance and compliance with existing pesticide manufacturing and applications standards is virtually impossible. The response of the Johnson administration after the submission of the Scientific Advisory Council report on pesticides in 1965 was effectively to hobble the federal regulatory program.

Surveillance and regulatory functions were split between the Public Health Service and the Agricultural Research Service. The PHS Office of Pesticide Research has responsibility for conducting basic research on human and environmental health hazards of pesticide use and is also responsible for inspecting establishments involved with the formulation of pesticide chemicals. If that were not enough, the PHS is supposed to monitor areas of concentrated pesticide use in major commercial agricultural centers in this country. However, the fine Byzantine hand of the agricultural interests has made sure that the PHS cannot issue cease and desist orders. Violations are to be turned over to the Agricultural Research Service for disposition and prosecution. But the ARS hasn't filed a major violation prosecution with the Justice Department in the 13 year history of the Federal "rat and bugs chemicals" act.

That law contains some neat provisions to dissuade investigators from digging into the pesticide chemicals industry. Information on the production of synthetic organic com-

pound pesticides is compiled by the US Tariff Commission, not Agricultural Research or Public Health. Further, information on the exact ingredients of specific formulations are not permitted to be disclosed by law, to protect "trade secrets."

SURTAX

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I voted against the surtax for the same reason that I voted against the surtax last year. I am against saddling the hard-pressed taxpayer with this heavy burden while the Federal Government continues to spend and spend and spend. It is not right to take extra money away from the people and then pump it into questionable programs which can be trimmed. In other words, I am against collecting more money just to spend more.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

SAFEGUARD AND NATIONAL PRIORITIES

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, we are engaged in a debate, as we consider the Safeguard proposal, over national security—our capacity to prevent or survive an enemy attack—and national vitality—our ability to create opportunities for a more meaningful, rewarding, and healthy life for each of our citizens. The Safeguard system must be tested against each of these considerations if we are to make an intelligent decision on the deployment question.

We face this decision at a time when our instincts, both prudent and humane, point toward the need to stem the decay of American society and to reconcile the differences among us. For more than a generation, external challenges have sapped our energies and diverted our resources from building America, while the accumulation of grievances, dramatic social change, and rising aspirations have made our needs ever greater.

As a result, public facilities are outmoded and overwhelmed, the effort to help the poor and the desperate has faltered, and patience is wearing thin. The agony of continuing sacrifice in Vietnam has brought our people to the great-

est national anxiety and discord any of us has known.

These considerations are an important influence in this debate. They create pressures which prompt many Senators, of both parties, to differ from the administration on such an important matter of national security. The American people look to the Senate to provide balance and prudence in national security policies which have so heavy an impact upon the resources which are available for all our urgent tasks.

In the period immediately following President Nixon's announcement, I expressed my doubts about the Safeguard system—doubts about the scope of the program, its justification, its feasibility, and its consequences for future strategic arms races and impending arms negotiations.

Those doubts have not been resolved in the course of this debate.

A question which finds the Senate so closely divided must, I suppose, be considered a close question.

Honorable and able Americans—within and outside the Senate—find themselves in disagreement on every critical issue which has been raised in this debate: Will the system work? Is it vulnerable? What is the thrust of Soviet weapons development? What are Soviet intentions? Which result in the Senate will contribute most favorably to the prospect of favorable negotiations with the Russians to limit nuclear weapons? What are the security risks associated with an "aye" vote? With a "nay" vote?

Each Senator, I am sure, has carefully considered each of these questions. Each Senator, I am sure, has concluded that the answers to these questions support the position he has taken. This Senator has found that the answers require a careful balancing of the arguments and available information.

Although the division in the Senate appears to be close, there appears to be much broader agreement on the wisdom of continued development toward a reasonable system to protect us against missile attacks. When and if it is needed.

Much of the debate over the ABM, therefore, has revolved around whether the nature of the foreseeable threat from the Soviet Union justifies going ahead now with deployment of this weapons system in its present form.

Though the weight of the evidence leads me to doubt that such circumstances are at hand, I believe most Senators are prepared to vote for authorization upon a proper showing of need.

For now, however, an impressive array of scientific skepticism about the Safeguard proposal, persuades me that it would be a mistake to go ahead with this program, at this time, and in this form. If there is well-founded doubt that the system can function effectively—while it distracts our efforts from other, more appropriate steps and provokes our adversaries to a defensive escalation of the arms race—deployment would be a serious mistake.

Safeguard is billed as a defense against a Soviet first-strike attack, but it depends on untested subsystems for logic and computing functions that may well fail against a massive sophisticated attack. Moreover, Safeguard's radars are

critically susceptible to spoofing and its "eyes"—unshielded missile-site radars—"MSR"—could be blinded by a concentrated strike, leaving the Minutemen missiles wholly unprotected.

These questions raise doubts about the ultimate justification of Safeguard's technical worth and the wisdom of deploying the system in the light of such doubts. The committee resolves both questions in these words:

It is prudent that any doubt on this question (its ultimate feasibility) be resolved in favor of confidence in the system.

In my judgment, such a benefit of the doubt resolution does not give proper weight to the risk that deployment will provoke a Soviet response based not upon our doubts but upon the assumption of maximum effectiveness of our system.

Moreover, such a benefit of the doubt resolution may freeze us into a technological solution to the problem which is not the best answer.

But, even if the system achieves the limits of its planned effectiveness, I am persuaded that the simple mathematics of United States-Soviet confrontation may make the effort futile; the Soviet Union could negate the incremental protection of Safeguard with a few months' production of offensive missiles.

It is possible, Mr. President, that at some time in the future, developments in the threat may make an ABM essential to protect our retaliatory forces. It is also possible that a limited deployment of ABM's could become an element of practical and stable big-power arms limitations.

And it is certainly possible that a credible and effective ABM can be developed, applying lessons our scientists are learning today.

It is for these reasons that I welcome the initiative of Senators HART and COOPER to authorize research and development of an ABM program that can work when and if it is needed, but that will not, because it is deployed prematurely, embroil the American people in costs and consequences we will regret. I intend to support their amendment, and I commend their effort to put ABM development in a posture consistent with the Nation's long-term needs, a program the majority of the American people can sensibly support.

II

There is what could be a tragic irony in the way in which the Safeguard program has been presented to the American people.

As cast by the administration, the ABM would serve to "safeguard" our Minuteman retaliatory forces. If the need were clear and this role could be assured, I feel confident that the Senate would not hesitate to follow the President's lead. But reality is far more complex than the administration's assurance would suggest, and the Senate must ultimately judge the strategic impact of the Safeguard system in the broader context of its effects in combination with other pending weapons systems.

The Soviet Union will see our ABM deployment in this perspective, and will make decisions about its own future weapons developments and the forthcoming arms negotiations in the light of

how it perceives America's true intentions in the field of strategic armaments. The mysterious efforts of the Soviet's lunar vehicle to dog the heels of our Apollo 11 may well be fresh evidence that they do not take all our declarations at face value.

It is in this context—the role Safeguard will play in the overall strategic posture of the United States and the threatening direction our adversaries must perceive emerging in our strategic forces—that I find the administration's proposal constitutes, not a safeguard, but a provocative and possibly dangerous game. It is notable that while the word "provocative" is the President's own term, the denial of such intent in Safeguard deployment cannot escape being taken by others as a thin mask for profoundly disturbing threats to the balance of mutual deterrence.

In assessing the overall capabilities of our strategic forces, the Soviet Union will give attention not only to the Safeguard, but also to our ongoing programs for equipping retaliatory forces with multiple independent reentry vehicles—MIRV's.

The linkage between Safeguard and the MIRV's leads to a stark fact: by deploying a vastly expanded, hard-point strike capability along with an ABM area defense system, American retaliatory nuclear forces could be converted into a system suitable for launching a first-strike attack upon the Soviet Union, while minimizing retaliatory damage to the United States. I understand that that is not our intention.

I understand that is not our intention, and the Senate and the American people do not so regard our nuclear weapons development. Of course the President would deny that this is our intention—as he should—but, Mr. President, the Soviet military planners cannot escape looking at our weapons development in that way.

Specifically, with the expansion in the number of deliverable nuclear warheads and the significant improvements in accuracy of delivery stated as the objectives of MIRV programs, the United States could, barring significant expansion in the number of Soviet strategic targets, achieve the capability to wipe out a significant portion of the Soviet Union's nuclear strike forces. Meanwhile, although the Safeguard has been billed primarily as a local defense of U.S. Minuteman silos, it also is designed with a degree of area defense capability—pointedly described by Secretary Laird in his statement to the Armed Services Committee as "defense of the continental United States against the kind of attack which the Chinese Communists may be able to launch in the mid-1970's." This area defense would, by the same token, also serve to defend the United States against the weak retaliatory effort the Soviet might be capable of mounting after receiving a first-strike American attack.

I need not emphasize, Mr. President, the rather simple fact that the technical problems faced by an ABM in the role of backup to a first strike are far simpler than those the same system would face in meeting a sophisticated adversary's surprise attack. Safeguard's

credibility in a first-strike role, I regret to say, is far greater than its credibility as a protection for our defense forces.

In terms of what we all believe American intentions to be, the foregoing might seem hypothetical and farfetched; but in terms of what the Soviets may logically fear our intentions to be, the threat of an impending American first-strike capability, based on Safeguard and MIRV, could seem terrifyingly real.

The linkage between these two systems in the American weapons arsenal is by no means casual. On March 19, in his statement to the Armed Services Committee justifying Safeguard expenditures, Secretary Laird also sought funds for a significant acceleration in the development of the Poseidon, a submarine-launched MIRV-carrying missile, for the express purpose of "enhancing its effectiveness against hard targets."

He said, at page 32 of his prepared statement:

The increase of \$12.4 million for the development of an improved guidance system for the Poseidon missile, will advance the IOC ("Initial Operating Capability") of the system by about six months. This development was started in FY 1968. The IOC, however, was slipped by about one year in connection with the FY 1969 expenditure reduction effort, and the level of funding provided in the original FY 1970 budget, \$33.5 million, would have slipped it further. This is an important program since it promises to improve significantly the accuracy of the Poseidon missile, thus enhancing its effectiveness against hard targets.

Surely, Mr. President, we cannot expect the Soviets to ignore that development as it undertakes to evaluate the thrust of our weapons development.

In the Poseidon program, 31 submarines will each carry 16 missiles, each in turn carrying as many as 10 warheads, for a total of almost 5,000 deliverable weapons, from the Poseidon boats alone. These and other offensive systems available to the United States, including the more than 1,000 Minutemen we may also equip with MIRV's, would be more than a match for the 1,200 to 1,300 ICBM's the Soviets are anticipated to have deployed during the next few years.

In this context, Mr. President, the Safeguard is a destabilizing weapon, raising the risk of nuclear war rather than diminishing it. As the American MIRV nears perfection and the Safeguard nears deployment, we are reaching for a point of no return in the arms race. If the Senate authorizes the deployment of Safeguard, we may well be stepping across that point of no return.

III

On April 3, I noted the following dimension of the administration's Safeguard proposal:

It is altogether possible, on the other hand, that the Administration is not, in fact, taken in by its own reassurance as to Soviet reactions. It may be that the Safeguard proposal is intended as a blunt challenge to the Soviets to come to the bargaining table and negotiate over strategic weapons, or else the United States will heat up the arms race, counting on our own superior technology to protect us if negotiations fail.

I submit, Mr. President, that this interpretation of our intentions is the logi-

cal one from the Soviet point of view, and interpreted as this kind of bluster, it has no rational justification.

One need not dwell on the lack of good faith such an American bargaining strategy would entail with respect to the forthcoming strategic weapons negotiations to which we and the Russians are both committed. What is more important is the lack of realism in assuming that negotiations with a proud and powerful country such as the Soviet Union might ever yield success when undertaken under the gun of crude threats, a lesson we should have learned in every arms control negotiation from the Baruch plan to the present.

For the Russians as for ourselves, national and ideological motivations and the high stakes of international competition compel the continuing commitment of resources to weapons developments at whatever level is thought necessary to insure national security and at whatever level a prudent estimate of the intentions of the other may indicate. As a result, if the talks fail, the prospects for negotiated arms controls will dim, unbridled arms competition will resume, and the stability of mutual deterrence will be destroyed.

It is equally unrealistic to assume that any reasonable purpose could be served by locking the Soviets into another round of fantastic spending competition for armaments. Ever since arms competition with the Soviets began in earnest 20 years ago, the superior resources and technological advancement of the United States, coupled with the geographical encirclement of the Soviet Union, have combined to keep the Soviets on the defensive in any arms competition.

But the fact that in years past we could afford more weapons than the Soviet Union and that we could build them with less strain on our resources is not relevant to future competitions. The demands on our energies and resources are now too great, and the costs of the phenomenal weapons systems of which Safeguard is the precursor are too high, to warrant the conclusion that the American people can afford future strategic arms races.

Mr. President, the needs of the American people are too urgent and too demanding to bank our future as a nation on the casual economic dividends that high and rising levels of defense spending have come to mean. We must recognize that in future arms races—even if we manage to keep the Soviets and all our other adversaries at bay without incinerating the world in the process—the costs and sacrifices the competition will entail are such that we, not they, will be the losers.

IV

To recognize the futility and the risk inherent in adventurous weapons development is only the beginning of the necessary effort to forge security policies that serve the Nation's best interests in a time of strain and transition, at home and abroad.

Arms sufficiency is the new watchword, and arms sufficiency is an apt watchword, but one that requires careful judgment. Together the President, the Congress, and the country must find

ways in the months and years ahead to substitute good sense and prudence for uncontrollable gambits that lead only to blind and dangerous alleys. As we strive to end the war in Vietnam, we must never forget the lessons on the need for restraint that unhappy conflict teaches.

At the same time, we must also be mindful of the urgency and the extent of the Nation's domestic needs—needs which can overwhelm us just as surely as the threat of external aggression, unless we can find the wherewithal, the ingenuity, and the spirit equal to the challenges.

The grim chain of urban sprawl and rural decline, of individual poverty and social disorganization, of wasted resources and hostile environments will not be broken by a government which is indifferent, or a private sector which is inactive—or preoccupied with hunting the next arms contract.

The chain can be broken only if we set priorities, if we make a commitment to meet them, and if we organize ourselves to fulfill our commitments. I have indicated the priorities I would establish, and they are not the priorities of a fortress America. The priorities I would set are the priorities of men and women and children who have a right to enjoy for themselves the fruits of this world and to help insure the same right for others. The priorities we must set recognize the interrelationship of jobs, income, education, health care, housing, transportation, public facilities, recreation, and environmental protection in the balanced development of urban and rural communities.

These priorities will never be set or achieved so long as the United States is being bled by the continuing hemorrhage of spending on strategic armaments.

Mr. President, much attention is now being given to the consequences ending the Vietnam war will have on the funds which will be available for domestic programs. It has become common to speak for planning purposes of the revenue surplus resulting from the lessening of hostilities as a "fiscal dividend"—the measure of the flexibility in the Federal budget that would be available for other national needs as the result of the termination of special Vietnam costs.

In March 1967, President Johnson appointed the Cabinet Coordinating Committee on Economic Planning for the End of Vietnam Hostilities. Their report appears as an annex to this year's report of the Council of Economic Advisers. The committee, assuming early cessation of hostilities, forecast annual fiscal dividends rising to \$22 billion in fiscal year 1972—funds available for spending on other priority programs or for tax reduction. While the calculation assumed the continuation of existing authorized military programs—including the Johnson administration Sentinel ABM—that \$22 billion sum, less amounts returned to taxpayers in tax cuts, represents a basic ceiling in funds available for expansion of all Federal programs, military and domestic.

To the extent that new weapons systems are authorized, or existing authorized systems exceed their anticipated costs, the funds available for domestic

program expansion will be further reduced. Thus while \$22 billion represents a basic maximum for domestic public purposes, a tax cut, weapon cost overruns, and additional weapons procurements will all squeeze that sum far below the maximum. If the costs of the war do not soon recede, of course, virtually no lessening of the budget squeeze can be anticipated. On the other hand, reduction of non-Vietnam military cost including the cancellations of all ABM deployment, would cause the fiscal dividend to be increased. There will be no fiscal dividend at all.

The fiscal dividend forecast by the committee, even assuming maximum availability, does not begin to match urgent demands for the rehabilitation and improvement of our society. For example, the report notes a \$6 billion gap existing now between amounts the Congress authorized for fiscal year 1969 and the amounts the Congress has funded for domestic purposes. I ask unanimous consent that the table from the Coordinating Committee's report be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TABLE 2.—Estimated gap between amounts currently authorized and funded [Billions of dollars per year]

Program	Amount
Total full cost	6.0
Elementary and secondary education	2.0
Higher education	1.3
Housing and community development	.6
Water and air pollution control	.5
Crime control and prevention	.5
Area redevelopment	.5
Health training and research, etc.	.4
Agricultural conservation and adjustment	.5

Source: Bureau of the Budget.

Mr. MUSKIE. The group also compiled a list of new programs "prominently and generally discussed recently as desirable to meet the needs of the Nation during the next several years," calculating their annual costs for fiscal year 1972—the year of the projected dividend. In many instances, the committee assigned dollar amounts far below the recommendations of the task forces or study groups from whose studies the programs were drawn. Even then, recognizing the list to be incomplete and inadequate, the Coordinating Committee reached a conservative total of almost \$40 billion for these urgent needs, nearly double the maximum fiscal dividend estimated to be available. I ask unanimous consent that the committee's table, with explanatory footnotes, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TABLE 3.—Illustrating new programs or major expansions of existing Federal civilian programs, fiscal year 1972 (derived from proposals of task forces and study groups) [In billions of dollars]

	Hypothetical expenditures
Total expenditures	39.7

TABLE 3.—Illustrating new programs or major expansions of existing Federal civilian programs, fiscal year 1972 (derived from proposals of task forces and study groups)—Continued

	[In billions of dollars]	Hypothetical expenditures
Education	7.0	
Preschool	1.0	
Elementary and secondary	2.5	
Higher	3.0	
Vocational	.5	
Health	3.8	
Kiddie-care	.5	
Medicare for disabled	1.8	
Comprehensive health centers	1.0	
Hospital construction and modernization	.5	
Nutrition	1.0	
Community service programs	.8	
Jobs and manpower	2.5	
Public jobs	1.8	
Manpower Development Training Act	.5	
Employment service	.2	
Social security and income support	9.5	
Unemployment insurance	2.0	
Public assistance	4.0	
Social security improvements	3.5	
Veterans	.3	
Economic, area, and other special development programs	2.2	
Entrepreneurial aid	.5	
Area redevelopment	.5	
Rural development	1.0	
Indian assistance	.2	
Crime, delinquency, and riots	1.0	
Violence and riot prevention	.1	
Safe streets programs	.3	
Rehabilitation of offenders and delinquents	.3	
Prevention of delinquency and crime by special measures for delinquent-prone youth	.3	
Quality of environment	1.7	
Air pollution prevention and control	.1	
Public water supply construction programs	.3	
Water pollution control and sewage treatment	1.0	
Solid waste disposal	.1	
Natural beautification, environmental protection, and recreational development	.2	
Natural resource development and utilization	1.4	
Land and forest conservation	.2	
Water resources and related programs	.5	
Mineral and energy (excluding hydroelectric) development	.2	
Natural environmental development	.5	
Urban development	5.5	
New cities	.5	
Land acquisition and financial planning (suburban)	.5	
Urban mass transportation	.5	
Model cities	2.0	
Other urban facilities and renewal	2.0	

TABLE 3.—Illustrating new programs of major expansions of existing Federal civilian programs, fiscal year 1972 (derived from proposals of task forces and study groups)—Continued

	[In billions of dollars]	Hypothetical expenditures
Transportation	1.0	
Airway and airport modernization	.4	
Rapid interurban ground transit	.1	
Modernization of merchant marine	.2	
Motor vehicle and transportation safety research and safety grants	.3	
Science and space exploration	1.0	
Post-Apollo space program	.5	
Scientific research in oceanography, communications, social and behavioral sciences, and natural sciences	.5	
Foreign economic aid	1.0	

NOTES

Education. The preschool program, an extension of Head Start, would provide full-time preschool education for about 500,000 children. The elementary and secondary education funds would about double the Federal support in that area. The funds proposed for higher education would more than double current Federal support. The vocational education funds would raise Federal support about halfway toward the recommendation of the 1968 Advisory Council on Vocational Education.

Health. The "kiddie-care" proposal would provide health care for needy mothers and infants. Medicare offered to beneficiaries of social security disability insurance on a contributory basis would potentially reach 2.2 million persons in 1972. About 350 additional comprehensive neighborhood health care centers a year could be established for the amount shown. The added funds for health facilities would enable the Federal Government to double the rate of output of such facilities, in line with estimates of national needs.

Nutrition. Nutritional supplements for needy pregnant women, nursing mothers, and small infants account for about \$200 million, while the remainder would allow a doubling of existing food assistance programs.

Community service programs. This would provide for expanded daycare centers for children of needy working mothers and for expansion of coordinated services through neighborhood centers.

Jobs and manpower. The funds for jobs in the public sector would permit expansion of about 500,000 jobs to provide public service employment for the chronically disadvantaged; this program would reinforce expansion in education, health services, and urban and area redevelopment. The increase in MDTA training would support expansion of the Jobs program and would reinforce efforts to lower unemployment while improving the Nation's price performance. It would also provide trained manpower for construction. The growth in employment service operations envisions strengthening, decentralizing, and computerizing manpower activities; developing a rural manpower service; and enlarging services to the disadvantaged.

Social security and income support. The unemployment insurance funds would provide for higher benefits, extended benefits during recessions, and aid to the unemployed through retraining and mobility assistance. The public assistance funds could permit revision of benefit standards and extended coverage, or the adoption of a modest new program of income aid with

objective standards. The added expenditure could fill as much as 40 percent of the current poverty income gap. Expansion of the WIN program would provide more job and training opportunities for welfare recipients. The social security expenditure could provide a higher minimum benefit for those dependent on social insurance benefits as the main source of income, and liberalization of eligibility requirements for disability insurance, as well as some general improvement in benefit levels.

Veterans. The higher priority recommendations made by the Veterans' Advisory Commission in March 1968 could be instituted with these funds.

Economic, area, and other special development programs. The entrepreneurial assistance program could help minority groups—so-called "black capitalism." Area redevelopment programs would assist growth centers in less populated areas, while rural redevelopment programs would concentrate on small communities, providing community facility development, special housing, and family farm assistance.

Crime, delinquency, and riots. Federal aid to State and local governments could be provided to help prevent violence and riots and permit a higher degree of Federal readiness to cope with such emergencies. The safe streets program funds would be used to work towards the objectives of the National Crime Commission with respect to strengthening the police and courts. Rehabilitation of offenders and delinquents would be pursued by intensive retraining and other services.

Quality of environment. Federal funds for pollution abatement may be required to enforce standards, investigate claims, or abate pollution caused by government or not readily attributable to particular private individuals. Assistance in expanding the Nation's water supply system would provide a small fraction of the \$2.5 billion annual requirement over the next 10 years. Provision of more recreational areas near population centers would be made possible.

Natural resource development and utilization. Department of the Interior, Corps of Engineers, and Department of Agriculture programs relating to land, mineral, energy, forest, recreational, and other fields have large backlogs of useful projects, many already planned and authorized but held back for budgetary reasons.

Urban development. Metropolitan development assistance would support improved planning and coordinated advance land acquisition. Each of these programs emphasizes these requirements, whether in new communities, suburbs, or older central cities. The allowances represent only a fractional contribution to the reconstruction and development of the cities.

Transportation. Such expanded investments in the improvement of the principal elements of the Nation's transportation system would serve the objectives of economic development, safety, and national defense.

Science and space exploration. The allowances would permit the science and space agencies to fund some of the research opportunities not covered in the stringent budgets of recent years.

Foreign economic aid. This additional amount would help to meet growth targets in Southeast Asia and under the Alliance for Progress as well as to cover other aid requirements. Even this increase would leave our foreign assistance program below levels of a few years back.

Source: Bureau of the Budget.

Mr. MUSKIE. Even this conservative calculation of the additional resources we will need to spend at home does not provide much leeway in making a major dent in the problems of the poor, such as a negative income tax preserving ade-

quate incentives, which the committee noted might require between \$15 and \$20 billion a year, or in providing sufficient employment to make a significant reduction in the numbers of Americans who cannot find jobs. Nor does it encompass steps to assist States and localities in meeting their mounting revenue needs from their increasingly inadequate tax bases—for which a revenue-sharing program of between \$5 to \$10 billion a year has been considered appropriate.

Mr. President, these are not small sums. They do not reflect small problems we can ignore. Together, these estimates, whether or not one agrees with them in detail, represent a conscientious effort to determine a level of "sufficiency" for a comprehensive approach to the nonmilitary problems facing America, a level of sufficiency which we must attain if we are to preserve our viability as a nation.

By contrast, the \$6 to \$7 billion pricetag assigned by the administration to the Safeguard system represents a far more valid measure of the relative significance of the ABM program, even assuming those systems costs have been fairly estimated, which many Members of the Senate have strong reason to doubt.

The true measure of the ultimate significance of the administration's Safeguard proposal lies in the likelihood of forcing the United States and the Soviet Union to higher and higher levels of arms competition, for which the costs forecast by Secretary Laird are only a very small downpayment. The cost of such an adventure must be counted in tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars, which the United States can ill afford to spend on engines of destruction.

I think these great figures estimating our domestic needs, and estimating the cost of an unrestricted arms escalation, pose the problem which faces us on the ABM issue in its stark magnitude. We cannot do both. At least, we cannot do both without the exercise of discriminating judgment. We cannot do both without exercising restraint, geared to a careful evaluation of the risks involved with any subjects which we consider in the development of weapons for our arsenal.

We must somehow take a reasonable risk to protect our national security abroad. However, we must do more than we now are doing—to eliminate the risks to our national security here at home.

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUSKIE. I yield.

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Maine for a reasoned discussion and speech today in support of the pending amendment. He developed at some length the effect that construction and deployment of ABM would have on the forthcoming arms limitation negotiations with the Soviet Union. And in that regard the administration, particularly the Secretary of Defense, strongly made the point that the decision to go ahead at this time is essential to their position as a bargaining point as they enter the negotiations.

I have constantly failed to understand really this point in the particular argument, because we have, as I understand

the figures after hearings and the debate and otherwise, a superiority in strategic force levels. For instance, in ICBM's, we have about 1,054 to approximately 1,000 on the part of the Soviet Union.

With respect to the Polaris missile, in round figures we have an estimated number of about 656 or 660 to perhaps 77 by the Soviet Union.

With respect to the intercontinental bombers, we have in round figures about 650 to 150 operated by the Soviet Union.

In deliverable warheads, we have some 4,200 as against 1,200 by the Soviet Union.

We have superiority in numbers in all of these fields. They must know of our industrial might measured against theirs. They must have some appreciation of our technical skill, for in the time frame of 1 week we succeeded in putting a man on the moon, whereas they failed with an unmanned moon vehicle.

We are ahead of them in the testing of MIRV's today.

With our superiority in all of these fields, does the Senator agree with me that the argument that we must have an ABM simply because the other side has an ABM to be in a proper bargaining point in negotiations?

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I think the Senator has made a very excellent point. I agree thoroughly.

I would like to add an observation. It seems to me that one can speculate prudently or proffessly about what the Soviet position may be at the negotiating table and what we might do to influence it favorably toward arms limitation.

We have concentrated, as we have debated what will be a strong negotiating position, upon the need to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that we have the strength because of our deployment of the ABM to caution them against permitting a continuation of the arms race.

It seems that what we need, if we are to negotiate successfully, is to convince them that we want a stabilization of the arms race, that we want to roll back the growing risk to the survival of mankind.

It seems to me, in other words, that the situation is something like this: There are two great military powers—we and the Soviet Union. Only if one of the two takes the initiative to move the other way from escalation of arms, do we have any chance to achieve that objective.

One of these two powers must take the initiative. One must be induced by the other.

It seems to me that the best way to make that initiative credible from the point of view of the other side is to take an initiative which carries some risks for us.

The road we seem to be choosing is to find a way to strengthen our arms to a point which will deter the Russians from trying to match it. I think we should try to encourage them to match us in taking risks in reducing arms. Of the two powers, the one most likely to take this kind of initiative historically, in the light of its belief in the tradition of humanism, is the United States of America.

I do not think delaying the deployment of an ABM system is an unacceptable risk. That there are risks or that

there are considered to be risks is evident from the debate on the floor. So, to the extent that there are, our initiative in refusing to deploy an ABM to me would add credibility to our recommendations to the Soviet Union that we mutually deescalate the nuclear arms race.

So, I agree with the Senator's argument, and I add this one of my own.

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. I notice also that the Senator dwelt at some length about the response on the part of the Soviet Union.

It is my understanding that the rules of the war planners, and rightly so, involve these concepts. The Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD) is in the Chamber today. He has sat with me in the Armed Services Committee and heard the same words and concepts spelled out. We always plan on a greater than expected risk. We always plan—and these are the rules by which our war planners govern themselves—on the worst possible case.

We always plan on the basis that our systems will not work as well as we expect and that the enemy's will work better than we anticipate.

We always plan on the basis of long lapse time between conception and deployment of a modern weapons system taking about 10 years.

Does the Senator suppose that the rules we apply are any different than those applied by the Soviet Union war planners, and that this in and of itself has an inherent action or reaction cycle which is more accelerated when we get a defensive—offensive switch back and forth?

Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator is right, of course. This involves one of the principal arguments in my remarks.

We have a tendency to think that if the enemy looks at us, he must, of course, recognize that our purposes are innocent, that we would never launch a first-strike attack and do not mean him harm. Unfortunately, that is not the way they read us. They are just as suspicious of our intentions as we are suspicious of their intentions. It will continue.

We are going to limit arms not because the other fellow thinks that we are nice guys, but because we are able to define the area of mutual interest which each decides is in his national interest.

The Senator is eminently right.

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, one other point. I note that the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) wishes to join in the colloquy.

The Senator from Maine raises some question about reliability.

Aside from the reliability of the components, computers which have not yet been built, and the radars which have some vulnerability under attack—the Senator has been a student of this debate and of the RECORD—does he recall that at any time in the very excellent presentations made on both sides, any explanation has been made of how effectively we can deal with the subject of decoys, balloons, chaff, saturation problems, blackout problems, and the electronic jamming problem? Does the Senator find answers to those questions any place in the debate or any place in the RECORD before the Senate?

Mr. MUSKIE. I do not recall seeing it, and the answer has not been provided

in any portion of the debate to which I have listened on the floor, either in closed session or in open session; nor has it been answered in any of the literature I have read which has been made available to me, rather generously, from both sides in this debate. I have not had a chance to read it word for word, but I have searched for that answer.

I understand, of course, the argument that has been made, I think very eloquently, by the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE), that at some point in the development of new technology you have to start putting the technology together and research the unanswered problems as you go along. I understand that.

Nevertheless, I think the Senator is absolutely right in the implication of the question he has put to me, that there are many unresolved technical problems seriously bearing upon its feasibility and its effectiveness which have not yet been answered. I think the supporters of the ABM proposition concede that.

Mr. PEARSON. I thank the Senator for a very valuable contribution at this time.

Mr. MUSKIE. I thank the distinguished Senator from Kansas.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUSKIE. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. On the question the Senator has brought up about the blackouts, the jamming, and decoys, I can say with firm assurance, as far as I can go, that that is a problem that always shows up. It is a part of the picture concerning any kind of method involving a weapon, offensive or defensive. If we never had built the ICBM's—offensive weapons—until we were certain that we had all the problems solved that go with it in the same field, in reverse, we never would have one. If we are going to wait until all the problems are solved and everything is known with reference to an ABM, a defensive weapon—in that field, particularly—we will never have one, and no one else will. It is all a part of the process.

I do not pose as an expert in this field, but I have been on a subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services and chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Construction during all the years that these missiles have been in process. The military construction came in in this way: You have to have those sites, and you have to have the research and development that involves those sites. Sometimes it is handled in a special way in that bill. We got this back in the days of the Nike-Ajax. That was the first little ground-to-air missile we had. We also got into the space field when Sputnik went up, and all those problems that went with it.

I know that uniformly we have these problems. I opposed the deployment of the ABM—what is now the ABM—years ago. We had a secret session. We have had many sessions in the committee over the years. The Senator from Kansas was a member of the committee for some time, and a very valuable member. I had always opposed the deployment until I was convinced that we had gone about as far as we could go, and I believe as far as we can go, with a weapon of this kind, until we really get down to the rub of

things and take some steps forward that this very modest program now contemplates.

That brought me to the proposition as the Senator from Rhode Island has expressed it. He is the former chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and he really does know a great deal about this. We must make a start. It has been amazing, in the case of other missiles, how many problems have been overcome after the start, has been made. Men are surprised, and then they are disappointed, too, on the same subject of the many different missiles. I refer to men such as Dr. Wernher von Braun and others who are really capable.

I am glad to give the Senator a résumé of my experience in that field, without getting into the scientific part of it, because I do not try to master that.

Mr. MUSKIE. I appreciate the Senator's comments, and I will respond briefly myself, but first I yield to the Senator from Kansas.

Mr. PEARSON. Let me say to the distinguished chairman of the committee, the Senator from Mississippi, that I understand and agree that many of these problems today, scientific and otherwise, which are talked about as deficiencies of the system, probably will be cured in time.

As a matter of fact, the great advance we have been making in computers really gave great credibility to the so-called Sentinel-Safeguard, as distinguished from the other systems.

But some other scientific problems are involved here, which I am not qualified to discuss, which have nothing to do with the ability of American scientists to conquer problems, and they deal fundamentally with the laws of nature and the laws of physics. The very efficiency of the radar makes it susceptible to chaff which may be spread across the sky. The better the radar, the better it can be fooled by that particular device.

Blackout, as I understand it, is a result of an explosion or high or low yield atomic blast within the atmosphere, which creates—as its name implies—enormous blackout, perhaps with a diameter of 100 miles, lasting as long as 5 minutes.

These are things, it seems to me, to which even the genius of the American scientific community has not found an answer. As a matter of fact, some of the very efficiency of our own system gives us back greater problems.

I do appreciate the response of the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services. I know of no one who knows more about this field or who embraces it and brings it to the Senate with a greater degree of honesty and sincerity than my former chairman.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, may I add this to the comments made by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi.

First, I agree with the comments that have just been made by the Senator from Kansas. I do not know of a Senator who would bring a question to the floor more conscientiously, more thoroughly, and with more thoughtful judgment, than the Senator from Mississippi. I want him to know that.

But what is involved here is not simply

the question of whether, having decided to build a piece of technology—whether it is a weapons system or something else—we have reached the point where we can start putting it together and work out additional bugs from there on. If that were the only question, I would say, "Yes," let us start, and let us start the business of working on a piece of hardware as we undertake to answer the unanswered questions. But, in addition, these other questions are involved, which are not susceptible to precise measure: the effect of our deployment upon the arms race, the effect of our deployment upon the Soviet evaluation of the thrust of our weapons development, and the effect of our deployment on negotiations.

Then, there is my own fundamental belief that if we want really to put together a credible negotiating posture from the point of view of the Russians, I think it is more important to convince them that we want to roll back in weapons development than it is to convince them if they will not agree with us that we have the capacity to deploy an ABM. I think the first conviction is more likely to be persuasive upon them than the second conviction.

I can see that honest men can disagree on this matter, as they obviously do, and we appear to be divided about 50-50 here. However, it is my conviction that we must take an initiative that is clearly recognized and identified by the Russians as an initiative toward peace.

Mr. PROXMIRE and Mr. DOMINICK addressed the Chair.

Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator from Wisconsin has been waiting to be recognized for quite a while. I yield to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I wish to commend the distinguished Senator from Maine for a superlative speech. I am especially impressed by his presentation because I think we in the Senate, and I think people around the country during the last year or so, have recognized that he is a very careful man, very measured, and responsible, and unusually so.

For example, he indicated we are taking a risk in not going ahead with the ABM. Many of us might not share that feeling because we may be more impulsive and feel we are convinced on the basis of what we have seen and heard that the ABM will not work, that it is a waste, and that the decision is, therefore, easier. But the Senator from Maine was very careful in not taking that position. He said that it may work and that we may be mistaken in not going along with it, but that we have to take certain risks.

I think the Senator makes an extremely strong case in arguing on the basis of his own assumptions about the Soviet Union that they are more likely to negotiate an arms limitation if we do not go ahead than if we do.

Mr. MUSKIE. I wish to say something on that point which the Senator has brought out. The Senator has said "more likely." This is something more than agreeing to go to the negotiating table. When I speak of the likelihood, I am talking about the substance of an agreement. We have to be concerned with that, too.

It was argued on the floor of the Senate that last year when we voted on deployment, the Russians indicated they were willing to go to the negotiating table. That is not the whole story. What is their attitude when they get to the negotiating table? It would take a crystal ball to foresee what their attitude would be, and I do not know or claim to know what that situation would be.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator. The Senator's observation goes to the heart of the matter.

The other point I wish to make is one that I think has been overlooked in this debate and I refer to the question of recognizing priorities, and that we have to make these hard choices; that when we go ahead with ABM it has an effect on what we can do with regard to our domestic problems which are so pressing and urgent.

I think no Senator has been more concerned and done more constructive work in preventing pollution or has made a greater contribution in connection with the Federal-State relationship than the Senator from Maine. I think he is eminently qualified to recognize the urgency of those priorities. It is always difficult to say we will not move for a marginal weapons system at this time because certain domestic situations must be met. I think the Senator from Maine, in posing this problem with respect to priorities and reminding us we cannot have everything we want, has made a real contribution today.

Mr. MUSKIE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I did not have the pleasure of listening to the entire speech of the Senator from Maine. However, I did enter the Chamber during the process of his colloquy. I wish to make a few comments in this regard.

First, with respect to the point made by the Senator from Kansas about technical difficulties that are involved, I wish to point out that a panel of four very fine scientists appeared before the Committee on Armed Services in a public hearing. I am not sure the Senator from Mississippi brought out this point. I know he has in the past. Two of these scientists were against the ABM system and two were for it. Each of them, in response to direct questions, said this was the very best available technical mechanism for a defense of this kind that had been or could be developed under present technology. That statement was agreed to whether they were for or against the ABM. All four of them said that.

With regard to the blackout situation, and I do not wish to get into a technical discussion on the situation, the system of arrangements of radar which has been contemplated under this system would avoid that particular problem and a great deal of work has been done in connection with it. So I would think that although there are problems, and no one doubts that there are problems, under the present methods of deploying the system most of the problems that have been brought out, or a good many of them, have already

been foreseen and circumvented by the planners who worked on the system.

With respect to the comment by the Senator from Maine on the need to convince the Soviets that we want meaningful arms limitations, I do not think anybody in the Senate or anybody in the Congress would disagree with the Senator. I think we all agree on that point. I cannot think of a happier situation than a viable arms limitation agreement which is properly supervised. I think it would be enormously fruitful for the Russians, for us, and for the entire world.

However, I wish to recount a few things along this line.

In connection with the test ban treaty, or moratorium—it was not a treaty—we followed through and said we would not do any more high-altitude testing. The Soviets said the same thing, but when it became in their interest to do it in 1960 and 1961, they unilaterally violated this moratorium and put themselves in a technical situation which, having gone forward, they had an earlier start or solution on some of the technical problems the Senator from Kansas has been talking about.

Mr. MUSKIE. That did not involve an agreement.

Mr. DOMINICK. That did not involve an agreement. It was a joint unwritten moratorium by verbal acquiescence.

Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator mentioned "verbal acquiescence." What does the Senator mean?

