

Office Department; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CHENOWETH:

H.R. 13088. A bill for the relief of Willy Sapuschnin; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts:

H.R. 13089. A bill for the relief of Jacinto Aguiar; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. O'NEILL:

H.R. 13090. A bill for the relief of Lem Buck You, Lem Soo Ying and Lem Stanley; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 13091. A bill for the relief of Madan L. Chaudhary; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SCHENCK:

H.R. 13092. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Voula Rozakis; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

408. The SPEAKER presented a petition of Virgil L. Cotton and others, Flint, Mich., relative to requesting separation of the colored and white races in the schools, and suggesting that anyone involved with the forced integration of the schools be impeached from office, regardless of what office he holds, which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor.

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SENATE

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1962

The Senate met at 10 o'clock a.m., and was called to order by Hon. FRANK E. MOSS, a Senator from the State of Utah.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Our Father, God, all the paths of our direst needs lead to Thee and Thy everlasting mercy. 'Midst all the traffic of our busy ways we are grateful for this morning sanctuary of the spirit.

Be to us a quickening presence, a sustaining power, a refuge from the tumult and confusion of our times.

We pray for the President, the Vice President, the Congress, and for all in every land who bear the responsibility of public office.

As those here face the thorny problems which still confront them, make those who speak for the Nation patient in argument, charitable in judgment, and slow to wrath.

Help us each to keep to the end of our brief day the unbroken vigil of the inner light, and to leave the world better for our sojourn in it.

In the dear Redeemer's name we ask it. Amen.

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DESIGNATION OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,

PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,  
Washington, D.C., September 10, 1962.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate, I appoint Hon. FRANK E. MOSS, a Senator from the State of Utah, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

CARL HAYDEN,  
President pro tempore.

Mr. MOSS thereupon took the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Friday, September 7, 1962, was dispensed with.

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LIMITATION OF DEBATE DURING MORNING HOUR

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, statements during the morning hour were ordered limited to 3 minutes.

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CALL OF LEGISLATIVE CALENDAR DISPENSED WITH

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the call of the Legislative Calendar was dispensed with.

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COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service and the Committee on Armed Services were authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Morning business is in order.

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EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

REPORT ON MODIFICATIONS AT CAPE CANAVERAL, FLA.

A letter from the Acting Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D.C., reporting, pursuant to law, on certain modifications to the gantry at launch complex No. 12, Atlantic Missile Range, Cape Canaveral, Fla.; to the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences.

REPORT ON CONSTRUCTION AT WALLOPS STATION, VA.

A letter from the Acting Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D.C., reporting, pursuant to law, on the construction of a Scout launch facility at the Wallops Station, Va.; to the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences.

REPORTS ON REAPPORTIONMENT OF APPROPRIATIONS

A letter from the Director, Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President, reporting, pursuant to law, that the appropriation to the Department of the Air Force for "Military personnel, Air Force," for the fiscal year 1963, had been apportioned on a basis which indicates the necessity for a supplemental estimate of appropriation; to the Committee on Appropriations.

A letter from the Director, Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President, reporting, pursuant to law, that the appropriation to the Department of the Navy for "Military personnel, Navy," for the fiscal year 1963, had been apportioned on a basis which indicates the necessity for a supplemental estimate of appropriation; to the Committee on Appropriations.

A letter from the Director, Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President, reporting, pursuant to law, that the appropriation to the Department of the Navy for "Military personnel, Marine Corps," for the fiscal year 1963, had been apportioned on a basis which indicates the necessity for a

supplemental estimate of appropriation; to the Committee on Appropriations.

REPORT ON APPLICATION FOR LOAN UNDER SMALL RECLAMATION PROJECTS ACT OF 1956

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting, pursuant to law, an application for a loan and grant under the Small Reclamation Projects Act of 1956, to the Settlement Canyon Irrigation Co., in Tooele County, Utah (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

INCLUSION OF CERTAIN OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF DEPARTMENT OF LABOR WITHIN PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 111 AND 1114, OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE, RELATING TO ASSAULTS AND HOMICIDES

A letter from the Acting Secretary of Labor, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to include certain officers and employees of the Department of Labor within the provisions of sections 111 and 1114 of title 18 of the United States Code, relating to assaults and homicides (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

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REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. ROBERTSON, from the Committee on Banking and Currency, with an amendment:

S.J. Res. 133. Joint resolution to provide for the coinage of a medal in recognition of the distinguished services of Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Rept. No. 2021).

By Mr. JACKSON, from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, with amendments:

S. 3160. A bill to amend the act of March 8, 1922, as amended, to extend its provisions to the townsite laws applicable in the State of Alaska (Rept. No. 2022).

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BILLS INTRODUCED

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. KUCHEL (for Mr. MURPHY):  
S. 3708. A bill for the relief of Sofia Mitropoulos; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(See the remarks of Mr. KUCHEL when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. KEATING:  
S. 3709. A bill for the relief of Richard Pang; to the Committee on the Judiciary.  
(See the remarks of Mr. KEATING when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

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CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

PRINTING OF ADDITIONAL COPIES OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE HEARINGS ENTITLED "STATE OF THE ECONOMY AND POLICIES FOR FULL EMPLOYMENT"

Mr. DOUGLAS submitted a concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 90) authorizing the printing for the use of the Joint Economic Committee of additional copies of its hearings entitled "State of the Economy and Policies for Full Employment," which, under the rule, was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

(See the above concurrent resolution printed in full when submitted by Mr. DOUGLAS, which appears under a separate heading.)

**RESOLUTION****PRINTING OF ADDITIONAL COPIES  
OF COMMITTEE PRINT ENTITLED  
"HOUSING FOR THE ELDERLY"**

Mr. McNAMARA submitted a resolution (S. Res. 382) to print additional copies of a committee print entitled "Housing for the Elderly," which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, as follows:

*Resolved*, That there be printed for the use of the Special Committee on Aging eight thousand additional copies of its committee print of the Eighty-seventh Congress, second session, entitled "Housing for the Elderly."

**SOFIA MITROPOULOS**

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, the distinguished junior Senator from New Hampshire is absent from the Senate. He desires a bill to be introduced. I request consent that I may introduce, on behalf of the junior Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. MURPHY] a bill for appropriate reference.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 3708) for the relief of Sofia Mitropoulos, introduced by Mr. KUCHEL (for Mr. MURPHY), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

**RICHARD PANG**

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference a private immigration bill for the relief of Richard Pang.

Richard Pang was born in 1926 at Camp John Hay, a U.S. establishment at Baguio City in the Philippines. He came into this world a citizen of the Philippines, by reason of his birth at Camp Jay; a citizen of the Republic of China, by reason of the Chinese nationality of his parents; and a national of the United States, by reason of the Commonwealth status of the Philippines at the time. He has spent his entire life in the Philippines and the United States and has lived for the last 8 years in Ithaca, N.Y. Now he is about to be deported to Formosa, an island on which he has never spent 1 day of his life and with which he has absolutely no ties.

If Richard Pang were a criminal, perhaps his banishment from our shores would be understandable. If he had shown himself at any time in his life to be unworthy of our concern, perhaps we would have to stand aside and permit the Immigration Service to force his exile to Formosa. But Richard Pang's only fault is that he wants to be an American. Our immigration laws, which are devoid of compassion and riddled with inequities, deny him this wish. The Immigration Service, is powerless to exercise any discretion no matter how unjust be the literal application of the law to these circumstances. But the Senate does not suffer any such impediment and I believe it will grant relief in this case when all the facts have been considered.

Richard Pang has lived his entire life under the American flag, first in the Philippines and for almost a decade in

New York. He has received a master of science degree from the graduate school of Cornell University. His training and ability can be of substantial benefit to his community and our country. A request that he be allowed to pledge allegiance to the flag under which he has lived all his life has been made by the president of Cornell University and prominent citizens from all walks of life in Ithaca.

I say America can afford to let down the bars for Richard Pang. Indeed, I say that America cannot afford not to let the bars down in such cases if we are to live up to our heritage of freedom and justice.

The House Committee on the Judiciary has turned down a private relief bill in this case. Its action is difficult to understand. In any event, it should not deter the Senate from taking whatever action we deem justified. Nothing prohibits us from adding this bill as an amendment to another House measure or from asking the House Committee to reconsider its action after approval of this bill by the Senate. In the interim, I have requested that the Immigration Service postpone its order of deportation. This is the one discretionary power the Service clearly possesses. I hope that my request will be granted in order that the Senate will not be deprived of an opportunity to grant relief in this case.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 3709) for the relief of Richard Pang, introduced by Mr. KEATING, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

**PRINTING OF ADDITIONAL COPIES  
OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE  
HEARINGS ENTITLED "STATE OF  
THE ECONOMY AND POLICIES FOR  
FULL EMPLOYMENT"**

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, on behalf of the Joint Economic Committee, I submit, for appropriate reference, a concurrent resolution authorizing the printing of 5,000 additional copies of its hearings entitled "State of the Economy and Policies for Full Employment."

The concurrent resolution provides for the printing of 5,000 additional copies of the Joint Economic Committee hearings entitled "State of the Economy and Policies for Full Employment." Because of the timely nature of the hearings and the widespread interest that they evoked, the Joint Economic Committee anticipates heavy demand from the press, universities, and professional groups. Under the normal allowances established by the Joint Committee on Printing, the Joint Economic Committee would receive less than 2,000 copies of the hearings, which would meet only a fraction of the anticipated demand.

The committee went to considerable trouble to hear testimony from outstanding economists not only from the United States but from Europe as well; the hearings were carried on for 3 weeks and represent an exceptionally heavy volume of information which should be of con-

siderable educational value to the many teachers, businessmen, and professional economists throughout the country who undoubtedly will request copies in the next few months.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The concurrent resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 90) was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, as follows:

*Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring)*, That there be printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee five thousand additional copies of its hearings of the Eighty-seventh Congress, second session, entitled "State of the Economy and Policies for Full Employment."

**PRINTING OF REVIEW OF REPORT  
ON ALAMEDA CREEK, CALIF. (S.  
DOC. NO. 128)**

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from New Mexico [MR. CHAVEZ], I present a letter from the Secretary of the Army, transmitting a report dated August 16, 1962, from the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, together with accompanying papers and an illustration, on a review of the report on Alameda Creek, Calif., requested by resolutions of the Committee on Public Works, U.S. Senate, adopted April 15, 1949, and June 17, 1949. I ask unanimous consent that the report be printed as a Senate document, with an illustration, and referred to the Committee on Public Works.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES,  
ETC., PRINTED IN THE RECORD**

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**By Mr. WILEY:**

Excerpts from address delivered by him over Wisconsin radio station, relating to the Wisconsin primary election.

Excerpts from address delivered by him on Labor Day, relating to the significance of labor to national life.

**CHALLENGE FOR AMERICA: TRADE  
OR FADE**

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD an excellent article in support of the Trade Expansion Act written by David J. Winton, a leading citizen and businessman of Minnesota.

I believe that this article is timely in view of the consideration that will soon be given by the Senate to this Trade Expansion Act.

I want to commend Mr. Winton for his lucid and cogent argument on behalf of this legislation. I would like to read one of the concluding paragraphs from Mr. Winton's speech which is an excellent summation of the argument on behalf of this legislation:

The Trade Expansion Act through increased world trade will help boost the rate

of America's industrial growth. It will assist in reemploying our unemployed workers, and ease our balance-of-payments position. As our allies grow in strength, they will grow in their ability to pay their full share of NATO and other defense costs. This, combined with their, and our, foreign aid to the newly founded and underdeveloped countries will strengthen and unify the free world as a whole.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**CHALLENGE FOR AMERICA: TRADE OR FADE—H.R. 9900 AND THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET**

(By David J. Winton, vice chairman of Macalester College, director of committee for national trade policy, director of National Planning Association, president of Winton Lumber Co., chairman of Kenwood Oil Co.)

By 1932, aided and abetted by the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, the United States had reached the unenviable distinction of having an average 48½ percent tariff. Actually, it was higher than 48½ percent because many prohibitive tariffs shut out entire categories of goods. This high tariff wall contributed to a catastrophic decline in foreign trade—both imports and exports, not only in the United States, but worldwide.

In 1934, the Trade Agreements Act was adopted by Congress. It has been renewed in various forms and names for 28 years. It has reduced tariffs to about 12½ percent on the average today. Again it is not an exact measure of the extent of protection for the United States. Many prohibitive tariffs on specific goods remain today.

The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, our present act dealing with tariffs, expires June 30, 1962. H.R. 9900, the Trade Expansion Act, is now before Congress. The President urges its passage so that he can deal particularly with the problems likely to be created for American trade by the development of the European Common Market.

The European Common Market is an economic union of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg—a union including some 170 million people. At the present time England, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway are negotiating to join the Common Market as full members; while Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland are seeking associate memberships. If all these countries join the Common Market there will be 325 million people included in an economic union with an industrial growth rate now roughly 2 to 2½ times the present growth rate of the United States. This could be a desirable market for American industry. Participation without discrimination will be most valuable to us. To gain access to this market is one of the main purposes of H.R. 9900.

The main difference between H.R. 9900 and the present Reciprocal Trade Act is found in the tariff changes designed to meet the Common Market competition and permit our U.S. goods to penetrate that market.

Here are the main changes: H.R. 9900 permits reduction of tariffs up to 50 percent on entire categories of items gradually over a 5-year period in place of the present act's maximum of 20-percent tariff reduction on an individual item-by-item basis. Under H.R. 9900, jointly and gradually over a 5-year period, tariffs can be eliminated completely on those goods 80 percent of which are produced in the United States and the Common Market. Further, under this bill, tariffs against raw materials from the newly developed and emerging countries can also be eliminated by the President. Because H.R. 9900 is a recognized instrument of foreign policy and since some domestic industries may be hurt by tariff reduction under the act, it contains trade adjustment features such as compensation for employees, com-

panies, or industries harmed as the national welfare is advanced.

This paper discusses particularly two questions in connection with H.R. 9900 about which there has been much misunderstanding. First, can the United States compete with foreign wages and costs? Second, how will the external tariffs and the internal tariffs of the Common Market discriminate against their imports and particularly their imports from the United States, or our exports to these European countries?

**THE EUROPEAN MARKET**

This past summer the State Department sent the author to Geneva as a public member of the U.S. delegation to the GATT conference there. As a result, I was in Europe much of the summer. I had not been there long before I began to see the significance of the renewed economic strength of our European partners and allies, and what this rich, vast market could mean to us in the United States. I am so impressed that I urge every businessman, every labor leader and every farm leader who can, to go to Europe and see this remarkable economic transformation for himself. Europe is on the make industrially. This is the kind of development that American businessmen who believe in the private enterprise system can appreciate and enjoy.

One of my earliest memories of France many years ago is of a workingman dressed in a blue smock and riding a bicycle with a long loaf of bread and a bottle of wine sticking out of a (musette) bag hung over his shoulder. This same chap has continued through the years. His day may not be completely over yet, but it is passing fast. For the bicycle is reaching for a motor scooter; the man with a gasoline engine on two wheels is reaching for a three-wheeler; and the three-wheeler for four wheels. And the four-wheeler Frenchman today, occasionally has a boat on a trailer behind. France in the early 1960's looks more like my home State of Minnesota two decades ago than the France and Europe one may have known in the recent past.

Installment buying is just starting in Europe. Recently I saw figures that showed installment debt in England to be \$32 per person, Germany \$27, and France \$18. In the United States it is \$212. We in the United States have 105 television sets per 100 families; Germany has 26 television sets per 100 families. As European living standards go up, a large demand is being created for television and many other kinds of durable goods which American business produces so efficiently. This European Common Market is growing and expanding 2 to 2½ times as fast as our U.S. markets, and it will eventually include 325 million people. This is the kind of potential market American businessmen are always dreaming about finding.

Look back for a moment on the France and Italy of 1948. Production and income were at poverty levels. They were overshadowed by the threat of Communist domination. Then came the industrial growth of the last decade and a half. Today these nations are enjoying rapidly rising standards of living and economic growth. We can take honest satisfaction in the comparison, for American aid stimulated the resurgence of industrial life in Europe after the Second World War. Our generosity here, an excellent example of enlightened self-interest, wrote one of the most glorious pages in American business history and in the record of Congress. For it was largely business that paid the taxes and Congress that voted the funds making the Marshall plan possible. In Western Europe it is fair to say we have helped run Karl Marx off the main street and up the alley.

A short time ago, February 22, 1962, to be exact, the Saturday Evening Post quoted a spokesman for the Kennedy administra-

tion. He said: "Our main battle point in the cold war is not Berlin or Cuba. It is the economic front. If we lose there, we lose everywhere. The President is asking for tools to fight for our survival." I believe this to be true.

Further, I believe in healthy business competition between our industries and those of Western Europe. We businessmen, labor leaders and farm leaders can understand this. The flow of goods both ways will raise living standards both in America and in Europe.

So far, for the vast majority of the products we make, we have been able to compete successfully with foreign producers. And I believe we can continue to hold our own very well in international markets, even though we live in an increasingly competitive world—a world experiencing rapid technical advance and economic growth.

One thing is abundantly clear: Exports create jobs for workers, markets and profits for businessmen and farmers. What is not so widely known is that foreign trade between the United States and the rest of the world provides all important markets for every single one of the 50 States. The accompanying chart at the end of this section shows how much businessmen, workers, and farmers in each and every State of the United States all benefit from our foreign trade.

More workers gain jobs than lose their jobs through foreign trade. According to a recent report by the AFL-CIO, the number of workers whose jobs depend on foreign trade is 10 times the number of jobs lost through imports.

Lionel D. Edie & Co., of New York, is a firm of practical economists. They make their living giving economic advice to their clients. They have allowed us to quote from their copyright release of January 26, 1962—telling how the Detroit automobile industry met the competition of imported foreign cars—and also from their release of February 28, 1962, about the comparison of the quantity of electrical power per worker in the United States and in Europe. The most important parts of these two releases follow:

**"POINT AND COUNTERPOINT"**

"In 1955 we imported 57,000 cars. In 1957 and in 1958 imports rose steadily. Plot the monthly figures on a chart and the line goes up and up. Then in 1959 the blow really came. We imported more than 665,000 foreign cars. Foreign cars had by then obtained more than 10 percent of the market."

"But American industry had become aware of the challenge. They were getting ready to compete with the foreign cars. The American people wanted smaller and more efficient cars, OK, American industry would provide them."

"In 1959 we produced 755,000 compact cars. In 1960 we really went to town; we produced almost 2 million compact cars."

"The rise and demise of imports: We reacted late, but when we did react we beat the competition hands down. As we reacted, foreign car imports declined. We met this competition."

"[Thousands units]

"Year	Foreign car imports	Compact car production
1955.....	57	249
1956.....	108	179
1957.....	259	180
1958.....	431	273
1959.....	668	755
1960.....	445	1,945
1961.....	250	1,990

"Points to be made. This very brief review of the way American industry reacted to foreign competition has some very interesting facets to it that should be realized

by those who underestimate our ability or inclination to compete:

"1. The importation of foreign cars although marginal was threatening. At no time were foreign car imports more than 11 percent of total car registrations.

"2. Foreign cars sold at prices substantially lower than American cars. Pricing competition was a major factor.

"3. Maintenance costs of foreign cars were below American cars. They burned gasoline more efficiently and required less lubrication.

"4. There was little comparable to foreign cars on the domestic market. American Motors was the only organization producing a domestic compact car. American industry had to gear up in order to compete. It had to design from scratch, and produce from scratch. It had to put in place entirely new assembly lines. To put it simply, they had to make tremendous capital investments to compete. It made them.

"5. Exports of American cars fell from 1955 to 1959, but since 1959 have risen moderately. This is particularly noticeable in the face of the extremely high tariffs and other obstacles levied against American cars by foreign countries.

"6. This case study encompasses almost all those negative factors that people use to claim we can't compete with foreigners. But compete we did, compete we can, and compete we will."

There is a strong relationship between the way Detroit met the imported small car competition and the power back of each worker in the United States and Europe. Let's see what Edie says about that:

#### "PRODUCTIVITY AND POWER

"The findings. Let us present our findings in two ways: First we compare energy utilization levels in industrial production and then in civilian employment.

#### "Kilowatt-hours produced per point of industrial production (indexes)

"[Billion units]

"Year	United States	Common Market	United States as a multiple of Common Market
1954	5.80	1.55	3.7
1955	5.93	1.52	3.9
1956	6.26	1.53	4.1
1957	6.51	1.54	4.2
1958	7.10	1.58	4.5
1959	6.91	1.59	4.3
1960	7.06	1.59	4.5

#### "Kilowatt-hours produced per civilian employee

"[Thousand units]

"Year	United States	Common Market	United States as a multiple of Common Market
1954	9.0	2.6	3.5
1955	9.9	2.7	3.7
1956	10.5	2.9	3.6
1957	11.0	3.1	3.6
1958	11.3	3.2	3.5
1959	12.1	3.5	3.5
1960	12.7	3.8	3.3

"Both these tabulations indicate the same things: The relative utilization of electrical energy is higher in the United States than in the Common Market and there is no material change taking place in the relative trend of U.S. consumption (of electric power in industry).

"What do these tabulations mean to us? They mean that there is a solid basis for assuming a substantially higher productivity in the United States than in the Common Market. We can compete on a cost basis."

Here is one more basic reason why American industry can meet successfully the competition of foreign costs and wages. Because of foreign costs and wages. Because our workers have more power and tools to work with.

Another instance of meeting competition was pointed out to me at a recent chamber of commerce meeting. Each winter the National Chamber of Commerce recruits speakers to tour the country and explain the chamber's position on important pieces of legislation before the Congress.

This year officials of the National Chamber of Commerce traveled to 15 cities in 3 weeks and explained six pieces of proposed legislation at each place. The National Chamber of Commerce stands firmly behind H.R. 9900 with only one reservation. This reservation is in connection with that portion of the "trade adjustments" part of the act covering longer payments to employees of industries adversely affected. The chamber feels that payments to laid-off employees should be limited to payments made and determined by the individual State involved. At the invitation of the national chamber, I explained H.R. 9900 to businessmen in New York, Providence, Syracuse, Columbus and Charleston, W. Va.

The third morning at breakfast in Syracuse Virgil Day, vice president of General Electric, who was part of the Chamber Arcade, volunteered: "Winton, I have a good example of our ability to compete. Our company has a plant at Utica making radios. Three years ago we were down to 300 employees. We considered abandoning the plant. Instead we studied how the Japanese made their radios. We decided we couldn't do it exactly their way, but gave the problem another hard look—more research, redesign and automation. Today we can meet the Japanese competition here in the United States and next year we think we can meet their competition abroad."

I said: "That's wonderful. How many employees do you have at your Utica plant today?"

Virgil Day replied: "That's the best part of the story. We now have 1,900 employees at Utica."

Much of our confusion about our ability to compete comes from equating wage rates with costs. They are not the same at all. It is costs we must compete against, not wages. The more one studies the problem of foreign trade and foreign competition, the more sure you are that America not only can, by and large, successfully compete, but we are competing successfully, and we are going to continue to compete successfully in world markets, not on every item but on the vast majority of products.

#### TRADE ADJUSTMENT PROVISION

Of course, there are cases where we can't compete, such as the extreme example of artificial flowers where it is all hand labor. The same is true of trout flies and, of course, some more important items. Occasionally, for example, we have lost a sale of heavy electrical equipment to England or Germany. But sometimes, in fact often, an industry that reacts fearfully about imports, or the threat of imports, is already "sick" from the competition of substitutes made in America, or changing whims in our consumer choices, or a dozen different and local competitive conditions. However, industries harmed by enlarged imports via H.R. 9900 will not on balance, adversely affect our total economy. In fact, quite the reverse is true. We have a favorable trade balance of some \$4 to \$5 billion now—exports \$20 billion, imports \$15 billion. We have many more jobs because of our present export-import picture than we would have under a restrictive trade program because many export jobs would disappear. According to the AFL-CIO, the Brookings Institution and a host of other

agencies down through the years, reducing and eliminating trade restrictions worldwide will improve living standards everywhere and will increase employment in the United States. We can't enjoy a favorable balance of trade if we don't accept imports. Otherwise, how can foreign countries buy our exports?

H.R. 9900 is more than a Trade Act. It is a key instrument of our foreign policy. It is important to remember this. If in the larger welfare of the Nation some are harmed, it is proper that both workers and employers receive adjustment assistance. The bill provides for this in specific detail.

#### EXTERNAL-INTERNAL TARIFF PROBLEMS

Our exports to the Common Market countries have increased 100 percent in the past 7 years, while the rest of our exports to other countries have increased only 30 percent. So we are talking about a very important market for us. To continue to enjoy this greatest of all oversea markets, we must give the President power to penetrate the external tariffs of that market—to bargain for lower tariffs against our goods. This is exactly what H.R. 9900 is designed to do.

As things are now we are in jeopardy. We stand to lose a substantial amount of this vast and growing market. This is because the original tariffs of the Common Market countries—that is the old tariffs between these countries—gradually, over some 7 years, will be reduced to zero. But the tariffs of the Common Market countries as a union against the rest of the world, including the United States, will be averaged from the individual tariffs of the member countries. The result: a big area of free trade among the Common Market members and a restrictive wall of protection around these same nations against the world, including the United States.

The President must have unusual powers to negotiate penetration of this wall. That is what H.R. 9900 is designed to do. The squeeze on U.S. business caused by the present structure of the internal and external tariffs to the Common Market is very important to understand, and then, to see how the President plans to meet the problem. We must remember the internal tariffs between Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg will gradually evaporate and they will be on a free trade basis with each other in the near future. But the external tariffs of these same countries will be maintained against the United States unless something is done about it. Again we come to the solution, H.R. 9900.

Let us take fishing rods as a hypothetical example. A manufacturer in Chicago could price his fishing rods at \$40, and prior to the Common Market, sell them in Hamburg, Germany for \$50, including a tariff of 25 percent. A similar rod could be made in France and priced there at \$40 to sell in Hamburg for the same \$50, again including the 25-percent tariff. But when the internal tariff between Germany and France disappears, the French producer could sell his rod in Germany for \$40 without duty. And if the present external tariff on fishing rods is 40 percent for France, 30 percent in Italy, 25 percent in Germany, 10 percent for Holland and Belgium, and 5 percent for Luxembourg, the Common Market's external tariff on this item would be the average of these old tariffs—120 divided by 6 or 20 percent. Our American manufacturer would be priced out of the Common Market. He would have to get \$48 (\$40 plus \$8 duty) for his fishing rods in Hamburg in order to keep his net price of \$40.

This external-internal tariff squeeze on U.S. exporters has already started on a number of items, and we will feel steadily growing pressure on our exports to Europe in the months ahead. Tariff discrimination against our goods caused by the Common Market will grow gradually but forcefully unless we

give the President the wherewithal to negotiate away this discrimination.

#### CONCLUSION

This study is based on a fundamental belief in our ability to successfully compete in the world market. Also it is hoped that this statement will clarify some of the dangers inherent in the existing structure of external and internal tariffs of the Common Market. We must act now. Europe is moving ahead at a rapid rate.

We must not overlook the forces at work in the international scene. There is a new resurgence of Russian aggressiveness; including prolonged tension over Berlin, bombing tests, subversion in Latin America and southeast Asia.

Russia is doing, and will continue to do, all in her power to foster a trade war between the United States and the rest of our allies, to sever Western Germany from the Western Alliance and destroy NATO. Should Russia succeed, we in America face not only business stagnation and recession, but the loss of our freedom and our way of life.

On the other side, H.R. 9900 offers a peaceful means of retaliation against world communism coupled with an immense opportunity to bind the free world together in economic abundance. With the power to reduce our own tariffs, the President has the best tool with which to bargain and get our goods into Western Europe. Thus, we can enlarge world trade with fewer restrictions both to and fro, and with great economic and security advantage to both our allies and ourselves.

The Trade Expansion Act through increased world trade will help boost the rate of America's industrial growth. It will assist in reemploying our unemployed workers, and ease our balance-of-payments position. As our allies grow in strength, they will grow in their ability to pay their full share of NATO and other defense costs. This, combined with their, and our, foreign aid to the newly founded and underdeveloped countries will strengthen and unify the free world as a whole.

H.R. 9900 is the indispensable agent in this plan for progress.

#### THE PRESCRIPTION FOR UNEMPLOYMENT

**Mr. HUMPHREY.** Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD an excellent and thought-provoking article by the distinguished economist, Leon H. Keyserling, in which he offers his program for a nationwide economic effort to fully develop our economic potential and to put to work all able-bodied members of our working force.

The article appeared in the August 5, 1962 issue of the New York Times magazine. Again, Mr. Keyserling presents a program of economic action that is designed to stimulate the economy and thereby absorb the unemployed, including those to be displaced by automation.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### ONE PRESCRIPTION FOR UNEMPLOYMENT (By Leon H. Keyserling)

Unemployment in the 1930's, rising to one-third of those able and willing to work, was a national disaster. But it did not indict us as a nation, for there was little knowledge of how to overcome it. More recently and today, unemployment at persistently high levels, while far from disaster, does indict us all, for the remedies are now well known. They involve practicable and immediate changes in national policies.

It is a happy augury, in a democracy where effective action depends upon popular consent, that leaders in all walks of life are moving toward an increasing accord, not only that unemployment must be dealt with, but also as to how to deal with it. The program suggested here will not meet with universal agreement, but I hope that it may help to crystallize the growing consensus to the point of action. It calls for:

1. A large and immediate tax reduction, to increase private incomes available for spending. More spending for goods and services would mean more employment to produce them. Controversial, time-consuming tax reforms, such as closing loopholes, should be deferred.

2. A large and immediate increase in Federal spending, to meet essential public needs. This would also mean more jobs.

3. An unequivocal Presidential assurance against repetition of the recent degree of intervention in price decisions, wagemaking and industrial disputes. This would remove a main barrier to confident business investment in new plant and equipment. More investment would create more jobs.

4. Far more liberal monetary and credit policies by the Federal Reserve System.

5. Better public explanation of how these job-creating efforts are consistent with preventing inflation and solving our international balance-of-payments and gold problem, lest concern about these issues prevent expansionary measures.

6. Improved communications between the Government and the public, including economic groups, to increase confidence and cooperation.

Before discussing this program, let us examine the nature of the problem.

Official figures now show full-time unemployment to be about 5½ percent of the civilian labor force—or close to 4 million, seasonally adjusted. But this calculation omits the full-time equivalent of part-time unemployment, which lifts unemployment to more than 7 percent.

In addition, in view of the high birth rate immediately after World War II, our total labor force should have grown by 1 million or more in the past year; actually, it grew far less. Why? Because, with jobs scarce, many without work are not actively seeking it and therefore are not counted in the statistics.

Allowing for them, and also for workers employed but underutilized because of slack plant operations, I estimate the true level of unemployment at close to 8 percent currently—about 6 million, seasonally adjusted. This is about twice the level consistent with maximum employment. Counting dependents, the material privation and morale-shattering experience of having the breadwinner idle now hit directly 10 million or more Americans.

This situation has not arisen suddenly. Since the end of the Korean war, unemployment, with some fluctuations, has moved inexorably upward in the long run. The trough of each recession has shown more unemployment than the trough of the preceding one, and the peak of each recovery has shown more unemployment than the peak of the preceding one.

The current recovery, underway for about a year and a half, now shows unemployment about 35 percent higher than when the recovery from the 1953-54 recession had run about the same length of time. And this is not just because there was so much unemployment when the current recovery started. This recovery to date has reduced unemployment only about two-fifths to two-thirds as much as comparable periods of recovery since World War II. Unemployment has become a chronically worsening problem.

Unemployment hurts us all. During 9 years from the end of the Korean war to mid-1962, about 24 million man-years of excess-

sive unemployment meant that we produced about \$375 billion less in goods and services (measured in 1960 dollars) than we should have. With this additional output, we could have lifted the living standards of 77 million Americans who still live in poverty or lesser deprivation; reduced the deficiencies in public programs—education, health, development of natural resources, urban renewal and housing—and carried with less strain our defense and international obligations. The actual rise in unemployment in June, together with other signs of a slowdown in the economy, suggests a substantial chance of another recession next year.

If the chronic rise in unemployment continues, we could during the 4 years 1962-65 forfeit another 18 million man-years of employment opportunity, and lose another \$300 billion worth of production. By 1965, unemployment could be 50 percent higher than now, even if that year were not recessionary.

Standard explanations of high unemployment include these points:

1. A large part of it is structural—i.e., much of the labor force is not fitted for new types of jobs resulting from technology and automation.

2. Much unemployment is due to particular handicaps among individuals—insufficient education, poor health, dearth of ambition, lack of mobility.

3. Much unemployment is concentrated in so-called distressed areas or in particular industries.

But while these standard explanations have some validity, they are grossly irrelevant to the problem of chronic unemployment. The relevant point is this:

Each year, because of natural causes, the number of people able and willing to work increases. Every year, because of advances in technology and skills, each employed person can produce more for every hour worked.

This is called increase in productivity. Thus, unless demand for the goods and services which people produce when employed rises steadily and rapidly enough to absorb both the growing number of people available for jobs and their increase in productivity, unemployment rises in the long run.

To be sure, when unemployment rises, the individuals and localities most "vulnerable" for one reason or another get hit first and hardest. But during periods when demand for goods and services rises sufficiently, most of the "vulnerables" find job opportunities. They become less "vulnerable" by training on the job, and those needing prejob training can get it because there are jobs to train them for. Further, the programs now essential to help restore adequate demand for goods and services would reduce their "vulnerability"—for example, expanded outlays for education and health. In short, with enough jobs to go around, the special causes of unemployment shrink to manageable proportions; without enough jobs, these special causes are progressively aggravated.

Turning to my proposals in more detail:

First, large tax reductions are needed now to increase private incomes available for spending. These cuts should be retroactive to July 1 (the start of fiscal 1963). Deferring action until further trends can be observed would only make us more "too late" than we are now; and uncertainties now surrounding tax policy are very damaging.

Tax reduction should be applied almost entirely to middle- and low-income families, who, more than others, translate enlarged after-tax income into immediate consumer demand. Some reduction in corporate and higher income tax rates may help to speed action. However, industry, with large unused capacities, needs tax concessions far less than larger private and public markets for its products. And investors have already received about \$1.5 billion in tax concessions through revision of Treasury regulations; this would be lifted to about \$2.5 billion if the President's tax credit proposal became law.

While proposals to "reform" the tax structure by closing "loopholes" are ultimately desirable, they would cause more acrimony and delay than we can afford now. They would not now stimulate the economy and indeed might repress it slightly.

Second, there should be a large increase in Federal outlays for essential public needs. The task of creating enough additional demand to restore reasonably full employment is too big to be accomplished by tax cuts alone. Besides, the Nation needs more schools and other publicly financed goods and services, not just more private consumer goods. I suggest, for fiscal 1963, combined tax reduction and increased spending having an annual value of about \$10 billion.

We should reexamine the areas where increased public spending would have the largest and most useful job yield. Because of the rate of technological progress and changes in patterns of demand, there is not much room for enlarged employment in some of our mass-production industries nor in agriculture. Tremendous acceleration of housing, urban-renewal, mass-transportation facilities, and health and educational and other human services would combine service of urgent needs with translation of the upsurging technology into more jobs. Such programs would also generate two or three dollars of job creating private investment and consumer outlays, in the same fields, for every new dollar of public outlays. Active programs in these areas are lamentably small, relative to need.

Third, I believe that the President should declare clearly against further intervention of the recent sort in price decisions, wage-making and industrial disputes. Some price-wage decisions and work stoppages do affect nationwide employment. But, except in total war, the consequences of erroneous private action in these areas are very unlikely to be damaging enough to justify on balance the adverse consequences of recent interventions.

The steel price forceback was probably unavoidable in view of what had immediately preceded it, including the highly publicized Government interest in the steel wage settlement. Yet the resulting impasse in the relationship between the Government and the managers of private enterprise, who find themselves uncertain as to where this type of intervention might hit next, has become a main factor against sufficient job creating business investment. The Government's "guidelines" approach, while potentially valuable, should be deferred until it can be thought through more carefully on a more limited basis in an environment more favorable to its acceptance.

Fourth, the Federal Reserve System should liberalize its monetary and credit policies. The trend now is toward tight money and still higher interest rates, on the ground that only this can maintain oversea confidence in the dollar and prevent the outflow of gold, especially if we liberalize fiscal [tax] policy. But to loosen fiscal policy and tighten monetary policy at the same time is like a doctor's prescribing more rest and more exercise for the same patient. A combination of more liberal fiscal and monetary policies, by reducing unemployment and improving economic performance, actually will help our balance-of-payments and gold position.

Fifth, I believe that the President would be well advised to launch a sustained and factual educational effort to dispel fears that a program of tax cuts and spending [enlarging the Federal deficit] would be inflationary at home and aggravate our balance-of-payments and gold problem abroad.

The relevant facts are these: Economists generally recognize that a budget deficit is not inflationary if it results in total activity well below our full productive capabilities.

Full production for fiscal 1963 would be about \$620 billion.

My proposal, allowing for the induced economic expansion, would result in a fiscal 1963 deficit of \$6.5 to \$7 billion. It would also, I estimate, result in production of somewhat more than \$600 billion—significantly below the inflationary danger point, but high enough to offer a realistic prospect of reasonably full production and employment by 1964. This condition, along with the closing of some tax loopholes when the time is more propitious than now, would yield enough revenues to balance the budget even with the reduced tax rates and increased spending which I propose.

Many analysts feel that, if the President's program remains as it now stands, production in fiscal 1963 will be no better than about \$565 billion, and that, if a recession develops, it may well sink to \$555 billion or lower. The result, through loss of revenues: a deficit of at least \$4 billion, and perhaps of \$7 billion or more. Thus, the true alternative is between choosing a planned deficit that will be highly beneficial to employment and production, and stumbling once again into a deficit through neglect of the needs of the economy.

It is worth noting that the ailment of chronically rising unemployment has probably created more inflation (through the inefficiencies of economic slack and efforts to compensate for low volume by higher prices) than have recent budget deficits in aid of economic performance.

To illustrate, in the years 1952-55, marked by reasonably high employment and economic growth, the average annual Federal deficit was \$6.5 billion while consumer prices were virtually stable. During the economic stagnation of 1955-57 there was an average annual Federal surplus of \$1.7 billion, but the average annual increase in consumer prices was 2.5 percent. During the 1957-58 recession, the average annual Federal deficit was only \$2.8 billion (contrasted with the \$6.5 billion earlier), but the average annual rise in consumer prices was 2.7 percent. (Budget figures for fiscal years in uniform 1957 dollars.)

Fear of aggravating our balance-of-payments and gold outflow problems has been a major obstacle to accepting the idea of a planned deficit. Actually, the major causes of these problems, the movement of American capital to Western Europe and the withdrawal of foreign funds from the United States, stem primarily from the existence of much lower unemployment and generally better economic performance overseas. We should only worsen these problems by trying to solve them through policies which repress our own employment and economic growth.

Sixth, we need more harmony in our public and private efforts on the job front. The first step here would be to improve the process by which the Government communicates and justifies its own intentions to those who must evolve complementary private economic policies. There is now pending a useful suggestion that the Federal budget be restated—e.g., with capital investments separated from current costs—to bring into clearer perspective the relationship between the budget and the national economy.

This idea should be carried further, under the Employment Act of 1946, through a description of our whole economy in operation, its resources and needs, its attainable goals, and the private and public economic policies most suited to their achievement. Many others have advanced this proposal, sometimes calling it a national economic budget; I have called it a national prosperity budget or an American economic performance budget. So that all Americans may pull together instead of drifting apart, we must develop some common definition

of what we are trying to do and why—a great national purpose in our economic life.

No President has been better endowed to lead in these tasks than President Kennedy. In view of the increasing consensus regarding our economic problems, I believe that he can build a more massive and intelligent popular support for a nationwide economic effort than any yet attained. But there is no time to spare. In domestic and, especially, in worldwide terms, time is racing far ahead of us. If we do not catch up, we shall not prevail.

#### KODAK TO EXHIBIT AT WORLD'S FAIR

**MR. KEATING.** Mr. President, several weeks ago the Eastman Kodak Co. of Rochester, N.Y., announced plans for an exciting and imaginative exhibit at the New York World's Fair, 1964-65. Plans were revealed at a ground-breaking ceremony at Flushing Meadow Park on August 21. Photography gives both employment to hundreds of thousands and enjoyment to millions in this country and abroad. I ask unanimous consent that the speech by President William S. Vaughn describing the Kodak exhibit appear at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**REMARKS BY WILLIAM S. VAUGHN, PRESIDENT OF EASTMAN KODAK CO., AT GROUND-BREAKING CEREMONIES FOR THE KODAK WORLD'S FAIR EXHIBIT, FLUSHING MEADOW PARK, N.Y., AUGUST 21, 1962**

Mr. Burrows, Mr. Moses, members of the press, honorable and distinguished guests, it is indeed a pleasure to be here with you this morning. Your presence adds validity to our own belief that this exposition has true significance—for industry, for our company, to this community and our State, and to the Nation. We are confident, further, that its appeal will be truly international.

On this occasion we mark the beginning of our contribution to that appeal. On these grounds you see today the foundations for a pavilion symbolic of photography's remarkable growth and achievements over 140 years.

At its outset, photography was a promising but cumbersome practice, something between art and alchemy. Later, as it became less difficult for the user and more manageable in the laboratory, photography and its influence began to grow. Today it is the world's leading hobby. Its sphere has extended to medicine, education, industry, commerce, government, and the sciences. It is one of the most versatile tools in the service of mankind.

In the finished pavilion on the Kodak site, visitors will find the most complete and colorful exhibit ever assembled to display photography's impact on our lives. We are confident that it will bring new awareness of photography's pervasive scope.

Part of the scope to which we refer is the enjoyment that millions associate with photography as a leisure activity. But there is more—the historian's interest in what went before, preserved on film, photography's ability to measure and document scientific progress, industry's growing use of photography as an ingenious and trustworthy production tool. The Kodak exhibit will present these many areas of interest.

Accomplishments of the past will also be on display. We will not neglect those pioneers who gave photography its start—Niepce and Daguerre. The first, Fox Talbot, inventor of the negative and print method

and Scott Archer, who in 1851 developed the wet process using glass plates.

Niepce, Daguerre, Talbot, and Archer were Europeans, but it was an American, George Eastman, who pioneered roll film and the simple, hand-held cameras that made picture taking both popular and practical for millions. Eastman's first Kodak camera reached the market in 1888. In August of 1889, just 50 years after Daguerre demonstrated his picture process before the French Academy, the first Eastman transparent-base roll film was announced.

Eastman built his company upon research. But his interest in experimentation was not limited to the sciences. He was as well a pioneer in mass production and international marketing. In that latter regard he was well aware of the rewards possible from the promotion of photography at international expositions.

As early as 1891, Eastman was planning to make the world's Columbian Exposition in Chicago a mecca for amateur picture takers from all parts of the world. When the exposition opened 2 years later, Kodak Exhibit Center provided darkrooms so that visitors might develop and print their own photos before leaving the fairgrounds. Photographic enlargements of then unbelievable size, up to 4 by 6 feet, amazed visitors.

The first full-size X-ray photograph of an entire human body was displayed by our company at Chicago's Century of Progress Exposition in 1933. The Kodak Pavilion at the Brussels Fair of 1935 was a focal point for picture takers. The company's Cavalcade of Color at the New York World's Fair of 1939 and 1940 gave great impetus to color photography's widespread popularity. Almost 8 million visitors to that exhibit saw tiny Kodachrome slides projected at 50,000 times their original size.

We mention these examples from the past only as precursors of what is to be presented by Kodak on this site in 1964 and 1965. We intend to offer fairgoers an exhibit as appealing, as instructive, and we believe, even more dramatic than those which have previously appeared under the Kodak emblem.

Exhibits will be designed with doing as well as seeing in mind. We also intend to present visual impressions that only photography can capture and convey, impressions too fleeting for the unaided eye to recall and interpret.

In physical design the Kodak Pavilion is the result of many months of thought and effort. Those chiefly responsible, the company's architects and designers, Will Burtin and others of his organization, have worked diligently and to excellent purpose. We are pleased at this time to reveal the result of their efforts.

