

SENATE—Wednesday, July 9, 1969

The Senate met at 11 o'clock a.m. and was called to order by the President pro tempore.

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, creator, preserver, redeemer and judge, infuse our hearts and minds with Thy higher wisdom that we may measure these days against the long years yet to come, and to judge our daily actions by Thy divine decrees. Invest our deliberations and our decisions with eternal meanings, that generations to follow may call us "blessed." Pour out Thy blessing upon this land that we may present unto Thee a nation cleansed, and redeemed. Equipped with righteousness and justice, with grace and generosity, may we have a part in Thy great redemption and at last establish the peace of Thy kingdom. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Tuesday, July 8, 1969, be dispensed with.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS DURING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that statements in relation to the transaction of routine morning business be limited to 3 minutes.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—and I shall not object—I wonder if it is possible to get consent to go beyond 3 minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Oh, yes.

Mr. DOMINICK. I have a 7- or 8-minute speech.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Surely.

Mr. DOMINICK. I have no objection.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate go into executive session to consider the nomination of George H. Goodrich, of Maryland.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The nomination will be stated.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of George H. Goodrich, of Maryland, to be an associate judge of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions for the term of 10 years.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of this nomination.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

The motion was agreed to, and the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted to yield.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the majority leader for yielding to me.

Mr. President, speaking as chairman of the committee, it is my concept that it is the committee's duty on the pending matter, the military authorization bill, to do everything possible to get this matter fully presented to the jury, so to speak—to the Senate.

The bill contains many major matters of far-reaching importance that go to the vitals of our security.

Second, I have a very strong feeling about the debate being conducted in open session as much as possible; and only with respect to classified matters that I thought were of the utmost importance would I think of anything other than an open session.

Third, if we can avoid going over the same matter a second time in closed session, I think we should do so.

So, in an effort to continue getting this bill fully presented, not only from my viewpoint, but also from that of all other members of the committee, I believe it would be better now to proceed in this manner: that the Chair have it understood that the Senator from Maine (Mrs. SMITH), who is the ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services, will be recognized soon today, to present her views on the bill as a whole. This would further present the picture as we developed it in the committee; that then the two subcommittee chairmen, the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON) and the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. McINTYRE), and the minority members of those subcommittees be given an opportunity to present their views. Of course, this would all be in open session.

I am not attempting to lay out any pattern for the Chair. I am simply making known the purpose and desires of the committee in presenting this bill.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield. I have discussed this matter briefly with the majority leader.

Mr. President, will the Senator from

Montana yield, to permit me to make one additional point?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. I wish to emphasize that to make the debate meaningful on matters that ought to be heard in a closed session, I shall judge later as to when I shall ask for a closed session. But I express the hope now, and say for my own part, that it is my hope that we will try to consolidate such matters in one closed session.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is fair enough. So the Senate is on notice that there will not be a closed session today.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order entered yesterday to that effect be rescinded.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair is advised by the Parliamentarian and the journal clerk that no order to that effect has been entered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct; it was an understanding.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Then the understanding is withdrawn.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I think that in this dialog it should be abundantly clear to all that, if there are minority Senators who believe they have matters that ought to be presented in a closed session, they will not be precluded from making that request. Of course, any Senator can so move.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair thinks he should make an observation. The rule of recognition in the Senate provides that "the Presiding Officer shall recognize the Senator who shall first address him." It is in the discretion of the Chair to recognize Senators under this rule.

By tradition and through custom that has existed for many years, the Chair does, as a rule, give priority of recognition, first, to the majority leader; second, to the minority leader; then to the Senator who is in charge of a bill; and next to the ranking minority member of the committee or other Senators concerned with presenting the bill. I know of no rule or custom at present that goes beyond that practice.

Every member of the committee—indeed, every Member of the Senate—who wishes to have an opportunity to do so, in the present status of the case, will be afforded an opportunity to speak to his heart's content on this particular issue.

Every Senator who wishes to speak will be recognized in due season, unless the Senate, by unanimous consent, limits debate and precludes him from doing so.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I was addressing my remarks particularly to rule XXXV, under which a Senator can move for a closed session. If his motion is seconded, the rule is automatically invoked by the occupant of the Chair.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. That, of course, is correct. But any Senator may be recognized, and it might be that before a single word were said in debate

in closed session, a motion could be made to return to open session. If a majority of the Senate so desired, they could return to open session.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, it is not necessary to say this but I wish to kill any kind of inference that anyone has brought in that I was trying to exclude anyone. The rules speak for themselves. The Chair has well stated the custom of the Senate about recognition and I think that is the correct rule. I was merely undertaking to explain to the Senate as a body what the committee was trying to do in presenting the bill.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Montana yield and, if so, to whom?

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, in view of the changed situation, that all committees of the Senate be permitted to meet during the session of the Senate today and I ask that attaches notify the committees that are in session to that effect.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, all committees of the Senate will be permitted to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The Senator from Montana has the floor.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair understands that the Senate is operating under the 3-minute rule.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Montana requests that he may proceed for 2 additional minutes. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Montana yield to the Senator from Texas?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I would like to ask the distinguished majority leader, in view of this development now, it is possible, is it not, that the closed session would come on tomorrow?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Not necessarily. I would not think so. I think there will be some open discussion first and very likely the closed session will not come tomorrow. What I say is subject to change.

Mr. TOWER. I wish to propound a further question.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.

Mr. TOWER. At the time the motion is made to close the doors will there be propounded a request relative to the presence of staff members on the floor?

Mr. MANSFIELD. There will, indeed.

Mr. TOWER. I would like to serve notice to the Senate that it is my current intent to raise an objection to any staff

members being allowed on the floor during the time when the doors are closed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. For the information of the Senate, I have discussed this matter with the distinguished chairman of the committee, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), and the distinguished minority leader (Mr. DIRKSEN) on the basis of precedents. There were four staff members outside of the regular members of the Committee on Armed Services who were permitted on the floor at the time of the last closed hearing. If this is going to get out of hand I think the only way to face up to it would be that no staff members, not even from the committee, be allowed, because if each Senator is going to ask that his staff member be present I think the need for a closed session goes out the window because we have a hard enough time keeping our own mouths closed. If we get them in here the roof is going to blow off.

If this matter gets out of hand there will be no staff members allowed and that is the way rule XXXV reads. It refers to closed sessions as affecting Senators only.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair would ask the clerk to read part 2 of rule XXXVI, which relates to this matter. There has been a good deal of discussion about who should be allowed on the floor. This rule very clearly establishes who shall be allowed on the floor.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

RULE XXXVI EXECUTIVE SESSIONS

2. When acting upon confidential or Executive business, unless the same shall be considered in open Executive session, the Senate Chamber shall be cleared of all persons except the Secretary, the Chief Clerk, the Principal Legislative Clerk, the Executive Clerk, the Minute and Journal Clerk, the Sergeant at Arms, the Assistant Doorkeeper, and such other officers as the Presiding Officer shall think necessary; and all such officers shall be sworn to secrecy.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, when the rule refers to officers of the Senate that would mean they would have to be officers of the Senate and could not be individual staff members. Is that correct?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Unless it were in the discretion of the Presiding Officer who could permit them under the language of this rule. But it has never been the custom or practice to allow it and the present Presiding Officer would not permit the presence of any attachés, particularly if objection was made, and the Senator from Texas has indicated he would object.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I wish to make one comment with respect to this possible request for advisers to be on the floor from the committees other than the Committee on Armed Services.

I think it is proper, if it could be allowed, to have experts from the Committee on Armed Services, but the Foreign

Relations Committee has been holding hearings in the field of armed services, and they are unalterably opposed to many things that the Committee on Armed Services is for.

I think it would be a big mistake to allow people on the floor who come with a prejudiced or prejudged view on the matter of weapons, ABM's and so forth. It is the job of the Committee on Armed Services to present the case and not the Foreign Relations Committee. I may be wrong, but I do not think I am.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be recognized for 2 minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona can yield to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. GOLDWATER. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona has taken his seat.

Mr. MANSFIELD. One of the difficulties in this body with respect to the committee system concerns the infringement of authority and responsibility. Sometimes the line is drawn pretty thin, and it is hard to say where it lies. Nowadays, because the field of defense is so overlapping, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine where the responsibility of one committee begins and the responsibility of another committee ends. It is overlapping, it is a difficult question, and it goes beyond the committees here involved. I recall that the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations has had questions raised about certain hearings held by the Committee on Government Operations, which were in the field of foreign policy.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I am looking at it from a technical standpoint. The expertise in this matter is in the Committee on Armed Services and not in some other committee.

I am very happy that the distinguished Senator from Mississippi refrained from holding hearings on foreign policy. I think that is the job of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Sometimes the two committees work together on a full committee or subcommittee basis. So far as expertise is concerned, there is enough expertise on the other side, on the anti-ABM side, that should be given consideration. With that in mind, I had a discussion on my own initiative with the distinguished minority leader to the effect that there should be equal distribution respecting staff floor privileges so that the same number of attachés or administrative assistants would be available on each side. In that way no advantage could be achieved one way or the other.

I wish to express my deep personal thanks to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi for what he had to suggest when this matter was brought to his attention, when it seemed it might get out of hand. He stated that as far as he was concerned, he would be glad to bear the load himself and not have the two men from the Committee on Armed Services on hand.

Mr. GOLDWATER. The chairman can do that—

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The

time of the Senator from Arizona has expired.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. GOLDWATER. The problem that comes up in my mind is, Where do we put an end to this? If the Committee on Armed Services is allowed one for the majority side and one for the minority side and the Committee on Foreign Relations is allowed one, because I do not think there is any minority side to it, then some other Member comes up and says, "I have got an interest in this. I have done a great deal of studying on it. I have a brilliant young man who has spent the past 3 weeks studying this matter and I think he should be on the floor. If we start that, then I suggest that everyone is entitled to have some expert behind him.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I tend to agree with the Senator that we will end up by having no "experts" or none in an unofficial capacity on the floor. Perhaps that is the best way to handle the situation. Certainly, Senators are supposed to have mature judgment and a grasp of the subject which they are discussing in this Chamber. They should be prepared to undertake that responsibility to the full and take it unto themselves, solely, if necessary.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I thank the Senator.

S. 2570—INTRODUCTION OF A BILL PROVIDING FOR THE TERMINATION OF JET AIRCRAFT OPERATION AT WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed in the morning hour for not to exceed 10 minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I introduce a bill concerning aviation problems at the Nation's Capital. Specifically, my bill proposes to phase out the use of jet planes at Washington National Airport, transferring these plane operations to Dulles and Friendship International Airports.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2570) to provide for the termination within 18 months of the use of Washington National Airport by jet aircraft, and to develop a plan for high-speed surface transportation connecting the city of Washington with Dulles International Airport and Friendship International Airport, introduced by Mr. DOMINICK, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Commerce.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I fully recognize that jets have been using Washington National regularly since they were first permitted at that airport in April 1966. During the ensuing 3 years or so, the operations involving jet planes have become rather deeply entrenched.

Recognizing that to cause a withdrawal of such plane operations overnight would create an undue hardship on the carriers involved, I am proposing a gradual phaseout to cover perhaps 18 months from the time of enactment. I think this is only fair.

But I insist that the jets have got to go from Washington National.

This is not a snap judgment on my part, because I have been considering this situation for 3 years. Back in June 1966, I called the attention of the Senate to the problem that jet operations at Washington National were creating for the people of the metropolitan area.

At that time, I had written to Gen. William F. McKee, Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, protesting the jet operations at the airport. I based my protest on four criteria:

First, that the congestion of traffic at this busy air facility was made worse by the advent of jet operations.

Second, that the noise level had become particularly acute, especially in certain areas of the Metropolitan Washington region. With the coming of warm weather, resulting in open windows and increased outdoor activity, the frequent noise problem became all the worse.

Third, that the opening of Washington National to jet planes resulted in a transfer of activity from underutilized Dulles International Airport, which was designed and located to accommodate jets, to Washington National, which was not designed for them, and certainly not located with the jet in mind.

Finally, I pointed out that the use of jets at the close-in airport made use of this facility by general aviation less feasible.

There is, however, still another source of irritation and complaint which has grown steadily worse since the advent of jet aircraft at National. I refer to the sooty exhaust plume which is emitted from these jets as they land and take off over our city.

According to a report from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, pursuant to the Air Quality Act of 1967, aircraft operating out of Washington National Airport dumped an average of 17.6 tons of pollutants into the air over Washington every day during 1967. With the sharp increase in traffic at National since that time, a new measurement today would undoubtedly show a sharp increase in the amount of pollution being generated by this increased traffic.

Commercial air carriers alone conducted 238,224 landings and takeoffs at Washington National in 1968. Multiply that number of takeoffs and landings by the average pollution emission of these aircraft and we reach the startling result that air carriers using Washington National Airport last year dumped 10,553 tons of pollution on the Nation's Capital.

Probably the most apparent objection by the people of the metropolitan area is, and has always been, their subjection to the noise bombardment every few minutes during heavy traffic periods. Here is what the Washington Post of April 26, 1966, had to say about the introduction of jet planes at Washington National Airport:

NOISE COMPLAINTS CONTINUE IN 2D DAY OF JET SERVICE AT NATIONAL AIRPORT

National Airport continued to be deluged by noise complaints yesterday while some airline officials, far from complaining, were citing increased passenger business as justification for bringing in the jets.

The Federal Aviation Agency received 223 telephone calls as of late yesterday afternoon complaining about airplane noise. The figure for Sunday, the first day of regularly-scheduled jet service at National, was 176.

The vast majority of complaints, according to the FAA, have come from the Georgetown and Foxhall areas. A few have come from neighborhoods south of the airport.

The jetliners landed mostly from the north and took off heading south on Sunday, so complaints from Georgetown and Foxhall mostly concerned landings.

The wind shifted yesterday, which meant the pattern was reversed with most take-offs heading north. The new jets' highly touted steep-climb capability apparently did not convince Georgetown and Foxhall residents that they were quieter than their predecessors.

Meanwhile, an American Airlines spokesman said that four of the company's six jet flights to Chicago on Sunday were "completely sold out, one was 80 per cent full and the last, the 10 p.m. flight, had 40 passengers. We had a much better day than usual to Chicago."

Eastern Air Lines reported 4740 passengers Sunday. A spokesman said business was up 5 to 7 per cent Sunday and was slightly better yesterday.

United Air Lines reported an 8 per cent over-all increase in passenger traffic.

An FAA spokesman said half of the complaints during the past 48 hours did not mention jets specifically, but just objected to "noise."

He also said, somewhat cheerfully, that there were 14 complimentary calls Sunday and 21 yesterday.

One caller objected to a twin-engine plane flying over the prohibited area between the Capitol and the Potomac. The National tower said they had not controlled the plane and had not even seen it. But the call prompted a careful records check. It was from the White House.

Mr. President, as I mentioned before, Washington National Airport was neither designed nor located to take on jet traffic. We have no less than the word of a former Federal Aviation Administrator on this.

During hearings on Washington, D.C., airports held in 1963 before the House Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, Administrator Najeeb Halaby was replying to a comment of Congressman FRIEDEL on the use of Friendship Airport. Administrator Halaby, referring to his predecessor at the Federal Aviation Agency, told the subcommittee:

Mr. Chairman, it occurs to me, in a sense the Federal Aviation Agency diverted traffic to Friendship Airport and gave it this great surge of traffic in the first 3 years of the jet age. If the Federal Aviation Administrator had wished to hurt, to be unjust to Friendship, he would have built up Washington National as a jet airport, and monopolized all the traffic. He didn't do that, sir. He refused the jets in there because Washington National is not built, designed, or set up for jet traffic. Therefore, the Congress built a new airport, in its wisdom.

Administrator Halaby, later in the same hearings, reiterated this specific point while commenting on the buildup

of traffic at Friendship brought on by the jet plane. He told the subcommittee:

Then the jet came in and for the simple, artificial reason that the jet could not properly be accommodated by the Washington National Airport at Gravelly Point, they got an airfall, or windfall of flights into Friendship.

J. B. Hartranft, Jr., in a statement to the subcommittee on behalf of the Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association pointed out that Dulles was designed to serve jet traffic, while Washington National was not.

Mr. President, I insist that it is highly incongruous to foist jet traffic on overcrowded Washington National, which is not designed for such planes, while not doing everything possible to utilize Dulles, and perhaps Friendship, more since they are fully prepared for jet planes.

The maddening congestion which exists at Washington National not only tries the patience of passengers and employees alike, but is a serious hazard to the residents of Washington. Congestion is so bad lately that at times the shuttle flights between Washington and New York have been delayed from 1 to 2 hours in both directions. And under such conditions, a midair collision could result in losses of life and property damage of catastrophic proportions.

A statistical comparison of operations at Washington National with Dulles tells the full story.

During 1968, the total volume of non-military traffic at Dulles was:

[Takeoffs and landings]	
Air carriers.....	58, 876
General aviation.....	98, 128
Total.....	157, 004

For 1968, the nonmilitary volume at Washington National was:

[Takeoffs and landings]	
Air carriers.....	238, 224
General aviation.....	104, 939
Total.....	343, 163

So there we have it, specifically spelled out. Over twice as many operations crowded in at Washington National than at Dulles. And Dulles is handling a volume which is far below its capacity.

An Editorial Research Reports study, "Airport Modernization," published February 22, 1967, emphasized the point of deliberately underutilizing Dulles while overloading Washington National. The study declared that:

Dulles International, which opened in 1962, was intended to be the nation's first jet-age airport. Located 26 miles west of Washington, Dulles in its 4½ years of operation has remained a jet-age white elephant, operating at a loss and accommodating only a fraction of the passenger traffic it is capable of handling. In part, this is due to the convenience of National in contrast to the 45-minute motor coach ride, at \$2.50 per person, to Dulles; cab fare to the city is \$13. The airlines serving Washington failed to shift sufficient flights from National to Dulles because of these factors. As a result, in fiscal 1965 National accommodated 6.5 million passengers while Dulles recorded a total of only 863,000 passengers. Dulles suffered still another blow when

the FAA decided in April 1966 to allow small jets to use National. Almost immediately National was serving 16,000 additional passengers a day, while Dulles was serving 15,000 fewer. Overloading of terminal facilities created chaos at National. Consequently, authorities ordered the airlines to limit combined operations to 40 flights an hour in order to cut the number of passengers crowding into the terminal, and a number of flights were shifted back to Dulles. Nevertheless, during calendar 1966 National served almost 8 million passengers while Dulles served 1.2 million.

Reports that consideration was being given to a \$200 million expansion of National to make it possible for larger jets to use the field provoked three dozen citizen groups to organize a campaign to phase aircraft operations out of the Potomac River airport altogether by 1970. FAA officials tried to damp down complaints about noise by requiring pilots in good weather to reduce power at 1,500 feet and follow the Potomac or Anacostia rivers until their planes reached the 3,000-foot level. But pilots contend that reduction of power is not safe, and citizens insist that the noise is not measurably reduced. An FAA study issued January 26 asserted that noise from the jets was no greater than from propeller craft, but the study convinced neither the irate residents nor the citizens' Committee Against National.

The President recently submitted a message to Congress outlining the problems of air transportation in the Nation. In it the President cautioned:

Existing jet ports are adding to the noise and air pollution in our urban areas . . . These important social and conservation considerations must be taken into greater account in future air systems development.

I think this is indicative of a growing awareness that jet aviation is a significant contributor to our urban air pollution problem, as well as the noise problem. And, recognizing the proximity of Washington National Airport to the city, this caution applies to that air facility.

(At this point Mr. HOLLINGS took the chair as Presiding Officer.)

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, the main attraction at Washington National, of course, is its proximity to the downtown area. In other words, the time-distance factor involved in transportation to and from the facility at Washington National compared to that for travel to and from Dulles Airport places the latter at a disadvantage.

In order to make Dulles more attractive to both carriers and travelers, and incidentally to realize a more equitable return on the obviously large investment at Dulles by way of utilization, we must plan and construct some means of rapid transit to connect the downtown area with the airport.

The problem of travel to and from airports has become a general one since today's airport must be located at a considerable distance from the central city, as is the case of Dulles. In his message on the problems of air transportation, the President recognized that travel between the airport and the city required special attention, and he therefore stated:

Most important, government at all levels, working with industry and labor, must see to it that all aviation equipment and facilities are responsive to the needs of the traveler and the shipper and not the other way around. Transportation to airports,

whether by public conveyance or private vehicle, is as much a part of a traveler's journey as the time he spends in the air, and must never be viewed as a separate subject. A plane travels from airport to airport, but a person travels from door to door. I have directed the Secretary of Transportation to give special attention to all the components of a journey in new plans for airways and airports improvements.

This is exactly what I have in mind, and what I am recommending for Dulles. Such a facility has already been built and placed in service at Cleveland. It was built with the assistance of Federal funds, and appears to be a success. It could serve as a model to serve other cities as a rapid transit link with their airports. The Cleveland facility is a rail transit line.

There are other possible types of rapid transit facility which could be adapted to serving Dulles and other major airports.

One possibility would be the use of a combination bus and monorail system. The bus would travel between the center city and the airport at high speed by suspension using an overhead monorail device. Then at either end of the trip, the bus would disengage from the monorail and travel conventionally. This system would combine the features of high speed for the city-airport trip with full flexibility while in the city and also at the airport.

A regular monorail system operating between the city and the airport would greatly aid the problem of travel to and from Dulles, if the bus-monorail plan would delay such a program or be considered not feasible. The George Washington Parkway, beltway, and Dulles express road affords the right of way needed for a monorail system.

But whatever the system decided upon, high-speed transportation to Dulles International Airport will aid materially in having this excellent terminal achieve its potential.

Mr. President, the people of Washington have waited patiently, and in vain, for relief from the evils that jet operations at Washington National thrust upon them. I fear that the situation will not correct itself, and that it will continue to grow worse. It is evident that only through specific legislation will a solution be found. The bill I am introducing is designed to accomplish this. It is my sincere hope that we act on this matter with all the haste and concern the situation demands.

Mr. President, I just want to say two things quickly.

I tried my living best to get General McKee to take some action on this matter. I do not know how long it was and how many letters I wrote and how many conversations I had with him, but I could not get anywhere.

I have been in the flying business since I got my license in 1935. I have flown all over the country. I had an airplane based at National Airport. I know what the congestion there is. I have been surrounded by three airplanes coming in at the same time at National Airport. The airport is not designed to take that kind of traffic. It is a hazard to health, life, and safety. If we do not do something about it, we are going to have a

major crash that is going to cause a major catastrophe to the area, the people, and property. We are going to have to do something about it.

I have understood that this bill will probably be sent to committee and be buried. In my opinion, that is totally wrong. We should have hearings on it. We should understand what the problems are. We are not going to solve the pollution problem entirely by the suggestion I have made, but at least we will spread it over a wider area and let some of the atmosphere filters dissipate the pollution and not help create a fog of pollution over this city.

I feel very strongly about this, as the present Presiding Officer can see, and probably as other Members of the Senate can hear, but we have to do something about it before we have another tragic accident, before we create more problems than we already have in the way of pollution, and before we drive practically everybody out of his mind from the noise of so many large aircraft taking off and landing at National.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOMINICK. I am happy to yield.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I share the deep concern of the distinguished Senator from Colorado as to the great congestion which exists at National Airport. That airport was designed for 4 million passengers. It is now carrying 10 million passengers.

I concur in the statement made by the distinguished Senator from Colorado that, if the air traffic at National Airport continues to increase, the likelihood of a major accident there will increase accordingly.

I am grateful, too, to the Senator from Colorado for focusing attention on the great Dulles International Airport, situated 26½ miles from the city of Washington. Some years ago Congress appropriated \$110 million so that Dulles might relieve the traffic congestion at National Airport and Dulles then would become the dominant jet airport in this area, which it was designed to do and which Congress had in mind to be done when the money was appropriated.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, the Senator is totally correct.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. But although Dulles was opened in, I believe, 1962—I do not remember the exact date, but it was roughly 1962—only 2 million passengers are going through Dulles at the present time.

It is a great airport. We have facilities there to take care of the great jet aircraft.

It does not seem logical to keep concentrating more and more aircraft at Washington National Airport and leave Dulles underutilized.

Mr. DOMINICK. I thoroughly agree with the Senator.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I think the statements in the excellent and eloquent speech made on the floor today by the distinguished Senator from Colorado will tend to focus attention on this very serious problem.

With his permission, I should like to

insert in the RECORD at this point a statement made at a hearing before the Subcommittee on Business and Commerce of the Senate District of Columbia Committee by the Honorable Clive L. DuVall II, of McLean, Va., a member of the Virginia House of Delegates and chairman of Virginians for Dulles. In his presentation he gave very interesting evidence in support of the needed development of Dulles International Airport.

I ask unanimous consent that the eloquent statement of Delegate DuVall before the subcommittee be included at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF VIRGINIANS FOR DULLES AT A HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON BUSINESS AND COMMERCE OF THE SENATE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE AT DULLES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, MAY 27, 1969

Mr. Chairman, I am Clive L. DuVal, 2d, of McLean, a Virginia State Delegate. I speak today as Chairman of Virginians for Dulles.

Virginians for Dulles is an organization composed of hundreds of residents of Northern Virginia, living in an area which stretches from Mount Vernon to Great Falls. Our membership is mainly drawn from some 50 different neighborhoods—some of them with more than 100 families represented. We also have scattered members in many other neighborhoods.

Our members are concerned about the problem of airports and airline service in the Washington area: some of us as users of the airlines, some of us as objectors to the impact of air traffic upon living conditions, most of us in both categories.

We welcome and appreciate the opportunity to testify on methods of increasing the utilization of Dulles International Airport, as well as on alternatives to the Kling report proposal to expend \$150 million or more for a massive expansion of National Airport.

In our view, the first and most obvious step to be taken to correct the under-utilization of Dulles is to make a 50% cut in the number of commercial flights presently using National Airport, and to assure that most of the eliminated flights are transferred to Dulles.

As all of us know, the present number of commercial flights using National will generate at least 10 million passengers in 1969, although that airport is designed to handle only 4 million passengers. Conversely, Dulles, which is equipped to handle 6 million passengers annually, will serve fewer than 2 million this year—and will operate at a deficit expected to be \$7 million.

This, of course, is an Alice-in-Wonderland situation, where everything is so topsy-turvy that the inclination of the Federal Aviation Administration is apparently not to correct the existing traffic imbalance between National and Dulles but rather to increase it by expanding National.

With regard to the method of reducing commercial air traffic at National, we endorse the "sector-radius" proposal of Senator William B. Spong, Jr., which seeks to cut commercial flights back by 30%-50% in order to achieve permanently an annual volume of not more than 7 million passengers at National. The approach of achieving this ceiling by a proportionate reduction of air traffic between National and the four proposed sectors of the eastern United States seems to us simple and fair. We also approve as an interim step Senator Spong's proposal to limit most commercial traffic at National to short-haul trips—by requiring that 60% of all commercial traffic be destined

to or originate from cities within 250-350 miles of National.

However, we would go further; we recommend that there be an immediate reduction in commercial flights using National of *not less than 50%*, and that eventually *all* flights to or from National be limited to short-haul trips by V/STOL (vertical short take-off and landing) aircraft.

Our principal reasons for supporting a drastic reduction in commercial traffic at National and a transfer of most of the eliminated flights to Dulles are as follows:

(1) *Safety.* The Airlines Pilots Association has warned emphatically that noise-abatement procedures, particularly for take-offs at National, "directly reduce the level of safety available." Pilots also believe that even the longest runway at National (6855') lacks the necessary margin of safety. On a hot, windless day, jets such as the Boeing 727 labor off the ground at the extreme end of this runway. Traffic controllers at National have protested traffic congestion there as a threat to safety. FAA has itself in the past publicly stated that National is too crowded for safety, and concedes that the present limit of 60 take-offs and landings per hour at National (not including extra shuttle sections) *exceeds the capacity of National to handle traffic under IFR conditions.*

In contrast, Dulles was intended by Congress and designed to be the jet port for the National Capital area, and can safely accommodate all jet traffic diverted from National. We conclude that FAA by failing to substantially cut back commercial traffic at National in favor of Dulles is courting the increasing likelihood of a horrifying jet crash into one of the densely populated areas in or near Washington, which includes Northern Virginia.

(2) *Noise.* With the advent of jets to National several years ago, the center of the Washington metropolitan area, including portions of Virginia and Maryland, has become what can best be described as a noise slum. In this connection, recent studies disclose that aircraft noise generated by National traffic already exceeds Federal Housing Administration noise standards with respect to homes located within half a mile of the Potomac on both sides of the river between the Woodrow Wilson and Key Bridges. In other words, housing within this area is now being subjected to noise levels so high that the homes would ordinarily be considered almost uninhabitable and hence ineligible for Federal mortgage insurance.

In a far broader area of Northern Virginia outside this half mile strip along the river, many hundreds of complaints from our members and others make it clear that National jet traffic noise is not only a nuisance and a disturber of our peace but a real physical pollutant and hazard to health.

We note that the reduction of noise nuisance and hazard inflicted on residents near airports is part of the stated mission of the Department of Transportation. Former Secretary Boyd has said:

"One of the goals we must have is to maintain an environment in which noise levels do not impair or indeed destroy the normal process of life. For those who must live surrounded by the din of normal city life, the whine of an increasing number of jet aircraft can make life almost intolerable."

The FAA is undoubtedly concerned about noise abatement, but the development of quiet jet engines or of V/STOL aircraft capable of carrying out all commercial operations at National Airport is apparently many years away. We have the word of a former Administrator of the FAA that the only sure way to reduce noise is to reduce traffic.

We therefore ask your assistance and that of members of this Committee to compel the FAA to live up to its responsibilities to the

citizens of Northern Virginia—and to do this, as we have said, through a 50 percent reduction of commercial traffic at National and the transfer of most of the eliminated flights to Dulles. The area comprising Dulles International Airport (10,000 acres) is, after all, many times larger than that of National (850 acres), and the extensive buffer zones of airport land on the approaches to Dulles' runways provide a protection for the public against aircraft noise and other hazards that is absent at National.

With reference to other means of improving utilization of Dulles, we are much impressed by proposals originally made by architect Arthur Cotton Moore to construct a second Dulles airport terminal somewhere in the Rosslyn area of Arlington. Eventually, the terminal at Dulles will have to be expanded anyway. Why not locate the additional ticket counters and other facilities in an area within a comfortable cab ride of both downtown Washington via the Theodore Roosevelt and Key Bridges and also the most populous areas of Northern Virginia?

Passengers flying out of Dulles could make their reservations, check in and get rid of their luggage at the new Rosslyn terminal, which would have connections to the various Potomac bridges, the George Washington Memorial Parkway, and Route 66. Passengers would then proceed by high-speed bus via the George Washington Parkway to Dulles Airport. The bus trip by this route would take about 25 minutes; when Route 66 is completed it could be made in 17 or 18 minutes.

Passengers who drove to the new terminal could leave their cars in 2000 parking spaces under the buildings; other parking spaces would, of course, be provided around the terminal.

In the future, this facility could be tied into the metropolitan subway system, since a subway station is proposed at Rosslyn.

We also believe that rapid rail transit connections between the new Rosslyn terminal and Dulles might be provided by utilizing the median of Route 66 within the Beltway and the abandoned right of way of the Washington and Old Dominion Railroad outside the Beltway. (We understand that Veeco now owns this portion of the W. & O. D. right of way, but is most cooperative with respect to its eventual use for rail rapid transit purposes.)

As to cost, we have rough estimates that the new Dulles terminal and roadway connections might cost up to \$15 million; and, off the top of my head, the development of rail rapid transit connections between Dulles International and Rosslyn might run double the same figure.

Even so, the total estimated cost of \$45 million is a small fraction of the \$150 million which would be spent under the Kling report to expand National.

We appreciate this opportunity to express our views on methods of increasing utilization of Dulles; and in closing we urge you to vigorously oppose any implementation of that portion of the Kling report which calls for the expansion of National. This proposal to improve airline service in the metropolitan area by greatly increasing traffic at a small, dangerous, noisy airport, while the magnificent facility here at Dulles continues to be under-used is so illogical, so fantastic, that we can only murmur in awe, "It's wild, man!" We urge you to keep the proposal in the world of fantasy where it belongs.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Following that, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an editorial from the July 8 edition of the Washington Evening Star concerning the increase in passenger traffic at Dulles International Airport, pointing

out that there has also been an undesirable increase in the use of Washington National Airport, and endorsing the proposal of my distinguished colleague from Virginia (Mr. Spone) for a rail line spur to Dulles, be included at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

IMPROVEMENT AT DULLES

It is good that passenger traffic at Dulles International Airport increased by some 30 percent in the first five months of this year as compared to the same period in 1968. But this isn't good enough.

The five-month passenger total at Dulles was 832,095. During the same time period at National Airport, however, the total passenger count was 4.1 million. This was a 5.2 percent increase at National, which was dangerously overcrowded a year ago.

Both the plane-riding public and the airlines prefer National, despite the risks, because it is close to downtown Washington. But this is no excuse for tolerating an increasingly hazardous condition when the splendid facilities at Dulles are under-used.

The gain at Dulles demonstrates that it can be attractive to an increasing number of people, and every effort should be made, by persuasion, compulsion, or both, to divert more traffic to its runways. The main hitch, of course, is distance. It now takes longer to get to Dulles and back than is the case with National. But this is not an insuperable problem.

There is no good reason why rapid transit cannot be made to serve Dulles, and Senator Spone of Virginia wants to include \$100,000 in the pending Washington metropolitan rapid transit authorization bill for a planning and feasibility study to this end. Senator Spone's idea is to extend the rapid transit system from its currently planned terminus in Falls Church to the international airport, using the median strip of the Dulles access road. This is the least that should be done—and done before disaster strikes at National.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 5 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, it is totally unbelievable to me that an FAA Administrator will take general aviation out of a general aviation airport—which is what National is—and shift it over to Dulles—which is a jet airport—and take jet aircraft out of Dulles and shift it to National. That is exactly what General McKee did. Over and over and over again I tried to get it through his head that he was going in the wrong direction. It was like trying to carve with a pencil on a block of concrete. You could not get anywhere with him. It was hopeless. And here he was, the second highest paid man in the entire federal system, because he received his military retirement pay as well as his salary as Director of the FAA. It made no sense to me at all.

One more point. My bill—and this I think will be of interest to the distinguished Senator from Virginia—also calls, not only for a phasing out, within 18 months, of jet aircraft from National to Dulles, but as promptly as possible, for the FAA Administrator to submit to Congress a plan for high-speed ground trans-

portation between the two airports, so it will solve that problem and help us get somebody moving, and not locked into a bog.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I agree with that.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DOMINICK. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I was not going to address myself to this point, but since the Senator brought up the matter of mass transportation, I might suggest looking at what the city of Las Vegas and Lockheed Corp. have done jointly in that respect to do away with the need for taxicabs and cars, using a monorail to get passengers from the airport to any hotel at any location in the city of Las Vegas.

I want to compliment the Senator from Colorado for bringing this matter to the Senate's attention. I agree with him. I do not think much will be done about it, unfortunately. There is a question in my mind that goes to the future effect of pollution of the air by jet or turbo engines, which is perhaps an unknown factor at this time. A number of meteorologists can make a pretty good case that it changes the weather pattern in some areas of our country. I do not subscribe to that view yet, but they make a logical argument.

Has the Senator considered the fact that the turbo engine, within 5 years, or perhaps 10 years, will probably replace the reciprocating engine, and that that fact will add to the pollution problem? That brings up a nice problem. Ought we not to be considering the eventual phasing out of National, to be developed for other uses? I personally think Dulles Airport is the only modern airport in the whole United States.

Mr. DOMINICK. I agree with the Senator.

Mr. GOLDWATER. My first impression was that we should bulldoze every airport in the United States and rebuild all of them on the pattern of Dulles. It might cost a lot of money, but as I fly into different airfields, Los Angeles International, for example, I see them wasting money—this is true of my own city of Phoenix—continuing to build old-fashioned runway systems and old-fashioned buildings. I think this would be a topic of interesting debate on the floor and before a committee, if we could ever get something like this before a committee.

I compliment the Senator for bringing this matter to the attention of the Senate. I wish him well on it, although I have my doubts.

Mr. DOMINICK. I thank the Senator. I may say that I went to Los Angeles and made a speech on that very subject, airport modernization, before the vice president of engineering for all the airlines. I pointed out to him, as the Senator from Arizona has pointed out, that O'Hare Airport is an anachronism. So is Los Angeles. My own field at Denver is likewise. The only modern one we have is Dulles, and we might as well use it while we can.

I do not know that I would want to go

along with the Senator's suggestion that we get rid of Washington National Airport entirely, because I suspect there will be much general aviation, at least, that will want to use that airport and will still be using reciprocal engines for quite a while.

But there may eventually be a shift over, and we may have to get rid of it as an airport and use it for other purposes.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

OVERLAPPING OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I should like at this point to remark on the colloquy that took place earlier in the day with respect to the hearing in the Committee on Armed Services, in which it was suggested that there might be an overlap between the function of the Committee on Armed Services and that of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

I should like to state that as far as I am concerned, it is my understanding and belief that the two committees have completely distinct and different functions, and I see no reason why there should be an overlap in the hearings on the subject matter that is presently before the Senate.

I read from the first page of the report of the Committee on Armed Services on the pending measure:

This bill would (1) authorize appropriations during fiscal year 1970 for (a) major procurement, (b) research, development, test, and evaluation by the Department of Defense, and (c) for the construction of certain missile test facilities at Kwajalein; (2) continue the authority for merging military assistance financing for South Vietnam, other free world forces there, Laos, and Thailand, with the funding of the Department of Defense; and (3) authorize the personnel strengths for fiscal year 1970 for the Selected Reserve of each of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces.

It is stated very clearly, it seems to me, that this bill is for procurement, for the purpose of supplying funds necessary, as requested by the Department of Defense and the Secretary of Defense, and as recommended to this body by the Committee on Armed Services after very long and careful hearings, excellently conducted, may I say, by our distinguished chairman.

I think that there are entirely different responsibilities, entirely different purposes, and entirely different areas of interest between the two committees, and I respectfully submit that it is my great hope and desire that my fellow Senators, in their enthusiasm, will not permit a

confusion of purposes to occur in the present debate.

The Committee on Armed Services has a very definite purpose. We have considered the request, and we have come before the Senate with recommendations for procurement, and procurement only. The bill has nothing to do with policy; it has nothing to do with Executive orders for distribution, effective deployment, or the rest. Those are matters for another committee.

I sincerely hope that, in pursuing the present order of business, my fellow Senators will bear this distinction carefully in mind.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am sorry that I was not present in the Chamber when the distinguished Senator from California made some remarks about the colloquy which I had earlier with the distinguished Senator from Arizona. It is my understanding that the Senator's remarks had to do with the authority, the responsibility, and the areas of concern of the particular committees, and it is my further understanding that the Senator from California stated that the lines are pretty clear and distinct.

It is my belief, Mr. President, that in the period since the end of the Second World War, and most especially since the Korean conflict, there has been a very close relationship in the administrations, both Democratic and Republican, between the Defense and State Departments. I personally am unhappy at the amount of authority which the Defense Department has had, by and large, in the foreign policy affairs of this Nation. When I think of the fact that now there are almost 2,700 American bases throughout the world; when I think of the fact that we have something on the order of a million and three-quarters military personnel, dependents, and indigenous workers located on those bases; when I think of the fact that they occupy 4,000 square miles of land, that they are located in 30 countries, and that they cost this Government at least \$4.8 billion a year to maintain, then I do think that there is a question about infringement by the Defense Department, or the military, if you will, in the foreign policy of the United States.

I was brought up to believe that the foreign policy of this country was conducted by the Department of State, acting under the direction of the President. Conditions have changed; I realize that. But I think that the military has had too much to say in the promulgation of foreign policy, and I blame that state of affairs on the State Department under previous administrations, and on the Senate for allowing it to happen. The

illustration which was brought out during the debate on the national commitments resolution, covering the situation in Spain, is a prime example. There the Secretary of State, under a previous Democratic administration, delegated to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the responsibility for carrying on negotiations seeking to bring about an extension of leases on the bases which we occupy, by grace of the Spanish Government, and at a good price to Spain itself.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, as I recall, delegated that authority to an Air Force general, General Burchinal, who was then stationed, I believe, at Wiesbaden, in West Germany; and he, carrying out his orders—and I find no fault with either General Wheeler or General Burchinal—entered into negotiations with Spanish authorities.

As a result of those negotiations, and only because an article appeared in the U.S. press under the byline of a Flora Lewis, did we know that certain commitments were almost on the point of being made, which would have involved this country in the affairs of Spain vis-a-vis its present or possible future relations with certain African countries.

I would hope that this trend of a dual military-State Department supervision and control of our foreign affairs would be mitigated, at least, and done away with if possible.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I think that there is in process under this administration such a move, and if I am correct in my assumption, I assure the President of the United States that the Senator from Montana will give him his full support.

I had thought that the colloquy which I had with the distinguished Senator from Arizona was a frank and candid exposition on an important question which he raised, a question which does confront the distinguished minority leader and the majority leader from time to time, when committee chairmen come to us and tell us that another committee has undertaken to hold hearings in an area where the original committee feels it has full responsibility.

Let me point out to the distinguished Senator from California that there was nothing personal in my remarks in answer to the questions—and good questions they were—raised by the distinguished Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER). I thought we understood the bounds within which we could converse and the bounds of the question involved.

I was therefore surprised to note that what I had said may have been taken amiss. I am prepared to debate the subject now, or at any later time.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I point out that there was no intent or thought

to criticize in any way the distinguished majority leader, for whom I have the greatest regard and affection. I had listened to the remarks, and I merely felt that as a Senator and as a member of the Armed Services Committee I had a right to express my feelings on what I thought were the functions and the duties and the purposes of this particular committee in this particular fashion.

I could join most heartily in criticizing some of the past policies and activities of both the military and Department of State over the years. I am completely in accord with the distinguished majority leader that a great deal has been left to be desired.

I think that, possibly, had their functions been better carried out, we would have far fewer problems to face today.

I am afraid that maybe my remarks have been misrepresented to the majority leader. I did not rise in contention. I did not rise in criticism. I rose only to say that in my understanding the purpose and function of this particular committee was expressed very well on page 1 of the report and that as far as I was concerned I thought maybe the matters of policy and use and deployment and what happens between the Department of Defense, the executive, and the Department of State might well be kept for another time or another place.

I merely said that it seemed that our function had to do with the procurement of military equipment as set up by request by the Department of Defense and as carefully gone over by the committee under the leadership of the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS).

I hope the Senator will understand my remarks and the fact that they were not in any way meant to be argumentative. I would not presume to do so under any circumstances.

I merely said it was my hope that the limitations we want to be implied were not only applied, but were also carefully spelled out and that the Senate might very well carefully carry on in the particularly difficult job we have before us.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I appreciate what the distinguished Senator from California had to say. I do not at all find his remarks amiss, but I do wish to point out that there is great difficulty in defining the lines where the authority and the responsibility of one committee ends, and where that of another begins. There is overlap.

It is almost impossible in this day and age, for example, to differentiate in some instances the line of demarcation between foreign policy and defense. The example I used of the Spanish bases is one illustration, and the example of the troops stationed abroad is another.

When we station so many troops and maintain so many bases abroad for so long, we invariably create problems that impinge on the field of foreign policy.

I hope, as does the Senator from California, that it would be possible to bring about a delineation between the two, because the military has persisted in its desire to compete with the State Department in many places where it has no primary responsibility.

Let me make it clear that I am not one of those who feel that it is good politics or good sense to denigrate the "brass." I have great respect and admiration for the military, and the fact that a man happens to wear an eagle or a few stars on his shoulders does not dilute that respect one bit.

I am appalled at the intensity of the attack on the military at times. I would hope we would understand, above all others, that those men who wear the uniform are carrying out their duties and their obligations as they are ordered to do and that they are doing the best they can in the light of the ability they possess.

I thank the Senator for clearing up the subject.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished majority leader. I am pleased that I find my feelings are so closely in accord with his.

One of the things that bothers me from time to time is that confusion sets in and we lose a direct objective in some of our thoughts and discussions and debates.

As I have said, I heartily agree with the distinguished majority leader and hope for the day when all of these troops deployed around the world can be brought home.

I would hope for the day that all of the bases we have to maintain could be finally closed.

I join with the Senator in deploring some of the policies and mistakes of the past that have made this situation necessary.

One of the reasons I became interested in running for office was the fact that I disagreed with so many of the policies pursued over the last 40 years.

I am pleased to join with the distinguished majority leader in his hope. But I also make the point that, so far as I am concerned, the particular discussion—the matter of the business before the Senate—is the procurement, the testing, and the development of military hardware, not the policy, not the deployment, not the use, not the matters that in my opinion are rightfully in the field of discussion of foreign policy, for the executive, and for the Department of State.

I thank the distinguished Senator.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator. But the Senator knows as well as I that this bill contains the proposal to deploy the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system. I am sure that is what the distinguished Senator has in mind basically, as well as the remainder of the bill which will be the pending business shortly. And there are many questions that will be raised about this or, for that matter, any measure that authorizes the expenditure of such a vast sum of money.

With respect to the ABM proposal alone, there is the question of the costs which have already skyrocketed from an initial \$6.4 billion to approximately \$10.3 or \$10.4 billion. There is the question of the reliability of the radar system contemplated, and not only its reliability, but also its vulnerability.

There is a question relative to the reliability of the computer system; a system as complex and complicated as

any ever devised according to the experts. And there is the question also that if and when an ABM system is needed, why are there not deployed enough Spartans and Sprints instead of the relatively scarce number contemplated today?

A third factor does bring the question squarely into the field of foreign policy. That is the question of possible negotiations between the Soviet Union and our country seeking to bring about an arms limitation or an arms agreement and the effect of the deployment contemplated in this bill on those negotiations.

If such an agreement can be achieved, it is thought by some of us at least, that not only will a good deal of money be saved and used in facing up to our domestic difficulties—and they are many—but perhaps an era of stability and peace will begin to envelop the people of the world at the same time.

When we get to the subject of negotiations, I think it should be made clear that the President already has announced the appointment of six members to represent this country; and he has indicated that they will start negotiations either the latter part of this month or the first part of August. It would be my hope that these negotiations would get underway. They would be carried on, I believe, under the aegis of the Disarmament Agency, which I believe is an arm of the State Department. In my opinion, it would be proper for that effort to be undertaken; and because of that possibility and that hope, there is a definite relationship, I think, between the ABM and the field of foreign policy.

Mr. MURPHY. I agree with my distinguished colleague that there is a very definite relationship.

First, may I say that I had not intended nor had I thought of the particular discussion of the ABM or any other of the particular matters of procurement individually. I was merely thinking in terms of the functioning of this committee. It seems to me that there is a proper place for the policy discussions, and I would hope that they would take place.

But it also seems to me that the matter of this particular committee has to do with the assessment of the requests for procurement sent by the Department of Defense, to go over them carefully, in an attempt to protect, in every way we can, the rights of the taxpayers, to make certain that there are not unnecessary purchases and unnecessary research and development, and that the matters of policy be left to another time.

I still have the hope that we might resolve some of this without too much direction toward the policy, the use, the deployment, and stay within the responsibility of the committee. I grant that I am a new member of the Committee on Armed Services, and perhaps as time goes on I will be inclined to get into other fields. However, at the moment, as I have said, it would seem that the purpose of the committee, as stated so clearly, is as I understood it; and I would hope that the discussion of policy could and would take place, in which I would be more than happy to join with my distinguished

colleague, because there are many areas in which I have had differences of opinion over the years.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate the distinguished Senator's remarks.

CANADA'S NATIONAL DAY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on July 1, our neighbor to the north, Canada, observed its National Day.

There is a very close relationship between the State of Montana and the Province of Alberta especially, but also with the Provinces of British Columbia on the west and Saskatchewan on the east.

It has been my privilege, together with the distinguished senior Senator from Vermont (Mr. AIKEN), the ranking Republican in this body, to represent the Senate in 11 interparliamentary meetings conducted in both the United States and Canada.

We feel that we have an unusually close relationship with Canada, and we are delighted that this nation of 21 million persons, with a gross national product of \$67 billion, is progressing as well as it is, and that its future is so bright.

Canada is now a country of 10 Provinces and two territories, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific and northward to the Arctic.

I should like to read to the Senate a statement made by the Honorable Campbell Moodie, Consul General of Canada, who is stationed at Seattle, in whose area of responsibility Montana is incorporated—at least, in that general consular area—in which he recently wrote to the Great Falls, Mont., Tribune that in addition to being the United States closest neighbors and allies, Canadians are the people—

Who occupy a good portion of your environment on this continent.

Who are hosts to about a third of your direct foreign investment in the whole world.

Who account for better than a quarter of your total international trade (far more than any other country and much more than most of the usual groups of countries; in fact, your trade with us is as great as the combined total of your trade with Japan, Britain, Germany and France together).

Who share similar ways of living and common ideals.

Then the Consul General, quoting one of the outstanding "new generation" statesmen, I believe, in the field of world diplomacy, the distinguished Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, who recently pointed out that as much as the two nations are alike, as much as they have in common both with one another and toward other nations, Canada and the United States are different. The Prime Minister said:

And each of us is healthier as a result of that difference.

In the words of the Great Falls Tribune:

The United States is really fortunate to have such a good neighbor and ally as Canada has been.

U.S. friendship with Canada must be cemented in every possible way—by mutual respect, understanding and cooperation.

Canada, a great nation already although in

its early development stages, has a tremendous future.

I look forward to continued cooperation between this country and Canada, under the leadership of President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau. They both have difficult jobs. I wish them both success, because, if they both succeed, it will be all to the best for both our countries.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial to which I have referred, entitled "Our Neighbor's Holiday—Canada's National Day," published in the Great Falls Tribune, Great Falls, Mont., on July 5, 1969, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OUR NEIGHBOR'S HOLIDAY: CANADA'S NATIONAL DAY

While celebrating our national holiday, the Fourth of July observance of Independence Day, not many citizens of the United States acknowledge the national holiday of Canada, our closest neighbor and best friend.

Canada observed its National Day on July 1, 102 years after it was born by the unification of four provinces and the attainment of independence.

Canada now is a country of 10 provinces and two territories stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific and northward into the Arctic.

From its earliest settlement in 1605, Canada has developed into a nation of more than 21 million persons with a gross national product of more than \$67 billion.

Campbell Moodie, Consul General of Canada who is stationed at Seattle, recently wrote to The Tribune that in addition to being the United States' closest neighbors and allies, Canadians are the people:

"Who occupy a good portion of your environment on this continent.

"Who are hosts to about a third of your direct foreign investment in the whole world.

"Who account for better than a quarter of your total international trade (far more than any other country and much more than most of the usual groups of countries; in fact, your trade with us is as great as the combined total of your trade with Japan, Britain, Germany and France together).

"Who share similar ways of living and common ideals."

Consul General Moodie quoted Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau who recently pointed out that as much as the two nations are alike, as much as they have in common—both with one another and toward other nations—we are different.

"And each of us is healthier as a result of that difference," Prime Minister Trudeau said.

The United States is really fortunate to have such a good neighbor and ally as Canada has been.

U.S. friendship with Canada must be cemented in every possible way—by mutual respect, understanding and cooperation.

Canada, a great nation already although in its early development stages, has a tremendous future.

NEW APPROACH TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION GUIDELINES

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, the kindest critique of the Nixon administration's wobbly new approach to school desegregation guidelines would be to call it "indecisive."

United Press International, after hav-

ing a day to mull over the administration's stand, stated:

The Nixon Administration has scrapped the September desegregation deadline from some Southern schools in a policy statement that seemed deliberately calculated to confuse liberals and Southerners alike into believing each had won:

The announcement of the administration's position was apparently timed for a hoped-for burial on the July 4 holiday weekend, but nevertheless drew the sharp reactions it deserved.

What, exactly, is the administration's position on the guidelines? As defined by the Baltimore Sun, it is abandonment of "full across-the-board school desegregation this fall" while "declaring full commitment to the principle of school integration in the North as well as the South." "As could be expected," the New York Times said, "it had something for everybody."

The National Education Association, composed of a million teachers and school administrators, voted at its Philadelphia convention to "insist" that the Nixon administration restore the September 1969, deadline for desegregation by all southern school districts. I applaud them for this firm and forthright action.

The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, meantime, issued a policy statement maintaining that the guidelines adopted in March 1968 "are still in effect." The HEW statement—issued 4 hours after the basic policy statement which had been put out jointly by HEW Secretary Robert Finch and Attorney General John Mitchell—was described by the Baltimore Sun as "a bizarre footnote to the day's events."

The New York Times commented:

When Robert H. Finch . . . failed in the matter of the Knowles appointment, he took comfort in the thought that "Sometimes when you lose one battle you are strengthened for another."

From the administration's long-awaited policy statement on school desegregation it appears that the Secretary has strengthened himself further by losing again, a process that may do him good but is rough on the causes he favors.

Once more, the administration saw-sawed back the other way and seemingly tried to patch things up with the other side by issuing some orders and filing some court actions. But the basic questions still remain.

Mr. President, when the people elect a President of the United States, they have a right to expect him to lead. At the very least they are entitled to know where he stands on such a fundamental moral issue as desegregation of schools.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business?

Mr. HARRIS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 11249) to amend the John F. Kennedy Center Act to authorize additional funds for such Center, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

HOUSE BILL REFERRED

The bill (H.R. 11249) to amend the John F. Kennedy Center Act to authorize additional funds for such Center, was read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on Public Works.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS,
ETC.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

REPORT ON EXPORT CONTROL

A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting, pursuant to law, the Eighty-Seventh Quarterly Report on Export Control for the first quarter of 1969 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY ACT WITH RESPECT TO INDIVIDUALS IN MENTAL INSTITUTIONS

A letter from the Secretary, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Social Security Act to limit Federal financial participation under the public assistance and medical laws with respect to individuals in mental institutions (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Finance.

REPORT OF COMPTROLLER GENERAL

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on selected aspects of payments and charges to Job Corps members, Department of Defense, Office of Economic Opportunity, dated June 30, 1969 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR TEACHERS OF BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS SCHOOLS

A letter from the Acting Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend Section 5723(b) of Title 5, United States Code, relating to length of service required by teachers in Bureau of Indian Affairs schools when travel and transportation expenses are paid to the first post of duty (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

PROPOSED IMPROVEMENT IN JUDICIAL MACHINERY IN CUSTOMS COURTS

A letter from the Attorney General, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to improve the judicial machinery in customs courts by amending the statutory provisions relating to judicial actions and administrative proceedings in customs matters, and for other purposes (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

By the PRESIDENT pro tempore:

A petition of the Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc., of Rochester, N.Y., praying for a

redress of grievances; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE

The following reports of a committee were submitted:

By Mr. BIBLE, from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, with an amendment:

S. 1686. A bill relating to age limits in connection with appointments to the United States Park Police (Rept. No. 91-295).

By Mr. JACKSON, from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, with amendments:

S. 1075. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to conduct investigations, studies, surveys, and research relating to the Nation's ecological systems, natural resources, and environmental quality, and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality (Rept. No. 91-296).

BILLS INTRODUCED

Bills were introduced, read the first time and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. DOMINICK:

S. 2570. A bill to provide for the termination within eighteen months of the use of Washington National Airport by jet aircraft, and to develop a plan for high speed surface transportation connecting the city of Washington with Dulles International Airport and Friendship International Airport; to the Committee on Commerce.

(The remarks of Mr. DOMINICK when he introduced the bill appear earlier in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

By Mr. FANNIN:

S. 2571. A bill to provide for national cemeteries in the State of Arizona; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

(The remarks of Mr. FANNIN when he introduced the bill appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

By Mr. CANNON (for himself and Mr. BIBLE):

S. 2572. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to engage in a feasibility study of the Amargosa Project, Nevada and California; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

(The remarks of Mr. CANNON when he introduced the bill appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

By Mr. BIBLE:

S. 2573. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to engage in feasibility investigations of certain water resource developments; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

(The remarks of Mr. BIBLE when he introduced the bill appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

By Mr. STEVENS:

S. 2574. A bill to amend section 2634 of title 10, United States Code, relating to the shipment at Government expense of motor vehicles owned by members of the Armed Forces; to the Committee on Armed Services.

S. 2575. A bill for the relief of Apollino Taganna Delovino; and

S. 2576. A bill for the relief of Flora Landicho; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(The remarks of Mr. STEVENS when he introduced the first above bill appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

By Mr. PROXMIER:

S. 2577. A bill to provide additional mortgage credit and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

(The remarks of Mr. PROXMIER when he introduced the bill appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

S. 2571—INTRODUCTION OF A BILL PROVIDING FOR NATIONAL CEMETERIES IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to provide for national cemeteries in the State of Arizona. It is my understanding that 38 States in the United States now have national cemeteries. Arizona today has a higher percentage of its total population who are veterans of various declared wars and conflicts than any other State in the Union. No doubt this ratio will continue through the years ahead due to the fact that many disabled veterans do migrate to Arizona for health reasons. Since Arizona is now the second most rapidly growing State in the Union and since the population of the State is estimated to double by 1985, it would be most appropriate to have a national cemetery in the State of Arizona.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Arizona Senate Memorial No. 3, urging the establishment of a national cemetery in Arizona, be printed in the RECORD at this point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the memorial will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 2571) to provide for national cemeteries in the State of Arizona, introduced by Mr. FANNIN, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

The memorial presented by Mr. FANNIN is as follows:

SENATE MEMORIAL 3

A memorial urging the establishment of a national cemetery in Arizona

To the Congress of the United States:

Your memorialist respectfully represents: The State of Arizona does not have a National Cemetery within its boundaries. The influx of veterans into the State of Arizona is due to the fact that for many years there have been many military installations located in the State. Moreover, thousands of veterans have moved to Arizona to take advantage of the dry, healthful climate.

A deceased veteran, who has expressed a desire to be buried in a National Cemetery, has to be transported to a distant point in another State for burial.

Wherefore your memorialist, the Senate of the State of Arizona prays:

1. That the Congress provide for the establishment of a National Cemetery in the State of Arizona.

2. That the Secretary of State of the State of Arizona transmit a copy of this Memorial to the President of the United States Senate, the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, and to each member of the Arizona Congressional delegation.

S. 2572—INTRODUCTION OF A BILL TO AUTHORIZE THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO ENGAGE IN A FEASIBILITY STUDY OF THE AMARGOSA PROJECT, NEVADA AND CALIFORNIA

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I am introducing, on behalf of Senator BIBLE, of Nevada, and myself, a bill authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to engage in a feasibility study to determine the economic practicability of taking water from the underground Amargosa River,

near Beatty, Nev., for irrigation, municipal and industrial uses.

A recent study by the Interior Department indicates there are approximately 93,000 acres of arable land in the Amargosa Valley which would be receptive to widespread irrigation if it were feasible. Valley residents are keenly interested in developing their resources as a contribution toward the growth and development potential of the region.

Limited irrigation has been developed in the area by privately owned wells but private development is beyond the financial resources of most potential irrigators.

The project would be undertaken by the Bureau of Reclamation. The proposed plan provides for drilling additional wells, and constructing the necessary distribution and drainage facilities to provide a water supply for 21,000 acres of irrigable lands.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2572) to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to engage in a feasibility study of the Amargosa project, Nevada and California, introduced by Mr. CANNON (for himself and Mr. BIBLE), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

S. 2573—INTRODUCTION OF A BILL RELATING TO FEASIBILITY INVESTIGATIONS OF CERTAIN WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENTS

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to engage in a feasibility investigation of the Brunswick Canyon damsite on the Carson River, Brunswick Division, Washoe project, ultimate phase in Ormsby, Douglas, and Lyon Counties, Nev.

The heavy storms and extensive stream runoff of the past season have pointed up the need of additional facilities on western Nevada streams to not only conserve surplus waters but to provide for flood control in this water deficient area. A further study of the Carson River at this locality could furnish information on which a solution of our problems could be based.

I trust the committee will add this proposal to those now under consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2573) to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to engage in feasibility investigations of certain water resource developments, introduced by Mr. BIBLE, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

S. 2574—INTRODUCTION OF A BILL DECREASING THE COST OF SHIPPING MILITARY MOTOR VEHICLES

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to

amend section 2634 of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the military departments, in certain cases, to ship automobiles to and from the State of Alaska by commercial motor carrier via the Alaska Ferry System, and by means of other surface transportation.

Mr. President, this bill would give the military departments more flexibility in moving privately owned automobiles of military personnel stationed in Alaska to and from Alaska in that it would allow shipment by water transportation, railroad transportation, or a combination thereof.

At the present time there is only one carrier serving Anchorage directly by water. The language of the existing law prohibits use of any mode of transportation except a water carrier. This means that under existing law the carriers serving Anchorage by water have all the military privately owned vehicle business. There are other land carriers interested in the business, who would be able to compete.

In addition, the military departments have indicated in the past, and I am certain that feeling has not changed now, that they would like to have several modes to choose from. As a rule, competition for Government business keeps Government costs down. Therefore, Mr. President, if my bill is enacted benefits will be threefold:

First, it will allow several carriers to bid on the military business to and from Alaska.

Second, it will give the military departments greater flexibility in their contracting authority.

Third, it will assure the taxpayers that transportation of the vehicles is being provided the Government at the lowest possible cost.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my bill be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 2574) to amend section 2634 of title 10, United States Code, relating to the shipment at Government expense of motor vehicles owned by members of the Armed Forces; introduced by Mr. STEVENS, was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 2574

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

(1) striking out the word "or" at the end of clause (1);

(2) striking out the period at the end of clause (2) and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and the word "or"; and

(3) adding at the end thereof a new clause as follows:

"(3) in the case of movements to and from Alaska, by commercial motor carrier via highways and the Alaska ferry system or other surface transportation between customary ports of embarkation and debarkation, if such means of transport does not exceed the cost to the United States of other authorized means.

S. 2577—INTRODUCTION OF A BILL PROVIDING ADDITIONAL MORTGAGE CREDIT

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I introduce a bill to extend for another year the authority of the Federal banking agencies to regulate the maximum rate of interest which financial institutions can pay on time and savings deposits. In addition, the bill contains a number of amendments designed to increase the effectiveness of monetary policy and to avoid another crippling blow to the housing industry.

I am sure many Members of the Senate remember the disastrous credit crunch of 1966 which severely clobbered the homebuilding industry. Housing starts dropped from a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 1.6 million in January of 1966 to 850,000 by October, a drop of nearly 50 percent.

In real terms, residential construction expenditures declined by \$5 billion over 1966 and 1967 whereas all other investment expenditures rose by \$20 billion. Sherman Maisel, a Federal Reserve Board Governor has estimated that the housing industry accounted for 70 percent of the reduction due to the Fed's 1966 tight money policy whereas it only comprises 3 percent of gross national product. These figures should make it abundantly clear that tight money has a disproportionate impact on the housing industry.

Not only does tight money discriminate against housing; but within the housing industry tight money discriminates against the poor. During the 1966 credit crunch, the sale of homes priced under \$12,000 dropped 51 percent; those priced between \$12,500 and \$15,000 dropped 42 percent; while those priced over \$30,000 actually increased by 10 percent.

Just as minority groups are the first fired during a recession, so low- and moderate-income housing is the first to be cut in a credit crunch.

Today we are faced with a potential repetition of the 1966 credit crunch. The increase in the bank prime rate to 8½ percent is an ominous indicator of an impending crunch. Escalating interest rates have not been successful in curbing business borrowing which contributes heavily to inflation; but high rates will exact an onerous burden on millions of home buyers, farmers, and small businessmen, and State and local governments.

In criticizing the increase in the prime rate, I want to make it clear that I am not opposed to the fight against inflation. But sky-high interest rates are not the answer. To the extent large corporations pass along the cost of higher interest rates to the consumer, the increase in the prime rate will actually add to inflation.

Simply put, the problem of inflation is that the total demands upon our economy exceed our ability to produce. Some kinds of spending must either be canceled or postponed if we are to stop inflation. The critical question is "Whose demands are to be cut back?"

In an overheated economy, a responsible policy should restrict those projects

which are of low priority and those which can be safely deferred. Applying this criteria to our present situation, it is my contention that there are two areas where sizable reductions are both possible and desirable—Government spending on military, space, and public works; and private corporate spending on plant and equipment.

Even though Congress and the administration must do more to cut Federal spending, I cannot agree that the entire burden of fighting inflation rests with the Federal Government. Business could do more to cut back on capital spending. And the banking community could do much more to cut back on business loans which help to feed the inflationary business investment boom.

Corporate planned expenditures on plant and equipment have skyrocketed. Last February, surveys revealed corporations planned to increase plant and equipment spending in 1969 by 13.9 percent over 1968. The most recent surveys show capital outlays still increasing by 12.5 percent despite the continuation of the Fed's tight money policy and astronomically high interest rates. Almost all economists agree that this rate of business investment is unsustainable, particularly since manufacturers are operating at only 84 percent of capacity.

Nonetheless, the business investment boom continues virtually unchecked by escalating interest rates. What has been the role of commercial banks in this process? How helpful have commercial banks been in restraining business spending?

The answer is not very much. Bankers have talked a good game about fighting inflation, but they have turned cartwheels to continue supplying funds to their corporate customers. Because of weak supervision by the Federal Reserve, our larger banks have become virtually immune to monetary policy.

When a bank is faced with excess business loan demand, it has two options. It can refuse loans and ration its available funds; or it can get more funds to meet its borrowers' demands. Unfortunately, our larger banks have elected the second option. In so doing, they have had to pay higher and higher rates to obtain the funds needed to continue their business loans. The high cost of obtaining money has in turn been used as a reason for an increase in the prime rate.

Despite the arguments of banking spokesmen, the increase in the prime rate was not inevitable. The banks brought it on themselves. Business loans at the 350 largest banks increased at an annual rate of 18 percent over the last 7 months, even though excessive business investment is adding to inflation.

Instead of turning down loans and rationing credit, large banks have scrambled across two continents searching for funds to feed the inflationary corporate investment boom. This excessive competition for funds has sent interest rates sky high, thus burdening millions of home buyers, small businessmen, and farmers while failing to curb corporate investment.

However, the real blame lies with the Federal Reserve Board for permitting

the large banks to undermine the Fed's tight money policy. For example, during the period from December 4 to June 25, the tight monetary policy of the Fed caused demand deposits to fall by \$400 million at large commercial banks. And because the Fed refused to increase the maximum rate which can be paid on time deposits, large banks lost \$8 billion in time deposits, mostly in negotiable CD's. Total deposits, both demand and time, thus fell by \$8.4 billion.

During the same period, business loans grew by \$7.1 billion or at an annual rate of 18 percent. How was it possible that large banks could be increasing their business loans by a whopping 18 percent a year when they lost \$8.4 billion in deposits? Where did they get the money?

First they got \$7.1 billion by dumping Treasury securities. This naturally increased their rate, thus adding to the general escalation of rates as well as the interest burden on the national debt. The capital losses on these security sales exerted downward pressure on bank earnings, and upward pressure on the prime rate.

Second, banks obtained \$6.6 billion by borrowing Eurodollars from their foreign branches. Through a loophole in regulation Q, Eurodollar liabilities are not covered, hence the larger banks are free to bid excessively for additional Eurodollars. The current Eurodollar rate is 10.4 percent and is one of the reasons cited by banks for the prime rate increase.

Third, the larger banks borrowed \$5 billion from other sources by issuing capital debentures, by borrowing in the Federal funds market, and by other means. Some banks have also been able to exploit an apparent loophole in the Holding Company Act, which permits a holding company to issue commercial paper while channeling the proceeds to its subsidiary bank. As in the case of Eurodollars, this form of borrowing is thus far exempt from the regulation Q ceiling.

These three devices alone netted large banks an additional \$18.7 billion—more than enough to offset the entire deposit loss of \$8.4 billion and to pump an additional \$7.1 billion into business loans.

If these loopholes had been closed and if the Federal Reserve had exerted stronger pressure on commercial banks to cut business lending, we would not have had the deplorably high interest rates we have today. The 8½-percent prime rate is not an inevitable result of past Federal spending. It is due to the inflationary actions of banks themselves and the failure of the Federal Reserve Board to restrain those actions.

In saying this I am not pointing the finger of moral blame at the banks. Banks are private institutions and have an obligation to their stockholders. Moreover, most bankers hate to say no to longtime business customers, even when saying no is in the best interest of our economy. The private interest of a bank is not always identical with the public interest.

But bankers cannot have it both ways. They cannot operate counter to monetary policy and then claim they are valiantly fighting inflation. Nor can they assert

that they are powerless to prevent an increase in the prime rate when it was their actions which laid the conditions for such an increase.