Mr. DOMINICK. We had gone along for a period of 18 months under a statement publicly made by the President of the United States that we would not make any more high-altitude tests as long as the Russians did not, and they did not. As a matter of fact, when they broke this unwritten agreement—

Mr. MUSKIE. The President said something. Did the Russians respond in kind?

Mr. DOMINICK. Yes. There were verbal assurances from the Soviets at that time that they had no intention of going ahead with this either as long as we did not.

Mr. MUSKIE. I think the language is important. I do not know if the Senator is paraphrasing the Russian attitude or position. An intention not to go forward is different than an agreement not to go forward unless there is a unilateral intention not to do something or a bilateral agreement with somebody not to do something.

Mr. DOMINICK. We tried to convince them of the fact that we did not intend to go forward with any more of these testings and we would not do so even though it was important to all kinds of applications, space and otherwise, if we had gone forward with it. We said we would not do it. I am sure the Senator from Maine remembers that well.

Mr. MUSKIE. I do.

Mr. DOMINICK. The time they violated this agreement was when they were before the so-called Belgrade group, saying again that they were not going to do anything in the way of disturbing what was going on, while at that very time they sent up the high altitude missile.

Mr. MUSKIE. I understand. Whether we thought that hope was documented

by a binding agreement may be another question, but I am sure we all hoped, by the coincidence of two unilateral actions taken by the two governments involved, that we had achieved an end of testing in the atmosphere. I am sure there are clearer illustrations in history of violations of agreements by the Russians. I understand that. The question is whether, now, we are so inhibited by history and documentation from trying again to work out an understanding with the Russians.

Mr. DOMINICK. We were never inhibited by that, we should not be, and I hope that we never will be. That was the point. The point I am making is that the United States, over a period of time, has tried again and again to impress upon the Soviets that we are not happy with our arms buildup, that we are ready to limit it; that it looks as though we are getting somewhere, and then, all of a sudden, we shoot off on a tangent again.

Let me illustrate the particular situation that we are faced with on the ABM. The United States has proposed not to build any more land-based ICBM's. We have a gigantic number of launchers, which the Russians know about. We have not built any more. We have not built any more Polaris submarines. We have a large number of submarines, and we have not increased them or replaced them or replaced them as they get older. We have a declining number of manned bombers. We had hoped—against experience, I might say—but we had hoped that in recognition of this, the Soviets would also level off their production, but they have not done so in any one of those fields.

This would indicate to me that we have done our best to impress on them we would like to get to an agreement on arms limitation and reduction just as rapidly as we can, that we do not want a proliferation of our weaponry. If we could reach such an agreement we would be delighted to do so.

Mr. MUSKIE. May I ask, in response, How do we identify a point where it is clear to both sides that the reaction of one side on continuing an activity is not a reaction to what the other side did earlier? If we are going to look for the point, because each side has unilaterally taken such clear steps to limit its arms that the other side can be sure that there is no risk of escalation, then we will not need an agreement.

We had Polaris submarines long before the Russians, and they are now engaged in producing their own. I cannot recall at the moment whether the dates of the beginning of construction of their Polaris program were at the time we were developing the MIRV program, but it is conceivable, unless the dates suggest otherwise. I do not have them. Their Polaris program was a response to our MIRV program. Thus, we can debate this until the cows come home.

The other point I make is that the Senator may be right. It may be that what we have already done to stabilize our own nuclear weapons development will be sufficient evidence to the Russians of the credibility of our initiative to work

out a meaningful agreement. But it may not, as well.

We have to decide this question, not after we understand what the Russians' willingness may be, but now.

I must say that I regard the debate to be on the Senator's side of this question of MIRV, that development and deployment of the ABM is more meaningful in respect to our defense posture vis-à-vis the Russians than the addition of more Minutemen, because the Senator has told us that the additional Minutemen are offensive missiles and are not the answer to the Russian threat. It is argued that the ABM is the answer. The Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) made an eloquent speech to that effect in this Chamber that few of us were privileged to hear. So that I think with respect to evaluating the attitude of the Russians, what we do about the ABM may be more persuasive than what we have done to discontinue production of more Minutemen.

Mr. DOMINICK. The interesting fact about that is that Kosygin himself and other Soviet leaders have said they consider the ABM a purely defensive weapon, for the purpose of protecting their own citizens and our citizens from being killed, and not as a threat to the other side.

Mr. MUSKIE. I do not know why we should take their word on that, when we do not take their word on other things when it seems to suit our purpose.

Mr. DOMINICK. They have already deployed their ABM.

Mr. MUSKIE. I understood that they had discontinued it.

Mr. DOMINICK. That is not so. I had some colloquy on that with the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE) just the other day.

Mr. MUSKIE. I would be happy to get the facts.

Mr. DOMINICK. I brought up the fact that they are continuing the construction of their ABM system. They are modernizing their present system and are also developing a new one.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article published in the Chicago Tribune dated July 27, 1969.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WORDS UNRELATED TO ACTIONS

All indications are that the Nixon administration and the Soviet Union are getting ready for negotiations, including a summit conference, on a broad range of problems, including strategic arms limitations.

Andrei Gromyko, Moscow's foreign minister, coupled a scathing attack on Red China with an appeal for "friendly relations" with the United States in his recent address to the supreme soviet. Recalling President Nixon's statement in his inaugural address that we are moving from a period of confrontation to a period of negotiation with the Russians, Gromyko said his government favored "wide-ranging" negotiations with the Nixon administration.

Hubert Humphrey, in Moscow, said Premier Alexei Kosygin talked to him "in some detail and with complete and utter frankness and candor" about world problems and urged him to tell President Nixon and the

American people how much the Soviet Union desires "to work with the United States in the cause of Peace." Humphrey was almost as rapturous about Kosygin as the egregious Ambassador Joseph E. Davies was about Stalin in World War II.

This sudden access of euphoria, so soon after the recent tragic events in Czechoslovakia, is disturbing. It is reminiscent of the "spirit of Geneva" in 1955, only a year before Russian tanks crushed the Hungarians; of the "spirit of Camp David" in 1959, only a year before Khrushchev insulted President Eisenhower and torpedoed the Paris summit conference and three years before he put nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba; and of the "spirit of Glassboro" in 1967, only a year before the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia.

With recurring armed clashes on their frontiers with Red China, which could lead to a major war, the Russians naturally would like some temporary accommodation with the United States that would assure its benevolent neutrality. Having bamboozled the United States with a so-called gentlemen's agreement against atmospheric nuclear tests, which they broke by testing monster warheads, and with a test-ban treaty which now forbids us to test similar weapons; having jumped into the lead in over-all offensive missile strength, and having deployed an anti-ballistic missile system, the Russians now would like to bind the United States with an arms limitation treaty that would prevent us from catching up.

We hope President Nixon will keep these considerations in mind when he enters into negotiations with the Russians. There is danger that they will be persuaded, by all the unreciprocated concessions we have made to the Communists in our efforts to end the war in Viet Nam, that we want peace at any price and can be pushed around.

Dean Acheson, former secretary of state, was a high priest of the "trust Stalin" cult during and after World War II, but he was disenchanted by bitter experience. He learned, as he has written, that the Russians use conferences and the forms of negotiation as "an instrument of war."

Acheson, as quoted in a recent Senate report on the soviet approach to negotiations, says the notion that "there is no alternative to negotiations with the Russians . . . is, of course, silly. For if there is no alternative, and if the Russians will only negotiate, as is now the case, on their own terms, then there is no alternative to surrender. But plainly there is an alternative, which is by action to change the attitude of the other party. . . . Action is often the best form of negotiation."

The soviet concept of diplomacy was best expressed by Stalin: "Words must have no relation to actions—otherwise, what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron."

O, but the present Russian leaders are different, it is said. Robert Conquest, a distinguished English author and student of Russian affairs answers that argument in the same Senate report:

"Russia is now ruled by a faceless group, almost all of whom took the first moves in their careers in the great purge of 1936-38. Kosygin went up in four steps, from shop manager in a Leningrad factory to minister, in about two years. This was at a time when the Leningrad Communists were being slaughtered on an even larger scale than elsewhere. And so it was with Brezhnev and Kirilenko in the Ukraine, where there was three survivors of the 102-man local central committee."

To have been promoted in those days was a sign of active complicity in Stalin's crimes. Conquest writes. He describes the Lenin-Stalin-Malenkov-Khrushchev-Brezhnev suc-

cession as a "dynastic disaster." And in the last two years, he adds, "we have seen an increasingly swift process of re-Stalinization." Even the long-discredited "short course" history of the Communist party, an embodiment of the Stalin myth, has been rehabilitated by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime.

Such is the character of the present Russian rulers, who are so anxious, we are told, to work with the United States in the cause of peace.

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Maine yield, so that I may address a question to the distinguished Senator from Colorado?

Mr. MUSKIE. I am happy to yield.

Mr. PEARSON. As the Senator has returned to the Chamber, recognizing that he has been here all during the session, we were debating and discussing the point made by the able Secretary of Defense as to authorizing the construction and deployment of the ABM system as a bargaining point as we enter into the talks that are contemplated with the Soviet Union.

Does the Senator from Colorado hold a similar view as to the ABM and say that it is essential as a bargaining point to go ahead with it at this time?

Mr. DOMINICK. I do not know that I would want to put it in those words. I should say that it is an important bargaining point; I do not say it is an essential bargaining point, no.

Mr. PEARSON. I asked the Senator that question because a point has been made and developed a number of times that we must have an ABM because the Russians have an ABM. The Secretary of Defense, in his own words, made it an essential bargaining point. The reason I address this question to the Senator from Colorado is that it was the distinguished Senator himself who first warned about and watched and studied the Russian deployment of a FOB system. Long before it was announced, the Senator from Colorado was doing some studying in this field. The testing of the fractional orbiting bombardment system did go forward, and the Russians have such a system today.

Mr. DOMINICK. That is correct.

Mr. PEARSON. It has been our judgment that the United States should not build or construct or deploy a FOB system. Does the Senator think that the United States should perhaps build an FOB system today because the Soviet Union has one, because if we do not have one and we enter discussions with the Russians, perhaps we would be in a weakened position?

Mr. DOMINICK. No, I do not think so at all. I hope we will never develop a FOB system.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. EAGLETON in the chair). Does the Senator from Maine yield the floor?

Mr. MUSKIE. Yes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I merely wish to finish the colloquy.

It seems to be that the FOB system which has been developed by the Soviets is designed either to attack our airfields, which can also be done with submarine launchers, or by air bombers; or for use as a city destroyer, which is something that gives me cold chills. I hope the

United States will never develop a weapon which is aimed to strike against cities only.

Mr. PEARSON. Would the Senator from Colorado agree that perhaps the Soviet utilization of that system would be to negate any effectiveness that an ABM system would have?

Mr. DOMINICK. No, I would not. I have a deep reluctance to have us forego the deployment of an ABM system, if for no other reason than to give the President another button to save us from an accidental or an unauthorized launch in the middle 1970's, whether it be by the Soviet Union, the Chinese, the Egyptians, or whoever it might be at that point. I just cannot see putting ourselves in a position where the only alternative we would have would be to wreak a holocaust.

Mr. PEARSON. I thank the Senator from Colorado.

WORLD REFUGEE PROBLEMS

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, refugee problems seldom dominate the headlines but the troubles of our time are taking a growing toll in the flight of people from conflict and oppression. All over the world, people are on the move.

In a recent series of nine articles, the Christian Science Monitor described today's vast movement of the homeless, the many governmental and private efforts being made to help them, and the continuing need for even greater efforts in behalf of our suffering fellow man. Because I feel these articles will be of considerable interest to Members of Congress and others, I ask unanimous consent that they be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 23, 1969]

HELPING HOMELESS: WORLD DOES CARE

(NOTE.—The world's refugee problem is one of the biggest stories of the space age. Millions of people are either on the move or leading restricted lives in camps. A vast proportion have little if any idea of the future. This account, the first of a nine-part series on the world's refugees, sets the scene as viewed from Geneva.)

(By Carlyle Morgan)

GENEVA.—Suddenly by thousands, or gradually a few at a time—that is the way political refugees come about.

Right now, nearly 20 years after leading governments thought the post-World War II refugee problem was all but finished, there are still 2½ million such people setting out, awaiting further directions midway in their journeys, or being repatriated or resettled.

Though confined to this planet, this is one of the space age's biggest stories.

"We need not wait for an invisible invasion from outer space. Our environment is already being changed by a sort of invisible invasion from within."

The speaker is an "old hand" at one of the world's oldest yet newest problems—the burden that millions of homeless, stateless refugees place on the world's conscience.

In scope and even in essence the problem of political refugees has recently been changing, almost unnoticed. Certain of their needs remain the same. But areas of concentration and major currents of refugee movements across the world have altered radically from what they were only a few years ago.

The awakening to the long-term need, and the international efforts to aid the refugees, have built up to a cause on earth that is as big as the conquest of outer space.

The crux is a spacious regard for the rights of men, women, and children to be safe from political, religious, or racial persecution.

This right is being buttressed by international agreements and accepted as a duty of national governments and international organizations.

It promises to be a powerful and enduring force. This appears certain because of the scope of the problem—and because emerging new nations and the demands for change in older ones have been generating refugees as fast as or faster than they can be resettled or repatriated.

Two and a half million—that is as many refugees as there were 10 years ago.

They inhabit boxlike houses and frail tents in refugee camps. Or, with their families, the more fortunate ones crowd ships for far-away places, board chartered airplanes for their old homelands—or perhaps for new ones.

WHO ARE THEY?

Their names pack the files of offices scattered over a large part of the world, where experts record where to, where from, skills, languages, backgrounds, and causes of displacement.

But who are the refugees?

Certainly in this century they have had remarkable origins. The movement included a million Russians fleeing from the 1917 revolution into Western Europe or wandering from Siberia into China, Mongolia, and Manchuria.

Soon afterward Armenians were fleeing the Turks—and many Turks sought resettlement within new national borders when their birthplaces were placed under Greek control.

Jews in the 1930's sought safety from their wouldbe exterminators in the Nazi Reich.

After World War II southeastern Europeans waited in Paris for restoration of freedom in their homelands.

In 1948 the emergence of Israel heralded hundreds of thousands of new refugees. There the problem is as great as ever.

Farther east there has been the steady post-1949 stream of Chinese fleeing the mainland to Hong Kong and Macao.

Then there was the 1956 Hungarian crisis and the Algerian turmoil of the late 1950's and early '60's—both producing refugees.

To the dismay of an astonished world came the flight of many Czechoslovaks following the 1968 Soviet invasion.

And in Africa today there are thousands on the move from one country to another. But the hapless caught in the Nigerian-Biafran conflict are not classified as refugees in an international sense since they are confined to their country.

For international experts the word "refugee" has acquired a distinct meaning. It is defined as a person forced to leave his own country for a political, racial, religious, or some other social reason not judged to be criminal.

Felix Schnyder, former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, said of the problem:

STANDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR AID

"Of all the various types of evil which man inflicts on man, the suffering of refugees persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion has, throughout history, been among the most cruel and persistent . . . reaching a monumental and tragic climax in our own 20th century."

A leading UN legal specialist on refugees, Dr. Paul Weis, has pointed out that "while the refugee problem is as old as history, international action for refugees started only after the first world war when the Bolshevik Revolution brought in its train a problem of refugees numbering 1 million persons."

This action has established the rights

of refugees in international practice and has provided food and shelter for them.

Today a network of verbal and tacit international agreements makes the world a safer place for refugees. It helps to give them legal and social status.

The UN has made strides from League of Nations days. The league's refugee operations were undertaken for specific problems, such as the Russian refugees and those fleeing Nazi Germany.

Except for the Middle East problem, the UN has been able largely to generalize its approach to refugees.

Wherever refugees originate they are covered by standing UN arrangements for aid. The UN has also been able to "depoliticize" the aid. Its help carries with it no judgment on the policies of states which produce the refugees. The states have begun to understand this and are becoming increasingly cooperative.

This trust is part of the basis for today's worldwide movements of refugees. But it follows from this that detailed accounts of their odysseys are usually sheltered from unnecessary publicity.

Privacy regarding countries of origin and of destination is dictated by political and diplomatic need. And it helps to ensure the personal safety of individual refugees and families.

The rights of refugees—the willingness of governments to let them go from their homelands and of others to receive them in transit or as permanent residents—have developed slowly.

To give wide publicity to the name of a country from which refugees are moving, for example, could cause that country to close its borders to the outflow. East Germany did so when it built the Berlin wall.

MIGRATIONS REPORTED IN GENERAL

Also risky is to name the countries receiving refugees. It can give the appearance that the countries are critical of policies in countries from which the refugees fled. In extreme cases this could lead to charges that receiving countries were conniving with agitators.

One of the vital rights of refugees is that presenting themselves at borders of neighboring states without fear of being turned back. For thousands this can mean the difference between life and death, authorities say, or between freedom and unjust and indefinite imprisonment.

Despite the need for official discretion about today's migrations, these can be reported and charted in general terms. Their most striking feature is the recent, little-known shift in the refugee problem from Europe to Africa, while the Middle East refugee situation remains much as it has for the past 20 years.

In the Middle East 1½ million Palestinian Arabs are still living (some observers say virtually "rotting") in refugee camps. Authorities who care for these refugees provide food, shelter, clothing, some education, and work training. But in the Middle East the refugees are "caught." They are waiting for a political solution of the Arab-Israeli crisis to return them to normal living.

Africa is the next largest—and newest—problem. There some 850,000 are on the move. The number, however, does not include those fleeing from the dangers of war in Nigeria.

The concentrations seen in Europe after World War II no longer exist. Millions have been moved from there to the United States, South America, and Australia. Many thousands were resettled in Europe as permanent residents or citizens. The International Refugee Organization (IRO) moved a million from Europe before its operations ceased in 1950.

This does not mean Europe is no longer an important area in the world refugee problem.

"This would soon become evident," a high official in refugee work says, "if the Inter-

governmental Committee for European Migration were to cease moving refugees through Europe to lands where they can find permanent homes."

No longer an area of concentration, Europe today would appear on a world chart of the migrations as a vast landing stage. Refugees flow to it from Eastern Europe. They also move across the Mediterranean from the coast of North Africa.

From Europe migrations flow out to Canada, some toward the United States, and larger currents to South America and Australia.

Refugees from Fidel Castro's Cuba make one of the more curious ripples among these broader currents. The Cubans are heading for the United States, but many now go by way of Spain. There they wait admission to the United States under the quota system.

Another concentration is Hong Kong. An influx a few years ago added 1 million to its population. Since then some—just how many is not precisely known—have moved into other Asian regions, or overseas. But most have stayed and are cared for by the Hong Kong authorities.

There are Chinese refugees in Macao and thousands of Tibetans in India and Nepal. (Some Tibetans are even farther from home in another mountainous state, Switzerland.)

Wars in Korea and Vietnam produced many thousands of homeless. But they remain, like the Biafrans, within national borders and do not count technically as international refugees.

Unnoticed by most of the world, political refugees have been changing in appearance. On the average they have darker skins than the refugees of yesterday. They are on the run from dangers less well understood by Western peoples.

"However," says an official who seeks to know as much about refugees as does anyone else in the world, "this refugee who looks at first sight so different that many of you don't even recognize him—he is the same man."

CONTINUING NEEDS UNDERLINED

That is the view of the current UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Prince Sadruddin Aga Kahn. The High Commissioner's work reflects the great change in the refugee problem. The new challenge focuses in Africa because of sudden changes of government, the emergence of new nations with unstabilized regimes, and rebellions in some areas still under colonial rule.

When he says that today's refugee is the same as yesterday's, Prince Sadruddin is underlining the refugees' continuing needs for legal protection, for recognized status in the country giving him asylum, for aid with passports or other documents.

But he is speaking just as emphatically of the refugee's need to become a part of the community where he finds safety, to become a productive member of the community, and be assured of a future there for himself and his children.

In the Middle East, where refugees' futures depend on settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict, the problem is the responsibility of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. It is one of the UN's specialized agencies, with headquarters in Geneva.

When possible, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) seeks permanent solutions of refugee problems in league with other international agencies.

These solutions also are helped by programs negotiated by the UNHCR with separate governments. They aid not only refugees but local populations with whom refugees hope to settle.

For example in Africa, the settlement of many refugees depends on programs for basic economic development in sparsely populated regions. Without this the regions could not provide food, shelter, or jobs, and there would be no established communities in which refugees could make their homes.

As UN experts explain, a refugee in Africa may flee across an "artificial" border set up by some past colonial government which cuts right across tribal borders. On the other side of the "colonial" border he often finds a "distant cousin" or other members of his tribe waiting to give him "traditional hospitality."

One result is that great numbers of such refugees may flow into an area unable to support a big increase in population. The inhabitants may be poor and already bearing heavy burdens.

The sudden presence of refugees impoverishes the local population even more. So UN-aided programs must provide immediate help. They must offer food and shelter for refugees and a means to enable them and the local population to produce larger and earlier harvests.

When these aims succeed, as they often do, the local peoples as well as the refugees gain permanent benefits. In some cases the arrival of refugees has obviously been to the advantage of the local population because of the international aid that followed.

So the UNHCR, termed "nonoperational" under its mandate, nevertheless is credited with arranging some of the most notable operations in the refugee field.

It gains from close cooperation with the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration.

ICEM is not a UN agency. It started in 1951, largely on American initiative. It has moved more than 1½ million persons out of Europe, in addition to the million moved earlier by the IRO. The ICEM is "Western" in that it began as an agency to move refugees from Eastern Europe.

Another aid is the United States Refugee Program, which helps defectors and refugees from Eastern Europe.

Voluntary groups give indispensable service, though sometimes within limited fields because of religious or racial connections. Jews, Protestants, and Roman Catholics are all represented in these efforts:

The World Council of Churches, the International Catholic Migration Commission, and the United Hias Service play big parts. The International Committee of the Red Cross is another leader as are the League of Red Cross Societies and its sister organization, the League of Red Crescent Societies (Muslim). The American Friends Service Committee and the Save the Children Federation add their resources. An almost endless list of voluntary organizations indicates the extent of the work.

They help refugees to train themselves in countries of asylum so as to migrate to countries that need them as permanent residents.

Meanwhile, the ICEM supplies cheap travel and makes loans to migrants. And the UNHCR watches over their rights until they have secured social status or citizenship in the countries of their choice.

All these agencies help to lead the refugee home, amid what is described by some as "the century of the homeless man." Sometimes "home" is a new place. But often it is back in the land from which he has fled.

"Voluntary repatriation," as this is termed, is often the most desirable of all solutions, say the experts. This becomes possible when the refugee has lost his fear of going home. His country, even perhaps under a new and revolutionary government, accepts him on the understanding that he is not returning to overthrow the government by illegal means, or to agitate against it.

Such repatriation returned nearly 200,000 Algerian refugees who had fled into Tunisia and Morocco during the Algerian war for independence.

EXTENSIVE SKILLS BUILD UP

While the flow of refugees continues, a vast political, legal, diplomatic, economic, and psychological "know-how" has accumulated for their benefit among authorities and experts whose job it is to help them.

"It is a career of discovery," says the UN's Dr. Thomas Jamieson, speaking of his own and others' long experiences in the work. Dr. Jamieson, one of the classic figures on the refugee landscape, says this discovery needs to be shared by more of the world. Especially, he adds, by the "rich Western world," which he says needs to realize how much is yet to be done and how much more money is required.

UN horizons are broadening. Sixty-seven of its member nations support the UNHCR financially. But the agency budget is very small, and half the organization's time goes to raising money.

Prince Sadruddin is working toward financial support from all UN members, even if some can give only small or "symbolic" amounts.

It is not enough, in his view, that only about half the members give funds. He would like to see the big powers—even the United States—do more for the UNHCR.

Alongside the big shift of emphasis from Europe to Africa, a change in attitudes of the UN's Communist states has been welcomed. These two are probably the most significant developments of the whole refugee picture in the past three years.

They may, moreover, be interlocked. The change in the Soviet attitude has coincided with the growth of African needs.

Communist politics in the "third world" of which Africa is a part may help to account for this. But to some extent so may the East-West détente.

Politics aside, here is one of the more hopeful changes in a world which still produces political refugees as fast as or faster than it increases its means for solving their problems.

TWO MILLION REFUGEES: A KEY TO THE MIDEAST CRISIS

ARAB STAND

(By John K. Cooley)

BEIRUT, LEBANON.—At the heart of the conflict between Arab and Israeli are about 2 million displaced people.

Nearly a million Arab Palestinians fled Palestine during the Arab-Jewish fighting that attended Israel's creation as a state in 1948.

Year after year, the rolls of refugees, nourished in body by international charity, but in spirit only by hope of return to their lost homes, grew larger.

In the tented camps, the shacks, and the prefabricated houses, or in the comfortable dwellings of the more fortunate, "home" was somewhere else—in the towns and villages from which the refugees had fled.

In June 1967, tragedy struck again. Israeli armies swept across West Jordan and parts of Syria and Egypt. Nearly a million more people fled or were driven from their homes in the six-day Arab-Israeli war or during the hostilities that followed it to the present day.

Since then, a new force is stirring among the refugees.

"Why," asks a young university graduate, now receiving military training in a camp of the Palestinian guerrilla organization Al Fatah, "should we fritter our lives away in useless dreaming or brooding, living from the handouts of the Western world's guilty conscience? It's much better to be living, and fighting, for our return home."

For the past year, the refugee camps have been losing their young and able-bodied inmates of both sexes.

No longer refugees

"So you see," the university graduate adds, "we aren't refugees any more. We are people, with an ideal and a country to fight for."

The country, he will tell you, is Palestine—a new Palestine where neither Jews nor people of any other religion will rule the others. The ideal is a coexistence of Moslem, Jew, and Christian in a secular state. "And

we are ready to fight for generations, if we have to, to achieve it," the young man says.

Since 1948, United Nations agencies, most governments including that of the United States, churchmen, historians, and humanitarians have appealed to Israel to permit the return of the Palestinians—or at least allow them a choice, as stipulated in many UN resolutions, between return and fair compensation.

Israel's reply, as repeated last year by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, has been, "There just isn't room." The bitter Arab comment on this is that morality has been sacrificed completely to expediency, and that Israel's Western friends, especially in the United States, simply do not care.

Since 1948, fewer than 100,000 Palestinians, under "family reunion" and "special-urgency" categories, have been permitted to return. In Israel, they and 300,000 others who never fled, live a life as second-class citizens. Those in West Jordan, Gaza, Syria's Golan Heights, and Sinai are obliged to live under a regime of military occupation, where retribution for resistance activity, real or suspected, is often swift and ruthless.

Family history cited

One family history, among hundreds of thousands of others, speaks eloquently. George S., once a well-to-do shopkeeper in Lydda, fled with his family in May, 1948, when trucks of the Haganah, predecessor of Israel's present army, rolled into Lydda's main street and ordered them to go.

Haunted by the fate of Deir Yassin, an Arab village where Israeli spokesmen later admitted they had, on April 10, 1948, killed about 250 Arab men, women, and children who had offered no resistance, George S. and his family moved to Nabulus.

There George S. built a useful existence. His two sons went to school and also helped him to farm a small plot of land.

When war struck again, the family lost nerve. This time they were not forced out, but after hearing of the Israeli destruction of the Arab villages of Emmaus, Yalu, and Beit Nuba, they fled before the Israeli armies arrived. They felt betrayed by the Arab armies and their leaders.

Very essentials needed

On the way to the East Bank of Jordan, their little daughter, Laila, was killed in an Israeli air attack. With no relatives or close friends to turn to in Amman, George S., his wife, and his two sons at first lived in a tented camp in the Jordan Valley.

Then, in the fighting of February, and March, 1968, they were forced to flee for the third time. Today, George S. has found part-time work near his camp on the outskirts of overcrowded Amman. His wife grows and markets a few vegetables.

And both sons have joined the guerrillas of Al Fatah. One has been to Lydda—where an Israeli dentist now lives in their old home.

After June, 1967, the 175,000 Palestinians who became refugees for the second time since 1948, and most of the 350,000 newly displaced from the occupied zones needed, in the words of Laurence Michelmore, commissioner-general of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA), "the very essentials of physical survival": food, water, shelter, blankets, clothing.

Jordan, the country hardest hit by the newest refugee influx, ironically also is the country which had successfully absorbed the most refugees before June, 1967. Palestinians were granted full Jordanian citizenship. The economy was thriving; hard work and effective use of United States and other foreign aid had raised the annual growth rate to 11 percent.

Before the June, 1967, war, 724,000 refugees were registered in Jordan for UNRWA rations and services, such as schooling. Since

the exodus of June, 1967, and the following months, this figure has risen by at least 20,000—but many thousands more were not on any official ration rolls.

Close to 300,000 registered refugees remain on the West Bank. About 500,000 UNRWA registered persons and another 237,500 registered with the Jordan Government are on the East Bank. These include close to 40,000 from Gaza who fled to East Jordan before King Hussein's government decided to close the Jordan River bridges to them in July, 1968, because, it felt, the Israelis were trying to empty Gaza at Jordan's expense.

UNRWA now assumes alone the total responsibility for food distribution among East Jordan refugees. Assisted by voluntary groups like the Near East Council of Churches, the Save the Children organization, the Quakers, and the Mennonites, it provides medical, schooling, and various self-help services. Most recently, the guerrilla organization, Al Fatah, has provided one school, two clinics, and one hospital, run by its own personnel.

More funds sought

Some 10,000 prefabricated houses of metal, and asbestos board, for 15,000 families are being erected now to replace tents, blown away or destroyed in many camps by winter rain, wind, snow, and mud, or forced to move by fighting.

UNRWA is trying to scrape together more funds—it lacks \$3.8 million of its \$42.5 million 1969 budget, and has had to shorten food rations—for more prefabs. In the words of one UNRWA official, "they provide at least a decent minimum of shelter, warmth, dryness, and privacy."

On the West Bank UNRWA's basic services recovered fairly quickly from the June war. "In general," UNRWA said in its last annual report, "the cooperation between UNRWA and the Israel authorities continued to be effective."

But Israeli authorities have kept the formerly large refugee population in the Jericho area camps down to a few hundred families. UNRWA has repeatedly said that "its capacity to help will be much greater if," in accordance with the Security Council resolution taken in July, 1967, "the inhabitants who fled are allowed to return to the places where they were living before the hostilities and where UNRWA's installations and facilities already exist."

Urgent task in Syria

The most urgent task in Syria since June, 1967, was caring for 17,500 Palestinian refugees and about 100,000 Syrian ones from the Israeli-occupied city of Kunetra and the nearby Golan Heights, which Israel already is colonizing with its own settlers.

Some refugees found shelter or rented quarters in Damascus. But about 8,000 moved into tented camps near Damascus and Deraa, in southern Syria. UNRWA and the relief agencies sought, as they did in Jordan, to alleviate the worst suffering with stoves, bedding, concrete floors under the tents, and other basic camp improvements. Food rations were augmented last winter with hot meals and extra-protein foods for children.

The 100,000 Syrian refugees are being cared for by the Syrian authorities and the Near East Council of Churches (NECC). Yoon Gu Lee, executive secretary of NECC, supervised construction of new housing units and delivery of emergency supplies.

"The Syrian authorities," he says, "have matched everything we have done many times over. This was help that really made a difference."

Lebanon's fairly stable, though slowly growing, 1948 Palestinian refugee population of about 170,000 emerged from the June war with the least new difficulties. Though Lebanon was not involved in land fighting with Israel in June, 1967, a few thousand

Syrians and others took shelter from fighting in the Marjayoun area of southern Lebanon. Local people and authorities care entirely for them.

Nationality acquired

Though Palestinians cannot legally work in Lebanon, about 20,000 refugees have acquired Lebanese nationality since 1948 and have become more or less integrated into Lebanon's free-enterprise economy.

An authoritative official source estimates that between 70,000 and 90,000 others, never registered with UNRWA, have, by one means or another, obtained Jordanian passports and so are entitled to work permits under the same conditions as other foreign residents of Lebanon. Despite this, a shantytown peopled by Palestinians—1948 refugee families—is one of the most disconcerting sights greeting a foreign tourist driving in from Beirut airport.

Perhaps hardest hit has been the Gaza Strip. This is the last remnant of British-mandated, pre-1948 Palestine. It was under Egyptian military rule from 1948 to 1956, and again after the Suez war in 1957 until Israel occupied it in June, 1967. Economists estimate it could support about 60,000 people without outside help.

Instead, Gaza had to cope with nearly 400,000 refugees by the time of the June, 1967 war. This figure is now down to about 308,000.

"There is no doubt," says a leading European official of one of the relief agencies "that the Israelis are following a conscious policy of emptying the strip of Arab inhabitants. Everything, from subtle persuasion to force, is being used to reduce the camp population."

Those in the Jabaliya camp, in northern Gaza, have been especially affected because of heavy Arab guerrilla and resistance activity in and around it.

Homes destroyed

More than 240 individual houses, Israeli sources admit, have been blown up in Gaza since June, 1967, a practice also followed in the West Bank and Jerusalem as a reprisal for real or suspected aid to guerrillas. UNRWA and other agencies have had to add hundreds of thousands of extra dollars to their budgets to provide basic services for these newly homeless and unemployed people.

Above and beyond the extreme bitterness of feeling in Gaza and the concentrated suffering there, impartial observers feel that the strip's population will have to be drastically reduced in any peace settlement, if ever it is to be viable.

The least publicized of Middle East refugees are about 350,000 Egyptians moved inland from the Suez Canal bank towns, heavily shelled in intermittent fighting from July, 1967 until the present. The Egyptian Government and religious relief agencies care for them.

Schools assisting

One small Egyptian village of 7,000, Oum Kinen, received 1,000 such refugees. Yoon Gu Lee reported that its people "gave 120 rooms free of charge, gave work to 97 people out of 150 able-bodied men; and quite a few people with skill began their business in the village, like shoemaking, carpet manufacturing and carpentry."

UNRWA cannot help these Egyptians, who depend on the U.A.R. government, the Roman Catholic organization, Caritas-Egypt, and the NECC. UNRWA does care for about 3,000 Palestinian residents displaced from Gaza and Al-Arish, in Sinai, since 1948 and the Suez War of 1956.

UNRWA's school system has sent hundreds of thousands of Palestinian youngsters into useful lives. During the school year 1967-68, UNRWA operated 446 elementary and preparatory schools—some in tents—for 179,591 Palestine refugee children. Another 41,

602 were enrolled in government and private schools, covering the first nine school years.

Some 15,226 attended secondary schools, not provided by UNRWA but given allowances or subsidies, which in 14,000 cases were paid to the students themselves. Arab governments bear most of the costs of secondary schooling.

The UNRWA teaching staff of about 5,200 was seriously disrupted by the hostilities of June, 1967 and afterward. Arab nationals were at first not permitted by the Israelis to return to occupied territory. In Gaza, 48 were deported by the Israelis and six killed in the fighting that also destroyed many classrooms.

Youth activities centers

Strikes, curfews, mass arrests, demonstrations, detention of teachers, and intrusion of Israeli troops into rebellious schools seriously hamper the education of these children.

UNRWA operates 34 youth activities centers, a few preschool play centers for tiny Palestinian children and teacher training centers. There are three preservice residential teacher training centers; two in Ramallah, West Jordan, and one in Sibli, Lebanon. In Beirut, the Swiss Government initially financed a joint UNRWA-UNESCO Institute of Education. There are UNRWA vocational schools at Kalandia, near Jerusalem; Wadi Seer, near Amman, and in Damascus. A YWCA training center in Beirut also offers vocational courses to 100 Palestinian girls.

In Jordan, the record of job placement of UNRWA secondary-school graduates is impressive. Since June 1967, 130 local and 600 foreign employers' requests for graduates were filled up to the beginning of this year. Virtually all graduates of teacher training schools have found useful jobs.

Few graduates placed

Less successful has been UNRWA's program of placing graduates in on-the-job training with industrial firms in Western Europe. Only 27 out of 950 candidates were so placed last year. West Germany, however has agreed to accept more. For Palestinians without qualifications for vocational schools, UNRWA operates basic literacy and handicrafts courses in everything from cooking, sewing, and carpentry to first aid. There are also courses for blind or handicapped refugees.

What of the story, often heard in the West, that most Palestinians really do not want to go home, or have their own state? "The huge adherence to the guerrilla organizations disproves this," says a guerrilla leader. Last year, Professors Peter Dodd and Halim Barakat of the American University of Beirut's sociology department conducted searching case studies of 122 typical refugee families, about 800 people from all walks of life in all.

Their research showed that some 64 percent of "old" (1948) and 82 percent of "new" (1967) refugees definitely wished to return. Only 15 percent of old refugees and 2 percent of new refugees did not wish to return.

One of the Palestinian mothers questioned replied: "Your country is like your child. You cannot be separated from it for a long time. Your country is where you were born and no other country would be dearer to your heart."

ISRAELI VIEW

(By Francis Ofner)

JERUSALEM.—Over nine-tenths of the 1,300,000 persons who immigrated to Israel after the establishment of the state in 1948—and who now make up half of the country's Jewish population—were refugees when they fled from their countries of origin. But practically none of them now would think of themselves here as a refugee. Nor would other Israelis put them into this category.

For instance, Jacques Sadras was born in

Alexandria, Egypt. When the Egyptian Army marched against nascent Israel May, 1948, Mr. Sadras was interned as a Zionist at the camp of Abukir in the Nile Delta.

After 15 months of detention, Mr. Sadras was taken handcuffed on board a ship in the Port of Alexandria and from there to Venice, Italy.

There he met and married Simha, also a refugee from Egypt. Emissaries of the Jewish Agency, who had come from Israel, soon put them on board a Haifa-bound vessel.

"After our arrival, we went to Kibbutz Ein Shemer, but left a few months later for personal reasons," Mr. Sadras says, "and the Jewish Agency stepped in again and put us up at the transit camp of Beit Lid, near Netania."

Couple lived in camp

Being a trained lathe operator, Mr. Sadras was sent to Beersheba, today a bustling city in the Negev, but then little more than an experiment in coexistence between immigrants from dozens of different countries. With so many newcomers arriving, the young couple had to live in a camp, even after their first boy was born.

The winter of 1949-50 was unusually cold for this warm region. "One February morning, I could not even open the hatch of the tent—we had been snowed in."

In the spring, the Jewish Agency gave the couple a newly built apartment consisting of one room, a shower cubicle, and a kitchenette.

The same year, Mr. Sadras was called up for his two years' compulsory military service.

"Those two years were hard for me and my wife," he recalls. "She and the boy had to make do with the monthly Army allowance."

While in the Army, he learned more skills, so that after his release in 1952 he was able to get a better job in Beersheba.

Further improvement came when Mr. Sadras' mother-in-law opened a very modest fish restaurant on the Jaffa seashore. It proved a great success. He joined her and now is prosperous, has a three-room apartment in Tel Aviv, a car, and three children.

"The years we went through were difficult," he now says. "But we are happy to be free in our own country—others have suffered more."

One of those who had it much tougher, is Mrs. Clara Landau-Bondi, a survivor of the Nazi extermination camp of Auschwitz and now a prominent ballet teacher in Jerusalem.

She was a student at the University of Zagreb, Yugoslavia, when World War II overtook her native country. For three years they were subjected to persecution under the Hungarian occupation forces, and in mid-1944, she, her sister, and their parents were deported to Auschwitz.

Fortunately her turn for the gas chambers had not come by the time the camp was evacuated in 1945 in view of the Soviet Army's advance. She survived the notorious "death march" back to Germany.

Successful ballet teacher

Eventually back in her home town of Sombor, in Yugoslavia, she heard that both her parents had been killed in Auschwitz. For a while, she took up her family's profession, ballet teaching and choreography.