We believe that this pavilion will be regarded as unique architectural showcase. A floating carpet of concrete, supported by four main columns, will provide a surface for gently sloping walkways, gardens, and fountains. There will be attractive settings for camera users who wish to photograph their families and friends.

Beneath the concrete carpet, at ground level, the visitor will find numerous exhibit areas of interest. Here he will be able to pass at leisure through the world of photography and, also, view exhibits which record Kodak achievements in other fields such as chemicals, plastics, and synthetic fibers.

A large and striking tower of photography will add visual drama. The equivalent of an eight-story building in height, the tower will have around its shaft five giant photographs. We expect that each of these will be more than 2,000 square feet in size, illuminated by day and by night, and visible from afar as well as nearby.

The tower will also house a large theater capable of accommodating thousands during the course of each day's fairgoing hours. We are, at the present time, planning a 12-

to 14-minute motion picture for showing there. To this production and to all that will appear at our exhibit we will draw upon our years of technical experience and the results of continuing research. Extensive study has gone into new methods of photographic display. Our aim is a total presentation as exciting in technique as in topical matter.

We have already referred to the part played by photography in modern life, in business, in science, in health, in a variety of fields. But to many of us photography is even more than pleasurable hobby or commercial medium. We nourish the sincere belief that photography, as a means of communication, can make substantial contributions to world understanding and progress.

Photography is a language of its own. Being universal in its appeal, it needs no translation. It can demonstrate that people throughout the world share many of the same problems. The same human aspirations, and a paramount hope for peace. It needs no footnotes, no interlingual dictionaries. We believe that no other medium is more admirably suited to carry the theme of the New York World's Fair—"Peace Through Understanding."

By 1964 the industrious and imaginative efforts of Mr. Moses and his associates will have come to fruition. Flushing Meadow will have been transformed by them into a symbol of human achievement. We are pleased to mark at this time the beginning of Kodak's part in this challenging enterprise. We appreciate your willingness to share this occasion with us. But let me add this note: Won't you come, too, and see us at the fair.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

#### STANDBY AUTHORITY TO ACCELERATE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMS OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PUBLIC BODIES

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be laid before the Senate and be made the pending business.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the Senate resumed the consideration of the amendments of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 2965) to provide standby authority to accelerate public works programs of the Federal Government and State and local public bodies.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] on page 6 in line 12 of the House amendments to Senate bill 2965.

#### CAN WE RESIST THE ONRUSH OF COMMUNISM?

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, last Friday it was my privilege to speak on the subject of war or peace. I prepared those remarks preparatory to a visit to Wisconsin, but never got to use them.

Today, I shall speak on another subject, namely, what I regard as the three great issues.

The first is whether we can keep the peace. The second is whether we can resist the onrush of communism. That is what I shall discuss today.

Before the week is over, I shall discuss what I regard as the third great issue; namely, whether we can maintain the economic solidarity of this country.

So far as I am concerned, those are the three big issues.

When I first came to Washington, Berlin, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltic States, and Eastern Germany were free. Now they have been taken into the Communist orbit. Many other things have changed since those days, and we must consider them in considering the issue—the future of communism.

We have had a war. We have laid aside many of our old ideas in relation to geography. In those days the world was really big. It took 12 hours to travel from Milwaukee to Washington. I have done it now in a little over an hour. It took the better part of a week to travel across the Atlantic; and now we are only 15 minutes away from Russia, with the intercontinental missiles that she has. Just recently, Russia put two cosmonauts into orbit in separate capsules. Just what the full meaning of that experiment is, we cannot yet foresee.

We, of course, have placed men into orbit, but only one of them traveled three times around the earth, whereas the Russian cosmonauts stayed aloft for days and traveled millions of miles.

We stayed out of the war until Pearl Harbor. At that time I was a non-interventionist, but Pearl Harbor changed my viewpoint.

It was several years after Pearl Harbor that we dropped the bomb at Hiroshima. It killed 100,000, and wounded another 100,000. That was a baby bomb compared with what we have and what the Russians now have.

Some may ask, But what has this to do with containing communism? It is very evident that we must contain communism in some other way except by war, because a war would destroy mankind. Are we losing the war? The rising power of democratic nations, the hesitancy of uncommitted countries to yield to communism, and the internal difficulties of the Communist nations give us the answer. In short, at present we are not losing the cold war.

In a superficial sense we may have met the challenge of communism—but no in Cuba, the Congo, or Laos.

Lenin said:

When the American bourgeoisie lose their heads; when they arrest large numbers of people on suspicion of their being Communists, and when they create an atmosphere of panic by spreading alarming rumors of Bolshevik plots, we should thank these American gentlemen. They are working for us.

Khrushchev said that he "would bury" us.

Yes, we have shrunken the world by our inventive genius, but we have not shrunken the ignorance that is widespread. We still have the prejudice that is based upon race, color, and religion; and we—at least, some of us—still fail to understand our American way of life, and that we are trustees of it.

And let it be said that we are not free from the demagog and his tactics.

Communism has as its objective taking away the idea of a government "of, by, and for the people." In other words, communism does not recognize the basic human rights that are set forth in our Constitution.

Someone has said:

It is good, of course, to salute the flag and to love one's country, but it is better still to love justice and righteousness and extend the doctrine of brotherhood.

In so doing, we become vigorous soldiers against atheistic communism.

Let us realize that the struggle is not for physical survival, but, as I have suggested, for the maintenance of human and spiritual values. We must make that very clear, and we must also distinguish between communism as a philosophical system and the brute force of Russian and Chinese imperialism.

Communism and its ideas can be overcome only by better ideas.

One of the weapons of communism is diversion. That is a military term which is used when one seeks to convince his opponent that the danger lies at one place, and attacks at another point. I believe the man who said:

The dangers from communism have never been more real than they are today.

Consequently, we must be on our toes and must be alert and adequate to meet any emergency—in short, alert to meet the challenge where it is most crucial.

President Kennedy, speaking a few days ago, said:

We are in a decade of crises, and we can't afford inefficiency and waste—the key to this century is power.

He was referring to the power that comes from generators. I want to apply the same term to the mind of man.

In his talk, the President referred to the differences that existed between the various segments of our society. I repeat, I am speaking about the power that would eliminate the attacks upon free enterprise and the attacks upon government, "of, by, and for the people."

I want power that will demonstrate the brotherhood of man, so that nations will obliterate the differences that separate them.

I want the power that will cause men to realize the significance of a God of the spirit. Do I want too much? That has been the wish of all the prophets and saviors of the race, and we are still in the wilderness, seeking for "the way, and the truth and the life."

WORLD COMMUNISM, A CONTINUING THREAT TO THE FREE WORLD

The major source for the Communist threat to the free world is twofold. It is the physical dimension, and thus power, of the movement and the nations it now embraces. It is also the goals and modus operandi of the movement in achieving those goals.

Looking at a map of the world today, one cannot avoid being struck by the massive configuration of power world communism represents. Over one-third of the world's population and almost one-fourth of the area of the world are now under direct Communist control. These figures, I hasten to add, do not take into account the worldwide scope

of the movement which, according to Khrushchev, has Communist Parties operating in 87 countries uniting into one movement a membership numbering more than 36 million people.

This total complex of physical and political power, my friends, represents a threat of enormous dimension to our security and that of the free world. The use, or rather, abuse of this power today is the fundamental cause of the political problems facing the world; for—intoxicated by the heady wines of success in territorial expansion, political aggrandizement, and scientific achievement—the Communists believe that the balance of world power has shifted to their advantage.

We cannot, and, indeed, we do not concede this point, but nevertheless, the danger to us stems from a Communist belief in this erroneous assumption and in conducting their foreign policy accordingly. It is this peculiar mixture of ideological belief and aggressive behavior that generates the danger for us today.

Yet, we cannot deny the fact that forces are at work in the world that add substantially to our problem; forces, in a sense, independent of communism. In this instance, I am thinking particularly of the vast, uncongealed power potential that is seen in the emerging new nations of the underdeveloped areas of the world. Whether their loyalties in international politics will be given to the Communist world or the democratic free world stands as one of the great questions of the immediate future.

Aside from these general problems, what are the specific manifestations of the Communist threat?

In approaching this question, I would first consider the specific Soviet threat, and, secondly, the threat from other areas of the world.

Let us first look at specifically the Soviet threat as it has taken shape in the problem of Berlin and the challenge in space.

A glance at the daily press is sufficient to apprise one of the great danger to world peace that Berlin represents. The sight of a dying refugee lad of 18 strung up on the barbed wire barricade along the Berlin wall has stirred the inner emotions of free Berliners sufficiently to inspire widespread unrest in the city and to raise the threshold of potential war.

We are deeply committed in Berlin.

We cannot back down before the Soviet threats and demands to force our withdrawal from the city.

Here is a test of strength that knows no parallel in recent years. It is a test of strength before which we cannot falter.

Submission to the Soviets in this contest would be the signal for a retreat for us in the global confrontation with communism. It would be new Munich, the launching of a new era of appeasement—the end of which would spell our doom as a nation and great power.

I do not deny that the risks are great in defending our position in Berlin.

I do not deny that solutions are extraordinarily difficult and that the alternatives presented to us are drastically limited.

But these risks we must accept, and in our search for an acceptable solution, however limited the alternatives, we must hold firmly to the principles of free choice upon which our vital interests and sacred honor rest.

A second threat to us from the Soviet Union comes in the shape of the current space race.

Recent success of the Soviet tandem orbital shots drives home again the unpleasant, bitter reality that we are in a desperate, indeed, a deadly race with the Soviet Union in space exploration.

Some may question the utility of our great investments in space. And I do not deny that these investments have been enormous. But, all Americans must comprehend the fact that space power means political power and that political power is a vital asset in the arsenal of survival.

The Soviet Union has accrued enormous political benefits from its successes in space. Since Sputnik I, the world has transformed its image of Russia. No longer is this the land of peasants, slovenly, awkward, inarticulate, and illiterate—the peasants that one finds so skillfully described in the writings of Turgenev. Rather, Russia, in the mind of the world today, is a land of proven technological and scientific success, a Russia in the technical sense that the 19th century Russian westernizer hoped would take place. As a consequence of the changed image of the Soviet Union, Russian prestige in world politics has increased enormously. And our prestige as the great technological and scientific wonder of the world has, I regret to say, declined.

Moreover, the political factors involved in the space race are compounded by the far-reaching military implications. We cannot overlook these implications in our assessment of the Communist threat.

Soviet Russia, therefore, poses a great threat to the free world, but, unfortunately, the threat of communism as a universal ideology and complex of power has a much broader dimension. Communist China has yet to throw its full weight in the great contest for survival. Ever since the Korean war, the Chinese Communists have, by and large, concentrated their energies on building communism in their country. Periodic peripheral thrusts at Quemoy and Matsu, Vietnam, and Laos have been serious irritants in world affairs, but, by and large the Chinese have yet to make their full influence and power felt. They are still kept out of the United Nations. But, how long can this go on? Now, we can only contemplate the mischief they will cause in world affairs. Soon, this potential threat of China will become a real threat. Then our problems and those of other free peoples will be compounded. For there can be no doubt that the free world will meet its greatest challenge when this reckless, massive, ideologically immature giant steps onto the stage of world affairs to play the major role its power and influence warrant.

My message to the Senate, therefore, is not at all comforting. The beautiful quiescent days of national insularity

have gone forever. What I bring to the Senate is a call to meet this great challenge to our survival. It will not be a challenge easily managed. The problems it will generate will be overwhelming and continuous. It will be so because the nature of international relations, especially as the Communists conceive it, is a continuous commitment to power conflicts and the generation of an unending procession of problems. In this era of prolonged anxiety we will have to bear our responsibilities manfully. Indeed, we must. This is our only alternative to survive as a people and a great power.

I conclude my remarks by saying what I said in the beginning: There are three great challenges to this country, our way of life, to the things we call American, and our leadership in a world of, for, and by the people. The challenges are: First, can we keep the peace? Second, can we contain communism? Third, can we maintain the economic solidarity of the American Republic?

**Mr. MILLER.** Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin for his outstanding speech. There are many points in his speech which need to be repeated over and over. I think he has rendered a service to the country for giving such a fine dissertation on communism and its problems as he has done today.

#### THE CONGO AND THE U.N.

**Mr. MANSFIELD.** Mr. President, in the current issue of the Saturday Evening Post there appeared an editorial entitled "The Congo and the U.N." I ask unanimous consent that the editorial may be printed in the body of the RECORD. I think it is worthwhile. It covers the situation rather thoroughly. Certainly, it is worth consideration by Members of the Senate.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE CONGO AND THE U.N.

In one of the more ironic twists of our times, ultraconservatives who pride themselves on being more anti-Communist and more devoted to the cause of freedom than others are clamoring for U.N. troops to withdraw from the Congo. They are urging the U.S. Government to put its trust in wily, opportunistic Moise Tshombe, secessionist president of Katanga Province. An organization called the American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters in a full-page newspaper advertisement recently proclaimed, "It's time for the U.N. army to get out of the Congo" and asked the question, "Why not let the Congolese settle their own affairs?"

It would be hard to conceive of a more disastrous step than for the U.N. to pull out of the Congo now. Nothing could be more naive than to expect that the Congolese could or would settle their own affairs.

The United Nations, heaven knows, has its limitations as a world peace organization. When the great powers come into direct collision, it is largely useless, but it can on occasion move into peripheral situations and prevent a great power collision that might otherwise occur. That has been its task in the Congo.

The United Nations went into the former Belgian Congo in the summer of 1960 to attempt to bring order to that unhappy land

after the Congo army had run amok and Belgian troops had moved back in. The Communists at that point made a brazen attempt to bring the Congo under their domination. More than 300 Communist "technicians" swarmed in. Communist sympathizers infiltrated the government of Premier Patrice Lumumba, which swung further and further to the left. The controlled radio and press adopted a strident anti-Western tone. The Russians, in the face of a series of U.N. resolutions, began sending trucks and planes into the Congo.

U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold called upon the Communists to halt their intervention. U.N. troops shut down major airfields to all but U.N. traffic, and after Lumumba was ousted, President Joseph Kasavubu ordered Russian and Czech "technicians" out of the Congo.

That the Communists had been frustrated by the U.N. was clear enough that fall when Nikita Khrushchev pounded his shoe on a desk at U.N. headquarters in New York, demanded Dag Hammarskjold's resignation and vainly insisted that a troika or three-headed directorate, be installed in place of the Secretary General.

Two years have passed, and the Communists so far have been foiled in their efforts to bring the Congo under their domination. The Central Congo Government now run by Premier Cyrille Adoula, shaky though it may be, is friendly to the West and committed, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk has said, "to genuine independence and progress for the Congo."

Moise Tshombe, although long regarded as a reliable anti-Communist, has recently been flirting with the Communists. His Conakat Party, which still insists in the Central Government Parliament at Léopoldville, has been teaming up with leftists against the Adoula government. Tshombe calls us "racist capitalists" and says the U.S. Department of State is "under the thumb of voracious financiers."

The object of our policy in the Congo is to enable the Congolese people to achieve a stable independent government. But time is rapidly running out for the present government. It cannot survive if it is to continue to be deprived of revenues from Katanga's rich copper and uranium deposits. Some measure of progress toward unification is a political necessity. The continuing secession of Katanga, as U.S. Under Secretary of State George Ball says, will "threaten the entire Congo with chaos and civil war and lead to the establishment of a Communist base in the heart of central Africa. The armed secession in Katanga plays into the hands of the Communists. This is a fact that all Americans should ponder."

The Adoula government recently proposed a federal constitution that would give Katanga a considerable measure of local autonomy. Tshombe called the constitution "what we always wanted." But our Government wisely decided not to rely solely on his word. Mr. Tshombe in the past has repeatedly adopted cooperative poses only to change his stance when the crisis of the moment had passed.

Accordingly in recent weeks our Government has devised a broad series of pressures and inducements to try to compel Tshombe to end his secession. U.N. Secretary General U Thant, who called Tshombe and his Katangan associates "a bunch of clowns," thereby confusing tragedy with comedy, has also proposed economic pressures, including the freezing of payments to Katanga by the wealthy, Belgian- and British-controlled Union Minière mining syndicate.

The officials who planned these pressures had no certainty that Tshombe would give in—or resort to another round of violence. But until a measure of stability is restored in the Congo, it would be foolhardy for the U.N. to withdraw. We must support the

U.N. presence there. The alternative, as President Kennedy has said, is "complete chaos."

**Mr. MANSFIELD.** Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

**Mr. MANSFIELD.** Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further proceedings under the quorum call may be dispensed with.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

**Mr. MANSFIELD.** Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate concludes its deliberations today, it stand in adjournment to meet at 10 a.m. tomorrow.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

#### DISARMAMENT: THE NECESSITY OF INFORMING THE PUBLIC

**Mr. MILLER.** Mr. President, the most important problem facing the world today is prevention of total nuclear war, which would destroy civilized society. From the standpoint of the national interest of the United States, however, solution to the problem must be consistent with our freedom and our way of life. "Better red than dead" is a materialistic philosophy which has no relevance to such a solution. To this end there is now great discussion concerning a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons which is highlighted by the current series of Soviet detonations going on in the atmosphere. It overshadows the disarmament negotiations, if they can be called negotiations, now going on in Geneva. To test or not to test is a subject which affects all people on this earth and generations as yet unborn.

There has never been a time in history when major powers voluntarily laid aside their arms. We do remember that in the 1920's and 1930's there were serious efforts to achieve this end. There was the Kellogg Peace Pact; there was the Washington Naval Treaty; and there were other conferences and documents which expressed this noble purpose. Some nations, including the United States, because of their sincere desire to reduce or eliminate the scourge of war, did in fact lay down their arms in part. But, while they were doing so, other nations, notably Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, secretly increased their armaments. There was no foolproof inspection at that time and there was no change of heart by basically aggressive nations. Winston Churchill records this cruel and misguided period between the wars in the first volume of his monumental history of World War II, "The Gathering Storm." He completes the tale in the last volume of the six. The theme of that last volume, "Triumph

and Tragedy" is "How the great democracies triumphed and so were able to resume the follies which had so nearly cost them their life."

Our philosophy in the United States is to live in peace with others. A nuclear test ban and a disarmament treaty would be consistent with our philosophy. But the goal, or the philosophy, of Soviet communism is to subjugate the world and us by one means or another. This avowed goal is expressed in the writings of Lenin; it is expressed in Khrushchev's famous phrase "we will bury you," and it is recognized as a Soviet goal by all people who have taken the trouble to acquaint themselves with the actions of the Soviet Union during recent history.

Can we, the United States, expect to alter that philosophy? Consider for example that in 3½ years of assiduous negotiations for a nuclear test ban, we have achieved no progress. My colleagues will recall that these negotiations were interrupted in 1961 when the Soviet Union, without any warning, and after secret preparations, began a massive series of nuclear tests, thus ending the moratorium on testing that had been in effect for 3 years.

We want a nuclear test ban. We want to work toward and eventually achieve a meaningful disarmament treaty. But we hear now alarmist speeches which could very well stampede us into making an inadequate treaty with a nation never known to keep its word. We hear that a nuclear arms race is a grave risk to our security. Is it a greater risk to have an arms race or to proceed with a treaty which can very well leave us disarmed when an aggressive nation confronts us with force clandestinely achieved and decisive in its power? An inadequate disarmament treaty with Soviet Russia is certainly more risky than escalation. Viewed calmly, a war by miscalculation is a real danger, though hypothetical. The Soviet determination to dominate us is not hypothetical at all, it is an announced policy. Which is the greater risk?

The Secretary of State told the Disarmament Conference at Geneva on July 24:

The United States does not insist on foolproof arrangements in a disarmament agreement and is ready to share certain risks.

He gave no indication of what kind of risks we would be willing to share, but the statement was unfortunate because it seems to follow an "accommodation" policy vis-a-vis the Soviets. Moreover, it encourages advocates of a headlong approach to a nuclear test ban agreement whose approach is that the risk of war grows every day; that modern weapons beget a greater risk of war. Of course, this is possible, but have we not learned that the risk of war is least to a nation that is powerful and makes it crystal clear to every other nation that it is determined to remain strong enough to deter aggression? Is there any doubt about this principle as we review history? Had France retained its power and shown a willingness to use it, would Hitler have reentered the Rhineland in 1936? Had

Britain made it clear that she would use her naval power, would Mussolini have attacked Ethiopia in 1935? Had the United States made it known that she not only had the power but the will to use it, would there have been a Korean war? A few years ago we let it be known that our Navy would be used to keep the Chinese Communists from crossing the Formosa Strait to attack Taiwan, and there has been no attack. What if we had adopted such a policy in 1940, and announced it to the world and to Japan? Would Japan have attacked? I believe that the answer to these questions is "No." Aggression would have been prevented, because the would-be aggressor would know, first, that power to resist its aggression existed, and, second, there was no point in taking a calculated risk of aggression because the will to commit the power to stop the aggression was beyond the shadow of a doubt.

We know that strength is the key to peace. Let us never forget this. Let us not gamble with security because of a desire to achieve a disarmament treaty, unless we know for a certainty that we are protected. Let us not take on the risk of anything less than certainty.

Consider our problems now of achieving a nuclear test ban. If the present Soviet tests bring them to what they regard as nuclear superiority, they will stop testing. Informed opinion holds that they already have nuclear parity. Putting it another way, they did not hesitate to negotiate while preparing for tests and then they tested in 1961, breaking the moratorium unilaterally. Does this not mean that regardless of what we do, the Soviets will test and develop and test until they feel that they have superiority, regardless of whether negotiations are going on or not? If they do not feel that way, why did they test in 1961? For what purpose would they test if not to seek superiority in nuclear weapon technology? I believe it is not a question, as has been suggested, of paying a price of forbearance to allow the Soviets to approach parity. I believe an analysis will show that they have parity now and that they will test and retest until they have superiority. They do not want a test ban, certainly not an enforceable one, until they have achieved superiority. Then we will not want one because we will not be able to afford one. If we had a test ban after they had achieved superiority, then we would have more than a risk. We would be doomed.

Should not the policy of this country be to continue to strive for the protection afforded by nuclear weapons superiority? Presumably, this will demand testing on our part. Should we not let the initiative for achieving a nuclear test ban come from the Soviet Union? And it will come when they feel that they have nothing to gain by further testing and when they feel that they will not catch up. They will have believed our determination not to be surpassed.

As much as anyone else, I want to live and have my people live in a disarmed

and peaceful world, but we shall never realize this without strength, conviction, and well-designed plans.

There are some aspects of our test ban and disarmament proposals I should like to discuss.

The manner in which recent findings from the Vela program was released to the public, our friends and enemies, was certainly not in the best interests of the Nation and our disarmament negotiators in Geneva. Many of the delegates in Geneva are grasping for straws endeavoring to find something that will break the impasse. News of a purported breakthrough in detection was bound to cause commotion. When U.S. revised proposals were not radical, the negotiators as well as our Government were placed in a bad light. Two developments came from Vela. One, that we could differentiate more precisely between a natural seismic disturbance and a nuclear explosion, although there still remain many disturbances we cannot identify as one or the other. But the other finding from Vela showed us that we could not detect nearly as small an underground explosion in earth as we thought we could. What concessions can we make at Geneva as a result of Vela? Perhaps a few less inspections at best. And we can make no concessions with respect to inspections to detect preparations for testing—a matter that is strangely omitted from news releases on the subject.

Some people have stated that very little can be learned from underground tests. This is a fallacy. Vast knowledge can be gained from underground tests in all fields of weapon development. Weapon technology is fast moving; a clandestine, underground Soviet test program could put them ahead of us in a very short time. We could not realistically include underground testing in a nuclear test ban without Western-monitored control posts throughout the Soviet Union.

During the negotiations of recent years, the Soviets have been adamant on the point of inspection. They call this espionage. They have not receded from this position in the slightest. It seems to be a matter of principle with them or it may be that they will not tolerate inspection because they plan to cheat. In any event, it is very doubtful that there is any purpose to be served by U.S. concessions on the number of inspections required in a treaty. The Soviets steadfastly declare they will not tolerate any inspections. Mr. Zorin, the Soviet representative at Geneva, has already greeted our concessions on the number of inspections by saying that he sees no great hope of a solution.

There are two warnings we should heed before entering into a test ban agreement. If the Russians tested, in order to convince the world that the Soviets abrogated the treaty we would have to offer positive proof. Only an inspection on the site with neutrals present would suffice. Secondly, any test ban the United States and U.S.S.R. entered into would have to include all other nuclear nations within a relatively short period of time. Otherwise, Russia, or

Communist China herself, could conduct their test programs in China with impunity.

It has been stated that proliferation of nuclear weapons and the technology for making nuclear weapons is the greatest threat to the peace of the world today. A test ban between Russia and the United States is supposed to stop proliferation. Let us look at the facts rationally. Regardless of efforts to the contrary, technology is going to diffuse to other nations—either whole plants which could be used to build tested weapons or know-how which would facilitate development. It is true that a test ban would slow weapon development and retard the trend toward cheap weapons; but, on the other hand, peaceful reactors could help to defray the costs of weapon manufacture. Weapons might even be sold by one nation to another. A nation acquires nuclear weapons for either status and prestige in the world, or to use on a potential enemy. It is difficult to see how a rapprochement between the United States and Russia could alter either of these two reasons. I suggest that proliferation should be only a minor consideration in reaching agreements with Russia, for a test ban would only slightly slow proliferation.

Turning now to disarmament, we heard recently in this Chamber that this Government should go on record as having the intention of achieving a workable and forcible disarmament program. I believe to begin with, we should preserve the knowledge in the world that we have the intention of remaining strong enough to deter aggression. Conversely, we should go on record as having no intention of achieving disarmament in part or in whole without corresponding foolproof safeguards that we will not be surprised or attacked by an aggressive power. To do less is to assume a risk too great to be accepted by a government dedicated to the preservation of freedom. If nuclear war is insane let us remember that to open oneself to fatal attack is also insane.

The Washington Post reported on August 7 that the U.S. delegation has stated in Geneva that it is prepared to freeze conventional arms production at the start of stage I of the disarmament program instead of at the end of that stage. Mr. Zorin replies that this considerable U.S. concession does not change the basic American unwillingness to halt the production of all nuclear delivery systems in the first stage. Suppose we halted the production of ballistic missiles in the first stage? Have we the slightest assurance without foolproof inspections that the Soviets would halt production of their missiles?

It seems conceivable that if we actually carried out a concession of this kind and then awoke one morning to find that the Soviet policy of cheating had continued undetected so that we were no longer able to deter aggression, the American people would demand impeachment of any President who had permitted such a situation to arise.

There is another aspect of this problem which deserves more than the silent

treatment it has thus far received from the administration. This is the development of an antimissile defense. Why should there not be inspection with respect to this? What good does it do to stop making nuclear weapons if the other side could neutralize our stockpile of such weapons by developing an antimissile defense? The result would be the same as if the other side continued to produce nuclear weapons because there was no foolproof inspection system.

Two years ago, a British writer, Constantine FitzGibbon, published a book which provides a glaring example of how false disarmament might be accomplished. This book is entitled, "When the Kissing Had to Stop." Although the account is fictional, this is how we might achieve our own defeat by our haste in making a treaty for disarmament. In the book on page 29, an address on the subject of peace by the hypothetical Soviet Premier, Mr. Kornoloff, to the political, cultural, and scientific leaders of the Soviet Union as well as many representatives from the Eastern European countries and China is reported as follows:

Amidst mounting applause he told his distinguished audience that the Soviet Union, wearied by the long series of fruitless summit conferences and by the complete lack of progress in the disarmament talks that have been going on for the last 7 years, has decided to force the issue by herself disarming unilaterally. This, he said, would be done by stages, and the first stage had already begun, with the dismantling of the rocket bases in the People's Republic of Poland. Journalists and others from all lands would be permitted, and indeed encouraged, to visit the rocket bases and see the work of demolition now being carried out. The next step would be the dismantling of the missile bases in the other Warsaw Pact countries, and then in the Soviet Union itself. Mr. Kornoloff said that he had every reason to believe that Russia's great peace-loving ally, the People's Republic of China, was contemplating taking a similar step. However, the final scrapping of all missile bases would naturally depend on some measure of similar disarmament on the part of the United States, Britain and other NATO powers. As soon as nuclear disarmament was achieved, the Soviet Union proposed to disband its conventional armed forces. Mr. Kornoloff said that never before in history had such a gesture for peace been made. Since this staged disarmament would be carried out in full view of the world press, this should dispose once and for all of the malicious American slander that the Soviet Union had no intention of truly disarming. The Soviet Union, he said, stood now, as it had always stood, for peace. It was now up to others to prove that their past statements were more than mere lipservice paid to this great ideal which, in Soviet Russia, was a proven reality. Mr. Kornoloff spoke for 5 hours.

The book continues:

The President has so far refused to comment on the surprise Soviet move. It is known, however, that the State Department regards Mr. Kornoloff's speech with a measure of skepticism. A State Department spokesman said: "We'll believe it when we see it."

The hypothetical Soviet Premier actually does pull down some rocket installations in Poland which he no longer

needs, and then, to give further evidence of his good faith, he decrees the dismantling of bases in Rumania. He is advised by a bewildered subordinate that there are no bases in Rumania. Kornoloff chuckles and says on page 96: "Exactly. Run up some dummy ones, fast, then pull them down with maximum publicity."

A feature of the disarmament plan is the zonal inspection scheme. This has been the subject of much discussion. I cannot picture the Nation living under a lottery. We must have a foolproof system of inspection. The random sampling of the zonal system was taken from industry and business techniques. It is true that a good estimate of the number of bad items on an assembly line can be obtained from sampling, but the items appear at random; there is no one behind the line conniving to produce the wrong answer. The point I am making is that the zonal inspection system has not been tested. To test its suitability is an expensive and prolonged undertaking. That is why it was offered as an illustrative example in the draft disarmament treaty. The difficulty of finding a few hidden missiles and their warheads, enough to blackmail the United States, is fantastic. They could remain hidden until the world was completely disarmed.

Much has been said about the sword of Damocles over our heads in the form of nuclear war by accident. However, if the Soviets were as apprehensive about this as some other people, they would be willing to relinquish some of their secrecy for more security. We need be no more apprehensive about this than they.

When some administration spokesmen talk about an accommodation with the Soviets, we should not be misled into thinking that the basic nature of communism, as an aggressive philosophy, will be changed; nor that the leaders of Russia will abandon communism. We should be alert to the fact that any agreement signed by these leaders will be consistent with their plan and their objective of world domination.

Thus far in Geneva they have conceded not one point of substance. In fact, they have been quite frank about their position of no concession on points of substance. Talk of a nuclear test ban agreement is one thing, but it takes two sides, both sincere, to make and keep an agreement. With the Soviet-directed crises in Cuba, in Berlin, in Laos, and in South Vietnam, we have received no indication whatsoever of sincerity on the part of the Soviet leaders other than their sincere intention to spread communism around the world by any means—fair or foul. Under such circumstances, it is time for us to stop making concessions or talking about possible concessions which carry risks with them and for the Soviets to display a change of intentions by accepting a foolproof inspection system on nuclear testing, on preparation for nuclear testing, and on the development of an antimissile defense as long as nuclear weapons are stockpiled.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### STANDBY AUTHORITY TO ACCELERATE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMS OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PUBLIC BODIES

The Senate resumed the consideration of the House amendments to the bill (S. 2965) to provide standby authority to accelerate public works programs of the Federal Government and State and local public bodies.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I do not intend to take much time in explaining the amendment which I offered last Friday for myself and the distinguished Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER]. My reasons for offering the amendment are clearly set forth in the RECORD of the proceedings of last Friday's session of the Senate. I shall now give a brief explanation of the purpose of the amendment.

When the bill passed by the Senate, S. 2965, was sent to the House, the House did not accept the Senate bill. The House Committee on Public Works had reported to the House its bill, H.R. 10113.

The bill which had been reported by the House Committee on Public Works was comprised of 12 sections. An amendment which was offered on the floor of the House struck out sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, leaving six sections, which was adopted as a substitute for the Senate bill. I think the operative section of the House substitute is section 3. Section 3 provides the criteria for making funds available to persistent labor surplus areas and to areas covered by the Area Redevelopment Act. It provides to the President the authority to allocate \$900 million to various agencies of the Government for public works projects in such areas.

While section 3 provides an authorization of \$900 million to make the bill effective, the actual amount to be made available will depend upon the action of the Appropriations Committees and the Congress.

Nevertheless, in section 5 of the House substitute, which would provide the Housing and Home Finance Agency with authority to make grants-in-aid for local public works if this measure becomes law, there is no reference to section 3. According to section 5, the Administrator would derive his authority from "section 9." The bill reported by the House Public Works Committee contained section 9, but there is no section 9 in the bill passed by the House. So the bill before us contains a known error.

I must say, in frankness, that I think it is one of inadvertence, because after the bill had been passed by the House, Representative BLATNIK, the House manager of the bill, asked unanimous con-

sent that the House request that the bill be returned by the Senate and that the Clerk of the House be authorized to correct the error; but objection was made.

So the bill came to the Senate with the error. It was referred to the Committee on Public Works, where I moved that the error be corrected by inserting in section 5 as the source of funds for grants by the HHFA the reference to the correct paragraph—to paragraph 3, instead of paragraph 9. But my proposal was opposed by the majority members of the committee, and it was defeated.

I have made the same motion in the Senate.

As I said on Friday, my motion may appear to some to be frivolous and without importance. I do not think so. I directed my remarks to this subject last Friday.

It is argued by the Senator in charge of the bill on the floor of the Senate, the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR], and by other Senators that the error can be corrected by interpretation on the floor of the Senate.

I think it is the rule, that if no interpretation of any kind is made, and if the validity of the bill should be questioned, and the issue should be determined by the courts, the courts could examine the bill and the legislative proceedings as a whole. If the intent of the legislative body is unclear, the courts could take the position that the legislative body did not intend to do a nullity, and considering the history of the development of the bill, in committee and on the floor, determine that the reference to "section 9" was inadvertent and that "section 3" was intended—to make the bill operative.

On the other hand we cannot know whether an interpretation made on the floor has validity in this case. And when this doubt is known to all of us, I hold that it is our duty to correct known errors. Those who favor the bill should not run a risk in failing to do so.

I cannot say that if the bill were to be interpreted by a court, the court would say the bill was inoperative. When I consider all the facts in connection with the bill—the fact that there is no section 9, and that the content of section 9 as originally reported and the content of the present section 3 are similar—I believe it is possible that a court would say that it was the intention of the House to refer to section 3, instead of section 9.

But some rather peculiar questions are raised: First, can the Senate determine what the House intended to do? I do not believe that it can. The managers of the bill in the House are the ones who have the capacity to speak for the House bill.

Then it may be said that the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR], as the Senator in charge of the bill, can interpret what is intended by the bill, in explaining the error. But there is a curious inconsistency in this connection.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, at this point will the Senator from Kentucky yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. MILLER. I know that during the debate last Friday, considerable point

was made of the fact that there was a certain intention on the part of the sponsor and floor manager of the bill in the House.

I hold in my hand a book entitled "Statute Making," written by Armand B. Coigne, and published by the Commerce Clearinghouse, copyright 1948. In this book, on the subject of construction and legislative intent, the statement is made:

The statements of the personal intention of members made during debates have been held not to be a proper source for the consideration of legislative intent, even when made by the sponsor.

And the following cases are cited:

*U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association*, 166 U.S. 290, 17 Sup. Ct. 540; *Hance Bros. v. American Railway Express Co.*, 19 N.Y.S. 530, 116 Misc. 653.

Mr. COOPER. I believe the Senator from Iowa is correct—that is with respect to one aspect of the rule of interpretation.

I believe the basic rule is set forth in the memorandum prepared by the office of the Legislative Counsel, under the title "Use of Extrinsic Aids in Interpretation of Statutes." On page 2, where the reference is to a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in *United States v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.* (1929, 278 U.S. 269, 278); this is the language of the Court:

But where the language of an enactment is clear and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impractical consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended.

In other words, if there is a clear statement in the language of the bill, it is to be taken as the intent of Congress, unless that construction would lead to an absurd or impractical consequence.

So, if a court were called upon to interpret the bill, it might say, "When '9' was used, Section '3' was intended." The court would conclude that Congress did not intend to do a nullity.

But we do not know whether that interpretation would be made.

I have raised the question of whether the Senate can interpret the intent of the House. It may be said that the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR] and other Senators are not trying to do so—that they are interpreting the intent of the Senate. But a curious situation arises in this connection. The majority members of the committee voted against saying that section 5 actually referred to section 3, and supported the section 5 as it appears in the bill—referring to the nonexistent section 9. All of this illustrates that it is wise to properly correct the bill.

Mr. President, I agree with what the Senator from Iowa said, namely, that what individual Members—except the managers of the bill—say about this matter has no importance at all, insofar as interpretation is concerned. The committee report and the statements made by the manager on the floor are the sources of evidence which a court would take into consideration. What other Members may say about the intent of the bill has no value at all, except as it draws explanatory statements from

Members in charge of the bill. What I say now has no legal value from the standpoint of interpretation. I can only point out to Members that we may be doing something which is improper, and which could work against the effectiveness of the bill, unless we correct in the proper way the known error in the bill.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, will the able Senator from Kentucky yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. RANDOLPH. On Friday evening the Senator from Kentucky stated his position, and he has reiterated it today. It was my understanding then, as it is now, that he believes that the inadvertent and/or technical error in numbering does not affect the substance of the House version of the bill. Is that correct?

Mr. COOPER. I say it is possible, and I will go further and say that I think it probable, if a court were required to interpret the bill, that in view of the history of the bill, it would find that it was the intent of the managers of the bill, and the House, to refer to section 3, rather than section 9. Such a conclusion is supported from the debate, and statements of Representatives BLATNIK and AUCHINCLOSS after the bill had been passed, after the mistake was discovered. That would be my judgment. On the other hand, I say there is a doubt about it which the Senate should take into account, and which places on the Senate the duty to correct the error.

Mr. RANDOLPH. May I inquire further?

Mr. COOPER. Yes.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Is it not true that the Senate's desire to agree to the House version of the public works acceleration bill is now indicated by the fact that the House bill calls for a 1-year action program, while the Senate bill called for an action program plus a standby program? And is it not true that the House bill calls for 75 percent of Federal participation in certain hardship or distress cases, the Senate bill called for 90 percent and that it is our desire to accept the House measure? These two basic differences have been resolved by the action of the Senate committee in recommending to this body that we agree to the House bill; is not that correct?

Mr. COOPER. The Senate Committee on Public Works voted to report the House substitute to the Senate with the recommendation that it pass. As the Senator knows, I offered an amendment in the committee to correct the error which was apparent in the House bill, and my amendment was defeated, being opposed by the majority Members.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Then, the Senator is saying to the Senate that there is no attempt on the part of the Senator from Kentucky to delay the passage of this legislation?

Mr. COOPER. No; I said that on Friday. Of course, I said then, and correctly, that if my amendment should be adopted, it would have the effect of sending the bill back to the House for action, or to conference. As was said so plainly by the majority whip [Mr. HUMPHREY] on Friday, that is what the majority does not want to do, because, as

they have said, very clearly, they are afraid if that should happen the bill might not be acted upon by the House or in conference, and the bill might be lost.

I said that my action could be interpreted by some as a desire on my part to delay or defeat the bill because, if my amendment were adopted, the bill would go back to the House or to conference. But I pointed out that I support the bill. I voted for the bill when it was previously before the Senate. I shall vote for it when it comes up for final vote. Nevertheless, I have offered the amendment for the reasons I have stated, because I believe it is the proper course for the Senate to take—not only with respect to this bill but with respect to all legislation when the Senate knows that errors exist.

Some doubt whether the error in the bill can be interpreted and corrected by legislative history. I pointed out that, according to the rules of the courts, interpretations can come only from a committee report—and we have no committee report—or from the Senator in charge of the bill. The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR] has made his statements for the purpose of correction and showing that when the numeral "9" was used, it meant the numeral "3."

I think it was inconsistent that the Committee on Public Works did not make the correction.

I doubt if the Senate can interpret what the House meant.

So there is some danger, even if slight, that we might pass a nullity, and later, if it were questioned, a court might say, "This bill has no effect." It is doubtful whether a taxpayer could assert a sufficient interest to bring an action in court.

But if this bill were passed, the Committees on Appropriations would have to provide funds for it, and the Committees on Appropriations might raise questions.

Also, the General Accounting Office might raise a question. It could raise a question about the lawful use of the funds. I know the opinions of the General Accounting Office are advisory but I do notice in a recent report on the functions of the General Accounting Office, Senate Document No. 96, May 29, 1962, at page 5, the following statement as one of its functions:

Rendering decisions at the request of heads of departments and agencies and disbursing and certifying officers on the legality of proposed payments or transactions, which decisions are binding on the executive branch.

Perhaps this statement is a little extensive. Such a question would perhaps go to court for decision.

If the bill is passed and the President signs it, the agencies will undoubtedly do his will, and the question may never be raised about its legal interpretation. But these possible complications—and I admit they are complications that may never arise—point up the importance of the Senate acting properly, and correcting the error.

I come to my final point: Is it a wise precedent for the Senate to pass a bill knowing that there is an error in it? I am sure that many times bills are

passed with errors in them, but without knowledge of the errors. They can be corrected by concurrent resolution. But I think it a bad precedent for either House to pass a bill with knowledge of errors which could affect the operation of the bill. The House found an error in the bill, but only after passage, and then Representative BLATNIK tried to secure its correction in a proper legislative manner. The usual practice is for either body of Congress to correct an error when the bill is before it, or, after the bill is passed, by concurrent resolution.

It may be said that in this particular instance the error is of no importance and that "we want to get this bill passed." But it is a bad precedent. It may not make any difference in this case, but when other bills are before us, will the Senate use this expedient again? Will it say, "It makes no difference—we will ignore the rules of the Senate and House and pass the bill"? By doing that, at some other time if not this time, we may pass a nullity, and with full knowledge.

I have raised these questions because I think they ought to be raised, because I think we are setting a bad precedent. I believe the injunction of the rule is to correct an error, and not to pass a bill with a known error.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield one more time?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. RANDOLPH. There is no argument between the Senator from Kentucky and the Senator from West Virginia about the fact that the House as well as the Senate has approved a necessary program of public works acceleration. Is that true?

Mr. COOPER. The House has passed its bill, and the Senate passed its bill several weeks ago. Today we are considering the House bill.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Today we find that the Senate, on recommendation of its Public Works Committee, is ready to accept the House version of public works acceleration. Is that correct?

Mr. COOPER. I do not know until the vote. I assume, if that is the intention of the majority, that will be the decision. I intend to vote for the bill even if my amendment is defeated. I know that the Senator is one of the sponsors of the bill and has worked diligently and devotedly for its passage—desiring to help the unemployed of his own State, West Virginia, and in the Nation.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, as a practical matter, the Senator from Kentucky knows that the higher education bill is now in conference. The Senate passed one version, and the House another. The conference is stymied and will, in all candor, not arrive at a method for adjusting the various ideas in the two versions. But in the case of public works the desire on the part of the Senate Public Works Committee is to eliminate a conference, accept the House version, in the two principles I have indicated, the program of projects for immediate action and the lesser Federal contribution, in certain cases.

Does the Senator from Kentucky not agree, that this inadvertence and technical difficulty on the part of the House,

with no misunderstanding as to the substance of the bill that we could proceed—that is, move the bill to the White House without further delay?

Mr. President, it is my belief that the Congress, both bodies having acted in the affirmative, are in accord that this vitally needed program should move forward.

The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] has worked diligently on this subject. I joined with him in sponsoring the basic bill for public works. Members of the Senate Public Works Committee, chaired by Senator CHAVEZ and in the pending measure, led in floor managership by Senator KERR, are convinced that action now will aid to alleviate unemployment and strengthen the economic base of the Nation. A majority of our committee, and a majority of both branches of the national legislative forum on rollcalls, have stamped approval on such an effort as we contemplate in the interest of employment and merited public construction.

Mr. COOPER. I have made my argument, and I desire to close.

I am aware that the majority wants the bill to be passed without further amendment so that it will not be necessary to send it back to the House or to go to conference.

