

Mr. RODINO (for himself, Mr. BARRETT, Mr. BYRNE of Pennsylvania, Mr. ELBERG, Mr. GARMATZ, Mr. GROVER, Mr. HELSTOSKI, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. MILLER of California, Mr. MINISH, and Mr. NEDZI):

H. Con. Res. 308. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress relating to films and broadcasts which defame, stereotype, ridicule, demean, or degrade ethnic, racial, and religious groups; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mrs. DWYER:

H. Res. 494. Resolution seeking agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on limiting offensive and defensive strategic weapons and the suspension of test flights of reentry vehicles; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. ICHORD (for himself and Mr. CLEVELAND):

H. Res. 495. Resolution amending rule XXXV of the Rules of the House of Representatives to increase fees of witnesses before the House or its committees; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. POLLOCK:

H. Res. 496. Resolution providing for the payment of transportation expenses of Members of the House of Representatives within the districts which they represent while on authorized trips to such districts; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. RARICK:

H. Res. 497. Resolution to create a select committee to conduct a full and complete study of the demography of the United States with the view toward providing relief from racial tensions by more equal distribution of underprivileged racial groups throughout

the several States and in the political subdivisions of each State; to the Committee on Rules.

#### MEMORIALS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII,

246. The SPEAKER presented a memorial of the Legislature of the State of Alabama, relative to discontinuances of passenger trains, which was referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

#### PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. BROWN of California:

H.R. 13147. A bill for the relief of Armando Neri Vila and Erlinda Sevilla Vila; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. RODINO (by request):

H.R. 13148. A bill to provide compensation to certain industrial end-users claimants by authorizing the sale of silver bullion; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI:

H.R. 13149. A bill for the relief of Ofelia Manrique; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DONOHUE:

H. Res. 498. A resolution to refer the bill (H.R. 4498), entitled "a bill for the relief of Branka Mardessich and Sonia S. Silvani," to the Chief Commissioner of the Court of Claims pursuant to sections 1492 and 2509 of title 28, United States Code; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

#### PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

189. By the SPEAKER: Petition of Allan Feinblum, New York, N.Y., relative to establishment of a Department of Peace; to the Committee on Government Operations.

190. Also, petition of the Congress of Micronesia, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, relative to the future political status of Micronesia; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

191. Also, petition of Clarence Martion, Sr., Washington, D.C., relative to redress of grievances; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

192. Also, petition of Khafre H. Sellers, Baltimore, Md., relative to redress of grievances; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

193. Also, petition of Henry Stoner, York, Pa., relative to commemorating the birth of the 400 millionth American; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

194. Also, petition of Allen Feinblum, New York, N.Y., relative to various proposed investigations; to the Committee on Rules.

195. Also, petition of the City Council, Greenville, S.C., relative to taxation of State and local government securities; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

196. Also, petition of the Niagara County Legislature, New York, relative to taxation of State and local government securities; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

197. Also, petition of the Board of Supervisors, Rockland County, N.Y., relative to taxation of State and local government securities; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

## SENATE—Monday, July 28, 1969

The Senate met at 11 o'clock a.m. and was called to order by the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. METCALF).

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

*Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven.—Matthew 5: 16.*

O God, our Father, to whom all hearts are open, all desires known, and from whom no secrets are hid, give us the cleansing and the strength of Thy presence. Help us all through this day that we may honor the office we hold, serve the Nation we love, bring credit to the name we bear and hope to those who trust us. Give us grace to persevere when things are difficult, to be cheerful when things go wrong, to be clear when things are confused, and to remain serene when things are turbulent. Make our lives beacons of goodness, truth and justice, and keep us so faithful to Thee that when the day is done we may know the peace which the world cannot give nor take away. Amen.

#### THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Friday, July 25, 1969, be dispensed with.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### WAIVER OF CALL OF THE CALENDAR

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the call of the legislative calendar under rule VIII be dispensed with.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS DURING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of the speeches by the distinguished Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FONG) and the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE) there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, with statements therein limited to 3 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Hawaii (Mr.

FONG) is recognized at this time for not to exceed 50 minutes.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FONG. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Illinois without losing my right to the floor.

#### DECLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, the matter of declassification of additional documents that have been used from time to time in the hearings has come up. Actually, no procedure has been devised that formalizes it, and I suggested to the majority leader this morning that I thought in every case where declassification is sought by any Senator, if the Pentagon is willing to do so, it ought to be formalized through the Senate and that the Senate leaders ought to ask for unanimous consent to so declassify, on the recommendation of the Pentagon. If these requests arise, I believe that is the way they should be handled.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator does not refer to the use of classified documents being declassified so far as committees are concerned, only so far as the Senate is concerned.

Mr. DIRKSEN. That is right.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if my understanding of this matter is correct, if there is a secret or otherwise classified document under the jurisdiction and re-

sponsibility of the Pentagon or the Department of Defense and it is willing to declassify that document and will take the responsibility for so doing—because that is where it should lie with the origination of the document—I see no objection in the Senate indicating its approval, and I would go along with what the distinguished minority leader has said.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on this point?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. I am a member of a committee that hears a good deal of this. I think any Senator is entitled to anything he wants to know, but I do not think it is our responsibility to say what is classified or unclassified. It can get us into serious trouble. The executive branch will have to take that responsibility. They have the experts.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The primary responsibility would have to be with them; what we would do, in effect, would be just to give an indication of approval to a decision which has been made by them, based on the responsibility which is theirs.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. My position has been that a Senator is entitled to information on which he has to make a judgment.

Mr. DIRKSEN. If the Pentagon is willing, then ours is only a ministerial function, and that formalizes it as such.

#### FURTHER DEBATE AND HEARINGS ON PENDING BUSINESS

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President there is another question I think I should raise, in view of the statements made on the floor of the Senate on Friday with respect to the possibility of further hearings by the Committee on Foreign Relations, and I thought the distinguished senior Senator from Tennessee also was thinking in terms of still another closed session.

We had planned—or we had hoped, shall I say—that perhaps a vote could come on the first amendment as early as Tuesday of this week. But in view of those circumstances, I wonder what that situation is now. That is the reason why I properly address this question to the majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. If the Senator will yield to me, I may say that I can only speak indirectly on the matter, because the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), the manager of the bill which is the unfinished business, the distinguished Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER), and the distinguished Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART) are directly concerned and they did have a colloquy on this matter. It is my recollection that so far as those three Senators are concerned, they want to get to a vote on the Cooper-Hart amendment as expeditiously as possible. However, it is my understanding that there is at least one Member of this body who feels that the vote should not be taken while the President is away on a very important voyage. Another Member has indicated that he intends to hold an executive meeting of his subcommittee on Wednesday, at

which time he expects that some pertinent secret information will be made available. I do not know what is contained in that information. I must confess my ignorance.

It would appear that on that basis it might not be possible to get to a vote, let us say, before Thursday. So far as I am concerned, I am ready to vote today. So far as the Senators from Mississippi, Kentucky, and Michigan are concerned, they are ready to vote today, or at least tomorrow. But we are in a bind on this matter.

I would hope that this hearing would be held, and I hope it would be possible on Thursday or Friday to get to the first vote on this important measure. While many other amendments are piled up behind the one having to do with the ABM, I believe the icejam would be broken by such a vote and that the measure could be proceeded with more expeditiously. If we do not, then I think we had better get ready to stay with this bill through August 13, and be prepared to resume its consideration when we return after Labor Day.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Let me make one observation.

I find it rather difficult, Mr. President, to counsel our Members that they have to stay here—and that means, of course, that they have to break engagements at home and elsewhere which they regard as quite important.

The Vice President, himself, is in something of a bind, in a sense. A conference of Governors is being held on the Pacific coast, and he would like to go. I think he has a meeting in Seattle, another meeting elsewhere out there, and meetings back here. In my latest discussion with him, I said, "I presume you will have to keep yourself rather fluid."

I say that to all our Members. But then nothing eventuates, and we continue with the discussions, and it puts the leadership in a difficult and somewhat awkward position. That is the reason why I raised the question. If this vote is going to be projected into the future—let us say until the President returns—then I think we should know it now, and we should give them liberty and say that insofar as these pressing engagements are concerned, they are fully ready to accept and should try to fulfill them if they can.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. FONG. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think the Senator from Montana expressed the situation entirely correctly as to the willingness to make an agreement to vote by the authors of the amendment and the chairman of the committee.

There is one addendum. We are ready to agree to a vote but we had in mind that 48 hours would be the minimum notice; the time to vote would come no sooner than 48 hours later.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is plenty of time.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FONG. I yield.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, as the majority leader said, we had quite a discussion on this question. The Senator from Mississippi, the Senator from Texas, the Senator from Michigan, and I were here. The Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART) and I stated that as far as we were concerned, as the sponsors of the amendment together with a number of other sponsors, we were ready to proceed as quickly as we could to a vote. I did say I had been informed that the Senator from Tennessee expected to hold an executive hearing in his committee on Wednesday regarding some reports concerning ABM. I am not fully informed as to what they concluded. I assume he would not be willing to agree to a vote until after the meeting was held.

We agreed that this afternoon the Senate would attempt to agree on an hour certain; that we would meet here and we would expect all of those who are interested in this amendment, both those who are for it and those who are against it, to be here to determine whether or not we can arrive at a time.

The Senator from Michigan and I have brought the matter up with the Senator from Mississippi, and as far as I am concerned, I hope we can meet here at 3 o'clock or thereabouts and discuss the matter.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FONG. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. It would appear that the Senator from Arkansas is the key to this question. He indicated he would like to delay the vote until after the President's return.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is correct. But there are two keys to the matter. The distinguished Senator from Tennessee is also to be considered. Unfortunately, he is detained on official business at this time. I feel as a matter of courtesy and to assure the protection of all interests that we should have both of those Senators on the floor when this matter is proposed and, hopefully, that we are able to arrive at a solution as to when the vote on the amendment will take place.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FONG. I yield.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, there is still another matter I am constrained to address myself to.

#### DECLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. If the Senator will yield, the Chair was not sure if the Senator was propounding a question to the Senate on the first proposition as to the declassification of secret documents.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes, I think I should do so; and I would ask unanimous consent, if that is necessary, that in every case where documents are declassified at the request of a Member of the Senate, and they are declassified by the Pentagon and the Senate is so advised, that it ought to formally approve the kind of declassification just as a matter of course.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. That is the general rule. Without objection—

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to make it very plain that this would not apply to the declassification of documents for any committee or to the right of any Senator to go to the committee and see such documents; and it would apply only to matters that may appear on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator state his unanimous consent request?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Where there is a request by a Senator to the appropriate authorities, which could be the pending one, that a document be declassified so it can be used publicly and used on the floor of the Senate, that it be so reported and that the Senate give its approval; and that case may not apply in any documents in the care of other committees as indicated by the majority leader.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I am not objecting now, the Senator does have in mind that it is the responsibility of the executive branch of Government, through the Pentagon or otherwise, to pass on whether or not documents be declassified.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Absolutely and without question.

Mr. DIRKSEN. But they send that to a committee, and committees are creatures of the Senate. I think the Senate as a body should be aware of it and it ought to have its approval.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears no objection, and it is so ordered.

#### TAX LEGISLATION

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I should address myself to still another matter. In view of the fact that we are at something of an impasse with respect to the ABM and a vote on the first amendment, there is before us this very urgent matter of the tax bill. I am wondering, under those circumstances, whether we cannot lay the ABM matter aside for a little bit and proceed on the question of the surtax because it is so vital to the economy and interests of the country.

The majority leader and I have discussed the matter in a most friendly fashion, but I still feel that sense of urgency.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FONG. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I would point out that the Democratic policy committee met with the Democratic members of the Committee on Finance, as the Senator and the Senate well know. We spent 7 hours last week trying to arrive at an accommodation with the expressed interests of the Republican leadership and the administration; and we came up with the best solution that we could, which we did present to the distinguished minority leader, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the White House. To date no word has been received in the form of an answer.

I would point out that the House of Representatives today is considering a 15-day extension; and what will happen to that extension is anybody's guess, either in that body or over here.

If it comes over here it would be my intention to permit it to be referred under normal procedures to the Committee on Finance; I intend to discuss the matter with the chairman of that committee, the distinguished Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG). I would point out that we are approaching the deadline; that at midnight this coming Thursday, if no accommodation is reached, the surtax will automatically go out of existence. If that unfortunate time comes it means that the current withholding levels which have determined the tax revenues held back from the wage earners and the salaried employees would expire and that that revenue would have to be returned at an appropriate time. The revenues to the Government would be lost. It would appear to me also that if the surtax is allowed to die that it would be most difficult to revive it, if I read the sentiments of the Members on this side of the aisle correctly.

As the distinguished minority leader has said, we are faced with an impasse. I feel as if I am approaching the guillotine. We have tried to go as far as we could to reach an accommodation with the administration. I wish to assure the distinguished minority leader that as far as the Senator from Montana is concerned that he, figuratively speaking, almost shed some of his blood to get this extension for as long as was possible. I personally would have been willing to go along with the chairman of the Committee on Finance to the first of the year but overwhelming sentiment was against that; some Senators only wanted to go to the end of September and some to the end of October. This was the best we could get and I think it is the only accommodation available to us at this time. If there is any possibility to bring about a change I would have no hesitancy in so stating publicly at this time, but I cannot make such an assertion.

(At this point, Mr. INOUYE assumed the chair.)

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. FONG. I yield.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, we have discussed it and I know that the majority leader has done his very best. But I point out in connection with the resolution that there is another specific; namely, that the date of April 18 is thoroughly nailed down so far as repeal of the dividend tax credit or the investment tax credit is concerned. Then it is committed to the hands of the administration and the minority leadership to accept. Frankly, it would put the minority leader in a very awkward position because I certainly cannot bind 43 Members on this side of the aisle. They share equal privileges and prerogatives in the Senate, and if any one of them would undertake to get up and offer an amendment when the bill comes before us, that would be his proper right to do so and I could not constrain him not to do it. I might talk to him and ask him not to do so. Whether he would so do, that would be the privi-

lege he has. That is equally true on the majority side of the aisle.

Thus, in trying to assess the responsibility of the leadership and to talk for everyone, that becomes virtually an impossible undertaking.

Now I can recite, from the standpoint of the administration, that before he left, the President made it crystal clear that he wanted that surtax bill because of the impact upon the country and upon all its commercial and industrial undertakings; and because, further, the withholding, of course, is still in effect, and if the surtax dies, as the majority leader points out, obviously those are withheld funds which will have to be restored to the taxpayers.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, will the Senator from Hawaii yield?

Mr. FONG. I yield.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I wonder whether the majority leader would not agree, since there seems to be a difference of opinion as to how long the surtax should be extended or whether it should be extended at all, that we should make it the pending business and let the Senate work its will. We could get unanimous consent for a limitation on time of debate so that it would not disrupt the ABM discussion, which I understand will be postponed for a few days anyway. Let the Senate work its will, and if a majority of the Senate wants the surtax to be extended only 2 months, 3 months, or 5 months, let it so take action, or if the Senate should decide to defeat it entirely, then so be it. But vote.

Mr. President, the point I make is that we should clear up this uncertainty as to whether we will or will not act. I am wondering whether we could not get agreement and proceed to a consideration of the tax bill.

The Finance Committee has completed the hearings and they are part of the bill which is on the Senate calendar. Therefore, could we not proceed and let the Senate work its will, as is customary with legislation before this body?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I could recognize the argument of the distinguished Senator from Delaware (Mr. WILLIAMS). I, of course, could not agree that hearings have been held on the bill now on the calendar. It was my understanding, subject to correction, that there really were no hearings and no witnesses—

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. The able Senator from Montana is in error on that. Hearings were held and have been printed. We had, I think it was, 3 days of hearings. Anyway, they were completed and all the witnesses, both administration and public witnesses, who wished to testify were heard on the surtax extension and the investment credit, the phase of the bill as reported by the House. All the hearings have been completed in their entirety.

The parts of the hearings which were not held and to which the Senator from Montana refers were those which concerned the tax reform amendments that would be offered at a later date by some Members. But so far as the bill that came over from the House was concerned, the hearings have been completed. They are printed and have been available a couple weeks.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Hawaii yield?

Mr. FONG. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. With regard to the investment credit, there certainly were not any completed hearings on that.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Oh, yes, there were.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There were a number of people interested in that aspect of the particular phasing out provisions, which they expected to be part of the hearings.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I was present throughout the hearings, and the chairman specifically made the inquiry of whether there were any additional witnesses who wished to be heard, and there were no other witnesses. To my knowledge there has been no request for any additional witnesses since. The completed hearings are printed and available on the bill as it was reported to the Senate Calendar.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does not the Senator recall when it was voted out, that the Senator from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE) was sitting there, ready, willing, and able to offer an amendment and all of a sudden the Senator made a motion, which motion carried, and he did not even get to present his amendments addressed to the phasing out? I also had a constituent placed in the same situation. As a matter of fact, I had thought there would be some further hearings—

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. No. The hearings were held. The Senator from Georgia did have an amendment, but testimony was also heard on the Talmadge proposal to phase out the investment credit.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The hearings were held and the committee took action without getting any action on any amendments—

Mr. MANSFIELD. On the basis of what the distinguished Senator has just said, I stand corrected; but in response to the specific question of the Senator from Delaware, the Senator from Montana just happens to be the lightning rod for the policy committee—

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I appreciate that.

Mr. MANSFIELD. On this side, and I act under the direction of that committee and in this instance not only that committee, which is charged with the scheduling of legislation, but also the Democratic members of the Senate Finance Committee; thus in view of their joint proposal of last week to extend the surtax for 5 months while we await the tax reform package, I would have to respectfully decline to accede to what the Senator from Delaware has requested at this time.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I thank the Senator.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I wish to thank the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FONG) for his kindness and patience during this colloquy.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, in view of the long colloquy which has just taken place, which has consumed approxi-

mately 20 minutes, I ask unanimous consent that my time begin as of now.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### SAFEGUARD—DECISION FOR PEACE

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, I have been closely following the debate on the President's proposed Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system. I have studied and analyzed much of the information, testimonies, and other relevant material that are in my possession, and I have carefully listened to the classified information presented in the closed session of the Senate. I have found that this is one of the most difficult issues to face the Senate this year, for a great many complex facts, assumptions, and policy considerations are involved.

We are all peering into the unknown future and trying to assess the possible threat to our Nation's security that may exist in the 1970's and what we, as a nation, should do to protect our people from that threat. Human judgments are required, and here is where knowledgeable and informed men do indeed differ.

At this juncture in the debate, which has been extensive and enlightening, yet at times contradictory, it occurred to me it might be helpful at the start of my statement to recite exactly what we in the Senate are asked to vote on at this time.

##### I. THE 1970 SAFEGUARD PROPOSAL

Before us is the bill (S. 2546) to authorize military procurement funds and military research and development funds for fiscal year 1970, plus funds for construction of missile test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range. The total amount contained in this authorization bill for various defense needs is \$20,059,500,000, plus \$12,700,000 for constructing a missile test facility at Kwajalein.

Included in this figure is a total of \$759.1 million for phase I of the proposed Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system. Of this total, \$400.9 million is for research and development; \$345.5 million for procurement of elements in the Safeguard program; and \$12.7 million for the Kwajalein missile test facility.

The record should show that in regard to Safeguard, the Senate Armed Services Committee unanimously recommended the research and development fund of \$400.9 million and the test facility at Kwajalein fund of \$12.7 million and by 10 to 7 recommended the procurement fund of \$345.5 million.

##### II. NO COMMITMENT TO MORE SAFEGUARD SITES

Deployment of the Safeguard ABM at two sites, as authorized by the pending bill, is most emphatically not an automatic trigger for additional sites.

Last March, in announcing the Safeguard proposal, President Nixon made very clear that he intends to review the entire ABM question annually in the light of technological developments, in the light of the threat to America evaluated at the time of the review, and in the light of international events, such as arms limitation talks.

If the annual review discloses good and sufficient reasons to indicate America should proceed no further on an ABM

system, I am confident President Nixon will so recommend.

Although the Nixon administration views the Safeguard ABM as a possible 12-site—with two optional sites additional—system, the President has made plain he is recommending now only a two-site deployment, at North Dakota and Montana, reserving judgment on the remaining sites until his annual review.

The Congress, in approving this bill, would likewise be reserving judgment on other ABM sites until we look at the entire matter again next year.

In this military authorization bill that is before us, we are not voting to authorize \$10.3 billion, the administration estimate for the 12-site Safeguard system. Nor are we voting to authorize \$40 billion, or \$100 billion, as Safeguard opponents estimate the total system could cost.

The amount of Safeguard funds we would authorize if we approve this bill is \$759.1 million. Of this sum, \$413.6 million carries the unanimous recommendation of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The balance of \$345.5 million was supported by a 10-to-7 vote of that committee. These funds will permit research and development of the ABM to go forward, so we can find out what technical bugs there are in the system and so we can begin to approach the knowledge the Russians have accumulated since 1962, when they began work on their ABM, which is now deployed.

The \$759.1 million will also permit construction of a missile test facility at Kwajalein and will permit procurement of radars, computers, ground equipment, and hardware for long-leadtime components of the Sprint and Spartan missiles. These items are required to move ahead with deployment of the Safeguard ABM at two sites.

I want to make very clear my understanding that a vote for the \$759.1 million to be used in fiscal year 1970, which ends next June 30, does not commit either the Senate or the Nixon administration to finance the entire Safeguard ABM system of 12 sites on the mainland of the United States, plus two optional sites in Alaska and Hawaii.

I repeat. A vote for the \$759.1 million authorization for a start on deployment of Safeguard does not commit the President, does not commit his administration, does not commit the Senate, and does not commit any Senator to additional Safeguard sites.

There is just no validity to the contention that by voting for the limited Safeguard program in the pending bill we are thereby committing ourselves to any larger ABM program.

The decision we make at this time is not irrevocable.

It can be changed—and I am sure it will be changed if changed circumstances permit.

##### III. BOTH DEFENSE AND DOMESTIC PRIORITIES CAN BE MET

Now let us look at the priority aspect of the Safeguard proposal before us.

What we are talking about is the priority of our Nation's survival.

I believe any decision on deployment

of the Safeguard ABM at two sites should hinge on whether this is necessary to insure the survival of America as a Nation.

Certainly, America's survival as a Nation is top priority. For unless we survive as a Nation, we are not going to be able to take care of all the other high-priority programs we need.

I do not believe that the Senate today is faced with the "either-or" proposition that: either we must have Safeguard or we must have poverty programs, education programs, health programs, social security programs, aid for our cities, and all our other high-priority needs.

I believe that this Nation, this administration, and this Congress will find the ways to provide the wherewithal to finance the limited Safeguard ABM proposal before us and to finance education, poverty, health, social security, transportation, and many, many other programs.

I do not believe that a vote for the limited Safeguard program forecloses other high-priority domestic programs.

Nor would a vote for the limited Safeguard program contained in the pending bill be construed as evidence that we in Congress attach a far lower priority to urgent domestic problems crying out for solution.

To say that our national security has top priority in no way diminishes my concern or the concern of other Members of Congress regarding our pressing domestic problems. There are so many crucial problems, we would be hard pressed to assign any order of priority. We might as well be asked which of our children we love most. The fact is, we love each of them and we are concerned about each of them.

The fact that the limited Safeguard proposal was pending did not deter many Senators from voting to exclude education programs from the expenditure ceiling we approved in the second supplemental appropriations bill on June 18. Nor did it deter many Senators from voting to exclude health programs under the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare from the spending ceiling. I voted to exclude both education and health programs from the expenditure ceiling, thus insuring that no cuts are made in these two vital areas.

The fact that I support these programs does not preclude support for the Safeguard proposal before us today. My view is that if a program is essential to our Nation, we should authorize it.

With this as a prelude, let me now discuss the Safeguard ABM proposal and my position on it.

#### IV. AMERICA'S SUPREME GOAL IS TO DETER WAR; ABM WILL HELP

It is no secret that the only real defense against a strategic nuclear attack on the United States is deterring any would-be attacker from initiating such a conflict or from pursuing policies that might produce such a result.

Given present and foreseeable weapons technology—both offensive and defensive—and the calculations that have been made on gain and losses to be anticipated, deliberate recourse to strategic nuclear attack—first strike—seems unlikely.

But even if one assumes that the So-

viet strategic forces are being built up not for a first-strike capability, but as a second-strike deterrent, the cold fact remains that this essentially second-strike force could be used in a first-strike role.

Moreover, the evolving character of the Soviet offensive forces, especially the SS-9 missiles, are well suited for a counterforce strike against our ICBM force if such a decision were ever made by the Russians. It is against this possible reality that the President has proposed to move ahead on providing additional protection for our Minuteman missiles.

Without adequate protection for our retaliatory ICBM's, America might well face a "deterrent gap" somewhere in the mid-1970's. The credibility of our nuclear deterrence would then no longer exist.

By influencing the attacker's calculation of his losses and prospective gains, an ABM deployment can contribute to deterring a strategic nuclear attack. It lends credibility to our nuclear deterrent forces.

The Cuban missile crisis was a vivid and real example where the strength and credibility of our strategic forces deterred war.

Why do you think the Soviet Union backed down in that nuclear confrontation?

Was it because President Kennedy used some persuasive and idealistic arguments? No.

What stopped the Russians was one basic factor—fear of, and respect for, the military might of the United States. The Soviets knew we had the ability and the capability to call their hand.

Today, since the Soviet Union has approximate nuclear parity with the United States and in addition has deployed an ABM system for her defense, the absence of a comparable U.S. defense capability could very well impair the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent force.

Beyond their mission as a deterrent to nuclear attack, our strategic forces play a very important role in our overall defense policy and posture. The capacity to deter lesser conflicts, or to limit conflict where it occurs, as in the Middle East, is significantly influenced by the balance of strategic forces. Consequently, this balance of nuclear terror tends to operate as a restraint upon conflicts at lower levels of intensity out of fear of unlimited escalation.

Unfortunately, this function of strategic forces has received little attention in the current ABM discussions.

Any weakening of our strategic capabilities would lessen our ability to control conflicts at lower levels of intensity and could also encourage the Soviet Union to pursue more adventurist policies, including the potential for "nuclear blackmail."

In the past, our strategic superiority was largely attributable to our offensive strategic forces. For the future, however, the defensive component of the overall U.S. strategic posture may become increasingly significant, vis-a-vis an enemy's calculations as to our likely response when American interests are challenged. An improved defensive component of our strategic forces could well contribute, in certain situations, the crucially important margin of strategic superiority necessary to deter war.

#### V. PRESIDENT'S SAFEGUARD PROPOSAL A DETERRENT TO WAR

On March 14, 1969, President Nixon announced to the American people that he had made a decision which he believes is "vital for the security and defense of the United States and also in the interests of peace, throughout the world."

The President disclosed his decision to recommend moving ahead with a limited deployment of a modified "thin" ABM system designed to preserve enough U.S. missiles to provide a credible deterrent against nuclear attack.

The President's Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system is designed primarily to protect our offensive missile sites and will initially provide protection for only two of these sites.

It is the two-site proposal that is before the Senate now.

#### A. FOUR BASIC OPTIONS

Before the Nixon administration decided to go forward with the Safeguard plan, four major alternatives were seriously considered.

First. A thick deployment designed to defend U.S. cities against a massive Soviet attack.

Second. No deployment at all, but a continuation of research and development.

Third. The continuation of the thin Sentinel program approved by the preceding administration.

Fourth. The deployment of a modified system which would fulfill three objectives: Defense of our land-based strategic offensive forces against a first strike by the Soviet Union; protection of our major cities against a Chinese attack in the 1970's; and defense of our country against an accidental or small attack from any source.

The first alternative—heavy deployment—was rejected because such thick defense "still could not prevent a catastrophic level of U.S. fatalities from a deliberate, all-out Soviet attack." In addition, such a heavy deployment might be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a prelude to an offensive strategy threatening their deterrent.

The second alternative—no deployment—was also rejected because it does not leave the United States with any option to provide a defense for our deterrent on a realistic schedule that might be required by the Soviet threat, nor does it provide a defense against a Chinese threat or an accidental attack.

The third alternative—deployment of the Sentinel system approved by the preceding administration—was likewise rejected, because it would be inadequate to meet the emerging Soviet threat to our strategic offensive missiles. This third alternative could also be misinterpreted as—and could in fact have been—a first step toward the construction of a heavy system for the defense of our cities. Such a deployment could be interpreted as provocative by the Soviet Union.

After examining all the available alternatives, the Nixon Administration selected the fourth—a combination of approaches which the President felt provided the most realistic means of safeguarding our retaliatory capability. This system calls for a measured deployment

of an active defense of our retaliatory forces, structured to expand or contract as circumstances may dictate.

**B. THE SAFEGUARD ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE—  
FIRST PHASE**

President Nixon has proposed for the current 1970 fiscal year that Congress approve a start on deployment of Safeguard ABM's at 2 ICBM sites, Grand Forks, N. Dak., and Malmstrom, Mont.

The sum requested for authorization is \$759.1 million, being the first installment for the construction of two prototype installations to include:

The sum of \$345.5 million for procurement of one missile site radar—Grand Forks; one missile site radar data processor—Grand Forks; training equipment; advance procurement for one other perimeter acquisition radar and one other missile site radar—Malmstrom; and leadtime missile parts—\$600,000—which includes funds for the construction of missile test facilities at Kwajalein for the Safeguard system totaling \$12.7 million, and funds for research and development for the Safeguard system in the amount of \$400.9 million.

It will not be implemented according to some fixed, theoretical schedule. It will be deployed in a manner clearly related to our periodic analysis of the threat. The first deployment will cover only the two missile sites of Malmstrom and Grand Forks Air Force Bases. These two bases will include both the Spartan and Sprint missiles and are expected to be operational by 1974.

Additional congressional approval will be necessary if work is to proceed beyond these first two installations in the years ahead. Action of the Senate on this pending bill in no way commits either the administration or the Congress to construct any additional ABM sites.

President Nixon said on March 14:

Each phase of the deployment will be reviewed (by the Executive and Legislative Branches) to insure that we are doing as much as necessary but no more than that required by the threat existing at that time.

The President emphasized:

This program will be reviewed annually from the point of view of (A) technical developments, (B) the threat, (C) the diplomatic context, including any talks on arms limitations.

The entire system need never be built if Washington and Moscow can agree to freeze or limit deployment of offensive and defensive missiles.

**VI. THREAT TO AMERICA'S DETERRENCE**

**A. THE RUSSIAN THREAT**

The potential threat from Russia lies in its growing force of missiles which could destroy a substantial portion of our own nuclear deterrent. Since we cannot stop a massive Soviet attack on our cities, we are dependent on deterrence to insure that nuclear war does not start in the first place.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union today is building at a rapid rate the kinds of weapons which could be used to erode our deterrent force.

According to our intelligence reports, "the Soviet ICBM force has more than quadrupled in the last 2¾ years from 250 operational launchers in June 1966, to more than 1,000 as of the end of March

1969." If the Russians continue to deploy ICBM's at the rate they did in 1967-68, they could have as many as 2,500 by the mid-1970's—two and a half times our present number.

At the present time, the greatest threat to our ICBM force is the large SS-9 ICBM which, with a warhead yield of up to 25 megatons and its presently estimated accuracy, could destroy a Minuteman in its hardened silo. The Soviets now have more than 230 of these missiles in operation or under construction.

A real concern is the prospect that the Russians might install highly accurate MIRV's—multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles—on their SS-9's. If this happens, and if their accuracy is improved to a quarter of a mile, the SS-9's "could probably destroy 95 percent of our Minuteman force."

Russia has tested and developed nuclear bombs that are 60 megatons in magnitude. The United States has not.

Russia has taken the initiative to develop a fractional orbital bombardment system. The United States has not.

To make matters worse, the Russians are going ahead with a massive program to build Polaris-type submarines, each carrying 16 nuclear missiles—SLBM. Secretary Laird has stated that the Russians could, by the mid-70's, pass the United States in Polaris-type submarines. At present, we plan to convert 31 of our 41 Polaris submarines to the Poseidon missile, which is capable of carrying 10 independently targetable reentry vehicles—MIRV. And there is no reason why the Soviet Polaris-type missiles could not have MIRV's just as we are planning for our own Polaris submarines.

In addition, these current developments in Soviet ballistic missile submarines are quite apart from the continuing growth of the Russian attack submarine force, which it is also feared might come to present a serious threat to our Polaris force.

This possibility was expressed by Defense Secretary Laird before the House Committee on Appropriations. On May 22, he testified:

The United States cannot preclude the possibility that the Soviets in the next few years may devise some weapon, technique, or tactic which might increase the vulnerability of our Polaris-Poseidon submarines. In that event, our strategic deterrent could be dangerously eroded, with all the consequences which would follow such a development.

The seriousness of these Russian buildups was confirmed by Gen. Earl Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In testifying before the House Appropriations Committee this year, General Wheeler said:

In the light of these developments and after review by the National Security Council, the President announced his decision to modify the Sentinel and to deploy instead the phased Safeguard system. At the outset, let me affirm that the Joint Chiefs of Staff support this decision because it will add to the overall strategic posture of the United States and to our ability to deter nuclear war.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that in light of the rapidly expanding Soviet ICBM and SLBM capabilities, it is prudent now to provide protection for a portion of the U.S. retaliatory force and that the phased

Safeguard deployment meets this requirement.

**B. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST THREAT**

Mr. President, in addition to providing a significant margin of strategic superiority, the Safeguard system would provide adequate protection against the possibility of an irrational, accidental, or miscalculated nuclear attack by Communist China during the 1970's.

Former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford testified last January before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Chinese Communist threat, saying in part:

We now believe that an initial operating capability with an ICBM will not be achieved until 1972 at the earliest, and more likely later.

Assuming that political and economic stability will be re-established within the next year or so, China could probably generate enough resources to support a moderate and growing ICBM deployment through 1975.

In May this year, Defense Secretary Laird told the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense:

By the latter part of the decade of the 1970's, the Chinese can have the capability of destroying tens of millions of people here in the United States with a force of less than 100 ICBM's.

The President's Safeguard proposal also includes a meaningful defense against a Chinese Communist attack in recognition of the danger that Red China's leaders may act irrationally. A thin defense could be effective against a light Chinese attack in the mid-1970's.

**C. PRESERVING OUR DETERRENT FORCES**

Although our deterrent forces and their protection are adequate today, Russia's current buildup of her first-strike capability compels the United States to further hedge against a possible unacceptable erosion of our deterrent in the future. To accomplish this, we can do one of several things.

First, we could remove the potential vulnerability of our ICBM's by planning to beat the Soviet SS-9 to the punch; that is, to launch our retaliatory force the minute we know an ICBM has been fired from the Soviet Union.

However, the firing may have been accidental, or the missile or missiles may not be aimed at the United States, or the warheads may be disarmed. If we launch our ICBM's at the first warning that a missile has been fired by the Soviet Union, we are irrevocably committed to nuclear holocaust. We need a response geared to accidental ICBM firings from whatever source.

Second, we could further increase our Minuteman, Polaris, and bomber forces to compensate for the increase of Soviet first-strike capability. Such a move, while providing some improvement of our deterrent, could easily be misinterpreted by Russia as an attempt to threaten its deterrent.

Third, we could further harden our ICBM's by putting them in more strongly reinforced underground sites. Unfortunately, studies show that hardening by itself is not adequate protection against foreseeable advances in the accuracy and size of Russian offensive forces.

Fourth, we could begin limited con-

struction on a defense for our retaliatory forces.

In selecting the fourth option, President Nixon clearly demonstrated that while providing for our country's security he did not want to provoke the Russians into another nuclear arms race.

In addition, we must not forget that the Russians have been deploying an ABM system around Moscow—the so-called Galosh system. It is estimated that this system calls for the deployment of some 100 missile sites around Moscow. Russia has a 4- to 5-year lead on the United States in developing an ABM system.

At the present stage of development, approximately 65 such sites are deployed, but it is believed that further construction has been held up. Although the real cause for this slowdown is not known, it is widely believed that the reason is to introduce a more sophisticated radar network. If this should prove to be true, then the modified Galosh system would obviously acquire a capability significantly greater than that with which it is now credited.

In light of these circumstances, why is it wrong for the United States to take steps to deploy two ABM installations to bolster our defensive posture and to preserve our deterrence?

#### D. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE SAFEGUARD SYSTEM

Supporters of the Safeguard system do not expect it, or any other system, ever to provide a perfect defense. The real question is whether deployment of the system would strengthen our national security either by enhancing deterrence or by reducing damage in the event of an attack.

At its present stage of research and development, it seems clear that the developers of the Safeguard missile system have high confidence that it will provide a substantial measure of protection against an accidental or irrational light attack. Although I share this view, I realize that there is a wide divergence of opinion as to its technological prospects.

There is even greater disagreement as to what level of effectiveness would prove meaningful, either as a deterrent or in limiting damage to our retaliatory forces in the event of a massive nuclear attack.

Mr. President, at just what level the degree of anticipated effectiveness is sufficient to warrant a deployment decision is a highly subjective matter. No one expects a perfect defense—but how good does the system have to be to be good enough?

There is an old Chinese saying, "The best is always the enemy of the good." What this simply means is that in the pursuit of the best solution, the attainable is often sacrificed.

The fact that the ABM, at its present stage of development, cannot provide an assured defense against a sophisticated missile attack is not a conclusive argument against deployment. An imperfect defense may be better than none and can be meaningful both in terms of lives saved and as a contribution to our overall strategic posture.

But, most important, an ABM system will give the President another crucial option in terms of having to choose be-

tween "humiliation and holocaust." At the present time, the only alternative courses of action that a President could take in response to an irrational or accidental nuclear attack would be, first, to release our massive retaliatory forces or, second, to do nothing.

However, with the Safeguard system the President would have the additional option of activating only those missiles that are designed to intercept and destroy the few incoming missiles. Thus, the President could handle an irrational or accidental attack without a great loss of lives and avoid the catastrophic consequences of a full nuclear retaliation.

If for no other reason than this—providing the President with an additional alternative to save lives—I think the Safeguard system is a worthwhile investment.

#### VII. MAJOR ARGUMENTS OVER SAFEGUARD

The major arguments advanced by the opponents of the ABM system have centered around the following:

Argument No. 1: The Safeguard components were designed for the protection of our major cities and not our ICBM sites. Therefore, opponents say that the design is inadequate or unsuitable to protect our missile sites. Consequently, they seek to delay deployment until further research and development will produce the desired design to protect our ICBM's.

The truth of the matter is, Mr. President, that the Safeguard components were selected from the Nike X development program which from the beginning had as a design objective hard-point defense. Several studies conducted in the last 2 years have verified that Sprint-class missiles and radars like the MSR are the preferred type of system components for the defense of our hardened ICBM forces.

Unlike the conceptually simple defense systems that are favored by some critics, the Safeguard components are designed with the possibility of growth in mind. This enables them to operate effectively against a growth in sophistication by the enemy's offensive threat.

Mr. President, those favoring delay want the research and development to be made at Kwajalein, away from the two proposed sites. It is difficult to see how research and development at Kwajalein, in a system of this nature, to be effective, would not necessarily embody deployment.

If we are to expend the necessary funds to deploy at Kwajalein, why not deploy at the two proposed sites and save the cost at Kwajalein?

There is no reason why our scientists and engineers at the two proposed sites could not work out the technical bugs and shortcomings that would be expected to show up before going ahead, if necessary, with total deployment. In this phased-deployment plan, the two missile sites are still in the experimental category—an extension of research and development. They will provide conditions which will not be present in a research and development environment.

Argument No. 2: The ABM is technologically too complex to work.

In this regard, Secretary Laird testified:

I am sure that on the basis of our present testing of the Spartan and the Sprint, the successful testing of the Missile Site Radar, the assurances that we have had from the Atomic Energy Commission, as far as the warheads are concerned, that this system will work.

Mr. President, have we already forgotten the amazing technological and scientific achievement of the past week? The ability of our scientists and technicians to send Americans to the moon and to return them safely to earth clearly demonstrated their technical and scientific prowess. If they can accomplish such an intricate and complex feat, I, for one, have faith that our country has the scientific, technological, and industrial resources to develop a Safeguard system that will work, critics notwithstanding.

I am reminded of similar divisions of scientific opinion in the development of the hydrogen bomb and the Polaris submarine.

Radars and computers were indispensable to the success of the Apollo moon-landing program, just as radars and computers are essential to the ABM. I am confident radars and computers can be modified to adequately service our Sprint and Spartan missiles in the defense of our ICBM's.

Argument No. 3: It would not increase security, because any defensive advantage can be negated by an increase in the offensive capability of the enemy.

This argument is based on the fallacious assumption that Safeguard equipment cannot be improved to meet a growing ICBM offensive threat. The ABM critics err in their arguments by assuming that we would not upgrade our Safeguard protection while the Russian offense grows.

If the Soviet threat continues to grow, even beyond the mid-1970's, then Safeguard installations can be improved on terms that are favorable to our defense. For example, adding an additional MSR at each Minuteman site would force the Soviets to double the size of their attack if they hoped to exhaust our ABM defense.

Likewise, if we were to double both the number of our interceptors and radars, the Soviets would have to quadruple the number of their offensive missiles required to exhaust our defense.

Argument No. 4: Safeguard deployment might prejudice arms control and arms-limitation negotiations.

I fail to see any inherent reason why deployment of a purely defensive system such as the proposed ABM system should imperil progress in arms control if the Soviets are seriously interested in reaching agreement on such measures. At the very least, it would appear that the Soviets do not see an incompatibility between deploying an ABM and attaining their objectives in arms-control negotiations.

In fact, Safeguard may give the Russians another incentive to negotiate. It should persuade them that any effort on their part to achieve a successful first strike is fruitless—that we will continue to protect our retaliatory forces effectively.

The Soviet Union, as we all know, had already constructed a limited ABM system around Moscow; it had also agreed

to strategic arms talks following the previous administration's decision to deploy the Sentinel system.

In fact, the Soviet Union agreed to strategic arms limitations talks a week after President Johnson announced his decision to deploy the Sentinel.

On June 27 of last year, 3 days after the Senate refused to delay deployment of the Sentinel ABM, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko announced that Russia was "ready for an exchange of opinions" on "mutual restrictions and subsequent restriction of strategic vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons—offensive and defensive including anti-missiles."

In addition, the Soviet press quoted President Nixon's favorable references to arms talks when he announced his decision on the Safeguard system and Premier Kosygin recently referred affirmatively to limitations on strategic arms in his message to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee.

In other words, Premier Kosygin's message was delivered after President Nixon's decision was announced. There was no sign from Kosygin that the Safeguard system would interfere with the success of the talks on the limitation of strategic arms.

The receptive Soviet response leads me to conclude that if the Russians are truly sincere in their desire to reach an agreement on arms limitation, some type of arms limitation agreement can be reached.

Argument No. 5. Deployment of Safeguard would revive the nuclear arms race and would inevitably lead to war. However, there is no historical evidence to substantiate this conclusion. More frequently, it has been the unwillingness to match the growing military strength of a potential enemy that has invited aggression.

The Safeguard deployment away from our cities should convince the Soviets that we are not trying to gain a first-strike capability against them. It should reassure them that a negotiated arms control agreement that protects deterrence while limiting first-strike use of long-range nuclear weapons is possible.

Mr. President, this issue is so complex and involved that it is not possible to determine with certainty whether an "ABM race" or any other arms race is or is not likely to result from our decision to deploy the Safeguard system.

Likewise, and equally important, it does not necessarily follow that an arms race in strategic forces will be avoided if we refrain from the deployment of our Safeguard system. For the buildup of strategic offensive forces may occur independently of a defensive buildup.

In actuality, an arms race in offensive weapons is likely to prove far more provocative and destabilizing than a defensive arms race.

Argument No. 6: Money for ABM should be diverted to alleviate our domestic problems.

The \$759.1 million authorization for Safeguard in the pending bill is about 1 percent of our total defense budget for fiscal year 1970. The \$345.5 million of procurement for deployment represents about 4 days' cost in Vietnam. Surely,

to bolster our Nation's defense and to give our President another option in case of accidental or irrational nuclear attack against America, we can afford to devote 1 percent of our defense budget to the ABM.

Many of those who object to the Safeguard ABM system on cost grounds say we should instead devote these funds to domestic programs. Yet, the Hart-Cooper modified amendment makes no such diversion. It would cost \$759.1 million, the same amount as S. 2546 as recommended by the Committee on Armed Services. There is no diversion of any of these funds under the Hart-Cooper amendment to America's pressing domestic problems.

Insofar as funds for high priority domestic needs are concerned, as I have already stated I voted to exempt education and health programs from the expenditure ceiling for fiscal year 1970 approved by the Senate last month. I regard education and health as very high priority programs.

As a member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health, Education, and Welfare, I expect I shall be voting to increase funds for libraries, impacted areas, and other education programs and for various important health programs.

As a member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, a few weeks ago I supported an increase in food-stamp funds, bringing the total to \$750 million, the full amount authorized by the Senate. I believe hunger is a high-priority program, and I am willing to provide the funds to alleviate hunger.

I am concerned about the plight of the millions of Americans on social security. I have introduced legislation to provide automatic increases in social security benefits as the cost of living rises 3 percent or more. I believe a social security increase is imperative for the millions of Americans who see their monthly checks eroded by inflation.

I am concerned about the millions of Americans living in poverty. I shall support President Nixon's proposal to make sure no one in poverty is required to pay Federal income taxes.

As a member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health, Education, and Welfare, I shall have an opportunity to examine the antipoverty program in detail and see how it can be strengthened.

I cite these examples to illustrate that money is being applied to our urgent domestic problems and to show that authorizing \$759.1 million for Safeguard will not prevent the Senate from voting additional funds for domestic problems.

As I said before, I believe we can do both—vote for the Safeguard funds and vote funds for domestic programs. We can do it by cutting waste and by insisting on prudent management.

#### VIII. CONCLUSION

Mr. President, to safeguard our Nation's security I strongly feel that the limited deployment of the Safeguard system at this time is mandatory.

I have come to this conclusion after heavily weighing the following reasons:

First. America's supreme goal is to deter war. To achieve this basic objec-

tive, America must maintain the credibility of her retaliatory force.

Second. The President's Safeguard system is a limited program designed to preserve the integrity of our deterrence. It will be flexible enough to expand or contract as circumstances may dictate.

Third. Congress is being asked to authorize \$757.1 million for the deployment of only two prototype installations. This approval does not mean that we have made an open-ended commitment to the Safeguard system for future years.

Fourth. Our intelligence reports show that the Russians are developing a real threat to our ICBM's. If the Soviets install highly accurate MIRV's on their SS-9's and improve their accuracy, they could probably destroy 95 percent of our Minuteman force.

Fifth. The Chinese Communist are on the threshold of developing an ICBM threat in the mid-1970's. The President's Safeguard system could provide a meaningful defense against such a threat.

Sixth. The possibility of an irrational or accidental attack must always be considered. Safeguard could provide the United States with the protection against such an attack.

Seventh. At the present time, the only alternative courses of action that our President could take in response to an irrational or accidental attack would be to release our massive retaliatory forces or to do nothing. Safeguard would allow the President to cope with this type of attack without a great loss of lives and avoid the catastrophic consequences of a full nuclear retaliation.

Eighth. Safeguard in my opinion, would not be detrimental to arms control negotiations. The Soviet Union has shown no indication that the deployment of the Safeguard system would jeopardize meaningful arms negotiation.

Ninth. As I have indicated earlier, Congress and the President are well aware of our pressing domestic needs and they are not about to ignore them. I shall not ignore them. Funds for this year's Safeguard deployment will not compromise our efforts to meet the urgent problems—poverty, health, education, pollution, housing, and others—of the American people.

#### IX. A DECISION FOR PEACE AND SECURITY

Mr. President, prudence would seem to indicate a policy of limited action in the field of ABMs. When one considers what the Soviet Union is developing and deploying, the burden of proof on those who are contrary minded is very great.

I believe that there should be no compromise with our country's security and defense. As President Kennedy expressed in his March 28, 1961, message to Congress:

Our strategic arms and defenses must be adequate to deter any deliberate nuclear attack on the United States or our allies. . . . Moreover we will not strike first in any conflict. But what we have and must continue to have is the ability to survive the first blow and respond with devastating power. This deterrent power depends not only on the number of our missiles and bombers, but on their state of readiness, their ability to survive attack and the flexibility and sureness with which we can control them to achieve our national purpose and strategic objectives.

I believe there is no cost or sacrifice too great to bear if it will insure peace through the deterrence of war.

At the same time, and equally important, I believe we must move toward talks with the Soviet Union in an effort to achieve some degree of stability in the arms race. This is why I was pleased by President's Nixon's statement that the Safeguard program will be under constant review to take into account the status of talks on arms limitation and reduction.

As for me, just as long as there is any chance that the President's decision could make the margin of difference as to whether or not this country is ever subjected to nuclear attack, I will support it. If the administration's projection of the nuclear threat to our national security does not materialize, we would have only expended about 1 percent of our 1970 defense budget.

On the other hand, if the opponents of ABM are wrong and we do not deploy Safeguard, then the United States faces the possibility of outright destruction or nuclear confrontation. And it is because I can conceive of circumstances in which this deployment could represent that margin of difference in insuring our national security that I support the Safeguard system.

Critics should realize that any decision on the ABM—even a decision to defer a decision—involves risks. Under present circumstances, I firmly believe that President Nixon has made a wise choice.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Hawaii yield?

Mr. FONG. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I have listened with great interest to the Senator's speech—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Hawaii has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Hawaii may proceed for an additional 5 minutes, and that immediately following that the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. McINTYRE) be recognized, according to the previous agreement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think the Senate owes a great deal to the Senator from Hawaii for the well-thought-out and carefully prepared speech which he has delivered with emphasis.

I agree with his major conclusions. I think they are sound. It is the only position left to take at this stage.

I particularly wish to point out the clarity with which the Senator expressed himself on point eight, that this step by us certainly would not—I repeat, would not—influence adversely the President's position and his power to negotiate with a chance of success in trying to work out some kind of arms limitation agreement with the Soviets. His facts are so clear. I am glad the Senator brought them out in such a fine way.

I believe that it will hurt the President's chances if we do not approve this program.

Again I commend the Senator from Hawaii for his fine speech.

Mr. FONG. I thank the distinguished Senator from Mississippi for his fine remarks. I agree with him 100 percent that if the President does not have this system to protect our deterrent, it would hurt us, and that this does not preclude the President from negotiating with the Soviets. I think that the Soviets have indicated that they are willing to negotiate even after we had announced the decision to deploy Safeguard.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Hawaii yield?

Mr. FONG. I am happy to yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I should like to congratulate my colleague from Hawaii for a most scholarly presentation. Quite obviously, he has listened closely and carefully to all the debate, all the discussion, he has read the records, and he has put together, I think, as clear, as concise and as logical a basic presentation of this most important matter as could possibly be done.

He has touched on all the important considerations, including most importantly, the constant review so that at any moment, if the ABM Safeguard system is not needed, it can be discontinued.

He has also touched on the cost. I believe my colleague would agree with me that all the opponents and the expert witnesses agreed, one, that while the system may not be perfect, it is the only available system under the state of the art at the present time and, two, that we can never be certain until we build one. That is all the President is asking, that we build two. If they are built and turn out to be a success, as we hope they will be, then we will have set up a most important defense for this country. But then, with the agreement of all that there should be a continuation of research and development, I congratulate my colleague for pointing out that the only financial difference between the cost of research and development and the cost of actually constructing the two sites which the President has asked for, is a matter of less than \$400 million—I believe it is \$345 million.

I agree with my colleague that this is a very small price to pay for what may be the deciding defensive strength in the contest between this country and the Soviet Union until such time as we can come to a sane, sensible, and hopeful agreement whereby there will be arms limitation.

I think that my colleague has done a perfectly magnificent job in speaking for deployment. He makes the point very well that, after all is said and done, those who have access to all the information, after many hours of study, have decided it is in the best interests of the security of this Nation that they want the ABM Safeguard system, and that it is badly needed. It may be the best investment of any that has ever been made from our defense standpoint.

Accordingly, I heartily congratulate my colleague from Hawaii and thank him most sincerely. I join him enthusiastically in his endorsement of the ABM system and in the hope that it will be voted on affirmatively by the Senate.

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, I want to thank the distinguished Senator from

California for his very laudatory remarks and to point out that the opponents of Safeguard do not ask that the money be cut, they propose to spend the same amount of money and deploy this system at Kwajalein. If they are going to ask that it be deployed at Kwajalein, we should deploy it at the two proposed sites.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 15 minutes.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—and I shall not object—I am waiting for the morning hour and I would like to get a little idea of the time—

Mr. MANSFIELD. I think the request of the Senator from New Hampshire is a feasible one, which I am sure the distinguished Senator from New York will recognize. There was extended colloquy as soon as the Senate convened and it has made everything late—

Mr. JAVITS. I am not quarreling with anything.

Mr. MANSFIELD. No. I am just explaining. The Senator from New Hampshire is asking for 15 minutes.

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 15 minutes, to allow for the distinguished chairman of the committee and others to speak.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

#### ABM: TO SEEK A COMMON GROUND

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, in recent years this Nation has been ripped with divisiveness. From turmoil in our cities to campus violence to the most unpopular war in history, the issues of the times have torn at our national unity with relentless savagery.

And now—in the very month when Apollo 11 brought us together again—we are confronted with the hour of decision on one of the most divisive issues of our time—the fate of the administration's Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system.

Rarely if ever has a single issue—other than war itself—provoked such a public outcry or so sharply divided the Senate of the United States.

In truth, Safeguard has become a monumental new symbol of national disunity.

Yet this need not be.

If only the proponents and the opponents of Safeguard would agree to seek a common ground, we could resolve this issue, and it could become a symbol of unity at a time when we desperately need such symbols.

I am not asking either faction to compromise its principles on this issue, I am merely asking them to seek areas of agreement, and I sincerely believe there is a common ground which satisfies the basic concerns of both sides.

The critics of Safeguard fear that any action in which Congress does not clearly withhold authority to deploy the system could escalate the arms race, jeopardize strategic arms limitation talks, commit

us to massive expenditures for an untried system of questionable feasibility.

Mr. President, I agree.

Proponents of the Safeguard system argue that we must have the capability to meet any clear threat to our deterrent power and that we must act now in order to assure that capability by the mid-1970's.

Mr. President, I also agree to that.

And I am firmly convinced that those two viewpoints are reconcilable.

I contend that my alternative to Safeguard accommodates both convictions.

On the one hand it makes it absolutely clear that Congress is withholding authority to deploy the system, and it therefore prohibits construction of any operational ABM missiles or parts thereof; and it freezes money and authority which the Pentagon now has to build missile sites and to acquire land other than the two locations needed to conduct research and development in place.

And on the other hand it authorizes research and development in place, at Grand Forks, N. Dak., and Malmstrom, Mont. By so doing it retains the option of deploying the system with minimal delay and at minimal cost should the Congress later decide to deploy on the strength of new evidence of a clear threat to our deterrent. And so, Mr. President, there is common ground waiting for those who seek practical resolution—for those who want to avoid a direct rebuff of the President—for those who want unity instead of division.

In the 2 months that have passed since I first described this common ground in my alternative to Safeguard, I have been heartened by the widespread expression of support of my position.

The McIntyre amendment has been endorsed by the Washington Post and by the Christian Science Monitor as well as by two of the leading dailies in my home State, the Concord Monitor and the Portsmouth Herald.

Moreover, there is evidence that there are counselors within this administration who also feel that the Nation would best be served by our moving to this common ground.

I have hoped, indeed prayed, that these counselors would prevail. But so far they apparently have not.

The leaders of the administration have seemingly turned a deaf ear to the wise words of the Republican Senator from Vermont, GEORGE AIKEN, who on July 10 warned that it was "essential that the legislation now before us be modified" if the President was to receive the strong support from the Senate that he needed before entering into arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union.

So I am distressed by the adamant, no-compromise posture of the administration.

In contrast, I feel critics of Safeguard have been more willing to seek a common ground. I know there are members of this body who sincerely believe that there should be no move whatsoever toward an ABM system. Yet they have been willing to authorize a concentrated research and development program with no reduction in the request for funds. I sincerely hope that eventually they will be willing to authorize research and development in

place so that neither time nor money will be lost if a later decision to deploy is made by the Congress.

Yet all I have is a hope. So far I have no firm evidence that many of the critics of the system would be willing to compromise further. And on the other hand, I have had no real encouragement that those friends and counselors of the administration who see the wisdom of the Nation uniting will prevail.

In this case how does a Senator vote when he deeply believes in the need for our seeking a common ground consistent with the principles of both sides?

I have concluded that the cause of accommodation would best be served if I voted for the Cooper-Hart amendment. I have decided that I cannot vote for the President's proposal unless it is modified. Whether the Cooper-Hart amendment prevails or not, I want to make it absolutely clear that I fully intend to offer my amendment.

If the Cooper-Hart amendment prevails, then the basic issue of congressional control of the decision to deploy will be resolved.

Once the Senate's desire to retain that control is made clear, then, hopefully, those counseling accommodation within the administration and among the critics will prevail and the administration, the Senate—and the Nation—can move to a common ground.

Let us bring this Nation together.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the four editorials I have referred to in my remarks be included at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, July 22, 1969]

#### ABM: WHAT KIND OF COMPROMISE?

It is not for us ordinary mortals to know what went on behind closed doors in the Senate on Thursday, when the ABM was debated in secret session. Such accounts of the proceedings as have become available indicate only that Senator Symington presented evidence in support of the assertion that the Safeguard system could be overcome with comparative ease by the Soviets and that Senator Jackson presented evidence that it could not be. Apparently there was also some controversy over the character and meaning of intelligence reports on the build-up of Soviet offensive strength as it relates to the proposed ABM. The direction in which the argument over the ABM has been moving in the past few months gives plausibility to reports that the secret session saw the lines drawn between two very stark positions: that which holds the deployment of the Safeguard system to be absolutely useless and that which holds it to be urgent and essential. It is not easy to remember any more that this is not what the debate was supposed to be about.

Necessarily, speculation and interpretation have loomed large in both sides' arguments. But increasingly these have been presented as certainties, whether they concern Soviet intentions, technological progress, or similar matters that cannot be asserted but only projected in a conditional way. Thus it is that the Senate (and the Administration) are now arguing an unprovable and even irrelevant case, namely whether a deployed Safeguard system is both necessary and efficient or neither of these, and the truth is that no one knows. Still, these positions are to a very great extent embodied in the two principal

proposals before the Senate, and what has been lost to view for the moment is what the President originally asked for: authority to proceed in such a way as to preserve the ABM option.

By its sweep and harshness, the Hart-Cooper Amendment before the Senate, which is supported by the ABM opponents, would have the effect of denying the President that option by too severely limiting the kind of testing and development the Administration could pursue. Similarly, the bill containing the Administration program authorizes more than is required to meet Mr. Nixon's previously stated and relatively modest aims, so that it appears to incorporate a commitment to the program that is anything but tentative or reversible in nature. A proper ABM compromise could hardly find middle ground between the position that the Safeguard is a farce and the position that it is a national imperative. But it surely is possible to work out language which does not deprive the Administration of flexibility sufficient to preserve its option, yet which also does not give it a sort of latter-day Tonkin Resolution on the ABM. That is in fact what Senator McIntyre's substitute measure has been about.

The guessing in the past week has had it that the Administration is now a few votes ahead of its opposition in any Senate test. So the President may decide to go for a close, total win in the Senate. The alternative would be for him to give the signal that he is prepared to take enough of the McIntyre language to broaden his support by a dozen or more votes. The size of his majority and the backing it would imply could be of considerable use to him. Mr. Nixon is acutely aware of the importance of domestic support in prosecuting his foreign policy with a degree of success—at least he is aware of it in other contexts. The question of plausibility with those with whom we are bargaining is no less crucial in relation to the coming arms talks than it has proved to be in Paris on the question of Vietnam. Mr. Nixon stands to gain nothing by trying for a tight majority at the expense of the broader political support he will need when the arms control talks get underway.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, July 16, 1969]

#### WORKABLE COMPROMISE NEEDED

Nothing better illustrates the staggering burdens which rest upon the heads, hearts, and shoulders of government officials than the present national uncertainty and division over what to do about the deployment of the ABM (the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system). This question has split party lines. Most of those on each side have reached their decisions for or against such deployment after agonizing heartsearching. Each side presents strong and sincerely held arguments.

Thus the proponents, led by President Nixon himself and bolstered by the Defense Department, hold that the ABM system (a) is, plain and simply, necessary for the defense of the United States against present and future Russian missile developments, (b) cannot be deferred without surrendering to Russia a dangerous "lead time" in missile development, (c) will permit America to enter arms limitation talks with the Russians in a stronger position, and (d) is needed because Russia has begun positioning its own ABM system.

The opponents, on the other hand, say that (a) the system is highly vulnerable and it is unproven that it can protect America's "second-strike" capability by guarding the country's missile sites, (b) deployment risks triggering an even heavier arms race, (c) the ABM could put the Russians off arms talks, and (d) the money could be better spent on homeside civilian problems.

Each side believes that its position will best serve the cause of peace and the future interest of the United States. Neither side has lacked for technically competent experts to quote. Each has elicited a heavy amount of passionate public support.

Support in the Senate has been a hairline affair. As this is written, the proponents are thought not to have enough votes to ensure ABM's passage. On the other hand, it is also thought that last-minute all-out pressure from the White House might swing enough votes for success.

Under such circumstances, we believe that there is no other feasible procedure than to explore a compromise. That suggested by New Hampshire's Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre has much merit. It would permit the Army to build the first two ABM sites in Montana and North Dakota and deploy radio and electronic gear, but would withhold leave to produce and deploy the actual missiles. The problem here is how long a delay this would eventually produce in setting up a complete system if American-Russian arms talks broke down. Some have said up to two years. But the Senator's office insists that the Pentagon has told him that only four or five months would be involved.

We recommend that the Senate turn its thought to some such compromise. And, second, we repeat our own earlier suggestion that the first point of business when the Americans and Russians meet be an informal agreement by both sides to suspend all development and deployment of such weapons until and unless it becomes apparent that no general arms limitation between the two can be reached.

[From the Concord (N.H.) Monitor, June 3, 1969]

#### MCINTYRE PROPOSAL IS REASONABLE

Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre, D-N.H., has proposed a compromise in the development of the so-called Safeguard antiballistic missile system that is sure to satisfy neither the proponents nor the opponents.

Facts and mature considerations in the heated ABM controversy fast are becoming irrelevant. It has become a symbol of conflict between the liberal and conservative elements in our society.

Generally speaking, the liberals are opposed to deployment of the system President Nixon has proposed, which would cost somewhere between \$8 billion and \$13 billion, while the conservatives favor it.

Deeply tangled in this controversy is the question of exploding government spending and subsequent increased taxation, and growing public concern and suspicion over the unholy alliance between the nation's military establishment and the industries that furnish its hardware.

What Sen. McIntyre proposed was a delay in deployment of the missiles themselves, while research and development is pushed on the complicated radar and computer systems that would control the ABM.

One of the most telling arguments against the Nixon administration ABM proposal is that there is no assurance it will work. The McIntyre proposal says, simply, that we won't put the missiles in place until we know the other components will work.

The Senator estimates first-year spending on his plan would be less than \$2 billion, but it's not clear how much this would be less than.

He told the New Hampshire Council on World Affairs last week that his alternative "could save us billions in misspent funds."

Sen. McIntyre, chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, was under intense pressure to leap into one camp or the other.

His committee, heavily laced with and under the control of conservative southerners and right-wing Republicans, sought to get him to join the pro-ABM faction.

But liberal Democrats in New Hampshire,

from whom he derives his support in the Granite State, threatened to turn against him and even turn off campaign money if he backed President Nixon's ABM proposal.

Thus from a political standpoint, the McIntyre alternative was a neat dance down the middle. Speculation still is rife on which side he would join if called upon to vote tomorrow "yes" or "no" on the Safeguard system.

Our view is that the McIntyre suggestion deserves concentrated study under congressional control. The military won't like it, so can't be trusted to give it a fair reading. Industries concerned will view it as a cutback in fat contract possibilities, so they can be expected to object.

We think slamming headlong into the ABM system now, with low-level certainty of success, would be foolhardy.

The cost is exorbitant; domestic crises too pressing; and we are not convinced the threat of Soviet attack at this time is all that imminent.

In addition, neither are we convinced that every avenue of an arms reduction agreement with the Soviets has been explored fully.

It is clear that we cannot dismantle our nuclear strike retaliation capability, nor allow ourselves to fall behind in the terrible reality of an escalating arms race.

But our government's crash program should be directed at the cause of the arms race, and not solely at reducing its possible effect.

[From the Portsmouth (N.H.) Herald, June 2, 1969]

#### SENATOR MCINTYRE DESERVES PRAISE FOR MODERATE APPROACH TO SAFEGUARD

From the Old Man of the Mountains to the Old Man of Seabrook, the state should be echoing the praises of Sen. Tom McIntyre, but we're afraid that it isn't.

Which simply goes to prove that people are inconsistent, a fact that was established as early as Adam and Eve and reestablished today.

McIntyre apparently has let the other shoe drop and has come out in opposition to the war lord's newest military toy, the Safeguard missile scheme. This is the gadgetry you'll remember which started out as a defense against Chinese aggression and wound up as a much modified protection for our Minuteman missiles.

No one can even verify that it will work, but it will cost a lot of money and does make the hate-Russia element in Congress and the nation happy; therefore, it must be worthwhile.

In New Hampshire Safeguard appeals to the same crew that has spent the last five months trying to wreck the state's budget, block any attempt at straightening out a messy, century-old tax structure.