In 1949, she asked the Jewish Agency envoy who had arrived in Yugoslavia, to take her to Israel.

"I arrived in Israel with one suitcase, no money and no knowledge of the language." But it did not take long to correct all three defects. Through a career as a midwife and a punch-card operator, she found her way back to ballet, married her pianist, and now runs the most successful ballet school in Jerusalem.

Another Israel refugee-turned-resident is Miss Tatiana Stepankova, formerly a commentator on Radio Prague, Czechoslovakia. When the Russians invaded her native coun-

try in 1968, she happened to be in Israel on a visit. She wanted to return home because she feels deeply attached to the Czech people. But she was advised by her friends in Prague and abroad not to return, because the Soviets would not allow journalists to exercise their profession freely, as they were beginning to before the invasion.

"I accepted with a heavy heart the invitation of my friends in Israel to join an Ulpan—a rapid Hebrew language course." By now she speaks Hebrew, but has declined an offer of a job from the Israel Broadcasting Service. Instead, she does public relations for a Tel Aviv hotel.

Tatiana's younger sister also went to an Ulpan and now is studying at the Hebrew University's Haifa branch. Their parents, who escaped later, have also found their niches in Israeli life. Unlike so many other families, this one is reunited.

Open nation

These three are true case-histories, including the names. They represent three major types of refugee immigrants—those from Arab and Moslem countries; from Hitlerian Europe, and from Communist-dominated parts of Europe.

The Israelis do not allow their immigrants to remain refugees for long.

The proclamation of independence states that "The State of Israel will be open to Jewish immigration and the ingathering of the exiles," and the "law of return" provides that "every Jew has a right to immigrate to Israel." That was one of the very first laws adopted by the Israeli Parliament over 20 years ago. The law further provides that every immigrant becomes a citizen with full rights as soon as he steps on the soil of the country, unless he specifically opts out.

Economically and socially, however, the process of shedding their refugee mentality and asserting their "Israeli-ness" takes more time. Still, the Israelis claim their record is second to none in their effort to integrate refugees with utmost speed.

It is estimated that nearly \$2 billion has been spent for this purpose. This includes the payment of fares to Israel, the provision of housing at low rent or on long-term, publicly financed mortgages, the teaching of trades to newcomers, even reclaiming land for immigrants settling in farm villages, providing them with tools, working capital, and instruction.

To speed up the process of integration even more, a special government ministry was set up last year under Deputy Premier Yigal Allon. Whole series of training courses have been run to teach officials how to handle newcomers and in which way their countries of origin affect their adaptability.

At present, the country has 10 absorption centers and 11 immigrant hostels for newcomers with nearly 5,000 places. Another 10 such institutions with a total of 2,700 places are under construction and seven more, with 2,700 places are being planned.

Charge against Arabs

But the success story of refugee Jews does not diminish awareness here of the tragedy of the Arab refugees.

By now, little heed is being paid any longer to the question of who is responsible for their becoming refugees—whether the Israelis, as the Arabs claim, or the Arab leaders, as the Israelis assert.

The most important aspect of the problem, in the Israeli view, is that the Arab governments do not want to solve the refugee problem. Instead, the Israelis' say, the Arabs are anxious to keep it alive and to use the refugees as a political, propaganda, and military weapon against Israel.

It is perhaps little known that Israel has absorbed over 40,000 Arab refugees—5,000 of them before the 1949 armistice and the rest

thereafter. They were all struck off the relief rolls of the United Nations.

The bulk of these refugees had come by 1952, but arrivals have been continuing under the reunion-of-families scheme at the rate of several hundred a year. In addition, some 14,000 permits for the return of 1967 war refugees have been issued, but so far only a fraction have been used.

As to a comprehensive solution of the refugee problem, the Israel government has repeatedly offered to pay compensation and to help in their resettlement, "provided it is part of a general solution of the refugee problem."

The return of refugees to Israel is considered unrealistic here. It would only create misery and unhappiness once more, Premier Golda Meir said in a recent speech. "What has taken place," she explained, "is actually an exchange of populations. We took some 600,000 Jewish refugees from Arab and Moslem countries, while about a similar number of Palestinian Arabs became refugees as a result of the 1948 war."

The number of the Arab refugees has been artificially inflated, the Israelis say, in addition to their natural increase. The root of the trouble is described here as the "stubborn refusal of the Arab governments to solve the problem."

EUROPE—STAGING POST FOR REFUGEES

(NOTE.—Twenty-four years after World War II, thousands of refugees are still on the move throughout Europe. West Germany received more than 28,000 in 1968. Tens of thousands fled Czechoslovakia following the Soviet invasion. But, as these reports show, wherever his destination and once over the initial changes, the European refugee settles quickly.)

GERMAN INFLEX

(By Harry B. Ellis)

GÖTTINGEN, GERMANY.—"We suggest they get housing more quickly if they choose a state like the Saarland," declared the West German official. "But relatively few take our advice."

He stopped, reflecting on hundreds of interviews over the years with German refugees from the Communist East.

"They say," he continued, "that the Saarland is too close to the frontier. We point out that the frontier is with France and friendly. But it makes no difference."

The official shook his head. "People who for years have lived close to a tense frontier want to bury themselves in the middle of Germany. They want no borders at all."

Speaking was Boris Schütz, representative of the West German Government at Camp Friedland outside Göttingen, four miles from the frontier with East Germany.

Hundreds of thousands of persons of German origin, some speaking little or no German, have flowed through the portals of Friedland, seeking new homes in the federal republic. They came—and still come, more than one thousand a month—from the Soviet Union, Poland, and the former Baltic states.

This mass of people forms part of the more than 12 million Germans who, since the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945, have fled or been pushed out of Communist lands in Central and Eastern Europe.

Every fifth person among West Germany's 59.8 million citizens came from areas now governed by Communist regimes, including Walter Ulbricht's East Germany.

In the immediate aftermath of the war Czechs and Poles, having suffered so much from Germans themselves, expelled indigenous Germans from the Czech Sudetenland and the Polish Oder-Neisse lands. Another huge group of Germans, fleeing Communism voluntarily, came west from East Germany.

Typical family seen

This flow continues. In 1968 more than 4,900 Germans escaped from East Germany, many of them risking fire from the guns of border patrols. Another 23,397 ethnic Germans came to the federal republic during the year from other Communist countries of Eastern Europe.

By the end of 1968, according to Kai-Uwe von Hassel, West German coffers had poured out \$17.5 billion since 1952 to compensate refugees from the east and to reestablish them within the federal republic. Mr. von Hassel heads Bonn's Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Injured.

The list of benefits is long. Take a typical family of four ethnic Germans—mother, father, and two children—arriving, bewildered and poor, at Camp Friedland from a Polish town.

Everything in the camp, food and new outfits of clothing, is free. The family's travel costs from Poland to whatever West German town they choose to settle in are paid by the federal government.

Each newcomer over 21 gets \$25 in cash. Each child receives half that amount. The refugees, as new West German citizens, are entitled to a full range of social-security benefits.

The family is helped in obtaining public-financed housing. If the children speak no German they are enrolled in special schools, until they can catch up with other German youngsters.

"The family is free to choose what land [state] it wants to live in," Mr. Schütz remarked. "Theoretically each land sets a quota but in fact the refugee's choice has priority."

Losses assessed

"The problem is that popular states like Baravia or Baden-Württemberg have too many people and not enough housing. So we try to suggest places where they can get apartments quickly."

Germans leaving Poland legally are required by the Polish Government either to sell their property or to turn it over to the Polish Government. Many refugees arrive nearly penniless at Camp Friedland.

These property losses, too, are assessed "Perhaps \$7 billion has been paid out in this category," Mr. Schütz said.

German refugees from East Germany are processed at a number of camps, or transient facilities, throughout the federal republic. Camp Friedland and a similar installation at Nuremberg are reserved for ethnic Germans from nations other than East Germany.

A smaller facility at Zirndorf, on the outskirts of Nuremberg, processes all non-Germans seeking political asylum in the federal republic.

Friedland handles ethnic Germans from the northern tier of Communist states, excluding East Germany. The Nuremberg camp collects German refugees from Czechoslovakia and the Balkans.

"Our first effort," Mr. Schütz explained "is to determine that the immigrant is of German origin. Then we ask, Why did you come?"

How to qualify

The newcomer should have chosen the federal republic for German reasons—that is, as an expression of his Germanness—to qualify for refugee benefits.

"Ninety percent of our refugees come legally," an official observed. "The rest come illegally, by various routes."

The legal way takes time. Relatives already in the federal republic apply for their kinfolk in the east to join them. This application is filed through Mr. von Hassel's ministry.

The application then goes to the Communist government concerned. In Moscow the relay is through the West German Embassy. The American Embassy in Warsaw handles requests concerning Poles.

Communist authorities then decide "yes" or "no." For years—following the first mass expulsion—Polish officials continued to clear ethnic Germans from the "western territories." These were former German lands east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers, awarded to Polish "administration" by the Potsdam Agreement.

But the Poles allowed relatively little emigration from East Prussia, taken from Germany and divided between Poland and the Soviet Union after World War II.

"We applied 18 to 20 times," an East Prussian refugee explained at Friedland, "and always were turned down."

"The last year Gomulka [Communist Party chief Wladyslaw Gomulka] said over the radio: Whoever does not want to be a Pole, but prefers Germany, let him leave. So we applied again," the refugee added, "and received permission."

"Now," remarked Mr. Schütz, "we get 350 or more ethnic Germans from East Prussia monthly. Not from Soviet East Prussia," he amended. "None are left there."

The current exodus from Poland includes a number of German Jews, most of whom go to Israel. A surprising number of East European Jews choose the federal republic as their new home.

Emigration climbs

The number of ethnic Germans emigrating from Czechoslovakia climbed sharply during the 1968 détente, after Alexander Dubcek eased the Communist reins and before the Soviet-led invasion of Aug. 21.

"Those Germans who come from Czechoslovakia," one official observed, "often arrive with cars crammed with household goods. Those from Russia and Poland generally arrive dirt poor."

"Germany under Hitler," one observer stated, "caused much of the great human upheaval in Europe before and during the war. Now, ever since the Nazi collapse, Germans themselves have become the refugees."

"These people," remarked another source, "are a net gain to the federal republic. They work hard, driven by a compulsion to catch up with other Germans."

"Even an electric toaster," Mr. Schütz declared, "is a sensation to many people who come through Friedland. Men go out from here and beg to work 80 hours a week to get their families started."

Every able-bodied German who returns can find work. At the beginning of March, 1969, the federal Ministry of Economics listed 625,000 unfilled jobs in West Germany.

Since 1949, when both the federal republic and East Germany were founded, about three million Germans have deserted East Germany for the economic glitter and political freedom of West Germany.

Until the Berlin wall was built in 1958, the inflow from East Germany was far larger than from the rest of Eastern Europe combined. Now the reverse is true.

Means of exit limited

East Germans must run a gauntlet of barbed wire, mine fields, and machine-gun bullets to escape. Ethnic Germans from Poland, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans still have legal—though limited—means of exit.

The loss of German citizens threatened the existence of East Germany. Exit of Germans from non-German Communist lands, on the other hand, often is regarded as purifying the country of alien elements.

Between 1950 and today nearly 650,000 ethnic Germans have entered the federal republic from Communist lands other than East Germany. This is in addition to the convulsive, uncontrolled expulsion movements at the end of the war.

The common denominator of the two great classes of German refugees—those from East Germany and those from elsewhere—is escape from communism.

Once in the federal republic the newcomers tend to blend with West Germans and soon are indistinguishable from them. This is the key differential the refugee question in West Germany has from the problem in other lands.

The word "refugee" connotes a displaced individual, eking out a meager existence on charity in an ugly camp. Millions of unfortunates—Arabs, Africans, and others—fit this concept.

Not so German refugees. West Germans have the money, jobs, and political will to absorb their ethnic brethren, uprooted in one way or another by the Nazi holocaust.

A CONTINENT THAT'S ON THE MOVE

(NOTE.—The creation of African states—particularly during this decade—has shifted the world's major refugees from Europe to this continent. As new states emerge, many minority groups flee—thus becoming refugees.)

(By Frederic Hunter)

Africa is a continent of refugees: political, ethnic, European, Asian, and, most of all, African.

People have always been on the move in this continent. But in the past they did not present the huge refugee problem they do today—that is a product of African nationhood and this decade.

Throughout history Africans have been populating a largely unpeopled continent, vast stretches of which are still sparsely settled.

Families, clans, and even tribes established themselves by fission. Empires built on trade rose and fell. Others built on military might dominated regions and their peoples for hundreds of years.

Some of those made homeless by war fled beyond the reach of their enemies into virgin land—or that of even weaker peoples. Others assimilated—or were assimilated by—the victors.

Before the era of colonialism the processes of movement inside Africa were largely unknown to the outside world. Africans displaced by the processes of movement outside the continent—by the European and Arab slave trades—were considered merchandise, not public charges.

Under colonial rule European administrations acted as higher authorities to settle the conflicts which displaced peoples. Colonialism tended to halt the age-old African migrations, to freeze the expansion and contractions of ethnic hegemonies.

DECEPTIVE AURA GIVEN

European rule, backed by the muscle of colonial armies, gave Africa a deceptive aura of stability and quiescence. This rule also imposed upon the continent a set of boundaries drawn in 1884 by European powers with little knowledge of African tribal territories.

The emergency of African colonies into nation-states—in large part a process of the last 10 years—has produced social and political, ethnic and economic upheavals virtually unparalleled in the continent's history. Those upheavals have produced hundreds of thousands of refugees.

Most have fled from warfare or terrorism. The problems of minorities—usually ethnic ones—have triggered most of these conflicts. They have sprung from the failure of peaceful efforts to define the role of these groups within the nation-state.

In most cases these ethnic-minority groups have—in fact or in appearance—dominated a sector of activity. Other groups have seen this dominance as detrimental to their interests. Eventually they have reacted violently against it.

Other conflicts have resulted from pressures to resolve within the framework of the modern state the problems posed by large cultural minorities or by nonconforming religious groups.

MANY PEOPLE SURPRISED

These African conflicts surprised and shocked many people, especially in the early days of nationhood when many assumed that colonial calm would carry over into independence. But colonialism was itself a type of social organization based on political domination by a minority.

With the thawing of the colonial freeze Africans began to sort themselves out in the more fluid atmosphere of national independence.

But that atmosphere proved less fluid than many Africans expected. The legacy of colonialism, that part not to be rejected, imposed curbs just as colonialism itself did.

Among the most important were the national boundaries.

The resolve to preserve these boundaries is great—despite the lip service rendered the concept of Pan-Africanism.

Thus in the postcolonial era people who pushed across internationally recognized boundaries found that they were no longer free—as they had been before colonialism—to settle where they could. Instead they were international refugees.

Generally speaking, the colonial powers removed themselves from black Africa without large-scale conflicts. The exception, Portugal, is fighting anticolonial wars in the three African territories it retains. Thousands of refugees have fled from these territories: 61,250 from Portuguese Guinea on the West African bulge, 30,150 from Mozambique. About 90 percent of the latter have fled to Tanzania, where most Mozambique liberation movements are headquartered.

CIVILIANS TERRORIZED

Black Africa's most violent anticolonial war has taken place in Angola where both sides have resorted to terrorism and intimidation of civilians. More than 360,000 refugees have left Angola, virtually all of them going to the Congo.

Even as a United Nations trust territory, Rwanda was essentially a feudal kingdom. In the years just prior to independence tribal warfare beset this tiny, densely populated central African nation. It pitted the ruling class, the tall, regal Tutsis, a mere 15 percent of the population, against the Hutus, their age-old vassals.

As the administration of Belgium, the UN trustee, was coming to an end, the Hutus succeeded in overturning Tutsi political domination in one-man, one-vote elections. Hutu representatives then deposed the Tutsi monarch. This action and the resumption of Tutsi-Hutu clashes, many of them bloody enough to evoke cries of Tutsi genocide, caused perhaps half the country's Tutsi population—about 200,000—to flee.

The problems posed by displaced Rwandese lodged in camps bordering their former home land illustrate some of the difficulties involved in resettling refugees in Africa and elsewhere.

An influential group of high-born Tutsis, called the Iyenzi, agitated within the camps against permanent settlement outside Rwanda. Some of them led attacks against their homeland, hoping to return to power. At one point they penetrated to within 12 miles of Kigali, Rwanda's capital.

OTHER PROBLEMS CAUSED

The unwillingness to resettle caused other problems. It prevented the camps from becoming self-supporting and tended to make the Tutsis professional refugees. It aroused the resentment of host-country citizens who received no outside support as did the refugees. In addition, the Tutsis, who measured wealth in cattle, took to agriculture reluctantly, disdaining it as Hutu work.

These refugees—and especially the revanchist Iyenzi—produced instability in the entire area surrounding Rwanda.

Their presence on Rwanda's borders posed more than strategic difficulties for Rwanda's

Hutu government. It also endangered the peaceful existence of the Tutsis remaining in Rwanda. This in turn impeded the country's development since the government depended upon this educated group in order to function effectively.

Tiny Burundi, Rwanda's neighbor to the south, approached independence in a similar state of feudalism. Due to less-defined ethnic divisions, however, it escaped intertribal clashes. But the entrance into Burundi of Rwanda's Tutsi refugees tended to upset this balance. Some observers point to the Tutsi influx as one of the factors which caused the assassinations of Burundi Premiers Prince Lewis Rwagasore and Pierre Ngendandumwe, the attempt to assassinate Premier Leopold Biha, and the 1966 overthrow of the monarchy.

Tutsi refugees also participated in the 1964 antigovernment rebellion in the Congo. Hopes of arming themselves for another attack against Rwanda seem to have motivated them.

Little conflict preceded the Congo's accession to independent nationhood. Due to the country's lack of preparation for self-government, however, and widespread misunderstandings as to what independence would involve, racial distrust deepened to the point of combustion just prior to the transfer of powers.

The conditions of the first weeks of Congo nationhood in 1960—uncertainty, a shaky, inexperienced government, a popular sense of betrayal by politicians, and the Army mutiny—ignited a panic among whites. They fled to Rhodesia and Uganda by car, to Brazzaville and Bangui by ferry, and to Rwanda across the eastern lakes at night. They flew from Leopoldville "loaded like cordwood," as some have recalled it. They arrived in Brussels owning only what they carried. Perhaps as many as 50,000 whites left the Congo at this time.

A similar situation gripped Equatorial Guinea a few months ago. There the actions of an inexperienced government caused Spanish settlers to panic and flee.

THOUSANDS DISPLACED

All of these situations arise from a common situation: in the displacement of a politically dominant ethnic minority or in attempts to displace such a minority.

This is the great African political adjustment of the decade.

The other great African adjustment causing the displacement of peoples is that due to domination—or fear of domination—by an ethnic minority in the economic sphere. It causes the displacement of one group in order to extend economic opportunities to another, usually a group more valuable politically to the leadership.

This process has displaced thousands of Asian merchants in East Africa. It probably will displace more. East Africans tend to regard the Asians as having a stranglehold on local retailing.

It also has displaced highly trained economic or administrative elites, distrusted by local peoples as controlling their government administration or certain fields of economic activity.

Among such displaced in the early 1960's were the Dahomeyans who staffed the colonial civil service in French West Africa. The Balubas of Katanga Province in the Congo, another administrative elite, fled fearing reprisals from other peoples of the region should the Katanga secession succeed.

About 300,000 Balubas returned to their ethnic homeland, Kasal Province, within the first year of Congolese independence. While the Katanga secession was being resolved, another 30,000 Balubas lived in a refugee camp in Elisabethville under United Nations protection.

The Ibos of Nigeria are perhaps a special case of this type of displacement.

Long resented in parts of Nigeria, es-

pecially the north, for their dynamism, their assumptions of superiority, and their control of administrative and retail posts, the Ibos were the victims of pogroms when resentment burst into violence after the assassination of northern leaders at the hands of a group of predominantly Ibo military officers.

MASSACRES BREAK OUT

Thus, in the Ibo case, the fears of economic domination combined with anxiety over political subjugation culminated in violent anti-Ibo massacres. These pogroms convinced many Ibos that they could not live safely outside their ethnic heartland—the Eastern Region of Nigeria. Several million of them fled there and later declared its secession as the Republic of Biafra.

During the near two-year course of the Nigeria-Biafra war, secessionist territory has been surrounded by federal forces. The difficulties of feeding, clothing, and caring for hundreds of thousands of refugees in a Biafra which is landlocked and cut off except from the air have been immense.

Other minority problems have caused the displacement of 121,000 Sudanese. There refugees have left their homeland due to more than a decade of sporadic civil war raging between the Arab north and the black cattle-raising nomads of the south. Basically at stake is the place in the Sudan, declared a Muslim state by the Arab majority, of a significant non-Muslim minority.

The position of large cultural minorities has caused similar problems in neighboring states. Ethiopia faces a serious separatist challenge in Eritrea, the province bordering the Red Sea. A dominant factor in this struggle is the place of a Muslim, Arab-influenced minority in the ancient Christian kingdom. More than 30,000 Ethiopian refugees have fled to the Sudan as a result.

BORDER WARS CALLED OFF

The ethnic solidarity of the Somali peoples, many of whom wander widely as shepherding nomads, have caused problems to Ethiopia, Kenya, and the French Territory of Afars and the Isaas, formerly French Somaliland. Although the Somali Republic has called off border wars with its neighbors, it still acts as the country of asylum for refugees numbered at more than 400,000 by some counts.

Some observers regard the 1964 Congo rebellion as largely an effort by minority tribes—the Tatela, Kusu, and related ethnic groups—to secure greater national influence. While the rebellion unified a wide variety of malcontents, these observers believe that Tatela-Kusu grievances acted as the engine behind it. The rebellion pushed more than 70,000 Congolese over the borders seeking refuge from the fighting.

Zambia has encountered special problems in trying to determine the place in a nation-state of nonconformist religious groups. Among these are the Watchtowers and the Lumpa sect of prophetess Alice Lenshina. These groups have instructed members not to participate in political activity, a prohibition which has led to suppression and coercive action by the Zambia Government.

VARIETY OF CLASHES

In a variety of clashes government forces have killed hundreds of sect adherents and have driven others from their villages. A number have fled beyond the borders of Zambia.

Mention must also be made of the continuing migrations from the countryside to the city. This process is one of the most significant now occurring in Africa. It has resulted from the desire of many young Africans to experience the opportunities and glamour of city living. It has swollen many African cities—Kanshassa, Lagos, Nairobi, and Accra, for instance—beyond their capacity to support the influx.

Those migrating to the cities are refugees in no customary sense. But many have fled,

as refugees do; they have left behind stagnation, societies run by conservative elders, and economic deterioration especially onerous in rural areas. Many do not find employment in the cities. And, like refugees, those who cannot lodge with relatives are homeless and displaced.

One would like to write that African refugees problems—and the minority adjustments which underlie many of them—will soon be resolved. Little evidence, however, demonstrates this view.

For the moment Africa's minority problems remain—as do the efforts of the new African nations to harmonize the demands of nationhood to those of minority groups.

Africa's refugees also remain. They are the wages paid by the ethnically oriented societies of the past for emergence into non-ethnically oriented nationhood.

FLIGHT TO HONG KONG

(NOTE.—It's a tight squeeze in this British colony—400 square miles for 4 million people. And half the populace are refugees, with more arriving each day from mainland China. That is the problem in Hong Kong. But, thanks to British pragmatism and Chinese initiative, it is being kept at manageable proportions.)

(By John Hughes)

HONG KONG.—It is a night without a moon, and the mist hangs low over the South China Sea, clinging to the rippling wavetops.

Cautiously the "snake boat" works its way through the coastal waters that divide China from Hong Kong. Suddenly there is a challenge. A police boat looms through the mist. A searchlight flares. There are shouts and splashes as passengers on the snake boat fling themselves over the side. Some strike out for shore. The sturdier ones make it and stumble, gasping, inland.

Another batch of refugees from Communist China has found sanctuary in Hong Kong.

Such scenes as these occur daily in the waters of this British colony as Chinese, who have decided to put their homeland behind them, make the break for life in what still may be a Chinese city, but one over which the British flag flutters.

Of Hong Kong's nearly 4 million people, about half are refugees from the mainland. After World War II, Hong Kong was a drowsy little tropical outpost with a population of less than a million. Then the Communists took power in China. Peasants from Kwangtung and capitalists and rich businessmen from Shanghai came pouring across the narrow land border into Hong Kong. By the end of the 1940's, Hong Kong's population had doubled. By the end of the '50's it had trebled.

INFLOW WORKS BY CYCLES

Since the great influx of the '40's, the flow of refugees has gone in cycles, depending on conditions inside China. In the summer of 1962, after two bad harvests and a resulting food shortage, some 160,000 Chinese surged across the border, breaking down the chain-link fence in the attempt to gain refuge in Hong Kong. About a third were arrested by British authorities and returned to China. The others have remained.

In ensuing years, the flow took a dip until the chaos of the "cultural revolution" in 1967.

At the peak of violence in China, more than 1,000 persons a month were slipping past Communist security patrols and making for Hong Kong. The colony's director of immigration, William E. Collard, recently calculated the number of "illegal entrants" into Hong Kong during that year at 18,000. Now the number has dropped to somewhere around 400 a month.

But since 1962, when the land frontier was reinforced, the bulk of refugees have come by water. Occasionally shots are heard from the Chinese side of the border fence; it is presumed that Communist guards have

opened up on some escapee trying to cross by land.

However, most refugees trickle along the coast to Hong Kong in junks and sampans, or pay the price for a hazardous ride in a snake boat, whose owner makes a living running human cargoes through both Communist and British patrols.

Some of the most venturesome walk over land as far as they can, then try swimming across coves and bays which divide Chinese territory from British. At low tide, they can cover some distance by wading but must still swim part of the way through open sea.

Thus, because of its accessibility to the mainland, Hong Kong is still the magnet for those disillusioned by the direction of events in China. Tibetan refugees have fled to India, and there has been some movement to the Soviet Union from minority groups scattered along China's northwest border. But the bulk of refugees have come funneling out through Hong Kong and to some extent through the Portuguese colony of Macao, 40 miles away across the estuary of the Pearl River.

BASIC SERVICES STRAINED

For the British, this poses obvious problems. Hong Kong is but 400 square miles in area, counting all its outer islands. Hong Kong Island itself has an area of 29 square miles, and it is desperately overcrowded.

The British argue that they have a primary responsibility to the 50 percent or so of the population actually born in Hong Kong, as well as to the others who have since made it their home. There is only so much the government can do. Housing, the school system, and basic services are already strained. Further immigration must be limited unless Hong Kong is to be swamped. Thus goes the official argument.

QUOTA NEVER FILLED

This has led to considerable criticism from abroad, for the official British policy is to hand back to China those Chinese who enter Hong Kong illegally. "Legal" emigrants to Hong Kong from China are limited to 50 a day in terms of an agreement between the two governments. By this is meant emigrants who have sought the permission of their government to leave, who have been issued with the necessary documents, and who come by train or foot across the prescribed crossing point at Lowu, completing all necessary formalities on both sides of the border.

The Chinese have in the past encouraged the blind, the aged, or the maimed, considered useless to a Communist society, to quit China for Hong Kong. But the prospect of any able-bodied man, particularly one disillusioned with the regime, getting such permission is remote.

Thus the 50-a-day legal quota never has been filled.

Anyone else who heads for Hong Kong is considered by the British an "illegal immigrant." Not only must he circumvent Communist guards and patrols on the Chinese side of the border, but he also must run the gantlet of Royal Hong Kong Police patrol boats cruising the colony's water boundaries.

In practice, however, the rules get bent. Refugees who slip past the British patrols and reach land are allowed to stay. When they seek registration and identity documents no questions are asked. The rule of thumb is that they are supposed to be returned to China if caught at sea. However, since the cultural revolution even this provision has been waived. Because of its delicate relationship with China, the Hong Kong government is reluctant to discuss this waiver. But, in fact, no refugees have been handed back in recent times.

TAIWAN SCREENING STRICT

What do go back are the junks and boats on which the refugees fled China. For these, in a Communist society, are considered state property, and the British are scrupulous

about sending them back, usually in tow of a Chinese tugboat.

One of the problems confronting the British is that few other countries throughout the world appear willing to absorb refugees from China. The Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan is apparently unenthusiastic, despite past promises. Chinese refugees who seek residence on Taiwan have to undergo strict political screening. Officials involved in the process also agree that the Nationalists seek only the best qualified and seem little interested in run-of-the-mill refugees.

Some Chinese arrivals in Hong Kong emigrate to Canada or the United States. But Canada primarily seeks experts, and though U.S. immigration laws have been liberalized, the ceiling for any one nationality is still 20,000 a year. Chinese who already have relatives in the United States can acquire visas fairly readily. For others the process is slow, and the 20,000 target has not yet been reached.

LABELING DEPLORED

The prospect for the bulk, then, is life in Hong Kong. But there are no refugee camps in Hong Kong, no sprawling settlements of easily identifiable escapees from China. Says one British official:

"When foreigners come, they say: 'Take me to your refugees.' And they find it difficult to understand when we tell them that the refugees are all around them. Their tourist guide may be one, their tailor, the man who drives their car, the boy who runs their hotel elevator."

"We don't set up refugee camps," he added. "In fact we don't even like labeling people 'refugees.' When you put them in camps you give them a refugee mentality. You insulate them from normal society. They lose the will to fend for themselves."

"This," as one official concedes, "sounds brutal. It's a policy which again gives rise to misunderstanding abroad. But in Hong Kong we believe it has been best to throw people into the community, releasing all their energy to fight for themselves."

This does not mean that the Hong Kong government has sat back and done nothing. The government has embarked on, and completed, some impressive programs of basic development and services. But these are across the board, for the entire community. Refugees participate.

Says one official: "After the 1962 influx, a lot of people from abroad came to us and asked us how they could help our refugees. I'm afraid many of them wanted a single identifiable refugee project with which they could be associated."

IMMIGRANTS BUILD PROGRESS

"But that wasn't the way we were thinking. We told people how best they could help the whole community—of which many were refugees. One of the most intelligent and understanding responses came from the Government of the United States. They built a badly needed technical college. It wasn't confined exclusively to refugees. But it helped tremendously in absorbing them into the community, which was our objective."

Much of Hong Kong's dramatic progress today is attributable to refugees. Shanghai capitalists brought their money, and sometimes their equipment, to Hong Kong. When the Communists took power in China, some textile-mill owners had ordered new machines, which were waiting in Hong Kong for shipment onward to China. They promptly canceled the shipping orders and set up new factories in Hong Kong.

From other strata of Chinese society came technical knowledge, initiative, industry—and cheap labor. All this has combined to make Hong Kong, a place with no natural resources of its own, an Asian boom town.

One of the Hong Kong government's most widely lauded achievements is its housing

program. With the initial influx from China, thousands of refugees set up squatter areas on hillsides or vacant land. Some squatter areas remain. But over the years, especially after the great fire of 1954, the government has resettled more than 1 million persons in apartment blocks of its own building. These, particularly in the hurried early stages, were not elegant. The principal concern was to throw up simple buildings providing minimum facilities for the maximum number of people in need.

These allowed only 24 square feet per adult. But this is being expanded to 27 square feet per person, and eventually to 35 square feet. By 1973, the government hopes to have housed 2.4 million persons in government blocks, or housing built with government money.

NO UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM

Tremendous problems remain. Blocks already built are overcrowded. Outside the government resettlement estates, overcrowding in slums and tenements is even worse. Some 300,000 people live in areas where there is less than 10 square feet per person. Schools are working double shifts yet nearly 100,000 children of school age do not have places.

But there is no serious unemployment problem in Hong Kong. And while there may be poverty, there is also some kind of work for everybody. Most refugees lean heavily on family or friends already here, and it is those without these connections that often encounter the most hardship.

A number of relief organizations take up such cases. One of the major ones is the American-financed International Rescue Committee, Inc., which helps find jobs and runs half a dozen day nurseries for refugees. Prominent in the nursery work is Mrs. Edwin Martin, wife of the American Consul General in Hong Kong, herself an expert on child care.

A CRISIS THERE IS NOT

The United Nations Refugee Committee has a modest Hong Kong program, while the U.S. State Department has a refugee-assistance program here providing \$500,000 in aid this year, plus a similar amount in foodstuffs for distribution to the needy in Hong Kong.

For China's refugees funneling into Hong Kong there is thus obvious hardship, upheaval, and anguish. But a combination of British pragmatism and Chinese vitality and initiative has reduced the problem to manageable proportions. A problem there is, but a crisis there is not.

**Hong Kong Population Growth
[In millions]**

1948	1.8
1958	2.7
1968	4.0

A RELUCTANT FAREWELL TO TIBET

(NOTE.—Tibetan refugees who fled to India have had to adapt to a new climate and a new society, leaving their nomadic past for an unknown future.)

(By Ernest Weatherall)

NEW DELHI.—The borders of Tibet are sealed now. Only a trickle of refugees finds its way through the passes of the Himalayas into India during the summer months. The Communist Chinese have decided they need the Tibetans for their labor force.

When the Chinese Communist Army invaded Tibet in 1950 to reestablish China's suzerainty over the area, Peking began a brutal colonization and subjugation of the country.

By 1959, the Chinese had decided to eliminate any remaining political influence of the Dalai Lama and the lamaseries. Thus began the largest influx of refugees into the subcontinent since its partition between India and Pakistan.

The Dalai Lama fled to India that year. And thousands of Tibetan refugees followed

him. Between 1959 and the outbreak of hostilities with China in 1962, these refugees were not welcomed by the Indian Government. During that period Jawaharlal Nehru had fostered the policy of "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai" (Indians and Chinese are brothers) with Peking. Mr. Nehru had recognized China's claim over Tibet, and the arrival of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees in India caused embarrassment in New Delhi.

But there were also economic reasons. India had still not absorbed the several million Hindu refugees who streamed over the borders from Pakistan in 1947. Even today, many of these refugees live in squalid slums and shacks or even sleep in the streets.

FINANCIAL AID FROM ABROAD

While India provided a sanctuary for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees, financial help for these gentle people came from other countries.

A considerable amount of aid came from the American Emergency Committee for Tibetan refugees. Other large contributions came from such voluntary agencies as the Red Cross and the Church World Service. Later, when the illusory friendship with Communist China evaporated, the Government of India began to put the Tibetan refugees to work on constructing roads along the border with China.

But it was the determination to survive that kept the Tibetan refugees going. After reaching India they worked on odd jobs, then later on the grueling border-road projects during the summer. In the winter they sold jewelry or knit pullover sweaters to make money.

It was reluctantly recognized by the Dalai Lama that it would be a long time, if ever, before the refugees would be able to return to their homeland. It was decided by the spiritual leader to set up programs that would make the Tibetan refugees self-sufficient and help them integrate into the life of India.

Today there are about 56,000 Tibetan refugees in India. With the help of the Indian Government, many have been resettled in different areas of the country. The Tibetan Industrial Rehabilitation Society has found employment for refugees in wool mills, tea estates, and in factories.

SELF-HELP CENTERS SPROUT

Self-help centers have also been set up around the country. One is a few miles from Darjeeling in West Bengal. This site is considered sacred by the Tibetans, since the Dalai Lama lived there during another Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1910.

The refugees are taught various handicrafts, such as carpet weaving, wood carving, and making Tibetan-style bags, boots, and shoes. These are sold to help pay for running the center. After learning various skills, refugees leave the center and set themselves up in business.

This facility takes care of not only working adults but also orphans and the aged. A nursery school has been set up to care for the youngsters while their parents are working.

Education has been given top priority in the program to rehabilitate Tibetan refugees. The Tibet Schools Society runs residential schools for some 7,000 children. All are in the cool hill stations, Darjeeling, Dalhousie, Kalimpong, Simla, and Mussoorie.

At Mussoorie are some 14,000 children who have lost their parents. They are being educated by the Save the Children Federation. A foster parent is provided for every 25 children. An important part of the curriculum is devoted to Tibetan studies, and lamas are on the faculty to provide religious training.

INDUSTRIAL ADAPTATION PUSHED

One of the most difficult projects is being carried out by the Tibetan Industrial Rehabilitation Society. Its mission is to break the Tibetan's traditional isolation so he can cope with the realities of industrial life.

The projects of the society include a fiber-glass factory, a limestone quarry, a lime plant, a woolen mill, and a tea estate. Many of the workers have been recruited from the border-road projects. However, they have become so used to seasonal labor on the roads they have had a difficult time settling down in a factory job.

Many Tibetans, who have traditionally lived in the mountains, tending yak and sheep, have found it almost impossible to adapt to the disciplines of an industrial society.

Most Tibetan refugees can adapt themselves to difficult conditions in India. Some have cleared dense tropical forests to establish agricultural settlements. Until reaching India, they never saw farm machinery. Now farmers in Mundegod in Mysore state use tractors donated by a private manufacturer.

A tractor maintenance and repair shop at the farm is being run by a young Tibetan, trained in mechanics at one of the refugee centers.

The agriculture settlements in Mysore have produced enough crops to sustain the 12,000 refugees who live there. In addition, the Tibetans also cultivate cash crops such as cotton.

RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE FIRM

The rehabilitation program has brought up some questions: If these programs succeed, and they appear to be doing so, will it weaken the influence of religion on the life of the Tibetans? Will they want to settle down in India and forget their homeland?

So far this has not happened. Religion is firmly entrenched in all strata of Tibetan society in India. In fact, the Dalai Lama indicated that the Tibetans would keep the flame of religion burning, even if it were extinguished in Tibet by the Communists.

In Ladakh, Tibetan Buddhist leaders have complained that the Kashmir government is finding excuses to evacuate the refugees. Other harassments include a refusal by the government to permit the Tibetans to build a place of prayer on the Srinagar Road.

As for putting roots down in India, the Tibetans seem more than willing to integrate themselves into Indian life. But they are still regarded as "foreigners" by New Delhi. Each time a Tibetan moves from one locality to another, he has to register with the police.

Because they are considered foreigners, the Tibetan refugees are not given the same legal protection as are Indians. In some cases, the refugees have suffered in their legal dealings with Indians.

Despite indications that the refugees may spend a lifetime in exile in India, the Dalai Lama said, "All my people who have escaped still want to return some day to Tibet."

SOUTH VIETNAM'S REFUGEES: AID "TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE"?

(NOTE.—There are 1.3 million refugees in South Vietnam. The government appropriates one-third of 1 percent of the national budget to helping them. But, concerned officials point out, there is still no concept of their long-term rehabilitation into a structured society. This problem, they say, has not yet been faced.)

(By Elizabeth Pond)

SAIGON.—The refugee program in Vietnam is at the critical point where it is, or should be, moving from emergency relief to long-term rehabilitation. But at the moment it appears headed for a "too little, too late" rating.

This is not to denigrate either the Herculean relief effort that has been made so far or the dedicated few on both the Vietnamese and the American sides who have labored to feed and shelter the millions of refugees the Vietnam war has created.

Officials point out with some pride that this is the first time in history that wide-scale care for war-created refugees has been instituted while the war was still in process.

Even so, the refugee problems are stagger-

ing in that they have a low-priority rating when pitted against continuing military operations, intensified peace negotiations, and political skirmishing in Saigon. Also they may well create the conditions all over again for a new Communist insurgency.

LEADERS DEPLETED

Any war is disruptive. A civil war is especially brutal. A guerrilla civil war reinforced by massive artillery and air power may be the most cruel of all (short of some nuclear holocaust). And a war that has raged intermittently for a quarter of a century defies comprehension in its results.

Apart from the dead, this war has bled the country of several generations of leaders, displaced up to a third of the population, rent the social fabric, destroyed villages and placed villagers in urban slums and worsening health conditions.