I can understand why those who feel very strongly about the bill—as does my friend from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH]—should take that position. I am in the peculiar position of being one who voted for the bill and yet saying we should not pass the bill without correcting the error. I do it on the grounds I have stated. This is not purely a technical matter. It is only technical in the sense that there was an inadvertent mistake.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. COOPER. I will yield in a moment.

My chief point is that this would be a precedent. If, each time the majority wants to take action it ignores the rules, then we will have created a bad precedent for the future. In this case it might not be very important. But in the future bills might come before the Senate respecting which the majority, whether Democrat or Republican, with all its powers, might say, "We will bypass the rules and prevent the bill from going to the House again, and thereby have our way."

I do not think it is right in this case, or for the future.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. I agree with nearly everything the Senator from Kentucky has said. The Senator knows that many times I have been on his side.

Mr. COOPER. Yes, many times.

Mr. PASTORE. I know how meticulous the Senator is as to legislation and how learned he is in the law. I think he has raised a very valid point.

If the Senator from Rhode Island has one fault, it is a frankness in speaking on issues. He is not prone to be am-

biguous, cagey, or even diplomatic, at times.

Mr. COOPER. I recognize and admire the Senator's frankness.

Mr. PASTORE. I feel this goes beyond what the committee under other circumstances would like to do. I think we must decide today whether we will accept a slight imperfection, with all of its consequences—which I do not think would be very serious—or whether we shall have no bill at all. To be frank about it, that is the question which confronts us.

If the bill has to go back to the House or has to go to conference, we will be sending it to its coffin. That is about the size of the problem.

That is the reason why the Senator from Rhode Island is willing to stomach this little imperfection today, and he hopes that it will not become a precedent.

I subscribe to everything the Senator from Kentucky has said. It would be a wonderful thing to correct the imperfection, if that could have been done in the House as the House leadership desired. But on a single objection it was not allowed to be corrected in the House. If we correct it in the Senate, the bill will have to go back to the House or have to go to conference, and it will go to its grave.

I think the bill is too immediately important for that, because many States are suffering from severe unemployment. This is a most important bill. We have long since argued its merits in the Senate, and we have already approved it.

I agree with the Senator from Kentucky. I think meticulously and technically he makes a valid point. He has everything in his favor. He is not hostile to the measure because he voted for the bill, when many other Senators did not. I voted then as he did. It is important here and now to take action. I would hope that the bill could be passed in the Senate in such a way as to send it to the President directly, because at this late stage, I fear that if we do not do that we will not have a bill at all. We would be denying help to distressed areas—to unemployed human beings for whom this bill holds out material, practical hope in the fastest fashion.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. KERR. Does the Senator want to correct the bill or defeat the bill?

Mr. COOPER. I have stated my position. I support the bill—and supporting it, want it to be correct. I know the Senator will give me full faith and credit.

Mr. KERR. I do. I was not present when the Senator stated his position.

Mr. COOPER. I said on Friday that I could understand very well that my amendment might be interpreted by some as being a desire to send the bill back to conference or to the House and delayed. I know it could be interpreted in that way if someone outside the Senate desired to do so—but I do not believe it will be interpreted that way in the

Senate. I have advocated a reasonable public works bill for several years. We did not agree on the exact terms when the bill was before the committee. I offered amendments, as the Senator knows, but I voted for the bill. I intend to vote for this bill.

I have raised this question because I thought it was my duty to do so, and because I think that if we do not correct the error it will be a bad precedent.

The majority has great power. If it can say this in a particular case, because there is a difficult situation in the House which might result in trouble, then—not particularly with respect to this bill, but with respect to some other bill—it can say, "We will ignore the rules." I can visualize a situation in which some majority in the future—whether Democratic or Republican—could impose its will.

Mr. KERR. If the amendment, if adopted, would defeat the bill, or would be likely to defeat the bill, would the Senator still want to have it adopted?

Mr. COOPER. The Senator has asked me a question difficult to answer. I offered the amendment for the reasons I have stated. I do not want to see the bill defeated.

If I were a member of the majority—and there is a great majority—I would have greater confidence. I assume the majority can defeat the amendment I have offered, and will pass the bill. If my amendment should be adopted, and if the bill should go to the House, I would say, if I were a member of the majority, considering the size of the majority, I would have more confidence in my majority than my distinguished friend and his colleagues on the other side seem to have. I am showing more confidence in the majority being able to pass the bill in the House, with my simple amendment which does not change the substance of the bill, than are many majority Senators, as indicated by their arguments.

I have offered my amendment in good faith. It was offered for the same purpose that Representative BLATNIK offered his motion in the House. The purpose is to try to correct a known error and avoid an unfortunate precedent. I have offered it also because I think there is always the possibility—I do not think too much of a possibility in this case—that if we should pass the bill, and if this difficulty were not cleared up, it might be questioned.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. KERR. If it should be determined there were a question about the matter, the Senator is aware of the fact that we could attach an amendment to the omnibus bill which will come before us in a few days.

Mr. COOPER. I think it could be so amended.

Mr. KERR. Does the Senator remember that, 3 or 4 years ago the TVA financing bill was passed?

Mr. COOPER. Yes. The Senator and I were working closely together on that measure.

Mr. KERR. I was working with the Senator for the benefit of his area, not mine.

Mr. COOPER. I understand that and am grateful. I doubt that the TVA bill would have passed without his leadership.

Mr. KERR. Does the Senator remember that at that time the President of the United States said, when the bill came to him, that he was going to have to veto it because of one clause which had to do with executive power?

Mr. COOPER. I remember it very well.

Mr. KERR. Does the Senator remember how that difficulty was resolved?

Mr. COOPER. I believe it was resolved by an amendment to the same bill.

Mr. KERR. If the Senator will permit me, I will refresh his memory. The Senator from Oklahoma, in conjunction with the Senator from Kentucky and the Senator from South Dakota, the late great Francis Case, who was with us then, discussed the question with a Presidential assistant, Mr. Merriam, and another Presidential assistant, Mr. Harlow.

We obtained assurances from the leadership in the Senate and from the leadership in the House so that the President would sign the bill, although it had a clause which was basically objectionable to him, when otherwise he would not have been willing to sign the bill.

As a result of the cooperative effort by the Senator from Oklahoma, along with the Senator from Kentucky and others, with the leadership in the House and the Public Works Committee in the House, and the leadership in the Senate and the Public Works Committee in the Senate, a joint resolution or a concurrent resolution—I have forgotten which—the President was assured, would immediately be passed to correct the language. Then President Eisenhower went ahead and signed the bill, and within 24 hours, the Congress passed the concurrent resolution making the law the way he wanted it.

Mr. COOPER. I remember the circumstances very well. In fact, I remember that the late Representative from Tennessee, Mr. Reece, and Representative BAKER from Tennessee, and I went to the White House and talked with President Eisenhower. We urged him, as did our leadership, both Democratic and Republican, to sign the bill upon the assurance that later the concurrent resolution would be passed. He did sign the bill.

Mr. KERR. Does the Senator not believe there was a much more substantial correction involved as to that legislation than would be involved in this instance?

Mr. COOPER. Absolutely. It was vital to the TVA self-financing bill. I think that case was a little different. There was no objection on either side to the proposed legislation.

Mr. KERR. The Senator is aware of the fact that the leadership on his side did not object to the request of Representative BLATNIK.

Mr. COOPER. Objection was made.

Mr. KERR. Not by the leadership on the Senator's side.

Mr. COOPER. The Senator is correct. Objection was made by Representative Gross of the minority. The problem was transferred to the Senate. If it should become necessary to agree to a concurrent resolution, the majority would have the same problem we are facing today.

Mr. KERR. If necessary, the Senator from Kentucky and the Senator from Oklahoma, working together, might be able to obtain adoption of a little amendment to the omnibus bill.

Mr. COOPER. The concurrent resolution would have to be agreed to by the House. There might be some objection there.

Mr. KERR. I am not indicating that the correction should be made by way of concurrent resolution. If the bill were found to be faulty and an amendment were required, I merely ask the Senator if he and I working together with the other members of the Committee on Public Works on the omnibus bill would not have a very good prospect of having such an amendment agreed to.

Mr. COOPER. I think we could have it adopted in the Senate. I do not know about the House. The Senator is a most persuasive man.

Mr. KERR. I have only one more question to ask my friend from Kentucky. He knows that Kentucky would probably be one of the States that would benefit the most from the bill.

Mr. COOPER. I know that. I am very aware of it. Several years ago, when President Eisenhower was President, I proposed several times to our leadership and to the President that a moderate public works program be developed for distressed areas. I have supported such a proposal again and again. One of the reasons for my support arises from conditions in my State, particularly the eastern section of Kentucky, in which I live, and which I know intimately. I am fully aware of its problems. I support the bill because I believe there is a hard core of unemployed in my State and in many other States. I do not want them to go unhelped. I support the bill.

Mr. KERR. The Senator is aware of the fact that Kentucky would benefit much more from the bill than would the home State of the Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. COOPER. I understand that. I know the great good will of the Senator from Oklahoma toward my State and other States. I know that such feeling is genuine on his part. I know that my amendment may appear to be technical. I am not what might be called a nit picker. Senators know that. But I have raised the question for reasons which are more substantial.

Since our dear friend, Senator Case, of South Dakota is dead and I am now in the position once occupied by him, I have the responsibility to raise substantial questions which have been raised by other minority members. If I did not do so, I do not think they would have much faith in me. They must trust me to look

after their interests in the Public Works Committee.

If I did not think the point had any substantial import, and yet Senators on my side wished to raise a question, in such a case I would leave it to another Senator. But in this case I believe that under the rules of the Senate, it is an error which should be corrected.

I do not claim to be one of the great rulemakers of the Senate. But I can see we might get into a situation where, because of expediency, the Senate might begin to ignore its rules. To do so would be bad and would give power to any current majority which is not good.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. KERR. Which rules of the Senate does the Senator think are involved?

Mr. COOPER. I think my proposition is inherent in the rules. In practice, errors have been corrected by action of either body before the bill has been passed. But if the bill has been passed and a mistake is discovered, under the precedents the mistake has been corrected by a concurrent resolution.

I call the Senator's attention to rule XIV, paragraph 5, which relates to the enrollment of bills. The Secretary of the Senate is required to examine all bills which have been passed by both Houses to see that they are correctly enrolled. I should like to make clear that I do not think the Secretary could change a bill. He would have to enroll it as passed, even with an error, if it should contain one.

But the rule with respect to the enrollment of bills indicates that it is the desire of the Senate to pass correct bills. If there were no rules, commonsense would tell us that we should do so.

Mr. KERR. Does the Senator think that the most the Senate can do with reference to this error, in the absence of changing it by an amendment, is to make a legislative history setting forth what it really should be?

Mr. COOPER. I have discussed that point. Legislative history comes into play in discovering the purpose intended, when a mistake in a bill which has been passed is discovered. A court may look to the legislative history. I think it is straining the point to make legislative history to explain an error which the body itself will not correct. I believe that is rather unusual.

Mr. KERR. If the body feels that the error is purely technical and inconsequential, and one which is impossible of any other interpretation than that given by the legislative history, does the Senator think we would still be straining at a point to do it in that way? There is no section 9 in the bill.

Mr. COOPER. I understand. I have discussed that point. I have pointed out that even though there were no explanation of the point at all, if it were ever examined by a court, the court would probably look at the whole record and say that the House did not intend to pass a nullity and would give the law effect.

Mr. KERR. That is correct.

Mr. COOPER. I have said, however, that I doubt that a Senator can explain what the intent of the House would be. I doubt that there are many cases in which either body knowingly voted out a bill with errors in it. It is entirely different from voting bills containing inadvertent errors.

And, I think it is a bad precedent if a majority can determine, when it desires, to work its will against the rules or against the spirit of the rules to secure the passage of a bill. I do not think that is good.

I doubt that the Senator, with his great knowledge of legislation and our governmental system, believes it was intended in our system of government, in which protections are given to the minority, that a majority should bypass customary procedures when it desires to impose its will upon the minority. I happen to be for the bill. But in my judgment, to bypass the customary procedure would not be a good thing and would establish a bad precedent.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his forbearance, patience, and kindness to the Senator from Oklahoma in regard to the matter of the majority imposing its will on the minority. He is in as good a position as any Senator to know that the Senator from Oklahoma, through all the years he has been a member of the Public Works Committee, has sought and secured with the minority on that committee accommodations on legislation, so far as I know, on every bill that has ever passed out of that committee with the exception of the public works bill reported from the committee earlier this year. I believe the Senator will verify the statement that for more than 13 years the distinguished late Senator Case of South Dakota, who sat as the ranking minority member of that committee—the position now occupied by the distinguished Senator from Kentucky—and the Senator from Oklahoma worked together on that committee, and, without exception, until the one bill this year, resolved their differences, not on a partisan basis, but in a manner that was acceptable both to the Senator from South Dakota and the Republican minority, when they were in the minority, and the Senator from Oklahoma and the Democratic majority, when they were in the majority.

The Senator from Oklahoma feels that if there ever was an example of bipartisan cooperation, and if there ever was a complete absence of the majority being in the posture of merely passing a bill the way it wanted to pass it, in spite of the way the minority felt about it, that is the situation which has prevailed in the Public Works Committee.

Mr. COOPER. I agree with the Senator. My experience on the committee confirms what the Senator has said. When I referred to the majority imposing its will on the minority, I was not talking about the Senator from Oklahoma or in a personal sense at all. I have found him always fair and considerate of all of us who are members of the committee and in every other way. I was not placing emphasis on this par-

ticular case, or on a Democratic majority. I was referring to creating a precedent which could lead to that kind of situation in the future. I assure the Senator that I have no personal reference to him. I believe he knows that, for we have worked together on many issues.

Mr. KERR. I have one more question, if the Senator will yield.

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. KERR. I am sure it is not true, but I would like to have the Senator's comment on whether in this case, the minority, armed with a technicality, is seeking to impose its will on the majority.

Mr. COOPER. That is not my purpose. That is always possible, except that in this case I believe we are probably armed with the rules.

Mr. KERR. I see. I thank the Senator very much.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment. I have a few comments to make on what the distinguished Senator from Kentucky has stated.

I note that the opponents refer to the error as being a slight imperfection, technical in nature. I suggest that that might be so in their opinion, but a court of law might look upon it in an entirely different light. I might also add that this involves a very deep and significant problem, far from a slight imperfection. The problem we have is not slight by any means. The reason is that this issue goes to the very heart of the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the Government. If we reject the amendment, we are, in effect, saying to the separate and independent judicial branch of the Government, "You will legislate for us. We have made an error. We have made it deliberately and knowingly and in violation of what we interpret to be the best traditions of this great legislative body."

"Now, because we have made an error and have deliberately made it, but because, incidentally, we have indicated that we do not think the error is very important, you will interpret it the way we like to have you interpret it, and we will leave it up to the court to fill in the gap."

I can very well understand a court of law saying:

"We will not be told by the legislative branch of the Government what to do. We will be only too happy to cooperate with the legislative branch of the Government in the case of an inadvertence or an oversight. However, we do not want you to come to the judicial branch of the Government with a deliberate error and ask us to legislate for you."

There is another point that I believe should be mentioned. I cannot understand the suggestions being made that the adoption of the amendment might represent the will of the minority overcoming the will of the majority. I cannot understand the concern about adding the amendment to the bill, and then having the bill committed to a coffin, to use the phrase of the distinguished

Senator from Rhode Island. I suggest that if that is the attitude to be taken, perhaps that is one more reason why the court should interpret the legislative intent on the House side to be opposed to the bill. As I said last Friday, the court could well conclude, if this bill could not be passed on the second consideration in the House, that some of the Members who voted for it in the first instance, knowing of the imperfection, expected it to die in that fashion.

Now that the imperfection has come to light, the court could conclude that the House would be in the position where it would almost have to vote against it the second time.

If the bill has merit, it will not be difficult to pass it the second time in the House. I cannot understand all the concern about the amendment. What we ought to do is live up to our legislative responsibility. That is a part of the tradition of this body. To pass the bill with an unwillingness to correct an imperfection, with the opportunity to make that correction, violates the tradition of this body, of which I am privileged to be a Member.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, on my amendment, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] for himself and the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER] to the House amendments to the bill, S. 2965. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT], the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. BURDICK], the Senator from Nevada [Mr. CANNON], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY], the Senator from Oregon [Mrs. NEUBERGER], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SMITH] are absent on official business.

I further announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Colorado [Mr. CARROLL], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRIEVE]

ING], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HICKEY], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. LONG], and the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] are necessarily absent.

On this vote, the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT] is paired with the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. BOTTUM]. If present and voting, the Senator from Alaska would vote "nay" and the Senator from South Dakota would vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from Nevada [Mr. CANNON] is paired with the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON]. If present and voting, the Senator from Nevada would vote "nay" and the Senator from New Hampshire would vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from Colorado [Mr. CARROLL] is paired with the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. FONG]. If present and voting, the Senator from Colorado would vote "nay," and the Senator from Hawaii would vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] is paired with the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON]. If present and voting, the Senator from Connecticut would vote "nay," and the Senator from Kentucky would vote "yea."

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HICKEY], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONROEY], the Senator from Oregon [Mrs. NEUBERGER], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SMITH], and the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] would each vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE] is paired with the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. MURPHY]. If present and voting, the Senator from Tennessee would vote "nay" and the Senator from New Hampshire would vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] is paired with the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON]. If present and voting, the Senator from Alaska would vote "nay," and the Senator from Kansas would vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. BURDICK] is paired with the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART]. If present and voting, the Senator from North Dakota would vote "nay," and the Senator from Indiana would vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON] is paired with the Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT]. If present and voting, the Senator from New Mexico would vote "nay," and the Senator from Utah would vote "yea."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] is absent on official business.

The Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT], the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. BOTTUM], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART], the Senators from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON and Mr. MURPHY], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], the Senator from Ha-

waii [Mr. FONG], the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are necessarily absent. If present and voting, the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] would vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT] is paired with the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON]. If present and voting, the Senator from Utah would vote "yea" and the Senator from New Mexico would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. BOTTUM] is paired with the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT]. If present and voting, the Senator from South Dakota would vote "yea" and the Senator from Alaska would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART] is paired with the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. BURDICK]. If present and voting, the Senator from Indiana would vote "yea" and the Senator from North Dakota would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON] is paired with the Senator from Nevada [Mr. CANNON]. If present and voting, the Senator from New Hampshire would vote "yea" and the Senator from Nevada would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. FONG] is paired with the Senator from Colorado [Mr. CARROLL]. If present and voting, the Senator from Hawaii would vote "yea" and the Senator from Colorado would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON] is paired with the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD]. If present and voting, the Senator from Kentucky would vote "yea" and the Senator from Connecticut would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. MURPHY] is paired with the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE]. If present and voting, the Senator from New Hampshire would vote "yea" and the Senator from Tennessee would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] is paired with the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING]. If present and voting, the Senator from Kansas would vote "yea" and the Senator from Alaska would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 30, nays 38, as follows:

[No. 249 Leg.]

YEAS—30

Allott	Goldwater	Prouty
Beall	Hickenlooper	Proxmire
Boggs	Hruska	Robertson
Bush	Jordan, Idaho	Saltonstall
Butler	Keating	Smith, Maine
Byrd, Va.	Kuchel	Thurmond
Carlson	Lausche	Tower
Case	McClellan	Wiley
Cooper	Miller	Williams, Del.
Curtis	Mundt	Young, N. Dak.

NAYS—38

Bible	Johnston	Muskie
Byrd, W. Va.	Jordan, N.C.	Pastore
Chavez	Kefauver	Pell
Clark	Kerr	Randolph
Douglas	Long, Hawaii	Russell
Eastland	Long, La.	Scott
Ellender	Magnuson	Sparkman
Engle	Mansfield	Stennis
Ervin	McCarthy	Talmadge
Hart	McGee	Williams, N.J.
Holland	McNamara	Yarborough
Humphrey	Morse	Young, Ohio
Jackson	Moss	

NOT VOTING—32

Aiken	Dirksen	Long, Mo.
Anderson	Dodd	Metcalfe
Bartlett	Fong	Monroney
Bennett	Fulbright	Morton
Bottum	Gore	Murphy
Burdick	Gruening	Neuberger
Cannon	Hartke	Pearson
Capehart	Hayden	Smathers
Carroll	Hickey	Smith, Mass.
Church	Hill	Symington
Cotton	Javits	

So the amendment of Mr. COOPER (for himself and Mr. MILLER) was rejected.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, I move that the vote by which the amendment was rejected be reconsidered.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk which I call up and ask to be read.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment offered by the Senator from Iowa will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. It is proposed at the end of the bill to add the following new section:

SEC. 7. This Act shall take effect November 15, 1962.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, the purpose of my amendment is to require that action under this legislation not take place until after the fall elections. That is why the date of November 15 is specified.

The Senate is aware of the fact that during the House consideration of this measure some rather serious indictments were made by certain members of my party regarding the action which might be undertaken under the bill. The phrase "political slush fund" was used, for example.

The Senator from Iowa does not use that indictment and is not indicting anyone. The point to be made is that this is a very important bill in the minds of many people. It is a very expensive bill, and I do not believe it ought to be passed with any stigma or any atmosphere of party politics attached to it.

It will be passed in the Senate with some bipartisan support. The able Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] has previously indicated that he intends to support the bill, as he has in the past. When there is bipartisan support of a measure such as this, I think it is asking little enough to make absolutely certain that it does not interfere with or become an issue in the elections this fall.

I have in my hand a copy of the September 11, 1962, issue of the Washington World, and in it is an article entitled "Proof Grows of President's Power Policies." One of the incidents cited in the article is that of a Republican Member of the House Public Works Committee who was told by an agency official that it would be unfortunate if he opposed the public works bill—now before us—in committee because then projects planned in his district would be canceled.

There is no authority cited for that statement. The name of the Representative concerned is not given. At most, it could be classified as hearsay. But all of us have heard of some undercurrent

of pressure which exists, and which should not exist.

I ask unanimous consent that the article to which I have referred from the Washington World be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### PROOF GROWS OF PRESIDENT'S POWER POLICIES

In Washington, there is increasing talk and a growing cause for alarm over this New Frontier power policy: If they don't agree with us, blackjack them into submission.

Much of the concern over the Kennedy administration's pressure politics has remained hidden, but some has bubbled to the surface. The power of the Presidency has been felt in the press, the public, the business community and, particularly, in the Congress.

Says Representative BRUCE ALGER, Republican, of Texas: "This Congress must remind President Kennedy that he is an elected head of the state, not a ruler by divine right nor one maintained by armed force."

Says Representative STEVE DEROUNIAN, Republican, of New York: "He was inaugurated President and not coronated king."

Senator ROBERT S. KERR, Democrat, of Oklahoma, incensed by the New Frontier's "influence by pressure" policy, told the Senate recently that he honored the President, but he honored the wishes of the people of Oklahoma even more.

Just what is this all about? Who's being pressured? How are they being pressured? Why are they being pressured?

The world has probed into the situation, sifting fact from gossip. Some of the information is from material compiled by the obviously concerned House Republican policy committee, but much of it is from Democrats, who also are repulsed by the idea of being bludgeoned into legislative submission.

Characteristic of the pressure is the fact that many Congressmen involved, although angry, still asked that their names be withheld for fear of provoking further reprisals.

Here is the eye-opening story:

#### HIS "BLACKJACK" EXTENDS TO CONGRESS AND VOTERS

President Kennedy in 1960 took to the American people a racy, wide-ranging legislative program. He promised action, if elected President.

Since assuming the Presidency, Jack Kennedy has had a tough time trying to get action in the Congress. He has had to marshal all the forces at his command to acquire support for his programs.

This has not been easy, nor has the effort been limited to Washington, D.C.

Couples applying for marriage licenses in heavily Democratic Chicago have been asked to sign petitions favoring the administration's medical care proposal.

Postmasters in Mississippi recommended by Congressman JOHN BELL WILLIAMS, Democrat, of Mississippi, couldn't get their nominations—because of some of WILLIAMS' votes opposing New Frontier programs.

Defense contractors in Michigan jumped on the phone to call their Congressmen in response to calls from the Department of Defense threatening cancellation of contracts unless a pet Kennedy project received House approval.

A St. Petersburg, Fla., newspaper reported that Democratic Congressmen in that State had been threatened with a loss of contracts, patronage, and even public works projects unless their voting records "improved" to the Kennedy administration's satisfaction.

One bitter Congressman describes the blackjack schemes as nothing more than "pressure, purchase, and promises."

The Democratic leadership was having difficulty in rounding up votes for the minimum wage bill. It was decided to dangle some bait: special standards for wreath-makers, processors of "shadegrown tobacco," workers employed as cotton ginners, radio station employees in cities of less than 100,000—all designed to attract individual votes. Even so, a Republican substitute won out.

Sometimes the pressure gets down to almost bare-knuckle tactics.

A Republican member of the House Public Works Committee was told by an agency official that it would be unfortunate if he opposed the standby public works bill in committee because then projects planned in his district would be canceled.

A prominent House committee chairman, admittedly cool to many New Frontier proposals, has become more friendly to the administration—after a series of discussions with the Attorney General about efforts to merge some of his business interests.

A day before the final vote on the House farm bill was scheduled, the administration sent out the big guns, dangling patronage and other plums. Postmaster General Day and Secretary of Agriculture Freeman made the speaker's lobby a miniature White House for consultation with members reported on the fence.

#### MINORITY VIEWS ON FARM BILL PRESSURE

Minority members found so much pressure exerted on the administration's farm bill that they prefaced their views in the committee report:

"The administration has finally forced its bill (H.R. 11222) out of the Committee on Agriculture only by the repeated application of intense political pressure, the like of which we have never witnessed in the past.

"In spite of this pressure, the bill just barely cleared the committee (which is controlled by a margin of 21 to 14 by the majority) by a vote of 18 to 17 with one proponent publicly stating that he would oppose the bill on the floor of the House. And this action came only after three desperate attempts to report the bill on April 13, May 2, and May 7, 1962."

At one time, when it appeared the farm bill would never get out of committee, a Democratic committee member received a phone call from President Kennedy.

An inside-the-committee source reports that the Congressman was told that, unless he voted to report the bill, he would be defeated by whatever means possible in his upcoming Alabama primary election.

The administration was pinning its prestige on the farm vote and a count of noses disclosed that the vote would be close. Things got rough:

A Democratic Member from the Southwest, who sought to vote in the well of the House, was almost forcibly removed from the front of the Chamber until the leadership got the idea he would support the administration. (Once he was given the opportunity to vote, he instead supported the Republican recommitment motion.)

Representative ORIS PIKE, Democrat, of New York, issued a news release the day of the voting in which he called Democratic pressures on him "arm twisting" of the worst sort. He said the Post Office Department, which had several new branches pending in his district, sent a representative to discuss the farm bill in relation to construction of the mail facilities.

Pressure on the Democratic majority Members became so great that even an amendment providing that the total number of employees in the Department of Agriculture shall at no time exceed the number of farmers in America, was defeated 230 to 171.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I would not be inclined to put my amendment to a vote if we could have the assurance,

which I think we should have, that the administration of this piece of legislation, if it becomes law, will be carried out impartially, without favor or pressure, regardless of the party in control of a certain congressional district, regardless of the votes or attitude of the Member of Congress from that particular district or State, so that it can be said that this is a piece of legislation passed by the Congress with bipartisan support which will be administered in the same spirit in which it was passed.

I would appreciate the comment of the Senator from Oklahoma, as Senator in charge of the bill, with respect to this policy. I have nothing more to add at this time.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, I want to say to my good friend from Iowa that I have searched this bill, and I have not discovered anything in it that would be helpful to the Senator from Oklahoma. If it would help, I would happily give the assurance the Senator has asked for. As far as the Senator from Oklahoma is concerned, it will be his purpose and he will do everything in his power to bring about the situation the Senator from Iowa has indicated should be the case.

I am sure he is aware of the fact that anything the Senator from Oklahoma might say would not be binding on the President of the United States. It is not binding even on the Senate. But the Senator from Iowa has expressed the hope and the belief of the Senator from Oklahoma. Certainly, it is the purpose of every Senator that I know of in favor of this bill that its benefits shall be as widespread as it is possible to make them with the amount to be appropriated, and that such benefits be made available in the form of jobs and improvements in the areas that need them, whether they are represented in the Congress of the United States by Democrats or Republicans. It would be very difficult to find many areas in the United States that did not have some relationship, not only to Republican or Democratic representation, but to Republican representation.

The Senator from Iowa knows that on the Public Works Committee projects offered there not only by the Republican members of the committee, but also by Republican Members of the Senate, are treated with the same consideration and the same favorable attention, and adopted just as easily, as are the projects sought by the Democratic Members.

I cannot look in any direction on the other side of the aisle without looking into the faces of Senators—including the face of the Senator from Iowa—who can verify that statement.

So far as the Senator from Oklahoma is concerned, it will be his hope and wish—and to the extent that his recommendation would have any effectiveness, the recommendation to make it so—that the bill be administered on a basis which is above partisan politics, because it deals with distressed human beings.

I am aware of the fact, I say to the Senator in all candor, that there are more distressed Democrats than there are distressed Republicans. I am perfectly aware of that fact, but so far as

I am concerned anything I can do will be in the effort to achieve the purpose that there be no partisanship in the administration of this measure.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments by the Senator from Oklahoma. I confirm what the Senator has said regarding the attitude which has prevailed on the Public Works Committee of the Senate while I have been privileged to be a member. However, the Senator knows that the attitude in that committee does not necessarily carry over, and unfortunately probably does not carry over, to certain areas of the administration.

I recognize, and I am sure the Senator from Oklahoma recognizes, that the line between unfortunate unemployed human beings, with respect to authorized projects with about the same need factor, can be very thin. Apparently, there has been, down through the debate on this amendment, considerable concern expressed over the possibility that that line would be drawn in such a way that a representative of the Democratic Party in a particular district would find a project being advanced in his district, whereas a Republican in another district might find the same type of project, with the same human beings involved, not authorized.

I recognize that the Senator from Oklahoma cannot tell the executive branch of the Government what to do, any more than the executive branch can tell the Senator from Oklahoma what to do, but I do believe that if the intention of the Senate is expressed, as the Senator from Oklahoma has so excellently expressed it, the administrators of these projects will think a long time before they seek to vitiate the intention that has been so ably expressed.

I thank the Senator from Oklahoma for his comments.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MILLER. I yield to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. HRUSKA. I wonder if the Senator from Iowa recalls the disclosures and the discussion on the floor of the other body with reference to the administration of the food stamp plan. It might have been that the 25 congressional districts represented by Democratic Representatives were fully deserving of the food stamp plan and all that went with it. I have an idea they were. I have an idea that the findings by the Department of Agriculture, which administered that plan, were to the effect that the people there should have received the benefits of the food stamps.

However, it developed also in that discussion that there was only one congressional district represented by a Republican Representative which received the benefits of the food stamp plan.

That might have been coincidence. It might have been on the basis of a very fine analysis of all the economic factors which existed. But there were some people who were a little skeptical about the matter of coincidence in that particular case. Some skepticism, and even cynicism, was expressed with respect to

some of the remarks made on the floor of the other body.

Has the Senator from Iowa the idea that perhaps another incident of like nature might occur?

Mr. MILLER. I say to the able Senator from Nebraska that the coincidence to which he referred is but one of several which have arisen within the past 18 months which give cause for concern about the impartiality of the administration on some of these projects and programs, when they affect human beings, regardless of party affiliation. I appreciate the Senator's bringing this to the attention of the Senate.

I suggest, however, that at the time the food stamp plan was debated, probably the same legislative attitude was not elicited from the Senator in charge of the bill as has been done today. If we were dealing with the food stamp plan on the floor today and the able Senator from Oklahoma were in charge of that bill and gave the same assurances in that respect as he has just now given to the Senate with respect to the pending bill, probably the abuses the Senator indicated would not have happened with respect to the food stamp plan. If they did occur, I do not think it would be very long before they were stopped. That is why I appreciate the comments and the attitude of the Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. HRUSKA. I thank the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the RECORD reflect it to be the sense of the Senate that this bill be administered on a basis that will be free of any partisan favoritism by any agency of the Government having responsibility under it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey in the chair). Is there objection to the request by the Senator from Oklahoma?

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KERR. I yield to my friend.

Mr. CHAVEZ. The next bill which is to come before the Senate is the highway bill, or the road bill. I know that bill is going to be administered, as to the building of highways, just as well in Republican States as it will be administered in Democratic States. Roads are going to be built everywhere.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, I very much fear that the statement by the Senator from New Mexico is entirely accurate.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, what was the Senator's request? The Senator made a unanimous consent request.

Mr. KERR. Will the reporter read it, please?

The Official Reporter (Julian R. Serles, Jr.) read as follows:

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the RECORD reflect it to be the sense of the Senate that this bill be administered on a basis that will be free of any partisan favoritism by any agency of the Government having responsibility under it.

Mr. KERR. My unanimous consent request, Mr. President, is that that be shown as a part of the legislative history on the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request by the Senator from Oklahoma?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, it seems to me that legislation has been administered in a manner which was honorable and objective, and I do not think any unanimous consent request ought to imply that there might be anything to the contrary. I know that that is the feeling of the Senator from Oklahoma, as he has expressed himself earlier.

The charges which are made about partisanship in the administration of these measures are without foundation in fact. The food stamp plan, for example, is administered in areas where there is distress. Frankly, it ought to be broadened, but it is a pilot program under authority of the Congress. It does not have broad range authority.

Members of Congress who are sharply critical of the food stamp plan and of its administration never voted for it in the first place.

I do not "buy" the argument that partisanship has been involved. To the contrary, there has been no partisanship. I think the Senator from New Mexico made it quite clear that in respect to the largest public works program we have, the road program, there has been administration on an objective, honorable, sensible basis. Any other program would be administered in the same way.

However, this program is directed in part toward those areas of the country in which there is serious unemployment. If such areas happen to have Democratic Representatives in Congress or Democratic Senators, I do not think anyone ought to say that it is partisan, and therefore the program cannot be made to work. Furthermore, I suggest it is pretty difficult to determine what areas are Democratic and what areas are Republican. Anybody who has been through an election knows that.

In my State it is pretty well divided. Yet it may shift. We have a Republican Governor. Two-thirds of our delegation are Republican representatives. How are we going to administer a program there on a partisan basis? I suppose that if we get a project in Minnesota, it will be charged that it was designed to help Republicans because we have a Republican Governor. However, we do not intend to be burdened with him too long.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. KERR. I wonder if the Senator will withhold his partisan speech until I get unanimous consent on my bipartisan request.

Mr. HUMPHREY. In light of the Senator's most magnificent suggestion, I say that I was not making a partisan reference. I recall the partisan attack which has been made. I do not consider my reference partisan at all. I submit there is no evidence that there has been any partisanship in the administration of the food stamp plan or the other plans that have been offered.

There surely has been none in the Area Redevelopment Administration.

I am not going to object to the Senator's request, but I do not believe that the Senate ought to agree to a resolution providing that it is the sense of the Senate that the President should be honest. The President of the United States has done a good job.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, I do not yield for that purpose.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request?

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KERR. I yield.

Mr. HRUSKA. Does the Senator have an idea, at the conclusion of the subject, that his unanimous-consent agreement might result in a veto for the reason stated by the Senator from Minnesota?

Mr. KERR. I do not think it would result in a veto. I did not ask for the adoption of a resolution. As the Senator from Minnesota indicated, no resolution is involved. I merely asked unanimous consent that it be recorded in connection with the legislative history of the bill that it is the sense of the Senate that the law be administered without partisan favor or discrimination.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KERR. I yield.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Reserving the right to object—and I do not intend to object—I thought a statement of the Senator from Oklahoma was very fair and fine. But I call the attention of the Senator from Oklahoma to the fact that if the unanimous-consent request to indicate the sense of the Senate does not have the force and effect of law, the very bill that we are acting upon, in connection with which the proponents are attempting to make a soliloquy or discussion on the floor of the Senate to substitute a portion of a measure that is not even in the bill and give that the force and effect of law would fall.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, I withdraw my request.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I make no objection.

Mr. KERR. I withdraw my request.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I am merely pointing out that it is either law both times or it is not law either time.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. KERR. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. Am I correct in my understanding that the bill would involve no back-door financing, but merely authorizations for appropriations?

Mr. KERR. That is correct.

Mr. HOLLAND. Am I correct in my understanding that, unlike the Senate bill passed several months ago, against which the Senator from Florida voted, the bill provides for only one program—

Mr. KERR. One year.

Mr. HOLLAND. A 1-year program to be now authorized by the Congress itself, rather than to have two programs, which the prior bill contained, one of which would be authorized by the Congress to take effect immediately, but the other of which would have been author-

ized to be set up at the sole discretion of the Executive at some time in the future?

Mr. KERR. No. It would have been triggered by certain events occurring, which then would have resulted in the President's discretion to put them in effect.

Mr. HOLLAND. Am I correct in my understanding that the second aspect of the Senate bill, against which I voted, is not contained in the present bill?

Mr. KERR. The Senator is correct.

Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator. I will be glad to vote for the bill for this one reason. I was not able to vote for the Area Redevelopment Act for various reasons which will appear in the Record as of that time. I am not unwilling, but instead am very willing, to grant aid to areas in which there is heavy and long continued unemployment. The bill has for its essence the setting up of speedy public works programs of various kinds in areas of that sort. For that reason I shall support the bill.

Mr. KERR. I thank the Senator.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KERR. I yield.

Mr. ELLENDER. As I understand, the President could not merely select a project here and there, but the projects would have to be authorized by Congress.

Mr. KERR. The project must either be an authorized project—for example, a project under the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, or sewage disposal—or it must be an authorized program.

Mr. ELLENDER. That is what I wished to make certain.

Mr. KERR. The Senator is correct.

Mr. ELLENDER. It would have to be an authorized project under the law as it now exists.

Mr. KERR. Yes; or an authorized program which is provided for in the law. The Senator is correct.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oklahoma yield?

Mr. KERR. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. The bill would change the formula under which participation of local and State governments would pay into the general fund needed to promote a project. In other words, if existing law provides a formula for the State to pay 66 percent and the Government 33 percent, of the cost of the project, under the bill the formula would be changed to 50 percent-50 percent.

Mr. KERR. Up to 50 percent-50 percent.

The language to which the Senator refers is the very essence of the bill. The very essence of the bill is to improve the economics insofar as the local community is concerned in connection with projects which are authorized and eligible, but which, because of its economic distress, the community cannot take advantage of. The very essence of the bill is to make it possible for the Federal Government to make a greater contribution, and thereby make it possible for a community to proceed with a project which it could now have if it had the money to put up the additional amount required under existing law.

Mr. LAUSCHE. But the language does not establish that fact. Whether the State does or does not have money, under the proposed legislation it would be entitled to participate by putting up less than it would have to put up under the old law. My difficulty is that under the separate programs—community facilities, area redevelopment, and others—great thought was given to the amount that the local and State governments should put up. We have suddenly come along with a new program. We would sweep aside, so far as the new program is concerned, all the requirements specifically set forth in specific programs of the past. I do not think we ought to do so in that way.

Mr. KERR. We would not sweep aside all restrictions or requirements. We would make it possible, insofar as the amount authorized under the bill is concerned, to increase Federal participation in programs. Projects of the Corps of Engineers usually require 100 percent participation by the Federal Government anyway, as would also a project of the Bureau of Reclamation. But with reference to projects such as sewage disposal facilities and others in which local participation in excess of 50 percent is required, it would be possible for many communities in which economic distress is great to get additional participation by the Federal Government, requiring less participation by the local government.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I can understand the sincerity of the Senator's position, but regrettably I believe it is a mistake to change the basic formula. I will offer my amendment.

Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KERR. I yield.

Mr. PROUTY. When the House report was issued, no section of Vermont was listed as a redevelopment area. Since that time, however, our three northeastern counties, Orleans, Caledonia, and Essex, have come under that classification. Is it the Senator's understanding that these counties would qualify under the revision?

Mr. KERR. Very definitely. They would be just as eligible as if they had been so designated before the bill was introduced.

Mr. PROUTY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. COOPER. The Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] raised a question concerning the share of the Federal Government in existing Federal-State programs. To the extent of whatever appropriations are made under this authorization, the areas which would be eligible for the grant-in-aid program would always be eligible for a grant of 50 percent; and in certain cases, where communities are found not to have the economic or financial capability to match a 50-percent grant, the Federal share could go to 75 percent.

The bill passed in the Senate provided for grants up to 90 percent for such communities. Therefore we have a reduction in the House substitute. The question which the Senator has raised was raised in committee when we first considered the original bill several weeks

ago, and on the floor of the Senate when the Senate bill was passed. Amendments were offered to achieve the objective the Senator desires, but they were rejected.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I understand that amendments were offered in committee on the original bill, which sought to achieve the same objective that I have in mind, but those amendments were turned down.

Mr. COOPER. Yes; in committee and also on the floor. If we are to have a public works acceleration bill for distressed areas, we must have such a provision to reach the areas and State governmental subdivisions which do not have the financial capability to meet the 50-percent requirements; otherwise, the bill would be ineffective in those areas where it is most needed.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, I renew my unanimous-consent request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I withdraw my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has a right to withdraw it.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I contemplate offering an amendment that would strike from the House amendments the language which alters the amount of money that local and State governments may post to qualify themselves for participation in the grants that are to be made.

On page 3 of the amendments pending before the Senate there are now provisions which would liberalize the requirement of moneys that must be posted by the local and State governments.

I contemplate offering an amendment that will keep all the existing laws in effect dealing with grants that the local and State governments must put up. The particular language that I shall ask to strike is as follows:

Notwithstanding any provision of such law requiring the Federal contribution to the State or local government involved to be less than a fixed portion of the cost of a project, grants-in-aid may be made under authority of this section which bring the total of all Federal contributions to such project up to 50 per centum of the cost of such project, or up to 75 per centum of the cost of such project if the State or local government does not have economic and financial capacity to assume all of the additional financial obligations required.

To summarize, I do not see any reason why we should in this law change the formula of participation. If the existing formula is that the State or local government shall put up 66 percent, I do not believe that by this bill we should reduce the requirement to 50 percent.

I now offer my amendment, which I send to the desk and ask to have stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 3, line 19, of the House engrossed amendments to the bill, beginning with the word "except" strike out all down through the period on page 4, line 5, and insert in lieu thereof a period.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I have already stated my reason for offering the amendment. My judgment is that we ought not, in the pending bill, change a well-thought-out formula in requiring participation by States and local communities in the financing of projects. The area redevelopment bill, the community facilities bill, and other programs were carefully thought out, and specific requirements were imposed upon local and State governments. This bill contemplates eliminating those provisions.

It is argued that a community which is in financial distress and which it is contemplated to aid by giving it a greater contribution, must be aided if the project is to be developed. However, let us take a State with ample wealth. The law now requires that the State put up 66½ percent and that the Federal Government put up 33½ percent. In that instance there would be no reason to relieve the State of its two-thirds contribution. The reason is that it ought to continue its contribution of two-thirds of the cost of the project.

The pending bill, in effect, says, to a State or community, "Even though you are wealthy, even though you can put up 66½ percent, we will relieve you of that responsibility and require you to put up only 50 percent."

I have offered my amendment because ever since I have been in the Senate I have noted that an effort is constantly made to keep reducing the local and State government's part of building the projects. Time and again bills are offered to reduce the amount. Efforts were made in some fields to increase the amount. I believe President Eisenhower tried to have it increased in one field, but his request was not listened to. My amendment is somewhat along the same line. I do not believe the time is at hand when we ought to begin, even in this special program, to change the basic requirements. That is what is attempted to be done in the pending bill.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LAUSCHE. I yield.

Mr. HRUSKA. In the summary of the bill which is on each Senator's desk, the last paragraph on page 2 reads:

#### ADVANCE PLANNING

S. 2965, as passed by the House would amend the public works planning program established by section 702 of the Housing Act of 1954 to waive repayment of a planning advance for any project, construction of which is initiated as a result of a grant made under this act.