So you'd think that McIntyre's opposition to a costly toy like Safeguard would immediately endear him to these thrifty souls. But not so. If there's one thing that some of them enjoy more than crippling the state economically, it's looking under their beds every night to make sure that the Politburo isn't hiding there.

This "Ax-the-Tax" crowd in New Hampshire would rather see billions blown on military hardware than a few billions spent in making this an even better nation in which to live.

McIntyre, and the other senators who are trying to withstand the raid by the military on the public treasury to finance Safeguard deserve our thanks. Whether or not they'll prevail against Nixon's profligate militarists is a question but the effort is based on good sense.

Safeguard has all the earmarks of another of the multi-billion-dollar weapons systems which can't even be credited as workable, simply because no one knows.

McIntyre, although he won't get any credit for this, is not burying his head in the sand.

He does have a viable alternative to the all-out Safeguard scheme.

What the senator wants is further research, no immediate deployment of Safeguard, but development of the ability to put into effect without delay should need arise.

McIntyre believes that the very fact that the United States could deploy a Safeguard would serve as notice to Russians that we're far from defenseless and wrong moves by them will prove expensive.

This isn't what the warhawks want, but it is a prudent approach.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I yield to the chairman of my committee.

Mr. STENNIS. As usual, Mr. President, the Senator has thoroughly considered this matter. He is thorough by nature, and active by nature, too, and our committee in the Senate is indebted to him for some very hard, long work that he has done since January on many matters that are involved in this bill.

I note, if I may say so to the Senator from New Hampshire, that he recognizes a threat here and he wants to do something about it. The only difference between his position and mine, as I see it, is the question of when we should move forward. I think this matter has been in the process of research and development, trial and error, far longer already than have most major missiles; that it has shown reasonable progress and continues to do so; and that we are just needlessly burning some daylight, which might be extremely important, if we do not move on now.

I do not see that the Safeguard has become a monumental new system of national disunity. I respect the Senator's opinion, but, as I understand it, there is a strong, basic feeling among the people, as far as they have had a chance to think about it. They say, "Well, we may need this thing and we had better move along." I believe that sums up, the best I can express it, the way people feel generally. I do know, as I understand the President, that he feels he has limited this matter to the rock bottom that the lowest, bottom level of necessity will allow. As it is in the bill, it is a reduction and a compromise, in a way.

So I greatly appreciate the Senator's fine work. As he knows, I always encourage him to keep working with reference to his thoughts. I am sorry we are divided on this matter. Again, let me say I think he has made a contribution.

Mr. MCINTYRE. I thank my distinguished chairman, who led our committee during the entire time we were considering the matter which was before us. I appreciate his remarks concerning my feelings in this matter. I would point to 1 or 2 aspects. First, I do feel, Mr. Chairman, that the important thing that is not in the bill is the absolute, specific control of the Congress over this weapon system, so that its deployment would, if it is ever employed, involve another vote by the Congress. Second, when I look at the count of Senators on this question, who are divided 50-50, or 49-49, that looks like a quite solid division in this august body.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I am happy to yield. Mr. MUSKIE. I also would like to

compliment the distinguished Senator, first of all, on his decision to support the Hart-Cooper amendment, but, even more importantly, because, as a neighbor, I take pride in the quality of his performance in the consideration of this issue and his work on the bill before us over the weeks and months behind us. He has shown a capacity to work hard and thoroughly, a capacity to understand and analyze the complexity of this issue, and then a good, old Northern New England persistence in pursuing his own point of view. Even as he endorses the Hart-Cooper amendment, he demonstrates that persistence in continuing the effort to sell his own compromise. I compliment the Senator indeed.

Mr. McINTYRE. I thank my friend from Maine very much for those kind remarks.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McINTYRE. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I join the distinguished chairman of our committee in congratulating the Senator on his typically analytical and concise position as expressed on the floor of the Senate today.

I, too, sympathize with his apprehensions about the degree of importance this ABM discussion has achieved, not only as to Congress and the relationship of Congress with the Defense Department, but also with respect to our position in the country itself, as well as what other people think all around the world.

I would hope, that just as the Senator has worked so long and so well on the technical facts of research and development in the subcommittee of which he is chairman, we will try, as we develop discussion of this matter on the floor, to stick to facts.

There have been many inaccuracies, not only in all the various pamphlets we and others have received about this matter, but also in debate on this floor. I have now had declassified a page of information which I will read into the RECORD behind the statesmanlike talk of the Senator from New Hampshire.

The statement has been made that: "All the components have been tested."

The facts are that the PAR has not even been built, let alone tested; and the PAR computer is scheduled for completion in the first quarter of 1971.

The MSR at Kwajalein has had some preliminary tests, and is scheduled to track an ICBM for the first time in November 1969; but the MSR computer does not yet have its necessary software.

A second inaccurate statement was: "Both the radars have been built in model form at Bell Laboratories."

The facts are that there are no PAR models at the Bell Laboratories or anywhere else.

The statement was made that the intercepter missiles of Safeguard have been used successfully against missiles sent from Vandenberg Air Force Base.

The facts are that the Spartan and Sprint have not been tested against targets. The first Spartan intercept at Kwajalein is scheduled for 1970. The first

Sprint firing at Kwajalein is scheduled for September 1970. The Sprint is being developed at the White Sands Proving Ground.

Finally, a statement was made that the Safeguard system has been tested as an integrated unit in the area of Kwajalein.

The facts are that there is no intention to build the system as an integrated unit in Kwajalein. The only components which will be built at Kwajalein are the MSR, its computer, and Spartan and Sprint launch cells. Some of these have not yet been built, much less tested.

Mr. President, at the end of last week I received an extraordinary document. It came from the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy.

The title of the document is, "Does the Supposed Softness of the Radars Render Safeguard Vulnerable?"

It is written by Mr. Clifford J. Hynning, who I find is a lawyer here in Washington. He is also the treasurer of that committee.

After reading this pamphlet, I honestly did not believe Mr. Hynning understands how the proposed system would work. I asked if he was a patent lawyer, or a lawyer with technical training qualifications, and found he is a lawyer in the international field. I shall not take further the time of the Senate today, but will comment tomorrow on the various statements in this latest brochure.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from New Hampshire has expired.

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to continue for 5 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I again commend the Senator for the way he has approached this problem, reasoned and not in any emotional manner. His position today is typical of his work in the Senate.

Mr. McINTYRE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McINTYRE. I yield to the Senator from New York.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I, too, would like to join my fellow Senators in expressing my satisfaction and gratification that the Senator from New Hampshire has adopted this view. I know it was a matter of long and difficult concern to him, and it is characteristic of his honesty and his dedication that he should have announced his conclusion in this very forthright way.

I should like to ask this question of the Senator: Is it not implicit—and the Senator has certainly heard everything that can be heard on this subject—in the Senator's statement that agreeing to the Cooper-Hart amendment will assert the paramountcy of Congress over this decision, inasmuch as we would have to vote again before there could be actual deployment? Is there not implicit in that idea the concept that until we do vote deployment, and until we deploy, there is a world of difference between everything that the Cooper-Hart amendment and the McIntyre amendment try to do, and deployment? It is only upon deployment that, like the men on the

moon, we really step out on the new plateau which puts further away from us than ever an arms limitation agreement; do I correctly gather that, based on the Senator's knowledge, expertise, and study? Is that implicit in the Senator's position, and would he care to express his views on it?

Mr. McINTYRE. I am happy to. I think the controlling thought, with me, was that as to this ABM system—and I am now thinking of it in operation, with all its components—the reins on the whole issue should be held right here in Congress.

It should not be handed over to the Pentagon, or handed over to the administration, particularly given our costly experience with premature deployment, in the year 1969.

I was talking with someone the other day who said, "You think the C-5-9 overrun was bad; wait until you see this one." I think this was a central consideration for me.

I also expect the considerations the Senator from Mississippi is talking about. My amendment seeks to lose no time, but to give us at least a year to weigh the evidence on intelligence estimated about the Soviet threat and to pursue strategic arms limitation talks.

So, in sum, insofar as the question of the Senator from New York is concerned, the essence of my decision to support the Cooper-Hart amendment, though I find some things wrong with it, is on that basis of congressional control.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. CHURCH. I am very highly impressed by the well reasoned and analytical address that the Senator has made, and I compliment him.

Mr. McINTYRE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, though there is no need to state it on the record, let me express formally my appreciation to the Senator from New Hampshire. In addition to all else that has been said in reaction to his statement, he has perhaps more graphically than any of us been able to dramatize the fact that the key to the debate, the fulcrum of the discussion, and the heart of our concern is whether this year, this Congress is going to permit deployment of a system. That is the thing that has given rise to what the Senator from New Hampshire described as a very deep division across the country.

I would hope that the adoption of the Cooper-Hart amendment will make it very clear that this Congress does not wish to repeat what I think was a mistake of the last Congress: the mistake of agreeing to deploy Sentinel. Let us not make the same mistake in deploying Safeguard. Let us go forward with research, to make sure that if the decision later shall be to deploy, we will be deploying a machine that has greater probability of working.

I thank my friend for yielding.

Mr. McINTYRE. I thank the Senator.

I yield one-half minute to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I join with other Senators in paying tribute to the Senator from New Hampshire. As a member of the Committee on Armed Services, the Senator from New Hampshire has addressed himself to the issue with knowledge and deep concern to find a reasonable solution to the problem.

The conscientious effort of the Senator is another testament to his integrity and concern for the security and best interests of our country.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may have 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from California.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I congratulate the distinguished Senator for the magnificent job he did as chairman of the Subcommittee on Research and Development and also for the obvious study and time that has gone into his speech.

I want to ask a direct question concerning his proposal that the control of military and armaments be maintained in Congress. Is it not a fact that this control is exactly what the debate is all about? And is it not true also that the actual appropriation of the money is still under the control of Congress and not under the control of the Department of Defense or the executive branch?

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, in the debate here, I think it is so important that we specifically, in whatever part of the bill becomes law, spell out that the control will remain in Congress.

I take it from the remarks of the Senator he is implying that we could let the matter go and that the option should be with the President and with the Pentagon. If that happens, then Congress would have to come in the back door by denying authorizations or appropriations in order to maintain some influence at a later date.

I think that we should now spell out specifically what can and cannot be done.

Mr. MURPHY. That is the basis of the debate; is it not? The debate is on the authorization for military procurement and research. This is what the entire debate has been about, as to whether we in the Senate—having talked with the experts, having listened to the requests of the Defense Department and having listened to the requests of the executive branch—have to make a decision as to whether we think this is a proper request and whether it is necessary in our belief for the security of the country.

We will decide here whether we think the amount of money should be provided for the procurement or not. Is that not the basis of the debate?

Mr. McINTYRE. All of the amendments and the bill itself contain the funding requested. So, there is no question about anything in the debate on the floor. The amounts are in the bill.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, the Senator missed my point. The Senator stressed the point that control should be maintained or retained in Congress. And I agree with him. However, I point out that the control is actually in Congress at the present time. And while it does not need any strengthening as far as I am concerned, more than a determination of the vote of the individual Senators as to whether they believe the request of the Department of Defense, backed up by the request of the President and their judgment after listening to the debate on the pros and cons of whether the program is needed and is capable of doing the job and is within the price range, the decision actually does rest in Congress at the present time. Is that not correct?

Mr. McINTYRE. That is where the Senator from California and the Senator from New Hampshire disagree. I say that the decision rests with the Senate and the House of Representatives, and that the bill should specifically contain a provision as to what can and cannot be done by the Pentagon.

Mr. MURPHY. I think then we are in agreement. I pointed out that we have control of the appropriations and, therefore, the determination does rest in the Senate and the House of Representatives at the present time. I see no particular purpose at the moment in stressing the fact that we are going to take more control because we think perhaps the Department of Defense and the executive branch ought to have less control.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to continue for an additional 2 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I agree that many times in the past mistakes have been made here and that we wished we had a chance to redo a lot of the things that had been done. However, my point is that the control does rest here. That is what we are talking about.

The entire matter hinges on the authorization for military procurement, and the decision rests here as to whether we think it is proper and necessary and whether we should go along with the experts we have heard in secret as well as the public testimony and go along with the majority opinion of the Committee on Armed Services.

I thank the distinguished Senator.

Mr. McINTYRE. I thank the distinguished Senator from California.

Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished senior Senator from Vermont.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont is recognized.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I know that the Senator from New Hampshire has been working long and hard to try to get the administration to see the absolute necessity of agreeing to a modification of the proposal now before the Senate. It is a modification which will not in the least impair the national security of the United States, but will make it possible for us to get an authorization bill at a reasonable time and get on with our other work.

It has been pointed out that the issue

may be whether Congress has the final say or whether it should leave the matter up to the administration or the Defense Department to decide. I believe that Congress should have the final and ultimate say. Congress is the branch of Government which is elected by the people at home and close to the grassroots feeling.

I certainly hope that the administration will see the necessity of reaching a satisfactory and workable agreement with the Senate. Otherwise, I suppose it is thought that after the bill goes to conference, the House might go along with the administration and the administration might win a victory.

If the administration does win a victory in this manner, it means that we will have to go all through this again in the conference report and the defense appropriations bill. Therefore, we ought to be getting to work at the earliest possible moment.

The administration can agree to a modification which will meet the approval of a large majority of the Senate. I think it would be most unwise of the administration to try to hold out for all it wants or nothing at all. If it does do that, the administration will get nothing—before the first of next year, anyway.

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Vermont. I agree with him thoroughly.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

#### AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two hours having elapsed, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which will be stated.

The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein missile range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

#### TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous unanimous-consent order, there will be a brief period for the transaction of routine morning business.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be recognized for 20 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, as President Nixon tours Asia, he has dis-

cussed very candidly two subjects which will affect Asians and Americans for a long time to come.

The first deals with America's reappraisal of its role in Asia, a topic which will be discussed and debated in the months ahead. The second deals with the reason for the soul searching reappraisal, the tragedy of Vietnam.

The war in Vietnam continues to be America's No. 1 national agony and preoccupation.

Some individuals with great expertise and knowledge have set forth plans for extricating the United States from this tragedy; and surely the public craves the certainty of such plans.

I personally despair of spelling out any precise plan. In a sensitive and terribly complicated matter such as Vietnam, any plan must have innumerable contingencies and imponderables which are inevitably affected by a reaction from the opposite side.

The best one can hope to do is to choose those interim objectives and courses of action which seem to offer the best hope of advancing the cause of peace—and to abandon those which do not.

In the next 3 days, President Nixon will be engaged in such a process with some of his Vietnamese advisers in Bangkok. He has indicated that he may order a change in military tactics, a change opposed by many of the military in Vietnam. I would like to commend the President for considering a change, and express my hope that such a move is forthcoming.

What I am about to suggest here today is not meant to be construed as a magical panacea. I simply wish to spell out my thinking with respect to three interim objectives we might legitimately pursue in the present Vietnamese context: First, a cease-fire; second, broadening the base of the Saigon government; and third, elections.

Of these three, I believe two can contribute to a viable strategy for peace, and the third cannot.

#### CEASE-FIRE

Many months ago, on June 15, 1968, I initially addressed myself to the question of a cease-fire.

I said, "The first matter of business, above all others, must be to seek a cease-fire."

Mr. President, I feel more strongly today than I did on June 15, 1968. Since then, nearly 13,000 Americans have been killed in Vietnam and another 88,000 have been wounded.

The killing in Vietnam must be stopped, and the United States must take every reasonable risk to accomplish this.

A phased withdrawal, whether the Clifford formula, the Nixon formula, or some other formula—even though a step in the right direction—does not stop the killing soon enough. American casualties, although reduced now from 450 per week to 160 per week, continue.

In my judgment, a cease-fire is a necessary and reasonable interim objective which we must adopt in the pursuit of this goal. I believe we can today direct our diplomatic and military efforts to-

ward achievement of a cease-fire with some hope of success.

There is currently a lull in enemy action in Vietnam. In General Wheeler's opinion, this lull represents nothing more than a tactical prelude to a further assault, and is not a response to President Nixon's peaceful gesture of troop withdrawal.

General Wheeler may be right. Whether he is or not, his prophecy is sure to fulfill itself if, as Secretary Laird has indicated, the United States continues a policy of "maximum military pressure."

But suppose we now interpret the lull, however the enemy conceives it, as the signal for a guarded scaling-down of our own efforts? Suppose we now welcome it as the enemy's first statesman-like step in a mutual deescalation leading ultimately to a cease-fire? One cannot help recalling how President John F. Kennedy created the opportunity for peace during the Cuban missile crisis by choosing to acknowledge Nikita Khrushchev's first, emotional letter rather than the much more bellicose official policy communication which followed it.

The risk is high in this kind of action, especially in a hot-war situation. But there is high risk as well in being too inflexible, too unimaginative, too timid in the search for peace—the risk of killing thousands of young Americans and Vietnamese whom a cease-fire could save.

Mr. President, I say abandon the policy of "maximum military pressure." It is both futile and discredited—all the more so if General Wheeler's pessimistic predictions about enemy intentions are correct. Instead, let us seek and create every possible opportunity to achieve a cease-fire or the battlefield.

We have seen all too many missions like General Wheeler's produce optimistic predictions about U.S. military progress, Vietnamization of the war, and the enemy's crumbling morale.

"Time, just a little more time, and the enemy will feel the crunch and quit," we are told.

But time in Vietnam is not measured by minutes and hours—it is measured in American lives and dollars, and that kind of time has now run out.

I believe the risks inherent in undertaking a major unilateral deescalation at this time in hopes of drawing the enemy into a mutual cease-fire are far less than the elusive certainties of continued maximum military pressure.

#### BROADENING THE BASE OF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT

Second, Mr. President, we are constantly told that, if the United States withdraws from Vietnam too rapidly, South Vietnam will fall. There will be no negotiated settlement, only capitulation.

Without belaboring history, I believe it is time to ask, "Why is this so?"

The preeminent reason is that today, as before, the Government of South Vietnam remains unrepresentative and unresponsive to the aspirations, both national and personal, of the vast majority of the Vietnamese people. It is composed of a military and social elite—an elite all too often engaged in the pursuit of per-

sonal gain and advantage, rather in the quest for social justice and reform. It is a government of Catholics, in a land of Buddhists—of emigres from the North in a land of strong regional loyalties—of military men in a land where the military has not been held in high regard—of men who fought for the French against their own people in a land where anticolonialism prevailed—and of men once again dependent on the force of arms of a foreign government in a land engulfed by the ferment of nationalism.

For over 14 years, the United States has bought time for the governments of Diem, Minh, Tho, Khanh, Huong, Oanh, Quat, Ky, and Thieu. Time has not been purchased on the cheap. The cost is over \$100 billion, nearly 40,000 American lives, over 200,000 wounded or maimed, and a cost in human suffering to the Vietnamese themselves which is unmeasurable.

And yet these successive governments have failed to afford political representation to the many diverse elements that make up South Vietnam's population; more importantly, they have failed to respond to the needs of the people. Past governments as well as the present have made numerous and grandiose promises and proposed a myriad of programs. Yet in land reform, in refugee relief, in rural development, in curbing corruption and inflation, the record is clear. The challenges are unmet.

Of all these deficiencies, none is more glaring than the failure of the Thieu government to broaden its base of support to include various neutralists who are not pro-Communist, but pro peace.

We cannot continue to pin American hopes for a free Vietnam on the narrow, restricted base of President Thieu and Vice President Ky. To do so is to prolong the killing and to insure, ultimately, that Vietnam will become Communist. If the neutralists are continually frozen out and their leaders jailed, we are signing in advance the death warrant for any type of non-Communists government in South Vietnam.

We must face the fact, Mr. President, that it is power—mainly American power—and not legitimacy derived from the consent of the governed, that makes public policy in South Vietnam. We have great power in South Vietnam to grant or to withhold, and Messrs. Thieu and Ky know it.

I think we have the right to insist that the thousands of neutralists confined in jail be released, and that the censored press be unshackled—now.

This strategy is not new. President Eisenhower recognized the legitimacy of withholding support if reforms were not instituted.

So did President Kennedy and Johnson. As President Eisenhower stated on October 23, 1954, in his original commitment of aid to South Vietnam:

The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an

independent Vietnam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people.

Unfortunately, to be effective a threat requires a willingness to act. We have been tested and found unwilling.

Unless and until we are willing to take the final step of withdrawal if reforms are not instituted, the small, elite group of Vietnamese running a government distinguished primarily by its corruption, repression, and inefficiency will continue to exercise great control over American lives, American wealth, and American destiny.

#### ELECTIONS

This brings me to point three: Elections and how they hold little hope as an instrument for securing peace in Vietnam in the foreseeable future.

Our great Nation came into being close to 200 years ago. As a democracy, we labored long and hard at the process of developing a broadly-based method of conducting elections.

Indeed, we in the United States are still struggling with the problem. Three of the key issues before this session of Congress are the questions of the electoral college, the right of 18-year-olds to vote, and the extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Thus, Mr. President, if we—with close to 200 years of experience and sophistication in the free electoral process—still struggle with this concept, can we expect that the South Vietnamese will successfully develop such a process instantaneously? Can we ask the American people to wait that long?

Mr. President, I believe that we in this country have become so impressed with our own method of government and its various processes—and I agree that we have much to be proud of—that our hopes and habits blind us to the fact that other peoples may not readily conform to our way of doing things.

While working toward the ultimate goal of free elections in South Vietnam, we must recognize that they are not in the immediate offing. We can neither afford to pin our hopes for peace on President Thieu's offer of elections—which he admits would take 2 years to set up—nor permit Hanoi's denunciation of that offer to deter us from seeking peace through other avenues.

Thus, I think it all the more important that we insist—and insist now—that the Thieu-Ky regime broaden its base. Then we should urge that this broadened regime negotiate in depth with the NLF and that whatever mutual accommodation is effectuated constitute the interim government of South Vietnam.

This interim regime might in due time call for some kind of referendum election to test popular feeling. It is a more representative regime, however—not elections—that should be our immediate objective. We must not be philosophically "hung up" on the election concept when, if we stop and think, we will realize that full-blown national elections with an unrestricted franchise are not in the offing.

#### CONCLUSION

Mr. President, I return to where I began. What I have said here today is not a magical, instant cureall. I hope it has been a realistic appraisal of three key elements in the search for a way out of the Vietnam nightmare.

While American soldiers continue to die, we cannot afford the security of great caution nor the luxury of utopian thinking in the quest for peace.

(At this point Mr. GRAVEL assumed the chair.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. EAGLETON. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, thanks to the distinguished Senator from Missouri I had an opportunity to glance over the text of the speech he has just concluded. It appears to me that the distinguished Senator from Missouri has done a lot of research, a lot of delving, soul searching and thinking on what is the most important question before this Nation today. It is a question which is important in our relations with other countries. It is a question which is tied implicitly to the domestic problems which confront us at home, and a question which in one way or another must be faced up to in such a manner that a reasonable solution can be found.

The distinguished Senator from Missouri has given his views and they are worth the consideration of this body and the administration.

I would like to comment on only one aspect of the Senator's speech and that is the question of elections by the Saigon Government and the National Liberation Front on a comprehensive and broad basis, which the Senator emphasized.

The Senator will recall that a year ago last September elections were held. Those elections were received with a great deal of skepticism in this country, but I would point out that at that time there were two elements excluded from participation. One element was the so-called neutralists and the other was, of course, the NLF.

Now, what the Senator is advocating is an all South Vietnamese election process by which all the people in South Vietnam would be given the opportunity to participate and to make their choice or choices known.

I agree wholeheartedly with the Senator in that respect, and I would point out, as he has, that those in control in South Vietnam are in reality northerners. What he is advocating is an all-South Vietnamese election. I think it is mandatory that in some manner, somehow, it will have to come to pass because the citizens of South Vietnam, regardless of ideology or orientation are the ones in the long run who will have to settle their own affairs, come to agreement among themselves, and plan their future. It is not the responsibility of this country; it is the responsibility of the people who live in South Vietnam.

Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from Missouri and compliment him for his candor. I commend him for the research and thought which went into the speech. I hope this is not his last speech on this subject or any other subject.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of the distinguished majority leader and the kind sentiments expressed in his statement.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, would the Senator yield?

Mr. EAGLETON. I yield.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I also wish to congratulate the distinguished junior Senator from Missouri on his outstanding speech today. I am in complete accord with the statements he made.

Very definitely the Senator is correct in his views that the government of South Vietnam is unrepresentative of and unresponsive to the aspirations of the vast majority of the Vietnamese people.

The fact is that Thieu and Ky, who head the militarist regime in Saigon, could not remain in power more than a few days were we to withdraw our Armed Forces from Vietnam. The Johnson administration and now the Nixon administration imposed the Thieu government on the people of South Vietnam. The Saigon militarist regime has the support, it seems to me, of fewer than 20 percent of the people of South Vietnam.

During the 2 weeks from July 5 to July 19, despite the lull, so-called, in large-scale ground action in South Vietnam, 3,347 men of our Armed Forces were killed and wounded in combat. During that same period, only 2,658 men of the too-friendly armed forces of South Vietnam were killed and wounded. Unfortunately, in that same period 84 additional American GIs lost their lives in what the Pentagon terms "accidents and incidents." In World War II, when there was no credibility gap, so-called, and no effort on the part of the Defense Department to minimize casualties, most of such deaths would have been termed combat deaths.

This has become an American war to maintain in office General Thieu and Air Marshal Ky, whose military Saigon regime, as I have stated, lacks the support of at least 80 percent of the people of South Vietnam. When our troops leave South Vietnam, Air Marshal Ky and other ARVN leaders, our friendly allies, will be out of office. It will be safe to predict that almost before our last GI leaves they will rendezvous in Hong Kong and Switzerland with their unlisted millions.

Clearly, disengagement depends upon finding a political solution to the war. A political solution requires a coalition government in Saigon to serve during the period of foreign troop withdrawal and to conduct elections for a permanent government.

The Thieu government is a product of a rigged election in which Communists, neutralists, and many Buddhists were forbidden to vote. South Vietnamese soldiers paid with American funds were herded to the polls and often voted twice—at their bases and in their home villages.

It is ironic that when he returned to Saigon from the Midway Conference Thieu promptly threatened to throw in jail anybody who advocated a coalition. This is hardly in keeping with "the principle of self-determination" to which President Nixon and Thieu piously dedi-

cated themselves. Today, Thieu and Ky hold nearly 60,000 of their political opponents behind bars in jails in Saigon and elsewhere in Vietnam. Many of them are sympathetic to a coalition government.

The fact is for many years the tail has been wagging the dog in Vietnam. The United States has been the virtual prisoner of the Saigon militarist regime which is the principal obstacle to a political settlement of the war. So long as President Nixon remains its prisoner, the war will go on.

President Nixon should immediately order the withdrawal of 200,000 of our GI's and Marines from South Vietnam. The rest of our forces there should then be assigned to our coastal enclaves until they are returned home the same way they were sent to Vietnam—by ships and planes. It is obvious that only through making it clear to Thieu and Ky that the United States no longer intends to maintain their regime in power will they then take the steps necessary to help bring about a cease-fire and armistice in Vietnam.

Again, I express my admiration to the distinguished Senator from Missouri for his speech.

Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator from Missouri yield?

Mr. EAGLETON. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. HART. I was fortunate in having the opportunity to read the remarks of the able Senator from Missouri and then, except for the brief time when I was called from the Chamber, to hear the delivery of his speech.

I rise to thank him for again compelling each of us to pause in whatever other assignments may be ours, to think about the overriding problem of Vietnam. I associate myself with the recommendations he makes. Most particularly, I think the Senator's reference to reducing field activity is of overriding importance. Until we have done that, I think we will continue to fall while the casualty lists mount.

I thank the Senator from Missouri very much for a very fine speech.

Mr. EAGLETON. I am very grateful to the Senator from Michigan for his comments.

I am pleased now to yield to the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH).

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I want to compliment the distinguished Senator from Missouri for having spoken up on the subject of Vietnam in such a forthright way.

I commend him particularly for speaking out with such frankness about the issue of the proposed elections in Vietnam.

He says in his remarkable address:

Thus, I think it all the more important that we insist—and insist now—that the Thieu-Ky regime broaden its base. Then we should urge that this broadened regime negotiate in depth with the N.L.F. and that whatever mutual accommodation is effectuated constitute the interim government of South Vietnam.

This, it seems to me, is wholly realistic and very likely constitutes the essential ingredient of any negotiated settlement.

From the beginning, the matter of elections has seemed to me to be not very realistic. The Senator puts his finger on the nub of the matter when he says:

We must not be philosophically "hung up" on the election concept when, if we stop and think, we will realize that full-blown national elections with an unrestricted franchise are not in the offing.

I must agree with the Senator. It is a hard thing to say, but it is true. It is also a hard thing to say, but true, that we did not put much emphasis on the need for elections in the early phases of our involvement in Vietnam. It was only after it became clear that no military decision could be reached there, that we began to emphasize the importance of elections as a prime objective of American policy. But this is, indeed, a novel objective. It is not consistent with the pattern of our relations elsewhere in the world.

For a long while, we have embraced the regime of Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa, but never have we called for elections there. Never have we indicated that it was vital to consider that the people of Formosa be given the right of self-determination.

For many years we have extended generous amounts of military aid to Franco in Spain, yet I have heard no one in this Chamber stand up and assert the principle of self-determination for the Spaniards.

One could go on and cite many other examples.

I think that the call for elections in Vietnam has been a way to give a moral purpose to the massive involvement of the United States in the Vietnamese war, an effort, if you please, to find an exit from the war that would be acceptable to the American people.

Elections, Western style, so familiar to us in this country, unfamiliar to Vietnam, a country which has no prior experience in Western democracy.

Therefore, I think that the Senator is absolutely right in pointing out the extreme difficulty in ever getting unrigged elections in Vietnam. His emphasis upon the necessity to work toward a settlement there on the basis of some kind of interim government representative of the various political factions that exist in South Vietnam, in my mind still represents the most realistic approach holding much promise or hope for an eventual negotiated settlement of the war.

I commend the Senator for taking hold of such a hard and emotional issue, which is naturally close to the hearts of the American people who believe in, and are accustomed to, the election process, by pointing out the weakness of that posture in connection with bringing the war to a close in Vietnam.

Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the Senator from Idaho. I only wish that in my remarks I had used his words and possessed the eloquence of his delivery. I believe that he has hit the point even more directly and with greater depth than I did in my comments. He has summarized what I so inadequately tried to convey.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Missouri yield?

Mr. EAGLETON. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Maryland.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I join my colleagues in commending the junior Senator from Missouri on his excellent speech on the present posture of the United States with relation to the South Vietnamese Government.

The Senator from Missouri, to use a familiar phrase, is off to a very fast start in Congress. His contributions to the various committees on which he serves are adding great stature not only to himself but also to the State which he represents.

The three points he makes in his address today are points which could well be studied and reviewed by every concerned American citizen.

I am particularly pleased that the Senator has commented upon the actual conditions in the South Vietnamese Government today.

I would like to ask him a few questions. The first question is: Is it not a fact that the present government in South Vietnam is and has been riddled with corruption and black marketing, even to the point where corporal stripes are sold for a price?

Mr. EAGLETON. I think that is not only unqualifiedly true, but is the history of the South Vietnamese Government since 1954, beginning with the Diem regime.

Mr. TYDINGS. The Senator points out, in concise and clear language, the failure of the government to make any effort to broaden the basis of the government to represent any element of its populace other than those representing the top governmental leaders. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from Missouri where the principal neutralist leaders, anti-Communist neutralist leaders, in South Vietnam are.

Mr. EAGLETON. Some of them are in jail, such as the person who ran second in the so-called elections of a year ago, as referred to by the Senator from Montana, elections in which only a token percentage of the total populace in South Vietnam participated. They are either shackled abroad or confined in jail. Even those who are afoot in Saigon are in the most restricted of circumstances in the expression of their philosophies and politics.

Mr. TYDINGS. Would it be a fair statement to say that any reference to the Ky government as a popular government, as democratic government, as a government representing the people of South Vietnam, as we know it in our country, is a complete myth; and that the government is maintained by virtue of the U.S. military power in Vietnam?

Mr. EAGLETON. I can think of even stronger words to respond to the Senator's question. I think not only is it a myth, but it is a gruesome distortion to refer to the Ky-Thieu government as a representative government or as freely elected.

Mr. TYDINGS. Let me commend the Senator from Missouri on his remarkably lucid portrayal of the U.S. posture, unhappy as it is, in South Vietnam. I think he has made a significant contribution to the dialog. I hope the President of the United States and his advisers

will read the distinguished Senator's speech.

Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the Senator from Maryland.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I have read the speech of the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON) with great interest. I, also, am intending to speak on Vietnam today. I found much that was instructive in the presentation of the Senator from Missouri, but it deals essentially with the other aspect of the problem of Vietnam; that is, the Government of South Vietnam. I feel that the need for America to withdraw from the combat role is very real and so that this is the time when it can be done with the least risk to our security and also to the security of our allies.

#### NEW STEPS TOWARD PEACE IN VIETNAM

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, in the 2½ months since President Nixon's May 14 speech to the Nation the administration has effected a number of constructive and realistic changes in the Vietnam policy it inherited from the previous administration. In my judgment, these changes have not been accorded sufficient recognition and support. As a Senator who sharply criticized the absence of any apparent Vietnam policy changes in a speech just 5 days preceding the President's May 14 address, and while recognizing that much remains to be done to end our combat involvement in Vietnam, I wish to use this opportunity to commend the President for his constructive movement away from the dead-end policies of the past.

Specifically, I commend the President for the following four basic, substantive changes in Vietnam policy which I regard as highly constructive and realistic steps toward peace:

First, a decisive moving away from the concept of terminating the war through a battlefield victory.

Second, the initiation of a definite program to de-Americanize the war and phase U.S. troops out of the main combat role.

Third, recognition of the NLF as an indigenous factor with a base of material political support.

Fourth, efforts to end the veto over U.S. policy in Vietnam given, in effect, to the South Vietnam Government by the previous administration, and the beginning of efforts to end the link between the national interest and prestige of the United States and the political fortunes of the particular regime in Saigon.

These are all highly significant steps which deserve the support and approval of all Americans. In relative terms, the Nixon administration has certainly moved farther away from the rigid position of the previous administration than the Communist negotiators in Paris have moved from their own rigid positions of the past. It would be well for the Communist side to realize that this discrepancy in adjustment of negotiating positions—so marked in the U.S. flavor—has not gone unrecognized by people like myself who have been outspoken critics of U.S. policy in Vietnam.

One of the grave dangers still latent in the Vietnam situation is the possible persistence in Hanoi of the delusion that it can inflict a "defeat" and a "humiliation" upon the United States. Pursuit of any such ill advised goals by the Vietcong, the NLF, and North Vietnam would be a dangerous illusion. It could be one of the few things that would have the precisely contrary result of rallying opinion and support in this country behind those who would initiate new and major U.S. military determination to win on the battlefield in Vietnam.

It is no secret—at least here in the Senate—that the administration is disappointed by what it considers to be a lack of adequate recognition and support for the new realism, adjustment, and flexibility it has shown in Vietnam policy. But, in my judgment, a good part of the basis for this lack of proper recognition and support rests with the administration itself.

The overwhelming mandate given to President Nixon in November 1968 was to end the war in Vietnam. Against this background, the administration's timing was too slow for its critics in demonstrating to the American people that it really did have the intention and the plans to move the Nation on a course away from the sterile, military escalation policies of the past. Second, the administration decided to be low-keyed; hence it tended to make less dramatic the changes it has made in Vietnam policy.

By playing down the sharpness of difference between the policy innovations in Vietnam policy it has introduced and those of its predecessor, the administration made the least instead of the most of an important opportunity to win the support and acclaim among the American people—assets which the Administration now recognizes as crucial to the success of our diplomacy in Paris.

The Nixon administration's Vietnam policy has been much better than the rhetoric it has used to express it. Administration spokesmen have persisted—quite needlessly and counterproductively—in using many of the most sterile and discredited of the phrases and concepts of the previous administration.

In my judgment additional adjustments, beyond those introduced thus far by the Nixon administration, and additional evolution, are necessary if the goals of the President's Vietnam policy are to be achieved. The administration's "two track" approach—reducing the U.S. combat role on the battlefield and seeking a political settlement through the Paris negotiations—is wise and has already produced some results. But both of these "tracks," as being pursued by the administration, appear to have built-in limitations and the Paris talks have reached an apparent stalemate.

In order to reduce our involvement in Vietnam to proportions which are commensurate with our national interest and acceptable to the American people, the administration must have a policy which depends essentially on measures which are within our power to effect unilaterally. These steps cannot be subject to the veto of the Thieu government and must not rely upon step-by-step "concessions" and "reciprocity" from Hanoi.

That is the reason why I stated, in the

hearings, to the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), that there was nothing inconsistent between the unilateral decisions required by the United States and what we very much wanted Saigon to do. They may not do it, Mr. President, and hence we also have to make our decisions based upon the theory that they may not.

The President has started the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops and has expressed his intention to proceed in this direction in a substantial way.

The central core of my presentation today, Mr. President, is that what is needed now is a definite timetable for the withdrawal of all U.S. combat troops by the end of 1970. This timetable for complete U.S. withdrawal from the combat role should be communicated to the Saigon government in clear and unmistakable terms. The fact of its existence—but not necessarily its details—should also be known to the world.

By proceeding in this way, the administration can make the process of U.S. combat disengagement serve as an incentive to both Saigon and Hanoi to reach a political settlement through negotiation.

The U.S. withdrawal timetable would be coordinated with a timetable for phasing equipped and trained ARVN forces into the combat role. The United States would continue to provide full logistic support to the ARVN forces as well as large-scale support including tactical air, naval, and artillery support.

Persons who have worked closely on this problem believe that the ARVN could have the capability to hold its own in combat against the Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces by the end of 1970—if a definite timetable, and requisite implementing plans, were decided upon now.

In my judgment, a clearly timetabled program for U.S. combat disengagement of the sort I have outlined above would be a much more effective inducement on Hanoi to negotiate politically than the kind of "threats" of U.S. military escalation which are sometimes heard from the diehards still among us.

A program of timetabled U.S. combat disengagement should disabuse Hanoi of the idea that it need only wait for U.S. public opinion to bring about a total and unconditional U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam—and a consequent realization of all of Hanoi's ambitions.

To be faced in the field by a viable South Vietnamese combat force would also undercut the Vietnamese Communists' now skillfully exploited argument that it is a native force locked in combat against the world's most powerful foreign army. In this context, there is an aura of glamor and heroism in the self-depicted Vietcong role which has helped it to gain political support within Vietnam, and which has helped it to recruit many of the bravest and most highly motivated young South Vietnamese.

If the Communist side continued to remain uncompromising in negotiations after the full combat role was taken up by the ARVN, then the psychological brunt of the war of attrition will have been shifted away from the American people and squarely onto the Vietnamese themselves.

As regards the Paris negotiations, in my judgment it is very important not to delude ourselves into thinking that every move we make to readjust our negotiating position is a concession to the other side. We are not—and should not be—making gratuitous “goodwill” concessions designed to appeal to the higher motives of our opponents. Efforts to describe our policy in such terms, and expressions of dismay over Hanoi's failure to respond in “good faith,” are naive and lack credibility. This long and bitter struggle will not be ended on the basis of mutual good will.

The key to further progress along the Paris negotiating track, in my judgment, lies in the further delinking of U.S. policy from the fate of the particular government now in power in Saigon—the military regime of Thieu and Ky. It is essential that the United States make it clear to Saigon as well as Hanoi that our commitment to political self-determination in South Vietnam is not synonymous with the self-perpetuation of the political status quo.

This is the crucial point so far as the Paris negotiations are concerned. Hanoi has asked for a coalition government to hold elections. We have prodded Saigon into counter-offering—a coalition electoral commission to conduct elections.

The Saigon government has a strong incentive in sticking to its offer of a mixed electoral commission, as opposed to a coalition government. If the NLF accepted the Government of Vietnam's position it would be conceding the legitimacy of the Thieu government and accepting for itself the status of an “illegal” insurgency.

It seems unlikely that the NLF will accept these conditions, in view of the long fight it has put up, its near defeat of the Saigon government in 1965 prior to the U.S. involvement on the ground, and its bitter memories of the failure of the Diem regime to hold elections in 1956 as prescribed by the Geneva agreements of 1954.

The U.S. interest lies in seeing that a fair election is conducted to allow the people of South Vietnam to choose a government of their own volition. The U.S. interest does not lie in trying to force the NLF to bend its knee—in a symbolic but important way—to the Thieu government. Thirty-six thousand American lives have not been sacrificed for that. Our Nation's prestige and honor are in no way tied to this; nor is the credibility of our word as a nation nor is the bravery of our soldiers.

The ability of the ARVN to hold its own against the Communist forces after it has assumed the full combat role might tempt the Thieu government to stiffen its own resistance to a negotiated political compromise. However, the ARVN's dependence upon U.S. logistic and tactical air support would retain in President Nixon's hands powerful leverage to deal with any such possible Government of Vietnam stonewalling tactics—in other words, resisting absolutely any effort to really make a peace.

In his speech of July 11—which President Nixon has described as “a comprehensive, statesmanlike and eminent fair proposal for a political settlement”—President Thieu asserts he

has “made relentless efforts and repeated acts of good will.” Thieu cites his government's agreement to join and continue the Paris peace talks three times as “another important gesture of good will on the part of the Government of Vietnam.”

In addition, President Thieu criticizes the Communists for “maintaining their absurd demands for the overthrow of the legal Government of the Republic of Vietnam.”

He offers elections on the following terms:

All parties and groups, including the “NLF” which is now bearing arms against us, can participate in the elections if they renounce violence and pledge themselves to accept the results of the elections.

Rhetorical sparring between Saigon and the NLF can continue indefinitely, unless we insist upon bypassing this stage and moving directly to a vote. Against the background as seen through the eyes of North Vietnam, of Diem's renege on the 1956 elections, and the irregularities of the 1967 elections—with even Big Minh barred from running and runner-up Dzu still languishing in political prison—the reluctance of the NLF to accept elections under the conditions offered by Saigon should not be surprising.

If the United States continues to allow its own freedom of action to be controlled by the details of procedural maneuvering and rhetorical posturing by the contending parties of Vietnamese, we will deprive ourselves of the chance to move forward to a creative new policy in Asia as a whole—based on the new realities of the 1970's rather than upon the obsolete echoes of the 1940's French colonial war.

The President has signaled this intent, and I ask very strongly that he go through with his intention in the best interests of our Nation and the people of the world.

There are urgent domestic problems which demand the attention and the resources of our Nation which are still being squandered in Vietnam. President Nixon is keenly aware of the need to redress the serious imbalance in national priorities which is so heavily attributable to President Johnson's ill-conceived Vietnam war policy. I urge him to move more swiftly and more decisively down the very paths he has now mapped out for the Nation. As a student of history, and as an admirer of General de Gaulle, he should take heart in the realization that de Gaulle's greatest achievement for France was his termination of the Algerian war.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial from today's New York Times, entitled “The Withdrawal Strategy,” be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE WITHDRAWAL STRATEGY

The continuing delay by Hanoi and the National Liberation Front in opening serious private peace negotiations in Paris leaves the United States with no choice but to proceed with an alternative strategy, Vietnamization of the war.

The Paris talks of course will go on. The United States halted the bombing of North

Vietnam on assurances—from the Russians, among others—that there would be serious negotiations. But if negotiations remain stalled, if forward-looking peace proposals from Washington and Saigon are unanswered, then other means of achieving American disengagement must be pursued.

The withdrawal of 25,000 American troops and President Nixon's statement that he hoped to bring home most of the remaining ground combat forces before the end of next year marked the first stage of this alternative strategy. It is a strategy based on strengthening and modernizing the South Vietnamese army and, starting immediately, turning over to it progressively the major combat responsibilities.

The rate of American withdrawal naturally will also be affected by the degree of North Vietnamese withdrawal. If the slowdown in reinforcement of North Vietnamese forces continues—leading to a gradual reduction of Hanoi's troops in South Vietnam—American troops can be brought home at a relatively rapid pace. A continuation of the present military lull, which increasingly calls for a reciprocal American gesture of de-escalation, might even permit the withdrawal of American troops to be speeded up. Most military men agree that the South Vietnamese can be prepared to take over all but helicopter combat operations—with, perhaps, some American logistical and continuing air support—in less than eighteen months.

There is always the possibility that South Vietnam's army will be defeated in battle. But that would force the United States to remain longer and it is unlikely that Hanoi would want to run that risk by testing Saigon's military prowess at this time—although there might well be such a test after a unilateral American withdrawal was completed.

Does unilateral American withdrawal encourage Hanoi to block negotiations in Paris and keep its troops in South Vietnam? The reverse is probably true. Hanoi's refusal to negotiate means continued warfare with the South Vietnamese armed forces of a million men—aided by American logistical and air support, which would still have to be negotiated out of the country one day. And that negotiation, at a time when American ground combat forces and casualties had been reduced to a minimum, would take place under conditions more favorable to the Administration in Washington.

Hanoi's choice is between a negotiated peace—which means early, speedy and complete American withdrawal, plus an important political role in South Vietnam for the N.L.F.—and a continued war with unforeseeable consequences. But whether Hanoi chooses peace or war, the American disengagement policy now is unlikely to be altered except as to the withdrawal rate.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I concur with the Senator. I hope we can move in that direction as quickly as possible. I think we are moving in that direction.

Mr. JAVITS. I said in the beginning of my speech that I thought the President was moving in that direction and that I thought he had the answer to the argument which many people make.

I am gratified to know that the Senator from Texas thinks as I do. I thank the Senator.

The Senator and I are as far apart on the ABM as we could be. However, we are together on this. Our judgment coincides. I would not refrain from agreeing with the Senator on this matter any more than he would refrain from agreeing with me.

I am delighted that the Senator asked me to yield.

Mr. TOWER. There is a growing feeling in the ARVN that they can do it themselves, given adequate resources. They think they can handle the problem. I say that based on my conversations with some of them.

I think we can expect the administration to continue to move in this direction.

I appreciate what the Senator has said. What the President is doing in that direction should not be interpreted as bugging out on our part.

We can yield to them more of the combat responsibility and will continue to do so.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his remarks.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have had the distinct privilege of listening to two excellent speeches today on the question of Vietnam.

The distinguished Senators who have spoken, the junior Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON) and the senior Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), have not been in accord in what they have had to say. But I would say that there is a good deal of comity between the two if we really go into the details.

The speeches seem to be to indicate the tremendously difficult problem which the President has in trying to find a reasonable solution to the conflict in Vietnam.

It would be my hope that the suggestions made by the distinguished Senator from New York, as well as those made by the distinguished Senator from Missouri, will be taken to heart by the administration, as I am sure they both will be, and will be studied in detail to see what if anything—and I am sure that something can come forth—could be derived from the speeches which would be of benefit in finding an end to this barbaric, tragic, and brutal war in which we are so unnecessarily engaged.

I noted that the distinguished Senator said in effect that the time for rhetoric is past, the time for sparring is past, and the time to get down to bedrock is here.

The Senator uses as one of his illustrations an effort made by President Thieu a few weeks ago by means of which he said he was prepared to hold an election for all South Vietnamese.

I was encouraged by that statement until I found out a few days later that what he meant was that these elections would not even be called until 2 years after a peace agreement had been reached.

I was hopeful that what he meant was that within a minimum of 3 months and a maximum of 6 months, an election could be held by all South Vietnamese, of all factions, to the end that the South Vietnamese themselves could settle their own problems and decide on their own future and chart the course for their own country.

Let us hope that on the basis of the speech made by the distinguished Senator from New York, as well as the speech made by the distinguished Senator from Missouri, the advice seriously

given is taken to heart not only in our own administration, as I am sure it will be, but also in Southeast Asia as well.

I commend the distinguished Senator for his well-thought-out remarks.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I think it is very kind of the majority leader to have been so gracious. I do not know of any praise that I would value more in the Senate than that of the majority leader.

I think we are finally embarking on the right doctrine, the two-track doctrine. I urge the President to bring home the fact that when President Thieu, or any government leader then in power in Saigon, feels that we are not underwriting or guaranteeing his continuation in power, he will be a lot more amenable to the arrangements and the compromises and the freedoms which we would urge on him or induce him to institute.

I noted with the greatest of interest—and I do not know whether the majority leader noted it—the appraisal yesterday in the New York Times that the administration had better listen more and more to the majority leader.

I think this discussion has lent added weight to that admonition.

I thank the distinguished majority leader.

#### PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP ABROAD

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have had the opportunity to read the excerpts from the unofficial account of President Nixon's meeting with reporters in Guam as published in the New York Times on Saturday, July 26, 1969. I must say that this unofficial account, allied with the evangelistic fervor the President displayed in explaining the purposes of his trip to Asia and Europe to the joint leadership last Tuesday, gave me cause for hope and good prospects for the future of our foreign policy in Asia. What the President is seeking to achieve, I believe, is time to reassess U.S. foreign policy, to do so on a long-range basis, and not to become captive to the shifts and turns of the moment.

The President is moving with caution and consideration but also with a sense of reality based on the changes which have occurred on this globe. He is not advocating isolationism, nor is he advocating the abandonment of Asia.

In his candid statements, both in this country and in Guam, he has emphasized that the United States is a Pacific power with peripheral interests on the Asian mainland.

The first two steps on the journey of understanding were in the Philippines and Indonesia, two nations which are primarily Pacific powers but with greater interests on the Asian mainland than the United States. What the President has done, in short, is to signal the less likelihood of American participation in wars on the Asian mainland in the future. The President has also encouraged the Asian nations to depend more on themselves in both internal security and military defense which, to me, seems to be a sound long-range policy. In short, what the President has stated broadly and plainly is continued support for the nations of Asia but with greater Asian participation and responsibility.

He has outlined a lessening in military aid programs and a greater emphasis on economic cooperation. His intent, I believe, is to avoid future Vietnams but, at the same time, to render what assistance is feasible and possible to the nations of Asia so that they can achieve economic and political stability and thereby be able to look after their own interests in a more strengthened fashion. The key words in our relations with these countries would be equality, understanding, and mutual cooperation. U.S. influence in the Pacific would be, if I understand the President's remarks correctly, one of balance throughout the area and not of primary responsibility, except in our own territorial areas. Perhaps the President's position—and he speaks for all of us—can best be stated in the remarks he made in Manila on July 28, when he said:

The United States will play its part and provide its fair share, but peace in Asia cannot come from the United States. It must come from Asia. The people of Asia, the governments of Asia, they are the ones who must lead the way to peace in Asia.

The President has been candid and forthright in recognizing that changes have occurred in the world, that old line policies may well have lost their effectiveness, and that as the world changes, we must change with it.

On his trip the President is visiting old friends and renewing visits to countries which he has visited many times before. We wish him well on his visits to Thailand, India, Pakistan, and Romania; and we want him to know that he has our full support on the basis of what he has said in Guam and restated in the Philippines and Indonesia.

We are very pleased with the turnouts which have come out to greet him as the Chief of State of this Nation, and we look forward with anticipation to his report to the American people on his return.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article previously referred to be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, July 26, 1969]  
EXCERPTS FROM UNOFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF  
PRESIDENT NIXON'S MEETING WITH REPORTERS

(NOTE.—Excerpts from an unofficial account of President Nixon's informal news conference today during his stopover on Guam. Mr. Nixon spoke for publication but stipulated that he not be quoted directly.)

MANILA, July 25.—The President said he had seen some speculation about changes in his itinerary and added that he had no present plans to go to Vietnam. But, he said, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker will be coming to Bangkok along with the ambassadors from the other Asian countries that he will not be visiting, and he intends to have a conversation with him there, which will be apart from the conversation he will have with the other ambassadors.

There is also a possibility that Gen. Creighton W. Abrams will be able to go with the Ambassador Bunker to Bangkok for that meeting, Mr. Nixon said.

Now, insofar as this phase of the trip was concerned, and he said he would speak first to the Asian phase and then later and briefly to the Rumanian phase, he thought that the backgrounders and the general statements that have been made from the State Depart-

ment had covered it pretty well. He thought what would be of greatest interest before questions is to give the perspective that he has with regard to Asia and America's role in Asia.

#### VISIT OF 1953 NOTED

He said his background here goes back a few years. It was in 1953 that he first visited this area. That trip was very, very extensive, with the usual four days in each country, a so-called state visit in each country. It provided an opportunity to meet the leaders, but more than that to know the countries in a very effective way.

In the 16 years that have passed, however, since that time, the changes have been very dramatic. He has returned to Asia on a number of occasions since then, and particularly to the countries that he will be visiting on this trip. Consequently, he has kept up with later developments and also, with the exception of President Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan in Pakistan, he knows each of the Asian leaders that he will be meeting and will be able to speak to them from that background.

Insofar as the general purpose of a trip like this is concerned, the President said he can understand some of the speculation to the effect that "why does a President of the United States think he learns anything by spending one day each in an Asian country?" Or, for that matter, as he did earlier, in a European country.

The answer is, and he might indicate what will be his general policy for the balance of his service in the White House, that he thinks a one-day trip is just as valuable as four days. In other words, if you take a one-day trip, and concentrate, as he does, on very little protocol, and a great deal of face-to-face conversation, an individual, in meeting the leader of the other country, will gain as much as if he stretched it out over a period of four days. He has been through both experiences, and, therefore, is somewhat knowledgeable in that respect, Mr. Nixon said.

#### SHORT PERIOD OF TIME

He feels, too, that when one considers the time that is available to a President in these periods, it is essential in order to cover all the ground that needs to be covered to limit, first, the amount of travel and the amount of time that is taken for each one of the stops. He mentioned that only as some of the reasoning that has gone into his decision with regard to covering a great deal of ground in a very short period of time: In this case, going around the world and, in the space of about eight days, after the moon shot, covering a number of countries.

Now, insofar as the individuals are concerned, having met all of these leaders previously, Mr. Nixon supposed the question could be raised, and with good reason, that once you know a leader, the contact with ambassadors would be sufficient. However, he has found in previous travels in Asia and in Europe as well, that as the situations change, it is vitally important to have a renewed contact with the leader in each of the countries involved, a renewed contact because his attitudes may change and in that way when the President reads, as he reads day after day, the cables that come in from all over the world, he can have a much better understanding of what those cables mean—the nuances—if he has more recently had a direct contact, face-to-face with the individual involved, the individual leader involved.

That is one of the reasons why he is a great believer in visits of this sort, where they are consistent with and can be taken at a time that will fit in with other very demanding parts of his schedule.

Now, a word about what is a very consuming interest in Asia, the President continued, a consuming interest because it is one he has had for a number of years, and one that now, as he looks at the perspective of history, is even more imperative.

#### ROLE IN ASIA

The United States is going to be facing, he hoped before too long—no one can say how long, but before too long—a major decision. What will be its role in Asia and in the Pacific after the end of the war in Vietnam? We will be facing that decision, but also the Asian nations will be wondering about what that decision is, Mr. Nixon said.

When he talked to Prime Minister John G. Gorton, for example, he indicated that in the conversations he had with a number of Asian leaders, they all wondered whether the United States, because of its frustration over the war in Vietnam, because of its earlier frustration over the war in Korea—whether the United States would continue to play a significant role in Asia or whether the United States, like the French before, and then the British, and, of course, the Dutch—whether it would withdraw from the Pacific and play a minor role.

This is a decision that will have to be made, of course, as the war comes to an end. But the time to develop the thinking that will go into that decision is now. Mr. Nixon said he thinks that one of the weaknesses in American foreign policy is that too often we react rather precipitously to events as they occur. We fail to have the perspective and the long range view that is essential for a policy that will be viable.

As he sees it, even though the war in Vietnam has been, as we all know, a terribly frustrating one, and, as a result of that frustration, even though there would be a tendency for many Americans to say, "After we are through with that, let's not become involved in Asia," he is convinced that the way to avoid becoming involved in another war in Asia is for the United States to continue to play a significant role, the President said.

#### UNITED STATES A PACIFIC POWER

He said that whether we like it or not, geography makes us a Pacific power and when we consider, for example, that Indonesia and its closest point is only 14 miles from the Philippines, when we consider that Guam, where he was presently standing, of course, is in the heart of Asia, when we consider the interests of the whole Pacific as they relate to Alaska and Hawaii, we can all realize this.

Also, as we look over the historical perspective, while World War II began in Europe, for the United States it began in the Pacific. It came from Asia. The Korean War came from Asia. The Vietnamese war came from Asia.

So, as we consider our past history, Mr. Nixon said, the United States involvement in war so often has been tied to Pacific policy or lack of Pacific policy, as the case might be.

As we look at Asia today, the President observed, we see that the major world power that adopts a very aggressive attitude and a belligerent attitude in its foreign policy, Communist China, of course, is in Asia, and we find that the two minor world powers—minor, although they do have significant strength as we have learned—that most greatly threaten the peace of the world, that adopt the most belligerent foreign policy, are in Asia—North Korea and, of course, North Vietnam.

When we consider those factors, we realize that if we are thinking down the road, down the long road—not just four years or five years, but 10, 15 or 20—that if we are going to have peace in the world, that potentially the greatest threat to that peace will be in the Pacific, the President said.

#### OTHER THREATS TO PEACE

He did not mean to suggest that the Middle East is not a potential threat to the peace of the world and that there are not problems in Latin America that concern us, or in Africa and, of course, over it all, we see the great potential conflict between the United

States and the Soviet Union, the East-West conflict between the two superpowers.

But as far as those other areas are concerned, he said, the possibility of finding some kind of solution is potentially greater than it was in the Asian area.

Pursuing that line of reasoning a bit further, he said he would like to put it in a more positive sense: When he looked at the problems in Asia, he said the threat to peace presented by the growing power of Communist China, the belligerence of North Korea and North Vietnam, should not obscure the great promise that was here.

Mr. Nixon declared that the fastest rate of growth in the world is occurring in non-Communist Asia, Japan, in the last ten years, had tripled its G.N.P., South Korea had doubled its G.N.P., Taiwan had doubled its G.N.P., Thailand had doubled its G.N.P. The same was true of Singapore and of Malaysia.

The record in some of the other countries was not as impressive. But consider the Philippines, he said. The Philippines in 1953 was a major importer of rice. Today, as a result of miracle rice, it no longer had to import it. Some progress was being made in areas like that.

#### INDIA AND PAKISTAN CITED

The President mentioned India and Pakistan and the terribly difficult and traumatic experience they have had. Because of their conflict with each other, more than with the problems they have had from the outside, that picture tends to be rather black.

But India's rate of growth as a result of two good crop years, and a reasonably good one this year, has been at 6 per cent, he said.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, Mr. Nixon said, they are emphasizing growth in manufacturing. They are growing at the rate of 10 per cent per year in manufacturing and from 1965 to 1970, their agricultural production will go up 21 per cent.

The poverty in these two countries, he said, strikes one with tremendous impact. But having seen what it was in 1953 and seeing what it was again in 1957, the amount of progress that has taken place, even in those countries where the rate has not been as high as others, was a very, very formidable thing to see, he asserted.

#### ASIA'S THREAT AND HOPE

So, what he is trying to suggest is this, the President said: Look at Asia. It poses, in his view, over the long haul, looking down to the end of the century, the greatest threat to peace of the world, and, for that reason, the United States should continue to play a significant role.

It also poses, he said, the greatest hope for progress in the world because of the ability, the resources, the ability of the people, the resources physically that are available in this part of the world, and for these reasons, we need policies that will see that we play a part and a part that is appropriate to the condition that we will find.

One other point he made very briefly was that in terms of this situation we must recognize that there are two great new factors which you will see, incidentally, particularly, when you arrive in the Philippines—something you will see there that we didn't see in 1953, to show you how quickly things change—a very great growth of nationalism, nationalism even in the Philippines, vis-a-vis the United States, as well as other countries in the world. And, also, at the same time that national pride is becoming a major factor, regional pride is becoming a major factor.

The second factor, he went on, is one that is going to have a major impact on the future of Asia, and it is something that we must take into account. Asians will say in every country that we visit that they do not want to be dictated from the outside. Asia for Asians. And that is what we want and that is the role we should play. We should assist it, but we should not dictate.

At this time, he said, the political and economic plans that they are gradually developing are very hopeful, we will give assistance to those plans. We, of course, will keep the treaty commitments we have.

#### VISIT TO RUMANIA

But as far as our role is concerned, he said we must avoid that kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam.

This is going to be a difficult line to follow. It is one, however, that he thinks, with proper planning, we can develop, he went on.

He said he would just answer some of the speculation about Rumania by pointing out that this trip to Rumania is not directed toward the Chinese or toward the Russians, but toward the Rumanians, Mr. Nixon said.

He said he did not believe that the President of the United States should be able to accept an invitation to visit a Western European country, but should automatically have to decline an invitation to visit an Eastern European country.

Mr. Nixon said that this was an era of negotiation rather than confrontation. It would be more difficult, of course, to develop the communication with Eastern European Communist countries than with Western European countries, but he thought it was time that a beginning be made.

He said he would have discussions of bilateral issues with President Nicolae Ceausescu, the problems of Europe, East-West relations.

But this trip under no circumstances, he said, should be interpreted as an affront to the Soviet Union or as a move toward China.

The President said he hoped that if the trip worked out it would set the stage for more openings of this type with countries in Eastern Europe where it would be mutually beneficial to the United States and the other countries involved.

The President was asked, on the question of United States military relationships in Asia, a hypothetical question: If a leader of one of the countries with which we have had close military relationships, either through SEATO or in Vietnam, should say, "Well, you are pulling out of Vietnam with your troops. We can read the newspapers. How can we know you will remain to play a significant role as you say you wish to do in the security arrangements in Europe?" What kind of approach would he take to that question?

The President replied that he had indicated that the answer to that question was not an easy one—not easy because we would be greatly tempted when that question is put to us to indicate that if any nation desires the assistance of the United States militarily in order to meet an internal or external threat we will provide it.

#### ON COMMITMENTS, TWO POINTS

However, he said he believed that the time had come when the United States, in its relations with all of its Asian friends, should be quite emphatic on two points: one, that we would keep our treaty commitments; our treaty commitments, for example, with Thailand under SEATO. And, two, that as far as the problems of international security are concerned, as far as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States was going to encourage and had a right to expect that this problem would be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.

He said he believed, from his preliminary conversations with several Asian leaders over the last few months, that they were going to be willing to undertake this responsibility. He said it would not be easy. But if the

United States just continued down the road of responding to requests for assistance, of assuming the primary responsibility for defending these countries when they have international problems or external problems, they were never going to take care of themselves.

He added that, when he talked about collective security for Asia, he realized that at this time it looks like a weak reed. It actually was. But looking down the road—he said he was speaking now of five years from now, 10 years from now—he thought collective security, insofar as it deals with internal threats to any one of the countries, or insofar as it deals with a threat other than that posed by a nuclear power, was an objective that free Asian nations could see and which the United States should support.

The President was asked whether, when speaking of internal threats, he included threats internally assisted by a country from the outside, such as we have in Vietnam?

#### INTERNAL THREAT IN THAILAND

The President replied, that generally speaking, it was the kind of internal threat that we do have in the Asian countries. For example, in Thailand the threat was one that was indigenous to a certain extent to the northeast and the north, but that would not be too serious if it were not getting the assistance that it was from the outside. The same was true in several of the other Asian countries, he said.

The President was reminded of his hope that his meetings in Rumania would open the way to other meetings involving Eastern Europe. Was it his hope that he would eventually be invited to Moscow to talk with the Russians, perhaps within the next six months or so?

The President replied that as far as any meeting with the Soviet Union was concerned, summit meeting, he had stated his position previously. He thought it would be well to restate it.

He did not believe that any summit meeting with the Soviet Union was useful unless a subject of major interest to both powers was to be discussed with some promise of finding a solution or at least making progress on that particular problem.

He said he believed, for example, as he looked over the history of summitry with the Soviet Union, that while, in all administrations, we had had the best of intentions, summitry had not been particularly helpful. He said this with regard to the spirit of Geneva, the spirit of Camp David, the spirit of Vienna and the spirit of Glassboro.

#### MEETINGS WITH SOVIET UNION

He felt that where the Soviet Union was concerned, for example today, there were three major areas where a summit meeting could be useful. If, for example, the time had come when we could make a breakthrough in the Mideast, and a summit meeting with the Soviet Union would play a significant part, he thought that could be considered.

The second area, Mr. Nixon said, is in the field of arms control. He said he had a long discussion with Mr. Smith just a few days ago, just before leaving, the day before leaving. As far as arms controls are concerned, at this time, the place and the forum in which the discussion should take place is at the ambassador level. There may come a time when a summit meeting may be the device that will make the breakthrough that we need to make in arms control.

Then at the top of the list he placed the problem of Vietnam where, if a summit meeting would serve a useful purpose insofar as Vietnam is concerned, naturally we would welcome that opportunity. That poses, however, Mr. Nixon said, a very significant problem because, whether the Soviet Union can be of assistance in Vietnam is somewhat dependent on its evaluation of whether

such assistance should be so publicly provided as a summit, of course, would indicate.

The President was asked, as a background to his thinking on Vietnam, even though it is not to be a major subject of discussion, whether he could tell what sort of reports he had received from Gen. Earle G. Wheeler about the prospects for additional replacement of American troops, and on the question of whether the fighting had eased to the point where we can make some de-escalation move ourselves.

The President replied that he would rather not comment on that at this time. If, after his conversations with Ambassador Bunker and possibly with General Abrams, he feels that some comment would be appropriate, he will make it then. But he should correct one impression that he should not have left, and that is that Vietnam will not be a major topic for discussion. In each of the Asian countries he is going to raise with the Asian leaders the question of the extent to which they would be willing to participate in the international supervisory bodies for elections in South Vietnam and for the policing of ceasefires, provided we are able to get any kind of acceptance on the part of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong on his proposal of May 14.