In all it has produced at least 4 million refugees, 300,000 physically disabled, 20,000 to 50,000 prostitutes, more than 90,000 orphans, and no one knows just how many juvenile delinquents and pre-delinquents.

One sees the evidence daily—the dirty homeless shoeshine boy in Saigon, the pathetic old man in a refugee camp with nothing to do, the widow in her 20's who has lost both legs and whose two children are in hospitals with wounds.

COMMUNIST ZONE FLED

But the situation now is vastly improved over two years ago or even a year ago, as a brief chronology shows.

The first wave of refugees in the post-French period was the 900,000 northerners (primarily Roman Catholics) who left the Communist north after the division of Vietnam in 1954. They built new villages in the south and were for the most part successfully resettled within three years.

The next wave came when the National Liberation Front (NLF) began its guerrilla war in the early '60's. By mid-1965 the numbers of new refugees, the majority of whom were fleeing NLF terror, had reached some 300,000.

These, however, were not so fortunate as the earlier refugees. They did not have the political glamour of the anti-Communist northerners, nor were they Catholics coming to a hospitable Catholic regime. They were instead an unwelcome burden to a government that had no tradition of social welfare or public services, that was paper thin in administrators, that was only beginning to restabilize itself after the 1963 assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem, and was fighting for its life on the battlefield.

The refugees were ignored as well by the Americans, who were fully occupied with the military side of introducing combat troops to Vietnam.

In late 1965 a minimal stopgap program of aid to refugees at last was begun. In early 1966 a special Commissariat for Refugees was established by the South Vietnamese Government.

In the beginning of 1967 the big U.S. military sweeps such as "Cedar Falls" and "Junction City" were inaugurated in III Corps, with villagers forced to move from their homes as large NLF-controlled areas were cleared and turned into free-fire zones.

More serious quantitatively was the explosion of bitter large unit warfare in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) area. As U.S. and South Vietnamese troops sought to meet the threat of main-force North Vietnamese units with frontal assaults, new refugees were created at a rate of 10,000 and 20,000 per week. One operation cleared 10,000 villagers out of a battle area within four days.

I Corps quickly became the critical area for refugees. In a matter of months half a million people or 20 percent of the area's 2.5 million were refugees—not cumulatively, but simultaneously. Some were forcibly moved against their will by U.S. soldiers, some fled the cross fire or especially American

bombing and free-fire zones of their own volition.

OFFICIALS NOT NOTIFIED

Frequently, for reasons of military security, refugee officials were not notified in advance when a clearing operation was planned and could not prepare for the sudden influx. More than once a responsible American official was first informed of incoming refugees by radio from the helicopter transporting the refugees.

Arguments over the military efficacy of such operations go on ad infinitum. One school argues that this massive relocation deprived the NLF of porters, rice growers, and recruits, as was finally proved in late 1968.

Another school argues that the shifts as conducted were simply irrelevant to the main objective of counterinsurgency: security for the population.

Whether the relocation was necessary or not from a military point, it did take place, and took place with a speed and under conditions that made it impossible to care for the refugees adequately.

In refugee camps there were repeated acute water shortages; some near starvation; widespread malnutrition; extended breakdowns of distribution either through sheer lack of cadres or through division of goods and money; overcrowding; hazardous sanitary and health conditions; an absence of schooling for 90 percent of the I Corps refugee children a frequent absence of farmland, jobs, job opportunities, and vocational training for adults. Above all, there was a lack of security, as Viet Cong attacks on the camps amply illustrated.

Furthermore, despite real concern in the Refugee Commissariat, Saigon—and province chiefs—tended to view the refugees with suspicion as Viet Cong sympathizers, which many of them were.

PRESSURE ON CHIEFS

Then a combination of things happened. On the Vietnamese side the Commissioner for Refugees put pressure on the I Corps province chiefs to support the program. Refugee officials were allotted more gas for transportation. Mobile distribution teams began to fill the wide gaps left by inadequate local cadres.

On the American side, the 1967-69 Kennedy subcommittee hearings spotlighted the plight of the refugees and brought considerable pressure on the Johnson administration to step up American effort.

The vast American logistical system was then geared up to service the refugee program, and Americans began exercising more control over relief commodities in provincial warehouses, so reducing illegal diversion of supplies.

Then any progress in meeting the needs of the refugees was shattered during February, 1968, with the countryside Tet offensive of the NLF and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA).

In this and the subsequent May and August offensives almost a million more people were made homeless, whether from the NLF-NVA attacks or from the heavy counterfire of allied bombing and artillery in the cities. The planned refugee program, itself an emergency operation, had to be subordinated to even more of a crash program.

SWEEPS HALTED

But Tet also brought an end to the wide-scale creation of refugees by allied military operations. Multidivisional sweeps were halted as American troops were pulled in to defend the cities. And this effect was reinforced by the tactical preferences of the new U.S. commander in Vietnam, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams. The order went out to avoid creating more refugees by military operations, and with some exceptions this principle has been adhered to since.

By fall of 1968 the allies had begun a counteroffensive into the countryside, in the

three-month accelerated Pacification Campaign. With the NLF stripping the countryside of guerrillas and political cadres to serve main-force units, the allied push met less resistance than anticipated and succeeded dramatically in its aim of widening the area of government "presence."

Thus the stage was set by the beginning of 1969 to get on with the return to villages or permanent resettling of the longer-term refugees that had always been the intended goal of the refugee program.

The bulk of the 1968 refugees, many of whom remained in their home areas and were employed but simply needed help in rebuilding their homes, were on their feet again. And widening government "control" in the countryside (or at least lessening NLF control) opened the way for older refugees to move back to their villages.

SUCCESSES REPORTED

This program now is in operation. But it has its drawbacks: The majority of the 215,000 who have returned to their villages or were resettled permanently in 1969 are still 1968 refugees, not the earlier ones. And the refugees themselves are reluctant to move back in many cases, as they are not persuaded that security exists.

Because of this some observers fear that the program may turn into yet another massive forced relocation, though there is no evidence of this so far.

But the resettlement program has successes, too. Along the coast of I Corps, new fishing cooperatives are beginning to work well. In the Mekong Delta villagers have begun drifting back from open fields to the wooded canals and roadsides they had left years before because of continuous infiltration by NLF snipers and subsequent allied bombing and artillery strikes.

The ambitious Pacification Campaign for this year calls for reducing the present 1.3 million unresettled refugees (the unofficial number runs somewhat higher) to one million by this fall. Refugee officials hope to bring it down even lower, to 600,000.

Meanwhile, conditions at the temporary camps are being improved. U.S. funds devoted to refugee programs in the narrow sense are considered adequate now by officials. More than 40 percent of refugee children are reported in school.

TOLERABLE CONDITIONS

The well-known Cam Lo camp south of the DMZ has a new irrigation system that should make the surrounding land arable for the first time in the two years refugees have lived there. U.S. Army and Marine medics have supplemented the less than 150 civilian doctors serving the countryside.

Yet serious problems remain. Insecurity is the worst, especially in the three southern provinces of I Corps, where the poorly defended refugee hamlets have come under repeated NLF attacks by both direct and indirect fire this year. Disease and high infant mortality have been reported in individual camps.

Seventy percent of the camps (and 90 percent of those in I Corps) are still rated deficient by refugee officials in terms of overcrowding, water, jobs, classrooms, clinics, and/or security.

But there have not been epidemics, nor has there been starvation. Rudimentary living conditions at least are on the whole much more tolerable now than they were in 1967.

Vietnam is fortunate. It is a fertile land, rich in natural resources—except in the inland mountains—and 90 percent of the population lives in the delta and coastal plain.

People do not starve when they are neglected. And Vietnam is fortunate in the resilience and ingenuity of its people, who have maintained their identity and cohesion over a millennia of sporadic wars.

The future remains an ominous question mark, however.

What happens when a family—and tradi-

tion-oriented society is torn from its roots on the scale that has occurred in Vietnam? What happens to children who have been removed from the discipline of fathers, village society, and quiet lives as buffalo herdboys to the urban sium world of theft and prostitution?

How does a nation rebuild after so much death and anguish?

URGENCY VOICED

Getting beyond charity to "social reform" and "real planning" was what the Health, Social Welfare, and Relief Minister, Dr. Tran Lu Y, called for in an interview.

His deputy for social welfare, Dr. Ton That Niem, said the same thing in different words. Until now refugee and welfare programs have just been "conditioned by the war," he commented. There has not yet emerged any program of prevention or development. Yet "the poverty of people" is what the Communists feed on.

An American official summed up the need as the rebuilding of a social infrastructure to replace that shattered by the war, one that would encourage development and yet not violate traditional local customs, and practices.

All officials spoke with urgency. All agreed that the problem had not even been faced yet.

In part this is a question of money. The social welfare branch of the ministry had its proposed budget sliced in half this year—down to 430 million piasters (\$3.6 million), or one-third of 1 percent of the South Vietnamese national budget.

DRASTIC CUTS IN PROGRAM

This has meant severe reductions not only in relief programs, such as orphan assistance, but also drastic cuts in planned community and day-care centers that were to have been the core of long-term community development.

This affects many more people than just refugees and ex-refugees, while the impact on those once dispossessed is likely to be proportionably greater.

But beyond money is the deeper question of concept—and a program to implement that concept. The U.S. has accepted and is discharging a responsibility for emergency help to refugees.

It has not yet, at least as evidenced in the total refugee and social welfare program, accepted a responsibility to promote long-term rehabilitation of these people into a restructured society. Nor has the South Vietnamese Government done so. Meanwhile, the NLF is waiting in the wings.

CUBAN REFUGEE: "I AM BOTH HAPPY AND SAD"

(NOTE.—Twice a day, five days a week, a flight arrives at Miami from Cuba. It is part of an arrangement unique in the annals of refugee history. Since the flights started, about 165,000 exiles have come to the United States—and the flow continues.)

(By James Nelson Goodsell)

MIAMI.—It is 12:20 p.m. on a sunny afternoon in Miami. A propeller craft belonging to Airlift International has just taxied up to a hanger area on the far side of Miami's busy International Airport away from the main terminal building.

As the door to the plane swings open, 90 men, women, and children step out into the bright sun and are moved quickly into waiting buses. The group, the second today, are Cuban refugees who have chosen exile from their homeland rather than to continue living in Cuba.

Twice a day, five days a week, since December of 1965, this steady trickle of refugees has been making the trip from Varadero airport northeast of Havana to Miami. Ever since the airlift began, approximately 165,000 Cubans have arrived in Miami under a program officially approved by both the Cuban and United States governments.

It is a unique arrangement in the annals

of refugees. Seldom, if ever, has there been a program for refugees which in a way has the blessing of both the country the refugees are leaving and the one to which they are going.

A FIRST FOR UNITED STATES

Moreover, the program is unique for the United States because this nation has never before been a country of first asylum for refugees. Those who have come to the U.S. in the past have for the most part passed through one or more intermediate nations.

The 90 Cubans who landed on this bright, sunny afternoon represented virtually every part of the island nation which lies only a scant 90 miles across the Florida Straits from the U.S.

They left their homeland, without any real assurance of ever seeing it again, for a number of reasons. Some frankly did not like the social and economic climate in Communist Cuba. Others, without much ideological bent, wanted to join relatives who preceded them to the United States. Still others found it a good way to start anew, having very little to leave behind in their homeland.

FAMILIES REUNITED

All of those who came today, however, have some relatives or family connections here which makes it possible to have their names placed on the United States list of Cubans who may enter through this official airlift corridor.

Among the group just landed here are 12 separate families—some with both parents and between one and four children. There are half a dozen elderly persons aboard the flight, going to join younger members of their families already in exile.

There are several men and several women traveling alone—in one case, a father is coming to join his wife and two children who preceded him, in another, a woman is joining a husband already here. One single girl, with an aunt and uncle living in a Northern state, has left her parents and a brother and sister behind in Cuba, with little expectation that they will follow.

It is a typical group—the sort that United States immigration, customs, health, and resettlement officials meet day in and day out.

ROADBLOCKS CRASHED

Not all Cubans who flee their island come out with the official airlift. Last January, in an incident which has yet to be fully explained, a large group of refugees fled by crashing a truck through Cuban and North American roadblocks at the Guantánamo Naval Base in southeastern Cuba. Still others attempt to slip across the Florida Straits in tiny boats, some of whom make it.

And other refugees go out through established commercial airline runs to Mexico City and Madrid. But this is only a small trickle, based on twice-a-week flights to Mexico and once-a-week to Spain—and then only on space available basis.

The bulk of refugees now comes out via the air ferry.

But refugees have been coming out of Cuba ever since Fidel Castro came to power, toppling the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista in January, 1959. The first to leave were some of the officials and supporters of the Batista government. Although their exact number is not known, several thousand Batista supporters appear to have fled the island in an exodus quite similar to those which take place in Latin America whenever a dictatorship is overthrown.

THREE PERIODS OF FLIGHT

Throughout 1959 and 1960, additional thousands left, some temporarily, some permanently. Among this group were many of Cuba's wealthiest families who were worried about the revolution under way on the island under Dr. Castro. There is no tally of the number of Cubans who left in this period to enter the United States, although U.S.

refugee officials here suggest it would run into several thousand.

Those same officials have records, however, for the period from February, 1961, onward.

They cite three distinct periods in the saga of the Cuban refugee and in the United States refugee program, which was begun in February, 1961:

Using commercial flights for the most part, 153,534 Cubans were registered with refugee officials in Miami between Feb. 1, 1961, and late October, 1962, at the time of the missile crisis which cut off commercial flights.

Using small boats and occasionally coming through another country, 29,962 Cubans were registered in the three years between the missile crisis and Dec. 1, 1965.

Using the airlift for the most part, 165,000 Cubans have come out in the 3½ years since Cuba and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding permitting those Cubans who wanted to leave the island to do so if their names were approved by both governments.

ASSISTED 300,000 REFUGEES

To process and speed the arriving refugees, the United States set up a reception and resettlement service. With a director in Washington and main facilities here, the United States Cuban Refugee Program to date has assisted in one way or another more than 300,000 Cubans. The minute a plane load lands at the Miami airport, officials from the Cuban Refugee Center here begin a detailed processing which takes surprisingly little time.

Persons aboard the 12:20 p.m. plane will be through much of the processing as early as 3 p.m. This includes a short speech of welcome, baggage inspection, immigration check, health examination, personal interviews, clothing distribution, and resettlement interviews with one of four agencies which officially take over once government formalities are finished.

Along the way, the new arrivals will be given a box lunch of sandwiches, cake, and some candy—also Cuban-type coffee.

For many of the refugees, language is an immediate problem—and virtually all those connected with the program speak fluent Spanish, some of them refugees themselves.

WHERE THEY GO

An effort is made to get the new arrivals to locations where members of their own families live—and to do it as quickly as possible.

Room and board facilities for the new arrivals are available in a converted United States Army officers billet at the Miami airport. But most new arrivals use the facilities for only a few hours, if that.

Although the greatest number of Cubans have chosen to remain in the Miami area, a significant number have gone to every state and the District of Columbia.

In order of numbers of refugees, the six states with the largest Cuban refugee population are: New York with 61,317; New Jersey with 37,804; California with 26,440; Illinois with 15,975; Florida outside the Miami area with 7,856; and Massachusetts with 6,370. Some 18,500 also fly direct to Puerto Rico.

According to refugee officials here, the refugees are making a substantial contribution to the communities in which they have resettled. While many had skills in Cuba which could be used in the United States, others had to develop new skills. A number of state and local agencies are cooperating with the refugee program in administering training and retraining programs for the newcomers.

There are problems, of course, for the bulk of the refugees have never before traveled far and are suddenly thrown into an alien environment. The cost of living in the United States is a major problem.

In addition, despite the official assurances

that there are very few refugees who want to return to a Cuba under Dr. Castro, there does indeed seem to be quite a number of Cubans even in the Miami area who are willing to express some doubts about having left, even if at the time they left they thought they were doing the right thing.

Interviews with a random sample of members of Miami's Cuban community suggest that the majority want to see the overthrow of the Castro government, wish that the United States would do something about making this possible, but wonder whether there is much that Washington can do—short of invasion.

Many of those interviewed would like to see numerous Castro reforms retained in a post-Castro Cuba.

"He's done a good deal for my island," an elderly Cuban refugee said, even though she and her children and grandchildren have all left the island. "I would go back, I suppose, but I am not sure my grandchildren will. They're now Americans."

Her reaction, expressed by others in different ways, was typical.

SOME STAY BEHIND

There are, of course, many refugees who live for the day they can return and for an end to the Castro government.

"He's the worst thing that ever happened to my country," said a middle-aged man who was in the clothing business in Havana before coming to Miami and now works as a dishwasher in a restaurant. "No one likes him in Cuba, just no one."

That reaction is also typical, but of a minority of refugees. For although the airlift shows no signs of letting up in the foreseeable future, most of the refugees admit Dr. Castro's support.

In fact, some of the recent arrivals here tell of brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers, and children left behind in Cuba who have no desire to leave the island—indeed who openly support the government. One recent arrival told of a brother who is a member of the Cuban Army and "a loyal Castro supporter."

Thus, families are often split in this evidence of the world refugee problem. It is a situation which has forced the United States Government to pay direct attention to the issue. Last year, something between \$60 million and \$70 million was spent by the U.S. on the Cuban refugee program. In the upcoming fiscal year, beginning July, the total may well push upward to \$80 million.

Although the Cuban episode is a unique one for the United States, estimates here and in Washington suggest that with time, the Cuban refugees will "melt into the pot as other refugees in the past have done," as one official phrased it.

Although many talk now of returning to Cuba, the majority probably will stay in the United States no matter what constitutional, political, and economic changes take place in their homeland.

The majority, after a time, go it alone and require no financial assistance. In fact, among the more than 300,000 Cubans admitted to the United States and registered with the refugee office here, only 18,000 are receiving aid in the form of financial assistance now—and most of these are classified as "unemployable"—the aged, the physically handicapped, and minors.

The vast majority of Cuban refugees are gainfully employed. Here in Miami alone, for example, there are 2,000 businesses run by Cubans in the area. This is out of a total of 120,000 or so Cubans in the Miami area.

LIBERATION FERVOR COOLS

A few years ago, numerous refugee groups aiming at returning to Cuba and overthrowing the Castro government sprang up in and around Miami. Some still exist. Others can, with the crank of a mimeograph machine, go back into business. But the period of de-

terminated planning by exiles to unseat Dr. Castro may have subsided. Some of the most active exiles of a few years back now are in business and other activities here.

One leading former activist says that perhaps as many as 10,000 refugees could be gathered to launch an attack on the island, "but the fire is going out of them." Yet another, Manolo Ray, one of the leading members of the exile opposition to the Castro government, suggests the figure might be 50,000.

This group serves as something of an embarrassment to the United States. For although Washington has no relations with Cuba, it does not see any immediate likelihood of a Castro overthrow.

"Conditions may not be too favorable on the island at the moment," says a Washington official, "but the Castro regime has plenty of support and is well entrenched."

The exiles coming out of Cuba, despite the steady stream, do not suggest otherwise. The 90 refugees who got off the plane this afternoon simply wanted out and did not like living under the Castro government—and the air bridge between Varadero and Miami provided the out.

"I am both happy and sad," commented an attractive 24-year-old girl who got off the plane.

Her comment pretty well sums up the refugee story here. It is a bittersweet experience for those going through it.

GET CONCERNED—A WAY TO HELP REFUGEES (By Bertram B. Johansson)

(NOTE.—The world's refugee population is on the increase each year. Despite the deep concern of many, officials report a need for three "mores": More world awareness; more individual generosity; and more partnership and cooperation between refugee agencies.)

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.—We were walking through the main lobby of the international arrival building at Kennedy Airport, New York, on our way to meet a plane load of new refugees.

Ruth Tropin, my companion from the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), pointed over to the escalator area and said:

"It's near there that the refugees usually meet their families. And, do you know, after 20 years in this work, I still can't look at them for very long when families are being reunited, even though they're all so happy."

Today it was a chartered Pan American plane load of more than 160 Cubans flown in from Madrid. There was a cluster of young boys on board (under the age of 15) who were being funneled into this country under the auspices of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) to keep them out of Fidel Castro's army in accordance with their parents' or other relatives' wishes.

Yesterday it was a plane loaded mostly with Czechs. Since the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, one of the side effects has been a marked increase in the flow of refugees from other East European countries where people feel they had better leave now. Polish Jews have been "encouraged" to leave in considerable numbers. Many Romanians are appearing on refugee rolls after tours abroad.

FRIENDS, RELATIVES WAITING

Once today's batch of refugees had finished their paperwork processing with United States Immigration and Customs men, they began coming into the lobby near the escalators. They peer into the crowds for a sight of a familiar face. Sometimes, especially with the Cubans, there are as many as six or seven relatives or friends waiting for each refugee coming through.

One refugee shows a sudden sign of recognition of a face long unseen, or of the face of a friend he had not expected to be there.

Through the welter of outstretched arms,

the hugs, the kisses, the tears, the laughter, one hears the great sighs and sobs of welcome and relief.

You swallow the lump in your own throat, turn away, and leave them to the privacy of their meetings.

One of the refugees tells you later that as they greet one another, they sometimes realize deep down they are easing the pain of having waited for months, or years, of uncertain separation. Now the uncertainty has ended. It feels good to let it go with tears and laughter.

A CUBAN VOICES PRIDE

A Cuban father waiting for his son to come in on this plane load says to me proudly:

"I used to be a lawyer in Havana. Now I am just a busboy in Miami. But I'm more proud than I can say to be a busboy in a free country and to have my son come here."

His smile fades for a moment as he starts to say, "My wife is still in Cuba with the other children, and when I have saved enough money to pay their way I will have them come too . . ."

What he did not say was that an estimated 800,000 Cubans are waiting to leave. That the rate of their departure is about 40,000 per year. And that this could mean a possible 20 years before he sees his whole family again.

Circulating in and out among the refugees as they come off the plane and straggle into the United States immigration area are workers like ICEM's Mrs. Tropin and others from Church World Service, IRC, the United States Catholic Conference, and the United Hebrew Immigrant Aid Service (when East European refugees arrive).

KINDNESS DISPENSED FREELY

Behind the humdrum work of processing the refugees, making sure they are all here, that they go onward to their next destination, which may be Canada, Australia, Miami, Milwaukee, or to friends in New York City, these workers dispense their kindness and compassion selflessly.

They do so so selflessly, in fact, that few people ever know about it, except the refugees themselves. They often write back to express gratitude for a kind word, for someone's lifting their cases off the sometimes confusing baggage belt, or pinning an identification tag on them . . . or just one of many other such first acts of kindness in a new country.

Few could comprehend, for instance, the vast amount of paperwork, international cabling, searching out of visas, challenging of immigration laws, or chartering of planes that goes on before a refugee arrives at his destination.

Miss Tropin pointed to one of the immigration officers and said:

"There's one of the kindest men on earth. One day a refugee got lost out here. He found him wandering around here late at night after all the other refugees had gone on to their next destinations all over the free world. Somehow, this man traced me down to a dinner party I was attending, and between us we got the refugee located with the people he was supposed to be meeting."

WORLD'S CONSCIENCE BATTERED

By a curious reversal, the unselfed work of these voluntary refugee agencies, governmental organizations, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is partially muffled by the rush of world events, by concern over Vietnam, violence, poverty, and urban problems. They all push themselves on the world's conscience, and have tended to overshadow some of the refugee facts such as these:

Because of the world's turmoil, there are actually more refugees around the world today than 10 years ago.

As of Jan. 1, this year there was a total of 17,226,915 uprooted refugees as defined

by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR). There were 15 million in 1959 which dropped to 13,510,050 in 1962.

This year's figures include the "new" refugees in Vietnam, the Czechs and other East European nationalities, the Cubans, the Biafran-Nigerians, many other Africans, the Tibetans, etc.

No one refugee agency or individual is likely ever to receive due recognition, except the reward of knowing how many thousands, even millions, of people they have helped. Nor could a series of articles such as these pay due attention to all of them.

The USCR can supply a copy of World Refugee Report which not only treats some of the current world refugee problems, but gives brief accounts, names, and addresses of most refugee agencies in the United States—governmental, intergovernmental, and private voluntary agencies. (USCR, 20 West 40th Street, New York, N.Y. 10018: \$1 per copy.)

HUNGARIAN REVOLT RECALLED

As an official of the International Rescue Committee says:

"The main problem facing the private voluntary refugee agency today is a loss of awareness in the community at large of the importance, the size of the refugee problem, and of the fact that each year seems to produce more refugees, and the concomitant lack of awareness each year by the general public.

"A very simple proof of this is that at the time of the Hungarian events (during 1956), virtually the whole of the United States was ready to help. There was hardly a university or person that didn't know about Hungary and didn't take some action about the 200,000 Hungarians leaving their country under duress.

"For the Czech situation of last year, and it continues, with some 50,000 persons involved, there was not even a fourth of the support. The Czech event passed without making a ripple in the American conscience as far as refugees were concerned. Only a few small colleges, for instance, offered scholarships to Czech students, and only the Ford Foundation injected itself into the Czech student problem here in the United States with funds. This expresses a vacuum of support . . . the change over these 13 years since Hungary.

CHANGES NOTED

A Church World Service official puts it this way:

"After a full generation, people are tired of refugees. With the passing of Eleanor Roosevelt, much of the charisma of United States concern and leadership in the international refugee field seems to have disappeared, in image, if not in fact. I cannot but help note that Sen. Edward Kennedy is probably the most vocal, and almost the only United States spokesman on behalf of the world refugee today. . . ."

While there are still many European and East European refugees to resettle abroad, the focus of the refugee problem is changing radically. For many of the refugee agencies, the refugee of the 1969-70's is quite a different person than the post-World War II product.

He is still disenfranchised. He is still legion in number. He comes, for the most part, from the southern hemisphere, from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. His problem cannot be solved by international migration. He might not even be outside of his tribal or national area.

For economic or political reasons he cannot be repatriated to his home community, and, depending on the accident of his geography, there is a question of whether he can be integrated locally.

This means that new acts of partnership and cooperation between governmental and nongovernmental agencies are becoming more frequent, and that where situations can be "depoliticized" enough, the UNHCR

good offices can come in to help weld such a partnership.

Currently the UNHCR offices are concerned with some 2,450,000 refugees around the world. The major statistics provide an interesting index of their distribution: 660,000 are in Europe; 160,000 in Asia; 940,000 in Africa; 110,000 in Latin America; 45,000 in Australia and New Zealand; and 520,000 in the United States and Canada.

The situation of the 660,000 refugees at present in Europe has been largely resolved, mainly as a result of the High Commissioner's permanent solutions program, the efforts of host governments, and of both results and work flowing out of World Refugee Year (1959/60).

An indication of the wider acceptance of the work of the UNHCR office on the part of some countries at the United Nations occurred here at the UN last December. The reelection of Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan as UN High Commissioner for Refugees took place by acclamation in the General Assembly.

On prior occasions the Soviet Union, East European countries, and third-force nations took some exception to the work of the UNHCR offices. But as UNHCR has demonstrated it can operate nonpolitically, and as world interest in Africa has increased, the support for UNHCR within the UN has become more unanimous.

It is noted that whereas the refugee coming to the United States or Canada or Latin America or Australia or New Zealand is apt to be one with certain skills and incentives that often make him an asset to his country of asylum, the problem in Africa or Asia is different.

REFUGEE COMMUNITIES FORMED

In the latter continents, much training for skills is often necessary, and movements of populations are apt to be on a mass basis. One solution has been to form whole communities for the refugees, as with the Tibetans in India, and in the remarkable community of M'boki in the Central African Republic, where 16,000 refugees from Sudan have been resettled.

At M'boki and also in India, the communities of refugees are integrating and making a contribution to the country of asylum. In both instances, too, host nations have been exceedingly generous with land and other donations when their own economies could hardly afford it. The generosity of many African nations in this respect is a factor highly appreciated by UNHCR officials involved in coordinating such programs, but not generally by the world community.

In the case of aid to Biafran-Nigerian refugees, a situation in which governments have feared to tread because of the highly sensitive political overtones of the problems, some of the private, religious and nonreligious agencies have stepped in and cooperated with their individual talents and skills to meet many exacerbated food and other problems. What does it all add up to—this tragic world situation with refugees?

Most observers will tell you that what is needed is more awareness of the problem, more individual generosity, more partnership and cooperation between refugee agencies—although there has been a great deal of the latter because the agencies themselves realize the enormity of the problems.

And, perhaps most of all, a more simple effectual love of man for his brother.

TAX TREATMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT BONDS

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, it is becoming increasingly clear that one of the most sensitive areas in the growing movement for tax reform concerns the

tax treatment of interest on State and local government bonds. As I have stated on previous occasions, I believe that if we are to succeed in meeting the challenge of the seventies, we must offer new Federal incentives to encourage State and local governments to seek more efficient methods of financing their expanding social programs. A number of major legislative proposals have already been submitted in this area, including the provision of a Federal interest subsidy or the establishment of an urban development bank, and I am hopeful that the coming debate on tax reform in both the House and the Senate will help to clarify the issues involved.

In a recent issue of the journal *Tax Policy*, Prof. Stanley S. Surrey of the Harvard Law School provides a detailed analysis of the many complex facts and issues in this difficult area. In addition, in an introduction to Professor Surrey's article, the editor of the journal makes several comments that help to place the present controversy in historical perspective.

Mr. President, because of the widespread interest in this problem, I commend Professor Surrey's article to all Members of Congress interested in the cause of tax justice, and I ask unanimous consent that the editor's introduction and the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article and introduction were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EDITOR'S NOTE TO "TAXATION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS"

Because of the current lively interest in tax loopholes and the fact that income tax exemption of the interest on state and local debt constitutes one of the most conspicuous of these loopholes, the editor asked Professor Stanley S. Surrey, formerly Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, to contribute the accompanying article on this subject.

We have invited Mr. Patrick Healy, Executive Director of the National League of Cities to respond to Professor Surrey's article. Mr. Healy's discussion of the issue will appear in the July-August issue of *Tax Policy*.

Professor Surrey has explored methods whereby the federal government might compensate state and local governments for the loss of the tax exemption privilege. Mr. Healy will probably stress the importance of this exemption in state and local finance and protection of the sovereignty of the states.

We are grateful to these distinguished contributors for this cooperation. We believe that our readers will find both articles illuminating and of great value.

There is considerable color and historic interest in this half-century controversy as Presidents, secretaries of the Treasury, well-known senators, state and local officials, business groups, tax economists, and others take part in the active drama, while investment houses continue to dangle the tax-exempt plum before the eyes of the wealthy. Through it all, the upper-bracket beneficiaries maintain a discreet and becoming silence.

There is an abundance of well-documented literature on the origin and court decisions relating to this exemption. The legal pros and cons have also been ably presented from time to time, and courageous statisticians have attempted to measure the value of the exemption privilege to the state and local governments, and the amount of revenue loss to the federal government.

Although this exemption stems from the

McCulloch vs. Maryland decision in 1819, the matter was not of great fiscal concern to the federal government until the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, giving Congress the power to levy an income tax. Moreover, public attention was not focussed on it until World War I forced the personal income tax rate, including surtax, to a top level of 77 percent.

Controversy over the exemption was particularly lively and colorful in the 1920's—perhaps more so than it has been since. Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon spearheaded the movement for abolition of tax-exempt securities in the twenties. It had been endorsed by both President Warren G. Harding and President Calvin Coolidge, and by Secretary of Commerce Herbert C. Hoover, later President. Hearings on a proposed amendment giving Congress and the states power to tax the income from government obligations were held by the Ways and Means Committee in 1922 and by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1923. The Ways and Means Committee recommended the adoption of such an amendment in January, 1924, but the House of Representatives failed to approve the resolution by the necessary two-thirds vote.

Another major effort was made in the thirties, but this time the movement was led by Senator Cordell Hull, later to become Secretary of State. On February 8, 1933, he introduced a Joint Resolution amending the Constitution to allow taxation of income from federal, state, and local securities and of governmental salaries. A similar resolution was introduced in the House by Representative Wright Patman. Secretary of the Treasury Ogden L. Mills approved the resolution, but did not anticipate its success. In 1934 Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., expressed favor for a constitutional amendment.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt preferred a more direct attack upon the problem. In a message of April 25, 1938, he urged that the time had come when Congress should exercise its constitutional power to tax income from whatever source derived, and that private income should not be exempt either from federal or state income tax, as a result of being derived from interest on federal, state, or municipal obligations. He reiterated these views in his tax message of January 30, 1939, and declared:

"A fair and progressive income tax and a huge perpetual reserve of tax-exempt bonds could not exist side by side. . . ."

"The tax immunities heretofore accorded to private income derived from government securities or government employment are not inexecutable requirements of the Constitution, but are the result of judicial decision."

"I repeat that it is not unreasonable to hope that judicial decision would permit the elimination of these immunities."

The tax immunity of governmental salaries was abolished by the Supreme Court in March, 1939.

On February 20, 1941, the Treasury eliminated the federal tax exemption for all its future securities. In March, 1941, the Bureau of Internal Revenue began a test action against the bondholders of the Port of New York Authority. On January 2, 1944, the Supreme Court refused to review a decision by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals holding the bonds exempt.

The past quarter century has not produced such determined efforts to end this exemption as were evident in the preceding quarter century, although at no time have the rumbles from the two opposing camps completely died out. Now after more than two decades of relative quiescence, the issue is again coming to the fore, but with a difference, for this time there are proposals for a *quid pro quo*, as indicated in Professor Surrey's paper. Another new element in the cur-

rent picture is the increasing difficulty in floating bond issues and the very great need of the state and local governments for capital funds.

In retrospect some of the arguments used by each side appear spurious. For example, state and local debt financing does not appear to have prevented private corporations from obtaining sufficient capital, as was widely claimed during the twenties. Nor does the claim that the federal government would lose more as a result of increased interest costs than it would gain from the taxation of governmental securities appear to have been substantiated.

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS

(By Stanley S. Surrey, Law School of Harvard University)

The subject of the federal income taxation of state and local government obligations is again under serious attention in the Congress. This attention is appropriate and desirable, for this perennial and previously intractable problem is urgently in need of a solution.

At present there are over \$120 billion of outstanding state and local tax-exempt obligations, and about \$15 billion in new obligations are being issued annually (for about a \$10 billion net annual growth). The outstanding issues and the annual new crop of obligations present different problems. These remarks relate primarily to the enormous increase in new issues of these obligations that now looms up before us and the effects of adding this new huge volume of tax-exempt obligations to the present market. The concern and the proposals to meet it can be briefly summarized:

The probable high level of new issues of tax-exempt state and local bonds over the next decade raises very serious problems for state and local governments and for the equity of our federal tax system. This high level can come about under the enormous financing requirements of the vast social programs so vitally necessary to meet our domestic needs.

The basic problem is that piling more and more reliance on the tax-exempt privilege as a way of helping states and localities to meet these financing requirements creates a powerful buyer's market for tax exempts. The state and local governments pricing their bonds on the basis of this exemption as a consequence will get less and less for it—that is, they will have to pay closer to the market rates of interest on taxable bonds—and their financing costs must inexorably rise. At the same time, the buyers would still get the tax exemption with even greater tax savings.

Those who are anxious to preserve the strength of state and local governments in the federal system should give serious thought to these problems.

We should all consider whether *new financing techniques* are available and appropriate to avoid these problems—techniques which at the same time operate to preserve the independence of action on the part of state and local governments in our national system to which the principle of tax exemption has contributed.

PROJECTIONS OF STATE-LOCAL CREDIT DEMANDS

Let us first consider the rate of growth of new state and local issues that looms ahead. The congressional Joint Economic Committee in 1966 made a projection of the likely level of growth of capital needs and thus of state and local bond issues through 1975. The JEC figures themselves suggested that this growth would be in line with the likely growth in gross national product. Since the supply of savings should also grow at about the GNP

rate, the general conclusion would be indicated that the marketability of state and local bonds should not change markedly relative to other bonds.

But the JEC report itself emphasized one reservation about this outlook, namely, the heavy reliance placed on commercial bank takings. They recognized that if commercial banks, for example, were attracted more heavily into mortgages (e.g., by the much touted housing boom of the 1970's) there would be problems for state and local governments in floating even a level of state and local issues that was growing in line with GNP.

Another set of qualifications should be added to this forecast of marketability of state and local bonds. The JEC projections basically assumed only the development of current programs. They did not make much allowance for new programs.

The expansion of federal programs that lies ahead is likely to induce even more substantial increases in state and local government borrowing than may have been anticipated in the study. The Congress has already considered a wide range of new federal programs in a variety of areas, such as pollution control and housing. In addition, pressures on the federal budget have recently caused attention to be focused on the potentialities of debt service grants to state and local governments, as are now used in the public housing area, rather than the lump-sum grants that have been more traditional. From a financial viewpoint, these debt service grants would shift the financing of the federal share of local project costs from the taxable market (i.e., away from the federal bonds that provide the funds for the lump-sum grants) to the tax-exempt market to absorb the local bonds that would be issued to finance the project (the debt service grants would help defray the interest and principal on these tax-exempt bonds).

Another factor that may well have been underestimated in the JEC work is the size of replacement needs. For example, much of the physical plant in our urban school system is aged and inadequate to the school needs of urban children. Replacement will be very expensive. These replacement needs alone could cause the annual net increase in state and local bonds to double in the next five to ten years.

In summary, the growth of new programs, especially federally aided ones, an increasing reliance on debt service grants to shift federal debt to state and local debt, and exploding replacement needs could increase the annual net growth in state and local debt from the present \$10 billion to as high as \$30 billion a year in ten years. *This would represent a rate of growth twice as high as the rate of growth of the savings supply.*

If state and local governments are to sell this enormous increase in tax-exempt bonds, then they will be commanding a larger share of the savings flow. To do so they will have to compete more sharply with other borrowers, such as homeowners and corporations. The question is whether tax exemption is an effective instrument with which to conduct this competition. The experts can readily demonstrate that this exemption is "inefficient" in the sense that state and local governments get less benefit from it in lower interest costs than the federal government gives up in lost tax revenues.¹ Some may say in reply, however, that even conceding this "inefficiency" it can be regarded as the price to be paid for the independence of decision-making that the interest exemption offers in general to state and local governments. But even if this were in turn conceded—and many would say that the price is already too high in terms of

the effect on the federal tax system and the wastage involved—we must certainly give serious thought to the question of how this will work out if state and local governments suddenly try to become much heavier borrowers.

THE MARKET FOR TAX-EXEMPT BONDS

To understand the significance of this enormous potential growth in tax-exempt bonds, it is necessary to remember that the institution of tax-exempt interest has an impact not only on federal tax returns but also on bond markets. It does save state and local governments money by reducing interest rates on their bonds, but it does so by narrowing the range of customers for those bonds. It narrows the range to groups that find tax exemption valuable. You do not find exempt pension trusts buying tax-exempt bonds.²

The rate on tax exempts is determined, like any other price, by demand and supply. If the supply of tax exempts is limited, they can be sold to the buyers who are most anxious to get them. If more tax exempts are to be sold, the price of those tax exempts will have to fall, i.e., their interest rate must increase. The price fall will be necessary to get existing buyers to take more tax exempts (and thus less of other investments) and to induce new buyers to enter the tax-exempt market.

It is significant that interest of all kinds—taxable and tax-exempt together—is a modest component of the income of upper-income individuals. That income consists mostly of dividends and capital gains, reflecting the fact that the wealth position of these individuals inclines them to the higher risk-higher return features of equity investment (which features are also associated with favorably taxed capital gains and untaxed unrealized appreciation). Inducing these investors into the relatively safe investment of state and local government bonds through tax exemption is in a sense swimming against the tide.