Neither can the Federal Reserve Board escape responsibility. The Federal Reserve authorities could have restrained the lending activities of our larger banks in a variety of ways:

They could have written a letter to all banks, as they did with some effectiveness in 1966, urging cutbacks in business loans;

They could have shut the discount window to those banks dumping Government securities;

They could have closed the loopholes in their regulations which permit banks to borrow excessive amounts of Eurodollars;

They could have closed another loophole in their regulations which permit banks to raise funds through holding company affiliates.

None of these actions was taken.

Since the Federal Reserve and administration have not acted, I am introducing legislation to increase the effectiveness of monetary policy and to help shield the mortgage market from another credit crunch. Housing starts have already dipped from a seasonally adjusted rate of \$1,878,000 in January to \$1,509,000 in May, a drop of 24 percent. The National Association of Homebuilders has projected that housing starts for all of 1969 will only reach 1,395,000 compared to 1,547,000 starts in 1968.

When the projected level of housing starts is measured against housing needs, the shortfall becomes even greater. The First Annual Report on National Housing Goals submitted to Congress by former President Johnson on January 17, 1969, indicated that housing starts would have to reach about 1,800,000 in calendar year 1969 to meet the 10-year goal established by Congress in the 1968 Housing Act. Thus, projected starts are already 400,000 below our needs and the shortfall could grow even greater if interest rates continue their meteoric rise.

The estimate of housing needs is not pie in the sky but is solidly related to the rate of family formation and existing housing stocks. Housing vacancy rates are at their alltime low, indicating an extremely tight housing market.

The housing industry is already severely depressed. Another credit crunch could spell disaster for the industry and for the would be homebuyer. It could set us back 2 years or more in achieving our housing goals. And it could do irreparable damage to our struggle to eradicate slum housing in our Nation's cities. We cannot afford to let it happen again.

EXTENSION OF RATE CONTROL AUTHORITY

Mr. President, section 1 of the bill I have introduced will extend for an additional year the authority of the Federal banking agencies to regulate the maximum rate of interest which can be paid by financial institutions on time and savings deposits. This authority was enacted by Congress during the height of the 1966 money crunch in order to restrain excessive competition for funds on the part of commercial banks and savings and loan associations.

The law gives the Federal Reserve Board the authority to establish different ceilings according to the size of the deposit. While the Banking Act of 1933 provided similar authority to the Federal Reserve Board, until 1966 the Board did not have the authority to establish lower rates for small denomination certificates of deposit which compete directly with savings deposits at thrift institutions.

Thus, the flexible authority provided by the 1966 law makes it possible to have higher ceilings for large denomination certificates of deposit in excess of \$100,000. These are issued primarily by the large New York money market banks and are highly competitive with Treasury bills, commercial paper, and other short term instruments.

On the other hand, the Board has maintained fairly low ceilings on small denomination certificates of deposit thus preventing a "rate war" between commercial banks and savings and loan associations. As a result, savings and loan associations are able to attract a reasonable supply of funds for the mortgage market thereby lending direct support to the level of activity in the homebuilding industry.

Most Federal officials feel that a renewal of this authority is absolutely essential to prevent a repetition of the disastrous rate war between banks and savings and loan associations which took place in 1966 and which caused thrift institutions to lose billions of dollars in savings deposits.

UNINSURED INSTITUTIONS

Section 2 of the bill would extend to uninsured financial institutions the same rate control provisions on deposits presently applicable to insured financial institutions. The problem of uninsured financial institutions is particularly acute in the State of Massachusetts where certain uninsured savings banks have been able to divert funds from insured institutions by offering higher deposit rates. As long as it is necessary to place insured institutions under the rate control authority, it is necessary, in the interests of competitive equality, to extend the same provisions to uninsured institutions.

If this authority is not extended to uninsured institutions, the amount of funds flowing to insured institutions could be substantially curtailed with potential adverse effects on their financial soundness.

TREASURY BORROWING AUTHORITY

Section 3 of the bill would amend section 11(i) of the Home Loan Bank Act which authorizes the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to borrow up to \$1 billion from the Treasury.

The legislation would require the rate to be charged the Federal Home Loan Bank Board on such borrowing to be set at the current market yield on Treasury obligations. The present law permits borrowing at the average of the so-called coupon rates on outstanding Treasury obligations. Since the coupon rate is substantially below the current market rate, the change of language would remove any subsidy involved in such borrowing.

Secondly, the legislation would provide the Treasury with a positive mandate

from the Congress to permit such borrowing authority to be used in a constructive manner. Specifically, it is expected by the Congress that the authority would be used to permit savings and loan associations to continue to supply reasonable amounts of funds to the mortgage market during periods of tight money. Any funds so borrowed would be repaid by the Home Loan Bank Board at the earliest practicable date, thus avoiding any permanent impact on the Federal budget. Moreover, the authority would only be used as a last resort when other alternative means cannot be effectively employed.

Mr. President, a similar provision passed the Senate Banking and Currency Committee last year by a vote of 8 to 4, but failed on the floor of the Senate by a vote of 45 to 44. However, last year's provision, which I offered as an amendment to the Rate Control Act, would have required the Federal Reserve Board to have loaned funds to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board during periods of tight money. At the time, many objections were raised that this provision could jeopardize the traditional independence of the Federal Reserve System.

While I do not share these fears, I have modified my proposal to eliminate any possibility that the independence of the Federal Reserve System would be endangered. The current language would authorize Treasury borrowing rather than Federal Reserve borrowing. Since both the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Treasury are under the direction of the President, it is evident that the President would be able to exercise complete control.

Mr. President, the aim of this authority is to enable the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to advance funds to savings and loan associations during a credit shortage. When interest rates undergo a rapid rise, there is a tendency for funds to be diverted from thrift institutions into the securities market. The immediate consequence, as has been shown in 1966, is a drastic reduction in the rate of mortgage lending on the part of savings and loan associations.

Theoretically, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board could borrow in the open market in order to continue supplying funds to savings and loan associations. The problem, however, is that frequently open market rates rise so high that member savings and loan associations no longer can afford to borrow from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board at prevailing market rates. For example, at the present time the Federal Home Loan Bank Board is paying 8 percent on its consolidated debentures. If these funds were reloaned to member associations at 8 percent, member associations would have to obtain at least a 9-percent yield on their mortgage loans in order to break even. If the mortgage lending rate is to be held to 8 percent, savings and loan associations cannot afford to pay much more than 7 percent in order to obtain funds. Thus, if the Federal Home Loan Bank Board were to charge member associations the going rate on Home Loan Bank Board debentures, many associations would be priced out of the market.

On the other hand, the current average rate on Treasury obligations is approximately 6.5 percent; therefore, if the home loan banks could borrow from the Treasury at this rate and reloan the proceeds to member associations, the volume of mortgage lending by savings and loan associations could continue.

The authority provided under section 3 would permit this type of borrowing to take place during periods of tight money and rapidly rising interest rates. It would not completely insulate the mortgage market from the impact of tight money, but it could soften the blow. Since the housing market already bears a disproportionate share of monetary restraint, it is only fair that the Federal Government take measures to spread the burden of adjustment more equitably.

REMOVAL OF TREASURY VETO ON HOME LOAN BANK BOARD BORROWING

Section 4 of the bill would remove the current veto power of the Treasury over the issuance of debentures by the Federal home loan banks. This provision would give the Federal home loan banks the same status as Federal intermediate credit banks, the central bank for cooperatives, the regional banks for cooperatives, and the Federal land banks, all of which provide credit to the agricultural sector of our economy.

While the Department of the Treasury is supposed to act as a traffic cop in order to insure an orderly flow of agency issues to the capital markets, at times the Treasury has exercised its veto as an instrument of stabilization policy.

For example, during 1966 the Treasury prevented the Federal home loan banks from borrowing additional funds even though the market rates then prevailing were within the reach of many member associations. By shutting off access to the capital market, the Treasury Department sealed the fate of the home building industry. The inability of the home loan banks to borrow led to a drastic reduction in the flow of mortgage credit from savings and loan associations.

While the absolute veto power of the Treasury would be removed, it is expected the Federal Home Loan Bank Board would consult with the Treasury in order to insure that the timing of its issues were coordinated with other agency issues and Treasury obligations.

HOLDING COMPANIES ISSUING COMMERCIAL PAPER

Section 5 of the bill would strengthen the authority of the Federal Reserve Board to administer regulation Q which establishes the maximum rate of interest which commercial banks can pay on time and savings deposits. At the present, there is a gaping loophole in regulation Q permitting large commercial banks to obtain funds in excess of the regulation Q ceiling through the bank holding company device. As currently practiced by seven or eight large New York City banks, a bank holding company will issue short-term notes in the commercial paper market at prevailing rates which at the present time are more than 1 percentage point higher than the regulation Q ceiling. The proceeds can then be channeled by the parent holding company to its subsidiary bank. This can be

done by purchasing participation certificates in the bank's loan portfolio or even purchasing loans outright. In either event, the bank has additional loanable funds to continue its business lending activity.

The language in section 5 would make it clear that the Federal Reserve Board has adequate authority to bring this kind of borrowing under the regulation Q ceiling. I am convinced the Federal Reserve Board already has this authority under existing law, although there are some who are uncertain on this point. In order to remove any doubt, I am suggesting that Congress adopt the language under section 5 to clarify the authority which the Federal Reserve Board already has under the Federal Reserve Act.

EURODOLLAR BORROWING

Mr. President, another gaping loophole in the administration of regulation Q is the practice of large commercial banks borrowing Eurodollars. The overseas branches of U.S. commercial banks are free to bid for Eurodollar deposits held in other countries at rates considerably in excess of regulation Q ceiling. The overseas branches can then reloan the funds to the parent bank at the prevailing Eurodollar rate, thereby circumventing the regulation Q ceiling.

The Eurodollar loophole makes it possible for large commercial banks to offset the impact of tight money and to maintain its lending activity notwithstanding a considerable reduction in its conventional time deposits.

Governor Brimmer of the Federal Reserve Board has said publicly that the impact of monetary policy on the business sector is considerably delayed because of the Eurodollar inflow. If we are to restore monetary control by the Federal Reserve Board over large commercial banks, this loophole must be plugged.

The language of section 6 would permit the Federal Reserve Board to establish marginal reserve requirements on additional Eurodollars obtained by U.S. commercial banks. The additional increase in Eurodollars would be measured from a base date which the Federal Reserve Board would from time-to-time establish. The Board could subject these Eurodollar funds to a reserve requirement of up to 100 percent.

The Federal Reserve Board has recently issued a proposed regulation establishing a 10-percent reserve requirement on incremental Eurodollar debentures. While this reserve requirement would effectively raise the cost of Eurodollar borrowing, I am not entirely confident that it will do the job. We have seen commercial banks pay fantastic rates in order to obtain loanable funds, hence a 10-percent increase in the effective price of those funds will not be an effective long-term deterrent. However, a 100-percent reserve requirement, if applied by the Federal Reserve Board, could effectively close the Eurodollar loophole. Since any Eurodollar obtained by a bank would have to be placed in reserve, the bank would have no incentive to borrow additional Eurodollar funds. It is expected this authority would be used sparingly by the Federal Reserve Board.

But it would constitute a powerful tool which the Fed could exercise when necessary to insure the effectiveness of its monetary policy.

VOLUNTARY CREDIT RESTRAINT PROGRAM

Sections 7 and 8 of the bill would reactivate the authority under which the Federal Reserve Board administered a voluntary credit restraint program during the Korean war. This authority was contained in the Defense Production Act of 1950. It authorized the President to consult with representatives of the financial community in order to establish voluntary programs of credit restraint.

Under this authority the Federal Reserve Board established industry committees of banks, investment banking firms, life insurance companies, savings and loan associations, and mutual savings banks. These committees established voluntary lending criteria designed to channel credit to the most essential uses. While there were a number of problems in the implementation of the criteria, by and large the program achieved its objectives.

A National Voluntary Credit Restraining Committee issued a statement on March 10, 1952, evaluating the success of the program. This statement was published in the March 1952 Federal Reserve Bulletin and reads as follows:

At the outset of the Program, which was without precedent in the country's financial history, there was widespread skepticism as to what might be accomplished by a self-regulation effort in the highly competitive field of lending. This has been supplanted by a recognition that the Program has proved practicable, workable, and effective as a supplement to fiscal, credit, and other anti-inflationary weapons. . . . The Program has been an important factor in holding prices level during the first year of its operation. (Statement released by National Voluntary Credit Restraint Committee, March 10, 1952.)

Mr. President, I do not think the economy has reached the point where a voluntary credit restraint program is called for. Nonetheless, I do feel that the Federal Reserve Board should have this authority on a standby basis should its use be required in the future. I understand that William McC. Martin, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, in testimony before the House Banking and Currency Committee suggested that it might be useful to have such authority reactivated on a standby basis.

Mr. President, the measures I have suggested will not completely solve the problem of high interest rates but I believe that in total they will provide for a more reasonable allocation of the impact of tight money on our economy and in particular they will help to insure a reasonable supply of mortgage credit so that we do not fall further behind in meeting our national housing goals. In view of the pressing need for decent housing in our central cities, I do not see how we can permit another drastic reduction in the level of housing starts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 2577) to provide additional mortgage credit and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. PROXMIER,

was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS

S. 1075

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), I ask unanimous consent that at the next printing of S. 1075, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the names of the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF), and the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS) be added as cosponsors.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 1758

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President on behalf of the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN) I ask unanimous consent that, at its next printing, the name of the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. HRUSKA) be added as a cosponsor of the bill (S. 1758) to designate the Interstate System as the "Eisenhower Interstate Highway System."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 1827, S. 1828, AND S. 1829

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS), I ask unanimous consent that at its next printing, the name of the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE) be added as a cosponsor of the bills S. 1827, to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to impose a minimum income tax, to require the allocation of deductions allowed to individuals in certain circumstances, and for other purposes; S. 1828, to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to increase the minimum standard deduction; and S. 1829, to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to reduce and extend the tax surcharge and to suspend the investment credit during the remaining period of applicability of the tax surcharge.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 2076

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at its next printing, the name of the Senator from Texas (Mr. YARBOROUGH) be added as a cosponsor of the bill S. 2076, the national wildlife disaster bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 2524

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at its next printing, my name be added as a cosponsor of the bill (S. 2524) to adjust agricultural production, to provide a transitional program for farmers, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 2561

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at its next printing, the name of the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN) be added as a cosponsor of the bill (S. 2561) to incorporate Pop Warner Little Scholars, Inc. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DISPOSITION OF FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO PAY A JUDGMENT TO CERTAIN INDIANS—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 67

Mr. HARRIS submitted an amendment, intended to be proposed by him, to the bill (S. 885) to authorize the preparation of a roll of persons whose lineal ancestors were members of the Confederated Tribes of Weas, Piankashaws, Peorias, and Kaskaskias, merged under the treaty of May 30, 1854 (10 Stat. 1082), and to provide for the disposition of funds appropriated to pay a judgment in Indian Claims Commission Docket No. 314, as amended, and for other purposes, which was referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and ordered to be printed.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 68

Mr. COOPER. (for himself, Mr. HART, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. PERCY, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. GORE, Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey, Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. SYMINGTON, and Mr. MONDALE) submitted an amendment, intended to be proposed by them, jointly, to the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorize personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

(The remarks of Mr. COOPER when he submitted the amendment appear later in the RECORD under the appropriate heading.)

Mr. McGOVERN subsequently said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my name be added as a cosponsor to the amendment to S. 2546 offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. HART) and the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) relating to deployment of and the acquisition of sites for an anti-ballistic-missile system.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia subsequently said: Mr. President, at the re-

quest of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), I ask unanimous consent that, at its next printing, his name be added as a cosponsor of the Cooper amendment to the bill (S. 2546).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

NOTICE OF HEARINGS

Mr. BIBLE. Mr. President, I wish to announce that hearings have been scheduled before the Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on three bills to establish national historic sites in recognition of three of our great Presidents. They are:

S. 2000, to establish the Lyndon B. Johnson National Historic Site;

Senate Joint Resolution 26, to provide for the development of the Eisenhower National Historic Site at Gettysburg; and

S. 560, to provide for the establishment of the William Howard Taft National Historic Site.

The hearings will be held in room 3110, New Senate Office Building on Tuesday, July 29, 1969, commencing at 10 a.m.

Anyone desiring to testify on any of these proposals should advise the staff of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the following nominations have been referred to and are now pending before the Committee on the Judiciary:

Farley E. Mogan, of Oregon, to be U.S. marshal for the district of Oregon for the term of 4 years, vice Eugene G. Hulett;

John O. Olson, of Wisconsin, to be U.S. attorney for the western district of Wisconsin for the term of 4 years, vice Edmund A. Nix.

On behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all persons interested in these nominations to file with the committee, in writing, on or before Wednesday, July 16, 1969, any representations or objections they may wish to present concerning the above nominations, with a further statement whether it is their intention to appear at any hearing which may be scheduled.

THE FAILURE OF VETERANS TO UTILIZE THE COLD WAR GI BILL IS A NATIONAL TRAGEDY

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, one of the great disappointments of a democracy is when a law is passed for the benefit of the people, but the people who could benefit from it remain ignorant or unaware of the law and its potential.

One such disappointment is the cold war GI bill, which I sponsored and after a long fight was finally enacted by the 89th Congress. The disappointment arises from the excruciating fact that only one out of 10 of the returning Viet-

nam veterans, who have not completed high school, have made use of the high school entitlement. This matter is discussed in a thoughtful editorial appearing in the San Francisco Examiner recently.

I have long felt that the Veterans' Administration is not doing an adequate job of informing these returning veterans of the opportunities available to them under the cold war GI bill. The editorial discusses the matter of utilization and poignantly focuses on this problem.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial, entitled "GI Benefits," published in the San Francisco Examiner of June 7, 1969, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GI BENEFITS

At a time when anti-poverty programs are being drastically curtailed it is ironic, to say the least, that so few eligibles are taking advantage of the solid economic elevator provided by the GI Bill of Rights. Figures made available by the Veterans Administration indicate that something is shockingly wrong somewhere.

After World War II, some 50 percent of veterans availed themselves of the GI bill help to get more education—the best possible route out of poverty and third-rate jobs. As of the first of this year, however only 19 percent of eligible Vietnam veterans were using the bill to get more training at colleges, vocational schools or on-the-job programs.

What is especially disturbing about the lowered figure is that an estimated 500,000 of the 2.7 million Vietnam veterans thus far discharged do not have even high school diplomas. Yet of the 500,000 only 21,000 today are taking advantage of a special high school subsidy.

Sen. Ralph W. Yarborough (D-Tex.), calling the situation a "tragedy," blames the VA for "not doing anything to get these men into school." He said the VA, despite the fact that the GI bill is virtually open-ended in funding, is soft-pedaling the education opportunities in order to hold down its budget. The VA vehemently denies the charge.

We simply do not know who or what is responsible, but we agree the situation is tragic—and inexcusable. Perhaps the VA, as it claims, is "doing more than ever" to inform returning veterans of all their GI bill benefits. Obviously much more must be done. Returning veterans in need of further education somehow must be persuaded to take wider advantage of the opportunities available, not merely "informed" of them.

DR. JOHN N. KNOWLES

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I do not know Dr. John H. Knowles, but I agree with the opinion expressed in the Tuesday, July 8, issue of the Evening Star, that the decision not to appoint him as an Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare was apparently a proper one.

I doubt whether many Senators really had strong feelings for or against Dr. Knowles, and would also guess that his nomination would have been confirmed had his name been submitted and that I would have perhaps voted for its confirmation.

In retrospect, since Dr. Knowles is now becoming a spokesman not for medicine, but for what he considers to be the political ills of this country, I, for one, am

thankful that he was not appointed. Apparently, Dr. Knowles is not content to concern himself with medicine, but he now poses as an expert on school guidelines and appears to have become an instant political analyst.

At any rate, I believe the editorial in the Evening Star, "Telling It Like It Isn't," will be of interest, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TELLING IT LIKE IT ISN'T

Dr. John H. Knowles, recently turned down by the President for the nation's top health post, says he "likes to speak out and tell it like it is."

He was talking in that context about Medicaid, which he called the "loudest waste of taxpayers' money and the most ill-conceived program which ever came down the chute."

Being a medical man and a hospital administrator, Dr. Knowles may be qualified to pass judgment on Medicaid. But when he undertakes to diagnose the performance of the President, he not only fails to tell it like it is, he talks like a diagnostician who has never even seen a political medical school.

According to the Associated Press, Dr. Knowles told a Boston television audience on Sunday that the White House under President Nixon "is in the grip of the arch conservatives and progress is at a complete standstill." He went on to say that the influence of conservative pressure groups on the President is "absolutely catastrophic."

This doesn't sound like the pronouncement of a physician whose professional training should make him wary of hyperbole. Neither does it make any sense.

Let's take a look at the political record. Dr. Knowles says he sees Mr. Nixon as a man "who's got his finger on the pulse of 51 or 52 percent of the people involved in a conservative backlash—a swing to the right."

Last November the Nixon winning margin was about 43.4 percent of the total vote. If the latest Gallup poll is accurate, however, 63 percent of the people today approve of the way the President is handling his job. Only 16 percent disapprove, the others being listed among the "no opinions."

This massive expression of approval is hardly what one would expect in the case of an administration which, in a little more than five months, turned in a performance which is "absolutely catastrophic." Nor do the extravagant comments by Dr. Knowles reflect any mature understanding of the fact that Nixon, in contrast to Hubert Humphrey, campaigned as a relatively conservative White House aspirant.

All of which leads us to something of a word-eating reflection: Politics aside, maybe the President was right in deciding that it was better to leave Dr. Knowles in charge of the Massachusetts General Hospital than to name him as Assistant HEW Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs.

THE PESTICIDE PERIL XXII

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, an article by Hunter James, published in the Sunday Baltimore Sun, reviews the current controversy over the use of the persistent pesticide, DDT.

The article traces DDT from its initial development and use as a killer of malaria, typhus, cholera, and Rocky Mountain spotted fever to its present threat as a killer of wildlife, fish, and

potentially man. DDT has been linked to cancer, and some authorities predict an epidemic-like outbreak of DDT-related cancers within the next 10 to 30 years.

Mr. James reports:

The fear among scientists is not just that the cumulative effects of DDT may one day manifest themselves in horrible ways, but that the damage may be irreversible.

Most action responding to this alarming threat has been on the State level. Some States have banned its use outright, and many other State legislatures are presently considering similar proposals.

Alternatives to DDT are being studied. It appears that biological control—such as the use of natural predators—is one of the most effective and safe.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DDT—PERSISTENT PROTESTS, A LITTLE ACTION, GROWING THREAT

(By Hunter James)

A single-engine crop duster comes clattering down over the summer landscape. A cloud of DDT billows down, covers the young plants with a noxious dusty film, drifts with the wind across the surrounding fields and roadsides or into the nearby woods, killing the grasshoppers and Junebugs as well as the boll weevils and tobacco worms.

And goes on killing them all summer long. The deadly and lasting effectiveness of DDT has worried scientists since the day it came into general use. Unlike less potent insecticides, it does not break down and dissipate readily. It gathers over long periods in the soil and water, on the leaves of growing things, and in the fatty tissues of animals and man—and its effect is cumulative. That's what makes it so economical to use and also why it poses a threat to human life.

The threat has only recently become tangible enough to cause widespread alarm. And there are still those who believe that the good of DDT outweighs the bad.

SILENT SPRING

Invented in Sweden a quarter of a century ago, the compound has helped make American farms the most productive in the world. It has also been used to knock out malaria, typhus, cholera, Rocky Mountain spotted fever and other serious diseases.

But the clamor against DDT and its derivatives is big and growing. It began seven years ago with the publication of Rachel Carson's "Silent Spring," a book now regarded as an almost-classic statement on the subject of pesticide poisoning. Miss Carson cited massive kills of frogs, snakes and birds as evidence of the damage DDT can cause. The long-term effects are quite different, but just as deadly. In the American bald eagle, for example, the poison manifests itself in the reproductive process. Eggshells become too thin to protect the young, and for that reason the bald eagle and other magnificent species—peregrine falcon, osprey and others—rapidly are becoming extinct.

In man the effect may be even more subtle, even more dangerous. Numerous studies have linked DDT to cancer. The relationship has not been definitely established, but most scientists feel there is more than enough evidence to justify banning the stuff. Some authorities, including Dr. W. C. Hueper, former director of the National Cancer Institute, believe there could well be an epidemic-like outbreak of DDT-related cancers within the next 10 to 30 years.

NELSON LEGISLATION

Last March, the Food and Drug Administration helped focus attention on the pesticides problem with a seizure of more than 21,000 pounds of coho salmon from warehouses in Wisconsin and Minnesota. A sample of the same batch of fish, taken from Lake Michigan, had been found to contain DDT residues of 12 to 19 parts per million, far higher than what had been found before and almost three times as high as the federal tolerance for beef.

The seizure brought prompt action from Robert Finch, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Despite opposition from five Republican governors in the Great Lakes region, he set a relatively stringent tolerance level for fish: five parts per million. Surprisingly, it was the first time there had been a limit of any kind. Mr. Finch also appointed a committee to investigate the pesticide menace and report back in six months with recommendations for bringing it under control.

Senator Gaylord Nelson (D. Wis.), more alarmed than his state's governor (one of the five opposing Secretary Finch's action) took the occasion to introduce legislation permanently outlawing the use of DDT. The frightening thing to him was that the pesticide residues in the fish had "probably traveled hundreds of miles through the air, water and soil" and had been "consumed through the normal food chain of up to a half-dozen organisms."

The senator is among those who believe that Miss Carson may have understated her case in "Silent Spring." Yet he has little hope that his bill will pass. He introduced a similar measure last year and the year before. Each time it died in the Senate Agricultural Committee.

LAWS ARE WEAK

Except possibly for the Food and Drug Administration, federal agencies have been singularly unresponsive to the threat posed by pesticides. Laws are weak and implementation weaker.

The Agriculture Department's Agricultural Research Service is the agency chiefly responsible for policing the registration, distribution and use of pesticides. If the government's General Accounting Office can be believed, the agency's performance has been inexcusably lax.

The GAO says the department has seized only a fraction of the products found to be below government standards and has repeatedly failed to take legal action against shippers accused of violating the law. Furthermore, the GAO says it has permitted food-handling establishments to use the pesticide Lindane despite reservations voiced by health authorities.

Although pesticide control is plainly a federal problem, since dust from Iowa can harm plants and wildlife in Nebraska, Congress has been reluctant to act. Most of what action there is exists in the states.

BIOLOGICAL CONTROL

About a third of them have no laws at all governing the use of DDT. Others, including Maryland, have recently adopted mild restrictions. Still others have banned it outright.

After the coho salmon seizure, the Michigan Agricultural Commission banned the sale of DDT indefinitely. Senator Nelson's state, Wisconsin, has been holding hearings on the problem for almost six months and will probably decide this fall whether to follow suit. After the first of the year California will not allow its use except in non-dust form. Arizona has banned it for a year, and the New York Pesticide Control Board wants it banned permanently except for emergency use. Rhode Island plans to outlaw it as soon as a safe substitute can be found and perhaps before. The Texas Legislature is studying the problem.

Of the alternatives to DDT, biological con-

trol is potentially the most effective as well as the safest. All sorts of experiments are under way: the use of natural predators; the use of sound and light to trick the insects out of the ground prematurely, in winter, and cause their death and the use of synthetic substances to trap and confuse them. There is also a feeling the genetic manipulation will prove useful.

Much of the argument in favor of pesticides is that they are cheap. But biological control may be cheaper. One California exterminator said to rely exclusively on natural means of control charges about \$8 an acre each year. Crop sprays can cost a farmer up to \$75 an acre.

Perhaps it is too early to prove conclusively that pesticides can cause cancer in man or otherwise send him to an agonizing death. It is interesting that Sweden, where DDT originated, has banned it simply because there is not proof that it will not do so. The fear among scientists is not just that the cumulative effects of DDT may one day manifest themselves in horrible ways, but that the damage may be irreversible.

THE OZARKS REGIONAL COMMISSION AND SENATE PASSAGE OF S. 1072

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, the Senate yesterday passed S. 1072, a bill to authorize funds to carry out the purposes of the Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965, as amended, and title V of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, as amended.

Title II of this bill is of particular importance to my State, for it includes significant amendments to title V of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 which authorized the Secretary of Commerce to designate "economic development regions."

The Ozarks Regional Commission was designated by the Secretary on March 1, 1966, and held its organizational meeting on September 7, 1966. Forty-four counties in southwest and south-central Missouri are included in the Ozarks Region. Parts of Arkansas, Kansas, and Oklahoma are also included.

Two sections in the bill passed today are of particular importance to the Ozarks Regional Commission and the other title V Commissions. Section 505 of the Public Works and Economic Development Act authorizes technical and planning assistance to the commissions. S. 1072 expands this authority to permit broader use of these funds for studies, technical assistance and demonstration projects, and training programs. This will give the regional commissions direct control over their own program development.

S. 1072 also amends section 509 of the Public Works and Economic Development Act significantly. Heretofore, this section authorized supplemental grant assistance to foster the use of existing Federal grant-in-aid programs within the development regions. This section would be amended to allow a commission to use funds authorized to it as "first dollar" money when there are insufficient funds for the Federal share under ongoing Federal grant programs.

The regional commissions are given greater flexibility under the amendments provided by S. 1072. They are given better tools with which to confront

the problems of regional economic development. The Ozarks Regional Commission has had almost 3 years to develop a coordinated plan for economic development. When the Commission was first designated, many people in my State felt that it would offer the potential for increased opportunities and benefits to citizens of an area with unique cultural assets, but comparatively low economic development.

I hope that with the amendments provided by S. 1072, including an authorization of \$50 million to the Ozarks Commission for fiscal years 1970 and 1971, the promise of this multistate, cooperative governmental effort can begin to be realized.

Mr. President, I have the privilege of being a member of the Senate Committee on Public Works and the Subcommittee on Economic Development of that committee. The distinguished gentleman from West Virginia, Senator JENNINGS RANDOLPH, has led the full committee in consideration of this matter, and the able gentleman from New Mexico, Senator JOSEPH MONTOYA, directed the work of the subcommittee in its thorough and deliberate examination of the problems of economic development relating to the bill. I joined many other Senators in co-sponsoring S. 1072, as originally introduced by Senator RANDOLPH, and S. 1090 which was introduced by Senator EDMUND MUSKIE. The bill we passed yesterday incorporates elements of both bills. It is a tribute to the leadership of the committee; it continues the outstanding program of the Appalachian Regional Commission, and it provides new opportunities to the regional economic development commissions.

THE DEPARTMENT CLUB OF PORT ARTHUR, TEX., CALLS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF 100,000-ACRE BIG THICKET NATIONAL PARK

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, the Department Club of Port Arthur, Tex., adopted a resolution on May 5, 1969, urging the passage of my bill, S. 4, to create a 100,000-acre Big Thicket National Park in southeast Texas.

The Department Club of Port Arthur refers to the Big Thicket as "the biological crossroads of North America." They recognize the richness and diversity of the Big Thicket's plant and animal life.

At least 300 species of birds live year-round in the Big Thicket including four kinds of owls, three kinds of hawks, a few last bald eagles, and an almost unsurpassed variety of water birds. The all-but-extinct whooping crane has been seen there, as have the rare red-cockaded woodpecker and Bachman's sparrow. It may be the last refuge of that endangered giant-among-woodpeckers, the ivory-billed.

The Big Thicket used to cover more than 3.5 million acres. Now less than 300,000 acres remain. Once the Big Thicket is gone, it will be gone forever. With it will go its wildlife, the rare birds, and the beauty. America will have lost irrevocably an integral part of herself.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent

that the resolution, including the names of its signers, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Whereas the Texas Federation of Women's Clubs have gone on record supporting the legislation to preserve 100,000 acres of the Big Thicket of Southeast Texas as a National Park, and

Whereas The Department Club of Port Arthur, Texas which is composed of 375 women is affiliated with the Texas Federation of Women's Clubs, it therefore urges that you work diligently NOW for the passage of Senate Bill S-4 creating a 100,000 acre Big Thicket National Park in Southeast Texas before this area designated as "the biological crossroads of North America" is lost for today's citizens and future generations.

Mrs. HERMAN TAYLOR, Jr.,
President.
Mr. FRED CRAWFORD,
Secretary.

PESTICIDE POEM

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I recently received a letter from an 11-year-old constituent, David Michaud, of Waukesha, Wis., who expressed his concern about the threat of DDT to our environment and human health in a three-verse poem.

It is significant that this young boy, who yet has no voice or vote in the decisionmaking processes of our Nation but who will have to inherit the results of his elders' mistakes, is trying in his small way to let us know the consequences of the continued use of this persistent pesticide.

I ask unanimous consent that David's poem and his brief letter to me be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter and poem were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WAUKESHA, WIS.
June 30, 1969.

DEAR SENATOR NELSON: I am an eleven year old boy writing to tell you about how I feel about DDT. Not only in Wisconsin, but in all the United States.

Enclosed you'll find a three-versed poem that I wrote.

Very sincerely,

DAVE W. MICHAUD.

P.S.—I typed every thing myself.

DDT

People are using ddt,
To get rid of pests;
But DDT is using them,
And making more unrest.

DDT is killing birds,
And many other game;
But men don't seem to understand,
It could kill us just the same.

We are using it in trees,
Then it starts to rain;
DDT flows into waters,
Many fish are being slain.

INDEPENDENCE DAY

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, under date of July 2, 1969, there appeared in the Washington Daily News a column by the distinguished minority leader, Senator DIRKSEN, entitled "A Day for Looking Back." It deals with Independence Day and is very informative and

interesting. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A SENATOR'S NOTEBOOK: A DAY FOR LOOKING BACK

(By Everett McKinley Dirksen)

Independence Day Friday, the observance of our 193rd year as a nation, will remind many of us that we are slipping away from our heritage in some respects.

All over the land this weekend our people will be traveling for fun and pleasure—to play golf and to participate in picnics. Generally, they will forget that such a wonderful thing as independence preserved thru the centuries is something Americans fought for with a courage and dedication seldom before demonstrated by man.

Independence Day ought to mean more to us than a day off from work, part of a weekend of fun and frolic.

In all the cities and hamlets of our country, in years gone by, the Fourth of July was celebrated with patriotic speeches, parades and thoughts of both the past and the future. This year, however, as in other recent years, there are many cities that won't even have a parade, that won't officially honor Independence Day.

As a nation, we may be losing some of our concern for the glorious past, a past that should bridge us into the unknown future. This week, then, is the right time to state a few facts of history that will help us to face tomorrow.

The Second Continental Congress, meeting in Philadelphia on July 2, 1776, passed a resolution in favor of Independence and, on July 4, that Congress agreed to the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration was signed by 56 courageous, farseeing Americans, truly the fathers of our country, on Aug. 2.

Despite the Declaration, the Revolutionary War continued and was not won until the British under Lord Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown Oct. 19, 1781.

There was dissent in 1776, as there is today. There was no unanimity for independence. The Tories in the colonial states wanted to dwell under the rule of King George III. Many delegates to the Continental Congress didn't want to sign the Declaration that came alive in the words of Thomas Jefferson. Some of them stayed away from the meeting place in the steepled state house in Philadelphia. But when it came time to be signed, they forgot the dissent and they returned to affix their deathless signatures to the document of freedom.

They decided they were Americans. They stood up for independence. They silenced their dissent. They forged a nation.

Who were those signers of the Declaration of Independence? I mention only two—you can read the other names in a copy of the Declaration in your dictionary or encyclopedia. There was John Hancock, of Massachusetts. He was wealthy for his day, and he had contributed \$100,000 to the cause of freedom. Had the revolution failed, his property and business would have been seized by the king. There was Charles Carroll, of Carrolltown, Md. He, too, was wealthy, probably the richest of all the signers. He staked his wealth and his very neck on the successful pursuit of the war for freedom. Many others of the 56 were men of means and property.

They all risked their every acre of land and farthing of money on an idea that men should be free. They engaged in the dissent of the day and helped to make their views into a dream come true, a dream for a better America where there would be opportunity for all.

They exhibited their devotion to their cause in the highest degree as they signed the document under the last sentence that

Jefferson had written into the Declaration: ". . . And for the support of this declaration with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our Sacred Honor."

How easily we forget that 193 years later we are all of us beneficiaries of the men who signed the Declaration of Independence. They signed for us who live in the turmoil of 1969. They sacrificed for us who may sometimes forget to express our appreciation of their courage and devotion and their willingness to pledge all in the cause of freedom.

A few simple things would do to mark our 1969 observance of Independence Day with reverence for the past and faith in the future. We can display the Flag. We can gather our family and friends about us and read aloud the Declaration and the names of the signers, perhaps putting to shame the commercialized ceremonies where the Declaration will not be recalled to the ears of millions.

We can stop awhile and think about the past that bridges the centuries to come.

REALISM IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, on June 30, 1969, Ambassador Charles W. Yost gave one of the most provocative and interesting speeches to the General Synod of the United Church of Christ in Boston, Mass.

I have always believed one of the real tests of Government leaders is to make the complicated simple. So often we seem to do just the opposite.

I am glad to see that Ambassador Yost has succeeded in reducing to simple terms some of our complicated problems and, in the process, presenting the paradoxes of our times.

I think his speech is most thought provoking and believe it would be of interest to my colleagues. For this reason I ask unanimous consent to have his speech printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REALISM IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

(By Ambassador Charles W. Yost, U.S. Representative to the United Nations)

Those of us who concern ourselves with international affairs—whether in government or in private institutions and organizations such as yours—are constantly being urged by colleagues and critics to be "realistic". Politics is the art of the possible, we are told. Let us set practical, achievable goals. Let us be toughminded and hard-nosed about pursuing them. Let us not be deluded into chasing rainbows or frightened into being soft about what is necessary for our national interest and national security.

Of course, none of us would dispute this argument up to a point. We are all of us, I am sure, practical men and women and not Utopians. But what exactly is "realistic" in this world which science and technology are so swiftly and radically transforming? Thirty years ago anyone who had said man would land on the moon in three decades would have been thought an utter fool, totally unrealistic. Yet we expect to do it next month. Even ten years ago anyone would have been ridiculed who predicted that by 1969 birth control would be a subject both of ordinary parlor conversation and of vast government programs. Yet it has happened.

Even in my lifetime the world's strongest military powers have twice been totally crushed, and worldwide empires which had lasted for centuries have suddenly disintegrated.

Their leaders had certainly thought they were practical men, but were they?

I venture to say that there are two elements which have always been essential to true realism in international affairs but which are particularly so in our fantastic time. They are objectivity and far-sightedness.

Of course we all know how difficult it is to be objective in any human affairs, to balance our own interests rationally and compassionately with those of our neighbors, to see ourselves as others see us. You may know the little rhyme of Piet Hein:

"Men, said the Devil
Are good to their brothers;
They don't want to mend
Their own ways, but each other's."

We are all too inclined to make the mistake the lady made at the cocktail party who said to her husband: "Darling, you've had too much to drink. You're getting all blurred." Yet if we cannot be objective about our real strengths and our real weaknesses, we are certain to miscalculate and, if our miscalculations are sufficiently serious, to suffer disaster. A so-called realism which is not objective about the rights, needs and complexes of other people, as well as about our own, is not realism but self-deception.

Similarly a realism which may be tactically appropriate but is strategically false, which takes account of next year but not of five or ten years hence, can also be fatal. I sometimes wonder whether a hard nose is not one you can't see beyond the end of. It is probably unwise to be, constitutionally and consistently, either a hawk or a dove, but it is certainly necessary for both of them to weigh very carefully, very realistically, where the consequences of their hawkishness or their dovishness would be likely to put the country a decade hence. Realism can no longer be merely a matter of keeping both feet on the ground, when the ground is shifting as rapidly as it now is. Someone had said—"Show me a man with both feet on the ground and I'll show you a man who can't get his pants on." It could hardly be argued that either astronauts or ministers of the gospel are satisfied to keep their feet on the ground, yet who among us is more deserving of respect.

Many of the disasters of modern times have occurred in large part because statesmen, who believed they were hard-nosed and realistic, were neither objective nor far-sighted. After the War of 1870 the German General Staff, over the objections of Bismarck, insisted on annexing Alsace and Lorraine in order to provide the security of a "strategic frontier" for Germany. The result was wholly to alienate France, to concentrate her energies on revenge and to pave the way for German defeat in two world wars. Similarly all the European powers before 1914 organized themselves in alliances and piled up armaments in order to ensure security, and ended by creating a situation which was fatal to the security of all of them. On the other hand, in the 1930's British and French "realists", drawing comfortable but undiscriminating conclusions from their earlier experience, failed to suppress or contain Hitler and Mussolini in time and thus helped bring on World War II.

If we attempt to be realistic, to be objective and far-sighted, about international affairs today, what do we see? I see four particularly dramatic and disturbing paradoxes.

The first paradox is that, while national armament is of course designed to promote national security, and never in history have nations been so well armed, yet never have they been so insecure. Never would the actual use of the full range of ready arms be so certainly fatal to so much of mankind and to civilized society. And in a certain sense precisely those nations which are the best armed are the most insecure because they

would be the first targets if a nuclear war should tragically occur. This is no one's fault—it is a consequence of technological advance in weaponry—but it does impose on the leaders of those best-armed states an enormous responsibility to find means of escaping from this hideous and stupid paradox. Realism could have no higher or more imperative goal than to resolve it.

The second paradox is that, while technology each year knits the world more closely together, while we can see around it in seconds and fly around it in hours, its people continue to be more and more fragmented into separate national sovereignties, more than 130 of them at latest count. And each of these nations insists on unrestricted independence to do exactly what it likes, precisely at a time when the interdependence of each and all is becoming more and more pre-emptory.

The third paradox is that just when science seems at long last to have solved the problem of production, when the gross national product of the developed nations is growing by leaps and bounds, when poverty is no longer inescapable, the gap between rich and poor nations is still widening rather than narrowing. Two-thirds of the world's population continues to exist below minimum standards of decency. As we are seeing today inside our own country, on a much smaller scale, this is a very explosive situation which, if not dealt with in time, can in the end tear the world apart.

The fourth paradox is related to the third. It is that our very triumphs if ungoverned can bring us to disaster, that the triumphs of medicine may increase our population to the point of asphyxiation and breakdown, that the triumphs of engineering and chemistry may fatally pollute our air, water and soil, that the triumphs of communication and surveillance may be misused to disorient or dominate the masses whom they should enlighten and safeguard.

Realism in international, as in national, affairs in the last third of the 20th century should, in my judgment, be concentrated with the utmost urgency on the resolution of these four paradoxes.

Unfortunately, during most of the past two decades the foreign affairs of the great developed nations have been distracted from these long-term concerns, that should be overriding, by the real and imagined exigencies of the Cold War among them. I say real and imagined because they are both.

The breakdown and desperation in Western and Eastern Europe and in the Far East after World War II were real; the Communist expansion from the Pripet marshes to the Elbe, throughout China and into some of the lands around China was real; the oppressive and regressive nature of Communist society under Stalin was real, nor, as Czechoslovakia bears witness, does it seem to have become much more progressive since Stalin. I am personally proud to have been associated with the imaginative, generous and decisive measures with which the United States and its allies during the ten years after the War, through the Marshall Plan, in NATO, in Korea and in Southeast Asia, restored stability and balance and made much of the world safe, if not for democracy, at least for self-determination and diversity.

There were, however, also during those years, as always during great international confrontations, many presumed exigencies of the Cold War which existed only in the heated imagination or the oversimplified doctrine of one side or the other. What I have called the law of disproportionate response to miscalculated challenge was tragically illustrated in many parts of the world. Capabilities of the adversary were exaggerated, intentions were misread, each prepared to meet the worst possible contingency, preparation for it on one side provoked preparation on the other, and both brought the

awful contingency closer by the very act of seeking to forestall it.

All this had nothing to do with realism. In historical perspective it will be seen to have been a colossal display of irrationality on both sides. The conduct of the Cold War has long ceased to meet the test of objectivity and farsightedness. More and more thinking people on both sides have begun to suspect that Pogo in the comic strip might have been right when he said, "We have met the enemy and they are us."

It is for this reason that the world welcomed with a great sigh of relief President Nixon's heartening inaugural address five months ago in which he stated his intention to move from confrontation to negotiation. "We cannot expect to make everyone our friend," he said, "but we can try to make no one our enemy. Those who would be our adversaries, we invite to a peaceful competition—not in conquering territory or extending dominion, but in enriching the life of man." After taking the oath of office he added: "And to that oath I now add this sacred commitment: I shall concentrate my office, my energies and all the wisdom I can summon, to the cause of peace among nations."

This commitment, in light of the precarious balance of terror under which we live, I call the highest realism. But it is not a commitment that can be met unilaterally. It takes at least two to negotiate as it takes two to confront. Fortunately there seems substantial evidence that the President's offer to negotiate on issues of the gravest importance is meeting, at least initially, with a positive response.

One of President Nixon's first initiatives in foreign affairs was to emphasize the need for United States and other great power assistance in bringing about a settlement—or at very least a defusing—of the conflict in the Middle East. In the two years since the latest major explosion there the parties in confrontation have shown again their inability to make peace with each other. As a cartoonist has pointed out, they recently passed the 700th day of the 6-day war. Yet until a just and durable peace is established, not only will the peoples of the Middle East live in fear and insecurity but the wider peace of the world will be threatened. Certainly permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, not only moved by a realistic understanding of these dangers but conscious of their own responsibilities under the Charter could hardly do less than lend their weight and wisdom to bringing this conflict to a close. They have agreed among themselves that they cannot impose a settlement but, if they should fail to seek one earnestly and urgently, they would be delinquent to their own national interests as well as to their Charter obligations.

An intelligent and sober realism also prompts the Administration's position toward negotiating a settlement in Vietnam. No one who knows Southeast Asia, as I do, could deny either the justice or the expediency of our assisting the people of that area up to a point—I emphasize, up to a point—to maintain their right to self-determination and independence. On the other hand, no one can, in my judgment, deny that there comes a point at which the scale of that assistance becomes disproportionate to what can be assimilated in the area, to what our national security requires, and to other more imperative demands on our resources both at home and abroad. The recognition of our other overriding needs prompts the assiduous effort of this Administration to negotiate at Paris as soon as possible a peace which will be both honorable and permanent.

The most significant current measure of statesmanship and realism will be the opening next month of U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the control and reduction of nuclear

weapons. This will be a long overdue attempt to deal realistically and farsightedly with the first paradox I mentioned earlier, the paradox of arms so numerous and so powerful that, if ever used, they would destroy civilization, and yet never numerous or powerful enough to provide real security for either side as long as the competition and the escalation continues. This senseless arms race is of course of profound concern not only to the United States and the Soviet Union—though both its burden and its threat weigh most heavily on them—but to the rest of the world which would not escape if nuclear war occurs and which, in its underdeveloped parts, bitterly resents the vast waste of resources when its own unmet human needs are so great.

So I come finally—in this analysis of true as contrasted with the short-term national interest of the United States—to the institution with which I have been intermittently associated ever since its establishment, at which I am now representing our government. I speak of course of the United Nations to whose high purposes and principles I am sure we are all dedicated. We must, however, not fail to apply to this great but still adolescent institution the same tests of realism which we have been applying to other factors in international affairs. To what extent can the United Nations—as presently constituted, or as it might realistically be expected to be reinforced over the next ten years—meet the urgent needs of modern society, meet specifically the decisive questions posed by the four paradoxes I mentioned.

We must be frank in admitting, first, that the authors of the Charter were themselves modest and realistic in proposing to set up not a world government or even a world federation but simply an organization of independent sovereign states with very limited powers of its own; and second, that this organization has not in practice been able to exercise, except on very rare occasions and with uncertain results, even some of the significant powers conferred upon it.

First, a word on the membership. In consequence of the division of several great nations following World War II, those nations have either been unrepresented or only partially represented in the United Nations. Their absence substantially reduces the capabilities of the organization. On the other hand, there has been an increasing trend to admit indiscriminately smaller and smaller states. While justified on the principle of self-determination, this practice is in fact contributing, first, to a growing fragmentation of the world just when its integration is most required, and, second, to a decline in the authority and representative character of the General Assembly. This anomalous situation, moreover, is increasingly reflected in the important councils of the United Nations as regional groups tend to choose their candidates for these bodies on the principle of simple rotation rather than on that of capacity to contribute to the Councils. This growing weakness cannot be cured until means are found to grant very small states a status which assures them of the protection and assistance of the United Nations without imposing on them obligations they are incapable of supporting.

A second field in which a significant element of unreality has crept into the activities of the United Nations is in the application of sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. It was anticipated that these would be invoked by the Security Council in cases where there was a clear breach of or threat to international peace and security and where milder action had failed. There has come to be in recent years great pressure to apply such sanctions to states or regimes in Southern Africa which deny the right of self-determination or equal political and human rights to the black majorities of their

population. These denials are of course in the highest degree reprehensible and fully deserving of condemnation by the world community. It is also true that over the long run they may come to constitute threats to international peace and security since the oppressed majorities may eventually refuse any longer to tolerate their oppression. It would seem to me, however, to be stretching the intent of the Charter to claim that the present situation, outrageous as it is, constitutes a present threat to international peace and security.

In any case the risk of proceeding from this premise to the application of economic sanctions is shown by the failure of such sanctions, so far at least, to achieve the desired results even against Rhodesia, a territory whose economy is relatively vulnerable. How much less likely would they be to achieve decisive results against neighboring and stronger countries, particularly when the overwhelming, the quasi-unanimous world opinion required to make such sanctions work is obviously absent. Let us not further weaken the authority and the potentiality of the UN by demanding of it prematurely more than it can realistically be expected to deliver. For the time being let each nation be the judge of what posture both moral imperatives and political farsightedness suggest it should assume toward Southern Africa.

Of course there are some who argue that the whole conception of the United Nations is unrealistic, that in a world of nationalisms only nation states can act effectively, and that the UN Charter is only pious rhetoric. I would most vigorously dispute their claim. On the contrary, I would argue that, in this interdependent world, the capacity of even the strongest individual nations to act effectively alone is growing ever narrower. There are coming to be more and more actions of the greatest consequence which, if they are to be done safely or even done at all, must be done by international agreement and international action.

I would argue that the most important of them is peacekeeping. Of course it is incumbent upon all nations to keep the peace. That has been a Christian principle for 2000 years but unfortunately it has not yet become an invariable Christian practice. But there is no nation today, no matter how powerful, capable of maintaining a *pax romana* or *pax britannica* around the world or even over any large part of it. If any should attempt to do so, it would incite both the rival ambitions of other great powers and the stubborn nationalism of a host of small ones. There can be, I suggest, no permanent peace imposed by any nation or group of nations. There can only some day we trust be a permanent peace imposed by a world community which has collectively decided that only by living in peace can it be sure of living at all.

In the meantime, the very epitome of realism, I would argue, is to strengthen in every possible way the international organizations we have, the United Nations and all its great family of specialized agencies, to enable them better to cope with the paradoxes of our times. Dag Hammarskjöld, U Thant and many others have long reminded us that the United Nations has only as much authority and resources as its members are willing to give it or lend it. Insofar as it has failed it has done so, not because of inherent flaws in its concept or constitution, but because its members have refused to let it have the necessary power and means to achieve the purposes they themselves have set for it. Their attitude has too often been that of the mother in the old nursery rhyme:

"May I go swimming, mother dear?"
 "Yes, My darling daughter,
 Hang your clothes on a hickory limb
 But don't go near the water."

Fortunately that attitude is changing. As to peacekeeping, the disastrous hangover of the Article 19 controversy, in which all of the participants including the United States behaved shortsightedly and foolishly, is wearing off. All of the great powers, including the Soviet Union, are showing significant interest in developing a more reliable UN peacekeeping capacity, first of all for use in supporting a Middle Eastern settlement but clearly also to be available to deal with other situations which the members of the Security Council might agree constitute serious threats to international peace. There does now seem to be a reasonable hope that, as the risks and burdens of unilateral response to such threats become more obvious, there may be an increasing acceptance of the necessity of an effective multilateral alternative such as the UN could provide.

It may be premature to show even this guarded optimism about the ability of the United Nations to cope in the near future with the other great paradoxes of our time, with the gap between living standards and prospects of developed and undeveloped countries, with the deteriorating quality of our environment as a consequence of inordinate population growth and promiscuous modernization, with the fragmentation of the human family into smaller and smaller national units. Certainly in this country, for example, aid to developing nations seems to have fallen into disrepute just at the moment when, if continued, it seems most likely to achieve some of its most dramatic successes.

On the other hand, it may be that multilateral aid, aid extended through the United Nations family, the World Bank, the UN Development Program and some of the specialized agencies, may be to some extent exempt from this general disrepute. Our Administration, for example, is requesting of the present Congress increased funds for some of these purposes. I very strongly hope that these requests will be approved and as time goes on may be further expanded. I urge that every one of you support these requests. I would consider it in the highest degree unrealistic to ignore or underestimate the grave danger to world stability, indeed to our own national interests, which would certainly flow from a frustration of the demand of the underprivileged two-thirds of the world's people that they share in benefits which modern science has so lavishly conferred on the privileged third. I would, moreover, consider it wise that a large part of what the rich nations do contribute to redress this balance be channelled through international agencies which are less likely to become involved in political complications than are national donors or lenders.

In the field of population control also the United Nations is at last substantially seized of the problem. A recent report of the U.S. United Nations Association by a distinguished panel, headed by John D. Rockefeller, recommended a very large increase in UN programs for this purpose and a large increase in U.S. contributions. I hope that both of these increases will take place. Similarly the UN is beginning, as we are here at home, to be deeply concerned with the pollution of our air, water and soil. These are scourges affecting all industrialized societies but more and more affecting to some degree societies of all kinds. The United Nations is planning an international conference on this subject in 1972 and the United States is preparing to do whatever it can to ensure that the conference has the maximum possible impact and benefit.

My friends of the United Church of Christ, ever since Moses, probably long before, man has been dreaming of the Promised Land. Even in Moses's time it was possible for small groups of men, inspired by faith, endowed with courage and enterprise, to make deserts bloom and to offer their children lives which were both rewarding and noble. To our gen-

eration, for the first time in history, is offered the possibility to offer to our children, and I mean all children of the family of man, lives of this quality, lives no less rich in adventure and challenge for being secure, healthy and harmonious, lives during which the age-old promise of "peace on earth and good will to men" might at last begin to be fulfilled.

Is this unrealistic? Of course it may be. Of course it will be if we insist on looking no farther than the ends of our hard noses, if we insist on setting no higher aim than national or racial or ideological advantage. In closing, I would argue again that, in light of the miracles, technological or divine, which now permit us to land on the moon, to blow up our planet or to feed the multitudes, the highest realism is to choose soberly among these miraculous new capabilities, to control and root out together those that could destroy us, to develop together to the 27th power those that can enrich and unite us.

A recent British Ambassador to Washington remarked that "man is a peculiarly constructed animal who can't read the handwriting on the wall until he has his back to it." Let that not be said of us. Let us read in time both the evil tidings and the good tidings written on the wall and, asking God's help, choose wisely and realistically between them.

WELDON OWENS, OF THE DALLAS TIMES HERALD, ENDORSES FOLK-LIFE FOUNDATION PROPOSAL

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, earlier this year, I introduced S. 1591, a bill to create an American Folklife Foundation. On June 25, 1969, Mr. Weldon Owens who authors a popular column, entitled "Cross Country," published in the Dallas Times Herald, endorsed my proposal. Mr. Owens is a knowledgeable commentator on events all across Texas, and I am highly flattered to have his support.

I ask unanimous consent that an extract from Mr. Owens' column of June 25, 1969, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the extract was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CROSS COUNTRY (By Weldon Owens)

Extra: A thousand thanks to Sen. Ralph Yarborough for his introduction of a bill to establish an American Folklife Foundation (Smithsonian Institution agency).

SOFTENING THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION GUIDELINES

Mr. MONDALE. For the past half year the school desegregation program has been forced to operate in a context of ambiguity, vacillation, and equivocation. Despite the existence of guidelines that clearly reflected the law and relevant court decisions, administration spokesmen continually suggested that these guidelines would be softened, and the deadlines relaxed.

I and a number of other Senators from both parties were relieved to hear Secretary Finch state on two occasions in late April and early May that the existing school desegregation guidelines were going to be enforced. Unfortunately last Thursday's statement of retreat by Secretary Finch and Attorney General Mitchell destroyed that promise. The deliberately confusing statement they issued on school desegregation—indicating

at least that some school districts would have more time to desegregate, and at worse that many school districts would have more time to desegregate—was unnecessary and tragic.

As editorial published in Monday's Washington Post summarized very well the unfortunate consequences that the administration's policy of vacillation and retreat, capped by the Finch-Mitchell statement, has had and will have on the effort to finally eliminate the dual school system some 15 years after the Supreme Court of the United States declared it unconstitutional. I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post,
July 7, 1969]

WATCH WHAT WE DO

There are a number of lessons the Nixon Administration could have learned from the Knowles affair, and chief among them is that short term buying and selling do not constitute good politics. For in the name of political expediency and at the altar of some presumed nitty-gritty, the President made an awful bargain and did himself more damage than he conceivably could have done by resisting outside pressure and taking a definable stand on the issue months ago.

We bring all this up because the Administration appears to have gone through the whole gruesome, self-damaging process over again, this time in relation to the Federal guidelines for school desegregation.

At the end of five months of interneckine manglings and counter manglings, and less than a week after Secretary Finch had asserted that no relaxation of the 1969-1970 deadlines for compliance was contemplated, the Administration has come forth publicly with an inconclusive, teeter-totter position: a lengthy statement beginning with a sanctimonious attack on nameless others who apparently don't share its rectitude in this matter ("This Administration does not intend to continue those old procedures that make satisfying headlines in some areas . . ."), and simultaneously announcing that the 1969-1970 deadlines will be relaxed and that they will hopefully also be enforced. The point is that the statement which, ironically, purports to "strip away the confusion which has too often characterized discussion of this issue," instead has compounded it. There is a little something for everyone; the range of possible interpretations is wide; the hard questions have yet to be faced or answered.

The guidelines are merely a system of standards and measures worked out by HEW, and derived in part from court rulings, whereby it is possible to judge a school district's compliance with the law and its consequent qualification (or lack of qualification) to receive Federal funds. Eighty-nine per cent of the districts in the South already are in compliance with the law. Nor is there any question that, taken together, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, with its provision for denying money to offending schools, and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which provided the first hefty sums that could be granted or denied, have functioned as an incentive to getting on with desegregation in the South. That is what the guidelines are all about. Only 11 per cent of the South's school districts remain in one stage or another of non-compliance, and a year and a half ago they were given until the fall of 1969 to comply, or until the fall of 1970 under certain special circumstances. It is the fate of these relatively few school districts that has had the Nixon Administration

in such a dither since it came to office—a dither, it might be added, which has not taken very shrewd account of how the act of rewarding the holdouts might affect the overwhelming majority of Southern districts which have already complied.

Two things may be said about the Administration's performance as an exercise in politics. One is that no matter how the practical issue finally is resolved, the Administration is bound to pay a heavy political price as a result of having opened the question in the first place. The other is that there was neither reason nor need to have done so. This, in other words, has been self-generated angst. The guidelines as formulated contained enough artful language to allow a reasonable degree of flexibility in their application. Again, the fall of 1969 deadline had built into it a dual advantage: it rested on the interpretation of court rulings, thus providing the Administration with a credible reason for deciding not to alter it; and it brought this thorny problem to its conclusion in the least political season of the next four years, a schedule designed to minimize the pain, cost, and temptation to posturing on the part of all concerned. Finally, momentum had been gathered; an aspect of inevitability had been perceived and even accepted by all but the most hard core Southern resisters; the end of the legal phase was in sight. Now, the Administration's ambiguity has undermined those deadlines, whether it intends ultimately to maintain them or not. It is odd that Mr. Nixon, who is so keenly attuned to the psychological necessities of the bargaining table in other connections, has permitted his Administration to give the Southern holdouts every reason to hope he is not serious about enforcing the guidelines and every incentive to resist HEW's warnings. A number of Southern school districts have already, in his term, withdrawn compliance plans they had reluctantly submitted to HEW. It is also odd that he did not perceive that by fiddling around with the guidelines, only partially hidden backstage, and letting this internal Administration drama play itself out in public, he was leading the Southern resistance to believe that he had it in his power to do them a favor—a situation that will naturally lead to bitter disappointment if he ultimately lets them down, and one that was wholly avoidable.

A few days before the guidelines statement was issued, Attorney General Mitchell made an extraordinary remark to a group of black protesters in his office, and one that is not without relevance to what has happened since. "You'd be better informed if instead of listening to what we say, you watch what we do," the Attorney General said.

Surely, it is not romantic to believe that what the Administration says and what it does should have a rather close connection—especially where the sending out of signals on this delicate and potentially explosive issue is concerned. This one can't be solved by equivocation, more delay, or on the cheap. That in our opinion is the best political advice Mr. Nixon's political advisers have given him—never mind the big legal and moral questions.

HEW AND DESEGREGATION

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, on June 20, Mr. Leon E. Panetta, Director, Office for Civil Rights, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, addressed the Southern Regional School Boards Association annual convention in Gatlinburg, Tenn. Mr. Panetta was formerly a legislative assistant to former Senator Kuchel of California, and assumed his present difficult position subsequent to the inauguration of President Nixon. In

my discussions with him, I have always found him to be a competent, cooperative, personable administrator.

In his remarks Mr. Panetta enunciates the philosophy of HEW on the school desegregation issue. As we all know, this is a highly controversial and volatile issue. I believe that Mr. Panetta's remarks would be most helpful to anyone seeking a better understanding of the position of HEW on this matter. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the text of his address be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS BY MR. LEON E. PANETTA, DIRECTOR,
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS

Please permit me first of all to thank you for your invitation to speak to the annual meeting of the Southern Region School Boards Association. Having worked in the United States Senate for three years, I know what it means when an elected official cries in anguish: "I need a lot more friends and a lot fewer enemies." I am sure many of you have often suffered the same anguish. Let me say that while the Office for Civil Rights is not going to win any popularity contests in this Government, I can assure you we relish every opportunity to win some understanding observers, if not more friends.

But moreover it gives me the chance to speak to each of you . . . to listen to each of you . . . to help reopen communication with you . . . to reason together with you in an area that is more infamous for its controversy, its emotion and its turmoil than its logic or reason.

I have had the honor of talking to many of you personally—in negotiating sessions, over the telephone, and at meetings similar to this. I understand your problems—how well I understand your problems—for I too must bear a responsibility for those problems when I enforce the law. It is a monumental responsibility for each of us. You must face your community and their pressures, and anxieties, and their desires, and yet, you must seek a sound and equal education for your children. I, as a member of the Executive Branch am sworn to uphold the law as written by the Congress and as interpreted by the courts and yet, I believe that I too must seek, in the end, a sound and equal education for the children of America. Over and over again I have reiterated that the position of my office is not "integration and to hell with education"—but, at the same time, I cannot and do not say: "education and to hell with the compliance with the law."

It is within this context that the various questions and problems surrounding desegregation arise. Such questions as: Are the two goals—education and compliance with the law—compatible and can they be achieved together or are they mutually exclusive? Does integration destroy the educational quality of a system? Is the law wrong? Is the *Brown* decision wrong and outdated? Is separate but equal education the best kind of education? What are the real difficulties involved in compliance with the law?

Let us, if we can today, survey some of the answers to these questions and try to understand a little better between us some of the real problems we share in this area.

First of all, what of the law itself—how clear is it? On the question of separate but equal education, the law as stated in the *Brown* decision of 1954 is quite clear: separate education is unequal education. On the issue of the dual school system the law is again quite clear: where a school has been established as an all black or an all white school under the dual school system, its racial identifiability must be disestablished. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is also quite

clear in its aim: when a school district continues to discriminate on the basis of race, color or national origin, Federal funds going to that district must be terminated. On the question of free choice, the Supreme Court has spoken unequivocally: where there is a more efficient or effective way of disestablishing the dual school system, freedom of choice must be held unacceptable. The court did not outlaw the use of free choice but it did say that such a method must be effectively disestablishing the racial identifiability of schools in that system.

What of your obligation under the law as members of a school board? The obligation of a school board is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work and promises realistically to work *now*. And so, whether you agree with the law or not, whether you believe the law has gone too fast or too far or not fast enough, I believe the obligations under the law with regards to school desegregation are quite clear: a local school system must go as far and as quickly as it is administratively feasible, regardless of the attitudes of the community, to disestablish the dual school system at the earliest practicable date.

How does this same law apply in the North where there is no dual school system and where alleged de facto situations prohibit enforcement under Title VI? The Office for Civil Rights proceeds on the basis that if we can establish deliberate acts of discrimination resulting in segregated education, we will proceed against such a school district under the law. For too long, Title VI enforcement has been regionalized to the South. Discrimination is not restricted to any geographic area—it extends across the Nation and must be dealt on a national basis. Today, for the first time, the Title VI staff is equally balanced North and South and we intend to keep it that way.

In general then, the law is clear on this issue, and this Administration must continue to enforce that law. There is a great deal of talk these days about law and order, but such law and order is not what each of us would like it to be but what the Congress and the courts have said it must be. It is not a citizens' prerogative to determine which laws he will obey and which he will ignore. If true law and order is to exist, all citizens must abide by the laws of this land regardless of personal likes or dislikes.

What are some of the other difficulties of compliance? Is it the impact on the educational quality in a community?

Recently, a district court judge rendered his decision with the following observation:

"In any community where one school is black and one predominantly white nobody needs to be told which is considered the good school. This is the case whether segregation is the result of an old housing pattern, the flight of white residents or the construction of a new school on a site beyond the walking distance of Negro children. The implication, and not infrequently, the assertion, that the Negro school is 'undesirable' disheartens both pupils and teachers and limits their expectations. Because it saps the pupil's motivation, his achievement level drops below his actual capacity and gives ostensible confirmation to the fear that he is somehow deficient. In other words, the school which should help him to resolve his self-doubts, strengthen his self-respect and encourage his aspirations actually does the reverse.

"The correlation between high expectations and excellent performance, low expectations and poor performance is so obvious and well documented that even without test scores to prove the point, it should be obvious that Negro children make better progress in desegregated schools where success is the rule than in all-Negro schools where it is usually the exception."

In addition, a recent appraisal of school desegregation by Dr. Meyer Weinberg concludes that the Negro pupil learns more in a

desegregated class, while the white student continues to learn at his accustomed rate. Negro aspirations, already high in terms of what he wants to achieve, increase in desegregated classes.

In another study, a large number of Negro 4th, 5th, and 6th graders in five desegregated schools were compared with a similar number in three all Negro schools. Academic achievement of the desegregated Negro students was considerably higher and the students desegregated at the 4th grade level fared even better than those who were in the 5th and 6th grade classes.

Other studies substantiate the fact that desegregation does serve to improve the overall quality of education for all students. Surely, there may be exceptions—where teachers are desperately deficient, where differences in educational quality have been excessive—but the fact remains that desegregation does advance equal educational opportunity for all.

Assume, then, that the law is clear and desegregation does not have a serious or adverse impact on educational quality, why is it so difficult to desegregate a school district? Why? Because it is not the law that is the greatest barrier nor is it the educational quality. You and I know that the most difficult barrier you face is the community reaction that must be encountered and responded to in seeking compliance with the law and equal educational opportunity. Call it feelings, however sincere or honest; call it prejudice; call it hate; call it fear; call it custom; call it history; call it whatever you will but in the end, it is the reason for white escapism . . . it is the reason whites will not attend formerly all black schools . . . it is the reason whites are creating a private school system that in many cases is grossly inferior to the public school system . . . it is the reason why black schools are being closed and predominantly white schools overcrowded . . . it is the reason blacks today are opposing one-way integration and seek to keep open good facilities that have been all black. And all of this is nothing new. We have all recognized its existence. We know the tension of all communities. We know that regardless of what a court may say or the Federal government require—attitudes of hate or fear or distrust cannot be changed overnight. And yet, I do not believe that we as a Nation can afford to be satisfied that this must always be the case—that our society must forever remain divided.

Only last week, a member of Congress told me: "Nothing is going to change . . . people are just not going to mix . . . just leave things the way they are." I left his office with a feeling of hopelessness. For what does this type of attitude mean—that we should be satisfied that blacks are being separated and get an inferior education? Does it mean that our society must continue not as one but as two? Does it mean that we should continue to plant the seeds of doubt and fear and anxiety in our young much as they were implanted in our hearts?

You and I, my friends, are at a crucial time in our history. Our greatest hope lies in giving to our children a hope and trust in all mankind—regardless of his color. If we continue to separate races, we will continue to divide a Nation—it is as simple as that. The America of tomorrow cannot afford to be burdened by the fears and prejudices of today. Nor can it afford to be frightened by the screams of either extreme, right or left. But that process can only begin in the open and free minds of our young.