He believes, for example, Mr. Nixon said, that the international supervisory bodies, which Mr. Thieu has also agreed to, should primarily be made up of and come from Asian nations and the Asian nations that he visits will all be interested in this subject. He wants to get their views on that.

#### ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL

The President was asked whether he anticipates in that connection that during his talks with the Asian leaders he is going to have to spend any significant amount of time perhaps convincing them that his plan for withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam will pose no threat to their security.

The President replied that one of the reasons for this trip is to leave no doubt in the minds of the leaders of non-Communist Asia that the United States is committed to a policy in the Pacific—a policy not of intervention but one that certainly rules out withdrawal, and regardless of what happens in Vietnam that we intend to continue to play a role in Asia to the extent that Asian nations, bilaterally and collectively, desire us to play a role.

He said he thought that some reassurance was needed because Vietnam is on the minds of all the Asian leaders. He believes, incidentally, that he will not have difficulty in providing that reassurance because, from the report that he did get from General Wheeler, he was told that the troop withdrawals have been accepted by the Thieu government and by the military in South Vietnam with not only very good grace, but that they have responded very effectively in meeting their own requirements, in handling their own defense. He thinks that he can give some reassuring comments to those Asian leaders who might raise the question, Mr. Nixon said.

#### DECLINES TO SPECULATE

The President was reminded that he mentioned that he felt that perhaps five years or ten years from now the Asian nations could collectively take care of their regional security problems. What is our policy to be in the meantime, he was asked, if a Vietnam type situation does occur?

The President replied that he would rather not speculate about one occurring. Each of these countries poses an entirely different question. He would simply say we are going to handle each country on a case-by-case basis.

But attempting to avoid that creeping involvement that eventually simply submerges you, he knows that we can learn from past experience and we must avoid that kind of involvement in the future.

The President said he could put it this

way: he recalled in 1964 some advice that he got from Mohammad Ayub Khan, who was then the President of Pakistan. This was before the United States had any significant troop commitment in Vietnam. Mr. Nixon asked him what his view was as to what our role should be. He said: "Well, the role of the United States in Vietnam or the Philippines, or Thailand or any of these countries which have internal subversion, is to help them fight the war but not fight the war for them." That, of course, is a good general principle, one which we would hope would be our policy generally throughout the world, the President said.

The President was reminded that the last time he met with reporters he mentioned that it was his hope that we might be able to withdraw all our combat troops, ground combat troops, in South Vietnam by the end of next year. In the light of that, he was asked if he had any plans for withdrawing the troops that we now have, or some percentage of them, from Thailand, and could he tell what he is going to tell the Thais about that?

#### WILL TELL THAIS FIRST

The President replied that he would tell the Thais first. But it is, of course, a proper question, he said.

He is reviewing not only our civilian personnel abroad, where he announced a cut a few weeks ago, but our military personnel abroad, including Thailand.

This is a matter, however, which will be discussed with the Thais, but it would not be appropriate to make any announcement as to what we were going to do until we have discussed it.

The President was asked whether in looking at the situation in post-Vietnam, and in countries other than Vietnam, it seemed to him that in terms of our military strength, the military men that we put into these other countries to help them, or military assistance or economic assistance, that in Asia, generally, we would have more or less of this type of assistance and aid in the years down the road than we have now.

The President replied less, if he got the question correctly, would there be more or less of military type of assistance.

He was asked about both in military and nonmilitary, since there are really two parts to this assistance problem, the economic part and the military part. Did he see us having a greater expenditure and a greater involvement in those respects or a lessened involvement as we look down the road?

The President replied that the military involvement, the military assistance, the military aid program and the rest, and particularly the commitments of military personnel, that that type of program would recede.

#### ECONOMIC AID STRESSED

However, as far as economic programs are concerned, and particularly those of a multilateral character—and here he had some new ideas that he will be expanding on in the months ahead—he would say that the level of United States activity would be adequate to meet the challenge as it develops, because it is very much in our interest in terms of economic assistance, economic assistance through loans and other programs, to help build the economies of free Asia, Mr. Nixon said.

For example, the President pointed to what has happened to South Korea, what has happened to Taiwan, what has happened to Thailand, what has happened to Japan. All of them now, or virtually all, are on their own feet, at least from an economic standpoint and are very good customers of ours.

#### FACT WITH THAILAND

The President was asked about quite a bit of speculation in the papers lately—both here and in Washington and in Thailand—as to whether or not there exists some sort of secret defense arrangement between the United States and Thailand.

Could he shed any light on the existence or nonexistence of such a thing and whether we have any similar arrangements with any other countries that might commit us beyond what his hopes might be?

The President replied that there is no secret defense agreement with Thailand. We, of course, have the SEATO treaty. We will keep our commitments under that treaty. We had the Rusk-Thanat communiqué, which simply spelled out the treaty.

We will, of course, keep our commitments set forth there as well, Mr. Nixon said.

But as far as any secret commitments are concerned, we not only have none in any of these nations, he will make none—and incidentally, he told Senator J. W. Fulbright that the other day, too.

The President was asked to give an evaluation of Red China's economic-political capability of inspiring further wars of liberation in the Asian nations. Are they able to continue that?

The President replied that Red China's capacity in this respect is much less than it was five years ago, even ten years ago. Because of its internal problems, Red China is not nearly as effective in exporting revolution as it was then. He thinks a pretty good indication of that is the minimal role that Red China is playing in Vietnam as compared with the Soviet Union, the President remarked.

Three years ago, Red China was furnishing over 50 per cent of the military equipment, the hardware, for the North Vietnamese. Now it is approximately 80-20 the other way around, he said.

#### PROBLEMS WITHIN CHINA

There may be other reasons for that coming about, and part of it is that Red China has enough problems within.

Another point he would make in that respect that bears on this: How things have changed since 1953, in country after country that he visited—and he was in every one that we are visiting here and all the others as well. The ones that Secretary William P. Rogers is going to visit on his trip—among most of the intellectual leaders and among many Government leaders, there was a real question as to what was the best path for progress, a question as to whether Communism, as it was developing in Red China, a Communist system was a better way to progress, or whether a non-Communist system was the better way.

Now, Mr. Nixon said, one of the significant developments that has occurred over these last 16 years, with all the bad things that have occurred, including the war in Vietnam, has been that that situation has reversed itself. The appeal of the Communist philosophy, for example, in Pakistan, in India, in Indonesia, in Japan, in any one of these countries, is less today than it was 16 years ago, 10 years ago, 5 years ago.

On the other hand, he would have to say that the effectiveness of subversive activities in many of these countries has not abated to the same extent. It can be on the upsurge. But as we look at the whole of Asia today, it is significant to note that what we have going for us more than anything else is this enormous rate of growth in non-Communist Asia as compared to Communist Asia. You compare Hong Kong with Communist China, you compare Taiwan with Communist China, you look at Japan with 100 million people, with a greater G.N.P. than China with 700 million people. Looking clear around the perimeter, from Japan through India, we find that free Asia's record of growth is a very significant factor in affecting the thinking of those who have to make the determination as to which path they are going to take, Mr. Nixon said.

#### NO MORE VIETNAMS?

The President was asked, when he said that the United States was going to continue

to play a major role in Asia and that this was one message that he intended to take with him on this trip, whether another message was that there would be no more Vietnams.

The President replied that certainly the objective of any American administration would be to avoid another war like Vietnam any place in the world. He recalled he had said it and so had his opponent, Mr. Humphrey, during the campaign—that we should develop a policy that would avoid other Vietnams.

Mr. Nixon said it was very easy to say that. But he said that to develop the policies to avoid that was taking an enormous amount of his time and that of his associates.

But what he said he could do was to learn from the mistakes of the past. He believed that we have, if we examine what happened in Vietnam, how we became so deeply involved—that we have a good chance of avoiding that kind of involvement in the future, he said.

#### TROOP WITHDRAWALS DISCUSSED

Mr. Nixon was asked whether he intended to make it clear to the Asian leaders that if the lull in Vietnam continues, he would announce a substantial withdrawal of United States forces in August.

The President replied that he would not make any announcement, and no decision on, troop withdrawals on this trip, and, of course, he would not make any disclosures of plans in that respect to Asian leaders prior to the time that he had discussed it with the government of South Vietnam and then made the announcement jointly.

That is one of the matters, he said, that he still had under study, under consideration, that he would be discussing with Ambassador Bunker, that he did discuss with General Wheeler and that he might discuss with General Abrams.

#### TACTICS IN VIETNAM

The President was asked whether there is also a pending question as to whether his administration will change its policy of maintaining maximum military pressure on the enemy in Vietnam?

The President replied that he had been re-examining, since the time his administration came into office, our military tactics in Vietnam, and one of the subjects that he has discussed at great length with General Wheeler and General Abrams has been the character of our commitment and the tactics that should be used. He defers, naturally, to military men as to the conduct of a war because they are more expert than he is in this field, he said.

However, when we are in the process of negotiations, then military tactics become part of the negotiations and, therefore, we are re-evaluating our tactics in Vietnam, having in mind the fact that we have a parallel action going along in the negotiating field, the President said.

If we have any changes in this respect, he will, of course, announce them, he added.

#### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

#### PROPOSED LEGISLATION CARRYING OUT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON THE COINAGE

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to carry out the recommendations of the Joint Committee on the Coinage and for other purposes (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

REPORT ON HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF  
SMOKING

A letter from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, transmitting pursuant to law, a report concerning current information on the health consequences of smoking, dated July 1, 1969 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Commerce.

PROPOSED CONCESSION CONTRACT FOR THE EL  
PORTAL ADMINISTRATION SITE OF YOSEMITE  
NATIONAL PARK

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting, pursuant to law, a proposed concession contract to operate the El Portal Market, a general merchandising service for the public, at the El Portal Administrative site of Yosemite National Park, Calif. (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

PROPOSED CONCESSION CONTRACT TO OPERATE  
CEDAR PASS LODGE, BADLANDS NATIONAL  
MONUMENT, S. DAK.

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting, pursuant to law, a proposed concession contract to operate Cedar Pass Lodge and provide related facilities and services for the public within Badlands National Monument, S. Dak. (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

PROPOSED CONCESSION CONTRACT TO PROVIDE  
FERRY SERVICE AT THE HALL'S CROSSING SITE  
WITHIN GLEN CANYON NATIONAL RECREATION  
AREA, UTAH

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting, pursuant to law, a proposed concession contract to provide ferry service and related facilities and services for the public at the Hall's Crossing site within Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, Utah (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

By the ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore:

A joint resolution of the Congress of Micronesia; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:

"SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 31

"A Senate joint resolution requesting the President and the Congress of the United States to consider seriously the future political status of Micronesia

"Whereas, by virtue of the Trusteeship Agreement between the United States and the Security Council of the United Nations, the United States has undertaken in Micronesia to foster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the trust territory and . . . to promote the development of the inhabitants of the trust territory toward self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the trust territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; and

"Whereas, the Future Political Status Commission of the Congress of Micronesia has for the past two years conducted a study of political alternatives which may be open to Micronesians with respect to their future political status, and has submitted its final report to this session of the Congress in accordance with law; and

"Whereas, proposals have been advanced by the President of the United States and considered by the United States Congress for the creation of a United States Commission to consider the future status of the Micronesian people but these proposals have not yet led to the actual creation of such a Commission by the United States Government; and

"Whereas, the Micronesian people are today ever more desirous than ever before of seeing a decision on their future status but believe sincerely that such a decision must be reached by the joint efforts of their representatives and those of the United States; now, therefore,

"Be it resolved by the Senate of the Third Congress of Micronesia, Second Regular Session, 1969, the House of Representatives concurring that the President and the Congress of the United States are urgently requested to give serious consideration to the future political status of Micronesia and the ways in which this status should be finally resolved; and

"Be it further resolved that certified copies of this Joint Resolution be transmitted to the President of the United States and the President of the United States Senate and the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives.

"Adopted: July 24, 1969.

"We hereby certify that the foregoing Joint Resolution was adopted by the Senate of the Congress of Micronesia, Third Congress, Second Regular Session in July, 1969, on the 22nd day of July, 1969.

"AMATA KABUA,

"President of the Senate.

"VICTORIO UHERBELAU,

"Clerk of the Senate.

"The House of Representatives of the  
Congress of Micronesia

"We hereby certify that the foregoing Joint Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives of the Congress of Micronesia, Third Congress, Second Regular Session in July, 1969, on the 24th day of July, 1969.

"BETHWELL HENRY,

"Speaker, House of Representatives.

"CARL HEINE,

"Clerk, House of Representatives."

A resolution adopted by the Communications Workers of America, Washington, D.C., relating to hunger in America; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

A resolution adopted by the Communications Workers of America, Washington, D.C., relating to the Selective Service System; to the Committee on Armed Services.

A resolution adopted by the Communications Workers of America, Washington, D.C., relating to Presidential Nominees; to the Committee on Commerce.

A resolution adopted by the Communications Workers of America, Washington, D.C., relating to consumer protection; to the Committee on Commerce.

A resolution adopted by the Communications Workers of America, Washington, D.C., relating to automobile insurance; to the Committee on Commerce.

A resolution adopted by the Niagara County Legislature, Lockport, N.Y., remonstrating against the adoption of any tax reform measure which would reduce the attractiveness of municipal bonds to private investors; to the Committee on Finance.

A resolution adopted by the Communications Workers of America, Washington, D.C., relating to social unrest in America; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

A resolution adopted by the Communications Workers of America, Washington, D.C., relating to electoral reform; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

A resolution adopted by the Communications Workers of America, Washington, D.C., relating to minimum wage; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

A resolution adopted by the Communications Workers of America, Washington, D.C., relating to farm labor; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

A resolution adopted by the Communications Workers of America, Washington, D.C., relating to national education policy; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

A resolution adopted by the Communications Workers of America, Washington, D.C., relating to uniform voting laws; to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

A telegram, in the nature of a petition, from G. L. Pucci, M.D., of Kansas City, Mo., urging the resignation of Senator Edward Kennedy; to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

The petition of Allan Feinblum, founder, World Peace Appeal, New York, N.Y., protesting the actions of the United States in the war in Vietnam; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF A  
COMMITTEE

As in executive session, the following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. SPARKMAN, from the Committee on Banking and Currency:

Carter L. Burgess, of New York, to be an incorporator of the corporation authorized by section 902(a) of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968; and

Thomas Hal Clarke, of Georgia, to be a member of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS  
INTRODUCED

Bills and a joint resolution were introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. FANNIN:

S. 2705. A bill to provide for medical and hospital care through a system of voluntary health insurance, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.

(The remarks of Mr. FANNIN when he introduced the bill appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

By Mr. METCALF (for himself and Mr. MANSFIELD):

S. 2706. A bill to provide for Federal participation in the cost of improvements to streets and appurtenant facilities at the Army Reserve facilities in Helena, Mont.; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. RANDOLPH:

S. 2707. A bill to consent to the Interstate Compact on Air Pollution between the States of Ohio and West Virginia; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. EAGLETON:

S. 2708. A bill for the relief of Kunihiro Yamamoto; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. TOWER:

S. 2709. A bill to authorize the erection of a statue to commemorate the manned lunar landing and the placing of the U.S. flag on the moon; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

(The remarks of Mr. TOWER when he introduced the bill appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

By Mr. GURNEY:

S. 2710. A bill to provide for the awarding of Congressional Space Medals to Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr., Neil A. Armstrong, and Michael Collins; and

S. 2711. A bill to provide for the awarding of Congressional Space Medals to persons who contribute to the exploration of outer space; to the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences.

(The remarks of Mr. GURNEY when he introduced the bills appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

By Mr. COTTON (for himself and Mr. Prouty):

S. 2712. A bill to regulate interstate commerce by strengthening and improving consumer protection under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with respect to fish

and fishery products, including provision for assistance to and cooperation with the States in the administration of their related programs and assistance by them in the carrying out of the Federal program, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce.

(The remarks of Mr. COTTON when he introduced the bill appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

By Mr. RANDOLPH (by request):

S. 2713. A bill to provide for the expansion and improvement of the Federal Airway System, for the imposition of airway user charges, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce.

By Mr. MATHIAS:

S. 2714. A bill for the relief of Staff Sergeant Lawrence F. Payne, U.S. Army (retired); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MURPHY:

S.J. Res. 142. A joint resolution for the establishment of a Drug Commission between the United States, Mexico, and Canada; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

(The remarks of Mr. MURPHY when he introduced the joint resolution appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

**S. 2705—INTRODUCTION OF A BILL PROVIDING FOR MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL CARE THROUGH A SYSTEM OF VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE**

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to provide for medical and hospital care through a system of voluntary health insurance.

The object of the bill is a simple one—to help all our citizens protect themselves against the cost of illness. The proposal would adopt the voluntary approach and would utilize our private insurance industry rather than an ever-increasingly expensive Government program. The system would be based on income tax credits.

Mr. President, I want to emphasize that this bill does not in any way affect the medicare program but it is aimed at offering at least one alternative to the expensive and cumbersome medicare program. Certainly a proposal embodying this approach should be looked into before we expand any Federal program. I do not know the cost of this proposal—it will not be cheap—but it will, I submit, be less expensive and healthier than adding to our Federal bureaucracy.

Here is how the system would work. Tax credits would be provided to individuals and families for the purchase of hospitalization and medical care. The amount of credit would be equal to the applicable percentage of the aggregate of allowable premiums paid during the year for medical insurance policies. For married persons filing joint returns or unmarried individuals with dependents, the tax credit would be as follows:

If the taxpayer's adjusted gross income is:	(Applicable percentage)
Not over \$5,000.....	100
Over \$5,000 but not over \$7,500.....	75
Over \$7,500 but not over \$10,000.....	50
Over \$10,000.....	25

For persons filing separate returns and unmarried individuals the tax credit would be as follows:

If the taxpayer's adjusted gross income is:	(Applicable percentage)
Not over \$2,500.....	100
Over \$2,500 but not over \$5,000.....	75
Over \$5,000 but not over \$7,500.....	50
Over \$7,500.....	25

The bill provides that persons with low incomes who do not qualify for the tax credit be provided with a Government voucher that can be exchanged for medical care and hospitalization insurance up to the maximum dollar limitation applicable to credits.

Under the bill the allowable premium upon which the credit may be applied is the aggregate amount of premiums paid during the taxable year by the taxpayer under one or more qualified medical care insurance policies. Such aggregate amount may not exceed:

First, \$150, in the case of a taxpayer who is not married and is not entitled to one or more exemptions under section 151(e) of the Internal Revenue Code—relating to additional exemption for dependents—for the taxable year;

Second, \$200 in the case of a taxpayer who is married and who files a separate return; and

Third, \$400, in the case of a joint return filed by husband and wife or in the case of a taxpayer who is not married and who is entitled to one or more exemptions under section 151(e) of the Internal Revenue Code.

Mr. President, I hope that the Finance Committee will give consideration to this proposal. It is not the only answer to the problem but it is one avenue of approach which deserves examination in any review of the medicare program. This is my purpose in introducing this proposal.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2765) to provide for medical and hospital care through a system of voluntary health insurance, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. FANNIN, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Finance.

**S. 2707—INTRODUCTION OF A BILL CONSENTING TO THE WEST VIRGINIA-OHIO AIR POLLUTION COMPACT**

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I introduce today a bill which calls for consent by Congress, pursuant to section 102 of the Clean Air Act of 1963, to an Interstate Compact on Air Pollution between the States of West Virginia and Ohio, with provision that the Commonwealths of Kentucky and Pennsylvania may join at some future date.

Congress has long been aware of the dire consequences of polluted air. Beginning with the Clean Air Act of 1963, we have made it clear that our mandate from the people is to turn the tide against the increasing air contamination that imperils the health of our citizens, particularly the young and the elderly, and fouls property at costs ranging into the billions of dollars each year.

The West Virginia-Ohio compact is a major step in the direction of controlling air pollution across this Nation, regard-

less of arbitrary territorial boundaries. This compact should serve as a model for other areas of the country with overlapping air pollution problems.

It should be underscored that the original West Virginia-Ohio Interstate Compact was passed by the separate State legislatures in line with the Clean Air Act of 1963 and prior to passage of the Federal Air Quality Act of 1967. The Clean Air Act was substantially revised and strengthened during the 90th Congress, although the purposes of the legislation have remained as they were originally stated.

Last year, the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary referred the original compact to the Committee on Public Works for review in light of the 1967 act and the latter committee's jurisdiction over air pollution matters. After extensive study, the Public Works Committee recommended several changes and conditions to bring the compact into line with more recent enactments and administrative guidelines.

The new compact has been reviewed by our Public Works Committee staff and found to comply in every respect with our recommendations and those of the Judiciary Committee. I commend the legislators of West Virginia and Ohio for taking time from other important matters to debate and pass—for the second time—a comprehensive air quality compact consistent with Federal laws and regulations.

Senator MUSKIE, chairman of the Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee, agrees that, because of the willingness of the States to meet the letter and intent of the Air Quality Act, there is no need for referral of this bill to the Committee on Public Works this year.

I hope the Committee on the Judiciary will be able to proceed expeditiously on this very important bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2707) to consent to the interstate compact on air pollution between the States of Ohio and West Virginia, introduced by Mr. RANDOLPH, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Judiciary.

**S. 2709—INTRODUCTION OF A BILL AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSIONING OF A STATUE IN COMMEMORATION OF THE RAISING OF THE AMERICAN FLAG ON THE MOON**

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, all Americans shared a feeling of elation and achievement as a result of our recent successful epic voyage to the moon. This feat constituted a landmark in the history of man.

Since man first crawled out of the primeval ooze, he has progressed over the latitudes of time and space to this high-water mark of his striving. Now man has crossed the second threshold of human history.

We can all feel a great sense of pride that our technology has caused us to accomplish what few thought possible such a short time ago.

The high point of our accomplishment came late in the evening of July 20th when astronauts Neil Armstrong and "Buzz" Aldrin stepped onto the surface of the moon and erected there the flag of the United States of America.

I believe that an appropriate reminder of that historic achievement should find its place among our other reminders of past achievements, many of which were much less significant.

For this reason, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to authorize the erection of a statue to commemorate the manned lunar landing and the placing of the U.S. flag on the moon.

I believe an appropriate reminder should take the form of a statue much like the Marine Memorial in Arlington Cemetery which depicts the raising of the American flag on Iwo Jima during World War II. The statue should depict, in my opinion, our astronauts raising the American flag on the moon.

In contrast to the Marine Memorial, which appropriately symbolizes American military victory, the statue which I propose would symbolize an American victory of another nature. It would symbolize a victory in the name of peace. Along with the American flag, our astronauts placed on the moon a plaque with these words:

Here men from the planet Earth first set foot upon the Moon, July, 1969, A.D. They came in peace for all mankind.

I would like to emphasize that this momentous achievement in the name of peace was made possible by the advanced technology we have reached through cooperation between Government and private industry, cooperation between business management and industrial labor, cooperation provided through what some have termed the military-industrial complex.

An appropriate site for a statue commemorating the lunar landing would, in my opinion, be at or near the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston. However, I would not like to see this bill delayed because of any possible legislative wrangling over the location for the statue to be erected. I would not like to see it become the subject of political maneuverings aimed at getting the statue for one part of America over another.

For this reason, my bill states that the statue should be erected "at an appropriate place" and I leave the decision regarding its location to the Congress as a whole.

The important thing is, that an American achievement of such great significance as this be appropriately marked for posterity. My bill provides for that recognition.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2709) to authorize the erection of a statue to commemorate the manned lunar landing and the placing of the U.S. flag on the moon, introduced by Mr. TOWER, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

S. 2710, S. 2711, AND SENATE RESOLUTION 225—INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND RESOLUTION RELATING TO FLIGHT OF APOLLO 11

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, I am introducing legislation today to commemorate the crew of Apollo 11 and all the persons who paved the way for their heroic and historic mission to the moon.

The first bill provides that congressional space medals shall be awarded by the President of the United States, in the name of the Congress, to Neil A. Armstrong, Michael Collins, and Edwin A. Aldrin in recognition of their contribution to the exploration of outer space.

The outstanding performance of these three men and the spectacular success of the Apollo mission is something in which not only all Americans, but all mankind can take pride. Without question, it represents the most enormous single scientific feat ever attempted and achieved by man.

The simple words, "The Eagle has landed" spoke eloquently for many things left unsaid. At once, we know they paid tribute to the tremendous abilities of our scientific, engineering, and technical abilities. But we also recognize and acknowledge that they spoke just as clearly for what can be done under our representative form of government and its system of free political expression, and most especially our wonderful system of free and private enterprise. Most of all, these words testify to what man's courage and ingenuity can and will accomplish.

The feat of Apollo 11 represents the culmination of centuries of painstaking acquisition of knowledge in man's drive to conquer his environment. He has taken the first giant step in reaching beyond his own earth world. History will mark this epic journey as the turning point in man's continuing quest to extend his physical boundaries to his spiritual vision.

Without the pioneering spirit, competence, and bravery of the astronauts who came before, or the efforts of the men and women associated with the space program, this dramatic lunar landing would have been impossible. Each in his way contributed as much to the success of this historic mission.

I am, therefore, also introducing a broader bill to award a Congressional Space Medal, to be presented by the President of the United States, in the name of the Congress to each person designated by concurrent resolution in recognition of his contribution to space.

Mr. President, at present there is no appropriate means of conferring congressional recognition for past, present, and future achievements in the space program of the United States. The purpose of this bill is to provide such an award. It is only proper that the astronauts and men and women who made their accomplishment a reality should be recognized for their achievements by the Congress of the United States.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bills will be received and appropriately referred.

The bills, introduced by Mr. GURNEY, were received, read twice by their titles,

and referred to the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, as follows:

S. 2710. A bill to provide for the awarding of Congressional Space Medals to Edwin E. Aldrin, Junior, Neil A. Armstrong, and Michael Collins; and

S. 2711. A bill to provide for the awarding of Congressional Space Medals to persons who contribute to the exploration of outer space.

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, in addition, I am submitting a resolution to express the appreciation and congratulations of the Congress for the magnificent contribution of the entire industry-NASA team associated with the space program.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The resolution (S. Res. 225), which reads as follows, was referred to the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences:

"S. Res. 225

"Whereas the United States has completed its first decade in space, with the combined talents of Government, industry, and education having been effectively employed in the space program to open a new frontier; and

"Whereas in the development of the space program science and technology have been brought to new levels of achievement, and inspiration and intellectual stimulation have been generated not only for the people of the United States but for the entire world; and

"Whereas the mission of Apollo 11, representing as it does the first real step by mankind into the universe beyond the planet on which we live, is not only a great adventure but demonstrates substantial progress toward the achievement of the objectives originally expressed in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958; and

"Whereas the achievement of these objectives—the expansion of human knowledge, the improvement of aeronautical and space vehicles, the development of information useful to our national defense, and the preservation of the United States' role as a leader in space science and technology and its application for peaceful purposes, with international cooperation in the peaceful application of the program's results—has importance for our Nation far beyond the specific areas of science and technology to which the program directly relates; and

"Whereas this mission provides a uniquely appropriate occasion for expressing public appreciation of the past achievements of the space program and public recognition of the potential of such program for benefits to mankind in the future: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That the Senate commends the magnificent team of men and women throughout the United States and the world at large, in Government, industry, and education, who have contributed so much to the accomplishments of our national space program; and expresses gratitude and appreciation, for itself and on behalf of the American people, for the outstanding dedication and tireless effort of all those who have been associated with the Apollo program in general and the Apollo mission in particular.

S. 2712—INTRODUCTION OF THE WHOLESOME FISH AND FISHERY PRODUCTS ACT

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, believing that the U.S. Senate should not be entirely precluded from doing some business during these months while we have this constant repetitious debate on matters that could be voted on tomorrow morning, I had planned to make a 9-

minute speech and introduce a bill which does not concern the defense of this country nor the tax situation, nor attempt to scuttle the administration by immobilizing the Senate.

It does concern a matter of deep interest to the consumers and housewives and those interested in the health of this country. It has to be taken care of by the Committee on Commerce, of which I am a member.

Mr. President, earlier this month the Consumer Subcommittee of our Committee on Commerce held hearings on legislation which would provide for the inspection of fish and fishery products.

Two weeks ago on July 14, witnesses for the administration appeared before the subcommittee to testify on the pending measure and to propose alternate legislation. Unfortunately, this alternate legislation was not before the subcommittee at that time since it was not received by the Senate until the following day, July 15. It is this legislative proposal by the administration which I shall, at the close of these remarks, introduce on behalf of myself and Senator PROUTY.

This legislative proposal by the administration is, I believe, a meritorious one and I hope that, notwithstanding its introduction subsequent to the hearing, that it will be given every consideration by our Committee on Commerce including, if need be, an additional opportunity for administration witnesses to appear once more and testify on the bill.

Federal inspection of food products is not a new concept. There has been some sort of such inspection since shortly before the turn of the century. More recently, we have had the Wholesome Meat Act and the Wholesome Poultry Products Act of the 90th Congress. Generally, the level of inspection has been dependent upon the complexity of the processing operation itself, the opportunities for adulteration, and the volume of production. The administration bill, I believe, takes these factors into account and meets the consumer protection needs in a direct manner with effective use of manpower and other resources. The estimated cost of the administration's bill, for example, under its concept of a continuous surveillance system would be \$26 million, as compared with an estimated cost of \$70 million under the measure now before our Committee on Commerce, S. 1092.

Quite frankly, I feel we should recognize the distinctions which do exist with respect to the inspection of fish and fishery products. Unlike meat and poultry, for example, and this is important, there is no plantsite slaughtering. This process takes place aboard the numerous fishing vessels which make the catch, and in the United States alone there are more than 80,000 such vessels. The inspection procedure for fish and fishery products, therefore, of necessity must commence at dockside with the arrival of the fishing vessel and accordingly is directed principally at processing.

In addition, there are approximately 4,000 fish processing plants in the United States—2,000 doing business in interstate commerce and 2,000 intrastate plants, the latter being under the supervision of State and local agencies. The adminis-

tration's bill would propose to strengthen the State and local capability and authority for improving conditions in the fishing industry where such is found to be necessary.

We should also bear in mind that fishing and fish processing is a seasonal occupation. For example, as Mr. Lowell Wakefield, president of the Alaska King Crab Institute, pointed out in testimony earlier this month:

There is, however, considerable merit in the argument of adequate vs. continuous inspection. Our Port Wakefield plant is one of about 30 fish plants on Kodiak Island. To carry out the provisions of this bill as now written would require about 20 full-time, year-round inspectors and about 10 additional seasonal ones. Yet, my town is an isolated village of some 400, and the plant has run only a couple of days a week for the last six months. To recruit a qualified man for such a job is not easy and to justify keeping him there all the time, difficult.

Finally, we also must recognize that the United States imports from foreign sources approximately 60 percent of its fish and fishery products. This bill makes no distinction between foreign and domestic products. It contemplates that the inspection procedures of such foreign sources will be at least equal to those imposed upon our own fishing industry.

Mr. President, the bill I introduce endeavors to take all of these sundry factors into account so as to establish a meaningful and a realistic fish and fishery products inspection program by vesting such authority in an appropriate regulatory agency, the Food and Drug Administration of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. It would accomplish this by appropriately amending and expanding the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act so as to automatically retain all the existing authority and definition contained therein; by providing for a system of continuous surveillance with authority for continuous in-plant inspection where the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare deems such to be necessary; by establishing a National Advisory Committee for the inspection program with a majority of its membership drawn from the public sector so as to give the consumer interests a direct role in policymaking and in the evaluation of the adequacy of the inspection program; by providing the Secretary with authority to develop research and technical systems related to the inspection program; and by recognizing the personnel needs of the inspection program for additional qualified career personnel and by directing the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to provide necessary or appropriate training for such personnel.

These are but some of the more salient features of this legislation.

Most importantly, however, Mr. President, this legislation has been drafted in an attempt to meet the specific problems associated with fish and fishery product inspection at a cost commensurate with such need. It also would seem to be in consonance with the declared congressional policy set forth in the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956 which notes in part the following:

Sec. 2 \* \* \* The Congress further declares that the fishing industry . . . can prosper

and thus fulfill its proper function in national life only if certain fundamental needs are satisfied by means that are consistent with the public interest and in accord with constitutional functions of governments. Among these needs are:

(1) Freedom of enterprise \* \* \* as well as freedom from unnecessary administrative or legal restrictions that unreasonably conflict with or ignore economic needs; \* \* \*

Perhaps the President's Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs, Mrs. Virginia Knauer, best summed up the approach of this legislation in the following manner:

But if the American public thinks they are getting continual inspection of the processing of meat, they are not. Because there is a patrol system, which I think you probably are aware of Mr. Chairman, in small establishments with a limited volume of production—this is meat products—which according to the Department, do not require constant supervision, and they are grouped together on a patrol assignment.

This includes the boning and cutting of meat and poultry, preparation of fresh cuts for our hotels, slicing and packaging of bacon and ham and labeling the findings, preparation of pork skins and the curing of one item, beef brisquets, and of course, certification of products for export.

They do not have mandatory, continuous inspection. They are grouped together. It would be like a visit as part of a patrol. This is an exercise in semantics, and I feel that the Administration bill, in the inspection of this fish processing, is stronger, actually, because it provides a great flexibility to the Secretary that he can institute continuous, intense inspection where he deems it necessary.

And that can be as six men around the clock, if necessary, or more, as he deems necessary.

May I ask from the housewife's point of view that any housewife in America would, I think, agree with me that if she has a clean kitchen and a clean back yard, that she doesn't need a continuous inspector from the city halls, Department of Health on her doorstep. Whereas her neighbor down the street, who may be a very slovenly housekeeper who has a dirty lawn piled high with garbage, which is, shall we say, a menace to the health of the neighborhood, would naturally need someone there at all times inspecting and certainly once that situation was cleaned up, a casual, continuing inspection would solve the problem. I think most housewives would agree on this.

So it is with processing plants, whether they are for beef or chickens or fish. There will be those that will have rather high standards which, after the initial intense inspection, probably will not need an inspection continually twenty-four hours a day but will continue that high inspection.

But I think that the flexibility of the Administration bill would insure to the American consumers the real healthy produce.

Mr. President, while seeking to assure the American consumer of wholesome fish products, this bill also exemplifies appropriate fiscal responsibility to the American taxpayer. It is geared to meet the specific problem without undue cost. I would hope that others interested in maintaining such a proper balance between the tripartite interests and equities of the consumer, the taxpayer and the industry will be similarly so inclined to agree with the approach proposed to be taken in this legislation submitted by the administration which I now introduce for appropriate reference.

Mr. President, I send to the desk a bill

introduced on behalf of myself and the Senator from Vermont (Mr. PROUTY) for appropriate reference.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2712) to regulate interstate commerce by strengthening and improving consumer protection under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with respect to fish and fishery products, including provision for assistance to and cooperation with the States in the administration of their related programs and assistance by them in the carrying out of the Federal program, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. CORTON (for himself and Mr. PROUTY), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Commerce.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 142—  
INTRODUCTION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION TO ESTABLISH A DRUG COMMISSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, MEXICO, AND CANADA

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I introduce a joint resolution which urges the President to seek and work for the establishment of a permanent International Drug Commission between the United States, Mexico, and Canada.

The drug problem is a clear and present danger to the health and morals of our Nation and our people.

President Nixon recognized this grave danger and has sent to the Congress a strong cure for this national menace. Along with Congressman BOB WILSON, DON CLAUSEN, and BOB MATHIAS of California, I wrote President Nixon making various recommendations for action in this field. I ask unanimous consent that our letter to the President be printed in full at the conclusion of my remarks. Naturally, I was pleased that the administration's recommended legislation incorporates some of the suggestions that we made.

Prior to that time I had also written to Assistant Secretary Charles A. Meyer, who also serves as a chairman and U.S. representative on the United States-Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship, after I discovered, upon reviewing the brochure of the Border Commission, that the drug problem was not even on the agenda of the U.S.-Mexico Border Commission. In my June 26 letter to Mr. Meyer, I urged not only that the drug problem be placed on the agenda, but that it be placed in a priority position.

On July 9, Secretary Meyer wrote to me saying that he had decided against my suggestion. I ask unanimous consent that my letter to Secretary Meyer and his response be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JUNE 26, 1969.

HON. CHARLES A. MEYERS,  
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Department of State, Washington,  
D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am writing you because of your chairmanship of the U.S.-Mexico Commission for Border Development

and Friendship. I was pleased that Mr. Frank B. Dean stopped by my office to discuss Senate Joint Resolution 119, which would authorize an appropriation for expenses of the Commission.

Naturally as a representative of a state which shares a border with Mexico, I will be pleased to support the resolution. Certainly I applaud joint efforts to foster friendship and improve relations between our countries and our people.

In examining your brochure, "A New Pattern for Borderland Development," I observed that after studies and conferences, the Commission decided to work in the following eleven areas: housing, manpower, community centers and services, libraries, industrial and economic development, health and sanitation, transportation, recreation, planning and technical assistance, education and joint disaster relief. I was, however, concerned with what I regard as a most serious omission. I am referring to the fact that the drug problem does not appear to be on the agenda.

The drug problem, as you well know, is already serious and seems to be growing daily. This year, the Senate Health Subcommittee, on which I serve, heard testimony that the drug problem was spreading to the elementary school. Frankly, citizens in my state as well as in other parts of the country are rightfully getting angry over the continuous and apparently growing quantities of drugs coming into the United States. There is a feeling that Mexico is not doing everything it can to prevent the illicit and illegal traffic in drugs. Indicative of this feeling is the fact that over one hundred cities in my state have separately passed resolutions urging Congress to close the border to minors unless they are accompanied by a parent or a responsible adult. I have urged the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee to hold hearings in Southern California to examine the drug abuse problem in general and the border question in particular, and I am hopeful that the Committee will be coming to California in the near future.

In summary, the alarming increase in drug traffic and drug use is not only harmful to its victims, but it also is harmful to the good relations between Mexico and the United States. I would, therefore, urge that drugs be added to your agenda and that it be a first order of business of this most important Commission.

With best wishes, I am,

Sincerely,

GEORGE MURPHY.

UNITED STATES-MEXICO COMMISSION FOR BORDER DEVELOPMENT AND FRIENDSHIP,

Washington, D.C., July 9, 1969.

HON. GEORGE MURPHY,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MURPHY: Thank you for your letter of June 26, 1969 concerning the role of the U.S.-Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship. I am delighted that we can count on your support of Senate Joint Resolution 119 which would authorize an appropriation for the Commission.

In your letter you outline your great concern about the increasing problem of narcotics, dangerous drugs and marijuana trafficking, and you urge that this problem be added to the agenda of the Commission. I have given full consideration to this proposal and have decided against it, for three reasons:

First, we are attempting to limit the scope of the Commission to problems within the immediate geographic area of the border. The narcotics problem transcends such a geographic area, and as such, lends itself more readily to treatment through regular diplomatic channels, as well as through the arrangement of informal cooperation which

already exists between the enforcement authorities of both countries.

Second, the Mexican Government has on repeated occasions resisted suggestions to have narcotics enforcement problems placed under a joint U.S.-Mexico commission. We estimate that a proposal to place narcotics problems on the CODAF agenda would be opposed by the Mexican Government.

Third, narcotics enforcement in Mexico is highly centralized under the Federal police. One of the principal aims of the Commission is to stimulate action on the local level in border communities. There appears to be little likelihood that meaningful local action on narcotics enforcement in Mexico is possible under present conditions.

While I oppose the inclusion of the narcotics problem as a separate item on the agenda of CODAF, I most certainly feel that it can and should be a part of certain other activities conducted by CODAF. For example, educational programs developed for primary and secondary-level schools should include information on narcotics and drug abuse. Similarly, there may be good possibilities of including rehabilitation of drug users and traffickers in certain community action programs. In any case, you may be assured that we will be alert to exploit any appropriate opportunity to emphasize to our Mexican counterparts our deep interest in eliminating the narcotics, dangerous drugs and marijuana problem from our border area.

In the meantime, I can assure you that efforts to solicit more effective Mexican assistance on enforcement are not being overlooked. A high level meeting of enforcement officials of both countries was held in June, and we are very hopeful this will be the basis of greatly increased cooperation in combatting the present situation.

I appreciate your taking the time to write to me on this matter, and I hope that I will continue to receive your guidance and suggestions whenever you deem it appropriate.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES A. MEYER,  
Chairman.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, for some time, I have been deeply concerned about the drug problem, and in my capacity as a member of the Subcommittee on Health I supported last year, the Drug Abuse and Control Act. In addition to making the possession of stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic drugs a crime, the bill also increased the penalties for those who push and traffic in illegal drugs. Yet it is obvious, Mr. President, that additional steps are needed and new strategies need to be devised to deal with the alarming use of drugs. For, as President Nixon warned—

It is doubtful that an American parent can send a son or daughter to college without exposing the young man or woman to drug abuse.

The National Institute of Mental Health estimated that one-third of our college and high school students have used marijuana or dangerous drugs. Surgeon General Williams Stewart told the Subcommittee on Health that drug use has spread to the elementary grades.

On July 17, the San Diego Union in a lead editorial pointed out the need for action now in the drug battle. The cartoon on the editorial page depicts the drug and dope problem as "the fifth horseman" galloping destructively across our country with a hypodermic gun labeled "dope." This is an apt description as evidenced by the frightening possibility raised in the editorial's conclusion which states:

And time as well as vigor is of the essence. Unless something is done quickly parents may not be able to send their children to playgrounds without exposing them to narcotics.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed at the end of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, during the past 6 years, customs officials have increased the seizure of drugs by 2,000 percent. While undoubtedly these increased seizures result from increased surveillance and controls, they also, I am certain, result from increased traffic in drugs. For drugs seized might be compared with the tip of the iceberg, allowing us to see the dangers, but not its size, real danger, or magnitude.

Mr. President, there is no doubt about it. The production of drugs in Mexico has become big business, and we must do all we can to stem this flood of narcotics which is entering our country. To be successful, we must have greater cooperation with the Mexican Government. For that reason, I am today submitting a resolution which urges the President of the United States to "seek of the President of Mexico and the Prime Minister of Canada the formation of a permanent commission to investigate ways and means of reducing the illicit traffic of narcotics and dangerous drugs within and between the United States, Mexico and Canada." Representative GONZALES, of Texas, introduced this measure on the House side on July 23.

Although in the past, there have been indications that the Mexican Government has not been receptive to this approach, I believe that the growing concern in both countries and the great danger posed by the alarming drug increase will result in the Mexican Government being more agreeable to cooperative action. In any event, it is incumbent upon this Nation to emphasize to Mexico the growing concern in the Nation about the rising use of drugs. The drug problem clearly has the potential of harming the good relationships we have enjoyed with our neighbors. This can be seen from the fact that over 100 cities in California have passed resolutions urging Congress to close the United States-Mexican border to minors unless accompanied by an adult.

In short, Americans are rightfully angry over the problem and are demanding that action be taken to stop the big drug business and traffic which is big profit to those who do not care how they make a buck.

I ask unanimous consent that an article written by veteran correspondent Francis B. Kent, published in last Sunday's Los Angeles Times, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the San Diego Union, July 17, 1969]  
PRESIDENT WRITES PRESCRIPTION: DRUG ABUSE  
NEEDS LEGAL CURE

The most sobering part of President Nixon's message which urged a massive, concerted attack on the runaway narcotics problem in

the United States of America was the paragraph relating to youth.

"It is doubtful," Mr. Nixon said, "that an American parent can send a son or daughter to college today without exposing the young man or woman to drug abuse."

Reams of statistics are available to support the President's inference that the national drug problem already has a strong grip on the emerging generation.

The National Institute of Mental Health estimates that more than one-third of all college and high school students today have used marijuana or a dangerous drug. It is estimated the number will nearly double before this decade ends.

Clearly this is a menace that will require a strong prescription. The days of mollycoddling an overt danger and exploring its social implications instead of taking strong legal cures must end. Otherwise the problem will be so immense that it may not be susceptible to either doses of law or of reason.

Mr. Nixon's prescription for control of the narcotics problem is both strong and timely medicine.

He recommends for approval of Congress a comprehensive program that will bring together for the first time all federal and state laws dealing with sale, possession, manufacturing and distribution of narcotics.

Especially pertinent, Mr. Nixon classes marijuana in the same general category as LSD, cocaine or heroin—which is realistic. The comprehensive approach should focus the energies of the federal establishment against the narcotics cancer which is eroding individual character and the national moral fiber.

Certainly the President's clear labeling of marijuana as a great danger should serve to halt a swelling attitude of permissiveness to this insidious threat.

It is ironic, but essential, that part of the fight against dangerous drugs has to be directed against decisions of the Supreme Court, which struck down sections of registration acts last year. Mr. Nixon's proposal to pattern laws requiring licensing and registration of persons possessing dangerous drugs is patterned after New York State law and should serve this purpose.

But implicit throughout the President's vigorous attack upon the dangerous drugs is the thought that it is a road that the federal government should not travel alone.

The visible part of the narcotics cancer is but a fraction of the total. The problem is so immense that it will require the full effort and cooperation of the federal government, states, institutions and families.

And time as well as vigor is of the essence. Unless something is done quickly parents may not be able to send their children to playgrounds without exposing them to narcotics.

[From the Los Angeles Times, July 27, 1969]  
DRUGS SEIZED AT BORDER UP 2,000 PERCENT IN 6 YEARS; RISE REFLECTS NOT ONLY TIGHTER CONTROLS BUT MORE DEMAND FOR MEXICO'S NARCOTICS

(By Francis B. Kent)

MEXICO CITY.—The body in the coffin looked ordinary enough but there was something about the men accompanying it across the border into the United States that bothered the customs agents.

An informal autopsy revealed extraordinary contents: a fortune in heroin.

Not everyone connected with the illicit drug traffic goes to such bizarre lengths. Simpler techniques have been far more successful. Yet the incident serves to illustrate what U.S. customs men are up against and their task gets more difficult all the time.

In the past six years, according to customs officials in Washington, the quantity of narcotic drugs seized at border points has increased by 2,000%. Joseph Jenkins, the Customs Bureau's director of investigations, said this increase reflects not only intensified

control efforts but a sharp rise in the dope traffic as well.

As a result of the growing demand among U.S. users, the production of illicit drugs has become a big business in Mexico. Just how big, no one knows, but the figures are sizeable.

#### CUSTOMS AGENTS

For example, U.S. customs agents along the 1,500 miles of border between Mexico and California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas seized more than 32 tons of marijuana last year, plus more than 50 pounds of heroin, morphine and cocaine.

Mexican authorities, meanwhile, destroyed more than 7,500 fields of poppies, the source of opium and its derivatives, and burned off hundreds of acres of marijuana.

How much managed to get across the border and into the hands of users is anybody's guess. The consensus: considerable.

Illicit drugs cross the border in every conceivable manner. The young, long-haired marijuana smoker may smuggle it over concealed in his surfboard. The professionals are more likely to use trucks with false bottoms, boats or airplanes. Unpoliced coastal landings and airstrips proliferate on both sides of the border.

Arrests and stiff prison sentences appear to be no more than a minor factor in slowing the traffic. Border arrests for trafficking in marijuana alone numbered 945 in 1965, and by last year had risen to 2,273. Conviction, under the Narcotics Control Act of 1956, brings a mandatory 5- to 20-year prison sentence with no hope of probation or parole. A second offense means 10 to 40 years.

On the Mexican side the law is even tougher and Mexican jails are not renowned for their luxurious facilities.

Until relatively recently, narcotics had not been much of a criminal problem in Mexico. Indians had smoked what is now called marijuana and munched on hallucinatory mushrooms long before the Spanish arrived in the early 16th century. Marijuana came into more popular use about 100 years ago when the peasant took it up to ease his hunger pangs.

Now its use has been noted among secondary-school students, and an occasional homicide has been attributed to organized crime's efforts to control distribution, not only of marijuana but the so-called hard narcotics such as heroin as well.

Just one thing keeps the international traffic alive: money. And, according to agents of the U.S. Treasury Department's Bureau of Narcotics, not all of it flows into the hands of that sinister organization known as the Mafia.

"Dope smuggling," one agent told The Times, "is about as exclusive as betting on the ponies."

#### LARGE PROFITS

Profits are enormous. The 2-pound brick of marijuana that nets its grower about \$4 in Mexico sells for as much as \$300 in the United States. The usual price in, say, Los Angeles or New York, is \$150. Much more profitable are the hard drugs: morphine, heroin, cocaine. They come in smaller quantities and provide vastly more effective results.

Calculating the profit margin on hard drugs is next to impossible, since they are invariably diluted at every stage of processing and handling and the price varies not only geographically but according to the balance between supply and demand. Almost any illicit narcotic, though, is worth at least twice as much on the U.S. side of the border.

Controlling the production and processing of drugs in Mexico is no easy task. Much of the interior is virtually inaccessible except by Jeep or burro. Yet the authorities here have mounted what is generally considered to be the most effective grassroots campaign in Latin America.

Under the supervision of Asst. Atty. Gen. David Franco Rodriguez, federal agents work

closely with the army and with local and state police departments. Each spring, when the opium poppy is ripe for milking, mixed teams move out into the eight-state area where cultivation of the poppy is concentrated. Traveling by whatever means is necessary, often on foot, they descend on illegal plantations that have been spotted from the air, destroy the growth and arrest the grower.

Equally tough measures are directed against those in Mexico who serve as links in the narcotics traffic that originates in South America, the Middle East and the Orient. The South American countries of Bolivia and Peru are a major source of cocaine, a derivative of the cocoa leaf that is chewed by Indians. The Mideast and the Far East produce heroin.

#### TURKISH HEROIN

Heroin is a particularly nettlesome problem because it is manufactured legally, under government license, in Turkey and India. U.S. officials estimate that up to 15% of the Turkish heroin finds its way into the contraband market.

Getting narcotics across the border into the United States, despite increasingly strict controls, presents no great challenge. Literally millions of U.S. and Mexican nationals cross the border every year and to search every one would be physically impossible.

"If we did," a customs agent observed, "cars would be lined up for miles and the congestion at airports would be outrageous."

Still, the number of U.S. agents along the border has almost doubled, to a total of 92 since 1965, and the combined efforts of U.S. and Mexican authorities have produced results, as can be seen by the increase in seizures and arrests.

#### MEETINGS HELPFUL

Jenkins, the bureau's investigations chief, is convinced that further cooperation will pay even greater dividends in the future. Joint meetings such as the recent roundtable conducted here between U.S. and Mexican experts have been particularly helpful, he said.

What the authorities on both sides hope for and expect is a change of attitude on the part of young people, especially in the United States, where marijuana has acquired widespread acceptance.

Medically, according to a Narcotics Bureau agent, it has yet to be established that marijuana is harmless or not habit-forming, and the evidence indicates that its use often leads to hard narcotics.

"About 80% of our confirmed addicts," he said, "started with marijuana."

Jenkins, who was with the Customs Bureau in Los Angeles for 10 years before his transfer to Washington in January, recalls a grim courtroom scene in which a 37-year-old offender had just been sentenced to 40 years in prison.

"I don't think I'm going to make it," the defendant said.

"Son, you just do the best you can," the judge replied.

JULY 10, 1969.

The PRESIDENT,  
The White House,

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We, the undersigned members of the California Congressional Delegation, having read the news accounts appearing in yesterday's Washington Post, wish to compliment and commend you for your bold and forthright proposals with regard to combatting the nation's drug problem.

Of particular significance, we believe, are the reported measures calling for stiffer penalties for habitual offenders and those involved in the illegal traffic and sale of drugs; and tighter restrictions, to include Federal licensing, of U.S. manufacturers of drugs, stimulants, and depressants.

As Californians, each of us has been actively involved for some time in trying to find a

solution to our State's common and unique problems of drug abuse. As such, we wish to bring to your attention and urge you to consider the following additional recommendations which we believe should be included in the Administration's position on this critical subject:

1. *Border Surveillance:* As you know, California and other states bordering on Mexico have a unique and compelling narcotics problem as it applies to the illegal traffic in dangerous drugs and narcotics into and out of Mexico. We believe a concerted effort must be made to expand and strengthen our border surveillance activities so that a more effective program of "reducing the supply" can be waged.

2. *Relations with Mexico:* Since full cooperation and continued friendship between the U.S. and Mexico is seriously affected by the situation which exists, we urge that our mutual narcotics problems be included as a priority item of discussion at the up-coming meetings of the U.S.-Mexico Border Commission for Friendship and Development. At present, it is our understanding that this matter is not included on the proposed agenda for these meetings.

3. *Drug Abuse Education:* It is our common view, as well as your own, that any all-out effort to combat the spreading menace of drug addiction and "experimentation" cannot rely on law enforcement alone. Therefore, we strongly support and join you in emphasizing the dire national need for more effective drug abuse education. The 1962 White House Conference on Narcotics and Drug Abuse reported the "failure of schools to recognize the problem and provide instruction of equal quantity and quality as that provided for other health hazards". In our collective judgment, no significant or meaningful role has been assumed by the Federal Government to assist our schools in providing effective drug abuse education and the need for such education for students and adults alike has now become acute.

Please be assured, Mr. President, that we speak for a vast majority of the Members of Congress in saying that we stand ready and willing to assist you and your Administration in any way possible in helping combat this growing menace to the young people of America, their parents, and to the very moral fiber of our society.

Respectfully,

GEORGE MURPHY,  
U.S. Senator, California.

ROBERT B. MATHIAS,  
18th Congressional District, California.

BOB WILSON,  
36th Congressional District, California.

DON H. CLAUSEN,  
1st Congressional District, California.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the joint resolution be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred and, without objection, the joint resolution will be printed in the RECORD.

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 142) for the establishment of a Drug Commission between the United States, Mexico, and Canada, introduced by Mr. MURPHY, was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

#### S.J. RES. 142

Whereas the illicit traffic in narcotics and dangerous drugs exists; and

Whereas this problem is of international consequence; and

Whereas despite the border efforts of the United States, Mexico, and Canada the flow

the illicit drug traffic continues at a dangerously high rate; and

Whereas this illicit traffic adversely affects the lives of young people who use barbiturates, marijuana and other dangerous drugs: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That the President of the United States is authorized, requested, and directed to seek with the President of Mexico and the Prime Minister of Canada the formation of a permanent commission to investigate ways and means of reducing the illicit traffic in narcotics and dangerous drugs within and between the United States, Mexico, and Canada.

#### ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS

S. 2523

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing, the name of the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) be added as a cosponsor of S. 2523, to amend, extend, and improve certain public health laws related to mental health.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 2608

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing, the names of the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. McCARTHY) and the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) be added as cosponsors of S. 2608, to provide for comprehensive control of narcotic addiction and drug abuse.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF AN AMENDMENT

NO. 107

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIER), I ask unanimous consent that, at the next printing, the name of the senior Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE) be added as a cosponsor of amendment No. 107 to the military procurement bill.

The amendment requires annual disclosures by former high-ranking civilians and military Pentagon employees who leave the Government and go to work for major defense contractors.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### SENATE RESOLUTION 225—RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE COMMENDATION AND GRATITUDE OF THE SENATE TO THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE NATIONAL SPACE PROGRAM ON THE OCCASION OF THE APOLLO 11 MISSION

Mr. GURNEY submitted a resolution (S. Res. 225) expressing the commendation and gratitude of the Senate to the men and women of the national space program on the occasion of the Apollo 11 mission, which was referred to the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences.

(The remarks of Mr. GURNEY when he submitted the resolution appear earlier in the RECORD under an appropriate heading.)

## NOTICE OF HEARINGS ON S. 2624

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Improvements in Judiciary Machinery, I announce hearings on S. 2624, a bill to improve the judicial machinery in customs courts by amending the statutory provisions relating to judicial actions and administrative proceedings in customs matters, and for other purposes. The hearings will be held at 10 a.m., on August 4, and 5, 1969, in room 6226, New Senate Office Building.

Any person who wishes to testify or submit a statement for inclusion in the RECORD should communicate as soon as possible with the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, room 6306, New Senate Office Building.

## NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATION BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, the following nomination has been referred to and is now pending before the Committee on the Judiciary:

H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr., of New York, to be U.S. attorney for the western district of New York for the term of 4 years, vice John T. Curtin, resigned.

On behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all persons interested in this nomination to file with the committee, in writing, on or before Monday, August 4, 1969, any representations or objections they may wish to present concerning the above nomination, with a further statement whether it is their intention to appear at any hearing which may be scheduled.

## ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

Mr. HART. Mr. President, not long ago, I authored a magazine article on the enticing temptations to violate the antitrust laws. Among the attractions I listed were the great potential returns balanced against the very low odds for being caught.

Thankfully, antitrust enforcement is being resurrected, and there is reason to hope that the traditional "crime does not pay" warning once more may be valid in the antitrust field.

Two items tend to substantiate this hope.

The first is the report from Brussels—as contained in a story published in the Washington Post last Friday—that the Common Market has for the first time fined companies for antitrust violations.

One-half a million dollars in fines were levied on six European companies for operating a secret quinine cartel.

My pleasure over this action is mixed, I confess, with some pride, for the Common Market officials graciously pointed out that they had learned of the cartel through the work of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly.

The subcommittee uncovered the cartel, and in hearings in 1967 laid out its operation through the actual working papers of the members. Those documents were one of the most remarkable sights any antitrust lawyer might ever hope to see, for they spelled out just how the

companies conspired to acquire the American stockpile of quinine and how they raised world prices after—with the cooperation of the State Department and General Services Administration—obtaining it.

Last fall criminal indictments were returned by a Federal grand jury against 15 companies and eight executives involved in the price fixing and other antitrust violations.

According to the subcommittee information, during the operation of the cartel, prices had gone up as much as 700 percent on quinine and similarly on quinidine—a lifesaving heart drug.

In addition to the action by the Common Market and the Department of Justice, private suits have been filed claiming millions of dollars in damages.

These private suits are in the nature of class actions. Under a class action, individuals who have suffered a loss too small to warrant hiring a lawyer join together to recover their damages jointly.

The growing popularity of these class actions justifies, I think, the hope the antitrust violations will become increasingly expensive. This, in turn, means that the congressional intent that private suits to collect treble damages would be a powerful deterrent to antitrust violations will carry new weight.

The class action has been brought to public attention most recently by the \$120 million settlement to reimburse consumers who were forced to buy antibiotics when they were price fixed by the pharmaceutical companies.

This is the largest settlement in antitrust history, and it carried considerably more clout against a corporation than the \$50,000 penalty accessible under the antitrust laws.

I would be remiss, I think, if I did not point out the role the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly also played in spotlighting the antibiotic case. This was first brought to general public attention by the drug extensive hearings and report carried out under the direction of Senator Kefauver.

In sum, all I am really saying is that so much of the time we grind our gears around here, and the temptation is great to think much of it is for naught.

In these two cases, I am sure the American consumer—and the European, with quinine—would say our efforts had been worth a great deal.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Washington Post article on quinine and one on class actions, published in the July 26 issue of the New Republic, be printed in the RECORD.

I also ask unanimous consent for the printing of a boxed story, captioned "Detectable Wrongdoing," which appeared on one page of the New Republic, giving the consumer class story. It, too, has relevancy.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EUROMART FINES FIRMS FOR RUNNING SECRET DRUG CARTEL

(By Richard Norton-Taylor)

BRUSSELS, July 24.—Six European companies have been fined a total of \$500,000 by the Common Market Executive Commission for establishing a secret quinine cartel, it was announced here today.

This marked the first time the Commission has imposed a fine for an infringement of the Market's antitrust regulations. The same six companies have been accused of forcing up U.S. prices on quinine by 700 per cent.

The drug companies concerned are Nedchem of the Netherlands, Boehringer and Buchler, both of West Germany, and three French companies, Pointet-Girard, Norgentaise (a Bristol-Myer subsidiary) and Pharmacie Centrale.

Together they control at least 50 per cent of the world quinine market. Nedchem of Amsterdam, the largest of the firms, has been fined \$210,000, Boehringer \$190,000, and the others considerably less.

Quinine, the traditional cure for malaria, is being used heavily in Vietnam, where new types of the disease have broken out. Quinine, its derivative, is a drug used to combat heart ailments.

The European cartel was first spotlighted by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Antitrusts and Monopolies. The cartel's key objective was to eliminate competition among the various producers in 1959 in buying a U.S. stockpile of 14 million ounces of quinine, enough for 1½ to 2 year's world supply.

This stockpile was shared among the six companies. When new sources of supply emerged, the firms prolonged the market-sharing and price-fixing agreements they had established. Within the Common Market, the companies agreed to reserve home markets for each partner, and reserved the manufacture of quinidine to the German and Dutch firms.

This directly conflicts with principles laid down in the Common Market's Treaty of Rome. "The infringement was knowingly committed," said the Commission in a note released today.

"Despite expert legal advice the companies continued their practices, deliberately filed no notification, and took what they believed to be adequate steps to keep the agreement secret. Among other things, they instructed all members to destroy compromising documents," it said.

But this was not fully followed and some documents first came to light in the U.S. Senate Subcommittee in 1967.

The quinine cartel led to a 700 per cent rise in the price of quinine between 1960 and 1966. In the latter half of this period, prices skyrocketed by as much as five times when U.S. military authorities, having disposed of most of their earlier strategic reserves of quinine, reappeared on the market as large-scale purchasers because of the Vietnam war. This led to the Senate investigation.

The Common Market decision on the quinine cartel signifies a new determination in the European Commission's competition directorate to look into other fields, notably the European electric-lighting industry, where a series of market-sharing agreements have been in force for some time.

Some of the same European drug firms involved in today's announcement were included in a Federal grand jury indictment last October of 15 drug companies for fixing the U.S. price of quinidine.

The fines announced today followed antitrust charges brought yesterday by the U.S. Justice Department against two British and three U.S. drug manufacturers for an alleged restrictive patent-licensing agreement of a drug, iron dextran, used in the treatment of iron-deficiency anemia.

## GIVING THE CONSUMER "CLASS"

(By David Sanford)

It is in the nature of consumer fraud cases that victims almost never recover their losses, since claims generally are smaller than the cost of paying a lawyer to go to court. A consumer can complain to the Federal Trade Commission, but even if the FTC is interested, investigates and finds fraud, the most it can do is order a merchant or finance company to stop defrauding its customers; com-

elling restitution is not within the FTC's limited powers. Better Business Bureaus, Bess Myerson, Action Line, Consumers Union, and Ralph Nader all receive complaints, but they offer only cathartic relief.

There are signs, however, that Congress, the courts and other agencies are becoming interested in consumer class actions—suits by one or a few consumers in behalf of all consumers similarly abused. A lawyer is rarely interested in representing a poor client who has been done out of \$400 by a finance company operating illegally, but if he can represent thousands of consumers identically defrauded, he has an interesting and potentially lucrative case.

All states and federal law provide for class actions by litigants who can establish a "unity of interest," but the laws are variously interpreted and, in most states inhospitable to class actions. In New York, according to Philip Schrag, a lawyer for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the courts go in for "metaphysical nitpicking," interpreting "unity of interest" to mean "that if 10,000 people sign the same contract—physically the same piece of paper—one person can sue in behalf of all of them. But if they sign 10,000 separate, identical, contracts then they don't have a 'unity of interest.'" The effect in New York and elsewhere is to discourage class actions. (Ironically, California, which has the same statute as New York, interprets it liberally and is a congenial place for class actions. In a recent Yellow Cab case a judgment required refund of overcharges to Los Angeles taxi users.)

Class actions may soon be more common across the country. In the antitrust field, for instance, lawyers representing 43 states have arranged an out-of-court settlement with five huge drug companies providing for refunds of \$120 million in overcharges for antibiotic drugs sold between 1954 and 1966. A New York City federal court in December 1967 convicted Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc., American Cyanimid Co. and Bristol Myers Co., Inc., of conspiring to fix prices of tetracycline and related broad-spectrum antibiotics and of conspiring to monopolize the market in these drugs. (Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. and Upjohn Co. were named as co-conspirators.) The conviction laid the companies open to civil antitrust suits by states, cities, hospitals, insurance companies, and individuals who had been overcharged. To avoid suits and conceivable judgments of as much as \$500 million the companies, all the while denying liability, have offered to settle claims out of court for \$120 million. [Last week the government filed a \$25 million damage suit against Pfizer and Cyanimid alleging they obtained their patents for tetracycline fraudulently.]

The tetracycline settlement is the largest in antitrust history—an accomplishment for which David Shapiro, one of the lawyers retained by New York, deserves major credit, since he chose to sue not in behalf of New York alone but for New York "on behalf of all that state's ultimate consumers." The individual purchaser of the involved drugs—if he can locate his records or signs a notarized statement detailing his expenditures—will be compensated for the overcharge. (On Tuesday, July 1, the drug firms placed ads in daily newspapers throughout the United States explaining the procedure for refunds. The ads reportedly cost more than \$200,000.) Consumers will thus benefit from a settlement that would never have been practicable had they sued as individuals with small claims.

The drug case was not, strictly speaking, a consumer class action, since it was brought by government in behalf of itself and its affected citizens rather by a consumer in behalf of all consumers.

In New York and elsewhere state laws allow groups with common interests to bring damage suits in the area of consumer frauds. Thus, the New York court of appeals

early this month agreed to hear a suit brought by Edna Hall and William Russell, two low-income consumers, against the Coburn Corporation, a large finance company. The two contend that they are among thousands of persons who purchased furniture and appliances under installment contracts sold by stores to the Coburn Corporation. The contracts, it is alleged, were printed in type smaller than the eight-point type required by state law. On this technicality the two hope to recover for themselves several hundred dollars in service charges paid on the "illegally drawn" contracts, as well as refunds to thousands of other persons who signed identical documents. The \$200 that Edna Hall hopes to recover is not enough to interest any lawyer, since thousands of dollars have been expended fighting her case, exclusive of lawyers' fees. But by fighting the case as a consumer class action, her lawyers hope to recover hundreds of thousands of dollars.