By and large, since the most distinctive feature of these state and local bonds is their tax exemption, the process of selling more bonds must involve widening the market by appealing to taxpayers with lower marginal tax rates than those now acquiring tax-exempt bonds. The appeal must involve the process of selling tax-exempt bonds at rates more closely comparable to those on taxable bonds, so as to make the exempt bonds attractive to those who get less tax advantage from the exemption.

THE INEVITABLE INCREASE IN INTEREST RATES ON TAX EXEMPTS

Higher costs to local governments

It is not possible to say exactly how much tax-exempt bond interest rates would rise with an increase in the relative share of tax exempts in the market. Obviously, it depends for one thing on the levels of general interest rates, which are subject to a great many forces. We can make some progress if we talk about the yield differential between high-grade municipals and high-grade corporate bonds. That differential has hovered around 70 per cent since 1954, i.e., high-grade municipals have in general sold at interest rates about 70 per cent of those on high-grade corporate bonds.

Table 1 presents some estimates of the possible response of the state and local bond rate to future developments. The table covers a range of possibilities respecting the size of state and local borrowing and the role of commercial banks in the market, since they are now the dominant institutional investor in municipal bonds. The future course of that role is of obvious importance—can the banks continue that role, keeping in mind that business loans are their primary function?

¹Footnotes at end of article.

What happens when they reach the limits of their taxable income, as some are now doing, so that the use of expenses, in fact

allocable to tax-exempt issues, against taxable income as now permitted, no longer produces tax savings?²

tax reforms to counteract the effect of tax preferences that now permit many taxpayers with high annual incomes to pay little or no federal income taxes. While we observed earlier that interest of all kinds is only a modest component of the income of upper-bracket individuals, nevertheless tax-exempt interest ranks second after capital gains taxation—perhaps third if we knew more about the magnitude of accelerated depreciation on buildings—among the factors enabling high-income taxpayers to reduce their effective rates of tax.⁴

TABLE 1.—SOME PROJECTIONS OF SPREAD BETWEEN STATE AND LOCAL (S. & L.) BOND RATES AND CORPORATE RATES¹

Rate of growth of State and Local bonds outstanding	Rate on high-grade S. & L. bonds as percentage of corporate rates		Difference in points between high-grade S. & L.'s and corporates		Rate on high-grade S. & L. bonds	
	With S. & L. market favorable ²	With S. & L. market unfavorable ²	With S. & L. market favorable ²	With S. & L. market unfavorable ²	With S. & L. market favorable ²	With S. & L. market unfavorable ²
GNP rate (6 percent) ³	70	75	1.8	1.5	4.4	4.7
Moderate rate (10 percent).....	75	80	1.5	1.2	4.7	5.0
High rate (20 percent).....	80	87	1.2	.9	5.0	5.3

¹ Assumes corporate AAA rate at 6.2 percent. The 70 percent relationship used as a base point here reflects the typical relationship of recent years.

² The favorable-unfavorable distinction involves the role of commercial banks in this market. Rates will be favorable to State and locals if commercial banks remain a large holder. They will be unfavorable if commercial banks hold a smaller share.

³ This would be a sharp slowdown for State and local government borrowing.

Table 1 shows that the interest rate increase resulting from a high volume of tax-exempt securities could be put as likely to be about one-half point (keeping in mind that it might come to a full point). At current levels of state and local debt issuance (\$15 billion gross) this would mean an increased annual interest cost of around \$75 million on one year's issues. This annual cost would of course cumulate if the increase persisted for subsequent new issues. With new issues rising at 10 per cent a year, a persistent increase in the state and local bond interest rate of one-half point would increase the annual cost by about \$500-\$600 million in seven years. This increased cost, remember, does not include the increased debt service itself, which would be something in addition. The increased cost is just the cost of the interest rate increase caused by the increased debt. It is the increase in cost caused by going to the well too often.

This is a substantial burden to put on local property taxpayers.

It should be observed that this discussion is based largely on data as of the end of 1968. It does not reflect the high interest rates prevalent in 1969 under the fiscal and monetary efforts to curb the inflationary aspect of the economy. Municipal financing clearly suffered under those efforts. But the discussion is in terms of what "normally" can be expected in the bond markets and therefore does draw upon the current difficulties.

Higher tax savings to buyers

This is not the full story, however. This process of bidding up the interest rates on tax-exempt bonds means that their benefits will automatically become much larger to those upper-bracket taxpayers who are already buying them and would, of course, continue to do so under such higher interest rates. In addition, the higher interest rates will bring more and more taxpayers into a position where the exemption makes holding state and local bonds attractive even at their lower marginal rates.

Table 2 shows for taxpayers at various effective rate brackets the value of tax exemption for an investment in state and local bonds which yields \$100 of exempt interest at current rates. The taxpayer in the 70 per cent tax bracket who earns \$100 in exempt interest when the exempt interest rate is 70 per cent of the corporate rate is in effect initially sacrificing \$43 of before-tax yield. But he is then rewarded by the larger after-tax benefits. Thus, if he had obtained a taxable bond paying \$143 (of which 70 percent is \$100), he would have paid a tax of \$100 and would net \$43. The purchase of a tax-exempt bond instead thus already produces a saving of \$57 for every \$100 he receives in exempt interest.

TABLE 2.—VALUE OF TAX EXEMPTION FOR VARIOUS TAXPAYER SITUATIONS BEFORE AND AFTER RISE IN EXEMPT BOND RATE RELATIVE TO CORPORATE RATE

Marginal tax rate (percent)	Net advantage of tax exemption on investment yielding \$100 when exempt rate relative to corporate rate is—		
	70 percent	80 percent	85 percent
70.....	\$57	\$71	\$78
60.....	43	57	64
48.....	26	40	47
30.....	0	14	21
20.....	-14	0	6
15.....	-22	-3	0

We can now see the increased benefits for taxpayers when the state and local governments go to the well too often. The increased interest cost indicated in Table 1 is an increased payment on bonds that would have been sold anyway to the present buyers. The result, therefore, is an automatic increase in the tax savings enjoyed by the present group of buyers of tax-exempt bonds, which they enjoy because the market discount on the bonds is less than the tax savings the bonds provide. Thus, if the interest rate on exempt bonds rises to 85 per cent of the corporate bond rate, the net saving of \$57 for a taxpayer in the 70 per cent bracket will rise to \$78—a gain of 37 per cent.

Looking down Table 2 one can see that as the relative interest rate on state and local bonds rises, taxpayers at lower marginal tax rates come into the position where they would be saving more in taxes from the exemption than they would lose on the interest differential; that is, their tax savings (which is the federal government's revenue loss) would be greater than the savings in interest to the state and local governments. If the state and local rate rises to 85 per cent of the corporate bond rate, even a taxpayer whose marginal tax rate is over 15 per cent would find these bonds a good investment.

In summary, the penalties for excessive reliance on the tax-exempt privilege to finance new programs are substantial. These penalties would be visited upon state and local governments through increasing the interest rate on all the bonds they sell, including the basic school and other bonds that they will have to sell anyway. The result occurs because the advantage of the present tax-exempt privilege of state and local bond interest works in a limited market that can be swamped by overuse of the tax exemption.

At the same time the tax savings to present buyers of bonds will rapidly pyramid and new groups of buyers will be drawn to these tax benefits. This expansion of the tax preference will be coming at a time when the patience of many with existing tax preferences is becoming exhausted—as is shown by the rapid and widespread rise in sentiment for

The present exemption for interest on state and local bonds has the general effect of a blanket, no strings attached, federal grant-in-aid to the issuing governments. It is achieved by giving tax favoritism to high-bracket individuals with conservative investment instincts, to commercial banks, and in lesser degree to some other financial institutions. The state and local governments clearly desire the general effect to continue. Those interested in the federal tax structure deplore the method of achieving this effect because of both the tax favoritism and the inefficiency or wastage involved in resorting to the technique of favoritism, in that more federal tax revenue is lost than the local governments obtain in aid.

The state and local governments carry no brief as such for the federal tax windfalls and the wastage. Up to now, however, they have not seen any other mechanism which can achieve for them the general effect that the tax exemption produces. But the future heavy financial demands on state and local governments will diminish for them the amount of the grant-in-aid that the tax exemption mechanism produces. The restraint on the scope of the market for their bonds that tax exemption involves will cause their interest rates to rise relative to taxable obligations and thus the amount of the grant-in-aid to lessen. At the same time, the tax favoritism perversely is increased.

The inefficiency inherent in the use of the tax exemption mechanism to achieve the grant-in-aid will thus hurt all the governments involved. They now have a common interest in finding a better path to the grant-in-aid. We should, therefore, turn to describing some of the alternatives proposed.

POSSIBLE NEW FINANCING TECHNIQUES

Local taxable bonds

In a talk on June 13, 1968, before the Municipal Forum of New York I described one possible new financing technique—that of local taxable bonds. I gave the example of a local project—it could be an anti-pollution project, an airport, an urban development project, and so on—as to which federal assistance would be provided not through the traditional initial capital grant but through a system of paying part of the debt service of a bond issue by the locality to meet the cost of the project. The federal share of the debt service—as respects both principal and interest—would be paid periodically over the life of that bond. I then indicated that instead of having the local bond a tax-exempt obligation, there could be used a local taxable obligation with two attributes: the federal government would fully guarantee the bond and, in addition, would use the tax revenue gained through the taxable status to pay to the local government an interest subsidy that would bring the interest cost to it down to a level lower than, or at least comparable to, the interest rate on a tax-exempt bond. This interest subsidy would be in addition to the share of the annual debt service provided by the federal government under the particular program.

This alternative of a local taxable bond could of course be used in connection with any state or local obligation, and need not be limited to a bond issued in connection with a federally aided project.⁵ The federal guarantee for the local bond would be

Footnotes at end of article.

relevant to the latter since the project itself would presumably have to conform to the contours of the particular substantive program under which federal aid was granted. Where such a federally aided project was not present, presumably there would be no federal guarantee of the local bond and no federal share of the debt service as such. But there would be a federal subsidy paid to the local government to cover part of the interest cost so as to make the issuance of the taxable bond worthwhile to the local government. The decision to issue a taxable bond would remain with the local government, and it could always if it preferred—which presumably would be a matter of financial calculation—issue a tax-exempt bond. The purpose for which the bond was issued would here be irrelevant, and the federal government would not be concerned with that aspect.

The mechanics of the local taxable issue and the payment of the federal subsidy would have to be explored. Thus, the federal government could pay annually a stipulated amount, agreed on when the bond was to be issued, such amount being a percentage of the interest. The basic authority for such arrangements would be a federal statute, and it could specify the amount of the interest subsidy or provide guidelines for the federal authorities to follow. Another possibility is a procedure under which the bond would carry two coupons, both taxable, but one for interest to be paid by the local government issuer and the other for interest to be paid by the federal government. Where necessary, steps would have to be taken to revise relevant state and local laws to permit the issuance of taxable obligations at market rates.

The marketing of this new kind of obligation—a local taxable issue—would of course involve a whole new dimension in state and local financing. I suppose analysts will differ as to the prospects for such a bond, the degree of time needed to gain wide market acceptance, the marketing patterns that would emerge, the effect of such issues on the market for presently taxable bonds, and so on. But it is difficult to see why the combined expertise of the federal government, state and local governments, and the investment banking profession could not evolve processes and procedures for the successful marketing of these issues.

Use of centralized borrowing power

The interest rates that would obtain on local taxable bonds would probably be similar to those of comparable corporate obligations. While there would be no federal guarantee as such (except on bonds connected with federally aided projects where such a guarantee could be worked out), the promise of the federal government to pay part of the interest should help the issue along. But at any event, the interest rates on local taxable bonds—even those guaranteed by the federal government—would be expected to be higher than the rate at which the federal government can borrow. The smallness of some local issues, the novelty of local taxable bonds, and the other marketing problems involved would support this conclusion. Since the federal government would have to pay a part of the interest cost, perhaps on a percentage basis, it would be concerned in seeking paths to reduce that cost. The state and local governments would have an equal interest in that objective. This has led to the suggestion of alternatives under which the federal borrowing power, or some other form of centralized borrowing, could be utilized in ways that would reduce the interest cost for the funds to be obtained from the investing public with respect to these state and local borrowings.

One suggestion, which I discussed in a talk on September 27, 1968, at the Fifth Municip-

pal Conference of the Investment Bankers Association in New Orleans, would utilize a new central institution called an Urban Development Bank. This approach was the subject of exploration in the latter part of 1968, and President Johnson submitted a proposal for such a bank in 1969. The bank would make long-term development loans and provide technical assistance to state and local governments and their agencies to help meet needs for essential public works and community facilities.⁶ It would be governed by a board of directors representing federal, state, and local governments and private investors in the bank. Its funds essentially would be raised from taxable debt obligations sold to the public. While the obligations would not be guaranteed by the United States, the bank would be authorized to issue obligations to the Treasury to insure the financial integrity of the bank. Presumably its public obligations would bear a rate reasonably close to the going rate for federal obligations. In turn the bank would make loans to state and local governments to finance capital expenditures for public works and community facilities at an interest rate not less than two-thirds of the rate at which the bank itself was able to borrow funds. The outstanding obligations of the bank could reach over \$20 billion in five years.

Thus, as respects its financing aspects, the bank in effect would be purchasing state and local obligations (while technically tax exempt this would be irrelevant since the obligations would be held by the bank, whose income would itself be exempt) and raising the funds to do so in the private market on a centralized taxable basis. The differential in interest rates, i.e., the subsidy to state and local governments, would be met by the federal government through authorized appropriations to the bank. The funds for this subsidy would come in effect from the income tax revenue derived from taxing the obligations issued by the bank. This process would permit a pooling of the various local government obligations, so that any disadvantages under the local taxable bond approach of issue size, of lack of a ready market in which local taxable bonds could be sold and bought, and of the novelty of such bonds, are all eliminated. The state and local governments would participate directly in the management and control of the bank. Use of the bank would be on a voluntary basis, however—any state or local government could still finance projects directly through its own tax-exempt obligations.

This type of bank is one method by which the efficiencies of centralized borrowing and marketing could be achieved, so that the interest cost would be largely comparable to the rate on federal obligations. Another proposal to this end has been suggested by Professors Donald Reeb and Edward F. Renshaw of the State University of New York at Albany.⁷ They suggest that the twelve Federal Reserve Banks be authorized to acquire state and local obligations directly, obtaining funds for this purchase by selling some of the federal bonds they now hold. They envisage the banks under this authority as operating in the secondary market and purchasing new issues on a broad basis. As an illustration, they consider a degree of purchase of state and local bonds that would produce a yield differential of 40 per cent in relation to the yield on federal bonds. Assuming the latter rates to be stabilized around 4.5 per cent, about the 1964-1967 average, this would give an average interest cost of 2.7 per cent for state and local bonds as compared with the 3.6 per cent average on high-grade municipals that characterized the 1964-1967 period. Since the Federal Reserve Banks are now paying their surplus earnings to the Treasury, the cost of this subsidy to the state and local governments would be met by the Treasury. But it would in effect be reimbursed by the tax revenues

from the taxable federal bonds that would be held by the public in lieu of holding tax-exempt obligations.

Whatever may be the merits of these two approaches to achieving centralized borrowing through taxable issues, with an interest subsidy to the state and local governments, they need not be looked on as alternatives. The bank would be designed to be more than a mechanical financing intermediary, and presumably would also develop technical skills in many phases of community development that would be of assistance to localities. The state and local bond market is large enough to permit various centralized borrowing approaches to operate. Indeed, the widening realization that new financing techniques are needed may well produce further alternatives for consideration.

REMAINING TAX-EXEMPT OBLIGATIONS

The various financing techniques discussed above are all optional in the sense that they do not preclude the continued direct issuance to the public of local tax-exempt obligations. It could well be, therefore, that a significant volume of exempt obligations would continue to be issued. Since the interest rate would be held down under financing techniques, the exempt obligations would be attractive only to higher-bracket investors and to banks, where the rate of tax would still make the lower exempt interest rates advantageous. There would also remain for a considerable period the large volume of presently outstanding obligations. Perhaps the use of subsidized local taxable bonds would make the refinancing of the presently outstanding bonds attractive to local governments where that opportunity was available under their terms.

The suggestion for a "minimum income tax" to lessen the tax reduction effect of tax-exempt interest and other tax preferences⁸ is here useful in reducing the tax escape that the continued presence of the exemption would permit. The minimum tax would not, in view of the ability of the state and local governments to use the new financing techniques, affect their ability to obtain funds on new issues. In the case of already outstanding bonds, the reduction in tax benefit would cause some reshuffling of holdings.

Even the minimum tax, however, would leave an advantage to the large volume of outstanding bonds. As time passed those bonds would become relatively more valuable and present holders would receive a windfall gain. This has led in the past to various suggestions that would remove the tax-exempt status on these bonds and provide some compensation to existing holders, such as a credit against tax, to leave them in the same net position as if they had originally bought taxable bonds.⁹ A recent suggestion would make the outstanding bonds taxable but with an offer by the federal government to exchange federal bonds at current interest rates for the outstanding local bonds. The holders of the latter while losing a future tax advantage would not suffer a loss of principal.¹⁰ Such approaches as to outstanding bonds of course would also end for the future any option to issue tax-exempt obligations. Also, like the minimum tax, they would involve ultimately a decision by the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of federal income taxation of state and local bond interest. The Department of Justice in 1942¹¹ stated with confidence that the step would be constitutional, and certainly nothing has happened in the intervening years to cause lawyers to believe that such a prediction would, to say the least, be any less valid today.

At any event, the congressional focus now is on the large volume of new issues that lie ahead, and a solution for those issues plus the minimum tax approach for the remaining issues would, together with inevitable attri-

Footnotes at end of article.

tion as to outstanding issues, be a very major step forward in meeting the present problems.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we may return to the summary at the outset:

The possible high level of new issues of tax-exempt state and local bonds over the next decade—a level required to meet the huge financing requirements of the vast array of needed social programs—raises very serious problems for both state and local governments and the federal government. The price for the state and local governments in the use of tax-exempt bonds on such a greatly increased basis under those programs will be in very sizable increases in their interest costs. The price for the federal government will be in serious inroads on the equity of its tax system.

Those anxious to preserve the strength of state and local governments and the integrity of the federal tax system should seek to develop new financing techniques that avoid such a high price.

New financing techniques have been offered for consideration. One is the use of local taxable bonds placed directly on the market. The second is a pooling of local obligations through centralized borrowing, either through a new financial institution which would raise its funds in the private market on a taxable basis or through Federal Reserve Bank purchases of local obligations. Both approaches permit the local governments to receive an interest subsidy to offset their departure from the use of the tax exemption privilege. Both approaches also permit that independence of state and local government which is now obtained through the tax exemption privilege, but do so without the tax favoritism, inefficiency, and consequent wastage of funds now associated with the historical solution to one of the problems of our federal system.

It is not enough, in thinking about these financing techniques, to say that they possess some rough edges or will take time to perfect. Such an outlook cannot end the inquiry or militate against moving forward with a new approach, for the present tax-exempt approach with its roots in history rather than logic clearly has serious known weaknesses. Nor can state and local governments seriously claim that tax exemption per se is the guarantor of their independence and vitality. That exemption is a way of supplying federal aid—presently amounting to about \$1.2 billion annually (at a revenue cost of \$1.8 billion)—to those governments through the lower interest rates. The removal of such aid would be a blow. But an even greater blow would be the removal of the \$25 billion in grants from the federal government.¹²

The fact that this far greater aid depends on federal legislation has not meant the disappearance of local government. On the contrary, it is generally agreed that the future strength of state and local governments will depend on still larger voluntary grants in a variety of forms from the federal government. Moreover, no one is suggesting that the fiscal aid now obtained by state and local governments through tax exemption be eliminated, and all the new financing techniques seek to provide comparable aid through interest subsidies. Even here in recognition of the desire to maintain as much freedom of decision as possible at the local level—whether in this matter or in other matters where federal aid is involved—the new techniques suggested keep open the option to issue tax-exempt obligations.

Certainly state and local governments presenting claims—claims which are valid and compelling if we intend to solve our problems of urban existence—for generous federal assistance to meet their operating and capital needs should join in seeking modern financing techniques rather than rigidly cling to the inefficiencies, wastages, and tax favoritism implicit in the historical technique of tax exemption.

In sum, there are paths to be explored by those who are willing to face this serious problem in a constructive way. That very exploration can in turn open up still other avenues for consideration. The proper federal role and the proper state and local government role in the necessary federal-state-local partnership required to meet the fast growing credit demand for new public facilities and social projects can thus be structured in the light of our pressing present needs.

For we are at a crucial crossroads. One way, a blind following of the past, could financially weaken state and local governments and thereby weaken the independence of these governments though outwardly preserving the trappings of independence. The other way, utilizing our knowledge of newly developed credit tools and the new financial institutions to operate them, can preserve and advance that independence.

FOOTNOTES

¹ See generally David J. Ott and Allan H. Meltzer, *Federal Tax Treatment of State and Local Securities*, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963.

² Tax-exempt entities have purchased tax-exempt obligations in the past and still do because of legal limitations on their investment powers. These limitations, however, are rapidly being removed.

³ For recent discussions that describe some pessimistic possibilities of the role of commercial banks, and hence increased difficulties in marketing state and local debt, see Edward F. Renshaw, "Improving the Market for Municipal Bonds," *Congressional Record*, February 17, 1969, at pages 3578-3580. Edward F. Renshaw, "Some Alternative Ways to Improve the Market for Municipal Bonds," *Congressional Record*, February 17, 1969, at pages 3583-3584.

⁴ *Tax Reform Studies and Proposals, U.S. Treasury Department*, Joint Publication, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, and Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969, p. 83.

⁵ See remarks of Congressman John W. Byrnes on tax reform, *Congressional Record*, January 30, 1969, pages 2319-2321.

⁶ S. 409, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., introduced by Senator John Sparkman, *Congressional Record*, January 21, 1969, pages 1316-1317. See also testimony of Budget Director Charles J. Zwick, in *The 1969 Economic Report of the President*, Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969, pp. 114-37.

⁷ See various papers by Professors Reeb and Renshaw in *Congressional Record*, February 17, 1969, at pages 3577-3584.

⁸ See *Tax Reform Studies and Proposals*, *op. cit.*

⁹ E.g., Lyle C. Fitch, *Taxing Municipal Bond Income*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1950.

¹⁰ Statement of George Meany, President, AFL-CIO, before Ways and Means Committee, on April 1, 1969, in Hearings on Tax Reform.

¹¹ *Revenue Revision of 1942*, Hearings Before House Ways and Means Committee, 77th Congress, 2d Session, Volume 3, pp. 2106-10 (1942). For a contrary argument, see Statement of Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland, before the Ways and Means Committee on March 1, 1969, in Hearings on Tax Reform.

¹² Estimate for fiscal 1970; see testimony of Budget Director Charles J. Zwick, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

THE SITUATION IN NIGERIA-BIAFRA

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the situation in Nigeria-Biafra continues to deteriorate, putting the lives of hun-

dreds of thousands on the brink of starvation and death.

But there is new hope today of bringing peace and relief to this troubled area. Some very significant initiatives are being made to pursue these goals.

On Wednesday, United Nations Secretary General U Thant, urgently appealed to the leaders of Nigeria and Biafra to reach agreement on the resumption of the Red Cross airlift into Biafra, which was stopped early in June.

His Holiness, Pope Paul VI is currently in Africa and has expressed the earnest hope of meeting with the representatives of Nigeria and Biafra, to do, as he said, "A bit of good for peace."

I want to take this opportunity to commend the Secretary General and His Holiness for taking these initiatives.

They deserve high tribute from all of us, and we must wish them well as they pursue their goals. In terms of humanitarian responsibilities, I have long believed that the United Nations had a role to play.

In terms of bringing peace to the area, and the reconciliation of the parties to the conflict, I strongly believe that the good offices of his holiness can make an important contribution.

I earnestly appeal to the leaders of Nigeria and Biafra to respond, and I earnestly hope that our own Government, and others—especially those in Africa—will actively support the efforts now being made.

Little of human dignity survives war in our time, but meaningful peace will only be found in the civilized behavior of all toward their fellowman.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to include at this point in the RECORD, recent articles from the Washington Post and the New York Times, pertaining to the Secretary General's appeal and the visit of his holiness to Africa.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, July 31, 1969]
THANT URGES FOR BIAFRA NEW MERCY FLIGHTS
(By Robert H. Estabrook)

UNITED NATIONS, July 30.—Secretary General U Thant appealed urgently to Nigeria and Biafra today to permit daytime flights to hunger areas by aircraft of the international Committee of the Red Cross.

Although the appeal was nominally made to both sides in the civil war, the effect of this portion of the statement was to bring pressure on Biafra.

Biafran authorities have never permitted daytime flights, ostensibly for fear of air raids. Nigeria presumably would readily agree to daytime flights from its own territory.

By implication, Thant also urged the Nigerian federal government to lift its recent ban on Red Cross operations. Without mentioning former ICRC President August Lindt of Switzerland, whom Nigeria denounced, Thant praised the Red Cross effort which has used supplies contributed by the United Nations Children Fund.

Thant's statement, the strongest he has yet made on humanitarian issues of the Nigerian war, was conspicuously timed to coincide with the visit of Pope Paul VI to Africa. Thant and the Pope, who have mutual esteem, have several times cooperated on peace efforts.

The Secretary General has frequently been criticized for not making a more active ef-

fort to settle the war. But he has contended that he must work with sovereign governments and that the Organization of African Unity has discouraged outside mediation. Only five of the 126 U.N. members have recognized Biafra.

Thant's message was dispatched to the Nigerian government in Lagos, but a U.N. spokesman said Thant was relying on the press to convey it to Biafra.

[From the Washington Post, Aug. 1, 1969]
POPE PAUL ARRIVES IN UGANDA; FIRST PONTIFF
TO VISIT AFRICA

(By Jim Hoagland)

KAMPALA, UGANDA, July 31.—Pope Paul VI made the first papal trip to Africa today as he flew here from Rome and warned Africa's 30 million Catholics against altering Church teaching in the name of Africanization.

The Pontiff arrived at Entebbe airport in bright midafternoon sunshine with stiff breezes blowing from Lake Victoria, a few thousand yards from Entebbe.

As he emerged from the jetliner, he donned his broad-brimmed white hat, gathered his scarlet robes in his hands and then walked briskly down the 17 steps of the airport platform.

The 71-year-old Pope was driven from Entebbe to Kampala, the capital of this East African country. He stood in the back of an open black Lincoln Continental convertible and waved to the tens of thousands of Ugandans who lined his route.

They waved banana fronds and palm leaves at the Pontiff and shouted, "Welcome holy father." Many women voiced the traditional high-pitched wail of extreme emotion as they saw the Pope.

Heading a procession of more than 100 cars that carried five African heads of states and many other dignitaries, the Pope was driven to Rubaga Cathedral, on a hillside overlooking Kampala, where he presided at the closing session of the All-African Bishops Conference.

There he read slowly, in heavily accented English, a 25-minute speech intended not only for the 2.8 million Catholics of Uganda but all Catholics of Africa, who make up about 10 per cent of the continent's population.

The speech contained an unexpectedly strong warning that the African Church must not go too rapidly nor too far in seeking to Africanize the clergy or the essential principles of Catholicism.

He admonished the church leaders present to remember the history of the missionaries who brought Christianity to Africa.

"It is a history which still continues, and must continue for a long time to come, even though you Africans are now assuming its direction," the Pope said. "The help of collaborators coming here from other Churches is still necessary to Africa today."

The pontiff then raised "a burning and much discussed question . . . the adaptation of the Gospel and of the Church to African culture. Must the Church be European, Latin, Oriental, or must she be African?"

He answered this question with two points, emphasizing the first: "Your Church must be first of all Catholic."

It "must be entirely founded upon the identical, essential, constitutional patrimony of the self-same teaching of Christ . . . We are not the inventors of our faith, we are its custodians," the Pope said.

AFRICAN CHRISTIANITY

But he then went on to say that the Church favored a certain pluralism "in the outward forms of ritual."

"The liturgical renewal is a living example of this. And in this sense you may, and you must, have an African Christianity," Pope Paul said.

But even then, he continued, there are

"the possible dangers of religious pluralism, the danger of making your Christian profession into a kind of local folklore, or into exclusivist racism, or into egoistic tribalism or arbitrary separatism."

These must be avoided in making reforms, he said, so that "you will be capable of bringing to the Catholic Church the precious and original contribution of 'negritude.'"

The 41 bishops, archbishops and cardinals who have been attending the conference here this week welcomed the Pope by pledging their "total solidarity" to him in the current controversies within the Church over dogma.

BISHOPS' STATEMENT

"The present state of contestation in the bosom of the Church appears to us to go beyond the bounds of dialogue and research," the bishops' statement said. "Our real faith cannot be called into question, even if its expression must be adapted to the diverse mentalities of different people."

Pope Paul was greeted immediately on his arrival just 20 miles north of the equator by a colorful display of African culture. As he walked from the airplane to be greeted by Ugandan President Milton A. Obote, troupes of dancers and bands filled the air with music and shouting. About 60 men played six-foot-long rolled cowhide horns.

SMALLER CROWD

A group of 40 male and female dancers clicked hollowed out gourds and danced. The women were dressed in red and blue short skirts and black halters. Another group of men dancers, attired in spotted antelope skins and wearing multicolored plume head-dresses, also greeted the Pope.

The throngs of hundreds of thousands that had been predicted to greet the Pope on his entrance to Kampala did not materialize. But those who turned out greeted him with enthusiasm.

Pope Paul began his eighth trip abroad as a reigning pontiff by stepping from a glistening white East African Airways VC-10 that was decorated with the flags of the East African countries of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania—and a blue, bounding lion.

As the cardinal of Milan, he visited Africa in 1962. He toured Rhodesia, South Africa, the Belgian Congo, Nigeria and Ghana during his three-week trip.

Such a wide-swinging trip would be difficult for him in Africa today. He himself ruled out a trip to Nigeria because of the political implications it would have in the civil war that he has offered to mediate. The Nigerian federal military government has been critical of the relief role played by the Church in Biafra.

AGAINST APARTHEID

And it is unlikely that he would feel comfortable in the white-minority-ruled countries of Rhodesia and South Africa. The pontiff has cast himself as the champion of the poor and the oppressed and has repeatedly spoken against apartheid-like systems.

He has demonstrated a deep concern for black Africa. He issued a message to Africa in 1967 that stressed the equality of all men and called for justice for all. And it was Pope Paul who proclaimed the first black African saints by canonizing the 22 martyrs of Uganda in 1964.

The ritual high point of the Pope's Uganda trip comes Saturday morning when he will consecrate an altar in a still unfinished shrine to the 22 martyrs, who were burned alive for their faith between 1885 and 1887.

MASS AT SHRINE

He will also say mass near the shrine on a small island in the middle of a fishpond Saturday morning.

Although the pontiff announced originally that he would make the trip as a pilgrim, it was rapidly escalated into a major diplomatic venture as well.

Friday he will meet with President Obote

and the heads of state of Tanzania, Zambia, Rwanda and Burundi in Uganda's parliament building, where he will speak to the parliament and diplomatic corps. Delegations from other African countries, including Nigeria, will be present.

A three-man delegation from Biafra is also here, in observer status. Speculation that the Pope will attempt to bring the two sides together centers on a four-hour open period Friday afternoon in the pontiff's otherwise tightly jammed schedule.

But the Pope did not mention Nigeria in his brief airport talk or in his major speech at the cathedral. He discussed religion exclusively, and stayed away from politics.

(Reuters reported that Msgr. Giovanni Benelli, Vatican deputy secretary of state, told newsmen on the flight that the Pope was prepared to stay in Africa a month, if it could help settle the Nigeria-Biafra war.)

[From the New York Times, Aug. 1, 1969]

POPE PAUL, IN UGANDA, BIDS AFRICANS BUILD UP CHURCH

(By Robert C. Doty)

KAMPALA, UGANDA, July 31.—Pope Paul VI flew here today from Rome to tell members of the Roman Catholic hierarchy of Africa that they must become "missionaries to yourselves." "You Africans must now continue upon this continent the building up of the church," he added.

He spoke to members of a Pan-African episcopal symposium in the tall, twin-towered Rubaga Cathedral in this highland city, which welcomed with native dances and the throb of drums the first Roman Pontiff to visit Africa.

His official mission here—his eighth overseas trip since his elevation in 1963—is to consecrate 12 African bishops and dedicate a shrine to 22 African saints martyred between 1885 and 1887.

BIAFRA A MAJOR CONCERN

But the Pontiff himself indicated in brief talks with reporters who accompanied him on the six-hour flight from Rome that his major preoccupation would be an effort to bring Nigerian and Biafran delegations to the point of discussing an end to the year-long civil war.

To a reporter who wished the 71-year-old Pontiff well on his effort in a crowded 52-hour visit here, Pope Paul replied:

"One needs stamina. We hope to meet representatives of Nigeria and Biafra and do a bit of good for peace. We go to learn and to teach."

Later, the most Rev. Giovanni Benelli, titular Archbishop of Tusuro and deputy to the Vatican Secretary of State, told reporters the meeting with the Biafrans and Nigerians probably would take place tomorrow night.

COULD EXTEND VISIT

If there is the slightest opening toward peace, Archbishop Benelli said, he would not rule out a Papal decision to extend the African visit beyond the scheduled departure time of Saturday evening.

In Kampala, however, there was little optimism over the possibility of successful Papal mediation in the present frame of mind of the two delegations here.

Pope Paul plunged into the substance of the problem facing the African church in his first major address to the cardinals, archbishops and bishops ending a three-day symposium here.

Foremost among these is the shortage of native African priests to replace the foreign missionaries who fostered the great Central African growth of Roman Catholicism beginning in 1879 here in Uganda, but who are gradually leaving today.

Through his 26-minute speech, delivered in his hesitant English, the Pontiff stressed the need for greater Africanization of the church here.

He praised again, as he has often in the past, the special quality of deep religious fervor characterizing the African church as something that could act as a leaven on the church as a whole.

At the same time, he warned that the African church must remain in the mainstream of doctrine and discipline and avoid the pitfalls of religious pluralism or exclusivist racism or arbitrary separatism.

If these dangers are avoided, he said, "you will be able to formulate Catholicism in terms congenial to your own culture; you will be capable of bringing to the Catholic church the precious and original contribution of negritude, which she needs particularly in this historic hour.

Referring to the shortage of native clergymen, the Pope said it was an immense task to recruit and train them. The vitality, development and the future of the African church depends on its successful accomplishment, he said.

AGREE TO A FEDERATION

The African hierarchy, in three days of meetings, has agreed to set up a permanent, loose federation of the 28 episcopal conferences of the continent.

Reflecting the attitudes of the civil governments of the newly independent nations they represent, many of the African prelates expressed a wariness of neocolonialism even in the ecclesiastical sphere.

Obviously still in great need of assistance from abroad both in missionary personnel and funds, the African bishops made repeated speeches insisting that this aid should be given without strings that would hinder the course of Africanization of the church.

Under the leadership of Paul Cardinal Zoungrana, the intellectually vigorous Archbishop of Ouagadougou, Upper Volta, who was elected president of the new group, the symposium approved a series of documents on development, on a philosophy of peace in Africa and a special peace appeal to leaders of Nigeria and Biafra.

A fourth document, a declaration of devotion to the Holy See, was read at the Cathedral Ceremony tonight.

The Pope's day began before dawn in a thunderstorm at his summer residence, Castel Gandolfo, in the Alban hills south of Rome. The Pope, as on seven previous voyages abroad, seemed to draw strength and vigor from his contacts with strange faces and places.

An hour and a quarter after his chartered East African Airways jet took off at 7:45 A.M., the Pontiff, wearing a white cassock, shoulder cape and zucchetto, a skull cap, left his private quarters to visit the 53 journalists and photographers traveling with him.

As on previous voyages, Pope Paul gave to each his hand to kiss or shake, depending on individual's religion, a nod and a blessing, while his secretary, Msgr. Pasquale Macchi, passed out commemorative bronze medals of the voyage.

With some of those who knew him before he reached his present rank, the Pope exchanged a few words, including his statement on his hope to contribute to peace in Biafra.

ORGANIZED CRIME

Mr. McCLELLAN, Mr. President, on July 17 and 18, 1969, two articles appeared in the Cleveland Plain Dealer, which are of interest in relation to S. 1861, the Corrupt Organizations Act of 1969, which I introduced along with Senator HRUSKA.

The articles were written by Sanford Watzman, a member of the Plain Dealer's Washington news bureau who specializes in covering crime topics on the

national scene. He has an extensive background in crime reporting. In these articles, Mr. Watzman has shown the potential application of S. 1861 to several current specific fact situations where the mob has entered legitimate businesses with great success, success unexplained in the normal business world.

Mr. Watzman has fulfilled the finest traditions of newspaper reporting in these articles. This is the sort of responsible, investigative reporting in the area of organized crime that was recommended by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. I am grateful for the efforts on the part of the Plain Dealer to make known to the general public the threat posed by mobster infiltration of legitimate organizations. It gives all that much more of a sense of urgency to our legislative efforts in this area.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the articles be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of these remarks.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Cleveland (Ohio) Plain Dealer, July 18, 1969]

NAME-DROPPING TRICKY IF COSA NOSTRA IS INVOLVED

(By Sanford Watzman)

NEW YORK.—To be successful in the bagel business here, hub of an industry that grosses more than \$20 million a year, it helps to brag about your connections in a certain way.

Name-dropping can be a terribly difficult art form where the Cosa Nostra is involved, a fact that was brought out in recent hearings before the New York State Investigation Commission (SIC).

Here is a conversation, as told to SIC, between two men who were competing for a bagel store location in Teaneck, N.J.:

One of the participants, identified as Joseph Pearlman, said, "I think you are in the wrong spot because our guy told us that this location is ours."

The second man, Salvatore Passalacqua also known as Sal Mauro, replied: "Well, I don't know who your guy is but he had better be pretty good because my guy is next to God."

"Well, that's pretty good," Pearlman retorted, "but my guy is God."

There was prolonged fencing, and then Mauro said: "Look, let's stop horsing around. I will give you my guy and you give me yours. My name is Tommy Ryan."

At this point, an associate of Pearlman, whose name was given as Philip (Sonny) Amster, broke in to say: "My guy is Jerry Catena."

Tommy Ryan is the mob nickname of Thomas Eboli, an heir of the late racket czar Vito Genovese. Catena is another leader of the old Genovese "family."

The dispute was settled inside the "family," SIC officials say. Passalacqua got the store.

The bagel industry was one of several shown at the hearings to have been infiltrated by the mob. This is the kind of evidence that the federal government will be seeking if a bill pending in Congress is enacted.

The focus would be not so much on Eboli or Catena as individuals but rather on the flow of Mafia money, which would be intercepted by legal action based on concepts in the antitrust laws.

Where it could be proved that an enterprise was taken over by "a pattern of racket-

ering activity," the business organization could be dissolved or the mobsters could be ousted from it, forfeiting their holdings.

The bill was drafted by Sens. John L. McClellan, D-Ala., and Roman L. Hruska, R-Neb., with the help of the Nixon administration.

The witness who told about the Teaneck bagel showdown was Raymond Fleishman, an official of the Bagel Bakers Union. Fleishman said he sat in on the discussion.

He explained his role as wanting to bring the two sides together to "see if they could talk out their problems."

There had been trouble between Passalacqua and the union when Passalacqua opened a store in Brooklyn and refused at first to recognize the union. Fleishman said he was hoping to avert further conflict in the industry.

At the Brooklyn place, the witness recalled, he was told by Harold Glantz, whom he named as an associate of Passalacqua, that the store management would prevail over the union because "we are special people."