Therefore, it is not a matter of reducing the contribution of the local agency; it is a matter of completely waiving it. Does the Senator's amendment cover this section as well?

Mr. LAUSCHE. It does not. I did not reach that section. My amendment deals only with the requirement that all existing laws shall prevail when a grant is made, except that the amount of the local and State contributions shall be lessened. I am trying to cure that part of the bill which provides that the amount required under existing law for State and local governments to contrib-

ute shall be changed. I did not reach this item, but the argument which I make is applicable to the item referred to by the Senator from Nebraska even with greater force than it is applicable to the items that I have tried to reach, because in my instance the percentage is changed, whereas in the instance mentioned by the Senator from Nebraska the local and State governments and others are completely released, according to what the Senator has stated.

Mr. HRUSKA. That is what the summary states, and I presume that that is what the bill provides.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I cannot understand this at all. In these times we should not change the formula. If we once change it, even though it applies to a special program, it will mean that we will have put the train on the rails and we will change it permanently.

Mr. HRUSKA. I am in sympathy with the Senator's amendment. I shall vote for it and support it, because I believe his reasoning is sound.

Mr. LAUSCHE. That is all I have to say.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Ohio.

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, to be consistent, I shall now offer an amendment to strike the last paragraph of the language just quoted by the Senator from Nebraska. I do not have it before me now, but I think the argument which I made applies with even greater force to that part of the bill.

Mr. KERR. Let me remind the Senator from Ohio that the only significance of the language that the Senator from Nebraska referred to is with reference to projects initiated as a result of grants under this act. The language referred to by the Senator from Nebraska does not relieve the local community of reimbursing the Federal Government for planning in advance. Many projects are carried forward under the law in accordance with which planning was made. The forgiveness of repayment of planning expense is limited to projects which may be constructed with money which Congress appropriates under this specific authorization.

Mr. HRUSKA. That is true; but that is in the part which the Senator from Ohio would like to reach by his amendment, is it not?

Mr. KERR. The Senator from Ohio has a right to offer his amendment. I wanted to be certain that he understood the very limited application of the language to which the Senator from Nebraska referred.

Mr. HRUSKA. It is not a repealer.

Mr. KERR. I hope the distinguished Senator from Ohio will not press his amendment.

Mr. LAUSCHE. What was the basic reasoning for making this exception?

Mr. KERR. It was thought by the committee, and I am sure by the House of Representatives, that if a local community were not in a position to put up a part of the cost of the project required under existing law, it might not be able to repay the advance the Government had

made in connection with the planning of the project. The bill provides for communities which do not have the economic means to operate under existing law. If the project is in a community where the economic conditions are such that it is regarded as appropriate to make a contribution greater than that permitted under existing law, I am sure the Senator from Ohio can understand that such a community might lose the project merely because it could not reimburse the Government planning money. I do not believe he would want to have such a situation result.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Does the Senator from Oklahoma take the position that the language to which we are referring deals only with projects initiated under this program?

Mr. KERR. Under this specific act, and paid for with appropriations under this particular authorization; that is correct. It would not change the law at all with reference to any project built under existing law. This is money appropriated under a special authorization.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Does the Senator make his statement basing it upon this language:

If construction of such project is initiated as a result of a grant-in-aid made from an allocation made by the President under the Public Works Acceleration Act.

Mr. KERR. Under this act; that is correct.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I withdraw the amendment.

Mr. HRUSKA. Is section 6(a) the section by which that amount is made possible for these purposes?

Mr. KERR. Will the Senator tell me where the language is that he has in mind?

Mr. HRUSKA. What section is referred to in the last paragraph of page 2 of the summary which has been furnished Senators?

Mr. KERR. It is section 6(g), which reads:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no advance made under this section for the planning of any public works project shall be required to be repaid if construction of such project is initiated as a result of a grant-in-aid made from an allocation made by the President under the Public Works Acceleration Act—

That act being the title of the bill.

Mr. HRUSKA. Senators have not been favored with copies of the amendments. I do not find copies of them on the desks of Senators. Certainly none is on my desk.

Mr. COOPER. I must agree that there has been great difficulty in securing copies of the House amendments, but I will try to answer the Senator's question. The reference we find in section 6 is as follows:

Section 702 of the Housing Act of 1954 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(g) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no advance made under this section for the planning of any public works project shall be required to be repaid if construction of such project is initiated as a result of a grant-in-aid made from an allocation made by the President under the Public Works Acceleration Act."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that section 702 of the Housing Act of 1954, with the House amendment shown in black brackets as printed in the House report, be made a part of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the section was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### SECTION 702 OF THE HOUSING ACT OF 1954

(Public Law 560, 83d Cong.)

#### RESERVE OF PLANNED PUBLIC WORKS

SEC. 702. (a) In order (1) to encourage municipalities and other public agencies to maintain at all times a current and adequate reserve of planned public works the construction of which can rapidly be commenced, particularly when the national or local economic situation makes such action desirable, and (2) to help attain maximum economy and efficiency in the planning and construction of public works, the Administrator is hereby authorized to make advances to public agencies (notwithstanding the provisions of section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended) to aid in financing the cost of engineering and architectural surveys, designs, plans, working drawings, specifications, or other action preliminary to and in preparation for the construction of public works: *Provided*, That the making of advances hereunder shall not in any way commit the Congress to appropriate funds to assist in financing the construction of any public works so planned: *And provided further*, That advances outstanding to public agencies in any one State shall at no time exceed 12½ per centum of the aggregate then authorized to be appropriated to the revolving fund established pursuant to subsection (e) of this section.

(b) No advance shall be made hereunder with respect to any individual project, including a regional or metropolitan or other areawide project, unless (1) it is planned to be constructed within or over a reasonable period of time considering the nature of the project, (2) it conforms to an overall State, local, or regional plan approved by a competent State, local, or regional authority, and (3) the public agency formally contracts with the Federal Government to complete the plan preparation promptly and to repay such advance or part thereof when due. Subsequent to approval and prior to disbursement of any Federal funds for the purpose of advance planning the applicant shall establish a separate planning account into which all Federal and applicant funds estimated to be required for plan preparation shall be placed.

(c) Advances under this section to any public agency shall be repaid without interest by such agency when the construction of the public works is undertaken or started: *Provided*, That if the public agency undertakes to construct only a portion of a planned public work it shall repay such proportionate amount of the advances relating to the public work as the Administrator determines to be equitable: *And provided further*, That in the event repayment is not made promptly such unpaid sum shall bear interest at the rate of 4 per centum per annum from the date of the Government's demand for repayment to the date of payment thereof by the public agency.

(d) The Administrator is authorized to prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the purpose of this section.

(e) In order to provide moneys for advances in accordance with this section, the Administrator is hereby authorized to establish a revolving fund which shall comprise all moneys heretofore or hereafter appropriated pursuant to this section, together with all repayment and other receipts in connection with advances made under this section.

There are hereby authorized to be appropriated to such revolving fund, in addition to the amount authorized by this section as originally enacted, the further amounts of \$12,000,000 which may be made available to the revolving fund on or after July 1, 1956; \$12,000,000 which may be made available to such fund on or after July 1, 1957; \$14,000,-000 which may be made available to such fund on or after July 1, 1958; \$10,000,000 which may be made available to such fund on or after July 1, 1961; and such additional sums which may be made available from year to year thereafter as may be estimated to be necessary to maintain not to exceed a total of \$58,000,000 in undisbursed balances in the revolving fund and in advances outstanding for plans in preparation or for completed plans with respect to projects which, in the determination of the Administrator, can be expected to be undertaken within a reasonable period of time.

(f) The Administrator is authorized to use during any fiscal year not to exceed \$50,000 of the moneys in the revolving fund (established under subsection (e)), to conduct surveys of the status and current volume of State and local public works planning and surveys of estimated requirements for State and local public works: *Provided*, That the Administrator, in conducting any such survey, may utilize or act through any Federal department or agency with its consent.

(g) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no advance made under this section for the planning of any public works project shall be required to be repaid if construction of such project is initiated as a result of a grant-in-aid made from an allocation made by the President under the Public Works Acceleration Act.]

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I have investigated and studied to ascertain the meaning of section 6, adding a new subsection (g) to section 702 of the Housing Act.

Mr. HRUSKA. It is good to have such reassurance, but Senators will be called upon to vote a \$900 million authorization; yet we have no copies of the amendments on our desks. It is not a very businesslike arrangement by which to proceed.

Mr. COOPER. I have been trying to obtain copies since last Friday, but have not been able to get any.

Section 702 of the Housing Act of 1954 provides that planning advances or loans may be made in order to encourage a reserve of planned public works. It provides that when construction of a project is started, the advance must be repaid.

Section 6 of the amendments of the House bill before us amends section 702 of the Housing Act by providing that such advances need not be repaid if construction is initiated as a result of a grant-in-aid made under the Public Works Acceleration Act. I think it was considered that if a project was determined eligible for a construction grant, the planning advances for the project could also be made a grant, if construction is actually started.

Mr. HRUSKA. I thank the Senator from Kentucky. His statement is reassuring.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MUSKIE in the chair.) The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Oklahoma to concur in amendments of the House of Representatives.

The motion was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That completes the consideration of the amendments of the House.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President—

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the motion was agreed to.

Mr. KERR. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Oklahoma to lay on the table the motion of the Senator from Montana to reconsider. [Putting the question.]

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion to lay on the table is agreed to.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.

Mr. MILLER. What is the pending business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no pending business at the present time.

Mr. MILLER. May I inquire what was the original motion to which the motion to reconsider was offered?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It was the motion of the Senator from Oklahoma to concur in the amendments of the House.

Mr. MILLER. The bill has not been finally passed, has it?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate has agreed to the amendments of the House. That completes the legislative action on the measure.

Mr. MILLER. Does not the Senate then have to pass the bill as amended?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate's consideration of the measure is now completed.

Mr. MILLER. I was on my feet seeking recognition at the time the question was put.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair was putting the question on the motion of the Senator from Oklahoma and did not hear the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I believe there are some Senators who wish to have a yea-and-nay vote taken on this question. I ask unanimous consent that the action taken by the Senate be rescinded, and that a yea-and-nay vote be taken within 10 minutes afterward.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Muskie in the chair). Is there objection?

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, let me ask whether the effect of the unanimous-consent request of the Senator from Montana is that the only matter left for decision would be the question of concurring in the amendments of the House of Representatives.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, in 10 minutes.

Mr. KERR. Is that satisfactory to the Senator from Iowa?

Mr. MILLER. In responding to the question, let me say that I wished to speak for about 7 or 8 minutes on this question, and I had several questions to ask.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I renew my request, and change the time to 15 minutes, to be equally divided between the Senator from Iowa [Mr. Mil-

ler] and the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The Senator from Iowa is recognized for 7½ minutes.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I should like to ask the Senator from Oklahoma several questions, in reflecting the legislative intent. I read from page 4 of the House amendments:

If the State or local government does not have economic and financial capacity to assume all of the additional financial obligations required.

Let me ask the Senator from Oklahoma what will be used to determine whether the State or local government has the financial capacity. Has any legislative record been made on this point?

Mr. KERR. Section 3 of the House amendments provides:

For the purposes of this section, the term "eligible area" means—

(1) those areas which the Secretary of Labor designates each month as having been areas of substantial unemployment for at least nine of the preceding twelve months; and

(2) those areas which are designated by the Secretary of Commerce under subsections (a) and (b) of section 5 of the Area Redevelopment Act as "redevelopment areas."

Mr. MILLER. Let me refer the Senator from Oklahoma to page 4, line 3. I believe the phrase to which I referred is to be found there. The Senator will note that the phrase used there is:

If the State or local government does not have economic and financial capacity.

The question I should like to have answered, so that we may have a little legislative history on this point, is, What tests will be used? I believe the House amendments are silent on that point.

Mr. KERR. If the Senator from Iowa will read further down on page 4, he will find the following language:

The President shall prescribe rules, regulations, and procedures to carry out this section which will assure that adequate consideration is given to the relative needs of eligible areas. In prescribing such rules, regulations, and procedures, the President shall consider among other relevant factors (1) the severity of the rates of unemployment in the eligible areas and the duration of such unemployment, and (2) the income levels of families and the extent of underemployment in eligible areas.

Mr. MILLER. But let me point out that what the Senator from Oklahoma has read really has no bearing on the financial capacity of a State or local government.

I should like to point out that there may be two local governments, and each may have the same relative need. But the determination may be made that one has a financial need greater than the other. Perhaps that financial need is based upon a bonding requirement that the local voters have adopted, whereas the voters of the other local government have not decided to have bonds issued. Is the Federal Government to determine, by the vote of some local citizens who rejected a proposed bond issue, that the

necessary financing is not available, and that therefore the Federal Government is to pour funds into that local area? Should not there be something more concrete than the mere statement "financial ability"?

Mr. KERR. I must say to my good friend the Senator from Iowa, that I think the language of the House amendments is adequate to give the guidelines in which the Senator from Iowa is interested. For example, on page 5, paragraph (h) provides:

The criteria to be used by the Secretary of Labor in determining areas of substantial unemployment for the purposes of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this section shall be the criteria established in section 6.3 of title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations as in effect May 1, 1962.

With reference to the specific provisions, I read now from page 4, beginning in line 2:

Or up to 75 per centum of the cost of such project if the State or local government does not have economic and financial capacity to assume all of the additional financial obligations required.

It seems to me to be a matter of decision by the agency of government having jurisdiction of the project to be initiated, and that in the exercise of such jurisdiction the affected administrator would be controlled by the language with reference to the criteria to be used in determining areas of substantial unemployment and the criteria, as included, for determining—

those areas which are designated by the Secretary of Commerce under subsections (a) and (b) of section 5 of the Area Redevelopment Act as "redevelopment areas."

Mr. MILLER. Let me ask this question: Would not the Senator from Oklahoma agree that when the local agency of government has a bonding authorization and when the local citizens are to decide, by voting, whether there shall be a bond issue, that is not within the concept of financial need or is outside the purview of need for financial assistance, where self-help is possible?

Mr. KERR. In my judgment, under the language of this measure, if a local unit of government had unused bonding capacity which it could use, but has declined to use, that would render it ineligible for this additional amount up to 75 percent.

Mr. MILLER. I thank the Senator from Oklahoma; that is very responsive to my question.

My second question is with reference to projects which can be substantially completed within 12 months. The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] and the Senator from Oklahoma had a colloquy on that point last Friday.

I wish to bring out a further point; namely, is it not the intention that the completion be by means of the use of normal operating methods, rather than through the use of overtime?

Mr. KERR. I would not be in a position to answer that question in the affirmative, because if the Senator from Iowa will refer to the House amendments

on page 4, paragraph (f) will be found to read as follows:

Funds allocated by the President under this section shall be available only for projects—

(1) which can be initiated or accelerated within a reasonably short period of time; \* \* \*

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time available to the Senator from Iowa has expired.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may have 2 additional minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I must object, because the agreement was that half of the time would be allotted to the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND]. If he wishes to yield some of his time, that is another matter.

Mr. THURMOND. How much time have I?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Seven and one-half minutes.

Mr. THURMOND. I yield 1 minute, if it is understood that I may have 6½ minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized for 1 more minute.

Mr. MILLER. I yield to the Senator from Oklahoma, who is about to answer my question.

Mr. KERR. I have read from subsection (f), at the bottom of page 4. I do not find in the House amendments anything which would prohibit the payment of overtime.

Mr. MILLER. I thank the Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. President, I have a statement on the bill. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### STATEMENT BY SENATOR MILLER

##### THE \$900 MILLION IMMEDIATE PROGRAM

The President of the United States has promised the people a balanced budget for the next fiscal year. This promise was made with the realization that inflationary pressures generated by the deficit of several billion dollars for the last fiscal year and the estimated deficit of several billion dollars for the current fiscal year will cause a further loss in value of our money, a further increase in the cost of living, and a weakening of confidence on the part of foreign creditors leading to a further drain on our precariously low gold reserves.

The \$900 million authorization for an immediate public works program was not included by the President in his budget. No witnesses before the committee provided assurance that the addition of such an expenditure would not unbalance the President's budget. Indeed, due to unfavorable economic reports, there is serious doubt that the anticipated revenue on which the balanced budget was premised will materialize. To add to the spending requested by the budget would only make the situation worse.

It would seem that other items of Federal expenditure contained in the budget might have a lower priority than the \$900 million immediate public works program contained in S. 2965. However, the President has not indicated which budget expenditure items, if any, should be eliminated or reduced to make room for this \$900 million expenditure to help relieve the unemployment problem. If he would do so, it would do much to dis-

miss the inference now present that the \$900 million expenditure lacks priority.

Although the proposed bill appears to contain safeguards against wasteful expenditures of Federal moneys by requiring that a project "meet an essential public need," testimony from the Director of the Area Redevelopment Administration reveals that once a local community has classified a project as a "need now" project, the only standard used at the Federal level is "first come, first served." Recognizing that the ARA has not had much time to perfect its procedures, it would seem that the terms "essential public need" and "need now" should be more meaningful in their application. For example, a so-called "need now" project submitted by one community may have only been "needed" for a year or two. Still, it would take priority over a "need now" project submitted later by another community even though it had been "needed" for 10 years.

If we believe in the capitalistic economic system which has provided the United States with the highest standard of living in the world, then it is to private business that we must look for sustained job opportunities for the millions of unemployed who are walking the streets looking for jobs—not to federally aided public works projects. Proof positive of this was furnished by the Administrator of the Area Redevelopment Administration, who pointed out that economic recovery in the case of the Carbondale, Ill., ARA project related to private business, "which is providing permanent jobs"; whereas the public facility projects envisioned by the \$900 million immediate public works program "do not have as much benefit as the loan in the Carbondale area, which was to a private business."

But continued serious deficits, loss in value of our money, increased costs of living leading to demands for wage increases, squeezes on profits which would otherwise provide capital investment required for business expansion, and new job opportunities—these factors discourage private business. Indeed, private investment in fixed assets dropped \$1 billion during the calendar year 1961. So the President's promise of a balanced budget was clearly in the national interest. More important is delivery on that promise, and I, for one, do not propose to take action which will prevent him from doing so.

There is latent in the bill the possibility of diluting the beneficial effects through the use of overtime payments. The distinguished Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR] has frankly stated that overtime payments should not be ruled out under the language of the bill. This means that, in order for a project to come within the concept of one which can be substantially completed within 12 months, the payment of overtime to insure such completion might be considered. I believe this would be wrong. What the bill is designed to do, insofar as unemployment is concerned, is to relieve the greatest number—to spread the beneficial results of employment to the greatest number, rather than having a smaller number receive benefits through payment of overtime.

Mr. President, I am anything but a pessimist, but history shows that public works legislation has not had a sustained favorable impact on unemployment. This cure was tried during the Roosevelt administration in the thirties, but unemployment nevertheless remained terribly high until World War II bailed us out of the depression. Continued deficit spending and inflation discouraged the growth of private business needed to provide sustained high employment. The figures below should be a warning to those voting for passage of this bill, particularly in light of the billion dollar deficits of the past 2 years and the expected billion dollar deficit for the current year. I include a table, setting forth the situation on

unemployment, Federal employees added to the payroll, Federal deficit, and spending on public works during the years 1933 through 1940, in the RECORD at this point in my remarks:

*Unemployment—Deficit spending table*

Year	Unemployed Thousands	Per cent unemployed	Federal employees added	Annual Federal deficit	Spending on public works
1933	12,830	24.9	-2,966	\$2.6	\$442
1934	11,340	21.7	98,354	3.6	698
1935	10,610	20.1	86,595	2.8	883
1936	9,030	16.9	126,407	4.4	729
1937	7,700	14.3	49,013	2.8	1,024
1938	10,390	19.0	-2,643	1.2	783
1939	9,480	17.2	83,206	3.9	992
1940	8,120	14.6	212,421	3.9	948
Net total increase				650,387	6,499

In conclusion, Mr. President, let me point out that on February 1, 1961, there were 2,358,141 employees on the Federal payroll. By the end of July 1962, this figure had grown to 2,511,025—an increase of 152,884. Thus we see, with the passage of this bill, the familiar pattern established in the thirties, and there is nothing whatsoever to indicate that the effect will be any different. At a time when there is talk of increasing international tensions, when our national defense budget is seeking ever higher levels, and when we are involved in a deadly economic competition with the Soviets, I think we ought not to be passing legislation which fails to meet the real cause of unemployment.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, if I know the temper of the Senate, it will approve S. 2965. However, I can see no justification for passing it, and desire to make a few remarks to set out my position on this bill.

The primary purpose of this measure, which authorizes the appropriation of \$900 million for public works projects, is to combat unemployment. In the guise of doing this, Congress is abdicating its traditional role of determining what public works programs and projects shall be undertaken by the National Government and the policies relative thereto.

It is highly unlikely that the bill will accomplish its stated purpose of providing immediate employment for the unemployed and generally create jobs in areas of underemployment. At the time when this measure was originally introduced, the country was in a period of recession and unemployment was higher than usual. Since that time, however, the economic complexion of the country has changed for the better and unemployment has dropped from the high of 5 million for the first quarter of 1961 to 3.8 million for the second quarter of 1962. The outlook is brightening and the prospects for improvement are encouraging. This bill if enacted will only add to the deficit and impede a faster economic recovery. The unemployment picture has improved to such an extent that the President, relying largely on this factor, declined to ask Congress for a "quickie" tax cut this year. This is a strong argument in opposition to the pending proposal.

The expenditure of the \$900 million which is authorized to be appropriated by this bill will necessitate further defi-

cit financing and thereby increase our national debt. From September 1 of last year until September 1 of this year the national debt has increased by over \$8 billion so that it is now over \$301 billion. This measure will necessitate a further increase in the debt ceiling. No part of the \$900 million authorized to be appropriate by this bill is contained in the budget, and therefore it will be an unexpected increase in a deficit which will be very large as things now stand. This bill will promote the trend of the continuing decline in the value of the dollar. The decline in purchasing power which results from the steady decline in the value of the dollar further accentuates the imbalance between consumption of goods and services and the productive capacity of the Nation, which naturally contributes to unemployment. In the long run, the inflationary effects of this measure will far outweigh the benefits which are claimed it will have in solving the unemployment problem.

At the end of this past fiscal year there were billions of dollars in unobligated balances of existing appropriations, which, if used wisely, would go a long way toward solving this problem. This is money which Congress has already appropriated for various programs, but which has not been put to use.

Under the provisions of this bill, the President is authorized to use the funds provided for the construction of any Federal public works project, either civil or military, which has been authorized by Congress. He may also use the money for any public works projects of States and local governments for which Federal financial assistance is otherwise authorized. This would give the President the power to initiate a public works project which may have been authorized 20 or 30 years ago, but which has never been sufficiently justified before the Appropriations Committee to have specific funds allocated to it. Thus the President could completely bypass the appropriation processes of Congress and order the construction of projects which would not be financed if reviewed and studied by Congress in the discharge of its constitutional responsibilities to appropriate funds. The Public Works Committee is presently considering several different projects for inclusion in an omnibus bill. It is apparent that the same end could be accomplished by that committee, and by increasing specific programs by specific amounts in areas of underemployment. In this way, Congress could retain its traditional authority and there would be no need for the giveaway of this vast amount of power to the President.

**Mr. MANSFIELD.** Mr. President, how much time have I left?

**The PRESIDING OFFICER.** One minute.

**Mr. MANSFIELD.** I yield the 1 minute to the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG.]

#### PERSONAL STATEMENT

**Mr. LONG of Louisiana.** Mr. President, I rise to a point of personal privilege. The Wall Street Journal of today

states that the junior Senator from Louisiana proposes to filibuster against H.R. 10 in the event his amendment is not retained in conference. A similar statement was made by that publication last Friday. Ordinarily I do not complain about such statements. However, I made no such threat. I have done my share of filibustering in this session. There will be no further filibustering on the part of the junior Senator from Louisiana, and I trust that the Wall Street Journal will set the record straight.

#### STANDBY AUTHORITY TO ACCELERATE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMS OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PUBLIC BODIES

The Senate resumed the consideration of the amendments of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 2965) to provide standby authority to accelerate public works programs of the Federal Government and State and local public bodies.

Mr. COOPER subsequently said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD prior to the vote on the public works acceleration bill a statement which I have prepared.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

##### STATEMENT BY SENATOR COOPER

A study of the progress of the public works bill through the Senate and House this year gives ample evidence of responsible action by Republicans in tightening its provisions. In the areas of total money authorized, manner of financing, and standby authority, Republicans in both Houses worked, and were in many cases successful, to make the bill a more responsible and effective piece of legislation.

1. The bill requested by the administration and originally presented to the Senate Public Works Committee included \$2 billion in standby authority—\$750 million to departments responsible for Federal public works programs, \$750 million for grants-in-aid programs of public works, \$250 million for loans for the State share of those programs, and \$250 million for supplemental needs divided among the Federal and grant-in-aid programs. In addition, Senator CHAVEZ, chairman of the committee, offered an amendment to authorize up to \$600 million for an immediate public works program, which was supported by the administration.

In committee, I moved and was supported by the other minority members, that only the Chavez amendment be reported to the Senate as the public works bill. In other words, we approved the spending of \$600 million for an immediate program, but opposed the authorization of \$2 billion for the standby program. The amendment was defeated in committee by the majority members, and the bill as reported to the Senate included both the standby authority, and \$600 million immediate authority.

Before the Senate took up the bill, I think largely because of the work of minority members of the Public Works Committee, Senator KERR offered for the majority members of the committee, an amendment which reduced the \$2 billion standby authority to \$750 million, but which increased the immediate program from \$600 to \$750 million. Republicans, led by the late Senator Case, continued to offer amendments on the floor which would have eliminated the standby program, and cut the immediate

authority back to the \$600 million recommended by the President and approved by the committee. Senator KERR's proposal was adopted, however, and as the bill went to the House, the \$2.6 billion requested by the administration had been cut by \$1.1 billion to \$1.5 billion, \$750 million of which was allocated for the controversial standby program.

The House Public Works Committee, and last week the House itself, supported the position of the minority members of the Senate Public Works Committee and most Senate Republicans. By a vote of 221 to 192, substituting the bill recommended by the House Public Works Committee for the Senate bill, the House eliminated the standby program and authorized \$900 million for an immediate program. Thus, the program suggested by the administration has at this point been cut from \$2.6 billion to \$900 million—a reduction of \$1.7 billion or two-thirds—largely because of the points brought out by Republicans that such a vast expenditure for a pilot program is irresponsible and unnecessary.

2. Republicans also acted responsibly in opposing the original method of financing. As presented to the Public Works Committee, the President could, after determining an acceleration period, cause the unobligated balances of appropriations, contract authorizations, revolving funds, and other authorizations to expend from public or corporate debt receipts available to departments and agencies such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank, and even the World Bank, to be transferred to accounts of other departments and agencies or to some new agency to be used to carry out the purposes of the standby act. Agencies would have been required to turn over to whatever agency was established to administer the expenditure of the \$2 billion, funds that Congress had provided for their uses, whether or not they desired to do so. In the Senate Committee on Public Works I moved, supported by Republican members, to strike this irresponsible method of financing, proposed by the administration—but our motion was defeated by the Democratic majority on the committee. Once the proposal was understood, the Senate agreed that this unique method of financing could be detrimental to the security of many agencies. On the Senate floor, this financing proposal was abandoned quickly by the majority, and the bill was amended to authorize appropriations for the standby program in the regular manner, largely as a result of united Republican opposition to the bizarre scheme.

The bill which was passed by the Senate today is a much better bill than that originally presented to the Senate by the administration, and was improved at every stage by responsible Republican action.

I am for a public works program, and I am concerned about unemployment in areas which have been left behind. I know that in the long run, the ability to provide jobs for our people depends on a strong economy. Basic measures are needed such as tax reform, tax reduction and the elimination of unnecessary expenditures to give the people confidence in our economy. But the proposed bill represents a new attempt to relieve unemployment, and I think it can be useful as an auxiliary measure in areas where people are unemployed. We must not forget these people, who through no fault of their own, cannot find work. We must help them.

**The PRESIDING OFFICER.** The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR] that the Senate agree to the House amendments. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the Clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I announce that the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT], the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. BURDICK], the Senator from Nevada [Mr. CANNON], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER], the Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY], the Senator from Oregon [Mrs. NEUBERGER], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SMITH] are absent on official business.

I further announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Colorado [Mr. CARROLL], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HICKEY], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. LONG], and the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Alaska [Mr. BARTLETT], the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. BURDICK], the Senator from Nevada [Mr. CANNON], the Senator from Colorado [Mr. CARROLL], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], the Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Texas [Mr. GORE], the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN], the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HICKEY], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from Missouri [Mr. LONG], the Senator from Oregon [Mrs. NEUBERGER], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SMITH], and the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] would each vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF] is paired with the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. MURPHY]. If present and voting, the Senator from Montana would vote "yea," and the Senator from New Hampshire would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY] is paired with the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON]. If present and voting, the Senator from Oklahoma would vote "yea," and the Senator from Kansas would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] is paired with the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. BOTTRUM]. If present and voting, the Senator from Louisiana would vote "yea," and the Senator from South Dakota would vote "nay."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] is absent on official business.

The Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT], the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. BOTTRUM], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART], the Senators

from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON and Mr. MURPHY], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. FONG], the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON] and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] are necessarily absent.

If present and voting, the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], and the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] would each vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. BOTTRUM] is paired with the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER]. If present and voting, the Senator from South Dakota would vote "nay" and the Senator from Louisiana would vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. FONG] is paired with the Senator from Utah [Mr. BENNETT]. If present and voting, the Senator from Hawaii would vote "yea," and the Senator from Utah would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON] is paired with the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON]. If present and voting, the Senator from Kentucky would vote "yea," and the Senator from New Hampshire would vote "nay."

On this vote, the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. MURPHY] is paired with the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF]. If present and voting, the Senator from New Hampshire would vote "nay," and the Senator from Montana would vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEARSON] is paired with the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY]. If present and voting, the Senator from Kansas would vote "nay," and the Senator from Oklahoma would vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 45, nays 22, as follows:

[No. 250 Leg.]

YEAS—45

Beall	Jackson	Moss
Bible	Johnston	Muskie
Boggs	Jordan, N.C.	Pastore
Byrd, W. Va.	Keating	Pell
Case	Kefauver	Prouty
Chavez	Kerr	Proxmire
Clark	Kuchel	Randolph
Cooper	Long, Hawaii	Russell
Dodd	Long, La.	Scott
Douglas	Magnuson	Sparkman
Eastland	Mansfield	Talmadge
Ervin	McCarthy	Wiley
Hart	McGee	Williams, N.J.
Holand	McNamara	Yarborough
Humphrey	Morse	Young, Ohio

NAYS—22

Allott	Hruska	Smith, Maine
Bush	Jordan, Idaho	Stennis
Butler	Lausche	Thurmond
Byrd, Va.	McClellan	Tower
Carlson	Miller	Williams, Del.
Curtis	Mundt	Young, N. Dak.
Goldwater	Robertson	
Hickenlooper	Saltonstall	

NOT VOTING—33

Aiken	Dirksen	Javits
Anderson	Ellender	Long, Mo.
Bartlett	Engle	Metcalfe
Bennett	Fong	Monroney
Botrum	Fulbright	Morton
Burdick	Gore	Murphy
Cannon	Gruening	Neuberger
Caehart	Hartke	Pearson
Carroll	Hayden	Smathers
Church	Hickey	Smith, Mass.
Cotton	Hill	Symington

So Mr. KERR's motion was agreed to.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the motion was agreed to.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion by the Senator from West Virginia to lay on the table the motion by the Senator from Montana to reconsider the vote, by which the Senate concurred in the amendments of the House.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL  
11 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, earlier today the Senate granted a unanimous-consent request that, when it concludes its deliberations today, it adjourn to meet at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. At this time I ask unanimous consent that the time for meeting be changed to 11 o'clock tomorrow morning, instead of 10 o'clock.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 1776, and that the Senate disagree to—

Mr. President, I withdraw that motion, because the Senator who offered the particular amendment with which I wanted to move to disagree is not in the Chamber, and I notice "amendments" are to be considered. We will wait, and consider that bill later.

AMENDMENT OF PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT, 1930, RELATING TO PRACTICES IN MARKETING PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the amendments of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 1037) to amend the provisions of the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930 relating to practices in the marketing of perishable agricultural commodities, which were, on page 1, strike out all after line 2, over through and including line 4, on page 2, and insert:

That paragraphs (6) and (7) of the first section of the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930 (7 U.S.C. 499a), are amended to read as follows:

"(6) The term 'dealer' means any person engaged in the business of buying or selling in wholesale or jobbing quantities, as defined by the Secretary, any perishable agricultural commodity in interstate or foreign commerce, except that (A) no producer shall be considered as a 'dealer' in respect to sales of any such commodity of his own raising; (B) no person buying any such commodity solely for sale at retail shall be considered as 'dealer' until the invoice cost of his purchases of such commodity in any calendar year are in excess of \$100,000; and (C) no person buying any such commodity for canning and/or processing within the State

where grown shall be considered a 'dealer' whether or not the canned or processed product is to be shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, unless such product is frozen or packed in ice, or consists of cherries in brine, within the meaning of paragraph 4 of this section. Any person not considered as a 'dealer' under clauses (A), (B), and (C) may elect to secure a license under the provisions of section 3, and in such case and while the license is in effect such person shall be considered as a 'dealer'.

"(7) The term 'broker' means any person engaged in the business of negotiating sales and purchases of any perishable agricultural commodity in interstate or foreign commerce for or on behalf of the vendor or the purchaser, respectively, except that no person shall be deemed to be a 'broker' if such person is an independent agent negotiating sales for and on behalf of the vendor and if the only sales of such commodities negotiated by such person are sales of frozen fruits and vegetables".

Sec. 2. The first section of such Act (7 U.S.C. 499a) is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraphs:

"(9) The term 'responsibly connected' means affiliated or connected with a commission merchant, dealer, or broker as (A) partner in a partnership, or (B) officer, director, or holder of more than 10 per centum of the outstanding stock of a corporation or association;

"(10) The terms 'employ' and 'employment' mean any affiliation of any person with the business operations of a licensee, with or without compensation, including ownership or self-employment."

On page 2, line 5, strike out "SEC. 2." and insert "SEC. 3"; on page 2, line 13, strike out all after "\$50" down through and including "\$25" in line 17; on page 3, line 7, strike out "SEC. 3." and insert "SEC. 4"; on page 3, line 24, strike out "SEC. 4" and insert "SEC. 5"; on page 4, line 1, strike out "SEC. 5." and insert "SEC. 6"; on page 5, line 5, strike out "SEC. 6." and insert "SEC. 7"; on page 6, line 11, strike out "SEC. 7." and insert "SEC. 8"; on page 6, line 14, strike out "SEC. 8." and insert "SEC. 9"; on page 7, line 10, strike out "SEC. 9." and insert "SEC. 10"; on page 7, line 20, strike out "SEC. 10." and insert "SEC. 11"; and on page 9, line 13, strike out "SEC. 11." and insert "SEC. 12".

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I move that the Senate disagree to the amendments of the House, request a conference with the House of Representatives thereon, and that the Chair appoint conferees on the part of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Florida.

The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. JOHNSTON, Mr. ELLENDER, Mr. HOLLAND, Mr. AIKEN, and Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota conferees on the part of the Senate.

#### FISH AND WILDLIFE BENEFITS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 1815, H.R. 1171.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title for the information of the Senate.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 1171) to assure continued fish and wildlife benefits from the national fish and wildlife conservation areas by authorizing their appropriate incidental or secondary use for public recreation to the extent that such use is compatible with the primary purposes of such areas, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Commerce, with amendments, on page 2, line 23, after the word "hatcheries", to strike out "and" and insert "game ranges, and other"; on page 3, line 12, after the word "upon", to strike out "the wildlife populations" and insert "fish and wildlife populations and management operations"; at the beginning of line 18, to insert "in existence or approved by the Migratory Bird Conservation Commission as of the date of enactment of this Act"; on page 4, line 1, after the word "stamps", to insert "Lands acquired pursuant to this section shall become a part of the particular conservation area to which they are adjacent"; in line 14, after the word "reasonable", to strike out "charges, fees, and" and insert "charges and fees and issue"; in line 18, after the word "purposes", to strike out "of this Act"; and in line 19, after the amendment just stated, to insert "The Secretary may issue regulations to carry out the purposes of this Act".

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendments be agreed to en bloc, and that the bill as thus amended be treated as original text for the purpose of further amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there will be no further action taken on the bill today.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. KUCHEL. Under the unanimous-consent agreement entered into, by which the committee amendments were agreed to, I assume there would be no parliamentary difficulty in one of my colleagues offering an amendment subsequently.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Oh, no.

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey subsequently said: Mr. President, I submit an amendment to H.R. 1171 to assure continued fish and wildlife benefits from the national fish and wildlife conservation areas by authorizing their appropriate incidental or secondary use for public recreation to the extent that such use is compatible with the primary purposes of such areas, and for other purposes. I ask that the amendment may be printed and not read and that the text of the amendment be printed in the RECORD at this point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment will be printed without reading.

The amendment is as follows:

At the end of the bill, insert the following:

"Sec. 6. Section 9(a) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, as amended, is amended by striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof a colon and the following: *'Provided further*, That upon a determination made by the President, in time of war or during any national emergency declared by the President, that the interest and welfare of the United States require the sale of any property or interest or any part thereof claimed in any suit filed under this subsection and pending on or after the date of enactment of this proviso the Alien Property Custodian or any successor officer, or agency may sell such property or interest or part thereof, in conformity with law applicable to sales of property by him, at any time prior to the entry of final judgment in such suit. No such sale shall be made until thirty days have passed after the publication of notice in the Federal Register of the intention to sell. The net proceeds of any such sale shall be deposited in a special account established in the Treasury, and shall be held in trust by the Secretary of the Treasury pending the entry of final judgment in such suit. Any recovery of any claimant in any such suit in respect of the property or interest or part thereof so sold shall be satisfied from the net proceeds of such sale unless such claimant, within sixty days after receipt of notice of the amount of net proceeds of sale serves upon the Alien Property Custodian, or any successor officer or agency, and files with the court an election to waive all claims to the net proceeds, or any part thereof, and to claim just compensation instead. If the court finds that the claimant has established an interest, right, or title in any property in respect of which such an election has been served and filed, it shall proceed to determine the amount which will constitute just compensation for such interest, right, or title, and shall order payment to the claimant of the amount so determined. An order for the payment of just compensation hereunder shall be a judgment against the United States and shall be payable first from the net proceeds of the sale in an amount not to exceed the amount the claimant would have received had he elected to accept his proportionate part of the net proceeds of the sale, and the balance, if any, shall be payable in the same manner as are judgments in cases arising under section 1346 of title 28, United States Code. The Alien Property Custodian or any successor officer, or agency shall, immediately upon the entry of final judgment, notify the Secretary of the Treasury of the determination by final judgment of the claimant's interest and right to the proportionate part of the net proceeds from the sale, and the final determination by judgment of the amount of just compensation in the event the claimant has elected to recover just compensation for the interest in the property he claimed.'

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. There are many Senators who are interested in this matter, and I would welcome cosponsors of the amendment.

Mr. KEATING subsequently said: Mr. President, I submit two amendments intended to be proposed to the pending bill (H.R. 1171) and ask that they be printed and ordered to lie on the table.

The first amendment would permit the sale of the General Aniline & Film

Co. to private enterprise. It is identical to the provisions of a bill which recently passed the House of Representatives unanimously and to legislation which I have sponsored in the Senate since 1959. It is supported by this administration and was supported by the previous administration, as well as by a host of labor, management, and civic organizations.

The second amendment would permit a lump-sum settlement in the amount of \$500,000, of an estimated \$3 million worth of claims for so-called heirless property. Under the provisions of existing law, all of this money would be used for the relief and rehabilitation of victims of persecution now in this country. It likewise has the support of this administration and a bill for the same purpose but a smaller amount had the support of the previous administration. I have not been advised of any opposition to this measure from any source.

I intend also to join in amendments to the pending bill to be offered by other Senators all of which are designed to permit a final settlement of the 17-year-old American war claims problem on a fair and equitable basis. We were assured by the majority leader when it was planned to offer similar amendments to the Philippine claims bill that he would provide another vehicle for consideration of these proposals later in the session. I want to express my gratitude to the majority leader for his co-operation and express my hope that these amendments will be approved by the Senate when they are motioned up for consideration.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the texts of my proposed amendments be printed at this point in the RECORD.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** The amendments will be received, printed, and will lie on the table; and, without objection, the amendments will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendments are as follows:

A

At the appropriate place in the bill add a new section to read as follows:

"Sec. . . Section 9(a) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, as amended, is amended by striking out the period at the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof a colon and the following: 'Provided further, That upon a determination made by the President, in time of war or during any national emergency declared by the President, that the interest and welfare of the United States require the sale of any property or interest or any part thereof claimed in any suit filed under this subsection and pending on or after the date of enactment of this proviso the Alien Property Custodian or any successor officer, or agency may sell such property or interest or part thereof, in conformity with law applicable to sales of property by him, at any time prior to the entry of final judgment in such suit. No such sale shall be made until thirty days have passed after the publication of notice in the Federal Register of the intention to sell. The net proceeds of any such sale shall be deposited in a special account established in the Treasury, and shall be held in trust by the Secretary of the Treasury pending the entry of final judgment in such suit. Any recovery of any claimant in any such suit in respect of the property or inter-

est or part thereof so sold shall be satisfied from the net proceeds of such sale unless such claimant, within sixty days after receipt of notice of the amount of net proceeds of sale serves upon the Alien Property Custodian, or any successor officer or agency, and files with the court an election to waive all claims to the net proceeds, or any part thereof, and to claim just compensation instead. If the court finds that the claimant has established an interest, right, or title in any property in respect of which such an election has been served and filed, it shall proceed to determine the amount which will constitute just compensation for such interest, right, or title, and shall order payment to the claimant of the amount so determined. An order for the payment of just compensation hereunder shall be a judgment against the United States and shall be payable first from the net proceeds of the sale in an amount not to exceed the amount the claimant would have received had he elected to accept his proportionate part of the net proceeds of the sale, and the balance, if any, shall be payable in the same manner as are judgments in cases arising under section 1346 of title 28, United States Code. The Alien Property Custodian or any successor officer, or agency shall, immediately upon the entry of final judgment, notify the Secretary of the Treasury of the determination by final judgment of the claimant's interest and right to the proportionate part of the net proceeds from the sale, and the final determination by judgment of the amount of just compensation in the event the claimant has elected to recover just compensation for the interest in the property he claimed.'"

B

At the appropriate place in the bill add a new section to read as follows:

"Sec. . . (a) Section 32(h) of the Trading With the Enemy Act is amended by striking out all that follows the first sentence in the first paragraph down through the third paragraph, and inserting in lieu thereof the following: 'In the case of any organization not so designated before the date of enactment of this amendment, such organization may be so designated only if it applies for such designation within three months after such date of enactment.'

"The President, or such officer as he may designate, shall, before the expiration of the one-year period which begins on the date of enactment of this amendment, pay out of the War Claims Fund to organizations designated before or after the date of enactment of this amendment pursuant to this subsection the sum of \$500,000. If there is more than one such designated organization, such sum shall be allocated among such organizations in the proportions in which the proceeds of heirless property were distributed, pursuant to agreements to which the United States was a party, by the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees and successor organizations thereto. Acceptance of payment pursuant to this subsection by any such organization shall constitute a full and complete discharge of all claims filed by such organization pursuant to this section, as it existed before the date of enactment of this amendment.

"No payment may be made to any organization designated under this section unless it has given firm and responsible assurances approved by the President that (1) the payment will be used on the basis of need in the rehabilitation and settlement of persons in the United States who suffered substantial deprivation of liberty or failed to enjoy the full rights of citizenship within the meaning of subdivisions (C) and (D) of subsection (a)(2) of this section; (2) it will make to the President, with a copy to be furnished to the Congress, such reports (including a detailed annual report on the use of the payment made to it) and permit such examination of its books as the President,

or such officer or agency as he may designate, may from time to time require; and (3) it will not use any part of such payment for legal fees, salaries, or other administrative expenses connected with the filing of claims for such payment or for the recovery of any property or interest under this section.'