The Coburn case was dismissed in two lower courts as an improper class action and it now remains for the appeals court to determine whether that judgment is to be sustained; whether, that is, there is a true "unity of interest."

Philip Schrag has filed a second case in the U.S. District Court to recover damages for a group of students allegedly bilked by a ski-tour organizer. Schrag is basing his argument on a law (the Lanham Act) under which businesses often sue competitors for false statements made in the interstate sale of goods and services. Schrag wishes to apply the law to *individual consumers* as well and in so doing open the federal courts to consumer class actions under the Lanham Act.

Paul Lurie, a Chicago attorney, is suing Montgomery Ward in behalf of about 6,000,000 Ward customers who last year were mailed unsolicited credit-life and disability insurance policies covering their Ward charge accounts. The policies were accompanied by a letter informing charge customers that they should notify Ward's if they did not wish to pay for such policies but that otherwise they would be billed. Lurie charges that the solicitation was a deceptive merchandising scheme, contrary to accepted merchandising techniques in which a customer's specific acceptance rather than his mere silence is required to consummate a purchase. Were Lurie representing a single client the suit would not be worth trying. Representing millions of clients, he stands to collect several million dollars for them if he is successful.

Mayor Lindsay's energetic Commissioner of Consumer Affairs in New York City, Bess Myerson Grant, has proposed to the City Council a consumer protection act which for the first time provides for restitution of money to victims of consumer frauds. The bill, which Mrs. Grant expects will be passed after hearings this fall, would give her agency power to bring suits on behalf of the citizens of New York. It would establish in her department an office of consumer's advocate, which would investigate and litigate complaints of fraud and when successful in court, arrange for money to be returned to those defrauded. Simon Lazarus, executive director of the City's Department of Consumer Affairs, says he anticipates that law will be copied by other cities and serve as a model for a federal consumer's advocate program.

Finally, at the federal level, Senator Joseph Tydings of Maryland will hold hearings of his subcommittee on judicial machinery July 28 and 29 to consider his bill to give the federal courts jurisdiction in consumer class action cases. It is Tydings' view that despite new laws and court decisions favorable to consumers, there is still no effective way under state laws for victims of fraud to recover losses. Because most states have laws hostile to class actions, Tydings would shift

to the federal courts authority over all class actions nominally involving interstate commerce and the possible violation of state or federal law. Lawyers who represent a class of consumers would be eligible under Tydings' bill to collect as fees up to 10 percent of damages and financial penalties won in court.

A lawyer familiar with Tydings' thinking, says his strategy so far has been "to keep his bill very quiet, very private, very small and try to get it through the judiciary committee before the finance companies find out what's going on." He didn't send out a press release when he introduced the bill—a very rare thing. The reason for the secrecy, of course, is that if enacted, Tydings' "Class Action Jurisdiction Act" would give the individual consumer immense leverage. One consumer bilked of \$20 has never been much of a threat. But a million consumers each similarly defrauded and represented in a single suit constitute a potential \$20 million headache for a finance company or retailer. Such judgments would make the practice of consumer law very profitable for attorneys, and redress the balance of power in favor of the consumer.

#### TOO MUCH CRITICISM OF OUR WAY OF LIFE

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, in this day and age, when far too many editors and commentators seem to feel it is the sophisticated or "in thing" to do to fire broadsides of criticism at everything American, it is refreshing and reassuring to read an occasional editorial written by an outstanding editor which enthusiastically speaks up for what is right about America. I take pleasure in calling to the attention of Congress and the country to just such an editorial recently published in the Daily Argus Leader of Sioux Falls, S. Dak., the largest newspaper in the largest city of a contiguous five-State area in the Upper Midwest.

Widely known because of his extensive travels abroad and his regular attendance at international meetings of editors and publishers, as well as because he is a former officer of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Fred C. Christopherson, the author of this editorial, has his editorials quoted frequently throughout the country. I sincerely hope this will be true of his editorial, "Too Much Criticism of Our Way of Life," which I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### TOO MUCH CRITICISM OF OUR WAY OF LIFE

Perhaps it is the function of those who comment on the passing scene to scold, nag and find fault, seeking thereby to effect an improvement in our way of life.

But it can be overdone. And I am very much of the opinion that it is being overdone now in the United States—overdone so much that the impression is being created that we, the people, are a miserable lot and that the world might be better off if we were to vanish from the face of the earth. Almost from every side, the fusillade of the critics is being drummed into our ears and placed before our eyes. We are told that we have made a dismal failure in about every field—in the field of human relations in this country and in the field of international affairs.

If we are to believe the critics, we have done everything wrong and nothing right. We have polluted the earth, the sea and the

skies by our presence. We have despoiled our resources and utilized our talents to pillage, destroy and corrupt.

#### IMPROPER BLAME

An impressive array of statistics can be presented to demonstrate otherwise and the time has come, it seems, to point out with force and vigor the fact that man—the American man—isn't as despicable as the faultfinders say he is.

It has been said, for example, that adult Americans have made a mess of things. This is a common criticism voiced by youngsters. Reference is made to the wars of this country.

But who started World War I? We didn't, but we—the Americans—stopped it. Who started World War II? We didn't. We stopped it. And we didn't start the wars in Korea and Vietnam.

We entered these wars, all four of them, as a matter of principle and simple justice—to aid the oppressed and repulse the aggressors. That wasn't a bad motive. That wasn't uncivilized. That was, in fact, national nobility—a nobility of a type never before demonstrated on such a massive scale in the world's history.

The story could go on and on. The resources of our land and the fruits of our labors have been spread widely throughout the world—into almost every nook and cranny of all countries.

Within the United States, our aims and benefactions have been more generous than those of any other nation—so generous that they may be defeating the very purpose we had in the foreground. Those who were productive and self-reliant have sought to help those who weren't. It now appears that the good work may have been overdone—so much overdone that the yield has been worthless.

#### WHAT HAS BEEN DONE

Students have been aided in their apparent desire for a college education. But many of them have responded by seeking to destroy the institutions set up for their guidance. In countless incidents, the recipients of welfare have come to believe that their grants are something to which they are entitled.

Let us stress the fact that we have provided in the United States the highest standard of living in the world.

Let us also take note of the fact that we have in this country the finest spirit of democracy that exists—a people without the class distinctions that are so common in many other nations.

Note, too, that this is a country where the man of humble origin can rise to the top in industry, government and the professions—a fact evidenced by numerous examples all about you in Sioux Falls, in South Dakota, in Washington and in the nation as a whole.

#### REASON FOR PRIDE

Yes, we have been imperfect. We haven't done what we might or should do. We have lagged at times in doing what should be done.

But what nation has done more? And in what period of American history was there a better record?

Let's continue to point out possible improvements. As we do so, however, let us take pride in the tremendous accomplishment of America, of our true exemplification of the better principles of the brotherhood of man, of our conservation and practical use of natural resources, of the many instances where we have made the once sterile desert bloom with the fragrance and the beauty of a rose.

Recognize our shortcomings? Yes. Be mindful of our achievements? Yes. Above all, though, keep the scoreboard in balance and realize that as an American you have a strong reason for being proud of what you and your fellow countrymen have done.

#### OIL LEAKAGE IN SANTA BARBARA CHANNEL

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, on July 28, Santa Barbara, Calif., will observe a day of infamy in its history. On that day 6 months ago an oil well on Federal tidelands 5½ miles offshore in the Santa Barbara Channel blew out and went out of control, pouring thousands of barrels of oil into the sea and onto the beaches of southern California.

Today, oil is still leaking from the sea bottom, still fouling the sea and the beaches, and there is no end in sight.

Secretary of the Interior, Walter J. Hickel, termed the oil spill "a disaster."

The former Secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall, said it was "a conservation Bay of Pigs."

People from all over the Nation and the world are asking why this disaster happened and what, if anything, Congress and the Government will do to prevent future disasters like this one which threatens one of the most beautiful coastal and marine areas in the world, enjoyed every year by millions of Americans and foreign visitors.

People are asking if the despoilation of this area by pollution of the waters by leaks, blowouts, and spills and pollution of the seascape by the erection of enormous drilling platforms in the channel waters truly is in the national interest.

They are asking what values justify the risk of potential destruction of an environment cherished by millions.

They are asking if it is really necessary to continue to drill for oil in the Santa Barbara Channel.

I ask these same questions.

Clearly, in Santa Barbara as in other parts of our country and this planet we live on, it is time to ask what we are doing to our environment and whether the slow destruction of our air, our water, and our land may not threaten man's own demise.

The national policy issues of the use of our natural resources—our land, water, and air—have once again been brought into focus by the Santa Barbara disaster.

Once again we have an opportunity to study the effects of national policy on our environment and review that policy in light of our experience at Santa Barbara and other parts of the Nation.

For 300 years we have exploited our land—too often with few safeguards for the environment, too often with no thought for conserving our resources or properly utilizing them.

The lands that lie along the great coastal regions of our Nation contain trillions of dollars of national treasure, encompass great scenic and recreational areas, provide employment and a special environment for millions of shore residents, and sustain the rich and varied marine life which supplies us with food and sport.

They are indeed vast, measuring 805,300 square statute miles under the usual Federal claim of jurisdiction and an additional 478,700 square statute miles measured by international standards which the United States might be expected to invoke. The combined areas are about 35 percent as large as the total

land of the United States and its territories.

The amount of proven reserves of oil and gas alone on the shelf is 2.9 billion barrels of oil and natural gas liquids, and 30.3 trillion cubic feet of gas. Sulfur reserves are estimated at 37 million tons, and there are an estimated 100 million tons of phosphorite deposits off California alone.

What has happened at Santa Barbara, and what is happening in other parts of our country both onshore and offshore, suggests that this national treasure, which is both our economic and defense security, is in danger of being squandered in a way that may permanently impair our environment and future security.

All of us in Congress have heard this story of depredation and neglect many times. We have seen it at firsthand right here in Washington where a once beautiful river has been defiled by actions of man along its banks. We see it in the strip mining in Appalachia, in the destruction of rich farmland by suburban sprawl, in the denuding of our forests and the alteration of our streams by dams and powerplants.

Each passing day and year sees the spread of this careless growth and exploitation.

Then one day an oil well blows out in the Santa Barbara channel or a Great Lake is found polluted, and we once again call into question our values, our national priorities and the policies which effect those values and priorities.

In Santa Barbara our values and priorities are clearly out of focus.

It is time that we asked how this happened and whether the national policies which guide development of our resources are adequate for the times we live in.

The question posed by the Santa Barbara experience is whether drilling for oil in the Santa Barbara channel is safe, given the geological conditions existing there and the current state of the technology of offshore oil production.

California is known as earthquake country, and Santa Barbara is very much in the geological center of earth movements.

In the last 150 years there have been at least 10 major earthquake occurrences in the Santa Barbara area. By way of illustration, in 1812 a huge tremor generated a tsunami tidal wave 30 to 50 feet high. Another major quake in 1925 caused \$20 million damage in Santa Barbara, and in the summer of 1968 a so-called "swarm" of 66 small quakes centered right in the channel.

Today, although drilling is going on right now and the oil companies are planning to build huge platforms and drill hundreds of wells in the waters above the earthquake area, we still do not have an authoritative analysis of what might happen if a major quake or submarine landslide strikes the area.

And we are told by the Nation's most competent earthquake experts that there is almost a 100-percent certainty that California will be rocked by quakes at some time in the future. Charles Richter of the California Institute of Technology, a world authority on earthquakes,

points out that because geologically California is still young, quakes and earth movements certainly can be expected in the future.

What would be the effect of a major earthquake on the wells and on the drilling and pumping platforms? What would happen if a large tsunami or tidal wave struck the platforms and wells? What effect would a submarine landslide have?

We have no definitive answers to those questions.

Furthermore, all the expert testimony I have heard suggests that there is a good chance of another blowout, spill or accident of some kind that will produce another disaster at Santa Barbara in coastal drilling and producing operations.

The technology of offshore drilling and producing still is too new to provide assurance that there will be no future major pollution events.

In Santa Barbara, where there has been a tremendous amount of faulting, producing uncertain geological formations, we can certainly expect numerous technical problems that almost certainly will result in "accidents" of one kind or another.

Yet, in his testimony before Senator MUSKIE's subcommittee, former Secretary of Interior Stewart Udall, reviewing the decision of his office to drill for oil in Santa Barbara, said:

The idea of a massive blowout that couldn't be controlled was not a fear that anyone raised and therefore never became a major policy consideration.

This failure to consider the major environmental threat from off-shore drilling illustrates a point I have made many times before: We cannot reasonably expect that people who profit from a program will give adequate consideration to the possible environmental dangers of the program. The demand for environmental safety and sanity will always come from the general public. Therefore, it is critically important that all governmental policy affecting the environment includes public hearings and participation as a mandatory part of the decisionmaking process.

At Santa Barbara, the Department of the Interior clearly evaded the environmental issue by proceeding with the leasing program in the channel without adequate hearings.

In a memorandum dated February 15, 1968, while the leases still were being discussed, an aide to the Assistant Secretary of Interior said:

The department should not go the public hearing route—that we had tried to warn the Los Angeles district engineer of the Corps of what he faced and we preferred not to stir the natives up any more than possible.

I say to you, Mr. President, and to the American people, it is time to begin listening to the natives. They are telling us that our values and priorities are out of whack, and that the disaster off the coast of Santa Barbara is the latest stunning example of our folly.

The Federal Government has a special and overriding responsibility to States and local communities.

Santa Barbarans historically have fought the development of oil onshore and offshore in the area.

Santa Barbara is one small city of 70,000 citizens who are proud of their community and their long record of preserving it against commercial depredation. The citizens see themselves now as the victims of an all-powerful Federal establishment against which they have no recourse.

Under our system of government there will continue to be clashes between the interests of one group or one community against the wishes and needs of all of the Federal system. But if our system is to be wholly effective and representative, the wishes of one State and one community must somehow be given proper consideration and weight.

I raise these points because the Nation is confronted with serious problems that involve our resources, our environment, and the clash of technology with the desires of our people.

For too long the interests of technology, industrial development, and exploitation of resources have been paramount over environmental interests.

The balance may already have tipped too far, if we are to believe the warnings of some scientists that our atmosphere already has been changed so radically that it may alter the climate, our polar icecaps, and, eventually, the depth and character of our oceans.

It is not too late to reverse the process of destruction and change at Santa Barbara and elsewhere.

The Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials, and Fuels, under the judicious and concerned leadership of its distinguished chairman, the Senator from Utah (Mr. Moss), is now considering an amended version of my bill, S. 1219, to ban drilling in the Santa Barbara channel. The amendments would suspend drilling temporarily and instruct the Secretary of the Interior to report to Congress on various environmental, legal, economic, and technical aspects of further drilling versus no further drilling.

To the oil-drenched swimmers of our California beaches, and to the angry and disillusioned property owners of the Santa Barbara coastline, such a temporary suspension would be viewed as a very small step toward ending the oil disaster.

Yet, I believe, such legislation would be a giant step for all of our Nation. Congress would in effect be declaring that environmental concerns in Santa Barbara are preeminent over the business-as-usual demands of our economy. Now, after 6 months of the oil leak below platform A, we cannot deceive ourselves that there is any other issue in the Santa Barbara channel.

#### MOVING EXPENSES OF EX-PRESIDENTS

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, an article entitled "Preserving L. B. J. Records Is Major Task," written by Robert Walters, and published in the Washington Evening Star of June 16, 1969, points out a series of unnecessary expenditures in connection with the transfer of the Presidential files from Washington to Texas.

We all recognize the responsibility of the Government to assist in moving ex-

penses of ex-Presidents, and there are certain necessary charges which are properly assumed by the taxpayers, but this article calls attention to what appears to be a series of unnecessary costs. There are a \$10,000 typewriter, a \$445 wastebasket, \$159 stapling machine, and a \$245 envelope opener to be used by \$100-a-day consultants who are assisting in writing the former President's memoirs which in turn will be sold. These appear to be uncalled for expenditures charged to the taxpayers.

In reviewing the history of this legislation, it is clear that the appropriations did not cover expenditures during the transition period beyond the 6-months period after the election. While I recognize that the Comptroller General has ruled otherwise, nevertheless I do not think his ruling can be supported by the law as passed by the Congress.

I ask unanimous consent that the article outlining this extravaganza be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AN OVAL ROOM IN TEXAS—PRESERVING L. B. J. RECORDS IS MAJOR TASK  
(By Robert Walters)

Former President Lyndon B. Johnson has carried to the central Texas hill country many of the accoutrements of the presidency, including a reproduction of the White House Oval Office.

Making full use of two relatively recent laws which authorize extraordinary retirement benefits for former presidents, Johnson has:

Acquired three separate Texas offices, with two others under construction, one of which will be part of a new \$440,000 federal building for his tiny (population 385) hometown of Johnson City.

Retained on the federal payroll as a \$100-a-day consultant Walt W. Rostow, former special assistant to the President for international security affairs.

Purchased with government funds more than \$200,000 worth of office equipment, including a \$10,000 IBM typewriter, almost \$6,000 worth of dictating and transcribing equipment and a \$445 Destroyit® waste basket which electrically shreds paper for security purposes.

Most of those expenditures are authorized under the 1964 Presidential Transition Act which provides for the payment of "transition" expenses to incoming and outgoing presidents.

The statute limits such payments to six months prior to inauguration day for the new President and six months after the inaugural for the retiring President.

However, the House Appropriations Committee, chaired by Rep. George H. Mahon, D-Tex., a longtime Johnson political ally, requested—and received on April 29—an "advisory opinion" from Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats extending from six months to 18 months the time in which Johnson can draw from the fund.

Under Staats' interpretation of the law, Johnson will be able to make purchases with "transition" funds until July 20, 1970. The period approved by Congress would have expired next month.

The General Accounting Office, which Staats heads, has acknowledged the existence of the unusual "advisory opinion," but has refused to make public a copy of the Staats letter or to explain the justification for changing the effective period of the law from six to 18 months.

The transition law authorizes the expenditure of a maximum of \$900,000, to be divided into equal \$450,000 portions between the

incoming and outgoing administrations. A total of \$75,000 is allocated for use by the vice president of each administration, leaving \$375,000 for each president.

Even after that law, providing for "the orderly transfer of executive responsibilities," becomes inapplicable to Johnson, he will qualify for the rest of his life for additional—but somewhat reduced—benefits under the 1958 Former Presidents Act.

That law authorizes the rental of "suitable office space, appropriately furnished and equipped," free mailing privileges and an annual allotment of \$80,000 for staff salaries, printing expenses, office supplies, communications equipment and similar expenses.

Under that statute, Johnson also will receive a \$25,000 yearly pension. In addition, he receives an annual pension, based on his own contributions, of about \$22,000 from Congress as the result of his service in the House and Senate.

Confidential documents prepared by officials of the General Services Administration show that only a few months after leaving office Johnson's employes and consultants were receiving \$454,981.

Included in that figure were \$28,000 yearly salaries for an executive assistant and two special assistants. The executive assistant is Wyatt T. (Tom) Johnson Jr., who served as deputy White House press secretary during the Johnson administration. He is not related to the former President.

The special assistants are Robert Hardesty and Harry Middleton, both former White House speech writers, now engaged in helping Johnson process his papers and write his memoirs.

Rostow, also aiding in that task, is on Johnson's government payroll as a \$100-a-day consultant working six days a week. He would thus receive \$28,800 annually, in addition to his salary as a member of the faculty at the University of Texas.

Yoichi R. Okamoto, the White House photographer who took thousands of pictures of Johnson during the White House days, also is carried on the Johnson payroll as a \$100-a-day government consultant, working a five-day week. His yearly salary on that basis would be \$24,000.

Most of the government-paid staff—funded separately from the transition and former president legislation—is formally assigned to the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, a \$12 million complex being constructed on the University of Texas campus in Austin. Informal planning for the library began in 1966, and construction got under way in 1967.

A total of 29 government employes have been assigned to the library, on loan from other agencies. Some are expected to return later to their permanent assignments. In addition, there is a transition staff of 14 persons.

The library complex, scheduled to be completed next April, includes:

A 100-seat auditorium, a 205-seat lecture hall, and archives designed to hold 8,000 filing cabinet drawers filled with Johnson papers as well as more than 500,000 photographs taken by Okamoto.

A 100,000-square-foot presidential library, larger than any similar facility, and a 20,000-square-foot museum to recapture the Johnson story from his earliest days in politics.

An oral history project which will include the tape-recorded recollections of 500 public figures, a large audio-visual collection of radio and television recordings, and a massive microfilming project involving the copying of more than 2 million pages of documents.

A School of Public Affairs at the university, administering a two-year master's degree program for 200 students as well as fellowships for prominent government officials and public figures.

Funds for those programs are being raised by the federal government, the university and private donors, but the bulk of the money is expected to come from Washington.

It is at the library that the reproduction of the Oval Office traditionally the President's principal working quarters in the West Wing of the White House—is being built directly under the 50-foot helicopter landing pad on the roof of the structure.

The military helicopter which will ferry Johnson into Austin from his ranch 65 miles northwest of the city is held for him on a standby basis at an Air Force base outside San Antonio. It is authorized under an agreement which calls for the Defense Department to provide transportation for persons receiving Secret Service protection—which Johnson also receives for the rest of his life.

A detail of approximately a dozen Secret Service agents is assigned to the LBJ Ranch, where Johnson also has the benefit of a 6,300-foot blacktop airstrip constructed during his presidential days by the Air Force.

Until Johnson's eighth-floor office in the library is completed next year, he will be working from a variety of other quarters. The most lavishly equipped is a teak-paneled suite on the top floor of the new 10-story federal office building in downtown Austin.

Johnson and aides occupy about 20 offices on the 10th floor. On the second floor, there is a mail room whose multi-lingual staff handles sacks of correspondence daily.

The confidential documents Johnson accumulated during his presidency are stored in offices on the top floor, while another 22 million pages of documents accumulated during his 38 years of political life are stored in a 13,000-square-foot room on the building's ground floor.

Of the \$208,400 worth of office equipment purchased for Johnson thus far, \$148,550 is intended for the Austin offices—in the federal building, the library, and the Commodore Perry and Driskill Hotels.

Included in that total are a \$10,155 IBM typewriter, two smaller models \$7,210 apiece, \$5,890 worth of dictating and transcribing equipment, the \$445 waste basket, a \$159 stapling machine and a \$245 envelope opener.

While waiting for completion of the new facilities, Johnson also has access to an office in the basement of the Johnson City Bank. The government, which pays the bank \$1 a year in rent, spent \$10,418 to refurbish the quarters for the former President's use and paid an additional \$59,850 for office equipment.

Those quarters will be abandoned when the government completes work on the \$440,000, two-story-air-conditioned federal building and post office for Johnson. Among its features is a fall-out shelter.

The federal government currently spends only \$1,860 a year to rent space occupied by both the Post Office and Agriculture Department in Johnson City, a small rural community whose principal industry is agriculture.

Last September, while Johnson was still in office, the government provided this justification for the new Johnson City federal building:

"The principal requirement for the building is to meet the growing needs of the postal service in the postal area served by the Johnson City post office, now located in inadequate leased facilities.

"In addition, the boyhood home of President Lyndon B. Johnson, located in the community, has been included in the National Register of Historic Places . . . The community thus attracts numerous visitors.

"It is appropriate, therefore, that federal activities serving the community and its environs be housed in a federal building which reflects the full dignity of its location."

#### OUR BEST DEFENSE IS PEACE

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, a nation's future rests on the experience of its citizens and the vision and goals of its youth. I cannot help wondering what

the vision of our youth will be considering the experiences we face today. A child growing up now sees a society where violence and war is an everyday occurrence. News films of Vietnam flash across the television screen as casually as the commercial for the latest toy—which also is an item of the war in miniature.

Rightfully so, average Americans are now vitally concerned and openly debate the relativity of our military weapons systems. The era of the sacrosanct military is ending. This is all to the good. But it is disturbing that the overkill grows; and unless positive actions are taken, such as disarmament agreements and a Soviet-United States detente in the arms race, this growth will proceed.

Add to the controversies surrounding our weapons systems chemical and biological warfare. The 1925 Geneva Protocol would prohibit first-strike with chemical and bacteriological weapons. Why cannot the Senate of the United States lend ratification to this agreement. It would commit us to development on a defensive basis. Our pledge to the world is not to use these agents as offensive weapons.

Mr. President, empty words and empty phrases make robots of a nation and leave us in a position of reaction only—not action. We must give credence to our words lest our children be left as robots only to react to the mistakes we make today. Our best defense is peace. And we must make every attempt to bring peace to the world to give credence to our national dialog and to leave dreams for our children.

#### A NEWSMAN RETIRES

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, there is something special about the newspaper profession in what it has given to this country and its importance to a democracy.

It is a profession that draws a special kind of man who spurns the normal monetary considerations that motivate other men and devotes himself to news-gathering and commenting on the issues of the day.

In Fond du Lac, Wis., the Commonwealth Reporter is losing one such man. Carl H. Keyser, its editor, and a veteran of 49 years in the newspaper profession, has retired.

It is sad that he is leaving, but Fond du Lac can be grateful that he gave so much. Hopefully he will find time in his retirement to write an occasional guest column or editorial for the paper.

Nothing I could say could be said better than the editorial published in the Commonwealth Reporter on July 7, 1969. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### AN EDITOR RETIRES

Carl H. Keyser retired Saturday as editor of the Fond du Lac Commonwealth Reporter. He was a man who disdained pretense.

He had no use for cluttered desks.

He wrote best about taxes and government and he drew on years of experience with city, county, state and federal prob-

blems—problems and issues which arose year after year, administration after administration—whether Democrats or Republicans were in office.

He disliked vacations or anything that kept him away from the flurry of events in the newsroom and the daily press run.

He felt comfortable with Republicans in office but he ripped into ineffective lawmakers regardless of their party.

He hit hard when he had to hit hard but he also could be gentle, and some of his best editorial writing described what he saw from the windows of his home on The Ledge . . . the first violets of spring, the first red leaves of autumn, deer tracks in the snow.

He had many friends at all levels of government. Early on election night last November when an entire editorial staff was straining to get the first report, an obscure township official got in touch with him to report Presidential totals and the news thus went winging into News Election Service headquarters, one of the first to be reported.

A decade ago when terrorists fired shots from the gallery of the House of Representatives in Washington, D.C., wounding several legislators, he got a call minutes later from Congressman William K. Van Pelt describing the scene.

He became so irked and irritated with the inefficiencies of three-man commission government, that he suggested in a series of editorials a change to the more modern council-manager form and within two years the City of Fond du Lac had a change in government.

He campaigned endlessly and tirelessly against the evils of the day as he saw them—Incompetent government officials, federal waste and debts, death on the highway, pollution of air and water, rising taxes and the little demagogues of officialdom.

Carl H. Keyser started work for the old Fond du Lac Reporter in 1920 and was only the second editor of the merged papers, the present Commonwealth Reporter. He did everything a newspaperman is required to do to learn his trade in almost a half century of work. He was a general assignment reporter, sports editor, city editor, telegraph editor, managing editor and editor.

When he started newspapering as a young man, Harold Lloyd was starring in a two-reel comedy at the Idea Theatre and adult ticket prices were 35 cents, prohibition was being debated at the Democratic national convention in San Francisco, the county fair was to feature "a grand salute to aerial guns and an opening salvo of six World War I signal rockets," and Mertz, Zabel and Klenow were the heroes of the Rueping baseball team.

In his 49 years with the Reporter Printing Co., Carl H. Keyser trained more than 150 men and women in news writing and editing. Among graduates of the Commonwealth Reporter editorial department today are three university professors, four editors of weekly newspapers, one of the state's top advertising agency executives, a physician, an Associated Press world services division writer, an AP bureau assistant manager, two managing editors, city editors and others in positions of responsibility in the newspaper business.

In the last month more than 40 former employes have written to their former boss and editor extending "best wishes" and congratulations on his 49 years with the Commonwealth Reporter.

Tom Masterson, for 30 years a top Associated Press foreign correspondent, put it well when he wrote to his former newsroom mentor: "Above all, your frequent admonition to write the story clearly and simply so the reader will understand it, served me well in writing about those complex happenings from countries far remote from the readers at home.

"Through it all—a civil war in China, riots

in Singapore, the complexities of international summit conferences in Paris and the Arab-Israeli conflicts—you don't forget your first city editor, not if he was of the caliber of a Carl H. Keyser."

A newsman could prize no compliment more highly.

#### THE ABM

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my remarks, titled "ABM: The Stakes," delivered to the Edward R. Morrow World Affairs Forum of the Overseas Press Club of New York on July 10, 1969, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### ABM: THE STAKES

With the opening of debate in the Senate, the "moment of truth" has arrived on the ABM issue. For, the ABM issue has acquired a symbolic importance beyond even the intrinsic questions involved. Its symbolic importance is twofold. First, the fate of the ABM is likely to determine the success or failure of the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) Talks now pending with the USSR; and second, if Safeguard is approved, it would establish a framework for U.S. policy that would place much heavier emphasis in terms of expenditure and national priority on military defense and security than on diplomatic and domestic considerations—including the grave crisis of the cities. That is why the stakes on this issue are so high.

The political coloration of the Nixon Administration's first term is in the making right now. The "Knowles Affair," the change in school desegregation guidelines, and the proposal to deploy Safeguard tend to come down heavily on the conservative side; while the expansion of food programs to cope with hunger and the impending decisions in the war on poverty, unemployment compensation and Federal underwriting of welfare standards come down on the liberal side. Thus, the decision on deployment of Safeguard stands out as a critical phase of the struggle for the soul of the Nixon Administration.

The decision on Safeguard represents not the "war" but rather an important "battle," which could have a decisive effect on how the Administration will go in terms of the future of our nation and the world. It is in this respect that I find it deeply regrettable that some advisors of the President have construed as political weakness the private efforts of Senate Republican moderates such as myself to reach a compromise on Safeguard. This compromise would involve deferring deployment for a year and is aimed at removing the issues of Presidential prestige and party loyalty from the difference of view over the ABM.

The future of arms limitation talks with the USSR is closely related to what happens in the ABM decision. If Safeguard wins, it will be much harder to bring about meaningful arms limitation. The die will have been cast for another step-up in the arms race and the Soviet Union will feel obligated to meet it. This does not mean that some lesser agreement would not be possible—as for example on prohibiting the use of the seabed for atomic weaponry—but a major arms limitations agreement will again have been put beyond practicability until both the Soviet Union and ourselves reappraise the new strategic situation in nuclear weapons created by the beginning of the Safeguard deployment. Thus, a major deficiency in the Administration's justification for the Safeguard ABM is the diplomatic deficiency.

Interestingly enough, neither our own nor the USSR negotiators seem to be sufficiently conscious of the likely blocking effect of the

ABM deployment on arms limitation discussions now scheduled to start this summer. I feel the world has a right to conclude that there is a vast difference between coming to the arms limitations discussions with the United States, through the Safeguard deployment, having its hands in the cookie jar as the Russians already have with MIRV and other nuclear weaponry—and a situation in which the United States comes to the negotiating table, having foregone an alleged negotiating advantage. Self-restraint of this nature for a limited time not endangering our security would escalate nuclear arms limitation to the high level on which it should rest and help toward reaching a stopping point in the arms race. There are only two players in the game, the United States and the Soviet Union, and we certainly ought to try to come to the nuclear arms limitation agreement before throwing another chip—estimated to cost at least \$8- to \$15-billion—on the table. These are the true implications of the ABM decision as I see them.

The routine attitude toward nuclear arms control and the SALT talks contained in Secretary Laird's testimony is clearly inadequate to these historic circumstances, in my judgment. The truly effective way to prevent a major escalation of the arms race and to nullify, through prevention, the development of threatening new Soviet weapons capabilities is by international agreement. Yet, in his discussion of possible U.S. reaction to Soviet weapons developments, Secretary Laird gave only *pro forma* attention to the prospects for an arms control agreement. He said:

"One possibility, of course, is an agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic armaments. I wholeheartedly support that objective, and we should do everything in our power to achieve a suitable agreement. But we must recognize that the issues involved are extremely complex and, even with the best of good will on both sides, it will be very difficult to work out an arrangement which truly safeguards the security of both sides."

From other remarks of Secretary Laird it seems that the Pentagon is determined to get the camel's nose under the tent with respect to the ABM. For instance, in describing ABM plans, Secretary Laird says: "How we would proceed from there would depend upon the outcome of the forthcoming talks with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitations . . ." He makes this more explicit in another place: "Thus, it is entirely possible that a Soviet-United States agreement on strategic arms limitations might provide for a limited ABM defense on both sides."

This view on ABM presented by Secretary Laird, together with the developments on MIRV testing, indicate that the Administration may believe that the U.S. and the USSR can both "MIRV" a little and "ABM" a little without getting swept up in the "action/reaction" cycle of a major new round of the arms race. In my judgment, any complacency on this score is dangerously misplaced.

The real questions in the ABM decision, therefore, are:

- (1) What is required by the security of the U.S. against strategic nuclear attack;
- (2) What will best contribute to the success of negotiations (SALT) with the USSR regarding nuclear arms limitation and control;
- (3) Does the expected technical capability of the Safeguard system really meet the tests set for its deployment;
- (4) Is the alternative of limited delay in deployment the wise course; or, is there a better alternative to Safeguard deployment.

The past successes of the Pentagon in selling weapons systems to Congress has rested heavily on the technological presentations. But something extraordinary has happened with respect to the ABM—both in its Sentinel and Safeguard forms. The technological

arguments put forward by the Pentagon have been systematically and relentlessly challenged by independent civilian scientific experts. This spontaneous "revolt" by the scientific community is unique in our post-war history.

I wish to pay my personal tribute here to the many eminent scientists who have voluntarily stepped forward to challenge and refute on technological grounds many of the claims and assertions of proponents of Safeguard and Sentinel. If Congress denies authority to deploy the Safeguard system this year, perhaps the single decisive factor in turning the tide of debate will have been the patriotic vigilance of our leading scientists who have just refused to permit Department of Defense and Administration technological appraisals to go unchallenged.

I do not propose to review in detail the technological arguments on this occasion. But, I have followed the arguments on both sides in some detail. In my judgment, the "Commentary on Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's May 22 Defense of Safeguard," written by three eminent scientific authorities—Drs. George Rathjens, Jerome Wiesner and Steven Weinberg—is a persuasive rebuttal to the case made by Secretary Laird. I agree with their conclusion:

"In a sense we may get the worst of all worlds with Safeguard: a poor defense of Minuteman; no significant defense of our cities; and yet because Safeguard uses the same components as Nike X and because the production lines for those components will have been established the Russians may react to our decision by expanding their offense just as if we were deploying a large scale defense for our population."

The most disturbing element of the case which Secretary Laird has been making for Safeguard is the deficient calibre and thrust of its basic, unstated intellectual concepts and assumptions. Also, controversy has developed concerning the national intelligence estimate of the Soviet missile threat—between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. The development of a credibility gap in this field could be a most dangerous precedent.

Pentagon testimony also strains credulity by attributing to the Soviet Union only the single-minded motive of an implacable will for conquest combined with a technological infallibility which our Department of Defense does not even claim for itself. Notably absent from this assumption regarding the USSR is any allowance for such considerations as the self-interest of Soviet civilians, including their demand for a better standard of living or the genuineness of their desire for peace.

When carried to extremes this sort of rigid thinking becomes contradictory and self-defeating. For instance, in one place Secretary Laird suggests that our Polaris submarine force will become vulnerable to Soviet weapons technology advances in the 1970's, and cites this as a reason why Safeguard is needed. But at another point he suggests that the USSR is planning to build a major fleet of Polaris-like submarines of its own—during the very years when he suggests that our superior version of the same weapons system may be unreliable—and he uses this hypothetical "threat" as another justification for Safeguard!

In my judgment, those responsible for preparing Secretary Laird's testimony on behalf of Safeguard have a view of the Soviet Union which is static and one-dimensional. As such it is dangerously inadequate to the judgments which must be made in the nuclear weapons field.

The complexities of weapons-systems design and war-gaming are onerously demanding in themselves and I do not blame the technicians who work in this field if work they have to on the basis of static and incomplete assumptions concerning the polit-

ical motivations and intentions of such a vast and enigmatic society as the Soviet Union. But for those who must make the final judgments on these life and death matters, it is not enough to accept without challenge the arbitrary assumptions of the war-gamers—to wit, that the adversary is free to pursue without restraint or distraction a single-minded drive for pre-emptive nuclear war capability, and that the U.S. response should be one of accumulating a limitless counter arsenal of military hardware. If the political authorities on both sides listen only to their war-game advisors there can be no brake on the nuclear arms race other than mutual bankruptcy—or worse.

In my judgment, any future Soviet decision to provoke a nuclear confrontation with the United States will stem as much from an adverse assessment of our national unity, will and morale as it will from an audit of warheads and megatonnage.

This hypothesis has direct pertinence to the question at hand because the ABM has become a symbol in the debate over national priorities. If the disaffected elements of our society—young rebels, anguished blacks, frustrated intellectuals, and the millions condemned to a deteriorating quality of life in our sprawling urban areas—are given to understand that technologically dubious military hardware is to have first claim on national resources, then we may well witness the kind of spiritual depression and national divisiveness which could tempt an adversary into thinking the U.S. could be faced down in a threatened nuclear confrontation. Conversely, I am confident that any potential aggressor would be deterred by the prospect of a revitalized and reunified America which was in the process of achieving breakthroughs on urban, racial and economic problems.

In reviewing the intellectual deficiencies of the Pentagon's justification for Safeguard, it is also necessary to comment on the strange revival of the "Chinese threat" argument. The President dismissed that argument in one of his earliest press conferences on the ABM issue, and on May 22, General Wheeler, appearing with Secretary Laird before the House Appropriations Committee said: "The principal feature of this Sentinel deployment upon which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reservations was its primary orientation against the Chicom ICBM threat."

Nonetheless, we find in Secretary Laird's testimony such extraordinary statements as: "Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that our ability to deter Communist China with our strategic offensive forces is considerably less certain than in the case of the Soviet Union."

The Secretary then proceeds to conjure the following frightening prospect:

"The President of the United States, no matter who he may be at the time, could find himself in an extremely difficult position in a serious confrontation with a Communist China armed with a force of even 25 relatively primitive ICBMs. Our cities would be hostage to the Chinese ICBM force, and the President would have no alternative but to back down or risk the destruction of several major cities and the death of millions of Americans."

Indeed, Secretary Laird's remarks about the Chinese suggest that the Pentagon has learned very little about Asia from the Vietnam war. For all its rhetoric, Peking has been very cautious militarily with respect to nuclear weapons and, with but a handful of missiles, any decision by Communist China to use them would be suicidal—and Peking would know this.

In my judgment, this kind of argument, designed to play upon deep fears of an alleged "Yellow Peril" is no more credible, or credible, than former Secretary Rusk's attempt to conjure up the frightening image of

"a billion Chinese on the Mainland, armed with nuclear weapons" as a rationale for the Vietnam War at a beleaguered moment when the earlier justifications had lost their credibility.

The present moment may well prove to be one of the most decisive in our history. The United States and the Soviet Union are poised on the brink of a major new escalation of the arms race, as both sides edge closer to deployment of a new generation of weapons systems which could upset the entire strategic "balance of terror" that has prevailed for the past decade.

All of our experience of the nuclear age argues that there can be no stopping halfway—once begun, the next round of the nuclear arms race will have to be played out to its logical conclusion. The dangerous strategic destabilization involved—and the staggering cost of the new weapons system—literally in the tens of billions—can bend the development of human society in truly nightmarish ways.

We have a chance now, using the pause of both sides on a stable strategic plateau, to assert rational human control over the arms race. It may be that the wit and will of man will prove inadequate to forging an effective agreement to control the terror of nuclear war. But surely we would be bitterly condemned by future generations if we do not at least try—if we do not make every effort now to break the "action/reaction" cycle through a negotiated nuclear arms control agreement.

#### THE PESTICIDE PERIL—XXXIII

Mr. NELSON, Mr. President, New York is one of the many States alarmed about the effect of DDT on fish and wildlife and is currently considering proposals to ban the use of this persistent, toxic pesticide.

The State division of fish and game is concerned that the DDT residue levels in lake trout in the State have increased significantly since the 1963 samplings of trout revealed an average of 5.6 parts per million of DDT residues—already 0.6 parts per million above the maximum amount permitted for fish in interstate commerce by the Federal Food and Drug Administration.

Also, in trout eggs taken from Lake George, the department reported "100 percent mortality in the young fry as early as the late 1950's," according to an article in the Ithaca Journal.

The department is expanding its sampling program so that by the end of this summer it should have a complete picture of the extent of pesticide pollution in the waters of New York State.

I ask unanimous consent that an article published in the Ithaca, N.Y., Journal of July 2, 1969, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### DDT RESIDUE LEVEL IN CAYUGA LAKE

(By Helen Mundell)

"I'm deadly sure the (DDT residue) level has gone up in lake trout from Cayuga Lake." William Bentley, assistant director of the State Division of Fish and Game in Albany, told the Journal this morning in an interview.

A 1963 analysis showed fish in Cayuga Lake had as much as .1 parts per million of DDT residue, which is more than the 5 ppm which the Federal Food and Drug Administration considers safe.

"We're pretty concerned with it, frankly," he added.

Bentley also said that the division has had "decreasing success in reproduction" of lake trout eggs taken from Cayuga and Seneca Lakes, because of the DDT residues in the eggs, although he declined to give a percentage.

Bentley said he had no data for DDT residue levels for Cayuga Lake trout for 1968 or 1969. Fish from last fall and this summer are being analyzed at the Rome Pollution Laboratory of the State Conservation Department, as part of an intensified pesticide identification program.

Pressed for data from earlier years, he said the department has some data, but he said the department has found errors in it. He refused to release it, saying:

"I don't like to give hazy or scare data."

He said some of the earlier data gives some "tremendous" levels, which he said he doesn't believe are correct.

"Within a relatively short time we'll have Cayuga Lake data," he said.

The last published data for Cayuga Lake was from fish collected in 1963 in the Taughannock area. It showed that of three trout, one contained 7.1 parts per million of DDT residue; a second contained 6.2 ppm and a third contained 3.6 ppm, for an average of 5.6.

The federal Food and Drug Administration has set five ppm as the maximum amount permitted for fish in interstate commerce. Fish with more than that amount are seized and destroyed.

Bentley said that of three fish caught in 1968 in Lake George one had 143 ppm of DDT residue, a second had 118 ppm and third had 41 ppm. The largest amount of DDT was found in the largest, oldest fish, he said, as DDT builds up year-after-year as the trout feed on smaller fish containing DDT.

In trout eggs taken from Lake George, he said the department had had up to 100 per cent mortality in the young fry as early as the late 1950s.

Bentley said the eggs hatch normally, but after they hatch the young fish live on the yolk sac attached to their bellies for up to 30 days. DDT is concentrated in the fat in the egg yolk and just as the young fish is ready to begin feeding, it absorbs the DDT in a massive enough dose to be lethal.

The same things now happening with eggs taken from Cayuga and Seneca Lakes, he indicated.

He considers the lack of success in reproducing trout to be very significant, not only to trout fishermen but to everyone, because it is an indicator of what DDT is doing to "our total environment."

Because of the department's concern with pesticide pollution, it has expanded its sampling program from 12 lakes to 100. During the summer it expects to analyze at least three fish from each of at least six species from the 100 lakes, including Cayuga.

"We expect to go on a two-shift basis" in analyzing the samples, Bentley said.

"By the end of the summer we'll have a pretty good picture from throughout the state," he concluded.

#### AMERICAN BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Mr. MURPHY, Mr. President, too often these days we hear those who are ever anxious to criticize the United States, speaking of American business "exploitation" in foreign countries. We hear far too little of the progressive and constructive advances which our businessmen have made possible through their operations in foreign lands.

There are many shining examples of

companies which have introduced their products in Latin American countries utilizing a policy of local ownership. In such instances these countries have received great benefits from the standpoint of financial gains, employment, and general all-round better economic conditions.

Donald M. Kendall, the dynamic president and chief executive officer of PepsiCo., Inc., has constantly insisted upon such policies in administering the companies under his supervision. Pepsi-Cola is a good example. Mr. Kendall, recently named by President Nixon as head of the National Alliance of Businessmen, came to this job well prepared by his broad background in business and international affairs. It is not surprising that he would administer the affairs of PepsiCo., Inc., with policies that benefit mankind as a whole.

Considering the above, I thought that Senators would be interested in reading the detailed and well-researched article by the prominent Latin American writer of the Evening Star, Jeremiah O'Leary, dated July 15, 1969, in the business section of this newspaper. The article, entitled "U.S. Companies Find Policy of Local Ownership Is Best," concerns Mr. Kendall's excellent work in carrying out such policies. I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### U.S. COMPANIES FIND POLICY OF LOCAL OWNERSHIP IS BEST (By Jeremiah O'Leary)

Nothing is more irritating to Latin American governments and peoples than the real or imagined spectre of a giant United States corporation extracting the national riches, drawing down enormous profits and generally functioning as if the locals were colonials.

The syndrome has caused, and still does, seriously strained governmental relations, expropriations with or without compensation and violence. The unfortunate collision of interest has affected fruit companies, mining firms, communications companies and oil interests.

When there is trouble it can range from a few broken windows at the U.S. company offices to the burning of department stores. Few Latin countries have not experienced the turmoil aroused by the symbolism of a powerful American company amid the grinding poverty that is the lot of a majority of Latin Americans today.

In this framework of company-government-people relationships, Pepsi-Cola has offered an example for nearly 35 years of the fact that local ownership can benefit Latin and North America alike and that multinational business practices can make both social and commercial contributions of importance.

#### OUTLOOK EXPLAINED

Donald M. Kendall, president and chief executive officer of PepsiCo., described the firm's philosophy this way: "We found out in the U.S. a long time ago that a local bottler, well known in his community and an integral part of it, made a lot more sense than absentee ownership. The same concept holds true in Latin America where for many years we have made the products and the personnel as indigenous as possible and the companies are not merely an extension of a North American business.

"Around the world, we are in 115 countries with 44 different languages and dialects. The only reference to the parent com-

pany is in the trademark. Only nine of 151 plants in 29 countries and territories in Latin America are company-owned. In all the others, the operation is locally-owned and controlled in all cases by nationals of the respective companies. These operations are totally autonomous and PepsiCo., exercises control only over product quality and trademarks."

Kendall said Pepsi-Cola plants now represent an investment in Latin America of more than \$160 million, employing 23,000 individuals in all categories and earning approximately \$36 million. The annual retail value of Pepsi-Cola products sold through 650,000 outlets in Latin America is more than \$250 million. He said PepsiCo gives direct employment to 2,800 people in Latin America and only 14 of these are North Americans. Worldwide, there are 10,000 direct employes and only 35 Americans among them.

Nearly everything except the working of the formula for the soft-drink originates in the country where the product is made. The essence or concentrates, the sugar, the cases, the glass for bottles are all supplied from within Latin America—not shipped in from the United States. Kendall said the annual value of the raw materials involved in bottling and distribution is \$100 million and all is purchased in the local economy.

The contribution by the 151 operations to government revenues is estimated to be \$25 million in the form of income and sales taxes yearly. Related services such as advertising, travel, freight and insurance comes to \$22 million.

The company owns and operates concentrate manufacturing plants in Mexico, Puerto Rico, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia and Chile as well as food plants in Mexico and Venezuela.

Pepsi-Cola emigrated to Latin America in 1935 when a bottling plant was opened in Havana. The company expanded rapidly in Latin America through local investors under the franchise system. During the 23 years from 1945 to 1968, the number of bottlers in the Latin American and Caribbean region increased from 23 to 151 existing today. Company officials point out that in much of Latin America soft-drinks have a nutritional value as well as the accepted refreshment concept of the U.S. The company's president for Latin operations today is a Mexican; his predecessor was an Argentine.

Kendall and the parent company are convinced they have a corporate commitment to community development programs. The company was a charter supporter of Accion, a private self-help program similar to the Peace Corps. Kendall was formerly president and is now chairman of the board.

#### JANESVILLE GAZETTE ENDORSES DDT BAN

Mr. NELSON, Mr. President, the Janesville, Wis., Gazette is joining the effort to inform the public of the dangers to our environment and to human health from the continued use of DDT through editorials endorsing proposals for a ban on this particular pesticide.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the Gazette's July 23 editorial commending the Wisconsin State Assembly for the passage of a bill to ban the sale, use, and distribution of DDT in Wisconsin.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### ASSEMBLY DOES A GOOD JOB

The Wisconsin Assembly showed it is in tune with public thinking last week when it

voted 99-0 to ban the sale, use and distribution of DDT in this state. The bill now goes to the Senate, which we hope will display a similar public consciousness and join the Assembly in banning the persistent pesticide.

As passed by the Assembly, the bill provides that DDT may be used only when an emergency board decrees that it is needed to combat "an outbreak of plant diseases of epidemic proportion" or the outbreak of an "epidemic disease of humans spread by insects which can only be controlled by DDT." That makes the ban pretty complete, and that's the way the Senate should leave it.

The lion's share of the credit for passage of the bill goes to Assemblyman Lew Mittness of Janesville, who is the bill's chief author and main sponsor.

When Mittness first introduced the bill, its chances for passage appeared slim. But hearings in Madison, coupled with alarming reports on fish and bird deaths caused by DDT, mobilized public opinion against the pesticide. The outcry became so widespread that legislators realized it was in their political interest to support the DDT ban.

Mittness, along with the bill's other supporters in the Assembly, pressed hard to get the measure out of committee. They also were instrumental in beating down several attempts to weaken the bill with amendments and steered it to successful passage.

Mittness, who was delighted by the unanimous passage of the DDT ban in the Assembly, pledged to use his influence for the measure in the Senate. "I'm going to talk to some of the senators," he said. The Janesville assemblyman said he thinks the 99-0 vote in the Assembly will induce the Senate to act favorably on the measure.

We hope Mittness is right, because Wisconsin sorely needs a ban on pesticides like DDT that are killing our fish and wildlife at an alarming rate. While the DDT ban bill does not extend to other pesticides, it is an important beginning because DDT is one of the most popular and one of the cheapest pesticides on the market.

Michigan already has banned the sale of DDT and other states are expected to follow. Let us hope that Wisconsin is one of the first to join in.

#### THE OLD FRONTIER STILL LIVES

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, the New York Times carried an interesting article about the State of Wyoming, its past and its present.

Wyoming is proud of her past. It was our ancestors who had the desire, the courage, and the strength to settle the wild, unsettled frontier. They fought against almost insurmountable odds, found in themselves the qualities necessary to settle, develop and stay in Wyoming. They battled Indians, produced the farms and ranches, and used them to provide a way of life for their families. They set the stage for the present. We are proud of our past.

We are proud of our present. Wyoming provides the beauty, the people, and an opportunity that is hard to find. Wyoming's citizens are the "now" people, the people who grow with the times. Their kindness and friendliness, throughout the State, is the topic of discussion for a number of our visitors. We have a real interest in tourists and in helping folks. It is a fine trait and motivates people to return again and again.

We are proud of our future. Now industry and growth is what they seek. The industry, the growing economy, the op-

portunity raising its head, and the youth are the factors. The fervor of our youth is symbolized in the Casper Troopers. The space of our land, the peaks of our mountains, the green of our forests, and the recreation we provide draws the tourists. All of these factors, coupled with the people—our very real power—helps point up that our opportunities are unlimited.

I ask unanimous consent that the article from the New York Times be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### WYOMING IN THE SPACE AGE: THE OLD FRONTIER STILL LIVES (By Martin Arnold)

CASPER, WYO.—North from the hills, black with Ponderosa pine, the plains stretch out as far as the eye can see, barren of all but the sun-dried sagebrush tumbling in the wind. This is a land that appears as serene and as orderly as the hills and steppes where 75 years ago there were badmen and later in the early 1900's, fortunes were made overnight in oil, and shootings to protect claims were not uncommon.

There remains a quality of the frontier about this city of 40,000. While people in the urban centers to the east and west are wrestling with the problems of housing and welfare, of muggings and demonstrations, Casper, several generations after the Indians and badmen, still has its feuds between the ranchers and the prospectors, still concerns itself with the problems of people who live for such basics as shelter and water.

Now in July, when the cattle and sheep have been driven to pasture high in the cool mountains 100 miles away, the plain is mostly yellow and brown, although here and there it is suddenly purple beneath a cloud or white where the wind is stirring a sand mound.

The big sky is desolate as the sea, but its blue is lighter, clear, with a trace of pink. And the big sky is still, as if, like the plain below, it had been scorched by the sun.

But if you stand on the top of the hills and look down you see a tight mass of steel and concrete, of wood and stone and brick, of pipes and wires and poles, of roads and highways. Casper is imposed upon the plain's edge, where once the Cheyenne, the Arapahoe, the Comanche, the Black Foot and Sioux roamed even before the Oregon Trail passed this way bringing, first, the pioneers headed westward and then the fur trappers and the cattle up from Texas.

Casper does not strike out boldly into the emptiness around it. It inches out timidly, street by street. In the midst of hundreds of thousands of acres, its houses, in architecture similar to those in any New York City suburb, are strung together as close as beads on an Indian embroidery. "It's the covered wagon complex. We all want to be together," a resident said. "Maybe it's to protect ourselves from the weather."

The automobile stickers say, "Wyoming: Oil Is Our Bread and Butter." Oil was first drilled in the state in 1888 three miles northwest of Casper—and ever since, the city has been a "boom and bust" town.

It brags of its economic vitality, but the picture is somewhat misleading. Up to five years ago, 50 major oil companies had administrative offices in the city, but now most have pulled out, leaving behind only a small number of field workers. Mobil Oil moved 150 families several years ago. That was a severe blow, and the immediate effect was the closing down of half the shops in one of the state's largest shopping centers.

Many young people are leaving. Fred Goodstein, who arrived here 46 years ago as a junk

dealer and who made millions in oil, says, "If we can make Casper College a four year college and then get a graduate school we can hold some of our youth. But there's no substitute for smokestack industry and unless we can get a larger labor force we wouldn't have that."

The lustiness that the city has comes not from the life-style of its natives, who are conservative people, but from its oil families, who are transients, moving on to new oil areas every few years.

Still, the plains immediately around the city are largely cattle and sheep land, and the Old West's earlier war between the ranchers and the homesteaders is now between the ranchers and the mineral prospectors. Walter J. Reynolds, a rancher, complains that there are "hundreds of unplugged drill holes" on his land and that because of claim jumping many portions of his ranch have been staked and drilled for claim validation three times.

In recent years, there has been an invasion of uranium prospectors, a secretive bunch. Howard Arnett, president of the Wyoming Mining Association, said, "It's a favorite Western plot. A guy goes out on the plains in his black hat and then rushes back and files his claim. Thousands of uranium claims are filed every month in the courthouses."

"When a man sitting at a switchboard in Kansas City can start a well pumping here, you can see that the city has to change from oil to mining to keep going," Mr. Arnett said.

It is the frontier in many ways. The people of Casper wear cowboy boots and ten-gallon hats and have front lawns that are decorated with wagon wheels. Horses often graze in their small backyards, and the city's business streets, although paved, are wide enough to allow the old freight wagons pulled by 22-horse teams to make U-turns.

One of the first things visitors are told about is the Casper Troopers, a drum and bugle corps composed of local men and women, who have traveled around the world winning international and national drum and bugle contests.

Old timers are proud of Goose Egg and Medicine Bow, just to the southwest and south, where Owen Wister's Virginian fell in love with Molly Wood, the Bear Creek schoolteacher, and feuded with Trampus, the range bully. They brag of Caspar Collins, who was killed July 26, 1865, when his horse panicked as he went to rescue a fallen trooper and carried him into a horde of oncoming Indians. An Army clerk misspelled his first name, and the city became Casper rather than Caspar, although the old fort, reconstructed at the bend of the North Platte River, a few miles out of town, is correctly Fort Caspar.

The Old West exists, however, in deeper ways. To a startling degree, the law of the sheriff prevails in Casper. Partly this is because of the national concern with law and order. Mainly, it's a deep-grained tradition, that the sheriff of the police are ever on the alert to keep out the badmen who drift in from the plains.

Maybe in 1969 it's just a motorcycle gang. Robin Axlund, 18, who had set up a fireworks stand at the edge of the city, said, "It's bad news on the plains, with everything so flat and dry and lonely. I told the sheriff the motorcycle gang was trying to get my fireworks. He told me to sleep out here with a gun and shoot them. I've got my gun now."

The lawmen are tough. Their cruisers follow the cars of strangers and some residents at night, and a simple question asked by a stranger brings, often, a surly answer. James W. Fagan, 41, an iconoclastic criminal lawyer, who used to work for Senator Gale McGee, says, "After 100 years of the Constitution, it doesn't matter out here what the Supreme Court says. It's irrelevant. The attitude of the county attorneys is that our state courts will uphold anything they do."

The North Platte River, near the site where Brigham Young built a ferry in 1847, flows around and into Casper, and the city likes to boast that it is the only river in the country once polluted but now clean, the entire cost of the cleanup having been done by the Standard Oil Company.

The river intrudes into the city in an area called the Sand Bar, several blocks from the main business section, where Casper's blacks—estimates range from 500 to 1,500—live in dilapidated one-story wooden shacks, most of which used to be brothels. Several of the shacks are still brothels, run by the blacks for a white clientele.

As far as white Casper is concerned there is no black problem. Blacks work as janitors and the Sand Bar will be replaced by a reluctantly accepted urban renewal project.

A polygot of Irishmen and Baptists, of Jews and Mormons, with a handful of Lebanese thrown in, the city has 49 churches and one synagogue. Casper is proud that there is no racial tension. The blacks are on the Sand Bar and the Indians are on a reservation, 100 miles to the west.

"Our children know when they get out of school there'll be some jobs for the white kids, but none for the black kids," the black proprietor of a brothel said. "Black kids have no money in their pockets to circulate, so most of them leave town."

"It's a happy city," said A. Deryl Safford, a certified public accountant. "I've moved away six times and have come back. It's a friendly, compassionate, helpful city. There's no such thing as a stranger."

#### DELPHIAN STUDY CLUB OF PADUCAH, TEX., URGES ESTABLISHMENT OF 100,000-ACRE BIG THICKET NATIONAL PARK

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, the Delphian Study Club of Paducah, Tex., has recently adopted a resolution urging the establishment of a 100,000-acre Big Thicket National Park in southeast Texas, as provided in my bill S. 4.

The Big Thicket has long been a paradise for the hunter. In spite of long abuse, small game still abounds. Alligators forage along the sluggish bayous; America's four varieties of poisonous snakes can be found in the dense brush; wild cats, foxes, raccoons, squirrels and opossum abound; and the deep woods still produce an abundant crop of white-tailed deer.

However, the big game and unusual animals face extinction. Jaguars and ocelots, which were once found within the Thicket have not been seen for many years. Local hunters heatedly dispute whether or not a few bears and panthers still roam the remote swamps. But, as these remote areas disappear, this dispute becomes increasingly pointless.

This beautiful and unique area with its rich and diverse plant and animal life is disappearing at a rate of 50 acres per day. It has already been reduced from its original size of 3.5 million acres to about 300,000 acres. We must act now if we are to save this invaluable resource.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution adopted by the Delphian Study Club of Paducah, Tex., be printed in its entirety, including the name of its signer, at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Whereas, the Big Thicket of Texas is a meeting place for eastern, western and northern ecological elements; and

Whereas, this is the last stand in Texas of the nearly extinct Ivory-billed Woodpecker; and

Whereas, this beautiful and unique area is rapidly being destroyed by bulldozer and chain saw; therefore

Be it resolved that the Delphian Study Club of Paducah, Texas urges the preservation of at least 100,000 acres containing the most unique areas of the Big Thicket, these areas to be connected by environmental corridors; and

Be it further resolved that the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee of the Senate of the United States be requested to set immediate hearings on S4 which would create a Big Thicket National Area.

NELDA H. TYLER,  
(Mrs. R. H.).  
President.

#### THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, from time to time Senators have expressed interest about the present membership and structure of the Joint Economic Committee. I should like to discuss our present organization and membership, particularly since our chairmanship rotates every Congress and also because we have added two new members in this session.

As presently constituted, the committee is made up of 20 members, 10 from each House. Our chairman during this 91st Congress is the distinguished chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee, Hon. WRIGHT PATMAN, of Texas, an excellent legislator and a dedicated public servant. It has been a pleasure and honor for me to work with him over the years. Mr. PATMAN was the floor manager of the original Employment Act at the end of World War II, and he has been steadfastly devoted to the great objectives of this act ever since. More than anyone in either House, he has served as a guiding spirit of the committee.

During the 90th Congress, it was my honor to serve as chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, and at the present time I am the vice chairman and the chairman of the committee's Subcommittee on Economy in Government.

The Subcommittee on Economy in Government has been making prolonged and extensive inquiry into national priorities and defense spending and I am most grateful to my associates on that subcommittee for their steadfast participation and support.

Chairman PATMAN heads the distinguished Subcommittee on Economic Progress, which over the years has contributed so much to our knowledge of economic growth, automation, and public investment. There are six other subcommittees covering Urban Affairs, Inter-American Economic Relationships, Foreign Economic Policy, Economic Statistics, International Exchange and Payments, and Fiscal Policy.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a complete listing of our subcommittees and their members.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE 91ST CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES— JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
Wright Patman, Texas, *Chairman*.  
Richard Bolling, Missouri.  
Hale Boggs, Louisiana.  
Henry S. Reuss, Wisconsin.  
Martha W. Griffiths, Michigan.  
William S. Moorhead, Pennsylvania.  
William B. Widnall, New Jersey.  
W. E. Brock 3d, Tennessee.  
Barber B. Conable, Jr., New York.  
Clarence J. Brown, Ohio.

SENATE  
William Proxmire, Wisconsin, *Vice Chairman*.

John Sparkman, Alabama.  
J. W. Fulbright, Arkansas.  
Herman E. Talmadge, Georgia.  
Stuart Symington, Missouri.  
Abraham Ribicoff, Connecticut.  
Jacob K. Javits, New York.  
Jack Miller, Iowa.  
Len B. Jordan, Idaho.  
Charles H. Percy, Illinois.

#### Committee staff

John R. Stark, *Executive Director*.  
James W. Knowles, *Director of Research*.  
*Economist:* Robert H. Haveman, Richard F. Kaufman, Loughlin F. McHugh, George D. Krumbhaar, (Minority), John R. Karlik, Frazier Kellogg, Douglas C. Frechtling (Minority).

*Administrative:* Esther S. Hickey, Hamilton D. Gewehr.

New Senate Office Building, G-133, Washington, D.C., 20510, Telephone: (202) 225-5171, Government Code: 180.

#### SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP Economic Progress

*Representatives:* Wright Patman, *Chairman*; Martha W. Griffiths, William S. Moorhead, W. E. Brock 3d, Clarence J. Brown.  
*Senators:* William Proxmire, J. W. Fulbright, Herman E. Talmadge, Len B. Jordan, Charles H. Percy.

#### Economy in Government

*Senators:* William Proxmire, *Chairman*; John Sparkman, Stuart Symington, Len B. Jordan, Charles H. Percy.  
*Representatives:* Wright Patman, Martha W. Griffiths, William S. Moorhead, Barber B. Conable, Jr., Clarence J. Brown.

#### Urban Affairs

*Representatives:* Richard Bolling, *Chairman*; Henry S. Reuss, Martha W. Griffiths, William S. Moorhead, William B. Widnall, W. E. Brock 3d, Clarence J. Brown.  
*Senators:* Abraham Ribicoff, William Proxmire, Jacob K. Javits, Charles H. Percy.

#### Inter-American Economic Relationships

*Senators:* John Sparkman, *Chairman*; J. W. Fulbright, Abraham Ribicoff, Jacob K. Javits, Len B. Jordan.  
*Representatives:* Richard Bolling, Hale Boggs, Martha W. Griffiths, Barber B. Conable, Jr., Clarence J. Brown.

#### Foreign Economic Policy

*Representatives:* Hale Boggs, *Chairman*; Henry S. Reuss; William S. Moorhead; William B. Widnall; W. E. Brock 3d; Barber B. Conable, Jr.  
*Senators:* John Sparkman, J. W. Fulbright, Herman E. Talmadge, Stuart Symington, Abraham Ribicoff, Jacob K. Javits, Jack Miller.

#### Economic Statistics

*Senators:* Herman E. Talmadge, *Chairman*; J. W. Fulbright; Jack Miller.  
*Representatives:* Richard Bolling, Martha W. Griffiths, Barber B. Conable, Jr., Clarence J. Brown.

*International Exchange and Payments*  
*Representatives:* Henry S. Reuss, *Chairman*; Richard Bolling; Hale Boggs; William

S. Moorhead; William B. Widnall; W. E. Brock 3d.

Senators: William Proxmire, Stuart Symington, Jacob K. Javits, Charles H. Percy.

*Fiscal Policy*

Representatives: Martha W. Griffiths, Chairman; Hale Boggs; William S. Moorhead; William B. Widnall; Barber B. Conable, Jr.  
Senators: William Proxmire, Herman E. Talmadge, Stuart Symington, Jacob K. Javits, Jack Miller, Charles H. Percy.

**ESCALATING COSTS OF MEDICARE AND MEDICAID**

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, Congress has been concerned over the escalating costs of both the medicare and the medicaid programs, and the Finance Committee has been conducting a study to determine the basis of this escalation.