Fleishman testified: "Glantz told me that he worked for Dominick. I said: 'Who is Dominick?'"

"And Mauro (Passalacqua) answered: 'Well, you would like Dominick, he would like you. Maybe you will get together. Maybe you will meet one day.'

"I persisted in asking who was Dominick and the only answer that I got was Dominick is Dominick."

Dominick turned out to be "Fats Dom" Alongi, a lieutenant of Eboli.

Fleishman continued: "Mauro said: 'There is a lot of money around here. We hope to open a lot of shops.' And he indicated to us that there was \$10,000 available to us if we were to cooperate with him, plus 5% of the business."

The witness said he spurned this offer, adding that the management capitulated afterward and signed a "standard contract" with the union.

Despite this victory, Fleishman said he was told by another Passalacqua associate, whom he identified as Artie Goldberg: "Ray, my guy is one of the biggest and you would have lost. You'll never know who he is."

But Fleishman said he already knew at the time the "guy" was Tommy Ryan.

He explained that the union had checked with law enforcement authorities because "a number of bakeries were starting to spring up, and they were people who had never been connected with the bagel business, and we started to get talk back that the people were not legitimate."

Another witness, Edward Halmowitz, related how he went to work at the bagel shop in Teaneck but found little to keep him busy. He complained about this to Artie Goldberg.

"I was always asking him," Halmowitz said, "When are we going to really start baking bagels, not just playing around." And he says, "soon, soon as we get the business."

Then Tommy Ryan made an appearance in the bakery.

"The first time he came," Halmowitz recounted, "I saw how they bowed down to him and I did not know who he was. They showed him all kinds of . . . respect and so forth.

"So Mr. Goldberg told me who he was. And that he was going to go out and secure them some business."

The witness recalled that on a subsequent occasion he remarked to Passalacqua that Tommy Ryan had called at the store.

Halmowitz said he got this reply: "Don't use the name Tommy Ryan. Use the name Davis, Mr. Davis, whenever you see him."

Passalacqua, in his own testimony at the SIC hearing, said he had known "Fats Dom" Alongi for 25 years. Asked how he met Alongi he replied:

"When I was in the junk business, on

Houston Street. He had the pigeon coop on the roof. . . . I'm a lover of birds, pigeons, and we took an interest talking about birds."

He denied knowing Eboli well or that he had referred to him in the talk about "God" at Teaneck. He denied too that he had tried to seduce the union with a \$10,000 offer.

Tommy Ryan took the stand but he refused to answer questions on the grounds that he might incriminate himself. John (Johnny Dio) Dioguardi, another mobster connected by testimony to the bagel business, gave a similar performance.

The acting chairman of SIC, Goodman A. Sarachan, said after the testimony was concluded:

"Does anyone really believe that some large chain supermarkets purchased certain grades of salami and frankfurters, and also bagels, from companies in which Johnny Dio and Tommy Ryan were connected because the chains thought these were superior products?"

"It is quite obvious that fear was the motivating factor for the unbelievable occurrences which were revealed at the hearings.

"It was fear which made these people do these things, and it was fear which kept them from reporting various forms of threats and extortion to law enforcement authorities."

Evidence adduced at the hearings was passed on to Federal and State prosecutors. SIC officials said they were looking forward to action by Grand Juries.

[From Cleveland (Ohio) Plain Dealer, July 17, 1969]

MOB IS UNDER FIRE IN KOSHER GAME
(By Sanford Watzman)

NEW YORK.—Meet Johnny Dio (real name: Dioguardi).

You know him as the mobster who made it big in labor, as the suspect some years ago in the acid-blinding of newsman Victor Riesel.

But Dio is also a man of business, specifically—although he is not Jewish nor does he look Jewish—the kosher meat business.

In this huge metropolitan area, where salami is a staple, Dio dominated what is known as the "lower end" of the trade marketing of the cheaper grades of salami, bologna and wieners.

How he moved in and won control was detailed at recent public hearings here conducted by the New York State Investigation Commission (SIC).

SIC officials regard the Dio operation, known as Mizrach Kosher Provisions, as the kind of mob-infiltrated enterprise that could become the target of a new weapon being forged in Washington.

That weapon is a proposed new law under which Cosa Nostra business combines would come under attack from trustbusters in the Justice Department using the same legal tactics that have helped break up industrial monopolies.

With the encouragement of the Nixon administration, Sens. John L. McClellan, D-Ark., and Roman L. Hruska, R-Neb., have introduced a bill to this end.

To hear Dio tell it, he is not a monopolist at all—he's just a schnook struggling to get ahead.

William Cahn, a Long Island district attorney, told SIC:

"I interviewed John Dioguardi in the summer of 1963, shortly after his release from prison (for tax evasion).

"He told me he was a hard-working kosher frankfurter salesman who left his home in Point Lookout every morning at 4 and drove to Sullivan County to sell his products, and that he received \$250 a week for these efforts.

"Our investigation disclosed his meteoric rise from a \$250-a-week salesman to a reputed \$250,000-a-year income from the Kosher meat business.

"This commission is aware of John Dio-

guardi's close association with powerful leaders in the Teamsters, in particular, James R. Hoffa (now in federal prison).

"A reliable confidential informant advised my office that Dioguardi's success was due to the fact that the supermarket chains accepted his product to insure they would continue to have labor peace.

"This informant advised that the principals of these large chains would refuse to cooperate with our investigation because of the fear of union troubles. This lack of cooperation became a reality and thwarted our investigation.

"Dioguardi's instant success is not the realization of the 'American dream' but a continuation of his successful activities as a labor fixer, extortionist and important member of syndicated organized crime."

One witness at the hearing was a "Mr. A.," who prevailed on SIC not to disclose his real name. "Mr. A." was sales manager of a firm that began to hit the skids after Dio emerged as a "salesman" for the competition.

(Actually, says SIC sources, Dio became the owner of the rival company. Under the McClellan-Hruska Bill, this company could be dissolved by a court order or Dio could be forced to surrender his interest in it, providing certain facts were proved.)

"Mr. A." was asked how many supermarket chains switched from his organization to Dio's. He replied:

"Seven or eight. It wasn't over a particular time. It was over a period of months."

The next witness was Moe Steinman, director of labor relations for a large supermarket chain. Steinman said that he had seen Dio "50 to 75" times over the last three or four years.

But they never conversed about unions; Steinman insisted.

Here are excerpts from the Steinman testimony:

Q. You are not business associates and you are not social friends and you sit down to have dinner together. What do you talk about?

A. Very good question. Just in general speaking of life in general.

Q. Would you talk about how your business was doing?

A. How our chains were doing? He would ask the questions. I said to him, in fact, "Last year was a little better than the year before."

Q. Did he ever tell you how Mizrach was doing?

A. No, he never brought that out.

Q. You seem to give the impression that you never meet Mr. Dio except accidentally you stumble into him. Have you ever made appointments to meet with him for dinner?

A. I said I did. He was at my house once or twice.

Q. Were there any other occasions when you made appointments?

A. I don't recall. I would be lying, you know, if I said no or yes.

Similar testimony was taken from Aaron Freedman, vice president of a chain of 78 stores.

SIC counsel Paul D. Kelly asked:

Q. "Has Mr. Dio ever been to your home?"

A. Yes . . . I got a call that he was in the neighborhood, would I mind if he came over to see me? . . . I found out that he wanted to sell me pins, primarily these types of pins that we give out to our employees after . . . a number of years of service.

Q. Is that the first time that Mr. Dio has ever requested you to purchase something from him?

A. Yes.

Q. He has never mentioned Mizrach Provisions in your presence?

A. No, sir . . .

Q. Have you ever had occasion to ask Mr. Dio for help with respect to labor contracts?

A. No, sir . . .

Q. Were you curious enough at any time

to ask Mr. Dio what his connections were with the kosher meat industry?

A. I wasn't that close enough to ask him those questions.

Dio is under a five-year sentence for bankruptcy fraud in connection with the failure of Consumer Kosher Provisions, Inc., a forerunner of Mizrach and the first company in that field to become a vehicle for Dio.

Immediate successor to Consumer Kosher (and also a forerunner of Mizrach) was First National Kosher Provisions. In this firm Dio was neither an officer nor a shareholder of record, although he organized the firm and illegally shifted Consumers' inventory to it.

The racketeer is appealing his sentence.

But whether Dio himself ultimately goes to jail because of his conviction under existing laws is not as important, say federal officials, as the mob's future in the industry.

President Nixon, in his crime message to Congress April 23, explained why an anti-trust-type bill such as the McClellan-Hruska measure was needed.

"The arrest, conviction and imprisonment of a Mafia lieutenant can curtail operations," Nixon said, "but does not put the syndicate out of business.

"As long as the property of organized crime remains, new leaders will step forward to take the place of those we jail."

RESOLUTION ON ORGANIZED CRIME
ADOPTED BY NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL

Mr. McCLELLAN, Mr. President, the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, which I am privileged to chair, is presently in the process of studying and revising a number of bills dealing primarily with the control of organized crime. We are now obtaining the last comments of the Department of Justice on these proposals, and we hope soon to begin reporting out a comprehensive legislative program in this area. The major bills include:

First. S. 30, which comprehensively revises and strengthens the evidence-gathering process in organized crime cases;

Second. S. 974, which creates within the Department of Justice the position of Assistant Attorney General for Organized Crime;

Third. S. 976, which provides for increased sentences for certain persons who are being sentenced for a felony as part of a continuing criminal activity in concert with one or more persons;

Fourth. S. 1623, which prohibits the investment of certain illegally gained income in any business enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce;

Fifth. S. 1624, which would amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and facilitate the collection of wagering taxes;

Sixth. S. 1861, which would prohibit the infiltration of legitimate organizations by racketeers or the proceeds of racketeering activity where interstate or foreign commerce is affected;

Seventh. S. 2022, which would make gambling affecting interstate commerce or operated by corruption a Federal crime; and

Eighth. S. 2122, a general immunity statute.

The subcommittee has been fortunate in having been able to obtain the critical comments and suggestions of a number of distinguished witnesses during three

hearing sessions. Several of their suggestions have been incorporated into tentative markup drafts of the proposals. I stated at the beginning of hearings on these proposals that I was not committed or wedded to the exact language contained in any of them and that I hoped that they could be improved and strengthened. This has certainly been the case. Several of these bills have indeed, in my opinion, been much strengthened as a result of the hearing process.

Hopefully, the enactment of a number of these bills will mark the beginning of a sustained war against the forces of organized crime. These measures, along with several of the titles from last year's omnibus crime bill should give law enforcement some badly needed, and long overdue tools, in their fight against the large criminal cartels. Any effort in this direction, however, must include all levels of law enforcement: Federal, State, and local. I was, therefore, very gratified to learn that the recent annual meeting of the National Association of Attorneys General that organization passed a resolution manifesting its concern in the continuing fight against organized crime.

Mr. President, the public and law-enforcement agencies everywhere are becoming increasingly aware of the many-faceted activities of organized crime and are becoming educated to the fact that organized crime, in one way or another, affects each of us. It will soon be time for the Congress to act to meet its responsibilities, too. The time for effective legislation against organized criminals is imminent. In concluding, I use the same words the President's Crime Commission used to close its chapter on organized crime:

The extraordinary thing about organized crime is that America has tolerated it for so long.

I ask unanimous consent to have a copy of the Attorneys General resolution inserted in the RECORD immediately following my remarks.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ORGANIZED CRIME

Whereas the members of this Association are directly involved in curbing the efforts of organized crime to expand its income, and its influence and control over legitimate business; and

Whereas this Association recognizes the need for all levels of government, whether local, state or federal, to join together and to cooperate in ferreting out and destroying the sources of income of organized crime; and

Whereas this Association recognizes and appreciates the concerted action underway and planned by the United States Department of Justice in the fight against organized crime;

Now therefore be it resolved that the 63rd Annual Meeting of the National Association of Attorneys General in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands reassert its interest and concern in the continuing fight in the field of organized crime; that we work with all levels of government and all branches of law enforcement in creating a total effort; and

Be it further resolved that the members of this Association, jointly and severally exchange information of desirable legislation to control organized crime, and that the

members and the Association offer vigorous support to the efforts of the Department of Justice in their field.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research development test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, the basic information necessary to a decision on deployment of the Safeguard antiballistic-missile system has been before Congress for many months. It is true, of course, that much additional testimony from many sources has since been submitted, most of it in the form of opinion—some of it informed, some ideological and speculative, some simply conjectural, and much of it contradictory.

However, I have been impressed by the fact that arguments pro and con seem to derive not so much from disagreement on hard facts and reasoned opinions as from contrary assumptions and premises to which the facts and opinions are related.

Accordingly, few Senators seem to have been influenced to change their minds on the wisdom of deployment of the ABM. This fact would seem to indicate that the decision before us may hinge not so much on data as on basic assumptions respecting national power, ideology, national intentions, and the ultimate determinate factor of national will in shaping defense policies of our Nation.

As the time approaches for final decision on funding deployment of the ABM, I find myself more persuaded than ever that the risks involved are extremely grave, that the security of the free world is at stake, and that the consequences of inaction could be catastrophic not alone for our Nation but for the free world.

These considerations influenced my original decision. Since then no new facts have been presented and no new arguments have been adduced to alter my original conclusions which, in abbreviated form, are as follows:

In the present contest between two great world powers, all of the idealistic good intentions in the world cannot be substituted for the integrity and therefore the credibility of our deterrent capability.

We believe that our deterrent is today a critical factor in the security of our Nation and of Western Europe, the Middle East and the Far East, and that it is essential to continued confidence in

our leadership on the part of uncommitted and undeveloped nations of the world.

I am convinced that an effective ABM Safeguard System is scientifically and technologically feasible; that it can be developed to provide a satisfactory measure of defense of our land-based deterrent; and that the cost is not disproportionate to the defense afforded.

Furthermore, I do not believe that the limited deployment of the ABM will result in escalation of the arms race nor that it should or would impede arms control negotiations with Russia.

In addition to these conclusions, Mr. President, undisputed facts show that Russia has continued from 1962 till now with successive improvements of their ABM System. It must be clear that an effective ABM protection of Russian cities would necessarily diminish our deterrent capability. On the other hand, Russia's deterrent remains unimpaired by reason of continued vulnerability of our cities. To permit Russia to enhance its deterrent by continued vulnerability of our cities and at the same time voluntarily accept vulnerability of our ICBM sites is to invite an unstable world situation which I find unrealistic and dangerously intolerable.

Mr. President, I earnestly hope that the nuclear arms race may be ended. But I have found no reasonable ground to believe that a negotiated agreement with Russia can be reached which would not be to the further advantage of Russia, nor am I aware of any evidence or of any argument that would convince us that unilateral abandonment of a defense of our strategic armament would alone induce the Soviet Union to cease its own efforts to achieve and maintain strategic superiority over us.

In this connection, it is my judgment that the power essential to our survival in today's world is our power of deterrent. Today we have that power. The question is, do we have the will to maintain it?

Mr. President, it is my sincere hope that we will defend our deterrent and protect our national security.

I support ABM.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for two unanimous-consent requests?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY, AUGUST 4, 1969

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon on Monday next.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FORTUNE'S EXCELLENT ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY PROBLEM

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, for years Fortune magazine has been recognized as a publication that has brought remarkable competence to reporting on American industry.

In their August issue they have done

one of the best jobs I have seen of analyzing the defense spending problem that so concerns all Members of Congress.

This issue is specially pertinent to Congress right now, when we are in the midst of debate on the military procurement authorization bill.

Mr. President, there are two articles in this issue that are so pertinent and informative that I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibits 1 and 2.)

Mr. PROXMIER. One is entitled: "The Case for Cutting Defense Spending," the other is "Where Military Contracts Go."

In addition, Mr. President, I am going to read in full to the Senate the lead editorial in the August issue of *Fortune*, entitled: "It's Time To Audit the Defense Department."

As I read this remarkable editorial, keep in mind that this is not the expression of an impulsive critic of the so-called military-industrial complex. *Fortune* has consistently hailed American industry and understands and deeply respects the reasons for America's industrial excellence.

This is not the expression of an advocate or polemicist for arms control or disarmament, or of a publication that underestimates the very real threat posed by Soviet military power. Indeed, in that connection, I invite Senators to read another article entitled "Military-Industrial Complex, Russian Style" in this same August issue of *Fortune*.

Here is an editorial from a publication that highly values American security and that fully and intelligently understands why it must meet whatever challenge may develop.

Mr. President, this is the editorial:

IT'S TIME TO AUDIT THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

The U.S. is in the grip of a costly, escalating pattern of military expenditure that could well keep rising even after Vietnam. As reported in a special defense section of this issue, evidence multiplies that this expenditure has come to live a life of its own—neither soundly based on our commitments nor, indeed, properly responding to the very real potential of the U.S.S.R. Appropriately, the Nixon Administration has begun a thoroughgoing review of the threats facing the U.S. and the defense structure needed to cope with them. The reassessment is urgently needed.

At staggering cost, the military has repeatedly bought weapons and deployed forces in ways that have added only marginally to national security. Moreover, in the procurement of new weapons, both the military and its corporate suppliers have been guilty of wasteful practices and flagrantly disingenuous cost estimates. "The Case for Cutting Defense Spending" (page 69) suggests that in the aftermath of the Vietnam war the defense budget could immediately be cut by more than 20 percent, to about \$62 billion, without compromising either the nation's security or its present commitments.

The Soviet Union, realizing one of its most compelling dreams, has now built a military machine roughly equal in power to that of the U.S. In the absence of arms-limitation agreements, prudence clearly requires that we maintain a strategic force amply capable of countering this adversary, whose military growth rate is so breathtaking. But prudence requires as well that we re-examine a conven-

tional force structure based on obsolete premises. Some of the basic tenets of U.S. defense policy have been carried over without systematic analysis since the late 1940's, a time when allies were poor and weak and potential enemies were sternly monolithic. The most expensive legacy from the past is the assumption, now quite dubious, that the U.S. needs what is known as a "two-plus capability"—a force structure that can be quickly expanded to fight a major conventional land war in Europe, another in Asia, and a limited war in the Americas, all at the same time. Many analysts believe that we can safely move back toward the "one-plus capability" that prevailed in the 1950's.

THE NARROWING OUTLOOK

For a long time, and particularly since the departure of the Eisenhower Administration, few of the outside checks and balances that constrain other federal agencies have been applied to the military establishment. In most matters, neither the President, his Budget Bureau, nor Congress was disposed to challenge policies agreed to by the armed services and the Secretary of Defense. Today's military leaders have come to senior rank expecting a level of financial support that would have been the envy of generations of predecessors.

To be sure, the Defense Department staff, particularly during Robert McNamara's tenure as Secretary, projected an aura of iron control over the military. Civilians vetoed manned bombers, nuclear carriers, and other projects requested by the services, and closed hundreds of superfluous military facilities. The Secretary boasted annually of deep cuts made in the budget requests of the individual services. While McNamara sometimes interposed his judgment with disappointing and expensive results, much of the civilian auditing surely was to the good. But it is wrong to conclude that a vigilant internal review at the Pentagon constituted ample control over the military. Allowing those responsible for day-to-day operations such a decisive say in their own operational scope and budget level has been no more justifiable at Defense than it would be anywhere else in the government. However competent the civilians who run the Pentagon, their heavy responsibilities and the intense pressures of their jobs inevitably narrow their outlook. As a former Budget Bureau official recalls, "At first, McNamara was a real tough budget director over the military, but eventually he and his people couldn't be so tough. It got to be their systems they were defending and arguing for."

THE COMPLEX "COMPLEX"

In Congress, through the years, a core of knowledgeable legislators have been deeply involved with defense matters, mostly through the Armed Services and Appropriations committees of both houses. Until the last couple of years, these Congressmen were generally in accord with the point of view of the military. On occasion, some of them actively supported the services against the Pentagon civilians when the two groups disagreed, as in the long controversy over the TFX-F-111 fighter-bomber. But they practically never overruled any concerted recommendation of the services and the Secretary.

Searching for a villain to account for the long absence of adequate control, a lot of Congressmen and others have lately fastened their attention on the "military-industrial complex." It is true that the interplay between the services and their suppliers generates pressures to maintain high levels of defense spending, almost irrespective of the external threat. The natural desire of military men to have ever more sophisticated and expensive weaponry coincides with the desire of contractors to supply it.

This can lead to excesses; as one former Pentagon official observes, "The contractor's

engineers and the government's engineers get all excited and oversell each other." But there is little reason to question the sincerity of either side. The overwhelming majority of both defense-industry executives and military officers hold strongly to a view of the world in which expensive weaponry is essential to security.

TOO MUCH TOO SOON

The problems posed by big weapon systems make some symbiotic relationship almost imperative. As NASA has learned in the Apollo project, large, technically adventurous undertakings demand the closest kind of interaction between buyer and seller.

Still, procedures at all levels of the decision-making and procurement processes need tightening. Fortunately, the biggest cause of unnecessary defense spending is not (as some congressional critics seem to think) sloppy management or skulduggery in the defense industry; if it were, the problem of cutting spending would be much more diffuse and impervious to solution than it is. Contractors sometimes do misbehave, of course. But they are already heavily policed by the Pentagon and the General Accounting Office. Moreover, under the fixed-price and incentive contracts favored by McNamara, penalties for egregiously bad management have been toughened. Many lax practices can be traced to the military's frequent tendency to emphasize performance and fast delivery of weapons over cost. More stringent budgets could dramatically change that emphasis.

Larger savings can be made by rationalizing the Pentagon's basic procurement practices and philosophies. As Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard puts it, "We are designing and building weapons that are too complex, and therefore too costly. We further compound the problem by trying to produce hardware before it is fully developed." A panel headed by Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, chairman and chief executive officer of Metropolitan Life, is studying the Pentagon's management machinery, and will report next year. Meanwhile the Defense Department is already introducing a number of promising techniques to discourage the practices Packard has identified. Among them: tying the start of production to the achievement of research and development "milestones," relying more on prototypes of new equipment instead of paper plans, and requiring the services to save money on one project if they add to the costs of another.

THE WILL TO COUNTERVAIL

Welcome as this ferment inside the Pentagon is, it does not change the urgent need for closer outside supervision. The defense establishment of itself can never provide the proper sense of balance between military needs and other priorities. But given the will to do so, the governmental structure as a whole is perfectly capable of countervailing the momentum of any "complex."

There are some promising signs. The new Budget Director, Robert Mayo, has moved to strengthen his bureau's powers over the defense budget. And the Administration's broad review of defense policy should enable the White House to provide more coherent strategic guidance than was offered under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

In Congress, skepticism about defense spending is now more pervasive than it has been at any time since the onset of the cold war. The frustrations of Vietnam and accelerating inflation, and the attention drawn to unmet domestic needs by urban disorders, have all contributed to the change. An early sign of the new legislative mood was Senator Richard Russell's successful assault in 1967 on the Navy's proposal to build fast-deployment logistics ships. Russell, the most respected advocate of the mil-

tary on Capitol Hill, argued that FDL ships would increase the tendency of the armed forces to intervene abroad by making them more capable of intervention. Since that vote, Congress has been paying more and more critical attention to other defense questions, ranging from broad matters of strategy, as in the debate over the ABM, to the short-comings of the weapon-procurement process.

Congressional pressure has already helped kill or sidetrack several major weapon projects, including the Army's Cheyenne helicopter and the Air Force's manned orbiting laboratory, and the Senate again this year turned down FDL ships. Inevitably, as the article on Lockheed Aircraft beginning on page 76 suggests, some of the legislative criticism has been unfair and immoderate. But the desirability of a broad role for Congress as a countervailing force to the defense establishment can no longer be in doubt.

REDEFINING THE NEED TO KNOW

Congress does need to supplement indignation with much better information than it has been getting on military questions. Senator John Stennis' decision to have the staff of his Armed Services Committee monitor the progress of major weapon programs is a step in the right direction. In addition, Congress ought to hold exhaustive hearings each year on the premises and strategy underlying the defense budget. These hearings should regularly test even the most fundamental assumptions about the nature of the external threat, and should critically examine the justifications not only for proposed new programs but also for continuing existing ones.

Furthermore, Congress needs its own permanent staff of systems analysts and others capable of assessing weapon programs and basic strategies. The staff, which should be responsible only to Congress, should file periodic reports, including recommendations for legislative action, and should be available for special assignments. These might include reviewing the Pentagon's contracting decisions on major systems and analyzing the efficiency with which big contracts are carried out. Perhaps some of this work could be done by outside organizations such as the Brookings Institution. Whatever form the new staff takes, it needs to have access on a confidential basis to all Pentagon data, including classified material. At present, legislators are hampered in investigating defense matters, because their security clearance is on a "need to know" basis—with the need determined solely by the Defense Department.

In redefining the goals of the military and its place in the governmental structure and in society, Congress and the Administration have a chance to exert a profoundly constructive influence on the character of American life in the 1970's. They should seize the opportunity.

Mr. President, I would now like to read much more briefly from the article on the case for cutting defense spending. I will read a few excerpts from the extraordinarily fine article written by Mr. Juan Cameron in the current issue of *Fortune* dated August 1. It is a balanced and thoughtful article and not a blindly critical article at all.

The article reads in part:

"Even if we are successful in eliminating the war in Vietnam," warned Melvin Laird, the Secretary of Defense, last spring, "we are still not going to come up with a drastically reduced defense budget. . . . A drastically reduced defense budget will not provide adequate security in the world in which we live." Secretary Laird presides over a U.S. defense budget of \$80 billion, up 70 percent from 1961. The likelihood of very much reduction, post-Vietnam, is very small in-

deed, as most Defense Department civilians and the military chiefs see it.

A growing number of critics, with long experience in the Defense Department and Budget Bureau, dispute this position. They make a strong case that post-Vietnam defense costs can be cut drastically without either damaging the national security or compromising this country's commitments to its allies. Indeed, careful analysis indicates factors other than "adequate security" are forcing up defense costs today.

The defense budget has been driven upward because much of it is based on strategic assumptions that have gone unchallenged since the early post-World War II years, when the enemy and his threat were quite different. The evidence is strong, too, that the force structure and force levels have been put together by the military chiefs in the absence of a clearly stated national security policy laid down by the White House. Furthermore, under the pressures of the Vietnam war, civilian control over military spending has diminished, efficiency has decreased, and a large amount of "gold plating" of the forces has taken place under the guise of meeting the needs of the war. Unless brought under control, these trends can easily drive the defense budget to more than \$100 billion within a few years. In fact, the Joint Chiefs for the past three years have requested a budget in excess of \$105 billion, and President Nixon, at the end of his campaign, foresaw defense spending, excluding the Vietnam war, rising to \$87 billion by 1972.

Fortune believes that a post-Vietnam defense budget of around \$61 billion would allow the U.S. to remain the world's No. 1 military power without any major change in its commitments, in its ability to meet military contingencies, or in its basic strategic concepts.

Mr. President, this is a very important observation by Fortune magazine, and I think it is one in which the Senate and the House of Representatives are going to have the most serious and significant debate over the next few years.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I am delighted to yield to the distinguished Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I saw those articles in Fortune magazine, but have not had a chance to study them as has the able senior Senator from Wisconsin. I listened with interest to his comments.

In 1950, the budget for the Defense Department, just shortly after the end of the Berlin airlift, at a time when Mr. Stalin was still alive, was some \$13,800,000,000 for all three services. A check shows the dollar has been reduced in value since 1950 almost exactly 50 percent. Therefore, assuming that the same relative dangers are present, the budget would be \$27,600,000,000. Nevertheless, last year and this year, and I believe several years preceding, it has been somewhere between 75 and 80 billion dollars, depending on the final figures.

Does not the Senator believe that it will be impossible for this country to fulfill the obligations it has to its own people unless the vast size of this military defense budget can be reduced?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I agree wholeheartedly with that. I think that unless the size of the military budget is reduced, no matter what we do in the way of taxes, we will continue to have a serious

and increasingly difficult inflationary situation. Unless the military budget is reduced, while we will make an effort in the area of solving our domestic problems, we will be inhibited from doing it. I do not see how we can do it effectively. Certainly, we cannot do it consistent with anything like a sound dollar or control over rising prices.

Mr. SYMINGTON. It is my understanding that the total personal individual annual income tax of the United States is some \$63 billion. Therefore, the cost of this military budget is a good many billion dollars more than that total income tax. We had considerable discussion on the floor with respect to the importance or lack of importance of a 10-percent surtax, which, in effect, is a war tax. With all due respect to this additional tax and based on the knowledge the Senator from Wisconsin has—he is one of the ranking members of the Committee on Banking and Currency and has done a most outstanding job as chairman of the Joint Economic Committee—does he think that the effects of this tax will have a major impact on the problem we are discussing this afternoon?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I do not. Once again, the simple logic applies which one of my constituents presented me within my State a week or so ago.

He said:

I don't understand how the federal government can argue that they are going to limit inflation by taking money from my pocket, taking money that I otherwise spend, and spending it themselves. It is true if they would take the money and not spend it or hold down their spending, it might have some anti-inflationary effect. But if they are going to spend money, how does that help us cope with the inflationary problem? How does it limit demand?

He is absolutely right.

Furthermore, I think all kinds of studies have shown that whether we have a balanced budget or not—and we all want that—as we increase our overall spending, even if we increase our taxes, the impact is sure to be inflationary.

This is especially true with military spending, because the spending does not satisfy any economic need. We are not providing more houses, more education, more job training, or meeting any of the economic needs. We are increasing payrolls and demands in military spending. We are not supplying any more goods to meet that demand.

Mr. SYMINGTON. In many cases we are just providing more cash to foreign countries. Is that correct?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes, indeed.

Mr. SYMINGTON. At a time when this Government, under the previous administration, was concentrating almost entirely on monetary effort as against fiscal effort to correct the steadily worsening financial problems, such as the continuing imbalance in our balance of payments, some of us, including the distinguished majority leader, felt that it might be wise to reduce at least some of our troops in Europe, troops sent there with understanding they would remain there for a maximum of some 18 months. They have now been there for over a quarter of a century. One of the reasons why we felt

it might be wise to at least partially reduce these troops—especially inasmuch as they were on the soil of the countries in question—was that never once since the agreement that created SHAPE, have any of those countries come anywhere near meeting what they said they would do when NATO was started; whereas, there never has been a year, a month, or day in which the United States has not met in full the commitments it made to those countries.

On this floor as well as in other places, however, the idea we could remove any troops from Europe at this time was viewed with—I think it is fair to say—consternation; and nothing was done.

I would ask the able Senator, a true authority in the financial field, and one who has so demonstrated in the many years he has been in the Senate: Does he not feel now that even fiscal effort to control inflation, along with the monetary effort, is now inadequate; and that what we must face up to if we are going to maintain the integrity of the dollar and stop inflation is in some manner to reduce the expenditures of the Federal Government?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I could not agree with the distinguished Senator from Missouri more enthusiastically. He is absolutely right. It is obvious, how can we use monetary policy further. We have come just about to the limit of that, with a prime rate of $8\frac{1}{2}$ percent, which means an effective rate of over 9 percent because of the amount that must be kept on deposit, and these are the top credit borrowers.

High interest rates are crucifying the homebuilding industry. We had testimony by the head of the homebuilders industry before the Committee on Banking and Currency a few days ago, in which he estimated that we are going to have a genuine depression in homebuilding because of these high interest rates.

We cannot rely, as I have tried to bring out, on tax policy. It seems to me that the only real answer is to cut military spending sharply.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I congratulate the able Senator from Wisconsin for his further effort to bring our Government balance sheet into balance. It is always rewarding to listen to him present such information.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the distinguished Senator.

Mr. President, I wish to emphasize that the most significant debate that is going to take place during the next several years in Congress will be over the size of the military budget, whether it will be, as President Nixon said last November, \$87 billion in 1972, or \$61 billion or thereabouts, which is the proposed level in Fortune magazine. Our decision is going to have a great effect in this country in terms of our economic stability and how we meet our very pressing domestic problems.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me briefly?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I have only a few more paragraphs, but I am happy to yield to the Senator now if he wishes.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I shall only be 2 or 3 minutes.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, as always, I appreciate the very diligent efforts of the Senator from Wisconsin. He is a great worker and he digs for the facts. He is helpful in anything he goes into, including this matter.

However, I wish to point out to the Senator and others that when it comes to magazine articles or editorial writers in Fortune magazine or any other magazine just making the flat statement that everything is escalating and that it will continue at the end of the war, I do not think those statements are facts at all. I believe it takes someone more knowledgeable than an editorial writer could be unless he made a great study of some of these major matters before being in a position to make an analysis such as that or making a decision on a weapon, and particularly a defensive weapon.

Mr. President, I speak with all deference to the Senator. I think if a man makes a survey such as that, he has to know something about war plans, and he has to know a good deal about strategy, and he must have a board of advisers that could make an analysis of all these matters.

Mr. President, I think you must have economists and financial experts who can analyze what the situation is and others who can analyze that analysis and bring in a report.

With all deference to the writer of the article and the Senator, magazines do have their place for reading, but here we are talking about a decision on a major military weapon.

We are going to reduce this budget, I believe. I have already said that for my part there is \$10 billion I want to reduce as soon as the shooting stops, and that is to get the combined military forces back to the same level they were when the war started. That would reduce it, in round numbers, by a million men, which figured at \$10,000 a man, would be \$10 billion. That is real money and I think it can be done. I asked General Wheeler about that the other day. He gave me substantial figures, speaking more or less off the cuff. He is the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs, as the Senator knows.

Instead of escalating, this matter is going down if I can have anything to do with it and if the Senator from Wisconsin has anything to do with it, and I think we can. But I do not believe we can judge whether we are to vote one way or another on a weapons system at this time based on such speculation as appears in a magazine article.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I should have forewarned the Senator. This article in Fortune magazine assumes the ABM system will go ahead. The implication, although this is not stated, is that Fortune does not object to the ABM deployment now.

They are talking about the overall cost of our military establishment. The Senator is correct. One can never rely on the writer of a magazine article, but only on the facts and statistics that are set forth

if they are verified. That is entirely what I am relying on. I do not know the man who wrote the article and I do not know his background but the facts and the statistics which are cited are in my view persuasive.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, before the distinguished Senator from Mississippi leaves the Chamber, I hope the Senator from Wisconsin will leave in the Record the high compliment the article pays the Senator from Mississippi for the fine work he has been doing in this field recently. Unfortunately, he was not in the Chamber when that was brought out.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I wish to say again for the purpose of the Record that the distinguished Senator from Missouri, in quoting these figures, did not point out that approximately \$30 billion a year of our defense budget is connected with the Vietnam situation. Therefore, when one is determining comparative figures between \$50 billion–\$69 billion—one has to take into account the fact that we have been injected into this war which many of us wish had not happened. Let us put it that way. I think that must be considered in connection with the entire situation.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the able Senator from Colorado knows I respect his opinion in this field and all other fields. If one adds the current cost of the Vietnamese war to the added cost incident to inflation, and we would have a defense budget of \$57 billion as against the current figure, which at the beginning of the year was approximately \$80 billion.

Mr. DOMINICK. That figure is not quite correct.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Fairly close. I believe the Senator made reference on this in the article to testimony before the committees that even if the war in Vietnam were to stop it would be doubtful if we could make a substantial reduction in the military budget.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I wish to confirm what the Senator has said. First we had the President, Mr. Nixon, who said on November 3 or 4 of last year, that he anticipated that after the war was over the military budget would be \$87 billion. Second, he had testimony before the Joint Economic Committee by Mr. Moot, the Comptroller of the Defense Department, who said that in his view he could not see how we could get the budget below \$80 billion after the war is over.

That is why I say that this matter is so crucial overall, and not relating to the ABM. I should have made that clear.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, these statements may be true and I am sure that the statements the Senator quoted

were made. However, after all, the appropriating and authorizing committees will determine the budget. The distinguished Senator from Mississippi has just indicated that he is in favor of cutting our Armed Forces by 1 million men, most of whom have been put in to take care of our problems in Vietnam and elsewhere.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, from the article I would like to indicate where they would make cutbacks. Sometimes when we get into specifics there are disagreements.

The article states:

A cutback of the 800,000 military men, as well as the naval ships and Air Force tactical squadrons that have been added since the Vietnam buildup in 1965;

In addition, the elimination of three and a half Army divisions and three tactical air wings now deployed in Europe and Asia;

A paring down of weapon systems of low cost effectiveness, such as tactical nuclear forces and certain Navy carrier units;

Minor adjustments in the strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces, principally a reduction in the B-52 bomber fleet, and dropping plans for a new intercontinental bomber;

A sharp cut in funds requested by the military for modernization of weapons or improved performance, through management-control devices such as the trade-off concept—i.e., the principle that for each additional dollar spent on procurement, a dollar must be saved elsewhere;

Greater over-all efficiency in the use of manpower, and a crackdown on wasteful procurement of new weapons.

Clearly there is no magic number to answer the question of how much defense is enough, a question as old as war itself. The problem of deciding how much is enough is not unlike that of buying insurance. You don't buy insurance for all conceivable disaster, but only enough to cover possible losses that you cannot afford to take. The threat of potential enemies—the U.S.S.R., Red China, even Cuba—and the strategy chosen to meet these threats play an important part in the design and cost of the military forces. For example, if the country should revert to the defense posture of the Eisenhower years and cut six Army divisions and six tactical air wings, the post-Vietnam budget would be around \$54 billion. A post-Vietnam "minimum nuclear-deterrence" budget, which would in addition cut out portions of the nuclear striking force and tactical nuclear force, would cost only \$42 billion a year. On the other hand, a "nuclear-superiority" budget, which would keep land, sea, and air forces at their present levels and provide an advanced intercontinental ballistic missile, a new strategic bomber, heavy antiballistic-missile defense, and an expanded fallout-shelter program, would run close to \$100 billion.

The U.S. conventional forces in the Far East, other than those fighting in Vietnam, originally were put there on the theory that if trouble started in Europe, China would probably apply a blowtorch to the U.S. in Asia. Despite the Soviet-Chinese rift of recent years, these forces have been kept there on the newer theory that China might make trouble independently of the Russians. But the former State Department specialist disagrees. "Many of us today," he says, "no longer think an overland attack by China is likely in view of the natural barriers and the structure of its armed forces. The country's political policies just don't run that way. If you conclude, as many of us have, that we don't need to meet a Red Chinese ground attack against Southeast Asia with conventional ground forces, and that the probability of Russia attempting to grab Berlin is receding, you could start weakening the two-plus capability."

TRIMMING THE \$24-BILLION-A-YEAR NAVY

As regards conventional forces, such challenges to long-held assumptions lead to several conclusions:

The U.S. forces allocated to NATO can be trimmed significantly; with their supporting components they cost today about \$14 billion annually and constitute *in themselves* a more powerful fighting force than any in the world except that of the Soviet Union.

Since simultaneous attacks by the U.S.S.R. and China are a remote possibility, the two-plus contingency capability can be reduced somewhat, in the direction of the one-plus capability that existed during the Eisenhower Administration.

The U.S. Navy, which is larger than all the rest of the world's navies, friendly and hostile, put together, can be significantly reduced in size. The fleet is designed to have the capability of fighting an ill-defined mission, called "War at Sea" in defense posture statements. Curiously, the Navy's mission was given much of its present definition during the landlocked crisis of August, 1961, when the Berlin Wall was built. Feeling itself hopelessly outclassed by the Soviet Union on the ground, the U.S. decided to offset this, in part, with an overwhelming naval force, which, in the event of future Soviet land grabs, could quickly assert and capitalize on control of the seas. This reasoning, now used in support of a \$24.4-billion-a-year Navy, is highly dubious.