"(b) The first sentence of section 33 of such Act is amended by striking out all that follows 'whichever is later' and inserting a period.

"(c) Section 39 of such Act is amended by adding at the end of subsection (b) the following new sentence: 'Immediately upon the enactment of this sentence, the Attorney General shall cover into the Treasury of the United States, for deposit into the War Claims Fund, from property vested in or transferred to him under this Act, the sum of \$500,000 to make payments authorized under section 32(h) of this Act.'

#### LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM AND ORDER FOR EXECUTIVE SESSION TOMORROW

**MR. MANSFIELD.** Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, there will be no further votes this afternoon. There are some speeches to be made.

I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of the morning hour tomorrow the Senate proceed to the consideration of the Executive Calendar.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** Without objection, it is so ordered.

**MR. MANSFIELD.** Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, it is the anticipation of the leadership to take up the nominations listed on the Executive Calendar, including that of Judge Thurgood Marshall, to be a judge of the circuit court of appeals.

#### ESTIMATED INCOME TAX FOR FISHERMEN

**MR. SALTONSTALL.** Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

**MR. MANSFIELD.** I yield.

**MR. SALTONSTALL.** The Senator mentioned Calendar No. 1776, H.R. 6413. The measure means a good deal for us in Massachusetts.

**MR. MANSFIELD.** It does indeed, but what I referred to was an amendment which the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] had submitted. There are amendments to the measure, so I do not know which one it was. That is why I am holding it up. If the Senator can find out the whys and wherefores, we shall be delighted to bring it up.

**MR. SALTONSTALL.** I understand that the Senator from Kansas has withdrawn his amendment.

**MR. MANSFIELD.** Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending business, Calendar No. 1815, be laid aside temporarily, and that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 1776, H.R. 6413.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** The bill will be stated by title.

**THE LEGISLATIVE CLERK.** A bill (H.R. 6413) to extend to fishermen the same treatment accorded farmers in relation to estimated income tax.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of the

bill, which had been reported from the Committee on Finance, with amendments, on page 2, line 18, after "December 31," to strike out "1961" and insert "1962"; and after line 18, to insert a new section, as follows:

Sec. 3. (a) Section 170(b)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to limitation on amount of deduction for charitable contributions by individuals) is amended by striking out "or" at the end of clause (ii), by inserting "or" at the end of clause (iii), and by inserting after clause (iii) the following new clause:

"(iv) an organization referred to in action 503(b)(3) organized and operated exclusively to receive, hold, invest, and administer property and to make expenditures to or for the benefit of a college or university which is an organization referred to in clause (ii) of this subparagraph and which is an agency or instrumentality of a State or political subdivision thereof, or which is owned or operated by a State or political subdivision thereof or by an agency or instrumentality of one or more States or political subdivisions."

(b) Section 170(b)(1)(B) of such Code is amended by striking out "any charitable contributions to the organizations described in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii)" and inserting in lieu thereof "any charitable contributions described in subparagraph (A)".

(c) The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1960.

**Mr. MANSFIELD.** Mr. President, I move that the Senate agree to the date on page 2, line 18, "1962."

**The PRESIDING OFFICER.** Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

**Mr. MANSFIELD.** Mr. President, I move that the Senate disagree to the committee amendment beginning with section 3, beginning at line 19, page 2.

**The PRESIDING OFFICER.** The question is on agreeing to the stated committee amendment.

The committee amendment beginning with section 3 was rejected.

**The PRESIDING OFFICER.** The bill is open to further amendment. If there is no further amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment of the amendment and the third reading of the bill.

The amendment was ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time and passed.

The amendment to the title proposed by the committee was rejected, as follows:

"An Act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to extend to fishermen the same treatment accorded farmers in relation to estimated income tax, and to increase the limitation on the amount of allowable charitable contributions which may be made by individuals to certain organizations."

**Mr. MANSFIELD.** Mr. President, I express the hope that no motion will be made to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed, because I wish to make absolutely certain that one or two of those who do not happen to be present today will have an opportunity to confirm the action taken by the Senate.

**Mr. SALTONSTALL.** Coming from Massachusetts, where the bill will mean

a great deal, I appreciate the statement of the majority leader. I hope there will be no objection to the bill. It means much to the fishermen to carry out their income tax obligations in the way the bill prescribes.

**Mr. MILLER.** Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

**Mr. SALTONSTALL.** I yield.

**Mr. MILLER.** I notice that on page 3 of the bill there is a proposed committee amendment relating to charitable contributions.

**Mr. MANSFIELD.** That is correct. The amendment was rejected.

Mr. President, the thanks of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] really should go to the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] and the distinguished chairman of the committee, the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], and others, who have indicated a very personal interest in the measure, because they knew of the vital interest the measure was to those engaged in deep sea and other fishing. That included the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON].

**Mr. SALTONSTALL.** I thank the majority leader. Of course, we are under obligation always to the Finance Committee when it does the right thing.

#### GI BILL EDUCATED EX-SAILOR WINS HARPER \$10,000 BOOK AWARD

**Mr. YARBOROUGH.** Mr. President, an article in this morning's New York Times illustrates the results that have been obtained in the past through GI education programs. Richard McKenna, an enlisted man who served in the Navy 22 years in the Far East has written a book, "The Sand Pebbles," which has been selected as the Harper Prize Novel of 1962. The selection carries with it an award of \$10,000. In addition, Mr. McKenna's novel is a Book-of-the-Month Club selection, and the Saturday Evening Post has bought it for serialization.

There are two different major motion picture companies bidding for the story. It deals with a period and place in the Chinese revolution between 1925 and 1927 with American sailors caught up in it.

The achievement illustrates what can be done and what is being done with the GI bill.

McKenna left the Navy at the age of 40 to study under the GI bill, at the University of North Carolina. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa. The GI bill changed the course of his life, and provided the world a writer whose talents might have been lost without such an opportunity for educational advancement.

Mr. President, a GI bill is needed today more than ever to give men like Richard McKenna the chance to realize their potential. A GI education bill is a particularly effective way of meeting this need since, in our complex society, many young men enter the Armed Forces without much education. A few years in the Armed Forces serves in most cases as a period in which great

strides in maturity are taken. At the stage in their lives when they leave service these young men have a strong desire to return to school and advance their education. But they do not have the money.

Mr. President, S. 349, the cold war GI bill now pending in the Senate, is designed to meet this need. It will furnish young veterans with partial-subsistence-level educational assistance.

Mr. President, S. 349 was considered briefly 2 weeks ago, but was temporarily laid aside when the Senate proceeded to the consideration of the tax bill. The 37 cosponsors hope that decisive action can be taken on this vital legislation as soon as possible.

Mr. President, I add that I hope that may be done, if not in this session, then in the next.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point the article "Ex-Sailor, 49, Wins Harper Prize of \$10,000 for His First Novel" from the New York Times of Monday, September 10, 1962.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Sept. 10, 1962]  
EX-SAILOR, 49, WINS HARPER PRIZE OF \$10,000 FOR HIS FIRST NOVEL—RICHARD MCKENNA'S "THE SAND PEBBLES" ALSO IS SELECTED BY BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB

(By Arthur Gelb)

Success has come late, but abundantly, to Richard McKenna.

An enlisted man who served in the Navy for 22 years in the Far East, Mr. McKenna began his first novel 3 years ago and will be nearly 50 years old when it is published in January by Harper & Row.

Born to impoverished parents in a small desert town in Idaho, Mr. McKenna entered the Navy at 18 during the depression and did not discover until his retirement that he had a thirst for formal education and a literary bent. His book, "The Sand Pebbles," has just been chosen from 545 entries by a jury composed by Louis Auchincloss, Elizabeth Janeway, and Philip Roth, as the Harper Prize Novel of 1962. The selection carries with it an award of \$10,000.

The Book-of-the-Month Club has given "The Sand Pebbles" its large cash blessing; the Saturday Evening Post bought it last week for serialization; and two major motion picture companies have started bidding for it.

The novel, a fat one, deals with a group of sailors, missionaries, and Chinese caught up in the revolutionary conflict in Hunan Province between 1925 and 1927. It is a lusty, action-packed tale written with a knowledgeable grasp of the historical significance of its setting and a sensitive eye for character. In style, it is plainly influenced by Hemingway.

INSPIRED BY YARN

On a visit to New York from his adopted home in Chapel Hill, N.C., to discuss his next novel with his publisher, Mr. McKenna explained yesterday that "The Sand Pebbles," was inspired by a sailor's yarn about the Chinese revolution.

"I first heard it when I went to China as a young sailor," he said. "In one sense my novel has been in preparation for 30 years, and all my service in China was a kind of field research, although I did not know it then."

The author is a quiet man who would rather listen than talk. There is little in

his manner to suggest the river gunboat sailor he was, though it is true that, like his sailor-hero, Jake Holman, in "The Sand Pebbles," Mr. McKenna can happily down a dozen fried eggs for breakfast. He also shares with his hero an intimate knowledge of, and a lyrical love for, machinery.

But everything else about Mr. McKenna bespeaks the scholar he has become since 1953, when, at the age of 40, he entered the University of North Carolina and sped through courses in literature, science and anthropology, making straight A's and Phi Beta Kappa.

Mr. McKenna gives an impression of immense reserves of strength and discipline. Under brows as unruly as an unweeded lawn, his keen eyes gaze at the world with candor and benevolent humor. His viewpoint, in his novel, is a combination of his former and his present selves.

"I've tried to tell the story both through the naive eyes of the sailor and the sophisticated eyes of the scholar," he said.

Mr. McKenna, who had always felt a vague sense of separateness from his fellow sailors, even as a young man, became oppressed by naval life as he grew older.

"By 1953," he said, "I was in a highly neurotic state and could see no future for myself. At this point I happened to get hold of Thoreau's 'Walden' which I'd never read. It was like medicine."

Mr. McKenna decided that the retirement pay due him as chief petty officer would be enough to sustain him in a Waldensian cabin in the desert; he would furnish the cabin chiefly with books, and retire there to read and learn.

A Navy captain suggested the alternative of entering the University of North Carolina with funds from the GI bill.

"When I got out of the Navy," Mr. McKenna said, "I felt my mind had been in a deep freeze. I felt I couldn't learn enough, fast enough."

After graduation, Mr. McKenna began writing short stories and selling them. One story he struggled with and could not write eventually became the concluding chapter of "The Sand Pebbles."

In love with his work and stunned by the discovery, so late in his life, or his gift, Mr. McKenna has an almost desperate sense of urgency about his future writing.

#### FIGHTING TIME

Ruefully quoting "Time's winged chariot hurrying near," Mr. McKenna confesses that he can hardly bear to pause and evaluate his success, though he knows it is bound to bring about certain changes in his style of living he feels he must hurry on to his next project, and his next, with the same fierce concentration he brought to the writing of "The Sand Pebbles," before his time runs out.

In Chapel Hill, Mr. McKenna sees very few people, and is locked in his workroom during most of every day. He relaxes by reading, doing woodwork and bird watching.

and was published in the September 9, 1962, issue of the News and Courier of Charleston, S.C. The other is entitled "Deadly Parallels Cited in 'Washington Cover-Up'" and was published in the Greenville News of Greenville, S.C., on August 13, 1962. The latter book review was written by the noted columnist, Mr. Holmes Alexander.

Mr. President, I feel that it is particularly important that every Member of the Congress read this book because we all need to learn more about the so-called right of executive privilege and its cost to the Congress and the country.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### "WASHINGTON COVER-UP"—SENATOR STROM THURMOND REPORTS TO THE PEOPLE

A new book, entitled "Washington Cover-Up," hits the Nation's bookstands this week. It is concerned with the subject of "executive privilege"—the so-called right of the executive branch to withhold information from the Congress. In fact, it is the first exhaustive work on the subject, and it lays bare numerous cases of waste, corruption, maladministration, and security risks which were covered up by use of this Executive-originated doctrine and later uncovered by other means.

The author of the book is Clark Mollenhoff, a Pulitzer Prize-winning Washington correspondent who is a close personal friend of Attorney General Robert Kennedy and President John Kennedy. This personal friendship, however, does not prevent Mr. Mollenhoff from expressing himself very candidly against use of "executive privilege" by the President in the recent investigation into military speech censorship policies.

In the book, Mr. Mollenhoff cracks Republicans as well as Democrats in their use of "executive privilege." He points out that the Kennedy brothers are not the only ones who have taken a different view when they moved to the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. For instance, Republican Attorney General William P. Rogers and President Eisenhower's counsel, Gerald Morgan, were once congressional investigators who protested loudly against the withholding of information from the Congress by the executive branch. When they went downtown, however, they advised Eisenhower administration officials to invoke the legally questionable doctrine 17 times.

In tracing the use of executive privilege to cover up embarrassing administrative actions, Mr. Mollenhoff goes all the way back to President George Washington and winds up with a brief treatment of President Kennedy's letters in 1962 (because the manuscript had already been written by then) authorizing Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk to refuse to identify Defense and State Department censors with specific speech deletions in the censorship investigation. He points out that there is no historical justification in alleged examples of how George Washington and Thomas Jefferson set precedents for hiding behind what I have called the "executive fifth amendment." He also makes the point that executive privilege has never been tested in the courts.

The biggest gain made in the game of bureaucratic coverup was pulled off on May 17, 1954, the same day of the fateful Supreme Court decision in the school segregation case. On that date President Eisenhower directed that no information or advice given within the executive branch be given to the late Senator Joe McCarthy's subcommittee. Mr. Mollenhoff described this letter as constituting "a naked claim of an authority for unlimited secrecy, without regard for laws or the spirit of a democracy." This letter was

later used by a number of subordinate administration officials to refuse information to the Congress.

Mr. Mollenhoff points out in this book that President Eisenhower was permitted to "get by" with his May 17, 1954, letter because "many editorial pages of a press that was normally much more objective had developed an attitude that anything that is bad for Joe McCarthy is good for the country." A similar attitude was reflected by administration defenders when efforts were made to have the censors themselves testify as to whether their censorship actions—many of which were not defended even by the administration—reflected individual caprice on their part or were in accord with established Government policies. Others who had flailed "executive privilege" when it had been used against them did not speak out in this instance, except for Congressman JOHN Moss, chairman of the House Government Information Subcommittee.

This book presents invaluable evidence of the insidious poison of "executive privilege," and how it can be used to cover up in efficiency, corruption, and other embarrassing incidents of bureaucratic bungling. The full facts on Government operations must be available for study by the Congress if the people are going to be able to govern themselves with any semblance of efficiency and good judgment through their elected representatives.

Sincerely,

STROM THURMOND.

[From the Greenville (S.C.) News, Aug. 13, 1962]

#### DEADLY PARALLELS CITED IN "WASHINGTON COVER-UP"

(By Holmes Alexander)

WASHINGTON.—On February 8, 1962, President Kennedy laid hands on the lid of a Pandora's box when he instructed Secretary McNamara to take personal responsibility for censorship of military speeches, but on no account to permit individual censors to come before the Senate's Special Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. The President wrote in part:

"I have concluded that it would be contrary to the public interest to make available any information that would enable the subcommittee to identify and hold responsible any individual with respect to any particular speech that he has reviewed.

"The principle which is at stake here cannot be automatically applied to every request for information. Each case must be judged on its own merits. But I do not intend to permit subordinate officials of our career services to bear the brunt and congressional inquiry into policies which are the responsibilities of their superiors."

In a book entitled, "Washington Cover-Up," to be published next month, the much-honored correspondent Clark R. Mollenhoff, an admirer of the President and an even closer friend of Attorney General Kennedy, speculates that this letter may loose upon President Kennedy a swarm of unforeseen and noxious troubles.

Mollenhoff recalls that a similar gag decision by President Eisenhower, used to prevent Senator McCarthy from questioning a Department of the Army official, later became the cause of just about the only scandals which the Eisenhower administration suffered. They were those which blighted the career of the "Assistant President," Sherman Adams, which brought about the Dixon-Yates debacle and which resulted in the disclosure of mismanagement and corruption in the foreign aid program, making it harder every year to get that program through Congress with the funds that an administration believes desirable.

On May 17, 1954, President Eisenhower used the same method as Mr. Kennedy later used—a letter to his Secretary of Defense,

#### "WASHINGTON COVER-UP"—A BOOK REVIEW

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I have just finished reading an advance copy of the new book, "Washington Cover-Up," written by Clark Mollenhoff, the distinguished and much-honored Washington correspondent for the Cowles publications. The book has impressed me so much that I have devoted my weekly newsletter of September 10, 1962, to a review of its contents.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, to have my newsletter and copies of two book reviews printed in the RECORD. One is entitled "Clark Mollenhoff Raps Bureaucracy in Fine New Book"

Charles Wilson—to prevent a Pentagon subordinate, John Adams, from testifying before a Senate committee. Mr. Eisenhower wrote in part:

"Because it is not in the public interest that any of their [the subordinates] conversations or communications, or any documents or reproductions \*\*\* be disclosed, you will instruct employees of your Department \*\*\* not to testify. \*\*\* This principle must be maintained regardless of who would benefit by such disclosure."

The deadly parallels in the Eisenhower and Kennedy positions are self-evident. Mollenhoff goes on to show, in lethal detail, how Eisenhower administrators used these instructions on no less than 17 occasions to jump behind "executive privilege" when their mistakes in judgment or actions were about to be exposed. Many, but not all, Democratic liberals of the day (Senators SYMINGTON and JACKSON were honorable exceptions) and much of the liberal press, in the author's phrase, "had developed an attitude that anything that is bad for Joe McCarthy is good for the country."

This sort of "justification" came up again last winter when it seemed that nobody except radical rightists, like General Walker and Senator STROM THURMOND, would be much miffed by "muzzling the military." Perhaps Mr. Kennedy's instructions to McNamara was intended to be an isolated instance, not applicable to all investigations. But with the Billie Sol Estes case still unresolved, and with criticism mounting on many fronts against the present administration, a time of proof may be at hand.

Mollenhoff is not a negative gadfly. He shows that, contrary to common opinion, which has been misled by official misstatements, there is no historical justification in alleged examples of how George Washington and Thomas Jefferson set precedent by hiding behind "executive privilege." He proposes a permanent cure for official coverup. In the absence of specific laws for withholding information, the author says, all officials except the President himself should be obligated to explain all their actions to Congress and the General Accounting Office.

The book is as good as a congressional investigation, and it deserves wide public and official attention.

[From the Greenville (S.C.) News and Courier, Sept. 9, 1962]

#### CLARK MOLLENHOFF RAPS BUREAUCRACY IN FINE NEW BOOK

"Washington Cover-Up," by Clark R. Mollenhoff. Doubleday, 239 pages, \$4.50.

"Washington Cover-Up," as its jacket proclaims, tells "how bureaucratic secrecy promotes corruption and waste in the Federal Government."

Every businessman, taxpayer, newspaper or radioman ought to read this book, which tells how a growing class of department heads in the Federal Government is taking advantage of a mythical right claimed by the President to invoke secrecy of vital Government information from congressional investigation committees.

He outlines how Presidents Truman and Eisenhower and, now, President Kennedy have shielded heads of departments who have failed to reveal evidence which would have saved taxpayers millions of dollars and punished those responsible for frauds which cost the taxpayers similar millions.

Much of this protection, Mr. Mollenhoff points out, is the result of ignorance on the part of the Chief Executives. But he also points out the stubbornness revealed by these Presidents in failing and refusing to study the faults in this system and to put an end to it.

The author shows that the Teapot Dome investigations and the resulting convictions were accomplished through investigations

conducted largely over the objections of the Chief Executives. He cites instances in the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations where revelations of fraud and inefficiency have been blocked by this shield of secrecy provided by the Presidents.

The author also cites instances of officials who have demanded the negation of such executive secrecy before being appointed to high office by the President, and have completely reversed themselves after such appointment.

"Official suppression of the truth generally is regarded as something alien to the American tradition of freedom and is incompatible with our system of self-government," he quotes Senator Thomas C. Hennings as saying. "Yet, despite these national attitudes, censorship and suppression of the truth are slowly becoming more and more commonplace in our Federal Government, and secrecy threatens to become the rule rather than the exception."

In an investigation of the Navy Department, he cites an added cost of \$125,000 to get information from other sources which would have been available had the President ordered the Department head to reveal the necessary information.

He mentions expensive coverups of graft and mismanagement in foreign aid programs, the building of a farm-to-market road in Peru which led to nowhere, the misappropriation of vast quantities of wheat sent to that country for famine relief and the building there of an irrigation dam for which there was no water.

#### VISIT TO THE SENATE BY CHILEAN PARLIAMENTARY GROUP

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, this noon the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs had the pleasure and honor of serving as host to a very distinguished group of parliamentarians from Chile, a friendly sister republic to the south of us.

We were also honored by the attendance of some of our colleagues in the Senate who are not members of the Committee on Foreign Relations. I may say to my colleagues in the Senate that they are always welcome at these official welcoming functions. This noon, for example, we had the honor of the presence of the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HRUSKA], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. YOUNG], and the Senator from Utah [Mr. MOSS], in addition to several members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

These distinguished parliamentarians were presented to us at the luncheon by one of the great friends of the United States in Embassy Row, so to speak, Ambassador Mueller, of Chile, who has come to be beloved not only so far as the executive branch of the Government is concerned, but also on the Hill, as we say.

It is now my distinct pleasure, Mr. President, officially to introduce our visitors for the RECORD. We have explained to our fellow Chilean parliamentarians, in the manner of the parliamentary fraternity, that this afternoon in the Senate is an afternoon of speechmaking, which explains, as we told them before they entered the Chamber, the many empty seats. We explained to them that we have done our voting for the day, and that the meeting of the Senate this

afternoon is one in which Senators make a record on some of the issues that are presented to the Senate.

They laughingly responded to that explanation by saying that they will feel very much at home, because parliamentary bodies in democracies are the same in this particular around the world. Yet we wanted them to come into this historic Chamber, which means much to the free world, and in these troubled times means so much to the whole matter of Western hemispheric union and the development of the cooperation that is so necessary in order to carry out the great ideals of our great President of the United States with respect to the historic Alliance for Progress program.

We did not want them to return to Chile without visiting within these hallowed walls. Therefore it is a great privilege to present our guests:

The Honorable Jacobo Schaulsohn, President of the Chamber of Deputies from Santiago, Radical Party. First elected to the Chamber in 1949. [Applause. Senators rising.]

The Honorable Humberto Aguirre-Doolan, Senator from Concepcion, Radical Party. First elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1949 and to the Senate in 1953. [Applause.]

The Honorable Humberto Del Rio, Member of the Chamber of Deputies from Cauquenes, Liberal Party. President of the Agricultural Committee. First elected to the Chamber in 1949. [Applause.]

The Honorable Renan Fuentealba, Member of the Chamber of Deputies from Coquimbo, Christian Democratic Party. First elected to the Chamber in 1957. President of the Christian Democratic Party. [Applause.]

The Honorable Victor Gonzalez-Maertens, Member of the Chamber of Deputies from Temuco, National Democratic Party, Padena. First elected to the Chamber in 1957. [Applause.]

The Honorable Julio Subercaseaux, Member of the Chamber of Deputies for the First District of Santiago, United Conservative Party. First elected to the Chamber in 1961. [Applause.]

Mr. President, to our Chilean friends I wish to say the Senate of the United States extends a very warm and cordial welcome, and we hope that they will have a very profitable and pleasant and enlightened trip as they go from point to point in this Republic. Thank you for coming. [Applause.]

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is happy to join in expressing to our distinguished visitors the official welcome of the Senate. The Chair appreciates the privilege of doing so.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Maurer, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed, without amendment, the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 222) providing for the designation of the period October 1962 through October 1963 as "National Safety Council 50th Anniversary Year."

The message also announced that the House had agreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 8038) to amend section 491 of title 18, United States Code, prohibiting certain acts involving the use of tokens, slugs, disks, devices, papers, or other things which are similar in size and shape to the lawful coins or other currency of the United States.

The message further announced that the House had disagreed to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 10) to encourage the establishment of voluntary pension plans by self-employed individuals; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. MILLS, Mr. KING of California, Mr. BOGGS, Mr. KEOGH, Mr. MASON, Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin, and Mr. BAKER were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 10650) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide a credit for investment in certain depreciable property, to eliminate certain defects and inequities, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. MILLS, Mr. KING of California, Mr. BOGGS, Mr. KEOGH, Mr. MASON, Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin, and Mr. BAKER were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message further announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 12870) making appropriations for military construction for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1963, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. SHEPPARD, Mr. SIKES, Mr. CANNON, Mr. JONAS, and Mr. TABER were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

#### ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills and joint resolutions, and they were signed by the Vice President:

S. 187. An act to authorize the Attorney General to compel the production of documentary evidence required in civil investigations for the enforcement of the antitrust laws, and for other purposes;

H.R. 75. An act to amend section 2103 of title 28, United States Code, relating to appeals improvidently taken;

H.R. 857. An act to improve due process in the consideration and final adjudication of disputed claims for veterans' benefits by providing that the claimant shall be furnished a brief statement of the facts and law applicable to the case appealed and afforded an opportunity to reply thereto;

H.R. 860. An act to repeal certain obsolete provisions of title 38, United States Code, relating to unemployment compensation for Korean conflict veterans;

H.R. 1322. An act for the relief of Georges Khoury;

H.R. 1450. An act for the relief of Maria Odelia Campos;

H.R. 1463. An act for the relief of Judy Josephine Alcantara;

H.R. 1678. An act for the relief of Jacques Tawil;

H.R. 2611. An act for the relief of Charles F. Ward, Jr., and Billy W. Crane, Sr.;

H.R. 4628. An act for the relief of Fotios Sakelaropoulos Kaplan;

H.R. 5234. An act to amend title 38, United States Code, to provide for the restoration of certain widows and children to the rolls upon annulment of their marriages or remarriages, and for other purposes;

H.R. 5317. An act for the relief of Mrs. Sun Yee (also known as Mrs. Tom Goodyou) and her children, Nale Har Yee, Shee Bell Yee, and Male Jean Yee;

H.R. 7328. An act for the relief of the estate of Louis J. Simpson, deceased;

H.R. 7437. An act for the relief of Stella Rosa Pagano;

H.R. 7900. An act for the relief of Lt. (jg.) James B. Stewart;

H.R. 9775. An act for the relief of Nihat Ali Ucuncu;

H.R. 9834. An act for the relief of Estelle L. Heard;

H.R. 10195. An act to validate payments of certain special station per diem allowances and certain basic allowances for quarters made in good faith to commissioned officers of the Public Health Service;

H.R. 10493. An act to amend title 18, United States Code, section 4163, relating to discharge of prisoners;

H.R. 11017. An act to amend section 4281, title 18, of the United States Code to increase from \$30 to \$100 the amount of gratuity which may be furnished by the Attorney General to prisoners discharged from imprisonment or released on parole;

H.R. 11031. An act for the relief of George Wm. Rueff, Inc.;

H.R. 11122. An act for the relief of Edward J. McManus;

H.R. 11863. An act for the relief of Vernon J. Wiersma;

H.R. 11996. An act to amend the act of January 30, 1913, to provide that the American Hospital of Paris shall have perpetual succession;

H.R. 12157. An act to amend the Bankruptcy Act in respect to the salaries of retired referees;

H.J. Res. 627. Joint resolution extending the duration of copyright protection in certain cases; and

H.J. Res. 783. Joint resolution granting consent of Congress to the State of Delaware and the State of New Jersey to enter into a compact to establish the Delaware River and Bay Authority for the development of the area in both States bordering the Delaware River and Bay.

#### THE FUTURE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SOVIET QUISLING REGIME IN CUBA

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, over the past several weeks, some of our most distinguished Senators have made statements on the subject of Cuba, expressing diverse opinions. This is as it should be, if the Senate is truly to fulfill its advisory function in the critical realm of foreign affairs.

For my own part, I have hesitated to speak before today for several reasons. In the first place, I do not regard the Cuban situation as one which lends itself to a simple one-word or one-action solution.

I do not believe that the way to deal with it is to send in the marines tomorrow.

In the second place, I know how great the cares of the President are, and how many different factors must be taken into consideration in establishing our policy toward Cuba and toward Latin America as a whole. I do not wish to add to the great burden he is carrying. I want to help our President, and that is why I speak today.

But, in the course of the current debate on Cuba, there are certain things that have not yet been said; there are certain aspects of the situation that have not been given due consideration.

I speak today in the hope that I can contribute, at least in small measure, to the discussion which is essential to the clarification of our collective thinking on Cuba.

Mr. President, we live in a time when historic retribution is quick to follow upon each political folly or lapse of judgment.

Three and a half years ago, Fidel Castro and a band of several thousand guerrilla followers were made masters of Cuba when the dictatorial regime of Fulgencio Batista crumbled.

In retrospect, the innocence and gullibility of our policymakers at that time with regard to Castro seem almost incredible. There is strong evidence to show that, if the Eisenhower administration misjudged the Cuban situation so gravely, they did so because vital information was suppressed at desk position and because spurious estimates by publicly unknown subordinates became the basis for policy decisions of the gravest import for the Western Hemisphere.

Because of these totally misleading estimates, for more than another year, despite Castro's daily abuse of America, the official policy was to keep our minds open, to give Fidel Castro a chance, to avoid doing anything that would, so we were warned, drive him into the arms of Moscow.

But today Castro's Cuba is as completely communized as the Soviet Union or Red China. The Iron Curtain has been rung down 90 miles from our shores.

The Cuban peasants are being forced into state farms. The workers are exploited and oppressed more brutally than chattel slaves. An omnipresent secret police keeps every Cuban under daily surveillance. The land does not produce, and the shop shelves are bare. The one thing of which there is a surplus is Communist literature, designed to help brainwash Cubans of all ages.

The economy of Cuba has become completely slave to the Soviet economy. And, in recent weeks, there has been ominous news concerning the arrival in Cuba of massive shipments of Soviet military equipment and of thousands of Soviet military personnel. What this adds up to is that Cuba has today become a full-fledged military and political satellite of the Soviet Union.

On many points the recent reports have been publicly confirmed by the President or else privately confirmed to the press by the Department of State.

About the following points, I believe there is no dispute:

First. During the last week of July, 11 Soviet cargo ships and 5 Soviet passenger vessels arrived in Cuba.

Second. The passenger ships carried approximately 5,000 Soviet personnel, whom the Cuban press described as agricultural and industrial experts who had come to Cuba for the humanitarian purpose of assisting the Cuban people. President Kennedy, himself, has confirmed that approximately 3,000 of the Soviet experts who have already arrived in Cuba, or are on their way, are, in fact, military experts.

Third. The material unloaded included tanks, planes, antiaircraft missiles, missile-equipped torpedo boats, and other military hardware of various kinds, communications equipment and heavy trucks.

Fourth. All of the ships arrived at night and were unloaded at night, according to eyewitnesses, by Soviet personnel.

Fifth. At least 15 additional ships bringing cargoes from the Communist bloc countries are at present on their way to Cuba. Some of these ships fly flags of NATO countries.

I can understand the State Department's desire to avoid statements which might unnecessarily aggravate the situation or alarm the American public. On the other hand, I believe that in a situation such as this the American public has a right to the unvarnished facts. From this standpoint I find it difficult to understand the assurances that were initially given to the American public that the Communist bloc personnel who entered Cuba aboard the ships which recently docked there were technicians in the nonmilitary sense. President Kennedy did the right thing in his statement of last Tuesday, when he set the record straight on this point and spelled out some of the details about the recent shipments.

But I have reason to believe, on the basis of information from reliable sources, that the situation in Cuba is even more grave than has yet been indicated to the American public.

What is more, the recent shipments of Soviet arms to Cuba are by no means the first. It can be stated as a matter of fact, that the Soviet bloc, prior to July of this year, had already delivered to Cuba 500 tanks of various sizes, 500 to 1,000 artillery pieces, between 50 and 75 Mig jet fighters, some 200,000 small arms, and mortars, antiaircraft guns and other military hardware in substantial quantity. With these earlier shipments, it goes without saying, had come Soviet bloc specialists and instructors to train the Cuban Red Army in its use.

#### IS THE BUILDUP DEFENSIVE?

The fantastic buildup of Soviet planes and tanks and missiles and advisory personnel that has gone on in Cuba over the past year cannot be dismissed as purely defensive.

As the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. KEATING] pointed out last Wednesday, weapons per se cannot be divided into clearly defined defensive and offensive categories. Most weapons can be used for either purpose. It all depends on who wields the weapons and on the intent of the wielder.

No quantity of Soviet arms could give Castro the capability to invade the

United States. But accepting this fact, I still say that the massive buildup of Soviet arms in Cuba constitutes a threat to the security of the United States and of the Western Hemisphere, and that this buildup must be regarded as an act of aggression and as a prelude to further aggression.

It is an act of Soviet aggression against the people of Cuba, in the sense that it endows the quisling tyranny with greater military power to keep them in subjection.

It is a prelude to further aggression in the sense that the large shipments of Soviet arms which have already been unloaded in Cuba are now being transshipped, through clandestine routes, to Castroite movements in other Latin American countries, some of which are already openly fielding guerrilla forces.

It poses a distinct threat to the security of the United States in the sense that it gives Castro the military power to overthrow, or repeat his attempt to overthrow, the Government of Panama, thus placing the Panama Canal under the direct control of Moscow. In doing so, Khrushchev and Castro would not stage a frontal attack on Panama; they would attack by proxy, using an indigenous extremist movement as a front, and pretending to the world that the entire action had been initiated by the Panamanian people.

The Soviet arms buildup in Cuba poses a threat to the security of the United States in the sense that it places the Soviet Union in control of territories and of physical facilities which could prove of the greatest strategic importance in the event of a military showdown with the Soviets.

There is a growing feeling in our country, a feeling that cuts across party lines and political labels, that the time has come to face up frankly to these facts. There is a feeling that we cannot afford to delay much longer, because the longer we delay, the more difficult it will be to cope with the problem.

The existence of this popular conviction has been demonstrated by the many editorials and columns in the American press. The temper of the American people on this matter is further demonstrated by the very heavy mail which Congress is now receiving on the subject of Cuba, urging a stronger policy toward the Castro regime. My own office alone has received literally hundreds of such letters and telegrams. One of the chief reasons why I am speaking today is that I consider it my duty to let my constituents know where I stand on this issue.

#### HOW OUR POLICY WENT ASTRAY IN CUBA

Three and a half years ago, as I pointed out in my opening remarks, the Castro movement consisted of a mere handful of guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra Mountains. At that time we might have prevented the establishment of a Communist beachhead on our very shores if we had listened to the warnings of our Ambassadors in Latin American countries and of our intelligence agencies. They warned us that, while there might not be conclusive proof that Castro, personally, was a Communist, there was proof that a number of his

chief lieutenants were Moscow-trained Communists and that the movement, as a whole, was to a dangerous degree under Communist influence. There were also many things in Castro's personal career, including the leading role he had played in the Bogotá riots of 1948, which at least strongly suggested that Castro himself had ties with the Communist apparatus.

Had we listened to these warnings, we would have striven to bring about an orderly transition from the Batista regime to a democratic and constitutional regime, directed against Castro as well as the extreme right. But, unfortunately, there were those in the State Department at the time who were prone to accept as gospel the evaluation of the Castro movement which found its way into the staid columns of the New York Times through the pen of Mr. Herbert Matthews.

Mr. Matthews assured the American public that Castro was not a Communist and that the Castro movement was not Communist dominated; and Matthews built up a hero image of Castro in which all the virtues of Robin Hood and Thomas Jefferson, of George Washington, and Abraham Lincoln, were combined in a single man.

The American people were fed more of the same hokum over the CBS network in a documentary film prepared by their Cuban correspondent, Mr. Robert Taber. Mr. Taber, who was dismissed by CBS when he was called before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, later blossomed forth as director of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, a Castro-subsidized front organization which for some time enjoyed a considerable vogue in this country. It also developed that Mr. Taber had a long criminal record, which included convictions for robbery and kidnaping.

Because we were thus misled as to the true nature of the Castro movement, because the reports of our ambassadors and of our intelligence services were minimized or ignored, because some of the experts in our Latin American division assured their superiors, in almost vehement terms, that there was no proof that Castro was a Communist or that his movement was Communist dominated—because of these things we did nothing to prevent Castro from coming to power in Cuba. Indeed, to the extent that our diplomacy did intervene in Cuba, it intervened in a manner that was mathematically guaranteed to assure the installation of a Castro regime.

The Batista regime crumbled primarily because it was venal and inept and cruel and had lost popular support. But it was American policy that was responsible for the timing of Batista's downfall and for the fact that, when he fell, the only man who could fill the vacuum that was thus created was Fidel Castro.

No effort had been made to encourage the formation of a middle-of-the-road alternative to both Batista and Castro.

No effort was made to explore the possibility of an election under OAS auspices, which our Ambassador to Cuba had advocated and believed possible.

As another variant, we might have explored the possibility of democratic reform under a non-Castro regime by stabilizing the situation until President Rivero Aguero, who had been elected as Batista's successor in November 1958, could be formally installed in an inaugural ceremony that was scheduled for February 24, 1959.

But apparently no alternative to a Castro takeover was given serious consideration. Our position was that Batista had to go and go immediately; and if Castro was the only man on the scene able to take over at that time, then the prudent thing to do was to be nice to Castro and to give him a chance to prove that he was basically a "decent fellow."

Because this was our attitude, no effort was made to warn the Cuban people, the overwhelming majority of whom were anti-Communist, of the dangerous degree of control which Moscow-trained Communists exercised in the Castro movement.

When the Castro regime publicly revealed its true colors, a decision was made, during the last months of the Eisenhower administration, to give active assistance to the Cuban opposition in an effort to overthrow the Castro dictatorship. This effort could have succeeded; indeed, I am certain it would have succeeded, had we determined in advance to support the Cuban freedom fighters on their beachhead with American air cover, to assure the success of their undertaking. But in this case, a policy which had been rightly and soundly conceived was, I have reason to believe, undermined by divisions within the ranks of the President's principal advisers.

There was, in particular, great concern that active American involvement in the Cuban invasion would alienate many of the Latin American and Afro-Asian nations and further complicate our position within the United Nations.

With some advisers pulling one way, and some advisers pulling the other way, the Cuban freedom fighters and the cause of Cuban freedom became the inevitable casualties.

The freedom fighters did not receive the air support which had been considered essential to the success of the invasion; and the result was the Bay of Pigs disaster.

#### THE HIGH COST OF NOT TAKING DECISIVE MEASURES

To overthrow the Castro regime today—I have no illusions on this score—will require a far greater effort than it would have required 1 year ago.

But the cost of overthrowing it today would be infinitely smaller than the price we will have to pay 2 or 3 years hence, when we may very well be confronted not with a single Castro regime, but with some half-dozen Castro regimes scattered through Latin America.

Each year that we fail to face up to the danger of Castroism, the cost of confronting it goes up in geometric proportion.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks an article on Cuba written by the distinguished col-

umnist Roscoe Drummond, which appeared in the August 29 issue of the Washington Post. I consider it an article of such significance that I hope all Senators will find the time to read it.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

**MR. DODD.** The basic argument of Mr. Drummond's column is that we cannot expect the Castro dictatorship to die on the vine; that while there is hunger, undernourishment, and monumental mismanagement under the Castro regime, Castro, despite all this—I quote—"is steadily tightening his grip on the Cuban state and on the Cuban people—with so much Soviet help that he is both ally and captive."

Perhaps the most cogent argument against the "let Castro die on the vine" thesis was made by the internationally famous liberal historian, Salvador de Madariaga, one of Europe's most revered elder statesmen, who for many years played a distinguished role in the League of Nations. Professor de Madariaga makes this statement in his recent book "Between the Bear and the Eagle":

The argument that Castro had better be left alone and given enough rope to hang himself is worthless. The experience of other nations fallen into the unscrupulous hands of the Communist Party allows of no such optimism. Time could only make of Cuba an impregnable base for communism to spread all over Latin America. The Latin American governments who shilly-shally over it are only preparing the rope with which they will be hanged. Castro must go soon.

I concur wholeheartedly in this opinion. If we permit the Castro regime to remain on the Latin American vine, in the hope that it will perish, the chances are that, instead of perishing of its own weakness, it will spread its disease to the rest of the vine.

We have committed ourselves to a massive program, the Alliance for Progress, in an effort to rehabilitate and modernize the economies of the Latin American countries. But this entire program is vitiated from the outset by the mere existence of the Castro dictatorship.

The fact is that we are losing the cold war in Latin America and we shall continue to lose it so long as we use foreign aid, unsupported by vigorous political action, as the chief instrument of American policy.

I have heard from many sources that, in most of the Latin American countries, the Alliance for Progress program is virtually unknown to the man on the streets. True, the intellectuals do know about it; but, as things are today in Latin America, the majority of the intellectuals are prone to condemn the Alliance as a device for the enslavement of Latin America by "American imperialism."

We put up money to build schools and combat illiteracy and encourage higher education. But all too often the teachers in these schools and the professors in the universities are members of Communist-dominated unions, who use their American-supported educational facilities to teach their wards to hate America and despise capitalism, and to admire

everything that bears the Soviet brand-mark.

A recent survey in Venezuela showed that the percentage of Communist teachers in grade schools ranged from a high of 86 percent in some schools to a low of 33 percent in other schools. It also showed that there were 800 card-carrying students in the engineering school of the University of Venezuela.

In Brazil, according to the newspapers, the Communists also completely dominate the student movement. I quote from a New York Times dispatch from Rio de Janeiro, dated July 23:

The leftist-dominated National Students Union has elected an unopposed list of officers on a platform including opposition to the U.S.-sponsored Alliance for Progress.

In Mexico, according to a detailed report I have recently received, the Communists exercise a degree of control over the teachers' union which is nothing short of terrifying.

I want to say a few words about the situation in Brazil, because the dangerous turmoil that today exists in that country is characteristic of much of Latin America—and will, I am afraid, remain characteristic so long as the Kremlin is permitted to maintain an advance base for political and military subversion on the shores of the Western Hemisphere.

President Goulart's government, according to all reports, is weak and divided, and the Communists are gaining influence on many fronts—in the trade union movement, among the unemployed, among the impoverished peasants of northeast Brazil, among the students and intellectuals, in the ranks of government workers, and even in the top echelon of the Brazilian Government.

Although President Goulart during his visit to the United States sought to dissociate himself from his pro-Communist brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, Governor of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, Brizola still remains in office, and his popular influence has, if anything, increased. He has repeatedly called for the expropriation of all U.S. property in Brazil; and on February 16 of this year he set an example for other Brazilians by arbitrarily confiscating all of the properties of the International Telephone & Telegraph Co. located within his state frontiers, offering only token compensation.

It is also significant that the new Prime Minister of Brazil, Dr. Francisco Brochado da Rocha, was Secretary of Justice and the Interior in the government of Brizola at the time when the International Telephone & Telegraph property was expropriated, and he is credited by many persons with having been the actual brain behind the expropriation.

The temper of the statements that the Brazilian people are listening to from their political leaders offers small reason for encouragement. For example, on May 22 of this year, Governor Brizola addressed a group of law students, at a meeting which was generously attended by Government dignitaries and members of Soviet bloc embassies. In this nationally televised diatribe, which would

have done credit to Fidel Castro, the Governor told his audience that Brazil was being occupied and sacked by the "imperialistic capitalists of the United States."

He said that Brazilians should have the courage to take over U.S. firms in Brazil, to tell Americans to get out, unless they bring their families and children to Brazil and become Brazilians and learn Portuguese.

He also said that one more chance should be given democracy in Brazil. And he served notice on the present government that it must make all the reforms demanded: Change the constitution. Kick the U.S. interests out of Brazil. Stop the Alliance for Progress—and do it now—or else the revolutionary forces would do it in their own way. And he added that he would gladly accept leadership of the revolution.

There are some who say that we cannot deal with the problem of Castroism in Latin America unless we first deal with the problems of poverty and social backwardness and military dictatorship. I say that the converse is true: That we cannot properly deal with the problems of poverty and political instability unless we first deal with the problem of Castroism. In the interim period, we have no alternative but to endeavor to deal with both problems simultaneously.