You, the leaders of your various communities, face the awesome responsibility of making the hope for one America become a reality. It is not an easy task and yet, much to their credit, over 89% of the school districts in the South have taken the step and are today in compliance with the law. I only hope that as we progress to enforce the law

in the North, school boards and superintendents will possess a small part of the courage and strength that thousands of their southern brethren have shown. For those districts that remain, facing some of the most difficult districts to desegregate, the challenge will be great. For many of you, the only way out in achieving compliance with the law and yet facing your community will be to place the blame on HEW or the Justice Department. I understand this process and am prepared to face such animosity in the future. But there are other more positive steps that can be taken—the formation of biracial committees to advise the board and assist in the transition, additional courses to better prepare teachers for desegregation, increased remedial education to help repair in children the deep scars of discrimination, and most of all the courage and strength of the school board to continue to do what is right.

We in the Federal government also have our job to do in this task. I do not believe that the Federal government should merely tell a school district that it is in non-compliance and then leave it up to them to find the difficult answers. This is a Federal law that is being enforced—it is equally a Federal responsibility to provide whatever assistance, technical and financial, may be required. For example, recent court decisions have for the first time recognized the importance of working with HEW in developing effective desegregation plans. Beyond this, it is necessary not only to provide technical and financial assistance but improved and better coordinated enforcement as well. This means plugging the obvious gaps that still remain and that make it so difficult for school districts to abide by the law. It is essential that the Government move against court order districts that are ignoring their orders. It is essential that we move against terminated districts that remain in violation of the law and yet are not receiving any Federal assistance. It is essential that we move against majority Negro districts that have for so long been ignored in the enforcement process. These are all efforts that can smooth the way to compliance with the law. In these ways, I believe the Federal government can fulfill its responsibility to help you fulfill yours.

Let no one minimize the challenge we face. But we must face it together; we must work together; and we must reason together. In the end, we can and we will give life to the words of the President in his inaugural address:

"To go forward at all is to go forward together. This means black and white together, as one nation, not two. The laws have caught up with our conscience. What remains is to give life to what is in the law: to insure at last that as all are born equal in dignity before God, all are born equal in dignity before men."

POSSIBILITIES FOR ALASKA COMMUNICATION

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, on June 16, 1969, I had the honor to inform the Senate of some monumental possibilities for Alaska communications. During the weeks since then, much has happened to increase our optimism that one of the world's last communications backwaters—Alaska—will receive prompt attention.

When I last spoke on this subject I had just requested the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to transmit a live telecast of the Apollo 11 moon mission to Alaska. No live television has ever been transmitted into Alaska from outside and I felt that it would be altogether fitting if the first such telecast was one of such historic consequence.

I am privileged to report that my efforts have been successful and that there will be live reception of the Apollo 11 flight in Alaska.

On July 4, 1969, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird informed me of his decision to have the Defense Department participate and cooperate. I am personally grateful for his decision and the support of the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. This weekend, a mobile satellite receiver station will be in Anchorage.

I want to say also that NASA and numerous private companies lent invaluable assistance to this effort. It will represent the first use of the Defense Department's TACSAT satellite in this fashion and thereby will serve worthwhile experimental purposes in addition to affording Alaskans the same opportunity that other Americans will have to witness the historic Apollo 11 mission.

I only regret that but one portable ground station was available for use, and other Alaskans located outside Anchorage will not be in the general reception area.

This live telecast reinforces my belief that the technological elements exist to bring communications to rural Alaska communities—communities which may not otherwise see television nor enjoy adequate communications for a decade or more unless action is taken now.

On July 2, 1969, I asked the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to consider making available for Alaska the ATS-1 satellite for a period of 10 months, starting as soon as possible after September 1. This application would bring educational, medical, vocational, rehabilitation, and cultural television to a number of rural Alaska communities. A large portion of Alaska's population lives in cities and villages without reliable communications with the outside world. Children go to school in this isolation confronted with language problems and the types of difficulties encountered in one-room schoolhouses shared by children of many grade levels. In other parts of the world technology is permitting children in similar conditions to have the benefit of educational television and to help span a generation of contact with Western culture. And our Nation is rightly providing the leadership in that effort. Our problem in Alaska is identical, and so what I am asking is the use of developed technology and available equipment for use in a modest experiment to demonstrate the use of educational television in the classroom.

Small communities could be linked with a major city for this experimental period to help Alaskan authorities plan for a permanent satellite communications link. This project is unique in that it would be the first time that public institutions, now without generalized communications, can learn and plan for the future State infrastructure able to cope with the most modern of communications.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a summary of a pilot program for use of satellite communications for Alaska; briefly describ-

ing the experimental organization involved in education, in community planning, in network organization, in program management, in facilities maintenance, and in all the organizational procedures necessary to harness the satellite and the specialized ground equipment for the public good.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A SUMMARY OF THE ALASKA PILOT PROGRAM FOR EDUCATIONAL AND PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS BY SATELLITE

(By U.S. Senator MIKE GRAVEL)

INTRODUCTION

On June 16, 1969, Senator Gravel issued a statement in the United States Senate in which he described the urgent need for generalized communications in Alaska. This document describes how an experimental project, six to nine months in duration, would be of great benefit to Alaska in the State's organizational planning for a permanent system.

It is important to note the uniqueness and experimental nature of the Pilot Program. Alaska is the only American territory where generalized communications throughout is feasible in the near future only by use of satellite communications. Alaska has, therefore, no outside source of experience to turn to in order to plan the terrestrial infrastructure to cope with such a unique modern system.

THE REQUIREMENT OF THE PILOT PROGRAM

To enable Alaskan authorities to plan an effective management organization for eventual permanent satellite communications throughout the State.

THE NEED

To bring data, voice, broadcast and television communications to all areas of the State in the near future.

To bring to rural communities and formative institutions their only access to authorized facilities such as the National Network for Biomedical Communications and the Networks for Knowledge.

To bring to the only Americans now without such facilities the modern educational, vocational, public health and cultural programs now available in the United States.

To bring to Alaska all the cultural and social benefits from public broadcasting.

TIMETABLE

September, 1969 to July, 1970. Due to organizational costs and limited hardware availability, two rural communities at a time could participate for four or five months, and a second pair of communities for the remaining period, or any suitable combination of one principal location, and three rural extensions.

AUTHORITY

The appropriate State authorities will be the sole judges of the content of all programming in the field of educational and vocational training.

The State will be assisted by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting to judge the selection and transmission of cultural programming.

TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT

Competent industrial organizations will be retained to operate the receiver installations, to maintain local distribution from the reception station to school rooms and community or village centers, and to transmit the programming authorized by the State.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration will make available ATS-1 (an experimental communications satellite located in synchronous orbit south of the Bay of Alaska) and insure the controls and technical availability, to the limits of feasibility,

of ATS-1 for the Pilot Program. Optionally, perhaps a SYNGOM satellite could be assigned for utilization by the State of Alaska with the operational support of NASA.

FUNDING

The unique nature of the utilization experiment is such that NASA will make available free-of-charge those operating expenses not unique to this pilot program. This does not preclude independent arrangements by NASA for other use of ATS-1 for other time segments.

Funding is available to assist Alaskan communities through existing Federal Public Laws and from Foundations. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting has indicated its full cooperation and the assistance of its good offices to the State of Alaska.

Local funding and resources will also be available in Alaska.

CLASSROOM AIDS AND COMMUNITY VIEWING

The important impact on classroom effectiveness cannot be measured. New equipment, such as electronic blackboards now successfully tested, might be used. Sufficient supplies of ETV programs are available for selection by the Alaska educational authorities. Public Broadcasting programs of varied adult interests are also available for selection.

BACKGROUND

The pilot project is timely since the satellite facilities may be available on a permanent basis in a few years. The project will enable the State to organize itself appropriately.

The Canadian authorities have indicated their willingness to make capacity available to Alaska in a manner consistent with the agreement of the United States and the eventual Intelsat Agreement.

The Federal Communications Commission and the Communications Satellite Corporation are expected to clarify, respectively, policy and responsiveness, as concerns domestic services to meet unique needs.

The three large network broadcasters have suggested an experiment for extending commercial public service telecasts on a live basis to Alaska where such television distribution of nationally broadcast programs are now delayed. It is possible to share the use of one of the ground stations for this pilot program should the three networks successfully negotiate their independent proposal.

RESIDUAL BENEFITS

The pilot program will enable all competent authorities to establish clear cost estimates for a permanent communications program. Based on estimates, formulated from experience in end-costing large programs of similar nature, the estimated annual cost per person over the first twenty years of generalized communications would be one dollar per month, predicated on an annual population growth of five percent.

ANOTHER NEUROLOGICAL DISEASE RESPONDS TO TREATMENT BY L-DOPA

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I want to call attention to an article in the Washington Post on Saturday, July 5, 1969, which discusses the use of L-Dopa at Washington's Children's Hospital to treat dystonia musculorum deformans, a disease which causes twisting and crippling of the limbs. The first use of the drug for dystonia was accomplished by Dr. Mary Coleman, a research neurologist at Children's Hospital. The results were remarkable.

A first use of the compound L-Dopa was at the Atomic Energy Commission's Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton, N.Y., where Drs. George C. Cotzias, Paul S. Papavasiliou, and Rosemary

Gellene used it in treating patients suffering from Parkinson's disease. They have achieved some remarkable results by means of long-term treatment. Slowly increasing oral doses of L-Dopa has resulted in at least partial improvement of some manifestations in a series of 28 patients. These patients ranged in age from 46 to 72 years and had been afflicted with Parkinson's disease for from 1 to 30 years. Improvement in the performance of these patients was graded as modest in four cases, moderate in four, marked in 10, and dramatic in 10.

The greatest result of the work of Dr. Cotzias and his group was the clear demonstration that L-Dopa can effectively reverse most of the disabling symptoms of Parkinson's disease and that L-Dopa can be given over a long period at high dosage levels, if the increase is made slowly. This same long-time careful increase in dose tends to ameliorate side effects.

The National Institute of Neurological Disease and Blindness has estimated that the cost for the care of victims of Parkinson's disease is about \$400 million annually in the United States, and that there are between 500,000 and 1,500,000 affected with the disease.

If the use of L-Dopa caused a sufficient improvement in only half the patients so that they were self-sufficient, the direct financial benefit would be roughly \$200 million per year. This figure does not include any estimate of the earnings capacity of those people who have returned to work, as have a doctor and an attorney.

I want to commend Dr. Cotzias and his group for the marvelous contribution they are making to the public health and welfare, and compliment the AEC for supporting their work. I would like to commend Dr. Coleman and her coworker, Dr. Ann Barnet, for their efforts in showing that treatment by L-Dopa appears to conquer another malady, dystonia, which, like Parkinson's disease, gets progressively worse with time.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Washington Post article concerning Dr. Coleman's work be included at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMEDY SEEN FOR LIMB DISEASE: NEW DRUG, L-DOPA, IS BEING TRIED AT CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL

(By Victor Cohn)

A disease that twists its victims' limbs and sometimes makes them writhe uncontrollably from head to foot appears to be responding to the powerful drug L-dopa.

L-dopa has been successfully used in the past two years in thousands of cases of Parkinson's disease—shaking palsy.

Because of this, one prominent doctor recently called it "the most important contribution to treatment of a neurologic disease in the past 50 years."

Now seven patients—three of them at Children's Hospital here—have responded dramatically to treatment of the grotesquely crippling dystonia musculorum deformans, to use the disease's full name.

A girl, 8, here is standing normally. Before treatment, she could stand only with support, leaning on the top of one twisted foot.

A man, 30, was able to walk to the platform to get his college degree this month, though he still must use a wheelchair most of the time.

A girl, 10, was rescued from a point near death after a bout of chronic vomiting that caused her to lose a third of her weight.

L-dopa was first used in dystonia by Dr. Mary Coleman, associate director of Children's Hospital's Clinical Research Center.

The 10-year-old was the first patient, starting last February. She had been treated at another hospital without any benefit.

Her neck was twisted slightly—the result of her dystonia—but her really serious symptoms were gastrointestinal disease, including vomiting, and lasting insomnia.

Dr. Coleman—a research neurologist—tested her brain chemistry, and found she was low in production of the powerful brain and nerve chemical, serotonin. The doctor tried a drug called 5-HTP, which should induce serotonin production.

In this case it did not, and, says Dr. Coleman, "I decided some other chemical in balance with serotonin might be even lower. I postulated it might be her catecholamines—serotonin, and the catecholamines control a part of the brain."

L-dopa initiates catecholamine production. And L-dopa has worked so far in this case and two others treated at this hospital, both with far more serious muscular expressions of dystonia.

"We can only say 'so far,'" Dr. Coleman adds. "It will be a year from now before we can even begin to say whether or not this is a lasting treatment, without any serious side-effects."

In any case, it is the most dramatic chemical attack yet made on this serious genetic disorder. Brain surgery sometimes helps it, but the good effects tend to disappear after a few years.

Dr. Coleman and Dr. Ann Barnett of Children's Hospital made a report on their work to the American Neurological Association in Los Angeles.

Their research spurred Dr. George C. Cotzias of Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island to try L-dopa in dystonia musculorum deformans.

He has effectively treated two more patients. Another two have been treated in Montreal by Dr. Andre Barbeau.

Cotzias is the doctor who first used L-dopa in Parkinson's disease. It relieves symptoms profoundly in many Parkinsonism patients, but does cause undesirable side effects in some.

Several drug firms are now pressing the Food and Drug Administration for general release of the drug for this ailment.

The National Institute of Neurologic Diseases and Stroke and a group of collaborating doctors are evaluating it for FDA.

FROM VIETNAM

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, all of us hear a great deal about campus unrest and the militant attitude of some of the young people of our country.

But there is another side to young America. There is a group of young people who are serving their country in the military. These young men exhibit the highest kind of loyalty, patriotism, and dedication. They are willing to let their actions speak for them and are perhaps more typical of our youth than those who are causing violence on college campuses. As an example, a Sheridan, Wyo., man has recently written his family:

To get out and see and be with the men and fight along side of them makes me proud to be an American and proud of my men.

I think, Mr. President, this clearly tells what this unheard segment of our young people is really like and I commend their courage and patriotic dedication. I would like to share a few paragraphs of a letter

from the Sheridan soldier who has been in Vietnam because it points up this dedication to duty:

Last week was very busy with the increased enemy activity. We had a bad week losing three men and about twenty-five wounded. Things have pretty well calmed down right now except in the Dakto Ben Het area next to the border. I'll probably go over there in the next day or two. I've been getting out a lot. Usually two or three times a week. It's the only way you keep ahead of the situation and find out what your batteries are doing.

Of course I learned a lot in Nha Trang but up here where all the action is taking place, really makes one feel he is making a contribution to the war effort. To get out and see and be with the men and fight along side of them makes me proud to be an American and proud of my men. We have some of the bravest men I've ever seen who face death daily but just won't stop when the chips are down.

I've seen them run from the safety of their bunkers during attacks to get to their "dusters" and "quads", get knocked down by incoming mortar rounds, get back up and keep going. Our men would rather be out fighting than back in the safety of base camp.

Mr. President, this kind of activity and this kind of dedication provides a truer picture of our dedicated young citizens. I am proud of them.

TRIBUTE TO DR. EDWARD C. CRAFTS

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, one of the great leaders of the progress in the field of Government conservation programs in the past several years has been Dr. Edward C. Crafts, who with the advent of the new administration stepped down as Director of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation in the Department of the Interior.

He was the Bureau's first Director, and how well he performed in his 7 years in that position is eloquently described in the July issue of American Forests, the magazine devoted to forests, soil, water, wildlife, and outdoor recreation, and published by the American Forestry Association.

Dr. Crafts, always "Ed" to his legion of friends and admirers, has been named special articles editor for the magazine.

Mr. President, I request unanimous consent that this article, which is a well-earned tribute to a great conservationist, appear in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CRAFTS NAMED SPECIAL ARTICLES EDITOR

Dr. Edward C. Crafts, former Director of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, has always had a special affinity for The American Forestry Association and AMERICAN FORESTS Magazine.

While he was a sophomore at Dartmouth College a special issue of AMERICAN FORESTS in July, 1930, on the 25th Anniversary of the U.S. Forest Service convinced him that forestry was for him. Later he graduated *summa cum laude* from the University of Michigan School of Forestry. He also received his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Michigan.

Thus, in 1932, began a 37-year career as a federal career forester. For 11 years, starting in 1951, he was Assistant Chief in charge of program planning, legislation and congressional relations for the Forest Service. He was

Director and driving force in the special Forest Service Task Force that compiled the Timber Resources Review. On the Hill, he had a major hand in enactment of the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield law, the Multiple Use Mining Act of 1955, and other key Forest Service legislation.

In 1962 Dr. Crafts struck out in a new direction by pioneering in the burgeoning outdoor recreation arena when he became Director of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation in the Department of the Interior. He built the new Bureau from scratch and today the Bureau coordinates programs of 60 federal agencies and is cooperating with all 50 states in developing comprehensive plans for outdoor recreation. It also administers the \$200 million a year Land and Water Conservation Fund. In 1968 the Bureau was instrumental in securing passage of acts creating a Redwoods National Park, a North Cascades National Park, a National System of Trails, and a National Wild and Scenic Rivers System.

Last year he was awarded the \$10,000 Rockefeller Public Service Award by Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. In 1968 he also was awarded an honorary Doctor of Science degree from the University of Michigan. This year he was recipient of *Holiday* magazine's commendation for a more Beautiful America. Dr. Crafts is the only person to receive Distinguished Service Awards from both the Departments of Agriculture and Interior.

When Dr. Crafts stepped down as Director of BOR early this year with the advent of Secretary Hickel, American Forests decided that Dr. Crafts' great ability and experience should not be permitted to lie fallow. Accordingly, the magazine invited him to join the staff as a special articles editor and he accepted. Dr. Crafts will do a series of carefully selected judgment articles on subjects of current concern. Some of these will include:

Whither BOR?—The first director of a new federal bureau invariably develops a father image for members of that bureau and Dr. Crafts is no exception. In this article Dr. Crafts will touch on the need to maintain a high degree of professionalism, the avoidance of political boondoggles on the part of an agency that allocates more than \$200 million a year to the respective states. Even more specifically he will elaborate on the proposed nationwide Outdoor Recreation Plan yet to surface and already long overdue, and other needed conservation and recreation measures.

The Saga of a Law—Dr. Crafts kept voluminous notes on the story behind the scenes of the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act. From this wealth of experience and fact he will develop a story not alone on the background and intent of this act and its legislative history, but on new trends and directions in administering it, including the pressure to increase the cut on federal timberlands and the growing conflict of recreation versus timber.

The Respective Roles of the National Parks and National Forests in Recreation—No one is better equipped than Dr. Crafts to write about the delicate and sometimes explosive relationships between two great government bureaus. What is the rightful role of each in our recreation pattern and how can we achieve the best results? What land swaps are needed and how can the basic conflict in the National Park Act be resolved? How much of the Parks should be wilderness? Dr. Crafts will offer his judgment.

Islands in Time—The public was greatly intrigued several years ago when the Johnson Administration proposed a survey of millions of islands over 10 acres in size off the coast of the United States and in the major lakes and rivers. This survey was conducted in Dr. Crafts' regime. We now have a Wilderness System, a Scenic Rivers Sys-

tem, a National Trails System, as well as National Systems of Parks and Forests. Next on the list may be a National Island System. Few are closer to this subject than Dr. Crafts and his observations and thinking on the subject will be read with vast interest.

TO ACHIEVE CLEAN WATER

Mr. HANSEN, Mr. President, Commissioner of the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration David D. Dominick recently provided a concise approach to what needs to be done by all sectors of government to achieve clean water.

Commissioner Dominick's remarks were before the Federal Water Quality Association and his statements are important as we work to upgrade the quality of our environment. Mr. Dominick, from Cody, Wyo., served as my legislative assistant for over 2 years before joining the Nixon administration as FWPCA Commissioner in March. He is doing an outstanding job and we are proud of his stewardship of this office.

It is an important crusade and one that will require the best efforts of all of us. Because I think his remarks have a great deal of merit, I commend them to the attention of my colleagues and ask unanimous consent that his speech be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS OF DAVID D. DOMINICK, COMMISSIONER, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, BEFORE THE FEDERAL WATER QUALITY ASSOCIATION

I want to discuss with you today some of the hopes and thinking of the new clean water team leadership in Washington.

Our water resources have been misused and abused by careless and greedy segments of our society as have the other elements of our natural environment.

Fortunately, America has become alert to, and alarmed by, the shocking deterioration of environmental quality. Evidence of environmental decay affronts the American people at every turn. They smell it, taste it, see it.

Consequently, the call for effective environmental management is becoming insistent.

For the most part, we have come to this realization:

Man is a thinking, dominating animal. But man, nonetheless, is dependent entirely on the ecological balance of his planet to sustain him.

The harm has been done because man has fancied the role of master, and refused to recognize that he is a part of a total ecosystem.

Secretary of the Interior Hickel has said:

"Our national production machinery is humming, but at what price? Oil from offshore pollutes beautiful beaches and endangers marine life; air pollution injures health; pollution from human and industrial waste threatens our major streams; poisonous pesticides and fertilizers contaminate our food; one of the Great Lakes is considered fatally ill.

"We cannot turn back the clock. Technology is here to stay. The problem is that we have carelessly assumed that nature can absorb unlimited punishment. Now we are paying the bill."

The administration is totally committed to the improvement and maintenance of environmental quality. President Nixon has said:

"If we are to maintain our current high standard of life, we must protect our environment, we must conserve our natural resources, we must see that the true wealth of this nation is administered in an economical and sensible fashion . . .

"In order to maintain a high quality for our environment and conserve natural resources, the Federal Government must provide strong leadership to coordinate an integrated program which will include all levels of government, private industry, and individuals throughout the country.

As you know, the President is planning to establish an Environmental Quality Council to give leadership and direction to Federal efforts to create a healthy environment. The Council would comprise the President and the Vice President, and the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health, Education, and Welfare, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, and Transportation. The effective management of the natural environment will require wisdom, and imagination, and ideas, and discipline, and money. But above all it will require action.

I'm talking about action that will keep us on the move to prevent problems rather than react to them.

With respect to water pollution, it seems to me that too much time and energy has been consumed in the past tussling with problems which have been permitted to assume large and sometimes fearful proportions. You know the kind of problems I'm referring to—oil spills and blowouts, floods, fish kills, pesticide poisoning, beach closings, the near destruction of Lake Erie, the threat to Lake Michigan, and so on.

Our pollution control experiences with Lake Erie and Lake Michigan have underlined the necessity and merit of taking action to prevent pollution problems from developing or tackling them before they become serious or even unmanageable.

The House Public Works Committee in its report of H.R. 4148, the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1969, said:

"Repeatedly, increasing scientific and technical expertise have brought to the fore aspects of the broad problem of which we were not aware, or with which we had dealt inadequately in the past. Events of catastrophic proportions have confronted us with dramatic evidence of the need for new or better preventive or control laws and procedures."

We certainly do not claim to have immediate answers for all the problems that confront the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration. But I want to assure you as earnestly as I can that we will not be faulted for lassitude, for a lack of desire, energy or action.

We will make the good fight in the knowledge, as some once said, that no one conquers who doesn't fight.

Secretary Hickel has said:

" . . . moderation in defense of clean water, clean air, good parks and bountiful wildlife is not necessarily a virtue. One has to be zealous about it, attack the problems as if it were war. Because it is. The potential extinct species are not certain animals and birds, but people—you and me."

We don't intend to be losers at FWPCA. We will act.

The basis for action is ideas—ideas which inspire and propel and provide purpose and goals.

I am sure that you here today and other associates and friends of the Federal Water Quality Association have some ideas that would help us. I solicit ideas from you and the Association and from any other group or citizen concerned about the future of our water resources.

I'll go further. I'll solicit your dreams because, as has been said, dreams are the stuff of which progress is made.

Dreams generate ideas and ideas breed action.

Carl Sandburg wrote:

"The republic is a dream. Nothing happens unless first a dream."

We need more than facts, more than tools and money, to win the war against dirty water. We need dreams full of hope and pride and vision.

One of the first tasks of the new Federal water team leadership has been to conduct a sweeping review of Federal water quality programs and the administration of them. This review is continuing.

At the same time we are proceeding to implement and utilize present laws while determining the need, if any, of new legislation to step-up the effectiveness of the national clean water program.

Certainly, we must be ready as well to assist the States in more ways to develop programs which will have as their main purpose the prevention of water pollution, the prevention of those problems to which I alluded earlier.

Secretary Hickel told the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution:

"We must establish the proper guidelines so that each entity will know its responsibilities. Industry must know what is expected of it, as must the municipalities, the States and the regional and interstate groups. We must develop the technical capability that is needed. We must have training programs. There is much that needs to be done."

And I heartily concur with this Congressional testimony by Mr. Hickel:

"I am convinced that with proper administration, adequate financing, and good tough enforcement of the objectives (of the Water Quality Act of 1965) as outlined by Congress can be attained. Our Federal program requires a cooperative effort by local, State, and National Governments, coupled with the support of private industry and the general public. It is only when all these elements of society work together that we can realize progress in cleaning up the polluted waters and prevent further pollution."

Now, of course, there is a good deal of concern expressed about the shortage of Federal funds to assist the clean water program—a shortage brought on by budgetary constraints which are affecting a number of domestic programs.

In this instance at least, I do not necessarily believe with George Bernard Shaw that the "lack of money is the root of all evil."

I think in this instance that *action* can be at least a partial substitute for money.

If the clean water teams at all levels of government will adopt and implement the slogan "less talk and more action" we will get rid of the dirty water. We won't however, if we spend all our time whimpering about the lack of money.

The clean water teams need your help and counsel if they are to put an action program in motion. They need the help of organizations like the Federal Water Quality Association and other groups of citizens concerned with the state of our water resources.

And you and other groups must keep after government to do the job.

Goad us, harry us, stay on our backs. Do this and, believe me, we'll get the job done.

STARVATION IN BIAFRA

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, for 3 years now the ugly Nigerian-Biafran civil war has dragged ruthlessly on and nearly 2 million Biafran civilians have become casualties of disease and starvation. It is understandable that the Biafran Government believes that its people are the victims of a devious plan for genocide or the systematic extermination of all Biafrans.

Genocide is a frightening word that evokes memories of horrible periods of the world's history when one group or government attempted the extermination of another group. Whether the starvation and death of innocent Biafran civilians caught in the middle of a war can be defined as a kind of genocide, is unimportant. What is important is that hundreds of thousands of Biafrans have died and will continue to die.

Until late in 1968, much of the world seemed unaware of the thousands of civilians who were dying as war raged around them on the west coast of Africa. It was at that time that the shocking report that 10,000 Biafrans were dying each day became known, and a world conscience was aroused. A private relief effort began under the combined efforts of the World Council of Churches, Caritas Internationalis, and the International Red Cross. For several months that program survived—often at the cost of lives and at great personal loss. Biafrans continued to die of starvation and disease during that period, but not by such vast numbers as they had previously.

Unfortunately, the lifesaving assistance could not continue. Nigerian nationalists, fearing that arms were being smuggled in with the food and medicine, put an end to the minimal assistance by an intensified effective air blockade. Negotiations also failed on a plan to permit food and medical supplies to be brought in over land or water.

Trying to head off the threat of five million Biafrans dying the agonizingly slow deaths of starvation and disease, the International Red Cross has reached an agreement with the Nigerians to permit a resumption of food and medical flights that will be inspected by neutral observers to insure that guns are not going to the Biafrans. The concern now is that General Ojukwu, the Biafran leader, will refuse the flights. In the past he has refused to accept food that comes out of inspection stations in Nigeria because he fears poisoning of his people.

While the issue remains unresolved, the starving Biafrans continue to die. Last week, Dr. Jean Mayer, the President's Special Consultant on Hunger was quoted in the Washington Post as making the almost unbelievable prediction that unless international relief can continue that "within the next 3 weeks, 2 million more people will die of starvation." At that rate the entire population of the secessionist government will soon be eliminated.

The mass deaths of those Biafran civilians may not be genocide in the strictest definition of the word. It may simply be as Chief Awolowo, the ranking civilian in Nigeria, said so callously that "all is fair in war, and starvation is one of the weapons of war."

Starvation, genocide, or an effective weapon of war—all are meaningless words. People are dying. Innocent people caught in the middle of a civil war. The U.S. Government should be demanding that these people be saved and we should make it a humanitarian national priority. Time is rapidly diminishing for the people of Biafra.

The story of the threat of starvation

in Biafra is an issue that no rational person can ignore. In recent days the stories have been reported in the press and editorials have called for action in such responsible newspapers as the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Christian Science Monitor.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, to have these editorials and news stories printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, July 2, 1969]

STARVATION THE WEAPON

Nigeria's hardliners have won an important political debate in Lagos and the immediate result is likely to be the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocents, mostly children, in the blockaded Biafran enclave. Mass starvation is a certainty if the relief airlifts, mounted by the International Committee of the Red Cross and Joint Church Aid, remain in suspension.

Lagos says it will continue to permit relief shipments into Biafra, but it knows full well that the stringent conditions it has imposed would block effective assistance indefinitely. It would be more honest to say what Chief Awolowo, the ranking civilian in the Federal Government, said last week: "All is fair in war, and starvation is one of the weapons of war."

As with so many tragedies in the Nigerian conflict, however, over-all blame cannot be assigned exclusively to one side. For months, the Federal Government offered immunity for daylight airlifts; but Biafra, citing security reasons, refused them. Lagos also accepted the proposal of some American members of Congress early this year for reactivating the Oblagu airstrip for round-the-clock flights, and trucking relief supplies a few miles into Biafra; General Ojukwu again refused.

The Biafran regime, time and again, has been willing to exploit starvation in order to advance its political ends. Lagos resented the fact that some relief agency workers, supposedly concerned only with humanitarian efforts, became political propagandists for the Biafran cause.

But none of this justified Nigeria in throwing out Dr. Auguste Lindt, the fairminded and incredibly patient Swiss coordinator for the International Red Cross, or in shooting down a Swedish Red Cross relief plane June 6. These were clearly blind, panicky reactions by Lagos to the unexpected Biafran bombing raids by the highly publicized "mini-air force" of the Swedish Count, Carl Gustav von Rosen.

As a sovereign nation recognized by all but a handful of countries, Nigeria has a legal right to enforce a blockade in order to put down what it regards as a simple rebellion. But this is no longer primarily a matter of international law; and whatever Chief Awolowo may believe, world opinion will no longer accept the starvation of millions of innocent people.

The United States, which has supplied \$70 million in relief supplies to both sides, should make this point forcefully to Lagos. It will help if the friends of Biafra, recognizing General Ojukwu's share in the responsibility for this appalling situation, will press equally hard for a more reasonable attitude by his regime in the interest of saving lives.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, July 2, 1969]

BIAFRA MILLIONS SEEN DYING IN FOOD CUTOFF

(By Spencer Rich)

The President's Special Consultant on Hunger said yesterday that 2 million Biafrans will die of starvation within the next three

weeks if international relief for the hungry is cut off.

Dr. Jean Mayer, the Harvard professor and internationally known nutritionalist who was chosen by President Nixon to organize the White House Conference on Food, Nutrition and Health, said there were nearly 3 million persons dependent on international food shipments, and most of these "already were hanging on a slender thread." A reduction of food now could send millions to their deaths, Mayer said.

Mayer, who went to Biafra on a study mission last February, made his comments in the wake of Monday's announcement by Nigeria that it was taking over from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) the function of coordinating food relief to the hungry in Nigerian-held areas of the civil war-torn country.

At the same time, Nigeria announced that it would allow food shipments into landlocked Biafra only if first cleared by Nigerian police or soldiers, and not when flown directly into Biafra from abroad.

Rescue agencies fear that the new regulations will be used to choke off food to Biafra. Chief Awolowo of Nigeria, highest civilian in the federal administration, said recently that starvation was a legitimate means of making war.

Mayer's sentiments were echoed yesterday by Marcel Naville, the new president of the ICRC, who predicted in Geneva, Switzerland, according to press reports, that "hundreds of thousands of children" will starve in the next few days alone unless international food relief to Biafra was allowed to continue.

Naville, like Mayer, said millions of persons could die of starvation.

In Washington, State Department spokesman said the U.S. was worried that relief operations might be hampered by the new Nigerian policy.

Dr. Mayer, referring to the Biafra situation, said, "We're really seeing the death of a nation right now." He said his study mission had concluded that 1.5 million persons had already died as a result of food shortages and "within the next three weeks, 2 million more people will die of starvation" unless international relief can be continued.

"There are three million people in refugee camps completely dependent on outside food supplies," he said. "So unless they get the food they'll die."

A Nigerian spokesman said here yesterday that pending the takeover of relief coordination functions by a Nigerian government commission—which would be very soon and was already beginning—the ICRC would continue in that role.

He said direct night flights of food into Biafra from abroad would continue to be banned, and day flights allowed only if they first stopped at Lagos or other Nigerian areas to be sure cargoes did not include war materials.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, June 28, 1969]

BIAFRA FAMINE LOOMS WITHOUT AIRLIFT (By David Winder)

LONDON.—Unless supply airlifts are immediately resumed, conditions in Biafra could return to those critical days of July and August, 1968, when massive starvation threatened.

Food supplies in Biafra are reportedly almost exhausted since the suspension of night relief flights by the International Red Cross (IRC) on June 6 and Joint Church Aid on June 15.

Joint Church Aid says some 3 million people face starvation if the flow of relief supplies is not resumed at an increased level.

[Reuters reports that, according to Joint Church Aid operations headquarters in Copenhagen, the organization has flown 26 tons of food and medicine into Biafra from the Portuguese island of São Tomé.

[Danish Col. T. Wichmann, chief of the Joint Church Aid flight operations, was on one of the planes that made the flight Friday. He reported that everything was normal.

[The operations headquarters quoted the colonel as saying a cable that full-scale relief flights by Joint Church Aid would be resumed immediately.

[Urgent consultations continue in Geneva, Lagos, and Copenhagen over resumption of full-scale deliveries by relief agencies, Reuters reports.]

Yet the IRC, which stopped all night flights after a Nigerian Air Force plane shot down a Red Cross DC-7 June 6, is not prepared to continue until given adequate guarantees of safety.

Added to this difficulty the relief organizations are becoming increasingly concerned over the tougher federal line or airlifts to Biafra.

The Nigerians have long been irritated by some of the methods used by the Red Cross in its aid work, and just recently Dr. Auguste Lindt, head of the Red Cross relief organization, was forced to quit under Nigerian pressure.

There are further indications that Nigerians are becoming even more restless with the whole relief question.

Chief Obafemi Awolowo, vice-chairman of the Federal Nigerian Executive Council, for instance, is reported as saying: "All is fair in war, and starvation is one of the weapons of war. I don't see why we should feed our enemies fat, only to fight us harder."

Asked how severe the problem in Biafra was following suspension of relief supplies, a senior IRC spokesman in Geneva told this newspaper:

"It's almost impossible to generalize. In some areas we are probably out of danger. In other areas not."

But the spokesman did go on to say that unless the airlifts were restarted within the next three weeks the situation would be back to the crisis period in July and August, 1968. At that time there were fears for the survival of the entire nation, although federal Nigerian sources suggested the extent of distress was greatly magnified.

Until the suspension of the night relief flights (Biafra does not accept them during the day for tactical reasons) "hundreds of thousands of children," according to the spokesman, "were being fed every day." The May total was put at 1.5 million, the majority of them children.

But the importance, he stressed, was a sustained effort.

Until June 6, when one of its planes was shot down, the Red Cross had reserve supplies for two weeks in Biafra. "Since then we have had to decrease the rate of distribution so that reserves will last longer."

Meanwhile the IRC can still continue supplying food to people in Nigerian-held territory. Thus far some 50,000 tons of food has been transported into these areas either by road or rail from Lagos.

While the logjam over Biafran-destined supplies continues, it is hoped the problem might be solved either by agreement of both sides on day flights, or a mutual willingness to dispatch food stocks up the River Cross in the Calabar region and to unload them near Ikot Okporo in Biafra.

Both propositions have run into difficulty. Observers here believe that the river proposal, an American initiative, would have the best hope of success.

But after initial agreement by Nigeria's Dr. Okoi Arikpo, Chief Anthony Enahoro, Information Commissioner, subsequently refused to confirm the statement. The Biafrans in turn agreed in principle, but sought some further guarantees from the United States.

One source believes that if the river proposition were to come into being it "would effectively put the kibosh on relief by air and so end Biafra's arms ferry."

The Biafrans, however, are suspicious of any routes that traverse federal territory.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, July 2, 1969]

GENOCIDE

One word now describes the policy of the Nigerian military government toward secessionist Biafra: genocide. It is ugly and extreme but it is the only word which fits Nigeria's decision to stop the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other foreign relief agencies, from flying in food to Biafra. Nigeria says it intends to take the control of all relief measures into its own hands. But lest there be any doubt of what that means, let it be noted that a few days ago Chief Awolowo, the highest civilian in the Lagos government, was quoted as saying that starvation was a legitimate means of war. Upward of a million people in Biafra have already died of starvation and its attendant ravages, and it now is likely—according to the President's consultant on nutrition, Professor Jean Mayer—that two million more may die within a matter of a few weeks.

For the Nixon Administration there should be no confusion or delay in deciding how to respond. The United States must immediately and unequivocally join in what we trust will be a worldwide demand that Nigeria not interrupt the flow of food and drugs to the civilian victims of the Nigerian civil war. As the principal relief donor Washington can do no less without becoming an accomplice to official genocide. Quite rightly, Nigeria states that providing relief to rebels is an act of political intervention. Nigeria is right too in claiming that Biafra's leadership has not hesitated to increase its own people's suffering as bait for world sympathy. It may be true that Red Cross flights have been misused as a cover for running arms. But so what? There are no diplomatic or political considerations so overwhelming that the United States must stand quietly by while another government murders a million or more souls.

CIGARETTE ADVERTISING

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, in view of the present controversy over cigarette advertising and the emotionalism involved, a recent letter to the editor of the Washington Star seems to place the issue in the proper perspective.

An appraisal of the question now before the Congress by Dr. J. B. Nesbitt of Rockville, Md., should cause some sober reflection on the fairness and merit of proposed Federal restrictions on advertising by the tobacco industry.

I believe there is considerable logic to Dr. Nesbitt's conclusions and I ask unanimous consent that his letter be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A NONSMOKING DOCTOR SPEAKS

SIR: The tobacco industry obviously needs a friend. As a devoted non-smoker, and as a physician who often advises patients to quit smoking, I am an unlikely prospect. But I have a couple of questions for the anti-smokers, and specifically concerning the laws requiring the warning on cigarette packages.

First of all the potentially harmful products which we use daily, cigarettes are the only product whose manufacturers have been required by law to practice self-condemnation. We are not told on a liquor bottle that we may become alcoholic or our livers cirrhotic. Our new cars are not plastered with bumper stickers reminding us of possible injury or death in accidents. Why "The Scarlet Letter" for tobacco?—possibly because cancer is an easier issue on which to crusade.

But it is no more deadly or prevalent than liver disease and auto accidents.

Secondly, and more important, is the issue of individual freedom. The surgeon general has advised us of the dangers of tobacco use, and I believe this is an appropriate function. But the expenditure of public funds, and the efforts of public institutions should end there. Knowledge of the danger is—and should be—universal. Big Brother should then step aside and leave further crusading to private organizations, so that financial donations toward persuading people not to smoke are voluntary. Let the consumer then decide whether the pleasures of smoking outweigh the risks. Further intrusions of the federal government into the area of individual freedom are likely to occur if this self-condemnation law goes unchallenged.

If the federal government feels compelled to discourage smoking (or alcoholism) maybe it should consider another method: possibly denying medicare to people with self-inflicted diseases of this kind. This would preserve individual freedom, and cost taxpayers less, not more.

J. B. NESBITT, M.D.

ROCKVILLE, Md.

UNITED STATES CANNOT REST UPON ITS LAURELS IN THE AREA OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, for the past few days, I have been talking about some of the specific human rights conventions which we as a Nation have failed to ratify despite their introduction into the Senate over a decade ago. These documents are important cornerstones upon which a sorely needed foundation for guaranteeing human beings certain basic rights can and must be built.

Over the years, our own Nation has been engaged domestically in a difficult struggle to advance the rights of all of our citizens through the processes of law. The Warren Court, as the highest judicial body in the land, will go down in history as being very instrumental in this area. Their effort and the efforts of others have reaped considerable gains for the people of the United States. They have held the attention and aroused the concern of men everywhere connected with the goal of providing to each individual the equal stature and privileges to which he is entitled.

But while acknowledging these domestic victories, we cannot rest upon them and disclaim interest in the same evils abroad that we have taken steps to abrogate at home. It is only fitting that a country which has taken such great strides for her own citizens should also play a leading role in the attempt to see human rights respected in all sections of the globe.

Many scholars, including Arthur Goldberg, former Secretary of Labor and Ambassador to the United Nations, have voiced the opinion that the root of most political frictions and disputes lies in social abuses remaining unchecked—discrimination, persecution, suppression. We must realize that until these abuses, these abnegations of an individual's basic rights, are eradicated, until a high minimum standard for the observance of human rights prevails throughout the world, then we shall not see the birth of a truly peaceful day.

Clearly, this should not be construed as implying that these human rights conventions are the long-sought-after panacea, the mysterious cure-all for all social woes. Neither would it be fair to assume that they will guarantee complete solutions for the problems to which they are addressed specifically. Nevertheless, they are very definite and positive steps in the proper direction, and as such, the United States should support them.

Mr. President, way back in 1783, the late Edmund Burke, the noted political philosopher, said:

The rights of men—that is to say, the natural rights of mankind—are indeed sacred things; and if any public measure is proved mischievously to affect them, the objection ought to be fatal to that measure. . . . If these natural rights are farther affirmed and declared by express covenants, if they are clearly defined and secured against chicane, against power and authority, by written instruments and positive engagements, they are in a still better condition. . . . Indeed, this formal recognition, by the sovereign power, of an original right in the subject, can never be subverted but by rooting up the radical principles of government, and even of society itself. . . .

In view of our reputation as being a nation which stands up for the oppressed, as the guardian of man's inalienable rights, our record on the ratification of the human rights conventions is particularly indefensible. Prof. Richard N. Gardner of Columbia University has repeatedly pointed out that—

Our membership in the small company of United Nations members who have refused to ratify human rights treaties has become a major diplomatic embarrassment. Our friends cannot understand it; our adversaries exploit it. It is a costly anachronism which we should liquidate without further delay.

Mr. President, in these times of fragmentation and alienation, we cannot tolerate or passively acquiesce to the denial of fundamental human liberties. The ratification of these treaties should be one of our top priorities, for as Arthur Goldberg has said:

We must demonstrate that this nation will not stand aloof from a major world effort to elevate human rights.

MINNESOTA PRINCIPALS GIVE VIEWS ON AID TO EDUCATION

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, several months ago I wrote to the school principals of the State of Minnesota to get their opinions and suggestions regarding national legislation in the field of education. I received very useful responses from many of these principals and wish to invite the attention of Senators to several of the recommendations that were most often mentioned.

First, the majority of principals expressed their enthusiasm for continued and expanded Federal education programs, but felt that if these programs were more flexible, they would be more responsive to the particular needs of each individual school and school district.

Finding ways to cut redtape was regarded as essential to the continued success of national education programs. Much of the paperwork requirement, the

principals felt, is time consuming and pointless.

Several principals suggested that advance funding of education programs would facilitate getting the money where it would do the most good in the shortest amount of time.

Highest on the list of priorities was the urgent need to make Federal funds available for more teachers and higher teachers' salaries, especially in poverty areas.

Several principals emphasized the need for more Federal funds for school construction and for new or special equipment.

I received numerous excellent suggestions for the use of funds for special programs—vocational education, increased guidance and counseling services, expanded Headstart programs, programs for poor children, gifted children, children with special learning disabilities—which I hope the Congress will consider carefully.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letters I received be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LINCOLN HILLS ELEMENTARY SCHOOL,
RICHFIELD PUBLIC SCHOOL,
Richfield, Minn., April 3, 1969.

Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: In response to your letter of March 27th my own belief is that too many proposals submitted for federal aid to education have missed the fundamental and basic needs of education. We have had expenditures for research—of the ivory tower variety. May we provide direct grants to the states?

The state departments of education can then distribute the funds to school districts on the basis of need and student population. What do I mean by basic needs? Relief for the tax-paying homeowner. Means for meeting the needs of each child. As a principal of a school with my staff and with close proximity to parents, we don't need to find out what the needs are—we see them everyday. Provide the funds on a direct basis to the state is the major federal educational responsibility. Do we need greater involvement by the federal branch of government? I seriously question such involvement.

Sincerely yours,
JOHN BLEEDORN.

ORTONVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Ortonville, Minn., April 3, 1969.

HON. WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: I was very pleased to hear that you will be serving Minnesota and education on the Senate Subcommittee on Education with the 91st Congress.

As a citizen and as an educator I wish to stress to you the crucial need for continuation of present federal support, and for initiation of new programs and legislation to support education at all levels. The increasing demands of today's educational needs, and the burden that the local tax-payer is bearing make this support an absolute necessity.

Federal involvement beyond direct financial support should be minimal. In my opinion, legislation that would appropriate directly to the states a sum for each pupil unit attending school, would be sound legislation. Whatever the nature of federal support—we need it—and we need it badly. Thank you for your

kind consideration. Rest assured that anything you personally can do for education in Minnesota and in the United States will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

MORRIS G. TIETJEN,
Elementary Principal.

TRUMAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Truman, Minn., April 1, 1969.

WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Recently you wrote a letter asking for any suggestions as far as federal involvement in education is concerned.

Some of my suggestions are certainly not new, but just a reaffirming of what has already been discussed in proposed legislation. I would like to see the following things happen:

1. The Project Headstart which is now under O.E.O. be put under the Department of Education where it belongs. I know there has been talk of this but as far as I know there has been no action taken as yet.

2. There was a recent proposal which I thought had some merit as far as federal assistance to local school districts. That is, give the districts \$100 per pupil—with 50% of this money going for programs and 50% for salaries.

3. If the federal government wants to assist the local districts financially make it easier for districts to secure this money. As it is now set up there seems to be a lot of unnecessary red tape before districts get to use this money.

4. I feel that if we are to retain quality educators they must be given a decent wage. If personal property is taxed to the limit, which I think in some cases it probably is, then we must develop some other means to support local education. Possibly with assistance from the federal government something in this area can be done.

I want to thank you for your time and consideration in these matters.

Sincerely,

JAMES ANDRZEJEK,
Elementary Principal.

ASHBY, MINN.,
April 1, 1969.

Hon. Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: It is a little hard to suggest changes in some education programs because of the many agencies involved. However, it seems to me that some schools have staff members that are capable of presenting well written plans and programs which seem very impressive while others do not have anyone who can do this. My concern is, "Is it fair to the boys and girls in one school to get these benefits while others are deprived of it?" Perhaps some system where all pupils in our schools receive aid would be more fitting to our American way of life.

Please keep up the good work you are doing. Help get the Nations hungry fed now. My best wishes and support in trying to solve the big city ghetto school problem, but remember not all the poor are there in the city we have many in rural Minnesota also.

Sincerely,

KEITH KAPPAHN,
High School Principal.

ONAMIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Onamia, Minn., March 28, 1969.

Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: Thank you for your letter of March 25, 1969. Yes, I do have some proposals for legislation. I believe the Federal Government is going to have to play a bigger role in education in this country if

we are to attain an educational level commensurate with our technical advancement.

Our needs are great. We need better schools, better teaching and broader curriculum. Onamia is a small community and school, yet our enrollment (477—grades 7-12, 850 total) puts us in about the middle, for size, throughout the state.

We need a new plant. A bond issue to build a new high school was defeated twice. We need more teachers and a broader curriculum. We offer 56 courses and the state tells us we should have a minimum of 80. Our enrollment does not justify 80 courses. We should consolidate with Isle. (Total enrollment of about 500). We do not even have a kindergarten. I realize that many of these problems are state and local problems, however, the Federal Government could help indirectly. I believe we are typical of many schools of our size in the state.

The NEA sponsored bill which would provide \$100.00 per pupil would help tremendously. The Federal Government should not tie the hands of local boards and administrators to specific things like PL 8910, however, they should require local effort and require local schools to improve education in such things as buildings, subject offerings and new programs.

I understand Congress is holding back on funding or fully funding the NEA programs. These programs have helped education and should be fully supported.

I thank you for your concern. I hope this letter can give you some insight to some of the problems we face on a local level and we are anxiously waiting for federal assistance.

Sincerely yours,

KENNETH E. HAAPOJA,
Principal.

JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL,
Fairmont, Minn., April 1, 1969.

WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

HONORABLE SENATOR MONDALE: Thank you for your letter of March 20th. I appreciate the opportunity of expressing my viewpoint.

Concerning Federal involvement, I've felt that Federal Aid to Education has helped immeasurably in tackling some of the problems in education. Specifically, many programs have been started which never would have been tackled without Federal support.

It would seem to me that the best way to improve the situation at this point would be to make more Federal money available with fewer strings attached.

It's gotten to the place where many projects are being written on the basis of what can be approved rather than the basis of really meeting the educational needs of a specific situation.

It looks as though Federal money will be necessary for teacher salaries and perhaps general budget assistance. I would like to see a part of the funds made available on the basis of numbers of students.

Thanks again for this opportunity to express my views.

Sincerely Yours,

R. B. TANQUIST,
Principal.

BUTTERFIELD-ODIN, IND.,
DISTRICT No. 836,
Butterfield, Minn., March 28, 1969.

Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. MONDALE: I was very happy to hear that you will be serving on the Senate Subcommittee on Education. I do have a few suggestions. One is federal aid for physical education. The program should be supported with funds and instructors and equipment for every boy and girl in the country. I also suggest funds for summer recreation pro-

grams in every school so well organized and supported with funds to keep all children ages 8 to 18 in organized recreation a part of each day during the summer.

Sincerely,

EUGENE THARES.

TYLER PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Tyler, Minn., March 31, 1969.

Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.

HONORABLE SENATOR MONDALE: I am in receipt of a letter in which you ask for suggestions in regard to legislation pertaining to federal funds for education. I am interested in the projects in elementary schools which are being funded with federal money.

I don't know how capable I am in giving suggestions, but since I attempt the administration of the project, I have become aware of some things that could bring about an improvement.

We have found that not knowing what money will be available to our district in advance of writing a project makes it difficult to plan effectively. When additional money becomes available in February or March, spending this to the best advantage for the students becomes an impossibility. An estimate which falls short nine or ten dollars isn't working well. So far we have attempted to incorporate a summer school session to use this money, but this does not always seem to be the best way to expend these funds.

Most schools are in agreement that a more effective program would result for the students of a given school if the money could be made available to the districts with the understanding that the school administrators use it in a way most suited to the schools' particular needs. Thus far the stipulations for the use of the money often do not serve best the type of situation our schools find themselves in. Insisting that most of the money be spent on personnel in an area completely devoid of certified personnel doesn't seem sensible.

Could the state department be put in command of the allotments? Perhaps the state departments would be better acquainted with the particular needs of a school in a given area of their own state.

Some of the paper-work requirements become absolutely asinine. An example of this is the type of evaluation of the projects which we are required to make. Requests for test scores on things not measurable by tests become absurd. State personnel will tell us that no progress can possibly be made in specific areas, yet we are required to spend much time and money in sending in five copies of something in the line of evaluation, all of which is completely meaningless.

In summary, then, I make a plea for a situation in which the government will indicate a greater faith in the school administrators and in the Title I administrators. Surely, those people who are guiding the education of the children in their community, should be considered adequately capable, and dedicated enough to the children, to use the money in a way that will best suit the needs of their school population.

Sincerely,

LEONA K. OERTER,
Title I Administrator.

CLINTON PUBLIC SCHOOL,
Clinton, Minn., March 25, 1969.

Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

Re: Letter dated March 20.

DEAR MR. MONDALE: Thank you for your letter regarding your work on the Senate Subcommittee on Education.

The only thing I would like you to be aware of in rural Minnesota is that we feel it is necessary for the local school districts to be custodians of any governmental money which we may have. Secondly, many govern-

ment programs are currently being curtailed or cut back which place a hardship on the local tax structure if we are to maintain programs or services started under title funds.

Thank you for giving me this opportunity to express my views.

Sincerely,

DUWAYNE DISCHER,
Principal, Elementary School.

PINE CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Pine City, Minn., March 31, 1969.

The Honorable WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: In response to your letter of March 25 offering assistance in problems in education. I would like to see emphasis put on elementary education. I realize persons aware of education's problems and needs know of the importance of a good beginning education. Unfortunately as a class, group or individually, the local boards—the final controlling force—fall far short of realizing the importance of a sound, comprehensive beginning education.

I believe there is a need for some control, regulation, etc. to require an equalization of expenditure for elementary program!

Too often we can analogize, as in the old poem, "For want of a nail, the shoe was lost", etc. So it is in education we decry poor students, drop outs, delinquents and run crash programs for these people. But do we work at the source, a poor beginning program.

Any positive efforts you can take to rectify what I feel is a gross iniquity will be supported by me to the utmost.

Respectfully yours,

JAMES S. LAMONT,
Elementary Principal.

MINNEAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Minneapolis, Minn., March 28, 1969.

HON. WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: Thank you for your letter informing me of your position on the Senate Subcommittee on Education. I know you to be a true friend of education in general and concerned about our special problems in the core-city.

I and the other administrators of the North Pyramid will try to keep you informed of our concerns in regard to legislation dealing with education.

Sincerely,

DONALD L. BURTON.

F. WILSON POND ELEMENTARY SCHOOL,
Bloomington, Minn., March 27, 1969.

HON. WALTER MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: Your letter dated March 20, 1969 was received with sincere appreciation. Your concern to inform educators of your assignment on the Senate Subcommittee on Education is gratifying.

In order for me to respond intelligently regarding legislation that would be of vital interest to me, could you, through newsletters or other informative materials, keep me informed of legislation pertinent to our Minnesota and national educational community?

The educational gains that have been made since P.L. 89-10 are vast and exciting. I hope that these gains can be continued and extended by those of you who represent all of us.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN W. WORKMAN,
Principal.

MINNEAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Minneapolis, Minn., March 28, 1969.

Mr. WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: I received your letter of March 26 with the information that you are serving

on the Senate Subcommittee on Education. As a principal in the Minneapolis Public School System, I share your concern as attempts are being made with . . . "serious issues of federal involvement and support in education at all levels."

If there are ways in which we can cooperate to bring about greater awareness and understanding, I will certainly be available and willing to cooperate.

Sincerely,

J. HOWARD STRAITON,
Principal.

MORA PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Mora, Minn., March 28, 1969.

HON. WALTER MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: We wish to thank you for your letter of March 25th informing of your position on the Senate Subcommittee on Education and your interest in aiding our local committee in upgrading educational facilities and programs.

We are faced with a unique problem in Mora in that we are experiencing an increasing number of severely retarded children classified as trainable within our immediate area and, therefore, are in need of proper facilities and trained personnel to deal with this problem.

Approximately two years ago the Pine-Kanabec Day Activity Center was organized and incorporated to service these children. During the past two years we have enrolled 28-plus severely retarded children and running two school buses to facilitate their transportation to the center which, at the present time, is the educational wing of a local church. These facilities are very inadequate and we are planning to construct a permanent educational unit in the very near future.

We have involved the Office of Economic Opportunity (Lakes and Pines Community Action Council) in our planning and we are at the present time using some of their personnel. Our immediate need is a permanent educational building together with housing facilities for those students orthopedically handicapped or having similar disability. The age groups we plan to have will range from 6 to 65 plus. We plan to make this a "home away from home" for the severely retarded in this area which includes Pine County, Kanabec County, Isanti County, and Milaca County.

Any aid and/or assistance you can give us in determining a source of financing the construction of an educational unit together with increasing the personnel of the present staff will be greatly appreciated.

Thank you again for your letter of March 25th informing us of your interest in aiding us in such a program.

Sincerely yours,

BOB LORENCE,
High School Principal.
JOE JOHNSON,
Elementary Principal.

LE SUEUR PUBLIC SCHOOL,
Le Sueur, Minn., March 27, 1969.

HON. WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: I was most surprised to receive your letter of March 20th. May I congratulate you on your assignment to the Subcommittee on Education.

I do have some concerns regarding Federal Aid to schools of which the Le Sueur district receives \$26,467.00 under title I of 89-10. Of this \$11,000.00 is currently being used for a Four Year Old Program. This program is in addition to the Head Start Program which we have had the past two Summers. The Four Year Old Program is the first in the State and we are in our second six weeks session with two groups coming each day for 2½

hours. The purpose is to improve language and motor skill development.

This program has already stimulated education and educators, plus improve the child's learning environment.

It is my belief that one of the functions of Federal Aid is to continue to stimulate education as it has in the past. My second concern is the broadening of the term deprived. Let me use a true example; I have had a boy in another school who was capable of doing eleventh grade work, but tested out at eighth grade level. You see, he was three years behind. Please understand the boy when tested was in the sixth grade. This boy also came from a good middle class home. We have got to have money to develop programs for the gifted elementary school child.

Perhaps I could be of more help if I could react to future legislation rather than just sounding off. If you wish to send me copies of the bills I would be happy to react to them.

I do remember your presentation last Fall here in Le Sueur, and also the fun we had in taking you away from the student editor so you could get some radio time.

Best regards to you also.

Sincerely,

ROGER FIELD,
Elementary Principal.

CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL,
Crookston, Minn., March 28, 1969.

HON. WALTER F. MONDALE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: May I present to you a few ideas I have regarding Federal Aid to Education.

I am hearing more and more rumblings regarding high property taxes, especially when it relates to taxes needed for education. Some way must be found to return more money from the federal government to the states for education. This aid must be for buildings, teachers salaries, and new programs. The local district is not able to carry this heavy burden any longer. The rich district will be alright, but what about the poor areas where the taxable base is low and money is hard to raise.

We must also provide more money for high schools to train our high school students in vocational fields. We have been paying too much attention to the college bound student and not enough to the average and below average student. Most of our college bound students will get there under almost any type of educational system, even if it is rather a poor system they will have enough ability and drive to get the education needed, although I realize the better trained they are the easier college will be for them.

The poor student is almost forgotten in most schools because we lack the money and space to provide these youngsters with reading specialists (this is where most of them have trouble), social workers, and psychologists. Along with their reading difficulties these students are the ones with emotional problems. If we can help them to do better in school and then educate them in some trade they are interested in we might keep many off the welfare lists, and also out of trouble with the law.

We need to change our curriculum to fit these youngsters. There is a definite need to cut out four years of English and many other requirements which these youngsters are bored with and in the end will not do them much good.

All this will take billions of dollars which must come from the federal government.

We cannot afford to teach college bound and poor students the same subjects and in the same manner.

I hope I have not taken too much of your valuable time.

Sincerely yours,

RAY A. FLOM,
Principal.

HARMONY AREA SCHOOLS,
Harmony, Minn., March 26, 1969.

HON. SENATOR MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: I think this is the first time any senator has asked for advice concerning educational problems since I have been an administrator. Thank you for thinking enough of those at the "grass roots", so to speak, because you should get some fine suggestions. We took a little time at our school to have Mr. Elstad (our Federal Program director) to write several suggestions that we think most practical and important. Since he works in this area each day he is most aware of some of the problems associated with Federal programs. His suggestions are attached.

There is definite need of Federal aid to education—there is little doubt of that. We do think that there is a great deal of "red tape" connected with it. I have been personally appalled by the amount of paper work necessary to get a student a needed piece of equipment. Perhaps Al Quile is correct in thinking that the four categorical aid programs should be consolidated. It would certainly cut down on paper work. We are looking for more flexibility with the Federal Programs.

Eventually, it seems, the Federal government may have to extend aid in helping to pay for teacher salaries. This may be especially true in poverty areas of the various states.

We again wish to thank you for your letter and the knowledge that you are interested in education for the state of Minnesota.

Sincerely,

S. L. HOUDEK.

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. S. L. Houdek, High School Principal.
From: Martin K. Elstad, Assistant Principal.
Subject: Education, Legislative Suggestions For.
March 24, 1969.

1. Re: Title I, P.L. 89-10:

Advice on funding should reach State Departments of Education much earlier. Funding should merit a term longer than the annual basis now in effect. (e.g. It is very difficult for a school administrator to contract for a teacher in April of 1969 when he will not be advised of funding for the next term until October or November of 1969.)

2. Re: Procurement of Equipment:

*Need for up-to-date, modern equipment still exists in schools. Equipment should not be eliminated as an approvable expense.
*Audio visual, computers, etc.

3. The 1960 census is not a realistic guideline for identification of deprived children in our community. They are not here.

MARTIN K. ELSTAD.

ANOKA-HENNEPIN INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 11,
Anoka, Minn., March 26, 1969.

HON. WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Thank you for your letter informing me of your appointment to the Senate sub-committee on education. There are two ways in which you could truly help a school district such as Anoka-Hennepin Independent School District No. 11.

1. A school district such as ours in which we receive 2,000 or more new pupils each year needs additional aid for construction of new schools. During the past year the taxes in our school district went up 78 mills. It would seem an apparent necessity that the federal government must aid rapidly expanding school districts such as ours.

2. A rapidly growing district such as ours will also need additional moneys for general aid if we are to continue to provide the best in education for our students.

Your help and interest in these matters will be sincerely appreciated by the patrons of our school district. Thanking you, in advance, for your efforts in our behalf, I am
Sincerely yours,

ROY HUMBERT,
Principal.

SOUTH JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL,
Moorhead, Minn., April 18, 1969.

HON. WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Thank you for the recent letter in which you requested proposals for legislation or modification of present legislative programs.

I feel that the placement of Head Start, under the jurisdiction of the school districts again, was a move in the right direction.

In legislative matters, we generally consider proposals in our Western Division Secondary Principals Association. This group in turn will submit adopted proposals to the Minnesota Association of Secondary Principals for action.

We are happy to learn that you have been appointed to serve on the Senate Subcommittee on Education and we trust that your efforts will be fruitful.

Sincerely,

HOWARD WERGELAND,
Principal.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.,
April 4, 1969.

HON. WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: In reply to your letter requesting suggestions on action to improve the total educational program, I have a few that may be timely.

(1) Increased federal aid in the area of supplemental teaching and individual tutoring of handicapped and disadvantaged children to lessen the burden on the local school district.

(2) Some standardization of qualifications for teachers in the area of SLD (special learning difficulties) tutoring. Although this falls under the jurisdiction of state department of education, federal guidelines more clearly defined would be helpful.

(3) Some adjustment should be made in regard to teacher retirement. I plan to retire in June 1970 at age 63. My pension on TRA (Teacher's Retirement Association) will be \$80.00 a month plus \$132.30 under FICA. Were I to continue teaching to age 65, the latter figure would be increased by \$13 per month. In both instances I received these figures from the respective offices recently. The TRA is this low because of out-of-state teaching. The year before I returned to teach in Minnesota the policy was changed so that no credit would be allowed on out-of-state teaching. I have taken advantage of all "buy-backs" available since 1952 and yet the pittance is only \$80, and that, under plan A with no refund.

I admit that teachers are today receiving a living wage. By the same token, those of us who are "oldsters" and near retirement have benefited only a few years from improved salary conditions. I taught in this state as recently as 1952 for \$3100 a year. Slight opportunity with such a salary to save for retirement. One reason for recent militancy of career teachers is the inadequate pension provisions in retirement. If a plan could be implemented whereby the federal government could compensate, in some measure, those teachers who are victims(?) of out-of-state teaching, their retirement years would become less of a penalty.

If I can be of assistance in the areas of resource or implementation for improved education legislation, I shall be more than happy to get involved.

Sincerely,

ELROY R. JOHNSON.

MIDLAND LUTHERAN COLLEGE,
Fremont, Nebr., April 1, 1969.

HON. WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: It is with utmost urgency that we request the United States Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee to give due consideration to raising the National Defense Student Loan appropriation to the earlier approved amount of \$191 million.

We have been given an estimated allocation of NDSL funds which is 25 per cent less than we received and used this year. Such a decrease for Midland College and all other institutions will be detrimental to our program of assisting needy students to enroll in college and of keeping these students in college.

Your immediate attention to the NDSL appropriations and to the appropriations for the other federal programs of student financial assistance is respectfully requested.

Sincerely,

HAROLD E. NOTT,
Financial Aids Officer.

WINDOM PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Windom, Minn., April 8, 1969.

WALTER F. MONDALE,
Senator, State of Minnesota, Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: It certainly pleases me that you will be serving on the Senate sub-committee on education during the 91st Congress.

I have always been impressed with your feeling for people and I certainly believe that our young people do need leaders of your calibre working for them. In my opinion, education doesn't receive its appropriate share of the national budget.

Presently the suggestion I would have would be to finalize the legislation at an early date so that we have plenty of time to plan and work on programs after they have been authorized. This has not necessarily been the case with Federal aid to education in the past.

Thank you very much for your March 27th letter. You will be hearing from me in the future regarding legislation.

Respectfully yours,

(Mr.) AUBREY FILLBRANDT,
Elementary Director.

MINNEAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Minneapolis, Minn., April 8, 1969.

HON. WALTER F. MONDALE,
The U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

SIR: Many thanks for the opportunity to write to you relative to pressing educational problems.

1. Schools are in great need of specialized resources to focus on young people with unique learning and emotional problems. I'm referring to the need for an improved counselor ratio 1-200 rather than the present 1-400, more psychologists, psychiatrists and social workers. Schools are all the time receiving more young people with serious problems—many of them beyond the school's ability to cope with them—at least with present resources.

2. The need to focus intensive reading help on K-3rd grade has been crystal clear for years. The upper grades and secondary schools would have fewer kids in reading distress if we placed a higher level of concern on teaching reading in the lower grades. A good teacher knows by second or third grade who's going to have reading troubles. This, then, is the place to pull up the big guns (the extra help) and to go to work intensively, not in grades 7-8-9 or 10.

You may be aware that a serious reading handicap is the one most generalized characteristic of youth and adults in trouble with the law. At a much less severe level it's

the principal characteristic of young people having school or learning problems.

3. In the third place we need laws or a policy that permits schools more freedom or options in working with the 14-15 year old boy unhappy with going to school. Age 16, the minimum legal leaving age, marks an opportunity or time for part-time work programs. The 15 year old, often times physically mature, is closed out of work programs.

4. Finally, urban and most rural schools too are still too much college oriented. The non-academically inclined youth too often has the cards stacked against him. We need vocational opportunities not unlike what Charles F. Nichols is presenting at the Work Opportunity Center in Minneapolis. This program is tremendous. We're asking why not a W.O.C. along Lake Street serving south Minneapolis, principally Central and South High School students—usually the drop-out type. Nichols, along with all school people, are worrying about Federal Funds running out on the W.O.C. at this early date. This Center must be kept going.

I could point up a dozen other problems, but I'll stop.

Best Wishes.

Sincerely,

RUSSELL D. BRACKETT,
Principal.

NORTHFIELD, MINN.,
April 4, 1969.

Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: You wrote our school principal asking for our proposals for legislation, etc. I shall try, but probably won't be brief.

It is most necessary to raise the level of salaries for teachers in both the elementary and secondary level. Teaching should become a profession and not a way of supplementing a husband's salary or, for the single woman, a better choice than being a stenographer. The salary should be adequate to attract and keep men with families to support, who now soon move up into administration, and talented women who now go into college teaching or one of the other better-paid profession. Good teachers are an economy in the long run.

Now salaries can't be raised to the proper level because real estate taxes aren't an adequate source of revenue. Obviously the Federal government must reinforce the state and local governments financially. And the funds are available! If we can spend 100 billions (more or less) on defense which means the destruction of our own and other countries resources we can find money for education, anti-pollution and urban problems.

You have my support and that of many others when you work for peace in Vietnam and reject the insanity of ABM and other equally disastrous military ventures.

Yours sincerely,

Mrs. JACQUELINE B. MAY.

MINNEAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Minneapolis, Minn., April 7, 1969.

The Honorable WALTER F. MONDALE,
The U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: I am pleased to learn from your letter of March 24, 1969 that you are serving on the Senate Subcommittee and hope that I can contact you from time to time about specific educational problems.

First, we now know the importance of early education, yet we still spend considerable more at the secondary level. All the latest research confirms that money spent early is far more economically sound, yet we continue to pour money into "drop-out" programs and attempt to rehabilitate those who should have been "saved" long ago. At Howe school I can pick out ten Kindergarten chil-

dren who need specialized help *now*, or they will be serious problems in junior high school. Next year, in first grade, these same children will begin to develop negative concepts about themselves, school and learning. A first grade teacher with thirty children cannot do the job that needs to be done. Every school in a large city faces about the same situation—limited funds and increasing problems. We don't need money for *new* programs. We need to adequately finance programs that we already know to be sound—i.e. providing a successful and satisfying start for all children.