THOSE VULNERABLE TACTICAL NUKES

The Navy's fifteen attack carriers, among the most costly and vulnerable of weapon systems, are also viewed as excessive even by some of Laird's key aides. But again congressional support in the armed-services committees has blocked repeated efforts to reduce this attack carrier force to a more realistic size. One solution long advocated by the office of the Secretary of Defense is to adopt the system, used with Polaris submarines, of rotating crews instead of ships on station. The Navy contends it needs two backup carriers for each carrier on station, but under a crew-rotation system the total number of ships could be reduced with no loss of combat effectiveness. It is highly doubtful, also, that the country still needs all of its enormously expensive and porous continental air defenses against a small Russian long-range bomber force, or that it will need, after Vietnam, all of the Air Force's twenty-three tactical air wings.

Increasingly, too, defense analysts are questioning the role of tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons, which still form the centerpiece of U.S. forces in NATO, no longer provide any military advantage over the Warsaw Pact countries, which now are also armed with them. Though tactical nuclear power has been growing rapidly during the past decade, there is little appreciation by the public of its dangers and its limitations. William Kaufmann of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has argued, in an unpublished study, that NATO field commanders would quickly lose control of their forces in the devastation that would follow a tactical nuclear fire fight. He cites war games showing that if tactical weapons were employed in Europe to stop a Russian advance on NATO, front-line troop casualties would be 20 percent a day. After a few days of this so-called "limited" nuclear war, civilian casualties would reach 1,700,000 dead and 3,500,000 wounded. In these circumstances the pressures to escalate to general nuclear war would be intense. Kaufmann also notes that tactical nuclear weapons are highly vulnerable to a surprise preemptive strike by an enemy because they are in "soft," exposed locations.

Mr. President, I have two or three other excerpts which I should like to read at this time:

THE HIGH COST OF GOLD PLATE

Regardless of the fact that the cost of Vietnam has declined from \$29 billion in 1968 to \$25 billion this year, other defense costs are heading upward under pressure from the military chiefs. Instead of becoming available for civilian programs this year, the \$4-billion saving in Vietnam costs was channeled into the non-Vietnam segments of the defense budget.

Of course it is true that the Armed Services Committee has cut that by \$2 billion. And the Nixon administration has cut it another \$1 billion, so that is some saving.

Continuing reading:

Price increases and sharply rising military pay costs are swallowing part of the savings. Inflation has added \$1.6 billion to defense costs in the past three years, and may add another \$3 billion by 1974. Pay increases, which cost \$5.8 billion in the last two years, will add \$7.4 billion more by 1974.

Beyond price and wage inflation, however, the military have since 1965 been "gold-plating" their forces—i.e., indulging in additional, and often excessive, increases in capital investment—and this has added billions to the cost of defense. An Army division of, say, 15,000 combat and 30,000 support troops costs \$680 million to equip and maintain today as opposed to \$550 million four years ago, largely because of the addition of costly helicopters, new small arms, and communication equipment. The \$900,000 of avionics in today's F-4 fighter bomber costs 20 percent more than an entire F-100 did in 1961. New destroyers, at \$57 million apiece, cost more than three times as much as those built during the Korean war.

Fortune's budget assumes deployment of the controversial Safeguard ballistic-missile defense system, whose costs in 1972 are estimated here at \$2 billion annually. Also included in the budget are funds for the Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles, both assumed to be equipped with new MIRV (multiple, independently targeted) warheads. Both missiles are included, even though there is a strong case for relying on Poseidon alone, thereby saving the \$400 million a year that Minuteman III will cost by 1972.

After the proposed cuts, the U.S. would still have the most powerful and diversified military force in the world; it would not be returning to a form of isolationism nor would it be in the position of carrying out unilateral disarmament. The analysis indicates that if many of the long outdated assumptions in the defense field are questioned, sharp eyes and sharp pencils, in President Nixon's words, can produce a streamlined defense budget better suited to the realities of the 1970's.

EXHIBIT 1

THE CASE FOR CUTTING DEFENSE SPENDING¹

(By Jan Cameron)

THE "SHOW-ME" SCHOOL OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE ANALYSTS

The defense policies of the Seventies will be influenced by the advice and expertise of Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard and Laurence Lynn, Jr., who is on the staff of the National Security Council, head a Nixon defense-strategy review that promises

¹ In the preparation of this article, Fortune has received valuable assistance from William Kaufmann, a former Defense Department consultant now at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Robert Benson, formerly in the controller's office in the Defense Department and now with the Urban Coalition in Washington. However, neither is responsible for, nor necessarily concurs in, the conclusions drawn or all of the specific budget cuts proposed.

to be the most far-ranging reappraisal of policy and force levels ever undertaken by any Administration. Foreign-policy specialist Henry Owen of the Brookings Institution and Carl Kaysen, director of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, are engaged in private defense studies that have already attracted wide attention, inside and outside the federal government. Henry Rowen, president of Rand Corp., and his former associate James R. Schlesinger, now assistant director of the Budget Bureau, have helped develop the analytical tools, in large part derived from corporate management, that are being used widely today within the government to examine military forces, weapons systems, and budgets. Charles L. Schultze, former Director of the Budget and senior fellow at Brookings, is contributing his detailed knowledge of defense and over-all federal budgeting to studies to how to reduce defense costs to realistic levels. Another important contributor to the new ferment is Robert Anthony, former controller of the Defense Department, now professor of management control at Harvard Business School.

"Even if we are successful in eliminating the war in Vietnam," warned Melvin Laird, the Secretary of Defense, last spring, "we are still not going to come up with a drastically reduced defense budget. . . . A drastically reduced defense budget will not provide adequate security in the world in which we live." Secretary Laird presides over a U.S. defense budget of \$80 billion, up 70 percent from 1961. The likelihood of very much reduction, post-Vietnam, is very small indeed, as most Defense Department civilians and the military chiefs see it.

A growing number of critics, with long experience in the Defense Department and Budget Bureau, dispute this position. They make a strong case that post-Vietnam defense costs can be cut drastically without either damaging the national security or compromising this country's commitments to its allies. Indeed, careful analysis indicates factors other than "adequate security" are forcing up defense costs today.

The defense budget has been driven upward because much of it is based on strategic assumptions that have gone unchallenged since the early post-World War II years, when the enemy and his threat were quite different. The evidence is strong, too, that the force structure and force levels have been put together by the military chiefs in the absence of a clearly stated national security policy laid down by the White House. Furthermore, under the pressures of the Vietnam war, civilian control over military spending has diminished, efficiency has decreased, and a large amount of "gold plating" of the forces has taken place under the guise of meeting the needs of the war. Unless brought under control, these trends can easily drive the defense budget to more than \$100 billion within a few years. In fact, the Joint Chiefs for the past three years have requested a budget in excess of \$105 billion, and President Nixon, at the end of his campaign, foresaw defense spending, excluding the Vietnam war, rising to \$87 billion by 1972.

FORTUNE believes that a post-Vietnam defense budget of around \$61 billion would allow the U.S. to remain the world's No. 1 military power without any major change in its commitments, in its ability to meet military contingencies, or in its basic strategic concepts. To reach this level would require, among other things:

A cutback of the 800,000 military men, as well as the naval ships and Air Force tactical squadrons that have been added since the Vietnam buildup in 1965;

In addition, the elimination of three and a half Army divisions and three tactical air wings now deployed in Europe and Asia;

A paring down of weapon systems of low cost effectiveness, such as tactical nuclear forces and certain Navy carrier units;

Minor adjustments in the strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces, principally a reduction in the B-52 bomber fleet, and dropping plans for a new intercontinental bomber;

A sharp cut in funds requested by the military for modernization of weapons or improved performance, through management-control devices such as the trade-off concept—i.e., the principle that for each additional dollar spent on procurement, a dollar must be saved elsewhere;

Greater over-all efficiency in the use of manpower, and a crackdown on wasteful procurement of new weapons.

Clearly there is no magic number to answer the question of how much defense is enough, a question as old as war itself. The problem of deciding how much is enough is not unlike that of buying insurance. You don't buy insurance for all conceivable disasters, but only enough to cover possible losses that you cannot afford to take. The threat of potential enemies—the U.S.S.R., Red China, even Cuba—and the strategy chosen to meet these threats play an important part in the design and cost of the military forces. For example, if the country should revert to the defense posture of the Eisenhower years and cut six Army divisions and six tactical air wings, the post-Vietnam budget would be around \$54 billion. A post-Vietnam "minimum nuclear-deterrence" budget, which would in addition cut out portions of the nuclear striking force and tactical nuclear force, would cost only \$42 billion a year. On the other hand, a "nuclear-superiority" budget, which would keep land, sea, and air forces at their present levels and provide an advanced intercontinental ballistic missile, a new strategic bomber, heavy anti-ballistic-missile defense, and an expanded fallout-shelter program, would run close to \$100 billion.

THE ORIGINS OF NON-POLICY

The Nixon Administration has already initiated what promises to be the most profound and basic reappraisal ever undertaken of the political-military threat facing the U.S., and of the defense structure needed to cope with it. The first results of this review, being carried on jointly by a National Security Council staff under Laurence Lynn, and the Defense Department under Deputy Secretary David Packard, should be reflected in next year's defense budget. Meanwhile the Joint Economic Committee, under the lead of Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, as well as several informal congressional groups such as the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, is conducting its own re-examination of defense policy. These efforts, like private defense studies now under way in the Brookings Institution under Henry Owen, former chairman of the State Department's policy planning council, reflect a widespread feeling that for too long the public and Congress have left such policies unquestioned. The result, in this view, is that defense and its spiraling cost have been largely the handiwork of the Pentagon and a handful of knowledgeable but uncritical Congressmen on the House and Senate Armed Services committees.

Since the early Kennedy years there has been no formal statement of national security policy such as existed in the 1940's under Truman, and later under Eisenhower. Under Eisenhower, for instance, the President and National Security Council formulated each year a document called the Basic National Security Policy on which the force levels and structure were based. Each spring Eisenhower would set a rough defense-budget target, based on this policy and on a percentage of estimated federal revenues for the coming year. The President, in effect, allocated a portion of the budget to the military and then let the military chiefs and Defense Secretary get the most defense they could

out of it. Or, as Eisenhower's Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson used to put it, get a bigger bang for a buck.

President Kennedy scrapped this procedure, including the rather abstract National Security Council policy papers, and turned defense policy and budgeting over to his brilliant, self-confident Defense chief, Robert McNamara. Allocating funds from a predetermined budget ceiling, McNamara said, was no way to go about setting a defense budget; the better approach was to find out what tasks the military had to perform, and then try to accomplish them at the lowest possible cost. One of McNamara's deputy secretaries explained the process in this manner: "We would start with a rough estimate of how much of our resources we would commit to defense. Then we would feed in intelligence appraisals from both the military and CIA on the threat, from which the Joint Chiefs would draw up a force structure and level to meet the threat. Usually the cost would be too high by about 20 percent. Through the summer and fall, the chiefs and the civilians would squeeze this budget down through a series of hard bargaining sessions. When our defense budget got to the President in December he would say the total cost was still too high, and a final cut would be made to meet the White House goals." The end result of this process would appear in the celebrated posture statements of Secretary McNamara, which, in some 200 pages, laid down the national security policy as he saw it in the first chapters, then presented detailed arguments in support of force levels needed to fulfill the policy.

FORCES BY LEGACY

The Nixon Administration believes there were some major flaws in the process. First of all, neither the White House, nor the State Department, nor the Budget Bureau was consulted on the wide range of strategies and force options associated with them except on an informal basis. (The big exception was nuclear weapons on which the White House exercised close control.) One of President Kennedy's and President Johnson's closest national security advisers cannot recall that the question of how many contingencies the nation should be prepared to meet simultaneously ever came to the White House for a decision: "There were no decisions of that kind when I was in the White House. Nor did we ever review the force level. A lot of things were not decided. Five divisions in NATO, two in Korea, were derived from history. We inherited them and no one questioned the premise. After Kennedy, the White House staff was involved much less in the defense budget. Johnson had no interest in strategy unless it related to a decision he had to make at the time. His only strategic contribution was to put a limit on our nuclear forces. He stopped piling nuclear warheads one on top of another."

McNamara, in describing for the first time the defense establishment in terms of its major roles and in funding the Defense structure five years in advance (research and development programs for eight years in advance), provided long-needed tools for analyzing the costs of various missions. But there were curious gaps in his process. McNamara felt it was not his role to challenge basic national commitments. One former aide recalls that whenever the military chiefs asked what kind of national security policy they were designing forces to implement, "I would have to try to piece it together from newspaper articles and government papers." Although the Budget Bureau has forty-six aides assigned to monitoring the defense budget, McNamara acted in effect as his own budget chief. He concentrated his review on the new weapon requests and, budget officials say now, questioned—but felt unable to do battle on Capitol Hill to cut—billions of dollars of ongoing spending on weapons and missions that had outlived their need.

Charles Schultze, Director of the Budget in the Johnson Administration, and now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, concedes he deferred too much to McNamara's judgments: "Frankly, when I was in the Budget Bureau, it frequently did not occur to me to ask the kinds of questions about underlying assumptions that I can see so clearly in hindsight needed asking."

The size of the conventional Army, Navy, and Air Force today is based on the need to have the capability of fighting simultaneously a land war in Europe and Asia, plus a minor conflict in this hemisphere. Although this concept dates from 1962, it is difficult today to find an official from either the Nixon or Johnson Administration who can explain when or how this capability became part of U.S. military doctrine, much less whether it is still valid. Like the forces committed to NATO and Korea, it has been part of accepted doctrine. The Nixon review is questioning all of these basic and long-accepted policies.

MINIMUM VERSUS MAXIMUM DETERRENCE

In estimating the nation's defense needs, it is important to distinguish between the strategic nuclear forces, which account for about 40 percent of current military spending, and general-purpose forces, which account for the remainder. At one extreme, the strategic nuclear forces—the ICBMs, the B-52 fleet, the forty-one Polaris submarines, and the continental air defense—can be structured on a so-called minimum deterrence basis, or second-strike capability. Supporters of this concept argue that so long as the U.S. possesses, after a first strike by the U.S.S.R., the ability to inflict a very significant level of damage on the enemy in a second or retaliatory strike, that is all the nuclear deterrence we need. The rough gauge of a credible second-strike capability is power enough to destroy one-quarter of an enemy's population and one-half its industry, thereby effectively eliminating it as a twentieth-century power. This is the general assumption on which the U.S. strategic nuclear forces have been built since 1961.

At the other end of the scale is the doctrine of nuclear dominance in which the U.S. would strive for a clearly preponderant offensive capability, one superior in every way to that of the Soviet Union. In addition, there would be a major-damage limiting capability, through defensive missile strength, to prevent an enemy from inflicting an unacceptable number of fatalities or other damage on the U.S. in a nuclear exchange. At its extreme, nuclear superiority would give the U.S. a so-called first-strike capability—i.e., the ability to destroy so much of the enemy's retaliatory capacity in a surprise attack as to neutralize effectively its second-strike capability. In budget terms, the difference between these two doctrines is estimated at around \$27 billion annually.

The general-purpose forces, which account for the remaining 60 percent of the current defense budget, also provide a wide range of budget options. These forces are designed to allow the U.S. to control a land or sea area or deny it to the enemy in a limited war or counterinsurgency situation, as opposed to destroying an enemy's population or industry. The size and deployment of these forces are not so much related to the defense of U.S. territory as they are to the defense of other countries. This is underscored today by the fact that seventeen of the nation's thirty-two and two-thirds active and reserve divisions are stationed in Europe, Korea, and Vietnam; and that nearly half of our 5,000 tactical and attack aircraft in fighting units are based overseas, along with nearly a third of the Navy's 700 general-purpose ships.

These general-purpose forces can be designed, at one extreme, for a fortress America or Western Hemisphere strategy under which the U.S. would maintain sufficient

conventional land and sea power to protect the continental U.S. from, say, a Cuban foray, but would not feel it in the national interest to wage a non-nuclear war outside the hemisphere. At the other extreme is a concept of containment under which fifty-two U.S. divisions would be deployed in forward positions from Norway to Japan to prevent the loss of an inch of soil to the Communists. The budget difference in costs between these two strategies would be in the neighborhood of \$40 billion annually. The present U.S. policy, which is to have conventional forces capable of meeting two major and one minor contingencies simultaneously—known as the "two-plus contingency capability"—is in a middle position.

PARING THE TWO-PLUS CAPABILITY

The generals and admirals, in arguing for larger standing forces and more sophisticated weapons, both strategic and conventional, warn over and over again that the military threat is great and growing. They cite the growing strategic nuclear power of the Russians and the Red Chinese efforts to develop a nuclear striking force. The buildup of the Soviet Union's submarine fleet, and its growing if still modest naval surface force, plus the prototypes of a new generation of fighter aircraft, are also cited as elements of the rising threat. Military men tend to want to meet enemy forces on a one-to-one basis regardless of great differences between the U.S. and its potential enemies in such elements as firepower and mobility. No President since five-star General Eisenhower has been successful in forcing major reductions in the defense budget over their ceaseless warnings of imminent peril.

Outside the Pentagon, however, many of the country's civilian watchdogs of defense spending take a different view. They concede that ever since the Soviet military weakness was revealed during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the U.S.S.R. has been trying to close the gap between its strategic forces and the rapidly growing nuclear power of the U.S. But this does not lead, they believe, to a firm conclusion that the enemy, as the military imply, is striving for a first-strike capability. Nor is there necessarily a relationship between the U.S.S.R.'s nuclear buildup and the need for the U.S. to maintain a conventional force of more than a million men, along with their ships, planes, tanks, and other hardware, in some 400 major bases around the world. A former State Department official intimately connected with national security planning in the Johnson Administration says: "Our commitments and force goals associated with them, both for NATO and the Far East [excluding Vietnam], account for about two-thirds of our defense costs today. These commitments stem from history and not from any clear analysis of whether or not the threat that led to troop deployments in the late 1940's and 1950's is still valid."

U.S. forces are stationed in Europe, this analyst says, as much to maintain a military balance between the West Germans and the other NATO countries as to meet a possible Russian push westward. Even after last year's Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Europeans regard the possibility of a Russian-initiated conventional war against NATO as an American fantasy. In the unlikely event that the U.S.S.R. launched a purely conventional invasion of Western Europe, critics of current Pentagon thinking say, NATO ground forces would be too weak to halt it without resorting to tactical nuclear weapons. In any event, it is the fear of nuclear war, and not the U.S. Seventh Army, that has contained the U.S.S.R. in Europe.

The U.S. conventional forces in the Far East, other than those fighting in Vietnam, originally were put there on the theory that if trouble started in Europe, China would

probably apply a blowtorch to the U.S. in Asia. Despite the Soviet-Chinese rift of recent years, these forces have been kept there on the newer theory that China might make trouble independently of the Russians. But the former State Department specialist disagrees. "Many of us today," he says, "no longer think an overland attack by China is likely in view of the natural barriers and the structure of its armed forces. The country's political policies just don't run that way. If you conclude, as many of us have, that we don't need to meet a Red Chinese ground attack against Southeast Asia with conventional ground forces, and that the probability of Russia attempting to grab Berlin is receding, you could start weakening the two-plus capability."

TRIMMING THE \$24-BILLION-A-YEAR NAVY

As regards conventional forces, such challenges to long-held assumptions lead to several conclusions:

The U.S. forces allocated to NATO can be trimmed significantly; with their supporting components they cost today about \$14 billion annually and constitute in themselves a more powerful fighting force than any in the world except that of the Soviet Union.

Since simultaneous attacks by the U.S.S.R. and China are a remote possibility, the two-plus contingency capability can be reduced somewhat, in the direction of the one-plus capability that existed during the Eisenhower Administration.

The U.S. Navy, which is larger than all the rest of the world's navies, friendly and hostile, put together, can be significantly reduced in size. The fleet is designed to have the capability of fighting an ill-defined mission, called "War at Sea" in defense posture statements. Curiously, the Navy's mission was given much of its present definition during the landlocked crisis of August, 1961, when the Berlin Wall was built. Feeling itself hopelessly outclassed by the Soviet Union on the ground, the U.S. decided to offset this, in part, with an overwhelming naval force, which, in the event of future Soviet land grabs, could quickly assert and capitalize on control of the seas. This reasoning, now used in support of a \$24.4-billion-a-year Navy, is highly dubious.

Within the Defense Department, talk of such cuts draws angry rejoinders. An assistant to Secretary Laird snaps that those proposing large defense cuts are backing away from the strategy of collective defense that the nation adopted after World War II: "Nobody has the guts to say to hell with collective defense, and to come out and say they prefer reverting to spheres of influence. Instead they hack away at the force level, at new spending for weapons like the ABM and the MIRV, at military assistance and the financing of arms sales to friendly countries." Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, a soft-spoken Republican with wide experience in foreign affairs, however, does propose a reappraisal of collective defense. "The strategy of containment through collective-security treaties," he says, "does need to be revised—even in Europe where increasingly it will be neither wanted nor needed for much longer. Countries like Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines want our forces at first, but once they have been there a while, nationalism is aroused by their presence. Whatever stability the U.S. has brought to the world has come, not through stationing conventional forces around the world, but through its economic aid and military assistance, and the nuclear umbrella we hold over our allies." Cooper calls for a sharp reduction of troops stationed abroad, and a redrawing of U.S. commitments to cover the two areas he feels are most vital to the U.S.—Europe and Japan.

Even such Senate hawks as John Stennis of Mississippi, chairman of the Senate Armed

Services Committee, are increasingly bothered by the current concept of collective defense—involving, as it does, alliances with over forty governments thousands of miles from the continental U.S. "These commitments," Stennis says, "were no more priced out in terms of money or troops than my grandchildren's baby shoes. I voted for some of these alliances. The theory was that these alliances would boost morale to the point where we would not be called on to deliver. But it has not worked out that way." Instead, Stennis and others point out, the U.S. has wound up as a major supplier of ground forces to Europe and Asia.

Beyond the doubts about current force levels and their deployment, there are compelling arguments that certain weapon systems continue to exist after the rationale for them has disappeared. The eight aging antisubmarine (ASW) carrier task forces, for example, are only marginally effective. As former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford said in his posture statement last January, this carrier force "is costly to operate in relationship to its effectiveness, particularly against the newer Soviet nuclear-powered submarines." If the Pentagon's civilians had had their way, this force would probably have been shrunk down long ago and the primary ASW role turned over to the nuclear attack submarines and land-based aircraft. But the armed-services committees of Congress have shielded the Navy from cutbacks, on the theory that the expenditure of additional millions on new carriers and aircraft can somehow make these task forces more effective.

THOSE VULNERABLE TACTICAL NUKES

The Navy's fifteen attack carrier's, among the most costly and vulnerable of weapon systems, are also viewed as excessive even by some of Laird's key aides. But again congressional support in the armed-services committees has blocked repeated efforts to reduce this attack carrier force to a more realistic size. One solution long advocated by the office of the Secretary of Defense is to adopt the system, used with Polaris submarines, of rotating crews instead of ships on station. The Navy contends it needs two backup carriers for each carrier on station, but under a crew-rotation system the total number of ships could be reduced with no loss of combat effectiveness. It is highly doubtful, also, that the country still needs all of its enormously expensive and porous continental air defenses against a small Russian long-range bomber force, or that it will need, after Vietnam, all of the Air Force's twenty-three tactical air wings.

Increasingly, too, defense analysts are questioning the role of tactical nuclear weapons. These weapons, which still form the centerpiece of U.S. forces in NATO, no longer provide any military advantage over the Warsaw Pact countries, which now are also armed with them. Though tactical nuclear power has been growing rapidly during the past decade, there is little appreciation by the public of its dangers and its limitations. William Kaufmann of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has argued, in an unpublished study, that NATO field commanders would quickly lose control of their forces in the devastation that would follow a tactical nuclear fire fight. He cites war games showing that if tactical weapons were employed in Europe to stop a Russian advance on NATO, front-line troop casualties would be 20 percent a day. After a few days of this so-called "limited" nuclear war, civilian casualties would reach 1,700,000 dead and 3,500,000 wounded. In these circumstances the pressures to escalate to general nuclear war would be intense. Kaufmann also notes that tactical nuclear weapons are highly vulnerable to a surprise preemptive strike by an enemy because they are in "soft," exposed locations.

A strong case can be made for turning all

tactical nuclear weapons—those in the hands of the U.S. Air Force and Army as well as NATO allies—over to the U.S. strategic forces, which are far less vulnerable to first-strike attacks. The Vietnam experience has suggested that B-52's could be used to carry tactical nuclear weapons in local warfare; if the enemy's anti-aircraft defense were strong, the bombers could deliver highly accurate air-to-ground missiles launched at a safe distance from the target area. Minuteman and Polaris missiles, too, now can be aimed with sufficient accuracy to hit battlefield targets. Kaufmann has estimated that 200 extra Minuteman ICBM's could be added to the strategic force for this secondary mission for about half the cost of the present tactical nuclear forces, saving \$1 billion a year.

THE HIGH COST OF GOLD PLATE

Regardless of the fact that the cost of Vietnam has declined from \$29 billion in 1968 to \$25 billion this year, other defense costs are heading upward under pressure from the military chiefs. Instead of becoming available for civilian programs this year, the \$4-billion saving in Vietnam costs was channeled into the non-Vietnam segments of the defense budget. Price increases and sharply rising military pay costs are swallowing part of the savings. Inflation has added \$1.6 billion to defense costs in the past three years, and may add another \$3 billion by 1974. Pay increases which cost \$5.8 billion in the last two years, will add \$7.4 billion more by 1974.

Beyond price and wage inflation, however, the military have since 1965 been "gold-plating" their forces—i.e., indulging in additional, and often excessive, increases in capital investment—and this has added billions to the cost of defense. An Army division of, say, 15,000 combat and 30,000 support troops costs \$680 million to equip and maintain today as opposed to \$550 million four years ago, largely because of the addition of costly helicopters, new small arms, and communication equipment. The \$900,000 of avionics in today's F-4 fighter bomber costs 20 percent more than an entire F-100 did in 1961. New destroyers, at \$57 million apiece, cost more than three times as much as those built during the Korean war.

Powerful Congressmen in the House Armed Services Committee, led by Chairman Mendel Rivers and ranking Republican Leslie Arends, show little hesitation in authorizing ever fancier and more expensive equipment. Says Arends, who supports the Air Force's request for new manned bombers at \$30 million to \$40 million each, which were opposed by former Secretary McNamara: "When I see us bombing in Vietnam with fifteen-year-old B-52's whose wings are about to fall off I know we need a follow-up bomber."

Senator Stennis supports the Navy's new nuclear-powered attack carriers, which, with new aircraft and their nuclear escort destroyers, will cost at least \$2.4 billion per carrier task force. This means that to put a nuclear-powered attack carrier and its 100 tactical aircraft on station in the Tonkin Gulf, and to provide two backup carriers, requires an investment of about \$7 billion, plus operating and maintenance costs of over \$700 million annually—far in excess of what land-based aircraft would cost.

The necessity for such costly items as nuclear-powered carriers and escorts has seldom been critically examined by Congress. Inadequate staff on the armed-services committees is one reason for this lack of review. Senator Daniel Ken Inouye of Hawaii, a member of the Armed Services Committee, points out that the committee, handling authorizations that cover close to half of the federal government's budget, has the smallest staff on Capitol Hill.

PRICING OUT A 1965 POSTURE

The point of departure for establishing an appropriate post-Vietnam level of spending is the fiscal 1965 budget, which involved

total spending authority of \$50.9 billion. This is selected as a base point because 1965 was the last fiscal year before the nation's large-scale involvement in Vietnam got under way and the year in which Secretary McNamara is generally thought to have achieved the greatest management control over the defense establishment. This level of spending allowed the country to support a small war in Vietnam, land a force in the Dominican Republic, create a large second-strike nuclear capability, and expand as well as modernize the general-purpose forces.

By fiscal 1972, the earliest year in which most of the Vietnam costs could be eliminated, cost and wage inflation would raise the cost of maintaining and equipping an equivalent military force to an estimated \$67.9 billion. The Pentagon is understood to have decided on another \$10.8 billion (in 1972 prices) for procurement of newer and more sophisticated weapons. In sum, unavoidable price and wage increases, plus new weapons and equipment that the military strongly desires, would mean a fiscal 1972 budget of at least \$78.7 billion. In all likelihood the spending would be significantly higher than this, since the Pentagon is anxious to retain a large part of the Vietnam augmentation in manpower. Senator Howard Cannon of Nevada, who sits on the Armed Services Committee, says that the Joint Chiefs have told him not to expect reduction of more than one division after Vietnam.

FORTUNE believes there are several areas of readily obtainable savings, which in 1972 would total \$17.6 billion. Since military manpower accounts for roughly half of the total defense budget, the first step is to shrink manpower back to, and possibly modestly below, the base-line year of 1965. If the armed forces were to be cut by one million from the present 3,500,000, the savings would exceed \$10 billion a year.

The cuts in manpower can be achieved by eliminating the Vietnam military manpower add-on of 800,000 men and by demobilizing three and a half Army divisions, three tactical air wings, and some Navy ships. The major cutbacks would be in Army ground divisions around the world for a generation like the twentieth-century equivalent of the Roman legions. Changing political conditions and the greatly increased capability in airlift (which allows 11,000 combat-equipped troops to be moved from the U.S. to Vietnam in forty-eight hours) argue in support of the manpower reductions. Such reductions, moreover, would lessen the great disparity between the relative defense efforts of the U.S. and its allies. Japan, for example, spends only 1 percent of its gross national product on defense, and the NATO countries 5 percent, while the U.S. spends 9 percent. The U.S. spends nearly as much on the defense of Europe as the rest of its NATO allies combined.

The second area for defense cuts lies in introducing rigid controls over procurement to minimize the "gold-plating" of new weapons, particularly aircraft and naval ships. Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard strongly favors the trade-off concept introduced by McNamara, which in essence says that if you buy more expensive weapons to replace existing ones, in the face of an unchanged threat, they should be more efficient—and hence fewer of them should be needed. As a hypothetical example, assume that in 1962 the Air Force determined it needed 1,000 fighter planes costing \$3 million each. Later it comes in with a proposal to buy new planes that will cost, say, \$6 million apiece. Under the trade-off concept, the Secretary of Defense might well decide to buy only half as many of the new planes, on the theory that each plane should be twice as effective.

Cost-effectiveness analysis, introduced by Secretary McNamara and perhaps overworked in such cases as the F-111, is still a powerful control system. In McNamara's day it ruled against the proposed 2,000-mph ad-

vanced manned strategic bomber (AMSA). The Nixon Administration hasn't decided whether to go ahead with the AMSA, which is still in the early development phase. The two key questions still to be answered are whether there is a role for the manned bomber that cannot be performed better and more cheaply by missiles today, and, if so, what kind of bomber the U.S. should have. Alain Enthoven, former assistant secretary of defense for systems analysis and now a vice president of Litton Industries, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in April, 1968: "Do we want to pour a lot of our country's resources into a new bomber? . . . I do not think that anyone is proposing that a new bomber would have significantly more range or payload than the B-52 [which] already has all that is needed. Once you can get from here to Russia with an adequate payload, then it is unnecessary to increase the payload or range capability." In the era of surface-to-air missiles, defense analysts say, the AMSA's greater speed is no advantage. If anything, they say, the AMSA, flying at higher altitudes than the B-52, would be more vulnerable to anti-aircraft missiles because it would show up on radar sooner.

The third way to achieve savings would be to apply greater efficiencies in the forces and weapon systems that would survive this pruning process. Deputy Secretary Packard is looking for possible economies in the training practices of the services, which cost over \$7 billion a year. A cut in basic training from eight to four weeks for soldiers who will serve short-time hitches in noncombatant specialties could save \$50 million a year. Reducing officer rotation by one-fourth, one defense analyst has estimated, would save \$360 million annually in transportation and moving expenses. Production inefficiencies, although generally overstated, nevertheless offer substantial chances for reductions.

Fortune's proposed budget of \$61.1 billion for fiscal 1972 is not so much a precise arithmetic total as it is a guide to a general level of spending that many informed men think can be readily achieved in the 1970's without impairing the nation's security. Some areas of defense spending such as research and development, communications and intelligence, would not be greatly reduced because tight security places them beyond appraisal. However, former Defense Controller Robert Anthony, for one, believes that improved intelligence-gathering techniques alone would allow cuts of \$500 million. Defense research would be kept at its present level. However, such recent projects as studies of Congo witchcraft, malaria in southern Italy, and how Korean women divers withstand cold water baffle the Pentagon's claim that any R. and D. cuts would "affect in a material way the security of the U.S."

Fortune's budget assumes deployment of the controversial Safeguard-missile defense system, whose costs in 1972 are estimated here at \$2 billion annually. Also, included in the budget are funds for the Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles, both assumed to be equipped with new MIRV (multiple, independently targeted) warheads. Both missiles are included, even though there is a strong case for relying on Poseidon alone, thereby saving the \$400 million a year that Minuteman III will cost by 1972.

The decision to leave these controversial new weapons in the budget is based on the judgment that the U.S.S.R. is pushing ahead with the development of similar weapons, and that the arguments against them, while strong, are not conclusive. A successful outcome of the disarmament talks would, of course, allow cuts in spending on these weapons, while an accelerated buildup in the Soviet nuclear striking force conceivably could boost the post-Vietnam defense budget as high as \$73 billion.

After the proposed cuts, the U.S. would

still have the most powerful and diversified military force in the world; it would not be returning to a form of isolationism nor would it be in the position of carrying out unilateral disarmament. The analysis indicates that if many of the long outdated assumptions in the defense field are questioned, sharp eyes and sharp pencils, in President Nixon's words, can produce a streamlined defense budget better suited to the realities in the 1970's.

HOW TO CUT THE DEFENSE BUDGET BY \$17 BILLION

In estimating a reasonable post-Vietnam military budget, Fortune takes as its starting point the Pentagon's \$50.9 billion of spending authority in fiscal 1965, just before defense costs began spiraling upward because of the Southeast Asian conflict. By fiscal 1972, the earliest year in which Vietnam's cost could be largely eliminated, inflation and increases in military pay would boost the cost of maintaining an equivalent military posture by \$17 billion, to \$67.9 billion, as the table at left shows. However, the procurement of some new and costly weapon systems that the Pentagon has in mind probably would swell the budget further, by at least another \$10.8 billion, bringing the total amount likely to be requested to a minimum of \$78.7 billion. Without changing its basic strategy or reneging on its commitments to

allies, however, the U.S. could safely adopt a "streamlined" 1972 defense budget of only \$61.1 billion.

The table shows how the estimated \$17.6 billion of cutbacks would affect various defense functions, while the table on the right, based on another kind of budget breakdown, shows how these reductions would affect the actual deployment of manpower and weapons. The reductions in weapon systems are based on savings likely in fiscal 1972, at prices of that year, on both direct and indirect operating costs as well as investment in hardware.

The savings from the elimination of four antisubmarine-warfare carriers, for example, include operating costs of \$440 million annually and an investment of \$500 million. The \$7.5 billion of savings in procurement and other efficiencies includes a variety of items ranging from elimination of the advanced manned strategic bomber (\$1.6 billion) and a reduction in annual Navy shipbuilding from \$1.5 billion to \$300 million, to reducing the modernization allowance for each Army division from \$70 million to \$30 million and a hold-down in officer rotation overseas (now every 1.3 years), which would save \$360 million. Other major savings would come from buying less expensive avionics for aircraft and reducing cost overruns through improved contracting procedures.

DEFENSE BUDGET, BY FUNCTION

[In billions]

	1965 actual	1965 actual in 1972 prices	Likely DOD requests for 1972	Streamlined 1972
Strategic forces.....	\$7.1	\$9.3	\$12.9	\$10.8
General-purpose forces.....	19.1	24.9	30.0	18.7
Intelligence and communications.....	4.5	5.9	6.1	5.6
Airlift and sealfit.....	1.4	1.8	2.7	2.2
Guard and reserve forces.....	2.0	2.6	2.6	2.6
Research and development.....	4.7	6.1	6.1	5.5
Central supply and maintenance.....	4.2	5.5	6.5	5.0
Training, medical, etc.....	5.9	7.7	7.7	6.7
Administration and associated activities.....	1.2	1.6	1.6	1.5
Support of other nations.....	1.3	1.7	1.7	1.7
Unfunded retirement.....	-.5	.8	.8	.8
Total.....	50.9	67.9	78.7	61.1

PROPOSED CUTS

[In millions]

	Savings in 1972
1. Reduce general-purpose tactical nuclear force.....	\$1,000
2. Eliminate 1½ NATO-oriented divisions.....	1,125
3. Eliminate 2 Asia-oriented divisions.....	1,500
4. Eliminate 3 tactical air wings, 2 in NATO, 1 in the United States.....	1,360
5. Reduce attack aircraft carriers from 15 to 10.....	2,440
6. Reduce antisubmarine (ASW) carriers from 8 to 4.....	940
7. Reduce the strategic bomber force from 550 to 275 planes.....	750
8. Reduce amphibious ships.....	365
9. Eliminate manned orbiting laboratory (MOL).....	600
10. Savings in procurement and more efficient use of manpower.....	7,520
Total.....	17,600

EXHIBIT 2

WHERE THE MILITARY CONTRACTS GO

(By William Simon Rukeyser)

Defense Department awards in fiscal 1968 accounted for 81.4 percent of the value of all contracts let by the federal government. With annual purchases by the Pentagon running over \$42 billion, defense ranks among the nation's giant industries.

Of course, defense contractors constitute an industry only in the sense that they share a common customer. In other respects there could hardly be a more varied group of companies. Contractors range in size from General Motors down to small machine shops. The military buys bugles and bagels as well

as missiles and planes. A number of quite large corporations do most of their business with the military, but some prominent defense contractors are primarily manufacturers of civilian goods. Among the top three defense suppliers in fiscal 1968, General Dynamics and Lockheed received new prime contracts equal to around 84 percent of annual sales, while for General Electric the comparable figure was 18 percent. General Motors' \$629,610,000 of prime contracts made it the tenth-largest defense supplier, but those awards were equal to less than 3 percent of the company's total sales.

Some major contractors are not corporations at all but universities or other non-profit institutions. With \$124,100,000 in prime contracts, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ranked fifty-fourth among defense suppliers last year, ahead of such important makers of military goods as Fairchild Hiller, Colt Industries, and Cessna.

The Pentagon keeps a much closer watch on suppliers' day-to-day activities than most commercial customers do. On contracts of any substantial size, at least one government contracting officer moves into the plant for the duration of the work, and squads of government auditors are on hand all the time. One reason for strict supervision at the plant level is that a lot of defense work is done by private contractors using government property. Last year \$6.9 billion of plants and equipment owned by the Defense Department was "in possession" of outside contractors. Olin Mathieson, for instance, runs two enormous "go-co" (for government-owned, com-

pany-operated) ammunition factories in Wisconsin and Indiana. Olin, which does not include the turnover from these plants in its own sales figures, calculates the replacement value of the plants at \$500 million.

About half of all the work covered by prime contracts is subsequently farmed out to subcontractors. Often subcontracts go to large corporations that also hold prime contracts. Accordingly, data on prime contracts only partly reveal the actual patterns of defense procurement. But the tabulations, map, and chart on these pages are necessarily based on prime contracts—specifically those awarded in fiscal 1968. Strangely, in view of the high proportion of defense work that trickles down to subcontractors, the Pentagon doesn't collect over-all data on subcontracting. Since 1963 it hasn't even required contractors to tell the department exactly how much of the work is subcontracted.