One point called to our attention was the manner in which nursing homes were having their cost basis substantially increased by changing hands at inflated figures or through reappraisals.

The increases resulting from this upward reevaluation feeds through in higher per bed and diem costs for medicare and medicaid patients.

A few weeks ago I visited the Department's Baltimore offices, and we discussed this point further, at which time specific cases were selected for more detailed examination.

I have just received a report from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare with the results of one of these cases which was selected for reauditing, and I ask unanimous consent that the report from Mr. Thomas M. Tierney, Director of the Bureau of Health Insurance, dated July 22, 1969, relating to this case be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

This nursing home selected was a 48-bed institution, and as this report will indicate, its established book value was \$342,020 with a per bed cost of \$7,125.

This home was reappraised and given a new appraisal cost basis of \$586,541, or an increase of 70 percent, with the result that the per bed cost was increased from the old basis of \$7,125 to \$12,220, or a corresponding increase of 70 percent.

It is significant to note that according to Mr. Tierney's report the intermediaries had approved without question this upward appraisal as the basis for determining increased medicare costs, and it is further significant that HEW, with all of its audit force in Baltimore, had not discovered this discrepancy nor placed any objection to this higher determination until after it had been selected as a sample case.

The Department now confirms that this does represent an overcharge and advises that the intermediary has been instructed to reexamine the rate schedule and make the necessary adjustments recognizing the lower cost basis.

The most disturbing point, however, is the apparent lack of concern that we find in this Department in not having

examined these cost factors prior to congressional action.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a letter from Thomas M. Tierney, Director of the Bureau of Health Insurance, and an enclosure.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION.

Baltimore, Md., July 22, 1969.

HON. JOHN WILLIAMS,  
Senate Finance Committee,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: We have now compiled the information you requested regarding the — Nursing Home in New York. I am enclosing copies of the institution's balance sheet, the auditor's work papers and the appraisal reports.

The appraisal report has apparently been prepared by a recognized and reputable appraisal firm. While we are not in a position to make an expert evaluation of the appraisal itself, we do have difficulty comprehending the large differences between the recorded capitalized costs of assets owned by this proprietary provider and the valuation determined as a result of the appraisal. For this 48-bed institution, the per bed cost is as follows:

Book value, \$342,020; per bed cost, \$7,125.  
Appraisal cost, \$586,541; per bed cost, \$12,220.

The appraisal was initially agreed to by the Hamilton Life Insurance Company which was then intermediary for this extended care facility. When Hamilton Life was terminated as intermediary and Travelers took over responsibility for the former's providers, it simply went along with the initial decision by Hamilton Life. Presumably, the provider's basis for requesting the appraisal was that its property records did not adequately reflect the cost of the facility.

Our position on this issue, which we have communicated to Travelers, is that since this is a proprietary provider and undoubtedly files tax returns, its tax returns should be used to establish the cost basis for its assets. The result is that although the appraisal reflects a substantially greater cost basis for assets of the — Nursing Home, it will not be recognized for purposes of Medicare reimbursement. Instead, the intermediary has been instructed to reverse the entry, recognize the cost basis shown for Federal tax purposes and make the necessary adjustments.

Sincerely yours,

THOMAS M. TIERNEY,  
Director, Bureau of Health Insurance.

**REPORT ON INCREASE IN DEPRECIABLE BASES OF ASSETS — NURSING HOME, —, N.Y.**

The balance sheet for the reporting period ended December 31, 1967, (copy enclosed) reflects a substantial increase in the depreciable base of the prover's fixed assets. This increase was the result of an appraisal of the historical cost of the assets (copy of appraisal report enclosed). The appraisal was requested by the provider and approval granted by the intermediary on July 12, 1968, (copy of approval letter enclosed). The appraisal was approved by the intermediary because the provider apparently did not have adequate evidence to support the historical cost of the assets.

The effects of the appraisal on the basis of the provider's assets are as follows:

Increase in Asset Values:

	Value before appraisal	Value after appraisal	Change
Land	\$6,340	\$18,000	\$11,660
Buildings	342,020	586,541	244,521
Major movable equipment	80,923	86,683	5,760
Subtotal	429,283	691,224	261,941
Accumulated depreciation	(73,707)	(122,908)	(49,201)
Book value	355,576	568,316	212,740

**RURAL HOUSING—NEED AND NON-RESPONSE**

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, last month the first National Rural Housing Conference was held at Airle House, in Warrenton, Va. The distinguished junior Senator from South Dakota (Mr. McGOVERN) was the keynote speaker. It is my understanding that the report of that conference will be available in published form in the next few weeks.

It is a commentary that this, the first national conference on rural housing, received so little attention in the press. The fact is, as is known, but seldom acted upon, that the rural areas and small towns of America contain more bad housing than the urban areas—not only in proportion to population but in flat numbers. Yet our national attention tends to focus on the urban areas and to neglect rural and smalltown needs. Certainly our Federal programs have largely overlooked the larger needs for the more concentrated ones.

How much attention, for example, are we giving to one rural group—the Indians—who are the worst-housed single group in the Nation? For Indians living on reservations, the incidence of indecent housing is not 1 in 10, as it is for the Nation as a whole, or even 1 in 2, as it is for the general population of those below the poverty line; it is 2 out of 3. In fact, if one considers the crowding aspect of housing, it is probable that 3 out of 4 families on reservations live in inadequate housing.

How much attention do we pay to the fact that incomes are lower but the costs of adequate housing higher in rural areas and small towns? Thus, while the average income of people living outside metropolitan areas is more than one fifth lower than people living in metropolitan areas, the Kaiser Committee found that a family outside a metropolitan area required as much as one third more income to secure adequate housing.

Surely it is time that we gave the housing needs of our rural areas and small towns at least as much attention and as much in the way of assistance for low-income housing as we do our great metropolitan areas. I hope that the work of the National Rural Housing Conference and the actions it took will mark the beginning of a real effort to correct this long and shameful neglect and the imbalance which has been its result. Specifically, I invite the attention of Senators to a background paper that was prepared for that conference by George Rucker, of the staff of the Rural Housing Alliance. It attempts to bring together some of the available information

on housing needs—past, present, and future—in rural America; and to compare the size of the need with the magnitude of our present efforts to do something about them. I would note that Dr. Rucker thinks that the official goal, in terms of assisted housing, adopted by Congress last year, is far too modest. Whether or not we agree in detail with this and other conclusions reached in his paper, I think that it makes both informative and stimulating reading. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the major portion of the paper, which is aptly titled "Rural Housing—Need and Non-Response." I have taken the liberty of leaving out some of the more detailed statistical tables and the various footnotes indicating his specific page references to other sources, since most of these are indicated in the body of the paper, at least in a general way.

There being no objection, the paper was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### RURAL HOUSING—NEED AND NON-RESPONSE

In 1949, when the Congress declared as a national objective, "the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family," more than one out of every three households was occupying a substandard unit. In rural America the proportion was more than one out of every two, and (depending on your definition of "rural"), 60 to 80 percent of the nation's substandard housing was to be found in those sections of the country. This paper represents an effort, utilizing a broad definition of rural and small town, to assess the situation as the 1960's end—to estimate the housing needs that exist and can be expected to develop during the decade ahead, to take cognizance of the Federal programs which are intended to meet those needs, and to attempt some indication of the degree to which they can be expected to do so.

First, some matters of definition need to be dealt with. The Census Bureau defines as "rural" all farms, and all non-farm places with populations of less than 2,500. The Congress, in defining the jurisdiction of its major rural credit agency, the Farmers Home Administration, has recognized that this Census definition is too restrictive and authorized the agency to serve places which are "rural in character" and do not exceed a population of 5,500. It is the contention of this paper that a more realistic division of the American society into "urban" and "rural" would set the dividing line still elsewhere by including in the latter category those communities of less than 25,000 population which are not part of a metropolitan area. (The Census Bureau in fact recognizes a division akin to this in its concept of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas—SMSA's. These are counties or groups of counties which are contiguous in character and include at least one "central city" with a population of 50,000 or more.) Thus, rural areas and small towns (R & ST) is defined in this paper as the combination of what the Census Bureau considers "rural" and other communities with populations of 2,500 to 25,000 which are outside of SMSA's.

Similarly, various definitions of substandard housing are available. In its 1960 Census of Housing, the Census Bureau attempted to classify units as "sound," "deteriorating," and "dilapidated," as well as noting the presence or absence of adequate plumbing facilities in the first two of these categories. This presented problems of comparability with earlier data, though, and most analysts have

used a standard/substandard division in which the latter term is applied to units which are dilapidated and/or lack adequate plumbing facilities. This paper follows their lead, though recognizing that some understatement of housing needs probably results. In part, this has been offset by adding to "needs" those standard units which are overcrowded (i.e., occupied by more than one person per room).

Data on the quality of occupied housing as reported in the 1950 and 1960 Censuses of Housing are presented in Table 1, together with estimates of what next year's Census can be expected to find. What is initially most striking about the figures is the apparent substantial reduction in substandard housing over the two decades. It should be noted, however, that this stems primarily from the change in the number of units with inadequate plumbing. The number of dilapidated units was also reduced substantially between 1950 and 1960, but not between 1960 and 1970. Note also that the amount of crowding in standard units increased between 1950 and 1960 and is not thought to have decreased significantly since 1960.

TABLE 1.—QUALITY OF OCCUPIED HOUSING, UNITED STATES AND RURAL AREAS AND SMALL TOWNS, 1950, 1960 AND ESTIMATED FOR 1970

	[Thousands of units]		
	1950	1960	1970
<b>United States:</b>			
Households and occupied units.....	42,826	53,024	62,425
Standard units.....	27,570	44,550	56,500
Standard but crowded.....	(2,682)	(3,957)	(3,900)
Substandard units.....	15,256	8,474	5,900
Dilapidated.....	(3,903)	(2,268)	(2,400)
Nondilapidated but without adequate plumbing facilities.....	(11,353)	(6,200)	(3,500)
<b>Rural areas and small towns:</b>			
Households and occupied units.....	21,700	22,800	26,600
Standard units.....	8,900	17,100	22,400
Standard but crowded.....	(900)	(1,500)	(1,700)
Substandard units.....	12,800	5,700	4,200
Dilapidated.....	(3,100)	(1,500)	(1,500)
Nondilapidated but without adequate plumbing facilities.....	(9,700)	(4,200)	(2,700)
<b>Share of totals accounted for by rural areas and small towns (percent):</b>			
Occupied units.....	51	43	43
Standard but crowded units.....	(32)	(36)	(43)
Substandard units.....	80	67	71
Dilapidated units.....	(79)	(64)	(61)
Other substandard units.....	(86)	(68)	(78)

Sources: 1950 and 1960 data for United States from Census of Housing, 1950 and Census of Housing, 1960; for R. & S.T. estimated from census data on basis of population ratios.

1970 data for United States, from Census Bureau projection of 1970 households, Series 2 (see Current Population Reports, P-25, No. 360), and TEMPO projections of substandard housing (interpolating on basis of data in table 23, "United States Housing Needs, 1968-78," vol. 1 of Technical Studies for President's

TABLE 2.—OCCUPIED SUBSTANDARD HOUSING, 1960, BY OCCUPANT INCOME, UNITED STATES AND RURAL AREAS AND SMALL TOWNS

	All occupied units	Occupant income			
		Under \$3,000	\$3,000 to \$5,999	\$6,000 to \$9,999	\$10,000 and over
<b>United States:</b>					
All occupied units.....	53,024	14,802	16,771	14,469	6,982
Dilapidated units.....	2,268	1,460	588	182	38
Other substandard units.....	6,206	3,841	1,778	491	96
Incidence of substandard units (percent).....	16	36	14	5	2
Distribution of substandard units (percent).....	100	63	28	8	2
<b>Rural areas and small towns:</b>					
All occupied units.....	22,810	8,680	7,600	4,820	1,710
Dilapidated units.....	1,460	1,070	300	70	10
Other substandard units.....	4,220	2,840	1,070	250	50
Incidence of substandard units (percent).....	25	45	18	7	4
Distribution of substandard units (percent).....	100	69	24	6	1

Committee on Urban Housing); for R. & S.T. adapted from U.S. estimates, assuming it included 43 percent of households, 61 percent of dilapidated and 78 percent of other substandard units (see below on basis of assumptions).

Data on standard but crowded units, throughout, from table 10, "Urban Housing Needs Through the 1970's," by Frank Kristof (with incidence assumed to be the same inside and outside metropolitan areas, as 1960 data indicate).

Households and occupied units identical by definition.

Components do not always add to totals because of rounding.

Basis for assumptions regarding R. & S.T. share of household and substandard housing: relationship to nonmetropolitan parts of the country extrapolated from 1950 and 1960 data, and R. & S.T. estimated as 116 percent of nonmetropolitan; nonmetropolitan portion of all population interpolated on Census Bureau's 1965-75 projection (Current Population Reports, P-25, No. 415); nonmetropolitan portion of dilapidated and other substandard housing interpolated on basis of projections in USDA, Economic Research Service, "Prospective Requirements for Housing in Areas Served by Farmers Home Administration."

In any event, the improvement in housing over the past twenty years should not be allowed to obscure the fact that an estimated ten million households occupy substandard or overcrowded quarters as the 1960's end. And, while the incidence of substandard housing in rural areas and small towns was apparently reduced at a rate somewhat better than the national average during the 1950's, it has lagged behind the rest of the country in the 1960's. Thus, these areas, while accounting for less than half the population, account for more than two-thirds of the substandard housing.

The correlation of substandard incomes and substandard housing is both obvious and recognized. Less well known perhaps is the degree to which incomes are both lower and more maldistributed outside metropolitan areas than within. The most recently published data on family income, which are for 1967, reveal that the median income in nonmetropolitan areas is 22% lower than in metropolitan areas. For the nonwhite family in a nonmetropolitan area, the gap is even more appalling. Their median income is only 37% that of a white family living in a metropolitan area—\$3,364 as compared with \$8,994. The net result of these correlations—between low income and bad housing and low income and nonmetropolitan areas—is a sort of "double-whammy" for the rural poor. The 1960 data on substandard housing and occupant-income, presented in Table 2, make this clear. For the country as a whole, 36% of the households with incomes below \$3,000 lived in substandard units; but for rural areas and small towns, it was 45%. This higher incidence of substandard housing was characteristic of every income level—even the \$10,000 and above category.

For those concerned with doing something about rural housing, the most striking statistics in Table 2 are probably those on the final three lines. Rural areas and small towns account for only 43% of the households, but for almost 60% of those in the bottom income group; they account for two-thirds of substandard housing and for three-fourths of the substandard housing occupied by those in that bottom income category.

TABLE 2.—OCCUPIED SUBSTANDARD HOUSING, 1960, BY OCCUPANT INCOME, UNITED STATES AND RURAL AREAS AND SMALL TOWNS—Continued  
[In thousands of units]

	All occupied units	Occupant income			
		Under \$3,000	\$3,000 to \$5,999	\$6,000 to \$9,999	\$10,000 and over
Share of totals accounted for by rural areas and small towns:					
Occupied units (percent).....	43	59	45	33	24
Substandard units (percent).....	67	74	58	48	47

Source: "Census of Housing," 1960 (U.S. data from table A-4, vol. HC (2), No. 1; data for R. & S.T. estimated from table 3, "Rural Housing," volume, and table C-4, vol. HC(2), No. 1).  
Components do not always add to totals because of rounding.  
Incidence of substandard units means the percentage of all occupied units in that category which are substandard. Thus, while 16 percent of all occupied units in the country are substandard, 25 percent of all those in rural areas and small towns are substandard; while 36 percent of the units in the country which were occupied by households with incomes under \$3,000 were substandard, only 14 percent of those occupied by households with income between \$3,000 and \$6,000 were substandard; etc.  
Distribution of substandard units refers to distribution by occupant-income; i.e., 63 percent of all substandard units were occupied by households with less than \$3,000 income, and 69 percent of all substandard units in rural areas and small towns were occupied by households in that income class.

Most important, from a public policy standpoint, more than 90 percent of substandard housing in rural areas and small towns was occupied by households with incomes below \$6,000. To expect these people to attain "a decent home and a suitable living environment" without massive public assistance is indeed what Michael Harrington has called "the great American housing hoax."

CURRENT PROGRAMS

Roughly three-fourths of the people in rural areas and small towns (as defined in this paper) live within the service area of the Farmers Home Administration. From the beginning, this agency's programs have been designed to help bridge the credit gap in rural areas—a gap reflected in the sources of credit as well as the amounts available. Studies by the Department of Agriculture's Economic Research Service have found, for example, that while 72% of metropolitan mortgage money comes from savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and life insurance companies, and only 28% from commercial banks, individuals, and other sources; in rural areas the pattern is almost reversed, with 64% coming from the commercial banks, individuals, and others, and only 36% from the savings and loan association, mutual savings banks, and life insurance companies. In part as a result of this very different pattern of credit, the terms available to rural borrowers tend to be significantly more restrictive. The ERS studies report repayment periods for rural borrowers averaging 5 to 10 years shorter and interest rates generally a quarter of a percent higher—and these are where the rural residents could find the credit. In short, the need for a supplemental source of credit in rural areas would be justified, even were incomes in those areas not lower and more maldistributed.

While the Housing Act of 1949 included a Rural Housing title, this was limited to farm housing until the early 1960's. In addition to this late entry into the field, FmHA has been consistently hampered by lack of funds and lack of staff. As an example of the former lack, consider the water and sewer grant program, essential to upgrading the environment for adequate rural housing. Not enacted until the mid-1960's the program has received less than half the funds which FmHA has estimated as required (\$104 million of \$220 million over the four fiscal years '66-'69). The dimension of Farmers Home's manpower gap was indicated in testimony last year. Over the 1960's the level of outstanding loans made and being serviced went up by more than 300%, while the number of man-years available to do the job went up only 41%.

FmHA's housing program began as a direct loan program, but since the mid-'60's it has been predominantly an insured loan program (93% of the FmHA housing program budget in FY '69.) It is also predominantly a homeownership program, with these loans accounting for 88% of the total, compared to 4% for farm labor housing and 5% for other rental housing, and the remaining 3% going to home repair loans. While it can certainly claim to reach lower in the income scale than the Federal Housing Administration, FmHA only makes about half of its regular homeownership loans to borrowers with incomes under \$6,000, and only about one-seventh of them to families with incomes below \$4,000. (It reaches lower in the income scale with its direct loans for home repair, but these average about \$1,200 in size and, though certainly helpful, hardly have any real impact in terms of transforming substandard to standard units.)

The primary housing agency for the nation is, of course, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, successor to the Housing and Home Finance Agency and to prior governmental agencies. HUD's major housing activity is in the field of insured mortgage financing, but this has traditionally been a program focused on middle-income families. Thus, for the Federal Housing Administration's major sales housing program, nearly three-quarters of the borrowers have incomes of \$8,000 and above and only 5% fall in the below-\$6,000 income range. Rental housing utilizing FHA-insured mortgages presumably reach somewhat lower in the income range but it is only comparatively recently that programs—such as rent supplements and interest subsidies—have been developed which are aimed at those in the lower-middle income ranges and below. The traditional HUD program for lower-income people has been, and largely remains, public housing, a federally-financed, but locally-controlled program.

Whatever the program, however, HUD has not been distinguished by its ability to serve those in rural and small town America. During the 1960's, for example, the non-metropolitan areas of the country, with 37% of the population, have received less than 20% of the FHA-insured home mortgages and have accounted for less than 10% of the units in projects with FHA-insured mortgages. The disparity becomes even more evident when one narrows the target to non-metropolitan communities below 25,000 in population. Table 6 presents data on some major HUD multifamily programs indicating the degree to which they reach into rural areas and small towns, as defined in this paper. Even for elderly housing, only 15% of the units will serve that 43% of the population which lives in the rural areas, and for the other programs the impact is little short of ludicrous.

TABLE 6.—UNITS IN FHA-INSURED MULTIFAMILY PROJECTS, UNDER SELECTED PROGRAMS, END OF 1966, UNITED STATES AND RURAL AREAS AND SMALL TOWNS

	Total units in United States	Units in R. & S.T.	R. & S.T. as percent of all
Market rate rental programs (secs. 220 and 221).....	71,854	1,373	2
Below-market-rate program (sec. 221(d)(3)BMR).....	52,939	791	1½
Elderly housing program (sec. 231).....	37,817	5,697	15

Source: FHA table 68, HUD's Statistical Yearbook, 1966.

Public housing, the only HUD program which has any real impact in the lower portion of the income scale, fails to make any better showing. While data on this program which are adaptable to our special definition of rural areas and small towns are not readily available, a close approximation is. Congressman Wright Patman of Texas has done his own analysis of public housing statistics to determine what proportion of them went into the non-metropolitan small towns (defined as having less than 10,000 population and located outside of SMSA's). \* \* \* Congressman Patman found that less than ten percent of the units were located in these areas, and that almost three-fourths of those that are, can be found in the South. Even in that region, which has specialized in small (and segregated?) local housing authorities, the small towns come out on the short end. With 53% of its population in non-metropolitan areas, the South has less than 20% of its public housing units in these small towns.

The programs of two other Federal agencies need to be noted, in connection with low income housing in rural and small town America. One of these is the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which has almost 77,000 housing units in the consolidated tribal areas under its jurisdiction. To characterize the housing situation in these areas as appalling is pallid understatement. The following was the situation as of mid-1968:

Standard units (29%).....	22,127
Substandard units (71%).....	54,739
Total (100%).....	76,866

Moreover, these figures do not tell the whole story, since the 77 thousand existing units were occupied by more than 90 thousand families, for an average of 1.18 families per unit. Of the substandard units, an estimated 19,438 (or 36%) were regarded as suitable for rehabilitation. The remainder will require replacement. Total needs in these tribal areas then are for 48,900 new units and 19,400 rehabilitated units. If the Bureau achieves its revised level of activity in the current Fiscal Year, and if there is no further increase in the number of Indian households under its jurisdiction, and if there is no further deterioration in the currently existing units; it can theoretically eliminate at least what it classifies as "substandard" Indian housing in the next ten-to-eleven years. If, however, BIA does no better than it did in the past six fiscal years, it will require more than half a century to do the job.

The last of the agencies to be noted is the Office of Economic Opportunity, which, both by logic and Congressional mandate, has an interest in low-income housing. "In government," as I. F. Stone points out, "the budget is the message." By that measure, OEO's interest in housing has tended to be peripheral. Of \$6,833 million in appropriated funds, it has expended an estimated \$35 million—or a half of one percent—on housing and housing related projects. Despite these limited re-

sources, however, OEO has made at least three important contributions to the current low-income housing scene. First, on the Rosebud Reservation in South Dakota, OEO, working with BIA, HUD, and the Public Health Service, initiated what, as far as this writer knows, is to date the only large-scale attack on the abysmal housing of a segment of our Indian population. During its 23-month duration, the project brought about the construction of 375 low-cost transitional houses for Rosebud-Sioux families.

Second, OEO has played a key role in the development of the housing development corporation as a new technique for securing low-income housing. It has funded, at least in part, about a dozen HDC's, including one in Appalachia and another specifically to work in the rural areas of a state. These OEO-funded HDC's have completed more than a thousand units of housing (both new construction and rehabilitation). The number is not staggering but none of the production statistics in the field of low-income housing are very impressive as yet.

Finally, OEO can justifiably claim to be a parent of the revived self-help housing movement in the United States. Building on the pilot project of the American Friends Service Committee in the San Joaquin Valley, OEO's Migrant Division has encouraged and supported the creation of other projects across the country, bringing the magic of homeownership to rural people at income levels that had never before been reached. Through April of this year, Farmers Home Administration, virtually the only source of mortgage credit for self-help housing in the United States, reported approval of more than 1,500 self-help loans. OEO cannot claim direct responsibility for all of these, but in its absence it is certain that the numbers would be small indeed, and the legislative base which the program achieved in the 1968 Housing Act highly unlikely.

#### ESTIMATING THE NEEDS OF THE 1970'S

Last year might well have been termed "the year of the housing goal." The Congress adopted, as part of the 1968 Act, the specific goal of securing "the construction or rehabilitation of twenty-six million housing units [within the next decade], six million of these for low and moderate income families." The figures adopted were taken from estimates presented in the Spring of 1968 by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. These HUD estimates, revised only slightly (in terms of annual production targets), remained the basis for the *First Annual Report on National Housing Goals* filed (as is required by the '68 Act) in January of this year. That report takes some pride in noting that, "the needs estimate has been endorsed by the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, the National Commission on Urban Problems, and the President's Committee on Urban Housing." The unanimity is, in fact, a good deal less complete than that. The Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission) did call for six million "assisted" units for low and moderate income families, but it called for them in the next five years, not the next ten. Moreover, the fact that the projections utilized by the Commission on Urban Problems (the Douglas Commission) and the Committee on Urban Housing (the Kaiser Committee) were within a million units of each other and of the HUD estimates obscures the fact that they each utilized different assumptions and, to some extent, different definitions of need.

Table 9 attempts a comparison of the three projections, utilizing summary data from each. (The projections utilized by the Douglas Commission were prepared by Frank Kristof, those used by the Kaiser Committee were prepared by General Electric's "think-tank," TEMPO.) As can readily be seen, there are substantial variances in the com-

ponent parts of the three projections. Both HUD and TEMPO assume relatively high rates of household formation, while Kristof found the Census Bureau's lower projection more credible. HUD assumed a rather rapid increase in the vacancy rate, and then added a million more units "abandoned because of population shifts," while Kristof and TEMPO assume substantially lower vacancy rates. A similarly wide spread is found in the estimates of net losses of standard units. HUD

assumed a decreasing number of losses over the decade, while Kristof assumed increasing yearly losses. TEMPO, like Kristof, assumed an increasing rate of losses, and also assumed that 2 million standard units would become substandard during the period, while Kristof expects much less net deterioration in the inventory of standard units. Finally, of the three sets of projections, only Kristof deals with the problem of overcrowding in standard units.

TABLE 9.—HOUSING NEEDS IN THE NEXT DECADE—A COMPARISON OF 3 ESTIMATES

	[In thousands of units]		
	1st annual report	Kristof study	TEMPO study
<b>UNITED STATES</b>			
New and rehabilitated units needed for:			
Additional households.....	13,100	12,300	13,400
Increase in vacancies.....	15,400	1,800	1,600
Replacement of net losses in standard units, including standard units which become substandard.....	21,800	2,400	5,000
Replacement of substandard units existing at beginning of decade.....	6,200	6,900	6,700
Elimination of crowding in existing standard units.....	(?)	3,900	(?)
<b>Total, estimated needs.....</b>	<b>26,500</b>	<b>27,300</b>	<b>26,700</b>
<b>RURAL AREAS AND SMALL TOWNS<sup>4</sup></b>			
New and rehabilitated units needed for:			
Additional households.....	5,400	5,100	5,500
Increase in vacancies.....	1,800	700	700
Replacement of net losses in standard units.....	700	1,000	2,100
Replacement of existing substandard units.....	4,400	4,900	4,800
Elimination of crowding in standard units.....	(?)	1,700	(?)
<b>Total, estimated needs.....</b>	<b>12,200</b>	<b>13,400</b>	<b>13,100</b>

<sup>1</sup>Includes 1,000,000 units "To compensate for units abandoned because of population shifts," a category not separately estimated in the Kristof and TEMPO studies.

<sup>2</sup>Not shown separately in 1st annual report; figure used here is computed as a residual.

<sup>3</sup>No estimate of crowding in standard units in 1st annual report or TEMPO study.

<sup>4</sup>Assuming that R. & S.T. makes up 41 percent of population increase and the same proportion of needs developing during the decade, but makes up 71 percent of existing substandard units (as in table 1 estimates).

<sup>5</sup>Excludes any portion of the 1,000,000 units mentioned in footnote 1 above, on assumption that this is intended to reflect population shifts out of rather than in to rural areas and small towns.

Note that the data on existing substandard units in this table are not comparable to those in table 1 since these refer to all substandard units, table 1 to occupied substandard units only.

Sources: 1st annual report on H. Doc. 91-63, "First Annual Report on National Housing Goals"; Kristof study from "Urban Housing Needs Through the 1980's," by Frank Kristof; TEMPO study from "United States Housing Needs, 1968-1978."

Thus, while a look only at the total in Table 9 would indicate a national need of 26.5 million to 27.3 million units in the next ten years and a need in rural areas and small towns of 12.2 million to 13.4 million units, differing combinations of assumptions provide a much wider range of needs. If one uses the "lowest" assumption for each component in the projections and excludes crowding as a need, the result is a national requirement of 22 million units and a rural and small town requirement of 11 million units. If, on the other hand, one takes the "highest" assumption for each component, and accepts Kristof's estimate on crowding in standard units, the national need for the decade goes to almost 35 million units and that for rural areas and small towns to 16 million units.

For the purposes of this paper, the Kristof estimates are accepted as *minimal* figures on housing needs in the 1970's. Any consistent estimate at a lower level than his would among other things—have to ignore crowding in standard houses, which means ignoring a major aspect of the problem.

Before proceeding to a comparison of current public program levels and the estimated needs, it is necessary to look at the concept of "assisted" starts and the level of need for them. "Assisted" is another way of saying "subsidized" and is used to refer to units built with mortgage financing which is at below-market-interest-rates (either because they are direct loans at less than market rates or the actual interest paid is reduced through some other mechanism), as well as low-rent public housing units. It is such "assisted" starts that the Congress had in mind for its "six million . . . for low

and moderate income families." But here, as in the estimates of need, the agreement of the authorities implied by the *First Annual Report* is less than real.

Again, the Act's figure originated with HUD. A look at the method by which it was "arrived at" is instructive. It was estimated that a minimum income of \$5,000 for nonelderly and 4,000 for elderly households, was the minimum required for adequate housing without assistance. The number of such households was projected to be 18.9 million by 1976. If one stops at this point it might appear that the number of assisted starts would be that rather than 6 million, but HUD didn't stop there. First it eliminated 6.1 million one-person households in the non-elderly group on the grounds that they "are assumed not to participate in the demand for traditional kinds of housing units." Then it dropped 3.9 million elderly households because it estimated that they already "own standing housing units, lowering their housing expenditures considerably. This is still further reduced by the estimated 900,000 "assisted units" already in existence.

This leaves 8 million households needing assistance, but HUD assumes that 2 million of these may get assistance by way of "increased social security and welfare payments, or through a loosening of the housing supply."

The Kaiser Committee did endorse the HUD figures, but it was apparently less confident in the chances of that last 2 million households, so it recommended "six to eight million Federally subsidized dwellings" in the next ten years. This is also in line with the TEMPO projections of "non-effective demand" for housing, which totaled 7.5 mil-

lion households in 1978. This presumably compares with HUD's 8 million households in need of assistance, but since TEMPO considered 20% of income as the appropriate budget share for housing and HUD used 25%, the fact that TEMPO came up with a lower total leads to one to conclude that they were working with substantially different estimates of income distribution.

In his study for the Douglas Commission, Kristof does not attempt to estimate "non-effective" demand or the need for assisted starts in any direct way. It might be noted that his projection of the components of inventory change during the 1970's concludes that there will be 18.4 million new standard units built and 1.2 million substandard units upgraded to standard status. When this is compared with his estimates of need, it reflects a "shortfall" of 7.7 million units. This "shortfall" is, in a sense, one measure of the gap which public policy may have to fill. Since Kristof's projection of almost 2 million units a year in construction and rehabilitation is about 1½ times what the nation has accomplished in any year since 1950. It is likely that his projection understates the "shortfall" by a fair amount.

It is true that the Douglas Commission called for "at least 500,000 units a year exclusive of housing for the elderly . . . [for] poor and moderate income families," and that Kristof's study itself discusses adding "5 million aided units per year." But the latter goes on to say, not that this would eliminate substandard housing in a decade, but that it would "reduce urban housing needs to negligible proportions by 1980 [italics added]."

The \$5,000 income level for estimated need for assistance (used by HUD for non-elderly households), strikes the present writer as a reasonable, if arbitrary yardstick. TEMPO's analysis of the '60 Census data concluded that the minimum income required for adequate housing ranged from \$3,400 for a white individual to \$6,500 for a nonwhite family of six or more living in a non-metropolitan area. The fact that this is a minimum figure means that while smaller households may secure adequate housing on less than \$5,000 a year, many households—and especially larger ones—actually require more than the minimum. Thus, \$5,000 is utilized as an across-the-board figure, representing an average measure of need. If it is applied to those already occupying substandard housing, it means that 84% of them will require assistance to secure replacement of their current substandard housing with standard housing. This implies, on the basis of the 6.9 million substandard units in 1970 estimated by Kristof, a need for 5.8 million assisted units for the nation as a whole and 4.1 million assisted units for rural areas and small towns, merely to replace already existing substandard units.

To estimate the proportion of assisted units required to eliminate crowding in existing standard units and to meet the need for standard units developing during the decade, use of the general pattern of income distribution is probably more logical. The most recent data here, indicate that 35% of all households fall in the below-\$5,000 income category. Applying this percentage to the remainder of the needs (including that represented by crowded standard units), as estimated by Kristof gives a figure of 7.2 million assisted units for the nation as a whole and 3 million for rural areas and small towns. Combining these estimates with those arrived at in the preceding paragraph gives totals of 13 million and 7 million, respectively, for the nation and for rural areas and small towns. While these estimates of the assisted units required for the coming decade are dramatically above those officially endorsed by Congress, as well as those used by the Douglas Commission and the Kaiser Committee, it should be noted that the Na-

tional Housing Conference, in its 1969 annual meeting, called for "at least 1,000,000 units annually for these [low and moderate] income groups." It is also worth stressing that the need for assisted units in rural areas and small towns is almost certainly larger rather than proportional to the need in the rest of the country. Thus, Farmer's Home Administration . . . estimates that 56% of the required units in its service area will need public assistance. If this percentage is applied . . . to the estimate of needs for rural areas and small towns adapted for this paper from the Kristof estimates, the result is 7.5 million assisted units, a level even higher than that arrived at above.

#### CURRENT PROGRAM LEVELS

Federal programs in the field of low-income housing may best be seen in the perspective of a pair of ironies. The first of these is, as Michael Harrington has said, "the magnificent irony that the stated purpose of the 1968 housing legislation was to fulfill the stated purpose of the 1949 act." The second, and more telling irony is implied by a report of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare on the housing of public assistance recipients. It concludes that more than \$1 billion a year in government funds is spent by welfare recipients on housing and that at least half of them are in quarters that are "considerably below accepted standards." When one compares this statistic with the fact that the annual cost of its low-income housing programs has been estimated by HUD at about \$321 million, it becomes clear that the government is spending more money on bad housing than on good.

TABLE 10.—FEDERALLY ASSISTED HOUSING UNITS, FISCAL YEAR 1968, FISCAL YEAR 1969, AND PROPOSED FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970

	[Thousands of units]		
	Fiscal years—		
	1968	1969	1970
Public housing.....	51	69	130
Other HUD rental programs.....	62	64	142
HUD ownership programs.....	9	13	129
All HUD programs.....	122	146	401
FmHA ownership programs.....	33	43	147
FmHA rental programs.....	2	3	3
All FmHA programs.....	35	46	150
All programs.....	157	192	551
Estimated portion in rural areas and small towns.....	53	67	210

<sup>1</sup> Original target (in initial fiscal year 1970 budget) was 186,000 units; estimated slippage thus 21 percent.

<sup>2</sup> Original target (in initial fiscal year 1970 budget) was 47,000 units; estimated slippage thus 2 percent.

Sources: fiscal year 1968 data from May 12, 1969, statement of Secretary Romney before House Banking and Currency Committee (see table 2 appended to statement); fiscal year 1969 data estimated on basis of same source, projecting 9-month figures to a 12-month basis; fiscal year 1970 target figures for HUD programs from "Summary of HUD Budget, fiscal year 1970," p. 1-7; fiscal year 1970 target figures for FmHA from unpublished May 16, 1969, "Program Attainment Report." Estimates for R. & S.T. portion assumed that all FmHA units and 15 percent of HUD units are located in those areas.

We turn now to how likely our current program levels are to meet our estimated needs and eliminate those twin ironies at last. Table 10 presents consolidated data on the number of assisted starts and rehabilitations produced by HUD and FmHA programs in FY 1968, expected in the current fiscal year, and proposed for the coming one. Based on the assumption that 15% of HUD-assisted units are located in rural areas and small towns (as defined in this paper), it also indicates the level for that target area. It should be remembered that the 551 thousand units proposed for the coming fiscal year are related to the planned achievement

of the ten-year total of 6 million units called for in the 1968 Act. . . . If the "slippage" that seems to have been experienced in the current fiscal year were to be characteristic of the next, the number of assisted starts would fall from 551 thousand to 464 thousand for the country as a whole, and from 210 thousand to 195 thousand for rural areas and small towns. Given the fact that the targets for FY '70 are so much more ambitious than were those for the current fiscal year, the chances for slippage are, in fact, larger.

The comparison of current program levels with estimated needs is a depressing business. We have estimated 7 to 7½ million assisted starts will be required in rural areas and small towns over the next decade. If this is the case, it would take a hundred years and more to do the job at existing levels of activity. Even if the current targets for next year are achieved, we would require nearly four decades to meet one decade's needs—hardly a winning proposition. It is the contention of this paper that it will not be enough to double or triple the current (i.e., FY '69) level of Federal housing activity in rural areas and small towns. That level must be increased more than tenfold if the stated goal of eliminating substandard housing in the next ten years is to be realized.

#### HEALTH OF CIGARETTE SMOKERS ENDANGERED BY PESTICIDE RESIDUES IN TOBACCO

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, high levels of DDT and other pesticides are being found in cigarettes and are increasing the health hazards already facing smokers.

Research findings on pesticide residues in tobacco and cigarette smoke indicate the probability of additional health hazards to smokers and add to the massively accumulating evidence of the pervasiveness of persistent pesticides in the world environment.

The presence of these pesticides again demonstrates the urgent necessity of setting national standards to prevent the indiscriminate and uncontrolled use of these pesticides to protect the environment. It is already clear that such standards must include a ban on DDT.

I believe that the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare should take immediate action to set regulations limiting the amount of pesticide residues in tobacco and avoid compounding the health hazards already facing the smoker.

Recent studies have measured up to 38 parts per million of DDT residues in cigarette tobacco and up to 53 parts per million in cigars. The studies were conducted by North Carolina State University researchers and other laboratories.

Tobacco is the only consumable agricultural crop that does not have a tolerance level specifying when the pesticide residue is hazardous. Furthermore, no significant Government research has been done to determine the effect of the residues on the smoker's health.

It is of great concern that the existence of toxic pesticide residues in cigarette smoke entering the human body has been virtually ignored by both the Agriculture Department and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

The Surgeon General has already identified certain substances in tobacco that can cause cancer, chronic bronchitis and pulmonary emphysema. Now there is evidence that the smoker's health is also besieged by poisonous pesticide residues flowing into his throat and lungs with cigarette smoke.

West Germany has recently set tolerance levels on a wide range of farm crops for 80 pesticides, including a zero tolerance for 14 persistent pesticides such as aldrin, dieldrin and endrin.

Under reported pressure from tobacco interests, the tolerance level for tobacco has been delayed until 1973.

According to North Carolina tobacco experts, if the present West German standards covered tobacco, virtually no American tobacco would be permitted on the German market.

Potential loss of the West German tobacco market has raised considerable concern among American tobacco interests. More than 700 million cigarettes and 88 million pounds of unmanufactured tobacco, worth \$74 million, were exported last year from the United States to West Germany.

The tobacco industry knows that its products cannot even come close to the residue tolerance levels that West Germany has set for similar farm crops. Unless some drastic changes in pesticide use are made, American producers might as well forget about selling to that market or any other that follows West Germany's lead in establishing tolerance standards for tobacco.

This entire episode is causing the greatest repercussions throughout the tobacco empire since the Surgeon General's report on smoking and health.

In addition to finding DDT residues of up to 38 parts per million in cigarettes and up to 53 parts per million in cigars, the North Carolina studies have found up to 100 parts per million on the green tobacco leaf after harvesting.

By comparison, the tolerance level for DDT established by the Food and Drug Administration for similar leafy products, such as cabbage, lettuce, and spinach, is seven parts per million.

Under current food and drug laws, tobacco is not considered as food in the United States and no tolerance level for residues has been set. Tobacco growers and processors are free to use as much pesticide as they want.

In contrast, fruit and vegetable producers must carefully watch the pesticide residue level or risk having their crop banned from commercial markets.

The frightening thing is that insects feeding on tobacco are developing an increasing resistance to DDT and other standard pesticides. This has caused growers to use even greater amounts of pesticides.

Nearly 5,500,000 pounds of insecticides were applied to 2,566,000 acres of tobacco in 1964, the latest year when detailed Agriculture Department statistics are available. The percentage of tobacco acreage treated with pesticides increased from 47 percent in 1952 to 81 percent in 1966.

A major problem exists because tobacco leaves have the characteristic of absorbing pesticides which cannot be

washed off and persist even after the curing and manufacturing process.

As a result of increased pesticides use, tobacco tested in 1965 showed six times more residue than 3 years earlier and 12 times greater than in 1957.

Research officials at the Agriculture Department have confirmed that insecticide residues, particularly chlorinated hydrocarbons like DDT, exist in high amounts in tobacco even after processing.

The principal pesticides listed by the Agriculture Department for use on tobacco in 1964 included:

DDT: 1,187,000 pounds on 559,000 acres, 2.1 pounds per acre average.  
TDE: 2,331,000 pounds on 657,000 acres, 3.6 pounds per acre.  
Toxaphene: 292,000 pounds on 98,000 acres, 2.9 pounds per acre.  
Parathion: 466,000 pounds on 340,000 acres, 1.4 pounds per acre.  
Carbaryl: 331,000 pounds on 123,000 acres, 2.7 pounds per acre.  
Malathion: 101,000 pounds on 43,000 acres, 2.3 pounds per acre.  
Endrin: 150,000 pounds on 149,000 acres, 1 pound per acre.  
Aldrin: 135,000 pounds on 85,000 acres, 1.6 pounds per acre.  
Dieldrin: 93,000 pounds on 182,000 acres, 0.5 pound per acre.

I ask unanimous consent that an article entitled "Poisons in Cigarette Tobacco Increase" published in the Health Bulletin of September 18, 1965; a research report entitled "Insecticide Residues on Tobacco During 1962," published in the Tobacco magazine of September 18, 1964; and a comprehensive review of pesticides research entitled "Pesticide Residues on Tobacco," published in The Residue Review of 1967, be printed in the RECORD.

The articles follow:

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### POISONS IN CIGARETTE TOBACCO INCREASE

Cigarettes on the market today contain much higher residues of insecticides than cigarettes sold several years ago, according to tests made by an independent laboratory for Health Bulletin. Four popular brands were analyzed for DDT and endrin by the sensitive gas chromatograph technique and the results were compared with previous reports of insecticide residues in cigarette tobacco published in the technical literature.

The most recent published study available to Health Bulletin is the article "Insecticide Residues on Tobacco During 1962," authored by three U.S. Department of Agriculture staff members and published in *Tobacco Science* (Volume 8). That article reported levels of DDT in brand name cigarettes ranging from 2 to 6 parts per million, and levels of endrin from 0.5 to 2 parts per million—with most brands at 1 part per million of endrin or below. Because of the great toxicity of endrin, the authors of that article recommended that its use for the control of tobacco insects be discontinued. It is no longer registered for use on tobacco by the U.S.D.A.

Health Bulletin's test results, received on September 9, showed that levels of DDT have increased dramatically since 1962. Four popular brands of cigarettes tested showed DDT levels of 25, 28, 38 and 37 parts per million respectively. Those figures indicate an average six-fold increase in DDT content since 1962. Comparison with a study of DDT residues in cigarettes in 1957 shows that the level now is roughly 12 times greater than it was then. (Bowery, et al. "Insecticide Resi-

dues on Tobacco," *Agric. and Food Chemistry*, 7(10): 693-702, 1959.)

Endrin levels in cigarettes have increased since 1962, despite the fact that producers are not supposed to use that highly toxic insecticide for tobacco insect control. The four brands of cigarettes tested by Health Bulletin contained endrin in amounts of 1.3, 1.5, 1.6 and 1.6 parts per million. Those are roughly twice the amounts detected in the 1962 tests by U.S. Department of Agriculture scientists. The maximum amount of endrin in cigarettes detected in the 1957 tests was less than three-tenths of a part per million. A later study by Bowery et al. showed that pesticide residues are present in mainstream cigarette smoke if they are also present in tobacco. (*Agric. and Food Chemistry*, 9(3): 193-7, 1961.)

Controlling the levels of pesticide residues in tobacco is made difficult—if not impossible—by the fact that there is no law preventing farmers or processors from using as much insecticide on tobacco as they wish. Tobacco is not classified as a food, and therefore is not subject to the control of the Food and Drug Administration. The FDA would have the legal power to set tolerances for insecticide residues in tobacco if given jurisdiction in that area by Congress. The U.S. Department of Agriculture registers insecticides for use on particular crops and can control the information placed on insecticide package labels. But it has no legal control over insecticide use, and does not set tolerances for residues on crops.

Increasing resistance of tobacco insects to DDT and other standard insecticides has forced farmers to use much larger amounts of these poisons to achieve the same degree of control they got with smaller amounts in past years. "If the present trend continues," the Texas Agricultural Experiment Station said in May of this year, "it is possible that in the near future there may not be any insecticides available which will produce the level of control to which producers are currently accustomed."

Insecticides in tobacco have attracted little attention from health researchers, probably because there are enough other harmful aspects of the smoking habit to occupy their thoughts and efforts. The search for cancer-causing elements in cigarettes has concentrated on substances occurring naturally in the tobacco plant. "The possible role of these compounds (insecticides) in contributing to the potential carcinogenicity of tobacco smoke is not known," the Surgeon General's advisory committee on smoking and health commented in its 1964 report. A spokesman for the Public Health Service told Health Bulletin this week that his agency is doing no research now on the effect of pesticides in tobacco on health.

#### INSECTICIDE RESIDUES ON TOBACCO DURING 1962

(By F. R. Lawson, Calvin Corley, and Milton S. Schechter)

Before the development of DDT the insecticides most commonly used on tobacco in the United States were arsenicals. The arsenic content of commercial cigarettes increased from about 15 p.p.m. in 1917 to as much as 50 p.p.m. in 1951, and then declined to less than 5 p.p.m. by 1958 (Guthrie et al. 1959). Today arsenicals are seldom used on tobacco. Small and McCants (1962) found an average of 2.8 p.p.m. in soil in North Carolina and 1.5 in tobacco. About 1 p.p.m. was found in tobacco grown on Maryland soil with no previous history of arsenic applications, (unpublished reports, U.S. Dept. Agric.).

The decline in the arsenic content of tobacco since 1951 reflects the replacement of the arsenicals with chlorinated hydrocarbons and organic phosphates. Of these the persistent chlorinated hydrocarbons are of

chief concern on tobacco. Bowery et al. (1959) showed that application of these insecticides at priming resulted in high levels of TDE, DDT, and endrin on green tobacco and that more than half of such insecticide residues persisted on tobacco through commercial processing. They also found 8.0-17.2 p.p.m. of TDE-DDT, and 0.08-0.29 p.p.m. of endrin in commercial cigarettes in 1957. Detectable amounts of these insecticides occur in the mainstream smoke (Bowery et al. 1959), and (unpublished report, N.C. State College).

Increased concern over the possible presence of insecticide residues in various agricultural products has prompted a more critical look at the status of such residues in tobacco following the application of insecticides to control various insect pests. The objectives of this study were to determine residues of DDT, TDE, and endrin on flue-cured tobacco from 1962 auction markets in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida; to determine the residue levels in cigar wrapper tobacco in Florida; and to obtain data on residues in manufactured tobacco products on the 1962 retail market.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Samples of raw, cured tobacco, as prepared and sold by the growers, were obtained from auction markets in four of the five States producing flue-cured tobacco. Flue-cured tobacco is the principal ingredient of cigarettes. Samples of raw, cured cigar wrapper tobacco were removed from stored leaf produced by 95 growers. The outside leaf on many brands of cigars constitutes 3-5 per cent of the weight of the cigar. Other types of tobacco were not sampled.

Flu-cured tobacco to be sold on auction markets is placed in piles on the floors of large warehouses. Each pile belongs to an individual grower and is usually made up of similar leaves harvested from the same portion of the stalk.

Three market towns were selected in Florida, 3 in Georgia, 5 in South Carolina, and 5 in each of the three principal tobacco belts of North Carolina. The towns selected were those reporting the most tobacco sold in 1961. One warehouse with at least 100 piles of tobacco on the floor was selected in each town, except that in two towns in Georgia and two in Florida samples were taken in two warehouses in each town. In each warehouse, 50 representative piles of tobacco were selected and duplicate composite samples taken by removing two leaves from each pile and placing them in separate bags. Since each grower may have had several piles of tobacco for sale each day, the samples did not necessarily represent 50 growers but probably did in some cases. Manufactured tobacco products were purchased from stores in Oxford, North Carolina. The brands chosen were usually the leading ones of each of the principal companies.

The tobacco leaves, including the stems, were ground in a Hobart food chopper. After extraction with hexane and cleanup by column chromatography on Florisil-Nuchar mixture, aliquots were analyzed by gas chromatography with an electron capture detector. The sensitivity was 1.0 p.p.m. for DDT and TDE and 0.5 p.p.m. for endrin on a 1.0-mg. sample of tobacco. The presence of DDT was confirmed by infrared spectrophotometry in the samples of cigar wrapper tobacco from Florida. The presence of DDT, TDE, and endrin was confirmed by spot checking 25 samples of manufactured tobacco by thin layer chromatography. (Adams and Schechter 1963).

RESULTS

Data on the mean residues of TDE, DDT, and endrin found on 10 samples of cured tobacco from the various localities are given in Table 1. They show that residues of DDT and TDE were highest in the averages of the samples collected in Georgia and South Carolina. The presence of these residues can be related to the greater abundance and neces-

sity for control of the tobacco hornworm (*Protoparce sexta* (Johannson)) and tobacco budworm (*Heliothis virescens* (F.)) in these States. The Florida samples showed more endrin and less DDT and TDE in flue-cured tobacco than Georgia or South Carolina. This result indicated considerable use in Florida of endrin. The highest residues of DDT and endrin were found on one composite cigar wrapper tobacco sample from Florida. With this type of tobacco even one or two small holes in a leaf will reduce its value; hence, insecticides are applied frequently, usually at least once each week and often twice.

The aliquots analyzed to give the data in Table 1 included stems. Data given by Bowery et al. (1959) did not. Since the amount of residue in stems is unknown probably the best basis for comparison is to assume that stems have no residue and correct for the weight difference by multi-

plying the figures in Table 1 by 1.282. On this basis, the mean residues of DDT and TDE on flue-cured tobacco from each area sampled in North Carolina were less than those reported for similar samples taken in 1956-58 (Bowery et al. 1959), but the mean residues of endrin were about the same. However, high residues of endrin were found on some of the samples of flue-cured tobacco in North Carolina as well as the cigar wrapper tobacco in Florida.

The results of the 1962 analysis of manufactured tobacco are given in Table 2. The quantity of TDE and DDT in commercial cigarettes has nearly doubled since 1957 (Bowery et al. 1959). All of the cigarette samples contained endrin, with half containing 1 p.p.m. or more. The maximum residue of 2 p.p.m. endrin found in one filter brand was 7 times greater than the maximum found in cigarettes in 1957.

TABLE 1.—INSECTICIDE RESIDUES ON CURED TOBACCO—1962 AUCTION MARKET

Type of tobacco and area	DDT		Residues p.p.m. TDE		Endrin	
	Mean	Maximum	Mean	Maximum	Mean	Maximum
Flue cured: <sup>1</sup>						
Florida.....	2.50	4.5	18.83	60.0	2.13	5.1
Georgia.....	7.90	32.0	35.85	58.0	1.21	1.8
South Carolina.....	10.44	27.5	31.19	60.0	1.22	2.7
North Carolina:						
Eastern belt.....	4.65	15.0	2.80	7.0	2.40	3.1
Middle belt.....	4.80	22.0	7.20	18.0	.75	2.1
Old belt.....	3.00	10.0	4.30	20.0	.49	1.1
Cigar wrapper: <sup>2</sup> Florida.....		216.0		10.0		7.8
Check tobacco: <sup>3</sup> .....	.0		.0		<.5	

<sup>1</sup> 10 Flue-cured tobacco samples (50 leaves per sample) from each area.

<sup>2</sup> Composite sample (100 leaves) from 95 growers.

<sup>3</sup> Since recovery analyses were 100 percent for DDT and TDE and 95 percent for endrin, no recovery corrections were deemed to be necessary for results in tables 1 and 2. Zero figures for endrin signify that none was detected within the sensitivity of the method employed. The figures <1.0 p.p.m. for DDT and <0.5 p.p.m. for endrin signify qualitatively detectable amounts below the levels of good quantitation.

TABLE 2.—INSECTICIDE RESIDUES OF DDT, TDE, AND ENDRIN IN BRAND-NAME TOBACCO PRODUCTS

Brand No. and type	DDT (p.p.m.)	TDE (p.p.m.)	Endrin (p.p.m.)
Cigarettes—1 carton each:			
1 regular.....	2.0	12.0	<0.5
2 regular.....	3.0	17.0	1.0
3 regular.....	4.0	18.0	.5
4 regular.....	4.0	18.0	1.0
5 filter.....	3.0	14.5	.5
6 filter.....	4.0	16.5	1.0
7 filter.....	6.0	21.5	2.0
8 king.....	3.0	20.0	<.5
9 king.....	4.0	23.0	.5
10 king.....	5.0	23.0	1.0
Cigars: 6 to 8 packages, 4 to 5 per package:			
1.....	53.0	10.0	.5
2.....	32.0	12.0	.0
3.....	10.0	15.0	.0
Pipe tobacco: 7 1 to 5 per 8-oz. cans or 1/2-lb. can			
1.....	<1.0	5.0	.0
2.....	1.0	10.0	<.5
3.....	<1.0	13.5	<.5
4.....	1.0	31.0	1.0
Snuff: 1 5-oz. jar or can:			
1.....	<1.0	14.5	.0
2.....	<1.0	17.0	<.5
3.....	<1.0	18.0	.5
4.....	1.0	22.5	2.0
5.....	1.0	29.0	.5

DDT residues in cigars were much higher than in any other product tested. The indicated high residues in Florida wrapper (Table 1) could account for part of the high residue in cigars, since the weight of a wrapper is 3-5 percent of the weight of the cigar. Endrin residue occurred in one of the three samples of cigars.

TDE residues in pipe tobacco and snuff were similar to those in cigarettes and cigars. Endrin was detected in 7 of the 9 samples of pipe tobaccos and snuff, with one sample of snuff running as high as 2 p.p.m. of endrin.

The results of the 1962 study corroborated earlier findings that high levels of TDE, DDT, and endrin residues occur on auction market tobacco and in commercial cigarettes and other manufactured tobacco products. The 1962 study also indicated an increased use of

endrin. On the basis of these data, the Entomology Research Division no longer recommends endrin for the control of tobacco insects.

LITERATURE CITED

Bowery, T. G., W. R. Evans, F. E. Guthrie and R. L. Rabb, "Insecticide residues on tobacco." *Agric. and Food Chem.* 7(10):693-702 (1959).

Guthrie, F. E., C. B. McCants and H. G. Small, Jr., "Arsenic content of commercial tobacco, 1917-1958." *Tobacco* 148(18):20-2 (1959).

Small, H. G., and C. B. McCants, "Residual arsenic in soils and concentrations in tobacco." *Tobacco* 154(10):20-22 (*Tobacco Science* 6:35-36) (1962).

Adams, Richard, and Milton S. Schechter, "Improved detection of chlorine-containing insecticides by thin-layer chromatography." Presented at the 77th Annual Meeting of the Association of Official Agricultural Chemists, October 14-17, 1963, Washington, D.C. (1963).

PESTICIDE RESIDUES ON TOBACCO<sup>1</sup>

By F. E. Guthrie<sup>2</sup> and T. G. Bowery<sup>3</sup>

I. INTRODUCTION

Tobacco is a unique crop with respect to possible contamination by pesticide residues

<sup>1</sup> Work reported herein was partially supported by PHS Grants EF00158 and ES00044 as well as *The Council for Tobacco Research*. The cooperation of the major tobacco manufacturing companies throughout all phases of the work is gratefully acknowledged. Contribution from the Entomology Department, North Carolina Agricultural Experiment Station, Raleigh, North Carolina. Published with the approval of the Director of Research as Paper No. 2361 of the Journal Series.

<sup>2</sup> Department of Entomology, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina.

<sup>3</sup> Division of Research Facilities and Resources, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland.

because it is not classified as a food nor a drug and is, therefore, exempt from tolerances by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of the United States.

The purpose of this review is to discuss residue problems on tobacco from culture through the commercial processes and to consider the importance of pesticide residues on tobacco. The specific relation of pesticide residues to the health aspects of tobacco use has been recently reviewed (Surgeon-General's Committee 1964). The review by Larson *et al.* (1961) is an excellent reference source for toxicological and clinical experiments concerned with tobacco.

To permit the reader fully to comprehend the residue problem on tobacco, a brief synopsis of the culture and manufacture of tobacco is presented. Figure 1 summarizes the events which might affect pesticide residues as a result of pest control.

Field tobacco is harvested by priming (pulling) the ripe leaves (two to three) each week for about five weeks. To control the insect complex, at least one insecticidal treatment is normally applied to protect the leaves during the priming period, and the biological effectiveness of this treatment should be 10 to 14 days. Essentially every grower applies one treatment per season, and two to three applications per season are not uncommon. One application of a growth regulator is commonly applied during the early priming period for control of suckers. Residues resulting from pesticide application to tobacco, as with other leafy products, are rather high due to the large surface-to-weight ratios. At curing, about 85 percent loss of water and 15 percent loss of dry matter occurs. When green and cured samples are to be directly compared, a factor of 9.2 (to place both samples on a dry weight, stemless basis) is frequently applied. Tobacco is either flue-cured (by placing leaves strung on a stick in a curing barn where the temperature is slowly raised to 160° to 180° F. over a period of four to five days) or air cured for several weeks in a case of burley and cigar tobaccos. During August to October for flue-cured and November to February for burley, tobacco is displayed by the farmer at warehouses throughout the tobacco area and sold to the tobacco companies by an auction system. It is aged in large hogsheds (50 cu. ft. barrels) from six months to several years depending on the demand for the grade of tobacco involved. The aging process is an active fermentation, and considerable changes in the chemistry of the tobacco result. As needed, it is removed from the storage process and the midvein is removed. The leaf is then shredded and made into the desired tobacco product. During smoking of tobacco, the burning zone of a cigarette is 854° to 913° C. (Touey and Mumpower 1957). The burning zone of cigars is 800° C. and of a pipe 560° C. (Greene 1955). The various aspects of the events which might affect insecticide residues on tobacco will be discussed.

## II. INORGANIC INSECTICIDES

Arsenicals were the first insecticides to be recommended for protection against the insects which attack field tobacco (Howard 1900). The earliest report of insecticidal residues found on tobacco was that of Remington (1927), who reported the arsenic content of commercial cigarettes. A number of investigators (Popp 1928, Gross and Nelson 1934, Zeldner and Wagner 1937, Barksdale 1940, Griffon and Delga 1947, Daff and Kennaway 1950 a, and Satterlee 1956) monitored the increase in arsenic residues on tobacco

through the appearance of synthetic insecticides around 1950. Data in these papers showed that arsenic in United States tobaccos increased from about ten p.p.m. in 1917 to about 50 p.p.m. in 1951. Holland *et al.* (1958 b) reported residues of 52 p.p.m. in 1957, but Weber (1957), Bailey *et al.* (1957), and Guthrie *et al.* (1959 a) reported a sharp decline in arsenic residues to near background levels about 1952. Figure 2 summarizes the residues of arsenic on U.S. tobacco. The content of arsenic on tobacco produced in Europe, Asia, and Africa has consistently been lower than from American tobaccos (Popp 1928, Bailey *et al.* 1957, Enercan 1954, Satterlee 1956, and Monnet and DuPont 1953).

Satterlee (1956) suggested that arsenic residues would be a permanent problem as tobacco grown on soils containing arsenical residues from repeated applications to cotton and tobacco would absorb appreciable amounts of arsenic. Weber (1957) concluded that there was no appreciable absorption of arsenic by tobacco grown on arsenate-contaminated soil, and this was subsequently confirmed (Small and McCants 1962). It is of interest to note that arsenic is of such universal occurrence in soils that it has been referred to as a "normal constituent," four p.p.m. being found in virgin soils (Greaves 1913). A completely synthetic "cigarette" (Vanguard), void of tobacco and introduced for sale in 1958, was found to contain 1.0 p.p.m. of arsenic (Small 1960).

Following normal cigarette smoking by humans, 60 percent of the arsenic was found to be primarily in the ash and about 25 percent was found in the stump of the cigarette (Bailey *et al.* 1957). These authors concluded that 7 to 18 percent was presumably volatilized during smoking, but the volatilized products were not portioned into side and mainstream components. This confirmed earlier work by Daff and Kennaway (1950b). Cigarette paper itself contains about 0.01 p.p.m. arsenic (Cooper *et al.* 1955). Experiments by Gross and Nelson (1934) and Thomas and Collier (1945) showed that approximately 12 percent of the total arsenic in a cigarette is present in the puffed smoke when two-thirds of the cigarette is consumed. Gross and Nelson (1934) proposed that the arsenic inhaled while smoking cigars, cigarettes, or pipe tobacco was an unimportant source of arsenic when compared to tolerances then established for food products. Holland *et al.* (1958 b) reported 35 percent of the arsenic to be volatilized (both side and mainstream smoke components): 31 percent was found in butts, and 33 percent in ashes of nonfilter cigarettes. They found the filter of a filter cigarette to remove less than four percent of the arsenic in the mainstream smoke. Cigarette smoke condensates from 100 cigarettes contained 0.026 mg. of arsenic (Garcia *et al.* 1959). Using a mechanical smoker with continuous suction, Barksdale (1940) found a transfer of 50 percent of the arsenic in the

suction traps. Other workers found four percent of the arsenic in mainstream smoke (Cogbill and Hobbs 1957).

Studies on As<sup>75</sup> mainstream smoke using rabbits in Holland smoking boxes (Holland *et al.* 1958 a) indicated that 0.01 percent of volatilized arsenic was retained by the animal. Distribution of arsenic in the respiratory tract two hours after smoking was discussed. After withdrawal of the rabbits from As<sup>75</sup> tobacco smoke, the radioactivity in the respiratory tract of the rabbits decreased rapidly for the first two days and then tapered off slowly.

In a study with eight human volunteers who inhaled smoke impregnated with sodium arsenate in the distal ends of cigarettes, Holland *et al.* (1959) found 2.2 to 8.6 percent of the total As<sup>75</sup> injected into cigarettes to be transferred to the respiratory tract. Approximately 50 percent of the inhaled arsenic was eliminated in ten days, primarily in urine. The remainder was "assumed to have been deposited in the body, exhaled, and/or eliminated in body secretions and excreta over a long period of time." The general distribution and elimination of arsenic has been reported by Lanz *et al.* (1950).

As lead arsenate was the primary insecticide used on tobacco until 1948, it is also of interest to note residues found for lead. Lead and arsenic residues in popular brands of cigarettes were found to be 5 to 25 times greater than tolerances for spray residues on fruits (anonymous 1936). On the basis of data obtained with a mechanical device simulating cigarette smoking, this same author hypothesized that 6.7 percent of the lead present in the smoked portion of the cigarette enters the smoker's mouth. Zeldner and Wagner (1937) found 22 p.p.m. of lead on Canadian cigarettes and less than 2.5 p.p.m. on Oriental tobaccos. Knegeting (1938) analyzed a limited number of cigarillos for lead, finding 0.69 mg. per cigarillo. Cigarettes were also analyzed, but no lead was detected. Although cigars were not included in his analyses, he concluded that the use of cigars might be a source of lead poisoning. Grotepass (1941) found tobacco smoke to be free of lead. Although 0.66 to 2.56 mg. of lead/100 g. of chewing tobacco was found, he concluded that it was an inconsequential source of lead poisoning. De Jong (1941) reviewed the published work on cigars, cigarettes, and chewing tobacco and concluded that there was little or no possibility of lead poisoning from consumption of these products.

## III. SYNTHETIC INSECTICIDES

By 1956, there remained little doubt that arsenic residues on tobacco had been sharply reduced and would be expected to be further reduced. However, the magnitude of residues from insecticides recommended to replace the arsenicals was unknown. Studies were therefore initiated on flue-cured tobacco to determine the magnitude of insecticidal residues from more recently introduced insecticides on commercial tobaccos.

TABLE I.—INSECTICIDE RESIDUES ON TOBACCO SAMPLED DURING TOBACCO AUCTION SALES—1956 TO 1962

State	TDE <sup>1</sup> (p.p.m.)				Endrin (p.p.m.)				Dieldrin Toxaphene <sup>2</sup> (p.p.m.) (p.p.m.)		
	1956 <sup>3</sup>	1957 <sup>3</sup>	1958 <sup>3</sup>	1969 <sup>4</sup>	1956 <sup>3</sup>	1957 <sup>3</sup>	1958 <sup>3</sup>	1960 <sup>4</sup>	1962 <sup>5</sup>	1962 <sup>6</sup>	1957
North Carolina.....	39	29	44	27	8	1.5	2.2	0.2	1.2	.....	7.2
Virginia.....	.....	.....	.....	11	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
South Carolina.....	.....	.....	.....	36	42	.....	.....	2.4	1.2	.....	.....
Georgia.....	.....	.....	.....	43	42	.....	.....	1.3	1.8	.....	.....
Florida.....	.....	.....	.....	46	21	.....	.....	3.6	2.1	.....	.....
Tennessee.....	.....	.....	.....	17	.....	.....	.....	1.2	.....	.....	.....
Kentucky.....	.....	.....	.....	30	.....	18	.....	.....	.....	5	0.3

<sup>1</sup> TDE plus DDT.