If funds were available, this is how I would spend the money.

(1) Begin a pre-school program with a strong emphasis on helping parents understand the importance of their role.

(2) Initiate a testing program before children fall academically, that would diagnose specific areas of weakness and prescribe teaching techniques to overcome these weaknesses. (Such tests are available; however, elementary schools need counselors and psychologists to administer tests, etc.)

(3) Give additional help to first grade teachers to insure that the first exposure to reading will be a positive experience for children.

(4) Provide opportunities for parents to come into the school to learn more about what is being done. I suggest paying parents for attending certain meetings at school. This makes more sense to me than paying a wealthy tobacco farmer for not growing tobacco.

This country faces a serious threat. Billions of dollars for defense, billions of dollars to Viet Nam and billions of dollars for an ABM system will not save us. "Unless we support education while we are rich, we shall surely become poor."

Sincerely,

RICHARD F. CORNWALL,
Principal.

USE OF CLOSED JOB CORPS CENTERS

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, on June 30, 1969, the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON), the distinguished chairman of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee's Employment, Manpower and Poverty Subcommittee, of which I am a member, submitted an amendment which he intended to propose to his bill, S. 1809, to extend the Economic Opportunity Act. Senator NELSON's amendment is designed to insure that the facilities and equipment which have been abandoned at the more than 50 Job Corps centers which have recently been shut down would be put to good use in socially valuable programs.

I wish to congratulate Senator NELSON on his excellent amendment and on his continuing concern—which I share very strongly—for the future of the Job Corps program. The more than \$60 million involved in capital expenditures in these abandoned centers should be able to be employed constructively to serve ends similar to those sought by the Job Corps, if the Labor Department and the Bureau of the Budget proceed in an imaginative and energetic fashion.

In California alone, there are tied up in capital investment in the eight centers shut down there a total of \$11 million. My office has received numerous letters from individuals and organizations inquiring as to plans for those facilities. And I have passed these inquiries along

to the Department of Labor with special reference to the Interagency Committee established by the Bureau of the Budget to study this problem.

Although I continue to believe very firmly that the Job Corps shutdowns were a tragedy for the young men and women involved and for the Nation as a whole, I feel that we must now turn our attention to salvaging as much physically and spiritually as possible from that program. I have joined with Senator NELSON and the ranking minority member of the subcommittee and the full committee, the most able senior Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), in attempting to insure so far as possible a fair shake for the individual young men and women affected by the shutdowns—both those in the centers closed and those frozen in the pipelines. Unfortunately, I fear, we have been only partially successful.

The other aspect of the situation is the use to be made of the now unused physical facilities. In this regard, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at this point in the RECORD the text of a July 1, 1969, letter and enclosure to me from the Secretary of Labor dealing with the proposed uses for various centers, including specific data regarding 27 centers, five of which are in California.

This amendment of Senator NELSON's would provide an effective context for establishing appropriate priorities for the utilization of these abandoned resources for public service programs. I intend to offer in subcommittee, however, an amendment to Senator NELSON's language to include "youth conservation work and other conservation programs" as one of the enumerated examples of uses for these center facilities under section 10(a).

It seems to me that this modification would be in line with the essential purpose of Senator NELSON's amendment which is to continue to use these facilities for Job Corps-type purposes. Conservation work has always played a significant role in the Job Corps, and most of the closed Job Corps facilities were conservation camps within national parks or reservations.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, D.C., July 1, 1969.

HON. ALAN CRANSTON,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR CRANSTON: Thank you for your letter of June 2, 1969, asking about the use of closed Job Corps Centers. The interagency task force on the use of the closed centers recently submitted its recommendations. Consistent with the recommendations, the closed conservation centers will revert to the Department of Interior or Agriculture as appropriate. It will be the responsibility of these Departments to find "socially useful" programs for the centers, such as (1) remedial or work-vocational-educational training for disadvantaged youth with emphasis on a conservation work experience; (2) youth conservation education, and/or work experience programs; (3) residential rehabilitation and/or correction programs; (4) other manpower programs; and (5) summer camping

programs for disadvantaged youth; and (6) regular Agency conservation programs. The enclosed sheets give information on some of the uses now being considered for the various conservation centers.

Kilmer and Parks Men's Urban Centers and Clinton and Moses Lake Women's Urban Centers will go to GSA. Leases will be terminated at the other centers as soon as it is possible.

I hope this provides the information you desire.

Sincerely,

GEORGE P. SHULTZ,
Secretary of Labor.

TAB C

Center	Location	Use	Remarks
Cedar Flats	Idaho County, Idaho	1. State police and patrolman academy 2. State correctional institution 3. Summer youth programs	A Federal-financed State program. State of Idaho is anticipating a grant in conjunction with war on crime program. The State of Idaho is interested in the center for use as a federally financed youth rehabilitation center. Lewiston, Idaho, school system interested for summer youth program. Would involve many school districts in Idaho and Washington.
Pagosa Springs	Archuleta County, Colo.	1. State reformatory honor camp 2. Boys' Club of America	The State of Colorado Division of Corrections would sponsor and finance operation and maintenance on a year-long basis. Will do conservation work. Boy's Club of America would like to run a year-long program. Now have permit for summer use on the Roosevelt National Forest.
Clear Creek Grants	Ormsby County, Nev. Valencia County, N. Mex.	1. Correctional institution 1. Joint use by U.S. Forest Service and New Mexico State College.	The U.S. Forest Service has need for the residences and shop facilities at Grants. A request for the remainder of the center has been made by New Mexico State University for a Grants branch college to be financed by the State of New Mexico. The region recommends that the center be used by the State of New Mexico for the branch college with the exception of the housing area and the shop building. No inquiries for use to date.
Mountainair Alder Springs	Torrence County, N. Mex. Glenn County, Calif.	1. Forest Service would like to use shop buildings for Regular program.	No other use is indicated for remainder of the center. The region recommends disposal since the modular type buildings with flat roofs are not suited to the severe weather and heavy snow loads common to the area. The isolation of the center (43 miles from nearest town) has caused continual problems of staff recruitment and retention, corpsman morale, and has contributed substantially to the high cost of operation.
Fenner Canyon	Los Angeles County, Calif.	1. MDTA programs 2. Conservation education 3. Corrections institution	This would be a residential and/or semiresidential training program involving several labor unions. Los Angeles County proposes to use the facility for teaching conservation education. Los Angeles County wants to use the facility as an inmate conservation crew camp.
Five Mile	Tuolumne County, Calif.	1. MDTA program 2. Conservation education 3. Junior college	The forest supervisor is working with the Carpenters Union and the local community action agency to develop an MDTA program. Stanislaus County proposes to teach conservation education and to cooperate with San Francisco State College to use student teachers. They also plan to conduct some programs for disadvantaged San Francisco grade school children. The Columbia Junior College in Sonora, Calif., would like to use the facility as an extension of their campus.
Los Pinos	Riverside County, Calif.	1. Fire crew base 2. Narcotics rehabilitation center	The Forest Service wants to use part of the camp for a 40-man hot shot fire crew. This is an unconfirmed inquiry by a Los Angeles church group for use of the facility as a narcotics rehabilitation center.
Sly Park	El Dorado County, Calif.	1. Combination ranger headquarters and regional training center 2. Conservation education 3. Conservation education 4. Correctional facility	The Forest Service wants to use part of the site as a ranger headquarters and the remainder of the facility as a regional training center. El Dorado County would like to use the facility for teaching conservation education and as an extension of their junior college campus. Sacramento County wants the facility to teach conservation education. El Dorado County wants to use as a correctional facility.
Cispus	Lewis County, Wash.	1. Conservation education program	The Forest Service wants to operate this center for year-long conservation education programs in cooperation with school districts, colleges, and universities.
Frenchburg	Menifee County, Ky.	1. Conservation education center 2. State corrections institution	The Forest Service wants to establish a conservation education center in conjunction with the Red River Gorge development. The program would be sponsored by the Forest Service in cooperation with school districts, colleges, and universities.
Hodgens New Waverly	LeFlore County, Okla. Walker County, Tex.	1. Conservation education center 2. Vocational training program 3. Summer camp	No inquiries for use to date. Forest Service sponsored conservation education programs in cooperation with school districts, colleges, and universities. State of Texas proposes to operate a residential vocational training program. Texas Agriculture Extension Service would like the facility for a summer camp.
Anthony	Greenbrier County, W. Va.	1. Vocational skill training center 2. Basic adult skills center 3. Alcoholics rehabilitation center 4. Correctional institution	State Senator John Bowling proposes establishment of vocational skills center. Financing is uncertain but probably would be a combination of State and Federal funds. The State department of education proposes to sponsor the program. Sponsor would be the division of alcoholism, department of mental health. The State department of corrections proposes to establish a forestry work camp for 16 to 18 year-olds.
Blue Jay	Forest County, Pa.	1. Adult vocational program 2. Youth Camp 3. Correctional institution	The State would sponsor the program for Forest and Venango Counties. Financing would be from Federal, State, and Appalachia funds. Sponsor would be State of Pennsylvania Department of Community Affairs. Marienville Civic Improvement Association would work through the State for establishment of either a State or county correctional facility.
Clam Lake	Bayfield County, Wis.	1. Vocational school 2. Summer forestry camp	Would be sponsored by State of Wisconsin. Sponsor would be Stevens Point College.
Hoxey	Wexford County, Mich.	1. Vocational training school 2. Corrections facility	Program would be year-long and sponsored by the Cadillac School Board working with the State. This would be a work camp for offenders sponsored by Michigan State Department of Corrections. Michigan State law stipulates that they may work only on State lands.
Isabella ² Lydick Lake	Lake County, Minn. Cass County, Minn.	1. Vocational training for Indians 2. Conservation education 3. Bemidji State College	No potential users known at this time. The sponsor would be the division for Indian education, State board of education. Sponsor would be the Minnesota Environmental Resource Council, the Golden Valley Center. Bemidji State College wants use of the center to expand their education program. Senator Mondale is alert to this.
Poplar Bluff	Butler County, Mo.	1. Work-vocational training for migrant workers 2. Correctional facility 3. Missouri National Guard 4. College	CAP and the Missouri Association for Migrant Workers would sponsor. Workers and their families would live on center. Missouri Conservation Department proposes to sponsor an honor camp for prisoners who would work on both national forest and State lands. Weekend training. Three Rivers Junior College proposes to utilize classroom space. No use identified at present.
Ojibway	Gogebic County, Mich.		

Footnotes at end of table.

TAB C—Continued

Center	Location	Use	Remarks
Ripton ²	Addison County, Vt.	1. Conservation education program 2. Post high school academy for high school dropouts 3. Vermont Grange	The Vermont Natural Resources Council proposes to sponsor the program for Vermont youth. This would be sort of a college preparatory program sponsored by the University of Vermont. The Vermont Grange wants to use the center for record storage, State grange fair, junior and youth grange programs, and museum. Senator Prouty has been in on this.
Vesuvius	Lawrence County, Ohio		No indicated use at present; however, the Forest Service is evaluating the possibility of using it as a regional training center.
Alpine	Greelnee County, Ariz.	1. Correctional institution 2. Youth programs and college seminars	State department of corrections—State of Arizona honor conservation camp within youth division (about 100 boys). Would do conservation work on national forest and vocational training. University of Arizona wants the center for seminars, conferences, and youth development programs. Sponsored by Cooperative Extension Service of University of Arizona. State would finance. Governor is in favor, but legislature would need to appropriate funds.
Dickinson	Stark County, N. Dak.		Land and improvements owned by U.S. Government in the name of GSA; leased annually to Forest Service.
Luna	San Miguel County, N. Mex.		Land donated to United States under OEO Act and improvements purchased utilizing Job Corps funds; land owned by U.S. Government in the name of OEO.

¹ Governor Samuelson has contacted the Department of Labor and the President regarding uses 1 and 2.

² OEO has already relinquished their interests to Forest Service.

CAMP KILMER REVISITED

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, an old saying is: Act in haste. Repent at Leisure.

An illustration of the truth of that comment can be seen in the situation involving the Camp Kilmer job training site. The administration rushed to get it closed; now the rush is on to get it open. Additional costs are involved in a program that allegedly was supposed to save money.

An editorial published in the Newark, N.J., Evening News sums up the situation. It also makes the excellent point that the new training center at Camp Kilmer is little and late.

Clearly, our Nation needs more, not fewer, training programs. I see no sign that the administration is moving toward that goal.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REVIVAL AT KILMER

Camp Kilmer is going back into business as a center for training disadvantaged young men for useful careers. The State Department of Education takes over part of the camp today for a program to be financed by a \$1.6-million grant from the U.S. Department of Labor.

This makes Camp Kilmer the second of the near-city residential training centers being established as part of the Nixon administration's overhaul of job-training programs. It is an encouraging result of second thoughts in Washington about sweeping abandonment of Job Corps centers like that which had operated at Kilmer for four years, but it is still a sharp comedown from what Kilmer had been providing.

Camp Kilmer had been training 1,700 men at a time, from several Eastern states, and at an investment of \$9 million a year. Now it's to enroll only 350 youths, most of them from Central New Jersey. It's staff, recently 600, will be down to 130.

What is more, the federal government, which turned Kilmer into a ghost camp a month ago, will now begin putting part of it back into shape. New faculty and trainees will have to be recruited, courses worked out anew, equipment adjusted. Not until September will the new center be ready for occupancy and full operation isn't expected before November.

While it is good to find Kilmer returning to usefulness in helping develop needed skills, we can regret once again that Washington did not thoroughly work out the adjustments in the first place. While supposedly motivated by a desire to save money, it is now involved in the additional expense of making buildings ready again. And in the process Kilmer's facilities will stand idle for up to five months, to the loss of young men whose training could have been continuing there.

CONSERVATION ECOLOGISTS ENDORSE SLEEPING BEAR DUNES NATIONAL LAKESHORE

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I am delighted to invite the attention of Senators to the support of the Michigan Association of Conservation Ecologists for the proposed Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore. MACE is an organization of professional ecologists working for the public interest in resource management.

At the May meeting of the MACE executive board, a statement of support for Sleeping Bear Dunes was adopted and the group resolved to work for establishment of the national lakeshore. This is further evidence of statewide united support for this needed conservation project.

My proposal and the bills sponsored in the House of Representatives by Representative JAMES O'HARA, Representative LUCIEN NEDZI, and Representative GUY VANDER JAGT, who represents the area concerned, seek to preserve the special features and qualities of this landscape without adverse impact on existing homes and communities. Our instrument to accomplish this is the national lakeshore, and the careful planning and control it can bring to the 61,000-acre area involved in these bills.

Mr. President, I welcome this further support for the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore and ask unanimous consent that the statement of the Michigan Association of Conservation Ecologists be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY MICHIGAN ASSOCIATION OF CONSERVATION ECOLOGISTS IN SUPPORT OF SENATE BILL 1023 TO ESTABLISH THE SLEEPING BEAR DUNES NATIONAL LAKESHORE

The Michigan Association of Conservation Ecologists (MACE) is an organization of 350 professional people working in the broad field of natural resources management. One of MACE's objectives is to assure that the public interest is best served in the management of our resources.

At the May Executive Board Meeting, MACE voted to work toward establishment of the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore. The following statement summarizes why we feel that prompt action must be taken.

The Michigan Association of Conservation Ecologists (MACE) agrees with the arguments advanced by others for immediate establishment of Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore. We find particularly pertinent the recognition of increasing recreational demands, the rising costs of land, and the threats of uses incompatible with the natural state of the area. Within those scientific disciplines in which we as ecologists feel particularly well-qualified, we recognize the unique geologic features of the Sleeping Bear Dunes and its surroundings. On this landscape, an unusual vegetative pattern has developed as a result of soil and climatic conditions. Especially dramatic are the contrasts found where the moving sand of the dunes adjoins a more stable forest floor.

If the vegetative and geologic contrasts of the area are to remain in their natural state within convenient proximity to each other improvements within the Sleeping Bear Dunes area must be adapted to the features of the landscape, not dictated by the caprices of ownership patterns. Furthermore, as in many areas where sandy soils are prevalent, these landscapes are especially vulnerable to disturbances. For instance, a ground-fire which removes the leaf litter and humus can so change the soil moisture and nutrient conditions that the entire plant community is changed to a more pioneer state for a prolonged period.

MACE recognizes that public ownership of contiguous areas is needed to assure that the attractive features of the Sleeping Bear Dunes region remain in their natural state and available for the enjoyment and enlightenment of everyone. Thus, we urge the establishment of the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore as proposed in Senate Bill 1023.

Respectfully submitted,
CARLOS FETTEROLF,
President.

THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS: WHO IS IN CHARGE?

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities represents the first serious effort on the part of our country to bring the United States into what a Washington Star editorial calls "the general civilized practice of the world in regard to the arts."

It all began in September 1965, with the enactment of legislation establishing the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities. Both endowments have raised our hope and expectations in the arts. Both endowments have done a remarkable job in the allocation of their meager funds. Both endowments have generated a renaissance in American culture. Yet, now, one of the endowments for the arts is being threatened by the lack of leadership. Roger Stevens who has further distinguished himself as chairman of this endowment for the past 4 years has vacated his position. Four months have passed, and President Nixon has failed to appoint a successor or reappoint Mr. Stevens.

Failure to fill this vacancy immediately will further disrupt the continuing of both endowments. The future of the arts in this country should not be at the disposal of a political decision that has to be cleared down through channels. This post and the momentum it has generated in the performing arts is too important for President Nixon to delay any further in his selection.

A Washington Star editorial makes this point quite clear. I ask unanimous consent that the editorial, entitled "A Man For the Arts," be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A MAN FOR THE ARTS

It is a rule of our democratic society that when the government is silent on any issue of general interest, the vacuum is immediately filled by the press, which advises the government on what it should do, warns the public on the perils of action or inaction and, most especially, publishes news of what the government has done, often with some ground for the reports.

In this spirit, it has been one of the journalistic treats of recent months to watch the appointing and then unappointing of a whole series of candidates for the position vacated by Roger Stevens as head of the National Council on the Arts.

Child actresses, newspaper publishers, department store tycoons, even museum directors, have come and gone in the busy swirl of a column. It's been fun, but it's beginning to pall.

This increasing exercise of natural gifts of invention indicates chiefly not a defect in journalism but one in government. The parade of appointments and firings really means—perhaps not consciously—that the government has been greatly remiss. The post is important, representing the first serious effort to bring the United States into the general civilized practice of the world in regard to the arts. Most nations have thought of the arts in the way we think of the aerospace industry, as something good for the country but not capable of supporting itself and therefore requiring government subsidy.

The importance of fast action is increased at this time of awareness of expense, even in the Pentagon. At such times such projects as the Council on the Arts are peculiarly liable to cutting back by congressmen not terribly art-minded. A chairman is desperately needed, and we urge the President to act immediately to fill the post so ably filled by Roger Stevens.

The fact is, of course, that nobody in the country is as well equipped to handle the job as is Mr. Stevens. What President Nixon really ought to do is reappoint the man who created the job to carry it forward.

OVERCROWDING AND US

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I invite the attention of the Senate to an excellent article published in the April 1969 issue of National Parks magazine. In this article, entitled "Overcrowding and Us," Dr. Paul Ehrlich, a biology professor at Stanford University, succinctly sets forth the grave problem of overpopulation facing this country as well as the rest of the world.

Mr. Louis Potter, of East Lansing, Mich., sent me Dr. Ehrlich's article and a letter in which he asks "when will our national leaders will have the courage and perception, and the sense of urgency regarding the problem, to speak out candidly and bring direction and purpose to meeting the crisis of the critical problem of overpopulation?" When, he asks, will we stop the insane arms race, pull out of the morass in Vietnam, and redirect our national priorities and energies toward our very survival? It is a timely question.

In our preoccupation with individual issues of the moment, we must step back in order to recognize the fundamental problem of population growth which lies behind so many of these individual problems. Dr. Ehrlich, in this article and in his recent book, "The Population Bomb," has offered us a careful, penetrating—and frightening—assessment of the problem we face. I hope that we have the sense of priority and national maturity to face this crisis now, to face it squarely without hiding the difficult issues under the rug any longer.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Potter's letter and Dr. Ehrlich's excellent article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EAST LANSING, MICH.,
June 21, 1969.

HON. PHILIP HART,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR HART: I am presuming to send you herewith a copy of an important article by Dr. Paul Ehrlich in the April, 1969, issue of National Parks Magazine. It is an article which should be read by every American over seventeen years of age, and I hope that you will take the time, within your very demanding schedule, to read it.

I am sure that many, many citizens wonder, as I do, when our national leaders will have the courage and perception, and the sense of urgency regarding the problem, to speak out candidly, and bring direction and purpose to meeting the crisis, on the critical problem of overpopulation. Will it be done before time runs out on us? When will we stop the insane arms race, pull out of the morass in Vietnam, and re-direct our national priorities and energies toward our very survival?

With much appreciation and esteem for your great work.

Sincerely,

LOUIS POTTER.

OVERCROWDING AND US

(By Paul R. Ehrlich)

Population pressure has been defined as "numbers threatening a value." By this standard, the United States is today a seething nexus of population pressures; virtually everything we value as the "American way of life" is currently being threatened by overpopulation. Yet very few Americans seem to be aware of the threat. Certainly, most informed Americans recognize that we are facing staggering problems—pollution, congestion, urban blight, resource depletion, overcrowded schools and courts, social unrest—the list goes on and on.

They are also aware that many areas of the world are facing a rapidly widening population-food gap. They know that people are starving to death every day, right now, and that the situation will probably get much worse in the very near future. These Americans will agree that India has a population problem, that Latin America and Southeast Asia have a population problem, even if they are a bit unsure just what should be done about it. But they *don't* think the United States has a population problem. All of our problems are environmental—with the proper action they could all be solved. Foresight and planning will allow us to provide for all future Americans. They assume the United States has the means to feed its increasing population for centuries to come—after all, we are paying farmers now *not* to grow food. And all those empty miles in Nevada, in Utah, in Arizona—we have lots of room for expansion. The population problem mentioned with increasing frequency by the news media is very foreign and distant, pertaining only to the far corners of the globe. It is really no concern of ours—except of course for our humanitarian desire to alleviate suffering among the less fortunate citizens of underdeveloped countries.

I must disagree. There is a growing number of signs that there are today already too many of us in the United States. We create more solid waste than we can dispose of, so it litters our landscape. We produce more sewage than we can treat, and along with myriad byproducts of our affluent society it pollutes our waters. We lower our water tables as we attempt to assuage our growing national thirst, permitting salt water to invade water-bearing strata. We ignore the principles of ecology when we cut forests, plow fields, and battle insect pests, thereby slowly ruining the food-producing capacity of our land. In many areas vehicular traffic is inexorably grinding to a halt as more and more people travel overcrowded streets and highways. The air in many cities is unfit to breathe; indeed, people are being advised to flee them if they wish to preserve their health. Parks, beaches, and resorts are mobbed. Ghettos and urban slums grow, and riots have become, like thunderstorms, a regular summer phenomenon. While the centers of our cities decay into uninhabitable slums, prime farmland is swallowed up by subdivisions. American babies suffer malnutrition, and some starve to death. There are not enough doctors to treat our population. Our schools are understaffed and overcrowded, as are hospitals and most other social agencies.

From rubbish to riots to starvation we are faced with an array of problems, all of which can be traced, at least in part, to too many people. That there are many other factors, and that any one of these problems, taken alone, might *theoretically* be solved without reducing the size of the population, is irrelevant. Few of our problems can be isolated, and none can *realistically* be solved without stopping our population growth.

After all, if our problems are in fact soluble without population control, why are they not being solved today? Smog is nothing new, and it is rapidly getting worse. Ghettos are nothing new, and neither is urban blight; but we see little improvement in either condition. Our water shortage and pollution problems have been recognized for decades, and yet they continue to grow worse. Indeed, our water problems are so severe that Dean Richard Jahns of Stanford's School of Earth Sciences recently said to me that the only remaining question was whether we will run out of water quantity or quality first. For years our highways have been jammed, our schools and hospitals overcrowded, and our resorts mobbed, despite continual efforts to relieve each of these situations. In our search for solutions we have insisted on considering each problem in isolation, ignoring its relationship with each of the others, and to population size. It is not surprising, then, that our attempted solutions fail. Continually increasing population, coupled with our incredible level of consumption, keeps the best efforts we are able to make far from adequate. Until the interrelationships of our problems are recognized and programs are adopted which include population control, our "solutions" are doomed to failure. A friend recently put it very well: "Whatever your cause, it is a lost cause without population control."

Americans, as individuals, show little sign of giving up the behavior patterns which, multiplied by 200 million, result in our current dilemma. These behavior patterns are based on deeply held beliefs and attitudes. One, of course, is the belief that every couple has the right to have as many children as it wishes and can afford. This "right" has deep social and religious bases, and is still considered to be taboo for discussion by most politicians and public officials. The most important issue of the day, population control, is seldom mentioned. I say the most important issue because the only other issue of similar magnitude is peace—and peace with an exploding population is as likely as Niagara Falls reversing itself.

Another fundamental attitude can be traced to the philosophy of the frontier. We have now exhausted all of the world's frontiers, and have no more vast new areas to settle and exploit, occasional nonsense about interplanetary colonization notwithstanding. We stew in our own effluents, and yet we act as if we could leave our ruined farmland, littered and polluted landscape and teeming cities and move on to a fresh frontier if we wished. Those days are gone forever, but the philosophy lives on in our behavior. As yet Americans have not made the ideological change necessary to living in a limited environment with limited resources.

Many Americans, however, do realize that we are running out of air, water, and other natural resources, and that we have no frontier to escape to. Unfortunately, that is where another dangerous false premise appears: our faith in Science and Technology. Overpopulation scares were wrong before—Science and Technology will save us again. Poison in the air? We'll invent new automobiles, filters, precipitators, and whatnot to clean it up. Running out of water? Nuclear power for desalting sea water, new methods of treating sewage, cloud seeding, and other vast public works will take care of that. Not enough food? We'll develop ways to grow crops in the sea, new high-yield grains, and perhaps new means of "creating" protein. Limited natural resources? New building materials, energy sources, and synthetics will solve that.

It all sounds so simple. But none of these things will come about soon enough or in quantity enough, even with a level of funding and cooperation unknown in the history of the nation. What are the chances that the consensus and the cash to attempt technological solutions will materialize? One need only

pick up a daily newspaper to read of the defeat of school bonds, the financial plight of urban transit proposals, the inability of state and federal governments to compel pollution abatement, of the lack of satisfactory techniques to cure our various social ills. This inaction is not the cause of our impending disaster, but it accelerates the arrival of the day of reckoning. The cause is unchecked population growth, with which no amount of money and technology can ultimately cope.

Of course, a major cause of the overpopulation of the United States is our economic philosophy. Our prosperity is believed to depend on a growing population and monumental waste. Population growth is hailed by businessmen and politicians alike as ensuring our economic future. Each new baby is viewed as a potential consumer of manufactured goods. In this day of automation, however, we must also learn to view each new baby as a potential member of the unemployed, an additional polluter, a user of irreplaceable resources, an increaser of crowds, and even a potential rioter. It is, in fact, likely that our population growth is a drag on our economy, just as population growth is unquestionably a drag on the economies of undeveloped nations. Some of our distinguished economists now feel that our capitalist system need not be fueled by an ever-growing population. Dr. J. J. Spengler has said: "In the future, economic growth will depend mainly upon invention, innovation, technical progress, and capital formation, upon institutionalized growth-favoring arrangements. Population growth will probably play an even smaller role than I have assigned it in earlier discussions. It is high time, therefore, that business cease looking upon the stork as a bird of good omen." The continuing success of our capitalistic system aside, it is futile to depend on population growth and resource depletion to support our economy indefinitely. Many vital resources are in limited supply and will eventually be exhausted. Furthermore, no biological population can continue to grow forever. For instance, continued human population growth at the present rate would raise the population density on Earth to some 1700 people per square yard in about 1000 years. Needless to say, we shall never reach this hypothetical density.

Recently, attempts to get Americans to act on the population problem have been impeded by irresponsible statements that the population explosion in the United States is over. These statements are based on statistics showing our birth rate to be at a record low—about 17 per thousand per year. There is an all-too-human tendency to grasp at any hopeful straw in a grim situation, and the low birth rate is just such a straw. Unfortunately, it is the difference between birth and death rates that is critical, not the rates themselves. Since our death rate now stands at about 9.5 per thousand per year, our population is increasing at a rate which will allow it to double in about 90 years. Those who cheer the recent decline in the birth rate should also remember that birth rates are changeable, like the weather. They have minor fluctuations as well as long-range changes, determined in no small degree by the state of the economy, wars, family-size fads, and so forth. The current low should no more be hailed as the end of our population explosion than should a warm December 26th be welcomed as the coming of spring. We are a long way from a stabilized population. In fact, our birth rate will almost certainly rise in the next few years, as the women born in the post World War II baby boom reach their peak reproductive years. We cannot continue to leave our population size fluctuations to chance, any more than we leave our economic growth to chance; there is too much at stake.

If the United States is overpopulated now, it is only logical to ask how many people this country should have. Unfortunately, there is no easy answer to this question. I once

hoped to start a discussion by throwing out 150 million as a suggested optimum population size for the United States. It is a size familiar enough to be "real" to most people. A population of that size is fully capable of running a highly technical, affluent society—our population was about that large in 1950. In an age of missiles 150 million Americans would be more than capable of defending themselves. We fought World War II with fewer people. Reducing our population to this size would reduce the pressure on irreplaceable resources and vital institutions, especially if the reduction were accompanied by an intelligent program aimed at restoring a liveable environment and maintaining the population in balance with that environment.

Ultimately we will be forced to reduce our population to a level much below 150 million. As the 20th Century Fund Survey U.S.A. and Its Economic Future put it: "... the United States now is definitely labeled as a have not country for many vital materials, a label it will have to live with in the years ahead." Unless a world disaster intervenes to end all population problems forever, we will rather quickly exhaust our supply of non-renewable natural resources, and we will have to find ways to live on renewable resources. We will be compelled to maintain a population size consistent with that requirement. And that day is coming sooner than many Americans realize. As famine strikes much of the rest of the world (estimated by agricultural experts William and Paul Paddock as most likely to occur in the mid-1970's) we will be denied many of the materials we now import. Starving nations are not going to be willing to send us raw materials when we are unable to send them food, and regardless of what some "experts" say we cannot hope to feed the entire world. Money will be worthless to these nations—they will be unable to buy food elsewhere, either. No one is so naive as to believe other nations will continue to supply us with the materials for our good life while they quietly starve.

The United States cannot avoid serious problems when other countries slip into massive famine. But starvation is just one potential consequence of the worldwide population-food-environment crisis, and the other consequences contain other, more deadly threats to our existence. If international pressures caused by massive starvation erupt into the holocaust of World War III, we will not be able to escape. If new deadly virus strains develop in the seething masses of hunger-weakened people or escape from our biological warfare laboratories, they will be quickly spread around the world by modern transport, and we will not escape. So, in addition to a fearsome array of domestic problems, all related to overpopulation, we are facing a really desperate worldwide situation, also due to overpopulation. We can ignore the world problem only at the peril of all mankind.

The United States is the world's richest nation, its greatest super-power. But all of this wealth and power will not permit it to remain aloof in this crisis. If there is to be any hope of getting the world through the coming crisis with civilization intact, the United States must assume the lead in taking drastic action immediately. This gives us one more urgent reason for decreasing our population. For us to succeed in persuading other people to decrease their birth rates we must be able to advocate "do as we are doing," not "do as we say." There are many who are eager to accuse us of racism or national interest to deny them ammunition for this attack, we must be doing what we demand of others.

FOR BUSINESSMEN ONLY: AN APPROACH TO SOLVING CRIME

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, "law and order" and "crime

in our streets" are overworked phrases in our present-day vocabulary. Americans are bombarded daily with news articles and speeches warning and alerting them, but little is offered in the way of constructive solutions.

Mr. Richard L. Gelb, president of Bristol-Myers Co., in a speech April 28, 1969, before the annual meeting of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, took a positive and constructive stance on the facts of crime. He outlined an approach needed from businessmen of this country to meet the challenge of reducing crime.

Industry as a whole should heed Mr. Gelb's call for support and, more important, involvement, in responsible crime control and correction. Their degree of participation will determine the quality of our society.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of Mr. Gelb's remarks be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CRIME: A BUSINESSMAN'S CHALLENGE

(By Richard L. Gelb)

I have very mixed feelings as I stand here before you today. On the one hand, I am rather overwhelmed at the honor of your invitation; on the other, I am saddened by the fact that this first luncheon meeting should have to be devoted to the problem of crime in our nation. Five years ago most of us were basically unaware of the impact of crime. Today you are not only aware of it but you want to do something about it. Across the country the amber light has finally changed—the signal is now green—we are ready to move against crime and against the breakdown of law and order. President Nixon signalled his continuing concern on April 23 in his message to Congress. The people through the ballot box and through the polls have already signalled their concern, and I am quite sure that the Attorney General will give you some very clear signals shortly.

How we may help is a more difficult question and before attempting any answer, I would like to make several brief observations concerning the special interest of business in the crime picture of our nation.

Today, for perhaps the first time, American business is facing up to the reality that crime is not just something in the movies or on TV, but rather, it is a fact of life which vitally affects American business in several ways.

Take costs—high crime costs in high taxes—our crime control system now costs more than four billion dollars a year. That figure is equal to roughly 5 per cent of all American business profits in 1968. High crime rates cost people higher prices—all of you are aware of the impact organized crime has on any business which it controls. For the first time the public is becoming equally aware of the problem. Crime reduces our market. Fear of crime causes people to stay at home. One study in the Crime Commission Report indicated that 43 per cent of the people in some areas of this country stay off the streets after dark. Crime inhibits business expansion. A company moves out of a city not because it wants to but because its women employees are afraid to walk the streets at night. Crime can mean the difference between a profit or a loss. The Firemen's Fund Insurance Company stated that 30 per cent of all business failures was due to theft by the employees of those companies. Finally and most important, the businessman personally, as a citizen, deplores crime. He often lives and usually works

in the city. What does it avail him—or anyone in fact—to build a career and an income if he must live in fear of becoming a crime victim. Money is no good if you live in a jungle.

Less than two years ago, I was grateful for the opportunity to present a businessman's view of crime and law enforcement to our nation's top police officials.

I urged these leaders to call upon their counterparts in business, to adopt their techniques and practices where needed and invoke the might, power and influence of business in this common effort.

Today I say to you that the time has come for us as citizens and particularly as businessmen, to take measures to defend against crime. What we must do is take part in an effective organized control strategy against crime. This is the only way to create an impact. It is not just a case of new devices, or more policemen, or larger jails. The entire criminal justice system needs a strengthening which it cannot achieve without our full support and participation.

As with any new endeavor it is difficult to know how to begin and specifically what to do. In this regard I would like to draw on my experience as a Trustee of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency in presenting what I believe are effective action suggestions—things that you can actually do and thereby know that the results of your actions will be felt—particularly with the desirable multiplier effect resulting from action in almost every community in America which is represented in this room. Each such community must invoke an additional multiplier by using the leverage of the organizations in which you are active in order to spread the word. You are the men and women who will motivate the activities of your Chambers of Commerce, Church Groups, Rotary, School Boards, Planning Boards and other civic organizations.

1. The businessman can begin this effort right at home in his plant or place of business. Most of us never think of the possible consequences of having a seemingly innocuous employee taking bets at work. Many of us would be shocked to think it exists. Some of us are apt to be permissive about what seems to be just a little gambling. But "on premises" gambling can lead to trouble and those who are familiar with even the rudiments of organized crime will be able to prophesize the probable results of such activities.

Organized crime is not limited to gambling. Next comes loan sharking. Some employees who bet go broke and inevitably seek to borrow money. The mob knows this and has a ready lender who not only has been waiting to lend the money but is also waiting to exert the pressure that follows non-payment. What happens next is limited only by the imagination.

Good inside information can lead to hijacking, extortion or successful payroll stick-ups. It is difficult to defend yourself against crime's fifth column—the enemy within your own ranks—and you are inviting him in when you have criminal activity, especially gambling, taking place on your premises.

2. As businessmen and respected members of the community you can exert political power. Help prevent the election of politicians who look the other way when it comes to illegal gambling or other criminal activities.

If we are going to do this job of fighting crime, we must get rid of corruption in government at all levels as a starter.

3. The businessman can use his financial strength as a lever to fight crime. For example, a large corporation was planning to move into a California City. So was organized crime. The corporation had warned city officials and business leaders "if the mob comes in, we stay out." The community kept the mob out.

Before going into a city determine if it is

in the clutches of organized crime. Is the criminal justice system a good one? You will have a big stake in that community and these questions are every bit as important as whether or not there is a good school system, good transportation or an adequate labor supply.

4. As businessmen, we can make our weight felt when local governmental budgets are drawn up to make sure that the criminal justice system gets its share. Alone, but more effectively through the Chamber or other business groups, we can press for appropriations to do something about poorly paid police, understaffed criminal courts and ineffective correctional programs. A sound criminal justice system is as important to your city as any other governmental service.

5. Businessmen can help gear their trade associations to become a stronger anti-crime force. Although trade associations and the Chamber cannot and should not get into the crime business, they can encourage and stimulate programs and seminars to educate and draw the blueprints for action with regard to the other points about which we are speaking.

6. The businessman can become a valuable resource for law enforcement agencies. Such help is offered to almost every other branch of government. The knowledge we have, and which we have so often given to other branches of government, of sound management and administrative principles should be made available to our own local law enforcement agencies.

7. You can shape crime control legislation. Your influence with legislators at each level can make a difference. A lack of such interest and contact by you shows that you really don't care.

8. As businessmen we can help provide opportunities for offenders so they are not forced onto the treadmill of crime. On his own, a businessman can employ released offenders. He can permit work-release programs to operate in his plant. He can urge others to endorse and adopt such programs.

9. The businessman can encourage his friends and associates to undertake crime control projects.

In your fight against crime, not only must you get involved, but you must get others involved. The National Council on Crime and Delinquency has compiled a list of fifty citizen action projects which show individual citizens how to effectively engage in combating crime and delinquency in their communities.

Let's sum up the nine ways you can actively fight crime:

1. Clean house.
2. Use your political power.
3. Use your financial strength.
4. Support a better criminal justice system.
5. Get your business and civic organizations involved.
6. Make yourself available to law enforcement agencies.
7. Support anti-crime legislation.
8. Support new ideas.
9. Get your associates, your employees, your friends and your family involved.

One final word on what you and your community can do and should do. It stems from this recommendation of the President's Crime Commission dated March, 1967 and I quote, "... all of the city's activities against crime should be planned together, by a single body. The police, the courts, the correctional system and the non-criminal agencies of the community must plan their actions against crime jointly if they are to make real headway."

In response to that suggestion in New York City that same month Mayor Lindsay created the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council to act as a single planning body for crime control measures and for the reform of the administration of criminal justice in New York City. The Council has

about sixty members, half representing public agencies and half from the private sector. The work that it is doing is innovative and action oriented and in just eighteen months we have made radical improvements in the criminal justice system. I mention it today only to let you know that we have knowledge and experience in New York City that has been developed, not in a laboratory but rather in a city that is perhaps more heavily involved in all kinds of crime than any other. I know that we have already shared this information with some cities. Mayor Lindsay has asked me to tell you that when and if your city is ready to move ahead in this area our city will make whatever knowledge we have available to you.

Today our country is grievously afflicted by a problem which daily grows larger. This affects our businesses. But far more important, it affects the quality of life in America. It engenders fear, distrust, lack of faith in government. It is not a good climate for business; it is not a good climate for living.

If we are to change this situation, all of us will have to get involved. You, as business leaders are in the vanguard of every important social effort in the country; you will have to take leadership roles in this field, too.

Our nation has grown great and strong, not because we relied solely on government, but because of the determination, the skill, and the courage of our private citizens. Now we must use the same qualities and apply them in safeguarding what we have built. This is why I urge you to get involved in responsible efforts to control crime—to make this a peaceful and safe and just society.

RECESS

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess subject to call of the Chair, but not later than 1 p.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Thereupon (at 12 o'clock and 12 minutes p.m.), the Senate took a recess subject to the call of the Chair.

At 1 o'clock p.m., the Senate reassembled, when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. GOLDWATER in the chair).

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Chair recognizes the Senator from Maine.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield, without losing her right to the floor?

Mrs. SMITH. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. EAGLETON in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, I speak in favor of this bill and I commend the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee for his able and comprehensive presentation. Senator STENNIS has stated well the actions of the Armed Services Committee which devoted so many weeks to the consideration of this important legislation.

The authorization for the procurement of major weapons, research and development, and reserve strength is a matter of significant importance this year and I urge Senate passage.

In speaking in favor of this legislation I speak in the interests of our national security. At a time when it has become fashionable to question, challenge, and defy defense spending I urge a word of caution to those who would emasculate our Nation's defense posture.

In pressing for passage of this bill I am not unmindful of the many ills that plague the Nation. I am keenly aware of our economic and fiscal problems and the need to match the Federal budget against a selective list of national priorities.

There are no instant solutions to our perplexing domestic problems and by the same token there are no instant solutions to countering the threat in a troubled world. I ask the Members to consider my remarks in the light of those realities in which we live, the actual world we are experiencing today and not the utopia that we would all like to see.

I recommend that in the deliberation of this bill extreme care and thought be given to the complexities of modern arms production. Also I ask that the members examine well the need to provide the time necessary for development of modern weaponry.

The provisioning of adequate aircraft, missiles, ships and other major items is far more complicated than authorizing and appropriating. The modern arsenal of today and more particularly that of the next decade require extensive and painstaking investigation. The lead time for deployment of these modern arms has multiplied manifold. The range of uncertainties in fabrication to insure reliability will not be lessened by postponement and incremental funding.

The high defense costs are repugnant to many Americans just as they are to me. But this is another fact of life that is no less real and I prefer to pay the price and avoid gambling with our security.

In my 29 years of congressional service I have strongly supported our nation-

al research and development programs and I will continue to do so. I did not favor cuts in research which were made in the Armed Services Committee.

The strategic advantage long held by the United States begins to disappear in 1969. Certainly on the rapid rate to achieve parity by the Soviets the balance may dip in the early 1970's. Until now we have maintained a viable military deterrent. I attribute this considerable achievement to our research and development effort.

In urging passage of this measure I caution those who would cut or curtail our strategic offensive capability. There has been much criticism of what was done wrong. I do not condone misfeasance, nonfeasance or malfeasance. But lest they lose sight of our destination, those desperate-minded critics should stop and pause for a reassessment. Heaping scorn on the Pentagon and making our uniformed personnel the scapegoats for our national and international ills represents the cynicism of those very elements that threaten our property, our institutions, and our lives. This critical chorus does little to enhance public confidence and does much to obscure the realities of 1969.

Mr. President, for the foreseeable future a strong military posture remains absolutely essential to our national survival. The recommendations of the Armed Services Committee on the offensive weapons of the future were decided upon only after a most searching examination of the threat and the alternatives. To delay or delete the aircraft and naval vessels contained in the bill is to settle for obsolescence. Cuts or deferrals in these areas is tantamount to acceptance of mediocrity.

Everyone must know the avowed goal of the Kremlin and Peking masters and we all know that the United States is the only nation that has denied them the attainment of their objective. Since we have accepted the challenge of leadership in this conflict of ideologies I, for one, will not support a policy of diminishing returns. I cannot in good conscience support a reduction of our offensive capability and a relinquishment of our technical superiority.

Mr. President, most assuredly it is a costly process but our cherished freedoms were not purchased at the bargain counter. Those who oppose us have always had a very high esteem for our offensive strategic forces. I strongly urge that we meet these needs now if we are to fulfill our national aspirations. I think America is equal to the task. Mr. President, I urge passage of this legislation.

In closing, I want to say a few words in defense of the muchly maligned military officers of our Nation. They are currently the favorite whipping boy of critics who have shared neither their responsibilities, experiences, sacrifices, nor risks.

Today they are the No. 1 targets just as the State Department's careerists were in the early 1950's when varying numbers of State Department personnel were accused of being card-carrying Communists.

In 1950 I spoke in defense of the State Department personnel who were being

smear from this immunity-cloaked Senate Chamber with tactics of half-truths, guilt-by-association, trial by accusation, and other techniques against which those smeared had no adequate way in which to defend themselves and prove their innocence.

Recently I have read some commentaries concluding that our country was returning to those days of the smears. I think we have already returned and just as I defended the smeared State Department personnel nearly two decades ago, now I want to defend the castigated military personnel of today.

Why are they being attacked? The answer to this question is very simple. Many want to find a scapegoat for the long, drawn-out, and unpopular Vietnam war. They have selected the military to be the scapegoat. They seek to blame the Vietnam war on the military. They seek to place the military in the role of the devil and of evil men who have no concern for the very critical, urgent and desperate domestic problems here at home.

How quickly we forget the military after they have successfully defended our Nation. But in this case, the most amazing aspect of the vitriolic attacks on the military stemming from weariness and concern about the Vietnam war is the failure to do the honest thing and recognize that this has not been a war of their choosing nor of their direction.

They did not make the decisions to intervene in Vietnam. Those decisions were made by their civilian bosses. They did not make the decisions to expand, intensify and escalate the war. Those decisions were made by their civilian bosses.

They did not make the decisions to observe sanctuaries from which the enemy could regroup and resupply to attack again—and even from which the enemy could shoot. Their civilian bosses made those decisions.

It was not the military who misled the public with such irresponsible optimistic statements that the boys would be back home from Vietnam by Christmas 3 or 4 years ago. It was not the military that was so tragically wrong in such estimates about ending the war. It was their civilian bosses who were so tragically wrong in evaluation and estimates of the enemy. It was their civilian bosses who made the unjustified optimistic predictions that ultimately undermined public confidence in the credibility of our Government.

Make no mistake about it, the military not only did not make the decisions, but their advice was repeatedly rejected and scorned and deprecated. Make no mistake about it, the military was derogated by their civilian bosses and subjected to open contempt by the decisionmaking "whiz kids."

Now, attempts are being made to make the military the scapegoats for the disastrous decisions made by their civilian bosses through the elite, but woefully inexperienced "whiz kids."

Make no mistake about it, the military has only been following the orders of the civilian bosses. Make no mistake about it, the military has not been formulating strategy and tactics as in past wars. In-

stead the strategy, and even the battlefield tactics, have been devised by their civilian bosses.

Make no mistake about it, the mistakes that have been made are the mistakes of the civilian bosses rather than the military.

Yet, the pattern has been always to credit the civilian bosses with any successes and to blame the military for any failures. This has even extended to the most recent withdrawal proposal advocated by former Secretary of Defense Clifford.

For actually the proposal advanced by Mr. Clifford is really a basic plan that General Westmoreland proposed some time ago but for which he has been given no credit.

Mr. President, we are all weary and tired and frustrated with the Vietnam war. But in that weariness, discouragement, and frustration, I plead that all of us strive for greater perspective. I plead that instead of making the military a whipping boy for decisions, policies, and actions of its civilian bosses that we all take a good hard look at ourselves and ask if we have any responsibility for what has happened.

I see no more justification for the intense campaign against the military now than for the intense campaign against the State Department personnel back in the early 1950's.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Maine yield?

Mrs. SMITH. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. I want especially to thank the Senator from Maine for her long contribution to the problems and work of our committee and particularly with reference to the bill. We began working on it in January, giving it a great deal of time from then until now. The Senator from Maine is always constructive in her approaches and in her remarks, and is always frank in her counsel and is always well informed. That means a great deal. She deserves special credit. The committee is indebted to her. I am even more indebted to her as the committee chairman.

I commend the Senator from Maine for a very fine, pointed speech which sums up the needs for our security and the proper approach, I think, toward reaching sound decisions on the items to which she refers.

I am pleased, too, that she made the remarks she did about our professional military men. I hold no special brief for them. I am not connected with them in any personal way. I admire them greatly for the hard decisions they make and the heavy responsibilities they often carry. I am proud to be a part of a country that can afford such men.

I include in these remarks the fine young men who have been fighting in Vietnam. This country has never been represented on the battlefield by a finer group of young Americans.

I shall have something more to say about personnel later, but at this time I want especially to commend the distinguished Senator from Maine once more, and thank her for her very fine, unselfish work.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, I want to express my deep appreciation to the distinguished chairman and our able colleague. It has been a very great privilege to work with him. I have a good teacher in him.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Maine yield?

Mrs. SMITH. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Florida.

Mr. HOLLAND. I should like to say to the distinguished Senator from Maine that I, too, am happy to have heard that portion of her speech which I was able to be present to hear. Her speech was fine, inspiring, and uplifting.

It should remind us of some of the things we need to recall. One of them is with respect to the limitation of our objective in the Vietnam war, that the military certainly did not make that decision. To them it was an almost unknown thing to have their objective so limited. It was our own national policy in foreign matters, the decision of our leaders in the field of foreign affairs from the President right on down who were responsible for that decision. I think we should always remember that.

We here in the Senate have a particular reason to remember that the passage—almost unanimously—of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was an assumption of our responsibility in the matter, which we should never forget. It certainly was not the act of the Armed Forces.

I appreciate so much the speech of the distinguished Senator from Maine. As always, we find in her expressions of conscience—the conscience of a gentle but firm New Englander—an uplifting experience for all of us.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, I deeply appreciate the very generous words of my able colleague and friend from Florida.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Maine yield?

Mrs. SMITH. I am happy to yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I should like to congratulate the distinguished ranking minority member of the committee for having carefully and clearly delineated a condition that all of us should be conscious of at all times but which, unfortunately, in the complexities of our society today, we sometimes tend to forget.

Sometimes, when things happen which we like, the honor goes to the wrong place.

Sometimes, in matters with which we are not too well pleased, the blame is put in the wrong place.

I can think of no one more capable of explaining this complex problem in clearer terms than the distinguished Senator from Maine has just done.

I think her speech is timely. It is important, and I should like again to congratulate most heartily my distinguished colleague.

Let me say one other thing, that as a new member of the committee involved in this particular bill, it has been one of the most gratifying experiences of my life to serve under the distinguished chairman, and under the distinguished

ranking minority member. It has been the finest exhibition of the committee system in action. I give most of the credit to the two leaders, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) and the Senator from Maine (Mrs. SMITH).

Again, I thank her very much for her fine presentation and associate myself with her remarks.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, I want to thank my good friend and able colleague from California for his kind words. It has been a very great privilege to have had seven colleagues on my side of the table present most of the time, and always present at the hearings that were held. The senior Senator from California has made an invaluable contribution to the work of the committee.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Maine yield?

Mrs. SMITH. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I take this opportunity, on the occasion of the speech of our distinguished ranking minority member on the Armed Services Committee, to commend the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, the Honorable JOHN STENNIS, our chairman, and Senator MARGARET CHASE SMITH, from Maine, our distinguished ranking minority member on the Armed Services Committee.

They have conducted the hearings in a most fair and impartial manner at all times. They have given every member of the committee an opportunity to voice his opinion. They have given every member an opportunity to serve on important subcommittees at great sacrifice, particularly to the distinguished ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee, Mrs. SMITH.

I certainly want to commend them and to say at this time, that as a new member of that committee, it has been a great privilege to work with them. At all times, they have displayed the best kind of leadership qualities of any chairman or ranking member, I am sure, of any committee in the Senate. And they have done this in spite of the voluminous work they have had put before that committee.

I certainly want to associate myself with the words spoken by Senator SMITH so far as the armed services are concerned. I think what she said needed to be said. I think the Nation should know those are the facts. If there is criticism, the criticism should not be directed to the professional members of the armed services, because in our form of government it is the civilian branch of the Government which makes the ultimate policymaking decisions. We want to keep it that way. We certainly do not want at any time to use the military as a scapegoat for our mistakes or as a target for our mistakes.

So I associate myself with those statements, and I commend the Senator from Maine for bringing them before the Senate and the Nation. I commend her for the entire statement. I say to her and to the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) that I am honored to have the opportunity to serve with them on this important committee.

Mrs. SMITH. I am grateful to my able colleague from the State of Massachusetts. It has been a pleasure to have had him on the committee and to have had the benefit of his wise and respected opinions. I am grateful to him.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mrs. SMITH. I yield.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, the fine compliments that I have just heard rendered in favor of the distinguished senior Senator from Maine recall the occasions when I had the pleasure of hearing the distinguished Senator from Maine when she was then an honorable Congresswoman from Maine. To my colleagues who have been making these eloquent statements let me say that they have had a privilege which I have enjoyed since the time when the senior Senator from Maine and I were Members of the other body. I share in the fine sentiments expressed with respect to her speech and her service.

I rose to ask the distinguished and charming Senator from Maine to yield for the purpose of addressing some thoughts with respect to a sentiment or view she has expressed in her speech, which I have followed word by word in its entirety. The Senator expressed support and interest in the necessity of preserving and having a viable deterrent. I wish to endorse fully her views in that regard and to associate myself with those views.

In this nuclear age, in this era in which great nations have the power to obliterate each other, and to destroy civilization in the Northern Hemisphere, there can be no victor in a nuclear war. In an all-out exchange between the United States and Russia, they would lose, we would lose, the world would lose, all would be lost. So in such a tragic and dangerous situation, the only practical and viable defense strategy—peace strategy—is, as the Senator, in my view, has said, to preserve a viable deterrent, a deterrent which will prevent the Soviets, or any other nuclear power that might sometime achieve such a power of destruction, from initiating a nuclear war against us.

I think the able senior Senator from Maine will agree with the senior Senator from Tennessee that the United States has no intention of initiating a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union. So the way to prevent a nuclear war, and thus preserve peace and freedom and life for all the American people, is to prevent a nuclear war by deterrence. Deterrence, in my view, as I expressed in the Senate late one evening this week, is of two parts: First, the power to retaliate with the destruction of a nation that might level a nuclear attack upon us; and, second, the will to use that power in retaliation if we should be so attacked.

That being the case, I go then to another part of the Senator's speech, if she will be so kind and tolerant as to yield to me a moment further. That is to preserve the offensive power necessary for such a viable deterrence.

Mr. President, though I do not now wish to draw the able Senator into a discussion of the ABM issue, just let me say

that the proposed ABM weapons system does not fit into this strategy. The ABM would be purely a defensive mechanism, designed to shoot down—maybe—some incoming nuclear missiles. This is not something that, in my opinion, would deter the Soviets from initiating a war. It would seem reasonable to conclude that the Soviets would not be likely to be any more apprehensive about U.S. ABM weapons than we are now apprehensive of Soviet ABM's. What they fear, or would fear in event an attack upon us should be under consideration, is the power of retaliation against them. This, then, makes very pertinent the remarks of the very able Senator, in the opinion of the senior Senator from Tennessee, of the necessity of preserving a viable deterrence.

In this age of danger and technology and capability of total destruction, it is necessary, in my view, as the Senator from Maine has said, to keep a viable deterrent. I think we have it. I think the Soviets know we have the power to retaliate with their destruction. We want to be sure also that they believe we have the will to do so.

I thank the able Senator for yielding to me.

Mrs. SMITH. I want to thank the distinguished Senator from Tennessee for his observations. I especially appreciate such generous words from one with whom I have worked for so many years, in both the House and the Senate and for whom I have such high regard.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mrs. SMITH. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, we who live in the West have always been charmed by the people from New England. They go away back into our early history. We often wonder what it is about these people from the Northeast part of our country that makes them so acceptable to all of us. It is something past their charm, attractiveness, and gentleness. Today we have an example of what I have been trying to ascertain, which for a long time I have suspected was true. It is the honesty of these people, as expressed and exemplified by the distinguished senior Senator from Maine (Mrs. SMITH), their ability to say what they want to say, and say it quickly. I think to have such a speech as this made in such a short time is a fine example of that quality.

I compliment the Senator from Maine, who is my leader on the minority side of the committee, for what she has said here today, and for the very persuasive and precise way in which she has said it. I associate myself particularly with that portion of her remarks which pertains to the protection of the men in uniform.

It has been my pleasure to have served with the Senator from Maine on this committee in the years before I took a little leave, and it is my pleasure to serve with her once again. I look forward to enjoying that pleasure for years to come; and I thank the Senator for her very able and honest remarks.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, I wish to express my deep appreciation to my able and distinguished colleague from Ari-

zona. Words such as his, coming from one who knows people well, mean a great deal to me. We are very pleased to have him back on the committee. He has been of tremendous help to us.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mrs. SMITH. I am happy to yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to join my colleagues in what they have said about the speech just made by the distinguished Senator from Maine. I noted that she recalled, indirectly, her declaration of conscience made almost two decades ago, and tied it in with an attempt which is seemingly being made by some elements in this country today against the military.

One thing about the Senator from Maine is that she has always been candid. She wastes few words, which I think is a New England characteristic, and always comes to the point. I want her to know that, as one who served as a seaman second class in the Navy, a private in the Army, and a private first class in the Marine Corps, I agree with her remarks about the attacks being made against the military at this time.

I do think that the military has made plenty of mistakes; but I believe, as the Senator has indicated she believes, that what they have been doing is carrying out policy and assignments laid down, in large part, by their civilian superiors, not only in the executive branch, but also in the Senate and the House of Representatives because we, in the Congress, did not exercise enough supervision, authority, and responsibility. Because of that, I believe that Members of this body should not find too much fault with what the military has done on the basis of what their superiors in the civilian areas of this Government have suggested, requested, or ordered.

When a man puts on a uniform, he undertakes a most serious obligation; and to the best of my knowledge, our men, regardless of their rank, have done a good job in looking after the interests of this Nation, in carrying out their responsibilities and obligations as good citizens; and if they have made mistakes in the awarding of contracts and in carrying out various kinds of assignments, that is to be expected, as mistakes will be made by all elements in our population.

I join the Senator in emphasizing the fact that the mistakes made by the military, policywise and otherwise, have in many instances been the fault of the executive branch and of Congress; and if we are going to lay around the blame, it is my very strong belief that we should look first at the mote in our own eye, look at the policies laid down by the executive branch, and share the blame as equitably as possible, and not place upon the military the blame for all the ills which beset this country.

Vietnam is bad enough. It is worse than bad enough; it is a tragedy. We should never have become involved there. But the military did not get us involved except incidentally, because the responsibility and the authority did not lie with them.

I would hope that this mania which seems to be affecting some portions of

our population as far as the military is concerned would realign itself, stabilize itself, and look at the facts for what they are, not seeking scapegoats, but rather cures for illnesses which may exist, and which may be cured or may in the future be prevented.

I again thank the distinguished author of the declaration of conscience for the fine speech she has made today, and for giving all of us the benefit of her remarks and recommendations.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, it has been a very great privilege to have served with the majority leader in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. As always, he is most understanding and most kind; and even though we are on opposite sides of the aisle, I have always found we are much in agreement on very many issues. I thank the Senator very kindly.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, it is a pleasure for me to commend Senator MARGARET CHASE SMITH for her fine statement today in defense of the military. I endorse her views, and I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Maine for speaking up for our men and women in uniform.

Mr. President, I plan to make a substantial statement at the first opportunity in support of our Armed Forces. My colleagues and I are as concerned as other Americans about our defense costs. We are equally concerned about our military who are responsible for our Nation's security. It is time to put the blame where it belongs, and I intend to do so in my address in the very near future.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, it was my privilege to chair the special Subcommittee on Research and Development appointed to help the full Armed Services Committee in its consideration of the Department of Defense authorization bill.

I want to compliment the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS). He has, as we all know, assumed the chairmanship of this great committee after the years of distinguished leadership given it by the senior Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL).

The Senator from Mississippi quickly proved his capacity for carrying out this difficult task by vigorously moving ahead to deal with the problems presented by the authorization bill we are now considering. He made great strides in opening up sources of information to Members which were not available to them in other than highly classified form in previous years. He appointed subcommittees to probe the key parts of this proposed legislation. He conducted a long series of hearings, including those on ABM, so that the members of the committee, and, where possible, the public, could be educated in the important facts and figures concerning our defense posture. And he was able to bring to the Senate an authorization bill that insures the security and defense of the Nation while still effecting needed economies.

I want to say a word of praise, too, for the distinguished Senator from Maine (Mrs. SMITH), who is the ranking Republican on the committee. Her knowledge and understanding have always

been of enormous assistance to all who serve on the committee.

It was my pleasure to work with the Senator from Ohio (Mr. YOUNG); the Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD); the Senator from California (Mr. MURPHY); the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE); and Everette L. Harper, of the Armed Services Committee staff, in carrying out this assignment.

The subcommittee was asked to study the research, development, testing, and evaluation budget and to make judgments on funding levels for research and exploratory projects, social and behavioral sciences research, and systems calling for sharp increases in research and evaluation funding for fiscal year 1970 and R. & D. and developmental increases in the future.

The committee found here, Mr. President, a great deal of work that needs to be done in the future. But I wish to stress right here that the subcommittee took a long, strong, and hard look at these various aspects.

To be completely fair, time was working against us. We took a look, as I state later on in my remarks, at about 20 projects of significance. We spent about 40 hours in briefings in depth, questioning the governmental witnesses, Government scientists and experts; and I do not deny the fact that at many times it was a labyrinth that caused at least this Senator to find many stairs and avenues leading into passages where it was difficult to discern the light. But we did look, and we looked hard.

Specifically, the subcommittee was called upon to examine the request for authority to obligate about \$8 billion for defense R.D.T. & E.

This figure represented more than a third of the authorization bill as originally submitted by Secretary Laird.

Needless to say, Mr. President, this budget presented the subcommittee with a most demanding challenge.

It is difficult enough to make judgments on the procurement program, but in that category, programs are reasonably well defined, costs can be estimated with some degree of hopeful certainty, and the military requirement for the weapon system under consideration has been validated. Detailed studies have been completed on available alternatives, and the Defense Department has recommended specific courses of action.

This is not the case with research and development, for research and development operates at the very frontiers of technological uncertainty.

I want the Senate to know that it was thoroughly impressed upon the committee as we started work that the one great advantage our country has in our competition with the Soviet Union is that we have a strong technological base. Nothing we are doing here or recommending undermines that, in my opinion.

The burden of responsibility borne by this subcommittee is attested to by the fact that, operating in the absence of firm decision factors, judgments had to be made on today's research and development efforts which would determine the limits of our deployment options 8, 10, or 12 years from now.

The budget for R.D.T. & E. covers a spectrum of responsibility ranging from the maintenance of a technological base to the deployment of weapon systems, and beyond that to the updating and modernization of existing weapons systems.

To make valid judgments on those considerations, the subcommittee attempted to follow the guidelines set down by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering—but within the broader framework of simultaneously considering other national priorities.

Dr. Foster's guidelines were:

Consider the total range of uncertainties and make decisions on programs to provide all reasonable hedges against possible new needs or changes in threat. We continuously make a series of calculations starting with intelligence to compare our own estimated leadtime with the worst case for the deployment leadtime of a potential enemy. We carry out R. & D. to provide all reasonable options. We deploy either when there is a clear, actual or imminent threat or when we cannot insure against our uncertainty with only a R. & D. program.

Dr. Foster admits that this is a low-risk policy. By low-risk policy, I mean low risk to the people and the peace and security of the American people. Dr. Foster explains it in these words:

Where threat information is adequate, we invest in amounts sufficient to meet the threat. Where information is inadequate and uncertainty high, we run some risks of overinvestment to insure that our capability will be adequate, that it is sure to fulfill our strategic objectives.

Now the low-risk policy is a logical policy if viewed from the traditional disposition to err on the side of strength when it comes to matters of national security. It is also a very expensive policy.

But all of us in this distinguished body are aware of the tremendous drain on our national resources made by today's truly staggering defense requirements, and none of us is unaware of the crying domestic needs unmet because of defense demands.

The matter of national priorities had to be considered, and it was the subcommittee's consensus that the low-risk policy afforded some cushion for realistic budget cuts that would not jeopardize security.

Still another factor helped determine the operating procedures of the subcommittee. That factor was time.

The subcommittee was created on February 28, 1969. At the outset it was determined that it would be impractical, because of time limitations, to make a detailed examination of the thousands of line items in the budget.

Instead, the subcommittee elected to test the integrity of the decisionmaking process. We looked for soft spots in the R.D.T. & E. program. We looked for interservice duplication or parallel developments leading toward the same or similar weapon systems as an end product. We examined the operational requirements for which some costly systems were being developed with a view toward measuring the ultimate cost against the priority. We found that a number of systems proposed for development did not

stand up to a searching analysis in these terms.

It was the conclusion of our subcommittee that in a number of cases—even if a system were successfully developed at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars—it would not enjoy a high enough priority for development to compete for funds with other costly and vitally needed operational systems.

Where the subcommittee was able clearly to identify such doubtful programs we recommended reduction, stretchout, or outright cancellation of the project.

In the course of its considerations, the subcommittee devoted more than 40 hours to 19 briefings from the committee staff, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and members of his staff, the CIA, and military departments. Subcommittee members also heard testimony before the full committee by officials of the Department of Defense and the military departments and closely examined the witnesses on research and development activities.

I am sure the other members of the subcommittee share my appreciation of the generous allocation of time for such questioning that was afforded us by the chairman of the full committee.

The Senate knows what it means when the chairman of a committee gives a generous allocation of time for presentation. The chairman of the full committee, the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) afforded us a generous time allocation.

The material the subcommittee obtained from its briefings, from the full committee hearings, and from reports provided by the Defense Department and other sources led to certain conclusions.

First, it was apparent that there were a number of programs where R.D.T. & E. efforts in one service did indeed parallel those under development in another service. In these areas the subcommittee determined that stretchout or an outright elimination of R. & D. would not seriously hamper the defense mission.

Examples would be the Army and Navy heavy-lift helicopter programs and the radar programs of the Air Force AWACS and Navy E2C projects. The subcommittee recommended that the Army heavy-lift helicopter program, \$15 million, and the Navy E2C radar program, \$66 million, be deleted, a total reduction of \$81 million.

Let me give you the essence of our reasoning for these cancellations:

We did not believe the Army heavy-lift helicopter development was justified. Because of the enormous estimated cost per copy—\$15 million each—of this machine we felt it was extremely doubtful that it could compete with other high priority deployments for the heavy funding required in the mid-1970's.

The HLH appears to be designed to operate on a permissive battlefield, yet it is not at all clear that this would be the environment the Army would face in the mid-1970's.

This is one of the things I want to stress. As defense scientists and military planners see these threats coming over

the horizon, they develop a counter, and at first the budget just creeps along a million or two; and then suddenly the decisional process is at work, and we find the \$1, \$2, or \$3 million suddenly escalating to \$15 or \$20 million. Then, if you look down the road far enough and say, "Well, when the time comes that you want to deploy this weapon, what is it going to cost?" Sometimes those figures are staggering. This is one of the things the subcommittee learned.

While only \$15 million is required for R. & D. funding for the HLH in fiscal year 1970, the funding requirements would escalate sharply within the next few years. This year appeared to be the decision point at which maximum savings could be achieved.

Moreover, it was felt that a large portion of the Army's requirements for heavy-lift helicopters can be met by its existing flying crane, or if necessary, by procurement of Navy heavy-lift helicopter equipment.

On the other hand, it was felt that the Navy/Marine requirement for battlefield recovery of disabled helicopters in Vietnam was necessary and could be met by a much less ambitious Navy heavy-lift helicopter program that could be completed and deployed on a much more timely schedule.

The Navy was requesting this year \$5 million in R.D.T. & E. for its heavy-lift helicopter. The Army was requesting \$15 million. Even though the word "commonality" is sort of out of place right now, the subcommittee said, "Why isn't there a common design here?" We necessarily found, as we talked to the Navy and Army experts, that there were different specifications, different areas of accomplishment, in which they were interested. But the Navy helicopter was within the state of the art. The Army heavy-lift helicopter was beyond the state of the art. It looked toward a deployment date of the mid-1970's. So the subcommittee, as I have said, canceled the Army heavy-lift helicopter, but recommended going forward with the Navy heavy-lift helicopter. This can be accomplished with a total R. & D. effort of \$60 million, and initial operational capability could be achieved much earlier than the Army development.

Let me say a word about the heavy-lift helicopter, the crane, in Vietnam today. This helicopter has a remarkable record of recovery of downed helicopters. It has done outstanding work. It does not have such a good record when you talk about recovery of downed airplanes, but the subcommittee had no difficulty in going along with the Navy's request. But, after a great deal of thought, we did decide that the Army heavy-lift helicopter should be canceled.