The pattern by States
[Contracts fiscal year 1968]

The big ten:

California ¹	\$6,471,875,000
Texas	4,087,182,000
New York ²	3,483,730,000
Connecticut ¹	2,355,135,000
Pennsylvania ³	1,727,314,000
Ohio ²	1,640,525,000
Massachusetts ¹	1,618,741,000

The pattern by States—Continued
[Contracts fiscal year 1968]

The big ten—continued

Missouri	\$1,356,871,000
New Jersey ²	1,108,440,000
Indiana ¹	1,107,453,000

¹ More than \$200 per capita of prime contracts.
² \$151 to \$200 per capita of prime contracts.
³ \$101 to \$150 per capita of prime contracts.

The pattern by companies
[In percent]

The 25 largest contractors	45.5
The second 25	11.5
The third 25	6.5
The fourth 25	3.5
All others	33.0

Suppliers in every one of the fifty states and in more than 80 percent of all congressional districts won Defense Department prime contracts in fiscal 1968. But the geographical distribution was far from even. The top ten states, listed above, garnered approximately 60 percent of the total dollar value. In some less populous states, military procurement has a large economic impact even though the absolute value of contracts received is comparatively slight. For example, Alaska, not shown on the map, won contracts

worth \$392 per capita, second only to Connecticut's extraordinary \$805. (Hawaii, also not shown, ranked in the middle group of states, with \$129.) At the other extreme, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New Jersey, despite their large dollar awards, were not among the top ten states on a per-capita basis.

Large corporations dominate the defense business. A hundred contractors won two-thirds of the dollar value of Pentagon awards in fiscal 1968, and the top twenty-five companies alone accounted for nearly half. Most of these twenty-five companies, listed on the page opposite, were also among the top twenty-five defense contractors a decade earlier, although the corporate form of some has been changed by mergers. The only arrivals on the list since fiscal 1958: Avco, Textron, Litton, Kaiser, Ford, Honeywell, Olin Mathieson, and Ryan. They replace I.B.M., R.C.A., Westinghouse, Republic Aviation, Chrysler, Curtiss-Wright, and Bendix. (The arrivals outnumber the departures by one because McDonnell and Douglas, now merged, were both on the 1958 list.) More than two-thirds of the prime defense contracts awarded in fiscal 1968 had a face value above \$1 million, and more than one-third came to more than \$10 million. Businesses defined by the government as small won only about 19 percent of the prime-contract dollars.

THE TOP 25 CONTRACTORS

Headquarters	New prime contracts (fiscal 1968)	Main projects	Headquarters	New prime contracts (fiscal 1968)	Main projects
1. General Dynamics	New York \$2,239,339,000	F-111 fighter bomber, Polaris submarine.	13. Textron	Providence \$500,747,000	Helicopters.
2. Lockheed Aircraft	Burbank, Calif. 1,870,197,000	C-141 & C-5A transports, Polaris missile.	14. Litton Industries	Beverly Hills 465,691,000	Ships, electronics.
3. General Electric	New York 1,488,707,000	Jet engines, electronics.	15. Raytheon	Lexington, Mass. 451,754,000	Hawk, Sparrow III, SAM-D missiles.
4. United Aircraft	East Hartford, Conn. 1,320,991,000	Jet engines, helicopters.	16. Sperry Rand	New York 447,197,000	Computers, electronics for ships and missiles.
5. McDonnell Douglas	St. Louis 1,100,837,000	Phantom F-4, Douglas A-4 bomber.	17. Martin Marietta	New York 393,454,000	Titan III and other missiles.
6. American Telephone & Telegraph	New York 775,927,000	Safeguard missile, anti-submarine projects.	18. Kaiser Industries	Oakland, Calif. 386,334,000	Jeeps
7. Boeing	Seattle 762,141,000	B-52, helicopters, Minuteman.	19. Ford Motor	Dearborn Mich. 381,344,000	Trucks, missiles, telecommunications.
8. Ling-Temco-Vought	Dallas 758,261,000	A-7 fighter, electronics, Lance missile.	20. Honeywell	Minneapolis 351,682,000	Avionics, torpedoes.
9. North American Rockwell	El Segundo, Calif. 668,641,000	Avionics, submarine electronics.	21. Olin Mathieson Chemical	New York 329,415,000	Ammunition.
10. General Motors	Detroit 629,610,000	Gas-turbine aircraft engines, tanks, M-16 rifle.	22. Northrop	Beverly Hills 310,256,000	Communication systems aircraft.
11. Grumman Aircraft Engineering	Bethpage, N.Y. 629,197,000	Fighter planes.	23. Ryan Aeronautical	San Diego 293,158,000	Engines, pilotless aircraft, electronics.
12. Avco	New York 583,648,000	Aircraft engines and parts.	24. Hughes Aircraft	Culver City, Calif. 286,109,000	Electronics.
			25. Standard Oil (New Jersey)	New York 274,377,000	Gasoline and jet fuel.

ASIAN FEVER

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, it would seem that there is, in addition to the Asian flu, a new fever that sometimes afflicts American Presidents traveling in Asia. Its most striking symptom is a remarkable expansion of rhetoric.

In the past week, our traveling President has made the following observations from Asia:

First, Neil Armstrong and his associates have accomplished a feat exceeded only by God at the creation.

Second, our interminable, inclusive frustrations in the jungles of Vietnam represent "our finest hour."

Third, if Thailand gets into trouble from within or without, we will rush in to open up a second front in Southeast Asia.

Fourth, President Thieu is one of the great statesmen of our age.

It seems clear that whereas the more common Asian flu leaves the patient weak and subdued, the new Asian fever intoxicates its victims with a powerful euphoria that is almost beyond comprehension.

Perhaps until we know more about this

new strain of Asian virus, the President would be willing to return to the United States in the quarantine chamber recently used by the astronauts following their return from the moon. This would provide a period of safe observation while medical scientists and national security experts considered whether to isolate the new virus or to encourage its spread over the entire populace.

SENSATIONALISM ON ABM DECRIED

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an article from the Washington Star dated July 31, 1969, dealing with the recent efforts by Dr. Sternglass to interject some other thoughts into the ABM.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SENSATIONALISM ON ABM DECRIED
(By Judith Randal)

Esquire Magazine, which thrives on controversy, added a new ingredient to the debate over the anti-ballistic missile this week

with newspaper advertisements which many leading scientists regard as irresponsible.

Esquire's ad heralded an article on the ABM luridly entitled, "The Death of All Children." It described this as "a summary of research on the matter of nuclear fallout, pulled together for the first time by Ernest J. Sternglass, professor of radiation physics at the University of Pittsburgh."

So important is its article, Esquire said in promotional letters to newspaper editors and reporters, that although it was received after deadline, it was incorporated in the "September" issue (published July 29) as a stop-the-press insert.

Actually the closely printed four-page "Footnote to the ABM Controversy" is a rehash of tired old arguments aired by Sternglass in various forums over the last six years and discredited almost without exception.

To assert that Sternglass' sensational claims against the ABM are unjustified is not to say that a case cannot be made against the system now nearing a vote on Capitol Hill. There are plenty of arguments against the ABM that make sense—social, geopolitical, technological and scientific—but Sternglass' isn't among them.

There is the danger, from the point of view of opponents of the ABM, that Sternglass' overstatement of risks could actually backfire, even perhaps changing a last minute "no" vote to a "yes" vote.

Sternglass' thesis—which he has aired in

testimony before Congress, on television, and in articles in "Science," "The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists," and a doctors' newspaper called "Medical Tribune"—is that atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons has had a marked and measurable effect on live births in the United States since 1945, when the atomic age began with an explosion near Alamogordo, N.M.

Sternglass claims that nuclear testing has led to "almost one excess death per hundred live births" or a total of "over 440,000 baby deaths" during the nuclear age.

Looking ahead, he has asserted that genetic damage from the detonation of ABM warheads defending against a missile attack "could itself produce sufficient (fallout) in the following few months to seal the biological doom of mankind."

In the Esquire article, he goes even further. "The fact is this," Sternglass writes, "a full-scale ABM system, protecting the United States against a Soviet first strike, could, if successful, cause the extinction of the human race."

Sternglass says nothing about what may happen if the ABM is unsuccessful, or the possibility that developers of the defense system may be unable to stay ahead of determined builders of an offensive capability.

But, whether by accident or intention, he falls into all sorts of traps as he builds his case against the ABM.

Take the matter of excess infant deaths. Sternglass claims the pre-natal exposure to fallout resulting from the 1945 New Mexico tests quickly led to the maintenance of relatively high fetal and infant deaths in distant states lying along the path of the fallout.

In fact, however, measurements recorded at the time of the tests showed that the explosion injected only a minute amount of fallout into the stratosphere, and that the debris was confined to New Mexico and parts of nearby Kansas and Nebraska—not the states where the decline in infant mortality failed to level off as expected.

In reproductive experiments on mice, cited repeatedly by Sternglass (but not done by him), for instance, large numbers of fetal deaths or damaged offspring resulted from injections of radioactive strontium.

But mice are not men, the dose was enormous by human standards, and injection is not the way strontium 90 enters the body after fallout.

Feeding experiments at doses comparable to those following a nuclear explosion in species closer to man have yielded far less sensational results.

Sternglass blames fallout for such things as the reduced birth weight of babies over the past 30 years, although every mother knows that this has come about through altered pre-natal care methods which deliberately hold down the mother's—and the baby's—weight during pregnancy.

In marshaling his "facts" to show a rise in childhood leukemia, he cites what he says was an alarming increase in one metropolitan area where, owing to population growth, the rate has actually remained stable.

This is the sort of "science" for which Sternglass would flunk a graduate student for trying to palm off in the guise of a research paper.

Fraught as it is with irrelevancy and error, the article can add little of consequence to lucid debate on the ABM, and can only cause confusion and emotionalism in a situation already too confused and emotional for anyone's good.

Mr. DOMINICK. I may say that this article, which I think is very well reasoned, points out that if a research student under Dr. Sternglass had brought up those so-called facts, he would have been flunked, and that Dr. Sternglass' arguments are just about as bad.

SPEECH BY SENATOR PERCY AT MT. SINAI HOSPITAL CORNERSTONE LAYING CEREMONY IN CHICAGO, ILL.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, my distinguished colleague from Illinois, Senator CHARLES H. PERCY, recently presented an excellent speech at the Mt. Sinai Hospital cornerstone laying ceremony in Chicago, the primary focus of which was upon three major health problems confronting our Nation.

Senator PERCY first explained that the shortage of medical manpower has laid a heavy burden upon our citizens in need of health services. He urged the expansion of medical schools and additional training programs for nurses and technicians.

Second, he described how the lack of proper organization in the medical field often results in waste and duplication of effort. Multi-specialty group practice is one area which he suggests could be expanded to assure continuous treatment for patients having medical problems requiring the care of more than one specialist.

Finally, Senator PERCY believes we must make health for every American a right, not a privilege, and points to the philosophy behind our medicare and medicaid programs. However, even with the existence of these programs, he is still convinced that far too often unequal treatment results solely from unequal income.

As the ranking Republican in the Health Subcommittee, I have read this speech with great interest.

Senator PERCY has pinpointed key problem areas in the health field deserving of the attention of all Senators, and I ask unanimous consent that his remarks be placed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR CHARLES H. PERCY

It is extremely satisfying for me to be here on the occasion of the start of this construction. This cornerstone is part of a building which will serve to ease suffering and prolong life and will be a symbol of man's concern for his fellowman.

It is common concern that brings us here today. All of you, in some way, have set as your goal helping those who have become ill. This is a good time to examine how we best can work together to provide health services to all who need them. I would like to outline some of the problems and attempt to offer some solutions.

Clearly, the major problem we face today is the shortage of trained medical personnel. The dramatic scientific breakthroughs of the past three decades have made it possible for us to do more to help people. The inter-related advances in surgical techniques, antibiotics and immunology as well as numerous new diagnostic and therapeutic instruments have brought us the possibility of curing diseases far beyond the greatest expectations of the pre-World War II physician. Because we can now do more, and because the average citizen is now better informed on health matters, the demand for physician-directed services has increased much more rapidly than the number of physicians.

This expansion of knowledge has placed phenomenal demands on the individual physician. The required information has exceeded the time available for the physician to learn it, and yet the pressure to shorten the medi-

cal curriculum continues. Can one person reasonably be expected to be an expert in reading cardiograms as well as skull x-rays? Clearly many physicians feel the only solution appears to be specialization. Perhaps one reason for the shortage of general practitioners is the medical student's knowledge that he couldn't possibly know enough to be a competent GP. In fact, only 2 per cent of today's medical school graduates plan to go into general practice.

Since complete, up-to-date medical care requires the services of a group of physicians of different specialties the manpower demand has skyrocketed while the average time required to train a physician has risen to at least 12 years after high school exclusive of military service.

Expansion of medical schools is a necessity. The building we are dedicating today will help the Chicago Medical School expand its entering class, and this is the most efficient way to produce more physicians. It is an important step, but, in addition to expansion, additional medical schools must be built. We must have enough positions so that all qualified applicants can be admitted. It gives one pause to realize that a nation rich enough to send men to the moon is forced to recruit more than 15 per cent of its new physicians from abroad, including many from relatively underdeveloped countries. The shortage of medical school facilities is so great that one out of every two qualified students applying for admission is turned down despite a shortage of 50,000 doctors nationwide—7,000 of them here in Illinois.

But the shortage is not merely in numbers of physicians. Nurses, technicians, and other types of personnel are in critically short supply. All training programs have to be expanded. Further, new professional categories will have to be established to assist in the different medical specialties. Funds are presently available from Federal sources for these programs but responsible individuals in the private sector must provide the initiative and momentum. Centers like Mount Sinai must continue to show the way. This job cannot be left to someone else.

A problem closely related to the manpower shortage is the lack of organization of medical services in this country. Here we have a fifty billion dollar industry that has mushroomed dramatically. With 300,000 practicing physicians we have almost 300,000 independent "corporations," each with its own particular way of doing things. The waste and duplication inherent in this lack of organization would not be a critical problem were it not for the fact that there aren't enough physicians to go around. It is incumbent upon the profession to organize itself in the most efficient manner possible. Multi-specialty group practice with sharing of facilities and ancillary personnel appears to be a more efficient way to use a physician's time. The single physician cannot bring the full range of medical knowledge to bear on all of his patients. He must be considered the entry point into a continuous comprehensive medical system. Although there is no substitute for the vigilance of the interested physician in maintaining the health of his patient, there should be no hesitation on his part to send his patient to another physician whose training is more relevant to the patient's disease.

If we are to meet our present crisis, many experts feel that the profession must encourage the development of substantially more group practice. The team approach to patient care must be taught in the medical schools. But even the multi-specialty group cannot be considered the basic unit of medical care.

Since the person who seeks a physician is really seeking a return to full health, the basic unit of medical organization must be that which can provide a full range of diag-

nostic and treatment services. This would consist of all facilities from the solo physician's office to the teaching hospital. Continuity of care involves everything from taking the pulse to providing radiotherapy, from dispensing aspirin to open-heart surgery. Clearly, multi-specialty groups and community hospitals must be affiliated with a teaching hospital to provide this in-depth service.

A continuous single medical system would permit a more rational distribution of services from the component facilities. With rapidly rising costs, especially for in-hospital care, unnecessary hospitalizations can and should be avoided. Motel and rest-home services are best provided in motels and rest-homes. Hospital admissions for diagnostic procedures are inexcusable with room rates approaching \$100 per day. Health insurance policies must be changed to cover comprehensive and not just hospital services. Hospital beds should only be used when no other alternative is open. The hospitals must lead the way in providing ambulatory services efficiently and rapidly. The teaching centers must clarify to students, house staff and attending staff what constitutes the need to be hospitalized. The teaching hospital is the focal point and it should be the organizational center for the provision of truly comprehensive medical care.

Another problem that has been with us for a long time is the existence of a double standard of medical practice. One kind of practice for those who can pay and a separate system for those who cannot pay. The medically indigent have traditionally been considered an asset to a teaching hospital. The physicians can learn by taking care of the poor and, finally, when their training is over they are ready to take care of private patients. The time has come to change our thinking on this subject. The poor are justifiably sensitive about being used as guinea pigs. A teaching institution which permits a double standard within its walls is really an anachronism. There must be a system, one system, with the type of care determined by illness and not by ability to pay. There should be no second-class citizens when it comes to adequate health care.

The Medicaid and Medicare programs are evidence that the American people regard medical care as a basic right, not a privilege only for those who can afford it. With adequate funding and implementation, medical indigence can be a thing of the past.

The shortage of medical personnel has led to particularly acute problems for the poor. There are vast areas in this country where only poor people live. Very few physicians are today starting their practices in low-income neighborhoods and impoverished rural communities. They realize, much like their foreign counterparts from underdeveloped countries who have immigrated here, that they cannot practice good medicine nor even make a decent living working there. In Chicago, most poor people are still forced to travel long distances and wait long hours to see a physician. The largest number go to Cook County Hospital. The other hospital centers, like Mount Sinai are helping to share the load but it is clear that ambulatory services must be brought to the communities. The Martin Luther King Neighborhood Health Center at 3316 West Grenshaw and the Mile Square Health Center at 2049 West Washington are examples of what can be done. More such clinics are needed. These clinics should be affiliated in some way with hospitals that can guarantee beds for those patients requiring hospitalization and where their clinic physician can follow their progress. Neither ambulatory clinics nor hospitals can operate separately.

Just last month I introduced legislation to provide Federal grants for construction of ambulatory care facilities to be staffed by multi-specialty groups of physicians with

admitting privileges at nearby hospitals. I hope that groups of private physicians medical schools, medical societies and hospital centers will be among the project applicants. Here again, Congress can write legislation, but the medical community must take the initiative by planning, recruiting and organizing. Without the cooperation of physicians, administrators and interested citizens we cannot do the job.

The physicians of this city have long recognized that Chicago would be better served by an expansion of outpatient facilities staffed by private physicians and more beds in private hospitals than by building a number of County Hospitals or by continuing to expand our present one. With Medicare, Medicaid and facilities grants these ideas can become reality and the City can serve as an example to other communities. The facility we are dedicating today represents a major step toward the realization of this goal.

I think it is right at this time for the American people to ask their government to reconsider its national priorities. The provision of enough physicians here on earth must assume a position of at least equal status to that of putting a man on the moon. A nation that spends over 3 billion dollars a year to keep farmers from growing crops can certainly afford a system of neighborhood health centers. Perhaps we can even scale down the billions being spent pursuing the elusive goal of security against every conceivable type of external military threat and concentrate on the more concrete goals of providing some measure of security to the individual against the more concrete threats to his health. In fact, I am more concerned in general with the threat from within the country than external threats.

I feel confident that the youth of our nation holds the key. It is they who are clamoring the loudest for a more humane society. In spite of the radical minority, most students feel they have a stake in the present system and they want it to work. It gives me great satisfaction to point out that the medical students of the Chicago area have taken the initiative in bringing some measure of compassion to problems confronting our Nation. On their own initiative last summer they went into the poverty areas of the city to see what they could do, as individuals, to help their fellowman. They have discovered some of the less pleasant realities of our system, but they came out of it determined to go back. The Chicago Student Health Project gave these young people the opportunity to do something to make society better. The fact that they could do something and that there were immense problems to be overcome was taken as a challenge not as an invitation to cynicism. Surely these students must be the pride of the profession; they will not be content to let someone else do what has to be done. They are showing all of us the way. I think they are indicative of what is best in their generation and it is something of which we can all be proud.

In summary, we have three primary problems—a shortage of medical manpower, a lack of organization of the medical industry, and inequality in the distribution of medical services to rich and poor. In fact, there are three aspects of the same problem, a longstanding lack of definition of a national health right. It is clear that the problem is too immense for even the combined resources of Federal, State and local governments. We must mobilize the experience and resources of the private sector and capitalize on the enthusiasm of our dedicated youth to build a health care system worthy of America.

That is what this cornerstone dedication ceremony is all about. That is what you have accomplished in the Alliance for Progress to nation-build here at home by helping to build a stronger and healthier people and to light the way for others to follow.

RETIREMENT OF JACK BELL

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I would like to say a few words about a long-time friend and one who knows the Senate of the United States perhaps as well as any other individual. I refer to Jack Bell, of the Associated Press.

Today, for the first time in 31 years, Jack Bell is not sitting in the press gallery as the chief of the Senate staff for the Associated Press. Mr. Bell retired yesterday, after long service to the news-gathering organization, the Associated Press.

Mr. Bell served as the chief political writer for many years, and since 1940, he has been the chief of the Senate staff for the Associated Press. He first began to cover the Senate in 1938.

I think it is interesting to note that of all the 100 Members of the Senate, only two were serving in this body when Jack Bell came to the Senate press gallery. They are the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL) and the distinguished senior Senator from Louisiana (Mr. ELLENDER).

Jack Bell had the confidence, and he has the confidence, of the Members of the Congress in general and the Senate in particular, because all of us as Senators know that we can rely on Jack Bell's integrity.

We know that we can talk with him frankly, and we know that he will not violate our confidence. We know him to be an able, objective, dedicated reporter.

As a Member of the Senate I can speak of my confidence in Jack Bell, but I can also speak of my confidence in Jack Bell as a newspaper editor.

All of my adult life until I came to the Senate had been spent in the newspaper business, and I know that editors all over the United States have great confidence in Jack Bell. When his byline was transmitted over the teletypes, those newspaper offices which received the AP dispatches would give extra credence to those political stories with the Jack Bell byline.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I would like to join the distinguished Senator from Virginia in paying tribute to Jack Bell. I had not realized before that he was retiring today—

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. He retired yesterday.

Mr. PROXMIRE. He certainly has been a remarkably fine reporter. Everything the Senator from Virginia has said about him is true. He is responsible, he is thoughtful, he is accurate, and he is very, very careful to be sure he gets all sides of every question.

This is something about our press services that I think has been improving over the years. One of the first things one learns in a school of journalism is how the press service has changed and how it is improving. I think Jack Bell epitomizes the best in journalism—fair and accurate reporting, and at the same time informative reporting.

Jack Bell wrote "The Spendid Misery," one of the finest books on the presidency

that has been written, certainly to my knowledge.

So I am delighted to join the Senator from Virginia in paying tribute to a great reporter. I hope that his retirement will mean that he will continue to cover the Senate and the Capitol, but perhaps in a different way.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I thank the Senator. I am glad to concur in the remarks he has made about Jack Bell.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. ALLOTT. I simply want to say that everything I could express about Jack Bell has been expressed by the Senator from Virginia, and I want to join in congratulations to Jack Bell on his retirement.

Yesterday, upon his official retirement, I was happy to attend a reception in his honor. My own acquaintance with Jack Bell goes back to 1947 or 1948. I have always had the feeling about Jack Bell, when he asked me about any situation, that he was inquiring for information and that he had not already made up his mind and was just looking for a word or two from me or anyone else he was interviewing to try to fortify an opinion he had already formed. In this respect, I think he reaches the top of the reporting profession.

Having regarded him as a close friend these many years, I am very happy to hear the words of my good friend from Virginia, because he has not only been a Member of the Senate, but he is the son of a distinguished father who was also in the Senate and who was one of the distinguished and one of the great men of all time in the Senate. Having been in the newspaper business, himself, for many years, he is able to look at Jack Bell's career in a professional way, in a way which probably surpasses that capacity in men who have probably never been in the newspaper business.

So I wish to join in extending best wishes to Jack Bell on his retirement, best wishes on his new column, and best wishes for many successful years to come.

I thank the Senator for yielding to me.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I join the distinguished Senator from Virginia and my distinguished colleague from Colorado.

It so happens that Jack Bell was a friend of two of my newspaper friends in Colorado. When I first came to Washington, they were helpful enough to get Jack Bell to meet with us. This happened when I was first elected to the House, about 9 years ago. So I have felt very able to express thoughts and ideas back and forth with him ever since that time.

I agree with the Senator that he is extremely fair. We do not necessarily have to agree with all his articles to believe that. We also feel that we have lost someone of great stability in that field by his retirement.

I know he is going to enjoy his retire-

ment, but I wish he were still here with us.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I thank the Senator. I concur in what the Senator has said. Jack Bell is a fine reporter, objective, and able.

I am happy to report to the Senate and to the distinguished Senator from Colorado that Jack Bell will still be in the Press Gallery, because he will be there from time to time representing the Gannett newspapers, a great group of newspapers. The president of the Associated Press is Paul Miller, a very able and perceptive newspaperman. Paul Miller is also president of the Gannett newspapers. Following the rules of the Associated Press, when Jack Bell reached retirement age, he had to leave that organization, but Paul Miller brought him—or is bringing him today—into the Gannett organization; so Jack Bell will still be here with us in the Senate Press Gallery.

In speaking of Jack Bell, I wish to mention also this aspect of news gathering: We have two great news gathering organizations in this Nation, the Associated Press and United Press International. I think it is most important that we have, and continue to have, two such national news gathering organizations.

I happen at one time to have been a member of the board of directors of the Associated Press, so I am a little bit closer to that organization in that respect than I am to the United Press International. But I have great confidence in both the AP and the UPI.

I believe it would be very unwise and undesirable for our country if we had in this Nation only one newsgathering organization of a national and worldwide character. We have two, the Associated Press and United Press International, and I happen to be one of those individuals who feel that, by and large, both of those organizations are doing a splendid job in reporting to the people of this Nation and the people of the world the events which are taking place in Congress, throughout the United States, and throughout the world.

That does not mean that there is not some reporting that is not all it should be. It does not mean there is not some sloppy reporting in various areas of the world, the United States, or the Senate, for that matter.

But by and large, these men, I think, do a remarkable job; and I might say I do not know of any tougher job that any person could have than to sit in the press gallery, day after day, and have to listen to us Senators here on the floor talking as much as we do, for hours at a time.

When we Senators get tired of listening to one another, we can go back to our offices, or go to a committee meeting, or take care of other problems that we need to look after. But those men who sit in the press gallery, particularly the news service representatives, who have to be on duty every minute that the Senate is in session—I say they have a tough job, and I congratulate all of them on the job they are doing.

I say again that in my judgment, Jack Bell has rendered his organization, the Associated Press, a great service over the years. He has been a credit to the newspaper profession through the many years

that he has been in it, and I think that he has rendered his Nation a great service through the high caliber and the objectivity of the reporting he has done during the many, many years that he has been a reporter, a political writer, and a Washington correspondent.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, whatever else may be said about the current debate over the proposed ABM system, one point is certain.

At no time in our history has a weapons system been so thoroughly studied and discussed in the Congress.

As a newcomer to this body who has not served on any of the committees that consider military budgets, I have listened closely to the arguments pro and con and have learned a great deal from both sides.

I have been impressed by the strong case that has been made on both sides of this key issue and by the sincerity of conviction that has animated both proponents and opponents on this issue.

In this debate over the Safeguard ABM system, Congress, for the first time, in my opinion, has effectively cut through the traditional mystique that has surrounded our military spending and placed every facet of the argument before the public.

I am particularly proud of my colleagues on both sides of this issue, here in the Senate, for performing what I consider to be an outstanding public service in delineating every significant detail of a question which has an all-important bearing on both our defense and foreign policies.

The need for intensive public airing of the issue is reflected in the public opinion polls.

According to a Gallup poll taken in late March, only 69 percent of the people questioned had ever heard of the ABM controversy, and only 40 percent had formed an opinion. Those with an opinion favored the ABM 5 to 3, but the more significant fact was that 60 percent were opinionless.

On Monday of this week, another Gallup poll was released showing that those who profess an opinion now favor the ABM by 4 to 3, but those without an opinion still totaled a disappointing 58 percent.

Despite the fact that the ABM is the most thoroughly discussed proposal for military expenditure in our history, it is clear that we are a long way from total public communication.

I, therefore, believe that the extended debate we have been having on this issue has been urgently needed to inform the public as well as to bring us to the right decision here in Congress.

In more ways than one, the ABM is a key issue in modern history. It marks the end of the blank check era so far as military spending is concerned. From this point on, both Congress and the public, if I am not mistaken, will demand that military budgets be subjected to the same close scrutiny that civilian budgets have long been accorded.

It also marks the growth of a new concern in the United States about our national priorities and the allocation of our resources between military and nonmilitary needs.

There has been a wide variance in the estimates of what the Safeguard system would cost. But whether the cost is \$7 billion, \$10 billion, \$20 billion, or many times these amounts, it still represents a very substantial outlay from the Nation's resources. And Vietnam has taught us, as no previous chapter of history has succeeded in teaching us, that our resources are not unlimited.

There is a growing awareness in the country these days that our national security involves meeting some of the critical domestic problems that threaten us with disintegration here at home, as well as building up the capability to meet possible aggression from abroad.

An expenditure of \$7 to \$10 billion would not eliminate poverty in the United States, but it would go a very substantial distance toward alleviating it.

But regardless of our critical domestic needs, I am sure there is not a person in this Chamber who would not fully endorse the Safeguard system if he believed it to be necessary, or even desirable, to our national defense.

But on this pivotal point, the case for Safeguard has, in my opinion, failed.

It has been pointed out that the Safeguard would give the President another alternative to choose from beyond releasing the big missiles or simply sweating it out. It would put another button on the console.

But if, in the event of a nuclear first strike against us, the President were to press this button, we need complete assurance that it would work, that it would intercept and destroy the enemy missiles without bringing fatal damage and fallout upon ourselves in so doing.

At this late stage of our debate, we do not, in my opinion, have this assurance.

Scientists have termed the Safeguard's complex of computer and radar systems the most intricate technological system man has yet attempted to create. We have heard a great deal of testimony on both sides about the workability and practicability of both of these systems from weaponry experts. Computer ex-

perts say the extremely sophisticated programing is so advanced that its theoretical processes have never been accomplished, let alone tested. In lay language, we are talking about the most celebrated pig-in-the-poke in modern history—on which it is proposed to base our first line of defense against possible thermonuclear attack.

Moreover, if the system should work in the interception and destruction of enemy missiles, we do not know what horrors it would create in the contamination of the atmosphere.

I still contend that our most effective defense from nuclear attack is where it has been from the beginning—in our deterrent capacity.

We have, I am told, efficient detection and warning systems which can give us approximately a half-hour warning of the launching of an enemy missile.

Then we have superior weaponry and it is distributed—as it has been stated so very eloquently here today—in such a way as to be least vulnerable to a first strike—our landbased missiles, our submarine fleet, and our strategic bombers.

The suggestion that an enemy could knock out all of these missiles with a first strike simply does not add up to credibility in my opinion.

Obviously, the Soviets are rapidly building up their nuclear capabilities, but in the words of the report of the Committee on Armed Services itself, it would be "the mid-1970's" before "they will be in a position to threaten the effectiveness of our Minuteman forces." I have not been convinced by the evidence presented in this debate that the Soviets are outstripping us in the development of other strategic weapons, including a sophisticated ABM system.

With all due respect to the able proponents of Safeguard, I simply cannot see it as either necessary or desirable for our defense at this particular time.

In fact, the damage it could do by disturbing the strategic balance between the great powers is extremely alarming to me.

This balance, of course, rests on the mutual understanding between the Soviets and ourselves that each nation has the nuclear capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on the other and that there is, therefore, no percentage in any dream of a first strike by either nation.

The contention by some proponents of the ABM that deployment of the Safeguard would aid us in disarmament negotiations with the Soviets is perhaps to me the most unconvincing argument of all.

It is like saying that escalated imbibing is the best route to sobriety.

The Soviets could interpret our deployment of an ABM system in more ways than one. The notion that they would passively accept Safeguard as a "defensive" system and not react to it is highly unlikely.

It would be just as easy for them to interpret the ABM as the second stage of a planned first strike—a device to stop the retaliating missiles once the holocaust was launched.

However one considers it and rationalizes it, the arms race is a dead-end street, a point of no return.

Inevitably, if we deploy a new weap-

on system, the Soviets will take measures to catch up.

If we have learned nothing else by this time, we should have learned that each new and more powerful weapon system begets new and more powerful retaliatory weapon systems on the part of our adversaries.

Realistically, the ideal relationship between two nations for constructive peace negotiation is a relationship of comparative equality. The ancient notion that we create an atmosphere for peace by building up an overpowering military capability, far exceeding our nearest rival, simply does not hold water.

As I stated far earlier, it is my conviction that the ABM advocates have not made a case for Safeguard—even on purely technical grounds.

If another nation launched a missile attack against us under any circumstances, it is inconceivable to me that we would rely on his multibillion-dollar pig-in-the-poke and leave the Minuteman like sitting ducks in the silos.

But the importance of the ABM issue goes far beyond the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of Safeguard as a weapon system.

The ABM is of historic importance as a symbol of the military psychology that has had such a dominant and pervasive influence on our culture and economy.

An ever-increasing number of thoughtful Americans believe that the policies this psychology has engendered are no longer relevant or right in terms of contemporary realities.

We are convinced that some of these basic policies have placed our Nation on a collision course—and must be changed.

The ABM is a rallying point for those who believe America must reorder its priorities.

It is, moreover, the first major weapon system that has been placed on the witness stand to face the Nation and to justify its existence, as civilian projects are required to do.

In this Chamber and elsewhere in the United States, dedicated citizens have disagreed over the ABM system year in and year out.

But there is one matter on which I believe we should all be able to agree—the desirability of shedding light on vital policy areas that may mean life or death for the future of our country.

I believe the Senate has kept faith with the people on this point.

We are almost equally divided, as has been indicated in the press.

The very fact that many Senators from the same States oppose each other on the issue, the fact that the population is almost equally divided, and the fact that scientists on both sides on every question arrive at different conclusions certainly make it obvious that we are divided and reach honest conclusions that are different.

Regardless of the debate, as I pointed out at the inception of this speech, the polls indicate that the majority of Americans are still unaware of what we are talking about in the ABM system.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I shall be quite brief. I say to the Senator from Iowa that other matters detained me. I am sorry I did not get to hear his speech completely. I would have listened to it

carefully. Even though we disagree in conclusions, I know of his application to this question as well as others, and I believe with the best intentions.

I believe that part of the answer to his observation is that, in a way, you have to sort of grow into these weapons systems and get the feel of them, to have a sort of understanding which is not scientific or military. It is just a feeling of balance.

I particularly disagree with him in connection with the effect it might have on the Russians for the United States now to come along and try to perfect, as they are trying to perfect, a purely defensive weapon. I do not believe any trait of human nature is better understood than the natural trait of defending yourself and keeping your powder dry and barricading your arsenal of weapons, whatever they are.

I believe, too, Mr. President, that perhaps the best insurance against either one of these nuclear powers—Russia and the United States—using these weapons is for both to have an effective ABM and that we know what they have, and they know what we have.

I think we can be in an awfully bad fix if we develop any kind of defense of this kind, because it will be known to Russia; and whether they have an intent to fire their ICBM's on us or not, we will have the uncertainty that makes blackmail against us, if they should try, a thousand times more effective.

Mr. President, I shall not detain the Senate long. During the last few weeks I have referred to the general charge that was made here, early in this session, that \$23 billion had been spent for missiles, and the next interpretation of that was that it had been wasted. The Senator from Missouri put in the RECORD first a list of those missiles, and he did not charge that it was waste. But within a few days thereafter, another Member of this body picked up the same figures and made an allegation that it was waste, and others have repeated it, not having the full facts before them, and it runs through the line of argument. It ran its course in the press and in the other media of expression, and it keeps running through the line of argument on the bill and on the ABM.

As soon as I could, after we finished drawing up the bill, I made a documented speech on the floor of the Senate on July 2, 1969, which took up every one of the weapons on which it had been alleged that the money spent on them was wasted. This was a well-documented discussion, not prepared in the Pentagon or anywhere else but in my office, with the help of a staff member who knew the research. I think it is well documented that of the \$23 billion referred to, \$18,886,000,000 went for missiles that took their stand and filled in a gap at critical times of our post-World War II history; and if we had not had them, we would have been defenseless in that field. Of that money, \$4.1 billion was for missile systems that were terminated prior to deployment. In all those contracts, there might have been a contract here and there that was wasteful. Those matters creep in. But I was never more certain of anything in my life than I am of the fact that the gross sum of \$18.8 billion

was not wasted and that it served a useful and a necessary purpose. The sum of \$4.1 billion went for experiments, testing, and basic research which was absolutely necessary in that field to find out what could and what could not be done. These things must be charged to profit and loss. It is comparable to the great automobile industry, which developed during the time when there were not Government subsidies and there were not big Government contracts. I think of the hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars that I know were used in experiments and false starts—what might be called failures. I recall the names of a great many cars that went to the marketplace and still were defective. That is in the nature of things.

I recall reading about Thomas A. Edison and the countless number of failures he had before he perfected the incandescent light, the ordinary light bulb, as we call it now, and how many scientists of his day said it could not be done. Relatively small sums of money were involved but they were large sums of money then, with which people backed him from time to time. He was the one who came through finally with the bulb that has grown into the modern electric light bulb.

With great deference to the distinguished Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA), on yesterday, after referring to this \$23 billion, he made this statement. I questioned him then; otherwise, I would not mention it in his absence—

Thus, our past failures to carefully examine and evaluate defense spending have permitted an incredibly large amount of taxpayers' money to be wasted.

He denominated the sum as wasted, and he said it was due to our failure to carefully examine and evaluate defense spending.

With deference, I refer the membership again to the remarks I made on July 2, 1969, beginning at page 18190. In that speech will be found a documentation of all these missiles except the very small ones that cost relatively small amounts of money. I refer to one paragraph. An illustration in that list of what is now called waste is the Polaris I, which was the first Navy missile of our now marvelous weapons system of underwater missiles in the submarines that we have in the seven seas around the world. The price listed as waste on the Polaris I, which was the parent missile, is \$1.13 billion.

Mr. President, I have never seen any system or weapon start off with as little promise or any system that required as much faith to keep it going as this one; and I have never seen one wind up with more success or more effectiveness as a weapon as I have seen in Polaris I. It was finally perfected. I remember going to Florida to see it in its infancy when I thought it was virtually without hope. But it moved on and the first missile system, Polaris I, began operating in November 1960. It continued to serve us until October 1965. Then, it was replaced. Was it abandoned? No, it was not abandoned. It was replaced by the next generation of the Polaris.

Mr. President, in order to make this presentation brief, we are moving into Poseidon, which is a tremendous im-

provement over Polaris I. It is still thought to be the greatest weapon in this field within our arsenal. It is the marvel of the scientific world. Therefore, to say, inferentially or otherwise, that the \$1.1 billion representing the initial cost of Polaris, which rendered service for 5 years, is waste, demonstrates a failure to dig deep enough to get the actual facts.

There are other items I shall not go into now. I do wish to mention one other missile, the Corporal missile for the Army. The Army carries its artillery, one might say. The Corporal was a very fine weapon, and it filled a wonderful role. The cost that is alleged to have been wasted was \$534 million. That missile was in the line of duty. It was the artillery that was carried by the Army over 11 years.

What happened? It used liquid fuel, which of course was disadvantageous. Liquid fuel was hard to handle, but that was the best we had for 11 years. It was succeeded by another system. It was no longer deployed after that, not because it was useless but because it was succeeded by something more capable and easier to handle, a solid fuel. They gave that new weapon the name of Poseidon.

So with great deference to anyone who lists the Corporal missile as having a cost that was wasted, they did not dig deep enough for the facts, because it was considered to be an essential missile which gave our Army a distinct advantage.

Mr. President, I have made this presentation to help get the facts before the Senate relating to these missiles.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

ORDER FOR THE RECOGNITION OF SENATOR STENNIS ON MONDAY, AUGUST 4, 1969

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Monday next, at the conclusion of the period for the transaction of routine morning business, the able Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) be recognized for 40 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STEVENS in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL MONDAY, AUGUST 4, 1969

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon on Monday next.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 3 o'clock and 28 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until Monday, August 4, 1969, at 12 noon.