It is not true that communism breeds only on poverty and political tyranny. I would point out to my colleagues that the government of Romulo Betancourt in Venezuela is commonly acknowledged to be one of the most democratic and socially progressive in Latin America, that the people of Venezuela enjoy a higher standard of living than any of their Latin American neighbors. But despite all these things—or is it precisely because of them?—the Communists have made the Government of Venezuela their No. 1 target in Latin America. Under Castroite instigation, Venezuela over the past 2 years has been the scene of riot after riot and uprising after uprising.

Let there be no mistake about it: The mere existence of Castroism makes political stability impossible in Latin America, and makes turmoil an epidemic condition. Fidel Castro, under Moscow's direction, has become both the principal organizer and charismatic symbol of the political and social chaos that today racks the lands of Latin America.

More than one Latin American political leader has faced up to the fact that so long as this turmoil is permitted to exist, there can be no way out but total chaos and ultimate communism. Speaking on August 16, for example, the Argentine Minister of Economics, Alvaro Alsogaray, stated the following:

If there is no political stability, if every day we are threatened by coups d'état, if at every moment we are fearful that blood is to be shed among Argentines \* \* \* if we look more like an anarchical state than an organized country, then this system of modern free economy with a social distribution of wealth, fails at its base and cannot work. We cannot attract capital under the permanent threat of revolution.

If the economies of Latin American countries are to be developed at a tempo

adequate for our times, it will require all the private capital, both domestic and foreign, that can be mobilized and brought to bear on the problem, through political encouragement and economic inducement. But the fact is that, since Castro took power in Cuba, there has been a serious flight of capital from virtually all the Latin American countries, a process of disinvestment rather than of investment. The inroads that Castroism has made in Latin America, the apparent stabilization of the Castro dictatorship, our failure thus far to take any active measures to terminate the problem, have all helped to produce a great outpouring of "frightened capital," seeking investment in safer areas.

I say that no foreign aid program, no matter how generously conceived, can act as a substitute for private capital. Foreign aid can render support to a program of private investment in the development of backward countries. But one of the prime functions of our foreign aid program, as I see it, is to create a climate that is hospitable to private investment. No sovereign government can be denied the right to expropriate property, in return for proper compensation, if it considers such action to be in the national interest. On the other hand, we must endeavor to set forth the facts about expropriation and the role of private capital to our Latin American friends. We must endeavor to explain to them that expropriation, historically, has weakened the economies of those nations who have practiced it; that it has resulted in an immediate deterioration in the management of the expropriated industries; that it has, at a later date, retarded their modernization and made it more difficult for them to compete in the world's markets; that it has, in effect, killed the goose that lays the golden egg by discouraging further capital investment in these countries.

I am convinced that we can get this across to the Latin American peoples because reasonable nationalists and true progressives have long since come to realize that expropriation is self-defeating. They have come to realize that the welfare of their people depends on their ability to foster a spirit of partnership between their governments and foreign investors, perhaps based on the profit-sharing formula which has now become so widespread.

Expropriation of foreign enterprises today remains the policy of only two groups: the lunatic nationalists like Mossadegh and the Communists. The Communist agitation for expropriation runs parallel to their vicious encouragement of antiwhite terrorism in the countries of Africa. The latter policy is designed to drive the white people physically out of Africa in order to create a political and social vacuum. The policy of expropriation, similarly, is designed to frighten out foreign capital already in the country and to keep away foreign capital that might have come in, for the purpose of creating an investment vacuum and further aggravating the economic hardship and social chaos on which communism fattens.

I come back to the point that there can be no serious program of economic

rehabilitation in Latin America so long as the Castro tyranny, which is the prime source of the expropriation sickness and of political turmoil in Latin America, is permitted to exist.

I say that the Alliance for Progress and the continued existence of the Castro regime are mutually incompatible—that one or the other will have to go.

#### THE NEED FOR A LIBERATION POLICY

I believe that the security of the hemisphere demands decisive action to put an end to the tyranny that today oppresses the Cuban people.

I cannot, however, agree with those who are today urging that we invade and occupy Cuba with American forces.

The call for an American military occupation of Cuba is false in its emphasis and lays us open to unnecessary attack by the Communist and Castroite propaganda apparatus. Because of this, an American military occupation of Cuba, even if carried out with dispatch and efficiency, might very well produce a worsening of the political situation throughout Latin America.

The Cuban people must be liberated from Soviet slavery. The right of self-determination must be restored to them. But the task of liberation must be carried out, in the first instance, by the Cuban people themselves. The role of the United States and of the other American nations must be limited to supporting the forces of Cuban freedom.

There is too great a tendency to accept Communist revolutions as irreversible and Communist regimes as permanent.

Indeed, this assumption somehow seems to have become an essential ingredient of our foreign policy.

It is an ingredient which seems to have had a paralyzing effect on our understanding and on our will.

It is not too much to say that unless we can succeed in shaking off this paralysis, the triumph of the Communist world over the free world is inevitable.

Even those who urge conciliation with communism will not dispute the statement that the Communists seek to subject the remaining free governments of the world by every means at their disposal—by propaganda, by political agitation, by infiltration, by guerrilla action, and, in certain cases, by direct military aggression. Nor would they question the statement that, employing these means, the Communists since World War II have annexed or succeeded in taking over the following roster of countries and territories: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, East Germany, North Korea, mainland China, North Vietnam, Tibet, northern Laos, and Cuba.

Rosters of names, I know, make dreary reading. But I do not think it would hurt us to repeat this roster to ourselves at regular intervals.

True, we did succeed in preventing the Communists from taking over in Greece, in Guatemala, and in South Korea. But the final outcome of the struggle is a matter of simple arithmetic if the Communists continue to annex new territories while we limit ourselves, at each

juncture, to defending, sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully, what remains of the free world.

I believe that if Communist counter-revolutions are possible, revolutions for freedom are also possible. I believe that if Communist regimes can be imposed on peoples, there are also ways in which these regimes can be deposed. I believe that the entire record of the postwar period, indeed, underscores the vulnerability of Communist regimes and the feasibility of overthrowing them.

The Communist regimes are different from the orthodox tyrannies of the past in the sense that they are totalitarian, that under communism, not merely is opposition political activity proscribed, but every phase of human activity is brought under the control of the all-powerful state.

Wherever they have taken power, these regimes have shown themselves to be monumentally inefficient. That this is so should not be surprising, because the concept on which they are based runs completely counter to the grain of human nature. Whether it is in the Soviet Union or in Czechoslovakia or in China or in Cuba, these regimes have demonstrated an infallible genius for undermining agricultural production by destroying the will of the peasant classes to produce. In the name of creating an ultimate utopia, they have invariably subjected their newly acquired peoples to far crueler economic hardship than they had ever before experienced.

This combination of ineptness and cynicism, of economic hardship and religious persecution and total political tyranny, has, in turn, produced in the countries subjected by communism a hatred more violent and more universal in nature than anything heretofore recorded by history. The phenomenon of total dictatorship has, in fact, produced the phenomenon of the "total revolution," in which entire peoples, including the military forces under supposedly Communist direction, have revolted against their Communist masters.

The French Revolution was opposed not merely by the aristocracy, but by substantial sections of the middle class and, in certain parts of France, even by the peasants.

The American Revolution, in terms of popular support, was at best a majority proposition, with substantial portions of the population remaining loyal to the British Crown, while other portions remained uncommitted.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the Communist revolutions that have taken place since that time, were distinctly minority affairs, in which disciplined conspiratorial parties, numbering only a tiny fraction of the total population, succeeded in imposing their will on their peoples by force and by subterfuge.

But there was no such national division at the time of the East German uprising in 1953, of the Polish uprising of 1956, of the Hungarian revolution of October 1956, of the Tibetan uprising of March 1959. These national uprisings against Communist tyranny have been marked by their universal nature, by

the fact that in each case the armed forces sided with the people against the tyrants. The report of the United Nations Committee on Hungary, for example, made the point that, when the Red army invaded Hungary to put down the revolution, there was not a single recorded instance of Hungarian fighting against Hungarian. It was the Hungarian people as a whole fighting against the tanks of the Red army.

That the phenomenon of "total revolution" is not a freak or historical accident is further demonstrated by the fact that we have had four such uprisings over the past 9 years. This is all the more remarkable, because in each case these uprisings took place without foreign support of any kind, without internal organization, in the very teeth of the Soviet Army or the Red Chinese Army, and without any hope of intervention or military assistance by the free world.

The Polish revolution was frozen halfway because of the massive presence of the Soviet Red Army within Poland and on its frontiers. The East German uprising and the Hungarian revolution were defeated only by the open intervention of the Red army against the peoples of East Germany and of Hungary. The Tibetan uprising, similarly, was not put down by any Tibetan quisling apparatus; it had to be put down by the overwhelmingly superior military forces of Communist China.

If such a total revolution against communism were to take place in Cuba, however, its immediate success would be assured for the simple reason that the Soviet Union and Communist China would be in no position to intervene in Cuba as they did in Hungary and East Germany and Tibet.

Against this background, Mr. President, I do not think it unrealistic to suggest that we should strive to assist the Cuban freedom movement to build up its forces and to foster the conditions for a total anti-Communist revolution, uniting the Cuban people and the Cuban armed forces against the quisling tyrants who oppress them.

We should not wait for this revolution to take place accidentally or spontaneously. On the contrary, short of open military intervention by American military forces, we should do everything in our power to encourage and to assist the forces of Cuban liberation.

I believe that the proposal of Professor de Madariaga for collective action by the Organization of American States in support of Cuban freedom is the ideal for which we should strive. But if such action cannot be organized, if our Latin American friends continue to shilly-shally, then, as President Kennedy suggested in his historic speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors after the Bay of Pigs disaster, we must be prepared to act alone in support of the Cuban people.

Our patience is not inexhaustible—

Said the President:

Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of noninterference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction—then I want it clearly understood that this

Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are to the security of the Nation.

Like all of my colleagues, I have given much thought to the situation in Cuba. I should like to submit for their consideration a six-point plan of action for the liberation of Cuba.

I submit this plan with no sense of finality.

I recognize that other and more effective measures may conceivably be devised for coping with the problem.

I recognize, too, the infinite complexities that the administration must take into consideration in determining its course of action.

I believe, however, that in this critical situation, a moral obligation devolves upon the Senate and especially upon the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, to give this matter their most earnest consideration and to set forth their opinions and their suggestions in the hope that they can thus be of some assistance to the few men upon whom rests the ultimate responsibility of decision.

I believe the first measure we must take is to commit ourselves to a "declaration of independence and freedom for the Cuban people," so that the whole world will know that the decision has been made to completely eradicate the malignancy of Castroism.

Second, I believe that we should inform the Cuban exiles in this country that we are prepared to support the establishment of, and grant recognition to, a broadly representative provisional Cuban Government-in-exile. If the Cuban political leaders cannot achieve the minimum agreement essential to the establishment of such a provisional government, then I believe that the faculty of the University of Havana, most of which is now in this country, or alternatively, the several hundred members of the Havana Bar Association who have sought refuge here, should be constituted as a provisional government, committed to the holding of free elections within 1 year of the liberation of Cuba.

As a third and immediate measure—in anticipation of action by the Organization of American States—I believe we should invoke the Monroe Doctrine to proclaim a total embargo on shipments of Communist military materials and military personnel to Cuba.

The words of President Monroe never had clearer application than they have today in Cuba.

In his message to Congress on December 2, 1823, President Monroe asserted—

as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.

We owe it therefore to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those [European] powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their systems to any portions of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety—

I ask my colleagues to note carefully the wording of this statement, to note

that President Monroe spoke of extending—  
their systems to any portion of this hemisphere.

I would also ask them to note with care the words of President Monroe when he said further in his statement that the United States would view as an—unfriendly act any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them—the Latin American republics—or controlling in any other manner, their destiny, by any European power.

I believe that this wording applies clearly to the situation that exists in Cuba today. I cannot understand, indeed, how my good friend, the distinguished Senator from California, could take the stand that the Monroe Doctrine did not apply to Cuba because the Soviet armaments and Soviet personnel now in that country were there by virtue of an official request from the Government of Cuba. He stated:

The Monroe Doctrine applies to a situation in which a foreign power by force overthrows an established regime in this hemisphere.

As I read the Monroe Doctrine, it applies to "any interposition" for the purpose of oppressing the Latin American peoples or controlling their destiny "in any other manner."

Nor can I understand the legitimacy which he accords the Castro government in his statement. The Castro government was not elected by the people of Cuba and does not represent them. It is not an indigenous government, but a quisling Soviet regime which has been imposed on the Cuban people by deception and by fraud and by terror, and which now maintains itself in power only thanks to the massive presence of Soviet arms.

At the time President Monroe made his historic declaration, the United States was only a minor power compared with the great nations of Europe, and its navy was by no means the first in the world. Today we are indisputably the world's greatest power, while our navy dwarfs the navies of all the Communist nations combined. If the Monroe Doctrine cannot be enforced today to deal with a situation that more clearly violates its intent than has any other situation since its proclamation, then I say that the candid thing to do would be to strike the doctrine from our books.

It is, however, my confident expectation that, with or without the support of our Latin American neighbors, the wisdom of the Monroe Doctrine in its specific application to Cuba will be recognized, and the necessary action will be taken to implement it.

In invoking the Monroe Doctrine to prevent the shipment of Communist military materials and military personnel to Cuba we could, I am certain, make it abundantly clear that our action was directed not against the Cuban people but against the Soviet quisling regime. We might even give consideration to substituting a food ship, loaded with American surplus food, for every shipment of Communist arms of military contraband that was turned back.

Fourth, I believe that we should greatly intensify our entire propaganda effort with the frankly declared purpose of assisting the Cuban people to liberate themselves. We must direct this propaganda not merely to the people of Cuba, but to all the peoples of the Americas, documenting the facts about Castro's communism, about the treachery by which he imposed his Communist tyranny on the Cuban people, about the abandoned promises for free elections, about the catastrophic economic mismanagement that characterizes his regime, about the thousands of Soviet and Chinese experts who are now flooding the country, about the abject economic and political tutelage to the Soviet Union into which Castro has led Cuba.

As a fifth step, I believe we should be prepared, preferably in concert with the OAS nations, to impose a total blockade on all shipments to Cuba, other than shipments of food and consumer goods.

Sixth, I believe we should be prepared to give open and increasing assistance to Cuba's heroic freedom fighters, who are daily defying Castro's execution squads.

I note that there have been some editorials in our country which have deplored the action of the group of Cuban refugee students who recently bombarded Havana from makeshift craft that they had sailed from Miami.

According to these editorials, the U.S. Government should now take the most stringent action to prevent any such future expeditions by Cuban patriots operating from our shores. I would point out to these editors that none of them, to my knowledge, made similar protests when the Castro movement was seeking to overthrow the Batista regime, and when agents for the Castro movement were active in this country, raising funds for its support and purchasing arms and ammunition which they sent by plane and by ship to the Castro guerrillas from Florida ports. Indeed, it is amazing, in retrospect, to realize that there was no public protest over the virtually total suspension of American law enforcement when it was a matter of "arms for Castro."

I suggest that it is our moral duty to give the Cuban freedom fighters of today at least the same leeway that we gave the agents of Castro only several years ago. Indeed, I would urge that we not only support the resistance movement in Cuba, but that we openly support the creation of a "Cuban Freedom Legion" in exile, whose ranks would be open to all Latin American nationals.

To be realistic, we cannot completely exclude the possibility of military assistance to the Cuban freedom fighters. But I believe that this is a decision that can only be made at a later date and against the background of a plan of action similar to the one I have here outlined.

Let us not be deterred from a policy of liberation by the fact that the Communist nations and certain of the Afro-Asian nations will scream at the top of their lungs that American imperialism is engaging in military aggression.

It is the Soviet Union which stands convicted of political and military aggression in Cuba, and which, from its Cuban beachhead, is daily practicing political aggression against the countries of the Western Hemisphere.

Moreover, the Soviets and the Afro-Asian extremists have long ago forfeited all right to protest against unilateral military action.

A free Hungary threatened no one; but, in open defiance of the United Nations, the Soviet Union sent in an army of 5,000 tanks to crush the Hungarian revolution in blood and to impose an inglorious quisling regime which could not have mustered a hundred votes in the whole of Hungary.

Goa threatened no one; but, in violation of the U.N. Charter, India invaded and annexed the territory of Goa.

West New Guinea, as a colony of the Netherlands, threatened no one, and the Netherlands Government had already committed itself to a policy of self-determination for the Papuan people. But Indonesia has now succeeded in forcing the peaceful surrender of west New Guinea to Sukarno's imperialist ambitions, flagrantly violating the two cardinal tenets on which the United Nations is founded—the right of self-determination of peoples and the repudiation of force as an instrument for the settlement of disputes.

Let us not be deterred from our commitment to a free and independent Cuba by the hysterical protests of tyrants or opportunists who usurp the name of the Cuban people or hypocritically invoke the United Nations Charter. For I believe that the justice of this policy of liberation will be vindicated by the Cuban people themselves in free elections, under OAS auspices, on the morrow after their liberation.

#### THE NEED FOR A FREEDOM ACADEMY

In concluding my remarks, I wish to urge that instead of endeavoring to cope with disasters when they have grown full bloom, we must in the future find some way of anticipating disasters and preventing their emergence.

The situation in Cuba today and the ominous rumblings in so many Latin American countries, again point up the dismal fact that the Communists know how to wage political warfare and we do not—that we have been losing the cold war because, in effect, we have been amateurs fighting against professionals.

It was precisely to cope with this deficiency that the Senate, in the closing days of the 1960 session, passed a bill calling for the creation of a Freedom Academy—where research into the entire spectrum of Communist strategy and tactics could be carried out under the direction of the most competent men available from government and from private life; where measures could be devised to meet and contain the Communist offensive and to restore the initiative in the cold war to the free world; and where Americans called upon to represent their countries abroad, either in the service of their Government or in the service of private business, could be schooled in the interlocking complexities of political warfare.

The Senate Judiciary Committee, in reporting this measure favorably, described the bill as "one of the most important measures ever introduced in the Congress." But unfortunately, after being passed by the Senate, the bill died in the House because of honest but, I believe, misguided fears that the Freedom Academy, if it were ever established, would be taken over by those who are soft on communism, or, even worse, by infiltrates.

When the bill was reintroduced in the Senate in February 1961, it was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for consideration, at the specific request of the committee chairman and by unanimous consent. I regret to report that, over the intervening year and a half, no hearings have been held on this bill, and chances are that it will not be brought to the floor for public debate before the close of the session.

The establishment of such a training academy has been strongly advocated by nationally recognized authorities in the field of the cold war. For example, the Strausz-Hupe group in their book "A Forward Strategy for America," pointed out that while the United States has established academies to train men for war and a Foreign Service Institute to train diplomats, no comparable establishment trains Americans in the art of psychological warfare.

It is in the field of revolutionary conflict techniques—

Said Dr. Strausz-Hupe and his colleagues—that the Communists hold a decisive margin of superiority over the Western Powers.

The need for a cold war training institution was also recognized by the so-called Sprague committee, which reported to President Eisenhower just before the close of his term. The committee strongly recommended that consideration be given to the establishment of a National Security Institute which "would provide concentrated exposure to and study of Communist ideology, techniques, and operations, worldwide, as well as of our total governmental informational resources, and the best ways to orchestrate and use them."

The need for such an institute has also been recognized and endorsed by the editors of our greatest national periodicals—Life magazine, Saturday Evening Post, and Reader's Digest; by the American Federation of Labor, with its extensive experience in combating communism both in this country and abroad; and by organizations like the Cold War Council, which was founded by people once prominent in the ADA, and the American Security Council, whose membership is primarily conservative and big business.

But above all, the need for a Freedom Academy has been underscored by the events that have taken place, at dizzying pace and in so many different parts of the world, since the Freedom Academy bill was first introduced.

There are those who have accused this administration of adhering to a "no win" policy, that is, of not wanting to win the cold war. I believe that this

charge is as mischievous as it is false. I am convinced, in fact, that there is no one in this administration who does not want to win the cold war.

The trouble is—and this is a trouble that has been true of every American administration since the close of World War II—that we do not know how to go about winning the cold war.

The trouble is that, while the Communists wage total political warfare, our own conduct is governed by conventional concepts of war and peace; when there is no war in the military sense of the word, we consider ourselves to be at peace and we conduct ourselves accordingly.

The trouble is that, while the Communist training schools every year turn out thousands of professional revolutionaries, some of them specialists in certain areas, others trained as conflict managers who know how to orchestrate all the instruments of political warfare, the free world continues to believe that traditional diplomacy and a conventional foreign service is all that is necessary to deal with the menace of communism.

The trouble is, in short, that, on the one side in the cold war, there are free world amateurs who look upon the struggle with communism as a phenomenon that can be resolved if we avoid provocation and conduct ourselves according to the Queensbury rules of 19th century diplomacy; while on the other side there is an international conspiracy disposing of tens of thousands of ruthless professionals dedicated to the total destruction of the free world, and nothing less than this.

I plan to speak at a later date on the theme that our chief trouble is that we do not know how to win.

Meanwhile, I would again point to the many ominous signs in the world situation as a reminder that the time has come for an end to amateurishness and an end to innocence.

We cannot afford any more Cuban disasters, or the luxury of performing postmortems for the purpose of discovering how and why these disasters occurred. The politics of hindsight must give way to the politics of foresight.

We must accept the fact of fourth-dimensional warfare, or psychological warfare, and we must equip ourselves with the knowledge and the means and the trained personnel required to meet the Communist onslaught in this dimension.

But above all, we must accept the underlying fact that we are locked in a life-and-death struggle with an enemy of infinite cunning and infinite ruthlessness.

Because the acceptance of this basic fact is the beginning of all political wisdom in the world in which we live today.

**Mr. KEATING.** Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Connecticut yield?

**Mr. DODD.** I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from New York.

**Mr. KEATING.** I am sorry that every Member of the Senate was not present to hear the analysis of the situation in

Cuba delivered by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut.

The Senator from Connecticut has advanced a program which does not involve armed action against Cuba at this time, action which I think most of us would agree would be a mistake; but he does set forth a six-point program, clearly after considerable study. There are two points about the Senator's address to which I should like to add a word.

One has to do with the analysis which the Senator from Connecticut has made of the nature of the weapons which are now located in the advanced Soviet base which is Cuba, weapons which cannot in any sense be considered purely defensive. Whether a weapon is defensive or offensive depends entirely upon the triggerman or the operator of the particular weapon and the person or the nation against which the weapon is turned. True, Mig fighters, tanks, missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and torpedo boats are defensive weapons; but they are also offensive if the desire is to use them offensively.

The other point relates to the analysis of the Monroe Doctrine. As the Senator has said, it was contended by the distinguished Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE] and has also been contended by others—and I venture to say that the Senator from California was enunciating the present policy of this administration—that the Monroe Doctrine is not here involved because Soviet Russia was invited to Cuba by the existing Government of Cuba.

Think what that reasoning leads to. It means that in any Latin American country, all that needs to happen is a coup d'état, following which the government which takes over by force may call in Soviet Russia or Communist China, or some other Communist country; and thereby the Monroe Doctrine will not apply. At present the situation is the Monroe Doctrine minus one country; and the next country which has a coup d'état will make the situation the Monroe Doctrine minus two. Pretty soon, all that will be left will be the Monroe Doctrine applying to the United States of America.

President Monroe made it abundantly clear that if the Monroe Doctrine is to remain in force—and I do not believe it is the policy of the United States to have it junked—it should cover cases in which our southern brethren—meaning the Latin American Republics—had imposed upon them by force from the outside the ideologies and the principles of a foreign power, which they would not of their own accord adopt. That is exactly what has happened in Cuba. Today Cuba is a Communist state; and communism was imposed upon Cuba by the world Communist movement, of which it is now apparent that Fidel Castro is a part, and admittedly so. Castro and Khrushchev have had the effrontery not only to admit but also to boast that they are making a military base of Cuba and are increasing military supplies and military personnel there.

I believe, as does the Senator from Connecticut, that we in Congress who feel strongly about this situation have

a duty to speak out on this question and to be certain that the American people are fully informed about it.

Ours is a government of the people. The American people, if they know all the facts in relation to this situation, will, in my judgment, be able, through their congressional representatives and in conjunction with the executive branch, to support a conclusion and a solution which will protect the security of our country. I feel that the Senator from Connecticut has today made a significant contribution to that end.

**MR. DODD.** Mr. President, I am deeply grateful to the distinguished Senator from New York. As usual, he is very generous.

As I have said openly, my intent was to make a small contribution to the current discussion of this subject. I think the Senator from New York has himself made a most significant contribution to it. All we are trying to do is to think things out and set forth our views.

I am aware that this is a difficult problem. There is no easy solution of it. It is satisfying to know that in this wonderful body we can speak our minds, and perhaps, in that way, help those who have the principal responsibility to make the right decision.

As I have said on many other occasions, I am glad to have the warm and comforting words of the great statesman from New York [MR. KEATING].

#### EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Aug. 29, 1962]

#### CASTRO NOT DYING ON VINE—FIDEL'S FALL SEEN POSSIBLE, BUT ONLY IF HE IS PUSHED

(By Roscoe Drummond)

**PORT-OF-SPAIN, TRINIDAD.**—Nowhere in Latin America have I encountered any support for the wishful thinking in Washington that Castro is going to die on the vine or that the Cuban dictatorship will soon fall from its inner weaknesses.

The prevailing view in the Latin American capitals I have visited is that while conditions in Cuba are getting steadily worse, the Castro regime itself is becoming steadily more entrenched.

One South American newspaper correspondent, who had spent considerable time in Cuba and left only recently, put it this way: "Fidel Castro is proving himself totally incompetent to manage the affairs of his nation, but extraordinarily skillful in managing the apparatus of a police state."

This raises a question of acute importance to policymakers in Washington who are rather counting on waking up some morning and finding that Castro has disappeared in the dust.

#### QUESTION IS POSED

The question is whether any Communist police state, holding all the weapons of terror and repression in its own hands, can ever be overthrown by a popular uprising armed with little more than sticks and stones.

There is no doubt that conditions are deteriorating inside Cuba. There is clearly developing an angry, resentful, frustrated and humiliated people who, while still passionately supporting the "Castro revolution," are heartsick over what Castro has done to the revolution.

The evidence is mounting that there is hunger and undernourishment. Cuba used to produce food for export and now cannot supply the needs of its own population.

Private farmers have no incentive to increase their crops, and the peasants on the state collective farms are wondering when they are going to receive "their land" as promised by Castro. They still can't quite realize that Castro's Communist state has taken over both the land and the peasants to work it.

The situation is so out of hand that you have the upside-down condition of farmers appealing to the cities to send them food.

Economic aid from the Soviet Union and Red China is failing to live up to promises—even as Fidel has failed to live up to his promises. Castro is finding that Communist bloc assistance—except arms—is not only doled out very carefully, but is also costly. Cuba's slim reserves of foreign currency are steadily being drained away, largely because Cuba no longer has the exports it can sell to the hard-currency countries.

But Latin American sources on the continent are convinced that Castro is steadily tightening his grip on the Cuban state and on the Cuban people—with so much Soviet help that he is both ally and captive.

Castro's armed forces seem to be all that he needs—and more—to prevail over any opposition that might develop. The Soviet Union is stepping up its shipments of arms and thousands of technicians. Castro has recruited the forces in ample volume. There is every reason to assume that the army is loyal to Castro's bidding. While the regime has been unable to feed his people properly, it has taken care to see that its troops are a favored class. This means that the Castro army is massively armed, well fed, and heavily disciplined for its duty—to keep the dictatorship in control at all costs.

#### A LIBERAL'S VIEW

A distinguished European liberal who has recently visited Latin America contends that Cuba ought to be liberated by the Organization of American States. These are the words of Salvador de Madariaga:

"The argument that Castro had better be left alone and given enough rope to hang himself is worthless. The experience of other nations fallen into the unscrupulous hands of the Communist Party allows of no such optimism. Time could only make of Cuba an impregnable base for communism to spread all over Latin America. The Latin American governments who shilly-shally over it are only preparing the rope with which they will be hanged. Castro must go soon."

But wishful hoping will not free the Cuban people. Castro will fall—only if he is pushed.

**MR. DODD.** Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD several articles relating to the Cuban situation.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 2, 1962]

#### RED DECISION TO BOOST AID TO CASTRO IS SEEN

(By Donald May)

The Soviet Union appears to have made a major policy decision to prop up the Castro regime in Cuba and draw it closer to the Communist camp, U.S. observers said yesterday.

Administration officials, who a week ago reported a big increase in Soviet military aid to Castro, gave this updated account of the situation:

Military supplies believed to include transportation, electronics, and construction equipment which had been reported being unloaded at Cuban ports late July and early August, apparently are being transported to sites around the island.

Officials feel it is a pretty safe prediction that the supplies will turn out to include Soviet antiaircraft missiles similar to the U.S. Nike. The prediction is based on other equipment which has been identified and the fact that Russia has given such missiles to Iraq and Indonesia.

A number of small patrol craft arrived as deck cargo aboard Soviet ships. It is not clear whether they were torpedo boats, as reported Friday by Senator KENNETH B. KEATING, Republican, of New York.

#### ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT

There is no evidence yet that Moscow has sent equipment to monitor U.S. rocket launches at Cape Canaveral, Fla. The electronic equipment which appears designed to bolster coastal and air defenses.

It is theoretically possible that such equipment could be used to interfere with ground signals that control the Canaveral rockets. But officials doubt that Russia or Cuba would try this. The United States could retaliate. The result would be a very expensive "rocket-jamming war."

It is considered very improbable that stations located in Cuba could send out signals to alter the course of U.S. rockets. This would mean obtaining the exact secret codes by which the rockets are controlled.

The most probable estimate of the number of Soviet-block technicians to arrive in Cuba recently is 3,000. It could be 5,000. There is no good estimate of what percentage are military technicians, but probably more than half are.

Though there are still many rumors that the military technicians are troops organized into combat units, all U.S. information from trained observers indicates the contrary. They are not in uniform and appear to be limited to installing the new military equipment and training Cubans in its use.

Senator HOMER E. CAPEHART, Republican, of Indiana, has called for a U.S. invasion of Cuba and KEATING has accused President Kennedy of withholding information about Soviet troops from the American public.

Much of the U.S. policy thinking on Cuba recently has centered on the broader trend of Russia's deepening involvement in Castro's affairs.

The Cuban economy is not thought to be on the brink of collapse but it has been going steadily downhill.

#### SUGAR CROP FAILURE

Cuba's 1962 sugar crop appears to be a failure. The harvest produced 4.8 million tons against an announced goal of 5.4 million tons, compared with a yearly average of 6 million tons over the previous 5 years.

The coffee harvest now underway in Oriente Province may also be in trouble. Because of labor problems, there apparently is a large-scale mobilization of students being carried out by the Government to harvest the crop.

Cuba's Labor Ministry announced last week a freeze on wages and curbs on absenteeism and vacation time. Cuban labor unions have made voluntary sacrifices in the past but this was the first time the order came directly from the Government.

#### FOOD RATIONS CONTINUE

Food rationing has been in effect since March. The economy also is plagued by lack of consumer goods, inflationary prices, and low production. Foreign exchange is at a new low.

Russia announced last Tuesday that Soviet shipments of economic aid goods to Cuba in 1962 would be twice that of last year. And since much of Cuba's economic troubles come from administrative bungling, some officials believe Russian advisers may now take an increased role in Government management.

In past years Russia has made Cuba pay with sugar for goods delivered. Now, it appears, the Kremlin is beginning to give aid on a pay later basis.

Recent U.S. policy has been aimed at cutting off Cuba economically. The question being analyzed now is whether Russia's substantially increased economic aid can counter the isolation policy by keeping the Cuban economy on its feet.

Many officials still doubt that Russia is willing to launch an all-out aid program in Cuba.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 3, 1962]

#### SOVIET CUBA TODAY—INSIDE STORY

(By Keith Morfett)

Thousands of strapping young Russians are moving quietly into tented military encampments close to the outskirts of Havana in a vast Soviet buildup that is causing deep concern among diplomats in the Cuban capital.

From 5,000 to 8,000 Russians have arrived so far.

A Western ambassador in Havana told me categorically:

"I have reported to my government, despite all denials, that many of these men are Soviet troops, that they are arriving in increasing numbers, and that this is all part of a carefully planned military operation to underwrite the Castro regime."

Many of the Russians are in their early twenties. All have reached Cuba aboard three Soviet passenger liners.

At the same time, a continuous armada of cargo ships is now stretched out between Russia's Black Sea ports and Cuba, carrying trucks, jeeps, machinery, food, guns—and ground-to-air missiles for Fidel Castro's armed forces.

This much is certain from what I have just seen in Cuba:

No large-scale attempt to overthrow the Castro regime could now be launched by the United States or Cuban exiles without Russian blood being spilled in the process.

I watched the Russians in two separate encampments—after being told they were a "ghost army" existing only in the imagination of Americans.

They looked pretty healthy ghosts to me. Hefty, athletic, and looking a lot better fed than their Cuban hosts, they crowded up to a barbed-wire fence at the first camp I found near the village of El Cano.

They appeared to be members of the kind of unit usually moved in advance of regular fighting troops to set up camps, establish communications networks and accomplish other related chores.

In the tropical heat they looked unhappy and homesick. They had cloth caps and denim trousers and clustered together for comfort like sheep on the range in a rain-storm.

The contrast between the El Cano crowd and the next lot I looked at was so great that it became clear Cuba's Russians fall into two distinct categories.

The El Cano Russians were recruited into labor battalions rather like the British Army's Pioneer Corps. They will dig trenches, lay cables, and do all the donkey work.

A few miles away, down a rutted side road the whole countryside was suddenly swarming with Soviets. This time they were obviously on different business. Hundreds of them moved around among military vehicles parked under trees, in fields, alongside hedges, and between row upon row of khaki-colored tents.

Nearby, antiaircraft guns in freshly dug pits were manned by Cuban militiamen. Machineguns were mounted at all approach roads into the camp. By the tasks they were doing, checking their equipment on radio

trucks, command vehicles and signal equipment, these Russians appeared to be military technicians such as signal, staff, and electronic engineers.

Out in open spaces around the camp, dozens of them were dressed in identical physical training outfits of the kind troops would wear. They were doing gymnastics under the direction of instructors. Others were playing volleyball—dressed in the same dark blue trunks and running shoes. Still others were out on an improvised running track.

In every field for a couple of miles around were military vehicles, including some armed cars. Groups of heavily armed Cuban militia patrolled the camp's perimeter.

Many of the Russians at this encampment were billeted in what was the former boys reformatory at Torrens, about 14 miles from Havana. But they had quickly spilled over into tents.

Still more tents were being erected by the Russians as I drove past. Trucks filled with more Russians were rolling in through the bright red dust from the port town of Mariel, where a high wall—called "Little Berlin" by the locals—is being built to screen off the dock area. Three miles from the Torrens encampment in the direction of Havana is a big Soviet vehicle park.

More Russian vehicles are packed in neat rows near Havana's seafront Malecon Drive, behind the American memorial commemorating the sinking of the battleship *Maine* during the war against the Spanish. These vehicles are all painted blue and stamped with the name "Zil."

Down in Havana's dockyards, trucks were leaving the Soviet vessels from early morning until late at night piled high with huge, unmarked wooden crates.

All dock entrances are heavily guarded. Hundreds more military trucks, jeeps, and command vehicles were lined up five deep for quarter of a mile along the street called San Pedro on the Havana waterfront. These vehicles are all marked in Russian "Gorikovsky Avtozavod" and are being moved quickly to all parts of the island.

The Soviet liner *Gruziya*, yellow hammer and sickle painted on its scarlet funnel, was unloading while I was in the dock area.

In addition to its Russian passengers, the *Gruziya* brought back to Havana hundreds of young Cubans who had been on special courses in Moscow and Leningrad. All carried cheap Russian travel bags which matched their blue uniforms. They were met at the docks by their families. The next day about 2,000 young Cubans boarded the *Gruziya* for the return journey to Russia.

The Cuban Government insists that the young Russians now pouring into Cuba—yet to be seen on the streets of Havana—are all civilians.

The tightest censorship ever imposed since Castro came to power is now operating in the Cuban capital. Extent and scope of the Soviet buildup is being deleted from cable dispatches by military censors.

Twenty Soviet ships have reached Havana Harbor in the last 3 weeks. In addition to the Soviet vessels, a fleet of chartered ships including some flying the British flag are under commission for the Cuban buildup.

Ten more Soviet vessels are at this moment Havana-bound on the high seas. They include the *Ustiuszha*, the *Ivan Polzunov*, the *Usoliet*, and the *Ojotsk*. From Soviet ports also now Havana-bound are the East German *Westfalen*, the Norwegian *Tive Lilian*, the Greek cargo ship *Parnow*, the Italian *Aironi*, the West German *Atlas*, and half a dozen ships flying the Liberian flag.

A number of British vessels are on the way to Russian ports to begin the long haul to the Caribbean.

What is behind it all? It began following the recent visit to Moscow by Fidel Castro's brother Raul Castro, who heads the Cuban

armed forces, and Economic Chief Ernesto (Che) Guevara.

I understand the Cuban Government urged Soviet Premier Khrushchev to provide the revolution's leaders with some sort of guarantee that the now openly Communist Cuban regime would not be allowed to collapse in the face of mounting economic chaos and shortages.

The Cubans sought similar guarantees against the possibility of direct American intervention to topple Castro's regime. They suggested Cuba might join the Warsaw Pact.

Instead of a pact, Mr. Khrushchev gave them a promise—and a better guarantee than they had bargained for. "I'll send you Russians," he reportedly said. "What better guarantee could you ask than that?"

While the Russians continue to arrive, Castro is anxious to keep his part of the bargain. This is that no incident of any kind involving the Americans should be allowed to arise while the Russians are still settling in.

This, it is believed in Havana, is why no fire was returned when an exile group steamed into Havana Bay 10 days ago and pumped cannon shells into a seafront hotel housing Communist technicians. It is also why Fidel Castro not only denied that his ships fired on an American plane last Friday, but also why he was reported enraged at the trigger-happy gunners who allowed it to happen. The Russians want no trouble, not at the moment anyway.

An air of anxiety now pervades Havana. It's as though everyone knows something big is about to happen—but no one knows quite what it will turn out to be. The presence of the Russians has given many Cubans a sense of quiet despair. They are convinced that "the Yanks won't come now—it's too late and they know it."

The city itself is almost totally Sovietized. The only hint of efficiency anywhere is in the big bright posters everywhere extolling the glories of the revolution, the workers, and solidarity with the Soviets. The posters are superbly painted and lend the only color to the city of drabness and despair.

During the last few hours before I left Havana, six more Cubans went to the firing wall. Four hundred Cubans were rounded up amid rumors of a plot to topple Castro. Communist newsmen in the city—whose sources are usually good—say they expect a Castro speech soon giving details of how the plot was smashed.

The militia has been mobilized for a week. The food shortage is worsening daily. More Cubans are guardedly critical of Castro than at any time in the past 2 years. They must be careful. The "Committee for the Defense of the Revolution" has its ears on every street and block.

Notices I had not seen before in the bare-shelved shops say "No dogs here—but we have teeth to bite those who talk against the revolution."

All security has been tightened. Every Cuban must now get not only police permission but also clearance from his local vigilante committee before he can even apply for an exit permit to leave the island.

The once elegant splendor of the big hotels is no more. Havana Hilton, where I stayed, is dirty, and everything is breaking down including the bathroom taps. Instead of a menu in the hotel restaurant, two plates of cold food are carted around on a trolley, and guests have to point to the plate they prefer.

At Havana Airport I watched a pitiful sight. Clothes of all kinds taken from departing Cubans as well as other cheap belongings were piled into a big heap. I was taken by militiamen to a small room and searched in case I was taking out anything for Cubans. Rings, watches, family heirlooms, all these must be left behind.

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Sept. 4, 1962]

UNCENSORED, EYEWITNESS REPORT NO. 2.—  
LIFE IN CASTRO'S SOVIETIZED CUBA  
(By Keith Morfett)

Forty-three months after the sweep of his bearded heroes into Havana from the mists of the Sierra Maestra, Fidel Castro has turned Cuba into a tropical 1984.

The swelling concentration of Russians in camps beyond the capital has coincided, over the last 10 days, with a final, unsecretive, spurt toward total sovietization and the creation of a closed society of 6 million people barely 50 minutes by air from the Florida coast.

All pretense is now tossed aside. Cubans are at last learning the meaning of the Migs in their skies and the "big brother" images of Lenin and Mao Tse-tung that look down from walls, billboards and banners across the islands, towns, and cities.

Before a crowd of Campesinos the other day Fidel Castro, speaking with the simplicity of a schoolmaster addressing children, said: "Put up your hands all those who think they knew what a revolution was 3 years ago." Not a single hand went up.

Castro said: "Put up your hands, all those who think they know what a revolution is now." Suddenly you couldn't see the heads for the waving hands.

Castro was unquestionably correct as Cubans are just discovering, the revolution was not the mountain battles against the troops of Batista; it was not the heady sense of victory at the seizure of Havana, nor the long, bitter wrangle over taking from America what Cubans considered their own.

The revolution is now. Even the slight degree of cautious gradualism of former days has gone out the window. The Soviets have arrived, and today the curtain is falling on Cuba with a finality that is startling even to many of those once proud of the name "Fidelista."

From this week on, Cuban citizens increasingly will be prisoners in their own homeland. Exit permits will be hard to get. Every obstacle against leaving is set up.

All emphasis on the country's future direction will be unashamedly Communist. Minister of Industry Ernesto (Che) Guevarra was in Moscow to set the final seal on the massive movement into the Caribbean of Russian personnel, armaments, food and oil that will now form the island's lifeline.

In Sloppy Joe's Bar just off the Prado, where Alec Guinness shot scenes for "Our Man in Havana," I looked across the world's longest bar at the barman with the world's longest face.

"No, señor. No hay beer. No señor. No hay whiskey. No señor. No hay gin. No señor. No hay orange juice."

His face brightened—but saddened just as suddenly with an awareness of the bitter irony of what he was saying.

"Señor, solo Cuba Libre." We both laughed. And he made me up the rum drink that is known nowadays as "Free Cuba."

The bare-shelved shops of Havana are no better. I cannot buy an egg—but I can buy a newly arrived booklet by Mao Tse-tung on "Correcting Contradictions in the Minds of the People."

I cannot buy a beef sandwich or a tin of milk or a pair of shoes—but I can buy a badge with Lenin's head on it or a dozen records of Russian folk songs.

I can make a telephone call, but I must not mind if a vibrant recorded voice comes on before the number goes through, chanting: "You are in the glorious free territory of Cuba. Venceremos [We will win]."

This is the lot of Cubans in Havana and throughout the island.

Cut this Soviet lifeline and Cubans must starve. Attack this island and Russians must die. It is now as simple as that.

I found Havana a strange city. Its streets are almost as free of traffic as a country town on a Sunday afternoon. Its restaurants are dismal, deserted places that you telephone first to see if they have food to serve at all.

Even the fish that abound off Cuba's coasts and the big Morro crabs from Havana Bay are seldom on sale in the city. The fishing fleets are tied up most of the time for "security reasons." And the chances are that if Ernest Hemingway's "Old Man" put out after marlin at the gulf stream's edge, he would be blasted out of the water by a Cuban gunboat.

But if Cubans are going short of things to eat, there's plenty of "new thought" to fill their minds. While I was in Havana a new batch of school textbooks, fresh from the printers, was going into the schools. There is a "new" geography book for 7-year-olds. Its author is Castro Cabinet member, Nunez Jimenez. Its title "This Is My Country."

It is superbly printed and illustrated, but all the maps of Cuba and its countryside are inset with little pictures of the revolution's leaders. Its first five pages consist of extracts from Castro speeches and under an early chapter heading, you read:

"Imperialism and the exploitation of the people."

The first grade learns that "in our schools before the triumph of the revolution, Yankee imperialists taught our children the theory that our country, 180 kilometers from United States, would never be able to free itself from the tentacles that imprisoned Cuba. Today, the struggle of the people destroys the lies of the false geography."