In selecting a vehicle for its airborne warning and control system, the Air Force evaluated the Navy's E2C aircraft as a possible candidate. But this aircraft fell short on the three crucial counts: It is a short-range aircraft having an endurance of something over 4 hours. It is too small to mount the radar which can give automated discrimination capability of low-flying targets over land. And even if its range were extended by refueling,

it could not carry a large enough crew to provide extended time on station.

So the subcommittee was looking at another situation where we felt that we had found a parallel development. This was the case of the radars in the airborne warning system and the E-2C Navy system.

The subcommittee felt that a more productive way of looking at consolidation of the Air Force and Navy requirements would follow this line:

In almost any future operation involving the employment of tactical air strikes, it would be feasible to employ a long-range Air Force AWACS. It is difficult to conceive of any extensive operation of this kind that would not employ both Navy aircraft and the strike aircraft of the Tactical Air Command. Therefore, it should be both feasible and desirable to have these strikes controlled by a single control authority.

Granted the validity of this premise, then it might be possible to reduce the Navy requirement for carrier-based AWACS to the single mission of controlling interceptors protecting the fleet against aircraft attack. If relieved of the strike control mission, the remaining mission could be performed with fewer E2A's per carrier and the 52 aircraft in the inventory probably could handle this situation so far as the Navy is concerned.

What we said, in essence, was this: Here is the Navy trying to develop a sophisticated radar. Here is the Air Force working along the same line. It is the conclusion of the subcommittee that the Air Force should go ahead, AWACS should go ahead. The Navy's attempt to develop control for tactical air strikes, flying off the carrier, could in almost every situation be handled by the Air Force project, rather than two—Navy and Air Force—thus eliminating the need for \$66 million additional with the E-2C program.

The second conclusion reached by the subcommittee involved a number of programs of doubtful operational priority.

Some of these programs would have taken only a small share of the R. & D. budget in fiscal year 1970, but would have amounted to hundreds of millions or billions of dollars in ultimate R. & D., procurement, and deployment costs.

The subcommittee felt that such programs would have little probability of deployment when competing with other urgently needed weapon systems in the late 1970's.

In this category, examples would include the undersea long-range missile system, surface-to-air missile, sea-based ballistic missile intercept system—the Navy's concept of ABM—and the manned orbiting laboratory program. The last named program was on the subcommittee's list for recommended deletion before the administration's announcement that it had been dropped.

The subcommittee recommended that each of these programs be deleted for a total net reduction of \$373 million.

The subcommittee's reasoning concerning the Sam-D, surface-to-air missile development, should be of interest to the Senate.

Sam-D is a followon surface-to-air missile program to replace the Nike-

Hercules and Hawk systems and give the Army a capability for defending against high performance aircraft and short-range ballistic missiles. It is a battlefield system. It is designed as a mobile system for deployment with field armies, as well as for deployment in the United States as a replacement for Hercules missiles in the bomber defense system.

Fiscal year 1969 development costs on Sam-D were \$60 million, and the fiscal year 1970 budget is \$75 million. Total estimated R. & D. cost for the system is \$682 million. The total deployment cost of Sam-D is estimated in 1969 at nearly \$2½ billion for deployment in the mid-1970's.

There is little doubt that surface-to-air missiles are an effective complement to other forms of air defense, and little doubt that the Sam-D would represent a substantial improvement over either the Hawk or Hercules systems. It would permit the engagement of short-range ballistic missiles as well as high performance aircraft and would make possible the simultaneous intercept of a number of targets.

But in considering the \$75 million item in the fiscal year 1970 budget, the subcommittee was impressed with the tremendous cost of providing what is really a rather limited defensive capability. And this raised the question of whether Sam-D has a sufficient standing in the Army's priority system to give it a reasonable chance for deployment even if it is successfully developed.

Do I make myself clear? As things go down the pipeline of R. & D. suddenly decisions are made. Suddenly the question arises: Should we go into deployment? Should we install 49 batteries of the Sam-D missile system? At that time, it has to compete with other items under consideration in the budget. So this was a controlling factor with the subcommittee. We did not think it had a reasonable chance for deployment if successfully developed.

It will be competing for procurement funding in the mid-1970's with a number of high cost systems, several of which are designed to provide protection against air attack. It is fairly obvious that we will not be able to deploy all of these systems against the single facet of the threat.

The subcommittee questioned the need for substituting Sam-D for Hercules in the bomber defense of the United States. This year a number of operational Hercules batteries were phased out on the grounds that the current bomber threat does not justify continued expenditures of O. & M. funds for their operation.

The subcommittee also questioned the threat for which Sam-D is designed. Is a tactical Sam system needed to defend against high performance aircraft? The Vietnam war has demonstrated that even high performance aircraft deliver their strikes at subsonic speeds. Assuming the threat of short-range surface-to-surface missiles, is it feasible to deploy Sam systems in sufficient numbers effectively to defend against short-range ballistic missiles? Such missiles presumably would be fairly cheap and could be launched in quantities sufficient to saturate Sam defenses.

The subcommittee thus concluded that in the present climate of austerity it would be unrealistic to expect to allocate sufficient resources to the Sam-D requirement to develop and produce this weapon system.

The third major conclusion by the subcommittee involved a number of programs of such highly charged emotional content in the eyes of many as to call for particularly diligent scrutiny.

In instances where such programs were deemed to have low priority and, as symbols of controversy, threatened more needed R. & D. programs, the subcommittee recommended their reduction.

Such programs included chemical and biological warfare, behavioral, and social sciences, and Federal contract research centers or "think tanks."

These, then, are some of the highlights, but in sum the subcommittee recommended R.D.T. & E. budget cuts totaling about \$1.3 billion. The full committee, after considering these recommendations, ordered reductions totaling \$1,042,900,000.

The full committee, and its other subcommittees, recommended the deletion of the following additional R. & D., line items: AH-56A Cheyenne helicopter, RF-111 aircraft, light intra-theater transport, tactical AGMC-3 missile, a 75-percent reduction in the airborne warning and control system, and a cut of \$14.9 million in the Maine battle tank program.

Other items relating to the development of chemical and biological weapons were recommended for deletion, and activities relating to military science, aircraft, ordnance and combat vehicles, and missile programs were recommended for substantial reductions.

The R. & D. budget request for the three services and the Defense agencies was thus reduced by 12.7 percent.

This \$1,042,900,000 reduction from the \$8.227 billion asked by Secretary of Defense Laird is the largest reduction in an R.D.T. & E. budget made by the Armed Services Committee in recent years. I am hopeful this will indicate to all of my colleagues in the Senate that a conscientious, sincere, and diligent effort to effect judicious cost reduction has been made by the subcommittee and the full committee.

I would like to take this opportunity to compliment Chairman STENNIS on his decision to appoint three subcommittees to screen the authorization budget, to thank the chairman and the members of the Subcommittee on Bomber Defense and the Subcommittee on Tactical Air for their help in scrutinizing the R.D.T. & E. items in their respective categories, and to express my personal appreciation for the work done by the members of the subcommittee and their staff members, and the full committee staff, with particular reference to Colonel Harper.

The future work of the Subcommittee on Research and Development would be greatly facilitated by additional staff help, for it is the subcommittee's intention to broaden and deepen its examination of the authorization budget next year in order to make even more detailed recommendations to the full committee.

One major effort by the subcommittee will be to encourage greater comparability among the various budget presentations brought to the Congress by the Department of Defense.

Elimination of confusing differences between sets of figures relating to individual programs will do much to help Members better identify the exact amounts of expenditures being requested.

This is not to imply that the various figures are incorrect or deliberately confusing. In most instances, the differences are attributable to variations in computing objectives. Nevertheless, comparability for clarity of understanding must be a primary goal in next year's authorization consideration.

In a time when the proper ordering of national priorities is of such importance, it is crucial that cost and potential impact of every program under consideration be clearly understood and carefully weighed.

It was very difficult at times to follow some of these items through the labyrinth of the budget lines.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McINTYRE. I am nearly finished with my remarks and then I will be glad to yield to the Senator.

Within the limits of time and available staff, the Subcommittee on Research and Development tried to do that this year, Mr. President.

In conclusion, let me emphasize that the reductions in the authorization recommended by the subcommittee and the full Armed Services Committee should not imply lack of faith in the research and development activities of the Department of Defense.

Our Defense leaders, our scientists and other experts, through R. & D. efforts over the years have developed world leadership in technology. All Americans can take pride in the contributions made by these dedicated men. We are continuing to maintain that technological advantage. In these uncertain times we cannot afford to lose it.

It is my view, shared by those who have studied these reductions along with me, that we have not recommended reductions which would reduce our technological advantage. We believe that these reductions can be absorbed while retaining our leadership base in technology.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAVEL in the chair). Does the Senator yield?

Mr. McINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. I wish to highly commend this subcommittee for the very fine job they did and to commend especially the chairman for his unrelenting efforts and very effective leadership in this vast field. It is a large undertaking to have \$8 billion worth of a multitude of research projects thrown into one's lap with a very few weeks before the hearings are to start on the major bill. One can hardly imagine the variety of problems that are involved in connection with research and development. The subcommittee has done an amazing

amount of work and they have accomplished a great deal in their work. I thank them especially. I think this is the forerunner of even greater work that they will be able to do in future assignments in this field.

I commend the Senator as well as thank him. I believe his work there will prove to be sound, solid, and lasting.

Mr. McINTYRE. I thank the Senator. I yield to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Just before the Senator concluded, I thought he mentioned petroleum.

Mr. McINTYRE. Petroleum? No.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I so understood him.

Mr. McINTYRE. I did not mention petroleum.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am prompted to ask a question about a recent story about petroleum that appeared in the newspapers. Apparently the armed services were unable to account for some \$21 million worth of petroleum supply in Thailand.

Recently I was discussing this matter with a man who is the head of one of the largest petroleum-gathering organizations in this country. By that I mean he operates oil pipelines and trucklines and gathers production of a great many small producers. That is why he has expertise in this area.

He told me he could not understand how it was possible for the armed services to lose track of any substantial amount of petroleum in view of the modern measuring techniques which have been developed and which are in daily use by industry.

Can the Senator enlighten us as to what happened to the \$21 million worth of petroleum that disappeared?

Mr. McINTYRE. I wish I could. The Senator is referring to headlines that appeared in newspapers recently?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. McINTYRE. I do not have the answer. My subcommittee's jurisdiction was in a different area. I would be glad to find out what the Department of Defense has to say about it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is the committee concerned with the disappearance of \$21 million worth of petroleum or not?

Mr. McINTYRE. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Have they looked into it at all, or inquired about it?

Mr. McINTYRE. I think the Senator will have to direct his question to the chairman of the full committee. I have been busy with the behavioral sciences.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That was the next question I was coming to.

Mr. McINTYRE. I will get the Senator off petroleum.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thought the Senator mentioned petroleum but am prompted now to ask about the social sciences. This is a matter we talked about a little bit last year, I believe. Can the Senator refresh my memory as to how many foreign universities are going to be included in the coming year's program for research?

Mr. McINTYRE. I do not know the precise number offhand, but we have taken a hard look at it. I want to assure the Senator that in his statement of May 1, most of the time when he talks

about research in foreign universities, he puts it under the heading of social and behavioral sciences, when it is really hard science. If we take a look at what the projects are about, they are hard, physical sciences.

I can tell the Senator that out of \$630 million under military sciences—and that is a big figure, I want to assure the Senator from Arkansas—in the short time allotted, we did not get the opportunity to take an item-by-item look. We did start to look and quickly learned that out of the \$630 million, only about \$6 million will embrace what the Senator is talking about. Under universities, only about \$6 million will be spent in foreign countries. A good share of that will go to American personnel.

As to how many universities, I could count them.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Was this reported to the committee?

Mr. McINTYRE. Yes. I have very adequate information on it this year.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Last year, when I inquired about it, the Senator did not have any information about it.

Mr. McINTYRE. Last year, when the Senator inquired about it, the Research and Development Subcommittee had not yet been established; the Senator was inquiring about a \$5 or \$6 million item in a budget of about \$22 or \$23 billion.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the Senator that that is a big figure. That is the reason why the Senate has not been informed to any reasonable degree as to what is spent, because we are always being confronted with such enormous sums of money that we give up in utter hopelessness and frustration.

To me, \$6 million is quite a lot of money. For 4 years I have been trying to get less than that for a project on the Little Red River in Arkansas and I cannot begin to get it off the ground yet. The Senator speaks of \$6 million as if it were just a drop in the bucket and he could not be bothered with it. I am not so much interested in that amount of money—although, of course, I am interested in it—but I am interested in the Department of Defense going abroad and injecting itself into foreign countries either in its universities or in projects such as Camelot and things of that kind, because it is this kind of activity that brings us into disrepute among the countries of the world and does a great damage to our foreign relations. Our foreign relations are already bad enough without the Department of Defense adding to it. I would like to know, how many countries will the Senator let out contracts to? Surely the Senator should know that.

Mr. McINTYRE. Let me give the Senator some idea—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I raised that question last year.

Mr. McINTYRE. Let me answer the Senator's question in broad terms—he is asking the question in narrow terms. The bulk of the money spent in foreign countries by the Department of Defense is for the gathering of information. Let me give the Senator a classic example. If we are studying the effects of high altitude on men, the place to go is Peru. There is where one gets high altitude and he can

find out what happens to men under certain stresses of heavy work. That is where we would go to find out something about that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. They do not go nearly so high as Apollo will go, do they? Why is that so necessary?

Mr. McINTYRE. I have not finished. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am sorry.

Mr. McINTYRE. If we want to take a look at some other problems, such as one having to do with the hardening of silos and the effects of bursting bombs on weapons, one of the places to go is to examine the crust of the earth in areas around Greece where many volcanic eruptions and earthquakes have taken place in the past. The Department of Defense, if it knows of an expert in Vienna, or in Liege, Belgium, or of any top man who knows something about aerodynamics, or on another project of that kind which is important to our Nation, the Department of Defense does not hesitate to hire such men and to contract with universities for a 2- or 3-year program. That is where the bulk of the money the Senator was complaining about last year was spent overseas. It is not always possible to find what we need to know to solve some of the gigantic problems we have in the United States. It is not always possible to find in this country the man we need who is most informed.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator mentioned Peru. Is the Senator saying that it is necessary, because the mountains in Peru are so much higher than they are in the United States, to go down there, that their altitudes are greater than they are in this country?

Mr. McINTYRE. Their altitudes are higher than here.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Their mountains are higher than our mountains?

Mr. McINTYRE. I am not an expert on topography, but I have been to Peru, and it is one place where there is going to be a project to study how much a man can endure in a very high altitude.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thought the Himalayas were higher than the Andes. But if we want high altitudes, those mountains are not nearly so high as the Apollo mission can go, are they? Why would they want to know how much a man can endure? What relation does that have to the military defense of our country?

Mr. McINTYRE. I would imagine in some future military effort. We never can tell.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What kind?

Mr. McINTYRE. I would not know. That would be a behavioral or a physical need of tomorrow.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. A need tomorrow. That is why I said last year, and now, that there are many projects in this bill that should be disassociated from the Department of Defense. They cannot possibly be justified as matters of defense. By that I mean the approach of persons like Mr. Teller on the subject of nuclear weapons. He says that nothing should stand in the way of research—no matter what it is. He was against the Test Ban Treaty, for example, because, he says we need to know, and nothing should stand in the way of knowledge. I do not agree

with that. I do not agree with the Department of Defense that because something needs to be known by someone, if it has any relation to a function or a mission of the Department of Defense, the Department should be producing it. I think that the social sciences and research projects, no matter how valid they are in themselves and no matter how suitable for the New School for Social Research in New York City, nevertheless should not be sponsored by the Department of Defense which takes the taxpayers' money and spends it in that fashion.

The chairman, as chairman of the subcommittee, should be able to give to the Senate an itemized list of the kind of projects that this money is being spent on, in how many countries, and in which institutions. I personally object to these projects unless absolutely essential for the Department of Defense itself. I object to going abroad to other countries—some of which used to be quite friendly—and injecting ourselves into their activities, just as in the same way the Department did in Chile on the project called Camelot. I know this kind of thing has been done in some other countries, too. Before this debate is over, the Senator should be able to supply that information for the benefit of the Senate and the public.

Mr. McINTYRE. What is it the Senator wants to know about? Is the Senator talking about social sciences, or physical sciences? I have got to know what the Senator is talking about before I can answer.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The social sciences. Let us start with that.

Mr. McINTYRE. Let me read from the social sciences the Senator is talking about, where we are spending money overseas. That is in his speech of May 1 this year.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was inquiring. I was not telling the Senator. On May 1, I was asking for information.

Mr. McINTYRE. The Senator starts out in his talk complaining about money being spent for social and behavioral sciences by the Department of Defense, and then the Senator proceeds to list—oh, my goodness, I do not know—there are 30 or 40 countries he lists, in which I cannot find one on social and behavioral sciences. Here, for instance, is one of the subject matters—in Argentina—X-ray spectrometry and galactic studies from the Southern Hemisphere.

Incidentally, where would the Senator suggest that the Department of Defense go if it wants to study the effects of the aurora borealis on satellite communications?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Let me make it clear that I obtained the list I put in the Record from the Department of Defense. I would not pretend to understand many of those titles. Most of them are gobbledegook to me. I have not the faintest idea what they mean. I put them in the Record because I got the whole list from the Department of Defense. I put them in the Record for the information of the Senate. I did not have the means nor the understanding to analyze studies like the Senator has just referred to. I did not say that every one of them had

no relation to the Department of Defense. I say a great many of them have. I believe they have. I thought the committee was going to come prepared this time to justify each of these projects and show they have some relationship to the mission of the Department of Defense.

Mr. McINTYRE. I will be happy to appear before the Senate and justify it. I tried, before the Senator arrived on the floor, to give a brief analysis of the recommendations of the full committee. We can talk about the social behavioral sciences and the physical sciences for the rest of the day, but I will be glad to come here and give a defense of them, because they can be defended. As a matter of fact, the committee looked into most of the social, behavioral science projects. We are in complete accord with them. Those are not the ones the Senator complains of.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Can the Senator give me an example of a behavioral science project that the Senator thinks is justified?

Mr. McINTYRE. To give the Senator an idea, I think a behavioral science project relating to men working on our air carriers in Vietnam, who suddenly develop a hearing difficulty, is justified. By behavioral studies, we learned it was wise to keep these men on the deck of an aircraft carrier only a limited amount of time, and then have them go below. We tested them to see if their hearing was affected as a result of the loud jet noises on aircraft carriers.

We also went into the question of a pilot's possibly losing his sight from flash blindness because of bombing.

A behavioral science project could justifiably go into the question of why we have a 29-percent turnover in our Armed Forces today. I think any study can be justified that indicates a group of men can be tested in order to eliminate the 10 percent or 15 percent of the men who would not have a good chance of passing a radar operator course. If we could eliminate that 10 or 15 percent of the men who are going to fail beforehand, we would save ourselves money.

With reference to the justification of these behavioral science studies, it should be pointed out that we use some complicated instruments, radars, and sensors that require men to sit in a rather uncomfortable position, watching radar, for example, for hour upon hour. We want to know when those men begin to lose their efficiency and when they should be taken off that duty. A man must sit there for 4 or 5 hours, watching some lines.

Social behavioral science studies as applied to the Department of Defense have saved millions of dollars.

When we get down to the areas the Senator from Arkansas is talking about, he has something to complain about. They are hard to justify. When we go to the science studies in Europe, for example, which are 99 percent physical sciences, to find a man there in a certain area, that is something else. We need a study of how the aurora borealis affects people so it can be helpful in the space program. The committee has recommended reductions in some of these areas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I may have used the wrong language. I would have thought that a study of the effect of the exhaust of an airplane on a man's hearing would have been more in the field of medical science. I would not think it was in the field of social sciences.

Mr. McINTYRE. It would be biomedical.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I read in the paper the other day that there were 50,000 desertions from our Army during the past year. This would clearly be more in the field of social sciences. Has the committee made a study of why so many of our soldiers have deserted? Has the committee studied that question? Has the committee given any attention to it? Is there a project on it?

Mr. McINTYRE. Excuse me. My attention was distracted.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Has the committee a project studying the question of why so many of our soldiers have deserted our Army? I think I read in the paper that this past year the number was over 50,000.

Mr. McINTYRE. There again we get into the question of definitions. Does the Senator know the difference between AWOL and desertion?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, a desertion is an absence of more than 30 days.

Mr. McINTYRE. As a former military lawyer in World War II, I defended many who were away 60 days, and they were not charged with desertion.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, it is a fact that there has been a substantial increase in desertions in the past year over 5 years ago or 3 years ago. Is that not correct? Has the committee made any study as to the number of AWOL's, whether it involves a week, 3 weeks, or 30 days?

Mr. McINTYRE. Yes, we have.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Can the Senator give us that information?

Mr. McINTYRE. The Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE) was chairman of a subcommittee that went into the question of AWOL's and desertions. We were particularly interested because of the State Department's putting its big nose into some of these situations, which resulted in an uneven pattern of punishment, to the extent that someone who had gone AWOL in Tampa, Fla., had the book thrown at him, while some member of the Armed Forces who had gone to Norway was taken home and given a free ride and 10 days off. There is a report on that matter which speaks very strongly on it. The Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE) was chairman of that subcommittee.

Of course there is an increase in AWOL's. Of course there is an increase even in desertions. We had them in World War II. Why should there not be with this unpopular conflict in Vietnam?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Has the committee made a study of that question? Is that increase in desertions due to the character of the war in Vietnam?

Mr. McINTYRE. I have not made the study. The subcommittee has.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator mentioned behavioral sciences and some of these studies.

Mr. McINTYRE. Is the Senator acquainted with the subcommittee's report, by the Senator from Hawaii, on the question of AWOL's and desertions?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No.

Mr. McINTYRE. Is the Senator acquainted with the work of the committee to upgrade the charge of being AWOL?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No. I saw in the papers that there was a very large increase. I think the article said there were over 50,000 last year. I cannot remember whether it was 1,500 or 15,000, but I think there were 1,500 prosecutions in the courts. This was an article within the last 2 or 3 weeks. I may be able to look it up. I thought it was a very interesting subject. I thought it might be one on which there was a research project. It would seem to me to be pertinent to the activities of the Defense Department. A number of those studies have no relation, I think, to the Defense Department.

Mr. McINTYRE. Of course, the distinguished Senator from Arkansas realizes when he talks in generalities of desertions and AWOL's, that a man who fails to get on a morning report is considered to be AWOL. We have statistics that show AWOL increases. The number has been increasing. The subcommittee of which the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE) is chairman did go into that question. That information can be obtained for the Senator.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is a member of the committee. I thought he was undertaking to give to the Senate and to the public statistics about it. I am not a member of the Armed Services Committee. If I have misstated it or given the wrong impression, I ask the Senator to straighten me out. How many desertions have there been? Define what a desertion is. What is an AWOL? I am only looking for light and understanding on the subject.

Mr. McINTYRE. What is it that the Senator is hoping to find? That the AWOL's and desertions are very high because of the unpopularity of the war?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the Senator knows, I would expect that information from him.

Mr. McINTYRE. The Senator expects quite a bit if he expects me to tell him how many desertions and how many AWOL's there are, and how much we are spending on universities on projects, and so forth. I am here today discussing research and development. All this other information is easily available.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is not for me. I have great difficulty obtaining any information from the Defense Department.

Mr. McINTYRE. Has the Senator asked for information on desertions?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No. I thought the Senator would give it today. There are other members of the committee here, if they care to give it. I do not care which member of the committee furnishes it.

Mr. McINTYRE. We are here on an authorization bill. The Senator wants to ascertain how many desertions there are. We will have that information for the Senator tomorrow. Is that satisfactory?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, that is all right, too. Any time. I apologize if the Senator does not like the question.

Mr. McINTYRE. May I say to the Senator from Arkansas that we are talking today about a \$20 billion budget, and I thought the Senator wanted to know how many universities we are spending the money in.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is an \$80 billion budget.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McINTYRE. Certainly.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, last year there was a special subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, chaired by the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE), which made a special study of these AWOL's, absences, and alleged desertions, and filed a very fine report thereon. I have asked someone to telephone for him, and have not received any response as yet. Apparently he has some other duties to take care of.

But the matter has been fully covered, and strong recommendations were made to the Department of Defense about the first part of this year.

My recollection is that the statistics are not nearly as alarming as the Senator from Arkansas might have been advised, in comparison, say, with World War II. But I do not have that report broken down. I have not seen it in several months, and I do not know that that is the subject of any special research by the Department of Defense; but I know it is a subject of concern, and that they are digging deeply into it.

My strong recommendation, personally, was that they were going to have to deal out more punishment in the proper cases, and that disparity of punishment was one of the factors. I will obtain a copy of that report for the Senator.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator from New Hampshire yield further?

Mr. McINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not wish to press the Senator on anything that is not within his area of responsibility. All the Senator needs to say is that it is not. I would agree with the Senator from Mississippi that it seems to me this is a subject which is a little more appropriate for research for the Department of Defense than is the effect of heights on a man in the Peruvian Andes, or some other place, which does not quite seem to me to be as interesting to the Defense Department or to the people of this country as why we have so many desertions.

I have been trying to make the point, as I did last year, that a number of these research projects struck me as being irrelevant to the function of the Defense Department.

I wish to cite another case which embarrassed me very much. I happen to be a member of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution. They were engaged as a kind of subcontractor—I do not know what the exact legal relationship was—for research, in the Pacific islands on the subject of bird migration. Then it was alleged the project had to do with germ warfare. I wish to state that of my own knowledge I do not know whether it had to do with germ warfare or not, but the contract turned out

to be embarrassing to the Smithsonian Institution. Is the Senator familiar with that particular incident? If not, it is all right; but there was something in the newspapers about it, which was drawn to my attention.

I later received a letter from the Smithsonian, asking my advice as to whether the Smithsonian should have any further dealings with the Department of Defense, because of this embarrassment. I was, of course, put on the spot to give my recommendation, since I was a Regent of the Institution.

Is the Senator familiar with the incident I am talking about? If not, we will drop the subject and I can look it up somewhere else.

Mr. MCINTYRE. I may have read something on that question.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The contract was alleged to have been a part of the biological warfare activities of the Defense Department. Does that have anything to do with the Senator's responsibilities on the committee?

Mr. MCINTYRE. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does he have jurisdiction over research in biological warfare?

Mr. MCINTYRE. Just a moment. The Senator's complaint is as to the work done by the Smithsonian?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am not complaining; I am asking. I am not complaining about anything at the moment. I am trying to find information.

Mr. MCINTYRE. If the Senator will give me a moment, and bring the subject up again later, I have something here on the Smithsonian's involvement, but I cannot seem to put my finger on it at the moment. I have information here on some 200,000 projects.

I suggest that if the Senator will give me a few minutes here, and will bring the subject up again, I will try to give him the answer he seeks.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. All right. I do not wish to press the Senator. Let me close by saying this: I wonder whether at a later time in the debate we could discuss the justification for a number of the research projects that the committee is recommending in this bill. I should like to do that as an illustration of the point that I am making. I reiterate, just for future reference, that I am not saying that these subjects are not in themselves worthy of someone's attention. I raise the question whether they should be funded and supported by the Defense Department, because they are not really properly related to the Department. We will raise the question again at a later time; I do not wish to pursue it now.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. While the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee is looking up his answer, I might call to the attention of the distinguished Senator that on page 1609 through page 1613, and including a part of page 1614, of the Senate report, is a complete list of the countries involved, numbering some eight or nine, and the subjects covered by these research programs.

I might say to the Senator from Arkansas that I feel this to be a lucrative field where we can do some cutting; and the subcommittee has already recommended close to a 13-percent cut in these particular figures. I join the Senator from Arkansas in believing that there are a lot of these items that are not needed.

I do not know how, though, we can discuss them on the floor of the Senate, to determine which are needed and which are not. I simply wanted to refer the Senator to those countries, and to the lists of projects under them.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is at page 1609?

Mr. GOLDWATER. Yes.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes, they begin there.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I am happy to yield.

Mr. CRANSTON. In connection with behavioral science projects, have there been or are there now, or are there authorized, studies of men under stress and in grave danger? Have there been studies of the effect of grave danger on their ability to make wise decisions, their ability to think clearly, and their ability to carry out difficult and complicated orders under certain conditions?

Mr. MCINTYRE. Under the branch of social and behavioral sciences, there are two areas called human performance and human factor engineering. Both of these fields have brought to light a great deal of information about the human being.

It has been discovered, for example, that something like 40 percent of all our weapons failures and aircraft and other problems occur, not because the machine gives out, but because the man makes a mistake under great stress such as the Senator has indicated. Particularly with the sophisticated weaponry we have today, to which I have already alluded, like radar operations, the sensors, and everything else we have, when men are required to work long periods of time under difficult circumstances, these studies have been of great benefit.

Mr. CRANSTON. Do those studies in depth go into circumstances such as might involve the commander of a Poseidon submarine, who presumably has the ability, if he wishes, to make a decision whether to launch? Do the studies explore the factors of stress and danger, and the effect upon a man of having the grave responsibility, virtually in his own hands, of deciding whether to launch a missile under certain circumstances?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I do not know whether the stresses involved in the exact situation of which the Senator is speaking have been studied or not. The Senator is assuming, of course, that a Polaris or Poseidon commander would have the authority to press the button. I imagine studies they have conducted involving command decisions under great stress would be part and parcel of the overall picture.

Mr. CRANSTON. And have studies been made not only of stress, but of stress under grave danger, danger to life, and its effect upon the ability of a man to

judge and to make delicate and vastly important decisions?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I would be guessing if I were to try to answer that. I think the subject of stress has been studied, yes, but as to stress under grave danger, I do not know.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. It is my understanding that the officers in charge of strategic weapons have all been given detailed psychiatric tests in connection with their regular medical examinations.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, to complete the record, I point out to the Senator from Arkansas that the committee report on page 47 gives some exact figures about the reductions.

One is foreign military security environments. There is a recommendation there for an actual reduction of \$800,000. That is almost 10 percent on that item. The next one has to do with policy planning studies. It is recommended that the reduction in that item be \$700,000.

In the last paragraph, at the bottom, the committee is recommending that a number of these efforts be transferred to other agencies—some to the Department of State, some to Arms Control and Disarmament, and some to the National Science Foundation and to others.

It takes a great deal of weeding out to be specific with reference to many of these categories.

I call that part of the report to the attention of the Senator. I appreciate the earnestness of his inquiry.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I am very glad that the chairman of the committee has called that to the attention of the Senate. I am especially glad to see the last part which recommends the transfer of a number of these programs to other agencies. For example, the Senator mentions the National Science Foundation, which is one that, it would seem to me, would be appropriate.

I assume that one reason they were not there to begin with is that they did not have the money for the programs. Will the Senator transfer them the money to fund them?

Mr. STENNIS. We will transfer the appropriation bill, if the Senator's committee has its way, over to his committee and others.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I want to pursue the matter a moment. I want to give the Senator an illustration so that he will not think I am being too nit-picking about the matter.

Mr. President, I have in my hand a document that is a research project. I will read the specific name. This is from the University of Massachusetts. It is entitled "The Ataturk Revolution in Turkey. Religion and Revolution. A Study of Comparative Politics and Religion."

This is funded by funds for research projects from the Department of De-

fense. This is an aspect of what this is about.

It states:

Beginning with a brief discussion of the decline and fall of the Ottoman empire, the report analyzes the interplay between Ataturk and the forces of religious traditionalism in the Turkish revolution. Special attention is given to the role of religion in the struggle for national sovereignty that ended in 1923. The report concludes with a brief discussion of the position of Islam in contemporary Turkish society.

That is an example of what I was raising a question about, as to the appropriateness for the Department of Defense to have funds authorized, and for us to appropriate money, that is spent for matters of that kind.

I do not see why this is a matter that the Defense Department should undertake.

I do not urge the Senator to answer now. I would let him have a look at the matter first. However, I am giving it as an illustration of what I have in mind.

Mr. McINTYRE. Would the Senator tell me what fiscal year this is planned for?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is a completed one. This was 1968.

Mr. McINTYRE. You are now talking about fiscal year 1969.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That was an illustration of what I meant.

Mr. McINTYRE. Is the item in the budget for the fiscal year 1970?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No. That is something that has gone by. It is an illustration of the type of activities I have reference to that are not related to military affairs. There are a number of these.

I do not have the ones that are in process as yet. I got all the information I could. However, for the Department of the Army, for example, in the hearings beginning on page 2209, many pages and many items are listed.

I assume they are still underway on plans for fiscal year 1970.

We notice some of them are on the right. These are some that I got from the Department of Defense. They indicate the type of things that have been done.

Mr. McINTYRE. What page is the Senator referring to?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is from the hearings of the Committee on Armed Services. It is the one that was on my desk.

Mr. McINTYRE. What page?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Page 2209.

Take the first item there. This is in fiscal year 1970. It says:

Beliefs and habits of certain foreign populations of significance for psychological operations.

I suppose that in some areas psychological understanding is necessary or helpful. If we had had any understanding of the psychology of the Vietnamese, I do not think we would have gotten into that war. There was a complete lack of understanding of what the Vietnamese people were like. I cannot say it would not have been helpful.

I do not think that particular one has any relation to the military responsibility. I doubt that the military is the

proper one to handle it, simply because they are not familiar with that type activity.

I have two others here. I do not wish to burden the Senator at the moment. I hope that at a little later time the Senator will be prepared to discuss some of these projects which I have discussed and possibly I will offer an amendment to strike them out, if that is an appropriate way to pursue the matter on the ground, that they have no place in the authorization.

Mr. McINTYRE. I think that is a perfectly appropriate way to handle the matter.

This gives a little idea of the difficulty the Research and Development Subcommittee had.

In calling attention to page 2209, the Senator is now talking about funds that are spent in Washington, at George Washington University. Even the item mentioned there is coded. I do not know if it is terminated now or if it is being continued.

If the Senator will supply us in advance with the 10 or 20 items he picks out of what amounts to 200 or 300 items, we will not have to spend all night figuring the matter out. If the Senator gives us advance notice of what he is criticizing, we will be here to either defend the matter or criticize it.

If the Senator is talking about the gamma gamma goat which turns out to be a six-wheeled track vehicle used in Thailand—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If a sophisticated member of the Armed Services Committee thought it was a goat, I do not think he should blame me.

Mr. McINTYRE. I think everyone thought it was a goat. However, it is a six-wheeled track vehicle.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not even know of a goat that has six wheels.

Mr. McINTYRE. Let us agree on the areas the Senator wants to complain about. Then if the Senator gives us advance notice, we will be prepared to defend or concede.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is fair enough. We brought this matter up tentatively last year. We had a little debate. I know that the chairman anticipated that I would bring the matter up again.

What I am really trying to do is to tighten up the whole operation. I think a lot of the civilian activities in our country are suffering from an overexpansion of the Military Establishment into fields which are really unrelated.

Mr. McINTYRE. The Senator has expressed my own sentiments. I think the Senator is justified in calling the attention of the committee to this work.

Because of our scrutiny of this area, action has been taken by the Department of Defense to tighten up the organization. The programs have been cut. We are asking the Senate to cut them even further. The subcommittee cut a billion dollars. There has been action. It is extremely difficult because of the multitudinous items to discuss one that the Senator suddenly picks up from nowhere.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, whatever develops as we go down the road on this research and development matter, as the Senator from New Hampshire has indicated, perhaps on an item-by-item review there will be further limitation.

I rise to thank the Senator from New Hampshire, the Senator from Mississippi, and the committee for digging into this area and coming in here with a recommendation that trims R. & D. by in excess of a billion dollars.

A year ago last April I offered an amendment that sought to maintain the research and development figure for the fiscal year 1969 at the level of the 1968 fiscal year. At that time the Committee on Armed Services recommended an increase in research and development of approximately \$508 million, even though we were all going through a great deal of discussion about the need to economize. My amendment—on which we voted on April 18, 1968—failed by just two votes.

I cite that experience to make the point that all of us, in the passage of 12 months, have developed a much greater and a much clearer understanding of the responsibility that the entire Senate carries with respect to what heretofore had been rather esoteric, box-car-type figure problems.

So I thank the Senator from New Hampshire and the committee. I wish that a year ago we had been able to keep the \$500 million from being added on.

I am sure that in part we reflect the mood of the country. But more than that, I think there was some leadership from the Senate to persuade the country to this move. Today we find ourselves receiving from the Committee on Armed Services a report which reduces by more than a billion dollars the research and development figure which a year ago we fell short of trying to keep from being increased a half billion dollars, and that, in anybody's book, is progress.

Mr. McINTYRE. I thank the distinguished Senator from Michigan. It was his good work of leadership that propelled us into taking a hard look, and we should continue taking a hard look, and look even harder.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. CRANSTON. I should like to refer to the behavioral science area we were discussing. It is an area in which I believe there may be need for more research in the interest of national security.

I wonder whether the Senate from New Hampshire could advise Senators, before consideration of this measure is complete, a bit more about the area of studies of men under danger—not stress so much as personal danger. There are behavioral scientists who believe that under conditions of grave danger to one's life, the ability to think wisely and carefully and to judge soundly is adversely affected.

The Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) has advised me that men in positions of grave responsibility, such as commanding Poseidon submarines, are

given psychiatric tests, and those likely to crack up generally are weeded out.

But the fact may be that the human being generally, by normal human practices or characteristics, tends to lose his ability to judge wisely when in grave danger. He is suddenly filled with adrenalin, his muscles swell, and he desires to smash whoever may be threatening him. The question of how this would affect the judgment of men who do have grave responsibilities at times of grave danger to themselves and to loved ones at home is one about which we should be fully knowledgeable. This could be the weakest link in and the gravest threat to the whole security performance of the United States, in the opinion of scientists.

Mr. MCINTYRE. The Senator from California would like the chairman of the committee to find out what studies have been conducted or are planned that concern men under great physical danger who are in a decisionmaking capacity?

Mr. CRANSTON. Exactly that.

Mr. MCINTYRE. We will try to find that out.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. GORE. I wish to express my very deep personal gratitude for the eloquent and informative speech of the able Senator from New Hampshire. It gives to the entire Senate a better understanding of the delicate and intense problems with which his committee has been coping. There are but few Senators who could command the audience of Senators and hold their attention as he has done today. He is favored, too, with the presence in the gallery of a charming lady, Mrs. McIntyre, during this long debate.

I thank the Senator both for his speech and for her presence.

Mr. MCINTYRE. I thank the distinguished Senator from Tennessee. He is always so generous.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I yield.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, earlier this afternoon, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), commended the chairman of the subcommittee and the members of that subcommittee for the job they had done.

While there were areas in the recommendations with which I was not in full agreement, I do want to commend Senator MCINTYRE, the chairman of that subcommittee, and the members of the subcommittee for the tremendous job they have done. They have put in a great deal of time. While this is the first year they have gone into this matter in such great depth, I think that out of it will come some good.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CRANSTON. I yield.

Mr. TYDINGS. I ask the Senator from New Hampshire whether as a result of a colloquy he had with the Senator from Arkansas, he is going to provide the Senate with the name of each foreign educational institution which receives funds from the Pentagon, and also

whether he is going to provide us with the purpose of the grant and the amount of the grant.

Mr. MCINTYRE. The Senator from Maryland asks easy questions compared with those asked by the distinguished Senator from Arkansas.

I believe we can place the information in the RECORD, subject to the security question, which is always bothersome. We have here the names of universities, other centers of intelligence, for the countries where DOD is planning to spend money for fiscal year 1970. I think we can make it available, if not place it in the RECORD. This appears to have been in the RECORD, so it can be put in the RECORD again.

Mr. TYDINGS. I have another question. On Monday evening there was a colloquy on the floor between the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) and the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD). I refer to page 18492 of the RECORD. In his statement, the distinguished majority leader mentioned some figures, and I will now quote from his statement. He is referring to Pentagon expenditures which found their way to the Hudson Institute:

In going back only 3 years, including this year, the figures show that in 1967, this organization received from the Department of Defense \$713,000. In 1968 it received \$444,000, under a Democratic administration, I might say. So far in 1969, under both a Democratic and Republican administration, I would assume, it received \$873,000. That comes to about \$2 million covering 3 years, and the third year has not been completed.

In his concluding sentences, the majority leader said:

I wonder how much of the research money, which comes to \$8 billion last year for the Department of Defense alone, has been siphoned to the Hudson Institute, the Rand Corp., colleges and universities, and other institutes in this country.

My question now to the Senator from New Hampshire is this: How much did the Hudson Institute receive, directly or indirectly, from the Department of Defense or the Pentagon in 1967, in 1968, in 1969, and how much is it going to receive in 1970? I think it might be helpful if the Senator could provide any information with relation to the amount of the cost of the book "Why ABM?" authored largely by members of the Hudson Institute, of Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y., and the relationship between that book and the funds received by the Hudson Institute from the Pentagon.

Mr. MCINTYRE. In answer to the Senator's question I can only say I have before me a sheet of paper which has been forwarded to me by the Department of Defense entitled "Funding Summary for Federal Contract Research Centers." This is a table which reflects that the Hudson Institute under actual fiscal year 1966 received \$827,000. The table shows that for fiscal years 1967, 1968, 1969, and planned fiscal year 1970 the Hudson Institute received none or none is now planned to be turned over by the Department of Defense to the Hudson Institute as a Federal contract research center.

We will have to inquire if this was a grant or if it is involved in this matter. We will try to find the information for the Senate.

Mr. TYDINGS. Forgetting that question, if we could, I would like to go back to how much money the Hudson Institute received directly or indirectly from the Pentagon in 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1970, and if we could have the total budget of the Hudson Institute and the percentage of their budget which is financed or carried by the Pentagon, I think it would be helpful. Could the Senator provide those figures?

Mr. MCINTYRE. The only answer I can give the Senator is that it is listed here as a Federal contract research center in 1966. For all other years, 1967 through 1970, the Hudson Institute shows no appropriation whatever. Directly, or indirectly, we will provide the information. I will place this table in the RECORD.

Mr. TYDINGS. The Senator will provide the information. I thank the Senator.

(At this point, Mr. GURNEY assumed the chair.)

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. MCINTYRE. I yield to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. At the same time will the Senator supply for the RECORD the amount of money supplied the Massachusetts Institute of Technology by the Department of Defense?

Mr. GOLDWATER. Would the Senator yield so that I may amend that request?

Mr. MCINTYRE. Just a moment. Does the Senator want an answer?

Mr. JACKSON. Does the Senator have the information now? It runs into the millions.

Mr. MCINTYRE. As a Federal contract research center the figure is about \$65 million. I do not believe that is all.

I wish to say this in explanation of what seems to be the difficulty in providing these figures. The subcommittee, in going into this matter, found a baffling series of line items and areas where one could make these figures jell and coincide. We are trying to get them, particularly for the Hudson Institute and MIT.

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as a Federal contract research center, looks like \$65 million.

Mr. JACKSON. Is it not a fact that MIT receives more Federal money in the national defense and national security area than any other educational center in the United States?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I believe that is correct.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. GORE. I do not know whether the funds under contract with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology or the Lincoln Laboratory or the Hudson Institute are justified. What I rise to suggest is that it is not realistic to put into juxtaposition a great institute of learning like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with a so-called think-tank like the Hudson Institute. It seems to me that whether either expenditure is justified or unjustified is one matter, but to compare these two institutes or organizations is quite unrealistic.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

TABLE II.—FUNDING SUMMARY FOR FEDERAL CONTRACT RESEARCH CENTERS

[Dollars in thousands, all appropriations]

FCRC's ¹	Actual fiscal year 1966	Actual fiscal year 1967	Actual fiscal year 1968	Estimated fiscal year 1969	Planned fiscal year 1970
University centers (total).....	(\$26,711)	(\$22,272)	(\$21,438)	(\$21,130)	(\$17,735)
Math Research Center (Wisconsin).....	1,295	1,300	1,300	1,350	1,455
HumRRO (GWU).....	2,750	3,367	3,427	3,995	4,253
CRESS (AU).....	2,347	1,939	1,560	1,960	2,100
Hudson Labs (Columbia).....	4,759	4,710	4,800	3,412	3,412
ORL (Penn State).....	9,512	8,120	7,159	7,433	7,407
APL (University of Washington).....	6,048	2,836	3,192	2,980	2,520
Systems analysis and technical direction (total).....	(94,102)	(108,120)	(104,565)	(108,403)	(114,619)
MITRE Corp.....	27,859	33,222	32,578	34,131	36,350
Aerospace Corp.....	66,243	74,898	71,987	74,272	78,269
Specialized research (total).....	(77,773)	(108,288)	(71,913)	(76,323)	(83,206)
Lincoln Labs (MIT).....	40,400	59,549	39,120	40,043	41,990
APL (JHU).....	37,373	48,739	32,793	36,280	41,216
Operations research and systems analysis: (total).....	(58,082)	(57,045)	(55,653)	(57,321)	(61,605)
IDA.....	13,257	11,239	10,546	10,898	11,150
RAND.....	19,628	20,805	20,440	21,171	23,855
RAG.....	11,125	9,842	9,619	9,985	10,800
ANSER.....	1,345	1,340	1,500	1,572	1,600
CNA (University of Rochester).....	7,000	9,119	8,838	9,195	9,500
ECAC.....	4,900	4,800	4,710	4,500	4,700
Hudson Institute.....	827				
Total ²	256,668	295,725	253,569	263,177	277,165
APL (JHU).....	18,504	12,205	9,375	12,106	11,160
Lincoln Labs (MIT).....	23,035	18,189	24,130	27,530	23,210
ORL (Penn State).....		1,403	2,212	1,125	950
Total subcontracts.....	4,539	31,797	35,699	40,761	35,320
Computer service to Government as opposed to professional services APL (JHU).....				1,200	1,200
Grand total.....	289,207	327,522	289,268	305,138	313,685
Grand total (R.D.T. & E. only).....	253,814	291,602	252,300	270,500	283,400
Percent of fiscal year 1966:					
Grand total: ³					
Gross.....	100	109.83	97.00	102.32	105.19
Adjusted ¹	100	104.59	87.98	88.38	86.54

¹ Includes 5 percent per annum for increases in the cost of living.² The above amounts include subcontracts of less than \$1,000,000 per FCRC. Below are the amounts subcontracted by each FCRC where the total per FCRC is greater than \$1,000,000.³ Grand total less subcontracts over \$1,000,000.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, to answer the question propounded by the Senator from Maryland, just a few weeks ago I had Dr. Brennan appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations. I shall now read from page 371 of the committee hearings, where I asked Dr. Brennan these questions:

Senator FULBRIGHT. What percentage of the support of the Hudson Institute is attributable to Government sources?

Dr. BRENNAN. I cannot give you an accurate number over any particular period of time, but I think if I said something like 80 percent over the past 2 years it would probably be roughly correct.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What was it when you were president? Was it about that when you were president?

Dr. BRENNAN. No, sir, it was higher.

Senator FULBRIGHT. How high was it?

Dr. BRENNAN. Probably around 90 percent.

That was the testimony of Dr. Brennan, who is still the head of that organization, and partly had to do with this book. He is on the staff and was president in March.

I think the point of the Senator from Maryland is quite correct. This is a relatively small institute. As he said, 80 to 90 percent of his funds come from this area.

The Senator from Arizona said the lab at MIT is a semiautonomous. I had a

delegation of students before me about a month ago. I think there were a few faculty members from MIT. They raised this question. They were primarily students who were concerned with the reputation of MIT. They sought counsel on whether or not they should urge their administration at MIT to completely disassociate itself from the Lincoln Lab because of the dissatisfaction that has arisen in many student bodies because of the association with the Department of Defense. It is a very active problem. But MIT, as such, is a great institution aside from the laboratories.

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, first, I want to associate myself with the remarks made today and yesterday by the able chairman of the committee, the distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS). His approach to the budget this year has been excellent. He proceeded to appoint subcommittees to go into the key areas of concern at the outset of the year.

The able and distinguished Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. McINTYRE) has done a very fine job as chairman of the Subcommittee on Research and Development, and I want to compliment him.

The same applies to the chairmanship of the Subcommittee on Tactical Air, as handled by the able and distinguished Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON).

Mr. McINTYRE. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, to complete the subtle questioning here, if it is subtle, I think it is well known that there are certain people at MIT who have strong anti-ABM feelings. I had the impression by reason of the question asked by the distinguished, able, and very fine Senator from Maryland, that the two were being linked.

I did not raise the question but as long as we go down that road it would be interesting to follow through with other institutions.

Mr. TYDINGS. I think the pertinent point would be that percentage of the money of the Hudson Institute which comes directly from the Pentagon. If the institute or a group of scientists are dependent primarily from one source for their whole sustenance and livelihood, they are more likely than a great institutions that has been in operation for years to produce the type answers that the source of their funding would suggest.

I would think that the link would be the percentage of their budget which comes from the source which may influence them.

Mr. JACKSON. Freedom of speech has not been interfered with in this regard. MIT, which receives more money than any other educational institution in the country, has a lot of spokesmen speaking against Department of Defense programs. In fact, they have a most active anti-ABM group, some of whom have testified before Senate and House committees recently.

Mr. TYDINGS. Does the Senator know whether the percentage of the budget of the Hudson Institute which comes from the Pentagon is more than 50 percent?

Mr. JACKSON. I do not know, but since this matter has been brought up I thought it pertinent to point out that at MIT, which receives the most money, they have more people opposing the ABM. I wonder what influence DOD money had on those people.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McINTYRE. I yield to the Senator from Arizona.

Mr. GOLDWATER. We are not talking about MIT. We are talking about Lincoln Laboratory. I think Lincoln Laboratory last year received something like \$31 million. Dr. Wiesner is one of the top deans of MIT and opposes the ABM. Mr. Kahn of Hudson Institute happens to favor the ABM. I hope we would not get into innuendos where we suggest that Hudson might be dealing off the bottom of the deck, and we have to doubt the veracity of learned people at Lincoln. I was sorry to see this whole matter injected into the discussion the other evening. I thought it was completely out of place in the record.

Mr. McINTYRE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point a table entitled "Funding Summary for Federal Contract Research Centers" for the fiscal year 1966 through planned fiscal year 1970.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The Senator from Mississippi, as chairman of the full committee, undertook chairmanship of the Bomber Subcommittee, an all-important one. In my judgment, the bill now before the Senate reflects the kind of thorough review, investigation, and study made of this most important area of our national security.

All members of the committee were most diligent in pursuing the problems with which they were faced.

I want to single out once again the distinguished lady from Maine (Mrs. SMITH) who, as always, in a very conscientious way, made a great contribution to the committee.

The Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE) mentioned earlier today her association in the House of Representatives. I had the privilege of serving with her in the House, where she was an able and distinguished member of the House Naval Affairs Committee, now a part of the House Armed Services Committee. Thus, Mr. President, we have been fortunate in having that kind of support in the committee in bringing this bill to the floor of the Senate.

Mr. President, in considering the fiscal year 1970 Department of Defense authorization bill, which is now before the Senate, I can think of nothing more essential for the Congress than clear thinking about the Soviet Union.

How can we reach sound judgments on the national defense budget if we do not understand the nature of the Soviet adversary?

Can you think of a top American business leader who would make decisions determining the survival of his company before he had carefully studied his chief competitors and what they were up to? Yet many in Congress seem willing to make decisions that could determine the safety and survival of this Nation and the future of individual liberty without facing up to what the Soviet Union is up to.

Recently, we have heard a great deal about "national commitments," disarmament, and threats to "out and cut and out and cut" the defense budget. But we have heard precious little discerning comment from those same sources about the nature of Soviet leadership and what is really going on in the Soviet Union.

Who are the Kremlin rulers today? What sort of people determine the foreign and defense policy of the Soviet Union?

Briefly, these are the members of the 11-man Politburo, in alphabetical order:

Leonid Brezhnev, age 62, General Secretary of CPSU Central Committee. Russian by birth, he began his career during the Stalin purge of 1936-38 in the Ukraine where there were three survivors of the 102-man local central committee. This is one of the men who denounced others on innumerable occasions. Orthodox in outlook, built his career on the political platform of return to doctrinal rigidity, partial rehabilitation of Stalinism, and crackdown on liberal writers. His political priorities are protection of the supremacy of the party, tightening the ties of the Socialist camp under Soviet dominance,

protection of defense goals through allocations to heavy industry, with agricultural allocations ranking second.

Andrey Kirilenko, age 62, Secretary of CPSU Central Committee. Russian by birth. Rose from a career of bloody and petty intrigue in the provincial Ukrainian party committees. Thus far one of Brezhnev's most loyal political supporters. Alternates with Suslov in deputizing for Brezhnev when the latter is out of town. Has been increasingly prominent in the past year and may now have edged Suslov out as the No. 2 man in the party. Kirilenko displayed a strong proconsumer bias during the Khrushchev years and in the period immediately after his ouster. These views have been muted since 1966 when ideological orthodoxy and preoccupation with the needs of defense began increasingly to dominate the thinking of the leadership.

Aleksey Kosygin, age 65, Chairman of U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. Russian, born in Leningrad. Took the first moves in his career in the great purge of 1936-38. He played an active role in party life at a time when the main "activity" was the denunciation and purge of the previous secretaries and bureaus, and when the Leningrad Communists were being slaughtered on a very large scale. During that time he advanced rapidly—moving up in four steps, from shop manager in a Leningrad factory to a post in the Soviet Government in about 2 years. Pragmatic with a strong interest in a balanced economy, especially interested in increased attention to consumer goods and "rationalization" of economic planning methods. His age, desire to preserve his privileged position, and orthodox Marxist training, however, limit his receptivity to new ideas and methods.

Kirill Mazurov, age 55, First Deputy Chairman of U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. Byelorussian by birth. Started his career in the party at the time of the 1936-38 purge. He has served some years in KGB operations. Pragmatic in outlook, responsible for light industry, but also interested in agriculture. Is behind a grandiose plan for the "urbanization" of the countryside being strongly pushed by the Byelorussian party organization, but currently hard up for funds. In foreign policy, Mazurov seems to favor an aggressive stance against the West. Alternates with Polyansky in deputizing for Kosygin.

Arvid Pelshe, age 70, Chairman of Party Control Commission. Latvian by birth and career, began his rise in the Latvian party during Suslov's proconsulship of that area, and is reported to owe his present high position to Suslov's patronage. A colorless party functionary, orthodox in outlook, he has spent important years in KGB operations.

Nikolay Podgorny, age 66, Chairman of Presidium U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. Ukrainian by birth and career. Under Khrushchev, identified with relatively liberal views, but since early 1966 has moved steadily toward orthodoxy in support of Brezhnev.

Dmitry Polyansky, age 51, First Deputy Chairman of U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. Ukrainian by birth, career ties to the Crimea, and thus far a loyal member

of the Ukrainian group in the Politburo. Has served in both party and state positions. As First Deputy Premier is responsible for agricultural production and is a zealous champion of investment in the agricultural production base. As a result has been increasingly in direct competition with the military for scarce resources. He is interested in doing business with the West and acquiring advanced Western technology, but otherwise seems to be ideologically orthodox in his foreign policy views.

Aleksandr Shelepin, age 50, Chairman of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. Russian, made his career in the Komsomol, then as head of the KGB. One of the most powerful figures in the leadership at the time of Khrushchev's ouster. Since 1966 his political position has steadily weakened. Interested in administrative efficiency and modern methods of control. Was behind move to rehabilitate Stalin in early 1966 and seemed to favor a tough, chauvinistic foreign policy. There are now indications that he is in search of a new platform to "run" on. Is said to have opposed Politburo handling of Czech crisis, but was an advocate of the aggressive line in the 1967 Middle East war.

Petr Shelest, age 61, Ukrainian by birth and career, still based in Kiev. First Secretary of Ukrainian Central Committee. Conservative on most domestic issues though something of a Ukrainian nationalist and champion of the "rights" of the republics, which however does not prevent him from applying harsh measures against his independently minded Ukrainian countrymen. A hard-liner on military matters. His remarks on foreign policy issues have been consistently tough, and he is reported to have pushed hard for a military intervention in the Czech crisis, fearful of the spread of the freedom virus to the bordering areas of the Ukraine.

Mikhail Suslov, age 66, Secretary of CPSU Central Committee with informal ranking of second in command. As the 1936-38 purge struck, Suslov began his spectacular rise, becoming one of the Rostov provincial secretaries. In 1939 he was appointed First Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee, where in 1944 he became involved in the deportation of the Karachai people. Proving successful in this, he was made Chairman of the Bureau of the Central Committee for newly occupied Lithuania in 1944 and reimposed Soviet rule against a bitter resistance. High priest in doctrinal matters with special interest in the cohesion of international communism. Orthodox in outlook and long opposed to "revisionism" in any field.

Gennady Voronov, age 58, Russian by birth. Grew up in the Soviet far east and for many years party boss of one of the large districts bordering on Communist China. Chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers. Ambitious figure with no apparent political ties with other members of the Politburo. Has been outspoken defender of the technocracy and favors establishing Western-style management training schools.

The often neglected truth about this group of men who are now on top in Rus-

sia is that they are the first generation of rulers who are actually the products of the Stalin system. Those who rose with Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, Kirilenko, and the others in the purge of 1936-38 were qualified for promotion by their denunciations of their colleagues. To have moved ahead in those days is a certain sign of complicity in Stalin's terror.

Now, in power, these men have shown themselves unable and apparently unwilling to make the reforms, small or large, required to meet the needs of an increasingly more complex, sophisticated Russian society. As one Russian observer put it:

There are no liberals at the top. Not in the Politburo. No Soviet Dubceks in sight, and no viable faction within the Party that would support one. That's the worst of it all.

Indeed, the repressive measures employed today to intimidate, frighten, and stifle expression of dissent approach those of the 1930's and 1940's in their intent and in the dogged intensity with which the Politburo executes them. There are more intellectuals now incarcerated in jails, committed to mental hospitals, or exiled to Siberia than at any time since Stalin's terror—Aleksandr Ginzburg, Yuri Galanskov, Pavel Litvinov, Larissa Daniel, and all the others. In addition, Soviet official organs employ countless other methods of repression. Liberals are slandered in the official press. Travel abroad is denied dissenters. Writers are denied the right to publish their works in their own country.

The lack of qualifications of most of the Politburo in dealing with foreign affairs is obvious. Careerists in the provincial or Central Party apparatus, they are generally narrow-minded, nationalistically oriented, basically hard-boiled Communists, limited men, concerned for their own positions and privileges, and knowing little of foreign reality.

After World War II, Maxim Litvinov used to take foreign diplomats and newspapermen aside and warn them that Stalin and his colleagues were thoroughly ignorant of the outside world, and that this constituted a very great danger. It seems that most of the present Politburo are no better off in knowledge of the outside world, some of them probably worse off. Clearly, we cannot discount the danger that these men, who are showing themselves unequal to the need for reforms at home, may make serious errors of judgment in their conduct of affairs abroad.

This is the group that chose to use armed force to strangle the evolutionary democratization of its own friend and ally, Czechoslovakia, which under Dubcek's leadership was indicating to the Soviet Union itself a way out of the vicious circle of repression, fear, repression. This is the group that then concocted the ominous Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty which asserts the right of the Soviet Union to intervene unilaterally in all Communist-run countries.

It is difficult to see how one could have thought up a more clumsy and self-defeating rationalization of the Czech

invasion. All the talk about the subordination of international law to the "laws of the class struggle" and the doubletalk about defending sovereignty by denying sovereignty gives no comfort to any other Communist ally, and shows a crude and deliberate disregard for the political interests of other Communist parties, particularly many in Western Europe, who, to retain the credibility of their effort to gain power by parliamentary means and of their willingness to support "bourgeois liberties," feel they must repudiate the theory of imperialist communism and Soviet Party predominance.

If anyone had any doubt about the capacity of the Politburo to blunder, its performance in the case of Czechoslovakia should dispel the doubt. The similarities between Moscow's forcible methods and Nazi methods are now fully visible to the peoples of all the Warsaw Pact countries, beginning with Rumania, and to Communist comrades around the world whose interests the Soviet leadership brazenly ignored.

Meanwhile, there is little doubt that a struggle for power and influence goes on within the Politburo, and that the outcome is uncertain.

In the Soviet Union a few leaders, conspiring when they choose, can make and unmake a man's power without his knowledge or that of the public. That is what happened to Khrushchev in 1964.

Will change, when it comes, bring merely a reshuffle of the same old party apparatus—Suslov or Kirilenko in place of Brezhnev; Voronov or Podgorny in place of Kosygin? Or will it bring a change of generations of party apparatus—Shelepin, Mazurov, Polyansky?

Will the change continue to restrict Soviet politics to the self-perpetuating Kremlin circles? Even now, the police appear to be gaining ground. As Michel Tatu, one of the most astute analysts of the Soviet scene has said, it is no accident that Yuri Andropov, the KGB chief, has been promoted to be an alternate member of the Politburo, for the first time since the notorious Lavrenti Beria was in the top group. Andropov has presided over the crackdown by the KGB on liberal Soviet intellectuals and signs of him in action during the Czechoslovak crisis have not indicated any doubts on his part concerning the intervention.

Also now, the influence of the Stalinist-type political commissars appears to be on the rise. General Shtemenko, Stalin's former chief of staff, downgraded two ranks on his master's death, has not only been reappointed to high position in the Soviet military hierarchy but is now Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states, and is campaigning to refurbish Stalin's image as a military leader. General Yepishev, a particularly sinister figure, who was Stalin's assistant minister of state security in the horrible Doctors' Plot period, was made chief political commissar of the Soviet Armed Forces in 1962, and promoted to full membership of the Central Committee following the fall of Khrushchev. He is noted for his continual attacks on the liberal writers and on the so-called "foreign imperialists." And one

gets no comfort from Yepishev's chilling article, widely circulated this year in *Kommunist*, the official Communist Party journal. In that article he says that "classical Leninist teaching" on the inevitability of "a series of frightful clashes" between capitalism and communism still applies in the nuclear age, and that World War III would "guarantee the construction of socialism and communism."

The resurgence of Soviet thinking in terms of the class struggle, reflected in military doctrine as well as in the Soviet approach to international law, must cause apprehension about the road ahead.

Now, the fact of the matter is that an increasing number of the informed Western analysts of Soviet developments assess the Soviet Union as a dangerous, unpredictable opponent—on the verge of a leadership crisis, the outcome of which cannot be forecast.

In this perspective, the fast-growing military capabilities of the Soviet Union take on added significance.

No one is sure of the future and one has to be prepared for surprises.

I am reminded of the lively discussion of the Czech crisis on August 7, 1968, at a high-powered workshop. The discussion produced a show of hands on the probability of Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia. Twenty present believed such an eventuality unlikely; two thought it probable.

One participant later suggested as a possible subtitle for the workshop, "Or Why We Were So Wrong."

We do not know who will have the finger on the Soviet trigger in the months and years ahead. The enormous Russian arsenal will be at the disposal of whatever "strong man" or ascendant faction of tough, ambitious figures come to the fore in the Soviet power struggle.

Hence, there is everything to be said for the United States to maintain a solid and prudent stance.

Mr. President, the essence of a solid and prudent stance is a protected U.S. second-strike capacity which gives us the capability to retaliate against a strategic nuclear attack, and therefore to discourage such an attack. This is the first essential of national security and individual liberty, and of the survival of us and our allies in freedom.

In recent years recognition has grown decisively among officials and scientists that we want to maintain the second-strike capacity—not of just one, but of all major vehicle types of our strategic force: Minuteman, bombers, and Polaris-Poseidon.

As our Armed Services Committee reports:

Each system has different limitations, is subject to varied uncertainties and requires distinct modes of attack. Each type must be protected, so as to insure no easy defeat of our system by an enemy. It must be of serious concern therefore if any part of our deterrent mixture is adversely affected by changing adverse forces and technologies.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has voted to cut about \$2 billion from the proposed 1970 Defense Department authorization bill. I joined in those votes. We can do without some of the less

urgent military programs. But in the face of the likely dangers ahead, tampering with the strategic offense and defense core of the Defense budget is a very risky business.

Of real concern is the continuing Soviet development of their gigantic SS-9 missile, on which they have already begun to test multiple reentry vehicles, and not without success. The evidence is firm that the Soviets have more than 230 SS-9's operational or under construction. If the Soviets continue to deploy additional missiles at the same rate as in the past few years, by the mid-1970's the survivability of most of our Minuteman forces, as presently deployed, would be in question.

Also of special concern is the threat to our bombers from the growing number of Soviet Polaris-type missile submarines, and the danger to our Polaris system from Soviet efforts in nuclear attack submarine construction and in anti-submarine warfare. As the report of the Armed Services Committee puts it:

We cannot assume that our Polaris system will be the first weapon in history to remain invulnerable.

Also of concern is the hard work which the Soviets have put into their ABM for many years. The Soviets are completing the deployment of some 60 Galosh ABM missiles on launchers around Moscow. And, very important, we now have hard evidence that the Soviets are testing an improved long-range ABM, which apparently has a "loiter" capability, so that, after the initial firing, the missiles can coast or "loiter" for a period of time, until a specific target is selected, at which point it can then be restarted and maneuvered to the target. The Tallinn defense system, very extensively deployed throughout the Soviet Union, is believed by many in the intelligence community to be subject to upgrading so as to give it an ABM capability.

Faced with these problems, President Nixon has recommended a phased program to deploy an ABM defense. The functions of the Safeguard ABM program are to help protect, first, the Minuteman silos; second, our manned bomber force; and third, the command and other facilities necessary in a crisis to assure national political control of both our land- and sea-based strategic forces. It is intended also to, fourth, provide a partial but useful protection of our people against an accidental, irrational or reckless small missile attack.

The opponents of the Safeguard program initially seemed to deny the fact that we confront increased threats to our deterrent forces in the mid and late 1970's. They now appear to have retreated from that position and are trying to make a case for alternatives to deploying an ABM system which in their view would be better.

Several Senators and scientists have suggested that, rather than defend our offensive forces, we should expand our offensive forces—our Minuteman or our Poseidon, or both. Yet buying more Minutemen without protection is certainly more destabilizing than an active defense of Minuteman silos, since it increases the capacity to strike first. And

buying more MIRVed Poseidon forces would surely be viewed from the Russian side as more threatening than a limited ABM defense of our forces.

Moreover, any significant expansion of our offensive nuclear weapons is more costly than the Safeguard program.

The President and the proponents of the Safeguard system are in my judgment the real moderates on this issue.

Some opponents of ABM advocate delay in deployment—of what they call "an inadequately tested, unproven missile defense system." In fact, the Safeguard system is the result of a very comprehensive research and development effort. The components are more fully advanced and better tested than were the components of the Polaris missile system, when a comparable go-ahead was given.

Mr. President, how can we now prove this system, except through a prototype-like deployment? Phase I of Safeguard is, in effect, a prototype installation that will enable the Defense Department to complete engineering, installation, and shakedown and tests and to have the two stations fully operative by 1974. If we delay the decision for about a year, as some propose, the soonest these two sites could be ready for complete checkout would be in 1976. This would leave us with no option to provide active defense for the essential portion of our Minuteman force on the schedule that may be necessary if we do not reach agreement with the Soviets on limiting or reducing strategic forces. There is obviously no substitute for time. And, what is more, the delay would cost us an extra expenditure of several hundred million dollars.

We can expect, as in the case of every other offense and defense system, that we can improve its effectiveness over the years. But we urgently need the experience of a deployed working prototype. The idea that we should not be getting this experience in this very important defense area of nuclear weaponry, while the potential opponent was not dormant and has had the opportunity to obtain some of this experience for many years, is to me the height of imprudence.

The statement to our committee by Freeman J. Dyson, of the Institute of Advanced Study, at Princeton, includes this perceptive comment:

In the long run the battle between offensive and defensive technology is a battle of information. If the defense knows where the offensive warheads are, it is not too difficult to destroy them. For the last 20 years the offensive has had an overwhelming advantage, but this advantage is being reduced as defensive information-handling capability improves. In the long run, I believe the defense will prevail because the defense will have more accurate and timely information than the offense. Defensive batteries within a hundred miles of the battle should ultimately be able to out-maneuver incoming offensive vehicles controlled from a command center 5000 miles away on land or in a submarine off-shore. The offensive command will be fighting the battle blind, without any possibility of quick reaction to defensive moves. I consider that it is only a question of time, perhaps ten or twenty years, before these inherent advantages of the defense become actual. The time that it will take to overturn the doctrine of the supremacy of

the offensive will of course depend on political decisions as well as on technological developments.

Some of the campaigners against ABM deployment argue that before deciding to proceed with deployment we should negotiate with the Russians.

Why either one or the other?

Why not both?

If we do not have our ABM system moving along, what inducement is there for the Soviets to negotiate with us on a freeze or a reduction in their ABM deployment? Can anyone seriously maintain that Moscow will agree to limit its ABM's if we now, and unilaterally, abandon deployment of our ABM's? Nothing in the record of negotiations on the control of arms suggests that this would be the way to have a successful negotiation with the Soviets.