<sup>2</sup> Bowery and Guthrie (1958).

<sup>3</sup> Bowery *et al.* (1959).

<sup>4</sup> Bowery and Guthrie (1961b).

<sup>5</sup> Lawson *et al.* (1964).

<sup>6</sup> Thurston and Caudill (1962).

<sup>4</sup> Chemical names of pesticides mentioned in the text by common name are shown in Table X.

(a) Residues on commercial tobacco

Residue data from warehouse samples of tobacco taken during annual sales are shown in Table I. A minimum of five warehouses in each of the states listed was used to establish these trends. Wide variations occurred among the different locations and years, probably as a reflection of requirement for control dictated by the severity of insect populations.

Commercial products (Table II) were sampled from purchases at local food stores. One comprehensive study of a large number of types of cigarettes purchased from widely separated geographical locations showed only slight differences among types and essentially no difference among locations (Bowery *et al.* 1959). This was expected, for commercial cigarette tobacco is a very homogeneous mixture even though large quantities of different types of tobacco are mixed to prepare the finished product. The quantities of TDE-DDT [reported as TDE in this review since 90 percent of the insecticide combination on commercial tobacco is TDE (Bowery *et al.* 1959)] in cigarettes approximately doubled between 1956 and 1962 but decreased appreciably from 1962 to 1966. The content of endrin in 1956 was barely detectable with the methods then available but was 1.3 p.p.m. by 1964. The reason for the reduction in amount of this insecticide from 1964 to 1966 is discussed in a later section.

As the 1957 analyses of commercial tobacco had shown residues to be present at detectable levels, an intensive study was initiated to determine the fact of insecticides during culture and manufacture of tobacco. Concurrently, studies were made to evaluate alternate methods which might control insects with reduced quantities of insecticides. Following (Table III) is a list of these alternate methods with appropriate reference. Only the use of alternate chemicals will be given further attention in this review.

(b) Magnitude of residues on green leaves and loss by weathering

If necessitated during harvesting, applications of insecticides to tobacco are recommended immediately after priming, providing maximal period of seven days between application and priming. Losses of residues following recommended application of chlorinated hydrocarbons were 50 to 80 percent after seven days of weathering, 50 to 150 p.p.m. of TDE and 5 to 13 p.p.m. of endrin remaining on the green leaf after this interval (Bowery *et al.* 1959). Similar data were found for Endosulfan and Telodrin (Guthrie and Bowery 1962). The loss by weathering of recommended rates of phosphate and carbamate insecticide over a seven-day period was much greater, about 90 percent, and residues on green tobacco after this period were 5 to 20 p.p.m. for Guthion and ten p.p.m. for carbaryl (Guthrie *et al.* 1959 c, Bowery and Guthrie 1961 a). Trichlorfon weathers quickly, and due to its water solubility, especially so following rain. It has been observed that once organochlorine insecticide residues on tobacco have dried following application, little residue is lost by rains (Bowery 1962), however. Except for Trichlorfon, the main loss of residues during weathering is attributed to growth and mechanical loss by agitation of tobacco leaves. Aircraft applications of DDT (1.75 lb./acre) resulted in maximum deposits on the upper surfaces of green leaves of 70 to 85 p.p.m. (Manson *et al.* 1962). Dust, emulsifiable concentrate, and wettable powder formulations of malathion (1.75 lb./acre) left initial residues ranging from 13 to 53 p.p.m., and approximately ten percent remained eight days after treatment (Wallis *et al.* 1957). The authors state that "no malathion residues have been reported on the cured tobacco, and it is unlikely that this insecticide would persist during the curing, redrying and aging processes."

(c) Loss during curing

The flue-curing process caused 40 percent loss in residues of recommended chlorinated hydrocarbon and 80 percent, or greater, loss of the phosphate and carbamate insecticides (Table IV). At this time, the residues of the organochlorine compounds go subsurface, and care must be taken thoroughly to release the chemicals from cured leaf lipids during chemical analysis or low values will be reported (Bowery *et al.* 1959). Consid-

erable conversion of Guthion to oxyguthion occurs during curing. No attempt has been made to verify whether loss of residues during flue-curing is due to conversion to unidentified products or whether the materials vaporize. Thurston and Caudill (1962) found a much smaller reduction (15 percent) of endrin residues during air-curing than previously reported for flue-curing, as might be expected under the milder conditions of air-curing.

TABLE II.—INSECTICIDE RESIDUES ON COMMERCIAL TOBACCO PRODUCTS

	TDE <sup>1</sup> (p.p.m.)				Endrin (p.p.m.)				Carbaryl (p.p.m.) 1966 <sup>4</sup>	
	1956 <sup>2</sup>	1960 <sup>3</sup>	1962 <sup>4</sup>	1966 <sup>5</sup>	1956 <sup>6</sup>	1962 <sup>7</sup>	1963 <sup>7</sup>	1964 <sup>8</sup>		1966 <sup>3</sup>
Cigarette.....	12.4	.....	22	11	0.2	0.8	<1.0	1.3	0.7	<0.3
Cigar.....	.....	17.1	44	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Pipe tobacco.....	.....	4.8	15	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Chewing tobacco.....	.....	4.3	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Snuff.....	.....	5.4	20	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

- <sup>1</sup> TDE plus DDT.
- <sup>2</sup> Bowery *et al.* (1959).
- <sup>3</sup> Bowery and Guthrie (1961 b).
- <sup>4</sup> Lawson *et al.* (1964).
- <sup>5</sup> Sheets *et al.* (1967).
- <sup>6</sup> Bowery (1962).
- <sup>7</sup> Wolfe *et al.* (1963).
- <sup>8</sup> Anonymous (1964).

TABLE III.—ALTERNATE INSECT CONTROL METHODS WITH REDUCED QUANTITIES OF INSECTICIDES

Method	Description	Estimated reduction of residue (percent)	Reference
Directed application of chemicals.....	Applied to top, immature leaves thus avoiding applications to lower, mature leaves and using 1/4 the dose required for nondirected treatments.	30-60	Guthrie <i>et al.</i> (1959b).
Integrated control.....	Permit natural factors to control small (noneconomic) larvae if possible before chemical control effected on larger worms likely to cause economic damage.	40-100	Lawson <i>et al.</i> (1961).
Biological control.....	Use of artificial Polistes wasp shelters in place of insecticidal treatment. Use of insect diseases when hornworms alone are problem.	0-100 100	Rabb and Lawson (1957), Lawson <i>et al.</i> (1961). Rabb <i>et al.</i> (1957).
Cultural control.....	Stalk destruction and MH-30 <sup>1</sup> effects which eliminate food of majority of overwintering hornworms.	50-100	Rabb <i>et al.</i> (1964).
Alternate chemicals.....	Dissipated during growth, dissipated during curing, dissipated during aging, dissipated during smoking, degraded in mammalian system.	.....	Cited elsewhere.

<sup>1</sup> Maleic hydrazide.

TABLE IV.—EFFECT OF FLUE-CURING, PROCESSING, AGING, AND CIGARETTE MANUFACTURE ON RESIDUES OF INSECTICIDES APPLIED AT PURPOSEFULLY HIGH RATES TO EXPERIMENTAL TOBACCO

[Compilation from Bowery *et al.* 1959, Bowery and Guthrie 1961 a, Guthrie and Bowery 1962]

Insecticide	Green (p.p.m.)	Flue-cured (p.p.m.)	Cumulative loss after indicated process (percent)				Cigarette manufacture
			Flue-cured	Stemmed, shredded, redried	Aged		
					1 Year	2 Years	
TDE.....	784	463	41	43	44	44	44
Endrin.....	101	60	42	45	47	47	47
Guthion.....	356	196	73	.....	73	.....	.....
Carbaryl.....	132	15	89	.....	89	.....	.....
Telodrin.....	17	4	76	.....	.....	.....	.....
Endosulfan.....	102	17	83	.....	.....	.....	.....
Trichlorfon.....	213	0.1	>99	.....	.....	.....	.....

- <sup>1</sup> Guthion plus oxyguthion.
- <sup>2</sup> Bowery (1962).

TABLE V.—TRANSFER OF INDICATED INSECTICIDAL RESIDUES ON EXPERIMENTAL TOBACCO INTO MAINSTREAM SMOKE [Compilation from Bowery *et al.* 1959, Bowery and Guthrie 1961 a, Guthrie and Bowery 1962]

Compound	Residue (p.p.m.)		Loss during smoking (percent)
	Cigarette <sup>1</sup>	Mainstream smoke	
Endrin.....	55	10	82
TDE.....	440	82 (+90 deHCl TDE) <sup>2</sup>	81
Telodrin.....	100	5.1	95
Endosulfan.....	100	3.3	97
Carbaryl.....	150	1.8	99
Guthion.....	300	0.6 (+0.04 oxy) <sup>3</sup>	>99

- <sup>1</sup> Purposefully treated at high levels to permit detection.
- <sup>2</sup> Oxygen analog.
- <sup>3</sup> Dehydrochlorinated TDE.

TABLE VI.—RESIDUES OF TDE AND ENDRIN IN MAINSTREAM SMOKE OF COMMERCIAL CIGARETTES

Cigarette	Number of brands tested	Micrograms/cigarette and "smoked" cigarette		Loss during smoking (percent)
		Cigarette	Mainstream smoke	
TDE <sup>1, 2</sup>				
Regular.....	7	12.7	1.6(+1.4 deHCl TDE) <sup>3</sup>	88
King.....	10	14.7	1.7(+1.3 de HCl TDE) <sup>3</sup>	88
Filter King.....	13	10.3	1.6(+0.6 de HCl TDE) <sup>3</sup>	86
Endrin <sup>4</sup>				
Regular.....	12	0.19	0.06	69

<sup>1</sup> TDE plus DDT.<sup>2</sup> Bowery et al. (1959).<sup>3</sup> Dehydrochlorinated TDE.<sup>4</sup> Bowery (1962).**(d) Loss during commercial processing**

Although there is considerable variation in the extent of storage of tobacco, a two-year period of aging is about normal. The residue content of the samples of tobacco treated at purposefully high rates of organochlorine compounds did not alter during a two-year aging period nor during subsequent steps to prepare the processed tobacco into cigarettes (Table IV). Similar samples containing Guthion and carbaryl were found to be unaltered during aging, which was somewhat surprising as the conditions during aging would be expected to offer ample opportunity for hydrolytic detoxication over such a lengthy period (Bowery 1962).

**(e) Loss during smoking**

Individual smoking habits vary enormously. A number of mechanical devices have been made to "simulate" smoking, however, and the L & M Smoking Machine

was used to ascertain the effect of smoking on organic insecticides (Bowery et al. 1959, Bowery and Guthrie 1962, Mold and Walter 1957). Briefly, the cigarettes are placed on a wheel, and as each cigarette passes a diaphragm the mainstream smoke is sucked through a series of solvents of cellulose filters. No attempt was made to collect the vapors of the sidestream smoke, nor to identify the insecticidal components, if any, of the ash. Residues in the butt of smoked cigarettes (eight puffs of two seconds duration) were not appreciably different from those in the original cigarette (Bowery et al. 1959).

The proportional of insecticide appearing in the mainstream smoke of experimental cigarettes prepared from tobacco deliberately impregnated with high levels of insecticide was 20 percent for TDE (plus 20 percent dehydrochlorinated TDE), 20 percent for

endrin, five percent for Telodrin, three percent for endosulfan, and less than one percent each for Guthion and carbaryl (Table V). Although levels of other commercially available insecticides have not been sufficiently high to study in commercial cigarettes, they have been studied for endrin and TDE (Table VI). These studies are fairly consistent with those from experimental cigarettes, although on a percentage basis slightly less TDE and slightly more endrin was found in the mainstream smoke of commercial cigarettes. It is suspected that there is a small (less than five percent) component of endrin coming through in the mainstream smoke as a breakdown product (possibly a *delta*-keto derivative), but this has never been substantiated. No appreciable difference was found in the quantities of TDE or endrin appearing in mainstream smoke from different types of cigarettes. While making a study of the various constituents in mainstream tobacco smoke of commercial cigarettes, Mold and Walker (1957) found an important fraction of their condensate to be TDE. Their results, reported after smoking 20,000 cigarettes, were in agreement with concurrent work of others.

The transfer of organic insecticides to mainstream smoke of pipe and cigar tobacco has not been studied. Recalling that the transfers into mainstream cigarette smoke for arsenicals and organic insecticides were somewhat similar, it would be suspected that the same pattern might apply, enabling one to estimate the transfer of organic insecticides to cigar and pipe smoke. Gross and Nelson (1934) found seven percent transfer of total arsenic into the puffed smoke for cigars and 26 percent for pipes.

TABLE VII.—RESIDUES OF TDE IN RABBIT TISSUES FOLLOWING EXPOSURES TO MAINSTREAM CIGARETTE SMOKE FROM CIGARETTES CONTAINING 48 UG. OF C<sup>14</sup>-TDE/CIGARETTE

[From Bowery et al. 1965]

Tissue	Calculated as C <sup>14</sup> -TDE (p.p.m.)				Organo-soluble components (percent)		
	3 months' exposure		6 months' exposure		TDE	deHCl-TDE <sup>1</sup>	Unidentified
	Organo-soluble	Total	Organo-soluble	Total			
Avg. 4 tissue fats.....	0.026	0.027	0.023	0.042	43	56	0
Avg. 7 vital organs.....	.010	.011	.014	.062	59	41	0
Avg. 3 respiratory tissues.....	.007	.009	.006	.032	33	49	18
Avg. 6 other tissues.....	.006	.008	.022	.116	43	57	0
Blood ug./ml.....		.011					
Urine ug./ml.....		.409					
Feces ug./g.....		.007					
Mainstream smoke.....					54	46	

<sup>1</sup> Dehydrochlorinated TDE.**(f) Residue retained during smoking**

Although the aforementioned tests had shown that insecticidal components could be brought into the smoker's mouth, the question of retention during expiration of smoke remained to be clarified. A test was made using C<sup>14</sup>-TDE experimental cigarettes in which one series was machine-smoked, one series was smoked by noninhaling smokers, and a third series was smoked by inhaling smokers. The human volunteer smokers exhaled the smoke (under slight vacuum) into a tube connected to three solvent traps. Analysis of the smoke showed that the non-inhaling smoker exhaled essentially all of the TDE brought into the mouth whereas the inhaling smoker retained about 70 percent of the TDE inhaled in the mainstream smoke (Bowery et al. 1965).

**(g) Fate of residue on inhaled smoke**

The next step necessary to evaluate the impact of insecticidal residues in mainstream smoke was to determine if the quantities retained in a mammalian system via respiratory intake behaved differently from oral doses of insecticides. The problem was approached with a tracer technique (Bowery et al. 1965), using rabbits as "smokers." Rabbits specially selected for their willingness to accept tobacco smoke were placed in Holland smoking boxes. C<sup>14</sup>-TDE added to cigarettes

at levels simulating commercial cigarettes and at levels four times this quantity were "smoked" in the specially designed apparatus. A 45-cc. puff of smoke was released into the box containing a rabbit for a duration of two seconds during each minute. Those rabbits which did not breathe normally during the "smoking" process were eliminated from the tests. Seventy cigarettes were smoked each day, five days a week, for the various test periods. The rabbits were then sacrificed and the various tissues analyzed for content of TDE and metabolites. Table VII summarizes the data, and, although the tests did not include as large a number of subjects as would be desirable, the conclusions were that the fate of TDE inhaled during smoking was similar to that for ingested TDE. All of the animals were autopsied at

the end of the experiment, and no untoward effects were noted.

**IV. NATURAL INSECTICIDAL COMPONENTS**

A discussion of insecticidal components of commercial tobaccos would not be complete without some mention of the naturally occurring component, nicotine. The content of nicotine in cured tobacco varies between one and three percent, and two percent is a likely average for American cigarettes. Table VIII summarizes the content of nicotine found in commercial tobaccos and the subsequent retention following use of various types of products. Quantities of nicotine received by the human system during smoking are appreciably greater than the quantities of synthetic insecticides received by the same route.

TABLE VIII.—MAGNITUDE AND FATE OF NICOTINE TRANSFERRED TO TOBACCO USERS

[Compiled from Larson et al., 1961]

Tobacco product	Mg./unit product	Percent		Mg. absorbed/unit product
		In mainstream smoke	Retained in lungs	
Cigarette.....	20/cigarette.....	15-20	65-90	1-3/cigarette.
Cigar.....	150/cigar.....		4-18	6-7/cigar.
Chewing tobacco.....	25/gram plug.....			8-88 mg./day.
Snuff.....				20-60 mg./day.

A large volume of literature indicates that mammals can tolerate nicotine in subchronic doses without ill effects for long periods of time, and, when administered slowly, at daily doses accumulatively much greater than lethal acute levels (Larson *et al.* 1961). The human body, particularly, seems to possess an extremely efficient mechanism for absorbing, distributing, metabolizing, and eliminating nicotine and its degradation products.

Nicotine was distributed to all tissues within 10 to 15 minutes (Hansson and Schmitterlow 1962). Rapid metabolism and excretion followed, and the liver, lung, and kidney were found to be the most important degrading tissues in the rabbit (Yamamoto *et al.* 1955). Over 90 percent of the total C<sup>14</sup>-nicotine administered was recovered in excretory products in 16 hours from rats (Ganz *et al.* 1951) and 36 hours from dogs (Bennett *et al.* 1954). About ten percent of the excretory alkaloid was the intact molecule (Wolf and Giles 1950, Haag and Larson 1942). There was no evidence that nicotine was stored in the body of the rat, mouse, or dog (Ganz *et al.* 1951, Bennett *et al.* 1954). The fate of nicotine has been the subject of an exhaustive study by McKennis and his associates in recent years. The key metabolite is cotinine, and a summary of the work with a suggested metabolic scheme is found in a recent publication (McKennis *et al.* 1964). Cotinine is also a metabolite of aging nicotine residues, at least in some plant parts (Gunther *et al.* 1959). The Surgeon General's Committee (1964) stated that the nicotine inhaled during smoking "probably does not represent a significant health problem."

V. MISCELLANEOUS PESTICIDES

(a) Fumigants

Unpublished data available at the present time indicate that fumigants and other pesticides applied to tobacco in storage (dichlorvos, hydrogen cyanide, methyl bromide, acrylonitrile-carbon tetrachloride mixtures, and pyrethrins) would not be expected to leave objectionable residues as a result of treatment under normal conditions of storage and processing (Childs 1966).

(b) Fungicides

In the United States, fungicides are rarely applied to cigarette tobacco types in the field, and no data have been reported on residues of fungicides on commercial tobacco. Lucas (1966) reported residues following experimental Dyrene treatments for brown spot on tobacco (three weekly applications during weekly harvest at one lb./acre). Resulting residues on cured tobacco ranged from 0.48 to 38.4 (average 7.2) p.p.m. In other experiments where Dyrene was applied at two lb./acre and maneb at one lb./acre (six weekly applications during harvest), residues on cured tobacco were 34 to 111 (average 47) p.p.m. and 76 to 495 (average 198) p.p.m., respectively. Residues of these fungicides were shown to vary directly with number and rates of application and inversely with rainfall. Residues of Dyrene and maneb on tobacco placed in an accelerated storage test for six months were not significantly decreased by the treatment.

Anderson (1962) injected 500 p.p.m. of Dyrene into cigars subsequently smoked in an artificial smoking apparatus. One percent of intact Dyrene was detected in mainstream smoke extracts, and 5.8 percent of a decomposition product, o-chloroaniline, was also isolated from the mainstream smoke.

In Europe, recent outbreaks of blue mold on green field tobacco have made frequent applications of fungicides a prerequisite to successful culture. The level of zineb on cured tobacco following field treatment (two to three lb./acre, 15 applications) was 1,050 p.p.m. for bright tobacco and 4,300 p.p.m. for burley tobacco (two to three lb./acre, 15 applications). When subjected to various

manufacturing processes, the residues in the finished cigarettes were found to be 43 and 76 percent, respectively, of the original levels (Carugno and Pizzini 1963). In other tests, Chouteau (1963) found maneb and zineb residues on cured tobacco to be 1,873 p.p.m. and 2,890 p.p.m., respectively; rates of field application were not given but presumably they were recommended rates. When subjected to bulk fermentation, 78 and 62 percent of the residues disappeared. These authors observed that during air curing, zineb degrades very little whereas 30 to 40 percent of maneb is destroyed.

(c) Herbicides and growth regulators

Three herbicides, diphenamid, Pebulate, and Vernolate, are registered for use on tobacco, and all are applied within a week of the time tobacco is planted. No published information concerning residues likely to occur in the cured leaf or present in tobacco smoke is available.

Maleic hydrazide is frequently applied at the rate of 2.25 lb./acre to control adventitious buds when tobacco is topped. Cigarettes made from tobacco so treated contained 10 to 30 p.p.m. (Stone 1957 and Carroll 1957) of maleic hydrazide. When cigarettes containing 30 p.p.m. were smoked in an automatic smoking machine (35 cc. puff of two seconds duration once per minute until length of butt was 20 mm.), 93 percent was decomposed or transferred to the side stream. The cigarette butts contained 30 p.p.m. indicating no buildup due to sublimation or any loss due to hot smoke pulled through the butt (Stone 1957). Cigarettes containing ten p.p.m. were similarly smoked without detection of maleic hydrazide in the mainstream smoke at the limit of the colorimetric method used. In a third test in which 105 p.p.m. of C<sup>14</sup>-maleic hydrazide was infused into cigarettes, 23 percent of the radioactivity was found in the mainstream smoke, a large part of which was postulated to be decomposition products.

When maleic hydrazide was applied to tobacco at the rate of 2.25 lb./acre, the green commercial leaves were found to contain 37 p.p.m. while the green sucker leaves contained 482 p.p.m. (Hoffman and Parups 1962). To determine the possible uptake of maleic hydrazide from accumulative soil residues, Hoffman *et al.* (1962) applied maleic hydrazide to soil in laboratory and field tests at concentrations up to five times the concentration normally applied to growing tobacco. Residues of maleic hydrazide disappeared more rapidly from sand and muck than from clay soils. About 88 percent of the original dose had disappeared from sandy soils within eight weeks. When tobacco plants were grown in soils containing five p.p.m. (five times the concentration which might occur if 2.25 lb. were applied directly to the soil) the green leaves contained 0.9 p.p.m. The authors concluded "that there would have to be an enormous amount of maleic hydrazide in the soil before any would be found in the plant."

(d) Soil fumigants

The uptake of organic chlorine or bromine by the tobacco plant following treatment

with soil fumigants (DD or EDB) at recommended rates and normal weathering conditions is about 0.3 percent of chlorine and 0.15 percent of bromine above normal concentration (Gaines and Graham 1953, Moseley *et al.* 1953). There is no published information to indicate whether this slight increase in chlorine or bromine content is traceable to the parent compound, or metabolites, or whether it is a manifestation of normal physiology of the plant. From 2.8 to 5.9 percent of chlorine and 1.4 to 3.0 percent of bromine is transferred to mainstream smoke based on the total quantities present in the intact cigarette (Moseley *et al.* 1953).

VI. TOBACCO AND PESTICIDE RESIDUE TOLERANCES

Expressions regarding the need for the establishment of tolerances for pesticide residues on tobacco have been raised on occasions by those in the socio-political environment in the United States. This coupled with the serious thought being given to such an action on the part of one European country, West Germany (anonymous 1966), requires some discussion as to the unique factors that must be considered with this product over those normally utilized when tolerances are established for foodstuffs.

Since pesticide residue tolerances are usually established on the "raw agricultural commodity" one must immediately be concerned as to the applicability of this to tobacco since the product that is ultimately consumed by the public (tobacco smoke) bears little resemblance to the raw product. At first blush one might argue that the same argument holds in most cases since modern food processing can drastically alter the relationship between the raw product and the consumed product. However, pesticide residues on raw agricultural food commodities are usually altered only in a quantitative manner with little, if any, significant qualitative change taking place between consumer purchase and consumption. In the case of pesticide residues on tobacco, extensive degradation of pesticide does, or is likely to, occur during the consumption phenomena. Only after the commodity (smoke) that is to be consumed is produced do the tolerance requirements for ingested foodstuffs and ingested smoke appear to become analogous.

Therefore, any consideration of the application of tolerances to tobacco should account for the pyrolysis factor in some appropriate fashion. For example, the TDE-DDT content of cigarette tobacco is about 11 p.p.m., well above the tolerance limit of 7 p.p.m. permitted on many foodstuffs. However, the amount of TDE-DDT actually delivered to the consumer during smoking is about 1.8 p.p.m., well below tolerances for food.

This principle was utilized by the Entomology Section of the 20th Tobacco Workers' Conference in Columbus, Ohio, in 1964 when the following resolution was passed: "Insecticides should not be recommended for use on field-grown tobacco when the projected levels of such residues in the mainstream smoke of commercial cigarettes would exceed the tolerances established for raw agricultural products, such as leafy vegetables."

TABLE XI.—RESIDUES OF INSECTICIDES TO BE EXPECTED ASSUMING USE OF THE MATERIALS LISTED AT RECOMMENDED RATES AND WAITING PERIOD OF 7 DAYS BETWEEN TREATMENT AND HARVEST

(Compiled from Bowery and Guthrie 1962, Sheets *et al.* 1966)

Material	Anticipated on tobacco (p.p.m.)			Tolerance "expected" tolerance (p.p.m.)	Levels actually found in commercial cigarettes (p.p.m.)
	Green	Flue-cured	In smoke		
TDE.....	58	35.0	7.0	7	1.70
Endrin.....	7	4.2	1.2	0	.06
Endosulfan.....	20	3.4	.1	2	.....
Telodrin.....	7	2.7	.08	0	.....
Carbaryl.....	13	1.4	.01	10	<.3
Guthion.....	25	1.8	.001	2	.....

Table IX summarizes the residues to be expected in the mainstream smoke of commercial tobacco following extensive use of recommended and experimental insecticides on tobacco. The state and federal recommendations for tobacco insect control in 1964 reflected the results for this action. Data for 1966, shown earlier in Table II, represent current analyses which indicate a marked decline in residues.

TABLE X.—Common and chemical names of pesticides mentioned in text

[Common name and chemical name]
Acrylonitrile: vinyl cyanide.
Carbaryl: 1-naphthyl <i>N</i> -methylcarbamate.
Cotinine: <i>N</i> -methyl-2-(3-pyridyl)-5-pyrrolidone.
DD: 1,3-dichloropropene and 1,2-dichloropropane mixture.
DDT: 1,1,1-trichloro-2,2-bis( <i>p</i> -chlorophenyl)ethane.
Dichlorvos: <i>O,O</i> -dimethyl 2,2-dichlorovinyl phosphate.
Diendrin: 1,2,3,4,10,10-hexachloro- <i>exo</i> -6,7-epoxy-1,4,4a,5,6,7,8,8a-octahydro-1,4 - <i>endo</i> -5,8-dimethanonaphthalene.
Diphenamid: <i>N,N</i> -dimethyl 2,2-diphenylacetamide.
Dyrene: 2,4,-dichloro-6-( <i>o</i> -chloroanilino)-s-triazine.
EDB: 1,2-dibromoethane.
Endosulfan: 6,7,8,9,10,10-hexachloro-1,5,5a,6,9,9a-hexahydro-6,9-methano-2,4,3 - benzo-dioxathiepin-3-oxide.
Endrin: 1,2,3,4,10,10-hexachloro- <i>exo</i> -6,7-epoxy-1,4,4a,5,6,7,8,8a-octahydro-1,4 - <i>endo</i> -5,8-dimethanonaphthalene.
Guthion: <i>O,O</i> -dimethyl <i>S</i> -4-oxo-1,2,3-benzotriazin-3(4 <i>H</i> )-ylmethyl phosphorodithioate.
Malathion: <i>S</i> -[1,2-bis(ethoxycarbonyl)ethyl] <i>O,O</i> -dimethyl phosphorodithioate.
Maleic hydrazide: 6-hydroxy-3-(2 <i>H</i> )-pyridazinone.
Maneb: manganese ethylenebis(dithiocarbamate).
Nicotine: 1-methyl-2-(3-pyridyl)-pyrrolidine.
Pebulate: <i>S</i> -propyl butylethylthiocarbamate.
Pyrethrins: insecticidally active principles of <i>Chrysanthemum cinerariaefolium</i> .
TDE: 1,1-dichloro-2,2-bis( <i>p</i> -chlorophenyl)ethane.
deHCl-TDE: 1-mono-chloro-2,2-bis( <i>p</i> -chlorophenyl)ethylene.
Telodrin: 1,3,4,5,6,7,8,8-octachloro-1,3,3a,4,7,7a-hexahydro-4,7-methanoisobenzofuran.
Toxaphene: mixture of isomers of octachlorocamphene (67 to 69 percent chlorine).
Trichlorfon: <i>O,O</i> -dimethyl (2,2,2-trichloro-1-hydroxyethyl) phosphonate.
Vernolate: <i>S</i> -propyl dipropylthiocarbamate.
Zineb: Zinc ethylenebis(dithiocarbamate).

#### Summary

Residues of inorganic insecticides on tobacco have decreased sharply in recent years, and the levels of arsenic on tobacco are of little significance at the present time.

Organic insecticides applied for tobacco insect control can be detected at relatively high levels during the early phases in the culture of tobacco due to the large surface-to-weight ratio characteristic of leafy products. During the flue-curing process about 40 percent of TDE and endrin are dissipated whereas more than 70 percent of certain other organochlorine insecticides, phosphates, and carbamates are lost in this process. The content of TDE and endrin in the cured leaf remains constant during two years of commercial processing. During the smoking of cigarettes 80 to 90 percent of TDE, 70 to 80 percent of endrin, and 95 percent (or more) of carbaryl and Guthion are dissipated. Noninhaling smokers exhale essentially all of the TDE in the mainstream smoke whereas inhaling smokers retain the

majority of the insecticide brought into the system. The fate of inhaled TDE in rabbits appears to follow similar pathways of storage and elimination as reported for oral doses. The intake of the most common insecticide appearing in tobacco smoke by the one-pack-per-day inhaling smoker is approximately equal to the intake of insecticide in his daily food (utilizing TDE plus DDT for comparative purposes).

The use of fumigants for control of stored tobacco insects, maleic hydrazide for sucker control, and fungicides for control of pathogens of minor importance on flue-cured tobacco do not presently appear to be a residue problem. Should plant disease problems on tobacco in the United States increase to the point where fungicide applications become a routine practice during the growing season, the residue problem which appears to presently plague European tobacco-producing areas could become critical.

Residue problems on tobacco deserving attention include monitoring of commercial tobacco, isolation and identification of side stream components of smoke, identification of decomposition products of mainstream smoke, and the retention of insecticide residues following use of cigar, pipe, snuff, and chewing tobaccos. Marked progress could be made to reduce the number of pesticide applications if economic threshold levels and accurate prediction systems could be incorporated into control programs.

#### Résumé

Les résidus d'insecticides inorganiques sur le tabac ont fortement diminué au cours de ces dernières années, et les doses d'arsenic que l'on trouve actuellement sur le tabac sont faibles.

Les insecticides organiques appliqués pour la lutte contre les insectes du tabac peuvent se trouver en doses relativement fortes durant les premières phases de la culture du tabac, en raison de la valeur élevée du rapport surface/poids qui caractérise les parties feuillues. Au cours du processus de séchage artificiel à l'air chaud, 40 p. cent environ de TDE et d'endrine se dissipent, tandis que 70 p. cent de certains autres insecticides organochlorés, de phosphates et de carbamates sont perdus. La teneur en TDE et endrine de la feuille séchée reste constante durant deux années de préparation commerciale. Pendant la combustion de la cigarette, 80 à 90 p. cent de TDE, 70 à 80 p. cent d'endrine et 95 p. cent (ou plus) de carbaryl et de Guthion disparaissent. Les fumeurs qui n'avaient pas la fumée rejettent pratiquement tout le TDE dans la colonne principale de fumée, tandis que ceux qui l'avaient absorbent la majorité de l'insecticide introduit dans l'organisme. Chez le lapin, le TDE absorbé par inhalation suit un processus de rétention et d'élimination analogue à celui qui est rapporté pour l'absorption par voie orale. Pour le fumeur qui avale la fumée d'un paquet de cigarettes par jour, l'apport de l'insecticide qui apparaît le plus couramment dans la fumée de tabac est approximativement égal à l'apport d'insecticide de la ration alimentaire quotidienne (si l'on prend comme élément de comparaison le TDE plus le DDT).

L'emploi de fumigants pour la lutte contre les insectes du tabac emmagasiné, de l'hydrazide maléique pour l'ébourgeonnement et de fongicides pour la lutte contre les agents pathogènes d'importance secondaire pour le tabac séché artificiellement à l'air chaud ne pose, en ce moment, aucun problème de résidus. Si les maladies du tabac prenaient de l'extension aux Etats-Unis, au point de nécessiter un emploi courant de fongicides durant la période de croissance, le problème des résidus, qui semble être actuellement un fléau pour les régions européennes productrices de tabac, pourrait devenir critique.

\* Traduit par S. Dormal van den Bruel.

Les problèmes de résidus sur le tabac, qui méritent de l'attention, comprennent le contrôle des tabacs commerciaux, la séparation et l'identification des composants des colonnes latérales de fumée, l'identification des produits de décomposition des colonnes principales de fumée, et la rétention des résidus d'insecticides faisant suite à l'usage du cigare, de la pipe, de tabac à priser et à chiquer. Des progrès notables pourraient être accomplis pour réduire le nombre d'applications de pesticides si des seuils économiques et des méthodes précises de prognose pouvaient être incorporés dans les programmes de lutte.

#### Zusammenfassung

Die Rückstände anorganischer Insektizide haben in den letzten Jahren stark abgenommen und die Arsenikmengen auf Tabak sind z. Zt. von geringer Bedeutung.

Organische Insektizide, die für die Insektenbekämpfung auf Tabak Anwendung finden, Können während der frühen Phasen in den Tabakkulturen infolge des grossen Oberflächen-Gewichts-Verhältnisses, das für Blattpflanzen charakteristisch ist, in relativ hohen Mengen nachgewiesen werden. Während des "flue-curing Prozesses" des Tabaks gehen etwa 40% des TDE und Endrin zu Verlust, während mehr als 70% gewisser anderer Organochlor-Insektizide, Phosphate und Carbamate bei diesem Prozess verloren gehen. Der Gehalt an TDE und Endrin im behandelten Blatt bleibt während der zwei Jahre der Weiterverarbeitung konstant. Beim Rauchen von Zigaretten verschwinden 80-90% von TDE, 70-80% von Endrin und 95% (oder mehr) von Carbaryl und Guthion. Nichtinhalierende Raucher atmen im wesentlichen das gesamte TDE im Hauptstrom des Rauchs wieder aus, während inhalierende Raucher ein Grossteil des eingatmeten Insektizids zurückhalten. Das Schicksal des inhalierten TDE beim Kaninchen scheint den gleichen Wegen der Ablagerung und Ausscheidung zu folgen, wie sie bei oraler Zufuhr mitgeteilt wurden. Die Aufnahme des am weitesten verbreiteten Insektizids, das im Tabakrauch des "eine Packung täglich -Rauchers" auftritt, ist annähernd gleich der Insektizidaufnahme in seiner täglichen Nahrung (wenn man TDE plus DDT zu Vergleichszwecken benutzt).

Die Verwendung von Begasungsmitteln zur Insektenbekämpfung in lagerndem Tabak, von Maleinsäurehydrazid für die Bekämpfung von Schösslingen und von Fungiziden zur Bekämpfung weniger wichtiger pathogener Lebewesen auf "flue-cured" Tabak scheint gegenwärtig kein Rückstandsproblem darzustellen.

Sollten aber die Probleme der Pflanzenkrankheiten auf Tabak in den USA bis zu einem Punkte zunehmen, an welchem die Fungizidanwendungen zu einer Routine-massnahme während der Wachstumsperiode werden, dann würde das Rückstandsproblem, das z. Zt. die europäischen Tabakanbaugebiete zu bedrängen scheint, kritisch werden.

Rückstandsprobleme beim Tabak, die Beachtung verdienen, umfassen Warnung des Tabakhandels, Isolierung und Identifizierung von Nebenbestandteilen in Tabakrauch, Identifizierung der Zersetzungsprodukte im Hauptstrom des Rauches und das Zurückhalten von Insektizidrückständen nach Genuss von Zigarren-, Pfeifen- Schnupf, und Kautabaken. Ein wesentlicher Fortschritt zur Verringerung der Anzahl der Pestizidanwendungen könnte erzielt werden, wenn ökonomische Schwellenwerte und genaue Vorschlagsysteme in die Bekämpfungsprogramme eingebaut werden könnten.

#### REFERENCES

- ANDERSON, G. A.: Dyrene and *o*-chloroaniline in tobacco smoke. Research Report No. 9715, Chemagro Corp., Kansas City, Mo. (1962).

\* Übersetzt von O. R. Klimmer.

- ANONYMOUS: Consumer's Research Bull. 2, (No. 5), 4 (1936).
- Unpublished mimeo. report. *Shell Chemical Co., Agr. Chem. Div., New York* (Feb. 13, 1964).
- Verordnung über Pflanzenschutz-, Schädlingsbekämpfungs-, und Vorratsschutzmittel in oder auf Lebensmitteln pflanzlicher Herkunft. Bundesgesetzblatt, Teill, Z1997A. Ausgegeben zu Bonn am 10. Dezember 1966, Nr. 53, pp. 667-673 (1966).
- BAILEY, E. J., E. I. KENNAWAY, and M. E. URQUHART: Arsenic content of cigarettes. *Brit. J. Cancer* 11, 49 (1957).
- BARKSDALE, E. E.: Cutaneous manifestation from tobacco with special reference to arsenical exfoliative dermatitis. *J. Amer. Med. Assoc.* 115, 672 (1940).
- BENNETT, D. R., R. E. TEDESCHI, and P. S. LARSON: Studies on the fate of nicotine in the body. VII. Observations on the excretion of nicotine and its metabolites by the dog. *Arch. Internat. Pharm. Dyn. Grand.* 98, 221 (1954).
- BOWERY, T. G.: Unpublished data. *N. Carolina Univ., Raleigh* (1962).
- , and F. E. GUTHRIE: TDE and endrin residues on tobacco; Their magnitude and fate from priming to smoking. Unpublished mimeo. report, distributed 15th Tobacco Workers' Conf., Athens, Georgia (Jan. 8, 1958).
- , W. R. EVANS, F. E. GUTHRIE, and R. L. RABB: Insecticide residues on tobacco. *J. Agr. Food Chem.* 7, 693 (1959).
- , P. E. GATTERDAM, F. E. GUTHRIE, and R. L. RABB: Fate of inhaled C<sup>14</sup>-TDE in rabbits. *J. Agr. Food Chem.* 13, 356 (1965).
- , and F. E. GUTHRIE: Determination of insecticide residues on green and flue-cured tobacco and in mainstream cigarette smoke. *J. Agr. Food Chem.* 9, 193 (1961 a).
- , Insecticide residues on 1960 tobacco crop. Unpublished mimeo. report, distributed 17th Tobacco Workers' Conf., Clemson, S. Carolina (Jan. 16, 1961 b).
- , Unpublished mimeo. report, distributed 18th Tobacco Workers' Conf., Gainesville, Fla. (June 5, 1962).
- CARROLL, R. B.: Analyses of diethanolamine in cigarettes and potato tubers treated with MH-30. Unpublished report, April 1957. Abstracted in ZUKEL, J. W.: A literature summary on maleic hydrazide, 1949-1957. *United States Rubber Co., Naugatuck Chem. Div., Naugatuck, Conn.* (1957).
- CARUGNO, N., and R. PIZZINI: Decrease in dithiocarbamate residues during the various stages of tobacco processing. *Proc. 3rd World Tobacco Sci. Congress*, p. 96 (1963).
- CHILDS, D. P.: Unpublished data. *Stored Tobacco Insects Investigations Laboratory, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Richmond, Va.* (1966).
- CHOUTEAU, J.: Changes in Zineb and maneb residues on tobacco leaves during curing and fermentation. *Proc. 3rd World Tobacco Sci. Congress*, p. 101 (1965).
- COBILL, E. C., and M. E. HOBBS: Transfer of metallic constituents of cigarettes to the mainstream smoke. *Tobacco Sci.* 1, 68 (1957).
- COOPER, R. L., J. A. S. GILBERT, and A. J. LINDSEY: Polycyclic hydrocarbons in cigarette smoke. The contribution made by the paper. *Brit. J. Cancer* 9, 442 (1955).
- DAFF, M. E., and E. L. KENNAWAY: Arsenic in tobacco. *Brit. Emp. Cancer Campaign Ann. Rept.* 28, 95 (1950 a).
- , The arsenic content of tobacco and tobacco smoke. *Brit. J. Cancer* 4, 173 (1950 b).
- DEJONG, D. J.: Tabak als mogelijke bron van loodvergiftiging. *Genseek. Gids.* 19, 148 (1941).
- ENERCAN, S.: Arsenic contents of Turkish tobaccos and cigarette blends. *Tekel. Inst. Raporl.* 6, 298 (1954).
- GAINES, T. G., and T. W. GRAHAM: Soil fumigation to control root ills. In: *Yearbook of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Agriculture*, pp. 561-567 (1953).
- GANZ, A. F., E. KELSEY, and E. M. K. GELLING: Excretion and tissue distribution studies on radioactive nicotine. *J. Pharmacol. Expt. Therap.* 103, 209 (1951).
- GARCIA, E. Y., M. MANAHAN, and T. NAZARIA: The deactivation of cigarette smoke against its carcinogenic agents. *J. Philippine Med. Assoc.* 35, 114 (1959).
- GREAVES, J. E.: The occurrence of arsenic in soils. *Biol. Chem. Bull.* 2, 519 (1913).
- GREENE, C. R.: Temperature profiles throughout cigarettes, cigars, and pipes. *Science* 122, 514 (1955).
- GRIFFON, H., and J. DELGA: Arsenic contents of some sorts of commercial tobaccos. Fate of the arsenic during combustion. *Ann. Pharm. France* 5, 343 (1947).
- GROSS, C. R., and O. A. NELSON: Arsenic in tobacco smoke. *Amer. J. Pub. Health* 24, 36 (1934).
- GROTEPASS, F. W. K.: Over een mogelijke van loodvergiftiging door tabek en tabaksstof. *Tsch. Soc. Geneesk.* 16, 25 (1941).
- GUNTHER, F. A., R. C. BLINN, E. BENJAMINI, W. R. KINKADE, and L. D. ANDERSON: Magnitudes and natures of nicotine residues on and in field-treated Texas mustard greens. *J. Agr. Food Chem.* 7, 330 (1959).
- GUTHRIE, F. E., and T. G. BOWERY: Thiodan and Telodrin residues on tobacco. *J. Econ. Entomol.* 55, 1017 (1962).
- , C. B. McCANTS, and H. G. SMALL: Arsenic content of commercial tobacco, 1917-1958. *Tobacco Sci.* 3, 82 (1959 a).
- , R. L. RABB, and T. G. BOWERY: Evaluation of candidate insecticides and insect pathogens for tobacco hornworm control, 1956-58. *J. Econ. Entomol.* 52, 798 (1959 c).
- , F. R. LAWSON, and R. L. BARON: Control of hornworms and budworms on tobacco with reduced insecticide dosage. *Tobacco Sci.* 3, 65 (1956 b).
- HAAG, H. G., and P. S. LARSON: Studies on the fate of nicotine in the body. 1. The effect of pH on the urinary excretion of nicotine by tobacco smokers. *J. Pharmacol. Expt. Therap.* 76, 235 (1942).
- HANSSON, E., and C. G. SCHMITTERLOW: Physiological disposition and fate of C<sup>14</sup> labeled nicotine in mice and rats. *J. Pharmacol. Expt. Therap.* 137, 91 (1962).
- HOFFMAN, I., and E. V. PARUPS: Analysis for maleic hydrazide. 1. Detection and determination in dried green tobacco leaves and suckers. *J. Agr. Food Chem.* 10, 453 (1962).
- , and R. B. CARSON: Analysis for maleic hydrazide. 2. Determination and persistence in soils. *J. Agr. Food Chem.* 10, 454 (1962).
- HOLLAND, R. H., M. S. McCALL, and H. C. LANZ: A study of inhaled arsenic-74 in man. *Cancer Research* 19, 1154 (1959).
- , R. H. WILSON, D. MORRIS, M. S. McCALL, and H. LANZ: The effect of cigarette smoke on the respiratory system of the rabbit. *Cancer* 11, 709 (1958 a).
- , A. R. ACEVEDO, M. S. McCALL, D. A. CLARK, and H. C. LANZ: A study of arsenic in regular-sized unfiltered and filtered cigarettes. *Cancer* 11, 1115 (1958 b).
- HOWARD, L. O.: The principal insects affecting the tobacco plant. *U.S. Department of Agriculture Farmer's Bull.* 120, 1 (1900).
- KNIGHTER, J.: Uit en voor de praktijk loodvergiftiging. *Gen. Gids* 16, 271 (1938).
- LANZ, H. P. C. WALLACE, and J. G. HAMILTON: The metabolism of arsenic in laboratory animals using As<sup>74</sup> as a tracer. *Univ. Calif. Berkeley Publ. Pharmacol.* 2, 263 (1950).
- LARSON, P. S., H. S. HAAG, and H. SILVETTE: Tobacco: Experimental and clinical studies. *Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins* (1961).
- LAWSON, F. R., C. CORLEY, and M. S. SCHECHTER: Insecticide residues on tobacco during 1962. *Tobacco Sci.* 8, 110 (1964).
- , R. L. RABB, F. E. GUTHRIE, and T. G. BOWERY: Studies of an integrated control system for hornworms on tobacco. *J. Econ. Entomol.* 54, 93 (1961).
- LUCAS, G. C.: Unpublished data. *N. Carolina State Univ., Raleigh* (1966).
- MANSON, G. F., J. R. W. MILES, R. J. McCLANAHAN, and W. W. SANS: Insecticide deposits from dusts or sprays applied by aircraft to flue-cured tobacco. *J. Econ. Entomol.* 55, 252 (1962).
- McKENNIS, H., S. L. SCHWARTZ, and E. R. BOWMAN: Alternate routes in the metabolic degradation of the pyrrolidine ring of nicotine. *J. Biol. Chem.* 239, 3990 (1964).
- MOLD, C. D., and T. B. WALKER: Isolation of TDE from cigarette smoke. *Tobacco Sci.* 1, 161 (1957).
- MONNETT, R., and O. DuPONT: L'arsenic dans les tobacs d'algerie tobacs a fumer et a macher. *Bull. Algerien. Cardinal* 6, 19 (1953).
- MOSLEY, J. M., G. M. BROADUS, and C. S. BOGGS: Some effects of soil fumigation on the composition of flue-cured tobacco. *Tobacco Chemists' Research Conf., Winston-Salem, North Carolina* (Oct. 1-2, 1953).
- POPP, H.: Vorkommen von Arsen in Tabak. *Ztschr. angew. Chemie* 41, 383 (1928).
- RABB, R. L., and F. R. LAWSON: Some factors influencing the predation of *Polistes* wasps on the tobacco hornworm. *J. Econ. Entomol.* 50, 778 (1957).
- , H. H. NEUNZIG, and H. V. MARSHALL: Effect of certain cultural practices on the abundance of tobacco hornworms, tobacco budworms, and corn earworms on tobacco after harvest. *J. Econ. Entomol.* 57, 791 (1964).
- , E. A. STEINHAUS, and F. E. GUTHRIE: Preliminary tests using *Bacillus thuringiensis* Berliner against hornworms. *J. Econ. Entomol.* 50, 259 (1957).
- REMINGTON, R. E.: hitherto unsuspected source of arsenic in human environment. *J. Amer. Chem. Soc.* 49, 1410 (1927).
- SATTERLEE, H. S.: The problem of arsenic in American cigarette tobacco. *New England J. Med.* 254, 1149 (1956).
- SHEETS, T. J., J. W. SMITH, and M. D. JACKSON: Insecticide residues on cigarettes. *Bull. Environ. Contamination and Toxicol.* (In prep.) (1967).
- SMALL, H. G.: Unpublished data. *N. Carolina State Univ., Raleigh* (1960).
- , and C. B. McCANTS: Residual arsenic in soils and concentrations in tobacco. *Tobacco Sci.* 6, 34 (1962).
- STONE, G. J.: The fate of maleic hydrazide in a burning cigarette. Unpublished report, May 1957. Abstracted in ZUKEL, J. W.: A literature summary on maleic hydrazide, 1949-1957. *United States Rubber Co., Naugatuck Chem. Div., Naugatuck, Conn.* (1957).
- SURGEON GENERAL: Smoking and health. Report of the advisory committee to the Surgeon General of the U. S. *Public Health Service. P.H.S. publication* no. 1103 (1964).
- THOMAS, M. D., and T. R. COLLIER: The concentration of arsenic in tobacco smoke determined by a rapid titrimetric method. *J. Ind. Hyg. Toxicol.* 27, 201 (1945).
- THURSTON, R., and P. CAUDILL: Unpublished data. *Dept. Entomol., Ky. Agr. Expt. Sta. Lexington* (1962).
- TOUPEY, G. P., and R. C. MUMPOWER: Measurement of the combustion-zone temperature of cigarettes. *Tobacco Sci.* 1, 33 (1957).
- WALLIS, R. L., F. F. SMITH, H. G. WHEELER, and E. A. TAYLOR: Malathion residues on vegetable, berry, and tobacco crops. *J. Econ. Entomol.* 50, 362 (1957).
- WEBER, J. H.: Arsenic in cigarette tobacco. *J. Sci. Food Agr.* 8, 490 (1957).
- WOLFE, H. R., W. DURHAM, and J. T. ARMSTRONG: Health hazards of the pesticides endrin and dieldrin. *Arch. Environ. Health* 6, 458 (1963).
- WOLFF, W. A., and W. E. GILES: Studies on tobacco chewing. *Fed. Proc.* 9, 248 (1950).
- YAMAMOTO, I., Y. KUROGUCHI, and M. TAKEUCHI: Studies on nicotine detoxication in the rabbit. *Fol. Pharm. Japan* 51, 60 (1955).
- ZEIDLER, F. A. J., and W. J. WAGNER: The lead and arsenic content of Canadian domestic tobacco. *Canad. Pub. Health J.* 28, 502 (1937).

**A CITIZEN TAKES A HARD LOOK AT THE ABM DEBATE—AN ARTICLE BY DEAN ACHESON**

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I have before me an article entitled "A Citizen Takes a Hard Look at the ABM Issue," which was written by Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State, and a well-known public official. The article was published in the Sunday Star of yesterday.

We all know Dean Acheson as a rugged individual, a man of vast experience in government, and a man who has faced the complicating questions of dealing with the Soviets. We know him as a gentleman who for many years was on the hot spot during the Korean war.

I think this article should be read by everyone who is interested in the ABM issue. It is a forthright exposition by a distinguished American. After leaving office, Dean Acheson continued to serve in an advisory capacity to more than one President. Some of the points made by Mr. Acheson should lay to rest some of the criticisms being leveled at the proposed program.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article to which I have referred may be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**A CITIZEN TAKES A HARD LOOK AT THE ABM DEBATE**

(By Dean Acheson)

Complexity is a serious obstacle to the working of the democratic process. This process requires a high degree of intelligent citizen understanding of issues that profoundly affect us all. Once an issue is wrapped in technological jargon and subtle misrepresentation, the citizen is tempted to throw in the intellectual towel and be pushed toward the conclusion favored by the vocal technocrats and other spokesmen who have captured the headlines and have sought to monopolize the positive symbols of peace.

This seems to be the course being followed in the debate over the President's proposal to deploy a modest Safeguard ABM system during the next five years to protect our Minuteman missiles against Soviet attack.

Four arguments, often wrapped in most confusing technical terms and resting on tendentious assertions, have been made against the Safeguard system:

1. The Minuteman missiles do not need protection.
2. The Safeguard ABM will not protect the missiles.
3. Safeguard will cost so much as to delay much-needed domestic programs.
4. A decision to deploy Safeguard will imperil strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.

Before we examine these arguments in layman's terms, let us first see what the situation is that has led the President to conclude that prudence requires the Safeguard defense system.

Over many years, we have sought to obtain Soviet agreement on the control of atomic energy and nuclear armaments. This effort did not succeed, and both the United States and the Soviet Union have developed a large number of intercontinental and medium-range missiles armed with nuclear warheads. The United States at one time had a great superiority in these weapons, but today, as a result of steady growth in the Soviet missile force and the leveling off of the U.S. force, the Soviet Union now can deliver slightly

more nuclear megatonnage by intercontinental missiles than we can.

**THREE TYPES**

The American nuclear arms system has three principal types of weapons: land-based Minuteman missiles in concrete silos sunk in the earth, shorter range missiles carried by nuclear submarines deployed much nearer their targets, and manned aircraft armed with nuclear bombs, but more vulnerable than either of the other two.

Both countries have developed antiballistic missile systems (ABMs) that can destroy in space incoming missiles detected by radar. The Russians have deployed some 60 of these (around Moscow). We have deployed none in the United States. The President proposes that we deploy ABMs around Minuteman silo sites to add to their security—hence, the name of the program, Safeguard.

The major new and urgent reason for this proposal now is the rapid development and deployment by the USSR of their powerful missile called the SS-9. This missile will be so accurate by the mid-1970's that its nuclear warhead would strike close enough to a Minuteman missile to destroy it despite the protection of its buried concrete silo. Moreover, the SS-9 is so large that it can carry as many as three nuclear warheads—perhaps more—each capable of destroying a different Minuteman missile.

The slower, manned bombers of SAC are much more vulnerable than hardened missiles, and will become increasingly vulnerable as the deployment of Soviet nuclear submarines close to the United States reduces the warning time of an incoming attack. The increasing vulnerability of SAC bombers as well as Minuteman would reduce our reliance for nuclear retaliation chiefly to the Polaris-Poseidon system, thus simplifying Soviet military planning. No one can say how long it will be before some technical breakthrough also renders our submarines vulnerable. Any such result would strike at the central purpose of what has been thought of as our nuclear strategy—that is, deterrence.

It would have been much better if nuclear weapons had never been possible or invented. But they exist—and are likely to continue to exist in even more dangerous forms—and while they do, what security there is lies in deterring their use by either side. Winston Churchill called this "the balance of terror." Mutual deterrence depends on the incapacity of either great nuclear power to wholly destroy the opponent's capacity to retaliate with a crushing blow. The conviction that a nuclear attack will inevitably bring on doomsday for all is our principal hope of averting nuclear war. Anything that may weaken that conviction is a betrayal of mankind.

To protect the Minuteman's contribution to deterrence, to frustrate any Soviet plan aimed at removing this agency of retaliation, the President has asked for the Safeguard system. How valid are the objections to Safeguard?

First, it is said that the Minuteman silos do not need protection. The Russian SS-9s, it is argued, are not sufficiently dependable and accurate to take out all our missiles before some would be off on their missions to Moscow and other targets. It would be better, it is said, to invest in more Minuteman missiles and rely on instantaneous retaliation rather than fall into the fatal Maginot Line defensive attitude.

**ESTIMATE ACCEPTED**

It is difficult for laymen to judge the performance of the Soviet SS-9s. In the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, I accept the estimates of the U.S. intelligence community, a group of highly trained professionals who examine these complex technical developments from every possible angle. Over many years I have had to decide ques-

tions on which experts differed. The truth may range somewhere between them, but usually nearer to the views of those who have most often done careful homework, who have been right in the past, and who have not interjected political factors into their technical judgment. Security based on an optimistic view of Russian incompetence rests on a ledge too narrow for safety. We had best assume that our opponent is as smart as we are.

Even worse, many ABM opponents advocate alternatives that would appear more provocative to the Soviet Union, would stimulate an arms race in offensive weapons, and would limit the military and diplomatic options of the President in a confrontation with a nuclear adversary.

Some of those who argue against ABMs urge the President to follow the "policy of the empty silo"—that is, to fire the Minuteman missiles at Russian cities on the first radar report of incoming missiles and thus avoid being stripped of our deterrent. The time available for such a decision precludes any deliberation by the President, or, perhaps, any notice to him.

Whoever in fact gives the order, the judgment to start action to destroy millions of Russian people bring counter-retaliation on millions of Americans might really be that of comparatively junior military officers. Having been through one radar alarm (happily false) of incoming hostile planes some hours before the presumed attack, I have little desire to see such decisions made in a matter of seconds.

Other opponents of deployment urge that we take a chance on the survival of enough Minutemen for counter-attack by building more, putting more concrete around the silos, and relying on Russian inaccuracy in hitting them. I understand the experts disagree on the efficacy of these measures. Whether they would protect Minutemen or not, the effect of this strategy would be to absorb on American soil, even though not directly on American cities, the brunt of the first attack, with the full effects of its fallout sweeping across the country. The ABM, on the other hand, seeks to confine the first nuclear exchange so far as possible to outer space, so that the destruction directly and through fallout will be far less and the consequences of error less ghastly. Also, it might give both sides one last clear chance to pause and think before plunging into the cataclysm of nuclear war between the superpowers.

Even though some attacking missiles would undoubtedly get through, the damage would be far less and, also, the temptation to steal an advantage by a surprise first blow, a nuclear Pearl Harbor, if the essence of sane nuclear strategy is deterrence, these are essential elements in strengthening it.

**COUNTER MEASURES**

Second, it is argued that Safeguard will not be effective in protecting Minutemen because Safeguard can be easily overwhelmed.

A few weeks ago some scientists were suggesting that a myriad of technical devices could be employed to render Safeguard ineffective. We heard a great deal then about penetration aids, precursor blasts, and the like, all presumed to be available to the Russians as well as being cheap, reliable, and effective. Indeed, every counter measure theoretically thought to be possible was offered as though it rendered Safeguard a hopelessly vulnerable victim to any device, even a gleam in a scientist's eye.

Much of this hasty prophesy has been quietly withdrawn—although not, to be sure, renounced. It quickly became apparent that the designer of Safeguard had thoroughly investigated the devices with which it will have to contend, knew their limits of cost, availability and effectiveness, and had taken them into account in the de-

sign of the system. So the air is somewhat cleared of chaff, electronic jamming devices, radar-blinding blasts, protected warheads, and decoys.

With the demise of the decoys, some perspective has been gained. The ground to which the doubting scientists have shifted is itself as doubtful. The claim now is that for the defense of Minutemen one would want a system different from Safeguard, because its radar is soft, and therefore an easy and inviting target. The ease with which radar—the “eye” of the system—can be destroyed is the contentious issue on which critics presently base their judgment that Safeguard can be “easily” overwhelmed.

Any antiballistic missile system requires a radar. Whether it is an easy target or a difficult one depends on whether it is defended, and, of course, Safeguard has, as a major function, defense of its own radar.

Defending the radar means having missiles available to intercept Soviet missiles aimed at its destruction. To overwhelm the system the Soviets must fire a number of offensive missiles sufficient to exhaust the interceptors. Now, there is no reason to believe that they will have this number by the time Safeguard will become operational. But reason has given way to invention here again, and some scientists have postulated a special Soviet missile force whose sole mission would be to attack the radars in large numbers.

This specialized force does not now exist. The Soviets lack the required technology to produce it. Their entire weapons program, unlike our own, has concentrated on the development of large, rather than small warheads. Precise costs are uncertain, but certainly high. Even if all of the necessary technology, production, testing, evaluation, and deployment could be managed, the required effort would be considerable. And we could make additions to Safeguard which, at substantially lower cost, could offset even this uncertain, difficult, and costly Soviet effort.

#### OFFENSE AND DEFENSE

Indeed, it is a reasonable hope that our willingness and capacity to frustrate a Soviet attack by forcing it to cope with Safeguard will induce the Russians to abandon efforts to develop the means for such an attack. What is certainly clear is that if we make it easy rather than difficult for them, and if we make it cheap rather than expensive, we will only encourage a posture that we have sought persistently, with great effort, to frustrate and dissuading them from developing.

While on this point, let me warn against the danger of underestimating defense even in nuclear war. Throughout military history the advantage has moved back and forth between the offense and the defense, but never to the elimination, or even great reduction in the importance of either. To use “a Maginot Line mentality” as a pejorative term is to be trapped by a cliché. The Maginot Line was good and useful strategically and tactically. It was never designed as the sole and sufficient defense of France. Its flanks and top had to be protected also.

The Germans never broke the Maginot Line; they outflanked it at its northern end through feebly-held Belgian positions and inadequate British and French mobile forces. The planned ABM deployment can be saturated but not by missiles it is planned to meet in the mid-1970s. If these are increased, Safeguard can be increased also. But to write off our bombers and land-based missile forces and rely only on submarines as critics suggest would be true Maginot psychology.

Third, it is argued that Safeguard will seriously interfere with much-needed social programs to improve our domestic life. This argument is untrue and based on the subtle misrepresentation that defense expenditures over the past several years have “taken

away” resources for domestic needs. On the contrary, from 1964 to 1970 Federal expenditures on welfare programs increased 120 percent, while defense spending, including Vietnam, increased only 55 percent. Furthermore, our direct expenditures on the nuclear strategic forces have decreased by about 50 percent from 16 billion dollars to 8 billion dollars annually. During the same period the Soviet expenditures in the same field have increased by about 70 percent, from \$10 billion to \$17 billion.

The requested ABM Safeguard program for five years is projected at \$10 billion, including research and development. On an annual basis this amounts to about one-fortieth of the current defense budget and less than one-fourth of one percent of our gross national product.

This comparatively small investment buys added security for a large portion of our retaliatory force. To give an idea of the order of magnitude involved, the needed expenditure by this country over the next five years to clear up pollution of the atmosphere would be about \$150 billion.

Moreover, the critics who suggest that the total \$101 billion cost of Safeguard could be saved for other uses are either misleading themselves or misleading the public. Virtually all the critics of Safeguard have advocated continuing research and development of ABM, which presently makes up more than three billion dollars of the total program cost. The critics themselves never cease to recommend alternatives to Safeguard which, if not as irresponsible as the “launch-on-warning” doctrine, are at the least costly, probably more costly than Safeguard.

The recent proposal that we double the number of our Minuteman missiles so that a sufficient number will survive a Soviet attack has been advocated largely on the grounds that it would cost less than Safeguard. Such a program would, however, almost certainly precipitate a dangerous increase in offensive missiles on both sides, as each struggled to maintain its position in an offensive arms race. The ultimate cost of such a program would be very much higher than Safeguard, as well as being open-ended and dangerously destabilizing.

#### WON'T HURT ANYONE

Fourth, it is argued that an ABM deployment will inhibit negotiation with the Russians about limiting nuclear armaments. This argument goes against both reason and experience. Safeguard does not add offensive weapons that Russians might believe they must match. The ABM will not hurt anyone, it will not enter Soviet territory. It is designed to meet and destroy an offensive weapon in space or above our territory. The Russians already have the ABM; they understand it. Our possession and deployment of these weapons will add greatly to their hesitancy to precipitate doomsday, but not to their fear that we will do so.

There have been no official or unofficial complaints by the Soviets, of which I am aware, concerning our proposals now and earlier to develop and deploy ABMs. Their leaders repeatedly assert the desirability of purely defensive weapons. Soviet strategic and political plans and agreements are made strictly in accordance with their own estimate of what is to their national interest, with what they call the calculus of forces. What we do is of interest to them in its effect, if any, on that calculus.

A decision by the Congress to reject the President's Safeguard proposal or to delay it pending negotiations with the Soviet Union would be seen in Moscow as a weakening of the United States deterrent forces. Either decision would materially reduce the chances for a successful outcome of those negotiations.

#### AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I should like to speak today on the critical issue of the anti-ballistic-missile system. I have spoken frequently against the recommendations of the Committee on Armed Services, and today I should like to speak in detail, setting forth the reasons for my opposition.

I certainly do not want to see this country undefended but I also do not want us to live under the illusion that the Safeguard ABM system will provide an adequate defense.

If I thought Safeguard would make our chances for survival greater, I would support it.

If I thought large expenditures of funds on an ABM system would provide an effective defense for the country, I would advocate spending the money.

I favor continued research, development, and testing for ABM systems. R.D. & T. serves a double purpose: it protects us against changes in the world nuclear situation and it either produces a workable ABM or provides the system unworkable. Also, it avoids fantastically expensive deployment costs on a system which may be unworkable or obsolete.

The Hart-Cooper amendment stresses further ABM research, development, and testing, but it carefully prevents deployment of any sort; nothing can go into the ground. The reasoning behind it is that deployment is what throws uncertainties into the arms race and disarmament talks; deployment is what commits us to a system.

If, as the amendment provides, there is to be no preparation of any site, research and development will not be conducted in North Dakota or Montana. The facilities at Kwajalein or the contractors' plants are far better suited for testing than installation facilities not yet constructed.

Any partial preparation of missile sites will commit us to further deployment; therefore, I support the Hart-Cooper amendment that will allow further ABM research and development, but bar the deployment of any components of the system.

The reasons for my position reflect my general views on the deployment of Safeguard. I have opposed it because I fear its effect on the crucial disarmament talks; question its technical feasibility;

believe there are better, cheaper, and more certain means of protection; am not convinced that the Russian threat is as immediate as the Pentagon would have us believe; and place a priority on domestic spending to meet our tremendous needs at home.