After this and other glimpses into the "new" geography in the same vein, it is no longer surprising to come across columns of slogan chanting schoolboys, marching like a miniature militia through Havana's streets.

The Castro revolution is creating its own art, its own music, its own poetry. A new volume of poetry has also gone into the schools. I have it beside me at this moment. Here is a poem written in tribute to Castro troops that fought in last year's disastrous invasion attempt by the Florida-based exiles.

The poem's title: "Bay of Pigs."

"With my useless hands,  
That know nothing else but how to write,  
I wish to gather your heads,  
My brothers, compatriots.  
The heads of those who died under a differ-  
ent sun,  
The heads that flew to undo the abuses.  
And in my being will be your blood,  
And the need for avenging your deaths.  
Now I do not fear the words:  
'Justice'; 'liberty'; 'bread'."

Or this one—the lines of which will soon be known by heart by a million schoolchil- dren:

"I believe in the life that is to come for all,  
I believe in the life that was born out of  
the fires of hatred,  
I believe in the Communist Party,  
I believe in the revolution,  
I believe in the budding roses,  
And in the peasants of my country."

With this "Orwellian" world, comic con- trasts sit strangely in the sadness of its streets.

Like the stickers on all the buses saying: "Consume the produce of your country"—when Cubans would quite happily consume anything from anywhere to supplement beans and dry bread.

Like the single island of elegance atop Havana's highest skyscraper where diplomats (and an occasional Cuban Cabinet minister)

eat duckling while Cubans far below go empty bellied to their beds.

Said one Cuban: "It's way up there in the sky so no one can see what's on their plates."

Like the new tourist literature, superbly done, that claims in bold letters across the front of gay brochures: "Cuba has a flavor all its own."

Like the bartenders in the world-famous "Floridita," who have removed the solid gold brooches, shaped into their names, from the lapels of their white jackets.

They stand now before the large lettering along the bar, "Da Cuna del Daiquiri" [the cradle of the Daiquiri] and explain a little sadly: "It seemed all wrong to keep wearing the gold brooches—with customers coming in with open-neck shirts."

Like the taxman who jerks his thumb toward the building that housed the U.S. Embassy and says reassuringly: "I tell you frankly, señor, the Yanquis will be back in there 12 months from now."

But when you hope it will be nice for him he adds, apologetically: "Ah señor, I am leaving soon with my family for Florida."

Through all of this the Cubans have re- tained their infinite capacity for courtesy and friendliness.

In many visits to Cuba I have never once been treated with discourtesy—despite being taken much of the time for an American. The same applied on this occasion, even though I tried to buy American magazines. The shelves were stacked high with Mao and Lenin, and a flood of Communist-bloc literature.

From the harbor wall where boys still cast for snapper, I looked back before leaving on a city that has worn itself out.

Russians move in by the thousands; but the heady fervor of rebellion has spent its force.

For Havana, 3 years and 7 months later, the "Barbudos" [bearded ones] are but a memory of what might have been.

Nothing is left now but the soldiers \* \* \* and the slogans \* \* \* and everywhere the guns.

[From the U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 3, 1962]

GROWING TURMOIL IN LATIN AMERICA—ARE REDS WINNING?

(Reported from Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Caracas, and Lima)

The Minister of Economics of Argentina, Alvaro Alsogaray, gave this gloomy picture of the outlook for his country on August 16:

"If there is no political stability, if every day we are threatened by coups d'état, if at every moment we are fearful that blood is to be shed among Argentines \* \* \* if we look more like an anarchical state than an organized country, then this system of modern free economy with a social distribution of wealth fails at its base, and cannot work."

"We cannot attract capital under the permanent threat of revolutions."

What Alsogaray said of Argentina is basically the case of virtually every one of the South American nations.

In country after country in South America, you find the people grumbling about their governments and demanding a change.

Communists, cashing in on this dissatisfaction in many countries, are making gains, more active than ever. Old-style military men and new-style soldier moderates are pressing for power, seizing it in some cases.

Turmoil is rising fast on this continent. And President Kennedy's plans to modernize this half of the hemisphere are getting much of the blame—or credit.

Leaders of some democratic governments, on the defensive, are blaming Mr. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress for many of their troubles. They say that the Alliance has raised false hopes of quick solutions to problems rooted deep in centuries of backwardness.

Actually, the seeds of change were taking root in Latin America long before the Kennedy program began, long before Fidel Castro's Communists took over Cuba and reached out toward South America.

Whatever the cause, there is no doubt that the 10 countries of this continent are up against political turmoil generated deep down at the grassroots.

A crisis of authority is paralyzing governments. They are fighting resistance to change by entrenched cliques of wealthy landowners and bankers. They are also fighting off Communists and their allies who are demanding extreme solutions.

It is now a year since the Alliance for Progress went into operation. In that year only 3 of 10 South American countries—Bolivia, Chile and Colombia—have produced long-range development plans as agreed. And there is little sign of the reforms in education, taxes and land distribution which are considered essential to the Alliance.

The shape and extent of the challenge rising from angry people becomes clear in a survey of what is happening inside each country.

**Argentine paralysis:** Argentina is almost at a standstill. The most advanced country on this continent, Argentina is almost paralyzed by a running battle among its military leaders over what to do about a threatened comeback by the followers of Juan D. Perón, the dictator ousted in 1955.

The new Argentine President José María Guido, has barely survived a military crisis that brought his country to the brink of civil war. It was the second such crisis in his 5 months of office. More trouble lies ahead.

Military men took over last March when President Arturo Frondizi lifted a ban on the Peronists, who promptly staged a startling comeback in state and congressional elections. Guido, then Senate President, succeeded Frondizi. But the real power lies in the hands of the military men, and they are divided.

The military promise elections next year, but Perón's men, they say, will be barred from running candidates. Whoever wins will thus be caught in the same tug of war between the armed forces and Peronists, who dominate labor unions.

In the meantime, things are going from bad to worse in Argentina. Exports are crippled by a meatpackers' strike. Living costs are shooting up. The peso is sinking in value. Communists are making common cause with Perón's followers.

**Brazil, Reds gaining:** The giant among South America nations, Brazil, is up against roaring inflation. Communists are making such gains that many ordinary people in Brazil are beginning to echo the Reds' anti-United States line.

President João Goulart presides over a weak and divided Government. He wants to do away with the present parliamentary system which weakens presidential powers by sharing them with a prime minister. But the political issues are blurred, executive talent is limited, discontent is rising and Communists are gaining positions of power within labor unions and in the depressed areas of northeast Brazil.

**Peru, military moderates:** A military junta that seized power in Peru in July has gained considerable acceptance by taking a moderate position.

The soldier rulers promise new elections within a year to substitute for recent elections which the military refused to accept on charges of fraud at the polls.

Peru's economy, compared to that of other South American countries, is in fair shape. Yet more than 6 million of its 11 million people live in poverty, illiteracy, and squalor. Little has been done to help these people, and the Communists are busy among them.

**Venezuela, Reds' No. 1 target:** As a democratic country which leads all on this continent in terms of social gains made in recent years, Venezuela's democratic Government has become a prime target for Communists.

Under President Rómulo Betancourt, schools are going up, land is being parcelled out to those who farm it, low-cost housing is rising in city and town. But lingering recession in some industries keeps the number of unemployed at about 300,000—or 12 percent of the work force.

Venezuelan Communists are trying their best to justify the prediction of Castro of Cuba that Betancourt would be "gone" by the year's end. Reds spearhead the opposition in the Chamber of Deputies, control young gangsters at the University of Caracas, stir up revolts in the armed forces, stage bank and store robberies. Jittery Venezuelan businessmen have been exporting their capital.

**Chile, a squeeze:** President Jorge Alessandri of Chile is caught in a squeeze between wealthy landowners who block reform bills in congress and a five-party Popular Front grouping which includes the Communists and which expects to win the presidency in 1964.

One result of the squeeze has been failure of the Government efforts to get more returns from income taxes. But taxes on the U.S.-owned copper companies are rising higher and higher.

Wealthy Chileans are sending their capital abroad in such quantities that reserves of foreign currencies have dropped sharply, and the value of the Chilean escudo has fallen too.

All over South America, troubles of a political and economic nature appear to be rising faster than ever in recent years.

**Bolivia, the nearly bankrupt welfare state of the Andes,** has been kept going by doses of U.S. aid doled out as direct gifts. Now powerful labor unions are resisting changes in the fantastic featherbedding practices of the nationalized tin mines.

In Ecuador, where the conservatives won a victory in last spring's elections sitdown strikes took over all the private banks in Guayaquil, the country's main port city. Political rioters had to be dispersed with tear gas by police. The chances of getting much-needed measures for land reform seemed slim.

**Missing, dynamism:** Through most of the countries of South America there is a shortage of dynamism in the democratic systems of government.

Experts of the Kennedy government who surveyed South America's leadership apparently counted on parties of the "democratic left" in various countries to supply the drive to push through reform programs vital to the Alliance for Progress.

Now, it appears, these parties just are not strong enough to do the job. In the recent Peruvian elections, where U.S. officials appeared to hope for a victory by the APRA Party, much of the "reform" fervor appeared to have gone out of that group. Landowners had become APRA supporters, and the relatively moderate APRA program drew less than 33 percent of the votes.

Military men rising throughout South America also are turning out to be a varied lot, no longer predictable. In Argentina the military leaders have so far shied away from taking the Presidential post and left it to a civilian. In Peru, where the military did take power, the soldier leaders show a willingness to break with the wealthy defenders of things as they are, display an interest in moderate reform.

**Showdowns coming:** All over South America there are signs that showdowns are taking shape in many countries. On one side are the Communist-led or Communist-influenced supporters of Castro-type dictator-

ship. On the other extreme are those who want to turn the clock back. Often the extremists work together to try to upset governments.

Big question in most of the countries of South America appears to be whether dynamic moderates can be found between these two extremes to provide a vehicle for carrying out the reforms which have been promised by the Alliance for Progress.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 5, 1962]

#### ARGENTINE SPEAKS OUT—TAKES STRONG ANTI-COMMUNIST STAND

(By Jessie Ash Arndt)

**WASHINGTON.**—Elsie Kasting de Rivero (Mrs. Rivero Haedo) of Buenos Aires is a dramatist, three of whose plays were running there at the same time this season, a novelist—under the pen name of Virginia Carreño—a lecturer on the history of politics and of the theater, but above all, she is a militant anti-Communist.

This tall, handsome Argentine woman—as articulate in English as in Spanish—is convinced that unless the free world makes its influence far more potently felt than it has so far, Latin America will be lost to communism in less than 2 years. She expressed this view at the time she attended the convention of the General Federation of Women's Clubs here in June, en route home from a trip to Asia.

She knows the methods of the Communists (her mother is a native of Latvia) and she sees them being used in her own country. "We talk of the possibility of world war III; this is it," she says. "It is being waged by psychological warfare."

Mrs. Haedo sees evidence of infiltration and propaganda all through the cultural life of Argentina, and in the schools, from the elementary grades to the universities.

In the universities, many of the authorities are avowed leftwingers, she says, "and add to this the infiltration in the arts."

#### DOMINATE THEATER

She stated that the Communists dominate the little theater—and there are 90 or more little theaters in Buenos Aires. In the cinema, the Soviet Union is supplying films free to exhibitors who show these as regular commercial fare to their patrons. The U.S. producers, of course, cannot do this and, unfortunately for the cause of the free world, Mrs. Haedo pointed out, the films they send to South America and other countries usually present the worst phases of American life and give a distorted idea of the United States. With Spanish the language of all the Latin American Republics except Brazil and Haiti, the distribution of subversive materials is relatively simple for the Communists.

In politics, she explained, the Communist aim is to stay in the background but to have many candidates, all of whom respond to the same Communist idea running under different party labels. This keeps the citizens battling against each other for issues that look different but really are merely a smokescreen for the dangerous national trend to the left.

This makes it difficult for good people to go into politics. They are not going to let themselves be destroyed by political campaigns, declared Mrs. Haedo. "We must reassess democracy, not from the legal aspect but from that of the spirit. We used to have in ancient times the 'infallibility' of soothsayers; then the 'infallibility' of kings; now it is 'infallibility' of numbers."

"Politics seems to have become an extension of the theater arts. We can't choose candidates who haven't the ability to speak or who have the wrong shape of nose."

#### CHOOSE CANDIDATES

She pointed out that in small groups it was different. There it was easy to choose

good candidates for office. They were known. People knew them and their families, their experience and their abilities, and voted accordingly.

"Also, a free leader must have a free press and other media of communication," Mrs. Haedo said, adding, "there are many Communist papers in Argentina."

Because of her outspoken anti-Communist stand, Mrs. Haedo is labeled in Argentina "a reactionary," she told me, but this does not alter her convictions.

Many Bolivians are now living in exile in other Latin American countries, she said, because Bolivia has already gone so far to the left, but they cannot work effectively against communism while in exile. In Argentina, for instance, they are not allowed to be vocal.

Women have a tremendous opportunity to make the counterinfluence felt, she believes, because of the fact that culture at present is the main field of Communist activity in Latin America.

#### AGREE ON QUEMOY

Mrs. Haedo was accompanied on her trip to Asia by Irene Silva de Santolalla, who has just completed a 6-year term in the Peruvian senate. "We agreed," she said, "that Quemoy is the frontline of defense for South America. If that were to fall to the Communists, Taiwan were to go, there would be only water between us and Red China."

Despite Communist influence in Argentina, there is an extraordinary project in preservation of Baltic culture going on there, said Mrs. Haedo. Books are being published there in the Estonian language. Manuscripts are sent to Sweden for editing, they are illustrated by an Argentine artist, and the whole put together and published in Argentina.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 5, 1962]

#### PRESIDENT STATES POLICY—UNITED STATES DRAWS LINE FOR CUBA

(By Bertram B. Johansson)

President Kennedy has, in effect, restated Monroe Doctrine policy in contemporary clothing.

Without referring to the doctrine as such, but touching on matters involving U.S. and hemisphere security, he issued a special White House statement Tuesday evening setting unmistakable limits on possible Cuban aggression in the hemisphere.

The statement was restrained. It was firm. It was explanatory in nature, specifying the nature of Soviet weaponry in Cuba, especially the nature of antiaircraft missiles, and had several obvious functions.

It was meant to keep the public informed, allay congressional clamor for an invasion of Cuba, warn the Castro regime, and possibly to temper the type of national hysteria that flash-fired in the era of the Spanish-American War at the turn of the century.

#### CONFERENCE HELD

The statement was issued by Press Secretary Pierre Salinger after the President had conferred for an hour with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, and a bipartisan delegation of Members of Congress.

Though concerned with Soviet arming of Cuba, the operative sections of the Kennedy statement focused, not on the Soviet Union, but on Cuba's intentions.

In effect, the Kennedy statement attempts to pull the Cuban question one step back from the cold-war arena, and place responsibility on Cuba for any aggression in the hemisphere.

#### RHETORIC COUNTERED

This tact is evidently a counter to Soviet rhetoric and oratory, which in effect constitutes a Soviet "Monroe Doctrine" implying that any "aggressive" move against Cuba

would be considered a move against all of the Communist brotherhood of comrades and nations.

"It continues to be the policy of the United States," the President said, "that the Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or by threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere."

President Kennedy's statement, which will not satisfy those who believe Communist aggression and infiltration in the hemisphere must be stopped now, appealed for consideration of the Cuban question "as part of worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace."

"It must be dealt with," he said, "as part of the larger issue as well as the context of special relationships which have characterized the inter-American system."

The President acknowledged the Soviet Union had provided Cuba with some 3,500 technicians, torpedo boats, and "a number of antiaircraft defense missiles with slant range of 25 miles which are similar to early models of our Nike."

He said also there was "no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet-bloc country; of military bases provided to Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo (the U.S. naval base in Cuba); of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or other significant capability in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance."

[From the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 5, 1962]

#### THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The year was 1823. Imperialist Russia, filled with ambitions to extend its domain, was pushing its power along the northwest coast of North America. In an alliance with Austria and Prussia, whose territories included parts of what is now East Germany, the Russians were threatening to intervene in revolutions in Central and South America.

In that situation the U.S. Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, proposed and the President of the United States, Mr. Monroe, issued a statement addressed to the European powers.

"We owe it therefore to candor," said the President of the United States, "and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portions of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety."

The United States, in those days, was a weak country. It comprised less than half its present continental expanse; it numbered barely 9 million people; it had only a small Navy and less Army. It was certainly no such power in the world as Austria, Prussia, France, or Imperial Russia. And as a matter of fact, in most of the chancelleries of the world there was contemptuous amusement at President Monroe's bold pretensions.

For they were bold. It took considerable courage for the President to act alone instead of waiting for Great Britain, which had suggested a joint statement but somehow never got around to acting on it. Neither Mr. Adams nor Mr. Monroe were quite sure how they would implement their policy if it were challenged by the great powers. But believing the step necessary to this country's peace and safety, they did not let uncertainty paralyze their decision.

Those quiet words, shorn of all bombast, served their purpose for 140 years, through many tests, because the world came to believe we meant what we said. The Monroe Doctrine did not keep the United States out of wars. It did assure that no foreign power would come to threaten us upon our own doorstep.

Or at least, the Monroe Doctrine did so until our own day.

It can hardly be a secret to anyone that a new imperialist Russia is extending its system to this hemisphere. The system of the present Government of Cuba is the Communist system. And this week the Castro regime signed a military pact with the Soviet Union in which it is frankly and publicly acknowledged that the Soviet Union will help train and provide arms to the Cuban Army.

But a difference between the centuries is that today Secretaries of State and Presidents of the United States have reacted differently. Both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy have asserted that the Monroe Doctrine is not dead. But up to yesterday neither had chosen to implement it; both have relied instead upon the so-called machinery of the inter-American security system.

That is, the U.S. Government has put its trust in the hope that others will act rather than in acting itself. Where once a weak nation was bold enough to put its shield over the other nations of the hemisphere, a strong nation has hoped that its weak neighbors will somehow rise and shield it from a danger on its own doorstep.

So matters stood until yesterday. Now President Kennedy has issued a statement saying that the Castro government of Cuba will not be permitted to extend its influence further in the Western Hemisphere and strongly implied that the United States will stand by its doctrine of 140 years ago.

Just 2 years—in July 1960—Mr. Khrushchev said the Monroe Doctrine was dead. The President of the United States says it is still alive. Now the problem today, as it was in the days of Imperial Russia, is for the United States to convince the world that it means exactly what it says.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 5, 1962]

#### CUBA AND MONROE DOCTRINE

(By William H. Stringer)

WASHINGTON.—At his last news conference President Kennedy was asked point-blank what the Monroe Doctrine meant to him in the light of world conditions and Cuba. He replied that it meant the same as it has since President Monroe and John Quincy Adams enunciated it.

Yet there have been changes. Originally the Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral warning by the United States that European powers must not "extend their system" to any portion of the Western Hemisphere. The doctrine told czarist Russia to stop encroaching in the Pacific Northwest. It advised France to quit Mexico in 1865.

Since the good-neighbor policy, the United States has sought more and more to enlist all of the hemisphere's states in the defense of hemispheric integrity. The Rio Treaty of 1947 refined encroachments to include "an aggression which is not an armed attack." At 1962's Punta del Este conference the Organization of American States aimed the broadened doctrine, albeit mildly, at Castro's Cuba, declaring his regime to be "incompatible" with the American system.

The United States has sought to set in motion events that will eventually topple Fidel Castro—embargoing Cuban trade, talking up the Castro menace throughout Latin America, strengthening hemispheric sinew through the Alliance for Progress (a painfully slow process). Now Moscow has countered the United States threat to the Castro regime with what looks to be massive intervention.

The Soviet Union doesn't care about the Monroe Doctrine. Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev is being bold at Havana as he is at Berlin.

This isn't the first flouting of the doctrine. Napoleon III had a whole army operating in Maximilian's Mexico. But the flouting always ceased, in former decades.

What happens this time, after Moscow has dispatched an armada of ships bearing technicians and service troops, Communist-bloc artillery, and communications equipment, plus supplies for a floundering economy?

The Kremlinologists constantly remind us that Moscow seldom acts from a single motive. We have two explanations for the Soviet move. One is that Moscow cannot afford, in terms of world prestige, to see its Cuban ally collapse in economic chaos. This would be no advertisement for communism.

Ergo, Moscow must sail to the rescue, and with sufficient military equipment to make Senor Castro invulnerable to internal revolt or small-scale amphibious attack.

The other explanation is that Moscow sees a way to make big trouble, close to home, for the United States; sees a chance to fortify a base for revolution that can reach out to all of Latin America; sees an opportunity to build a technological redoubt which can even track U.S. space experiments from Cape Canaveral.

Actually, the weighty probability is that both explanations will prove true. Having moved in to save the Cuban economy, Premier Khrushchev will exploit his leasehold to the full.

The question facing President Kennedy is what Moscow's boosted intervention will do to the "peace and safety" of the United States, which the original Monroe Doctrine was summoned up to protect.

Cuba as a creaking semi-Communist state was no great menace. Cuba as a Soviet-bloc state so heavily armed as to shift the military power balances in Latin America is a much bigger menace.

But if Cuba ever came to mean, to Premier Khrushchev or anyone else, that the United States, for fear of nuclear consequences, would hesitate to act when its "peace and safety" was threatened, then this would be the biggest peril of all.

This latter prospect was directly implicit in the reporter's question about the Monroe Doctrine.

[From the Seafarers Log, August 1962]

#### NATO GOES CUBAN, MOVES RED CARGO

The current mass shipment of food, arms, and technical equipment from the Soviet bloc to Cuba has been accomplished with the aid of some of the closest allies of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Shipowners in Britain, Norway, and Greece, among other countries, supplied most of the tonnage running to Havana and other Cuban ports. The "emergency" shipments were made necessary by Cuba's failure to provide enough of the necessities of life for her people, under the present Communist system. President Kennedy disclosed that the United States had discussed the Cuban shipping excursions by NATO country shipowners and said he would make every effort to have them curtailed.

The move by our allies to ship Communist supplies to Cuba is considered a direct contradiction of NATO policy, which is to stand firm against the Communist menace. Any weakening of this structure could have severe repercussions to the Western World.

**Mr. KEATING.** Mr. President, the continuing issue in Cuba, as Marguerite Higgins has so succinctly put it in her latest column "is not whether the Soviet-supplied missiles are offensive or defensive or whether Soviet officers are in Bermuda shorts rather than battle gear," but whether or not our policy of hesitation and restraint is not encouraging the Soviets to press harder.

The same sentiments, in effect, were expressed by Robert Frost on his return from the Soviet Union, when he said:

Khrushchev said he feared for U.S. modern liberals. He said we were too liberal to fight. I suppose he thought we'd stand there the next hundred years saying, "On the one hand; but on the other hand."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD the perceptive article by Marguerite Higgins.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### RUFFIANSHIP VERSUS RESTRAINT (By Marguerite Higgins)

WASHINGTON.—The key issue in Cuba is not whether the Soviet-supplied missiles are offensive or defensive or whether Soviet officers are in Bermuda shorts rather than battle gear. The issue is whether American policies of so-called restraint tempt the Russians into putting on more pressure everywhere or whether U.S. restraint will be rewarded by Soviet restraint.

So far, President Kennedy, with, of course, the most honorable of motives, has most often taken the advice of those officials who counseled caution even at the price of letting the Russians get away with a slice here and a slice there of the U.S. world position in areas ranging from the Far East to central Europe to the Caribbean.

The President himself at a press conference stated part of the rationale for this attitude by indicating that America had to be cautious in Cuba because action against the Communist incursions there might result in Soviet counteractions in places like Berlin.

But what a tragedy if, for example, the initial slowness of American reaction should prove one day to be the factor that decided Khrushchev to authorize a new era of brinkmanship in Berlin by threatening to use the missiles newly emplaced along the Western air corridors to the city.

And with a new crisis boiling up, it seems important to bring to the surface what has been known for several months to insiders in Washington. This is that Americans of great stature, both in and out of Government, Democrats as well as Republicans, are now asking whether President Kennedy will preside over the decline of America as a great power.

Perhaps this seems unduly alarmist at a time when America is so psychologically attuned that headlines give greater attention to a "satisfactory conversation" between the American Secretary of the Interior and the Premier of the Soviet Union than to dispatches from Berlin saying that Russians have riddled an American military car with 40 machinegun bullets.

But nonetheless the question is being asked and soon, it can be predicted, will be put on the public record because the men involved know that the issues are too crucial to go undebated.

Indeed, some of President Kennedy's advisers most closely connected with the Berlin situation feel that in the coming months the United States is risking the most serious—and needless—confrontation with the Russians in Berlin because this country—not just in Europe but also in Cuba and elsewhere—has not faced up to the possibility that inaction vis-a-vis the Russians often runs greater risk than action.

As President Kennedy himself once remarked atmospherics have their uses, and the time to send sharp diplomatic protests to Moscow, to summon the Soviet Ambassador for stern confrontations, was at the beginning: That is, at the moment that the first Soviet ship of the recent armada (which

everybody knew was on the way) headed toward Cuba in July. The long silence on this score plus official attempts to play down the importance of it all was an invitation, the argument goes, for Moscow to believe that America was looking for a way to evade the challenge.

Moscow's reaction, of course, was very ungentlemanly. For instead of playing Washington's game, Moscow threw its challenge contemptuously in America's teeth by openly announcing to the world that it was sending military personnel and supplies to Cuba. There is a conviction in many responsible quarters that a straight and tough stand from the beginning would have greatly inhibited the Soviets—and still might. Nonetheless, it is a great mistake to rule out publicly whatever means might be necessary to curb Soviet intrusion, including a blockade and all that flows from that. How can promises of any sort of immunity help but embolden such an opponent?

For Robert Frost spoke true and well in Moscow when he described Premier Khrushchev as both a ruffian and a great man. Ruffianship has never been inconsistent with greatness, and the gentlemanly approach to international politics has never impressed the Bolsheviks.

Indeed, just 18 months ago, Premier Khrushchev created a stir in diplomatic circles by this remark on Cuba: "How am I to believe that Kennedy is serious about Berlin when he permitted the failure of the invasion of the Bay of Pigs? After all, Cuba is at America's own back door." This was, of course, a conversational probe and Khrushchev later indicated he did not subscribe entirely to his own thesis.

But here in Washington, advocates of a firm line earnestly warn that nothing less than the future of this country is at stake unless President Kennedy becomes convinced of this proposition: That the risk of counterpressure to Soviet thrusts is less than the risk of doing nothing because the greatest danger is that the next time Khrushchev says America is afraid he might really believe it.

**Mr. MANSFIELD.** Mr. President, in the middle of the front page of the Baltimore Sun of today, Monday, September 10, 1962, is an article entitled "Russian 'Horse Trade' Hinted—KEATING Says United States May Be Eyeing Cuba-Berlin Deal."

I should like to read excerpts from the article, as follows:

Senator KEATING said today "a horse trade" with Russia in Cuba and Berlin may be in the wind and branded it as a betrayal.

Further:

KEATING said reports circulating here "suggest that the Soviet Union may want to put Cuba and Berlin up on the auction block together for a diplomatic deal that would make some of our most hard-boiled negotiators blush."

And, again:

"In brass-tacks language," he said, "it would mean that Premier Khrushchev has told President Kennedy, 'you lay off on Berlin, we'll lay off on Cuba. But if you press us in Berlin, then we will put the screws on you in Cuba.'"

KEATING said "the United States may well be toying with some Soviet deal to link the two," adding:

"In some of his most recent utterances, the President has spoken of the two crises in the same breath and has in effect urged a 'wait and see' attitude."

KEATING said the United States must make clear to the people of Cuba and the people of Berlin and to people everywhere, "that no such deal is in the cards."

The article was sent out by the Associated Press, and I assume it was published in other newspapers throughout the country.

Mr. President, these references in the morning's press to statements, purportedly made by the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. KEATING], to which I have referred, and which use such words as "deal" or "a horse trade" between the United States and Russia over Berlin and Cuba must, I think, be discussed on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. President, the Senator from New York is a most responsible Member of this body whose understanding of foreign policy problems is deep and far reaching. He knows, for example, the difference between a fact and a rumor in the international situation. He knows that a sense of discernment between fact and rumor is essential if Senate discussion of foreign policy is to help to minimize rather than complicate the enormous burdens which the President bears in these matters. He knows, further, that President Kennedy did not create either the present Berlin situation or the present Cuban situation; that both were in existence long before he took office. He knows, too, I am sure, that the President is doing the best he can to deal with both issues in a way which safeguards the Nation and the interests of all of us. He knows, finally, that the President, as we all are, is most concerned that American lives not be expended unnecessarily through rashness or error in Cuba or Berlin.

Knowing how deep is the sense of responsibility of the Senator from New York, and his utter lack of partisanship where matters of great national concern are involved, I am somewhat at a loss to understand the news reports in this morning's press about a deal with Russia over Cuba and Berlin.

I am not quite sure what kind of a deal could be involved; but the Senator must know, since he speaks of it. It appears to be a most serious deal. And since the Senator from New York has referred to it, and the Senator is a most responsible man, I presume that the report has a serious foundation. It is always possible, of course, that the Senator was merely speculating on possible developments in a grave situation. The press may have misinterpreted his speculation. What was the Senator's fancy may have become fact by the peculiar chemistry in which the press sometimes indulges.

But I would most certainly like to know from the Senator from New York himself whether such was the case. If he was speculating, that would be an end to the matter.

But if the Senator from New York was doing more than speculating, if he knows of a deal involving a "horse trade" on Cuba and Berlin, that is a completely different matter. I am sure that the Senator from New York would agree that this is critical information of the greatest importance to the Nation. I am sure, too, that the Senator from New York would agree further that the President should also have access to this critical information and its

source, since the President, beyond talking or speculating, has the responsibility for decisions involving the very lives of Americans with respect both to Berlin and Cuba, as well as elsewhere. So I would ask the Senator from New York, whether or not he has specific information that a deal is being worked out, or is even being seriously contemplated, involving some kind of trade as between the situations in Berlin and Cuba and, if so, can he give the Senate the details and his source of information?

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Montana, our majority leader, whom we all deeply respect.

The news account to which he has referred, referred to a television program in Buffalo, in which I was very careful to say that the linking of Cuba and Berlin as a deal was a rumor which was prevalent in Washington; and I am sure the distinguished majority leader has not in these remarks for the first time heard the rumor that such a deal might be made.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at this point will the Senator from New York yield?

Mr. KEATING. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I must admit in all honesty that I have never heard of a "deal" being made relative to a combination of matters affecting Cuba and Berlin. Of course I have heard the President and Members on this floor, the present speaker included, in discussing the Cuban situation, mention the fact that the responsibilities of the President were worldwide in nature; in addition to having to keep an eye on Cuba, he also had to watch conditions in Berlin, in southeast Asia, in the Middle East, in Africa, and in the Far East, in the region of Formosa, as well. There are other points which could be mentioned.

But I must admit—and I say this most sincerely—that I have never heard of any kind of "deal" which would affect the interrelationship of Berlin and Cuba, insofar as the policy of our President is concerned.

Mr. KEATING. Of course, Mr. President, I accept as a fact the statement of the majority leader.

If the word "deal" were not used, perhaps the majority leader has previously heard the rumor that these were all part and parcel of one proposal.

Perhaps it would clarify the situation to include following my remarks excerpts from such respected publications as U.S. News & World Report and the Northern Virginia Sun which include just such reports. I ask unanimous consent that these two articles be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the two articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From U.S. News & World Report]

War over Cuba, involving the United States with Russia, is moving closer, now that the Soviets have an advanced military base just off the coast of Florida.

President Kennedy, on September 7, asked Congress for authority to call up to 150,000 reservists. Main reason: The Russians' move into Cuba.

Soviet submarines, based on Cuba, are expected soon to lie athwart strategic lifelines of the United States to the Panama Canal, to the oil and raw materials of South America, ready to help Castro's Reds move to the mainland.

Missile-carrying Soviet submarines, based on Cuba, would threaten U.S. cities. Cuba, military leaders say, is an ideal base for high-accuracy missiles that can cover the heart of the United States.

In late 1959, long before the armed power of the Soviet Union moved into Cuba, Samuel Flagg Bemis, professor of diplomatic history and inter-American relations at Yale University, wrote an article for U.S. News & World Report. Professor Bemis, an outstanding authority in his field, warned that Communist power established in the Caribbean could "tip the balance of power fatally against the United States in the present deadly crisis of power and politics which we call the 'cold war.'"

With Cuba as a Soviet base, the United States suddenly finds itself engaged with threats from the four points of the compass—from Cuba on the south and along the Atlantic seaboard, from Russia against Berlin and Western Europe on the east, from Russia over the North Pole, from Russia and Red China to the west. Mr. Bemis warned in 1959 that "we simply cannot allow that to happen."

Now that it has happened and that the Soviets are involving the United States on a fourth front, the whole problem of Cuba is taking on a new dimension—one that admittedly is far more dangerous to the security of the United States than at any time in the past.

#### A POLICY THAT FAILED

Soviet power, now firmly planted in the Caribbean, marks the collapse of a U.S. policy followed since Cuban exiles were allowed to invade Castro's Cuba without air cover or support in 1961.

American policy, up to this month, had been "to allow Cuba to wither on the vine." U.S. officials talked until recent days of isolating Cuba.

The idea at the highest level of the Kennedy administration has been to base this country's Cuban policy on the premise that the dictator of Cuba, in the end, would fall as the result of an economic breakdown.

Soviet boss Nikita Khrushchev, by throwing in economic aid to bolster Cuba's economy and military aid to stiffen its defenses and give the Reds striking power, has countered that U.S. policy. Castro, in effect, is covered by a Soviet guarantee against failure.

If a military base for communism located within 90 miles of Florida is to be removed, as officials talking privately see it now, the removal will have to be accomplished by military means.

Here again, however, President Kennedy finds himself boxed in by Khrushchev, now that Soviet power has been taken to Cuba.

The box: Let the United States make a move against Castro in Cuba, and Khrushchev will heat up the Berlin crisis, move into Laos, strike at Iran or into the Middle East. Chinese Communist will move against Formosa or prod North Koreans to move into South Korea.

With Khrushchev of Russia and Mao of Red China working together during a Cuban showdown, the United States could find itself swinging in all directions.

Cuba under Soviet domination is described by military men as throwing the United States off balance.

#### SOVIET BUILDUP

Armed forces within Cuba are gaining substantial strength.

President Kennedy himself, on September 4, reported that the Russians without doubt have put ground-to-air missiles similar to

the early U.S. Nike-Ajax into Cuba. Mr. Kennedy also confirmed that there are now Soviet-made torpedo boats with ship-to-ship guided missiles in Cuba.

In addition, Castro has at least 60 operational Mig fighters, Soviet-made tanks and Russian 122-millimeter artillery plus other guns in quantity, modern antiaircraft guns, considerable numbers of Soviet jeeps and trucks, quantities of radar and other electronic equipment. Small arms, including the latest machineguns from Communist Czechoslovakia and ammunition for such arms, have been supplied in quantity.

Main factor in Soviet aid, as confirmed by the President's statement, is a minimum of 3,500 Russians, described by British newsmen in Cuba who saw them as "brawny young men \* \* \* tanned \* \* \* fit and constantly in training." An eyewitness report by one of the British observers set the number of these Russians at "from 5,000 to 8,000."

SENATOR KENNETH B. KEATING, Republican, of New York, said that there were 5,000 Russian troops—not technicians—already in Cuba.

Such doubly confirmed reports, differing only as to the number which admittedly is growing day by day as Soviet freighters and personnel carriers arrive in Cuba, appear to be in line with earlier reports of Khrushchev's personal pledge to Raúl Castro, brother of Fidel. It supposedly was made to Raúl on his visit to Russia some months ago.

The Cuban Defense Minister in his brother's dictatorship, asked Khrushchev to take Cuba into protection of the Warsaw Pact grouping. Khrushchev is said to have replied: "I will do better than that. I will send Russians to Cuba."

There are no reliable reports as yet that nuclear warheads or long-range missiles capable of delivering them on U.S. cities have been placed in Cuba. Chances are, experts say, that Khrushchev would insist on keeping such weapons aboard Russia's nuclear submarines, which, however, could use Cuban bases.

Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary of State, summoned the Ambassadors of the Latin American countries to the State Department on September 5 to give them information gathered by the United States on the flow of Soviet military personnel and materiel to Cuba.

President Kennedy, in his statement of September 4, declared that if there were aggression from Cuba against any other part of the Western Hemisphere, then the United States would act. Threat from Cuba, as the President interpreted it, should be dealt with "as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace."

Present policy of the United States, as it appears to the world, is to accept the buildup of Cuba as a Soviet base without using military force to prevent that buildup. Policy now is to avoid shooting.

With the Russians thus established on an island base within the Western Hemisphere, however, there are real chances of serious incidents. The U.S. base at Guantanamo is in more danger. Trouble for Venezuela, Guatemala, Panama, and other countries on the Latin American mainland is more likely than ever.

#### WHAT IT WILL TAKE

Congressional leaders, by September 7, were agreed it might take U.S. military action in Cuba to remove the threat to U.S. security. Republican leaders urged legislation giving Mr. Kennedy authority to make what military move he deemed necessary. It was then that the President asked authority to call 150,000 reservists.

If it comes to a fight to oust Castro's dictatorship, the conflict may be bloody. U.S. soldiers in Cuba would find themselves up against not just Cuban Reds, but Russians too.

War over Cuba, discounted by administration leaders until recent weeks, has been brought closer by Khrushchev's act of moving Soviet arms and military men into an island of the Americas.

[From the Northern Virginia Sun]

#### ALL TRAFFIC HARASSING EXPECTED; 1961 NOTE WARNED UNITED STATES ON CUBA

(By Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott)

The East Germans are expected to soon begin harrassing the allies' Berlin air traffic with newly installed electronic counter equipment.

These electronic devices, similar to those being installed in Cuba, are showing up along the three air corridors linking West Berlin to West Germany.

U.S. Intelligence estimates warn that the ECE stations are being readied to blockade the corridors by jamming the guidance control systems of allied aircraft flying into the big Tempelhof Airfield in West Berlin.

By really intensive use of these and other methods, the East Germans, if backed by the Soviets, can effectively block the corridors according to U.S. military experts. Planes flying these airways because of bad weather in the fall and winter months must depend about 80 percent of the time on radio guidance from ground control stations.

Already the Soviet puppet East German regime is preparing to justify this warlike takeover by listing the corridors as East German Republic airways in documents circulated to all countries recognizing the Communist government.

Copies of these explosive documents, obtained by U.S. intelligence agents are being carefully examined for their full significance by State Department experts on East German-Soviet affairs.

One opinion of these experts is that Soviet Premier Khrushchev is planning to use the East Germans to touch off a brandnew war of nerves over West Berlin to determine if the United States will stand firm.

Also that Khrushchev will link the East German blockade of the corridors closely with the use of ECE measures against U.S. planes flying over and around Cuba.

#### THE SECRET NOTE

Although the communication was never made public, Khrushchev sent a blunt note to President Kennedy in April 1961 threatening West Berlin if the United States used troops against Cuba. This alarming note was delivered to the White House on the weekend before the ill-fated Cuban invasion.

A congressional source, who knows the whole story about the note, says that it scared McGeorge Bundy, the chief foreign policy adviser in the White House, into prevailing on the President to call off U.S. air strikes planned to help the Cuban rebels bomb out Castro's air force on the invasion eve.

This could explain why such a note was not made public—because it would make Americans begin to think what quid pro quo guides our foreign policy.

It might also shed new light on why Khrushchev is so boldly sending "an estimated" 20,000 military "technicians" and "advisers" to Cuba without fear of U.S. counter military action.

These new Soviet threats are one of the reasons behind Vice President LYNDON JOHNSON's trip to Turkey, Greece, and Italy. He is obtaining assurances from Western leaders of these NATO allies that they will support U.S. military action if necessary, to break any Communist air blockade.

Before leaving on this trip, Vice President JOHNSON told a small gathering at his home that both President Kennedy and he expected Khrushchev to move against West Berlin last year.

He said this estimate was the reason why President Kennedy called up Reserve units to buildup U.S. forces in Western Europe.

#### NEW CRISIS BREWING

The Joint Chiefs of Staff now believe that 1962 is the year that Khrushchev may try to force the West out of West Berlin. This military evaluation is supported by a Swedish intelligence report that Khrushchev is planning to create an incident and use it as an excuse to send Soviet troops into West Berlin.

MR. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senator from New York will yield at this point, I would say he is correct in that respect. I have heard mention of Cuba, Berlin, southeast Asia, the Middle East, and whatnot, all together. So mention of them has been made, but never, to the best of my knowledge, with the connotation of a deal attached.

MR. KEATING. The distinguished Senator from California [Mr. ENGLE]—who replied, one day last week, to an address which I had previously made about Cuba, and whose address has been challenged today by the distinguished Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] on important, vital particulars—stated, as a part of his address, that when President Kennedy was asked about a statement made by the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART], calling for a U.S. invasion of Cuba, to stop the flow of Soviet men and supplies, the President said:

The United States has obligations all around the world, including West Berlin and other areas, which are very sensitive, and, therefore, I think that in considering what appropriate action we should take, we have to consider the totality of our obligations and also the responsibilities which we bear in so many different parts of the world—

#### Adding:

In response to your specific question, we do not have information that troops have come into Cuba.

That was on August 30.

In the text of the statement which the President made on Cuba, this statement was made:

The Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace. It must be dealt with as a part of the larger issue as well as the context of the special relationships which have characterized the inter-American system.

The fact that the majority leader, who so ably and so loyally represents the administration on this floor, has made the statement which he has—namely, that there is no relationship between the two—is exactly what was asked for by me in the same television address, as the first and foremost point:

First and foremost, we must make clear to the people of Cuba and the people of Berlin and equally clear to all the peoples of Latin America and the peoples of Germany and Europe that no such deal is in the cards.

The objective of these remarks and others which the Senator from New York has made has been to stiffen our position with regard to Cuba and to say to the President and the administration that there is backing in the Congress for a

more vigorous position, a harder position, with regard to the Cuban situation, and, indeed, as regards Berlin.

Both Houses of the Congress, in my judgment, will respond to keeping Cuba and Berlin entirely separate and distinct, and in not making a concession on one in order to get a concession on the other, and in standing absolutely firm on Berlin, and at the same time in taking more vigorous steps than any which have been taken to date to prevent further shipping of military equipment and military personnel into Cuba.

The Senator from New York is well aware of the problems which the President faces, and it is not his desire to add to those problems.

**Mr. MORSE.** Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

**Mr. KEATING.** In just a moment.

The responsibility of the President is to make the final decisions; and it is an awesome responsibility in the face of world events as they exist today.

I thank my friend and colleague from Montana for his reference to the fact that I have tried to be responsible.

I have been critical, but I have tried to be responsible in such criticism. I shall continue to be, but I shall not hesitate to speak out at any time when I feel that additional facts should be brought out.

I again express my gratitude to the Senator from Montana for the manner in which he has raised this question, and the reassurance—which is the important thing—which I consider implicit in his remark to the effect that no deal or arrangement has been made, or, indeed, will be made, to trade off anything to do with Berlin against anything to do with Cuba.

**Mr. MANSFIELD.** Mr. President, will the Senator yield briefly at that point?

**Mr. KEATING.** I yield.

**Mr. MANSFIELD.** I am indebted to the Senator from New York for his clarification of the news story. There is no deal affecting the interrelationship of these two areas, Cuba and Berlin. I express the hope that, if anyone ever suggested such a possibility, he would immediately contact the President of the United States, who is, of course, in charge of our foreign policy, and who, I think, would be most happy to set the record straight on any occasion when such a situation was placed before him.

**Mr. KEATING.** When I received a call from the Secretary of State this morning, that is exactly what I said to him—that a statement by the President or the Secretary of State to the effect that these are not part and parcel of one transaction, to be traded off against each other, would be the very best way to set the record straight. I still think it would be. But the fact that the distinguished majority leader has made this statement on the floor gives me great confidence that that is the situation.

Let me further say that I recollect when I approached the State Department in mid-August asking for a report on the Soviet landings, I received, after 2 weeks, a reply that was so uninformative as to be virtually useless.