I do not think that we can realistically expect the Politburo to sign an arms agreement that rules out a limited Soviet ABM defense and leaves their country vulnerable to nuclear coercion and attack from Communist China and other secondary nuclear powers. And I also very strongly doubt that the American Congress and people would accept an agreement under which the Soviets are permitted to have their ABM system while we have no comparable ABM protection well underway here.

Thus I believe the chance is promising that we could come to an agreement with the Soviet Union for a limited ABM defense on both sides—an agreed ceiling on the number of ABM's, for example—provided that we do not foolishly throw that chance away by now scuttling our own program.

In my judgment, anyone who wants a successful negotiation with the Soviets to halt the further evolution of dangerous strategic armaments should be a strong proponent of the Safeguard ABM.

President Nixon has asked us to give him the funds to proceed with the Safeguard ABM as a matter "essential for national security."

After thorough consideration, a majority of the Senate Armed Services Committee has supported the President's request.

President Nixon believes that he would be in a much stronger position in the forthcoming negotiations with the Soviets on limitation of offensive and defensive nuclear systems if he had the backing of Congress on his Safeguard program. I agree with that analysis. Indeed, in my opinion, nothing would be more detrimental to our diplomatic effort—and more shortsighted—than to deny the President the strong hand he needs just as his negotiators are about to sit down at the conference table.

I have no doubt that the Senate will evidence its commonsense and vote to go forward with the ABM program as part of the 1970 Department of Defense authorization bill.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I am glad to yield to the distinguished Senator from Texas.

Mr. TOWER. I express my appreciation to the distinguished Senator from Washington for one of the best speeches

on defense research that I have heard in a long time. It is information that everyone should heed. I think, certainly, that it makes the strongest possible case for the acceptance of research and deployment of the ABM.

Now that we are witnessing the resurgence of Stalinism, does not the Senator believe that the time remaining for a detente is less, probably, than in previous years?

Mr. JACKSON. I think the Senator is correct. If anyone has doubts about the nature of the present regime, I suggest that he read some of the quotations from the writings of that long-time Communist, Marshal Tito. Marshal Tito was a member of the Communist Party before many of the present members of the Politburo were even eligible to join the Young Communist League. Marshal Tito is so much concerned that he is now arming his peasants for guerrilla warfare.

If anyone has further doubts, he should listen to the words of the Communist leaders in Romania.

If we want to leave that area and move to Western countries, we can read what Luigi Longo, the head of the Communist Party of Italy, has said about the present regime. Can any Senator imagine how embarrassed the head of a Communist Party must be in a Western country, where free and open elections are held, to have to admit on the platform that if his party comes to power, according to the Brezhnev doctrine, that country, will then come under the discipline of the Soviet Union, and be subject to unilateral occupation by the Soviets.

No wonder the leaders of so many of the Communist Parties in the Western World have denounced the leadership in the Politburo as dangerous and, indeed, a threat to the peace of the world. Yet I am amazed to hear it said in the United States and elsewhere that the Soviet Union is no problem, and this at a time when the top ranking leaders of the Communist world outside the Soviet Union are warning, over and over again, about Soviet imperialism. In fact, the major foreign policy problem which confronts us is Russian imperialism.

Mr. President, the Brezhnev doctrine cannot be explained in the doctrinal terms of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. This doctrine is a most fantastic proposition. It can be explained, however, in terms of Russian history, in terms of Russian imperialism.

I submit that with all the discussion that has been going on about defensive systems and offensive systems, we have spent altogether too much time talking about the military hardware and we have not been debating the central issue. The central issue which you have to decide first, before you can decide what kind of military budget you should have or what kind of foreign policy you should have, is: What kind of adversary do you face, and what is he up to?

I submit that even if we just listen to the representatives of the Communist world outside of the Soviet Union, we get a pretty good measure of the threat as they witness it.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. TOWER. The Senator is obviously knowledgeable on this matter. Does he discern any genuine desire on the part of the present hierarchy of the Soviet Union to reduce the current pace of arms technology, development, and deployment?

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, there is a direct relationship to the coming of power of the present group in the Politburo and the increase in Soviet strategic arms. They are directly related. There is a direct relationship, of course, to the use of force to subjugate Czechoslovakia and the enunciation of the now-infamous Brezhnev doctrine. I do not think there is any doubt that the men who are running the Politburo today are unsure of themselves. They are not very competent. I think they present to the western world—and to the Communist world outside of the Soviet Union—a real, and unpredictable threat.

Mr. TOWER. Further, does it appear that historically Soviet arms development and Soviet stockpiling of arms, the expansion of Soviet military capacity, is directly related to what we have done in the way of arms development? In other words, have they simply reacted to the things we have done?

Mr. JACKSON. This is not, of course, the case. The Soviets, in my judgment, have decided on what they feel they might need if they ever got into a nuclear war, in order to be in a better position than the opponent if such a war does come. Obviously, there is some interaction between their programs and ours, but it is not the simple action-reaction pattern that some people call it.

In my statement I referred to General Yepishev, who made some rather startling comments about the fact that war was still inevitable, even in a nuclear age. The Senator will recall that Mr. Khrushchev walked away from that position. He said that obviously Mr. Lenin, when he laid down the idea of the inevitability of war, did not have in mind the possibility of catastrophic thermonuclear weapons, and therefore thermonuclear war was unthinkable.

But now we have a high functionary, and influential official in the Soviet Union, writing in an official organ, the Communist, saying, in effect, that we might have nuclear war and that indeed the possibility of it was inevitable and that if we did it would "guarantee the construction of socialism and communism."

I think this presents some measure of the preparations that they are making.

Mr. TOWER. Then the Senator would reject the somewhat fragile contention and the historically unprovable contention that if we develop and deploy an ABM, we are simply fueling the arms race for the Soviet Union, that they will react by something greater.

Mr. JACKSON. I do not have the direct quotation before me, but in 1967 this very question was asked of Mr. Kosygin at a press conference in London. They asked Mr. Kosygin, in effect, "Are you not fueling the arms race by deploying an ABM system?" He, in effect, said, "There are two systems—offensive and defensive—and a defensive system is merely in de-

fense of the country, and it does not add to or fuel the arms race." This is Mr. Kosygin's position.

I will point out that the Soviet Union was the first to develop an ICBM, the first to deploy an ABM—which we have not yet done, the first to set off a 60 megaton bomb—something we have never done. They were the first to deploy a fractional orbital bombardment system.

I should observe at this point that from 1945 until the fall of 1949, we in effect unilaterally disarmed so far as the hydrogen bomb was concerned. We had the understanding, the talent, and the know-how from the days at Los Alamos to go ahead with what was then called the super project. We made no move in this regard until Klaus Fuchs was apprehended and we had the conclusive evidence that the Russians knew a lot about it. Klaus Fuchs, of course, turned out to be the greatest traitor in this century, especially in the field of technology and science. He had given this information to the Soviets. But for 4 years we did nothing about developing a hydrogen bomb, because we did not want to fuel the arms race.

We need not go into detail about what the Soviets did in the postwar period when we had an absolute monopoly of nuclear weapons. There are too many people in Central Europe in chains today who testify to what they did. There were the continuing harassments of Berlin, and so on. But there were limits as to how far Moscow would go when it was in a totally inferior nuclear position. But if they get into a position where they feel they could move, from a strategic point of view, with relative impunity, I wonder what they would do in this troubled world in trying to extend their influence. I think they would be tempted to take great risks and this could lead to the most dangerous kind of confrontations with us, and with other powers.

Mr. TOWER. Then, would it not be valid to say that even if we should unilaterally initiate a cessation of development, production, and deployment of strategic weapons in this country, we could not expect the Soviets to do the same?

Mr. JACKSON. There is evidence to completely corroborate the Senator's statement.

The Senator will recall that President Johnson invited Mr. Khrushchev not to go ahead with the production of any more fissionable material with the new plants that were underway. There was a unilateral move on our part. We ourselves announced a shutdown. Mr. Khrushchev indicated he was going to do likewise, but instead they added to their capacity. The Russians went right ahead and added to their production of fissionable material.

Mr. TOWER. I thank the Senator for his remarks, and I should like to associate myself with those remarks.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. DOMINICK. I should like to congratulate the Senator for what I think is one of the best speeches I have heard in a long time.

I think one of the problems we have been facing—and I have said this over and over, to the extent of walking out in anger from one of the Armed Services Committee meetings—is the fact that when we are given data, it is always marked "secret" with respect to what the enemy is doing, but by and large it is not with respect to what we are doing. So the whole security picture has been turned around, and the people of this country have not been permitted to know what the Soviet Union in fact has been doing.

All the information I have—and I would ask the Senator whether this is correct—is that when we leveled off on our Minuteman production and deployment, it is our hope at that time that this would bring down, as I understand it, or would create an atmosphere in which the Soviets themselves would stop their production of offensive weaponry. Am I correct?

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is correct.

Mr. DOMINICK. What happened?

Mr. JACKSON. The Soviets went right ahead and proceeded to harden their strategic missile sites. They did this at a time when they knew we did not have a first-strike capability.

In fact, today the Soviets are the only one building toward a first-strike capability. We do not have that capability and we do not want it. We made that decision in 1961 when we decided to go ahead with Minuteman. We told the whole world we were going for a second-strike capability and none other than that.

Mr. DOMINICK. In the meantime, did they not produce and deploy the SS-9 and the SS-11 and a good number of their other missiles which are in evidence, and have they not accelerated production, no matter whom they may be targeted on?

Mr. JACKSON. The nature of our position in this matter is well known. The Senator will recall that we entered into a nuclear test ban moratorium with the Soviets. The way in which they announced the termination of the agreement was to set off a 60-megaton bomb. We were acting in good faith and we were not prepared to resume testing. The result was that they were able to test strategic nuclear weapons that were invaluable to them, including ABM weapons, in which 2 years' work was involved.

As a result of their action in this regard they were able to obtain data and information in the strategic weapons field that we have not been able to get because we went along with the nuclear test ban treaty. I supported that agreement. But I point out we had this agreement and without warning they abrogated it. They knew very well their intentions in that regard because from what they were able to do it was apparent they had made the decision months and months previous to the time they broke the moratorium in September 1961.

Mr. DOMINICK. The Senator emphasized the leadership of the Soviet Union in the context of what it might be like 5 years, 6 years, or 7 years from now. I would hope that before we are through

we would also get the same type of information with respect to the leadership of the Red Chinese.

Mr. JACKSON. I think the Russians would like to get that information also.

Mr. DOMINICK. I think they would, and I would be happy to have the Senator do the same type of research he has done on this matter and get that information out if he could.

It seems to me that I recall President Johnson urged that we deploy the Sentinel system against a possible Chinese attack in the middle 1970's. I remember reading myself the words of Mr. Mao, who is in charge of that country, saying they would not mind a nuclear world war because they could survive it out of sheer numbers, which would leave no speculation with respect to what might happen if they had more nuclear power than they now possess.

I hope we can get some background analysis of the upcoming leadership in that area and put that information in the Record with respect to the forces we are facing.

I congratulate the Senator.

Mr. JACKSON. I thank the Senator. I wish to comment on the remarks of the able Senator.

I think that the Soviets during these tense days with the Chinese Communists are counting heavily, on having in the period ahead, among other things, an ABM system that can deal with nuclear blackmail efforts or an irrational act on the part of the Chinese. We know that very substantial Soviet conventional and strategic forces have been moved into the Sino-Soviet border area. We do not know what might happen. Anything could happen out there. It is a most explosive situation.

I feel quite strongly that, if there is a chance to reach an agreement involving strategic weapons, it is primarily in this area of the antiballistic missile system, because I believe the Russians are going to insist on a minimum number of ABM's, especially in order to deal with the Chinese problem as it is now, and as they may find it in the period ahead. But to get the Soviets to limit the number of their ABM's, I think we need to have our own ABM system really underway—to bargain with. That is the point I developed in my earlier remarks.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. DOMINICK. One of the things that has been of increasing concern to me is the semantic somersaults made in some areas of the country where people who say we have an overkill say we should not deploy the ABM because that would be provocative; and they say build more offensive weapons. That does not make sense to me. It seems to me that if we have an overkill, we should maintain the ability of that overkill to be used as needed.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I heard the statement of the able Senator from Colorado, regarding the support by oppo-

nents of ABM of offensive weapons as an alternative. The distinguished Senator from Washington has made the same statement. In the testimony of Secretary Laird before the House committee, he made a similar statement.

It is said that those who oppose deployment of the anti-ballistic-missile system this year, a defensive system, favor additions of missiles to our offensive systems.

I must say that is incorrect. The framework in which such a statement has been made is—that if a year from now the Soviets are proceeding with the deployment of the SS-9, perhaps armed with MRV or MIRV, at that time, if necessary to protect our deterrent, we could protect our assured deterrent by building additional Minuteman missiles and additional Polaris or Poseidon-type submarines. That is the context in which such statements have been made.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is correct regarding his own position certainly.

Mr. COOPER. Yes, but the implication, and I say this with all courtesy as the Senator knows my regard for him, of the statement made here today, and made by Secretary Laird in his testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, is that opponents of the anti-ballistic-missile system are arguing for an alternative; that is, additional ICBM's and the Polaris should be deployed. This is not correct.

Mr. JACKSON. I say in response to the statement of my good friend that it is far less provocative to try to defend our deterrent; then later if that is not adequate, the decision can be made about going ahead with an addition to the offensive system.

We did have some testimony before our committee, the Committee on Armed Services, to the effect that if the situation reaches the point where the Minuteman is really threatened, so that it no longer has a credible position in the deterrent system, then it would be preferable to go the offensive route, rather than try an ABM defense. I think I stated it correctly.

Mr. COOPER. My position is that arms control is the best means of security. But if talks fail—if the threat to this country becomes as serious as the Secretary of Defense says—we can increase offensive weapons to meet the threat. He conjures up a bleak picture for the United States—but one based on several assumptions: First, that the Soviet Union will proceed with the deployment of the SS-9 and construction of Polaris-type submarines. The second assumption, if the Soviet Union takes that course, is that the United States would then protect itself both by the deployment of a better and effective ABM system and by the construction of more intercontinental ballistic missiles, and by Poseidon. These measures would be available to the United States to protect and defend its nuclear deterrent. The assumptions to my mind, are not correct. But they are argued to make the case upon which the ABM is based. The fact is—the Soviets may not proceed as assumed—but if they do—we can protect our security without timelag.

Mr. JACKSON. Let me say in response to my good friend that the Secretary of Defense, of course, must make certain assumptions because prudence tells him that there is a leadtime factor involved. In other words, what we are really talking about, as the Senator knows, is what the Soviets may have in the way of strategic arms in the 1974-76 and beyond time frame. We look at what they are doing and try to make certain extrapolations from that as to what they may have during that period. Unless we allow for the leadtime, we will not have the means to protect our deterrent in that period. The big debate turns on that.

Mr. COOPER. We shall get into those points later, during debate. But on the question of leadtime, if it should become necessary to build additional offensive weapons I believe the Senator will agree that there would be time to do so.

Mr. JACKSON. Well no. This involves cranking up production of Minutemen and Poseidon missiles, producing and deploying them which takes time. Polaris submarines take time. We have had various estimates of the leadtime required, and they can be supplied to the Senate. What we are really talking about is what the capability will be during the mid-seventies and beyond.

Mr. COOPER. We shall be prepared on these points.

Mr. DOMINICK. Will the Senator from Washington yield so that I may make one more comment?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. DOMINICK. In my comment, I did not mean to impugn anything about one of my most beloved friends in the Senate, my friend from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER). I had not meant it personally. What I have said is that from all over the country, and from many scientists, they have said that we are capable of building a defensive weapons system that will be provocative, but if we build an offensive system it will be nonprovocative. That seems to me to be a question of a semantic somersault. I can understand it in the context of putting it in what the Senator is talking about, but this is not the context in which many people are putting it, including the previous Secretary of Defense.

Mr. COOPER. I have heard the testimony of the scientists before the Armed Services Committee, and the subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee chaired by the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE), except when I was ill. I have read the testimony. I do not know any scientist—I may be wrong, but I have not so read or heard—who said that, as an alternative to ABM, offensive weapons should be deployed.

Mr. JACKSON. On that one point, the Senator has read the testimony of many experts from each side of the ABM. I do not have that at my fingertips, but in the next few days I will place in the RECORD a number of statements. It was my understanding that if the threat reached the point that it was, indeed, a grave threat to the Minuteman deterrent, they would advocate going forward with a buildup of the offensive forces. I shall place that in the RECORD. I believe that was the testimony, for example, of Dr.

Rathjens and Dr. Chayer, and possibly others such as Dr. Wiesner.

Mr. COOPER. I think that is correct. That is the statement I have made.

Mr. JACKSON. I thought the Senator said they did not say it.

Mr. COOPER. In the event of a threat that materialized—

Mr. JACKSON. Let us put in the RECORD what it is.

Mr. COOPER. We would have the option, if necessary, of deploying additional offensive weapons.

Mr. JACKSON. But, as I recall, they said it was in preference to the ABM. It seems to me, from the Russian point of view, that going ahead with an offensive system would be far more provocative and destabilizing than providing for a defensive system. That was my point. But, in any case, the record will speak for itself as to what they and others have said.

Mr. COOPER. We will place in the RECORD their statements—

Mr. JACKSON. May I just add this other thing, since the colloquy referring to the leadtime necessary to crank-up Minuteman production and deploy a substantial number, I am advised that the leadtime is a number of years—some estimates run as high as 4 to 5 years.

Mr. COOPER. I do not think so. Perhaps the Senator can produce the facts for the RECORD during debate.

Mr. JACKSON. I will supply data on this matter.

Mr. COOPER. I have listened to the speech of the Senator from Washington very carefully. He always makes a very effective and informative speech. I am not going to question the judgment of the Senator from Washington regarding characteristics of the Politburo. I do not contradict the Senator's statement about the new doctrine which the Soviet Union declared—

Mr. JACKSON. The Brezhnev doctrine.

Mr. COOPER. In connection with Communist countries. It is an unusual innovation in any system of law and international relations. Czechoslovakia was a brutal example.

I would argue that if the Soviet leaders are as unpredictable as it is said they are—and they may be—and if the threat which the Senator has pictured so grimly, as has Secretary of Defense Laird, is a true threat, and knowing that both countries are armed to the teeth, that the United States has more men under arms around the world than the Soviet Union and that though the United States possesses three times as many nuclear warheads as the Soviet Union, that both countries have the capability of destroying the other, even if first struck by a nuclear attack—then the Senator's speech supports the argument that we are making. Let our great and humane country try in negotiations, to determine whether it is possible to reach an agreement to control both offensive and defensive weapons rather than deploying new weapons systems such as ABM or MIRV. If not an agreement in formal terms, a tacit agreement proved by a halt in their deployment by the Soviet Union and the United States.

This course of action, of effort, offers at

least some ray of hope for the people of our country and the rest of the world. It is better to make the effort, even if it fails, than to vote to pile up these weapons, particularly at a time when we are preparing for negotiations to urge their control.

Mr. JACKSON. Let me respond to my good friend from Kentucky by saying that I have the highest regard for his sincerity in presenting his point of view. No one that I know of, on the committee or in the Senate, has stated that we do not have this awesome strategic nuclear capability at the present time. I have been trying to emphasize that we are not talking about that now. We are talking about 1974-76. I do think that the Senate should know what is happening in the strategic arms field. The Soviet Union, as the Senator knows, now has deployed or has under construction, more land-based, long-range missiles, not to mention their medium-range missiles, targeted on Western Europe, than the United States. Also, as the Senator knows, the Soviets have a greater megatonnage deliverability capability right now than we have.

Speaking of nuclear arms, we should remember, when we are talking about nuclear strategic capability, that it is not just the number of warheads that matters; it is warhead numbers, times yield, times deliverability, that spells out the nuclear posture.

I want to add that I share the Senator's desire to negotiate with the Soviets. I have supported all moves in that regard. But now I want to ask a simple question:

Why would the Russians negotiate to give up or limit an ABM system if they have one and we do not have one? Where is our bargaining power in that situation?

Mr. COOPER. They may not. The Senator has answered the question in his own speech. He said it may well be, as a result of these negotiations, that the Soviets and the United States may decide they want an ABM system. But this would be the result of agreement.

Mr. JACKSON. I think it is desirable to have a limited number of ABM weapons. I do think, in light of the condition that exists between the Soviet Union and Communist China—and the Senator is fully aware of what has happened there is recent weeks—there is a good chance that, while the Soviets would not want to eliminate the ABM system, they might agree to limit the ABM's they would deploy—that is, if we do not scuttle our own ABM program before the talks even begin.

Mr. COOPER. That is the issue the Senator raised—that the Soviets would not abandon their ABM system. The argument that we should make a decision now on deploying ABM to help in negotiations does not hold water. I do not believe that a decision now to start deployment of an ineffective ABM system, which cannot be deployed or tested as an integrated system until 1974, is going to have any weight with the Soviet Union. Either Dr. Foster or Secretary Laird testified before the House committee that we could destroy their partially deployed ABM system around Moscow. We would

just overcome it with missiles. I would consider that the Soviets believe they could similarly overcome our ABM system.

Mr. JACKSON. Did he mean now?

Mr. COOPER. Of course, we have the MIRV. They have MIRV, we believe.

Mr. JACKSON. We are not so sure they do not have MIRV.

Mr. COOPER. We know what we have. If we are to have control and limitation of arms, I believe the factor that either country has the power to destroy the other will be the deciding factor, rather than an ABM system which may be physically deployed 4 to 6 years from now, and not an effective one, even then.

Mr. JACKSON. Again, on the negotiation question, the Senator will recall that the debate on the ABM grew out of the military construction bill. We discussed foreign and defense policy in connection with the military construction bill for over a week.

The Senator will recall that the argument was made that if we went ahead and first deployed the ABM system, the Russians would not talk. It is all in the record. I do not need to go into detail. The argument was that they would not talk. I took the position that if we went forward with the ABM, we would increase the Soviet incentive to come to the conference table. The Senator will recall that on a Monday we voted to go ahead with the ABM, and on a Thursday Mr. Gromyko asked for talks. This is the significant point. I did not assert at the time that by going ahead we would force the Russians to talk, but I did point out that the constant argument being made that the Russians would not talk if we went ahead did not make sense. The record speaks for itself.

Mr. COOPER. I remember that. I was one of those who argued—

Mr. JACKSON. I do not recall that the Senator took that position, but other Senators did.

Mr. COOPER. I want to be honest—

Mr. JACKSON. I was trying to protect the Senator.

Mr. COOPER. I doubt that the Soviets are so loosely organized that they would make such a decision in 3 days, upon a vote by the U.S. Senate to deploy the Sentinel system. I am almost ashamed to make the debating point that last year the argument was made that construction of the Sentinel system would bring the Soviets to talks. This year, we have abandoned the Sentinel system as ineffective. We should not vote to deploy ABM before we commence negotiations. The objective is to stop the arms race—not accelerate it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has made a very interesting speech characterizing the leadership of the Russian Government. I am not sure his speech will promote talks, or very friendly talks, but that is beside the point.

Mr. JACKSON. Has the Senator read the series of articles by Anatole Shub recently published in the Washington Post?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did. I read another article following that which is contradictory to it. But that is neither here nor there. It does not matter what Mr. Shub said. The Senator is a distinguished Senator from Washington and a leading Senator, who would have been Secretary of Defense, according to all reports, if he had wanted to be. It is quite a different thing to read what the Senator from Washington said and to read what Mr. Shub said. Mr. Shub is a fine newspaperman who was in Russia but was asked to leave by the Soviet Union. I imagine he was not pleased by that development. I do not wish to make any point of that.

I understood the Senator to refer a moment ago to "first-strike capability." I am wondering in what way he uses the term "first-strike capability." What does that term mean to the Senator from Washington?

Mr. JACKSON. It means to the Senator from Washington an ability to destroy their nuclear strike force to the point where they would not be able to provide a creditable strike force against us.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. A retaliatory one?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes. I am not saying what the Soviets intend to do with the capability they are building. I do not know what they intend. I am talking only about capability.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. A moment ago I understood the Senator from Washington to say—not in this colloquy, but just before—that the Soviets today have the only first-strike capability in the world; we do not have a first-strike capability.

Mr. JACKSON. I believe the Soviets are building toward a first-strike capability. We are not seeking a first-strike capability.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would like the Senator to elucidate that a little.

Mr. JACKSON. Yes; I shall be happy to. As the senior Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE), who is a member of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, will recall, we were advised several years ago that the decision had been made not to go ahead with big nuclear bombs.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right. They are big, but not as big as theirs. I would say one megaton is pretty big.

Mr. JACKSON. I am talking about nuclear weapons that are capable of destroying hardened silos in the Soviet Union. Mr. McNamara made the decision in 1961, when we moved rapidly with the deployment of the Minuteman force, that we had bombers that could deliver nuclear weapons of many megatons greater than the Minuteman or the Polaris or the Poseidon, when it is deployed; but—and this is the point—we could not use manned bombers to knock out the hardened silos in the Soviet Union, for the simple reason that by the time the bombers got there, with the warning the Soviets would have, the silos would be empty.

Does that answer the question of the Senator?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No. I asked the question, or perhaps the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) did, of the present Secretary of Defense, Mr. Laird, if he considered that the Russians had

the capacity now to knock our retaliatory capacity. In other words, did they have a first-strike capability? If I recall, he said they did not. So we have a direct conflict between the Senator's testimony and that of the present Secretary of Defense, which strikes me as rather odd, inasmuch as the Senator from Washington could have been Secretary of Defense, had he chosen to be. I am sure that is correct.

Mr. JACKSON. No.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I mean correct about the difference, not about the Secretaryship.

Mr. JACKSON. Let us stick to the present question the Senator poses. The Soviet Union does not now have a capability of destroying our retaliatory force.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator said a few minutes ago they did.

Mr. JACKSON. I made a very clear distinction in the colloquy with the Senator from Kentucky. I said we are not talking about our current capability. We are talking about what it will be in 1974 or 1976. I am sorry if there was any misunderstanding.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is what I am trying to clarify: I think the Senator said prior to that, because I made a note of it, that the Soviets today have the only first-strike capability in the world, that we do not have a first-strike capability.

Mr. JACKSON. No; that is not correct.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was simply going to ask the Senator to clear it up now, because I thought he just now said they did not have a first-strike capability; but he says they do have it now?

Mr. JACKSON. What I am saying is that a first-strike capability, of course, is not achieved, in a technical sense, until you can destroy a sufficient number of the hardened or, shall we say, submerged submarines of the adversary, as well as a sufficient number of the ICBM's to the point that he cannot make a credible retaliatory response.

But I am pointing out to the Senator that I do not know why the Soviets would want to have a 25-megaton capability in their missile, if it is only for a second strike? I would like to obtain a response to that question. I think with a 25-megaton warhead, if you get enough of them, you have a first-strike capability, and you can have a second strike, third strike, fourth strike, many different strikes. But when they get enough of that kind of megatonnage in the warhead of a missile, and enough missiles, if there are no other steps taken to protect our missiles, with the number of Minutemen that we have now deployed, the Soviets could destroy a large enough number to make our land-based retaliatory force ineffective.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We spent 3 hours, I believe—the Senator from Tennessee was there—in executive session the other day with the present Secretary of Defense and the Director of the CIA, much of it on this point. The Secretary finally agreed that all he was talking about, as to capability, was that these SS-9's were capable of destroying a Minuteman silo. He did not mean to

imply that this would be a first strike capability, because they had no feasible way to deal with either our bombers or the Poseidon, and so on.

In other words, he retracted, in my view, what he publicly had said in the first meeting with our committee, when he said:

They are going for a first strike capability, let there be no doubt about it.

All I am trying to do is clarify the record. I do not wish to precipitate a big argument on the merits, although I will have to say, in view of what the Senator has said, that there was a deliberate decision on the part of our Government not to go for these big ones, because they are a less efficient use of our fissionable capacity.

After all, a megaton in a Minuteman is a terrific weapon; it is 50 times the force that destroyed Nagasaki. It was felt that there was no point in developing one that big, and I assume that the Senator from Washington agreed with that decision.

Mr. JACKSON. That was correct.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This was a deliberate decision, because it was the most efficient way to use our fissionable material.

Mr. JACKSON. I cannot agree with the Senator on that at all. The decision was not based on the efficient use of nuclear material. The decision was made that we would not go for a first strike capability against the Soviets. Bear in mind, we had a wide lead then. The decision was made that we would have a second-strike force that would be usable only against soft sites—cities airfields, and so on—I want to make it clear that the decision was not made on the basis of efficient use of fissionable material.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. You get much more out of a number of small ones than one big one; I think that should be obvious. When you consider the capacity for destruction of a megaton, it is a terrific weapon. You can destroy a city like Washington with one of them.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is correct; but he has to make the point, however, when he argues in that direction, that it requires only a minimum megatonnage to knock out a city.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But we have plenty for a retaliatory strike, if they knocked them all out. That is one point I am making.

Mr. JACKSON. We are talking about what the situation is going to be in 1974, or 1976. I emphasize that, because that is the issue.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes; and that is based upon a lot of assumptions. It is assuming that the Russians will continue to develop theirs, and we will stand still and will not make any more, and that has been argued at great length.

I wish to ask a few other questions. I also understood the Senator to say, and I want to see if I am correct—I believe the RECORD will show—that the Senator said the Russians have deployed a fractional orbital bombardment system. Did he say that, or not?

Mr. JACKSON. That is correct.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. They have deployed it?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. And it is workable, and in operation?

Mr. JACKSON. I might say to the Senator, he can find the statement in open literature. A top-ranking Soviet officer, in one of their official publications, so announced it. And we know that they have deployed some.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Some. But I mean, is it an operating weapons system?

Mr. JACKSON. They have an operational system. It is limited in numbers at this time. One of the problems in this regard is that they use, as a booster, the SS-9.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But did the Senator say it? I am not arguing with the Senator; I just want to be sure I heard the Senator correctly.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator heard me correctly.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That it is an operational FOBS system?

Mr. JACKSON. That is right. They have available for use an operational fractional orbital bombardment system.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Deployed?

Mr. JACKSON. Deployed.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Very well. I just wanted to be sure.

The Senator mentioned a time when we offered to freeze testing fissionable material, and the Russians, in return, tested a large bomb?

Mr. JACKSON. No, I did not say that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What did the Senator say?

Mr. JACKSON. What I said was that in 1961, in September, I believe, the Soviets, without warning, broke the nuclear test moratorium and set off a 60-megaton bomb. I think it was on the same day.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Was that a formal moratorium, or a tacit one?

Mr. JACKSON. It was an understanding. I ask the able Senator from Tennessee, who is present in the Chamber, and who, I think, attended some of the meetings at Geneva.

It was an understanding, in any event. Whether it was reduced to writing, I do not know for sure. I will come to the other question.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That we offered to freeze the further manufacturing of fissionable material. Did the Senator say that?

Mr. JACKSON. No, I did not say that. I will answer the question.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not want to put words in the Senator's mouth. I am asking whether he said something to that effect.

Mr. JACKSON. No, I did not. I said that President Johnson announced that we were closing some of our nuclear reactors. He had taken this up earlier with Mr. Khrushchev, and Mr. Khrushchev agreed to close, or not go ahead with, some of the new reactors that the Soviets were building. What happened, though, was that we closed ours, and the Soviets went ahead and finished theirs, and they are in operation. I believe the chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy at that time, the distin-

guished Senator from New Mexico, Senator ANDERSON, can corroborate what I have just said.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Then I misunderstood. We did not, either then or at any other time, offer to freeze the development of fissionable material?

Mr. JACKSON. No. This point came up, as the Senator may recall, in a question raised by the able Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) about unilateral disarmament proposals. I stated that this was a proposal that we had made and I mentioned what had happened as a result of it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I, of course, am not prepared, and do not wish to try to question any of the Senator's characterizations of the members of the Politburo. I do not know them personally. I have read some of the descriptions of them, as the Senator mentioned, particularly those by Mr. Shub and also others. I would agree that the members of the Politburo have not shown, in my opinion, very good judgment, particularly with regard to Czechoslovakia. As the Senator from Washington said, it was a great mistake. I believe he said that. I forget how he characterized it.

Mr. JACKSON. It was a terrible tragedy for the people of Czechoslovakia.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. JACKSON. But, as the Senator knows, Moscow did not stop with the invasion; the Politburo laid the groundwork for further invasions with the Brezhnev doctrine, which they announced, after the assault on Czechoslovakia, and as an attempt to justify it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator is correct. But I am not so sure that there is a great difference between the attitude of what they call the Brezhnev doctrine and the recent doctrine of our former Secretary of State, who made statements to the effect that we do not have to have treaties in order to preserve peace around the world; that we were prepared to—I forget the exact language, but the purport was that we were prepared to intervene at almost any time or anywhere that we thought that it was in our interest to prevent the spread of communism.

Mr. JACKSON. I do not think the Secretary said that. May I comment on that point?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes; certainly.

Mr. JACKSON. My understanding was that Secretary of State Rusk had indicated the number of treaty obligations we had throughout the world. Then, after going through that long list, he said there might be situations in the world where it would be in the national interest of the United States to come to the aid of a country, even though we did not have a formal treaty. I think that was what he said.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not see much difference between what I said and what the Senator from Washington said.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator from Arkansas said "intervene."

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, "come to the aid," if the Senator wishes. The Russians are saying that they came to the aid of the sound and God-fearing Communists in Czechoslovakia.

They were coming there to the followers of Novotny who had been put out. Every big country always takes the position that they are coming to the aid of their friends and of those who believe in the same gods they believe in. This is characteristic of all big countries.

It is very unpopular ever to equate one's own country with another country with whom one disagrees or a country that has a different point of view.

The belief that the big countries are characterized by some common faults is not much accepted. The belief is: "It is very good to take the position we are taking." That was the position more or less of the late John Foster Dulles who took the position that we are good people and all other people are suspect, and particularly the Russians.

The Russians are very shortsighted people, in my opinion, in many respects. However, I cannot say on the other hand that everything we have done has been above suspicion and motivated by the common good.

I think we have our national interest at heart. As the Senator has said, wherever our national interests are affected, we act. In the Dominican Republic, in the face of specific treaties that said specifically that we would not under any circumstances intervene in Latin American countries, we did intervene. And we did it without even notifying the OAS until after we had done it.

I am not trying here to argue about the particular merits of the matter. I say that action was very similar to action taken by any big country whenever it feels that its interests are involved. I think if we are ever to go along the road that the Senator from Kentucky mentioned a moment ago and if we are ever to make any progress away from the constantly increasing arms race and the piling up of more and more armaments, we have to have some kind of political agreements.

To make statements condemning the leaders of another country, and one of them in particular, saying that he engaged in bloody intrigue is not a very good way to have talks.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, let me observe that I would think that the first question that any logical person would want to resolve in deciding how to vote on a defense appropriation bill would be: What kind of an adversary do we face? This is what I have done. I have tried. And I spent a lot of time on this matter. I must say that I think we face a very rough adversary, a very dangerous adversary, and an unpredictable one.

I think this is a logical and sensible approach. Let me get to the other two points the Senator raised before I yield to the Senator.

The Senator mentioned Czechoslovakia and said that maybe the Russians were intervening at the request of the Czechs.

If the Senator will recall, early on the night of the invasion or the next morning, the Russians got out a statement saying that they were intervening at the request of the Czech leadership. Of course, the whole handling of the Czech affair by the Russians was so clumsy that it turned out the request had not

been made. They were so crude that they did not even go through the usual Communist ritual of setting up some kind of pro forma request. When they got into Czechoslovakia they could not find a "quisling" to work with and they had to get Dubcek out of jail, where they had put him, and deal with him again.

The Senator has mentioned the Dominican Republic and apparently tried to compare this with Czechoslovakia. What we did there resulted in a free and open election. What kind of election is being held in Czechoslovakia?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did not say anything about an election. I did not say the Russians were invited by Dubcek. They were not. But they said they were.

I am not saying they did not lie about it. I think they did. All I am saying is that they put it on the ground of protecting Communists. We originally put our action in the Dominican Republic on the ground, as the President said, of protecting American lives.

I was at the White House when the President told us that 500 Americans were threatened and that we were going to take them out. He never alleged that the Dominican Government asked us to intervene. However, later on different reasons developed.

Mr. JACKSON. However, there was a free and open election there.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is another matter.

Mr. JACKSON. That is a very important matter, Mr. President.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is not the point I am making. I am not trying to make the point that they are a democracy and we are not. We are a democracy, and we have a Constitution, thank God. And we have a Senate that functions. We are trying to make it function now.

The real point of the debate is not the ABM as such.

The whole point of the debate is an effort on the part of some Members of the Senate to reassert some control over the military department. The Senate is the only agency of the Government that can do it. I do not exclude the President. The Senate is the only agency that can bring about any degree of control over the military department because of the peculiar situation in our Government. That is what the debate is about.

The point that is being argued happens to be the ABM. It could have been any other of a number of things that might develop. However, the ABM developed out of a variety of circumstances.

That is what it is all about. I do not deny that we are a democracy. I am glad that we are, but we should not be so self-righteous about it as to say that we do everything because of some fine motives. That is not right. We do it to protect our interests.

I do not deny that in every case. We do it when our interests are involved, and not through some misunderstanding of a situation.

That is the point I am making. It is the same thing with weapons. We have been told we have enough weapons to kill them 10 times over. The Senator from Kentucky said that a moment ago. And I agree with him. The Senator from Mis-

souri (Mr. SYMINGTON) was here. It was said that we have three times as many lethal strategic weapons.

I believe he said that a moment ago. He said deliverable strategic weapons. We are not talking about IRBM's, the short-range vehicle. We are talking about the Minuteman, the Poseidon's, and those that are deliverable by airplanes and so forth.

Mr. JACKSON. If the statement is limited to the long-range manned bombers, we do not have that figure.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Of course, we have got some manned bombers that are not so long range, too. The Senator knows that. They can deliver them. The reference was to deliverable strategic weapons.

I do not wish to engage in a numbers game. We have enough to destroy them. The Senator from Tennessee discussed it in the hearings and said that we had far more than enough to destroy the 50 largest cities in Russia, to hit each one of those 50 largest cities with 48 missiles.

The point is that, it seems to me, the whole thread of the Senator's argument is, first, that the Senate should not intervene. We should not intervene to put our decision or our judgment in the place of the President's on the ABM, which means the Defense Department.

Mr. JACKSON. Before the Senator goes on to that point, one thing I wanted to get clear is his position. Do I correctly understand that the Senator feels that it is wrong for the Senator from Washington to discuss the nature of the adversary? He said it is going to hurt Soviet relations.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think it is wrong.

Mr. JACKSON. What was the point, then?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is not wrong for the Senator to take the position which I think he does. The thrust of his argument is that there is no point in having talks or trying to make agreements with the Russians. They are so bad that they are beyond the pale.

Mr. JACKSON. I have never said that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I said that is the thrust of his argument.

Mr. JACKSON. No, that is not so at all.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. And the effect of what he says about the leadership is that he has not the slightest hope that the Russian leaders will make an agreement.

Mr. JACKSON. You obviously did not listen carefully to what I said, because I argued for serious arms control negotiations with the Soviets.

What concerns me is that many Senators say there is not enough information available about weapons systems, so we are going into executive session—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did not ask to go into executive session.

Mr. JACKSON. I did not say that. I said Senators have made this point. Surely we also need as much information as we can get about the Soviets. I was really surprised when the Senator raised the question that somehow it was out of order to discuss the nature of the adversary.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did not say it was out of order. The Senator is never out

of order. He says what he pleases. That is why we have the Senate. That is the only place it can be done.

Mr. JACKSON. I would think that the No. 1 order of business in the Committee on Foreign Relations would be to hold hearings on current developments in the Soviet Union—in short, on the nature of the adversary.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is interesting. The press did not pay much attention to it, but the Committee on Foreign Relations has held three hearings this year and we had one last year on this point. We made inquiry as to whether there were any competent people in the field of psychology or psychiatry studying the Russians. No such research is going on. We have all kinds of research sponsored by the Defense Department, but, according to the best authorities we could get, such as Dr. Karl Menninger, who is acknowledged to be one of the greatest psychiatrists in the world, and certainly in this country, and Dr. Hall—nobody is really trying to understand the Russians. The Committee on Foreign Relations has tried to foster studies to understand what the Russians are motivated by and what they are like.

Mr. JACKSON. Before the committee called the psychiatrists, I would think it would have called in experts on the Soviet Union.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We had anthropologists.

Mr. JACKSON. Before the committee called the anthropologists, I would think it would have called the Kremlinologists.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What is an expert on the Soviet Union, in the Senator's opinion?

Mr. JACKSON. I think there are a lot of scholars in this field who have devoted their life to the study of the Soviet Union and who know a lot about it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Would the Senator give me some information about that?

Mr. JACKSON. Yes. I would call, as an outstanding witness, Dr. Philip Mosely, of Columbia, one of the great scholars in this field; also Dr. Fainsood, of Harvard; also Dr. George Taylor, of the University of Washington. There are men like Ambassador Tommie Thompson. There are distinguished authorities like Ambassador Chip Bohlen, who has been in the Foreign Service and served in Russia a long time. I would think it would be a matter of concern to find out what is really going on in the Soviet Union.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have had all those at different times in the past. The Senator misunderstands.

Mr. JACKSON. Has the committee made a study of the Politburo? Has the committee gone into it in detail? Who were the witnesses.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have had before our committee, both formally and informally, Thompson and Bohlen, in the usual course of events.

Mr. JACKSON. I assume they were there as Ambassadors. They had to come up to be confirmed. What I was talking about was hearings on current developments in the Soviet Union, including the present Soviet leadership.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO SAFEGUARD

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I bring to the attention of the Senate a study by a group of able University of Michigan scientists who support additional defense of Minuteman missiles but reject the Safeguard system on technical and cost grounds.

These scientists conclude that Safeguard, because of radar and computer problems and because of inadequate testing opportunities, is unlikely to provide a credible defense.

They claim that even if technical problems were solved satisfactorily, the proposed Safeguard system would have to be expanded to more than 1,200 Sprint missiles to provide an effective defense for Minuteman.

The study puts the cost of Safeguard, including projected overruns, at \$28 billion; of the expanded system, at \$40 billion.

Noting their support for defending our Minuteman deterrent, the scientists estimate that for \$5 billion we could further harden our silos to the point which would require Russia to launch 6,000 missiles to insure destruction of our retaliatory force.

The Secretary of Defense justifies the need for Safeguard on the grounds that Russia may have 500 missiles by 1975.

The study makes clear that, if indeed it is important to increase protection of our Minuteman missiles there is at least one alternative which is cheaper and more effective than Safeguard.

The study also notes that Moscow could interpret installation of Safeguard as an effort to develop a first-strike capability, thereby stimulating the arms race.

I ask unanimous consent that the report be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A REPORT OF THE COST OF THE SAFEGUARD ABM AND ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS

SUMMARY

We present assessments of the Safeguard ABM, and of an alternative to ABM that we believe provides better defense of the U.S. ICBM force at significantly less cost.

In developing our cost estimates of the Safeguard system, we have taken cognizance of the radar vulnerability and the small number of Sprint missiles destined for defense of our ICBM's. We conclude that critical reviews of Safeguard would call for much more extensive deployment of radars and Sprints than proposed and for abandonment of most sites not involved in ICBM defense. We estimate the final cost of the currently proposed Safeguard at 28 billion dollars, while 40 billion dollars is our estimate for the revised ABM. This estimate takes into account technical problems such as the short time available from target detection to Sprint ignition and the outstanding computer programming difficulties involved in target recognition under realistic conditions, and the overruns characteristic of deployments requiring solution of such technical problems. On technical grounds it is likely that neither system would provide a credible defense.

The alternative defense of our ICBM force, which we strongly support, is a superhardening of Minuteman silos. The military has

made a proposal for greatly strengthening and isolating the silos which can now withstand some 200 pounds per square inch blast overpressure. This hardening would significantly reduce the distance at which a nuclear weapon could render the Minuteman inoperative. We make several analyses dependent on a range of realistic values for Soviet missile accuracy and payload, and find, for example, that the Soviet Union would have to launch some 6000 missiles of the S-9 category against our superhardened sites, in order to assure 95% destruction of our Minuteman installations, which destruction level is usually taken as one requirement for a "successful first strike." This result applies equally to attacking missiles with 25 megaton warheads and to use of multiple warheads. (The first strike would also have to be similarly effective against all other U.S. deterrents.) It is estimated that this hardening program will cost 5 billion dollars and will not require substantial advances in technology. We submit that it is likely to be a credible defense and that beyond its technical feasibility and much lower cost, it offers the special advantages over ABM of its completely passive nature and its ever-ready standby status.

I. SAFEGUARD AND A REVISED ABM

Introduction

The Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile system proposed by the Nixon administration has two goals: The "area" defense of a large portion of the United States, and a "point" defense of portions of several Minuteman ICBM bases. The "area" defense, relying primarily on Spartan missiles with a range of several hundred miles, is proposed in order to counter a "light" attack by a small number of ICBM's against centers of population. President Nixon stated this purpose in his news conference of April 18, 1969: "The other reason (for Safeguard) is that . . . by 1973 (the Chinese communists) would have a significant nuclear capability which would make our diplomacy not credible in the Pacific unless we could protect our country against a Chinese attack aimed at our cities." The "point" defense utilizes Sprint missiles with a range about twenty five miles and is supposed to protect our Minuteman missiles in order that they will be available to retaliate after a nuclear attack. We will deal only briefly with the area defense proposal. There are many reasons to believe that this portion of Safeguard should be omitted, and the suggested phased deployment for Safeguard would permit just that.

Unlike the area defense, a point defense of some of our ICBM's may be feasible in terms of present technology, although it could be overcome by a variety of Russian countermeasures.

Because of this possible feasibility and because of the extreme importance of effective protection of our nuclear deterrent, we feel this to be the essential part of the Safeguard proposal. In Section I of this report we will review the Safeguard proposal and introduce a Revised ABM proposal designed to remove incapacitating weaknesses in Safeguard as protector of our ICBM deterrent. We argue that such revisions would be made in the course of review if it were decided to continue with the ABM program. In Section II of this report we assume that we will use Safeguard or the Revised ABM to try to protect our Minuteman retaliatory force and we assume that the Soviet Union will not develop sophisticated countermeasures. We discuss technical difficulties and costs facing ABM. The cost we estimate is substantially more than the administration estimate, largely because of predictable cost overruns. The Revised ABM is even more costly because

it contains added components in spite of our omission of the Spartans and many Safeguard sites. Finally, in Section III, we discuss other strategic deterrents and alternate defenses for our ICBM's. In particular, there are persuasive reasons for supporting the "Hard-Rock superhardening program for the Minuteman silos.

Critique of the safeguard area defense against light attack

Sufficient arguments have been developed over the past year to convince almost every scientist who has studied the problem of area defense against ICBM's that it would be unwise and wasteful to deploy an ABM system for that purpose at the present time.² We are unaware of any detailed attempt to justify this scheme against these arguments. Briefly, the arguments are: (1) The proposed Spartan missiles can be, at most, only marginally effective against incoming ICBM's which employ merely elementary radar-confusing devices, i.e., simple decoys, chaff, and previous nuclear explosions appropriately placed. (2) An important claim for Spartan is that it might disable an ICBM through x-rays at a distance of, say, fifty miles. This possibility would depend, however, on a number of unknown factors, and there would be no choice but to also try to kill the enemy ICBM with Sprints unless the Spartan was known to have detonated only a few miles from the ICBM. (3) If the area to be protected is near the coast, there is no effective defense against either short-range missiles launched from off our coasts or cruise missiles which fly at very low altitude and can maneuver in flight. Because these missiles can be fired from immediately off shore, areas near the coast may have little or no warning. It is inconceivable that any protective systems should have the "hair-trigger" necessary for a defense against such a short-range light surprise attack. (4) It is most unlikely that any nation would be so irrational as to launch a light attack with ICBM's because the damage inflicted upon us would be much less than the destruction we would inflict upon them. Only the ICBM, of the several means available for a light attack, can be definitely traced back to the nation ordering the attack. But the ICBM light attack is the only form for which the Spartan missile has any capability.³

Nevertheless, it may be claimed that, although the Safeguard area defense is neither technically nor theoretically sound, we have nothing to lose by deploying the system as a full-scale experiment.⁴ The danger in this delusion is that if the Soviet Union believes, or if certain elements in the Soviet Union could effectively argue, that this useless system might work its deployment would severely escalate the arms race. In the mad logic of nuclear deterrence this consequence follows from the fact that the Safeguard area defense is an offensive threat because we could use it to protect the United States after we had launched a first-strike attack. The effectiveness of ABM area defense would be greater under these circumstances because: (1) This complex system is more likely to work as planned if given advance warning (2) The attack might be uncoordinated and weak after the U.S. first strike. Thus an area defense is both ineffective and at the same time stimulates the arms race.

Given that the deployment of an area defense system seems unwarranted at present, we assume for our Revised ABM that it will not be deployed and we deduct that part of the cost. We do so because it seems likely that the promised yearly reviews of the ABM situation will conclude that area defense should not be deployed without considerable additional research and successful innovation. Twelve sites in the continental

United States are proposed for deployment in Safeguard. Seven of these are area defense sites, four are ICBM defense sites, and the last is a Washington, D.C., site proposed to defend hardened control centers. We will drop the seven area defense sites in our revised ABM. We think it is realistic to assume that the Washington site will remain in the program. We drop the Spartans at the five remaining sites, although this is not a major cost item. It seems reasonable to retain the long-range radar capability.

McGraw Hill's Defense Marketing Survey has investigated costs of the proposed Safeguard system allowing for no cost overruns.⁵ Their estimate is that a system completed by 1975 will cost \$11 billion. This includes \$8.0 billion, corresponding to the somewhat lower administration figure of \$6.6 billion plus warhead procurement, plus some \$3 billion for research and development and operation and maintenance. Defense Secretary Laird has since confirmed the \$11 billion figure.⁶ Since the portion for the area defense system, not counting long-range radars PAR's would in their estimate cost close to \$4 billion, the net cost for research and development and for deployment of a point defense system at four Minuteman bases (and for a protected headquarters in Washington, D.C.) would be about \$7 billion. In the following section we discuss the sources of added costs if a minimal first-generation ABM system is to be deployed by 1975 or shortly thereafter.

Protection of more Minutemen with more Sprints

Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, DOD, has stated that 300 of our Minutemen should survive a first-strike attack in order that our deterrent be credible. This estimate coincides with statements of Robert McNamara. The Safeguard proposal involves protection initially of the Grand Forks, N.D., and Malstrom, Montana, Minuteman farms, which are stated to hold a total of 350 Minutemen. However, although proposed numbers of Sprints have not been revealed, it is apparently proposed to have one cluster of about 75 Sprints at each farm.⁷ Each cluster could cover a region some 40 miles in diameter which would contain some 50 Minutemen (The Minutemen are about 5 miles apart).⁸

When this same program is extended as proposed in Safeguard to two additional Sprint bases at Warren AFB, Wyo., and Whiteman AFB, Mo., a total of 200 Minutemen would have some protection, i.e. about 300 Sprints worth. This proposal is not adequate. (Cost considerations lead us to believe that we have not grossly underestimated the proposal.) If 300 Minutemen are to survive an attack it would appear that a minimum of 400 should be protected and that each Sprint base protecting 50 Minutemen should have at least 150 Sprints. We conclude for our Revised ABM proposal that four other Sprint bases must be added to the program, giving a total of 1200 Sprints to protect 400 Minutemen. A reasonable probability estimate shows that if twice as many attacking ICBM's are used against the 400 Minutemen as against undefended Minutemen, i.e., if two perfect reentry vehicles with warheads, RV's, are used against each silo (and none against the radars) then about three-fourths of the emplaced ICBM's, or a total of 300, would not be harmed.⁹ Actually many Sprints should be used to defend radar so that the number of Sprints should be even greater than 1200.

Reduction of radar vulnerability

A possibly crippling weak-link of the defensive system we are discussing is the vulnerability of the radars. They cannot be hardened so great accuracy is not needed to disable them. A very small number of missile site radars, MSR's, is proposed, in fact only one for each site. A rapid sequence of ICBM's

could be employed as a relatively cheap way to knock out the MSR. Prof S. Weinberg has shown that Safeguard could be very cheaply exhausted in this manner, because if the defense does not use up its Sprints defending the radar, the radar will surely be destroyed leaving the remaining Sprints useless.¹⁰ In one of his examples, a battery of 75 Sprints is used up against 33 RV's, with the MSR having only a 10% chance of surviving this attack in spite of the defense. In the overall picture, Weinberg finds that a roughly one percent increase in total enemy ICBM's, at a cost to them of roughly \$100 million, would negate two Sprint bases of 75 Sprints each if the extra weapons were used against the radars. It has also been pointed out that the Soviet Union could employ SS-11's, which are inadequate for attacking silos, to attack the radars.

We suggest that a change in Safeguard, with good reason, will soon be recommended as essential to the viability of the ABM system: Rather than one MSR installation per site there should be several, spaced, say, 15 miles apart.

We will add the cost of three backup MSR for each proposed MSR (i.e., 36 at nine sites: five, sites retained from Safeguard and four added) for our Revised ABM proposal.

II. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS AND THE COST OF ABM
Technical problems with radar, data analysis, and control

The missile site radar (MSR), the data-processor, and command and control face a severe problem in the expected conditions of a first strike accompanied by simple countermeasures, i.e., a massive attack with initial explosions leading to radar blackout and with simple decoys, at the top of the atmosphere. We calculate that if a Sprint is to cover a 20 mile horizontal range, it must be fired when the incoming RV (reentry vehicle with warhead) is about 30 miles up (see figure). This is approximately at the top of the atmosphere where the blackout and decoys are still effective.

These numbers are derived from the statement that it is possible to unmask, or distinguish, simple decoys by acceleration and other measurements (from the actual RV) at 20 to 30 miles altitude and below, and that radar blackout will be effective for a significant time (several minutes) over an appropriately large area (about twenty miles diameter) at altitudes of about 30 miles and higher.¹¹ In principle, then, the detection-control system could start a Sprint toward an incoming RV when the latter is some 20 to 30 miles high (see figure). According to information about the velocities of the vehicles, if the impact point is 20 miles off, the Sprint will take about seven seconds from ignition to arrival. The RV will impact from 30 miles up in about 7 to 8 seconds or from 20 miles in about 5 seconds.¹²

To summarize, the time before impact when the RV becomes possibly discernible and the time for the Sprint to reach it before impact are essentially the same—*about 7 seconds!*¹³ This is an astonishing demand upon the detection and control system. The time pressure is relieved up to several seconds if the Sprint is installed close to the point of impact. This means that, to protect, Sprints must be assigned an area much smaller than their range. This substantially increases duplication and costs, and places a premium on very fast data analysis. The analysis of this section and the section "More Sprints to Defend More Minutemen" suggest that the Sprint is not ideal for Minuteman protection. A smaller shorter range missile deployed in greater numbers would be more effective.

This severe time squeeze is, however, only a part of the most crucial problem. Scientists and engineers among our readers are asked to consider the information taken in by the

Footnotes at end of article.

MSR scanning well over 1000 square miles in the event of a massive attack with many RV's and many hundreds of simple decoys (any one of which is indeed unmaskable after careful analysis if it is below, say 30 miles) and with previous explosions (at, say 30 miles) resulting in reflection, absorption, and noise. Many hundreds of trajectories must be simultaneously found and tracked in this radar input, and analyzed in detail. The information is to be gathered and fully analyzed over a period of, say, 3 seconds at most and Sprints dispatched (another second to ignition?) and guided. Such a programming problem in pattern recognition is not yet solved. Progress with this type of problem has been much slower than was estimated in advance, and development much more expensive. The time-sharing problems involved in these computations are also staggering.

Professor J. C. R. Licklider has discussed the fact that as computer programs have become larger, programmer effectiveness has dropped. The processing units for the ABM system would have to be many times larger than any previously built and the programming far more extensive, complex, and sophisticated. Professor Licklider writes, "The significant thing is that the main causes of inefficiency lie outside the individual programmer. If the number of programmers working on a given system were increased from 100 to 1000, the hourly productivity of each would decline to one-third or one-fifth—or possibly one-twentieth. It may well be that, for any given state-of-the-art, there is an upper limit to the rate of production of complex integrated software . . ."¹⁴

We would like to add that development of an effective detector-control system for Sprints as discussed will be possible only through extensive realistic experiments or tests. A system developed with experience of one missile reentry with decoys will not operate in the presence of many missiles and decoys, and a system developed with experience of these will not operate in the presence of recent nuclear explosions. As Dr. Foster has stated, it would be very valuable (in our opinion, practically essential) to develop it with tests involving atmospheric explosions (forbidden by the test ban treaty).

It is correct to include the expense connected with these difficulties under the heading of cost overruns, since it arises from the difficulty in the course of development to meet specifications for particular hardware and software. Cost overruns are included in our final estimate as discussed below. We will not include added costs for premature deployment of an inadequate electronics system in, say, 1971 or 1972. We hope such premature deployment will not occur.

Cost overruns

History of Overruns

Detailed analysis of Department of Defense contracting reveals that the Pentagon consistently pays substantially more than was initially estimated for its weapons systems. The actual cost divided by the original cost estimate is called the cost overrun factor. The problem we now consider in our analysis of ABM costs is determination of a reasonable cost overrun factor. We shall discuss both the record of other weapons systems and the general reasons for substantial initial underestimates of cost.

The cost of previous systems can readily be separated into costs for development and costs for production. Average overruns appropriate for application to the ABM are found to be about the same for the two types of costs. A study by Professors Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer contains a record of cost overruns for development of a

number of missile and aircraft projects, mainly in the late 1950's.¹⁵ Their results, with added information, are presented in Table I. These sample projects were of high priority; however, they were typical, not exceptional, in overruns. Several of the well known cases of failure and very high overruns of the period are not included (e.g., Hound Dog, SAGE).

The asterisks in Table I indicate the projects in which "state-of-the-art" problems were severe. They illustrate situations in which techniques to be used were not well-understood or well-developed at the initial stages of the program, so that new areas of engineering had to be developed in addition to the more conventional design work. At present, as we have stressed in Section II above, a useful ABM design would have severe "state-of-the-art" problems in its electronic components, particularly in programming. On the other hand, prototype missiles have flown and thus development difficulties are not expected there. It is not clear how severe warhead research problems will be. Since the major portion of projected development costs is for the electronics system, the appropriate cost factor is among the higher values in Table I, such as those marked by asterisks: it should be more than a factor of 3. Considering that research has been under way for some time and that the contractor, Bell Telephone Laboratories, is particularly strong, we shall use the factor of 3. Previous experience suggests that, along with this overrun, development would be completed approximately two years later than predicted.

Table I.—Development cost overruns

Program:	Overrun
Atlas *	4.0
Sparrow III	3.5
Talos *	5.0
Land Talos	2.0
Bomarc *	7.0
Nike Ajax	3.0
Nike Hercules	2.0
B-58	2.4
F-4H	2.5
Jupiter	0.7
F-105	3.0
Average	3.2

*Projects with severe "state-of-the-art" problems.

Production costs play a larger part of projected ABM costs than development costs. A study by Professors A. W. Marshall and W. H. Meekling contains a record of production cost overruns.¹⁶ These are listed in Table II, according to difficulties with the state-of-the-art: small risk, medium risk, and high risk. Highly complex weapons systems with extensive electronics are classified as the riskiest projects. The Safeguard ABM clearly falls into the "high risk" category—that is, by Richard A. Stubbing's definition, "a system in which at least one major component must be redesigned. The radar, computer and circuitry are the heart of each electronic system, and redesign in this area reflects the very highest degree of uncertainty as regards expected performance."¹⁷ The average cost for "high risk" systems is 3.4 times the initial estimate. However, Stubbing notes that "the largest cost increases are in missile development, which during this period advanced into a new and radically different technology, involving computers and other electronic equipment capable of solving complex guidance and control problems without human assistance." The average cost for "high risk" missiles was 4.6 times the initial estimates. We see that production overrun experience is very similar to development overrun experience.

Table II.—Production cost overruns

Small risk:	
Cargo aircraft	1.6
Cargo aircraft	1.5
Cargo aircraft	.9
Cargo aircraft	.8
Fighter	2.0
Fighter	1.5
Average	1.4
Medium risk:	
Bomber	2.8
Fighter	2.5
Fighter	2.0
Fighter	1.2
Fighter	.6
Missile	1.3
Average	1.7
High risk:	
Missile	7.0
Missile	6.4
Missile	6.0
Missile	2.7
Missile	.8
Bomber	4.0
Bomber	1.2
Fighter	4.0
Fighter	1.0
Fighter	.8
Average	3.4

The cost-overrun history cited above has continued in this decade without noticeable change. Let us discuss the two projects which are at this time very prominent in the news: the C-5A transport and the F-111 fighter-bomber. Professor Scherer has recently testified on overruns in these programs:¹⁸ "The cost for developing the F-111 was originally estimated at \$700 million by General Dynamics and \$900 million by military analysts. By 1968, actual development costs had soared to \$2 billion. The Phoenix air-to-air missile for the Navy version of the F-111 was to be developed for \$175 million. Actual costs were nearing \$420 million when the program terminated." The production costs follow the same pattern of grossly underestimated costs for the final product. The initial estimate was \$2.8 million, including engine, for the Air Force version. The final price is about \$6 million for each F-111A. Initially the cost of the Navy's F-111B was put at \$3.5 million for each aircraft. The final cost would have been about \$9 million. This weapons system would probably have been initially placed in the medium-risk category of Table II. Similar very large overruns apply to the Cheyenne helicopter, Ma in Battle Tank (MBT), short range attack missile (SRAM) and other recent projects.

On the C-5A, Scherer testified, "No one seems to know what the true overrun in the C-5A program is, but, for example, as nearly as one can tell, the cost of the first 58 airframes will exceed Lockheed's contract cost estimate by about \$900 million, or 64 percent. Compared to the F-111 experience, this is not at all bad. But transport programs have traditionally attempted less ambitious technical advances than combat-weapon systems, and their cost overruns have been correspondingly lower." As shown in Table II, low risk aircraft showed an average cost increase of 40%. By this yardstick, the C-5A is not an improvement.

Thus we see that any internal reforms initiated by Robert McNamara did not change the cost overrun picture which has been well documented for the 1950's. Indeed, we shall now present arguments that such overruns are inherent to our general system of new weapons development and procurement. We conclude that overrun factors of 3 or more are to be expected on the basis of past experience for a system such as ABM. We

Footnotes at end of article.

shall apply a factor of 3 to projected costs other than construction and maintenance (where we assume no overrun).

Basic Reasons for Overruns

Basic reasons for cost overruns have been given as (i) inflation, (ii) Defense Department and contractor "optimism," (iii) contractor inefficiency, and (iv) technological uncertainty (state-of-the-art problems).

(i) Inflation: The effect of inflation is calculable. Apologists for the contractors notwithstanding, unforeseen inflation should not have been an important element in the overruns.

(ii) "Optimism": Professor F. M. Scherer in recent testimony pointed out:¹⁵

"Getting a major weapons program started is not easy and realistic cost estimates have a sobering effect. Recognizing this, industrialists and military officers are inclined to view a program's future prospects through rose-tinted glasses." Scherer presented two illustrations, the Skybolt and the Nike Hercules (an ancestor of the proposed ABM): "Prime contractor for the Skybolt guided missile program was Douglas Aircraft Company. In the spring of 1959, when 14 firms were competing for the Skybolt job . . . Douglas found its backlog situation desperate. Skybolt appeared to be its best new opportunity, and it went all-out in the design competition. . . ." Scherer goes on to detail the dramatic denouement of this case whose repercussions remain with us. The Nike Hercules, was executed under prime contracts by Western Electric and its affiliate, Bell Telephone Laboratories (as with Safeguard). At the beginning in 1953, it was projected that the ground guidance and control equipment for Hercules could be obtained by converting existing Nike Ajax equipment in the field for \$210,000 a battery. "However, when negotiations for the first production contracts began in the early months of 1955, Western Electric announced a new (and better) approach . . . This turned out to cost \$1.7 million per battery . . . In interviews, Western Electric representatives acknowledged that their production engineering staff members knew early in the game that a field modification program would prove to be impractical, but that they had presented the highly optimistic field modification cost estimates because they were more "sellable" to the Army and Congress."

In the past the only authority that has attempted to bring about some realism to cost estimates before major decisions are made is the Office of the Secretary of Defense, OSD. But there are good reasons why one might expect OSD efforts to be inadequate, including the length of lines of communications within DOD and, particularly, lack of motivation. Other considerations such as balance between the services may be more important than cost.

(iii) Contractor Inefficiency: Contractor inefficiency is a difficult problem because the projects are very long-term and thus are non-competitive over long periods, because there is a very close relationship between DOD and contractors, and because it appears to be in the national interest to see major weapons contractors maintain their capabilities. Problems such as support of excess staff during lean periods and the fact that it would indeed be unreasonable to make contractors suffer for natural difficulties going beyond the state-of-the-art make it very difficult to monitor and judge proper costs. The decision-making process calls for constant consultation between contractors and DOD at all stages. In many respects the DOD and its contractors function as one administrative structure. Consequently, the problems of policing costs cannot be solved by admonishing the DOD to supervise its contractors more closely.

(iv) State-of-the-Art: We feel that tech-

nological difficulties are underestimated as a serious impediment to accurate cost estimates. In the private sector, corporations are very cautious in developing new products. Technically difficult projects are not pushed prematurely. Contrast the military: A tremendous premium has been placed on new kinds of capabilities and relatively less stress on simplicity and reliability. In areas where new technology has to be developed, it is not possible to estimate costs in advance without the likelihood of a large error. Rather than being realistic about this, the military is strongly motivated to err on the low side. Thus we see great fluctuation in cost overruns from project to project and large cost overruns on the average, particularly where problems with the state-of-the-art were severe.

Thus, although there have been many attempts to improve the cost-overrun situation and although these will continue, efforts made after the initial estimate has been made will at best have marginal benefits. The problems are inherent, and will not be circumvented by procedural changes in DOD or showcase default of contract cases. Possibly Congress can develop an independent expert group charged with monitoring programs both technically and economically. However, such a possibility would have little effect on a project beginning now. Our conclusion is that cost overruns for new programs, such as ABM, will be characteristic of similar programs in the past. Thus we estimate that final costs will be 3 times the initial estimates for all R and D and procurement items.

Are Overruns Related to Success or Failure of the Program?

Some high-overrun projects were very successful and well worth the cost. More typical in cases of sophisticated systems is inability to meet specifications. Stubbing cites a "sample of 13 major Air Force/Navy aircraft and missile programs with sophisticated electronics system initiated since 1955 at a total cost of \$40 billion . . . Less than 40% of the effort produced systems with acceptable electronic performance—an uninspiring record that loses further lustre when cost overruns and schedule delays are also evaluated."¹⁷ Many of the projects listed in the tables above must be regarded as failures to meet reasonable overall specifications.

We stress the relevance of this to Safeguard, where the carrot or yearly reevaluation has been held out to Congress. The probability is low that the radar data-processing control system will work as a whole under realistic conditions. There is a likelihood, based on experience with past systems, that the attempt to make it work will continue at great expense even after overwhelming difficulties become apparent to technical staff.

This important point can be illustrated by the TFX or F111. The TFX provides an excellent analogue to the ABM because it too was an entirely new weapons system—and a very expensive one. An important factor

in continuing the expenditures is the scarcity of hard data available to the public for estimating costs. Despite rumors as early as December, 1964, that the TFX costs were spiraling and a Department of Defense communiqué admitting that they were higher than the original estimates, the president of General Dynamics, Frank W. Davis, felt secure enough to issue, in November 1967, a public denial that the plane was caught up in a price increase.

The public finds itself constantly reassured that its billions of dollars of tax money are being well spent, even if they are not. In March, 1965, it was learned that the Navy version was overweight, that the engines were malfunctioning, and that its missile weapons system was still incomplete. On April 22, 1967, an F-111B crashed. More technical problems were found that August. The Navy version had trouble taking off from an aircraft carrier in September, and later that month a fire broke out in the tail of an F-111. In October, Assistant Navy Secretary Robert A. Frosch said that although the F-111B "will probably not meet all the initial specifications . . . [it] represents the finest fleet air defense system available in the immediate future." Almost a year of expenditures was to go by before the Navy was to cancel the overweight F-111B.