Nuclear clouds. Mushroom shaped. Scattered across the face of the earth. We live daily and have for the past two decades with the possibility. Occasionally, we worry about it publicly, as in the 1950's, when local schools, and municipal buildings were stocked with civil defense shelters and supplies, or in 1962, when we had a close brush with nuclear confrontation in Cuba.

Nevertheless, day in and day out, 1,054 intercontinental missiles wait to be released, 30 minutes from their anticipated destination in the Soviet Union.

Of the 656 sea-based missiles, about 400 are always beneath the sea waiting to be launched from 41 Polaris submarines.

Forty percent of the 680 intercontinental bombers, armed with four hydrogen bombs each, are kept on strategic alert, ready to take off in less than 15 minutes at warning provided by the ballistic missile early warning system.

The United States plans to double its more than 4,000 strategic nuclear weapons in the next few years.

Minuteman II, the third version of the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile, currently is replacing the two earlier versions. If the Minuteman III force is set at 500 missiles, total individually aimed ICBM warheads will increase from 1,000 to 2,000. The submarine Polaris A-3, also a third-generation missile, is fitted with a cluster of three warheads. With completion of the planned Poseidon submarine force, individually aimed warheads on submarines will rise from 656 to more than 6,000. Within the next several years, about one-half of the bomber force will be replaced with new and faster aircraft. And none of this includes the tactical nuclear weapons we have positioned throughout the world.

Arrayed on the Soviet side are between 1,050 and 1,100 intercontinental ballistic missiles, about 700 of which have been deployed in the last 3 years. Two hundred of these missiles are the large and accurate SS-9 which, like the U.S. Minuteman II, may be outfitted with multiple individually aimed warheads in the future. The Soviet Union also has between 700 and 800 intermediate-range ballistic missiles aimed at Western Europe.

Within the past year, the Russians have launched several submarines comparable to the U.S. Polaris, carrying 30 long-range missiles. Their arsenal includes 10 to 15 other nuclear-powered submarines each carrying three missiles of a shorter range capability.

Obviously, the world nuclear destructive capacity has grown from the development of the atomic and hydrogen bombs to immense proportions, with the major powers having more than sufficient sophisticated delivery systems for hydrogen weapons. The United States maintains its numerical lead in every category of weapons, but both are con-

fident of the capability to kill hundreds of millions of persons.

The capability exists and is deployed; however, it has not been used because of belief in mutual deterrence. Both Russia and the United States are deterred from launching a "first-strike" by the knowledge that the other would inevitably retaliate, and could destroy one-third to two-thirds of the attacker's population and industry.

This uneasy deterrence balance is threatened by the deployment of the American Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system. The threat comes from uncertainties—the uncertainties as to whether an anti-ballistic-missile system can work because it is impossible to test under the circumstances of a real nuclear warhead attack, the uncertainties which come with the inevitable introduction of offensive weapons to negate the effectiveness of an ABM defense, the uncertainties which must be added when we spiral into a new round of nuclear weapons development and the uncertainties about our intentions when the deployment of more weapons indicates a decision to spend on military materials rather than on peaceful and domestic needs.

Unusable nuclear weapons offer us nothing but a balance of terror. After having stockpiled nuclear weapons with an explosive power of 15 tons of TNT for every man, woman, and child on earth, it seems absurd to be told that we must increase our nuclear armaments so that we can disarm from a position of strength. An equal absurdity is that the moment we begin the work on ABM's, we and the Russians also build the MIRV—multiple independent re-entry vehicle—the weapon to circumvent ABM's.

The impact of agonies and absurdities surrounding the American defense posture of the past 20 years, Prof. George Wald, of Harvard, says, is what is bothering the students. "I think that what we are up against is a generation that is by no means sure that it has a future."

To straighten out the problems which Americans confront, both young and old, we must make clear that we are a nation of peace, not a nation of war; a nation of life and not one of death and destruction. The best way we can do this is by making every possible effort to achieve successful disarmament talks.

First, Ending the nuclear arms race is so important that we must let nothing jeopardize disarmament talks. I fear the effect of a decision to deploy Safeguard, creating uncertainties about our good intentions and difficulties for enforcing any arms accord. If we fail to take advantage of an opportunity to level off the arms race when both the Americans and the Russians feel that they have a secure deterrence, we forgo a rare opportunity to achieve peace and security.

Both the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the possibility for disarmament talks offer some hope of escape from the arms race. After China and France entered the category of nations with nuclear capability, we sought international agreement to stop the worldwide deployment of nuclear weapons. The treaty may be abrogated, but inter-

national negotiations and agreements, international good faith, are truly our only means of survival. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty gives us a chance to step back, at least symbolically, from the international competition in arms, and to encourage other nations to do the same thing.

Section VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty requires the United States and Russia to do everything possible to halt the arms race, including disarmament talks. Whether or not we follow that specific encouragement, the U.S. acceptance of the treaty is hollow indeed if it is not followed by other efforts to dampen the arms race. However, our good faith will also be questioned if we move ahead with ABM deployment notwithstanding ongoing disarmament talks. Deployment of the ABM or any other new missile development such as the MIRV flies in the face of our proclaimed policy of nonproliferation.

I am terribly afraid that our deployment of ABM, even the initial authorization of deployment at two sites, and the further testing and installation of MIRVed warheads will seriously jeopardize any chance we have of achieving accord through disarmament talks. Therefore, I deplore the fact that the Air Force recently ordered MIRV warheads.

I joined with 40 other Members of the Senate to introduce a resolution calling upon the administration to enter into a mutual moratorium with the Soviet Union on testing the MIRV warheads. Although the Soviets possess the technology and capability to deploy MIRV, it is unclear whether tests of their version of the MIRV have begun. The best way to stop Soviet development of the weapon is a suspension of American tests as long as the Soviet Union refrains from testing as well. This would keep the situation stable until there is an opportunity to reach agreement on a limitation of both ABM and MIRV.

There simply is no need to develop either the anti-ballistic-missile system of MIRV if we can reach an agreement with the Soviets to stop mutual development.

On the other hand, President Nixon's policy for the talks seems to be negotiation of a weapons escalation. Mr. President, I will repeat the last sentence, because I am very fearful that what I say is correct. On the other hand, President Nixon's policy for the talks seems to be negotiation of a weapons escalation. The administration freely acknowledges and proclaims it is now deploying the MIRV system. The administration must intend to negotiate a workable MIRV and a workable ABM if it follows the line that we would put ourselves in the strongest position by having both an ABM system and a fully-tested MIRV when we go into the talks. The majority of the committee on Armed Services made explicit their view of the administration's position:

The President believes that the backing of the Congress on his Safeguard program would strengthen his hand in the forthcoming negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitation of offensive and defensive nuclear systems. If we unilaterally abandon all deployment of our ABM's, what incentive do

we give the Soviets to negotiate with us a limit or a reduction in their ABM deployment?

The Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, in his defense of the Safeguard system in hearings before a House Appropriations Subcommittee on May 22, 1969, brushed off the problems of achieving arms limitation while the Safeguard is being deployed:

Meanwhile, we have to deal with the world as it is today. Until an acceptable arrangement is achieved, we must continue to insure the sufficiency of our deterrent.

Noting the existence of the Galosh ABM defense which has been deployed around Moscow and contains 67 missiles—a system most observers term obsolete—Laird continued his testimony:

It is entirely possible that a Soviet-United States agreement on strategic arms limitation might provide for limited ABM defense on both sides.

He ignored, however, any problems of Soviet reaction or of inspection.

The obstacles, which deployment of ABM and MIRV could put in the way of achieving some type of arms limitation agreement are: First, what will be the Soviet reaction—and our counter-reaction—and second, assuming that the situation does not remain stable, once we have achieved even limited ABM and MIRV deployment, how can any limitation and its accompanying verification problems be achieved.

We must assume that the Soviet reaction to our deployment of ABM will be to either scale up the number of deterrent missiles, strengthen their own anti-ballistic-missile system, or put multiple warheads on their existing missiles. The response might well include all three. We should keep in mind that one of the reasons used by the administration for present deployment of the Safeguard system is that the Russians have deployed a limited anti-ballistic-missile system.

Of course, the fear of either country concerning the other's ABM system is that it may be effective, and if it is effective, it could end the deterrent value of existing missiles. Mutual deterrents depend not on the number of weapons maintained by each side, but on the assurance that either side will be able to retaliate to a degree that is unacceptable if attacked by the other. If one country can protect itself against attack, then it can use its missiles on an offensive, "first-strike" basis with impunity. Secretary Laird has argued that the Soviets are moving toward a "first-strike" capacity with the development of larger and more accurate missiles and a small ABM system.

The Soviets could argue that the United States is doing the same thing by deploying ABM and adding MIRV warheads to our existing nuclear weapons. Our ABM system contains at least 10 times as many missiles as the Galosh system around Moscow. A Soviet cost analysis would show that most of the cost of the proposed American Safeguard system goes purely for population defense although its proponents claim the system

is intended to defend our missiles, bombers, and the center of command, Washington, D.C.

Safeguard presumes to protect nearly all of the United States from a "light" or accidental attack and it can be the basis for a "thick" city defense system which the Russians would fear as giving us the "first-strike" capacity. In addition, we have begun work on MIRV which can circumvent the ABM on the grounds that the Russians have deployed an ABM system around Moscow.

Developments by one nation inevitably breed developments by the other.

Although the Defense Department claims a rapid buildup in Soviet forces indicates their push toward a "first-strike" capacity, many other observers argue that the rapid Soviet buildup is only an effort to achieve parity with the number of missiles maintained by the United States.

If both the United States and Russia have ABM and MIRV, arms limitation negotiators, although they might be able to negotiate an acceptable limitation on the deployment of ABM and MIRV, would be faced with the problem of inspection. As ABM defense may include a large number of small missiles or missiles with multiple warheads which would be impossible to count unless onsite inspection were allowed. Equally difficult to check would be the performance of radars or computer programs. Deployment of ABM enhances the incentives to deploy MIRV, which makes the probability of arriving at an agreement even more complicated.

We have a chance in the ABM vote to assure meaningful disarmament talks—uncomplicated by the problems of onsite inspection—by demonstrating our good faith and slowing the deployment of ABM.

Proponents of ABM claim that it will strengthen the President's hand as he enters arms negotiations with the Soviets. The assumption is that if the Soviets enter negotiations with a deployed ABM system, we should too. However, if the United States argues that it should be allowed to catch up to the modest Soviet system, then the Soviets in turn could argue that they should be permitted to close the gap in submarine-launched missile capabilities and the strategic bomber force. The superiority of the American Polaris force offsets by many times the U.S.S.R. ABM system.

The United States would do better if all new strategic force deployment, both offensive and defensive, for both sides is terminated as soon as possible. If disarmament talks fail and if the United States is in danger of dropping behind in the arms race, we can then rapidly deploy more offensive nuclear weapons.

Of course, I recognize that we must not fail to insure the safety of the United States from nuclear attack. On the other hand, we must not fail to take any steps to reduce or terminate the possibility of such attack. At the moment, the two world power nuclear forces are balanced, and that balance exists at a level far above the number of weapons needed to

inflict catastrophic damage. This dangerous fact can give us hope, hope of reaching some type of arms accord.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, speaking recently in Moscow to the Supreme Soviet, gave encouragement to an atmosphere which can produce meaningful talks; he said:

We are for the development of good relations with the United States and would like these relations to be turned into friendly ones because we are convinced that this would correspond to the interests of both the Soviet and the American peoples . . . when it comes to problems of safeguarding peace, the Soviet Union and the United States can find a common language.

He reaffirmed Soviet willingness to seek negotiations with the United States, but the Russians have yet to reply to the U.S. proposal to begin disarmament talks in the first 2 weeks of August. We should keep that fact in mind during our consideration of the effect of Safeguard deployment on Soviet willingness to talk about arms limits.

Our situation is well described at the conclusion of the "Over View" section by Abram Chayes, Jerome B. Wiesner, George W. Rathjens, and Steven Weinberg in "ABM: an Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic-Missile System."

We are now at a point where it can be said that both sides have a sufficiency, a moment of rare and precious strategic balance. That is why this moment seemed so hopeful for the conclusion of some kind of strategic arms limitation agreement, in which, as almost everyone agrees, the best hope for ultimate security lies.

If there are risks in deferring deployment for a time, we believe they are small. There are also risks in going forward now, because if this moment is lost, one like it will not come soon again.

Second, Safeguard is the most sophisticated system ever designed, and we have little assurance that it will work. More research, development, and testing should give that knowledge before we make a decision for deployment.

Assuming that what is for me the most important consideration—achieving arms limitation—is not a factor, will the proposed ABM system achieve its purposes?

The Safeguard system contemplates deployment at 12 sites within the continental United States: at missile bases, air bases and around Washington, D.C. The location of the sites provides light air cover for the entire continent. The Armed Services Committee has reported a bill which would authorize phase 1 of the Safeguard plan. Phase 1 allows acquisition of the sites at Grand Forks, N. Dak., and Malmstrom, Mont., and the missiles' radar and computer systems there.

The chief purpose of the ABM Safeguard system, we are told this year, is to defend American missile wings. At the same time, Safeguard is basically the Sentinel system proposed by President Johnson and intended to provide light protection for many American cities. By reducing the number of missile sites, increasing the radar capacity, and moving the missiles away from major cities, Sen-

tinels has become Safeguard, deployed not against a future Chinese attack on our cities, but against a future Soviet attack on our missile bases.

The shift is intended to allay Russian fears that the United States is building a viable defense that will protect it from the Russian deterrent. The basic components of Safeguard remain those of an area defense, providing a very light missile cover for nearly the entire continental United States.

Safeguard includes two separate radar systems: PAR—perimeter acquisition radar—a long-range radar design to detect incoming missiles at a range of 1,000 to 2,000 miles and track them until they come into the range of MSR—missile site radar—which performs surveillance and detection, target track, missile track, and command functions for the Safeguard antiballistic missiles. Their extensive range means the PAR's are not needed at every site.

The computers for this system, the largest and most complex ever built, are intended to interpret the radar signals, identify and track targets, distinguish between actual warheads and decoys, allocate and guide the Safeguard missiles, and fire them when they are within range of their target.

The two missiles in the system are the Spartan and the Sprint. The Spartan is a long-range missile, armed with a large warhead and designed to intercept incoming missiles in outer space. At that altitude effects from a nuclear explosion are felt on the surface of the earth. Spartan, therefore, is designed as a city defense, but an ineffective or open one because it is easy to fool the Spartan missile. All decoys, penetration devices and attempts to jam a missile are effective in outer space.

The other missile, Sprint, has a range of about 25 miles, is highly maneuverable, and has a high rate of acceleration. The Sprint is designed to pick up incoming missiles which escape the Spartan. It is less easy to mislead the Sprint with decoys because most of them burn up as the incoming missile enters the atmosphere.

The weakest link in the system is the radar. For radars to work they cannot be protected in silos such as the offensive missiles are. Consequently they are quite soft and vulnerable to less than a direct hit by an incoming missile. The radar sits exposed and virtually unprotectable—potentially as ineffective as a blinded Cyclops.

The long-range radar has little capability to discriminate between actual warheads and decoys. In addition, incoming missiles may be equipped with electronic jamming devices intended to mislead the radar. The Russians have developed FOBS—fractional orbit bombardment system—which delivers a missile on a much lower orbiting trajectory, accomplished by placing a missile in orbit and then breaking the orbit, giving the defensive radar scarcely 3 minutes warning. Intentionally caused fire storms or nuclear explosions screen incoming missiles from the defending radar.

No possibility exists for testing the system because it is impossible to simulate

an incoming nuclear attack with simultaneous explosions.

The radars, computers, and missiles must operate in close coordination, and the system, to be effective, must be able to handle a large number of incoming missiles at a time when there may be many nuclear explosions and blackouts. Past experience with complicated radar and computer systems is not encouraging. The SAGE—Semi-Automatic Ground Environment—was a defense system designed to protect against manned-bomber attack through the use of radar and computer analysis. After 15 years of work and \$20 billion, SAGE has not worked well enough to convince us of its reliability against a well-planned air attack. In this year's budget, the administration is asking for an airborne warning system (AWACS) because the ground-based radar was vulnerable in earlier warning systems; at the same time, the administration presses the expensive Safeguard which will be entirely dependent on ground-based radar.

Problems exist with each of the ABM components, and no one knows yet whether the system will work as a whole. All political questions aside, much more research and development and testing is needed before we deploy Safeguard.

I agree with the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that we should continue research and development on ABM systems. The world situation may change, and we may later want to deploy an ABM of some type; I do not believe that we should close all doors to that possibility.

Third, alternatives to Safeguard exist that are better, cheaper and more certain to achieve the purposes of an antiballistic-missile system.

Technical difficulties present different problems of varying seriousness of each of the specific defensive purposes.

The defensive missile site problems include the large number of Sprints which may be needed to destroy incoming ICBM's and the vulnerability of the radar. It would be much cheaper to either superharden the missile silos or increase the number of our offensive missiles so that more of them would survive an attempted preemptive first strike.

If a large number of offensive missiles are fired at one Minuteman site and if our ABM system at 95 percent effectiveness will allow one in 20 of the incoming missiles to penetrate the defense, it is difficult to expect the President to wait and see if the attack fails. Undoubtedly he would launch the Minutemen, and the ABM would be left defending open holes. If an enemy knows that the President will wait out a first-strike attack, it serves only to encourage that attack.

Cities are "soft" targets and extremely vulnerable to even one missile with a nuclear warhead eluding the defense. The Spartan missiles are especially designed to protect population centers, but decoys and penetration devices in outer space can mislead the radar and misdirect the Spartan.

No one claims that either the Sentinel or Safeguard system would be an adequate defense for cities. President Nixon, on March 4, 1969, warned—

The heaviest defense system we considered, one designed to protect our major cities, still could not prevent a catastrophic level of U.S. fatalities from a deliberate all-out Soviet attack.

Secretary of Defense Laird presented the predicted fatalities from a Soviet first strike in the mid-1970's. A Soviet attack with no defense could kill between 110 and 120 million Americans. It was predicted that the Sentinel system would cut the deaths to 100 million, decreasing the death rate by only about 15 percent.

Bomber bases are the same soft targets as cities. Safeguard's protection for them is ineffective and unneeded because the warning system and radars give ample opportunity for aircraft carrying nuclear arms to be aloft by the time missiles arrive.

ABM is also sold as protection against the accidental release of a missile against the United States. A better protection against an accidental launching is the use of a self-destructive device on each missile; such devices should be a subject for negotiation at the strategic arms limitation talks. Indeed it is perplexing why we have not equipped our ICBM's already with a self-destruct mechanism to avert an accident on our part.

Finally, in the attempt to find a purpose for phase I of the Safeguard system, Secretary of Defense Laird on May 22 rationalized the deployment of ABM at two missile sites, Montana and North Dakota, on the grounds that it would provide an opportunity to test the system.

Neither the Governor of Montana nor the Governor of North Dakota is happy about the prospect of ABM development in his State.

The type of research and development Mr. Laird envisaged at the two missile bases would be possible only if offensive missiles could be fired into the States with a nuclear blackout of some sort which is impossible under the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It would be far wiser to continue the development and testing at Kwajalein where there are research and development facilities already and the possibility exists of firing ICBM's into Kwajalein to actually test the system in limited circumstances.

In response to Mr. Laird's May 22 ABM White Paper, George W. Rathjens, Jerome B. Weisner, and Steven Weinberg, pointed out:

One cannot but wonder if all of the recent emphasis on the advantage of Phase I deployment for check-out and R&D purposes is an afterthought—an effort to find an acceptable rationale for the Safeguard decision, arrived at after it had become apparent that both the threat to our retaliatory force and Safeguard's actual utility as a defense for Minuteman had been much overstated.

The honorable Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE) has referred to the ABM system as a program in search of a mission. And indeed it is. We could have found and still can develop a better means of defending our ICBM's with an antiballistic-missile system which would be less expensive, and contain more, smaller missiles and a less sophisticated radar.

Chayes, Wiesner, Rathjens, and Weinberg outlined a good defense for our deterrent if a need were determined. First,

the ABM system would be concentrated to protect enough intercontinental ballistic missiles to assure the retaliatory capacity of the United States to any enemy first strike. They suggest that it protect two wings of missiles and not include the soft bomber bases. Second, it would not include Spartans and PAR's, intended for long-range use, and ineffective against heavy sophisticated attacks. Third, rather than using Sprints, it would use a simpler and cheaper weapon which could be deployed in greater numbers. The simpler weapon, although it would not protect cities, would be sufficient for the protection of hardened missile sites. Fourth, it would use more, cheaper, harder radars at each missile site. And finally, the computer programming would be far simpler because most decoys and penetration tactics are less effective at lower altitudes.

Basically, it is much simpler to defend our missile sites because they can be defended at lower altitudes. And as long as we are sure that we have retaliatory capacities sufficient to destroy or inflict intolerable damage upon the attacking nation, the concept of mutual deterrence keeps nuclear peace.

We should step back from Safeguard. If we later decide that it is necessary to deploy a deterrent defense, then we should deploy one that is designed to be effective. The trouble with Safeguard is that it is basically a city defense system with much of its cost allocated to components designed to defend a city against a light nuclear attack.

Secretary Laird in his March 19 testimony said that one of the reasons the administration rejected Sentinel was that it could be interpreted by the Russians as a first step toward a heavy city defense. Although the Safeguard missiles are not deployed as close to cities, the system itself is basically the same and subject to the same interpretations. A city defense, if it makes us invulnerable to attack and gives us the capacity for a safe first strike—at least if that is what the Russians think it does—steps up the ante in an arms race. Safeguard gives us a poor defense of the Minuteman missiles, very little protection from attack against our cities, and makes the Russians believe that we are building the basis for a city defensive system.

If we are concerned about the potential Russian threat of the mid-1970's, we should choose a response which takes less leadtime to develop than the complicated anti-ballistic-missile system. Because it takes between a year and a half and 2 years from the start of construction to the operational availability of an ICBM—as compared to the 1976 availability of ABM—it is wiser to plan to deploy more Minuteman missiles if we need them based on the evidence we have in 1972 or 1973. That alternative would protect us as well by 1975 as would the provocative ABM.

Thus far, about \$4.7 billion has been spent in research and development on land-to-air nuclear defense systems, including the Sentinel. Mr. Laird, to illustrate that the ABM system is ready for production and deployment, noted that some of the components are already be-

ing manufactured, and that \$434 million has been obligated for procurement; as of March 30, 1969, \$103 million in procurement funds had been expended. Although the bill before the Senate authorizes research and development, procurement and construction for ABM at a cost of about \$760 million, the actual cost of fiscal 1970 expenditures on Safeguard is an appropriation request of slightly over \$1 billion plus \$350,000 carried forward from the past year.

Costs for the completed Safeguard ABM are estimated presently at between \$10 and \$13 billion. The senior Senator from Missouri, (Mr. SYMINGTON), citing the additional costs of the C-5A transport plane and the F-111—at 5 times its original price—said it is within the range of possibility that the "thin" system could cost at least \$40 billion, and if we develop a heavier defense system, the cost could go as high as \$400 billion, a figure greater than the current national debt.

The \$40 billion figure includes sufficient missiles and radars for 95 percent effective protection of Minuteman missiles. This means that 1 in 20 offensive missiles would elude ABM, perhaps knocking out the system's radar and thus destroying the defense for a Minuteman wing. The price for ABM jumps to \$100 billion if ABM is deployed to defend 50 cities; the additional cost covers many more missiles, radars, and computers. If 95 percent effective ABM protection is provided for the entire country, the cost may go as high as \$400 billion, and still there is the chance that one in 20 missiles may get through.

The cost of any ABM system must be measured in the tens of billions of dollars; in contrast, we can duplicate the entire ICBM force or the entire Polaris fleet for about \$5 billion. The cost of superhardening 1,000 Minuteman missiles is between \$6 and \$7 billion. Superhardening would protect three times as many Minutemen as Safeguard phase I which would cost \$4 billion, and superhardening would increase the number of surviving missiles at least half again as compared to the number which would survive if protected by the full Safeguard program at a cost of more than \$10 billion.

If we do not deploy ABM we will continue to have sufficient defense to protect us for some time to come; the Polaris missiles, the defensive measures already taken to protect the ICBM's, and the mobility and quick reaction of bombers. The Safeguard system is intended to protect our Minuteman missiles. However, those missiles are already in hardened silos which prevent their destruction unless the attacking missile is accurate and carrying a heavy warhead. The early warning system allows a sufficient time for the Strategic Air Command to become airborne. Safeguard, as presently designed, would not assist in a defense of bomber bases from a simultaneous Russian attack on bomber bases and nuclear sites because radars employed in the ABM, if they work as described, pick up an incoming missile in time to allow the bombers to leave the

ground. The ABM is not intended to protect our Polaris missiles.

The key to our defense and stability has been, and will continue to be, the near-invulnerability of the deterrent force which arises from the diversity of weapons systems and the power of any single strategic weapon which we might send against an enemy urban target.

Fourth. The proponents of Safeguard base their case upon the threat of Russian missile development. They ignore the ease with which the Russians, if their threat is growing as fast as claimed, can nullify whatever ABM protection we deploy.

Our position is sufficiently strong for us to avoid the fears of a Russian buildup, but most military planners overreact to any new developments. We have been plagued with cries of "missile gap" for the past 15 years. The Senate Committee on Armed Services report on the ABM included minority views that the committee heard witnesses for deployment who said little other than to reemphasize fears of the Soviet Union. Questioning of Secretary Laird in the past few months indicates that this administration's justification for deploying a system to protect our missile sites from Russian attack is based upon the same evidence which allowed the previous administration to officially ignore the Russians and deploy a similar ABM system near cities to protect against a light Chinese attack.

Why the Russians accepted talks and what they plan in future missile deployment figures heavily in the thinking of proponents of ABM. President Nixon rejected canceling the Safeguard program and reverting to research and development because, according to Secretary Laird:

He was convinced that the Soviet threat to our bombers and land-based missiles was more imminent than previously assumed.

The majority report of the Armed Services Committee also was based upon a number of presumptions about Russian intentions: what their position will be in negotiations on ABM; how they will react to the talks if the United States does deploy ABM; and when they will have a variety of new weapons.

The emphasis of the majority position coincided with the armed services minority summary of the evidence presented:

It was noticed that witnesses who testified for deployment of the system devoted much if not most of their time to re-emphasizing their fear of the Soviet Union; whereas witnesses who opposed the proposed system expressed in detail why they believed the system would not work, or why and how it could be nullified in any real effectiveness by relatively minor additions to the Soviet SS-9 production.

The proponents of Safeguard, with the assistance of the Department of Defense, have declassified every possible piece of evidence about the Russian threat; at the same time they have refused to declassify how much more Russian development will be necessary to nullify our Safeguard system.

According to Wolfgang Panofsky, di-

rector of the Stanford linear accelerator and an expert on nuclear physics:

If the threat to Minuteman grows at the rate projected by the Defense Department, and if Minuteman become vulnerable at a certain time several years hence, then if the Safeguard system were installed and functioned perfectly, then the Minuteman would be just as vulnerable as before only a few months later . . .

It would . . . appear clear that if we proceed with these systems, the Soviet Union will respond by increasing its offensive strength so as to negate any possible advantage which might be derived from said Safeguard deployment. The result could only be a further escalation of the arms race.

The simplest offense against an ABM-protected installation would be to saturate it with incoming offensive missiles or with multiple warheads such as MIRV to the extent that all defensive missiles are used up. Experts have calculated that if we take into consideration a 30 percent failure probability for each missile, something that must be done under the present state of missile development, then three defensive missiles must be allocated to destroy each incoming warhead with 97 percent certainty. This requires that each missile base have three times as many defensive missiles as the number of offensive missiles they expect an attacker to use.

All of the Russian offensive missiles might be directed at several U.S. missile bases, and as long as the Russians have a slim margin of offensive missiles after the Safeguard defensive missiles are used up, they retain the ability to destroy the missile sites. An arms race between offensive missiles and the number of defensive missiles needed to destroy incoming warheads could spiral beyond control with neither side certain that it has the needed slim margin.

Fifth. The deterioration and uncertainty in American life raises a different security question; if we want to remedy domestic ills we must cut back our immense and disproportionate defense expenditures.

After three decades of war, World War II, the cold war, the Korean war, and the current war in Vietnam, Americans are tiring of military and defense spending consuming 40 percent to 60 percent of the Federal budget, especially as problems in the United States become less easy to ignore; they are becoming apprehensive of the warnings from the Pentagon which justify new projects.

Gen. David M. Shoup, retired commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, wrote recently:

The defense establishment now devotes a large share of its efforts to self-perpetuation, to justifying its organizations, to preaching its doctrines, and to self-maintenance and management. Warfare becomes an extension of war games and field tests. War justifies the existence of the establishment.

And the Defense Establishment has become the largest organization in the world. The Pentagon spends almost 10 percent of the U.S. gross national product; its spending accounts for 43 cents of every Federal tax dollar. The Military Establishment employs directly or indirectly 8.5 million people—one of every nine jobs in the United States. As of 1968

there were over 23 million living veterans of U.S. military service.

Congress has finally taken the size of the military and General Eisenhower's warning of the military-industrial complex to heart. Close investigation of Defense Department practices reveals which companies benefit from military procurement, contract profit margins and cost overruns, inefficient or shabby performance on contracts, the relationship between the military research centers and the Pentagon, and former military personnel employed in the defense industries.

In the past 6 months we have learned that almost all large military contracts overrun their original cost estimates from 200 percent to 700 percent. We have seen billions of dollars expended on major missile or defense systems abandoned as obsolete or unworkable after years of research and development. Work on such projects as the B-70 bomber, the nuclear-powered airplane, the Dyna-soar, the Sea Master jet-powered seaplane, and the Skybolt continued long after the projects were declared unworkable. More than \$15 billion of tax money has gone for missile systems produced, deployed, and then abandoned as out-dated or unworkable. The bad record of the military on keeping spending and costs under control decreases our confidence that the ABM is a system we can afford.

A commitment to an expensive, questionable ABM when taxpayers are caught between inflation largely caused by high rates of Federal spending—10 percent of the GNP is military spending—and high taxes—43 cents of every tax dollar goes to support the military—is unwise. I believe we should cut all funds for Safeguard deployment until we are convinced that there is a need, that there is no better alternative and that the system works.

But for now the question is whether we spend on destruction in the name of protecting life—which no one claims the Safeguard system can do—or on life-giving domestic programs.

Almost every great nation has been destroyed from within. If a nation will not spend money on problems within, then no amount of money spent on dangers from without will save that nation. A nation with the capability of destroying the world certainly must also have the capability for encouraging life.

Surely feeding the hungry, housing the poorly housed, remaking a livable environment, and providing adequate school and health facilities for millions of Americans must come before the deployment of yet another nuclear weapons system unless we find ourselves in a changed world position where the protection offered by our present deterrent is no longer effective. The administration states, however—

Notwithstanding the severe budget stringencies under which the Government will have to operate over the next fiscal year, President Nixon found it necessary to recommend this program to the Congress.

As Congress considers appropriations for domestic programs throughout the rest of the year, we shall realize exactly how expensive ABM is. One sacrifice of

a human program to the military effort was the \$100 million cut the Nixon administration made in the Job Corps. As a result of this cut, the number of Job Corps slots were reduced by more than half, ending training for 19,000 Corpsmen; 340 of them were at the Job Corps conservation camps at Lydick Lake and Tamarac, Minn.

The \$1 billion ABM will cost in fiscal year 1970 could buy many other human programs. \$1 billion could buy day care to provide Headstart opportunities for 625,000 more children. At least 500,000 welfare parents could receive job training and full supporting services to move into regular employment under the work incentive program (WIN) for \$1 billion. \$1 billion could buy 225,000 additional training-employment opportunities through the new careers program. And perhaps most striking, for less than half the cost of ABM we could provide children's allowances of \$50 per month for all children under the age of 6.

Estimates supplied by the Department of Agriculture, the Agricultural Committee and the National Planning Association, the National Council on Hunger and Malnutrition, and the Bureau of the Budget indicate that to feed the hungry through school lunches, food stamps and direct commodity distribution will cost anywhere from \$2 to \$4 billion dollars a year.

Congress has never adequately funded the low-income housing programs, rent supplements, the homeownership program, or the model cities programs. The Department of Housing and Urban Development receives hundreds more applications than it can possibly fulfill. The Riot Commission called for 6 million new housing units in the next 5 years for low- and moderate-income families; the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 set a similar goal for 10 years. The price tag? \$75 to \$80 billion in Government assistance over a 10-year period—the military budget for 1 year.

Crime control and law enforcement.

Public transportation systems.

Clean air and water.

We are not the only nuclear power feeling the pressure of domestic spending needs. The director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, Prof. Marshall D. Shulman believes that concern for the cost effect in the 1971-75 5-year plan of an upward-spiraling arms race led the Soviet leadership into accepting disarmament talks.

In a speech on the floor of the Senate recently, the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) cataloged the Soviet economic position. He pointed out that the Soviet Union supports 10 percent more people than the United States on one-half the economic production of this country. Correspondingly, its military budget at less than \$40 billion is about half that of the United States, after making allowances for price and wage differences.

The most severe Russian domestic spending pressures come from the agricultural and consumer sectors of the economy. Russia devotes seven times more people to agricultural production than does the United States, but it pro-

duces 20 percent less food. Industrial efficiency in the Soviet Union is coming more and more to depend upon motivation from the rewards of better housing, food and clothing. Soviet industrial investment must continue at the same rate to maintain the present growth of output necessary to support its military capacity. If the Soviet Union spends a greater share of its budget on the military, it will be to the detriment of a healthy economy and eventually to the detriment of the ability to support a large war machine.

The American people have lived with fear of Soviet attack for a quarter of a century and have expended a thousand billion dollars on defense in recognition of possible danger. Many billions of the dollars spent have been wasted. Gigantic military expenditures have been detrimental to many other plans, programs, and policies which now appear equally important to the security and well-being of this Nation.

If we had had more accurate information about planned Soviet strategic forces, we simply would not have needed to build as large a nuclear arsenal as we have today—

Said Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on September 18, 1967. He continued:

If the Soviet offensive-defensive threat does not increase beyond the highest level projected through 1972 and the latest national intelligence estimates, we will have more assured destruction capacity than we will probably need.

In the past it has proved impossible to defeat military plans. Patriotism and caution—the fear that if we do not spend every requested cent in protection of America, we may regret the day—have made military budget requests nearly sacred.

Are we now going to react with fear to statistics painting a supposed Russian nuclear buildup, fear which will drive us to another round of missile armament for an already filled nuclear arsenal?

We cannot allow the same forces which have operated in the past to draw us closer to nuclear holocaust. In the words of Albert Camus:

I know that the great tragedies of history often fascinate men with approaching horror. Paralyzed, they cannot make up their minds to do anything but wait. So they wait, and one day the Gorgon devours them. But I should like to convince you that the spell can be broken, that there is only an illusion of impotence. That strength of heart, intelligence and courage are enough to stop fate and sometimes reverse it. One has merely to will this not blindly, but with a firm and reasoned will.

For these reasons, Mr. President, I strongly oppose the proposed deployment of the ABM system.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUGHES in the chair). Does the Senator from Minnesota yield to the Senator from Texas?

Mr. MONDALE. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. Does the Senator have some assurance that if we cease our development and deployment of the ABM, the Soviets will likewise arrest their contingent development of air superiority

aircraft, that they will arrest their development and deployment of their offensive missiles, that they will arrest their development of deepwater silent submarines, that they will arrest the momentum of their development of military technology, if we merely, by a simple act, turn down the ABM?

Mr. MONDALE. I have two answers to the question posed by the Senator from Texas.

First, his question assumes that the ABM system is an effective deterrent to the alleged Soviet buildup. I have become firmly convinced, based upon the closed session held in the Senate recently, my reading of all the literature I could obtain, and the nearly 5 hours of secret testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations which I sat through, that whatever the dangers alleged from the buildup of Soviet nuclear missile capability, the ABM system is a weak, a timid, and an insipid response.

I believe that if there is one thing we can afford to do, it is to wait a few months, or perhaps a year, in responding to a possible Soviet buildup—especially with an inadequate, inappropriate, and highly doubtful response.

The second point is that we have the advantage in every weapons system. The Senator from Texas refers to nuclear submarine capability. The Senator is surely aware that we have a massive margin over the Soviet Union in deliverable missileery propelled by nuclear submarines and fired from submerged positions, that even with their increased production, it will be many years before they could catch up.

We are far ahead of the Soviets in MIRV capability technology. We are far ahead in the number of manned bombers and in the number of missiles—and in practically every other category there is.

With the capacity to destroy the Soviet Union several times over, should we not now take a chance and use a reasonable period to see whether we can agree with the Soviet Union to limit the arms race before we become billions and billions of dollars poorer and far less secure than we are today?

Mr. TOWER. May I say I am not arguing the quality of the current capability of the ABM. I am not even at this point arguing whether or not it works, although I think it does. I think it will.

Mr. MONDALE. The Senator must know that even if it works the way the proponents say it will work, it does not help. If we could get the proponents to declassify a little of this material, we could specifically talk about that.

Mr. TOWER. The Senator implies that if we will stop it, the Russians will stop it and we can have some meaningful talks. I want to know what assurance the Senator has that if we stop it, they will stop it. They are ahead of us in some areas of technology. They have much better air superiority than we have. As a matter of fact, it is going to take us a long time to catch up with them, if we try. As far as submarine development is concerned, they are proceeding at a more rapid pace than we are. As far as hardened missile sites are concerned, they are proceeding at a much more rapid pace than we are. The point is, if

we arrest our effort here, will they sit down and arrest their own?

Mr. MONDALE. I have two answers to make to the Senator. First of all, we will know whether they are arresting their development. If they escalate to the level which the Senator from Texas would have us believe they might, then we can always respond at that time. As the Senator knows, we know virtually every detail of the development of such things. They are observable. We know them.

Mr. TOWER. If I may interject at that point—

Mr. MONDALE. The second point is this. If the Senator could persuade the Department of Defense to declassify some of the evidence that has been presented to us to show how useless the ABM system is, perhaps we could debate that point with a little more credibility.

Mr. TOWER. I think what the Senator is referring to, as far as declassifying some information is concerned, are some "think" papers that were done 2 or 3 years ago. They are going to work them over again.

Mr. MONDALE. I have no doubt the Defense Department would like to work them over.

Mr. TOWER. There are subsequent papers that would have to be declassified in the process. There was classified material not even brought out in the discussions in the last closed session, because of its sensitivity.

But let us go back to the original point. The main thrust of the argument of Senators who have opposed the ABM is that if we will simply fail to develop and deploy the ABM, we are going to create a vastly more favorable climate for talks and the Soviets are going to have less zeal in the development of their own technology. If the Senator can give me some evidence of that, I will be on his side.

Mr. MONDALE. That is good news. First of all, let me say I am glad to hear the proponents of the ABM system have better information than that which was disclosed in the closed session, because I would like to think their fervor was based on more than the slim evidence that was disclosed. Perhaps it could be made available to Members of the U.S. Senate, so we could know all the facts.

Mr. TOWER. I thought the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), who is being denigrated, actually did a splendid job. By consensus, he pretty well answered all the questions that were raised in that session.

Mr. MONDALE. The Senator from Texas knows I have great respect for the Senator from Washington, but I do not recall his stating, at any time in that debate, that he had all kinds of new information that was not disclosed to the Senate, which was stronger than the evidence which was.

Mr. TOWER. I think the information is going to come before the appropriate subcommittee, and that is new information here. But I think we are working on the same ground here. We have been working on it for 3 or 4 weeks. I am a little disappointed that the opponents of the ABM are not prepared to come to a vote. I cannot understand the reason for the delay. I think every document

which the opponents bring forth will result in bringing forth another document on the part of the proponents. I think the lines are hardened. There seems to be a singular unwillingness on the part of some Senators who are opposed to come to a vote. To the credit of Senators HART and COOPER, they are disposed to bring it to a vote at the earliest opportunity. But we cannot bring it to a vote and we are holding up the work of the Senate.

Mr. MONDALE. As the Senator from Texas knows, this is probably one of the most important issues to come before the Senate in many years. If we continue to proceed on the theory that there is no way to negotiate a settlement on armaments with the Soviets; that there is no reason to believe that a few months spent in trying to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union could bring anything favorable; that the only security there is for the American people is to respond to every single appeal of the Defense Department for more and more arms and for new and different kinds of weapons systems; that all we should do, as we have done for years, is consult our suspicions and fears; and that we make no efforts to limit arms, then it seems to me this generation has lost any opportunity to deal with problems at home and is resigned to agree to a policy that is going to create far more tension and far less security than anything else.

Thus, how we decide on this issue is not a question that comes just before this body, but it is a fundamental question of what kind of world we want.

I say a couple of weeks of debate spent on that question is time well spent. If we had spent this kind of attention in the first place, instead of routinely passing favorably upon every request of the Pentagon, we would be billions of dollars richer and more secure. I am glad we are finally standing up and having the kind of debate we should have.

Mr. TOWER. I think 4 weeks of debate pretty well gets at all the answers and questions.

Mr. MONDALE. The Senator just mentioned that we have all kinds of new information at the Defense Department that we have not heard.

Mr. TOWER. I did not say it is new. It has been there. They have not chosen to disclose it.

Mr. MONDALE. Why have they decided not to provide the Senate with information of which we should be informed?

Mr. TOWER. I think it is available if the Senator decides to go after it. I have the distinct feeling that there is an effort to reach into the past to find "think" papers developed by the Defense Department to support conclusions already arrived at.

Let us be realistic. The lines have hardened. We all know how we are going to vote on this issue. I do not think any more argument beyond what has been had is going to change the outcome. The point I make is that while the proponents of the ABM are being accused of pitching our arguments on the basis of fearful arguments—in effect, we are being told that we are pushing the panic button of fear and suspicion—on the

other hand we could probably make an equally good case that the proposals of the opponents of the ABM are based on visionary support and good faith that perhaps have no background in experience and history.

Mr. MONDALE. Why do we not just have talks with the Soviet Union and find out?

Mr. TOWER. I am prepared to have talks with the Soviet Union, but I am not prepared to have talks with the Soviet Union while we are doing nothing in the way of weapons development and they are doing everything. They are devoting far more to research and development than we are. They have far more updated facilities for research and development than we have. And technologically, they are going to be ahead of us in a very short period of time, if they are not now.

If the Senator can give me some assurance that they are going to arrest all this while we sit and bargain, then I will be in his corner.

Mr. MONDALE. The Senator from Texas knows that we enjoy an impressive margin in every one of the weapons fields. We can destroy the Soviet Union several times with our power, and there is no threat to that retaliatory power until the middle of the 1970's, at the very earliest. We are not romantic about the Soviet Union. What we are suggesting here is that we have negotiations, and see if we can agree to limit this tragic arms race. If we do, we will be richer and more secure than if we do not. That is a hardheaded, practical, realistic position.

The position of the proponents, basically, is that we should deploy a series of new systems such as the ABM and the MIRV, which make it exceedingly difficult to reach an agreement and even more difficult to enforce an agreement. In effect, the position of the proponents is to negotiate an escalation. We would like to negotiate a limitation. We think we would all be better off.

Mr. TOWER. I think we would be, if we could all just sit down and beat our swords into plowshares and our spears into pruning hooks. But I would like to say that the only reason we maintain a huge military establishment is to deter aggression on the part of others.

I do not think that the Senator from Minnesota would even hint that this administration, the previous administration, or the administration before that had imperialistic designs on the rest of the world. I do not think, even in the most partisan context, I could accuse the Johnson administration of that, nor that the Senator from Minnesota could accuse the Nixon administration of that.

The fact of the matter remains that there are nations in this world that do have designs on others. They would prefer not to resort to military means to accomplish those designs, but if they have to, including Czechoslovakia, they will.

I think what the Senator from Minnesota is arguing is that we cannot have meaningful negotiation unless we allow the Soviet Union to achieve military parity with the United States. Is that the thrust of his argument?

Mr. MONDALE. As the Senator from

Texas well knows, and as I have repeated several times in this colloquy, we already enjoy a massive superiority.

Mr. TOWER. In certain areas.

Mr. MONDALE. And we well know, at any given time, what the Soviets are doing. We retain the right to expand production of Polaris missiles and Polaris submarines; and I happen to think that the Polaris is a better way than the ABM of meeting the Soviet challenge. We can always deploy more offensive missiles, as well as a number of other things.

What makes this situation critical is that ABM is a new weapons system, which, whether it be for offense or defense, upsets the whole structure and balance, making it increasingly difficult to reach an agreement. That is why I and many others think this is not the time to deploy a new system.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the Senator says we know what the Soviet Union is doing at all times. I have no criticism of our intelligence gathering community, but I must say that the Soviets have a much easier time getting intelligence in this country than we have in getting intelligence in their country, because they are a closed society, and we are an open society.

We cannot always be sure what they are doing. I think, generally speaking, we have underestimated what they are doing, and this gets me back to the point that if we are going to negotiate in a meaningful way disarmament, we have got to have parity.

Again, that raises a number of questions. That means the Soviets have no imperialistic designs on anyone else. In the second place, what is parity? How do we determine parity? They are superior to us in a number of fields. Would the Senator be prepared to see us ask them to stop development of an air superiority weapon while we catch up with them in that field, or while we allow them to catch up with us in others?

How do we know whether we have parity, unless we have open inspection? Does the Senator believe a closed society like the Soviet Union is going to allow open inspection, so we can determine whether or not we have parity before we begin these talks?

Mr. MONDALE. As the Senator from Texas knows, we know by air surveillance what they are doing with their missileery. We know how many missiles have been deployed, we know the character and the kinds that are being deployed, and it is this information that the proponents of the ABM have been using daily to raise concern about the capacity of our retaliatory forces.

There is nothing about Soviet missile development that we cannot determine by our present surveillance and information-gathering sources. We can easily afford to go to negotiations now, and see if we can agree with the Soviet Union. We will keep up with the facts during the course of the negotiations. If developments such as those to which the Senator makes reference should occur, we can always review the matter at that time. The question is whether we are going to take this reasonable risk to end the insane, immoral, and outrageously costly arms race—one which strips this

Nation of its capacity to deal with its own problems, creating another security risk, perhaps a more serious security risk—or whether we are going to continue just consulting our fears and apprehensions, and accepting every single proposal the Defense Department sends down here because they would like to have us spend the money.

Mr. TOWER. If the Senator will yield further—

Mr. MONDALE. Gladly.

Mr. TOWER. What we are proposing in this bill is an expenditure of \$759.1 million for research and development, and for predeployment procurement and preparation. We are not asking for operational deployment here. A year hence, we can come back and review the matter. All we want to make sure of is that the state of the art is sufficiently advanced, and valuable lead time is not lost, in the event the negotiations fail.

The Soviets themselves have said that they do not regard this as provocative, because it is a defensive weapon. They are employing or have deployed an ABM themselves. They say that that is defensive, not offensive.

The other option we can take is to put all our eggs in the offensive basket.

Mr. MONDALE. The Senator must know that the so-called Galosh ABM system is an old "Model T" system, so bad that even the Russians stopped deploying it. It is at the technological level of some of our earlier ABM systems, which we ourselves have abandoned. To raise that question is, I think, to create the impression that the ABM system in and around Moscow poses a serious or substantial or significant threat, when it does not.

Mr. TOWER. What would the Senator's reaction be if he found that they had ceased work on the present system because they were developing or had developed a better system?

Mr. MONDALE. That is the reason we need negotiations—to agree on these matters, to determine at what level we are going to place a ceiling on arms development, to decide if we are going to try to continue to outbuild other nations. Are we going to continue to spend increasing billions of dollars on such systems, many of which are highly dubious, to continue to consult our fears, and not try to reach an agreement on arms limitations?

Mr. TOWER. Therein lies the dichotomy between us.

Mr. MONDALE. As the Senator knows, the Hart-Cooper proposal favors continuing research, development, and testing of an ABM system. The distinction is on the deployment issue. The proposal to establish the system in Montana and North Dakota, obviously, is the beginning of a deployment of the system; and we hope through this proposal, to avoid that possibility.

Mr. TOWER. I cannot see why we cannot proceed with onsite research-and-development testing and evaluation as a prelude to deployment and be prepared to deploy if necessary.

Again, the whole argument is based on assumption. We are making an assumption—those of us on this side of the aisle—that the Russians will not ne-

gotiate and that we cannot have a satisfactory settlement or a satisfactory resolution of the arms race. The opposition is saying that we should risk it; that we should take a chance; that perhaps we can achieve some sort of negotiation to limit the arms race.

We are accused of basing our argument on fear; but our fear is well founded. It is based on history. It is based on experience. There is all the evidence in the world to show that the Russians desire to achieve military superiority to accomplish their imperialistic designs in the world. There is nothing to show that even if parity is achieved, they will be willing to negotiate to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion in the matter of a limitation of arms development.

Mr. MONDALE. Is the Senator from Texas suggesting that an effort to reach an arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union would be futile; that there is no hope?

Mr. TOWER. I would be delighted if an arms limitation agreement could be reached with the Soviets. If it were a matter of determination that both of us should be equal, that would be fine, provided we had meaningful inspection. But I do not see that our placing ourselves in a position of inferiority or parity will necessarily help the negotiations along.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, this past weekend, a public opinion poll prepared by Dr. Gallup showed that almost 60 percent of Americans polled expressed the view that they still did not understand all the factors that go into the ABM system and are having difficulty in fully understanding the debate.

I think this underscores the need to have fuller amplification, debate, and discussion, because the Senate does not operate in a vacuum. This body has a responsibility to debate in public, so that the public might have better knowledge of the issues and facts that bear upon matters that are dealt with in the Senate. Certainly that public opinion poll shows the need for further discussion and education on the ABM.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MONDALE. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. HART. I had risen simply to congratulate the able Senator from Minnesota on his discussion and to intrude no further. But his very last point bothers me. I think it should bother all of us. Why is it that 58 percent of Americans are either unaware of the anti-ballistic-missile program or have not made up their minds about it? The Senator from Minnesota suggests that that would indicate the necessity for further discussion in the Senate. Perhaps so. But are we at fault? The discussion has been thorough and full, I should think.

One certainly cannot quarrel with the coverage of the discussion in the media. I suspect that newspapers are not sold and television channels are not kept locked in when someone explains or undertakes to write a technical discussion about the anti-ballistic-missile system. I think we all agree that we are talking about something that bears on a nuclear arms race which involves the survival of us all. Yet, more than half of the people

in this country, we are told, have not heard about it or have not made up their minds.

Perhaps we, who are nontechnicians, really have undertaken to discuss too technically the anti-ballistic-missile system. Perhaps we count warheads and multiply them by three and get into sensors and radars, and I doubt if any of us could come close to being the equal of Dr. Seagraves in college physics. My grade in that subject was not very good 30 years ago.

Perhaps at the risk of being charged with oversimplifying the debate, we should bring it into more of a layman's context.

The argument is made that by our beginning to deploy an ABM system, the Russians will not be discouraged, but will recognize it for what it is, a defensive system. Then, why in heaven's name when the Russians began to deploy their ABM system, did we get in a lather and begin to MIRV because they had begun to deploy an ABM system? That is a system that we understand now is outmoded and ineffective.

We ought to get that point discussed and developed a bit further. We cannot have it both ways. We are wrong in one or the other of those analyses, are we not?

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I agree with the Senator from Michigan. We have for the past few months been officially stating that the Russians are prepared for a first strike. "There is no doubt about that," said the Secretary of Defense.

I wonder what the response of the defense planners and political leaders of the Soviet Union is. I wonder if they really believe that we think the Soviet Union is prepared for a first strike.

What would their reaction be? And what would our reaction be if it were the other way around?

The only way I can see to sort out these suspicions and try to replace terror and a sense of insecurity with some stability is to have the strategic arms limitation talks. We must work out our differences, try to agree on a system that limits arms and provides an inspection system which would permit us to know without doubt that the agreement is being kept, and permit the Russians to have the same opportunity. We would both retain our mutual deterrence.

It so happens that we are now ahead of the Russians in every weapons system. We have nothing to lose and much to gain by eliminating the suspicions that have created the ever-increasing arms budget and ever-increasing environment of instability, uncertainty and terror.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, again risking oversimplification in an effort to broaden an awareness of the questions before us and in the minds of the people of this country, perhaps we should make this point: sometimes when we are proposing that we should delay deploying the ABM until we have had an arms control discussion with the Soviet Union, we are asked to prove, if we delay the deployment, whether the Soviets would withhold its action in developing some kind of a super rocket or bomber. We

ought to ask ourselves where the balanced budget is, who is really ahead, and whether there is anyone here that would trade the American weapons system.

Does anyone want to trade America's nuclear power for that of the Soviets? Would we be able then to go into discussion and negotiations?

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I agree with the Senator from Michigan. I sat through hours of executive sessions and through the debate we had on the floor. There seems to be little, if any, doubt that we have a mammoth advantage in every critical strategic weapons system. It is well known that our MIRV technology is almost ready for deployment, if it has not already been deployed.

I think that the ABM system we are testing is not much of a defense. However, compared to the Galosh system, it is the difference between a modern Cadillac and a Model T.

If there ever is going to be a time in our history when we can and should determine to end the insane arms race, now is the time.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, in the hearing to which the Senator from Minnesota makes reference before the Committee on Foreign Relations, does he recall the statement of Dr. Marshall Shulman, professor of government and director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, when he said:

It follows, also, Mr. Chairman, that it would not be wise to deploy an ABM system in the belief that it would improve our bargaining position in relation to the missile talks. To do so would be more likely, in my opinion, to strengthen the position of those on the Soviet side who are only too ready to argue that the United States is too committed by its system or its pressure groups to an arms race to be seriously interested in its abatement.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I do not recall that. However, I agree wholeheartedly with the point.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I think it is important that we should remind ourselves of this periodically. Getting back to the point that persuaded me to do more than just thank the Senator from Minnesota, this Gallup poll of July 26, which he discussed as he concluded his remarks, indicates that a majority of Americans are either unaware of the ABM program or have not made up their minds about it. Fifty-eight percent of Americans are unaware or do not know. Yet, across the country, in full-page ads, captioned "84 percent of all Americans support an ABM system," is this ad by members of the Citizens Committee for Peace With Security, the chairman of which is William J. Casey. One need not be a Ph. D. in mathematics to know that that one does not add up.

Mr. MONDALE. Is that the Mr. Casey who is going to be with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency?

Mr. HART. This is my understanding, yes.

Mr. MONDALE. It is no wonder, then, that the American public becomes confused, when a man who has taken a position as one who is supposed to be primarily concerned with limitation of armaments helps sponsor a poll which

says 84 percent of the American people support an ABM system, and Dr. Gallup comes out a week later and says 60 percent do not understand the ABM issue.

Mr. HART. Or do not know about it. Mr. MONDALE. According to the Gallup poll, how many support the ABM system?

Mr. HART. Twenty-five percent, if I read this correctly.

Mr. MONDALE. Twenty-five percent favor the ABM, and the ad says 84 percent. Is that within the normal margin of error?

Mr. HART. Well, it is, in the development of weapons systems cost estimates, but aside from that, I know no area where that range of mistake is so accepted.

Mr. MONDALE. I thank the Senator.

#### THE SURTAX EXTENSION

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, earlier today an item appeared on the UPI wire service commenting upon the fact that the majority leader, speaking for the Democratic policy committee, has indicated that there will be no votes on the surtax extension, thereby leaving the impression that this tax is going to be allowed to lapse.

Approximately 3 hours later a second item appeared on the same wire service with a New York dateline.

I ask unanimous consent that both these items be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the two items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### TAXES

WASHINGTON.—Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield raised the possibility today, Congress might quietly bury the 10 per cent income tax surcharge this week by letting paycheck withholding of the extra levy expire.

"The surtax expires at midnight Thursday," Mansfield told reporters, referring to paycheck withholding. The surtax itself expired June 30, but Congress extended withholding for a month while considering President Nixon's plea to extend the surcharge another year.

"If it goes out of existence Thursday, it would be very hard to revive it in view of the deep undercurrent in this body."

He referred to opposition by some Senators toward Nixon's surtax proposal, under which the 10 per cent levy would apply this year, then drop to 5 per cent Jan. 1.

Mansfield warned last week that Senate opposition to the surtax was increasing. He said the administration was calling it a vital anti-inflation tool but had no evidence it had slowed inflation so far.

The House passed Nixon's surcharge proposal a month ago, and the Senate Finance Committee approved it. But Mansfield's democratic policy committee has refused to put the bill on the Senate calendar until coupled with a tax reform measure.

Last week, Mansfield proposed a compromise—extend the surtax through November, enough time to get a tax reform bill ready. Then, he said, Congress could take up the surcharge and reform.

Senate Republican Leader Everett M. Dirksen told newsmen he rejected Mansfield's proposal. But Mansfield said Dirksen hadn't said the same to him and he was still hoping Dirksen and the administration would agree.

"I'm hoping the accommodation which

was proposed would be accepted," Mansfield said.

Mansfield's veiled threat to let the whole surcharge package expire came in response to questions about a resolution, scheduled for a House vote today, which would extend withholding of the levy another 15 days.

Newsmen asked Mansfield whether he'd rush the resolution through the Senate. Unexpectedly, he declined to say he would. He said the proposal would go to the Senate Finance Committee, but declined to promise he'd then put it on the floor for a fast vote.

A week ago, Mansfield had offered to extend withholding up to 4 months. But today he said he was uncertain because so many Senators had since told him they opposed the surtax.

#### STOCKS

NEW YORK.—The gloom intensified on Wall Street today as the stock market took another tumble. It has been in a steady decline for more than three weeks.

The selling hit virtually all major groups. One exception was the airlines with some issues recording gains on the strength of new routes awarded several companies by the Civil Aeronautics Board.

The downturn has been attributed by some analysts to concern by investors over the prospect of corporate profits and expansion. The failure of the Senate to extend the income tax surcharge has added to Wall Street's worries.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I emphasize again that this lack of decision on the part of the Senate and the prevailing uncertainty as to what the Senate will or will not do with respect to the extension of the surcharge and what it will or will not do with respect to the repeal of the investment credit is creating chaos in our markets.

I hope the leadership in the Senate can be prevailed upon to allow the Senate at least to vote on this measure and to remove this cloud of uncertainty. Certainly there can be no excuse for the continued delay on the part of the Senate to act.

I most certainly do not attribute to the Democratic policy committee any ulterior motives; however, if this were part of a plan to create a recession in this country no other action that could be taken would be more fruitful in that direction than these unwarranted delaying actions.

I appeal to the leadership that we get action on this tax bill at an early date.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. I asked the Senator to yield because it would be so easy to dismiss the situation as a stockmarket decline: The stockmarket is going down, so what do we care? Most of the people in the United States are not materially affected. But people have to realize that it is not just the market going down. Housing starts are going down by a million; that is approximately 40 percent.

The economic pressure will be felt, because high interest rates are being built into every price, and wage settlements are taking that into consideration, going up approximately 6 or 7 percent. We are heading for a recession. There is no question about it. I do not know that it can be avoided, considering the way the Federal Reserve Board has put the brakes on in this situation. Certainly,

we are not helping it any by marking time as we are on the surtax extension.

I am delighted that the Senator is pressing the fight. It is interesting that he and I, in a sense, have joined in it; and I think it is quite symbolic of the situation the country faces.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I thank the Senator, and I should emphasize what he has said.

When one speaks of disrupted financial markets he is speaking not only of the price of stocks as it affects investors but also of the climate in which the employers of America expand and operate their businesses. This can be carried over into increased unemployment, which I am sure none of us wants.

Interest rates have been climbing, and while I do not claim that extension of the surtax alone would change the interest rates or solve that problem, it is one of the factors with which we must deal, along with many others including the control of Government spending. All these are actions which must be taken as part of an overall correction of our fiscal dilemma.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I read this morning that several utility companies have been permitted to add the surtax into their rate structure. My question does not concern that however. My question is, "Would it not be better to have a 4- or 5-month extension of the surtax than no extension at all?"

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Except for this point. Even if the surtax were extended for 4 or 5 months the uncertainty is still not removed from American industry as to whether the surtax is going to be extended.

That uncertainty as to whether Congress will or will not face up to these hard financial decisions is what causes many of today's problems.

Another point is this: Under this proposal of the Democratic policy committee no action would be taken on the investment credit until November. Many companies file their tax returns on a fiscal year basis. One company in particular mentioned that its fiscal year ends on August 1. It has bought approximately \$10 million worth of equipment since the April date. We all expect that there is a reasonable chance that this investment credit will be repealed retroactively. The company, however, would be in this position when it files its annual tax return. It must pay its taxes based on the law on the books on the date it files its return. The 7 percent tax credit has not been repealed. It is still the law. The company would have no choice except to take the tax credit. It can invest the money in 90-day Treasury bills, draw 6 percent, and if and when Congress does repeal the investment credit retroactively, it will have 60 days to file an amended return and to pay the tax to the Government. There is no choice except to give the company the 60 days without penalty or interest because, as Congress retroactively repeals this tax, a penalty cannot be put on a taxpayer for not having paid a tax which was not the law on the date he paid his tax.

So not only would the Government lose the use of that revenue during this interval, but also it would have to borrow the money, and perhaps borrow it from the same man.

Another point is that when the companies go to the bankers to arrange their loans they do not know the terms upon which they are going to purchase this equipment, whether the investment credit will or will not be allowed.

My suggestion is that we make this tax bill the pending business and that we proceed to vote. There are those who earnestly think that a 3- or 4-month extension would be better. If that is the will of the Senate I accept the will of the majority. On the other hand, let the Senate itself decide.

Surely it is not expected that all Senators blindly delegate to the Democratic policy committee our proxies to vote as they order.

Mr. President, if the Democratic policy committee is determined to repeal the surtax let the country know their position by voting on the bill. In that way we will know where we stand. Then the administration could cut expenditures accordingly; otherwise the Democratic policy committee could raise the debt ceiling to cover the additional deficits. I know of no reason why we should leave this matter hanging in the air with no action being taken. That is my point.

As the Senator from New York has said, this situation does contribute to the uncertainty that exists in the financial community. It has an adverse effect on interest rates.

A couple of weeks ago it was reported that the city of New York had sold a sizable bond issue. It was estimated that the interest rate was three-eighths percent higher than it would have been had it not been for the uncertainty as to whether or not Congress was going to change the tax exempt status of State and municipal bonds.

It is true, as the Senator from Vermont has said, that American industry, whether one is talking about utilities or manufacturers, makes allowances for taxes as a part of the cost of the operation.

On another point, suppose we do not extend the surtax or it is repealed. In that event the money that has been withheld from the employees would have to be refunded. It is true that wage earners would get the money back next year but it would be without interest. I think a great many inequities are being created in this situation.

There is now on the Senate Calendar a bill which was considered by the Committee on Finance. The hearings have been held, and the hearings have been printed. I have a copy of the printed hearings on my desk. They are available to all Senators. I do not see why we do not proceed to a vote on the bill, either up or down, and settle the question.

Mr. President, I made this same point last year when the Senate at that time was delaying action on the original tax bill. I could take the speech that I made last year in support of President Johnson's tax bill, change the dates, and make the same speech now while urging Presi-

dent Nixon's request for prompt action by the Senate on his proposed tax bill.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield. Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I agree with the Senator that tax legislation is undoubtedly the most important legislation that will come before this session of Congress; that it ought to be considered and a decision made at the earliest possible moment.

But I have an elementary question about the surtax. Is the surtax intended to hold prices up or to hold prices down?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. As far as I am concerned the surtax is not a vehicle to control prices at all. It is needed to provide revenue to avoid an unbearable deficit.

Mr. AIKEN. Then, does it affect prices at all?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Our Government will be operating at a deficit of \$5 billion to \$6 billion a year even with the extension of the surcharge. If we do not extend it we will have a deficit of at least a billion dollars a month. That is inflationary and as the Senate delays action now, fires of inflation are fanned in this country and prices are pushed higher.

Mr. AIKEN. I noticed just a few minutes ago on the ticker that the surplus as of June 30 was about \$1.9 billion or nearly \$2 billion more than anticipated. How much of this amount was due to the 10-percent surtax? Would it be all of it?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. It would be a part of it. The tax surcharge enacted last year provided about \$9 billion in extra revenue. But I point out that when they talk about surplus today they are speaking of the overall collections of the Government, including trust funds. The Government did not close last year's operations with any surplus. It does not have the right to use trust fund money to defray the normal operating costs of the Government. For example, about \$400 million of that amount is due to accumulation of surplus in the railroad retirement fund. That fund represents money paid by the employers and employees of the railroads. Not a dime of Government money goes into that fund. Yet the accumulation in that trust fund is treated for bookkeeping purposes as though it were Government money. The same thing is true with respect to the trust fund for social security. Those funds cannot be used to defray the normal operating costs of the Government.

When that fancy accounting now used for bookkeeping purposes is eliminated we come up with a deficit last year of \$6 to \$8 billion.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, would the Senator yield further?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, the news item stated that the surplus as of June 30 is the largest surplus since the \$1 billion-plus surplus of 1960. But if I remember correctly, and I think I do, that surplus of 1960 was due to a \$13 billion deficit in 1959.

Mr. JAVITS. Exactly.

Mr. AIKEN. As a citizen-taxpayer I do not think I understand the situation too well, but I do rely on the Senator from Delaware for good advice.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I asked the Senator to yield to me. I know the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) wants to be heard on this one point of the Democratic versus Republican tug-of-war here.