**Mr. MORSE.** Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

**Mr. KEATING.** I yield.

**Mr. MORSE.** I am pleased that the Senator from New York has had this colloquy with the majority leader growing out of the telecast program that he has already explained to the Senate; but I would like to make these comments, if he would permit me to do so, apropos his observations.

I assure the Senator from New York that President Kennedy does not barter freedom. Freedom is not for barter, and it would be unthinkable that President Kennedy for a moment would relate Berlin and Cuba for negotiating purposes in any negotiations with Russia.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs, I want to say that the President of the United States has no intention whatsoever of linking the two in any negotiation, because the two could not be linked without just such ugly rumors as the Senator said he heard arising in Washington—namely, that the President of the United States is bartering freedom.

I would have us all remember that in the very critical situation involving Cuba there must be complete unity among us in supporting the right arm of the President of the United States. In the very delicate and difficult crises that exist around the world, it is very easy, I think, in the field of semantics, to link Cuba and Berlin; but they are unlinkable in that each crisis involves its own set of facts.

I say to the Senator from New York and the American people that they can rest assured that the President of the United States does not trade off freedom in any negotiation in any field of foreign policy.

My subcommittee is maintaining very close contact with this administration. For example, Monday afternoon at 4:30, we are to have a conference with the United States Ambassador to the Organization of American States, Ambassador Morrison. Tomorrow, we will meet with other State Department officials on the same subject. As chairman of the subcommittee, I have taken the position from the very beginning of this crisis that we must be kept informed with regard to what is going on. I think we are. The Senator from New York and the American people can rest assured that these crises are being considered in their separable, individual natures, and they are not being considered in any negotiating package. Let me assure the Senator from New York of that fact.

The Senator will share my point of view that the time has come when we must ascertain the position of our associates in the Western Hemisphere, members of the Organization of American States, as to what the course of action should be, if there is to be joint action, in regard to the threat of the establishment of a Russian-Communist beachhead in Cuba. I think there is grave danger that such a beachhead might very well be established.

One of the most delicate problems we have—it is very risky even to comment on it publicly, but it should be commented on—is the problem involving the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine

is not dead, but I do not think the Monroe Doctrine is the doctrine it was when it was first established by the United States, or when we enforced it 50 or 75 years ago. In part—and note my language—it was established in order to guarantee to our neighbors to the south of us that we would protect them, as well as ourselves, from any possible overrunning of them, or any one of them, by a foreign power.

We carried that out, although, as we know, the historians have written that in the early decades we carried it out through the British fleet. After all, our great ally, Great Britain, enforced the Monroe Doctrine for a good many years, in that other foreign nations knew if they sought to exercise any extraterritorial ambitions over Latin America we would stand firm on the Monroe Doctrine but the Monroe Doctrine would, in those days, be enforced by the British fleet.

A great many changes have occurred since the initiation of the Monroe Doctrine. For example, the section which declares that we will not become involved in European affairs is a completely dead letter. Insofar as it relates to this hemisphere, it is a two-pronged doctrine; and let us never forget it. It is a doctrine in which we made clear that from the standpoint of our own national security we did not propose to have foreign powers establish extraterritorial rights in the Western Hemisphere. But we also said we were opposed to that because we were going to protect our neighbors to the south who, in that time of history, were exceedingly weak nations and could have been easily overrun if they could not rely upon their great neighbor to the north to come to their defense and assistance if necessary.

In our conferences in Latin America for some time past we have found that the attitude of our Latin American friends today in some instances is not the attitude they adopted at the time the Monroe Doctrine was first initiated. This is a delicate subject, but some of them have taken the position—and it is well recognized—that any carrying out of any policy of the Monroe Doctrine as originally contemplated by the United States, so far as Latin American countries are concerned, would have to be done with their complete consent, cooperation, and association. In other words, the Latin Americans question the right of the United States to take the position that it can say to any foreign power, "Your relationships with country X, Y, or Z in Latin America are going to be determined by the United States."

So we enter into areas of conflict, which require the exercise of very delicate diplomacy.

During World War II, we negotiated a series of treaties and declarations by Western Hemisphere nations which sought to make incursions by Axis Powers into the hemisphere the subject of combined opposition and resistance by the signatories.

We sought, in other words, to enforce the Monroe Doctrine not unilaterally, but through hemispheric action.

That is how we changed the concept of the Monroe Doctrine during World

War II relative to the German-Italian-Japanese axis.

Since then, we have done much the same thing relative to communism. We have held a series of conferences in an effort to keep communism out of this hemisphere not simply as U.S. policy and by U.S. action but as a policy and action of the OAS.

I do not know of any country which signed the act of Punta del Este which would not want to cooperate with us in stemming the establishment of communism in Latin America by way either of a beachhead in Cuba or of a Communist taking over of X, Y, or Z country in Latin America, for there is a recognition that if that should happen in Latin America to one country, or to two or three, it could very well extend through the hemisphere.

There have been in the press some rather excited editorials whose writers have not taken into account that the Monroe Doctrine today is not the Monroe Doctrine established by President Monroe, because of these changes in the attitude of some of our Latin American friends in regard to the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to certain types of facts now. I only mention it in passing in this discussion, because it ought to be noted in the Record.

So the senior Senator from Oregon believes our subcommittee ought to know what is going on within the Organization of American States and within the council of the Organization of American States. To that end I asked Ambassador Morrison this morning if he would make himself available to give us a very informal executive briefing in regard to the Organization of American States, as we have a right to ask. He has the privilege of giving it or of not giving it. I am sure he will give it.

We have asked officials of the State Department—either the Secretary of State or the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs—to give us a briefing tomorrow in regard to this whole issue *vis-a-vis* Cuba and other Latin American states.

I appreciate the generosity of the Senator from New York in letting me make these comments at this length. I am about through. I felt that in the midst of this colloquy with the majority leader I owed it to my administration to make the statements I made.

I close by saying that I want the American people to know that they have every reason to place complete faith in the President of the United States, irrespective of their partisanship relative to this Cuban crisis, for the President of the United States has not placed Cuba and Berlin on the barter market.

The President is seeking to defend freedom both in Cuba and in Berlin on the basis of the facts involved in each crisis, and they are different in some respects. The common objective is not different; it is our policy in both places that freemen are not to be overridden by communism without American support of freemen. We intend to support freedom where freemen are willing to stand up and fight for freedom.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, it is very heartening to have this additional

assurance from the distinguished Senator from Oregon, who acts as the chairman of the important subcommittee dealing with Latin American affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and to hear from his lips the assertion that no effort will be made to relate Berlin to Cuba in connection with any negotiations.

I hope that when the President is asked again about the situation he will make that very clear. If he is going to say that the United States has obligations all around the world, including West Berlin and other areas, and if he is going to say that the Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace, then the very delineation which has been made by the Senator from Oregon might be added, in order that it might be made perfectly clear to the American people—because I am sure that is what they want—that there is no negotiation as between these two situations, and there will be no concessions made on the one issue in order to get concessions on the other.

I also wish to make it clear, knowing the President of the United States, having served with him, that there is not one doubt in my mind for a moment as to his intentions, his patriotism, or his desire to do the right thing under the circumstances. If these colloquies serve no other purpose, I hope they will serve the purpose of making it clear to the President's advisers that the Congress is behind the President in any decision which he may make which is a firm one, a solid one, one in which interests are not paired off one against the other.

I commend the Senator from Oregon for his action in trying to get from the members of the Organization of American States some information as to what their attitude will be. That is very important. We should make every effort to proceed in concert with our friends of the Latin American Republics. When I made four suggestions the other day, the second suggestion was that we try to do that very thing. The Senator from Oregon is on the right track on that point.

I must add one word about the Monroe Doctrine. It is now undergoing a reinterpretation. Before the Senator from Oregon came to the Chamber, the distinguished Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd] was speaking on that subject. I think perhaps the Senator from Oregon did not hear him. The Senator from Connecticut said that if we say that the Monroe Doctrine does not apply, perhaps in all candor we should say that it no longer exists. In a colloquy with reference to the Monroe Doctrine I said that I think it applies in Cuba. I do not think it is an answer to say that the Cuban Government invited in the Soviets, and therefore the Monroe Doctrine does not apply in a case in which a country invites in a foreign power. If we are going to accept the Monroe Doctrine as President Monroe enunciated it, I point out that he expressly covered such a situation as that. He said that some foreign power might try to impose upon one of our southern brethren—meaning one of the Latin American Republics—a form of government they did not want.

That is exactly what has happened in Cuba. If we say that Cuba is out, and we now have a Monroe Doctrine minus one, then if there is a coup d'état in some other country and that country calls in Soviet Russia, the Communist Chinese, or some other power, then we will have a Monroe Doctrine minus two. Are we going to keep the Monroe Doctrine alive? Certainly the American people look upon it as a very important part of our policy. If we are going to scrap it, ignore it, or completely reinterpret it, I think we must make clear what we are doing. I do not think we can interpret it in such a way as to keep it viable, and say that it does not apply if a country invites in a foreign European power or an outside power no matter what the government is that is established there, whether it is the will of the people or not.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEATING. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I am glad the Senator from New York has raised those points, because I would be completely misunderstood, or I would have completely failed to present my view if I read in the RECORD any statement that would be subject to the possible interpretation that the Senator from New York may be making of what I have previously said here this afternoon.

Certainly Cuba cannot determine whether or not there is a Monroe Doctrine. Certainly country X, that may invite in Russia, cannot determine whether there is a Monroe Doctrine. I am talking about free nations in Latin America. I only wish to point out that we have to be very careful that we do not make an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine applicable to them on a unilateral basis, for they are very sensitive now about the Monroe Doctrine, as to whether or not we are going to speak for countries X, Y, and Z, which are free countries, and not Communist countries. That is why I have urged that if there is an application of the Monroe Doctrine, we ought to do it in concert through the OAS with our free neighbors to the south of us.

I should like to make the point as clear as I know how to use the English language, that, Monroe Doctrine or no Monroe Doctrine, we have a duty to protect our own security. If the establishment of a Russian beachhead in Latin America for offensive purposes threatens the security of the United States, then no matter how many nations in Latin America or who in Latin America feels that we should not protect our own security, they must be ignored. But that has nothing to do with the Monroe Doctrine, I respectfully point out. That has to do with the responsibility of our Government to keep America secure from the danger of a Communist beachhead so close to our shores that our own security may become endangered.

I made that comment in effect the other day on the floor of the Senate when I was discussing that problem much more briefly with the colleague of the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS]. I say nothing here today that I did not intend to make clear the other day, except I did not go into that detail.

If the Senator would permit me, I should like to ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, after the Senator's comments, that part of a lecture that I gave at the University of Arizona at Tucson some months ago, in which I discussed some of the problems involving the Monroe Doctrine.

Taking what I have said here this afternoon plus the lecture which I gave at the University of Arizona at Tucson, there could not be any possibility of anyone misunderstanding the position of the senior Senator from Oregon on this very delicate subject, unless one merely wishes to misunderstand it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD following the speech of the Senator from New York my lecture at the University of Arizona at Tucson some months ago dealing with the Monroe Doctrine.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER (MR. HART in the chair).** Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

(See exhibit I.)

**MR. KEATING.** Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his contribution. I yield the floor.

#### EXHIBIT I

**PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN LATIN AMERICA**  
(Remarks of Senator WAYNE MORSE at the  
1962 International Forum, University of  
Arizona, Tucson, Ariz., Feb. 22, 1962)

In a dispatch to the American Ambassador in London dated July 25, 1895, Secretary of State Richard Olney set forth a classic of extreme interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. "Today," he said, "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."

The basic fact of our relations today with Latin America is that we are abandoning the "Olney doctrine," and returning to a much more literal and genuine interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, at least to that part of it which related to the Western Hemisphere.

What, after all, did the Monroe Doctrine really say? Certainly it scarcely resembled what the Secretary of State enunciated as our hemispheric policy in 1895. It actually had two parts, one covering our relations toward Europe, and the second covering our relations with other nations in the Western Hemisphere. Too many Americans have rather conveniently forgotten that one part of the Monroe Doctrine declared, and I quote: "Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none."

And again: "With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere."

This resolve on our part to refrain from participating in the affairs of Europe is a dead letter. But what of that section of the Monroe Doctrine relating to the Western Hemisphere? It declared, and I quote: "That the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." And again: "But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on

great consideration and just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

The 1962 Declaration of Punta del Este was a much better restatement of the Monroe Doctrine than the Olney dispatch of 1895.

The United States is no longer "practically sovereign" in the Western Hemisphere.

Our relations with Latin America have been radically altered by two revolutionary changes since the end of World War II. The first of these has been the emergence of the United States from the confines of the Monroe Doctrine, from isolation, and the broadening of our foreign policy horizon from regionalism to globalism. The global commitments incurred by, or thrust upon, the United States in the late forties constituted a revolution in American foreign policy—a revolution, in the words of Prof. Hans Morgenthau, that marked "the permanent assumption by the United States of responsibilities beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere."

The second great change has been the emergence of Latin America into the mainstream of world history, or, more precisely, the awakening of the long-quiescent peoples of Latin America to the great social forces—communism, democracy, and, above all, nationalism—that in our time have aroused all the people of the non-European world. Thus it may be said that while the United States has emerged from isolation to join and lead a worldwide community of wealthy and long-established democratic states, the nations of Latin America have emerged from isolation to join the new countries of Asia and Africa not in a community but in a common revolution. It is a revolution conceived in economic deprivation and political humiliation, nurtured by the force of nationalism and soaring hopes of economic advance, and dedicated to the goal of securing for themselves decent, dignified, and rewarding lives as modern nations.

Both the United States and the Latin American Republics came into their new roles with unresolved dilemmas and anomalies. The ambiguity for the United States was its failure until very recently to adjust the regionalism of the Monroe Doctrine to the new globalism of the problems that confront us.

While we spent billions to rebuild Europe, and more billions to help the new nations of Asia and Africa, we said to Latin America: "We are not going to help you, and under the Monroe Doctrine, we are not going to let anyone else help you, either."

Latin America came into the modern world afflicted with an even greater dilemma—the deep contradiction between the language of democracy and progress, and the reality of oligarchy and reaction that have conditioned the political life of Latin America since the days of Simon Bolivar.

"Democracy," said Benito Juarez a century ago, "is the destiny of future humanity." But the history of Latin America has, with rare exceptions, belied that destiny and an angry and aroused generation of Latin Americans now demands an end to the ancient hypocrisy and immediate efforts on the part of their governments to achieve performances that match their promises.

The Mexican writer and diplomat Octavio Paz (currently in the Office of External Affairs, Mexico City), expressed the basic contradiction incisively in an essay on the character of his country. "The liberal and democratic ideology," he wrote, "far from expressing our concrete historical situation, obscured it. The political lie installed itself almost constitutionally among our coun-

tries. The moral damage has been incalculable and reaches into deep layers of our character. Lies are something we move in with ease. During more than a hundred years we have suffered regimes of brute force, which were at the service of feudal oligarchies, but utilized the language of liberty."

Such considerations as these—too briefly defined—condition the relations between the United States and Latin America in the 1960's. The problem for both the United States and Latin America is to devise a hemisphere policy in a global context. I should like now to examine some of the elements that might comprise such a policy.

The basic policy of the United States toward Latin America today is to foster both security and progress in the shortest possible time. The Alliance for Progress has belatedly been recognized as a vital modern implementation of the Monroe Doctrine, along with the establishment of the Organization of American States, and the declarations that first nazism and later communism have no rightful place in the inter-American system.

The success of the Alliance for Progress, given the explosive social forces at work in Latin America today and our woefully belated willingness to come to grips with them, is problematical. Its conception and intent, however, are wisely attuned to the realities of the 1960's, to the need for a hemisphere policy in a global context.

The Alliance for Progress represents for the United States a new form of "intervention," an intervention in depth to cope with deeply rooted social and economic ills of Latin America. Before commenting on some of its problems and prospects, I should like to reexamine briefly the traditional concepts of intervention and nonintervention in relation to the new forces at work in Latin America.

Today's problem of nonintervention, simply stated, is whether the Organization of American States can or cannot intervene in the affairs of one of its member states in order to forestall intervention from beyond the American continents that threatens the security of the entire hemisphere.

The question is a simple one but any answer to it is enormously complicated by the fact that to the Latin Americans "intervention" is not an abstract concept but an historical experience deriving principally from their relations with the United States. It is not difficult to understand that, for deeply rooted historical reasons, the Latin American reaction to Soviet intervention in the hemisphere is conditioned by the experience of American intervention.

The attitude of the Latin Americans toward intervention by the United States is by no means one of unambiguous hostility, as is widely believed. It is rather an ambivalent attitude, depending upon the cause for which intervention is undertaken. In recent years there has been a steady procession of Latins coming to Washington to petition for U.S. assistance for overthrowing Batista or Castro in Cuba, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, or some other Latin American ruler. To these exiles—of whom the most conspicuous at present are the large number of refugees from Communist Cuba—the doctrine of nonintervention in itself has no appeal. It is their contention that when we withhold assistance we are in effect intervening on the side of entrenched regimes. The United States is thus doubly damned, regardless of its acts or omissions, and I think that those well-meaning persons who suffer excessively from flagellations of conscience over our deviations from nonintervention would do well to face up to the fact that the United States cannot avoid playing a major, and often decisive, role in the affairs of the Latin American Republics.

"The moral here," as one perceptive student of Latin American affairs recently put

it, "is that a great power such as the United States necessarily intervenes in the affairs of other countries, especially smaller ones, as much by what it does not do as by what it does. A policy of nonintervention, if that term is interpreted in the strictest, most liberal sense, becomes plainly impossible. The question, therefore, is not one of intervention or nonintervention per se, but of the ends and means of intervention."

Latin antipathy to intervention derives directly from the historical fact that most of the interventions of the past have been by the United States and for ends and by means that most Latins find objectionable. American interventions, it is widely believed—and not altogether inaccurately—have been designed to protect American business interests. Few Latin Americans are aware of the preeminently strategic considerations centering on the security of the Panama Canal that motivated the repeated interventions in Central America and the Caribbean in the first three decades of the 20th century—the only large-scale sustained interventions in which the United States has engaged.

An even more subtle ambivalence characterizes Latin American attitudes toward the problem of Communist intervention and subversion. Most Latin American governments are able at present to deal with the hard core of Moscow-trained Communists operating within their own frontiers. Soviet intervention in Cuba is another matter. While Castro has proclaimed himself a Marxist-Leninist, many Latin Americans, persuaded that he has the support of the Cuban people, are disposed to accept his open espousal of Marxism as an alarming but nonetheless legitimate exercise of the right of self-determination. This consideration is coupled with the sensitivity and fear of many Latin American governments to widespread and volatile fidelista sentiment in their own countries. One can express satisfaction, and even surprise, that the Punta del Este Conference went so far as to deprive Cuba of participation in the Organization of American States.

The compelling question at this juncture is the degree to which the governments of Latin America are prepared to tolerate the efforts of the Castro regime to subvert the legitimate representative governments that now prevail in most of Latin America. There can be no question that some progress was made at Punta del Este when shipments of arms and other implements of war from Cuba to subversives in other countries of the OAS were embargoed. Another measure to forestall intervention from Cuba was the setting up of a five-man committee of experts on how to combat subversion.

In the past there has been a tendency to regard intervention by the United States as intolerable and Communist intervention with indifference or only mild concern. The Alliance for Progress, and the excesses of the Castro regime, are bringing about a slow but discernible change in these attitudes. In due course these trends may be expected to generate new attitudes toward intervention, more favorable in regard to the United States, and more realistic in regard to Cuba and the Soviet Union.

The Alliance for Progress and the Cuban revolution represent two forms of revolution, which are engaged in a sustained contest for prevalence throughout Latin America. The Cuban revolution aims to impose a new form of tyranny on the peoples of the American republics, by consent if possible, by force, demagogery, or subversion if necessary. The Alliance aims to generate the means for creating a decent social and economic life for all Latin Americans under free institutions.

It represents a new form of intervention in depth, designed to cope with ancient social and economic ills and to recast the so-

cieties of Latin America. I should like, in the remainder of these remarks, to consider some of its problems and prospects.

The basic problem of the Alliance for Progress is to carry out a social revolution with due process of law.

The social and economic problems that oppress Latin America are nothing less than staggering. It is highly unlikely that even a generation of concerted effort will overcome Latin America's grievous mismanagement and entrenched selfish interests, its political factionalism and racial, class, and national animosities. What is new in Latin America is not the existence of these ancient evils but the eruption in recent years of massive forces of popular protest and social discontent.

The social and economic grievances of the Latins can be indicated by a few facts and figures:

The feudal land system created by the Spanish conquerors has persisted with some modifications to the present day. Three-fourths of all of the arable land in the entire continent is owned in the form of vast latifundia by 2 percent of the people. The result is the desperate "land hunger" of the millions of dispossessed.

Industry and commerce, the mines, oil fields, and other nonagricultural assets, when not owned by foreign capitalists, are dominated by a small oligarchy of great wealth, some of whom are also owners of latifundia. Taking all forms of wealth together, it is estimated that 50 percent of it is owned by only 2 percent of the people.

Over half of the people of Latin America are undernourished and over half are illiterate. For lack of schools and teachers, millions of children are deprived of even rudimentary formal education.

With an average per capita income of only \$289 a year, levels of material consumption are far below the minimum required for a decent life by even the lowest income groups of Western Europe or North America.

In addition, Latin America is beset by a population explosion, with the result that per capita production of wealth has not only stopped growing but appears to be declining. Latin America's population, now 200 million, is increasing at a rate of about 2½ percent a year, the highest of any major region in the world. Over 40 percent of the population is under 15 years of age, with the result that the economically productive portion of the population must support a greater inactive proportion than those supported in more advanced countries.

The Latin American oligarchies bear a heavy burden of responsibility for the grave inequities of Latin American societies, although the harshest and most violent expressions of popular wrath are directed against foreigners. The latifundia are often inefficiently run and underproductive and land reform is probably the most explosive issue in Latin America today. Few of the landed oligarchy have shown any willingness to part with any of their property. Land is a form of wealth that is virtually tax free; by ancient custom the tax rates on land are very low and by ancient custom even these low taxes are commonly evaded. In fact, tax evasion by the rich, whatever their source of wealth, is so common as to be regarded almost as a prerogative of their station.

Another compelling economic problem—I can mention but a few—is the lack of desperately needed investment capital. Commercial interest rates range from about 12 percent to an illegal but not uncommon 35 percent. While Latins complain, often with justice, of American companies sending their profits home, a substantial amount of Latin America's own capital has been sent abroad—perhaps as much as \$10 billion—by wealthy Latins who refuse to invest in their own countries because they fear revolution and, in their fear, so act as to make revolution more likely.

Still another source of grave economic maladjustment is the heavy dependence of the Latin American economies on single commodity exports, coupled with the fact that world market prices for most of these commodities have fallen seriously in recent years. Brazil, for example, derives 58 percent of her total export earnings from coffee. Some other figures for export earnings are as follows: Venezuela, 92 percent from petroleum; Colombia, 77 percent from Coffee; Bolivia, 62 percent from tin; Ecuador, 57 percent from bananas; Chile, 66 percent from copper.

Latin American countries are pressing the United States to enter agreements for the stabilization of raw materials export prices, especially for coffee, and it can be readily seen that such arrangements would constitute a significant form of assistance to the Latin American economies.

Probably the most pressing long-term need of Latin America is education, and the expansion of educational facilities and opportunities is quite properly one of the central objectives of the Alliance for Progress. Fifty percent of the children of Latin America have no schools to go to and only 20 percent of the pupils who attend primary schools are able to complete the full course. Standards of education must also be raised by improving methods and teacher training and adapting curricula to the pressing needs of a continent undergoing social transformation.

Another focus of effort under the Alliance program must be housing. The majority of the population of Latin America still live in rural areas but in recent years movement to the cities has proceeded apace and there now exists a terrific disproportion of people living in urban areas. There are thousands of families in Lima, Peru, for example, some 30 percent of the total population of the city, living as squatters under the most wretched conditions, and the same is true of Bogotá and of many cities of Brazil. While few of the Latin American Republics can afford to invest great sums in low-cost housing programs, more can be done than is now being attempted. There are great numbers of unemployed whose only capital is time—time which, properly utilized and directed, can be used for the construction of housing.

The most explosive question remains that of land reform, the reshaping of the vast, inefficient latifundia. It is estimated that per capita production of food in Latin America today is slightly lower than it was 25 years ago—not very much lower but it has got to be a great deal higher if living standards are to be raised to a tolerable minimum.

The solution is not necessarily in all instances the breaking up of the latifundia into tiny parcels. The great estates in Haiti, for example, were broken up into postage stamp plots and in two generations the land became barren because of poor conservation practices. Both Mexico and Puerto Rico have had considerable success in operating large farm units as cooperatives. The overriding needs in land reform, regardless of what form it takes, are efficient operation and democratic participation by those who for so long have been deprived and dispossessed.

The task of the Alliance for Progress in the face of these staggering problems is, in the words of President Kennedy, "to demonstrate to the entire world that man's unsatisfied aspirations for economic progress and social justice can be achieved by free men working within a framework of free institutions."

With an objective of social revolution without violent upheaval, the Alliance exceeds in scope and design the postwar Marshall plan for Europe, whose objective was one of restoration.

The extent to which it succeeds or fails will probably also be the extent of success with our modern version of the Monroe Doctrine.

## CONFERENCE BETWEEN ROBERT FROST AND KHRUSHCHEV

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the American people should be indebted to Mr. Robert Frost for the very candid observations he has made in a news conference on his return from a recent visit to the Soviet Union and an hour-long conference with Mr. Khrushchev. In a few brief comments Mr. Frost has summed up the essence of the U.S. domestic and foreign policy and has given the American people a clear understanding as to why we are losing the cold war, why we are drifting toward socialism in our domestic program, and why we are trying to force socialism on foreign countries through our foreign-aid program. He reports that Mr. Khrushchev thinks we are "too liberal" to defend ourselves.

Mr. Frost's quotes on his impressions gained from his conference with Mr. Khrushchev are quite revealing and to the point. He is quoted in a UPI dispatch from New York this morning as having said:

He [Mr. Khrushchev] said he feared for us because of our lot of liberals. \* \* \* He thought that we're too liberal to fight. He thinks we will sit on one hand and then the other.

Mr. President, is that not exactly what we have been doing in our reactions—some too late—to Communist aggressive acts in the cold war? This is the essence of our no-win foreign policy—do nothing for fear we may cause an aggressive Soviet act to escalate into a nuclear holocaust in which we will all be incinerated. We are paralyzed by fear.

Mr. Frost's remarks point out that Mr. Khrushchev is convinced we will not fight because our "liberal" leaders are hoping for an accommodation with communism by heading our country in the direction of socialism—which Mr. Frost is frank to say he feels is best for the world. I have stated in speech after speech that the essence of our policy in the cold war is that we will move in this country toward socialism with the hope that Messrs. Khrushchev, Castro, Tito, and Mao Tse-tung will "evolve" in part toward the western position by installing a few incentives and easing restrictions on individual freedoms.

Reading on in the UPI dispatch from New York as published in the Washington Post of this morning, Mr. President, we find that Mr. Frost seems to share the idea of the "evolution" of the two systems. Here is the rest of the article:

But Frost brought back a feeling that both Soviet and United States Governments were growing more alike each day—each moving toward a center ground.

Frost said that he could notice the humanizing of Soviet life in Russian poetry. "I said to them that you could tell from their poetry that they were humanizing a little down from the severity of their idea—easing off toward democracy. They let me get away with it," he said.

"I am not a Communist and I feel it quite hard to strain up to socialism. I go slow about it. I drag my feet. But I have about decided that socialism is the only way to handle the billions being born now." Frost said.

"I see that ahead, but I'll be dead by then. I told the Russians that they're eas-

ing down to socialism and we're straining up to it."

Describing the 10-day visit as "the time of my life," Frost confirmed that Khrushchev gave him a message for President Kennedy during their talk. He declined to say what it was. Asked when he planned to see Mr. Kennedy, he said, "I don't plan. I wait for the President."

Frost said he regretted that he referred to Khrushchev in a Moscow press conference as a ruffian.

"I should have modified that a little and said rough and ready, not ruffian," he said. "Ruffian is a pretty strong word."

Frost, who continued on by a connecting airline to his home in Cambridge, Mass., denied that he read his poem, "Mending Wall," during his visit to embarrass the Russians about the wall in Berlin.

"Everybody asks me for the poem," he explained. "If I don't do it I get blamed."

He did liken the concept of a wall to current Soviet-United States relations, however.

"All life is cellular," Frost said. "Even the Communists have cells. All cells are a matter of walls breaking down and renewing."

"That's what happens after a war—new boundaries and a danger of new wars," Frost said.

Frost who said he did not discuss Cuba with Khrushchev, was asked if he planned to return to the Soviet Union, where he went this time at Russian invitation.

"Some day," he answered. "I said I would be back when I got older and wiser."

Mr. President, our no-win foreign policy is responsible for our plight today in Cuba, where a strong Communist military arsenal is being built to establish communism firmly throughout the Western Hemisphere, and in Berlin, where we are being constantly squeezed by the Communists to get out and forfeit the Western World's greatest outpost of democracy—and possibly all of Germany.

I have stated over and over again, Mr. President, that the American people must demand a change in our foreign and domestic policies if we are to win in this struggle which the forces of world communism have forced on us. Many in this country—and many in this body—have bought the so-called sophisticated approach to foreign policy and domestic policy on the basis that we must be modern in a modern world and that we must not provoke a nuclear holocaust in the atomic age. We have found, however, Mr. President, that the "sophisticated" policies have brought us the greatest debt load any nation has ever known, more restrictions on our individual freedoms than our people in America have ever known, and consistent and repeated reverses in the cold war to the point where the Communists today control 26 percent of the world's population and 36 percent of the world's land mass, including an outpost 90 miles off the Florida coast.

Mr. President, judging by the mail which is flooding my office and many editorial comments I have been reading in the past few weeks, the American people are well on the way to waking up in the cold war. In fact, they are ahead of their leaders, and if the leaders do not wake up soon, the people may react at the polls regardless of the pressures by both major political parties to keep Cuba and the cold war out of the political arena.

At this point in my remarks, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a newsletter I wrote on this overall subject for release on June 12, 1962, entitled "Socialism or Americanism?" and two other newsletters dated March 5, 1962, and May 14, 1962, entitled "What No-Win Means" and "A Win Policy," respectively.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SOCIALISM OR AMERICANISM?  
(News release by Senator THURMOND, June 11, 1962)

On June 5 and 7 I had the opportunity to delve deeply into U.S. foreign policy when Under Secretary of State George Ball appeared before the Special Preparedness Subcommittee to explain why certain statements about communism and winning the cold war were deleted from military speeches by State Department censors. I asked Mr. Ball more than 200 questions on many aspects of foreign policy. The record on this cross-examination will not be available for some time, but it will prove to be very interesting reading.

One of the many points brought out was the fact that U.S. foreign policy is committed to check only the "externally aggressive" type communism, indicating that there is no opposition to communism as an ideology or to Fabian (gradual) socialism. In other words ideological differences are unimportant. This is one of the principal reasons we are losing the cold war, particularly the battle of ideologies, which consists of the fight for the minds of men around the world. Actually, there can be no such thing as a brand of communism which is not "externally aggressive," for communism is dedicated to a world revolution and world domination by any means possible. The Senate indicated its feeling on brands of communism when it surprisingly voted 57 to 24 Wednesday to cut off all foreign aid to Communist or Marxist-led countries.

After Mr. Ball testified that he felt Fabian socialism and "nonaggressive" communism (the Tito type) did not constitute a threat to the United States, I read him a few quotes from a book entitled "New Fabian Essays." It was edited by Mr. R. H. S. Crossman, a member of the Fabian Executive Committee, and its foreword was written by Clement Attlee, former Prime Minister of Great Britain. In his comments Mr. Crossman said:

"The task of socialism is neither to accelerate this political revolution, nor to oppose it (this would be as futile as opposition to the industrial revolution a hundred years ago), but to civilize it.

"To do this we must realize that a victory for either side would be a defeat for socialism. We are members of the Atlantic alliance; but this does not mean that we are enemies of every Communist revolution. We are opposed to Russian expansion, but also to an American victory. Our object is to keep the cold war cold and, in particular so to restrain rearmament that it remains at a level which both sides can sustain over a period of years.

"If we construct an anti-Communist ideology, or take part in organizing an anti-Cominform, we shall merely intensify the cold war and confirm the illusion that the preservation of freedom requires the defeat of communism. In fact, if freedom is to survive, it is essential that neither the United States of America nor the Soviet Union should win, and that ideological passion should subside."

What Mr. Crossman has done here is to state U.S. foreign policy in a nutshell, just

as Mr. Ball did when he sent to our subcommittee on March 29, 1962, the following comment as to why the word "victory" was stricken from military speeches: "The word 'victory' has a militaristic and aggressive ring less suited than the substituted phrase to describing our national objectives. It also implies an 'all or nothing' approach leaving no room for accommodation." Since filing this report, Mr. Ball has come under considerable fire for this comment. Thus he is now trying to disown his own statement.

Persons who are oriented toward the Socialist ideology do not seek victory for the United States over communism because, as Mr. Crossman points out, "a victory for either side would be a defeat for socialism."

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., now a top Presidential adviser, stated the case for socialism in America in 1947. After ruling out communism, capitalism, and fascism, he made this comment: "Has non-Communist, libertarian socialism a future? One must answer that there is no inherent reason why democratic socialism should not be possible. There seems no inherent obstacle to the gradual advance of socialism in the United States through a series of New Deals."

We in the United States cannot serve the cause of socialism and Americanism at the same time, for one calls for a no-win policy in the cold war, and the other demands victory over the forces which have vowed to "destroy capitalism and dethrone God."

#### WHAT "NO WIN" MEANS

(News release by Senator THURMOND, Mar. 5, 1962)

We have a "no win" foreign policy.

The phrase may be new, but the policy is not. When the Communists took over in China, we had a "no win" policy; only then it was called a policy of "letting the dust settle." At various times since, it has been given many names: "containment," "accommodation," and somewhere I have heard it called "the policy of the ostrich."

All of these titles are more or less descriptive, but "no win" is the most descriptive. China, Korea, Hungary, Tibet, the Congo, Laos, Vietnam, the Berlin wall—they all spell "no win."

We have a "no win" policy; this does not mean that it is our policy to lose. It means that we dare not try to win, for fear we may lose.

Two basic ingredients of such a policy are fear and naivete.

Fear tends to obscure the perspective. Nothing could obscure the horribly destructive power of a nuclear war; for the facts of such destructive potential are too awesome to be exaggerated even by the most advanced form of fear—panic, itself. Fear, however, can and does cause an exaggeration of the likelihood that a nuclear war will occur. Our policymakers—who admittedly bear an awesome responsibility—have allowed the gruesome potentialities of the weapons, themselves, to magnify out of proportion the danger that such weapons will be resorted to by the Communists.

No sane man wants a nuclear war. The Communists don't want a nuclear war. The Communists want to dominate the world, but a world filled with people to perform slave labor, not a world of nuclear-burned ashes. They will threaten nuclear war, and often do, in the hope that we are paralyzed with fear while they expand their empire by the nonnuclear means of subversion, infiltration, espionage, propaganda, and any other foul means short of nuclear war itself.

Naivete is nothing more than wishful thinking and ignoring facts. No one wants

to admit, even to himself, that his plans are based on fear and are without hope of success. Our policymakers have, therefore, pieced together a rationalization that we will not lose even with a "no win" or "do nothing" policy.

This rationalization is arrived at by the theory of "evolution." Simply stated, it is the belief that, given time, the Communists will "evolve," or gradually change into a more civilized and nonaggressive society with whom we can peacefully coexist. We don't necessarily have to lose, because "the leopard may change his spots."

We have been sitting on our hands waiting for the Communists to evolve since shortly after World War II. In that time, they have become a nuclear power, and exploded a 58-megaton bomb; they have leapfrogged our missile program and developed rocket engines with greater thrust and missiles with advanced guidance systems; they have brought under their domination about 15 countries and 900 million people. Their industrial capacity has evolved, but not their morals; their weapons have evolved, but their intentions and efforts are still to dominate and enslave the people of the world.

There is obviously no shortcut to victory for freemen. While we must carefully reckon with the possibilities of a nuclear war, we must also stop ignoring the probabilities of piecemeal slaughter and enslavement of the remaining free world, if we continue to passively await the evolution of Communists into civilized neighbors who operate by some moral code. There is some small possibility the Communists will evolve; but there is a great probability that unless we abandon the "no win" policy, only the Communists and their slaves will witness it.

We must have a "win" policy. The first step is to set a goal of victory over communism in the cold war. Concrete long-range and short-range objectives should be established for every arena of the cold war. Strategy and tactics should be employed which will utilize our every resource for the accomplishment of those goals.

#### A WIN POLICY

(News release by Senator THURMOND, May 14, 1962)

In last week's newsletter I mentioned the rising tide of public sentiment against our no-win cold war policies. This strong expression of concern by grassroots America has gotten under the skins of policymakers at the State Department and White House. It has resulted in more attempts to explain and defend foreign policy, according to the Washington Post, "to keep political headwinds from spreading no-win attacks."

So now policymakers are declaring that anyone who advocates victory in the cold war is a warmonger because any move toward victory would escalate into a nuclear holocaust. Such statements have recently been uttered by the President, the Secretary of State, and our chief policy planner, Dr. Walt Rostow. This is merely a play on fear and does not reflect a valid assessment of Khrushchev's victory strategy. In public statements and by deeds he has ruled out nuclear war to attain his goal of world domination. He has no desire to rule a world filled with nuclear ashes, and he's not about to be provoked into such a war for another reason: he knows which side has the edge in destructive power.

The cold war can be won without a nuclear holocaust by forcing the Communists to change their goals rather than merely reacting to their victory tactics and hoping some

day they will change. Here are 12 policies which, if followed, could put us on the road toward eventual victory in the cold war:

1. Recognize that we are in a war—a total war—with the forces of international communism and state as a policy that it is our intention to win this conflict pressed on us.

2. Act decisively to call Communist bluff and aggressive tactics before they reach uncontrollable proportions, and determine to fight, if necessary, to insure vital points and interests.

3. Maintain a military establishment which will insure not merely an adequacy but a supremacy of military power.

4. Blockade Cuba from Communist arms shipments and determine to undo Castro rather than hope he will undo himself.

5. Quit trading with Communist nations; quit sending them aid.

6. Negotiate, if we must negotiate with the Communists, on our terms and about things we don't like—not just their dislikes.

7. Take the offensive to sell our political and economic systems to the world.

8. Promote a sound domestic economy by putting first things first and eliminating the nonessentials and giving more attention to our declining gold reserves. We can lose the cold war through economic bankruptcy more easily than we can by overt Communist aggression.

9. Guard against being lulled into a deep Socialist sleep at home with handouts by advocates of an all-powerful central government. Tyranny by a homegrown dictatorship can be just as ruthless and suppressive of liberty as any outside force.

10. Institute programs to promote patriotism and to inform individual citizens as to the true and total nature of the Communist threat. Individuals must be alert to Communist propaganda, infiltration, subversion, and other insidious methods of Communist operations.

11. Rededicate ourselves, individually and as a nation, to a moral and spiritual regeneration in the fight against materialistic and atheistic communism. Spiritual and moral power can give us courage, strength, wisdom, and faith and also save us from softness and decay—physically, mentally, and morally.

12. Most importantly—reappraise our cold war policies and our estimates of the enemy. We must eliminate unrealistic policies which have been responsible for our cold war losses. These policies have been based on false conceptions—on ideas that we can trust the Communists, that they will change their goals on their own volition, that world popularity is more important than respect, that ideological differences are unimportant, that we can negotiate or buy our way out of the cold war, and that communism is a nationalist rather than internationalist disease.

The American people want a win policy in the cold war because we are a winning people and also because of the realization that there will be no second prize in a world dominated by communism.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, in closing my remarks here today I must point out to the Senate that this distinguished poet has very eloquently "spilled the beans" on our no-win foreign policy and the direction in which our domestic policies are carrying us as a nation. His candor alone is worth some type literary prize. I only wish our leaders would be as frank with the American people as Mr. Frost has been in this news conference.

**AUTHORIZATION FOR COMMITTEE  
ON ARMED SERVICES TO FILE  
BILLS AND REPORTS**

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate Armed Services Committee be granted permission to file bills and reports up until 12 o'clock tonight.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**EXECUTIVE SESSION**

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business.

**EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF  
COMMITTEES**

The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. SPARKMAN, from the Committee on Foreign Relations:

Tom Killefer, of Virginia, to be Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank.

By Mr. ROBERTSON, from the Committee on Banking and Currency:

Walter C. Sauer, of the District of Columbia, to be First Vice President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington.

By Mr. JOHNSTON, from the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service:

One hundred and fourteen postmaster nominations.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further reports of committees, the nominations on the Executive Calendar will be stated.

**DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN  
SERVICE**

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the nominations on the Executive Calendar be stated beginning with the diplomatic and foreign service.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Francis H. Russell to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Tunisia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

**U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON  
INFORMATION**

The legislative clerk read the nomination of John L. Seigenthaler to be a member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information for the remainder of the term expiring January 27, 1964, and until his successor has been appointed and qualified.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

**UNITED NATIONS**

The legislative clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations in the United Nations.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the nominations be considered en bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nominations are considered and confirmed en bloc.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the nomination for U.S. circuit court judge go over, and that the nominations at the bottom of page 2 of the Executive Calendar be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**NOMINATIONS PLACED ON THE  
SECRETARY'S DESK—DIPLOMAT-  
IC AND FOREIGN SERVICE**

The legislative clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations placed on the Secretary's desk in the diplomatic and Foreign Service.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous consent that the nominations be considered and agreed to en bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nominations are considered and agreed to en bloc.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the nominations confirmed today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**LEGISLATIVE SESSION**

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**ENROLLED BILL PRESENTED**

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, September 10, 1962, he presented to the President of the United States the enrolled bill (S. 167) to authorize the Attorney General to compel the production of documentary evidence required in civil investigations for the enforcement of the antitrust laws, and for other purposes.

**ADJOURNMENT TO 11 A.M.  
TOMORROW**

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if there is no further business to be transacted, I move that the Senate adjourn,

under the order previously entered, until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 3 o'clock and 50 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned, under the order previously entered, until tomorrow, Tuesday, September 11, 1962, at 11 o'clock a.m.

**CONFIRMATIONS**

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate September 10, 1962:

**DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE**

Francis H. Russell, of Maine, a Foreign Service officer of the class of career minister, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Tunisia.

**U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION**

John L. Seigenthaler, of Tennessee, to be a member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information for the remainder of the term expiring January 27, 1964, and until his successor has been appointed and qualified.

**UNITED NATIONS**

The following-named persons to the positions indicated:

Adlai E. Stevenson, of Illinois, to be representative of the United States of America to the 17th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Francis T. P. Plimpton, of New York to be representative of the United States of America to the 17th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Albert A. Gore, U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee, to be representative of the United States of America to the 17th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to serve no longer than December 31, 1962.

Gordon Allott, U.S. Senator from the State of Colorado, to be representative of the United States of America to the 17th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to serve no longer than December 31, 1962.

Arthur H. Dean, of New York, to be representative of the United States of America to the 17th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to serve no longer than December 31, 1962.

Charles W. Yost, of New York, to be alternate representative of the United States of America to the 17th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Philip M. Klutznick, of Illinois, to be alternate representative of the United States of America to the 17th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Jonathan B. Bingham, of New York, to be alternative representative of the United States of America to the 17th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Carl T. Rowan, of Minnesota, to be alternate representative of the United States of America to the 17th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to serve no longer than December 31, 1962.

Mrs. Marietta P. Tree, of New York, to be alternate representative of the United States of America to the 17th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to serve no longer than December 31, 1962.

**DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE**

The nominations beginning Givon Parsons, of Texas, now a Foreign Service officer of class 2 and a secretary in the diplomatic service, to be also a consul general of the United States of America, and ending W. John Wilson, of California, a Foreign Service Staff officer, to be a consul of the United States of America, which nominations were received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on August 21, 1962.