The Air Force, however, persevered optimistically through 1968 in the face of highly publicized crashes, difficulties with terrain-avoidance radar, and too-high cost. General G. P. Disoway, commander of the Tactical Air Command, belittled the reports of troubles with the F-111A saying: "We always have a lot of problems with airplanes until we get them out into the field and then the people in the field seem to cure it." Finally, in January, 1969 the Air Force relented and cut back its orders with General Dynamics. Severe difficulties continue, but Secretary Laird insists upon keeping the assembly lines at Fort Worth running.

The money for this failure cannot be shut off. Once a program begins too much money and prestige are at stake for it to be readily terminated.

We stress, in concluding this subsection, that experience suggests that very deleterious technical difficulties in ABM development are unlikely to prevent substantial deployment. Although there are examples to the contrary, it is hard to stop a program under way. The cost overrun is likely to be large regardless of whether the system is technically a success or a failure.

Cost Estimate

The Revised ABM involves 9 sites with a total of 36 MSR's and 1250 Sprints. Other expenses are scaled from the Defense Marketing Survey² estimates for Safeguard as shown in Table III. A cost overrun factor of 3 is introduced for research, development and procurement, but not construction, operation and maintenance. The total cost of the Revised ABM is \$40.5 billion and of the Safeguard ABM is \$27.7 billion.

TABLE III.—COST ESTIMATE IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS (THROUGH 1975 FOR PROGRAMS WITHOUT OVERRUNS)

Item	Safeguard		Revised ABM	
	Without overruns	With overruns	Without overruns	With overruns
PAR (long range radar)	0.56	0.56
MSR (missile site radar)	1.5	4.5
Spartans	1.05
Sprints (at \$800,000 each)56	1.0
Data processing, command and control	2.0	3.25
Warheads2125
Total, procurement	5.9	17.7	9.6	28.7
Construction	2.10	2.1	3.5	3.5
R.D.T. & E. (research and development, testing and evaluation—for the particular system in question)	2.40	7.2	2.4	7.2
Operation and maintenance70	.7	1.15	1.15
Total	11.1	27.7	16.6	40.5

Footnotes at end of article.

III. AN ALTERNATE TO ABM
Superhardening

The primary purpose of the Safeguard ABM system is to provide a high level of protection for our Minuteman ICBM's force against a Russian first strike. We shall now consider an alternative approach to the problem of ICBM security and its relative advantages.

The U.S. Air Force "Hard-Rock" program provides such an alternative.¹⁹ Hard Rock is a program to bury Minuteman silos deeper and to further isolate and strengthen them. Measured in terms of blast pressure that can be sustained, the proposal is to superharden our Minuteman silos from the present average 300 pounds per square inch over-pressure to a planned 3000 psi, with control areas approaching a hardness rating of 7000 psi in some instances. Some \$58 million was allocated to the program in Fiscal 1970, but the program has been brought to a virtual standstill by the Nixon administration in the attempt to sell Safeguard ABM.

There is no question that the hardening of underground missile silos renders them extremely invulnerable to the effects of nuclear explosions. A missile silo hardened to 3000 psi could survive the air blast of a 10 megaton explosion at ranges of less than 1000 feet.²⁰ The principal damage mechanism to these underground structures is not the air blast, but the tremendous ground shock accompanying a surface or near surface nuclear blast. There is considerable evidence that heavy, well designed underground structures will sustain no heavy damage from ground shock beyond 1 1/4 crater radii from "ground zero", that is, just outside the ground crater dug by a nuclear blast. The dimensions of the crater formed depend primarily on the yield of the weapon and the type of soil in which the burst occurs. A 10 megaton surface explosion in dry soil will cause a crater of 1400 feet radius, with heavy damage to underground structures extending 1745 feet.²¹

The effectiveness of a superhardened silo thus depends on the accuracy with which the enemy warhead can be brought on target. At present, U.S. and Russian ICBM's are capable of CEP's²² of about 2500 feet. Although this figure could conceivably be improved somewhat by technological breakthroughs, we expect no more than a marginal decrease in ballistic missile CEP's.²³

The Department of Defense has stated that the Russians would not attempt a first strike unless they could destroy 95% of our Minuteman missiles, thus rendering our ICBM retaliation ineffective. The question, then, is how many warheads the Russians would have to launch at our 1000 superhardened Minuteman in order to destroy at least 95% of them.

Table IV gives the number of warheads, of various yields, that must be delivered at a superhardened silo in order to achieve a 95% probability of destroying the target. Three different CEP's are used to account for possible state-of-the-art improvements in weapon delivery accuracies.

If we assume that all Russian missiles will carry a 25 megaton warhead and will have

TABLE IV.—NUMBER OF WARHEADS REQUIRED FOR A 95-PERCENT PROBABILITY OF DESTROYING A SUPERHARDENED SILO

Weapon yield (megatons)	Destruction radius (feet)	Number of warheads to achieve 95 percent kill		
		CEP= 2,500 ft.	CEP= 2,000 ft.	CEP= 1,500 ft.
1.....	811	42	27	15
4.....	1,287	17	11	6
10.....	1,746	9	6	4
25.....	2,368	5	4	2
49.....	2,963	3	2	2

a CEP of 1/3 nautical mile of 2000 feet, then four missiles would have to be detonated per Minuteman. In order to destroy 95% of our 1000 Minutemen they would have to launch about 6000 missiles (assuming 67% probability of successful launch and detonation).²⁴ This is to be compared with Secretary Laird's estimate that the Soviets would have about 500 such missiles in the mid-seventies.

Our calculation involves the assumption that first strike capacity would be credible only if the first wave of missiles were adequate. Dr. Foster and Richard Latter have suggested that the Russians could plan to send over second and third waves of ICBM's after somehow observing which Minuteman silos did not suffer close hits.²⁵ We already assume a great deal of optimism on the part of the initiators of a first strike if we assume that they would trust that our ICBM's would not be fired before the first wave. The suggestion that they would plan to trust the U.S. to await second and third waves without retaliation is, indeed, surprising.

An examination of Table IV shows that multiple warheads do not significantly affect the picture.²⁶ Thus with superhardening, where the CEP of the attacking weapon is comparable or greater than the radius at which the emplaced ICBM can be damaged, MIRV (Multiple Independently-targetable RV) capability is of no value. It would not add first-strike capability. Detailed study of this important result is needed.

The cost of the Hard Rock superhardening program is estimated at over \$5 billion. A four year research and development program has been proposed for a new superhardened silo at \$50 million a year.²⁷ These numbers are to be compared respectively with our \$40 billion estimate for an ABM system and with the \$1/2 billion a year R & D program for ABM's. The relatively low R & D costs for superhardening illustrate the fact that it is a civil engineering problem involving no great advances in state-of-the-art.

The principal advantages of superhardening vs. anti-ballistic missiles are cost (approximately one-seventh of the cost of ABM as estimated in this report), effectiveness, reliability (there are few mechanical or electrical parts which could fail and render the system useless), and relative invulnerability to countermeasures. Most important from the standpoint of the arms race, superhardening is passive. It does not pose a long run threat of increased offensive capability. It need not inspire a race to develop countermeasures.

Conclusions

Protection of the U.S. nuclear deterrent is of the highest priority. Proponents of the Safeguard ABM have claimed that it is necessary and credible as protection against a Soviet first strike, deployable at a cost of \$11 billion and completely defensive and therefore not a step in weapons escalation.

If these claims were true, we would support the Safeguard, but the proposal is questionable on every one of these points.

Necessity for ABM

The need for an ABM is a relative question. It must be judged with due reference to the total U.S. defense system: the U.S. has four deterrents such that a small part of any one of them is adequate.²⁸ The ABM is proposed as a marginal protection for one of these. The four deterrents are (1) ICBM's, (2) SAC long range bombers (which remain a remarkably credible deterrent), (3) nuclear missile submarines²⁹ and (4) thousands of warheads deliverable by some 2000 vehicles (intermediate range planes and missiles) stationed at aircraft carriers and hundreds of foreign bases. There are various means of protection for all four deterrents. For ICBM's, aside from ABM, there is mobility (which the U.S. has apparently not chosen), timing

(i.e., the missiles can be fired before the attack is completed)³⁰ and hardening. We have shown in the previous section that superhardening would be very effective.

Credibility of ABM

Arguments have been presented on the technical problems faced by ABM. These arguments can be summarized by the statement that ABM is an unusually complex system that cannot be fully developed by realistic trial and error. Experience indicates that the system as a whole is unlikely to work. In addition, the Safeguard proposal itself does not call for adequate deployment to create a credible defense.

Cost of Deployment

Our cost estimate, based on experience with analogous systems and on expansion of Safeguard into a Revised ABM with some credibility, is \$40 billion compared to some \$5 billion for superhardening.³¹

Potential for Escalation

The ABM approach to defense begins a spiral of measures and countermeasures leading to rapidly increasing cost and, perhaps, to instability. Reacting to actual and potential Soviet deployment of ABM, the U.S. has already developed: hardened warheads,³² electronic countermeasures, and sophisticated decoys. Development and deployment of a sequence of very costly measures and countermeasures can easily be envisioned. The offense holds a lead time of about a decade in this race.

For the above reasons we oppose deployment or partial deployment of ABM. We support continued research and development of ABM at a reasonable level. The present level of some 1/2 billion dollars a year is, perhaps, excessive.

We also support action in the near future to safeguard our ICBM's if that action can be shown to be relatively inexpensive, credible, and not conducive to a rapid arms spiral. On this basis we support superhardening of Minuteman silos.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ New York Times, April 19, 1969.
- ² "ABM", Abram Chayes and Jerome B. Wiesner, Editors, The New American Library, 1969; "ABM, ABC", Union of Concerned Scientists, P.O. Box 289, MIT Branch Office, Cambridge, Mass., 1969; "A Critique of the Safeguard ABM", Council for a Livable World, Washington, D.C., 1969; R. L. Garwin and H. A. Bethe, Scientific American, 1968.
- ³ On occasion, protection of SAC bomber bases and protection against accidental attack have been advanced as subsidiary reasons for ABM area defense. The former is unreasonable from a cost stand point compared to alternatives. If the highly unlikely possibility of accidental attack is considered to require a defense, an ABM system could be designed which would provide some defense if given adequate warning. This system would not be Safeguard.
- ⁴ A particular disadvantage of deployment in the continental U.S. is that natural tests of the system will not be possible.
- ⁵ McGraw Hill's Defense Marketing Survey, Inc. Reported, e.g., by Sen. J. S. Cooper, Congressional Record, May 8, 1969.
- ⁶ New York Times, June 14, 1969.
- ⁷ Number of Sprints: D.M.S. Survey, ref. 5; S. Weinberg, ref. 10.
- ⁸ Number of Minutemen Protected: Deduction from number of Sprints; CBS-TV Documentary, May 1969; R. Lapp, The New Republic, June 28, 1969.
- ⁹ If we assume each Sprint has an 80% probability of being effective, and assume reasonable strategies of attack and defense then 1200 Sprints would actually protect 77% of the 400 Minutemen if each is attacked by two perfectly aimed and function-

ing RV's. This assumed success rate of four-fifths is, on the basis of experience, excellent field performance for a system such as Sprint including detection and analysis of incoming RV, command, launch, guidance and detonation. The problem of reliability of complex systems is brought out by experience with the Apollo shots. Very large expert teams employing long count-downs with the replacement of many dozens of parts during count-down are required for the launches to go on schedule with reasonable reliability. Experience with demonstration launches of installed Minutemen, presumably under standard conditions with no count-down, has been frequent failure.

¹⁰ S. Weinberg, Essay in "ABM", ref. 2.

¹¹ Decoys: See, for example, Harm Bruning, "Flight Mechanics of Space and Re-entry Vehicles", The University of Michigan Engineering Summer Conferences, 1968, p. 127. Radar Blackout: See, for example, R. L. Garwin and H. A. Bethe, Scientific American, March, 1968, and H. A. Bethe, essay in "ABM", ref. 2.

¹² Sprint Velocity: Cecil Brownlow, Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 24, 1969, pp. 27, 28. RV Velocity: H. Bruning, ref. 11, and "Current Research in Astronautical Science, Rome, 1959", L. Broglio, Editor, Pergamon Press, 1961.

¹³ The stated time is optimistic for Sprint because we have not fully accounted for the fact that Sprint is slowed by the atmosphere for a distant low level intercept, while the RV time decreases with increasing altitude of intercept.

¹⁴ J. C. R. Licklider, Essay in "ABM", Abram Chayes and Jerome B. Wiesner, Editors, The New American Library, 1969.

¹⁵ Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, "The Weapons Acquisition Process", Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, 1962, p. 22.

¹⁶ A. W. Marshall and W. H. Meckling, Essay in "The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity", R. R. Nelson, Editor, Princeton University Press, 1962, pp. 461-475.

¹⁷ Richard A. Stubbing, Congressional Record, February 7, 1969, p. 3171.

¹⁸ F. M. Scherer, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, June 9, 1969 (Published in Congressional Record and to be published by Public Affairs Press).

¹⁹ Donald C. Winston, Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 28, 1969, p. 16. See also AWST, May 13, 1968, p. 32.

²⁰ "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons", United States Department of Defense, published by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, April 1962, p. 300.

²¹ P. 293, ref. 20.

²² The CEP, or Circular Error of Probability, is the radius of an imaginary circle drawn around the target in which 50% of the delivered warheads will fall.

²³ Basic research is presently being done on terminal guidance systems that guide the reentering warhead directly to the target. It is conceivable, although not probable, that the massive technological problems involved could be overcome to make such a system feasible. However, such systems are extremely vulnerable to counter measures that will render them totally ineffective; thus we do not consider them as a threat.

²⁴ If they could achieve a CEP of $\frac{1}{4}$ n.m., or 1500 feet, then they would have to launch about 3000 missiles. If we assume 80% success for their missiles and a CEP of $\frac{1}{4}$ n.m., as Dr. Foster has in one of his estimates, then they would have to launch 2500. This degree of accuracy is not available to the Soviet SS-9 missile being deployed.

²⁵ New York Times, May 13, 1969 and Allen-Goldsmith Column, Ann Arbor News, June 9, 1969.

²⁶ For example, even if each multiple warhead had the same accuracy as the single

missile, which will not be true, then three 4-megaton IRV's will be no more effective than the one 25-megaton weapon. Eight one-megaton IRV's will be no more effective than the 25-megaton weapon. These numbers correspond roughly to the maximum number of MIRV's which could be carried instead of one 25-megaton RV. Without superhardening, MIRV's could be relatively effective, as has been stressed by the Defense Department. Assume three 4-megaton IRV's per missile with 20% malfunction rate for the independent targeting but otherwise $\frac{1}{3}$ n.m. accuracy and $\frac{2}{3}$ reliability as assumed above. Then without superhardening about 1300 missiles (i.e., 4 RV's per silo) would be needed for an effective first strike against our Minutemen.

²⁷ Ref. 15 and Walter Andrews, Aerospace Technology, January 15, 1968.

²⁸ G. Rathjens, Scientific American, April 1969; I. F. Stone, New York Review, March 27, 1969.

²⁹ Some 41 Polaris submarines are presently in service; at least 31 of these will be equipped in the near future with Poseidon missiles. Proposals exist to equip the Poseidon missiles with multiple independently targeted warheads, MIRV's. Up to ten warheads per missile are contemplated. Assuming that ten warheads per missile are used, and there are 16 missiles per submarine, there will be 160 warheads available in a single Poseidon submarine. By Defense Department criteria just two such submarines constitute a massive deterrent.

The effectiveness of this SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile) deterrent is dependent on the continuing mobility and invulnerability of the nuclear submarine. These factors will be compromised only if the U.S.S.R. develops an anti-submarine technology capable of detecting and continuously tracking all missile submarines in transit and on station. Rear Admiral Levering Smith, director of the U.S. Navy's strategic systems project, states that "he is quite positive that the Polaris system will remain relatively invulnerable for another forty years. He knows of no new Soviet anti-submarine warfare methods."

We note that from the standpoint of the arms race the SLBM is mainly a defensive weapon since it is neither highly accurate nor powerful and so would be ineffective against hardened sites.

³⁰ R. Lapp, ref. 8.

³¹ Another comparison cost is roughly \$10 billion to deploy the present Minuteman force.

³² The proposal by the AEC to build production facilities for these warheads was announced in 1967; the cost was \$32 million.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask the distinguished majority leader about the program for tomorrow and also tonight.

Mr. MANSFIELD. It is my understanding that today, after the general debate on the pending measure is disposed of, the distinguished Senator from West Virginia intends to call up the supplemental conference report.

For tomorrow, we will continue on the debate.

ORDER ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 11 A.M., TOMORROW

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent at this time that when the Senate completes its business this evening, it stand in adjournment until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.

HUGHES in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for an inquiry?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Will committees be permitted to meet until 12 noon tomorrow?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR HOLLINGS ON TOMORROW

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS) may be recognized for not to exceed 40 minutes after the disposition of the Journal on tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT FROM THURSDAY, JULY 10, UNTIL 11 A.M., FRIDAY, JULY 11, 1969

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business tomorrow, it stand in adjournment until 11 o'clock on Friday morning, July 11, 1969.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR CHURCH ON FRIDAY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after the disposition of the Journal on Friday, July 11, the distinguished Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) be recognized for not to exceed 1 hour.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, on Friday, will committees be permitted to meet during the 1 hour when the Senator from Idaho is recognized?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.

Mr. DOMINICK. Subject to the right, however, of an objection—through the period for the transaction of routine business?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. That is all the Senator is talking about.

Mr. HOLLAND. Will there be a period for the transaction of routine business?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Both mornings.

Mr. HOLLAND. The two Senators from Florida wish to introduce a bill at that time. It may take 15 minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Fine.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 11400) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and for other purposes; that the House receded from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 4, 11, 13, 16, 27, 29, 31, 33, 38, 39, 43, 46, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56,

58, 60, 62, 87, 91, and 92 to the bill and concurred therein; and that the House receded from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 6, 7, 8, 40, 42, and 90 to the bill and concurred therein, severally with an amendment, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills:

S. 1647. An act to authorize the release of 100,000 short tons of lead from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile; and

H.R. 3689. An act to cede to the State of Montana concurrent jurisdiction with the United States over the real property comprising the Veterans' Administration Center, Fort Harrison, Mont.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION, OF MISSILE TEST FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE, AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do not wish to detain the Senator much longer. I think he misunderstood the point I was trying to make.

Actually, the hearings I am speaking of were not designed to try to find out what the Russians' political position is today, or the intrigue and gossip with the Kremlin, or even in the White House and in our own Government.

The point of the hearings was to try to understand what it is that has afflicted us and other people over the years in our ability to come to agreement which would avoid the creation of war.

We have had CIA representatives at our committee. We have had them on two or three occasions, as the Senator knows. Personally, I think they are probably the best information about the Russians in this area—not in the area I am speaking of—of any of the people the Senator has spoken of. When he mentions people like Fainsod, and so forth, they are experts, such as they are, with very limited personal acquaintance and knowledge in Russia. That is no fault of their own.

I have been told by Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, as a matter of fact, that Senator ELLENDER, a distinguished Senator of this body, has seen more of Russia and knows them better than anybody in the State Department, more than

Llewellyn Thompson himself. Llewellyn Thompson told me that Senator ELLENDER was allowed to go places and to see factories and sites all over Russia that they would not allow Ambassador Thompson himself to see. In effect, Senator ELLENDER saw more of Russia than one of our Ambassadors who had been there on two tours of duty.

But this is not what I am talking about. I think it is a most unusual phenomenon that two great countries, we and the Russians, are unable—and it is not the first time—to come to some kind of *modus vivendi*. We cannot come to where we are able to stop this expenditure of our funds. In this country it amounts to \$80 billion this year, and we have created a situation, in the richest country in the world, that now threatens us with a form of bankruptcy—that is, in the sense of such high interest rates and such a shortage of credit that we are verging upon the creation of a panic. Something is wrong.

What I was trying to get at is what it is that makes these countries, the Russians as well as ourselves, take postures which make it almost impossible to come to an agreement. This year we are spending, in this budget, approximately \$80 billion. The Russians, to the best estimate of the CIA, are spending the equivalent in purchasing power of \$60 billion. It is a lot more than either one of these countries should be spending on arms.

What I am getting at is not how they devised their budget and all the other superficial and other arrangements they make. I am trying to find out why two great communities act like such fools. I do not believe anybody has studied it.

As a matter of fact, my committee had before it an anthropologist who said that in World War II this country sponsored a very intensive study of the Japanese with respect to what makes them tick, why they feel as they do about the Emperor, why they feel as they do about one another, how they feel about big business, and so forth. The researchers did a good job in that study and they made recommendations to General MacArthur which our Government followed, and which were beneficial and contributed to the American success in that operation.

I asked our witness: "Is there anybody to your knowledge making similar studies about the Russians?" He said, "No." That is the point I was making. We do not make a serious effort to understand the motivation of the Russians when we consider the kinds of programs we are discussing here today.

The CIA is the one Government agency that I have seen that has given me some hope that we have some people who are seriously trying to understand the Russians. I do not see anybody else who is trying to understand them. All we are doing is following the traditional way of dealing with possible enemies, by building more and more arms. Apparently it is the easiest thing to do although it is more expensive. That is all we seem to know how to do: More arms. What we are doing is not designed to bring about the kind of agreement the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) spoke about a moment ago.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me briefly.

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I shall not elaborate. I think the Senator's speech and his discussion were outstanding. He is always outstanding in this field or in any other field he undertakes to become informed in. He has made a real contribution. Later I shall comment on certain paragraphs of his speech.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I compliment the Senator on his fine presentation. It has been my privilege during my service in the Senate to serve on the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations. It is very unfortunate that the Committee on Foreign Relations seems to have decided it should be the Committee on Armed Services. Their functions are entirely different. The function of the Armed Services Committee is to keep this country so strong that we can defend ourselves. Is that correct?

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is correct.

Mr. LONG. The function of the other committee is to try to get along with other people.

I might say there was a time when I was on the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Foreign Relations. There were six members from the Committee on Foreign Relations who served on the Committee on Finance. The change of heart they had when they left that committee room was absolutely beyond belief. Six Senators would vote and vote to give away the Capitol Dome, and then walk across the square to the Committee on Finance and be as tight as Dick's hatband because the whole thinking of the other committee is different.

The Committee on Foreign Relations would spend money and give it all away, with no feeling of responsibility; but the philosophy of the Committee on Finance is that we must pay for things, and we do not give away anything unless we get something in return. The difference in point of view was absolutely fantastic. Six Senators would walk across that square and vote diametrically in opposition to the way they voted in the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Finally, this Senator began to feel as if he were suffering from schizophrenia. Therefore, I resigned from the Committee on Foreign Relations so I could think one simple way: if I am going to pay something, I want to get something. If I do say so, I have been very happy with being on the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Commerce where one always thinks in terms of—"Let me see. Is this a good thing for Louisiana; or is this a good thing for America?"

I read this statement by Dick Goodwin. He said our biggest mistake was when we provided the Army with equipment to fight a war. He said that is why we are in the war in Vietnam and that if we had no weapons we could not fight and, therefore, there would be no war.

The logical extension of that philosophy would be that since we would have no weapons and no defense, we would just about have to apply for annexation

to the Soviet Union, and, in that way, avoid war.

Frankly, I think we should defend ourselves and we should have the strength and courage that goes with pride in our country. I think the answer is that we should be as strong as the other fellow. I take it that is the burden of the Senator's argument. We should be able to defend ourselves. As I understand it, the Senator is not saying we should overkill the other man, but just be able to defend American homes.

Mr. JACKSON. The basic problem we face is not new. It is the age-old problem of preserving and nourishing individual liberty. From time to time, an adversary has come to the fore on the world scene, in the form of a totalitarian society such as the Nazi dictatorship in World War II, or as we face today in the form of Soviet imperialism. The problem is basically, as I see it, the question of whether or not we are willing to do the things necessary to preserve and encourage individual liberty.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. LONG. It appears that what was said by Magsaysay in the Philippines is correct. He said, "Here are two things, my clenched fist and my open palm. You can shake my hand or if you want to fight I will fight you." That is the approach of Americans. We never had a war with the Soviet Union and there is no reason why we should. However, the best way to assure there will be no fighting is that we stay strong enough to defend ourselves.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I wish to conclude by saying what I said several times during my prepared remarks. I do not think there is any greater priority than the requirement to try to reach agreement with the Soviet Union to limit arms. Of course, this agreement has to be enforceable. I feel very deeply that we have the best chance of reaching an agreement from a position of strength, and if anyone has any doubt about how to negotiate with the Soviets, ask the Czech people.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for 1 minute in light of what the Senator from Louisiana has just said?

Mr. JACKSON. I yield.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, what the distinguished Senator from Louisiana said reminds me of certain expenditures we are making, and I think that in our debates on these different points we should bear in mind the question of national resources.

The budget for January called for \$5.2 billion in ammunition for 1 year in Vietnam. I thought there were 250,000 Vietcong and North Vietnamese soldiers there, but I checked with the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), and he checked with the Department of Defense, and we are advised that there are 240,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong soldiers in South Vietnam rather than 250,000.

Mr. President, assuming there are 240,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong combat troops in South Vietnam, if one were to take \$5.2 billion which was asked

for ammunition alone for 1 year, that would be \$21,666.66 for ammunition alone for 1 year to shoot at each Vietcong and North Vietnamese soldier in South Vietnam.

If one were to take the estimated cost of the war of \$3 billion a month or \$36 billion a year and divide it by 240,000, being the number of North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops in South Vietnam, that would be \$150,000 a year to fight each Vietcong and North Vietnamese soldier in South Vietnam.

However, on schools we have requested a budget of \$2.3 billion for all elementary and secondary education for 52 million American schoolchildren.

That figures out to \$44 per year for schoolchildren in America, to educate them. In other words, \$44 for 52 million American schoolchildren, and \$21,666.66 a year just for ammunition to shoot at each Vietcong in Vietnam. If there is a more unsound, economic, domestic political policy, I cannot imagine what it would be. I think it is a piece of folly what we have done and are doing.

I do not wish to prolong this discussion. The distinguished Senator from Washington has said that he has yielded the floor but the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG) went into this question of priorities and throwing away money, and I thought I would add that footnote as to how we are really throwing it away.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, it would be my intention to make a few comments on the colloquy now going on, and then to yield to the distinguished Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) for the purpose of introducing an amendment; then to follow it up with some comments on a very important agreement reached with the West German Government today by the administration. But before doing that, I should like to yield to my friend from Arizona who has been patiently waiting for what he tells me will be a 30-second comment.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Illinois for yielding to me.

Mr. President, there was some discussion on the floor a short time ago about the Hudson Institute and the Lincoln Laboratory of MIT.

I have acquired some information which I think is needed and will be of interest to the Senate.

On the Hudson Institute, the percent of the budget which is defense funded for the fiscal year ending June 1968 is as follows:

Total budget \$1.36 billion; nongovernment \$370,000, or 27 percent; Department of Defense \$950,000, or 69 percent; other Government agencies \$40,000 or 3 percent. In the case of the Lincoln Laboratory at MIT, 100 percent of the budget is Government funded; 99 percent from the Department of Defense; and 1 percent from NASA, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Once more I thank the Senator from Illinois very much for yielding to me.

AMENDMENT NO. 88

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I yield at this time to the distinguished Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER).

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I ask

unanimous consent that I may submit an amendment, with the understanding that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) will not lose his right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I submit an amendment to S. 2546 on behalf of the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART) and myself. I ask that it be printed, and that it also be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Chair would inquire of the Senator from Kentucky, does he wish to call it up at this time?

Mr. COOPER. No, Mr. President.

The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of the bill add a new section as follows:

"Sec. 402. Funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other Act for the acquisition of an antiballistic missile system may be used only for research, development, testing, evaluation and normal procurement incident thereto, and may not be used for the deployment of an antiballistic missile system or any part or component thereof or for the acquisition of any site or preparation of any site for the deployment of any such system."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received and will lie on the table.

Mr. PERCY obtained the floor.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Illinois yield for a question?

Mr. PERCY. I am delighted to yield to the Senator from Tennessee for a question.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, has the Senator from Illinois noticed the shift in strategy, emphasis, and the attempted justification which has appeared yesterday and today?

Before the Senator answers that question, let me bring to his attention that when President Nixon appeared on television before the American people to announce his position with respect to the ABM issue, his principal reason given for recommending deployment of the ABM was that it was necessary in order to preserve the integrity of our deterrence.

When Secretary of Defense Laird appeared before the Armed Services Committee and the Committee on Foreign Relations, he said that deployment of the ABM is necessary "in order to preserve the integrity of our deterrents."

Now yesterday, in public comment, the able and distinguished Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), chairman of the committee, has put principal emphasis upon another point.

Both he and the Secretary of Defense have abandoned advancement of the earlier position.

Now, today, the distinguished Senator from Mississippi says that it is necessary to improve our bargaining position with the Soviets.

Today, the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) poses his remarks on that point. The President has asked for it, he said; we must do it to strengthen our bargaining position with the Soviets.

We are back to the old canard of arming in order to parley. No longer is it advanced that deployment of the ABM is

necessary in order to preserve the integrity of our deterrence.

Mr. President, if it is not necessary, then who wants this thing?

This basic point is no longer advanced. Read the colloquy now published by Secretary of Defense Laird. He retreated from that position. The Senator from Mississippi has retreated from that position. The Senator from Washington has now retreated from that position.

Now a new position is being taken, not that it is necessary in order to preserve the integrity of our deterrence, not that it is necessary for our defense, but that it will strengthen our bargaining position with the Russians.

Has not the Senator noticed that shift in emphasis?

Mr. PERCY. I had noticed that. I should make comment on it, before we leave tonight, if I am able to make a few remarks. But right now I can classify such logic, most respectfully, as pure hogwash.

Mr. STENNIS and Mr. JACKSON addressed the Chair.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I have been asked to yield to the distinguished Senator from New York, who has been waiting quite some time to make a short comment, and then I would be glad to yield to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, as long as the two Senators just referred to are on the floor and standing on their feet, I think that in all fairness, we should be heard.

Mr. PERCY. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I do not want to prolong this argument on the ABM, but the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE) is mistaken when he states he has noticed a change in my position. I say that with all respect to him. There is no change in my position about the ABM as a deterrence, nor is there any change in my thought that the President of the United States is going to negotiate.

I would hope he would not have the rug pulled out from under him before he speaks to the Russians by any Republican, Democrat, or anyone else—it does not make any difference who it might be. That is just commonsense. I have said that since January, somewhere along there. I continue to say that because that is my belief. We do not have to read any books to find that out. I thank the Senator from Illinois very much for yielding.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Illinois yield?

Mr. PERCY. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. I want to say exactly the same thing. I have not changed my position regarding the ABM. I think it is very clear that it is needed to protect our deterrence. The fact that I relate it to negotiations at this time, I think, is most pertinent. It is important that the President of the United States, as a representative at the negotiating table, does not have the rug pulled out from under him. That is the way it will be interpreted, if we deny funds for ABM at this time.

That is my position, and I have not changed my views.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator from Illinois yield?

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I could comment further on that same point, but right now I yield to my distinguished colleague from New York (Mr. JAVITS).

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, there are two observations I should like to make on the remarks which have just been made by my colleagues on the question on negotiation. One is the dimension, which has not been mentioned sufficiently in debate, and I hope it will have the attention of all Members of the Senate; namely, that it is not so much what we can expect from the negotiators as they stand now, but what we can expect from them when they actually are in negotiation. It is my judgment, as one Senator—and I think there is a great deal of opinion on this subject—that the dimension of the negotiations will be very much more serious in trying to come to a big rather than a small agreement, from our deployment of Safeguard. That is a critically important point because of the impact on others.

If we are there with our hands for the moment in the cookie jar; that is, they have some kind of ABM and we have some kind of ABM, the result will be a mouse or the whole of the negotiations may amount to preventing atomic weapons on the seabed or something like that. We have got to put on an abrasive attitude toward committing ourselves not to deploy, and then we will be in there fighting for a big agreement through negotiation.

That is the very atmosphere and attitude that negotiations require if they are really going to meet what the world has a right to expect. Otherwise we are going to have people, as if in the grocery business, all of whom may have some kind of atomic weapons, arriving at little agreements, as a result of little "buy this" negotiations, and letting the press think they have done something big.

I think the greatest argument against deployment is that then we are really building a fire under our negotiators to do something appreciable, because we are running risks. The Senator from Washington is right, we are running risks. As the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) has said, that is the very reason why we should do what we suggest be done, because the running of risks will enable us to get something big rather than something miniscule, which will be the case if we go on this way, and we will settle nothing until we get an atomic holocaust.

As the Senators from Michigan and Kentucky have invited Senators to ask to join them, I myself have the honor, with the permission of the Senate, to ask unanimous consent that I may be included as a cosponsor of the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PERCY. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there has been a great deal of talk about negotiating from strength. The ABM sys-

tem is supposed to give us strength 6 or 8 years from now.

There has been some talk that the Soviet Union exceeds us in ICBM's, the Minuteman and Titan. I do not think that is applicable. I say that most respectfully, although I do admit that by the end of this year, according to our best intelligence estimates, they may be 25 or 30 ahead of us as far as ICBM launchers are concerned.

As far as sea launchers are concerned, at the end of last year there were 656 Poseidon missiles, compared with 45 missiles of similar type on Soviet submarines.

The third is in the intercontinental bombers, the B-52 and the B-58. This country had 645, and the Soviets had 150 of their bombers. I think the Soviet figure still would not exceed that, because it had gone down from 155 the preceding year.

So if we are talking about strength, we have it, and they know we have it.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to join as a cosponsor of the amendment submitted by the Senator from Kentucky and the Senator from Michigan.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be a cosponsor of the pending Cooper-Hart amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PERCY. I yield.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may join in the same manner.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PERCY. I yield.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I make the same request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I believe the debate this afternoon, the colloquy that followed the speech of the distinguished Senator from Washington, was extremely valuable. I think it is very important that the colloquy followed because of the very grim picture that was painted by the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON) and the grim picture that was painted of the position of my distinguished friend and our former colleague in the House, Melvin Laird, which, if left unclarified, might cause some people to believe that we should erect an iron curtain; in fact, that we should triple-plate it; that the situation was so critical that we should insulate and isolate ourselves.

Yet we know that is not the interpretation the Secretary of Defense placed on it. In the concluding comment made by the distinguished Senator from Washington, he clarified completely that he did not intend that at all; that he himself earnestly hoped we could find a negotiated settlement of the arms race now going on; that we could find a way to de-

escalate the danger and the terror along the path on which the two nations are now proceeding.

I believe that this is the interpretation which all of us would like to place on these remarks, remarks the Senator had every right to make. He is not speaking for the U.S. Government or the administration. He is speaking as one Senator. There are people who would agree with every word in his speech.

The intention in this country, on the part of every President we have had in our time, whether Democrat or Republican, is to bring down the curtain, to perforate it, to bring about a thaw in the cold war, to try to normalize in every way our relations with the Soviet Union. That was the policy of President Johnson and President Kennedy, and of President Eisenhower before them, and it is certainly the policy today of President Nixon. I do not think anyone would say that President Nixon is naive about communism or the Soviet Union, or their intention or their capability. He is alert to all of that. He has been a lifetime student of the Communist movement.

On the other hand, President Nixon has taken the initiative and he has set the tone for this country and the hope for the country in saying:

Let us work toward these negotiations. We are willing to start them as of July 31, the end of this month.

Certainly he has full expectation that those talks will be underway very early in August.

I do not think any one of us could say that the Soviet Union will negotiate an agreement with us that is just in our interest and not in their interest. No one would believe that they would, or even, perhaps, should. We are not unaware of the fact that we cannot hope to have an agreement with the Soviet Union unless it also serves the Soviet interest.

We have a coincidence of interests. Faced with a coincidence of interests, we have the opportunity for agreements. That was how we achieved an agreement on Austria. That was how we achieved an agreement on the testing of atomic weapons. We had that same coincidence of interests when we agreed on a non-proliferation treaty. It is hoped that we will have many more bases of accord in the future.

I would simply say that there is no question in anyone's mind that we must have a credible deterrent. In this respect I agree completely with the distinguished Senator from Tennessee. He has indicated, and I would indicate, that a credible deterrent depends upon two principal factors: First, the power to retaliate against anyone who dares to strike against us and, second, the will to use that power; and let no nation have any question about either point, the first or the second. We have the power. We have the will to use that power if attacked and if the free world is endangered by any nation.

Having said that, I think we can carry on this debate on the military procurement bill before us.

I think the way we carry this debate on will be exceedingly important. It is important because the Nation is watch-

ing us. The Nation is divided on many issues. People are settling these issues in different ways. We are going to settle this issue with reason, not emotion. We are going to resolve our differences because we are 100 men with this great responsibility in this Chamber, equally divided, roughly, on one very important part of the military procurement authorization bill. But we are going to approach this problem by trying to analyze it, look at the conditions, look at the adversary, or the potential adversary, and look at and weigh all the alternatives.

I would like to say that I think it is with great pride that all of us will have this debate led by the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS).

I think we all have a good feeling about having that committee under his chairmanship, because he is a man of great intelligence, a man of utter fairness, as demonstrated time and again in his relationship to his colleagues, and a man of absolute integrity. It would be hard to fill the shoes, in this job, of Senator RUSSELL; but I think all of us, unanimously, including Senator RUSSELL himself, would feel that no one is better qualified; and in this instance, the national interest, the seniority system of the Senate, and the great ability of the distinguished Senator now holding the chairmanship all coincide.

I myself am very proud to have had the privilege, over the past 2½ years, of working with the Senator who will lead those who oppose the ABM deployment at this time. The distinguished Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER), a sister State of Illinois, has been a friend of mine for many years. I think he embodies the qualities which citizens want and deserve in their representatives. He is beloved in his own State; he is respected throughout the country. He is respected by every Member of this body, and by the President of the United States.

I have seen him study this issue as I have never seen anyone study any issue before. I have sat alongside him for well over a year now, as he has interrogated experts in the field of intelligence, the military field, and the appropriate scientific fields, to try to discover what the truth of this matter is.

He is a man of great judgment; and I think it is a remarkable thing that the battle will be headed by the two men probably best qualified to oppose each other. Each of them has come to a different conclusion after weighing the same set of facts. This is perhaps why the administration admitted, when they made the decision to go ahead with an ABM system, that it was a marginal decision.

It is a very difficult decision. We happen to think that we have the votes to win, and we will win in the effort to delay deployment, for a number of reasons; but we respect the judgment of those who take a different position than we do.

I should like to make a few comments that I put together this morning to answer, to a degree, the points that have been raised by the distinguished Senator from Washington.

The issue before the Senate regarding the anti-ballistic missile system is between those who would start ABM deployment now and those who would continue research and development, testing, and evaluation to produce a more workable system than is now available if it should ever become necessary to deploy that system.

By continuing research, development, and testing, by not beginning deployment in the United States now, we can make the deployment decision later. That decision can be based on whether we can develop a system that will work and on what we learn of Soviet intentions at the forthcoming nuclear arms talks.

Proponents of starting ABM deployment now say it would strengthen the President's hand in talks with the Soviet Union. I would simply, respectfully, say that in my judgment this is hogwash.

The President will be in a strong position if the Congress orders continued testing, research, and development to make the now-vulnerable Safeguard system really effective. Hasty deployment of a highly vulnerable ABM system cannot possibly increase the credibility of our military defenses.

The Safeguard proposal for beginning deployment at sites in Montana and North Dakota will require early installation of today's vulnerable missile site radars—MSR's—and construction of ABM sites where realistic testing really cannot occur. It would freeze the system in an ineffective state.

It would make far more sense to redesign the radars, to test them at Kwajalein, and to deploy a full system out there where intercepts of nonnuclear missiles can be tested.

I am not a technician nor a scientist; but I was down here some 25 years ago as a procurement officer for the Navy. I spent some 25 years as a defense contractor. I have worked with the military over a period of many years, including 3 years in military service.

The situations I fear most, and the times I have gotten into the deepest trouble as an industrialist or as a procurement officer, have been when we rushed ahead with a system that was not yet ready for production. We invariably delayed, in the end, deployment or production. We delayed and frustrated the objective we were trying to achieve, in our haste to put into production something that was untested.

Proponents of immediate deployment contend that a year's delay will make it impossible to catch up with the proposed schedule of putting two sites in operation by the end of 1973 and making the whole system operational by 1975.

This is untrue. If we do not begin deployment now, but rather—and I for one would be willing—begin preproduction of long leadtime components, we can at relatively small cost start deployment—should it later appear advisable—a year from now and still meet the Pentagon's schedule.

In my dedication to the security and national interest of the United States—and I know that my dedication is matched by the dedication of every other Member of the U.S. Senate—I will support, and I know every other Senator will

support, whatever level of military spending seems required.

But I think the word "sufficiency," as used by the President of the United States, was one of the most significant words yet contributed to the vocabulary of this dialog.

I have not been convinced that deployment of the ABM will yield any net gain in national security. The fact is that this system in its present stage of design and development—even if approved by the Congress—will probably never be fully deployed because it has yet to be perfected as a weapons system. We need lose no time as we conduct arms talks with the Soviet Union, because we can use that time for development of less expensive, smaller radars which can be better defended than the present vulnerable design permits.

The main reason cited for ABM deployment is to deny the Soviets a preemptive first-strike capability. The fact is that it would be sheer lunacy for the Russians to attack the United States with nuclear weapons even without us having the ABM because:

First. The underwater Polaris fleet remains ready to strike a devastating response.

Second. At any time about 250 of our intercontinental bombers are on 10-minute alert, and their air-to-ground nuclear rockets would be part of the retaliatory strike.

Third. It is impossible that our entire Minuteman Titan force could be wiped out with one blow.

These are facts of which the biggest, rashest hawk in the Kremlin is well aware.

In order for the ABM to make sense, the Soviets would have to believe: First, they could with a sudden attack wipe out all our nuclear forces if we did not have it; and, second, our ABM would preserve enough of our nuclear forces intact to make any such Soviet attack suicidal.

However, the present ABM system is too vulnerable to provide such protection, and our overall missile forces are sufficiently protected to maintain a devastating second-strike capability without the ABM.

On the eve of the arms talks with the Soviet Union, let us continue—even accelerate—the research, development, and evaluation process. Let us also give ourselves a reasonable period of time to determine, in the words of Secretary of State Rogers:

If the Russians want to go out of the ABM business.

Then we can do the same same.

I urge that we do nothing that would in any way frustrate the success of these negotiations, nor do anything that would in any way appear to look cynically upon such negotiations, which I truly believe are in our common interest.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I want to commend the administration for its announcement today of a new 2-year offset arrangement with Germany to help defray U.S. military balance-of-payments

costs for maintaining U.S. troops in Germany. The new agreement goes a long way toward correcting the absolutely scandalous arrangements that have been concluded in recent years under which, on very short-term loans, at prevailing market rates of interest, we are paying interest on money to defend and to provide for the defense of Western Europe.

Speaking as one Senator, I think that those arrangements have been simply impossible to continue. And I think they would have imperiled our whole ability to support our level of forces in Europe.

The new 2-year offset arrangement is for \$1,513 million which represents around 80 percent of the total U.S. balance-of-payments costs in Germany. Sixty-one percent of the total offset will be in the form of purchases in the United States by Germany for a total of \$925 million. The other \$595 million will take the form of other financial transactions. The largest single other item is that Germany will buy \$250 million of U.S. Treasury bonds with a 10-year maturity at 3½ percent. This represents a considerable advance over past offset loans where interest rates were at prevailing market rates of interest. Even more important is that Germany is blocking interest on its past loans to the United States and leaving it in the U.S. Treasury. The \$32.5 million of interest will be applied to military purchases in the United States.

In addition, Germany is buying up \$118 million of Eximbank and Marshall Plan debts owed to the United States; is prepaying \$44 million of other German debts to the United States; and is setting up a special fund of \$150 million for German investment in the United States.

It is my understanding from the Under Secretary of the Treasury on the telephone this afternoon that that is the only part of the financial arrangement that will carry commercial interest rates.

This new agreement is a major step toward creating a sounder financial basis for U.S. expenditures in NATO in that it covers 80 percent of all our balance-of-payments expenses, primarily using purchases.

We must still strive for a 100-percent offset; an offset that involves only purchases and not loans. If loans are to be used, we must be absolved of any interest costs.

This is the principle that I was striving for when I presented a plan to the NATO North Atlantic Assembly in June for a multilateral automatic offset arrangement for all military expenditures within NATO. The principle is that no country should gain or lose on the military balance-of-payments account as a result of its commitment to the common defense of NATO.

The administration has taken a big step toward this goal, and I am encouraged that in the future we shall be able to arrive at an agreement that will automatically offset military expenditures 100 percent through the use of purchases in the United States. This would also eliminate the agonizing, and I would say disturbing, and some would say humiliating,

bilateral negotiations that endanger German-American relations.

As rapporteur—working chairman—of the Balance of Payments Subcommittee of NATO, I plan to continue my work toward this goal.

I know of no greater threat to the continuation of our current U.S. troop level in Europe than the balance-of-payments crisis that we face today. We must continue our efforts until we reach a total offset on our NATO military balance-of-payments account.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 1969—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 11400) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and for other purposes. I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of the report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The report will be read for the information of the Senate.

The assistant legislative clerk read the report.

(For conference report, see House proceedings of July 8, 1969, p. 18604, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I think we should have a short quorum call.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I agree. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may put in a brief quorum call without losing my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, the grand total of the budget estimates of new obligatory authority considered in connection with this bill was \$4,814,305,334. The House version of the bill recommended \$3,783,212,766, and the Senate version of the bill recommended appropriations of \$4,459,669,644. The Senate will recall that subsequent to the House committee consideration of the bill, supplemental emergency requests submitted directly to the Senate amounted to a figure in excess of \$450 million. The final bill agreed to in conference is in the amount of \$4,352,357,644. This is a reduction under the total

budget estimates of \$461,947,690. The final bill is \$569,144,878 over the House bill and \$107,312,000 under the Senate bill. After the Senate has completed consideration of this conference report, it is my intention to ask unanimous consent to insert into the record a tabulation which will completely detail each item in the bill by listing the budget estimate, the House and Senate allowances for each item, and the final conference agreement.

Perhaps I should comment briefly on the rapid transit money which the Senate had inserted in the bill.

All down through the years, the House Committee on Appropriations has expressed the belief that there is a place for both a freeway system and a rapid transit system in the Capital City. Since 1962, a series of delays and obstacles to the construction of the authorized highway projects have occurred. I want to call to the Senate's attention what has transpired.

In 1966, the National Capital Planning Commission approved a balanced freeway system. This occurred after the House had acted on the District of Columbia appropriation bill for fiscal year 1967. The Senate added \$4,527,000 for the rapid transit system, and the House conferees receded and concurred in the Senate amendment. Subsequently, the Planning Commission repudiated its approval, and the newly created Department of Transportation entered into the picture to such an extent that the entire Interstate Highway System in the District of Columbia was blocked. Last year, the Congress enacted legislation in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 directing that work commence on certain highway projects in the District. This directive has been stalemated through actions of the National Capital Planning Commission and the District of Columbia City Council as well as the Department of Transportation. The various delays since 1962 have caused highway projects which had undergone the complete appropriations process to be shunted aside so that the District has accumulated approximately \$200 million in funds that cannot be used. Furthermore, the Department of Highways and Traffic has expended about \$3,300,000 for preliminary engineering and design plans which have been discarded due to changes in planning and \$1,400,000 in plans held in abeyance, for a grand total of \$4,700,000 for design work that in all likelihood will not be used.

The House committee has continually stated each year that as soon as the highway program is allowed to proceed without recall they will recommend funds for rapid rail transit. They demonstrated this responsiveness in 1966 when there was a slight breakthrough and I am definitely of the opinion, from my meetings with the conferees on this bill and from my understanding of the current impasse that has developed, that there has been no change on the part of the House committee in respect to this matter. The Senate conferees, therefore, were forced to yield and the moneys were stricken.

Amendment No. 90 was the most controversial portion of the bill. Original language was inserted into the bill in the House, setting a limitation on fiscal year 1970 budget outlays. This original House language was stricken in the Senate and, as an alternative, a completely different approach was proposed. The final language agreed to, after a number of meetings between the House and Senate conferees, is a compromise of the positions of the two Houses.

The House provision as originally written set an overall expenditure ceiling for fiscal year 1970. Of significance is the fact that it contained no exemptions. The House provision also did not make an expenditure reduction in the projected budget outlay figures for fiscal year 1970.

On the other hand, the provision adopted by the Senate provided for an expenditure reduction in fiscal year 1970 of not less than \$1.9 billion. This reduction was to be made in the so-called controllable portion of the budget. The Senate provision exempted from any reduction the so-called uncontrollable items, and among these were funds for the financing of the war in South Vietnam. The Senate provision also contained a ceiling for fiscal year 1970, which could be adjusted upward for the items which are uncontrollable, such as interest, social security payments, and the like.

The language which has been agreed to in conference is a compromise between the proposals of the two Houses. At this point, I would like to say that I personally preferred the Senate provision since it effected a reduction in the new budget of President Nixon of not less than \$1.9 billion, and I fail to see why such a reduction could not be made in the face of a request to the Congress to continue the surtax. However, my personal views did not prevail in the conference, and the language which has been agreed to—which sets an expenditure ceiling of \$191.9 billion—also provides that that ceiling will be adjusted, upward or downward, as a result of congressional actions or inactions on budgetary proposals, whether initiated by the President or by Congress, and whether or not the expenditures were included in the budget review of April 15. This means that although there will be a reduction of \$1 billion in expenditures, this does not necessarily mean that the President's budget will be reduced \$1 billion. The President's budget may be adjusted upward as a result of actions or inactions by Congress, and although a \$1 billion reduction will ultimately be effected from the total expenditures finalized by Congress, such authorized expenditures may exceed, in the controllable area, the budget figures proposed by President Nixon in the April review.

The compromise language exempts from the imposed ceiling—to the extent of \$2 billion—increases in such uncontrollable items as social security, veterans' life insurance, interest, farm price supports, and certain items where receipts may be less than anticipated in the budget.

Mr. President, the best that can be said for the compromise language is that it

does set a ceiling on expenditures, which must be periodically adjusted based upon the action or inaction of Congress and the \$2 billion to which I referred; and, in addition, it does effect a reduction of \$1 billion under some figure which is not known at the present time because of the actions or inactions of Congress. As I said before, I did not favor this compromise language. I favored the Senate amendment. Mr. President, I believe that this compromise language will serve to provide a reduction in overall Federal expenditures, which is what I understood the will of the Senate to be.

Mr. President, I now wish to express appreciation to the other conferees who worked so diligently, so faithfully, and so patiently, and upon whom I had to lean for support and encouragement. Especially do I wish to express my appreciation to the ranking minority member, the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT).

I invite attention to the fact that this bill was in conference from June 25 until July 8. We had several meetings, and of course the conferees tried to uphold the position of the Senate in all matters. But, as Senators know, there must be a spirit of give and take in such conferences; and the Senate, of course, had to yield on some items and the House receded on others. I feel that in the main this is an excellent conference report, particularly with respect to the money items therein.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I concur with the distinguished chairman of our conference in his feeling that, dealing with the money items, the conference was a very fair and equitable conference and that in the main the Senate action prevailed.

I share with him, however, disappointment in the fact that the Senate language on a limitation of expenditures was thought to be thoroughly unacceptable so far as the House members were concerned, and we could not move them a single inch in our direction.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I do not think that is quite the case. I think they moved several inches in our direction, but we also had to move several inches in their direction.

Mr. MUNDT. But not as far as the basic philosophy of the Senate language was concerned, which was largely the brainchild of the distinguished Senator from West Virginia. We, on the Senate side, had worked out a very firm commitment on the part of Congress for some actual savings in expenditure.

I really am disappointed in the final result. It is better, I agree with the Senator, than the House language previously enacted. But I would be less than candid with my colleagues in the Senate and the House if I did not call attention to the fact that the basic language as finally adopted retains the earlier language of the House, which has an escape hatch so wide that a nearsighted farmer could drive a full load of alfalfa through it without touching either gatepost. I want to read it to you because the Senate

should be advised of that. It is on page 11 of the conference report on behalf of the managers of the House.

At this point I pause long enough to say that I continue to regret that the Reorganization Act of Congress, passed by the Senate a year ago, has not been approved by the House, because among other reforms it provided that the U.S. Senate and its membership would also get a conference report prepared on behalf of the managers of the bill on the part of the Senate. It has always rankled me a little to have to rely entirely upon the description and the analysis of the conference action as viewed exclusively by the Members of the House. Our conferees come to the Senate time after time emptyhanded, with no written report as to what transpired and as a consequence very few Senators ever get a completely clear picture of the conference action. This is a weakness in our system which should be corrected.

I now wish to read the escape-hatch language, because I am afraid it will not result in the kind of economies which we hoped might flow from this effort. This appears on page 11 of the conference report on behalf of the managers of the House:

The conference agreement retains the House language that would operate continuously to adjust the ceiling, as appropriate to comport with the estimated budget outlay effect of specific congressional actions or inactions in appropriation bills or other bills having an impact on the April 15 budgetary proposals. The conferees have added language to this part of the provision to also make it clear that other actions by the Congress would operate to adjust the ceiling in like fashion. These budgetary and other actions would result in adjustments of the ceiling whether initiated by the President or by the Congress.

Once that language is included in any so-called spending limitation formula, Mr. President, we have the phenomenon of a moving ceiling that moves up or down according to the action by Congress on the various appropriation bills. I submit that in reality that kind of moving ceiling has very little advantage compared with no ceiling at all. To all intents and purposes, this so-called ceiling on spending would work as well, suppose, if we had not used a figure of some \$191 billion, but had used instead the figure \$19 billion, the ceiling will move up automatically any time we go beyond it anyhow. I say that because I share with my colleagues in the Senate and House the inspiration that induced us to make a noble effort to write a legitimate, tight ceiling on expenditures to help squelch the fierce fires of inflation.

The House Committee on Appropriations felt, and we on our side felt, that instead of having the matter handled as was done last year, by the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance, which wrote in their concept of expenditure ceilings and employment ceilings, we would undertake the job in our appropriation committees. In my opinion, we pretty badly failed. I do not know whether the House Committee on Ways and Means could have had any better luck in approaching this matter. However, insofar as I am concerned, I openly invite the

members of the Committee on Ways and Means and the members of the Committee on Finance, if they feel inclined to do so, to take a whack at it. We found it was a most difficult thing to do.

We tried, on both sides of the Capitol, to do a responsible job. I think we largely failed. Because I think we largely failed, I think the invitation has to be extended to all concerned to evolve some ingenious method to accomplish the results which we desire, that is, a reduction in expenditures which will enable us, after having passed the necessary tax legislation, to make some dent in the battle against inflation.

Certainly I shall welcome any wisdom that the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Finance can write into legislation, or any formula they can conceive of, which will achieve results.

So far as I am concerned, I have very little confidence in the efficacy of a moving ceiling. It is like a moving target. It is an elusive thing. We did not have that fluctuating feature in the Senate bill, I might add.

Of course, Congress can always spend more than is provided by some arbitrary ceiling which it fixes for itself, but under our Senate language it has to go through the painful, obvious, well publicized process of specifically exempting increased expenditures from the ceiling limitation. This will not now be necessary under the House language. It will simply be automatic—after the fact. For the next few days, the computing machines, the analysts, the economists, and the master mathematicians of the two bodies will figure out what impact this action will have on the moving ceiling. They will then have a new dollar figure for a ceiling, one which will go up or down each time Congress acts on money bills. I do not think that is an adequate answer to our serious problem. It was the best we could do in conference, unfortunately. Certainly we tried valiantly to uphold the Senate position, but we failed.

Mr. President, except for that failure I think that the remainder of the conference report certainly merits the approval of the Senate, and there is nothing we can do to correct this situation here.

Therefore, I shall vote for the adoption of the conference report, as I agreed to sign it. It is the best we can bring about because of the inability to get anything better between the two appropriation committees.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I think this is a rare occasion. I am doubtful that I have seen anything like this in a long time where two Senators who labored so long, and I think so effectively, in creating this bill are so modest about their attainment. I think they attained a great deal. Beginning in April, there were long and painful hearings. They presented the bill splendidly on the floor of the Senate, where it was agreed to. Then, it went to conference. I am not at all of the feeling that they should be so modest in describing the result of their efforts, which I think have been largely successful. I compliment them.

Anyone who inspects this RECORD will find that there were 92 amendments in conference and, in the main, the Senate prevailed in conference.

The second point I wish to make is that I think the concept of the control of expenditures begun in the Committee on Appropriations in the other body this year and carried forward here is a very fine one and should be a part of the appropriations process of the two Houses, rather than to come as it did last year from the exhaustive and very fine efforts of the two Senators—and it was a bipartisan effort—who are members of the Committee on Finance. So the final effort to control expenditures which, in many respects was successful last year, was really the product of the tax raising committee rather than the tax spending committees, as it should be.

I am not at all of the feeling of my distinguished friends about the provision for control of expenditures. As weak as they think it is, I think it is an improvement over the House version.

When the Senator from Rhode Island called attention to the manifest weaknesses, and the conference included the amendments to meet his views, they materially strengthened the measure.

So far as the question of a moving ceiling is concerned, that is what it was last year, and that is what it is always going to be unless the Senate and the House enact this control measure the very last day of the session.

In this instance, we enacted it before any annual appropriation bill had been called up, and I think that is the time to enact it; but by being enacted at that time it has to contain machinery to reflect the actions of Congress for the remainder of the session on annual appropriation bills.

I cite just one instance and that is with respect to the food stamp appropriation where the Senate wrote into the bill the other day an increase of \$410 million for availability in fiscal year 1970. Under the provision in the final version of the expenditure control features of the conference bill whatever will be reported by the Bureau of the Budget in the way of expenditures in fiscal year 1970 out of the \$410 million, if it be enacted in the Agriculture appropriation bill, will serve to increase the new ceiling. It will be the action of the Congress and the representatives of the people and it should not be ignored or taken out by the Bureau of the Budget or the Executive after we get away from here.

As far as the Senator from Florida is concerned, he thinks that a fine service has been rendered in that particular part of the conference bill and that the conference bill reflects the excellent and effective work of the Senator from West Virginia and the Senator from South Dakota. The Senator from Florida does not like to hear them downgrade themselves or their service. He is here to pay tribute to them as having done a fine job and he is sorry they could not accomplish everything they described, but who has ever been able to do that in the Congress. After all, we consist of a good many people, 100 Senators and 435 Representatives. When one gets through

with a conference it is certain to reflect the views of the two able Senators who struggled hard on a bill such as this one.

I congratulate the Senators. This is a good conference report and a good bill. As one who has seen every phase during the creation of a bill and who has participated in a modest way, I do not want to see my friends disregard the credit I think they are due and which I am willing to give them at this time.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I appreciate the very generous and gracious remarks made by the Senator from Florida (Mr. HOLLAND). I cannot express enough appreciation for the support he gave me in conference and the work he rendered, and the efforts he put forth to help bring back a good conference report.

I do share the feeling of the Senator from South Dakota to the effect that the moving ceiling pretty much knocks out any suggestion of any real bona fide reduction in Federal expenditures insofar as the conference report is concerned. We have been successful in requiring a \$1 billion reduction in some figure. We do not know what that "some" figure is and we will not know until all the figures are in. But it was the best we could do. Moreover, any increase in uncontrollables over the \$2 billion cushion may result in a forced offsetting reduction in expenditures elsewhere.

I cannot reconcile myself to the idea of having the Congress extend the surtax to permit the Government to tax the people and siphon off more moneys to be spent in turn by the Government on new programs.

But that is what we are being asked to do. We are being asked to extend the surtax. We should be willing to tighten our belts and curtail a few of the expenditures if we are going to continue to saddle the burden on the American people of a 10-percent surcharge throughout the remainder of the calendar year and 5 percent thereafter until June 30 of next year. I regret that the conference report does not show a determination at this time to enforce expenditure cuts. It does not make sense to me.

I think we must all agree that one of the major factors contributing toward inflation in this country is the gigantic expenditure of Federal moneys. Yet, what we are apparently going to see is the extension of a surtax which will draw more money from the pockets of the taxpayers while, at the same time, the Federal Government turns right around and spends more money on Federal programs. Such expenditures will fuel the fires of inflation. In other words, we are told that we must have the surtax to fight inflation. What it amounts to is simply that we will collect more money to fight inflation, and we will spend more money to feed inflation. It just does not make sense to me.

That is the position I take. I know that forced expenditure reductions would pinch my feet a little bit, too. Of course, I am going to try and increase appropriations over the budget estimates for certain items, such as public works projects in my State, but I was willing when

I brought this bill to the Senate floor in the first instance to accept offsetting reductions elsewhere for any appropriation increases in certain areas that the Congress might, in its wisdom, wish to make.

Of course, those offset reductions elsewhere might have evoked some complaints from me, too. But I think Congress should be willing to make some cuts in Federal expenditures, if we are going to extend the surtax. But, apparently, that is not the case. So we did the best we could in conference. As I say, we did not bring back a conference report which is entirely to my liking, but I cannot have it all my way. I think we possibly made some gains, but we also lost. However, I do appreciate the kind remarks of the Senator from Florida, and again I thank the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. MUNDT. I want to say to the Senator from Florida that I thank him for his generous comments. I would be ungracious if I did not express my appreciation for what he said. But it was not exactly out of a sense of humility that the Senator from West Virginia and I felt that we should "come clean" and point up this "escape hatch." We did so rather out of an abundance of caution when we felt that it plumb could not work and that we should so warn our colleagues.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I think it is pretty much meaningless.

Mr. MUNDT. I hope we are wrong, but I do not want the Senator from Florida to think that we are the two humblest Members of the Senate. I do not suppose we are any more faithful disciples of Uriah Heep than anyone else in our closed society—and there are not many people in our Chamber winning prizes for modesty these days—but we feel we had to work out a formula that would work or describe to you the weaknesses of this substitute ceiling-fixing language as we see them.

The difference between a moving ceiling, which is as good as no ceiling at all—it is not any better, it is not any worse, but it kind of fools the people. I am afraid—but the difference between a moving ceiling and a fixed ceiling concept such as we had written in on the Senate side is this. We were to increase the food-stamp plan or some other expenditure with a fixed ceiling, we would have to have economies somewhere else along the rest of the year in order to get back that money and keep within the fixed ceiling.

The purpose of the ceiling is to compel Government to live within it. It compels us to economize. A moving ceiling does nothing. It would work as well, I suppose, if we had \$1 billion as a proposed ceiling. That would make headlines all over the country. The conferees put on a ceiling on expenditures of \$1 billion. However, if the Congress went beyond it, it would not be too important, there would be no confession of failure, because that ceiling—whatever it is—moves up and up automatically, while the people with the calculating machines are reporting back how much it had moved up and the dollar-figure involved

in the new and still temporary expenditure ceiling.

So, I hope we are wrong. I hope we get the economies. If we do, it will be a bill at a time, a vote at a time, and an amendment at a time, as the appropriation process unfolds. I do not think, however, we will get the needed economies by the machinations of a moving ceiling such as the House proposed and pushed through the conference.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, will the Senator from West Virginia yield?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. I discussed this with the distinguished Senator. Under the House language, the ceiling that they put on would not apply to the educational appropriations. The subcommittee amended this to apply—the House knocked out the provision that we put in the Vocational Education Act last year that exempted all education appropriations from this ceiling. According to the House bill, they knocked out the House provision which would have repealed the prohibition against a ceiling on educational appropriations.

Congress passed the vocational educational amendments last year. My question is: Did the Senate prevail with that amendment?

I have read the language of the limitations on fiscal year 1970 budget outlays. Could the distinguished Senator indicate to me that the Senate did prevail? What are the facts about the educational appropriations? Do we have the status as it was before the House language which knocked out the language in the Vocational Education Act last year, or did the House prevail?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. The House language in the original bill did not do what the Senator states.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. When it was debated in the Senate, no one contended that it did.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. The House had no language in the bill limiting expenditures by the Office of Education. The Senate Appropriations Committee wrote the repealing language into the bill, but the Senate, at the urging of the distinguished Senator from Texas, and as a result largely of the efforts made by the Senator from Texas knocked out the language that had been written in by the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, which would have repealed the law.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. I want to thank the Senator for—

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I want to emphasize that but for the Senator from Texas and his efforts, I think the language inserted by the Senate Committee on Appropriations would have stayed in the bill.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I want to thank the Senator for his—

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I defended the committee's position on the floor, but the Senator's work was more effective than mine and he prevailed.

Now in answering the Senator's question—

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President,

will the Senator from West Virginia yield for one more comment?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. No, not at this time, but shortly. If I may just continue, because I want to allay the concern of the Senator from Texas (Mr. YARBOROUGH), the Senator undid the work of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Consequently, that item was not in conference. The result is that the basic law, which was embraced in the education amendments of last year, I would say, largely because of the work of the Senator from Texas and the former Senator from Oregon, Mr. Morse, is still the law.

In summation, the answer to the Senator's question is that expenditures of the Office of Education are not affected in any way by the conference report. Now I gladly yield to the able Senator.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. I want to congratulate the distinguished Senator from West Virginia. I serve on the committee with him. I am glad to be corrected. I had an error in my statement about the House. I commend the Senator's diligence. He knows exactly what is in the bill. I serve on that committee with him and he always has his homework done completely and has an exact knowledge of it. I want to commend him and thank him for his clarification which will relieve many people who have been worried about this question and asked me about it.

I want to say to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia that he gives me too much credit. Fifty Senators were working on that. I was only one of the instruments among all the half a hundred. I am very grateful to him for clarifying this matter.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Other Senators, including Mr. PELL, should have a great deal of credit, but I know I am right in saying that the Senator from Texas, (Mr. YARBOROUGH) did lead the fight. One day when I was very busily engaged in defending the committee's position with the respect to the expenditure limitation, he was lining up names of cosponsors for his amendment.

I pay tribute to the Senator from Texas.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. I want to commend the Senator from West Virginia for his diligence but I would say it was not a case of who prevailed—I am certain he would not object to what is right, but I think wisdom prevailed rather than a humble servant on the committee, one of nine Senators. Many of us worked on it. As the Senator knows, no one man could have done it. It was a case of wisdom and the desire of the people to see education furthered in this country.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I have had the opportunity to discuss with my friend from West Virginia the fate of the \$16 million which the Senate restored in the supplemental for the program which is known as educational opportunity grants; so will the Senator yield for a comment or two as well as one or two questions which I would hope he would comment on, if I may?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I am happy to yield to the able junior Senator from Indiana.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, first of all, I should like to add my understanding to that which has already been abundantly expressed about the difficulties and the heavy task of the Senator from West Virginia.

I know of no greater difficulty than to try to supervise an appropriation measure, to try to allocate limited funds within this body, unless it would be to allocate limited funds between this body and the other body. So my remarks—and I want to emphasize this—are not in any way directed at the Senator from West Virginia. Rather, if I may, I would like to direct these few words to our colleagues in the House. Each body is independent, of course.

I would like, as one Senator—and that is all I can speak for—to serve notice that, at a more propitious time than during the consideration of this supplemental appropriation bill at this late hour, I intend to do everything I can in my power—here again as one Senator—to see if we can reorient these priorities. I think they are out of kilter as far as that \$16 million for the education opportunities grants are concerned.

We wisely, of course, have given great consideration to the need for efficiency. It has been my experience, in a relatively short period of time, only 7 years, but 8 years prior to that time in the State legislature, to observe that everyone is in favor of efficiency until it comes to cutting one particular project that is of significant interest to the one who previously talked of efficiency. I recognize that. But when we look at the whole operation of the Federal function in the area of education, we have to reorient our priorities. We have to take a hard, realistic look at the times in which we live. We have to realize there are things going on on some of our campuses which cannot be tolerated or, frankly, excused.

I think the record will bear out my observation that these misdeeds are participated in by a relatively small percentage of our students, but, because of the great notoriety they have received, there is a reaction—I sense it in the country as well as in my own constituency in Indiana and other places—which threatens to disembowel our whole educational effort at the Federal level and threatens to turn back the clock in the effort in which many of us have participated, along with the Senator from West Virginia, to try to broaden the base for educational opportunities.

That is my judgment from talking to thousands of young people, not only in my State but throughout the country. The young people want to learn. They want to face up to the challenges. They are asking questions which perhaps we should have asked 10 or 20 years ago.

Some of them point out the inconsistencies between what some of us in the older generation say and what we do. One of these inconsistencies is pointed out very vividly in the insistence on the part of the House that the \$16 million of education opportunities grants be stricken from the conference report.

I allude to this inconsistency because, if there is one area that is fraught with controversy, it is the area of poverty. The whole area of guaranteed income, nega-

tive income tax, welfare, supplemental housing is a very hot potato. Yet there is one thing I have found no disagreement on. A person may be the most conservative person there is with respect to welfare, may be totally opposed to the Job Corps, but when it gets down to the fundamental question, there seems to be total agreement that the final solution to the problem of poverty is education.