I would like to suggest to the Senator from Vermont (Mr. AIKEN), the Senator from Delaware (Mr. WILLIAMS), and our leader, that the war of nerves has to end because if it does not there will be nothing to fight about. We must end this war of nerves.

I understand the situation well. We know much about political infighting. However, in my judgment—and in this statement I do not bind the Senator from Delaware in any way—whether the time is to be 5 months or 1 year the Senate had better express itself and do it quickly because this is a situation that is deteriorating very quickly.

Whatever any Senator may say about my coming from the financial community—for which I do not apologize and never will—that is where the ear is to the ground. The situation is bad, and it is my position that the situation is not going to get better if we "horse around" with this matter.

I hope this war ends in a matter of days—and not weeks or months—because the economy of the entire country is seriously in jeopardy.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I thank the Senator. That is my point. I respect those who feel this surtax should be extended only for 4 months or 6 months, and while I strongly disagree I shall abide by the decision of the Senate. But whatever the decision is let the Senate make it. If the Senate is only going to extend the surtax for 4 months, 6 months, a year, or repeal it, whatever we do let us do it, and let the taxpayers know the rules. That is my only point. I want a vote on the bill. The Senate has a right to work its will and under no circumstances can 100 Senators delegate to the Democratic Policy Committee the power to make or enforce its own will on the Senate regardless of what other members may think.

Who are these men who comprise this all powerful group?

I agree with the Senator from New York. This tax bill is not an issue that should be characterized as Republican versus Democrat, for it is not. I remind Senators that last year I joined with the then-Senator from Florida in a bipartisan effort to put through the surtax originally as it had been proposed by then President Lyndon Johnson. We introduced the bill which later became the law. We joined together not as Republicans and Democrats but as Members of the Senate. That measure was a bipartisan effort.

I am confident that whatever position I may take or whatever position others may take we will not find complete agreement of positions straight

across the aisle. But this should not be a partisan question at all. I find no fault with any Senator who disagrees with my position, but I have a right to express it and to vote accordingly. Another Senator has just as much right to his position that the time should be perhaps, 4 months or 6 months. I think I am entitled to my position and he is entitled to his position. Whatever we do, let the Senate as a body make the decision.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has been in the Senate for as long as I have. He knows very well when we have a deadline, as we now have. The present law, I believe, expires Friday, does it not? The extension of the withholding?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. The Senator is correct.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from New York is entirely correct. I do not quarrel with him although I come from a State having as little to do with the market as any State could have. I agree the situation is significant.

As a practical matter, the Senator from Delaware heard the majority leader express what I think is a reasonable proposal for a compromise; that is, the extension of the law to the end of November. That would do several things. It certainly goes part way toward the Senator's view, but it also gives us an opportunity in other areas to deal specifically with tax reform; and in addition to that the opportunity to have budgetary cuts.

The Senator from Delaware has made a great reputation in the past on his very effective activity in this field and his tax knowledge. If he would cooperate on some budgetary cuts it would be equally effective, if not more so, on the question of inflation and, as the Senator said a moment ago, bringing into balance the financial situation. This is a measure that the Senator from Delaware has long supported.

In view of the short time, I submit that everything indicates we should make the agreement. If there is serious objection to either side's position, the Senator knows it cannot be passed, really, between now and Friday. Therefore, it is a made-to-order situation in which agreement should be brought about. The majority leader, after consultation at great length with Members on this side of the aisle, and with the policy committee, has made clear his position. I do not think that is an unreasonable position. I do not understand why it does not go a long way toward meeting the views of the Senator from Delaware, giving us time really to work out a reasonable position on two or three other related situations, specifically tax reform and also budgetary matters. I do not see why the Senator objects to that.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, first as to the July 31 deadline, I did not object to its extension. I recognize, as do other Members, that we cannot finish action on this bill by July 31, to get it through conference, even if we tried. The House is sending over an extension of 15 days, or until August 15.

The minority leader and I conferred with the majority leader this morning and suggested that we stop it at the desk and pass it.

There was a rumor we were going to try to attach the surtax to it. I assured the Senator and the majority leader that there is no truth to such a rumor so far as I am concerned. This extension could and should be passed without amendment. But the point I make is that we should then proceed—to a vote on the bill itself.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is only 15 days. That is no time for the other matter.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. If we will stop this filibuster and get down to business we can do it. There is no reason why we cannot. The Senator mentioned my past interest in budget cuts, I can assure the Senator that this is not just a past interest; it is a continuing interest, and I only hope I will have his support in the days ahead.

Going back to last year, one section of that law was a section requiring a mandatory reduction in expenditures by around \$6 billion. Later, Congress, much to my regret, did whittle that down, but we retained a portion of that reduction.

Again this year I tried to get meaningful legislation requiring mandatory expenditure control to be written into the law. However, on a rollcall vote in the Senate I was defeated. The rollcall was about 80 to 16 I believe. I do not know whether the Senator from Arkansas was one of the 16 that tried to put meaningful expenditure control into the law, but, anyway I lost. After we lost, I took the next step available. Recognizing that we could not get votes in the Senate for a control over expenditures I discussed this with the White House and received a commitment from the President that he would support a real control over expenditures.

I had a letter from the President dated July 16 on this subject, which I shall be glad to read at this point:

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
Washington, July 16, 1969.

HON. JOHN J. WILLIAMS,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS. I am aware of the concern over extension of the surtax and repeal of the investment credit unless expenditure controls are made clearly effective. Possibly some of this concern arises from the flexibility of the expenditure control provision of H.R. 11400 just passed by the Congress.

In this legislation the limit on expenditures for fiscal year 1970 would appear to be \$191.9 billion—one billion below the \$192.9 billion projected in my revised budget. However, the actual language (1) authorizes me to exceed this ceiling by two billion dollars for increases in specified items of uncontrollable spending, thereby raising the ceiling potentially to \$193.9 billion; and (2) enables Congress to raise expenditures by any amount for any program, thereby permitting automatic Congressional increases in the ceiling.

There is an obvious advantage in having a precise ceiling—one which clearly specifies the maximum allowable expenditures. I therefore assure you and your colleagues—that includes the Senator from Arkansas—that I accept in good faith the \$191.9 billion ceiling as passed by Congress. More than this,

barring a plainly critical and presently unforeseeable emergency, I will hold total expenditures for fiscal 1970 within the \$192.9 billion indicated in my April budget proposals.

I will regard this \$192.9 billion maximum as a ceiling on fiscal 1970 expenditures, on this premise—that when an increase is approved by Congress or develops in one program it will be offset by a corresponding decrease in another program, thereby keeping the total budget within the \$192.9 billion maximum.

For the Executive Branch this means that if uncontrollable spending, such as interest on the public debt and social security benefits, should exceed the April estimates, or if other spending essential to the national welfare is approved, the additional spending will have to be offset by reductions elsewhere. Further it means that, if the Congress should vote expenditures above those provided for in the breakdown of the \$192.9 billion total, it will also need to impose compensating reductions in other programs. Failure to establish such priorities in allocating funds within the \$192.9 billion total will compel the Executive Branch either to impose offsetting reductions itself in programs approved by Congress or to refrain from spending the increase.

I believe this firm expenditure control, prompt extension of the surtax and the excises, and repeal of the investment tax credit will give us the tools our country needs to brake and stop inflation. It is my understanding that the Ways and Means Committee and the Finance Committee will follow this action with prompt consideration of a major tax revision package which will include many of the reform proposals I recommended to Congress last April.

Working together, I am confident that the Congress and the Administration can establish sound priorities and keep within a \$192.9 billion expenditure total for 1970. I assure you that I intend to see that this is done.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON.

Mr. President, considering that we could not get the votes in the Senate I have gone as far as I could in getting expenditure controls. Without this cooperation of the President I could not have made this satisfactory progress in that direction.

I will join the Senator from Arkansas in trying to control them further, as the various appropriation bills come up.

I recognize that he and perhaps others feel that a 4-month or a 6-month extension of the surtax would be just as effective an action as a 1-year extension. I respect his position, but I disagree with it.

All I am asking for is an agreement that we just not let this drift as a state of uncertainty. Let us make the tax bill the pending business and go on and vote it up or down, letting the country know under what rules they are going to operate. That is all I am asking. I am not asking for a commitment on the part of any Senator that he is or is not going to support the bill as the administration requested or as we reported it. Let the Senate work its will. The Senator from Arkansas has been in the Senate longer than I have, but during our period of service we have never had a situation just like this before, a situation where we would be given an ultimatum that unless the Democratic policy committee can get a solid commitment that all Senators will vote in a certain manner, they will not make the tax bill the

pending business. That is not the way for the Senate to operate. Let the leadership make it the pending business, and then each Senator who has strong feelings on the subject can try to persuade others to adopt and approve his position. If he fails, then the Senate proceeds to approve whatever position it wishes. That is all I am asking, that we remove this indecision, this uncertainty, and let the American taxpayers know the rules of the game under which we are operating.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator; but I think the way to remove that doubt is the way the majority leader has suggested. I can remember a number of occasions—not relating to taxes—on which agreements were worked out between both sides and then, under unanimous consent, very controversial matters were solved. I was not always in agreement, but that is the way to do things when there are controversial matters to be acted on within a limited time.

I do not see how a provision for 15 days is going to work with respect to either the budget matter or reforms—obviously not the reforms. The main reason for the 4 months is that a number of those who are interested, and I am not among them, in some reforms insist upon having those reforms or not voting for the surtax at all. There is a very grave doubt whether the surtax standing alone could pass. Distasteful as it is—I voted against it last year—I am not sure I will vote for it this year unless it is a part of some arrangement in which some progress will be made—that was worked out as a compromise.

I think the majority leader did everything he could to find an area of agreement that would allow him some assurance of getting action, because he realizes the seriousness of the situation, just as the Senator from New York expressed it. It was a good-faith effort to arrive at an agreement which would be effective. The Senator knows this has been done on highly controversial matters, especially in the area of social legislation, where, after a long, drawn-out stalemate, it is solved by agreement. That is what the majority leader is trying to do.

With reference to the tax matter and the budget matter, I may point out that we have before us an authorization bill for appropriations. I hope the Senator from Delaware will join me and other Senators in being specific—without the generalized ceilings which are always subject to having holes punched in them—about adjusting the budgetary matters. I hope he will join us in that and in many other efforts that can be had between now and November, when we would have to vote on the bill.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I agree with the Senator that we should arrive at a decision on the pending bill, and I appreciate that he would like to have me vote with him on the matter. I respectfully suggest to him that the roll be called right now and that the Senate proceed to vote on it. I have been ready to vote for 3 weeks. Let us call the roll.

I am not criticizing the majority leader. The Senator knows that the majority leader speaks for the Democratic policy committee. But what I am asking

is that we be given a chance to vote. I feel very strongly that the Senate is creating an unnecessary disturbance in our financial community by its delayed action.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator from Delaware knows of my great respect for him, especially in the field of finance. I am not a member of the finance committee. So as to inform myself, I would ask the Senator a couple of questions.

Is it not true that, despite the fact this tax has been in effect about a year, it has at least not yet been successful in stemming inflationary tendencies?

I ask that question with the premise that last month, inflation for that one month increased 0.6 percent. If we agree to continue this tax until the 30th of November, it is my understanding the administration stated they would like to see the surtax cut from 10 percent to 5 percent next year? That to me eliminated the idea this was the basic answer to inflation.

There are people in my State who believe at least some tax reforms are necessary, say a \$100 exemption relief in the lower brackets, and elimination of millionaires not paying any taxes. I do not mean millionaires in property, rather citizens of the country who have an income of \$1 million who do not pay taxes, even though they do not have tax-free securities such as municipal bonds. Some thought those two could get by the Senate with the surcharge continued until the 30th of November, which would be only the difference of 1 month; and I understand it is planned to cut it then anyway.

I ask these questions because if anybody has made an impression on me—and I say this with great sincerity—on the importance of reducing Government expenditures, it has been the able and distinguished Senator from Delaware, with whom, over the years, it has been my privilege to serve.

We have a Federal budget now of some \$193 billion. Six years ago, when I started talking about the growing danger incident to our continuing unfavorable balance of payments, some of my colleagues would kid me about it. The Senator from Delaware never did. I present to him that the last quarter to the best of my knowledge, was the worst quarter we have ever had in our history of balance of payments. If carried out on an annual basis, it would run some \$11 billion a year.

Under those circumstances, I would ask the distinguished Senator from Delaware if he believes that prompt passage of this surcharge tax extension would take care of the inflation going on in the country today because—in my opinion—of the gigantic expenditures now characteristic of the Federal budget.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I appreciate the questions of the Senator from Missouri. To the best of my ability, I shall try to answer them, but I first want to refer to the remarks he made earlier when he referred to his own attempts to alert the Senate to the problem of our balance of payments. It was a

timely warning. I regret that more attention was not paid to the warning he was presenting.

To get back to the question, do I think the enactment of the surcharge will check inflation? The answer is: As to that in itself, no. I do not think any one action, extending the surtax alone, or cutting the budgetary expenditures alone, or monetary policies alone, will in itself do the job, but I think it takes a coordination of all of them.

I go back to last year. The Senator is correct when he says the enactment of the surcharge last year did not check inflation as it had been anticipated it would do. There is no argument about that. But I am going to point out clearly why I think it failed. In the first place, President Johnson, and I am not necessarily carrying his banner, recommended to the Congress early last year, in January, the enactment of a surcharge as one necessary measure to reduce our staggering deficit and control inflation. I promptly endorsed it. I had advocated similar action months before. I thought we had to take that action, and I publicly endorsed it. Later the Senator from Florida and I joined in introducing the 10-percent surcharge, as advocated by the President, but we accompanied that with what in our opinion was an equally important measure; namely, expenditure controls. It takes both taxes and expenditure controls to do the job and to be effective. Congress enacted that package, but action was delayed then just as Congress is delaying action today.

While we introduced that bill in February and the President was appealing for prompt action just as Mr. Nixon is today, Congress did not get around to passing the bill or to putting it on the President's desk for signature until approximately July 1—6 months of unnecessary delay.

There was a delay of 6 months, during which time expenditures were running uncontrolled and deficits were mounting. The surtax was not as effective as it would have been because of the uncertainty for a period of 6 months as to whether it would be enacted. That in my opinion was one of the contributing factors as to why it failed.

There was another contributing factor. After the surtax had become law the Federal Reserve System in my opinion made a serious mistake by misjudging the economy. Instead of cooperating and moving with restraint the Federal Reserve pumped a substantial amount of additional credit into the country. It increased the flow of cash far above that needed. That action was highly inflationary and in direct contradiction of the action taken by imposing the surtax. To that extent the effect of the surcharge in controlling inflation was minimized.

Then there was a third factor. Along with the surtax was a proposal to reduce expenditures by \$6 billion. That would have had a salutary effect, but Congress later enacted a series of exemptions for their special projects, with the result that only about one-third of the expenditure control remained effective. That resulted in about \$4 billion more spending than was anticipated. Four billion more was

poured into the economy than was anticipated at the time the bill passed. This undue delay in meeting the threat of inflation head on was the failure of Congress to act, not the formula itself.

In my opinion, those were the three contributing factors that to some extent nullified the congressional action on imposing the surtax.

Of course, no one can look back and say what would have happened "if," but there is no doubt a mistake was made.

The point I make today is that here again we see the pattern of Senate-delayed action developing. Again there is uncertainty as to what Congress will do. No one is more familiar with what problems such a situation can present than the Senator from Missouri, who made a great record in private industry before he came to the Senate. He knows that any industry, in making its plans, likes to know exactly under what rules it will be expected to operate.

They have a right to know as soon as possible what the tax rates will be.

When they plan to buy new machinery are they going to get the 7-percent investment credit or are they not? Many in business file tax returns on a fiscal year basis, and, as I pointed out earlier, there are problems for those companies that are filing on a fiscal year basis after July 1. As of July 1 the investment credit is still the law of the land, and companies that are filing tax returns must—they have no choice—take the 7-percent investment credit now, and later if we repeal it retroactively file an amended return and pay it back to the Government. Not only is this unnecessary work but it creates uncertainty. What excuse is there for delaying this decision?

I feel strongly that if the Senate delays action until the end of the year and lets uncertainty prevail as to whether we will or will not extend the investment credit, even though we then extend the surcharge and repeal the investment credit, we will have lost the wholesome effect as a brake on inflation that would prevail if we passed it today. That is the reason that I urge that whatever action the Senate wants to take we vote on it—4 months, 6 months, whatever it is, let us lay down the rule and eliminate this uncertainty. Frankly, I would take that same position if I thought the Senate would defeat the measure. If the Senate is going to defeat the proposed extension of this surtax let us do it now; and then let those who make this decision tell us how they plan to cope with the resulting \$12 billion deficit, and let them assume full responsibility for the inflationary results of their action.

As the Senator knows, nothing in the world creates more disturbance in industry and in the financial community affecting interest rates and cost of living, than this uncertainty. Companies make all the allowances for the worst and must prepare for even worse than that which will actually develop.

As I said the other day, it is a good bit like the boy scheduled to get a whipping: anticipating the whipping and walking down to the barn with your dad is far worse punishment than the pain you experience after it is all over.

I think that is just what we are talking about in connection with this tax bill today. Whatever decision to be made make it quick.

I yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, as a result of a conversation I had with the distinguished Senator from Delaware a little over 3 years ago, I recommended at that time to the Secretary of the Treasury that we recognize this problem on a fiscal basis as well, instead of just on a monetary basis. In other words, I recommended that he come in for a tax increase.

I would not argue in any way with what the Senator has presented today. He knows the facts far better than I. But I would ask him this question: Does he believe that the continuation of this tax will have a major effect, to the point where it will control the inflation now characteristic of our economy, or does he believe that it is also necessary to reduce expenditures, as many of us have been trying to do on this floor for some weeks? I am not referring to any particular item, I do not wish to get into a debate on any parochial line of reasoning. But is not the important thing for us to do now is to reduce spending?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I agree with the Senator; and I have made this statement many times, but I repeat it again here: If we are only going to extend this surcharge to provide an additional \$8 or \$9 billion with which to expand the spending programs of the Government we will not only contribute nothing toward controlling inflation, but I think it would have an adverse effect. I think it would actually be more inflationary to collect extra taxes only to pour the money out in increased Government spending streams.

For that reason, I firmly believe we have got to have this act accompanied by firm control over expenditures. If I felt for a moment this was only going to serve the purpose of providing additional revenue to increase spending I would not support the tax bill myself.

That is the reason I said last year that I would not support the surcharge, even though I was the author of the bill, if the expenditure controls were deleted from it. I told the administration this year that after our failure here in the Senate to obtain, legislatively, a firm, meaningful control over expenditures I would be reluctant to support this surcharge extension. I could not argue for its enactment on the floor of the Senate unless we had a firm commitment worked out with the executive branch that there will definitely be controls over spending. That was the reason I solicited and received the letter from the President promising that the administration would hold the lid on expenditures. The Senator from Missouri, who has taken this line consistently, will agree with me that my voting record in the Senate has reflected that belief.

Mr. SYMINGTON. There is no question about that.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. One further point. The Senator mentioned the balance of payments and that in this quarter they are worse. I am sure he will

agree with me that last year's improvement in the balance of payments, about which there was so much boasting, was not a true correction of our balance-of-payments problem. It represented an unusually large inflow of foreign investment capital coming into this country and buying of American securities, bonds, and stocks; and that resulted in a mathematical improvement in the balance of payments, while at the same time our exports as related to imports were on the adverse side.

Mr. SYMINGTON. It also reflected the financial problems of a particular country.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. That is correct; there was a flight of capital from abroad coming into this country.

When we speak of the strength of the American dollar today, as some do, while it is in a little better position than it was a couple of times last year, to a large extent the dollar looks stronger today because we are comparing it to the weaker currency position of some of the other countries, which were stronger last year.

I do not think we can afford to gamble on the stability of the dollar. I remember very well, as does the Senator from Missouri, that during the debate on the question of whether the Senate would or would not enact a surcharge last year it was necessary for the administration to call the leadership of the Senate on a certain Friday and adjourn the Senate before we could have a vote. If we had had the vote, at that time it was almost certain to be adverse on the enactment of the surcharge. It was the opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and others that the American dollar would have gone over the brink within 72 hours had the Senate defeated that surtax on that date.

When the Senate adjourned early that Friday and carried the vote over until the following Tuesday the administration mustered enough votes to pass the measure.

I plead with the Senate leadership not to let that happen again—but time is running out.

I say, let us not gamble with the stability of our dollar to that point again. That is the reason I think it is vitally important that we take action. I think any action would be better than inaction; that is the point I am making. I am not trying to say I have the only answer, but the Senate has a right to express its will. Let us take action and solve the impasse before it is too late; that is all I ask.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I see the majority leader is present, and I would rather like to address what I have to say to him, and also to the distinguished Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I thought when we finished the dialog that at 3 o'clock we were going to discuss some procedural matters with reference

to the ABM issue pending before the Senate and then likely have a vote on the Cooper-Hart amendment.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I am willing to yield the floor.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I accept the floor in my own right.

Obviously we are not going to get action on the tax matter unless we set aside the ABM debate and address ourselves to it.

Tomorrow it is expected that the House of Representatives will complete action on the tax bill and that it will be messaged over.

I discussed the matter with the majority leader, who thought that perhaps it ought to be committed to the Senate Committee on Finance. I uttered the hope that perhaps we could ask for immediate consideration and that if there be objection, it would then go to the calendar and could be called up at an appropriate time.

I think that one of the hazards involved in sending it to the Finance Committee is that if action is expected, there must be a physical vote. The question is how long will it take to get a quorum. That is one matter.

The second matter involves how much discussion there will be before that bill finally gets to a vote.

Since time is so important in this matter, I renew my hope that perhaps we can call it up and have objection made, if anyone so desires, and put the measure on the Senate Calendar. It will then be there to call up at any time. It has got to be here and ready so that when the ABM matter is set aside—and that matter has not been agreed to yet—we may then get to the tax bill.

However, that is a parliamentary problem that confronts us. And it has got to be solved first. There is no other answer to it.

That question anticipates whether a vote can be had on the pending amendment, the Cooper-Hart amendment.

Various objections have been registered. Some Senators say that we ought to wait and ought not to conclude the matter until the President returns. They say that there will be hearings in the Committee on Foreign Relations, that the senior Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE) is prepared to adduce heretofore unexplored material of high value. I do not know what it is. However, one can anticipate that all of this will take time.

The query is, without discussing the merits of any measure, whether it is the surtax or the ABM: When do we vote so that we can give a sense of certainty to the Members of the Senate as well as to the commercial community when we finally get around to the surtax?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President the distinguished minority leader did approach me earlier today about the possibility of putting on the calendar the 15-day extension of the surtax withholding levels.

I did not at that time express any enthusiasm for such a procedure, nor do I do so now. But I did say that I would be

glad to discuss it, as a courtesy, with the distinguished chairman of the committee, the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG).

It would be my preference this time to have the resolution, if and when it comes from the House, referred to the Committee on Finance, which is the proper procedural attitude to take.

The distinguished minority leader has indicated that it would be difficult perhaps to get the members of that committee together. I do not think it would be difficult at all, may I say, most respectfully, in view of the deadline of midnight this coming Thursday, at which time the surtax will go out of existence if it is not renewed in some shape or form.

My present guess is that it might well go out of existence. That would mean that the money withheld from salaried workers and wage earners would have to be repaid to them.

It would mean also, in my opinion, that it would be very difficult to get the surtax resurrected again in view of the undercurrent of feelings I have detected on this side of the aisle.

I would say that if the Committee on Finance can meet and report out on a 9-to-8 basis the extension of the surtax as reported from the House, with all of these factors in mind, there will be no trouble in getting a quorum present, and that, in view of the time expiration of midnight Thursday next of the present surtax, if not extended, it would be possible to get action at that time, too.

I am sure the distinguished minority leader, who is a member of that committee, would agree with that and understand the situation in which not only he finds himself, but I also find myself at the same time.

I have nothing more to add to what I have said twice today on this matter and what the Democratic policy committee and the Democratic members of the Finance Committee authorized me to state on Thursday last.

I am not the author of these proposals. I am the servant of the policy committee, and what the policy committee decides to do, I will do to the best of my ability and without any if's, and's, or butt's.

I am here as a lightning rod in a certain sense, because there is a lot of heat coming in my direction. But I do not mind that. It goes with the job and with the responsibility entrusted to me. And that responsibility will be carried out without fear or favor.

I am saying now that I am putting everything on the table, where it has always been, anyway, and it will be for the Senate to decide what to do within the next several days about this most important question which confronts us.

I can only repeat again that if I detect correctly the undercurrent of feelings on this side of the aisle as far as the surtax is concerned, if it ever goes off the books, it is very possible that it will not be put on the books again.

I do not know what the distinguished Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE) has in mind, except that he has called a meeting of his subcommittee in executive ses-

sion on Wednesday next. It will be my hope, in view of the developments which have become known on the floor of the Senate over the past 2 or 3 days, that it might be possible the next day, Thursday, to take up the ABM amendment.

If an agreement could be reached with the distinguished Senator from Tennessee, I would hope that the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), would reconsider his position and perhaps come along. I do know that the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER); the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART); the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS); the distinguished minority leader, the Senator from Illinois (Dr. DIRKSEN), and the Senator from Montana—now speaking—would like to get a vote as rapidly as possible.

Speaking for myself, I do not think that, so far as the President is concerned, he cares one way or the other when the vote comes.

That is about all I can say.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I have one other question I should like to ask the distinguished majority leader.

Let us assume that the tax measure is referred to the Committee on Finance, and let us assume, also, that without an undue use of time it is reported to the Senate Calendar. Now, that implies that to get any action, the ABM matter—meaning the amendments—has to be set aside, and the majority leader, exercising his very proper province, must call up the tax bill. Under the circumstances, and in view of all that has been said, would the ABM matter and this amendment be set aside for that purpose?

Mr. MANSFIELD. If I may answer, with due respect to the chairman of the committee.

Mr. STENNIS. It is all right.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I would be loath to set the pending business aside unless some agreement, if possible, could be reached relative to the accommodation proposed in good faith by the Democratic policy committee and the Democratic members of the Committee on Finance to the distinguished minority leader and the administration, if it were given some consideration and perhaps, hopefully, approval. I do not take as a negative answer the fact that 2 hours after this accommodation was given to the distinguished minority leader, it was turned down; that it was turned down just because the press, the radio, and the TV said so. I received no word from anyone in the administration or from the Republican leadership which indicated that it was turned down. As a matter of fact, I think that last Friday the distinguished minority leader said that the door was still open, and I replied that I hoped the door would stay open.

But, frankly, this is about as far as we can go. It took a great deal of persuasion to get this far, and I think we are up against a proposition which cannot be compromised any further but which will have to be decided one way or the other at the proper time—and the proper time will not extend beyond midnight of Thursday next.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, the

awkward position in which the minority leadership finds itself—and very particularly the minority leader—is simply that what is contained in that resolution implied that the proposal would be accepted as such, without changing one jot or tittle. Now, then, that presumes that I would go to every one of the 43 Members on the minority side and ask them to concur. They may or may not concur. I have no control over that. Obviously, I cannot abrogate the privileges, the rights, and the prerogatives of any Member of the Senate. So if one of them should stand in his place and offer an amendment, or a series of amendments, obviously that is his right as a Senator. How shall the minority leader control that? He cannot control it. He might make some importunity. He might make a plea and say, "Please do not do it." But they might ignore him, for all his trouble, because everybody has a serious interest in the matter.

So I found myself in that awkward position, and I could not say to the distinguished majority leader, "We accept." I could say for myself, "I accept." But I could not say it for every Senator on this side of the aisle, and certainly I could not say it for those on the majority side of the aisle.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Nor could I. But there is such a thing as good faith and good understanding, and I have found that the word of the distinguished minority leader is as good as gold. He has never said anything to me that he did not back up; and I hope that, in reverse, my actions toward him have been on the same basis.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I trust it will always be that way, at the present value of gold.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Thirty-five dollars an ounce.

Mr. DIRKSEN. But I know, from what pours into my office every day, that there are people in the Capitol from all over the country. They are coming and appealing for modifications in the so-called investment tax credit:

Can't you make a little modification so that we can buy some boxcars for our railroads? Those mean shipments; they, in turn, mean jobs. That contributes to the economy and to its viability. Can't you please do it?

What happens in my office is happening in every office—certainly in this end of the Capitol. So how can I say that somebody is not going to stand in his place and ask for a modification?

When one looks at the resolution of the majority policy committee, he sees how carefully—almost as if it were done by a genius—they nailed down the date; they nailed down everything in connection with it, so that, if you changed a comma, it probably would be a violation of the spirit of that undertaking by the committee.

I always want to play in the very best of faith. That is a chance we have to take. But the problem is, if it comes over here tomorrow, if it goes to the Committee on Finance, if we have a meeting the next morning, and if we report it to the Senate Calendar, do we then move aside the pending business of the Senate and get at it?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. DIRKSEN. In just a moment.

On that question, I do not think there really has been a durable answer.

I yield to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I know the importance of this tax matter, as reported to the country and as reported to the Senate. Without lessening that, I wish to address myself briefly to the real pending business of the Senate—the Cooper-Hart amendment.

Let me underscore, too, that I want everyone, of course, to have full opportunity to debate that matter pro and con as much as he might wish. But, Mr. President, this is serious business. The debate on that issue has been going on since January of this year on the floor of the Senate, in addition to the debates we had theretofore.

This authorization bill contains all the hardware of the military program, and we have to have this every year. That is contrary to the usual pattern. We authorized various programs for 2, 3, or 4 years.

I was one of the principal sponsors of the amendment to the law that required this authorization and held out for it to the last, because I thought Congress should have the opportunity to pass on it every year. The argument against it was that it will be delayed; Congress will not act; it will drag along; too much time will be consumed. We finally overcame that argument. The Senator from Georgia was the author of the amendment. That became the law, and I think it is a very wholesome law.

But it certainly does put the bee on us. This is totally a legislative responsibility. We cannot blame the Defense Department; we cannot blame industry. We cannot blame anyone but ourselves. We are holding up this matter, which will take weeks at best after it passes the Senate. The House will have to act. It will have to go to conference. The report will have to come to the Senate. Everything in the bill will have to wait for the final decision. The House Appropriations Committee has had some very fine hearings. I understand their position is they have gone as far as they can go until these authorization matters are settled.

Therefore, we have a responsibility here. This measure involves hardware for Vietnam, if it continues to last over there.

One of the arguments against the ABM is that we already have the Poseidon program. We are converting now from the Polaris over to Poseidon. These submarines are held up now in the process of remodeling, as I understand the situation, pending disposition of this bill. So this is not a minor matter. We are dealing with matters vital to our security. Many other illustrations could be pointed out. I think there is a good chance that we could proceed to a vote before too long. With respect to the tax matter, I personally would like to know more about how we are going to proceed, but I believe we can find time for a tax matter. It would have to be largely by agreement, at any rate, as I understand it. I do not believe that is the real difficulty here.

News stories in some places suggest

that the ABM go over until after the August recess. Mr. President, that would be pitiful. Here are the authors of the amendment. They are ready to speak. They have taken a position on the floor of the Senate. Let us close ranks and in some way give the Senator from Tennessee an opportunity to have his hearing. I am not talking behind his back. He knows how I feel about that. Give him a chance to have his hearing and vote on this matter Friday. I think there should be 48 hours' notice. It takes time to travel and present the arguments. I am hoping that some day this week will be considered. I have just referred to Friday. I believe that is reasonably possible. I hope they will get the hearings all together. All the background material is known. We could finally get the bill to conference and still have requests for hearings. If we listened to some persons, we would still be having hearings on the atomic bomb.

I appeal to the Senate. Let us close ranks and get started on something definite. I propose Friday.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Mississippi has made a suggestion that we might be able to vote Friday. I just talked with the distinguished Senator from Arkansas. He would not feel inclined to agree to vote on Friday. If we could accomplish it only by a time limitation, and if there was an agreement, that would be the end of it. But if we do not lay it aside, what happens to the surtax? That is the problem.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, we have been engaged in repetitious debate on this issue and we are now going into the fourth week. I cannot conceive of anything new that might be brought to light that would change the already hardened lines on this issue in the Senate. I think the lines are clearly drawn.

I think we do the people of this country a great disservice if we do not go ahead on this matter. If we cannot arrive at some agreement to vote, preferably on Wednesday or Thursday—that would give the Senator from Tennessee time to reveal whatever documents he wants to investigate in his committee meeting—I would feel a strong inclination to offer a tabling motion to force the issue and bring it to a vote because I do not think we are going to contribute any more to enlighten the Senate on this issue.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. TOWER. I do not have the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DOLE in the chair). The Senator from Illinois has the floor.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri is recognized.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, most of my discussion about this matter was in the closed session.

But I feel the Senator from Tennessee,

who is not in the Chamber today, should also be present for this discussion, because some 2 months ago, as a guess, members of the engineering and scientific fraternity, suggested we look into some reports.

I thereupon asked that I be allowed to look at these reports. At first I was told the reports could not be located. This was done with complete sincerity. I do not in any way criticize that, but if there was any delay it was not the fault of the Senate.

Later on one of the reports was found and was promptly sent to the Senate. I think it fair to say that this report does not approve certain aspects of the design of the ABM. As is the case in much of this discussion, however, it is difficult to talk about it in open session because pertinent factors incident to such discussion have been classified.

Only last week another report was obtained and sent over. In both cases, I might add, these reports were not made by any opponents or proponents of this system or any other system. They were paid for by the taxpayers of the United States and were made at the request of the Department of Defense. One of them was made by a company headed by Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the other by a company called Aerospace. Both companies are nonprofit organizations which obtain their business from the Government.

I have been told there are other reports made by other companies.

Mr. President, this is the first weapons system I have opposed at its original presentation since coming into Government. When I was criticized for doing so I looked up the record. I found that since World War II I have worked for and voted for \$953 billion for the Defense Department, which means at the end of this year that figure will be over a trillion dollars.

I do not criticize the delay of these reports, and believe everything was done to obtain them for us. I do not criticize in anyway people who are entirely sincere in their belief this system should be deployed now. But I do find there are statements in the two reports which would imply that considerable thought should be given to whether or not this Safeguard system should be deployed now instead of, as the Cooper-Hart amendment recommends, waiting a year before deciding on deployment.

In addition, there is another report which we learned about only last week. I do not know whether that is favorable or not. That is a report made by the Defense Science Advisory Board.

I understand that report is critical of the Safeguard system itself; not just any ABM system.

The scientists who told me about it—and two did—are universally respected. They would not be considered political scientists against the ABM system or political scientists for the ABM system; rather independents. They said that in their opinion it would be wise for the Senate to look at the reports before the vote as to whether or not to deploy now.

If we had known about the reports before, naturally we would have looked at them before. One has not yet been received. It is my understanding the dis-

tinguished Senator from Tennessee has requested it. I personally would like to see it.

From what I have read—and I have not tried to make any count—this will be a close vote; and I hope that it will be judged on the facts. I cannot imagine anything more valuable to a Senator, before he votes on this subject, than as much knowledge as possible of the facts.

The Senator from Tennessee is chairman of his subcommittee. He has scheduled a meeting on Wednesday to review these reports.

Now the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, knows that I have nothing but the most complete respect for him. Of all the men I have ever known, he has a wise concept of justice.

Inasmuch as the vote will be close, inasmuch as there is much pressure—let me emphasize that the pressure by no means is on only one side—we owe it to ourselves and the Senate to examine all reports made by independent experts who tried to obtain the facts.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Missouri yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.

Several other Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Missouri yield to me so that I may yield the floor?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I yield now to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I want to comment on what the Senator said relative to the hearing of the Senator from Tennessee which has been talked about here. I have also requested representatives from the Pentagon to come and discuss another aspect of this matter which has just been brought to my attention in the past few days.

If I may add one other thing, the Senator from Mississippi seems to take upon us a little more than usual blame for this delay. This is the first time—I believe it is correct—that I can remember this kind of bill was first submitted to the Senate. Normally, it is passed by the House first, is it not, and then sent on to the Senate? On this occasion I do not know whether they did. I do not wish to delay it beyond the time for reasonable consideration of this matter because it is extremely important; but I would not agree to a vote now, under these circumstances, on Friday.

It may be, after the hearings on Wednesday, if the matter is brought up on Thursday, that the Senator from Tennessee and the Senator from Missouri and others interested in this may wish to agree to it, so that I might not object. However, I think it would be preferable to vote next Tuesday or Wednesday.

In that connection, I do not see why we do not proceed with the tax matter. It has a time limit on it for Friday, or at least midnight Thursday. It is very important, as the Senator from Illinois has pointed out, that the last meeting of the President with the leaders of Senate and House was on the matter of the tax bill.

If this is not agreeable to the Senator from Mississippi, I have amendments to the pending bill which I am prepared to offer and to offer tomorrow morning, if the Senator would like, and utilize that time in disposing of certain amendments without any extended debate. They are simple amendments. That will make some progress in disposing of the military bill. If that is an agreeable procedure, I thank the Senator.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator has mentioned something else that has come up, I believe I have a rough idea of what it is; namely, what happens when the air becomes filled with nuclear explosions and so forth.

Earlier this morning, I received a pamphlet which to the best of my knowledge is not entirely accurate. I am sure said pamphlet was sent to many other people because it is printed in rather deluxe fashion. It makes several statements which, to the best of my knowledge, are not correct.

As mentioned earlier today, I shall discuss this pamphlet briefly on the floor tomorrow.

What worries me is that if we could get a few figures declassified, we could clarify certain aspects of the system so that more people would understand its operation.

I took the two committees most thoroughly briefed on this matter and combined their votes—the only two committees that have been thoroughly briefed on this matter—and to my surprise, even though the Foreign Relations Committee has three less members than the Armed Services Committee, found that the vote on the Cooper-Hart amendment was 18 for, 14 against, 1 undecided; this out of the 33 members.

It has always been my conviction that the more facts we get, the more constructive the vote will be.

It is hard to discuss this matter intelligently without releasing classified figures; for example, the number of Sprints and Spartans involved in each missile field.

I am trying to figure a way, tomorrow, to say what should be said without violating security.

We have two reports. We are expecting two more. There may be more; so I would hope we could spend a little more time to understand the technical people, those not connected either politically against it or politically for it.

I should also say, with great respect, to my chairman, the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, that I do believe, generally, in connection with authorization bills, the Senate must proceed ahead of the House.

It is my understanding the House has not even started its hearings on the Army and Navy, and although they did start authorization hearings on the Air Force, those have been temporarily suspended.

Thus, I would hope that all Members of the Senate would have a little more time in order to understand to the best of their ability, what this is about, and not just the two committees most directly involved.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the

Senator yield to me quite briefly for a response?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President—  
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, just by way of response to the Senator from Missouri and the Senator from Arkansas, there is nothing especially new about this authorization bill coming up in the Senate first. It should have been up in both Houses perhaps before now, but last year I was acting chairman on that bill, and it was taken up here first. I know that to be a fact. My recollection is that some previous years when I was acting chairman we took it up first. Certainly, the rule about the House taking up an authorization bill is not rigid; just appropriation bills.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Just on appropriations.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes; appropriations are always handled in that order.

Mr. President, I know of no additional reports or additional information or as to what might be in them. I do not think any has been withheld.

I may mention, for the benefit of Senators who may not have heard Secretary Laird yesterday on one of the network programs, "Face The Nation," when he discussed this question, that Mr. Rowan said:

Mr. Secretary, it was reported this past week that the Institute for Defense Analysis, which is sometimes described as the Pentagon's "think tank," has come up with a report saying that it would be wasteful to deploy an ABM system—an anti-ballistic missile system. Is there such a report? Have you seen it, and how do you react to it?

Mr. LAIRD. Well, there are several reports that have been made by the Institute for Defense Analysis. The report you refer to is an older report, on both the pros and the cons of the ABM system.

The rest of the answer is important:

I think it's important from the Department of Defense standpoint to have these outside agencies look at both the pros and the cons. And we have had studies made outlining the adverse opinion on various weapon systems, as well as the supporting information. And we have reports from that group on both sides of this particular question.

I study those reports, and then I make my recommendation after I have studied the reports to the President of the United States.

Mr. SHEEHAN. Mr. Secretary, could you go into detail as to what is in these reports? The opposition in the Senate is making something of them, and claiming that they're new information—fresh information which says the system won't work—specifically that high altitude nuclear blasts would knock out the radars and the other communication networks within the system and make it unworkable.

Could you comment on that?

Mr. LAIRD. Well, I'd be very happy to, and I commented on that charge, in very great detail, before the House Appropriations Committee, and I would direct your attention to the detailed explanation of that that I went into on the unclassified record before the House Appropriations Committee, and this was covered in great detail.

This program is just a short program, and I'm sure you don't want to get into that detail now. But I would direct your attention to the very thorough and complete answers

that were given before the House Appropriations Committee when that very same question was asked.

There's about ten pages of testimony in which, I think, that that question was very adequately dealt with.

The Senator from Arkansas made a legitimate inquiry last Friday, I believe it was, on that very point. I knew I had heard it gone into, but I could not give him the book and page.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator have the book and page now?

Mr. STENNIS. No, but I will get it and give it. I will have it for the Senator in 5 minutes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator.

Mr. STENNIS. We had this same manner in our Preparedness Subcommittee hearings, which the Senator from Missouri will remember. We always have to go into that question, and do.

I thank the Senator for yielding to me.

Mr. SYMINGTON. To the best of my knowledge, none of these reports have anything to do with the point brought up by the Senator from Arkansas. They do have something to do with—at least one of them does, and I know because I have read it—the vulnerability of the proposed radar system.

In effect, what the Senator from Tennessee and some others are asking for is the same knowledge the Secretary of Defense has with respect to these reports. He has read them and formed his opinion. If there is also a favorable report, we should have it. I did not have the privilege of listening to the Secretary of Defense, yesterday, being back in my State. If there is a favorable report from the Institute of Defense Analysis, inasmuch as I have one which is not favorable in some respects, I would also like to see the favorable report.

I did not want to leave the impression that these reports had anything to do with what the Senator from Arkansas was talking about. I do feel that in an atmosphere of this character, we would not want to be "tabled" out of any information.

We want and should have all the information we can get. It is not our fault people had trouble getting these reports together. They were made some time ago. I do not know the exact date.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Texas.

Mr. TOWER. I think the paper referred to by the Senator from Mississippi was written in 1966, a summer paper. Of course, the way this thing operates is that these academicians can get together and do these things ordinarily when they are deployed away from their respective universities. This is a "think tank" type operation. I have heard this paper described as "Thoughts that occurred to me while shaving." That is probably the best way to describe the report, because that is all they are. They are "think tank" type papers. A man makes proposals and says, "Why do we not see if this can work?" or "Why do we not see if it does not work?"

Relative to the matter of the Senator from Mississippi on the blackout, the

page and number are in the hearing before the House Appropriations Committee, page 61 of the hearings. I do not have the precise date. Anyway, during the course of the hearings, as appears on page 61 of the hearings before the House, on the possibility of the radar blackout, Mr. Lipscomb said:

Mr. Secretary, the charge is frequently made that the ABM system just won't work because of its nuclear environment. That the radars will be blacked out either from explosion from our shots or the shots that are coming in from the Soviet Union.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Lipscomb, thank you for your generous remarks. I miss sitting on that side of the table. The blackout will not invalidate the system. Over the past several years extensive analysis has been made of the effect of blackout on the ABM, both self-blackout caused by our own intercepts and the blackout caused by an enemy's high burst above the atmosphere, and also of weapon debris that escapes from the burst region at very high altitude detonation. But we believe that this can be handled by having an overlap of the PAR radar systems so that one PAR can cover the same area while another PAR is temporarily blacked out.

I would like Dr. Foster to comment on that point.

Mr. FOSTER. Mr. Lipscomb, the situation is as Secretary Laird has indicated. We made a test in 1962 to determine the effect on radar of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. So also did the Soviet Union. From those tests we calculated the best kind of an attack to make against the Safeguard system. We also designed the Safeguard system to minimize the effectiveness of such attacks. As a consequence of these studies, we find that it is not worthwhile for the enemy to attempt a blackout attack.

I would also like to add that we have analyzed the Soviet ballistic missile defense around Moscow. We know how many missiles we would have to expend to make a blackout attack on their radars. We have decided that isn't a profitable venture either. We propose to go through that system by sheer exhaustion of the defense.

Several Senators addressed the chair.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, who has the floor?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi has the floor.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator from Kentucky has been waiting about an hour. He is the author of the amendment. I would like to yield to him.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri yielded the floor, and the Chair then recognized the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Will the Senator from Kentucky yield to me?

Mr. STENNIS. Just a minute, Mr. President. I still have the floor.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I beg the Senator's pardon.

Mr. STENNIS. I will yield the Senator 5 minutes, or even 10 minutes, later, but I want to get to the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) and to the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART).

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I would like to get to the Senator from Kentucky also. I have great respect for him; in fact I would not be present on the floor if he had not suggested I come over this afternoon. I did not know he was waiting, having not been here all the time.

Mr. STENNIS. Very well.

Mr. President, I yield for a reasonable time to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. First, with respect to the matter just raised by the distinguished Senator from Texas, to the best of my knowledge it is not covered in any of the reports in question. Second, the report made by the Institute of Defense Analysis, I am told by the staff, was made in 1966 and delivered to the Pentagon in 1967. Third, the report made by Aerospace is dated 1968.

There is one other matter I would raise Mr. President; then I shall be through. We talk a lot about scientists and engineers, and technical pros and cons; but anyone who has any connection with the Pentagon knows there are many people in that building who are not in sympathy with deployment now of this proposed ABM system. It is not a scientific matter entirely. It must operate when it is installed. That is another reason why I thought it might be valuable to review these reports, so we could find out in a more practical way, perhaps, why it is there are people in the Defense Department who do not think now is the time to deploy.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Mississippi for yielding.

Mr. STENNIS. I was glad to yield to the Senator.

Mr. President, I yield now to the Senator from Kentucky. I suggest that the Senator from Kentucky obtain the floor in his own right. I yield the floor, Mr. President.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I have no desire to interrupt my friend the Senator from Missouri. I want to come back to this issue of when a vote shall be taken, and I know the Senator from Michigan will join me.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. The issue has been debated in the country, now, for more than a year. The debate in the Senate on the pending bill is now entering its fourth week. I should like to say, however, that I do not think there has been any unusual delay in reaching a decision on this amendment. It does have some importance. From the standpoint of costs, it involves a first phase cost of about \$2 billion; and a phase 2 cost of \$10.8 billion; and many competent scientists believe it will go far beyond that to \$30 or \$40 billion dollars.

The amendment is important to the security of the country, and to the arms talks. So I do not consider that time has been lost. During the first week, the sponsors of the bill had the obligation to explain their views not only on the ABM issue, but to explain on the entire bill. During the second week, there was no burden upon us to bring up the amendment; the moon shot occupied attention for 2 days, at least, and no debate was possible. Last week Senator HART brought up the amendment.

If one looks at the RECORD, he will find that many Members of the Senate have spoken for the amendment and have entered into the debate. If the debate has been, as is said, slow, I do not think it can be charged against our efforts to try to bring out the information we be-

lieve necessary for judgment. We have tried.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This has special reference to what the Senator from Missouri was saying. I do not wish to delay the vote, but the culprit seems to be me at this point.

On May 16, I wrote a letter to the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Laird, of which I shall read the first paragraph:

I understand that the Institute for Defense Analyses has prepared a paper, No. N-619, which is entitled: "Soviet First-Strike Counterforce Capability—Fact or Fiction." Will you please provide the Committee with a copy of that document?

They replied on June 2—Senators will note that they usually reply about 2 or 3 weeks later—and politely declined to furnish it. They said:

In summary, an IDA Internal Note is an internal working document for staff review, comment and criticism and is neither intended nor suitable for external distribution.

I have had this kind of response time and again from the Department of Defense. Sometimes, when the Senator from Missouri or a member of the Committee on Armed Services joins in a request, I get them, and many times I do not get them. In the same letter, I also requested a copy of the "Command and Control" study, going back to the Gulf of Tonkin. They did not then, nor have they yet, supplied it.

These are reports paid for by the taxpayers, material supplied by IDA or similar organizations, but they have refused to make them available, though finally after much effort, as the Senator from Missouri has stated, he sometimes will get one, or if the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services orders the Defense Department to make them available, as the Senator from Georgia once did in the case of the Gulf of Tonkin, we get them.

But I do not accept the idea that we are delaying the vote, when we are dealing with a matter of this importance, for the Department of Defense has no compunction about classifying anything they think is unfavorable to their position. I do not think we have delayed. I think a matter of this weight is entitled to much greater time for debate; and if there is anything further that I think we need, I shall not agree to a vote. I have already made it plain that I shall not agree to a vote on Thursday or Friday of this week. We will need to see what the hearings reveal on Wednesday.

It may be that nothing further will be revealed that has not already been revealed. Then I shall be willing to vote. I think the sensible thing to do would be to dispose of the tax matter—as I am prepared to do—and then to revert to this bill after the tax bill has been disposed of.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART) and I believe that as we are the original sponsors of the amendment; we have the duty to bring the issue to a decision. We have brought the question of

agreeing upon a time to vote, to the floor of the Senate so that Senators could state their views. Both of us are willing to move toward a vote on the amendment as quickly as possible. But it is the right of other Senators who believe that they need more time to object. We are at least arriving at some idea as to when the Senate can vote.

We knew, and so stated so on the floor last Friday, that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE) would hold a hearing and that he would not want a vote until after the hearing.

Certain other questions had been raised about information. One question arose after the closed hearing. We were advised on that day that we would have last-minute intelligence. We heard the most recent intelligence. Certainly we would not and do not question the credibility of Senators who offered the information, but we had no opportunity to go to the sources until the closed hearing was over. Whatever impression it carried had been made.

Several Senators said—at least one of them is in the Chamber today—that they had not finally decided until they had heard certain evidence which was given at the closed session. But those of us who oppose deployment had never heard the last-minute intelligence—until the closed hearing. We had no opportunity to challenge its meaning.

A statement by the Secretary of Defense before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations was amplified in last-minute intelligence offered in the closed hearings. Its meaning could have influenced Senators. Later I wrote to Secretary Laird and Dr. Foster and questioned them on the subjects, one of which was submarines. I received letters with answers to some of my questions, but not answering my questions on submarines.

Officials from the Department of Defense and the CIA came to my office and talked to me about the new information we had received in the closed session. I must say that their reports were in harmony, but on the subject, for which I had requested information—submarines—one could form a judgment either way. I asked, "Can you make a categorical statement that this fact is correct?"

The answer was, "No, but it is our judgment, based on certain phenomena, that it is correct."

So one could make his judgment either way.

The reports of intelligence, and their elusive nature is one of the problems we have faced in this debate. This has been brought out in the discussions on the floor of the Senate last Friday and today.

My position is the same, and I am sure that the distinguished Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART) will agree with me. We want to keep working every day toward a vote. If the tax matter comes up—and it is of great importance, as far as I am concerned—I would consider laying our amendment aside temporarily. However, I do not want to lay it aside on any other proposition, because if we were to do that, it would be necessary to start over again.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the

Senator yield for a brief parliamentary inquiry?

Mr. COOPER. I will yield in a moment. I believe—and I know—that the matter of this last-minute intelligence has had a strong inhibiting effect on the matter of bringing the debate to a close.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a brief parliamentary inquiry?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, cannot any Member of the Senate, when recognized, offer a motion to table a pending amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. TOWER. And if that motion is made, then it is not debatable and the vote must immediately ensue on the motion to table?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I do not yield the floor for that purpose.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, for the benefit of the Senator, I might say that serious consideration is being given by some Senators to the possibility of offering such a motion on Wednesday or Thursday.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I certainly hope that there will not be such a motion until after prior notice has been given for a certain reasonable time within which every Senator may have his say and debate the matter.

I am sure that the Senator from Texas does not want this done by surprise. We do not want anything like that done without notice.

Mr. TOWER. Adequate notice will be given.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, the Senator from Kentucky has described very well our motive last Friday in undertaking to develop the possibility of arriving at a time for a vote and in reviewing the discussion this afternoon.

I rather think in view of the concern of the Senator from Tennessee and the pendency of the matter, I assume in executive session, in the subcommittee on Wednesday, that until that matter has concluded, none of us would push for a date certain.

We would all recognize the necessity and obligation to give the Senator from Tennessee an opportunity to develop whatever record there may be on Wednesday. We could then renew our discussion here.

The Senator from Kentucky has described exactly how we who offer the amendment feel. We are anxious to see the amendment go forward to a vote and that any debate that any Senator believes to be relevant to a prudent decision is available.

I am sure that no one would want the Senate to act after having notice that

such a report is in existence until we have had that opportunity.

Those of us who support the amendment have the deep conviction that the deployment of the ABM system at this time would be wrong.

For that reason we would hope to win when we have a vote. However, more importantly, we hope that the vote will be the action that is correct and in our national interest.

A few days to insure that that is done is time well spent.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, as the ranking minority member of the Gore subcommittee, I second the concern of our chairman and the concern of the Senator from Missouri, a member of the full committee, that we not set a time for any vote on this vital amendment until we are quite sure we have all the information that bears upon this question.

I appreciate, therefore, the assurance of the Senator from Michigan and the Senator from Mississippi on this point.

So far as the suggestion of a motion to table is concerned, I am satisfied that no matter what position the majority of the Senators might take on the final substantive question, the overwhelming majority would defeat a motion to table which they regarded as untimely because sufficient time for all information to be available had not been allowed.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I hope that no one would be so shortsighted as to make a motion to table the Cooper-Hart amendment. That motion certainly would not carry. And if it were to carry, it would virtually assure the introduction of 100 other amendments which would mean that the debate would run on and on—until no one would know when it would conclude.

There is one question that I should like to ask the Senator from Kentucky. I have been hopeful that we might find some advantages for the civilian economy, with the ABM radar and computer systems.

I virtually had given up on that hope because of the great cost of the radars that have been proposed. I think the cost is estimated to be in the neighborhood of \$100 million each. However, there will be other uses for these systems in the Defense Establishment.

Has the Senator from Kentucky found any alternative uses for the ABM radar?

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I am not an authority on this matter. I did make inquiry from scientists at the most respected laboratories concerned with radar whose names are well known in the radar field. Dr. Ruina is one.

Dr. Ruina informed me that the use of these radars in nondefense areas, would be prohibitive in cost. For example, radars used for air traffic control are about as large and expensive as any radars applied to civil uses, and their cost is only on the order of a million dollars. The cost of the MSR and PAR are

about 100 times greater. My inquiries revealed that the PARS and MSRS could be used for certain other functions such as early warning, observation of United States or Soviet missile tests, as an addition to the BMEWS and for satellite tracking.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, as I understand it, there are six or seven uses to be made of the radars, in addition to being a component part of the ABM system.

Mr. COOPER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. AIKEN. Therefore, if the research and development work is carried on, the cost would not be a total loss in the event it turned out to be unadaptable to the ABM system alone. I think that is important.

Mr. COOPER. They could be used in several ways, should the Safeguard system never be deployed. For this reason research and development on the radars at recognized test sites would not be a loss to the military security of this Nation. Even if they are superseded, as now seems likely, we could put them to some constructive use.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, so many of us are not only willing, but are also anxious to have the research and development work go on. However, we want reasonable assurance that the results of that research and development work will have some major value to our defense system, and hopefully, to our economic system.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, without question, Dr. Ruina said that we could make some use of the radars even if we decide never to deploy the system.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, while the distinguished Senator from Mississippi is on the floor, I would like to comment on one portion of the comments of the Senator from Kentucky.

I would like to move forward with dispatch on the ABM vote. We all agree that the debate has been exceedingly informative and useful. There has not been a day gone by without a major speech being given by both proponents and opponents.

I think that we have learned a great deal. I think we would all want to have every bit of time that is necessary. As far as I am concerned, I would be ready to vote tomorrow or Friday. I think that I have all the information I need. On the other hand, I would want to be cognizant of the fact that there may be new information that has not yet been revealed.

I have seen no dilatory tactics of any kind, any place. We recognize the urgency of moving ahead.

When the distinguished Senator from Kentucky said he would be willing to set aside his amendment for the surtax bill, I think this is exceedingly important to the Committee on Armed Services. I do not know anyone who is a bigger purchaser in America and who would be more adversely affected by the inflationary spiral we have today. In one month we have had an increase in the cost of living of six-tenths of 1 percent, and if the Defense Department budget reflects this increase, it is costing the military

services a half-billion dollars a month in just paper for which they are not getting any value. The value of the military appropriation is dwindling that rapidly.

Though the surtax is not a perfect answer for inflation, I will try on Wednesday to answer my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Missouri, on his question as to whether it has had any effect at all. I think it has had an effect in slowing down the gross national product and the growth of the economy. I can only ask. What would we have had for an inflationary spiral and growth if we had not imposed the surtax?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PERCY. I should like to complete my remarks.

To show the crisis we are in today in interest costs, which is a reflection of inflation, I point to last week, when the State of Connecticut, on triple A bonds, paid the highest interest cost that has ever been recorded in history. Last Thursday the State of Illinois tried to float a \$48 million bond issue to finance higher education—double A bonds—and we could not get a single municipal bond dealer or banking company in this country to bid on those bonds.

Because of the demand for credit, we know that interest rates probably should go higher than they are right now; yet we know the distortions that that action would have.

So this problem of inflation is the only one I can see that would be cause for setting aside this very important debate on bringing the ABM issue to a vote as quickly as we can; as well as the rest of this military bill. We want to move forward, but that one exception, I think, is warranted by the circumstances that I see.

I yield to the distinguished Senator from Missouri.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky has the floor.

Mr. COOPER. I yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Let me assure the distinguished Senator from Illinois that when I asked questions of the Senator from Delaware it was with recognition that no one on the floor is more capable of discussing fiscal and monetary problems than the distinguished ranking minority member of the Committee on Finance. In asking questions, I was not taking a position, rather wanted to know from him whether or not he thought if we did this, we could control inflation. I know the Senator from Illinois will agree with me that if we extend the surcharge and it does not control the growing inflation, we will have to adopt something additional.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. We seem to be deadlocked on both sides, in the ABM and in the surtax. The American system has a way, when it seems that you are up against a brick wall, of showing a way out or causing you to take a way out, and it generally comes from the public, the press, and our own consciences.

I back the Senators who are sponsoring this amendment. I am a member of

the Committee on Foreign Relations. I think they are absolutely right. We ought to vote on this Tuesday or Wednesday.

It is my conviction that we should deal with the surtax this week, so urgent is that. I do not think the matter should be set aside for anything but the surtax.

I can only express these things as the optimum way to proceed, because I do feel that under the American system, between now and tomorrow and the next day, it will bear in on us that we have to do what we have to do, and the positions which now seem so firmly fixed will yield, as they always have yielded, to the higher patriotic duty and responsibility which are involved.

Mr. COOPER. The Senator is always wise. I wish to clarify one thing I said earlier. In talking about laying this amendment aside for the surtax, I said I was simply expressing my own view. Of course, I would not agree to anything like that without conferring with the Senator from Michigan and those who support this amendment. But I do not want to see this laid aside for some other subject. I believe, with the Senator from New York, that after these hearings are held, we should fix a date and vote on this amendment. We cannot do it the latter part of this week.

Mr. JAVITS. May I make a suggestion?

Mr. HART. Let me thank the Senator from Kentucky for taking me off the hook. That was not a joint decision of the offerers of the amendment with respect to putting it aside for the surtax.

As I listened to the discussion about the inflationary fires that have to be banked by the surtax and that the Defense Department is the biggest sufferer from inflation, it occurred to me that it is also the biggest contributor to inflation; and if we had been doing this kind of work for the last couple of years, we would not need a surtax.

Mr. JAVITS. It may be that if the unanimous consent were arrived at tomorrow or the next day with respect to voting next week on the Cooper-Hart amendment, that would cause people to feel that the door is open to acting on the surtax this week. I make that as a suggestion, most respectfully.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Kentucky yield the floor?

Mr. COOPER. I yield, yes.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I just want to say that here is one Senator who has been waiting a long time to vote against this amendment, has been waiting a long time to vote for the ABM program and to vote for this bill, has been waiting a long time to vote for the surtax extension, and he cannot understand these proceedings as being other than dilatory. The Senator from Florida has been through several so-called filibusters himself. He thinks he knows a filibuster when he sees it. He thinks he has seen a very skillful one in this very long, drawn-out debate. He wants the RECORD to show that he recognizes it as a filibuster, and he hopes there will be a chance given to vote on this amendment in the next couple of days.

The Senator from Florida wants to call attention to the fact that the surtax is in the wings and should be voted, and I think it is the patriotic duty of Congress to extend the surtax.

The second thing he wants to call attention to is that we are at the 28th of July. We have not passed a single appropriation bill that has gone to the President. We are talking about a vacation beginning August 13, for 3 weeks. We have not done anything worthy of the name up to now in this session, which has extended nearly 7 months.

The Senator from Florida just wants it to be clearly understood that this is a filibuster. He heard the Senator from Vermont, who has been in the Senate even longer than he, say a short time ago that if a motion was made and carried, it would mean that there would be 100 other amendments and that the debate would extend on and on and on and on. I believe those are the exact words used by the distinguished Senator from Vermont.

The Senator from Florida just wants to ask his friends to please bring this thing to an end; to leave the Senate in a position to determine this business, which is simply an authorization; to leave the Senate in the position to pass the surtax bill; and I hope to set aside the plan for vacation, when we have not passed a single appropriation bill for the current fiscal year that has been sent to the President.

Let us not have this continuous debate. If Senators want to have a filibuster, the Senator from Florida is not going to say that cannot be done; but he wants it to be clear in the RECORD, and the people to understand it, that that is what is going on.

I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. COOPER. I say to the Senator from Florida that that may be his view; it is not mine; and the fact that he announces it to the public does not make it a filibuster. I have gone through this about four times now, and I will do it again.

The first week certainly was the week during which the Senator from Mississippi presented the bill. The bill does not include only the ABM. Many other programs are included in the bill. Altogether it is a \$20 billion bill. During the first few days the chairman was supported by quite a few Senators who are members of the committee. The next week a great many Senators were in the State of the Senator from Florida. Many of them were there for 2 days, and properly so. I do not believe we could put our minds on anything at that time except the beginning of that great trip to the moon. Monday was a holiday and the next day the Senator from Michigan introduced our amendment.

I do not consider that we have been in a long and useless debate in connection with the matter. This is an important debate. It involves the possible expenditure of at least \$10 billion and many persons believe it will involve billions of dollars. It also involves the security of our country. The measure involves not only our security but also it deals with peace. It is not a simple measure.

The fact that the Senator from Florida calls it an authorization bill is not very descriptive of the amendment, in my view. Nevertheless, the Senator from Michigan and I are ready day after day to be here and to use our best efforts to arrive at a vote. We hope the vote will be the latter part of this week.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I do not object to the Senator continuing to speak. I have frequently spoken myself in filibusters. I think I know one when I see it.

Mr. COOPER. I must say I have joined the Senator.

Mr. HOLLAND. The fact that the Senator and his associates are willing to speak on and on and on indicates that they are engaged in a filibuster. I want to indicate that is what we are faced with.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of the Senator from Florida and his concern about the business of the Senate, and that this matter move along as well as the tax bill.

It is a fact that I have had many conferences with the Senator from Kentucky and the Senator from Michigan. Without any exception they have wanted to get their amendment to a vote and they have been ready and have gone to any length they could in cooperating on that score.

Mr. HOLLAND. Are they ready to vote now?

Mr. STENNIS. I think they are. I do not speak for them. However, they have come to the Chamber repeatedly for colloquies to see if we could get an arrangement to vote, and they did so today. We came here at 3 o'clock today for that purpose. I am sure that is their position. The matter is held up, nevertheless, and the Senator will address himself to that.

Mr. HOLLAND. The Senator from Florida is perfectly willing for Senators to talk, but he wants it understood that if they want to vote, he believes the Senate is ready to vote and as long as they keep talking when they say they are ready to vote, they are filibustering.

Mr. STENNIS. I appreciate the fact that the Senator is trying to get the Senate moving and I commend him for it.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I appreciate very much the comments of our able committee chairman, the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS).

I would be a little reluctant to quarrel with the distinguished Senator from Florida when he identifies our discussion as a filibuster. He is a better practitioner of that brand of medicine than the Senator from Kentucky or the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator.

Mr. HART. But I suggest in this case he ought to go back to the medical books. He is misreading some of the symptoms.

As the Senator from Mississippi said, the Senator from Kentucky and I have

been here several days, not to filibuster, but to see if we could get a time to vote.

#### PROGRAM FOR TUESDAY

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I wish to ask the distinguished Senator from West Virginia what time the Senate will convene tomorrow.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Under the order of Friday, July 25, 1969, the Senate will convene at 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Immediately following the prayer and disposition of the Journal the able Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Cotton) will be recognized for 2½ hours, during which he and the able Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Hollings) will discuss in executive session the nomination on the Executive Calendar, to wit, Carl J. Gilbert, of Massachusetts, to be Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, with the rank of Ambassador.

There is a likelihood that there may be a rollcall vote at the conclusion of the 2½ hours.

Mr. TOWER. Will the morning hour then follow the 2½ hours allotted to the Senators indicated?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I do not recall that any request has been made that there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, but that would pose no problem. I am sure we could have such a period if the Senator wishes.

Mr. TOWER. I thank the Senator.

#### ORDER FOR TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that tomorrow, immediately following the disposition of the nomination on the Executive Calendar, there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, for not to exceed 30 minutes, with statements made therein to be limited to 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cranston in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 11 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the order of Friday, July 25, 1969, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 20 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until Tuesday, July 29, 1969, at 11 o'clock a.m.