I firmly believe that, although it is not quite that simple.

There is a total inconsistency in saying that education is the solution to the problem of poverty, and then striking out grants that are designed to permit unfortunate people who have been, through no fault of their own, born into families and environments that almost defy description, to have scholarship opportunities which would permit them to raise themselves by their own bootstraps and raise another generation in another environment with a better chance of being first-class Americans.

The Senator from West Virginia has been very indulgent, and I did not intend to get involved in this statement; but let me add that I have talked with officials at both private and State institutions in Indiana—and we have some very fine ones. Two weeks ago I had an opportunity to go to the Greensboro branch of the University of North Carolina and speak with a gentleman who is in charge of the educational assistance programs. He gave the same message that our education officials have been giving in the areas and schools where the dropout rate is high. We all know what happens to the youngster when he drops out. These officials have been giving the message to the poor and the underprivileged children, "Stick by your guns. Study. Stay in the classroom. Get your diploma. We are going to make it possible for you to get further training and get a college degree"—which is unheard of in many of these communities—"and have a whole new life for your family."

These children have stuck to programs like Upward Bound and others. They have stuck by their guns. Yet these people, both in North Carolina and in Indiana, and I imagine it is the same throughout the country, tell me that without this \$16 million we are not going to have enough funds to give scholarship grants to young people who have been in the Upward Bound program, let alone those who have not. It seems to me this is going to be a terribly disastrous thing. Not only will it be a loss of know-how and creative ability and a great humanitarian loss, but I suggest we are dealing with dynamite when we raise the expectations of these young people and say, "Here is a chance for you to have a better tomorrow," and then, when the time comes to cross the threshold, tell them that, because of the action of the House of Representatives, the door has been literally slammed in their faces.

I do not need to repeat the axiom we are all familiar with, that the future of America depends on our commitment to our educational needs of tomorrow.

So perhaps we ought to make an examination or reorient our priorities and see whether we should do more in the area of education. Education is not a

field in which we can cut back 1 year and make it up the next year. Each youngster who drops out of the education process has very little likelihood of getting back in. I not only suggest we need to continue the programs which we have undertaken to date, but, as far as investment of dollars is concerned, we have no better investment or way of doing a better job with our dollars. This is the key to the future.

I think some of us are going to do everything we can to see that the House of Representatives does not cause us to lose that key before we can take advantage of it.

I thank my friend from West Virginia for his indulgence. I know he did everything he could, but I think the House, in this instant, has been extremely shortsighted. I hope we can energize a force within this body to let the House know we mean business.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I am very sympathetic to what the Senator from Indiana has just said. I was sympathetic to the item to which he has addressed his remarks. However, the conferees found the House to be adamant in its position.

I do not believe that the door, to paraphrase the Senator's words, has been slammed back in the faces of young people who want to receive an education. This is an ongoing program, and \$124,600,000 was allotted to the program after conference action on the 1969 regular appropriation bill. So, although it is true that it would have been desirable to have the additional \$16 million, I think we have to recognize that the 1970 appropriation will be coming along from the House at the end of this month, at least I would hope so. At that time, I am sure Senators will want to renew their efforts in behalf of this item by presenting to the appropriate subcommittee on appropriations—and it does not happen to be the one of which I am chairman—their viewpoints in support thereof.

I must point out that this item was not budgeted, and it is extremely difficult to take an unbudgeted item to conference and get the House to yield on the item.

I think the fact that it was not budgeted is largely responsible for our temporary defeat. It was not that the House conferees wanted to slam the door on anyone; it was simply that the House felt that if items are so necessary and needed, the executive branch ought to send up a budget request.

I would hope that those Senators who are interested in this item—and I am interested in it as well, though I was not one of those who led the fight for its inclusion in this bill; as a matter of fact, the suggested amendment came to our attention very late, we had no hearings on it, the House committee held no hearings, and as I have already stated there was no budget estimate, so we were at a great disadvantage in conference, in our attempt to prevail—will take encouragement from the realization that there was a very sizable amount of money appropriated in the 1969 appropriation bill, and undoubtedly there will be a considerable amount appropriated in the 1970 regular bill.

The battle is not wholly lost. I congratulate the Senator, and I commend the other Senators who joined with him in support of this item. They did a very fine job. I wish we could have prevailed in the conference.

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one further brief comment, although he has already, as I have stated before, been overly indulgent to me?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.

Mr. BAYH. I know how hard the Senator tried on this matter, and I know that at this late hour, we are not going to do anything about it in this bill. I think the Senator's admonition to start looking now to the next bill is certainly what we must do.

But as we do that, I hope that we will recognize the responsibility that the legislative branch has to deal with the inequities that exist in the system, and not fall back on the fact that the executive branch downtown did not feel that this was important.

The large sum to which the Senator referred is there, it is true, but when you consider the number of scholarships, the NDEA program, the EOG program, the loan program—which is practically dried up because of the interest rate, though I and some other Senators have introduced a bill to try to free it—as far as providing resources for the young people who want to go ahead and get an education, this whole program has become really regressive, and it deeply concerns me. I am a bit despondent about it all. I am sure I shall feel better tomorrow, but not enough to lose my determination to hope we can do better.

What better investment is there than to give these young people the resources they need to expand their knowledge, intellects, and skills, so that they can help solve some of these problems the rest of us have not yet been able to solve?

I thank the Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank the Senator from Indiana for his helpful comments.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.

Mr. MONDALE. I share with the distinguished Senator from Indiana his appreciation of the task which the Senator from West Virginia has before him, in seeking to satisfy not only the Members of the Senate, but the conference committee as well, on a difficult supplemental appropriation bill such as this, involving, as I understand it, nearly \$4.3 billion.

I deeply regret, however, that this second supplemental appropriations bill did not include any of the \$16 million supplemental appropriation for the educational opportunity grant program which the original Senate version of the supplemental bill included.

This \$16 million supplemental for the EOG program, which the Appropriations Committee added to the Senate version of the bill, would have restored the money which last fall's conference committee on the Labor-Health, Education,

and Welfare appropriation cut from the original Senate appropriation for this program. It would have made 32,000 additional grants available for initial year EOG students, and prevented a severe reduction in the size of this program from occurring this fall. It would have kept faith both with our institutions of higher learning and with our disadvantaged students.

This is the second time, as I understand it, that the Senate has sought to include this \$16 million figure for the purpose of maintaining the level of initial year educational opportunity grants, and the second time it has been dropped by conference committees.

The net effect is that serious cutback in the initial year EOG grants that will be available. We funded educational opportunity grants for 123,000 initial year students in the first year of this program, the school year 1966-67; for 133,000 initial year students in the school year 1967-68; and for 140,000 initial-year students in 1968-69; but, because we failed to include this \$16 million, the figure this year will drop to 100,000 new students. Percentage-wise, it is a substantial and severe cut. It involves denying the possibility of higher education to as many as 40,000 able young men and women in this country—young men and women who have the ability to go on to college, but, because of the financial gap which exists between them and the rising costs of a higher education, will be prevented from doing so.

Many of these young men and women have been approached through such Federal programs as Talent Search or Upward Bound. Many of them have been approached by the colleges and universities, have been identified as able young men and women, and have been encouraged to believe that they could afford to go to college through a combination of loans, grants, and work-study. The educational opportunities grants are essential; they are the foundation on which loans and work-study programs are built.

Several Senators wrote the full committee urging the inclusion of this \$16 million, which was included by the committee in the Senate version of the bill. The Senate Appropriations Committee decision to restore this \$16 million was applauded in floor statements by the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), the Senator from New York (Mr. GOODELL), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART), the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON), the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), and myself. And many other Senators, as the Senator from West Virginia knows, are most interested in it.

The reason for this interest and support is that very few programs have worked as successfully as the EOG. Very few programs have elicited the strong support of American educational institutions that this program has.

I do not have to remind the Senator from West Virginia that the cost of education is rising almost twice as fast as

the cost of living. It is now literally out of range for an estimated 700,000 able young men and women, who cannot afford to go on to college today because of the rising cost of education. Within 3 years, there will be 1,250,000 able young men and women who cannot afford to go on to college because of the rising cost of education.

This would have been the time, in my opinion, to substantially increase the educational opportunities grants program, so that we could take in an ever larger share of these able young men and women, and give them a chance to go on through college and contribute more effectively, not only to their own lives, but to the lives of their relatives, their neighborhoods, their States, and this Nation. Surely the experience we had with the GI bills ought to persuade us that this is not only right for these young men and women, but it is a good investment for the Nation.

The World War II GI bill of rights law has already repaid the Federal Government, and we have years and years to go with it. The Government is making a nice profit from the World War II bill of rights as well as from the other educational programs. That is why I find the loss of this \$16 million particularly grievous. I do not know how we can explain to these young men and women the kind of priorities we have.

I appreciate the fact that the Senator sought to include this additional funding. But we have before us a supplemental budget involving additional appropriations of \$4.3 billion, of which, I understand, about one-half is defense-related. We wanted to include \$16 million merely to maintain an existing program at a level nearly as great as it has been in the last 3 years. That may not mean much to us in the Senate, but it will profoundly affect the lives of 32,000 gifted young men and women.

I would hope that somehow we could develop a strategy to cause the House to understand the nature of this problem, and to do a far better job of enlisting their support, in some way, than we have thus far.

I am not being at all critical of the conferees, because I appreciate their difficulties, which we have already discussed.

Perhaps this problem was best expressed in the words of the president of the University of Minnesota, Malcolm Moos, who said:

Such federal cutbacks jeopardize not only our work with low income students presently at the university, but also our future recruitment programs. In addition, these cutbacks create hardships for the student group least able to cope with them, and may well increase campus tensions as institutions are unable to assist our economically deprived.

As the Senator from West Virginia understands, this issue will arise again in the regular budget-making process before the appropriate subcommittee. I wish it to be known that I shall do all I can to make the realities of this program, the compelling need for this program, the basic commonsense and justice underlying it, known in the Senate and known before the appropriate com-

mittee, because I feel there are few things that Congress can do now that will go further, that will help more, that constitute a better investment, than the educational opportunity grant program.

Reductions in educational investments are simply false economies. I believe that the conference committee decision not to include any supplemental for the educational opportunity grant program was a serious mistake, just as I believe the administration's proposed budget reductions in education programs for fiscal year 1970 are serious mistakes. I am disappointed that this effort to keep the educational opportunity grant program operating at a steady level has been unsuccessful, and I pledge my support for efforts to assure that important programs of Federal aid to education—from preschool education to elementary and secondary, higher education and adult education—are funded at a fuller and more adequate level in fiscal year 1970.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank the Senator from Minnesota. I am only sorry that I do not possess the eloquence of the Senator from Minnesota and the Senator from Indiana; otherwise, we might have prevailed in conference.

Mr. MONDALE. I thank the Senator from West Virginia. We were hoping that the Senator would prevail because of his greater eloquence.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, first I join with the views of my colleagues on the Education Subcommittee and express also my desire to work with them.

I shall certainly do my utmost to have adequate funds inserted for the educational opportunity grants in the regular HEW bill and fight for them all of the way.

I would, however, at this moment like to thank the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD)—I have been waiting for some time to do this—and I should also like to thank the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT), who has apparently left the Chamber momentarily, for following through as they did with respect to the matter of summer employment.

I think they did well to get \$7.5 million out of \$10 million. We should have had a very much larger allocation, but all we could get in the Senate was \$10 million. So, to come back from the conference with the House with 75 percent in a case in which they had nothing is a very fine achievement. I have been in those conferences and have fought very hard in them.

More than that, it gives me great gratification that an act of the Senate after debate and consideration is not just tossed off lightly.

The Senator from West Virginia told me that he had contended for this measure in conference as if it were his own. And he obviously did, or it would not have come out this way.

I do not think there is any finer tribute that a Senator can pay another Senator than to say to him: "You did what you would have done for your own amendment if it had carried in the Senate, and you did this on a matter on which you had some doubts. You took the amendment and said you would follow through on it, and you did."

Not only am I grateful—because that is not very important—but I also think the Senate will find itself with an extremely helpful, though small amount of money. It will be very critical at a time when I think it will be demonstrated that every drop of this kind of rain will fall on very barren soil.

I thank my colleague for everything he did, and especially for sticking so closely, so precisely, to what he told the Senate and what he told me he would do in respect to the matter.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, it should be said that but for the efforts of the Senator from New York, I do not think we would have the \$7.5 million in the bill. It was not my intention originally to insert it. However, as a result of his unflinching diligence and work, I offered the substitute amendment which carried in the amount of \$10 million. The Senator is precisely correct in saying that, having done that, I fought for it hard in conference.

As a matter of fact, I think I felt a greater responsibility to contend for that amendment in conference than I would have felt had it been my own legislative brainchild, so to speak, from the beginning.

So the Senator, I think, can feel very good about it all. I have no hesitancy in saying frankly and candidly, as I have here, that whatever credit there may be due anent this item, the Senator from New York can really feel proud, because it is mostly due him. I support the Neighborhood Youth Corps type programs, but it was he who generated the climate and pressed the fight to include the funds.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, that is very kind of the Senator, but I still maintain what I have said. The Senator did it as if it were his own, and this is a very, very fine thing.

Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.

Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, initially, I commend the Senator from West Virginia and his fellow colleagues for their diligence and their relative success in the conference from which they have emerged.

There is an item, however, on which I think the conferees have been short-sighted.

For the benefit of the RECORD, I should like to ask the Senator from West Virginia a question or two about that item.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Certainly.

Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, pursuant to the land-grant authorization for Federal City College and Washington Technical Institute, the House appropriated \$7.24 million which the Senate did not see fit to leave in the bill after it came here. Am I correct?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. The Senator is correct.

Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, this money was programmed to be used in part by Federal City College for a land-grant extension program and on the part of Washington Technical Institute for a vocational program and environmental science program. These programs could not be expanded otherwise.

The Senate agreed to an amendment on the floor which would have appropriated in lieu of a \$7 million-plus endowment \$360,000 which would have enabled these two institutions to go forward with these programs. Am I correct?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. The Senate did agree to a proposal, at the behest of the distinguished junior Senator from Virginia, to add the \$360,000.

Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, it is my understanding that in the conference the House felt it would not settle for anything other than the \$7.24 million endowment on its part. Am I correct?

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. The House expressed the viewpoint that if the Senate position prevailed, and the \$360,000 were allowed, the door would thereby be opened for continuing requests for a new and permanent program in subsequent years which requests, in the view of the House, would become larger each year than the amount which was originally inserted at the request of the Senator from Virginia.

The House was adamant in opposing the position of the Senate. The Senate conferees, I suppose largely at my suggestion, were firm in opposing the \$7.24 million inserted by the House.

It was my feeling that, in view of the fact that the item had come to the subcommittee in the form of a supplemental request and that the hearings themselves did not produce sufficient testimony on which to support the \$7 million figure, the budget request should come up again and go through the normal channels and go before the regular appropriations subcommittees in the two Houses handling the particular item, so that they might exercise their considered judgment thereon after eliciting whatever testimony they might be able to secure in justification thereof.

The result was that the House yielded insofar as the Senate position was concerned anent the \$7.2 million, and the Senate was forced to yield in connection with the smaller amount. The slate was wiped clean, and no money was included.

Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, implicit in what the Senator has said is that the House position was in substance that if any appropriation was to be made, they wanted it to be made for the endowment of \$7.24 million.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. The Senator is again correct.

Mr. SPONG. I think the RECORD should show that until the endowment is appropriated, and as a result of the lack of action by the conference, these two institutions for the time being will not be able to expand programs in nutrition, child care, consumer education, and other aspects of family living in the District of Columbia, as well as environmental science programs and mechanical arts programs of which I already have spoken.

I think the expansion of these programs, particularly in the District of Columbia, are vital at this time. I was glad to hear the Senator from West Virginia say that he felt that in the regular proceedings to take place before the proper Appropriations Committees, the entire \$7.24 million will again be considered.

But I feel that these programs should be expanded in the District. I think they are needed. I think we are shortsighted when we appropriate money for food stamps and food programs, without recognizing that nutrition education, and these other extension programs are necessary. I hope that Congress will see fit to provide for the full endowment in the 1970 budget.

I thank the Senator from West Virginia for reviewing this matter with me.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I wish to make one slight correction, not necessarily in the Senator's remarks, but perhaps in my own.

If I said that the item "will be considered" in the 1970 budget, I do not think that is a precise statement. I am not sure that it was included in fiscal year 1970 budget estimates that were sent to Congress by the President. I am just not knowledgeable in that regard. But if an estimate has not yet been sent up, the Senator can, of course, ask the President to send up such a request. If the President does not accede to that request, and if there is no budget estimate before the Congress for this item, the Senator can approach the Appropriations Committee in the Senate and ask that it insert the money.

May I say that I hold no particular prejudice against this item, and it will not come before my subcommittee, if it does come up in the regular 1970 request. I have no prejudice against this item, per se. I did not feel that it had been justified in the hearings. Perhaps that was partly my own fault; perhaps I should have asked for additional testimony on it.

Nevertheless, I have no doubt that the able Senator from Virginia (Mr. SPONG) will continue in his efforts until he succeeds. I am sure he will do everything he possibly can, and I commend him on his unflagging devotion to this cause.

Mr. SPONG. I say to the Senator from West Virginia that upon reviewing the record of the testimony before the Senate subcommittee, I can only agree with him that there was a lack of proper information upon which the Senate should act. But the fact remains that this money in lieu of land has been authorized by virtue of the status of this college. These programs have been authorized and planned, but as a result of this, they cannot go forward, and they are all badly needed. Whether through the endowment of otherwise, I shall continue wherever I can to see that something is done about it.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I know the Senator will do that. I know he is disappointed at the action of the conferees, but I am confident that if this item can be justified, the Senator from Virginia will see that it is so justified.

Mr. SPONG. I thank the Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. If it should happen not to go before the regular subcommittees as a result of a budget estimate submitted, and if it should come again before this subcommittee during the fall, I can assure the Senator that there will be ample testimony taken on it; and the Senator from Virginia will

be given an opportunity to appear before my subcommittee and present the facts which he has been able to develop, and which reveal so much resourcefulness and effort on his part.

I commend him. He has temporarily lost a battle. But if I know my man, I think he will win the final and decisive battle when the time comes.

Mr. SPONG. I thank the Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I urge that the conference report be agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the conference report.

The report was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendments in disagreement.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 6 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment, insert: "\$500,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 7 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment, insert: "\$1,500,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 8 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment, insert: "\$2,000,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 40 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment, insert: "\$7,500,000".

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 42 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the matter stricken and proposed by said amendment, insert the following: "\$3,920,000, to remain available until expended for annual interest grants authorized by section 306 of the Higher Education Facilities Act, as amended (Public Law 90-575, approved October 16, 1968): *Provided*, That, in addition, \$160,000 shall be derived by transfer from 'Community mental health resource support,' Public Health Service, fiscal year 1969: *Provided further*, That none of the funds appropriated by this Act for annual interest grants authorized by section 306 of the Higher Education Facilities Act, as amended by Public Law 90-575, shall be used to formulate or carry out any grant to any institution of higher education unless such institution is in full compliance with section 504 of such Act.

Resolved, That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 90 to the aforesaid bill, and concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

"Sec. 401 (a) Expenditures and net lending (budget outlays) of the Federal Government during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, shall not exceed \$191,900,000,000: *Provided*, That whenever action, or inaction, by the Congress on requests for appropriations and other budgetary proposals varies from the President's recommendations reflected in the 'Review of the 1970 Budget' appearing on pages 9351-9354 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

of April 16, 1969, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall report to the President and to the Congress his estimate of the effect of such action or inaction on expenditures and net lending (budget outlays), and the limitation set forth herein shall be correspondingly adjusted: *Provided further*, That the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall report to the President and to the Congress his estimate of the effect on expenditures and net lending (budget outlays) of other actions by the Congress (whether initiated by the President or the Congress) and the limitation set forth herein shall be correspondingly adjusted: *Provided further*, That net congressional actions or inactions affecting expenditures and net lending reflected in the 'Review of the 1970 Budget' shall not serve to reduce the foregoing limitation of \$191,900,000,000 unless and until such actions or inactions result in a net reduction of \$1,000,000,000 below total expenditures and net lending estimated for 1970 in the 'Review of the 1970 Budget'.

"(b)(1) In the event the President shall estimate and determine that expenditures and net lending (budget outlays) during the fiscal year 1970 for the following items (the expenditures for which arise under appropriations or other authority not requiring annual action by the Congress) appearing on page 16 of the budget for such fiscal year (H. Doc. 91-15, part 1, Ninety-first Congress), namely:

"(1) Items designated 'Social security, Med-

icare, and other social insurance trust funds';

"(ii) the appropriation 'National service life insurance (trust fund)' included in the items designated 'Veterans pensions, compensation, and insurance';

"(iii) the item 'Interest'; and

"(iv) the item 'Farm price supports (Commodity Credit Corporation)'

will exceed the estimates included for such items in the 'Review of the 1970 budget', referred to in subsection (a) hereof, the President may, after notification in writing to the Congress stating his reasons therefor, adjust accordingly the amount of the overall limitation provided in subsection (a).

"(2) In the event the President shall estimate and determine that receipts (credited against expenditures and net lending) during the fiscal year 1970 derived from:

"(1) sales of financial assets of programs administered by the Farmers Home Administration, Export-Import Bank, agencies of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Veterans' Administration, and the Small Business Administration; and

"(ii) leases of lands on the Outer Continental Shelf will be less than the estimates included for such items in the 'Review of the 1970 Budget' referred to in subsection (a) hereof, the President may, after notification in writing to the Congress stating his reasons therefor, adjust accordingly the amount of the overall limitation provided in subsection (a).

"(3) The aggregate amount of the adjustments made pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection shall not exceed \$2,000,000,000.

"(c) The Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall report periodically to the President and to the Congress on the operation of this section. The first such report shall be made at the end of the first month which begins after the date of approval of this Act; subsequent reports shall be made at the end of each calendar month during the first session of the Ninety-first Congress, and at the end of each calendar quarter thereafter."

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendments of the House to the amendments of the Senate numbered 6, 7, 8, 40, 42, and 90.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from West Virginia.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD a tabulation which reflects the budget estimates, the House and Senate allowances, and the conference action on the amounts in the bill.

There being no objection, the tabulation was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL, 1969 (H.R. 11400)

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY ESTIMATES AND AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED IN THE BILL

TITLE I—MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

H. Doc. No.	Department or activity	Budget estimate	Version of bill		
			House	Senate	Conference
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—MILITARY					
MILITARY PERSONNEL					
91-94	Military personnel, Army	\$136,200,000	\$110,000,000	\$110,000,000	\$110,000,000
91-94	Military personnel, Navy	21,500,000	14,500,000	21,500,000	21,500,000
91-94	Military personnel, Air Force	146,000,000	115,000,000	146,000,000	146,000,000
	Total, military personnel	303,700,000	239,500,000	277,500,000	277,500,000
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE					
91-94	Operation and maintenance, Army	144,600,000	96,310,000	96,310,000	96,310,000
91-50	Operation and maintenance, Marine Corps	24,300,000	15,390,000	15,390,000	15,390,000
	By transfer			(8,910,000)	
91-94	Operation and maintenance, Air Force	307,300,000	242,700,000	242,700,000	242,700,000
	Total, operation and maintenance	476,200,000	354,400,000	354,400,000	354,400,000
	By transfer			(8,910,000)	
PROCUREMENT					
91-94	Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army	717,000,000	640,100,000	640,100,000	640,100,000
	Total, title I, military operations in Southeast Asia, Department of Defense, military	1,496,900,000	1,234,000,000	1,272,000,000	1,272,000,000
	By transfer			(8,910,000)	

TITLE II

CHAPTER I

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERVICE

91-94 Salaries and expenses \$1,400,000 \$1,400,000 \$1,400,000 \$1,400,000

EXTENSION SERVICE

91-94 Cooperative extension work, payments and expenses 218,000 218,000 218,000 218,000

SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE

S. Doc. 91-18 Flood prevention 4,000,000 4,000,000 4,000,000 4,000,000

AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION AND CONSERVATION SERVICE

91-50 Sugar Act program 7,500,000 7,500,000 7,500,000 7,500,000

FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION

Emergency credit revolving fund (Language) (Language) (Language)

Total, chapter I: New budget (obligational) authority 13,118,000 9,118,000 13,118,000 13,118,000

Footnotes at end of table.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL, 1969 (H.R. 11400)—Continued

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY ESTIMATES AND AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED IN THE BILL—Continued

TITLE II—continued

H. Doc. No.	Department or activity	Budget estimate	Version of bill		Conference
			House	Senate	
CHAPTER II					
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—MILITARY					
MILITARY PERSONNEL					
91-50	Reserve personnel, Navy	\$8,500,000	\$4,150,000	\$4,150,000	\$4,150,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority	(3,500,000)	(3,150,000)	(3,150,000)	(3,150,000)
91-94	Reserve personnel, Marine Corps	6,800,000	4,500,000	6,400,000	5,450,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority	(1,600,000)	(800,000)	(1,600,000)	(1,200,000)
91-50	Retired pay, Defense	175,000,000	175,000,000	175,000,000	175,000,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority	(15,000,000)	(15,000,000)	(15,000,000)	(15,000,000)
	Total, military personnel	190,300,000	183,650,000	185,550,000	184,600,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority	(18,100,000)	(16,950,000)	(17,750,000)	(17,350,000)
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE					
91-50	Operation and maintenance, Navy	126,100,000	20,000,000	20,000,000	20,000,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority	(26,100,000)	(20,000,000)	(20,000,000)	(20,000,000)
91-50	Operation and maintenance, Marine Corps	4,600,000	3,600,000	3,600,000	3,600,000
	By transfer			(1,000,000)	(500,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority	(4,600,000)	(3,600,000)	(3,600,000)	(3,600,000)
	By transfer			(1,000,000)	(500,000)
91-50	Operation and maintenance, Army National Guard	13,000,000	10,000,000	10,000,000	10,000,000
	By transfer			(3,000,000)	(1,500,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority	(7,600,000)	(6,000,000)	(6,000,000)	(6,000,000)
	By transfer			(1,600,000)	(800,000)
91-50	Operation and maintenance, Air National Guard	15,682,000	8,800,000	8,800,000	8,800,000
	By transfer			(5,377,000)	(2,000,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above) budget authority	(6,682,000)	(5,200,000)	(5,200,000)	(5,200,000)
	Total, operation and maintenance	59,382,000	42,400,000	42,400,000	42,400,000
	By transfer			(9,377,000)	(4,000,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority	(44,982,000)	(34,800,000)	(34,800,000)	(34,800,000)
	By transfer			(2,600,000)	(1,300,000)
	Total, chapter II:				
	New budget (obligational) authority	249,682,000	226,050,000	227,950,000	227,000,000
	By transfer			(9,377,000)	(4,000,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority	(63,082,000)	(51,760,000)	(52,550,000)	(52,150,000)
	By transfer			(2,600,000)	(1,300,000)
CHAPTER III					
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA					
FEDERAL FUNDS					
91-50	Federal payment to the District of Columbia	11,000,000	10,365,000	10,365,000	10,365,000
91-50	Loans to the District of Columbia for capital outlay	18,736,000	Not considered	18,736,000	
	Total, Federal funds	29,736,000	10,365,000	29,101,000	10,365,000
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FUNDS					
91-50	General operating expenses	1,070,000	975,000	975,000	975,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority	(940,000)	(845,000)	(845,000)	(845,000)
91-99	Public safety	10,457,000	10,034,000	10,034,000	10,034,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority	(8,098,000)	(8,098,000)	(8,098,000)	(8,098,000)
91-50	Education	13,931,000	13,931,000	13,931,000	13,931,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority	(13,085,000)	(13,085,000)	(13,085,000)	(13,085,000)
91-99	Health and welfare	111,000	111,000	111,000	111,000
	Increased pay costs (reallocations) (included above)—budget authority	(111,000)	(111,000)	(111,000)	(111,000)
91-99	Sanitary engineering	252,000	252,000	252,000	252,000
	Increased pay costs (reclassifications) (included above)—budget authority	(252,000)	(252,000)	(252,000)	(252,000)
91-99	Settlement of claims and suits	60,000	60,000	60,000	60,000
91-50	Capital outlay	18,736,000	Not considered	18,736,000	
	Total, District of Columbia funds	44,607,000	25,553,000	44,089,000	25,553,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority ³	(22,486,000)	(22,391,000)	(22,391,000)	(22,391,000)
	Total, chapter III, new budget (obligational) authority	29,736,000	10,365,000	29,101,000	10,365,000
CHAPTER IV					
FOREIGN OPERATIONS					
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE					
SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICE					
91-50	Assistance to refugees in the United States (Cuban refugee program.)	2,853,000	2,700,000		
	By transfer			(2,700,000)	(2,700,000)
	By transfer—increased pay costs	(38,000)	(35,000)	(35,000)	(35,000)
FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT					
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS					
S. Doc. 91-19	Subscription to the International Development Association	160,000,000		160,000,000	160,000,000
	Total, chapter IV:				
	New budget (obligational) authority	162,853,000	2,700,000	160,000,000	160,000,000
	By transfer	(38,000)	(35,000)	(2,735,000)	(2,735,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	By transfer	(38,000)	(35,000)	(35,000)	(35,000)

Footnotes at end of table.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL, 1969 (H.R. 11400)—Continued
 COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY ESTIMATES AND AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED IN THE BILL—Continued
 TITLE II—continued

H. Doc. No.	Department or activity	Budget estimate	Version of bill		Conference
			House	Senate	
CHAPTER V					
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT					
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS					
91-94	Salaries and expenses, telecommunications	\$777,000	\$500,000	\$777,000	\$500,000
FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT					
DISASTER RELIEF					
91-94	Disaster relief	35,000,000	35,000,000	35,000,000	35,000,000
INDEPENDENT OFFICES					
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION					
91-94	Salaries and expenses	650,000	600,000	600,000	600,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves	(81,000)	(81,000)	(81,000)	(81,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority	(500,000)	(500,000)	(500,000)	(500,000)
	Release of reserves	(21,000)	(21,000)	(21,000)	(21,000)
	Total	(521,000)	(521,000)	(521,000)	(521,000)
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION					
91-50	Salaries and expenses		^a Language	Language	
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM					
91-50	Salaries and expenses	3,139,000	2,573,000	3,139,000	2,850,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority	(2,139,000)	(2,139,000)	(2,139,000)	(2,850,000)
VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION					
91-50 and S. Doc. 91-18	Compensation and pensions	276,600,000	179,000,000	276,600,000	296,600,000
91-50 and S. Doc. 91-18	Readjustment benefits	89,200,000	14,200,000	89,200,000	89,200,000
91-50 and S. Doc. 91-18	Medical care	53,800,000	46,189,000	53,800,000	53,800,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves	(15,167,000)	(15,167,000)	(15,167,000)	(15,167,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority	(39,006,000)	(31,325,000)	(39,006,000)	(39,006,000)
	Release of reserves	(15,167,000)	(15,167,000)	(15,167,000)	(15,167,000)
	Total	(54,173,000)	(46,562,000)	(54,173,000)	(54,173,000)
91-50	General operating expenses	12,500,000	12,000,000	12,000,000	12,000,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority	(7,900,000)	(7,900,000)	(7,900,000)	(7,900,000)
	Total, Veterans' Administration	432,100,000	251,389,000	431,600,000	431,600,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves	(15,167,000)	(15,167,000)	(15,167,000)	(15,167,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority	(46,906,000)	(39,226,000)	(46,906,000)	(46,906,000)
	Release of reserves	(15,167,000)	(15,167,000)	(15,167,000)	(15,167,000)
	Total	(62,073,000)	(54,462,000)	(62,073,000)	(62,073,000)
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT					
MORTGAGE CREDIT					
91-50	Homeownership and rental housing assistance (annual contract authorizations, increase in limitations):				
	Homeownership assistance	(50,000,000)	(40,000,000)	(50,000,000)	(45,000,000)
	Rental housing assistance	(50,000,000)	(40,000,000)	(50,000,000)	(45,000,000)
RENEWAL AND HOUSING ASSISTANCE					
91-50	College housing (annual contract authorization, increase in limitation)	(4,500,000)	(2,500,000)	(2,500,000)	(2,500,000)
91-50	Low-rent public housing annual contributions:				
	1968	7,168,000	7,168,000	7,168,000	7,168,000
	1969	16,000,000	16,000,000	16,000,000	16,000,000
	Total, renewal and housing assistance	23,168,000	23,168,000	23,168,000	23,168,000
DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT					
91-50	Payment of participation sales insufficiencies	4,836,000			
91-50	Fair housing program	2,000,000		1,000,000	
	Total, departmental management	6,836,000		1,000,000	
	Total Department of Housing and Urban Development:				
	1968	7,168,000	7,168,000	7,168,000	7,168,000
	1969	22,836,000	16,000,000	17,000,000	16,000,000
	Total	30,004,000	23,168,000	24,168,000	23,168,000
	New annual contract authorizations, increase in limitations	(104,500,000)	(82,500,000)	(102,500,000)	(90,000,000)
Total, chapter V:					
New budget (obligational) authority:					
	1968	7,168,000	7,168,000	7,168,000	7,168,000
	1969	494,502,000	306,062,000	488,116,000	486,550,000
	Total	501,670,000	313,230,000	495,284,000	493,718,000
	New annual contract authorizations, increase in limitations	(104,500,000)	(82,500,000)	(102,500,000)	(92,500,000)
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves	(16,248,000)	(16,248,000)	(16,248,000)	(16,248,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority	(49,545,000)	(41,934,000)	(49,545,000)	(49,545,000)
	Release of reserves	(16,188,000)	(16,188,000)	(16,188,000)	(16,188,000)
	Total	(64,733,000)	(57,122,000)	(64,733,000)	(64,733,000)

Footnotes at end of table.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL, 1969 (H.R. 11400)—Continued
 COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY ESTIMATES AND AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED IN THE BILL—Continued
 TITLE II—continued

H. Doc. No.	Department or activity	Budget estimate	Version of bill		
			House	Senate	Conference
CHAPTER VI					
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR					
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT					
91-94	Management of land and resources.....	\$10,410,000	\$10,410,000	\$10,410,000	\$10,410,000
	By transfer.....	(1,628,000)	(1,628,000)	(1,628,000)	(1,628,000)
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(275,000)	(275,000)	(275,000)	(275,000)
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves (and transfer hereto).....	(175,000)	(175,000)	(175,000)	(175,000)
	By transfer.....	(1,178,000)	(1,178,000)	(1,178,000)	(1,178,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(450,000)	(450,000)	(450,000)	(450,000)
	Total.....	(1,628,000)	(1,628,000)	(1,628,000)	(1,628,000)
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS					
S. Doc. 91-18	Education and welfare services.....	2,781,000		2,781,000	2,781,000
91-94	Resources management.....	2,769,000	2,769,000	2,700,000	2,700,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(426,000)	(426,000)	(426,000)	(426,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority.....	(1,619,000)	(1,619,000)	(1,619,000)	(1,619,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(426,000)	(426,000)	(426,000)	(426,000)
	Total.....	(2,045,000)	(2,045,000)	(2,045,000)	(2,045,000)
BUREAU OF OUTDOOR RECREATION					
91-94	Land and water conservation:				
	Repayable advance to the Land and Water Conservation Fund.....	(19,000,000)	(19,000,000)		
	Liquidation of obligations out of the Land and Water Conservation Fund.....	(19,000,000)	(19,000,000)	(19,000,000)	(19,000,000)
OFFICE OF TERRITORIES					
S. Doc. 91-18	Administration of territories.....	950,000		950,000	950,000
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY					
1-94 and S. Doc. 91-18	Surveys, investigations, and research.....	2,242,000	2,092,000	2,242,000	2,242,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority.....	(1,792,000)	(1,792,000)	(1,792,000)	(1,792,000)
BUREAU OF MINES					
91-18	Health and safety.....	750,000		750,000	750,000
91-50	Helium fund (borrowing authorization).....	10,000,000	5,000,000	10,000,000	10,000,000
OFFICE OF OIL AND GAS					
91-50	Salaries and expenses.....	123,000	48,000	48,000	48,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority.....	(48,000)	(48,000)	(48,000)	(48,000)
BUREAU OF COMMERCIAL FISHERIES					
91-50	Payment to Fishermen's Protective Fund.....	60,000	60,000	60,000	60,000
BUREAU OF SPORT FISHERIES AND WILDLIFE					
91-94	Management and investigations of resources.....	1,353,000	1,353,000	1,353,000	1,353,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(139,000)	(139,000)	(139,000)	(139,000)
91-94	Construction.....	400,000	200,000	400,000	400,000
	Total, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife.....	1,753,000	1,553,000	1,753,000	1,753,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(139,000)	(139,000)	(139,000)	(139,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority.....	(1,103,000)	(1,103,000)	(1,103,000)	(1,103,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(139,000)	(139,000)	(139,000)	(139,000)
	Total.....	(1,242,000)	(1,242,000)	(1,242,000)	(1,242,000)
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE					
91-94	Management and protection.....	2,479,000	2,479,000	2,366,000	2,366,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(195,000)	(195,000)	(195,000)	(195,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority.....	(1,679,000)	(1,679,000)	(1,679,000)	(1,679,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(195,000)	(195,000)	(195,000)	(195,000)
	Total.....	(1,874,000)	(1,874,000)	(1,874,000)	(1,874,000)
91-50 and S. Doc. 91-18	Construction.....	1,103,000	100,000	1,103,000	1,103,000
	Total, National Park Service.....	3,582,000	2,579,000	3,469,000	3,469,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(195,000)	(195,000)	(195,000)	(195,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority.....	(1,679,000)	(1,679,000)	(1,679,000)	(1,679,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(195,000)	(195,000)	(195,000)	(195,000)
	Total.....	(1,874,000)	(1,874,000)	(1,874,000)	(1,874,000)
	Total, Department of the Interior.....	35,420,000	24,511,000	35,163,000	36,153,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(1,210,000)	(1,210,000)	(1,210,000)	(1,210,000)
	By transfer.....	(1,628,000)	(1,628,000)	(1,628,000)	(1,628,000)
	Liquidation cash.....	(19,000,000)	(19,000,000)	(19,000,000)	(19,000,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority.....	(6,241,000)	(6,241,000)	(6,241,000)	(6,241,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(1,210,000)	(1,210,000)	(1,210,000)	(1,210,000)
	By transfer.....	(1,178,000)	(1,178,000)	(1,178,000)	(1,178,000)
	Total.....	(8,629,000)	(8,629,000)	(8,629,000)	(8,629,000)

Footnotes at end of table.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL, 1969 (H.R. 11400)—Continued

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY ESTIMATES AND AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED IN THE BILL—Continued

TITLE II—continued

H. Doc. No.	Department or activity	Budget estimate	Version of bill		
			House	Senate	Conference
CHAPTER VI—Continued					
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE					
FOREST SERVICE					
91-94	Forest protection and utilization:				
	Forest land management	\$25,028,000	\$25,028,000	\$24,374,000	\$24,374,000
	Forest research	1,564,000	1,564,000	1,564,000	1,564,000
	State and private forestry cooperation	124,000	124,000	124,000	124,000
	Release Public Law 90-364 reserves	(1,676,000)	(1,676,000)	(1,676,000)	(1,676,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority	(6,832,000)	(6,832,000)	(6,832,000)	(6,832,000)
	Total, Department of Agriculture, Forest Service	26,718,000	26,718,000	26,062,000	26,062,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves	(1,676,000)	(1,676,000)	(1,676,000)	(1,676,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority	(6,832,000)	(6,832,000)	(6,832,000)	(6,832,000)
NATIONAL FOUNDATION OF THE ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES					
91-50	Salaries and expenses	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000	3,000,000
	Total, chapter VI:				
	New budget (obligational) authority	65,136,000	54,227,000	64,225,000	64,225,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves	(2,886,000)	(2,886,000)	(2,886,000)	(2,886,000)
	By transfer	(1,628,000)	(1,628,000)	(1,628,000)	(1,628,000)
	Liquidation cash	(19,000,000)	(19,000,000)	(19,000,000)	(19,000,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority	(13,173,000)	(13,173,000)	(13,173,000)	(13,173,000)
	Release of reserves	(1,210,000)	(1,210,000)	(1,210,000)	(1,210,000)
	By transfer	(1,173,000)	(1,173,000)	(1,173,000)	(1,173,000)
	Total	(15,561,000)	(15,561,000)	(15,561,000)	(15,561,000)
CHAPTER VII					
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR					
BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY					
91-94	Unemployment compensation for Federal employees and ex-servicemen	20,000,000	20,000,000	20,000,000	20,000,000
MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION					
	Manpower Development and Training Activities			10,000,000	7,500,000
WAGE AND LABOR STANDARDS					
BUREAU OF EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION					
91-94	Employees' compensation claims and expenses	15,900,000	15,900,000	15,900,000	15,900,000
	Total, Department of Labor	35,900,000	35,900,000	45,900,000	43,400,000
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE					
OFFICE OF EDUCATION					
91-50	Higher educational activities	11,161,000	11,161,000	20,280,000	3,920,000
	By transfer	(160,000)	(160,000)	(160,000)	(160,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above)—by transfer	(160,000)	(160,000)	(160,000)	(160,000)
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE					
OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL					
91-50	Comprehensive health planning and services:				
	By transfer	(9,186,000)	(9,186,000)	(9,186,000)	(9,156,000)
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves	(292,000)	(292,000)	(292,000)	(292,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above)—release of reserves	(128,000)	(128,000)	(128,000)	(128,000)
91-15	District of Columbia Medical Facilities	15,000,000	15,000,000		15,000,000
SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICE					
91-50	Grants to States for public assistance	651,546,000	651,546,000	651,546,000	251,546,000
91-50	Assistance for repatriated United States Nationals	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION					
S. Doc. 19-18	Salaries and expenses (increase in limitation)	(16,500,000)		(21,200,000)	(21,200,000)
	Total, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare	677,807,000	677,807,000	671,926,000	670,566,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves	(292,000)	(292,000)	(292,000)	(292,000)
	By limitation increase	(16,500,000)		(21,200,000)	(21,200,000)
	By transfer	(9,346,000)	(9,346,000)	(9,346,000)	(9,346,000)
	Increased pay costs:				
	Release of reserves	(128,000)	(128,000)	(128,000)	(128,000)
	By transfer	(160,000)	(160,000)	(160,000)	(160,000)
	Total	(288,000)	(288,000)	(288,000)	(288,000)
	Total, chapter VII:				
	New budget (obligational) authority	713,707,000	713,707,000	717,826,000	713,966,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves	(292,000)	(292,000)	(292,000)	(292,000)
	By transfer	(9,346,000)	(9,346,000)	(9,346,000)	(9,346,000)
	By limitation increase	(16,500,000)		(21,200,000)	(21,200,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Release of reserves	(128,000)	(128,000)	(128,000)	(128,000)
	By transfer	(160,000)	(160,000)	(160,000)	(160,000)
	Total	(288,000)	(288,000)	(288,000)	(288,000)

Footnotes at end of table.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL, 1969 (H.R. 11400)—Continued

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY ESTIMATES AND AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED IN THE BILL—Continued

TITLE II—continued

H. Doc. No.	Department or activity	Budget estimate	Version of bill		Conference
			House	Senate	
CHAPTER VIII					
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH					
SENATE					
	Gratuity to widow of deceased Senator.....			\$30,000	\$30,000
SALARIES, OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES					
	Administrative and clerical assistants to Senators.....		(Language)	(Language)	(Language)
CONTINGENT EXPENSES OF THE SENATE					
91-94.....	Inquiries and investigations, 1968.....	\$126,900		126,900	126,900
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES					
	Gratuity to mother of a deceased Member.....		\$30,000	30,000	30,000
CONTINGENT EXPENSES					
	Miscellaneous items.....		(Language)	(Language)	(Language)
ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL					
	House office buildings.....		(Language)	(Language)	(Language)
	Total, chapter VIII—New budget (obligational) authority:				
	1968.....	126,900		126,900	126,900
	1969.....		30,000	60,000	60,000
CHAPTER IX					
PUBLIC WORKS					
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY					
CORPS OF ENGINEERS—CIVIL					
91-18.....	Flood control and coastal emergencies.....	25,000,000		25,000,000	25,000,000
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION					
91-21.....	Plant and capital equipment.....	45,000,000		45,000,000	45,000,000
	Total, ch. IX—New budget (obligational) authority.....	70,000,000		70,000,000	70,000,000
CHAPTER X					
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE					
LEGAL ACTIVITIES AND GENERAL ADMINISTRATION					
91-98.....	Salaries and expenses, general administration.....	127,000	65,000	65,000	65,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves (and transfer hereto).....	(253,000)	(253,000)	(253,000)	(253,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority.....	(25,000)	(25,000)	(25,000)	(25,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(253,000)	(253,000)	(253,000)	(253,000)
91-98.....	Salaries and expenses, general legal activities.....	1,667,000	1,314,000	1,277,000	1,277,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves (and transfer hereto).....	(100,000)	(100,000)	(100,000)	(100,000)
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(100,000)	(100,000)	(100,000)	(100,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority.....	(878,000)	(878,000)	(878,000)	(878,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(800,000)	(800,000)	(800,000)	(800,000)
91-98.....	Salaries and expenses, Antitrust Division.....	99,000	99,000	99,000	99,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves (and transfer hereto).....	(262,000)	(262,000)	(262,000)	(262,000)
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(90,000)	(90,000)	(90,000)	(90,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority.....	(5,000)	(5,000)	(5,000)	(5,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(562,000)	(562,000)	(562,000)	(562,000)
91-98.....	Salaries and expenses, United States attorneys and marshals.....	2,833,000	2,505,000	2,505,000	2,505,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(150,000)	(150,000)	(150,000)	(150,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority.....	(1,468,000)	(1,468,000)	(1,468,000)	(1,468,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(150,000)	(150,000)	(150,000)	(150,000)
	Total, legal activities and general administration.....	4,726,000	3,983,000	3,946,000	3,946,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(935,000)	(935,000)	(935,000)	(935,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority.....	(2,376,000)	(2,376,000)	(2,376,000)	(2,376,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(935,000)	(935,000)	(935,000)	(935,000)
	Total.....	(2,311,000)	(2,311,000)	(2,311,000)	(2,311,000)
FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM					
91-50.....	Salaries and expenses, Bureau of Prisons.....	2,319,000	2,319,000	2,319,000	2,319,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(250,000)	(250,000)	(250,000)	(250,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority.....	(1,842,000)	(1,842,000)	(1,842,000)	(1,842,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(250,000)	(250,000)	(250,000)	(250,000)
91-98.....	Support of U.S. prisoners.....	2,500,000	2,500,000	2,500,000	2,500,000
	Total, Federal Prison System.....	4,819,000	4,819,000	4,819,000	4,819,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(250,000)	(250,000)	(250,000)	(250,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority.....	(1,842,000)	(1,842,000)	(1,842,000)	(1,842,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(250,000)	(250,000)	(250,000)	(250,000)
	Total.....	(2,092,000)	(2,092,000)	(2,092,000)	(2,092,000)

Footnotes at end of table.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL, 1969 (H.R. 11400)—Continued

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY ESTIMATES AND AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED IN THE BILL—Continued

TITLE II—continued

H. Doc. No.	Department or activity	Budget estimate	Version of bill		Conference
			House	Senate	
CHAPTER X—Continued					
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE—Continued					
BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS					
91-94	Salaries and expenses	\$1,422,000	\$1,187,000	\$1,187,000	\$1,187,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves	(400,000)	(400,000)	(400,000)	(400,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority	(450,000)	(450,000)	(450,000)	(450,000)
	Release of reserves	(400,000)	(400,000)	(400,000)	(400,000)
	Total	(850,000)	(850,000)	(850,000)	(850,000)
	Total, Department of Justice	10,967,000	9,989,000	9,952,000	9,952,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves	(1,585,000)	(1,585,000)	(1,585,000)	(1,585,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority	(4,668,000)	(4,668,000)	(4,668,000)	(4,668,000)
	Release of reserves	(1,585,000)	(1,585,000)	(1,585,000)	(1,585,000)
	Total	(6,253,000)	(6,253,000)	(6,253,000)	(6,253,000)
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE					
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE					
91-94	Operations and administration (release of Public Law 90-364 reserves)	\$(116,000)	\$(116,000)	\$(116,000)	\$(116,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above)—release of reserves	(116,000)	(116,000)	(116,000)	(116,000)
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE SERVICES ADMINISTRATION					
S. Doc. 91-18	Salaries and expenses (language limitation)	(147,000)		(147,000)	(147,000)
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION					
91-50	State marine schools (liquidation of obligations—by transfer)	(210,000)	(210,000)	(210,000)	(210,000)
THE JUDICIARY					
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES					
91-94	Printing and binding Supreme Court reports:				
	1969	27,000	27,000	27,000	27,000
	1968	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000
	Total, Supreme Court of the United States	37,000	37,000	37,000	37,000
CUSTOMS COURT					
91-94	Salaries and expenses	155,850	113,000	113,000	113,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority	(92,900)	(92,900)	(92,900)	(92,900)
COURTS OF APPEALS, DISTRICT COURTS AND OTHER JUDICIAL SERVICES					
91-94	Salaries of judges	2,075,000	1,975,000	1,948,000	1,948,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority	(1,830,000)	(1,830,000)	(1,830,000)	(1,830,000)
91-50	Salaries of supporting personnel	2,865,000	2,412,000	2,412,000	2,412,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority	(2,165,000)	(2,165,000)	(2,165,000)	(2,165,000)
S. Doc. 91-18	Fees and expenses of court-appointed counsel:				
	Fiscal year 1968	850,000		850,000	850,000
	Fiscal year 1969	850,000		850,000	850,000
91-50	Travel and miscellaneous expenses	525,000	400,000	400,000	400,000
91-94	Administrative Office of the United States Courts:				
	141,500	97,500	97,500	97,500	
	By transfer	(10,000)	(10,000)	(10,000)	(10,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority	(87,500)	(87,500)	(87,500)	(87,500)
	By transfer	(10,000)	(10,000)	(10,000)	(10,000)
	Total	(97,500)	(97,500)	(97,500)	(97,500)
	Total, court of appeals, district courts, and other judicial services:				
	Fiscal year 1968	850,000		850,000	850,000
	Fiscal year 1969	6,456,500	4,884,500	5,707,500	5,707,500
	By transfer	(10,000)	(10,000)	(10,000)	(10,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority	(4,082,500)	(4,082,500)	(4,082,500)	(4,082,500)
	By transfer	(10,000)	(10,000)	(10,000)	(10,000)
	Total	(4,092,500)	(4,092,500)	(4,092,500)	(4,092,500)
	Total, the Judiciary:				
	Fiscal year 1968	860,000	10,000	860,000	860,000
	Fiscal year 1969	6,639,350	5,024,500	5,847,500	5,847,500
	Total	7,499,350	5,034,500	6,707,500	6,707,500
	By transfer	(10,000)	(10,000)	(10,000)	(10,000)
	Increased pay costs (included above):				
	Budget authority	(4,175,400)	(4,175,400)	(4,175,400)	(4,175,400)
	By transfer	(10,000)	(10,000)	(10,000)	(10,000)
	Total	(4,185,400)	(4,185,400)	(4,185,400)	(4,185,400)

Footnotes at end of table.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL, 1969 (H.R. 11400)—Continued

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY ESTIMATES AND AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED IN THE BILL—Continued

TITLE II—continued

H. Doc. No.	Department or activity	Budget estimate	Version of bill		Conference
			House	Senate	
CHAPTER X—Continued					
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE—Continued					
CUSTOMS COURT—Continued					
THE JUDICIARY—Continued					
Total, chapter X:					
New budget (obligational) authority:					
	1969	\$17,606,350	\$15,013,500	\$15,799,500	\$15,799,500
	1968	860,000	10,000	860,000	860,000
Total					
	18,466,350	15,023,050	16,659,500	16,659,500	16,659,500
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(1,701,000)	(1,701,000)	(1,701,000)	(1,701,000)
	Limitation increase.....	(147,000)		(147,000)	(147,000)
	By transfer.....	(220,000)	(220,000)	(220,000)	(220,000)
Increased pay costs (included above):					
	Budget authority.....	(8,843,400)	(8,843,400)	(8,843,400)	(8,843,400)
	Release.....	(1,701,000)	(1,701,000)	(1,701,000)	(1,701,000)
	By transfer.....	(10,000)	(10,000)	(10,000)	(10,000)
Total					
	(10,554,400)	(10,554,400)	(10,554,400)	(10,554,400)	(10,554,400)
CHAPTER XI					
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION					
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY					
S. Doc. 91-18	Salaries and expenses.....	4,634,000		2,000,000	
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD					
91-94	Salaries and expenses.....	298,000	298,000	298,000	298,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(28,000)	(28,000)	(28,000)	(28,000)
Increased pay costs (included above):					
	Budget authority.....	(150,000)	(150,000)	(150,000)	(150,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(28,000)	(28,000)	(28,000)	(28,000)
Total					
	(178,000)	(178,000)	(178,000)	(178,000)	(178,000)
COAST GUARD					
91-50	Retired pay.....	2,300,000	2,000,000	2,000,000	2,000,000
Total, chapter XI:					
	New budget (obligational) authority.....	7,232,000	2,298,000	4,298,000	2,298,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(28,000)	(28,000)	(28,000)	(28,000)
Increased pay costs (included above):					
	Budget authority.....	(150,000)	(150,000)	(150,000)	(150,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(28,000)	(28,000)	(28,000)	(28,000)
Total					
	(178,000)	(178,000)	(178,000)	(178,000)	(178,000)
CHAPTER XII					
TREASURY DEPARTMENT					
BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT					
91-50	Administering the public debt.....	1,978,000	1,978,000	1,978,000	1,978,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(334,000)	(334,000)	(334,000)	(334,000)
Increased pay costs (included above):					
	Budget authority.....	(543,000)	(543,000)	(543,000)	(543,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(334,000)	(334,000)	(334,000)	(334,000)
Total					
	(877,000)	(877,000)	(877,000)	(877,000)	(877,000)
SECRET SERVICE					
S. Doc. 91-18	Salaries and expenses.....	470,000		470,000	470,000
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT					
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS					
91-94	Salaries and expenses.....	107,000	107,000	100,000	100,000
	Increased pay costs (included above)—budget authority.....	(42,000)	(42,000)	(42,000)	(42,000)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL					
91-94	Salaries and expenses.....	200,000	200,000	147,000	147,000
Total, Executive Office of the President					
	307,000	307,000	247,000	247,000	247,000
Total, chapter XII:					
	New budget (obligational) authority.....	2,755,000	2,285,000	2,695,000	2,695,000
	Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....	(334,000)	(334,000)	(334,000)	(334,000)
Increased pay costs (included above):					
	Budget authority.....	(585,000)	(585,000)	(585,000)	(585,000)
	Release of reserves.....	(334,000)	(334,000)	(334,000)	(334,000)
Total					
	(919,000)	(919,000)	(919,000)	(919,000)	(919,000)

Footnotes at end of table.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL, 1969 (H. R. 11400)—Continued

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY ESTIMATES AND AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED IN THE BILL—Continued

TITLE II—continued

H. Doc. No.	Department or activity	Budget estimate	Version of bill		
			House	Senate	Conference
CHAPTER XIII					
CLAIMS AND JUDGMENTS					
91-101 and S. Doc. 91-18 and S. Doc. 91-22	Claims and judgments.....	\$18,188,688	\$16,880,812	\$18,188,688	\$18,188,688
Total, title II:					
New budget authority:					
	Fiscal year 1968.....	8,154,900	7,178,000	8,154,900	8,154,900
	Fiscal year 1969.....	1,844,516,038	1,358,736,312	1,811,377,188	1,784,265,188
	Total.....	1,852,670,938	1,365,914,312	1,819,532,088	1,792,420,088
	<i>New annual contract authorizations, increase in limitations.....</i>	<i>(104,500,000)</i>	<i>(82,500,000)</i>	<i>(102,500,000)</i>	<i>(92,500,000)</i>
	<i>Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....</i>	<i>(20,489,000)</i>	<i>(20,489,000)</i>	<i>(20,489,000)</i>	<i>(20,489,000)</i>
	<i>Limitation increases.....</i>	<i>(16,647,000)</i>	<i>(11,547,000)</i>	<i>(21,547,000)</i>	<i>(21,547,000)</i>
	<i>By transfer.....</i>	<i>(11,229,000)</i>	<i>(11,229,000)</i>	<i>(23,306,000)</i>	<i>(17,929,000)</i>
	<i>Liquidation cash.....</i>	<i>(19,000,000)</i>	<i>(19,000,000)</i>	<i>(19,000,000)</i>	<i>(19,000,000)</i>
Increased pay costs (included above):					
	<i>Budget authority.....</i>	<i>(135,978,400)</i>	<i>(116,435,400)</i>	<i>(124,848,400)</i>	<i>(124,448,400)</i>
	<i>Release of reserves.....</i>	<i>(18,589,000)</i>	<i>(18,589,000)</i>	<i>(18,589,000)</i>	<i>(18,589,000)</i>
	<i>By transfer.....</i>	<i>(1,983,000)</i>	<i>(1,983,000)</i>	<i>(3,983,000)</i>	<i>(2,683,000)</i>
	Total.....	(155,563,400)	(136,407,400)	(147,418,400)	(145,718,400)
TITLE III					
INCREASED PAY COSTS					
	New budget (obligational) authority.....	1,464,734,396	1,183,298,454	1,368,137,556	1,287,937,556
	<i>Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....</i>	<i>(59,510,000)</i>	<i>(62,277,000)</i>	<i>(59,741,000)</i>	<i>(59,741,000)</i>
	<i>By transfer.....</i>	<i>(86,873,000)</i>	<i>(81,676,000)</i>	<i>(87,916,000)</i>	<i>(84,516,000)</i>
	<i>Limitations on administrative and nonadministrative expenses.....</i>	<i>(24,223,000)</i>	<i>(22,223,000)</i>	<i>(22,223,000)</i>	<i>(22,223,000)</i>
TITLE V					
GENERAL PROVISIONS					
	Increases in limitations and transfers from trust funds for personal services pursuant to sec. 502 of bill (H. Doc. 91-50).....	(630,000)	(630,000)	(630,000)	(630,000)
RECAPITULATION					
Grand total, titles I, II, III, and V:					
New budget (obligational) authority:					
	1968.....	8,154,900	7,178,000	8,154,900	8,154,900
	1969.....	4,806,150,434	3,776,034,766	4,451,514,744	4,344,202,744
	Total.....	4,814,305,334	3,783,212,766	4,459,669,644	4,352,357,644
	<i>New annual contract authorizations, increase in limitations.....</i>	<i>(104,500,000)</i>	<i>(82,500,000)</i>	<i>(102,500,000)</i>	<i>(92,500,000)</i>
	<i>Release of Public Law 90-364 reserves.....</i>	<i>(79,989,000)</i>	<i>(82,766,000)</i>	<i>(80,230,000)</i>	<i>(80,230,000)</i>
	<i>By transfer.....</i>	<i>(97,105,000)</i>	<i>(92,905,000)</i>	<i>(120,132,000)</i>	<i>(102,245,000)</i>
	<i>Liquidation cash.....</i>	<i>(19,000,000)</i>	<i>(19,000,000)</i>	<i>(19,000,000)</i>	<i>(19,000,000)</i>
	<i>Limitations on administrative and nonadministrative expenses.....</i>	<i>(40,870,000)</i>	<i>(22,223,000)</i>	<i>(43,570,000)</i>	<i>(43,570,000)</i>
	<i>Increases in limitations and transfers from trust funds or personal services pursuant to sec. 502 of bill.....</i>	<i>(630,000)</i>	<i>(630,000)</i>	<i>(630,000)</i>	<i>(630,000)</i>
Increased pay costs (included above):					
	<i>Budget authority.....</i>	<i>(1,600,112,796)</i>	<i>(1,229,733,854)</i>	<i>(1,422,983,956)</i>	<i>(1,412,383,956)</i>
	<i>Release of reserves.....</i>	<i>(78,099,000)</i>	<i>(80,866,000)</i>	<i>(78,330,000)</i>	<i>(78,330,000)</i>
	<i>By transfer.....</i>	<i>(87,259,000)</i>	<i>(83,069,000)</i>	<i>(91,389,000)</i>	<i>(86,996,000)</i>
	<i>Limitations on administrative and nonadministrative expenses.....</i>	<i>(24,223,000)</i>	<i>(22,223,000)</i>	<i>(22,223,000)</i>	<i>(22,223,000)</i>
	<i>Increases in limitations and transfers from trust funds for personal services pursuant to sec. 502 of bill.....</i>	<i>(630,000)</i>	<i>(630,000)</i>	<i>(630,000)</i>	<i>(630,000)</i>
	Total.....	(1,790,323,796)	(1,486,511,854)	(1,686,065,956)	(1,600,565,956)

¹ Also proposes that \$17,000,000 now earmarked for maintenance of real property be utilized for the general purposes of this appropriation.
² Also proposes that \$1,500,000 now earmarked for maintenance of real property be utilized for the general purposes of this appropriation.
³ Includes reallocations under Department of Public Health (\$111,000), and reclassifications under Department of Sanitary Engineering (\$252,000).
⁴ To be derived by transfer from "Economic assistance" appropriations of the Agency for International Development.

⁵ To permit purchase of 1 replacement aircraft from available funds at an estimated cost of \$300,000.
⁶ And an additional \$250,000 proposed to be made available through congressional action to reduce funds earmarked for planning grants.
⁷ Combined under the heading "Grants to States for public assistance" in the bill.
⁸ Also language reducing by \$800,000 the amount to be advanced from this appropriation to the Small Business Administration for loan processing services.

ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR CANNON TOMORROW

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, at the conclusion of morning business on tomorrow, the distinguished Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON) be recognized. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

APPOINTMENTS AND PROMOTIONS IN THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I enter a motion to reconsider the vote by

which S. 1583 was passed by the Senate on July 8.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The BILL CLERK. A bill (S. 1583) to provide that appointments and promotions in the Post Office Department, including the postal field service, be made on the basis of merit and fitness.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion will be entered.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, I move that the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to request the House to return the papers on S. 1583 to the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-

tion is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Texas.

The motion was agreed to.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF
AMENDMENT

S. 2546

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia, Mr. President, at the request of the able Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), who now presides over this Chamber with a degree of efficiency and dignity "so rare as a day" in July, I ask unanimous consent that, at its next printing, his name be added as a cosponsor of the amendment offered by Senator COOPER and Senator HART to the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1970 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat ve-

hicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize the construction of test facilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it so ordered.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia, Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that

the Senate stand in adjournment until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 7 o'clock and 9 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, July 10, 1969, at 11 a.m.

CONFIRMATION

Executive nomination confirmed by the Senate July 9, 1969:

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS

George H. Goodrich, of Maryland, to be an associate judge of the District of Columbia court of general sessions for the term of 10 years.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

VICTORY AT MONTE CASSINO

HON. HENRY HELSTOSKI

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, July 9, 1969

Mr. HELSTOSKI. Mr. Speaker, from the dawn of history, Cassino stood as the southern gateway to Rome. On the adjacent mountain known as Monte Cassino, many temples and altars were built to unknown deities by unknown worshipers in the dim past.

St. Benedict arrived there in the years 525 to 529 and found a complete pagan acropolis, which he rebuilt, in a Christian pattern, into the abbey of Monte Cassino.

Here, the Poles tried to grasp the always elusive, to them, freedom—when the Polish Legions under Gen. Henryk Dabrowski were guarding this territory for the armies of Napoleon; then again in 1918, when the Polish Army of the West was being organized from Polish-Austrian prisoners of war; and in May 1944, when the Second Corps of the Polish Army-in-Exile wrested the mountain from the Germans.

On the slopes of point 593, these poignant words are written:

We Polish Soldiers,
For your freedom and ours,
Have given our souls to God,
Our bodies to the soil of Italy,
And our hearts to Poland.

This simple inscription is carved on the spire which stands above a military cemetery at Monte Cassino, in Italy. There lie buried the 860 Polish soldiers of the Polish Second Army Corps who gave their lives in the capture of the most crucial German fortification in Italy.

The story of these Polish forces is perhaps one of the most tragic chapters in the history of World War II—but it is a chapter the last pages of which have not yet been written until the free world proves that these men who were faithful to their service did not give their lives in vain.

May 18 marked the 25th anniversary of one of the most important and momentous battles of the Second World War. On that day in 1944 Monte Cassino, that rugged and seemingly impregnable citadel in Italy, fell to a stubborn, gallant, and undaunted Polish Army, after un-

successful previous attempts by the Americans and British had failed.

Since the free world seems to have forgotten and overlooked this great contribution of the Poles to the cause of freedom, I take this occasion to relate again these historic facts which need recording in the archives of history.

The initiative in the battle came from the Americans. When the U.S. 5th Army was blocked by the Germans at the Anzio beachhead, a joint American-French frontal attack was staged on January 20, 1944, to capture the Monte Cassino and open the way to Rome. The attack was preceded by heavy artillery fire during which 31,000 shells were dropped in a half hour on German positions. The attack failed. The U.S. 34th and 36th Divisions suffered heavy losses, while the French lost 1,300 men.

On February 11, a British unsuccessful attack took place. The Royal Sussex, Rajputana Rifles, and a New Zealand tank unit were smashed to bits.

On March 11, a third general attack was undertaken with a total of 12 brigades of the best English, Hindu, and New Zealand troops. During 3 hours of this battle, 578 cannons hurled 1,200 tons of ammunition and 514 planes dropped 1,100 bombs at the fortified Abbey of Monte Cassino. It was the most concentrated bombardment in the war. The attacking troops entered the ruins of Cassino. After 10 days the offensive failed because of the heavy losses of the attacking force, with the Hindu Division alone losing 3,000 men.

Then on May 11, 1944, at 11 p.m. the Appenine Peninsula began to tremble from a renewed violence; 2,000 heavy artillery guns opened fire on Monte Cassino. With American, British, French, New Zealand, and Polish troops participating, the Poles were given the assignment to capture Monte Cassino in a frontal assault where three previous bloody offensives failed.

At 1 a.m. on May 13, main elements of the Polish 2d Army Corps—the 3d and 5th Divisions under the command of Lt. Gen. Wladyslaw Anders, began to attack German positions, capturing under withering enemy fire and in hand-to-hand combat Points 593 and 569, and finally the Phantom Ridge. The battle lasted a whole week. The Polish fighters were being killed like flies by the murderous German fire. In the last phase of the

battle, after using all reserves and even technicians from the Engineer Corps and antiaircraft units, the Polish command mobilized three half battalions composed of cooks, orderlies, drivers, telephone operators, supply men, and everyone else who could bear arms, and threw them into battle which finally brought victory as the Polish unit captured the Abbey of Monte Cassino on May 18, 1944, at 10 a.m., unfurling the Polish white and red flag above the smoke-filled and blood-stained battlefield.

Peace returned to the ruins of Monte Cassino. The road to Rome and ultimate victory for the Allies was opened. The Fifth Army under Gen. Mark Clark entered Rome and continued the offensive onward.

Immediately after the battle, General Leese, commander of the 8th British Army, told the press correspondents:

I want to tell you that the capture of Monte Cassino was entirely an achievement of the Poles. I am glad that you are here on this historic day for Poland, when Monte Cassino has been taken by the soldiers of the Second Polish Army Corps.

Without respite the Poles marched on to victory at Ancona, at Bologna, and in the Emelian Apennines. Those were the proud days for the 2d Army Corps and for all Poles, and yet at that time the goal of national independence for which they were all fighting seemed as far away as it had in the grim days of 1939.

One year later, in March 1945, a committee was formed for the purpose of rebuilding the Monte Cassino Abbey. However, it made very little progress.

Then on October 10, 1945, the Polish Embassy at the Vatican notified the Papal Secretary of State, that the soldiers of the Polish 2d Corps are willing and ready to rebuild the abbey. The Pope accepted this offer with deep gratitude. The British command assigned 200 German prisoners of war, who worked a whole year on the project under Polish officers and men.

Thus, the Poles not only conquered the enemy on Monte Cassino, but were the first to start working on the restoration of the abbey to its former glory.

As Fred Majdalany points out in his book, "The Battle of Cassino":

By their selfless immolation the Poles turned that grim mountainside into a memorial to soldiers everywhere.